{"doc_id": "e139a355b2784e35e0b60b3eb18da706", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nA New Shock and Little Room\nto Maneuver\n2022\nAPR\nW o r l d E c o n o m i c a n d F i n a n c i a l S u r v e y s\nRegional Economic Outlook\n22\nI N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D\nRPA\nSub-Saharan Africa\nA New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver\n©2022 Cataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : a new shock and little room to maneuver.\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : a new shock and little room to maneuver. | World economic and financial\nsurveys.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2022. | World economic and financial surveys. |\nApr. 2022. | Includes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers: ISBN 9798400208294 (English Paper)\n9798400208430 (ePub)\n9798400208454 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. |\nEconomic development -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R445 2022\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the\nspring and fall, to review developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and\npolicy considerations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the\nviews of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\nPublication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090 (USA)\nTel.: (202) 623-7430 Fax: (202) 623-7201\nEmail: publications@imf.org\nwww.imf.org\nwww.elibrary.imf.org\nSee all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nII INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 III\nContents\nAcknowledgments � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � v\nExecutive Summary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �vi\nA New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1\nYet Another Shock � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nAn Uncertain and Insufficient Economic Recovery � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nRisks are Tilted to the Downside � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �6\nComplex Choices with Fewer Options � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7\nBeyond the Crisis: Enhancing Resilience and Lifting Potential Growth Will Be Key � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15\nReferences � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 24\nStatistical Appendix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 25\nBoxes\nSpecial Focus: Spillovers from the War in Ukraine � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nBox 1� One Year On: Vaccine Rollout In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �19\nBox 2� Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vulnerability To External Shocks � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �20\nBox 3� Economic Consequences Of Conflicts In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �22\nBox 4� Central Bank Digital Currencies In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �23\nFigures\nFigure 1� Commodity Prices, 2005–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nFigure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Yields, 2019–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1\nFocus Figure 1� Global Food Prices, 2021–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nFocus Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 8 Wheat Importers � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nFocus Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Dependence on Food Imports, Top 10, 2019 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2\nFigure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nFigure 4� Selected Economies: Fully Vaccinated Persons � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nFigure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3\nFigure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4\nFigure 7� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Real GDP Growth for 2021 and 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4\nFigure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Fiscal Projections for 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4\nFigure 9� Selected Regions: Real GDP Per Capita, 2019–26 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �5\nFigure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Human Capital Divergence � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �6\nFigure 11� Selected Regions: Extreme Disasters since 1990 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7\nFigure 12� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation Rates, 2005–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7\nFigure 13� Sub-Saharan Africa: Median CPI Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8\nFigure 14� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8\nII INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 III\nFigure 15� Sub-Saharan Africa: Output Loss and Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8\nFigure 16� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, 2010 and 2020 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �9\nFigure 17� Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Risk Status for PRGT Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries, 2015–21 � �9\nFigure 18� Sub-Saharan Africa: Banks’ Holdings of Government Debt, 2015–21 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �10\nFigure 19� Sub-Saharan Africa: External Debt Service, 2010–21 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �10\nFigure 20� Sub-Saharan Africa: Tax Revenues, 2018–25 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �11\nFigure 21� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rates, 2019–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �13\nFigure 22� Sub-Saharan Africa: International Reserves, 2021 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �13\nFigure 23� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange-Rate Regime, 1980–2018 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �14\nFigure 24� Selected Countries: Exchange Rate Overvaluation, 2017–20 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �14\nFigure 25� Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Exports and Tax Revenues � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15\nFigure 26� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Per Capita, 2010–26 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15\nFigure 27� Selected Regions: Share of Infrastructure Projects Receiving Government Support � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �17\nStatistical Appendix Tables\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �27\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �28\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �29\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �30\nIv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 v\nAcknowledgments\nThe April 2022 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared by a\nteam led by Peter Kovacs under the supervision of Papa N’Diaye, Catherine Pattillo, and Damiano Sandri.\nThe team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Aqib Aslam, Marijn Bolhuis, Habtamu Fuje, Cleary Haines,\nShushanik Hakobyan, Franck Ouattara, Saad Quayyum, Henry Rawlings, Ivanova Reyes, and Andrew Tiffin.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Erick Trejo Guevara.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\n• In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and\n0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures\nand totals are due to rounding.\n• An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2019–20 or January–June) indicates the\nyears or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule\n(/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does\nthe abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).\n• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n• “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are\nequivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).\nIv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 v\nExecutive Summary\nAn already-stretched region faces yet further—potentially leading to food crises in some\nanother shock… countries—boost risk premiums, and weaken global\ndemand. Sub-Saharan Africa is also vulnerable to a\nThe economic recovery in sub-Saharan Africa surprised sharper-than-expected tightening in global monetary\non the upside in the second half of 2021, prompting conditions and a slowdown of growth in China\na significant upward revision in last year’s estimated and Europe. Locally, the slow vaccine rollout has\ngrowth, from 3.7 to 4.5 percent. This year, however, left many countries vulnerable to new COVID-19\nthat progress has been jeopardized. waves and could favor the emergence of new variants.\nOngoing security risks and conflicts may weigh on\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a global economic growth. And the region remains highly\neconomic shock that is hitting the region at a time exposed to increasingly frequent—and increasingly\nwhen countries’ policy space to respond is minimal severe—climate-related shocks.\nto nonexistent. Most notably, surging oil and food\nprices are straining the external and fiscal balances of Three immediate priorities for a constrained\ncommodity-importing countries and have increased and increasingly complex policy outlook\nfood security concerns in many countries. High food\nprices will disproportionately harm the most vulnerable Besides accelerating the vaccination campaign to protect\nsegments of the population, especially in urban areas. the region from new COVID-19 waves, policymakers\nface three policy priorities.\nMoreover, the shock threatens to compound some of\nthe region’s most pressing policy challenges, including I. Balancing inflation versus growth.\nthe COVID-19 pandemic’s social and economic legacy, The increase in commodity prices due to the war\nclimate change, heightened security risks in the Sahel, in Ukraine, especially for food and energy, has\nand the ongoing tightening of monetary policy in the compounded recent inflationary pressures in many\nUnited States. countries. Since output levels remain well below\npre-pandemic trends in most countries, central banks\nBecause of this, the growth momentum for the region are facing a difficult balancing act between curbing\nhas weakened. Economic activity this year is expected inflation and supporting growth. To navigate this\nto expand by 3.8 percent, held down by weaker growth trade-off, central banks will need to monitor price\nprospects in oil-importing countries. developments carefully, stand ready to increase rates\nif inflation expectations drift up, guard against the\nThe economic recovery is expected to accelerate in financial stability risks posed by higher interest\n2023, with growth trending at about 4 percent over the rates, and maintain a credible policy framework\nmedium term. But this pace of growth is not enough to underpinned by strong central bank independence and\nmake up for lost ground from the pandemic and renders clear communication. Some have started to increase\nthe region’s Sustainable Development Goals significantly interest rates already, and more tightening may be\nmore difficult to achieve. The pandemic has also left needed in many cases.\ndeep social scars, illustrated starkly by the increase in the\nnumber of people living in extreme poverty. Prolonged II. Addressing the economic impact of the war in\nschool closures have also imposed severe costs on Ukraine without adding to debt vulnerabilities.\nstudents, curtailing their education, undermining their The fallout from the war in Ukraine is hitting the\nlifetime productivity, and weighing on sub-Saharan region at a time when fiscal space is extremely limited.\nAfrica’s medium-term prospects. Public debt ratios are now at their highest levels since\nthe beginning of the century, and many low-income\n… and a more uncertain outlook� countries are either in debt distress or close to it.\nTherefore, the fiscal policy response needs to be carefully\nLooking ahead, policymakers will need to navigate calibrated and targeted at protecting the most vulnerable\nexceptional uncertainty with fewer policy options households from rising food and energy prices without\nand little room for error. Internationally, a prolonged adding to debt vulnerabilities.\nwar in Ukraine may increase commodity prices\nvI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 vII\nIn commodity-importing countries, especially those may be needed in some countries to support exchange\nfacing tighter fiscal constraints, finding resources to rates, even in the face of weak economic activity.\nprotect the vulnerable will require a significant reprioriti-\nzation of spending, for example, by eliminating wasteful Beyond the crisis: toward strong, inclusive,\nsubsidies to state-owned enterprises. In commodity- and sustainable growth\nexporting countries, higher commodity prices can\ngenerate sizable fiscal windfalls but only if governments Looking beyond the pandemic and current geopolitical\ncontain expenditures on energy subsidies. Most of these tensions, creating jobs and meeting the Sustainable\ngains should, in turn, be used to rebuild policy buffers, Development Goals will require strong, inclusive, and\nespecially in countries with elevated fiscal vulnerabilities. sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end,\ndecisive policy action is needed to enhance economic\nLooking beyond immediate needs, most countries diversification, unleash the private sector’s potential,\nwill need to pursue fiscal consolidation to reduce and address the challenges posed by climate change.\ndebt vulnerabilities and lay the ground for stronger\nand more sustainable medium-term growth. This will Many countries in the region continue to remain highly\nrequire improving revenue mobilization and increasing dependent on commodity exports, experiencing as a\nthe efficiency of public spending in the context of consequence more volatile output and lower economic\ncredible medium-term fiscal frameworks. Importantly, growth. Thus, greater economic diversification is\nfiscal consolidation measures should protect the essential. To this end, commodity exporters should take\nweaker segments of the population and prioritize advantage of rising commodity prices to strengthen the\ndevelopment needs. credibility of their macroeconomic frameworks, improve\nthe investment climate, and consider using targeted\nNavigating this complex path will be difficult and sectoral interventions in case of market failures.\nmany countries will require international support. The\nallocation of $23 billion of IMF special drawing rights Lifting potential growth also requires leveraging the\n(SDRs) in 2021 to the region has provided critical help full potential of the private sector. For example, a\nto strengthen external positions and finance urgent successful implementation of the African Continental\nexpenditures during the pandemic. The Group of Free Trade Area would greatly boost regional growth\nTwenty’s pledge to channel $100 billion in SDRs to and competitiveness. Public authorities should also\nvulnerable countries is another important step. But the explore new financing channels to boost private\ninternational community should go further, for example, investment, for example by providing transparent and\nby removing obstacles to the implementation of the well-designed infrastructure incentives in collaboration\nCommon Framework and allowing for swift and efficient with international development finance institutions.\ndebt restructurings where needed. Digitalization also provides important opportunities\ncoupled with new challenges and risks. For example,\nIII. Managing exchange rate adjustment. many countries are exploring the possible adoption\nMonetary tightening in the United States and rising of central bank digital currencies to enhance financial\nrisk premiums associated with the war in Ukraine, have inclusion, lower the cost of remittances, and offer\nplaced downward pressure on exchange rates across the an alternative to private cryptocurrencies that could\nregion. For pegged currencies, authorities should find otherwise weaken monetary transmission.\nthe right balance between monetary and fiscal policy\nto maintain the credibility of the peg. For countries Finally, climate change poses extreme challenges for\nwith more flexible arrangements, depreciation may help the region given its exposure to weather-related disasters\nbuffer the effects of global tightening. But even for these and the reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Investment in\nlatter countries, difficult decisions may lie ahead. For adaptation is thus of paramount importance. But the\nmany, there are clear limits to the near-term benefits green transition also provides new opportunities for\nof exchange rate depreciation, given sizable currency sub-Saharan Africa given its potential for renewable\nmismatches and pass-through to inflation. A targeted energy. International financial support will be critical to\nuse of foreign exchange intervention may help to lean help the region finance the cost of adaptation, seize the\nagainst excessive exchange rate movements but the scope opportunities offered by the green transition, and ensure\nfor intervention is often constrained by low levels of fair and affordable access to energy.\ninternational reserves. Therefore, monetary tightening\nvI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 vII\nA New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver\nYET ANOTHER SHOCK …and clouded the global economic outlook�\nSince the publication of the Regional Economic Even before the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures\nOutlook: Sub-Saharan Africa in October 2021, in major advanced economies proved stronger and\nsub-Saharan Africa has experienced a series of adverse more persistent than expected. With the added\nshocks. