| {"doc_id": "0329b0c8d938866afa69b447ca278d4b", "text": "1 \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nCommuniqué No. 87 of the Monetary Policy Committee \nMeeting of Monday, January 21, 2013 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on, January 21, \n2013 with ten (10) out of the twelve (12) members in \nattendance. The Committee reviewed the domestic \neconomic conditions in 2012 and the challenges therefrom \nagainst the backdrop of the international financial and \neconomic environment in order to chart the course of \nmonetary policy in 2013. \n \nThe International Economic Situation \nThe Committee noted that global economic growth \nremained largely uneven and subdued in most economies \nin 2012. Latest data from the IMF indicate that global output \nwas weaker than previously forecast due to continued \ncontraction in the Euro zone and Japan as well as the less \nthan anticipated growth in Brazil and India. The fragility in \nthe global economy was further compounded by the \nuncertainties surrounding resolution of the “fiscal cliff” and \ndebt ceiling challenges in the US and the difficulties \nassociated with China’s attempts to “rebalance” its growth. \nThese developments adversely affected private sector \nconfidence, worsened the unemployment situation and \nfurther tightened financing conditions in both the periphery \nand core economies. In the euro area, economic and \nfinancial conditions remained severely weak. Although the \n2 \n \nEuropean Central Bank (ECB) attempted, through its \nintervention scheme, to halt the downward trend in \neconomic activities in the zone, the effort did not record \nmuch success. Overall, global output was estimated to \nhave expanded by 3.2 per cent in 2012 against the earlier \nprojection of 3.3 per cent made in the October 2012 IMF \nWorld Economic Outlook. \n \nGrowth in the advanced economies was estimated at 1.3 \nper cent in 2012 and projected at 1.5 per cent in 2013, \nreflecting an upward revision of 0.2 percentage point, \nrespectively, from the initial estimates. The Committee \nnoted that the decline in global investment was mainly \ntraced to the fiscal standoff in the US and its implications for \nthe paltry expansion in output of 2.0 per cent in Q3, 2012. \nEmerging European economies, which had previously \nshown signs of strong rebound from the credit crisis, have \nnow been hit hard by slow exports growth and a halt to real \nGDP growth. On the whole, the Committee is of the view \nthat while the decisions of the ECB considerably reduced \nthe probability of a Eurozone-wide financial crisis, the \ncondition of country-level financial systems remained \ndifficult and could constitute significant challenge to output \nexpansion in 2013. \n \nLatest data from the Asian economies suggest that a \ngradual recovery may be underway. China's economy, \nwhich had previously recorded a slowdown over seven \nconsecutive quarters to Q3, 2012, witnessed improved \neconomic activity in Q4, 2012. Recent fiscal and monetary \neasing \noperations \nhave \nincreased \ninvestment \nin \ninfrastructure with signals of further spending into 2013. The \nIndonesian economy, after recovery from the severe \nflooding in 2011, continued to show resilience against the \n3 \n \nglobal slowdown as investment and strong domestic \ndemand contributed more to growth. It is expected that \nthese twin drivers of growth would further sustain output \nexpansion in 2013, although recent reports indicate that \nsevere flooding has once again hit the economy during \nJanuary 2013. The sub-optimal performance of the \nJapanese and Indian economies, however, was a major \ndrag on recovery in the region. The Indian economy was \nhampered by slow approvals for new projects, deterioration \nin business sentiment largely due to the rising current \naccount deficit, uncertainty over the selling of government \nstakes \nin \nstate \nowned \nenterprises, \nfiscal \ndeficits, \ndepreciation of the Rupee and a high debt burden, as well \nas slow implementation of structural reforms. Japan’s \ndrawback was largely due to a combination of declining \nexports and sluggish domestic demand. There are, \nhowever, expectations that the growth decline would \nbottom-out in 2013 as anticipated rebound in major trading \npartner economies like China and the US would translate to \na recovery in the demand for Japanese goods and \nservices. \nThe Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continued \nto \nrecord \nmixed \nperformance, \nevidenced \nby \nthe \ndivergence between the economies of oil-exporting and \noil-importing countries. Oil-importing countries experienced \nsubdued economic performance with an estimated growth \nof 2.0 per cent in 2012 while the oil-exporting countries grew \nat an average rate of 6.6 per cent. Growth in oil-exporting \ncountries was driven largely by high oil output and prices \ncoupled with the early post-conflict recovery of Libya. \nGrowth for the entire region in 2013 has been projected at \n3.75 per cent, which is 1.35 percentage points below the \nestimate for 2012. The Committee noted that the challenges \n4 \n \nconfronting these countries is how to strengthen the \nresilience of their fragile economies against major oil price \nshocks through diversification and expansion of the private \nsector. \n \nEconomic conditions in sub-Saharan Africa remained \ngenerally robust despite the sluggish growth in the global \neconomy. Prudent policies and improved fundamentals in \nmost countries provided additional impetus for increased \neconomic activity in the region. The Committee noted that \nthe main risks to the outlook for the region come from their \ntrading partners including the possible intensification of the \nfinancial stress in the euro zone and a sharp fiscal \nadjustment in the US. \n \nIn light of the uncertainty about the direction of fiscal policy \nin the US, particularly with regard to the yet to be resolved \nissue of debt ceiling, and the persisting euro zone financial \nand economic crises, the Committee was of the view that \nthe global economic environment was still fragile and highly \nvulnerable to a further contraction, although the downside \nrisks appeared to be less severe relative to conditions in the \nlast two years. