{"doc_id": "f1efd2863aa4f43afed58f8f21870e71", "text": "INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023\nOC T\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nREGIONAL\nECONOMIC\nOUTLOOK\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023\nOCT\nCopyright ©2023 International Monetary Fund\nCataloging-in-Publication Data\nIMF Library\nNames: International Monetary Fund, publisher.\nTitle: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon?\nOther titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon? | Light on the horizon? | World economic and financial\nsurveys. | Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.\nDescription: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2023. | World economic and financial surveys. |\nOct. 2023. | Includes bibliographical references.\nIdentifiers: ISBN 9798400253508 (English Paper)\n9798400253560 (ePub)\n9798400253546 (Web PDF)\nSubjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. |\nEconomic development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.\nClassification: LCC HC800.R44 2023\nThe Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to review\ndevelopments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff\nand do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.\nPublication orders may be placed online or through the mail:\nInternational Monetary Fund, Publication Services\nP.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090, U.S.A.\nT. +(1) 202.623.7430\nF. +(1) 202.623.7201\npublications@IMF.org\nIMFbookstore.org\nelibrary.IMF.org\nFind all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa\nhttps://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? iii\nContents\nAcknowledgments ....................................................................................................... v\nCountry Groupings. ..................................................................................................... vi\nAssumptions and Conventions. ........................................................................................ vii\nExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1\nLight on the Horizon? .................................................................................................... 2\nRecent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine ................................................ 3\nLooking to the horizon: four priority policies ........................................................................ 9\nReferences .............................................................................................................. 15\nStatistical Appendix. ................................................................................................... 18\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\niv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFIGURES\nFigure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth, 2021–24 .................................................................. 3\nFigure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth. ............................................. 3\nFigure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28. .................................................................. 4\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP, 2019–24 .......................................................... 4\nFigure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis. ............................................................................. 5\nFigure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation, 2002–23 ................................................................. 6\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, (excluding grants), 2015–24 ..................................... 6\nFigure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt, 2000–24 ................................................................... 6\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Per Capita Income ..................................................... 7\nFigure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year 1960–2023 ........................................................... 7\nFigure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates versus Expected Inflation .............................................. 10\nFigure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve Cover, 2022. ................................................................ 10\nFigure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar, 2020–23 ................................................................ 11\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of GDP, 2023 . .. 12\nTABLES\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings ................................................................ vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings ..................................................... vi\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations ........................................................................... vii\nSTATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES\nSA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average .............................................................. 18\nSA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt .............................................. 19\nSA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants. ............................................... 20\nSA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves. ..................................................... 21\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? v\nAcknowledgments\nThe October 2023 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared by a\nteam led by Saad Quayyum and under the supervision of Andrew Tiffin, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.\nThe team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Wenjie Chen, Michele Fornino, Cleary Haines, Irena Jankulov Suljagic,\nThibault Lemaire, Hamza Mighri, Francine Nyankiye, Alvaro Piris, Henry Rawlings, Arthur Sode.\nCharlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Yao Nourdine Ouattara.\nThe editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nvi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nCountry Groupings\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings\nOil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile\nIntensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected\nCountries Countries Situations1\nAngola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso\nCameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi\nChad Central Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon\nCongo, Republic of African Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African Republic\nEquatorial Guinea Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Chad\nGabon Republic of the Eswatini Comoros Congo, Comoros\nNigeria Eritrea Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Congo, Democratic\nSouth Sudan Ghana Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Republic of the\nGuinea Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Congo, Republic of\nLiberia Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Eritrea\nMali Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Ethiopia\nNamibia Madagascar Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau\nNiger Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Mali\nSierra Leone Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mozambique\nSouth Africa Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Niger\nTanzania Rwanda Namibia Malawi Nigeria\nZambia São Tomé Nigeria Mali São Tomé and Príncipe\nZimbabwe and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan\nSenegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe\nSeychelles Senegal Rwanda\nTogo Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa South Sudan\nZambia Tanzania\nTogo\nUganda\nZimbabwe\n1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024\nSub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings\nThe West Economic Common East African Southern African Southern Economic\nAfrican and Monetary Market for Community Development African Community of\nEconomic and Community of Eastern and Community Customs West African\nMonetary Union Central African Southern Africa Union States\n(WAEMU) States (SADC)\n(CEMAC) (COMESA) (*EAC-5) (SACU) (ECOWAS)\nBenin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin\nBurkina Faso Central Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso\nCôte d’Ivoire African Republic Congo, *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde\nGuinea-Bissau Chad Democratic South Sudan Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire\nMali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Tanzania Democratic South Africa Gambia, The\nNiger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Uganda Republic of the Ghana\nSenegal Gabon Eswatini Eswatini Guinea\nTogo Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea-Bissau\nKenya Madagascar Liberia\nMadagascar Malawi Mali\nMalawi Mauritius Niger\nMauritius Mozambique Nigeria\nRwanda Namibia Senegal\nSeychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone\nUganda South Africa Togo\nZambia Tanzania\nZimbabwe Zambia\nZimbabwe\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? vii\nAssumptions and Conventions\nThe following conventions are used in this publication:\nIn tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor\ndiscrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.\nAn en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or\nmonths covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between\nyears or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY\n(for example, FY 2012).\n“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.\n“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to\n¼ of 1 percentage point).\nAs used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as\nunderstood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that\nare not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.\nThe boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the\npart of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement\nor acceptance of such boundaries.\nSub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations\nAGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone\nBDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan\nBEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe\nBFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini\nBWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles\nCAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad\nCIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo\nCMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania\nCOD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda\nCOG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa\nCOM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia\nZWE Zimbabwe\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 1\nExecutive Summary\n2023 has been a difficult year for activity in sub-Saharan African economies. The inflationary shock following\nRussia’s war in Ukraine has prompted higher interest rates worldwide, which has meant slowing international\ndemand, elevated spreads, and ongoing exchange rate pressures. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected to fall\nfor the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year.\nThe region is expected to rebound next year, with growth increasing to 4.0 percent in 2024, picking up in four-\nfifths of the sub-Saharan Africa’s countries, and with strong performances in non-resource intensive countries.\nMacroeconomic imbalances are also improving—inflation is falling for most of the region, and public finances are\ngradually being put on a more sustainable footing.