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shaken momentum of rising commodity prices, monetary\nglobal commodity markets, added to geopolitical tightening in advanced economies is proceeding at a\ntensions, and compounded the region’s already- faster rate than anticipated a few months ago and is\ndifficult policy outlook—which included the ongoing leading to a considerable increase in sovereign yields\nmonetary tightening in advanced economies, the (Figure 2). Rising yields also reflect increased risk\nvulnerability to new waves of COVID-19 infections premiums from worsening geopolitical tensions, which\nbecause of low vaccination rates, and political have combined to reduce portfolio inflows into the\ninstability and security risks in many countries. region and put downward pressure on most exchange\nrates.\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine has destabilized\nglobal commodity markets��� Sub-Saharan Africa also faces headwinds from lower\ndemand from key trading partners because of the\nThe war has prompted a surge in commodity prices global activity slowdown. Economic growth in the\nby disrupting energy and food exports from Russia United States is expected to be 1.5 percent lower in\nand Ukraine (Figure 1). Although this may result in 2022 relative to the October 2021 forecast because of\na windfall gain for some large commodity exporters, less fiscal stimulus and tighter monetary conditions.\nrising commodity prices are undermining fiscal and The economic outlook has deteriorated also in the\nexternal balances in commodity-importing countries, euro area and in China, with downward revisions to\nwhile also threatening food security and energy 2022 growth of about 1.5 and 1.2 percentage points,\naffordability for their most vulnerable populations. In respectively.\nthis context, several countries are highly dependent\non wheat imports with a few of them sourcing a large Domestically, a slow vaccination rollout has left the\nproportion of these imports directly from Ukraine region exposed���\nand Russia (see Special Focus, page 2). In addition,\nhigher fertilizer and oil prices will increase the costs for The Omicron variant drove a fourth pandemic\nharvesting, transporting, and processing food, putting wave that hit sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 2021\nfurther upward pressure on food prices. (Figure 3). Confirmed cases rose very rapidly, reaching\nthe highest level since the beginning of the pandemic.\n(Percent)\nFigure 1� Commodity Prices, 2005–22 Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Yields, 2019–22\n(Percent)\n(Index, 2016= 100) (US$ per barrel)\n14\n200 150\nSSA Average\n12\n150 340bps\n10\n100\n8\n100\n6 250bps\n50\n50 4 EMBIG\nFood price index (left scale)\nWTI oil price (right scale) 2\n0 0 Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-20 Jul-20 Jan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22\nJan-05 Jan-10 Jan-15 Jan-20\nSources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.\nSource: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System. Notes: EMBIG = J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global,\nNote: WTI = West Texas Intermediate. SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 1\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSPECIAL FOCUS: SPILLOVERS FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE\nThe war has increased the global prices of key commodities. Sub-Saharan Focus Figure 1� Global Food Prices, 2021–22\nAfrica’s direct links with Russia and Ukraine are relatively modest, making (Index, February 22, 2022 = 100)\nup less than 2½ percent of the region’s total trade with the outside world.\n175\nThe war will nonetheless affect the region through its effect on global\ncommodity prices. For the region’s 8 net oil exporters, higher energy prices\nwill represent a windfall gain. And exporters of other key commodities 150 Wheat\n(copper, gold, diamonds, palladium) may also benefit from higher prices\nand increased sales. But for the region’s remaining 37 non-oil-exporting 125\ncountries, higher oil and gas prices will result in a significant negative\nterms-of-trade shock—which will worsen trade balances, increase transport\n100\nand living costs, and deteriorate fiscal balances, particularly for those Rice\nwith fuel subsidies. For oil importers, the crisis is expected to increase Maize\nthe region’s import bill by almost $19 billion. In addition, oil importing 75\nSep-21 Dec-21 Feb-22\nfragile countries are expected to experience a 0.8 percent deterioration\nof their fiscal balances (compared to the October 2021 forecast), twice Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff\ncalculations.\nthe average of all oil importing countries.\nA protracted conflict could further drive up global food prices (Focus Figure Focus Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 8 Wheat Importers\n1). This is a particular concern—sub-Saharan Africa imports about 85 (Millions of US dollars, Numbers in parenthesis = percent from Russia/\nUkraine, data from 2020 or latest available.)\npercent of its wheat and some countries source a large proportion of their\nTanzania (70)\nimports directly from either Russia or Ukraine, making them particularly 3,000\nCôte d’Ivoire (18)\nvulnerable to disruptions in supply (Focus Figure 2). Foodstuffs comprise\n40 percent of the region’s consumption basket, and imports represent Senegal (51)\na key hedge against local harvest shortfalls. In this context, the direct Mozambique (30)\npass-through of global food prices to domestic food prices is relatively 2,000\nAngola (6)\nhigh, at over 30 percent. Moreover, the indirect pass-through of global oil Other\nprices to domestic food prices can also be sizable, especially for countries\nEthiopia (31)\n(Ethiopia, Kenya) where imports of staples are significant. Further, Russia\nis a key producer of fertilizers and natural gas (a key input to fertilizer 1,000\nproduction), so an extended conflict will likely lift overall agricultural costs. Kenya (33)\nRussia\nHigher food inflation will add to food insecurity and social tensions.\nSouth Africa (28)\nAlmost two-thirds of the region’s calories come from cereals (maize, rice, 0 Ukraine\nand wheat) and starchy roots (cassava, yams, and sweet potatoes), so rising\nSources: United Nations COMTRADE; and IMF staff\nwheat prices are especially concerning—even before the war in Ukraine, calculations.\nthe number of undernourished people had more than doubled in 2021\nto almost one-quarter of the population in the wake of the COVID-19\nFocus Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Dependence on Food\npandemic. Further food price increases will hurt the most vulnerable and Imports, Top 10, 2019\nmay add to social tensions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected (Percent of daily calories consumed, red = fragile and conflict-\naffected state, data from 2020 or latest available)\nstates (Focus Figure 3). Food security is already a critical issue across\nBotswana\nthe Sahel, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Madagascar.\nEswatini\nThe war may affect global financial conditions beyond commodity prices.\nLesotho\nRising uncertainty could disrupt capital flows at a time they are needed\nMauritius\nmost. And a risk-off shock could trigger capital outflows—markets would\nCabo Verde\nlikely differentiate according to existing vulnerabilities, but most would\nSão Tomé & Príncipe\nface increased borrowing costs and exchange rate pressures.\nSeychelles\nWheat\nSome countries may, however, benefit over the medium-term from\nThe Gambia Rice\nEuropean energy diversification efforts. For example, Nigeria, Senegal,\nSenegal Maize\nMozambique, and Tanzania have the largest proven natural gas reserves in\nBenin\nthe region. These countries may face stronger export demand from Europe,\nespecially given the EU’s recent decision to classify gas as sustainable. 0 20 40 60\nSources: Food and Agriculture Organization; and IMF\nSources: Food and AgricultureOrganization; and IMF staff calculations.\nstaff calculations.\n2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nFigure 3.Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\n(Seven-day moving average) Figure 5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022\n(Number of attempted and successful coups per year, by decade)\nFigure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths Figure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022\n(Seven-day moving average) (Number of attempted and successful coups per year, by decade)\n50,000 800 4\nNew cases\n(left scale)\n40,000\nNew deaths 600 3\n(right scale)\n30,000\n400 2\n20,000\n10,000 200 1\n0 0 0\nJan-00 Jul-00 Feb-01 Aug-01 Mar-02 1990–99 2000–09 2010–19 2020–22\nSources: Coups d’état, 1950 to Present (Jonathan Powell and Clayton\nSources: Our World in Data; and IMF staff calculations.\nThyne); and IMF staff calculations.\nHowever, the variant proved to be relatively less severe, than 45 percent of their populations, underscoring the\nresulting in fewer deaths than in previous waves and ongoing disparity in global vaccination levels.\nrequiring less stringent lockdown measures.\n���while several countries face security threats�\nThe vaccination campaign has accelerated in recent\nmonths because of an increased vaccine supply and The region has experienced an increase in the\nprogress with distribution (Box 1). For example, five prevalence of political instability and military coups\ncountries (Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda, in recent years (Figure 5). Since August 2020,\nSeychelles) reached the IMF-proposed 40 percent military forces have assumed control in four countries\nvaccination rate for 2021 by drawing on diversified (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali), and coups\nvaccine sources, well-trained health staff, and have been attempted in two others (Guinea-Bissau,\ncoordinated efforts among health officials, government Niger). Regional and international sanctions have\nofficials, and the private sector. been imposed on several of these countries, which\ncould constrain their access to finance and curtail their\nHowever, vaccination rates remain inadequate in growth prospects.\nmost countries. As of early April, only 12 percent of\nthe population is fully vaccinated across the region The region is also confronting several armed conflicts\n(Figure 4). This falls well short of the 70 percent and terrorist threats, including in Burkina Faso, the\nvaccination target for mid-2022 set in the IMF Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic\nproposal (Agarwal and Gopinath 2021). Furthermore, of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.\nthe pace of vaccination is still much slower than In Ethiopia, hostilities escalated in November. The\nFigure 4. Selected Economies:Fully Vaccinated\nin the rest of the world. For example, advanced intensity of the fighting has since declined, but\nPersons\neconomies have already provided boosters to more prospects for a peace agreement are still uncertain.\n(Percent of population)\nFigure 4� Selected Economies: Fully Vaccinated Persons\n(Percent of population) AN UNCERTAIN AND INSUFFICIENT\n80 AEs ECONOMIC RECOVERY\nAEs boosters\nNon-SSA EMDEs\n60\nSSA\nAfter Gaining Momentum in 2021, the\n40 Recovery Is at Risk\n20 GDP outturns for the third quarter of 2021 were\ngenerally stronger than expected. High-frequency\n0 indicators suggest that economic activity moderated\nJan-21 Apr-21 Jul-21 Oct-21 Jan-22 Apr-22\nin the fourth quarter of 2021 but was largely resilient\nSources: Our World in Data; and IMF staff calculations. to the spread of the Omicron variant (Figure 6).\nNote: AEs = Advanced Economies, Non-SSA EMDEs = non-sub-\nTherefore, projected real GDP growth in sub-Saharan\nSaharan African emerging market and developing economies,\nSSA = sub-Saharan Africa. Africa for 2021 has been revised upward significantly\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 3\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nFigure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth\ndownward revisions of about 0.4 percentage point.\n(Rolling quarterly growth, year-on-year, percent)\nAmong the oil importers, downgrades are more\n10\npronounced for fragile states, with 2022 growth being\nmarked down by 0.5 percentage point.\n5\nThe commodity price shock is also having highly\n0 asymmetric effects on government revenues and fiscal\nbalances across the region (Figure 8). In oil-exporting\n–5 countries, 2022 fiscal revenues have been revised up\nActual by 2.1 percentage points of GDP. Exporters of other\nNowcast commodities are also expected to receive revenue gains,\n–10\nDec-18 Jun-19 Dec-19 Jun-20 Dec-20 Jun-21 Dec-21 though more modest. But the impact of these gains on\nfiscal balances is much more muted, because of higher\nSources: Haver Analytics; IMF internal databases; and IMF staff\ncalculations. expenditures on energy subsidies. Non-resource-\nrelative to the October 2021 forecast, from 3.7 to intensive countries will instead see their fiscal balances\n4.5 percent (Figure 7). Looking at different country deteriorate considerably.\ngroups, Ethiopia is driving the large upward revision\nfor non-resource-intensive countries—its economy Looking at the region’s largest economies and country\nfared better than expected despite multiple shocks groups:\n(pandemic, conflict, and locust infestation). In\ntourism-dependent countries, however, 2021 growth • South Africa’s growth slowed in the second half\nwas revised downward because the pandemic has of 2021 after a relatively strong performance in\ncontinued to weigh on their economic recovery. the first half of the year. The third COVID-19\nwave and the July unrest weighed on growth in\nThe commodity price shock following the Russian the third quarter and were only partially offset by\ninvasion of Ukraine has stalled the positive a rebound in the fourth quarter. After the 2021\nmomentum in the region’s economic recovery, rebound associated with the lifting of lockdowns,\nwith aggregate growth for 2022 expected to soften growth is expected to slow down to a modest\nto 3.8 percent. Aggregate numbers mask strong 1.9 percent in 2022, held down by structural\nheterogeneity across the region (Figure 7). Growth constraints (including in the electricity sector)\nfor oil exporters in 2022 has been revised up by and tighter global financial conditions. Without\n0.8 percentage point (compared to the October fiscal adjustment, public debt is projected to grow\n2021 forecast), although security challenges and steadily in the coming years, reaching 83.7 percent\naging infrastructure constrain oil supply. But growth of GDP by 2026. Increasing potential growth\nprospects for oil importers have deteriorated, with and maintaining debt sustainability hinges on the\nFigure 7� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Real GDP Growth Figure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Fiscal Projections\nfor 2021 and 2022 for 2022\n(Percent, difference from October 2021 forecast) (Percent of GDP, difference from October 2021 forecast)\n2021. From 3.7 to 4.5\nRevenue Excluding Grants\nNon-resource-intensive countries Revenue Excluding Grants\nOther resource-intensive countries\nOther resource-intensive countries\nOther resource-intensive countries\nOil exporters\nSub-Saharan Africa\nOil exporters\nTourism-dependent countries Non-resource-intensive countries\nNon-resource-intensive countries\nOil exporters 10 15 20\nOverall Balance Excluding Grants 10 15 20\n2 3 4 5 6 7 Overall Balance Excluding Grants\n2022. From 3.8 to 3.8 Other resource-intensive countries\nTourism-dependent countries Other resource-intensi O ve il e co xp u o n r tr te ie r s s\nNon-resource-intensive countries Oil exporters\nNon-resource-intensive countries\nSub-Saharan Africa Non-resource-intensive countries\n−6 −5 −4\nOil exporters\n−6 −5 −4\nOther resource-intensive countries\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n2 3 4 5 6 7\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\ntimely implementation of credible fiscal policies High food and commodity prices and elevated\nand structural reforms, including on the product debt risks also cloud the outlook. The country is\nmarket regulatory framework, labor market highly dependent on wheat imports from Russia\nflexibility, management of state-owned enterprises and Ukraine, adding pressure on food prices.\n(SOEs), and acceleration of the energy transition. Although medium-term growth prospects are\nbetter, uncertainty is very high because of internal\n• Nigeria’s growth outlook has improved through conflict and global geopolitical tensions.\nhigher oil prices and a stronger-than-anticipated\nrecovery of manufacturing and agriculture. • Tourism-dependent countries face a particularly\nGrowth is expected to reach 3.4 percent in challenging recovery. International travel faces\n2022, falling back to 2.9 percent from 2024 a longer recovery path than other sectors. Many\nonwards. The outlook is subject to high tourism-dependent countries experienced a\nuncertainty associated with oil prices and financial short-term setback in their recovery with the\nconditions. Moreover, low vaccination rates, emergence of the Omicron variant. Some\nrising security risks, and elevated price pressures countries have fared better because of significant\nweigh negatively on the medium-term growth remittance inflows (Comoros, The Gambia) or\noutlook. Diversification away from oil will be rapid vaccination rollout (Seychelles). Still, others\ncritical to raise growth potential sustainably and face persistent income losses as large as 15 percent\nreduce volatility. of GDP (Cabo Verde, Mauritius).\n• Angola grew 0.7 percent in 2021, reversing a • Fragile economies’ economic growth is expected\nfive-year long recession streak. The country to accelerate marginally from 4.6 percent in 2021\ncould not take full advantage of high oil prices to 4.8 percent in 2022—a much more modest\nbecause of recurring technical problems and low acceleration than expected in October 2021.