{"doc_id": "88c03b0a5c9b9c93c4fb5c42d7f94ac9", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nLiving on the Edge\n2022\nOC T\nW o r l d E c o n o m i c a n d F i n a n c i a l S u r v e y s\nRegional Economic Outlook\n22\nI N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D\nTCO\nSub-Saharan Africa\nLiving on the Edge\n©2022 Cataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : living on the edge.\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : living on the edge. | World economic and financial surveys.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2022. | World economic and financial surveys. |\nOct. 2022. | Includes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers:\n9798400221910 (paper)\n9798400221941 (ePub)\n9798400221989 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. |\nEconomic development -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R4456 2022\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the\nspring and fall, to review developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and\npolicy considerations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the\nviews of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\nPublication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090 (USA)\nTel.: (202) 623-7430 Fax: (202) 623-7201\nEmail: publications@imf.org\nwww.imf.org\nwww.elibrary.imf.org\nSee all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nii INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 iii\nContents\nAcknowledgments � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �iv\nExecutive Summary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � v\nLiving on the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1\nRecent Developments and Outlook: Another Challenging Year � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nPolicymaking at the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4\nFour Policy Priorities � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �5\nInternational Solidarity Remains Essential � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �9\nInfographic: Living on the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 11\nReferences � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 12\nStatistical Appendix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 13\nFigures\nFigure 1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Portfolio Flows � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nFigure 2� World: Global Commodity Prices � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nFigure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, 2000–20 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nFigure 4� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation, 2010–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nFigure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nFigure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nFigure 7� Emerging and Frontier Market Economies: Exchange Rates, National Currency per US Dollar � � � � � � � � �6\nFigure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Increase in Policy Rates � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7\nFigure 9� Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Interest to Revenue Ratio, 2019–25 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7\nFigure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8\nStatistical Appendix Tables\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �16\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �17\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �18\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �19\nii INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 iii\nAcknowledgments\nThe October 2022 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared by a\nteam led by Andrew Tiffin under the supervision of Aqib Aslam, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.\nThe team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Marijn Bolhuis, Wenjie Chen, Habtamu Fuje, Cleary Haines, Shushanik\nHakobyan, Peter Kovacs, Saad Quayyum, Henry Rawlings, Ivanova Reyes, and Qianqian Zhang.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Erick Trejo Guevara.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\n• In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or\n0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals\nare due to rounding.\n• An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2019–20 or January–June) indicates the years\nor months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between\nyears or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does\nthe abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).\n• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n• “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to\n¼ of 1 percentage point).\niv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 v\nExecutive Summary\nSub-Saharan Africa’s recovery has been abruptly • Consolidating public finances amid tighter financial\ninterrupted. Last year, activity finally bounced back, conditions. Regional debt is approaching levels last\nlifting GDP growth in 2021 to 4.7 percent. But seen in the early 2000s before the impact of the\ngrowth this year is expected to slow sharply by more Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. And\nthan 1 percentage point to 3.6 percent, as a worldwide in the context of rising global interest rates, access\nslowdown, tighter global financial conditions, and a to funding will likely become much less forgiving.\ndramatic pickup in global inflation spill into a region To build resilience and absorb the cost of a higher\nalready wearied by an ongoing series of shocks. Rising interest bill, authorities will need to continue\nfood and energy prices are striking at the region’s most consolidation. Further, credible medium-term\nvulnerable, and public debt and inflation are at levels fiscal frameworks—including effective debt\nnot seen in decades. Against this backdrop, and with management—can reduce exposure to shifts in risk\nlimited options, many countries find themselves pushed sentiment and can lower borrowing costs. For some\ncloser to the edge. countries, debt reprofiling or restructuring may be\nneeded, requiring improved implementation of the\nThe near-term outlook is extremely uncertain. G20 Common Framework.\nConcretely, the region’s prospects are tied firmly to\n• Setting the stage for sustainable and greener growth.\ndevelopments in the global economy, while locally, the\nHigh-quality growth has long been a priority, but\nsociopolitical and security situation for many countries\nthe context for reform is changing dramatically\nremains particularly difficult.\nin the context of accelerating climate change.\nInvestment in resilient, green infrastructure is\nIn this regard, policymakers face the most challenging\nincreasingly important. And capitalizing on the\nenvironment in years. They will need to deal with\nregion’s sizable endowment of renewable energy\nimmediate socioeconomic crises as they emerge (fighting\nsources—and potentially leapfrogging fossil-fu-\nfires), while also reducing vulnerabilities to future\nel-based models—will require both innovating\nshocks as best they can (building resilience). Ultimately,\nprivate finance and energy sector reforms.\nhowever, the region’s safety and prosperity will require\nhigh-quality growth, so policies must also set the stage Regional Economic Outlook Analytical Notes\nfor a sustainable recovery (moving away from the edge).\nAs background to the findings and recommendations\nWith these goals in mind, sub-Saharan Africa faces of the October 2022 Regional Economic Outlook:\nfour key policy priorities: Sub-Saharan Africa, a separate series of notes are\nprovided on select topics of current interest. “Building\n• Addressing food insecurity. With 123 million\na More Food-Secure Sub-Saharan Africa” outlines\nacutely food-insecure people across the region,\nthe region’s response to the food security crisis and\nrising food and energy prices mean that lives are\nrecommends policies for improving resilience in the\nat risk. Tackling this issue is a clear priority, but\ncontext of climate change. “Tackling Rising Inflation\nthe ability to rapidly expand social safety nets is\nin Sub-Saharan Africa” analyzes the main drivers of\nconstrained in many cases, so some countries have\ninflation across the region and discusses elements of an\nturned to expensive and poorly targeted support\nappropriate monetary policy response. “Managing Oil\nmeasures. While these measures, especially food\nPrice Uncertainty and the Energy Transition” addresses\nsupport, may be necessary in the current emergency,\nthe response to volatile export prices and examines\nthey should eventually be phased out and replaced\npolicies for oil exporters considering a global transition\nwith better-targeted alternatives, ensuring that\naway from fossil fuels. “Digital Currency Innovations\nscarce resources go to those who need them most.\nin Sub-Saharan Africa” outlines recent developments\n• Managing the shift in monetary policies. With in this fast-moving space and discusses the costs and\nincreased inflation and rising global interest rates, benefits of various instruments currently contemplated\nmost authorities have started to tighten monetary by the region’s policymakers (mobile money, central\npolicy. But in a context of fiscal consolidation and bank digital currencies, and cryptocurrencies).\na fragile recovery, authorities face a difficult balance.\nThey should increase policy rates gradually and\ncautiously, keeping a close eye on inflation expecta-\ntions and the level of foreign exchange reserves.\niv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 v\nLiving on the Edge\nRECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND gains have been scaled back since April, and significant\nOUTLOOK: ANOTHER CHALLENGING heterogeneity persists—oil exporters can expect an\nimprovement of about 16 percent in their terms of\nYEAR\ntrade this year, while non-resource-intensive countries\nface a drop of about 4½ percent. For commodity\nSub-Saharan Africa’s recovery has been sharply exporters and importers alike, however, external prices\ninterrupted. Last year, activity in sub-Saharan Africa are now increasingly uncertain.