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) growth rate at 6.61 per cent for \n2012, which is lower than the level recorded in 2011 by 0.84 \nper cent. The estimated real GDP growth rate at 7.09 per \ncent in the fourth quarter of 2012 was higher than the 6.48 \nper cent in the third quarter but lower than the 7.68 per cent \nrecorded in the corresponding period of 2011. The non-oil \nsector remained the major driver of growth recording 8.23 \n5 \n \nper cent increase in contrast to the oil sector, which \ncontracted by 0.17 per cent during the period. The \nCommittee expressed concern about the continued \ndecline in the contribution of the oil sector to growth due to \nlower production relative to the corresponding period of \n2011 and enjoined the Federal Government to fast track the \npassage of the Petroleum Industry Bill to halt the trend. \n \nThe relatively robust growth projections despite the slowing \nglobal \neconomy \nreflected \nthe \nrelatively \nfavourable \nperformance of wholesale and retail trade; the services \nsectors; outcome of banking sector reforms; and initiatives \nby government to stimulate the real economy. Despite the \ndevelopments in the international oil market where the US is \nnow the second largest oil producer, the Committee \nobserved that the growth projection remained promising, \nanchored on the recent improvements in power supply. The \nCommittee \nnoted \nwith \nsatisfaction \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment’s efforts to sustain the current initiatives to \nboost power generation, particularly the progress made in \nreforming the power sector. \nThe Committee, however, observed that the severe \nflooding in several parts of the country in 2012, which \ndamaged housing, agricultural and oil assets, could pose \ndownside risks to growth and feed into food supply deficits \nand inflation in the near term. Also, the continuing security \nchallenges as well as delays in reform of the oil sector could \nundermine investor-confidence and output growth in the \nnear-term. \nPrices \nThe Committee observed that, on the average, inflationary \npressure was elevated in 2012. The year–on–year average \nheadline inflation rate in 2012 stood at 12.24 per cent, while \n6 \n \nthe average core and food inflation year-on-year stood at \n13.87 and 11.32 per cent, respectively. The major drivers of \nheadline inflation in December 2012 included food and \nnon-alcoholic beverages, housing, water, electricity and \ntransport. The pickup in food inflation in the later part of \n2012 was accounted for by imported food items and food \nshortages due to the impact of flood on farmlands along \nthe major agricultural belt of the country. However, the \nCommittee was of the view that the pass-through effects of \nimported food inflation to domestic prices may have been \nsubdued owing to the relatively stable exchange rate \nduring the period under review. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 13.72 per cent in \nDecember 2012 over the level at end-December 2011. \nAggregate domestic credit (net) grew by 1.98 per cent in \nDecember 2012, which was substantially below the \nbenchmark of 52.17 per cent for the year. Credit to \nGovernment \ncontracted \nbetween \nSeptember \nand \nDecember 2012; occasioned by the sustenance of \ngovernment as a net creditor to the banking system, \nreflecting more prudent fiscal measures, including the \nintroduction of the Treasury Single Account. \nInterest rates in all segments of the money market \nmoderated between 19th November 2012 and 3rd January, \n2013. This reflected in increased liquidity in the banking \nsystem including the release of statutory revenue to sub-\nnational governments, absence of repo transaction during \nthe review period, repayments of matured CBN Bills and \nbanks’ desire to maintain optimum liquidity position on their \nbalance sheets at the end of their common financial year. \nThe interbank call and OBB rates, which opened at 13.99 \n7 \n \nand 13.95 per cent on November 19, 2012, closed at 10.32 \nand 10.45 per cent, respectively, on January 3, 2013. The \naverage interbank call and OBB rates for the period were \n11.09 and 11.03 per cent, respectively. The average prime \nlending rate increased slightly to 16.54 per cent in \nDecember 2012 from 16.48 and 16. 51 per cent in October \nand November 2012, respectively. In contrast, the average \nmaximum lending rate fell marginally to 24.61 per cent in \nDecember 2012 from 24.65 and 24.70 per cent, respectively, \nin October and November, respectively while the weighted \naverage savings and term deposits rate decreased to 5.50 \nper cent in December from 5.57 per cent in the preceding \nmonth. The Committee, therefore, encouraged the Bank to \nfast track the financial inclusion strategy to improve \nfinancial intermediation and the effectiveness of the \ntransmission mechanism of monetary policy and to adopt \nways of moderating the high spread between deposit and \nlending rates. \n \nThe Committee observed that the rally in the Nigerian \ncapital market continued as equities market indicators \ntrended upwards in the review period. The All-Share Index \n(ASI) increased by 35.45 per cent from 20,730.63 to 28,078.80 \nbetween December 30, 2011 and December 31, 2012. \nMarket Capitalization (MC) also increased, by 37.38 per \ncent, from N6.53 trillion to N8.97 trillion during the same \nperiod. The positive performance of the ASI and MC was \ndue to the sustained increase in the demand for blue-chip \nstocks particularly in the banking and consumer goods \nsectors following improvements in earnings and growing \ninvestor-confidence. The Committee, however, noted that \nthe significant factor responsible for the recovery was strong \nportfolio flows and cautioned that the capital market \n8 \n \nremained structurally vulnerable to external shocks until its \nfunding basis was changed. \nExternal Sector Developments \nAt the Wholesale Dutch Auction System (wDAS), the \nexchange rate opened at N157.31/US$ on November 20, \n2012 and closed at N157.33/US$ on December 31, 2012 \nrepresenting a depreciation of N0.02 or 0.01 per cent. The \naverage wDAS exchange rate during the period was \nN157.32/US$. At the BDC segment of the foreign exchange \nmarket, the selling rate opened at N160.00/US$ on \nNovember 20, 2012 and closed at N159.50/US$ on \nDecember 31, 2012, representing an appreciation of N0.50 \nor 0.31 per cent for the period. At the interbank segment, \nthe selling rate opened at N157.95/US$ on November 20, \n2012 and closed at N156.25/US$ on December 31, 2012, \nrepresenting an appreciation of N1.70 or 1.08 per cent. \nOverall, the relative stability recorded in the foreign \nexchange market could be attributed to the combined \neffects of improved supply of foreign exchange by the oil \ncompanies and enhanced capital inflows from portfolio \ninvestors during the period under review. Also, oil revenue \nincreased at an average of 2.73 per cent monthly \nthroughout 2012. In the first eleven months of 2012, oil \nreceipts totaled US$40.087 billion. \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction that the premium \nbetween wDAS and the interbank rate narrowed towards \nthe end of the review period. However, the premium \nbetween the wDAS and BDCs widened towards the end of \nthe review period from N1.682/US$ to N2.172/US$ suggesting \nthe need to sustain and further complement existing \nmeasures to discourage speculative activities in the foreign \nexchange market. In general, the Committee noted that \n9 \n \ndecisions at previous MPC meetings were yielding the \ndesired results. \nThe Committee expressed satisfaction with the sustained \naccretion to external reserves which stood at US$43.849 \nbillion as at December 31, 2012, representing an increase of \nUS$1.682 billion or about 3.98 per cent from the level of \nUS$42.167 billion at end-October 2012. Relative to the end-\nDecember 2011 level of US$32.915 billion, the external \nreserves at the end of December 2012, had risen by \nUS$10.934 billion or 33.21 per cent. The increase in the level \nof foreign reserves was driven mainly by proceeds from \ncrude oil and gas exports and crude-oil related taxes as well \nas reduced funding of the wDAS on account of the huge \ninflow of foreign portfolio investments, which was about 77.0 \nper cent of total inflows through the CBN. The foreign \nreserves level could finance about 9 months of imports. