Add files using upload-large-folder tool

dedup/cb_requests/000e466327b2685b875dfdcfa7b7ff80.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "000e466327b2685b875dfdcfa7b7ff80", "text": "1 \n \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 140 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 24th AND TUESDAY 25th JANUARY, \n2022 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) held its first meeting for the year 2022 on \nthe 24th and 25th of January 2022 in the light of waning optimism for a robust \nrebound in global recovery in 2021. This resulted from the persistence of the \nCOVID-19 pandemic and emergence of new variants of the virus; persisting \nsupply \nbottlenecks; \nglobal \ninflationary \npressures; \nand \nthe \nimminent \ncommencement of monetary policy normalization by some major central \nbanks. In the domestic economy, output growth recovery was relatively strong \nin 2021. It is however, expected to continue reasonably in 2022, following \nconsiderable improvement in the third quarter of 2021 and a positive outlook \nfor the fourth quarter. This was hinged on the continued support of the monetary \nand fiscal authorities to sustain the current momentum. The Committee \nreviewed the developments in the global and domestic economic and \nfinancial environments in 2021, as well as the outlook and risks for 2022. \nTen (10) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted that while the recovery of the global economy in 2021 \nfell \nbelow \nthe \ninitial \nforecast, \nfinal \nestimates \nshowed \nconsiderable \nimprovements over the 2020 outcome, evidence that the global economy was \npulling out of the doldrum associated with the pandemic. Consequently, the \nrecovery is gaining momentum with increasing consumer spending, upswing in \ninvestments and soaring world merchandise trade, above pre-pandemic levels. \nThis reflects the resilience of economic agents in the face of new strains of the \n2 \n \n \nvirus and rising infection rates. The Committee, however, took cognizance of \nsignificant headwinds confronting the global economy in 2022, largely \nassociated with the persisting threats of new variants of the coronavirus. The \nAdvanced Economies are however, in a strong position to offset the impact of \nthese headwinds with stronger policy support and better access to COVID-19 \nvaccines. Consequently, this group of economies have shown better resilience \ntowards disruptions to the recovery. In the medium term however, the rising \ninflationary pressures and the gradual withdrawal of both monetary and fiscal \nstimuli may dampen the recovery in 2022. \nIn the Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), poor access to \nvaccines and limited policy support meant that this group of economies have \nbeen harder hit by the Covid-19 health crisis and its associated \nmacroeconomic downturn. In China, one of the few countries that stayed out \nof recession in 2020, output weakened in the third quarter of 2021 and has \ncontinued to weaken as the Covid infections continue to rage amid power \nsupply shortages and a turbulent property market. Following the containment \nof the infections in India, the economy has commenced a sharp recovery and \nis set to continue on an upward trajectory. Overall, growth in the EMDEs is \nexpected to slow in 2022 due to the low level of vaccination and limited policy \nsupport in several economies in this group. \nOn price development, the MPC observed that inflation, in most Advanced \nEconomies remained high and unlikely to abate in the short to medium term. \nThis is driven by the persistence of supply side disruptions and pent-up demand \nassociated with economic recovery. In the EMDEs, inflation has remained high \ndue to a combination of persisting exchange rate pressures and supply \nbottlenecks associated with the lockdown restrictions. With the US Fed and \ncentral banks of other advanced economies now moving towards monetary \npolicy normalization, the eventual interest rate hike may likely trigger huge \ncapital outflow from the EMDEs which will further aggravate exchange rate \npressures with a pass-through to domestic prices. \n3 \n \n \nGlobal financial markets data show significant sell-off, as investors continued to \nrebalance their portfolios with the shift from assets such as gold and emerging \nmarket securities to securities of Advanced Economies suggesting market \nresponse to the impending interest rate hike. Thus, global financial conditions \nare expected to tighten as risk averse portfolio investors reassign their portfolios \nfrom perceived riskier emerging market securities, to less risky advanced \neconomy securities with the expectation of improved yields. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nStaff projections showed that the economy is expected to remain on a path of \npositive growth, given the impressive performance in the third quarter of 2021 \nand continuing rebound in economic activities. The Committee noted with \nsatisfaction, the significant improvement in the Manufacturing Purchasing \nManagers’ Index (PMI), which rose to 52.0 index points in December 2021, \ncompared with 50.8 index points in November reflecting the continuing \neconomic recovery. This expansion was driven largely by increasing business \nactivities in the economy, leading to increase in new orders and uptrend in \nemployment and production levels. The Non-Manufacturing PMI, however, \ndeclined marginally to 48.0 index points in December 2021 from 48.6 points in \nNovember, largely reflecting a decline in services. \nThe Committee noted with concern, the slight increase in headline inflation \n(year-on-year) to 15.63 per cent in December 2021 from 15.40 per cent in \nNovember following seven consecutive months of decline. The unexpected \nincrease was attributed to both the food and core components, which rose to \n17.37 and 13.87 per cent in December 2021 from 17.21 and 13.85 per cent in \nNovember, respectively. The Committee, however, expressed confidence in \nthe Bank’s sustained intervention programmes, noting that inflation will continue \nto abate as food supply improves. Members also noted that the seasonal drive \nin price development associated with the December festive period was largely \ncontributory to the marginal increase in price levels, and as such, believe that \nthis episode of increase may be temporary. \n4 \n \n \nReviewing the developments in monetary aggregates, the Committee noted \nthat broad money supply (M3) rose further to 13.77 per cent in December 2021, \ncompared with 10.10 per cent in November 2021. This upthrust was largely \ndriven by the growth in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of 15.58 per cent in \nDecember 2021, compared with 9.40 per cent in November 2021. Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA), however decreased to 6.06 per cent in December 2021, \ncompared with 14.98 per cent in November 2021. The sharp growth in Net \nDomestic Assets (NDA) was largely attributed to an increase in claims on the \nFederal government and other sectors. The slowdown in growth of Net Foreign \nAssets (NFA) resulted from a decrease in foreign assets holdings of the banking \nsystem in favour of more domestic investments. \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s intervention \nprogrammes aimed at stimulating productivity in manufacturing/industries, \nagriculture, energy/infrastructure, healthcare and Micro, Small and Medium \nEnterprises (MSMEs). Between November and December 2021, under the \nAnchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP), the Bank disbursed N75.99 billion to \nsupport the cultivation of over 383,000 hectares of maize, rice and wheat during \nthe 2022 dry season, bringing the cumulative disbursements under the \nProgramme to ₦927.94 billion to over 4.5 million smallholder farmers cultivating \n21 commodities across the country. All excess output aggregated from the \nfinanced farmers will be released to the Nigeria Commodity Exchange (NCX) \nto help moderate the prices of food in the market. The Bank also released N1.76 \nbillion to finance two (2) large-scale agricultural projects under the Commercial \nAgriculture Credit Scheme (CACS). \nIn addition, the Bank disbursed the sum of ₦151.23 billion under the Real Sector \nFacility to 15 additional projects in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and \nservices. The funds were utilized for both greenfield and brownfield (expansion) \nprojects under the Covid-19 Intervention for the Manufacturing Sector (CIMS) \nand the Real Sector Support Facility from Differentiated Cash Reserve \nRequirement (RSSF-DCRR). Cumulative disbursements under the Real Sector \n5 \n \n \nFacility currently stood at ₦1.40 trillion disbursed to 331 projects across the \ncountry. As part of its effort to support the resilience of the healthcare sector, \nthe Bank also disbursed ₦498.00 million to two (2) healthcare projects under the \nHealthcare Sector Intervention Facility (HSIF), bringing the cumulative \ndisbursements to ₦108.85 billion for 118 projects, comprising of 31 \npharmaceuticals, 82 hospital and 4 other services. \nTo support households and businesses affected by Covid-19, the Bank disbursed \nN20.29 billion to 40,521 beneficiaries, comprising 35,340 households and 5,181 \nsmall businesses under the Targeted Credit Facility (TCF) within the period. The \ncumulative disbursements under the TCF stood at N369.78 billion to 777,666 \nbeneficiaries, comprising 648,052 households and 129,614 small businesses. To \nfurther promote entrepreneurship development among Nigerian youths, the \nBank disbursed N293 million to 59 beneficiaries under the recently introduced \nTertiary Institutions Entrepreneurship Scheme (TIES). \nUnder the National Mass Metering Programme (NMMP), the sum of ₦47.83 billion \nwas disbursed for the procurement and installation of 858,026 electricity meters \nacross the country under the Scheme’s Phase-0. The Committee also noted the \nimproved collections by DisCos as a result of increased meter installations. The \nBank released ₦274.33 billion to power sector players, as part of its effort to \nsupport the sector under the Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment Assurance \nFacility (NBET-PAF). This was in addition to the ₦20.58 billion released to \nDistribution Companies (DisCos) under the Nigeria Electricity Market \nStabilisation Facility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). To further support the development of \nenabling infrastructure in the gas industry, the Bank released additional ₦3.00 \nbillion for the augmentation of an existing infrastructure, bringing the \ncumulative disbursements under the Intervention Facility for National Gas \nExpansion Programme (IFNGEP) to ₦42.20 billion for six (6) projects. \n Furthermore, under the 100 for 100 Policy on Production and Productivity (PPP), \nwhich was introduced to stimulate the flow of finance and investments to \nenterprises and projects with potential to kick-start a sustainable economic \n6 \n \n \ngrowth trajectory, accelerate structural transformation, promote diversification, \nand improve productivity, the Bank has received 224 applications, valued at \n₦294.91 billion for real sector projects in agriculture, energy, healthcare, \nmanufacturing and services. The applications are currently being processed \nand the first batch of beneficiaries under the intervention will be announced on \n31st January 2022, with their names published in national dailies. These projects \nhave been carefully selected in line with the approved selection criteria as \ncontained in the guidelinesq \nMoney market rates fluctuated within and above the asymmetric corridor, \nreflecting prevailing liquidity conditions in the banking system. The monthly \nweighted average Open Buyback (OBB) rate increased to 12.75 per cent in \nDecember 2021 from 10.61 per cent in November 2021. The increase in the Open \nBuyback (OBB) rate reflected the tight liquidity conditions in the banking system. \nThe MPC noted the continuing positive performance in the equities market in \nthe review period, with the All-Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) \nincreasing by 1.61 and 1.63 per cent to 42,716.44 and N22.30 trillion on \nDecember 31, 2021, from 42,038.60 and N21.94 trillion on October 29, 2021, \nrespectively. This positive performance reflected improved corporate earnings \nas investors participation increased in the market. \n \nThe MPC also noted the sustained resilience of the banking system, following the \nprogressive improvement in the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio from 5.10 per \ncent in November 2021 to 4.85 per cent in December 2021- a first in a long time. \nThe Committee also noted that the liquidity ratio remained well above its \nprudential limit at 41.3 per cent, though Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) declined \nmarginally to 14.53 per cent in December 2021 from 14.90 per cent in the \nprevious month. The Committee thus, urged the Bank to sustain its firm regulatory \nsurveillance. \n7 \n \n \nMembers also noted the continued improvement in the external reserves despite \nongoing foreign exchange market pressures. The reserves stood at US$40.20 \nbillion as at December 2021. \nOutlook \nThe broad outlook for the recovery in both the global and domestic economies \nis clouded with uncertainty such as the resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic, \ndriven by new and mutating strains of the coronavirus; persisting supply \nbottlenecks; high and rising inflationary pressures; and dwindling monetary and \nfiscal stimuli. \nThe Emerging Markets and Developing Economies are likely to experience a \nsharp downturn as a result of the identified headwinds confronting the outlook. \nThis is hinged on the back of the ongoing two-speed recovery of the global \neconomy, driven by continued disparities in the administration of vaccines \nbetween the Advanced Economies and the Emerging Markets and Developing \nEconomies. While the Advanced Economies will also experience a downturn in \n2022, this group of economies are expected to take a less severe hit as most of \nthem have achieved significant high levels of vaccination. \nStaff forecast project output growth at 3.10 per cent in 2021 with an expected \nbetter \noutcome \nin \n2022, \nconsistent \nwith \nthe \nexpected \nimproved \nmacroeconomic performance. The economic recovery is therefore expected \nto progress gradually with the ongoing support by the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities, progress in COVID-19 vaccinations and continued high crude oil \nprices. \nAfter a moderate increase in December 2021, headline inflation is expected to \ntrend marginally upwards in the short-term before moderating towards the end \nof the first quarter of 2022. This is expected as food harvests progress towards \nthe end of the first quarter of 2022 and improve food supply. In general, with \nthe Bank sustaining its intervention programmes through the year, food inflation \nis expected to trend downwards in 2022. \n8 \n \n \nAvailable forecasts for key macroeconomic variables for the Nigerian \neconomy, indicated expected rebound in output growth for most of 2022, \nsustained by ongoing broad monetary and fiscal stimuli. Accordingly, the \nNigerian economy is forecast to grow in 2022 by 2.86 per cent (CBN), 4.20 per \ncent (FGN) and 2.76 per cent (IMF). \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee accessed the balance of risks confronting the domestic \neconomy in the near term as they impact output growth and price stability. \nMembers noted the unrelenting effort by the monetary and fiscal authorities in \nmitigating the impact of the virus on the economy. It observed the continued \nmoderate recovery of the domestic economy but requires further concerted \npolicy effort by both the monetary and fiscal authorities to improve the \nmomentum and strengthen the recovery. Members were thus of the view that, \nbuilding on the improved growth in the third quarter and the positive PMIs in the \nfourth quarter of 2021, output growth is expected to strengthen into 2022. \nOn the Pandemic, the MPC reviewed its continued impact on the domestic \neconomy as Members collectively agreed that the downside risks were still \nhindering the recovery. In this light, it commended the efforts of the Presidential \nTask Force on COVID-19 for procuring vaccines and continuing the drive to \nensure that most Nigerians are fully vaccinated. \nOn price development, Members continued to express concerns about the \nimpact of insecurity in farming communities on food inflation. Whereas headline \ninflation had been moderating for several months, the committee believed that \nits recent uptick was associated with increased demand during the festive \nseason and was thus of the view that prices will return to the downward \ntrajectory given the Bank’s ongoing interventions in the agriculture sector. On \nthis note, Members applauded the efforts of the Bank with the recent launch of \nthe rice pyramids, noting that these efforts to increase food supply and stem \nfood inflation were in the right direction. Members, however, reiterated the key \n9 \n \n \nrole of the Federal Government in providing the necessary security around the \ncountry, and particularly in the farming communities, to ensure that farmers and \ntheir produce remain safe, and food supply is both boosted and uninterrupted. \nThe Committee noted that the ongoing dry season farming would further \nimprove food supply and dampen prices. \nMembers noted the ongoing debate around the removal of fuel subsidy and \nsuggested a robust engagement with relevant groups in the country, and \nafterward follow a stepwise and gradual approach, to ensure its moderate \nimpact on cost of transportation and energy for individual, households and \nfirms. The Committee also noted the need to encourage the take-off of private \nrefineries across the country to provide alternative competitive local supply \nsource and reduce the need for government intervention to manage fuel \nprices for domestic consumption. In addition to this, the Committee called for \nthe speedy conclusion of the government gas-powered vehicle conversion \nscheme and other alternative sources of fuel. \nOn the exchange rate, the Committee applauded the Management’s efforts \nat maintaining stability over the short term with increasing demand as the \neconomy continues to reopen. Members noted the dwindling proceeds from \noil sale, despite rising crude oil prices. They further noted the need to address \nthe persistent reduction in remittance of oil revenue to the Consolidated \nRevenue Fund and urged the NNPC to urgently address this anomaly. The \nimproved foreign exchange supply will thus support the Bank’s demand \nmanagement strategy in the foreign exchange market and consolidate \nmacroeconomic performance, especially those that promote export, reduce \ndependence on import and reduce foreign exchange demand pressure. The \nMPC welcomed the improvement in foreign capital inflow through diaspora \nremittances and urged the Bank to further extend the incentive scope to \nattract more remittances to official channels. \nThe Committee noted the rising government debt profile and the concentration \nof the funding sources and its implications for fiscal sustainability and \n10 \n \n \nmacroeconomic stability, including its impact on financial system performance \nand growth. The MPC continued to urge the Government on the need to \nharness other sources of revenue to reduce its dependence on oil as a single \nrevenue source. In addition, it reiterated the need for government to seek \nalternative, more viable, and efficient infrastructure financing sources, in order \nto ease its expenditure burden. To this end, Members called on the fiscal \nauthorities to take advantage of InfraCorp, the private sector driven \ninfrastructural \nvehicle \nand \ntransfer \nviable \ninfrastructure \nprojects \nfor \nconsideration by the Corporation as this would ease pressure on Government. \nthat would otherwise have to raise revenue through taxes from an already \nburdened private and household sector. \nThe improved performance of the equities market in the review period, \nsignposted continued investor confidence in the Nigerian economy. This in the \nview of Members was a positive sign that the economy remained on a path to \na more robust medium-term recovery. \nThe banking sector indices, in the consideration of Members, showed no less \nresilience as other macroeconomic indicators reviewed; even as obvious \ndownside risks associated with the Pandemic continued to impact the business \nenvironment. Members thus applauded the Management’s efforts in ensuring \nthe continued downward trend of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) ratio, signifying \nimproving conditions in the banking system. Nevertheless, Members \nemphasized the need for the Bank to closely monitor developments in the \nsector and swiftly respond to any emerging challenges. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nThe MPC observed with concern the moderate rise in inflation in December \n2021, noting that this was typical of increased aggregate demand associated \nwith the end of year festive activities. Members, however, expressed their \ncontinued commitment to drive down domestic prices by putting in place \n11 \n \n \nrelevant policy measures to curb the rise in inflationary pressures, while also \nsupporting the fragile growth recovery. \nIn its determination as to whether to hold or loosen or tighten its policy stance, \nthe MPC was mindful that, whereas the US and some Advanced Economies \nhave signaled their intention to commence policy normalisation which may \nresult in capital flow reversal for EMDEs, the major focus at these climes were \ntargeted mainly at reining in the high level of inflation which had been \nunprecedent in the last four decades in those climes. \nFor Nigeria, members were of the view that Nigeria is confronted with, not only \ninflation but also fragile output growth. As a result, MPC believes that its current \nstance of price and monetary stability conducive for growth remain desirable. \nThe MPC is convinced that various measures being implemented were helping, \nnot only in boosting output growth, but also in moderating inflation. The MPC \ntherefore, enjoyed Management to continue to use its development finance \ntools to accelerate output growth, which will also help in boosting \nmanufacturing output that would ultimately aid moderation in prices. It also \nrequested Management to continue its use of administrative measures, \nincluding discretionary tools at its disposal through CRR to control money supply \nin the economy. \nIn its final consideration, the Committee was clear that a loosening option was \nnot desirable because it would trigger liquidity surfeit and fuel inflationary \npressure as available funds may outstrip the economy absorptive capacity or \ndomestic capacity utilization. It also feels loosening could trigger foreign \nexchange demand pressure, as the excess liquidity would be channeled to \neither frivolous importations or speculative holding of foreign exchange as \nalternative investment channels narrow; leading to foreign exchange \ndepreciation and or inflation. \nThe MPC also dropped a tightening option at this meeting in view of the fragile \nstate of the current GDP growth rate and potential external and domestic \n12 \n \n \nheadwinds confronting the economy. The Committee opined that tightening \ncould truncate the steady improvement in credit performance, including other \nfinancial soundness indicators, and reverse the declining trend in NPLs. \nMoreover, tightening could counteract the CBN’s credit expansion motive as a \nnecessary condition for improved economic growth and employment \ngeneration. \nThe MPC, therefore, concluded that a HOLD stance remains desirable at this \ntime, as this would indicate a conservative but cautious and consistent policy \nchoice given the prevailing economic conditions and outlook, thus \nstrengthening policy credibility and focus. It also feels that a hold would signal \nMPCs realisation of the fragility of the growth recovery and its sensitivity to \nemerging global and domestic uncertainties. Hence the need to sustain the \ncurrent policy trajectory. \nAfter a careful balancing of the benefits and downsides of each policy option, \nthe MPC decided to hold all policy parameters constant; believing that a hold \nstance will enable the continued permeation of current policy measures in \nsupporting the recorded growth recovery and further boost production and \nproductivity, which would ultimately rein-in inflation in the short to medium term. \nThe Committee thus decided by a unanimous vote to retain the Monetary \nPolicy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to retain: \nI. The MPR at 11.5 per cent; \nII. The Asymmetric Corridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. The CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. The Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \n13 \n \n \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n25th January 2022", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 140 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting held on Monday 24th and Tuesday 25th January 2021.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/00585b4a6279c6701be35b3e1400c185.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "00585b4a6279c6701be35b3e1400c185", "text": "1 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 126 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF THURSDAY 19th AND \nFRIDAY 20th SEPTEMBER 2019 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 19th and 20th of \nSeptember 2019, in the light of softening global growth and weaker-\nthan-anticipated domestic output recovery. The Committee \nevaluated developments in the global and domestic economies \nand examined the outlook for the rest of the year. It noted the build-\nup of vulnerabilities in major Advanced Economies and its spill-over \nto the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs). Nine \n(9) out of the eleven (11) members of the Committee were present \nat the meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nOutput growth across major advanced economies remained \nsubdued, confronted by legacy headwinds, including the \nsubsisting trade war between the US and China, regional hostilities \nin the Middle-East, rising debt levels, growing uncertainties around \nBREXIT and increasing political tensions between the US and Iran, \nincluding fragilities in the financial markets. In the EMDEs, output \ngrowth remained broadly mixed with some economies performing \nstronger than others. \n \n2 \n \nConsequently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its \nprojected global growth forecast to 3.2 per cent in 2019 from 3.6 \nper cent. \nPrice developments continued to soften across the major \nadvanced and EMDEs as aggregate demand continually weaken, \nresulting in softening monetary policy by major central banks to \naddress downward trending prices and to strengthen aggregate \ndemand. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that real \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.94 per cent in the second \nquarter of 2019, compared with 2.10 and 1.50 per cent in the \npreceding and corresponding quarters, respectively. This mediocre \ngrowth, we believe, is consistent with global trends of dampening \noutput growth and was driven mainly by the oil sector, which grew \nby 5.15 per cent while the non-oil sector grew by 1.64 per cent. At \n57.7 and 58.0 index points, the Manufacturing and Non-\nManufacturing \nPurchasing \nManagers’ \nIndices \n(PMI) \ngrew \nmoderately for the 30th and 29th consecutive months, respectively, \nin September 2019. Staff projections indicate that real GDP in Q3 \nand Q4 2019 would average 2.11 and 2.34 per cent, respectively, \ndriven primarily by the non-oil sector. This optimism in growth \nprospects is anchored on the new momentum of rising credit to the \nprivate sector. However, the headwinds to the growth prospects \n \n3 \n \nremain high unemployment, rising public debt and heightening \ninsecurity across the country. \nThe Committee noted the continued moderation in headline \ninflation (year-on-year) to 11.02 per cent in August 2019 from 11.08 \nper cent in July 2019, driven by decline in the food and core \ncomponents to 13.17 and 8.68 per cent in August 2019 from 13.39 \nand 8.80 per cent in July 2019, respectively. The development in the \nfood and core components of inflation was partly due to improved \nagricultural production in the current harvest season, supported by \nthe Bank’s sustained intervention in the agricultural sector as well as \nthe continued stability in the foreign exchange market. The \nCommittee, however, noted the upward pressure imposed on \nprices due to rising insecurity in the food producing areas of the \ncountry, increased liquidity injection from FAAC disbursements and \nlate budget cycles. It also highlighted the imperative to address \nthe economy’s infrastructural deficits, such as power supply, \nupgrade of transport and production infrastructure as a means of \nreducing cost-push inflation. \n \nThe Committee observed that broad money supply (M3) grew by \n5.65 per cent in August 2019, compared with the level at end-\nDecember 2018, annualized to 8.48 per cent, but remaining below \nthe 2019 indicative benchmark of 16.08 per cent. The growth was \nlargely driven by the increase in Net Domestic Credit (NDC), which \ngrew by 24.36 per cent in August 2019 from the level at end-\nDecember 2018. The growth in NDC was accounted for by the \n \n4 \n \nsignificant increase in credit to Government, which grew by 94.33 \nper cent while credit to the private sector grew by 9.36 per cent in \nAugust 2019. The Committee urged the Management of the Bank \nto explore new initiatives to further improve lending to the private \nsector, while calling on Government to adopt other ways of funding \nits operations outside the banking sector. \nIn the review period, money market rates oscillated within the \nstanding facilities corridor due to prevailing liquidity conditions in \nthe banking system. The monthly weighted average Inter-bank Call \nand Open Buyback (OBB) rates increased to 8.00 and 13.37 per \ncent in August 2019 from 6.52 and 11.01 per cent in July 2019, \nrespectively. \nThe Committee observed the continued bearish trend in the \nequities market, while noting the increased activity in the sovereign \nbonds market, reflecting global trends and investor preference for \nfixed income securities. In the light of this development, the All-\nShare Index (ASI) declined by 11.62 per cent to 27,779.00 index \npoints on September 13, 2019, from 31,430.50 index points at end-\nDecember 2018. Market Capitalization (MC), however, grew by \n15.37 per cent to N13.62 trillion on September 13, 2019, from N11.72 \ntrillion at end-December 2018. This increase in market capitalisation \nwas attributed to the listing of 2.75 billion ordinary shares by Airtel \nAfrica in July 2019. \nThe MPC noted the improved performance and resilience of the \nbanking sector, evidenced by the continued moderation in the \nratio of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) from 11.2 to 9.4 per cent in \n \n5 \n \nMay and August 2019, respectively. While noting that this was still \nabove the prudential benchmark of 5.0 per cent, the Committee \ncalled on the Management of the Bank to drive this ratio below the \nprudential benchmark. \nOutlook \nThe persistence of policy uncertainties, financial vulnerabilities and \nrising geo-political tensions continued to cloud the medium-term \noutlook. This is evidenced by the sustained weakening of global \ngrowth across regions, amplified by the persisting trade tensions \nbetween the US and its major trading partners, rising corporate and \npublic debt levels. \nOn the domestic economy, output growth in 2019 is expected to \npeak at 2.1 per cent (IMF), 2.2 per cent (World Bank) and 2.27 per \ncent (CBN). These forecasts remain underpinned by expectations \nof favourable oil prices which would lead to higher external \nreserves, stable exchange rate, moderate inflationary pressure as \ngovernment increases capital expenditure, including enhanced \nflow of credit to the private sector to stimulate investment, \nsustained \nCBN \ninterventions \nin \nthe \nreal \nsector, \neffective \nimplementation of the Economic Recovery Growth Plan (ERGP), \nbuild-up of fiscal buffers, as well as improved security in the country. \n \n \n \n \n6 \n \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee noted the decline in output growth in the second \nquarter of 2019, partly attributable to the delay in implementation \nof the 2019 budget. It however, observed that this was an \nimprovement over the corresponding quarter of 2018. In addition, \nit noted the broad slowdown across key economies and the \nresponse of major central banks to revise their policy rates \ndownwards. \n \nOn price developments, the Committee commended the \nprogressive moderation in consumer prices and urged the Bank to \nsustain its intervention in the real sector of the economy to reduce \nthe output gap. \n \nThe MPC noted the improvements in the financial soundness \nindicators and urged the Management of the Bank to sustain its \nregulatory surveillance to ensure continued financial system \nstability. The Committee, particularly noted the growth in the size of \nindustry loans from N15.4 trillion in June to N16.23 trillion in \nSeptember 2019. On the recent directives to deposit money banks \nto increase their Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR), the Committee \nunderscored the need to grow consumer, mortgage and \ncorporate credit to drive aggregate demand and ensure a \nreduction in unemployment and increase in output growth. \nConsequently, the Committee urged the Management of the Bank \nto fast-track the development of the credit scoring system, to \n \n7 \n \npromote increased intermediation. In addition, the Committee \ncommended the introduction of the Global Standing Instruction \n(GSI) initiative aimed at de-risking credit in the industry by \ncommitting bank customers to repay their loans to banks. The MPC \nfurther noted the increased supply of micro credit to key Micro \nSmall and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and efforts through the \nNigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending \n(NIRSAL) Microfinance Bank to extend the reach of its credit \nfacilities across the country. The MPC however, observed that the \ngrowth in credit to the private sector remained significantly low, \nrelative to the absorptive capacity of the economy. \n \nThe MPC further underscored the linkage between high \nunemployment and heightened insecurity, emphasizing the critical \nneed for urgent steps towards more jobs and wealth creation in the \ncountry. As an interim solution, the Committee called on \nGovernment at all levels to ratchet up public works programmes \naimed at easing the threat of rising unemployment in the country. \nThis, the Committee argued, would be achieved through efficiency \nin public spending. The MPC also noted the Government’s current \ndrive to increase Value Added Tax (VAT), adding that this will \nimprove fiscal revenue to support expenditure and reduce the \nbudget \ndeficit \nas \nwell \nas \nGovernment \nborrowing \nwhen \nimplemented. The Committee, however, noted that this was too \nlittle to close the gap in Government finances. Consequently, the \nMPC called on the Government to, as a matter of urgency, adopt \n \n8 \n \nwhat it termed a BIG BANG approach towards building fiscal \nbuffers by purposefully freeing-up redundant public assets through \nan efficient, effective and transperent privatization process. This \nwould raise significant revenue for Government and resuscitate the \nredundant assets to generate employment and contribute \neffectively to national economic growth. The MPC noted the \nunstable oil prices, its implications on accretion to external reserves \nand its persistent call on the Government to build fiscal buffers. \nConsequently, the Committee called on the National Assembly to \nexercise restraint from increasing the oil price budget benchmark \nto avoid budgetary overruns at the implementation stage of the \nbudget. Projections from the oil futures market, indicate that oil \nprices will remain tight around the budget oil price benchmark in \nthe medium term. \n \nThe Committee’s Decision \nIn its considerations regarding the policy options to adopt, the MPC \nas usual, felt compelled to review the options of whether to tighten, \nhold or loosen. \nThe Committee noted the positive moderation in inflation, though \nslowly from 11.08 per cent in July to 11.02 per cent in August 2019. \nGiven that this was still above the target range of 6-9 per cent, and \nconsidering the pressure on reserve accretion caused by the \nrelatively weak crude oil price, the MPC felt the imperative to \ntighten. On the contrary, the Committee was of the view that doing \nso in the midst of a fragile growth outlook would increase the cost \n \n9 \n \nof credit, and further contract investment and constrain output \ngrowth. \nOn loosening, the Committee felt that this would result in increased \nsystem liquidity and hence, heighten inflationary tendencies in the \neconomy. In particular, the MPC was of the view that loosening \nwould drive growth in consumer credit but without a corresponding \nadjustment in real sector output. The Committee was also \nconvinced that increased liquidity and interest rate moderation \nwould result in exchange rate pressures as money supply rises. \nAs regards the option to hold, the MPC opined that the option \nrequires a clear understanding of the quantum and timing of \nliquidity injections into the economy, before deciding on possible \nadjustments to the stance of monetary policy. The Committee was \nalso of the opinion that retaining the current position of policy offers \npathways to appraising the effects of the suit of heterodox \nmonetary policy to encourage credit delivery to the real sector, \nespecially in the light of the subsisting implementation of the Loan-\nto-Deposit Ratio policy. \n \nIn view of the foregoing, the Committee decided by a unanimous \nvote to retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 13.5 per cent and \nto hold all other policy parameters constant. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 \n \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Retain the MPR at 13.5 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around \nthe MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \nThank you. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n20th September, 2019", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 126 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of September 19  and 20, 2019.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/04b1f6362dc6fa7d01386e03257582d8.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "04b1f6362dc6fa7d01386e03257582d8", "text": "Central Bank of Nigeria \nPage 1 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.153 \n \nDate: Tuesday, 23 July 2024 \n \nMONETARY POLICY RATE HIKED TO 26.75 PERCENT \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) \nheld its 296th meeting on the 22nd and 23rd of July 2024 to review recent \neconomic and financial developments as well as assess risks to the outlook. \nEleven members attended the meeting. \n \nDecisions of the MPC \nThe Committee’s decisions are as follows: \n1. Raise the MPR by 50 basis points to 26.75 per cent from 26.25 per cent. \n2. Adjust the asymmetric corridor around the MPR to +500/-100 from +100/-\n300 basis points. \n3. Retain the Cash Reserve Ratio of Deposit Money Banks at 45.00 per cent \nand Merchant Banks at 14 per cent. \n4. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent \n \nConsiderations \nThe Committee was mindful of the effect of rising prices on households and \nbusinesses and expressed its resolve to take necessary measures to bring \ninflation under control. It re-emphasized its commitment to the Bank’s price \nstability mandate and remained optimistic that despite the June 2024 uptick in \nheadline inflation, prices are expected to moderate in the near term. This is \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 2 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.153 \nhinged on monetary policy gaining further traction, in addition to recent \nmeasures by the fiscal authority to address food inflation. \n \nIn its consideration, the Committee noted the persistence of food inflation, \nwhich continues to undermine price stability. It was observed that while \nmonetary policy has been moderating aggregate demand, rising food and \nenergy costs continue to exert upward pressure on price development. The \nprevailing insecurity in food producing areas and high cost of transportation of \nfarm produce are also contributing to this trend. Members were, therefore, not \noblivious to the urgent benefit of addressing these challenges as it will offer a \nsustainable solution to the persistent pressure on food prices. \nAlso noted in its consideration, is the increasing activities of middlemen who \noften finance smallholder farmers, aggregate, hoard and move farm produce \nacross the border to neighbouring countries. The Committee suggested the \nneed to put in check such activities in order to address the food supply deficit \nin the Nigerian market to moderate food prices. The MPC, therefore, resolved \nto sustain collaboration with the fiscal authority to ensure that inflationary \npressure is subdued. \nIn addition, the Committee expressed optimism with the recent stop gap \nmeasures by the Federal Government to bridge the food supply deficit. In \nparticular, the 150-day duty free import window for food commodities (maize, \nhusked brown rice, wheat and cowpeas), amongst others, will moderate \ndomestic food prices. It is noteworthy that these measures will not lead to direct \ninjection of liquidity into the economy as to cause further inflation. While the \nmeasure is a welcome development and may prove effective in the short run, \nit is expedient that it is implemented with a defined exit strategy to avert a \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 3 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.153 \npossible rollback of the recent gains in domestic food production. To support \nthese initiatives, the Bank is already engaging Development Finance \ninstitutions like the Bank of Industry (BOI) to ensure adequate support to \nindustries with a focus on Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs). \nThe MPC noted the narrowing spread between the various foreign exchange \nsegments of the market, an indication of price discovery and improved market \nefficiency, thus reducing opportunities for arbitrage and speculation. The \nCommittee noted that the increase in the level of external reserves would \nfurther build confidence for a more stable exchange rate and thus urged the \nBank to explore available avenues to improve inflows, especially through \ndiaspora remittances. In addition, Members noted the efforts of the Federal \nGovernment and private sector towards improving domestic refining capacity \nas this is expected to reduce foreign exchange currently being expended on \nthe importation of refined petroleum products. \nThe MPC noted the sustained resilience of the banking system, reflected in \nimprovements of key financial soundness indicators (FSIs). Members further \nencouraged the continued need for close monitoring of the system, as the \nimplementation of the recapitalization exercise progresses. \nTo consolidate on the gains thus far achieved, the Committee re-emphasized \nits commitment to stay on course with its tightening cycle in view of the urgent \nneed to address inflationary pressures. \n \nKey Developments in the Domestic and Global Economies \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 4 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.153 \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics, domestic headline inflation rose \nmarginally to 34.19 per cent in June 2024 from 33.95 per cent in May 2024, \ndriven by the continued rise in the year-on-year components of food and core \ninflation. Similarly, month-on-month headline inflation rose to 2.31 per cent in \nJune 2024, from 2.14 per cent in the preceding month. The food and core \ncomponents rose to 2.55 and 2.06 per cent in June 2024 from 2.28 and 2.01 \nper cent in May, respectively. \n \nReal GDP (year-on-year) grew by 2.98 per cent in the first quarter of 2024, \ncompared with 3.46 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2023, driven by both the \noil and non-oil sectors. Staff forecasts, however, suggest that the domestic \neconomy will grow by 3.38 per cent in 2024, while the IMF has projected growth \nat 3.1 per cent in 2024. \nAs of July 18, 2024, external reserves stood at US$37.05 billion, compared \nwith US$34.70 billion as at end-June 2024. This represents eleven (11) months \nof import cover for goods and services. \nThe global economy, according to the IMF, is forecast to grow at 3.2 and 3.3 \nper cent in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Headwinds to the global projection \nremain the tight global financial conditions and ongoing geopolitical tensions \nassociated with the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, both of which have significant \nimpact on commodity prices and the global supply chain. \nGlobal inflation is forecast to continue to decelerate marginally in 2024 but may \nstay above the long-run objectives of most advanced economy central banks. \nGlobal financial conditions may, therefore, remain broadly tight through 2024 \nand into 2025. \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \nPage 5 of 5 \n \nMONETARY POLICY COMMUNIQUE NO.153 \nThe Committee reaffirmed its commitment to continue to monitor developments \nin the global and domestic economies to guide policy and ensure that inflation \nexpectations are adequately anchored. \nThe next meeting of the Committee will be held on the 23rd and 24th of \nSeptember 2024. \nThank you. \nOlayemi Cardoso \nGovernor, \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n23rd July 2024", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No.153 of the 296th Meeting of Monetary Policy Committee held on Tuesday, 23rd July, 2024.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/05964b7f846c75b472e1e0cfe49a5af7.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "05964b7f846c75b472e1e0cfe49a5af7", "text": "1 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 125 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF MONDAY 22nd AND \nTUESDAY 23rd July, 2019 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 22nd and 23rd of \nJuly, 2019, in an environment of subdued global growth and \nfragile domestic economic recovery. The Committee reviewed \ndevelopments in the global and domestic macro-economy. It \nnoted that the global environment \nis overwhelmed with \nvulnerabilities and financial fragilities. Inflation in the advanced \neconomies is trending downwards and significantly below the \nlong-run objective, necessitating the adoption of accommodative \nmonetary policy, the global economy is poised to see another \nround of loose monetary policy. All Eleven (11) members of the \nCommittee were at the meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nGlobal output growth remained weak with persistent headwinds \nexpected to continue for the rest of the year. Key amongst these \nheadwinds is the rising trade tensions, particularly between the US \nand its key trading partners in Europe, Canada, China and India, \nrising debt levels in some Advanced Economies and Emerging \nMarkets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) as well as growing \n \n2 \n \npolitical uncertainties across several regions. Consequently, the \nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) downgraded its 2019 global \ngrowth forecast from 3.6 per cent to 3.3 per cent. \nPrice developments across the major advanced economies \nremained muted alongside softening output growth. In the \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), however, \ninflationary developments were mixed in response to challenging \nmacroeconomic conditions. The Committee noted, that the return \nto monetary accommodation by the advanced economies could \nsee a new wave of capital flows to the EMDEs as investors \ncontinue to search for higher yields. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nAvailable data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed \nthat real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 2.01 per cent in \nthe first quarter of 2019, driven by the non-oil sector, compared \nwith 2.38 and 1.89 per cent in the preceding and corresponding \nquarters of 2018, respectively. The Committee noted the \ncontinued but moderate expansion in the economy as indicated \nby \nthe \nManufacturing \nand \nNon-Manufacturing \nPurchasing \nManagers’ Indices (PMI), which grew for the 27th and 26th \nconsecutive months in June 2019. The indices stood at 57.4 and \n58.6 index points, respectively, in June 2019. Staff forecast indicate \na 2.11, 2.39 and 2.56 per cent growth in GDP in Q2, Q3 and Q4 \n2019, respectively, expected to be driven largely by the non-oil \nsector. The Committee, however, noted that the downside risks to \n \n3 \n \nthe growth projections to include low credit to the private sector; \nhigh unemployment; delayed intervention of fiscal policy as well \nas low revenue and fiscal buffers, amongst others. The continued \nintervention by the Bank in the real sector is, however, expected \nto partly ameliorate the downside risks only in the short-run, while \nsound fiscal policy is expected to drive growth in the medium to \nthe long-run. \nThe Committee observed that broad money supply (M3) grew by \n4.97 per cent in June 2019 from the level at end-December 2018, \nat an annualized rate of 9.95 per cent. It was also below the \nindicative benchmark of 16.08 per cent for 2019. The growth in M3 \nwas largely driven by the increase in Net Domestic Credit (NDC), \nwhich grew by 17.26 per cent in June 2019 from the level at end-\nDecember 2018. The growth in Net Domestic Credit (NDC) was \naccounted for by the significant increase in credit to Government, \nwhich grew by 55.80 per cent, while credit to the private sector \ngrew by 9.0 per cent in June 2019. The Committee, however, \nnoted that the constrained growth in the monetary aggregates as \nan indication of weak financial intermediation in the banking \nsystem and called on the Management of the CBN, to sustain the \nvarious initiatives of the Bank to improve lending to the private \nsector in Nigeria. \nThe Committee welcomed the moderation in headline inflation \n(year-on-year) to 11.22 per cent in June 2019 from 11.40 per cent \nin May 2019. This was attributed to the decline in the Food and \nCore components to 13.56 and 8.80 per cent in June 2019 from \n \n4 \n \n13.70 and 9.03 per cent in May 2019, respectively. It noted the \ndevelopment as being partly due to the CBN’s support to the \nagricultural sector and the prevailing stability in the Nigerian \nforeign exchange market. The MPC further noted that although \ninflation moderated in June 2019, the continued pressure on \nprices continues to be associated with structural factors such as \nthe high cost of electricity, transport and production inputs. The \nMPC, however, expects that with the commencement of the \nharvest season, food prices will taper further downwards. It thus, \nhowever, advised that the security challenges in some parts of the \ncountry should be addressed urgently to increase agricultural \nproduce in order to sustain the downward trend in inflation. The \nMPC reiterated its commitment to ensure the maintenance of \nprice stability. \nThe net liquidity position and interest rates in the economy \nreflected the impact of liquidity injections and the Bank’s liquidity \nmanagement operations \nassociated with fiscal federalism, \ntransformation of maturing CBN Bills, Open Market Operations \n(OMO) \nauctions \nand \nforeign \nexchange \ninterventions. \nAccordingly, the monthly weighted average Inter-bank call and \nOpen Buyback (OBB) rates, oscillated within the MPR corridor, \nincreasing to 8.38 and 8.71per cent in June 2019 from 5.14 and \n8.34 per cent in May 2019, respectively. \nThe Committee noted with concern the continued bearish trend \nin the equities segment of the capital market in spite of the \nsustained capital inflow to the economy, reflecting continued \n \n5 \n \nportfolio reallocation from equities to fixed income securities. \nConsequently, the All-Share Index (ASI) declined by 9.11 per cent \nto 28,566.79 index points on July 12, 2019, from 31,430.50 index \npoints at end-December 2018. Market Capitalization, however, \ngrew by 18.77 per cent to N13.92 trillion on July 12, 2019, from \nN11.72 trillion at end-December 2018. This was due largely to the \nadditional listing of new firms during the review period. \nThe Committee welcomed the continued stability in the foreign \nexchange market and the steady accretion to external reserves, \nwhich stood at US$44.88 billion as at July 19, 2019, representing a \n0.38 per cent increase from US$44.71 billion at the end-June 2019. \nThe MPC also noted the steady moderation in the Non-Performing \nLoans (NPLs) ratio of the banking industry to 9.36 per cent in June \nfrom 10.95 per cent in May 2019. While this remained above the \nprudential benchmark of 5.0 per cent, its continued moderation \nindicates the improved resilience of the banking system. The \nCommittee thus emphasised its resolve to further drive down the \nNon-Performing Loans (NPLs) in the industry so as to strengthen the \nstrategic health of banks in the Country. \nOutlook \nThe overall medium-term outlook for the global economy remains \nmixed with indications of continued softening of global output \ndue \nto \npersisting \npolicy \nuncertainties \nand \nsustained \nmacroeconomic \nvulnerabilities. \nThese \nare \nlikely \nto \nbe \naccentuated by the increasing trade tensions between the US \n \n6 \n \nand its major trading partners, rising debt levels and geo-political \ntensions. \nOn the domestic economy, output growth in 2019 is expected to \nremain weak, peaking at 2.27 per cent, while inflation is projected \nat 11.37 per cent by the CBN staff projections by end-2019. The \nunderlying arguments in favour of this forecast include: favourable \noil prices; stable exchange rate; moderate inflationary pressures; \nenhanced flow of credit to the private sector; sustained CBN \ninterventions in the real sector; effective implementation of the \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP); building fiscal \nbuffers; and improved security in the food producing areas of the \ncountry. \nCommittee’s Consideration \nIn its considerations, the Committee noted the need to boost \noutput growth through sustained increase in consumer credit and \nmortgage loans and granting loans to our Small and Medium \nEnterprises companies. It also observed that the Management of \nthe Bank had started the prescription of using benchmark loan-to-\ndeposit ratios to redirect the banks focus to lending. To mitigate \ncredit risk, the Committee enjoined the Management of the Bank \nto de-risk the financial markets, via the development of a reliable \ncredit scoring system, similar to what applies in the advanced \ncountries as this will encourage Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) to \nsafely grow their credit portfolios. \n \n7 \n \nThe MPC called on the fiscal authorities to expedite action on \nexpanding the tax base of the economy to improve government \nrevenue and stem the growth in public borrowing. It further urged \nthe \nfiscal \nauthorities \nto \nbuild \nfiscal \nbuffers \nto \navert \nmacroeconomic downturn in the event of a decline in oil prices. \nThe Committee also called on the Bank to intensify efforts to \nencourage Nigerians in the diaspora to use official sources for \nhome remittances, noting that the effort will complement other \nmeasures geared towards improving Nigeria’s current account \nbalance. It enjoined the Bank to consider introducing incentives \nsuch as the reduction of charges on diaspora home remittances \ninto Nigeria. \nOn the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the \nCommittee urged the Federal Government to put in place \nmeasures to aid the economy in realising the benefits and full \npotentials of that Agreement. In particular, it noted the need to \nresuscitate moribund industries in Nigeria and improve key \ninfrastructure in order to strengthen the productive base of the \neconomy, create job opportunities as well as boost exports. \nThe Committee noted the positive developments towards the \ncreation of a common currency in the West African Zone by \nJanuary 2020 and commended Government and the Central \nBank for pushing forward the initiative. The Committee, however, \nenjoined the Bank to ensure that Nigeria is properly positioned to \nmaximise the benefits of monetary integration. \n \n8 \n \nIn consideration of the specific policy options to adopt; to hold, \nloosen or tighten, the MPC made the following observations: \n(i) \nWhilst the focus on growth was imperative, the mandate of \nprice stability remains sacrosanct; \n(ii) \nGiven the happenings in the external sector and the fact \nthat inflation is moderating, tightening of monetary policy should \nnot be an option at this time, as restriction of the capacity of the \nDMBs to create money could curtail their credit creation \ncapabilities. \nOn the contrary, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was of \nthe view that, whilst loosening could increase money supply, \nstimulate \naggregate \ndemand \nand \nstrengthen \ndomestic \nproduction, the economy could be awash with liquidity especially \nif \nloosening \ndrives \ngrowth \nin \nconsumer \ncredit \nwithout \ncommensurate adjustment in aggregate output. \nOn holding the current monetary policy position, the Monetary \nPolicy Committee (MPC) observed that given the recent actions \nof the Bank’s management involving the prescription of minimum \nlending thresholds by the deposit money banks to our Deposit \nMoney Banks (DMBs), it is safe to assume that this action, targeted \nat stimulating credit growth to the real sector would increase \ncredit delivery to the real sector and accelerate investment and \neconomic growth. It also observed that since interest rates were \ncurrently trending downwards, it is safer to await the full impact of \n \n9 \n \nthese policy actions on the economy before a review of the \nposition of monetary policy. \n \nThe Committee’s Decision \nIn consideration of the foregoing, the Committee decided \nunanimously by a vote of all members present to retain the \nMonetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 13.5 per cent and to hold all other \npolicy parameters constant. The decision was informed by the \nconviction of members that key macroeconomic indicators are \ntrending in the right direction. \nConsequently, the MPC unanimously voted to: \nI. Retain the MPR at 13.5 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/-500 basis points around \nthe MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n23rd July, 2019", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central bank of Nigeria Communique no. 125 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday 22nd and Tuesday 23rd July, 2019.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/0ab2697bcf2c1681735c4575934560e1.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "0ab2697bcf2c1681735c4575934560e1", "text": "Table A.1.1:\nMonetary\nSurvey (N'\nMillion)\nMONETARY\nASSETS/\nLIABILITIES\n1960\n1961\n1962\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n(NET)\n150.27800000000002\n163.62799999999999\n156.33600\nBy Central\nBank\n155.23400000000001\n151.47\n153.226\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n-4.9560000000000031\n12.157999999999994\n3.11\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks2\n…\n…\n…\nDOMESTIC\nCREDIT\n(NET)\n117.628\n143.76600000000002\n187.00200\nClaims on\nFederal\nGovt (Net):\n8.2980000000000018\n26.64\n38.22\nBy Central\nBank\n4.604000000000001\n20.698\n31.48\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n3.694\n5.9420000000000002\n6.74\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nClaims on\nPrivate\nSector:\n109.33\n117.126\n148.78200\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n109.33\n117.126\n148.78200\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nClaims on\nState and\nLocal Govts:\n0\n0\n0\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nClaims on\nNon-\nFinancial\nPublic\nEnterprises:\n0\n0\n0\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nClaims on\nOther\nPrivate\nSector:\n109.33\n117.126\n148.78200\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n109.33\n117.126\n148.78200\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nOTHER\nASSETS\n(NET)\n4.4899999999999949\n-14.562000000000012 -17.91\nTOTAL\nMONETARY\nASSETS\n272.39600000000002\n292.83199999999999\n325.428\nMONEY\nSUPPLY\n(M1)\n217.60599999999999\n222.32\n242.14\nCurrency\nOutside\nBanks:\n135.32400000000001\n138.19799999999998\n149.96\nCurrency in\nCirculation\n154.154\n160.19399999999999\n174.65600\nVault cash:\ncurrency\nheld by\ncommercial\nbanks\n-18.829999999999998\n-21.995999999999999 -24.696000\nVault cash:\ncurrency\nheld by\nmerchant\nbanks\n…\n…\n…\nDemand\nDeposits1\n82.281999999999996\n84.122\n92.18\nPrivate\nSector\nDeposits at\nCBN\n4.8000000000000001E-2 0.80600000000000005 1.5880000\nPrivate\nSector\nDeposits at\nCommercial\nBanks\n82.233999999999995\n83.316000000000003\n90.591999\nQUASI\nMONEY1\n54.79\n70.512\n83.288000\nTime,\nSavings &\nForeign\nCurrency\nDeposits of:\n54.79\n70.512\n83.288000\nCommercial\nBanks\n54.79\n70.512\n83.288000\nMerchant\nBanks\n…\n…\n…\nOf which\nForeign\nCurrency\nDeposit\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL\nMONETARY\nLIABILITIES\n(M2)\n272.39600000000002\n292.83199999999999\n325.428\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1excludes\ntakings\nfrom\ndiscount\nhouses\n2Merchant\nBank\nstarted in\n1972\n… means\nnot\napplicable\nUniversal\nBanking\nwas\nadopted in\n2001, hence\nCommercial\n& Merchant\nBanks\nbecame\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\n(DMBs).\nTable A.1.2:\nMonetary\nAuthorities'\nAnalytical\nAccounts -\nAssets (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1960\n1961\n1962\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n155.23400000000001 151.512\n153.262\nGold\n0\n14.15\n14.15\nIMF Gold\nTranche\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCurrencies\n0\n0\n0\nDemand\nDeposits at\nForeign Banks\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bills of\nForeign\nGovernments\n155.12200000000001 122.758\n139.111999\nSDR Holdings\n0\n0\n0\nAttached Assets 0\n0\n0\nRegional\nMonetary\nCooperation\nFunds\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nAssets\n0.112\n14.603999999999999 0\nCLAIMS ON\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\n6.7220000000000004 23.006\n32.64\nTreasury Bills &\nTB Rediscounts\n6.7220000000000004 17.216000000000001 32.64\nTreasury Bills\n3.15\n3.2\n3.07600000\nTreasury Bills\nRediscounts\n3.5720000000000001 14.016\n29.564\nNigerian\nConverted\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bond\nStock\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bonds\nSinking Funds\nOverdrawn\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bonds\nInterest\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nOverdraft on\nBudgetary\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Account\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Sinking\nFunds\nOverdrawn\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Interest\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury\nCertificates\n0\n0\n0\nOther Claims on\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n5.79\n0\nClaims on\nFederal\nGovernment\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE AND\nLOCAL\nGOVERNMENT\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nStates & Local\nGovernments:\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nState\nGovernments\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nLocal\nGovernments\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on State\n& Local Govt.\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nNONFINANCIAL\nPUBLIC\nENTERPRISES\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nNon-Financial\nPublic:\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nState Parastatals\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on Non-\nfin. Publ. Ent.\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\n(NON-\nFINANCIAL)\nPRIVATE\nSECTOR\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nDEPOSIT\nMONEY BANKS\n0\n0\n0\n(Overdrafts to)\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\n(Overdrafts to)\nMerchant\nBanks1\n0\n0\n0\nOther Claims on\nDMBs\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on\nDeposit Money\nBanks (Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\n(OFI's)\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Claims on\nOFI's:\n0\n0\n0\nLoans to OFI's1\n0\n0\n0\nInvestment in\nOFI's\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellaneous\nClaims on OFIs\n0\n0\n0\nUNCLASSIFIED\nASSETS\n2.9340000000000002 2.8780000000000001 3.12599999\nParticipation in\nInternational\nOrganisations\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Currency\nSubscriptions:\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Local\nCurrency\nSubscription\n(CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)1\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Non-\nNegotiable\nInterest Bearing\nA/C (CBN acc.\nrecords)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Securities\nAccount (CBN\nacc. records)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Accounts\nValuation\nAdjustments\n0\n0\n0\nSDR Allocation\n#1 (rev.\ndescrepancy)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Gold\nTranche A/C\n(CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)\n0\n0\n0\nHoldings of\nSDRs (CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)\n0\n0\n0\nIBRD\nSubscriptions\n0\n0\n0\nTotal\nReceivables\n0\n0\n0\nReceivables\n0\n0\n0\nIncome\nReceivable:\n0\n0\n0\nAccrued\nEarnings\n0\n0\n0\nImpersonal\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nInterest\nReceivables1\n0\n0\n0\nOther Income\nReceivable\n0\n0\n0\nExchange\nDifference on\nPromisory Notes\n0\n0\n0\nSME\nRevaluation\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on\nBranches\n0\n0\n0\nNon-Monetary\nPrecious Metals\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellanoues\nunclassified\nAssets\n2.9340000000000002 2.8780000000000001 3.12599999\nOther\nMiscellaneous\nAssets\n2.9340000000000002 2.8780000000000001 3.12599999\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nHead Office\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nBranch\nExpenses1\n0\n0\n0\nZonal Office\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nUnclassified\nAssets (Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL ASSETS\n164.89\n177.39599999999999 189.027999\nSource : Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1These\nitems were\nreclassified\nfrom the last\nquarter of 2006\n\"-\" indicates not\navailable\nTable A.1.3:\nMonetary\nAuthority's\nAnalytical\nAccounts -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1960\n1961\n1962\nRESERVE\nMONEY\n157.05000000000001\n166.95599999999999\n177.5\nCurrency in\nCirculation\n154.154\n160.19399999999999\n174.6\nHead Office\n0\n0\n0\nBranches\n0\n0\n0\nDeposit Money\nBanks'\nDeposits:\n2.8959999999999999\n6.7619999999999996\n2.851\nCommercial\nBanks\n2.8959999999999999\n6.7619999999999996\n2.851\nCommercial\nBanks Demand\ndeposits\n2.8959999999999999\n6.7619999999999996\n2.851\nCommercial\nBanks Special\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nCommercial\nBanks\nRequired\nReserves\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks Demand\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks Special\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks\nRequired\nReserves\n0\n0\n0\nOther Deposits\nOf DMBs\n0\n0\n0\nDMBs' deposits\n(branch\nposition)\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n4.8000000000000001E-2 0.80600000000000005\n1.588\nNon-Financial\nPublic\nEnterprises\n(Parastatals):\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\nCorporations\nDeposit\n0\n0\n0\nState and Local\nGovernment\nDeposits and\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nState\nGovernment\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n4.8000000000000001E-2 0.80600000000000005\n1.588\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nFinancial\nInstitutions\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\ndeposits\n(branch\nposition)\n0\n0\n0\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n0\n4.2000000000000003E-2 3.599\nNon-Resident\nDeposits of:\n0\n0\n0\nForeign DMBs\n(Current\nAccounts)\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCentral Banks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nCustomers\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to\nForeign\nMonetary\nAuthorities:\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bills\nHeld by\nForeign\nMonetray\nAuthorities\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nLiabilities\n0\n4.2000000000000003E-2 3.599\nLONG-TERM\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n0\n0\n0\nLong-Term\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nTrade Debt\nPromissory\nNotes A/C\n0\n0\n0\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\nDEPOSITS\n2.1179999999999999\n2.3079999999999998\n1.159\nBudgetary\nAccounts\n2.1179999999999999\n2.3079999999999998\n1.159\nDeposits on\nNigerian\nConverted\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nDevelopment\nStocks\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nTreasury\nCertificates\n0\n0\n0\nOther Federal\nGovt Deposit\n0\n0\n0\nFederal Govt\nDeposit\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCAPITAL\nACCOUNTS\n2.9020000000000001\n3.34\n3.787\nCapital\n2.9020000000000001\n3.34\n3.787\nReserves\n0\n0\n0\nProvisions\n0\n0\n0\nUndisbursed\nProfits\n0\n0\n0\nRevaluation\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nForeign Assets\nRevaluation A/\nC\n0\n0\n0\nFixed Assets\nRevaluation\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIABILITIES\n2.7719999999999998\n3.944\n4.948\nIntra-Bank\nAccounts\n(Uncleared\nEffects)\n0\n0\n0\nGovt Lending\nFund\n0\n0\n0\nExpense/\nInterest\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to\nIMF\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Account\nAdjustments\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nUnclassified\nLiabilities\n2.7719999999999998\n3.944\n4.948\nOther\nMiscellanoues\nunclassified\nLiabilities\n2.7719999999999998\n3.944\n4.948\nUnclassified\nLiabilties\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellaneous\nExcess Crude\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nSubnationals\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n164.89\n177.39599999999999\n189.0\nSource :\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nTable A.1.3:\nMonetary\nAuthority's\nAnalytical\nAccounts -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nItem1\n2003\n2004\n2005\nRESERVE MONEY 688652.52727272734 732310.30300291744\n76278\nCurrency in\nCirculation\n502254.5\n545803\n64238\nHead Office\n503032.5\n545803\n64238\nCurrency in\nCirculation(Branch\nPosition)\n-778\n0\n0\nDeposit Money\nBanks' Deposits:\n186398.02727272731 186507.30300291738\n12039\nCommercial Banks 159892.84545454546 171067.43486050572\n11484\nCommercial Banks\nDemand deposits\n19985.436363636363 26395.122974367245\n15422\nCommercial Banks\nSpecial deposits\n3.5545454545454547 3.5354735724718802\n3.5\nCommercial Banks\nRequired Reserves\n139903.85454545455 144668.77641256599\n99421\nMerchant Banks1\n15723.609090909089 15419.545682978298\n5552.\nMerchant Banks\nDemand deposits\n3544.1363636363631 2115.2294116364596\n3867.\nMerchant Banks\nSpecial deposits\n26.736363636360693 8.7212841434831319\n8.699\nMerchant Banks\nRequired Reserves\n12152.736363636364 13295.594987198356\n1676\nOther Deposits Of\nDMBs\n77.372727272727275 20.322459433371737\n0\nDeposit Money\nBanks' deposits\n(branch position)\n10704.2\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n235740.43299999996 143519.28012933\n21552\nNon-Financial\nPublic Enterprises\n(Parastatals):\n235280.83299999998 143103.15301615\n21113\nFederal\nGovernment\nParastatals\n235280.83299999998 143103.15301615\n21113\nPrivate Sector\nCorporations\nDeposit\n7.6\n114.05550984999999\n4093.\nState and Local\nGovernment\nDeposits and\nParastatals\n0.3\n20.988160360000002\n2.200\nState Government\nParastatals\n0\n2.2876999999999997E-3 1.100\nState Government\nDeposits\n0.3\n20.985872660000002\n1.100\nLocal Government\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nOther Financial\nInstitutions\nDeposits\n102.8\n281.08344297000002\n294.1\nDevelopment\nBanks\n102.5\n9.0697494600000006\n67.3\nOther Financial\nInstitutions\n0.3\n272.01369351\n226.8\nPrivate Sector\ndeposits (branch\nposition)\n348.9\n0\n0\nSHORT-TERM\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n5982\n228615.29895991003\n43817\nNon-Resident\nDeposits of:\n5008.3\n108374.43518562001\n30932\nForeign DMBs\n(Current\nAccounts)\n4099.2\n54773.842949530001\n30834\nForeign Central\nBanks\n909.1\n46994.415337730003\n98.5\nOther Foreign\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n6606.1768983599995\n0\nOther Foreign\nCustomers\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to\nForeign Monetary\nAuthorities:\n972.6\n120239.76377429\n12884\nTreasury Bills\nHeld by Foreign\nMonetray\nAuthorities\n972.6\n4524.9976802900001\n8034.\nSME World Bank\nLoan A/C\n1.1000000000000001 1.1000000000000001\n4666.\nSME Drawdown\nAccount\n0\n0\n184\nOther Foreign\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nLONG-TERM\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n87455\n67734\n12887\nLong-Term\nLiabilities\n87455\n67734\n12887\nTrade Debt\nPromissory Notes\nA/C\n87455\n67734\n12887\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\nDEPOSITS\n298730.09999999998 447708.86863733002\n39404\nBudgetary\nAccounts\n292831.59999999998 374895.9\n33821\nDeposits on\nNigerian\nConverted Bonds\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nDevelopment\nStocks\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nTreasury\nCertificates\n0\n7.8974283499999993\n0\nOther Federal\nGovt Deposit\n7.9\n72805.071208979993\n55831\nFederal Govt\nDeposit (Branch\nPosition)\n5890.5999999999913 0\n0\nCAPITAL\nACCOUNTS\n353196.9\n553426.03393341997\n71011\nCapital\n3000\n3000\n3000\nReserves\n40473.4\n46179\n46180\nProvisions\n31041.200000000001 41139.933933419998\n63357\nUndisbursed\nProfits\n0\n0\n0\nRevaluation\nAccounts\n278682.3\n463107.1\n59757\nForeign Assets\nRevaluation A/C\n278682.3\n463107.1\n59757\nFixed Assets\nRevaluation\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIABILITIES\n194641\n1228953.3590880102\n22675\nIntra-Branch\nAccounts\n(Uncleared\nEffects)\n2346.1000000000931 1132.0706\n34945\nGovt Lending\nFund\n0\n113.24732\n0\nExpense\n108822.5\n3346.3078879999998\n12308\nImpersonal\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to IMF\n307283.3\n336984.37428001\n38290\nIMF Account\nAdjustments\n0\n0\n0\nSDR Allocation\n(CBN Rec)\n0\n0\n0\nOther Unclassified\nLiabilities\n50501.5\n212291.45900000015\n54367\nOther\nMiscellanoues\nunclassified\nLiabilities\n50501.5\n212291.45900000015\n54367\nUnclassified\nLiabilties (Branch\nPosition)\n4195.3999999999996 0\n0\nMiscellenoues\nExcess Crude\nsavings\n0\n0\n97920\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n51604\nSubnationals\nGovernment\n0\n0\n46316\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n1864397.9802727273 3402267.1437509172\n44067\nSource : Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1These\nitems were\nreclassified from\nthe last quarter of\n2006\nTable\nA.1.3.1:\nQuarterly\nMonetary\nAggregates\n(N' Million)\nNFA\nNCG\nCCP\nPeriod\n1960\nQ1\n158.18200000000002 1.1259999999999999 69.90200000\nQ2\n142.69400000000002 13.486000000000001 73.02400000\nQ3\n144.702\n12.11\n80.07599999\nQ4\n150.27800000000002 8.2980000000000018 109.33\n1961\nQ1\n153.05799999999999 11.312000000000001 99.10800000\nQ2\n145.94200000000001 23.55\n97.93\nQ3\n131.88800000000001 34.816000000000003 96.53600000\nQ4\n163.62800000000001 26.64\n117.126\n1962\nQ1\n155.11600000000001 27.05\n122.562\nQ2\n139.37\n33.411999999999999 124.1620000\nQ3\n136.334\n28.318000000000001 126.658\nQ4\n156.33600000000001 38.22\n148.7820000\n1963\nQ1\n138.10599999999999 23.398\n140.0040000\nQ2\n127.74199999999999 25.806000000000001 143.4240000\nQ3\n143.816\n26.36\n144.3679999\nQ4\n133.45200000000003 67.068000000000012 170.5\n1964\nQ1\n122.12\n49.592000000000006 157.1620000\nQ2\n123.61\n58.175999999999995 157.3360000\nQ3\n130.27199999999999 59.873999999999995 171.91\nQ4\n124.892\n83.126000000000005 222.9559999\n1965\nQ1\n112.79599999999999 74.373999999999995 197.6860000\nQ2\n124.77799999999999 71.63\n194.85\nQ3\n155.69999999999999 77.793999999999997 187.9019999\nQ4\n154.596\n80.48\n232.608\n1966\nQ1\n143.91800000000001 86.746000000000009 206.3180000\nQ2\n150.38400000000001 96.134\n195.2760000\nQ3\n149.45400000000001 114.59599999999999 205.02\nQ4\n126.49\n136.17599999999999 245.5620000\n1967\nQ1\n124.18\n134.678\n231.3439999\nQ2\n88.957999999999998 191.33\n167.94\nQ3\n74.496000000000009 199.54\n202.452\nQ4\n46.722000000000001 191.352\n241.5080000\n1968\nQ1\n34.119999999999997 238.82600000000002 209.702\nQ2\n75.661999999999992 276.39400000000001 191.2820000\nQ3\n64.853999999999999 286.26599999999996 190.434\nQ4\n64.158000000000015 351.41\n222.84\n1969\nQ1\n71.707999999999998 451.18799999999999 177.256\nQ2\n73.915999999999997 414.82\n191.7640000\nQ3\n73.843999999999994 421.73399999999998 194.9079999\nQ4\n87.804000000000002 512.19200000000001 249.744\n1970\nQ1\n88.513999999999996 614.92999999999995 223.38\nQ2\n82.213999999999999 596.90200000000004 242.696\nQ3\n105.422\n659.96199999999999 281.7919999\nQ4\n128.15\n768.6\n351.7\n1971\nQ1\n152.18799999999999 800.37599999999998 389.3059999\nQ2\n225.624\n751.54199999999992 439.0740000\nQ3\n181.178\n711.15\n457.0759999\nQ4\n267.5\n597.20000000000005 502\n1972\nQ1\n228.589\n515.02\n516.1559999\nQ2\n206.727\n564.34399999999994 546.2480000\nQ3\n229.41200000000001 606.99099999999999 553.2439999\nQ4\n229.5\n606.29999999999995 628.7000000\n1973\nQ1\n276.411\n666.53699999999992 589.4299999\nQ2\n325.61199999999997 683.63599999999997 620.6279999\nQ3\n288.62799999999993 742.45600000000002 642.2720000\nQ4\n403\n563.29999999999995 753.6\n1974\nQ1\n810.23200000000008 278.80400000000003 766.8289999\nQ2\n1496.7139999999997 -123.09399999999999 797.0259999\nQ3\n2500.1309999999994 -849.47699999999998 855.5950000\nQ4\n3492.5\n-1277\n966.7\n1975\nQ1\n3714.3410000000003 -1240.4779999999998 1015.857999\nQ2\n3768.2820000000002 -1142.7259999999999 1181.505000\nQ3\n3515.6689999999999 -663.53100000000006 1434.06\nQ4\n3533.2\n-453.9\n1671.8\n1976\nQ1\n3308.8130000000001 239.81799999999998 1787.039\nQ2\n3597.2440000000001 -68.566000000000088 1963.214000\nQ3\n3536.7709999999993 -9.1649999999999565 2152.898999\nQ4\n3170.2\n845.5\n2464.4\n1977\nQ1\n3079.819\n1523.5060000000001 2609.224999\nQ2\n3002.1369999999997 1239.271\n2938.551000\nQ3\n2908.0430000000001 1296.9460000000001 3165.853000\nQ4\n2722.3\n1353.8\n3808.4\n1978\nQ1\n2386.9720000000002 2377.5500000000002 3883.795999\nQ2\n1666.374\n2331.3559999999998 4094.875000\nQ3\n1107.2\n3015.8\n4273.399999\nQ4\n1192.9000000000001 2504.4\n4513\n1979\nQ1\n1473.9\n3604.5\n4573.7\nQ2\n1895\n2488\n4807.8\nQ3\n2735.8\n4315.7\n4915\nQ4\n3232.2\n3365.6\n5399.6\n1980\nQ1\n3811.8\n3597.9\n5603.3\nQ2\n4632\n2307\n6050.9\nQ3\n5661.54\n1665\n6696.1\nQ4\n5622\n3567.8\n7457.8\n1981\nQ1\n5800.3\n1885.6\n7937.7\nQ2\n5770.4\n1836\n8443.4\nQ3\n4358.7\n3760.6\n9188.799999\nQ4\n2585\n6532.9\n9670.5\n1982\nQ1\n1061.08\n6182.3\n10418.5\nQ2\n702.2\n6847.4\n10944.5\nQ3\n708.8\n6223.8\n11161.7\nQ4\n866.5\n10660.6\n11611.4\n1983\nQ1\n666.7\n8645\n11610.2\nQ2\n518.4\n11263.2\n11686.7\nQ3\n556.29999999999995 13584.4\n11744.3\nQ4\n501.4\n16450.099999999999 12237.8\n1984\nQ1\n626.4\n15991.5\n12423\nQ2\n905.7\n16524\n12520.7\nQ3\n772.9\n16497.2\n12410.4\nQ4\n1110.7\n19125.3\n12895.3\n1985\nQ1\n1132.2\n16628.5\n12987.8\nQ2\n1043.0999999999999 17553.400000000001 13134\nQ3\n573.20000000000005 20641.599999999999 13437.8\nQ4\n1418.4\n20323.599999999999 14139\n1986\nQ1\n1170.3\n16972.2\n14748.5\nQ2\n1132.4000000000001 17750\n15320.9\nQ3\n1960.1\n17516.599999999999 16880.09999\nQ4\n5367.8\n19550.599999999999 18299.90000\n1987\nQ1\n4699.1000000000004 20098.900000000001 18769.8\nQ2\n1341.6\n19039.599999999999 19513.3\nQ3\n3337.4\n18917\n20355\nQ4\n3700.5\n22247.5\n21892.5\n1988\nQ1\n2734.3\n22410.2\n23000.3\nQ2\n4558.3\n19832.599999999999 23435\nQ3\n4549.5\n20114.099999999999 25369.8\nQ4\n9492.4\n29340.6\n25472.5\n1989\nQ1\n15032.5\n28246.400000000001 27754.40000\nQ2\n15085.6\n20378.2\n28589\nQ3\n18900.7\n11422.2\n28980.3\nQ4\n22524.3\n7360.3\n29643.9\n1990\nQ1\n29412.5\n13204.1\n31696.79999\nQ2\n32512.6\n2200.1999999999998 31762.5\nQ3\n35389.4\n2962.8\n35860.1\nQ4\n43909.9\n22772.7\n35436.6\n1991\nQ1\n52512.7\n10501.3\n34206.69999\nQ2\n53585.599999999999 20988.6\n37693.4\nQ3\n49911.5\n6318.6999999999935 38750.40000\nQ4\n56045.3\n39626\n42079\n1992\nQ1\n83970.5\n45412.4\n43772\nQ2\n85271.4\n22302.400000000001 55040.9\nQ3\n81299\n31384.5\n48749.9\nQ4\n35778.254452560002 91112.177941029993 76098.69655\n1993\nQ1\n46418.27959749\n83980.267907850008 94677.02340\nQ2\n64137.994785390001 71209.247841670003 129214.9316\nQ3\n61685.122250779998 87338.196203759988 149753.4890\nQ4\n63559.128210689996 185167.90864615998 91199.27034\n1994\nQ1\n55002.138001419997 196487.72180619999 132608.8234\nQ2\n52324.039887070001 200380.57354292\n138449.8746\nQ3\n34978.211608490004 201975.97931853001 139164.3930\nQ4\n56220.278973220004 288113.53555272997 145103.8859\n1995\nQ1\n105297.76417024\n183781.43643315\n141103.6617\nQ2\n121273.40783373\n175104.62533886003 173073.6187\nQ3\n110984.23736495001 167317.32313931998 187512.9958\nQ4\n108663.01165378002 263002.77373526996 204945.0941\n1996\nQ1\n119129.05452384999 180252.06006774999 212316.4025\nQ2\n122222.28208609001 216415.04459630998 228864.6641\nQ3\n131925.54633712998 179417.37735082002 247150.4743\nQ4\n237978.47605804997 110465.55059363999 255558.8235\n1997\nQ1\n158240.5667585\n96627.252425689949 257047.5154\nQ2\n226031.53991070998 75624.955832560125 314644.8810\nQ3\n237368.72585434999 38823.871590509982 334584.0297\nQ4\n234015.68380143002 46358.40601206998\n316577.2707\n1998\nQ1\n254473.37588214997 34801.010737800003 325097.4033\nQ2\n275325.78724879003 47150.208454530017 351155.5289\nQ3\n285075.35103017004 34228.128846320047 355501.0194\nQ4\n247041.61239663002 139916.24237582998 370706.7389\n1999\nQ1\n634905.32368301996 -33229.391522390026 395399.4602\nQ2\n608426.92078908009 142759.77518876013 425237.1196\nQ3\n623997.04554158985 91308.820947089916 437373.2015\nQ4\n666271.15772920009 176804.87366981001 452411.1221\n2000\nQ1\n774824.28541749006 20342.750744140078 470107.9189\nQ2\n888657.30402372999 -26413.87530147018\n511632.8108\nQ3\n920402.61677158996 48184.37421485997\n552125.6730\nQ4\n1275016.9141366801 -123989.79177483983 587486.2034\n2001\nQ1\n1263237.9947249598 25849.176732580137 690357.5547\nQ2\n1398377.66601872\n-69914.345498410024 729382.6592\nQ3\n1440539.7\n-27426.20000000007\n810457.9\nQ4\n1326157.2\n111973.2\n871739.3\n2002\nQ1\n1361813.6\n126572.8\n925343.2\nQ2\n1191616.3\n211558.1\n944648.1\nQ3\n1282215.5\n373639.2\n938271.2\nQ4\n1346526.9\n430656.4\n1010638.4\n2003\nQ1\n1325852.2\n605045.69999999995 1047582.9\nQ2\n1173900.5\n625658.69999999995 1045848.1\nQ3\n1388233.8\n591944.69999999995 1191546.48\nQ4\n1570567.6\n499985.6\n1303421.899\n2004\nQ1\n1829690\n453804.35583333328 1372906.3\nQ2\n2010641.8\n453025.1\n1464169.8\nQ3\n2644672.6970083104 485725.53136267001 1507885.178\nQ4\n3140484.4750000006 593222.99\n1642872.2\n2005\nQ1\n3397866.6340000001 341727.82500000007 1816680.5\nQ2\n4003941.6\n603058\n1937515\nQ3\n4098471.85\n306031.90000000002 1950379.82\nQ4\n4341718.9090000009 602322.5\n1922775.77\n2006\nQ1\n5108959.9400000004 471892.32264000003 2040808.143\nQ2\n5568809.9990000008 360789.37300000002 2257453.79\nQ3\n5718702.2857403699 -235144.67443473986 2494474.935\nQ4\n6307859.2621254111 -1936615.7398334397 2556919.725\n2007\nQ1\n6997940.7801675685 -2508626.5831918996 2982217.060\nQ2\n7633412.6287206691 -2615012.0202473397 3463443.736\nQ3\n6977270.8816119991 -2462860.9903952605 4144172.664\nQ4\n7266512.0892413696 -2368484.3898503501 4968967.298\n2008\nQ1\n7991622.795226261\n-2501996.3264524098 5862327.126\nQ2\n8316237.2229435993 -2716445.3121344191 6655281.678\nQ3\n8523480.9670053404 -3230039.2832730096 7378526.087\nQ4\n8550430.3120210711 -3107688.5878986004 7909783.777\n2009\nQ1\n8105332.2178045306 -3605924.3653774792 8015572.794\nQ2\n7643607.1311438996 -3150018.1333399601 8305283.488\nQ3\n6886864.5521917501 -2957111.8267005095 9516411.600\nQ4\n7593321.8175431397 -2302294.6829203302 9895762.477\n2010\nQ1\n7249631.8516228097 -1649471.8410700993 9715608.119\nQ2\n6484759.0065151807 -1489877.5147097702 9783650.389\nQ3\n6453963.9705059491 -1026277.2824700093 9994873.582\nQ4\n6506618.5896335989 -1121798.6274487204 9460534.255\n2011\nQ1\n6988078.1024739295 -1240157.98395412\n9070174.647\nQ2\n6453690.2622074606 -1068311.3299590996 9537711.936\nQ3\n6669766.0504796105 -1148207.624127429\n10710576.18\nQ4\n7138672.7772038607 -496861.61620338075 13670373.15\nSource :\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNFA = Net\nForeign\nAssets, NCG\n= Net Credit\nto\nGovernment,\nCCP = Credit\nto Core\nPrivate\nSector, CSLG\n= Credit to\nStates &\nLocal\nGovernments,\nRM =\nReserve\nMoney, M1\n= Narrow\nMoney, M2\n= Broad\nMoney\nSupply, PSDD\n= Private\nSector\nDemand\nDeposits,\nReserves =\nDMBs'\nDeposits with\nCBN, CIC =\nCurrency in\nCirculation\nTable\nA.1.3.2:\nMonetary\nPolicy\nTargets and\nOutcomes\n(Growth\nRates)\nVariables\n1985\n1986\n1987\nM2\nActual\n12.44159178433889\n4.2325022072030958 22.91948097\nTarget\n*\n*\n*\nM1\nActual\n11.04976354514247\n-2.2885141951289838 12.05937877\nTarget\n6.5\n7.8\n11.8\nNDC\nActual\n7.6263405432752673 9.8306570020834219 16.61668934\nTarget\n7.2\n8.6999999999999993 4.400000000\nNCG\nActual\n6.2655226323247186 -3.8034600169261354 13.79446155\nTarget\n7.1\n5.9\n1.5\nCPS\nActual\n9.6445991950555676 29.428531013508746 19.63180126\nTarget\n7.4\n12.8\n8.4\nReal GDP1\nActual\n11.33\n1.89\n-0.69\nTarget\n1\n**\n**\nInflation\nActual\n1.0309278350515483 13.673469387755077 9.694793536\nTarget\n30\n***\n***\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria &\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNotes: 1Real\nGDP growth\nrates\nbetween\n1985 - 1999\nare from the\nharmonized\nseries on\nGDP\nproduced by\nthe NBS.\n*Quantitative\ntarget for M2\nis not\nspecified.\n**Policy\nstatement is\nspecified as\nstimulate\ngrowth in the\nproductive\nsectors\n***Policy\nstatement is\nspecified as\nsignificantly\nreduce/\nmoderate the\nrate of\ninflation\nTable A.1.4:\nConsolidated\nBankers'\nClearing\nHouse\nStatistics\nNumber of\nNumber\nof\nAmount\nDail\nWorking\nCheques\n(N' Million)\nPeriod\nDays\nCleared\nNo. \nChe\n1965\n302\n93195\n81.347999999999999 503\n1966\n301\n356498\n309.36199999999997 592\n1967\n300\n390000\n368.83\n573\n1968\n301\n499043\n437.61399999999998 626\n1969\n296\n457732\n452.92600000000004 506\n1970\n224.33333333333334 721365\n929.4\n321\n1971\n285.33333333333331 962513\n1211.3\n337\n1972\n232.25\n1218257\n1650\n524\n1973\n251.66666666666666 752586\n1361\n299\n1974\n253.875\n1452127\n2634.8\n571\n1975\n250.625\n1745190\n4528.3\n696\n1976\n251.875\n1806094\n6914.2\n717\n1977\n249.375\n1912212\n12481.7\n766\n1978\n235\n2121047\n11742.5\n902\n1979\n246.79166666666669 1931123\n11868.7\n782\n1980\n249.5\n2224072\n16111.7\n891\n1981\n243.5\n2561607\n19407.099999999999 105\n1982\n244.79166666666666 2403235\n20345.099999999999 981\n1983\n247.16666666666666 2164534\n18667.3\n875\n1984\n247.75\n2614286\n16281.5\n105\n1985\n247.2833333333333\n2803920\n13778.6\n113\n1986\n248.0333333333333\n3535360\n24958.5\n142\n1987\n246.2\n4951035\n26699.7\n201\n1988\n243.5\n4900697\n56181.4\n201\n1989\n246.91\n4682186\n54832.5\n189\n1990\n244.87\n5066202\n57839.199999999997 206\n1991\n244.72\n5652178\n124891\n230\n1992\n247.41\n7358580\n170235.3\n297\n1993\n225.14\n5151561\n205420.3\n228\n1994\n247.51\n4910565\n310176.59999999998 198\n1995\n247.24\n4826155\n466598.7\n195\n1996\n249.63\n4050401\n406318.2\n162\n1997\n250\n3665107\n391924.1\n146\n1998\n249.25\n7754672\n1198647.8\n311\n1999\n249.76\n8620745\n1413125.5\n345\n2000\n248.88\n10297889 2095478.1\n413\n2001\n250.88\n10193442 2256381.7000000002 406\n2002\n252\n5339419\n2325719.1\n211\n2003\n248\n12526643 8928400\n505\n2004\n256\n13997898 10996044.699999999 546\n2005 1\n248\n14638511 13915416\n590\n2006 1\n247\n14927414 16492064.02\n604\n2007\n246\n19895613 28111190.41\n808\n2008\n251\n30172925 43357416.039999999 120\n2009\n251\n29159780 29390953.149999999 116\nQ1\n62\n6355035\n8179050.8300000001 102\nQ2\n60\n6546945\n6934688.7400000002 109\nQ3\n64\n7868262\n7456434.6100000003 122\nQ4\n65\n8389538\n6820778.9699999997 129\n2010\n251\n33973919 19675506.369999997 135\nQ1\n62\n7869704\n4595469.28\n126\nQ2\n60\n7645735\n4667918.3899999997 127\nQ3\n64\n9247992\n4931925.2899999991 144\nQ4\n65\n9210488\n5480193.4100000001 141\n2011\n249\n37718585 22302646.039999999 151\nQ1\n64\n8111122\n5417761.29\n126\nQ2\n60\n8944203\n5226954.8900000006 149\nQ3\n64\n9732357\n5548609.75\n152\nQ4\n61\n10930903 6109320.1100000003 179\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\nClearing\nHouse\nactivities\ncommenced\nin 1965\nTable A.2.1:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nStatement of\nAssets &\nLiabilities -\nAssets (N'\nMillion)\nASSETS\n1960\n1961\n1962\nRESERVES\n18.829999999999998\n21.995999999999999\n24.6960\nCurrency\n18.829999999999998\n21.995999999999999\n24.6960\nDeposits with\nCBN:\n0\n0\n0\nReserve\nRequirements\nCurrent\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nStabilization\nSecurities\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n43\n73.075999999999993\n43.26\nClaims on\nNon-resident\nBanks:\n42.874000000000002\n72.959999999999994\n43.0679\nBalances held\nwith banks\noutside Nigeria\n2.194\n1.83\n2.718\nBalances held\nwith offices\nand branches\noutside Nigeria\n40.322000000000003\n71.072000000000003\n40.2920\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nBanks outside\nNigeria\n0.35799999999999998 5.8000000000000003E-2 5.80000\nBills\nDiscounted\nPayable\noutside Nigeria\n0.126\n0.11600000000000001\n0.192\nCLAIMS ON\nCENTRAL\nGOVERNMENT\n3.694\n5.9420000000000002\n6.74\nTreasury Bills\n3.694\n5.9420000000000002\n6.74\nTreasury\nCertificates\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nCentral\nGovernment\nBankers Unit\nFund\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE &\nLOCAL\nGOVERNMENT\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nState\nGovernment\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nLocal\nGovernment\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nPRIVATE\nSECTOR\n109.33\n117.126\n148.782\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nOther\nCustomers\n107.672\n111.878\n142.991\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nNigeria Banks\nSubsidiaries\n0\n2.59\n2.58599\nBills\nDiscounted\nfrom non-bank\nsources\nInvestments:\n1.6579999999999999\n2.6579999999999999\n3.20400\nOrdinary\nShares\nPreference\nShares\nDebentures\nSubsidiaries\nOther\ninvestments\n1.6579999999999999\n2.6579999999999999\n3.20400\nCommercial\npapers\nBankers\nAcceptances\nFactored Debt\nAdvances\nunder Lease\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\n0\n0\n0\nUNCLASSIFIED\nASSETS\n60.981999999999999\n76.513999999999996\n61.7539\nFixed Assets\nDomestic Inter-\nBank Claims:\n12.592000000000001\n7.9420000000000002\n13.99\nBills\nDiscounted\nfrom Banks in\nNigeria\n2.4140000000000001\n2.1179999999999999\n6.00399\nMoney at call\nwith Banks\n0\n0.14799999999999999\n0.3\nInter-bank\nPlacements\nBalances held\nwith banks in\nNigeria\n6.4\n2.5459999999999998\n5.68799\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nother Banks in\nNigeria\n3.778\n3.13\n1.998\nChecks for\nCollection\nMoney at call\noutside banks\nCertificates of\nDeposit\nPlacement\nwith Discount\nHouses\nOther Assets:\n48.39\n68.572000000000003\n47.7640\nReceivables\nPre-payments\nBills Payable\nSuspense\nSundry\nDebtors\nFEM\nCBN naira\nDepreciation\nNDIC\nMiscellaneous\n48.39\n68.572000000000003\n47.7640\nTOTAL\nASSETS\n235.83599999999998\n294.654\n285.232\nSource: Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\nFollowing the\nadoption of\nUniversal\nBanking in\nNigeria,\ncommercial\nand merchant\nbanks figures\nwere merged\nfrom 2001\nTables A.2.2:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nStatement of\nAssets/\nLiabilities -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nLIABILITIES\n1960\n1961\n1962\nDEMAND\nDEPOSITS\n82.233999999999995\n83.316000000000003\n90.59199\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n82.233999999999995\n83.316000000000003\n90.59199\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nTIME, SAVINGS\n& FOREIGN\nCURRENCY\nDEPOSITS\n54.79\n70.512\n83.28799\nTime Deposits:\n17.908000000000001\n28.135999999999999\n34.84000\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n17.908000000000001\n28.135999999999999\n34.84000\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nSavings\nDeposits:\n36.881999999999998\n42.375999999999998\n48.448\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n36.881999999999998\n42.375999999999998\n48.448\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCurrency\nDeposits:\n0\n0\n0\nDomiciliary\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nOther Deposits: 0\n0\n0\nMONEY\nMARKET\nINSTRUMENTS:\n0\n0\n0\nCertificate of\nDeposit Issued\n0\n0\n0\nNotes & Deposit\n(Cash)\ncertificates\n0\n0\n0\nBONDS\n0\n0\n0\nDebentures\n0\n0\n0\nNotes & Deposit\n(Cash)\ncertificates\n0\n0\n0\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES:\n47.956000000000003\n60.917999999999999\n40.15\nBalance Held\nfor offices and\nbranches\nAbroad\n47.802\n55.293999999999997\n39.15599\nBalance held\nfor banks\noutside Nigeria\n0.154\n0.34\n0.914000\nMoney at call\nwith foreign\nbanks\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nother banks\noutside Nigeria\n0\n5.2839999999999998\n0.08\nCENTRAL\nGOVERNMENT\nDEPOSITS\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nTime Deposits\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nDemand\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nSavings\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nCREDIT FROM\nCENTRAL\nBANK\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nCBN\n0\n0\n0\nCBN Overdrafts\nto banks\n0\n0\n0\nCAPITAL\nACCOUNTS:\n5.9320000000000004\n20.417999999999999\n28.57400\nCapital\n5.9320000000000004\n20.417999999999999\n28.57400\nReserve Fund\n0\n0\n0\nReserves for\nDepreciation &\nnon-performing\nassets\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nFederal and\nState Govt\n0\n0\n0\nTotal loans /\nlease loss\nprovision\n0\n0\n0\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIABILITIES:\n44.923999999999999\n59.49\n42.628\nInter-bank\nliabilities\n5.2560000000000002\n2.8719999999999999\n3.052\nBalances held\nfor banks in\nNigeria\n4.9980000000000002\n2.3340000000000001\n0.884000\nMoney at call\nfrom banks in\nNigeria\n0\n0\n0\nInter-bank\ntakings\n0\n0\n0\nUncleared\neffects\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nother banks in\nNigeria\n0.25800000000000001 0.53800000000000003 2.168000\nBankers\npayments\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nOther creditors\n0\n0\n1.352000\nLetters of\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nTakings from\nDiscount\nHouses\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nLiabilities:\n39.667999999999999\n56.618000000000002\n38.22399\nAccounts\nPayables\n0\n0\n0\nSuspense\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nProvision for\nTax Payments\n0\n0\n0\nSundry\nCreditors\n0\n0\n0\nForex Awaiting\nCover\n0\n0\n0\nExchange\nDifferential\n0\n0\n0\nProvision for\nBad Debt\n0\n0\n0\nFEM\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellaneous\n39.667999999999999\n56.618000000000002\n38.22399\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES:\n235.83600000000001\n294.654\n285.2320\nSource:\nComputed from\nDeposit Money\nBanks' Returns\nNote: Following\nthe adoption of\nUniversal\nBanking in\nNigeria,\ncommercial and\nmerchant banks\nfigures were\nmerged from\n2001\nTable\nA.2.3:\nSectoral\nDistribution\nof\nCommercial\nBanks'\nLoans and\nAdvances1\n(N' Million)\nP r o d u c t i o n\nAgriculture,\nManufac-\nMining\nPeriod\nForestry\nturing\nand Quarying\nand Fishery\n1960\n22.5\n4.8\n1.10000000000\n1961\n25.2\n6.6\n0.9\n1962\n36.1\n11.7\n1.10000000000\n1963\n39.299999999999997 17.899999999999999 1.2\n1964\n60.4\n26.3\n1.2\n1965\n68.3\n29\n1.3\n1966\n4.8\n39.1\n1.5\n1967\n3.7\n39.6\n2\n1968\n3.8\n37\n1.2\n1969\n4.3\n41.9\n3.1\n1970\n7\n76.400000000000006 6.6\n1971\n9.3000000000000007 119.7\n11.6\n1972\n19.2\n144\n10.1999999999\n1973\n21.6\n6.3\n182.2\n1974\n27.2\n258.5\n12.2\n1975\n37.4\n410.7\n16.3\n1976\n79.599999999999994 609\n14.6\n1977\n139.1\n837.8\n37.7000000000\n1978\n229\n1138\n39.4\n1979\n329.6\n1357.3\n44\n1980\n462.2\n1956.8\n50.9\n1981\n590.6\n2659.8\n88\n1982\n786.6\n3037.6\n94.3\n1983\n940.4\n3053.1\n118.7\n1984\n1052.0999999999999 3083.5\n165.5\n1985\n1310.2\n3232.2\n236.1\n1986\n1830.3\n4475.2\n208\n1987\n2427.1\n4961.2\n246.3\n1988\n3066.7\n6078\n227.3\n1989\n3470.5\n6671.7\n271.600000000\n1990\n4221.3999999999996 7883.7\n362.4\n1991\n5012.7\n10911.3\n541.799999999\n1992\n6978.9\n15403.9\n759.7\n1993\n10753\n23110.6\n1424.1\n1994 2\n17757.7\n34823.199999999997 -\n1995 2\n25278.7\n58090.7\n12071.6\n1996\n33264.1\n72238.100000000006 15049.5\n1997\n27939.3\n82823.100000000006 20611\n1998\n27180.7\n96732.7\n22848.2\n1999 2\n31045.7\n115759.9\n24683.5999999\n2000 2\n41028.9\n141294.79999999999 32288.6\n2001 2\n55846.1\n206889\n70477.1000000\n2002 2\n59849.7\n233474.7\n70170\n2003 2\n62102.8\n294309.59999999998 95976.4\n2004 2\n67738.600000000006 332113.7\n131055.6\n2005 2\n48561.5\n352038.3\n172532.1\n2006 2\n49393.4\n445792.6\n251477.1\n2007\n149578.9\n487576\n490712.9\n2008\n106353.84736185\n932799.45334747992 846942.843756\n2009\nQ1\n114296.55306491\n967045.59272338997 827019.216693\nQ2\n88635.087339379999 985572.47353811003 788350.406195\nQ3\n110842.10444036999 1023467.26469489\n1173075.15582\nQ4\n135701.30451533\n993456.99962274998 1190731.58303\n2010\nQ1\n136591.1\n954448.44\n1216664.63999\nQ2\n150297.29999999999 901749.5\n1405618.7\nQ3\n176688.3\n1023961.6\n1513894.2\nQ4\n128406\n987641\n1178098.60000\n2011\nQ1\n146862.91941388001 1007399.04805924\n1348260.61011\nQ2\n155101.81287010998 910000.42233526998 1308677.95287\nQ3\n234121.71419351999 1087403.3372241301 1361666.35248\nQ4\n255205.29476771\n1053213.32807472\n1295298.86162\nSource :\nComputed\nfrom\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks'\nReturns\nNotes:\n1New\nreporting\nformat\ncame into\neffect as\nfrom 1994\n2Revised\nTable\nA.2.4.1:\nMoney\nMarket\nInterest\nRates (Per\ncent)\nCentral Bank\nMinimum\nTreasury\nCertificates1\nRediscount\nTreasury\nOne Year\nTw\nYea\nPeriod\nRates\nBill Rate\nMaturity\nMa\n1960\n6.25-4.50\n6.63-4.00\n…\n…\n1961\n5.25-4.50\n4.75-4.00\n…\n…\n1962\n5.25-4.50\n4.75-4.00\n…\n…\n1963\n4\n3.5\n…\n…\n1964\n5.00-4.00\n3.5\n…\n…\n1965\n5\n4.50-3.50\n…\n…\n1966\n5\n4.5\n…\n…\n1967\n5\n4.5\n…\n…\n1968\n5.00-4.5\n4.50-4.00\n4.5\n4.6\n1969\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1970\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1971\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1972\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1973\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1974\n4.5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1975\n4.50 - 3.50\n4.50 - 2.50\n4.5\n4.6\n1976\n3.5\n2.5\n3\n3.6\n1977\n4\n3\n3.5\n3.6\n1978\n5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1979\n5\n4\n4.5\n4.6\n1980\n6\n5\n5.5\n6\n1981\n6\n5\n5.5\n6\n1982\n8\n7\n7.5\n8\n1983\n8\n7\n7.5\n8\n1984\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1985\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1986\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1987\n12.75\n11.75\n12.25\n12.\n1988\n12.75\n11.75\n12.25\n12.\n1989\n18.5\n17.5\n16.38\n17.\n1990\n18.5\n17.5\n18.2\n18.\n1991\n14.5\n15\n15\n15.\n1992\n17.5\n21\n22\n23\n1993\n26\n26.9\n27.4\n27.\n1994\n13.5\n12.5\n13\n13\n1995\n13.5\n12.5\n13\n13.\n1996\n13.5\n12.25\n…\n…\n1997\n13.5\n12\n…\n…\n1998\n14.308066759388039 12.950834492350486 …\n…\n1999\n18\n17\n…\n…\n2000\n13.5\n12\n…\n…\n2001\n14.308066759388039 12.950834492350486 …\n…\n2002\n19\n18.88\n…\n…\n2003\n15.75\n15.02\n…\n…\n2004\n15\n14.21\n…\n…\n2005\n13\n6.9950000000000001 …\n…\n2006\n12.25\n8.7999999999999989 …\n…\n2007\n8.75\n6.91\n…\n…\n2008\n9.8125\n9.55 - 4.50\n…\n…\n2009\n7.4375\n6.13 - 1.30\n…\n…\nQ1\n9.75\n5.98 - 1.30\n…\n…\nQ2\n8\n6.13 - 2.00\n…\n…\nQ3\n6\n5.70 - 3.99\n…\n…\nQ4\n6\n6.00 - 2.50\n…\n…\n2010\n6.125\n12.25 - 0.95\n…\n…\nQ1\n6\n8.15 - 0.95\n…\n…\nQ2\n6\n6.60 - 1.00\n…\n…\nQ3\n6.25\n10.00 - 1.75\n…\n…\nQ4\n6.25\n12.25 - 4.90\n…\n…\n2011\n9.1875\n20.00 - 5.56\n…\n…\nQ1\n7.5\n12.00 - 5.56\n…\n…\nQ2\n8\n14.00 - 6.80\n…\n…\nQ3\n9.25\n13.50 - 6.30\n…\n…\nQ4\n12\n20.00 - 10.10\n…\n…\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Treasury\nCertificates\nstarted in\n1968 and\nterminated\nin 1995\n… means\nnot\napplicable\nTable\nA.2.4.2:\nWeighted\nAverage\nDeposit and\nLending\nRates of\nCommercial\nBanks\nPeriod\nSavings\nPrime1\nMaximum\n1960\n0\n0\n0\n1961\n4\n7\n8\n1962\n3\n7\n8\n1963\n3\n7\n8\n1964\n3.5\n7\n8\n1965\n3.5\n7\n8\n1966\n3.5\n7\n8\n1967\n3.5\n7\n8\n1968\n3\n7\n8\n1969\n3\n7\n8\n1970\n3\n7\n8\n1971\n3\n7\n10\n1972\n3\n7\n10\n1973\n3\n7\n10\n1974\n3\n7\n10\n1975\n4\n6\n9\n1976\n4\n6\n10\n1977\n4\n6\n6\n1978\n5\n7\n11\n1979\n5\n7.5\n11\n1980\n6\n7.5\n9.5\n1981\n6\n7.75\n10\n1982\n7.5\n10.25\n11.75\n1983\n7.5\n10\n11.5\n1984\n9.5\n12.5\n13\n1985\n9.5\n9.25\n11.75\n1986\n9.5\n10.5\n12\n1987\n14\n17.5\n19.2\n1988\n14.5\n16.5\n17.6000000000\n1989\n16.399999999999999 26.8\n24.6\n1990\n18.8\n25.5\n27.7\n1991\n14.29\n20.010000000000002 20.8\n1992\n16.100000000000001 29.8\n31.2\n1993\n16.66\n18.32\n36.0900000000\n1994\n13.5\n21\n21\n1995\n12.61\n20.18\n20.79\n1996\n11.69\n19.734999999999999 20.8575000000\n1997\n4.7949999999999999 13.5425\n23.3150000000\n1998\n5.49\n18.2925\n21.3374999999\n1999\n5.33\n21.32\n27.19\n2000\n5.29\n17.98\n21.55\n2001\n5.49\n18.2925\n21.3374999999\n2002\n4.1500000000000004 24.85\n30.19\n2003\n4.1100000000000003 20.71\n22.88\n2004\n4.1900000000000004 19.18\n20.82\n2005\n3.83\n17.95\n19.4899999999\n2006\n3.14\n17.260000000000002 18.7\n2007\n3.5449999999999999 16.9375\n18.3624999999\n2008\n2.8351051735668453 15.135431097964885 18.6974283067\n2009\n2.6758333333333333 18.990833333333335 22.6225000000\n2010\n2.2054760160644169 17.585619776284673 22.5088589011\nQ1\n3.2252458492491436 18.862684160327294 23.2399634196\nQ2\n2.6030135378162043 18.4918183963796\n22.6881088386\nQ3\n1.5036280312257242 16.983417618075887 22.2597186751\nQ4\n1.4900166459665953 16.004558930355913 21.8476446713\n2011\n1.4326146365649115 16.017555778160496 22.3870267607\nQ1\n1.4678244724127172 15.763047385025134 21.8828773606\nQ2\n1.4102905787877755 15.776574228119017 22.1093746244\nQ3\n1.4463673730592548 15.841984232431306 22.2611864283\nQ4\n1.4059761219998983 16.68861726706653\n23.2946686295\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Formerly\nreferred to\nas First\nClass\nAdvances\nUniversal\nBanking\nwas\nadopted in\n2001,\nhence\nCommercial\n& Merchant\nBanks\nbecame\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\n(DMBs)\nTable A.2.5:\nSelected\nFinancial\nRatios of\nCommercial\nBanks\n(Percentage)\nPeriod\nLiquidity Ratio1\nCash Reserve Ratio2\nLoan\nRati\nActual\nPrescribed\nMinimum\nPrescribed\nActu\n1960\n0\n83.2\n1961\n0\n78\n1962\n29.1\n88.6\n1963\n31\n93.3\n1964\n31.3\n25\n106\n1965\n34.4\n25\n101\n1966\n40.200000000000003 25\n100\n1967\n72.599999999999994\n40.2\n1968\n90.7\n72.5\n1969\n89.5\n91.7\n1970\n94.5\n51.3\n1971\n73.7\n68.2\n1972\n61.8\n74.2\n1973\n63.8\n69.8\n1974\n65\n61.6\n1975\n68.5\n51.1\n1976\n59.1\n48.3\n1977\n52.7\n53\n1978\n38.4\n68.5\n1979\n45.1\n70.3\n1980\n47.6\n66.7\n1981\n38.5\n74.5\n1982\n40.5\n84.6\n1983\n54.7\n83.8\n1984\n65.099999999999994\n81.9\n1985\n65\n66.9\n1986\n36.4\n83.2\n1987\n46.5\n72.9\n1988\n45\n66.9\n1989\n40.299999999999997\n80.4\n1990\n44.3\n66.5\n1991\n38.6\n59.8\n1992\n29.1\n55.2\n1993\n42.2\n42.9\n1994\n48.5\n60.9\n1995\n33.1\n73.3\n1996\n43.1\n72.9\n1997\n40.200000000000003\n76.5\n1998\n46.8\n74.4\n1999\n61\n54.6\n2000\n64.099999999999994\n51\n2001\n52.9\n65.6\n2002\n52.45\n62.7\n2003\n50.9\n61.8\n2004\n50.475000000000001\n68.6\n2005\n50.174999999999997\n70.8\n2006\n55.7\n63.6\n2007\n48.75\n40\n70.7\n2008\n44.253875688862223 35\n3\n80.9\n2009\n30.7\n25\n1.25\n85.6\n2010\nQ1\n30.6\n25\n1\n79.4\nQ2\n30.3\n25\n1\n78.0\nQ3\n29.1\n25\n1\n78.7\nQ4\n31.7\n25\n1\n60.6\n2011\nQ1\n23.307957921142169 30\n1.4930846027446847 48.3\nQ2\n17.899999999999999 30\n3.7514744990374451 44.8\nQ3\n19.957375282733157 30\n4.0033105247290335 43.4\nQ4\n42\n30\n8\n44.7\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Liquidity\nratio is the\nratio of total\nspecified\nliquid assets\nto total\ncurrent\nliabilities\n2Cash\nreserve ratio\nis the ratio\nof cash\nreserve\nrequirement\nto total\ndeposit\nliabilities\n3Loan-to-\nDeposit\nratio is the\nratio of total\nloans and\nadvances to\ntotal deposit\nliabilities\nTable A.2.6:\nDeposits and Loans\nof Rural Branches of\nCommercial Banks\n(N' Million)\nYear/Quarter\nDeposits\nLoans\n1982\n111.7\n35.9\n1983\n131.19999999999999 44.2\n1984\n276.60000000000002 58.2\n1985\n311.39999999999998 114.9\n1986\n873.5\n373.6\n1987\n1229.2\n492.8\n1988\n1378.4\n659.9\n1989\n5722\n3721.1\n1990\n8360.1\n4730.8\n1991\n10580.7\n5962.1\n1992\n4612.2\n1895.3\n1993\n19542.3\n10910.4\n1994\n4855.2\n1602.2\n1995\n8807.1\n8659.2999999999993\n1996\n12442\n4411.2\n1997\n19047.599999999999 11158.6\n1998\n18513.8\n11852.7\n1999\n15860.5\n7498.1\n2000\n20640.900000000001 11150.3\n2001\n16875.900000000001 12341\n2002\n14861.6\n8942.2000000000007\n2003\n20551.8\n11251.9\n2004\n64490\n34118.5\n2005\n18461.900000000001 16105.5\n2006\n3118.6\n24274.6\n2007\n3082.3\n27263.5\n2008\n13411.807559209999 46521.477695000001\n2009\n3296.2273579400003 15590.500285\n2010\nQ1\n3879.44\n14741.98\nQ2\n25.36\n16054.14\nQ3\n27.46\n16417.34\nQ4\n20.79\n16555.98\n2011\nQ1\n24.86\n16919.59\nQ2\n27.36\n16261.67\nQ3\n22.23\n18132.64\nQ4\n20.184072910000001 19980.30255\nSource : Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: Rural banking\nstarted in 1977\nTable\nA.2.7.1:\nNumber of\nCommercial\nBanks\nBranches in\nNigeria and\nAbroad\nBranches\nPeriod\nNumber Urban\nRural\nAbroa\nof\nBanks\n1960\n12\n154\n4\n2\n1965\n15\n217\n6\n2\n1970\n14\n263\n7\n3\n1971\n16\n306\n9\n3.231\n1972\n16\n353.57317073170731 9.6971544715447155 3\n1973\n16\n371\n10\n4\n1974\n17\n388\n11\n4\n1975\n17\n420\n12\n4\n1976\n18\n446\n12\n5\n1977\n19\n474\n13\n5\n1978\n19\n511\n98\n5\n1979\n20\n533\n133\n6\n1980\n20\n565\n168\n7\n1981\n20\n622\n240\n7\n1982\n22\n676\n308\n7\n1983\n25\n694\n407\n7\n1984\n27\n810\n432\n7\n1985\n28\n839\n451\n7\n1986\n29\n879\n481\n7\n1987\n34\n947\n529\n7\n1988\n42\n1057\n602\n6\n1989\n47\n1093\n756\n6\n1990\n58\n1169\n765\n5\n1991\n65\n1253\n765\n5\n1992\n65\n1495\n774\n6\n1993\n66\n1577\n775\n6\n1994\n65\n1634\n763\n6\n1995\n64\n1661\n701\n6\n1996\n64\n1727\n675\n5\n1997\n64\n1727\n675\n5\n1998\n54\n1466\n714\n5\n1999\n54\n1466\n714\n5\n2000\n54\n1466\n722\n5\n2001\n90\n1466\n722\n5\n2002\n90\n2283\n722\n5\n2003\n90\n2520\n722\n5\n2004\n89\n2765\n722\n5\n2005 2\n25\nSource :\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNote:\nClassification\nof Branches\ninto Urban\nand Rural\nstopped in\n2005 due to\nconsolidation\nof banks\n1Abroad\ncomprises\nbranches and\nsubsidiaries\n2The number\nof banks\nreduced to\n25 following\nconsolidation\nof banks\nTable\nA.2.7.2:\nNumber of\nCommercial\nBanks\nBranches in\nNigeria (by\nStates) and\nAbroad\n2006 2007 2008 2009\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nNumber of\nBanks\n25\n24\n24\n24\n24\n24\n24\n24\n24\nBranches\nAbroad2\n2\n7\n8\n2\n2\n2\n2\n2\n2\nNumber of\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\nBranches in\nNigeria by\nState1\nAbia\n104\n111\n138\n135\n137\n138\n141\n145\n14\nAbuja(FCT) 163\n219\n283\n291\n345\n356\n361\n460\n39\nAdamawa\n39\n52\n58\n65\n60\n62\n63\n64\n67\nAkwa-Ibom 60\n78\n85\n92\n97\n98\n99\n105\n10\nAnambra\n121\n174\n212\n217\n221\n217\n217\n211\n23\nBauchi\n35\n45\n50\n52\n52\n52\n51\n51\n53\nBayelsa\n28\n31\n37\n39\n39\n39\n38\n37\n35\nBenue\n39\n53\n61\n68\n68\n73\n71\n73\n72\nBorno\n61\n57\n68\n87\n70\n72\n71\n76\n76\nCross-River 36\n52\n63\n75\n69\n71\n71\n73\n77\nDelta\n98\n129\n174\n180\n190\n196\n193\n196\n19\nEbonyi\n15\n22\n28\n32\n32\n32\n32\n32\n35\nEdo\n109\n118\n163\n168\n176\n181\n175\n179\n18\nEkiti\n31\n54\n67\n65\n63\n75\n58\n73\n80\nEnugu\n90\n93\n120\n126\n128\n135\n130\n138\n14\nGombe\n25\n29\n33\n38\n40\n40\n40\n40\n41\nImo\n37\n57\n84\n88\n92\n93\n104\n101\n10\nJigawa\n19\n29\n34\n36\n34\n36\n35\n35\n38\nKaduna\n126\n133\n157\n167\n157\n162\n164\n166\n17\nKano\n130\n130\n160\n178\n176\n176\n183\n162\n17\nKatsina\n33\n41\n50\n53\n53\n58\n57\n58\n60\nKebbi\n21\n31\n35\n36\n36\n36\n36\n38\n40\nKogi\n27\n64\n68\n71\n82\n82\n81\n82\n83\nKwara\n39\n70\n67\n70\n70\n71\n72\n77\n80\nLagos\n1038 1407 1551 1591 1628 1686 1690 1763 17\nNasarawa\n19\n27\n40\n44\n47\n46\n48\n49\n51\nNiger\n46\n51\n69\n74\n72\n75\n75\n77\n76\nOgun\n52\n122\n139\n150\n154\n155\n149\n162\n17\nOndo\n87\n91\n107\n107\n108\n111\n109\n114\n12\nOsun\n38\n81\n93\n93\n91\n90\n92\n93\n96\nOyo\n112\n163\n191\n201\n205\n207\n220\n215\n23\nPlateau\n77\n65\n73\n78\n75\n77\n76\n75\n79\nRivers\n179\n197\n248\n262\n266\n275\n273\n299\n30\nSokoto\n46\n41\n54\n55\n56\n58\n59\n59\n61\nTaraba\n16\n27\n30\n32\n34\n34\n35\n36\n37\nYobe\n22\n32\n33\n36\n32\n32\n32\n32\n31\nZamfara\n15\n24\n29\n31\n33\n35\n35\n36\n34\nTOTAL\n3233 4200 4952 5183 5288 5432 5436 5682 57\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria/\nNigerian\nDeposit\nInsurance\nCorporation\nNotes:\n1This\nincludes\ncash\ncenters\n2Some\nbank\nbranches\nbecame\nsubsidiaries\nTable A.2.8:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nLoans to\nSmall Scale\nEnterprises1\nPeriod\nCommercial Banks\nLoans\nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Ban\nLoans\nTo Small Scale\nTotal Credit to\nPrivate\nTo Small Scale\nEnterprises as\nEnterprises (N'\nMillion)\nSector (N' Million)\nPercentage of T\nCredit (%)\n1992\n20400\n75456.299999999988 27.0355159211\n1993\n15462.9\n88821\n17.4090586685\n1994\n20552.5\n143516.79999999999 14.3206230908\n1995\n32374.5\n204090.59999999998 15.8628079882\n1996\n42302.1\n254853.09999999998 16.5986209310\n1997\n40844.300000000003 311358.40000000002 13.1180979861\n1998\n42260.7\n366544.1\n11.5294994517\n1999\n46824\n449054.3\n10.4272467717\n2000\n44542.3\n587999.9\n7.57522237673\n2001\n52428.4\n844486.2\n6.20831933073\n2002\n82368.399999999994 948464.1\n8.68439828138\n2003\n90176.5\n1203199\n7.49472863591\n2004\n54981.2\n1519242.7\n3.61898727569\n2005\n50672.6\n1991146.42\n2.54489571891\n2006\n25713.7\n2609289.4\n0.98546753763\n2007\n41100.400000000001 4820695.7\n0.85258233578\n2008\n13512.20422159\n7799400.1132610394 0.17324671161\n2009\n16366.485012469999 9667876.6775001772 0.16928727535\n2010\nQ1\n17822.900000000001 9611989.9867048915 0.18542362221\nQ2\n12977.964575200001 9706272.2268573288 0.13370699143\nQ3\n13686.8\n9771333.859219199\n0.14007094831\nQ4\n12550.3\n9198173.0575210787 0.13644339937\n2011\nQ1\n13133.23678616\n9009438.8557658698 0.14610287407\nQ2\n109587.19760191\n9231557.3861079682 1.18709328251\nQ3\n14952.4760971\n10240403.486577002 0.14601452097\nQ4\n15611.7\n9614445.7984891199 0.16237753404\nSource :\nComputed\nfrom\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks'\nReturns\nNotes: This\ntable\ncontains\nrevised\nfigures\n1The\nabolition of\nmandatory\nbanks'\ncredit\nallocations\nof 20% of\nit's total\ncredit to\nsmall scale\nenterprises\nwholly\nowned\nby\nNigerians\ntook effect\nfrom\nOctober 1,\n1996\nSmall Scale\nEnterprises\nstarted in\n1992\nTable A.3.1:\nSummary of\nAssets &\nLiabilities\nof Primary\nMortgage\nInstitutions\n(N'\nMillions)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS :\n1. CASH\n29.3\n42.5\n30.9\n2. Balance\nheld with\n446.6\n504.1\n811.699999999\n(a) FMBN\n61.3\n84.1\n84.4\n(b) Other\nbanks\n385.3\n420\n727.3\n3. Treasury\nBills/\nCertificate\n0\n135.6\n0\n4.\nPlacements/\nInvestments\n895.5\n1185.3\n611.799999999\n5. Loans\n208.9\n334.7\n560.299999999\n6. Other\nAssets\n662.9\n1408.5\n1055.59999999\nTotal Assets 2243.2000000000003 3610.7\n3070.29999999\nLIABILITIES\n:\n1. Capital\n441.5\n845.7\n1228.59999999\n2. Reserves\n55.2\n-60.3\n-125.4\n3. Savings\n292.10000000000002 326.39999999999998 399.2\n4. Fixed\nDeposits\n626.39999999999964 1249.9000000000001 645\n5. Balance\nheld for\nother Fin.\nInts.\n337.5\n567.9\n213.9\n6. Other\nLiabilities\n490.5\n681.1\n709\nTotal\nLiabilities\n2243.1999999999998 3610.7000000000003 3070.29999999\nNumber of\nReporting\nPMI\n145\n252\n279\nLoans to\ndeposits\nRatio\n3.2\n21.2\n53.7\nLiquidity\nRatio\n6.9\n31.8\n67\nLiquid\nAssets\n475.9\n682.2\n842.6\nCurrent\nLiabilities\n6891.8\n2144.1999999999998 1258.09999999\nDeposits\n6554.3\n1576.3\n1044.2\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\nLiquidity\nRatio =\nLiquid\nAssets/\nCurrent\nLiabilities x\n100\nTable A.3.2:\nSummary of\nAssets/\nLiabilities of\nDiscount Houses\n- Assets (N'\nMillion)\nASSETS\n1993\n1994\n1995 1\nCASH AND\nBALANCES\nWITH BANKS\n6.4\n50.5\n71.3269999\ni) Cash on hand 0.1\n0.2\n0.19800000\nii) Balances\nwith CBN\n0\n15.4\n-2.2549999\niii) Balances\nwith other\nbanks\n6.3\n34.9\n73.384\nCLAIMS ON\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\n4213.2\n7126.2\n1552.64200\ni) Treasury Bills 4213.2\n7125.9\n1552.64200\na) Pledges\n0\n0\n668.15\nb) Unpledged\n0\n0\n884.491999\nc) Bill with PDO\n(CBN)\n0\n0\n0\nii) Treasury\nCertificate\nMaturing\n0\n0\n0\na) Within 1 year 0\n0\n0\nb) 1-2 years\n0\n0\n0\niii) Treasury\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\na) Pledges\n0\n0\n0\nb) Unpledged\n0\n0\n0\niv) Eligible\nDevelopment\nStock\n0\n0.3\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE\nGOVERNMENTS\n0\ni) State\nPromissory\nNotes\n0\nii Eligible State\nBonds\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nBANKS\n138.69999999999999 2308.1\n471.074999\ni) Money at Call 0\n232\n0\nii) Loans and\nAdvances\n11\niii) Commercial\nBills:\n460.074999\na) Bankers\nAcceptances\n138.69999999999999 2076.1\n410.074999\nb) Promissory\nNotes\n50\nc) Negotiable\nCertificate of\nDeposit\n0\nd) Stabilisation\nSecurities\n0\niv) Others\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\n251.95\nMoney at Call\n251.95\nLoans and\nAdvances\n0\nCommercial\nBills:\n0\na) Promissory\nNotes\n0\nb) Negotiable\nCertificate of\nDeposit\n0\nOthers\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHERS\n915.832999\nCommercial\nBills\n915.832999\nLoans and\nAdvances\n0\nOthers (CBN\nCertificate)\n0\nOTHER ASSETS 103.5\n98.4\n89.2840000\nFIXED ASSETS\n79.7420000\nTOTAL ASSETS\n4461.7999999999993 9583.1999999999989 3431.85300\nASSETS ON\nREPURCHASE\nTRANSACTION\n12190.0650\nTreasury Bills\n7012.88900\nTreasury Bills\n(Bonds)\n-\nFixed Buy Back\nRepo\n-\nEligible\nCommercial\nBills\n5177.17600\nTreasury Bills\nRepo with CBN\n-\nTreasury Bills\nRepo with other\nDiscount House\n-\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1A new\nreporting\nformat was\nintroduced in\nJune 1995\nTable A.3.3:\nSummary of\nAssets/Liabilities\nof Discount\nHouses -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nLIABILITIES\n1993\n1994\n1995 1\n19\nCAPITAL AND\nRESERVES\n436\n565.70000000000005 865.47400000000005 12\ni) Paid-up Capital 385\n437.5\n667.45\n94\nii) Statutory\nReserves\n0.5\n18.5\n51.005000000000003 12\niii) Share\nPremium\n64.918999999999997 37\niv) Other\nReserves\n50.5\n109.7\n82.1\n51\nv) General\nReserve\n0\n85\nMONEY-AT-CALL 3350\n5517.6\n707.93700000000001 76\ni) Commercial\nBanks\n678.86900000000003 61\nii) Merchant\nBanks\n25\n31\niii) Non-Bank\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n4.0679999999999996 12\niv) Others\n0\n0.\nv) Associated\nTreasury Notes\n0\n0\nOTHER AMOUNT\nOWING TO:\n0\n25\ni) Commercial\nBanks\n0\n0\nii) Merchant\nBanks\n0\n0\niii) Non-Bank\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n1.\niv) Others\n0\n25\nBORROWINGS\n2.9\n2347.5\n610\n13\ni) Central Bank of\nNigeria\n2.6\n0\n0\n0\nii) Overdrafts\n0\n13\niii) Other Banks\n0.3\n2347.5\n610\n0\nOTHER\nLIABILITIES\n672.9\n1152.4000000000001 1248.442\n26\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n4461.8 9583.1999999999989 3431.8530000000001 11\nLIABILITIES FOR\nASSETS SUBJECT\nTO\nREPURCHASE\nARRANGEMENTS\n12190.065000000001 32\n- Repo with CBN\n0\n0\n- Repo with\nBanks\n7900.9660000000003 27\n- Fixed Buy Back\nRepo\n0\n0\n- Repo with\nDiscount Houses\n50\n- Repo with\nOthers\n4289.0990000000002 0\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1A new\nreporting format\nwas introduced in\nJune 1995\nTable\nA.3.4:\nSelected\nFinancial\nRatios of\nDiscount\nHouses\nITEM\nTarget 1993\n1994\n1995\nAssets\nStructure\nAssets\n4029614\n7125921\n15526\nTreasury\nBills of\nLess Than\n91 Days\nMaturity\n4029614\n7125921\n15526\nTreasury\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities\n3352974\n7865119\n13179\nMoney at\nCall\n3350050\n5517625\n70793\nBorrowings\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nOther\nAmounts\nOwing\n0\n0\n0\nStructure\nof Assets\nRatio1 (%)\n70\n120.2\n90.6\n117.8\nTotal\nBorrowings\n& Amount\nOwing\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nBorrowings\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nAmount\nOwing\n0\n0\n0\nCapital &\nReserves\n436003\n565672\n86547\nCapital\n385000\n437500\n66745\nReserves\n51003\n128172\n19802\nGearing\nRatio: x:1\nx=50 7.0000000000000001E-3 4.1500000000000004 0.704\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1Target for\nStructure\nof Assets\nRatio was\nset and\nretained at\n70%\nbetween\n1993 and\n2002. It\nwas\nchanged to\n60% in\n2003.\nTable A.3.5:\nSummary of\nAssets &\nLiabilities of\nCommunity/\nMicrofinance\nBanks (N'\nMillion)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS :\nCash in hand\n66.7\n190.7\n233.1\nBalance with\nother banks\n245.9\n781.2\n879.8\nMoney at call\n197.7\n695.7\n773.2\nBills Discounted\n23.3\n23.4\n24.7\nLoans &\nAdvances:\n135.80000000000001 654.5\n1220.5999\n(a) Agriculture &\nforestry\n29.5\n123.2\n155.4\n(b) Mining &\nQuarrying\n3.7\n5.7\n32.200000\n(c)\nManufacturing &\nFood Processing\n19.899999999999999 129.6\n201\n(d) Real Estate &\nConstruction\n14.6\n47.5\n34.9\n(e) Transport/\nCommerce\n45.6\n280\n513.79999\n(f) Others\n22.5\n68.5\n283.3\nInvestments\n118.4\n326.60000000000002 491.4\nEquipment on\nLease\n-\n-\n6\nFixed Assets\n124.9\n406.4\n753.7\nOther Assets\n54.5\n120.1\n310.7\nTOTAL ASSETS\n967.2\n3198.6\n4693.2\nLIABILITIES:\nDeposits\n639.6\n2188.2000000000003 3216.7\n(a) Demand\n207.9\n588.5\n836.3\n(b) Savings\n304.2\n1107.9000000000001 1865.7\n(c) Time\n127.5\n491.8\n514.70000\nMoney at Call\nTakings\n0\n-\n5.0999999\nBalances held for\nBanks\n39.5\n63.9\n33.6\nMatching Loans\n36.9\n74.599999999999994 71.099999\nOther Loans1\n0\n-\n108.2\nShareholders\nFunds\n227\n625.29999999999995 935.4\n(a) Paidup\nCapital\n197.9\n417.2\n769\n(b) Reserve\n29.1\n208.1\n166.4\nOther Liabilities\n24.2\n246.60000000000002 323.10000\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n967.2\n3198.6\n4693.2\nNumber of\nReporting Banks\n334\n611\n902\nLoans to Deposit\nRatio2\n23.428066558680609 30.100794813729404 38.253363\nLiquidity Ratio3\n75.143572375202467 74.046445539718476 57.937580\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1Other\nLoans consists of\ndonations/\ngrants/\nsubventions\n2Loans to Deposit\nratio= (Loans\nand\nadvances+Bills\ndiscounted)*100/\n(deposits+money\nat call Takings\n+balances held\nfor banks)\n3Liquidity Ratio\n= ((Cash in hand\n+ Balance with\nother banks +\nMoney at Call)/\n(Deposits +\nMoney at call\nTakings +\nBalances held for\nbanks))*100\nWith effect from\nDecember 2006,\nall the existing\nCommunity\nBanks were asked\nto transform to\nMicrofinance\nBanks\n4Provisional\nTable A.3.6:\nSummary of Assets\nand Liabilities of\nFinance Houses (N'\nMillion)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS\n1. Liquid Assets\n286\n4446.5\n3655.