\nBut the rebound is not guaranteed. A slowdown in reform efforts, a rise in political instability within the region, or\nexternal downside risks (including from China slowing down) could undermine growth. Moreover, four clouds are\non the horizon which require determined policy action in the face of difficult tradeoffs:\nƒ First, inflation is still too high. It is in double digits in 14 countries. And it remains above target in most countries\nwith explicit targets.\nƒ Second, the region continues to face significant exchange rate pressures.\nƒ Third, debt vulnerabilities are elevated. The funding squeeze is not over, as borrowing rates are still high,\nand rolling over debt is a challenge. And half of the low-income countries in the region are at high risk or in\ndebt distress.\nƒ Finally, while the recovery is underway, economic divergences within the region are widening—in particular,\nper capita incomes in resource intensive economies remain subdued.\nAgainst this background the policy priorities are as follows:\nƒ Addressing inflation: For countries where inflation is high but falling, a “pause” may be warranted, with rates\nheld at existing elevated levels until inflation is firmly on the path to target. In countries with still rising inflation,\nfurther monetary tightening may be required until there are clear signs that inflation is cooling.\nƒ Managing exchange rate pressures: For pegged countries, monetary policy needs to be aligned with the anchor\ncountry to preserve external stability and prevent further losses of reserves. In countries with floating exchange\nrates, currencies should be allowed to adjust as much as possible, since efforts to resist fundamentals-based\nmovements come at a significant cost. The adjustment should be accompanied by other policy measures—\ntighter monetary policy to keep inflation in check, targeted support for the poor, structural reforms to strengthen\nthe export sector, and fiscal consolidation where the fiscal deficit is adding to exchange rate pressures.\nƒ Managing debt obligations while creating space for development spending: For much of the region, fiscal\npolicy must adapt to a tighter financing envelope and elevated debt vulnerabilities. This involves better mobi-\nlizing domestic revenue, a strategic approach to spending, borrowing prudently, and anchoring fiscal policy\nthrough a credible medium-term framework. In the few countries where debt is unsustainable, debt restruc-\nturing may also be needed. With large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need\ngreater financial support from donors.\nƒ Improving living standards and potential growth, particularly in resource intensive countries: Boosting income\nper capita will require wide-ranging structural reforms, including investment in education, better natural\nresource management, improved business climate and digitalization, and a commitment to trade integration.\nRegional Economic Outlook Notes. In parallel, a series of analytical notes explore topics of current interest.\n“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China” explores the Africa-China relationship\nand the implications of a slowdown in China. “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-\nOffs in Debt Restructuring” discusses debt developments and how to approach sovereign debt restructuring.\n“The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity” discusses trends in development finance and\ntheir policy implications.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nLight on the Horizon?\nStill emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have been hit by a sluggish global economy,\nworldwide inflation, high borrowing costs, and a cost-of-living crisis. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected\nto fall for the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. But a long-awaited rebound\nis on the horizon. Inflation is falling, public finances are stabilizing, and growth is poised to increase to 4.0\npercent next year. Still, even though the outlook is less ominous, it is too early to celebrate. In many cases,\ninflation is still too high, borrowing costs are still elevated, exchange-rate pressures persist, and political\ninstability is an ongoing concern. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse\nof sunshine, it is important for authorities to guard against a premature relaxation of stabilization policies,\nwhile also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create new\nspace to address the region’s pressing development needs.\nLight on the Horizon?\n2023 has been a difficult year\nSlowing international activity, higher global interest rates, elevated\nspreads, and renewed exchange rate pressures have all combined to\ncreate an acute funding squeeze.\nA long-awaited growth rebound next year\n2023: 2024:\nfell for the set to\nsecond year recover\n3.3% 4 %\nThe recovery is not guaranteed: four policy priorities\nPersistent Exchange-rate Fiscal Divergent\ninflation pressures sustainability recoveries\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 3\nRecent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine\nEmerging from a difficult year in 2023, activity in the region is expected to\nrebound next year…\nFIGURE 1\n2023 has been another challenging year. The inflationary\nFigure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth,\nshock following Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted higher 2021–24\ninterest rates worldwide, with a significant impact this year. (Percent)\nFor sub-Saharan Africa, this has meant slowing international\n4.8\ndemand, higher global interest rates, elevated spreads, and Projections\nongoing exchange rate pressures that have all combined to\ncreate an acute funding squeeze—yet another shock for a 4.4\nregion still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic. As a\nresult, growth in 2023 is expected to fall for the second year\nin a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. 4.0\nBut growth in sub-Saharan Africa is set to rebound to\n4.0 percent in 2024. (Figure 1.) Model estimates suggest 3.6\nthe region’s recovery may already have started. GDP data\nfor most countries are still only available for Q1 2023. But\n2021 22 23 24\nhigh frequency indicators show that aggregate activity for\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nthe region improved in the second quarter.1 Important\nfor the region, disruptive power shortages in South Africa\npicked up significantly in 2022 and have weighed on that country’s growth in 2023—but even here outturns for\nthe first half of the year have been better than anticipated, owing to the lower-than-projected impact of power\nshortages and the ongoing strength of the services sector. Looking ahead, the relative size of South Africa\n(19½ percent of regional GDP) means that average regional growth in 2024 will largely reflect South Africa’s\ncoming recovery (Figure 2), which in turn will be driven by that country’s efforts to address pressing issues in the\npower sector. But the region’s recovery extends beyond South Africa. Indeed, in stark contrast to 2023, growth will\nimprove in around four-fifths of the region’s economies.\nfigure 2 figure 2 Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth\n(Percent contributions, from 4.0 to 3.3) (Percent contributions, from 3.3 to 4.0)\n2022 to 20220322 to 2023 2023 to 20220423 to 2024\nBurkina FaBsourkina Faso South AfricSaouth Africa\nMozambiquMeozambique Angola Angola\nEquatorial EGquuinaetoarial Guinea Senegal Senegal\nUganda Uganda Ghana Ghana\nCongo, De Cmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep. Niger Niger\nNiger Niger Nigeria Nigeria\nGhana Ghana Tanzania Tanzania\nAngola Angola Uganda Uganda\nNigeria Nigeria Burkina FaBsourkina Faso\nSouth AfricSaouth Africa Congo, DeCmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep.\nOthers Others Others Others\n3.5 3.35.7 3.73.9 3.9 3.4 3.43.6 3.63.8 3.84.0 4.0\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Barhoumi and others 2022.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\n…with faster growth in the region’s more diversified economies\nStill, there is significant heterogeneity across the region—in particular, the divergence between resource-intensive\nand non-resource-intensive countries is expected to persist. Both groups of economies will recover next year,\nbut at different paces. Subdued commodity prices will continue to weigh on exports for most resource-intensive\neconomies, but overall growth will improve nonetheless from 2.6 percent in 2023 to 3.2 percent in 2024, buoyed\nmainly by private consumption and in some cases, a number of new (or repaired) hydrocarbon projects coming\non stream (Niger, Senegal), and mining projects starting production (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia,\nMali, Sierra Leone). Growth in non-resource intensive countries, on the other hand, will be supported by both\nconsumption and investment and is expected to improve from 5.3 percent to an impressive 5.9 percent (Figure 3).\nThis two-speed recovery is a long-standing pattern, becoming particularly pronounced following the commod-\nity-price shock of 2015 (see “Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty,” Chapter 1 in Regional Economic Outlook:\nSub-Saharan Africa, April 2019). Since that episode, the divergence between these two types of economies has\nbecome more entrenched. Neither group of countries is expected to completely recover lost ground from the\ncrisis, but non-resource countries have nonetheless proven more resilient, supported by their more diversified\neconomies. For resource-intensive economies, on the other hand, a less diversified structure along with greater\nexposure to external shocks has weighed on investor confidence and activity—weakening prospects in the short\nterm and undermining potential growth in the long run (Figure 4).\nExternal conditions are improving\nAlthough the global environment remains difficult, some improvements have been observed since the April 2023,\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:\nƒ First, after three long years the World Health Organization has declared that the pandemic is over.\nƒ Second, consumption has proven unexpectedly resilient across numerous large economies, so that (still\ndownbeat) projections for global growth in 2023 have been revised upwards since April.\nƒ Third, global inflation is slowly falling (Figure 5). Policy-rate hikes in many large economies are now on pause\nand international financial conditions are easing—which has helped reduce sovereign spreads for sub-Saharan\nAfrican countries, taking some pressure off the funding squeeze.2\nFigure 3\nFigure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP,\nFigure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28\n2019–24\n(Percent, dashed line = weighted average)\n(Index 2019 = 100, dashed line = pre-crisis projections)\n7.5\nProjections\n120 Non-resource-intensive\ncountries\n5.0 Non-resource-intensive\ncountries\n110\n2.5\nResource-intensive\nResource-intensive\ncountries\ncountries\n0.0\n100\n–2.5\n2005 10 15 20 25 2019 20 21 22 23 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: See country groupings on page vi. Note: See country groupings on page vi.\n2 Spreads on Eurobonds have come down by 150 bps between March and end-September 2023.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 5\nƒ Finally, global supply chains have normalized, and food and energy prices have fallen. International food\nprices have dropped by over 20 percent over the past 18 months. With food being close to 40 percent of\nsub-Saharan Africa’s consumption basket, this is good news for a region grappling with an acute cost-of-living\ncrisis and an already-troubling incidence of poverty—about a third of the population in sub-Saharan Africa is\nestimated to live under $2.15 a day.\nMacroeconomic imbalances are declining\nInflation is coming down in sub-Saharan Africa. Having peaked in March 2023 at almost 10 percent (y/y), median\ninflation in sub-Saharan Africa has dropped by 3 percentage points, bringing the latest estimate to 7 percent as\nof July, 2023.