| {"doc_id": "c5b7ca844e9c7a1dc0fdba70b95d31f1", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nThe Big Funding Squeeze\n2023\nAPR\nWorld Economic and Financial Surveys\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nThe Big Funding Squeeze\n2023\nAPRIL\nCopyright ©2023 International Monetary Fund\nCataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: the big funding squeeze.\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : the big funding squeeze. | World economic and financial surveys.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2023. | World economic and financial surveys. |\nApr. 2023. | Includes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers: ISBN 9798400235641 (English Paper)\n9798400235771 (ePub)\n9798400236044 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. |\nEconomic development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R4456 2023\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to\nreview developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the\nIMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\nPublication orders may be placed online or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090, U.S.A.\nT. +(1) 202.623.7430\nF. +(1) 202.623.7201\npublications@IMF.org\nIMFbookstore.org\nelibrary.IMF.org\nFind all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE iii\nContents\nAcknowledgments. ...................................................................................................... v\nCountry Groupings ..................................................................................................... vi\nAssumptions and Conventions ........................................................................................ vii\nExecutive Summary ..................................................................................................... 1\nThe Big Funding Squeeze. .............................................................................................. 2\nRecent Developments: The Makings of a Funding Crisis .......................................................... 3\nThe Outlook for a Two-speed Recovery in 2024. ................................................................... 6\nFour Main Policy Priorities. ........................................................................................... 7\nConclusion . ......................................................................................................... 13\nReferences. ............................................................................................................. 14\nStatistical Appendix ................................................................................................... 15\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\niv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFIGURES\nFigure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Spreads, 2021–23 .......................................................... 3\nFigure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Interest Payments to Revenue, Excluding Grants .................................... 4\nFigure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sources of Financing. .................................................................. 4\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth, 2023. ............................................................... 5\nFigure 5. Real GDP Per Capita, 2019–24 ................................................................................ 5\nFigure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth, 2022–24 ........................................................... 6\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Eurobonds Repayments, 2023–25. .................................................... 8\nFigure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Ratio at End-2022 and Fiscal Adjustment Needs .............................. 8\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers of Changes in Public Debt Ratio between End-2012 and End-2022 ....... 9\nFigure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Median Inflation, December 2021–February 2023 ............................... 10\nFigure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Changes in Policy Rate and Inflation .............................................. 10\nFigure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rate versus US Dollar ....................................................11\nFigure 13. Climate Finance Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2020. .................................................... 12\nTABLES\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings ............................................................... vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings ..................................................... vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations .......................................................................... vii\nSTATISTICAL TABLES\nSA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average ............................................................. 17\nSA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt ............................................. 18\nSA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants .............................................. 19\nSA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves .................................................... 20\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE v\nAcknowledgments\nThe April 2023 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared by a\nteam led by Wenjie Chen and under the supervision of Luc Eyraud and Catherine Pattillo.\nThe team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Anna Belianska, Marijn Bolhuis, Balazs Csonto, Cleary Haines,\nSaanya Jain, Laurent Kemoe, Hamza Mighri, Saad Quayyum, Moustapha Mbohou Mama, Pritha Mitra,\nHenry Rawlings, Ivanova Reyes, Andrew Tiffin, and Qianqian Zhang.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Yao Nourdine Ouattara.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nvi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nCountry Groupings\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected\nCountries Countries Situations1\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi\nChad Central African Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon\nCongo, Republic of Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African\nEquatorial Guinea Congo, Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Republic\nGabon Democratic Eswatini Comoros Congo, Chad\nNigeria Republic of the Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Comoros\nSouth Sudan Eritrea Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Congo, Democratic\nGhana Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Republic of the\nGuinea Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Congo, Republic of\nLiberia Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Eritrea\nMali Madagascar Ghana Guinea Ethiopia\nNamibia Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau\nNiger Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mali\nSierra Leone Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Mozambique\nSouth Africa Rwanda Namibia Malawi Niger\nTanzania São Tomé Nigeria Mali Nigeria\nZambia and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan\nZimbabwe Senegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe\nSeychelles Senegal Rwanda\nTogo Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa South Sudan\nZambia Tanzania\nTogo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\n1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West Economic and Common East African Southern Southern Economic\nAfrican Monetary Market for Community African African Community of\nEconomic and Community of Eastern and Development Customs West African\nMonetary Central African Southern Africa Community Union States\nUnion States\n(WAEMU) (CEMAC) (COMESA) (* = EAC-5) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central African Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire Republic Congo, *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Chad Democratic South Sudan Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Tanzania Democratic South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Uganda Republic of the Ghana\nSenegal Gabon Eswatini Eswatini Guinea\nTogo Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea-Bissau\nKenya Madagascar Liberia\nMadagascar Malawi Mali\nMalawi Mauritius Niger\nMauritius Mozambique Nigeria\nRwanda Namibia Senegal\nSeychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa Togo\nZambia Tanzania\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE vii\nAssumptions and Conventions\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\nIn tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor\ndiscrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.\nAn en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or months\ncovered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or\nmonths (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example,\nFY 2012).\n“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent\nto ¼ of 1 percentage point).\nAs used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as\nunderstood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are\nnot states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.\nThe boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part\nof the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or\nacceptance of such boundaries.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 1\nExecutive Summary\nA funding squeeze has hit the region hard. Persistent global inflation and tighter monetary policies have led\nto higher borrowing costs for sub-Saharan African countries and have placed greater pressure on exchange\nrates. Indeed, no country has been able to issue a Eurobond since spring 2022.\nThe funding squeeze aggravates a protracted trend that has been years in the making. The interest burden\non public debt is rising, because of a greater reliance on expensive market-based funding combined with a\nlong-term decline in aid budgets.\nThe lack of financing affects a region that is already struggling with elevated macroeconomic imbalances.\nPublic debt and inflation are at levels not seen in decades, with double-digit inflation present in half of\ncountries—eroding household purchasing power, striking at the most vulnerable, and adding to social\npressures. Estimates suggest that 132 million people were acutely food-insecure in 2022.\nIn this context, the economic recovery has been interrupted. Growth in sub-Saharan Africa will decline to\n3.6 percent in 2023. Amid a global slowdown, activity is expected to decelerate for a second year in a row.