The language barrier and Puerto Rican identity  Puerto Rico should not become an American state because linguistic and cultural differences continue to divide the other 50 states and Puerto Rico. This would mean that Puerto Rico would either fit incongruously into the union, or it would lose its distinct cultural identity. Historically the US administrations of Puerto Rico have pursued 'Americanization' campaigns there, focusing especially around imposing the use of the English language and casting aside 'old values'. This policy was deeply resented and strongly resisted by most Puerto Ricans, and it failed. Thus, after 91 years of intimate association, Puerto Rico remains a separate cultural nationality. [1] [2]  Furthermore in terms of national identity, Puerto Rico joining the US would result in it losing the semi-independent (or at least distinct) identity which it currently has in the eyes of much of the world. To name but two examples, Puerto would no longer have its own representative in the Miss Universe Pageant (which Puerto Rico has actually won on three occasions) and they would not be recognized as an individual nation in the Olympic games, as it currently is. These international representations would be curbed under statehood, as Puerto Rico would be required to participate in the same manner as the other 50 states, and to compete to represent the United States collectively, and not Puerto Rico individually, in these international events. [3]  Changing language policies would also undermine Puerto Rican culture: the territories that became Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma (who all had large and historically rooted non-English-speaking populations) were all admitted to the union by congressional enabling acts that required that “schools shall always be conducted in English” in order to ensure assimilation. [4] This would likely also be the case with Puerto Rico, and could undermine the access of future generations of Puerto Ricans to their Hispanic heritage and culture, subsuming it within the overpowering tide of English-speaking American culture. Thus the Puerto Rican people are highly independent and have immense pride in their district and rich Latin culture and Spanish language, and they should not be deprived of that culture, which statehood would arguably contribute towards.  [1] NoPuertoRicoStatehood. “Puerto Rico Statehood”. 29 May 2011.  [2] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010.  [3] Essortment. “Puerto Rican Statehood, the An overview of the pros and cons”. Essortment.com.  [4] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010.


Much of this argumentation assumes that the Puerto Rican economy will not expand with statehood, which there are many good reasons to believe would occur. Look at what happened to the last two states admitted to the Union, Hawaii and Alaska. Both economies grew substantially after being admitted to the Union and became net contributors to the U.S. Treasury. Puerto Rico would receive equal treatment in both taxes and benefits, the same as the other states. Benefits to the island under the current system are limited by Congress. Those limitations would be removed. At the same time, payments of federal taxes would be phased in, as provided by the enabling legislation. It has been estimated Puerto Rico as a state will contribute nearly $2 billion to the U.S. Treasury each year. [1] How is that possible? Through economic growth. With economic growth there are more jobs, fewer unemployed, and less of a public assistance burden.  [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004.


It does not matter if think tanks are used in this way, so long as the conclusions that are reached by the think tanks are true. If there is objective value in an idea it should be communicated as well as possible. If this cannot be done with conventional marketing, it is good for it to be possible through a think tank. If the think tank’s idea and conclusion is wrong, the fact that it is presented objectively makes it no less falsifiable. Think tanks do not exist in a vacuum, and for every false idea presented as positive there will be another think tank to scrutinise it. In either case, the consumer is given useful information in an accessible way that can still be questioned.


Think tanks’ power of objectivity is the best form of marketing for biased views  Think tanks are considered more credible than corporate marketing. [1] In the case of corporate marketing the recipient is aware that he is being sold a product. In the case of think tanks, the recipient believes he is being given unbiased information. Therefore, it is tempting for corporations to finance think tanks and encourage them to reach the conclusions that they otherwise would promote through marketing. This way, think tanks can be powerful tools for promoting a biased agenda: if done successfully the same message is communicated but in the form of credible information rather than manipulative marketing. In fact, it is common practice for journalists to quote think tanks without labelling their political bias. [2] And they most certainly don’t say if there is funding from a particular interest for example with the supposedly free market Institute of Public Affairs in Australia that somehow ends up arguing for government investment and intervention in Northern Australia – a position suspiciously close to several big mining companies. [3] This violates people’s freedom to make an informed decision, and can give biased views disproportionate and undue influence. By forcing them to disclose, any corruption or bias will become obvious to all.  [1] Mayer, Jane. “Covert Operations”, A Reporter at Large, The New Yorker. 30 August 2010   [2] Dolny, Michael. “What’s in a Label?”, Extra!, FAIR. 1 May 1998   [3] MediaWatch, “Disclosing the funding of think tanks”, ABC News, 27 May 2013,