\nAs with growth, there is significant heterogeneity across countries. Countries with flexible exchange rates\non average have higher inflation rates than those with more fixed arrangements, and nearly one-third of the\nregion still had double-digit inflation as of July, 2023. Nonetheless, using latest available data, over 40 percent\nof countries have had inflation fall consistently for at least two months. And most other countries are expected\nto peak soon, with only five countries (Angola, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Seychelles) projecting\ninflation to increase over the course of 2024. Some countries with elevated inflation are relatively large economies\n(Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria) so the weighted average rate for the region is also elevated. But looking at the median\ncountry, the impact of the crisis on sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the region’s projected disinflation path, is broadly\nin line with trends elsewhere (Figure 5).\nFigure 5\nFigure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis\n(Percentage point difference to end of 2019 pre-pandemic level)\nWeighted Average Median\nAEs AEs\nNon-SSA EMs Non-SSA EMs\n5.0 Non-SSA LICs 5.0 Non-SSA LICs\nSSA SSA\n2.5 2.5\n0.0 0.0\n2019 20 21 22 23 24 2019 20 21 22 23 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nNote: AEs = Advanced economies; Non-SSA EMs = Non-sub-Saharan African emerging markets; Non-SSA LICs = Non-sub-Saharan African\nLow-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.\nOf critical importance to the region’s food security, domestic food price inflation has also fallen, driven largely\nby a general drop in global food prices. Typically, as international food prices fall, domestic food inflation follows\nwith a lag of 6-to-12 months and with an almost complete pass-through for imported staples. Although median\nfood price inflation is still too high at over 10 percent, this is down from a peak of almost 16 percent in October\n2022 (Figure 6). The recent trend is a welcome development for the region, as sub-Saharan Africa is the most food\ninsecure region in the world. Projections for 2023 suggest that 142 million people are acutely insecure, up by\n10 million from last year and representing 12 percent the population.\nTurning to the region’s fiscal situation, public finances are gradually being put on a more sustainable footing.\nIn 2020 the median fiscal deficit (excluding grants) expanded sharply to 8.2 percent of GDP, owing to the impact\nof the pandemic on revenues and the need to protect the most vulnerable (Figure 7). Consequently, median\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n6 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 6\npublic debt also increased sharply, from around Figure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation,\n51½ percent in 2019 to almost 59 percent in 2020 2002–23\n(Figure 8). But few countries entered the crisis with the (Percent, year over year, median, as of July 2023)\nfiscal space to sustain such an effort, and most authori- 2007–08 Russian\nties have since started to consolidate. The median deficit Global invasion\nfood price of Ukraine\n(excluding grants) narrowed to 6.1 percent of GDP in\n15 crisis\n2022 and is expected to moderate further to 5.3 percent\nin 2023. As a result, debt levels have largely stabilized\nat around 60 percent starting from 2021 and are 10\nprojected to ease gently starting 2024—halting an almost\ndecade-long upward trend. The fiscal adjustment so far\nreflects an almost equal mix of spending restraint and 5\nincreased revenues (as a percent of GDP).\nBeyond general consolidation, some countries (Angola,\nDec. 2002 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 17 Dec. 22\nThe Gambia, Nigeria, Zambia) have started to implement\nSources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff\nsignificant energy subsidy reforms to create space for\ncalculations.\ndevelopment spending. In Nigeria, for example, in June\n2023 the authorities removed fuel subsidies that cost about $10 billion last year—four times the amount spent\non health. Most of these subsidies were poorly targeted and tended to benefit affluent segments of the popula-\ntion. Moreover, a significant amount of fuel was being smuggled out of the country, rewarding the rent-seeking\nbehavior of a small number of individuals and effectively subsidizing consumers (or distributors) in neighboring\nstates. Similarly, Angola has announced plans for a phased removal of energy subsidies worth almost $4 billion.\nStill, some storm clouds remain…\nThe recovery next year is most welcome but is not guaranteed:\nƒ First, the funding squeeze is not over. Debt levels have stabilized regionwide, but are still elevated in many\ncases—over half the region’s low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in distress.\nAnd with a trend shift toward market financing, which is more costly than loans from official creditors, debt\nservice obligations have ballooned. Further, although sovereign spreads have eased from their peak earlier\nin the year, borrowing costs remain elevated. For non-distressed countries, the average yield on outstanding\nFigure 8\nEurobonds is over 12 percent, compared to 7 percent prior to the pandemic. Although global interest rates\nFigure 7\nFigure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, Figure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt,\n(excluding grants), 2015–24 2000–24\n(Percent of GDP, median, dashed line = pre-crisis level) (Percent of GDP)\nProjections 120 25th and 75th Projections\n8 quartiles\n90\n7\n6 60\nMedian\n5\n30\n2016 18 20 22 24 2000 06 12 18 24\nSource: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 7\nshould eventually fall in line with declining inflation, longer-term global rates are not expected to return to\npre-crisis levels anytime soon. At current yields, no Eurobond has been issued since April 2022 and some\ncountries may struggle to roll over near-term liabilities—indeed, aggregate upcoming Eurobond repayments\nof around $6 billion in both 2024 and 2025 are of particular concern.\nƒ Second, inflation is still too high. Although inflation is trending down for more than 40 percent of the region,\nrates are still above pre-pandemic levels. For countries where expectations are not well anchored, the longer\nelevated inflation persists the greater the prospect of spiraling second-round effects—ultimately requiring\nmonetary authorities to tighten even more aggressively, and potentially adding an extra hurdle for fiscal author-\nities who may face added public wage demands.\nƒ Third, exchange-rate pressures continue. As a further consequence of the funding squeeze, rising global\ninterest rates and softening commodity prices have placed pressure on most sub-Saharan African currencies,\ncomplicating the choices facing policymakers—especially in the fight against inflation. For those with flexible\narrangements, and particularly those with competitiveness concerns or low reserves, efforts to resist currency\nmovements may ultimately undermine growth and make the funding squeeze even worse (see below).\nƒ Fourth, longer-term prosperity remains fragile, especially for less diversified economies. Sub-Saharan Africa\nis endowed with enviable natural resources and a rapidly growing population. But incomes for many of the\nregion’s inhabitants have stagnated—indeed, income per capita growth has long been significantly softer within\nresource-dependent economies, which host nearly two-thirds of the population. In more diversified countries,\nincome per capita is now growing at a respectable 3½ percent, suggesting that living standards can double in\nas little as 20 years. But for less-diversified resource-intensive countries, continued low output growth and rapid\ndemographic change suggest that this doubling may take generations, if ever. (Figure 9). So, a fundamental\nchallenge for policy makers in these countries is to improve resource management and accelerate the process\nof diversification, helping reduce the divergence in living standards across the region.\nƒ Fifth, recent examples of political instability have underscored the implications of persistent fragility. Forty\npercent of sub-Saharan Africa is classified as either fragile or in conflict affected areas. And there have been\n11 coups or attempted coups in the region since 2020; representing a marked increase over the relative\ntranquility of the previous 20 years (Figure 10). The economic and humanitarian costs of political instability\nare not new but rising geo-economic fragmentation is adding to political and social tensions in some fragile\ncountries, including in the Sahel. In addition, fragile and conflict affected states are particularly exposed to\nFigure 10\nexogenous events, such as climate shocks. Evidence suggests that, following extreme weather events, cumula-\ntive output losses can reach about 4 percent in fragile states compared to around 1 percent in other countries\nFigure 9\nFigure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year\nPer Capita Income 1960–2023\n(Years, one block represents one country) (Average number of episodes per year)\n4 Unsuccessful\nNon-resource intensive countries Successful\nOil exporters\n3\nOther resources\n2\n1\n0\n1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010– 2020–\n20 30 40 >50 69 79 89 99 09 19 23\nSources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff\nSources: Jonathan Powell, University of Central Florida; and\ncalculations.\nClayton Thyne, University of Kentucky.\nNote: See country groupings on page vi.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n8 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\n(Jaramillo and others 2023). These losses, in turn, limit countries’ ability to protect themselves against future\nshocks, with consequences spilling over to other groups of countries, often over multiple generations.\n…and the road ahead will be turbulent, with easing global risks but rising\nlocal risks\nGlobally, risks have eased since the April 2023 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, coming\nout of a four-year crisis, and with limited fiscal and reserve buffers, the ability of most countries in sub-Saharan\nAfrica to absorb further shocks is still limited. But external risks are now much more balanced. Activity in major\neconomies has been more resilient than expected and inflation is falling, often surprising on the downside. Further,\nswift action taken to contain banking-sector turbulence has reduced the immediate risks of financial stress. So\noverall, the risk of a global hard landing has receded. Nevertheless, the global environment is still challenging\nand key downside risks remain:\nƒ Importantly for sub-Saharan Africa, growth in China—the region’s largest trading partner—is already slowing and\nmay be lower than expected. This could not only impact sub-Saharan Africa’s exports but might also shrink\ninward foreign direct investment and lending from the world’s second largest economy (see analytical note\n“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China”). A downside scenario with a deep-\ner-than-expected contraction in China’s real-estate market and weaker consumer confidence would slow\nglobal activity and also tighten financial conditions for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)\nborrowers, leading to a –1¼ percent cumulative drop in sub-Saharan African output over 2024–26.\nƒ Financial markets may tighten unexpectedly, inhibiting borrowing in international markets for sub-Saharan\nAfrican economies. This remains a concern as market expectations of policy rates in advanced economies still\ndiffer from announced intentions, raising the prospect of a sudden repricing of risks. Persistent price pressures,\nor significantly higher global energy prices, may also necessitate tighter-than-expected monetary policy in\nadvanced economies, resulting in higher international borrowing rates.\nƒ Rising geopolitical tensions can weigh on global trade and growth and might also add to commodity-price\nvolatility. Food prices, for example, are already exposed to adverse weather patterns from El-Niño but might be\nrocked even more violently if the war in Ukraine were to escalate. More generally, trade restrictions are rising.