\ninvestment affecting oil production. Growth is Furthermore, the outlook has significant downside\nexpected to accelerate to 3 percent in 2022, with risks. Many countries—particularly in the Sahel—\nnon-oil sectors (agriculture, construction, and face ongoing security challenges and political\ntransportation) as the main drivers of growth. In instability, coupled with regional and international\nthe medium-term, growth could gradually reach sanctions. Food security concerns have increased\n4 percent because of high oil prices and the strong greatly because of the rapid rise of food prices,\nperformance of non-oil sectors. Key risks to this which exacerbates risks of social unrest. In\noutlook include high inflation (especially food) addition, rising inflation and limited fiscal space\nand continued oil production problems. constrain policy options further.\n• Ethiopia’s growth is expected to slow down from Looking beyond 2022, sub-Saharan Africa is expected\n6.3 percent in FY2021 to 3.8 percent in FY2022 to grow slightly above 4 percent (or 1.8 percent in\nbecause of the intensified military conflict in the per capita terms). This is far short of the pace needed\nfirst half of the fiscal year, the lingering effects for the region to recoup the output losses from the\nof the pandemic amid low vaccination rates, pandemic (Figure 9). Indeed, per capita incomes\nand the spillovers from the war in Ukraine. are expected to remain more than 4 percent below\nFigure 9� Selected Regions: Real GDP Per Capita, 2019–26\n(2019 = 100, dashed lines indicate pre-pandemic projections)\n20\n110 110 20\n1 S 1 u 0 b-Saha S ra u n b - A S f a ri h c a a ran Africa 1 A 1 d 0 vanced A e d c v o a n n o c m ed ie e s conomies 21 21\n22\n22\n105 105 23\n105 105 23\n24\n24\n25\n100 100 100 100 26 25\n26\n95 95 95 95\n2019 2019 21 21 23 23 25 25 2019 2019 21 21 23 23 25 25\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 5\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\npre-pandemic projections. Further, with output in poorer households that spend a much larger fraction\nadvanced economies expected to reach their pre-pan- of their income on food. This is prompting growing\ndemic trend in the near term, the gap between the concerns about food insecurity in several countries\nregion and advanced economies that was opened by (Chad, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of the Congo,\nthe COVID-19 crisis is likely to persist. Madagascar, South Sudan). In some countries, food\ninsecurity is combining with slow and uneven job\nThe Pandemic Has Left Deep Social Scars prospects to undermine political stability.\nSub-Saharan Africa was struggling to create job\nopportunities for its growing workforce even before RISKS ARE TILTED TO THE DOWNSIDE\nthe pandemic. But COVID-19 has undermined\nlabor markets further, especially in contact-intensive A continuation of the war in Ukraine and prolonged\nsectors, which employ relatively more vulnerable restrictions on exports from Russia could place\ngroups, including women and low-skilled workers additional upward pressure on food and energy prices.\n(Aslam and others 2021). Consequently, the long-term This would weigh heavily on the region’s commodity-\ntrend of decreasing poverty that had previously taken importing countries, exacerbating food insecurity,\nhold in the region has reversed, and 39 million more fueling social tensions, and placing the heaviest\npeople fell into extreme poverty in 2020 and 2021 burden on vulnerable populations. An escalation in\n(Lakner and others 2020; World Bank 2022). In geopolitical tensions between Russia and Western\nparallel, inequality worsened across income groups countries could also increase global risk aversion and\nand subnational regions, increasing the risk of social raise borrowing costs, especially for countries with\ntension and political instability. The sharp increase in more precarious fiscal positions.\nfood prices due to the war in Ukraine has the potential\nto further dramatically increase poverty and inequality Sub-Saharan Africa is also vulnerable to an\nacross the region. acceleration in the pace of monetary tightening in\nadvanced economies. For example, an unexpected\nThe pandemic has also harmed much-needed human 25-basis-points increase in the US 10-year rate could\ncapital accumulation because of prolonged school lower regionwide growth by about 0.25 percentage\nclosures. Schools in sub-Saharan Africa closed for point, through higher borrowing costs and weaker\n128 days, on average, between February 2020 and external demand (Box 2). No country would be\nOctober 2021—much longer than in advanced immune to such a shock, but frontier economies and\neconomies, where closures lasted about 84 days resource-intensive countries are particularly exposed.\n(Figure 10). Longer school closures in Africa will The region is also vulnerable to a slowdown in\ncontinue to widen the gap in learning outcomes and China, which accounts for more than 20 percent of\nweigh on medium-term growth. sub-Saharan Africa’s exports.\nRapidly rising global food prices—reaching the On the domestic front, low vaccination rates continue\nhighest levels in more than a decade—have aggravated to expose sub-Saharan Africa to the risk of new\nsocial tensions. The impact is particularly acute on COVID-19 waves. Additionally, the continued\nexistence of a large pool of unvaccinated people\nFigure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Human Capital Divergence\nincreases the risk of new variants, threatening lives and\n600 livelihoods in the region and beyond.\n500 Downside risks may also materialize if sub-Saharan\nAfrica’s security situation continues to deteriorate. The\n400 baseline projections assume a gradual de-escalation of\npolitical and military tensions across the region. But if\n300 political instability and security risks persist or worsen,\nthe economic outlook could deteriorate significantly.\n200 For example, active conflicts tend to reduce economic\n0 100 200 300 400 500 activity in affected countries by about 2.5 percent on\naverage and can trigger significant negative spillovers\non neighboring countries (Box 3).\nSources: Angrist and others, 2021; and United Nations Educational,\nScientific and Cultural Organization.\n6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\ngninrael\ndezinomrah\ncimednap-erP\n71–0002\n,)OLH(\nsemoctuo\nFigure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa:Human Capital Divergence\nAdvanced economies\nSub-Saharan Africa\nNumber of fully closed school days,\nFebruary 2020–October 2021\nSources: Angrist et al, 2021; and United Nations Educational, Scientific and\nCultural Organization.\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nFigure 11� Selected Regions: Extreme Disasters since 1990\nSub-Saharan Africa is also highly exposed to\n(Average percentage of population affected in a year)\nclimate-related shocks, including droughts, storms,\n2.0\nand floods (Figure 11). These are becoming more\nfrequent and more severe and have a particular 1.6 Droughts Storms Floods\nimpact on the region’s growth prospects, given its\nreliance on agriculture and limited resources for 1.2\npost-disaster relief.\n0.8\n0.4\nCOMPLEX CHOICES WITH FEWER\nOPTIONS 0.0\nSSA EMDEs AEs\nSources: EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database; and IMF staff\nAccelerating the vaccination campaign to reduce the calculations.\nNote: A disaster is considered extreme if the total number of deaths plus\nrisk of new COVID-19 waves and the emergence\n30 percent of the total affected population make up at least 1 percent\nof new variants remains critical and will require of the entire population of the country. SSA = sub-Saharan Africa,\nEMDEs = emerging market and developing economies, AEs = advanced\nboth domestic and global efforts. On the domestic\neconomies.\nfront, countries should continue to address logistical\nchallenges and undertake communication campaigns staple in a number of countries, including Ethiopia,\nto counter vaccine hesitancy. Furthermore, several Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania.\ncountries are poised to invest in vaccine manufacturing\nfacilities (Georgieva 2022). The international But the experience across the region has been far\ncommunity should ensure steady and predictable from uniform, suggesting an important role for local\nvaccine donations and help the poorest countries factors. Although bumper crops in some countries\nfinance the purchase of additional doses. Beyond have helped to keep food prices moderate, drought\nincreasing vaccination rates, investing in therapeutics, in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and parts of Kenya)\ntesting, and epidemiological surveillance is key to and conflicts (particularly in the Sahel) have affected\nbolstering the resilience of local health systems. food production and prices adversely. Countries with\ngreater reliance on food imports are facing more\nBesides controlling the pandemic, the region faces price pressures because of higher global food prices.\nthree pressing policy priorities: containing ongoing Inflationary pressures have also been stronger in\ninflationary pressures without unduly undermining those countries that experienced larger depreciations.\ngrowth, protecting vulnerable groups in the population Buoyed oil prices have helped ease exchange rate\nfrom the surge in energy and food prices without pressures and associated inflation in oil exporters while\nadding to debt vulnerabilities, and managing exchange pushing up energy prices and inflation in oil importers\nrate adjustments in response to tightening global (Figure 13). Although inflation has been better\nmonetary conditions. anchored and more subdued historically in countries\nwith pegged exchange rate regimes, price pressures\nI� Balancing Inflation Versus Growth have also picked up but remain modest (Côte d’Ivoire,\nGuinea-Bissau, Togo).\nInflation has increased considerably, influenced by both\nFigure 12� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation Rates, 2005–22\ninternational and domestic factors.\n(Percent, year-on-year)\n25 Interquartile range for CPI inflation\nMost countries in the region have seen significant\nFood inflation\ninflationary pressures over the past year, affecting 20 CPI inflation\nNon-food inflation\nboth food items—about 40 percent of the region’s\nconsumption basket—and non-food items (Figure 12). 15\nGlobal factors have contributed strongly, for example,\nvia high commodity prices, droughts and export 10\nrestrictions in major food exporters, and global supply\n5\nshortages (Choi 2021). The war in Ukraine has\nexacerbated these pressures through even higher oil\n0\nand food prices, particularly of wheat—an important 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021\nSources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 7\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nFigure 13� Sub-Saharan Africa: Median CPI Inflation\npressures that would fuel inflation in sub-Saharan\n(Percent, year-on-year)\nAfrica. Persistent supply bottlenecks could also increase\n20\nMedian international prices of food and manufactured goods,\n16 Interquartilerange affecting countries with a high reliance on imports\n12 (Seychelles, South Sudan). Given shrinking fiscal space\n8 and large spending needs, central banks in the region\n4 may also face political pressure to monetize some of\n0 the debt or keep a looser monetary stance for longer,\nDec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 which would result in higher inflation relative to\nOil exporters Oil importers Countries Countries with current projections.\nwithout exchange rate\nexchange rate pegs\nTrading off inflation and growth.\npegs\nSources: IMF, Information Notice System; and IMF, World Economic Economic activity in most countries remains well\nOutlook database.\nbelow the pre-pandemic trend. Therefore, inflationary\nInflation is expected to gradually decline but risks pressures pose a difficult trade-off for central banks\nremain. looking to restrain inflation without compromising\nthe recovery. Several central banks (Angola, Ghana,\nInflation for the region is expected to remain elevated Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia) have\nin 2022 at 12.2 percent and then gradually come started to increase rates because of inflationary\ndown to 9.6 percent in 2023—revised up by 3.6 pressures, and monetary policy for the CEMAC\nand 2.5 percentage points, respectively, from the region has also been tightened to support the external\nOctober 2021 forecasts (Figure 14). However, there position amid falling reserves (Figure 15).\nis significant heterogeneity across the region. For\nexample, inflation is expected to be below 4 percent Central banks should continue to monitor inflationary\nin the Central African Economic and Monetary pressures carefully and guard against the risk that\nCommunity (CEMAC) region in 2022. The decline current increases in food and energy prices may\nin inflation next year is projected to be broad-based, de-anchor inflation expectations. To fend off these\nreflecting an expected easing of global and local supply risks, additional tightening might be needed in\nchallenges, and the likely responses of the region’s countries facing rising inflation, even if output\ncentral banks in the event that inflationary pressures remains below potential. Rate hikes may also need to\nstrengthen even more. be coupled with tightening in financial regulations\nthat may have been relaxed during the pandemic. In\nBut there are significant risks to the inflation outlook. countries where inflationary pressures are more muted\nAn escalation of the war in Ukraine can push oil or less persistent, monetary policy can continue to\nand food prices even higher. Faster-than-anticipated remain accommodative. In all cases, it will be critical\nmonetary policy normalization in the United States to preserve the credibility of the monetary frameworks\nand Europe could lead to stronger exchange rate\nFigure 15� Sub-Saharan Africa: Output Loss and Inflation\nFigure 14� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation\n(Percent, red dots indicate monetary tightening since June 2021)\n(Percent, annual average)\n70\n13 ZWE\n60\n12\n50\n11\n40 LSO 10 ETH –\n30 AGO\n9 RWA SLE NGA\n20 ZMB\n8 Oct. 2021 WEO MWI GHA CEMAC\nMUS NAM BWA GIN BDI\nCurrent WEO 10 BFA COD 7\n0 SSD ZAF SWZ\n6 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10\n2019 20 21 22 23\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: WEO = World Economic Outlook.\nNote: See page 27 for a list of country acronyms.\n8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\n1202\n,doirep-fo-dne,noitalfni\nIPC\nMedian inflation\nReal GDP as percent of pre-COVID-19 projection for 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nand maintain clear communication. These are essential placing severe strains on debt sustainability in many\nelements to enhance monetary transmission and thus countries. Moreover, the pandemic has worsened\nreduce the need for aggressive monetary tightening. most countries’ fiscal position, pushing public debt\nto its highest level since the beginning of the century.\nAs borrowing rates rise, central banks should also One-half of low-income countries in the region are in\nbe careful about emerging financial sector risk from debt distress or at high risk of distress (Figure 17), and\nleveraged financial institutions, firms, and households. many have been left with little or no fiscal space at a\nSimilarly, banks’ exposure to government bonds needs time of elevated spending needs.\nto be monitored carefully, given the potential for\nadverse feedback loops between sovereign and bank The composition of creditors has also changed\ndistress, especially considering the recent deterioration markedly. Bilateral debt has shifted from Paris Club\nin bank capitalization in several countries. members to non-Paris Club creditors, making debt\nrenegotiations more complicated. Furthermore, a\nDuring this delicate period for monetary policy, it is growing pool of private creditors has largely financed\nalso important to buttress central bank independence the increase in public debt, reflecting the region’s\nand capacity. Central banks’ objectives need to be deepening financial markets and improved access to\ndefined clearly within a context of forward-looking international markets. Domestic government debt\npolicy. Governments should avoid pressuring has increased from 15 percent of GDP in 2010 to\ncentral banks to monetize fiscal spending or keep a 30 percent in 2020. Over the same period, external\nmore accommodative policy stance than otherwise public debt held by private entities has increased from\nwarranted by inflation pressures.1 An inappropriate 4 percent of GDP to 11 percent.\npolicy stance can undermine confidence in the\nlocal currency, leading to runaway inflation and For policymakers in the region, access to domestic and\nmacroeconomic instability, and undermining short- foreign private markets presents both opportunities\nand medium-term growth prospects. and challenges.\nII� Addressing the Economic Impact of the • The ability to borrow domestically proved\nWar in Ukraine without Adding to Debt particularly helpful at the beginning of the\nVulnerabilities pandemic when many sub-Saharan African\ncountries lost access to international financial\nPublic debt has increased considerably, mostly financed markets. Domestic borrowing also provides\nby private creditors. opportunities to limit the issuance of foreign\ncurrency debt. But with a few notable exceptions\nFigure 17. Sub-Saharan Africa: DebtRisk Status for\nSub-Saharan Africa’s public debt has increased steadily (Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria,\nPRGT Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries,\nfor more than a decade (Figure 16). This has helped South Africa), domestic maturities are relatively\n2015–21\nfund the region’s development needs but is now short and interest rates are high. Domestic\nFigure 16� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, Figure 17� Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Risk Status for PRGT\n2010 and 2020 Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries, 2015–21\n(Percent of GDP) (Number of countries)\n60 Domestic 6 2 3 6 7 7 5 6\nExternal bonds 7\nMultilateral 9 9 9 12\n40 Bilateral 14\nOther\n21 19\n15 14 15\n16\n20 15\n6 6 5 5 4 2\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021\n0\nLow Moderate High Distress\n2010 2020\nSource: IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis Low-Income Developing\nSources: World Bank, International Debt Statistics; IMF, World\nCountries database.