It is already in the interest of think tanks to be transparent. Think tanks exist in societies that depend on open communication and the free flow of ideas. Numerous organisations exist to criticise and unmask non-transparent think tanks: [1] this is sufficient incentive for them to reveal their funding. There may be exceptions in which the benefits of non-disclosure overrule the disadvantages in terms of trust, but these are rare, and it does not follow that it will be abused.  [1] Who Funds You, Political Innovation,


Think tanks may become smoke screens for criminal groups  In the status quo, the ability of think tanks to be non-transparent potentially provides a framework for criminal groups, or in extreme cases organisations, to handle large amounts of money without revealing where their money comes from or goes. We are allowing extremist groups to be exempt from answering to the government or shareholders in their management of money or information. In the US and Canada, think tanks are also exempt from tax. [1] By this mechanism, false think tanks can be used, for example, to channel money from openly extremist groups that could otherwise not access those parts of the world.  [1] 26 USC § 501 - Exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc., Legal Information Institute


People have a right to know where their information comes from  Democracies rely on transparency. Our commitment to transparency means surrendering part of our autonomy for the collective. This does not mean that our autonomy does not still belong to us; the institutions that affect our lives are under a constant obligation to justify their decisions and existence in relation to us. I do not have a right to know everything about the local football club (if I don’t play football and they are not a public company their decisions don’t affect me). Think tanks, however, are highly influential, and directly affect the society in which we live: some have, for example, lobbied successfully against action to prevent global warming. [1] Therefore they are to be considered a power in society, and the principle of transparency must be extended to them.  [1] Monbiot, George. “The educational charities that do PR for the rightwing ultra-rich”, Comment is Free, The Guardian. 18 February 2013,


Think tanks don’t have any legislative power. At the end of the day, what they do is merely make suggestions. If they were active lobbyists they would lose their privileged legal position as an academic organisation. [1] Even if there may be other benefits of them being transparent, the legal concept of transparency cannot be extended to them. That would open the door to forcing other independent private institutions to reveal details of their organisation. Furthermore, think tanks rarely claim to be completely impartial. They usually have an agenda and are aligned with a political party. This concession in terms of impartiality merits equal concessions in terms of demanded transparency. At the end of the day it is their work that influences the agenda and that same work shows where their sympathies lie.  [1] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524.


There is no necessity to disclose think tank funding publically in order to circumvent this issue. As long as there are public institutions that scrutinise think tanks and are also bound to secrecy unless there are anomalies, the risk of terrorism can be successfully regulated. Being a think tank does not prevent an organisation from having to be transparent to government about their finances. It is unnecessary to expose think tanks that do not act illicitly to the general public.


Think tanks can choose transparency in the status quo anyway (as shown by nef): this benefit is relatively small. On the other hand, it harms the many other think tanks that need to protect the information of who funds them if, for instance, the funders do not wish to disclose it. It is a loss of freedom for the majority, not a gain.


The status quo promotes non-transparency  Non-disclosure can be perceived as objectivity. It is easier for the public to criticise a think tank that is openly associated with a particular funder. That kind of prejudice is stronger than the more general the prejudice against non-disclosure. A person might distrust a non-transparent think tank, but dislike a think tank that is funded by an organisation they are already prejudiced towards. [1] In any comparison between two such organisations the distrusted organisation will have greater impact than the disliked organisation. [2] This gives non-transparent think tanks an advantage over transparent and honest ones. Billionaires are then able to buy influence by secretly funding organisations such as the Global Warming Policy Foundation or the Institute of Economic Affairs that is then listened to, by the media and therefore the public, when their own views would simply be dismissed due to the personal motivations of the backers. [3] By forcing all think tanks to reveal their funding, we level the playing field.  [1] Bentley, Guy. “The state funding swindle: how left wing think-tanks are pulling taxpayer-funded wool over our eyes”, Commentary, The Commentator. 20 September 2012,   [2] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524.   [3] Monbiot, George. “The educational charities that do PR for the rightwing ultra-rich”, Comment is Free, The Guardian. 18 February 2013