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee observed that the performance of the \nglobal economy remained largely subdued and was \ncharacterized by uncertainty and contraction in the Euro \nzone and Japan, as well as lower than expected growth in \nthe large emerging and developing economies. The \nCommittee notes with caution that the partial resolution of \nthe Fiscal Cliff in the US offers some hope for gradual global \neconomic recovery as indicated by the rebound of many \nglobal financial markets in the wake of the staving off of \nautomatic tax increases and expenditures cuts on 1st \nJanuary, 2013. The Committee further observed that the \nrobust prospects for energy independence of the US could \npose downside risk for global oil prices in the medium-to-\nlong term which could threaten fiscal sustainability in many \noil- dependent economies around the world. \n10 \n \nThe Committee noted that in spite of the slow progress \nmade in the resolution of the Euro zone crises, the prospect \nof a deepening recession in the near term has not been \ncompletely \naverted. \nDevelopments \nin \nthe \ndomestic \neconomy in the past three months highlighted some new \npressure points to macroeconomic stability. The Committee \nwas of the view that shocks to the economy could come \nfrom significant fall in the demand for oil, leading to a fall in \noil prices and government revenues, weaker exchange \nrate, rising inflationary pressures and depletion in external \nreserves. The Committee also noted the drop in headline \ninflation in December 2012, although it also recognized that \ncore inflation had risen; driven mainly by cost-push factors \neven in the face of sluggish growth in the monetary \naggregates. \n With regard to the budget of the Federal Government, the \nCommittee \ncautioned \nagainst \ncomplacency \nover \ngovernment revenues; despite the high level of oil prices. \nThe Committee noted uncertainty in global demand and \nsupply of crude oil, and weak performance of non-oil and \nVAT revenues. The Committee, however, noted with \nsatisfaction the efforts the Federal Government aimed at \nkeeping deficits within the threshold prescribed by the Fiscal \nResponsibility Act and advocated sustenance of the effort. \nOn expenditure, the Committee noted that there was still \nthe need to continue to drive down recurrent expenditure in \nfavor of capital expenditure in view of the infrastructure \ndeficit that continued to constrain growth performance. The \nCommittee noted that the oil price benchmark for the 2013 \nbudget which was increased from US$75 to US$79 may pose \ndownside risk to the inflation objective and, therefore, \nconstituted a pressure point for the low inflation objective \nand effective monetary policy in 2013. The Committee \n11 \n \nreaffirmed its commitment to respond appropriately if public \nspending in 2013 ultimately adds to inflationary pressures. \n In view of these developments, the Committee was faced \nwith three choices: \n(i) An increase in the MPR in response to the higher oil \nprice benchmark for fiscal 2013; \n(ii) \n A reduction in MPR in view of the declining GDP \ngrowth trajectory and headline inflation; and \n(iii) Retaining the current monetary policy stance in \nview \nof \nthe \nconflicting \nprice \nsignals, \nglobal \nuncertainties and the need to preserve the stability \nof the system. \n \n12 \n \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nGiven the stability achieved in the last twelve months with \naverage year-on-year headline inflation rate at 12.24 per \ncent, in 2012, the MPR of 12 per cent was considered to be \njust about right. The Committee considered the calls for a \nreduction in the MPR because of the benign inflation \noutlook other things being equal. However, this may be \nundermined by the increased sub-national government \nspending and Federal Government high expenditure in \n2013, the higher benchmark oil price in the 2013 budget \nand the US debt ceiling with possible impact on commodity \nprices. \nIn view of the foregoing, the Committee decided that it was \nprudent to hold and monitor developments between now \nand the next meeting of the MPC. The Committee, \ntherefore, decided by a majority vote of 8:2 to maintain the \ncurrent policy stance i.e., to retain the MPR at 12.0 per cent \nwith a corridor of +/- 200 basis points around the midpoint; \nretain the CRR at 12.0 per cent; and to retain the Liquidity \nRatio at 30.0 per cent. Two members voted for a reduction \nof the MPR by 25 basis points. \nThank you. \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n21st January, 2013 \n \n \n \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS: \n13 \n \n1.0 \nALADE, SARAH \nHeadline inflation moderated to 12.0 percent in December compared \nto12.3 percent recorded in November. This decrease is driven mainly by \nfood inflation which decreased to 10.2 percent compared to 11.6 percent \nrecorded in November 2012. In the international scene, there is slight \nrecovery in the United States driven mainly by the housing market and \nrenewed GDP growth in China. On the domestic front, the increase in the \noil benchmark poses downside risk to inflation and remains a possible \npressure point. Based on this, I will support a hold in monetary policy rate \nand Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR). \n \nHeadline inflation decreased marginally to 12 percent in December from \n12.3 percent recorded in the previous month. The decrease is attributable \nlargely to moderating food prices in December after a sustained increase \nresulting from the national wide flood that affected food supply in some \nparts of the country. Food inflation declined from 11.6 percent in \nNovember to 10.2 percent in December. However, core inflation \nincreased marginally to 13.7 percent compared to 13.1 percent recorded \nin the previous month, although the increase is marginal, it is of concern. \nStaff projections suggest an easing of inflationary pressure in the coming \nmonths \ndue \nto \nseasonal \npattern \nand \nother \nmacroeconomic \ndevelopments. However, this deceleration in inflation will need to be \nmonitored for a while to avoid premature monetary policy easing. \n \nThe 2013 budget passed by the National Assembly with a high oil \nbenchmark could be expansionary. The 2013 budget projected a budget \ndeficit of 2.17 percent, which is lower than 2.85 percent recorded in 2012, \nand even lower than the 3 percent as stipulated in the Fiscal Responsibility \n14 \n \nAct. The high oil benchmark which was increased from the initial proposal \nof $75 to $79 per barrel could pose downside risk to inflation. Given that \npast monetary policy decisions have been effective in strengthening the \nbuffers needed to safeguard the economy against downside risks, \nmonetary easing at this point could be counterproductive. \n \nPast monetary policy actions have been successful in restoring stability in \nthe money and foreign exchange markets. Money market rates and \nexchange rate have been stable as speculative demand is reduced. In \nthe foreign exchange market, there has been stability with rate \nconverging between the official rate and the unofficial window. Past \nmonetary policy decisions also aided capital inflows into the economy; \nhowever, the declining imports of Nigerian oil by the United States as they \nexpand domestic production could affect the level of the inflows. This has \nimplication for both government revenue and exchange rate stability and \ncaution should be exercised to safeguard the Naira, suggesting that \nmonetary easing at this time is premature. \n \nGlobal economic growth projection is showing some improvements \nboosted by recovery from emerging market economies. Monetary easing \nin China embarked upon in the last quarter of the year is starting to \nstabilize the economy with fourth quarter GDP reaching 8 percent. \nAlthough the United States economy is being hit by a headwind from the \nEurozone \ndebt \ncrisis, \nthere \nare \nsome \npositive \ndevelopments. \nUnemployment rate is projected to average 7.7 percent in 2013, and \nhousing market is expected to continue moderate recovery with strong \n15 \n \ngains in residential construction and home prices. In the Euro zone, the \ncontinued progress by the Eurozone ministers to tackle the Euro area debt \nproblems has not yielded major breakthrough, but signs of improvements \nare being recorded in Spain and Italy. These mixed development calls for \na cautious approach to monetary policy at this time. \n \nBased on the above, with declining food inflation and no immediate \ninflationary threats in the coming months, I will support a hold in Monetary \nPolicy Rate and Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR). \n2.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \nI have voted for the retention of the current stance in monetary \npolicy for the following reasons; \n Figures released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) show \nthat real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for 2012 is \nprojected to be 6.61%, only 0.84% lower than what was \nrecorded in 2011. Estimated real GDP growth rate for the fourth \nquarter 2012 at 7.09% is higher than the 6.48% in the third \nquarter. Though these growth numbers are lower than those of \ncomparable periods in 2012, they are higher than the average \nfor other Sub-Saharan African countries. The high real GDP \ngrowth for the fourth quarter is an indication that in spite of the \nrelatively high lending rates, we still witnessed strong growth. In \nfact, the lower growth rate for 2011 relative to 2012, is largely \n16 \n \ndue to decline in Agricultural Sector growth, a sector that \naccounts for less than 3% of aggregate credits. \n Year-on-Year (YOY). Headline, (HI) and Food Inflation (FI) \nmarginally declined from 12.3% to 12.0% and 11.6% to 10.2% for \nNovember and December respectively. \nHowever, Core inflation (CI) increased from 13.0% to 13.0% over \nthe same period. Besides, the Month-on-Month measure for \nthe three segments increased. We also face the following \nchallenges in the inflation management equation; \n- Though at a reduced level, the budget passed by National \nAssembly is a deficit one. \n- Besides given that the time taken to pass the budget has \nbeen at a record level and the fact that 2012 budget \nspending is currently permitted, we may see injections of \nsubstantial additional liquidity when the President signs the \n2013 Appropriation Act. \n- A reduction in Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) may lead to \ninjection of additional liquidity which may threaten inflation \nnumbers and put pressure on the foreign reserves. \n We have seen marginal appreciation in the value of the Naira \nagainst the US Dollar in all segments of market at the end of \n2012. Besides, we have seen substantial accretion to foreign \nreserves. I will like to see it sustained for now \n17 \n \n With both inflation and Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 12%, we \nare just about taking real interest rate to a positive level. A \ndownward adjustment of MPR should logically follow a similar \ndownward reduction in the level of inflation in order to attain \npositive real rate of interest which is desirable for the country. \nThe high level of interest rate and yields in government \ninstruments has led to crowding out of the private sector in an \nenvironment of deficit financing by Government. This has also \nled to recent surge in foreign portfolio inflows. There may be \nrisks associated with these inflows but what is more important is \nfor us to identify, quantify and manage these risks because \nthese flows are directly related to the accretion of reserves, \nstability in exchange rate, increasing liquidity in the capital \nmarket and increase in market capitalization. \nI would therefore want to see sustained stability of inflation numbers \nand exchange rate, before I can support easing of policy stance. \nIt is in the light of the foregoing that I voted as follows; \n- Retain MPR at 12% \n- Maintain the existing corridor at plus and minus 2% for \nstanding and deposit rates respectively \n- Maintain the Cash Reserve Ratio at 12%. \n \n3.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \n18 \n \nI vote to: \n 1. Reduce the MPR by 0.25% to 11.75%. \n 2. Maintain the asymmetric corridors at ±2.0% around the MPR. \n 3. Maintain CRR at 12%. \n \nJustification \nAt the November MPC I voted to leave the MPR, asymmetric \ncorridors and CRR unchanged. I argued: “as the year comes to an \nend, a major policy shift is not desirable . . . it is wise to stay the \ncourse more so, given the pervasive uncertainties in the global \neconomy in fourth quarter of 2012 (failures of the EU to resolve its \nsovereign debt crisis) and in the first quarter of 2013 (fears of the US \nfalling off the fiscal cliff).” \n \nI had contemplated cutting the MPR at three MPC meetings in 2012: \nMarch, 2012; May 2012 and July 2012. At all three meetings, I \nexpressed concerns about a recurring set of problems: slowing GDP \ngrowth from third quarter of 2010; rising unemployment; high levels of \npoverty; fiscal dominance (unsustainable levels of government \nexpenditures and debt and its crowding-out effects on private \nborrowing, investment and consumption); growing disconnect \nbetween the financial and real sector; the asymmetries in the gains \nof tightening and the growing inefficiencies of financial markets \nindicated by rise in interest rate spreads as well as the rise in the level \nof profits of Deposit Money Banks in absolute and relative terms. \n \n19 \n \nI decided against a rate cut at the March and May meetings of the \nMPC. In March I justified my decision on two pillars: (i) fiscal \ndominance will undermine the effectiveness of a rate cut and (ii) the \npass through effects of rate cuts may not be instantaneous or strong \nenough to stimulate real activity. Similarly, at the May MPC, I \ndecided against a rate cut because as I put it: \n \n“the