\nStill, this headline figure masks significant variation across the region. Many countries will register a small\npickup in growth this year, especially non-resource-intensive economies, but the regional average will be\nweighed down by sluggish growth in some key economies, such as South Africa.\nThe funding squeeze will also impact the region’s longer-term outlook. A shortage of funding may force\ncountries to reduce resources for critical development sectors like health, education, and infrastructure,\nweakening the region’s growth potential.\nFour policy priorities can help address the macroeconomic imbalances in the context of current financing\nconstraints:\n Consolidating public finances and strengthening public financial management amid difficult funding\nconditions. This will rely on continued revenue mobilization, better management of fiscal risks, and more\nproactive debt management. International assistance remains also critical to alleviating governments’\nfinancing constraints. For countries that require debt reprofiling or restructuring, a well-functioning\ndebt-resolution framework is vital to creating fiscal space.\n Containing inflation. Monetary policy should be steered cautiously until inflation is firmly on a downward\ntrajectory and projected to return to the central bank’s target range.\n Allowing the exchange rate to adjust, while mitigating the adverse effects on the economy, including the\nrise in inflation and debt due to the currency depreciations.\n Ensuring that important efforts to fund and address climate change do not crowd out basic needs, like\nhealth and education. Climate finance provided by the international community must come on top of\ncurrent aid flows.\nRegional Economic Outlook Notes. A separate series of analytical notes are provided on topics of current\ninterest. “Geo-Economic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught Between the Fault Lines” demon-\nstrates that sub-Saharan Africa stands to lose the most in a severely fragmented world, and stresses the\nneed for building resilience. “Managing Exchange Rate Pressures in Sub-Saharan Africa: Adapting to New\nRealities” outlines the drivers and consequences of recent exchange-rate pressures and discusses policies\nto help soften the impact on the region’s economies. “Closing the Gap: Concessional Climate Finance\nand Sub-Saharan Africa” considers the critical need for concessional finance in helping the region address\nclimate change and explores ways in which additional flows might be unlocked.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nThe Big Funding Squeeze\nThe confluence of higher global interest rates, elevated sovereign debt spreads, and exchange rate\ndepreciations, among other factors, has created a funding squeeze for many countries in sub-Saharan\nAfrica. This challenge comes on top of policy struggles from the ramifications of the COVID-19\npandemic and the cost-of-living crisis. Reflecting these considerations, economic activity in the\nregion will remain subdued in 2023, with growth at 3.6 percent before rebounding to 4.2 percent in\n2024 predicated on a global recovery, subsiding inflation, and the winding down of monetary policy\ntightening.\nSub-Saharan Africa facing funding squeeze\nDonor flows\nare drying up\n%\nBorrowing costs Legacy of recent\nare rising crises remain\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 3\nRecent Developments: The Makings of a Funding Crisis1\nConjunctural factors have aggravated sub-Saharan Africa’s already difficult\nfinancing situation…\nThe region’s financing options have deteriorated significantly over the past year. The acceleration in the tight-\nening of global monetary policy, prompted by the rapid pickup in global inflation after the onset of Russia’s\nwar in Ukraine, has led to higher interest rates worldwide and raised borrowing costs for sub-Saharan African\ncountries, both on domestic and international markets.\nSovereign spreads for sub-Saharan Africa have soared Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Spreads,\n(Figure 1)—to three times the emerging market average 2021–23\nsince the start of the global tightening cycle. Higher (Basis points, simple average)\ninterest rates on US treasury bonds and the search\nFailure\nfor safe assets amid global uncertainty pushed the 1,250 of SVB\nUS dollar effective exchange rate to a 20-year high in Russian\ninvassion Sub-\n2022, increasing the value of dollar-denominated debt 1,000 of Ukraine Saharan\nand dollar-denominated interest payments. Together, Start of US Africa\ntightening\nthese factors have added to the region’s external 750 768\nbps\nborrowing costs.\n500 225\nHigher uncertainty amid the pandemic and the war in bps\nEMBIG\nUkraine has also led to risk repricing, disproportion-\n250\nately affecting sub-Saharan African countries because Jun-21 Sep-21 Dec-21 Mar-22 Jun-22 Sep-22 Dec-22\nof lower credit ratings, and cutting off virtually all\nSource: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.\nfrontier markets from international market access since Note: Sub-Saharan Africa includes Angola, Côte d’Ivoire,\nEthiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia,\nspring 2022.2 More specifically, Eurobond issuances\nNigeria, Senegal, South Africa. EMBIG = Emerging Market\nfor the region declined from $14 billion in 2021 to Bond Index Global.\n$6 billion in the first quarter of 2022.\nThe effect has been a drastic and pro-cyclical tightening of financing conditions, which has aggravated under-\nlying vulnerabilities. Borrowing costs have increased significantly over the past decade, with interest payments\nas a share of revenue doubling over the same period. At 11 percent of revenues (excluding grants) for the median\nsub-Saharan African country in 2022, interest payments are about triple those of the median advanced economy\n(Figure 2). Structural shifts behind this increase in borrowing costs include a decline in aid budgets to the region\nthat led some countries to turn to market-based finance, which is more expensive (Figure 3). Increased integra-\ntion in international debt markets and deepening of domestic financial markets also made it easier to contract\nmore private domestic and external debt on non-concessional terms. Finally, inflows from China, for a while a\nsignificant source of financing, have declined markedly more recently.\n…on top of the fallout from multi-year shocks…\nThe financing squeeze comes at a most unfortunate time, as the region is facing elevated economic imbalances.\nIn the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, macroeconomic imbalances have returned as a\nfirst order challenge for most African countries, and they are pushing countries close to the edge (Selassie 2022).\nInflation remains elevated and volatile. The median inflation rate in the region was about 10 percent in February\n2023—more than double since the beginning of the pandemic. Besides registering double-digit headline\ninflation in roughly half of the countries in the region, about 80 percent are also experiencing double-digit food\n1 For more discussion on the origin of the financing crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, see also Selassie 2023.\n2 Although frontier markets represent only one-third of the countries, they account for 60 percent of the region’s GDP and 60 percent\nof the total population.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Interest Payments Figure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sources of Financing\nto Revenue, Excluding Grants (Percent of regional GDP)\n(Percent, median)\nEurobond\n50 GHA 4 issuances\n40 3 ODA\nMWI\nZMB\n30 2 Loan disbursements\nfrom China\n20 Frontier market\neconomies 1\nSSA\n10 Oil exporters 0\n2000 03 06 09 12 15 18 21\n0\nSources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P. ; Organisation for Economic\n2012 2022 Co-operation and Development, OECD.stat; and World Bank,\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. International Debt Statistics.\nNote: See pages vi-vii for country acronyms and groupings. Note: ODA = Official Development Aid.\ninflation in February. However, fuel price pressures have decelerated recently because international prices fell\nfrom their peak in mid-2022 by up to 30 percent as of the end of 2022, providing some reprieve for the region.\nAbout half of the countries have now reported a deceleration in inflation in recent months, but there were also\nresurgences; and because subsidies on fuel and food prices are being phased out this year (Cameroon, Central\nAfrican Republic, Ethiopia, Senegal), inflation will likely remain volatile throughout 2023. A few countries also\nfaced pressures to raise public wages in the second half of 2022 because of increases in the cost of living,\ntriggered by higher food and fuel prices (Cameroon, Mali, Rwanda, The Gambia).\nPublic debt as a share of GDP is relatively high. Sub-Saharan Africa’s public debt ratio—at 56 percent of GDP in\n2022—has reached levels last seen in the early 2000s. Since the pandemic, the debt increase has been driven\nby widening fiscal deficits because of overlapping crises, slower growth, and exchange rate depreciations.\nElevated public debt levels have raised concerns about debt sustainability, with 19 of the region’s 35 low-income\ncountries already in debt distress or facing high risk of debt distress in 2022—the same situation reported in the\nOctober 2022 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.\nMost currencies in the region depreciated against the US dollar in 2022. For those already grappling with high\ninflation, the weakening of the currency relative to the dollar made matters even worse because the region\nis highly dependent on imports with a significant share of them invoiced in dollars. Currency depreciations\nalso contributed to higher general government debt because about 40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s debt is\nexternal as of 2021. Although exchange rate pressures have eased since November 2022—in some cases because\nsignificant depreciations have already taken place—they remain elevated and volatile.\n…resulting in another year of disrupted recovery...\nGiven this challenging environment, the region’s growth will decline to 3.6 percent in 2023 from 3.9 percent\nin 2022 following the strong rebound of 2021. This subdued outlook in sub-Saharan Africa marks a growth\nslowdown, the second year in a row. Some common factors explain the growth underperformance, including\nthe rise in central bank rates to fight inflation and the war in Ukraine dampening global economic activity and\nthus, export demand for the region. Nonetheless there are large variations across the region (Figure 4). Niger,\nthe Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Senegal are on the higher end of the region’s growth distribution,\nwith this year’s coming online of oil and gas in those countries expected to contribute significantly to higher GDP\ngrowth. On the opposite end, the significant economic contraction in Equatorial Guinea is a result of a decline\nin oil production. Meanwhile, South Africa’s growth is projected to decelerate sharply to 0.1 percent in 2023,\nweighed down by an intensification of power outages, a weaker external environment, and a negative carry-over\neffect from the growth slowdown at the end of 2022.