/* ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ SovQMHESCheck.pli — QMHES Hybrid Security Governance Gate SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: - Fail-closed: HALT if hybrid key strength < minimum threshold - Uses WORM-attested key strength from QMHES hybrid key exchange - Zero external dependencies (uses existing sov_monster_kernel.f90 primitives) - All governance events WORM-attested before state change INTEGRATION: - Called by SovFailClosed.pli as additional gate before quantum resource allocation - Reads hybrid key strength from WORM chain (attested by MLIR hybrid pass) - Operates alongside SovZMOSCheck.pli (spectral stability gate) Mathematical basis: - Key strength = min(classical_entropy_bits, quantum_entropy_bits) - Hybrid guarantee: attacker must break BOTH classical AND quantum to compromise - Minimum threshold: 128 bits (NIST security level 1, ML-KEM compatible) - MMP integration: system multiplicity ≤ φ⁻ᴺ ensures prime structure holds Prior Art: SnapKitty Foundry Intel (April 14, 2026) Original Research Lab: JAB Capital Trust (2021) ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */ dcl SovQMHESCheck entry (ptr) returns(fixed bin) external; dcl Blake3Seal entry (char(*), char(*), ptr returns) external; dcl WormLogGovernance entry (char(*), char(*)) external; dcl FetchQMHESKeyStrengthFromWORM entry (ptr) returns(fixed bin) external; dcl FetchQMHESMultiplicityFromWORM entry (ptr) returns(float bin(64)) external; dcl GetAgentEd25519Key entry returns(char(64) var) external; dcl AgentHalt entry external; /* ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ QMHES HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE GATE Semantics: Allow quantum execution iff: 1. Hybrid key strength ≥ MIN_STRENGTH (128 bits) 2. MMP multiplicity ≤ φ⁻ᴺ (prime structure stable) Both conditions must pass (AND logic, not OR) ANY failure → WORM-attest + halt agent (fail-closed) ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */ QMHESHybridGate: proc(options(main)); dcl KEY_PTR ptr; dcl KEY_STRENGTH fixed bin; dcl IS_SECURE fixed bin; dcl MIN_STRENGTH fixed bin init(128); dcl CURRENT_MULTIPLICITY float bin(64); dcl MMP_BOUND float bin(64); dcl PHI_INV float bin(64) init(0.6180339887498948482); dcl SYSTEM_DIM fixed bin; dcl AGENT_KEY char(64) var; dcl DENIAL_REASON char(200) var; KEY_PTR = GetLatestWORMHybridKeyPtr(); KEY_STRENGTH = FetchQMHESKeyStrengthFromWORM(KEY_PTR); CURRENT_MULTIPLICITY = FetchQMHESMultiplicityFromWORM(KEY_PTR); SYSTEM_DIM = GetSystemDimension(); MMP_BOUND = PHI_INV ** SYSTEM_DIM; AGENT_KEY = GetAgentEd25519Key(); /* ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── FAIL-CLOSED HYBRID SECURITY LOGIC Default: DENIED (IS_SECURE starts at 0) Must PROVE both key strength AND MMP stability to allow ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ IS_SECURE = 0; DENIAL_REASON = ''; /* Gate 1: Hybrid key strength check (NIST Level 1 minimum) */ if (KEY_STRENGTH < MIN_STRENGTH) then do; DENIAL_REASON = 'QMHES_KEY_WEAK: Strength=' || char(KEY_STRENGTH) || ' Min=' || char(MIN_STRENGTH); goto DENY_EXECUTION; end; /* Gate 2: MMP stability check (prime structure must hold) */ if (CURRENT_MULTIPLICITY > MMP_BOUND) then do; DENIAL_REASON = 'QMHES_MMP_UNSTABLE: Multiplicity=' || char(CURRENT_MULTIPLICITY) || ' Bound=' || char(MMP_BOUND); goto DENY_EXECUTION; end; /* ALL gates passed — allow hybrid-secured execution */ IS_SECURE = 1; /* WORM-attest the APPROVAL (provenance for audit) */ call WormLogGovernance('QMHES_HYBRID_APPROVED', & 'KeyStrength=' || char(KEY_STRENGTH) & || ' Multiplicity=' || char(CURRENT_MULTIPLICITY) & || ' Bound=' || char(MMP_BOUND)); return; /* ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── DENY PATH: Hard fail, WORM-attest, halt agent No state corruption possible (hybrid key never issued) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ DENY_EXECUTION: /* WORM-attest the DENIAL (immutable audit record) */ call WormLogGovernance('QMHES_HYBRID_DENIED', DENIAL_REASON); /* Seal denial with agent's Ed25519 key (provable intent) */ call Blake3Seal( 'QMHES_FAIL_CLOSED:' || DENIAL_REASON, AGENT_KEY, null()); /* Hard halt — agent suspended until hybrid security restored */ call AgentHalt(); /* Control never reaches here */ return; end QMHESHybridGate; /* ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ HELPER: SovQMHESCheck (Fortran-callable via C ABI) Called by sov_monster_kernel.f90 as pre-execution gate Reads latest WORM-attested hybrid key strength + MMP status Returns: 1 = hybrid-secure (safe), 0 = insecure (denied) ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */ SovQMHESCheck: proc(key_ptr) returns(fixed bin); dcl key_ptr ptr; dcl key_strength fixed bin; dcl multiplicity float bin(64); dcl mmp_bound float bin(64); dcl phi_inv float bin(64) init(0.6180339887498948482); dcl sys_dim fixed bin; dcl min_strength fixed bin init(128); /* Fetch WORM-attested values */ key_strength = FetchQMHESKeyStrengthFromWORM(key_ptr); multiplicity = FetchQMHESMultiplicityFromWORM(key_ptr); sys_dim = GetSystemDimension(); mmp_bound = phi_inv ** sys_dim; /* Fail-closed: default deny */ if (key_strength < min_strength) then return(0); if (multiplicity > mmp_bound) then return(0); /* Both gates pass — hybrid-secure */ return(1); end SovQMHESCheck;