\nAlmost 3,000 restrictions were imposed globally just last year—nearly 3 times the number imposed in 2019.\nAnd looking ahead, the region is highly exposed if large economies prioritize national interest over the global\ncommon good, particularly when it comes to issues such as: technology transfers to low-income countries, trade\nrestrictions, and climate change. Moreover, countries in sub-Saharan Africa may be forced to choose between\ncompeting political blocs, undermining their efforts at trade integration and diversification, and so constraining\npotential growth (see analytical note “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught Between the\nFault Lines” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—The Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).\nStill, the global economy is also subject to a range of upside risks. These include: further downside surprises on\ncore inflation; stronger consumer demand, including from policy support in China; and a better-than-expected\ninvestment response to current policy incentives. In addition, recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and\ngreen technologies could also usher in a new period of strong productivity growth, boosting investment and\npotential output. A global upside scenario with faster disinflation, higher commodity prices, and a strong recovery\nin investment in advanced economies could lift cumulative output in resource-intensive sub-Saharan Africa by\nalmost ½ percent of GDP over 2024–26.\nWhile global risks have eased, region-specific risks have increased across sub-Saharan Africa:\nƒ In particular, the risk of conflict has increased significantly, owing to mounting geopolitical tensions, weak\ninstitutions, and a cost-of-living crisis that has left many behind. The military takeover in Niger has raised the\npossibility of a regional military conflict in the Sahel, while in Ethiopia, social tensions and the prospect of\nfurther violence remain despite a peace deal. The security situation also remains challenging in a number of\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 9\nother countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Finally, there is risk that the\nworsening conflict in Sudan can add to economic and humanitarian strains in neighboring countries.\nƒ In the face of rising social tension, there is also risk that reform momentum may slow, undercutting the region’s\nnewly improved prospects for macroeconomic stability and growth.\nLooking to the horizon: four priority policies\nAuthorities in sub-Saharan Africa face some of the most daunting policy challenges in the world: maintaining\nmacroeconomic stability amid limited resources, urgent development and humanitarian needs (including food\ninsecurity), frequent shocks, and political instability and fragility. Currently, with the pandemic officially over (for\nnow), inflation coming down, and growth looking to pick up, the outlook is finally starting to look less ominous.\nBut it is too early to celebrate. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse of sunshine,\nit is important for authorities to maintain momentum—guarding against a premature relaxation of stabilization\npolicies, while also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create\nnew space to address the region’s development needs. In this context, policy makers will need to focus on four\ninter-related priorities: addressing inflation, allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility, managing high debt\nobligations while creating space for development spending, and boosting the prospects for broad-based growth\nto ensure prosperity for all.\nHow to address still-elevated inflation?\nAs noted above, headline inflation is falling in many sub-Saharan African countries. This has been helped by a\ndrop in external food and oil prices compared to 2022, but available data suggests core inflation is also trending\ndownward, in part resulting from a delicate process of monetary tightening over the past 2 years. Since end-2021,\nthe median country has increased policy rates by 350 bps—broadly in line with a median emerging-market hike\nof 400 bps. Amplifying this effort, many countries have also taken extra steps to mop up excess liquidity, bringing\neffective interbank rates closer to the main policy rate (Angola, Tanzania, CEMAC, WAEMU), and introduced limits\non credit growth (Ethiopia). A further part of the story, however, reflects less-orthodox measures put in place to\naddress abrupt swings in the cost of living. These include administered prices and subsidies which helped limit\ninflation in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda and Togo.\nBut inflation is still too high. Inflation at end 2023 is projected to stay in double digits in 14 countries, including\nsome of the region’s larger economies, such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria. And among countries with an explicit\ninflation target range, inflation remains above target in two-thirds of cases. In addition, many countries will likely\nface an extra inflationary impulse as fuel subsidies and other emergency measures are unwound (Angola, Nigeria,\nSenegal, Tanzania), or in response to persistent volatility in global oil prices. So, policy will continue to reflect a\ndelicate balance—including an assessment on when it is finally appropriate to start easing the monetary stance.\nGauging the appropriate stance is difficult. Although policy rates have increased in almost all countries, they may\nnot have always kept pace with anticipated inflation, and so may not have increased the real cost of borrowing\n(Figure 11). For example, with only modest increases in the policy rate in Nigeria, the monetary stance remains\nloose, owing in large part to the financing of the fiscal deficit by the central bank, but also the impact on inflation\nof depreciation and the relaxation of fuel subsidies.\nFinally, a key consideration is the need to preserve the credibility of the region’s monetary authorities. Regionwide,\nthe ability of the authorities to contain inflation amid global shocks owes much to improvements in their policy\nframeworks over the last two decades. Advances in central bank independence, inflation targeting frameworks,\nexchange rate flexibility, and macroprudential regulation have all played critical roles. That credibility is now being\ntested. Care must be taken to safeguard and strengthen this effort, as a more credible policy framework anchors\nexpectations against future shocks, reducing the tightening needed to keep inflation under control.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\nLast year, the direction of policy across sub-Saharan Africa was Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates\nrelatively unambiguous for most countries—with rapidly rising versus Expected Inflation\ninflation, policy rates needed to be tighter. Looking ahead, (1-year ahead)\nas inflation continues to ease, decisions are likely to be more\n10\nTighter stance\ncomplicated and changes in the monetary policy stance will\nlikely be less synchronous:\nƒ Currently, in select economies with still elevated and 5\nGHA\npersistent inflation, further monetary tightening remains KEN\nappropriate until there are clear signs that inflation is ZMB NGA\nMOZ\ncooling and on track to meet the authorities’ inflation target. 0 NAM\nUGA MUS\nThis is critical to safeguard credibility and keep long-term TZA\nAGO\ninflation expectations anchored.\nLooser stance\nƒ For countries with high but falling inflation, a “pause” may -5\n-5 0 5 10\nbe warranted, with rates held at existing elevated levels\nChange in expected inflation since Dec. 2022 (percent)\n(‘higher for longer’) until inflation is firmly on the path to\ntarget. Loosening prematurely could risk a sharp resurgence\nin inflation once activity rebounds. And amid ongoing\nuncertainty—including, in some cases, the prospect of an\nimpulse from the easing of emergency measures—policy makers should err on the side of caution.\nMore generally, monetary policy needs to remain data-dependent going forward and coordinated with other\npolicies. For countries where inflation has closed on target and expectations are well anchored, authorities\nmight consider gradually easing to a more neutral policy stance. For example, Uganda in August 2023 cut policy\nrates amid its relatively benign inflation outlook. In any event, a strong commitment to price stability will still be\nessential and policy makers should be watchful of inflationary pressures re-emerging. Similarly, policies should be\naccompanied by clear forward-looking communications, outlining country circumstances and international devel-\nopments, as well as the motivation for the current policy stance. Strengthening central bank communication can\nhelp anchor inflation expectations and enhance monetary policy credibility.\nAre exchange rates sufficiently flexible?\nFigure 12\nAs noted above, the ongoing funding squeeze means that most sub-Saharan African countries continue to face\nexchange rate pressures. And since few countries have comfortable reserve buffers, this requires a delicate policy\nresponse (Figure 12).\nFigure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve\nFor pegged countries, stability requires authorities to adjust Cover, 2022\nthe policy mix to sustain the peg—this will entail matching the (Months of imports)\nmonetary policy stance of the anchor country but may also\ndemand added (and coordinated) fiscal consolidation to rein\nin external imbalances.\n9 Comfortable\nFor countries with more flexible arrangements, this added\nCEMAC\nflexibility is no guarantee of a less-difficult policy challenge. WAEMU\n6\nRecently, for example, policy makers in most non-pegged\nregimes have allowed exchange rates to weaken. But\nAdequate\nevidence suggests that many have refrained from allowing 3\nthe exchange rate to adjust in full—in some cases this can\nLow\nbe seen in large spreads between rates in the official and\n0\nparallel market (Burundi, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Malawi), and\nin a few, a further deterioration in reserves. The temptation to Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n)tnecrep(\n2202\n.ceD\necnis\netar\nycilop\nni\negnahC\n10 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 11\nSources: Haver Analytics; IMF, World Economic Outlook\ndatabase; and IMF staff calculations.\nNote: See countries abbreviation on page vii.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 11\nresist exchange rate pressures is understandable. Policy makers legitimately worry that depreciation can lead\nto inflation, adding to cost-of-living pressures and fueling social unrest. But efforts to resist fundamentals-based\nmovements also come at a significant cost. The exchange rate is an essential signal through which economies\nadjust to external shocks. Resisting this adjustment does not make the shock go away, but may instead add to the\nburden of adjustment down the road.\nIn countries with limited reserves, for example, resisting depreciation often entails distortive foreign exchange\nrationing or price controls. Rationing can starve businesses of much needed imports and disrupt production\n(Ethiopia, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe). Similarly, rationing can discourage capital inflows, owing to investor\nconcerns about their ability to repatriate their returns. Even without rationing, an artificially elevated exchange\nrate may still deter foreign investors, who may hold off until an anticipated adjustment takes place. So rather\nthan avoiding the costs of adjustment, efforts to resist depreciation may instead undermine growth and actually\nmake the funding squeeze worse. Moreover, inflationary pressures can still arise even in the face of resistance, as\nprices often reflect currency movements in the parallel informal market rather than the official market (Ethiopia).