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nNon-resource-intensive\nOil exporters\nOther resource-intensive\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 5\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth, 2023\n(Percent, fragile countries in red)\nAverage:\nNGA\n3.6\nSLE UGA\nNon-resource-intensive countries COM MUS SSD CIV\nOil exporters\nGAB BWA MDG GNB TZA GMB RWA\nOther resource-intensive countries\nCAF ERI TCD COG CPV MOZ GIN NER\nLSO ZWE SWZ AGO ZMB LBR MLI TGO ETH\nGNQ ZAF GHA STP MWI NAM BDI SYC CMR BFA KEN BEN COD SEN\n0 3 6 9\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: See pages vi-vii for country acronyms and groupings.\nThe region’s financial sector has held up relatively well. The share of non-performing loans has improved\nslightly—down to about 7½ percent in 2022 from nearly 9 percent of total loans for the median country in 2021.\nAfter a temporary decline during the pandemic, bank profitability has bounced back to the pre-COVID-19 trend\nas of mid-2022. However, the capital adequacy of banks in the region has dipped slightly in the last two years\nrelative to its pre-pandemic peak in 2019.\n…and undermining economic and development prospects.\nUnlike many major advanced economies, countries in Figure 5. Real GDP per Capita, 2019–24\nsub-Saharan Africa had limited fiscal space entering (2019 = 100, dashed line indicates pre-crisis trend)\nthe pandemic recession, hampering policymakers’ 110\nability to mount an effective response. This has Advancedeconomies\n105\nresulted in larger scarring effects on the economy,\nincluding from disruptions to education. The current 100\nfunding squeeze is constraining many countries’ ability\n95\nto address these scars, contributing to the muted 2019 2021 2023\nrecovery. Moreover, authorities are forced to reduce 110\nresources for critical development sectors such as Sub-Saharan Africa\n105\nhealth, education, and infrastructure, weakening the\nregion’s medium-term growth prospects. Partly for 100\nthese reasons, the catch-up in growth has remained\n95\nelusive, with GDP per capita remaining stubbornly 2019 2021 2023\nbelow pre-pandemic trend (Figure 5). Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nThe lack of fiscal space has also made it challenging for countries to address the vast social needs, espe-\ncially those in the most vulnerable segments of the population. Insufficient funding meant that the authorities\nstruggled to scale up targeted support when the region faced record-high food, fuel, and fertilizer prices in\n2022. In fact, the cost-of-living crisis remains a major concern for sub-Saharan Africa given the high incidence of\npoverty—35 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to live under $2.15 a day as of 2019\n(latest available data from the World Bank Low-Income Dataset). About 132 million people were estimated to be\nacutely food-insecure in 2022, an upward revision from the estimate of 123 million in the October 2022 Regional\nEconomic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n6 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nThe Outlook for a Two-speed Recovery in 2024\nConsistent with the global rebound, regional growth will pick up from 3.6 percent\nto 4.2 percent in 2024…\nSub-Saharan Africa is poised to grow at 4.2 percent in 2024 from 3.6 percent in 2023. Almost four-fifths of\nthe countries are projected to register a growth pickup in 2024, driven by higher private consumption and\ninvestment. Importantly, the recovery for sub-Saharan Africa is linked intricately to global developments that are\nconditional on the realization of three key global factors:\n Global economic activity is assumed to continue to recover from the effects of the war in Ukraine. This would\ntranslate into tailwinds for exporters in the region, while the dissipation of supply chain bottlenecks will ease\nimport prices.\n Global inflation is projected to recede further in 2024. Thus, it is assumed that major central banks may slow\nthe pace of monetary policy tightening in the second half of 2023 as inflation (excluding volatile food and\nenergy prices) has been declining at a three-month rate—although at a slower pace than headline inflation—in\nmost (though not all) major economies since mid-2022. Subsequently, a slower pace of tightening implies less\npressure on exchange rates and spreads for the region. However, global interest rates are expected to remain\nelevated and well above pre-pandemic levels.\n Crude oil prices are expected to continue to fall by about 6 percent in 2024 relative to the previous year as\ndemand pressures subside. Because net fuel importers represent two-thirds of the region’s GDP, lower prices\nshould affect sub-Saharan Africa’s growth positively. Nonfuel commodity prices are projected to remain\nbroadly unchanged.\nOf course, there is large heterogeneity in growth across subgroups. The growth rebound is expected to be\nprimarily driven by the non-resource-intensive and other resource-intensive countries (Figure 6). The former are\nChapter 1 - Figure 6\nprojected to grow by 6.2 percent in 2024, following 5.7 percent in 2023, reflecting more dynamic and resilient\neconomies—including those in the Eastern African\nFigure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth,\nCommunity—and aided by the recovery in non-mining\n2022–24\nactivities including agriculture. Other (non-oil)\n(Percent)\nresource-intensive countries are also projected to\nSub-Saharan 2022–23\npost strong rebounds, in some cases boosted by new\nAfrica |\nmining projects (iron ore in Liberia and Sierra Leone; 2023–24\nrenewable energy commodities in the Democratic Oil exporters |\nOther resource-intensive\nRepublic of the Congo and Mali). In South Africa,\ncountries excluding\nactivity is expected to recover in 2024 as the energy South Africa |\ncrisis abates and the external environment improves.\nSouth Africa |\nHowever, growth among oil exporters is projected\nNon-resource-\nto decelerate in 2024 to 3.1 percent from 3.3 percent intensive countries |\nin 2023, mostly because of the continued decline in\n0 2 4 6\ncrude oil prices and production slowdowns. Nigeria’s\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\ngrowth is forecast to decline to 3.0 percent next year. Note: See pages vi for country groupings.\nConsistent with the expected receding of global inflation, the median inflation for the region is projected to\nbe down at 5 percent by the end of 2024 (year-over-year), still above pre-pandemic levels but half that at the\nend of 2022. Sub-Saharan Africa is a large importer of food and energy items, which average 50 percent of\nthe region’s consumption basket. Thus, the recent onset in the decline in global food and fuel prices that is\nprojected to continue throughout this year and next, is expected to contribute much to the slowdown in regional\nheadline inflation.\nL\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 7\n…but faces significant downside risks.\nThe outlook for the global economy is clouded by sizable uncertainty because of the multiple shocks in recent\nyears and ongoing financial sector turmoil. Compared to the January 2023 World Economic Outlook Update,\nglobal recession risks have increased, while concerns about stubbornly high inflation persist. Thus, global risks\nare squarely to the downside (April 2023 World Economic Outlook).\nThe ongoing banking sector turbulence in major economies could impact the region through several channels.\nA deterioration of business and consumer confidence could depress activity in the key advanced economies\nand spill over to African countries through lower demand for imports and lower commodity prices. In addition,\nwhile financial conditions in sub-Saharan African countries are not closely correlated with those in the United\nStates or Europe, banking sector stress in the latter economies could nonetheless increase global risk aversion,\nwhich would aggravate the funding squeeze even further for the region. As in past episodes of global financial\nstress, a broad-based outflow of capital from emerging market and developing economies could occur, causing\nfurther dollar appreciation, which would worsen vulnerabilities in countries with large dollar-denominated\nexternal debt. The dollar appreciation would further depress global trade due to many products being invoiced\nin dollars.\nApart from risks in the banking sector, three additional types of global downside risks are worth highlighting.\nFirst, stickier-than-expected inflation could prompt further monetary policy tightening. This could lower net\nfinancial inflows to sub-Saharan Africa and aggravate balance of payment pressures, which would lead to\ndomestic currency depreciations and squeeze already tight financing conditions even further. Another global risk\nis an escalation of the war in Ukraine, which could perpetuate already elevated global uncertainty and raise food\nand energy prices, making the financing environment even more difficult. Finally, a worsening in geoeconomic\nfragmentation could have negative spillovers into sub-Saharan Africa, including rising trade barriers and higher\nfood prices, because the region relies highly on commodity exports and is sensitive to global demand and price\nshocks (Analytical Note “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught Between the Fault Lines”).\nUnder a global downside scenario that considers severe financial sector stress, global real GDP growth in 2023\ncould be 1.8 percentage points below baseline and 2024 growth could be lower by 1.4 percentage points\n(April 2023 World Economic Outlook). The overall effect on global output is about one fourth the size of the\nimpact of the 2008–09 global financial crisis. The slowdown would be accompanied by a disinflationary impulse,\nincluding lower oil and gas prices. Global trade would decrease because of depressed global demand, increased\nuncertainty, and the rising value of the dollar. The cumulative cost to sub-Saharan Africa would amount to a loss\nof −1.9 percent of GDP over 2023–24, with oil exporters experiencing more losses (−2.5 percent) relative to other\nresource-intensive countries (−1.8 percent) and non-resource-intensive countries (−1.4 percent).\nFour Main Policy Priorities\nThe global slowdown, higher interest rates, and a dramatic pickup in global inflation have pushed many countries\ncloser to the edge. The following four priorities are centered around policy strategies that aim to help policy-\nmakers address macroeconomic imbalances in the context of severe financing constraints.