\nEconomic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: PRGT = poverty reduction and growth trust.\n1 Hooley and others (2021) documents the adverse impact of central bank lending to government on the exchange rate and inflation\nSource:IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis Low-Income Developing\nin sub-Saharan Africa.\nCountries database.\nNote: Debt risk ratings for Cabo Verde begins in in 2014, and South\nSudan in 2015. PRGT = poveINrtTyER rNeAdTIuONcAtiLo MnO NaEnTAdR Yg FrUoNwD t| hAP tRrILu 2s0t2.2 9\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nborrowing has also increased bank holdings of most desirable response. Where this is not feasible,\nsovereign bonds, in line with patterns seen in other countries may use targeted tax reductions or price\nemerging markets (April 2022 Global Financial subsidies with clear sunset clauses to contain the rise\nStability Report). Sovereign bonds now amount in domestic food and energy prices. This could be\nto almost 20 percent of bank assets and reach as justified in countries with weak social safety nets and\nhigh as 40 percent in some countries (Figure 18). limited ability to scale up targeted cash transfers. If\nAt such levels, the sovereign’s fiscal health and well-designed and temporary, targeted tax reductions\nthe banking sector’s financial health are closely and price subsidies could protect households from\nintertwined, giving rise to a tight sovereign-bank high price volatility, providing time for a more gradual\nnexus whereby sovereign risk can severely impair adjustment. Measures such as price controls and\nbanks’ balance sheets, especially in countries with export restrictions should instead be avoided as they\nweakly capitalized banks. lead to market distortions and could exacerbate supply\nconstraints domestically and internationally.\n• Greater access to international capital markets has\nalso proved to be a mixed blessing. On the positive The policy response should consider the persistent\nside, countries have been able to draw on much- nature of the commodity price shock, calling for a\nneeded financial resources at a time of declining careful use of limited fiscal resources and implying\nofficial development assistance flows. However, that excessive shielding of domestic prices will\nthe substitution of low-cost, long-term multilateral eventually require a large adjustment. Furthermore, it\nflows with higher-cost private funds has resulted should differentiate between countries, depending on\nin a steep rise in external debt-service costs and economic and social conditions and on whether they\nhigher rollover risks (Figure 19). Furthermore, are commodity importers or exporters.\nthe reliance on foreign funds has prompted a\nlarge increase in foreign-currency debt. Therefore, Net commodity importers will face strong pressures\nthe region is highly vulnerable to a tightening on fiscal balances. To support the vulnerable via\nin global financial conditions and exchange rate targeted transfers and subsidies, countries will need\ndepreciations. to reprioritize spending, for example, by cutting\nnon-essential expenditure such as wasteful subsidies to\nCushioning the economy from the war in Ukraine SOEs. The fiscal adjustment will need to be stronger\nwithout increasing debt vulnerabilities. in countries facing tighter financial constraints.\nThe war in Ukraine is thus hitting the region at a Net commodity exporters can receive fiscal windfalls\ntime when most countries have little to nonexistent only if they contain subsidy expenditures. For\nfiscal space to buffer the shock. Consequently, fiscal example, some oil exporters provide expensive\npolicy needs to react in a targeted manner, aiming and generalized energy subsidies to the domestic\nat protecting vulnerable segments of the population population which could lead to a deterioration in fiscal\nfrom the increase in energy and food prices without balances despite the revenue increase associated with\nadding to debt vulnerabilities. In this context, targeted higher export prices (Nigeria). Therefore, removing\nand direct transfers to vulnerable households are the generalized subsidies is crucial to ensure that the rise\nFigure 18� Sub-Saharan Africa: Banks’ Holdings of Figure 19� Sub-Saharan Africa: External Debt Service, 2010–21\nGovernment Debt, 2015–21 (Percent of exports of goods and services)\n2010\n(Percent of total assets)\n25 11\n20\n12\n20 13\n15 Interquartilerange 14\n15\n15\n10\nMedian 16\n10\n17\n5 5 18\n19\n0 0 20\n2015 2019 2021 2010 12 14 16 18 20 21\nSource: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nin commodity prices generates fiscal savings. It is Figure 20� Sub-Saharan Africa: Tax Revenues, 2018–25\nthen essential that these savings are directed largely (Simple average, percent of GDP, dashed lines = pre-COVID-19\nprojections.)\nto strengthening fiscal sustainability supported by\n2018\nstrong governance frameworks, given the precarious\nNon-resource-intensivecountries\n19\nconditions faced by many countries. 18\n20\nOver the medium term, most countries will need to 21\ncontinue fiscal consolidation in order to reduce debt 16 22\nvulnerabilities and boost resilience while protecting 23\ndevelopment spending. To this end, revenue 14 24\nmobilization is a key priority. The pandemic has 25\nderailed revenue mobilization efforts, especially in Resource-intensivecountries\n12\nresource-intensive countries (Figure 20). Authorities\n2018 20 22 24\nshould now renew their tax reform efforts, aiming\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nto lift revenues at least back to pre-pandemic levels.\nAs authorities consider the best way forward, • Monitor fiscal risks to avoid negative surprises.\nthey should look for innovative approaches to old Many countries should focus especially on the\nproblems, for example, by leveraging the potential transparency and management reform of SOEs\nfrom digitalization to broaden tax bases, enhance tax (Kenya, South Africa).\nfairness and taxpayer compliance, and improve tax\nadministration. Countries should also adopt credible medium-term\nfiscal frameworks to ensure that sufficient resources\nRevenue mobilization efforts should be complemented are available to meet debt-service obligations and\nwith measures to increase the efficiency of public broader spending needs. By raising trust in fiscal\nspending and strengthen accountability. For example: sustainability, credible budget plans can reduce\nborrowing costs by as much as 40 basis points\n• Improve the targeting of public expenditure. (October 2021 Fiscal Monitor). Even countries\nDigital delivery mechanisms, such as mobile without market access benefit from fiscal credibility\nmoney or smart cards, could be used effectively for by attracting more private investment and fostering\nthis purpose, as demonstrated in Togo during the macroeconomic stability.\npandemic. Furthermore, many countries should\nstrengthen social safety nets to respond to future Strengthening debt management capacity is also an\nshocks in a more targeted and transparent manner. important priority. Debt vulnerabilities can be reduced\neffectively via credible medium-term debt strategies\n• Enhance public investment management. During and proactive liability management, and by improving\nthe last two years, many countries postponed debt reporting, transparency, and communication. For\ninvestments to prioritize health and social instance, public debt data in many countries continue\nspending. As investment programs resume, to be incompletely reported or hidden through\ncountries will need to use their limited resources confidentiality clauses, limiting the effectiveness of\ncarefully and effectively to support green and debt management and complicating potential debt\nresilient infrastructure investment, which is restructurings. Despite significant improvements in\nfound to be up to 12 times more cost-effective debt management in recent years, a recent report from\nthan frequent disaster relief (April 2020 Regional the World Bank found that 40 percent of low-income\nEconomic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2). countries have not published sovereign debt data for\nGiven large investment needs, it is critical that more than two years (World Bank 2021).\ninvestment projects are managed effectively\nand transparently, with careful identification, Domestic consolidation needs to be accompanied by\npreparation, prioritization, risk management, international support...\nand integration into medium-term strategies and\nfinancing frameworks. In addition, steps taken Local fiscal efforts are not sufficient to simultaneously\nduring the pandemic to increase transparency restore sustainable fiscal positions and meet essential\nin procurement (including beneficial ownership spending and investment needs, given the size of the\ninformation) should continue in order to mitigate shocks associated with the prolonged pandemic and\nthe risk of corruption. now with the war in Ukraine. To offset further scarring\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 11\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\n(especially in human capital) and make renewed the official creditor composition of low-income\nprogress toward the Sustainable Development Goals countries is much more diverse than in the past, and\n(SDGs), international support for the region remains that an effective debt treatment requires bringing all\nessential. major official creditors to the table. The importance\nof comparability of treatment among all creditors,\nSub-Saharan African countries received $23 billion including private creditors, remains a prerequisite\nof IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) in 2021 for fair debt resolutions and a requirement of debt\nwhich have helped strengthen external positions and treatments under the Common Framework.\nsupport urgent spending needs. For example, several\ncountries have used part of their SDR allocation for However, the Common Framework has faced\nessential social spending on pandemic-related needs significant implementation challenges. So far, progress\nand education programs (Chad, The Gambia, Niger, has been slow for the three countries that have applied\nRwanda, and Sierra Leone). The region’s poorest for debt treatment under the Common Framework\nand most vulnerable countries also received two (Chad, Ethiopia, Zambia), and they have experienced\nyears of debt-service relief through the Catastrophe delays in reaching tangible results. This calls for urgent\nContainment and Relief Trust, ending in April 2022. improvements along several dimensions:\nLooking ahead, the G20 has committed to channel\n$100 billion of their SDR holdings to vulnerable • First, the Common Framework needs greater\ncountries, especially in Africa. This would be a major clarity on the steps, conditions, and timeline for\ncontribution to the region’s short-term liquidity needs effective debt relief. This is important to increase\nand longer-term development. The SDRs could be the predictability of the process and improve\nchanneled through the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and coordination among stakeholders to avoid\nGrowth Trust or the newly created Resilience and protracted negotiations. There is also a need to\nSustainability Trust. To ensure that both domestic and strengthen the involvement of debtor countries\ninternational funds are well spent, countries should and their interactions with creditors.\nfurther increase transparency and accountability of\ntheir public finances. Many have made efforts to • Second, to encourage faster resolution and broader\nenhance reporting and audits on COVID-19-related participation, debt service payments should be\nexpenditure. This reform momentum should be suspended from the time an IMF-supported\nmaintained, including the use of digital innovations in program consistent with the Common Framework\npublic finance management. debt treatment is agreed to with IMF staff. This\nwould provide an incentive for debtor countries\nFor countries with the most pressing debt to request debt treatment and for creditors to be\nvulnerabilities and particularly for fragile states, constructive during negotiations.\ndirect budget support through grant financing will\nbe critical. The IMF has recently published a new, • Finally, more work is needed on securing\ncomprehensive strategy to better support fragile and comparability of treatment among various\nconflict-affected states (FCS). The strategy recognizes creditors. Coordinating many bondholders,\nthe risk that FCS may fall further behind other navigating contractual clauses, and dealing\ncountries in their post-pandemic recovery and fail to with non-cooperative creditors can be complex,\nachieve the SDGs, unless their efforts to exit fragility especially for low-income countries with weaker\nare supported by coordinated actions of development debt management capacity.\npartners, including the IMF (IMF 2022a).\nIII� Managing Exchange Rate Adjustment\n.. and a predictable and effective framework to reduce\nThe pandemic and the recent global financial\ndebt burdens where needed.\ntightening have weighed on exchange rates in\nsub-Saharan Africa…\nFor some countries, restoring debt sustainability will\nrequire debt re-profiling or an outright restructuring\nof their public debt. Recognizing that a timely and The COVID-19 crisis has generally weakened the\norderly debt resolution is in the interest of both region’s exchange rates. During the first year and a\ndebtors and creditors, the G20 has taken an important half of the pandemic, exchange rates depreciated on\nstep to facilitate the restructuring of official external average by about 10 percent against the US dollar\ndebt. The Common Framework acknowledges that (Figure 21), in line with elevated risk aversion and\n12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nFigure 21. Sub-Saharan Africa: ExchangeRates,\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\n2019–22\n(Versus US dollar, nominal index, end-2019 = 100)\nFigure 21� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rates, 2019–22 Tightening global financial conditions and limited\n(Versus US dollar, nominal index, end-2019 = 100) reserves will complicate policy trade-offs for countries\nwith both pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes.\n110\nWAEMU/CEMAC\n105 Exchange rate regimes in the region vary greatly and\nhave evolved over time (Figure 23), consistent with\n100\nOtherresource-intensive a general result that there is no single regime that is\ncountries\n95 preferred for all countries at all times. For sub-Saharan\nAfrica, half of the region’s economies maintain a\n90 Depreciation Oil exporters pegged exchange-rate arrangement, and the other half\n85 maintain more flexible arrangements. Intervention is\nNon-resource-intensivecountries relatively common in the latter countries, with a trend\n80 toward more managed frameworks in the years since\nDec-19 Jun-20 Dec-20 Jun-21 Dec-21\nthe global financial crisis.\nSources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, World Economic Outlook\ndatabase; and IMF staff calculations.\nIn countries with a peg, exchange-rate policy will need\nSources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, World Economic\nvolatile commodity prices and capital flows. However, to remain centered on finding the right policy mix\nOutlook database; and IMF staff calculations.\nexchange rate movements have differed widely from (including monetary and fiscal policy) consistent with\ncountry to country and displayed considerable maintaining the credibility of the peg. This may entail\nvolatility. The South African rand, for example, taking steps to offset a sustained erosion of reserves, for\ndepreciated sharply at the onset of the crisis, but example, by tightening macroeconomic policy, despite\nrecovered most of that loss over the following year. a still-weak economic outlook.\nCountries with firm pegs to the strengthening euro\n(Cabo Verde, Comoros, CEMAC, São Tomé and In countries with more flexible arrangements, some\nPríncipe, WAEMU) are also a notable exception, additional depreciation may help buffer the effects\ngiven that their exchange rates appreciated against the of global financial tightening. But the benefits of\nUS dollar. flexibility are often circumscribed, particularly during\nperiods of global turmoil. For example, balance-sheet\nThe tightening of global financial conditions in mismatches, shallow financial markets, and limited\nrecent months has intensified exchange rate pressures hedging opportunities may increase the potential\nfor most countries. Oil exporters are an important impact of exchange-rate volatility on financial\nexception. For example, in the final quarter of 2021, stability. Additionally, when the exchange-rate-pass-\nAngola’s currency registered its strongest gain since through to domestic prices is high, imported inflation\n1999, supported by rising oil prices, a credit-rating represents an added challenge for monetary policy\nupgrade, and a significant tightening of monetary because it risks de-anchoring inflationary expectations\npolicy. For countries pegged to the euro, the previous and undermining the credibility of the authorities’\nyear’s appreciation against the US dollar has been monetary framework.\nlargely unwound.\nFigure 22� Sub-Saharan Africa: International Reserves, 2021\n(Months of imports)\n… and left most countries with limited reserve buffers.\nEfforts to offset exchange rate pressures in 2021 have 9\nled to a drop in reserves in several countries. In this\ncontext, the 2021 SDR allocation was most timely 3–5 months\nby strengthening countries’ external positions besides 6\nproviding resources for urgent spending programs.\nHowever, for a large portion of sub-Saharan Africa,\nreserve levels remain far from comfortable (Figure 22). 