\nfinally bounced back, bringing GDP growth in 2021\nup to 4.7 percent. Unfortunately, growth is expected Macroeconomic Imbalances Have Returned…\nto slow this year by more than 1 percentage point to\n3.6 percent, as a worldwide slowdown and a dramatic Policy space to confront the latest challenges\npickup in global inflation spill into a region already remains thin as the region endures its third year of\nwearied by an ongoing series of shocks. Rising food crisis. Over the past few years, as authorities have\nand energy prices are striking at the region’s most struggled to protect lives and livelihoods throughout\nvulnerable, and macroeconomic imbalances are the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal positions have\napproaching levels not seen in decades. deteriorated, increasing regional public debt to about\n60 percent of GDP. And with global supply chain\nA Shifting and Tumultuous Global Environment\nFigure 1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Portfolio Flows\nThree major global developments are reshaping (Billions of US dollars)\nsub-Saharan Africa’s outlook: the slowdown in 6\nadvanced economies and emerging markets, tightening\n4\nglobal financial conditions, and volatile commodity\n2\nprices.\n0\nIn the months since April, growth projections have Equity\n-2\nbeen scaled back worldwide. Global growth in 2022\nBonds\nhas been revised down by almost ½ percentage point, -4\ndriven in large part by a drop for both advanced -6\neconomies and China of about 1 percentage point. 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 2022 :\nH1\nSources: EPFR; and IMF staff calculations.\nWith the rapid pickup in global inflation, monetary\nNote: EPFR data covers flows to portfolio investment funds.\npolicy normalization in advanced economies has (Index, February 21, 2022 = 100)\nsped up. In this context, capital flows have remained Figure 2� World: Global Commodity Prices\nprecarious (Figure 1). For the first half of the year, (Index, February 21, 2022 = 100)\noutflows from sub-Saharan Africa rivaled those 180\nassociated with the onset of the COVID-19 crisis or\n160\nthe 2015 commodity price shock, adding to pressure\non exchange rates, with the largest depreciations 140\nobserved in Ghana, Malawi, and Sierra LeoneS.S1A REO\n120\nWheat\nCopper\nGlobal commodity prices have been particularly 100\nturbulent. Wheat, for example, almost doubled at the\n80 Invasion\nonset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine but has since Oil of Ukraine\nreturned to prewar levels (Figure 2). More broadly, 60\nsub-Saharan Africa’s terms of trade are still expected to Sep-21 Dec-21 Mar-22 Jun-22 Sep-22\nimprove in 2022, compared with last yeaArp,r ibl ut some Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.\n1 Although most currencies weakened against the US dollar in the first half of 2022, real effective exchange rates actually appreciated\nin more than half of sub-Saharan African countries, in part due to high inflation.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 1\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\ndisruptions adding to the fallout from the war in traditionally been robust predictors of social unrest\nUkraine, double-digit inflation is now present in and have contributed to growing protests across the\nabout 40 percent of the region’s economies. region this year (Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Sierra\nLeone). However, looking beyond food and fuel prices,\nOn public debt, regional indebtedness is now regional core inflation remains muted at this stage.\napproaching levels last seen in the early 2000s before\nthe impact of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries …Clouding the Economic Outlook…\nInitiative, though with a different composition\n(Figure 3). The substitution of low-cost, long-term The current upheaval comes at a most unfortunate\nmultilateral debt with higher-cost private funds has time, as many countries are still dealing with the\nresulted in rising debt-service costs and higher rollover fallout from a pandemic that is far from over.\nrisks. Nineteen of the region’s 35 low-income countries Vaccination rates in sub-Saharan Africa are still only\nare in debt distress or at high risk of distress.2 Out of a fraction of those in other regions (21 percent of the\nthe other ten countries of the region, three have faced population fully vaccinated), leaving many countries\nspreads of more than 1,000 basis points at some point exposed to further illness and the possible emergence\nover the past six months (Angola, Gabon, Nigeria). of new variants.\nOn inflation, rising prices have mirrored worldwide Nonetheless, as underscored in the April 2022 Regional\ntrends, where inflation has increased more rapidly and Economic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa, the region\nmore persistently than expected, and where incomes enjoyed a surprisingly strong recovery toward the end\nhave been squeezed by hikes in the cost of living. of 2021. With final GDP data for more countries,\nRecent inflation increases may appear less striking the growth figure for 2021 has been revised upward\nrelative to historical averages for sub-Saharan Africa further to 4.7 percent.\n(Figure 4), especially for countries with fixed exchange\nrates, but much of the recent movement has been However, the recent global turmoil has interrupted this\ndriven by essential food and energy items, which are progress. Regionwide, growth is expected to slow to\nimported in many countries and average 50 percent of 3.6 percent in 2022 and 3.7 percent in 2023 because\nthe region’s consumption basket. of muted investment and an overall worsening balance\nof trade (in volume terms). Oil exporters will grow\nAs a result, poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition by 3.3 percent in 2022, and other resource-intensive\nhave been exacerbated, particularly in urban areas, countries by 3.1 percent. Even with a drop in their\nwith consequences not only for confidence and terms of trade, diversified non-resource-intensive\neconomic growth but also for social and political countries will continue to be among the region’s\nstability. Rising food and energy prices have more dynamic and resilient economies, growing by\n4.6 percent (Figure 5).\nFigure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt,\n2000–20 Figure 4� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation, 2010–22\n(Total, percent of GDP) (Percent, year-on-year, dashed line = pre-COVID-19 average)\n60\n9.0\nSub-Saharan Africa(median)\n40 7.0\n20 5.0\n3.0 Global\n0 composite\n2000 05 10 15 20\n1.0\nDomestic External Bonds Multilateral Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 Jan-16 Jan-18 Jan-20 Jan-22\nBilateral Other\nSources: World Bank, International Debt Statistics; and IMF, World Sources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.\nEconomic Outlook database. Note: Global composite by Haver Analytics.\n2 These are the 35 sub-Saharan African economies covered by the Joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for\nLow-Income Countries.\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nLIVING ON THE EDGE\nFigure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth, 2022\n(Percent, red = Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations)\nSub-Saharan Africa weighted average: 3.6 Non Resource\nNGA\nOil Exporter\nBFA GNB\nOther Resource\nGAB COM MOZ MDG SEN\nERI ZWE LBR BWA GIN BEN MUS\nMLI NAM GHA CPV TZA CIV COD\nCAF LSO SLE ZMB TCD CMR UGA TGO RWA NER\nMWI STP ZAF SWZ AGO BDI ETH COG GMB KEN GNQ SSD SYC\n0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: See page 15 for country abbreviations list.\nFor 2022, the new growth projection for sub-Saharan …Amid Significant Downside Risks�\nAfrica represents a relatively modest downgrade of\n−0.2 percent, compared with the April 2022 Regional Looking ahead, the outlook for 2022 and 2023 is\nEconomic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa—substantially extremely uncertain. Sub-Saharan Africa’s prospects\nless than the −0.9 percent revision for advanced are tied firmly to developments in the global economy,\neconomies. But the modest revision masks some and three key factors will shape the near-term path:\nregional heterogeneity. South Africa’s 2022 growth (1) the monetary policy response of the world’s\nprojection, for example, was revised up as a robust largest economies to elevated inflation, (2) the war in\nrecovery in services activity, amid lower COVID-19 Ukraine, and (3) the ongoing impact of COVID-19-\ncases, more than offset the adverse impacts of flooding, related lockdowns and supply chain disruptions.\npower cuts, and strikes. Elsewhere, 33 of the remaining\n44 countries have revised their projections downward Currently, the baseline projection for sub-Saharan\nin light of a less-benign global outlook and cost-of- Africa assumes that global monetary tightening does\nliving pressures on domestic activity. not prompt a widespread recession or a disorderly shift\nin global financial conditions. Further, it assumes that\nRevisions to projected inflation have been more the conflict in Ukraine does not worsen, and that there\nsignificant—the median for the region (year over are no additional pandemic-related disruptions to\nyear) has increased by almost 2 percentage points, global activity.\nbringing the end-2022 forecast to 8.7 percent. Again,\nexpectations differ across countries (Figure 6). The Clearly, all these global factors are subject to sizable\nprojected median for those with pegged exchange downside risks.\nrates is 6 percent (up 2.0), but it reaches 12.6 percent\n(up 3.6) for those with more flexible arrangements. • Perhaps most important, monetary authorities\nAngola is a notable exception: 2022 inflation has across the globe face the most challenging policy\nbeen marked down by more than 3 percentage points environment in many years. If global inflation\nbecause of the rapid appreciation of the Kwanza were to persist, faster and larger tightening in\nassociated with higher oil prices. advanced economies could slow global demand\nand further increase borrowing costs in sub-\nFigure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation\n(Percent, year-on-year, as of July 2022) Saharan Africa, undermining debt sustainability\nand constraining local authorities’ ability to\nETH\nGHA shield their most vulnerable. A global slowdown\n30\nSLE MWI and tighter financial conditions might also\nfurther reduce the supply of official development\n20 AGO assistance to the region. In addition, added\nSTP exchange rate pressures from a strengthening\nERI US dollar may increase imported inflation for the\n10\nregion while draining reserves and undermining\nfinancial stability in countries with balance sheet\n0 vulnerabilities. At the extreme, sudden capital\noutflows may cause distress in economies with\nFlexible Pegged\nArrangement Exchange Rate large external financing needs.