\nTherefore, for all these reasons, it seems best to let the exchange rate adjust amid strong fundamentals-based\nexchange rate pressures, particularly in countries with low reserves (see analytical note “Managing Exchange Rate\nPressures in Sub-Saharan Africa—Adapting to New Realities” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—\nFigure 13\nThe Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).\nAdjustment, however, needs coordinated policy Figure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar,\nsupport. This may include tighter monetary policy to 2020–23\nkeep inflation in check and ensure expectations remain (Index, Feb. 29, 2020 = 100; dashed line = parallel rate)\nanchored. Fiscal consolidation may also be warranted\n100\nif a lax fiscal position is driving the exchange rate\npressure (for example through monetary financing of\nthe deficit). Nigeria is a case in point. The unification of\n75\nthe Naira has been a bold and necessary move but is\nnot sufficient in itself. Follow-up support from monetary\nand fiscal policy is needed to avoid the reemergence\n50\nof an inflation-depreciation spiral (Figure 13). Beyond\nstabilization policies, targeted social support should\nbe put in place to protect the most vulnerable. And\n25\nto speed the realignment of economic activity toward\nmore competitive sectors, structural reforms that Jun. 2020 Jun. 21 Jun. 22 Jun. 23\nremove obstacles for the tradeable sector can maximize Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.\nbenefits of exchange rate depreciation. Note: Final data point as of end-September, 2023.\nHow to manage high debt obligations while still creating space for development\nspending?\nAs outlined above, debt levels are high and the funding squeeze is far from over. Moreover, with countries\nrelying increasingly on market financing, interest payments have ballooned, crowding out space for develop-\nment spending—the median ratio of interest to revenue is around 10½ percent in sub-Saharan Africa, over three\ntimes that of advanced economies. With rising needs and fewer options, fiscal policy must center around ways to\nadapt in the face of a tighter funding envelope (Figure 14).\nMobilizing revenue. Amid high external borrowing costs, authorities will ultimately need to rely more on domestic\nresources. In this context, sub-Saharan Africa has some of the lowest revenue-to-GDP ratios in the world. While\nmedian revenues (excluding grants) have increased by about 1 percent of GDP between 2019 and 2023 they\nare nonetheless projected to remain steady next year at only 17.0 percent of GDP, significantly below 40 percent\nin advanced markets and 27 percent in other EMDEs. This suggest stronger efforts will be needed to increase\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n12 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nFigure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment\nNeeded to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP, 2023.\nrevenues, including by expanding the tax base through Fi(gpeurrcee n1t4 o.f SGuDbP-,S naoh.a orfa cno uAnftrriiceas): Fiscal Adjustment\nreduced (distortive) tax expenditures and improved Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of\ntax design.3 The region has often relied on value GDP, 2023\nadded taxes (VAT), but as activity shifts to the formal (Percent of GDP, number of countries)\nsector, consideration should also be given to more\nprogressive sources, such as income and property\ntaxes in addition to VAT (see Gaspar and Selassie\n2017). More broadly, a critical precondition for tax\npolicy reform is effective tax administration, an area\nwhere the increased use of digitalization promises to\nsignificantly improve efficiency in collection.\nSpending smart. With limited revenues and large\ndevelopment needs, countries need to make the\n-5 0 5 10\nmost of the resources they have. Investment projects\nSources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.\nshould be selected carefully to ensure high economic No S t o e u : r S c e e v : e N n a t t y i o p n e a r l c a e u n t t h t o h r r i e ti s e h s o , l a d n r d e I p M re F s e st n a t f s f t c o a p lc o u n la e ti - o th n i s rd\nNote: 70-percent threshold represents top one-third of countries. For\nand social returns, while efficiency of spending needs ofc coouunntrtireies s.b Feolor wco uthnitsri etsh breeslhoowl dth, isa tdhjuresstmhoelndt, asdtajubsitlimzeesn t debt at\nstaebndili-z2e0s2 d1e bletv aetl .t hFeo ern dth oosf e2 0a2b2o lveev,e l.a Fdojur stthmoesen ta bborivneg,s debt to 70\nto be improved. For many countries, phasing out adpjeursctemnet nt obvreinrg s tdhee bt ftoor e7c0a pste rcheonrti zoof nth.e forecast horizon.\nfuel subsidies and ensuring that these subsidies do\nnot re-emerge will be a vital part of the effort to keep expenditures in check. For countries where sustainability\nrequires a large adjustment effort, difficult choices will need to be made and some spending rationalization may\nbe inevitable. However, these should protect growth enhancing expenditures (such as on education, health,\ncritical infrastructure) as well as social assistance to the vulnerable (see Amaglobeli 2022).\nBorrowing prudently. Effective debt management can help strike the balance between funding the government’s\nneeds and ensuring that debt remains sustainable. When countries need to borrow, they should rely more\non concessional financing where possible or choose official creditors with lower interest rates. Extending the\nmaturity of loans and ensuring repayments are not bunched together can help reduce refinancing risks, while\nstrengthening debt management frameworks can be key in expanding the range of viable options. In a difficult\nfunding environment, for example, debt management efforts need to be agile and proactive—if international costs\nremain prohibitive for countries looking to rollover Eurobonds, an efficient debt management office may help\nsecure alternate funding channels, for example through syndicated loans or from domestic capital markets (see\nIMF 2021).\nMedium-term credibility. Having a strong medium-term fiscal framework can improve lender confidence and\nlower risk premia. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have de jure frameworks but the ability of these to steer\npolicy has often been limited, with frequent breaches of fiscal rules. There is scope to greatly improve the design\nand effectiveness of these frameworks by: ensuring that the deficit path is anchored by a viable debt target;\nstrengthening key budget processes (including expenditure controls and fiscal risk management tools); and\nbetter communicating with the public to overcome resistance to difficult reforms—underscoring the long-term\nbenefits of reform and the (often mounting) costs of doing nothing (David and others 2023).\nFor most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, many of the efforts listed above are already underway and should be\nsufficient to maintain fiscal sustainability. But for some, implementing the measures in full may still not be enough.\nSuch cases are atypical and are prompted by widely different country circumstances. But where debt is not\nsustainable, it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that this debt is resolved swiftly. In this regard, some authorities\nhave engaged with creditors to restructure their debt through the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment\n3 In 2022, the median tax revenue-to-GDP ratio was 13 percent. A ratio of 15 percent is typically associated with accelerated growth\nand development (Gaspar et al., 2016) and 27 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were below this threshold in 2022.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 13\n(Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia). These recent cases will provide valuable experience and a clearer roadmap\nof what creditors and debtors can expect from each other going forward in undertaking debt restructuring (see\nanalytical note “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-Offs in Debt Restructuring”).\nHow to reduce divergence in income per capita and improve living standards\nmore fairly?\nSluggish income per capita growth, particularly among resource-intensive countries, can undermine the region’s\nnear-term recovery and is a major long-term obstacle for shared prosperity. Structural reforms can help to ensure\nbroad-based and durable improvements in living standards, reducing divergence in sub-Saharan Africa and\nreducing inequality more generally.\nInvest in people not just natural resources. Sub-Saharan Africa is significantly behind many other regions in terms\nof human capital accumulation—enrollment rates in the region’s secondary schools (54 percent) fall far below\nthe rates seen in EMDEs in other regions (89 percent). Greater focus on education and training can help boost\nproductivity for the millions of workers now entering the workforce, ensuring they are better able to participate in\nthe global economy. Investing in girls’ education, in particular, can have multifaceted returns—adding to produc-\ntivity gains, boosting savings, improving health outcomes, and ensuring that the opportunities and benefits of\neconomic growth are passed on to future generations. As a priority, therefore, authorities should both widen\nthe access and improve the quality of education. For example, abolishing school fees (recently implemented in\nZambia) and providing school lunches and stipends can help attract and retain students, while hiring and training\nnew teachers is critical to ensure that quality standards do not slip as the school population grows.\nImprove natural resource management. Sub-Saharan Africa has abundant natural resources. Some, such as oil,\nmay become less important as the world transitions to cleaner energy, while others (for example, lithium) may\nbecome more important. In either case, the key challenge is to ensure that the region’s natural wealth translates\ninto improved living standards for all. This not only requires good governance and transparency, it also demands\nsound fiscal management. As above, credible medium-term fiscal frameworks are essential for macroeconomic\nstability. But they are particularly important for many resource-intensive countries, where frameworks need to be\nresilient against volatile commodity prices—avoiding boom-bust cycles in public investment that can undermine\nlong-term growth, and also ensuring public wages do not greatly exceed private-sector wages, which can\nundermine competitiveness.\nAccelerate diversification and private sector participation. Expanding beyond the resource sector requires an\nenvironment where business and innovation can thrive. As a first step, continued macroeconomic stability and\ncredible policies can support investor confidence. In addition, removing red tape, reducing regulatory barriers,\nand ensuring adequate access to key public services (transport, electricity, water, and sanitation) are all essential\nto ensure that investment projects in new sectors remain viable. Digitalization and widening internet access can\nalso create new and larger markets and help unlock the region’s underlying dynamism and creativity. Evidence\nsuggests that many development projects may simply not take place without the addition of public incentives\n(Eyraud, Pattillo and Selassie 2021), particularly for resource-intensive countries seeking to expand activity further\nup the value chain. But the associated fiscal risks must be managed carefully, and policies should be aimed at\naddressing specific market failures—ultimately business investment should be self-sustaining rather than reliant on\ncontinued public support (see Cherif and others 2022).