{"doc_id": "517ee916a643e669fafa1e52f8372666", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nA Tepid and Pricey Recovery\n2024\nAPR\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nA Tepid and Pricey Recovery\n2024\nA P R\nCopyright ©2024 International Monetary Fund\nCataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: a tepid and pricey recovery.\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : a tepid and pricey recovery. | A Tepid and pricey recovery. | Regional economic\noutlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2024. | Apr. 2024. |\nIncludes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers: ISBN 9798400267895 (English Paper)\n9798400269769 (ePub)\n9798400269783 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Economic\ndevelopment—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R44 2024\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to review\ndevelopments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff\nand do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\n\\Publication orders may be placed online or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090, U.S.A.\nT. +(1) 202.623.7430\nF. +(1) 202.623.7201\npublications@IMF.org\nIMFbookstore.org\nelibrary.IMF.org\nFind all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY iii\nContents\nAcknowledgments ....................................................................................................... v\nCountry Groupings. ..................................................................................................... vi\nAssumptions and Conventions. ........................................................................................ vii\nExecutive Summary .................................................................................................... viii\nA Tepid and Pricey Recovery ............................................................................................ 1\nRecent Development: Global Markets Reopen at a Steep Price ................................................... 2\nThe Outlook: A Long-Awaited but Tepid Rebound ................................................................. 6\nPolicy Priorities for Adapting to High Borrowing Costs in a Shock-Prone World .................................. 8\nCalling for International Support and Solidarity ................................................................... 13\nReferences .............................................................................................................. 15\nStatistical Appendix. ................................................................................................... 17\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\niv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTABLES\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings ................................................................ vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings ..................................................... vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations ........................................................................... vii\nBOX\nBox 1. Breaking Down the African Premium ............................................................................ 4\nBox Figure 1.1. Côte d’Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at Issuance, 2014–24 ................................................. 4\nBox Figure 1.2. Regression Estimates, African Premium................................................................4\nFIGURES\nFigure 1. Sovereign Spreads, 2022–24 .................................................................................. 2\nFigure 2. External Funding Flows of the Public Sector ................................................................. 3\nFigure 3. Change in Banks’ Holdings of Government Debt and Private Sector Credit ............................... 3\nFigure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24. .......................................................................... 5\nFigure 5. Change in GDP Growth Between 2023 and 2024 ........................................................... 6\nFigure 6. Real GDP Per Capita, 2000–25 ................................................................................ 7\nFigure 7. Geopolitical Risk and Shipping Costs, 2016–23. ............................................................. 7\nFigure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants, 2019–25 .................................................................... 9\nFigure 9. Median Inflation, December 2021–February 2024. ........................................................ 10\nFigure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates, February 2024 ............................................................... 11\nFigure 11. Actual versus Target Inflation, February 2024 ............................................................ 11\nFigure 12. Exchange Rates, January 2023–February 2024 ........................................................... 12\nFigure 13. Stock Exchange Market Capitalization, 2023 ............................................................. 13\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan African Low-Income Countries: Gross External Financing Needs, 2020–28. ............. 14\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES\nSA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average .............................................................. 19\nSA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt .............................................. 20\nSA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants. ............................................... 21\nSA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves. ..................................................... 22\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY v\nAcknowledgments\nThe April 2024 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared under the supervision\nof Wenjie Chen, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—A Tepid and Pricey Recovery , was prepared by Adrian Alter\n(team lead), Cleary Haines, Grace Li, and Thibault Lemaire, under the guidance of Wenjie Chen.\nThree analytical notes accompany the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:\n“Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa without Undermining Development”\nwas prepared by Arthur Sode (team lead) and Jimena Montoya, under the guidance of Antonio David.\n“Digging for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in Critical Minerals”\nwas prepared by Paola Ganum, Athene Laws, Hamza Mighri, Balazs Stadler, Nico Valckx (team lead), and\nDavid Zeledon, under the guidance of Wenjie Chen.\n“Building Tomorrow’s Workforce: Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic Dividend”\nwas prepared by Michele Fornino (team lead), under the guidance of Andrew Tiffin.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nvi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nCountry Groupings\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected\nCountries Countries Situations1\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi\nChad Central Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon\nCongo, African Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African Republic\nRepublic of Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Chad\nEquatorial Guinea Republic of the Eswatini Comoros Congo, Comoros\nGabon Eritrea Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Congo, Democratic\nNigeria Ghana Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Republic of the\nSouth Sudan Guinea Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Congo, Republic of\nLiberia Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Eritrea\nMali Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Ethiopia\nNamibia Madagascar Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau\nNiger Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Mali\nSierra Leone Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mozambique\nSouth Africa Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Niger\nTanzania Rwanda Namibia Malawi Nigeria\nZambia São Tomé Nigeria Mali São Tomé and Príncipe\nZimbabwe and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan\nSenegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe\nSeychelles Senegal Rwanda\nTogo Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa South Sudan\nZambia Tanzania\nTogo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\n1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West Economic Common East African Southern African Southern Economic\nAfrican and Monetary Market for Community Development African Community of\nEconomic and Community of Eastern and Community Customs West African\nMonetary Union Central African Southern Africa Union States1\nStates\n(WAEMU) (CEMAC) (COMESA) (*EAC-5) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central Comoros Congo, Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire African Republic Congo, Democratic Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Chad Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Kenya Democratic South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Rwanda Republic of the Ghana\nSenegal Gabon Eswatini Somalia Eswatini Guinea\nTogo Ethiopia South Sudan Lesotho Guinea-Bissau\nKenya *Tanzania Madagascar Liberia\nMadagascar *Uganda Malawi Mali\nMalawi Mauritius Niger\nMauritius Mozambique Nigeria\nRwanda Namibia Senegal\nSeychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa Togo\nZambia Tanzania\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\n1 Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African Sates (ECOWAS) on January 28, 2024.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY vii\nAssumptions and Conventions\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\nIn tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor\ndiscrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.\nAn en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or\nmonths covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between\nyears or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY\n(for example, FY 2012).\n“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent\nto ¼ of 1 percentage point).\nAs used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as\nunderstood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are\nnot states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.\nThe boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part\nof the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or\nacceptance of such boundaries.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nviii REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nExecutive Summary\nAfter four turbulent years, sub-Saharan Africa appears finally on the mend. With the easing of global financial conditions,\nCôte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Kenya issued Eurobonds earlier this year, ending a two-year hiatus from international markets\nfor the region. Public debt ratios have broadly stabilized, and some capital flows are making a tentative comeback.\nThe overall regional outlook is gradually improving, with economic activity tepidly picking up. Growth will rise from\n3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024, with nearly two thirds of countries anticipating higher growth. Economic\nrecovery is expected to continue beyond this year, with growth projected to reach 4.0 percent in 2025. In parallel,\nmedian inflation has almost halved from nearly 10 percent in November 2022 to about 6 percent in February 2024.\nHowever, not all is rosy, and the funding squeeze continues. The region’s governments continue to grapple with\nfinancing shortages, high borrowing costs, and rollover risks amid persistently low domestic resource mobilization.\nSignificant debt repayments are looming this year and next. The financing challenges are forcing countries to cut\nessential public spending and redirect development funds to debt service, thereby endangering growth prospects for\nfuture generations.\nThe funding squeeze partly reflects a reduction in the region’s traditional funding sources, particularly Official\nDevelopment Assistance. Gross external financing needs for low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa are estimated\nto exceed $70 billion annually (6 percent of GDP) over the next four years. As concessional sources have become\nscarcer, governments are seeking alternative financing options, which are typically associated with higher charges, less\ntransparency, and shorter maturities.\nThe cost of borrowing—both domestic and external—has increased and continues to be elevated for many. In 2023,\ngovernment interest payments took up 12 percent of its revenues (excluding grants) for the median sub-Saharan\nAfrican country, more than doubling from a decade ago. The private sector has also started to feel the pinch from\nhigher interest rates.\nRisks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside. The region continues to be more vulnerable to global shocks,\nparticularly from weaker external demand and elevated geopolitical risks. Moreover, countries in sub-Saharan Africa face\nrising political instability and frequent climate shocks. The region faces a critical year with 18 national elections in 2024.\nSimilarly, climate shocks are becoming more frequent and widespread, including droughts of unparalleled severity.\nAmid current financing constraints and cascading shocks, the international community needs to play a more active role\nin assisting the region. In addition, three policy priorities can help countries adapt to these challenges:\nƒ Improved public finances focused on revenue mobilization is still the first line of defense against a world of higher\nborrowing costs and narrowing funding options. But top priority should be given to minimizing the impact of fiscal\nconsolidation on lives and livelihoods. On the financing side, there is still a pressing need for concessional funding.