pass through of lower MPR to the Maximum lending \nrate is likely to be inelastic. As a result, Small players who \nare more likely to grow output and employment are \nunlikely to benefit from an MPR cut. In addition, the \nchances of growing the loan book is limited by the existing \nstructure of liquidity which is skewed in favor of Hold to \nMaturity (HTM) government securities while the chances of \nchanges in the credit structure in favor of value-added \nand job creating sectors and economic agents such as \nfarmers and small and medium scale industrialists is limited \nwithout improvements in infrastructures among other \nprerequisites.” \n \nHowever, at the July MPC, I voted for a cut in MPR by 0.25% after a \nreview of the regime of tightening from macroeconomic, general \nequilibrium and game theoretic perspectives. The details of my \nargument are contained in my personal statement after the July \nMeeting. Suffice to recall that I became convinced that the \nargument about the magnitude and timing of the pass through of \nrate cut became less important compared to the dangers of \nportfolio capital that has poured into Nigeria in the period of \ntightening. It is axiomatic that portfolio flows are volatile, cause asset \n20 \n \nprice bubbles and trigger financial crisis even when fundamentals \nare strong as was the case of the Asian Tigers in 1997. \n \nWith the commitment of the MPC to stable exchange rates which I \nsupport, interest rates along with creative administrative and \ninstitutional game changers are the options to check the inflow of \npotentially destabilizing capital while encouraging the inflows of \ncapital that will stimulate job creating growth. \n \nThe sharp growth in portfolio flows (i) after October 2011 and (ii) after \nJuly 2012 is well above trend and its effects on the capital market \nalready signal that financial and macroeconomic instability lies in \nthe future unless the rights forward looking policies are implemented \nnow. The effects of the last episode of outflows in 2008 and the \neffects on the capital market, the banking system and the costs of \nbailouts are still fresh. \n \nIt is to avoid such costs that I vote for a cut in MPR by 0.25% as a \nsignal of a commitment to the macroeconomic stability now and, \nin the future and, to avoid history repeating itself at an even greater \ncost. \n4.0 \nLEMO, TUNDE \nMacroeconomic developments by end-December 2012 have \nsignificantly justified the tightening stance of monetary policy since \n2011Q3. Headline inflation at 12 per cent by end-December 2012 \n21 \n \ncould be regarded as largely subdued in the face of the various \nupside risks that confronted the economy such as the partial \nremoval of subsidy on the PMS, upward adjustments in electricity \nand imports tariffs, as well as the unprecedented and highly \ndevastating flood. Furthermore, quite a number of market risk \nindicators have fallen considerably as evidenced by fair degree of \nstability in the money market rates, exchange rate, and reduction in \nthe yield of government bond, which suggest improved confidence \nin the economy by foreign investors. In the light of the improvements \nin the financial sector therefore, there are strong arguments that \npriority should be given to the real sector of the economy in terms of \ncommencement of loosening stance of monetary policy. The \nargument is more compelling against the backdrop of declining real \noutput growth rate as provisional estimates for 2012 at 6.61 per cent \nindicate the continuation of the downward slide that commenced \nin 2010. \n \nWhile the considerations to relax the current tightening stance are \nvalid, it may be in order to examine some other upside risks in the \nnear term to the effective delivery of the primary mandate of price \nstability. First, we may need to recognize that the effects of the major \ncontributory factors to inflation in FY2012 are yet to bottom out with \nempirical analysis suggesting that the effect of some of these factors \nparticularly the flood would peak in the first quarter of 2013. Second, \ncore inflation at 13.70 per cent at end-December 2012 was still \n22 \n \nelevated and significantly higher than the four-year average of 11.50 \nper cent, therefore requiring appropriate policy measures. \n \nFinally, the accelerated passage given to the 2013 budget by the \nNational Assembly as well as the Presidential Pact with the Ministers \non budget performance suggest that there would be higher \ninjections into the economy in the first quarter of 2013 through \ncapital expenditure than what was experienced in the past. The \nliquidity \nsurfeit \nmay \nbe \naggravated \nby \nthe \nconcurrent \nimplementation of the extended 2012 capital expenditure as well as \nthe Supplementary Budget on 2012 flood relief and payments of \nsubsidy to oil marketers. Closely related to this development is the \ncurrent benchmark price of US$79/barrel of crude oil under the 2013 \nbudget which is adjudged to be overly optimistic. Apart from the \nfact that it would increase the level of domestic monetary \naggregates with implication for price level, it would also constrain \nthe capacity to increase savings into the Excess Crude Account \n(ECA), making the economy highly vulnerable to shocks arising from \nvolatility in oil earnings. \n \nIn the light of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Bank should \nclosely watch emerging macroeconomic developments and clearly \nrecognize the evolving trend before a change in the current \ntightening stance of monetary policy. Consequently, I vote for a hold \nof both the MPR and the CRR at the prevailing rates of 12 per cent. \n \n23 \n \n5.0 \nMOGHALU, KINGSLEY CHIEDU \nI vote for a retention of the Monetary Policy Rate at 12 per cent, and \nto maintain the status quo on the transmission corridor, the Liquidity \nRatio, the Cash Reserve Ratio and the Net Open Position for the \nfollowing reasons. \n \nFirst and most important, although inflationary pressures are \nmoderating with headline inflation dropping to 12 per cent in \nDecember 2012 from 12.30 per cent in November 2012, and with a \nsimilar drop in food inflation from 11.60 per cent to 10.20 per cent \nover the same period, core inflation increased from 13.10 per cent to \n13.70 per cent. Inflationary risks remain in the Nigerian economy, \nand the decelerating trend has not become consistent enough to \nwarrant a reduction in the MPR at this time. State Government \nbudgets have increased by more than 20 per cent year to year as of \nDecember 2013, Federal Government expenditure will remain high in \n2013, and this situation is likely to be exacerbated by the higher \nbenchmark oil price in 2013 budget. \n \nSecond, we need to weigh the stability – increasing external reserves \nthat serve as an effective and necessary buffer for the economy, the \ninflow of portfolio investments that has helped maintain the stability \nof the exchange rate of the naira, and real interest rates – delivered \nby monetary policy over the past year – against the loud calls for a \nreduced MPR based on a belief that the present MPR of 12 per cent \n24 \n \nis preventing increased credit to the real