\nFiscal policy amid tighter financial conditions\nPolicymakers in sub-Saharan Africa have to adapt to an environment with tighter financing conditions, which has\ntwo important implications for the conduct of fiscal policy. First, debt vulnerabilities (already elevated) are likely\nto worsen. With rising borrowing costs, countries may find it challenging to refinance their existing liabilities and\nrollover longer maturities. This could create liquidity problems, which may, over time, raise solvency questions\nin some cases. Second, policymakers will struggle to cover even the most essential expenses for basic services\nlet alone securing financing for further progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Eurobonds Repayments, 2023–25\n(Billions of US dollars)\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Eurobonds Figure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Ratio at\nRepayments, 2023–25 End-2022 and Fiscal Adjustment Needs\n(Billions of US dollars) (Percent of GDP)\n8 9\n6 5\nOthers\n4 1\nKenya Nigeria -3\n2\nSouth\nAfrica -7\n0 0 40 80 120 160\n2023 2024 2025\nSource: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: Fiscal adjustment needs are computed as of 2023 in order\nto reduce debt ratio to 70 percent of GDP for countries above\nthreshold within 6 years or stabilize at latest level for countries\nbelow threshold. Negative fiscal adjustment needs imply available\nfiscal space.\nSLoouorckein: Bgl oaohmebaedrg, Fthinea ndceiffi Lc.Pu.lt funding environment for the region is likely to remain and become a key feature\nof the new normal. Over the next few years, the region’s countries are projected to have some of the world’s\nhighest interest bills relative to revenues, exceeding 50 percent in a few cases. In the next two years alone, a\nsizable share of outstanding Eurobond debt will come due—about $6 billion in 2024 and another $7 billion in\n2025 (Figure 7). If countries struggle to make repayments or rollover debt, it could have potential repercussions\non the region’s economic growth and social development.\nIn this context, consolidating public finances in the context of a credible and transparent medium-term fiscal\npolicy framework remains a priority for the region. As highlighted in the October 2022 Regional Economic\nOutlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, there is nonetheless heterogeneity among countries. Those that still have some\nfiscal space can use it to continue making much needed investments in human and physical capital to address\ndevelopment needs. But most countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities need to consolidate their public\nfinances to preserve fiscal sustainability. For some, adjustment needs are moderate, but for others, adjustment\nneeds are very large, and it is unlikely that fiscal consolidation alone will be enough to ensure fiscal sustainability\n(Figure 8). In this case, the necessary adjustment could be accompanied by debt reprofiling or restructuring.\nCountries have already started fiscal adjustment. After a significant deterioration in 2020, the median fiscal deficit\nratio in sub-Saharan Africa started to decline in 2021, with a consolidation of almost 1 percentage point of GDP\nprojected for 2023. Fiscal consolidation, which is expected to continue into the medium term, can be pursued\nin a way that minimizes possible negative impacts on growth and poverty. This will require increased efforts\nto boost revenue mobilization, but also prioritizing and increasing the efficiency of spending where possible\nincluding the phasing out of untargeted fuel subsidies. Crucially, fiscal adjustment should make allowances for\ncontinuing social spending and protecting the most vulnerable populations amid the ongoing cost-of-living\ncrisis. This can be done through targeted transfers to those particularly exposed to higher energy and food\nprices or an expansion of existing social safety nets. Saving part of the windfalls from higher commodity prices\nwill be especially helpful for commodity exporters with elevated fiscal vulnerabilities.\nBeyond fiscal consolidation, authorities can take additional steps to adapt to a world of tighter financing\nconstraints:\n Managing fiscal risks resulting from the funding squeeze will be critical to improve fiscal sustainability. Given\ntighter budgets, the risk of fiscal slippage rises along with the temptation for governments to accumulate\narrears, increase off-budget spending, extend guarantees and contingent liabilities. All these operations can\nsdeen\ntnemtsujdA\n8 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nDebt stock\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers of Changes in Public Debt Ratio\nBetween End-2012 and end-2022THE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 9\n(Cumulative change, percentage points of GDP)\ntranslate into so-called “stock-flow adjustments”3, Figure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers of Changes in\nwhich have contributed significantly to the debt Public Debt Ratio between End-2012 and End-2022\nincrease in the past decade (Figure 9). Containing (Cumulative change, percentage points of GDP)\nthese flows through better public financial manage-\n70\nment practices and better risk management is\n50\nessential to improve debt dynamics, including by\nstrengthening fiscal transparency and oversight of 30\nstate-owned enterprises. 10\n By reinvigorating efforts to boost domestic -10\nrevenue mobilization, countries can generate -30\nmore resources for development spending, and -50\nattract more financing because a country’s revenue Exchange ratedepreciation Nominal interest rate\nstream is a main metric for its debt repayment GDP deflator Real GDP growth\nCumulative primary deficits Stock flows adjustments\ncapacity. Sub-Saharan African countries lag signifi- Change in debt to GDP\ncantly in revenue collections, with a median tax\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff\nratio of only 13 percent of GDP in 2022, compared calculations.\nwith 18 percent in other emerging economies\nand developing countries and 27 percent in advanced economies. Successful revenue mobilization efforts\noften require pursuing revenue administration reforSmosu racnesd: IiMmFp, rWovorinldg E tchoeno dmeics iOgunt looof kt adxa tpaboalsicei;e asn,d i nIMclFu sdtainffg c ablcyu lations.\nexpanding the base for value added tax and leveraging digitalization in tax collection (Togo, Guinea-Bissau).\n Effective and proactive debt management is critical to lowering debt risks. Debt management can help strike\nthe balance between funding the government’s needs and ensuring that debt levels remain sustainable. This\nincludes enhancing debt reporting, lengthening maturities, and avoiding bunching of repayments to mitigate\nrefinancing risks.\n For some countries that are likely to experience aggravated debt vulnerabilities and require debt reprofiling\nor restructuring, a well-functioning debt-resolution framework is vital to creating fiscal space. As the variety\nof debt instruments has widened, the creditor base has also become more diversified and negotiations more\ncomplex. Four countries in sub-Saharan Africa are currently seeking or are in the process of restructuring their\ndebt under the Common Framework—Ghana is the latest in the group (others are Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia).\nThe Common Framework constitutes a step toward finding an effective and consistent way for the Group of\nTwenty and Paris Club official creditors to provide debt treatment for low-income countries, in case of need.\nThus far, coordination among creditors has been challenging and the process has been slower than antici-\npated. Potential reforms include defining processes that are more predictable and timelier, earlier sharing of\ninformation between creditors and the international financial institutions, and introducing a standstill on debt\nservice during the debt treatment process after staff-level agreement on an IMF program has been reached.\nFinally, international assistance remains critical to alleviating governments’ financing constraints. Donor nations\nshould ensure that official development assistance continues to go to those countries in greatest need. Many\nfragile and conflict-affected states, for instance, still rely primarily on official development assistance for\nfinancing their development needs. Donors can work with recipient countries towards setting a more modest\nand well-defined set of objectives, such as public health initiatives or targeted capacity building, where smaller,\nmore focused interventions can make a difference. In addition, higher volumes of countercyclical financing,\nparticularly from International Financial Institutions (IFIs), are necessary to offset the highly procyclical nature\nof private capital flows. Countercyclical financing helps countries that have lost market access or are subject to\ncapital outflows to smooth the adjustment, and, for instance, avoid abrupt and disruptive spending cuts.\n3 Stock-flow adjustments refer to discrepancies between the annual change in public debt and the budget deficit, a prominent feature of\ndebt dynamics in many sub-Saharan African countries. In such a case, the fiscal deficit may not be a good depiction of financing needs\nas debt may increase more (or less) than the fiscal deficit. A positive stock-flow adjustment means that the increase in government debt\nexceeds the annual deficit (or decreases less than implied by the surplus).\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n10 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nMonetary policy amid high inflation\nBy the beginning of 2023, inflation had started to fall in about half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, while\ninflation is still rising or very volatile for the rest. Regardless of the trajectory, inflation remains high, with at\nleast 20 out of 45 countries still facing double-digit inflation, and a median inflation of about 10 percent as of\nFebruary 2023, more than twice the level at the end of 2019 (Figure 10). Median core inflation, which excludes\nenergy and basic food prices, was more than 6 percent as of the end of February (where data were available) but\nremains volatile, showing no clear signs of decline. Projections point to inflation staying above pre-pandemic\nlevels throughout 2027. Thus, policymakers have to continue this delicate dance between keeping inflation in\ncheck while being mindful of the still-fragile recovery. The good news is that external factors (such as imported\nfood and energy or swings in the exchange rate) rather than domestic demand pressures have driven much of\nthe inflation in the region. Many of these external factors have subsided in recent months, and thus inflation is\nlikely to follow suit, but because the transmission of lower international prices into domestic markets will take\ntime, inflation is expected to remain above pre-pandemic levels in the near term.