\nƒ Monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring price stability. As inflation eases, more countries will have space\nto cut interest rates. Enhanced coordination between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies is crucial.\nƒ Implementing structural reforms such as expediting trade integration and improving the business environment\nto attract more foreign direct investments could diversify funding sources and the economy. Sub-Saharan African\ncountries will need more support from the international community, with multilateral and regional development\nbanks potentially exploring options to further leverage their balance sheets to support a more inclusive, sustainable,\nand prosperous future.\nRegional Economic Outlook Notes. A series of analytical notes explore (1) strategies for implementing necessary fiscal\nadjustment with minimal negative impact on socio-economic conditions “Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa\nwithout Undermining Development”; (2) ways to capitalize on region’s abundant critical mineral resources “Digging\nfor Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in Critical Minerals”, and (3) the importance of stepping\nup investment in education “Building Tomorrow’s Workforce: Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic\nDividend”.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 1\nA Tepid and Pricey Recovery\nAfter four turbulent years, the outlook for sub-Saharan Africa is gradually improving. Growth will rise from\n3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024, with nearly two thirds of countries anticipating higher growth.\nEconomic recovery is expected to continue beyond this year, with growth projections reaching 4.0 percent\nin 2025. Additionally, inflation has almost halved, public debt ratios have broadly stabilized, and several\ncountries have issued Eurobonds this year, ending a two-year hiatus from international markets. However,\nnot all is favorable. The funding squeeze persists as the region’s governments continue to grapple with\nfinancing shortages, high borrowing costs, and impending debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain\ntilted to the downside. The region continues to be more vulnerable to global external shocks, as well as the\nthreat of rising political instability, and frequent climate events. Three policy priorities can help countries\nadapt to these challenges: improving public finances without undermining development; monetary policy\nfocused on ensuring price stability; and implementing structural reforms to diversify funding sources and\neconomies. Amid these challenges, sub-Saharan African countries will need additional support from the\ninternational community to develop a more inclusive, sustainable, and prosperous future.\nA Slow Climb\nThe region has recovered its footing, but governments are still grappling\nwith the funding squeeze, high borrowing costs, and rollover risks.\nAdapting to a world with tight 2025:\nfinancing conditions and more Continued\nprone to shocks requires: recovery\n4.0%\n2024:\nA tepid\nrebound\n3.8%\nInternational\nsupport & solidarity\nDiversifying financing sources\nand growth opportunities\nMaintaining price stability\nwhile supporting growth\nImproving public finances without\nundermining development\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nRecent Development: Global Markets Reopen at a Steep Price\nEmerging from four turbulent years, sub-Saharan Africa appears on the mend …\nFigure 1. Sovereign Spreads, 2022–24\nAt last, the light on the horizon for sub-Saharan Africa’s Figure(B 1a.s iSs opvoienrtse, isgimnp Slep arveearadgse, )2022–24\neconomy seems to shine a little brighter. The region’s (Basis points, simple average)\nnearly two-year hiatus from international capital markets\nended with Côte d’Ivoire’s successful Eurobond issuance\nin January 2024. Benin and Kenya quickly followed suit, 1,000 Last Sub-Saharan\nissuance Africa\ncapitalizing on the renewed global appetite for African\nbefore\ndebt. This resurgence is further highlighted by the hiatus\n750\nnarrowing in sovereign spreads, following the easing of\nReturn to\nglobal financial conditions (Figure 1).\nEurobond market\n500\nSimilarly, the region has seen a continued improve-\nment in macroeconomic imbalances, a sign of optimism EMBIG\n250\nhighlighted in the October 2023 Regional Economic\nJan-22 Jan-23 Jan-24\nOutlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—Light on the Horizon? In\nSources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.\nparticular, inflation has come down significantly, with the\nNote: Sub-Saharan Africa includes Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,\nSources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.\nmedian headline inflation dropping to about 6 percent Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South\nNote: Sub-Saharan Africa includes Angola, Côte d'Ivoire,\nAfrica. EMBIG = Emerging Market Bond Index Global. Data up to\nin February 2024 from a peak of nearly 10 percent in MGarachb o2n9,, G20h2a4n.a, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,\nNovember 2022, in part reflecting the effects of monetary Senegal, South Africa. EMBIG = Emerging Market Bond Index\npolicy tightening across many countries. On the fiscal situatioGnlo,b tahl.e D aatuat uhpo troit Mieasr chha 2v9e, 2c0o2n4.tinued consolidation\nefforts, with the median fiscal deficit narrowing to 4.0 percent of GDP in 2023, the lowest since the onset of the\npandemic. Consequently, public debt ratios have largely stabilized at around 60 percent of GDP in 2023 and are\nprojected to ease this year.\nThere are also tentative signs that select capital flows are making a comeback to the region. After several years\nof sluggish inflows, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region rose to 2.0 percent of GDP in 2023, indicating\na continuation of the post-pandemic recovery. Even more promising is the increase in the number of announced\nFDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa, which increased by about 10 percent in 2023 from the previous year.\n… but the region’s governments are still grappling with a shortage in financing,\nhigh borrowing costs, and rollover risks, …\nUnfortunately, not all is rosy. The region is still facing an acute funding squeeze, a situation highlighted in previous\nreports. Debt service obligations continue to swell. Preliminary data from last year show a decrease in external\nfinancing sources for the public sector coupled with an uptick in external debt service, leading to the lowest\nnet external flows for the region’s governments since the Global Financial Crisis (Figure 2). In 2023, government\ninterest payments took up 12 percent of its revenues (excluding grants) for the median sub-Saharan African\ncountry, more than doubling from a decade ago. Significant external debt repayments are looming this year and\nnext, including $5.9 billion on Eurobonds in 2024, increasing to $6.2 billion in 2025, along with significant bank\nloan repayments—syndicated and bilateral—over the next two years.\nThis funding squeeze partly reflects a reduction in the region’s traditional funding sources, particularly Official\nDevelopment Assistance (ODA)—a critical support for most countries in the region—which has steadily declined\nas a percentage of GDP over the past 15 years. This reduction is compounded by the redirection of aid towards\nconflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Moreover, China’s official bilateral lending is also significantly lower than its peak\nin 2016. As traditional funding sources have declined over time, governments have sought alternative funding\noptions. Increased integration in international debt markets and deepening of local financial markets have\nmade it easier to contract more commercial debt, both domestically and externally, on non-concessional terms.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 3\nFigure 2. External Funding Flows of the Public\nThis significant financial market progress has provided FigSuecreto 2r. External Funding Flows of the Public\nuseful access to financing, but they often come with Se(cPteorcrent of GDP)\nhigher costs. In the case of syndicated and bilateral (Percent of GDP)\nloans from international commercial banks, they are 6\noften associated with shorter repayment periods, higher\n4 IMF/WB\ncharges, less transparency, and, in some cases, tied to\ncollateral pledges, adding to future fiscal burdens and Net ODA\n2 external\npotentially elevating fiscal risks. flows China\nBonds/loans\n0\nEven for countries that have re-accessed international Principal\nmarkets, borrowing costs remain high. As of end-March,\n–2 Interest\nthe average yield on the region’s Eurobonds for\nnon-distressed countries was close to 11 percent,\n–4\nsignificantly higher than the pre-pandemic average Avg. 2010–19 Avg. 2020–22 2023\nof 7.3 percent, making it still unaffordable for many. Sources: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook database;\nWorld Bank, International Debt Statistics database, and IMF\nKenya, for instance, issued a bond at 10.4 percent\nstaff calculations.\nSources: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World\nyield to maturity, significantly above the 6.9 percent Note: Excludes South Africa due to data constraints; but tentative\nBank, International Debt Statistics database.; and IMF staff\nyield at issuance of its bond due this year. This allowed estimates suggest that adding the country to the sample would not\nchcaanlcguela tthioen os.verall results. Data for 2023 are estimates. “Bonds”\nthe country to clear most of its immediate debt and pNerotatein: Etox Eculurdoebso nSdosu itshs uAefdri cbae fdouree Mtoa dy a2t0a2 c2o. “nLsotraanisn”t sc;o bveurt bteonthta tive\npush back repayments by seven years. Similarly, Côte syndicated and bilateral bank loans. Principal and interest denote\npeasymtimenattse so ns upgugbelisc ta tnhda tp audbdlicinlyg gthuear canotuenetdry d teob tth.e sample would not\nd’Ivoire faced its highest borrowing cost in a decade\nchange the overall results. Data for 2023 are estimates. \"Bonds\"\nwith a USD-denominated Eurobond.1 Sub-Saharan African sovereign issuers have generally been paying higher\npertain to Eurobonds issued before May 2022. \"Loans\" cover both\nyields than equally-risky issuers in other regions, although the often-referenced “African premium” appears to be\nsyndicated and bilateral bank loans. Principal and interest denote\nrelatively small. Furthermore, this premium essentially disappears when comparing sub-Saharan African state-\nowned enterprises (SOEs) and corporates with similar issuers elsewhere (see Box 1).\n… with the private sector also feeling the pinFcihgu.re 3. Change in Banks' Holdings of Government Debt\nand Private Sector Credit\nIn recent years, local banks have shown a stronger Figure 3. Change in Banks’ Holdings of\n(Percent of assets; average)\npreference to lend to the government than to the private Government Debt and Private Sector Credit\nsector. Before the pandemic, banks’ exposure to the (Percent of assets, average)\nprivate sector increased much faster than their exposure 8\nto the government, highlighting the region’s progress in\nfinancial development. In contrast, since the pandemic, 6 Public Private\nprivate sector credit as a share of bank assets remained\nbroadly unchanged, while lending to the government\n4\nhas seen continued increase (Figure 3). This increasing\nbank-sovereign nexus could pose financial stability risks\n2\nin some countries (for example, the Central African\nEconomic and Monetary Community [CEMAC]),\n0\nstemming from issues like maturity mismatches, asset\nPre-pandemic 2015–19 Post-pandemic 2020–23\nconcentration, and illiquidity.\nSources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff\ncSaolcuurclaetiso:n IsM.F, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff\nRelatedly, firms’ borrowing costs have increased. Ncaoltceu: lDataiotan sas. of December 2023 or latest available.\nDomestically, across over half of the region’s countries Note: Data as of December 2023 or latest available.\nwith available data, the median prime lending rate more than doubled, in real terms, by the end of 2023 from\nabout 2.5 percent a year earlier (Figure 4). The prime lending rate is usually an indicator of domestic borrowing\n1 This bond issuance includes two tranches: 1) a $1.5 billion traditional Eurobond with a 13-year maturity at a yield of 8.5 percent; and\n2) a $1.1 billion ESG bond with a 9-year maturity at 7.875 percent. Considering the USD-EUR hedges that were simultaneously\nsecured, the effective coupon rates in euro terms are 6.85 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively. Following the Eurobond issuance,\nCôte d’Ivoire was upgraded to Ba2 stable outlook by Moody’s.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nBox 1. Breaking Down the African Premium\nCountries from sub-Saharan Africa with market access have historically faced somewhat higher borrowing costs\ncompared to similar issuers. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire’s (CIV) $2.6 billion Eurobond issuance in January 2024 (at a\nweighted-average spread of about 400 basis points) was its most expensive to date, although recent surges in costs can\nlargely be attributed to the increase in US bond yields (Figure 1.1). CIV’s spread at issuance was 50 basis points above\nthe pricing of a similar bond from a developing country outside sub-Saharan Africa, with the same rating. This raises\nthe question of whether there could be an “African premium”—defined as the extra cost African countries pay when\nborrowing from international markets that cannot be explained by differences in macroeconomic fundamentals.