sector. Clearly, the stability \ndelivered by the prevailing regime of monetary policy outweighs a \nview that is not supported by evidence that the MPR of 12 per cent is \nwhat is actually stifling real sector credit. I certainly wish to see a \nlower MPR, but this should only happen in response to a sustained \ndownward trend in inflation. In fact, credit to the private sector as a \nratio of GDP has increased by 9 per cent, and there remains no \nevidence that credit to the real sector increased dramatically in the \nyears and months when the MPR was lower. \n \nOn the other hand, reducing the MPR will not affect real sector \ngrowth owing to structural constraints in the economy that I have \nargued in my previous MPC statements. Attempts to make monetary \npolicy “responsible” for problems the solutions to which lie elsewhere \nshould not influence the MPC to act precipitately. What is more, \ngiven the recent return to life of Nigeria’s capital market in the wake \nof the global financial crisis, a premature end to the monetary \ntightening cycle could result in another stock market bubble. \n \nI am aware of – and share – the concerns over the risks inherent in \ncreating seeming incentives for inflows of “hot money” into the \nNigerian economy. It is important that monetary policy not be built \non maintaining high policy rates merely for the purpose of attracting \nportfolio inflows because of the benefits they offer. These benefits \nare of a transient nature when considered against the structural \nactions needed to grow the economy in a sustainable manner. But \n25 \n \nprice stability remains a core mandate of the Central Bank of \nNigeria. Together with exchange rate stability, they remain necessary \nfor Nigeria in the near to medium term, pending the realization of \nmore structural reforms by the Federal and State Governments and \nfiscal authorities. And, provided the risks around hot money can be \nmanaged – and from all indications they can – combating inflation \nconsistently downward remains necessary. \n \nI therefore believe we should maintain the status quo and watch the \nevolution of price levels and other monetary aggregates in 2013. \n \n6.0 \nOLOFIN, SAM \nFocusing on developments in the global economy since our last \nmeeting, and their potential impacts on the domestic economy, \nstaff reports indicate some degree of sustained, albeit gradual \nimprovements in projected global growth rate, from 3.0% in 2011 to \n3.3% in 2012, and rising slightly further to 3.6 % in 2013. This not \nwithstanding, there are still some significant downside and upside \nrisks to global recovery that also portend potential dangers to the \ndomestic economy. There is strong evidence of rising food and \nenergy prices, posing upside risk to global inflation, and hence to \nimported inflation in the domestic economy. \n \nFinancial market fragilities and uncertainties in the Euro-zone \nconstitute major downside risk to economic recovery, with potentials \n26 \n \nfor weakening demand for, and lowering of commodity prices \nincluding that of petroleum. Low growth in critical emerging markets \nand overall weak global investment climate, suggest that demand \nfrom these markets may not be strong enough to pick up the slack in \nthe demand from the country’s traditional trading partners. \n \nHighlights of developments in the domestic economy show \ncontinued slow but robust growth in overall GDP which is estimated \nat 6.61% for 2012. There is also evidence of moderating inflationary \npressures with headline inflation put at 12% in 2012. This is below a \nfour year average of 12.08%. While money market rates have \nstabilized, lending rates remain high, with significant spread between \nlending and deposit rates. Foreign exchange market has remained \nstable with marginal appreciation in the exchange rate. There has \nalso been appreciable accretion to external reserves which stand at \n$46.79 billion as at January 17, 2013, notwithstanding the fact that a \nsizable, but manageable proportion of this is coming from hot \nmoney inflows. There are growing concerns about sustainability of \ncurrent levels of indebtedness especially in respect of state \ngovernments. \n \nThere are also growing concerns about the effects of internal \nsecurity threats, and impacts of flooding on level of economic \nactivity. Coupled with these are concerns about fiscal sustainability, \ngiven threats to flow of oil revenue that may result from significant \nreductions in US oil imports, as it shifts demand to its own domestic as \n27 \n \nwell as other competing sources. The overall economic outlook for \nQ1, 2013 therefore is that of an economy with a stable financial \nsector; a healthy non-oil sector led overall GDP growth performance, \nwith headline inflation trending downwards. There are however \nmajor downside risks from uncertainties associated with tepid global \neconomic recovery, unresolved financial crisis in the Euro zone, and \ntheir potential negative impacts on the level of economic activity in \nthe short to medium term. \n \nThe foregoing outlook leaves us with considerable doubts as to \nwhether the time is ripe for monetary policy easing or not. As always, \nthe critical issues surround the need to balance price stability needs \nwith growth considerations. In view of the relative stability gains \nmade over the last several quarters, it may be tempting to shift \nemphasis from stability considerations to monetary easing to \npromote growth. However such a major policy shift would be \npremature at this meeting, in view of the continuing uncertainties in \nthe global economic outlook. Prudence demands keeping existing \nmeasures in place for as long as the external uncertainties that pose \nsignificant threats to domestic stability persist. One would therefore \nbe strongly inclined towards retaining the status quo, as we watch \nfurther developments between now and the next meeting. I am \ntherefore voting for keeping MPR as well as the CRR at their current \nlevels. This would enable us maintain existing stability and further \nstrengthen our buffers by way of sustained accretion to foreign \nreserves. \n28 \n \n \n7.0 \nSALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nAhead of this meeting, the call for easing of monetary policy had, \nperhaps unsurprisingly, gathered momentum. Release, a few days \nago, by the National Bureau of Statistics of inflation figures for \nDecember 2012 showing a decline in the rate of increase in \nHeadline inflation to 12 percent appeared to provide support for the \ncase to ease monetary policy. Reflection on the inflation data \nprovides, at best, the most tenuous support for the notion of inflation \nbeing under control. The decline in Headline inflation was essentially \nthe result of a ‘base’ effect in the year-on-year measure of food \ninflation. The 100bp increase in the month-on-month measure of \nfood prices is quite large and perhaps reflective of the continuing \nimpact of the flooding on food supply. \n \nIn addition, rising Core Inflation – increasing from 13.1per cent to 13.7 \npercent between November and December last year, continues to \nbe a source of concern. It is worth bearing in