3\nFor example, many countries are still short of the\nstandard import-cover benchmark—there is no unique\nframework for assessing reserve adequacy, but import 0\ncover is often the prime motive for maintaining Before SDR After SDR\nreserves in the region and 3 to 5 months is a common Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff\ncalculations.\nstandard (Shanz 2019; Jeanne and Sandri 2020). Note: SDR = special drawing rights\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 13\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nFigure 23� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange-Rate Regime, Figure 24� Selected Countries: Exchange Rate Overvaluation,\n1980–2018 2017–20\n(De facto classification, percent of countries) (Percent)\n100\n75 Sub-Saharan\nAfrica\n50\n25\nEmerging\nMarkets\n0\n1980 1990 2000 2010 2018\nIndependent Managed Crawl\n– 20 0 20 40 60\nBasket Conventional Peg Hard Peg\nSources: IMF staff reports; and IMF staff calculations\nSources: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Note: Based on IMF staff assessments of real effective exchange rates,\nRestrictions database; and IMF staff calculations. excluding pegged currencies.\nTherefore, even for countries with flexible arrange- Indeed, for most countries, the case for or against\nments, reserves will still be an integral part of the intervention is seldom straightforward (IMF 2022).\nauthorities’ policy tool kit because they provide policy\nspace to maintain internal price and financial stability On the one hand, shallow markets, often-weak\nin the face of large exchange-rate swings. But with less monetary policy credibility, and high foreign-exchange\nroom to maneuver, many policymakers will need to liabilities are common features throughout the\nuse their resources carefully as shocks unfold. region, implying that large exchange rate movements\nmight risk de-anchoring inflation expectations and\nFor countries with limited reserves, authorities have undermining financial stability. In such circumstances,\nsometimes offered favorable rates, including to specific foreign-exchange flexibility may act as a shock\nsectors. But the resulting parallel market for foreign amplifier rather than a shock absorber. Moreover,\nexchange (Nigeria, Zimbabwe) can weigh on growth— dominant foreign currency pricing—in which both\ndistorting investment, encouraging rent seeking, exports and imports are priced in a foreign currency—\nand adding to uncertainty. The decision to return implies that the shock-absorber role is weakened in\nto a more unified framework is often difficult, but many cases, as exchange-rate movements induce less\nexperience suggests that the shift to a market-clearing expenditure switching, although the quantitative\nofficial rate is not in itself likely to lead to a sharp relevance of this aspect is still under examination.\nincrease in inflation, as prices in the real economy Intervention to smooth undue exchange rate volatility\ntend to reflect the less-favorable parallel exchange could, therefore, be a helpful addition to the policy\nrate; and removing exchange-market distortions can toolkit subject to the availability of reserves.\ngive a substantial boost to development, by reducing\nuncertainty and strengthening competitiveness On the other hand, the region is relatively exposed\n(Gray 2021). In this regard, the exchange reform to persistent real shocks, suggesting that intervention\nimplemented in South Sudan last year prompted a might not always be the appropriate policy response.\nsignificant appreciation of the parallel market rate, Also, with currencies being overvalued in many\nhelping to reduce inflation and insulating the country countries (Figure 24), sustained efforts to resist\nfrom rising global food prices. downward pressure risk supporting unsustainable\npolicies and weak external positions.\nWhat role for foreign exchange intervention?\nFinally, in some countries the scope for intervention to\nIMF staff analysis suggests that intervention may have lean against excessive movements in the exchange rate\na role to play in the policy toolkit for sub-Saharan is limited by low reserves. In these cases, authorities\nAfrican countries, but this must be weighed carefully, may have no option but to tighten monetary policy.\ngiven the region’s complicated policy backdrop.\n14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nBEYOND THE CRISIS: ENHANCING But so far, most oil exporters have been unable to\nRESILIENCE AND LIFTING POTENTIAL boost production, because of security concerns and\nyears of underinvestment that have translated into a\nGROWTH WILL BE KEY\nsecular decline in market shares.\nLooking beyond the immediate policy priorities, In addition to greater macroeconomic volatility,\nstrengthening resilience and lifting potential growth resource-intensive countries suffer from significantly\nrequires an ambitious reform agenda to promote weaker economic growth. For example, their average\neconomic diversification, unleash the private sector’s growth in the decade before to the pandemic was\npotential—for example, via regional trade integration, about 3.1 percent, considerably lower than the\ninnovative financing channels, and digitalization—and 5.9 percent experienced by non-resource-intensive\nconfront the challenges posed by climate change. countries. This divergence is expected to continue\n(Figure 26), widening regional inequality even more.\nPromoting Diversification\nPromoting diversification and developing new\nMany countries in the region remain highly dependent industrial capabilities is therefore a key priority for\non commodity exports (Figure 25). For example, in commodity exporters (Cherif and others forthcoming).\nsome countries, oil exports reach more than 40 percent A broad range of policy actions is needed to achieve\nof GDP (Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, these goals.\nSouth Sudan). Beyond oil, 15 countries are large\nexporters of other commodities, such as iron ore and • Credible macroeconomic policies and a favorable\ncopper. Oil exporters and other resource-intensive investment climate are essential ingredients to\ncountries combined represent more than 70 percent ensure that the private sector can take advantage of\nof the region’s GDP. Besides accounting for a large new opportunities.\nshare of countries’ GDP, commodities contribute\nvery significantly to fiscal revenues. For example, • Targeted sectoral interventions may be helpful to\ncommodities provide more than 50 percent of total encourage the reallocation of resources to the most\nfiscal revenues in several oil-exporting countries. promising activities. These interventions should\nfocus on addressing both policy failures, which\nThe reliance on commodity exports makes countries may include a burdensome regulatory framework,\nhighly susceptible to fluctuations in commodity high tariffs on critical inputs, an overvalued\nprices. Commodity-dependent countries were among exchange rate, inadequate infrastructure, or an\nthe hardest hit at the start of the pandemic when insufficiently skilled workforce; and market\noil prices tumbled to record lows. The recent strong failures, which generally entail a sector-specific\nrebound in commodity prices may provide temporary bottleneck or externality, where firms do not\nrelief for resource-intensive countries, by increasing fully internalize the possible benefits of potential\nfiscal revenues and strengthening growth prospects. actions. From experience, targeted infrastructure,\nresearch and development subsidies, and support\nFigure 25� Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Exports and Tax\nfor start-up incubators have often proved effective.\nRevenues\n100\n80 SSD GNQ\nAGO 60\nCOG\nBFA NGA\n40 TCD GAB\nCMR MLI BWA 20 GIN ZMB\nGHA\nNER SLE 0\n0 20 40 60 80\nSources: United Nations, COMTRADE database; Bank of Sierra Leone;\nIMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: See page 27 for a list of country acronyms.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 15\nfo\ntnecrep\n,seunever\nxat\nytidommoC\n12–5102\negareva\n,eunever\nlatot\nFigure 26� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Per Capita, 2010–26 Other resource-intensive countries\n(Index, 2010 = 100)\nOil exporters 180\n2010\n150 Non-resource-intensive countries 11\n12\n13\n120 Resource-intensive countries 14\n15\nCommodity net exports, percent of GDP,\n90 16\naverage 2000–20\n2010 15 20 25 17\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nBut, trade-related measures, strategic investments the continent. The system could substantially reduce\nby SOEs, and directed lending have often the risks associated with relying on third-party\nproved risky and have sometimes encouraged currencies, and make intraregional payments easier,\nrent-seeking. Thus, targeted interventions are faster, and less expensive.\nmore likely to succeed where governance and\nadministrative capacity is strong, and when Trade integration will greatly benefit the region but\ncomplemented by broader economy-wide reforms. benefits and costs will not be distributed evenly across\nand within countries. For example, countries that are\n• Cross-country experience shows that successful less integrated into regional and global value chains\ntargeted interventions are generally accompanied could see fewer benefits (October 2021 Regional\nby enhanced accountability, including through Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific). To harness the\nspecific performance targets, the promotion of AfCFTA’s full potential and ensure inclusive growth,\ncompetition, and a focus on export orientation. policymakers must be prepared to provide adequate\nsafety nets and retraining opportunities for workers in\nSeveral success stories in sub-Saharan Africa can inspire sectors that could be adversely affected.\nefforts to enhance economic diversification (October\n2017 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Encouraging More Innovative Financing\nAfrica, Chapter 3). For example, in the last 30 years, Channels to Boost Investment\nMauritius has managed to evolve from a mono-crop\neconomy to a competitive upper-middle income Sub-Saharan African countries need significant\ncountry. Rwanda has embarked on an ambitious financing to close the infrastructure gap and meet\nprogram of investment in infrastructure and education the SDGs. Catalyzing private finance will be essential\nand has seen the region’s fastest movement of labor given high debt levels and low revenue mobilization.\nfrom agriculture to higher-value-added activity. The continent holds immense opportunities for\nprivate investors. It has a young and growing\nStronger Regional Trade Integration population, abundant natural resources, large markets,\nand great potential for digital transformation. Still,\nThe recent launch of the African Continental Free risk-adjusted returns of projects in sub-Saharan Africa\nTrade Area (AfCFTA) marks a milestone toward are often perceived to be less attractive than elsewhere.\ndeeper regional integration. This agreement has the\npotential to eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of existing To mobilize private finance, governments should\nintraregional trade flows (with an estimated increase deliver sustained improvements in the investment\nin intraregional trade by about 15–25 percent over climate and macroeconomic stability, including\nthe medium term) and, critically, to reduce non-tariff predictable access to foreign exchange reserves.\nbarriers that are continuing to undermine regional Furthermore, they should explore innovative solutions\ncompetitiveness (April 2019 Regional Economic to improve risk-return profiles, for example, by\nOutlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 3). Deeper providing public incentives to finance infrastructure\nintegration would boost incomes, create jobs, projects (Eyraud and others 2021). Up to 80–90\ncatalyze foreign direct investment, and facilitate percent of infrastructure projects receive government\nthe development of regional supply chains. The support in some regions, but this happens less often\nAfCFTA will need to be implemented swiftly and in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 27). Middle-income\ncomplemented by an enabling macroeconomic countries with relatively strong state capacity and\nenvironment and a range of structural reforms to institutions and with market access (Ghana, Kenya,\ndeliver its full potential. Senegal) are particularly well positioned to attract\nprivate finance. Their pipeline of bankable projects\nRegional integration would also benefit from the is often sufficiently developed, and many projects\ndigitalization of trade processes, the promotion of have a critical size that makes them appealing to\npaperless trading systems, and the alignment of investors. Appropriate institutional, governance, and\nmultiple and overlapping regional trade frameworks legal frameworks are crucial to safeguard public sector\nvia regulatory standardization and enforcement. balance sheets from risks related to project financing.\nThe recently launched Pan-African Payment and\nSettlement System is also an important step in Multilateral development banks (MDBs), development\noperationalizing the AfCFTA because it facilitates finance institutions, and other development partners\ntransactions among more than 40 currencies across could play a key role in helping attract private\n16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nFigure27. SelectedRegions: Share of Infrastructure Projects Receiving\nGovernment Support A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\n(Percent)\nFigure 27� Selected Regions: Share of Infrastructure Projects\nvery little to rising global temperatures but that\nReceiving Government Support\nwill bear the greatest burden given its exposure to\n(Percent)\nweather-related disasters and dependence on rain-fed\nEast Asia and Pacific\nagriculture. Therefore, investment in adaptation\nMiddle East and North Africa is of critical importance. For example, investment\nin climate-resilient infrastructure, better irrigation,\nEurope and Central Asia\nimproved seed varieties, and strengthened health\nSouth Asia\nsystems can deliver large gains.\nSub-Saharan Africa\nYet global mitigation efforts are also critical for\nLatin America and the Caribbean\nthe region. The green transition offers important\n0 20 40 60 80 100 opportunities for diversification and job creation.\nSource: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Sub-Saharan Africa has unrivalled potential for\nProjects database.\nrenewable energy and an abundance of minerals\nSoinuvrcees:t mwoernldt .B Iannskt,r uPmriveantet sP saurtcichi paast ibonle innd Inedfr afsintruanctcuere a (nPdP I) Projecktesyd afotarb tahsee .transition.\nguarantees could leverage additional private funds. But\nsupport should be targeted, temporary, and granted Financing adaptation and seizing the opportunities\non the basis of proven market failures. It should also presented by the green transition will require\nbe transparent, leave sufficient risk to private parties, significant investment, thus support from the\nand display additionality, meaning that incentives international community will be essential. At the\nshould make worthy projects happen that would not 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference\nhappen otherwise. MDBs and other development (COP26), the African Group of Negotiators indicated\npartners could also deploy more equity financing, local that, beginning in 2025, a minimum $100 billion\ncurrency financing and other risk-sharing instruments per year over the next decade and a half would be\nin order to reduce the dominance of senior, foreign needed for infrastructure investment to boost resilience\ncurrency debt financing. and to curb emissions. IMF estimates suggest that\nclimate change adaptation alone will cost up to\nDigital Innovation Can Enhance Financial $50 billion every year, equivalent to about 3 percent\nInclusion and Reduce Costs of regional GDP.\nSeveral countries in the region are exploring the Policy efforts should also be directed at ensuring\npossibility of adopting a central bank digital currency that the green transition is also a just transition,\n(CBDC). Nigeria has already moved forward by for example, by ensuring that carbon taxes and\nlaunching the eNaira. CBDCs can offer several the removal of fossil-fuel subsidies do not pose\nbenefits, for example, by enhancing financial affordability challenges for the most vulnerable\ninclusion, lowering the cost of remittances, and segments of the population. The transition of workers\nreducing the reliance on private crypto currencies that to green sectors will also require investment in new\nmay hinder monetary transmission and facilitate illicit skills and adequate social protection. To this end, a\nflows (Box 4). Yet CBDCs also present new challenges recent innovative partnership between South Africa\nand risks. To harness the benefits of CBDCs, countries and a group of advanced economies, announced\nshould invest in digital infrastructure, build expertise at COP26, aims at accelerating decarbonization,\nwithin central banks, and confront cybersecurity while supporting vulnerable groups.2 In addition,\nrisks. This is a complex and evolving area, where because a large share of the population still has no\nthe balance between benefits and risks depends on access to electricity, a continued increase in access to\ncountry characteristics. affordable and sustainable energy should accompany\nthe transition. Closing the access gap in sub-Saharan\nInvesting in Climate Change Adaptation and African countries will require an estimated annual\nSupporting the Green Transition are Key investment of $28 billion by 2030, according to the\nInternational Energy Agency.\nClimate change is posing major challenges for\nsub-Saharan Africa—a region that has contributed\n2 For more information, see the Political Declaration on the Just Energy Transition in South Africa:\nhttps://ukcop26.org/political-declaration-on-the-just-energy-transition-in-south-africa/.