\nFoster trade integration. Growth and diversification requires access to new opportunities and markets. The African\nContinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the world’s largest free trade area by population covering 1.3 billion\npeople with a combined GDP of $3 trillion. AfCFTA is aimed at lowering tariffs and non-tariff measures, and if\nimplemented with additional reforms—such as improving transport, customs and border processing, and access\nto trade financing—it has the potential to boost income levels and support the expansion of cross-border value\nchains. Median merchandise trade among African countries, and between Africa and the rest of the world, could\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n14 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nincrease by as much as 53 percent and 15 percent, respectively. This in turn could raise the real per capita income\nof the median African country by more than 10 percent (ElGanainy and others 2023). Signatories have agreed\nto eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of non-sensitive products by end-2025, and 7 percent of tariff lines on sensitive\ngoods by 2030. The challenge now is implementation. Priority should be given to ensuring that these deadlines\nare met.\nA helping hand from the international community is needed\nWith large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need greater donor support. The four-year\ncrisis, and the ongoing funding squeeze, has highlighted the need for both concessional official development\nassistance (ODA) and increased countercyclical flows to offset the procyclical nature of private capital flows\n(see analytical note “The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity”).\nBut ODA to sub-Saharan Africa has been trending downward. For official donors, if increased aid to the region is\nnot feasible in the short run, then one option is to ensure more progressivity in the flows that remain, ensuring that\nscarce resources are channeled to sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest and more fragile countries.\nOn countercyclical flows, the IMF is an essential component of the region’s global safety net, particularly for\ncountries with limited reserve buffers. Demand for assistance has increased dramatically since the start of the\npandemic, with the IMF providing policy guidance and financing of $55 billion, much at highly concessional\nterms. Twenty-six countries have IMF financing arrangements, with about $4 billion disbursed so far in 2023. Five\ncountries (Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Seychelles) have had arrangements approved under the newly\nlaunched Resilience and Sustainability Facility since December 2022, helping them better prepare for climate-\nrelated shocks. And Burkina Faso, Guinea, Malawi and South Sudan have received $358 million from the new\nFood Shock Window, supporting their ability to weather the global food crisis. But the IMF’s ability to continue\nlending at high levels will depend upon the availability of concessional resources. This is a challenge that the IMF\nis working to address, including via pledges from the IMF’s members for both loan and subsidy resources for the\nPoverty Reduction and Growth Trust.\nIn a difficult and more costly funding environment, sub-Saharan African countries may have to rely more on their\nown efforts. But funding and reforms need to go together. Without reform, external development funding is less\neffective. But without funding, reform is more difficult. Emerging from a long crisis, and with some signs of light on\nthe horizon, now is the time for the region and the international community to come together—the more we help\nthe region make progress now, the more resilient the global economy will be for all.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 15\nReferences\nAmaglobeli, David, Emine Hanedar, Gee Hee Hong, and Céline Thévenot. 2022. “Fiscal Policy for Mitigating\nthe Social Impact of High Energy and Food Prices.” IMF Note 2022/001, International Monetary Fund,\nWashington, DC.\nBarhoumi, Karim, Seung Mo Choi, Tara Iyer, Jiakun Li, Franck Ouattara, Andrew J Tiffin and Jiaxiong Yao. 2022.\n“Overcoming Data Sparsity: A Machine Learning Approach to Track the Real-Time Impact of COVID-19 in\nSub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Working Paper 2022/88, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nDavid, Antonio, Luc Eyraud, Fabio Comelli, Peter Kovacs, Jimena Montoya, and Arthur Sode. 2023. “Navigating\nFiscal Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Departmental Paper, International Monetary Fund, Volume\n2023, Issue 6. Washington, DC.\nElGanainy, Asmaa, Shushanik Hakobyan, Fei Liu, and Hans Weisfeld. 2023. “Trade Integration in Africa\nUnleashing the Continent’s Potential in a Changing World.” IMF Departmental Paper 2023/003, International\nMonetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nGaspar, Vitor, Laura Jamarillo, and Philippe Wingender. 2016. “Tax Capacity and Growth: Is there a Tipping\nPoint?” IMF Working Paper 16/234, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nGaspar, Vitor, and Abebe Aemro Selassie. 2017. “Taxes, Debt and Development: A One-Percent Rule to Raise\nRevenues in Africa.” IMFblog (blog), December 5, 2017 https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2017/12/05/\ntaxes-debt-and-development-a-one-percent-rule-to-raise-revenues-in-africa.\nEyraud, Luc, Catherine Pattillo and Abebe Selassie. 2021. “How to Attract Private Finance to Africa’s\nDevelopment.” IMFblog (blog), June 14, 2021. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/06/14/\nblog-how-to-attract-private-finance-to-africa-s-development.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019. “Two-Track Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty.” Chapter 1 in\nRegional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2021. “Guidance Note for Developing Government Local Currency Bonds\nMarket.” Washington, DC.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. “Industrial Policy for Growth and Diversification: A Conceptual\nFramework.” IMF Departmental Paper 2022/017, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “The Big Funding Squeeze.” in Regional Economic Outlook:\nSub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught between\nthe Fault Lines.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Managing Exchange Rate Pressures in Sub-Saharan Africa—Adapting\nto New Realities.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, April.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity.”\nAnalytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC. October.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China.”\nAnalytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC. October.\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Tradeoffs\nin Debt Restructuring.” Analytical Note in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC.\nOctober.\nJaramillo, Laura, Aliona Cebotari, Yoro Diallo, Rhea Gupta, Yugo Koshima, Chandana Kularatne, Daniel Jeong\nDae Lee, Sidra Rehman, Kalin Tintchev, and Fang Yang. 2023. “Climate Challenges in Fragile and Conflict-\nAffected States.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2023/001, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n16 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nStatistical Appendix\nUnless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF\nstaff estimates as of September 30, 2023, consistent with the projections underlying the October 2023,\nIMF, World Economic Outlook.\nThe data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department.\nData definitions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible.\nHowever, in some cases, data limitations limit comparability across countries.\nCountry Groupings\nƒ Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive\ncountries, and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.\nƒ The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent\n25 percent or more of total exports.\nƒ The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other\nresource-intensive countries.\nƒ Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income,\nand countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).\nƒ The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income\n(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.\nƒ The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 of more than\n$1,135.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).\nƒ The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 equal to or\nlower than $1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).\nƒ The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification\nof Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.\nƒ The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown\non page vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and\nCEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community\n(EAC-5); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development\nCommunity (SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for\nRwanda and Burundi, which joined the group only in 2007.\nMethods of Aggregation\nƒ In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated\nas the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power\nparity as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic\nOutlook (WEO) database.\nƒ In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of\ndata for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group\nGDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.\nƒ In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic\naverage of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a\nshare of total group GDP.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 17\nList of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4\nTables SA1.,SA3.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA2.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nNote: “...” denotes data not available.\nTable SA4.\nSources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.\n1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for\nreserves data.\n2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for\nreserves data.\n3 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.\n4 Official Reserves include foreign assets held by Ghana Petroleum and Stabilization Fund and exclude\nencumbered assets.\n5 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.\n6 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the\nZimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are\nsubject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe\noperated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n18 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices\nReal GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average\n(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 2.0 –5.6 1.2 3.0 1.3 3.3 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.1 22.3\nBenin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.3 5.5 6.3 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 5.0 2.5\nBotswana 4.1 –8.7 11.9 5.8 3.8 4.1 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.9 4.7\nBurkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 1.5 4.4 6.4 1.0 1.9 3.9 14.1 1.4 3.0\nBurundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 3.3 6.0 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 20.1 16.1\nCabo Verde 3.0 –19.6 6.4 17.0 4.4 4.5 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 5.2 2.0\nCameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 1.9 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.2 4.8\nCentral African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.5 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.8 6.5 3.2\nChad 2.4 –2.1 –1.2 3.4 4.0 3.7 1.9 4.5 –0.8 5.8 7.0 3.5\nComoros 3.1 –0.