mind that higher non-\nfood prices have been driven, largely, by the cost of reform. The call \nto ease monetary policy is unsupported by the most basic analysis of \nthe most recent available data on inflation. The outlook for inflation \nin Nigeria in H1 2013 appears benign – Central Bank Staff estimate \nthe year-on-year rate of increase in Headline inflation easing to 8.5 \nper cent by the end of H1 2013, similarly, do they expect Core \ninflation to ease to 6.6 per cent. Whilst the rate of increase in food \n29 \n \nprices will also come off double digits, it is expected to be stickier \nthan the other measures of inflation – ranging in H1 2013 between 8.5 \nand 10.5 percent. \n \nBeyond inflation, the sluggish growth performance of the economy \ncould also provide a basis for easing monetary conditions. Having \nreviewed the quarterly GDP data, especially in comparison with \n2011, it would appear that there is a growth momentum building in \nthe economy. In other words, the economy might already be in \nrecovery mode. Comparing the sector growth performance on a \nyear-on-year basis, summarized below, the sharp reduction in the \nnumber of sectors with decelerating growth performance \n \n2011 \n2012 \nNo \nof \nSectors \nwith \nGrowth \nAccelerating \nNo \nof \nSectors \nwith \nGrowth \nDecelerating \nNo of Sectors \nwith \nGrowth \nAccelerating \nNo of Sectors with \nGrowth \nDecelerating \nQ1 \n28 \n5 \n4 \n29 \nQ2 \n26 \n7 \n18 \n15 \nQ3 \n12 \n21 \n18 \n17 \nQ4 \n13 \n20 \nData not available \n \nwhen compared to the same quarter in the previous year provides \nindication of improving activity. While it can be argued that easing \nmonetary conditions would further strengthen growth, it is important \nin that context to ask whether Banks in Nigeria have regained their \nappetite for lending. My interactions and conversations do not lead \nme to conclude that banks are looking to expand their lending \nportfolios in those areas that afford able to further stimulate growth. \n30 \n \n \nAnyway, financial market conditions show a reduction in bond yields \nsince October, 2012. In other words, there appears to be a ‘natural’ \ndecline in rates which should force the banks to seek more profitable \nopportunities in the real economy. It would be prudent to see what \neffect declining fixed-income market rates have on bank appetite \nfor \nreal \nsector \nlending. \nFurthermore, \nnotwithstanding \nthe \nimprovement in forex reserves, a reduction in policy rates could \nserve to trigger a disorderly exit of Foreign Portfolio Investors – a \nprospect which would unnecessarily put pressure on the exchange \nrate. \n \nA couple of threats to the inflation outlook should not be overlooked. \nThe fragility of global economic environment continues to be a \nsource of concern. Our hope is that ‘Fiscal Cliff 2013’ is resolved \nwithout adversely affecting global financial markets. Attention needs \nto be paid to uncertainty as to the dynamics and mid-term direction \nof oil prices. The importance of oil price to our economy cannot be \noveremphasized. Whilst political uncertainty and increased liquidity \nmade available by Quantitative Easing activity of key Central Banks \nsuggest that oil prices will hold firm in the short-term, it appears that \nwe may begin to see oil prices ease on the back of new finds and \ndeployment of new technology. The increase in the budget \nbenchmark price of crude oil sanctioned by the National Assembly, \nfrom US$75 to US$79, is potentially higher than its nominal value of 5 \nper cent. Based on actual average production in 2011 and 2012 of \n31 \n \n2.1 million barrels/day, the revenue assumptions in the revision \nproposed by the National Assembly raises the effective budget \nbenchmark price of crude oil to US$95/barrel. In other words, a 27 \npercent increase. An effective price of US$95/barrel leaves little \nroom for adverse fluctuations. \n \nFurthermore, domestic conditions seem set fair to provide a recovery \nin spending in 2013. On the public sector side, with only the budget \nfor Osun State unannounced, proposed spending by sub-national \ngovernment for 2013 shows an uplift of approximately 15 per cent – \nranging between – 17 Per cent and 42 per cent. This is in addition to \nthe stimulus provided to household budgets by the absence of \nfurther action on fuel price deregulation. \n \nI would like to see a sustained trend of easing inflation numbers to be \nconvinced that monetary policy should ease. \n \n8.0 \nUCHE, U. CHIBUIKE \nThroughout 2012, MPC maintained a tight monetary policy stance \nand retained MPR at 12 percent. This no doubt helped curtail \ninflation in a very turbulent year that witnessed a substantial petrol \npump price increase and widespread flood disaster. Another \nconsequence of the tight monetary policy stance is the increased \ninflow of foreign direct investments which is in part responsible for the \nongoing recovery of the capital market. While these no doubt are \n32 \n \nseen as positive developments by beneficiary stakeholders in our \neconomy, the fundamentals of our oil rent economy remain weak. \n \nForeign direct investments that do not impact on the development \nof the real sector simply represent hot money chasing after instant \nreturns. High MPR and tight monetary policy has made investments in \nNigerian bonds and stocks to be very attractive to foreign investors. \nAt least in the short run, such foreign investments have also assisted \nin helping ease the pressure on the Naira exchange rate. While this \nmay be welcome at the present time especially given the price \nstability mandate of the CBN, potential danger lies ahead. Huge \ninflows of foreign investments that only target high return stocks and \nbonds without impacting on real sector growth cannot be \nsustainable. This is especially so given the fact that the current \nstability we are witnessing has little to do with sound economic \nfundamentals. The country is simply at the mercy of the vagaries of \ninternational oil prices and foreign investments. \n \nAny mishap, like a sudden decline in oil prices will trigger massive \ncapital outflows which would swiftly reverse all the so called gains of \nmonetary stability. Monetary stability is not an end in itself. It makes \nsense only if it facilitates real sector development. Monetary policy \nmust therefore be proactive in the attempt to promote real sector \ngrowth. At this stage therefore, I believe that the time has come for \nus to begin to think seriously about how to use monetary policy to \nassist the real sector and how to reduce the inherent risks associated \n33 \n \nwith the increasing inflow of hot money. The fact that past attempts \nto reduce MPR have rarely translated to reduced interest rates and \nincreased credit to the real sector should never be seen as an \ninsurmountable obstacle. It is in my opinion the duty of the CBN to \nensure that the wide interest rate margins of commercial banks are \ncurtailed. This should not be difficult because available evidence \nshow that such wide interest rate variances have in some cases \nbeen fuelled by the abuse of existing CBN interest charge rules by \ncommercial banks. The belief