\nSources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 3\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\n• An intensification of the war in Ukraine or POLICYMAKING AT THE EDGE\nprolonged restrictions on Russian exports could\nadd to the turmoil seen over the past year, putting For many policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa, the\nadditional upward pressure on food and energy road ahead is daunting. With growing social needs,\nprices in sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbating food rising imbalances, and elevated risks, the recent crisis\naffordability problems for the most vulnerable has pushed many of them even closer to the edge.\npopulations, and fueling social tensions. Depleted buffers and shrinking policy space leaves\nFurthermore, an escalation in geopolitical strains little room for error, and decisions must often strike\nbetween Russia and Western countries could also a difficult balance across competing demands, most\nincrease global risk aversion and raise borrowing notably:\ncosts for the region, especially for countries with\n• Fighting fires. First and foremost, precedence\nmore fragile fiscal positions.\nshould be given to saving lives. Throughout the\nCOVID-19 crisis, the region was focused appro-\nDomestically, the sociopolitical context for many\npriately on immediate measures to protect the\ncountries is challenging. Seven countries will hold\nhealth and livelihoods of those at greatest risk.\npresidential and parliamentary elections over the\nNow, a cost-of-living crisis is adding to an already\nnext 12 months, and many others face rising popular\nfragile food security situation, requiring a similarly\ndissatisfaction. In such circumstances, responding\nurgent response.\nquickly to new shocks or pursuing long-needed reform\nmay be more difficult. Several countries also continue • Building resilience. Faced with an uncertain and\nto face elevated security concerns (Burkina Faso, volatile outlook, authorities must reduce vulnera-\nCameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, bility to future shocks as best they can. In the first\nMali, Mozambique). Current projections assume a instance, this may require rebuilding buffers and\ngradual de-escalation of political and military tensions. insuring economies against larger tail risks\nBut if security risks persist or worsen, the economic (Analytical Note “Managing Rising Oil Price\noutlook for these countries and their neighbors could Uncertainty and the Energy Transition”). In\ndeteriorate significantly. addition, countries can build resilience by\nstrengthening their policy frameworks. Although\nAny quantification of such risks should be treated current imbalances in sub-Saharan Africa may\nwith caution. The impact of yet another shock to recall the 1990s, the region has made significant\nthe region can be particularly hard to predict, given progress since then, particularly in improved\nlimited buffers and elevated poverty, food insecurity, budget frameworks, monetary credibility, and\nand social tensions. Still, under a downside scenario governance. These achievements have helped\nthat abstracts from local security and political cushion some of the recent turmoil but will need\ndifficulties and considers only global factors (with to be safeguarded and strengthened.\ntighter sanctions and reduced oil exports from\n• Moving away from the edge. Ultimately, pro-\nRussia, a significant downturn in China’s real estate\ngressing beyond the current situation will require\nsector, persistent labor-market disruptions in major\nhigh-quality growth over the medium term,\neconomies, and tighter global financial conditions),\nsuggesting that the premium on upfront structural\nworldwide growth would slow by an additional\nreform is higher than ever. Strong growth is\n1½ percentage points each year over the next two years\nperhaps the most essential remedy available for the\n(October 2022 World Economic Outlook). This would\nelimination of imbalances, as a growing economy\nbe historically exceptional and would be accompanied\nmeans a growing tax base and more policy space—\nby markedly higher oil and gas prices. On top of an\nfor an average African country, an additional\nalready downbeat baseline projection, the cumulative\n1 percentage point of annual GDP growth over\ncost to sub-Saharan Africa would amount to a loss of\na decade could reduce the debt ratio by close to\n−0.7 percent of GDP over 2023–24, though with\n15 percentage points.\na somewhat different impact on oil exporters (gain\n+1.1 percent) versus other resource-intensive countries\n(lose −1.8 percent) and non-resource-intensive\ncountries (lose −1.4 percent).\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nLIVING ON THE EDGE\nFOUR POLICY PRIORITIES support at the scale or pace needed—even countries\nthat had been innovative in leveraging new digital\nWith these objectives in mind, each country must technologies during the COVID-19 crisis (Togo) have\ntailor its policy mix to its own circumstances. But for had less success adopting the same approach in current\nthe region more broadly, the considerations described circumstances.\nearlier suggest four pressing priorities.\nInstead, many countries have turned to immediately\nAddressing Food Insecurity available short-term support measures, addressing\nboth fuel and food price pressures in the context of\nBy the end of 2022, 123 million people or 12 percent an overall cost-of-living squeeze. From a recent survey\nof sub-Saharan Africa’s population are expected to face of IMF country teams, these short-term measures\nacute food insecurity (two-thirds of the worldwide implemented this year are mostly untargeted and\ntotal), one-third of which have become acutely food are split evenly between those aimed at food security\ninsecure since the start of the pandemic. And of these, directly and those addressing higher fuel prices\na large proportion are children in circumstances in (Analytical Note “Building a More Food-Secure\nwhich chronic hunger can permanently curtail future Sub-Saharan Africa”). Some countries have cut taxes\nhealth and prospects. The rapid increase in food on food or fuel (Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe),\ninsecurity over the past two years is mainly due to and others have introduced new subsidies (Kenya,\n(1) the fallout from the pandemic and the recent war Senegal, Zambia). A number have introduced price\nin Ukraine, (2) a worsening security situation in some controls (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire), allocated credit to key\nparts of the region, (3) a four-season drought in the importers or agricultural firms (Sierra Leone), made\nHorn of Africa, and (4) other climate shocks (Angola, direct government arrangements to import critical\nMadagascar). Areas of particular concern include the staples (Ethiopia), and introduced export restrictions\nDemocratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, (Côte d’Ivoire). The Nigerian authorities have\nSouth Sudan, some parts of Kenya, and countries in suspended long-touted plans to scrap gas subsidies.\nthe Sahel. The World Food Programme has identified Only a few countries have introduced targeted cash or\nthe drought in the Horn of Africa as the world’s worst in-kind transfers.\nfood emergency in 2022.\nIn the current emergency, some of these measures\nIn addition to local factors (such as climate events may be a necessary expedient, but they should also be\nor local conflicts), food security is shaped strongly phased out eventually. Many programs, like subsidies,\nby global food prices. Food accounts for almost are often expensive and poorly targeted, funneling\n40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s consumption public funds to those with the greatest consumption\nbasket, and many countries are net importers of key rather than the greatest need, and at the expense of\nstaples (corn, rice, wheat). For some of these items, other critical priorities such as public investment. For\ninternational prices have doubled since early 2020, example, fuel subsidies—which seem less critical than\nwhile fuel and fertilizer prices have reached as much food assistance measures at the current juncture—are\nas triple, adding to transport costs and weighing often extremely costly, regressive, and ultimately\non harvests. Moreover, climate-related events are unsustainable. Similarly, price caps and export\nworsening, which will further undermine food security restrictions can generate significant distortions, with\nregionwide (Baptista and others 2022). increasingly adverse consequences for food insecurity,\ngrowth, and poverty reduction.\nAs a policy response, global prices should ideally be\nallowed to pass through into domestic prices, while The transition away from emergency measures will\nauthorities protect the most vulnerable through vary from country to country, depending on the gap\ntargeted cash transfers or an expansion of local social between domestic and international prices, the amount\nsafety nets (Amaglobeli and others 2022). of fiscal space, and the availability of mitigating social\nsupport options (IMF 2020). For food subsidies, prices\nIn much of sub-Saharan Africa, however, such an could be adjusted gradually, and authorities might\napproach is simply not viable. Given the size of the consider targeting specific items, such as basic staples,\nproblem, few countries have the infrastructure or that can better avoid leakage to higher-income groups.\nadministrative capacity to expand their targeted\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 5\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nFigure 7� Emerging and Frontier Market Economies:\nManaging the Shift in Monetary Policies\nExchange Rates, National Currency per US Dollar\n(Percent, change between December 2021 and July 2022)\nInflation in many advanced economies has reached\nits highest level in more than four decades, but the Angola\nBrazil\npickup has been less dramatic in sub-Saharan Africa.\nMexico\nMedian inflation is currently at about 9 percent,\nMozambique\ncompared with a pre-COVID-19 level of a little more\nRwanda\nthan 5 percent.\nNamibia\nMauritius\nMoreover, as authorities consider the appropriate South Africa\npolicy mix to fight inflation, it is notable that the Indonesia\ndrivers of inflation in many sub-Saharan African Kenya\neconomies are different from those seen elsewhere. China\nEthiopia\nFor example, one clear factor behind the recent\nMalaysia\nglobal surge was the unprecedented policy stimulus\nIndia\nemployed by many of the largest economies, all aimed\nCEMAC/WAEMU\nat supporting their economies during the pandemic. Poland\nThis level of support was not an option for most of Hungary\nsub-Saharan Africa, where limited policy space has Argentina\ninstead muted the regional recovery. Similarly, analysis Pakistan\nof the components of inflation in sub-Saharan Africa Türkiye\nsuggests that much of the recent increase has been due -30.0 -20.0 -10.