\nCash in Hand\n40.04\n239.20400000000001 271.1\nBalances with Banks\n245.96\n1469.396\n1665.\nPlacements with\nOther Finance\nCompanies\n0\n2737.9\n1718.\n2. Domestic Credit\n1512.8\n5634\n4787.\nInvestments\n380.7\n1298.5\n1333.\nNet Loans &\nAdvances\n1132.0999999999999 4335.5\n3453.\nEquipment on Lease\n0\n0\n0\n3. Other Assets\n403.1\n1798.1\n1636.\n4. Fixed Assets\n244\n1507.2\n1581.\nTotal Assets\n2445.9\n13385.800000000001 11660\nLIABILITIES\n1. Shareholder' Fund\n576.6\n2668.2\n2111.\nPaid - Up Capital\n554.9\n2668.2\n2111.\nReserves\n21.7\n0\n0\nPublished Current\nYear Profit/Loss\n0\n0\n0\n2. Taking from Other\nFinance Companies\n0\n1592.2\n1434.\n3. Long Term\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\n4. Total Borrowings\n1292\n6969.9\n5449.\n5. Other Liabilities\n577.29999999999995 2155.5\n2664.\nTotal Liabilities\n2445.8999999999996 13385.8\n11660\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\n73232.399999999994\n#REF!\n1622880.6\n1696113\n#REF!\n446760.6\n1452734\n1899494.6\n40.040000000000006\n245.96\n286\nTable A.3.7:\nNumber of\nDevelopment &\nSpecialised\nBanks/\nInstitutions\nBANKS /\nINSTITUTIONS\n1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999\nDEVELOPMENT\nBANKS\n1\n2\n2\n2\n3\n4\n4\n4\n4\n4\nEducational\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nUrban\nDevelopment\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNigerian Export\nand Import\nBank\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nBank of\nIndustry\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNigeria Agric.\nCredit Dev.\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nFederal\nMortgage Bank\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nSPECIALISED\nBANKS:\n169\n287\n629\n1150 1245 1630 1646 1293 1293 1292\nCommunity\nBanks\n(Microfinance\nBanks)\n0\n66\n401\n879\n970\n1355 1368 1015 1015 1014\nPeoples Bank (\nBranches )\n169\n221\n228\n271\n275\n275\n278\n278\n278\n278\nSPECIALISED\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS:\n84\n127\n872\n674\n680\n657\n564\n478\n540\n541\nFinance Houses\n618\n310\n290\n279\n279\n270\n279\n280\nInsurance\nCompanies\n(Reporting)\n80\n100\n105\n105\n103\n90\n90\n83\n57\n57\nDiscount\nHouses\n-\n-\n-\n3\n4\n4\n5\n5\n5\n5\nPrimary\nMortgage\nInstitutions\n-\n23\n145\n252\n279\n280\n186\n115\n194\n194\nNational\nEconomic\nReconstruction\nFund\n(NERFUND)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNational Social\nInsurance Trust\nFund (NSITF)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNigeria Deposit\nInsurance\nCompany\n(NDIC)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nSecurities and\nExchange\nCommission\n(NSE)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\n1\n1\n1\nNational\nPension\nCommission\n(PENCOM)\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote:\nCommunity\nBanks\ntransformed to\nMicrofinance\nBanks in\nDecember 2006\nTable A.4.1:\nValue of\nMoney\nMarket\nInstruments\nOutstanding\nas at End-\nPeriod (N'\nMillion)\nPeriod\nTreasury\nTreasury\nEligible Develo-\nBills\nCertificates\npment Stocks1\n1960\n18\n-\n-\n1961\n34\n-\n-\n1962\n48\n-\n-\n1963\n60\n-\n-\n1964\n68\n-\n-\n1965\n80\n-\n-\n1966\n128\n-\n-\n1967\n168\n-\n-\n1968\n240\n20\n-\n1969\n340\n142\n-\n1970\n556\n236\n-\n1971\n616\n256\n-\n1972\n616\n286\n-\n1973\n616\n286\n-\n1974\n616\n286\n-\n1975\n616\n228\n49.8\n1976\n616\n652\n175.4\n1977\n691\n900\n437.3\n1978\n816\n1800\n248.2\n1979\n2119\n2310\n-\n1980\n2119\n2727.6\n31.7\n1981\n5782\n2307.6\n98.9\n1982\n9782\n1668.6\n93.8\n1983\n13476\n4894\n90.5\n1984\n15476\n6413\n87.4\n1985\n16976\n6644\n-\n1986\n16976\n6654.7\n14.6\n1987\n25226\n6664.1\n28.3\n1988\n35476\n6794.6\n5.9\n1989\n24126\n6944.6\n-\n1990\n25476\n34214.6\n-\n1991\n56728.3\n34214.6\n-\n1992\n103326.5\n35241.4\n-\n1993\n103326.5\n36584.300000000003 10\n1994\n103326.5\n37342.699999999997 -\n1995\n103326.5\n23596.3\n-\n1996\n103326.5\n-\n-\n1997\n221800.5\n-\n-\n1998\n221801.5\n-\n790.3\n1999\n361758.4\n-\n952.8\n2000\n465535.8\n-\n2406.30000000\n2001\n584535.80000000005 -\n3704.7\n2002\n584535.80000000005 -\n1128\n2003\n825054.5\n-\n33254.9\n2004\n871577\n-\n32758.7\n2005\n854828\n-\n101361.5\n2006\n701399.8\n-\n319332.3\n2007\n574929.42999999993 -\n694061\n2008\n471929.5\n39705.9\n914106.1\n2009\n797482.48\n52577.2\n1229049.7\n2010 2\nQ1\n837320\n45477.2\n1471774.9\nQ2\n901020\n67174.8\n1568810\nQ3\n1064270\n58460.3\n1730069.38\nQ4\n1277100\n0\n1448129.89\n2011\nQ1\n1439591.3149999999 0\n0\nQ2\n1561424.8389999999 0\n0\nQ3\n1607835.017\n0\n0\nQ4\n1727914.3640000001 0\n0\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1From\n1975 to\n1978\nCertificate\nof Deposits,\nBankers\nUnit Fund\n& Eligible\nDevt Stocks\nwere\nlumped\ntogether\n2Revised\nTable A.4.2:\nTreasury Bills\nIssues and\nSubscriptions\n(N' Million)\nS u b s c r i p t i o n s\nPeriod\nIssues\nCentral\nCommercial\nBank\nBanks\n1960\n52\n8.4779999999999998 24.248000000\n1961\n106\n18.494\n56.845999999\n1962\n175.99400000000003 59.287999999999997 52.765999999\n1963\n194.006\n85.706000000000003 35.816000000\n1964\n262\n125.26600000000001 53.054000000\n1965\n292\n153.40600000000001 51.356000000\n1966\n403.96000000000004 221.858\n54.692\n1967\n592.04800000000012 456.79199999999997 37.08\n1968\n900.46\n432.51799999999997 387.78199999\n1969\n1149.998\n376.64\n608.84799999\n1970\n1878\n769.6\n771.6\n1971\n2463.9999999999995 1516.2\n553.9\n1972\n2464.0000000000005 1674.1\n445.4\n1973\n2464.0000000000009 1318.9\n780.2\n1974\n2463.9999999999995 694.6\n1413.9\n1975\n2464\n358.2\n1602.2\n1976\n2510.1000000000004 328.2\n1699.9\n1977\n3139.0000000000005 513.29999999999995 2170.3000000\n1978\n4780\n1921.9\n2071.6999999\n1979\n7167.0000000000009 2531\n3996\n1980\n8639\n1803.3\n6104.4\n1981\n11975.999999999998 5890.4\n5438.4\n1982\n26476\n18283.099999999999 7522.1\n1983\n45831.999999999993 28445\n15805.7\n1984\n55904.000000000007 28107.9\n24820.9\n1985\n6875.9999999999991 4372.5\n2099.5\n1986\n65904.000000000015 40626.6\n22415.200000\n1987\n88663.999999999985 70837.399999999994 16573.900000\n1988\n111154.00000000001 89015.2\n20878.8\n1989\n130554\n106569.60000000001 13887.8\n1990\n91903.9\n33020.5\n17116.599999\n1991\n133156\n77729\n25609.7\n1992\n135969.90000000002 123163.3\n4473.8\n1993\n112326.50000000001 97959.6\n7541.6\n1994\n103326.50000000001 92292\n5343.3\n1995\n103326.40000000001 86938.8\n9099.5\n1996\n103326.5\n33856.400000000001 32028.9\n1997\n72930.900000000009 54319.6\n11089\n1998\n88930.9\n61768.7\n12864.7\n1999\n80930.899999999994 17367.099999999999 38568.400000\n2000\n86895.1\n0\n58257.2\n2001\n1985453.2\n1065709.3\n686183\n2002\n2421143.2000000002 929123.2\n998915.2\n2003\n3026347.1\n789158\n1394\n2004\n3467740.5\n811945.2\n1403052.4\n2005\n2521730\n996108.86\n1257194.77\n2006\n1509070\n643210\n771570\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Savings\nInstitutions\ninclude\nmutual\nsavings and\nloan groups,\ncredit\norganisations,\nco-operative\nsocieties,\ninsurance\ncompanies,\npost office\nsavings\nbank, pension\nand\nprovident\nfunds,\nschools,\nunions, etc.\n2Others\ninclude\nFederal, State\nand Local\ngovernments,\nDiscount\nHouses and\nother\ncompanies\nTable\nA.4.2.1:\nTreasury\nBills Issues,\nSubscriptions\nand\nAllotments 1\n(N' Million)\nAllotments\nPeriod\nIssues\nTotal\nCentral\nSubscriptions\nBank\n2007\n1304182.74\n3141189.05\n25069.847999\nQ1\n343106.56\n850511.90999999992 0\nQ2\n360929.43\n923260.26\n0\nQ3\n328216.70999999996 502476.68000000005 19586.775999\nQ4\n271930.04000000004 864940.2\n5483.0720000\n2008\n916281.6\n2787775.5300000003 7584.3300000\nQ1\n253217\n594467.48\n6376.7400000\nQ2\n241274.33999999997 977616.13000000012 1200.1399999\nQ3\n165217.01\n432583.72000000003 0\nQ4\n256573.25\n783108.2\n7.45\n2009\n1392430\n2541080\n30\nQ1\n275580\n679000\n30\nQ2\n341580\n560000\n0\nQ3\n322230\n493680\n0\nQ4\n453040\n808400\n0\n2010\n2003950\n4324860\n0\nQ1\n315050\n981890\n0\nQ2\n419410\n857240\n0\nQ3\n598640\n1310570\n0\nQ4\n670850\n1175160\n0\n2011\n3046260\n6598530\n0\nQ1\n706570\n1724190\n0\nQ2\n759910\n1938920\n0\nQ3\n709190\n1373590\n0\nQ4\n870590\n1561830\n0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1\nTable\npresents\nrevised\ntemplate and\ndata.\n2Comprises\nallotments to\nMoney\nMarket\nDealers\n(MMDs),\nMandate/\nInternal\nAccounts\nand Brokers.\nTable A.4.3: Holdings\nof Treasury Bills\nOutstanding (N'\nMillion)\nTotal Outstanding1\nHolders\nPeriod\nCentral Bank\nMerch\nincluding Rediscounts Banks\n1960\n18\n2.73\n-\n1961\n34\n13.32\n-\n1962\n48\n9.3659999999999997 6.82\n1963\n60\n31.367999999999999 6.95\n1964\n68\n13.164\n9.710\n1965\n80\n24.934000000000001 6.51\n1966\n128\n57.973999999999997 6.72\n1967\n336\n189.624\n-\n1968\n240.01400000000001 8.5440000000000005 -\n1969\n556\n100.208\n-\n1970\n555.9\n100.2\n28.2\n1971\n646.20000000000005 179.6\n24.3\n1972\n616\n36.6\n34.20\n1973\n616\n86.4\n40.70\n1974\n616\n18.899999999999999 -\n1975\n615.90000000000009 1.2\n-\n1976\n615.79999999999995 3.1\n7.4\n1977\n691\n161\n26.9\n1978\n816\n27.3\n7.8\n1979\n2118\n0.2\n45.9\n1980\n2119\n-\n40.6\n1981\n5782\n3404.9\n51.1\n1982\n9782\n5463.7\n171.7\n1983\n13476\n6018.1\n374.5\n1984\n15475.400000000001 4860\n876.5\n1985\n16976\n6184.1\n1027.\n1986\n16976\n11585\n98\n1987\n25226\n14215.3\n260.6\n1988\n35475.999999999993 22560.3\n159.1\n1989\n24126\n11164\n84.6\n1990\n25476\n3403.9\n346.1\n1991\n56728.3\n34756\n673\n1992\n103317.5\n81143\n1004.\n1993\n103326.5\n47386.5\n9393.\n1994\n103326.5\n30184.2\n28286\n1995\n103326.5\n41984.1\n2105.\n1996\n103326.5\n9490.9\n8947.\n1997\n221800.5\n141676.6\n6384.\n1998\n221801.5\n132513.4\n8165.\n1999\n361758.4\n79860.5\n12723\n2000\n465535.8\n87355.5\n12439\n2001\n584535.80000000005 325328.5\n-\n2002\n584535.80000000005 134960.70000000001 -\n2003\n825054.5\n255664.6\n-\n2004\n871577\n60807.4\n-\n2005\n854828\n82679\n-\n2006\n701399.8\n24514.93\n21612\n2007\n574929.42999999993 5940.84\n25655\n2008\n471929.5\n410.2\n26529\n2009\nQ1\n546929.4\n2943.5\n12678\nQ2\n641929.4\n23416.6\n6311.\nQ3\n753578.1\n2078.3000000000002 12855\nQ4\n797482.48\n1900.3\n59339\n2010\nQ1\n837319.99999999988 0\n20302\nQ2\n901020\n0\n11579\nQ3\n1064270\n24480\n38147\nQ4\n1277100.0000000002 24480\n32730\n2011\nQ1\n1439590\n30660\n17351\nQ2\n1561420\n19420\n83750\nQ3\n1607840\n3040\n36899\nQ4\n1727910\n69300\n20036\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1Nominal\nvalue\n2Since the Adoption\nof Universal Banking\nPractice in 2001,\nMerchant Banks and\nCommercial Banks\nfigures are aggregated\nunder Commercial\nBanks\n3Includes statutory\nboards, corporations,\nsavings-type\ninstitutions, local\ngovernments,\ncompanies,individuals\nand public accounts\nwith CBN from 1989\n4The figures from\n2007 are that of\nDiscount Houses\nTable A.4.4:\nHoldings of\nTreasury\nCertificates\nOutstanding\n(N'Million)\nTotal Outstanding1\nHolders\nPeriod\nCentral\nCommercial\nBank\nBanks\n1968\n20\n-\n19.391999999\n1969\n142\n-\n138.87\n1970\n236\n2.27\n223.434\n1971\n256\n-\n188.958\n1972\n285.8\n0.5\n202\n1973\n285.70000000000005 19.3\n231.5\n1974\n286\n0.6\n261.7\n1975\n227.6\n2.7\n214.1\n1976\n651.90000000000009 4.7\n587.70000000\n1977\n899.80000000000007 79.599999999999994 808.6\n1978\n1799.9999999999998 1177\n440.6\n1979\n2310\n1072.8\n837\n1980\n2727.6\n1590.9\n834.3\n1981\n2301.6\n1112.5999999999999 850.4\n1982\n1665.6\n900.3\n625.79999999\n1983\n4914.3999999999996 3560.7\n798.7\n1984\n6413.0999999999995 4304.2\n1429.5\n1985\n8354.0999999999985 3724.4\n2264\n1986\n6654.7\n4518.3\n1360.8\n1987\n6654.0999999999995 3431.6\n2322.1999999\n1988\n6794.6\n3670.4\n2035.7\n1989\n6944.5999999999995 4483.5\n1095.9000000\n1990 3\n34214.6\n31847.1\n1036.5\n1991\n34214.600000000006 32813.300000000003 559.29999999\n1992\n34214.6\n22896.6\n324.60000000\n1993\n36584.299999999996 35307.699999999997 673.7\n1994\n37342.699999999997 22365.9\n614.29999999\n1995\n35687.1\n30079\n280.8\n1996 4\n37342.700000000004 31142.9\n415.6\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNote:\n1Nominal\nValue\n2Includes\nStatutory\nBoards/\nCorporations,\nSavings -\ntype\nInstitutions,\nLocal\nGovernment,\nCompanies\nand\nIndividuals\n3Includes\nnew issues of\nTC of N27.3\nbillion\n4Total\noutstanding\nTreasury\nCertificates\nwere\nconverted\ninto treasury\nbonds with\neffect from\n16th March,\n1996\nTable.4.5:\nHoldings of\nDevelopment\nStocks (N'\nMillion)\nPeriod\nCentral\nCommercial\nMerchant\nBank1\nBanks\nBank2\n1960\n1961\n1962\n-\n1.5459999999999998\n1963\n2.5\n0.6\n1964\n13.7\n0.5\n1965\n19\n0.6\n1966\n21.2\n2.4\n1967\n30.5\n2.4\n1968\n40.9\n1.7\n1969\n38.5\n1.9\n1970\n37.1\n3.6\n1971\n145.80000000000001 9.4\n-\n1972\n121.6\n11\n-\n1973\n69.5\n5.8\n1974\n0.1\n10.6\n1975\n309.8\n74.400000000000006\n1976\n451.9\n142.1\n-\n1977\n216.3\n243.4\n6.6\n1978\n826.6\n143.5\n0.5\n1979\n1410.8\n272.39999999999998 0.5\n1980\n1381.3\n524.79999999999995 1.5\n1981\n1529.1\n361.9\n1.5\n1982\n1658.6\n328.8\n1.9\n1983\n1768.6\n301.60000000000002 3.3\n1984\n1536.6\n272.10000000000002 1.1000000000\n1985\n1613.4\n395.7\n33\n1986\n1618.3\n545.70000000000005 11.7\n1987\n1550.3\n537.20000000000005 5.0999999999\n1988\n1450.5\n404.9\n13.6\n1989\n1484.9\n39.5\n6.1\n1990\n1497.8\n156.80000000000001 6.7\n1991\n807.9\n33.5\n6.4\n1992\n121.6\n29.5\n3.6\n1993\n1506.2\n159\n-\n1994\n1207.5\n-\n-\n1995\n918.1\n14.7\n-\n1996\n789\n471.1\n0\n1997\n1193.3\n14\n0\n1998\n494.4\n13\n157.80000000\n1999\n671.6\n4\n0\n2000\n251.3\n0\n0\n2001\n251.3\n0\n0\n2002\n6903.4\n2692.7249999999999 0\n2003\n415\n32504.9\n-\n2004\n230\n32758.7\n-\n2005\n158.57\n0\n0\n2006\n102.50700000000001 0\n0\n2007\n143.88900000000001 0\n0\n2008\n129.19999999999999 0\n0\n2009\n24.645\n0\n0\n2010\n0\n0\n0\n2011 3\n0\n0\n0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Exclude 20\nbillion naira\nTreasury\nBonds issued\nin March,\n1990\n2Merchant\nBanks ceased\nafter the\nadoption of\nuniversal\nbanking\npractice in\n2001.\n3The\ndevelopment\nstocks\noutstanding\nas at\nend-2010\nwere fully\nredeemed at\nend-March\n2011.\nForeign\nholdings of\nDevelopment\nStocks are\nnegligible\nTable A.4.6:\nTransactions\nat the\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNumber of Deals\nYear\nIndustrial\nLoan\nETF Bond Equities Total\nGovt.\n1961\n92\n242\n-\n334\n1962\n175\n520\n-\n695\n1963\n296\n415\n-\n711\n1964\n404\n581\n-\n985\n1965\n391\n627\n-\n1018\n1966\n501\n595\n-\n1096\n1967\n336\n427\n-\n763\n1968\n286\n360\n-\n646\n1969\n307\n246\n-\n553\n1970\n303\n331\n-\n634\n1971\n204\n748\n-\n952\n1972\n258\n640\n-\n898\n1973\n285\n537\n-\n822\n1974\n256\n2807\n-\n3063\n1975\n203\n501\n-\n704\n1976\n321\n696\n-\n1017\n1977\n337\n1314\n-\n1651\n1978\n243\n2230\n-\n2473\n1979\n124\n3099\n-\n3223\n1980\n220\n6918\n-\n7138\n1981\n118\n10081\n-\n10199\n1982\n184\n9830\n-\n10014\n1983\n292\n11633\n-\n11925\n1984\n194\n17250\n-\n17444\n1985\n340\n23231\n-\n23571\n1986\n270\n27448\n-\n27718\n1987\n294\n42\n20189\n20525\n1988\n100\n-\n21460\n21560\n1989\n171\n-\n33273\n33444\n1990\n118\n49\n39103\n39270\n1991\n45\n9\n41716\n41770\n1992\n71\n14\n48944\n49029\n1993\n39\n28\n40331\n40398\n1994\n16\n48\n42010\n42074\n1995\n0\n15\n49549\n49564\n1996\n11\n15\n49489\n49515\n1997\n6\n5\n78078\n78089\n1998\n1\n3\n84931\n84935\n1999\n4\n0\n123505\n123509\n2000\n8\n0\n256515\n256523\n2001\n14\n0\n426149\n426163\n2002\n3\n0\n451847\n451850\n2003\n1\n19\n621697\n621717\n2004\n3\n13\n973510\n973526\n2005\n4.4000000000000004 19.2\n1021943 102196\n2006\n5\n1\n1367948 136795\n2007\n0\n37\n2614983 261502\n2008\n0\n138\n3535493 353563\n2009\n0\n15\n1\n1739349 173936\n2010\n5\n0\n2\n1925471 192547\n2011\n0\n0\n33\n0\n1235434 123546\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNotes:\nIndustrial\nloans figure\nfor\n1961-1986\nincludes\nequities\nActive\nTrading\nStarted in\nJune 1961\nExchange\nTrust Fund\n(ETF) is an\ninvestment\ninstrument\nintroduced\nin 2011\nTable\nA.4.7.1:\nAll Share\nIndex on\nthe\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1985\n111.3\n112.2\n113.4\n1986\n134.6\n139.69999999999999 140.80000000000\n1987\n166.9\n166.2\n161.69999999999\n1988\n190.8\n191.4\n195.5\n1989\n239.7251\n251\n256.89999999999\n1990\n343\n349.3\n356\n1991\n528.70000000000005 557\n601\n1992\n794\n810.7\n839.1\n1993\n1113.4000000000001 1119.9000000000001 1130.5\n1994\n1666.3\n1715.3\n1792.8\n1995\n2285.3000000000002 2379.8000000000002 2551.1\n1996\n5135.1000000000004 5180.3999999999996 5266.2\n1997\n7268.3\n7699.3\n8561.4\n1998\n6435.6\n6426.2\n6298.5\n1999\n5494.8\n5376.5\n5456.2\n2000\n5752.9\n5955.7\n5966.2\n2001\n8794.2000000000007 9180.5\n9159.7999999999\n2002\n10650\n10581.9\n11214.4\n2003\n13298.8\n13668.8\n13531.1\n2004\n22712.880000000001 24797.43\n22896.400000000\n2005\n23078.3\n21953.5\n20682.400000000\n2006\n23679.4\n23843\n23336.6\n2007\n36784.5\n40730.699999999997 43456.1\n2008\n54189.919999999998 65652.38\n63016.56\n2009\n21813.759999999998 23377.14\n19851.89\n2010\n22594.9\n22985\n25966.25\n2011\n26830.7\n26016.799999999999 24621.200000000\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNote:\n1All\nShare\nIndex\nstarted in\nJanuary,\n1985\nTable\nA.4.7.2: Total\nAnnual\nMarket\nCapitalization\non The\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange (N'\nBillion)\nYear\nGovernment\nStocks/\nSecurities\nDebt/Bonds\nETF Equities\n1981\n3.1\n0.0\n1.9\n1982\n3.0\n1.0\n1.0\n1983\n3.5\n0.0\n2.2\n1984\n2.9\n0.2\n2.4\n1985\n3.5\n0.4\n2.7\n1986\n2.7\n0.4\n3.7\n1987\n4.2\n0.0\n4.0\n1988\n4.5\n0.4\n5.1\n1989\n4.2\n0.6\n8.0\n1990\n3.4\n0.8\n12.1\n1991\n3.3\n1.4\n18.4\n1992\n3.2\n1.8\n26.2\n1993\n3.6\n2.1\n41.8\n1994\n3.2\n2.1\n61.0\n1995\n3.2\n2.1\n175.1\n1996\n3.0\n3.0\n279.8\n1997\n2.8\n2.8\n276.3\n1998\n2.7\n3.1\n256.8\n1999\n2.4\n3.1\n294.5\n2000\n2.1\n4.1\n466.1\n2001\n8.3\n5.8\n648.4\n2002\n12.7\n3.5\n748.7\n2003\n25.2\n8.4\n1,325.7\n2004\n178.1\n7.9\n1,926.5\n2005\n365.5\n11.1\n2,523.5\n2006\n888.9\n3.5\n4,228.6\n2007\n2,976.6\n17.0\n10301\n2008\n2529.96\n45.52\n6987.50999999999\n2009\n1930.26\n108.54988514199999\n4992\n2010\n1715.2\n280.39999999999998\n7922.6\n2011\n1509.2\n1649.3\n0.9 6513.2\nNote:\nExchange\nTrust Fund\n(ETF) is an\ninvestment\ninstrument\nintroduced in\n2011\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nTable\nA.4.7.3:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nMarket\nCapitalization\n- Equities\nOnly (N'\nBillion)\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1985\n4.8164972962893895 4.8554447137796011 4.9073746037\n1986\n5.8248026602026224 6.0455046926471496 6.0931070918\n1987\n7.2225821990179622 7.1922897631922424 6.9975526757\n1988\n8.2568525079246697 8.2828174529181418 8.4602445770\n1989\n10.374081725091676 10.862001988936539 11.117323948\n1990\n14.843293554602523 15.115925477033997 15.405867362\n1991\n22.879444030082666 24.104123935608179 26.008219901\n1992\n34.360277208030325 35.082968177015353 36.311975573\n1993\n48.182282926222882 48.463569830318853 48.922283858\n1994\n72.108979737708992 74.229450245509341 77.583255640\n1995\n98.896147989309469 102.98562682578159 110.39861862\n1996\n222.22098172664553 224.18133507365278 227.89432220\n1997\n314.53501616010936 333.18650164708805 370.49380011\n1998\n278.5\n278.2\n272.60000000\n1999\n247.6\n242.7\n246.3\n2000\n321.3\n332.6\n333.2\n2001\n506.1\n542.79999999999995 541.5\n2002\n629.9\n625.9\n663.3\n2003\n841.2\n864.6\n846.9\n2004\n1534.8574121951101 1740.2\n1635\n2005\n1863.6901898864801 1783.1636898278\n1680\n2006\n2566.4\n2574.1\n2510.8000000\n2007\n4976.2997116833794 5510.1517687488795 6150.0491393\n2008\n10692.738058529301 12503.2\n12125.895279\n2009\n4879.1000000000004 5231.8999999999996 4483.5\n2010\n5441.5876318420305 5535.7471679987502 6280.5987499\n2011\n8744.2000000000007 8315.6\n7866.7\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nTable\nA.5.1:\nSavings\nStatistics -\nCumulative\n(N' Million)\nPeriod\nSavings and Time\nDeposit with Comm.\nBank\nNational Provident\nFund\nFederal Savings \n1960\n36.881999999999998 -\n6.796000000000\n1961\n42.375999999999998 -\n6.546000000000\n1962\n83.3\n-\n6\n1963\n94.3\n8.9060000000000006 5.9\n1964\n108.4\n17.8\n5.9\n1965\n141\n27.3\n5.5\n1966\n162.5\n37.1\n5.3\n1967\n131.19999999999999 43.5\n4.8\n1968\n183.5\n50.9\n4.900000000000\n1969\n215.4\n58.6\n5.099999999999\n1970\n336.7\n67.400000000000006 4.900000000000\n1971\n371.8\n76.599999999999994 4.5\n1972\n456.9\n89.2\n4.3\n1973\n582.29999999999995 109.7\n4.5\n1974\n973.2\n129.80000000000001 4.7\n1975\n1572.4\n159.9\n8.1\n1976\n1979.2\n193.9\n6.9\n1977\n2255.1\n230.4\n8\n1978\n2601.6999999999998 269.89999999999998 8.1\n1979\n3702.1\n306.7\n7.7\n1980\n5163.2\n338.9\n7.3\n1981\n5796.1\n375.3\n7.1\n1982\n6338.2\n411.5\n4\n1983\n8082.9\n472.3\n5\n1984\n9391.2999999999993 504.1\n8\n1985\n10550.9\n540.5\n8.1\n1986\n11487.7\n577.4\n8.1\n1987\n15088.7\n614\n16.89999999999\n1988\n18397.2\n651\n22.4\n1989\n17813.3\n699.1\n37.5\n1990\n23137.1\n723.5\n-\n1991\n30359.7\n650\n-\n1992\n43438.8\n719.8\n-\n1993\n60895.9\n766.8\n-\n1994\n76127.8\n757.9\n-\n1995\n93327.8\n731.4\n-\n1996\n115352.3\n-\n-\n1997\n154055.70000000001 -\n-\n1998\n161931.9\n1365.3\n-\n1999\n241604.7\n1365.3\n-\n2000\n343174.1\n1365.3\n-\n2001\n451963.1\n1365.3\n-\n2002\n556011.69999999995 1365.3\n0\n2003\n655739.69999999995 -\n-\n2004\n797517.2\n-\n-\n2005\n1316957.3999999999 -\n-\n2006\n1739636.9\n-\n-\n2007\n2693554.3\n-\n-\n2008\n4118172.8\n-\n-\n2009\n5763511.2000000002 -\n-\n2010\n5954260.5\n-\n-\n2011\n6531913.0086532207 -\n-\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1Consists\nPeoples\nBank and\nCommunity\nBanks\nTable A.6.1:\nIncome and\nExpenditure\nof Non-Life\nInsurance\nCompanies\nin Nigeria (N'\nThousand)\nI n c o m e\nWholly\nJoint\nForeign1 All\nYear\nNigerian\nCom\n1970\n5162\n1428\n4668\n1125\n1971\n9898\n1670\n5378\n1694\n1972\n10071\n9057\n6455\n2558\n1973\n12620\n9378\n7775\n2977\n1974\n18287\n17606\n3272\n3916\n1975\n33863\n31242\n5579\n7068\n1976\n53031\n44387\n5771\n1031\n1977\n109473\n55175\n0\n1646\n1978\n99797\n67113\n0\n1669\n1979\n89517\n66853\n0\n1563\n1980\n114581\n73658\n0\n1882\n1981\n151187\n89479\n0\n2406\n1982\n159560\n99950\n0\n2595\n1983\n171959\n56674\n0\n2286\n1984\n140593\n97002\n0\n2375\n1985\n118622\n86464\n0\n2050\n1986\n148792\n114900\n0\n2636\n1987\n259669\n160289\n0\n4199\n1988\n300351\n206324\n0\n5066\n1989\n507450\n194314\n0\n7017\n1990\n657155\n391288\n0\n1048\n1991\n842364\n491873\n0\n1334\n1992\n1501231\n1016670\n0\n2517\n1993\n5087311\n813946\n0\n5901\n1994\n13649482\n1022193\n0\n1467\n1995\n13520921\n1066728\n0\n1458\n1996\n11202468\n1948095\n0\n1315\n1997\n13405788\n3113230\n0\n1651\n1998\n14756790\n3089681\n0\n1784\n1999 2\n8996087.5283242259 1883542.4716757727 0\n1087\n2000\n11615534.671297198 2431985.3287028004 0\n1404\n2001\n15248142.747829529 3192557.252170471\n0\n1844\n2002\n18131387.630630165 3796232.3693698323 0\n2192\n2003\n30435320.046148058 6372349.953851941\n0\n3680\n2004\n34258357.296997257 7172792.7030027388 0\n4143\n2005\n41631695.546604142 8716574.4533958565 0\n5034\n2006\n42880646.399999999 8978071.6869977321\n5185\n2007\n43952662.559999995 9202523.4791726749 0\n5315\n2008\n44831715.811199993 9386573.9487561285 0\n5421\n2009 3\n45638686.695801593 9555532.2798337396 0\n5519\n2010 4\n46642737.803109229 9765753.9899900816 0\n5640\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\n1Wholly\nForeign\nowned\ninsurance\ncompanies\nceased to\nexist in\nNigeria since\nthe\npromulgation\nof the\nNigerian\nEnterprises\nPromotion\nDecree of\n1977\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof income\nand\nexpendicture\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReport\n3Revised\n4Provisional\nTable A.6.2:\nSources of\nIncome of\nNon-Life\nInsurance\nCompanies\nin Nigeria -\nAll\nCompanies1\n(N'\nThousand)\nAll\nCompanies\nMotor\nEm\nPremiums\nFire\nAccident\nVehicle\nLia\nYear\n(A)\n1970\n10838\n1644\n914\n5700\n696\n1971\n15870\n2212\n1048\n8940\n100\n1972\n24666\n3086\n1562\n15073\n160\n1973\n27844\n3224\n1832\n16939\n168\n1974\n36518\n4365\n2236\n21489\n194\n1975\n67879\n7289\n3209\n43632\n339\n1976\n101113\n8183\n5522\n68757\n500\n1977\n154872\n12533\n9879\n91853\n703\n1978\n159592\n14003\n12135\n94739\n828\n1979\n149555\n17115\n12028\n84501\n606\n1980\n179569\n16449\n16634\n92128\n756\n1981\n234050\n22109\n27907\n116418\n995\n1982\n248765\n27507\n28430\n121401\n110\n1983\n191801\n26359\n24933\n115737\n665\n1984\n205694\n28337\n28720\n94185\n610\n1985\n195290\n35649\n29420\n99256\n611\n1986\n254158\n41636\n30174\n104722\n580\n1987\n406500\n75087\n47808\n126795\n663\n1988\n486648\n82712\n58385\n151539\n108\n1989\n673089\n154922\n111303\n161895\n131\n1990\n1013674\n194435\n124173\n343864\n116\n1991\n1296243\n233418\n176271\n501760\n381\n1992\n2445691\n839248\n249778\n906282\n241\n1993\n4931918\n543496\n605498\n1907969\n956\n1994\n14519149\n535494\n602822\n2284879\n621\n1995\n13525125\n781963\n763100\n2346806\n994\n1996\n11091331\n1822198\n1832617\n3384708\n160\n1997\n10941579\n2068116\n1286315\n3771245\n565\n1998\n11688251\n2385065\n1717812\n3616410\n514\n1999 2\n14597280\n2920500\n2351910\n6293130\n244\n2000\n22531460\n3449780\n2872570\n7403980\n260\n2001\n28981290\n3807940\n3888020\n10101830 384\n2002\n37765890\n4908300\n4918670\n11715490 402\n2003\n43441810\n5940650\n5812680\n12871620 512\n2004\n50100830\n6965130\n8370930\n15482440 682\n2005\n67465560\n12252550 11050140\n16322630 758\n2006\n81583750\n11970620 15239750\n20734980 912\n2007\n89104890\n11458440 16566740.000000002 25771390 992\n2008\n107221300 17454900 23208400\n38701200 100\n2009 3\n153476980 19534950 25918890\n44133980 895\n2010 4\n149042220 23247330 26933050\n42440470 145\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\nAll\nCompanies\ncomprises\nNigerian,\nForeign and\nJointly\nowned\ncompanies\n1Wholly\nForeign\nowned\ninsurance\ncompanies\nceased to\nexist in\nNigeria since\nthe\npromulgation\nof the\nNigerian\nEnterprises\nPromotion\nDecree of\n1977\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof income\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReport.\n3Revised\n4Provisional\nTable A.6.3:\nBreakdown\nof Total\nExpenditure\nof Non-Life\nInsurance\nBusiness -\nAll\nCompanies1\n(N'\nThousand)\nClaims\nFire\nAccident\nYear\n(A)\n1970\n3760\n528\n358\n1971\n4658\n720\n226\n1972\n7467\n886\n430\n1973\n11991\n1504\n543\n1974\n13329\n970\n421\n1975\n18800\n1200\n713\n1976\n27625\n2302\n770\n1977\n45993\n4287\n1668\n1978\n55517\n4536\n2149\n1979\n59141\n3839\n2855\n1980\n59363\n5642\n2238\n1981\n74208\n6271\n3655\n1982\n79173\n6780\n5482\n1983\n78580\n6034\n5586\n1984\n77704\n5334\n6276\n1985\n63975\n-14.0\n6408\n1986\n86390\n6876\n5884\n1987\n109430\n16421\n8374\n1988\n151143\n16527\n11242\n1989\n278928\n46954\n28823\n1990\n306512\n61513\n30795\n1991\n386872\n80415\n42783\n1992\n613887\n114795\n66768\n1993\n2684105\n1161034\n448731\n1994\n1315294\n267396\n193828\n1995\n1508882\n194532\n207139\n1996\n1654069\n342701\n276877\n1997\n1677282\n349106\n376620\n1998\n1956214\n388133\n396745\n1999 2\n5923180\n890970\n1649040\n2000\n5629520\n1107650\n806330\n2001\n6110520\n1164660\n957820\n2002\n6856145\n1857870\n109284.999999\n2003\n9415200\n1681740\n2266790\n2004\n12084040\n2724430\n2852920\n2005\n12402400\n2766710\n3138160\n2006\n76276110\n6662980\n15239750\n2007\n15843976\n1793390\n3829306\n2008\n25629870\n6076600\n4467500\n2009 3\n26270616.75\n6228514.9999999991 4579187.5\n2010 4\n26848570.318500001 6365542.3299999991 4679929.625\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\n11970 -\n1998 data\nwere\nsourced\nfrom Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof\nexpendicture\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReports\n3Revised\n4Provisional\nTable A.6.4:\nBreakdown\nof Total\nAssets of\nInsurance\nCompanies\n(N' Million)\nYear\nGeneral Business\nLife\nTotal\n1996\n21332.84\n7602.09\n28934.93\n1997\n29312.5\n8615.68\n37928.18\n1998\n30847.77\n10603.45\n41451.22\n1999\n34616.78\n15514.87\n50131.65\n2000\n41495.519999999997 20104.48\n61600\n2001\n51674.03\n26386.45\n78060.4799999\n2002\n51933.72\n33322.01\n85255.7300000\n2003\n74386.41\n49880.959999999999 124267.37\n2004\n77730.14\n63491.89\n141222.03\n2005\n130402.53\n72710.59\n203113.12\n2006\n219086.67\n88455.94\n307542.61\n2007\n302262.83\n125234.33\n427497.160000\n2008\n386016.4\n187136.08\n573152.48\n2009 1\n388350.69\n198108\n586458.689999\n2010 2\n376354.43\n188202.89\n564557.320000\nSource:\nNAICOM\nReports\nNote:\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nTable A.6.5:\nTotal\nInsurance\nBusiness\nInvestments\n(N' Million)\nYear\nGovernment\nSecurities\nStocks & Bonds\nReal Estate &\nMortgage\n1996\n1546.16\n4047.81\n2523.19999999\n1997\n2012.01\n4095.38\n2683.5\n1998\n4145.88\n3633.17\n211.95\n1999\n2987.21\n4174.04\n332.65\n2000\n3558.95\n4992.87\n282.339999999\n2001\n3842.71\n6886.26\n359.33\n2002\n3752.08\n8350.85\n960.31\n2003\n3558.95\n4992.87\n282.339999999\n2004\n8708\n0\n351.84\n2005\n4178.0600000000004 61800.82\n33788.15\n2006\n4858.1000000000004 121813.13\n45186.77\n2007\n20914.810000000001 222278.92\n45331.91\n2008\n21333.106200000002 226724.49840000001 46238.5482000\n2009 1\n21866.433854999999 232392.61085999999 47394.5119049\n2010 2\n22347.495399809999 237505.24829891999 48437.1911669\nSource:\nNAICOM\nReports\nNote:\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nTable A.7.1:\nSelected\nFinancial\nDeepening\nIndicators\nYear\nMoney Supply2 (M2)\n(N' Million)\nCredit to Private\nSector2 (N' Million)\nGDP at Current\nPrices (N' Millio\n1960\n267.59999999999997 109.33\n2233\n1961\n287.39999999999998 117.126\n2361.19999999\n1962\n302.74166666666673 148.78200000000001 2597.6\n1963\n315.75000000000006 174.88333333333333 2755.8\n1964\n363.68333333333339 212.63333333333333 2894.4\n1965\n410.66666666666657 249.98333333333335 3110\n1966\n456.1583333333333\n267.46666666666664 3374.8\n1967\n453.51666666666671 276.43333333333334 2752.6\n1968\n420.47499999999997 260.88333333333338 2656.2\n1969\n548.40833333333342 255.25\n3549.3\n1970\n789.55833333333339 358.45\n5281.1\n1971\n971.92500000000007 540.34999999999991 6650.9\n1972\n1055.8166666666666 651.73333333333335 7187.5\n1973\n1265.9916666666668 749.85\n8630.5\n1974\n1753.7166666666669 899.11666666666679 18823.0999999\n1975\n3031.3333333333335 1339.2166666666667 21475.24\n1976\n4510.55\n2064.4249999999997 26655.78\n1977\n6147\n2872.3166666666671 31520.34\n1978\n7392.7583333333341 4059.8583333333331 34540.1\n1979\n9185.7999999999975 4902.1000000000004 41974.7\n1980\n11856.6\n6234.2249999999995 49632.32\n1981\n14471.166666666666 8570.0500000000011 47619.66\n1982\n15786.741666666669 10668.341666666667 49069.2799999\n1983\n17687.924999999999 11668.041666666666 53107.38\n1984\n20105.941666666666 12462.933333333334 59622.53\n1985\n22299.241666666665 13070.341666666667 67908.55\n1986\n23806.399999999998 15247.450000000003 69146.9900000\n1987\n27573.583333333332 21082.991666666665 105222.84\n1988\n38356.799999999996 27326.416666666668 139085.299999\n1989\n45902.883333333331 30403.216666666671 216797.54\n1990\n52857.024999999994 33547.700000000004 267549.99\n1991\n75401.175000000003 41352.458333333336 312139.74\n1992\n111112.31431586668 58122.946707604184 532613.829999\n1993\n165338.74903876081 127117.71006025917 683869.79\n1994\n230292.59533829082 143424.20840868165 899863.22\n1995\n289091.06826094998 180004.75994529083 1933211.55\n1996\n345853.96302209416 238596.56383301585 2702719.13\n1997\n413280.12874556083 316207.08122229832 2801972.58\n1998\n488145.78616809909 351956.19148720079 2708430.86\n1999\n628952.16046613676 431168.35551063489 3194014.97\n2000\n878457.27378138236 530373.30355560745 4582127.29\n2001\n1269321.6122086474 764961.51875191682 4725086\n2002\n1505963.5\n930493.92499999993 6912381.25000\n2003\n1952921.1944166666 1096535.5649999999 8487031.57000\n2004\n2131818.9816774447 1421664.0323878631 11411066.91\n2005\n2637912.7306666668 1838389.9259166664 14572239.1200\n2006\n3797908.9755059485 2290617.7580883321 18564594.73\n2007 1\n5127400.702273746\n3668657.823863212\n20657317.6666\n2008 1\n8008203.9499551719 6920498.7505434304 24296329.2863\n2009 1\n9411112.2489084415 9102049.1088738423 24794238.6563\n2010 1\n11034940.929925786 10157021.17683167\n33984754.1295\n2011 3\n12172490.283057844 10660071.836505456 37543654.6990\nSources:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria and\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Figures are\nannual\naverages\n3Provisional", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2011 Statistical Bulletin Financial Statistics.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/0d9cd9fbe74bdc83cdc441fa3e2658da.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "0d9cd9fbe74bdc83cdc441fa3e2658da", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communique No 109 of the \nMonetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and \nTuesday 19th and 20th September 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 19th and 20th \nSeptember 2016, amidst persistently subdued global \nand domestic economic and financial environments. \nThe Committee thoroughly assessed the global and \ndomestic macroeconomic and financial developments \nand risks to the domestic economy up to September \n2016, and the outlook for the last quarter of the year. \nIn attendance were 10 out of 12 members. \n \n2 \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee acknowledged the tepid growth \nperformance of global output, arising from legacy \nfactors, the June 23rd Brexit vote as well as contagion \nfrom emerging markets’ weak demand and contracting \nproductivity. Whereas growth appears to be slowly \nrecovering in advanced economies, especially the \nUnited States, the outlook remains fraught with \nuncertainty as long-term government bonds have \nnosedived to multi-year lows on expectations of loose \nmonetary policy from advanced economies and the \ncontinued sub-optimal performance of the Euro Area, \nJapan and China. Consequently, the IMF had in July \n2016, further downgraded its baseline forecast for \n3 \n \nglobal growth to 3.1 per cent from 3.2 in April. The \nWorld Bank in its June 2016 Report on Global \nEconomic Prospects showed even less optimism with \na global output growth projection of 2.4 per cent for \n2016 from the 2.9 per cent in January. The subdued \nglobal growth prospects is traced to persistently weak \nfundamentals, mainly in emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies (EMDEs), mostly due to soft \ncommodity prices, diminished investment, contracting \ntrade, weak demand and rising inflation. Volatility in \nglobal financial markets appeared to have subsided in \nthe second quarter of the year, after a wild ride \nfollowing the UK Brexit vote, and against the backdrop \n4 \n \nof less likely US rate hike expectations and some \nstability in the crude oil market. \nThe United States (US) economy firmed up at a \nseasonally-adjusted annualized rate of 1.1 per cent in \nQ2 2016, although with a downward adjustment of 0.1 \nper cent from the first estimate of 1.2 per cent. It, \nhowever, still represents a noticeable improvement \ncompared with the 0.8 per cent growth recorded in Q1 \n2016. The improved performance of the economy was \nattributed to increased private consumption spending, \na robust labor market and increased exports, even as \nretail sales and manufacturing output declined. \nJapan’s economy expanded at a seasonally adjusted \nannualized rate of 0.2 per cent in Q2 2016 compared \n5 \n \nwith 1.7 per cent in Q1 of 2016, against the backdrop \nof weak wage growth and an external sector that is \nundermined by a strong yen. Fearing that monetary \npolicy may be approaching its limits, the government \non 2nd August, approved a fiscal stimulus of ¥13.5 \ntrillion (US$132 billion) in a spirited attempt to \njumpstart the economy, even as the Bank of Japan \n(BOJ) dismissed market speculation that it was \nplanning to stop its monthly monetary stimulus \nprogram of ¥6.7 trillion ($69.07 billion). The massive \nfiscal and monetary stimuli are, however, yet to have \nthe desired impact. \nReal GDP in the Euro area expanded by 0.3 per cent, \na significant decline compared with the 0.6 per cent \n6 \n \nrecorded in Q1 2016. Downside risks from the Brexit \nvote seems to have dissipated with no attendant major \neconomic shock to the zone’s economy thus far. As \nsuch, many of the conditions that had driven the \nrecovery remained in place, suggesting that Q3 growth \nmay continue in the direction of the second quarter. \nFollowing its September 8th, 2016 meeting, the \nGoverning Council of the European Central Bank \nresolved to leave its key interest rates on the main \nrefinancing operations, the marginal lending facility \nand the deposit facility unchanged at 0.00, 0.25 and -\n0.40 per cent, respectively. The Council also \nreaffirmed its commitment to sustain the monthly asset \npurchases of €80 billion (US$90.4 billion) until end of \n7 \n \nMarch 2017 or until a sustained adjustment is seen on \nthe path of inflation, towards the 2.0 per cent policy \ntarget. \nThe Bank of England (BoE), at its August 4th meeting, \nand in attempts to further blunt the aftershocks of the \nBrexit vote, decided to cut its benchmark interest rate \nfor the first time since 2009, by 25 basis points from \n0.5 per cent to 0.25 per cent, the lowest ever in the \nBank’s history. The Committee voted to increase its \nmonthly assets purchase program financed through \nthe issuance of reserves by another ₤60 billion \n(US$80.4 billion) from ₤375 billion (US$502.5 billion) \nto ₤435 billion (US$582.9 billion). Furthermore, the \nBoE revived its financial crises-era U.K. government \n8 \n \nbond buying program financed through the issuance of \nreserves, up to ₤10 billion ($13.4 billion), in effort to \nstimulate the economy and steer inflation towards its \n2.0 per cent target. \nWhile major EMDEs continue to be constrained by low \ncapital \ninflow, \nthe \nintractable \nmacroeconomic \nenvironment faced in 2015 and through to the first half \nof this year is gradually abating. The prospects for \nnear term full economic and financial recovery in the \nEMDEs remain subdued, with the IMF (WEO July \n2016 Update) projected growth rate forecast for this \ngroup of countries at 4.1 per cent, a downward review \nfrom 4.3 projected in April. However, the resumption of \n9 \n \ngrowth is expected to be powered by rising credits and \na surge in government spending. \nThe potential alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC \nmembers like Russia, to reduce quota, in the face of \ndisruptions to production in Nigeria, Libya and Iraq, \nhave aided relative stability in the crude oil market. \nGlobally, general price levels remained tapered due to \nsustained low oil and other commodity prices. In the \nadvanced economies, despite the uncertainties arising \nfrom the UK referendum, accommodative monetary \npolicy stance of the region’s central Banks, negative \ninterest rate in Japan and elsewhere, as well as \nvarious fiscal stimuli, global inflation has remained \nsuppressed. As deviations in macroeconomic \n10 \n \nfundamentals in the advanced economies and the \nEMDEs widen, monetary policy could continue to \ndiverge between the two in the short to medium term. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nData released by the National Bureau of Statistics \n(NBS) in August indicated that the economy had \nslipped into recession following another contraction in \nQ2, 2016. The August 2016 data showed domestic \noutput in Q2, 2016 contracted by 2.06 per cent. This \nrepresented a decline of 1.70 percentage points in \noutput from the -0.36 per cent recorded in Q1, and \n4.41 percentage points lower than the 2.35 per cent \n11 \n \ngrowth in the corresponding period of 2015. The non-\noil sector contracted by 0.38 per cent, compared with \nthe 0.18 per cent contraction in the preceding quarter. \nAgriculture; \nOther \nServices; \nEducation; \nArts, \nEntertainment & Recreation; and Information & \nCommunication, grew by 4.53, 4.32, 2.88, 1.80 and \n1.35 per cent, respectively. \nThe shocks associated with energy shortages and \nprice hikes, scarcity of foreign exchange and \ndepressed \nconsumer \ndemand, \namong \nothers, \napparently proved to be more damaging than \nexpected. Recognizing that the conditions which \nprecipitated the current economic downturn were not \nessentially sensitive to monetary policy interventions, \n12 \n \nthe \nMPC \nagain \nrenewed \nits \ncall \nfor \nurgent \ncomplementary fiscal policies to resuscitate production \nand engineer aggregate consumption. In particular, \nmembers \nunderscored \nthe \nimperatives \nof \ndiversification of the economy away from oil into \nagriculture, manufacturing and services as well as \nmore efforts towards payment of salaries and arrears \nof public sector employees particularly in states and \nlocal \ngovernments \nto \nstimulate \naggregate \nconsumption, as part of the overall fiscal policy menu \nkit. On the supply side, efforts must be intensified at \nincreased capital expenditure to redress infrastructural \ndeficits, improve the business environment and spur \ngrowth. \n13 \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted that headline inflation (year-on-\nyear) rose again in August to 17.6 per cent, from 17.1 \nper cent in July 2016, thus maintaining the upward \ntrend since January 2016. The increase in headline \ninflation in August reflected increases in both food and \ncore components of inflation. Core and food inflation \nhave increased from 16.93 and 15.80 per cent in July \nto 17.2 and 16.43 per cent, respectively, in August \n2016. \nThe Committee nonetheless, noted that the month-on-\nmonth evolution of consumer price inflation has been \nless phenomenal. The headline inflation index rose by \n14 \n \n1.0 per cent in August from 1.3 per cent in July, 1.7 \nper cent in June; and 2.8 per cent in May 2016. \nSimilarly, the core index has been increasing at a \ndecreasing rate since May when it rose by 2.7 per \ncent. It moderated to 0.85 per cent in August from 1.22 \nper cent in July and 1.83 per cent in June. The same \npattern of moderation is seen in the food (month-on-\nmonth) index which rose by 1.2 per cent in August \nfrom 1.21 per cent in July, 1.4 per cent in June and 2.6 \nper cent in May. \nThe MPC further noted that the pressure on consumer \nprices continues to be associated with reform-related \nlegacy and structural factors including high costs of \nelectricity, transport, production inputs, as well as \n15 \n \nhigher prices of both domestic and imported food \nproducts. The MPC expects that with the onset of the \nharvest season, the restrictive stance of policy as well \nas the flexible FX regime, prices will begin to taper in \nthe fourth quarter. \nMonetary, \nCredit \nand \nFinancial \nMarkets \nDevelopments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 8.08 per cent in \nAugust, 2016, compared with the July level of 10.75 \nper cent. When annualized, M2 grew by 12.12 per cent \nin August 2016 above the growth benchmark of 10.98 \nper cent for 2016. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew by \n20.09 per cent in the same period, annualized at 30.14 \n16 \n \nper cent. At this rate, the growth rate of NDC was \nabove the provisional benchmark of 17.94 per cent for \n2016. The development in NDC, essentially reflected \nthe relative growth in credit to the private sector of \n21.07 per cent in the month, annualized to 31.61 per \ncent. Credit to government grew by 1.99 per cent in \nAugust 2016, which annualized to a growth of 3.0 per \ncent compared with the growth benchmark of 13.28 \nper cent. The growth in M2 was traced to exchange \nrate effect following the depreciation of naira in the \nsecond quarter of the year. \nMoney \nmarket \ninterest \nrates \nreflected \nliquidity \nconditions in the economy. Average inter-bank call \nrate, which stood at 15.00 per cent on 8th July 2016, \n17 \n \nclosed at 30.00 per cent on August 26, 2016. Between \nJuly 8th and 26th August 2016, interbank call rate \naveraged 24.95 per cent. The rates increased to 50.0 \nper cent on July 15, 2016. The sharp increase was \nattributed to the drop in net liquidity during the period. \nThe Committee noted a decline in the equities \nsegment of the capital market as the All-Share Index \n(ASI) fell by 3.51 per cent from 28,733.90 on July 18, \n2016, to 27,725.40 on September 15, 2016. Similarly, \nMarket Capitalization (MC) declined by 3.55 per cent \nfrom N9.87 trillion to 9.52 trillion during the same \nperiod. In addition, relative to end-December 2015, the \ncapital market indices fell by 20.06 per cent and 3.35 \nper cent, respectively, reflecting the slowdown in the \n18 \n \neconomy. Overall, the capital market did not show \nvulnerabilities \nto \ndomestic \nand \nexternal \nsector \ndevelopments. \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe average naira exchange rate weakened at the \ninter-bank segment of the foreign exchange market \nduring the review period. The exchange rate at the \ninterbank market opened at N285.25/US$ and closed \nat N305.90/US$, with a daily average of N302.87/US$ \nbetween July 1st and August 26, 2016. The Committee \nobserved that total foreign exchange inflows through \nthe CBN increased by 89.14 per cent, from \nUS$1,092.21 million recorded in July to US$2,065.79 \nmillion in August 2016. This increase was due mainly \n19 \n \nto receipts of foreign flows within the month. Total \noutflows, however, decreased by 4.57 per cent from \nUS$2,728.12 million to US$2,603.35 during the same \nperiod. In direct efforts to deepen the foreign exchange \nmarket and stabilize the financial markets generally, a \nnumber of policy instruments were deployed since the \nlast MPC meeting, including an increase in the \nbenchmark \ninterest \nrate. \nComplementary \nadministrative measures were also taken towards \nachieving this goal, among which was the directive to \nIMTOs to sell forex directly to Bureau de Change \nOperators, in order to improve liquidity in that segment \nof the foreign exchange market. While challenges \nremained, the Committee expressed optimism that \n20 \n \nwith the crystallization of current policy measures, \nnoticeable improvements should be observed in the \nfinancial markets. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe \nCommittee \nacknowledged \nthe \nweak \nmacroeconomic performance and the challenges \nconfronting the economy, but noted that the MPC had \nconsistently called attention to the implications of the \nabsence of robust fiscal policy to complement \nmonetary policy in the past. The Committee also \nassessed the impact of its decision to tighten the \nstance of monetary policy by raising the MPR in July \n2016. At the time, the Committee understood the \ncomplexity of the challenges facing the economy and \n21 \n \nthe difficulty of arriving at an optimal policy mix to \naddress rising inflation and economic contraction, \nsimultaneously. The Committee also recognized that \nmonetary policy had been substantially burdened \nsince 2009 and had been stretched. The Committee \nnoted that new capital flows into the economy, \napproximately US$1 billion, had come in since July, \nwhile \nmonth-on-month \ninflation \nhas \ndeclined \ncontinuously \nsince \nMay \n2016. \nAgainst \nthis \nbackground, members reemphasized the need to \nprioritize the use of monetary policy instruments in \ndealing essentially with stability issues around key \nprices (consumer prices and exchange rate) as \nprerequisites for growth. \n22 \n \nThe MPC noted that stagflation is indeed a very \ndifficult economic condition with no quick fixes: having \nbeen imposed by supply shocks as well as fiscal and \ncurrent account (twin) deficits. Consequently, the \npolicy framework must be reengineered urgently to \nprovide a lever for reversing the negative growth trend. \nWhile the imperative for ensuring financial system \nstability remains, the MPC reiterated the fact that \nmonetary policy alone cannot move the economy out \nof stagflation. \nThe MPC considered the numerous analysis and calls \nfor rates reduction but came to the conclusion that the \ngreatest challenge to the economy today remains \nincomplete fiscal reforms which raise costs, risks and \n23 \n \nuncertainty. The calls came mainly from the believe \nthat reducing interest rates will spur credit growth, not \nonly in the private sector but also by the public sector, \nwhich \nwill \nhelp \nprovide \nliquidity \nto \nstimulate \nconsumption \nand \ninvestment \nspending. \nThe \nCommittee was of the view that in the past, the MPC \nhad cut rates to achieve the above objectives; but \nfound that rather than deploy the available liquidity to \nprovide credit to agriculture and manufacturing \nsectors, the rate cuts provided opportunities for \nlending to traders who deployed the same liquidity in \nputting pressure on the foreign exchange market \nwhich had limited supply, thus pushing up the \nexchange rate. \n24 \n \nWith respect to providing opportunity to the public \nsector to borrow at lower rates to boost consumption \nand investment spending, the Committee agreed that \nwhile it was expected to stimulate growth through \naggressive spending, doing so without corresponding \nefforts to boost industrial output by taking actions to \ndeepen foreign exchange supply for raw materials will \nnot help reduce unemployment nor would it boost \nindustrial capacities. The Committee was also of the \nview that consumer demand for goods which will be \nboosted through increased spending may indeed be \nchasing too few goods which may further exacerbate \nthe already heightened inflationary conditions. The \nurgency of a monetary-fiscal policy retreat along with \n25 \n \ntrade and budgetary policy, to design a comprehensive \nintervention mechanism is long overdue. \nThe Bank has since 2009 expanded its balance sheet \nto bail out the financial system and support growth \ninitiatives in the economy. While stimulating economic \ngrowth and creating a congenial investment climate \nalways is and remains essentially the realm of fiscal \npolicy; monetary policy in all cases only comes in to \nsupport sound fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the Bank \nhas and shall continue to deploy its development \nfinance interventions to complement the overall effort \nof fiscal policy towards reinvigorating the economy. \nThe interest rate decisions of the Bank are, therefore, \n26 \n \nanchored on sound judgment, fundamentals and \ncompelling arguments for such policy interventions. \nThe Committee also feels that there was the need to \ncontinue to encourage the inflow of foreign capital into \nthe economy by continuing to put in place incentives to \ngain the confidence of players in this segment of the \nforeign \nexchange \nmarket. \nConsequently \nthe \nCommittee considers that loosening monetary policy \nnow is not advisable as real interest rates are \nnegative, pressure exists on the foreign exchange \nmarket while inflation is trending upwards. \nThe Committee noted the positive response of the \ndeposit money banks (DMBs) to the Bank’s call for \nincreased credit to the private sector between July and \n27 \n \nAugust. As the growth in the monetary aggregates \nspiked above their provisional benchmarks, headline \ninflation continued its upward trajectory in August \n2016, and now close to twice the size of the upper limit \nof the policy reference band. Supply side factors \nincluding energy and utility prices, transportation and \ninput costs, have continued to add to consumer price \npressures. Members emphasized that improved fiscal \nactivities, especially, the active implementation of the \n2016 Federal Budget, and payment of salaries by \nstates and local governments, will go a long way in \ncontributing to economic recovery. In the same \ndirection, the Committee urged the fiscal authorities to \n28 \n \nconsider tax incentives as a stimulus on both supply \nand demand sides of economic activities \nOutlook \nThe data available to the Committee and forecasts of \nkey variables suggest that the outlook for inflation in \nthe medium term appears benign. First, month-on-\nmonth inflation has since May 2016 turned the curve; \nsecond, harvests have started to kick-in for most \nagricultural \nproduce \nand \nshould \ncontribute \nto \ndampening consumer prices in the months ahead; and \nthird, the current stance of monetary policy is expected \nto continue to help lock-in expectations of inflation \nwhich, has started to improve with the gradual return \nof stability in the foreign exchange market. In this light, \n29 \n \nthe MPC believes that as inflows improve, the naira \nexchange rate should further stabilize. Overall, the \nmajor pressure points remain the challenges in the oil \nsector (production and prices), output contraction, and \nother financial system vulnerabilities as well as foreign \nexchange shortage. \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe Committee assessed the relevant risks, and \nconcluded that the economy continues to face \nelevated risks on both price and output fronts. \nHowever, given its primary mandate and considering \nthe limitations of its instruments with respect to output, \nthe Committee elected to retain the current stance of \n30 \n \npolicy. Conscious of the need to allow this and other \nmeasures like the foreign exchange market reforms to \nwork through fully, the Committee decided to retain all \nthe monetary policy instruments at their current levels. \nIn summary, all 10 MPC members voted to: \n(i) Retain the MPR at 14.00 per cent; \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n(iii) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; \nand \n(iv) Retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and \n-500 basis points around the MPR \nThank you for listening. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n20th September 2016", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 109 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, September 19 and 20, 2016.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/0f03319554020c48f37fdb1c486ad632.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "0f03319554020c48f37fdb1c486ad632", "text": "1 \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 90 of the Monetary Policy Committee \nMeeting of Monday and Tuesday, July 22 and 23, 2013 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on July 22 and 23, 2013 with 10 out of the \n12 members in attendance. A new member, Mr. Stephen O. Oronsaye, who is a \nBoard member, replaced Professor Sam Olofin whose tenure as a Board \nmember had expired. The Committee reviewed the economic conditions and \nchallenges that confronted the domestic economy in the first half of the year, \nparticularly since the last MPC meeting in May 2013. It also re-evaluated the \nshort-to-medium term risks to inflation, domestic output, external balance and \nfinancial stability. \nInternational Economic Developments \nGlobal economic recovery remained weak, as new risks have emerged \nincluding the possibility of a further slowdown in growth in the emerging market \neconomies. The old risks of a recession in the Eurozone have persisted alongside \nslowing growth in China and the possibility of tighter financial conditions when \ncentral banks gradually exit from their current monetary accommodation \nstance. \n \nConsequently, global growth prospects have not improved. Blaming weaker \ndomestic demand and slower growth in several key emerging market \neconomies, as well as a more protracted recession in the euro area, the IMF in \n2 \n \nJuly 2013 reviewed downward its global growth forecast. It also reviewed \ndownward its growth forecast for the US and China to 1.7 and 7.8 per cent, from \n1.9 and 8.0 per cent in April 2013, respectively, but raised the forecast for the UK \nfrom 0.7 per cent to 0.9 per cent in the same period. For the Eurozone which has \nseen its longest recession since monetary union, the IMF projects a further \ncontraction of 0.6 per cent in 2013, which more or less doubled the earlier \nforecast in April. The IMF has also cut the growth forecast for Brazil, South Africa, \nIndia and Russia to 2.5, 2.0, 5.6 and 2.5 per cent from 3.0, 2.8, 5.8 and 3.4 per \ncent, respectively. Japan‟s growth rate forecast is projected at 2.0 per cent, up \nfrom a forecast of 1.5 per cent. \n \nThe slowdown in global growth is likely to impact on commodity prices and thus, \nadversely impact oil exporting countries like Nigeria. In addition, continued \nfragility in financial markets continues to generate bouts of capital flow reversals \nand inflows that are potentially disruptive to emerging and transition markets. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated the real Gross Domestic \nProduct (GDP) growth at 6.72 per cent for Q2 2013, slightly higher than the 6.56 \nper cent recorded in Q1, and 6.39 per cent in Q1 of 2012. Overall, GDP growth \nfor fiscal 2013 was projected at 6.91 per cent up from 6.58 per cent in 2012. The \n3 \n \nnon-oil sector remained the major driver of growth recording 7.91 per cent in \ncontrast to the growth rate of -0.68 per cent for the oil sector during the second \nquarter of 2013. The drivers of the non-oil sector growth remained agriculture; \nwholesale and retail trade; and services which contributed 1.72, 1.47, and 2.90 \nper cent, respectively. The Committee noted the continued decline in the \ncontribution of the oil sector to overall GDP and the underlying factors \nresponsible for this state of affairs. These factors include; sustained oil theft which \nhas led to a decline in output volumes in the face of an uncertain international \noil market and price signals, weak infrastructure, and downside risks due to \ndiscovery of shale oil and the emergence of other African oil exporters \ncompeting for Nigeria‟s traditional oil market. \nPrices \nInflationary pressures continued to moderate partly in response to the tight \nmonetary policy and base effect. The year-on-year headline inflation \ndecelerated to 8.4 per cent in June from 9.0 per cent in May. Also, core inflation \ndeclined significantly to 5.5 per cent in June from 6.2 per cent in May and 6.9 \nper cent in April. Food inflation, however, rose to 9.6 per cent in June from 9.3 \nper cent in May 2013. Notwithstanding the moderation in headline inflation, \nthere are benign risks on the horizon, including the possibility of accelerated \nfiscal releases in the later part of the year and the effects of the upward review \nin electricity tariffs in line with the MYTO following the implementation of the full \nderegulation of the energy sector. \n4 \n \nThe six-month inflation outlook indicates that inflation would remain within single \ndigit territory due to base effect and tight monetary policy. However, the current \nstate of government finances is likely to generate increased borrowing. The key \nrisks to the outlook, therefore, remain fiscal operations, increased pressure on the \nexchange rate due to excess structural liquidity in the banking system and the \npossibility of a capital flow reversal in the medium term. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Market Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 0.71 per cent as at end-June 2013 over the \nlevel at end-December 2012. When annualized, M2 grew by 1.42 per cent, \ncompared with the growth of 2.70 per cent in the corresponding period of 2012. \nThus, M2 growth was also significantly below the growth benchmark of 15.20 per \ncent for 2013 and 7.60 per cent for Q2 of 2013. \nInterest rates in the interbank money market moved in tandem with the level of \nliquidity conditions in the banking system. The average liquidity ratio was 67.79 \nper cent compared with the prudential requirement of 30.0 per cent. Thus, the \naverage inter-bank call and open-buy-back (OBB) rates, which opened at 12.07 \nand 11.91 per cent on May 20, 2013, closed lower at 10.42 and 10.29 per cent, \nrespectively, on June 28, 2013. However, the average inter-bank call and OBB \nrates for the period were 11.80 and 11.46 per cent, respectively. \nThe recovery in the Nigerian capital market continued, as equities market \nindicators were upbeat in the review period. The All-Share Index (ASI) increased \n5 \n \nby 28.8 per cent from December 2012 to June 2013, while the equities Market \nCapitalization (MC) increased by 27.3 per cent from N8.97 trillion on December \n31, 2012 to N11.43 trillion on June 28, 2013. Improved earnings and investor \nconfidence in the economy contributed to the up-swing in stock prices. The \nequities market median price-earnings ratio rose above the long-run median by \n9.0 per cent in June 2013 indicating that share prices were recovering faster \nthan earnings and investor assessment of future returns was good. \nExternal Sector Developments \nAt the Wholesale Dutch Auction System (wDAS), interbank and the BDC \nsegments of the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate depreciated to \nN157.32/US$, N161.25/US$, and N163.00/US$ on July 19, 2013 from N157.30/US$, \nN158.30/US$, and N159.50/US$ on 21st May, 2013. The Committee noted the \ndepreciation recorded in all segments of the foreign exchange market in the \nreview period on the back of a general sell-off by portfolio investors in emerging \nand frontier markets following guidance by the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) \nwith respect to its quantitative easing programs. It also observed that the \nexperience in Nigeria was not unique, as the spike in the US yields negatively \nimpacted financial markets globally. However, calm has since returned to the \nfinancial markets following further clarifications by the FED that exit from \nquantitative easing is not imminent and does not necessarily mean monetary \ntightening. Thus, the Nigerian capital market has seen a rally, while the demand \npressure in the foreign exchange market has somewhat moderated. The \n6 \n \nCommittee, however, noted the build-up of structural excess liquidity in banks \nbalance sheets, which poses risks to the inflation and exchange rate outlook. \n The Committee noted the increase in external reserves to US$47.99 billion as at \nJuly 18, 2013 from US$43.83 billion at end-December, 2012, representing a rise of \nUS$4.16 billion or 9.49% year-to-date. This level of reserves provides cover for \napproximately 11 months of import. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee was satisfied with the prevailing macroeconomic stability \nachieved during the period, including the single digit inflation, stable banking \nsystem, exchange rate stability, favourable output growth, capital market \nrecovery and growth in external reserves, thus sustaining internal balance and \nexternal viability. The Committee also noted the recent volatility in the foreign \nexchange market and also recognized that the commitment of the Bank to \ndefend the currency in the face of capital flow reversal and significant revenue \nattrition has stemmed the depreciation of the naira. Consequently, the Bank has \nbeen able to sustain the objectives of financial and price stability. \nThe Committee observed the build-up in excess liquidity in the banking system, \nand expressed concern over the rising cost of liquidity management as well as \nthe sluggish growth in private sector credit, which was traced to DMB‟s appetite \nfor government securities. This situation is made more serious by the perverse \n7 \n \nincentive structure under which banks source huge amounts of public sector \ndeposits and lend same to the Government (through securities) and the CBN \n(via OMO bills) at high rates of interest. \nThe Committee expressed strong concerns about the risks posed to government \nrevenues from oil theft, less than expected production, new discoveries of shale \noil, the fast increasing number of African oil exporters, the dwindling market for \nNigerian crude as well as the inevitability of a fall in global oil prices as well as \ncapital flow reversal, which may impact the current global (dollar) carry trade, \nfor which Nigeria has been a major beneficiary. \nThe Committee commended the Federal Government on its sustained efforts \ntowards fiscal consolidation in 2012 and stressed the need to reverse the loose \nfiscal stance of 2013. The Committee articulated the monetary policy risks of \ndwindling fiscal revenues to include: the crowding out effect of government \nborrowing, depletion of excess crude savings and pressure on the exchange \nrate. Available data indicates that capital expenditure is the first casualty of \ndwindling government revenues as available resources are channeled into \nfunding non-discretionary recurrent expenditure. \nThe Committee considered the inflationary outlook for the rest of the year as \nbenign. However, principal risks remain largely due to the loose fiscal stance \nand rising deficit, excess liquidity in the banking system and risks to the \n8 \n \nexchange rate due to a combination of revenue shocks and external \ndevelopments. \nDecisions \nHaving considered all the above factors, the Committee decided: \n1. By a vote of 9 to 1 to hold the MPR at 12 per cent. One member voted for \na 50 basis points reduction; \n2. By a vote of 9 to 1 to maintain the symmetric corridor around the MPR at \n+/-2 per cent. One member voted for an asymmetric corridor; \n3. Unanimity to retain the CRR at 12 per cent; and \n4. 9 to 1 to introduce a 50 per cent CRR on public sector deposits. This will be \napplied on Federal, State and Local Government deposits and all MDAs. \nFor other deposits CRR will remain at 12 per cent \n \nThank you. \n \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n23rd July, 2013 \n9 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS: \n1.0 \nALADE, SARAH \n \nHeadline inflation decreased by 60 basis points to 8.4 percent in June from 9.0 \npercent recorded in May, 2013. While core inflation decreased from 6.2 percent \nin May to 5.5 percent in June, food inflation increased form 9.3 percent to 9.6 \npercent during the same period, following the commencement of the planting \nseason. In the international scene, the overall risk to growth is on the downside. \nFor Nigerian, there is a risk that global financial conditions may tighten if the \nanticipated unwinding of monetary policy stimulus in the United States crystalizes \nand could lead to sustained capital flow reversal with implication for instability \non exchange rate stability and reserve build-up. On the domestic front, fiscal \nexpansion remains elevated in 2013 compared to the level in 2012. In addition, \nalthough inflation rate is trending down, there are still upside risks to inflation. In \nview of these developments, I am inclined to support a hold in Monetary Policy \nRate (MPR) and Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) on private sector deposits, but \n50 percent CRR on public sector deposits. \n \nDownside risk to global growth has deepened as growth in some key emerging \nmarkets slows. The IMF WEO update of July 9, 2013 downgraded global growth \nfor 2013 from 3.3 percent projected in April to 3.1 percent. This downgrade is \npredicated on weaker domestic demand and slowing growth in key emerging \n10 \n \nmarkets, protracted recession in the euro areas and slower than expected \nexpansion in the United States. Second quarter GDP growth in China decreased \nto 7.5 percent against the projected 7.7 percent. Further risk to global growth is \namplified by the possibility of the end of monetary easing in the United States \nand the implication of that decision on global financial conditions. In May and \nJune, financial markets were very volatile as a result of recent increases in \nadvanced economy interest rates and weakness in emerging market domestic \neconomies. Most emerging market economies are experiencing increasing \ncapital outflows and currency depreciation, which could further jeopardize \ngrowth if not properly managed. Against this background, monetary policy at \nthis time should be focused at minimizing the downside risks to the domestic \neconomy. \n \nDownward trend in inflation is a welcome development, however, all potential \nrisks to inflation outlook should be considered. Headline inflation further \ndecreased to 8.4 percent in June from 9.0 recorded in May, one of the benefits \nof past monetary policy tightening. However, there are still downside risks to \ninflation outlook in Nigeria. While the downward inflationary trend presents a \nstrong argument for monetary policy easing, there are other compelling reasons \nto tread cautiously for the moment. One of the main reasons is the fear of \nsudden portfolio flows reversal which could crystalize on monetary easing and \nmay have a destabilizing effect on the economy if not managed in an orderly \n11 \n \nmanner. In the midst of reversal of flows out of emerging markets, the ability to \nattract inflows into the economy is ringed upon tight monetary policy stance. \nFurthermore, in an environment where structural bottlenecks constrain the flow \nof credit to the real sector of the economy, lowering policy rate will not \nnecessarily lead to increased credit expansion. Therefore there is need to \nmaintain delicate balance between stability and growth objectives. \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) is trending below forecast. The 2013 first quarter \nGDP grew by 6.6 percent as against 6.99 percent recorded in the fourth quarter \nof 2012. The projection for second quarter forecast is also below expectation \ndue to decline in oil output. Non-oil sector grew by 7.9 percent in the first quarter \nof 2013 compared to its contribution of 8.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012. \nThe oil sector‟s contribution to GDP declined by -0.5 percent in the first quarter \nas against a decline of -0.2 percent decline in the last quarter of 2012. The \nprojected second quarter decline is expected to be higher than -.07 percent. \nThese developments can be attributed to a combination of insecurity in the \nnorthern part of the country that has affected agricultural production during \ncritical planting season, oil theft and pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta that \nhave resulted in the shutdown of some oil wells and reduced oil production. \nAlthough National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) projections suggest a GDP growth of \n6.91 percent for the year, the achievement of this goal will require careful \nplanning and maintenance of stable macroeconomic environment. \n12 \n \n \nThe banking system continues to show high level of liquidity, suggesting that \nmonetary easing at this time may be counterproductive. Banking system \ndeposits at the CBN deposit lending facility has consistently been high \nprompting CBN to sell securities worth N7,608.27 billion January 2 and July 18, \n2013, and this amount was substantially oversubscribed, suggesting excess \nliquidity in the system. The build-up of excess structural liquidity in the banking \nsystem poses risks to exchange rate stability and inflation outlook. \nConsistent downwards trend in oil production is bound to put pressure on fiscal \noperations of the government. The continued slow-down of growth in key \nemerging markets like China coupled with lower than expected oil production \ndue to pipeline vandalism and oil theft will affect revenue generation of the \ngovernment and increased drawdown on savings. According to updated WEO, \nJuly 2013 report, average crude oil prices is expected to fall by 4.7 percent for \nthe year on weak demand from emerging markets and continued gains in \nsupply from the shale oil. If this trend persists, the Nigeria economy will be \naffected in terms of decreased oil revenue and external reserve build up. In the \nface of these developments, fiscal expenditure which has continued to trend \nupwards in 2013 compared to the level in 2012 will put pressure on the revenue \nof the three tiers of government and lead to increased borrowing and higher \ninterest rate crowding out private sector and further constraining growth. To \n13 \n \nalleviate these risks monetary policy should do all it can to dampen the adverse \neffects on the economy. \nAgainst this background, I support a hold on Monetary Policy Rate and Cash \nReserve Requirement (CRR) in private sector deposits at 12 percent, but a 50 \npercent increase in CRR for public sector deposits, to balance the concern on \nmacroeconomic stability and growth objectives. \n \n2.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \n \n1.0 \nDEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST MPC MEETING \n1.1 \nInflation – Remarkable improvement was witnessed, as year-on-year (YoY) \nHeadline Inflation (HI) declined to 8.40% in June compared to 9.00% in \nMay, 2013. The month-on-month (MoM) inflation also declined to 0.59% in \nJune from 0.67% in May. Core Inflation (CI) YoY declined to 5.5% in June \nfrom 6.2% in May. However, the YoY and MoM measures of Food Inflation \n(FI) showed marginal increase to 9.6% and 0.7% from 9.3% and 0.51% in \nJune and May. It is clear from this development that we have achieved \nstable single digit inflation numbers in the last five months. \n1.2 \nGrowth remains robust as projected GDP of 6.72%, is above Sub-Saharan \naverage of 5%. \n1.3 \nBanking System continued to witness relative stability. Total industry assets \ngrew marginally to N21.4 trillion in June compared to N21.0 trillion in \n14 \n \nMarch. Average industry liquidity ratio stood at 68% as at end of June, \nroughly the same position as at end March, 2013. The huge liquidity is \nriding on the back of the refusal of banks to lend more aggressively, the \nmonetization of Excess Crude Account balances due to augmentation \nand increased fiscal spending. \n1.4 \nExchange Rate Management – the naira has witnessed mild depreciation \nagainst the USD particularly in the Interbank and Bureau De Change \nsegments. Interbank rate depreciated by 1.86% to N161.25 (July, 19) from \nN158.30 (May 21). BDC rate also depreciated by 2.19% to N163.00 over \nthe same period. The observed depreciation was due to the combination \nof decline in foreign inflows; increased demand and the change in \nmarket sentiment. \n1.5 \nInterest rates - remained largely stable. However, there still remains huge \nspread of over 19% between average Maximum Lending Rate and \nConsolidated Savings/Deposit rate. \n1.6 \nForeign Reserves increased to $48 billion as at July 18, 2013 from $45 billion \nas at end June, 2013. This increase was despite the massive reversal of \nportfolio inflows during the period. \n1.7 \nThe global economy continued to be weak. Actual Q2 growth in the \nUnited States of America (USA) was 1.75% compared to forecast growth \nof 2.5%. The Euro Area continued to face their challenges. China‟s \n15 \n \ngrowth also trended to 7.5% while the gains witnessed in Japan is still \nbeing watched. This development remains a concern for Nigeria. \nBesides, indications that the current QE embarked upon by the Federal \nReserve System in United States of America may be reduced from \nOctober, 2013, led to upswing in yield on bonds/treasuries. This amongst \nothers also led to the reversal of portfolio inflows and the hunt for yield in \nfrontier and emerging markets. \n1.8 \nGovernment spending – we have witnessed increased spending during \nthe period January – July, 2013 when compared to the corresponding \nperiod of 2012, of about N370 billion. The fiscal deficit as at end July, 2013 \nthough within budget, also increased by almost N135 billion relative to the \ncorresponding period in 2012. \n2.0 \nCONSIDERATIONS/PRESSURE POINTS/RISKS \nIn my view, the following are the key risks and pressure points the \neconomy is facing. \n2.1 \nThe huge liquidity in the banking system, poses a clear threat to inflation \nand exchange rate. The outlook is that the system will continue to be \nliquid due to government's fiscal operation. \n16 \n \n2.2 \nFiscal risk from increased government spending has exacerbated systemic \nliquidity over time. The system is likely to witness increased government \nspending particularly as we approach pre-election year. \n2.3 \nReversal or reduction in foreign inflows, particularly portfolio inflows would \ncontinue to put downward pressure on foreign reserves and upward \npressure on the naira exchange rate. This is compounded by the seeming \nend to the global hunt for yield in emerging and frontier markets following \nthe potential phasing out of QE in the USA. MPC should take steps to stem \nthe reversal of these flows or ensure their orderly exit. \n2.4 \nGovernment revenues could continue to be pressured even as oil price is \nforecast to remain stable in the short to medium term. In the long run, the \npicture appears to be uncertain because of the variety of economic \nchallenges facing the developed and emerging economies, including \nthe discovery of Shale oil. This could elicit larger deficits and intensify \ninflationary pressure. \n2.5 \nThe above stated factors could combine to put pressure on foreign \nreserves, exchange rate and inflation. \n3.0 \nRECOMMENDATION \n3.1 \nMaintaining the tight monetary policy stance is a compelling case. The \nmain challenge remains how to address the liquidity problem in the \n17 \n \nsystem without directly driving market and lending rates up. Whatever \nprescription is advanced should seek to minimize the ultimate cost of \npolicy. \n3.2 \nIt is in the light of the foregoing that I voted as follows: \n Maintain monetary policy rate at 12% \n Maintain the symmetric corridor of plus and minus 2% around the \nMPR for SLF and SDF respectively \n Maintain cash reserve ratio on private sector deposits at 12% \n Introduce cash reserve ratio of 50% on public sector deposits \n Keep net open position limit at 1% of shareholder's funds. \n \n3.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nFoundation for Decision \n1. I voted for cut in MPR by 50 basis points at the last three MPC meetings \n(January, March and May). The primary reason was to discourage portfolio \ninflows which are distorting asset prices and triggering asset price bubbles \nand encouraging complacency among investors and undermining the \nstability of the financial system and the economy. The trend of portfolio flows \nfrom January 2012 is incompatible with short and medium term goals of price \nstability with growth. The Bernanke effect which crystalized a few weeks ago \n18 \n \nand its contagion effects on Nigerian asset prices and net forex flows give \nweight to my consistent concern. \n2. The short term volatility of portfolio investments in equities and the obvious \nasset bubble it has triggered in Nigeria raises at least three questions. First, \nwhat is the likelihood that post February 2008 bubble will not be repeated \nand if so, what are the likely costs? Second, what are the real economic \nbenefits of the portfolio flows? To what extent do the flows increase \ninvestments; productivity growth, output growth, employment growth, \nincomes, consumption or, sustainable reserve growth? Three, what are the \nopportunity costs and the gains of countering reverse portfolio flows? \n3. The threat of portfolio flows in 2013 arises from the fact that (1) asset price \nbubble is a global phenomenon; (2) financial markets are malfunctioning all \nover the world (assets and commodities are overpriced and, growth in credit \nto productive activities is tepid); (3) the quantitative easing regimes in the US, \nEurope and Japan and the structural changes that loosened the links \nbetween finance and the real economy have overtime, considerably \nweakened if not broken the transmission mechanisms of policies (monetary \nand fiscal) globally and (4) liberalism appears to have self-fulfilled its \nprophecy about a dichotomy between financial and real variables: financial \nvariables now have stronger effects on financial variables and very weak \neffects on real variables even in the short run. More precariously, good real \nmarket news (lower rate of unemployment and better than expected real \n19 \n \ngrowth) now trigger financial market instability (sell off in anticipation of \neasing of easing). \n4. The fragility of the global economic system was revealed in the last few \nweeks following Bernanke‟s signal about an ending of QE3. The selloff that it \ntriggered was global and with its exposure, the contagion effects on Nigeria \nwere strong and the mechanism was as expected. This means clearly, that \nmore volatility lie in the short term because easing of quantitative easing is \njust a question of when not if. \n5. It is important for our policy process to recognize that portfolio flows and its \nvolatilities are symptoms of deep seated failures or malfunctioning of markets \nand of fiscal systems globally also, of a progressive deterioration in the \ncommunitarian virtues that built many great economies. It is strategically \nimportant therefore, to deal with the underlying causes of malfunctions \nrather than the symptoms. \n6. In recent times, one of the causes of malfunctions in the Nigerian financial \nsystem is the paradox of substantial government deposits in Deposit Money \nBanks (DMBs) and high government borrowing from the DMBs. As at June 13, \n2013, the three tiers of government had N2.384 Trillion in the DMBs out of \nwhich about 90% are in zero interest bearing Current Accounts. To mop up \nthe liquidity at 14% will cost N301.33 billion which is more than the annual \nbudgets of most states. Clearly, governments are over-borrowing, are \nwasteful in the management of public resources and are undermining the \n20 \n \ncompetitiveness of the DMBs. This corporate welfare, transfers or subsidy is \nclearly wasteful and costly. In addition, it undermines and corrupts the public \nsector and makes public resources to generate inefficient outputs and \nineffective outcomes. Improving the market and the state demands the \ncorrection of the causes of distortions. \n7. The Central Bank is the banker to the government. Government deposits \nbelong with its banker: the Central Bank especially as the Federal \nGovernment is committed to a Single Treasury Account. Such a good \ninitiative ought to be successfully implemented because it has many \nfundamental implications for the economy. \n8. A policy of increasing CRR on government deposit will help the government \nto proceed quickly to the Single Treasury Account. By doing so, the \ngovernment will better manage public resources, cut down wastes and \ncosts. This will help the fiscal consolidation programme of the government \nand help government succeed in cutting down deficits and borrowing. \nActing now is important given the inevitability of the end of Bernanke‟s QE3 \nand the corrections in asset and commodity prices that is most likely to \nfollow. The expected crowding-out of crude exports by shale exports is \nanother incentive for government to cut cost and borrow less now. The \nexpressed desire of the government for lower interest rates is an additional \nincentive: lower borrowing will reduce borrowing costs and conduce easing. \n21 \n \n9. An increase in CRR on government deposits will also “incentivize” the DMBs \nto seek for deposits from the private sector and, to lend to the private sector. \nAfter all, the DMBs and other organized private sector players canvass for a \nmarket driven economy. A dependence on Government Deposits breeds \ncomplacency among DMBs. This policy is thus compatible with a market \ndriven economic model. The policy therefore, helps DMBs to rethink their \nbusiness models which have lulled them into complacent rent seeking \nbehaviours. Complacency is dangerous in a highly volatile world and \ncomplacent financial institutions are the least able to survive in a volatile and \nhighly competitive world. Our recent history and, the costs of cleaning up the \nconsequences of complacent mismanagement of the recent past makes it \nnecessary to support DMBs to develop more sustainable business models. A \nrate of 50% is strong enough but not debilitating. The future direction is \nsufficiently strong signal for DMBs to quickly change their business model and \nadapt to new realities. \n10. The trends of government revenue, expenditure and deficit in 2013 have \nbeen highly volatile around a growing trend for expenditure and deficits. The \nvolatile trend may not be surprising given that the fiscal anchor (oil revenue) \nis volatile. Yet, it is also, surprising given (1) the adoption of the excess crude \naccount as a stabilizing mechanism and (2) the fact that the “non-\ndiscretionary” component of the budget is very high. The data indicates (1) \nan expansionary fiscal policy and (2) over-borrowing in excess of the size of \n22 \n \nfiscal deficit. Given the size of Federal Deposits in DMBs (about N1.16 Trillion) \nand Federal Deficits (N413.52) there is no economic reason for the size of \nborrowing or the extent of drawdown on the excess crude account in the first \nhalf of 2013. With better cash management, the Federal, State and Local \nGovernments will require much less credit from domestic and foreign sources. \n11. Lower government borrowing will bring fiscal policy into alignment with \nmonetary policy and have downward effects on interest rates, debt service \nand crowding-out effects. A rate cut in MPR will then be more likely passed \non to borrowers. Creating the enabling conditions for a stronger transmission \nmechanism is a necessary first step to a potentially effective price stability \nwith growth monetary policy regime. In the United States and in the United \nKingdom with historically low interest rates, lending to the real sector is low \nand only carry traders are profiting the most. It is important to counter the \nadverse effects of “carry trading”. This begins for Nigeria with a fundamental \nchange to the substantial and growing arbitrage opportunities offered by the \nspread between government deposit and government borrowing. \n12. A significant decline in government borrowing will shrink considerably the rent \n(guaranteed above normal profits) appropriated from the games of \ngovernment deposits and government borrowing. First, lower levels of \ngovernment borrowing will directly reduce nominal rates on treasury bills and \nFGN Bonds. Second, lower guaranteed profits will force DMBs to shift from \ninverted intermediation to virtuous intermediation that is more likely to \n23 \n \nexpand access at lower cost to investors in real and service activities. The \npolicy thus, is to help DMBs to transit from a precarious rent seeking model to \nmore sustainable business models. \n13. The excessive government borrowing has made it very costly to maintain \nprice and exchange rate stability in the last two years. The expected impact \nof a 50% CRR on government deposit should significantly reduce OMO \ninterventions and reduce considerably the costs of maintaining price and \nexchange rate stability. The rent from the games of government deposits \nand the associated games of government borrowing show up as demand for \nforeign currency in WDAS and interbank market and, as capital outflows in \nthe balance of payments. The data shows that such suboptimal capital \nexportations have been financed by maintaining balance of trade surplus. \nThe national account identity implies that when domestic output consistently \nexceeds domestic absorption, (1) investment is likely to be less than savings; \n(2) potential output is likely to far exceed actual output and (3) resources \n(including labor) are most likely underemployed. The costs of the games of \ndeposit-borrowing arbitrage are systemic. Thus, eliminating the costs is critical \nto enhancing the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policies. \n14. In my personal statement after the July 2012 MPC I argued for “a creative mix \nof policies and incentives changing actions to change the financial games \nto ones in which the rational game in town is one that produces rational \nreaction functions that (1) enhance the efficiencies of the money, bond and \n24 \n \nFX markets; (2) deploy liquidity to create rather than destroy money by \nlending to sectors and activity with highest contributions to output and \nproductivity growth and jobs instead of holding as war chest for speculative \nopportunities and attacks and; (3) enhances the effective management of \nliquidity at firm level and economy-wide.” I argued further that the “creative \nmix” is necessary to (1) limit the capacity of speculative and rent seeking \nplayers and activities to damage the Nigerian financial system and economy \nand (2) empower efficiency driven economic agents and activities. \n15. I am convinced therefore, that a 50% CRR on government deposit in the first \ninstance is necessary to start the process of correcting market and state \nfailures in a concrete and effective way. The very short-run effects and the \nlikely reaction functions of key players have also been well analyzed and \nanticipated. The right institutions to support the policy are also clear and well \nwithin the capacities of the Banking Supervision Department of the Central \nBank. \n16. The data also shows that DMBs are maintaining liquidity ratios that are more \nthan 30% above statutory liquidity ratios. In addition, DMBs are maintaining \nreserves with the Central Bank far in excess of the CRR requirements. Both \nbehaviours are symptoms of the rent seeking business model. \n17. In addition to the 50% CRR on government Deposits, I support (1) an \nasymmetric corridor for Special Deposit Facility (-4%) and Special Lending \nFacility (2%) and (2) zero remuneration for all CRR. Strengthening the \n25 \n \ntransmission mechanism of monetary policy requires the right incentives. A \n10% interest on Special Deposit Facility (SDF) is a disincentive to lending and \ncreation of money. Reducing the returns on DMB deposits under SDF will \nreduce such deposits. While this may generate changes in portfolio \nallocations (such as increase in demand for government securities, OMO bills \nor forex), I am not convinced that the benefits (lower costs and lower \nincentive for rent seeking) is outweighed by the risks of portfolio realignment. \nThis is more so, since it is not a standalone policy but, complementary to the \n50% CRR on government deposit. \n18. I am not voting for a rate cut at this MPC for strategic reasons. At this point, \nchanging the business model and correcting the failures in the market is \nprimary. For unless, the transmission mechanism is strengthened, rate cuts will \nnot pass on to borrowers. For instance, the latest data shows that in the last \none year (June 2012 to June 2013), only N13.6 billion new loans was \nextended to the manufacturing sector. In contrast, professional, scientific \nand technical activities (N61.34 billion) and administrative and support \nservice activities (N31.52 billion) attracted far more. Most worrisome, the \nDMBs revealed a preference to lend to the top five sectors with highest share \nof the non-performing loans acquired by AMCON: capital market, oil and \ngas, general commerce, construction and Transportation. The contributions \nof these sectors to GDP and employment are minimal relative to agriculture \n26 \n \nand manufacturing which face the problems of access in addition to the \nproblem of cost. \n19. My vote at this MPC is a first step because there are more opportunities for a \ncreative mix of policies to improve the efficiency of markets and the state. \nOnce the arbitrage opportunities in the deposit-borrowing game are \neliminated; price stability with job creating growth monetary policy will be \nfeasible. \nDecision \n20. I vote: \ni. to raise CRR on government (Federal, State and Local) Deposits with \nDeposit Money Banks to 50%; \nii. to retain CRR on Private Deposits with DMBs at 12%; and \niii. for an asymmetric corridor of -4% (SDF) and 2% (SLF) around the MPR of \n12%. \n \n4.0 \nLEMO, TUNDE \n \nMacroeconomic performance has been broadly positive since the beginning of \nthe year. Inflation pressure has largely been subdued, headline being at single \ndigit since January, while real GDP growth has also remained robust. However, \nthe downside risks to the near and medium term outlook are quite significant. \nThe major risk is from the external sector through likely sharp decline in the \n27 \n \ninternational price of crude oil arising from the falling external demand due to \nthe discovery of new oil technology (shale and fracking) by the Nigeria‟s major \ntrading partners, notably the US and UK. This development poses a grave risk to \nthe buildup of the external reserve. At the same time, the imminent tapering off \nof the quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve Bank has led to reversal of \nmarket sentiment against developing and emerging economies with the \nimplication of capital outflows, adding further pressure to the foreign exchange \nmarket. Although a reasonable buffer has been built given that the external \nreserves stood at about US $48 billion by July 19, which is within the range of \noptimal reserves for middle income commodity exporting country, the level is still \nbelow the pre global financial crisis era. This is indicative that the economy is less \nresilient relative to the pre global financial crisis period. \nAnother major cause for concern is the development in the fiscal sector. Actual \nrevenue for fiscal operations showed a negative variance of about 17 per cent \nduring the first half of the year. It is pertinent to note that the revenue is falling \nnot from falling oil price but from shortfall in production. Oil production for the \nfirst half of the year averaged 1.9 mbpd, 22 per cent below the 2.52 mbpd \nassumed in the budget. Borrowing to finance the ensuing fiscal deficit would \nnot only trigger inflation pressure but would also have serious implication for the \nreal sector growth through the crowding out of the private sector credit. \nBesides, the reversal of portfolio flows, as indicated above, would impact on the \npricing of Government debt instruments given that the yield curve on long \n28 \n \ntenored government bond commenced an upward movement in May. Thus, \nthe cost of raising funds by the Government might increase, with the implication \nof further weakening the fragile fiscal account. \nAlthough it is probable to assume a fair degree of fiscal prudence given that the \nactual fiscal deficit of N413.99 billion at the end of first half of the year was within \nthe proportionate level assumed under the 2013 budget, this was, however, \nachieved at the expense of the Excess Crude Account (ECA). The current ECA is \nabout 50 per cent of the position at end-December 2012, suggesting that the \nwhole ECA could be completely depleted by the end of the year, if the trend \ncontinues. This, invariably, suggests limited fiscal space to respond to the \nimpending adverse developments in the global oil market. \nFinally, the episode of liquidity surfeit seems to have re-emerged in the banking \nsector. The market rates: Overnight Buy Back (OBB) and Interbank call rates \n(IBCR), have virtually remained at the lower end of the MPR corridor since the \nbeginning of the year, suggesting that the market has completely adjusted to \nthe prevailing stance of monetary policy. The foreign exchange market has \nbeen hard hit by this development. \nOn the balance, it is noteworthy that inflation has maintained consistent \ndeceleration in the recent times, providing a valid premise to review the MPR \ndownward or at least maintain the current level. On the other hand, the risks \nposed to the external reserve, through the developments in the external sector \n29 \n \nas well as the emerging liquidity surfeit in the banking system from large deposit \nbalances on public sector accounts, require a strong policy action. \nIn the light of these concerns, I vote for the retention of the MPR at 12 per cent \nand the symmetry corridor of 200 basis points with a view to addressing the likely \ninflation pressure from fiscal slippage. With respect to the CRR, however, I vote \nfor a CRR of 50 per cent on public sector deposit while the current rate of 12 per \ncent be maintained on private sector deposit. This is with a view to altering the \nconduct of the market and curtailing pressure on the foreign exchange market. \n \n5.0 \n MOGHALU, KINGSLEY CHIEDU \n \nThe overarching context for the decision of this meeting of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee is a benign inflation environment in the near-term, with headline \ninflation reduced to 8.4% and inflation expected to remain in single digits for the \nremainder of 2013, a volatile global environment, and fundamental concerns \nabout the prospects for the Nigerian economy in the medium term owing to a \ncombination of structural economic defects and global developments. The \nquestion, then, is whether the MPC should reduce the monetary policy rate in \nthe face of an immediate inflation outlook that is benign, or hold rates at their \ncurrent point of 12% for other reasons that are important as well. \n \nConsiderations \n30 \n \nInternational Environment: The global environment is characterized at this time \nby three factors, all with important implications for the Nigerian economy. First, \nslowing growth in China, continuing recession and rising unemployment in \nEurope, and still-sluggish recovery in the United States economy, alongside a \ndecline in manufacturing output in these three economies, point to a reduction \nin their levels of importation since they are producing at less than their \ncapacities. This will have adverse implications for Nigeria‟s oil exports and thus \nfor the country‟s earnings from such exports, on which the Nigerian economy \nsingularly depends. \n \nSecond, increased production of shale oil and gas in the United States and \nsome other countries through “fracking” technology combined with increased \noil finds in a number of other African countries means that competition for oil \nmarkets is increasing and Nigeria is already losing the U.S. as a major importer of \nNigerian crude. It also has implications for the future price of oil. This situation \nposes a serious strategic threat to Nigeria‟s economic growth trajectory as an \nundiversified, mono-product economy. Combined with oil output production \nthat is well below the benchmark of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day as a result of \nleakages, oil theft, and shut-ins, the overall outlook for Nigeria is one that justifies \ndeep concern. Lower oil earnings put pressure on the naira exchange rate \nbecause such reduced earnings will lead to declining foreign exchange \nreserves. \n31 \n \n \nAnother dimension of the global environment with important effects on the \nNigerian monetary sphere is the trajectory of quantitative easing (QE) by the U.S. \nFederal Reserve Bank. The Fed‟s accommodative monetary policy stance has \nimportant implications for emerging market economies including Nigeria‟s \nbecause it affects decisions on asset allocation by portfolio investors, who, in a \nsearch for yield, have invested significantly in Nigeria‟s financial instruments for a \nhigher yield than is available in more mature economies. This of course has \nimplications – positive and negative – for the stability of the naira exchange \nrate. Positive because the high MPR of 12% attracts financial flows that help \nmonetary stability in Nigeria, and negative because of the risks posed by the \nprospect of possibly sudden reversals in capital flows. \n \nThe major development since the last meeting of the MPC has been the \nvolatility of the financial markets as a result of the Federal Reserve‟s unsuccessful \nattempt at “forward guidance” – an effort to point to an orderly tapering off of \nQE over the next 18 months, which led to portfolio outflows from Nigeria. But QE \nwill inevitably end at some point. What then for Nigeria as a major beneficiary? \nThis situation suggests what could be described as Faustian bargain with what \nthe U.S. Federal Reserve Bank Governor Richard Fisher has described as the \n“feral hogs” of the global financial markets. \n \n32 \n \nEconomic Fundamentals, Fiscal Deficits and the Political Cycle: When we \ncombine the international environment with Nigeria‟s economic fundamentals \nof a mono-product economy vulnerable to external shocks and internal \nchallenges, plus fiscal concerns over elevated government spending (most of it \nnon-discretionary), borrowing and depletion of the excess crude account, we \nare left with the unpleasant reality that exchange rate stability and its \nimplications for price stability, is presently a factor of outsized importance in \nNigeria‟s macroeconomic management. It is likely that this will remain so for the \nnear to medium term until structural and infrastructure reforms take place and \nhelp diversify the economy away from oil. \n \nMaintaining exchange rate stability therefore remains vital for price stability. The \nMPR is a decisive factor. Furthermore, although the inflation outlook remains \nbenign in the near term, government spending will likely increase as the 2015 \nelections draw closer, with potential inflationary impact. \n \nBanking System Liquidity Surfeit: We also have structural excess liquidity in a \nbanking system in which chasing government deposits far outweighs bank \nlending to the real sector in importance as a business model. Average liquidity \nratio stood 67.8% at end-June 2013, indicating that funds that could be \nintermediating in the real economy were sitting in banks or being lent mainly to \ngovernments at a handsome profit ironically produced by a (justified) MPR of \n33 \n \n12%. It is important that the Nigerian banks‟ unhealthy dependence on \ngovernment deposits – which in most countries sit in a central bank – be broken \nin order to prevent dangerous buildups of liquidity and encourage banks to offer \nprivate depositors more returns in order to obtain their savings. \n \nConclusions \nOverall, the question is whether the MPC should tighten, hold the MPR at its \npresent level, or ease monetary rates. Here, the findings of the CBN Macro-\neconometric Model of the Nigerian Economy (CBN MAC II) have offered \ndecisive guidance and address a number of popular – but erroneous – beliefs \nabout the MPR. From this model it is clear that a reduction of the MPR at this \ntime is not the right path to take. It will affect the stability of the naira because \nthe all-but-certain massive capital outflows will put pressure on the currency \nwhich will precipitate either a serious run on our foreign reserves or a \ndepreciation/devaluation of the currency that will be a channel for inflation in \nan import-dependent economy. Moreover, the model empirically establishes \nthat reducing the MPR will not have a decisive downward impact in lending \nrates or stimulate credit to the real sector. Rather, what will make a difference is \nremoving the perverse incentives Nigerian banks presently enjoy in depending \non government deposits in banks. \n \n34 \n \nThus, the benign inflation outlook is not a compelling outlook for easing \nmonetary policy yet. A scenario rate of an 8% MPR, at which lending rates will \nfall significantly, would trigger the highest depreciation of the naira exchange \nrate, with the consequences outlined above. Maintaining the MPR at 12% \nresults in a high lending rate but will yield a stronger and more stable naira. \nRemarkably, the CBN MAC II shows that the impact on output growth of its three \nscenarios of an MPR at 12%, 10% and 8% is similar. In order words, the present \nMPR is not a drag on growth, which is influenced by far more structural factors. \nAll three scenarios in the model yield a projected output growth rate of 6.5%. \n \nVote \nBased on the above considerations and conclusions I vote to: \n Maintain the MPR at 12% \n Maintain symmetric transmission corridor of plus or minus 2% \n Maintain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) for private deposits in deposit \nmoney banks at 12% \n Increase the CRR on public sector deposits to 50% \n Maintain the Net Open Position (NOP) of banks at 1% \n \n \n \n \n35 \n \n \n6.0 \n ORONSAYE, O. STEPHEN \nPreamble \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting of July 22-23 was my first, and I \nwas warmly welcomed by the committee. \nLike every other Nigerian concerned about the country‟s economy, I have been \nfollowing the trend of MPC decisions and reasons advanced for such decisions. \nAlthough we are yet to arrive at the economic post we desire – low single-digit \ninflation rate, favourable exchange rate, and strong foreign reserves - I am \npersuaded to believe that we are on the right path to even greater \nmacroeconomic stability. \n \nVotes \nI voted for the following: \na) \nRetaining the MPR at 12%; \nb) \nMaintaining the symmetric corridor around the MPR at +/- 2.0%; \nc) \nRetaining the CRR at 12%; and \nd) \nIntroducing a 50% CRR on deposits from the Public Sector. \nBases for my decision \nIt is gratifying to note decelerations in headline and core inflation rates on year-\n36 \n \non-year basis. This, in my view, indicates that the monetary policy measures put \nin place are delivering the desired results – macroeconomic stability. However, \nwe must continue to tread with caution given the fact that there is likely to be \nincreased Government spending in the course of the year. This is a risk to \ninflation which is forecasted to remain within single-digit as a result of tight \nmonetary policy. \nThere have been arguments by stakeholders on the need to reduce MPR in \norder to free more credit to the real sector, however, the economic reality has \nshown that a reduction in the MPR does not necessarily translate to more credit \nfor the real sector or the SMEs for that matter. \nConversely, there have been arguments that holding the MPR at 12% has \ncontinued to reduce inflation and ensure price stability, which is a core \nmandate of this Committee. The simple economic question that arises is: If \nholding the rates at 12% has worked, why do we need to reduce the rate at a \ntime when inflationary pressures can resurface. \nHaving carefully assessed both arguments, I am persuaded to go with the latter \nhence my vote to retain MPR at 12%. Relatedly, I voted that the symmetric \ncorridor be maintained around the MPR at +/- 2.0. \nAvailable evidence indicates that there is a build-up of excess liquidity in the \nbanking system. Indeed, records show that DMBs receive deposits from \nGovernment (public sector) but do not lend to the real sector. Rather, these \n37 \n \ndeposits are loaned out to government at high interest rates. This, in my view, \nshould not be encouraged. \nIn voting for the introduction of a 50% CRR on deposits from the Public Sector, I \nvote for an ethical business model that encourages greater intermediation in \nthe economy. \n \n7.0 \n OSHILAJA, JOHN \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee concluded its 233rd meeting with the decision \nthat the Central Bank of Nigeria will begin demanding Differentiated Reserve \nRequirements (DRR) from all reporting Deposit Money Banks. As of the next \nBanking Reserve Maintenance Period, all Public Sector Naira deposits shall be \nheld against a Reserve Requirement of 50%. \nA Reserve Requirement is the amount of funded liabilities (in this case, deposits) \na bank must itself hold as deposits with the central bank. In Nigeria, where the \nCBN oversees a fractional reserve banking system (like most central banks), this \nrequirement is expressed as the Cash Reserve Ratio, or CRR. As the CRR for all \nprivate deposits remains unchanged at 12%, the new requirement on public \nfunds represents an increase of 38%. \nI agree, in principle, with MPC colleagues on purposes to be served by the \nCBN‟s adoption of a DRR Regime. I however disagree with the timing and pace \nof regime change. For this reason, I cast the sole dissenting vote on this measure \n38 \n \nwhich, in my view, was prompted by the desire of the CBN (among other \nlongstanding reasons) to curb its escalating Liquidity Management costs. \nReserve requirements offer central banks a cheaper way of draining surplus \nliquidity; cheaper than the practice of selling government securities outright. It‟s \na simple solution, really. Like any bank, central banks are also obligated to pay \ninterest on debts sold to banks and the investing public. Similarly, central banks \nare also not obliged to pay interest on demand deposits. While this tactic is \ntypically easier on a central bank‟s purse strings, it is not always the case for the \neconomy at large. In Fractional Reserve Banking, increasing Reserve \nRequirements curtails the availability of credit by contracting the lending \ncapacities of banks. \nMy concerns about differentiating the CRR in Nigeria at this time center around \nthe expected and potential impacts of such a measure on a weakening \neconomy, with shallow financial markets, coupled with poor visibility on the \npreparedness of the banks (including quite possibly the CBN itself) to manage \nlikely fallouts of a widely unanticipated Liquidity shock. \nI would have preferred to see the CBN provide forward market guidance on the \nmeasure; \npublicly \nand \neffectively \npre-announcing \nits \nintentions, \nand \nundertaking further collaborative steps (communicated via circulars and such) \nahead of implementation, to minimize the potential for public confusion and \nmarket disorder. The perverse incentive the CBN now seeks to address is not \n39 \n \npeculiar, and has existed in Nigeria since colonialists established formal banking \nin the country. Hence, any time and money taken to ensure a smooth transition \nwould, in my opinion, have been time and money well-spent. The MPC values \nits market credibility and works to build and sustain this with its transparency and \njudicious use of Regulatory Power. But these are not the only means available \nto Monetary Authorities. Demonstrating competence, even-handedness and \ndue reciprocal respect can be just as effective in promoting regulatory \ncredibility and market confidence. On this occasion, I also would have \npreferred that we placed more reliance on these latter qualities of the Central \nBank than the former. \nThink of this latest move by the CBN as a system-wide margin call – by my \ncalculations, a N885 billion margin call. \nMy vote signified misgivings about the potential for disorderly asset liquidations in \nour securities markets; as local banks and other leveraged investors scramble to \nraise cash. Some borrowers may face calls from their bankers to accelerate \nloan repayments. Newly approved, though undisbursed, credits may now be \nrenegotiated for shorter tenors; thus squeezing carefully prepared company \nexpansions and projects for investible cash. Projects in developmental stages \nmay also be deferred; being now unable to meet the lowest returns required by \ninvestors. And even if all of the above should thankfully not occur, costs of \nborrowing in the economy are now set to rise across the board. As I see it, this \nmandated general increase, in the cost of funds to the economy, is premature. \n40 \n \nThis turn of events unfolds at a time when public expectations (and Bank \nforecasts) of inflation continue to be subdued, exchange rate pressures are \nconsidered to be easing, and private sector lending is showing signs of revival. \nOn an annualized basis, credit to the Core Private Sector is growing at just over \n7.5% – a category of credit that grew at just under 6% for the whole of last year. \nIt remains to be seen if this latest assault on excess bank liquidity will \nmeaningfully grow Private Sector credit as desired in the coming months. \nNonetheless, in the shorter term, I would advise private borrowers not to hold \ntheir breaths. \nRoughly N3 Trillion of Nigeria‟s N15 Trillion deposit-base are public sector \ndeposits. Under the old Reserve Requirement of 12%, Public Sector deposits \nalone provided banks with a capacity to lend of up to N24 Trillion. With DRR, this \npotential is now reduced to N6 Trillion. There remains a further N12 Trillion of \nprivate deposits that endows banks with a maximum lending capacity of N96 \ntrillion. Clearly, expectations of the MPC are that more of this remaining and \nlargely unused capacity (now N102 Trillion in total) will be used to grow the \neconomy more productively. If this looked to be the case, in an anticipated \ndeclining interest rate environment, I most certainly would have voted \ndifferently. Which brings me to the root cause of the developments outlined so \nfar: the fiscal position and dominance of Government in Nigeria which, in my \nopinion, once again threatens to obliterate any reasonable possibility of \nachieving single-digit Naira borrowing rates within the foreseeable future. \n41 \n \n \nGovernment in Nigeria has been a net creditor to the economy for years; a \nprincipal source of funds flowing, through the banking system, to feed and build \nthrough paychecks and credit. However, rather than investing these flows in \ncredit-risky loan assets, Nigerian banks demonstrate an understandably \nprodigious appetite for credit-riskless assets – such as those created by \nGovernment financing operations e.g. Treasury Bills and Bonds. This condition \nalso happens to be the means by which banks everywhere, as custodians and \nintermediaries of the public‟s funds, capitalize on a perverse incentive promoted \nby Financial Authorities themselves. Supply begets its own Demand, and this \nincentive is not unique to Nigeria, or developing countries. It also exists in \nadvanced economies, rewarding banking systems for performing the \naforementioned economic functions. Compensations thereby derived are also \nintended to be additional to the rewards of expert risk-taking and management \nwhen conducive credit market structures and conditions prevail. Hence, it is to \nNigeria‟s further economic loss that its banks have been allowed for decades to \nbuild entire business models around what is in effect a subsidy; and what in \nnormal circumstances elsewhere are secondary and even tertiary sets of \nbusiness priorities. \nIn low income economies, characterized by smaller formal Private Sectors, less \nrobust credit distribution channels – structural economic and market \ndeficiencies in general – the Public Sector‟s use of credit tends to feature \n42 \n \nprominently when net exposures in financial systems are tallied by sector. As \nChina and others in Asia and Latin America have shown, Fiscal Policies can be \npowerful forces for constructive economic development. It simply depends on \nthe purposes for which Policy and associated Official borrowings are designed. \nEconomies tend to deliver Income and Job Growth when continuous effective \ninvestment, in physical and social infrastructure, are dominant drivers in sensible \nGovernment borrowing and revenue mobilization. Growth of such desirable \nqualities is not the typical outcome if all an economy does is deplete \nirreplaceable natural and economic resources, to pay for foreign goods and \nservices, while financing inequitable subsidies and sub-standard production at \nhome. \nWith longstanding revenue vulnerabilities of Government vigorously reasserting \nthemselves – through below target oil production, slowing export markets and \nnow oil-export theft – the Federal Government (FG) is commendably, at N414 \nbillion, 7% short of its deficit target in an already expansionary Budget. \nNonetheless, the FG is funding an actual 2.1% of GDP deficit against the 1.85% it \noriginally estimated for 2013. According to CBN staff calculations, Federal and \nConsolidated Government net revenues are currently 21.3% and 22.5% below \ntheir respective targets. The FG‟s expenditures (notably those slated for capital \ninvestment) are down 18.5% while, on a consolidated or FAAC basis, \nnondiscretionary recurrent expenditures are barreling along at a 10.3% higher \nrun-rate than 1H 2012 levels. Government, in Nigeria, appears quite happy to \n43 \n \n“share” revenue benefits, but is not as exuberant in managing commensurate \nresponsibilities for expenditure management. The bottom line is that Nigeria‟s \npublic revenues are falling twice as fast as the running costs of Government are \nrising. And to cover this widening gap, despite deferrals (on public investment) \nand draw-downs (on fiscal savings), an increasingly squeezed FG and \nspendthrift sub-national counterparts are increasingly turning to debt markets for \nsustenance. \nSo far this year, the Federal Government alone has incurred debt service costs \nof N309 billion. Knowledgeable back of the envelope estimates puts the cost of \nCBN Liquidity Management over a similar timeframe in the region of N200 billion. \nSimply stacking these figures in total against the N595 billion earned in Net \nInterest Margins this year to date – by CBN-reporting banks – brings the symbiotic \nrelationship between Government and Banking in Nigeria into stark relief \n(overseas \ninstitutions \nare \nprohibited \nfrom \ninvesting \nin \nCBN‟s \nLiquidity \nManagement debts). I am all for realigning this dysfunctional systematic \nrelationship to derive meaningful improvements in the delivery of Public Services \nand values added to the Nigerian economy. In my professional opinion, \nhowever, successfully attaining goals of this nature and scope demands much \nmore of the CBN, MPC, and Government itself than the mere stroke of a \nregulator‟s pen. \n \n44 \n \n8.0 \n SALAMI, ADEDOYIN \n \nMy pre‐MPC reflections had centered on 2 issues: how badly had Nigeria been \naffected by the US Federal Reserve‟s „forward guidance‟ about the likely timing \nof the commencement of its unwinding of the Quantitative Easing (QE) \nprogramme; and the impact on Nigeria‟s fiscal position of the continued gap \nbetween the budget‟s assumption on oil revenues and realised income. As it \nwas, the issues with respect to the impact of QE became secondary – although \nnot without leaving a mark! This left our fiscal challenges at the centre of \nattention. \n \nWhilst the „Fed‟ has since gone about dousing the fires ignited by its initial \nannouncement, Nigeria, like many other emerging and frontier markets, has \nseen a reversal of capital flows. Available data shows cash outflows in May and \nJune 2013 amounting to US$9,132mn and inflows, in the same period of \nUS$6,205mn. The outflow of US$5,898 in June 2013 exceeded the level for the \nsame month a year earlier by approximately 29 percent. The net outflow of \nUS$2,789mn in June 2013 came on the heels of net outflows of US$81mn and \nUS$138mn in April and May 2013. The net outflows in May and June contrast with \nnet inflows for the same months a year earlier. \n \nUnsurprisingly, Nigeria‟s external reserves dropped from US$47.7bn in May 2013 \nto US$44.98 the following month. Perhaps most heartwarming is that our foreign \n45 \n \nexchange reserves had, by mid‐July, recovered to US$47.99bn. The US$3bn \nimprovement in reserves between the end of June 2013 and Mid‐July 2013, if \nsustained will result in the best month-on‐month improvement in reserves since \nJan 2012. It appears that the challenge of whether to haemorrhage reserves in \nresponse to speculative capital outflows or to employ exchange rates as the \ninstrument of adjustment is thus deferred. \n \nPoor performance of oil production, and thus revenues, despite rising prices \nmeant the fiscal position and outlook would be a source of concern. Available \nfigures show a Federal Government budget deficit of NGN413.99bn in the first \nhalf of the year. Though marginally better than the NGN443.52bn provided for in \nthe 2013 budget of the Federal Government, this compares unfavourably with \nNGN277bn for the same period a year ago. The extent of change in fiscal \nposture worsens when it is borne in mind that the Federation Reserves, otherwise \nknown as the Excess Crude Oil Account, fell from US$11.46bn in December 2012 \nto US$5.52bn in June 2013. At this rate of utilisation, the Federation Reserves will \nbe exhausted before year‐end! \n \nConcern about the loose stance of fiscal policy is exacerbated by a realisation \nthat emerging evidence points to alignment of the spending and electoral \ncycles. This pending alignment suggests that based on the pattern defined by \nthe growth in government spending since the restoration of democratic rule, \n46 \n \ncontrol over government spending is unlikely to be restored this side of the next \nGeneral Elections – especially given the high proportion of nondiscretionary \nspending. The loose stance of fiscal policy creates a challenge to which \nmonetary policy has to respond. Questions are: “When is the right time? and \n“How should Monetary Policy respond?” \n \nThe very high liquidity of the Deposit Money Banks continues to pose a risk to \nmonetary stability – especially the exchange rate. Whilst the Central Bank has \ndeployed its Open Market Operations in liquidity management, slow growth in \nthe expansion of nongovernment lending creates vulnerabilities. In this context, \nit is may be pertinent to provide incentives which stimulate intermediation – \nalbeit at the cost of raising lending rates! \n \nWhile lending rates will rise, I expect that sterilizing government deposits (well, \nhalf of the government‟s deposits) will also raise deposit rates. The disruptions \nshould be weighed against the risk, which a highly liquid banking system poses \nto the currency. \n \nOn a positive note, the rise in domestic prices has been well anchored. For the \nsixth month in a row, the rate of increase in aggregate prices (allowing for \nseasonal influences) remains in single digit. National Bureau of Statistics‟ data for \nJune 2013 show Headline, Core and Food prices rising by 8.4 percent, 5.5 \n47 \n \npercent and 9.6 percent respectively. More importantly, Staff estimate a benign \noutlook for prices, forecasting a peak in headline inflation of 8.9 percent \nbetween July and August, followed by a steady decline thereafter to 7.4 \npercent by year‐end. \n \nStaff year‐end projections for the other components of inflation are no less \nencouraging. Despite Staff expectations of a rise in core inflation in the four \nmonths to end‐October 2013, when this count is expected to peak at 7.2 \npercent, non‐food inflation is expected to close the year at 6.7 percent. On the \nbasis of these projections, year‐end 2013 close for core inflation will be 700bps \nlower than it was twelve months earlier! The projections for the rate of increase \nin food prices, adjusted for seasonality, are no less cheerful. Staff predict that \nfood price inflation, though more variable, will close this year at 7.8 percent. In \n2012, food inflation ended the year at 10.2 percent. \n \n \n9.0 \n UCHE, U. CHIBUIKE \n \nThere is a reasonable degree of consensus that the root cause of the recurring \neconomic difficulty in Nigeria has been our inability to diversify the economy \naway from oil rents. As a result of the above, our economic health has been tied \ndirectly with world oil prices and domestic oil output. Both variables, which have \nuntil recently been on the increase have helped fodder the fiscal dominance \nstance of government and the emergence of our country as a rentier state. The \n48 \n \nabove scenario has made the formulation of monetary policy extremely difficult \nespecially during periods when our recurring fiscal expansion has been \nentwined with falling crude oil production and/ or prices. \nThe result is that over the years monetary policy has been preoccupied with \ndealing with the consequences of fiscal expansion which include: high interest \nrate, high inflation rate and pressures on the exchange rate of our currency. By \nfar the most grievous consequence of our tight monetary policy stance is the \nfact that it discourages lending to the real sector. Inadvertently, we are now \nmainly concerned with treating the symptoms while at the same time \naggravating the root cause of our economic problem. While it is true that the \nfocus of MPC is price stability, I have consistently maintained that this cannot be \nan end in itself. The very essence of our price stability mandate is to help \npromote economic growth and real sector development. \nRecent developments point to the possibility that even with the best of \nintentions and using our conventional monetary policy tools, we may no longer \nbe in a position to ensure price stability in the medium term. Few, for instance, \nwould disagree with the fact that with the continuing discovery of huge reserves \nof shale oil around the world; increasing oil theft in our country and the \nimproving technology for the refining of heavy crude, the current downward \ntrend in our revenue from oil will likely be sustained at least in the short and \nmedium term. The increasing shortfalls in oil revenue, in recent times, which has \nled to increased government borrowing in the current year is not likely to abate \n49 \n \nin the near future. It is instructive that even OPEC had now advised Nigeria to \ndiversify her economy. \nUnless we diversify our economy, this problem can only get worse. Monetary \ntightening to guarantee price stability, which will definitely come at the expense \nof real sector economic growth and development, will yield little meaningful \nresult even in the short run. The structural nature of our monetary policy problem \nis perhaps best brought out by the fact that our commercial banks are \nincreasingly shying away from their traditional intermediation function. \nHandsome returns earned from investments in risk free government securities \nhave helped promote this unfortunate behavior by banks. Under the above \nscenario, banks have simply become the conduit for transferring private sector \nsavings to the government which has shown little restraint for fiscal expansion. \nAnother worrying trend is the practice where government place huge sums of \nmoney in banks at little or no interest and then turn back to borrow from such \nbanks, directly or through treasury bills, at double digit interest rates. This trend is \nclearly not sustainable. While the incentive for this perverse behavior may be \nopen to debate, we must find creative ways of using monetary policy to curb \nsuch harmful practices. One way to do this is to apply a very high CRR on \ngovernment deposits. At the very least this will make it less lucrative for banks to \ntarget government deposits. More prudent fiscal management by government \nwill also no doubt help reduce the impact of government fiscal dominance on \nmonetary policy. \n50 \n \nThe idea that MPC should adopt a blanket tight monetary stance, possibly \nthrough the increase of CRR is in my view not well thought out especially at the \npresent time. This is especially so when one considers the fact that such an \naction will hurt the real sector more. The Nigerian Government does not have a \nvery good record of showing restraint especially when it comes to increasing \ninterest rates to attract investments in its debt securities. The real sector clearly \ndoes not have this privilege. We must devise creative ways of using monetary \npolicy to encourage banks to lend to the real sector. \nFurthermore, I personally find it difficult to justify a blanket tightening of our \nmonetary policy when available evidence suggests that inflation has indeed \nameliorated and it is also unlikely to be a threat in the near future. Rather, I am \nof the humble view that the current scenario provides us with a modest \nopportunity to signal our determination to encourage credit to the real sector \nby reducing MPR by 50 basis points. Admittedly, as I noted in a previous decision \nstatement, reducing MPR alone will not be the sole solution to this problem. We \nmust find creative ways of addressing the issue of the rising spread between \ndeposit and lending rates. It is for instance no exaggeration to conclude that \nour current policy of relying on moral suasion to attain the above objective has \nfailed. The exploitative and predatory nature of our banking system is further \nhighlighted by the impunity with which some banks defraud the public through \nfraudulent schemes like the overcharging of interest rates. Thankfully, the CBN \nhas already started to expose such schemes. I however believe that the time \n51 \n \nhas come for us to create a regulatory regime that will provide a strong \neconomic disincentive against such practices. \nFinally, the current foreign exchange volatility we experienced in the past month \nor so makes it prudent for me to again express my reservations with respect to \nthe “popular view” that maintaining high MPR makes Nigeria competitive with \nrespect to attracting Foreign Direct Investments. This is because most of these so \ncalled FDIs are simply speculative capital looking for short term profit outlets. This \nkind of capital does not develop economies. Admittedly, attracting such FDI \nusually help central banks to curtail exchange rate pressures. This however \nhappens only in the short run. Experience has shown that in the long run, \nspeculative capital is always volatile and economically disruptive. The reverse \nflow of such capital can easily put pressure on both currency exchange rates \nand the capital market. FDI makes sense only when it is applied to real sector \neconomic development. Recent developments have reinforced my belief that \nthe time has come for a rethink of our FDI policies. As a start, we must formulate \npolicies that discourage the inflow of short term FDI. \nIn conclusion therefore, I will like to see monetary policy focus more on policies \nthat will help the diversification of our economy. This is the root cause of our \ncurrent economic problems. \nIn the light of the above factors, I hereby vote as follows: (1) to reduce MPR by \n50 basis points to 11.50 percent with interest rate corridor of + 200/- 200 basis \n52 \n \npoints; (2) to retain CRR at 12 percent but increase CRR on government deposits \nto 50 percent; and (3) to retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent. \n \n10.0 SANUSI, LAMIDO SANUSI, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF \nNIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nThe Environment \nWe are meeting at a time the Financial Markets are beginning to calm down \nafter weeks of turmoil. If the recent strong, almost irrational reaction of markets \nto the guidance of Chairman Bernanke may have had a disconcerting effect, \nits real value lies in reminding us about the fickleness and fragility of markets and \nthe ease with which capital moves across borders. Bernanke stated an obvious \nfact: that at some point, the U.S economy will recover and the Fed will have to \nstop its QE performance. The Fed chairman did not say that QE termination is \nimminent. Also a tapering of QE is not monetary tightening. It simply represents \na slowdown in the rate of expansion of the Fed‟s Balance Sheet. \n \nIn spite of this, the world saw a sudden, wide-spread, knee-jerk reaction with \nyields in US treasuries spiking and huge sell-offs by investors in Emerging and, to a \nlesser extent, Frontier markets. The lesson for us is to remember that, in the short-\nterm, markets are not necessarily rational. They are also very fickle. For this \nreason, we cannot afford, as some analyst have suggested, to simply play \n53 \n \naround with the exchange rate (by moving the mid-point or widening the \nband). This is because once the markets doubt our commitment to exchange \nrate stability and start belting against the Naira the costs can be very high. \nSimilarly, we cannot afford to ignore the build-up of systemic risks. The very high \nexcess liquidity in the system (as evidenced not just by high Liquidity Ratios but \nalso by the sheer size and frequency of OMO activities) is a case in point. So also \nis the sharp rise (on an annualized basin a doubling over 2012) in the borrowing \nby the Central Government, at a time when the Federation has spent over \nN700b out of the excess crude savings accumulated in 2013. \n \nI have just covered, above, the main areas of concern, to my mind. Headline \ninflation in June printed at 8.4%. It will rise a bit, accordingly to staff forecasts, in \nthe third quarter, but will remain below 10% and may even end the year at \nbelow 8%. We have had our own share of selloffs and pressure on our currency, \nbut in line with our plans for this eventuality, we have maintained relative stability \nat little cost to Reserves. The Naira is trading slightly out of our preferred band \nbut it will return there soon and hopefully the investors will return. Banking sector \nindices are all satisfactory and the capital market is in a healthy state. By all \nindices we really do not need to do anything. \n \nDespite all of that we need to be sensitive to other facts. The fiscal deficit in \nH1:2013 was N413.99b compared to N277.8b in H1:2012. The Federation has \n54 \n \ndrawn N706.3b from the Excess Crude Account. We know about 52% of this \ngoes to the Federal Government, a figure in excess of N350b. If the savings had \nnot been drawn, the deficit would have been in the region of N770billion in \nH1:2013 alone. Let us recall that the total deficit in the 2013 budget was \nestimated at N887billion. At this rate the actual deficit will be over N1.4trillion at \nthe end of the year. Net consolidated revenue stood at N3.5trillion in H1:2013 \ni.e. 22.5% below target, yet FAAC distribution amounted to N4.22trillion \n(averaging N703b a month) i.e. 96.3% of target. On a forward looking basis this \nis a build-up of inflationary risks that will be compounded by election spending. \nTo keep monetary conditions unchanged is to be overly accommodating of \nfiscal exuberance. Clearly, the Government has derailed from the path of Fiscal \nconsolidation followed in 2012. \n \nThe Banking system is also sitting on so much liquidity and not deploying it to the \nreal economy including large amounts held as public sector deposits. So the \nGovernment has borrowed over N2trillion from the banks yet Government \nagencies have over N1.3trilliion sitting interest free in the same banking industry. \nI am convinced that this systemic liquidity, if not dealt with, will constitute a risk to \nprice and exchange rate stability, in addition to being a perverse facilitator of \nrent seeking and arbitrage. \n \nMy vote \n55 \n \nHaving weighed all the options open to us I vote as follows: \n \n1. I support leaving the MPR at 12% principally to leave space for \nraising MPR in the event of increased spending during the electoral \ncycle. Also, the very high costs of OMO would advise \ncomplementing the MPR with other tightening measures. I see no \nbenefit to lowering MPR at this point that will outweigh the risk of \ncurrency depreciation, capital reversal and further encouragement \nof Fiscal Dominance; \n2. I do not support the proposed asymmetric corridor because a lower \nremuneration of SDR is an easing signal. This contradicts our view \nthat conditions are already loose. I vote with the majority for \nretaining the symmetry. \n3. I concede that we should leave CRR on non-public sector deposits \nat 12% for the same reason as above. I will therefore refrain from \nvoting for an increase so long as the option is kept open should the \nneed arise in the future. \n4. I vote for increasing the CRR on Public Sector deposits to 50% as this \nwill achieve the multiple objectives of \n \na) Improving market conduct; \nb) Supporting the Naira and \n56 \n \nc) Tightening liquidity conditions. \n \nIt also sends clear signals of commitment to stability on all fronts. \n \nI vote accordingly.