\nHowever, the analysis in this box finds that the “African premium” is quite modest for sovereigns, and virtually non-\nexistent for corporations and SOEs. By controlling for issuer-specific fundamentals (proxied by the issuer’s credit rating),\nglobal factors, and bond characteristics, the premium for sovereign Eurobond issuances ranges between 53 and 88\nbasis points, with a midpoint of 70 basis points (Figure 1.2). This gap widens during global shocks to 120 basis points,\nunderscoring potential constraints in terms of investor demand and liquidity. However, when focusing on Eurobonds\nissued by sub-Saharan African SOEs and corporations, this premium disappears, indicating no significant borrowing\ncost differences from counterparts outside the region. One plausible explanation is that most sub-Saharan African\ncorporations issuing Eurobonds, relative to sovereigns, are generally rated higher, as investment grade, a reflection of\nbetter governance and management standards and healthier balance sheets.\nNotably, this box does not address the question of the objectivity of credit ratings, which are taken as given in the\nanalysis.1 The ratings debate remains inconclusive, with data availability being one of the main obstacles. Moving away\nfrom ratings, Gbohoui and others (2023) and Presbitero and others (2016) have found that, in the secondary market,\nthe disparities in bond spreads between sub-Saharan African countries and their counterparts elsewhere are primarily\ndue to weaker economic and political fundamentals, including the risk of conflict, default history, and structural issues.\nSpecifically, challenges related to governance, transparency, and public finance management in sub-Saharan Africa are\nsignificant factors that contribute to higher spreads.\nFigure 1.1. Côte d'Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at Figure 1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regression\nBIosxsu Faigncuere, 210.114. –C2ô4te d’Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at\nE\nB\nst\no\nim\nx\na\nF\nt\ni\ne\ng\ns\nu\n,\nr\nA\ne\nf\n1\nri\n.\nc\n2\na\n.\nn\nR e\nP\ng\nre\nre\nm\ns\ni\ns\nu\ni\nm\non Estimates,\nIs(Psuearcnecnet,, 2a0nn1u4a–l2)4\n(B\nA\na\nf\ns\nr\nis\nic\np\na\no\nn\nin\nP\nts\nr\n)\nemium\n(Percent, annual) (Basis points) 2014\n9 140 15\n16\n8 120 Non-crisis Crisis Over the cycle\nCIV yield-to-maturity 17\n7\n418 bps 100 18\n6\nCIV historical average yield 80 19\n5\n4 60 20\n3 329 bps 40 21\n2 22\n20\n1 US 10-year yield 23\n0\n0 24\nSovereigns State-owned Corporates\n2014 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24\nenterprises\nSources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.\nSources: Dealogic; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: The average intrayear 10-year bond yield is used for\nSNooutrece: sT:h Dee caoloegffiic;c aienndt IsM dFe sptaicfft ecdal cinul athtioisn fis.gure are from pooled\nthe United States, which is the proxy for the risk-free rate with\nSources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff Nreogter:e Tshseio cnose wfficitihen ttism dee p(qicuteadr tienr t)h aisn fdig urareti nagre fifrxoemd peoffoelecdt s, where\nsimilar maturity as Côte d’Ivoire issuances. bps = basis points;\nCIVc a=lc Cuôlatteio dn’sIv. oire. rtehgere sdseiopnesn wditehn ttim vea (rqiaubarltee r)i sa ntdh rea tiynige lfdix etdo e fmfecattsu, rwithye rfeo trh ee ach\ndEeupreonbdoenntd v airsiasbulaen isc eth. eT yhieeld stoe tm aotfu rictyo fuonr teraiecsh Ecuornobsiodnedr ed are\nNote: The average intrayear 10-year bond yield is used for all emerging markets and developing ecoonomies. Other\nissuance. The set of countries considered are all emerging markets\nthe United States, which is the proxy for the risk-free rate controls include tranche size and maturity and a Group of\nand developing ecoonomies. Other controls include tranche size and\nThis bwoithx swimasil apr rmepataurreitdy absy C AIVd risiasnua Anlcteesr.. BPS = basis points. Twenty (G20) dummy. Robust standard errors are utilized.\nmaturity and a Group of Twenty (G20) dummy. Robust standard\nCIV = Côte d'Ivoire. e C rr r o is rs is a y re e a u r t s ili z r e e d fe . r C t r o is is 2 0 ye 0 a 8 r – s 0 r 9 e , f e 2 r 0 to 1 5 2 – 0 1 0 6 8 , – 0 a 9 n , d 2 0 2 1 0 5 2 – 0 1 – 6 2 , 1 a . n S d a 2 m 02 p 0 le –\nperiod: 2006–24.\n21. Sample period: 2006–24.\n1 For more details about this debate see Griffith-Jones and Kraemer (2021) and Fofack (2021), which discuss potential perception\nbiases by credit rating agencies in the context of Africa and EMDEs, more generally.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 5\nFigure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24\n(Percent, median)\ncosts for top-rated corporations, thus, interest rates Figure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24\nfor loans to smaller enterprises are likely even higher, (Percent, median)\n10\nreflecting lower access to financial services, lack of strong\ncollateral, and greater default risks. In parallel, firms with 8 Interquartile range\ninternational market access have borrowed more from 6\nabroad, increasing their leverage and borrowing costs. 4\nFor instance, the median corporate spread for syndicated\n2\nloans (over the respective benchmark) increased from 350\n0\nbasis points prior to the pandemic to 580 basis points in\n–2\n2023. Going forward, a prolonged period of elevated\n–4\ninterest rates could affect corporate credit quality by\nraising borrowing costs, and impairing firms’ profitability –6\nJan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22 Jul-22 Jan-23 Jul-23 Jan-24\nand their capacity to repay debt.\nSources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.\nMoreover, several countries are facing challenges like foreSigounrc ecsu: Hrraevenrc Ayn aslyhticosr;t aangde IMs Fostra ffi cmalpcuolarttio nrse.strictions\n(for example, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria) which have complicated business operations. This\ncomes at a time when companies in the region have just turned a leaf and returned to pre-pandemic profitability.\nThe ability of countries to respond to current challenges is further constrained by\nrising uncertainty and shocks.\nThese financing challenges have forced many countries to reduce essential public spending, including capital\ninvestments, and diverted resources critical for development to debt service. The liquidity squeeze is imperiling\nthe growth prospects of the region’s future generations, as funds are sorely lacking to address the vast develop-\nment needs, intensified by the pandemic’s scarring effects. For instance, nearly 3 in 10 school-age children are\nnot attending primary and secondary education. Of those who do enroll in primary school, only about 65 percent\ncomplete it, compared to the global average of 87 percent (Analytical Note “Building Tomorrow’s Workforce:\nEducation, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic Dividend”). Beyond health, education, and infrastructure, food\ninsecurity remains a key challenge in the region. As of 2023, an estimated 140 million people across the region,\nincluding a significant number in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, are grappling with acute\nfood insecurity, with policymakers facing constraints in their ability to respond effectively given limited fiscal space.\nMeanwhile, the region also faces rising political instability and climate shocks that hinder growth, strain limited\nresources, and could increase social tensions:\nƒ Political instability is intensifying the challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, dampening growth through height-\nened policy uncertainty and diminished investor confidence. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger left the Economic\nCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024, following prolonged political discord stemming\nfrom recent coups. This move exacerbates uncertainty and geoeconomic fragmentation in a region already\nstruggling with fragility, poverty, and food insecurity. Sub-Saharan Africa faces a critical year in 2024 with 18\nnational elections, including presidential, scheduled mainly in its western and southern parts. The delay in the\npresidential election in Senegal created further political uncertainties in the region. More generally, political\ninstability surrounding elections has been found to not only incur macroeconomic costs but also trigger longer-\nterm fiscal adjustments at the expense of public investment (Ebeke and Ölçer 2013). Additionally, it also poses\nrisks of policy reversals (Gaspar, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados 2017).\nƒ Climate change is also exacerbating sub-Saharan Africa’s struggles, weighing on agricultural yields and labor\nproductivity in an already-vulnerable region. Last year, the hottest on record globally, hit the region hard.\nMalawi and Mozambique faced devastating cyclones, while long and severe droughts in the Horn of Africa\ngave way to sudden flash floods in November. South Sudan’s prolonged floods have aggravated food scarcity.\nParts of southern Africa are now suffering from an unprecedented drought, with the early months of 2024—\na crucial period for cultivating crops—recording the lowest levels of rainfall in the last 40 years. In central Africa,\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n6 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nthe Congo Basin has been experiencing its worst flooding in nearly six decades. These weather extremes take a\nheavy toll on human lives and stymie development, stretching government resources thin and leaving the most\nvulnerable to suffer disproportionately.\nThe Outlook: A Long-Awaited but Tepid Rebound\nDespite a projected growth rebound this yeaFirg,u trhe e5. uChpatnugren in i sG DmP oGdroewstht, f raonmd B ethtwee en\nrecovery remains markedly uneven, … 2023 and 2024\n(PFeirgceunrtea g5e. pCohinatsn)ge in GDP Growth Between 2023\nAfter two years of slow growth, the region’s outlook is\nand 2024\nmildly improving as a whole, with growth expected to\n(Percentage points)\nrise from 3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024.\nTwo thirds of countries in the region anticipate faster Sub-Saharan Africa\ngrowth compared to 2023, with a median growth\nOil exporters excluding Nigeria\nacceleration of 0.6 percentage point. The growth pick-up\nin 2024 varies significantly across country groups, Nigeria\nprimarily driven by a rebound among oil exporters,\nOther resource-intensive\nexcluding Nigeria, with growth for that group projected countries\nto increase by 1.5 percentage points to 3.1 percent\nNon-resource-intensive countries\n(Figure 5). Meanwhile, diversified economies, which\nhave been enjoying persistently high growth rates, are –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff\nexpected to see their growth remain unchanged.\ncalculations.\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and\nFor 2024, growth rates also vary widely by country. South Africa’s growth is projected at only 0.9 percent for 2024,\nIMF staff calculations.\nhampered by persistent energy shortages and logistical challenges at ports and railways. Nigeria is expected\nto grow by 3.3 percent in 2024, a slight improvement from 2023, supported by its oil sector. Notably, Niger and\nSenegal are among the region’s fastest-growing economies, projected to expand by 10.4 percent and 8.3 percent\nin 2024, respectively, thanks to oil and gas projects coming online. Overall, the growth divergence between\nresource-intensive and non-resource-intensive (diversified) countries is expected to persist—a long-standing\npattern, becoming particularly entrenched since the commodity-price shock of 2015, with the former group of\ncountries projected to grow at 3.0 percent, and the latter at 5.7 percent in 2024.\nIn 2025, sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow by 4.0 percent, with private consumption and investment\ncontinuing their recovery. In the baseline, other frontier markets beyond Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Kenya are\nexpected to start issuing in 2025 or later. This will help ease the funding squeeze in those countries and support\nthe recovery. In the medium term, the region’s growth is anticipated to stabilize at around 4.3 percent, with\nnon-resource-intensive countries expected to grow almost twice as fast as their resource-heavy counterparts,\n6.2 percent compared to 3.5 percent.\n… and when accounting for population growth, the income gap with the rest of\nthe world is widening.\nThe growth pick-up masks another critical concern: the stalled progress in per capita income convergence, a\nchallenge magnified by the region’s unparalleled population growth. From 2000 to 2024, sub-Saharan Africa’s\nreal income per person grew by almost 75 percent, outstripping that of advanced economies, who only saw a\n35 percent increase. Nonetheless, this achievement dims when comparing to emerging market and developing\neconomies (EMDEs) outside the region, where real income per person more than tripled over the same period\n(Figure 6). More worryingly, since 2014, growth in sub-Saharan Africa’s real per capita income has seen a marked\nslowdown, diverging further away from other EMDEs.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 7\nThe expected rebound is subject to significant risks and uncertainties.\nFigure 6. Real GDP Per Capita, 2000–25 2000\nImportantly, the growth pick-up is linked intricately Fi(gInudreex , 62.0 R00e =a l1 G00D)P Per Capita, 2000–25 01\nto domestic and global developments. Domestically, (Index, 2000 = 100) 02\nthe economic outlook hinges on the effectiveness of 380 03\nongoing domestic reforms. In South Africa, efforts to 330 O de th v e e r lo e p m in e g r g e i c n o g n m om ar i k e e s t and 04\n05\nmitigate the energy crisis through improved electricity\nNon-resource-\n280 06\nsupply are underway but electoral uncertainties loom intensive\ncountries 07\nlarge which could derail the reform momentum. Nigeria 230\nSub-\n08\nis developing a comprehensive private sector-led Saharan\n180 Africa 09\ngrowth agenda, by addressing long-standing distortions\n10\n130 Resource-intensive\nin the foreign exchange market, boosting oil production,\ncountries 11\nand enhancing revenue mobilization. 