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0\nto external factors such as food and energy or swings\nSource: IMF, International Financial Statistics.\nin the exchange rate (Figure 7). The elements most\nNote: Red labels denote sub-Saharan African countries.\nreflective of demand pressures, such as nontradable CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa;\ncore inflation, have remained relatively stable to WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.\ndate (Analytical Note “Tackling Rising Inflation in boosting resilience. Although many countries\nSub-Saharan Africa”). have made significant progress in strengthening\nthe transparency, credibility, and independence of\nSo, compared with many of their advanced market their monetary frameworks, these frameworks are\ncounterparts, many sub-Saharan African authorities now being tested.\nface a more delicate challenge. • A tailored approach. In some instances, authori-\nties may need to adjust policies more aggressively.\n• A gradual path. Most countries need to raise\nFor example, a rapid tightening may be needed\ntheir policy rates to address rising inflation and\nin countries with very high inflation (Zimbabwe)\nexchange rate pressures. But current interest rate\nor acute domestic demand pressures (Ghana). For\nhikes are taking place in the context of a still-\ncountries with pegged exchange rates, the amount\nfragile recovery and elevated social needs. So far,\nof tightening needed will vary, but both monetary\nthe rise in inflation has been mostly driven by\nand fiscal policy should be consistent with\nexternal factors and, looking ahead, demand is\nsupporting reserves and maintaining the credibility\nexpected to remain relatively soft, including as a\nof the peg. Finally, for countries with more flexible\nresult of fiscal consolidation. Therefore, countries\narrangements, a sudden surge in capital outflows\nshould tighten cautiously, while also keeping\npresents authorities with a choice between\na close eye on inflation developments and the\ntightening monetary policy, letting the exchange\nemergence of second round effects.\nrate depreciate, or intervening directly to support\n• Cautious but not complacent. Authorities need the currency. Intervention to smooth exchange\nto be wary of moving too slowly, particularly in rate volatility is a helpful part of the policy toolkit,\ncountries with less-well-anchored inflation expec- but it is constrained in many cases by low foreign\ntations or weaker policy credibility. In this regard, exchange reserves. Most countries have external\nmaintaining monetary credibility is also a key goal positions that are weaker than justified by funda-\nbecause it anchors expectations more strongly mentals and so could benefit from a depreciation.\nagainst future shocks, reducing the tightening In these countries, a mix of tightening and\nneeded to keep inflation under control and so nominal depreciation might be preferable.\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nLIVING ON THE EDGE\nFigure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Increase in Policy Rates\naround 55 percent of GDP. Approximately one-third\n(Percent, between December 2021 and September 2022)\nof the region’s economies now have debt levels above\nWAEMU 2.50 (+0.50) 70 percent of GDP.\nBotswana 2.65 (+1.51)\nGlobal financial conditions are set to become\nMauritius 3.00 (+1.15) less forgiving. Much of the current debt has been\ncontracted during a period of historically low interest\nCEMAC 4.50 (+1.00)\nrates. Looking ahead, as global policy rates normalize,\nTanzania 5.00 (+0.00) financial conditions will continue to tighten,\nNamibia 5.50 (+1.75) adding to external borrowing costs and weighing on\nsub-Sahara Africa’s debt dynamics. Over the next few\nRwanda 6.00 (+1.50)\nyears, already-high interest payments are projected\nSouth Africa 6.25 (+2.50) to increase as a proportion of revenue, exceeding\n50 percent in some cases and far surpassing the\nLesotho 6.25 (+2.50)\nburdens seen in other regions (Figure 9).\nKenya 8.25 (+1.25)\nFurthermore, as global conditions tighten, borrowing\nZambia 9.00 (+0.00)\ncosts may also become more volatile. As with other\nUganda 9.00 (+2.50) emerging markets, sub-Saharan African borrowers\nNigeria 15.50 (+4.00) are subject to sudden changes in market sentiment,\nparticularly those perceived at greater risk. During\nMozambique 17.25 (+4.00)\nthe most recent turmoil, for example, sovereign\nAngola 19.50 (-0.50) spreads fluctuated widely, disrupting the plans of\nsome countries that had aimed to issue during the\nGhana 22.00 (+7.50)\nyear. In this context, countries with reduced access to\n1 5 10 20 30 global markets will need to rely more on often-shallow\nSources: Haver Analytics; and IMF, International Financial Statistics. domestic markets, potentially crowding out local\nNote: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; borrowers. Higher borrowing costs are also a concern\nWAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.\nfor countries without market access, as inflationary\nSo far, monetary authorities throughout the region pressures have promoted a general tightening of\nhave indeed moved cautiously (Figure 8). Over monetary policy across the region, with direct\ntwo-thirds have started increasing policy rates to consequences for domestic interest rates and public\nensure that inflation and inflation expectations remain borrowing costs.\nin check, but rate hikes have not kept pace with the\npickup in headline inflation. This caution is likely To preserve fiscal sustainability, build greater resilience,\nappropriate, given the supply side origins of recent and absorb the cost of a higher interest bill, authorities\ninflation and muted demand pressures. But authorities will need to continue fiscal consolidation. Rising\nshould still keep a close eye on possible second-round borrowing costs, muted growth, and elevated debt\neffects, as the costs of fighting inflation are typically stocks have undermined debt dynamics for many\nmuch higher once inflation expectations become countries so that even stabilizing debt at an elevated\nentrenched.\nFigure 9� Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Interest to Revenue\nRatio, 2019–25\nConsolidating Public Finances amid Tighter\n(Percent of revenue excluding grants)\nFinancing Conditions\nSub-Saharan Africa\nPublic debt has increased steadily in sub-Saharan\nAfrica for more than a decade, rising sharply in Non-sub-Saharan\nAfrican Emerging and\nrecent years owing to increased spending and falling\nDeveloping Economies\nrevenues in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. About\nhalf of the countries are expected to undertake some Advanced Economies\nconsolidation this year—regionwide deficits are\n0 10 20\nprojected to narrow by about ½ percent of GDP\nafter a larger consolidation of about 1¼ percent in Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: Regional averages weighted by GDP at purchasing power parity\n2021, bringing average debt at end-2022 down to\nexchange rates.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 7\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nFigure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed\n(2) boost investor confidence by improving\nto Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP\ncommunication with the market and outlining\n(Percent of GDP, number of countries)\nplans for foreign and domestic debt issuance; and\n(3) better anticipate debt rollover needs and risks.\nFiscal Adjustment\nspace needs For some countries, tightening global financial\nconditions may aggravate debt vulnerabilities\nsignificantly, requiring some reprofiling or\nrestructuring. In this context, a well-functioning\ndebt-resolution mechanism is vital. The G20\nCommon Framework is an important step forward\nas it recognizes that effective debt treatment requires\nall major official creditors to be at the table. Recent\n-10 -5 0 5 10 15 progress in Zambia is most welcome, but more is\nSources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations. needed—the framework should be improved to allow\nNote: The 70 percent threshold represents top one-third of countries.\nswift and fair resolution for distressed debt, covering\nFor countries below this threshhold, adjustment stabilizes debt ratio\nat end-2021 level. For those above, adjustment brings debt to a broader set of countries, allowing for a standstill\n70 percent over the forecast horizon.\nof payments during negotiations, and encouraging\nlevel will require significant effort (Figure 10). For creditor committees to meet and formulate agreements\nmost, successful consolidation will require accelerating quickly and transparently (Chabert, Cerisola, and\nefforts to boost revenue mobilization, prioritizing Hakura 2022).\nspending where possible, and increasing the efficiency\nof public spending, as discussed in previous reports. In Setting the Stage for Sustainable and Greener\ncommodity-exporting countries, higher commodity Growth\nprices can generate sizable windfalls but only if\nexpenditures on energy subsidies are contained. Most Ultimately, sub-Saharan Africa’s future prosperity and\nof these windfalls should be used to rebuild policy resilience will require high-quality growth, especially\nbuffers, especially in countries with elevated fiscal because the region’s population is expected to double\nvulnerabilities (Bellon and Massetti 2022a). over the next three decades. Within 10 to 15 years,\nmore than half of the world’s job market entrants will\nBeyond this general strategy, however, authorities come from sub-Saharan Africa.\ncan also take steps aimed specifically at a less-benign\nborrowing environment: For countries with limited fiscal space, providing\nthese job entrants with new opportunities will require\n• A credible and clearly articulated medium- a pivot from government-led growth toward private\nterm fiscal framework can raise trust in fiscal sector innovation and activity. Most of these reforms\nsustainability, reduce exposure to shifts in risk are long-standing priorities that predate the recent\nsentiment, and lower borrowing costs. This crisis, including enhancing competition, removing key\nframework should be supported by strong budget bottlenecks to doing business, improving governance,\ninstitutions, transparent reporting practices, and fostering trade integration, and broadening financial\nsound management of fiscal risks. Countries inclusion (April 2021 Regional Economic Outlook:\nwithout market access can benefit from fiscal Sub-Saharan Africa; and 2022 Analytical Note “Digital\ncredibility, through more private investment, Currency Innovations in Sub-Saharan Africa”).