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria MPC Communique No  90 of July 22 and 23, 2013 MPC Meeting (with Personal Statements of MPC Members) (2).pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/1133d4c62c976375246989a156e3fa04.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "1133d4c62c976375246989a156e3fa04", "text": "Table A.1.1:\nMonetary\nSurvey (N'\nMillion)\nMONETARY\nASSETS/\nLIABILITIES\n1981\n1982\n1983\n1981\n1982\n1983\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n(NET)\n2585\n888.1\n501.4\nBy Central\nBank\n2403.8000000000002 777.6\n357.3\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n143.19999999999999 15.3\n81\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks2\n38\n95.2\n63.1\nDOMESTIC\nCREDIT\n(NET)\n16203.4\n22272\n28687.9\nClaims on\nFederal\nGovt (Net):\n6532.9\n10660.6\n16450.0999999\nBy Central\nBank\n4689.6000000000004 7667.3\n10924.2\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n1773.9\n2818.6\n5140.39999999\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n69.400000000000006 174.7\n385.5\nClaims on\nPrivate\nSector:\n9670.5\n11611.4\n12237.8\nBy Central\nBank\n265.5\n273.39999999999998 311.399999999\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n8818.5\n10459.4\n10849.1\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n586.5\n878.6\n1077.3\nClaims on\nState and\nLocal Govts:\n0\n0\n0\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on\nNon-\nFinancial\nPublic\nEnterprises:\n0\n0\n0\nBy Central\nBank\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on\nOther\nPrivate\nSector:\n9670.5\n11611.4\n12237.8\nBy Central\nBank\n265.5\n273.39999999999998 311.399999999\nBy\nCommercial\nBanks\n8818.5\n10459.4\n10849.1\nBy\nMerchant\nBanks\n586.5\n878.6\n1077.3\nOTHER\nASSETS\n(NET)\n-2626.7\n-5066.5\n-8310.20000000\nTOTAL\nMONETARY\nASSETS\n16161.7\n18093.599999999999 20879.0999999\nMONEY\nSUPPLY\n(M1)\n9915.2999999999993 10291.799999999999 11517.8\nCurrency\nOutside\nBanks:\n3861.9\n4222.5\n4842.8\nCurrency in\nCirculation\n4347.7\n4728.8999999999996 5299.3\nVault cash:\ncurrency\nheld by\ncommercial\nbanks\n-485.8\n-506.4\n-456.5\nVault cash:\ncurrency\nheld by\nmerchant\nbanks\n0\n0\n0\nDemand\nDeposits1\n6053.4\n6069.3\n6675\nPrivate\nSector\nDeposits at\nCBN\n1172.5\n888.6\n819.4\nPrivate\nSector\nDeposits at\nCommercial\nBanks\n4880.8999999999996 5180.7\n5855.6\nQUASI\nMONEY1\n6246.4\n7801.8\n9361.29999999\nTime,\nSavings &\nForeign\nCurrency\nDeposits of:\n6124\n7529.5\n8876.6\nCommercial\nBanks\n5796\n6838.2\n8082.9\nMerchant\nBanks\n328\n691.3\n793.7\nOther\nPrivate\nSector\nDeposits at\nMerchant\nBanks\n122.4\n272.3\n484.7\nTOTAL\nMONETARY\nLIABILITIES\n(M2)\n16161.7\n18093.599999999999 20879.0999999\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1excludes\ntakings\nfrom\ndiscount\nhouses\n2Merchant\nBank\nstarted in\n1972\n… means\nnot\napplicable\nUniversal\nBanking\nwas\nadopted in\n2001, hence\nCommercial\n& Merchant\nBanks\nbecame\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\n(DMBs)\nTable A.1.2:\nMonetary\nAuthorities'\nAnalytical\nAccounts -\nAssets (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1981\n1982\n1983\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n2440.8000000000002 1041.5\n796.999999\nGold\n428\n48.9\n96.4\nIMF Gold\nTranche\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCurrencies\n0\n0\n0\nDemand\nDeposits at\nForeign Banks\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bills of\nForeign\nGovernments\n1897\n977.5\n685.3\nSDR Holdings\n0\n0\n0\nAttached Assets 0\n0\n0\nRegional\nMonetary\nCooperation\nFunds\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nAssets\n115.8\n15.1\n15.3\nCLAIMS ON\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\n6131.9000000000005 8226.6\n12250\nTreasury Bills &\nTB Rediscounts\n3409.9\n5552.9\n6508.20000\nTreasury Bills\n3404.9\n5463.7\n6018.1\nTreasury Bills\nRediscounts\n5\n89.2\n490.1\nNigerian\nConverted\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bond\nStock\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bonds\nSinking Funds\nOverdrawn\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bonds\nInterest\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nOverdraft on\nBudgetary\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Account\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Sinking\nFunds\nOverdrawn\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nStocks Interest\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury\nCertificates\n1113.7\n936\n3894\nOther Claims on\nFederal\nGovernment\n1608.3\n1737.7\n1847.8\nClaims on\nFederal\nGovernment\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE AND\nLOCAL\nGOVERNMENT\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nStates & Local\nGovernments:\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nState\nGovernments\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nLocal\nGovernments\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on State\n& Local Govt.\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nNONFINANCIAL\nPUBLIC\nENTERPRISES\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nNon-Financial\nPublic:\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nFederal\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nOverdrafts to\nState Parastatals\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on Non-\nfin. Publ. Ent.\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\n(NON-\nFINANCIAL)\nPRIVATE\nSECTOR\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nDEPOSIT\nMONEY BANKS\n565.70000000000005 565.4\n672.3\n(Overdrafts to)\nCommercial\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\n(Overdrafts to)\nMerchant\nBanks1\n0\n0\n0\nOther Claims on\nDMBs\n565.70000000000005 565.4\n672.3\nClaims on\nDeposit Money\nBanks (Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\n(OFI's)\n265.5\n273.39999999999998 311.399999\nDevelopment\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Claims on\nOFI's:\n265.5\n273.39999999999998 311.399999\nLoans to OFI's1\n0\n0\n0\nInvestment in\nOFI's\n265.5\n273.39999999999998 311.399999\nMiscellaneous\nClaims on OFIs\n0\n0\n0\nUNCLASSIFIED\nASSETS\n305.5\n551.20000000000005 592.1\nParticipation in\nInternational\nOrganisations\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Currency\nSubscriptions:\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Local\nCurrency\nSubscription\n(CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)1\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Non-\nNegotiable\nInterest Bearing\nA/C (CBN acc.\nrecords)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Securities\nAccount (CBN\nacc. records)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Accounts\nValuation\nAdjustments\n0\n0\n0\nSDR Allocation\n#1 (rev.\ndescrepancy)\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Gold\nTranche A/C\n(CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)\n0\n0\n0\nHoldings of\nSDRs (CBN\nAccounting\nRecords)\n0\n0\n0\nIBRD\nSubscriptions\n0\n0\n0\nTotal\nReceivables\n0\n0\n0\nReceivables\n0\n0\n0\nIncome\nReceivable:\n0\n0\n0\nAccrued\nEarnings\n0\n0\n0\nImpersonal\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nInterest\nReceivables1\n0\n0\n0\nOther Income\nReceivable\n0\n0\n0\nExchange\nDifference on\nPromisory Notes\n0\n0\n0\nSME\nRevaluation\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nClaims on\nBranches\n0\n0\n0\nNon-Monetary\nPrecious Metals\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellanoues\nunclassified\nAssets\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nMiscellaneous\nAssets\n0\n0\n0\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nHead Office\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nBranch\nExpenses1\n0\n0\n0\nZonal Office\nExpenses\n0\n0\n0\nUnclassified\nAssets (Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL ASSETS\n9709.4000000000015 10658.1\n14622.8\nSource : Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1These\nitems were\nreclassified\nfrom the last\nquarter of 2006\n\"-\" indicates not\navailable\nTable A.1.3:\nMonetary\nAuthority's\nAnalytical\nAccounts -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1981\n1982\n1983\nRESERVE\nMONEY\n5026.0999999999995 5784.5\n6109.5\nCurrency in\nCirculation\n4347.7\n4728.8999999999996 5299.3\nHead Office\n0\n0\n0\nBranches\n0\n0\n0\nDeposit Money\nBanks'\nDeposits:\n678.4\n1055.5999999999999 810.2\nCommercial\nBanks\n678.4\n1055.5999999999999 810.2\nCommercial\nBanks Demand\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nCommercial\nBanks Special\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nCommercial\nBanks\nRequired\nReserves\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks Demand\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks Special\ndeposits\n0\n0\n0\nMerchant\nBanks\nRequired\nReserves\n0\n0\n0\nOther Deposits\nOf DMBs\n0\n0\n0\nDMBs' deposits\n(branch\nposition)\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n1172.5\n888.6\n819.4000000\nNon-Financial\nPublic\nEnterprises\n(Parastatals):\n1038.4000000000001 845.9\n743.7\nFederal\nGovernment\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\nCorporations\nDeposit\n0\n0\n0\nState and Local\nGovernment\nDeposits and\nParastatals\n134.1\n42.7\n75.7\nState\nGovernment\nParastatals\n0\n0\n0\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nFinancial\nInstitutions\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nDevelopment\nBanks\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n0\n0\nPrivate Sector\ndeposits\n(branch\nposition)\n0\n0\n0\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n37\n263.89999999999998 439.7\nNon-Resident\nDeposits of:\n37\n263.89999999999998 439.7\nForeign DMBs\n(Current\nAccounts)\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCentral Banks\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nCustomers\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to\nForeign\nMonetary\nAuthorities:\n0\n0\n0\nTreasury Bills\nHeld by\nForeign\nMonetray\nAuthorities\n0\n0\n0\nOther Foreign\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nLONG-TERM\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES\n0\n0\n0\nLong-Term\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nTrade Debt\nPromissory\nNotes A/C\n0\n0\n0\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\nDEPOSITS\n1442.3\n559.29999999999995 1325.8\nBudgetary\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nNigerian\nConverted\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nDevelopment\nStocks\n0\n0\n0\nDeposits on\nTreasury\nCertificates\n0\n0\n0\nOther Federal\nGovt Deposit\n0\n0\n0\nFederal Govt\nDeposit\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nCAPITAL\nACCOUNTS\n91\n109\n129\nCapital\n0\n0\n0\nReserves\n91\n109\n129\nProvisions\n0\n0\n0\nUndisbursed\nProfits\n0\n0\n0\nRevaluation\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nForeign Assets\nRevaluation A/\nC\n0\n0\n0\nFixed Assets\nRevaluation\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIABILITIES\n1940.5\n3052.8\n5799.4\nIntra-Bank\nAccounts\n(Uncleared\nEffects)\n0\n0\n0\nGovt Lending\nFund\n0\n0\n0\nExpense/\nInterest\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities to\nIMF\n0\n0\n0\nIMF Account\nAdjustments\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nUnclassified\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nMiscellanoues\nunclassified\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\nUnclassified\nLiabilties\n(Branch\nPosition)\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellaneous\nExcess Crude\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nSubnationals\nGovernment\n0\n0\n0\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n9709.4\n10658.1\n14622.8\nSource :\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nTable\nA.1.3.1:\nQuarterly\nMonetary\nAggregates\n(N' Million)\nNFA\nNCG\nPeriod\nCPS\n1981\nQ1\n5800.3\n1885.6\nQ2\n5770.4\n1836\nQ3\n4358.7\n3760.6\nQ4\n2585\n6532.9\n1982\nQ1\n1061.08\n6182.3\nQ2\n702.2\n6847.4\nQ3\n708.8\n6223.8\nQ4\n866.5\n10660.6\n1983\nQ1\n666.7\n8645\nQ2\n518.4\n11263.2\nQ3\n556.29999999999995 13584.4\nQ4\n501.4\n16450.099999999999\n1984\nQ1\n626.4\n15991.5\nQ2\n905.7\n16524\nQ3\n772.9\n16497.2\nQ4\n1110.7\n19125.3\n1985\nQ1\n1132.2\n16628.5\nQ2\n1043.0999999999999 17553.400000000001\nQ3\n573.20000000000005 20641.599999999999\nQ4\n1418.4\n20323.599999999999\n1986\nQ1\n1170.3\n16972.2\nQ2\n1132.4000000000001 17750\nQ3\n1960.1\n17516.599999999999\nQ4\n5367.8\n19550.599999999999\n1987\nQ1\n4699.1000000000004 20098.900000000001\nQ2\n1341.6\n19039.599999999999\nQ3\n3337.4\n18917\nQ4\n3700.5\n22247.5\n1988\nQ1\n2734.3\n22410.2\nQ2\n4558.3\n19832.599999999999\nQ3\n4549.5\n20114.099999999999\nQ4\n9492.4\n29340.6\n1989\nQ1\n15032.5\n28246.400000000001\nQ2\n15085.6\n20378.2\nQ3\n18900.7\n11422.2\nQ4\n22524.3\n7360.3\n1990\nQ1\n29412.5\n13204.1\nQ2\n32512.6\n2200.1999999999998\nQ3\n35389.4\n2962.8\nQ4\n43909.9\n22772.7\n1991\nQ1\n52512.7\n10501.3\nQ2\n53585.599999999999 20988.6\nQ3\n49911.5\n6318.6999999999935\nQ4\n56045.3\n39626\n1992\nQ1\n83970.5\n45412.4\nQ2\n85271.4\n22302.400000000001\nQ3\n81299\n31384.5\nQ4\n35778.254452560002 91112.177941029993 79958.92037\n1993\nQ1\n46418.27959749\n83980.267907850008 99456.85646\nQ2\n64137.994785390001 71209.247841670003 134264.9807\nQ3\n61685.122250779998 87338.196203759988 154994.4360\nQ4\n63559.128210689996 185167.90864615998 95489.66165\n1994\nQ1\n55002.138001419997 196487.72180619999 137480.3251\nQ2\n52324.039887070001 200380.57354292\n143840.2129\nQ3\n34978.211608490004 201975.97931853001 144977.2514\nQ4\n56220.278973220004 288113.53555272997 151000.2584\n1995\nQ1\n105297.76417024\n183781.43643315\n147074.4177\nQ2\n121273.40783373\n175104.62533886003 180255.1184\nQ3\n110984.23736495001 167317.32313931998 193476.6521\nQ4\n108663.01165378002 263002.77373526996 211358.5980\n1996\nQ1\n119129.05452384999 180252.06006774999 217960.3252\nQ2\n122222.28208609001 216415.04459630998 234837.6951\nQ3\n131925.54633712998 179417.37735082002 251980.4292\nQ4\n237978.47605804997 110465.55059363999 260613.5090\n1997\nQ1\n158240.5667585\n96627.252425689949 284904.6824\nQ2\n226031.53991070998 75624.955832560125 321378.9223\nQ3\n237368.72585434999 38823.871590509982 339468.8390\nQ4\n234015.68380143002 46358.40601206998\n319512.2076\n1998\nQ1\n254473.37588214997 34801.010737800003 327923.9364\nQ2\n275325.78724879003 47150.208454530017 353857.9367\nQ3\n285075.35103017004 34228.128846320047 357824.2650\nQ4\n247041.61239663002 139916.24237582998 372574.1713\n1999\nQ1\n634905.32368301996 -33229.391522390026 401352.2934\nQ2\n608426.92078908009 142759.77518876013 427408.3165\nQ3\n623997.04554158985 91308.820947089916 440983.2520\nQ4\n666271.15772920009 176804.87366981001 455205.2168\n2000\nQ1\n774824.28541749006 20342.750744140078 478189.6373\nQ2\n888657.30402372999 -26413.87530147018\n522327.8034\nQ3\n920402.61677158996 48184.37421485997\n564206.1921\nQ4\n1275016.9141366801 -123989.79177483983 596001.5387\n2001\nQ1\n1263237.9947249598 25849.176732580137 713552.0566\nQ2\n1398377.66601872\n-69914.345498410024 758574.5579\nQ3\n1440539.7\n-27426.20000000007\n832559.7000\nQ4\n1347554.7782653999 -6006.5267363200837 854999.3250\n2002\nQ1\n1326157.2000000002 111973.20000000024 892872.3999\nQ2\n1248916.8999999999 126572.8\n939384.2\nQ3\n1191616.2999999998 211558.10000000009 968625.5000\nQ4\n1282215.5\n373639.19999999995 955762.0999\n2003\nQ1\n1346526.9000000001 430656.4\n1024325.700\nQ2\n1325852.2000000002 605045.69999999995 1066036.8\nQ3\n1173900.5\n625658.70000000007 1065107.100\nQ4\n1388233.8\n591944.69999999995 1211993.379\n2004\nQ1\n1570567.5999999999 499985.60000000003 1321106.400\nQ2\n1829689.9999999998 453804.35583333328 1393780.9\nQ3\n2010641.7999999998 453025.10000000009 1489346.499\nQ4\n2644672.6970083104 485725.53136266989 1534447.778\n2005\nQ1\n3140484.4750000006 593222.99\n1666760.100\nQ2\n3397866.6340000001 341727.82499999984 1840766.4\nQ3\n4003941.5999999996 603058\n1986211.203\nQ4\n4098471.8500000006 306031.89999999991 2007355.82\n2006\nQ1\n5108959.9400000004 471892.32264000003 2126956.628\nQ2\n5568809.9989999998 360789.37300000002 2303700.519\nQ3\n5718702.2857403699 -235144.67443473986 2571678.048\nQ4\n6307859.2621254111 -1936615.7398334397 2650821.454\n2007\nQ1\n6997940.7801675685 -2508626.5831918996 3048942.347\nQ2\n7633412.6287206691 -2615012.0202473397 3503722.968\nQ3\n6977270.8816119991 -2462860.9903952605 4203169.479\nQ4\n7266512.0892413696 -2368484.3898503501 5056720.898\n2008\nQ1\n7991622.795226261\n-2501996.3264524098 5964326.801\nQ2\n8316237.2229435993 -2716445.3121344191 6754681.588\nQ3\n8523480.9670053404 -3230039.2832730096 7474666.378\nQ4\n8550430.3120210711 -3107688.5878986004 8059548.917\n2009\nQ1\n8105332.2178045306 -3405605.1033774791 8226442.555\nQ2\n7643607.1311438996 -2879781.4153399598 8556944.652\nQ3\n6886864.5521917501 -2820157.6907005096 9811363.265\nQ4\n7593321.8175431397 -2302294.6829203302 10219336.11\n2010\nQ1\n7249631.8516228097 -1649471.8410700993 10050671.90\nQ2\n6484759.0065151807 -1489877.5147097702 10102817.50\nQ3\n6453963.9705059491 -1026277.2824700093 10336114.78\nQ4\n6506618.5896335989 -1121798.6274487204 9830344.079\n2011\nQ1\n6988078.1024739295 -1240157.98395412\n9446946.316\nQ2\n6453690.2622074606 -1068311.3299590996 9957949.884\nQ3\n6669766.0504796105 -1148207.624127429\n11110737.01\nQ4\n7138672.7772038607 -496861.61620338075 14183591.81\n2012\nQ1\n7306723.1029554289 -440807.59916966991 14119886.07\nQ2\n7522255.0360213192 -1133629.2849571791 14701058.39\nQ3\n8301526.9739228208 -1377602.6316287601 14753999.50\nQ4\n9043678.6840773299 -2453557.0913491198 15151762.14\nSource :\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNFA = Net\nForeign\nAssets, NCG\n= Net Credit\nto\nGovernment,\nCPS = Credit\nto Private\nSector, CCP\n= Credit to\nCore Private\nSector, CSLG\n= Credit to\nStates &\nLocal\nGovernments,\nRM =\nReserve\nMoney, M1\n= Narrow\nMoney, M2\n= Broad\nMoney\nSupply, PSDD\n= Private\nSector\nDemand\nDeposits,\nReserves =\nDMBs'\nDeposits with\nCBN, CIC =\nCurrency in\nCirculation\nTable\nA.1.3.2:\nMonetary\nPolicy\nTargets and\nOutcomes\n(Growth\nRates)\nVariables\n1985\n1986\n1987\nM2\nActual\n12.44159178433889\n4.2325022072030958 22.91948097\nTarget\n*\n*\n*\nM1\nActual\n11.04976354514247\n-2.2885141951289838 12.05937877\nTarget\n6.5\n7.8\n11.8\nNDC\nActual\n7.6263405432752673 9.8306570020834219 16.61668934\nTarget\n7.2\n8.6999999999999993 4.400000000\nNCG\nActual\n6.2655226323247186 -3.8034600169261354 13.79446155\nTarget\n7.1\n5.9\n1.5\nCPS\nActual\n9.6445991950555676 29.428531013508746 19.63180126\nTarget\n7.4\n12.8\n8.4\nReal GDP1\nActual\n11.33\n1.89\n-0.69\nTarget\n1\n**\n**\nInflation\nActual\n1.0309278350515483 13.673469387755077 9.694793536\nTarget\n30\n***\n***\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria &\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNotes: 1Real\nGDP growth\nrates\nbetween\n1985 - 1999\nare from the\nharmonized\nseries on\nGDP\nproduced by\nthe NBS.\n*Quantitative\ntarget for M2\nis not\nspecified.\n**Policy\nstatement is\nspecified as\nstimulate\ngrowth in the\nproductive\nsectors\n***Policy\nstatement is\nspecified as\nsignificantly\nreduce/\nmoderate the\nrate of\ninflation\nTable A.1.4:\nConsolidated\nBankers'\nClearing\nHouse\nStatistics\nNumber of\nNumber\nof\nAmount\nDail\nWorking\nCheques\n(N' Million)\nPeriod\nDays\nCleared\nNo. \nChe\n1981\n243.5\n2561607\n19407.099999999999 105\n1982\n244.79166666666666 2403235\n20345.099999999999 981\n1983\n247.16666666666666 2164534\n18667.3\n875\n1984\n247.75\n2614286\n16281.5\n105\n1985\n247.2833333333333\n2803920\n13778.6\n113\n1986\n248.0333333333333\n3535360\n24958.5\n142\n1987\n246.2\n4951035\n26699.7\n201\n1988\n243.5\n4900697\n56181.4\n201\n1989\n246.91\n4682186\n54832.5\n189\n1990\n244.87\n5066202\n57839.199999999997 206\n1991\n244.72\n5652178\n124891\n230\n1992\n247.41\n7358580\n170235.3\n297\n1993\n225.14\n5151561\n205420.3\n228\n1994\n247.51\n4910565\n310176.59999999998 198\n1995\n247.24\n4826155\n466598.7\n195\n1996\n249.63\n4050401\n406318.2\n162\n1997\n250\n3665107\n391924.1\n146\n1998\n249.25\n7754672\n1198647.8\n311\n1999\n249.76\n8620745\n1413125.5\n345\n2000\n248.88\n10297889 2095478.1\n413\n2001\n250.88\n10193442 2256381.7000000002 406\n2002\n252\n5339419\n2325719.1\n211\n2003\n248\n12526643 8928400\n505\n2004\n256\n13997898 10996044.699999999 546\n2005 1\n248\n14638511 13915416\n590\n2006 1\n247\n14927414 16492064.02\n604\n2007\n246\n19895613 28111190.41\n808\n2008\n251\n30172925 43357416.039999999 120\n2009\n251\n29159780 29390953.149999999 116\n2010\n251\n33973919 19675506.369999997 135\n2011\n249\n37718585 22302646.039999999 151\nQ1\n64\n8111122\n5417761.29\n126\nQ2\n60\n8944203\n5226954.8900000006 149\nQ3\n64\n9732357\n5548609.75\n152\nQ4\n61\n10930903 6109320.1100000003 179\n2012\n248\n12045833 7461634.4921066007 485\nQ1\n63\n2830591\n1995209.7968421299 449\nQ2\n61\n2941867\n1903055.7330567499 482\nQ3\n63\n3268251\n1832847.6596817202 518\nQ4\n61\n3005124\n1730521.302526\n492\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Revised\nClearing\nHouse\nactivities\ncommenced\nin 1965\nTable A.2.1:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nStatement of\nAssets/\nLiabilities -\nAssets (N'\nMillion)\nASSETS\n1981\n1982\n1983\nRESERVES\n1376.1\n2002\n1266.7\nCurrency\n485.8\n506.4\n456.5\nDeposits with\nCBN:\n890.3\n1495.6\n810.2\nReserve\nRequirements\nCurrent\nAccounts\n890.3\n1495.6\n810.2\nStabilization\nSecurities\n0\n0\n0\nCBN Bills\nShortfall/\nexcess credit/\nothers\nFOREIGN\nASSETS\n259.2\n246.4\n343.5\nClaims on\nNon-resident\nBanks:\n255.7\n242.5\n339.7\nBalances held\nwith banks\noutside Nigeria\n245.5\n238.8\n333.7\nBalances held\nwith offices\nand branches\noutside Nigeria\n9.1999999999999993 3.7\n6\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nBanks outside\nNigeria\n1\n0\n0\nBills\nDiscounted\nPayable\noutside Nigeria\n3.5\n3.9\n3.8\nCLAIMS ON\nCENTRAL\nGOVERNMENT\n1773.9\n2818.6000000000004 5140.399999\nTreasury Bills\n917.5\n2189.8000000000002 4361.7\nTreasury\nCertificates\n856.4\n628.79999999999995 778.7\nDevelopment\nStocks\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nCentral\nGovernment\nBankers Unit\nFund\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE &\nLOCAL\nGOVERNMENT\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nState\nGovernment\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nLocal\nGovernment\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nPRIVATE\nSECTOR\n8818.5\n10459.4\n10849.1\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nOther\nCustomers\n8242.2000000000007 9869.5\n10259.1\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nNigeria Banks\nSubsidiaries\n0\n1.6\n0\nBills\nDiscounted\nfrom non-bank\nsources\nInvestments:\n576.29999999999995 588.29999999999995 590\nOrdinary\nShares\nPreference\nShares\nDebentures\nSubsidiaries\nOther\ninvestments\n576.29999999999995 588.29999999999995 590\nCommercial\npapers\nBankers\nAcceptances\nFactored Debt\nAdvances\nunder Lease\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\nUNCLASSIFIED\nASSETS\n7249.8\n7135.5\n9101.799999\nFixed Assets\nDomestic Inter-\nBank Claims:\n972.5\n782.3\n1494.300000\nBills\nDiscounted\nfrom Banks in\nNigeria\n59.3\n69.5\n114.7\nMoney at call\nwith Banks\n297.8\n320.5\n718.4\nInter-bank\nPlacements\nBalances held\nwith banks in\nNigeria\n614.4\n380.3\n657.2\nLoans &\nAdvances to\nother Banks in\nNigeria\n1\n12\n4\nChecks for\nCollection\nMoney at call\noutside banks\nCertificates of\nDeposit\nPlacement\nwith Discount\nHouses\nOther Assets:\n6277.3\n6353.2\n7607.5\nReceivables\nPre-payments\nBills Payable\nSuspense\nSundry\nDebtors\nFEM\nCBN naira\nDepreciation\nNDIC\nMiscellaneous\n6277.3\n6353.2\n7607.5\nTOTAL\nASSETS\n19477.5\n22661.9\n26701.5\nNote:\nFollowing the\nadoption of\nUniversal\nBanking in\nNigeria,\ncommercial\nand merchant\nbanks figures\nwere merged\nfrom 2001\nTables A.2.2:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nStatement of\nAssets/\nLiabilities -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nLIABILITIES\n1981\n1982\n1983\nDEMAND\nDEPOSITS\n4880.8999999999996 5180.7\n5855.6\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n4880.8999999999996 5180.7\n5855.6\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nTIME, SAVINGS\n& FOREIGN\nCURRENCY\nDEPOSITS\n5796\n6838.2\n8082.90000\nTime Deposits:\n3816.8\n4517\n5203.60000\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n3816.8\n4517\n5203.60000\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nSavings\nDeposits:\n1979.2\n2321.1999999999998 2879.3\nPrivate Sector\nDeposits\n1979.2\n2321.1999999999998 2879.3\nState\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nLocal\nGovernment\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nForeign\nCurrency\nDeposits:\n0\n0\n0\nDomiciliary\nAccounts\n0\n0\n0\nOther Deposits: 0\n0\n0\nMONEY\nMARKET\nINSTRUMENTS:\n34.4\n116.3\n107.6\nCertificate of\nDeposit Issued\n34.4\n116.3\n107.6\nNotes & Deposit\n(Cash)\ncertificates\n0\n0\n0\nBONDS\n0\n0\n0\nDebentures\n0\n0\n0\nNotes & Deposit\n(Cash)\ncertificates\n0\n0\n0\nFOREIGN\nLIABILITIES:\n116\n231.10000000000002 262.5\nBalance Held\nfor offices and\nbranches\nAbroad\n6.6\n2.8\n0.4\nBalance held\nfor banks\noutside Nigeria\n109.4\n228.3\n262.100000\nMoney at call\nwith foreign\nbanks\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nother banks\noutside Nigeria\n0\n0\n0\nCENTRAL\nGOVERNMENT\nDEPOSITS\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nTime Deposits\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nDemand\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nFederal\nGovernment\nSavings\nDeposits\n0\n0\n0\nCREDIT FROM\nCENTRAL\nBANK\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nCBN\n0\n0\n0\nCBN Overdrafts\nto banks\n0\n0\n0\nCAPITAL\nACCOUNTS:\n497.4\n667.7\n845.1\nCapital\n497.4\n667.7\n845.1\nReserve Fund\n0\n0\n0\nReserves for\nDepreciation &\nnon-performing\nassets\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nFederal and\nState Govt\n0\n0\n0\nTotal loans /\nlease loss\nprovision\n0\n0\n0\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIABILITIES:\n8152.8\n9627.9\n11547.8\nInter-bank\nliabilities\n329.1\n349.5\n290.8\nBalances held\nfor banks in\nNigeria\n104.3\n102.1\n148.800000\nMoney at call\nfrom banks in\nNigeria\n135\n132\n66\nInter-bank\ntakings\n0\n0\n0\nUncleared\neffects\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nother banks in\nNigeria\n0\n0\n0\nBankers\npayments\n0\n0\n0\nLoans &\nAdvances from\nOther creditors\n89.8\n115.4\n76\nLetters of\nCredit\n0\n0\n0\nTakings from\nDiscount\nHouses\n0\n0\n0\nOther\nLiabilities:\n7823.7\n9278.4\n11257\nAccounts\nPayables\n0\n0\n0\nSuspense\nAccount\n0\n0\n0\nProvision for\nTax Payments\n0\n0\n0\nSundry\nCreditors\n0\n0\n0\nForex Awaiting\nCover\n0\n0\n0\nExchange\nDifferential\n0\n0\n0\nProvision for\nBad Debt\n0\n0\n0\nFEM\n0\n0\n0\nMiscellaneous\n7823.7\n9278.4\n11257\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES:\n19477.5\n22661.9\n26701.5\nSource:\nComputed from\nDeposit Money\nBanks' Returns\nNote: Following\nthe adoption of\nUniversal\nBanking in\nNigeria,\ncommercial and\nmerchant banks\nfigures were\nmerged from\n2001\nTable\nA.2.3:\nSectoral\nDistribution\nof\nCommercial\nBanks'\nLoans and\nAdvances1\n(N' Million)\nP r o d u c t i o n\nAgriculture,\nManufac-\nMining\nPeriod\nForestry\nturing\nand Quarying\nand Fishery\n1981\n590.6\n2659.8\n88\n1982\n786.6\n3037.6\n94.3\n1983\n940.4\n3053.1\n118.7\n1984\n1052.0999999999999 3083.5\n165.5\n1985\n1310.2\n3232.2\n236.1\n1986\n1830.3\n4475.2\n208\n1987\n2427.1\n4961.2\n246.3\n1988\n3066.7\n6078\n227.3\n1989\n3470.5\n6671.7\n271.600000000\n1990\n4221.3999999999996 7883.7\n362.4\n1991\n5012.7\n10911.3\n541.799999999\n1992\n6978.9\n15403.9\n759.7\n1993\n10753\n23110.6\n1424.1\n1994\n17757.7\n34823.199999999997 -\n1995\n25278.7\n58090.7\n12071.6\n1996\n33264.1\n72238.100000000006 15049.5\n1997\n27939.3\n82823.100000000006 20611\n1998\n27180.7\n96732.7\n22848.2\n1999\n31045.7\n115759.9\n24683.5999999\n2000\n41028.9\n141294.79999999999 32288.6\n2001\n55846.1\n206889\n70477.1000000\n2002\n59849.7\n233474.7\n70170\n2003\n62102.8\n294309.59999999998 95976.4\n2004\n67738.600000000006 332113.7\n131055.6\n2005\n48561.5\n352038.3\n172532.1\n2006\n49393.4\n445792.6\n251477.1\n2007\n149578.9\n487576\n490712.9\n2008\n106353.84736185\n932799.45334747992 846942.843756\n2009\n135701.30451533\n993456.99962274998 1190731.58303\n2010\n128405.95164552999 987640.99102281989 1178098.63832\n2011\nQ1\n146862.91941388001 1007399.0480592401 1348260.61011\nQ2\n155101.81287011001 910000.42233527009 1308677.95287\nQ3\n234121.71419351999 1087403.3372241298 1361666.35248\nQ4\n255205.29476771\n1053213.32807472\n1295298.86162\n2012\nQ1\n264651.34930798004 1082856.4043797001 1268115.98374\nQ2\n291204.67455460998 1088447.4535449399 1485939.85636\nQ3\n293001.63217933004 1109775.12869103\n1625724.85275\nQ4\n316363.95819060999 1068341.7272808601 1771496.31295\nSource :\nComputed\nfrom\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks'\nReturns\nNotes:\n1New\nreporting\nformat\ncame into\neffect as\nfrom 1994\n2Revised\nTable\nA.2.4.1:\nMoney\nMarket\nInterest\nRates (Per\ncent)\nCentral Bank\nMinimum\nTreasury\nCertificates1\nRediscount\nTreasury\nOne Year\nTw\nYea\nPeriod\nRates\nBill Rate\nMaturity\nMa\n1981\n6\n5\n5.5\n6\n1982\n8\n7\n7.5\n8\n1983\n8\n7\n7.5\n8\n1984\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1985\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1986\n10\n8.5\n9\n9.5\n1987\n12.75\n11.75\n12.25\n12.\n1988\n12.75\n11.75\n12.25\n12.\n1989\n18.5\n17.5\n16.38\n17.\n1990\n18.5\n17.5\n18.2\n18.\n1991\n14.5\n15\n15\n15.\n1992\n17.5\n21\n22\n23\n1993\n26\n26.9\n27.4\n27.\n1994\n13.5\n12.5\n13\n13\n1995\n13.5\n12.5\n13\n13.\n1996\n13.5\n12.25\n…\n…\n1997\n13.5\n12\n…\n…\n1998\n14.308066759388039 12.950834492350486 …\n…\n1999\n18\n17\n…\n…\n2000\n13.5\n12\n…\n…\n2001\n14.308066759388039 12.950834492350486 …\n…\n2002\n19\n18.88\n…\n…\n2003\n15.75\n15.02\n…\n…\n2004\n15\n14.21\n…\n…\n2005\n13\n6.9950000000000001 …\n…\n2006\n12.25\n8.7999999999999989 …\n…\n2007\n8.75\n6.91\n…\n…\n2008\n9.8125\n9.55 - 4.50\n…\n…\n2009\n7.4375\n1.30 - 6.13\n…\n…\n2010\n6.125\n0.95 - 10.25\n…\n…\n2011\n9.1875\n5.56 - 16.75\n…\n…\nQ1\n7.5\n5.56 - 10.23\n…\n…\nQ2\n8\n6.80 - 10.99\n…\n…\nQ3\n9.25\n6.30 - 11.25\n…\n…\nQ4\n12\n10.10 - 16.75\n…\n…\n2012\n12\n10.00 - 17.20\n…\n…\nQ1\n12\n12.00 - 17.20\n…\n…\nQ2\n12\n11.00 - 15.70\n…\n…\nQ3\n12\n10.50 - 15.38\n…\n…\nQ4\n12\n10.00 - 13.39\n…\n…\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Treasury\nCertificates\nstarted in\n1968 and\nterminated\nin 1995\n… means\nnot\napplicable\nTable\nA.2.4.2:\nWeighted\nAverage\nDeposit and\nLending\nRates of\nCommercial\nBanks\nPeriod\nSavings\nPrime1\nMaximum\n1981\n6\n7.75\n10\n1982\n7.5\n10.25\n11.75\n1983\n7.5\n10\n11.5\n1984\n9.5\n12.5\n13\n1985\n9.5\n9.25\n11.75\n1986\n9.5\n10.5\n12\n1987\n14\n17.5\n19.2\n1988\n14.5\n16.5\n17.6000000000\n1989\n16.399999999999999 26.8\n24.6\n1990\n18.8\n25.5\n27.7\n1991\n14.29\n20.010000000000002 20.8\n1992\n16.100000000000001 29.8\n31.2\n1993\n16.66\n18.32\n36.0900000000\n1994\n13.5\n21\n21\n1995\n12.61\n20.18\n20.79\n1996\n11.69\n19.734999999999999 20.8575000000\n1997\n4.7949999999999999 13.5425\n23.3150000000\n1998\n5.49\n18.2925\n21.3374999999\n1999\n5.33\n21.32\n27.19\n2000\n5.29\n17.98\n21.55\n2001\n5.49\n18.2925\n21.3374999999\n2002\n4.1500000000000004 24.85\n30.19\n2003\n4.1100000000000003 20.71\n22.88\n2004\n4.1900000000000004 19.18\n20.82\n2005\n3.83\n17.95\n19.4899999999\n2006\n3.14\n17.260000000000002 18.7\n2007\n3.5449999999999999 16.9375\n18.3624999999\n2008\n2.8351051735668453 15.135431097964885 18.6974283067\n2009\n2.6758333333333333 18.990833333333335 22.6225000000\n2010\n2.2054760160644169 17.585619776284673 22.5088589011\n2011\n1.410540889601277\n16.021312678181349 22.4159819273\nQ1\n1.4406701674354434 15.778074985108544 21.9986980271\nQ2\n1.3784253451898565 15.776574228119017 22.1093746244\nQ3\n1.4221527735511146 15.841984232431306 22.2611864283\nQ4\n1.4009152722286931 16.68861726706653\n23.2946686295\n2012\n1.6986497418592916 16.790310674021502 23.7875001961\nQ1\n1.5303662999550116 17.100166493473218 23.1436962141\nQ2\n1.7850197380544932 16.935905967416719 23.3961172346\nQ3\n1.7882468509059493 16.617919231364066 23.9582972996\nQ4\n1.6909660785217122 16.507251003831996 24.6518900359\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Formerly\nreferred to\nas First\nClass\nAdvances\nUniversal\nBanking\nwas\nadopted in\n2001,\nhence\nCommercial\n& Merchant\nBanks\nbecame\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\n(DMBs)\nTable A.2.5:\nSelected\nFinancial\nRatios of\nCommercial\nBanks\n(Percentage)\nPeriod\nLiquidity Ratio1\nCash Reserve Ratio2\nLoan\nRati\nActual\nPrescribed\nMinimum\nPrescribed\nActu\n1981\n38.5\n74.5\n1982\n40.5\n84.6\n1983\n54.7\n83.8\n1984\n65.099999999999994\n81.9\n1985\n65\n66.9\n1986\n36.4\n83.2\n1987\n46.5\n72.9\n1988\n45\n66.9\n1989\n40.299999999999997\n80.4\n1990\n44.3\n66.5\n1991\n38.6\n59.8\n1992\n29.1\n55.2\n1993\n42.2\n42.9\n1994\n48.5\n60.9\n1995\n33.1\n73.3\n1996\n43.1\n72.9\n1997\n40.200000000000003\n76.5\n1998\n46.8\n74.4\n1999\n61\n54.6\n2000\n64.099999999999994\n51\n2001\n52.9\n65.6\n2002\n52.45\n62.7\n2003\n50.9\n61.8\n2004\n50.475000000000001\n68.6\n2005\n50.174999999999997\n70.8\n2006\n55.7\n63.6\n2007\n48.75\n40\n70.7\n2008\n44.253875688862223 35\n3\n80.9\n2009\n30.7\n25\n1.25\n85.6\n2010\n30.425000000000001 25\n1\n74.2\n2011\nQ1\n23.307957921142169 30\n1.4930846027446847 48.3\nQ2\n17.899999999999999 30\n3.7514744990374451 44.8\nQ3\n19.957375282733157 30\n4.0033105247290299 43.4\nQ4\n42\n30\n8\n44.7\n2012\nQ1\n46.5\n30\n8\n48\nQ2\n49.232036383828714 30\n8\n46.8\nQ3\n47.586861464329132 30\n12\n44.5\nQ4\n49.718722095003507 30\n12\n42.3\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNotes:\n1Liquidity\nratio is the\nratio of total\nspecified\nliquid assets\nto total\ncurrent\nliabilities\n2Cash\nreserve ratio\nis the ratio\nof cash\nreserve\nrequirement\nto total\ndeposit\nliabilities\n3Loan-to-\nDeposit\nratio is the\nratio of total\nloans and\nadvances to\ntotal deposit\nliabilities\nTable A.2.6:\nDeposits and Loans\nof Rural Branches of\nCommercial Banks\n(N' Million)\nYear/Quarter\nDeposits\nLoans\n1982\n111.7\n35.9\n1983\n131.19999999999999 44.2\n1984\n276.60000000000002 58.2\n1985\n311.39999999999998 114.9\n1986\n873.5\n373.6\n1987\n1229.2\n492.8\n1988\n1378.4\n659.9\n1989\n5722\n3721.1\n1990\n8360.1\n4730.8\n1991\n10580.7\n5962.1\n1992\n4612.2\n1895.3\n1993\n19542.3\n10910.4\n1994\n4855.2\n1602.2\n1995\n8807.1\n8659.2999999999993\n1996\n12442\n4411.2\n1997\n19047.599999999999 11158.6\n1998\n18513.8\n11852.7\n1999\n15860.5\n7498.1\n2000\n20640.900000000001 11150.3\n2001\n16875.900000000001 12341\n2002\n14861.6\n8942.2000000000007\n2003\n20551.8\n11251.9\n2004\n64490\n34118.5\n2005\n18461.900000000001 16105.5\n2006\n3118.6\n24274.6\n2007\n3082.3\n27263.5\n2008\n13411.807559209999 46521.477695000001\n2009\n3296.2273579400003 15590.500285\n2010\n20.79\n16555.98\n2011\nQ1\n24.86\n16919.59\nQ2\n27.36\n16261.67\nQ3\n22.23\n18132.64\nQ4\n20.184072910000001 19980.30255\n2012\nQ1\n19.967823920000001 20257.625102999998\nQ2\n20.645741309999998 23263.324443000001\nQ3\n20.772686030000003 24681.143673999999\nQ4\n19.723217039999998 22579.970439000001\nSource : Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: Rural banking\nstarted in 1977\nTable A.2.7.1: Number of\nCommercial Banks\nBranches in Nigeria and\nAbroad\nBranches\nPeriod\nNumber Urban\nRural Abroad1 Total\nof\nBanks\n1981\n20\n622\n240\n7\n869\n1982\n22\n676\n308\n7\n991\n1983\n25\n694\n407\n7\n1108\n1984\n27\n810\n432\n7\n1249\n1985\n28\n839\n451\n7\n1297\n1986\n29\n879\n481\n7\n1367\n1987\n34\n947\n529\n7\n1483\n1988\n42\n1057\n602\n6\n1665\n1989\n47\n1093\n756\n6\n1855\n1990\n58\n1169\n765\n5\n1939\n1991\n65\n1253\n765\n5\n2023\n1992\n65\n1495\n774\n6\n2275\n1993\n66\n1577\n775\n6\n2358\n1994\n65\n1634\n763\n6\n2403\n1995\n64\n1661\n701\n6\n2368\n1996\n64\n1727\n675\n5\n2407\n1997\n64\n1727\n675\n5\n2407\n1998\n54\n1466\n714\n5\n2185\n1999\n54\n1466\n714\n5\n2185\n2000\n54\n1466\n722\n5\n2193\n2001\n90\n1466\n722\n5\n2193\n2002\n90\n2283\n722\n5\n3010\n2003\n90\n2520\n722\n5\n3247\n2004\n89\n2765\n722\n5\n3492\n2005 2\n25\nSource : Central Bank of\nNigeria\nNote: Classification of\nBranches into Urban and\nRural stopped in 2005 due\nto consolidation of banks\n1Abroad comprises\nbranches and subsidiaries\n2The number of banks\nreduced to 25 following\nconsolidation of banks\nTable\nA.2.7.2:\nNumber of\nCommercial\nBanks\nBranches in\nNigeria (by\nStates) and\nAbroad\n2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011\nQ4\nQ4\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nQ4\nNumber of\nBanks\n25\n24\n24\n24\n24\n16\n21\n24\n24\nBranches\nAbroad2\n2\n7\n8\n2\n2\n2\n2\n2\n2\nNumber of\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks\nBranches in\nNigeria by\nState1\nAbia\n104\n111\n138\n141\n146\n83\n114\n129\n12\nAbuja(FCT) 163\n219\n283\n361\n398\n232\n323\n372\n35\nAdamawa\n39\n52\n58\n63\n67\n38\n57\n63\n79\nAkwa-Ibom 60\n78\n85\n99\n99\n47\n74\n88\n92\nAnambra\n121\n174\n212\n217\n237\n136\n200\n224\n22\nBauchi\n35\n45\n50\n51\n53\n33\n44\n51\n50\nBayelsa\n28\n31\n37\n38\n37\n26\n32\n38\n37\nBenue\n39\n53\n61\n71\n75\n44\n59\n65\n57\nBorno\n61\n57\n68\n71\n79\n50\n63\n71\n68\nCross-River 36\n52\n63\n71\n79\n39\n61\n70\n76\nDelta\n98\n129\n174\n193\n198\n123\n156\n184\n17\nEbonyi\n15\n22\n28\n32\n35\n19\n30\n32\n45\nEdo\n109\n118\n163\n175\n183\n105\n146\n158\n16\nEkiti\n31\n54\n67\n58\n80\n32\n57\n61\n60\nEnugu\n90\n93\n120\n130\n141\n67\n107\n118\n11\nGombe\n25\n29\n33\n40\n40\n24\n32\n36\n36\nImo\n37\n57\n84\n104\n104\n57\n86\n99\n97\nJigawa\n19\n29\n34\n35\n39\n28\n32\n38\n37\nKaduna\n126\n133\n157\n164\n183\n114\n147\n169\n17\nKano\n130\n130\n160\n183\n193\n133\n164\n184\n18\nKatsina\n33\n41\n50\n57\n62\n31\n46\n56\n55\nKebbi\n21\n31\n35\n36\n40\n30\n36\n40\n40\nKogi\n27\n64\n68\n81\n80\n48\n75\n78\n77\nKwara\n39\n70\n67\n72\n79\n53\n67\n68\n13\nLagos\n1038 1407 1551 1690 1766 981\n1284 1509 14\nNasarawa\n19\n27\n40\n48\n58\n33\n45\n49\n51\nNiger\n46\n51\n69\n75\n80\n49\n69\n76\n76\nOgun\n52\n122\n139\n149\n175\n108\n145\n155\n40\nOndo\n87\n91\n107\n109\n121\n69\n103\n109\n10\nOsun\n38\n81\n93\n92\n105\n69\n92\n95\n11\nOyo\n112\n163\n191\n220\n236\n149\n195\n207\n20\nPlateau\n77\n65\n73\n76\n79\n48\n67\n76\n72\nRivers\n179\n197\n248\n273\n302\n174\n225\n266\n24\nSokoto\n46\n41\n54\n59\n53\n38\n49\n53\n53\nTaraba\n16\n27\n30\n35\n37\n25\n34\n36\n41\nYobe\n22\n32\n33\n32\n35\n19\n31\n33\n35\nZamfara\n15\n24\n29\n35\n35\n23\n30\n34\n33\nTOTAL\n3233 4200 4952 5436 5809 3377 4577 5190 54\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria/\nNigerian\nDeposit\nInsurance\nCorporation\nNotes:\n1This\nincludes\ncash\ncenters\n2Some\nbank\nbranches\nbecame\nsubsidiaries\nTable A.2.8:\nCommercial\nBanks'\nLoans to\nSmall Scale\nEnterprises1\nPeriod\nCommercial Banks\nLoans\nCommercial Banks\nCommercial Ban\nLoans\nTo Small Scale\nTotal Credit to\nPrivate\nTo Small Scale\nEnterprises as\nEnterprises (N'\nMillion)\nSector (N' Million)\nPercentage of T\nCredit (%)\n1992\n20400\n75456.299999999988 27.0355159211\n1993\n15462.9\n88821\n17.4090586685\n1994\n20552.5\n143516.79999999999 14.3206230908\n1995\n32374.5\n204090.59999999998 15.8628079882\n1996\n42302.1\n254853.09999999998 16.5986209310\n1997\n40844.300000000003 311358.40000000002 13.1180979861\n1998\n42260.7\n366544.1\n11.5294994517\n1999\n46824\n449054.3\n10.4272467717\n2000\n44542.3\n587999.9\n7.57522237673\n2001\n52428.4\n844486.2\n6.20831933073\n2002\n82368.399999999994 948464.1\n8.68439828138\n2003\n90176.5\n1203199\n7.49472863591\n2004\n54981.2\n1519242.7\n3.61898727569\n2005\n50672.6\n1991146.42\n2.54489571891\n2006\n25713.7\n2609289.4\n0.98546753763\n2007\n41100.400000000001 4820695.7\n0.85258233578\n2008\n13512.20422159\n7799400.1132610394 0.17324671161\n2009\n16366.485012469999 9667876.6775001772 0.16928727535\n2010\n12550.3\n9198173.0575210787 0.13644339937\n2011\nQ1\n13133.23678616\n9009438.8557658698 0.14610287407\nQ2\n109587.19760191\n9231557.3861079682 1.18709328251\nQ3\n14952.4760971\n10240403.486577002 0.14601452097\nQ4\n15611.7\n9614445.7984891199 0.16237753404\n2012\nQ1\n14875.073296729999 9520551.9726192486 0.15624171097\nQ2\n15065.36516238\n10048406.516823487 0.14992790286\nQ3\n14995.818688610001 10274095.4\n0.14594544416\nQ4\n13863.462939219999 10440956.329526043 0.13277962766\nSource :\nComputed\nfrom\nDeposit\nMoney\nBanks'\nReturns\nNotes: This\ntable\ncontains\nrevised\nfigures\n1The\nabolition of\nmandatory\nbanks'\ncredit\nallocations\nof 20% of\nit's total\ncredit to\nsmall scale\nenterprises\nwholly\nowned\nby\nNigerians\ntook effect\nfrom\nOctober 1,\n1996\nSmall Scale\nEnterprises\nstarted in\n1992\nTable A.3.1:\nSummary of\nAssets &\nLiabilities\nof Primary\nMortgage\nInstitutions\n(N'\nMillions)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS :\n1. Cash\n29.3\n42.5\n30.9\n2. Balance\nheld with\n446.6\n504.1\n811.699999999\n(a) FMBN\n61.3\n84.1\n84.4\n(b) Other\nbanks\n385.3\n420\n727.3\n3. Treasury\nBills/\nCertificate\n0\n135.6\n0\n4.\nPlacements/\nInvestments\n895.5\n1185.3\n611.799999999\n5. Loans\n208.9\n334.7\n560.299999999\n6. Other\nAssets\n662.9\n1408.5\n1055.59999999\nTotal Assets 2243.2000000000003 3610.7\n3070.29999999\nLIABILITIES\n:\n1. Capital\n441.5\n845.7\n1228.59999999\n2. Reserves\n55.2\n-60.3\n-125.4\n3. Savings\n292.10000000000002 326.39999999999998 399.2\n4. Fixed\nDeposits\n626.39999999999964 1249.9000000000001 645\n5. Balance\nheld for\nother Fin.\nInts.\n337.5\n567.9\n213.9\n6. Other\nLiabilities\n490.5\n681.1\n709\nTotal\nLiabilities\n2243.1999999999998 3610.7000000000003 3070.29999999\nNumber of\nReporting\nPMI\n145\n252\n279\nLoans to\ndeposits\nRatio\n3.2\n21.2\n53.7\nLiquidity\nRatio\n6.9\n31.8\n67\nLiquid\nAssets\n475.9\n682.2\n842.6\nCurrent\nLiabilities\n6891.8\n2144.1999999999998 1258.09999999\nDeposits\n6554.3\n1576.3\n1044.2\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\nLiquidity\nRatio =\nLiquid\nAssets/\nCurrent\nLiabilities x\n100\nTable A.3.2:\nSummary of\nAssets/\nLiabilities of\nDiscount Houses\n- Assets (N'\nMillion)\nASSETS\n1993\n1994\n1995 1\nCASH AND\nBALANCES\nWITH BANKS\n6.4\n50.5\n71.3269999\ni) Cash on hand 0.1\n0.2\n0.19800000\nii) Balances\nwith CBN\n0\n15.4\n-2.2549999\niii) Balances\nwith other\nbanks\n6.3\n34.9\n73.384\nCLAIMS ON\nFEDERAL\nGOVERNMENT\n4213.2\n7126.2\n1552.64200\ni) Treasury Bills 4213.2\n7125.9\n1552.64200\na) Pledges\n0\n0\n668.15\nb) Unpledged\n0\n0\n884.491999\nc) Bill with PDO\n(CBN)\n0\n0\n0\nii) Treasury\nCertificate\nMaturing\n0\n0\n0\na) Within 1 year 0\n0\n0\nb) 1-2 years\n0\n0\n0\niii) Treasury\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\na) Pledges\n0\n0\n0\nb) Unpledged\n0\n0\n0\niv) Eligible\nDevelopment\nStock\n0\n0.3\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nSTATE\nGOVERNMENTS\n0\ni) State\nPromissory\nNotes\n0\nii Eligible State\nBonds\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nBANKS\n138.69999999999999 2308.1\n471.074999\ni) Money at Call 0\n232\n0\nii) Loans and\nAdvances\n11\niii) Commercial\nBills:\n460.074999\na) Bankers\nAcceptances\n138.69999999999999 2076.1\n410.074999\nb) Promissory\nNotes\n50\nc) Negotiable\nCertificate of\nDeposit\n0\nd) Stabilisation\nSecurities\n0\niv) Others\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHER\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS\n251.95\nMoney at Call\n251.95\nLoans and\nAdvances\n0\nCommercial\nBills:\n0\na) Promissory\nNotes\n0\nb) Negotiable\nCertificate of\nDeposit\n0\nOthers\n0\nCLAIMS ON\nOTHERS\n915.832999\nCommercial\nBills\n915.832999\nLoans and\nAdvances\n0\nOthers (CBN\nCertificate)\n0\nOTHER ASSETS 103.5\n98.4\n89.2840000\nFIXED ASSETS\n79.7420000\nTOTAL ASSETS\n4461.7999999999993 9583.1999999999989 3431.85300\nASSETS ON\nREPURCHASE\nTRANSACTION\n12190.0650\nTreasury Bills\n7012.88900\nTreasury Bills\n(Bonds)\n-\nFixed Buy Back\nRepo\n-\nEligible\nCommercial\nBills\n5177.17600\nTreasury Bills\nRepo with CBN\n-\nTreasury Bills\nRepo with other\nDiscount House\n-\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1A new\nreporting\nformat was\nintroduced in\nJune 1995\nTable A.3.3:\nSummary of\nAssets/Liabilities\nof Discount\nHouses -\nLiabilities (N'\nMillion)\nLIABILITIES\n1993\n1994\n1995 1\n19\nCAPITAL AND\nRESERVES\n436\n565.70000000000005 865.47400000000005 12\ni) Paid-up Capital 385\n437.5\n667.45\n94\nii) Statutory\nReserves\n0.5\n18.5\n51.005000000000003 12\niii) Share\nPremium\n64.918999999999997 37\niv) Other\nReserves\n50.5\n109.7\n82.1\n51\nv) General\nReserve\n0\n85\nMONEY-AT-CALL 3350\n5517.6\n707.93700000000001 76\ni) Commercial\nBanks\n678.86900000000003 61\nii) Merchant\nBanks\n25\n31\niii) Non-Bank\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n4.0679999999999996 12\niv) Others\n0\n0.\nv) Associated\nTreasury Notes\n0\n0\nOTHER AMOUNT\nOWING TO:\n0\n25\ni) Commercial\nBanks\n0\n0\nii) Merchant\nBanks\n0\n0\niii) Non-Bank\nFinancial\nInstitutions\n0\n1.\niv) Others\n0\n25\nBORROWINGS\n2.9\n2347.5\n610\n13\ni) Central Bank of\nNigeria\n2.6\n0\n0\n0\nii) Overdrafts\n0\n13\niii) Other Banks\n0.3\n2347.5\n610\n0\nOTHER\nLIABILITIES\n672.9\n1152.4000000000001 1248.442\n26\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n4461.8 9583.1999999999989 3431.8530000000001 11\nLIABILITIES FOR\nASSETS SUBJECT\nTO\nREPURCHASE\nARRANGEMENTS\n12190.065000000001 32\n- Repo with CBN\n0\n0\n- Repo with\nBanks\n7900.9660000000003 27\n- Fixed Buy Back\nRepo\n0\n0\n- Repo with\nDiscount Houses\n50\n- Repo with\nOthers\n4289.0990000000002 0\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1A new\nreporting format\nwas introduced in\nJune 1995\n2Revised\nTable\nA.3.4:\nSelected\nFinancial\nRatios of\nDiscount\nHouses\nITEM\nTarget 1993\n1994\n1995\nAssets\nStructure\nAssets\n4029614\n7125921\n15526\nTreasury\nBills of\nLess Than\n91 Days\nMaturity\n4029614\n7125921\n15526\nTreasury\nBonds\n0\n0\n0\nLiabilities\n3352974\n7865119\n13179\nMoney at\nCall\n3350050\n5517625\n70793\nBorrowings\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nOther\nAmounts\nOwing\n0\n0\n0\nStructure\nof Assets\nRatio1 (%)\n70\n120.2\n90.6\n117.8\nTotal\nBorrowings\n& Amount\nOwing\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nBorrowings\n2924\n2347494\n61000\nAmount\nOwing\n0\n0\n0\nCapital &\nReserves\n436003\n565672\n86547\nCapital\n385000\n437500\n66745\nReserves\n51003\n128172\n19802\nGearing\nRatio: x:1\nx=50 7.0000000000000001E-3 4.1500000000000004 0.704\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1Target for\nStructure\nof Assets\nRatio was\nset and\nretained at\n70%\nbetween\n1993 and\n2002. It\nwas\nchanged to\n60% in\n2003.\nTable A.3.5:\nSummary of\nAssets &\nLiabilities of\nCommunity/\nMicrofinance\nBanks (N'\nMillion)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS :\nCash in hand\n66.7\n190.7\n233.1\nBalance with\nother banks\n245.9\n781.2\n879.8\nMoney at call\n197.7\n695.7\n773.2\nBills Discounted\n23.3\n23.4\n24.7\nLoans &\nAdvances:\n135.80000000000001 654.5\n1220.5999\n(a) Agriculture &\nforestry\n29.5\n123.2\n155.4\n(b) Mining &\nQuarrying\n3.7\n5.7\n32.200000\n(c)\nManufacturing &\nFood Processing\n19.899999999999999 129.6\n201\n(d) Real Estate &\nConstruction\n14.6\n47.5\n34.9\n(e) Transport/\nCommerce\n45.6\n280\n513.79999\n(f) Others\n22.5\n68.5\n283.3\nInvestments\n118.4\n326.60000000000002 491.4\nEquipment on\nLease\n-\n-\n6\nFixed Assets\n124.9\n406.4\n753.7\nOther Assets\n54.5\n120.1\n310.7\nTOTAL ASSETS\n967.2\n3198.6\n4693.2\nLIABILITIES:\nDeposits\n639.6\n2188.2000000000003 3216.7\n(a) Demand\n207.9\n588.5\n836.3\n(b) Savings\n304.2\n1107.9000000000001 1865.7\n(c) Time\n127.5\n491.8\n514.70000\nMoney at Call\nTakings\n0\n-\n5.0999999\nBalances held for\nBanks\n39.5\n63.9\n33.6\nMatching Loans\n36.9\n74.599999999999994 71.099999\nOther Loans1\n0\n-\n108.2\nShareholders\nFunds\n227\n625.29999999999995 935.4\n(a) Paidup\nCapital\n197.9\n417.2\n769\n(b) Reserve\n29.1\n208.1\n166.4\nOther Liabilities\n24.2\n246.60000000000002 323.10000\nTOTAL\nLIABILITIES\n967.2\n3198.6\n4693.2\nNumber of\nReporting Banks\n334\n611\n902\nLoans to Deposit\nRatio2\n23.428066558680609 30.100794813729404 38.253363\nLiquidity Ratio3\n75.143572375202467 74.046445539718476 57.937580\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNotes: 1Other\nLoans consists of\ndonations/\ngrants/\nsubventions\n2Loans to Deposit\nratio= (Loans\nand\nadvances+Bills\ndiscounted)*100/\n(deposits+money\nat call Takings\n+balances held\nfor banks)\n3Liquidity Ratio\n= ((Cash in hand\n+ Balance with\nother banks +\nMoney at Call)/\n(Deposits +\nMoney at call\nTakings +\nBalances held for\nbanks))*100\nWith effect from\nDecember 2006,\nall the existing\nCommunity\nBanks were asked\nto transform to\nMicrofinance\nBanks\n4Revised\n5Provisional\nTable A.3.6:\nSummary of Assets\nand Liabilities of\nFinance Houses (N'\nMillion)\nITEM\n1992\n1993\n1994\nASSETS\n1. Liquid Assets\n286\n4446.5\n3655.\nCash in Hand\n40.04\n239.20400000000001 271.1\nBalances with Banks\n245.96\n1469.396\n1665.\nPlacements with\nOther Finance\nCompanies\n0\n2737.9\n1718.\n2. Domestic Credit\n1512.8\n5634\n4787.\nInvestments\n380.7\n1298.5\n1333.\nNet Loans &\nAdvances\n1132.0999999999999 4335.5\n3453.\nEquipment on Lease\n0\n0\n0\n3. Other Assets\n403.1\n1798.1\n1636.\n4. Fixed Assets\n244\n1507.2\n1581.\nTotal Assets\n2445.9\n13385.800000000001 11660\nLIABILITIES\n1. Shareholder' Fund\n576.6\n2668.2\n2111.\nPaid - Up Capital\n554.9\n2668.2\n2111.\nReserves\n21.7\n0\n0\nPublished Current\nYear Profit/Loss\n0\n0\n0\n2. Taking from Other\nFinance Companies\n0\n1592.2\n1434.\n3. Long Term\nLiabilities\n0\n0\n0\n4. Total Borrowings\n1292\n6969.9\n5449.\n5. Other Liabilities\n577.29999999999995 2155.5\n2664.\nTotal Liabilities\n2445.8999999999996 13385.8\n11660\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\n73232.399999999994\n#REF!\n1622880.6\n1696113\n#REF!\n446760.6\n1452734\n1899494.6\n40.040000000000006\n245.96\n286\nTable A.3.7:\nNumber of\nDevelopment &\nSpecialised\nBanks/\nInstitutions\nBANKS /\nINSTITUTIONS\n1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999\nDEVELOPMENT\nBANKS\n1\n2\n2\n2\n3\n4\n4\n4\n4\n4\nEducational\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nUrban\nDevelopment\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNigerian Export\nand Import\nBank\n-\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nBank of\nIndustry\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nNigeria Agric.\nCredit Dev.\nBank\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\nFederal\nMortgage Bank\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nSPECIALISED\nBANKS:\n169\n287\n629\n1150 1245 1630 1646 1293 1293 1292\nCommunity\nBanks\n(Microfinance\nBanks)\n0\n66\n401\n879\n970\n1355 1368 1015 1015 1014\nPeoples Bank (\nBranches )\n169\n221\n228\n271\n275\n275\n278\n278\n278\n278\nSPECIALISED\nFINANCIAL\nINSTITUTIONS:\n84\n127\n872\n674\n680\n657\n564\n478\n540\n541\nFinance Houses\n618\n310\n290\n279\n279\n270\n279\n280\nInsurance\nCompanies\n(Reporting)\n80\n100\n105\n105\n103\n90\n90\n83\n57\n57\nDiscount\nHouses\n-\n-\n-\n3\n4\n4\n5\n5\n5\n5\nPrimary\nMortgage\nInstitutions\n-\n23\n145\n252\n279\n280\n186\n115\n194\n194\nNational\nEconomic\nReconstruction\nFund\n(NERFUND)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNational Social\nInsurance Trust\nFund (NSITF)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNigeria Deposit\nInsurance\nCompany\n(NDIC)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nSecurities and\nExchange\nCommission\n(NSE)\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\n1\n1\n1\nNational\nPension\nCommission\n(PENCOM)\nSource: Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote:\nCommunity\nBanks\ntransformed to\nMicrofinance\nBanks in\nDecember 2006\nTable A.4.1:\nValue of\nMoney\nMarket\nInstruments\nOutstanding\nas at End-\nPeriod (N'\nMillion)\nPeriod\nTreasury\nTreasury\nEligible Develo-\nBills\nCertificates\npment Stocks1\n1981\n5782\n2307.6\n98.9\n1982\n9782\n1668.6\n93.8\n1983\n13476\n4894\n90.5\n1984\n15476\n6413\n87.4\n1985\n16976\n6644\n-\n1986\n16976\n6654.7\n14.6\n1987\n25226\n6664.1\n28.3\n1988\n35476\n6794.6\n5.9\n1989\n24126\n6944.6\n-\n1990\n25476\n34214.6\n-\n1991\n56728.3\n34214.6\n-\n1992\n103326.5\n35241.4\n-\n1993\n103326.5\n36584.300000000003 10\n1994\n103326.5\n37342.699999999997 -\n1995\n103326.5\n23596.3\n-\n1996\n103326.5\n-\n-\n1997\n221800.5\n-\n-\n1998\n221801.5\n-\n790.3\n1999\n361758.4\n-\n952.8\n2000\n465535.8\n-\n2406.30000000\n2001\n584535.80000000005 -\n3704.7\n2002\n584535.80000000005 -\n1128\n2003\n825054.5\n-\n33254.9\n2004\n871577\n-\n32758.7\n2005\n854828\n-\n101361.5\n2006\n701399.8\n-\n319332.3\n2007\n574929.42999999993 -\n694061\n2008\n471929.5\n39705.9\n914106.1\n2009\n797482.48\n52577.2\n1229049.7\n2010 2\n1277100\n0\n1448129.89\n2011\nQ1\n1439591.3149999999 0\n0\nQ2\n1561424.8389999999 0\n0\nQ3\n1607835.017\n0\n0\nQ4\n1727914.3640000001 0\n0\n2012\nQ1\n1947185.098\n0\n0\nQ2\n2084590.382\n0\n0\nQ3\n2132926.9569999999 0\n0\nQ4\n2122926.9569999999 0\n0\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1From\n1975 to\n1978\nCertificate\nof Deposits,\nBankers\nUnit Fund\n& Eligible\nDevt Stocks\nwere\nlumped\ntogether\n2Revised\nTable A.4.2:\nTreasury Bills\nIssues and\nSubscriptions\n(N' Million)\nS u b s c r i p t i o n s\nPeriod\nIssues\nCentral\nCommercial\nBank\nBanks\n1981\n11975.999999999998 5890.4\n5438.4\n1982\n26476\n18283.099999999999 7522.1\n1983\n45831.999999999993 28445\n15805.7\n1984\n55904.000000000007 28107.9\n24820.9\n1985\n6875.9999999999991 4372.5\n2099.5\n1986\n65904.000000000015 40626.6\n22415.200000\n1987\n88663.999999999985 70837.399999999994 16573.900000\n1988\n111154.00000000001 89015.2\n20878.8\n1989\n130554\n106569.60000000001 13887.8\n1990\n91903.9\n33020.5\n17116.599999\n1991\n133156\n77729\n25609.7\n1992\n135969.90000000002 123163.3\n4473.8\n1993\n112326.50000000001 97959.6\n7541.6\n1994\n103326.50000000001 92292\n5343.3\n1995\n103326.40000000001 86938.8\n9099.5\n1996\n103326.5\n33856.400000000001 32028.9\n1997\n72930.900000000009 54319.6\n11089\n1998\n88930.9\n61768.7\n12864.7\n1999\n80930.899999999994 17367.099999999999 38568.400000\n2000\n86895.1\n0\n58257.2\n2001\n1985453.2\n1065709.3\n686183\n2002\n2421143.2000000002 929123.2\n998915.2\n2003\n3026347.1\n789158\n1394\n2004\n3467740.5\n811945.2\n1403052.4\n2005\n2521730\n996108.86\n1257194.77\n2006\n1509070\n643210\n771570\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Savings\nInstitutions\ninclude\nmutual\nsavings and\nloan groups,\ncredit\norganisations,\nco-operative\nsocieties,\ninsurance\ncompanies,\npost office\nsavings\nbank, pension\nand\nprovident\nfunds,\nschools,\nunions, etc.\n2Others\ninclude\nFederal, State\nand Local\ngovernments,\nDiscount\nHouses and\nother\ncompanies\nTable\nA.4.2.1:\nTreasury\nBills Issues,\nSubscriptions\nand\nAllotments 1\n(N' Million)\nAllotments\nPeriod\nIssues\nTotal\nCentral\nSubscriptions\nBank\n2007\n1304182.74\n3141189.05\n25069.847999\nQ1\n343106.56\n850511.90999999992 0\nQ2\n360929.43\n923260.26\n0\nQ3\n328216.70999999996 502476.68000000005 19586.775999\nQ4\n271930.04000000004 864940.2\n5483.0720000\n2008\n916281.6\n2787775.5300000003 7584.3300000\nQ1\n253217\n594467.48\n6376.7400000\nQ2\n241274.33999999997 977616.13000000012 1200.1399999\nQ3\n165217.01\n432583.72000000003 0\nQ4\n256573.25\n783108.2\n7.45\n2009\n1392430\n2541080\n30\nQ1\n275580\n679000\n30\nQ2\n341580\n560000\n0\nQ3\n322230\n493680\n0\nQ4\n453040\n808400\n0\n2010\n2003950\n4324860\n0\nQ1\n315050\n981890\n0\nQ2\n419410\n857240\n0\nQ3\n598640\n1310570\n0\nQ4\n670850\n1175160\n0\n2011\n3048490\n6512720\n0\nQ1\n706570\n1724200\n0\nQ2\n759910\n1938920\n0\nQ3\n709220\n1373590\n0\nQ4\n872790\n1476010\n0\n2012\n3609654.0719999997 8750485.4989999998 163857.24400\nQ1\n947451.321\n1947967.2\n163857.24400\nQ2\n970821.44799999997 2518619.46\n0\nQ3\n822050.723\n2215153.6179999998 0\nQ4\n869330.58\n2068745.2209999999 0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1\nTable\npresents\nrevised\ntemplate and\ndata.\n2Comprises\nallotments to\nMoney\nMarket\nDealers\n(MMDs),\nMandate/\nInternal\nAccounts\nand Brokers.\nTable A.4.3: Holdings\nof Treasury Bills\nOutstanding (N'\nMillion)\nTotal Outstanding1\nHolders\nPeriod\nCentral Bank\nMerch\nincluding Rediscounts Banks\n1981\n5782\n3404.9\n51.1\n1982\n9782\n5463.7\n171.7\n1983\n13476\n6018.1\n374.5\n1984\n15475.400000000001 4860\n876.5\n1985\n16976\n6184.1\n1027.\n1986\n16976\n11585\n98\n1987\n25226\n14215.3\n260.6\n1988\n35475.999999999993 22560.3\n159.1\n1989\n24126\n11164\n84.6\n1990\n25476\n3403.9\n346.1\n1991\n56728.3\n34756\n673\n1992\n103317.5\n81143\n1004.\n1993\n103326.5\n47386.5\n9393.\n1994\n103326.5\n30184.2\n28286\n1995\n103326.5\n41984.1\n2105.\n1996\n103326.5\n9490.9\n8947.\n1997\n221800.5\n141676.6\n6384.\n1998\n221801.5\n132513.4\n8165.\n1999\n361758.4\n79860.5\n12723\n2000\n465535.8\n87355.5\n12439\n2001\n584535.80000000005 325328.5\n-\n2002\n584535.80000000005 134960.70000000001 -\n2003\n825054.5\n255664.6\n-\n2004\n871577\n60807.4\n-\n2005\n854828\n82679\n-\n2006\n701399.8\n24514.93\n21612\n2007\n574929.42999999993 5940.84\n25655\n2008\n471929.5\n410.2\n26529\n2009\n797482.48\n1900.3\n59339\n2010\n1277100.0000000002 24480\n32730\n2011\nQ1\n1439590\n30660\n17351\nQ2\n1561420\n19420\n83750\nQ3\n1607830\n3420\n36899\nQ4\n1727910\n69300\n20036\n2012\nQ1\n1947185.1\n163893.84\n36462\nQ2\n2084590.38\n111734.64\n47703\nQ3\n2132926.9500000002 62323.98\n30148\nQ4\n2122926.96\n62323.58\n31708\nSource: Central Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: 1Nominal\nvalue\n2Since the Adoption\nof Universal Banking\nPractice in 2001,\nMerchant Banks and\nCommercial Banks\nfigures are aggregated\nunder Commercial\nBanks\n3Includes statutory\nboards, corporations,\nsavings-type\ninstitutions, local\ngovernments,\ncompanies,individuals\nand public accounts\nwith CBN from 1989\n4The figures from\n2007 are that of\nDiscount Houses\nTable A.4.4:\nHoldings of\nTreasury\nCertificates\nOutstanding\n(N'Million)\nTotal Outstanding1\nHolders\nPeriod\nCentral\nCommercial\nBank\nBanks\n1981\n2301.6\n1112.5999999999999 850.4\n1982\n1665.6\n900.3\n625.79999999\n1983\n4914.3999999999996 3560.7\n798.7\n1984\n6413.0999999999995 4304.2\n1429.5\n1985\n8354.0999999999985 3724.4\n2264\n1986\n6654.7\n4518.3\n1360.8\n1987\n6654.0999999999995 3431.6\n2322.1999999\n1988\n6794.6\n3670.4\n2035.7\n1989\n6944.5999999999995 4483.5\n1095.9000000\n1990 3\n34214.6\n31847.1\n1036.5\n1991\n34214.600000000006 32813.300000000003 559.29999999\n1992\n34214.6\n22896.6\n324.60000000\n1993\n36584.299999999996 35307.699999999997 673.7\n1994\n37342.699999999997 22365.9\n614.29999999\n1995\n35687.1\n30079\n280.8\n1996 4\n37342.700000000004 31142.9\n415.6\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNote:\n1Nominal\nValue\n2Includes\nStatutory\nBoards/\nCorporations,\nSavings -\ntype\nInstitutions,\nLocal\nGovernment,\nCompanies\nand\nIndividuals\n3Includes\nnew issues of\nTC of N27.3\nbillion\n4Total\noutstanding\nTreasury\nCertificates\nwere\nconverted\ninto treasury\nbonds with\neffect from\n16th March,\n1996\nTable.4.5:\nHoldings of\nDevelopment\nStocks (N'\nMillion)\nPeriod\nCentral\nCommercial\nMerchant\nBank1\nBanks\nBank2\n1981\n1529.1\n361.9\n1.5\n1982\n1658.6\n328.8\n1.9\n1983\n1768.6\n301.60000000000002 3.3\n1984\n1536.6\n272.10000000000002 1.1000000000\n1985\n1613.4\n395.7\n33\n1986\n1618.3\n545.70000000000005 11.7\n1987\n1550.3\n537.20000000000005 5.0999999999\n1988\n1450.5\n404.9\n13.6\n1989\n1484.9\n39.5\n6.1\n1990\n1497.8\n156.80000000000001 6.7\n1991\n807.9\n33.5\n6.4\n1992\n121.6\n29.5\n3.6\n1993\n1506.2\n159\n-\n1994\n1207.5\n-\n-\n1995\n918.1\n14.7\n-\n1996\n789\n471.1\n0\n1997\n1193.3\n14\n0\n1998\n494.4\n13\n157.80000000\n1999\n671.6\n4\n0\n2000\n251.3\n0\n0\n2001\n251.3\n0\n0\n2002\n6903.4\n2692.7249999999999 0\n2003\n415\n32504.9\n-\n2004\n230\n32758.7\n-\n2005\n158.57\n0\n0\n2006\n102.50700000000001 0\n0\n2007\n143.88900000000001 0\n0\n2008\n129.19999999999999 0\n0\n2009\n24.645\n0\n0\n2010\n0\n0\n0\n2011 3\n0\n0\n0\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Exclude 20\nbillion naira\nTreasury\nBonds issued\nin March,\n1990\n2Merchant\nBanks ceased\nafter the\nadoption of\nuniversal\nbanking\npractice in\n2001.\n3The\ndevelopment\nstocks\noutstanding\nas at\nend-2010\nwere fully\nredeemed at\nend-March\n2011.\nForeign\nholdings of\nDevelopment\nStocks are\nnegligible\nTable A.4.6:\nTransactions\nat the\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNumber of Deals\nYear\nIndustrial\nLoan\nETF Bond Equities Total\nGovt.\n1981\n118\n10081\n-\n10199\n1982\n184\n9830\n-\n10014\n1983\n292\n11633\n-\n11925\n1984\n194\n17250\n-\n17444\n1985\n340\n23231\n-\n23571\n1986\n270\n27448\n-\n27718\n1987\n294\n42\n20189\n20525\n1988\n100\n-\n21460\n21560\n1989\n171\n-\n33273\n33444\n1990\n118\n49\n39103\n39270\n1991\n45\n9\n41716\n41770\n1992\n71\n14\n48944\n49029\n1993\n39\n28\n40331\n40398\n1994\n16\n48\n42010\n42074\n1995\n0\n15\n49549\n49564\n1996\n11\n15\n49489\n49515\n1997\n6\n5\n78078\n78089\n1998\n1\n3\n84931\n84935\n1999\n4\n0\n123505\n123509\n2000\n8\n0\n256515\n256523\n2001\n14\n0\n426149\n426163\n2002\n3\n0\n451847\n451850\n2003\n1\n19\n621697\n621717\n2004\n3\n13\n973510\n973526\n2005\n4.4000000000000004 19.2\n1021943 102196\n2006\n5\n1\n1367948 136795\n2007\n0\n37\n2614983 261502\n2008\n0\n138\n3535493 353563\n2009\n0\n15\n1\n1739349 173936\n2010\n5\n0\n2\n1925471 192547\n2011\n0\n0\n33\n0\n1235434 123546\n2012\n44\n0\n452 2\n1147128 114762\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNotes:\nIndustrial\nloans figure\nfor\n1961-1986\nincludes\nequities\nActive\nTrading\nStarted in\nJune 1961\nExchange\nTrust Fund\n(ETF) is an\ninvestment\ninstrument\nintroduced\nin 2011\nTable\nA.4.7.1:\nAll Share\nIndex on\nthe\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1985\n111.3\n112.2\n113.4\n1986\n134.6\n139.69999999999999 140.80000000000\n1987\n166.9\n166.2\n161.69999999999\n1988\n190.8\n191.4\n195.5\n1989\n239.7251\n251\n256.89999999999\n1990\n343\n349.3\n356\n1991\n528.70000000000005 557\n601\n1992\n794\n810.7\n839.1\n1993\n1113.4000000000001 1119.9000000000001 1130.5\n1994\n1666.3\n1715.3\n1792.8\n1995\n2285.3000000000002 2379.8000000000002 2551.1\n1996\n5135.1000000000004 5180.3999999999996 5266.2\n1997\n7268.3\n7699.3\n8561.4\n1998\n6435.6\n6426.2\n6298.5\n1999\n5494.8\n5376.5\n5456.2\n2000\n5752.9\n5955.7\n5966.2\n2001\n8794.2000000000007 9180.5\n9159.7999999999\n2002\n10650\n10581.9\n11214.4\n2003\n13298.8\n13668.8\n13531.1\n2004\n22712.880000000001 24797.43\n22896.400000000\n2005\n23078.3\n21953.5\n20682.400000000\n2006\n23679.4\n23843\n23336.6\n2007\n36784.5\n40730.699999999997 43456.1\n2008\n54189.919999999998 65652.38\n63016.56\n2009\n21813.759999999998 23377.14\n19851.89\n2010\n22594.9\n22985\n25966.25\n2011\n26830.7\n26016.799999999999 24621.200000000\n2012\n20875.830000000002 20123.509999999998 20652.47\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nNote:\n1All\nShare\nIndex\nstarted in\nJanuary,\n1985\nTable\nA.4.7.2: Total\nAnnual\nMarket\nCapitalization\non The\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange (N'\nBillion)\nYear\nGovernment Stocks/\nSecurities\nDebt/Bonds\nETF Equities\n1981\n3.1\n0\n1.9\n1982\n3\n1\n1\n1983\n3.5\n0\n2.200000\n1984\n2.9\n0.2\n2.4\n1985\n3.5\n0.4\n2.7\n1986\n2.7\n0.4\n3.7\n1987\n4.2\n0\n4\n1988\n4.5\n0.4\n5.099999\n1989\n4.2\n0.6\n8\n1990\n3.4\n0.8\n12.1\n1991\n3.3\n1.4\n18.39999\n1992\n3.2\n1.8\n26.2\n1993\n3.6\n2.1\n41.8\n1994\n3.2\n2.1\n61\n1995\n3.2\n2.1\n175.1\n1996\n3\n3\n279.8\n1997\n2.8\n2.8\n276.3\n1998\n2.7\n3.1\n256.8\n1999\n2.4\n3.1\n294.5\n2000\n2.1\n4.0999999999999996\n466.1\n2001\n8.3000000000000007 5.8\n648.4\n2002\n12.7\n3.5\n748.7\n2003\n25.2\n8.4\n1325.7\n2004\n178.1\n7.9\n1926.5\n2005 1\n365.47\n9.83\n2523.5\n2006 1\n902.99\n3.49\n4227.100\n2007 1\n2976.58\n16.98\n10180.29\n2008 1\n2558.96\n16.41\n6957.45\n2009 1\n2030.26\n8\n4989.390\n2010 1\n1939.27\n56.37\n7913.8\n2011 1\n1800.88\n1357.57\n0.9 6532.6\n2012\n4421.04\n1400.433626857\n1\n8974.450\nNote:\nExchange\nTrust Fund\n(ETF) is an\ninvestment\ninstrument\nintroduced in\n2011\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\n1Revised\nTable\nA.4.7.3:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nMarket\nCapitalization\n- Equities\nOnly (N'\nBillion)\nYear\nJanuary\nFebruary\nMarch\n1985\n4.8164972962893895 4.8554447137796011 4.9073746037\n1986\n5.8248026602026224 6.0455046926471496 6.0931070918\n1987\n7.2225821990179622 7.1922897631922424 6.9975526757\n1988\n8.2568525079246697 8.2828174529181418 8.4602445770\n1989\n10.374081725091676 10.862001988936539 11.117323948\n1990\n14.843293554602523 15.115925477033997 15.405867362\n1991\n22.879444030082666 24.104123935608179 26.008219901\n1992\n34.360277208030325 35.082968177015353 36.311975573\n1993\n48.182282926222882 48.463569830318853 48.922283858\n1994\n72.108979737708992 74.229450245509341 77.583255640\n1995\n98.896147989309469 102.98562682578159 110.39861862\n1996\n222.22098172664553 224.18133507365278 227.89432220\n1997\n314.53501616010936 333.18650164708805 370.49380011\n1998\n278.5\n278.2\n272.60000000\n1999\n247.6\n242.7\n246.3\n2000\n321.3\n332.6\n333.2\n2001\n506.1\n542.79999999999995 541.5\n2002\n629.9\n625.9\n663.3\n2003\n841.2\n864.6\n846.9\n2004\n1534.8574121951101 1740.2\n1635\n2005\n1863.6901898864801 1783.1636898278\n1680\n2006\n2566.4\n2574.1\n2510.8000000\n2007\n4976.2997116833794 5510.1517687488795 6150.0491393\n2008\n10692.738058529301 12503.2\n12125.895279\n2009\n4879.1000000000004 5231.8999999999996 4483.5\n2010\n5441.5876318420305 5535.7471679987502 6280.5987499\n2011\n8744.2000000000007 8315.6\n7866.7\n2012\n6579.1049999999996 6342\n6549.8419999\nSource:\nNigerian\nStock\nExchange\nTable\nA.5.1:\nSavings\nStatistics -\nCumulative\n(N' Million)\nPeriod\nSavings and Time\nDeposit with Comm.\nBank\nNational\nProvident\nFund\nFederal Savings Bank Feder\nBank\n1981\n5796.1\n375.3\n7.1\n56\n1982\n6338.2\n411.5\n4\n69.3\n1983\n8082.9\n472.3\n5\n89.9\n1984\n9391.2999999999993 504.1\n8\n114\n1985\n10550.9\n540.5\n8.1\n104\n1986\n11487.7\n577.4\n8.1\n121.1\n1987\n15088.7\n614\n16.899999999999999 133.6\n1988\n18397.2\n651\n22.4\n195.5\n1989\n17813.3\n699.1\n37.5\n213.2\n1990\n23137.1\n723.5\n-\n304.6\n1991\n30359.7\n650\n-\n433.7\n1992\n43438.8\n719.8\n-\n729.4\n1993\n60895.9\n766.8\n-\n819.5\n1994\n76127.8\n757.9\n-\n816.7\n1995\n93327.8\n731.4\n-\n435.7\n1996\n115352.3\n-\n-\n-\n1997\n154055.70000000001 -\n-\n-\n1998\n161931.9\n1365.3\n-\n436.3\n1999\n241604.7\n1365.3\n-\n-\n2000\n343174.1\n1365.3\n-\n-\n2001\n451963.1\n1365.3\n-\n22300\n2002\n556011.69999999995 1365.3\n0\n22300\n2003\n655739.69999999995 -\n-\n-\n2004\n797517.2\n-\n-\n-\n2005\n1316957.3999999999 -\n-\n-\n2006\n1739636.9\n-\n-\n-\n2007\n2693554.3\n-\n-\n-\n2008\n4118172.8\n-\n-\n-\n2009\n5763511.2153961603 -\n-\n-\n2010\n5954260.4522725996 -\n-\n-\n2011\n6531913.0086532207 -\n-\n-\n2012\n8062104.8126581004 -\n-\n-\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1Consists\nPeoples\nBank,\nCommunity\nBanks and\nNon\nInterest\nBanks\nTable A.6.1:\nIncome and\nExpenditure\nof Insurance\nCompanies\nin Nigeria (N'\nThousand)\nI n c o m e\nWholly\nJoint\nForeign1 All\nYear\nNigerian\nCom\n1981\n151187\n89479\n0\n2406\n1982\n159560\n99950\n0\n2595\n1983\n171959\n56674\n0\n2286\n1984\n140593\n97002\n0\n2375\n1985\n118622\n86464\n0\n2050\n1986\n148792\n114900\n0\n2636\n1987\n259669\n160289\n0\n4199\n1988\n300351\n206324\n0\n5066\n1989\n507450\n194314\n0\n7017\n1990\n657155\n391288\n0\n1048\n1991\n842364\n491873\n0\n1334\n1992\n1501231\n1016670\n0\n2517\n1993\n5087311\n813946\n0\n5901\n1994\n13649482\n1022193\n0\n1467\n1995\n13520921\n1066728\n0\n1458\n1996\n11202468\n1948095\n0\n1315\n1997\n13405788\n3113230\n0\n1651\n1998\n14756790\n3089681\n0\n1784\n1999 2\n8996087.5283242259 1883542.4716757727 0\n1087\n2000\n11615534.671297198 2431985.3287028004 0\n1404\n2001\n15248142.747829529 3192557.252170471\n0\n1844\n2002\n18131387.630630165 3796232.3693698323 0\n2192\n2003\n30435320.046148058 6372349.953851941\n0\n3680\n2004\n34258357.296997257 7172792.7030027388 0\n4143\n2005\n41631695.546604142 8716574.4533958565 0\n5034\n2006\n42880646.399999999 8978071.6869977321 0\n5185\n2007 3\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n1053\n2008 3\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n1572\n2009 3\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n1899\n2010 3\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n2003\n2011 3\nN/A\nN/A\nN/A\n2337\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\n1Wholly\nForeign\nowned\ninsurance\ncompanies\nceased to\nexist in\nNigeria since\nthe\npromulgation\nof the\nNigerian\nEnterprises\nPromotion\nDecree of\n1977\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof income\nand\nexpendicture\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReport\n3Revised\n(NAICOM\nAnnual\nReport,\n2011)\nTable A.6.2:\nSources of\nIncome of\nInsurance\nCompanies\nin Nigeria -\nAll\nCompanies1\n(N'\nThousand)\nGENERAL\n(NON\nLIFE)\nSub Total\nMotor\nEm\nPremiums\nFire\nAccident\nVehicle\nLia\nYear\n(A)\n1981\n234050\n22109\n27907\n116418\n995\n1982\n248765\n27507\n28430\n121401\n110\n1983\n191801\n26359\n24933\n115737\n665\n1984\n205694\n28337\n28720\n94185\n610\n1985\n195290\n35649\n29420\n99256\n611\n1986\n254158\n41636\n30174\n104722\n580\n1987\n406500\n75087\n47808\n126795\n663\n1988\n486648\n82712\n58385\n151539\n108\n1989\n673089\n154922\n111303\n161895\n131\n1990\n1013674\n194435\n124173\n343864\n116\n1991\n1296243\n233418\n176271\n501760\n381\n1992\n2445691\n839248\n249778\n906282\n241\n1993\n4931918\n543496\n605498\n1907969\n956\n1994\n14519149\n535494\n602822\n2284879\n621\n1995\n13525125\n781963\n763100\n2346806\n994\n1996\n11091331\n1822198\n1832617\n3384708\n160\n1997\n10941579\n2068116\n1286315\n3771245\n565\n1998\n11688251\n2385065\n1717812\n3616410\n514\n1999 2\n14597280\n2920500\n2351910\n6293130\n244\n2000\n22531460\n3449780\n2872570\n7403980\n260\n2001\n28981290\n3807940\n3888020\n10101830 384\n2002\n37765890\n4908300\n4918670\n11715490 402\n2003\n43441810\n5940650\n5812680\n12871620 512\n2004\n50100830\n6965130\n8370930\n15482440 682\n2005\n67465560\n12252550 11050140\n16322630 758\n2006\n81583750\n11970620 15239750\n20734980 912\n2007 3\n89104890\n11458440 16566740.000000002 25771390 992\n2008 3\n126470300 17454900 23208400\n38701200 100\n2009 3\n153127120 19534950 25918890\n43784170 895\n2010 3\n157336810 24249950 27816160\n43925650 143\n2011 3\n175756750 24990020 30706670\n45421770 100\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\nAll\nCompanies\ncomprises\nNigerian,\nForeign and\nJointly\nowned\ncompanies\n1Wholly\nForeign\nowned\ninsurance\ncompanies\nceased to\nexist in\nNigeria since\nthe\npromulgation\nof the\nNigerian\nEnterprises\nPromotion\nDecree of\n1977\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof income\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReport.\n3Revised\n(NAICOM\nAnnual\nReport,\n2011)\nTable A.6.3:\nBreakdown\nof Total\nExpenditure\nof Insurance\nBusiness -\nAll\nCompanies1\n(N'\nThousand)\nGENERAL\n(NON-\nLIFE)\nClaims\nFire\nAccident\nMotor\nEmpl\nYear\n(A)\nVehicle\nLiabi\n1981\n74208\n6271\n3655\n46951\n1320\n1982\n79173\n6780\n5482\n44651\n1480\n1983\n78580\n6034\n5586\n55641\n1151\n1984\n77704\n5334\n6276\n53710\n1157\n1985\n63999\n-14.0\n6408\n54152\n863\n1986\n86390\n6876\n5884\n54220\n832\n1987\n109430\n16421\n8374\n55637\n8005\n1988\n151143\n16527\n11242\n67825\n831\n1989\n278928\n46954\n28823\n73112\n1974\n1990\n306512\n61513\n30795\n114486\n2284\n1991\n386872\n80415\n42783\n164835\n5612\n1992\n613887\n114795\n66768\n267441\n8304\n1993\n2684105\n1161034\n448731\n607331\n1282\n1994\n1315294\n267396\n193828\n605163\n2203\n1995\n1508882\n194532\n207139\n563644\n9572\n1996\n1654069\n342701\n276877\n712329\n5454\n1997\n1677282\n349106\n376620\n780888\n4196\n1998\n1956214\n388133\n396745\n832866\n3976\n1999 2\n5923180\n890970\n1649040\n1824670\n9379\n2000\n5629520\n1107650\n806330\n1804240\n1123\n2001\n6110520\n1164660\n957820\n2315940\n1324\n2002\n6856145\n1857870\n109284.99999999999 2818650\n1108\n2003\n9415200\n1681740\n2266790\n3040170\n1267\n2004\n12084040 2724430\n2852920\n3476240\n1894\n2005\n12402400 2766710\n3138160\n3733390\n1535\n2006\n76276110 6662980\n15239750\n20734980 9127\n2007\n15843730 1793390\n3829060\n6196120\n2075\n2008\n25864870 6076600\n4467500\n9935500\n3192\n2009 3\n49498930 15124740 6567450\n13040290 3373\n2010 3\n37589560 7794060\n6444450\n13219030 2810\n2011 3\n39389160 8520450\n6820640\n13205620 2710\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey and\nNational\nInsurance\nCommission\n(NAICOM)\nAnnual\nReports\nNotes: CBN\nhad not\nconducted\nInsurance\nAnnual\nSurvey since\n1999\n11970 -\n1998 data\nwere\nsourced\nfrom Central\nBank of\nNigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey\n2From 1999,\nthe\nbreakdown\nof\nexpendicture\nwere\nextracted\nfrom\nNAICOM\nAnnual\nReports\n3Revised\n(NAICOM\nAnnual\nReport,\n2011)\nTable\nA.6.4:\nBreakdown\nof Total\nAssets of\nInsurance\nCompanies\n(N'\nMillion)\nYear\nGeneral Business\nLife\nTotal\n1996\n21332.84\n7602.09\n28934.93\n1997\n29312.5\n8615.68\n37928.18\n1998\n30847.77\n10603.45\n41451.22\n1999\n34616.78\n15514.87\n50131.65\n2000\n41495.519999999997 20104.48\n61600\n2001\n51674.03\n26386.45\n78060.47999999\n2002\n51933.72\n33322.01\n85255.73000000\n2003\n74386.41\n49880.959999999999 124267.37\n2004\n77730.14\n63491.89\n141222.03\n2005\n130402.53\n72710.59\n203113.12\n2006\n219086.67\n88455.94\n307542.61\n2007\n302262.83\n125234.33\n427497.1600000\n2008 1\n386016.4\n187138.06\n573154.46\n2009 1\n388350.69\n198108.85\n586459.54\n2010 1\n391741.6\n193274.19\n585015.79\n2011\n407432.22\n213662.92\n621095.14\nSource:\nNAICOM\nReports\nNote:\n1Revised\n(NAICOM\nAnnual\nReport,\n2011)\nTable A.6.5:\nTotal\nInsurance\nBusiness\nInvestments\n(N' Million)\nYear\nGovernment\nSecurities\nStocks & Bonds\nReal Estate &\nMortgage\n1996\n1546.16\n4047.81\n2523.19999999\n1997\n2012.01\n4095.38\n2683.5\n1998\n4145.88\n3633.17\n211.95\n1999\n2987.21\n4174.04\n332.65\n2000\n3558.95\n4992.87\n282.339999999\n2001 1\n3842.71\n6786.26\n359.33\n2002\n3752.08\n8350.85\n960.31\n2003 1\n4489.21\n11490.31\n14272.79\n2004 1\n4169.09\n20071.86\n21832.18\n2005\n4178.0600000000004 61800.82\n33788.15\n2006\n4858.1000000000004 121813.13\n45186.77\n2007 1\n20914.810000000001 222278.92\n45331.91\n2008 2\n21374.935820000002 227169.05624000001 46329.2120200\n2009 2\n21845.184408040004 232166.77547728\n47348.4546844\n2010 2\n22325.778465016883 237274.44453778016 48390.1206874\n2011 2\n22816.945591247255 242494.48231761134 49454.7033426\nSource:\nNAICOM\nReports\nNote:\n1Revised\n(NAICOM\nAnnual\nReport,\n2011)\n2Provisional\nTable\nA.7.1:\nSelected\nFinancial\nDeepening\nIndicators\nYear\nMoney Supply2 (M2)\n(N' Million)\nCredit to Private\nSector2 (N' Million)\nGDP at Current B\nPrices (N' Million\n1981\n14471.166666666666 8570.0500000000011 94325.02188909\n1982\n15786.741666666669 10668.341666666667 101011.2258063\n1983\n17687.924999999999 11668.041666666666 110064.0325368\n1984\n20105.941666666666 12462.933333333334 116272.1831873\n1985\n22299.241666666665 13070.341666666667 134585.5946864\n1986\n23806.399999999998 15247.450000000003 134603.3212250\n1987\n27573.583333333332 21082.991666666665 193126.2035533\n1988\n38356.799999999996 27326.416666666668 263294.4591011\n1989\n45902.883333333331 30403.216666666671 382261.4860783\n1990\n52857.024999999994 33547.700000000004 472648.7450671\n1991\n75401.175000000003 41352.458333333336 545672.4112709\n1992\n111112.31431586668 58122.946707604184 875342.5183171\n1993\n165338.74903876081 127117.71006025917 1089679.716564\n1994\n230292.59533829082 143424.20840868165 1399703.220237\n1995\n289091.06826094998 180004.75994529083 2907358.180301\n1996\n345853.96302209416 238596.56383301585 4032300.338297\n1997\n413280.12874556083 316207.08122229832 4189249.771037\n1998\n488145.78616809909 351956.19148720079 3989450.282097\n1999\n628952.16046613676 431168.35551063489 4679212.050583\n2000\n878457.27378138236 530373.30355560745 6713574.835460\n2001\n1269321.6122086474 764961.51875191682 6895198.326750\n2002\n1505963.5\n930493.92499999993 7795758.354547\n2003\n1952921.1944166666 1096535.5649999999 9913518.186719\n2004\n2131818.9816774447 1421664.0323878631 11411066.90590\n2005\n2637912.7306666668 1838389.9259166664 14610881.44790\n2006\n3797908.9755059485 2290617.7580883321 18564594.73\n2007\n5127400.702273746\n3668657.823863212\n20657317.66668\n2008\n8008203.9499551719 6920498.7505434304 24296329.28636\n2009\n9411112.2489084415 9102049.1088738423 24794238.65635\n2010\n11034940.929925786 10157021.17683167\n33984754.12956\n2011 1\n12172490.283057844 10660071.836505456 37409860.61058\n2012\n13895389.12757512\n14649276.457122438 40544099.93881\nSources:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nand\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNotes:\n1Revised\n2Figures\nare\nannual\naverages", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2012 Statistical Bulletin Financial Statistics.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/1503e7ff85d7e680169b0559f2a5b440.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "1503e7ff85d7e680169b0559f2a5b440", "text": "1 \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 85 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, September 17 and 18, \n2012 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on September 17 and \n18, 2012, with 10 out of the 12 members in attendance. The \nCommittee reviewed the conditions and challenges that confronted \nthe domestic economy during the first eight months of 2012 against \nthe \nbackdrop \nof \ninternational \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \ndevelopments with a view to reassessing monetary policy options in \nthe short-to- medium term. \nThe International Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted that the global economy showed signs of \nfurther weakness in the last three months, with the latest data not \nshowing any evidence of improvement up to the beginning of the \nthird quarter of 2012. The Committee also observed that the weak \n2 \n \ngrowth resulted from considerable financial market fragilities in the \neuro area with resultant negative spillover effects to other regions, \nuncertainty resulting from the Eurozone crisis as well as poor \nmacroeconomic performance in other advanced economies. \nRising food and energy prices is also a contributory factor. \nIn July 2012 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) update projected \nthat global output would moderate to 3.5 per cent in 2012, which is \n0.1 percentage point lower than the forecast of April 2012. Growth in \nadvanced economies was projected to decline from 1.6 per cent in \n2011 to 1.4 per cent in 2012, with the slowdown being most severe in \nthe peripheral economies, where the dampening effects and \nuncertainty from tighter financial conditions are strongest. \nIn the US, real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 1.5 per cent in Q2 \nof 2012, down by 0.5 percentage point from 2.0 per cent in Q1. The \nsluggish \ngrowth \nwas \nprimarily \ndue \nto \ndeclining \naggregate \nconsumption, government spending, and negative terms of trade. \n The euro zone is on the brink of a double-dip recession following the \ncontraction in output between April and June. Real output across \n3 \n \nthe 17-nation bloc fell by 0.2 per cent in Q2 of 2012 while signs of \nfurther contraction are in the horizon. Rising unemployment and \nlarge scale fiscal retrenchment coupled with increased taxes in a \nnumber of countries constrained aggregate demand leading to cut-\nback on investment and low export growth. Unemployment level \nacross the zone has attained a record high of 11.3 per cent, the \nhighest since 1995, with Spain recording the highest level and Austria \nthe least. Weak financial markets and the persisting sovereign debt \ncrisis as well as rising energy prices led the European Central Bank \n(ECB) to retain its main refinancing interest rate at 0.75 per cent. EU \nmembers remain cautious about the ECB’s Outright Monetary \nTransactions scheme, which is based on strict adherence to austerity \nmeasures and fiscal consolidation pact. \nIn Asia, most economies recorded significant slowdown in economic \nactivity up to Q2 of 2012, mainly on account of weakening exports \nand investment. Export growth has moderated, reflecting the \nsluggish demand from Europe while investment remained weak due \nto heightened volatility of capital flows and the lagged effects of \n4 \n \ntighter domestic monetary policies. China’s real GDP growth slowed \nto 7.6 per cent in Q2 from 8.1 per cent in Q1 due mainly to decline in \nnet exports. Growth moderated in Japan especially in Q3 due to \nsoftening in manufacturing activity. India’s real GDP, year-on-year, \nmoderated to 5.5 per cent in Q2 of 2012 from 6.1 per cent in Q4 of \n2011, mainly as a result of deceleration in private consumption. \nOverall, the growth trajectory for the remainder of the year tends \ntoward a downturn, as downside risks, including weak external \ndemand, elevated price levels, widening twin deficits, falling \ninvestments, and rising interest rates, remain heightened. \nRobust economic activities in the MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa \nregions would partly offset the declining output growth in the \nadvanced and emerging markets in 2012. Real GDP growth was \nprojected at 5.0 per cent in each of the regions, underpinned by \nstrong natural resources prices, new natural resources exploration \nand production in several countries, recovery from drought in the \nSahel and parts of Eastern Africa, strong post-conflict recovery in \nsome countries, improved governance practices and growing \n5 \n \ndisposable income. Despite these developments, growth in the \nregions faces significant downside risks on the back of increased \nglobal uncertainties. \nThe Committee believes that the recent quantitative easing \nmeasures by the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve \nSystem could be responsible for the high crude oil prices in the \ninternational market. It highlighted the possible increase in carry \ntrade and the risk of a bubble in the domestic capital market. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nRecent macroeconomic data indicates that the economy is \nperforming better than forecasts although growth in the first two \nquarters of 2012 has remained consistently below the corresponding \ngrowth rates in 2011. The provisional real GDP growth rate from the \nNational Bureau of Statistics stood at 6.28 per cent in Q2 of 2012, up \nfrom 6.17 per cent in Q1 2012 but lower than the 7.61 per cent \nrecorded in the corresponding period of 2011. The non-oil sector \n6 \n \nremained the major driver of growth recording a 7.50 per cent \nincrease in contrast to the oil sector, which contracted by 0.73 per \ncent during the period. Overall GDP growth for fiscal 2012 has been \nrevised upwards to 6.77 per cent from the earlier projection of 6.50 \nper cent. The Committee welcomed the promising growth \nperformance although it expressed concern that the overall output \ngrowth projection for 2012 is still lower than the 7.45 per cent \nrecorded in 2011. \nThe growth drivers within the non-oil sector remained agriculture; \nwholesale and retail trade; and services; which contributed 1.94, \n1.69, and 3.16 per cent, respectively. The Committee noted that the \nrelatively robust growth projections despite the slowing global \neconomy \nreflected \nthe \ncontinuing \nfavorable \nconditions \nfor \nincreased agricultural production, improved security situation and \npower supply. \nPrices \nThe Committee observed that the inflationary pressures experienced \nduring the first half of 2012 appear to be moderating in the third \n7 \n \nquarter. The year-on-year headline inflation declined to 11.7 per \ncent in August 2012 from 12.8 per cent in July while core inflation \ndecelerated to 14.7 from 15.0 per cent during the same period. Also, \nfood inflation declined sharply to 9.9 per cent in August 2012 from \n12.1 per cent in July. The significant decline in year-on-year food \ninflation was attributed to the decrease prices of both processed \nfoods (from 4.2 to 3.6 per cent) and farm produce (from 7.9 to 6.4 \nper cent). The Committee observed that the inflationary pressures \nfrom the partial removal of petroleum subsidy in January, 2012 \nappear to have waned in Q3, 2012, and that given the relatively \nstable exchange rate regime, the pass-through to domestic prices \nwas low during the period. The Committee, however, recognized the \nupside risk to inflation in the near-term to include increased spending \nin the fourth quarter and monetized capital flows following the US \nQE3. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets’ Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 3.50 per cent in August 2012 over \nthe level at end-December, 2011, which annualized to 5.25 per cent. \n8 \n \nThe annualized growth rate is significantly lower than the growth rate \nof 15.43 per cent recorded in 2011. Aggregate domestic credit (net) \ndeclined by 3.82 per cent in August 2012, annualized to a decline of \n5.73 per cent from the level at end-December 2011 level. The \ndecline in aggregate domestic credit (net) in August 2012 was due \nto a huge fall in credit to Government (net), which declined by \n246.47 per cent or 369.71 per cent on annualized basis. This \ndevelopment reflected the combined effects of the significant \ngrowth in Federal Government deposits with the banking system and \ncontraction on claims to government. The introduction of a Treasury \nSingle Account (TSA) appeared to have had the desired effect of \nreducing government borrowing. \nInterest rates in all segments of the money markets rose initially, in \nresponse to the increase in the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) by \n400 basis points at the MPC meeting of July 21 and 22, 2012. The \nrates, however, trended downwards toward the end of the review \nperiod. The inter-bank call and OBB rates, which opened at 17.85 \nand 14.99 per cent, closed at 14.19 and 13.56 per cent, respectively, \n9 \n \nduring the review period. Developments in the interest rate structure \nindicated that the retail lending rates remained high in August 2012. \nThe average maximum lending rate increased marginally to 23.76 \nper cent in August 2012 from 23.45 per cent in July. However, the \naverage interest bearing deposit rate declined to 6.24 per cent in \nAugust 2012 from 6.64 per cent in July. Thus, the spread between the \naverage maximum lending rate and the average interest-bearing \ndeposit rate widened to 17.53 per cent in August 2012 from 16.81 per \ncent in July. The Committee expressed concerns that lending rates \nhave remained high and enjoined the Bank to sustain its efforts \ntowards the reduction in interest rate spread, while stabilizing \ninterbank rates to sustain liquidity and facilitate intermediation in the \nbanking system. The Committee noted that this can only be \nachieved by sustaining the current efforts at reducing overheads in \nthe banking industry and deepening capital market reforms to \ndiversify sources of finance for the real economy, and complement \nbank loans. \n10 \n \nThe Committee observed that the recovery in the Nigerian capital \nmarket continued during the review period, as equities market \nindicators were positive. The All-Share Index (ASI) increased by 9.96 \nper cent between June 29, 2012 and August 31, 2012, while Market \nCapitalization (MC) increased by 9.64 per cent during the same \nperiod. Equity Market Median PE ratios at 9.86 in August 2012, fell \nbelow the long-run median of 10.77 by 0.91 or 8.44 per cent, \nsuggesting bargain valuations and an imminent rebound. The \nCommittee observed that the performance of the NSE during the \nperiod was consistent with the global trends, especially in the wake \nof monetary expansion. \nExternal Sector Developments \nAt the Wholesale Dutch Auction System (WDAS), the exchange rate \nduring the period, July 25 – August 31, 2012, opened at N157.40/US$ \nand closed at N157.36/US$, representing an appreciation of N0.04k. \nThe appreciation was due to the combined effects of the increase in \nCash Reserve Requirement, reduction in the Net open position and \nthe policy barring DMBs/Discount Houses from accessing Lending \n11 \n \nwindows (SLF and Repo) and WDAS simultaneously. At the interbank \nsegment, the selling rate opened at N160.05/US$ and closed at \nN158.15/US$, representing an appreciation of N1.90 or 0.01 per cent. \nThe appreciation experienced in this segment was due to increased \nsupply of foreign exchange by oil companies to the interbank \nmarket. At the BDC segment of the foreign exchange market, the \nselling rate opened at N163.00/US$ and closed at N161.00/US$, \nrepresenting an appreciation of N2.00k or 0.01 per cent for the \nperiod. The appreciation recorded in this segment was traced to the \nlow demand of foreign exchange by end users vis-à-vis the high \nsupply of foreign exchange at the interbank market and the \napparent taming of speculative activities. \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction that the premia between the \nrates at the WDAS and the interbank; and between the wDAS and \nthe BDCs; narrowed towards the end of the review period, and \ntherefore encouraged the Bank to sustain and complement existing \nmeasures to discourage speculative demand in the market. In \n12 \n \ngeneral, the Committee noted that the decisions taken at the last \nmeeting of the MPC had produced the desired result. \nIn the same vein, the Committee expressed satisfaction with the \nsignificant accretion to external reserves during the period. Gross \nexternal reserves as at September 5, 2012 stood at US$ 41.81 billion, \nrepresenting an increase of US$ 6.40 billion or 18.07 per cent above \nthe level of US$35.41 billion at end-June 2012. External reserves \nincreased by US$ 8.88 billion or 27.0 per cent on a year-on-year basis \ncompared with US$ 32.93 billion at end- August 2011. The increase in \nthe reserve level was driven mainly by proceeds from crude oil and \ngas sales and crude oil related taxes. The foreign reserves level could \nfinance over seven months of imports. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nGiven developments in the global and domestic economy and the \nfinancial markets, the Committee noted that the weak global \ngrowth indices called for cautious optimism by policymakers. The \nresolution of the euro area debt crises remains a major concern \neven with the approval of the efforts of the European Central Bank \n13 \n \nto address the debt crises in the euro area by the German \nConstitutional Court. It further noted that its decisions at the July \nMPC Meeting appeared to have had some positive impact in a \nnumber of areas, namely: a deceleration in year-on-year inflation in \nAugust 2012, stability of short term interest rates around the Monetary \nPolicy Rate (MPR), buildup in external reserves and stability in the \nexchange rate. However, core inflation is still high at 14.7 per cent in \nAugust. The threat of increased inflow of hot money arising from the \nactions of the US Fed to further stimulate the economy through its \nQE3 activities and its capital reversal implications were noted. \nThe Committee noted the rise in oil prices but cautioned against a \nhasty deployment of the windfall to immediate consumption as the \ntrend could be reversed. Monetary policy could not, therefore, \nunder the circumstance, react to what may be purely temporary \ndevelopments. \nDespite the threats from a combination of global and domestic \nfactors, the Committee noted that the level of economic growth in \nthe third quarter of 2012 remained robust and the year-end forecast \n14 \n \nwould likely be met owing largely to the improvements in power \nsupply and the steady progress of reforms, actions in respect of the \nalleged fraud in the petroleum subsidy regime and improved fiscal \noperations. The Committee noted that these measures, generally \ntake time to impact the real economy. \nWith this development, the Committee observed that the inflation \noutcome for the remaining period of the year is likely to be lower \nthan the initial forecast of 14.7 per cent. The Committee would \ncontinue to monitor developments in the price level, and remain firm \nin its commitment to price stability as its mandate. The Committee \nalso noted that the growth rate of real output, though impressive by \nglobal trends, was on the downward trend since Q1 2010 most \nespecially in the agricultural sector. It was of concern to the \nCommittee that the declining output in the agricultural sector was \ntraceable to the security challenges and high intensity of rainfall \nwhich has led to flooding in several parts of the country. It noted that \nthe measures taken at the last MPC meeting have succeeded in \n15 \n \nstabilizing the foreign exchange market as well as enhancing the \nbuild up in external reserves. \nOverall, the MPC believes that the current rise in crude oil prices and \nthe tight monetary policy regime presented an opportunity for \nbuilding reserve buffers in the light of the uncertainties surrounding \nthe global economy. \nThe Committee, therefore, identified the key policy challenges to \ninclude: \n1. Protecting the domestic economy and building external \nreserves buffer; \n2. Potential large inflow of “hot money” resulting from further \nmonetary easing in the US and Europe and improved yield on \nfixed income instruments; \n3. Persisting high core inflation rates; \nThe Committee noted that this moderation in headline inflation has \nnot been accompanied by a significant decline in core inflation. \nGiven the unpredictability of food prices, there is a need to watch \n16 \n \nthis trend as we approach year-end before altering the present \nmonetary stance. \nDecisions: \nIn view of the foregoing, the Committee by a unanimous vote \ndecided as follows: \n1. Retain the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 12 per cent with +/-\n200 basis points corridor; \n2. Retain the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 12.0 per cent. \n3. Retain the Net Open Position at 1.0 per cent. \nThank you. \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n18th September, 2012", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique 85 doc September 18 2012.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/16c91ee0a60da42e773849644ca4c0ff.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "16c91ee0a60da42e773849644ca4c0ff", "text": "1 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 141 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 21ST \nMARCH 2022 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on 21st March, 2022, in \nan environment of heightened geopolitical tensions and persisting \nmacroeconomic uncertainties, associated with the recent Russia-\nUkraine crisis and headwinds stemming from the lingering impact of \nthe COVID-19 pandemic. The Committee reviewed developments \nin the global and domestic environments in the first quarter of 2022 \nand the outlook for the rest of the year. These include the likelihood \nof tightening external financial conditions associated with monetary \npolicy normalization in the Advanced Economies, the cocktail of \nsanctions imposed on Russia, global supply chain disruption \nassociated \nwith \nthe \ninvasion \nof \nUkraine, \nand \nincreasing \nvulnerabilities associated with the burgeoning global private and \npublic debt portfolio and risks to financial stability. Others include \nincreased uncertainties across major financial markets and the \nincreased risk of continuing rise in prices confronting central banks \ndue to the huge monetary and fiscal stimuli injected into the global \neconomy to subdue the downside risks to growth. \nTen (10) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \n \n2 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted with concern, the recent heightening of \nuncertainties confronting the recovery of the global economy as \nthe Russia-Ukraine conflict and numerous sanctions against Russia, \nintroduced a new dimension of risk to the tepid recovery of the \nglobal economy. It further took into cognizance, the lingering \nheadwinds associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and global \nsupply chain constraints; rising inflationary pressure; and more \nrecently, the progression of an interest rate hike by the US Federal \nReserve Bank and Bank of England (BOE). Members noted that the \nongoing war and the resultant sanctions against Russia will continue \nto have a considerable impact on the global supply chain as both \ncountries are major players in the global commodities market. With \nboth countries significantly interconnected to the global financial \nmarkets, global capital flows are expected to experience some \ndownturn, exacerbated by the increasing sanctions on Russia. \nConsequently, the earlier projections by the International Monetary \nFund (IMF) for global output growth in 2022 and 2023 of 4.4 and 3.8 \nper cent, respectively, are likely to be revised downwards due to the \noverarching downside risks identified on the horizon. \nPrice development across major Advanced Economies continued \nto trend upwards and is expected to be accentuated in the short to \nmedium term, reflecting the persisting supply bottlenecks, rising food \nand energy prices, and the ongoing war which heightened the \nobserved trend. In the Emerging Market and Developing Economies \n(EMDEs), inflation remained high, with some economies recording \n \n3 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \ninflation rates well above the average in the Advanced Economies. \nThis was mostly due to a mix of downside risks from the COVID-19 \npandemic, capital flow reversals, legacy structural challenges, \nsupply-side bottlenecks, and exchange rate market pressures. \nIn the global financial markets, investors maintained a substantial \nportion of their portfolios in gold and other precious metals, as the \nuncertainty around market securities persists alongside the \nPandemic and the emergence of new risks following the imposition \nof sanctions on Russia. It is still unclear at the moment how the \nprogression with monetary policy normalization by some key \nAdvanced Economies will impact the recovery of the global \neconomy, given the risks associated with this Crisis. Investors are \nhowever adopting a cautious approach in view of the impact of \nthese developments on activities in the global markets. Global \nfinancial conditions are thus, expected to tighten in the short-term \nas the investment horizon gradually becomes clearer. This is \nexpected to impact capital flows to emerging market economies \nas risk-averse portfolio investors adopt a wait-and-see approach. \nConsequently, the risks to the overall recovery of the global \neconomy remain heightened and call for cautious policy \nmaneuvering to avoid a sharp downturn such as experienced in \n2020. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 3.98 per cent (year-on-year) in the \nfourth quarter of 2021, compared with 4.03 per cent in the third \n \n4 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nquarter of 2021 and 0.11 per cent in the corresponding period of \n2020. On a quarter-on-quarter basis, GDP grew by 9.63 per cent in \nthe fourth quarter of 2021 compared with 11.07 per cent in the \npreceding quarter. This indicates the fifth consecutive quarter of real \noutput expansion, following the exit from recession in 2020. The \npositive performance was driven largely by the growth in the non-oil \nsector to 12.36 per cent in Q4 2021 from 10.99 per cent in Q3 2021. \nQuarrying, transportation & storage; education; financial & \ninsurance services; information & communication; as well as a \nsteady rebound in manufacturing and mining activities were key to \nthe growth of the non-oil sector. \nThe Committee, however, noted that although the Manufacturing \nPurchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), remained above the 50-index \npoints benchmark in February 2022, it moderated slightly to 50.1 \nindex points from 51.4 index points in January 2022. This sustained \npositive performance in the manufacturing PMI reflects the \nresilience of the economy in light of persisting headwinds to the \nrecovery. The Non-Manufacturing PMI, however, remained below \nthe 50 index points in February 2022 at 49.0 index points, with a slight \nmoderation compared with 49.01 points in January 2022 as legacy \nheadwinds such as the persisting insecurity and infrastructural \nconstraints continued to impact production and the ease of doing \nbusiness in Nigeria. \nThe Committee observed with concern, the marginal increase in \nheadline inflation (year-on-year) to 15.70 per cent in February 2022 \nfrom 15.60 per cent in January 2022, a 0.10 percentage point uptick. \n \n5 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nThis increase was largely attributed to a rise in the core component \nto 14.01 per cent in February 2022 from 13.87 per cent in January \n2022, while food prices moderated marginally. The rise in core \ninflation was mostly due to rising energy prices as a result of the \ncurrent scarcity of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), rise in the cost of \nAutomotive Gas Oil (AGO), and hike in electricity tariff. The \nCommittee, however, expressed cautious optimism, that with \nsustained interventions by the Bank in various sectors of the \neconomy and broad fiscal support to tame these legacy structural \nconstraints, price development will moderate as output growth \nimproves. The MPC, therefore, urged the fiscal authorities to seek \ninnovative ways of addressing the current critical supply-side \nchallenges confronting the economy, to enable the unhindered \ntransmission of all the recently deployed fiscal and monetary \nstimulus to the real economy. \nMembers noted that the growth rate of broad money supply (M3) \nincreased to 2.12 per cent in February 2022, compared with 1. 