\nAlmost all central banks in the region have hiked policy rates since December 2021,4 with cumulative rate hikes\nlarger in countries with higher inflation. However, the median interest rate hike was only about 270 basis points\nin sub-Saharan Africa between end-2021 and February 2023—lower by almost 130 basis points compared with\nthe median in emerging market and developing economies outside the region (Figure 11). For most countries,\ncurrent policy rates remain well below average policy rates over the past decade, while short-term real rates in\nthe region are also still broadly in negative territory. In some countries, growth in reserve money continues to\nexceed nominal GDP growth (Nigeria, Malawi). Angola is the only country to have cut the policy rate in early\n2023, given the sharp decline in headline inflation.\nFigure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Median Inflation, Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Changes in Policy\nDecember 2021–February 2023 Rate and Inflation\nChapter 1 - Figure 11\n(Percent, year-over-year) (Percentage points, between December 2021 and\nFebruary 2023)\n15 Lorem ipsum\nBotswana Policy rate Inflation (0.4)\nCountries where inflation is\n13 still increasing or volatile WAEMU (0.0)\nCEMAC (3.1)\nMauritius (4.2)\n11\nEswatini (2.4)\nAll sub-Saharan Rwanda (18.8)\n9\nAfrican countries Namibia (2.6)\nLesotho (4.5)\n7\nSouth Africa (1.1)\nCountries where inflation is declining Congo, Dem. Rep. (11.5)\n5 Kenya (3.5)\nDec-21 Mar-22 Jun-22 Sep-22 Dec-22 Zambia (–6.8)\nUganda (6.3)\nSources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff\nThe Gambia (6.0)\ncalculations.\nMozambique (3.1)\nNote: Country groupings are based on recent evolution of\ninflation for the last 3 months. The sample includes 37 countries Nigeria (6.3)\nwith available data. Malawi (13.9)\nAngola (–15.2)\nSierra Leone (27.2)\nGhana (40.2)\n0 10 20 30\nSources: Haver Analytics; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.\nNote: Numbers indicate change in inflation.\n4 Rates have stayed flat in a few countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles as of the end of\nFebruary 2023.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 11\nWhat is needed to move ahead? Policymakers need to adjust the pace of monetary policy tightening to both\nthe level and trajectory of inflation, in close coordination with fiscal policy, which can also tame domestic demand\npressures where they exist and contain money growth:\n In cases where countries are still experiencing very high inflation, continued acceleration, or significant\nvolatility, authorities need to continue to tighten policy rates decisively because these countries are\nsusceptible to second-round effects and de-anchoring of inflation expectations. Tackling both after they\nbecome entrenched will be very difficult.\n In countries that have signs of inflation peaking, but where inflation is still relatively elevated, authorities need\nto steer monetary policy cautiously until inflation is firmly on a downward trajectory, and inflation projections\nreturn within the target band of the central bank in the medium term.\nMore generally, given the uncertainty in predicting turning points in the inflation trajectories, monetary policy\nneeds to be data-dependent based on country-specific economic developments, including paying particular\nattention to wage growth in the coming months, but also international food and energy price developments\nbecause food and energy make up 50 percent of the region’s consumption basket on average.\nCountries with pegs or heavily managed floats have generally experienced lower inflation than those without\npegs, but their currency arrangement constrains their ability to control the pace of monetary policy tightening.\nAnchor currencies in the region include the euro (West African Economic and Monetary Union and Central\nAfrican Economic and Monetary Community), the South African rand, and the US dollar—all subject to a different\npace of monetary policy tightening by their respective central banks. Thus, currency peggers will not only have\nto keep a close watch on elevated inflation and its trajectory but also keep policy rates in lock with the anchor\npolicy rate to preserve external stability and foreign exchange reserves.\nExchange rate management amid large depreciation pressures\nSub-Saharan African countries experienced significant Figure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rate\nexchange rate depreciations in 2022 (Figure 12), exac- versus US Dollar\nerbating the financing crisis by increasing the external (Percent change from September 2021 to February\ndebt service burden. These pressures were predom- 2023. Asterisk = Peg)\ninantly brought on by shifts in global fundamentals,\nincluding increases in interest rates in advanced * * * * * *\n* *\neconomies and adverse terms of trade. Currency\n*\n**\n* *\ndepreciations contributed to a rise in inflation and\n*\npublic debt while deteriorating the trade balance in the * * *\nUp >20\nnear-term. Exchange rate pressures also manifested\nUp 10-20\nin the depletion of reserve assets—about a quarter of Up 0-10 *\ncountries had reserves below three months of imports Down 0-10\nat the end of 2022—because foreign exchange inflows Down 10-20 *\nDown 20-30 *\nslowed down and central banks used their reserves to *\nDown 30-50\nfinance imports (Analytical Note “Managing Exchange Down > 50\nRate Pressures—Adapting to New Realities”). Source: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.\nMany countries acted to contain these pressures in 2022. The tightening of monetary policy helped to support\ntheir currencies, and some countries also intervened in foreign exchange markets to resist exchange rate\npressures. As reserves dwindled over the course of 2022, the degree of intervention also slowed down. Many\ncountries also applied administrative measures to control foreign exchange flows in 2022, including multiple\ncurrency practices (Nigeria), price control through moral suasion, and banning foreign currency transactions\nfor local businesses. Some countries also resorted to unconventional measures such as buying oil with gold\n(Ghana), and foreign exchange rationing became even more acute in 2022 (Ethiopia, Nigeria).\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n12 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nNonetheless, some adjustment of currencies seems unavoidable in many cases. There are certainly some\nreasons for sub-Saharan African countries to resist exchange rate pressures, including an elevated share of\nforeign-currency debt and weakly anchored inflation. But countries have to adjust to new fundamentals of\nhigher global interest rates and tighter financing conditions that are expected to last into the foreseeable future.\nFor most countries, the low levels of reserves limit the scope for interventions.\nPolicymakers can take several steps to mitigate possible adverse impacts on the economy as a result of the\nnecessary currency adjustments. In countries where inflation is aggravated by the exchange rate passthrough,\ntighter monetary policy will help alleviate the pressure by keeping inflation expectations in check and stem\ncapital outflows while attracting inflows. Where fiscal imbalances are key drivers of exchange rate pressures,\nfiscal consolidation can help to rein in external imbalances and contain the increase in debt related to\ncurrency depreciation.\nIn some cases, for countries that have sufficient reserve buffers, the use of foreign exchange intervention can\nreduce the volatility of exchange rate. For instance, for those with shallow foreign exchange markets, weak\nmonetary policy credibility, and large foreign exchange mismatches, foreign exchange intervention can tempo-\nrarily reduce some of the costs associated with excessive exchange rate movements. However, countries can\neasily run out of reserves if exchange rate pressures persist because of fundamental forces.\nResponding to climate change without sacrificing basic needs\nCritical development needs, like schooling, health, and infrastructure services, are in danger of not being\nadequately filled under the funding squeeze. Most governments have limited fiscal space, hampering their\nability to protect the most vulnerable and allocate sufficient funds to essential development sectors. Limited\nfinancing makes it particularly challenging to address the ongoing food security crisis that is affecting the region.\nIf the difficulties in addressing basic needs were not enough already, climate change is presenting additional\nspending pressures on shrinking fiscal budgets. For instance, cyclone Freddy—one of the latest in a series of\nclimate shocks to the region—has battered vulnerable families and communities in southern Africa, but countries\nhave limited means for climate adaptation. For the\nFigure 13. Climate Finance Flows to Sub-Saharan\nAfrican continent alone, adaptation costs could\nAfrica, 2020\nreach $50 billion per year by 2050, in a 2-degree\nOther flows: $0.6 bn\nCelsius scenario (GCA 2021), and mitigation costs\nfor a clean energy transition in Africa have been\nestimated at around $190 billion per year until 2030 Public grants: Private flows:\n$7.5 bn $3.1 bn\n(IEA 2022). However, climate funding to the region\nremains well below these needs, with private and\npublic sources estimated at about $22 billion in 2020,\nas shown in Figure 13 (Analytical Note “Closing the\nPublic non-\nPublic concessional\nGap: Concessional Climate Finance and Sub-Saharan concessional\ndebt: $7.7 bn\nAfrica”). Advanced economies have also fallen far debt: $3.5 bn\nshort of a 2009 pledge to mobilize $100 billion a year\nfor climate actions in developing countries. Source: Climate Policy Initiative.\nIt is important that resources allocated towards climate change do not crowd out those devoted to basic needs\nand other development goals. Official development assistance, for instance, has been declining over the last two\ndecades, and despite a temporary surge during the COVID-19 pandemic, aid flows are likely to shrink further\nover the near term. More support from advanced economies is needed to ensure that the essential development\nneeds of African countries are adequately financed, with the objective of fostering strong, resilient, and inclusive\ngrowth. Furthermore, climate finance must come on top of current aid flows rather than replacing them.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 13\nTherefore, what can be done to mobilize the additional climate financing to the region?