Legally requiring disclosure from all benefits think tanks  Even think tanks benefit from the introduction of this policy. The status quo leaves disclosure as a strategic device: think tanks are unwilling to disclose more than their competition for fear of being unfavourably portrayed. Such negative competition, i.e. competition in factors that do not improve the products of the market, makes them unable to make rational decisions about their funding if, for instance, potential funders want to contribute only on the condition that this funding be made public. As a consequence, the advent of organisations who call for transparency has been praised by prominent think tanks like the New Economics Foundation. [1] By depriving everybody of the strategic tool of revealing none or only a part of their funding, think tanks cannot be pressured into hiding or providing certain information about their funders, and they can thus act more independently.  [1] Read, Sam. “Think tank funding matters: it’s central to democracy”, the nef blog, 22 June 2012,


On the other hand, by disclosing funders more corporations and individuals will have an incentive to fund think tanks. They will be assured that they will be publically recognised for it, and thus be rewarded when the think tanks they support produce good ideas.


Such a system, in which one allows think tanks to accept substantial anonymous donations, has immense downsides. It is simply too easy for a think tank to claim all, or most, of its funding is anonymous to them when it is questioned, while in fact they have been having informal strategic talks with potential funders days prior to, during, or after the donation. We cannot adopt a policy that is so easy too abuse, and since all think tanks must know who their funders are, we are not restricting their independence any further by asking them to make it public.


Overregulating think tanks sets a dangerous precedent  The public scrutiny on think tank funders may backlash on perfectly innocent investors. Investors may be accused of corruption if think tanks that share their values independently reach favourable conclusions. Alternatively, minor investors may become guilty by association, for instance, if notorious companies or political parties have been seen supporting the same think tanks – even if this is done for completely different reasons. The motivations of think tanks cannot be made synonymous with their funders, but these funders should also not be made synonymous with each other. Thus for example Policy exchange is both seen as a think tank for UK conservative modernisers – the progressive wing of the party while also having been labelled as a “neo-con attack dog”. [1]  [1] Helm, Toby, and Hope, Christopher, “The top twelve think tanks in Britain”, The Telegraph, 24 January 2008,


Private investors have a right to privacy  The public scrutiny on think tank funders may backlash on perfectly innocent investors. Investors may be accused of corruption if think tanks that share their values independently reach favourable conclusions. Alternatively, minor investors may become guilty by association, for instance, if notorious companies or political parties have been seen supporting the same think tanks – even if this is done for completely different reasons. The motivations of think tanks cannot be made synonymous with their funders, but these funders should also not be made synonymous with each other. Thus for example Policy exchange is both seen as a think tank for UK conservative modernisers – the progressive wing of the party while also having been labelled as a “neo-con attack dog”. [1]  [1] Helm, Toby, and Hope, Christopher, “The top twelve think tanks in Britain”, The Telegraph, 24 January 2008,


Think tanks should be assessed by the value of their ideas, not by who funds them  One can conceive of an infinite amount of cases in which results of a think tank’s research are completely independent of their funders. Their opposition, however, will be likely to signal corruption, when in fact there may be no relation between a funder and certain results. Even if they are associated by sharing a perspective or an aim, this is not a sign of corruption or bias, and it should not enter into the value of a think tank. There has been one study of charity donations (as think tanks are) that concludes that anonymous donations are “a costly signal of a charity’s quality by an informed donor”. [1]  [1] Peacey, Mike W., “Masked Heroes: endogenous anonymity in charitable giving”, Centre for Market and Public Organisation Bristol Institute of Public Affairs, May 2013, p.27