\nimproved macroeconomic stability, and lower\ndomestic borrowing costs. But the context for growth-enhancing reform is\nshifting dramatically. If the world is to cap global\n• Volatile borrowing conditions place an added warming at 1.5°C, it must also cap the total\npremium on effective and transparent public cumulative amount of greenhouse gases released into\ndebt management. Medium-term strategies the atmosphere, implying that the global economy\nimplemented by efficient and qualified debt now faces a binding “carbon budget.” Considering\nmanagement offices will be critical to (1) diversify the emissions over 1850–2020, estimates suggest that\nfinancing sources to fill shortfalls in external only 15 percent of this total carbon budget remains\nfinancing, including by developing domestic (IPCC 2021, Table SPM.2). So going forward, global\nbond markets and broadening the investor base; economic activity will need to become significantly\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nLIVING ON THE EDGE\nless carbon intensive. Given the approaching • On policies, subsidy reform can help strengthen\ndemographic pressures on sub-Saharan Africa, this price signals and rebalance incentives away from\nsuggests that any durable global solution to climate the use of traditional carbon-intensive fossil fuels.\nchange must take the region’s interests and constraints Similarly, improved electricity sector governance\ninto account. (with tariff reform and reduced regulatory barriers)\nmay encourage the introduction and uptake of\nIn addition, sub-Saharan Africa stands out dispropor-\nnew technologies by providing a more conducive\ntionately as the most climate-vulnerable region in the\nand competitive investment environment.\nworld, plagued by increasingly intense and frequent\nnatural disasters. For authorities, mainstreaming\nadaptation into government policy will be key\nINTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY REMAINS\n(Aligishiev, Massetti, and Bellon 2022, and Bellon\nESSENTIAL\nand Massetti 2022a, 2022b). But more broadly,\nwide-ranging investment in resilient, green infrastruc-\nture will also be critical. This has implications for\nAs they pull themselves back from the edge, many\nalmost all aspects of development, and with limited\nsub-Saharan African countries will struggle to meet the\nresources, it may require exploring areas in which\nbasic needs of their populations without significant\nthe private sector is able to implement adaptation\nadditional financial assistance.\nand mitigation measures more efficiently than the\npublic sector.\nOn Climate\nFor example, energy is a fundamental bottleneck\nto growth in sub-Saharan Africa—about half of the Securing a fair energy transition should not be the\nregion’s population does not have a reliable supply of responsibility of sub-Saharan African authorities\nelectricity, limiting, for example, their ability to start alone. Having contributed little to global emissions,\nand run a business. Globally, of course, growth and the region is disproportionately affected by climate\nindustrialization have historically been associated with change. And while a low-carbon and climate-resilient\nrising energy needs. So, for sub-Saharan Africa, a fair growth path offers the region an opportunity to\nand clean energy transition will be a critical part of the leapfrog forward in a way that delivers on the region’s\nregion’s development. And expanded access represents development and climate goals simultaneously,\na key opportunity for authorities to unlock sustainable sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to finance the\ngrowth—with new and better jobs for all, improved investment needed without a dramatic step-up in\nhealth, and increased resilience. international support, including through the provision\nof incentives for private sector participation (Mitra and\nIn this regard, capitalizing on the region’s sizable others. Forthcoming).\nendowment of renewable energy sources and\npotentially leapfrogging fossil-fuel-based models will For the official sector, in the context of their\nneed both private finance and policy reform: commitments from the Copenhagen Accord, the Paris\nAgreement, and the Glasgow Climate Pact, advanced\n• On funding, accessing the region’s renewable economies promised $100 billion per year in climate\nenergy resources will require sizable upfront assistance for developing countries. Over 2016–19,\ninvestment in flexible generation, new storage an average of $73 billion was disbursed each year, but\ntechnologies, regional interconnectivity, and only one-quarter went to sub-Saharan Africa, with part\noff-grid energy systems. But the expense of this of this replacing previously committed development\nnew infrastructure will likely be beyond the financing. More is needed. In this context, the\nreach of most governments, so together with forthcoming UN Climate Change Conference in\ndevelopment partners, they will need to explore Egypt (COP-27) will be a welcome opportunity for\ninnovative solutions that improve the risk-return the global community to reaffirm its commitment to\nprofile of private funding for clean energy projects. effective climate action and a just transition.\nPotential measures include blended finance,\nguarantees, and credit enhancements, along with For the region, more concessional climate finance—in\nother actions to prepare bankable projects and addition to existing commitments—will be critical\nlower entry costs for potential investors. to supporting conservation and climate adaptation.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 9\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nIn this regard, the IMF is helping catalyze new capital climate issues. It recently established the Resilience\ninflows by boosting local capacity on climate strategy and Sustainability Trust, which will complement\nissues, including through the Climate Macroeconomic the existing lending toolkit by providing affordable\nAssessment Program and Climate Public Investment financing to address longer-term structural challenges,\nManagement Assessment pilots. including climate change. And responding to the most\nrecent food security challenge, the IMF has launched a\nOn Broader Development Needs new food shock window under its emergency lending\nfacilities, which would help qualifying members\nInternational assistance is also critical to respond to facing an urgent balance-of-payments need associated\nthe region’s emergency food security, vaccination, with the current shock mitigate its impact. Finally,\nand pandemic needs and to help countries maintain for fragile and conflict-affected states, the IMF is\neconomic stability as they negotiate their way away working closely with the region to customize support\nfrom the edge. It should be emphasized that budget and enhance collaboration with other development\nsupport to sub-Saharan Africa is in decline—as a partners, including the World Bank and the United\nfraction of recipient GDP, official development aid Nations.\n(ODA) disbursements from the Organisation for\nEconomic Co-operation and Development have To support these efforts, and considering the region’s\ndropped from about 4½ percent in the 1990s to below growing need for concessional financing, it will\n3 percent more recently.3 And humanitarian assistance be essential to secure additional pledges from the\nhas also been compressed, despite pressing food international community to strengthen the IMF’s\nsecurity needs. Poverty Reduction Growth Trust, Catastrophe\nContainment and Relief Trust, and Resilience and\nAs always, the IMF stands ready to help. In addition Sustainability Trust.\nto technical assistance, the IMF has arrangements\nwith 23 countries in the region and has provided In sum, following yet another shock, sub-Saharan\n$27 billion in assistance in the form of emergency African authorities are once again carefully navigating\nfinancing, programs, and debt relief since the onset their way forward, weighing various competing\nof the COVID-19 crisis. In addition, last year’s demands in a context of shrinking resources. The road\n$23 billion special drawing rights allocation to the will not be easy. But the region’s ultimate potential\nregion also helped strengthen external positions remains undimmed. With help, sub-Saharan Africa\nand provide budget financing, including to support will be poised to finally fulfill the promise of the\nsocial spending at a most critical time. The IMF is African century, contributing to a more prosperous,\nalso expanding its lending facilities to better address greener future for the region and for the world.\n3 ODA increased significantly in 2020 (to 3.8 percent of SSA GDP), reflecting emergency financing during the COVID-19 crisis,\nbut preliminary data suggest that aid returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2021.\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\n(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:30) L L I I V V I I N N G G O O N N T T H H E E E E D D G G E E\nInfographic: Living on the Edge\nInfographic: Living on the Edge\nLIVING ON THE EDGE\nA more turbulent global environment and a more daunting outlook....\nInfl ation has almost doubled Social tensions are rising\nCommodity prices\nRecovery has been interrupted\nare volatile\n123 million people are\nBorrowing costs are rising\nfood insecure\n...places further strains on policymakers\nFiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt\nBelow 70% of GDP\n(percent of GDP, no. of countries)\n4.7\nFiscal space Adjustment needs\nSub-Saharan\n3.6\nAfrica Growth\n2021–22\n–5 0 5 10\nSource: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations\nAddressing food Consolidating public\nFOUR insecurity fi nances amid tighter\nfi nancial conditions\nPOLICY\nManaging the Setting the stage\nPRIORITIES shift in monetary for sustainable and\npolicies greener growth\n(cid:14) (cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:15) | OCTOBER 2022\nI I N N T T E E R R N N A A T T I I O O N N A A L L M M O O N N E E T T A A R R Y Y F F U U N N D D | | O O C C T T O O B B E E R R 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nReferences\nAligishiev, Zamid, Emanuele Massetti, and Matthieu Bellon, Mattieu and Emanuele Massetti, 2022a.