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.5 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.4 11.1 1.2\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.2 8.9 6.7 4.7 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.1 10.6\nCongo, Republic of 0.3 –6.3 1.1 1.7 4.0 4.4 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.2\nCôte d'Ivoire 6.5 1.7 7.0 6.7 6.2 6.6 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.3 2.3\nEquatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.8 –0.4 3.2 –6.2 –5.5 2.5 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.4 4.0\nEritrea1 4.6 … … … … … 2.6 … … … … …\nEswatini 2.5 –1.6 7.9 3.6 3.1 3.3 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 5.5 5.0\nEthiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.2 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 29.1 20.7\nGabon 3.7 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.8 2.5\nThe Gambia 2.5 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 12.3\nGhana 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.1 1.2 2.7 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.9 42.2 23.2\nGuinea 6.2 4.7 5.0 4.3 5.9 5.6 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 8.3 7.9\nGuinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 4.2 4.5 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.0 3.0\nKenya 4.7 –0.3 7.6 4.8 5.0 5.3 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 6.6\nLesotho 1.5 –3.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.2 6.9 5.6\nLiberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.3 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.6 8.0\nMadagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.0 4.0 4.8 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 10.5 8.8\nMalawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 1.7 3.3 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 27.7 19.8\nMali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.7 4.5 4.8 1.1 0.5 3.8 9.7 5.0 2.8\nMauritius 3.7 –14.6 3.4 8.7 5.1 3.8 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.8 6.5\nMozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.4 4.2 7.0 5.0 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 7.4 6.5\nNamibia 2.8 –8.1 3.5 4.6 2.8 2.7 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 6.0 4.9\nNiger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.9 4.1 11.1 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.6 6.6\nNigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.1 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 25.1 23.0\nRwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 8.2 6.2 7.0 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.5 6.0\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.5 2.4 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 20.8 11.9\nSenegal 5.0 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.1 8.8 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 6.1 3.3\nSeychelles 6.8 –8.5 2.5 8.9 4.2 3.9 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.6 -0.8 2.0\nSierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 4.0 2.7 4.7 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 42.9 29.8\nSouth Africa 1.6 –6.0 4.7 1.9 0.9 1.8 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.8 4.8\nSouth Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 0.5 3.5 4.2 98.6 24.0 30.2 –3.2 16.3 13.6\nTanzania 6.7 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.1 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0\nTogo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.3 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.0 2.8\nUganda 5.3 –1.2 5.7 6.4 4.6 5.7 6.8 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.8 4.7\nZambia 4.3 –2.8 4.6 4.7 3.6 4.3 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 10.6 9.6\nZimbabwe2 4.6 –7.8 8.4 6.2 4.1 3.6 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 314.5 222.4\nSub-Saharan Africa 3.8 –1.6 4.7 4.0 3.3 4.0 8.3 10.1 11.0 14.5 15.8 13.1\nMedian 4.3 –1.2 4.8 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 3.6 4.6 8.2 7.1 5.3\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 –0.0 5.2 5.0 4.3 5.0 8.0 11.1 10.7 15.2 15.1 11.8\nOil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.1 3.2 2.6 3.1 11.2 13.0 15.9 17.1 20.5 20.0\nExcluding Nigeria 2.1 –3.6 1.6 3.2 2.0 3.1 10.2 12.3 13.2 12.8 9.4 12.7\nOil-importing countries 4.4 –1.2 5.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 6.7 8.6 8.5 13.1 13.3 9.7\nExcluding South Africa 5.8 0.8 6.0 5.4 4.8 5.4 7.5 10.9 10.2 15.7 16.3 11.6\nMiddle-income countries 3.1 –2.8 4.5 3.4 2.6 3.3 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 14.6 12.8\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.2 –1.7 5.1 4.4 3.4 4.4 7.4 7.9 9.1 12.5 11.9 9.8\nLow-income countries 6.0 1.9 5.4 5.6 5.3 5.7 8.8 14.8 12.5 18.2 18.8 13.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 5.6 1.0 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.7 7.8 4.9 4.8 8.3 8.7 6.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.3 3.9 4.1 10.3 15.6 16.4 20.3 24.2 20.2\nCFA franc zone 4.4 0.6 4.6 4.8 4.3 5.7 1.6 2.4 2.8 6.5 4.9 3.3\nCEMAC 2.5 –1.5 1.9 3.3 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 5.4 5.7 4.0\nWAEMU 5.7 1.7 6.0 5.6 5.2 7.0 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.0 4.5 3.0\nCOMESA (SSA members) 5.9 0.5 6.4 5.9 5.2 5.3 9.4 17.1 14.6 19.5 20.8 15.4\nEAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.6 5.2 5.0 5.7 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.1 6.8 5.6\nECOWAS 4.0 –0.6 4.4 3.9 3.3 4.1 9.3 10.2 12.7 17.0 20.9 17.2\nSACU 1.7 –6.1 5.0 2.2 1.2 2.0 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.9 4.8\nSADC 2.8 –4.2 4.6 3.4 2.5 3.2 7.7 10.7 9.6 11.6 11.5 10.5\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 19\nTable SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt\nOverall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 0.7 -1.9 1.0 59.8 138.9 86.8 66.7 84.9 77.1\nBenin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 -4.3 -3.7 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 53.0 52.4\nBotswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 0.0 -1.9 -1.1 17.6 18.7 18.7 18.0 18.7 18.1\nBurkina Faso –3.3 –5.1 –7.4 –10.7 -6.6 -5.6 31.0 43.3 55.4 58.3 61.2 61.2\nBurundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –12.1 -5.0 -2.8 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 72.7 65.8\nCabo Verde –5.0 –9.1 –7.5 –4.1 -4.5 -3.2 102.1 144.6 147.6 127.3 113.1 109.7\nCameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 -0.8 -0.6 27.6 44.9 46.8 45.5 41.9 39.6\nCentral African Republic –1.3 –3.4 –6.0 –5.3 -3.5 -2.8 47.4 43.4 47.6 51.8 50.1 49.6\nChad –0.9 1.6 –2.0 5.1 8.3 0.8 40.8 55.9 57.4 48.8 43.2 38.7\nComoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –3.9 -4.9 -4.5 18.0 24.0 25.5 27.9 33.3 36.9\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the –0.1 –3.3 –2.0 –0.8 -2.0 -2.0 18.0 16.5 15.9 14.5 13.3 11.1\nCongo, Republic of –2.1 –1.1 1.6 8.9 4.1 5.0 59.7 102.5 97.8 92.5 97.8 91.0\nCôte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.9 –6.8 -5.2 -4.1 32.4 46.3 50.9 56.8 56.8 57.0\nEquatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.8 2.6 13.6 3.8 0.4 25.2 49.4 42.1 34.6 38.3 33.7\nEritrea1 –2.3 … … … … … 235.6 … … … … …\nEswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 -0.3 -2.3 22.5 41.2 40.8 42.0 42.4 41.9\nEthiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 -2.7 -2.0 49.5 53.9 53.8 46.4 37.9 31.2\nGabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 1.9 -0.4 -1.1 44.5 78.3 65.8 57.7 64.9 64.5\nThe Gambia –4.3 –2.2 –4.6 –4.8 -2.7 -2.5 70.2 85.9 83.1 82.8 72.3 65.5\nGhana –6.6 –17.4 –12.0 –11.2 -4.6 -4.1 49.6 72.3 79.2 92.4 84.9 81.5\nGuinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.8 –0.7 -2.3 -2.4 40.2 47.8 41.5 33.1 31.6 31.5\nGuinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.9 –5.9 -3.5 -3.2 55.0 77.7 78.8 80.3 73.9 71.4\nKenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.2 –5.8 -4.7 -4.1 46.7 68.0 68.2 68.4 70.2 68.3\nLesotho –3.1 –0.0 –5.1 –7.7 1.0 -0.4 43.5 53.6 55.7 59.9 61.3 60.4\nLiberia –3.9 –4.0 –2.5 –5.3 -2.8 -3.3 28.7 58.7 53.3 53.9 52.3 52.7\nMadagascar –2.1 –3.9 –2.6 –6.4 -3.9 -3.4 38.1 52.2 52.0 55.1 54.0 53.5\nMalawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –9.3 -6.8 -8.0 35.5 54.8 61.5 75.2 78.6 77.4\nMali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.8 -4.8 -4.4 31.5 46.9 50.4 51.7 51.8 52.6\nMauritius –3.3 –10.4 –4.0 –3.2 -5.0 -5.7 62.2 94.6 88.4 83.1 79.7 78.9\nMozambique –4.2 –5.4 –3.6 –5.0 -2.8 -2.2 78.9 120.0 104.9 95.5 89.7 92.4\nNamibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.7 –6.5 -4.2 -4.0 38.2 64.3 70.4 69.8 67.6 66.8\nNiger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.8 -4.9 -4.1 27.8 45.0 51.3 50.3 48.7 46.3\nNigeria –3.1 –5.6 –6.0 –5.6 -5.4 -4.5 21.9 34.5 36.5 39.6 38.8 41.3\nRwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –5.8 -5.0 -7.3 33.0 65.6 66.7 61.1 63.3 72.1\nSão Tomé & Príncipe –5.2 2.9 –1.5 –2.2 0.2 0.1 94.6 86.7 76.7 77.7 58.5 54.4\nSenegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 -5.0 -3.9 47.2 69.2 73.3 76.6 81.0 72.1\nSeychelles 1.5 –14.9 –5.4 –1.2 -1.1 -1.3 65.0 77.6 70.7 61.5 60.8 59.0\nSierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.6 -5.4 -2.9 51.5 76.3 79.3 95.8 88.9 82.6\nSouth Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.5 –4.7 -6.4 -6.5 44.9 68.9 68.8 71.1 73.7 75.8\nSouth Sudan –5.7 –5.6 –9.4 5.1 8.4 4.3 53.0 49.9 52.5 37.8 60.4 50.9\nTanzania –2.7 –2.5 –3.4 –3.7 -3.3 -2.6 36.3 39.8 42.1 42.3 42.6 41.8\nTogo –3.8 –7.0 –4.7 –8.3 -6.6 -4.7 48.3 61.8 64.6 66.3 67.2 67.6\nUganda –3.0 –7.5 –7.5 –5.8 -4.2 -2.7 27.8 46.4 50.6 48.4 48.3 47.7\nZambia2 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.7 -6.0 -4.6 50.9 140.2 110.8 98.5 … …\nZimbabwe3 –3.4 0.8 –2.2 –2.0 -4.1 -3.2 51.7 84.4 59.8 98.4 95.4 56.9\nSub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.5 –5.0 –4.4 -4.2 -3.7 37.7 57.1 56.6 57.1 57.7 55.8\nMedian –3.1 –5.2 –4.9 –4.9 -4.0 -3.0 41.3 57.3 58.6 59.1 60.8 57.0\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.1 –5.8 –4.4 –3.9 -3.2 -2.6 42.7 63.4 60.3 59.4 58.8 54.0\nOil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.7 –4.1 –3.1 -3.5 -2.7 30.3 48.8 46.2 46.3 48.9 48.6\nExcluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.1 0.5 2.0 0.1 0.8 48.6 89.5 69.4 59.8 68.1 62.2\nOil-importing countries –3.8 –7.5 –5.5 –5.2 -4.6 -4.1 42.8 61.5 61.8 63.0 61.5 58.8\nExcluding South Africa –3.6 –6.5 –5.5 –5.4 -3.9 -3.3 41.4 58.2 58.3 59.3 56.8 52.4\nMiddle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.4 –4.6 -4.7 -4.2 37.2 59.0 58.6 59.5 62.0 61.9\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.4 –7.6 –4.8 –3.8 -3.3 -2.5 45.0 74.1 68.4 67.3 69.7 66.0\nLow-income countries –2.6 –3.8 –3.9 –4.0 -3.1 -2.7 39.7 51.6 50.9 50.4 47.6 42.8\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –5.0 -3.9 -3.3 35.5 48.2 50.1 49.6 49.3 48.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations –2.8 –4.5 –4.7 –4.3 -3.7 -3.1 29.0 42.9 43.6 45.0 43.5 41.3\nCFA franc zone –2.7 –4.3 –4.1 –3.2 -2.9 -2.7 35.2 53.7 56.3 57.1 57.8 55.8\nCEMAC –2.5 –2.0 –1.5 3.1 1.4 0.3 36.6 59.6 57.5 53.5 53.5 50.5\nWAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.9 -5.2 -4.3 34.7 50.4 55.6 59.3 60.1 58.6\nCOMESA (SSA members) –3.5 –5.6 –4.8 –4.6 -3.6 -3.1 42.4 60.8 57.9 57.5 54.2 47.6\nEAC-5 –4.3 –6.4 –6.1 –5.3 -4.2 -3.5 39.1 55.6 57.2 56.4 56.9 55.9\nECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.5 –6.3 -5.1 -4.3 27.7 43.2 46.8 49.9 50.4 51.0\nSACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.6 -6.0 -6.1 43.5 66.3 66.4 68.3 70.4 72.2\nSADC –3.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.5 -4.6 -4.2 45.1 70.3 64.1 64.2 66.7 64.4\nSee sources on page 16.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND\n20 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa\nTable SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants\nBroad Money External Current Account, Including Grants\n(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 34.6 38.4 24.4 20.0 20.0 19.6 3.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 3.1 3.7\nBenin 28.1 30.5 32.7 33.4 33.4 33.4 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –5.6 –6.0 –5.7\nBotswana 44.7 52.5 45.4 41.9 42.9 42.7 2.0 –10.3 –1.3 3.0 0.8 1.5\nBurkina Faso 32.3 43.6 49.0 46.0 47.9 48.4 –5.1 4.1 0.4 –6.2 –5.1 –5.2\nBurundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.0 54.7 53.6 –14.1 –10.3 –12.4 –15.6 –18.7 –20.7\nCabo Verde 85.5 114.3 110.7 93.3 92.8 92.2 –6.3 –15.0 –11.8 –3.6 –5.8 –5.0\nCameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 29.6 30.1 30.3 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –1.8 –2.6 –2.4\nCentral African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 30.6 29.