Being subject to scrutiny discourages investors from supporting good projects  Think tanks depend largely on voluntary funding for their projects, [1] so they must be careful when risking potential investments. Investors are likely to be put off from funding think tanks with good aims if this funding will be scrutinised and their interests questioned. [2] They are likely not to wish to risk being associated with seemingly biased results: a system by which funders can support ideas in themselves, perhaps even anonymously for the think tanks themselves, is the one in which think tanks best flourish and best produce results. Those that produce the best and most interesting ideas will be those who succeed in obtaining funding.  [1] Think Tank Funding, On Think Tanks,  accessed 11 June 2013  [2] Butcher, Jonathan, “Does it Matter Who Funds You?” One World Trust, 12 July 2012,


This is not an inherent flaw in the system. In the status quo, large investors can still publically advertise the fact that they are funding a project, and this too can have repercussions and bring negative associations for other investors. It is a risk anyone makes when investing in a given idea. The right to privacy of investors in political campaigns was discarded once evidence of potential abuses and political arrangements surfaced. Similarly, this right cannot apply to think tank funders. [1]  [1] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524.


Think tanks should be able to choose not to know who funds them  The information think tanks provide can be extremely useful to society. Therefore we should be hesitant to restrict their key strength, which is their independence. There may be scenarios in which think tanks, in need of funding for a purely positive project, ask for donations from anyone who believes in their values. Wanting to avoid any negative associations or any accusations of bias, they choose not to find out who their funders are, and thus they cannot disclose that information. For think tanks who claim independence by only asking for anonymous donors, this is no longer an option when they are forced to disclose. The attempt to create more objectivity actually removes one of the ways of being perfectly impartial.


People are capable of assessing a biased idea after discovering its bias, while it is dangerous to present potentially biased ideas as genuine, for this limits discussion. This is especially so in the status quo, where the suspicions of who may be funding think tanks remain when they choose not to disclose their funders. A blanket obligation of all think tanks to reveal their funding allows for open discourse and thus more space to discuss the ideas themselves.


Suggesting that feminising African politics will stop poverty and provide empowerment returns to the ideas we attach to women. Women are often associated with domesticity, care, and reproductivity. Who’s to say that this is what women are or what they stand for? Basing quota systems on what women are believed to do is dangerous – in reality behaviour cannot be predicted, as women remain diverse and heterogeneous. A study has shown that there is no relationship between the number of women cabinet members and the sex of the executive implying that women don’t really help other women in politics (Jalalzai, p.196).  Additionally who is to say that by having women in political roles they will instantly be able to implement and act on their desired policies? How resources and power are distributed within the political system is key. Resources may remain controlled by men.


Feminising the state: women helping women  Including women in politics helps enable poverty to be tackled. Poverty is a women’s issue; women are more likely to live in poverty than men, and women are needed in politics to change this. Women understand each other, and what they need.  Furthermore, although data varies, evidence shows gender inequalities remain intertwined to poverty and impoverishment [1] [2] . Women in positions of power and leadership can put the issues women face on the agenda and apply action. There is clearly a need to get women into politics to counter the current ‘boys club’ that exists in most countries where men help each other into positions of power squeezing out women and other methods of doing things.  [1] See further readings: Gender Inequality Index, 2014.  [2] See further readings: Chant, 2003.


Women become integrated into a man’s world. But the territory may not be changed. First, women may become like men in response to the jobs they take up and how one is expected to act in the given role. When we consider what conditions women are introduced, potentially with limited training in public speaking, confidence or acceptance, how will they fare? Their best way forward is to get help from the men already in parliament.  Secondly, how do women experience work and are they treated at work? Quotas introduce more women, however, they may experience gender-based harassment and unfair treatment at work. In the case of Kenya, a female politician was publicly slapped [1] . Who will ensure their rights are protected and they are treated equally in a political world?  Finally, is power redistributed? Frequent protests in Senegal show that despite quota systems being implemented women do not end up with power despite being in parliament. [2] Women are legally enrolled into local and national parties but do their seats ensure they can lead political parties? Does being a local candidate ensure the potential for national progression?  [1] African Spotlight, 2013.  [2] Kabwila, 2012.