\nBellon. 2022. “Macro-Fiscal Implications of “Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to\nAdaptation to Climate Change.” IMF Climate Climate Change into Fiscal Policy.” IMF Climate\nNote 2022/02, International Monetary Fund, Note 2022/01, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC. Washington, DC.\nAmaglobeli, David, Emine Hanedar, Gee Hee Hong, Bellon, Mattieu and Emanuele Massetti. 2022b.\nand Céline Thévenot. 2022. “Fiscal Policy for “Planning and Mainstreaming Adaptation to\nMitigating the Social Impact of High Energy and Climate Change in Fiscal Policy.” IMF Climate\nFood Prices.” IMF Note 22/001, International Note 2022/03, International Monetary Fund,\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC. Washington, DC.\nBaptista, Diogo, Mai Farid, Dominique Fayad, Chabert, Guillaume, Martin Cerisola, and Dalia\nLaurent Kemoe, Loic Lanci, Pritha Mitra, Hakura. 2022. “Restructuring Debt of Poorer\nTara Muehlschlegel, Cedric Okou, John Spray, Nations Requires More Efficient Coordination.”\nKevin Tuitoek, and Filiz Unsal. Forthcoming. IMF Blog, April 7. Washington, DC.\n“Climate Change and Chronic Food Insecurity\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change\nin Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Departmental\n(IPCC). 2021. “Summary for Policymakers.” In\nPaper 2022/016, International Monetary Fund,\nClimate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.\nWashington, DC.\nContribution of Working Group I to the Sixth\nBelianska, Anna, Nadja Bohme, Kaihao Cai, Yoro Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel\nDiallo, Saanya Jain, Giovanni Melina, Pritha on Climate Change, Geneva.\nMitra, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro and Solo Zerbo.\nInternational Monetary Fund. (IMF). 2020.\nForthcoming. “Climate Change and New Financial\n“Reaching Households in Emerging and Developing\nInstruments: Opportunities and Challenges for\nEconomies: Citizen ID, Socioeconomic Data, and\nSub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Staff Climate Note,\nDigital Delivery.” Special Series on Fiscal Policies to\nInternational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nRespond to COVID-19, Washington, DC.\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented The low-income countries had average per capita gross\nin this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff national income in the years 2019–21 equal to or lower\nestimates as of September 30, 2022, consistent with than $1,085.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\nthe projections underlying the October 2022 World\nEconomic Outlook. The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations\nare classified based on the World Bank, Classification of\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.\ncountries in the IMF’s African Department. Data\ndefinitions follow established international statistical The membership of sub-Saharan African countries\nmethodologies to the extent possible. However, in in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown\nsome cases, data limitations limit comparability across on page 14: CFA franc zone, comprising the West\ncountries. African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)\nand CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern\nCountry Groupings and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa\nCommunity (EAC-5); the Economic Community of\nCountries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African\ngroups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive Development Community (SADC); and the Southern\ncountries, and non-resource-intensive countries African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates\n(see table on page 14 for the country groupings). include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which joined\nthe group only in 2007.\nThe oil exporters are countries where net oil exports\nmake up 30 percent or more of total exports. Methods of Aggregation\nThe other resource-intensive countries are those where In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for\nnonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent or real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as\nmore of total exports. the arithmetic average of data for individual countries,\nweighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as\nThe non-resource-intensive countries refer to those a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing\nthat are not classified as either oil exporters or other power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook\nresource-intensive countries. (WEO) database.\nCountries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer\ngroups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and prices are calculated as the geometric average of data\ncountries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at\n(see table on page 14 for the country groupings). purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.\nThe source of purchasing power parity weights is the\nThe membership of these groups reflects the most WEO database.\nrecent data on per capita gross national income\n(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except\nClassification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic\nSituations. average of data for individual countries, weighted by\nGDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share\nThe middle-income countries had per capita gross of total group GDP.\nnational income in the years 2019–21 of more than\n$1,085.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 13\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Countries Intensive Countries Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected\nSituations1\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi\nChad Central African Cabo Verde Botswana Central African Cameroon\nCongo, Republic Republic Comoros Cabo Verde Republic Central African\nof Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Republic\nEquatorial Guinea Republic of the Eritrea Comoros Congo, Democratic Chad\nGabon Ghana Eswatini Congo, Republic of Republic of the Comoros\nNigeria Guinea Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire Eritrea Congo, Democratic\nSouth Sudan Liberia Gambia, The Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Republic of the\nMali Gambia, The Congo, Republic of\nGuinea-Bissau Eswatini\nNamibia Guinea Eritrea\nKenya Gabon\nNiger Guinea-Bissau Ethiopia\nLesotho Ghana\nSierra Leone Liberia Guinea-Bissau\nMadagascar Kenya\nSouth Africa Madagascar Mali\nMalawi Lesotho\nTanzania Malawi Mozambique\nMauritius Mauritius\nZambia Mali Niger\nMozambique Namibia\nZimbabwe Mozambique Nigeria\nRwanda Nigeria\nNiger South Sudan\nSão Tomé and São Tomé and\nPríncipe Príncipe Rwanda Zimbabwe\nSenegal Senegal Sierra Leone\nSeychelles Seychelles South Sudan\nTogo South Africa Tanzania\nUganda Zambia Togo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\n1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West African Economic and Common Market East African Southern African Southern Economic\nEconomic and Monetary Community for Eastern and Community Development African Community of West\nMonetary Union of Central African Southern Africa (*EAC-5) Community Customs Union African States\n(WAEMU) States (CEMAC) (COMESA) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central African Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire Republic Congo, Democratic *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Chad Republic of the South Sudan Congo, Democratic Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Congo, Republic of Eritrea *Tanzania Republic of the South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Equatorial Guinea Eswatini *Uganda Eswatini Ghana\nSenegal Gabon Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea\nTogo Kenya Madagascar Guinea-Bissau\nMadagascar Malawi Liberia\nMalawi Mauritius Mali\nMauritius Mozambique Niger\nRwanda Namibia Nigeria\nSeychelles Seychelles Senegal\nUganda South Africa Sierra Leone\nZambia Tanzania Togo\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\n14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSub-Saharan Africa Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nStatistical Appendix Tables\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������17\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables\nTables SA1�,SA3� Table SA4�\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World\nEconomic Outlook database, October 2022� Economic Outlook database, October 2022�\n1 Fiscal year data� 1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union\n2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for reserves data�\nsettlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,\n2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary\nand are in the process of redenominating their national accounts\nCommunity (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for reserves data�\nstatistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe\ndollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, 3 Fiscal year data�\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar 4 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted due\nas the unit of account�\nto ongoing debt restructuring�\nNote: “���” denotes data not available� 5 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross\nsettlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,\nTable SA2�\nand are in the process of redenominating their national accounts\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World\nstatistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe\nEconomic Outlook database, October 2022�\ndollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\n1 Fiscal year data�\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar\n2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted\ndue to ongoing debt restructuring� as the unit of account�\n3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross Note: “���” denotes data not available�\nsettlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,\nand are in the process of redenominating their national accounts\nstatistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe\ndollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar\nas the unit of account�\nNote: “���” denotes data not available�\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 15\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 2.6 –0.7 –5.8 0.8 2.9 3.4 16.0 17.1 22.3 25.8 21.7 11.8\nBenin 4.5 6.9 3.8 7.2 5.7 6.2 