74 \nper cent in January 2022. This was largely attributed to an increase \nin the growth rate of Net Domestic Assets (NDA) to 5.78 per cent in \nFebruary 2022 from 2.62 per cent in the previous month. \n \nOn the developments in the money market, the Committee \nobserved the movement in money market rates around the \nasymmetric corridor, reflecting the prevailing liquidity conditions in \nthe banking system. Accordingly, the monthly weighted average \nOpen Buyback (OBB) and Inter-bank Call rates decreased to 5.81 \n \n6 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nand 9.30 per cent in February 2022 from 6.00 and 16.00 per cent in \nJanuary 2022, respectively. The decrease in the rates reflected the \nliquidity conditions in the banking system. \nThe MPC noted the sustained improvements in the equities market in \nthe review period. The All-Share Index (ASI) and Market \nCapitalization (MC) both increased significantly from 42,716.44 and \nN22.30 trillion on December 31, 2021, to 47,282.67 and N25.48 trillion \non March 18, 2022, respectively. This prevailing positive performance \nwas \nattributed \nto \ngradually \nimproving \nmacroeconomic \nfundamentals which support improved outcomes and returns on \ninvestments from companies quoted on the Nigerian Exchange \nLimited. \n \nThe MPC also noted the continued resilience of the banking system, \nevidenced by the further moderation of the ratio of Non-Performing \nLoans (NPLs) to 4.84 per cent in February 2022 from 4.90 per cent in \nDecember 2021. The Committee also noted that Liquidity Ratio (LR) \nremained above its prudential limit at 43.5 per cent in February 2022, \nwhile the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), moderated slightly to 14.4 \nper cent in February 2022 from 14.5 per cent in December 2021. \nOverall, Members expressed confidence in the Bank’s regulatory \nregime and commitment to maintaining stability in the banking \nsystem, urging the Management to sustain its tight regulatory \nsurveillance. \nOn the external reserves position, the Committee noted the \ndecrease in the level of gross external reserves to US$39.44 billion as \n \n7 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nof March 17, 2022, from US$40.21 billion on January 25, 2022, \nindicating a decrease of 1.95 per cent during the review period. The \nmoderate accretion to reserves reflects the duality of Nigeria’s \nposition as an oil exporter and importer of refined petroleum \nproducts. \n \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s various \ninterventions to stimulate productivity in manufacturing, industry, \nagriculture, energy, infrastructure, healthcare, and micro, small and \nmedium enterprises (MSMEs). Between January and February 2022, \nthe Bank disbursed N29.67 billion under the Anchor Borrowers’ \nProgramme (ABP) for the procurement of inputs and cultivation of \nmaize, rice, and wheat, three crops that hitherto were significant \nconcerns of FX demand. These disbursements bring the total under \nthe programme to over 4.52 million smallholder farmers, cultivating \n21 commodities across the country, comes to a total of ₦975.61 \nbillion. The Nigeria Commodity Exchange (NCX) has also been \nrestructured to effectively aggregate excess outputs from the Bank’s \nABP-financed projects, with the objective of moderating food prices. \nThe Bank also released N19.15 billion to finance 5 large-scale \nagricultural projects under the Commercial Agriculture Credit \nScheme (CACS), bringing the total disbursements under the Scheme \nto ₦735.17 billion for 671 projects in agro-production and agro-\nprocessing. \n \n \n8 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nIn addition to these, the Bank disbursed the sum of ₦428.31 billion \nunder the ₦1.0 trillion Real Sector Facility to 37 additional projects in \nthe manufacturing, agriculture, and services sectors. The funds \nsourced from the Real Sector Support Facility - Differentiated Cash \nReserve Requirement (RSSF-DCRR), were utilized for both greenfield \nand \nbrownfield \n(expansion) \nprojects \nunder \nthe \nCOVID-19 \nintervention for the Manufacturing Sector (CIMS). Cumulative \ndisbursements under the Real Sector Facility currently stand at ₦1.75 \ntrillion, disbursed to 368 projects across the country. Under the 100 for \n100 Policy on Production and Productivity (PPP), the Bank has \ndisbursed the sum of ₦29.51 billion to 31 projects, comprising 16 in \nmanufacturing, 13 in agriculture, and 2 in healthcare. \n \nAs part of its effort to support the resilience of the healthcare sector, \nthe Bank also disbursed ₦8.50 billion to 6 healthcare projects under \nthe Healthcare Sector Intervention Facility (HSIF), bringing the \ncumulative disbursements to ₦116.72 billion for 124 projects, \ncomprising of 31 pharmaceuticals, 56 hospitals, and 37 other \nservices. An additional tranche of N14.7 million was disbursed to 5 \nresearchers \nunder \nthe \nHealthcare \nSector \nResearch \nand \nDevelopment (HSRD) Grant. \n \nTo support households and businesses affected by the COVID-19 \nPandemic, the Bank disbursed N21.66 billion to 19,685 beneficiaries, \ncomprising 12,044 households and 7,641 small businesses under the \nTargeted Credit Facility (TCF) within the period. The cumulative \ndisbursements under the TCF stood at N390.45 billion to 797,351 \n \n9 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nbeneficiaries, comprising 660,096 households and 137,255 small \nbusinesses. \n \nThe Bank disbursed ₦11.11 billion to power sector players, under the \nNigeria Bulk Electricity Trading Payment Assurance Facility (NBET-\nPAF), bringing the cumulative disbursements under this facility to \n₦1.28 trillion. The sum of ₦12.64 billion was also released to Distribution \nCompanies (DisCos) under the Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation \nFacility – Phase 2 (NEMSF-2). The cumulative disbursement under the \nNEMSF-2 thus stood at ₦232.93 billion. Both interventions were \ndesigned to improve access to capital and ease the development \nof enabling infrastructure in the Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry. \n \nOutlook \nThe overall medium-term outlook for the global economy remains \nuncertain as the war between Russia and Ukraine persists, alongside \nthe ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The sanctions against Russia are \nexpected to have a considerable backlash against the global \neconomy as Russia is an interconnected economy both in the global \ncommodity and financial markets. The extent of the backlash has, \nhowever, not fully crystallized but presents a significant downside risk \nto the recovery of the global economy if the crisis is not resolved \nimmediately. \nAdditionally, the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant \ndownside risk to global recovery as the virus continues to mutate into \nhighly infectious strains. This is imparting a high level of uncertainty on \neconomic agents, thus, creating inhibitions towards making the \n \n10 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nrequired investments to set the recovery on a sustainable path. As \npart of the lifting of restrictions associated with the COVID-19 \npandemic, the strong recovery of aggregate demand has \ncontinued to pose a strong upside risk to inflation, as supply \nbottlenecks persist. This has been further aggravated by sanctions \nimposed on trade with Russia and other blockages associated with \nsupplies from Ukraine. Consequently, inflation is expected to remain \nconsiderably high in the short term, even as some Advanced \nEconomies progress with interest rate lift-off. The rise in both \ncorporate and public debt in the Advanced Economies and \nEmerging Market and Developing Economies, is also a major threat \nto global financial stability as the risk of sustainability is heightened in \nthe currently tensed global environment. Capital flows are thus, \nexpected to be restricted as global financial conditions tighten over \nthe short to medium term. \nIn the domestic economy, available data on key macroeconomic \nindicators suggest the likelihood of subdued output growth for the \nNigerian economy for most of 2022. This is hinged on the dampening \nimpact to the growth of rising energy prices in the domestic \neconomy; tightening external financial conditions as some \nAdvanced Economies pursue interest rate lift-off; as well as the \npersistence of legacy security and infrastructural problems. It is, \nhowever, expected that monetary and fiscal stimuli will remain in \nplace to continue to support the recovery until the downside risks to \ngrowth and the upside risks to inflation dissipate substantially. \nAccordingly, the Nigerian economy is forecast to grow in 2022 by \n3.24 per cent (CBN), 4.20 per cent (FGN), and 2.70 per cent (IMF). \n \n11 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \n \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nMPC noted with concern the impact which the global price \nincrease in petroleum and other products is having practically on all \neconomies. The Committee further noted that this has resulted in \nimported inflation on the Nigerian economy and believes that \nspecific actions need to be taken to ensure that this trend does not \ncontinue given the adverse consequences and aggressive rising \nprice level could have on the cost of living and purchasing power \nof Nigerians. \nBefore the Russia-Ukraine war, MPC was optimistic that the \nmoderate decline in inflation was sustainable due to the positive \nimpact of good harvest on price levels. The MPC worries that, \nwhereas global prices have gone up, this has been compounded \nby the shortage of supply of petroleum products. In the short run, \nMPC urges NNPC to take urgent steps to ensure an adequate supply \nof petroleum products in Nigeria so as to reduce the rate of arbitrary \nincrease in the price of petroleum products by oil marketers. The \nCommittee noted, with grave concern, the unprecedented rate of \noil theft recorded in recent time, and its debilitating impact on \ngovernment revenue and accretion to reserves. \nIn the medium-term, MPC is hopeful that the proposed take-off of \nthe Dangote Refinery in the course of the year would help to \nimprove the supply of petroleum products in Nigeria. MPC also notes \nthat the rising price of diesel is compounded by the problem of \n \n12 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \ninadequate electricity supply which has adversely impacted \ndomestic prices. MPC advises the CBN Management and the fiscal \nauthorities to take specific and urgent actions to avoid many power \ngenerating stations shutdown for turn-around maintenance, \nresulting in the current unwarranted shutdown of generating assets. \nMPC is relieved that food inflation declined marginally due to good \nharvest. Although some scarcity is expected as we approach the \nplanting season, the Committee is optimistic that with the high level \nof strategic grain reserves of the CBN, it is relieved that food prices \nwould \nremain \nrelatively \nmoderated. \nMPC \nfurther \nadvised \nManagement to redouble its developmental finance initiatives \naimed at boosting domestic food output which would help in \nmoderating food inflation going forward, thereby moderating \nheadline inflation. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nWhile growth has continued to improve, members noted that \ninflation was confronted with upward pressure due to emerging risks \nwithin the domestic and external environment. The MPC, however, \nnoted that the substantial upward push to price levels continued to \nbe influenced by supply-side factors such as the scarcity of PMS, \npersisting insecurity and backlash from the Russia-Ukraine war. These \nrequire a careful and focused policy intervention to address and \nresolve. In this light, the MPC, urged the Bank to continue using the \ntools at its disposal, while increasing its collaboration with the fiscal \nauthority to ensure that inflation is adequately reined in and growth \nis returned to a strong and sustainable path. \n \n13 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nThe Committee also encouraged the Bank to continue the use of its \nintervention mechanism to deploy funds to output-stimulating and \nemployment-generating sectors of the economy. \nIn its consideration as to whether to hold, tighten, or loosen, MPC \nremained concerned that the global situation on rising prices may \ncontinue in the near term but may begin to moderate if deliberate \nand urgent actions are taken by both the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities to correct the rising inflation. On another hand, \nCommittee was satisfied that the use of the Bank discretionary CRR \npolicy should be deployed more aggressively to control the level of \nmoney supply in the economy. \nOn tightening in order to rein in the rising price level, MPC was of the \nview that given the fragile state of the current GDP growth and the \npotential external and domestic headwinds from the Russia-Ukraine \nwar, a contractionary policy stance would stifle the expected \ninvestment expansion needed to drive growth and absorb the \nshocks in Nigeria. \nMPC also feels that not only would tightening reverse the steady \nimprovement recorded in credit expansion, it is also of the view that \ntightening would not necessarily tame the inflation, particularly \nwhere the marginal decline is relatively not yet sustainable. \nIn the case of whether to loosen, the Committee feels that loosening \nwould trigger further liquidity surfeit and fuel inflationary pressure as \navailable funds outstrip the economy’s absorptive capacity. MPC \nalso feels that loosening would trigger FX demand pressure, as the \n \n14 \n \nClassified as Confidential \n \nexcess liquidity would exert demand pressure on the FX market and \ntrigger a naira depreciation which would also fuel inflation. \nBased on the foregoing, the Committee decided to adopt a hold \nstance as it would indicate a precautionary and consistent policy \nstance with the prevailing economic conditions particularly as \nfurther economic and financial shocks are exerted from the ongoing \nRussia-Ukraine war. \nOn the strength of the above considerations, three members voted \nto raise MPR by 25-basis points, one member voted to raise MPR by \n50-basis points, while six members voted to hold all parameters \nconstant. \nThe Committee thus decided by a majority vote to retain the \nMonetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 11.5 per cent. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. Retain the MPR at 11.5 per cent; \nII. Retain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis points around \nthe MPR; \nIII. Retain the CRR at 27.5 per cent; and \nIV. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n21st March, 2022", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 141 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting held on Monday 21st March 2022.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/1c91b8c006adf46ec0db520ac96d822b.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "1c91b8c006adf46ec0db520ac96d822b", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 96 of \nthe Monetary Policy Committee Meeting, July \n21-22, 2014 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on July 21 and 22, 2014 \nagainst the backdrop of continuing QE3 tapering by the U.S Federal \nReserve which has resulted in the slowing of inflows to emerging \nmarkets and frontier economies; and the attendant uncertainties in \nthe outlook for monetary policy and financial stability in the post-\ntapering period. The meeting was attended by 10 members. A new \nmember, Prof. Dahiru Hassan Balami, whose appointment had \nrecently been confirmed by the Senate, was also in attendance. The \nCommittee deliberated on key external and domestic economic \ndevelopments and considered the Banking Stability Report since the \nMPC meeting of May 2014 as well as the outlook for the rest of the \nyear. \n2 \n \nThe global monetary policy environment appears to be further \ncomplicated by risks posed by continued currency crisis and fragility \nin Europe, geo-political tensions in the Middle East and a number of \nemerging and developing economies. Domestically, the policy \nchallenges remain. These include the uptick in inflation, anticipated \nincreased spending towards the general elections and the possible \neffects of US tapering on the domestic market. \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted that the rebound in global economic activity \nstrengthened in the first half of 2014; although at levels lower than \npreviously projected. The tapered growth arose mainly from the \nemerging and developing economies owing to the rising real interest \nrates and geo-political crisis. On the whole, the effects of the global \nfinancial crisis have continued to wane even as the issues of rising \nincome inequality, unemployment and poverty appear to be \ngaining prominence; engaging the attention of the monetary \nauthorities. These latest projections indicate that the euro area is \ngradually coming out of recession, as growth projection for 2014 is \n3 \n \npositive for all member countries albeit with significant variation. \nGrowth is expected to be stronger in the core EU countries while high \ndebt and financial fragmentation continue to weigh on aggregate \ndomestic demand in the peripheral countries. For the entire euro \nzone, there is a risk of low inflation or outright deflation which could \nresult in higher real interest rates that may constrain output \nexpansion. \nIn the emerging and developing economies, growth is projected at \n5.0 per cent in 2014 from 4.7 per cent in 2013, buoyed by stronger \nexternal demand from the advanced countries. The key downside \nrisks in the developing and emerging economies include: political \nuncertainty, exchange rate realignment in response to changing \nfundamentals, further monetary tightening to address emerging \ncurrency crisis, and tighter external financing conditions arising from \nthe rapid normalization of the US monetary policy. Inflation is \nprojected to remain subdued in 2014 and 2015, partly reflecting the \nsignificant output gaps in the developed economies, weaker \ndomestic demand in developing and emerging economies, and \n4 \n \nsliding commodity prices, especially fuels and food. In the advanced \neconomies, inflation is currently below target and its return to the \nlong run trend could take a while due to the slow pace of economic \nrecovery. Likely depreciation in currencies, domestic demand \npressure, and capacity constraints could pose upside risks to inflation \nin the emerging market economies. \nThe Committee noted that the stance of monetary policy could \ndiverge across regions over the medium term on account of \nvariations in risks and other challenges confronting various \neconomies. The US is expected to commence tightening by the \nsecond half of 2015 as inflation hits the long run target and \nunemployment rate falls to the threshold level. The euro area and \nJapan are expected to continue with supportive monetary policy \ndue to low inflation including threat of deflation in some countries, \nweak recovery, weakness in bank balance sheets, and strong \ndemand for their bonds as a result of low sovereign risk. \nMajority of the central banks remained cautious with regard to the \nstance of monetary policy. While most advanced economies are \n5 \n \nlikely to maintain an accommodative stance for monetary policy for \nthe rest of the year to firm up aggregate demand and employment, \nthe major impetus for monetary policy adjustments in the emerging \nmarkets and developing economies could come from the effects of \nthe US Fed’s tapering of QE3 on their currencies and the financial \nmarkets. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \n \nOutput \nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported revised growth \nnumbers from 2010 to 2013 and the first quarter of 2014, as part of \nthe GDP rebasing exercise. Accordingly, the estimated growth rate \nfor 2013 now stands at 5.49 per cent, compared with 5.31 and 4.21 \nper cent recorded in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Similarly, the \nrevised estimate of 6.77 per cent for the fourth quarter of 2013 was \nan improvement over the 5.17 and 3.64 per cent in the previous \nquarter and the corresponding period of 2012, respectively. In the \nfirst quarter of 2014, real GDP growth was 6.21 per cent, which was \nhigher than the corresponding quarter of 2013. In line with the trend, \n6 \n \nthe non-oil sector was the main driver of growth in the first quarter of \n2014, recording 8.21 per cent growth. The key growth drivers in the \nnon-oil sector in the first quarter of 2014 remained industry, \nagriculture, trade, and services which contributed 1.77, 1.26, 1.26 \nand 3.15 per cent, respectively. The oil sector continued to record \nimprovements in performance with its growth rate improving from -\n9.36 and -11.40 per cent, respectively, in the fourth and first quarters \nof 2013, to -6.60 per cent in the first quarter of 2014. \nThe Committee welcomed the impressive growth performance but \nnoted that the country has the potential to do better with \nappropriate supportive macroeconomic policies. The Committee, \ntherefore, stressed the imperatives for monetary policy to sustain \nefforts aimed at supporting non-inflationary growth in key sectors of \nthe economy. The Committee also emphasized the need for \ngovernment to sustain and deepen tax revenue and enhance \nefforts aimed at fast-tracking the structural transformation of the \neconomy with a view to making it resilient to adverse shocks as well \n7 \n \nas creating the necessary platforms for reducing unemployment, \nincome inequality, and poverty in the country. \n \nPrices \nDevelopments in the aggregate price level suggest an underlying \ninflationary pressure since January 2014. The year-on-year headline \ninflation steadily inched up marginally from 7.9 per cent in April to 8.0 \nper cent in May 2014 and further to 8.2 per cent in June. The up-tick \nin June was, however, largely attributed to the rise in food inflation \nwhich rose from 9.7 per cent in May 2014 to 9.8 per cent in June \nwhile core inflation, on the other hand, rose from 7.7 per cent in May \n2014 to 8.1 per cent in June. The Committee noted that all measures \nof inflation have witnessed progressive upward trend since February \n2014 and agreed that this trend should be monitored closely to \nachieve a reversal. \nMonetary, \nCredit \nand \nFinancial \nMarkets’ \nDevelopments \nBroad money (M2) rose by 1.66 per cent in June 2014 over the level \nat end-December 2013, indicating an annualized growth rate of 3.31 \n8 \n \nper cent. The annualized growth rate was considerably lower than \nthe growth benchmark of 15.52 per cent for fiscal 2014. For the same \nperiod, net domestic credit increased by 0.88 per cent compared \nwith the growth rate of 15.39 per cent over the corresponding period \nof 2013. When annualized, net domestic credit rose by 1.77 per cent, \ncompared with the growth benchmark of 28.5 per cent for fiscal \n2014. The expansion in aggregate domestic credit was mainly due to \nthe increase in claims on the private sector which increased by 2.75 \nper cent in June 2014, which was however, moderated by the \ncontraction in net credit to Government. \nMeanwhile, money market rates remained within the MPR corridor \nduring the review period. The monthly weighted average OBB rate \nwas 10.38 per cent in May 2014 but it increased by 14 basis points to \n10.52 per cent in June. The uncollaterized overnight rate was 10.50 \nper cent in June 2014, compared with 10.63 per cent in May 2014. \nOverall, both the OBB and overnight call rates were trading closer to \nthe lower bound of the MPR corridor on account of liquidity surfeit in \nthe banking system. Activities in the capital market were bullish \n9 \n \nduring the period with the All-Share Index (ASI) increasing by 2.8 per \ncent from 41,329.19 at end-December 2013 to 42,482.48 at end-June \n2014. Market capitalization also moved in the same direction. \nExternal Sector Developments \nAll the segments of the foreign exchange market witnessed a \nconsiderable degree of stability during the period. The exchange \nrate at the retail-Dutch Auction System Segment (rDAS) of the \nmarket was flat at N157.29/US$ in the review period. At the inter-\nbank market, the selling rate opened at N162.20/US$ and closed at \nN162.95, representing a depreciation of N0.75 or 0.46 per cent. \nConversely, at the BDC segment, the exchange rate opened at \nN167.00/US$ and closed at N168.00/US$, representing a depreciation \nof N1.00 or 0.6 per cent. \nGross official reserves rose to US$40.20 billion by 18 July from US$37.31 \nbillion at end-June 2014. The increase in reserves was mainly due to \nincreased accretion and moderation in the rate of depletion. \n \n10 \n \nThe Committee’s Consideration \nThe Committee was satisfied with the relative stability in the \nmacroeconomy as reflected in the impressive growth rates, stable \nconsumer prices and exchange rate as well as increased external \nreserves. It was however concerned about the weak translation of \nstability to microeconomic gains in employment and access to \nfinance especially by small and medium scale businesses. It, \ntherefore, emphasized the need for the MPC decisions to take into \naccount the long run impact on employment level, wealth creation \nand growth of businesses. \nThe Committee noted the potential of the power sector to stimulate \noutput growth through enhanced investment and the spill-over \neffect in employment generation if the challenges confronting the \nsector are effectively and appropriately addressed. Specifically, it \nnoted that gas-to-power has remained a binding constraint in \nreaping the benefits of the recently-concluded power sector \nreforms; urging for the collective efforts of government, private \ninvestors and the banks to resolve. Other pressure points include the \n11 \n \nunderlying pressure from food/core inflation and the risks that could \nemanate from the likely increase in aggregate spending in the run \nup to the 2015 general elections. The Committee was also \nconcerned about the implications of the on-going QE3 tapering for \ninflows and external reserves. The Committee recognized the \nnecessity of sustaining a stable naira exchange even as it has to \ndeal with the delicate balancing of the need for a low interest rate \nregime. The Committee noted that portfolio flows were not \nemployment generating but were essential in the absence of \nadequate fiscal buffers. \nThe Committee welcomed the moderation in the rate of depletion in \nexternal reserves in recent months, noting that reserves accretion \nneeded to improve much faster to provide a strong and more \nresilient buffer to fiscal operations. The Committee, however, noted \nthat a gradual reduction in the country’s import bills through \ndomestic production of some of the major food imports should be a \nkey element in the overall reserves accretion strategy. It welcomed \n12 \n \nthe decision of the Bank to collaborate with other stakeholders in this \nregard. \nThe Committee further expressed concern about the liquidity level \nand the trending uptick in inflation which may not be unconnected \nwith the poor harvest in some agricultural producing areas, \nparticularly in the north eastern and central states of the country. It \nhowever, noted that other reform measures could dampen food \nprices in the short to medium term and restore inflation to a \nsustainable long-run path. Overall, the Committee noted that the \npolicy direction of inflation, exchange rate and interest rate must be \nseen not only in the context of price and financial stability but also in \nenhancing the quality of life of Nigerians and promoting \nemployment generation. \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nIn view of these developments, the Committee decided by a \nunanimous vote to retain the current stance of monetary policy with \none member voting for an asymmetric corridor around the MPR. \nConsequently, the MPC voted to: \n13 \n \n(i) \nRetain the MPR at 12 per cent with a corridor of +/- 200 basis \npoints around the midpoint; \n(ii) \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent; \n(iii) \nRetain the public sector Cash Reserve Requirement at 75.0 per \ncent; and \n(iv) Retain the private sector Cash Reserve Requirement at 15.0 per \ncent. \n \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd July 2014 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE \n \n1.0 \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \nDevelopments in the macroeconomy in the first half of the year \nremained broadly positive albeit with cautious optimism about the \noutlook for the remaining period of the year. The revised GDP \nfollowing the rebasing exercise, as expected, was lower but the \nestimate of 5.49 per cent for 2013 could be adjudged robust \nparticularly when cognizance is taken of the weak global economic \nrecovery. Stability in the exchange rate appears strengthened in \nvirtually all the segments of the markets while external reserves \nwitnessed a modest improvement, relative to the position at the last \nmeeting. \nThere are however a number of risks to macro stability over the short \nto medium term. First, the evolving trend in price level should give \nconcern to the monetary authority. Although headline inflation is still \nlargely subdued at 8.2 per cent in June 2014, there seems to be \nconsiderable degree of underlying pressure given that it has \n15 \n \nconsistently trended upwards in the last three months. More \nimportantly, food inflation is projected to rise beyond single digit in \nthe second half of the year thereby posing significant risk to the long \nterm inflation target of the Bank. Apart from structural issues that \ncould impinge on food inflation, the electioneering activities would \nreach the climax in the second half of 2014 cum early period of \n2015. \nBesides, the development in price level has implications for banking \nsystem stability. The weighted average deposit rate as at May was \n6.32 per cent, suggesting that depositors earned negative real \ninterest rate which may fuel loss of deposit from the banks with the \nattendant impact on the banking system stability. As a result, \nreduction of the policy rate which could further lead to reduction in \ndeposit rate without a concomitant reduction in lending rate may \nnot be appropriate at the moment. \nAgain, the relative modest improvement in the external reserves \nnotwithstanding, there has been persistent demand pressure in the \nforeign exchange market since January. Cumulative net outflow as \n16 \n \nat end- May 2014 was about US$7.5 billion as against cumulative net \ninflow of US$3.72 billion in the corresponding period of 2013. The \nprospects in the medium term horizon appear dim with the tighter \nexternal financial conditions being a key issue. Unemployment rate \nin the US fell to an all-time low of 6.1 per cent in June 2014, a clear \nevidence of strong recovery process, which informed the Federal \nReserve to shift the termination of its asset purchase program to the \nfourth quarter of 2014 as against the initially planned 2015. Thus, \nappropriate monetary policy measures need to be in put place at \nleast to provide soft landing for the economy during the adjustment \nperiod. \nThis said, monetary policy environment is facing a difficult dilemma \nat this point in time as improvement in the macroeconomy has not \nsufficiently translated to impressive socio economic indicators. For \nexample, statistics on unemployment rate revealed that it has \nvirtually been trending upwards since 2009, reaching 24.70 per cent \nin 2013 against the 5-year (2009-13) average of 23.36 per cent. In the \nlight of daunting challenges of high unemployment and poverty \n17 \n \nconfronting the economy, an accommodating monetary policy that \nwould foster inclusive growth and poverty reduction is desirable. \nIt is imperative, however, to bring to bear that if stability is not \nachieved in the short term, the anticipated long term objective of \ngrowth, unemployment, and reduction in poverty may remain \nelusive. It is equally important to recognize the limitations of \nmonetary policy in addressing most of the fundamental problems \nincluding building reserve buffers. Some of the issues require active \nsupport of the fiscal authority particularly building of external reserves \nthrough accretion from oil earnings. Perhaps, more importantly, \nthere are a number of deep rooted problems that limit access to \nfinance by real sector operators which could render reduction of \npolicy rates by the central bank ineffective. The problems are mainly \ndue to uncompetitive business environment resulting from poor state \nof infrastructure, security challenges, and weak institutions. These \nproblems require major structural reforms. To this end, I believe a \nrobust engagement with the fiscal authority is a sine qua non. \n18 \n \nOn the whole, pending the time the necessary building blocks for \nthe resilience of the economy would be put in place, it is worthwhile \nto maintain stability in the macroeconomy by holding steady the \nsubsisting monetary policy measures. Consequently, I vote for \nretention of MPR at 12%, private sector CRR at 15%, public sector \nCRR at 75%, and LR at 30%. \n2.0 ALADE, O. SARAH \nGlobal economic growth forecast have backpedalled due to \nrevision in the first quarter performance of the U.S. economy. The \ndownward revision in the U.S. is due to severe winter weather \ndisruptions, subdued consumer spending, construction and industrial \nactivities. In spite of these developments, growth is expected to \naccelerate as the year progresses and is projected to reach 3.4 and \n4.0 percent respectively in 2014 and 2015 according to July IMF \nWEO. In emerging markets, while earlier risks have diminished, there \nare increased geopolitical risks from the Middle East and euro area. \nIn the domestic environment, the renewed inflationary pressure and \nexpected fiscal spending as the election year approaches poses \n19 \n \nsome concern for monetary policy. Based on the above, I support a \nhold in policy rate. \nWhile there are some downside risks to global growth, the US \nEconomy is showing some impressive momentum. Growth in the \nUnited States is showing some momentum with strong consumer \nconfidence index. U.S. employers accelerated their hiring last \nmonth, adding a robust 288,000 jobs and helping drive the \nunemployment rate to 6.1 percent, the lowest rate since September \n2008. This is the fifth straight monthly job gain above 200,000 jobs in \nthe US, although wages are yet to rise significantly. In the Euro zone, \nslowing inflation has raised real interest rate which may affect growth \nin the zone. Countries in the zone are at different stages of \neconomic activities as general confidence is waning. These \ndevelopments coupled with the effects of the tapering could \ndampen domestic conditions, thus the need for monetary policy to \nbe proactive and guarded. \nHeadline inflation increased to 8.2 percent in June compared to 8.0 \npercent recorded in May 2014. Headline inflation increased to 8.2 \n20 \n \npercent in June, suggesting that inflation may be expected to stay \nelevated in the coming months, due to possible food supply \nshortage. This is the fourth consecutive month of year-on-year \nincreases in the Headline index since February. Both food and core \ninflation rose slightly. Food inflation increased from 9.7 percent in \nMay to 9.8 percent in June, while core inflation increased from 7.7 \npercent in May to 8.1 percent in June. Staff projection suggests that \ninflation is expected to exceed the upper bound of the implicit \ninflation threshold of 9 percent before the end of 2014, although it \nwill still remain in the single digit range. This suggest that even with \nthe anticipated fiscal risk as a result of pre-election and increased \nsecurity spending, monetary policy cannot ignore the inflationary \noutlook. Based on this, monetary policy should remain cautious to \nanticipate the impact of fiscal, security and food supply shocks. \nWhile domestic growth has remained strong, some risks to growth \nare evident. The newly rebased GDP forecast for 2014 GDP \nremained strong and robust with 2013 fourth quarter growth \nestimated at 6.77 percent compared with 5.17 percent in the \n21 \n \npreceding quarter. The 2014 first quarter GDP growth rose by 6.21 \npercent which is higher than the 4.45 percent recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 2013, but lower than the 6.77 percent in last \nquarter of 2014. The rebased GDP show a more diversified economy \nthat will require a multi-agency coordination for sustaining the \ngrowth momentum and achieving inclusive growth. The sustenance \nof this robust growth rate and the achievement of broad-based \ngrowth will require the creation of an environment that is conducive, \ncompetitive and attractive to both foreign and domestic investors. \nMonetary policy must therefore continue to ensure the maintenance \nof macroeconomic stability. \nThe risk of fiscal expansion in the run up to the general election is \nvery likely. There will be pressure to increase the speed of implement \nof the budget by both the legislative and the executive as the \ngeneral election approaches. In addition, the security challenges \nfacing the country will also require additional spending to secure the \ncountry and its boarders, while these are legitimate expenses; they \nare bound to put upward pressure on both inflation and exchange \n22 \n \nrate. Therefore all efforts should be made to ensure that excess \nliquidity in the system that is not channeled into productive activities \nshould be sterilized. Thus monetary policy should do all it can to help \ncontain inflationary pressure and lowering rate at this point may be \ncounter-productive. \nStability has returned to the Foreign exchange market, though some \nrisks remain. This has been helped by accretion to the foreign \nreserve and sustained inflow in the local bond market. Reserve as at \nJuly 17, 2014 stood at $40.05 Billion. The risk to this stability will be the \nimpact of the deadline given to the Bureau de change (BDCs) of \nJuly 31, 2014 to recapitalize. However, the resolve to build buffers \nwould help counter any adverse market reaction to the change. An \nadded risk is the effect of tapering on the economy as advanced \neconomies recovery continues. Therefore, global and domestic \nevents should be monitored to avoid downside risk to the Naira \nexchange rate \nMoney market conditions suggest ample liquidity in the banking \nsystem. Rates at the Interbank and Open Buy Back (OBB) rate have \n23 \n \nremained within the corridor at weighted average rate of 10.50 and \n10.48 percent, respectively, between May, 2014 and July 18, 204. \nThese indicate excess liquidity in the system as banks accessed the \nStanding Deposit facility (SDF), but were rarely at the Standing \nLending Facility (SLF) window since the last MPC in May. In addition, \nprime lending rate was steady at 16.5 percent between May and \nJune, suggesting that care must be taken to manage the structural \nliquidity and the structural impediments to credit growth in the \neconomy. These developments coupled with anticipated upward \ninflationary pressure would suggest that monetary easing at this time \nmay be counter-productive. \nWhile pressure at foreign exchange has eased, there are some \ndownside risks. Inflationary pressure has persisted in the last \nconsecutive four months and the projection is trending upwards. In \nan election year coupled with fragile and uncertain global \nenvironment, macroeconomic stability is very important. Based on \nthese, I vote for a hold on Monetary Policy Rate, the maintenance of \n75 percent increase in public sector deposits Cash Reserve \n24 \n \nRequirement (CRR) and a 15 percent increase in private sector Cash \nReserve Requirement. \n \n3.0 \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \nOn the basis of the review of the macro economic data on the \ncurrent situation of the economy, I voted to hold the current \nmonetary policy rate of 12 percent, cash reserve ratio of 75 percent \nfor public deposit, and 15 percent for private sector deposit with \nsymmetric corridor of +/-2 percent be maintained. \nREASONS \nGlobal Economy \nThe global economy is fairly establish with favorable growth recovery \nin the US and Japan with improving employment figures. Although \nthe picture in the Euro zone is weaker with only the Germany \neconomy fairly better. For China, its growth rate at is about 7.5 \npercent and largely stable. In Africa the growth remains strong for \nmost of the countries. Some tools to stimulate the European \neconomy are being put in place. Global prices are subdued to the \n25 \n \nfact that inflation is currently lower than policy goals. The implication \nof the above is that import inflation is not a problem to the Nigerian \neconomy for now. However progressive tapering of QE3 in the \nUnited \nStates \nof \nAmerica \nposes \nsome \nchallenges \nto \nthe \nmanagement of exchange rate, foreign reserves and the financial \nas a whole. \nThe international price for crude oil has been steady. The threats to \nNigerian oil revenue exist due to share oil and gas from the US and \nother countries. \nDomestic Economy \nThe Nigerian economy has witnessed a robust growth of about 6.2 \npercent in 2014 Q1. The prospects for sustaining the growth are high \nbecause of stable oil price, and other supporting policies in other \nsectors of the economy which include agriculture, industrial sectors \nand energy. However, the greatest problems to growth in the \neconomy are: the current insecurity in the north eastern region of \nNigeria; high unemployment rate; oil theft and vandalisation of oil \nand gas infrastructure. On a good note is the high level of robustness \n26 \n \nof the banking sector in Nigeria; stable prices; exchange rate and \nfinancial sector. However, the gap between private deposits and \nlending rate is a source of concern. There are questions that need to \nbe asked and answered as to the consequences of reducing the \ninterest rate in the near future. Although high interest kills businesses, \ninterest cannot be reduced now partly because most banks invest \nhuge sums of money in providing security, power generations, leases \nof operating premises, as well as inflationary pressures. If interest rate \nis reduced, the environment may be too harsh for many banks to \noperate. There may be out flow of FDI which the economy currently \nneeds. \nCONCLUSION \nThe prospect of growth in Nigeria remains strong; however the \ngrowth has to be pro job creation. This would reduce the level of \nunemployment, inequality and level of poverty in the economy \nthereby raising the welfare of the people. The stability in the \nfinancial sector has been achieved at the expense of strategic \nsacrifice of monetary policy independence for exchange rate \n27 \n \nstability at the risk of medium term macro and financial system \nstability. It is not appropriate to cut the interest rate. \n \n4.0 \nDANIEL-NWAOBIA, ANASTASIA \nThe performance of the domestic economy has remained \nimpressive, given the current level of the macroeconomic indicators. \nFor instance the real GDP grew at 6.21% in the first quarter of 2014; \nthe year-on-year inflation rate, in spite of the rising trend since \nFebruary, 2014 remained at single digit of 8.2% in June, driven largely \nby the rise in food prices. The naira exchange rate at the Retail \nDutch Action Spot (rDAS-SPT) segment remained steady at \n$/N157.29 between May 20, 2014 and July 18, 2014, while the \nexternal reserves level stood at U$40.20 billion as at July 17, 2014, \nwhich could cover approximately 7 months of imports. \n \nThe outlook for domestic output in the coming months is positive, \ngiven the various efforts by the Government to enhance domestic \noutput such as: the successful implementation of the Growth \nEnhancement Scheme (GES) which was designed to guarantee \n28 \n \ntimely supply of inputs to farmers on a sustainable basis; and \nGovernment’s renewed efforts at curbing crude oil theft, as well as \naddressing the challenges of the energy sector. Furthermore, the \ncontinued improvement in global output would have positive \nimpact on Nigeria’s oil export and public revenue if government \nintensifies current effort to curb leakages in the oil sector. However, \nincrease in US oil output and export may dampen demand for \nNigeria’s crude, especially in Europe. \n \nStaff estimates project a gradual increase in the inflation rate over \nthe next six months based on: acceleration in food inflation due to \nseasonal effect of the expected increase in prices and demand for \nstaples; expected growth in reserve money and depreciation in the \nBDC rate. However, the current efforts by the CBN to sanitize the \nBDC segment of the foreign exchange market could minimize the \nexchange rate effect on inflation. The year-on-year inflation was \nprojected to remain within single digit in the next six months. \n \n29 \n \nThe relative stability in the official foreign exchange market is \nexpected to subsist through the third quarter of 2014 with sustained \nintervention by the CBN. The current effort by the Bank to tackle \nforeign exchange volatility with increased capitalization of the BDC \nand curtailing retail currency importation would enhance the \nstability of the exchange rate in the market. \n \nPressure points to note, however include: sustaining the stability of \nthe naira exchange rate; managing capital flows, especially the \nvolatile portfolio investments and potential reversals as tapering \nnears its end in September, 2014; high lending rates and wide interest \nrate spread; election related expenditure in 2014/15 which could \nheighten the liquidity profile in the economy; and building of fiscal \nbuffers to insure against global shocks. \n \nIn spite of the concerns expressed above, the current relative \nimpressive performance of the economy as well as the outlook in the \nnear to medium term confirm the effectiveness of the current tight \n30 \n \nmonetary policy stance, particularly in keeping inflation within single \ndigits as well as maintaining stability in the foreign exchange market. \nIt is, therefore advisable to sustain the current policy stance. \n \nConsequently, I vote as follows: \n \n(i) \nThe Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to be retained at the \ncurrent level of 12% and corridor of +/- 2% for the inter-\nmeeting period. \n \n(ii) \nThe Private sector CRR should also be retained at 15 per \ncent, given the current banking system liquidity profile. \n \n(iii) \nThe current policy on foreign exchange (mid-point and \nexchange rate band of N155/US$1 +/- 3%) should be \nretained, while the CBN continues to intervene to stabilize \nthe rates, when necessary. The Federal Government is \nalready making efforts at rebuilding the fiscal buffers \nrequired to sustain the stability of the exchange rate. It is \nmy strong belief that the fiscal and monetary authorities \nwill \ncontinue \nto \nwork \nclosely \nto \nsustain \nthe \nmacroeconomic and price stability that will engender \ngrowth and create jobs. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n31 \n \n5.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nI vote: \n to maintain MPR at 12%; \n to maintain Private Sector CRR at 15% and Public Sector CRR at \n75% \n to maintain Liquidity Ratio at 30% \n for asymmetric corridor of -5% (Standing Deposit Facility) and \n+2 (Standing Lending Facility). \nThis implies that I am voting for the same policy set I voted for at the \nlast meeting in May 19-20, 2014. Maintaining MPR, CRR (private), CRR \n(public) and Liquidity Ratio at current levels takes due cognizance of \n(1) the trend of key macroeconomic indicators (growth, inflation, \nunemployment, fiscal deficit and public debt, external reserves, \ncapital flows, money survey, oil price, etc.); (2) the economic report \nand inflation forecast by Bank Staff for the last two quarters of 2014; \n(3) expectations of economic actors and (4) open economy \nmacroeconomic analysis of Nigeria’s current policy regimes. The \nvote also takes due cognizance of the global economic outlook for \n2014 particularly, the risks associated with the US Fed’s tapering and, \nthe high likelihood of transition from inflationary to deflationary policy \nby the US Fed and the Bank of England as price levels begin to rise. \n32 \n \nIn the short term, keeping MPR, CRR on private sector deposit, CRR \non public sector deposit, Liquidity Ratio and the SLF rate unchanged \noffer some relative stability for economic agents to implement their \neconomic plans for 2014. It also provides the MPC with the \nopportunity to develop forward looking medium term strategy to \nadapt seamlessly to a post quantitative easing phase and to repair \nthe transmission mechanism of monetary policy which has been \nweakened by the changes in the global economy after the 2007-8 \ncrisis and the global policy responses to the crisis. \nMarket functioning efficiency is a key link in the transmission \nmechanism that needs to be fixed. In the current monetary policy \nregime, the interbank market is critical. Yet, in the last few quarters, \nactivities in the interbank market have slowed down. I have argued \npreviously that AMCON effects do not fully explain the slowdown in \nthe interbank market. My argument draws support from the relatively \nhigh volumes of activities in the Special Deposit Facility (SDF) and \nOBB windows as well as the very low spread between SDF and OBB \nrates. It is clear to me that the incentive and trade-off principles are \n33 \n \nin play. Consequently, changing the game and strengthening the \ninterbank market requires changing incentives. An asymmetric \ncorridor of -5 (SDF) and plus 2 (SLF) is good starting point. It will \nhowever, be necessary to complement an asymmetric corridor with \na creative mix of instruments, directives and institutional changes \nthat will progressively reduce the extent of market segmentation, \nconcentration and asymmetries in key markets: money, equities and \nforex \nmarkets. \nMarket \nsegmentation, \nconcentration \nand \nasymmetries significantly distort the pricing and allocation functions \nthe markets while generating a set of avoidable opportunity costs. \nWithout significantly improving market functioning, it will be difficult \nto repair the transmission mechanisms which have been undermined \nby dysfunctions in global financial markets. I remain convinced of \nthe need for a forward-looking monetary policy regime anchored in \n(1) a creative mix of policies and institutional changes; (2) effective \nmonetary-fiscal policy and strategic coordination system and (3) \nsound macro-prudential and micro-prudential regulations. \n \n34 \n \n6.0 \nMOGHALU, KINGSLEY CHIEDU \nI believe the policy choices facing the MPC at this meeting are \nwhether to leave the Monetary Policy Rate unchanged at this time \nor to further tighten monetary policy in the face of an uptick in \ninflation. \nWith year-on-year headline inflation having increased to 8.2 per cent \nin June 2014 from 8 per cent in May, food inflation recording a \nmarginal increase to 9.8 per cent from 9.7 per cent in May, and with \ncore inflation at 8.1 per cent in June from 7.7 per cent in May – an \nunquestionably sharp increase – the questions are: \n(a) \nWhat do we do in the face of a seeming reassertion of \ninflationary trends? \n(b) \nHow can the trilemma be resolved between the present \nlevels of inflation that may ultimately break out of the MPC’s \npreviously declared inflation target of single digit-inflation, the \ndesirability of reducing the MPR in order to further support \neconomic growth, set against the need to maintain price \nstability (without which, in any event, there will be no real \ngrowth in a situation of monetary instability), if need be with \nfurther monetary tightening. \nIn my mind, the goal of monetary easing is a medium to longer-term \none. It was never the expectation that monetary policy would \n35 \n \nremain permanently tight or even so for any longer than is necessary. \nBut there is no rational basis or data that would support a reduction \nin the MPR at this time. The Committee’s main course of action \nshould be to hold rates where they are for now, because inflation \nfigures, while a cause for some concern, are not one for alarm \neither. The MPC should monitor the monetary horizon carefully and \nbe prepared to act as required should inflationary trends not be \nreversed, or at least contained, in the months ahead. \nTaking a forward view, monetary policy will likely be challenged by \nthe trilemma indicated above in the last quarter of the year if \ninflation levels continue to rise, liquidity in the system remains high (in \nparticular given the anticipated redemption of Asset management \nCorporation of Nigeria (AMCON) bonds held by private creditors, in \nOctober 2014), and the United States Federal Reserve bank ends its \nquantitative easing program in that period as the Fed has indicated. \nThe present and near-term scenario is counter-balanced somewhat \nby the fact that there are possible options besides increasing the \nMPR, for example increasing the private sector cash reserve ratio. \n36 \n \nThe depletion of the country’s external reserves appears to have \nbeen stanched by a number of measures taken by the CBN to \nsanitize the bureau de change segment of the market, as well as \nimproved collaboration between the monetary and fiscal authorities \nand a gradual rebuilding of fiscal buffers. \nAccordingly, I believe the MPC should continue to hold its powder \ndry, for now, in relation to a shift either towards loosening or \ntightening policy should monetary conditions so warrant. \nI therefore vote to: \n Hold the MPR at 12 per cent \n Maintain the minimum liquidity ratio at 30 per cent \n Maintain a symmetric MPR corridor of plus/minus 200 basis \npoints \n Maintain the CRR on public sector deposits at 75 per cent and \nthat on private deposits at 12 per cent. \n \n7.0 \nSALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nThe Research Forum which preceded this meeting of the MPC \nprovided, as usual, an opportunity for a stimulating and wide ranging \n37 \n \ndiscussion of background issues relevant to Monetary Policy decision \nmaking in the short and medium term. Perhaps the most significant \ntake-away from this session for me is a reinforcement of my view that \nwe are heading into a period when some very significant changes \nwill have to come if the objectives of keeping inflation suppressed \nand the exchange rate stable without compromising growth is to be \nrealized. Some very important but difficult choices will have to be \nmade – indeed, as I had written in my Statement at the conclusion \nof the previous meeting, there will be few occasions in the future \nwhen we will have the luxury of voting to keep policy unchanged. \n \nTo begin with, recent trends in inflation data and the outlook for the \nrate of increase in prices provided by Bank Staff point, in the short \nterm, to the balance of probabilities tilting towards tighter monetary \npolicy as Headline inflation is projected to rise to 9.4percent at the \nend of the year. Whilst Headline Inflation remains within the band of \n6-9percent announced for this year, the recent upward trend across \nall definitions of inflation would ordinarily be a cause for concern. \nHowever, 6mth ahead projections by Bank Staff suggest that the \n38 \n \nrate of increase in prices of non-food items will decline continuously \nfrom the 8.1percent in June to close the year at 6.5percent. In \ncontrast, the price of Food items is projected to rise to 11.6percent \nby year end. \n \nPerhaps a bigger worry in the short-term continues to be the pressure \non the Currency. The banks continue, thanks to AMCON \ndisbursement and slow growth in credit, to be awash with liquidity – \nwitness Interbank Call rates remaining below the MPR and the \nabsence of activity in the interbank markets. It is increasingly difficult \nto escape the conclusion that bankers are/maybe up to the usual \ngame of running rings around the regulator! Despite a NOP limit of \n1percent, at the end of H1-2014, consolidated commercial bank \nforeign currency assets exceeded their liabilities by approximately \n30percent. The questions around and risks of this position are self-\nevident. \n \nBeyond the banks and despite the US$1.9billion increase in accretion \nto forex reserves that took the reserves slightly past US$40bn in July \n39 \n \n2014, there continues to be an uneasy feeling about the Naira \nabroad - see the seemingly relentless increase in private holdings of \nforeign currency at the expense of Naira deposit. \n \nThe real issue on which to reflect is whether the time for a change of \nmonetary policy regime is appropriate and what conditions must \nhold for such a change to be sustainable. \n \nTo begin with there are now serious data challenges which need to \nbe resolved. The World Bank in its document – Nigeria Economic \nReport, released immediately after the MPC challenges the notion of \nan unemployment rate in excess of 20percent. If, as the report \nsuggests, unemployment is less than 10percent, a key pillar for easing \nmonetary policy will need to be rebuilt. \n \nI have also followed with interest the media discussion about the \npossibility of creating additional intervention funds to deal with issues \nin sectors as diverse as Power, Health and Rice. I am not sure if I am \nalone in wondering whether the balance sheet of the Central Bank \n40 \n \ncan bear the additional strain that such intervention will impose. I \nhad hoped that rebuilding the Balance sheet of the Central Bank \nwould be a major task to be accomplished in the relative calm that \nhas followed the crisis in 2009/2010. It appears to that the discussions \nhave lost sight of the rationale for the creation of intervention funds. \nWith banking sector crisis and locked credit markets, the Central \nBank of Nigeria (CBN), like many other Central Banks, intervened \ndirectly to make credit available to the economy. Though \nunconventional, the measure, as I recollect the MPC discussion at \nthe time, was intended as one-off! \n \nIntervention funds, such as were created, are essentially fiscal policy \ninstruments. Indeed, I seem to recollect the vilification of the CBN at \nthe time for straying into the domain of fiscal policy! It appears that \nhaving acquired a taste for ‘intervention’, how do we wean \nourselves off this? In my view there are other market-based \ninstruments that can serve the intended purpose just as well – \nperhaps better! A significant shock in the near future will find us de-\nnuded and unable to respond meaningfully! Let us be clear, the \n41 \n \nbanking sector intervention fund, which is what I regard AMCON to \nbe, has shown issues and thrown up challenges which we need to \nunderstand carefully before proceeding further in this direction. \n \nThe clamour for lower interest rates, which I understand are already \nforming the basis of market expectation in various post-election \nscenarios - also require some reflection. The desirability of lower \ninterest rates is not at issue – at the very least, it reduces costs, \nenhances competitiveness and can provide a boost to job creation \nand the economy. Movement towards lower interest can happen \nsustainably in either of the following circumstances: (i) when our \nforex buffers are rebuilt – however, question is what level of reserves \nwill afford that capacity to reduce interest rates without creating \nmore difficulty; (ii) when we revise our present forex distribution \narrangements – key question here is having become used to \nsubsidized access to foreign currency at the R/WDAS window, are \nwe ready to wean this economy away from subsidy. Revising our \nforex distribution method will doubtless have implications for value \nand perhaps volatility. \n42 \n \nAs I indicated at the top of my comments, difficult decisions lie \nahead. Whilst our present circumstances allow me, on this occasion, \nto vote to hold policy parameters unchanged, I think we are \nheading into a period when we will have limited options but to \nconfront the hard choices ahead. \n \n8.0 \nUCHE, U. CHIBUIKE \nThe data presented at the 239th MPC meeting show that the \neconomic and financial outlook of the Nigerian economy continues \nto be mixed. On the negative side, all the main measures of inflation: \nfood, headline and core, have inched upwards albeit slightly. Also, \nour banking system, although stable has come under increasing \npressure thus the number of banks that failed at least one of the \nsafety ratio tests have increased marginally. Arguably the most \ntroubling development and perhaps the greatest threat to financial \nsystem stability in Nigeria is the increasing dollarization of the banking \nsystem. This creates structural risks especially given the fact that there \nis an increasing dysfunction between interest earnings and interest \nexpenses risks in most of the culprit banks. The exchange rate of the \n43 \n \nNigerian Naira, although stable has continued to lie outside the \nofficially allowed band margins and with the imminence of the 2015 \nelections, there are concerns that increased government spending \nwill add fodder to the already existing pressure on the Naira \nexchange rate. \nOn the positive side, our reserves have been inching upwards albeit \nmarginally while the growth rate of our newly rebased economy \ncontinues to be in positive territory. In the light of some of the above \npressures, some may argue that there is need for further tightening of \nmonetary policy in order to proactively curtail inflation and promote \nmonetary stability. At the current time, however, I have come to the \ncareful conclusion that such a policy move will be an error. This is in \npart because monetary stability is not an end in itself. Rather, its \nprincipal objective is to help promote real sector development. \nTightening money supply at the present time will only lead to the \ncrowding out of the real sector in the credit market by the public \nsector which, at least currently, has less restraint when it comes to \ndemand for borrowing. This insatiable demand by the Nigerian \n44 \n \npublic sector for credit has, at least in part, created the unfortunate \ncircumstances that have encouraged foreign portfolio flows to \nprosper and flourish unabated in Nigeria. While in the short run such \ninflows have been an important pillar in our ability to reasonably \nmaintain exchange rate stability in Nigeria, I am convinced that the \nconsequences of such uncontrolled short term portfolio inflows will \ngreatly harm our economy in the medium term. Given the general \nbut gradual movement towards tapering by the key Western country \nthat has been at the centre of global credit expansion, for instance, \nit is logical to expect that some material outflows of foreign portfolio \ninvestments may occur in Nigeria in the near future. Since the \nmovement of foreign portfolio flows in Nigeria is not entirely within our \ncontrol, it makes little sense to allow such investments unfettered \naccess to our economy. \nIn the light of the above, I believe the time has come for us to begin \nto develop policies that will gradually encourage future portfolio \ninflows to take a long term position in our economy. I have \nspecifically recommended that we target future portfolio inflows so \n45 \n \nas not to ignite unnecessary panic amongst existing investors. A \nmore radical change of policy will certainly not be in the interest of \nour fragile economy. While the measure proposed above may not \nbe easy, to do nothing will only further increase the powers of such \nforeign portfolio flows in the Nigerian economy. This will no doubt be \nto the detriment of our economic development and growth. \nAdmittedly, our economy’s addiction to foreign portfolio flows has \nimmense short term benefits especially in the area of assisting the \nexchange rate stability of the Naira. Unfortunately, addiction to \nforeign portfolio flows mimics all the characteristics of drug addiction \nand thus can never lead to a happy ending unless the dependence \nis ended. \nAlthough I am reluctant to propose further tightening of our current \nmonetary policy stance at the present time, I believe that there is still \nmuch we can do administratively to enhance the availability of \ncredit to the real sector of our economy at reasonable rates. In this \ndirection, I am particularly worried about the increasing margins \nbetween deposit and lending rates of commercial banks. While this \n46 \n \nmay have been responsible for the relatively handsome profits banks \ncontinue to declare in Nigeria, it will, in the long run harm the \nintermediation process which is the primary basis and foundation of \nbanking business. Convincing the banks that continued exploitation \nof the imperfect markets in which intermediation currently take \nplace will in the long run be self-destructive should not be too \ndifficult to achieve. Protagonists of the view that market forces are \nthe main explanatory variable for the widening gap between \ndeposit and lending rates in Nigeria have since lost their audience. \nWith respect to the need to achieve stability in the exchange rate of \nthe Naira, there are unfortunately no easy options in a mono \nproduct import dependent economy. It is for instance public \nknowledge that should, for instance, the international price of oil \ncollapse, the relative stability that the Naira exchange rate has been \nexperiencing for some time now will disappear. This clearly shows \nthat in a fiscally dominant environment, there are limits to what \nmonetary policy can do. I am, however, convinced that as our \ndemocracy develops and deepens, the balance of power in our \n47 \n \ngovernance structure will gradually shift to the advantage of the \nelectorate. When this happens, any government that is unable to \ndiversify our mono product economy will be severely punished by \nthe electorate during elections. There will therefore be a natural \nincentive for governments to reduce the dependence of the \nNigerian economy on crude oil. Until that time, all we can do is to \nencourage government to adopt fiscally prudent economic policies. \nIn the light of the above factors, I hereby vote as follows: (1) to retain \nMPR at 12 percent with interest rate corridor of + 200/- 200 basis \npoints; (2) to retain CRR at on private sector and government \ndeposits at 15 percent and 75 percent respectively, and; (3) to retain \nLiquidity Ratio at 30 percent. \n \n9.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \nI vote to hold the MPR at its current level of 12%, along with the \nsymmetric corridor of +/-2%, the CRR on public sector deposits at the \ncurrent level of 75% and 15% for private deposits. \nMy decision is based on the following considerations: \n48 \n \nTrends in the Global Economy \nThe predominant features of the global economy at the moment \nare the fairly established growth recovery in the US, with improving \nemployment figures; some recovery in Japan; weak growth in the \nEurozone area, with Germany in a slighter better situation. China’s \ngrowth has been largely stable with a slight downward cast. Growth \nremains strong in most of Africa, although slightly lower than in 2013. \nQE3 continues be rolled back in the US, monetary easing is being \nmaintained in the UK and the ECB is deploying some tools to \nstimulate the European economy. In all these areas, inflation is \ncurrently lower than policy goals and global prices are also \nsubdued. \nWhile imported inflation from our main trading partners is not an issue \nat the moment, the progressive tapering of QE3 in the US poses \nconsiderable challenges to the management of foreign reserves, \nexchange rate and banking/financial systems \n49 \n \nThe international price of crude oil has been fairly steady, although \nthe many conflicts raging in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the \nvolatile situation in some North African countries may engender \nsome volatility in the near future. \n Moreover, it should be repeated that there are significant medium \nthreats to the oil revenues of Nigeria from the rapid expansion in \nsupply of shale oil and gas from the US and other countries \nDomestic Economy \nThe GDP growth rate in Q1 of 2014 remains robust at 6.21%, despite \nthe higher base, which is an improvement over 2013. The growth \nprospects also remain bright due to the stable oil prices, supportive \npolicies, particularly in the agriculture, energy and industrial sectors. \nMoreover, some of the sub-sectors in the non-oil sector continue to \naccount for much of the growth momentum. \nThe most significant challenges to growth prospects relate to the \ninsecurity in the North-eastern part of the country; the persistently \nhigh level of unemployment (despite some recent improvement in \n50 \n \nthe numbers), and in particular graduate unemployment; continuing \noil theft and vandalism of oil and gas infrastructure (although there \nhas been an increase in oil output in June 2014); the risk of political \ntensions in the run-up to the general elections in the country; \nchallenges to the foreign reserve level (despite the improvement in \nJune 2014). Pervasive corruption continues to undermine growth. \nHuge income inequalities also need to be addressed. \nThe foreign exchange rate has remained stable for about 3 years \nsignificantly due to strong policy intervention, although pressures are \nmounting on the rate due to future expectations related to QE3 \ntapering. The capital and money markets, despite fluctuations, are \ncurrently fairly stable. \nHeadline inflation, year-on-year, has increased to 8.17% in June 2014, \ndriven largely by increases in food and non-alcoholic beverages, \nclothing and footwear, housing, water, electricity, gas sectors and \ntransport. Core inflation is the main overall driver for the currently \ninflationary hike. \n51 \n \nInterest rates, already too high, have risen further in the last month. \nThe gap between lending and deposit rates, again already high, has \nincreased slightly. Broadly, the financial system remains stable. \nFederal government fiscal operations have generated an overall \nsurplus in the January-May 2014 period. However, this has largely \nbeen achieved at the expense of significant reductions in capital \nexpenditure, which will undermine growth prospects in the medium \nterm. \nConclusion \nGrowth rates and growth prospects remain strong, although major \nefforts need to be made to ensure that growth is accompanied by \nimproved income inequality, reduction in poverty and substantial job \ngrowth. \nWhile high lending rates are an abiding concern, it is not appropriate \nat this time to reduce the policy rate or otherwise ease monetary \npolicy. This is due to the upward trend in headline inflation and core \ninflation in particular, heightened inflation expectations in the next six \n52 \n \nmonths particularly for food prices, increasing pressures on the \nforeign exchange rate and the possible threats to foreign reserves if \nthere is an acceleration of reverse capital flows. There is clearly a \nneed to keep a close watch on these developments and to respond \neffectively at the right time. I therefore vote to retain the currently \ntight monetary stance. \n \n10.0 GODWIN EMEFIELE, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF \nNIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nThe 239th meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee was held \nagainst the backdrop of a tentative recovery in the international \neconomic and financial environment. As the impact of the global \nfinancial crisis have continued to wane, issues of rising income \ninequality, unemployment and poverty are becoming the main \nfocus of the monetary authorities around the world, in line with the \nnew normal monetary policy. This situation has prompted a rethink of \nthe entire paradigm of focusing primarily on price stability. \nAlthough \nmonetary \npolicy \nmakers \nrecognize \nthe \nstrong \ninterconnectedness of economies and the enormous scope for \n53 \n \nspillovers, they have been largely influenced in their considerations \nby the stability of domestic financial markets and monetary \nconditions during these highly uncertain times. The recent projections \nshow that the euro area is slowly coming out of recession and \ngrowth could restart in 2015. The peripheral countries, on the other \nhand are expected to experience low domestic demand due to \nhigh debt and financial fragmentation. Growth is projected at 5.0 \nper cent in the emerging and developing countries in 2014 from 4.7 \nper cent in 2013. \nLike in most jurisdictions, the US Federal Reserve embarked on a \nmassive quantitative easing (QE) programme since 2008 primarily to \nsoothe domestic concerns around output and employment in the \nface of obvious failure of traditional monetary policy to stimulate \naggregate demand. The Fed has since begun to scale back its \nstimulus package with improving macroeconomic performance. \nHowever, this has important consequences for emerging markets \nand \nfrontier \neconomies, \nincluding \nNigeria, \nwhich \nattracted \nsignificant private capital flows following QE programme. In effect, \n54 \n \nthe most crucial external consideration for monetary policy makers in \nemerging markets and frontier economies today appears to be how \nto mitigate the adverse consequences of QE tapering for markets, \ncurrencies and financial flows. \nDomestically, the macroeconomy has exhibited relative stability as \nshown by the encouraging growth rates, stable consumer prices, \nand exchange rate as well as rising external reserves. The latest \nfigures from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) suggest that \neconomic growth is still comparatively impressive even after the \nrebasing exercise. Estimated growth rate for 2013 at 5.5 per cent \ncompares favourably with 5.3 and 4.21 percent observed in 2011 \nand 2012, respectively. Similarly, the revised estimate of 6.8 per cent \nfor the fourth quarter of 2013 represented an improvement over the \n5.2 and 3.6 percent in the previous quarter and the corresponding \nperiod of 2012, respectively. The naira exchange rate at the r-DAS \nand interbank interest rates has also remained well anchored by \nprevailing policies. Inflation has remained contained within the \n55 \n \nBank’s target zone of 6 - 9 percent, though headline inflation inched \nfrom 8.0 percent in May 2014 to 8.17 percent in June. \nWhile I recognize this gradually rising inflationary trend, the \nchallenges posed by high unemployment and limited access to \ncredit deserve to be factored into any considerations aimed at \nimproving the robustness of growth and ensuring the sustainability of \nprice stability. I also recognize other concerns for monetary policy to \ninclude the on-going QE3 tapering for inflows and external reserves, \nlikely increase in government expenditure in preparation for the 2015 \ngeneral elections and balancing the need for low interest rate with \nprice stability. \nAccordingly, the options for monetary policy facing the MPC appear \nto me to be either retention of the current stance of monetary policy \nwhile employing other non-conventional means to support a \nresolution of the broad development bottlenecks or a reduction in \nthe policy rate to stimulate credit to the real sector of the economy. \nHaving considered these developments, I vote as follows: \n56 \n \n1. Hold the MPR at 12 per cent with a corridor of +/-200 basis \npoints \n2. Retain liquidity ratio at 30 per cent \n3. Maintain the public sector Cash Reserve Requirement at 75.0 \nper cent; and \nRetain the private sector Cash Reserve Requirement at 15.0 per \ncent.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/CBN Communique of 239th MPC Meeting on 22 July 2014  WPS doc.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/1cebf107cd41dc962f134e80662c1db7.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "1cebf107cd41dc962f134e80662c1db7", "text": "[image]\nContent on this page requires a newer version of\nAdobe Flash Player.\n[image]\nPART ONE\nCHAPTER 1: ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL BANK O\nCHAPTER 2:MONETARY POLICY, SURVEILLANCE A\nCHAPTER 5 AND OPERATIONS OF THE CBN IN 201\nPART TWO\nCHAPTER 3: THE GLOBAL ECONOMY\nCHAPTER 4: FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nCHAPTER 5: FISCAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE\nCHAPTER 6: REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nCHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS\nCHAPTER 8: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/Annual Report 2010.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/21e8647a44009b964f9d35a4296f4124.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "21e8647a44009b964f9d35a4296f4124", "text": "1 \n \n \nCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUE NO. 121 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING OF WEDNESDAY 21ST AND THURSDAY 22ND NOVEMBER, \n2018 \n \nBackground \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 21st and 22nd of \nNovember, 2018, amidst a resurgence of global inflationary pressures, \nincreased fragilities in the global financial markets, weakening crude oil \nprices, \ncontinuous \ncapital \nflow \nreversal \nand \nmoderate \ncurrency \ndepreciations, especially in the emerging markets as well as a strengthening \nUS dollar and subdued global economic growth outlook. The Committee \nappraised recent developments in the global and domestic macroeconomic \nand financial environments, as well as the economic outlook for the first half \nof 2019. In attendance were eleven (11) members of the Committee. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the contraction in global output, underpinned largely \nby escalating trade tensions resulting in widespread uncertainty and waning \ninvestor confidence. Consequently, global growth in 2018 has been \ndowngraded to 3.7 per cent from the earlier projection of 3.9 per cent. \nGrowth softened in major advanced economies in the third quarter of 2018. \nIn the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), growth \nremained divergent, reflecting a combination of country-specific factors. \nThus, growth in the advanced economies is expected to remain at 2.4 per \ncent in 2018, supported by strong output growth in the US projected at 2.9 \n2 \n \nper cent. The U.S. expansionary fiscal stance, strong wage growth and \ncontinued inflow of capital into U.S. dollar denominated assets, are expected \nto provide the impetus for growth. In the United Kingdom, growth remained \nweak, hampered by uncertainties around Brexit negotiations. Growth in the \nEuro Area, projected at 2.0 per cent, appears to be subdued by low \ndomestic aggregate demand amidst relatively high unemployment and \nreduced global trade. In the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies, \ngrowth was revised downwards to 4.7 per cent from the earlier projection of \n4.9 per cent, largely in anticipation of a slowdown in China as the country is \nconfronted with an adverse external trade environment. \nOverall, the downside risks to global economic activity remained: elevated \nfinancial fragilities and policy uncertainties, the gradual erosion of rule-based \nmultilateral trading system, tighter financial conditions with latent disruptive \nportfolio adjustments, increased capital flow reversals with potentials for \nheightened exchange rate depreciation and some volatility, fiscal fragilities \nand increased debt burden, geo-political tensions and increasingly \ndepressed aggregate demand in some countries. These factors will continue \nto shape developments for the rest of 2018 and into 2019. \nThe MPC also noted that monetary policy in most advanced economies, \nparticularly the US, continued on a path of normalisation in view of strong \nwage growth and declining unemployment. The Bank of England hiked its \npolicy rate in August 2018, while the European Central Bank (ECB) has given \nguidance to terminate its asset purchase programme in December 2018. The \nCommittee was concerned that these developments will in the medium \nterm, accentuate capital flow reversals from emerging and developing \neconomies, including Nigeria. \nDomestic Output Developments \nThe Committee noted the positive outlook for output growth, evidenced by \nthe Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers Indexes \n(PMI), which stood at 56.8 and 57.0 index points, respectively, in October \n3 \n \n2018, indicating expansion for the 19th and 18th consecutive months. This was \nattributed to the stability in the foreign exchange market, implementation of \nthe 2018 capital budget and the on-going intervention of the Central Bank of \nNigeria (CBN) in the real sector of the economy. However, the recent \nincidence of flooding across the country and the impact of herdsmen attack \non farming communities could affect output growth for the rest of the year. \nOverall, the Committee believes that, even though output recovery remains \nfragile, the effective implementation of the 2018 capital budget, relative \nimprovements in power supply, progress with counter-insurgency in the North-\nEast and sustained intervention by the CBN in the real sector, will improve the \ninvestment climate and reduce unemployment. Consequently, the MPC \nreaffirmed its support for all initiatives designed to stimulate domestic output \ngrowth. \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe Committee noted that broad money (M2) grew by 6.52 per cent in \nOctober 2018 over its level at the end-December 2017; and annualised to a \ngrowth rate of 7.82 per cent, which was below the provisional benchmark of \n10.48 per cent for 2018. The growth in M2 was largely due to the significant \ngrowth in Net Foreign Assets (NFA) which grew by 20.71 per cent in October \n2018, annualised to 24.85 per cent which is above the 2018 provisional growth \nbenchmark of 14.50 per cent. Credit to Government and Net Domestic \nCredit (NDC) expanded by 7.43 and 2.71 per cent, annualized to 8.92 and \n3.26 per cent, respectively; but below the annual benchmark of 13.10 and \n17.40 \nper \ncent, \nrespectively. \nCredit \nto \nthe \nprivate \nsector \ngrossly \nunderperformed as it grew by 1.94 per cent, annualised to 2.33 per cent, \nbelow the 2018 benchmark of 12.40 per cent. The underperformance of the \nmonetary aggregates was of concern to the MPC, which urged the CBN to \nensure improved credit delivery to the small and medium scale industries, \nparticularly to the unbanked urban and rural populations. \nThe Committee noted the benign performance of inflation, as headline \ninflation (year-on-year) decreased to 11.26 per cent in October 2018 from \n4 \n \n11.28 per cent in September 2018 after two consecutive months of marginal \nincreases. The drop in headline inflation was driven by food inflation, which \nmoderated to 13.28 per cent in October from 13.31 per cent in September \n2018. Core inflation, however, inched up marginally to 9.9 per cent in \nOctober 2018 from 9.8 per cent in the previous month. On a month-on-month \nbasis, headline and food inflation also moderated to 0.74 and 0.82 per cent \nin October from 0.84 and 1.0 per cent in September 2018, respectively, while \ncore inflation increased from 0.64 per cent in September 2018 to 0.80 per \ncent in October 2018. \nThe Committee noted that the moderation in inflation was largely seasonally \ndriven and was therefore, unsustainable as prices were expected to pick \ntowards the end of the year. However, the MPC observed that the near-term \nupside risks to inflation remained; the disruption to agricultural production \nand distribution arising from flooding, insurgency in the North-East, herdsmen-\nfarmer crisis, high cost of energy, anticipated spending in the run-up to \nChristmas festivities and campaign-related spending towards the upcoming \n2019 \ngeneral \nelections. \nAccordingly, \nthe \nCommittee \nenjoined \nthe \nappropriate authorities to continue to address these challenges and to \nsustain the implementation of the 2018 budget and the Economic Recovery \nand Growth Plan of the Federal Government to ameliorate the supply side \nconstraints. \nMoney market interest rates oscillated throughout the review period, \nreflecting fluctuations in banking system liquidity. Inter-bank call and Open \nBuy Back (OBB) rates, which stood at 16.00 and 17.08 per cent, respectively, \non September 26, 2018, declined moderately to 14.00 and 16.31 per cent, \nrespectively, on October 24, 2018. On average, interbank call and OBB rates \nrose from 8.68 and 7.64 per cent in September 2018 to 14.18 and 13.93 per \ncent, respectively, in October 2018, closing at 10.00 and 9.72 per cent, \nrespectively, on November 21, 2018. The developments in net liquidity \nposition and flows which culminated in higher market rates reflected the \nimpact of higher risk perception in the market, withdrawals from the banking \n5 \n \nsystem for monthly statutory disbursements to states and local governments; \nOMO sales and foreign exchange interventions. \nThe average naira exchange rate remained relatively stable and converging \nat both the Bureau-de-Change (BDC) and the Investors’ and Exporters’ (I&E) \nwindow segments of the foreign exchange market during the review period. \nThe exchange rate at the I&E window opened at N364.00/US$ and closed at \nN363.90/US$ with a daily average of N363.87/US$ between September 26 \nand November 16, 2018. At the BDC segment, the exchange rate opened at \nN360.00/US$ and closed at N361.85/US$, with a daily average of N360.98/US$, \nover the same period. The relative stability in the foreign exchange market, \nthe MPC noted, was attributable to the sustained policies of the Bank to \nincrease the supply of foreign exchange from autonomous sources. Gross \nofficial reserves decreased from US$42.60 billion at end-September, 2018 to \nUS$41.53 billion on 16th November, 2018. \nThe Committee noted the bearish trend in the equities segment of the capital \nmarket during the review period. Thus, All-Share Index (ASI) decreased by \n8.70 per cent from 34,848.45 on August 31, 2018 to 32,058.28 on November 16, \n2018. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) decreased by 8.72 per cent from \nN12.72 trillion to N11.70 trillion during the same period. Relative to the end-\nDecember 2017, the indices decreased by 19.29 and 16.32 per cent, \nrespectively. These developments largely reflect the sustained profit taking \nactivities by portfolio investors as foreign yields become increasingly more \nattractive abroad. The MPC, however, believes that this trend will reverse in \nthe medium term given the current efforts at further improving investor \nconfidence and the relative stability in the Investors and Exporters (I&E) \nwindow of the foreign exchange market. \n \nThe Overall Outlook and Risks \nForecasts of key macroeconomic variables indicate a positive outlook for the \neconomy in Q4 of 2018. The Committee expects that the effective \nimplementation of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and the \n6 \n \n2018 budget, improvements in the security challenges, enhanced flow of \ncredit to the real sector and stability in the foreign exchange market will \nredirect the economy on a path of inclusive and sustainable growth. \nIncreased production in the oil and the non-oil sectors are also expected to \ndrive output growth in the medium term. The Committee, however, \nacknowledged the downside risks to this outlook to include: reduced portfolio \ninflows, weak of fiscal buffers, low domestic credit, and sluggish aggregate \ndemand. \nThe inflation outlook suggests continued but moderate inflationary pressure to \nthe end of 2018, based largely on increased consumer spending for the \nChristmas festivities, election-related expenditure and increased pace of \nimplementation of the 2018 Federal government budget. Improvements in \nthe security, increased harvests as well as a stable exchange rate are \nexpected to moderate the rise in inflation. \nOverall, the outlook for the economy remains positive with a growth \nprojection of 1.75 per cent in 2018. \nCommittee’s Considerations \nThe Committee assessed the macroeconomic environment in 2018 and \nnoted the modest stability thus far achieved in domestic prices, output \ngrowth and the financial system. The Committee noted that the economy \nwas on the right path but some key sectors continued to experience \nsignificant challenges. The MPC, however, expressed concern about the \ntepid growth expectations and growing uncertainty in the global financial \nmarkets arising from the poor reception of the Brexit deal by British politicians, \ncontinuing trade war between the US and her major trading partners, as well \nas the commencement of US sanctions on Iran. \nThe Committee believed that although the domestic economy was \nrecovering modestly from recession, however, the recovery was tepid and \nefforts should be stepped up to strengthen aggregate output and demand. \nIn this regard, the Committee urged the CBN to deepen and broaden access \n7 \n \nto finance to high employment elastic sectors with particular emphasis on \nsmall and medium scale enterprises. The Committee called on the CBN to \nextend the success recorded under the Anchor Borrowers Programme to \nother items including fish and palm oil, etc. by introducing more stringent \nmeasures to curb access to foreign exchange for products that can be \nproduced within Nigeria. \nThe MPC welcomed the moderation in inflation in October, reflecting \ndeclining food prices. The Committee believes that given the negative \noutput gap, the proposed increase in the national minimum wage would \nstimulate output growth due to prolonged weak aggregate demand arising \nfrom salary arrears and contractor debt. Consequently, its impact on the \naggregate price level would be largely muted, given that the monetary \naggregates have largely underperformed in fiscal 2018. In addition, the \nprevailing stability in the foreign exchange market would continue to \nmoderate pressures on the domestic price level. \nThe MPC noted the improvements in the financial stability indicators, \nincluding non-performing loans, capital adequacy and liquidity ratios of the \nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs). It urged the Bank to sustain its surveillance over \nthe Banking industry by taking prompt corrective measures to further improve \nstability in the system. The Committee also called on the fiscal authorities to \nbuild significant buffers to strengthen the efficacy of monetary policy. \nOverall, the MPC considered the options to loosen, hold or tighten. The \nCommittee continues to hold the view that although loosening would \nencourage the flow of credit to the real sector, help in reduction of the \naggregate cost of credit and spur business spending and investment, thereby \nreinforcing the CBN’s support for output growth and economic recovery, it, \nhowever, believed that doing so will reverse more rapidly, the gains of price \nand exchange rate stability achieved so far given the liquidity impact that \nwould entail. The ensuing liquidity will exert pressure on the exchange rate in \nthe light of increased capital flow reversals arising from monetary policy \nnormalisation by the US Fed. This would further depress the capital market. \n8 \n \n \nAs for tightening, The MPC hold the view that, while tightening will strengthen \nthe stability of the foreign exchange market because of its dampening effect \non the demand for foreign exchange, it was however convinced that this \nwould simultaneously dampen investment growth, widen the output gap, \ndepress aggregate demand and weaken output growth. \n \nThe MPC recognises the fact that it had held the policy rate and other policy \nparameters constant over the last several meetings. The Committee \nunderscores that by holding its policy position constant, it has confidence in \nthe various policies and administrative measures deployed by the Bank which \nhave resulted in the moderation in domestic price levels and stability in the \nforeign exchange rate. Thus, a hold position is an expression of confidence in \nthe policy regime, given the gradual improvements in both output growth \nand price stability. On this premise, the downside risks to growth and upside \nrisks to inflation appears contained. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nIn light of the above, the MPC decided by a vote of all eleven (11) members \npresent to HOLD. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 14 per cent; \n2. Retain the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the \nMPR; \n3. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \n4. Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd November, 2018", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 121 of the MPC Meeting Held on November 21 and 22, 2018.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/22e42c5fcd18eb305c7077c6d5a64a18.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "22e42c5fcd18eb305c7077c6d5a64a18", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO 120 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING OF MONDAY 24th AND TUESDAY 25th SEPTEMBER, 2018 \nBackground \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on the 24th and 25th of September, \n2018 and evaluated developments in the global and domestic economic and \nfinancial environments in the first eight months of 2018, as well as the outlook for \nthe rest of the year. Ten members of the Committee were in attendance. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the uneven expansion in global output amidst growing \ntrade tension, rising oil prices and debt levels as well as currency depreciation in \nmost of the notable emerging markets and developing economies. These \ndevelopments notwithstanding, there was evidence of resilient financial markets \nand output growth in the advanced economies led by the United States, which \nexperienced sharp improvements in output growth. In the Euro area, United \nKingdom and Japan, the pace of growth was moderate but steady, while in the \nEmerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), growth was sluggish and \nrelatively uneven. \n2 \n \nGrowth in the advanced economies was projected to remain at 2.4 per cent in \n2018, same as in 2017, led by the US which grew by 4.1 per cent in Q2 2018 and is \nprojected to grow by 2.9 per cent in 2018. The Euro area and Japan, grew by 0.4 \nand 0.7 per cent, respectively, in Q2 and are projected to grow by 2.2 and 1.0 \nper cent, respectively, in 2018. In the EMDEs and Developing Economies, growth \nis expected to remain strong at 4.9 per cent in 2018 compared with 4.7 per cent \nin 2017. Growth in the EMDEs is expected to be led by India and China, which \nare projected to grow by 7.3 and 6.6 per cent, respectively, in 2018. \nOn average, the momentum of the global economy remained on track towards \nachieving the 2018 growth projections of 3.9 per cent as financial conditions \nremain broadly favourable with limited spill over of trade tensions amongst the \ngeneral political sentiments. However, the recent episodes of large-scale flooding \nin major areas across the globe could pose some threat to growth. \nAccordingly, the MPC believes that rising oil prices, tighter financial conditions, \nhigher yields in the advanced economies and capital flow reversal from the \nEMDEs, resulting in pressure on currencies of some countries with fragile conditions, \nas well as growing trade tensions between the US and China, would continue to \nshape developments in the EMDEs in the medium term. \n Domestic Output Developments \nAvailable data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that real GDP \ngrowth declined by 45 basis points as the economy grew by 1.50 per cent in the \nsecond quarter of 2018, down from 1.95 per cent in the preceding quarter, but \n3 \n \nhigher than 0.72 per cent in the corresponding quarter of 2017. The growth \nslowdown was traceable to contraction in the oil sector in the second quarter of \n2018, compared with the previous quarter. The Committee noted that non-oil real \nGDP grew by 2.05 per cent, reflecting the strong performance of construction, \nservices and agriculture, which grew, by 7.66, 4.19 and 1.19 per cent, respectively. \nFurthermore, the non-oil sector was similarly supported by the stability in the \nforeign exchange market, continued implementation of the 2017 capital budget \nand the on-going interventions of the Bank in the real sector of the economy. \nThe MPC was of the view that even though growth remained weak, the effective \nimplementation of the 2018 FGN capital budget and policies that would \nencourage credit delivery to the real sector of the economy would boost \naggregate demand, stimulate economic activity and reduce unemployment in \nthe country. \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \n \nThe Committee noted that relative to the level at end-December 2017, Broad \nMoney (M2) grew by 2.98 per cent in August 2018, annualised to 4.47 per cent, \nbut below the provisional benchmark of 10.48 per cent for 2018. The growth in \nM2 was largely driven by growth in Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of 18.63 per cent in \nAugust 2018, annualised to 27.94 per cent and above the provisional growth \nbenchmark of 18.15 per cent for the year. Net Domestic Credit (NDC), however, \ncontracted by 4.18 per cent, annualized to 6.27 per cent, in contrast to the growth \nbenchmark of 12.45 per cent for 2018. The contraction in NDC was attributed to \nthe 34.68 per cent contraction in net credit to the Government in August 2018. \n4 \n \nConversely, credit to the private sector grew marginally by 0.81 per cent in August \n2018 from a contraction of 0.13 per cent in July 2018, annualized to 1.21 per cent, \nagainst the annual benchmark of 5.64 per cent. \nThe MPC observed that despite the under-performance of key monetary \naggregates, headline inflation (year-on-year) inched up to 11.23 per cent in \nAugust 2018, from 11.14 per cent in July 2018. The rise in headline inflation was \nfrom food, while core inflation declined, indicating that supply side factors were \ndriving the price increase. The near-term upside risks to inflation remained the \ndissipation of the base effect, expected 2019 election-related spending, \ncontinued herdsmen attack on farmers and the current episodes of flooding \nwhich has destroyed crops and would affect food supply and prices. In this \nregard, the Committee urged the fiscal authorities to ensure sustained \nimplementation of the 2018 budget to relieve the supply side growth constraints, \nas well as address the flooding incidence which has become perennial, on a \npermanent basis. \nThe average inter-bank call rate declined from 9.0 per cent in July 2018, to 4.0 per \ncent on September 20, 2018. Similarly, the average Open Buy Back (OBB) rate \ndeclined from 11.44 to 4.72 per cent over the same period. The relative decline \nin market rates reflected the increased statutory allocations to states and local \ngovernments and maturing securities. The development did not significantly \ntransmit to retail interest rates as average maximum lending rates marginally \ndeclined to 30.93 per cent in August from 31.09 per in July 2018. Similarly, average \nprime lending rate decreased to 16.65 per cent in August from 16.83 per cent in \n5 \n \nJuly 2018. The weighted average deposit rate also declined to 4.57 per cent in \nAugust from 4.79 per cent in July 2018, widening the spread between the average \nlending rate and weighted average deposit rate to 26.36 per cent in August 2018 \nfrom 26.30 per cent in July 2018. \nThe Committee noted the decrease in external reserves to US$44 billion on \nSeptember 20, 2018 from US$45 billion at the end-July 2018. Total foreign \nexchange inflow through the economy fell by 38.34 per cent to US$6.00 billion in \nJuly from US$9.73 billion in June 2018. The Committee believes that accretion to \nexternal reserves should strengthen in the last quarter of 2018, with crude oil price \nremaining above the budget benchmark price of US$51.00 per barrel and oil \nproduction increasing to 2.3 million barrels per day. \nThe Committee, noted the relative stability in both the Investors’ and Exporters’ \n(I&E) window of the foreign exchange market, which was sustained by \nautonomous inflows and measures taken by the Bank to deepen the foreign \nexchange market and curb speculative practices. \nThe MPC expressed concern at the decline in major capital market indices. The \nAll-Share Index (ASI) decreased by 14.99 per cent to 32,540.17 on September 21, \n2018 from 38,278.55 at end-June 2018. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) \ndecreased by 14.33 per cent to N11.38 trillion on September 21, 2018 from N13.87 \ntrillion at end-June 2018. The development was due largely to sustained profit-\ntaking by portfolio investors and capital reversals as foreign yields become \nincreasingly more attractive. \n6 \n \nThe Overall Outlook and Risks \nAvailable data and forecast of key macroeconomic indicators show a positive \noutlook for the economy in the third quarter of 2018. The Committee expects that \nsustained implementation of the 2018 budget, improvements in the security \nsituation and sustained stability in the foreign exchange market will stabilize prices \nand strengthen economic growth. Growth in the non-oil sector, especially \nagriculture, manufacturing, services and light industries are expected to drive \noutput growth over the medium term. The Committee, however, identified the \ndownside risks to the outlook to include: the impact of increased monetary policy \nnormalization in the advanced economies and the strengthening US dollar. \nOthers are: the late implementation of the 2018 budget, weakening demand and \nconsumer spending, build-up in contractor debt, low minimum wage, impact of \nflooding on agricultural output and other economic activities, continuing security \nchallenges across the North-East and North-Central zones, and growing level of \nsovereign debt. \nThe outlook for the year, however, remains positive as the economy is projected \nto grow by 1.75 per cent in 2018, anchored on continued stability in the foreign \nexchange market, sustained high price and production of oil and improved \nelectricity supply. \n Inflation outlook suggests a mild resurgence of inflationary pressure in the \neconomy, traceable largely to cost-push factors, election related spending, \namongst other domestic factors. The moderating factors to the outlook would \n7 \n \ninclude; improved power supply, increased expenditure on capital projects and \nimproved security conditions, all of which may exert downward pressure on \nconsumer prices in the near-term. \nThe Considerations of the Committee \nThe Committee appraised the macroeconomic environment and noted that at \nits July meeting, modest stability had been achieved in key indicators, including \ninflation, exchange rate and external reserves. In particular, relative stability had \nreturned to the foreign exchange market, buoyed by a robust level of external \nreserves with inflation trending downwards for the 18th consecutive month. These \ngains so far achieved appear to be under threat of reversal, following new data \nwhich provides evidence of weakening fundamentals. The Committee identified \nrising inflation and pressure on external reserves created by capital flow reversal \nas the current challenges to growth. It noted that inflationary pressures have \nstarted rebuilding and capital flow reversals have intensified as shown by the \nbearish trend in the equities market even though the exchange rate remains very \nstable. \nThe Committee was concerned that the exit from recession may be under threat \nas the economy slowed to 1.95 and 1.50 per cent in Q1 and Q2 2018, respectively. \nThe Committee noted that the slowdown emanated from the oil sector, with \nstrong linkages to employment and growth in other key sectors of the economy. \nIn this regard, the Committee urged government to take advantage of the \ncurrent rising oil prices to rebuild fiscal buffers, strengthen government finances in \n8 \n \nthe medium term and reverse the current trend of decline in output growth. The \nMPC also called on the fiscal authorities to intensify the implementation of the \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) to stimulate economic activity, \nbridge the output gap and create employment. \nThe Committee noted that disruptions to the food supply chain in major food \nproducing states due to the combined effects of poor infrastructure, flooding and \nthe on-going security challenges resulted in a rise in food prices, contributing to \nthe uptick in headline inflation. The Committee was, however, optimistic that as \nharvests progress in the coming months, pressure on food prices would gradually \nrecede, while growth enhancing measures would over the medium term have \nsome moderating impact on food prices. \nThe MPC expressed concern over the potential impact of liquidity injections from \nelection related spending and increase in FAAC distributions which is rising in \ntandem with increase in oil receipts. \nThe Committee was concerned with the rising level of non-performing loans in the \nbanking system, traced mainly to the oil sector and urged the Bank to closely \nmonitor and address the situation. It also expressed concern over the weak \nintermediation by Deposit Money Banks and its adverse impact on credit \nexpansion and investment growth by the private sector. \nIn view of the above developments, the MPC noted that the economy was still \nconfronted with growth headwinds and inflationary pressures. It reiterated the \nneed for synergy between monetary and fiscal policies as a viable option for \n9 \n \nmacroeconomic stability. The Committee, therefore, identified two likely policy \noptions as tightening or maintaining the status quo ante. Tightening would tame \ninflationary pressures, stem the reversal in portfolio capital, improve the external \nreserves position and maintain stability in the foreign exchange market. \nConversely, the MPC felt that raising rates would further weaken growth as credit \nwould become more expensive, NPLs would increase further, leading to a \ndeceleration in output. In the Committee’s opinion, the upward adjustment \nwould not only signal the Bank’s commitment to price stability but also its desire \nto maintain positive real interest rates. \nA decision to hold all policy parameters constant would sustain gradual \nimprovements in output growth, maintain the current monetary policy stance and \nawait a clearer understanding of the quantum and timing of liquidity injections \ninto the economy before deciding on possible adjustments. The MPC, however, \ncalled on the government to fast track the implementation of the 2018 budget to \nhelp jumpstart the process of sustainable economic recovery, and to facilitate \npassage of the Petroleum Industry Bill in order to increase the contribution of the \nsector to overall GDP. \n The Committee’s Decision \nIn light of the above, the MPC decided by a vote of seven (7) members to retain \nthe MPR at 14 per cent. However, three (3) out of these seven (7) members voted \nto raise the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) by 150 basis points, an indication \n10 \n \nthat left to them, we should have tightened. The other three (3) members voted \nto tighten by raising the MPR by 25 basis points. \n In summary, the MPC voted to: \nI. \nRetain the MPR at 14 per cent; \nII. \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of +200/-500 basis points around the \nMPR; \nIII. \nRetain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; and \nIV. \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \n \n \nThank you. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n25th September 2018", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUE NO 120 OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF MONDAY 24th AND TUESDAY 25th SEPTEMBER, 2018.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/24db48d3c24bcf3224ffda23bffd0e44.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "24db48d3c24bcf3224ffda23bffd0e44", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 93 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday 20 and Tuesday 21 January, 2014 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on January 20 and 21, 2014 \nagainst the backdrop of uncertainties in the global economy, \nespecially arising from the commencement of the QE3 tapering by the \nFed. In attendance were eight (8) out of the ten (10) members \nfollowing the retirement of Mr. Tunde Lemo, Deputy Governor, on \nJanuary 11, 2014 and Mr. John Oshilaja, an external member of the \nMPC, who completed his term on December 31, 2013. The Committee \nreviewed key global and domestic economic developments in 2013 \nand re-assessed the short- to medium-term risks to inflation, domestic \noutput and financial stability and the outlook for 2014. \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe global economy is expected to continue recovering from the \nglobal financial crisis, as growth is projected to accelerate in 2014. The \nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) projected global growth at 3.4 and \n3.5 per cent in 2014 and 2015, respectively, up from 2.4 per cent in \n2013. Some other sources, however, have produced less optimistic \nprojections of global growth for 2014; for example, the United Nations \nDepartment for Economic and Social Affairs’ (UNDESA) has projected 3 \nper cent growth. The decision by the US Federal Reserve to reduce its \nmonthly asset purchases from USD85 billion to USD75 billion left most \nmarkets stable having already priced-in the development. The \nquantitative easing measures by the US Federal Reserve had helped to \nrestore momentum to the US economy and also contributed to the \nimprovement of the Eurozone economy in 2013. \n \nEurope is forecast to return to growth in 2014 after two years of \ncontraction. Greece, which has been at the centre of the Bloc's \n2 \n \nbanking and debt crisis, is expected to record its first economic \nexpansion in six years. Emerging markets that were major beneficiaries \nof cheap money from the Fed stimulus could experience financial \nmarket instability as tapering begins, although the US authorities have \nmade it clear that they remain sensitive to the impact of their domestic \npolicies on global markets and will therefore aim to minimise \ndisruptions. \n \nGlobal inflation is projected to rise to 2.71 per cent in 2014, up from \nabout 2.30 per cent in 2013. Favorable developments in food and fuel \nsupply would moderate upward pressure on prices of major \ncommodities, despite the expected acceleration in global activity. The \nUS recorded inflation of 1.5 per cent in December, up from 1.2 per cent \nin November, 2013. \nMost central banks maintained a cautious posture in 2013, retaining or \nvarying policy rates only slightly. The financial markets expect monetary \nauthorities to continue with policies aimed at supporting growth in \n2014. In effect, monetary conditions are likely to remain easy in key \nadvanced economies over the short- to medium-term on the back of \nthe forward guidance that monetary authorities in these economies \nhave given, with regard to the conditions that must be met before any \nchange in policy stance comes into effect. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated real Gross Domestic \nProduct (GDP) growth rate of 7.67 per cent for the fourth quarter of \n2013, which was higher than the revised figure of 6.81 and 6.99 per cent \nrecorded in the third quarter, and the corresponding period of 2012, \nrespectively. Overall, growth rate for fiscal 2013 was estimated at 6.87 \nper cent up from 6.58 per cent in 2012. \nThe non-oil sector remained the major driver of growth, recording 8.73 \nper cent in the fourth quarter of 2013. The growth drivers in the non-oil \nsector remained agriculture; wholesale and retail trade; and services \n3 \n \nwhich contributed 1.64, 2.34, and 2.66 per cent, respectively. The \nrelatively robust growth performance despite sluggish global recovery \nreflected the continuing favourable climatic conditions for increased \nagricultural production, sustained outcome of banking sector reforms \nand macroeconomic stability. \n \nPrices \nThe moderation in inflationary pressure, which began in the fourth \nquarter of 2012, continued in 2013. The year-on-year headline inflation \nfell consistently from 9.0 per cent in January to 8.6 and 8.4 per cent in \nMarch and June, respectively, before ending the year at 8.0 per cent. \nAlso, food inflation, which constitutes 51.8 per cent of the CPI basket, \ndeclined from 10.1 per cent in January to 9.5, 9.6, 9.4 and 9.3 per cent \nin March, June, September, and December 2013, respectively. \nHowever, core inflation initially declined to 7.2 and 5.5 per cent in \nMarch and June from 11.3 per cent in January, but rose during the \nsecond half of the year to 7.4 and 7.9 per cent in September and \nDecember, 2013, respectively. The moderation in domestic price level \nwas largely due to the tight monetary policy stance coupled with the \nrelatively stable exchange rate regime during the period, which \nresulted in single digit inflation in the three measures for the whole year. \nThis is the first time the country has achieved this since 2007. \nThe Committee noted with satisfaction that the year-on-year headline \ninflation remained within the indicative target range of 6-9% in the \nsecond half of 2013. However, the Committee noted the underlining \npressure on core inflation, which may not be unconnected with the \nwidening spread between official and BDC exchange rates. In order to \nhead off the spectre of rising inflation in 2014, concrete actions will be \nneeded to stabilize the currency and minimize the divergence \nbetween the two segments of the foreign exchange market. \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Market Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) contracted by 4.82 per cent in December \n2013 over the level at end-December 2012, in contrast to the growth of \n16.39 per cent in the corresponding period of 2012. M2 was also below \n4 \n \nthe growth benchmark of 15.20 per cent for 2013. Aggregate domestic \ncredit (net) grew by 11.11 per cent in December 2013, over the end-\nDecember 2012 level. The aggregate domestic credit (net) at end-\nDecember 2013 was, however, below the provisional benchmark of \n22.98 per cent for 2013. The decline in M2 was due mainly to the \ndecrease in Net Foreign Assets by 5.86 per cent. \nInterest rates in all segments of the money market reflected the liquidity \nconditions in the banking system. At the MPC meeting of November 18-\n19, 2013, the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) was retained at 12.00 per \ncent with a symmetric corridor of +/- 200 basis points, thus effectively \nmaintaining the SLF and SDF rates at 14.00 and 10.00 per cent, \nrespectively. Alongside the existing Cash Reserve requirement (CRR) of \n12.0 per cent, the 50.0 per cent CRR on public sector deposits was \nretained \nto \naddress \nexcess \nliquidity \nin \nthe \nbanking \nsystem. \nConsequently, both the weighted average inter-bank call and OBB \nrates opened at 11.73 per cent in December 2012 but closed at 10.86 \nand 10.46 per cent in December 2013, respectively. \nThe capital market continued its rally with the equities market providing \nthe lead. The All-Share Index (ASI) increased by 47.2 per cent from \n28,078.81 on December 31, 2012 to 41,329.19 on December 31, 2013. \nMarket Capitalization (MC) increased by 47.4 per cent from N8.97 \ntrillion to N13.23 trillion during the same period. Improved earnings and \ninvestor confidence in macroeconomic management contributed to \nthe rise in stock prices. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe end-period exchange rate remained stable at the w/rDAS and \ninterbank segments but depreciated significantly at the BDC segment. \nThe exchange rate at the w/rDAS-SPT in 2013 opened at N157.33/US$ \n(including 1% commission) and closed at N157.26/US$, representing an \nappreciation of N0.07k or 0.04 per cent. The inter-bank selling rate \nopened at N156.25/US$ and closed at N159.90/US$, representing a \ndepreciation of N3.65k or 2.34 per cent for the period. However, at the \nBDC segment of the foreign exchange market, the selling rate opened \n5 \n \nat N159.50/US$ and closed at N172.00/US$, representing a depreciation \nof N12.50k or 7.84 per cent. \nGross external reserves as at December 31, 2013 stood at US$42.85 \nbillion, representing a decrease of US$ 0.98 billion or 2.23 per cent \ncompared with US$ 43.83 billion at end- December 2012. The \nCommittee noted that the decrease in the reserves level resulted \nlargely from a slowdown in portfolio and FDI flows in Q4 2013 resulting in \nincreased funding of the foreign exchange market by the CBN to \nstabilize the currency. The Committee again expressed concern over \nthe continued depletion of the Excess Crude Account (ECA) which \nbalance stood at less than US$2.5 billion on January 17, 2014 compared \nwith about US$11.5 billion in December 2012. This absence of fiscal \nbuffers increased our reliance on portfolio flows thus, constituting the \nprincipal risk to exchange rate stability, especially with uncertainties \naround capital flows and oil price. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe MPC welcomed the sustained stability of the exchange rate and \nsingle digit inflation in 2013. It, however, identified four (4) key concerns \nfor policy in the short- to medium-term: \n1. Depletion of fiscal buffers following the continuing decline in oil \nrevenue, rundown of reserves and depletion of excess crude oil \nsavings; \n2. Falling portfolio and FDI inflows; \n3. Widening gap between the official and the BDC exchange rates; \nand \n4. Creeping increase in core inflation. \n \nOn the depletion of fiscal buffers, the Committee decried the \ncontinuous fall in revenue from oil despite stable price of oil and \nproduction in 2013. Although the Committee acknowledged output \nlosses due to theft and vandalism, this could not wholly explain the \nmagnitude of the shortfall in revenue. As a consequence, accretion to \nexternal reserves remained low while much of the previous savings \nhave been depleted, thereby undermining the ability of the Central \n6 \n \nBank to sustain exchange rate stability. The Committee therefore, \nurged the fiscal authorities to block revenue leakages and rebuild fiscal \nsavings needed to sustain confidence and preserve the value of the \nnaira. \n \nThe MPC also noted the reduction in portfolio inflows driven by the \ncommencement of the QE3 tapering by the Fed, transition concerns at \nthe CBN and continued depletion of the ECA, thus dampening investor \nconfidence. The reduction of the US stimulus especially, could in \naddition, trigger capital flow reversals and put greater pressure on the \nnaira exchange rate. The Committee also expressed concern about \nthe widening gap between the official and the BDC exchange rates, \nnoting that this could precipitate speculation and round-tripping. \nThough, the BDCs represent a small component of the foreign \nexchange market, the widening spread appeared to have fed into \ncreeping increases in core inflation. \nThe Committee re-affirmed its commitment to a stable exchange rate \nregime while urging the fiscal authority to provide support by reducing \nfiscal leakages, improving controls around oil revenues and reviewing \nterms around production sharing agreements with oil companies, while \nawaiting the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). The \nCommittee also noted the necessity for a complementary monetary \npolicy response to ensure sustained exchange rate stability and \nconvergence of rates in various segments. In the light of this, two \noptions were considered: \na) Allowing a depreciation of the currency to avoid further \ntightening and depletion of reserves; and \nb) Maintaining our commitment to currency stability while stressing \nthat monetary policy is almost at its limits and needs support from \nthe fiscal side in the form of excess crude savings if currency \nstability is to be maintained in the future. \nThe Committee decided that the costs of a weaker naira far outweigh \nthe benefits to the Nigerian economy and the core mandate of the \nCBN. It therefore opted to maintain its commitment to currency \nstability. Furthermore, having looked at all the options, the Committee \n7 \n \ndecided against excessive reliance on external reserves to support the \nexchange rate and opted for monetary tightening until fiscal buffers \nare rebuilt. \nDecision \nHaving considered all the issues above the Committee decided as \nfollows: \n All members voted for an increase in CRR on public sector \ndeposits from 50 per cent to 75 per cent with effect from February \n4, 2014 \n Five (5) members voted for a retention of CRR on private sector \ndeposit at 12 per cent while three (3) voted for an increase in this \ncomponent to 15 per cent \n One (1) member voted for allowing the currency to depreciate \nby either shifting the mid-point or widening the band. \nThe decision is therefore as follows: \n1. MPR remains at 12 per cent +/- 200 basis points and liquidity ratio \n(LR) at 30 per cent \n2. Public sector CRR increased from 50 per cent to 75 per cent \n3. Private sector CRR retained at 12 per cent \n4. The CBN to take immediate step to redress the supply-demand \nimbalance in the BDC segment while maintaining its focus on \nanti-money laundering (AML) activities. \n \nThank you for Listening \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n \n21st January, 2014 \n8 \n \nPERSONAL \nSTATEMENTS \nBY \nTHE \nMONETARY \nPOLICY \nCOMMITTEE \nMEMBERS: \n \n1.0 ALADE, SARAH \n \nThis first MPC of the year is coming at a time of some uncertainties in \nthe world economy. The world’s four largest economies are currently \nundergoing transitions with the United State of America struggling to \nboost growth in a fractured political environment. China is moving from \na growth model based on investment and exports to one led by \ninternal demand. Europe is struggling to preserve the integrity of its \ncommon currency while resolving a multitude of complex institutional \nand debt issues, and Japan is trying to fight two decades of deflation \nwith aggressive and unconventional monetary policies. All these have \nimplications for the Nigerian economy, with deep dependency on \nexport earnings and external demand. These development coupled \nwith internal domestic dynamics during an election year, which are \ndiscussed below will require careful maneuvering and appropriate \npolicies to safeguard the stability of the economy. Against this \nbackground, I support a no change in Monetary Policy Rate (MPC), a \n75 per cent increase in public sector deposits Cash Reserve \nRequirement (CRR) and a review of the exchange rate midpoint to \nsafeguard the economy. \n \nHeadline inflation increased slightly to 8.0 per cent in December \ncompared \nto \n7.9 \nper \ncent \nrecorded \nin \nNovember \n2013. \nNotwithstanding the slight increase in inflation in December 2013, the \ngoal of single digit inflation was achieved in 2013 with average \nheadline inflation for the year at 8.52 per cent. In the same period, core \ninflation rose slightly to 7.9 per cent in December from 7.8 per cent \nrecorded in November 2013, while food inflation remained unchanged \nat 9.3 per cent from the previous month. Despite this downward trend \nin inflation, there are still pockets of risks in the short term. These include \nthe upcoming planting season and the fiscal risk through increased \nelection spending. Additional risks include reduction to the fiscal buffers \nand its impact on the investors/consumer confidence and exchange \n9 \n \nrate stability. Based on this, monetary policy should remain restrictive to \nforestall the anticipated impact of fiscal risks and food seasonality. \n \nAlthough there is likelihood of heightened fiscal spending as the \nelectioneering season commence, the late passage of the bill give \nroom to maneuver in the first quarter. The 2014 national budget \nsubmitted to the National Assembly has a deficit of 1.9 per cent, which \nis lower than 2.17 per cent recorded in 2013 and even lower than the 3 \nper cent stipulated in the Fiscal Responsibility Act. The late passage of \nthe bill will mean that expenditure would be delayed suggesting \ndampened risk for front-loading of expenditure in the first quarter. \nMonetary policy will have to expect an increased spending later in the \nyear due to electioneering activities. \n \nThere has been intense pressure on exchange rate as the spread \nbetween the official and Bureau de change (BDC) rates has widened. \nAs at December, 2013, foreign exchange reserves stood at $42.85 \nbillion, mainly on the back of foreign inflows and reduced government \nrevenue. Government oil revenue declined throughout 2013 on the \nback of oil theft and pipeline vandalism, resulting in the depletion of \nExcess crude Account (ECA) and pressure on the exchange rate. In \nthe face of planned sustained tapering from the United States, it is \nimportant that an appropriate exchange rate policy is adopted to \nbalance the objective of stable currency without unduly depleting the \naccumulated reserves. Effort should be intensified at rebuilding the \nfiscal buffers in anticipation of exit as cheap money dries up. \nOtherwise, the exit could pose downside risk to the domestic economy \nthrough exchange rate pressure and reserve depletion if not managed \nproperly. Already, available data suggest that Gross Foreign Direct \nInvestment (FDI) and portfolio inflows decreased significantly in the last \nquarter of 2013. Given that monetary policy is approaching its limit, \nthere is need to allow for more flexibility in the exchange rate. \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) although robust is trending below \nforecast. The 2013 third quarter GDP grew by 6.81 and the projection \nfor the fourth quarter is expected to be higher due to reforms in the \n10 \n \nagricultural sector which drove the growth in non-oil sector to 7.95 per \ncent in the third quarter. The oil sector’s contribution to GDP declined \nby -0.58 per cent in the third quarter attributable to oil theft and \npipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta that have resulted in the \nshutdown of some oil wells and reduced oil production. Although \nNational Bureau of Statistics (NBS) projections suggest a GDP growth of \n7.27 per cent for 2014, its achievement will require careful planning and \nmaintenance of stable macroeconomic environment. Precaution \nshould be taken to safeguard the Naira, suggesting that monetary \neasing at this time is premature, however to guarantee growth, \nincreasing rate could dampen the projections. It is therefore important \nto manage the inflation-growth nexus in the face of high level of \npoverty in the country. Base on this, focus must be on striking the right \nbalance between interest rate and flexible exchange rate in the \nmanagement of inflation. \n \nThe banking system continues to show high level of liquidity, suggesting \nthat monetary easing at this time may be counterproductive. Banking \nsystem deposits at the CBN deposit facility has consistently been high. \nEven with OMO operations, Interbank and OBB rate still traded below \nthe standing deposit facility rate at 10.54 per cent and 10.23 per cent \nrespectively as at January 10, 2014. However, lending rates remained \nhigh at over 23 per cent, suggesting that care must be taken to \nmanage the structural liquidity and the structural impediments to credit \ngrowth. In addition, pressure on the exchange rate window is \nimpacting the foreign exchange reserves negatively. Therefore, a \nbalance between defending the naira and saving the reserve must be \nstruck for economic stability. \n \nGlobal economic growth projection is showing some improvements \nboosted by recovery in major economies especially in the United \nStates. The IMF upgraded the global economic outlook to 3.6 per cent \nform 2.9 per cent projected in the April World Economic Outlook (WEO) \nciting stronger US economy and return to positive but subdued growth \nin the euro zone. The Federal Reserve Quantitative Easing (QE) have \nhelped channel cheap funds to emerging markets such as Nigeria \nhelping to drive equity market growth and reserve build up. However, \n11 \n \nthe Federal Reserve policymakers decided last month to cut the \nmonthly bond purchases to $75 billion from $85 billion and suggested it \nwould further trim its buying in future meetings if conditions continue to \nimprove. Most analysts are of the opinion that economic conditions are \npositive enough to suggest that the Fed will continue reducing its bond \npurchases in 2014. This has implications for foreign inflows, reserve build \nup and exchange rate stability in emerging countries. There is also a \npossibility that as the cheap money from quantitative easing dries up, \nforeign investors could exit the country with consequences for the \ndomestic economy. Therefore to remain competitive and attract \nforeign investors, tight monetary policy stance should be maintained. \nBased on the above, with benign inflationary outlook, high structural \nliquidity and sustained pressure on the foreign exchange, I will support \na no increase in Monetary Policy Rate, a 75 per cent increase in public \nsector deposits Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) and a review of the \nmidpoint in exchange rate band. \n \n \n2.0 BARAU, SULEIMAN \n \ni. \nREVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS \n \nThe estimated GDP growth rate of 6.87 for 2013 is impressive and is \nan indication of a rebound in growth statistics as it is higher than \n6.58% recorded in 2012. The 7.67% recorded in Q4 2013 did not \nonly show a very strong rebound over growth performance in \nearlier quarters of 2013 but it is also higher than 6.99% recorded in \ncorresponding period (Q4) of 2012. \n \nThe robust growth recorded in 2013 is inspite of the tight monetary \nmeasures implemented by the CBN. A point may be made that \nthis is below Nigeria’s potential but we must also state that this \ndevelopment shows that what is required to spur radical growth in \nthe real sector is the implementation of significant reforms that \nwould make credit to gravitate towards that sector. The second \npoint to make is that Nigeria’s GDP growth is taking place at a time \nthat other emerging economies such as India have not reversed \n12 \n \nrecent trends in GDP decline effectively since the beginning of the \nglobal financial crises. Finally, Nigeria’s GDP growth is substantially \nand consistently higher than Sub-Saharan African estimate of 5% in \n2013. \n \nThe global economy is showing strong signs of recovery. The IMF \nexpects global growth to accelerate from 2.9% in 2013 to 3.6% in \n2014. While the US economy has shown signs of strong growth \ngoing into 2014, China and other emerging market economies are \nprojected to continue to grow at levels that are higher than those \nof the advanced economies. Europe is also forecast to return to \nstrong growth in 2014 after over two years of crisis. Overall the \nrebound in global growth would on balance be positive to \ndeveloping economies including Nigeria. \n \nFinancial markets around the world were not significantly jolted by \nthe “tapering” announcement of December 18, 2013 by the US \nFederal Reserve System reducing monthly Asset Purchase program \nfrom $85 billion to $75 billion monthly. This is because markets had \nanticipated and largely factored in the expected “tapering”. \nLatest job figures released in the US shows that targets have been \nmissed and informed opinion suggest that ‘’tapering’’ would \ncontinue to be gradual perhaps in magnitude of $10 billion \nreduction until end2014. What is very clear is that the Quantitative \nEasing measures of the Federal Reserve have helped the strong \nrebound of the US, reversal of slide in Europe and have supported \nrecent modest growth in developing and emerging economies. \n \nDomestic inflation remains largely subdued. All measures of \ninflation remained at single digit. HeadIine Inflation (YoY) inched \nup marginally to 8.0% from 7.8% in December and November \nrespectively. The Core measure continued its marginal upswing \nfrom 7.75% to 7.87% in November and December respectively. \nHowever Food Inflation moderated to 9.25% in December \ncompared to 9.31% in November. It is important to highlight that \nmonth on month measures for the three broad measures of \ninflation have shown increasing tendencies. \n13 \n \n \nMoney markets rates were relatively stable during review period. \nWith average interbank call rate at 12.24% and OBB at 11.98%, \nrates were largely within the corridor throughout 2013. However, \nthe sustained high spread between deposit and lending rates \nremain a source of concern for policy. \n \nExchange rates remained largely stable particularly in the \nWholesale/Retail (w/r) DAS and Interbank segments. The rate at \nw/r DAS witnessed appreciation of 0.04 in 2013 while interbank and \nBDC rates depreciated by 2.34% and 7.84%. Of concern is the \npremium between rDAS and BDC rates which has widened to \n9.38% due largely to measures taken to check the uncontrolled \noutflow of funds at the BDC window. \n \nThe level of external reserves declined to $42.85 billion but they \nremain largely at decent levels, capable of supporting over 10 \nmonths of import. There has been substantial downward pressure \non the reserves due to a combination of declining revenues from \nsale of crude oil due to leakages and increased demand that is \ndriven by the liquidity in the system. \nii. \nCHALLENGES/RISKS \nThe following (not in any particular order of importance) are the key \npressure points facing the MPC; \n Keeping inflation at single digit in view of the forecasts for 2014 and \nthe upward trend of the Core Inflation measure. \n Reversing the declining levels of foreign reserves particularly in \nview of the observed reduction in and likely reversal of foreign \nportfolio inflows following reversal of QE by the Fed of the USA. \n \nContaining demand and supply issues at the Foreign Exchange \nmarket. The supply issues are largely as a result of reduced \nrevenues due to oil theft and other possible sources of leakages. \nDemand pressure is driven largely by the evidence of sustained \nliquidity, fiscal spending and market sentiment. \n14 \n \n Checking the premium between rDAS and BDC rates. The \nimmediate cause for the sharp rise in premium is traceable to the \nrecent measures taken by CBN to curb money laundering. This was \naggravated by activities of clients who may have been forced to \nrecourse to the use of foreign currencies to avoid charges \nassociated with Naira cash withdrawals. \n Preparing for the effect of capital outflows/’’tapering’’ The newly \nappointed US Fed Chief Yallen’s statement that QE will continue \nthrough 2014 is a good development. The pattern of tapering is still \na source for concern. A sudden and drastic reversal will lead to \nmassive reversal of portfolio flows. It is gratifying that a survey of \nfinancial experts in the US suggests that ‘’tapering’’ may be in \nmonthly equal amounts of N10b. \n Narrowing the spread between Deposit and Lending rates. While \nmarket rates have remained stable, the spread between deposit \nand lending rates have remained disturbingly high. The shared \nservices initiative of the banking industry when fully implemented \nwould help to narrow spreads. Nigerian banks also have one of \nthe highest costs of doing business but the weak state of the fixed \nincome segments of the capital market, have also reduced \noptions available to borrowers and this has led to the distortion in \npricing the cost of capital by banks who now literally play in quasi-\noligopolistic market scenario. \n Pre—election year/fiscal spending – liquidity injection is expected \nto be stepped up. This is perhaps responsible for the recent \nsubstantial reduction in the Excess Crude Account (ECA) balances. \nFurther depletion of the ECA will increase the liquidity risk to the \nsystem and impact price stability negatively. \n Oil price/international oil demand/global growth in oil production; \nstaff reports indicating that growth in production will marginally \noutstrip demand growth in spite of the shale oil developments \nmake the oil price outlook, at least in the short run, to be positive. \nThe crises in South Sudan and Syria though unfortunate, appear \nhelpful. Strong oil price forecast should help or at least reduce the \neffect of oil revenue leakages and will impact portfolio flow risk but \n15 \n \noil price collapse is still a risk we must keep in view given the volatile \ncurrent state of the global economy. \niii. \nFOREIGN EXCHANGE, MARKET STABILITY AND FISCAL ISSUES \n Out of the above challenges, the issue of currency stability \n(exchange rate and smooth functioning of the foreign exchange \nmarket) should now take the centre stage in view of recent \ncommentary \nadvocating \nsome \nform \nof \ndepreciation \nor \ndevaluation to address the strong demand and exchange rate \npremium between rDAS and BDC rates. I have the following \ncomments on this matter; \n I am aware of the recurring debate as to whether the Naira is \novervalued or not at the moment. The jury is still out there on this \nmatter. \n The increased foreign exchange demand we have witnessed \nrecently is driven by established high level of liquidity in the system \nwhich itself is caused by past accelerated fiscal spending. \n Depreciation of the Naira will have significant pass through effect \non domestic prices and obviously wipe out the gains we have \nmade in taming inflation. Besides, being an import dependent \neconomy, depreciation will not benefit the economy unless we see \nstructural reforms that will help diversify the economy, make our \nproducts/exports internationally competitive and stimulate exports. \n The aggravated demand for foreign exchange (for transfers/Letters \nof Credit, valid) that we have seen in 2013 is largely in the area of \ninvisibles which has increased by 23.8% from 2012 to 2013 or 24% \n($13.3b) and 48.2% ($26.1b) of total outflows. \n Total Demand for Foreign Exchange in 2013 was $35 billion while \ntotal accretion to reserves from purchase of foreign exchange \nfrom Government excluding autonomous sources was $45billion. \nAt current estimated level of supply and demand, it is difficult to \njustify a depreciation. In this regard, it is difficult to rationalize \nmarket sentiment beyond saying that we should depreciate simply \n16 \n \nbecause other emerging economies, with less strong market \nfundamentals, have also depreciated. \n In assessing the Naira/ dollar exchange rate, there are two levels of \nanalysis that is required. Whether the demand/supply interplay is \ndriven by fundamental or technical factors. In my view demand is \nnot driven by fundamental but by technical factors and market \nsentiments which we could address. The second level is whether \nour response should be strategic or tactical. In terms of strategy, I \nrecommend that currency stability is important given the \nconsequence of depreciation on the economy unless it is \nabsolutely necessary. We have a large number of tactical \nmeasures \nthat \nwe \ncould \ntake \nto \ncontain \nsome \nof \nthe \ndemand/supply pressures and by extension, the exchange rate. \nThese have started and should be sustained. In addition to these, \nwe need to take out further liquidity from the system so as to \nreduce the demand pressure. We should consider depreciation \nafter these measures have failed. \n \niv. \nRECOMMENDATIONS \nIt is in view of the foregoing issues, challenges and pressure points that I \nvoted as follows; \n That we maintain the current tight policy regime \n That we increase Cash Reserve Rate (CRR) to 15% and Public \nSector CRR to 75% \n That we keep Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 12% \n That we maintain the corridor around MPR at plus and minus 2% \non the Standing Lending and Standing Deposit Facilities. \n That we keep minimum Liquidity Ratio at 30% \n That we keep the Net Open Position limit at 1% of Shareholders \nFunds \n \n \n \n \n17 \n \n3.0 GARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nMY VOTE \ni. \nI vote for (i) an increase in the CRR on public sector deposit from 50% \nto 75% and (ii) holding CRR on private sector deposit at 12%; MPR at \n12% and the asymmetric corridor of ±2%. \nJUSTIFICATION \nii. \nGiven the structure of the Nigerian economy and, the inflation \nprocess in particular, a stable exchange rate is critical to the primary \ngoal of price stability. Available evidence links the downward trend \nof the headline inflation from 12% in December 2012 to 8% in \nDecember 2013 to a stable exchange rate regime. \niii. \nYet, a stable exchange rate regime has been achieved by \nsacrificing \nmonetary \npolicy \nindependence \na \npoint \nthat \nis \ntheoretically obvious from the impossible trinity thesis. Ideally, the \nmaintenance of stable exchange rate regime ought to make fiscal \npolicy a more potent instrument for achieving growth and \nemployment goals. However, the fiscal policy regime is yet to take \nadvantage of the stable exchange rate and price stability to \ndevelop national economic competitiveness. Also, a non-forward \nlooking and non-strategic management of oil and gas resources is \nfailing to sustain inflows of forex revenue to support monetary policy \nin stabilizing the exchange rate with minimal tightening. \niv. \nIt is clear to me that (i) a forward looking fiscal policy regime is \ncritical to the attainment of macroeconomic goals in Nigeria; (ii) a \nforward looking fiscal policy depends on a commitment to the fiscal \nrules in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and (iii) a strategic and \nforward looking management of oil and gas resources is critical to \nbuilding the forex reserves required to support a stable currency. \nv. \nThe macroeconomic management in Nigeria as I indicated in my \nlast personal statement faces two key structural challenges that \nneed urgent attention. The first is the global challenge that is rooted \nin the low interest rate and quantitative easing trap that the major \nwestern economies have dug themselves into. The trap has (i) \nweakened the transmission mechanisms of policies (monetary and \n18 \n \nfiscal) and (ii) distorted financial-real economy relationships while \ncausing financial markets to malfunction in the allocation and \npricing of financial assets. As a consequence, global financial flows \nare threatening the financial and economic stability of emerging \nmarkets. The danger is acute for economies committed to \nexchange rate stability and free capital flows. This is because the \nmonetary policy of such an emerging market could easily be \ntrapped in a high interest rate regime because easing in such a \nregime will exert downward pressures on the exchange rate. A \nstable exchange rate and price regime could very easily unravel. \nvi. \nTo the extent that exchange rate stability is necessary for the \nattainment of the primary goal of price stability, and given the \npressures that rising yield in developed economies are exerting on \nan expanding set of emerging countries, monetary policy has to be \nforward looking. Therefore, a monetary response to emerging \ndangers is necessary. \nvii. \nI have always argued consistently for a creative mix of policies and \ninstitutional changes because institutions and the incentives they \nembed are critical to the strategies and outcomes of the games \nthat economic agents play in Nigeria. For instance, while simplistic \nanalysis will narrow policy options to that defined by the impossible \ntrinity, creative analysis expands the choice set and enables a not \nonly an informed choice but, a wise one. We now know from past \nexperiences and evidence that a creative mix of policies works. We \nalso know from studies and past experience that a regime of (i) \nlowering supply to BDC and (ii) rDAS creates arbitrage opportunities \nthat rational players exploit and widens regardless of the \nfundamentals. Whereas, a positive current account balances and a \npositive balance on the financial flow account should lead to \nupward pressures on the exchange rate appreciation, arbitrage \nopportunities works contrariwise. In 2011, we confronted a similar \nsituation that was effectively checkmated by appropriate reaction \nfunctions –policy/institutional. \nviii. \nOf the options evaluated, the CRR on public sector deposits has \nproven to be very effective as an instrument of monetary policy. As \nwe have argued since the July MPC, the increase in the CRR on \npublic deposit is a game changer for monetary policy, for fiscal \npolicy, for Nigerian financial markets and, for Nigerian banks. \n19 \n \nPersonal Statements have been providing forward guidance about \nthe policy direction on public deposit. Forward looking fiscal policy \noperators ought to be working speedily towards a Treasury Single \nAccount (TSA) while forward looking deposit money banks ought to \nbe changing (i) their business model hence, (ii) the composition of \ntheir liabilities and assets. \nix. \nThe increase in public sector CRR to 50% in July 2013 was \ncomplemented by financial system stability supportive measures. We \nnow know as anticipated that the rise in OBB and interbank rate was \nshort-lived. Also, that the short term interest rates (maximum and \nprime lending rates) were flat while the treasury bills rate has trended \ndownwards. In addition, the composition of the deposits of the DMBs \nhas been shifting significantly in favour of public sector deposits \nwhich rose by 148% to N5.9 Trillion by ending of December 2013. \nx. \nIn voting to increase the CRR on public sector deposit to 75%, I \nexpect the fiscal authorities to speed up the process towards the \nTreasury Single Account (TSA) which I have consistently argued is \n“indispensable (i) to avoiding a high interest rate trap and (ii) to \npreparing the economy to soften the likely adverse effects of the \nlow interest rate trap imploding.” \nxi. \nI have also anchored my vote on the premise that with “a more \nefficient and effective cash management that a Treasury Single \nAccount will facilitate; the federal government would be a net \nlender to the economy. This will have several positive effects: (i) less \ndependence of DMBs on government securities; (ii) improved \nefficiency in the pricing and allocation of credit; (iii) transition from \ncrowding-out effects of borrowing to crowding-in effects of \ngovernment lending; (iv) rise in money multiplier through increased \nintermediation by DMBs; (v) potentially lower interest rates; (vi) less \ndependence on portfolio flows; (vii) more efficient pricing and \nallocation of financial assets and (viii) reduced risks of financial \ncontagion.” \n \n4.0 MOGHALU, KINGSLEY CHIEDU \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee meets at a time of significant \nuncertainty in which the immediate horizon for monetary policy is \n20 \n \nfaced with strong challenges. In arriving at my vote I have taken into \nconsideration the following factors: \n The role of fiscal factors in the current difficulties, marked by a \nsevere decline in the Excess Crude Account over the past year, \nthus leaving the country dangerously vulnerable to external \nshocks as a result of the lack of fiscal savings. There is no \nindication that this situation will change in the near to medium \nterm. \n Sharp declines in Foreign Direct Investment and portfolio inflows \nas a result of the commencement of a tapering of quantitative \neasing (QE) by the United States Federal Reserve Bank, but also \npartly owing to the depleting ECA. \n The difficulties that have buffeted the naira as an anchor of price \nstability, with the increased gap in rates between the official and \nparallel markets owing to bottlenecks in supply to bureau de \nchange. \n The rise of core inflation, headline inflation, and staff projections of \ninflation heading upwards in the next six months. These forecasts \nare based largely on BDC rates for the naira, net credit to the \ngovernment, and on the quantum of reserve money. \nAgainst this background, the options before the MPC appear to be \nmainly between an intervention in monetary conditions through the \nMonetary Policy rate and\\or the Cash Reserve Ratio by increasing \neither of both, or depreciating the naira while maintaining monetary \nconditions. \nIn favour of a currency depreciation we have the argument that the \ndifference between the official and parallel rates has persisted for the \npast few months, and the CBN has spent significant amount of reserves \nto maintain the value of the currency, suggesting that perhaps the \nexchange rate may be artificial and there is a need to “bite the bullet” \nof depreciation. This is especially so when we consider that the CBN has \nfor the last few years defended the value of the naira not in terms of \nseeking a fixed exchange rate but of a predictable band within which \nthe naira can be traded, thus facilitating effective currency planning \n21 \n \nby economic actors. In this context the question becomes not if, but \nwhen will the CBN depreciate the naira – most likely by moving the \nmid-point of the band. \nBut the other side of this debate is question of whether, beyond the \ngap between the parallel and official markets, caused mainly by \nsupply-side factors owing to controls imposed by the CBN on the \nimportation of US dollars and restrictions on sales by banks to BDCs, \nthere has been any change in the economic fundamentals to support \na depreciation of the naira. In this context I note that the price of oil, \nthe most important factor, has remained strong. And the role of the \nnaira as an anchor of stability and its characteristic as a major pass-\nthrough channel of inflation, the need to manage expectations for the \nyear 2014 - a sensitive year in Nigeria’s political economy- and the \nunpredictability of the fallout of a naira depreciation, all argue for a \nresponse through monetary conditions and not the exchange rate at \nthis time. In the absence of a fundamental change of circumstance in \nthe fundamentals that support the value of the naira, a depreciation of \nthe currency is not called for at this time and devaluation should be a \nlast option. \nMonetary tightening through the CRR will help control liquidity and \ncontribute further to structural reform of bank lending to the real sector \ninstead of the pursuit of public sector deposits. It will also help conserve \ndeclining foreign reserves. Here, however, it is important to keep \nconcerns about financial stability in mind, as banks and bank borrowers \nhave long borne the brunt of fundamental structural problems in the \ndecision-making paradigm of the MPC. \nBased on the foregoing considerations, I vote to: \n Increase the CRR for public sector deposits from 50 per cent to 75 \nper cent, and the CRR for private sector deposits from 12 per cent \nto 15 per cent. \n Maintain the MPR and the minimum Liquidity ratio at their present \nlevels of 12 per cent (with the corridor at plus or minus 2 per cent) \nand 30 per cent respectively. \n22 \n \n Maintain the present band of the naira exchange rate and take \nadministrative measures to close the gap between the RDAS and \nBDC rates of exchange of the naira. \n \n5.0 ORONSAYE, STEPHEN OSAGIEDE \n \nStatistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) since the last \nMonetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting in November 2013 \nprojected fourth quarter Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2013 to \ngrow by 7.67 per cent compared to 6.58 recorded in the \ncorresponding period of 2012. \n \nAlthough all measures of inflation remained within single digit, headline \ninflation appears to be on the rise. The Naira has continued to enjoy a \ngreat deal of stability because of the intervention of the CBN, however, \nthe Bank may not be able to sustain this for a long time unless certain \nstructural challenges are addressed \n \nThere is huge disparity between the official exchange rate of the Naira \nand the rate at Bureaux de Change (BDCs), which needs to be \naddressed to avoid the pass-through inflation. Therefore, we need to \ntake appropriate steps to check the wide gap in the exchange rates. \nWhile we must remain committed to a stable exchange rate, I do not \nsupport depreciation in the value of the Naira. For me, the \nfundamentals on ground do not support such a move: oil prices are still \nhigh and there are no threats presently. I believe that the cost of a \nweaker currency far outweighs the benefits to the economy. \n \nThe MPC noted that Broad money supply (M2) shrunk by 4.82 per cent \nin December 2013 compared to the growth of 16.39 witnessed during \nthe corresponding period of 2012. We also noted that the aggregate \ndomestic credit at the end of December 2013 was below the \nprovisional benchmark of 22.98 per cent for 2013. The decline in Broad \nmoney supply is attributable to a fall of 5.86 per cent in the country’s \nnet foreign assets. This calls for greater fiscal discipline and monetary \ntightening. \n23 \n \nThe bulk of public sector funds are still in Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) \nand I do not think there is any reason why all public sector funds should \nnot be back to the CBN. I am of the view that the CBN should have a \ndeliberate constructive engagement with the Federal Ministry of \nFinance in order to address areas of concern, if any. \nWe have consistently held MPR at 12% and achieved stability. Those \nconditions for maintaining the rate at that figure have still not changed. \nTherefore I support the view that we do not tamper with the rate at this \npoint in time. \nOn the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) on deposits from the Public \nSector, I think that the impact has been positive on the financial \nsystem. Consequently, I am persuaded to support an increase in the \nCRR on public sector deposits from 50% to 75%. \nVotes \nBased on the foregoing, I voted for the following: \na) \nHolding the MPR at 12%; \nb) \nRetaining the symmetric corridor of 200 basis point around the \nMPR; \nc) \nRetaining the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 12% for \ndeposits from the private sector; \nd) \nIncreasing the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) on deposits \nfrom the Public Sector from 50% to 75%; and \ne) \nMaintaining Liquidity Ratio at 30%. \n \nI also voted that the Central Bank of Nigeria urgently addresses the \nimbalance in the BDC segment while also stepping up its anti-money \nlaundering (AML) activities. \n \n6.0 SALAMI, ADEDOYIN \n \nHeadline inflation in December 2013 ended the year at 8 per cent, \nwhich, though marginally higher than the 7.9 per cent reported for the \nprevious month, took the average for the year to 8.5 per cent a \nposition much better than the 12.2 per cent average for 2012. \n24 \n \nNotwithstanding the continuous deterioration in Core inflation from its \nmid‐year low of 5.5 per cent to 7.9 per cent at year end, its average for \nthe year of 7.7 per cent also marks an improvement on the 13.9 per \ncent in the previous year. The satisfaction of that position is however \nslightly undermined by realization that Core inflation continued to edge \nhigher since July 2013. \n \nThe nature of challenges to confront monetary policy making in Nigeria \nthis year began to define themselves last year. It had already been \napparent before the close of 2013 that the key factors to take shape \nthe direction and nature would include – \n Pace of and reaction to the tapering of Quantitative Easing by \nthe Federal Open Markets Committee of the US Federal Reserve; \n Fiscal Dominance arising from dwindling revenues and its \nimplication for Reserves and currency management; \n The dynamics and impact of risks related to the electoral cycle. \nIt was already clear that 2014 would be a challenging year for making \nmonetary policy. Whilst the questions already suggested themselves, \nthe most pervasive being around currency rates and the implications \nfor policy credibility, there were few answers. The wall of data provided \nfor this meeting provided cold comfort. \n \nThe first conclusion from the data is a worsening outlook for inflation. Six-\nmonth forecasts provided by Bank Staff for the meeting in November \nsuggested would drop from 8.3per cent in December 2013 to 7.2 per \ncent in March 2014 before rising to 8.1 per cent the following month. \nBank Staff now expect Headline inflation to be 8.4 per cent in April 2014 \nand further increase to 9.2 per cent by June 2014. A similar trend is \nexpected for Core and Food inflation. Indeed, the rate of increase in \nfood prices is expected to cross into ‘double digits’ in May 2014. \n \nBeyond the worsening prospects for inflation, available data show a \ncontinuing deterioration in fiscal performance. A sharp increase in \nexpenditure, especially ahead of an election, is the typical fear on the \nfiscal side. Available data shows continuing revenue weakness. Data \nfrom the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF), \nthe Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the National Bureau of Statistics \n(NBS) show that between 2011 and 2013, average crude oil prices and \n25 \n \nproduction dropped by 1.02 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. In \nthe same period the average annual decline in revenue from Crude oil \ndropped almost 12 per cent. In consequence of this, our fiscal savings, \nrepresented by the Excess Crude Account, dropped from NGN1.551trn \nin Dec 2012 to NGN0.434trn in Dec 2013. A continuation of this trend \nalmost certainly implies higher levels of government borrowing putting \nworsening the challenge of ‘crowding out’ amongst others. \n \nFailure to rebuild fiscal buffers is also reflected in the FOREX Reserve \ndata. At US$43.8bn in mid‐Jan 2014, forex reserves are almost 10 per \ncent lower than the 2013 high of US$47.8bn in March. Furthermore, the \nFederation Reserves component, which represents Excess Crude \nsavings, amounted to US$42.48bn – down from US$11.46bn in \nDecember, 2012. The deterioration in Foreign Reserve position also \nreflects a slowdown in inflows from Foreign Portfolio investors (FPI). Whilst \nFPI inflows, at US$19.182bn in 2013, accounted for approximately 82 per \ncent of capital importation in 2013, there was a noticeable slowdown \nin the Q3‐2013. Indeed, both FPI and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) \nslowed significantly. It is not unlikely that QE tapering by the US Federal \nReserve is a contributory factor in the slowdown of FPI flows. \n \nRecent pressure on the Naira at the Foreign Exchanges reflects a \ncombination of restricted supply to the Bureau de Change (BDC) \nsegment of the market and heightened expectations of currency \ndepreciation. From the perspective of economics theory, a persistent \nsurplus on our current account, resulting from high oil price, should see \nthe Naira strengthen. However, the failure to build reserves has resulted \nin strengthening expectation of that the Naira will lose value. This \nexpectation has been manifested in a continuing switch from Naira to \nforeign currency denominated deposits – a trend I had previously \ndescribed as ‘retail hedging’. \n \nUnless the Fiscal side shows significant improvement imminently, the \noptions for monetary policy may become glaringly inconsistent with the \nobjectives and policy direction for the economy in Nigeria. For \nmonetary policy, the challenge of managing the internal and external \nvalue of the Naira is a core element of its mandate. Achieving inflation \nrate of 6‐9 per cent in 2014 requires a stable currency. The model \n26 \n \narticulated, in various documents, for the growth and development of \nthe larger economy in Nigeria is predicated on Import substitution. \nSimilar to attainment of the mandate that the Central Bank of Nigeria \n(CBN) achieve price stability, import substitution requires a stable, even \nstrong currency!! \n \nGiven the data and information laid before my colleagues and I on this \noccasion – in particular, the immediate and emerging build‐up of \nbanking system liquidity, it is clear that there is a need to respond to the \npressure on the currency and forestall the build‐up of further pressure. \nThe measures which I have supported, further sterilizing government \ndeposits by raising the Cash Reserve Ratio to 75 per cent and easing \nthe constraint on supply to the BDC segment of the forex market, \nshould, in the short term, achieve the objectives set. However, it is \nincreasingly clear that we are approaching the limits for using the cost \nof credit as a management tool without inflicting damage on the \ngrowth and development aspirations of the economy. \n \n7.0 UCHE, U. CHIBUIKE \nIn previous MPC meetings, I have consistently argued that poor fiscal \nmanagement remains the major impediment to the promulgation of \neffective monetary policy in our country. In the past, such poor fiscal \nmanagement practices which include increasing levels of oil theft and \nexcessive and sometimes unnecessary borrowings have contributed \nmaterially to monetary tightening by MPC. While such tightening may \nhave helped achieve the desired single digit interest rate which has \nlasted for some time now, the fact remains that this has to a great \nextent been done at the cost of growing the real sector of the \neconomy. Government has for instance increasingly, directly and \nindirectly, crowded out the private sector in the market for loans and \nadvances. The primary goal of monetary stability, which is the \npromotion of real sector economic development, has therefore been \nsubordinated to funding government fiscal indiscipline. At the \nNovember 2013 MPC meeting, for instance, I explicitly asserted thus: \nThe danger fiscal policy poses to development of effective \nmonetary policies in Nigeria becomes stark when one considers the \n27 \n \nmechanism of cash management by government. For over one \ndecade, all parties are in agreement that a Treasury Single Account \n(TSA) will provide the most effective platform for managing \ngovernment funds. At the very least, the incessant practice of \nunnecessary borrowings at high interest rates while simultaneously \nholding huge balances in non interest yielding deposits will be \ngreatly curtailed. Despite this simple logic, government is yet to \nimplement the TSA. This has led to widespread allegations that \nprivate interests within government policy making circles are \ncolluding with banks and benefitting handsomely from the status \nquo through the receipt of deposit brokerages. \nIt was because of my above view that I voted for an increase in CRR \non public sector deposits at the said meeting. Although I was in the \nminority at the time, I still believe that this is the way to go. Available \nevidence from our decision to increase CRR on public sector deposits \nto 50 per cent in July 2013, for instance, show that this is one form of \nmonetary tightening that has led to increased lending to the real \nsector by banks. This is so because the incentive for banks to earn rent \nincome by simply colluding with government officials to privately place \ngovernment deposits in such banks has been reduced. Banks have \ntherefore been forced to focus more on their intermediation function \nwhich is what leads to economic development. \nAnother way of making the above point is to argue that increasing CRR \non public sector deposits will reduce the incentive for government \nofficials to make suboptimal decisions in the management of \ngovernment funds for personal interests. In other words, increasing CRR \non public sector deposits will have a direct impact on government \nfiscal management. An obvious consequence of the above will be the \nreduction in government debts. \nI am aware that some stakeholders are very critical of the use of CRR \nbecause of its blunt nature and direct impact on the cash-flow of \nbanks. It is however important to note that the use of CRR on public \nsector deposits is in itself an anomaly. If, for instance, a TSA is in place \nand all government deposits domiciled in the CBN which is the official \nbanker to Government, the issue of using CRR on such public sector \ndeposits will not arise in the first place. \n28 \n \nIt is also pleasing to note that the tightening of monetary policy through \nincreasing CRR on public sector funds at the present time is unlikely to \nattract further speculative foreign capital. This is especially so given the \nfact that available statistics suggests that recent international \ndevelopments have already ensured a slowdown in the inflow of such \nspeculative capital. Despite this, I find it prudent to continue to express \nmy concern about speculative capital. This is because the vulnerability \nof the value of our currency in recent times has at least in part been as \na consequence of the unstable nature of such speculative FDI. The \nearlier we begin to discourage such capital flows, the better. \nAdmittedly, this has to be gradually and skillfully done to prevent \nsudden capital flight. While FDI is desirable, it only makes sense when it \nis invested in the real sectors of our economy. \nAs already mentioned, increasing CRR on public sector deposits will \nmake banks to focus more on their intermediation function. An obvious \nconsequence of this will be enhanced competition amongst the banks \nwhich will at least in the medium term begin to reduce the \nunacceptable wide spread between deposit and lending rates in the \ncountry. \nAnother issue of concern for me is the widening gap between the \nr/wDAS exchange rate and the Bureau de Change exchange rate for \nthe Naira. This creates huge incentives for banks and regulators to \nexploit the system and earn arbitrage profits. This is even more troubling \nin an import dependent economy like ours where the BDC rate is \ngradually \nbecoming \nthe \nbenchmark \nfor \nprices \nof \nimported \ncommodities. This might explain why core inflation is gradually inching \nup. I therefore believe that the time has come for us to rethink our BDC \npolicies with the objective of reducing the gap between BDC and \nr/wDAS exchange rates. Surely there must be effective ways of \ncurtailing money laundering in our economy without materially \naffecting the supply of foreign exchange to Bureau de Changes. \nIn conclusion, I am convinced that the greatest threat to effective \nmonetary policy in the country is the way government conducts its \nfiscal \npolicy. \nGovernment \nfiscal \nmanagement \nproblems \nhave \nincreasingly made it difficult for monetary policy to be effective. \nThankfully, monetary policy is not altogether helpless. Using monetary \n29 \n \npolicy to force government to implement the TSA will, at least to some \nextent, help improve government fiscal policy management. Equally \nimportant is the fact that it will help to refocus banks on their \nintermediation function which is central to promoting economic \ndevelopment. \nIn the light of the above factors, I hereby vote as follows: (1) to retain \nMPR at 12 per cent with interest rate corridor of + 200/- 200 basis points; \n(2) to retain CRR at 12 per cent but increase CRR on government \ndeposits from 50 per cent to 75 per cent; and (3) to retain Liquidity \nRatio at 30 per cent. \n \n8.0 SANUSI LAMIDO SANUSI, GOVERNOR AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \nPOLICY COMMITTEE \n \nBarely a few weeks before this MPC meeting, one was looking forward \nto a very routine meeting at which we would review the economic \nenvironment and outlook, congratulate ourselves for a job well-done, \nand leave everything unchanged. The sense of calm is not entirely \nwithout basis. \n \nGDP growth has remained robust in spite of high interest rates. Inflation \nremained firmly in single-digit range for the entire year 2013, the first \ntime this has happened since 2007. The equity market is doing \nextremely well and is performing almost as well as it did before the \nfinancial crisis. AMCON has reduced its indebtedness by about \nN1trillion. As we predicted, there was no disruption to the market \ndespite the unfounded but understandable alarm raised by many \nanalysts. \n \nYet, complacency and self-congratulation are extremely dangerous \nand if unchecked could turn stability into the calmness before a storm. \nOur task is to always look out for red flags and anticipate the possible \nimpact on stability. \n \nThe most obvious red flag is the fiscal space. In January 2014, we are \nyet to have a budget approved, and there is no end in sight to high \n30 \n \nrecurrent spending. The Federation has squandered its Excess Crude \nSavings, from $11.5billion at the beginning of 2013 to under $2.5billion \ntoday. This, moreover, has happened in a period of high and stable oil \nprices and high levels of production and crude lifting, in spite of losses \ndue to oil theft and vandalism. Clearly, huge fiscal leakages continue \nto exist in the oil sector as will become manifest at the conclusion of on-\ngoing debates around NNPC remittances to the Federation Account. \nTo compound the problem, we saw in Q4:3 a significant collapse in \nportfolio and FDI flows as a result of QE tapering in the US, concerns \nover leadership transition at the Bank and alarm at the rate of \ndepletion of fiscal savings. As a result of the above, the Bank has had \nto increase funding of the forex market to avoid currency depreciation. \nBut this has also meant a return to the era of attrition of foreign \nexchange reserves. \n \nOn the monetary side, measures aimed at curbing money laundering \ndisrupted the equilibrium in the BDC market through curbs on supply, \nleading to the emergence and widening of a gap between exchange \nrates in the inter-bank and BDC segments. The weak naira at BDC has \nfed into costs and creeping inflation and threatens to reverse some of \nthe progress made in the recent past. The BDC rate is also not helped \nby ill-advised tariff regimes which force eligible demand onto the \nparallel market thus compounding the shortage in that segment. \n \nIt is therefore not entirely surprising that exchange rates, reserves and \nfiscal leakages formed the fulcrum for our discussions these past two \ndays. We have had to deal with a number of difficult questions: Do we \nneed a monetary response now, or do we wait until next MPC? If we \nchose to respond, should we allow the Naira to depreciate or reaffirm \nour commitment to keeping it stable within current range? If we opted \nfor the latter in the wake of declining foreign currency inflows and \nsavings, how could we best defend the Naira? Do we deplete our \nreserves and expose the economy to greater risk; or tighten money at \nthe risk of a big public and political outcry? These decisions are never \neasy. \n \n \n \n31 \n \nMy position is as follows: \nOn the exchange rate, I continue to maintain that stability must \ncontinue to be the lodestar of monetary policy and a weak naira will \nwipe out investor profits, lead to a bearish run on the stock exchange, \nstoke up inflation and ultimately result in even more extreme tightening \nwithout offering any tangible benefits. For me, letting the naira \ndepreciate is an absolute last resort after all attempts at stabilizing it \nhave failed, or where the cost of supporting the currency becomes \nunbearable. \n \nI also do not see any wisdom in depleting reserves to support the \ncurrency. In any case, this strategy fails once reserves fall to a level \nwhere investors believe we do not have the ammunition to support the \ncurrency. \n \nI have never believed we were at the end of our tightening cycle. \nPushing up interest rates may not be a priority given the already high \nyields in our market and given that only about 10% of portfolio flows are \nin fixed income instruments. But we need to continue attacking the \nstructural liquidity surfeit in the system. By tightening monetary \nconditions and increasing the supply of dollars to the BDC segment we \ncan stabilize the currency and achieve convergence. \n \nMy vote is \n \ni. \nTo increase CRR on Public Sector to 75% for now, with a view to \ngetting to 100% if need be later in the year; \nii. \nI also vote with the minority for increasing Private Sector CRR to \n15% as this reduces incentive for arbitrage and adds bite to the \ntightening measures; \niii. \nI support retention of MPR and LR at current levels; \niv. \nAdministrative measures should be taken to restore equilibrium to \nthe BDC segment. I vote accordingly.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No  93 (with Personal Statements) of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday 20 and Tuesday 21 January (2).pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/26fcf4084d61712d97cd0f3860f89719.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "26fcf4084d61712d97cd0f3860f89719", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nNew Project Home Publications Draft Exchange Control circulars for public comment following 2026 Budget announcements\n \n\nDRAFT EXCHANGE CONTROL CIRCULARS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT\n\nView the circulars\n\nThe South African Reserve Bank has published various Exchange Control draft circulars for public comment, following the 2026 Budget announcements by the Minister of Finance.\n \n\nThis would make the SPR the reference rate for PLR-linked financial contracts, ensuring a clearer link between monetary policy and lending rates, and improving public understanding of loan pricing mechanisms. \n\nThese circulars primarily address increased new limits for cross-border payments and investments by individuals in South Africa, as well as the streamlining of certain administrative processes.\n\nThe draft circulars can be accessed here.\n\nThe closing date for the comments is 17 March 2026.\n\nAttachments:\nDraft Exchange Control circulars for public comment following 2026 Budget announcements\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/media-releases/2026/exchange-control-circular-comment"}

dedup/cb_requests/29f75c5c5167dfc4003ac6532982b1b6.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "29f75c5c5167dfc4003ac6532982b1b6", "text": "1 \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 92 of the Monetary Policy Committee \nMeeting of Monday 18 and Tuesday 19 November, 2013 \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on November 18 and 19, 2013 \nagainst the backdrop of widespread uncertainties and risks of deflation in \nthe global economy but stable domestic macroeconomic conditions. Eleven \n(11) out of the twelve (12) members were in attendance. The Committee \nreviewed the global and domestic economic environment from January to \nOctober 2013 and re-assessed the short- to medium-term risks to inflation, \ndomestic output and financial stability and the outlook for the rest of the \nyear. \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe global economy is currently adjusting structurally to the evolving \ngrowth dynamics in the advanced and emerging market economies. While \ngrowth in the advanced economies has resumed, growth in the emerging \neconomies has slowed down. Global growth averaged 2.5 per cent in the \nfirst half of 2013, same as in the second half of 2012. The United States \n2 \n \n(US), Japan and a few European countries just emerging from recession \nare helping to drive the current growth. \nImprovement in US output is anchored by enhanced industrial production \nbuoyed \nlargely \nby \nstrong \nprivate \ndemand \nand \nextra-ordinary \naccommodative monetary policy. The political standoff over fiscal \nsustainability, which led to a shutdown of the US Government in October, \n2013, was moderated, however, by discretionary spending during the \nperiod. Strong signs of growth resumption have emerged from some euro \narea economies, especially Portugal and Greece. Given the changing \nglobal growth dynamics, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its \nglobal economic growth forecast in October to 2.9 per cent in 2013 and 3.6 \nper cent in 2014. \n \nGlobal inflation is estimated to fall from 3.75 per cent in 2012 to 3.0 per \ncent in 2013, but could rise marginally in 2014. Food and fuel prices \ncontinued to positively moderate global consumer price inflation. In the light \nof these developments, most central banks responded by either \nmaintaining current policy stance or moderately easing the policy rate in the \nlast three months. \n \n3 \n \nThe financial markets expect monetary conditions to remain easy through \nthe first quarter of 2014. Indications to this came from the Fed Chairman-\ndesignate during her Senate screening. In addition, the Bank of England \nhas given signals that its quantitative easing would continue to late 2014 \nwhile the Bank of Japan has also indicated that its quantitative easing \nwould continue until inflation reaches a 2.0 per cent target. \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated that real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 6.81 per cent in the third quarter of 2013, \nwhich was higher than the 6.18 per cent in Q2, and 6.48 per cent Q3 of \n2012, respectively. Overall, growth for 2013 was projected at 6.87 per cent, \nup from 6.58 per cent in 2012, indicating that the economy is remaining on \nits steady growth trajectory. \n \nThe non-oil sector remained the major engine of growth recording 7.95 per \ncent compared with a decline of 0.53 per cent for the oil sector in the third \nquarter of 2013. Agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, and services \n4 \n \ncontinued to be the drivers of non-oil sector growth contributing 2.50, 1.96, \nand 2.82 per cent, respectively. The relatively strong domestic growth \nforecast in an environment of sluggish global growth and sturdy signs of \ndeflation reflected the continuing favourable conditions for increased \nagricultural \nproduction \nand \nincentives \nfor \nstrong \nmacroeconomic \nmanagement. \nPrices \nThe moderation in consumer price inflation, which began in the fourth \nquarter of 2012, continued in the third quarter of 2013. The year-on-year \nheadline inflation moderated to 7.8 per cent in October 2013 from 8.0 per \ncent in September. Also, food inflation declined to 9.2 per cent in October \nfrom 9.4 per cent in September 2013. Core inflation, however, rose to 7.6 \nper cent in October 2013 from 7.4 per cent in September. Thus, the decline \nin headline inflation reflected the moderation in food prices. The Committee \nobserved with satisfaction that in the last four months, all the three \nmeasures of inflation continued to be within the single digit inflation target. \nHowever, the Committee noted the potential risks to inflation of increased \naggregate spending in the run-up to the 2015 elections. \n \n5 \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Market Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) contracted by 6.16 per cent in October 2013 \nover the level at end-December 2012. When annualised, M2 contracted by \n7.39 per cent, in contrast to the growth of 8.24 per cent in the \ncorresponding period of 2012. M2 was also below the growth benchmark of \n15.20 per cent for 2013. Aggregate domestic credit (net), however, grew by \n7.32 per cent in October 2013, which annualised to a growth rate of 8.78 \nper cent over the end-December 2012 level, in contrast to the contraction \nof 3.30 per cent in the corresponding period of 2012. The annualised \ngrowth rate in aggregate domestic credit (net) at end-October 2013 of 8.78 \nper cent was below the provisional benchmark of 22.98 per cent for 2013. \nThe decline in M2 was traced mainly to decline in net credit to Federal \nGovernment and Net Foreign Assets and other assets (net). \nOverall, Government spending in the 2nd Half of 2013 has been more \nmoderate than it was in the earlier part of the year. The erosion of the fiscal \nbuffers through the depletion of the ECA has further exposed the economy \nto vulnerabilities while the fall in oil revenue has left capital inflows as the \nonly source of external reserves accretion. The Federal Government debt \nhas also risen phenomenally along with its deposits at the deposit money \n6 \n \nbanks, showing the Government as a net creditor to the system. This \nunderscores the urgent need for the immediate implementation of the \nTreasury Single Account. The continued delay in returning government \naccounts to the Central Bank is adding to the huge cost of government debt \ndue to poor cash flow management. \nReserve money (RM) declined marginally by N138.48 billion or 2.98 per \ncent to N4,511.51 billion at end-October 2013, from N4,649.99 billion at \nend-September 2013. The level of RM at end-October 2013, was below the \nfourth quarter indicative benchmark of N5,009.88 billion by N498.37 billion \nor 9.95 per cent. \nInterest rates in all segments of the money market reflected the tight \nliquidity conditions in the banking system. The weighted average inter-bank \ncall and OBB rates opened at 17.99 and 16.92 per cent on September 25, \n2013 but closed at 12.50 and 11.73 per cent, respectively, on November \n15, 2013. \nThe capital market continued its rally with the equities market providing the \nlead. The All-Share Index (ASI) increased by 34.9 per cent from 28,078.81 \non December 31, 2012 to 37,883.53 on November 15, 2013. Market \nCapitalization (MC) increased by 35.0 per cent from N8.97 trillion to N12.12 \n7 \n \ntrillion in the review period. Improved earnings and investor confidence in \nmacroeconomic management and substantial portfolio inflows (as foreign \ninvestors \ntook \nadvantage \nof \nthe \nfavourable \ndomestic \neconomic \nenvironment) accounted for the upswing in capital market activities. \nGenerally, equity market valuations remained close to their long run \nmedian suggesting that equity prices were fully valued and the stock \nvaluations were close to economic fundamentals. \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe naira exchange rate remained stable at the w/rDAS and inter-bank \nsegments of the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate at the \nw/rDAS-SPT during the review period opened at N157.31/US$ (including \n1% commission) and closed at N157.63/US$, representing a depreciation \nof N0.32k. The average official exchange rate during the period was \nN157.38/US$. The inter-bank selling rate opened at N160.00/US$ and \nclosed at N158.65/US$, averaging N160.15/US$, representing an \nappreciation of N1.35k for the period. However, at the BDC segment of the \nforeign exchange market, the selling rate opened at N162.00/US$ and is \nhovering around N167US$ at present, reflecting the impact of reduction in \n8 \n \ndollar supply to the segment-as part of the CBN anti-money laundering \nmeasures. \n \nThe Committee noted the increase in external reserves to US$45.37 billion \nas at November 15, 2013, representing an increase of US$1.26 billion or \n2.85 per cent above the level of US$44.11 billion at end- September 2013. \nExternal reserves increased by US$0.95 billion or 2.14 per cent on a year-\non-year basis over the US$44.47 billion at end-November 2012. The \nCommittee continued to express its disappointment at the low rate of \nreserve accretion in spite of strong oil prices; which is a result of the \nabsence of fiscal savings. \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee recognized the importance of taking into consideration not \njust the static indices at the point of meeting but overall strategic objectives \nand targets, as well as the outlook for the domestic economy and the \nexternal environment, especially with this being the last meeting for 2013. \nThe Committee noted the decline in inflation and the benign outlook going \ninto the first half of 2014. It further noted the positive impact of monetary \n9 \n \npolicy in engendering a stable exchange rate regime and attracting portfolio \ninvestment thus driving the strong recovery of asset prices on the Nigerian \nStock Exchange. It also noted that global monetary conditions were likely \nto remain loose going into Q1:2014 for a number of reasons. First, in the \nU.S.A, it is clear that the incoming Federal Reserve Chairperson, Janet \nYellen, does not see tapering as imminent given the on-going disputes \naround the budget and the weakness of economic recovery. \n \nIn England, although recovery appears to be firmly on track, the BoE is \nclearly not going to consider raising rates until unemployment falls to 7%, \nprobably in late 2014. The BoJ is likely to continue with QE until inflation \nreaches its 2% target which is a long way off, and the ECB has just lowered \nits benchmark rate to avert the risk of deflation. For these reasons, the \nCommittee does not anticipate any major internal or external shocks before \nits next meeting in January 2014. \nThe MPC also noted that AMCON is expected to reduce its debt by N1 \ntrillion in December 2013. The CBN has directed that AMCON redeem its \nBonds for cancellation by exchanging them for FGN Treasury Bills on its \nbooks. Consequently, the only impact of the repayment is that the Balance \n10 \n \nSheet of AMCON (and the contingent liability on the FGN from its \nguarantee of AMCON Bonds) will shrink by N1 trillion. This is positive for \nthe economy and the credit rating of the FGN and the banking industry. Its \nimpact on the markets will be minimal given that only AMCON’s Balance \nSheet is affected significantly and AMCON is not a player in these markets. \n \nThe outlook for 2014, however, portends some potential headwinds that \nmay lead to further tightening in monetary conditions. It is expected that \n2014 will be the year for QE- tapering in the US and interest rate rises in \nEurope, both of which will lead to some pressure on the exchange rate and \nstock prices due to the impact on capital flows. It is also the year in which \nelection spending is likely to take place domestically, thus bringing more \npressure to bear from the fiscal side. As a result, the MPC is of the view \nthat we are not yet at the end of the tightening cycle and may need to \ntighten further in response to these eventualities next year. \nThe Committee also noted that, while Federal Government spending \noverall in 2013 has not been significantly higher than in 2012, oil revenues \nhave continued to decline in spite of the relative stability in oil price and \noutput when compared with preceding years. As a result, Excess Crude \n11 \n \nsavings have fallen from about $11.5b at year-end 2012 to less than $5b \non November 14. External Reserves have remained in excess of $45billion \nonly because of a massive inflow in portfolio funds. The implication of this \nis that financial markets are extremely fragile and susceptible to external \nshocks. The MPC again calls on the Fiscal Authorities to rebuild buffers in \nthe excess crude account, and this can be done by blocking fiscal leakages \nin the oil sector and increasing oil revenues. Clearly, the major risk on the \nfiscal side at present is not one of escalation of spending but loss of \nrevenue from oil exports. \nFinally, the Committee formally adopted an inflation target of 6-9% in 2014. \nIt also noted that ECOWAS Heads of State have set a 5% target at the \nConvergence Council. The MPC reaffirmed its commitment to moving \nNigeria firmly into being a low-inflation environment in the medium term. \nHowever, the MPC recognizes the high cost of rapid adjustment and plans \nto make the transition gradually. \nDecision \nHaving considered the success of Monetary Policy in attaining price and \nexchange rates stability; the potential headwinds in 2014; the ultimate goal \nof transiting to a truly low – inflation environment; and the need to retain \n12 \n \nportfolio flows in view of the erosion of fiscal reserve buffers, the committee \ndecided as follows: \n1. \nNine (9) members voted to keep MPR at 12% +/- 2%; private sector \nCRR at 12%; public sector CRR at 50% and Liquidity Ratio at 30% \n2. \nOne (1) member voted for a 0.5% reduction in MPR and an increase \nin public sector CRR from 50% to 75% \n3. \nOne (1) member voted for 0.5% reduction in MPR and an increase in \npublic sector CRR from 50% to 100% \nThe Committee has therefore decided by a majority vote of 9 to 2, to hold \nall rates at current levels. \n \nThank you for Listening \n \nSanusi Lamido Sanusi, CON \nGovernor \nCentral Bank of Nigeria \n19th November, 2013", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria MPC Communique No 92 November 18 and 19 2013.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/2a8099d3c542e6956a3aacd63e7910f9.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "2a8099d3c542e6956a3aacd63e7910f9", "text": "MENU\nC.1.1\nGross Domestic Product at Current Basic Prices\nC.1.2\nGross Domestic Product at 2010 Constant Basic Prices\nC.1.3\nImplicit Price Deflator\nC.1.4\nGross Domestic Product and Expenditure at Current\nPurchasers' Prices\nC.1.4.1 Quarterly Gross Domestic Product and Expenditure at\nCurrent Purchasers' Prices\nC.1.5\nGross Domestic Product and Expenditure at 2010 Constant\nPurchasers' Prices\nC.1.5.1 Quarterly Gross Domestic Product and Expenditure at\n2010 Constant Purchasers' Prices\nC.1.6\nQuarterly Gross Domestic Product at Current Basic Price\nC.1.7\nQuarterly Gross Domestic Product at 2010 Constant Basic\nPrice\nC.1.8\nQuarterly Implicit Price Deflator\nC 1.9\nGross Domestic Product at Current Basic Prices for Crop\nProduction and Trade\nC 1.10 Gross Domestic Product at 2010 Constant Basic Prices for\nCrop Production and Trade\nC.2.1\nMonthly Inflation Rates: Headline, Core and Food\nC.3.1\nValue of Loans Guaranteed under the ACGSF Operations\nC.3.2\nNumber of Loans Guaranteed under the ACGSF Operations\n– State Basis\nC.3.3\nValue of Loans Guaranteed under the ACGSF Operations -\nState Basis\nC.3.4\nCumulative Total Loans under the ACGSF Operations –\nFully Repaid and Analysed by States\nC.3.5\nCumulative Loans Guaranteed under ACGSF Operations\nfrom Inception - Value Group Basis\nC.3.6\nCumulative Loans Guaranteed under ACGSF Operations\nfrom Inception - Category Basis\nC.4.1\nAverage Manufacturing Capacity Utilisation\nC.4.2\nAverage Manufacturing Capacity Utilisation - continued\nC.5.1\nMonthly Rainfall Statistics in Some Nigerian Towns\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.1: Gross\nDomestic Product at\nCurrent Basic Prices\n(N' Billion) /1\nActivity Sector\n1981\n1982\n1. Agriculture\n17.05217562455643\n20.125923754417478\n(a) Crop Production\n12.817212762063727\n14.324073818349174\n(b) Livestock\n2.5250250412388464\n3.9626890665702614\n(c) Forestry\n1.1595725694985244\n1.165729649956796\n(d) Fishing\n0.55036525175533269\n0.67343121954124685\n2. Industry\n40.004902370917684\n38.214128373227702\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n5.9199708484771234\n4.9312459733655496\n(b) Solid Minerals\n7.1989670359907354\n4.1960462524715121\nCoal Mining\n5.3253285694877217\n2.5692374677353045\nMetal Ores\n0.99685246081531442\n0.7644943389102955\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n0.8767860056876986\n0.8623144458259121\n(c) Manufacturing\n26.885964486449829\n29.086836147390642\nOil Refining\n8.7648189050160003E-2 8.5878134273411594E-2\nCement\n1.9330900499552772\n2.5492844025217294\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n18.422319987076335\n19.597698030122569\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n2.8255864334488785\n3.0058640670441572\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n0.98890521538776477\n1.0519991947365164\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n0.19520341614016121\n0.20765775465017075\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n0.20171103471472557\n0.21458057131001579\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n0.47727161585111183\n0.5077224265109056\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n0.27137920177776614\n0.28869369611576301\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n2.008963036138316E-2\n2.1371385885999489E-2\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n0.35645403301062645\n0.37919645872301688\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n0.17545107375853863\n0.18664517634004527\nOther Manufacturing 0.93085460591710534\n0.99024484915633704\n3. Construction\n11.037960672764527\n9.9035146605979598\n4. Trade\n12.493943765278942\n12.80198483335999\n5. Services\n64.242174832540115\n73.932837479264307\n(a) Transport\n6.3082732024817041\n6.4581464126355383\nRoad Transport\n2.9057545843084198\n2.3792294058391583\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n1.1052312382644915\n1.2821082085834927\nWater Transport\n0.72701929047278047\n0.9105690297591672\nAir Transport\n0.69235357119515895\n0.90791337172011977\nTransport Services\n8.018611712723768E-2\n8.4663160816505573E-2\nPost and Courier\nServices\n0.79772840111361587\n0.89366323591709507\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n23.198566185558697\n24.704343120078732\nTelecommunications\n& information\nservices\n1.2410005677752758\n1.4434198677020358\nPublishing\n1.0517268706461646E-2 1.1115335001640823E-2\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n0.57427995401644427\n0.60693648244414045\nBroadcasting\n21.372768395060518\n22.642871434930917\n(c) Utilities\n3.0878096516536679\n3.2665334819828247\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n0.80350158738330613\n0.85806198003437528\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n2.2843080642703617\n2.4084715019484491\n(d) Accommodation\nand Food Services\n0.84035429865222677\n0.86108778944395481\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n7.7482003306751848\n10.063519187273611\nFinancial Institutions 4.8032036750738527\n5.5964853970198485\nInsurance\n2.9449966556013329\n4.4670337902537609\n(f) Real Estate\n5.2399682938416259\n5.5716571801271666\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n2.5896417377454424\n3.9176083101153183\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n1.9879821901214539E-2 3.0074181439327035E-2\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n9.0921163370352787\n11.535129270350176\n(j) Education\n3.3984648989451935\n4.3116179420624441\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n1.6032143583836611\n2.0339912278407195\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n3.7073276923758149E-2 3.9181455196917736E-2\n(m) Other Services\n1.0786124387424481\n1.1399479207175873\nTotal Nominal GDP\n144.83115726605769\n154.97838910086747\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: /1 GDP figures\nwith new\nclassifications,\ncomprising 46\nactivity sectors;\nformerly, there were\n33 activity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.2: Gross\nDomestic Product at\n2010 Constant Basic\nPrices (N' Billion) /1\nActivity Sector\n1981\n1982\n1983\n1. Agriculture\n2364.3731486709953 2425.960886265661\n2409.0\n(a) Crop Production\n1854.7644381450066 1897.0788510556019 1842.7\n(b) Livestock\n341.4114984501303\n361.11570182456416 393.13\n(c) Forestry\n77.897985894235816 73.910249772589779 75.282\n(d) Fishing\n90.299226181622458 93.856083612905508 97.963\n2. Industry\n6603.2501241770569 6272.8280254660822 5264.8\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n4977.4167016442461 4453.0936326449046 4052.9\n(b) Solid Minerals\n67.136725990190342 54.840498086830479 44.014\nCoal Mining\n21.325683908371513 10.288707148775732 9.7275\nMetal Ores\n7.8629667891480457 5.8709112466321045 4.8222\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n37.948075292670794 38.680879691422639 29.465\n(c) Manufacturing\n1558.6966965426204 1764.8938947343477 1167.8\nOil Refining\n36.577194134307838 38.492025878518405 27.862\nCement\n190.94308846746745 223.84711937831045 79.268\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n986.25114498555968 1113.2231059357896 785.90\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n151.26964775335452 170.74440720499015 120.54\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n52.941697986061214 59.757518929339774 42.186\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n10.450344625887697 11.795743063700499 8.3274\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n10.798734311594808 12.188985139991869 8.6050\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n25.551053175304766 28.84054727881686\n20.360\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n14.528465940573721 16.398889939017124 11.577\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n1.0755117140593782 1.2139752606452345 0.8570\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n19.08300357599223\n21.539787932779426 15.206\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n9.3928898480047653 10.602149425602654 7.4847\nOther Manufacturing 49.83392002445207\n56.249639366845592 39.710\n3. Construction\n851.56160720015964 679.20041572776643 598.78\n4. Trade\n1770.3814648506529 1846.9542313218717 1801.7\n5. Services\n3668.4379978683696 3760.1347569042377 3775.1\n(a) Transport\n264.51265392694575 211.89135026114621 178.32\nRoad Transport\n222.11099390100759 168.11351968652437 132.24\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n9.4568919574328447 10.163788165736849 9.2068\nWater Transport\n5.7437918478678203 4.6627325985005355 7.2076\nAir Transport\n18.657176093501143 21.236869436038319 22.526\nTransport Services\n4.4794937997364661 4.5155248722501238 4.2472\nPost and Courier\nServices\n4.0643063273998852 3.1989155020960158 2.8924\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n263.40944916805984 281.23537814500605 278.78\nTelecommunications\n& information\nservices\n16.489402879431484 16.170411454680579 10.453\nPublishing\n1.2939250736291683 1.3043328362558106 1.2268\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n70.652871246690651 71.221171782643495 66.989\nBroadcasting\n174.97324996830858 192.53946207142619 200.11\n(c) Utilities\n18.393647622973088 17.17433594759602\n22.263\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n6.1627693128311583 6.821999574770234\n6.5601\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n12.230878310141929 10.352336372825786 15.702\n(d) Accommodation\nand Food Services\n53.784582521705673 50.80426068701113\n42.696\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n282.17074220644486 372.26776015695117 336.89\nFinancial Institutions 196.90869858214526 242.66722956390373 251.21\nInsurance\n85.262043624299579 129.60053059304741 85.684\n(f) Real Estate\n1063.9598100967005 1074.0493298602748 1086.7\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n421.38197573613263 423.67054043802602 481.17\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n3.2348098611158806 3.2523784143330747 3.6937\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n807.07554340633169 825.92169200899878 844.76\n(j) Education\n242.55585291095306 248.21981297733444 253.88\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n110.69765449595106 113.28257292600571 115.86\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n4.5610741640342676 4.5977614330185803 4.3245\n(m) Other Services\n132.70020175102093 133.76758364853566 125.81\nTotal Real GDP\n15258.004342767234 14985.078315685621 13849.\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: /1 GDP figures\nat 2010 constant\nbasic prices. The\nnew GDP\nclassifications\ncomprise 46 activity\nsectors; formerly,\nthere were 33\nactivity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.3: Implicit\nPrice Deflator\nActivity Sector\n1981\n1982\n1983\n1. Agriculture\n0.7212133852112721\n0.82960627553224031 0.98\n(a) Crop Production\n0.69104261966994163 0.75505948581835436 0.88\n(b) Livestock\n0.7395840657685625\n1.0973460989229984\n1.32\n(c) Forestry\n1.4885783710414633\n1.5772232586732733\n1.68\n(d) Fishing\n0.60949055161155097 0.71751472426519181 1.00\n2. Industry\n0.60583654440779455 0.60920095717733824 0.74\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n0.11893661317368732 0.11073753170639368 0.10\n(b) Solid Minerals\n10.722844955297059\n7.6513642269036213\n8.44\nCoal Mining\n24.971431595669646\n24.971431595669642\n24.9\nMetal Ores\n12.67781598913918\n13.021732177417157\n12.9\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n2.310488737374881\n2.2293041231353579\n2.25\n(c) Manufacturing\n1.724900331545334\n1.6480784614969051\n2.66\nOil Refining\n0.23962523950941816 0.223106298807043\n0.21\nCement\n1.0123906895350305\n1.138850662720988\n1.17\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n1.8679136729768837\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n1.867913672976883\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628423\n2.84\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n1.8679136729768837\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n1.8679136729768828\n1.7604465740628419\n2.84\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628423\n2.84\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628426\n2.84\nOther Manufacturing 1.8679136729768835\n1.7604465740628423\n2.84\n3. Construction\n1.2962022453144781\n1.4581137512977369\n1.49\n4. Trade\n0.70572043445636257 0.69314033971472933 0.89\n5. Services\n1.7512133193983246\n1.9662284002856873\n1.98\n(a) Transport\n2.3848663225858187\n3.0478575008730533\n3.54\nRoad Transport\n1.3082443751539297\n1.4152516765312078\n1.75\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n11.687045207234409\n12.614471963372949\n11.9\nWater Transport\n12.657479757778143\n19.528656437471721\n14.2\nAir Transport\n3.7109237095978664\n4.2751751827386508\n3.98\nTransport Services\n1.7900709480154906\n1.8749351008295347\n2.26\nPost and Courier\nServices\n19.62766427657429\n27.936443939564604\n30.3\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n8.8070364441473039\n8.7842231240697881\n8.66\nTelecommunications\n& informaion\nservices\n7.5260491653295247\n8.9263026593193651\n7.96\nPublishing\n0.81281898935330754 0.85218547694837321 1.02\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n0.8128189893533071\n0.85218547694837288 1.02\nBroadcasting\n12.214877644972352\n11.76011981716824\n11.3\n(c) Utilities\n16.787369829772594\n19.019853180641071\n19.5\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n13.037995527601209\n12.577866219865236\n12.4\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n18.676566035132552\n23.265004296716356\n22.4\n(d) Accomadation\nand Food Services\n1.5624445877461031\n1.6949125482778746\n2.08\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n2.7459261970563769\n2.7033012966341077\n2.62\nFinancial Institutions 2.4393049721315787\n2.3062386326646864\n2.35\nInsurance\n3.4540535628939733\n3.4467712206213768\n3.39\n(f) Real Estate\n0.4924968259247855\n0.51875244695250589 0.60\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n0.61455920918816509 0.92468272777827965 0.77\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n0.6145592091881652\n0.92468272777827976 0.77\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n1.1265508428939899\n1.3966371608780188\n1.43\n(j) Education\n1.4011061197491843\n1.7370160304069477\n1.78\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n1.4482821390242746\n1.7955023224704552\n1.84\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n0.81281898935330754 0.85218547694837288 1.02\n(m) Other Services\n0.81281898935330732 0.85218547694837288 1.02\nTotal GDP\n0.94921428787449602 1.0342180790516387\n1.17\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: Implicit price\ndeflator table of the\n2010 rebased GDP\nfigures, comprising\n46 activity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.4:\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct and\nExpenditure\nat Current\nPurchasers'\nPrices (N'\nBillion)\nComponents\n2010\n2011\n2012\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Household\n36452.425310000006 41437.720573279985 42115.912174\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Non-\nProfits\nServing\nHousehold\n224.47955999999999 248.79069634799995 278.57015000\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n4832.1478599999991 5412.0055999999995 5953.2061599\nIndividual\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n1124.4408070219997 1336.2241826399998 1254.9358585\nCollective\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n3707.7070529779999 4075.78141736\n4698.2703014\nChanges In\nInventories\n408.00264370349737 432.00032702242657 540.97603061\nGross Fixed\nCapital\nFormation\n9183.0594428744589 9897.1971804486293 10281.951752\nExports Of\nGoods And\nServices\n14013.840829999999 19961.271382175408 22824.414345\nLess Imports\nOf Goods And\nServices\n9644.6053400000001 13675.626364290001 9395.4006415\nExpenditure\nOn The Gross\nDomestic\nProduct\n55469.350306577966 63713.359394984451 72599.629972\nCompensation\nOf Employees\n14626.616123768064 17209.416517558773 19988.616753\nOperating\nSurplus\n37238.661085625237 42346.759513751698 47495.975477\nConsumption\nOf Fixed\nCapital\n2450.7201313725441 3053.6236003357558 3778.9501956\nOther Taxes\nOn\nProduction\n(Net)\n296.26683581212063 370.59759333822024 450.39263570\nNet Taxes On\nProducts\n857.08613000000014 732.96217000000013 885.69491000\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct At\nCurrent\nMarket Prices\n55469.350306577973 63713.359394984443 72599.629972\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\n(NBS)\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.4.1:\nQuarterly\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct and\nExpenditure\nat Current\nPurchasers'\nPrices (N'\nBillion)\nComponent\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Household\n9236.0310319270611 7850.8946345826434 10446.931119\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Non-\nProfits\nServing\nHousehold\n56.645387582632289 46.004171485240711 54.256261448\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n899.81211250608987 1179.359582156661\n1137.3011360\nIndividual\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n285.29255321897006 283.61604998733492 273.29673047\nCollective\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n614.51955928711982 895.74353216932593 864.00440553\nChanges In\nInventories\n102.89925921699485 101.25505435408212 98.406899178\nGross Fixed\nCapital\nFormation\n2206.7667773557778 2019.3727050834323 2569.5889542\nExports Of\nGoods And\nServices\n2507.9171600415498 3865.7060157198216 3199.9100137\nLess Imports\nOf Goods And\nServices\n2219.693357889123\n1921.0872169375407 2989.8053009\nExpenditure\nOn The Gross\nDomestic\nProduct\n12790.37837074098\n13141.504946444342 14516.589083\nCompensation\nOf Employees\n3508.2258508269224 3504.0140854593374 3618.2144234\nOperating\nSurplus\n8414.131121794002\n8766.955765058492\n10005.405499\nConsumption\nOf Fixed\nCapital\n586.71204141525152 592.49000053807367 608.32023946\nOther Taxes\nOn\nProduction\n(Net)\n74.40931332718921\n71.070818914668308 72.498275978\nNet Taxes On\nProducts\n206.90004337761368 206.9742764737702\n212.15064535\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct At\nCurrent\nMarket Prices\n12790.37837074098\n13141.50494644434\n14516.589083\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\n(NBS)\nNote: Q1\n2014 - Q2\n2015 are\nrevised, while\nQ3 - Q4 2015\nare\nprovisional.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.5:\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct and\nExpenditure\nat Constant\nPurchasers'\nPrices (N'\nBillion)\nComponents\n2010\n2011\n2012\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Household\n36452.425310000006 35323.696585750236 35326.235998\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Non-\nProfits\nServing\nHousehold\n224.47955999999999 232.29404777156614 231.76713171\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n4832.1478599999991 5053.1499201557253 4952.9984321\nIndividual\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n1124.4408070219997 1247.6227152864485 1045.0826691\nCollective\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n3707.7070529779999 3805.5272048692768 3907.9157629\nChanges In\nInventories\n408.00264370349737 406.16647715418986 487.90451872\nGross Fixed\nCapital\nFormation\n9183.0594428744589 8425.7621478472847 8640.7651620\nExports Of\nGoods And\nServices\n14013.840829999999 17628.390963052243 16995.712961\nLess Imports\nOf Goods And\nServices\n9644.6053400000001 8889.1082466931439 5965.3337406\nExpenditure\nOn The Gross\nDomestic\nProduct\n55469.350306577966 58180.351895038104 60670.050464\nCompensation\nOf Employees\n14626.616123768064 16068.305934795919 16630.297150\nOperating\nSurplus\n37238.661085625237 38237.852104570135 39484.104236\nConsumption\nOf Fixed\nCapital\n2450.7201313725441 2870.4093634534456 3414.1589049\nOther Taxes\nOn\nProduction\n(Net)\n296.26683581212063 334.47436221861034 401.33275170\nNet Taxes On\nProducts\n857.08613000000014 669.31012999999996 740.15742\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct At\nCurrent\nMarket Prices\n55469.350306577973 58180.351895038104 60670.050464\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\n(NBS)\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.5.1:\nQuarterly\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct and\nExpenditure\nat Constant\nPurchasers'\nPrices (N'\nBillion)\nComponent\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Household\n9236.0310319270611 7850.8946345826453 10446.931119\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf Non-\nProfits\nServing\nHousehold\n56.645387582632289 46.004171485240711 54.256261448\nFinal\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n899.81211250608987 1179.359582156661\n1137.3011360\nIndividual\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n285.29255321897006 283.61604998733492 273.29673047\nCollective\nConsumption\nExpenditure\nOf General\nGovernment\n614.51955928711982 895.74353216932593 864.00440553\nChanges In\nInventories\n102.89925921699485 101.25505435408212 98.406899178\nGross Fixed\nCapital\nFormation\n2206.7667773557778 2019.3727050834323 2569.5889542\nExports Of\nGoods And\nServices\n2507.9171600415498 3865.7060157198216 3199.9100137\nLess Imports\nOf Goods And\nServices\n2219.693357889123\n1921.0872169375407 2989.8053009\nExpenditure\nOn The Gross\nDomestic\nProduct\n12790.37837074098\n13141.504946444342 14516.589083\nCompensation\nOf Employees\n3508.2258508269224 3504.0140854593374 3618.2144234\nOperating\nSurplus\n8414.131121794002\n8766.955765058492\n10005.405499\nConsumption\nOf Fixed\nCapital\n586.71204141525152 592.49000053807367 608.32023946\nOther Taxes\nOn\nProduction\n(Net)\n74.40931332718921\n71.070818914668308 72.498275978\nNet Taxes On\nProducts\n206.90004337761368 206.9742764737702\n212.15064535\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct At\nCurrent\nMarket Prices\n12790.37837074098\n13141.50494644434\n14516.589083\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\n(NBS)\nNote: Q1\n2014 - Q2\n2015 are\nrevised, while\nQ3 - Q4 2015\nare\nprovisional.\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.6:\nQuarterly Gross\nDomestic Product at\nCurrent Basic Prices\n(N' Billion) /1\n2010\nActivity Sector\nQ1\nQ2\n1. Agriculture\n2594.7598643887827\n2873.3775676302871\n(a) Crop Production\n2262.1780849831298\n2561.46005386454\n(b) Livestock\n237.29750991917683\n216.10369715101353\n(c) Forestry\n30.420966488845341\n34.382272589486178\n(d) Fishing\n64.863302997630953\n61.431544025247469\n2. Industry\n2827.6212463011043\n2874.3201537525551\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n1937.6317697026793\n1983.8949685183236\n(b) Solid Minerals\n14.581306044613076\n9.7884015726080236\nCoal Mining\n1.1123513746139324\n0.86130543579457775\nMetal Ores\n0.81447509669772866\n0.66427173852358568\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n12.654479573301414\n8.2628243982898599\n(c) Manufacturing\n875.40817055381171\n880.63678366162333\nOil Refining\n63.51877564903269\n63.46945982942939\nCement\n54.473171403683317\n54.901787201566364\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n565.17753983766102\n568.08621284553487\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n80.301015473552297\n81.383545129578891\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n30.764360528319955\n30.951949729292807\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n5.9821355720392253\n6.0467417185676275\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n6.2493298015977672\n6.2675920160968834\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n14.947498599662893\n15.076601845483562\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n8.3857221802479724\n8.4152712930076756\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n0.62033342667439928\n0.62201454707189086\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n10.988539082528556\n11.033759407971058\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n5.2648627633110028\n5.4168197530839866\nOther Manufacturing 28.734886235500699\n28.965028344938343\n3. Construction\n401.38352101599696\n388.55029797353791\n4. Trade\n2191.3428310958275\n2234.19634294671\n5. Services\n4568.3708645616525\n4564.0863076674786\n(a) Transport\n144.8486040369288\n176.50723529134814\nRoad Transport\n129.02793663193708\n158.93111887929498\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n1.5146439352727383E-2 3.0195690104374485E-2\nWater Transport\n0.83374207605099393\n1.1183185583984425\nAir Transport\n7.2239121867778175\n7.7729290305565772\nTransport Services\n3.9797852895613657\n5.080030454732305\nPost and Courier\nServices\n3.7680814132488449\n3.5746426782614464\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n1448.8142555673992\n1432.9404097616839\nTelecommunications\n& informaion\nservices\n1172.4908278684693\n1204.1089681366886\nPublishing\n2.1594887250174057\n1.7095190567843157\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n124.0689021970919\n108.98261220436946\nBroadcasting\n150.09503677682079\n118.13931036384147\n(c) Utilities\n55.286097730083021\n51.342433288415023\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n44.515528112932863\n40.134743498559786\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n10.77056961715016\n11.207689789855237\n(d) Accomadation\nand Food Services\n63.135755393419785\n52.906461085885759\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n489.14692141700755\n480.99885236466605\nFinancial Institutions 428.14597621091423\n412.56380438178957\nInsurance\n61.000945206093348\n68.435047982876483\n(f) Real Estate\n888.22837312672118\n972.27983124124705\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n406.16444485858699\n425.05774834899699\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n3.2017207632114801\n3.4231411088576094\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n497.14468149091994\n479.66473465927589\n(j) Education\n205.68665822870278\n212.7736708730252\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n85.59579965458444\n81.771554221130046\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n7.6121781948117873\n6.0260391901624271\n(m) Other Services\n273.50537409927568\n188.39419623278559\nTOTAL (GDP)\n12583.478327363362\n12934.530669970569\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: /1 New GDP\nfigures with new\nclassifications,\ncomprising 46\nactivity sectors;\nformerly, there were\n33 activity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.7:\nQuarterly Gross\nDomestic Product at\n2010 Constant Basic\nPrices (N' Billion) /1\n2010\nActivity Sector\nQ1\nQ2\n1. Agriculture\n2594.7598643887827\n2873.3775676302871\n(a) Crop Production\n2262.1780849831298\n2561.46005386454\n(b) Livestock\n237.29750991917683\n216.10369715101353\n(c) Forestry\n30.420966488845341\n34.382272589486178\n(d) Fishing\n64.863302997630953\n61.431544025247469\n2. Industry\n2827.6212463011043\n2874.3201537525551\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n1937.6317697026793\n1983.8949685183236\n(b) Solid Minerals\n14.581306044613076\n9.7884015726080236\nCoal Mining\n1.1123513746139324\n0.86130543579457775\nMetal Ores\n0.81447509669772866\n0.66427173852358568\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n12.654479573301414\n8.2628243982898599\n(c) Manufacturing\n875.40817055381171\n880.63678366162333\nOil Refining\n63.51877564903269\n63.46945982942939\nCement\n54.473171403683317\n54.901787201566364\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n565.17753983766102\n568.08621284553487\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n80.301015473552297\n81.383545129578891\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n30.764360528319955\n30.951949729292807\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n5.9821355720392253\n6.0467417185676275\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n6.2493298015977672\n6.2675920160968834\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n14.947498599662893\n15.076601845483562\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n8.3857221802479724\n8.4152712930076756\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n0.62033342667439928\n0.62201454707189086\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n10.988539082528556\n11.033759407971058\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n5.2648627633110028\n5.4168197530839866\nOther Manufacturing 28.734886235500699\n28.965028344938343\n3. Construction\n401.38352101599696\n388.55029797353791\n4. Trade\n2191.3428310958275\n2234.19634294671\n5. Services\n4568.3708645616525\n4564.0863076674786\n(a) Transport\n144.8486040369288\n176.50723529134814\nRoad Transport\n129.02793663193708\n158.93111887929498\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n1.5146439352727383E-2 3.0195690104374485E-2\nWater Transport\n0.83374207605099393\n1.1183185583984425\nAir Transport\n7.2239121867778175\n7.7729290305565772\nTransport Services\n3.9797852895613657\n5.080030454732305\nPost and Courier\nServices\n3.7680814132488449\n3.5746426782614464\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n1448.8142555673992\n1432.9404097616839\nTelecommunications\n& informaion\nservices\n1172.4908278684693\n1204.1089681366886\nPublishing\n2.1594887250174057\n1.7095190567843157\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n124.0689021970919\n108.98261220436946\nBroadcasting\n150.09503677682079\n118.13931036384147\n(c) Utilities\n55.286097730083021\n51.342433288415023\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n44.515528112932863\n40.134743498559786\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n10.77056961715016\n11.207689789855237\n(d) Accomadation\nand Food Services\n63.135755393419785\n52.906461085885759\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n489.14692141700755\n480.99885236466605\nFinancial Institutions 428.14597621091423\n412.56380438178957\nInsurance\n61.000945206093348\n68.435047982876483\n(f) Real Estate\n888.22837312672118\n972.27983124124705\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n406.16444485858699\n425.05774834899699\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n3.2017207632114801\n3.4231411088576094\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n497.14468149091994\n479.66473465927589\n(j) Education\n205.68665822870278\n212.7736708730252\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n85.59579965458444\n81.771554221130046\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n7.6121781948117873\n6.0260391901624271\n(m) Other Services\n273.50537409927568\n188.39419623278559\nTOTAL (GDP)\n12583.478327363362\n12934.530669970569\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: /1 Preliminary\nreal GDP figures at\n2010 constant basic\nprices. The new GDP\nclassifications\ncomprise 46 activity\nsectors; formerly,\nthere were 33\nactivity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.1.8:\nQuarterly Implicit\nPrice Deflator\nActivity Sector\n2010\n2011\nQ1\nQ2 Q3 Q4 Q1\nQ2\n1. Agriculture\n100\n100 100 100 104.31829403844932 101.53655\n(a) Crop Production\n100\n100 100 100 103.35534223782304 99.456570\n(b) Livestock\n100\n100 100 100 112.31228190765192 123.65749\n(c) Forestry\n100\n100 100 100 107.09218399070257 107.24052\n(d) Fishing\n100\n100 100 100 107.42448179993444 105.46971\n2. Industry\n100\n100 100 100 115.91238220823401 121.87620\n(a) Crude Petroleum\n& Natural Gas\n100\n100 100 100 119.78054929600344 129.05217\n(b) Solid Minerals\n100\n100 100 100 100.2617424083585\n100.25924\nCoal Mining\n100\n100 100 100 100.25\n100.25000\nMetal Ores\n100\n100 100 100 100.38937962095467 100.32750\nQuarrying & Other\nMining\n100\n100 100 100 100.25476055867144 100.25476\n(c) Manufacturing\n100\n100 100 100 106.46703019889191 106.92226\nOil Refining\n100\n100 100 100 107.13992687676625 107.26142\nCement\n100\n100 100 100 103.65674903328801 103.65693\nFood, Beverage and\nTobacco\n100\n100 100 100 107.37937636168617 107.56372\nTextile, Apparel and\nFootwear\n100\n100 100 100 106.34670769739986 106.38325\nWood and Wood\nProducts\n100\n100 100 100 106.17581374179321 106.25165\nPulp, Paper and\nPaper Products\n100\n100 100 100 105.60568704030307 105.98958\nChemical and\nPharmaceutical\nProducts\n100\n100 100 100 74.8219783432572\n115.77599\nNon-Metallic\nProducts\n100\n100 100 100 103.66550465290196 103.66550\nPlastic and Rubber\nproducts\n100\n100 100 100 107.69606035186148 107.70685\nElectrical and\nElectronics\n100\n100 100 100 102.91773634918557 103.77538\nBasic metal , Iron\nand Steel\n100\n100 100 100 102.18454457131938 102.84054\nMotor vehicles &\nassembly\n100\n100 100 100 105.74361003711851 105.75685\nOther Manufacturing 100\n100 100 100 105.60871086289548 105.94909\n3. Construction\n100\n100 100 100 103.46199754898626 107.89131\n4. Trade\n100\n100 100 100 107.75609180266493 106.38573\n5. Services\n100\n100 100 100 104.34302177638226 107.51677\n(a) Transport\n100\n100 100 100 75.539243201087686 82.343717\nRoad Transport\n100\n100 100 100 70.473712556282337 77.277024\nRail Transport &\nPipelines\n100\n100 100 100 112.32754061057805 121.21189\nWater Transport\n100\n100 100 100 142.30551315632931 145.23988\nAir Transport\n100\n100 100 100 104.15983450372481 126.35476\nTransport Services\n100\n100 100 100 121.31123993755155 115.04815\nPost and Courier\nServices\n100\n100 100 100 102.1508675529189\n101.26726\n(b) Information and\nCommunication\n100\n100 100 100 105.24271704607364 105.62917\nTelecommunications\n& informaion\nservices\n100\n100 100 100 104.41972296065813 104.03660\nPublishing\n100\n100 100 100 101.42041340726304 101.68507\nMotion Pictures,\nSound recording &\nMusic\n100\n100 100 100 107.10433070074376 116.51652\nBroadcasting\n100\n100 100 100 109.82079930538013 110.69400\n(c) Utilities\n100\n100 100 100 109.03942286577863 108.83389\nElectricity,Gas,Steam\n& Air conditioner\n100\n100 100 100 110.17081070294896 110.17081\nWater supply,\nsewage, waste Mang.\n100\n100 100 100 102.49999999999999 102.49999\n(d) Accomadation\nand Food Services\n100\n100 100 100 104.6735500068132\n106.90120\n(e) Finance &\nInsurance\n100\n100 100 100 106.56276382970734 108.44958\nFinancial Institutions 100\n100 100 100 106.37334292758848 108.11057\nInsurance\n100\n100 100 100 107.42953849563806 109.88587\n(f) Real Estate\n100\n100 100 100 108.13897180947313 116.28187\n(g) Professional,\nScientific &\nTechnical Serv.\n100\n100 100 100 102.48342623447222 109.10562\n(h) Administrative\nand Support Services\nBusiness Services\n100\n100 100 100 103.66251900109866 105.34514\n(i) Public\nAdministration\n100\n100 100 100 103.65650042284393 105.33902\n(j) Education\n100\n100 100 100 102.13075855591181 102.11873\n(k) Human Health &\nSocial Services\n100\n100 100 100 101.36278926606657 102.30716\n(l) Arts,\nEntertainment &\nRecreation\n100\n100 100 100 109.07167493524845 111.47887\n(m) Other Services\n100\n100 100 100 106.44443379719885 110.26923\nTOTAL (GDP)\n100\n100 100 100 107.81171360947252 109.42909\nSource: National\nBureau of Statistics\n(NBS)\nNote: Implicit price\ndeflator table of the\nrebased GDP figures,\ncomprising 46\nactivity sectors.\n1Revised\n2Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.9:\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct at\nCurrent Basic\nPrices for\nCrop\nProduction\nand Trade (N'\nBillion) /1\nActivity\nSector\n2010\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nCrop\nProduction\n2262.1780849831298\n2561.46005386454\n3660.0972\nBeans\n27.534230496825582\n37.659670251161359\n84.301962\nCassava\n930.01970234838996\n954.30005315977394\n1220.5515\nCocoyam\n75.497679465723351\n77.453647971051709\n99.071185\nCotton\n66.603010613996773\n91.146304584453958\n203.98683\nGroundnut\n38.43710411496042\n52.576603598101308\n117.68961\nGuinea Corn\n78.086768008681673\n96.676409256545583\n216.39948\nMaize\n166.81954943574956\n304.11091598875271\n389.06215\nMelon\n7.5401203735143074\n13.75139338350769\n17.589731\nMillet\n58.635735643300329\n80.206761073389941\n179.53695\nRice\n46.352028961304327\n94.022043172342194\n160.34772\nYam\n719.37263102463544\n745.52252335663945\n953.60822\nOil Palm Fruit 47.279521976147414\n14.03372806882035\n17.951846\nTrade\n2191.3428310958275\n2234.19634294671\n2230.7576\nRetail\n112.70624016033614\n114.89354693603455\n114.70974\nWholesale\n1720.2450337536886\n1754.537344483475\n1752.3117\nWholesale/\nRetail\n300.37831857246056\n305.7358058051139\n305.12868\nWholesale/\nRetail/Export\n0.20988955554089725 0.20875772079408325 0.1965855\nRepairs of\nPersonal &\nHousehold\nGoods\n56.717430825837759\n57.71925814856214\n57.323500\nSales,\nMaintenance\n& Repair of\nMotor Vehicle\n& Motorcycles\n0.86729240486964554 0.87901662367809619 0.8658128\nExport\n0.218625823093305\n0.22261322905213862 0.2216188\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote: /1 GDP\nactivity\nsector/sub-\nsector figures\nextracted\nfrom the new\nGDP\nclassifications.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.1.10:\nGross\nDomestic\nProduct at\n2010\nConstant\nBasic Prices\nfor Crop\nProduction\nand Trade (N'\nBillion) /1\nActivity\nSector\nQ1-2010\nQ2-2010\nQ3-2010\nCrop\nProduction\n2262.1780849831298\n2561.46005386454\n3660.0972\nBeans\n27.534230496825582\n37.659670251161359\n84.301962\nCassava\n930.01970234838996\n954.30005315977394\n1220.5515\nCocoyam\n75.497679465723351\n77.453647971051709\n99.071185\nCotton\n66.603010613996773\n91.146304584453958\n203.98683\nGroundnut\n38.43710411496042\n52.576603598101308\n117.68961\nGuinea Corn\n78.086768008681673\n96.676409256545583\n216.39948\nMaize\n166.81954943574956\n304.11091598875271\n389.06215\nMelon\n7.5401203735143074\n13.75139338350769\n17.589731\nMillet\n58.635735643300329\n80.206761073389941\n179.53695\nRice\n46.352028961304327\n94.022043172342194\n160.34772\nYam\n719.37263102463544\n745.52252335663945\n953.60822\nOil Palm Fruit 47.279521976147414\n14.03372806882035\n17.951846\nTrade\n2191.3428310958275\n2234.19634294671\n2230.7576\nRetail\n112.70624016033614\n114.89354693603455\n114.70974\nWholesale\n1720.2450337536886\n1754.537344483475\n1752.3117\nWholesale/\nRetail\n300.37831857246056\n305.7358058051139\n305.12868\nWholesale/\nRetail/Export\n0.20988955554089725 0.20875772079408325 0.1965855\nRepairs of\nPersonal &\nHousehold\nGoods\n56.717430825837759\n57.71925814856214\n57.323500\nSales,\nMaintenance\n& Repair of\nMotor Vehicle\n& Motorcycles\n0.86729240486964554 0.87901662367809619 0.8658128\nExport\n0.218625823093305\n0.22261322905213862 0.2216188\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote: /1 GDP\nactivity\nsector/sub-\nsector figures\nextracted\nfrom the new\nGDP\nclassifications.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009)\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n34700\n14.360818803736327\n34731\n15.019778830591088 4.5885964850647269\n34759\n15.555481557803915 3.5666485722262991\n34790\n16.953089742695781 8.9846667857782307\n34820\n17.997574248430951 6.1610274090903516\n34851\n18.811972624876251 4.5250452377842123\n34881\n19.434917232883979 3.3114262944651074\n34912\n20.120215016244664 3.5261162944453304\n34943\n20.464070164048451 1.7090033457702418\n34973\n19.958629647186186 -2.4698924153916835\n35004\n20.229297031145581 1.3561421237031368\n35034\n20.964718593811707 3.6354281690256016\n35065\n21.19137637206779\n1.0811391397496948\n47.56384480\n35096\n21.575263690167432 1.8115261196797121\n43.64568169\n35125\n22.073985234331563 2.3115432159997766\n41.90486583\n35156\n22.350661865206771 1.2534058890503132\n31.83827965\n35186\n23.584826028870982 5.5218237880706056\n31.04447134\n35217\n24.238232775893554 2.7704539614696273\n28.84471639\n35247\n25.169813076594131 3.8434332622925069\n29.50820821\n35278\n25.495006059620057 1.2919960193440261\n26.71338770\n35309\n25.305083133274692 -0.74494167956356705\n23.65615896\n35339\n24.874566441749742 -1.7013051854346486\n24.63063287\n35370\n24.449502990189135 -1.708827579190185\n20.86185176\n35400\n23.965667363632186 -1.9789180448825334\n14.31428118\n35431\n24.225140070720403 1.0826850892621707\n14.31602952\n35462\n24.455820713425645 0.95223656924920874\n13.35120193\n35490\n25.108224311425083 2.6676822898087664\n13.74576926\n35521\n26.1710616445752\n4.2330246853278624\n17.09300513\n35551\n26.616045355312046 1.7002891085585077\n12.85241333\n35582\n27.061029066048885 1.6718626106790424\n11.64604827\n35612\n27.26109288527061\n0.73930602836065873\n8.308682318\n35643\n27.461156704492339 0.73388040627608575\n7.711904991\n35674\n26.956508045604899 -1.8376817273865385\n6.526060015\n35704\n26.451859386717452 -1.8720846855745776\n6.340986680\n35735\n26.432610128355055 -7.2770908392399747E-2 8.111032518\n35765\n26.413360869992658 -7.2823903008156776E-2 10.21333338\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009) -\nContinued\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n35796\n26.361890717115781 -0.19486408083476192\n8.820385104\n35827\n26.458675676705703 0.36713967381361101\n8.189686155\n35855\n26.854940074342249 1.4976728332076732\n6.956747483\n35886\n27.489557774923988 2.36313206741454\n5.037992528\n35916\n27.794523769402645 1.1093885066308644\n4.427699150\n35947\n28.777502103968764 3.5365899510328092\n6.342970305\n35977\n29.600017328830912 2.8581883927608658\n8.579716350\n36008\n29.473732837427796 -0.42663654551347463\n7.328810488\n36039\n28.836867199745075 -2.1607905628905826\n6.975529437\n36069\n28.837750028191444 3.0614575440921499E-3 9.019746425\n36100\n29.3026606917973\n1.6121599748640847\n10.85799150\n36130\n29.559964201371645 0.87808923660770688\n11.91292295\n36161\n30.128344848578376 1.9228056006250256\n14.28749618\n36192\n30.262365932388981 0.44483387482512171\n14.37596613\n36220\n30.49291652058475\n0.76183927162487919\n13.54676806\n36251\n30.671973487346467 0.58720839851721962\n11.57681668\n36281\n30.951743982256268 0.91213724811420605\n11.35914484\n36312\n31.159492719225991 0.67120203982310045\n8.277266757\n36342\n30.778718268304011 -1.2220174903137462\n3.982095437\n36373\n29.698264437124706 -3.5103925438375398\n0.761802384\n36404\n29.481557797053977 -0.72969462754137737\n2.235647141\n36434\n29.263571876616716 -0.73939756487034458\n1.476612592\n36465\n29.290366119973033 9.15617665173869E-2\n-4.19571859\n36495\n29.626062159627619 1.1460971101541588\n0.223606354\n36526\n29.379318433645835 -0.83286035333452446\n-2.48611869\n36557\n29.737676471621498 1.2197629389702342\n-1.73380185\n36586\n30.057797395336767 1.076482636499037\n-1.42695148\n36617\n30.65724796139655\n1.9943263246320981\n-4.80097113\n36647\n31.624031239991403 3.153522716103609\n2.172049685\n36678\n32.988716892655631 4.3153437406754875\n5.870519747\n36708\n32.831087563097434 -0.47782801031976874\n6.668144127\n36739\n33.587883066960373 2.3051185934930345\n13.09712437\n36770\n34.055040150686388 1.3908500359927274\n15.51302812\n36800\n34.262571549149747 0.60939995238614131\n17.08267088\n36831\n33.794157744411024 -1.3671297382532543\n15.37635824\n36861\n33.929831562809845 0.401471222999362\n14.52697081\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009) -\nContinued\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n36892\n34.56255830615396\n1.8648095619715548\n17.64247827\n36923\n35.266938793145286 2.0379871210688378\n18.59345778\n36951\n35.528102975693557 0.7405354461868825\n18.19928955\n36982\n37.779266522972158 6.3362897501696835\n23.23110858\n37012\n38.884688784339311 2.9260024428875226\n22.95930423\n37043\n38.285999348141843 -1.5396534083579638\n16.05786145\n37073\n39.068982237167731 2.0450893338477982\n18.99996356\n37104\n39.872590647803229 2.0568961990286851\n18.71123454\n37135\n40.565028289373259 1.7366256626923757\n19.11607829\n37165\n40.886148378370081 0.79161805756942272\n19.33181465\n37196\n39.684193011697154 -2.9397617881482603\n17.42915243\n37226\n39.526506525042123 -0.3973533910807987\n16.49485041\n37257\n40.974600080736373 3.6636011704621581\n18.55198830\n37288\n41.61297891537798\n1.5579867366215723\n17.99430384\n37316\n41.703765383492012 0.21816863507572748\n17.38247159\n37347\n42.60157261218054\n2.1528205437389971\n12.76442486\n37377\n42.843580061802008 0.56807163393838778\n10.18110572\n37408\n42.965796068827942 0.2852609582337351\n12.22325863\n37438\n45.152932782364417 5.0904135699774997\n15.57232924\n37469\n44.76958220632207\n-0.84900482077229356\n12.28159865\n37500\n44.611267128888798 -0.35362196748603481\n9.974697442\n37530\n43.0821751614845\n-3.4275914265930112\n5.371077663\n37561\n44.50611287155791\n3.3051667069642576\n12.15073180\n37591\n44.336303562751148 -0.38154154081445313\n12.16853565\n37622\n45.314301015006272 2.2058615032507731\n10.59119778\n37653\n44.638925123131258 -1.4904254876431935\n7.271640451\n37681\n44.148444718740706 -1.0987728827197714\n5.862011050\n37712\n46.123656541328501 4.4740235701877964\n8.267497449\n37742\n46.559269950647177 0.94444682400309432\n8.672687678\n37773\n48.975696061085763 5.1899999999999835\n13.98763794\n37803\n50.987056522953722 4.1068542637132879\n12.92080797\n37834\n50.339882670639724 -1.2692904757556533\n12.44215422\n37865\n52.80752397802403\n4.9019607843137294\n18.37261610\n37895\n53.249837042555171 0.83759478046199831\n23.60062332\n37926\n53.980817580780325 1.3727376060155478\n21.28854689\n37956\n54.893379271813025 1.6905295842677646\n23.81135742\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009) -\nContinued\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n37987\n55.461402365210908 1.0347752332484816\n22.39271294\n38018\n55.731446130924667 0.48690396239088329\n24.84943572\n38047\n54.064624266691496 -2.9908103592314035\n22.46099406\n38078\n54.213613930533569 0.27557698932139374\n17.53971388\n38108\n55.768693546885181 2.8684300927516233\n19.77999999\n38139\n55.88043579476674\n0.20036734012356305\n14.09829831\n38169\n56.43449110717944\n0.99150141643058021\n10.68395580\n38200\n56.890771952695786 0.80851414899760243\n13.01331853\n38231\n57.626408417916011 1.2930681725181898\n9.125374713\n38261\n58.962659465499577 2.318817160862892\n10.72833785\n38292\n59.404972530030733 0.75015792798484426\n10.04830084\n38322\n60.387373125989377 1.6537346187005113\n10.00848176\n38353\n60.91814880342676\n0.87895142636855894\n9.838817998\n38384\n61.826054567464382 1.4903699174564338\n10.93567251\n38412\n62.859670360368746 1.6718126364936978\n16.26765415\n38443\n63.935189496228695 1.7109843715280419\n17.93198213\n38473\n65.150386441940583 1.9006699679580521\n16.82250793\n38504\n66.258497066765997 1.7008504252126215\n18.57190468\n38534\n71.17515597355434\n7.4204202094020104\n26.11995709\n38565\n72.939752304683864 2.479230718911495\n28.21016449\n38596\n71.640748673060813 -1.7809268479509655\n24.31930193\n38626\n69.932023465872049 -2.3851303048027717\n18.60391661\n38657\n68.386255703510571 -2.2103861517975929\n15.11873971\n38687\n67.371263618586454 -1.4842047930283258\n11.56515034\n38718\n67.441102523512427 0.10366275051832474\n10.70773463\n38749\n68.525933513362517 1.6085605799102751\n10.83665938\n38777\n70.425551727348918 2.7721157766000886\n12.03614547\n38808\n71.96666356271534\n2.1882850720613476\n12.56189921\n38838\n72.022534686656115 7.7634728601921665E-2 10.54813120\n38869\n71.882856876804169 -0.19393625961600947\n8.488510997\n38899\n73.31222646428904\n1.9884707558779837\n3.002551187\n38930\n75.672781450786857 3.2198653626317935\n3.746967956\n38961\n76.119750442313077 0.59066018581187052\n6.252030935\n38991\n74.215476301331591 -2.5016820600648515\n6.125166444\n39022\n73.694012477884357 -0.70263488080298941\n7.761437908\n39052\n73.130645311481516 -0.76446803133688945\n8.548721492\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009) -\nContinued\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n39083\n72.818698202812186 -0.42656140574266033\n7.973765964\n39114\n73.377409442219943 0.76726342710995254\n7.079766272\n39142\n74.122357761430294 1.0152284263959359\n5.249239719\n39173\n75.006983890492592 1.1934673366834119\n4.224623148\n39203\n75.360834342117528 0.47175667287402234\n4.635076604\n39234\n76.506192382903436 1.5198319535400913\n6.431763715\n39264\n76.855386907533287 0.45642648490749593\n4.832973453\n39295\n78.857435515411126 2.6049554734355382\n4.208453823\n39326\n79.253189309991626 0.50185983350061747\n4.116459722\n39356\n77.595679299748582 -2.0914111150276256\n4.554579673\n39387\n77.497904832852214 -0.12600504020161907\n5.161738690\n39417\n77.930906043393236 0.55872634424751766\n6.563952377\n39448\n79.057640376198904 1.4458119249611769\n8.567774936\n39479\n79.267157090976809 0.26501766784451775\n8.026649746\n39508\n79.886395381320426 0.78120411160060144\n7.776381909\n39539\n81.134183815997758 1.5619536076465721\n8.168839230\n39569\n82.670639724369124 1.8937220245610149\n9.699740516\n39600\n85.724927833131588 3.6945257940977854\n12.04965920\n39630\n87.577986777167325 2.1616337171409725\n13.95165687\n39661\n88.602290716081583 1.169590643274887\n12.35756037\n39692\n89.57537945805008\n1.0982658959537162\n13.02432146\n39722\n89.035291926622591 -0.60294194084930552\n14.74258970\n39753\n88.993388583666999 -4.7063745228271614E-2 14.83328326\n39783\n89.663842070956335 0.75337448990271128\n15.05556219\n39814\n90.152714405438118 0.54522795721257467\n14.03415783\n39845\n90.827823819722511 0.74885090120334041\n14.58443465\n39873\n91.363255424154943 0.58950174287471668\n14.36647627\n39904\n91.898687028587389 0.58604698568007052\n13.26753127\n39934\n93.593444454790955 1.8441584760360712\n13.21243523\n39965\n95.320793369959958 1.8455875037309681\n11.19378666\n39995\n97.290250488872346 2.066135886289274\n11.08984582\n40026\n98.389049259707605 1.1294027565084122\n11.04571728\n40057\n98.882577521184473 0.50160893431763043\n10.39035292\n40087\n99.352826147686002 0.47556267068461011\n11.58813993\n40118\n100\n0.65138947467077912\n12.36789787\n40148\n102.15362108067139 2.1536210806713854\n13.92956036\nTable\nC.2.1:\nMonthly\nInflation\nRates:\nHeadline,\nCore and\nFood\n(Base\nPeriod:\nNovember\n2009) -\nContinued\nPeriod\nAll Items (Weight =\n1000.00)\nCPI\nMonth-on Change (%)\nYear-on Chan\n40179\n103.132596576434\n0.95833655763364334\n14.39766096\n40210\n105.04121347791509 1.8506437002840102\n15.64871760\n40238\n104.89575369643057 -0.13847877101599693\n14.81175140\n40269\n105.7237498214395\n0.78935142351438969\n15.04380882\n40299\n105.68100672692285 -4.0429037551959368E-2 12.91496679\n40330\n108.76\n2.9134783708421708\n14.09892443\n40360\n109.94\n1.0849577050386046\n13.00207312\n40391\n119.9\n1.76\n13.7\n40422\n112.4\n0.46\n13.6\n40452\n112.7\n0.3\n13.4\n40483\n112.8\n0.04\n12.8\n40513\n114.2\n1.29\n11.8\n40544\n115.6\n1.2\n12.1\n40575\n116.7\n0.96\n11.1\n40603\n118.3\n1.37\n12.8\n40634\n117.7\n-0.54\n11.3\n40664\n118.7\n0.91\n12.4\n40695\n119.9\n0.97\n10.19999999\n40725\n120.3\n0.32\n9.4\n40756\n122.3\n1.67\n9.300000000\n40787\n124\n1.41\n10.3\n40817\n124.6\n0.49\n10.5\n40848\n124.7\n0.04\n10.5\n40878\n126\n1.06\n10.3\n40909\n130.19999999999999 3.35\n12.6\n40940\n130.5\n0.28000000000000003\n11.9\n40969\n132.6\n1.59\n12.1\n41000\n132.80000000000001 0.13\n12.9\n41030\n133.80000000000001 0.75\n12.7\n41061\n135.30000000000001 1.1499999999999999\n12.9\n41091\n135.69999999999999 0.24\n12.8\n41122\n136.6\n0.67\n11.7\n41153\n138\n1.01\n11.3\n41183\n139.19999999999999 0.88\n11.7\n41214\n140\n0.6\n12.3\n41244\n141.1\n0.75\n12\n41275\n141.94242593503455 0.62451284791420392\n9.031228096\n41306\n143.00478978985183 0.74844701844358497\n9.541969032\n41334\n144.02484802931767 0.71330354805935769\n8.593279888\n41365\n144.81957672026283 0.55179970804995548\n9.051524170\n41395\n145.79400599253356 0.67285742324254727\n8.963892210\n41426\n146.64740632153999 0.58534664933354463\n8.353156270\n41456\n147.44104732747647 0.54118993703599472\n8.682261186\n41487\n147.80838283451527 0.24914059802011934\n8.230815778\n41518\n148.92247199195367 0.75373881783534102\n7.951913585\n41548\n150.03608402171807 0.74777971038821534\n7.807248521\n41579\n151.11334979203559 0.71800445695555482\n7.931397267\n41609\n152.28557258334132 0.77572417851827424\n7.956880784\n41640\n153.26452754872915 0.64284156980929197\n7.976545095\n41671\n154.02624160570301 0.49699305452899978\n7.707050814\n41699\n155.23484011939189 0.78467052178213237\n7.783373663\n41730\n156.189702184791\n0.6151080934310329\n7.851235117\n41760\n157.40589757982508 0.77866554454092807\n7.964587781\n41791\n158.62361686868786 0.77361732157794449\n8.166670551\n41821\n159.65091163132766 0.64763039887698426\n8.281183920\n41852\n160.42283833484777 0.48350911099252869\n8.534330231\n41883\n161.30793708717633 0.55172864507053987\n8.316720055\n41913\n162.129385758122\n0.5092425616364693\n8.060262179\n41944\n163.09214364355299 0.59382071974745543\n7.927025552\n41974\n164.435367926396\n0.82359839832548687\n7.978297048\n42005\n165.76640124921758 0.8094568337739787\n8.157056235\n42036\n166.901129082572\n0.68453427522290156\n8.358892187\n42064\n168.41986231233099 0.90995982957528554\n8.493597302\n42095\n169.70818437657499 0.76494663192090684\n8.655168684\n42125\n171.57735565776201 1.1014031456723501\n9.003130312\n42156\n173.16578467426601 0.92578010100142194\n9.167719216\n42186\n174.36741071215195 0.69391654947672521\n9.217923612\n42217\n175.399354897905\n0.59182170655536481\n9.335651156\n42248\n176.46129071508099 0.60543883858301228\n9.394053325\n42278\n177.20070684553821 0.41902455063139143\n9.295860227\n42309\n178.37088002796099 0.66036597892514237\n9.368162097\n42339\n180.14536694823201 0.99482994084732468\n9.553905111\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNotes:\n1Same as\ncore\ninflation\n2Same as\nyear-on-\nyear and\nannualized\ninflation\n3Same as\n12-month\nmoving\naverage\ninflation\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.1:\nValue of\nLoans\nGuaranteed\nunder the\nACGSF\nOperations\n(N'\nThousand)\nCash\nCrops\nYear\nOil Palm Rubber Cocoa\nCotton\n1981\n39\n63.7\n20.3\n428.8\n1982\n496.5\n0\n7\n65\n1983\n76.2\n0\n92.6\n109.6\n1984\n70\n18\n83.1\n21\n1985\n1154.3\n775\n38.200000000000003 41.9\n1986\n252\n1000\n29.5\n225.6\n1987\n2724.5\n64\n1206.5999999999999 1597.1\n1988\n701\n8.1\n1282.7\n6871\n1989\n1062\n30\n2676.5\n5279.8\n1990\n175\n0\n575.29999999999995 1453\n1991\n116\n3.7\n578.5\n2736\n1992\n243\n45\n902\n2500.699999999999\n1993\n160\n5.5\n578\n398\n1994\n7.5\n0\n220.3\n2865.8\n1995\n450.3\n0\n708\n6875.5\n1996\n485\n248\n2425\n6175\n1997\n4122.5\n0\n1510\n5951\n1998\n442.5\n1\n502\n3972\n1999\n382\n0\n770\n972\n2000\n1060\n0\n435\n1310\n2001\n4602.5\n80\n1579\n7715\n2002\n4427.5\n200\n1100\n660\n2003\n3380\n940\n1971\n1640\n2004\n7320\n0\n2960\n4880\n2005\n78075\n200\n52375\n1020\n2006\n37290\n0\n18465\n330\n2007\n18450\n145\n21040\n830\n2008\n109344\n1100\n62680\n0\n2009\n142731.6 9046\n81780\n54570.2\n2010\n62338\n3860\n22862\n2240\n2011\n81940\n0\n10265\n0\n2012\n275520\n0\n121739.06\n0\nQ1\n8170\n0\n0\n0\nQ2\n40260\n0\n5000\n0\nQ3\n178100\n0\n8449.0600000000013 0\nQ4\n48990\n0\n108290\n0\n2013\n107625\n750\n25563\n0\n2014\n159602\n1100\n218034\n0\nQ1\n69762\n0\n4530\n0\nQ2\n37505\n1100\n8360\n0\nQ3\n34250\n0\n13090\n0\nQ4\n18085\n0\n191804\n0\n2015\n123790\n6700\n271230\n0\nQ1\n5740\n2810\n21220\n0\nQ2\n49220\n3430\n131390\n0\nQ3\n12380\n160\n38780\n0\nQ4\n56450\n300\n79840\n0\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nNote:\n1Sum total\nfor cash\ncrop,\nlivestock,\nfood crop,\nfishery,\nmixed\nfarming\nand others.