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 17\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nBOX 1� ONE YEAR ON: VACCINE ROLLOUT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nCOVID-19 vaccinations remain low in sub-Saharan countries with successful vaccination campaigns relied on\nAfrica, driven initially by limited supply and later by a more diversified vaccine portfolio sourced from multiple\nlogistical challenges. As of early April, only 12.2 percent suppliers (vaccine manufacturers, COVAX, the African\nof the population in sub-Saharan Africa has been fully Vaccine Acquisition Trust, and bilateral donors) which\nimmunized, compared with 64 percent in emerging markets helped them mitigate the supply risks during the earlier\nand developing economies and 74 percent in advanced days of vaccine production and distribution.\neconomies. Only five countries in the region (Botswana,\nCabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles) reached Regional vaccine manufacturing initiatives are underway\nthe IMF-proposed target of 40 percent coverage by the and could help reduce Africa’s exposure to future health\nend of 2021. The problems with limited vaccine supply shocks. Licensing and technology transfer agreements have\nhave eased, since India began exporting vaccines again in offered a short-term solution to mitigate vaccine supply\nOctober 2021,1 and advanced economies have accelerated shortages over 2021. For instance, Aspen Pharmacare\nthe pace of dose donations bilaterally and through the in South Africa started supplying Johnson & Johnson’s\nCOVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) (Figure 1.1). vaccine in July 2021. But a longer-term solution involves\nNevertheless, several supply-side challenges could linger establishing a sustainable ecosystem for local vaccine\nwell into 2022, including delays in vaccine manufacturing production that would require specialized equipment, a\nin developing countries because of ongoing intellectual highly trained workforce, a conducive investment climate,\nproperty rights waiver negotiations at the World Trade and a predictable and stable demand for vaccines from\nOrganization, shortages of medical supplies (for example, African countries. A handful of COVID-19 vaccine\nsyringes), and dose donations with a short shelf-life. In production facilities are set up or in the pipeline across\ncountries where the supply constraints are not binding, four sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Rwanda,\nthe focus has shifted toward meeting the health-system Senegal, and South Africa). For example, a new vaccine\ninfrastructure needs (for example, transportation, cold- manufacturing facility is being constructed (with financial\nchain storage, vaccination sites, trained medical staff, and assistance from the US, EU, and other partners) at the\nancillary medical equipment such as syringes and personal Institut Pasteur de Dakar in Senegal, which will be one of\nprotective equipment), and launching communication the first start-to-finish factories on the continent.\ncampaigns to maximize the vaccine absorption. This\nis particularly challenging in countries with large rural Figure 1�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Vaccine Deliveries, 2021–22\npopulations and limited rural health infrastructure. (Million doses, as of March 31, 2022)\n240 230\nSuccessful vaccination campaigns in the region have been\nmarked by effective preparedness and coordination, and\nBilaterals/AVAT\ndiversified vaccine sources. By the time vaccines started 180\nCOVAX\narriving in March 2021, countries with the current high Donations via COVAX 135\nvaccination rates had completed 38 percent of the vaccine 120 Bilateral donations\nreadiness pillar components, as assessed by the World Bank, 78\ncompared with 24 percent in other countries. For example, 60\nGhana became the first sub-Saharan African country to\n20 15\nreceive a COVAX delivery in February 2021 and was able\n0\nto administer half of that initial supply within 10 days 2021:Q1 21:Q2 21:Q3 21:Q4 22:Q1\nbecause of staff training and simulation exercises ahead of\nSources: Airfinity; and IMF staff calculations.\nthe rollout. Continued collaboration among health officials, Note: Bilaterals refers to doses received directly from vaccine\ngovernment officials, and the private sector to adapt and manufacturers. Donations via COVAX refers to doses donated by\nadvanced economies and channeled through COVAX.\nmeet challenges was also crucial for the rollout success\nAVAT = African Vaccine Acquisition Trust, COVAX = COVID-19\n(for example, Botswana, Cabo Verde, and Rwanda). Finally, Vaccines Global Access.\nThis box was prepared by Shushanik Hakobyan.\n1 Export restrictions on the Serum Institute of India, a major supplier of the COVAX facility, derailed the delivery of vaccines from April through\nJune of 2021 and plunged the vaccination campaigns of countries relying primarily on COVAX into chaos.\n18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nBOX 2� SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS\nRecent international shocks are likely to have significant are particularly vulnerable to international conditions\nimplications for the macroeconomic outlook in sub-Saharan since they are more integrated via financial links and have\nAfrica. Notably, the ongoing US monetary policy tightening lower-than-average policy buffers to weather adverse shocks.\nis worsening external financing conditions. Furthermore,\nthe war in Ukraine and the reduction of oil exports from A multi-country global vector autoregressive (GVAR)\nRussia are stoking inflationary pressures across the globe model was used to quantify the impact of different external\nbecause of their impact on energy and food prices. shocks on GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This model\nincorporated (1) domestic variables (real GDP, inflation\nSub-Saharan African countries vary in their exposure to rate, interest rate, exchange rate), (2) country-specific\nexternal shocks. Three factors shape the extent to which foreign variables, which are cross-sectional weighted\ncountries are vulnerable to shocks: the strength of trade averages of domestic variables in other countries, and\nties with the global economy; the degree of integration (3) global variable (US 10-year rate, oil price).1 Average\nwith international financial markets; and the availability bilateral trade (2016–18) was used to create the weight\nof policy buffers to respond to shocks, such as accumulated matrix required to construct the foreign variables. Using\ninternational reserves. Considering different country annual data (1980–2021) for 71 countries, including\ngroups within sub-Saharan Africa, oil exporters are highly most sub-Saharan African countries, two shocks were\nsusceptible to external shocks because of a strong trade simulated (1) a positive shock to the US interest rate,\nchannel (Figure 2.1). Other resource-intensive countries reflecting the ongoing US monetary tightening, and (2)\ntend to be less exposed to external shocks because of low a positive oil price shock as experienced in recent months.\nfinancial integration. Non-resource-intensive countries Sign restrictions were used for identification, assuming a\nalso are relatively insulated from external shocks because slower pace for global economic activity because of the US\nof lower trade integration. Frontier market economies monetary policy tightening and higher inflation fueled by\noil price increases.\nFigure 2�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Vulnerability to External Shocks by Channels and Buffers\n(Percentile score minus sub-Saharan Africa average)\n12\nTrade Financial Policy space\n8\n4\n0\n–4\n–8\nOil exporters Other resource-intensive Non-resource-intensive Frontier market\ncountries countries economies\nSources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimations.\nNote: Variables used to define channels: trade includes (i) exports as share of GDP, (ii) imports as share of GDP;\nfinancial includes (i) private gross capital inflows as share of GDP, (ii) external debt as share of GDP, (iii) short-term\nexternal debt as share of total external debt, and (iv) non-FDI as share of private capital inflows; policy space includes\n(i) reserves as share of GDP (inverted), (ii) gross government debt as share of GDP, and (iii) inflation. Data are for 2019\nor most recent year. All scores are percentiles over all other emerging market and developing economies normalized\nas deviations from the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Bars represent unweighted mean for country groups, excluding\nSouth Sudan.\nThis box was prepared by Hany Abdel-Latif and Marijn Bolhuis.\n1 Estimates are based on annual data for most sub-Saharan African countries. When estimated with quarterly data for a smaller number of\nsub-Saharan African countries, the results do not change significantly.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 19\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nContinued Box 2\nA tightening of US monetary policy and an increase in in trading partners (Figure 2.2). A 10-percentage point\nenergy prices can affect economic growth severely in sub- increase in oil prices will lead to an average decline in\nSaharan Africa. An unexpected 25 basis points increase in regional growth by 0.5 percentage point (Figure 2.3). The\nthe US 10-year rate is associated with an average decline impact also varies by country sub-groups—a positive oil\ninF irgeugrioen2a.l2 r.e Salu Gb-DSaPh oafr aabno Autf r0ic.2a5: GpeDrPce nRteasgpe opnosinet tion price shock affects oil importers the most.\ntUheS f Mirsot nyeetaar,r ya sP hoilgihceyr Triagtehst elonwinegr growth and demand\nFigure2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to Oil\n(25 bps US rate increase, weighted average growth\nresponses) Increase\nFigure 2�2 Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to US Monetary Figure 2�3 Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to Oil Price Increase\nPolicy Tightening (10 percentage points oil price increase, weighted-average growth\n(25bps US rate increase, weighted-average growth responses) responses)\n0.10 4\n0.00 3 Oil exporters\n2 Oil Importers\n–0.10\n1\n–0.20\n0\n–0.30\n–1\n–0.40 –2\n–0.50 –3\n0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10\nSources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimations. Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimations.\nNote: Dots show average estimates with the range denoting 95 Note: Dots show average estimates with the range denoting 95\npeSrcoeuntr cceonsf:i dHeancvee rin Atenrvaallyst.ics; and IMF staff estimates. percent confidence intervals.\nSources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimates.\nNote: Dots show average estimates with the range\nNote: Dots show average estimates with the range\ndenoting 95 percent confidence intervals.\ndenoting 95 percent confidence intervals.\n20 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nBOX 3� ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSub-Saharan Africa has seen a sharp increase in the Conflicts also have a clear, direct negative impact on\nincidence of conflicts in recent years. Most recently, violence development goals such as poverty and hunger, educational\nhas picked up in the Sahel and the Central African Republic, attainment, child mortality, and access to essential services.\nand political dissatisfaction and worsening insecurity have Furthermore, conflict can leave long-lasting social scars.\ncontributed to an uptick of military coups (Burkina Faso, For example, exposure to conflict in childhood leads to\nMali, and Guinea) (Figure 3.1) These developments stem poorer lifetime health outcomes for both the affected\nfrom a combination of common factors (weak political generation and for future generations. Human capital losses\nsystems, inter-community tensions, poor governance, poor from conflict also lower people’s lifetime productivity and\nservice delivery) and country-specific triggers (electoral reduce socioeconomic mobility, and the reintegration of\ntensions, security challenges). As a result, increased security demobilized combatants is often a prolonged challenge\nspending is straining public finances, while disrupted trade and an ongoing source of potential instability.\nroutes, damaged infrastructures, displaced people, weakened\ninstitutions, crippled tourism, and a less-hospitable business Conflicts also generate negative spillovers. Worldwide,\nenvironment are all weighing on economic activity. estimates suggest that neighbors bear almost one-fifth of all\noutput losses of global conflict (de Groot and others 2022).\nConflicts impose large social and economic costs. For The onset of a conflict has, on average, resulted in a\nsub-Saharan Africa, IMF staff estimates suggest that active cumulative drop in imports of almost 25 percent over five\nconflicts tend to depress annual growth by 2.5 percentage years. But perhaps more importantly, prolonged conflicts\npoints per year in directly affected countries (April 2019 tend to increase security risks for neighboring countries and\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2). generate refugee flows, which may exhaust host countries’\nIn the last three decades, this has translated into a already-stretched social infrastructure, while also adding\nregionwide loss of about 3/4 percent of GDP each year to social tensions. In sub-Saharan Africa, the onset of a\n(Figure 3.2). With the recent increase in the incidence of conflict has historically been followed by sizable refugee\nconflicts, however, this estimated lost output has increased flows into neighboring countries, often amounting to\nto almost 1.5 percent. Moreover, reduced tax revenue, 2 percent of the origin country’s population over a five-year\nrising public debt, and increased military spending, all period (Figure 3.3).\nfurther complicate the policy environment faced by local\nFigure 3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Incidence and Cost of\nauthorities, undermining macroeconomic stability and\nlonger-term growth.\nFigure 3�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Deaths from Conflict, 2001–21 Figure 3�2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Incidence and Cost of Conflict,\n(Thousands) 1990s–2020s\n(Percent of region (Percentage points\n80 Eastern Africa in conflict) of GDP)\nCentral Africa 40 1.6\n60 Sahel\nWestern Africa 30 Incidence 1.2\n(Left scale)\n40\n20 0.8\n20 GDP loss due to conflict\n10 (Right scale) 0.4\n0 0 0.0\n2001–05 2006–10 2011–15 2016–21 1990's 2000's 2010's 2020's\nSources: Uppsala Conflict database, ACLED; and IMF staff Sources: Uppsala Conflict database, ACLED; and IMF staff\ncalculations. calculations.\nSources: Uppsala Conflict Dataset; ACLED; Penn\nThis box was prepared by Marijn Bolhuis and Andrew Tiffin. World Tables; and IMF staff calculations.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 21\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nContinued Box 3\nFigure 3�3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Sources of Refugee Inflows\nto the Region, 2020\n(Thousands) SOM SSD\nRWA\nNGA\nERI\nCOD\nCAF SDN\nBDI\nTCD TZA\nKEN CMR\nNER\nETH UGA\nSources: United Nations Human Rights Council; and IMF staff\ncalculations.\nBOX 4� CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nMany central banks across the world—including 13 in Figure 4�1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Central Bank Digital Currencies\nsub-Saharan Africa—are currently exploring the option Status, 2022\nof using a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) to\nZambia\nenhance their electronic payment system (Figure 4.1). A Kenya\nCBDC is a digital version of cash that can be stored and Tanzania\ntransferred electronically and is fully backed by the issuing Mauritius\nMadagascar\ncentral bank. In October 2021, Nigeria became the first\nEswatini\ncountry in Africa and the second in the world after the\nZimbabwe\nBahamas to issue a CBDC—the eNaira. Namibia South Africa\nRwanda Ghana Nigeria\nPotential benefits and challenges\nResearch Pilot Launched\nSource: Central Bank Digital Currencies Tracker.\nCBDC entails various possible advantages.\nNote: Tanzania and the East African Community were not in the\nCBDC Tracker. Their initiatives are at an early stage of exploration.\n• Fostering financial inclusion. In sub-Saharan Africa,\nCBDCs could bring financial services to previously and cheaper by shortening payment chains and creating\nunbanked or underbanked people, allowing digital more competition among remittance service providers.\ntransactions in remote places without internet access at Faster clearance of cross-border payments can help\nminimal or no cost.1 promote trade integration within the region and with\nthe rest of the world.2\n• Facilitating cross-border transfers and payments. The\naverage cost of sending remittances to sub-Saharan • Providing an alternative to cryptocurrencies. The\nAfrica was 8 percent of the transfer amount in 2020. spread of private cryptocurrencies poses the risk that\nCBDCs could make sending remittances easier, faster, citizens may move their money to these assets either\nThis box was prepared by Habtamu Fuje, Saad Quayyum, and Franck Ouattara.\n1 Allowing the unbanked and underbanked to participate in digital payment systems might also support reducing informality, which in turn can\nexpand the tax base and boost revenue for the government.\n2 South Africa, for example, is participating in Project Dunbar with the central banks of Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore to test the use of\nCBDC for international settlements. The East African Community is also exploring the development of a regional CBDC to upgrade the East\nAfrican Payment System.\n22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nA NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER\nContinued Box 4\nfor ease of transaction or if they lose confidence in the to be done. Development, deployment, and oversight\nlocal currency. This may undermine monetary policy of CBDCs also require substantial technical capacity in\ntransmission. Moreover, cryptocurrencies could be a central banks.