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.1 –12.7 –8.8 –7.8\nChad 14.6 20.8 23.3 25.5 23.9 27.0 –7.6 –7.4 –3.4 6.2 0.2 –3.3\nComoros 25.1 31.2 36.7 36.7 37.8 38.7 –3.1 –1.9 –0.5 –2.4 –5.6 –5.8\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 20.2 21.9 19.5 21.4 21.8 –4.4 –2.2 –1.0 –5.2 –6.0 –5.3\nCongo, Republic of 26.6 32.7 30.8 27.5 30.5 32.3 –3.0 12.3 14.2 19.4 4.0 2.1\nCôte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 15.2 14.5 13.3 13.1 –0.3 –3.1 –4.0 –6.5 –4.7 –3.8\nEquatorial Guinea 13.2 17.5 14.7 16.4 19.9 24.8 –8.4 –0.8 5.4 9.6 –2.6 –3.0\nEritrea1 207.6 … … … … … 14.9 … … … … …\nEswatini 26.8 32.3 30.3 30.3 30.4 30.4 6.0 7.1 2.7 –0.7 6.3 3.2\nEthiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 25.3 22.6 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.4 –2.0\nGabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 22.8 26.5 27.6 2.4 –6.9 –4.5 1.6 –0.8 –2.1\nThe Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.2 54.6 52.0 50.6 –7.6 –3.0 –0.1 –5.9 –5.0 –5.2\nGhana 24.1 30.8 29.4 29.5 27.8 26.9 –5.6 –2.5 –2.7 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8\nGuinea 24.2 27.8 26.2 28.1 28.4 29.0 –16.3 –16.2 –2.1 –8.2 –8.9 –8.8\nGuinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.6 46.6 44.6 44.0 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –9.6 –7.1 –4.5\nKenya 36.8 37.2 35.2 33.9 32.6 31.9 –6.9 –4.7 –5.2 –5.1 –4.9 –4.9\nLesotho 34.2 40.3 37.3 40.3 38.4 37.4 –6.1 –1.0 –4.4 –7.9 –3.1 –4.7\nLiberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 25.0 25.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.9 –19.6 –22.9 –23.1\nMadagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 29.2 30.9 31.7 –2.7 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –3.9 –4.8\nMalawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 23.6 23.6 –10.2 –13.8 –13.3 –3.4 –5.9 –8.5\nMali 27.1 36.1 39.1 40.2 40.2 40.2 –5.2 –2.2 –7.5 –6.9 –6.5 –5.7\nMauritius 104.3 156.8 160.1 141.5 129.6 131.3 –5.8 –8.8 –13.0 –11.5 –6.2 –4.1\nMozambique 33.5 43.3 42.8 40.9 37.5 36.3 –31.3 –27.6 –22.4 –32.9 –16.0 –39.3\nNamibia 58.3 71.5 70.6 63.0 63.3 63.7 –8.1 2.6 –9.9 –12.7 –7.1 –6.4\nNiger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.4 19.4 19.4 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –15.6 –12.5 –3.9\nNigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 27.0 28.3 1.2 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6\nRwanda 22.4 29.0 29.9 29.2 26.8 27.3 –10.5 –12.1 –11.2 –9.8 –12.7 –11.3\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 41.1 32.5 29.5 28.1 26.3 26.3 –17.4 –11.2 –12.1 –13.3 –14.9 –10.0\nSenegal 34.6 45.3 47.9 51.9 56.4 59.9 –7.2 –10.1 –11.2 –19.9 –14.6 –7.9\nSeychelles 64.4 101.9 92.7 86.3 88.9 88.2 –15.3 –12.3 –10.1 –7.1 –6.9 –8.5\nSierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 36.2 30.2 27.7 –23.0 –7.9 –8.6 –8.8 –6.8 –7.0\nSouth Africa 66.4 74.0 70.1 71.1 71.5 72.3 –3.5 1.9 3.7 –0.5 –2.5 –2.8\nSouth Sudan 20.7 18.4 14.9 8.8 12.8 12.0 4.5 –19.2 –9.5 9.8 2.3 2.0\nTanzania 22.1 20.9 21.3 21.8 22.4 22.4 –7.0 –1.9 –3.4 –5.4 –5.1 –4.2\nTogo 37.2 46.6 48.0 50.4 50.4 51.0 –4.9 –0.3 –0.9 –3.2 –3.1 –2.7\nUganda 17.4 22.5 21.8 20.1 20.5 20.4 –5.6 –9.4 –8.3 –8.2 –7.1 –8.2\nZambia 21.0 31.3 24.3 26.6 26.8 26.3 0.3 10.6 9.7 3.6 3.8 7.1\nZimbabwe2 24.1 14.8 14.9 19.0 15.8 15.1 –7.9 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 –0.7\nSub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.1 36.6 36.6 36.7 –2.8 –2.7 –1.0 –1.9 –2.7 –2.8\nMedian 26.4 31.0 30.6 29.6 30.3 30.0 –5.6 –4.2 –4.1 –5.4 –5.1 –4.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.0 32.6 31.3 30.1 29.6 29.3 –4.5 –4.0 –3.0 –3.3 –3.9 –3.9\nOil-exporting countries 25.3 27.1 25.2 25.0 26.1 27.1 0.9 –3.1 0.6 2.5 0.8 0.6\nExcluding Nigeria 27.4 31.9 25.0 22.9 23.7 24.3 0.2 –1.5 4.0 7.1 0.9 0.7\nOil-importing countries 41.5 44.9 43.6 42.9 42.1 41.6 –5.2 –2.5 –1.8 –4.3 –4.3 –4.2\nExcluding South Africa 28.2 32.8 32.6 31.6 30.8 30.3 –6.4 –4.5 –4.5 –6.1 –4.9 –4.8\nMiddle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.6 39.9 40.3 –1.5 –1.7 0.3 –0.4 –1.6 –1.5\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.7 36.0 32.9 31.6 31.2 31.3 –2.2 –2.6 –1.4 –0.9 –2.6 –2.0\nLow-income countries 24.6 28.7 29.5 28.5 27.8 27.1 –8.0 –5.5 –4.8 –6.2 –5.3 –5.6\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 21.6 24.6 24.9 25.2 25.3 25.4 –7.9 –6.8 –5.9 –6.8 –6.7 –6.7\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 25.1 27.6 28.2 27.8 28.2 28.5 –1.7 –3.8 –1.9 –1.9 –1.7 –2.3\nCFA franc zone 22.0 27.7 29.4 29.5 30.2 31.1 –3.8 –3.4 –3.9 –4.4 –5.1 –4.0\nCEMAC 20.4 25.8 26.1 26.4 27.8 29.2 –3.4 –2.5 –0.8 3.6 –1.2 –2.0\nWAEMU 23.0 28.8 31.2 31.1 31.4 32.0 –4.3 –3.9 –5.7 –9.2 –7.2 –4.9\nCOMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.4 33.7 32.0 30.7 29.8 –5.7 –4.1 –3.7 –4.5 –3.8 –3.5\nEAC-5 27.4 29.2 28.5 27.8 27.3 26.9 –7.0 –5.1 –5.6 –6.2 –6.0 –5.9\nECOWAS 24.2 27.0 27.5 27.8 28.5 29.3 –1.0 –4.0 –2.4 –2.6 –2.4 –2.0\nSACU 64.6 72.3 68.4 68.9 69.2 69.9 –3.4 1.5 3.0 –0.7 –2.4 –2.6\nSADC 49.6 54.7 50.7 50.0 49.8 49.9 –3.4 –0.1 1.8 –0.8 –2.5 –3.0\nSee sources on page 16.\nINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023\nLIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 21\nTable SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves\nExternal Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves\n(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)\n2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024\nAngola 33.6 90.9 68.9 43.1 56.0 54.7 9.3 9.5 6.5 7.3 7.0 7.0\nBenin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 37.8 39.6 39.3 … ... ... ... ... ...\nBotswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 9.3 9.3 8.3 11.4 6.4 6.6 5.7 6.0 6.1\nBurkina Faso1 21.0 22.8 24.4 26.1 24.9 24.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nBurundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.6 27.9 30.8 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 1.9 2.3\nCabo Verde 78.4 129.6 119.3 106.9 96.2 91.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 5.6 6.0 5.9\nCameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 31.1 29.7 28.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCentral African Republic2 29.2 36.3 32.8 34.4 31.4 30.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nChad2 24.2 28.2 24.3 22.4 20.9 20.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nComoros 17.0 23.2 24.7 27.1 32.9 36.2 7.1 7.9 9.0 6.5 7.5 7.9\nCongo, Democratic Republic of the 14.1 13.7 14.5 13.2 12.1 10.4 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.1\nCongo, Republic of 2 24.4 29.2 23.7 25.1 25.5 23.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nCôte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.5 30.7 36.0 35.7 34.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEquatorial Guinea2 8.8 15.4 12.2 10.0 9.0 6.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nEritrea3 62.2 … … … … … 2.8 … … … … …\nEswatini 8.8 15.2 15.2 17.2 20.2 21.5 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.5 3.3 3.4\nEthiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.0 17.9 14.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 … …\nGabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 34.8 39.0 39.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nThe Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.2 47.6 43.2 39.1 3.6 5.8 7.1 5.3 5.0 5.0\nGhana4 26.3 39.3 38.1 43.2 41.5 41.9 3.0 3.7 4.0 1.2 1.4 2.1\nGuinea 23.2 27.2 25.2 21.5 21.0 21.8 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2\nGuinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.5 39.4 34.6 32.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nKenya 22.8 30.6 31.1 31.2 33.6 34.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.7\nLesotho 35.3 46.6 41.1 41.4 45.8 44.7 4.8 4.1 4.9 3.8 3.9 4.0\nLiberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 35.3 35.4 36.5 2.1 2.2 3.9 3.1 3.1 3.1\nMadagascar 23.5 35.9 33.2 33.7 36.3 37.0 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.0 3.9\nMalawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 31.5 27.2 32.1 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.3 3.3\nMali1 22.8 31.5 27.1 26.6 24.6 23.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nMauritius 13.3 20.2 23.3 19.4 19.7 17.6 8.4 14.4 12.8 11.8 9.2 8.8\nMozambique 63.8 90.7 83.3 71.0 64.9 66.6 3.5 4.7 2.6 2.8 1.9 1.9\nNamibia 12.2 18.8 14.5 16.7 17.2 16.4 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.0\nNiger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 32.5 29.7 29.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nNigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 11.2 13.3 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.5 5.8 5.7\nRwanda 28.0 54.8 53.5 46.8 52.1 62.3 3.9 5.3 4.6 3.7 3.6 4.3\nSão Tomé & Príncipe 84.3 65.1 59.5 59.2 51.0 47.9 3.7 4.4 3.6 2.5 2.0 2.5\nSenegal1 32.9 48.9 45.9 47.0 43.6 39.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nSeychelles 34.4 35.4 38.3 29.4 30.6 33.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5\nSierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 48.9 56.2 53.4 3.2 4.6 5.6 4.2 3.6 3.3\nSouth Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 18.8 21.0 21.0 5.8 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.6\nSouth Sudan 50.0 50.6 50.3 40.6 61.1 51.3 1.7 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9\nTanzania 25.9 28.4 28.8 27.3 26.4 26.9 4.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.1\nTogo1 13.3 29.0 25.7 26.1 25.4 26.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...\nUganda 16.6 29.4 27.9 26.0 25.8 26.2 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 3.1 3.4\nZambia5 26.4 66.6 53.9 36.8 … … 2.7 1.3 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.8\nZimbabwe6 31.7 26.5 19.8 22.5 21.8 14.9 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0\nSub-Saharan Africa 16.5 26.4 24.6 23.6 25.2 24.8 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.8\nMedian 22.8 31.6 30.8 31.1 29.7 30.8 3.6 4.3 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.3 36.3 33.7 31.4 31.2 29.5 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.0\nOil-exporting countries 11.2 20.3 19.8 18.2 21.7 22.6 6.3 6.2 5.7 6.3 5.7 5.7\nExcluding Nigeria 27.6 55.2 45.2 36.2 41.7 39.8 6.7 5.6 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.8\nOil-importing countries 20.2 29.7 27.0 26.6 26.7 25.7 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.1 3.0\nExcluding South Africa 23.5 32.6 31.1 30.1 28.9 27.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.5\nMiddle-income countries 14.6 25.0 23.0 22.5 25.3 25.5 5.8 5.8 5.3 5.3 4.8 4.7\nExcluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.4 41.5 37.5 35.3 37.2 36.1 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2\nLow-income countries 24.5 30.6 29.2 26.9 25.0 23.4 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.9\nExcluding low-income countries in fragile and\nconflict-affected situations 22.4 31.9 30.9 29.2 28.8 30.0 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.5\nCountries in fragile and conflict-affected\nsituations 11.1 17.4 17.6 16.8 17.7 17.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.6 3.4\nCFA franc zone 21.0 33.5 30.7 32.4 31.9 30.7 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.1\nCEMAC 20.8 32.6 27.9 27.8 27.9 26.8 4.2 3.3 3.0 4.1 4.6 4.8\nWAEMU 21.4 34.0 32.3 35.1 34.0 32.7 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.1 3.9 3.8\nCOMESA (SSA members) 22.0 29.7 28.6 26.0 24.7 22.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.3\nEAC-5 22.7 30.7 30.7 29.7 30.7 31.9 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.8\nECOWAS 9.9 18.6 19.2 19.7 22.1 23.2 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.0 4.0\nSACU 14.9 22.8 18.2 18.4 20.4 20.4 5.9 6.2 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.7\nSADC 20.4 32.1 26.8 25.0 26.9 25.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.3\nSee sources on page 16.\nOCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND", "source": "imf", "stratum": "imf", "fetch_date": "", "url": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2023/October/English/text.ashx"}