Democracy must be representative  Quotas are building representative democracies. Through the quota system women are given a voice in society. Quotas mean women are represented in politics. Women are half of the electorate so should be around half of the legislature. Although not there yet the rising numbers symbolise positive change. In 2012, on average, 1/5 of MPs in sub-Saharan Africa were women (The Economist, 2013). In South Africa and Rwanda the number is far above this. Women make up 42% of parliament seats in South Africa, and 64% in Rwanda (ibid.). At present, in Africa we have 2 female presidents (Liberia; Malawi); and 1 prime minister (Aminata Toure, Senegal). Notably Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa all have some form of quota system (quotaProject, 2014).


Having more women does not mean a representative democracy is built as it is not just gender balance that needs to be considered but ethnicity, language groups etc. as well.  Additionally, the bias quota system will cause future problems. In the future men will need to be targeted and receive help. For example in Rwanda the focus on including women has pushed men out of politics. Implementing quotas favours the creation of a certain ‘representative democracy’. The democracy becomes ‘represented’ by what we think democracy should look like.


When we don’t just consider battle deaths the extent to which violence is declining is questionable [1] . Furthermore, we cannot suggest women in politics will limit war, conflict, or violence, as anomalies are found – such as Margret Thatcher’s use of violence in closing down industries across the UK and willingness to engage in the Falklands conflict. Furthermore the idea returns to a preconceived image and ideal women. The women are represented as the caregiver, submerged within traditional constructions of women as nurturing and empathetic.  [1] See further readings: WDR, 2011.


Changing the male territory  African politics remains masculinised and strongly male dominated. Implementing quotas shows a commitment to change gender inequalities by increasing women’s political participation (Bachelet, 2013). More women mean gender imbalances can be changed, women empowered, and the territorial boundaries defining what men and women do will become blurred.  Additionally women in African politics can change the ‘boys club’ of bad governance in Africa. Bad governance can be tackled as the prominence of males controlling decisions will be changed, and internal political relations altered. The least corrupt countries on the continent; Rwanda and Botswana both have some form of quota system(quotaproject, 2014, Transparency International, 2013)


A safer world  International relations debates, and conflict theories, suggest more women in politics makes for a safer world. In Pinker’s (2011) book the feminisation of politics is identified as a key factor to explain the decline in conflict and violence – battle deaths have declined from 20 per 100,000 people to only 1 or 2 today. Women are more inclined to call for peace resolution and being ‘maternal beings’ reflect nurturing behaviours.


It remains difficult to compare the experiences of women in Scandinavia and Africa. The contexts – history, ideas, and social geographies – are completely different. While Scandinavia may well not need quotas to change perceptions in Africa it may be the best way to do so. Women in Africa need a voice, and therefore politics provides a platform for their empowerment both vocally and in their use of public space. Quotas are a fast-track. It’s not forcing change but guiding and enabling it.


The women’s quota is a vital start to tackle underlying inequalities. Quotas of multiple identities such as race, class, age, sexuality, class and ethnicity will need to be included following the implementation of a women’s quota.


The woman’s ‘political job’  Quotas mean more women are able to enter the political world; however, how is it decided what political jobs and positions they can utilise? The inclusion of women into politics in Africa has mainly been in certain departments i.e. gender and health. More powerful women are needed in positions that remain masculinised – such as defence and security. Therefore the quota may introduce more women in politics, however, how active are they in deciding what area of politics? The quota may well be seen merely a means to introduce women passively into new distinct gender roles.  If women are believed to be granted positions as a result of the quotas, rather than it being a position they have earned, they may be more at risk of marginalisation at work. Having a quota provides a reason to argue that an exceptional woman has received her place no based upon merit but due to the quota. This may be used as an excuse to prevent women reaching the most important positions.