\nconduit for illicit financial flows. CBDCs could minimize\nthese risks by offering a reliable and regulated alternative Therefore, before pursuing CBDCs, central banks in the\nto cryptocurrencies. region would need to carefully evaluate the benefits and\nweigh them against the challenges and risks, considering\n• Enabling timely and targeted welfare disbursement. If the local context and internal capacity. For CBDCs to be\nCBDCs are broadly used by population, including by successful they also need to be accompanied by sound\nlow-income households, targeted welfare support could macroeconomic and regulatory policies that buttress\nbe provided directly through CBDCs, especially during confidence in the local currency. In addition, how CBDCs\nsudden crises such as those triggered by the COVID-19 could affect the thriving private industry for digital payment\npandemic or natural disasters. services should be carefully thought through and managed\nas some operators can have systemic importance.\nThe design and adoption of CBDCs should address the\nfollowing challenges and risks: The eNaira\n• Data integrity. It is essential that the CBDC is The Central Bank of Nigeria’s eNaira provides a useful\ntrustworthy and protects consumers’ privacy. Consumers example of how CBDCs could work in practice. It has a\nwill have to entrust the central bank with a large amount two-tiered architecture whereby the Central Bank of Nigeria\nof personal transaction data and need to be confident (CBN) issues the eNaira and financial institutions directly\nthat this information will be safe and not misused. engage with users for distribution, payment facilitation,\ndispute resolution, and other roles. At present, all users\n• Cyber risk and disruptions. Like other forms of digital need to open and maintain wallets in the eNaira platform\nmoney, CBDCs are exposed to the risk of cyber attacks. and link their bank accounts with their wallets. Transfers\nTherefore, central banks need to invest in cybersecurity can be made from bank accounts to eNaira wallets up to a\nprograms (PwC 2021; Mancini-Griffoli and others daily maximum and a cumulative limit. The limits are set\n2018). While this can be expensive, some of the cost can to prevent a sudden surge of transfers from the banking\nbe offset by lower costs of managing and distributing system to the eNaira platform, which could destabilize the\ncash given that CBDCs are expected to reduce cash use. banking system. To open a wallet, users need to download\nthe eNaira app and provide their bank verification number.\n• Financial integrity risk. Central banks would have The bank verification number helps to identify end users\nto put in place appropriate measures to ensure AML/ and makes it possible to comply with financial integrity\nCFT regulations are followed. This will require in many regulations. As of end January, over 700,000 wallets have\ncountries strengthening national identification systems been downloaded and a total of 9 million transfers and\nso that Know-Your-Customer requirements can be more payments have been made using eNaira.\neasily enforced without undermining financial inclusions.\nThe CBN is planning to allow users without a bank\n• Financial/banking sector instability. Central banks account to open an eNaira wallet with only the national\nneed to be careful that CBDCs do not disrupt the identification number to make it more accessible to the\nbanking system through significant transfers of funds unbanked. Users without bank accounts will have lower\nfrom commercial banks to CBDC wallets, which reduces transaction limits to minimize financial integrity risks. The\nbank funding and lending capacity. CBN also plans to allow the Nigerian diaspora to send\nremittances through the eNaira platform. For this plan to\n• Digital infrastructure and knowledge. Broad adoption be successful, it is important to strengthen confidence in\nand effective utilization of CBDCs hinge on the the local currency and support a unified market clearing\naccessibility of digital infrastructure such as phone and exchange rate. Finally, the CBN plans to make it possible\ninternet connectivity. While sub-Saharan Africa has to pay taxes through the eNaira platform which could\nmade significant strides with digitalization, much needs potentially improve revenue collection.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 23\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nReferences\nAgarwal, Ruchir, and Gita Gopinath. 2021. “A Proposal International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022a. “The IMF\nto End the COVID-19 Pandemic.” IMF Staff Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.” IMF\nDiscussion Note 2021/004, International Monetary Policy Paper 2022/004, International Monetary Fund,\nFund, Washington, DC. Washington, DC.\nAslam, Aqib, Habtamu Fuje, and Henry Rawlings. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022b. “The Role\n2021. “Jobs in Lockdown: Insights from Sub- of Foreign Exchange Intervention in Sub-Saharan\nSaharan Africa.” IMF Special Series on COVID-19, Africa’s Policy Toolkit.” International Monetary Fund,\nInternational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 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Peria, Itai Agur, Anil Ari, John Kiff, Adina Popescu,\nand Céline Rochon. 2018. “Casting Light on Central\nEyraud, Luc, Hilary Devine, Adrian Peralta Alva,\nBank Digital Currencies.” IMF Staff Discussion\nHoda Selim, Preya Sharma, and Ludger Wocken.\nNote 18/08, International Monetary Fund,\n2021. “Private finance for development: wishful\nWashington, DC.\nthinking or thinking out of the box?” IMF Staff\nDepartmental Paper 2021/011, International PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). 2021. “The Evolution\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC. of Money: Why Financial Institutions Should Start\nPaying Attention to CBDCs.” Regulatory Brief (May),\nGeorgieva, Kristalina. 2022. “Support for Africa’s Vaccine\nPricewaterhouseCoopers, New York.\nProduction is Good for the World.” IMFBlog (blog),\nJanuary 12, 2022. https://blogs.imf.org/2022/01/12/ Razafimahefa, F. Ivohasina. 2012. “Exchange Rate\nsupport-for-africas-vaccine-production-is-good-for- Pass-through in Sub-Saharan African Economies\nthe-world/. and its Determinants.” IMF Working Paper 12/141,\nInternational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nGray, Simon. 2021. “Official and Parallel Exchange\nRates—Recognizing Reality,” IMF Special Series Schanz, Jochen. 2019. “Foreign Exchange Reserves\non COVID-19, September 23, 2020. International in Africa: Benefits, Costs, and Political Economy\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC. Considerations.” BIS Papers 105, Bank for\nInternational Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.\nHooley, John, Mika Saito, Lam Nguyen, and Shirin\nNikaein Towfighian. 2021. “Fiscal Dominance World Bank. 2021. Debt Transparency in Developing\nin Sub-Saharan Africa Revisited.” IMF Working Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank.\nPaper 2021/017, International Monetary Fund,\nWorld Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects.\nWashington, DC.\nWashington, DC: World Bank.\n24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented The low-income countries had average per capita gross\nin this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff national income in the years 2018–20 equal to or lower\nestimates as of April 8, 2022, consistent with the than $1,045.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\nprojections underlying the April 2022 World Economic\nOutlook. The countries in fragile situations had average Country\nPolicy and Institutional Assessment scores of 3.2 or\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African less in the years 2016–18 and/or had the presence of a\ncountries in the IMF’s African Department. Data peacekeeping or peace-building mission within the last\ndefinitions follow established international statistical three years.\nmethodologies to the extent possible. However, in\nsome cases, data limitations limit comparability across The membership of sub-Saharan African countries\ncountries. in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown\non page 26: CFA franc zone, comprising the West\nCountry Groupings African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)\nand CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern\nCountries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa\ngroups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive Community (EAC-5); the Economic Community of\ncountries, and non-resource-intensive countries West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African\n(see table on page 26 for the country groupings). Development Community (SADC); and the Southern\nAfrican Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates\nThe oil exporters are countries where net oil exports include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which joined\nmake up 30 percent or more of total exports. the group only in 2007.\nThe other resource-intensive countries are those where Methods of Aggregation\nnonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent or\nmore of total exports. In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for\nreal GDP growth and broad money are calculated as\nThe non-resource-intensive countries refer to those the arithmetic average of data for individual countries,\nthat are not classified as either oil exporters or other weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as\nresource-intensive countries. a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing\npower parity weights is the World Economic Outlook\nCountries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) (WEO) database.\ngroups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and\ncountries in fragile situations (see table on page 26 for In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer\nthe country groupings). prices are calculated as the geometric average of data\nfor individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at\nThe membership of these groups reflects the most purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.\nrecent data on per capita gross national income The source of purchasing power parity weights is the\n(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, WEO database.\nCountry Policy and Institutional Assessment score\n(averaged over three years). In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except\nfor broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic\nThe middle-income countries had per capita gross average of data for individual countries, weighted by\nnational income in the years 2018–20 of more than GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share\n$1,045.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method). of total group GDP.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 25\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Countries Intensive Countries Countries Countries Situations\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burundi\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Central African Republic\nChad Central African Republic Cabo Verde Botswana Central African Chad\nCongo, Republic of Congo, Democratic Comoros Cabo Verde Republic Comoros\nEquatorial Guinea Republic of the Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Congo, Democratic\nGabon Ghana Eritrea Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of the\nNigeria Guinea Eswatini Congo, Republic of Republic of the Congo, Republic of\nSouth Sudan Liberia Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire Eritrea Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Gambia, The Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea\nNamibia Guinea-Bissau Eswatini Gambia, The Gambia, The\nNiger Kenya Gabon Guinea Guinea\nSierra Leone Lesotho Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau\nSouth Africa Madagascar Kenya Liberia Liberia\nTanzania Malawi Lesotho Madagascar Madagascar\nZambia Mauritius Mauritius Malawi Malawi\nZimbabwe Mozambique Namibia Mali Mali\nRwanda Nigeria Mozambique São Tomé and Príncipe\nSão Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and Príncipe Niger Sierra Leone\nSenegal Senegal Rwanda South Sudan\nSeychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone Togo\nTogo South Africa South Sudan Zimbabwe\nTanzania\nUganda Zambia\nTogo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West African Economic and Common Market East African Southern African Southern Economic\nEconomic and Monetary Community for Eastern and Community Development African Community of West\nMonetary Union of Central African Southern Africa (*EAC-5) Community Customs Union African States\n(WAEMU) States (CEMAC) (COMESA) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central African Republic Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire Chad Congo, Democratic *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Congo, Republic of Republic of the South Sudan Congo, Democratic Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Tanzania Republic of the South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Gabon Eswatini *Uganda Eswatini Ghana\nSenegal Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea\nTogo Kenya Madagascar Guinea-Bissau\nMadagascar Malawi Liberia\nMalawi Mauritius Mali\nMauritius Mozambique Niger\nRwanda Namibia Nigeria\nSeychelles Seychelles Senegal\nUganda South Africa Sierra Leone\nZambia Tanzania Togo\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\n26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSub-Saharan Africa Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nStatistical Appendix Tables\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������29\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables\nTables SA1�,SA2�,SA3� Table SA4�\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World\nEconomic Outlook database, April 2022� Economic Outlook database, April 2022�\n1 Fiscal year data� 1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union\n2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for reserves data�\ndue to ongoing debt restructuring� 2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary\n3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for reserves data�\nsettlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar, 3 Fiscal year data�\nand are in the process of redenominating their national accounts 4 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted due\nstatistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe to ongoing debt restructuring�\ndollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\n5 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar\nsettlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,\nas the unit of account�\nand are in the process of redenominating their national accounts\nNote: “���” denotes data not available� statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe\ndollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,\nZimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar\nas the unit of account�\nNote: “���” denotes data not available�\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 27\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 2.5 –0.7 –5.6 0.7 3.0 3.3 16.0 17.1 22.3 25.8 23.9 13.2\nBenin 4.5 6.9 3.8 6.6 5.9 6.1 1.5 –0.9 3.0 1.7 4.6 1.8\nBotswana 4.9 3.0 –8.7 12.5 4.3 4.2 5.1 2.7 1.9 6.7 8.9 4.5\nBurkina Faso 6.1 5.7 1.9 6.9 4.7 5.0 1.3 –3.2 1.9 3.9 6.0 2.0\nBurundi 2.3 1.8 0.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 6.1 –0.7 7.3 8.3 9.2 6.5\nCabo Verde 2.4 5.7 –14.8 6.9 5.2 5.8 1.2 1.1 0.6 1.9 2.3 2.0\nCameroon 4.4 3.5 0.5 3.5 4.3 4.9 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.3\nCentral African Republic –0.6 3.0 1.0 1.0 3.5 3.7 4.7 2.8 0.9 4.3 4.0 3.6\nChad 3.5 3.4 –2.2 –1.1 3.3 3.5 1.7 –1.0 4.5 –0.8 4.1 3.1\nComoros 3.4 1.8 –0.3 2.2 3.5 3.7 1.8 3.7 0.8 1.5 5.0 1.5\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 6.4 4.4 1.7 5.7 6.4 6.9 12.3 4.7 11.4 9.0 6.4 6.1\nCongo, Republic of 0.5 –0.4 –8.1 –0.2 2.4 2.7 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.0\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.3 6.2 2.0 6.5 6.0 6.7 1.6 0.8 2.4 4.2 5.5 2.3\nEquatorial Guinea –3.1 –6.0 –4.9 –3.5 6.1 –2.9 2.9 1.2 4.8 –0.1 4.0 3.9\nEritrea 5.4 3.8 –0.6 2.9 4.7 3.6 3.6 –16.4 4.8 4.5 6.2 3.5\nEswatini 2.7 2.6 –1.9 3.1 2.1 1.8 6.1 2.6 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.2\nEthiopia1 9.7 9.0 6.1 6.3 3.8 5.7 13.5 15.8 20.4 26.8 34.5 30.5\nGabon 4.0 3.9 –1.9 0.9 2.7 3.4 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 2.9 2.6\nThe Gambia 2.5 6.2 –0.2 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.1 7.1 5.9 7.4 8.0 8.0\nGhana 6.7 6.5 0.4 4.2 5.2 5.1 11.7 7.1 9.9 10.0 16.3 13.0\nGuinea 6.1 5.6 6.4 4.2 4.8 5.8 12.1 9.5 10.6 12.6 12.7 12.3\nGuinea-Bissau 4.0 4.5 1.5 3.8 3.8 4.5 1.4 0.3 1.5 3.3 4.0 3.0\nKenya 5.0 5.0 –0.3 7.2 5.7 5.3 7.3 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.2 7.1\nLesotho 2.4 0.0 –6.0 2.1 3.1 1.6 4.9 5.2 5.0 6.0 6.1 5.6\nLiberia 3.8 –2.5 –3.0 4.2 4.5 5.5 10.3 27.0 17.0 7.8 8.2 6.9\nMadagascar 2.8 4.4 –7.1 3.5 5.1 5.2 7.4 5.6 4.2 5.8 8.8 6.8\nMalawi 4.2 5.4 0.9 2.2 2.7 4.3 17.0 9.4 8.6 9.3 10.7 7.1\nMali 4.4 4.8 –1.2 3.1 2.0 5.3 1.5 –2.9 0.5 4.0 8.0 3.0\nMauritius 3.8 3.0 –14.9 3.9 6.1 5.6 3.3 0.5 2.5 4.0 8.4 5.7\nMozambique 5.9 2.3 –1.2 2.2 3.8 5.0 8.1 2.8 3.1 5.7 8.5 7.7\nNamibia 3.6 –0.9 –8.5 0.9 2.8 3.7 5.3 3.7 2.2 3.6 5.5 4.6\nNiger 6.2 5.9 3.6 1.3 6.9 7.2 1.1 –2.5 2.9 3.8 5.0 3.0\nNigeria 4.0 2.2 –1.8 3.6 3.4 3.1 11.8 11.4 13.2 17.0 16.1 13.1\nRwanda 6.9 9.5 –3.4 10.2 6.4 7.4 3.9 2.4 7.7 0.8 8.0 7.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 4.5 2.2 3.0 1.8 1.6 2.8 8.7 7.7 9.8 8.1 14.5 9.2\nSenegal 4.9 4.6 1.3 6.1 5.0 9.2 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.2 3.0 2.2\nSeychelles 5.1 3.1 –7.7 8.0 4.6 5.6 2.5 1.8 1.2 9.8 5.6 1.6\nSierra Leone 5.0 5.3 –2.0 3.2 3.4 4.3 9.2 14.8 13.4 11.9 17.3 14.5\nSouth Africa 1.9 0.1 –6.4 4.9 1.9 1.4 5.3 4.1 3.3 4.5 5.7 4.6\nSouth Sudan –5.9 0.9 –6.6 5.3 6.5 5.6 107.2 51.2 24.0 5.3 16.0 15.0\nTanzania 6.6 7.0 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.2 7.