1.6 –0.9 3.0 1.7 5.0 1.8\nBotswana 4.9 3.0 –8.7 11.4 4.1 4.0 5.1 2.7 1.9 6.7 11.2 5.8\nBurkina Faso 6.1 5.7 1.9 6.9 3.6 4.8 1.3 –3.2 1.9 3.9 14.2 1.5\nBurundi 2.3 1.8 0.3 3.1 3.3 4.1 7.9 –0.7 7.3 8.3 17.3 8.5\nCabo Verde 3.5 5.7 –14.8 7.0 4.0 4.8 1.2 1.1 0.6 1.9 6.5 3.5\nCameroon 4.4 3.4 0.5 3.6 3.8 4.6 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 4.6 2.8\nCentral African Republic –0.6 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 3.0 4.7 2.8 0.9 4.3 6.5 6.3\nChad 3.5 3.4 –2.2 –1.1 3.3 3.4 1.7 –1.0 4.5 –0.8 4.9 3.1\nComoros 3.4 1.8 –0.3 2.2 3.0 3.4 1.8 3.7 0.8 –0.2 11.4 8.4\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 6.4 4.4 1.7 6.2 6.1 6.7 12.3 4.7 11.4 9.0 8.4 9.8\nCongo, Republic of 0.5 –0.4 –8.1 –0.6 4.3 4.6 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.0 3.5 3.2\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.3 6.2 2.0 7.0 5.5 6.5 1.6 0.8 2.4 4.2 5.5 4.0\nEquatorial Guinea –3.1 –5.5 –4.2 –3.2 5.8 –3.1 2.9 1.2 4.8 –0.1 5.1 5.7\nEritrea 5.4 3.8 –0.5 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.6 1.3 5.6 6.6 7.4 6.4\nEswatini 2.7 2.7 –1.6 7.9 2.4 1.8 6.1 2.6 3.9 3.7 4.9 4.2\nEthiopia1 9.7 9.0 6.1 6.3 3.8 5.3 13.5 15.8 20.4 26.8 33.6 28.6\nGabon 4.0 3.9 –1.9 1.5 2.7 3.7 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 3.5 3.2\nThe Gambia 2.5 6.2 0.6 4.3 5.0 6.0 6.1 7.1 5.9 7.4 11.3 11.1\nGhana 6.7 6.5 0.5 5.4 3.6 2.8 11.7 7.1 9.9 10.0 27.2 20.9\nGuinea 6.1 5.6 4.9 3.8 4.6 5.1 12.1 9.5 10.6 12.6 12.7 12.2\nGuinea-Bissau 4.0 4.5 1.5 5.0 3.8 4.5 1.4 0.3 1.5 3.3 5.5 4.0\nKenya 5.0 5.1 –0.3 7.5 5.3 5.1 7.3 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.4 6.6\nLesotho 2.4 0.0 –6.0 2.1 2.1 1.6 4.9 5.2 5.0 6.0 8.1 6.2\nLiberia 3.8 –2.5 –3.0 5.0 3.7 4.2 10.3 27.0 17.0 7.8 6.9 8.7\nMadagascar 2.8 4.4 –7.1 4.3 4.2 5.2 7.4 5.6 4.2 5.8 9.8 8.0\nMalawi 4.2 5.4 0.9 2.2 0.9 2.5 17.0 9.4 8.6 9.3 18.4 16.5\nMali 4.4 4.8 –1.2 3.1 2.5 5.3 1.5 –3.0 0.5 3.8 8.0 3.0\nMauritius 3.8 3.0 –14.9 4.0 6.1 5.4 3.3 0.5 2.5 4.0 10.2 6.1\nMozambique 5.9 2.3 –1.2 2.3 3.7 4.9 8.1 2.8 3.1 5.7 11.3 8.6\nNamibia 3.6 –0.8 –8.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 5.3 3.7 2.2 3.6 6.4 4.9\nNiger 6.2 5.9 3.6 1.3 6.7 7.3 1.1 –2.5 2.9 3.8 4.5 3.0\nNigeria 4.0 2.2 –1.8 3.6 3.2 3.0 11.8 11.4 13.2 17.0 18.9 17.3\nRwanda 6.9 9.5 –3.4 10.9 6.0 6.7 3.9 2.4 7.7 0.8 9.5 8.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 4.5 2.2 3.0 1.9 1.4 2.6 8.7 7.7 9.8 8.1 15.0 11.2\nSenegal 4.9 4.6 1.3 6.1 4.7 8.1 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.2 7.5 3.1\nSeychelles 5.1 3.1 –7.7 7.9 10.9 5.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 9.8 4.1 3.3\nSierra Leone 5.0 5.3 –2.0 4.1 2.4 3.3 9.2 14.8 13.4 11.9 25.9 26.8\nSouth Africa 1.9 0.3 –6.3 4.9 2.1 1.1 5.3 4.1 3.3 4.6 6.7 5.1\nSouth Sudan –6.1 0.9 –6.5 5.3 6.5 5.6 102.7 49.3 24.0 30.2 17.6 21.7\nTanzania 6.6 7.0 4.8 4.9 4.5 5.2 7.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.0 5.3\nTogo 5.7 5.5 1.8 5.3 5.4 6.2 1.3 0.7 1.8 4.3 5.6 2.1\nUganda 5.3 7.8 –1.4 6.7 4.4 5.9 7.0 2.1 2.8 2.2 6.4 6.4\nZambia 5.3 1.4 –2.8 4.6 2.9 4.0 9.0 9.2 15.7 22.0 12.5 9.5\nZimbabwe2 7.4 –6.1 –5.2 7.2 3.0 2.8 2.1 255.3 557.2 98.5 284.9 204.6\nSub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.2 –1.6 4.7 3.6 3.7 8.3 8.2 10.2 11.1 14.4 11.9\nMedian 4.6 3.8 –1.2 4.3 3.8 4.6 4.7 2.8 3.9 4.6 8.0 6.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.2 4.7 0.0 5.1 4.3 4.9 7.9 8.2 11.2 10.8 15.1 11.8\nOil-exporting countries 3.5 1.7 –2.4 3.0 3.3 3.1 11.4 11.0 13.0 15.9 17.2 14.5\nExcluding Nigeria 2.4 0.6 –3.8 1.3 3.5 3.5 10.3 10.2 12.4 13.4 12.9 7.8\nOil-importing countries 4.5 4.0 –1.3 5.6 3.8 4.0 6.5 6.6 8.6 8.5 13.0 10.5\nExcluding South Africa 6.0 5.6 0.9 5.9 4.4 5.1 7.3 7.7 11.0 10.2 15.6 12.6\nMiddle-income countries 3.6 2.2 –2.9 4.5 3.3 3.1 8.3 7.3 8.5 10.5 12.9 10.5\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.4 3.5 –1.7 4.9 4.3 4.5 7.4 6.0 7.9 9.1 11.9 8.2\nLow-income countries 6.2 6.1 2.0 5.3 4.2 5.3 8.6 10.7 15.0 12.7 18.8 15.8\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 5.5 6.6 1.0 5.4 4.3 5.3 8.0 4.7 4.9 4.7 7.8 7.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 4.8 3.4 –0.2 4.2 3.6 3.9 10.3 12.0 15.7 16.5 20.8 17.9\nCFA franc zone 4.4 4.4 0.6 4.4 4.5 5.4 1.7 0.2 2.4 2.8 6.1 3.1\nCEMAC 2.6 2.0 –1.5 1.5 3.8 3.4 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.5 4.5 3.3\nWAEMU 5.6 5.7 1.8 5.9 4.9 6.4 1.4 –0.6 2.2 3.5 7.0 3.1\nCOMESA (SSA members) 6.2 5.7 0.5 6.4 4.5 5.2 8.8 12.3 17.3 14.7 20.1 17.2\nEAC-5 5.6 6.4 0.9 6.7 4.9 5.3 7.3 3.9 4.4 4.4 6.4 6.3\nECOWAS 4.7 3.5 –0.6 4.4 3.7 3.9 9.6 8.1 10.2 12.7 16.6 13.9\nSACU 2.1 0.4 –6.4 5.2 2.2 1.3 5.3 4.0 3.2 4.6 6.9 5.2\nSADC 3.1 1.3 –4.3 4.5 3.0 2.8 7.5 8.6 10.8 9.6 12.1 9.3\nSee page 15 for sources and footnotes\n16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola –0.2 0.8 –1.9 3.8 2.7 0.0 51.3 113.6 136.5 86.4 56.6 52.5\nBenin –2.4 –0.5 –4.7 –5.7 –5.5 -4.3 27.9 41.2 46.1 49.9 54.8 55.6\nBotswana –0.9 –8.5 –11.1 –2.6 –1.5 1.1 18.0 16.5 19.0 19.5 21.3 19.6\nBurkina Faso –3.4 –3.4 –5.7 –6.4 –6.1 -5.3 28.6 42.5 46.4 52.4 59.6 59.3\nBurundi –4.8 –6.4 –6.6 –4.2 –7.3 -7.6 43.6 60.0 66.0 66.6 66.4 67.6\nCabo Verde –6.5 –1.7 –9.1 –7.3 –6.4 -5.6 106.4 114.0 145.1 142.3 154.5 149.0\nCameroon –3.3 –3.2 –3.2 –2.4 –2.0 -0.2 24.5 41.6 44.9 45.5 46.8 43.7\nCentral African Republic –1.6 1.4 –3.4 –6.0 –4.8 -0.1 44.3 47.1 43.4 47.6 52.1 47.6\nChad –1.3 –0.2 2.1 –1.8 5.4 7.8 38.7 52.3 54.2 56.0 44.7 38.3\nComoros 1.4 –4.3 –0.5 –2.7 –6.5 -5.5 19.0 21.7 24.0 26.0 34.5 38.2\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 0.2 –2.0 –1.4 –1.0 –3.6 -2.8 20.4 15.0 16.5 16.1 14.7 10.8\nCongo, Republic of –0.9 4.7 –1.2 1.7 9.0 6.4 57.9 84.8 114.0 103.6 82.0 73.9\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.3 –2.3 –5.6 –5.0 –5.3 -4.0 33.5 38.4 47.6 52.1 56.0 55.1\nEquatorial Guinea –5.7 1.8 –1.7 2.6 3.7 4.1 21.2 43.2 48.4 42.8 27.1 26.5\nEritrea –4.9 0.6 –4.4 –4.1 –1.3 -0.1 174.9 187.1 179.7 176.2 164.7 149.6\nEswatini –4.8 –6.7 –4.5 –4.6 –6.4 -2.6 19.6 39.5 41.4 45.0 45.8 44.1\nEthiopia1 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8 –2.8 –3.1 -3.0 47.5 54.7 53.7 52.9 46.4 40.4\nGabon 0.6 2.1 –2.2 –1.9 1.2 3.0 40.2 59.8 78.3 65.8 54.0 52.4\nThe Gambia –4.4 –2.5 –2.2 –4.6 –4.4 -2.7 65.8 83.0 85.9 83.8 80.6 73.1\nGhana –6.6 –7.3 –15.3 –11.4 –9.2 -8.6 47.0 62.7 79.1 82.1 90.7 87.8\nGuinea –0.4 –0.3 –3.1 –1.7 –1.9 -2.8 43.5 38.6 47.5 42.5 39.0 37.2\nGuinea-Bissau –2.5 –3.9 –9.6 –5.7 –4.4 -4.0 53.5 64.0 76.5 78.5 82.0 80.3\nKenya –5.8 –7.4 –8.1 –8.0 –7.0 -5.3 44.2 59.1 68.0 67.8 69.4 67.5\nLesotho –2.8 –7.5 0.2 –4.4 –6.6 -5.9 40.9 50.5 54.2 53.5 50.7 48.0\nLiberia –3.2 –4.8 –3.8 –2.4 –5.0 -3.6 26.2 48.5 58.7 53.2 55.1 56.2\nMadagascar –2.0 –1.4 –4.0 –2.9 –6.5 -4.8 37.1 40.6 50.8 53.1 53.8 53.1\nMalawi –3.2 –4.5 –8.2 –8.9 –7.1 -8.0 32.6 45.3 54.8 63.9 73.3 74.5\nMali –2.8 –1.7 –5.4 –5.0 –5.0 -4.7 29.8 40.7 47.3 51.9 55.9 55.8\nMauritius –2.7 –8.4 –10.9 –6.1 –6.0 -5.9 60.5 84.6 99.2 93.5 90.9 90.0\nMozambique –4.8 0.1 –5.4 –3.7 –3.4 -4.3 72.3 99.0 120.0 106.4 102.4 102.6\nNamibia –6.0 –5.5 –8.1 –9.1 –8.1 -6.1 33.8 59.4 66.6 72.0 71.8 71.7\nNiger –3.4 –3.6 –5.3 –5.9 –6.6 -4.7 25.4 39.8 45.0 51.2 57.1 57.0\nNigeria –3.0 –4.7 –5.6 –6.0 –6.2 -5.8 19.7 29.2 34.5 36.6 37.3 38.6\nRwanda –2.1 –5.1 –9.5 –7.0 –6.4 -5.7 29.6 49.8 65.6 66.6 68.1 68.6\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –6.0 –0.1 5.9 1.5 1.4 0.8 82.2 71.6 81.4 72.4 64.0 63.1\nSenegal –3.9 –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.2 -4.5 44.0 63.6 69.2 73.2 77.3 74.3\nSeychelles 1.4 0.9 –16.5 –5.8 –2.9 0.9 70.1 54.2 84.8 72.9 64.9 61.7\nSierra Leone –5.3 –3.1 –5.8 –7.3 –3.8 -2.6 48.6 72.4 76.3 79.3 81.8 78.1\nSouth Africa –4.0 –4.7 –9.7 –6.0 –4.9 -5.4 42.2 56.2 69.0 69.0 68.0 70.7\nSouth Sudan –7.0 0.0 2.9 4.3 3.0 2.5 41.8 28.1 36.4 64.7 52.3 29.7\nTanzania –3.0 –2.0 –2.5 –3.1 –3.1 -3.3 35.0 39.0 40.5 40.7 39.5 38.1\nTogo –4.3 1.6 –6.9 –6.0 –6.1 -4.6 46.8 52.4 60.3 63.7 66.1 65.4\nUganda –3.0 –4.8 –7.5 –7.7 –5.5 -4.7 25.6 37.6 46.3 51.8 52.2 51.3\nZambia2 –5.6 –9.4 –13.8 –8.4 –9.5 -9.1 44.7 99.7 140.2 119.1 … …\nZimbabwe3 –3.3 –1.0 0.8 –2.3 –1.5 -1.5 47.7 93.2 102.5 66.9 92.6 64.9\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.2 –3.9 –6.4 –5.1 –4.5 -4.3 35.0 50.1 57.6 57.0 55.5 53.7\nMedian –3.2 –2.5 –5.3 –4.6 –5.0 -4.0 39.1 52.3 58.7 63.9 57.1 57.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –2.9 –3.2 –5.5 –4.3 –3.6 -3.1 39.9 57.6 64.3 60.9 59.1 55.0\nOil-exporting countries –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.0 –3.5 -3.6 27.2 43.9 48.6 46.3 42.5 41.8\nExcluding Nigeria –1.5 0.3 –1.7 1.1 2.3 1.3 42.8 80.2 88.5 69.7 53.3 49.0\nOil-importing countries –3.8 –4.3 –7.3 –5.7 –5.1 -4.7 40.5 53.5 62.4 62.3 63.0 61.1\nExcluding South Africa –3.6 –4.1 –6.3 –5.5 –5.2 -4.4 39.4 52.1 59.4 59.0 60.7 56.7\nMiddle-income countries –3.4 –4.4 –7.3 –5.6 –4.8 -4.6 34.4 50.9 59.5 59.0 57.0 56.4\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.2 –4.0 –7.3 –4.9 –3.6 -3.1 41.6 66.0 75.5 69.5 65.8 63.1\nLow-income countries –2.7 –2.3 –3.5 –3.7 –3.6 -3.2 37.7 47.4 51.8 51.0 51.2 45.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations –2.8 –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –4.4 -4.1 34.0 42.0 48.3 50.1 49.9 48.5\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations –2.8 –3.6 –4.3 –4.6 –4.6 -4.2 26.4 38.0 43.0 43.6 43.8 41.3\nCFA franc zone –2.6 –1.5 –4.4 –3.9 –2.8 -1.7 33.1 47.4 54.4 56.4 56.2 54.6\nCEMAC –2.4 –0.1 –2.0 –1.2 1.7 2.8 33.3 52.3 60.0 57.3 49.6 46.2\nWAEMU –2.9 –2.4 –5.7 –5.5 –5.7 -4.4 33.6 44.3 51.3 55.9 60.4 59.