80 12\n2000 5 10 15 20 25 Proj.\n13\nWith the likelihood of a hard landing receding as adverse Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF\n14\nsupply shocks unwind, risks to the global outlook are staff calculations.\nNote: The series show the evolution of GDP per capita iPn constant 15\nbroadly balanced. There is scope for further upside\nlocal currency. Country group composites are calculated as the 16\nsurprises to global growth, including faster disinflation, arithmetic average of data for individual countries weighted by GDP\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlookdatabase; and 17\nvalued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.\nand faster economic recovery in China. However, risks to IMF staff calculations. 18\nthe outlook for sub-Saharan Africa seem more tilted to the dowNontsei:d Teh,e w siethrie tsh seh foowl ltohwe ienvgol ugtlioonb oafl GshDoPc pkesr pcaaprtitiac ularly 19\nrelevant for the region:2 in constant local currency. Country group composites 20\nare calculated as the arithmetic average of data for\n21\nƒ A faltering global economy. In a downside scenario wheirned ivmidaujaol rc oeucnotrnieos mweieigsh tleikde b yC GhDinPa v aalnuded tahte European\n22\nUnion underperform, global growth would suffer a substapnutricahla asinngd ploawsteirn pga rsitlyo awsd ao swhnar.e T ohf itso tealx gterorunpa lG dDePm. and\n23\nSSA = sub-Saharan Africa.\nshock would have notable repercussions for sub-Saharan Africa, affecting the region through several channels 24 Proj.\nincluding lower export demand, exchange rate depreciation, a decline in remittances sent by the African 25 Proj.\ndiaspora, and lower commodity prices. As a result, growth in sub-Saharan Africa would be about 1 percentage\npoint lower than in the baseline for 2024 and 2025, with oil exporters being hit the hardest. However, with\ndeclining commodity prices and quicker disinflation, monetary policies would relax more rapidly, setting the\nstage for a modest growth recovery in 2026.\nƒ Elevated geopolitical risks. An escalation of the conflict in theF Miguidrde l7e. EGaesot pwooliutilcda rle Rsiuslkt iann fdu rSthheipr pdiinsgru Cpotisotnss, to\nsupply chains, transportation routes, and commodity 2016–23\nFigure 7. Geopolitical Risk and Shipping Costs,\nproduction, ultimately driving up the prices of 20 ( 1 In 6 de –2 x, 3 2022 = 100)\ncommodities and shipping costs (Figure 7). Relative to (Index, 2022 = 100)\nthe baseline, oil and gas prices would be (on average) 500\n15 percent higher in both 2024 and 2025. At the same\ntime, prices of agricultural goods and processed food 400\nwould rise. Model simulations suggest that the overall Geopolitical\n300\nnegative growth impact on sub-Saharan Africa would\nbe relatively muted. However, countries in the region\n200\nthat are less reliant on natural resources would expe-\nrience a significant downturn, with growth lower by 100\nabout 1.3 percentage points in 2024. Importantly, Balticdry index\n0\ninflation would remain elevated for a longer period\nDec-15 Dec-17 Dec-19 Dec-21 Dec-23\nacross the region, deviating upward from baseline\nSources: Caldara and Iacoviello (2022); Haver Analytics; and IMF\nprojections by about 1.9 and 1.5 percentage points in staffS coaulrccuelast:i oCnasl.dara and Iacoviello (2022); Haver\n2024 and 2025, respectively. NotAen: Calayltdicasra; aanndd IIaMcFo vsietallfof c(2a0lc2u2l)a dtiaotnas d.ownloaded on February\n16, N20o2te4:, Cfroamld ahrtatp asn:/d/m Iaacttoevoiiealcloo v(i2e0ll2o2.c)o dma/tgap dr.ohwtmn.loaded\n2 The two downside risk scenarios are consistent with the global risk scena o r n io F s e p b r r e u s a e ry n t 1 e 6 d , i 2 n 0 t 2 h 4 e , A fro p m ril 2024 World Economic Outlook\nreport. To quantify the downside scenarios, model simulations are presehntttepds :i/n/m thaitste soeiactcioovni ebllaos.ecodm o/ng pthr.eh tAmF.RMOD—a module part\nof the flexible system of global models developed by Andrle and others (2015)— which is one of the IMF’s workhorse macroeconomic\nmodels.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n8 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nOn top of the global economic risks, sub-Saharan Africa faces increasing region-specific risks (see also IMF 2024).\nThe risk of social and political tensions has increased significantly because of mounting geopolitical fragmenta-\ntion, coups d’état, and a cost-of-living crisis that has left many behind, worsened by the effects of climate change.\nRising social tensions and many upcoming elections raise concerns that efforts to reforms may slow, undercutting\nmomentum. In particular, growth may be adversely affected by the following:\nƒ Heightened security risks: The region now has one of the highest rates of terrorist attacks worldwide.3 Social\ntensions and the prospect of further violence remain elevated in Ethiopia despite a peace deal. The security\nsituation also remains challenging in several other countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic\nRepublic of the Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Moreover, the intensifying conflict in Sudan could\nfurther harm the economy and humanitarian conditions in nearby countries. As of March 2024, the UNHCR has\nreported that since the conflict began in April 2023, almost 1.3 million refugees, asylum-seekers, and returnees\nhave arrived in South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. Beyond the tragic human losses\nand disruptions to economic activity, violence and conflict further strain tight budgets, including because of the\nsurge in security spending.\nƒ Climate risks: If the drought in southern Africa continues, the negative impact on the 2024 economic outlook\ncould be significant in some countries, and the drought would also put pressures on external balances and\npublic spending. Moreover, this could exacerbate the food insecurity situation in sub-Saharan Africa, posing a\nmajor humanitarian challenge and weighing on productivity and economic prospects.\nPolicy Priorities for Adapting to High Borrowing Costs in a Shock-Prone\nWorld\nAlthough the region is finally showing signs of recovery, many countries face high borrowing costs and continue\nto grapple with tight financing constraints and ongoing debt vulnerabilities. These difficulties are compounded by\na more shock-prone world.4 Adapting to these challenges requires a resolute package of strong domestic reforms\nand external support. Domestically, there is a need for continued tightening in fiscal policy, while minimizing\nthe harm on economic development. Monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring price stability, while\ncomplementing fiscal efforts and supporting growth provided inflation is easing. Implementing structural reforms\ntargeted at broadening funding sources and diversifying the economy will be crucial to adapt to a high interest\nrate environment and build resilience. Recognizing that these reforms will take time to deliver results, there is\npressing need for countries to mobilize funding at lower costs, including from international partners.\nFiscal policy: improving public finances without undermining development\nOver the past decade, the fiscal position of many sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated, a trend\nexacerbated by repeated shocks and the ensuing demand for fiscal support. This has led to heightened debt\nvulnerabilities across the region. In response, policy efforts are now focusing on rebuilding fiscal buffers and\nreducing debt to strengthen borrowing capacity. Some countries face more urgency for fiscal tightening due\nto an acute funding squeeze, driven by rising debt service costs and limited access to financing. Together with\ncurrency depreciations, this has intensified funding constraints. For instance, Ethiopia became the latest country in\nthe region to default, failing to make a Eurobond coupon payment in December 2023.\nMost countries in sub-Saharan Africa have started adjusting their public finances. About two thirds of countries\nhave already improved their fiscal balances in 2023, with expectations for fiscal deficits to fall from a median of\n5.2 percent of GDP in 2022 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2024 (Figure 8). Although the approaches to fiscal adjustment\n3 Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for nearly 50 percent of global terrorism deaths in 2022 (Vision of Humanity’s Global Terrorism Index\n2022 report).\n4 See also Box 1.1 in the April 2024 World Economic Outlook.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 9\nFigure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants, 2019–\nvary by country, about 40 percent of those undergoing Figure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants,\n25\nconsolidation are frontloading their efforts. For instance, 2019–25\n(Median, percent of GDP)\namong the group of countries reducing their fiscal deficit (Median, percent of GDP)\nover a three-year period from 2022 to 2025, the median 0\nInterquartilerange\ncountry undertook almost half of the total adjustment in the\ninitial year, 2023.\n–3\nIn terms of composition, the ongoing fiscal adjustment efforts\nare roughly evenly split: nearly half are focused on increasing\nrevenue, whereas the other half consist in reducing spending.\n–6\nOn the latter, about half of the countries in consolidation,\nsuch as Botswana, Cameroon, and Kenya, are focusing on\npreserving their investment-to-GDP ratios while cutting –9\ncurrent spending. The rest intends to reduce capital expen- 2019 20 21 22 23 24 Proj. 25 Proj.\nditures by an average of 1.4 percent of GDP, which may slow Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nfuture growth.\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nWith rising needs, limited financing options, and borrowing costs remaining high, fiscal tightening in sub-Saharan\nAfrica has to be carried out in a way that meets the country-specific needs while minimizing harm to its economy\nand people. This will require, in particular:\nBoosting revenues. To implement the necessary adjustment, while protecting economic growth and social\nwelfare, it is key to focus on boosting revenues rather than cutting essential spending (although there is also\nscope to improve expenditure efficiency as discussed further below). Emphasizing tax increases offers a way to\nraise more funds without hurting investments in key areas like infrastructure, health, and education. The region\nfaces a tax gap, defined as the difference between the levels of tax potential and tax collection, estimated at\naround 5 percent of GDP (Analytical Note “Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa Without Undermining\nDevelopment”). This suggests a big opportunity to increase revenue through smarter tax policies and better\nadministration. Simplifying the tax system, widening the tax base, improving tax compliance, and using tech-\nnology can make tax collection more effective. The success of electronic sales registers in Ethiopia is a good\nexample of how technology can help. Creating a medium-term revenue strategy that outlines both policy changes\nand administrative improvements can guide reforms, making them easier to implement and more credible. With\ntechnical support from the IMF, countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Togo are developing\nthese strategies, while Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, and Uganda are already putting them into action. An additional\nbenefit from higher revenues is that it boosts a country’s borrowing capacity and credit-worthiness, thus, lowering\nits future borrowing costs.\nPacing the adjustment. Ideally, spreading out fiscal tightening over time would prevent sudden, disruptive\nchanges. A more backloaded adjustment path would also allow for more time to implement important reforms\nand establish measures to ease the impact. However, many countries face urgent fiscal pressures due to the\nongoing funding squeeze. Taking immediate steps towards fiscal consolidation may not only be unavoidable but\ncould also strengthen confidence in the region’s adjustment efforts. The specific approach to reducing deficits will\nvary by country. For instance, for countries rich in natural resources, a more gradual approach to fiscal tightening\nmay be warranted given that fuel commodity prices are projected to remain relatively low in the medium term.\nBuilding public trust. Gaining public support is pivotal for the success of fiscal consolidation plans. This involves\nclear communication about the importance of fiscal adjustments, their potential benefits, and the risks of delaying\naction, despite some short-term downsides for certain groups. Strategies for winning over the public include\ntargeted support to help those most affected, carefully planning the order of reforms, and demonstrating the\ngovernment’s dedication to managing finances responsibly and transparently.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n10 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nDealing with elevated debt burdens. There are significant debt vulnerabilities in the region, with 19 out of 35\nlow-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa either in debt distress or at high risk of distress as of end-2023. Besides\nfiscal consolidation, some countries can also adopt additional measures including enhancing debt reporting, refi-\nnancing and—in collaboration with creditors—extending loan maturities and spreading out repayments. Improving\npublic financial management and risk management, boosting fiscal transparency, and monitoring state-owned\nenterprises are key to help control “stock-flow adjustments,” triggered by issues like accrued arrears, increased\noff-budget spending, and expanded guarantees. However, several countries (Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia)\nin the region are currently in the process of restructuring their debt under the G20 Common Framework for Debt\nTreatment. The coordination among creditors has been challenging but there has been some progress as well.