Assuming causality: Africa Vs Scandinavia  Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark – have high female participation rates in parliament. However, Rwanda is one African nation that has even greater female parliamentary representation. In Scandinavia the quota has been introduced but is only implemented by some parties. Nevertheless there is little difference between parties in Denmark, for example, that utilise the quota and those that do not. This shows that voluntary quotas can work but also that they are not really necessary. This is because the position of women and capability to engage in politics was tackled first. The key thing is the perception of women; if they are perceived equally and voted for on their own merits women will win as often as men. This shows, crucially, political participation by women should not be dependent on quotas. We should not rely on quotas for gender equality.  Women face multiple barriers to political participation; deeper action is required to adjust imbalances rather than simple quotas. Having quotas simply encourages a perception that gender matters in politics when the desired outcome is the opposite; a belief by the electorate that politics is genderless with both as able to perform the role. In Senegal for example, the quota is being criticised as challenging traditional culture and patriarchal society norms it is however those norms that need to be changed not just the number of women in politics [1] .  [1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2012.


Are the women representative of all women?  How can it be assured the women entering African politics are representative of the women in that African nation? Further, will the leader implement politically popular ideas or required policies?  If we are introducing quotas for women in politics we need to think about what women are entering. The concern with race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and class is fundamental as if we accept the principle that an unrepresented group should get a quota of parliamentarians this should not just apply to women. We need to think about who the women are, what they represent, and who. Even for women simple quotas do not ensure effective representation of what all women want, or ensure the means for change. Women are heterogeneous, as are their challenges in life.


Working within gender departments does not mean a woman will be limited in integrating with departments of security. Politics is integrated, and interconnected, therefore learning how to run one political department shows how to run another. Having a woman represent a department shows them in a position of power regardless of the department. We should not believe that the department of health is somehow less important than Defense.


The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway. [1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics. [2]  [1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York.   [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008.


The 'Middle Way' has international support  The USA, the most powerful nation in the world, has been vocal in its support for the 'Middle Way' strategy. Concurrently, the US has not given any indication that it would support complete Tibetan independence – nor is it likely to. America is unlikely to jeopardise trade relations with China over the Tibetan issue by giving political legitimacy to those advocating complete independence. [1]  The European Parliament and the Scottish Parliament have also both passed motions advocating for the 'Middle Way' as a solution in Tibet. [2] [3] Such international support for the 'Middle Way' should be compared to the fact that no country in the world has ever recognised Tibetan independence. [4]  Only the involvement of international actors and inter-governmental organisations can guarantee that Tibet and China will be able to attain a peaceful and equitable equilibrium with each other. International support means that the international community would accept any change when it occurs and gives China a further incentive to negotiate for some form of the ‘Middle Way’ as it would positively benefit its international relations.  [1] Valdes, Manuel. “Dalai Lama to begin 6-day U.S. visit in Seattle to discuss compassion amid turmoil in Tibet”. Associated Press. 10 April 2008.   [2] TibetCustom. “European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet”. TibetCustom. 26 March 2010.   [3] Australia Tibet Council. “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue Presented to Scottish Parliament”. Australia Tibet Council. 2011.   [4] The Economist. “Britain's suzerain remedy”. The Economist. 6 November 2008.


China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted.


The 'Middle Way' is the most realistic path for Tibet and China  The Dalai Lama believes complete independence is not a viable solution for the Tibet crisis. Rather, his advocacy is aimed at creating common understanding between the Chinese and the Tibetans. He points to the model of the European Union as an example of a modern supranational political system in which different ethnicities and nationalities can cooperate to achieve an agreed ideal of prosperity.  “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].” [1]  The 'Middle Way' is the most practical and realistic path for Tibet and China, as it bridges the needs of the Tibetan people with and interests of China.  Specifically, the "Middle Way" offers a mutually beneficial course of action, as it avoids the concerns that China has regarding national unity and separation and at the same time it enables the Tibetan people to achieve de-facto equivalent of a right to self-determination.  Acceptance of the 'Middle Way' would work as a signal demonstrating the increasing openness and accountability of Chinese political culture. As it is beneficial for both parties, it can be considered as a practical political course with a great potential to alleviate an ever growing strained situation. [2]  China is more likely to negotiate with Tibetan activists and leaders if their demands are limited to greater political autonomy. Conversely, China is unlikely to give up control of Tibet, as doing so would constitute a grievous blow to the territorial integrity of China itself.  The 'Middle Way' provides the current generation of Chinese leaders with an opportunity to accord greater autonomy to Tibet, without risking their domestic political capital or jeopardising China’s international standing.  A key aspect of the 'Middle Way' is an undertaking by Tibetan leaders not to push for further independence if greater autonomy is granted.  The 'Middle Way' also has the advantage of being in keeping with Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, mirroring the religion’s own ‘middle way’ tradition. The Buddhist 'Middle Way' is the descriptive term that Siddhartha Gautama (the Supreme Buddha) used to describe the character of the path he discovered that led to liberation. It was coined in the very first teaching that he delivered after his enlightenment. In this sutta- known in English as The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dharma- the Buddha describes the middle way as a path of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. [3]  The Dalai Lama's “Middle Way” in Tibet is designed, per its name, around these Buddhist principles, and so it has the advantage of being in keeping with the religious beliefs of most of Tibet's population. This adds to its practicality as it would offer a political strategy consistent with the cultural norms of most Tibetans. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way's is the most practical and realistic path toward rapprochement between Tibet and China.  [1] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008.  .  [2] Gyaltsen, Kelsang. “The Middle-Way approach”. Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1997.   [3] Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya, 56:11  .