\n Unlock more concessional finance. Sub-Saharan African countries encounter challenges in accessing conces-\nsional climate finance, in part because requirements vary greatly across financing providers. For example,\nclimate funds—a key channel for concessional financing—have the potential to be scaled up significantly to\nhelp meet the region’s climate adaptation and mitigation needs. However, the numerous access require-\nments and project selection criteria for these funds present serious hurdles for countries in the region seeking\nto access this financing. To help unlock concessional financing, development partners—including the IMF—\ncan support countries in building and strengthening capacity. Priority areas include governance and public\nfinancial management, development of adequate data and climate strategies, formulation of legal and regu-\nlatory frameworks, and financial system reforms.\n Increase private climate finance. The private sector has the potential to mobilize significant climate finance\nin the region as it does in the rest of the world. This can be done by developing the use of financing instru-\nments like green bonds or sustainability-linked bonds and attracting private institutional investors. Increasing\nthe attractiveness of private climate finance will require better data to support financial risk monitoring and\nanalysis on performance indicators, but also more transparency and disclosure.\n Join forces: leverage concessional finance to catalyze private finance. In many cases, the risk-adjusted returns\nof climate projects in the region are insufficiently attractive to international or domestic investors. Concessional\nfinance in the form of guarantees, loan tenure extension, below market pricing and subordinated loans can\nhelp reduce the risks associated with climate projects and raise their attractiveness to private investors. This\n“crowding in” of private sector finance could increase the scale of climate infrastructure projects, although\nprivate funding is a difficult and complex issue, where options and best practices are still being developed.\nThe IMF’s new Resilience and Sustainability Facility is an important new financing instrument that will help\nsub-Saharan Africa address longer-term structural challenges, including those posed by climate change. It was\nlaunched in 2022, and five countries are already benefiting from the facility, including one from sub-Saharan\nAfrica (Rwanda). The Resilience and Sustainability Facility provides financing to support both adaptation and\nmitigation efforts, while also providing a framework of transparency, credibility, and stability that are essential in\nincentivizing private sector investments in climate resilient infrastructure and renewable energy projects.\nConclusion\nPolicymakers in sub-Saharan Africa are looking at yet at another difficult year, facing tighter financing conditions\non top of the ongoing repercussions from a recent cascading series of shocks. Despite serious financing\nconstraints, there are still a few policy levers available to alleviate the situation. For instance, domestic revenue\nmobilization offers a potential source of financing. Moreover, improving domestic legal and regulatory\nframeworks and undertaking financial systems reforms would not only attract much needed climate finance but\nalso other types of private finance to the region that can help address basic needs and development goals in\naddition to those arising from climate change. Above all, sub-Saharan Africa will require international assistance\nin addressing the funding squeeze. The IMF also stands ready to support the region. As of March 2023, the\nIMF has lending arrangements with 21 countries in the region and has received many program requests. The\ndisbursements associated with IMF programs, emergency financing facilities, and the special drawing rights\nallocation represented $50 billion between 2020 and 2022.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n14 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nReferences\nGlobal Center on Adaptation (GCA). 2021. State and Trends in Adaptation Report 2021. How Adaptation Can\nMake Africa Safer, Greener and More Prosperous in a Warming World.\nhttps://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GCA_STA_2021_Complete_website.pdf\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA). 2022. “Africa Energy Outlook 2022.” World Energy Outlook Report.\nInternational Energy Agency, Paris.\nSelassie, Abebe Aemro. 2022. “The Return of Macroeconomic Imbalances: Adapting to Life on\nthe Edge.” Remarks at the 13th Andrew Crockett Lecture Governors’ Roundtable for African\nCentral Bankers, All Souls College, Oxford. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/06/27/\nsp062722-13th-andrew-crockett-lecture-governors-roundtable-for-african-central-bankers.\nSelassie, Abebe Aemro. 2023. Remarks at the 2023 Oxford Center for the Study of African Economies\nConference, St Catherine’s College, Oxford. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/03/20/\nsp032023-abebe-selassie-2023-oxford-csae-conference.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 15\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff estimates\nas of March 30, 2023, consistent with the projections underlying the April 2023 World Economic Outlook.\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department. Data defini-\ntions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible. However, in some cases,\ndata limitations limit comparability across countries.\nCountry Groupings\n Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive\ncountries, and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\n The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.\n The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent\n25 percent or more of total exports.\n The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other\nresource-intensive countries.\n Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income,\nand countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\n The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged\nover three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.\n The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2019–21 of more than $1,085.00\n(World Bank, using the Atlas method).\n The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2019–21 equal to or lower\nthan $1,085.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\n The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification\nof Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.\n The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown on\npage vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC;\nthe Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community (EAC-5); the\nEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community\n(SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for Rwanda and\nBurundi, which joined the group only in 2007.\nMethods of Aggregation\n In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as\nthe arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity\nas a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook\n(WEO) database.\n In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of data\nfor individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.\nThe source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.\n In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic\naverage of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share\nof total group GDP.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n16 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4\nTables SA1.,SA3.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2023, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data\nare subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA2.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2023, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data\nare subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA4.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2023, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for\nreserves data.\n2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate\nfor reserves data.\n3 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n4 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data\nare subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 17\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 2.0 –5.6 1.1 2.8 3.5 3.7 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 11.7 10.8\nBenin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.0 6.0 5.9 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.5 3.0 2.0\nBotswana 4.1 –8.7 11.8 6.4 3.7 4.3 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 6.5 5.2\nBurkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 2.5 4.9 5.9 1.0 1.9 3.9 14.1 1.5 2.3\nBurundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 3.3 6.0 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 16.0 13.0\nCabo Verde 4.0 –14.8 7.0 10.5 4.4 5.4 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 4.5 2.0\nCameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.4 4.3 4.4 1.9 2.5 2.3 5.3 5.9 4.7\nCentral African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.4 2.5 3.8 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.8 6.3 2.7\nChad 2.4 –2.1 –1.1 2.5 3.5 3.7 1.9 4.5 –0.8 5.3 3.4 3.0\nComoros 3.1 –0.2 2.1 2.4 3.0 3.6 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.0 8.1 1.4\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.5 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.0 10.8 7.2\nCongo, Republic of –0.5 –6.2 1.5 2.8 4.1 4.6 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.5 3.3 3.2\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.5 1.7 7.0 6.7 6.2 6.6 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 3.7 1.8\nEquatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.2 –3.2 1.6 –1.8 –8.2 2.5 4.8 –0.1 5.0 5.7 5.2\nEritrea 4.6 –0.5 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.6 5.6 6.6 7.4 6.4 4.1\nEswatini 2.5 –1.6 7.9 0.5 2.8 2.5 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 5.4 4.8\nEthiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.4 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 31.4 23.5\nGabon 3.7 –1.9 1.5 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.4 2.6\nThe Gambia 2.5 0.6 4.3 4.4 5.6 6.3 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 11.3 8.7\nGhana 6.5 0.5 5.4 3.2 1.6 2.9 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.9 45.4 22.2\nGuinea 6.2 4.9 4.3 4.3 5.6 5.7 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 8.1 7.5\nGuinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 3.5 4.5 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 5.0 3.0\nKenya 4.7 –0.3 7.5 5.4 5.3 5.4 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.8 5.6\nLesotho 1.5 –3.