\nGhana reached an agreement-in-principle on a debt treatment with its official bilateral creditors in January 2024,\nin under half the time required for Chad two years prior, and Ethiopia’s debt standstill at the end of 2023 was also\na positive development. After reaching an agreement with official creditors in June 2023, the Zambian authorities\nand the Eurobond holders’ Steering Committee agreed on a debt treatment in line with program parameters and\ncomparability of treatment set under the G20 Common Framework, in March 2024. Steps to improve this process\nfurther include the introduction of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable created by the IMF, World Bank, and\nthe G20 to better coordinate creditors and address restructuring issues.\nMonetary policy: maintaining price stability while supporting growth\nHeadline inflation in sub-Saharan Africa has been Fig F u ig re u r 9 e . 9 M . M ed e i d a i n an In In fl f a la t t i i o o n n , , D D e ec ce em m b b e e r r 2 2 0 0 2 2 1– 1–\ndeclining since reaching its peak in November 2022, Feb F r e u b a ru ry a r 2 y 0 2 2 0 4 24\n(Percent, yearoveryear)\nwith the situation varying across countries (Figure 9). (Percent, year over year)\nIdeally, monetary policy can complement fiscal efforts 26\nCountries where inflation\nand support growth. However, based on latest available\nis still increasing or volatile\n22\ndata from February 2024, roughly a third of the countries\nstill face double-digit inflation, largely due to signifi- 18\ncant currency depreciations (notably in Angola, Malawi,\n14\nNigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Even among countries Sub-Saharan Africa\nwith a marked decline in inflation, only a select few have 10\nreduced policy interest rates over the past 12 months\n6 Countries where inflation\n(Botswana, Ghana, and Mozambique). The majority have\nis declining\nopted to continue tightening or maintain elevated policy 2\nDec-21 Jun-22 Dec-22 Jun-23 Dec-23\nrates, even after inflation has passed its peak.\nSources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff\ncalculations.\nThis cautious stance in monetary policy stems from two\nNoSteo: uCrocuenst:r Cy goruonutpryin agust,h coornitsieissti;n Hg aovf ear fiAxneadl ysetitc os;f aconudn ItMrieFs ,\nkey factors. First, median core inflation only recently are categorized based on the evolution of inflation over the past\nstaff calculations.\napproached the levels seen before the pandemic. Second, three months. In over half of the countries, inflation is declining.\nNote: Country groupings are based on evolutionof inflation\nsub-Saharan African countries started their monetary\nfor the last 3 months. In over half of the countries, inflation\ntightening cycles later than other EMDEs, leaving them to play cisa tdcehc-liunpin gw.hile many EMDEs have started easing\nsince the second half of 2023. This timing has resulted in a delayed cycle of tight monetary conditions, with the\nregion’s median policy rate peaking roughly 12 months later than in other EMDEs.\nNonetheless, signs are growing that more countries in the region could soon have more space to lower interest\nrates. This is demonstrated by monetary policy rates in real terms becoming increasingly positive across the region\n(Figure 10). Furthermore, about half of the countries with an implicit or explicit inflation target have already seen\ninflation return below or within their target bands as of February 2024 (Figure 11).\nPolicymakers grappling with high borrowing costs, repercussions of fiscal adjustments, and mediocre growth face\nthe delicate task of balancing price stability and cushioning the negative impact of fiscal consolidation where\npossible. In particular:\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 11\nFigure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates, February\nƒ About half of the countries in2 02th4e region show Figure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates,\nclear signs of easing inflation(aPreyr cpenrte)ssures, with February 2024\ninflation already below or within their target bands. (Percent)\nCentral banks may consider gradually easing to a Ghana\nCongo, Dem. Rep.\nmore neutral policy stance. This move would allow\nMozambique\nfor more accommodative financing conditions, Malawi\nKenya\nboosting private investment and mitigating the\nUganda\nimpact of fiscal consolidation. CEMAC\nEswatini\nƒ In nearly one third of the countries, inflation is The Gambia\ntrending lower but moderately exceeds targets. Tanzania\nZambia\nA “pause” in policy tightening may be warranted to South Africa Based on end-2024\ninflation\nensure confidence in achieving price stability. Namibia\nLesotho Based on end-2023\nƒ As for the rest, where inflation significantly exceeds Rwanda inflation\nSeychelles\ntarget policy rate and continues to rise, policymakers Angola\nshould decisively tighten monetary policy until WAEMU\nGuinea\ninflation is firmly on a downward trajectory and\nMauritius\nprojected to return to the central bank’s target Nigeria\nBotswana\nrange. Maintaining price stability should be the\nSierra Leone (-30)\nimmediate goal, and policies to reduce inflation\n–20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15\ncan be accompanied by measures to alleviate the\nSources: Haver Analytics; IMF International Financial Statistics\ncost-of-living crisis. Where moSnoeutrcaersy: Hfianvearn Acnianlygti csi;s a nd IMdFa tIanbtearsnea;t iaonnda lI MFiFna sntacffia lc alculations.\nStatistics database; and IMF staff calculations.\ncommon, ending this practice and implementing Note: CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary\nNote: CEMAC = Central African CEcoomnmomuinci tayn, dW MAoEnMeUta r=y West African Economic and Monetary Union.\nsterilization are essential (for example, Ethiopia). In\nCommunity, WAEMU = West African Economic and\ncases where monetary policy is Mtooone atacryc oUmniomn.odative\nFigure 11. Sub-SaharanAfrica: Actual versus\nand contributing to inflation, central banks should FiguTraerg 1e1t .I nAfclattuioanl ,v Feersburusa Trayr g20e2t4 Inflation,\nwithdraw excess liquidity, particularly if monetary Feb(rNuuamryb e2r0 o2f 4co untries)\npolicy transmission is impaired (Angola, CEMAC, (Number of countries)\nNigeria). 20\n18\nMore generally, enhanced coordination between 16\nfiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies is crucial 14\n12\nto prevent excessively loose monetary conditions\n10\nthat might restart inflationary pressures. For instance,\n8\nmonetary policy tightening could be particularly 6\nrelevant when fiscal adjustments lead to higher inflation 4\n(for example, due to the removal of energy subsidies). 2\n0\nHowever, higher monetary policy rates could raise\nBelow or within band Moderately above Markedly above\nfinancing costs, contributing to higher government\nSources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff\ninterest payments. This needs to be accommodated calcuSlaotiuorncse.s: Country authorities;Haver Analytics; and\nwithin the existing budget. Clear forward-looking NoteI:M InFfl asttiaofnf cdaaltcau rleafteiorsn sto. February 2024, or the latest available.\nModerately above = between the upper bound of band and twice\ncommunication on policy goals including by disclosing the upper bound. Markedly above = exceeding twice the upper\ndetails about the timing of policy actions could bound of band.\neffectively manage market expectations and minimize uncertainty.\nExchange rate pressures and foreign currency shortages remain major concerns for policymakers. In 2023, most\ncurrencies in the region depreciated against the US dollar (Figure 12). The slower increase in monetary policy\nrates in sub-Saharan African countries compared to advanced economies contributed to the region’s exchange\nrate depreciations. Other factors include decreased capital inflows, headwinds to exports, and the monetization\nof high fiscal deficits in few countries.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n12 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\ng g\nFor countries with a flexible exchange rate regime and Figure 12. Exchange Rates, January 2023–\nRates, January 2023–February 2024\npersistent exchange rate pressures, a combination of February 2024\n(Percent change versus US dollar)\nexchange rate adjustment, monetary policy tightening (Percent change versus US dollar)\nand targeted measures to alleviate the adverse\nCEMAC/WAEMU\neffects continues to be needed. The policy response Guinea\nMozambique\nis constrained by the modest level of external buffers,\nMadagascar\nwith about 80 percent of the countries having reserves Seychelles\nMauritius\nbelow 5 months of imports at end-2023. Moreover, the\nUganda\nuse of import restrictions and administrative measures Ethiopia\nBotswana\nare particularly discouraged as they are distortive and\nThe Gambia\ndeter economic activity and investment. For countries Tanzania\nSouth Africa\nwith pegged regimes, the main objective is to maintain\nKenya\nan adequate level of foreign exchange reserves, aligning Sierra Leone\nRwanda\npolicy rates with their respective anchor currency policy\nLiberia\nrate to preserve external stability. Ghana\nZambia\nCongo, Dem. Rep.\nStructural reforms: broadening Burundi\nMalawi\nfinancing sources and diversifying\nAngola\ngrowth opportunities Nigeria\n-80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0\nPast reports’ recommendations on structural reforms\nSources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.\nremain relevant for driving growth and development\nNote: CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary\nin sub-Saharan Africa. However, in a context marked by Community; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.\nhigher borrowing costs and a more shock-prone world,\nthe structural policy priorities outlined below target these specific challenges.\nNavigating higher borrowing costs entails finding more affordable and stable alternative financing sources but\nalso spending more wisely:\nAttracting foreign direct investment. The role of FDI has been vital for development in many emerging market\neconomies, where it has provided stable financing, technology access, and job creation. However, sub-Saharan\nAfrica captures a mere 3 percent of global FDI. Given high borrowing costs, prioritizing cost-effective and viable\nreforms becomes essential to mobilize more FDI. Focusing on reforms that ensure macroeconomic stability and\nreduce policy uncertainty can already elevate investor confidence. Other effective measures include enhancing\nthe business environment, leveling the playing field between public and private firms, reducing red tape, and\nimproving governance. For instance, Senegal dramatically shortened the setup time for new businesses from\ntwo months to just 48 hours by streamlining administrative processes and reducing transactions costs. This\nmove greatly contributed to enhancing its attractiveness to investors, as seen in the rise of net FDI inflows from\n1.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 9.3 percent in 2022, including in the hydrocarbon sector.\nFostering domestic financial markets. Developing domestic markets could also offer an alternative funding source\nfor the region. So far, these markets are less developed compared to other regions. Excluding South Africa, the\naverage stock exchange market capitalization is less than 20 percent of a country’s GDP, significantly lower than\nthe 50 percent in other EMDEs and far below the 126 percent in advanced economies (Figure 13). Strengthening\nfinancial markets requires building strong institutional frameworks that safeguard property rights and contract\nenforcement, promoting bank competition, and enhancing financial infrastructure. Like in the case of attracting\nFDI, governments also need to ensure economic stability as well as increase transparency and reduce risks. In\nturn, better domestic financial markets would allow for more productive use of savings—often kept as nonfinancial\nassets—by converting them into investment capital. Given that small and medium enterprises constitute the\nmajority of the region’s private sector, fostering financial inclusion through the development of mobile banking,\nmicrofinance and financial literacy would improve these enterprises’ access to funding.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 13\nFigure 13. Stock Exchange Market\nCapitalization, 2023\nFigure 13. Stock Exchange Market Capitalization, Improving the quality and efficiency of public\n(Percent of GDP,average)\n2023 spending. Facing higher borrowing costs and tighter\n(Percent of GDP, average) financing constraints, it is vital to spend every penny\nwisely to ensure the highest return possible. However,\n120\nsub-Saharan African countries have to bridge a signifi-\n100\ncant gap in public spending efficiency, with nearly half\n80 of the potential value from public investments going\nunrealized—significantly worse than the 34 percent inef-\n60\nficiency found in other emerging market economies\n40\nin 2020.5 This calls for a more strategic approach in\n20 project selection, ensuring transparent procurement,\n0 and minimizing project management costs. Investments\nAdvanced economies Emerging market and Sub-Saharan Africa ² should prioritize sectors with high private and social\ndeveloping economies¹\nreturns including infrastructure, education, and health-\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Federation\ncare, aligning with sustainable development goals.\nof Exchanges; and IMF staff calculations.