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.4 5.4\nTogo 5.7 5.5 1.8 5.1 5.6 6.2 1.3 0.7 1.8 4.3 4.6 2.0\nUganda 5.3 7.7 –1.4 5.1 4.9 6.5 7.1 2.3 2.8 2.2 6.1 4.1\nZambia 5.3 1.4 –2.8 4.3 3.1 3.6 8.9 9.2 15.7 20.5 15.7 9.2\nZimbabwe2 7.4 –6.1 –5.3 6.3 3.5 3.0 2.1 255.3 557.2 98.5 86.7 46.5\nSub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.1 –1.7 4.5 3.8 4.0 8.3 8.1 10.2 11.0 12.2 9.6\nMedian 4.6 3.8 –1.2 3.9 4.3 5.0 4.6 2.8 3.9 4.5 6.2 4.6\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.2 4.6 0.0 4.8 4.6 5.2 7.9 8.1 11.2 10.6 12.6 9.7\nOil-exporting countries 3.5 1.7 –2.3 2.9 3.5 3.2 11.4 11.0 13.0 15.8 15.3 11.6\nExcluding Nigeria 2.4 0.6 –3.7 1.1 3.6 3.4 10.3 10.2 12.4 12.8 13.2 8.0\nOil-importing countries 4.5 3.9 –1.3 5.4 4.0 4.5 6.5 6.5 8.7 8.5 10.5 8.5\nExcluding South Africa 6.0 5.6 0.9 5.5 4.9 5.6 7.3 7.6 11.0 10.2 12.5 10.0\nMiddle-income countries 3.6 2.1 –3.0 4.3 3.6 3.4 8.3 7.3 8.5 10.5 11.1 8.5\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.4 3.4 –1.7 4.5 4.7 4.9 7.4 6.0 7.9 9.0 10.3 7.1\nLow-income countries 6.2 6.0 2.0 5.0 4.6 5.6 8.5 10.6 15.0 12.4 15.3 12.6\nExcluding low-income countries in 6.9 7.3 2.8 5.4 4.6 5.7 8.3 7.1 9.5 11.8 16.0 14.0\nfragile situations\nCountries in fragile situations 5.1 3.9 0.4 4.6 4.8 5.7 6.7 12.6 19.0 10.4 11.0 7.2\nCFA franc zone 4.4 4.4 0.6 4.2 4.8 5.6 1.7 0.2 2.4 2.8 4.5 2.4\nCEMAC 2.6 2.0 –1.6 1.4 3.9 3.4 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.5 3.2 2.7\nWAEMU 5.6 5.7 1.8 5.6 5.3 6.7 1.4 –0.6 2.2 3.5 5.3 2.3\nCOMESA (SSA members) 6.2 5.7 0.5 5.9 4.8 5.5 8.8 12.2 17.3 14.6 17.0 13.9\nEAC-5 5.6 6.3 0.9 6.2 5.3 5.6 7.2 3.9 4.4 4.4 6.2 6.0\nECOWAS 4.7 3.5 –0.6 4.2 4.1 4.3 9.6 8.2 10.2 12.7 13.3 10.3\nSACU 2.1 0.2 –6.5 5.1 2.1 1.6 5.3 4.0 3.2 4.6 5.9 4.6\nSADC 3.1 1.2 –4.4 4.4 3.1 3.0 7.5 8.6 10.8 9.5 9.9 7.0\nSee page 27 for sources and footnotes\n28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola –0.2 0.8 –1.9 2.8 3.1 1.6 51.3 113.6 136.8 86.3 57.9 54.6\nBenin –2.4 –0.5 –4.7 –5.8 –4.5 -3.5 27.9 42.5 46.1 50.6 49.3 48.7\nBotswana –0.9 –8.5 –11.0 –4.7 –3.1 1.0 18.0 16.5 19.0 21.3 23.2 22.9\nBurkina Faso –3.4 –3.4 –5.7 –5.6 –6.1 -5.0 29.6 42.0 46.5 50.7 53.4 53.1\nBurundi –4.8 –6.4 –6.6 –3.9 –7.4 -7.5 43.6 60.0 66.0 68.6 69.2 69.6\nCabo Verde –6.5 –1.8 –9.1 –8.5 –7.1 -5.1 107.6 124.9 158.8 154.1 159.2 152.7\nCameroon –3.3 –3.2 –3.2 –3.2 –1.2 0.7 24.5 41.6 44.9 47.1 45.2 41.0\nCentral African Republic –1.6 1.4 –3.4 –6.0 –2.5 -2.0 44.3 47.2 43.4 47.6 46.3 44.7\nChad –1.3 –0.2 2.1 –0.8 5.9 8.3 38.7 51.1 52.1 58.2 46.5 39.8\nComoros 1.4 –4.3 –0.5 –2.4 –5.6 -5.3 18.9 19.5 22.3 25.2 30.4 34.5\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 0.2 –2.0 –1.4 –0.0 –3.3 -2.4 20.4 15.0 15.6 12.7 10.6 8.7\nCongo, Republic of –0.9 4.7 –1.2 2.0 11.3 7.7 57.9 81.7 110.1 85.8 64.0 62.4\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.3 –2.3 –5.6 –5.6 –4.7 -3.8 33.5 38.4 47.0 51.4 51.8 51.4\nEquatorial Guinea –5.7 1.8 –1.7 1.7 3.5 4.4 21.2 43.0 48.8 39.9 27.8 30.4\nEritrea –4.9 0.6 –4.4 –4.0 –1.0 0.1 174.9 187.1 182.2 170.8 151.9 140.1\nEswatini –4.8 –7.0 –5.4 –5.7 –5.8 -2.6 19.6 39.6 42.1 42.8 45.6 44.3\nEthiopia1 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8 –2.8 –4.0 -3.3 47.5 54.7 53.7 52.9 48.3 42.7\nGabon 0.6 2.1 –2.2 –1.5 1.6 3.5 40.2 59.8 77.3 69.5 57.4 57.2\nThe Gambia –4.4 –2.5 –2.2 –4.4 –4.4 -2.3 65.8 83.0 85.0 83.0 80.4 75.5\nGhana –6.6 –7.3 –15.6 –11.6 –8.7 -7.8 47.0 62.7 78.3 81.8 84.6 84.8\nGuinea –3.4 –0.5 –2.9 –1.5 –4.4 -4.2 43.5 38.4 44.0 39.3 39.1 37.5\nGuinea-Bissau –2.5 –4.0 –10.0 –5.9 –4.1 -4.0 53.7 66.5 79.4 80.7 79.7 77.7\nKenya –5.8 –7.4 –8.1 –8.1 –6.9 -5.3 44.2 58.6 67.6 68.1 70.3 69.4\nLesotho –2.8 –7.5 0.3 –6.9 –7.8 -6.1 40.9 50.5 54.2 54.7 52.5 50.3\nLiberia –3.2 –4.8 –3.8 –2.9 –2.9 -2.7 26.2 48.9 58.3 52.9 51.6 51.6\nMadagascar –2.0 –1.4 –4.0 –6.3 –6.3 -4.1 36.9 38.5 49.0 53.4 57.9 56.7\nMalawi –3.2 –4.5 –8.2 –8.5 –7.8 -7.5 32.6 45.3 54.8 63.5 66.9 71.2\nMali –2.8 –1.7 –5.4 –4.9 –4.5 -3.5 29.8 40.7 47.3 52.1 53.4 52.1\nMauritius –2.7 –8.4 –10.9 –7.2 –4.9 -5.2 60.5 84.6 99.2 100.7 98.9 96.1\nMozambique –4.8 –0.1 –5.1 –3.6 –3.0 -3.8 70.7 96.1 119.0 102.3 102.0 94.8\nNamibia –6.0 –5.5 –8.2 –8.9 –7.8 -5.0 33.8 59.5 66.7 70.2 69.6 68.2\nNiger –3.4 –3.6 –5.3 –5.9 –5.4 -4.2 25.1 39.8 45.0 52.9 53.8 53.1\nNigeria –3.0 –4.7 –5.7 –6.0 –6.4 -5.9 19.7 29.2 34.5 37.0 37.4 38.8\nRwanda –2.1 –5.1 –9.4 –6.9 –6.8 -6.3 29.6 49.8 64.6 68.6 72.0 73.6\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –6.0 –0.1 5.9 0.9 1.2 0.4 82.2 71.6 81.4 61.3 63.1 60.0\nSenegal –3.9 –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –4.7 -3.7 43.3 63.6 69.2 75.7 75.3 71.3\nSeychelles 1.4 0.9 –17.4 –5.8 –6.7 -0.8 70.1 54.2 89.1 72.5 76.7 73.0\nSierra Leone –5.3 –3.1 –5.8 –6.9 –3.9 -3.2 48.6 72.4 76.3 76.2 75.0 73.1\nSouth Africa –4.0 –4.7 –9.7 –6.4 –5.8 -6.1 42.2 56.3 69.4 69.1 70.2 73.4\nSouth Sudan –7.0 0.1 6.7 10.0 8.9 3.9 41.8 28.1 37.2 58.2 50.5 21.2\nTanzania –3.0 –2.0 –2.5 –3.3 –3.3 -3.0 35.0 39.0 40.5 40.8 39.8 38.9\nTogo –4.2 1.6 –6.9 –6.5 –4.9 -4.0 46.8 52.4 60.3 63.8 63.6 62.3\nUganda –3.0 –4.8 –7.5 –7.8 –5.6 -4.1 25.6 37.6 46.4 51.6 53.1 52.4\nZambia2 –5.6 –9.4 –13.8 –8.7 –9.0 -6.8 44.7 99.7 140.2 123.2 … …\nZimbabwe3 –3.3 –1.0 0.8 –2.0 –2.6 -2.7 47.7 93.2 102.6 67.6 67.2 61.7\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.2 –3.9 –6.4 –5.3 –4.7 -4.2 35.0 50.0 57.4 56.9 55.1 54.3\nMedian –3.2 –2.5 –5.3 –5.6 –4.5 -3.7 39.0 51.1 58.3 61.3 57.9 56.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.0 –3.2 –5.5 –4.5 –3.4 -2.7 39.9 57.5 63.9 60.6 57.3 54.7\nOil-exporting countries –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 –3.4 -3.3 27.2 43.8 48.5 46.3 42.5 42.0\nExcluding Nigeria –1.5 0.3 –1.6 0.7 3.0 2.6 42.8 79.9 88.2 68.9 53.1 49.2\nOil-importing countries –3.8 –4.3 –7.3 –5.9 –5.4 -4.8 40.5 53.5 62.2 62.2 62.3 61.7\nExcluding South Africa –3.6 –4.1 –6.3 –5.6 –5.2 -4.2 39.3 52.0 59.0 58.7 58.5 56.2\nMiddle-income countries –3.4 –4.4 –7.4 –5.9 –4.9 -4.6 34.4 50.9 59.5 59.1 57.1 57.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.2 –4.0 –7.3 –5.3 –3.1 -2.4 41.5 65.9 75.2 69.5 64.4 62.7\nLow-income countries –2.7 –2.3 –3.4 –3.5 –3.8 -3.1 37.7 47.2 51.4 50.3 48.7 45.3\nExcluding low-income countries in –2.9 –2.7 –4.1 –4.4 –4.4 -3.7 38.7 48.8 52.6 53.4\nfragile situations 52.3 49.5\nCountries in fragile situations –2.2 –1.4 –3.1 –2.9 –2.6 -2.1 37.0 45.4 51.9 49.3 46.8 43.4\nCFA franc zone –2.6 –1.5 –4.4 –4.1 –2.0 -1.2 33.1 47.2 54.0 56.2 53.2 51.8\nCEMAC –2.4 –0.1 –2.0 –1.4 2.5 3.4 33.3 51.7 59.2 56.4 47.9 45.5\nWAEMU –2.9 –2.4 –5.7 –5.7 –4.9 -3.9 33.6 44.4 51.1 56.1 56.5 55.4\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.3 –4.6 –5.5 –5.1 –5.3 -4.1 40.1 54.4 61.0 58.5 58.0 54.8\nEAC-5 –4.2 –5.3 –6.4 –6.5 –5.6 -4.4 37.0 48.9 55.7 57.1 57.9 56.8\nECOWAS –3.3 –4.3 –6.6 –6.4 –6.2 -5.5 25.6 36.7 43.8 47.2 46.9 47.2\nSACU –3.9 –4.9 –9.6 –6.4 –5.7 -5.8 40.8 54.6 66.9 66.9 68.0 70.8\nSADC –3.1 –3.7 –7.1 –4.6 –4.0 -4.0 42.0 61.1 71.2 64.8 62.1 62.0\nSee page 27 for sources and footnotes\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 29\nREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nSA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 34.8 33.1 37.7 24.5 22.7 22.3 3.3 6.1 1.5 11.3 11.0 4.9\nBenin 27.8 27.8 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 –5.0 –4.0 –1.7 –4.5 –5.8 –5.5\nBotswana 45.0 47.2 52.5 50.6 49.8 49.7 2.1 –7.0 –10.8 –0.5 0.5 2.8\nBurkina Faso 30.5 40.7 45.0 48.7 51.8 54.5 –4.9 –3.3 –0.1 –3.1 –5.7 –5.3\nBurundi 25.7 39.6 46.3 50.9 52.7 54.4 –14.1 –11.6 –10.2 –13.5 –18.6 –15.7\nCabo Verde 92.4 102.0 125.3 116.2 112.7 109.2 –8.4 –0.4 –15.9 –12.5 –11.5 –8.6\nCameroon 21.3 24.0 26.6 29.3 31.2 32.1 –3.2 –4.3 –3.7 –3.3 –1.6 –2.9\nCentral African Republic 22.7 28.0 30.3 33.3 31.7 30.5 –7.6 –4.9 –8.5 –10.6 –11.0 –8.4\nChad 13.9 17.0 20.8 22.3 21.7 21.2 –8.1 –4.4 –7.6 –4.5 1.3 –2.3\nComoros 24.2 28.1 31.2 36.5 36.5 36.5 –2.7 –3.3 –1.6 –3.4 –8.3 –8.2\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.4 15.1 20.2 22.1 26.2 30.6 –5.4 –3.2 –2.2 –1.0 –0.3 –0.3\nCongo, Republic of 27.2 24.4 36.4 31.8 28.8 32.2 –5.4 0.4 –0.1 15.4 26.0 14.7\nCôte d'Ivoire 11.0 11.7 13.8 15.5 13.6 13.2 0.1 –2.3 –3.2 –3.7 –4.8 –4.4\nEquatorial Guinea 15.2 16.0 17.3 14.3 11.9 7.3 –9.7 –0.9 –4.2 –3.4 –1.6 –2.0\nEritrea 199.0 241.5 235.3 226.6 211.5 202.6 12.1 13.0 11.4 13.5 13.5 13.3\nEswatini 26.5 28.3 32.4 30.7 33.9 33.9 4.6 4.3 6.7 0.5 –2.1 –0.2\nEthiopia1 28.5 33.0 30.8 31.1 26.5 24.2 –7.0 –5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –4.5 –4.4\nGabon 23.3 23.3 27.9 24.6 22.4 26.1 4.9 –0.9 –6.0 –6.9 1.7 –0.1\nThe Gambia 36.7 47.2 55.5 59.8 56.7 53.2 –8.0 –6.1 –3.2 –9.5 –14.9 –11.8\nGhana 23.6 26.1 31.4 30.6 30.6 30.4 –6.1 –2.7 –3.1 –3.0 –3.6 –3.5\nGuinea 24.3 24.5 25.6 23.6 23.8 23.8 –15.6 –11.5 –13.7 –4.0 –9.6 –8.5\nGuinea-Bissau 36.7 43.4 47.1 48.8 46.7 45.2 –2.3 –8.8 –2.6 –3.1 –5.6 –4.8\nKenya 36.9 34.4 37.1 35.2 34.3 33.8 –6.9 –5.3 –4.7 –5.4 –5.8 –5.3\nLesotho 34.6 35.4 41.8 40.6 39.1 38.4 –6.5 –2.1 –2.0 –9.3 –15.6 –8.9\nLiberia 20.2 20.9 25.5 24.8 24.9 25.0 –17.8 –19.6 –16.3 –17.8 –16.1 –15.9\nMadagascar 23.0 24.8 28.7 31.1 32.3 31.8 –3.4 –2.3 –5.4 –5.5 –6.5 –6.2\nMalawi 17.1 16.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 –9.3 –12.6 –13.8 –14.5 –17.3 –15.4\nMali 26.5 29.6 36.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 –5.6 –7.5 –2.3 –4.5 –5.3 –4.9\nMauritius 104.3 120.8 163.7 165.8 153.0 143.6 –6.5 –5.4 –12.5 –11.1 –14.0 –8.0\nMozambique 31.9 36.9 43.3 42.7 43.2 43.4 –30.7 –19.1 –27.6 –22.4 –44.9 –39.0\nNamibia 58.3 63.9 71.3 71.2 71.2 71.2 –8.3 –1.8 3.0 –7.3 –6.9 –4.4\nNiger 17.1 17.1 19.2 21.3 23.2 23.8 –12.9 –12.2 –13.4 –15.8 –15.8 –13.8\nNigeria 22.1 23.9 25.0 24.9 25.3 26.2 1.9 –3.3 –4.0 –0.8 –1.1 –1.1\nRwanda 21.4 25.7 28.9 30.2 29.9 30.6 –9.9 –11.9 –11.9 –10.5 –11.4 –10.3\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 37.4 31.8 32.4 30.0 30.0 30.0 –16.8 –12.1 –10.3 –9.7 –12.1 –8.7\nSenegal 33.2 41.5 45.3 48.2 50.5 50.0 –6.7 –7.9 –10.9 –11.8 –13.0 –8.4\nSeychelles 64.7 82.5 119.0 107.7 84.0 80.6 –19.1 –16.2 –23.0 –20.3 –30.0 –23.6\nSierra Leone 22.0 23.2 29.5 31.7 31.4 31.1 –22.9 –14.3 –6.8 –13.0 –17.2 –13.7\nSouth Africa 66.5 67.1 74.6 70.5 70.4 71.1 –3.4 –2.6 2.0 3.7 1.3 –1.0\nSouth Sudan 18.1 13.6 14.6 16.3 15.5 10.1 3.5 1.5 –15.6 –7.6 9.5 1.1\nTanzania 22.6 20.4 21.3 21.5 21.5 21.4 –7.5 –2.6 –1.8 –3.3 –4.3 –3.6\nTogo 36.2 42.0 45.4 46.9 47.1 47.2 –5.4 –0.8 –1.5 –3.3 –5.9 –6.4\nUganda 17.2 19.4 22.5 25.1 23.5 23.4 –5.7 –6.2 –9.3 –7.9 –7.0 –9.8\nZambia 20.1 23.6 31.3 35.4 34.8 34.2 1.1 0.6 12.0 6.7 4.4 4.3\nZimbabwe2 24.3 18.7 17.1 16.4 18.5 21.7 –9.9 4.0 4.7 3.6 2.5 1.5\nSub-Saharan Africa 34.8 35.5 38.6 37.5 37.0 37.0 –2.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 –1.7 –2.5\nMedian 25.8 28.0 31.3 31.1 31.4 31.8 –5.7 –4.0 –4.2 –4.5 –5.8 –5.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 27.8 29.5 32.7 32.0 31.1 30.9 –4.5 –3.5 –4.3 –3.2 –3.1 –3.6\nOil-exporting countries 23.7 24.9 26.9 24.9 24.9 25.7 1.4 –1.9 –3.6 0.4 1.7 0.0\nExcluding Nigeria 27.4 27.4 31.4 25.1 24.2 24.3 0.3 1.6 –2.5 3.5 7.4 2.7\nOil-importing countries 41.8 41.4 45.2 44.3 43.4 43.1 –5.2 –4.0 –2.6 –1.9 –3.6 –4.0\nExcluding South Africa 27.9 30.0 33.0 33.5 32.6 32.3 –6.5 –4.7 –4.7 –4.7 –6.0 –5.4\nMiddle-income countries 37.8 38.4 42.2 40.2 39.8 40.0 –1.2 –2.6 –2.0 0.2 –0.2 –1.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.6 31.7 36.2 34.0 33.0 32.7 –2.0 –2.0 –3.1 –1.7 –0.5 –1.6\nLow-income countries 24.2 27.0 28.8 29.8 29.1 28.9 –8.3 –5.4 –5.6 –4.9 –6.3 –6.1\nExcluding low-income countries in\n24.3 27.3 28.4 29.4 27.8 27.1 –9.3 –6.1 –6.3 –6.1\nfragile situations –8.3 –7.9\nCountries in fragile situations 20.8 22.1 25.6 26.5 26.5 27.3 –5.1 –3.7 –4.0 –2.4 –2.1 –2.8\nCFA franc zone 21.6 24.5 28.0 29.6 29.6 30.0 –3.7 –4.0 –4.5 –4.5 –3.3 –3.9\nCEMAC 20.4 22.2 26.0 26.4 26.2 27.1 –3.6 –2.6 –4.3 –2.0 2.9 –0.0\nWAEMU 22.4 25.7 29.1 31.3 31.3 31.5 –4.1 –4.9 –4.6 –6.1 –7.3 –6.2\nCOMESA (SSA members) 29.7 32.0 34.6 35.0 33.4 32.8 –5.9 –4.4 –4.1 –3.7 –4.3 –4.2\nEAC-5 27.3 27.0 29.3 29.2 28.5 28.3 –7.1 –5.1 –5.1 –5.6 –6.0 –6.0\nECOWAS 22.5 24.8 27.0 27.3 27.6 28.2 –0.5 –3.9 –4.3 –2.6 –3.2 –2.8\nSACU 64.8 65.6 72.9 68.9 68.8 69.5 –3.3 –2.7 1.5 3.1 0.9 –1.0\nSADC 50.0 49.4 55.0 51.6 51.3 51.5 –3.3 –1.9 –0.1 1.9 0.4 –1.3\nSee page 27 for sources and footnotes\n30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX\nSA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\nAngola 29.2 59.5 89.1 72.7 44.8 43.6 8.3 13.6 10.2 6.2 6.6 6.6\nBenin1 14.2 25.1 30.3 36.2 36.6 35.6 … ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.8 11.8 11.8 9.8 11.3 11.0 11.6 10.0 6.5 6.2 6.3 7.1\nBurkina Faso1 21.1 23.2 25.4 23.6 23.2 22.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 20.0 18.0 17.5 20.0 19.6 18.4 2.8 1.3 1.0 2.1 1.6 1.2\nCabo Verde 81.3 107.3 142.8 124.6 135.6 129.5 5.1 8.9 6.9 7.4 6.4 5.7\nCameroon2 16.1 29.2 32.5 32.3 33.7 32.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 26.1 35.8 36.3 32.8 32.9 30.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 24.1 24.2 27.3 26.2 23.2 21.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 17.7 19.6 24.1 23.3 29.8 33.9 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.2 7.1 6.8\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 15.7 12.8 12.9 11.3 9.4 7.7 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4\nCongo, Republic of 2 23.8 31.0 34.2 29.3 25.0 26.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 24.4 30.0 34.1 33.1 33.8 32.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.1 13.9 16.4 12.0 9.7 12.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea 63.4 61.7 58.1 53.7 47.6 44.0 3.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.4\nEswatini 8.2 12.7 15.3 15.9 18.0 18.3 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0\nEthiopia3 24.5 28.2 28.8 29.0 27.0 24.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.6 0.8 0.8\nGabon2 27.4 38.9 49.0 38.1 33.7 34.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 35.1 46.4 48.9 46.5 45.1 43.5 3.7 4.0 5.1 5.8 4.7 4.3\nGhana 23.6 29.6 36.0 36.0 36.9 34.6 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.3\nGuinea 26.8 19.7 25.1 26.0 26.6 27.8 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.1\nGuinea-Bissau1 29.4 37.8 44.9 40.1 41.7 38.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 22.2 30.5 32.8 33.3 35.0 36.4 4.3 6.1 4.5 4.4 3.9 4.2\nLesotho 34.9 38.8 48.2 42.5 43.9 45.2 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.4\nLiberia 15.3 35.2 40.9 37.6 37.8 37.5 2.1 2.2 2.1 4.0 4.0 4.1\nMadagascar 23.2 26.9 36.4 40.1 43.3 45.0 3.1 5.3 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.8\nMalawi 17.3 28.0 31.8 31.7 37.0 39.3 2.3 3.1 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.7\nMali1 22.2 26.5 31.8 29.3 28.8 26.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.7 10.9 21.1 22.4 30.1 28.5 6.9 16.9 15.0 14.7 11.4 10.0\nMozambique 58.8 80.8 91.6 82.1 76.1 76.2 3.2 5.3 4.6 2.5 2.3 2.2\nNamibia 10.8 20.3 23.9 17.7 17.5 16.0 3.2 5.4 4.2 5.1 4.1 4.3\nNiger1 17.0 25.4 33.0 33.0 34.4 33.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.1 6.7 8.0 9.1 8.8 8.7 5.9 6.3 6.6 5.9 6.5 7.0\nRwanda 24.7 43.2 53.9 55.8 59.3 60.9 3.7 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.7\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 76.6 65.4 64.9 61.3 63.1 60.0 3.8 3.3 5.0 4.4 5.2 5.1\nSenegal1 30.1 47.4 48.9 45.8 45.9 42.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 37.9 26.3 40.7 39.3 36.4 40.0 3.4 5.7 4.6 4.6 3.8 3.6\nSierra Leone 30.4 41.4 48.3 47.9 48.3 48.0 2.9 4.5 4.6 5.4 4.3 4.0\nSouth Africa 13.7 20.2 23.6 18.7 19.6 20.1 5.4 8.4 6.4 5.1 4.7 4.3\nSouth Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.8\nTanzania 24.9 28.1 28.9 28.5 26.7 25.0 4.6 5.8 5.6 4.9 4.6 4.3\nTogo1 12.8 17.6 28.7 25.8 28.0 27.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 15.6 25.3 31.5 32.9 33.8 34.0 4.6 3.7 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.6\nZambia4 21.8 48.7 66.6 57.6 … … 2.8 2.6 1.2 2.6 2.8 3.5\nZimbabwe5 33.6 31.2 30.8 21.8 19.5 20.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.8 0.8\nSub-Saharan Africa 15.4 22.9 26.6 25.1 24.0 23.4 4.9 6.0 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.6\nMedian 22.3 28.2 32.6 32.9 33.8 33.4 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.4 3.9 3.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 23.3 32.0 36.7 34.7 32.6 31.7 4.2 4.9 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.6\nOil-exporting countries 9.9 17.1 20.0 20.2 17.7 17.1 6.0 6.9 6.4 5.4 6.0 6.5\nExcluding Nigeria 24.6 43.5 55.5 47.9 36.7 36.4 6.3 8.3 5.9 4.3 5.2 5.6\nOil-importing countries 19.2 26.2 30.1 27.5 27.6 27.1 4.2 5.6 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.5\nExcluding South Africa 23.0 29.3 33.0 31.9 31.5 30.5 3.4 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1\nMiddle-income countries 13.4 21.4 25.1 23.6 22.5 22.1 5.5 7.0 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.4\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 22.9 35.2 41.8 39.1 35.9 35.3 5.2 6.4 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.7\nLow-income countries 24.0 28.0 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.3\nExcluding low-income countries in 25.0 31.1 34.1 34.1 3.4 3.9 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.7\nfragile situations 33.2 31.7\nCountries in fragile situations 23.0 25.3 28.3 25.9 25.0 24.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5\nCFA franc zone 20.8 29.7 34.1 32.2 31.8 31.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8\nCEMAC 19.1 28.9 33.2 29.8 27.9 28.3 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.6 4.4\nWAEMU 22.4 30.2 34.6 33.7 34.2 32.6 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.0\nCOMESA (SSA members) 21.4 27.6 30.8 29.9 29.2 28.6 3.1 3.9 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.7\nEAC-5 21.8 29.4 32.2 32.7 33.2 33.3 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.1\nECOWAS 9.3 15.1 18.2 19.2 18.4 17.6 5.0 5.3 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.6\nSACU 13.7 19.9 23.1 18.4 19.3 19.7 5.5 8.3 6.3 5.1 4.7 4.4\nSADC 18.8 27.4 32.5 27.3 25.7 25.5 5.4 7.7 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.3\nSee page 27 for sources and footnotes\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 31", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2022/April/English/text.ashx"}