\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.2:\nNumber of\nLoans\nGuaranteed\nunder the\nACGSF\nOperations\n- State\nBasis\nYear\nFCT\nAbia Adamawa Akwa Anambra Bauchi Bayelsa Benue\nAbuja\nIbom\n1981\n-\n-\n58\n-\n77\n223\n-\n24\n1982\n-\n-\n50\n-\n123\n80\n-\n19\n1983\n-\n-\n63\n-\n210\n131\n-\n38\n1984\n-\n-\n98\n-\n69\n290\n-\n60\n1985\n-\n-\n120\n-\n163\n402\n-\n194\n1986\n-\n-\n245\n-\n229\n758\n-\n195\n1987\n-\n-\n423\n-\n1058\n1044\n-\n750\n1988\n-\n-\n970\n-\n1898\n2137\n-\n1236\n1989\n-\n-\n1080\n-\n2580\n2456\n-\n1890\n1990\n8\n-\n1075\n172\n2735\n2262\n-\n1574\n1991\n246\n-\n929\n105\n2063\n1564\n-\n1554\n1992\n271\n233\n389\n50\n1693\n1559\n-\n582\n1993\n176\n187\n451\n36\n855\n1001\n-\n573\n1994\n241\n184\n548\n116\n357\n1495\n-\n570\n1995\n241\n161\n688\n191\n335\n1491\n-\n553\n1996\n200\n152\n1071\n233\n352\n1069\n-\n320\n1997\n370\n61\n585\n106\n666\n438\n2\n765\n1998\n506\n110\n440\n253\n478\n222\n8\n430\n1999\n520\n94\n280\n424\n388\n316\n20\n740\n2000\n490\n719\n313\n464\n761\n499\n74\n1826\n2001\n1289 130\n246\n521\n353\n807\n100\n2300\n2002\n1142 292\n323\n604\n159\n815\n130\n1387\n2003\n0\n234\n372\n616\n241\n357\n0\n2865\n2004\n1126 327\n47\n560\n100\n686\n0\n2538\n2005\n103\n263\n1097\n519\n324\n578\n98\n2100\n2006\n487\n463\n1715\n218\n336\n962\n131\n343\n2007\n1\n509\n2476\n343\n303\n427\n64\n1508\n2008\n119\n813\n2177\n245\n493\n863\n140\n6452\n2009\n120\n730\n2714\n531\n969\n1417\n201\n3741\n2010\n99\n819\n2823\n523\n913\n1063\n113\n1062\n2011\n19\n930\n2504\n598\n1113\n861\n124\n708\n2012\n1004 1670 3831\n397\n781\n286\n105\n793\nQ1\n11\n62\n58\n26\n155\n2\n33\n21\nQ2\n303\n337\n979\n40\n86\n25\n2\n72\nQ3\n463\n878\n1954\n74\n194\n236\n16\n432\nQ4\n227\n393\n840\n257\n346\n23\n54\n268\n2013\n503\n1377 4192\n392\n1697\n791\n96\n557\n2014\n814\n1404 3072\n440\n1760\n2013\n113\n1373\nQ1\n178\n578\n831\n135\n449\n1\n36\n109\nQ2\n270\n314\n945\n118\n684\n350\n37\n264\nQ3\n65\n186\n988\n75\n237\n1433\n16\n754\nQ4\n301\n326\n308\n112\n390\n229\n24\n246\n2015\n1012 830\n2691\n854\n1106\n947\n35\n1318\nQ1\n255\n111\n835\n222\n235\n519\n12\n42\nQ2\n208\n271\n128\n139\n219\n0\n5\n205\nQ3\n247\n117\n777\n259\n305\n283\n6\n838\nQ4\n302\n331\n951\n234\n347\n145\n12\n233\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.3:\nValue of\nLoans\nGuaranteed\nunder the\nACGSF\nOperations\n- State\nBasis (N'\nThousand)\nYear\nFCT\nAbia\nAdamawa\nAbuja\n1981\n-\n-\n3566.3\n1982\n-\n-\n1193.5\n1983\n-\n-\n2140.199999999\n1984\n-\n-\n776.1\n1985\n-\n-\n999.4\n1986\n-\n-\n2825.2\n1987\n-\n-\n2712.6\n1988\n-\n-\n6016.5\n1989\n-\n-\n4734.8\n1990\n22.5\n-\n3856.8\n1991\n915.4\n-\n3882\n1992\n1010.4\n1179.5\n1443.6\n1993\n881\n837.8\n1689\n1994\n1223\n892\n2757.5\n1995\n1848.2\n2100.6999999999998 7718\n1996\n2134.6999999999998 1381.5\n14896.9\n1997\n4633\n933\n11111.7\n1998\n4647\n3162\n8256\n1999\n8202\n1744\n10260\n2000\n13232\n4580\n9881\n2001\n44420\n5815\n19005\n2002\n39260\n16704\n26515\n2003\n-\n9103\n344350\n2004\n-\n16069\n148840\n2005\n9345\n17285\n217220\n2006\n81500\n53036\n376875\n2007\n500\n58674.600000000006 482560\n2008\n56020\n180889\n430283\n2009\n72875\n202289.5\n542560\n2010\n25996\n115546\n510532.674\n2011\n24312\n232029.8\n372521\n2012\n123185\n342255.8\n366363.18\nQ1\n7630\n5190\n11550\nQ2\n23070\n99662\n65435.9\nQ3\n30855\n143113.79999999999 120980.68\nQ4\n61630\n94290\n168396.6\n2013\n182404\n313116.5\n375601.55\n2014\n171165\n325360\n462304\nQ1\n55510\n164370\n144738\nQ2\n58980\n42875\n148065.5\nQ3\n14030\n28560\n145584.5\nQ4\n42645\n89555\n23916\n2015\n164426\n135426.5\n258939\nQ1\n34910\n16560\n139960\nQ2\n28710\n38004\n25593\nQ3\n43507\n32287.5\n37040\nQ4\n57299\n48575\n56346\nSource :\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.4:\nCumulative\nTotal\nLoans\nunder the\nACGSF\nOperations\nFully\nRepaid and\nAnalysed\nby States\n(N'\nThousand)\nStates\n1981\n1982\nNumber Amount\nNumber Amount\nFCT Abuja 0\n0\n0\n0\nAbia\n0\n0\n0\n0\nAdamawa\n58\n3566.3\n50\n1193.5\nAkwa Ibom 0\n0\n0\n0\nAnambra\n77\n1933.7\n123\n2319.9\nBauchi\n223\n2927.8\n80\n546.29999999999995\nBayelsa\n0\n0\n0\n0\nBenue\n24\n489.3\n19\n165.7\nBorno\n13\n95.9\n7\n292.60000000000002\nC/Rivers\n39\n1255.5\n27\n2005.2\nDelta\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEbonyi\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEdo\n51\n1623.6\n60\n1554.7\nEkiti\n0\n0\n0\n0\nEnugu\n0\n0\n0\n0\nGombe\n0\n0\n0\n0\nImo\n39\n1216.3\n35\n2047.8\nJigawa\n0\n0\n0\n0\nKaduna\n176\n3034.9\n186\n3453.8\nKano\n82\n2114.6\n68\n3351.6\nKatsina\n0\n0\n0\n0\nKebbi\n0\n0\n0\n0\nKogi\n0\n0\n0\n0\nKwara\n38\n1039.9000000000001 44\n479.9\nLagos\n22\n4007\n14\n3996\nNassarawa 0\n0\n0\n0\nNiger\n111\n770.3\n68\n368.2\nOgun\n22\n3461.4\n18\n1544.3\nOndo\n8\n643.1\n16\n880\nOsun\n0\n0\n0\n0\nOyo\n70\n2804\n65\n3906.5\nPlateau\n29\n1216.7\n51\n684.3\nRivers\n18\n2225.1\n7\n2294\nSokoto\n195\n1217\n138\n679.6\nTaraba\n0\n0\n0\n0\nYobe\n0\n0\n0\n0\nZamfara\n0\n0\n0\n0\nTotal\n1295\n35642.400000000001 1076\n31763.899999999998\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.5:\nCumulative\nLoans\nGuaranteed\nunder\nACGSF\nOperations\nfrom\nInception -\nValue\nGroup\nBasis\n(Amount in\nN'\nThousand)\nYear\n5,000 &\nBelow\n5,001 -\n20,000\nNumber Amount\nNumber Amount\n1981\n734\n4345.6000000000004 234\n2603.3000000000002\n1982\n684\n9931.6\n178\n1904.3\n1983\n885\n2165.8000000000002 191\n2666.5\n1984\n1182\n3452.1\n282\n2792.7\n1985\n2506\n5955.5\n512\n5142.8999999999996\n1986\n4197\n10030.6\n621\n6778.3\n1987\n15174\n40261.300000000003 669\n7378.5\n1988\n23255\n65352.9\n958\n10247.9\n1989\n33133\n88095.2\n1093\n10662.9\n1990\n29848\n74308.399999999994 598\n6277.4\n1991\n21092\n56556.800000000003 688\n7085.1\n1992\n20185\n62214.2\n748\n7827.1\n1993\n14255\n52284.1\n961\n9347.1\n1994\n14675\n56377.7\n1445\n15596.9\n1995\n14167\n65181\n2981\n31643.4\n1996\n11385\n57766.6\n6221\n64140.1\n1997\n8112\n41278.300000000003 7948\n86949.7\n1998\n5134\n24818.400000000001 8153\n92300\n1999\n2596\n13249.4\n8379\n112700.7\n2000\n226\n1652\n9407\n146489.20000000001\n2001\n529\n2847.4\n8828\n135306.79999999999\n2002\n185\n726.3\n7276\n120238.2\n2003\n280\n1352.5\n9848\n172680.5\n2004\n317\n1485\n10433\n173510.3\n2005\n85\n342.8\n14045\n233905.1\n2006\n150\n735.5\n9314\n167752.73000000001\n2007\n26\n126\n3186\n56863\n2008\n58\n835\n1751\n33067\n2009\n28\n137.51\n5707\n90412.081000000006\n2010\n25\n121\n4075\n68229.928000000014\n2011\n50\n235\n4540\n106048.98000000001\n2012\n193\n26179\n5961\n98316.2\n2013\n27\n500\n4564\n74110\n2014\n36\n177.7\n8914\n143721.70000000001\n2015\n199\n631.41999999999996 6366\n117783.7\nTotal\n225613 771709.63000000012 157075 2422480.2190000005\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable\nC.3.6:\nCumulative\nLoans\nGuaranteed\nunder\nACGSF\nOperations\nfrom\nInception -\nCategory\nBasis\n(Amount in\nN'\nThousand)\nYear\nIndividual\nInformal\nGroup\nCo-\noperat\nNumber\nAmount\nNumber Amount\nNumb\n1981\n1205\n17813.400000000001 0\n0\n28\n1982\n1013\n16117.7\n0\n0\n10\n1983\n1248\n14197.8\n0\n0\n12\n1984\n1563\n9853.9\n0\n0\n9\n1985\n3219\n19407.7\n0\n0\n15\n1986\n5001\n25643.3\n0\n0\n33\n1987\n15960\n54897.2\n0\n0\n113\n1988\n24352\n80078.899999999994 0\n0\n90\n1989\n34354\n104329\n0\n0\n95\n1990\n30516\n86213.3\n0\n0\n163\n1991\n21889\n69932.899999999994 0\n0\n100\n1992\n21048\n75549.100000000006 0\n0\n137\n1993\n15329\n68257.899999999994 0\n0\n171\n1994\n16395\n86451.9\n0\n0\n146\n1995\n17849\n132778.29999999999 0\n0\n207\n1996\n18698\n179824.7\n0\n0\n319\n1997\n17248\n184686\n24\n7516.5\n532\n1998\n14482\n190305.2\n16\n1705\n77\n1999\n12439\n193501\n10\n1351\n361\n2000\n13875\n324187.40000000002 66\n9995\n148\n2001\n20296\n727945.4\n0\n0\n1\n2002\n23527\n1025575.8\n80\n10594\n70\n2003\n23955\n1106456.3999999999 233\n30774\n112\n2004\n34912\n2017344.7\n71\n21180\n45\n2005\n45793\n2969096.7\n296\n20036.5\n145\n2006\n50578\n3984895.49\n987\n82661\n2458\n2007\n41073\n4145410.54\n2110\n228200\n44\n2008\n50632\n6157288.4010000005 1686\n289219\n439\n2009\n49565\n7495288.2800000003 818\n128674\n3072\n2010\n49402\n7370945.557\n503\n43274\n884\n2011\n53803\n9375403.8599999994 1785\n384641\n697\n2012\n46960\n9128295.3599999994 685\n27987\n672\n2013\n54381\n8673464.9499999993 629\n181535\n1201\n2014\n69062\n12061412.15\n1275\n309072\n1912\n2015\n68404\n11299659.23\n324\n41082.42\n694\nTotal\n970026\n89472509.418000013 11598\n1819497.42 15212\nSource:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria\nReturn to Menu\nTable C.4.1:\nAverage\nManufacturing\nCapacity\nUtilisation (Per\ncent)\nSub - Sector\n1981\n1982\n1983\nMeat & Dairy\nProducts\n-\n73.7\n63.6\nVegetable &\nGrain Mill\n-\n-\n30\nBakery Product 55.3\n73.900000000000006 60.4\nSugar Cocoa\nConfectionery\n84.2\n62.3\n50\nMiscellaneous\nFood\nPreparation\n-\n-\n66.0999999\nBeer & Stout\n100\n86\n68\nSoft Drinks\n-\n56.2\n36.4\nTextiles\n76.900000000000006 73.599999999999994 57.4\nKnitting Carpet\n& Rug\n-\n49.5\n46.5\nLeather\nProducts\n85\n71.8\n54\nLeather\nFootwear\n84.4\n81\n-\nSaw Milling\n65.099999999999994 65.099999999999994 55.8\nWood & Cork\nProducts\n80\n79.8\n56.3\nPaper\nManufacture &\nProducts\n67.599999999999994 55.8\n41.6\nPrinting\nPublishing\n75\n60.8\n60.1\nBasic Industrial\nChemical\n-\n57.1\n51.1\nPaints\n71.7\n60.7\n41.5\nDrugs &\nMedicine\n71.400000000000006 65.3\n54.3\nSoap &\nPerfumes\n-\n63.8\n51.2\nOther Chemical\n& Petroleum\nProducts\n65.400000000000006 64.2\n48.4\nTyres & Tubes\n-\n44.6\n35.7000000\nPlastic Products 50.4\n53\n52.3\nGlass & Glass\nProducts\n-\n62\n43.4\nCement &\nCement\nProducts\n70.3\n65.2\n65.5\nBasic Metal\nIndustries\n-\n-\n-\nStructural\nMetal Products\n-\n61.8\n46.6\nFabricated\nMetal Products\n63.6\n56\n39.7000000\nRadio T.V &\nCommunication\nEquipment\n-\n50.1\n27.4\nMotor Vehicle\nAssembly\n79.099999999999994 61.4\n38.1\nRoofing Sheets\n-\n-\n-\nWine, Spirits &\nDistillers\n-\n-\n-\nAverage\nCapacity\nUtilisation (%)\n73.3\n63.6\n49.7\nSource :\nCentral Bank of\nNigeria\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.4.2:\nAverage\nManufacturing\nCapacity\nUtilisation\n(Per cent) …\nContinued\nSub-Sector\n2009 1\nQ1\nQ2\nQ3\nOils and Fats\n70\n64.5\n57.5\nDairy\nProducts\n63.166666666666664 64\n61.33333333\nGrain Mills\nProducts\n43\n45\n41.45454545\nManufacture\nof Animal\nFeeds\n58.4\n51.4\n57.4\nBakery\nProducts\n68.09574468085107\n68.09574468085107\n68.73404255\nManufacture\nof Sugar\n24\n24\n24\nSugar/\nConfectionery\n71.25\n71.25\n71.25\nManufacture\nof Macaroni,\nNoodles,\nCouscous and\nSimilar\nFarinaceous\nProducts\n57\n52\n54\nManufacture\nof Other Food\nProducts\nN.E.C.\n22.916666666666668 24.75\n26.16666666\nSpirit\n68\n64.666666666666671 66.33333333\nWine\n32.5\n49.5\n49.5\nMalt Liquors\nand Malt\n67.25\n67\n65.5\nSoft Drinks\n76.688888888888883 76.844444444444449 77.42222222\nSpin, Weaving\nand Finishing\nTextile\n59.111111111111107 59.805555555555557 58.88888888\nMade-up\nTextile\nExcluding\nApparel\n54.25\n52.75\n51.625\nCarpets &\nRugs\n44\n43\n56\nCordage, Rope\n& Twine\n80\n80\n85\nTextiles N.E.C. 64.333333333333329 67\n70\nWearing\nApparel\nExcluding\nFootwear\n65.125\n66.166666666666671 68.16666666\nTan & Leather\nFinishing\n38\n29.4\n26\nLeather\nProducts\nExcluding\nFootwear &\nWeaving\nApparel\n21\n28\n28\nFootwear\nExcluding\nRubber &\nPlastic\n78.5\n81.666666666666671 78.83333333\nSawmilling\n55.555555555555557 61.555555555555557 61.44444444\nManufacture\nof Builders'\nCarpentry and\nJoinery\n59.666666666666664 51\n56.66666666\nWood & Cork\nProducts\nN.E.C.\n62\n62\n60\nManufacture\nof Pulp, Paper\nand\nPaperboard\n80\n70\n80\nPaper Articles\nN.E.C.\n58.4\n57\n56\nManufacture\nof Other\nArticles of\nPaper and\nPaperboard\n58.142857142857146 56.428571428571431 60.57142857\nPrinting &\nPublishing\n42.857142857142854 43.666666666666664 43.46031746\nManufacture\nof Refined\nPetroleum\nProducts\n40\n40\n40\nBasic\nIndustrial\nChemicals\n58.166666666666664 65.666666666666671 63.16666666\nFertilizers &\nPesticides\n63.75\n63.75\n61.625\nPaints,\nVarnishes &\nLacquers\n53.555555555555557 49.111111111111114 52.55555555\nDrugs &\nMedicines\n44.833333333333336 47.833333333333336 47.83333333\nSoap,\nDetergents &\nCosmetics\n49\n47.8125\n51.6875\nRubber\nProducts\n44.75\n41.75\n35\nPlastic\nProducts\n52.692307692307693 55.42307692307692\n72.26923076\nGlass & Glass\nProducts\n41.666666666666664 73.333333333333329 68.33333333\nManufacture\nof Refractory\nCeramic\nProducts\n46.133720930232556 45.581395348837212 44.46511627\nNon-metallic\nMineral\nProducts\n68.5\n61.5\n58.5\nManufacture\nof Structural\nMetal\nProducts\n63.258064516129032 66.41935483870968\n65.12903225\nForging,\nPressing,\nStamping and\nRoll-forming\nof Metal;\nPowder\nMetallurgy\n65.8\n65.8\n66\nManufacture\nof Cutlery,\nHand Tools\nand General\nHardware\n60\n72.5\n69.5\nMetal\nFurniture and\nFixtures\n58.551724137931032 57.413793103448278 59.58620689\nManufacture\nof Tanks,\nReservoirs and\nContainers of\nMetal\n32.666666666666664 27.333333333333332 27.33333333\nMotor\nVehicles\nAssembly\n17\n14\n17\nMotorcycles &\nBicycles\n48\n50\n50\nManufacture\nof Wooden\nFurniture\n60.571428571428569 59.918367346938773 60.91836734\nAverage\n54.418870173055382 54.949850076467385 55.66986594\nWeighted\nAverage\n58.25674432480173\n58.578719124391213 59.53575138\nSource:\nNational\nBureau of\nStatistics\nNote:\n1Provisional\nReturn to\nMenu\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres)\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n1981\nJanuary\n0\n0\nFebruary\n3\n16.7\nMarch\n101.2\n192.1\nApril\n100.3\n119\nMay\n149.4\n242.8\nJune\n436.3\n276.8\nJuly\n222.4\n205\nAugust\n61\n254.4\nSeptember 136.6\n313.60000000000002\nOctober\n169.9\n113.9\nNovember 51.8\n31.6\nDecember 0\n0\n1982\nJanuary\n3.4\n51\n0\nFebruary\n52.7\n29.1\n0\nMarch\n29.5\n59.2\n0\nApril\n121.2\n118.4\n0\nMay\n155.6\n128.1\n0\nJune\n124.9\n146.9\n2\nJuly\n80.599999999999895 244.8\n2\nAugust\n8\n10.7\n2\nSeptember 84.8\n147.69999999999999 3\nOctober\n109.6\n172.7\n2\nNovember 0.4\n0\n2\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n1983\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n0.2\n0\nMarch\n7\n21.8\n1\nApril\n75.3\n63.2\n7\nMay\n214\n331.5\n1\nJune\n207.8\n355.2\n1\nJuly\n131.9\n98.099999999999895 2\nAugust\n38.299999999999997 25\n3\nSeptember 150.80000000000001 195.7\n3\nOctober\n8.9\n129\n5\nNovember 32.799999999999997 5.2\n3\nDecember 27.5\n29.9\n0\n1984\nJanuary\n0.2\n5.4\n0\nFebruary\n1.2\n5.0999999999999996 0\nMarch\n202.5\n91.7\n1\nApril\n89.5\n134.30000000000001 6\nMay\n194\n287.2\n1\nJune\n154.80000000000001 120.6\n2\nJuly\n76.7\n129\n2\nAugust\n116.3\n37.299999999999997 1\nSeptember 135.80000000000001 322.3\n2\nOctober\n127.5\n132.4\n1\nNovember 18.399999999999999 13\n0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n1985\nJanuary\n0\n1.7\n0\nFebruary\n0\n1.3\n0\nMarch\n80.599999999999895 52.8\n5\nApril\n89.099999999999895 124\n3\nMay\n123.8\n177.7\n1\nJune\n123.2\n174.4\n2\nJuly\n168.4\n217.7\n2\nAugust\n180.1\n186\n3\nSeptember 200.9\n216.8\n3\nOctober\n110.8\n116.2\n1\nNovember 14.9\n84.2\n0\nDecember 0\n3.2\n0\n1986\nJanuary\n0\n3.3\n0\nFebruary\n52.9\n52.5\n0\nMarch\n32.5\n43.4\n7\nApril\n133.19999999999999 98.7\n1\nMay\n148.30000000000001 95.2\n1\nJune\n143\n149.5\n1\nJuly\n80.2\n128.69999999999999 2\nAugust\n8\n50.9\n3\nSeptember 120.2\n162.9\n2\nOctober\n75.8\n228.2\n1\nNovember 2.7\n15\n2\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n1987\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n99.2\n60.8\n7\nMarch\n57.4\n52.5\n9\nApril\n57.3\n68.3\n2\nMay\n69.599999999999895 99.9\n6\nJune\n105.3\n212.8\n2\nJuly\n145.9\n248\n1\nAugust\n292.7\n261\n3\nSeptember 312.3\n302.5\n3\nOctober\n137.4\n195.3\n1\nNovember 0\n0.5\n0\nDecember 0\n0.3\n0\n1988\nJanuary\n14.5\n3.9\n2\nFebruary\n35.5\n30\n1\nMarch\n75.7\n60.1\n5\nApril\n257.7\n95.2\n6\nMay\n221.1\n222.1\n1\nJune\n260.60000000000002 410.1\n1\nJuly\n138.80000000000001 251.2\n2\nAugust\n123.5\n152\n2\nSeptember 308.3\n187.2\n2\nOctober\n114.2\n189.3\n9\nNovember 31.1\n4.5999999999999996 0\nDecember 28.4\n22.8\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n1989\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n3.8\n10.7\n0\nMarch\n160.9\n121.3\n5\nApril\n139\n50.9\n5\nMay\n101.4\n236.9\n1\nJune\n247.4\n283.7\n1\nJuly\n271.2\n236.7\n2\nAugust\n163.69999999999999 173.8\n2\nSeptember 180.4\n126.9\n1\nOctober\n116.6\n168.4\n1\nNovember 17\n36.200000000000003 0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n1990\nJanuary\n32.5\n42.7\n0\nFebruary\n27.4\n0.7\n8\nMarch\n1.6\n7.9\n0\nApril\n140.19999999999999 221.9\n6\nMay\n152\n129.6\n1\nJune\n173.2\n194\n2\nJuly\n220.3\n508.4\n3\nAugust\n22.2\n34.1\n2\nSeptember 164.8\n170.7\n1\nOctober\n93\n188.9\n1\nNovember 6\n110.3\n2\nDecember 71.7\n103.6\n3\n1991\nJanuary\n2.5\n5\n0\nFebruary\n60\n27.7\n0\nMarch\n38.1\n82.099999999999895 4\nApril\n118.1\n231.4\n1\nMay\n127.1\n171.6\n2\nJune\n179\n207.2\n2\nJuly\n286.2\n285.10000000000002 1\nAugust\n84.3\n190.3\n3\nSeptember 194.4\n138.6\n1\nOctober\n129.4\n279\n1\nNovember 0\n4.7\n0\nDecember 4\n44.2\n0\n1992\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n0\n0\nMarch\n8.4\n39.700000000000003 9\nApril\n145.69999999999999 238.7\n1\nMay\n116.9\n95.9\n1\nJune\n175.7\n245.3\n1\nJuly\n235\n327.7\n1\nAugust\n44.3\n62.3\n2\nSeptember 224.3\n386.1\n2\nOctober\n105.5\n148.1\n1\nNovember 20.7\n70\n5\nDecember 0\n0\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n1993\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n67.8\n7\n0\nMarch\n74.2\n103\n3\nApril\n45.5\n204.3\n4\nMay\n167\n224.4\n1\nJune\n255.6\n198.7\n2\nJuly\n155.9\n61.3\n2\nAugust\n70.3\n185.2\n3\nSeptember 188.4\n374.8\n2\nOctober\n120.8\n110.9\n1\nNovember 8.8000000000000007 58.6\n2\nDecember 39.299999999999997 5\n0\n1994\nJanuary\n12.1\n31\n0\nFebruary\n1.6\n89.3\n0\nMarch\n104.1\n59.2\n0\nApril\n60.2\n47.8\n9\nMay\n87.9\n94.4\n1\nJune\n120.7\n183.6\n1\nJuly\n130.5\n517.6\n1\nAugust\n21.2\n103.5\n5\nSeptember 193.9\n152.1\n2\nOctober\n129.9\n240.8\n1\nNovember 16.7\n37.6\n0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n1995\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n4\n16.3\n0\nMarch\n152.6\n55.2\n2\nApril\n124.8\n115.4\n5\nMay\n69.400000000000006 136\n1\nJune\n230.8\n336.2\n1\nJuly\n133\n348.3\n2\nAugust\n195.7\n257.7\n4\nSeptember 163.5\n192\n1\nOctober\n79.099999999999895 143.1\n1\nNovember 0\n38.9\n1\nDecember 0\n4.7\n0\n1996\nJanuary\n0\n9.6\n0\nFebruary\n88.099999999999895 102.7\n1\nMarch\n63.4\n223.9\n2\nApril\n82.4\n183.1\n7\nMay\n142.19999999999999 81\n2\nJune\n161.6\n360.4\n1\nJuly\n270.60000000000002 391\n2\nAugust\n165.6\n204.2\n3\nSeptember 372.7\n119.5\n2\nOctober\n125\n338\n1\nNovember 0\n1.4\n0\nDecember 0\n11.6\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n1997\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n0\n0\nMarch\n70.900000000000006 272.3\n2\nApril\n254.6\n222.1\n7\nMay\n117.7\n211.4\n1\nJune\n187.9\n266.60000000000002 1\nJuly\n145.6\n180.9\n1\nAugust\n130.80000000000001 83.5\n2\nSeptember 184.6\n138.5\n2\nOctober\n182.6\n205.8\n1\nNovember 8.8000000000000007 77.5\n9\nDecember 71.400000000000006 47.1\n5\n1998\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n1.1000000000000001 0\n2\nMarch\n12.8\n24.4\n9\nApril\n82.8\n56.4\n8\nMay\n173.6\n152.5\n1\nJune\n162.19999999999999 196.9\n1\nJuly\n150\n198.5\n3\nAugust\n97.5\n40.799999999999997 1\nSeptember 251.2\n245.6\n1\nOctober\n179.9\n247.2\n3\nNovember 5.6\n10.4\n0\nDecember 1.7\n0\n0\n1999\nJanuary\n13.1\n9.5\n0\nFebruary\n87.7\n37.700000000000003 0\nMarch\n39.799999999999997 128.19999999999999 2\nApril\n113.5\n121.3\n8\nMay\n104\n122.8\n2\nJune\n177.9\n274.5\n1\nJuly\n319.3\n275\n3\nAugust\n305.3\n226.8\n3\nSeptember 119.8\n229\n2\nOctober\n54.4\n318.3\n1\nNovember 0\n76\n0\nDecember 0\n0.3\n0\n2000\nJanuary\n4.3\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n0\n0\nMarch\n74.099999999999895 9.6\n0\nApril\n113.3\n94.7\n5\nMay\n78.2\n173.3\n1\nJune\n144.5\n347.2\n1\nJuly\n166.5\n187.2\n2\nAugust\n284.89999999999998 192.6\n3\nSeptember 246.3\n395.7\n2\nOctober\n97.599999999999895 238.6\n1\nNovember 0\n16.100000000000001 0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n2001\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n5.2\n0\nMarch\n32.799999999999997 115.5\n0\nApril\n145\n81.400000000000006 9\nMay\n183.2\n161.6\n9\nJune\n154.80000000000001 172.6\n1\nJuly\n89.599999999999895 246.4\n3\nAugust\n22.4\n127.6\n3\nSeptember 194.5\n280.5\n2\nOctober\n22.6\n144.80000000000001 1\nNovember 3.1\n70\n0\nDecember 1.2\n58.6\n0\n2002\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n2\n0\nMarch\n55.3\n138.1\n7\nApril\n164.9\n218.3\n1\nMay\n109.1\n89\n3\nJune\n228.7\n215.5\n2\nJuly\n309.7\n223.9\n4\nAugust\n91.4\n96.4\n4\nSeptember 122.9\n228.3\n3\nOctober\n157.6\n194.1\n2\nNovember 13.5\n20.9\n0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n2003\nJanuary\n3\n31.8\n0\nFebruary\n54.1\n72.900000000000006 2\nMarch\n23.8\n44.8\n1\nApril\n126.8\n200.2\n8\nMay\n113.3\n108.5\n1\nJune\n341.7\n346\n3\nJuly\n147.4\n138.4\n4\nAugust\n40\n30.5\n2\nSeptember 281.10000000000002 293.60000000000002 2\nOctober\n106.4\n260.7\n8\nNovember 4.2\n41.5\n6\nDecember 0\n3.1\n0\n2004\nJanuary\n13.9\n8.9\n0\nFebruary\n41.2\n94.2\n1\nMarch\n90\n54.2\n0\nApril\n66.3\n115\n6\nMay\n268.5\n313.39999999999998 2\nJune\n179.3\n249.5\n3\nJuly\n46.1\n212.8\n2\nAugust\n150.80000000000001 88.1\n3\nSeptember 91.9\n353\n1\nOctober\n217.1\n240.8\n2\nNovember 2.1\n31.9\n5\nDecember 0\n13.7\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n2005\nJanuary\n0\n0.1\n0\nFebruary\n15.1\n61.2\n0\nMarch\n88.8\n86.1\n2\nApril\n105.3\n89.8\n6\nMay\n211.4\n217.2\n1\nJune\n134\n356.3\n4\nJuly\n109.1\n322.8\n2\nAugust\n34.700000000000003 39.4\n2\nSeptember 145.4\n102.7\n1\nOctober\n39.4\n142.4\n2\nNovember 34.4\n53\nDecember 0\n2.2999999999999998\n2006\nJanuary\n7.6\n57.3\n1\nFebruary\n37.5\n115.3\n2\nMarch\n56.1\n149.6\n4\nApril\n144.4\n75.7\n3\nMay\n130.5\n154.30000000000001 1\nJune\n276.7\n440.9\n1\nJuly\n103.8\n134\n1\nAugust\n67.8\n144.9\n3\nSeptember 219.9\n452.1\n1\nOctober\n112.9\n319.5\n1\nNovember 7.2\n82\n0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n2007\nJanuary\n0\n0\nFebruary\n0\n0\nMarch\n24.1\n13.7\n2\nApril\n58.4\n58.3\n1\nMay\n201.4\n264.10000000000002 7\nJune\n324.2\n487.4\n1\nJuly\n508.2\n281\n3\nAugust\n169.2\n164\n3\nSeptember 170.3\n387.1\n2\nOctober\n182.2\n327.5\n1\nNovember 36.799999999999997 60.7\n0\nDecember 0\n6.1\n0\n2008\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n2.6\n8\n0\nMarch\n28.2\n158.20000000000002 2\nApril\n79.199999999999989 57.199999999999996 3\nMay\n135.39999999999998 251\n6\nJune\n177.29999999999998 249.50000000000003 2\nJuly\n269.29999999999995 358.6\n2\nAugust\n166.6\n236.20000000000005 3\nSeptember 365.79999999999995 313\n1\nOctober\n146.9\n207.9\n6\nNovember 0.4\n25\n0\nDecember 0\n54.6\n0\nTable C.5.1:\nMonthly\nRainfall\nStatistics in\nSome Nigerian\nTowns\n(Millimetres) -\nContinued\nYear\nMonth\nOgun\nF\nAbeokuta\nIjebu-Ode\nA\n2009\nJanuary\n0\n46.4\n6\nFebruary\n14.3\n45.2\n5\nMarch\n23.8\n27.1\n0\nApril\n236.1\n87.6\n7\nMay\n261.59999999999997 228.8\n1\nJune\n213.09999999999997 560\n1\nJuly\n152.30000000000001 368.9\n1\nAugust\n208.8\n59.3\n4\nSeptember 130.6\n151.19999999999999 1\nOctober\n136.9\n114.1\n2\nNovember 88\n80.8\n5\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n2010\nJanuary\n1\n2.6\n0\nFebruary\n6.8\n30.8\n0\nMarch\n3\n91.6\n7\nApril\n104.1\n106.7\n3\nMay\n173.4\n114.2\n3\nJune\n51\n268.39999999999998 1\nJuly\n385.9\n150\n3\nAugust\n207.00000000000003 245.1\n2\nSeptember 259.60000000000002 548.9\n2\nOctober\n215.8\n46.4\n2\nNovember 57.300000000000004 115.9\n0\nDecember 12.6\n0\n0\n2011\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n68.2\n61.6\n4\nMarch\n19.600000000000001 14.1\n0\nApril\n56.5\n66.2\n7\nMay\n148\n217.6\n1\nJune\n102.5\n185\n1\nJuly\n284.7\n435.9\n2\nAugust\n41.8\n122.2\n1\nSeptember 295.3\n306.5\n2\nOctober\n255.2\n319.8\n1\nNovember 6.8\n32.5\n0\nDecember 0\n0\n0\n2012\nJanuary\n0\n0\n0\nFebruary\n27.2\n101.9\n2\nMarch\n57.500000000000007 16.8\n1\nApril\n76.5\n91.6\n5\nMay\n183.8\n136.60000000000002 1\nJune\n350.3\n301.3\n2\nJuly\n147.79999999999998 317.2\n3\nAugust\n34.200000000000003 59.6\n2\nSeptember 189.60000000000002 254.10000000000002 2\nOctober\n283.2\n164.2\n2\nNovember 8.3999999999999986 104.1\n1\nDecember 5.2\n0\n0\n2013\nJanuary\n0\n43.4\n2\nFebruary\n33.799999999999997 23.700000000000003 3\nMarch\n82.200000000000017 65.5\n2\nApril\n221.4\n184.60000000000002 1\nMay\n161.29999999999998 249.5\n1\nJune\n68.899999999999991 162.99999999999997 1\nJuly\n192.89999999999998 370.79999999999995 1\nAugust\n20.400000000000002 49.400000000000006 1\nSeptember 157.10000000000002 185.29999999999995 1\nOctober\n87.100000000000009 221.79999999999995 1\nNovember 0.6\n49.3\n0\nDecember 11.1\n41.7\n0\nJanuary\n16\n10.899999999999999 1\nFebruary\n18.399999999999999 48.8\n2\nMarch\n187.3\n109.3\n6\n2014\nApril\n179\n104.2\n1\nMay\n134.10000000000002 286.39999999999998 2\nJune\n206.09999999999997 145.99999999999997 1\nJuly\n163.09999999999997 333.90000000000003 7\nAugust\n99.200000000000017 201.4\n5\nSeptember 274.8\n280.09999999999997 2\nOctober\n222.3\n251.89999999999998 2\nNovember 37.700000000000003 101.90000000000002 3\nDecember 0\n0\n0\nSource: Nigeria\nMeterological\nAgency (NMA)\nTransformation\nof data to\nquarterly series\nby Central\nBank of Nigeria\nNote: 1. Initial\ndata gap\nindicates\ncommencement\nperiod of\nrainfall data\ncapturing in\nthe particular\nstation\n2. Zero stands\nfor no rainfall\ndata capture or\nvery negligible", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2015 Statistical Bulletin Domestic Production, Consumption and Prices.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/2d837b2ce525cbd1fc47c92094631142.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "2d837b2ce525cbd1fc47c92094631142", "text": "CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 147 OF THE MONETARY POLICY \nCOMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 20th AND TUESDAY 21st MARCH, 2023 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) met on 20th and 21st March, 2023, faced \nwith new and existing headwinds, undermining the full recovery of the global \neconomy. These include the recent bank failures in the United States and \nSwitzerland, amidst widespread monetary policy tightening, which introduced \na new dimension to the risks confronting the global financial system, as well as, \nthe persisting high but receding global inflation. The continued hostilities \nbetween Russia and Ukraine and its implications to the smooth functioning of \nthe global supply chain also remain a critical strain to the recovery of global \noutput growth. \n \nIn the domestic economy, output recovery progressed at a relatively moderate \npace, while headline inflation trended upwards, albeit less aggressively, driven \nmainly by a marginal increase in food inflation. \nThe Committee assessed key risks to the global economy associated with these \ndevelopments and their impact on the Nigerian economy, as well as, the \noutlook for the rest of the year. \nTwelve (12) members of the Committee attended this meeting. \nGlobal Economic Developments \nThe Monetary Policy Committee noted the new and existing headwinds to the \nbroad stability of the global economy. Primary amongst these is the risk of a \nglobal financial contagion from the recent bank failures in the United States \nand Switzerland. In Europe, the war between Russia and Ukraine has continued \n \n \nunabated, causing critical strains to the commodities and energy markets as \nsupply chain bottlenecks remain, while the lingering risk of the resurgence of \nseveral variants of the Corona virus persists after China set aside its Zero-COVID \nPolicy. Furthermore, the deteriorating relations between the US, China, Russia \nand some major oil producers in the Middle East, continue to contribute to \nincreased volatility in the oil market. \nIn the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies, the unfolding tight \nexternal financing conditions and shock spillovers from the Advanced \nEconomies, could further dampen the recovery of output growth. \nIn light of these developments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its \nJanuary 2023 World Economic Outlook, forecast global output growth for 2023 \nat 2.9 per cent, compared with 3.4 per cent in 2022. Growth is, however, \nexpected to improve to 3.1 per cent in 2024. \n \nWhile global inflation shows sign of deceleration, monetary policy normalization \nis progressing unabated, especially amongst key Advanced Economy central \nbanks, targeted at moderating global demand pressure. Price development \nacross several economies is thus expected to remain high throughout 2023, but \nto decelerate gradually in 2024. \n \nThe key factors expected to keep inflation above the long-run target of several \ncentral banks include: the persisting disruption to energy markets associated \nwith continued war between Russia and Ukraine; high commodity prices; and \ngeneral disruptions to the global supply chain associated with uncertainties \naround the COVID-19 pandemic in China and the ongoing tensions between \nthe US and China over Taiwan’s sovereignty. \n \nAcross several Emerging Market and Developing Economies, inflationary \npressures have remained high due largely to rising energy prices, high prices of \n \n \ngrains and exchange rate pressures associated with capital flows to high yield \nUS dollar-denominated assets. \n \nIn the global financial markets, renewed fears of a global financial contagion \nare forcing investors to move away from the equities market to safer assets such \nas gold, while others seek higher returns in treasury securities with improved \nyields. With several Advanced Economy central banks progressing with \nmonetary policy normalization, global financial conditions will likely remain \ntight, thus reinforcing the reassignment of financial portfolios to reflect the risk \naversion of investors. \nDomestic Economic Developments \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that Real Gross \nDomestic Product (GDP) grew by 3.10 per cent in 2022. In the fourth quarter of \n2022, it grew by 3.52 per cent (year-on-year), compared with 3.98 per cent in \nthe corresponding period of 2021 and 2.25 per cent in the preceding quarter. \nThe economy maintained a positive growth trajectory for nine consecutive \nquarters, since exiting recession in 2020. The improved performance was driven \nlargely by sustained growth in the services and agricultural sectors, a rebound \nin economic activities associated with economic recovery and continued \nintervention in growth enhancing sectors by the Bank. Staff projections showed \nthat output growth recovery is expected to continue into 2023 and 2024. \nThe Committee, however, observed with concern, the marginal increase in \nheadline inflation (year-on-year) in February 2023, to 21.91 per cent, from 21.82 \nper cent in January 2023, a 0.09 percentage point increase. This increase was \nattributed largely to a minimal rise in the food component to 24.35 per cent in \nFebruary 2023, from 24.32 per cent in January 2023, while the core component \nmoderated to 18.84 per cent in February 2023, from 19.16 per cent in January \n2023. The shocks to the food component were driven by high cost of \ntransportation of food items, lingering security challenges in major food-\n \n \nproducing areas and legacy infrastructural problems, which continue to \nhamper food supply logistics. \nBroad money supply (M3) grew by 13.14 per cent (annualized) in February 2023 \n(year-to-date), below the 2023 provisional annual benchmark of 17.18 per cent. \nThis was driven largely by the growth in Net Foreign Assets (NFA), which was \nattributed to the increase in foreign asset holdings of the Central bank and \ndecrease in foreign claims on Other Depository Corporations (ODCs). \nMoney market rates reflected the tight liquidity conditions in the banking \nsystem. Consequently, the monthly weighted average Open Buyback (OBB) \nand Inter-bank Call rates increased to 12.74 and 12.54 per cents in February \n2023, from 10.14 and 10.35 per cent in January 2023, respectively. \nThe Committee noted the continued stability in the banking system, reflected \nby the performance of the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs). The Capital \nAdequacy Ratio (CAR) stood at 13.7 per cent, Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) \nratio of 4.2 per cent and Liquidity Ratio (LR) of 43.1 per cent, as of February 2023. \nThe MPC observed the sustained improvement in the equities market in the \nreview period, as the All-Share Index (ASI) and Market Capitalization (MC) both \nincreased to 54,915.39 and N29.92 trillion on March 17, 2023, from 51,251.06 and \nN27.92 trillion on December 30, 2022, respectively, indicating renewed investor \nconfidence in the Nigerian financial market. \nThe Committee, however, noted the marginal decline in the level of gross \nexternal reserves to US$36.13 billion in February 2023, from US$36.4 billion in \nJanuary 2023, a decrease of 0.7 per cent, reflecting the downtrend in crude oil \nprices, as global uncertainties persist. \nThe Committee reviewed the performance of the Bank’s various interventions \naimed at stimulating production and productivity across the real sector. \nBetween January and February 2023, the Bank disbursed N12.65 billion to three \n(3) agricultural projects under the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP), \n \n \nbringing the cumulative disbursement under the Programme to ₦1.09 trillion to \nover 4.6 million smallholder farmers cultivating or rearing 21 agricultural \ncommodities on an approved 6.02 million hectares of farmland across the \ncountry. \nThe Bank also released the sum of ₦23.70 billion under the ₦1.0 trillion Real Sector \nFacility to eight (8) new real sector projects in agriculture, manufacturing, and \nservices. Cumulative disbursements under the Real Sector Facility currently \nstands at ₦2.43 trillion, disbursed to 462 projects across the country, comprising \n257 manufacturing, 95 agriculture, 97 services and 13 mining sector projects. \nUnder the 100 for 100 Policy on Production and Productivity (PPP). The Bank also \nreleased ₦3.01 billion under the Nigerian Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility \n(NEMSF-2) for capital and operational expenditure of distribution companies \n(Discos) aimed at improving their liquidity status and aid their recovery of legacy \ndebt. This brings the cumulative disbursement under the facility to ₦254.39 billion. \nOutlook \nThe overall outlook for the full recovery of both the global and domestic \neconomies, remained clouded by new and legacy downside risks. \nAvailable data and forecasts for key macroeconomic variables for the Nigerian \neconomy, suggest that the domestic economy will continue to recover for the \nrest of 2023 at a moderate pace, in light of evolving and persisting shocks to the \neconomy. The continued upward pressure on inflation, rising cost of debt and \ndebt servicing, as well as deteriorating fiscal balances remain headwinds, which \nmay undermine the smooth path to a faster recovery. Accordingly, the Nigerian \neconomy is forecast to grow in 2023 by 3.03 per cent (CBN), 3.37 per cent (FGN) \nand 3.20 per cent (IMF). \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nAt this meeting, MPC focused its attention not only on the inflationary trends in \nmost major economies, but also on the reported impact of policy rate hikes: \n \n \naimed at rein-in inflation on financial system stability in the global financial \nsystem. \nThe MPC hence took time out to discuss the recent bank failures in the US and \nSwitzerland, an event that occurred following the persistent interest rate hikes in \nthe US, and how this has adversely impacted the broad portfolio of banks in the \nUS. It noted that whereas MPR was increased by 500 basis points in Nigeria, from \n12.5 per cent in 2022 to 17.5 per cent in January 2023, the Financial Soundness \nIndicators (FSIs) in Nigeria shows that the Nigerian banking system remain \nresilient due largely the stringent prudential guidelines put in place by the CBN \nwhich has resulted in a strong build-up of not only the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) \nin Nigeria, but also the Liquidity Ratio and capital Adequacy Ratio. \nIn the light of these strong FSIs, MPC was comforted that its various decisions in \nincreasing MPR have had moderate impact on inflation, given that the rate \nappears to have plateaued in Nigeria. \nThe Committee’s major considerations at this meeting, therefore, focused on \narriving at key policy mechanisms to shield the economy from emerging shocks \nfrom the global economy, as well as sustain its focus on domestic price stability. \nHeadline inflation, in the view of members, remained high with increased \nexpectations of price development, due to the perennial scarcity of PMS and \nongoing discourse around the removal of fuel subsidy. With the prices of other \nenergy products also rising, members stressed the importance of addressing \nprice development. \nThe Committee also considered the continued impact of exchange rate \npressure on domestic price levels and called for policies to attract both portfolio \nand foreign direct investment to Nigeria. It maintained optimism that, the \ncontinued progress made with the RT200 FX programme, Naira-4-dollar and \nother policies targeted at attracting diaspora remittances, would continue to \nhelp improve accretion to the external reserves and improve liquidity in the \nforeign exchange market. \n \n \nWhile output growth remains on a positive trajectory, Members called for \nincreased monetary and fiscal coordination to support the recovery in light of \nrisks confronting the domestic economy. To this end, the Committee enjoined \nthe fiscal authority to explore other avenues to improve non-oil revenue to \nreduce the fiscal deficit and public debt burden. \nFollowing new risks of financial contagion emerging from the scenario of failed \nbanks in some Advanced Economies, members examined the possibility of \nshocks to the Nigerian banking system from these banks and concluded that \nthe Nigerian banking system remains reasonably insulated from such likely \ncontagion. The CBN has been able to achieve this through stringent micro and \nmacro-prudential guidelines that have ensured that individual banks and the \nbanking industry in Nigeria have adequate buffers to ward-off global \ncontagion. In addition to this, the MPC examined the possible impact of further \npolicy rate hikes on the stability of the banking system and was convinced that \nfurther hikes would not adversely impact the stability of the banking system. The \nCommittee, however, called on the Bank’s Management to strengthen its \nregulatory oversight on the banking system to ensure that the banking industry \nremain stable and resilient. \nThe Committee’s Decision \nThe MPC noted that while the continued rise in headline inflation remained a \nsignificant problem confronting the economy, other macroeconomic variables \nare moving in the right direction, despite observed headwinds. \nThe Committee’s debate at this meeting, therefore, was whether to continue its \nrate hike to further dampen the rising inflation trajectory or hold to observe \nemerging development and allow for the impact of the last five rate hikes to \npermeate the economy. Loosening, in the view of members, would gravely \nundermine the gains achieved so far. \nThe MPC observed the continued upward risk to price development around \nexpectations on the removal of the PMS subsidy; rising prices of other energy \n \n \nsources; continuing exchange rate pressure; and uncertain climatic conditions. \nThese in the view of members, provides a compelling argument for an upward \nadjustment of the policy rate, albeit, less aggressively. The Committee, \nhowever, noted that the naira redesign and cash withdrawal limit policies have \nresulted in a sizeable reduction in Currency-Outside-Banks, indicating an \nexpected improvement in the potency of monetary policy tools. \nMembers, however, remained aware of the ongoing challenges associated \nwith the limits imposed on cash withdrawals in the face of frequent downtime \nin bank electronic transaction channels. The Committee thus called on Other \nDepository Corporations, online payment platforms, and other stakeholders to \nensure that the prevailing incidence of network failures is overcome in the \nimmediate and short term. This would ensure that the Naira Redesign and Cash \nWithdrawal Limit Policies lead to an improved in-road of the CBN Cashless \nprogram and efficiency of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. \nMembers, thus, resolved by a majority vote to raise the Monetary Policy Rate \n(MPR) by 50 basis points. In Summary, ten (10) members voted to raise the MPR \nby 50 basis points, one (1) member voted to raise the MPR by 25 basis points \nand one (1) member voted to hold the MPR. All members voted to keep all \nother parameters constant. \nThe MPC, therefore, voted to: \nI. \nRaise the MPR by 50 basis points to 18.0 per cent; \nII. \nRetain the asymmetric corridor of +100/-700 basis points around the MPR; \nIII. \nRetain the CRR at 32.5 per cent; and \nIV. \nRetain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 per cent. \nThank you. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele, CON \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n21st March 2023", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 147 of The Monetary Policy Committee Meeting Held on Monday 20th and Tuesday 21st March 2023.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/2de2bf9bfcdd771fd2a72a351555d8b2.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "2de2bf9bfcdd771fd2a72a351555d8b2", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communique No 108 of \nthe Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of \nMonday and Tuesday 25th and 26th July 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 25th and 26th July \n2016 against the backdrop of fragile global and domestic \neconomic and financial conditions. The Committee \nevaluated the global and domestic macroeconomic and \nfinancial developments in the first six months of 2016 and \nthe outlook for the rest of the year. In attendance were 8 \nmembers. \n \n2 \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted the continued sluggish growth in \nglobal output, being underpinned by weak demand and \nslowing productivity. In addition to existing risks, rising \ndebt levels in the Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), \nvolatile financial markets and the vote of the United \nKingdom to exit the European Union “BREXIT” have \nlessened the prospects for a more prosperous global \neconomy in 2016. Consequently, \nthe International \nMonetary Fund (IMF), in July 2016, further downgraded its \nbaseline forecast for global growth to 3.1 per cent from 3.2 \nin April. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and \nDevelopment (OECD) forecast for global output in 2016 is \neven less optimistic at 3.0 per cent. Slower global growth \nprospects is traced to weak trade, sluggish investment, \n3 \n \nprotracted weak aggregate demand and low commodity \nprices; which have translated to output declines in the \nEmerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs). \nThe Brexit vote has created widespread uncertainty and \nelevated volatility in the global financial markets. \n \nThe United States (US) economy grew by 0.8 per cent in \nQ1 of 2016, though, much lower than the 1.4 per cent \ngrowth recorded in the last quarter of 2015. The tapered \ngrowth was attributed to the goods sector which continues \nto struggle under the weight of declining factory activity; \nthe hitherto resilient service sector is now losing steam \nwhile trade remains under pressure from a strong dollar \nand weak domestic demand. \n \n4 \n \nThe Japan economy grew at an annualized rate of 1.7 per \ncent in Q1 of 2016, a reversal of the negative growth \nrecorded in Q4 of 2015. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) at its \n15th-16th July meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, \nmaintained its monthly asset purchase at ¥6.7 trillion \n(US$63.93 billion), leaving the policy rate also unchanged \nat negative 0.1 per cent. \n \nThe Euro Area grew by 0.6 per cent in first quarter, 2016, \nup from 0.3 per cent, recorded in fourth quarter of 2015. \nDownside risks to the growth outlook have, however, risen \nfollowing the Brexit vote. The Governing Council of the \nEuropean Central Bank (ECB), at its meeting of July 21st, \n2016, retained its key interest rates on the main \nrefinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and \n5 \n \nthe deposit facility at 0.00, 0.25 and -0.40 per cent, \nrespectively, with the expectation that they would remain \nat present or lower levels for an extended period of time. \nThe ECB also sustained its monthly asset purchases of \n€80 billion (US$87.91) until March 2017, with possibility of \nextension. \n \nIn anticipation of and to mitigate the impact of the Brexit \nvote, the Bank of England (BoE) voted to continue its ₤375 \nbillion (US$495 billion) monthly assets purchase program, \nfinanced through the issuance of reserves and possible \nincrease in the quantum should the need arise. The Bank \nalso retained its policy rate at 0.5 per cent, with a \ncommitment to stimulate inflationary growth towards its 2.0 \n6 \n \nper cent long run path. The Bank also hinted at a possible \nfurther easing of monetary policy in August, 2016. \n \nMajor EMDEs continued to face declining capital inflows, \nrising financing costs and geo-political tensions, all of \nwhich pose constrain to growth. Depressed commodity \nprices continued to tilt the balance of risk towards the \ndownside, thus, dampening prospects for near term \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \nrecovery \nin \nthe \nEMDEs. \nConsequently, the IMF (WEO July 2016 Update) \ndowngraded the 2016 growth forecast for this group of \ncountries to 4.1 from 4.3 per cent in the April projection. \n \nIn July, oil and other commodity prices rallied against the \nbackdrop of better-than-expected economic data on China \n7 \n \nin the second quarter, sustained attacks on oil production \nfacilities in Nigeria, and continued unrest in Libya. \nNonetheless, global inflation remained subdued despite \nwidespread easing of monetary policy. In the advanced \neconomies, recent developments such as BREXIT has \nincreased the uncertainty surrounding the future of the \nEuro \nzone \nthus \nfurther \nweakening \ndemand \nand \nsuppressing inflation. Consequently, while the stance of \nmonetary policy in most advanced economies is expected \nto remain accomodative through fiscal 2016 in the \nEMDEs, it is expected to remain mixed, reflecting diversity \nand multiplicity of shocks confronting them. \n \n \n \n8 \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe Nigerian economy is still saddled with the effects of \nthe shocks of the first quarter of 2016; which led to a \ncontraction in output arising from energy shortages, high \nelectricity tariffs, price hikes, scarcity of foreign exchange \nand depressed consumer demand, among others. \nWhereas the influence and persistence of some of the \nfactors waned in the second quarter, it is unlikely that the \neconomy rebounded strongly in the quarter as setbacks in \nthe energy sector continued owing mainly to vandalism of \noil installations. In addition, the implementation of the 2016 \nbudget in the second quarter remained slower than \nexpected in the second quarter. The Committee noted that \nmost of the conditions undermining domestic output \n9 \n \ngrowth were outside the direct purview of monetary policy. \nIt nonetheless, hopes that the deregulation in the \ndownstream petroleum sector and the liberalization of the \nforeign exchange market would help bring about the much \nneeded relief to the economy. \nData from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate \nthat domestic output in the first quarter of 2016 contracted \nby 0.36 per cent, the first negative growth in many years. \nThis represented a decline of 2.47 percentage points in \noutput from the 2.11 per cent reported in the fourth quarter \nof 2015, and 4.32 percentage point lower than the 3.96 \nper cent recorded in the corresponding period of 2015. \nAggregate output contracted in virtually all sectors of the \neconomy, with the non-oil sector recording a decline of \nabout 0.18 per cent, compared with the 3.14 per cent \n10 \n \nexpansion in the preceding quarter. Agriculture and Trade \nwere the only sectors with positive growth at 0.68 per cent \nand 0.40 per cent, respectively, Industry, Construction and \nServices contracted by 0.93, 0.26 and 0.08 percentage \npoint, respectively. \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted a further rise in year-on-year \nheadline inflation to 16.48 per cent in June 2016, from \n15.58 per cent in May; 13.72 per cent in April, 12.77 per \ncent in March and 11.38 per cent in February 2016. The \nincrease in headline inflation in June reflected increases in \nboth food and core components of inflation. Core inflation \nrose sharply for the fourth time in a row to 16.22 per cent \nin June, from 15.05 per cent in May; 13.35 per cent in \n11 \n \nApril; 12.17 per cent in March; 11.00 per cent in February \nand 8.80 per cent in January having stayed at 8.70 per \ncent for three consecutive months through December, \n2015. Food inflation also rose to 15.30 per cent in June, \nfrom 14.86 per cent in May; 13.19 per cent in April; 12.74 \nper cent in March; 11.35 per cent in February, 10.64 per \ncent in January and 10.59 per cent in December, 2015. \nThe rising inflationary pressure was largely a reflection of \nstructural factors, including high cost of electricity, high \ntransport cost, high cost of inputs, low industrial activities \nas well as higher prices of both domestic and imported \nfood products. \nThe MPC expressed strong support for the urgent \ndiversification of the economy away from oil to \nmanufacturing, agriculture and services; and called on all \n12 \n \nstakeholders to increase investment in growth stimulating \nand high employment elasticity sectors of the economy in \norder to lift the economy out of its current phase. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 8.26 per cent in June, \n2016, a 4.80 percentage points increase from 3.46 per \ncent in May compared with the 0.54 per cent contraction in \nJune 2015. When annualized, M2 grew by 16.52 per cent \nin June 2016 against the provisional growth benchmark of \n10.98 per cent for 2016. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew \nby 12.52 per cent in the same period and annualized at \n25.04 per cent. At this rate, the growth rate of NDC \nexceeded the provisional benchmark of 17.94 per cent for \n2016. There was no change in the level of banking sector \nnet credit to government in June, contrasting the 31.45 per \n13 \n \ncent growth in May. Credit to the private sector grew by \n14.45 per cent in June 2016, which annualizes to a growth \nof 28.90 per cent, outperforming the benchmark growth of \n13.38 per cent for the year. The MPC expressed cautious \nsatisfaction over the improved performance of credit to the \nprivate sector and urged the Bank to ensure that the \ntempo is sustained inorder to stimulate recovery of output \ngrowth. \nThe MPC noted that the level of money market interest \nrates largely reflected the liquidity situation in the banking \nsystem during the review period. Average inter-bank call \nrate, which stood at 20.0 per cent on 17th June 2016, \nclosed at 50.0 per cent on July 15, 2016. The increase \nwas attributed in part; to the newly introduced foreign \nexchange framework and the mop up of naira liquidity due \n14 \n \nto increased sale of foreign exchange by the CBN during \nthe period. Generally, the period under review witnessed a \ndecline in volume of activity in the inter-bank market owing \nto injections by FAAC and maturity of some CBN \nsecurities. \nThe MPC also noted the decline in the indices of the \nequities segment of the capital market. The All-Share \nIndex (ASI) declined by 6.55 per cent from 29,597.79 on \nJune 30, 2016, to 27,659.44 on July 22, 2016. Similarly, \nMarket Capitalization (MC) declined by 6.26 per cent from \nN10.17 trillion to N9.50 trillion during the same period. \nRelative to end-December 2015, the indices fell by 3.43 \nper cent and 3.55 per cent, respectively. Globally, \nhowever, the equities markets remained generally bearish, \nin the aftermath of the Brexit vote. \n15 \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe MPC noted the actions taken by the Bank as part of \nthe implementation of the flexible foreign exchange regime \ndecided at its meeting in May which was designed to \nimprove liquidity and stabilize the foreign exchange \nmarket. The Bank introduced a flexible exchange rate \nregime in the inter-bank market; introduced a Naira-settled \nOTC-FMDQ-OTC trading platform, adopted two-way quote \ntrading platform at the inter-bank foreign exchange market \nand appointed foreign exchange primary dealers. \nHowever, the average naira exchange rate weakened at \nthe inter-bank segment of the foreign exchange market \nduring the review period following the liberalization of the \nmarket. The exchange rate at the interbank market \nopened at N197.00/US$ and closed at N292.90/US$, with \n16 \n \na daily average of N244.95/US$ between May 25 and July \n19, 2016. The initial weakness was attributable to the \nnormal market reaction to a new regulatory reform. The \nMPC reaffirmed its commitment to its statutory mandate of \nachieving a stable naira exchange rate. \n \nThe MPC’s Considerations \nThe \nMPC \nrecognized \nthe \nweak \nmacroeconomic \nenvironment, as reflected particularly in increasing \ninflationary pressure and contraction in real output growth. \nIn view of this, the MPC underscored the imperative of \ncoordinated action, anchored by fiscal policy, to initiate \nrecovery at the earliest time. Members called on the \nFederal Government to fast-track the implementation of \nthe 2016 budget in order to stimulate economic activity to \n17 \n \nbridge the output gap and create employment. In the same \nvein, the MPC expressed concern over the non-payment \nof salaries in some states and urged express action in that \ndirection to help stimulate aggregate demand. On its part, \nand as a complementary measure, the MPC restated its \ncommitment to measures and deployment of relevant \ninstruments within its purview to complement fiscal policy \nwith a view to restarting growth. The Committee also \nenjoined deposit money banks (DMBs) to partner with \nGovernment and the Bank in this direction, by redirecting \ncredit from low employment generating sectors to those \ncapable of supporting growth, reducing unemployment \nand improving citizen standards of living. \n \n18 \n \nMembers agreed that the economy was passing through a \ndifficult phase, dealing with critical supply gaps and \nunderscored the imperative of carefully navigating the \npolicy space in order to engender growth and ensure price \nstability. The MPC therefore, summarized the two policy \noptions it was confronted with as restarting growth or \nfighting inflation. The MPC was particularly concerned that \nheadline inflation spiked significantly in June 2016, \napproaching twice the size of the upper limit of the policy \nreference band. \nThe Committee noted that inflation had risen significantly, \neroding real purchasing power of fixed income earners \nand dragging growth. The MPC was further concerned \nthat while the situation called for obvious tightening of the \nmonetary policy stance, the recession confronting the \n19 \n \neconomy and the prospects of negative growth to year-\nend needed to be factored into the policy parameters. \nThe arguments in favour of growth were anchored on the \npremise that the current inflationary episode was largely \nstructural. In particular, members noted the prominent role \nof cost factors arising from reform of the energy sector, \nleading to higher domestic fuel prices and electricity tariffs \nand prolonged foreign exchange shortages arising from \nfalling oil prices leading to higher inputs costs, domestic \nfuel shortages, increased transportation costs, security \nchallenges, reform of the foreign exchange market \nreflected in high exchange rate pass-through to domestic \nprices of imports. Consequently, the current episode of \ninflation, being largely non-monetary but largely structural, \ntightening at this point would only serve to worsen \n20 \n \nprospects for growth recovery as the Bank had in June \n2016, withdrawn substantial domestic liquidity through the \nforeign exchange market upon introduction of the flexible \nforeign exchange market regime. Members however, \nnoted the negative effect of inflation on consumption and \ninvestment decisions and its defining impact on the \nefficiency of resource allocation and investment. \nThe MPC further noted the prolonged non-payment of \nsalaries, a development which has affected aggregate \ndemand and worsened growth prospects. It also noted \nthat at the May MPC meeting, members weighed the risks \nof the balance of probabilities against growth and voted to \nhold, allowing fiscal policy some space to stimulate output \nwith injections, but this has been long in coming. \n21 \n \nThe MPC in putting forward for tightening considered the \nhigh inflationary trend which has culminated into negative \nreal interest rates in the economy; noting that this was \ndiscouraging to savings. Members also noted that the \nnegative real interest rates did not support the recent \nflexible foreign exchange market as foreign investors \nattitude had remained lukewarm, showing unwillingness in \nbringing in new capital under the circumstance. Members \nfurther noted that there existed a substantial amount of \ninternational capital in negative yielding investments \nglobally and Nigeria stood a chance of attracting such \ninvestments \nwith \nsound \nmacroeconomic \npolicies. \nConsequently, members were of the view that an upward \nadjustment in interest rates would strongly signal not only \nthe Bank’s commitment to price stability but also its desire \n22 \n \nto gradually achieve positive real interest rates. Such a \ndecision, it was argued, gives impetus for improving the \nliquidity of the foreign exchange market and the urgent \nneed to deepen the market to ensure self-sustainability. \nMembers were of the opinion that this would boost \nmanufacturing and industrial output, thereby stimulating \ngrowth which is desired at this time. \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe MPC, recognizing that the Bank lacked the \ninstruments required to directly jumpstart growth, and \nbeing mindful not to calibrate its instruments in such a \nmanner as to undermine its primary mandate and financial \nsystem stability, in assessment of the relevant issues, was \nof the view that the balance of risks remains tilted against \nprice stability. Consequently, five (5) members voted to \n23 \n \nraise the Monetary Policy Rate while three (3) voted to \nhold. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n(i) Increase the MPR by 200 basis points from \n12.00 to 14 per cent; \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.50 per cent; \n(iii) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv) Retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 \nbasis points around the MPR \n \nThank you for listening. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n26th July 2016", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No 108 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday 25th and 26th July 2016.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/2f0e1e92487ecc0434be7d00088abc87.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "2f0e1e92487ecc0434be7d00088abc87", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nHome Publications\n \n\nPUBLICATION DETAILS\n\nTitle :\nArtificial Intelligence in the South African Financial Sector\nPublished Date:\n2025-11-24\nLast Modified Date:\n2026-02-25, 13:26\nCategory:\nMedia > Media Releases | What's New | Publications > Prudential Authority\n\nThe Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) and the Prudential Authority (PA) have jointly published their inaugural report, Artificial Intelligence in the South African Financial Sector. This report provides the first comprehensive overview of AI adoption, including machine learning (ML) and generative AI (GenAI), within South Africa’s financial institutions.\n\nAttachments:\nArtificial Intelligence in the South African Financial Sector\nBack\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/media-releases/2025/artificial-intelligence-in-the-south-african-financial-sector"}

dedup/cb_requests/3091fe45e0e4f2788fb48c7f3d0dbdcc.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "3091fe45e0e4f2788fb48c7f3d0dbdcc", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nHome Publications\n \n\nPUBLICATION DETAILS\n\nTitle :\nWinners of the 2025 G20 TechSprint\nPublished Date:\n2025-11-11\nLast Modified Date:\n2025-11-11, 14:10\nCategory:\nMedia > Media Releases | What's New | Company > G20\n\nThe 2025 G20 TechSprint marks the first time the global innovation initiative has taken place on African soil.\n\nAttachments:\nWinners of the 2025 G20 TechSprint\nBack\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/media-releases/2025/g20-techsprint-winners"}

dedup/cb_requests/3161d301734a8d0745ecff7585533f78.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "3161d301734a8d0745ecff7585533f78", "text": "About us\nWhat we do\nPublications\nNewsroom\nContact us\nSARB POLICY RATE 6.75% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nCPI 3.1% \n\nMar 2026\n\nPPI 1.8% \n\nFeb 2026\n\nPRIME 10.25% \n\n24 Apr 2026\n\nR2030\n\t\n\nR209\n\t\n\nSABOR\n\t\n\nZARONIA\n\t\nZAR/USD\n\t\n16.6276\n\nZAR/GBP\n\t\n22.4116\n\nZAR/EUR\n\t\n19.4385\n\nZAR/JPY\n\t\n0.1041\nHome Publications\n \n\nSTATEMENT OF THE MPC JANUARY 2026\n\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n\nForecast Report MPC January 2026\n\nCurrent Repo Rate\n\n \n\n6.75%\n\nNext due: 26 March 2026\n\nCurrent Inflation Rate\n\n \n\n3.6%\n\nNext due: 18 February 2026\n\nInflation Target\n\n \n\n3%\n\nTolerance band: plus or minus 1\n\nStatement of the Monetary Policy Committee\n\nIssued by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank\n\n \n\nLast year was marked by extreme global uncertainty, and 2026 has begun with a new round of shocks. Geopolitical tensions remain elevated, reflecting what appears to be a rupture in the global political order. There are also new threats to central bank independence.\n\nMarkets are jittery, and precious metals like gold have received safe-haven flows. There are also ongoing risks of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) bubble. Furthermore, global imbalances have become very large. For instance, China’s trade surplus was over a trillion dollars last year, a new record. Meanwhile, government debt is still growing fast in key economies, with the US fiscal deficit, for example, approaching two trillion dollars. These trends are not sustainable.\n\nDespite these fragilities, asset prices have been resilient and global growth is holding up, supported by investments in AI, as well as fiscal stimulus in major economies. Inflation generally slowed last year, and many central banks have had space to adopt more neutral policy settings. Financing conditions for emerging markets remain benign. \n\nTurning to South Africa, growth looks steadier. The economy has expanded for four consecutive quarters, and the available data suggest it grew further in the most recent quarter. This would mark the longest unbroken growth phase since 2018.\n\nThe main growth driver has been household consumption, up by more than 3% last year, compared to an estimated 1.3% for the overall economy. Unfortunately, investment has been weak, contracting during the first half of 2025. However, the third-quarter data showed a rebound. We hope this investment recovery will be sustained, allowing the economy to achieve structurally higher growth.\n\nOur forecasts continue to show growth moving somewhat higher, approaching 2% over the medium term. We see some upside risks to these projections.\n\nMoving to prices, inflation last year was 3.2%, close to our 3% objective. Inflation was a bit higher towards the end of the year, mainly because of temporary factors. The December print came in at 3.6%. However, we expect this was the peak, and that inflation will slow from here.\n\nIndeed, our near-term inflation forecast has fallen, with the rand stronger and a lower oil price assumption. We are, however, keeping an eye on food inflation, especially meat prices, which are being affected by a serious outbreak of foot and mouth disease. We are also concerned about electricity prices, given that NERSA’s price correction may rise from R54 billion to R76 billion.\n\nMore positively, inflation expectations have fallen, with the latest survey showing longer-term expectations at record lows. We look forward to expectations declining further, as South Africans experience ongoing lower inflation and learn more about the new target.\n\nIn turn, lower expectations will be important for getting inflation to settle at 3%. Currently, we are benefitting from low goods price inflation, supported by factors like the stronger rand. Goods inflation is at 3%, and core goods is at 1.2%. By contrast, services inflation is still over 4%. It is desirable to have services inflation moving closer to 3%, as low inflation becomes the new normal for South Africa.\n\nWe assess the risks to the inflation outlook as balanced.\n\nAgainst this backdrop, the MPC decided to keep the policy rate unchanged, at 6.75%. Two members favoured a cut of 25 basis points, while four preferred a hold.\n\nThe Quarterly Projection Model continues to forecast gradual rate cuts as inflation subsides. The model interprets the policy stance as moderately restrictive currently, with rates reaching neutral levels during 2027. As before, this rate path remains a broad policy guide. Our decisions will continue to be taken on a meeting-by-meeting basis, with careful attention to the outlook, data outcomes, and the balance of risks to the forecast.\n\nMoving to our scenarios:\n\nOver the past year, there have been large changes in both the rand exchange rate and oil prices. Our baseline forecasts assume these prices will stay roughly where they ended 2025, but the outlook is uncertain. We therefore considered a pair of scenarios: a favourable one where the rand is stronger and the oil price keeps falling, and a more challenging one where the rand weakens and oil goes up again.\n\nIn the adverse scenario, inflation peaks at 4%, and the convergence to the 3% target is slower. Interest rates are largely unchanged in the near term, with the shift down to neutral delayed by about a year. In the positive scenario, inflation gets as low as 2.3%, temporarily. In this context, expectations ease faster and inflation ultimately settles near 3% more quickly. This allows front-loading of interest rate cuts, with neutral reached during the current year.\n\nThese scenarios show that even quite large shocks, like those modelled, would not push inflation outside our tolerance range of 3% plus or minus one. They also demonstrate how supply shocks interact with inflation expectations, affecting how fast we deliver on the 3% target. We are trying to anchor expectations at 3%. Positive shocks get us there sooner, while negative shocks delay the process, but don’t block it. Overall, monetary policy appears well positioned to manage the range of shocks that might come our way.\n\nTo conclude, 2025 was a watershed year for the South African economy. Despite a volatile global backdrop, there was significant progress on domestic reforms, including a new inflation target. These efforts have been rewarded with lower borrowing costs, a rapid decline in inflation expectations, and steadier growth. It is crucial to sustain this progress. For monetary policy, our main contribution is to deliver on the new target, which means stabilising inflation at 3% over the next few years. Further gains in economic performance would come from reaching a prudent public debt level, lowering administered price inflation, and continuing structural reforms that raise potential growth.\n\nMPC Decision\n\nThe MPC kept the repurchase rate at 6.75%.\n\nInflation is at 3.6%\n\nInflation ticked up to 3.6% in December 2025. However, the average for the year was 3.2%, which is close to our new 3% target. We expect inflation to slow again this year.\n\nGlobal Outlook\n\nGeopolitical tensions remain elevated, leaving markets jittery. Global imbalances have become very large, with China’s trade surplus exceeding a trillion dollars last year and government debt growing fast in key economies, including the US.\n\nInflation Outlook\n\nForecasts show inflation slowing in the near term, helped by a stronger rand and lower oil prices. However, services inflation is still above 4%. We would like to see it moving closer to our 3% target, as low inflation becomes the new normal for South Africa.\n\nEconomic Outlook\n\nSouth Africa’s growth looks stable, with the economy having expanded for four consecutive quarters, driven by household consumption. Forecasts continue to show growth moving slightly higher, approaching 2% over the medium term.\n\n \nUPCOMING ANNOUNCEMENTS\n\n26 March 2026\n\nRELATED PAGES\n\nMPC Statements \nMPC Webcasts\n\n \n\nQuick links\nFrequently asked questions\nGold Coins Purchased from the Public\nCareers\nInternet banking\nForms\nExtranets\nWhistleblowing\nPromotion of Access to Information Manual\nSARB Group Privacy Notice\nProcurement\nFraud and scams\nRSS feed subscription\nDisclaimer\nSitemap\nCookie policy\nContact\n\nTo contact us, click here\n\nTelephone: 0861 127 272 \n\n370 Helen Joseph Street,\n\nPretoria, 0002\n\nP O Box 427,\n\nPretoria, 0001\n\nDownload app\nQuarterly Bulletin\nSocial Media\n \nSupported Browsers\n \nThe South African Reserve Bank © Copyright 2020.", "source": "SARB", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-04-27", "url": "https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2026/january"}

dedup/cb_requests/32fc326d1c65012e71c7bfd16e308811.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "32fc326d1c65012e71c7bfd16e308811", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No 110 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday 21st and 22nd \nNovember, 2016. \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 21st and 22nd November \n2016, amidst relatively subdued global and domestic economic and \nfinancial conditions. The Committee evaluated the global and \ndomestic macroeconomic and financial developments as well as \nthe challenges to the domestic economy up to November 2016, and \nthe outlook for the first quarter of 2017. In attendance were 10 out of \n12 members. \n \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee acknowledged the tapered growth in global output, \nstemming from relatively unbalanced risks to the global economic \noutlook. Global recovery \nremains fragile in the advanced \neconomies while the emerging markets and developing economies \n(EMDEs) continue to struggle against strong headwinds, including \nlow commodity prices, slowing demand and instability of capital \nflows. The path to the modest improvements in the advanced \n \n2 \n \neconomies has increasingly turned fragile owing to persistent \nuncertainties. While still being expected to unravel, the BREXIT shocks \nhave been rapidly followed by the outcome of the U.S. Presidential \nElections; a development which has created its own uncertainties. \nAccompanied by the planned referendum in Italy, and general \nelections in France and Germany, the global political environment \ncould not be more uncertain. In effect, current judgments about \ngrowth prospects in the first half of 2017 could be overly optimistic. \nThe IMF’s current outlook for global growth for 2016 which was \nrevised to 3.1 per cent in July and retained in October could be \nmissed by a significant margin. The World Bank has been more \ncautious in retaining its June 2016 global output growth projection of \n2.4 per cent. Headwinds to global growth prospects are also \nemanating from weak trade and financial conditions. The OECD’ \nEconomic Forecast, September 2016 Update, emphasized that both \nelements underpin the current low-growth trap facing the global \neconomy. The United States (US) economy exceeded it’s growth \nexpectation in Q3 2016, growing at an annual rate of 2.9 per cent, a \nsignificant uptick from the average growth rate of 1.1 per cent in H1 \n2016. The enhanced performance of the economy was attributed \nlargely to the growth of inventories and robust surge in exports, \ncoupled with improved consumer spending, even as the mining \nsector recorded a pull back. Japan’s economy grew at a seasonally \nadjusted annualized rate of 0.2 per cent in Q2 of 2016 compared \n \n3 \n \nwith 1.7 per cent in Q1 of 2016. The moderation in growth was largely \nattributed to weak wage growth and a strong yen. The Bank of \nJapan (BoJ) in a rare move at its September MPC meeting set a \ntarget for government bond yields and introduced an inflation-\novershooting commitment. The Bank voted to apply an interest rate \nof minus 0.1 per cent to the policy rate on balances in current \naccounts held by financial institutions. The Bank also announced a \nplan to purchase Japanese Government bonds up to JPY 80 trillion \n(approximately USD788 billion), among series of policy measures \ntaken towards achieving the price stability target of 2 per cent. The \ngovernment had, in August, approved a fiscal stimulus of ¥13.5 trillion \n(US$132 billion) in a spirited attempt to jumpstart the economy. Real \nGDP in the Euro area is expected to maintain or outperform its Q2 \ngrowth rate of 0.3 per cent in the third quarter. While short-term \ndownside risks from the Brexit vote have largely subsided, the \nlongterm potential economic impact remains uncertain. As such, the \nzone’s growth path remains challenged. At its October 20th, 2016 \nmeeting, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank \ndecided to retain its key interest rates on refinancing operations, the \nmarginal lending facility and the deposit facility at 0.00, 0.25 and -\n0.40 per cent, respectively. The Council also reaffirmed its \ncommitment to sustain its quantitative easing programme of monthly \nasset purchases of €80 billion (US$85.6 billion) until March 2017 and \nbeyond, as economic conditions dictate. The growth outlook for the \n \n4 \n \nUK in 2016 was upgraded to 1.8 per cent from 1.7 per cent, although \nthat for 2017 was downgraded to 1.1 per cent from 1.3 per cent. The \nBank of England (BoE), at its November 2nd meeting, decided to \nleave its benchmark interest rate unchanged at 0.25 per cent as \npart of its earlier commitment to support output recovery in the \naftermath of the Brexit vote. In addition, the Committee voted to \ncontinue its quantitative easing programme of £435 billion. Whereas \nsome Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) \ncontinue to contend with low capital inflow and unstable \nmacroeconomic environment, the prospects for their recovery look \nmore promising. The IMF (WEO October 2016 Update) projected \ngrowth rate of 4.2 per cent, an upward review from 4.1 per cent \nprojected in July 2016 for the EMDEs. The marginal improvement in \ngrowth outlook is expected to be powered by improvements in India \nand China. Global inflation rose moderately in response to rising \nprices in the advanced economies due to the modest recovery in oil \nprices. However, their central banks are expected to stay the course \non accommodative monetary policy. Following the Brexit vote and \nthe recent outcome of the US Presidential Elections and uncertainties \nsurrounding both events as well as the regime of negative interest \nrates and heavy fiscal and monetary stimuli in Japan and elsewhere, \nwe expect a resurgence of aggregate demand and even higher \nprice increases. \n \n \n5 \n \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments Output \nData released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in August \nshowed that the economy slipped into recession following a second \nconsecutive contraction in Q2, 2016. Domestic output contracted in \nthe quarter by 2.06 per cent. The latest release in November 2016 by \nthe NBS shows that real income actually worsened in Q3, 2016 as \noutput contracted further by 2.24 per cent relative to its level in the \nprevious and corresponding quarter of 2015. The non-oil sector grew \nby 0.03 per cent, driven by Agriculture which grew by 4.54 per cent, \nfollowing the 0.38 per cent contraction in Q2 2016,. The MPC noted \nthat the key undercurrents – shortage of foreign exchange, low fiscal \nactivity, high energy prices and the accumulation of salary arrears, \nespecially at the sub-national levels of government – continued in \nthe third quarter of the year. Members also noted that those \nconditions could not have been ameliorated directly with monetary \npolicy instruments. It, however, recognized the need to continue to \nengineer monetary policy in such a way as to enable fiscal policy \nthe required space to improve public investment in infrastructure. \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted that headline inflation (year on-year) \ncontinued to rise in October 2016 to 18.3 from 17.9 per cent in \nSeptember and 17.6 per cent in August, 2016, thus maintaining the \nupward momentum since January 2016. The increase in headline \n \n6 \n \ninflation in October reflected increases in both the food and core \ncomponents of inflation. Core and food inflation increased from 17.7 \nand 16.6 per cent in September to 18.1 and 17.1 per cent, \nrespectively, in October, 2016. The Committee also noted the less \nrapid movement in the month-on-month CPI between September \nand October. Headline inflation index (month-on-month) rose by \n0.83 per cent in October, from 0.81 per cent in September, \ncontrasting the successive declines since May 2016. Similarly, the \ncore index has been increasing at a slower pace since May when it \nrose by 2.7 per cent. It moderated to 0.75 per cent in October from \n0.96 in September. A similar pattern is noted with the food (month-\non-month) index which rose by 0.86 per cent in October from 0.81 \nper cent in September. The MPC observed that the incessant \npressure on consumer prices continues to come from structural \nfactors including high cost of power and energy, transport, \nproduction factors, as well as rising prices of imports. \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 10.50 per cent in September, \n2016, compared with the 8.08 per cent in August, 2016. When \nannualized, M2 grew by 14.0 per cent in September 2016, above the \ngrowth benchmark of 10.98 per cent for 2016. Net domestic credit \n(NDC) grew by 21.88 per cent in the same period, annualized at \n29.17 per cent. At this rate, the growth rate of NDC was above the \nprovisional benchmark of 17.94 per cent for 2016. The development \n \n7 \n \nin NDC, essentially reflected the relative growth in credit to the \nprivate sector of 20.69 per cent in September, annualized to 27.59 \nper cent. Credit to government grew by 29.57 per cent in the review \nperiod, which annualized to a growth of 39.43 per cent compared \nwith the growth benchmark of 13.28 per cent for fiscal 2016. The \ngrowth in government borrowing was largely to compensate for the \ncontinued decline in oil receipts. Money market interest rates \noscillated in tandem with the level of liquidity in the banking system. \nThus, average inter-bank call rate, which stood at 11.50 per cent on \n11th October 2016, closed at 15.02 per cent on November 17, 2016. \nBetween these periods the interbank call rate averaged 11.68 per \ncent. However, the average interbank call rates fell to 10.00 per cent \non October 24, 2016, following net government financing of N149.00 \nbillion between October 18 and 28, 2016 and the payment on \nOctober 24th 2016 from statutory revenue allocation of N174.00 \nbillion. The Committee noted a decline in the equities segment of \nthe capital market as the All-Share Index (ASI) fell by 7.33 per cent \nfrom 27,839.93 on September 19, 2016, to 25,797.88 on November 16, \n2016. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) declined by 7.11 per cent \nfrom N9.56 trillion to 8.88 trillion during the same period. In addition, \nrelative to end- December 2015, the capital market indices fell by \n9.93 per cent and 9.85 per cent, respectively, reflecting the \nchallenges facing the economy. \n \n \n8 \n \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe average naira exchange rate weakened at the inter-bank \nsegment of the foreign exchange market during the review period. \nThe exchange rate at the interbank market opened at N305.00/US$ \nand closed at N305.90/US$ between September 1st and October 27, \n2016. The Committee observed that total foreign exchange inflows \nthrough the CBN decreased by 31.85 per cent, from US$1,404.84 \nmillion in September to US$957.37 million in October 2016. The \ndecrease was due to lower crude oil and other government \nrevenues in the period under review. In spite of the resumed Joint \nVenture payments in October, total outflows also continued to \ndecrease, dropping significantly by 58.68 per cent from US$2,456.86 \nmillion to US$1,015.08 million during the same period. The Committee \nalso implored the Management to continue to direct more focus at \nmaking \nforeign \nexchange \navailable \nto \nagriculture \nand \nmanufacturing sectors of the economy by enforcing its policy \ndirecting DMBs to allocate 60 per cent of the FX available to these \nsectors. The MPC believes that the Security agencies should sustain \ntheir checks on the activities of illegal foreign exchange operators in \norder to bring sanity to that segment of the market. The Committee \nreiterated that the extant foreign exchange regulation outlaws the \ntrafficking of currency on the streets as some unlicensed operators \ncurrently do. Thus, to evolve an appropriate naira exchange rate \n \n9 \n \nthat stabilizes the foreign exchange market, BDC operators must \nstrictly observe the terms and conditions of their license. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \nThe Committee assessed the fragile macroeconomic conditions and \nthe strong headwinds confronting the economy. In particular, the \nCommittee considered the implications of the twin deficits of current \naccount and budget deficits, the rise of nationalist sentiments across \nthe West and implications for national elections in France and \nGermany as well as the forthcoming referendum in Italy. Other \nconsiderations include the yet to be unveiled long term uncertainties \nof Brexit and expectations of significant shifts in US economic policy. \nThe \nCommittee \nreaffirmed \nthe \nurgency \nof \nprioritizing \nthe \ndiversification of the economy given the emerging gloomy \nprotectionist outlook of the global economy. The Committee also \nevaluated the impact of its July and September 2016 actions on the \nmacroeconomy noting that while foreign exchange inflows into the \neconomy had improved significantly in July and August, it declined \nafter the September MPC meeting, leading to rising inflation and \nincreasing negative real interest rates. However, outflows significantly \ndropped, lending credence to the propriety of the decisions of the \nJuly and September MPC meetings. The MPC reiterated the \nlimitations of monetary policy in reversing the current stagflationary \ncondition in the economy, which it traced to supply and demand \nshocks. Members stressed the need for a robust and more keenly \n \n10 \n \ncoordinated macroeconomic policy framework that would restart \noutput growth, stimulate aggregate demand and rein in inflation \nexpectations. \nConsequently, \nthe \nMPC \nwelcomes \nefforts \nat \nresuscitating planning, noting the progress made in developing the \nmedium term economic recovery plan. The MPC urged the Federal \nGovernment to urgently assess the extent of its indebtedness to \ndomestic economic agents and develop a framework for \nsecuritizing the debts in order to settle its outstanding domestic \ncontractual obligations which cuts across all sectors of the economy. \nThese accumulated debts have slowed business activities of \neconomic agents; most of who are indebted to the banking system, \nthus compromising the integrity of the financial system. It also \nadvised the Bank to commit to greater surveillance and deployment \nof early warning systems in managing the banking system. Overall, \nmembers called for an enrichment of fiscal and other sector \ninitiatives and interventions towards resolving the growth challenges \nin the economy in order to promptly revive confidence in the \neconomy. \nOutlook \nAvailable data and forecasts of key economic variables indicate \nthat the outlook for growth and inflation in the medium term \ncontinues to be challenging. Growth is expected to remain less \nrobust given the absence of sufficient fiscal space while the current \ntight stance of monetary policy and improved agricultural harvests \n \n11 \n \nare expected to contain further price increases and moderate price \nexpectations as the trend has already revealed. \n \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe Committee assessed the relevant risks to the global and \ndomestic economy and concluded that the risks to the economy \nremained highly elevated on two fronts (price and output). \nHowever, considering the importance of price stability, and being \nmindful of the limitations of monetary policy in influencing output \nand employment under conditions of stagflation, the Committee \ndecided unanimously in favour of retaining the current stance of \nmonetary policy, thus keeping the MPR at 14.0 per cent alongside all \nother policy parameters. In summary, all 10 MPC members voted to: \n \n(i). \nRetain the MPR at 14 per cent; \n(ii). \nRetain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n(iii). Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv). Retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR \nThank you for listening. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd November 2016 \n \n12 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nMEMBERS \n \n1.0 \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \n \nThe condition of key macroeconomic indicators at this meeting has \nnot significantly altered from the position at the last meeting. This, \nhowever, should not be construed in terms of loss of potency of \nmonetary policy measures but largely a manifestation of the drag \nfrom legacy factors cum the lag in transmission of monetary policy \nimpulses to the real economy. Besides, there are some new shocks \nfrom the global environment with the latest one being the outcome \nof the recent US presidential election. These shocks have somehow \nexacerbated the fragility in both the real and financial sides of the \ndomestic economy. From the real sector side, the upward trending \ninflation dynamics since the beginning of the year is still much at \nplay, with the headline inflation accelerating to 18.3 percent in \nNovember, while the contraction in output has occurred for three \nconsecutive quarters. From the financial sector side, the pressure in \nthe FX market is still unabated, culminating in some level of \ndepreciation of the exchange rate at the parallel market although \nthe rate at the interbank market has been fairly anchored around \nN305/US$. The money market rates of OBB and IBR have equally \ndisplayed a high level of volatility, reflecting swings in liquidity \ncondition. \n \n13 \n \nAgainst this background, it may seem expedient to introduce some \nnew measures particularly to address new shocks from the global \nenvironment but I would like to vote for a hold in this meeting in light \nof the following considerations. Firstly, an analysis of the current \ninflation dynamics shows that while the October headline inflation at \n18.3 percent on year-on-year basis could still be adjudged \nsignificantly high, the month-on-month basis at 0.83 percent \nrepresents considerable deceleration. It may therefore be plausible \nto assume that the current elevated year-on-year headline inflation \nis to a large extent reflective of base effect and therefore the \ncurrent explosive trend may revert to single digit by mid-2017 as the \neffect of legacy factors begins wane. \nSecondly, as recognized in most of my previous statements, the \nchallenge posed by structural factors has equally played a \ndominant role in inflation dynamics. It is without doubt that the \ninfluence of monetary policy in reversing recession is limited. Recent \nexperience from Japan has lent further credence to this assertion. \nThe Bank of Japan has been doing monetary stimulus since 2013 to \nwade off recession but the impact has been very minimal until the \nTreasury embarked on massive injection estimated at US$132 billion \nin fiscal measures in August 2016. The latest IMF WEO indicates that \nJapan is now on the path of exiting recession. The lesson here is the \nneed for fiscal stimulus to jump start activities in critical sectors of the \neconomy. \n \n14 \n \nThirdly, with respect to the contraction in output, the critical mass of \nthe challenge lies in the supply side of the economy, in which \nmonetary policy has limited impact. It is commendable that the \nFederal Government is making efforts to boost aggregate demand \nparticularly through the release of another tranches of bailout funds \nof about N388.3 billion to alleviate the burden of salary payments by \nthe sub-national governments but there are some critical private \nagents whose operations are crippled by debts owned by \ngovernment parastatals and agencies. There are reports that the \npower market is becoming highly illiquid on the heel of massive \nunpaid bills by Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) of \ngovernments to electricity distribution companies (Discos) who in \nturn find it difficult to meet their commitments to the generating \ncompanies (Gencos), crippling their operations. Recent statistics \nrevealed that the Egbin power terminal has lost output by about 74 \npercent on account of acute financial strain. Against this \nperspective therefore, settlement of these debts would not only \nimprove the demand side of the economy but it would considerably \nimprove the production environment and invariably ease supply \nside. \nIt is however pertinent to recognize the limitation imposed on the \nfiscal space by resource constraint due to dwindling revenue from oil \nand the fact that borrowing from the domestic market is almost \ncrossing the sustainable bar. It is in this regards that I would like to \n \n15 \n \nadvocate for innovative financing options such as the securitization \nof the debt to the contractors in order to provide some leeway to \nstimulate economic activities from both the demand and supply \nsides. Although the domestic debt is very high, total public debt at \nless than 10 percent of the GDP still suggests room for borrowing. It is \nin light of this that I would like to reiterate my support, initially \ncanvassed in my September’s statement, for the proposed external \ndebt of about US$30 billion which the Federal Government has \nsubmitted to the National Assembly and hope the Assembly would \nexpeditiously consider the request. \nWhile my support for new external loans is unequivocal, I strongly \noppose loan facilities that could create spectre of debt overhang \nsimilar to the pitfall of the eighties. Consequently, the terms and \nconditions of the new loans must be concessionary but it needs to \nbe recognized that such facilities are only available for countries \nthat have put credible macroeconomic policies in place. Against \nthis perspective therefore, I would like all the relevant agencies of \ngovernment to expedite actions on the proposed Medium Term \nExpenditure Framework and Fiscal Strategy Paper and secure the \nendorsement of world class monetary and financial institutions like \nthe \nInternational \nMonetary \nFund \n(IMF). \nObtaining \nsuch \nendorsements, in my view, should not be difficult in light of the fact \nthat a reasonable components of expected reform measures such \nas elimination of unproductive fiscal transfers like fuel subsidy, \n \n16 \n \nflexibility in the exchange rate, efficiency in public resource \nmanagement, and commitment to good governance through fight \nagainst corruption are already in place. It needs be clarified that the \nproposal here is not to secure IMF loans, which terms may not \nnecessarily align with the development aspirations of many \ndeveloping countries, but to secure an endorsement like Policy \nSupport Instrument (PSI) which the country undertook between 2005 \nand 2007. \nOne other issue that cannot be discounted in the overall \nmacroeconomic policies framework is the likely direction of US \nforeign policy from 2017 when the President-elect formally takes \nover. Going by some key appointments in the transition team of the \nincoming US President, the direction of economic policy is becoming \nfairly discernible. Issues of trade restriction against some notable \nemerging economies like China may not be completely ruled out \nwith severe implication for global growth and export demand of \nmany developing countries like Nigeria. Consequently, it may not be \nunlikely that the softening global demand for crude oil may continue \nwith implication of prolonged dampening price. Although it is \nexpected that that the forthcoming OPEC meeting would lead to \ncut in output, most analysts are highly critical about the likely success \nof the meeting in view of the huge magnitude of output freeze \nrequired to equate demand to supply. Bringing this to perspective \ntherefore, the urgency of structural reforms that would reduce the \n \n17 \n \ndependence of the economy on crude oil export cannot be \noveremphasized. Still on the external sector, with the US election \nover, the US Fed may see a clear coast to commence hikes in the \npolicy rate which in essence would further strengthen the US dollar \nagainst most currencies. As argued in my immediate past statement, \nI do not subscribe to the need to hike interest rate with a view to \ncompeting for portfolio capital for beefing up external reserves. My \nview is further strengthened by push and pull theory of capital flow \nwhich posits that interest rate adjustment as a means of attracting \ncapital to developing economies is only effective if there are \nsufficient factors which push out the capital from developed \ncountries. In other words, interest rate could only be used to allocate \ncapital flowing out of developed economies among competing \ndeveloping economies but not potent enough to solely push the \ncapital out of the developed economies. \nIn light of the foregoing, I would like to propose for the retention of all \nthe monetary policy measures currently in place in anticipation that \nthe fiscal authority would continue to address some of the binding \nconstraints on the path of aggregate demand particularly the issue \nof debts owed key economic agents. \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n2.0 \nALADE, SARAH O. \n \nA combination of domestic and external events will have profound \ninfluence on monetary policy in most emerging economies in the \ncoming months and Nigeria is no exception. The election of Donald \nTrump as the President of United States and his policies for United \nStates will affect the world economy. Global recovery remains fragile \nin advanced economies while the emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies (EMDEs) continue to struggle against strong \nheadwinds, which ranged from low commodity prices, slowing \nconsumer demand to instability of capital flows. The United States \n(US) economy grew at 2.9 percent in the third quarter of 2016 \nexceeding growth expectation. However, growth is projected to \ndecline if Donald Trump implements some of the policies that he has \ncampaigned on. These will have spillover effect on most emerging \nmarkets including Nigeria. Therefore monetary policy should be \nready to act in the event of adverse impact on the economy. On \nthe domestic front, foreign exchange scarcity will continue to \nimpact growth negatively and keep inflationary pressure elevated. \nSince the policy direction is still fluid, I will support a hold on monetary \npolicy rate. \n \nThe election of Donald Trump as president has heightened global \nuncertainty: Although the policy direction of a Trump presidency is \nstill being formed, some of the promises made during the \n \n19 \n \ncampaign are bound to have a huge effect on the global \neconomy. Mr. Trump has criticized the monetary-policy choices of \nthe current Federal Reserve and could push the Federal Reserve in \na significantly more hawkish direction, leading to a quicker than \nexpected increase in interest rate. The rate increase will impact \nmany emerging market economies negatively especially with the \nlower commodity prices and depressed consumer spending. \nAccording to the research firm Oxfam, “If Mr. Trump is able to fully \nimplement his plans to impose tariffs on goods from China and \nMexico and force large numbers of undocumented immigrants to \nleave the United States, the United States economy would begin to \nstall by 2019”. Their research also show that economic expansion \nwould also slow globally as weakness in China and the United \nStates spread to their trading partners. In the wake of such \ndevelopment, Emerging Market and Developing economies that \nare already experiencing weak aggregate demand and low \ncommodity prices will see output decline resulting in more difficult \neconomic and business environment. Depressed commodity \nprices will continue to pose downside risk to growth in emerging \nmarkets, especially on commodity exporting countries, thus, \ndampening prospects for near term economic and financial \nrecovery in these economies. \n \n \n20 \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) growth continues on a negative \ntrajectory: Output growth in the third quarter declined further to 2.24 \npercent. The effect of energy shortages, high electricity tariffs, fuel \nprice hikes, scarcity of foreign exchange and depressed consumer \ndemand continue to dampen growth in the second quarter. In \naddition, the implementation of the 2016 budget remained slower \nthan expected affecting the speed of economic activities at a time \nwhen fiscal policy is needed to complement the efforts of monetary \npolicy to spur growth. According to the Minister of Budget and \nPlanning, “The Federal Government has spent about N3.577 trillion as \nat September 2016 out of the full year budget of N6.06 trillion for the \n2016 fiscal year. This translates to a 59 percent performance of the \nprorated budget for the first three quarters. The decline of -0.18 \npercentage points in output from the second quarter numbers \nrevealed that the recession is bottoming out. The policies being put \nin place, including the different government schemes in agriculture \nand the plan by the government to come up with economic \nrecovery plan is expected to impact growth positively. In the face of \nrising inflation and drying up of capital inflow, monetary policy \nshould still be focused on its core mandate of price stability, \nespecially given the possibility that the United States Federal Reserve \nwill quicken its rate rising plan under a Donald Trump Presidency. \nMonetary policy should therefore focus on achieving stability at \nhome and creating the environment necessary to attract foreign \n \n21 \n \ninflows to cushion the loss on revenue from low oil price. In addition, \npolicies to expand internal revenue base should be pursued \nvigorously. \n \nHeadline inflation has remained elevated during the period. \nHeadline inflation further increased to 18.3 percent in October 2016, \nfrom 17.10 percent recorded in July. The increase in headline \ninflation in August reflected increases in both food and core \ncomponents of inflation. Core and food inflation have increased \nfrom 16.93 and 15.80 per cent in July to 17.2 and 16.43 per cent, \nrespectively, in August 2016. However the rate of increase is \ndeclining, headline inflation index rose by 1.0 per cent in August from \n1.3 per cent in July, 1.7 per cent in June; and 2.8 per cent in May \n2016. Similarly, the core index has been increasing at a decreasing \nrate since May when it rose by 2.7 per cent. It moderated to 0.85 per \ncent in August from 1.22 per cent in July and 1.83 per cent in June. \nThe rising inflationary pressure can largely be attributed to structural \nfactors, including high electricity tariff, high transport cost as a result \nof higher fuel prices, high cost of inputs, low industrial activities as \nwell as higher prices of both domestic and imported food products. \nIn addition, the effects of increase in monetary aggregates cannot \nbe ignored. Broad money and Narrow money supply has been on \nincrease showing a correlation between their growth and inflation. \nThe persistent upsurge in inflation calls for balanced monetary and \n \n22 \n \nfiscal policy intervention to mitigate the effect on the poor. High \ninflation hurts the poor as it erodes their purchasing power and \naffects investment decisions negatively, policy middle ground to \nachieve the objective of lower inflation and growth should be \npursued. \n \nThe recently adopted foreign exchange regime is having less than \nexpected outcome requiring the fine tuning of the implementation \nframework. After a period of restriction in the foreign exchange \nmarket, a new market driven approach was adopted in June, \n2016. This was supposed to result in price discovery and greater \nparticipation in the market. To achieve this, the implementation of \nthe framework needs to be fine-tuned to attract inflows and \nharmonize exchange rates in the different segments of the market. \nThis will not only increase confidence in the market, but will also \nensure continuation of economic activities, and reversal of the \nnegative growth path. At this time therefore, monetary policy \nshould be focused on restoring confidence in the domestic \neconomy and increasing supply of foreign exchange to attract \ninflows. \n \nAgainst this background, I support policy continuity by voting for a \nhold on the policy rate to gradually bring inflation under control \nand bring interest rate to a less negative territory. I therefore \n \n23 \n \nsupport the retention of Monetary Policy Rate at 14 percent, the \nretention of Private Sector Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) and \nLiquidity Ratio at 22.5 percent and 30.00 per cent respectively; and \nretention of the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR to help attract capital inflow and spur growth. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 \n \n3.0 \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \n \nAt the global level, estimated growth rate in 2016 was downgraded \nto 3.1% by the IMF and World Economic Outlook from 3.2% pre-\nBrexit estimate. This is in addition to the risks highlighted in my \nSeptember personal statement: the election of Donald J. Trump, \nthe apostle of America’s first as U.S president, political tensions and \ninward looking policies. Although crude oil prices are stabilising \naround $48.0-$50.0 per barrel, it is considered very low by crude oil \nexporting countries’ growth expectations in their economies. Apart \nfrom the US economy, global growth has been generally sluggish \nincluding emerging economies like China. Inflation at global level \nhas slightly inched up in advanced economies and some emerging \nmarkets. However, the global events have not impacted much in \nstimulating growth in LDCS such as Nigerian. \n \nAt the domestic level, the summary of statistics shows that the \nNigerian economy had a turbulent year 2016. The economy \nconsecutively registered negative growth rates of -0.36, -2.06, and -\n2.24% in the first, second and third quarters of 2016 respectively. The \nlow level of growth was not unconnected with low level of \nproductivity which is supported by low level of aggregate demand \nin the economy. Primarily, movements in output come from \nmovement in demand for goods. What matters when it comes to \n \n25 \n \naggregate output is the supply side, such as how much the \nNigerian economy can produce? What role will monetary policy \nplay to promote growth? \n \nIt should be noted that from January to November 2016, the \nfollowing factors have not favoured the aggregate growth of \noutput in the economy: poor economic and social infrastructure; \nbad roads network, poor communication and transportation, \nerratic power supply, scarcity of investable funds, insufficient \nportable water; unstable educational and health systems. Other \nchallenges include insecurity such as Boko Haram, Niger Delta \nmilitancy, armed banditry, cattle rustling, clashes between \nherdsmen and farmers; weak economic institutions; poor corporate \ngovernance and endemic corruption. It should be noted that \ndomestic debt to government contractors is running into more than \n1.7 trillion naira, a threat to stimulating growth in the economy \nbecause it affects the financial system stability. This is so because \nthe contractors owed the banks thereby contributing to the rising \nlevel of non-performing loans (NPLs) which is threatening the \ncapital base of the DMBS. \n \nThere is also the high interest rate charged by the DMBs. The high \ninterest rates do not promote new investment in the real sector of \n \n26 \n \nthe economy. The transmission mechanism of the DMB is not \nfunctioning as expected. \n \nFrom December 2015, the level of inflation had risen from a single \ndigit of 9.55% to a double digit of 18.74% by mid of November 2016. \nThe rising level of inflation in the economy was caused mostly by \nstructural factors including the PMS fuel subsidy removal and the \ndepreciation of the naira at the interbank rate as a result of the \nliberalisation of the foreign exchange market leading to increased \npressure on the foreign exchange market. Insecurity has also \naffected agricultural production in the North-eastern part of \nNigeria, especially Borno and Yobe states. It should be noted that \nthe technology sophistication of the Nigerian economy depends \non its ability to innovate and introduce new technology. The size of \nthe economy’s capital stock is very low. The wide gap between the \ninterbank and the parallel rate is not a healthy development, \nbecause it encourages round tripping. The current sharing Formula \nrequesting that 60% of allocation by the DMB’S goes to \nmanufacturing while the remainder to other sectors seems to be \ninadequate. The monitoring strategy of the share and utilisation of \nthe foreign exchange that goes to the manufacturing sector is \ninadequate. I had earlier argued for the adoption of an integrated \napproach to managing the scarce foreign exchange by customs \nand excise Department to play a critical role in making sure that \n \n27 \n \nforeign exchange allocated to the manufacturers are properly \nutilised in bringing in the inputs and put it to use in the production \nprocess. What monetary policy tools do we put in place to revamp \nthe economy out of the recession as we move to 2017? The various \nlevels of government are encouraged to settle the domestic \ncontractors who are also indebted to help reduce the rising level of \nNPLS which is stifling the activities of the banks in the disbursement \nof further credit to the economy. This is necessary because price \nstability is the core mandate of the CBN. There is need for \ngovernment to signal the downward trend in the interest that banks \ncharge customers. Demand also could be assisted through the \ndevelopment banking of the CBN such as the Anchor Borrower’s \nProgramme (ABP). Unenlightened Nigerians should be educated to \nunderstand that MPC is required to take the best decisions on \nbehalf of the country. For example it does not make sense to \nreduce MPR to less than 14% when inflation is about 18.74% in \nNovember 2016. The Nigerian government should as a matter of \nurgency pay the amount of electricity consumed to the power \nsector. The power sector also needs to be diversified by optimising \nthe utilisation of other sources of energy which include the \nfollowing: coal, solar dam construction, and wind as alternatives. \nThe government can issue service bonds to domestic contractors \nso that they can continue to pay the banks they owed. It is a \nprocess of securitisation of federal government bonds. \n \n28 \n \nMy current position is that both monetary and fiscal policies need \nproper coordination to complement each other to stimulate the \neconomy to grow out of this current recession. This justifies my \nthinking that given the current economic situation and the earlier \npolices put in place, I vote to hold so as to allow earlier policies put \nin place to work out. Hence: \n(i) I Retain the MPR at 14 percent \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.5% \n(iii) \nRetain the liquidity ratio at 30%, and \n(iv) Retain the symmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis \npoints around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 \n \n4.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \n \nBackground \nMy vote is to hold at this meeting, partly based on the need to allow \nfor the full transmission of the policies agreed at the July meeting \nand partly due to the need to remain cautious in the face of rising \nuncertainty in the global environment. Within the domestic \nenvironment, the upward trend in general price level continued \nalbeit at a declining rate in the month of October even as demand \nin the foreign exchange market remained elevated, exerting \npressure on the exchange rate. The contraction in output, which has \noccurred for three consecutive quarters, is most likely to persist to the \nend of the year on the backlash of shocks from both demand and \nsupply sides. Within the global economic space, recovery remains \nsoft on the backdrop of emergence of new shocks with the latest \nbeing the outcome of the recent presidential election in the US. The \noutcome of the election may likely escalate the level of uncertainty \nin the global economic arena as investors anticipate drastic shift in \npolicy stance and invariably elicit a wait and see attitude on the \npart of investors. Although the immediate outcome of the election \nhas had some favorable impact on emerging market economies \nwith the dollar shedding some weights, sustainability of the trend \nshould, at best, be taken with guarded optimism. \n \n30 \n \nOverall, the balance of risk tilts towards upside in the domestic \neconomy and invariably suggests the need for a proactive policy \naction. However, given that current inflation pressure is largely due \nto supply shocks in addition to the fact that transmission of the \nimpulses of recent hike in the policy rate is still ongoing, I will opt for \nretention of all the existing monetary policy measures in place. \nPressure Points. \nGlobal Environment \nThe global political economy is yet to revert to the steady state in \nthe aftermath of Brexit which occurred in the mid-year and \nconsequently reinforced existing shocks like the rebalancing model \nin China and persisting adverse terms of trade for commodity \nexporting countries. While the impact of these shocks is yet to wane, \nthe global risk profile appears to have become elevated again on \nthe backlash of the outcome of the recent US presidential election. \nWith respect to the outcome of the US election in particular, the fact \nthat the incoming ruling party is also in firm control of the Congress \nhas heightened controversy around socio economic policies like the \nclimate change, health insurance, immigration, NATO trade deals, \ntaxes, and the whole gamut of US foreign policy. As such, investors \nmay likely make cautious moves in near term until the outlook of the \nUS economic policies becomes clearly discernible. This view is \nsupported by the latest IMF statistics which reveals that the \n \n31 \n \nestimated global growth for the first half of the year was below \nprojection on account of loss of momentum by the US economy. \nWhen this development is added to the fragility in the euro zone as \nwell as the recession in emerging economies like Brazil and Russia, \nglobal output gap is much likely to widen with dire consequence for \nthe external sector of emerging and developing economies. \nAlthough global growth is expected to pick up in the medium term \ndue to increased weight attached to fast growing economies, this \nshould not be much of a good news for countries such as Nigeria \nbecause the prospect of export demand is much linked to \nsystemically important countries. \nAnother issue of serious concern in the global environment is the \ndevelopment in the crude oil market. Oil prices witnessed \nconsiderable rally in the month of October, moving close to \nUS$50/barrel. Current global output is about 33.6million bpd against \nmarket clearing output of 32.5 million bpd. To balance the supply \nside therefore, output cut must be in the neighborhood of 1 million \nbpd, a huge magnitude that has made most analysts skeptical of \nthe success of the forthcoming November meeting of the OPEC. \nThe implication for the domestic economy becomes extremely \ngrave in the light of the fact that current domestic production is \nequally below projection due to production shutdown in the Niger \nDelta area. \n \n32 \n \nFinally, unfolding scenarios have clearly signaled that the much \nanticipated hike in the US Fed Fund rate would commence soonest. \nThe US Fed Chair confirmed to the Congressional Joint Economic \nCommittee last week that the labor market has improved \nconsiderably, while inflation is equally inching towards the target \nrate of 2 percent. The major reason delaying the commencement \nof the hike in rate is the need to factor into consideration the \ndirection of the policies of the incoming government particularly the \npromised increased spending and massive tax cut. \nIn essence, the above highlighted global issues will in the first round \nseverely affect both the external and fiscal sectors of the domestic \neconomy while the spillover effect would aggravate the imbalances \nin the real sector through the second round effect. \nDomestic Environment \nThe risk profile in the domestic environment has generally been \nelevated and there is the likelihood to further tilt upside due to new \nshocks from the global environment. The rising price spiral since the \nbeginning of the year continued with headline inflation accelerating \nto 18.3 percent in October, on the backdrop of the second round \neffect of upward adjustment in the prices of electricity and refined \npetroleum products as well as sharp swings in the exchange rate. \nStaff forecast indicates that inflation will revert to single path \ntrajectory by mid-2017 on the assumption that new shocks do not \n \n33 \n \nemerge in the economy. It is however very likely that the medium \nterm inflation forecast would be altered by both demand and \nsupply shocks. From the demand side, the Federal Ministry of \nAgriculture has recently put the nation on alert of imminent famine \nfrom the early part of next year as a result of new trend of trans \nborder movement of grains to the detriment of supply to local \nmarkets particularly in the northern part of the country. This should be \nfairly expected as it reflects re-allocation of resources in response to \nthe depreciation of the local currency which makes exports \nexceedingly attractive. From the supply side, it is a welcome \ndevelopment to note that normalcy is gradually returning to the war \nravaged north eastern part of the country, but it may take a while \nfor full economic activities to resume in this region. Given the \ncontribution of this region to agricultural production, the output gap \nwould still filter into the general price level. \nWith respect to output contraction, there are three major risks. The \nfirst one is from the global environment, particularly due to the \nemergence of a new government in the US in which the direction of \nforeign trade particularly to Africa is still pretty clouded. The US is the \nmajor importer of crude oil from Nigeria and in the event of reversal \nof key items of US foreign policy against emerging economies, the \nexport of crude oil could suffer significantly with implication for the \nalready shrinking oil GDP. The second issue is also related to crude oil \nand this has to do with declining level of production due to the rising \n \n34 \n \nwave of militancy in the Niger Delta area. My view is that the \nsituation is far from being normal in the region and this position is \nlargely premised on available statistics on crude oil production. \nCurrent statistics show that the average crude oil production in the \nyear is in the neighborhood of 1.6million bpd against the projection \nof about 2.2 million bpd in 2016 budget outlay. The third issue is \nabout the entire production environment as indicated by both the \nreal sector and monetary condition indices. The production \nenvironment is still highly challenged mainly on account of high \ninfrastructural deficit particularly in the power sector. In one of the \nrecent briefings by the Honorable Minister of power, it was indicated \nthat attainment of steady power supply is contingent upon adding \nnew generation capacities to the grid but this is highly constrained \nby paucity of funds. The 2017 appropriation bill is yet to be released \nbut it is doubtful if considerable positive deviation could be \nachieved in terms of availability of funds for critical projects in light of \nbinding constraints imposed by revenue shortfall. With respect to \nmonetary condition index (MCI), the two major variables namely the \ninterest rate and exchange rate have been high and the need to \nkeep to the primary mandate of monetary authority in terms of price \nstability could not offer the comfort to relax MCI in the near term. \n \n \n \n35 \n \nWay Forward \nManage Inflation Expectation: It needs to be recognized that \neconomic agents particularly in our type of economy are generally \nbackward looking in terms of forming expectation about the future. \nWith inflation being in double digit territory in the last 10 months, the \nlikelihood of inflation persistence could be high not necessarily due \nto \nmacroeconomic \nfundamentals \nbut \nfrom \nself-reinforcing \ninflationary process on account of backward looking nature of \neconomic agents. A most reliable way to reduce the backward \nlooking habits of economic agents therefore is for the monetary \nauthority to come out strongly in its resolve to address inflation \nconcerns. With this in mind, I am of the view that the current tight \nMCI, particularly the level of the policy rate, should not be altered \nwhile some special credit schemes are put in place to mitigate the \nadverse impact of the MCI on output gap. \nInnovation in Public Expenditure: The constraint imposed on fiscal \nprofile on account of dwindling revenue is a clarion call for \ninnovative approach to finance government expenditure. It is \ncommendable that the Federal Government has devised an \nalternative approach to managing expenditure on importation of \nrefined petroleum products through crude oil swaps. This approach, \nto a lot of extent, would not only ease pressure on fiscal authority but \nwould equally reduce the pressure in the FX market. It should \n \n36 \n \nhowever be borne in mind that the ultimate goal of improving the \ncapacity of domestic refineries should be pursued to a logical end. \nIn addition, the fiscal authority should explore innovative means such \nas debt securitization to offset its indebtedness to domestic \neconomic agents particularly the contractors in order to keep \neconomic activities on track. \nConcessionary External Debts: The Keynesian approach in respect of \nmacroeconomic response to swings in business cycle is still much \nrelevant at this critical point particularly in addressing the output \ngap. Inflation concern has definitely imposed constraint on the \ncapacity of monetary policy to assume an expansionary stance. The \nfiscal authority, however, could still use the instrument of government \nexpenditure \nto \nstimulate \nthe \neconomy \nby \nbuilding \ncritical \ninfrastructure. Given the high domestic debt with implication for \ncredit to the private sector, it becomes compelling for government \nto seek for alternative means for financing capital projects. Within \nthis context therefore, I am inclined to support the proposed external \ndebt of about US$30 billion by the fiscal authority but contingent \nupon the fact that the terms and conditions should be as \nconcessionary as possible. Given this, I hope that both the Executive \nand the National Assembly would quickly resolve all grey areas in \nrespect of the proposal such that the parliament would give the \nrequired approval. \n \n37 \n \nSeek new Markets for Exports: The US is the major importer of \nNigerian crude oil, accounting for over 60 percent of oil demand \nfrom the country. It is not unlikely that the incoming US government in \nJanuary 2017 would pursue a highly restrictive trade policies, if the \ncampaign promises would be translated to reality. Nigeria, for \nexample, should take cue from the Mexican authority which has \nbeen working assiduously on the best approach to manage the \nlikely adverse impact of the immigration policy of the incoming US \ngovernment. Nigeria should equally begin to explore alternative \nexport destination to avoid being caught napping in the event of \nunfavorable trade policies. It needs to be underscored that the \nprospects of such adventure hinges on credible structural policies \nthat seek to add value to the crude oil before exporting it. Again, this \nbrings to the fore the imperativeness of making the local refineries \nfunctional. \nDecision \nAs highlighted above, the primacy of stability in the macroeconomic \nenvironment cannot be compromised. Nevertheless, given that the \ntransmission of impulses of the hike in the policy rate at the July \nmeeting is still ongoing coupled with the fact that significant drivers \nof current inflation pressure is largely structural as well as high \nuncertainty in the global environment, I will opt for retention of all the \nexisting measures of monetary policy. \n \n38 \n \n5.0 OKWU JOSEPH, NNANNA \nGlobal Macroeconomic developments have remained relatively \nfragile in Q3 of 2016, reflecting continued uncertainties in the \neconomic environment since 2015. Major headwinds acting as push \nfactors in the previous quarters of the year remained largely \nunchanged in the period under review. Overall, global growth \nperformance has been uneven across board as advanced \neconomies recorded weaker- than- expected growth, compared to \na slight rebound in the emerging markets and stagnation in Euro \nZone. \n At the domestic front, GDP growth continued to contract from -2.06 \npercent in Q2 to -2.24 percent in Q3 due largely to the decline in \naggregate demand, infrastructure deficits, foreign exchange \nscarcity, weak commodity prices and dwindling investor confidence. \nIn this context, over reliance on monetary policy per se, to reverse \ncurrent stagflation may prove ineffective without complementary \nfiscal and structural policy initiatives. \nThough the flexible exchange rate management regime has assisted \nin mitigating the hemorrhage in external reserves, the subsisting \nchallenge has remained forex illiquidity, rising fiscal gap and \nfinancial system instability. \n \n39 \n \nMonetary policy in the quarter, was expansionary, arising from the \nquasi-fiscal operation of the Central Bank. However, the observed \nmonetary expansion in the period under review is attributed to the \nincrease in Central bank’s intervention in the real sector without \nwhich increased food production would not have been achieved. In \nthe context of the foregoing, the question before the MPC was how \nto address the challenge of the stagflation facing the economy and \nrestoring financial system stability. In this regard, a quick win would \nbe for the fiscal authorities to securitize all domestic (Federal, state \nand local) government debts owed to contractors and sundry \nsuppliers of government services to ensure that economic activity is \njump started and the rising number in the non-performing loans in \nthe banking system mitigated. \nConclusion \nAgainst this backdrop, I voted to: \n Retain the MPR at 14.00 percent, \n Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent, \n Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent; and \n Retain the asymmetric window at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR. \n \n \n \n40 \n \n6.