\nNSotoeu: rTchees :s aIMmFp,le W inocrlludd Eesc o7n9o smtoicck O euxctlhoaonkg deas tfarobmas 7e0; Wcoournldtr ies. Moreover, fighting corruption can enhance investment\n1 EFxecdluedraintgio snu obf- SEaxhcahraann gAefrsic; aa. n2 dE xIMcluFd sintagf fS coaultchu Alafrtiiocan.s. quality and bolster public trust.\nNote: The sample includes 79 stock exchanges from 70\nInc oau snhtroiecsk.-prone world, diversifying sources of economic growth is vital to lessen volatility and build resilience:\n1 Excluding sub-Saharan Africa.\nA2c Ecxeclleurdaintgin Sgo uethc oAnfroicma.ic diversification. Natural resource-intensive countries in the region represent nearly\nthree quarters of the region’s aggregate GDP as of 2022. This heavy reliance exposes them to the volatility of\nglobal commodity prices. Moreover, the eight oil exporters are expected to see a significant reduction in their\noil revenues, projected to be only half of their 2020 levels by 2050, under a conservative transition scenario\ntowards clean energy (Analytical note “Managing Oil Price Uncertainty and the Energy Transition”, October 2022).\nTo mitigate these risks and build resilience, diversifying their economies away from oil is crucial. This includes\nexpanding into manufacturing, services, and technology. For countries in the region rich in critical minerals that\nare essential for the clean energy transition, diversification could entail moving from extracting and exporting\nraw minerals to processing them, thereby increasing value added, creating higher-skilled jobs, and fostering\ntechnological spillovers (Analytical Note “Digging for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in\nCritical Minerals”). Over the medium term, encouraging policies that support innovation, skill development, and\nbetter logistics and connectivity are key to achieving a structural transformation that makes the economy more\ncompetitive and resilient.\nIntegrating with regional trade partners. By expanding trade relationships beyond traditional partners,\nAfrican countries can diversify export destinations and import sources, mitigating the risks associated with\neconomic downturns in any single region. The African Continental Free Trade Area offers a significant oppor-\ntunity in this regard, but its success hinges on substantial reduction in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, robust\ntrade facilitation, as well as improvement in trade environment and infrastructure. To date, the implementation\nof these measures has been slow and narrow, confined to a few countries and a limited range of actions. If fully\nimplemented, the median goods trade within Africa could increase by 53 percent and with the rest of the world\nby 15 percent (El-Ganainy and others, 2023). Bolstering regional integration can also forge a larger and more\ninterconnected market, enhancing the region’s investment appeal.\nCalling for International Support and Solidarity\nReforms will take time to deliver results. In the meantime, countries in sub-Saharan Africa will need support from\nthe international community. The estimated gross external financing needs for low-income countries (LICs) in the\nregion amount to about $70 billion annually (6 percent of GDP) from 2024 to 2028 (Figure 14). It is crucial that\n5 Based on analysis using IMF Public Investment and Capital Stock Database and IMF Fiscal Affairs Department PIMA database.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n14 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan African Low-Income\nboth multilateral and official bilateral creditors continue to Figure 14. Sub-Saharan African Low-Income\nCountries:Gross External Financing Needs,\nplay a key role in providing financing to the region and Countries: Gross External Financing Needs,\n2020–28\nsupporting domestic policy and reform efforts. However, 2020–28\n(Billions of US dollars)\nthis comes at a time when these creditors and donors (Billions of US dollars)\nhave been struggling with many competing global 80 External debt amortization Current account deficit\ndemands. Ongoing discussions on how to enhance the\nuse of multilateral and regional development banks’ 60\nbalance sheets could help deliver more financing to LICs\n(Holland and Pazarbasioglu 2024). Likewise, continued\n40\nreevaluations of country engagements by official bilateral\ndonors and creditors—traditional providers of ODA and\n20\nnon-Paris creditors—could enhance the allocation of\nlimited concessional funds and grants, including to the\n0\npoorest. 2020 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28\nProjections\nFor some countries facing external financing gaps,\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF\nseeking assistance from the IMF might be necessary. In\nSstoauffr ccealsc:u IlMatFio,nWs.orld Economic Outlook database; and\nfact, over the past four years, the IMF has emerged as a INMoFt es:t aAfgf gcraelcgualtaet igornoss.s external financing needs for low-income\nkey supporter of sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2020, there has N co o u te n : t r A ie g s g r c e o g rr a e t s e p g o r n o d s s to e x th te e r n s a um l fi n o a f n a c ll i n p g o n si e ti e v d e s g f r o o r s l s o w ex - ternal\nfinancing needs within the group.\nbeen a surge in demand for financial assistance across income countries correspond to the sum of all positive\nthe region, with the IMF disbursing $34 billion in financing, mgruocshs eoxft eitrn oanl f icnaonnccinegs snieoendas lw tiethrimn tsh. eT ghreo u2p0.21 Special\nDrawing Rights (SDR) allocations contributed another $23 billion, bringing the total support to approximately\n$58 billion, which also includes $0.8 billion from the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust. Currently, more\nthan half of sub-Saharan African countries (27 out of 45) benefit from IMF financing arrangements, with around\n$6 billion distributed in 2023 alone.\nThe IMF is placing stronger emphasis on inclusive growth, including more support to help countries increase\nsocial spending. In recent years, nearly all new IMF programs in sub-Saharan Africa have included social spending\ntargets, with an estimated median set at around 2 percent of GDP over 2022 and 2023. Attention to climate\nissues has grown as well. Since December 2022, nine sub-Saharan African nations (Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon,\nCôte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Seychelles) have secured arrangements under the new\nResilience and Sustainability Facility. The IMF also plays a crucial role in capacity development (CD), providing\ntechnical assistance and training. Notably, sub-Saharan Africa received nearly 40 percent of the IMF’s direct CD\ndelivery in 2023. The forthcoming Domestic Resource Mobilization Initiative, designed to help tackle funding\nchallenges and assist member countries securing resources for development needs, should prove especially\nvaluable for the region.\nFinally, three key milestones highlight the IMF’s concerted efforts to meet the evolving needs of the region. First,\nIMF member countries’ quotas were increased by 50 percent following the completion of the 16th General Review\nof Quotas, which was accompanied by a collective commitment to explore strategies for quota realignment by\nJune 2025. A second major development was enhancing sub-Saharan Africa’s voice within the IMF by adding\na 25th seat to the Executive Board, allowing for a third representative for African countries. This decision\nunderscored the importance of ensuring diverse voices and perspectives at the highest levels of decision-making.\nThese developments align with global efforts to amplify Africa’s influence in the global arena, highlighted by\nthe African Union’s permanent membership in the G20 and South Africa’s upcoming G20 chairmanship in 2025.\nLastly, first-stage fundraising goals for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), the IMF’s concessional\nlending instrument, were achieved. By March 2024, a total of $19.5 billion had been raised for PRGT lending\nresources, along with $3.1 billion for PRGT subsidy resources. Later this year, the IMF will review its PRGT facilities\nand financing to enhance its concessional financing for LICs, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Amidst a\nvolatile global economy, the goal of the review is to strike a balance between ensuring adequate financial support\nto LICs and restoring the PRGT’s long-term financial sustainability.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 15\nReferences\nAndrle, Michal, Patrick Blagrave, Pedro Espaillat, Keiko Honjo, Benjamin Hunt, Mika Kortelainen, René Lalonde,\nDouglas Laxton, Eleonara Mavroeidi, Dirk Muir, and Sussana Mursula. 2015. “The Flexible System of Global\nModels–FSGM.” IMF Working Paper 2015/64, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nCaldara, Dario, and Matteo Iacoviello. 2022. “Measuring Geopolitical Risk.” American Economic Review 112,\nno. 4: 1194–1225.\nEbeke, Christian, and Dilan Ölcer. 2013 “Fiscal Policy over the Election Cycle in Low-Income Countries.”\nIMF Working Paper 2013/153, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nEl-Ganainy, Asmaa A., Shushanik Hakobyan, Fei Liu, Hans Weisfeld, Céline Allard, Hippolyte W. Balima,\nCeline Bteish, Rahul Giri, Daniel S. Kanda, Sergii Meleshchuk, and Gustavo Ramirez. 2023 “Trade Integration\nin Africa: Unleashing the Continent’s Potential in a Changing World.” Departmental Paper 2023/3,\nInternational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nFofack, Hippolyte. 2021. “The Ruinous Price for Africa of Pernicious ‘Perception Premiums’.” AGI, Brookings\nInstitution Report, October.\nGaspar, Vitor, Sanjeev Gupta, and Carlos Mulas-Granados. 2017. “Fiscal politics.” International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC.\nGbohoui, William, Rasmané Ouedraogo, and Y. Modeste Some. 2023. “Sub-Saharan Africa’s Risk Perception\nPremium: In the Search of Missing Factors.” IMF Working Paper 2023/130, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC.\nGriffith-Jones, Stephany, and Moritz Kraemer. 2021. “Credit rating agencies and developing economies.”\nUN/DESA Working Paper No. 175.\nHolland, Allison and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu. 2024. “How to Ease Rising External Debt-Service Pressures in\nLow-Income Countries” IMF Blog, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.\nInternational Monetary Fund. 2024. “Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects for Low-Income Countries.”\nIMF Policy Paper 2024/011, Washington, DC.\nPresbitero, Andrea, Dhaneshwar Ghura, Olumuyiwa S. Adedeji, and Lamin Njie. 2016. “Sovereign bonds in\ndeveloping countries: Drivers of issuance and spreads.” Review of Development Finance 6, no. 1: 1–15.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 17\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff estimates\nas of March 29, 2024, consistent with the projections underlying the April 2024 World Economic Outlook.\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department. Data defini-\ntions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible. However, in some cases,\ndata limitations limit comparability across countries.\nCountry Groupings\nƒ Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive countries,\nand non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.\nƒ The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent\nor more of total exports.\nƒ The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other\nresource-intensive countries.\nƒ Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and\ncountries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged\nover three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.\nƒ The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 of more than $1,135.00\n(World Bank, using the Atlas method).\nƒ The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 equal to or lower\nthan $1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\nƒ The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification of\nFragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.\nƒ The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown on page\nvi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC; the\nCommon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community (EAC-5); the Economic\nCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and\nthe Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which\njoined the group only in 2007.\nMethods of Aggregation\nƒ In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as\nthe arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity\nas a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook\n(WEO) database.\nƒ In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of data\nfor individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP. The\nsource of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.\nƒ In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic average\nof data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share of total\ngroup GDP.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n18 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4\nTables SA1.,SA3.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2024, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–29 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA2.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2024, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–29 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2024–25 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA4.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2024, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for\nreserves data.\n2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for\nreserves data.\n3 Data and projections for 2020–29 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n4 Official Reserves include foreign assets held by Ghana Petroleum and Stabilization Fund and exclude\nencumbered assets.