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.3 –4.6 –5.5 –5.1 –5.0 -4.2 40.1 54.6 61.3 58.6 59.4 53.8\nEAC-5 –4.2 –5.3 –6.4 –6.4 –5.5 -4.6 37.0 49.1 55.9 56.8 57.1 55.3\nECOWAS –3.3 –4.3 –6.5 –6.4 –6.3 -5.6 25.6 36.7 44.0 47.2 48.4 47.7\nSACU –3.9 –4.9 –9.6 –6.0 –4.9 -5.1 40.8 54.5 66.5 66.8 65.9 68.3\nSADC –3.1 –3.7 –7.1 –4.2 –3.5 -3.9 42.0 61.1 71.0 64.9 62.0 60.5\nSee page 15 for sources and footnotes\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 17\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 34.8 33.1 37.8 24.3 18.1 18.6 3.3 6.1 1.5 11.2 11.3 5.4\nBenin 27.8 27.8 30.5 32.6 32.6 32.6 –5.0 –4.0 –1.7 –4.4 –6.0 –5.6\nBotswana 45.0 47.2 52.5 48.3 45.3 47.5 2.1 –7.0 –10.8 –0.5 2.0 2.5\nBurkina Faso 30.5 40.7 45.0 50.6 53.9 56.8 –4.9 –3.3 4.3 0.2 –3.5 –3.4\nBurundi 25.7 39.6 46.3 50.6 52.6 54.4 –14.1 –11.6 –10.2 –13.4 –14.9 –14.1\nCabo Verde 91.4 93.1 114.3 107.1 100.4 100.7 –8.3 0.2 –15.0 –11.2 –14.0 –6.2\nCameroon 21.3 24.0 26.6 29.1 30.9 31.8 –3.2 –4.3 –3.7 –4.0 –2.3 –2.8\nCentral African Republic 22.7 28.0 30.3 33.3 31.3 29.7 –7.6 –5.1 –8.6 –10.8 –14.1 –7.5\nChad 13.9 17.0 20.8 23.3 20.1 20.2 –8.1 –4.4 –7.6 –4.5 0.8 –2.4\nComoros 24.2 28.1 31.2 36.8 36.1 33.4 –2.7 –3.9 –3.0 –2.4 –10.5 –9.1\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.4 15.1 20.2 21.9 26.2 29.7 –5.4 –3.2 –2.2 –0.9 0.0 0.0\nCongo, Republic of 27.2 24.4 36.4 32.6 30.3 34.2 –5.4 0.4 –0.1 12.6 19.1 11.1\nCôte d'Ivoire 11.0 11.7 13.8 15.4 13.6 13.0 0.1 –2.3 –3.2 –3.8 –5.2 –5.0\nEquatorial Guinea 15.2 16.1 17.1 14.7 10.4 10.4 –9.7 –0.9 –4.2 –3.4 –1.6 –2.1\nEritrea 198.9 241.5 232.1 232.1 232.1 232.1 12.2 13.1 14.6 13.5 12.2 10.8\nEswatini 26.5 28.3 32.3 30.3 33.9 33.9 4.6 3.8 6.7 2.5 –0.8 0.1\nEthiopia1 28.5 33.0 30.8 31.1 29.0 26.9 –7.0 –5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –4.4\nGabon 23.3 23.3 27.9 23.1 20.9 24.4 4.6 –5.0 –6.9 –5.7 –1.4 –2.9\nThe Gambia 36.7 47.2 56.0 59.5 55.5 50.9 –8.0 –6.2 –2.9 –8.1 –13.7 –11.7\nGhana 23.6 26.1 30.8 29.5 29.2 29.9 –6.1 –2.7 –3.0 –3.2 –5.2 –4.4\nGuinea 24.3 24.6 27.6 25.8 24.9 25.4 –15.6 –11.5 –13.6 –1.3 –7.0 –8.0\nGuinea-Bissau 36.5 42.0 45.6 45.5 43.9 42.6 –2.3 –8.5 –2.7 –3.2 –6.5 –4.7\nKenya 36.9 34.4 37.2 35.0 34.6 34.9 –6.9 –5.2 –4.7 –5.2 –5.9 –5.6\nLesotho 34.6 35.4 41.8 38.5 36.7 36.0 –7.0 –1.7 –1.6 –5.0 –8.5 –8.7\nLiberia 20.2 20.9 25.5 24.6 24.8 24.9 –17.8 –19.6 –16.4 –17.7 –16.3 –16.5\nMadagascar 23.0 24.8 28.7 29.1 33.9 33.6 –3.4 –2.3 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –5.1\nMalawi 17.1 16.0 17.5 20.9 20.9 20.9 –9.5 –12.6 –13.8 –12.2 –12.1 –12.9\nMali 26.5 29.6 36.5 40.4 40.4 40.4 –5.6 –7.5 –2.2 –10.0 –7.9 –7.1\nMauritius 104.3 120.8 163.7 164.6 151.9 142.6 –6.5 –5.1 –9.2 –13.6 –13.0 –8.1\nMozambique 31.9 36.9 42.9 43.6 42.8 43.0 –30.7 –19.1 –27.3 –22.9 –45.9 –39.6\nNamibia 58.3 63.6 71.6 71.4 70.3 69.4 –8.3 –1.7 2.6 –9.1 –8.0 –4.2\nNiger 17.1 17.1 19.2 19.9 21.7 22.3 –12.9 –12.2 –13.5 –13.8 –15.6 –13.9\nNigeria 22.1 23.9 25.2 24.9 25.6 26.5 1.9 –3.3 –4.0 –0.4 –0.2 –0.6\nRwanda 21.4 25.7 29.4 30.4 30.4 29.9 –9.9 –11.9 –12.1 –10.9 –12.6 –11.7\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 37.4 31.8 32.4 30.2 30.2 30.2 –16.8 –12.1 –11.0 –11.3 –13.9 –11.0\nSenegal 33.2 41.5 45.3 48.2 49.0 49.1 –6.7 –7.9 –10.9 –13.2 –13.0 –9.5\nSeychelles 64.7 82.5 113.3 108.2 100.7 99.5 –17.5 –3.2 –13.7 –10.5 –6.6 –7.7\nSierra Leone 22.0 23.2 29.5 32.4 30.7 29.9 –22.9 –14.3 –6.8 –14.9 –8.5 –7.7\nSouth Africa 66.5 67.0 74.1 70.3 69.6 70.3 –3.4 –2.6 2.0 3.7 1.2 –1.0\nSouth Sudan 18.1 13.6 14.6 17.1 14.7 7.7 3.5 1.5 –13.8 –2.7 8.6 2.1\nTanzania 22.6 20.4 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.4 –7.5 –2.6 –1.8 –3.3 –4.4 –3.9\nTogo 36.2 42.0 45.4 47.5 47.6 47.7 –5.4 –0.8 –0.3 –1.9 –4.8 –5.7\nUganda 17.2 19.4 22.4 21.8 21.6 21.6 –5.7 –6.6 –9.5 –8.3 –8.0 –10.2\nZambia 20.1 23.6 31.3 25.2 25.0 25.0 1.1 1.4 12.0 7.6 –1.8 –3.7\nZimbabwe2 24.3 18.7 17.1 16.3 13.8 12.0 –9.9 4.0 2.9 1.1 0.6 0.3\nSub-Saharan Africa 34.8 35.5 38.6 37.2 36.6 36.8 –2.5 –3.3 –2.9 –1.1 –1.7 –2.5\nMedian 25.8 28.0 31.2 31.1 30.9 31.8 –5.8 –4.0 –4.2 –4.4 –5.9 –5.1\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 27.8 29.5 32.7 31.5 30.6 30.6 –4.5 –3.5 –4.2 –3.3 –3.4 –4.0\nOil-exporting countries 23.7 24.9 27.0 24.9 24.5 25.3 1.4 –2.0 –3.6 0.7 2.0 0.3\nExcluding Nigeria 27.4 27.4 31.5 25.0 21.6 22.4 0.3 1.2 –2.5 3.2 6.6 2.6\nOil-importing countries 41.8 41.4 45.0 43.8 43.1 42.9 –5.2 –4.0 –2.5 –1.9 –3.8 –4.3\nExcluding South Africa 27.9 30.0 32.9 32.9 32.5 32.3 –6.5 –4.7 –4.5 –4.7 –6.2 –5.8\nMiddle-income countries 37.8 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.1 39.6 –1.2 –2.6 –2.0 0.2 –0.2 –1.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.6 31.7 36.1 33.1 31.4 31.7 –2.0 –2.0 –3.1 –1.9 –1.2 –2.1\nLow-income countries 24.2 27.0 28.8 29.7 29.6 29.4 –8.3 –5.4 –5.5 –4.9 –6.1 –6.1\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile\nand conflict-affected situations 21.6 22.3 24.7 25.0 25.3 25.1 –8.1 –6.1 –6.6 –6.0 –7.0 –7.3\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 23.3 26.1 27.7 28.1 28.5 29.0 –1.3 –3.8 –4.2 –1.8 –1.9 –2.2\nCFA franc zone 21.6 24.5 28.0 29.7 29.5 30.1 –3.8 –4.3 –4.2 –4.9 –4.2 –4.5\nCEMAC 20.4 22.2 26.0 26.2 25.6 27.1 –3.7 –3.4 –4.5 –2.5 0.8 –1.0\nWAEMU 22.4 25.7 29.1 31.6 31.4 31.6 –4.1 –4.9 –4.1 –6.3 –7.5 –6.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) 29.7 32.0 34.6 33.9 33.5 33.0 –5.9 –4.3 –4.1 –3.8 –4.6 –4.8\nEAC-5 27.3 27.0 29.3 28.5 28.3 28.4 –7.1 –5.1 –5.1 –5.6 –6.3 –6.4\nECOWAS 22.5 24.8 27.1 27.3 27.7 28.3 –0.5 –3.9 –4.2 –2.4 –2.7 –2.6\nSACU 64.8 65.5 72.4 68.7 67.9 68.6 –3.3 –2.6 1.5 3.1 0.9 –1.0\nSADC 50.0 49.4 54.8 51.1 49.9 50.0 –3.3 –1.9 –0.1 1.9 0.3 –1.4\nSee page 15 for sources and footnotes\n18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 29.2 59.5 89.3 68.6 45.2 42.2 8.3 13.6 9.5 7.4 7.1 6.7\nBenin1 14.2 25.1 30.3 34.8 39.4 41.3 … ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.7 12.6 12.5 10.1 10.6 10.3 11.6 10.0 6.5 5.8 6.2 6.2\nBurkina Faso1 20.2 23.7 25.2 25.2 28.1 27.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 20.0 18.0 17.5 19.9 18.4 17.1 2.8 1.3 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.4\nCabo Verde 80.2 97.9 130.3 114.9 127.6 126.1 5.1 8.9 6.9 7.0 5.1 5.0\nCameroon2 16.1 29.2 32.5 30.2 32.8 33.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 26.1 35.8 36.3 32.8 33.7 31.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 24.1 25.5 28.2 24.4 21.6 20.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 18.0 20.9 23.2 24.0 32.6 37.6 7.0 6.9 8.2 8.5 7.3 6.5\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 15.7 12.8 13.7 14.6 13.2 9.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4\nCongo, Republic of 2 23.8 31.0 32.4 26.3 22.8 23.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 20.4 28.2 34.4 31.5 34.5 34.5 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.1 14.0 16.3 12.4 8.5 9.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea 63.4 61.7 57.3 55.4 51.5 46.8 4.6 5.0 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.5\nEswatini 8.2 12.7 15.2 15.5 17.2 16.9 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1\nEthiopia3 24.5 28.2 28.8 29.0 25.5 22.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.6\nGabon2 27.4 38.9 49.0 36.1 30.9 31.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 35.1 46.4 49.4 47.5 45.2 43.7 3.7 4.0 5.3 6.0 4.4 4.1\nGhana 23.6 29.6 35.0 34.4 39.5 47.5 3.2 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.3\nGuinea 26.8 19.9 27.0 28.3 26.9 26.7 2.2 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.4\nGuinea-Bissau1 29.3 36.2 43.1 38.3 42.3 41.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 22.2 29.8 32.1 32.3 33.3 34.8 4.3 6.2 4.5 4.4 3.9 4.2\nLesotho 34.9 38.8 48.2 42.4 44.3 47.2 4.8 3.9 4.2 4.7 3.7 3.3\nLiberia 15.3 34.9 41.1 37.2 39.1 40.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 4.3 4.1 4.3\nMadagascar 23.2 26.9 36.4 38.0 40.3 41.6 3.1 5.3 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5\nMalawi 17.3 28.0 31.8 31.6 34.3 38.7 2.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.1\nMali1 22.2 26.5 31.8 27.9 28.3 28.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.7 10.9 21.1 22.2 30.5 29.7 7.0 16.9 14.4 15.1 11.7 10.6\nMozambique 58.8 80.8 90.7 84.9 77.9 76.6 3.2 5.3 4.6 2.5 2.3 2.4\nNamibia 10.8 20.2 21.3 16.6 17.7 16.8 3.2 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.1 4.3\nNiger1 17.0 25.4 33.0 31.5 35.2 35.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.1 6.7 8.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 5.9 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.7\nRwanda 24.6 43.2 54.7 53.4 55.6 56.3 3.7 4.6 5.4 4.5 4.2 4.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 76.6 65.4 64.9 60.0 64.0 63.0 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 4.6 4.6\nSenegal1 30.1 47.4 48.9 45.8 47.4 45.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 37.9 26.3 38.8 39.5 32.9 34.2 3.3 5.2 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.7\nSierra Leone 30.4 41.4 48.3 48.3 50.3 51.1 2.9 4.5 4.4 6.1 4.9 4.0\nSouth Africa 13.7 20.2 23.4 18.6 20.0 20.7 5.4 8.4 6.4 5.2 4.8 4.5\nSouth Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.8\nTanzania 24.9 28.1 28.9 28.4 27.0 25.4 4.6 5.8 5.6 4.7 4.4 4.3\nTogo1 12.8 17.6 28.3 25.4 27.7 26.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 15.5 22.9 29.8 27.7 27.8 28.3 4.6 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.4 3.4\nZambia4 21.8 48.7 66.6 56.0 … … 2.8 2.6 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8\nZimbabwe5 33.6 31.2 30.8 21.6 18.5 19.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.5 1.2 1.1\nSub-Saharan Africa 15.3 22.8 26.5 24.6 24.1 23.8 5.0 6.1 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.5\nMedian 21.9 28.2 32.3 31.5 32.8 33.7 3.7 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 23.0 31.7 36.5 33.8 32.4 32.0 4.2 5.0 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.4\nOil-exporting countries 9.9 17.1 20.0 19.5 17.8 17.0 6.0 6.9 6.3 5.8 6.1 6.3\nExcluding Nigeria 24.6 43.6 55.5 45.2 36.2 35.2 6.3 8.3 5.5 4.7 5.2 5.3\nOil-importing countries 19.0 25.9 29.9 27.1 27.7 27.9 4.2 5.6 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.4\nExcluding South Africa 22.7 28.9 32.8 31.4 31.4 31.1 3.4 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.9\nMiddle-income countries 13.3 21.3 25.0 23.0 22.8 22.7 5.5 7.0 5.8 5.3 5.2 5.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 22.6 34.9 41.5 37.5 36.0 36.5 5.3 6.5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.5\nLow-income countries 24.0 27.8 30.9 29.5 28.1 26.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.2\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 21.5 27.3 32.2 31.4 31.2 30.9 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.6\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 10.2 15.5 17.3 17.5 16.5 15.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7\nCFA franc zone 19.9 29.4 34.1 31.1 31.9 32.1 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.3\nCEMAC 19.1 29.1 33.1 28.2 26.3 26.7 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.7 3.1 3.8\nWAEMU 20.8 29.5 34.6 32.8 35.5 35.3 5.0 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.0 4.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) 21.4 27.1 30.5 29.4 27.9 27.0 3.1 3.9 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.5\nEAC-5 21.8 28.6 31.6 31.1 31.2 31.4 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.4 4.0 4.0\nECOWAS 9.0 15.0 18.2 18.9 19.1 19.0 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.5\nSACU 13.7 19.9 23.0 18.3 19.7 20.3 5.5 8.3 6.3 5.2 4.8 4.5\nSADC 18.8 27.4 32.4 27.1 26.3 25.9 5.4 7.7 5.6 4.8 4.5 4.3\nSee page 15 for sources and footnotes\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 19", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2022/October/English/text.ashx"}