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.2 6.8 5.5\nLiberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.3 5.5 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 6.9 5.9\nMadagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.2 4.2 4.8 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 9.5 8.8\nMalawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 2.4 3.2 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 24.7 18.3\nMali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.7 5.0 5.1 1.1 0.5 3.8 10.1 5.0 2.8\nMauritius 3.7 –14.6 3.5 8.3 4.6 4.1 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 9.5 6.9\nMozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.3 4.1 5.0 8.2 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 7.4 6.5\nNamibia 2.8 –8.0 2.7 3.8 2.8 2.6 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 5.0 4.6\nNiger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.1 6.1 13.0 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 2.8 2.5\nNigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.0 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 20.1 15.8\nRwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 6.8 6.2 7.5 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 8.2 5.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 4.0 3.0 1.9 0.9 2.0 2.5 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 17.9 7.3\nSenegal 5.0 1.3 6.1 4.7 8.3 10.6 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 5.0 2.0\nSeychelles 4.7 –7.7 7.9 8.8 3.9 3.9 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.7 3.1 3.7\nSierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 2.8 3.1 4.8 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 37.8 25.9\nSouth Africa 1.6 –6.3 4.9 2.0 0.1 1.8 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.8 4.8\nSouth Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 6.6 5.6 4.6 98.6 24.0 30.2 17.6 27.8 10.0\nTanzania 6.7 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.2 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.9 4.3\nTogo 5.7 1.8 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.3 2.9\nUganda 5.3 –1.3 6.0 4.9 5.7 5.7 6.8 2.8 2.2 6.8 7.6 6.4\nZambia 4.3 –2.8 4.6 3.4 4.0 4.1 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 8.9 7.7\nZimbabwe1 4.6 –7.8 8.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 172.2 134.6\nSub-Saharan Africa 3.7 –1.7 4.8 3.9 3.6 4.2 8.3 10.1 11.0 14.5 14.0 10.5\nMedian 4.4 –1.2 4.6 3.7 4.2 4.6 4.5 3.9 4.6 8.2 6.8 5.2\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 0.0 5.2 4.8 4.8 5.4 8.0 11.1 10.7 15.2 14.1 10.1\nOil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 11.2 13.0 15.9 17.2 16.8 13.4\nExcluding Nigeria 2.0 –3.6 1.5 2.9 3.4 3.3 10.2 12.3 13.2 13.0 8.5 7.4\nOil-importing countries 4.4 –1.3 5.7 4.3 3.7 4.7 6.7 8.6 8.5 13.1 12.5 9.0\nExcluding South Africa 5.8 0.8 6.0 5.1 5.1 5.8 7.5 10.9 10.2 15.6 15.2 10.6\nMiddle-income countries 3.1 –2.9 4.5 3.4 2.9 3.4 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 13.0 9.6\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.2 –1.7 5.0 4.4 4.3 4.7 7.4 7.9 9.1 12.5 11.7 7.6\nLow-income countries 6.0 1.9 5.4 5.1 5.4 6.1 8.8 14.8 12.5 18.2 16.7 12.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile\nand conflict-affected situations 5.6 1.0 5.6 4.5 5.1 5.7 7.8 4.9 4.8 8.2 8.5 6.9\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.4 10.3 15.6 16.4 20.3 20.0 15.5\nCFA franc zone 4.4 0.6 4.5 4.8 5.2 5.9 1.6 2.4 2.8 6.4 4.1 2.7\nCEMAC 2.4 –1.4 1.7 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 4.9 4.9 4.0\nWAEMU 5.7 1.7 5.9 5.7 6.1 7.4 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.1 3.7 2.1\nCOMESA (SSA members) 5.8 0.5 6.5 5.4 5.3 5.6 9.4 17.1 14.6 19.4 18.5 14.1\nEAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.6 5.1 5.4 5.8 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.0 7.0 5.4\nECOWAS 4.0 –0.6 4.4 3.9 3.8 4.2 9.3 10.2 12.7 17.0 17.9 12.6\nSACU 1.8 –6.4 5.2 2.3 0.4 2.0 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.8 4.8\nSADC 2.8 –4.4 4.6 3.2 2.3 3.4 7.7 10.7 9.6 11.5 9.6 8.0\nSee sources on page 16.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n18 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 1.6 -0.2 -1.9 59.8 138.9 86.9 67.0 63.3 59.2\nBenin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 -4.3 -2.9 30.1 46.1 50.3 52.4 52.8 51.6\nBotswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 –2.0 -2.7 -1.5 17.6 18.7 19.0 19.9 20.6 19.3\nBurkina Faso –3.3 –5.1 –7.4 –10.4 -7.8 -6.7 30.3 44.9 48.2 54.3 58.0 60.2\nBurundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –12.1 -4.6 -2.7 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.3 69.5 61.0\nCabo Verde –5.5 –9.1 –7.3 –4.5 -5.0 -3.6 111.0 145.1 142.9 127.4 120.2 117.9\nCameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.8 -0.8 -0.6 27.6 44.9 46.8 46.4 42.8 40.4\nCentral African Republic –1.3 –3.4 –6.0 –5.6 -3.0 -2.1 47.4 43.4 47.6 50.7 49.1 48.5\nChad –0.9 2.1 –1.6 5.1 7.0 4.5 41.1 54.1 55.9 50.4 43.7 40.1\nComoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –3.7 -6.4 -5.6 18.1 24.0 25.4 29.1 32.5 35.7\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 0.1 –1.4 –0.9 –1.6 -1.5 -2.5 18.0 16.7 16.3 14.6 11.0 9.0\nCongo, Republic of –2.1 –1.2 1.8 6.6 4.8 5.1 62.3 112.1 107.9 99.6 96.5 89.2\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.8 –6.7 -5.1 -4.0 32.4 46.3 50.9 56.8 63.3 60.6\nEquatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.7 2.6 4.7 3.3 1.7 25.2 48.4 42.6 27.1 26.4 29.5\nEritrea –2.9 –4.4 –4.1 –1.3 -0.1 0.6 173.6 179.7 175.4 163.8 146.3 135.3\nEswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.6 –5.7 0.7 -0.8 22.5 41.2 41.5 45.4 39.3 37.2\nEthiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 -3.5 -3.0 49.5 53.9 53.8 46.4 37.6 33.3\nGabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 1.8 0.9 0.3 44.5 78.3 65.8 55.1 60.3 58.2\nThe Gambia –4.3 –2.2 –4.6 –4.8 -2.7 -2.1 70.2 85.9 83.5 84.0 73.0 68.6\nGhana –6.6 –17.4 –12.1 –9.9 -7.3 -8.4 49.6 72.3 79.6 88.8 98.7 92.8\nGuinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.7 –0.7 -2.3 -2.4 40.2 47.5 40.6 33.4 30.0 30.1\nGuinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.6 –5.5 -3.8 -3.2 55.6 78.2 78.9 79.5 76.5 74.7\nKenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.1 –6.0 -5.2 -4.4 46.7 67.8 67.0 67.9 66.6 65.4\nLesotho –2.9 0.3 –4.4 –3.4 2.5 8.4 41.8 60.0 56.4 57.9 58.5 57.3\nLiberia –3.9 –3.8 –2.4 –6.9 -4.9 -3.9 28.7 58.7 53.3 55.4 57.1 56.1\nMadagascar –2.1 –4.0 –2.8 –6.8 -3.0 -3.3 38.1 51.2 52.3 57.0 53.1 52.0\nMalawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –10.4 -7.8 -8.0 35.5 54.8 61.6 70.1 72.2 69.4\nMali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.8 -4.8 -4.3 31.5 46.9 50.7 53.2 54.1 54.9\nMauritius –3.3 –10.4 –4.0 –3.2 -4.2 -3.6 62.2 94.6 88.4 80.9 78.1 77.1\nMozambique –4.4 –5.4 –3.6 –5.2 -4.8 -3.1 78.9 120.0 107.2 104.5 102.8 103.1\nNamibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.8 –7.3 -4.1 -2.7 38.6 66.6 72.0 71.3 68.5 66.8\nNiger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.9 -5.3 -4.1 28.2 45.0 51.3 51.1 52.5 49.4\nNigeria –3.1 –5.6 –6.0 –5.5 -5.3 -5.4 21.9 34.5 36.5 38.0 38.8 39.0\nRwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –6.5 -5.4 -6.1 33.0 65.6 66.6 64.4 67.1 71.1\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –4.7 5.9 1.5 8.1 2.7 2.3 81.3 81.4 70.6 58.1 54.8 54.2\nSenegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.1 -4.9 -4.0 47.2 69.2 73.2 75.0 73.1 69.9\nSeychelles 1.5 –16.3 –5.5 –1.0 -2.0 -1.8 67.0 84.8 72.9 63.4 62.5 60.0\nSierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.9 -6.2 -2.9 51.5 76.3 79.3 98.8 92.2 84.9\nSouth Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.6 –4.5 -5.9 -6.1 45.0 69.0 69.0 71.0 72.3 74.0\nSouth Sudan –5.7 –5.6 –9.4 0.9 5.8 7.0 53.0 49.9 58.5 39.6 48.4 46.1\nTanzania –2.7 –2.5 –3.4 –3.3 -2.9 -2.6 36.3 39.8 42.1 41.6 40.1 38.5\nTogo –3.9 –6.9 –4.6 –7.3 -6.1 -5.3 48.8 60.3 63.7 68.0 68.5 69.0\nUganda –3.0 –7.5 –7.5 –5.8 -4.1 -3.3 27.8 46.3 50.6 50.8 50.2 49.2\nZambia1 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.9 -6.3 -6.7 50.9 140.2 110.8 … … …\nZimbabwe2 –3.4 0.8 –2.2 –2.1 -3.0 -2.2 51.8 84.4 59.8 92.8 102.3 100.0\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.4 –5.0 –4.4 -4.3 -4.2 37.6 57.1 56.6 56.5 55.5 53.9\nMedian –3.1 –5.1 –4.6 –4.8 -4.1 -2.9 41.4 60.0 59.8 57.9 60.3 59.2\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.1 –5.7 –4.4 –4.0 -3.3 -3.1 42.6 63.3 60.1 59.2 57.0 53.9\nOil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.7 –4.1 –3.1 -3.4 -3.8 30.4 48.8 46.3 45.1 44.5 43.6\nExcluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.1 0.5 1.6 0.8 -0.3 48.7 89.9 70.1 59.3 56.8 53.8\nOil-importing countries –3.8 –7.4 –5.5 –5.1 -4.8 -4.5 42.7 61.4 61.6 62.9 61.5 59.6\nExcluding South Africa –3.6 –6.4 –5.4 –5.4 -4.3 -3.8 41.2 58.0 58.0 59.1 57.1 53.9\nMiddle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.4 –4.5 -4.6 -4.8 37.2 59.1 58.6 58.7 58.8 57.9\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.5 –7.6 –4.8 –3.8 -3.3 -3.3 45.1 74.3 68.4 66.7 66.6 63.7\nLow-income countries –2.6 –3.6 –3.8 –4.2 -3.3 -3.0 39.4 51.2 50.5 50.5 46.9 43.8\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile\nand conflict-affected situations –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –4.9 -3.7 -3.4 35.5 48.0 50.0 50.1 48.3 47.0\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations –2.8 –4.4 –4.7 –4.4 -4.1 -4.0 28.8 42.7 43.4 44.1 42.6 41.0\nCFA franc zone –2.7 –4.3 –4.0 –3.6 -2.8 -2.4 35.3 53.9 56.0 56.1 57.6 56.0\nCEMAC –2.5 –2.0 –1.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 36.8 59.9 58.1 51.9 50.3 48.3\nWAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.7 -5.3 -4.3 34.7 50.5 54.8 58.7 61.7 60.1\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.5 –5.4 –4.7 –4.9 -3.9 -3.6 42.1 60.4 57.4 57.6 52.7 48.9\nEAC-5 –4.3 –6.3 –6.1 –5.3 -4.3 -3.7 39.2 55.5 56.7 56.7 55.3 53.8\nECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.5 –6.1 -5.4 -5.2 27.7 43.2 46.6 48.4 49.8 48.7\nSACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.5 -5.6 -5.7 43.5 66.5 66.7 68.5 69.4 70.8\nSADC –3.2 –7.0 –3.9 –3.4 -4.1 -4.3 45.1 70.4 64.4 64.5 63.4 62.4\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023\nTHE BIG FUNDING SQUEEZE 19\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 34.6 38.4 24.4 19.5 19.3 19.2 3.0 1.5 11.2 11.0 6.2 3.1\nBenin 28.1 30.5 32.6 32.6 32.6 32.6 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –5.7 –5.8 –5.0\nBotswana 44.7 52.5 45.3 44.1 46.2 45.9 2.0 –8.7 –0.5 3.1 3.3 5.4\nBurkina Faso 32.3 43.6 49.0 41.9 43.1 43.6 –5.1 4.1 –0.4 –5.2 –3.6 –2.7\nBurundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.3 57.8 59.7 –14.1 –10.3 –12.4 –15.7 –15.6 –13.2\nCabo Verde 92.9 114.3 107.1 99.3 98.4 98.8 –6.9 –15.0 –11.3 –7.5 –5.0 –4.0\nCameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 30.7 30.2 30.5 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –1.6 –2.8 –3.0\nCentral African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 29.6 28.9 –7.1 –8.2 –11.0 –13.3 –8.8 –7.4\nChad 14.6 20.8 23.3 21.3 21.2 20.4 –7.6 –7.3 –4.5 2.8 –1.4 –4.9\nComoros 25.1 31.2 36.7 36.7 35.0 33.5 –3.1 –1.7 0.8 –4.6 –7.3 –6.4\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 20.2 22.2 21.1 22.1 23.3 –4.4 –2.2 –0.9 –2.2 –3.9 –3.0\nCongo, Republic of 27.4 35.8 34.0 31.8 36.8 38.3 –3.2 13.5 14.6 21.2 4.8 0.1\nCôte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 15.2 14.5 13.6 13.3 –0.3 –3.1 –4.0 –6.5 –5.7 –5.3\nEquatorial Guinea 13.2 17.1 14.7 10.4 10.4 10.4 –7.6 –4.2 –3.6 0.0 –2.1 –5.8\nEritrea 207.6 232.1 232.1 232.1 232.1 232.1 14.9 14.2 14.1 12.9 14.1 12.4\nEswatini 26.8 32.3 30.3 29.8 28.9 28.5 6.0 7.1 2.7 –1.7 3.4 3.5\nEthiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 26.7 26.3 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –3.4 –2.6\nGabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 21.9 24.6 26.6 2.4 –6.9 –4.5 1.2 –0.1 –1.1\nThe Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.5 55.3 52.6 51.2 –7.6 –3.0 –3.8 –15.0 –13.8 –10.5\nGhana 24.1 30.8 29.5 29.3 27.2 26.6 –5.5 –3.8 –3.7 –2.3 –2.9 –2.0\nGuinea 24.2 27.6 25.7 27.9 24.4 24.9 –16.3 –16.1 –2.1 –6.2 –5.2 –4.6\nGuinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.6 48.4 47.1 46.7 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –5.9 –4.9 –4.7\nKenya 36.8 37.2 35.0 33.2 32.0 31.8 –6.9 –4.8 –5.2 –4.7 –5.3 –5.3\nLesotho 34.2 40.3 37.2 34.8 34.2 34.2 –6.1 –1.0 –4.4 –4.4 0.6 1.0\nLiberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 25.1 25.