\n5 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2024–25 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n6 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 19\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025\nAngola 2.0 –5.6 1.2 3.0 0.5 2.6 3.1 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.6 22.0 12.8\nBenin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.3 5.8 6.0 6.0 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 2.8 3.0 2.0\nBotswana 4.1 –8.7 11.9 5.8 3.2 3.6 4.6 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.1 4.0 4.5\nBurkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 1.8 3.6 5.5 5.8 1.0 1.9 3.9 13.8 0.9 2.1 2.0\nBurundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 2.7 4.3 5.4 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 27.0 22.0 20.0\nCabo Verde 3.0 –20.8 5.6 17.1 4.8 4.7 4.7 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 3.1 2.0 2.0\nCameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.2 5.9 5.5\nCentral African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.6 3.2 4.7 4.6\nChad 2.8 –2.1 –0.9 3.1 4.4 2.9 3.7 1.9 5.3 –1.6 6.9 2.7 3.1 3.1\nComoros 3.1 –0.2 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.0 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.4 8.5 2.0 2.2\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.0 8.8 6.1 4.7 5.7 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.9 17.2 8.5\nCongo, Republic of 0.3 –6.3 1.1 1.7 4.0 4.4 3.2 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.6 3.0\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.6 0.7 7.1 6.9 6.2 6.5 6.4 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.0\nEquatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.8 –0.4 3.2 –5.9 0.5 –4.6 2.5 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.5 4.4 1.8\nEritrea1 4.6 … … … … … … 2.6 … … … … … …\nEswatini 2.5 –1.6 10.7 0.5 5.1 3.7 3.3 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.9 3.9 3.1\nEthiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.2 6.2 6.5 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 30.2 25.6 18.2\nGabon 3.7 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.6 2.1 2.2\nThe Gambia 2.5 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 5.8 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 15.1 10.5\nGhana 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.1 2.3 2.8 4.4 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.7 37.5 22.3 11.5\nGuinea 6.2 4.7 5.6 4.0 5.7 4.1 5.6 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 7.8 11.0 10.2\nGuinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 4.2 4.2 5.0 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.2 3.0 2.0\nKenya 4.7 –0.3 7.6 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.3 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 6.6 5.5\nLesotho 1.3 –5.3 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.5 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.3 6.3 6.4 5.4\nLiberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.3 6.2 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.1 6.3 5.1\nMadagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.0 3.8 4.5 4.6 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 9.9 7.8 7.3\nMalawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 1.6 3.3 3.8 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 30.3 27.9 14.7\nMali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.5 1.1 0.5 3.8 9.7 2.1 1.0 2.0\nMauritius 3.7 –14.5 3.4 8.9 6.9 4.9 3.7 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.0 4.9 3.6\nMozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.4 4.4 6.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 6.1 4.4 5.5\nNamibia 2.8 –8.1 3.5 4.6 3.2 2.6 2.6 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 5.9 4.8 4.8\nNiger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.9 1.4 10.4 6.1 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 3.7 6.4 4.6\nNigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.0 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 24.7 26.3 23.0\nRwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 8.2 6.9 6.9 7.0 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.0 5.8 5.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 –0.3 2.9 4.1 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 21.2 14.2 7.8\nSenegal 5.0 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.1 8.3 10.2 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 5.9 3.9 2.0\nSeychelles 6.6 –11.7 0.6 15.0 3.7 3.2 3.8 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.6 –1.0 -0.2 2.6\nSierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.5 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 47.7 39.1 21.7\nSouth Africa 1.6 –6.0 4.7 1.9 0.6 0.9 1.2 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.9 4.9 4.5\nSouth Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 –5.2 –0.1 5.6 6.8 98.6 24.0 30.2 –3.2 40.2 54.8 21.7\nTanzania 6.7 4.5 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.5 6.0 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 4.0\nTogo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.3 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.1 2.7 2.0\nUganda 5.3 –1.1 5.5 6.3 4.8 5.6 6.5 6.8 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.4 3.8 4.9\nZambia 4.3 –2.8 6.2 5.2 4.3 4.7 4.8 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 11.0 11.4 7.8\nZimbabwe2 4.6 –7.8 8.4 6.5 5.3 3.2 3.2 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 667.4 561.0 554.7\nSub-Saharan Africa 3.8 –1.6 4.7 4.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 8.3 10.2 11.0 14.5 16.2 15.3 12.4\nMedian 4.4 –1.2 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.5 3.6 4.6 8.2 6.7 4.9 4.8\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 –0.1 5.2 5.0 4.5 4.9 5.3 8.0 11.2 10.7 15.2 16.0 14.1 10.6\nResource-intensive countries 3.1 –2.5 4.1 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.2 8.8 11.0 11.5 14.7 17.5 17.2 14.2\nOil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.1 3.2 2.5 3.3 3.0 11.1 12.9 15.7 17.1 20.1 22.4 18.6\nExcluding Nigeria 2.1 –3.6 1.6 3.0 1.6 3.1 3.2 10.0 12.2 12.7 12.8 9.5 13.0 8.3\nOther resource-intensive countries 3.4 –2.7 5.1 3.5 2.4 2.8 3.3 6.5 9.2 7.7 12.5 15.0 12.5 10.2\nExcluding South Africa 5.6 0.4 5.5 5.0 4.1 4.5 5.1 8.1 15.4 10.9 18.1 24.2 19.8 15.4\nNon-resource-intensive countries 5.9 0.8 6.5 5.7 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 7.9 9.8 14.1 12.9 10.7 8.1\nMiddle-income countries 3.1 –2.9 4.5 3.4 2.6 3.2 3.3 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 14.3 14.0 11.4\nLow-income countries 6.0 1.8 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.7 8.8 14.9 12.5 18.3 21.3 18.6 15.1\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.1 10.2 15.6 16.3 20.3 25.6 25.1 21.2\nCFA franc zone 4.4 0.3 4.5 4.8 4.2 5.5 5.4 1.6 2.5 2.7 6.5 4.2 3.7 3.1\nCEMAC 2.5 –1.5 1.8 3.1 2.7 3.4 3.1 2.2 2.9 1.2 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.0\nWAEMU 5.7 1.3 6.0 5.7 4.9 6.6 6.6 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.0 3.8 3.4 2.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) 5.9 0.4 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.3 5.6 9.4 17.3 14.7 19.6 23.9 20.6 16.4\nEAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.9 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.1 6.8 5.5 5.1\nECOWAS 4.0 –0.7 4.4 3.9 3.4 4.1 4.1 9.3 10.2 12.7 16.9 20.1 19.4 15.8\nSACU 1.7 –6.1 5.0 2.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.9 4.8 4.5\nSADC 2.8 –4.2 4.6 3.4 2.2 2.6 3.0 7.7 10.8 9.6 11.7 13.3 13.0 10.7\nSee sources on page 18.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n20 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025\nAngola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 0.7 –0.1 2.7 3.1 59.8 138.7 83.7 64.8 84.5 70.3 61.8\nBenin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 –4.5 –3.7 –2.9 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 54.2 53.4 52.4\nBotswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 0.0 –0.6 –3.6 –0.7 17.6 18.7 18.7 17.8 19.4 17.9 16.8\nBurkina Faso –3.3 –5.2 –7.5 –10.7 –6.8 –5.7 –4.7 31.1 43.8 55.6 58.4 61.9 63.3 63.4\nBurundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –10.6 –9.1 –5.9 –3.3 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 62.8 72.7 62.7\nCabo Verde –5.0 –9.3 –7.7 –4.3 –0.3 –3.2 –2.1 102.1 148.1 153.1 127.5 115.4 112.2 108.0\nCameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 –0.7 –0.4 –0.4 27.6 44.9 46.8 45.3 41.9 39.2 36.5\nCentral African Republic –0.9 –3.4 –6.0 –5.3 –3.5 –3.1 –1.9 47.5 44.4 48.5 54.2 55.7 55.6 54.4\nChad –0.7 1.2 –1.4 4.2 –1.3 –1.0 –0.7 30.7 41.2 42.1 35.9 35.1 32.3 31.4\nComoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –4.0 –4.5 –3.4 –2.4 18.1 24.3 26.3 28.1 33.2 35.5 36.3\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 0.5 –3.2 –1.8 –0.5 –2.2 –1.6 –1.2 18.0 16.2 15.7 14.3 14.3 11.1 8.9\nCongo, Republic of –2.1 –1.1 1.6 8.9 3.6 4.9 3.6 59.7 102.5 97.8 92.5 100.8 94.6 89.4\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.8 –6.6 –5.2 –4.0 –3.0 32.4 46.3 50.2 55.3 57.1 57.7 56.9\nEquatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.8 2.6 13.6 1.7 3.3 0.6 25.2 49.4 42.1 34.6 42.4 37.7 36.8\nEritrea1 –2.3 … … … … … … 235.6 … … … … … …\nEswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 –3.8 –1.1 –0.9 –2.7 22.5 41.0 40.2 41.0 37.8 37.2 38.0\nEthiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 –2.5 –2.0 –2.5 49.2 53.7 53.8 47.1 38.0 30.5 28.6\nGabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 –0.7 –1.8 –4.2 –6.4 44.5 78.3 65.8 63.6 70.5 73.1 78.9\nThe Gambia –4.2 –2.4 –4.8 –4.9 –3.0 –2.6 –1.3 70.2 85.9 83.1 82.9 71.7 64.3 59.7\nGhana –6.6 –17.4 –12.0 –11.8 –4.6 –5.0 –4.3 49.6 72.3 79.2 93.3 86.1 83.6 80.9\nGuinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.7 –0.8 –1.6 –3.0 –2.6 40.2 47.8 42.7 40.2 40.3 35.1 32.6\nGuinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.9 –6.1 –7.6 –3.8 –3.0 55.0 77.7 78.8 80.4 77.8 76.5 74.0\nKenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.2 –6.1 –5.3 –4.0 –3.2 46.7 68.0 68.2 68.4 73.3 73.0 70.3\nLesotho –3.1 –0.0 –5.4 –5.2 3.1 2.8 –2.2 43.7 54.7 58.4 62.9 63.6 63.2 62.3\nLiberia –3.9 –4.0 –2.5 –5.3 –6.4 –5.0 –5.0 28.7 58.7 53.3 53.9 55.7 56.5 57.7\nMadagascar –2.1 –4.0 –2.8 –5.5 –4.9 –3.8 –4.6 38.1 51.9 51.8 53.4 56.6 56.1 55.6\nMalawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –9.4 –7.6 –6.6 –7.5 35.5 54.8 61.5 75.8 81.3 74.9 74.6\nMali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.9 –4.8 –4.2 –3.6 31.5 46.9 50.3 52.9 53.0 55.1 55.7\nMauritius –3.3 –10.5 –4.1 –3.1 –3.3 –3.7 –3.0 62.2 94.7 88.8 84.2 81.1 81.0 80.8\nMozambique –4.2 –4.6 –3.9 –5.2 –2.7 –3.3 –1.2 78.0 120.0 104.3 99.3 91.9 96.9 94.7\nNamibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.7 –6.0 –3.7 –2.1 –3.3 38.2 64.3 70.4 70.5 67.2 65.4 64.2\nNiger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.8 –5.5 –4.1 –3.0 27.8 45.0 51.3 50.7 51.8 48.9 47.4\nNigeria –3.1 –5.6 –5.5 –5.4 –4.2 –4.6 –4.2 21.7 34.5 35.7 39.4 46.3 46.6 46.8\nRwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –5.7 –5.5 –7.0 –3.4 33.0 65.6 66.7 61.1 62.1 69.9 71.7\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –5.2 2.9 –1.5 –2.2 0.9 0.9 1.5 78.4 70.8 62.4 58.1 49.5 42.6 37.4\nSenegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 –4.9 –3.9 –3.1 47.2 69.2 73.3 76.0 79.6 72.5 67.6\nSeychelles 1.5 –14.8 –5.6 –0.8 –1.5 –1.4 –0.4 65.0 77.4 71.2 58.9 56.7 58.3 57.2\nSierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.3 –7.3 –3.0 –3.6 51.5 76.3 79.4 94.1 80.0 69.7 67.8\nSouth Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.5 –4.3 –6.0 –6.1 –6.3 44.9 68.9 68.8 71.1 73.9 75.4 77.9\nSouth Sudan –5.7 –5.5 –9.3 4.2 8.0 4.1 3.8 53.0 49.3 52.2 39.9 54.1 48.3 42.1\nTanzania –2.7 –2.6 –3.5 –3.9 –3.5 –2.7 –2.6 36.7 41.3 43.4 44.9 46.3 46.1 44.4\nTogo –3.8 –7.0 –4.7 –8.3 –6.6 –6.0 –3.0 48.3 62.2 64.9 66.5 67.2 68.3 66.5\nUganda –3.0 –7.8 –7.5 –6.3 –5.0 –4.1 –3.6 27.8 46.3 50.4 49.9 49.9 49.7 48.6\nZambia2 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.8 –6.8 –6.1 –5.4 50.9 140.0 111.0 99.5 115.2 … …\nZimbabwe3 –3.3 0.8 –2.2 –6.0 –7.8 –9.9 –9.8 51.5 84.5 58.6 100.6 90.2 98.5 86.8\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.5 –4.9 –4.4 –4.1 –3.7 –3.4 37.6 57.0 56.2 57.2 60.1 58.5 56.8\nMedian –3.1 –5.0 –4.8 –5.2 –4.0 –3.7 –3.0 40.6 56.7 58.5 58.6 59.5 58.3 57.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.0 –5.7 –4.4 –4.1 –3.4 –2.8 –2.5 42.5 63.2 59.8 59.7 60.0 55.8 52.7\nResource-intensive countries –3.2 –6.7 –4.7 –4.0 –4.0 –3.9 –3.7 36.1 55.9 54.5 56.1 60.8 60.6 59.3\nOil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.6 –3.7 –3.0 –2.6 –1.9 –1.7 30.1 48.4 44.9 45.8 53.9 52.4 50.5\nExcluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.0 0.5 1.7 0.1 1.2 1.0 47.7 87.2 66.6 58.4 67.4 59.2 54.5\nOther resource-intensive countries –3.8 –8.4 –5.6 –4.9 –5.0 –5.0 –4.8 42.4 62.4 62.1 65.4 65.9 65.3 64.3\nExcluding South Africa –3.5 –7.2 –5.6 –5.5 –4.2 –4.1 –3.5 38.8 55.7 54.7 59.4 58.5 56.5 52.9\nNon-resource-intensive countries –3.6 –6.0 –5.4 –5.7 –4.2 –3.4 –2.9 43.5 60.3 61.3 60.6 58.3 54.2 51.9\nMiddle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.2 –4.5 –4.3 –4.0 –3.7 37.1 59.0 58.1 59.3 65.2 65.6 64.9\nLow-income countries –2.5 –3.7 –3.9 –4.2 –3.7 –3.2 –2.9 39.2 51.3 50.5 51.2 48.4 45.1 42.4\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations –2.8 –4.4 –4.4 –4.3 –3.4 –3.1 –2.9 28.7 42.6 42.8 44.9 46.9 44.4 42.1\nCFA franc zone –2.7 –4.2 –4.0 –3.3 –3.5 –2.8 –2.4 34.6 53.0 55.3 56.4 58.1 56.8 55.5\nCEMAC –2.4 –2.0 –1.4 2.5 –0.3 –0.2 –0.9 35.2 57.2 55.3 52.5 53.8 51.3 49.8\nWAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.8 –5.3 –4.2 –3.2 34.7 50.5 55.3 58.8 60.6 59.9 58.