that banks in a rentier state where \ninformation inefficiency thrives will through moral suasion behave is a \nless predatory manner with respect to interest rate policies is \nerroneous. The current data which shows that banks are gradually \nreturning to their mega profit declaration days sometimes with little \nrespect for existing CBN rules is clear evidence of this. \n \nEnsuring the enforcement of existing interest rate rules and if \nnecessary using regulation to limit the interest rate spread of banks is \na necessary condition for the creation of an enabling environment \nfor the transmission of MPR changes to the all-important real sector. I \nam aware of the argument that the problem of the real sector in \nNigeria is structural because it would be difficult to assist the sector \nwithout clear improvements in macro security and infrastructure. \nWhile this argument has some merit, it should not prevent us from \nencouraging banks to grant credit to this important sector. This is \nespecially so given the fact that the current scenario which is \ndependent on high oil prices and predatory foreign capital is not \n34 \n \nsustainable. Developments, although in fits and starts, in macro \ninfrastructure should also be acknowledged. The view that we must \nwait until all the structural issues impeding the real sector are \nremoved before we can promote credit to the sector must be \ndiscountenanced. \n \nIt is in the light of the above that I have come to the conclusion that \nit is now time for us to rethink the current tight monetary policy \nstance. Given the ability of some of the stakeholders who benefit \nfrom the status quo to sabotage monetary policy, I am of the view \nthat we should cautiously start this process with signaling a change in \ndirection by reducing MPR by only 25 basis points in the first instance. \nI therefore vote as follows: (1) to reduce MPR by 25 basis points to \n11.75 percent with interest rate corridor of +/- 200 basis points; (2) to \nretain CRR at 12 percent; and (3) to retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 \npercent. \n \n9.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \nI vote to maintain the Monetary Policy Rate at 12%. \n \nThe current global and Nigerian situation is similar in some respects to \nthe last meeting of the MPC in November 2012 in the sense that \nthere are some significant areas of uncertainty, coupled with \ndevelopments that point in different directions. \n \n35 \n \nDespite an improvement in growth in the US economy in the last \nquarter of 2012, there are still major uncertainties regarding the \nresolution of the fiscal, budgetary and debt crisis. Some of the \nthreats to the Euro have abated somewhat, but growth in the \nEurozone countries is still flat or declining; austerity measures are still \nbiting. Also growth in the emerging economies in the last quarter is \nlack-luster, despite some recovery in China. \n \nIn the Nigerian domestic economy, the projected GDP growth rate \nin 2012 is lower at 6.61% than for the previous three years, although it \nis projected in the last quarter of the year to be slightly higher than \n7%, which is the highest quarterly rate in 2012. Overall, GDP growth is \nstill robust. \n \nThe first quarter of 2013 is expected to experience lower pressures on \nprice levels due to a number of factors: the base effect; declining \nglobal prices and therefore lower imported inflation; low aggregate \ncredit to the economy mainly due to significant fiscal consolidation \nby the fiscal authorities (federal government borrowing declined \nfurther in November 2012, and by 12.4% on an annualized basis); \nslow growth in money aggregates. The high levels of interest rate \nalso appear to have attracted some hot money into portfolio \ninvestments. Additionally, exchange rates in the country have been \nremarkably stable over the last year, with the Naira performing \nbetter than other African currencies, so there does not appear to be \na substantial risk of exchange-rate induced pressures on price levels. \n36 \n \nOn the other hand, inflation in December 2012 is estimated at 12%. \nThe NBS estimates that food prices may experience some pressure in \nQ1 of 2013 due to the delayed effects of the floods last year. \n \nAlong with growth uncertainties in the US and Europe, fairly weak \ngrowth in the emerging economies, discoveries of oil in many African \ncountries and rapid increase in oil production in the US, there are \nhuge uncertainties surrounding the oil market which clearly cloud \nthe outlook for Nigeria. Although there has been a significant \nimprovement in managing the federal government expenditure, \nthere are some concerns about the possibility of spending spikes \nfollowing budget approval and due to some carry over spending \nfrom the 2012 budget. If this happens, there might be a liquidity \nsurfeit and thereby pressure on price levels. \n \nOverall, with the inflation rate at the current level of 12%, rising level \nof core inflation and the need to see a clearer picture with respect \nto government expenditure and Q1 price levels, it would not be \nprudent at this time to signal the end of the tightening period, which \nhas helped to reduce pressure on prices. It does not appear right \nnow that an easing of the monetary stance can translate into \ncheaper lending for the productive sectors, whereas the risk on price \nlevels is more potent. \n \nFor these reasons I vote to hold. \n \n37 \n \n10.0 SANUSI LAMIDO SANUSI, CON, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF \nNIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nI will be very brief in this personal statement as the issues are clear \nand have not changed much since last MPC. Inflation remains in \nthe lower double-digit range, with expectations of a decline in \nJanuary largely on the back of base effects of fuel subsidy shock in \nQ1:2012. GDP growth is slower than last year due to slow growth in \nthe Agricultural and Oil sectors, underscoring the need for structural \npolicies to be fast-tracked. \n \nAlthough inflation outlook is stable, the increased projected \nspending by state governments and raised oil price benchmark at \nthe Federal level may pose a risk in the medium-term. The global \neconomy remains fragile and the outlook is mixed, at the very best. \n \nIn the past year, we have achieved price stability, exchange rate \nstability, banking system stability and a healthy reserves position. The \nequities market is also on the mend and although it is still vulnerable \nto unstable portfolio flows, the fundamentals suggest that we are \nnowhere near a bubble at this point. Indeed, the only negative in \nthis picture is the high lending rates faced by borrowers. The CBN will \ncontinue working with the banks to work out how to best address the \nquestion of spreads. \n \n38 \n \nAt this point, policy is working so well, there is no need to change it. I \nvote that we retain current stance and watch domestic and global \ndevelopments ahead of next MPC and review the position in March.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Communique No 87 of the MPC of 21st January 2013 (with personal statement of members).pdf"} |