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.9 –15.7 –17.0 –18.3\nMadagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 34.3 35.0 36.0 –2.7 –5.4 –5.0 –5.6 –5.7 –5.1\nMalawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 24.7 24.9 –10.2 –13.8 –12.6 –3.6 –12.2 –13.3\nMali 27.1 36.1 39.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 –5.2 –2.2 –8.2 –6.9 –6.2 –5.5\nMauritius 104.3 156.8 160.0 142.8 130.8 131.0 –5.8 –8.8 –13.3 –13.5 –8.2 –6.8\nMozambique 33.5 43.3 43.6 43.7 43.5 42.2 –31.1 –27.3 –22.8 –36.0 –13.3 –34.6\nNamibia 58.3 71.6 71.4 70.4 69.7 69.6 –8.1 2.6 –9.8 –13.5 –5.3 –3.7\nNiger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.7 20.8 20.8 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –15.5 –12.8 –8.1\nNigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 27.3 28.7 1.2 –3.7 –0.4 –0.7 –0.6 –0.5\nRwanda 22.4 29.4 30.4 30.4 29.9 30.5 –10.5 –12.1 –10.9 –11.6 –13.2 –12.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 36.6 32.5 29.4 27.9 26.3 26.3 –15.6 –11.0 –11.2 –13.8 –11.8 –11.3\nSenegal 34.6 45.3 47.8 49.0 49.7 50.0 –7.2 –10.9 –13.6 –16.0 –10.4 –4.6\nSeychelles 66.9 113.3 108.2 101.6 101.8 100.9 –15.7 –13.5 –10.4 –7.3 –9.2 –10.0\nSierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 33.9 30.0 28.0 –21.9 –7.1 –8.7 –10.3 –6.1 –5.1\nSouth Africa 66.4 74.1 70.3 71.8 71.9 72.7 –3.5 2.0 3.7 –0.5 –2.3 –2.6\nSouth Sudan 20.7 18.4 14.9 9.6 10.2 10.3 4.5 –19.2 –9.5 6.7 6.3 5.7\nTanzania 22.1 20.9 21.3 21.0 20.9 20.8 –7.0 –1.9 –3.4 –4.6 –4.0 –3.3\nTogo 37.6 45.4 47.5 49.1 50.4 51.0 –5.1 –0.3 –0.9 –2.8 –4.0 –3.7\nUganda 17.4 22.4 21.8 20.7 20.6 20.7 –5.7 –9.5 –8.3 –8.1 –10.9 –11.9\nZambia 21.0 31.3 24.3 24.3 24.2 23.9 0.3 10.6 9.2 2.4 3.8 4.5\nZimbabwe1 24.1 14.8 14.9 16.0 13.5 13.9 –7.9 2.5 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.8\nSub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.2 36.7 36.6 36.9 –2.7 –2.8 –1.1 –2.0 –2.6 –2.7\nMedian 26.4 31.2 31.1 31.8 30.0 30.5 –5.5 –4.2 –4.2 –4.7 –5.0 –4.6\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.1 32.6 31.4 30.0 29.4 29.4 –4.5 –4.1 –3.3 –3.1 –3.5 –3.7\nOil-exporting countries 25.3 27.2 25.2 24.9 26.1 27.1 0.9 –3.2 0.7 1.8 0.5 –0.2\nExcluding Nigeria 27.5 32.0 25.2 22.5 22.8 23.1 0.2 –1.7 3.2 7.0 2.8 0.4\nOil-importing countries 41.6 44.9 43.6 43.0 42.1 41.9 –5.2 –2.6 –1.9 –4.1 –4.2 –4.1\nExcluding South Africa 28.2 32.7 32.7 31.6 30.8 30.7 –6.4 –4.6 –4.7 –5.7 –5.0 –4.7\nMiddle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.7 39.7 40.2 –1.5 –1.8 0.2 –0.6 –1.5 –1.6\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.8 36.1 32.9 31.3 30.6 30.6 –2.1 –2.8 –1.9 –0.7 –1.8 –2.0\nLow-income countries 24.6 28.7 29.6 28.5 28.2 28.2 –8.0 –5.5 –4.9 –5.8 –5.3 –5.5\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile\nand conflict-affected situations 21.6 24.6 24.8 25.5 25.1 25.3 –8.0 –6.8 –5.9 –6.4 –7.2 –6.9\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 25.1 27.7 28.3 27.9 28.7 29.5 –1.7 –3.8 –1.8 –2.2 –2.0 –2.2\nCFA franc zone 22.0 27.7 29.5 28.8 29.1 29.4 –3.7 –3.6 –4.7 –4.4 –4.8 –4.3\nCEMAC 20.5 25.9 26.4 26.0 26.8 27.5 –3.3 –2.8 –2.1 2.1 –1.4 –2.9\nWAEMU 23.0 28.7 31.1 30.1 30.2 30.2 –4.3 –4.0 –6.2 –8.4 –6.8 –5.1\nCOMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.5 33.8 32.2 31.2 31.2 –5.7 –4.1 –3.7 –4.2 –4.6 –4.2\nEAC-5 27.4 29.2 28.4 27.4 26.8 26.8 –7.0 –5.1 –5.6 –5.8 –6.4 –6.3\nECOWAS 24.2 27.0 27.4 27.6 28.2 29.0 –1.0 –4.2 –2.4 –3.0 –2.6 –2.0\nSACU 64.6 72.4 68.5 69.7 69.9 70.5 –3.4 1.6 3.1 –0.7 –2.1 –2.2\nSADC 49.6 54.7 50.8 50.6 50.0 50.1 –3.4 –0.1 1.9 –0.4 –1.6 –2.4\nSee sources on page 16.\nAPRIL 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n20 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 33.6 90.9 68.9 44.2 46.2 45.9 9.3 9.5 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.8\nBenin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 38.3 38.7 38.1 … ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 10.4 10.9 9.5 11.4 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.8 7.2\nBurkina Faso1 20.2 24.4 24.0 25.4 24.7 23.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.3 27.6 28.8 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.5 2.2 3.4\nCabo Verde 85.5 130.3 114.9 108.1 101.1 98.2 5.7 6.9 6.8 6.2 6.2 6.5\nCameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 32.9 30.5 29.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 29.2 36.3 32.8 34.4 31.8 30.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 24.2 28.2 24.4 23.0 21.8 21.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 17.2 23.1 24.5 28.4 31.6 34.8 7.1 7.9 9.4 7.4 7.5 7.7\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 14.1 13.8 14.8 13.4 10.1 8.3 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9\nCongo, Republic of 2 25.4 31.9 26.6 27.0 27.1 24.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.6 30.8 36.1 36.7 35.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.8 16.3 12.2 8.4 9.0 9.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea 62.2 57.3 55.2 51.2 45.8 42.8 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.5 5.0 5.3\nEswatini 8.8 15.2 15.2 18.6 19.3 19.8 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.4\nEthiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.0 18.2 15.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.5\nGabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 31.1 33.1 32.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.5 48.3 44.7 42.0 3.6 5.8 7.0 5.1 4.5 4.2\nGhana 26.3 39.2 38.2 42.7 51.8 54.1 2.8 2.5 2.4 0.6 0.8 1.7\nGuinea 23.2 27.0 24.8 21.9 19.5 20.4 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5\nGuinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.2 40.0 36.7 34.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 23.6 32.2 32.3 31.9 33.5 33.9 4.6 4.5 4.7 3.7 3.0 3.3\nLesotho 35.3 46.6 41.0 42.5 44.6 44.5 4.8 4.1 5.1 4.0 4.5 5.6\nLiberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 37.2 38.1 38.1 2.1 2.2 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.5\nMadagascar 23.4 36.4 37.2 38.9 39.9 39.9 3.4 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.6\nMalawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 29.9 33.2 34.4 2.5 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.3 2.8\nMali1 22.8 31.5 27.2 26.7 25.1 23.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.3 20.2 23.3 23.5 24.5 23.8 8.4 14.4 12.5 12.1 10.0 9.8\nMozambique 63.8 90.7 85.1 76.1 72.7 73.6 3.5 4.7 2.6 2.9 2.1 2.1\nNamibia 12.6 21.3 15.7 17.2 16.9 15.5 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8\nNiger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 33.0 32.7 30.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.8 6.1 6.6 6.0 5.7 6.0 6.3\nRwanda 28.0 54.7 53.4 51.5 55.7 61.7 3.9 5.4 4.4 3.7 3.7 4.1\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 75.1 64.9 58.5 58.1 54.8 54.2 3.8 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.8\nSenegal1 32.9 48.9 45.8 47.5 43.5 39.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 35.4 38.8 39.5 31.1 33.7 34.1 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.6\nSierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 51.0 56.8 53.0 3.2 4.6 6.1 4.6 3.7 3.3\nSouth Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 20.7 22.0 22.1 5.8 6.4 5.5 5.2 4.8 4.4\nSouth Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.7 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.9\nTanzania 25.9 28.4 28.8 27.4 26.3 25.0 4.8 5.3 4.3 3.9 3.8 4.0\nTogo1 13.4 28.3 25.4 27.5 26.2 26.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 16.9 29.8 27.7 26.8 28.9 29.1 4.6 4.3 4.6 3.4 3.4 3.8\nZambia3 26.4 66.6 53.9 … … … 2.7 1.3 2.9 3.1 3.3 4.2\nZimbabwe4 31.7 26.6 19.8 21.5 23.6 26.3 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.2\nSub-Saharan Africa 16.6 26.5 24.6 24.2 24.3 23.8 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1\nMedian 22.8 32.1 30.8 31.1 32.3 31.0 3.8 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.8\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.4 36.6 33.9 31.8 31.4 30.4 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.9 3.1\nOil-exporting countries 11.2 20.1 19.5 18.0 17.9 17.8 6.3 6.4 5.6 5.5 5.8 6.1\nExcluding Nigeria 27.6 55.8 45.4 36.1 36.8 36.5 6.7 5.6 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.5\nOil-importing countries 20.3 29.9 27.2 27.6 27.7 27.1 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.4 3.1 3.1\nExcluding South Africa 23.7 32.9 31.4 30.7 30.1 29.0 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.6\nMiddle-income countries 14.7 25.2 23.2 23.2 23.9 23.7 5.8 5.8 5.2 4.9 4.8 5.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.6 42.0 37.9 35.7 37.1 36.5 5.4 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.8 4.2\nLow-income countries 24.5 30.5 29.1 27.1 25.2 24.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.0\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile\nand conflict-affected situations 22.5 32.0 31.1 30.1 30.2 30.0 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.6\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 11.1 17.2 17.4 16.7 15.7 15.3 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.0 4.0 4.2\nCFA franc zone 21.0 33.7 30.8 32.2 31.8 30.9 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.9\nCEMAC 20.9 33.0 28.2 27.1 26.8 26.2 4.2 3.2 3.0 4.2 4.3 4.5\nWAEMU 21.3 34.1 32.3 35.3 34.6 33.4 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.1 3.6 3.7\nCOMESA (SSA members) 22.2 30.2 29.1 26.7 25.4 24.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.4\nEAC-5 23.1 31.5 31.3 30.4 31.4 31.3 4.6 4.7 4.5 3.7 3.4 3.7\nECOWAS 9.9 18.6 19.2 19.7 20.1 20.0 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.8\nSACU 14.9 23.0 18.3 20.3 21.4 21.4 5.9 6.3 5.4 5.3 4.9 4.6\nSADC 20.4 32.2 27.0 26.4 26.9 26.5 5.7 5.6 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.4\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2023", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2023/April/English/text.ashx"} |