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.4 –5.6 –4.8 –4.9 –4.2 –3.5 –3.3 42.4 60.6 57.7 58.1 55.6 50.8 47.3\nEAC-5 –4.4 –6.5 –6.2 –5.6 –4.7 –3.8 –3.1 39.3 56.2 57.7 57.6 59.5 59.4 57.3\nECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.1 –6.3 –4.5 –4.4 –3.7 27.6 43.2 46.2 49.9 55.2 56.4 55.7\nSACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.1 –5.5 –5.8 –5.9 43.5 66.3 66.4 68.3 70.6 71.6 73.6\nSADC –3.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.4 –4.4 –4.1 –4.0 45.1 70.4 63.9 64.4 68.0 66.3 64.7\nSee sources on page 18.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024\nA TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 21\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025\nAngola 34.6 38.4 24.4 20.0 21.6 20.1 20.0 3.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 3.1 4.9 4.6\nBenin 28.1 30.5 32.7 33.4 30.7 30.7 30.7 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –6.0 –5.6 –5.0 –4.6\nBotswana 44.7 52.5 45.4 40.0 40.7 42.1 42.0 2.0 –10.3 –1.3 3.0 –0.4 –1.2 2.5\nBurkina Faso 32.4 44.1 48.6 46.1 42.5 43.5 44.7 –5.1 4.2 0.4 –7.2 –7.9 –5.7 –4.1\nBurundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.6 55.7 54.7 53.5 –14.1 –9.7 –11.6 –16.2 –13.3 –17.3 –15.3\nCabo Verde 85.5 116.9 114.3 95.9 95.5 96.2 95.4 –6.3 –15.3 –12.2 –3.4 –5.3 –6.1 –6.3\nCameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 29.4 29.9 30.1 29.8 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –3.4 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8\nCentral African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 31.9 31.0 30.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.1 –12.7 –9.0 –7.7 –6.7\nChad 11.0 15.3 17.1 18.8 20.6 22.4 23.5 –3.8 –2.8 –1.9 5.4 –2.5 –2.3 –3.0\nComoros 25.1 31.2 37.1 37.1 38.2 38.9 38.7 –3.1 –1.8 –0.3 –0.5 –6.0 –5.8 –5.3\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 19.9 21.6 19.5 21.3 21.8 22.2 –4.4 –2.1 –1.0 –5.0 –5.4 –4.1 –3.2\nCongo, Republic of 26.6 32.7 30.8 27.5 31.8 34.3 34.7 –2.2 12.6 12.8 18.5 3.2 2.5 –0.1\nCôte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 14.9 14.1 11.4 11.7 11.6 –0.3 –3.1 –3.9 –7.7 –6.0 –3.8 –2.6\nEquatorial Guinea 13.2 17.5 14.7 16.4 19.7 19.2 19.3 –8.4 –0.8 4.2 2.4 –1.3 –2.7 –2.7\nEritrea1 207.6 … … … … … … 14.9 … … … … … …\nEswatini 26.8 32.3 29.7 28.1 27.9 27.5 27.5 6.0 7.1 2.6 –2.7 2.2 2.1 1.1\nEthiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 24.9 22.5 23.3 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.9 –2.6 –1.7\nGabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 22.8 26.4 26.4 26.4 5.2 –0.5 3.3 10.4 4.2 4.0 3.0\nThe Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.2 54.6 49.3 45.5 43.8 –7.6 –3.0 –4.2 –4.2 –4.1 –4.4 –3.1\nGhana 24.1 30.8 29.4 29.5 29.4 27.9 28.2 –5.6 –2.5 –2.7 –2.1 –1.7 –1.9 –2.2\nGuinea 24.2 27.8 25.5 29.1 25.7 26.3 24.7 –16.3 –16.2 –2.5 –8.6 –8.7 –10.6 –10.0\nGuinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.5 46.7 46.1 45.2 44.4 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –9.6 –9.4 –5.6 –4.6\nKenya 36.8 37.2 35.2 33.9 34.0 34.0 34.0 –6.9 –4.7 –5.2 –5.2 –3.9 –4.3 –4.2\nLesotho 35.6 41.1 39.1 38.7 40.1 38.4 37.4 –6.2 –1.8 –5.4 –9.6 –2.9 –1.1 –7.0\nLiberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 26.8 27.0 27.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.8 –19.0 –26.5 –24.8 –24.5\nMadagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 28.9 30.1 32.1 33.6 –2.7 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –4.5 –4.8 –4.7\nMalawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 –10.2 –13.8 –14.1 –3.2 –6.9 –7.1 –9.4\nMali 26.9 31.3 39.5 41.1 37.8 37.8 37.8 –5.2 –2.2 –7.4 –8.0 –9.0 –5.1 –4.4\nMauritius 104.3 156.7 159.9 140.9 132.9 132.2 135.5 –5.8 –8.8 –13.0 –11.5 –5.9 –5.3 –4.8\nMozambique 44.7 59.0 56.2 55.0 50.9 51.3 51.2 –30.9 –27.4 –22.6 –34.7 –11.0 –38.7 –42.9\nNamibia 58.3 71.5 70.6 63.0 63.2 63.7 63.8 –8.1 3.0 –11.2 –13.1 –10.9 –7.2 –6.6\nNiger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.4 18.4 18.5 18.8 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –16.2 –12.8 –5.1 –4.3\nNigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 33.6 30.0 30.5 1.2 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 0.3 0.6 –0.1\nRwanda 22.4 29.0 29.9 29.2 29.2 27.4 28.6 –10.5 –12.1 –11.2 –9.8 –11.7 –12.1 –9.8\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 41.1 32.5 29.5 28.1 25.4 23.4 23.4 –17.4 –11.2 –12.1 –13.1 –12.9 –9.2 –8.9\nSenegal 34.6 45.3 48.2 51.9 50.1 47.9 61.3 –7.2 –10.9 –12.1 –19.9 –15.1 –8.9 –4.8\nSeychelles 64.4 101.6 93.4 80.5 82.8 86.5 85.9 –15.3 –12.3 –10.1 –6.9 –7.3 –8.4 –8.5\nSierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 35.5 32.5 26.4 25.0 –23.0 –7.9 –9.5 –11.0 –4.0 –2.8 –3.7\nSouth Africa 66.4 74.0 70.1 71.1 72.1 74.3 75.6 –3.5 1.9 3.7 –0.5 –1.6 –1.8 –1.9\nSouth Sudan 22.3 23.2 17.6 14.4 14.9 13.1 13.0 4.5 –18.9 –9.4 9.7 1.7 3.9 5.7\nTanzania 22.3 21.7 22.0 22.8 23.4 23.5 23.7 –7.1 –2.5 –3.8 –5.6 –5.3 –4.2 –3.6\nTogo 37.2 46.6 48.1 50.4 50.4 51.0 51.5 –4.9 –0.3 –2.2 –4.2 –3.4 –3.9 –3.6\nUganda 17.4 22.5 21.8 20.4 20.6 20.7 20.5 –5.6 –9.5 –9.3 –8.8 –7.7 –7.3 –7.6\nZambia 21.7 31.2 24.3 27.1 29.4 29.4 29.7 0.3 10.6 9.7 3.7 –1.8 3.7 5.2\nZimbabwe2 23.9 14.8 14.9 18.8 15.9 15.8 15.6 –7.9 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.0\nSub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.2 36.7 38.3 37.4 37.8 –2.7 –2.7 –1.0 –2.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.6\nMedian 26.4 31.0 30.3 29.3 30.4 30.0 30.2 –5.3 –3.4 –4.1 –5.3 –5.3 –4.4 –4.2\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.2 32.7 31.4 30.3 29.8 29.3 29.8 –4.4 –3.9 –3.0 –3.5 –4.1 –3.7 –3.3\nResource-intensive countries 36.8 40.0 38.1 38.1 41.0 40.0 40.3 –1.7 –1.4 0.8 –0.0 –1.6 –1.3 –1.3\nOil-exporting countries 25.1 27.0 25.0 24.8 30.9 28.3 28.6 1.0 –2.9 0.9 2.5 0.6 1.1 0.6\nExcluding Nigeria 26.9 31.2 24.5 22.5 24.3 23.9 23.9 0.6 –0.5 4.6 7.1 1.1 1.7 1.3\nOther resource-intensive countries 48.3 52.3 50.2 50.3 50.3 50.8 51.1 –4.4 –0.1 0.7 –2.4 –3.3 –2.7 –2.4\nExcluding South Africa 26.3 30.8 30.6 30.4 30.2 29.9 30.0 –5.8 –2.3 –2.5 –4.3 –4.8 –3.5 –2.7\nNon-resource-intensive countries 30.2 34.7 34.6 33.1 31.5 30.8 31.7 –6.9 –6.3 –6.4 –7.9 –5.6 –5.8 –5.2\nMiddle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.6 42.3 41.2 41.9 –1.4 –1.7 0.4 –0.5 –1.6 –1.3 –1.3\nLow-income countries 24.9 28.9 29.8 29.0 27.9 27.3 27.6 –7.8 –5.5 –5.0 –6.3 –5.4 –5.5 –5.0\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 25.2 27.7 28.3 28.0 31.8 29.5 29.9 –1.6 –3.7 –1.9 –2.0 –2.1 –2.8 –2.8\nCFA franc zone 21.6 26.9 29.0 29.1 28.1 28.2 29.8 –3.3 –2.8 –3.5 –4.8 –5.6 –3.7 –3.0\nCEMAC 19.6 24.6 25.0 25.2 27.1 27.7 27.8 –2.4 –0.9 0.5 3.7 –0.8 –1.0 –1.6\nWAEMU 22.9 28.3 31.2 31.1 28.6 28.5 30.8 –4.3 –4.0 –5.8 –10.0 –8.4 –5.2 –3.7\nCOMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.4 33.7 32.0 31.2 30.6 30.9 –5.7 –4.1 –3.8 –4.6 –4.1 –3.5 –2.9\nEAC-5 27.4 29.5 28.7 28.1 28.4 28.3 28.3 –7.0 –5.3 –5.9 –6.4 –5.7 –5.5 –5.2\nECOWAS 24.2 26.9 27.4 27.9 32.0 29.5 30.4 –1.0 –4.0 –2.4 –2.8 –3.0 –2.7 –2.5\nSACU 64.6 72.3 68.3 68.8 69.6 71.6 72.7 –3.4 1.5 3.0 –0.7 –1.8 –1.9 –1.8\nSADC 49.9 55.1 51.0 50.3 50.8 51.5 51.9 –3.4 –0.2 1.8 –0.8 –2.3 –2.5 –2.5\nSee sources on page 18.\nAPRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n22 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025\nAngola 33.6 91.2 69.2 43.2 54.6 52.9 46.5 9.3 9.5 6.5 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.7\nBenin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 37.8 41.0 44.7 45.8 … ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 9.3 10.1 9.2 7.6 11.4 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.0 6.2 6.2\nBurkina Faso1 21.0 23.1 24.5 26.1 26.1 25.9 25.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.6 19.8 31.9 31.1 2.5 1.0 2.2 1.5 0.7 1.7 2.4\nCabo Verde 78.4 132.9 123.9 105.7 95.2 93.3 90.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.1\nCameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 30.9 28.9 28.8 27.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 29.3 37.3 33.7 36.1 34.6 33.1 31.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 18.2 20.7 17.9 16.5 14.9 13.1 14.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 17.1 23.5 25.4 27.3 32.6 34.8 35.5 7.1 7.9 8.6 6.6 6.4 6.9 6.5\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 17.8 15.5 16.3 14.9 16.6 16.8 15.8 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.3\nCongo, Republic of 2 24.4 29.2 23.3 24.5 24.6 22.3 21.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.5 30.3 35.1 36.0 37.7 36.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.5 15.4 12.2 10.0 10.0 8.2 6.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea3 62.2 … … … … … … 2.8 … … … … … …\nEswatini 8.8 15.2 14.9 17.4 19.2 20.4 21.7 3.7 3.1 3.0 2.4 3.0 3.1 3.0\nEthiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.3 17.4 13.9 11.7 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 … … …\nGabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 34.6 34.4 30.0 28.5 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.2 47.6 43.7 39.2 35.2 3.6 5.8 7.7 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.6\nGhana4 29.8 42.0 41.7 42.7 43.8 46.5 47.7 3.0 3.7 4.0 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.8\nGuinea 23.2 27.2 24.5 21.9 19.7 18.1 18.3 2.2 1.9 2.6 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.3\nGuinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.5 39.4 35.5 33.0 31.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 22.8 30.6 31.1 31.2 33.9 38.3 37.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 4.1 4.1\nLesotho 35.4 47.5 43.1 44.0 47.1 46.8 45.9 4.8 4.1 5.0 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.5\nLiberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 35.3 35.1 35.3 36.4 2.1 2.2 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.9\nMadagascar 23.5 35.9 33.2 33.2 36.6 38.2 39.0 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.4\nMalawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 32.0 27.9 31.8 31.9 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.8 2.9 3.9\nMali1 22.8 31.5 27.1 27.2 24.6 24.1 24.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.3 20.2 23.2 19.3 20.6 17.5 16.7 8.4 14.4 12.8 11.4 9.7 9.7 9.5\nMozambique 63.1 90.2 82.9 73.9 66.7 65.5 63.1 3.5 4.6 2.6 3.1 2.2 2.1 2.0\nNamibia 12.2 18.8 14.5 17.2 18.0 17.2 15.4 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 5.0 5.2\nNiger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 32.9 32.0 29.1 28.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 11.6 18.0 19.6 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.1\nRwanda 28.0 54.8 53.5 47.0 51.0 60.2 65.2 3.9 5.3 4.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.2\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 84.3 65.1 59.5 57.8 50.6 46.5 44.4 3.7 4.4 3.7 2.3 1.0 1.9 2.6\nSenegal1 32.9 48.9 45.9 47.0 43.2 39.4 36.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 34.4 35.3 38.6 28.1 28.0 32.2 34.0 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6\nSierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 47.6 51.4 43.8 44.4 3.2 4.5 5.6 3.7 2.7 2.6 2.5\nSouth Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 18.8 21.0 21.9 22.6 5.8 6.4 5.5 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.8\nSouth Sudan 50.0 49.9 50.1 42.8 51.0 44.9 42.1 1.7 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.9\nTanzania 26.0 29.4 29.6 29.2 29.4 30.6 28.8 4.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9\nTogo1 13.3 29.5 26.0 26.4 25.6 26.8 27.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 16.6 30.0 29.5 26.7 26.5 27.3 26.9 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 3.0 3.6 4.0\nZambia5 26.4 66.5 54.1 39.2 40.1 … … 2.7 1.3 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.6\nZimbabwe6 31.6 26.6 19.7 22.6 22.0 20.4 19.9 0.5 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4\nSub-Saharan Africa 16.7 26.6 24.8 23.8 25.6 27.2 26.5 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.9\nMedian 22.7 31.6 30.6 31.1 30.7 31.8 31.1 3.6 4.4 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.6 4.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.7 36.6 34.0 31.6 31.5 30.6 28.9 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.2\nResource-intensive countries 14.9 23.9 21.8 20.9 23.5 25.8 25.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.1 4.6 4.5 4.5\nOil-exporting countries 11.1 20.2 19.6 18.1 21.6 26.7 26.2 6.3 6.2 5.7 5.9 5.5 5.8 5.9\nExcluding Nigeria 27.0 54.0 44.3 35.6 39.2 36.8 33.5 6.6 5.5 4.4 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7\nOther resource-intensive countries 18.8 27.2 23.5 23.3 24.8 25.2 25.1 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.8\nExcluding South Africa 24.1 31.1 29.0 28.0 28.4 28.1 27.1 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.8\nNon-resource-intensive countries 24.1 34.5 33.9 32.5 30.9 30.2 28.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.7\nMiddle-income countries 14.8 25.2 23.2 22.5 25.6 28.9 28.7 5.8 5.8 5.3 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9\nLow-income countries 24.7 30.7 29.4 27.4 25.5 24.0 22.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 11.3 17.4 17.6 16.9 18.2 20.2 19.7 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.2\nCFA franc zone 20.6 33.0 30.1 31.7 31.3 31.0 30.2 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.4\nCEMAC 19.9 31.3 26.8 26.6 25.6 24.1 23.3 4.3 3.4 3.3 4.2 4.0 4.2 3.8\nWAEMU 21.4 34.0 32.1 34.9 34.6 34.8 34.0 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.1 3.3 3.5 3.8\nCOMESA (SSA members) 22.4 30.0 29.0 26.5 25.3 24.3 22.7 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7\nEAC-5 22.7 31.1 31.2 30.4 31.7 34.6 33.8 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.0\nECOWAS 10.3 18.8 19.5 19.6 22.9 28.7 29.4 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.5 3.7 3.6 3.8\nSACU 14.9 22.9 18.2 18.4 20.5 21.2 21.7 5.9 6.2 5.4 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.9\nSADC 20.6 32.4 27.0 25.4 27.7 27.8 26.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.7\nSee sources on page 18.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2024/April/English/text.ashx"}