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nContext \nThis last MPC meeting of 2016 offers us an opportunity to take stock \nand to consider the outlook for 2017 as guide to policy choice. The \nexpected path of fiscal policy and the domestic economy as well as \nthe crystallization of “Brexit effects” and “Trump effects” in 2017 are \nkey in analysis of possible paths of the national and global political \neconomy. Because, the 2017 Budget proposal is not yet presented, \nwe draw inferences from its path in 2016. \nTaking stock allows us to gain insights into how successful the MPC \nhas been. In addition, it could make clearer the strategic and policy \noptions. The Mandate of the Central Bank is the right benchmark for \nstock taking. The CBN Act 2007 in Section 2 provided that the \nprincipal objects of the Bank are to: (a) ensure monetary and price \nstability; (b) issue legal tender currency in Nigeria; (c) maintain \nexternal reserves to safeguard the international value of the legal \ntender currency; (d) promote a sound financial system in Nigeria; \nand (e) Act as banker and provide economic and financial advice \nto the Federal Government. \nThe available official data show significant deviations from \n“mandate expectations”. The inflation rates between 2015:12 and \n2016:10 have risen sharply by 61.3% (Food), 91% (headline) and 108% \n(core) and the goal of single digit inflation was unrealized for nine \n \n41 \n \nstraight months. The paths of domestic prices have been closely \nlinked to the pass through effects a 35.5% loss of the value of the \nNaira relative to the US$ and a rising market spread from N61.3 in \n2015:12 to per each US$ to N156.8US$ in October 2016. Clearly, the \nmandate of price stability was unmet and the deviation from \nannounced policy target has been widening for eight months. \nExternal reserves which had been trending downwards since its peak \nvalue in September 2009 of US$62.08 declined further from US$28.28 \nbillion in December 2015 to US$23.81 billion –a decline of \nUS$4.47billion. In contrast, Money supply rose by N2.97 trillion \nbetween November 2015 (N6.98 trillion) and October 2016 (N9.95 \ntrillion), a rise of 43% (about 71% accounted for by growth in Central \nBank’s demand deposit). The phenomenal expansion in money \nsupply is key to explaining the phenomenal rise in domestic prices, \nthe loss of value of the domestic currency and the inefficiencies in \nthe forex market indicated by the rising spreads between segments \nof the forex markets. The stock market continued to be bearish with \na loss of 9.9% between September 30 2016 and November 18 2016! \nThe macro-economy receded further and the unemployment \nproblem worsened in the first three quarters of 2016. The economic \ndecline also expanded to most critical sectors of the economy: oil \nand gas, manufacturing, constructions, services and trade. The \nresulting unemployment therefore is more structural than frictional. \nFrom an annual positive GDP growth of 2.79% in 2015, for the first \n \n42 \n \nthree quarters of 2016, the GDP growth rates were negative (-0.34, -\n2.06 and -2.24 respectively). It is also worth noting that the size of the \nnegative growth is trending up. \nThe economy also faces the twin deficit problem: a rising budget \ndeficit and current account deficit. In addition, the size of the public \ndebt which stood at N10.975 trillion in December 2015 rose sharply to \nN16.297 trillion in June 2016! A significant part of the growth is \nattributable to the significant loss of value of the Naira and the \nupward revaluation of external debt as well as the rise in interest \nrates in 2016. The crowding out effects of debt services on non-debt \ngovernment expenditure has returned to the pre-Paris Club exit days. \nOverall, the paths of key structural and policy variables foreshadow \na very difficult 2017. \nThe global economy conditions are also unlikely to be favourable to \nNigeria. The effect of Brexit on the UK economy so far, is visible in the \nloss of value of the British Pound by 16.05% in 2016. With the frosty \nrelationships between the EU and the UK political authorities and a \npossibly acrimonious and long drawn out split, the regional \neconomic implications are dire. Already many international financial \ninstitutions are threatening to relocate from London. When President \nTrump takes office on January 20th 2017, the greatest danger is like \nto be his unpredictability and the uncertainty and high risks of \nconflicts and instabilities within the United States political systems and \nbetween the United States and its neighbours on one hand, and \n \n43 \n \nChina on the other. Heightened risks and uncertainties would have \nadverse effects on global trade and financial flows which are highly \nsensitive to the psychological states of “investors”. The global \neconomic recovery in the worst case scenario; may be reversed or \nslowed down. Such reversals or slow down would hurt commodity \nexporters such as Nigeria. \nOverall, the domestic and foreign outlook portends a very difficult \nyear for Nigeria and other vulnerable commodity exporters. \nUnresolved Issues \nI shall keep reiterating a number of longer term issues which remain \nunresolved and whose resolution is critical to both the path of policy \nand of the political economy. The first is the issue urgently \n“harnessing, directing and putting to effective use the best available \nintellectual and political resources to” develop a forward looking \nmedium to long term strategic macroeconomic management \nframework for Nigeria with the wellbeing of Nigerians as its principal \nend. This assignment could not be ceded profit making organisations \nthat have never developed an economy because it is not their \nbusiness to do that. Similar contracts in the past were doomed by \nthe disconnections between “designers” and “implementors”. The \nsecond issue is the need to convert rent havens in both the real and \nfinancial sectors to efficiency and effectiveness centres. The \neconomy cannot thrive with rent havens distorting access, pricing \n \n44 \n \nand allocation and undermines growth and employment generating \ninnovations and transferring wealth from a majority to a few rich. \nThree, the present hedonistic orientation that dominates economic \npolicy and discourse put the future at great risks and is the source of \nthe dangerous quick fixes that frankly have damaged institutions \nand done great harm to the future capacity of government and \ncitizens to leverage on endowments to build sustainable value \nadding economic systems. The fourth issue is the conduct of \neconomic policy within strategic vacuums and present hedonistic \nperspectives. The economic and welfare costs of the non-resolution \nof the issues are growing every second and with the headwinds \nexpected in 2017, the costs could easily become prohibitive and \nnon-reversible. \nDecision \nI vote to hold. I considered voting for reducing the monetary policy \nrate for the purpose of policy credibility and consistency. In my view, \nthe expansion in money supply between November 2015 and \nOctober 2016 conflicts with and undermines whatever impacts the \nhike in monetary policy rates in May and July MPCs could have had \nin stabilizing prices and the exchange rate. Rather, I am convinced \nbeyond all reasonable doubts that the expansion of money supply is \ncausal to the pressure on the Naira, the rise in domestic prices and \nthe spillover effects on financial system stability and rising costs of \n \n45 \n \npublic debt and, the obvious crowding out effects of debt service \non non-debt expenditure. \nHowever, I vote to hold because resolving the four issues above is far \nmore fundamental and second, the effects of lower interest rates \nare countered by the interest rate asymmetries institutionalized by \ndeposit money banks who pass-on lower rates to borrowers with high \ninterest rate elasticities (the big ticket borrowers who account for \nmost of borrowed funds) and pass-on higher interest rates quickly to \nborrowers with low interest rate elasticities (retail borrowers who have \nhigher output and employment elasticities). In the process, the \nfavoured sectors which are the rent havens (oil and gas, general \ncommerce, utilities, etc.) suck-in all the benefits of a lower interest \nrate. The reality of the Nigerian policy environment and the dire \noutlook for 2017 is that there are no quick fixes, a magic policy bullet \nthat will automatically resolve all the structural, strategic and policy \nissues. I am convinced that a longer term perspective is critical to \nthe right environment for thinking and choosing more efficient and \nmore effective policies. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n46 \n \n7.0 \nUCHE, CHIBUIKE U \n \nThese are indeed difficult times for monetary policy in Nigeria. With \nthe economy deep into recession and inflation inching up, the \ndilemma for MPC is whether to support growth by easing or to fight \ninflation by tightening monetary policy. Because of the peculiarities \nof our economy, both options have severe pitfalls. \nTightening at the present time is likely to further depress our economy \nthat is already in recession. Perhaps more worrying is the fact that it \nwill likely lead to a banking crisis. With NPLs now tottering around the \ndouble digit boundary, it is clear to me that tightening monetary \npolicy now will be an error. I am of course aware that some \ninternational investors may want to see a higher Monetary Policy \nRate as an encouragement to keep their investments in the country. \nI am however convinced that doing this will be to the detriment of \nour national economy. \nThe argument that increasing MPR at the present time will help our \neconomy by attracting more foreign investors makes little sense. This \nis so because high cost of capital can only discourage real sector \ninvestors. Only speculators can find such rates attractive. As I have \nargued in previous meetings, speculative capital- like short term \nforeign portfolio flows- end up causing more problems in an \nunderdeveloped economy like ours. In my view therefore, only long \n \n47 \n \nterm foreign capital, which target the real sector, can aid economic \nand industrial development in the long run. \nLoosening monetary policy at the present time will also have severe \nconsequences. It could for instance exacerbate the inflation that is \nalready in double digit territory and which is still rising. At another \nlevel, it could promote financial sector disintermediation by \nencouraging diversion of deposits from the banking sector. Any \npolicy that will result in the deepening of the negative real returns \nbank customers currently earn can only help discourage bank \nintermediation. \nPerhaps more important is the fact that loosening could further add \nto the pressure on the value of the Naira. It is my reasoned opinion \nthat our current foreign exchange crisis is the elephant in Nigeria’s \neconomic space. Since oil rents still provide most of our foreign \nexchange earnings, there is no easy way out of this crisis in the short \nrun. Of course the obvious exception will be the miraculous recovery \nof international oil prices to golden days of $100+ a barrel level. This \nmay however be wishful thinking. With our love for most things that \nare foreign and our disdain for most things that are local, there are \nfew viable paths out of the current economic hole that we are in, at \nleast in the short run. \nWhile it is essential to honour existing foreign exchange needs of \ncitizens and businesses, the time has come for Government to adopt \n \n48 \n \nand \noperationalize \na \nclear \neconomic \nand \ndevelopmental \nprogramme that will help to curtail the current craze for foreign \ngoods and services and encourage local production. What we must \nhowever do in the short run is to drastically reduce the variances \nbetween the parallel, Bureau de Change and official market \nexchange rates for the Naira. The current levels of arbitrage that \nexist in the foreign exchange market in Nigeria, if unchecked, will \nend up sabotaging the integrity of our banks, regulators and entire \neconomy. \nFrom the above, it is obvious that in the medium and long term, our \neconomy can only get succor if we are able to reverse its current \noverdependence on oil rents. In this direction, there is little monetary \npolicy can do on its own. Extensive cooperation with the fiscal \nauthorities is required. As already stated, there are no painless \noptions. It is for instance obvious to all that the size of Government \nmust come down if any meaningful investments are to be made in \ninfrastructure, which is essential for economic and industrial \ndevelopment. The bailouts and interventions by the CBN clearly has \nits limitations and cannot be the solution to our infrastructural \nproblems. To the contrary, it may actually be adding to the problem \nof inflation and exchange rate devaluation. Also worrying is the fact \nthat such interventions have the potentials to weaken the financial \nhealth of our Central Bank. \n \n49 \n \nCBN interventions aimed at guaranteeing the payment of salaries to \nGovernment workers is even more dangerous. For the avoidance of \ndoubt, I am not necessarily advocating mass sack in the civil service. \nRather, a strict embargo on employment and adopting policies that \nsupport willing civil servants to become entrepreneurs may also \nachieve meaningful results even in the medium term. \nBased on the above very difficult scenarios, I have come to the \nconclusion that the best line of action for MPC at the present time \nwill be to maintain status quo. Although this may not be the solution \nto our current economic quagmire, it is in my view the least \ndestructive option. \nI therefore vote as follows: (i) to retain the MPR at 14.00 per cent; (ii) \nto retain the CRR at 22.50 per cent; (iii) to retain the Liquidity Ratio at \n30.00 per cent; and (iv) to retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 \nand -500 basis points around the MPR. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n50 \n \n8.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \nThe International Context \nThe election of Donald Trump as President of the United States is the \nmajor recent development that may impact significantly on Nigeria, \ngiven the importance of the US as a trading partner and its overall \ninfluence on the world economy. While there is some uncertainty \nregarding the extent to which his pronouncements during the \nelection campaign will actually be translated into practice, there \nare some outcomes which appear likely to have a significant effect \non Nigeria. Firstly, it appears that stronger incentives will be provided \nfor US domestic oil producers. This might increase the supply glut and \nweaken prices, even as shale oil producers continue to make efforts \nto improve production efficiency and reduce their break-even price \nlevel. \nSecondly, \nthe \nvaunted \nprioritization \nof \ninfrastructure \nimprovement might generate a fiscal stimulus and lead to a rise in \nboth price levels and interest rates in the US. This might encourage \ncapital outflow from developing and emerging markets including \nNigeria. Thirdly, if some of the trade protectionist policies promised \nby the incoming President are implemented, it might have some \ncontractionary effect on global output as other countries respond or \nadjust. However, these effects are for the medium term. In the short \nterm, even though GDP growth rate has doubled in the US in Q3, \nunemployment has reduced marginally and prices have ticked up a \n \n51 \n \nbit in October, it is highly unlikely that policy rates will be adjusted \nuntil the new administration has settled in. \nGrowth in China, while still strong, is slowing down a bit, mainly due \nto structural changes. In the Eurozone, output, prices and \nemployment levels have remained more or less at the same level as \ncompared to the Q2 2016. While the effects of BREXIT are still muted \nin the UK, partly due to uncertainties of the exit timing, the Japanese \neconomy is still in dire straits, despite a long period of fiscal stimulus, \nnegative interest rates and a significant debt level. Growth forecasts \nfor Africa, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa for 2016 are all being revised \ndownwards. \nIn general therefore, there is unlikely to be a significant boost to \ngrowth in Nigeria from external demand, while downward pressures \non oil prices loom. Imported inflation, however, is not expected to be \na significant issue in the short run. \nThe Domestic Economy \nUnsurprisingly, GDP growth rate in Q3 2016 has fallen to a new low of \n-2.24% the third consecutive quarterly fall in GDP. This decline was \nmainly propelled by a 22% contraction of the oil sector, due mainly \nto sabotage of oil and gas pipelines. Non-oil GDP for the first time in \nthe year experienced a positive, albeit tiny growth of 0.03% in Q3, \nlargely due to an increase of 1.22% in Agricultural output, the highest \nachieved in the last 15 quarters. Both Industry and Construction \n \n52 \n \nexperienced negative growth rates for the fourth quarter in a row. \nManufacturing output in particular experienced a sharp fall. Trade \nalso fell. It is clear that the support being provided to Agricultural \nproduction is bearing some fruit, and needs to be intensified and \ninstitutionalized, so that it constitutes an important element in a \nbroader strategy for economic diversification and domestic \ninvestment. \nThe significant fall in GDP growth rates also resulted in an increase in \nboth unemployment and underemployment to 13.3% and 19.3% \nrespectively. \nThe combination of falling growth and rising prices continue to stalk \nthe Nigerian economy. Headline inflation rose to 18.33% in October \n2016, compared to 17.85% in September (YOY), and by 0.83% month-\non-month, which is slightly higher than the MoM growth in \nSeptember, yet the second lowest MoM increase since May 2016. \nBoth food and Core inflation rose in October, with Food and Non-\nAlcoholic beverages making the strongest contribution to the \ninflationary pressure. It should also be noted that imported Rice was \nthe single most significant contributor to food price increases in \nOctober. \nIn the external sector, external reserves rose slightly to US$25.21 in \nNovember 2016. However, it is unlikely that this trend can be \nsustained due to the sharp fall in foreign inflows. Also, the trade \n \n53 \n \nbalance has deteriorated sharply to the lowest level this year. While \nthe Naira exchange rate at the inter-bank market has remained \nsteady for a while, there are still pressures in the unofficial market, \nand there continues to be a wide gap between prices at the two \nmarkets. \nThe fiscal operations of the government up to September this year \nindicated a substantial gap between budgeted and actual revenue \nof about 25%, with a corresponding gap in expenditure of about \n20%. The objective of reflating the economy to get out of recession \nhas therefore been undermined. On the other hand, the relatively \nlow fiscal operations may have helped to slightly dampen the \ninflationary pressure in the short term. \nThe financial sector has continued to come under pressure mainly \narising from the negative growth rates in the economy and the Naira \ndepreciation effect. Hence banking sector profitability, ROE and \nROA have all declined, while NPLs have risen. Given the dominance \nof the oil sector, this outcome is to be expected, as is indeed \nhappening to many other oil-exporting developing and emerging \neconomies. Steps are being taken by the DMBs and the monetary \nauthorities to adequately respond to these challenges. \nConclusion and Recommendations \nIt is becoming increasingly clear that the path to economic recovery \nand social progress in Nigeria has to come from sustained internal \n \n54 \n \nefforts. It does not appear that there would be much succor to the \neconomy from international economic developments- such as \nstrong demand stimulus, sharp and sustained recovery in oil prices or \nsignificant and enduring increases in capital inflows. The role of \nmonetary policy is also increasingly narrowing. The significant \nincrease in agricultural output seen is an encouragement to intensify \nefforts to boost output in this sector. Even the evident contribution of \nimported rice to the inflation figure highlights the opportunity to \nredouble efforts to boost local rice production. \nOne of the bigger challenges though is that the manufacturing \nsector has been experiencing a sharp fall in output and capacity \nutilization, despite increased lending by the DMBs to the sector. This is \nmainly due to inadequate access to foreign exchange. However, \nthe foreign exchange scarcity is unlikely to abate soon. The need for \na structural shift in manufacturing output to focus more on local \ninputs is therefore imperative. \nOne of the lessons recently learnt, in my opinion, is that raising the \nMPR is not likely to have an appreciable and enduring effect on \ncapital flows right now, as we have argued earlier. This is because \nthe macroeconomic and policy environment is not very supportive, \nand oil output remains uncertain. \nConsequently, tightening monetary policy will not at the moment \nlead to a substantial increase in the supply of foreign currency. Of \n \n55 \n \ncourse, inflation remains a serious challenge, which is eroding the \npurchasing power of income earners and therefore deepening \npoverty. We have argued earlier though, that the current inflationary \npressure has largely emanated from Naira depreciation, utility tariffs, \nPMS and supply bottlenecks and will therefore not be appreciably \naffected by monetary policy tightening. In addition, despite the \ncentral mandate of the CBN and the MPC for price stability, it would \nbe difficult to justify a tightening of monetary policy when the fiscal \nauthorities are trying to provide fiscal stimuli to address the negative \ngrowth rate. Moreover, tightening will substantially complicate the \nchallenges facing the financial sector. At the same time, loosening \nmonetary policy is not appropriate at the time of surging inflationary \npressure. \nIn consideration of the circumstances described therefore, I vote to \nmaintain the current monetary stance with respect to the MPR, CRR, \nliquidity ratios. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n56 \n \n9.0 ADEDOYIN SALAMI \n \nThe data releases ahead of and during this meeting made for sober \nreflection on how much self-harm we continue to inflict on ourselves. \nWith Headline inflation for October 2016 recorded at 18.3 percent – \na further increase from 17.9 percent the previous month – and \nOutput growth, measured by quarterly GDP figures, at -2.24 percent \nfor Q3 2016 showing, a further deepening of the recession, our \nnational economic situation thus continues to worsen. \nIn voting at this meeting, it was clear there was no real option other \nthan to hold. Any measures to tighten monetary conditions would \nworsen the recession. Easing conditions will only exacerbate \ninflationary conditions and continue to stoke the pressure in the \nFOREX market. Furthermore, we still await fiscal proposals for 2017. \nAs I noted in my comments at the end of our previous meeting, \ncontracting output and rising costs create a major dilemma for \npolicy-making. What should be the priority and which measures \nshould we adopt? Simply stated, should we reduce interest rate to \nstimulate investment and subsequently output; or should inflation be \nthe primary focus of monetary policy – in which case we should raise \ninterest rate and curtail liquidity growth. Any hope that base effects, \nwhich should apply early in 2017, will help with the prioritization is at \nbest feeble. It is already clear that inflation will continue rising for the \nrest of this year and into the new year. \n \n57 \n \nClarity requires stating that this has been a bad year for monetary \npolicy! As is clearly shown in liquidity data, both money supply and \ndemand deposits have risen quite sharply in the past year. At the \nsame time as we have sharply raised liquidity, largely through an \nalmost unceasing flow of liquidity from intervention funds and \nlending to government, Monetary Policy has pretended to tighten \nby raising the MPR – which now stands at 14 percent. The use of \nmonetary policy to achieve objectives best attained through fiscal \npolicy measures – fiscalisation of monetary policy – must now stop. \nIt is therefore in my view, important to note that the regime \nintervention funds may now be distorting the dynamics of markets \nand competition within the Nigerian Economy. To remind those, who \nhave forgotten, these funds were created in response to the \nimminent failure of some key banks in 2010. They were not intended \nto be perpetual. The distortions they now engender imply that we \nMAY make their beneficiaries unable to compete in their absence. In \nmy view, if this regime is to be sustained, it would be useful to inject a \nlarge dose of transparency. In other words, declare the size of the \nfunds, the criteria for their creation and perhaps even the \nbeneficiaries – afterall, we do publish the beneficiaries of FOREX \nsales (arguably a more scarce resource). \n \n \n58 \n \nEvidence that the injection of liquidity has overwhelmed any efforts \nat tightening is manifested in continued slide in the Naira’s rate of \nexchange and rising inflation. Worst of all, this position has resulted in \nalmost complete erosion of the Central Bank’s credibility. \nThis situation throws up a new challenge which must be addressed in \n2017. Irrespective of any inconsistencies between fiscal and \nmonetary policy, there may now be appearing a gap between \nCentral Bank Management, which has sole responsibility for \nIntervention Funds and the Monetary Policy Committee. Whilst MPC \nhas either held or tightened, the easing of liquidity conditions has \narisen largely out of management decisions. \nBeyond ensuring consistency between management decisions and \nthat of MPC, the Central Bank must, in 2017, address the challenges \nin the FOREX market. Multiple FX rates don’t help in any way. Having \nagreed to FOREX Market liberalisation at the meeting in May, I doubt \nif any of us on the MPC foresaw the current position. A fragmented \nmarket with price discovery only in parallel market was hardly what \nwas envisaged. In my view, the energy and effort devoted to \n‘managing’ the Naira would perhaps have been more fruitful if the \nparadigm for currency management shifts from managing the \nvolume of US Dollars available to managing Naira liquidity. \n \n \n59 \n \nIn addition, it becomes imperative, going forward, to define the role \nof exchange rate management in stimulating the productive \ncapacity of our economy. As I have argued before, exchange rate \npolicy must coherently be deployed with other measures to \nstimulate production. Whilst continued devaluation of the currency \nwill achieve nothing beyond rising prices, a well-thought-out policy \nfor managing the forex rate consistent with well-defined national \neconomic priorities begins to restore credibility and thus confidence. \nIronically, the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) value for the Naira is \nestimated at between N315-329/US$. The gap between this figure \nand the N455/US$ at which the currency trades in the parallel \nmarket, as we hold this meeting, represents a 40percent \nundervaluation of the currency. This provides a proxy for the cost of \nloss of confidence. \nI have in the past consistently drawn attention to the challenge \nposed by the deteriorating quality of bank risk assets. Whilst is it \nunderstandable in the context of a shrinking economy, I remain \nconcerned as to whether we have a good grip on this issue. Data \nshows Non-Performing Loans of Banks to have further risen to \n13percent at the end of Oct., 2016. Perhaps because of my limited \nknowledge of Accounting, I remain worried about whether we have \na truly comprehensive picture of the situation. \n \n \n60 \n \nFor the avoidance of doubt, I am clear in my mind that monetary \npolicy must address inflation, whilst fiscal policy must be deployed to \ncreate incentives for private sector deployment of investment \ncapital. Rising cost, which increasing prices represent, amongst \nothers undermines our national economic competitiveness thus \nexporting jobs abroad. Furthermore, rising prices hit the poorest \nsegments of our society hardest. This cannot be a recipe from \ncreating socio-economic conditions wherein our citizens can thrive \nand national cohesion achieved. \nWe can argue that monetary policy has reached its limits only \nbecause it has been wrongly deployed. Perhaps it is time for a \nthorough-going review of policy frameworks. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n61 \n \n10.0 EMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL \n BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \n POLICY COMMITTEE \n \nWith rising populism in many countries – especially in the aftermath \nof categorical votes for Brexit in the UK and Donald Trump in the US, \nand the impending polls in Germany, France and Italy – the \nreverberations \nof \nthe \nglobal \npolitical \nlandscape \nrestrained \neconomic outcomes in 2016 and undermined the modest recovery \npreviously projected for 2017. Consequently, vis-à-vis the 3.2 \npercent recorded in 2015, global growths for 2016 and 2017 may fall \nshort of the 3.1 and 3.4 percent forecasted by the IMF. This reflected \nthe increased uncertainty heralded by the populist votes and the \ncontinued fragilities in both advanced and developing countries. \nAmong advanced countries, the US economy has so far \nstrengthened in 2016 while performances in the Euro area, the UK \nand Japan remained colourless. The slowdown of the Chinese \neconomy and the cowed outcomes in key emerging markets also \nprovided a bidirectional drag on global economy performance. \nStill to recover from the recent oil price shock, the Nigerian \neconomy is braced for further global shocks in 2017 as results of the \npopulist votes are implemented in the US and UK. Consequently, the \nexpected recovery of the Nigerian economy may be delayed as \nthe recession elongates. So far in 2016, the domestic economy has \n \n62 \n \nexperienced three consecutive quarters of contraction. Data from \nthe NBS indicates that GDP growth fell to -2.24 percent in quarter 3 \nfrom -2.06 percent in quarter 2. Though oil and manufacturing GDP \ncontinued to contract, the positive growth of non-oil GDP in the \nthird quarter is salutary and could signal the turning point towards \nrecovery. This is particularly remarkable as the economy sustains its \nefforts \nto \ndisentangle \nfrom \noil \ndependence \nand \ndiversify \ncompletely. More encouraging is the 4.54 percent growth in \nagriculture GDP which could signal the imminent moderation in \nfood inflation in the near term. \nAt 17.9 and 18.3 percent in September and October 2016 vis-à-vis \n17.6 percent in August, inflation rate maintained its upward trend \nthroughout the year from a single-digit rate of 9.6 percent in \nJanuary. This continued to reflect the rise in both the food and the \ncore components of inflation which, respectively, rose to 17.1 and \n18.1 percent in October from 16.6 and 17.7 percent in September. \nDuring the same period, the month-on-month headline rate also \nrose, albeit marginally, from 0.81 to 0.83 percent. The rising \ninflationary trend is predominantly underlain by lingering pass-\nthrough from exchange rate and high energy prices. It is my \nexpectation that as the base-effects taper out and the impact of \nrecent policy adjustments permeates the system, inflation rate will \nbegin to moderate by the first quarter of 2017. \n \n63 \n \nAnalyses of liquidity conditions indicate monetary expansion as \nannualised growth rate of broad money supply increased to 14.0 \npercent in September from 12.1 percent in August relative to a \ntarget of 10.9 percent. This was driven by growing domestic credits \nas both private and public sector credits, at annualised rates of 27.6 \nand 39.4 percent, expanded beyond their respective benchmarks \nof 13.4 and 13.3 percent. Correspondingly, money market rates \neased during the review period as average interbank call rate fell \nfrom 25.0 percent between July and August to 11.7 percent \nbetween 11 October and 17 November 2016. I reiterate the \nimportance of channelling credits to MSMEs, the agriculture sector \nand other productive real sector ventures in the economy. It is \nimperative that efforts continue to be directed, at this time, to \nlabour-intensive sectors that can boost employment, stimulate \ndomestic demand and engender import substitution. I believe that \nthe reduced exchange market pressure therefrom would generally \nlessen uncertainty in the economy, especially as the naira-dollar \nexchange rate stabilised around ₦305.00/US$ in September and \nOctober 2016. \nThough the poor economic performance which emerged in 2016Q1 \nlingered into 2016Q3, there is potential for an early recovery in 2017 \nif the much needed structural, trade and social policies are \nundertaken. \nThroughout \n2016 \nwe \nhave \nseen \neconomic \ncontractions, \nrising \ninflation, \nrising \nunemployment, \npersistent \n \n64 \n \nexchange market pressure, and growing non-performing loans. \nThese reflected the enduring effects of the lower oil prices \ntransmitted through foreign exchange scarcity and constricted \nfiscal space. I note that the weakened domestic demand which \ncontinued in quarter three is directly linked to the accumulated \npayment arrears for public sector workers and contractors. This is \ngleaned from the steady decline in household consumption, a \nsignificant component of our aggregate demand. Furthermore, the \neffect of the domestic energy price shocks, in electricity and fuel, \nwhich occurred earlier in the year continued to ripple through the \nsystem affecting not only productivity but also inflation rate. \nI note that regardless of further economic contraction in 2016Q3, \nthe positive growth in non-oil GDP, especially in agriculture GDP are \nupbeat for the overall recovery of the economy. Nonetheless, this \nmay be wishful thoughts if definite structural policies that are \nrequired to rectify the deep-seated aggregate supply deficiencies \nand improve productivity are not put in place. I note again that \nmonetary policy alone cannot lift the economy out of the present \npredicaments. While we will continue to fine-tune instruments within \nour remit, we require other economic policymakers to be proactive \nand strategic. \nNear-term prospects of the economy suggest a cautious outlook for \ngrowth in the first half of 2017, especially as Brexit negotiations begin \n \n65 \n \nand Donald Trump is inaugurated. Nonetheless, it may be untimely \nand counterproductive, at this time, to undertake a pre-emptive \nrate cut. The latent economic benefit of lowering policy rate at this \ntime is non-positive, given that even a dramatic cut in rate is not \nenough to guarantee a positive growth while inflation rate will \nconcurrently skyrocket. However, a hike may also not guarantee \nsubstantial fall in inflation given the prominence of structural factors \nin the inflation dynamics. Besides, even at the current rates, we \nhave observed a rise in the systemic liquidity which is adequate to \nsupport the growth process. I am of the view that an impulsive \nadjustment of policy may be detrimental and sub-optimal. It is \npertinent to allow the effects of past policy decisions to fully \npercolate the system in order to avert the dual problems of time \ninconsistency and indeterminacy. \nBased on the foregoing, I vote to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 14.0 percent; \n2. Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent; \n3. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.0 percent", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 110 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, November 21 and 22, 2016, with Personal Statement of Member.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/3339235cdafec366edceebc6f0e0c382.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "3339235cdafec366edceebc6f0e0c382", "text": "1 \n \n \n CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA COMMUNIQUÉ NO 112 OF THE \nMONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF 20TH AND 21ST MARCH \n2017 \n \n1.0. Background \n \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on the 20th and 21st March, \n2017, against the backdrop of persistent uncertainty in the global \neconomy, \nstemming \nfrom \neconomic \nand \nsocio-political \ndevelopments around the world. On the domestic front, while the \nQ4 2016 GDP figure was better than the last two consecutive \nquarters, the economy remained in recession with inflationary \npressures continuing unabated. These adverse external and \ndomestic \nconditions \ncontinued \nto \ncomplicate \nthe \npolicy \nenvironment. \n \nIn attendance at the meeting were 10 members of the \nCommittee. The Committee assessed the global and domestic \neconomic and financial environments in Q1 2017 as well as the \noutlook for the medium-term. \n \n \n \n2 \n \nExternal Developments \nThe global economy witnessed greater momentum in Q4 2016, \nfacilitated by gains in both developed, emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies which propelled global GDP growth to 2.7 \nper cent year-on-year in Q4, 2016, a 0.2 percentage point \nimprovement over Q3 2016. \n \nIn spite of this improvement, the external environment continued \nto be plagued by political, economic and financial market \nuncertainties, with the defining issues being: Brexit, growing \nprotectionist \nand \nanti-globalization \nsentiments, \ndivergent \nmonetary policies of the advanced economies‟ central banks \nand volatile commodity price movements. The protectionist \nstance of the new U.S. administration could impact negatively on \nglobal trade and economic recovery. \n \nThe MPC noted the slip in oil prices against the backdrop of fears \nof a supply glut, fuelled by increased activities in US Shale oil \nproduction, which threatens to undermine the rebalancing effects \nof the last OPEC decision to cut output. The Committee also noted \nthe increase in the target range of the US Fed funds rate at the \nlast meeting of the FOMC and the potential spillover effects on \nglobal capital flows and interest rates, especially given the still \ntepid global economic activity and weak demand. Challenges in \nthe emerging markets and developing economies persist, as they \nstruggle with strong headwinds from low commodity prices, rising \n3 \n \ninflation, currency volatility, receding real income and capital \nreversals. \n \nOverall, the Committee noted the dampening effects of \neconomic stagnation and uncertainty on global trade and \ninvestment. In spite of these constraints, however, the IMF \nestimates that the global economy would witness a slight \nimprovement in growth from 3.1 per cent in 2016 to 3.4 per cent in \n2017. \n \nGlobal inflation continued its moderate but steady rise against the \nbackdrop of improved oil prices and depreciated currencies in \nseveral emerging markets. Amongst the major advanced \neconomies, the U.S Fed maintained its tightening stance, with a \nfurther upward adjustment1 in March 2017. Meanwhile the Bank of \nJapan (BOJ), Bank of England and the European Central Bank, \nmaintained the soft policy stance at their most recent meetings. \n \nDomestic Output Developments \nData released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in \nFebruary 2017 showed that the economy contracted marginally \nby 1.30 per cent in Q4 2016, effectively remaining in recession \nsince Q2 2016. Overall, in 2016, the economy contracted by 1.51 \nper cent, with the contraction in Q4 being the least since Q2 2016. \nThe non-oil sector grew by 0.33 per cent in Q4, largely reflecting \n \n1 The Federal Reserve again raised its benchmark Federal Fund rate by 25 basis points in March 2017, to a range of 0.75 to 1.00 per cent, having \nraised rates by the same margin in December, 2016, and also provided indication of further rate hikes in 2017 \n4 \n \nthe slowdown in the agricultural sector, which decelerated to 4. \n03 per cent in Q4 2016 from the 4.54 per cent recorded in Q3 \n2016. The Committee remains of the conviction that fiscal policy \nremained the most potent panacea to most of the key negative \nundercurrents \ni.e. \nstunted \neconomic \nactivity, \nheightened \nunemployment and high inflation. \n \nIn spite of the recent moderate recovery in oil prices, the \nCommittee approached developments in commodity prices \ncautiously. It noted that the era of high oil prices was over, thus \nmaking diversification away from oil more imperative today than \never. \n \nDevelopments in Money and Prices \nThe committee noted that money supply (M2) contracted by 5.73 \nper cent in February 2017, annualized at -34.38 per cent in \ncontrast to the provisional growth benchmark of 10.29 per cent for \n2017. Similarly, Net Domestic Credit (NDC) contracted by 1.41 per \ncent in February, 2017, annualized to 8.46 per cent, being \nsignificantly below the 17.93 per cent provisional growth \nbenchmark for 2017. Likewise, net credit to government \ncontracted at an annualized rate of 49.74 per cent, representing \n82.86 per cent below its programmed target of 33.12 per cent. In \neffect, all the major monetary aggregates contracted by end-\nFebruary and underperformed their programmed provisional \nbenchmarks for fiscal 2017. \n5 \n \n \nHeadline inflation (year-on-year), however, declined for the first \ntime in 15 months, dropping by 0.94 percentage point to 17.78 per \ncent in February, from the 18.72 per cent recorded in January \n2017, and 18.55 per cent in December, 2016 seemingly reversing \nthe monthly upward momentum recorded since January, 2016. \nThe moderation in headline inflation in February, 2017 reflected \nbase effect as well as decline in the core component, which fell \nby 1.90 percentage points from 17.90 per cent in January to 16.0 \nper cent in February, 2017. The food index, however, rose to 18.53 \nper cent in February, a 0.71 percentage point increase over the \n17.87 per cent recorded in January, 2017. \n \nThe Committee, similarly, observed a continuous upward trend in \nthe month-on-month inflation rate in February, having slightly \nmoderated between December 2016 and January, 2017. It noted \nthe sustenance of the structural factors mounting pressures on \nconsumer prices, such as the high cost of power and energy, \ntransport and production factors, as well as rising prices of imports. \nNonetheless, the Committee remains optimistic that the adopted \npolicy stance and other ancillary measures directed at improving \nthe agricultural and other relevant sectors of the economy would \ncombine to restart growth and drive down prices in the short to \nmedium-term. \n \n6 \n \nMoney market interest rates moved in tandem with the level of \nliquidity in the banking system. Rates were relatively stable during \nthe review period, the interbank call rates opened at 6.25 per \ncent on January 25, 2017 and closed at 13.14 per cent on \nFebruary 28, 2017. However, the average inter-bank call rate rose \nto 100.00 and 133.84 per cent on January 21 and January 23, \n2017, respectively, following the withdrawal of liquidity from the \nbanking system through the sale of foreign exchange worth \nN137.00 billion on February 21, 2017. \n \nThe Committee noted the decline in the equities segment of the \ncapital market as the All-Share Index (ASI) fell by 3.07 per cent \nfrom 26,036.24 on January 31, 2017, to 25,238.01 on March 10, \n2017. Similarly, Market Capitalization (MC) decreased by 2.68 per \ncent from N8.97 to N8.73 trillion during the same period. Relative to \nend-December 2016, the capital market indices, fell by 3.12 and \n3.03 per cent, respectively, reflecting the challenges still \nconfronting the economy. \n \nTotal foreign exchange inflows through the CBN decreased by \n8.87 per cent in February, 2017 compared with the previous \nmonth, as foreign exchange market receipts were significantly \nlower. Total outflows, also declined by 7.32 per cent during the \nsame period. The Committee noted that the average naira \nexchange rate remained stable at the inter-bank segment of the \nforeign exchange market in the review period. \n7 \n \n2.0. Overall Outlook and Risks \n \nAvailable data and forecasts of key economic variables as well as \nthe newly released Federal Government‟s Economic Recovery \nand Growth Plan (ERGP), indicate prospects of output recovery in \n2017. The Committee expects that the implementation of this \nplan, the new foreign exchange policy as well as the current effort \nby the Federal Government to restore peace in the Niger Delta \nregion would help revive economic growth and stabilize prices. \nThe Committee identified the downside risks to this outlook to \ninclude the possibility of a slower-than-expected rate of global \neconomic activity, tight monetary policy stance by the U.S. Fed, \nresulting in strengthening U.S dollar, and low oil prices. \n \n3.0. The Considerations of the Committee \n \nThe Committee re-evaluated the implications for Nigeria of the \ncontinuing global uncertainties as reflected in the unfolding \nprotectionist posture of the United States and some European \ncountries; sustenance of the OPEC-Russian agreement to cut oil \nproduction beyond July 2017; sluggish global recovery and the \nstrengthening U.S. dollar. \n \nThe Committee also evaluated other challenges confronting the \ndomestic economy and the opportunities for achieving price \nstability, conducive to growth in 2017. In particular, the Committee \n8 \n \nnoted the persisting inflationary pressures; continuing output \ncontraction; high unemployment rate; elevated demand pressure \nin the foreign exchange market; low credit to the real sector and \nweakening \nfinancial \nsystem \nindicators, \namongst \nothers. \nNonetheless, members welcomed the improved implementation \nof the foreign exchange policy that resulted in naira‟s recent \nappreciation. Similarly, the Committee expressed satisfaction on \nthe release of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, and \nurged its speedy implementation with clear timelines and \ndeliverables. On the strength of these developments, the \nCommittee felt inclined to maintain a hold on all policy \nparameters. \n \nNevertheless, the Committee noted the arguments for tightening \npolicy which remained strong and persuasive. These include: the \nreal policy rate which remains negative, upper reference band for \ninflation remains substantially breached and elevated demand \npressure in the foreign exchange market. The reality of sustained \npressures on prices (consumer prices and the naira exchange \nrate) cannot be ignored, given the Bank‟s primary mandate of \nprice stability. It noted that the moderation in inflation in February \nwas due to base effect as other parameters, particularly; month-\non-month CPI continued to rise. However, tightening at this time \nwould portray the Bank as being insensitive to growth. Also, the \ndeposit money banks may easily reprice their assets which would \nundermine financial stability. Besides, the Committee noted the \n9 \n \nneed to create binding restrictions on growth in narrow money \nand structural liquidity and the imperative of macroeconomic \nstability to achieving price stability conducive to growth. \n \nThe Committee also considered the arguments for loosening the \nstance of monetary policy, noting its desirability in stimulating \naggregate demand if credit increased with lower rates of interest. \nIt noted the arguments that loose monetary policy was capable \nof delivering cheaper credit, making it more attractive for \nNigerians to acquire assets, thus increasing wealth and stimulating \naggregate spending and confidence by economic agents, which \nwould eventually lead to lower Non-performing loans in the \nsystem. However, the counterfactual arguments against loosening \nwere anchored on the upward trending month-on-month inflation \nand its impact on the exchange rate. Loosening would thus \nworsen the already negative real interest rate, widen the interest \nrate spread and reverse the positive outlook for the current \naccount position. \n \nOn outlook for financial stability, the Committee noted that the \nbanking sector was becoming less resilient as a result of the \nadverse macroeconomic environment. Nevertheless, the MPC \nreiterated its resolve to continue to pursue financial system \nstability. To this end, the Committee enjoined the Management of \nthe Bank to work with DMBs to promptly address rising NPLs, \n10 \n \ndeclining asset quality, credit concentration and high foreign \nexchange exposures. \n \nThe Committee also noted the benefits of loosening at this time \nwhich will be in line with the needs of fiscal policy to restart \ngrowth. The MPC, however, noted that loosening would \nexacerbate inflationary pressures, worsen the exchange rate and \nfurther pull the real interest rate into negative territory. Since \ninterest rates are sticky downwards, loosening may not necessarily \ntransmit into lower retail lending rates. \n \nThe Committee noted the consecutive positive contribution of \nagriculture to GDP in Q4 2016, a development partly traceable to \nthe Bank‟s interventions in the sector. The Committee remains \noptimistic that, if properly implemented, the newly released \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) coupled with \ninnovative, growth-stimulating sectoral policies would help fast \ntrack economic recovery. \n \n4.0. The Committee’s Decisions \n \nThe Committee, in consideration of the headwinds in the domestic \neconomy and the uncertainties in the global environment, \ndecided by 9 out of 10 members to retain the MPR at 14.0 per \ncent alongside all other policy parameters. One member voted to \nraise the MPR. In summary, the MPC decided to: \n11 \n \n \n(i) Retain the MPR at 14 per cent; \n(ii) Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \n \n(iii) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv) Retain the Asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR \n \nThank you for listening. \n \nGodwin I. Emefiele \n \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n \n21st March, 2017 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nMEMBERS \n1. ADELABU, ADEBAYO \nFollowing the resolution at the last meeting to correct the wide \ndistortion in the foreign exchange market, a remarkable \nimprovement has been recorded as evidenced in the narrowing \nof the margin between the two markets. This is as a result of the \nnew foreign exchange policy which now accommodates certain \nitems previously excluded from the interbank market. From the \nreal sector side, inflation at 17.78 per cent in February is still \nelevated but it is somehow soothing that a fair level of \ndeceleration could be observed in contrast to the upward trend \nthat persisted throughout fiscal 2016. The contraction in GDP \ncontinued up to the last quarter of 2016 but gradual recovery is \nanticipated in the current fiscal year given the increase in \nagricultural activities most especially rice production. \nFrom a policy perspective, as it has always been due to the \nmultidimensional nature of the challenges, the issue is not that \nstraightforward given that the risk to the medium term outlook are \nfrom both the financial and real sectors. From the financial side, \nthe major risk is the state of the foreign exchange market with the \nexchange rate occupying the front burner. Some degree of \nstability has been achieved in the last one month owing to the \nnew measures introduced by the Bank but certain developments \nportend the capacity to trigger new pressures in the market. \n13 \n \nAmong others, the US Fed Reserve increased the policy rate at \ntheir meeting last week while analysts are of the view that further \nincreases could still take place in the course of the year given the \nexpansionary fiscal stance of the new administration in the US. This, \nin essence, could trigger capital outflow from emerging \neconomies and ultimately strengthen the US dollar further against \nother currencies. Besides, I doubt if the issue of demand pressure in \nthe foreign exchange market has been completely dealt with. \nThe recent rally in the value of the Naira at the BDC‟s market is not \nnecessarily due to reduction in demand for forex but mainly on \naccount of increase in supply by the Bank, which to some extent \nhas affected the rate of reserves accretion. The point here is that \napart from transactions demand for forex, which the Bank is trying \nto meet through increased intervention, it is not unlikely that \ndemand for forex as a store of value is equally increasing. This \nphenomenon could have only resulted from lack of confidence of \neconomic agents with respect to the sustainability of the current \nappreciation in the value of the domestic currency, given that the \nUS dollar is currently appreciating against most global currencies. \nThus, some level of speculation could still heighten demand \npressures and possibly lead to depreciation of the domestic \ncurrency. In light of the fact that much of the inflation in the last \ncouple of months has been driven by the pass through effects of \nexchange rate depreciation, then, it could be reasonably \nassumed that inflation dynamics may still face upside risks in the \n14 \n \nmedium term. This, invariably, should require some tightening \nmeasures. \nAnother emerging threat on the financial side is the rising NPLs of \nthe banking sector. The sector has been severely hit by the \ncombination of high lending rate, exchange rate risk, and \ncontraction in economic activities, resulting in significant rise in the \nlevel of defaulting portfolios. Although it is comforting that the \nsoundness of the banking sector has not been eroded to the level \nexperienced in the aftermath of the 2007-9 global financial crisis, \nwhich elicited the CBN intervention, such level of erosion is a likely \npossibility if the trend in the last couple of years continues. The \nsector therefore deserves some form of attention. In as much as \nthe three risk factors to the sector highlighted above are very \nimportant, the interest rate appears to be the only one under the \ncomplete control of the Bank. As such, I am of the view that the \nneed to build a safeguard against the risk of another round of \ninstability in the banking sector demands that the interest rate \npath should be closely guided. \nFrom the real side, the contraction in output is projected to \nbottom out in the current year but not without some challenges. \nMost of the banks are wary of booking new credit as much effort is \nnow placed on recovery. Obviously, credit growth, particularly to \nthe private sector may slow down considerably thereby stifling the \nrecovery process. This should naturally elicit easing of credit \ncondition from the policy side. This position is further reinforced by \na casual analysis of inflation dynamics. Core and food inflation \n15 \n \nremained fairly stable up to 2015 but the two of them trended \nupward in 2016 despite the fact that growth of agricultural GDP \nremained positive during the period. This, in essence, suggests that \nthe current inflation trajectory is more of a cost-push phenomenon \nand less of demand pull, invariably, requiring easing of conditions \nin the business environment. On the other hand, gradual recovery \nfrom the recession is expected in 2017 but this would largely be \npropelled by agriculture as considerable drag could still be \nobserved in some key sectors. Available statistics revealed that \nkey sectors like mining and manufacturing contracted by 21.64 \npercent and 4.38 percent, respectively, in the third quarter of \n2016. Going by the magnitude of contraction in these sectors, it \nwould definitely take a while for the sectors to recover and in the \nlight of the fact that these are major employment generating \nsectors, the impact of recovery on employment would be highly \ndiminished. As a result, monetary policy still needs to play a critical \nrole in propelling growth particularly in job enhancing sectors. \nOther key challenges are the developments in the fiscal sector. \nThe fiscal 2017 Appropriation Bill of about N6.0 trillion with about 26 \npercent allocated to capital project is a good step towards \nenhancing the recovery process. However, the key challenge \nremains the delay in passing the Bill into law. Under this condition, \nthe constitution permits that certain portions of recurrent \nexpenditure could be spent while no portion of capital \nexpenditure is permitted. The implication is that the component of \nexpenditure that could shift the supply curve to the right is \n16 \n \nimpeded while the component that shifts aggregate demand to \nthe right is not constrained thereby stoking inflation. This, invariably, \nshows that apart from the need to strengthen coordination \nbetween fiscal and monetary policies, all the various arms of \ngovernment including the legislature need to work in concert in \nthe \nprocess \nof \naddressing \nthe \ncurrent \nmacroeconomic \nimbalance. \nFrom the foregoing, the risks to the outlook appears fairly \nbalanced, suggesting that further tightening or loosening may be \na \nsub-optimal \nchoice \nin \nthe \nprevailing \ncircumstance. \nConsequently, I would like to opt for retention of the current \nmeasures of monetary policy which specifically means that both \nthe MPR and CRR be maintained at 14 and 22.5 percent, \nrespectively. In addition, strong complementarity is required from \nfiscal and structural policies while both the executive and \nlegislature need to deepen their relationship particularly on \nmatters revolving around macroeconomic management. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 \n \n2. ALADE, SARAH O. \nThis MPC meeting is taking place at a period of uncertainty in the \nglobal economy, stemming from economic and socio-political \ndevelopments around the world, amid fragile domestic economic \nenvironment. While the domestic economy experienced a better \n2016 fourth quarter GDP figure than the last two consecutive \nquarters, the economy remained in recession with inflationary \npressures not moderate as expected. These adverse external and \ndomestic conditions are continuing to complicate the policy \nenvironment in Nigeria, and would require delicate balancing to \nachieve both growth and stability in the country. \n \nThe growth momentum is improving for the global economy; \nhowever, more needs to be done to sustain the momentum. The \nglobal economy witnessed greater momentum in Q4 2016, \nfacilitated by gains in both developed, emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies which propelled global GDP growth to 2.7 \nper cent year-on-year in Q4, 2016, a 0.2 percentage point \nimprovement over Q3 2016 with the United States economic \nrecovery. The Federal Reserve raised its key interest rate by 0.25 \npercentage point on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 on the back of \nstrong jobs report and Fed confidence about the pace of growth \nin the U.S. economy. The Fed placed its key interest rate at 0% in \nDecember 2008 to resuscitate the collapsed housing market. But a \nlittle over eight years later, the U.S. economy is in much better \nshape and has grown, albeit slowly. The IMF estimates that the \n18 \n \nglobal economy would witness a slight improvement in growth \nfrom 3.1 per cent in 2016 to 3.4 per cent in 2017. However, this \nforecast will be determined by a number of factors including the \nrising wave of populist and anti-globalization sentiments and \ndivergent monetary policy stance of the central banks in \nadvanced economies which will ultimately impact the Nigerian \neconomy. \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) is still negative although with \nmarginal improvements: The most recent data indicated that the \neconomy contracted marginally by 1.30 per cent in the fourth \nquarter of 2016, effectively remaining in recession since second \nquarter of 2016. The contraction in the fourth quarter growth was \nthe least for the year, as the economy contracted by 1.51 per \ncent overall in 2016. The non-oil sector grew by 0.33 per cent in the \nfourth quarter largely reflecting the slowdown in the agricultural \nsector, which recorded a 4. 03 per cent growth down from 4.54 \nper cent recorded in third quarter of 2016. The cumulative effect \nof energy shortages, high electricity tariffs, fuel price hikes, scarcity \nof \nforeign \nexchange \nand \ndepressed \nconsumer \ndemand \ncontinued to dampen growth throughout the year. The negative \ngrowth in GDP under normal circumstances would have \nnecessitated a reduction in monetary policy rate, however \nrecognizing that the conditions which precipitated the current \neconomic downturn were not sensitive to monetary policy \ninterventions, a cut in policy rate would not be appropriate at this \ntime. Therefore, given the rising inflation and the reversal of capital \n19 \n \ninflows the current stance of monetary policy should remain at \ncurrent level to reverse the situation. Money supply (M2) \ncontracted by 5.73 per cent in February 2017, representing an \nannualized growth of 34.38 percent against the provisional growth \nbenchmark of 10.29 per cent for 2017. Similarly, Net Domestic \nCredit (NDC) contracted by 1.41per cent in February, 2017, with \nan annualized growth of 8.46 per cent and significantly below \nthe17.93per cent provisional growth benchmark for 2017. \nAlthough growth in monetary aggregates contracted at end-\nFebruary, excess liquidity still remain in the system, making \nmonetary policy stance not as tight as the policy rate would \nsuggest. The challenge for the committee as in 2016 is how to \naddress growth concerns without escalating inflationary pressures. \nEfforts to spur economic growth will therefore require the \ncooperation and collaboration of monetary and fiscal policy and \ndelicate balancing of both global events and domestic risks. \n \nInflationary pressure slowed marginally, but still at upper double \ndigits. Headline inflation declined by 0.94 percentage point to \n17.78 per cent in February, from the 18.72 per cent recorded in \nJanuary 2017, and 18.55 per cent in December, 2016. This marked \nthe first time in 15 months, that headline inflation has declined \nreversing the monthly upward momentum recorded since \nJanuary, 2016. The moderation in headline inflation is as a result of \nbase effect as well as decline in the core component, which fell \nby 1.90 percentage points from 17.90 per cent in January 2017 to \n20 \n \n16.0 per cent in February, 2017. However, food inflation rose to \n18.53 per cent in February, from 17.87 per cent recorded in \nJanuary, 2017. While some structural factors such as the high cost \nof power and energy, transport, production factors, as well as \nrising prices of imports are responsible for the high inflation, \ninflationary pressure is also being driven by excess liquidity in the \nsystem. Against this background, it is necessary to start the rolling \nback of some of the intervention programs of the Bank and \nrefocus monetary policy on price stability by lowering inflation. \nMonetary policy must keep a close eye on inflation to avoid it \novershooting and further eroding purchasing power of the poor. \n \nBetter management of the foreign exchange policy and the \nunification of multiple exchange rates is required. Further reform in \nthe interbank foreign exchange market is needed to allow for \ntransparency and price discovery in line with the policies released \nin June 2016. This will attract the much needed capital into the \neconomy and liquidity into the market and unify the multiple \nexchange rates. \n \nTherefore, based on the above, I support the retention of the \ncurrent stance of monetary policy. I vote for no change in \nMonetary Policy Rate at 14 percent, retain Private Sector Cash \nReserve Requirement (CRR) at 22.5 percent, and retain Liquidity \nRatio at 30 percent to address both growth and macroeconomic \nconcerns. \n \n21 \n \n3. BALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \nThe data available at the March MPC meeting revealed a \ndeteriorated situation of the financial system stability in Nigeria \nwith capital adequacy ratio of 13.36 percent; NPLs of 13.59 \npercent; and liquidity ratio of 46.61 percent all lower than the last \nmonth‟s figures depicting poor performance of the Nigerian \nfinancial sector. The „‟big elephant in the room‟‟ is the foreign \nexchange rate in the market. Ordinarily, the parallel/black foreign \nexchange market is where the forces of demand and supply \ndetermine the exchange rate. However, in Nigeria, the black \nmarket which constitutes only about 5% of the total size of the \nforeign exchange market is the most quoted. The black foreign \nexchange market has been a threat to the stability of the Naira \nexchange rate particularly at BDC‟s. Evidence shows that the \nexchange rate for the Naira to the dollar has stabilised around \nN305-N307 for the months of February and greater part of March \n2017 at the interbank rate. However, the black markets have been \nwitnessing price discoveries ranging from N445-N 505 between the \nsame period. The parallel market in Nigeria is seen as the 5% \n„‟noisy market‟‟ because even at the official level, the \nstakeholders quote black market rate as the most realistic rate. \nThe rate is not determined by the forces of demand and supply \nand that is why the value of the naira was undervalued to date. \nThis has created instability in both the foreign exchange market \nand prices in the commodity market leading to inflationary \npressures in the economy. The black market rate does not reflect \n22 \n \nany market mechanism as the naira is currently undervalued \nleading to distortion thereby affecting growth and encouraging \nround tripping. However, in Nigeria, the stakeholders continue to \naccept the black market rate as the naira exchange rate \nbetween the dollar and the naira. The formalisation of the market \nwould appreciably facilitate the channelling of available foreign \nexchange to productive sectors of the economy as well as \npromoting price stability in the economy. The black market rate \nand the depreciation of the naira have indeed distorted price \nstability and economic growth. \nTo achieve this, there is need or it is expected to trace the \nhistorical development of the foreign exchange market in Nigeria. \nThe pertinent questions are: Who are the economic agents that \npatronise the market? What role had the 1995 Foreign exchange \nmanagement Act played in promoting the black market? Is there \nneed to repeal the act? What has been the role of the black \nmarket \nin \npromoting \nand \nfacilitating \ncross-border \ntrade \nparticularly in the Eastern sub-region of West Africa including \nNigeria and her immediate neighbours? How is price determined \nin the black market? How can the black market be reduced to its \nbarest minimum to facilitate release of foreign exchange for \nproductive purposes and also to stabilise the economy? To answer \nthese questions, it is important to trace the origin of black forex \nmarket in Nigeria. \n The black market in Nigeria began operating largely after Nigeria \nmoved from the pound sterling era which was convertible to a \n23 \n \nnon-convertible currency (i.e. the naira) during the civil war. This \nled to some documentation which was introduced in order to \nallocate the foreign exchange. Those who could not access the \nforeign exchange began to create their own market. The major \ncustomers or clients are cross-border traders, students and parents \nfor BTA and oversea school fees, medical tourism settlements, and \nthose who want to avoid documentation. Today the exchange \nrate in the black market is usually not determined by the \ninteraction of the forces of demand and supply but by order that \ncontrol huge amount of “unearned income.” The CBN can help \ncreate a market to take care of the customers of black market \nwhere there are price discoveries. For the market to be effective, \nthe CBN should fund the window effectively by also reducing the \nlevel of documentation to create confidence and credibility in \nthe market. In managing the foreign exchange rate, there is need \nto re-examine the role of the BDCs in exchange rate \nmanagement in the economy. This will help achieve price stability. \nIf exchange rate is stable, it would boost growth. It should be \nnoted that depreciation of the naira affects inflation and that \ninflation hurts growth and promotes poverty in the economy. \nMonetary policy can assist in regulating inflation partly through \nmanaging the exchange rate. The pathway to price stability \nwhich is conducive to growth is necessary. Since partly inflation \nhas been triggered by exchange rate volatility, rising level of \nM1,and other structural factors like increase in the price of \nPMS,AGO, and LNG, Electricity tariffs, the CRR should not be \n24 \n \nreleased into the economy through the back door due to its \ninflationary effect. Adjustment is needed in the management of \nthe economy. At the international level, hike in interest rates in the \nUS, uncertainty in the oil market and increasing level of \nprotectionist policies by major trading partners will impact on the \neconomy. The challenges at the domestic level include the \nfollowing: \noutput \ncontraction, \nweakening \nfinancial \nsystem \nindicators, increased demand pressure in the foreign exchange \nmarket and external uncertainties and possible capital flight due \nto hike in interest rates at the international market. However, the \nrecession is backtracking; inflation has shown some slowdown for \nthe month of February 2017. The balance sheet of the CBN needs \nto be appropriated and this requires that the ways and means of \nfunding government should be resisted to safe guard the \neconomy. Given the above scenario to protect the economy, i \nproposed to hold and allow the operation of the previous actions \nsuch as new FX policy, to support output growth and to bring \ndown the ratio of NPLs closer to the prudential threshold. \nI therefore vote to hold the following: \ni. Retain the MPR at 14 per cent ; \nii. Retain the CRR at 22.5 per cent; \niii. Retain the Liquidity ratio at 30 per cent ; and \niv. Retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR. \n \n25 \n \n4. BARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nOne of the key resolutions in the last meeting was the imperative \nof improving the condition in the foreign exchange market \nparticularly in narrowing the premium between the interbank and \nthe BDCs markets. A giant stride has been taken in this regard \nthrough the new foreign exchange policies which makes provision \nfor the funding of certain excluded activities from the interbank \nmarket. These measures have fairly eased the pressure in the \nmarkets and I think it is worth commending. Equally impressive is \nthe gradual reduction in the imbalances of the external sector as \nthe current account of the balance of payment recorded a \nsurplus in the latter half of 2016 as against trade deficit of the \npreceding two halves. Although inflation is still elevated, it is \nsomehow comforting that a downward trend was recorded in \nFebruary relative to the upward trend that persisted in fiscal 2016. \nThese positive developments notwithstanding, the well-known \nchallenges are still lingering. The softness in output has not shown \nany noticeable improvement while the pressure in the foreign \nexchange market is still relatively elevated. The risks in the global \nenvironment have equally shown no sign of waning. The new \nadministration in the US continues to forge ahead with its \nprotectionism and nationalism policies as major EMEs countries \ncontinue to grapple with different kinds of challenges such as \ngeo-political strife even as an array of non-economic factors \ncontinue to pull a drag on growth prospects in many regions. On \n26 \n \nthe whole, the balance of risks appears to skew domestic growth \ndownward but my vote is to hold at this meeting, mainly informed \nby the need to maintain the prevailing tight stance of monetary \npolicy which is germane to sustaining the modest gain in the \nforeign exchange market and by extension, the stability in the \noverall macroeconomic environment \nPressure Points \nGlobal Environment \nBased on the latest projection of the IMF, global economy would \nexpand by 3.4 percent in 2017, representing substantial \nimprovement over the less than satisfactory outturn of 2016. The \nprojection equally suggests a steady recovery in the global \neconomy after the slump of about three years ago due majorly to \nrecession in Euro area. In my view, I may subscribe to the likelihood \nof improved global economic activities in 2017 but I hold a great \ndeal of reservation about the magnitude of expansion as currently \nprojected. My view is hinged on the ground that there has been \nno significant alteration to the risk matrix in the global environment \nsince the latter half of 2016 rather a little more complication has \nevolved. Among others, the new administration in the US \ncontinues to show unwavering commitment to its protectionism \nand nationalistic polices. With the spate of executive orders on \ntravel ban in recent times and the attendant rising global \nresentment, it is without doubt that I submit that the world may \nneed to contend with a new challenge relating to immigration, \n27 \n \nrefugees, and increased social tension with potential negative \nspillover to global trade. Besides, most EMEs are still grappling with \nquite a number of non-economic challenges, including geo-\npolitical conflict in the Middle East. For me, the current global \ngrowth projection seems not to have captured these risks and \ntherefore appears highly vulnerable to downward revision. When \nthese issues are put in context, it is much likely that the external \nsector of the domestic economy may still face considerable \npressure. \nAnother major issue in the global arena is the financial market \ncondition with particular reference to the strengthening US dollar. \nThe new trend in the value of the dollar would be much more \nbolstered by the anticipated stance of the US Fed‟s policy in the \nnear to medium term. The short term interest rate was increased \nby 0.25 points by the US Fed in December 2016 and \ncomplemented by another increase at their last week‟s meeting. \nThe increase was not much of a surprise to me but an unusual \ndimension to the process was the uncommon consensus over the \ndecision as some avowed dovish members dramatically turned \nhawkish. This phenomenon, on its own, is a strong signal to the \nmarket which is a likelihood of additional two or three hikes in the \ncurrent year. My view is informed by the body language of most \nmembers, suggesting that a one-time hike is not enough to \nstabilize the dual variables of inflation and unemployment around \ntheir long run trend. Besides, there is another compelling reason \nwhich is the strong desire to revert to normal monetary policy. The \n28 \n \ncurrent Fed Balance sheet of over US$4 trillion is excessively out of \nnormal and most officials have expressed strong concern in \nrespect of this. Certainly, the current level of policy rates, even \nwith the current increase, is not enough to contract the balance \nsheet to the normal size. In light of these anticipated \ndevelopments, the US dollar may consistently strengthen over \nmajor currencies particularly the EMEs currencies. These \ndevelopments point to the fact that recent improvement in the \nexternal sector of the domestic economy particularly the \nimprovement in accretion to external reserves require maximum \nprotection. \nDomestic Environment \nA number of positive developments have been observed in the \ndomestic environment but the medium term outlook is still fraught \nwith some risk factors, notably, the following. \nInflation Risk: Headline inflation at 17.3 percent in February 2017 \nrepresents a deceleration in contrast to consistent upward trend \nwhich prevailed through the entire 2016. This, to some extent, \ncould be interpreted as the commencement of a downward \ntrend but I am of the view that the seeming improvement should \nbe celebrated cautiously. This is based on the fact that the month-\non-month inflation still showed semblance of acceleration as at \nFebruary, suggesting that the year-on-year deceleration was due \nto base effect. A month-on-month increase in inflation is indicative \nof \npersisting \nunderlying \npressure \nwith \nthe \nonly \nplausible \n29 \n \nexplanation being the dynamics of the exchange rate, given that \nthis is the only variable that has been less stable in recent times. \nThe concern here is that in as much as actual depreciation of the \nNaira would trigger inflation pressure, the expectation of \neconomic agents in terms of the ability of the Bank to maintain \nstability in the exchange rate could act faster on inflation \ndynamics than the actual movements in exchange rate. To say \nthe least, the confidence of economic agents in the ability of the \nBank to maintain the current exchange rate is still at the lowest \nebb. \nPossible Resumption of Pressure in the Foreign Exchange Market: \nAs noted above, the pressure in the foreign market has eased \nconsiderably with the margin between the two markets narrowing \nto about 29 percent from as high as 60 percent. Although the \nnew trend is a significant milestone, the margin is still high with the \nlikelihood of getting higher if not well managed. A likely risk factor \nis the evolving stance of the US Fed which would significantly \nincrease the flow of capital to the US to the detriment of most \nemerging economies. Presently, the US dollar has commenced a \nrising trend against most currencies with little regards to countries \nor regions as notable currencies like Euro and Pound Sterling are \nfalling relative to the US dollar. With respect to Nigeria, the recent \nmeasures by the CBN may ease pressure on the dollar from the \nperspective of reduction in transaction demand but the demand \nfor dollar as a store of value could still show considerable \n30 \n \nelevation in view of the new direction of monetary policy in the \nUS. \nReduced Banking Sector Resilience: The banking sector has been \nextremely challenged by a number of risk factors which are not \nlikely to diminish in the near term. The benchmark interest rate has \nbeen fairly high for a relatively long period and this, invariably, has \nstarted taking its toll in the asset quality of the banking system. \nBesides, the rapid depreciation in domestic currency has \ntriggered another risk in terms of currency mismatch as a number \nof domestic firms with foreign currency denominated liabilities find \nit increasingly challenging to meet their repayment obligations. \nAnother major issue is the huge indebtedness of the public sector. \nRecently, the electricity distribution companies (DISCOs) have \nraised alarm about the rising rate of default, most especially from \nthe public sectors as most government agencies are owing the \nDISCOs. This has equally affected the ability of these companies to \nmeet their contractual obligations to numerous contractors who in \nturn depend on the banking sector. The cumulative effect of \nthese issues is reduction in resilience and increase in vulnerability \nof the banking sector. \nWay Forward \nSustain Liquidity in the Forex Market: One important parameter \nthat determines the direction of price in the foreign exchange \nmarket is the level of confidence by economic agents, which in \nturn depends critically on the level of liquidity in the market. The \n31 \n \nBank has recorded significant progress in the last one month with \nthe rates in the two markets moving towards convergence zone. \nThis has been possible on account of increased funding of the \ninterbank market as well as the re-admission of certain activities \nfor eligibility in the interbank market. Any event that leads to \nreduction in the level of liquidity support for the interbank market \ncould be wrongly construed by economic agents as lack of \ncapacity on the part of the Bank to meet the demand in the \nmarket with severe consequence of erosion in the level of \nconfidence. As such, appropriate framework should be in place \nto ensure timely intervention in the market in order to eliminate \nundue friction from insufficient liquidity. \nMaintain the Current Tight Monetary Policy Stance: It is remarkable \nthat monetary policy has started recording some gains notably in \nthe areas of slight moderation in inflation and modest rally in the \nexchange rate. It is fairly obvious that these indicators are still far \nfrom the comfort zone and thus the key issue at this meeting is not \njust sustaining the gain but to improve on them. This could only be \nachieved by striking the relevant balance with the issues in both \nthe domestic and global environments. The issues in the domestic \neconomy are threefold, namely, output stimulation, exchange \nrate stability and moderation in inflation. Based on the structure of \ndomestic economy, exchange rate stability is critical to both \noutput stimulation and inflation control. If stability of the exchange \nrate is paramount, then easing of monetary policy stance could \nbe counter-productive as some arbitrage outlets would be \n32 \n \ncreated in the financial markets. In other words, economic agents \ncan borrow cheaply in the domestic money markets and invest \nsuch fund in the foreign exchange market, heightening the \npressure in that market. Furthermore, exchange rate stability is \nequally dependent on the level of capital flow. In the light of the \nfact that the effect of globalization on monetary policy is being \nstrengthened on daily basis and viewed within the prism of the \nfamous concept of Trilemma which posits that the three variables \nof capital account liberalization, domestic interest rate, and \nexchange rate stability could not be held by domestic monetary \nauthority simultaneously, I think it would be in order, under our \npresent circumstances, to allow interest rate to move in tandem \nwith developments in the global economy. This would logically \nrequire an increase in the MPR but in order to strike a balance \nbetween output concern and financial sector stability, I would \nprefer that the current level of the policy rate be maintained. \nStrengthen Prudential Measures in the Banking Sector: A number \nof issues such as the elevated interest rates have increased \nvulnerability and reduced resilience in the banking sector. In as \nmuch as easing monetary policy stance does not appear a \ndesirable option at the moment, measures need to be taken to \novercome some of the anticipated negative consequences. \nApart from pressure on banking system stability through elevated \ninterest rate, other issues in the global environment constitute \nsignificant challenges. One major evolving source is currency \nmismatch. As such, I would strongly advocate for increased \n33 \n \nregulatory surveillance on the banking sector. Special attention \nneeds to be paid to issues bordering on risk of currency mismatch \nas well as loan concentration particularly in weak and vulnerable \nsectors. \nDecision \nConcern for the lingering softness in output as well as reduction in \nresilience of the banking sector probably suggest reduction in the \npolicy rate while the issues of inflation and exchange rate may \ndemand increase in the policy rate. To strike a balance, I would \nopt for retention of the Monetary Policy Rate at the subsisting 14 \nper cent as well as other monetary policy measures currently in \nplace. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n34 \n \n5. GARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nContext \nThe MPC held after a fruitful MPC retreat in which for the first time, \nmembers of the MPC met with Ministers of the key Economic \nMinistries (Budget and Planning, Finance and Trade and \nInvestment). I believe we agreed on the principles for fiscal-\nmonetary policy coordination: humility, sincerity and integrity. I \nalso believe it was clear to us that monetary, fiscal and prudential \npolicies are organically linked and that there are grave dangers of \ncostly policy errors if we act as if they were independent. Finally, I \nbelieve that we recognized that a pathway to price stability with \ngrowth and employment is a medium to long term one and \nsuccess depends on pathways to fiscal prudence and sustained \nfinancial system stability. \nA historical analysis of the data and national experiences of \nrecurring recessions and stagflation makes it clear that a return to \nprice stability and growth takes several quarters and that a return \nto “normal employment targets” takes even longer. Further, the \ncosts of adjustments depend on the timeliness and effectiveness \nof fiscal and prudential policies. Economic history teaches us that \neffective policy coordination minimizes the response lag and the \nassociated costs. \nThe mandates of the MPC since 2007 remains to: (a) ensure \nmonetary and price stability; (b) issue legal tender currency in \nNigeria; (c) maintain external reserves to safeguard \nthe \n35 \n \ninternational value of the legal tender currency; (d) promote a \nsound financial system in Nigeria; and (e) Act as banker and \nprovide \neconomic \nand \nfinancial \nadvice \nto \nthe \nFederal \nGovernment. Unless these are changed, confidence in Nigeria‟s \nmacroeconomic management could not be restored if monetary \npolicy \nis \ndetached \nfrom \nthe \nenabling \nlegislations \nto \naccommodate incompatible levels of expansions in spending and \nbalance \nsheets. \nConversely, \nthe \nconfidence \nin \nNigeria‟s \nmacroeconomic management would be much enhanced if fiscal \npolicy is strongly rooted in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and \na pathway to fiscal prudence and discipline and effectiveness is \nfound in the shortest possible time. \nThe current national and global challenges are significant enough \nto warrant greater attention to enabling legislations and the \nunfolding global political economy. How the global political \neconomy continually affects the economy as well as expectations \nabout how it will evolve influences Nigeria‟s policy options –fiscal, \nmonetary and prudential. Macroeconomic management has to \ncontend with (i) four quarters of negative growth; (ii) price inflation \nthat is more than twice above the upper bound of the target of 6-\n9%, (iii) exchange rate pressures, (iv) AMCON liquidity, “liquidity-\nmop- up liquidity (each round of tightening expands liquidity by \nthe rate of returns on treasury bills) and “monetization liquidity”; (v) \ndestabilizing effects of “FAAC Effects” on the call money and \nopen buy back rates and (vi) fiscal challenges: efficiency and \neffectiveness, growing public debt and its financing implications \n36 \n \nfor structure of expenditure (debt service is crowding-out non-\ndebt expenditure) and (vii) current account deficit. \nIt is important particularly given the expansion in the Consolidated \nBalance sheets of the financial system to significantly limit the \n“noisy liquidity” particularly, the monetization of oil revenue and \nother fiscal liquidity. I believe there is consensus on the right \nstrategies and the macroeconomic benefits particularly with \nregards to enhancing confidence in the macroeconomic \nmanagement and prudential policy of the monetary and fiscal \nauthorities. \nThe global outlook remains tenuous. The crystallization of “Brexit \neffects”, “Trump-win effects” and the unfolding “discontent votes” \nacross the world and the mavericks they are turning up are more \nlikely to heighten uncertainties as well as political and economic \nrisks worldwide. Already, the rising interest rates in the United States \nand rise in global inflation may cause an expansion in deflationary \npolicies (more central banks raising rates). Higher US rates may \nstrengthen the US$ and alter financial flows further in favour of the \nUS. Monetary policy pivoted on portfolio flows is not realistic. \nNeither is it appropriate. There is a greater chance of attracting \nflows through the appropriate incentives for our nationals that \nhave surpluses to remit back home. However, beyond attracting \nthe flows, the issue of appropriate use of such flows is important. It \nis wasteful to use them for consumption or to create rent for \ncurrency traders. \n37 \n \nUnresolved Issues \nA number of longer term issues which remain unresolved that \nneed urgent resolution to enhance policy efficiency and \neffectiveness include (a) the lack of forward looking medium to \nlong term strategic macroeconomic management framework for \nNigeria as the context for policy analysis and choice; (b) the \ncontinuing malfunctions in the credit market which tends to \nallocate credit to sectors with traditionally high NPLs and low \noutput and employment elasticities as well as a tendency to \nrestrict access and to charge maximum rates on credit to sectors \nand economic agents with traditionally lower NPLs and higher \noutput and employment elasticities; (c) the conversion of rent \nhavens in both the real and financial sectors to efficiency and \neffectiveness centres; (d) a shift from a present hedonistic \norientation to a longer term commonwealth-oriented perspective; \nand (e) the elimination of strategic vacuums for policy analysis \nand choice that increase costs of policy failures. \nThere is also the debate about (a) what level of inflation is good \nfor the economy (the threshold debate); (b) what cost can the \neconomy bear to pursue deflationary policies (the sacrifice ratio \ndebate) and (c) whether inflation is caused by monetary or \nstructural factors. \nI see inflation as a problem of rising prices because of its effects on \nrelative prices, income, aggregate demand and aggregate \nsupply even if it is a one period change. Therefore, it is desirable \nthat inflation is kept as low and as infrequent as possible. The \n38 \n \ntarget of 6-9% remains the target for monetary policy and it is \nimportant to have a clear path to price stability. I also am \nconvinced based on discussions at the retreat that a pathway to \nprice stability passes through the pathway to fiscal prudence, \nefficiency and effectiveness as well as a sustainable pathway to \nfinancial system stability. \nThe pursuit of deflationary policy has negative real effects which \nhas crystalized into the negative growth in 2016. The data is clear \nthat the economic slow-down began many quarters before \n2016:Q1. Even before then, unemployment had been increasing \neven before the aggregate economic slow-down because \nindustry and other real sectors particularly construction and oil \nand Gas had slowed long before the recession began. Part of the \nslow-down is accounted for by private and public dis-savings and \nthe effects of the dis-savings on growth in “available capital \nstock”. The decline in public and private income and savings has \nhad long-term adverse effects on capital accumulation. The \nadverse effects are visible in the degeneration in the quality and \nquantity of public infrastructures and private capital. Such \ndegenerations \nhave \ndire \nconsequences \nfor \ninvestment, \nemployment, growth and macroeconomic stability. \nA careful analysis of the data on inflation, monetary survey and \nreal variables (GDP, unemployment, fiscal and external balances) \nusing macroeconomic frames and general equilibrium frames will \ncaution against categorical statements such as: (i) inflation is \n39 \n \nalways a monetary phenomenon or (ii) inflation is purely a \nstructural phenomenon in Nigeria. \nI believe based on historical evidence that both categorical \nstatements are false and misleading! The historical data and its \nanalysis show that monetary and structural factors affect inflation \nin Nigeria but not always in equal proportion at all times. The \nstructural factors work mostly on the supply-side. Yet, since 2015, \nwe have seen moderating structural effects on the demand side \nwith the non-payment or delayed payments of the salaries of \nmany civil and public employees. Despite the forced dis-savings \nand borrowing, expenditure adjustments have been necessitated \nby the uncertainties in income flows and the budget effects of \ninflation. Thus, the repression of demand is having a moderating \neffects on inflation (with adverse welfare consequences) while the \nleftward shifts in real supply caused by the cost push effects of \nexchange rate depreciation on production costs and supply \nprices is driving prices up and driving down investments, growth \nand employment. It is obvious that the cost effects have been \nstronger than the repressed demand effects. \nA plot of monthly M1 and monthly inflation rate with appropriate \nbase, one observes a high co-variation between December 2012 \nand October 2015 (fairly flat) and between November 2015 and \nFebruary 2017 (significantly positive growth of 62% (M1) and 99% \n(Inflation rate). Clearly, it would be unwise to discount the data \nand argue without empirical foundation that a rapid expansion in \nM1 is not inflationary especially when output and employment are \n40 \n \nreceding and when the economy faces exchange rate pressures; \ntwin deficits (fiscal and current account), rising public debt \nproblem and is proposing a highly leveraged expansionary fiscal \nspending. \nAs the monetary and fiscal authorities consolidate on the \nfoundations laid at the retreat, it would become clearer to both \nsides that “capping the growth of money supply and eliminating \nprice and allocative efficiencies of the extant foreign exchange \nmechanisms are critical to the success of monetary policy in 2017 \nand indeed; to the overall health of the economy.” Also, that \nagreeing on clear paths to fiscal prudence, discipline, efficiency \nand effectiveness is foundational in building a growth path that \ncreates decent jobs and good value-additions for Nigeria and \nNigerians. It is also important to learn the right lessons from the \nthree \nmetaphors: \n“medical \ndiagnostic”, \n“tapeworm” \nand \n“recovering addict”. \nDecision \nI vote to hold. As in my previous votes to hold at MPC meetings in \nNovember 2016 and January 2017, I considered voting for \nloosening the monetary policy stance to ensure that monetary \npolicy is consistent and credible: an expansion in money supply \nshould always be followed by reduction in the MPR and vice \nversa. However, voting to hold is based on the consensus to work \nout a clear path to price stability conducive to growth which is the \ngoal of MPC consistent with its mandate. \n41 \n \nThe path requires a cap on money supply, a resolution of the \n“AMCON liquidity” problem, a reduction in “mop-up liquidity” and \nend to monetization of the crude export income as well as \nmoderation of “FAAC effects” on the stability of Call rate and \nOBB. A rules-based option to money supply growth and indeed to \nexchange rate determination is compatible with a rules-based \nfiscal policy envisaged in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007. I \nremain “convinced that a cap on the growth of money supply \nwould free monetary policy to be more effective. It would help to \nlimit the costly mop-ups that generate excessive rise in interest \nrates, create new liquidity proportionate to the interest rate, \nreduce the pressures on the domestic and international value of \nthe Naira and minimize the negative effects of exchange rate \nvolatility on real activities and on financial system stability. \nI am also convinced of a need to harness and put to effective use \nthe best Nigerian minds and talents in the analysis of national and \nglobal political economy from a diverse set of perspectives and \nskills sets to arrive at the best dynamic strategic context for \nmacroeconomic management in Nigeria compatible with our \nnational aspirations. \n \n \n \n \n42 \n \n6. NNANNA, OKWU JOSEPH \nMacroeconomic developments in 2016 and during the first quarter \nof 2017 were generally fragile. In Nigeria, the fragility was caused \nby both external and internal economic headwinds, of which the \ndecline in commodity price, fiscal drag and foreign exchange \nilliquidity were the major contributing factors. \nGlobal growth was revised upwards by the International Monetary \nFund (IMF), from 3.1 percent in 2016 to 3.4 percent in 2017; despite \nthe downside risks of Brexit uncertainties and the USA protectionist \npolicy stance. \nOverall, it is expected that the global economy will, all things \nbeing equal, leverage on the anticipated near-term fiscal stimulus \nin the advanced market economies and the marginal recovery in \ncommodity prices. However, global growth was projected to \nremain largely asymmetrical in the short-term in the advanced, \nemerging and frontier economies in 2017. \nAt the home front, macroeconomic development has started \nshowing positive signs, as the deep decline in output growth of -\n2.24 percent in Quarter Three has slightly improved to -1.30 \npercent in Quarter Four of 2016. Similarly, inflation has also \ndeclined to 17.8 percent, in February 2017, from 18.72 percent in \nJanuary. \nFiscal surprises have continued to undermine the effectiveness of \nmonetary policy, to wit, the economy is yet to witness an effective \n43 \n \ncoordination of fiscal, monetary and structural policies that will \ndrive sustainable non-inflationary growth. \nEmpirical studies have confirmed that the pass through effect of \nexchange rate depreciation on domestic price level is very severe \nand disproportionate. Consequently, the need to bring stability in \nthe foreign exchange market cannot be overemphasized. The FX \nmarket is in need of liquidity, while a call for fiscal consolidation \nmay not be politically appealing during the period of deep \nrecession, nevertheless, monetary financing of the twin deficits, will \nnot produce the desired quick fix; in the absence of \ncomplimentary structural reforms and targeted expenditure \naimed at addressing the palpable infrastructure deficits. We are \noptimistic that the Nigerian economy shall surely rebound with \nproper coordination of fiscal, monetary and structural policies, in \n2017. \n \nConclusion \nAgainst this backdrop, I voted to: \n1) Retain the MPR at 14.0 percent \n2) Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent \n3) Retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent and, \n4) Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR \n \n44 \n \n7. SALAMI, ADEDOYIN \nThis meeting comes in the wake of publication of our national \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and on the eve of \npublication of the IMF‟s report in respect of its Article IV \nConsultation earlier in the year. This meeting was preceded by a \nretreat at which MPC members and other stakeholders reflected \non the possible role of Monetary Policy in resolving challenges \nfacing the Nigerian economy. \nAt the end of the meeting, I voted in a minority to raise interest \nrates. In voting as I did, I am clear in mind that it is time to tighten \nMonetary Policy. The following reasons which I will discuss shortly \ninform my view: (i) loose policy which we had pursued had \nyielded only higher prices and shrinking output; (ii) the adverse \nimpact of inflation on the most vulnerable should not continue to \nbe ignored; (iii) the threshold beyond which rising prices lead to \nshrinking output has been exceeded. \nAhead of discussing the reasons which guided my vote, it is \npertinent to emphasise the attention which the MPC, in its \ncommunique, drew to the declining resilience of the Banking \nSector. I have in many of my personal statements expressed \nunease about the Banking Sector. The Report provided by Bank \nStaff at this meeting did little to assuage my unease. Non-\nPerforming Loan Ratio (NPL) which had dropped from 13.24 per \ncent in Sept., 2016 to 12.80 per cent in December 2016 rose to \n13.59 per cent in February 2017. This, as we know significantly \n45 \n \nexceed the regulatory maximum of 5 per cent. Whilst Bank Staff \nassure that when adjustment is made for „3 Outlier Banks‟ the size \nof NPL ratio drops to 7.45 per cent, I remain unease especially \nwhen anecdotal evidence suggests that the figures provided by \nthe banks are likely to be understatements and we also note that \nthis is an industry with extensive customer overlaps which heighten \nadverse network or contagion possibilities. \nReturning to my vote, my assertion that the stance of Monetary \nPolicy \nhad \neased \nconsiderably \nmay \nappear \nto \nbe \ncounterintuitive. After all, the MPC tightened monetary policy by \nraising the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), on two occasions, from 11 \nper cent in November 2015 to 14 per cent in July 2016 where it has \nremained since. As I have noted in a previous MPC Statement, \ndespite higher MPR, transactions liquidity or the narrow definition \nof Money Supply (M1) rose from N6.9trn to N11.3trn in the same \nperiod even though output growth was rapidly weakening. \nThe seeming satisfaction with slower rate of price increase needs, \nin my opinion, to be tempered with a dose of caution. Yes the \ndata shows that adjusting for seasonality, overall inflation in Feb. \nslowed to 17.78 per cent compare with 18.72 per cent and 18.55 \nper cent in January 2017 and December 2016 respectively. The \nslowdown in February being the 1st in more than a year! Better still, \nlike aggregate inflation, Core inflation also slowed to 16.01 per \ncent from 17.87 per cent in the previous month, Food inflation \nhowever continued to rise. In Feb., 2017, food prices rose by 18.53 \nwhen compare with the same period in the previous year. \n46 \n \nInflation data however requires reflective interpretation. The \nimprovements signalled by seasonally adjusted inflation are \ndisputed by data which shows that between January and \nFebruary, prices increased by 1.49 per cent – the highest such rise \nbetween two months since June 2016. Some would argue, with \njustification, that recent developments – measured by the month-\non-month values – deserve greater attention. Indeed, by this \nmeasure, all three measures of inflation – aggregate, core and \nfood - continue to increase sharply. What we are seeing in the \nyear-on-year data is the impact of base effects. Left unattended, \nthe month-on-month data already points to heightened inflation \nin 2018!! \nStaff forecasts also don‟t provide much room for comfort. Whilst \nthe 6mth ahead forecast show Core inflation declining to 12.8 per \ncent in August 2017, both aggregate and food inflation will remain \nabove 16 per cent. \nWhile Economics is clear that low-to-moderate inflation can and \ndoes stimulate output, it is just as unambiguous that there exists a \nlevel, different across countries, beyond which inflation is harmful \nto output. When inflation adversely affects production, its effect is \nfelt in the form of rising unemployment. For Nigeria, various studies \nhave sought to establish the threshold beyond which rising \ninflation adversely affects output. The most recent exercise with \nwhich I am familiar was undertaken by Dr. Sanni Doguwa, \npreviously of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in 2012. He estimates that \n47 \n \nbeyond 12 per cent, the effect of inflation serves to reduce \noutput. We are clearly beyond this threshold. \nFor me, inflation, at these levels, continues to worsen socio-\neconomic conditions as it erodes the value of income especially \nfor the vulnerable. The N18,000 minimum wage announced in the \nrun-up to the 2011 General Election, is now worth N9,000 when \nadjusted for the impact of inflation. Real families and people, least \nable to protect themselves, continue to be impoverished by rising \ninflation. In other words, by undermining purchasing power of \nincome, rising prices emasculates and kills the dreams of fellow \ncitizens. Given the need for social cohesion, this challenge to \nmoderate inflation is not to be ignored. \nBased on the foregoing, I cast my vote to tighten monetary policy \nby increasing interest rates and hoping that colleagues on the \nmanagement of the Central Bank will resist pressure to continue to \nexpand liquidity as has happened in the recent past. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n48 \n \n8. UCHE, CHIBUIKE U \nDuring the MPC meeting, it was refreshing to note that inflation \nhad started to inch slowly downwards. Although this is cheering \nnews, I still think that we are not out of the woods yet. My position \nis in part based on the fact that the 2017 budget is yet to be \npassed. Government‟s current fiscal policies have also further \ncomplicated the problem. \n \nGovernment borrowing to supplement dwindling oil rents, has \ncontinued unabated. What is however less clear is whether \nindeed these new loans are being applied to develop productive \nassets and from which cash flows such debts will be repaid in \nfuture. The result is that the sustainability of Nigeria‟s mounting \ndebts is increasingly being questioned. The growing agitation for \nsalary increases across the entire country can only help to \ncomplicate the above scenario. It is also obvious that the \ncontentious issue of petroleum subsidy reform is yet to be laid to \nrest. It is a shame that we seem to have learnt nothing from history. \n \nEqually troubling is the diverse impact of the current economic \nrecession on the various sectors of our economy. In this direction, \nthe banking sector has consistently been of concern to MPC. \nBanks are important because not only do they play an important \nrole in the diverse sectors of our economy, they are, if well \nregulated, also a good barometer for measuring the general \nhealth of our economy. This is because banks are primarily \n49 \n \nfinancial intermediaries that intermediate between surplus and \ndeficit units of the economy. The health of the banking sector, at \nleast in the long run, is usually entwined with the health of the \nentire economy. \n \nGiven the current economic situation in the country, it is perhaps \nnot surprising that there is need for the CBN to continue to closely \nmonitor these banks. The fact that the NPL ratio for the Nigerian \nbanking system is already above the threshold of 5 percent and \nrising in my view limits the choices MPC can boldly make. It is for \ninstance, difficult for MPC to recommend monetary policy \ntightening at the present stage. This is because such a move will \nimpact negatively on our fragile banking system. \n \nThe impact of any such increase to the manufacturing sector will \nalso be negative. Admittedly, high interest rates is only one of the \nnumerous challenges the sector is facing. Without addressing our \ncountry‟s huge infrastructure deficit, governance challenges, \nmultiple taxation and inconsistent industrial policies, the terrain \nahead for our industrial sector will remain difficult. \n \nI am also aware that the dwindling oil revenues has also put the \nCBN under pressure to shore up its reserves. A popular argument is \nthat such reserves will be needed to protect the value of our \ncurrency. A tempting but dangerous strategy for achieving the \nabove objective is to raise MPR so as to make our country more \n50 \n \ncompetitive in its bid to attract foreign portfolio flows. Like in every \ncoin, financial flows have two sides: inflows and outflows. While \ninflows can help ameliorate foreign exchange difficulties in the \nshort \nrun, \none \nmust \nthink \nabout \nthe \nforeign \nexchange \ndenominated cash flows that will help facilitate the outflows \n(which will include interests). It is because of the above that I have \nalways advocated that at our stage of development, we should \nonly allow foreign capital inflows that are tied to productive \nassets. Unless we do this, we will simply be encouraging the inflow \nof speculative capital. Our shallow capital and money market \nmake us an excellent destination for such speculative capital. \n \nThe reality is that we cannot be able to defend the value of our \ncurrency in any sustainable manner if we continue to depend on \noil rents. Unfortunately, I am not convinced that there is a credible \nplan in place to change our oil rent dependence trajectory. It \nappears, in my opinion, that hoping for a return to the high oil \nprice days has been prioritized over the need to strategically \ndiversify our mono product oil rent economy. \n \nBased on the above multiple problems and misplaced priorities, \none can fully understand the pressure on the management of the \nCBN to intervene in diverse sectors of our national economy \nincluding paying salaries on behalf government entities some of \nwhich are very poorly run and lack financial transparency. The \nreality however is that there is little the CBN can do in the above \n51 \n \ndirection without either contravening the legal instrument that \nestablished it or flouting national appropriation rules or sabotaging \nits own balance sheet. Perhaps more dangerous is the fact that \nthe action of the CBN can actually undermine its monetary policy \nrole and weaken the efficacy of its monetary policy tools. It is \ntherefore, in my humble opinion, prudent for the CBN to do all \nwithin its power to resist any pressure to intervene in diverse sectors \nof our economy. \n \nAnother CBN practice that I find troubling is the continued \nexistence of multiple exchange rates. While I appreciate the \nargument that such practice are historically not new in Nigeria, it is \nhowever important for us to realize that it is an abnormal and \ndestructive practice. We should therefore do all in our power to \neliminate it. \nIn conclusion, I strongly urge the CBN management and the fiscal \nauthorities to rethink the above issues raised. This will greatly help \nto improve the efficacy of monetary policy in Nigeria. \n \nI therefore vote as follows: \n \n(i) To retain the MPR at 14.00 per cent; (ii) To retain the CRR at22.50 \nper cent; (iii) To retain the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv)To retain the Asymmetric Window at +200 and -500 basis points \naround the MPR. \n \n52 \n \n9. YAHAYA, SHEHU \nI vote to maintain the current monetary stance due to the reasons \nprovided below \nDevelopments in the Global Economy \nThe effects of the new Trump government are still unfolding on the \nworld economic and financial system. GDP growth rate in the US \nhas slowed down in Q4 2016 to 1.9%, bringing GDP annual growth \nrate for 2016 to 1.6% as compared to 2.6% in 2015 and 3.5% in Q3 \n2016. There were also slight declines in output growth rates in UK, \nChina, India, France and Japan. Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa fell \nto less than half the level for 2015. Overall, the world economy \ngrew at 3.1%, slightly lower than 2015. \nExpectations are that growth will pick up a bit in 2017, especially \nwith prospects for a higher growth rate in the US due to \nannounced economic and infrastructure programs and due to \nthe expected tightening of monetary policy which is likely to \nattract substantial investments. On the other hand, the multilateral \nsystem is being weakened; trade protectionism is being promoted \nand competitiveness undermined, especially considering, in \naddition to the pronouncements of President Trump, the \nstatement of the G20 to withdraw full commitment to anti-\nprotectionist measures. These factors may have the opposite \neffect of undermining growth prospects in the global economy. \n53 \n \nEarly signs in the first quarter of this year seem to indicate that \ninflationary pressures in the global economy are likely to be higher \nthan for 2016: The US, EU and UK may experience higher \ninflationary levels than their policy objectives. \nWith respect to oil prices: the prospects are more likely to go in the \ndirection of price weakening in 2017, mainly due to relatively \nlower global growth, possibility of higher output from Iran and \nLibya and higher stock levels. The rising levels of shale oil \nproduction in the US may also put OPEC production cut \nagreements under considerable pressure. \nConsidering the above, global demand for Nigeria‟s exports, \nincluding petroleum exports, may be uncertain, while prospects \nfor imported inflation are higher than for 2016. This calls for greater \nefforts to be made with respect to policy creativity, better \nmedium and long term planning \nThe Domestic Economy \nIt would seem to appear that the current recession is slowly \nbottoming out. GDP fell by 1.3% in Q4 2016 (as compared to a \ndecline of 2.24% in Q3 2016), bringing the annual figure for 2016 to \n-1.5%. Many sectors still recorded negative growth rates. There was \na substantial decline in the output of Petroleum and Natural gas \nof 12.4%. Manufacturing, construction, services, trade and the \nnon-oil sector all experienced negative growth rates. The rate of \ndecline was moderated by a significant increase in agricultural \nproduction of 4%, mainly led by crop production. Solid minerals, \n54 \n \nfinance and insurance and Information & Communication had \npositive growth rates and helped to moderate the rate of GDP \ndecline in Q4. \nIn 2017, there are prospects of gradual recovery as Q1 output of \nPetroleum and natural gas is likely to experience some recovery, \nwhile the policy support being provided to crop production, if \naccompanied by favourable weather conditions, is likely to \nfacilitate continued growth in agriculture sector output, which \naccounts for about one quarter of GDP. \nA big step has been taken by the government to develop the \nmuch awaited medium term plan in the form of the Economic \nRecovery \nand \nGrowth \nProgram \n2017-2020. \nDespite \nsome \nlimitations to the plan and the delay in developing it, and despite \nthe fact that a coherent implementation strategy is yet to be \narticulated, it is still an important positive step and provides a \nbroad framework within which monetary policy can be situated. \nFor the first time in more than one year, headline inflation slightly \ndeclined, year on year to 17.78% in February 2016 (from 18.72% in \nJanuary). Core inflation contributed relatively more to the \ndeceleration in CPI, especially imported food, processed food, \nclothing and footwear, housing, electricity and transport. \nHowever, food prices have gone up, year on year, despite the \nincrease in food crop output. This may be due to seasonal factors. \nThere is an important wrinkle in the story however. The year-on-\nyear fall in CPI is largely attributable to the base effect as the \n55 \n \ncurrent inflationary pressure had commenced in February 2016. \nMonth-on month, the CPI rose by 1.49% in February 2017 as \ncompared to January 2016, an increase which is even higher than \nthat of January 2017 over December 2016. Food inflation rose in \nFebruary, mainly due to the inflationary effect of farm produce. \nCore inflation, month-on-month also rose. This indicates that the \nchallenge of inflationary pressure is still potent. \nThe foreign exchange market was also characterized by a \nnumber of positive developments. The value of the Naira at the \ninter-bank market has remained stable. External reserves also \nincreased significantly to over USD30 billion, a level last achieved \nin Q4 2014. With the recent injections of dollar liquidity into the \nforex market by the CBN and the re-admission of some categories \nof demand into the inter-bank market, the inter-bank/parallel \nmarket rates premium have narrowed significantly. This should \nhave a positive pass-through to help reduce inflationary pressure \nin the coming months. \nMacro-environmental pressures on the financial sector are still \nsignificant. Capital adequacy, liquidity and non-performing loans \nfor the DMBs have all deteriorated. Nevertheless, ROE and ROA \nhave improved as compared to Q4 2016. Total assets and \ndeposits have been fairly resilient, while credit supply has \nincreased by around 2.3% over the last year, even after taking into \naccount the effects of Naira depreciation. The main challenges \nthat need to be addressed by the DMBs relate to loan \nconcentration and NPLs. The monetary authorities are taking the \n56 \n \nnecessary steps to ensure that the challenges are being \nadequately addressed to keep the financial sector healthy. \nAlthough the 2017 budget has not yet been approved, the \ngovernment has reiterated its intention to pursue an expansionary \nfiscal program. This is also encapsulated in the Economic \nRecovery and Growth Program. While this should help to reflate \nthe economy, it will also contribute to expansion of money supply \nand put pressure on price levels. The monetary authorities \nobviously need to pay attention to this issue. \nConclusion and Recommendations \nAs discussed above, there are a number of challenges on the \nNigerian economy emanating from developments in the global \neconomy. Due to the tepid growth rates in most of the major \ntrading partners of the country, there is little to expect in terms of \nincreased demand for Nigerian exports. The prospects for \nnormalization of monetary policy in the US threatens to choke off \nforeign portfolio investments to emerging and developing markets \nand complicate the task of maintaining stability in the foreign \nexchange market. Prices appear to be moving upwards in \nEurope, US and UK, raising the possibility of some imported \ninflation. Yet, oil price recovery may be undermined by increased \noutput and stocks. Everything therefore needs to be done to \nstabilize or increase production in the country in order to \nmoderate the possible effects of weak international oil prices. \n57 \n \nPrice developments in the Nigerian economy will appear to \nsupport a policy of monetary tightening. This is because, despite \nthe slight dip in the CPI in February, the rate of inflation is still too \nhigh- impacting negatively on real incomes, undermining growth \nefforts and business confidence. In addition, month on month \nprices are still rising. \nHowever, this is not the right direction to take at this time. The \ninflationary pressure is essentially emanating from four sources- \nstructural (such as infrastructure deficits); policy induced (such as \nreduction or elimination of subsidies on petroleum price, increase \nin electricity tariffs); Naira depreciation pass-through effect; and, \nliquidity in the economy. \nStructural and policy induced sources are the purview of the fiscal \nauthorities. The exchange rate issue is being tackled by the \nmonetary authorities through the injection of dollars into the \nmarket- which is already succeeding in reducing the margin \nbetween the inter-bank and parallel markets. It would be \nimportant to find a way of stabilising the supply of foreign \nexchange and maintaining a robust level of reserves in the face of \nchallenges to the price of oil. It would be necessary to manage \nthe demand for foreign exchange so as to facilitate access for \nuses which will enhance and support the growth and job creation \nstrategy, since it would be extremely difficult to provide unfettered \naccess to everybody in such an import-dependent economy and \nyet maintain exchange rate stability. Excess liquidity in the \neconomy can be curtailed through better management of ways \n58 \n \nand means advances and rationalizing interventions. We also \nsupport various schemes aimed at providing incentives, through \nthe creative use of Cash Reserve Requirements, to DMBs to give \ngreater support to the more productive sectors of the economy in \nline with the extant medium term plan. These are the areas to \nwhich the efforts to control inflationary pressures should be \ndirected, which can have a much bigger impact than raising the \nMPR, and yet be able to support the growth impetus. \nOn the other hand, much as loosening monetary policy may \nappear to help support growth, it is also not the right thing to do. \nThe \nreasons \nhave \nbeen \nadequately \nexplained \nin \nthe \nCommunique from the MPC meeting and it is not necessary to \nrepeat them here. What is important is to build on the positive \ncollaboration between the monetary and fiscal authorities which \nhas been promoted at the highest level in the last week, maintain \nconstant communication, interaction and collaboration so that \nthe twin objectives of equitable growth and financial stability can \nbe attained. \nI therefore vote to maintain the current policy stance with respect \nto the MPR, corridors, liquidity ratios and CRR, while some \nadditional thinking is being undertaken to find an optimum way of \ndeploying the CRR in such a way as to provide an incentive for \nDMBs to lend a larger proportion of their portfolio to sectors that \nare critical to growth, employment generation and improved \nproductivity. \n59 \n \n10. \nEMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF \nNIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nI note with some reassurance the benign developments in the \nNigerian economy as GDP growth, though still negative, seemed \nto have turned the corner during the last quarter of 2016 while \ninflation, which remained high at double digit, slowed somewhat \nin February 2017. In the same vein, the ongoing tapering premium \nbetween the interbank and the BDC exchange rates, which \nstarted within the last few weeks, is indeed heartening. Barring \nany further adverse global shocks, and if the recent rallying \ncontinues into the future, we expect the prevailing inclement \ndomestic economic conditions to dissipate within the short-term. \nHowever, global macroeconomic outlook remained hazy in the \nnear- to short-term, with escalating uncertainties and elevated \nrisks. Whereas global output growth accelerated by 0.2 \npercentage points to 2.7 percent in 2016q4 vis-à-vis 2016q3, the \nchanging \npolitical \ndynamics \nunderlined \nby \nincreased \nprotectionism, populism and distrust threatens the prospect of a \nfull global recovery. These, in conjunction with volatile commodity \nprices and divergent monetary policy among key advanced \neconomies, are heightening financial market vulnerabilities \nespecially in emerging markets and developing economies. \nRecent data indicate a softening of crude oil prices as Bonny \nlight dropped from US$57.2 per barrel on 21st February 2017 to \nUS$50.7 per barrel as at 21st March 2017. This has implications for \n60 \n \ninflows into the fiscal treasury and the FX reserves even as the \nNigerian economy remains set to exit the recession in 2017. On \ndomestic output, the 1.3 percent contraction in GDP in 2016q4 \nrelative to the 2.1 percent and 2.2 percent contractions in the \npreceding two quarters is a turning point somewhat indicative of \nan impending rebound. With overall GDP growth at -1.5 percent \nfor the entire 2016 vis-à-vis the 2.8 percent recorded in 2015, the \nagriculture GDP exhibited the strongest outturn with a growth rate \nof 4.1 percent in 2016 from 3.7 percent in 2015. Accordingly, the \nNigerian economy remains on track to grow by 0.8 percent in \n2017 and 2.3 percent in 2018 as projected by the IMF. In \nfurtherance, the Nigerian Government, in its newly released \nEconomic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), projects enhanced \ngrowth rate of 7 percent by 2020. To insulate Nigeria‟s recovery \nplan from emerging global dynamics, it remains imperative that \nthe ERGP is assiduously implemented. \nI reiterate once again that Nigeria‟s economic challenges are \nessentially driven by foreign exchange scarcity (due to low crude \noil receipts and inadequately diversified economy), constrained \nfiscal space, high energy prices and depressed domestic \ndemand (partly attributable to sizeable salary arrears owed to \nsome civil servants). These factors, which are largely structural \nand exogenous to monetary policy, permeate the trajectory of \ndomestic prices. Consequently, inflation rate, at double digit, \ncontinued to be high and outside the CBN‟s tolerance range. \nAvailable data on domestic prices indicate a high but slightly \n61 \n \nmoderated inflation outcome as the rate slowed from 18.7 \npercent in January 2017 to 17.8 percent in February 2017; the first \ndecline in 15 months. A breakdown indicates that, during the \nsame period, core inflation declined by 1.9 percentage points to \n16.0 percent while food inflation ascended 0.7 percentage points \nto 18.5 percent. \nThe recent inflationary trend, though largely structural, is \nreinforced by the outcomes of monetary aggregates. Broad \nmoney supply (M2) shrank by 5.7 percent in February 2017 away \nfrom the 10.3 percent expansion targeted for 2017. This was \nunderpinned by the contraction in net domestic credit, which \ndecreased by 1.4 percent as against the programmed growth of \n17.9 percent. Accordingly, the relative tight condition reflected in \nmoney market interest rates which rose from 6.3 percent as at 25 \nJanuary 2017 to 13.1 percent by 28 February 2017. \nAgainst the backdrop of the foregoing, I note that the Nigerian \neconomy may already be on the course of recovery, though \nmuch still needs to be done. I am staunchly of the stance that \nmacroeconomic policies should not just concentrate on short-\nterm goals of overcoming the current challenges; but should \nrather be instituted to correct the structural imbalances that \nundermined the resilience of the economy. In this regards, the \noutlook of the ERGP is a step in the right direction. The monetary \npolicy committee and indeed the CBN will continue to ensure \nthat policy decisions are delicately balanced to support \n62 \n \nGovernment‟s growth objectives without jeopardising price \nstability. \nI note in this respect the need for increased credit to strategic \nprivate sector ventures. In my previous statements, I asserted the \nimperativeness of ensuring that critical funding is directed to \nlabour-intensive high employment elastic real sector ventures. This \nis because the marginal benefit of an extra fund will generate \nmore employment in this sector than in others. With the high \nmarginal propensity to consume in Nigeria, the extra income due \nto the increased employment will boost domestic demand, \nsupport aggregate supply and quicken our exiting the prevailing \nrecession. I therefore continue to enjoin banks to provide credits \nto strategic real sector activities. \nWith respect to decisions at this MPC, I recognise the constraint \nwithin which we operate. We will nonetheless continue to pursue \nour price stability mandate with a renewed vigour at ensuring \nexchange rate stability. Although the heartening outcomes of \nGDP growth and inflation rates as well as the narrowing of the \ninterbank-BDC exchange rate premium could be considered as \narguments for easing the monetary stance. Yet, the fact that \nthese metrics remain outside acceptable levels provides reasons \nfor further tightening. In our decisions, we must position ourselves \nto \nbrace \nimpending \nglobal \nshocks \nboth \npolitically \n(as \nprotectionism and anti-globalisation rhetoric increase) and \neconomically (as the US Fed is poised for another rate hike). \n63 \n \nConjointly with the volatile crude oil price, these will affect FX \ninflows to the country. We must not only mitigate these risks, our \ndecisions must also not distort the wide-ranging recovery of the \nNigerian economy. \nIn consideration of both global and domestic developments, and \ngiven that the effects of the past policy decisions are still \nunfolding, it is my view that the current position is maintained. \nDecisions to adjust any of the policy variables might just be too \nsoon and may destabilise the traverse of economic recovery. \nSuch adjustment, at this time, will be impulsive, detrimental and \nwill lead to indeterminate outcomes. \nBased on the foregoing, I vote to: \n1. Retain the MPR at 14.0 percent; \n2. Retain the CRR at 22.5 percent; \n3. Retain the asymmetric corridor at +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain liquidity ratio at 30.0 percent", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No. 112 of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, March 20 and 21, 2017, with Personal Statement of Members.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/377a4bb337be43d4d985972d63f24959.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "377a4bb337be43d4d985972d63f24959", "text": "1 \n \n \n \n \n \n \nCentral Bank of Nigeria Communiqué No. 106 of the Monetary Policy \nCommittee Meeting of Monday and Tuesday, March 21 and 22, 2016 \nThe Monetary Policy Committee met on 21st and 22nd March 2016 \namidst uncertain global economic prospects and continuing \nchallenges in the domestic economy. In attendance were 8 out of \nthe 12 members. The Committee appraised the international and \ndomestic economic and financial environments in the first two \nmonths of 2016 as well as the outlook for the rest of the year. \nInternational Economic Developments \nThe Committee noted with concern the further decline in global \noutput at the end of 2015, which grew at 2.3 per cent, year-on-year \nin Q4, its slowest in three years, representing a 0.3 percentage point \ndecline compared with 2.6 per cent in Q3. This deceleration \nstemmed from the continuous slowdown of growth in the emerging \nmarket economies, worsened by deteriorating conditions in the Euro \narea and China as well as key emerging market economies. Other \nfactors include sustained pressure in global financial markets arising \n \n2 \n \nfrom US monetary policy normalization, depressed global oil market \nand persistently weakened global aggregate demand. \nThe slowdown in growth in the United States to 1.0 per cent in Q4 \nfrom 2.0 per cent in Q3 was attributed to slowdown in private \nconsumption \nexpenditure \n(PCE) \nand \nnon-residential \nfixed \ninvestments. In Japan, output declined by 1.4 percentage points in \nQ4, 2015 in contrast to the 1.3 per cent growth recorded in Q3. The \nBank of Japan’s monthly asset purchase program of ¥6.7 trillion \n($56.71 billion) remains substantially sub-optimal, as the economy \ncontinues to lurch between contraction and expansion, with the \nadoption of a negative interest rate policy in January 2016. \nIn the Euro area, GDP grew by 1.5 per cent in Q4 of 2015, and \nprojected to grow at 1.7 per cent in 2016. The European Central \nBank (ECB), at its meeting on 10th of March, 2016 eased monetary \npolicy by further reducing its refinancing rate to 0.0 per cent and \ndeposit rate to -0.4 per cent. The Bank also expanded its monthly \nasset purchase program from €60 billion ($65.4 billion) to €80 billion \n($87.2 billion) to further stimulate output growth and move inflation \ntowards its long term objective of 2.0 per cent. \nOn the other hand, the Bank of England (BoE) sustained its stock of \nassets purchase, financed through the issuance of reserves at ₤375 \nbillion ($536.25 billion), while retaining its policy rate at 0.5 per cent. \nThe BoE further committed to investing ₤8.4 billion ($12.01 billion) of \n \n3 \n \ncash flows associated with redemption of the January 2016 \ngovernment securities held in the Asset Purchase Facility, with a \ncommitment to bring inflation closer to the 2.0 per cent target, \nreducing unemployment and promoting growth. \nUncertainties and geo-political tensions in the Middle East, including \na negotiated ceasefire agreement in Syria and Iran’s re-entry into \nmainstream international oil market may have further redefined \nconditions in the oil market. The market witnessed some uptick in \nprices following the resolve of the Organization of the Petroleum \nExporting Countries (OPEC) and some non-OPEC members to pursue \na higher anchor price, coupled with smaller-than-anticipated build-\nup in stocks at the Cushing Oklahoma delivery hub for United States \ncrude futures. \nThe Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) were \nforecast to grow at 4.3 per cent in 2016, an improvement over the \n4.0 per cent recorded in 2015. However, external and domestic \nchallenges have persisted, stemming from low commodity prices, \ntroubled financial markets, tepid global demand, policy uncertainty \nas well as continuously feeble growth in global trade. In addition, \nweaknesses in major emerging market economies, diminished \ncapital inflows, rising borrowing costs and geopolitical factors have \nbeen identified as possible deterrents to growth in the EMDEs. In the \nenvironment of suppressed inflation, slow growth, weak global \ndemand and volatile financial markets, the stance of monetary \n \n4 \n \npolicy in the advanced economies is expected to remain \naccommodative in 2016, while in the EMDEs, it is expected to be \nunderpinned by currency adjustments and other complementary \npolicies. \nDomestic Economic and Financial Developments \nOutput \nThe Bank had adopted accommodative monetary policy since July \n2015 in the hope of addressing growth concerns in the economy, \neffectively freeing up more funds for DMBs by lowering both CRR \nand MPR, with excess liquidity arising from the lower CRR \nwarehoused at the CBN. DMBs were to access these funds by \nsubmitting verifiable investment proposals in the real sector of the \neconomy. The funds have not impacted the market yet because the \nCBN was still processing some of the proposals submitted by the \nDMBs. In the first episode of easing which resulted in injecting liquidity \ninto the Banking system, DMBs did not grant credit as envisaged. \nMoreover, the delay in passage of the 2016 Budget has further \naccentuated the difficult financial condition of economic agents as \noutput continues to decline due to low investment arising from weak \ndemand. The cautious approach to lending by the banking system \nunderpinned by a strict regulatory regime conditioned by the Basel \nCommittee in the post global financial crisis era has further alienated \n \n5 \n \ninvestors from access to credit as banks prefer to build liquidity \nprofiles in anticipation of government borrowing. \nIn the light of these developments, domestic output growth in 2015 \nremained subdued as reported by the National Bureau of Statistics \n(NBS). Consequently, real GDP grew by 2.11 per cent in the last \nquarter of 2015, more than half a percentage point lower than the \n2.84 per cent recorded in the third quarter and 3.83 percentage \npoints in the corresponding period of 2014. Overall, growth in 2015 \nwas estimated at 2.79 per cent, compared with 6.22 per cent in \n2014. The major impetus for growth continued to come from the non-\noil sector which grew by 3.14 per cent in Q4, 2015 compared with \n3.05 per cent in the preceding quarter. The key drivers of growth in \nthe non-oil sector were Services, Agriculture and Trade; contributing \n1.23, 0.83 and 0.76 percentage points, respectively. \nThe Committee noted that the sluggish growth in output was directly \nattributable to certain fiscal uncertainties, which inadvertently \nhampered movement of labor and goods; fuel scarcity, increased \nenergy tariffs, foreign exchange scarcity as well as slow growth in \ncredit to private sector in preference to high credit growth to the \npublic sector. The Committee noted that many of these factors were \noutside the control of monetary policy and given these limitations, in \nthe absence of complementary fiscal and structural policies, the \nonly option was to continue with the existing measures. The MPC \n \n6 \n \nbelieves that complementary fiscal and structural policies are \nessential for reinvigorating growth. \n \nPrices \nThe Committee noted the increase in year-on-year headline inflation \nto 11.38 per cent in February 2016, from 9.62 per cent in January and \n9.55 per cent in December, 2015. The increase in headline inflation in \nFebruary reflected increases in both food and core components of \ninflation. Core inflation rose sharply for the first time to 11.00 per cent \nfrom 8.80 per cent in January after a lull of three consecutive months \nat 8.70 per cent through December, 2015. Food inflation also inched \nup to 11.35 per cent from 10.64 per cent in January and 10.59 per \ncent in December, 2015. The rising inflationary pressure was traced to \nthe lingering scarcity of refined petroleum products, exchange rate \npass through from imported goods, seasonal factors and increase in \nelectricity tariff. The Committee noted that the factors responsible for \nrising inflation were more structural in nature than monetary, but \nreaffirmed its commitment to monitor the developments closely and \nto work with the relevant authorities to address the underlying drivers \nof the upward price movements. \n \n \n \n7 \n \nMonetary, Credit and Financial Markets Developments \nBroad money supply (M2) grew by 2.29 per cent in February, 2016 in \ncontrast to 1.69 and 0.25 per cent in January 2016 and February \n2015, respectively. When annualized, M2 grew by 13.74 per cent in \nFebruary 2016 against the provisional growth benchmark of 10.98 per \ncent for 2016. Net domestic credit (NDC) grew by 3.71 per cent in \nthe same period, annualized, at 22.26 per cent. At this rate, the \ngrowth rate of NDC was below the provisional benchmark of 17.94 \nper cent for 2016. Credit to the private sector grew by 1.45 per cent \nin February 2016, which annualized to a growth of 8.70 per cent, \nbelow the benchmark growth of 13.28 per cent. The Committee \nnoted with concern, the dismal performance of growth in credit to \nthe private sector, noting that even at that, credit went primarily to \nlow employment elasticity sectors of the economy. This had a \nsignificant negative impact on output growth. \nMoney market interest rates reflected the liquidity situation in the \nbanking system. Average inter-bank call and OBB rates, which stood \nat 0.5 and 2.77 per cent on 25 January 2016, closed at 4.00 and 5.00 \nper cent, respectively, on March 9, 2016. Between January 25th and \nend-February 2015, interbank call and OBB rates averaged 1.43 and \n2.68 per cent, respectively. This was traced to liquidity surfeit in the \nbanking system. The deposit money banks were, however, reluctant \nto grant new credit because of rising non-performing loans (NPLs), \nmainly in the oil sector, amongst other reasons. \n \n8 \n \nThe Committee also noted the slight improvement in the equities \nsegment of the capital market during the review period. The All-\nShare Index (ASI) rose by 8.1 per cent from 23,916.15 on January 29, \n2016 to 25,853.58 on March 14, 2016. Similarly, Market Capitalization \n(MC) rose by 8.02 per cent from N8.23 trillion to N8.89 trillion during \nthe same period. However, relative to end-December 2015, the \nindices declined by 9.73 per cent and 9.74 per cent, respectively. \nExternal Sector Developments \nThe average naira exchange rate remained stable at the inter-bank \nsegment of the foreign exchange market during the review period. \nThe exchange rate at the interbank market opened at N197.00/US$ \nand closed at N197.00/US$, with a daily average of N196.99/US$ \nbetween January 25 and March 14, 2016. The Committee reiterated \nits commitment to maintaining a stable naira exchange rate. The \nMPC took note of the level of activity in the autonomous foreign \nexchange market as well as the rising demand in the interbank \nmarket but observed that the data on demand for foreign \nexchange, was being overshadowed by speculative demand. \nHowever, the Committee charged the Bank to speed up reforms of \nthe foreign exchange market to improve certainty and eliminate \nnoise and opportunities for arbitrage. \n \nThe Committee’s Considerations \n \n9 \n \nThe \nCommittee \nnoted \nthe \nweakening \nmacroeconomic \nenvironment, reflected particularly in foreign exchange shortages, \nslowing GDP growth rate and rising inflation. Overall economic \ngrowth slowed significantly in 2015, particularly in Q4. Apparently, the \nconditions responsible for the slowdown – uncertainty around fiscal \npolicy, adverse external environment, security challenges in some \nparts of the country affecting production and distribution of \nagricultural produce, low electricity supply, fuel shortages, and \nsluggish growth in credit to the private sector – have continued in \nthe first quarter of 2016. \nOn the monetary side, contrary to the notion of liquidity overhang in \nthe financial system, the wider economy appears starved of the \nneeded liquidity to spur growth and employment. Recent \nperformance of the monetary aggregates lends credence to this \nfact. With the exception of credit to government, growth in all the \nmonetary aggregates remained largely below their indicative \nbenchmarks, yet; headline inflation spiked to 11.38 per cent in \nFebruary 2016, substantially breaching the policy reference band of \n6 - 9 per cent. Apart from liquidity, the increase in inflation was driven \nby structural factors such as fuel scarcity, increased electricity tariff, \npersistent insecurity, exchange rate pass through and seasonality of \nagricultural produce. The conflicting signals from slowing growth and \nrising inflation present a difficult policy challenge. Though mindful of \nthe limitations of monetary policy in influencing the drivers of the \n \n10 \n \ncurrent price spiral, the Committee stressed the need to urgently \naddress the key sources of the pressures. In this regard, the \nCommittee reaffirmed its commitment to closely monitor the \ndevelopment while encouraging relevant authorities to address the \nstructural bottlenecks. \nFrom the monetary data, the Committee noted that the excess \nliquidity in the banking system was contributing to the current \npressure in the foreign exchange market with a strong pass-through \nto consumer prices. The Committee further noted that previous \nefforts to reflate the economy in order to spur growth did not elicit \nthe required response from DMBs, hence; the surfeit of liquidity in the \ninterbank market. Obviously, the attendant low rates at that market \nhave not transmitted to the term structure of interest rates. \nConcerned about the need for low interest rates to support growth \nand employment, the Committee urged the CBN to explore \ninnovative ways of ensuring the unhindered flow of credit at low cost \nto key growth sectors even as monetary policy has to, under the \ncircumstance, address the liquidity surfeit in the banking system as \nwell as the pressure on exchange rate and consumer prices. The \nCommittee hopes that fiscal and other structural policies would soon \nbe deployed to strengthen the overall response of macroeconomic \npolicy to the shocks. \nThe Committee was also concerned that with headline inflation at \n11.38 per cent, noting that the policy rate had become negative in \n \n11 \n \nreal terms. This development has the potential of keeping both \nforeign and domestic investments on hold. As part of measures to \naddress the supply constraint in the foreign exchange market, yields \non domestic instruments have to be competitive to attract the much \nneeded foreign inflows. On the administrative side, this will have to \nbe complemented by a comprehensive reform of the foreign \nexchange market which is currently being undertaken. For the \navoidance of doubt, the Bank would continue to allow domiciliary \naccount holders unfettered access to funds in their accounts. \nThe Committee also urged speedy passage of the 2016 Budget in \norder to halt the depressing effect of the uncertainty that engulfs the \nwaiting period, hoping that the implementation of the budget would \ngo a long way in boosting business confidence, and reinvigorating \nthe financial markets. In the circumstance, the Committee urged the \nBank to continue to upscale its surveillance of the financial system \nwith the aim of promptly detecting and managing vulnerabilities to \nensure sustained stability. \nFinally, the Committee remains committed to price stability across \nthe range of consumer prices, exchange rate and interest rate, \nwhich is fundamental to reviving economic growth and employment \ngeneration. In the meantime, the Bank would continue to leverage \nits development finance policy to support critical sectors of the \neconomy. The MPC also stressed the need to sustain, deepen and \n \n12 \n \nspeed up reforms designed to ensure focused coordination of \nmonetary and fiscal policies. \nThe Committee’s Decisions \nThe Committee, in its assessment of relevant internal and external \nindices, came to the conclusion that the balance of risks is tilted \nagainst price stability. The MPC therefore, voted to tighten the \nstance of monetary policy. One member voted to retain the CRR at \n20.00 per cent while another member voted to retain the current \nwidth of the asymmetric corridor. \nIn summary, the MPC voted to: \n(i) Raise MPR by 100 basis points from 11.00 per cent to 12.00 per \ncent; \n(ii) Raise CRR by 250 basis points from 20.00 to 22.50 per cent; \n(iii) Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 per cent; and \n(iv) Narrow the asymmetric corridor from +200 and -700 basis points \nto +200 and -500 basis points \nThank you for listening. \nGodwin I. Emefiele \nGovernor, Central Bank of Nigeria \n22nd March 2016. \n \n13 \n \nPERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE \nMEMBERS \n \n1.0 \nADELABU, ADEBAYO \n \nThe challenges in both the domestic and global macroeconomic \nenvironments since the latter half of 2014 appear somehow \nintensified. The global economic landscape is grappling with slow \nrecovery with global growth projected at 3.0 per cent in 2016, a \nsomewhat flat trend relative to 2015. Perhaps, more disturbing is the \nmedium to long term outlooks for key emerging and developing \neconomies where growth prospect is confronted by three significant \nheadwinds. The first one is the lingering slowdown of economic \nactivities in China in which the likelihood of quick bottom out remains \nlow given the complication introduced by the ongoing rebalancing \nmodel. A sharper than expected slowdown in countries like China \nwould not only weigh down on growth prospects of other \ndeveloping and emerging economies but for Nigeria in particular it \nwould aggravate the weakness in external demand for export, \nworsening the current account deficit which reared its ugly head at \nend-December 2014. \nAnother headwind is the persisting lower energy and other primary \ncommodities prices. It is a little bit comforting that a rally was \nobserved in the price of crude oil in the last one week with the price \n \n14 \n \nof Brent inching to about US$41/barrel but I would apply some \ncaution in building projections around this new price. This is because \nthe rally was not driven by fundamentals but by mere speculation of \nlikely cut in production by OPEC members at their next meeting in \nApril. Persistent softness in energy prices would directly impinge on at \nleast two macroeconomic accounts. The first is the current account \ncomponent of the balance of payment with potential implication on \nexternal reserves. The other area is the fiscal account as the odd of \nfiscal revenue under-running its target becomes elevated. The \nimplication is either under-implementation of the budget or \nheightening of fiscal deficit with the attendant worsening of the \nfragile condition of public debt. \nThe last headwind from the global environment is the ongoing \ntightening of the monetary policy stance by the US Federal Reserves \n(Fed). Further tightening of monetary policy by the US Federal \nReserves in the face of monetary stimulus by the European Central \nBank (ECB) would widen the diverging stance of monetary policy \nbetween the two blocs, heightening volatilities in the global financial \nmarkets. Given that the tightening process of the Fed would further \nstrengthen the dollars, the cumulative effect is elevated risk level for \nfinancial markets in developing economies and consequent \nacceleration of capital outflow. \nThe risk elements in the domestic environment are not in any way less \npronounced. Firstly, inflation is above the single digit threshold of the \n \n15 \n \nBank with the pressure emanating from both the core and food \ncomponents. Growth is tepid as overall output growth at 2.79 per \ncent in 2015 was significantly lower than 6.22 per cent recorded in \n2014. Another worrisome dimension on growth is the challenge with \nsome important subsectors of the GDP. The industrial sector, with the \ngreatest employment generating potential, contracted by 0.7 per \ncent in 2015, thus, it is not much of surprise that unemployment rate \ncommenced an upward trend in the third quarter 2015. The \nchallenge of banking system liquidity is yet unabated while the \nseemly perennial pressure in the foreign exchange market appears \nintensified as external reserves recorded a mild negative growth \nbetween end-December 2015 and March 18, 2016. \n In the light of these multidimensional challenges, what is the logical \nway forward for monetary policy? As I have always pointed out, a \ncareful diagnosis of the challenges revealed that monetary factors \ncould have played some roles but the dominant factors are \nstructural in nature. Take the issue of headline inflation for instance, \nthe only monetary factor that could have played some role is \nexchange rate depreciation as other factors like growth in monetary \naggregates, which could fuel aggregate demand, remained \nsuppressed during the period. Analysis of inflation dynamics revealed \nthat food and non-alcoholic beverages which have the highest \nweight in headline inflation (about 51 per cent), increased by 0.37 \npercentage point on year-on year basis in February 2016. Farm \n \n16 \n \nproduce, which is an important component of food inflation, also \nincreased by 39 percentage points during the same period. Given \nthe significant weight of these items on inflation, any enduring effort \nto curtail headline inflation must of necessity tame rising risks in these \nareas. Some prominent factors that drive price level in these sectors \nare seasonality in agricultural produce, higher cost of energy, and \nrecurring fuel scarcity. The point here is that monetary policy \nresponse alone would not be sufficient to address the current \nunderlying rising risk to price level but in view of the fact that some \nforms of monetary factor is at play, I may be cautiously disposed to a \nmodest upward adjustment in the Monetary Policy Rate. With this in \nmind, continuous efforts should be made to fast track fiscal and \nstructural policies that would address the inherent bottlenecks in \nproduction process. \nAnother key issue is the liquidity surfeit which I would not want to \ntreat in isolation. I would, as always, like to consider it within the \ncontext of overall macroeconomic objectives which are output \ngrowth and employment. One of the key disadvantages of excess \nbanking system liquidity is the tendency to filter into inflation through \nthe channel of excessive aggregate demand. Available statistics is \nindicative that this has not happened so far because broad money \nonly grew by 2.29 percent at end February 2016, translating to \nannualized growth rate of 13.74 per cent. The major challenge with \nthe current liquidity surfeit is that it is not translating to improve \n \n17 \n \nprivate sector credit as anticipated when we commenced \nmonetary easing in the second half of 2015. It is equally feared that \nthis might eventually drive pressure in the foreign exchange market, \nthus a need for sterilization. My position is that we should not derail \nfrom the overall goal of monetary policy on account of some \nteething issues that could be handled administratively. As I pointed \nout earlier, growth is not only softening but contraction is taking \nplace in key sectors like industrial sectors. If growth must be \nenhanced, banks must lend, and if banks must lend, liquidity must be \navailable. From this perspective, I am of the view that concerted \nefforts should be put in place by all stakeholders including Bankers \nCommittee on effective and efficient means of utilizing excess \nbanking system liquidity in the real sector of the economy instead of \nsterilizing it through higher CRR. \nIn the light of the foregoing, I would like to propose that the MPR be \nincreased by 100 basis points to 12 percent while the CRR be \nretained at 20 per cent. The asymmetry corridor around the MPR \ncould be adjusted from +2/-7 per cent to +2/-5 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 \n \n2.0 \nALADE, SARAH O. \nHeadline inflation accelerated to 11.38 percent in February \nfrom 9.62 percent recorded in January, the highest since \nDecember 2012. Projected growth for 2016 has been further \ndowngraded from over 4 percent to 2.3 percent according \nto the IMF Article IV report. On the global scene, weak \neconomic activities in China and Euro area and geopolitical \ntension pose great challenge to growth in 2016. The United \nStates is showing strong signs of recovery on the back of \nstronger consumer spending and improved unemployment \nfigures. However, in the emerging market economies, lower \ncommodity prices and sluggish growth in the economies of \ntrading partners are affecting growth. These developments \nsuggest that monetary policy should remain balanced and \ncautious in managing both domestic and global events in \nthe face of inflationary pressure; therefore I will support an \nincrease in Monetary Policy Rate and Cash Reserve \nRequirement to counter adverse external shocks to the \neconomy and contain inflationary pressure. \nHeadline inflation edged up to 11.38 percent in February \nreflecting a combination of limited foreign exchange supply \nand seasonal effect as all categories of prices increased \nduring the period. Headline inflation edged up to 11.38 \npercent in February 2016, from 9.62 percent recorded in \n \n19 \n \nJanuary. Core inflation increased to 11.04 percent from 8.84 \npercent recorded in January, while food inflation rose to \n11.35 percent from 10.64 percent in the previous month. This \nis attributable to the pass-through effect exchange rate, \nhigher transportation cost as a result of inadequate fuel \nsupply and seasonal effect. The current level of inflation is \nabove the indicative target of between 6 to 9 percent set \nby the Central Bank and the single digit rate set for the \nECOWAS monetary zone. The sudden upsurge in inflation will \nneed to be monitored to ensure that inflationary pressure is \ncontained, as staff projection suggests a further increase in \nthe coming months, before moderating towards the end of \nthe year. Therefore, in the short to medium term inflationary \npressure is a major concern and monetary policy must \nrespond appropriately. \n \nGross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is slowing on the back \nof lower international oil price and lower government \nrevenue. The unabated decline in oil price and the negative \nimpact on government revenue poses downside risk for \ndomestic GDP growth in 2016 as growth has been sluggish. \nThis is because revenue measures to mitigate the negative \nimpact of oil price decline will include high borrowing which \nmay \nimpact \non \nsome \ngrowth-enhancing \ncapital \nexpenditures and austerity measures, including increase in \n \n20 \n \ntax rate and broadening of the tax base. These \ndevelopments suggest that both global events and \ndomestic risks pose huge challenge to growth in the coming \nmonths. Policies should be mindful of the impact of the \nfallout of decline in government revenue on growth and \ntherefore, efforts at economic diversification should be \nintensified and judicious use of available resources made a \npriority to minimize waste. \n \nForeign exchange scarcity is affecting economic activities \nand impacting growth. While the Central Bank is making all \nefforts to meet all legitimate foreign exchange demand, \nreduced inflow is making foreign exchange scarce.. It is \nimportant for the Bank to implement policies that will \nencourage inflows and increase supply of foreign exchange \nto meet import demand and reduce Current Account \nDeficit (CAD) which has been widening. The lack of liquidity \nin the interbank market is fueling capital outflow and \ncurrency weaknesses outside the interbank market. These \ndevelopments are having a dampening effect on growth. \nUnder these uncertain conditions, monetary policy should \nbe focused at restoring confidence in the domestic \neconomy, increasing supply of foreign exchange, accretion \nto reserve and making all efforts to bring inflation to the \ntarget level. \n \n21 \n \n \nAgainst this background, I vote for a change in Monetary \nPolicy Rate from 11 percent to 12 percent, increase in \nPrivate Sector Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) to 22.5 \npercent, to address the increase in inflation rate. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 \n \n3.0 \nBALAMI, DAHIRU HASSAN \n \nGrowth: The second MPC meeting for year 2016 is coming at a time \nwhen the global economy is facing a number of headwinds which \nincludes; continued fall in crude oil and other commodity prices, \nweak response to stimulus and deflation in Europe, slow economic \ngrowth in China as well as declining import and export figures. In the \nsame vain, economic growth in Europe is expected to inch up to \n1.7% in 2016. The tepid growth in the global economy would \ncontinue to weaken demand for crude oil which will negatively \naffect Nigeria’s fiscal position, budgetary revenue and ability to \nexecute the 2016 Federal budget and also affect the accretion to \nforeign reserves. Furthermore the normalization of the U.S economy \nand expected hike in US interest rate which also has implications on \nthe Nigerian economy. With Nigeria being an import dependent \neconomy, a hike in the US Fed rate implies further pressure on the \nNaira, while a weaker Naira and stronger dollar will lead to higher \ninflation in Nigeria; and this will also fuel capital outflows as investors \nwould want to take advantage of the U.S interest rate hike. The \ndivergence of monetary policy between the U.S.A and other \ndeveloped and emerging economies will present a problem to the \nNigerian economy e.g. higher interest in the U.S and lower rate in \nEurope. The general implication of the slowdown in growth will mean \nless aid for the rebuilding of the Northeast part of Nigeria that has \n \n23 \n \nbeen \ndevastated \nby \nthe \nBoko \nHaram \ninsurgency. \nThough \nreconstruction has commenced, it is estimated to gulp more than \nN1.3 trillion in order to meet with the socio economic demand of the \npeople of the affected region. Hence, Boko Haram insurgency \nshould be treated as a global phenomenon. Thus requiring synergy \nwithin and between countries. \n At the domestic level the economy is currently heading towards \nstagflation. This is evidenced in declining growth with unemployment \nand inflation itching up. The headwinds affecting the domestic \neconomy \ninclude \nthe \nexternal \nmacroeconomic \nimbalances \nhighlighted earlier. In my earlier statement, I had argued that Nigeria \nshould seriously promote growth rather than attacking inflation \nbecause of its own medium and long-term effects on the economy. \nGrowth could be encouraged through targeted diversification of the \neconomy using sectors like agriculture, solid mineral, education and \nindustrialization. Nigeria has comparative advantage in the sectors. \nThe identified sectors can be used as major growth drivers of the \neconomy. However, it should be noted that development banking \nwill be critical in this pursuit. The issue of the fiscal side is also of \nparamount importance. \nPrices: The global inflation rate is likely to remain subdued as a result \nof weak demand and negative output gaps. The global consumer \nprices estimated for 2016 is expected to be as high as 6.9% for sub-\nSaharan Africa and 1.1% for advanced economies, while emerging \n \n24 \n \nand developing countries will witness 5-6% increase in consumer \nprices. The headline inflation in Nigeria rose from a single digit figure \nof 9.0% and 9.6% in December 2015 and January 2016 respectively \nto double digit figure of 11.4 % in February 2016 while unemployment \nrate stood at about 9.9 % during this period and forecasted to \nincrease further as the implementation of 2016 budget starts. \n The rise in Nigerian inflation has been attributed to several factors \namong which are rising food prices, hike in electricity charges, \ndeclining power generation and insufficient distribution system as \nwell as rising prices of imported commodities given that Nigeria is an \nimport dependent economy. In addition, lack of urgency in the \nmove towards diversification of the economy despite the collapse of \nthe oil prices, and lack of market friendly return to attract private \nsector capital in real sector of the economy. It is also envisaged that \nwhen the budget is finally approved in March the inflationary trend is \nlikely to rise in the short run. What policy option can be put in place \nto tackle the problems of inflation? To my mind the shift from the \nconsumption of foreign to locally made goods should be sustained \nwhile provision of infrastructural facilities that will encourage and \nraise the level of production should be improved. \nExternal Reserve: The external Reserve rose from $27.50 billion to \n$27.78 billion in January and February respectively and later \ndeclined to $27.43 billion on 16th March 27, 2016 which represents a \ndrop of 3.04% relative to the balance of $28.29 billion recorded in \n \n25 \n \nDecember 2015. The decline in revenue was attributed to fall in non-\noil revenue compared to the previous month before March 2016. It is \nmy opinion that with fall in oil price the revenue can be boosted by \nconcentrating and boosting the growth of the non-oil sector through \neffective and efficient diversification of the economy as highlighted \nearlier. It should be noted that external reserve has been drawn to \nsupport the naira, payment for school fees abroad and Basic Travel \nAllowance (BTA). But again on the fiscal side, what are our \nauthorities doing with the educational institutions, health, power, \nand importation of simple equipments in order to add to its demand \nside. \nThe Banking Stability: The stress test conducted on the Nigerian \nDeposit Money Banks (DMBs) in terms of Capital Adequacy Ratio \n(CAR), Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and Liquidity Ratios (LR) as well \nas the Return On Equity (ROE) and Return On Assets (ROA) revealed \nmixed results, but were generally sound and favorable relative to the \nprudential requirement. As at Feb 2016, the CAR stands at 16.55% \nabove the prudential requirement of 10-15% mark for banks with \nnational and international authorization. Similarly, during the same \nperiod under review the NPLs and Liquidity ratios were above the \nMaximum 5% and Minimum 30% prudential. While both ROE and \nROA marginally declined from 18.09 and 2.28 ratios in February 2016, \nrespectively. However, the banking sector is susceptible to \nvulnerabilities particularly that of NPLs due to their exposure to the oil \n \n26 \n \ncompanies as well as dollar loans. There should be need for \nimprovement of the efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation of \ncredit, foreign exchange and securities, and strengthening of the \ntransmission mechanism of the monetary policy as well as reducing \nthe structural vulnerability of the Nigerian economy. This can be \nachieved by understanding the system very well using appropriate \ndata, policy and strategy to implement the proposed policies. \nExchange Rates: On the exchange rate, the official rate has been \nstable while the parallel market has fluctuated from N300-N315 as at \n23rd March 27, 2015. A lot has been done on the demand side of \nforeign exchange; however, there is need to look at the supply side. \nHere we have to prepare adequately to get the relevant data and \nanalysis. The gap between the official and parallel market is a \nsource of concern because for rational economic agents it \nencourages round tripping which is very devastating to the \neconomy. The level of liquidity, growth, exchange rate and \ninflationary trend suggest that some policy changes be put in place \nto deal with some of the challenges affecting the economy on the \nmonetary side. The current situation requires tightening. \nOn the basis of the analysis made above, I vote in support of \ni. Raising CRR from 20% to 22.5% \nii. Raising the MPR from 11% to 12% \niii. Retaining the Liquidity ratio at 30% \n \n27 \n \niv. To adjust the asymmetric corridor from +2/-700point basis to \n+2/-500 point basis \nIn conclusion, The November MPC Policies and the hold that took \nplace in January did not produce the required result in terms of \neffective control of the level of liquidity in the economy. Monetary \nauthorities have to keep an eye on growth and respond to policies \naffecting it appropriately. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 \n \n4.0 \nBARAU, SULEIMAN \nBackground \nMy vote at this meeting is largely informed by the fact that enduring \ngrowth is only feasible within the context of stable macroeconomic \nenvironment, thus the issues of rising inflation and excess liquidity \ndeserve urgent response in order for monetary policy to remain on \ntrack. I also subscribe to a compelling need for robust fiscal and \nstructural policies given that monetary policy alone cannot deal with \nthese and related issues. \nThe risk matrix in both the global and domestic macroeconomic \nenvironments appears relatively elevated since the beginning of the \ncurrent fiscal year. The tepid global growth that characterized fiscal \n2015 is equally being envisaged in 2016 while pockets of financial \nmarket volatility are quite discernible. In line with the trend since mid-\n2014, commodity prices particularly crude oil prices have not been \nfaring well. Although a little bit of rally is currently being observed in \nthe global crude oil prices against the backdrop of likely freeze in \noutput by OPEC members, the sustainability of the observed gains \nshould be treated with guarded optimism given Iran’s position to \npump more oil in their bid to recover lost market share. \nAs expected, the vulnerability of the domestic economy to the \nexternal environment suggests that key domestic macroeconomic \nindicators should show less than satisfactory outcomes. Inflation has \n \n29 \n \nburst the single digit threshold of the Bank while output growth \ncontinues with its lackluster performance since end 2014. Evidence \nof slowdown abound in the financial system particularly in the \ncapital market though the banking system remains resilient despite \nthe issues of rising NPLs, persistent liquidity surfeit, and excessive \ndemand pressure in the foreign exchange market. \nThe critical issues confronting us remain the need to stem the rising \ninflationary trend, curtail liquidity surfeit in the banking system, \nmoderate pressure in the foreign exchange markets and possibly \nprovide some leverage to jump start growth. My candid view is that \nmonetary policy alone cannot deliver satisfactory outcomes on all of \nthese variables, hence the need for fiscal and strong structural \npolicies to complement the actions of monetary authority that we \nhave continued argued for. \nDevelopments/Pressure Points \nGlobal Environment \nLingering Softness in Global Recovery: Recent data and statistics \nreveal that the weakness in global growth which became \npronounced in 2015 is far from being over. The interim global growth \nfor 2016 at 3.0 per cent is suggestive of flat trend relative to 2015, \nwhich was not only below the long run average but equally the \nslowest pace in the last five years. It is a matter of serious concern \nthat the post crisis recovery in the US is becoming susceptible to \n \n30 \n \nsetback on account of strengthening dollar and low investment in \nmining. Perhaps, more worrisome is the diminishing growth prospects \nfor key emerging economies. For instance, the current recession in \nBrazil could be prolonged and more intense than anticipated on \naccount of ongoing political uncertainty while the contraction in \nRussia is being intensified by continuous slide in crude oil price. In \nChina, managing the rebalancing process constitutes a daunting \nchallenge to growth while flood is threatening the growth projection \nfor India. \nThese developments have far reaching implications on the domestic \neconomy. Notably, the recent rally in the price of crude oil \nnotwithstanding, medium term developments in the price of the \ncommodity may remain insufficiently positive to lift the country out of \ntrade imbalance trajectory. Secondly, the country’s ability to \ndiversify the economic base with a view to ameliorating the \ndwindling fortune from crude oil may also suffer severe setback as \nmajor emerging and advanced economies remain weak. Available \nstatistics indicate that the country’s non-oil exports declined by 58 \nper cent at end-December 2015 as global trade remained largely \nsubdued owing to cut-back on imports by countries like China and \nother emerging economies. \nResurgence of Volatility in Global Financial Markets: Unfolding \ndevelopments since the beginning of the year are suggestive of \nrenewed wave of volatility in the global financial markets. Going by \n \n31 \n \nthe last meeting of the Federal Reserve System of the US, the \nfrequency of rate hike this year may be lower than earlier \nanticipated but the ongoing divergence of monetary policy stance \nbetween the euro area and the US would continue to fuel upside risk \nto market volatility. In addition, uncertainties around Renminbi \nexchange rate is a potential spillover of volatility to global financial \nmarkets particularly in emerging and advanced economies. Indeed \navailable data has shown that European banks equity prices have \nfallen by about 20 per cent since the beginning of the year while \nglobal equities shed significant weight in the months of January and \nFebruary with Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World \nIndex plummeting by almost 10 per cent. \nThese developments could trigger new round of capital outflow in \nthe domestic financial markets, heightening pressure as well as \nrenewed wave of volatility in the naira exchange rate. It could be \nexpected that the overall impact of these risks on the banking \nsystem may not be as severe as in the previous episode of global \nfinancial instability on account of improved macro-prudential buffer \nbut the spillover should be expected to adversely impinge on the \ncurrent \nfaltered \ngrowth \ntrajectory. \nThis \ncould \nbe \nfurther \ncompounded by the intensification of imbalances in the external \nsector due to rising deficit on the current account. \n \n \n32 \n \nDomestic Environment \nA number of issues would continue to pose upside risks in the \ndomestic economy and these include: \nRising Inflationary Pressure: Headline inflation, at 11.38 per cent in \nFebruary 2016, has crossed the single digit threshold of the Bank. The \ninflation dynamic is a little bit complicated given that the pressure is \nfrom both food and core components. An assessment of the upside \nrisks is suggestive that the inflation level may remain elevated over \nthe medium term. Among others, the exchange rate risk is prominent \nas economic agents begin to adjust price level in line with \ndevelopments in the parallel markets even when they source foreign \nexchange from the interbank window. To me, the initial price \nadjustment is not much of an issue as this headwind would \neventually ease but the more knotty issue is the self-reinforcing \nimpetus to inflationary pressure which would inevitably increase \nparticularly if accretion to external reserves does not increase \nsubstantially. \nPersistent Liquidity Surfeit: When the Committee decided to \ncommence monetary easing in July 2016, the intention was to free \nsterilized liquidity and make such available for bank lending. \nAvailable evidence to date prove to the contrary. Private sector \ncredit increased, on annualized basis, by mere 8.70 per cent at end-\nFebruary 2016 against an annual target of 13.28 per cent, while \n \n33 \n \nbetween the last week of January and end-February 2016, the \naverage inter-bank and OBB rates were 1.43 and 1.26 per cent, \nrespectively. Comparing these market rates with the Monetary \nPolicy rate (MPR) of 11 per cent during the period presents a clear \ncase of liquidity surfeit in the banking system while the wider-\neconomy lending is dismal. Besides, this development also shows \nthat MPR, which is supposed to be the signaling rate does not, as \nearlier studies demonstrated, have significant influence on the \nmoney market rates. \nRising Risk in Domestic Financial Markets: The Sovereign Yield spread \nbetween Nigeria 10-year bond and similar US Treasury instrument \nincreased from 8.56 per cent at end-December 2015 to 11.65 per \ncent by end-February 2016, an increase of 309 basis points. Yield \nspread on similar instrument in Ghana increased by mere 127 basis \npoints while for South Africa it decreased by 34 basis points during \nthe period. In other words, while foreign investors’ risk perception for \nNigeria and Ghana has increased, the risk perception for South \nAfrica has decreased but more disturbing is that risk perception for \nGhana is lower than Nigeria. A major reason for this development is \nheightened exchange rate risk and rising inflation in the country. The \nimplication of this is on the cost of financing domestic projects. \nGiven the amount of borrowing required to finance fiscal deficit in \n2016 budget (about N2.2 trillion), the financing may have to be \ncarried out at higher interest rate with possible spillover to other rates \n \n34 \n \nin the economy. This could also constitute additional headwinds to \ngrowth. \nWay Forward \nNeed to Halt Creeping Inflation: Growth issues are very pertinent in \nmacroeconomic policy but sustainable growth is only possible within \nthe context of a stable macroeconomic environment particularly \nlow and stable inflation. Latest empirical work undertaken by staff of \nthe Bank on inflation-growth nexus in Nigeria indicates that inflation \nlevel of 13 per cent and above is inimical to growth. As pointed out \nabove, foreign investors are already responding to the evolving \nmacroeconomic environment through the pricing of long term \nbonds. On this note, I am of the opinion that though we are \npassionate about the need to jump start growth, it is expedient to \nfollow a path that can guarantee durable upward growth trajectory, \nwhich is curtailing inflation to an acceptable threshold. Besides \nmonetary policy actions alone cannot deliver growth. This justifies \nour sustained call for the pre-requisite structural and real sector \nreforms to support monetary policy decisions. In light of this, it \nbecomes compelling to adjust the MPR upward \nStrengthening of Agricultural and Food Policies: Analysis of inflation \nespecially from January 2016 reveals that the rise in core inflation has \nbeen relatively moderate while food inflation particularly farm \nproduce has assumed phenomenal increase. Given the large share \n \n35 \n \nof food in the average household budget, the effect is the new \nelevated general price level. Under these circumstances, the \ncapacity of central bank to fight inflation is limited. It is therefore \nincumbent for the Federal Government particularly, the Ministry of \nAgriculture, to put in place robust policies for intervening in food \nproduction and distribution. \nUrgent Curtailment of Liquidity Surfeit: As pointed out earlier, liquidity \nin the banking system has not led to improvement in private sector \ncredit. Secondly, in the face of low money market rates and apathy \ntowards private sector lending, the inter-bank foreign exchange \nmarket would likely become the ultimate destination of the banking \nsystem excess liquidity that had continued to put pressure on our \nexchange rate and become a fertile ground for market bubbles. \nPerhaps more worrisome is the fact that the disturbing weakness of \nmonetary policy transmission signaled by the excess banking system \nliquidity threaten a loss of one of the vital tools of monetary policy. \nAgainst this perspective, pending the deployment of appropriate \nframework that would enable the banking system to channel excess \nliquidity into the real sector, such liquidity should be sterilized. \nStructural Policies: Price stability is a cardinal mandate of monetary \nauthority but monetary policy alone cannot address all forms of \ninflationary pressures particularly if the causes are structural. The \nstructure of the economy contributed significantly to the current \ninflationary trend. Among others, the nature of production and \n \n36 \n \ndistribution of goods and services played a significant role. For \ninstance, the official price of Petrol Motor Sprit (PMS) is N86/litre but \nmost economic agents obtained the product at a price above the \nofficial rate while the parallel market rate became the basis for \ncosting inputs and pricing outputs. As I have said in my previous \nstatements, structural policies that could fast track the turnaround of \ndomestic refineries as well as build new ones are inevitable. \nRelatedly, higher transportation cost contributed considerably to the \nup-tick in price level in the months of January and February. These \npoints to the fact that the dominant use of road transport in the \nhaulage of goods need to be reviewed and replaced by more \nefficient means like rail and water ways if inflation is to be addressed \nsustainably via the traditional monetary policy tools. \nBesides, the high degree of import constitutes serious issue for \ninflation when there is large variation in exchange rate. An open \neconomy that seeks to control inflation must of necessity take into \nconsideration movement in the exchange rate. Within the domestic \neconomy, \nnominal \nexchange \nrate \nat \nthe \nofficial \nwindow \ndepreciated by about 22 per cent at end-February on year-on-year \nbasis while general price level increased by about 2 percentage \npoints during the period. Anything short of this should be regarded as \nabnormal. The logical way forward is to reduce the level of level of \nimport by stimulating domestic production through appropriate \npolicies. \n \n37 \n \nIt is instructive to stress that significant reduction of pressure in the \nforeign market would be achieved if these structural issues could be \naddressed and this would, invariably, reduce the risk in the financial \nmarkets. \n Decisions \nAgainst the background of the need to address the lingering liquidity \nsurfeit while simultaneously stemming the rising tide of inflation \nparticularly the core component, I voted as follows: \ni. \nMPR be increased by 200 basis points from 11 to 12 per cent \nii. \nCRR be increased by 250 basis points from 20 to 22.5 per cent \niii. \nAsymmetric corridor around MPR be adjusted to +200/-500 \nbasis points \niv. \nLR to remain at 30 per cent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n38 \n \n5.0 \nGARBA, ABDUL-GANIYU \nMetaphors \nI feel compelled to use three metaphors to illustrate the dilemma \nthat confronts monetary policy and indeed, macroeconomic \nmanagement in Nigeria today so that we could all have the \nconversations that is necessary for policy effectiveness and \nachieving the mandates of the monetary and the fiscal authorities. \nThe first metaphor is the ‘medical diagnostics metaphor’. When a \ndoctor suspects that a patient is anemic, it is sound medical practice \nto send the patient to the laboratory for a full blood count test. \nWhen the result is ready, the doctor carefully and thoroughly \nanalyses it to understand the problem, and if necessary recommend \nadditional tests to determine underlying problem(s) and consult with \nrelevant colleagues/team members before determining the best \nintervention for the patient. To transfuse a patient without screening \nthe blood and without knowing the blood type of the patient is \nmurderous and a serious criminal breach of the ethics of medical \npractice and the laws of any sane nation. No sane persons will use \nthe services of such a doctor unless they were suicidal. Most serious \ncountries will keep such doctors off medical practice for the entirety \nof their lives. Recently, a 46 years old US medical doctor was \nsentenced to 30 years to life in prison by a judge in Los Angeles after \nmurder convictions in connection with prescription drug overdose \n \n39 \n \ndeaths of three of her patients. She was convicted for recklessly and \ncriminally prescribing drugs fueled by greed. The implications of this \nmetaphor for monetary policy is that more than ever before, \nrigorous, critical and mandate focused and evidence based \ndiagnostics is needed first, because so much has changed in the last \ndecade and second, because good and bad policies have long \nlasting effects. Shortness of the policy sight dooms policy analysis, \npolicy choice and actions and policy effectiveness. This is why I keep \nrepeating the point that my vote is for “harnessing and directing all \navailable intellectual and political resources to engage the fiscal \nauthorities to develop a strategic macroeconomic management \nframework for Nigeria” for the medium to the long term. \nThe second metaphor is the ‘tapeworm metaphor’ and it addresses \nthe dangers of quick-fix measures. A hungry person decides to \nswallow live tapeworms with a large dose of hope that his hunger \nwould be satiated. Clearly, to swallow life tapeworms whole \nbecause one wants to satiate hunger pangs is a quick fix to a \nhunger problem, but an unwise solution. For only the tapeworms will \nbenefit from such folly. Indeed, the health of the individual will \nbecome inversely proportional to the health of the tapeworms in the \nindividual. \nThe \ntapeworm \nmetaphor \nimplies \nthat \ntrading-off \nmonetary policy independence for exchange rate stability using \nportfolio flows was bound to profit only portfolio investors. Sooner \nrather than later, their rational behaviours would destabilize the \n \n40 \n \nforeign exchange market and further limit the latitude of the MPC for \neffective monetary policy. It was also very clear from the credible \nevidence from sound research papers on the Nigerian Foreign \nExchange Management that the Retail Dutch Auction System \n(RDAS) is inherently unstable because it inevitably creates arbitrage \nopportunities which rational speculators would inevitably take \nadvantage of. The data on global economic slow-downs particularly \nin China from 2013, forward guidance on US Fed rate hike and the \n‘Bernanke effects’ of May 2013 and historical pattern of movements \nof commodity prices all pointed to headwinds from negative \ncommodity price shocks and reversals of portfolio flows out of \ncommodity exporters and emerging markets. It was also clear that \nnegative commodity price and reverse financial flows tend to have \nthe most destabilizing effects on the financial markets and \nmacroeconomic management of small open commodity exporters. \nIt was also obvious to the discerning that exchange rate instability \nand widening spreads were highly probable in the absence a \nforward looking and creative macroeconomic management \nstrategy. For it was clear that a backward looking strategy will fail to \nensure the allocation of scarce forex resource to those who could \nbest use it to create tangible values and create jobs in Nigeria. \nSimply put the real economy and jobs were at risk not in 2015 or 2016 \nbut as far back as December 2011. To think that the journey to \nstagflation began only recently is to think amiss. \n \n41 \n \n \nThe third metaphor is the ‘recovering addict metaphor’. The \nrecovering drug addict who after being released from rehab seeks \nadvise on how to stay off drugs from the drug dealer who aided him \nto develop dependence on drugs is doomed to suffer a relapse. The \ndealer clearly has a conflict of interest between truth and profit and \na rational drug dealer would rather have a client than a friend. This \nmetaphor applies to Nigeria’s fiscal processes where in terms of its \nconflict between saving excess crude and at the same time \ndoubling its public debt every 14 quarters between 2007 and 2016 \non the advice of institutions that profit from its borrowing. Like the \naddict, Nigeria is urged on; on a borrowing binge on the \ndisingenuous premise that it is under-borrowed in disregard of the \nfiscal and monetary trade-offs and crowding-out effects. \nWhen you put together, the consequences of the three metaphors, \nyou get a strategic conundrum that makes purposeful, effective and \nconsistent monetary and fiscal policy very difficult to achieve. Were \nexperience the best teacher as the cliché say, then we would have \nlearnt from the aftermath of the jumbo loan of 1978 and of the \ncapital account liberalization of 2006. Then we would have \nprepared for the shocks that were inevitable given the scope of \nquantitative easing globally and the risks of nomalisation. \nFailures to learn the rights lessons lead to repeated cycles of errors at \nrising costs. I believe the window of opportunity for changing the \n \n42 \n \nstrategic character of Nigeria’s macroeconomic management is not \nwidening or remaining static. I believe the earlier we have \npurposeful, effective and sustainable harnessing and utilization of all \navailable intellectual and political resources to develop a people-\ncentered strategic macroeconomic management framework for \nNigeria, the better for the Nigerian people. When the United States \nconfronted the global financial crisis in the summer of 2008, the fiscal \nand monetary authorities and the US Senate and Congress worked \ntogether \nwith \nthe \nPresidential \ncandidates \n- \nJohn \nMccain \n(Republican) and Barack Obama (Democratic) - to put together a \ncomprehensive strategy that started to steer the ship of their state \nfrom the precipice even when it required many to commit \nideological volte-faces. I believe that Nigeria has been at such a \npoint for some time. Every delay makes it more difficult and more \ncostly. \nBackground to Decision \nAt the March 2016 MPC I asked and attempted to answer many \nquestions before deciding. The questions included: (i) What are the \nreal problems confronting the economy and what are their \nunderlying and immediate causes? (ii) What can we learnt from the \nrecent domestic and global economic strategies, policies, interests, \nbehaviours, market processes, the outcomes and the paths? (iii) \nWhat are the short to medium term domestic and global outlooks? \n \n43 \n \n(iv) What do we know about the stagnation-inflation process, the \nallocation and pricing relations in the segmented forex and money \nmarkets, the relationships between the spot and futures forex market, \nthe relationships between fiscal and monetary policies in the recent \npasts, the effectiveness and efficiency in the allocation the loanable \nfunds and forex and the short to long term effects of capital account \nliberalization of debt and equity? In addition, how has policy choices \naffected uncertainties, risks, expectations and rational behaviours of \nkey players? How do we separate the short term noises in the \nmarkets and policy space from the trend factors? How strong the \nexchange rate is pass-through and how effective and symmetrical is \nthe transmission mechanism of monetary policy? What is the real \ntrade-off compatible with medium to long term low inflation growth? \nWhat are the likely effects of a high leverage fiscal expansion \nbudget on the feasible options of monetary policy hence, on the \neffectiveness of monetary policy in 2016? (v) What are the domestic \nand global medium term outlooks? (vi) What the relationships \nbetween fiscal, monetary, prudential (macro and micro) and \ndevelopment finance policies? (vi) What are the strategic goals set, \nthe binding constraints, the inherent trade-offs and framework for \nevaluation and choice of the best feasible options as well as the \nevaluation criteria? These are some of the questions that needs clear \nanswers to in the conversations leading to a people-centred \nstrategic macroeconomic management framework for Nigeria. \n \n44 \n \nIn a policy choice context, the framing of options is rather limited \nand costly trade-offs may be the price to pay for strategic and \ncoordination weaknesses. What we know from the Economic Report \nprepared by Bank Staff is that there has been for at least 10 quarters, \na steady build-up of stagnation pressures mainly in industry (peaking \nin the four quarters of 2015) and a build-up of inflation from \nNovember 2014 and with the most significant increase in February \n2016. The build-up is partly explained by the deflationary monetary \npolicies, the Bernanke effects which triggered the exit of portfolio, \nexchange \nrate \ngenerated \nsupply \nshocks \nand, \neventually, \ncommodity price shocks amplified by the economic slowdown in \nChina, Japan and the Eurozone. \nIt is clear from the pattern of stagnation and inflation that exchange \nrate pass-through is a key factor in both. It is also clear from an \nevaluation of the over thirty three exchange and trade related \nadministrative measures between June 2014 and January 2016 that \nthe consistent shifting of demand pressures first from RDAS market to \ninterbank, then from interbank to BDCs and finally from BDCs to the \nparallel market has been a strong factor in (i) the widening of the \nexchange rate spread and the attractiveness of the arbitrage \nopportunities and (ii) the growing importance of the parallel forex \nmarket which ought to have been kept so small that its noise value is \ngreatly minimized as it was when the Wholesale Dutch Auction \nSystem (WDAS) was in operation. It is also, evident from data that the \n \n45 \n \ngrowth of money supply driven by a spike in demand deposits in \nDecember 2015 and February 2016 and the final shift in forex \ndemand to the parallel markets in January 2016, the announced \ncommitment to supply a key player forex contributed significantly to \nthe unprecedented spread between the ‘official interbank’ and the \nparallel rate from January 2016. The data on utilization of forex and \nindeed on allocation of credit do not show that economic activities \nwith the highest output and employment elasticities attract forex or \ncredit under both tightening and easing regimes. The high interest \nrate spreads and rising exchange rate spread signal market mal-\nfunctioning problems that need to be urgently corrected as part of a \ncomprehensive strategy. \nThe MPC communiqué has given forward guidance about its \ncommitment to forex market comprehensive strategy. Therefore, as \nMPC works towards the comprehensive strategy, the main issue for \nme at this MPC is stemming the drift into the global stagflation trap of \nthe 1970s. The 1970s ‘stagflation trap’ made it clear that the \ntraditional demand management strategies were ill-suited to \ncorrecting supply shocks. This is because a short-run trade-off \nbetween unemployment/growth and inflation does not exist. \nStimulus programmes of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter \nadministrations (before President Carter appointed Volcker as Chair \nof the UD Fed) worsened the stagnation and the inflation and \nhelping the neoclassical counter revolution in macroeconomics. If \n \n46 \n \nwe fail to learn from history, we are condemned to repeating it and \nmuch higher costs. \nThe lessons of history imply that the MPC has to decide which goal it \ncould most effectively achieve in the short term for it is impossible for \nmonetary policy on its ‘sore legs’ to stimulate growth and deflate the \neconomy at the same time. Paul Volcker’s US Fed chose inflation. \nInevitably, the sacrifice ratio was high not only for the US which \nsuffered several episodes of recessions, but more for those who \nnaively walked into the ‘debt trap’. The high costs within the US \ncould partly be attributable to both recognition and action lag \nwhich in turn, could be explained by weight given to political \nexigencies in decision making. The lessons for me are clear, getting \nout of a stagflation trap is neither easy nor low cost. That is why \ngetting into the traps of stagflation, debt and capital account \n(equity and debt) is very dangerous and ought to have been \navoided when they lay in the future. \nIt is clear to me from available evidence that (i) monetary policy has \nmore effective impact on inflation in the short term, (ii) the \nimpending fiscal expansion will be inflationary and crowd-out private \ninvestment given its high leverage structure, (iii) the asymmetrical \nnature of interest rate and the malfunctions in the credit market and \nthe rational behavior of DMBs rendered the easing at the September \nMPC ineffective and counterproductive (the release of the ‘forex \nchasing liquidity’ that MPC had been mopping-up since the huge \n \n47 \n \nquantitative easing of 2009-2014 contributed to exchange rate \npressures), (iv) the consistent shifting of demand towards the parallel \nmarket contributed to the sustained widening of exchange rate \nspreads; (v) inflation has asymmetrical effects on poorer individuals, \nhouseholds small businesses and domestic producers (through \nnegative budget and supply shocks), and (vi) effective fiscal-\nmonetary-prudential-development policy coordination is necessary \nindeed critical to job creating growth and to macroeconomic and \nfinancial system stability. To want is not to have: nothing can be \nproduced out of nothing! \nI am persuaded based on what we know about (i) the recent \ninflationary pressures (it was triggered by exchange rate pass-\nthrough effects of recent forex market shifts and amplified by the \npost-September 2015 liquidity shocks and the lingering fuel crisis), (ii) \nthe structural path of economic stagnation, (iii) the asymmetrical \nnature of interest rate policies and (iv) domestic and global \neconomic and financial outlook, my vote is for a tightening regime. \nClearly, a tightening regime conflicts with the requirements for \nreversing economic stagnation. The easing at the last two MPCs of \n2015 which I did not support, did not achieve lower interest rates or \ngreater access by real sector operators because the allocation \npattern in key markets – money and forex – are biased against real \nsector operators. Without correcting for the factors that predisposes \nthe financial markets to allocate to sectors that have lowest output \n \n48 \n \nand employment elasticities and to wholesale borrowers that have \nhigher default risks, easing is unlikely to generate real investment, \ngrowth and job creation. Yet, a runaway inflation undermines the \nmandate of the MPC. The balance of policy effectiveness is on the \nside of tightening checking the advance of inflation pressures. The \nstatus quo not only is unable lower lending rates and interest rate \nspread, it has undercut inflation through its effects on exchange rate \nand undercut growth through by triggering significant supply shocks \nthrough its exchange rate effects and allocation bias. \nIn the constrained policy space that the MPC is in, tightening is the \nbest option for the short term. It allows MPC to work to fix to the \ntransmission mechanism that has been considerably weakened and \ndistorted by attractiveness of inverted intermediation and the pricing \nand allocation problems of the forex and money markets that have \ntrend effects on growth and employment. Therefore, I am \nconvinced about the urgent need to correct and avoid further \nescalation of inflation expectation and pressures. I am also \nconvinced about the urgency of a forward looking comprehensive \nstrategic framework for evaluating options based on sound \nknowledge about nexuses, constraints, trade-offs, strength of \ntransmission mechanisms, hysteresis and the true cost-benefits of \nalternative choices to help the MPC make wise, effective and \nsustainable decisions. \n \n49 \n \nDecision \nFirst, I strongly support the forward guidance about a comprehensive \nstrategy for foreign exchange management framework. In addition, \nmy vote reiterate my conviction about the urgent need to harness, \ndirect and put to effective use the best available intellectual and \npolitical resources to engage the fiscal authorities to develop a \nforward looking strategic macroeconomic management framework \nfor Nigeria” for the medium to the long term effectiveness of \nmacroeconomic management compatible with the long term \nwellbeing of Nigerians. The great challenge for MPC is to deliver on \nthe promise of a forward looking comprehensive strategy and for the \nfiscal and monetary authorities to deliver on a forward looking \nstrategic macroeconomic management framework for Nigeria. \nSecond, to stem and prevent a runaway inflation and its adverse \neconomic consequences, I vote for: \n1. Increase in CRR by 2.25% to 22.5% \n2. Increase in MPR from 11% to 12% \n3. Asymmetric Corridor of -5 (SDF), +2 (SLF) \n4. Hold liquidity Ratio at 30% \n \n \n \n \n \n50 \n \n6.0 \nUCHE, CHIBUIKE U \n \nA disturbing development that MPC was faced with at this meeting \nwas the issue of rising inflation. With inflation rate now officially above \nMPR, there is very little room for maneuvre. This is because any \ninvestment at the current MPR will yield a negative real return for the \ninvestor. \nThis \nhas \nnegative \nconsequences \nfor \nboth \nthe \ncompetitiveness of our financial instruments and the health of our \nbanking sector in general. Unfortunately, this inflation problem may \nget worse when Government begins to implement its 2016 deficit \nbudget. In my humble opinion, therefore, there is now a strong case \nfor monetary policy tightening. \nIn following the above route however, there is need for extreme care \nespecially given the fact that the resultant higher interest rates is \nlikely to negatively impact on the stability of the Nigerian banking \nsystem. This is especially so because for some time now we have \nbeen witnessing a slow but consistent rise in the nonperforming loan \nportfolio of banks in the country. Tightening monetary policy at this \ntime will therefore further increase the pressure on the NPLs of \nNigerian banks. The fact that the consequences of the last banking \ncrisis in Nigeria continue to rear its head in AMCON’s financial \nstatements remain a major reason for my trepidation in this regard. \nGiven the current level of inflation, I am in total agreement with the \nassertion that the tightening of monetary policy at the present time \n \n51 \n \nmust include an increase in MPR. While I support the need to \nincrease MPR, to the extent that it does not pose a material danger \nto our banking system stability, I consider it prudent to reiterate that I \nam not convinced by the argument that enhancing our country’s \ncompetitiveness in attracting foreign currency investments should \nalso be an incentive for increasing MPR. As I have consistently \nargued in some of my past policy statements, the time has come for \nNigeria to impose some form of restrictions on the inflow of foreign \n‘investments’ into the country. This should be specifically aimed at \ndiscouraging short term portfolio inflows. History has taught us that \nsuch speculative capital inflows only offer temporary relief, mainly in \nthe arena of exchange rates, and generally cause more harm than \ngood. I therefore see no harm for the country to insist that the only \ntypes of foreign capital it will welcome are those that have long term \ninvestment intentions. \nFrom the above, it is clear that the problem of monetary stability in \nNigeria is more complicated than increasing MPR. Despite the \nobvious fiscal policy gains that resulted from the implementation of \nthe TSA, inflation has continued to trend upwards. The main reason \nfor this trend is the nation’s inability to diversify its economy away \nfrom its current overdependence on oil rents. With persistent low oil \nprices, which has thus far shown no credible sign of abating, the \nability of the country to continue to fund the indulgence of its \n \n52 \n \ncitizens in all manner of imported goods which has been \nencouraged over the years by high oil prices is now very doubtful. \nThe result of the above is the current unrelenting pressure that is now \nbeing put on the exchange rate of the Naira. Given the dynamics of \nthe exchange rate mechanism that is currently in place in Nigeria, a \ndistinct and robust parallel market has emerged and the gap \nbetween the exchange rate in this market and that in the official \nmarket has continued to widen. This has created immense \nopportunities for arbitrage. The fact that prices and inflation in \nNigeria currently correlate more with the parallel market exchange \nrate is evidence that such arbitrage opportunities are being \nexploited. \nI am of course aware that the exchange rate mechanism in the \ncountry is currently being reviewed with the view of reducing (or \neliminating) the variance between the official and parallel \nexchange rates for the Naira. It is however important to stress that \nwhatever exchange rate management system that is arrived at will \nbe unsustainable if the Nigerian economy continues to be \ndependent on oil rents. \nOn its part the CBN has been exploiting its developmental role in its \nattempt to promote the diversification of our economy. It has, for \ninstance, recently used exchange rate allocation restrictions as a \ntool to discourage the importation of some 41 items. As I stated in an \n \n53 \n \nearlier policy statement, I am in full support of the CBN’s attempt to \nexploit its developmental function in its bid to aid sustainable \nnational economic development. I however believe that there is \nneed for more studies in this area before continuing on this \ntrajectory. This is particularly important given the fact that the CBN \nhas a long history of exploiting its developmental function. Learning \nfrom the mistakes and/ or successes of the past will in my view lead \nto the formulation of more effective policies in the above direction. \nDespite its developmental role potentials, there is a limit to what the \nCBN can achieve without the support of the fiscal authorities. In my \nview, for instance, the time has come for the Federal Government to \nban the import of all goods that can be manufactured locally. \nAnother way to encourage local industrial development is to impose \nhefty tariffs on luxury goods and goods that have reasonable local \nsubstitutes. Although these measures may appear extreme, the stark \nreality, in the light of the current international oil prices, is that Nigeria \nis no longer in a position to support the import dependent appetite \nof its citizens. \nIt is of course obvious that for any meaningful progress to be made in \nthe direction of promoting local industries, there is an urgent need \nfor the Nigerian Government to also tackle the country’s poor \ninfrastructure, declining educational standards, declining ethical \nstandards, porous borders and rampant corruption that has now \nbeen engrained in our system. \n \n54 \n \nIn summary therefore, I support a tightening of monetary policy at \nthe present time. I therefore vote as follows: (1) to increase MPR by \n100 basis point from 11 percent to 12 percent (2) to retain the \nasymmetric interest rate corridor of + 200/- 700 basis points around \nthe MPR; (3) to increase CRR by 250 basis points from 20 percent to \n22.50 percent; and (4) to retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n55 \n \n7.0 \nYAHAYA, SHEHU \nThe Global Economy \nThe possible effects of the changes in global economic and \nfinancial variables, including that of our main trading partners on the \nNigerian economy have remained fairly stable over the last quarter \nof 2015- positive GDP growth rates in US, UK, a bit lower but still high \ngrowth rates in China, high growth rates in India, much lower growth \nin the Euro area, slowed growth in South Africa, negative growth \nrates in Japan Brazil and Russia. Most oil producing countries are still \nfacing difficult challenges. This underlines the importance of \ndeveloping new trading partners. Worth noting is the additional \nstimulus injected into the Eurozone by the ECB to support growth and \nthe prospects for further normalization of interest rates in the US \nduring 2016. \nGeneral price levels as well as food prices and raw materials remain \nlow in US, UK, Europe and much of Asia and are expected to remain \ngenerally low or even in some cases dip, for much of 2016. Crude oil \nprices rose to around $40/barrel in mid-March, but it is not evident \nthat even this modest rise can be sustained, due to persisting supply \nglut and the prospects of resumed expansion in shale oil production \nonce the $40 dollar threshold is crossed. For oil producing countries \nincluding Nigeria, the effects of pressures on the local currency is \nimpacting significantly on local prices. \n \n56 \n \nDomestic Economy \nQ4 GDP dropped to 2.11%, the lowest in the year, with an overall \ngrowth rate of 2.79% in 2015, much lower than forecast. The decline \nin growth rate was mainly driven by a sharp fall in the oil sector \nduring the quarter and a significant drop in manufacturing \nproduction. It is instructive to note that, increased lending to the \nmanufacturing sector and privileged access to foreign exchange at \nthe official rate did not translate into higher output. \nOutput in the power sector stagnated. The non-oil sector grew at a \nslightly faster rate than in Q3 2015. Agriculture also grew, but not fast \nenough. Special attention needs to be paid to this issue if agricultural \nproduction is actually to serve as the bulwark for pulling the non-oil \neconomy forward. One important consequence of the low growth \nrate is that unemployment has risen consistently in each quarter of \n2015, reaching about 7.5 million in Q3 2015, which is a jump of 24% \nover the previous quarter. \nOne of the most significant developments in the domestic economy \nis the big jump in headline inflation to 11.38% in February 2016, year \non year, as compared to 9.62% in the previous month. Most of the \nincrease emanated from core inflation, particularly processed food, \nhousing, water, electricity, gas fuel. The increase in food inflation, \nthough lower than core, was mainly driven by increases in imported \nrice and bread (due to the imported wheat component). Here, the \n \n57 \n \nexchange rate effect is evidently significant. It is important that the \nright and measured response to this price hike be developed. \nFrom the foregoing, it seems clear that the foreign currency market \nand the fixing of the Naira exchange rate is posing some challenges \nthat need to be addressed. In particular, the parallel market rates \nappear to be having a significant effect on price levels, particularly, \nbut not exclusively for imported goods. On the positive side, the pick \nup in prices of crude oil has led to an increase in external reserves to \nUS$28 billion by Mid-March. However, it is not at all apparent that this \nincrease will be sustained- hence measures to adapt to the long \nterm decline in oil prices must continue to be developed and \nimplemented, including a longer term strategy for the foreign \nexchange market to avoid a significant decline in reserves, \nintolerable pressures on the official exchange rate, declines in \ninward foreign currency flows. \nThe banking sector remains robust, with respect to capital, asset and \nincome based measures, as well as a lower level of risk on the Net \nOpen Position, albeit with slight declines in capital adequacy, return \non equity and on assets, as well as an increase in NPLs. Liquidity in \nthe banking system has remained quite high, with a significant \nproportion of it in the form of deposit for forex. It is pertinent to note \nthat injections of liquidity emanating from the loosening of monetary \npolicy has been, to a large extent, used for forex bids, and has not \ntranslated, in any significant way, into lower interest rates or higher \n \n58 \n \nlevels of lending to the productive sectors. Lending concentration \nremains a cause for concern. \nConclusion and Vote \nMost of the evidence is pointing towards persistent oil glut in the \nmedium term and therefore low prices. It is necessary to develop a \nlong term approach to the foreign exchange market, which \nobviously has an important effect on prices, foreign reserves, \nportfolio investment and FDI and therefore growth. This approach \nshould be set, not just as a short term response to declines in forex \nsupply, but as part of wider strategic objectives of growth, job \ncreation and a more egalitarian society. \nThe other important task is to respond to the short term threat of \ninflation. In devising the right response, it matters if the causes of the \ncurrent spike in prices is due to transient factors or due to unfolding \ncumulative effects of pressures in the foreign exchange market, \nincreases in the cost of fuel and power etc. It is also important that \nthe overall objective of supporting expansionary fiscal policy to \nstimulate growth is not lost sight of. At the moment, the real MPR is \nnegative. We consider the cumulative effects of various factors as \nproviding a better explanation of the spike in prices. Approval of the \nbudget later in the month and the surge in fiscal spending may also \ngenerate additional pressure on price levels. Moreover, the banking \nsector is characterized by excess liquidity. Under the circumstances \n \n59 \n \nwe deem it essential to tighten monetary policy and therefore vote \nas follows: \nRaise the MPR by 100 basis points to 12%. \nAsymmetric corridor to be tightened to +2/-5 \nRaise CRR to 22.5% \nLiquidity Ratio remains at 30% \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n60 \n \n8.0 EMEFIELE, I. GODWIN, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL \n BANK OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN, MONETARY \n POLICY COMMITTEE \nGlobal economic performance throughout 2015 was generally \ntepid and uneven as output growth dropped to 2.3 percent in the \nfourth quarter from 2.6 percent in the third quarter. Though medium-\nterm outlook remain modest, growth is projected to gain marginal \ntraction in 2016 with the IMF forecasting a rate of 3.4 percent during \nthe year. The fragile global economic environment reflects \ndepressed demand, rising uncertainties and enormous vulnerabilities \nespecially \namong \nkey \nemerging \nmarkets \nand \ndeveloping \neconomies. Nonetheless, recovery and expansion in advanced \neconomies is envisaged to remain largely robust buoyed by \nrelatively benign conditions and accommodative monetary policy. \nIn the US recovery is expected to be sustained albeit at a cautious \npace, fuelled by cheaper energy and modest private demand. The \neuro area is also likely to continue its rebound largely on the back of \ndynamic private consumption. \n \nAverage growth among emerging markets and developing \neconomies is forecast to increase slightly from 4.0 percent in 2015 to \n4.6 percent in 2016. This is regardless of rising uncertainty related to \ndevelopments in China, softened commodities and energy prices, \nfinancial markets fragilities, and weak global trade. The key \n \n61 \n \ndownside risks to the envisaged fragile recovery in emerging \nmarkets and developing economies include the withering capital \nflows, currency volatility, fiscal vulnerabilities, and heightening \ngeopolitical tensions. On the back of the uneven global outlook, \naccommodative monetary policy is expected to largely remain \namong advanced economies even as emerging markets and \ndeveloping economies generally deal with currency and structural \nissues. \n \nIn Nigeria, recent data by the National Bureau of Statistics shows \nthat domestic output growth decelerated further to 2.1 percent in \nquarter four of 2015 from 2.8 percent in quarter three. At that pace, \nfourth quarter growth is 1.7 percentage points lower than its level in \nthe corresponding period of 2014. Growth for the entire 2015 slowed \nto 2.8 percent from 6.2 percent at the end of 2014 and the average \nof 5.3 percent in the preceding three years. Though growth in the \nnon-oil sector decelerated from 7.2 percent in 2014 to 3.8 percent \nin 2015, it continued to be the driver of overall growth given the \ndeeper contraction of the oil sector from -1.3 percent to -5.5 \npercent over the same period. By respectively contributing 1.23, \n0.83 and 0.76 percentage points to non-oil growth, services, \nagriculture and trade sub-sectors remain the key growth propellers. \nIn line with various forecasts including staff estimates, we expect a \nmoderate pick-up of growth to between 3.5 and 4.0 percent in \n \n62 \n \n2016, especially if global conditions improve. I note that the major \ndomestic impediment to growth is the apathy of the financial sector \nto lend to the real private sector even in the presence of enormous \nsystemic liquidity. \n \nOn domestic prices, the year-on-year headline inflation rose sharply \nfrom 9.6 percent in January 2016 to 11.4 percent in February. \nAccording to the National Bureau of Statistics, this sudden ascent \nwas attributable to the effects of acute fuel scarcity, exchange rate \npass-through (especially to imported foods), and the hike in energy \ntariffs. Consequently, both the food and the core components of \ninflation rose during the month to 11.4 percent and 11.0 percent \nfrom 10.6 percent and 8.8 percent respectively, in the preceding \nmonth. Though the underlying causes of inflation in February were \nessentially structural and supply sided, it is exigent to curb its ascent \nin order to ensure that the projected trend of future inflation reverses \ndownward. \n \nData on domestic monetary, credit and financial conditions \nindicated that, during the review month, broad money supply grew \nby 2.3 percent over preceding December. This implies an \nannualised monetary expansion of 13.7 percent relative to the \nprovisional programmed target of 15.2 percent. Similarly, net \ndomestic credit increased by 3.7 percent which annualises to 22.3 \n \n63 \n \npercent and is 7.0 percentage points below the 29.3 percent \nexpansion provisionally targeted for 2016. The flow of credit to the \nprivate sector was unacceptably far less than anticipated. With a \ngrowth rate of 1.5 percent, the annualised growth at 8.7 percent \nwas significantly below the target rate 13.3 percent. I note once \nagain that sluggish growth of credit to the private coexisted \nperversely with a highly liquid money market. \n \nThe extent of liquidity surfeit in the banking system is reflected in the \nrepeatedly low interest rates in the market. Starting at 0.5 percent \nand 2.8 percent on 25 January 2016, the interbank call and OBB \nrates, respectively, recorded averages of 1.4 percent and 2.7 \npercent between 25 January and end-February 2016. The aberrant \nconcurrence of excess liquidity in the banking sector and poor flow \nof credit to the private sector is expounded by the lethargy at \nlending to the real sector of the economy due in part to a \nheightened default risk. Developments at the domestic capital \nmarket indicated a rare return of bullish episodes at the equity \nsegment. Starting at 23,916.2 points on 29 January 2016, the All-\nShare Index of the Nigerian Stock Exchanged grew by 8.1 percent \nto the 25,853.6 points as at 14 March 2016. Over the same period, \nMarket Capitalisation rose by 8.0 percent from ₦8.2 trillion to ₦8.9 \ntrillion. \n \n \n64 \n \nDuring the review period, the exchange rate of the Naira to the US \ndollar at the interbank market continued to steady around \n₦197.00/US$ with a daily average of ₦196.99/US$ between 25 \nJanuary and 14 March 2016. This reflected the strong commitment \nof the CBN to safeguard the domestic currency, even in the \npresence of immense speculative pressures, using a mix of orthodox \nand alternative policy measures. I note, once again, that fostering a \nsustainable autonomous inflow of foreign exchange is expedient \nand imperative as this can feasibly ease the pressure on our gross \nofficial reserves. In this regard, the Bank is currently working on a \nnumber of initiatives that will boost the supply in the foreign \nexchange market. On official reserves, our data indicate a decline \nof 0.8 percent in 30-day moving average position from US$28.1 \nbillion as at end-January 2016 to US$27.9 billion on 18 March 2016. \n \nOn the whole, I note the multiplicity, complexity and simultaneity of \nchallenges confronting the Nigerian economy at this time. These \ninclude decelerating growth, rising inflation, excess liquidity, low \ncredit to the productive private sector, and a constricted foreign \nexchange supply. Most of these are largely attributable to low \ncrude oil prices and its spill-over effects on structural vulnerabilities \nand a constrained fiscal space. In recent times, the MPC has \nadopted a largely accommodative stance of monetary policy to \nprop flagging growth. The aim was to release liquidity into the \n \n65 \n \nsystem with a view to elevating the flow of credit to the real sector. \nWhile the policies succeeded in raising the level of liquidity in the \nbanking system, it however did not translate immediately to \nincreased credit to the core private sector. Instead, financial \ninstitutions channelled the excess liquidity to the foreign exchange \nmarket and increased downward pressure on the Naira exchange \nrate. Consequently, the goal of bolstering growth was stymied while \nthe heightened pressure on the exchange rate transmitted to rising \ninflation. In addition, the continued delay in ratifying the 2016 fiscal \nbudget further complicated growth outcomes, as the attendant \nuncertainty around fiscal policy delayed investment decisions. \n \nI reiterate that the structural vulnerabilities of the Nigerian economy, \nwhich was once again undraped by the prolonged fall in crude oil \nprices, is underpinned by a problem of weak aggregate supply. \nNigeria needs to learn from the experiences of past episodes of low \noil prices and accept the current episode as an opportunity to \ndiversify the economy once and for all. To this end, the CBN will not \nrelent in its efforts at supporting the broad diversification of the \neconomy and the build-up of our domestic productive capacity. It \nis in this regard that I deem it fitting to be tactful in tackling the \nproblems of slowing growth, rising inflation, liquidity surfeit and poor \nprivate sector credit. Given the apparent trade-offs inherent in \npolicy decisions, we need to make some sacrifices and choose the \n \n66 \n \nleast costly policy options. \n \nI strongly believe that in the medium term, we need to boost \nproductivity and domestic supply capacity to ensure that jobs and \ngoods are in abundant supply. On its part, the CBN will sustain and \nstrengthen its development finance initiatives to ensure that \nconcessionary credits are channelled to strategically selected real \nsector ventures. In the immediate term, however, there is need to \ntame inflation which has maintained an upward trajectory over the \nlast year. It is also imperative to rein in the banking system’s excess \nliquidity which is stoking the pressure on the exchange rate. On the \nbalance of inflation-output trade-off, it is most optimal at this time to \ntighten the noose on inflation and reduce the speculative pressures \non the exchange rate. To mitigate an excessive sacrifice of output \ngrowth, the CBN development finance schemes will be used to \nchannel concessionary credit to the private sector. I am of the view \nthat this option will correct the perverse simultaneity of excess \nliquidity and poor credit and will moderate exchange market \npressure and the attendant pass-through to inflation. \n \nI therefore vote as follows: \n1. 100 basis points increase in MPR from 11.0 percent to 12.0 \npercent; \n \n67 \n \n2. 250 basis points increase in CRR from 20.0 percent to 22.5 \npercent; \n3. Narrow the asymmetric corridor from +200/–700 basis points \naround the mid-point of the MPR to +200/–500 basis points; and \n4. Retain Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent.", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/MPC_Communiques/Central Bank of Nigeria Communique No 106 of the MPC with Personal Statements of Members for the meeting held on March 21 and 22, 2016.pdf"}

dedup/cb_requests/384633f403232b33e05180b8fc90ceed.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"doc_id": "384633f403232b33e05180b8fc90ceed", "text": "Table B.1.1:\nSummary of\nFederal\nGovernment\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\nItem\n1981\n1982\n1983\nTotal\nFederally\nCollected\nRevenue\n13290.5\n11433.7\n10508.7\nOil Revenue\n8564.4\n7814.9\n7253\nNon- Oil\nRevenue\n4726.1000000000004 3618.8\n3255.7\nFederation\nAccount\n10182.799999999999 9884.9\n9798.6\nFed Govt\nRetained\nRevenue\n7511.6\n5819.1\n6272\nTotal\nExpenditure\n11413.7\n11923.2\n9636.5\nRecurrent\nExpenditure1\n4846.7\n5506\n4750.8\nCapital\nExpenditure2\n6567\n6417.2\n4885.7\nCurrent\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n2664.9\n313.10000000000002\n1521.2\n% of GDP\n5.5962180326361004 0.63807742848478732 2.864385326\nOverall\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n-3902.1000000000004 -6104.1\n-3364.5\n% of GDP\n-8.194304621242571\n-12.439758643289652 -6.33527769\nNominal\nGDP\n47619.66\n49069.279999999999\n53107.38\nFinancing:\n3902.1000000000004 6104.1\n3364.5\nForeign (net) 464.4\n263.5\n1106.900000\nDomestic\n(net)\n4200.8\n3402\n7057\nBanking\nSystem (net)\nof which:\n3018\n3989.2\n5296.3\nCBN\n3624.1\n2989.2\n3271.2\nDeposit\nMoney Banks\n-\n-\n-\nNon Bank\nPublic\n1182.8\n412.8\n1760.7\nOther\nFunds3\n-763.1\n2438.6\n-4799.39999\nSources:\nFederal\nMinistry of\nFinance &\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes:\n1Includes\ninterest\npayments on\ndebt service,\nother\ntransfers and\nextra-\nbudgetary\nitems\n2Includes\ncapital\nrepayments\non debt\nservice,\nother\ntransfers and\nnet lending\n3Includes\nPublic,\nSpecial and\nTrust Funds,\nTreasury\nClearance\nFunds,\nexcess\nreserves, etc\nMinus (-)\ndenotes\nincrease;\nPlus (+)\ndenotes\ndecrease\n4Revised\n5Provisional\nTable B.1.2:\nFederal\nGovernment\nRecurrent\nExpenditure (N'\nMillion)\nFunction\n1981\n1982\n1983\nAdministration 914.91105020318321 1039.3670419911953 896.808017\n1. General\nadministration\n914.91105020318321 1039.3670419911953 896.808017\n2. Defence\n-\n-\n-\n3. Internal\nSecurity\n-\n-\n-\n4. National\nAssembly\n-\n-\n-\nSocial and\nCommunity\nServices\n294.7465430635512\n334.8411220228017\n288.914493\n5. Education\n165.42735212777967 187.93055085224069 162.154097\n6. Health\n84.457536121458403 95.946353990292366 82.7864036\n7. Other social\nand community\nservices\n44.861654814313127 50.964217180268655 43.9739925\nEconomic\nServices\n175.65115913195615 199.54510949317077 172.175609\n8. Agriculture\n13.027660430071114 14.799822214696919 12.7698865\n9. Construction 96.66455652443841\n109.81390393949656 94.7518879\n10. Transport &\nCommunication\n32.415281070098203 36.824754486962412 31.7738909\n11. Other\neconomic\nservices\n33.543661107348456 38.1066288520149\n32.8799441\nTransfers\n3461.3912476013093 3932.2467264928323 3392.90187\n12. Public debt\nservicing\n1027.4071205835871 1167.1660317191556 1007.07816\n13. Pensions\nand gratuities\n210.39158694547916 239.0113020656959\n206.228640\n14.\nContingencies/\nsubventions\n8.7193002878428718 9.9053928208601416 8.54677446\n15. Other/\nOther CFR\ncharges\n2214.8732397844001 2516.1639998871206 2171.04829\nTOTAL3\n4846.7\n5506\n4750.8\nSources:\nFederal\nRepublic of\nNigeria Official\nGazettes and\nthe various\nstates' official\nGazettes\nNote:\n3Excludes\ninterest\npayments on\ndebt service,\nother transfers\nand extra-\nbudgetary\nitems\nTable B.1.3:\nFederal\nGovernment\nCapital\nExpenditure\n(N' Million)\nAdmin-\n% of\nEconomic\nYear\nistration\nTotal\nServices\n1981\n720.1\n10.96543322673976\n3629.4\n1982\n385.4\n6.0057345882939597 2542.5\n1983\n1098.2\n22.477843502466381 2290.69999999\n1984\n262.7\n6.4071608009560732 656.3\n1985\n459.6\n8.4103427452559156 892.7\n1986\n264.8\n3.105502650466764\n1099.90000000\n1987\n1816.2\n28.500588466065125 2159.69999999\n1988\n1898.6\n22.764715051378285 2128.69999999\n1989\n2617.5\n17.410420311159296 3926.3\n1990\n2919.9\n12.141663132157381 3485.7\n1991\n3345\n11.8027303296649\n3145\n1992\n5118.5\n12.872422560501768 2336.69999999\n1993\n8081.7\n14.82831759685001\n18344.7\n1994\n8785.1\n12.387634785379795 27102.7999999\n1995\n13337.8\n11.010390603137074 43149.2\n1996\n14863.6\n6.9806313264260913 117829.1\n1997\n49549\n18.375185470738735 169613.1\n1998\n35270.400000000001 11.413792701727681 200861.9\n1999\n42737.2\n8.5812914786248786 323580.799999\n2000\n53279.5\n22.250699412697966 111508.6\n2001\n49254.9\n11.227557092431784 259757.8\n2002\n73577.399999999994 22.894341587058982 215333.4\n2003\n87958.9\n36.393528358633823 97982.1\n2004\n137765.85\n39.221594306049816 167721.799999\n2005\n171574.13523020002 33.028689862783224 265034.672880\n2006\n185224.25081580001 33.53168217137371\n262207.292574\n2007\n226974.40434701598 29.893325505454392 358375.646608\n2008\n287103.5850780037\n29.878920084409621 504286.873618\n2009\n315880\n27.40111034004164\n506010\n2010\n264554.18840399996 29.931346153948812 412245.207159\n2011\n232600\n25.323897659227001 386500\n2012 1\n190500\n21.776406035665293 321000\nSources:\nFederal\nMinistry of\nFinance,\nOffice of the\nAccountant-\nGeneral of\nthe\nFederation\nNote:\n1Provisional\nFor 2012,\nthis\nincludes\nN874.76b\nof\nbudgetary\ncapital\nexpenditure\nand\nN137.56b\nof transfers\nTable B.1.4:\nFederal\nGovernment's\nDomestic\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYear\nTreasury\nFGN\nTreasury\nBills\nBonds1\nCertificates/\nPromissory No\n1981\n5782\n…\n2057.6\n1982\n9782\n…\n1668.6\n1983\n13476\n…\n4894.3999999\n1984\n15476\n…\n6413.1\n1985\n16976\n…\n6654.1\n1986\n16976\n…\n6654.7\n1987\n25226\n…\n6654.1\n1988\n35476\n…\n6794.6\n1989\n24126\n…\n6944.6\n1990\n25476\n…\n34214.6\n1991\n57763.1\n…\n34214.6\n1992\n119752.8\n…\n35241.4\n1993\n116380.7\n…\n36584.300000\n1994\n170925.9\n…\n37342.699999\n1995\n276905.2\n…\n23596.3\n1996\n179628\n…\n…\n1997\n364523.5\n…\n…\n1998\n378530.1\n…\n…\n1999\n361758.4\n…\n…\n2000\n465535.7\n…\n…\n2001\n584535.80000000005 …\n…\n2002\n733762.5\n…\n…\n2003\n825050\n72560\n…\n2004\n871577\n72560\n…\n2005\n854828.4\n250830\n…\n2006\n1667689.1\n643940\n…\n2007\n2533265.2999999998 1186160\n…\n2008\n471929.42800000001 1445599.5819999999 …\n2009\n797482.446\n1974926.57\n63030\n2010\n1277100\n2901600\n…\n2011\n1727910\n3541200\n…\n2012\n2122926.9569999999 4080048.8479999998\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nand Debt\nManagement\nOffice\nNotes:\n1Issuance of\nFGN Bonds\ncommenced\nin 2003.\n22009 figure\nis Promissory\nNote while\nthe rest are\nTreasury\nCertificates.\n\"…\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B1.5:\nHoldings of\nFederal\nGovernment's\nDomestic\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYear\nCBN\nCommercial Banks\nMerchant Bank\n1981\n4523.6000000000004 1773.9\n69.400000000\n1982\n6488.9\n2818.6\n174.7\n1983\n10402.200000000001 5140.3999999999996 385.5\n1984\n9531.7000000000007 8726.1\n894\n1985\n9905.5\n10254.9\n1133.9000000\n1986\n16103.3\n4422\n148.19999999\n1987\n17646.900000000001 7572.7\n285.39999999\n1988\n26636\n7309.6\n167.9\n1989\n15647.7\n3614\n84.6\n1990\n27380.799999999999 8702.4\n362.1\n1991\n62294.3\n6813.5\n673\n1992\n138769.60000000001 5535.1\n693.3\n1993\n202434.7\n29535.4\n9344\n1994\n308440.81349961\n38901.1\n8371\n1995\n414285.93392921\n20539.8\n1755.8\n1996\n312804.26257656998 47243.3\n8821.9\n1997\n403301.54926672002 39402.199999999997 5697.9\n1998\n454910.50820316997 48795.3\n8879.7000000\n1999\n530420.82642499998 188165.5\n13325.3\n2000\n511445.78956614999 277345.7\n14711.1\n2001\n738585.36609865993 202966.2\n…\n2002\n532453.19999999995 461357\n…\n2003\n592234.1\n371370.4\n…\n2004\n441590\n605185.1\n…\n2005\n188298.9\n613285.19999999995 …\n2006\n652493.09897227993 972689.1\n…\n2007\n97038.493432179996 1958335.8865813201 …\n2008\n289370\n1482160\n0\n2009\n323180\n1274580\n284720\n2010\n343140\n2605010\n144370\n2011\n348000\n3790800\n147200\n2012\n398268.27514500002 3580423.5738000004 160318.87385\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nand Debt\nManagement\nOffice\nNote: 1 2008\nto 2012\nfigures are\nSinking Fund\nwhile the\nrest are\nMerchant\nBanks\n\"…\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B.1.6:\nNigeria's\nExternal\nDebt\nOutstanding\n(N' Million)\nYears\nMultilateral\nParis Club\nLondon\nClub\n1981\n179.6\n1975.9\n0\n1982\n530.4\n5474.4\n1981.7\n1983\n566.4\n6002.2\n2758.8\n1984\n1271.2\n6360.4\n5443.7\n1985\n1293.5\n7726.4\n6164.3\n1986\n4670.7\n21725.3\n8444.70000000\n1987\n8781.5\n63205.599999999999 6766.5\n1988\n9991.7999999999993 75445.3\n14986.1\n1989\n21473.599999999999 121229.6\n42840\n1990\n34606.300000000003 154550.6\n53431.8\n1991\n39458.300000000003 173051.2\n58238.1\n1992\n89274.3\n324729.90000000002 41890.6\n1993\n81456.3\n400380.9\n45323.8\n1994\n97056.6\n404212.6\n45367.9\n1995\n97042\n476731.2\n44990\n1996\n102630\n420002\n44946\n1997\n96199\n417568.8\n44946\n1998\n93214\n458257.8\n44946\n1999\n361194.9\n1885664.8\n187627.1\n2000\n379043\n2320269\n223832.6\n2001\n313504.7\n2475509.4\n228950.2\n2002\n375700.1\n3220823.5\n182964.5\n2003\n413877.7\n3737279.9\n196156.9\n2004\n384248.7\n4196844.5999999996 196155.5\n2005\n330654.40000000002 2028580.1\n189768.4\n2006\n332219.2\n0\n0\n2007\n363448.79087999999 0\n0\n2008\n464557.84560000006 0\n0\n2009\n524204.60580000008 0\n0\n2010\n635447.72160000005 0\n0\n2011\n723122.96840000001 0\n0\n2012\n727322.43030000001\nSources:\nCentral\nBank of\nNigeria and\nDebt\nManagement\nOffice\nTable B.2.1:\nSummary of\nState\nGovernments'\nand Federal\nCapital\nTerritory\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\n1981\n1982\n1983\nTotal\nRevenue\n4874.8\n4561.5\n4329.399999\n(i)\nFederation\nAccount1\n3825.6\n3245.7\n2958.5\n(ii) Value\nAdded Tax\n-\n-\n-\n(iii) Internal\nRevenue\n142.6\n74.900000000000006 38\n(iv) Grants &\nOthers\n906.6\n1240.9000000000001 1332.9\n(v)\nStabilization\nFunds\nReceipts\n-\n-\n-\n(vi) Others\nRecurrent\nExpenditure\n4611\n4733.8999999999996 5262.1\nCurrent\nSurplus (+)/\nDeficit (-)\n263.8\n-172.4\n-932.7\nCapital\nExpenditure\n6379.9\n5946.6\n5828.8\nExtra-\nbudgetary\nExpenditure6\nTotal\nExpenditure\n10990.9\n10680.5\n11090.9\nOverall\nSurplus (+)/\nDeficit (-)\n-6116.0999999999995 -6119\n-6761.5\nFinancing\n6116.1\n6119\n6761.5\n(a) Internal\nLoans2\n558.9\n546.79999999999995 -737\n(b) External\nLoans\n1167.4000000000001 1331.2\n1652.8\n(c) Opening\nCash Balance\n-\n-\n-\n(d) Other\nFunds3\n4389.8\n4241\n5845.7\nSources:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria/\nOffices of the\nAccountant\nGeneral of\nthe States\nand Federal\nCapital\nTerritory\n(FCT)\nNote: F.C.T.\nfinances are\nincluded as\nfrom 1990\n1Statutory\nAllocations\n(Gross)\n2Internal\nLoans\ninclude\nCapital\nReceipts for\n1986-1989\n3Positive\n(+) sign\nconnotes\ndecrease\nwhile\nnegative (-)\nsign connotes\nincrease in\nOther Funds\n4Revised\n5Provisional\n6 Includes\ncontribution\nto external\ndebt fund\nand other\ndeductions at\nsource\n\"-\" Indicates\n\"Not\nAvailable\"\nTable B.3.1:\nSummary of\nLocal\nGovernments'\nFinances (N'\nMillion)\n1993\n1994\n1995\nCURRENT\nREVENUE\n19874.5\n19223.100000000002 24412.7\n(i) Federation\nAccount3\n18316.400000000001 17321.3\n17875.5\n(ii) State\nAllocation\n253.1\n466.4\n625.4\n(iii) Value\nAdded Tax\n0\n0\n3558.1\n(iv) Internally\nGenerated\nRevenue\n1035.5999999999999 1205.9000000000001 2110.80000\n(v) Grants &\nOthers4\n269.39999999999998 229.5\n242.9\nRECURRENT\nEXPENDITURE\n13966.5\n14884.2\n16317.2\nCurrent\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n5908\n4338.9000000000015 8095.5\nCAPITAL\nEXPENDITURE\n5508.8\n4082.9\n6126.1\nTOTAL\nEXPENDITURE\n19475.3\n18967.100000000002 22443.3000\nOverall\nSurplus(+)/\nDeficit(-)\n399.20000000000073 256\n1969.39999\nFINANCING\n-399.20000000000073 -256\n-1969.3999\n(a) Loans\n39.9\n71.5\n50.5\n(b) Opening\nCash Balance\n-\n-\n-\n(c) Other\nFunds5\n-439.1000000000007\n-327.49999999999636 -2019.9\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nNotes: Local\nGovernment\nSurvey\ncommenced in\n1993\n1Revised\n2Provisional\n3Made up of\nGross\nStatutory\nAllocation,\nExchange\nGain, Share of\nExcess Crude,\nFGN refund to\nLocal\nGovernments\nand\nAugmentation\n4Include\nStabilization\nFund and Gen.\nEcology\n5Positive (+)\nsign connotes\ndecrease while\nnegative (-)\nsign connotes\nincrease in\n'Other Funds'.\nTable B3.2\nLocal\nGovernments\nTotal\nOutstanding\nDebts1\nState\nNo\nof\nLGs\n2007\n2008\n2009\nAbia\n17\n152129880.54000002 55761371.349685714 27184252\nAdamawa\n21\n1571624000\n64406475.125364378 15679516\nAkwa Ibom\n31\n24200000\n12399019.283784235 30344301\nAnambra\n21\n1441285571\n21691436.082418371 41070000\nBauchi\n20\n1348314695.49\n78164179.697969943 15676688\nBayelsa\n8\n149910000\n3296457.3016185616 10321000\nBenue\n23\n1044821586.76\n28811426.437935423 11133234\nBorno\n27\n833942152.96000004 3985728.760421792\n90535555\nCross River\n18\n638301557.90999985 35049974.937046394 60834044\nDelta\n25\n1557724238.51\n80836144.407208189 29875288\nEbonyi\n13\n22644250.850000001 9737394.2876690608 70793675\nEdo\n18\n292408591.36000001 50450176.421426252 13522350\nEkiti\n16\n492950990\n1665619335.9326885 16580503\nEnugu\n17\n598457160\n24996056.081544518 12402100\nGombe\n11\n90277350.589999989 15897517.909805905 11002084\nImo\n27\n281331303\n30423237.177467413 11111434\nJigawa\n27\n436996625.02999997 4983437.0705266669 45804352\nKaduna\n23\n245541100\n43889536.318227254 88083911\nKano\n44\n2380799295.3599997 95759560.120738104 19205677\nKatsina\n34\n27614417.919999998 10446980.387684396 16306112\nKebbi\n21\n235249182\n30035941.241398703 34831286\nKogi\n21\n819025596.97000003 19270311.182367235 22104049\nKwara\n16\n1193574573.5800002 16403036.467884939 83945156\nLagos\n20\n257096570.98000002 16568802.782770744 13803308\nNassarawa\n13\n819594856.72000003 9734883.9342366643 94254917\nNiger\n25\n377575959.52000004 7200418.4252301361 30444532\nOgun\n20\n0\n15178834.452753296 49678967\nOndo\n18\n427201291.25\n23136872.226906329 46065481\nOsun\n30\n75710261.219999999 977858.31807278958 40560166\nOyo\n33\n557656130\n198752494.42217597 21764696\nPlateau\n17\n1026388200.92\n24401018.568936992 25492571\nRivers\n23\n1303877990.6500001 4782187.5225900952 54287827\nSokoto\n23\n277926360\n33520653.316295564 88690832\nTaraba\n16\n3196446950\n59338386.033132873 13305781\nYobe\n17\n42802020\n56266327.897133395 71751044\nZamfara\n14\n581733966.81999993 14597687.894868024 23217272\nFct\n6\n540641890.75\n39354542.969716713 14424713\nTotal\n774 25363776568.66\n2906125702.7477007 63745916\nSource:\nCentral Bank\nof Nigeria\nAnnual\nSurvey\nNote:\n1Provisional", "source": "CBN", "stratum": "cb_requests", "fetch_date": "2026-05-11", "url": "file:///CBN/Annual_Reports/2012 Statistical Bulletin Public Finance Statistics.pdf"}