The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution. [1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo.  The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution. [2] If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’.  [1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March 2010. http :// www . eastasiaforum . org /2010/03/08/ the - dalai - lamas - middle - way - approach - and - the - need - for - re - adjustment /  [2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007.


The 'Middle Way' respects China's right to territorial integrity  The Chinese government has a right to protect the unity of China against Tibetan separatism. US President Abraham Lincoln, in justifying efforts to maintain the union in the face of an imminent civil war, said in 1858, “A house divided cannot stand”. [1] Unity was argued to be essential to the integrity and future of the union if the United States as a much more decentralized federal union cannot sanction such a division then a much more centralized China cannot. China can put forth the same rationale as Lincoln for forcing Tibet to remain part of China, for example when it notes argues that the concept of an independent Tibet has historically been used by what it calls ‘foreign imperialists’ to interfere in China internally and split it up so that it can more easily be controlled from abroad. As an example of this, the CIA’s support for Tibetan separatists during the Cold War is cited. [2] [3]  Mongolia provides a striking precedent for for Chinese worries about Tibetan independence, as it gained independence through Soviet backing and subsequently came under effective control of the USSR. [4] If Tibet were to achieve independence, both China and Tibet would be weaker, with less geopolitical strength and with greater tensions and opportunities for conflict. This is especially true in light of the history of foreign attempts to interfere with China internally, as noted above. The Dalai Lama made a similar argument himself when he stated: “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].” [5] In 2008 the Foreign Minister of Cyprus similarly argued that the ‘One China’ policy, including Tibet, was necessary to safeguard China’s territorial integrity. [6] The government of Fiji has offered similar support. [7] The 'Middle Way' accounts for this need of China's whilst also offering greater autonomy to the Tibetan people, thus respecting the rights of both parties.  [1] Abraham Lincoln Online. “House Divided Speech”. Abraham Lincoln Online.   [2] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http :// news . xinhuanet . com / zhengfu /2002-11/15/ content _630888. htm  [3] Wonacott, Peter. " Revolt of the Monks : How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester ; A Role for Dalai Lama ' s Brother " . Wall Street Journal . 30 August 2008. http :// online . wsj . com / article / SB 122005956740185361. html ? mod = googlenews _ wsj  [4] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http :// news . xinhuanet . com / zhengfu /2002-11/15/ content _630888. htm  [5] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008.   [6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. “Cyprus supports the principle of a ‘single’ China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 20 March 2008/ . http :// www . mfa . gov . cy / mfa / mfa 2006. nsf / All /5 B 640 E 57 BE 973 A 1 FC 22574120050 A 086? OpenDocument  [7] Fijilive. “Fiji backs China’s action in Tibet”. Fijilive. 24 March 2008. http :// www . fijilive . com / news _ new / index . php / news / show _ news /3075


China will simply never accept independence for Tibet, and so it is not a reasonable alternative to hold up against the 'Middle Way'. Rather, whatever gains can be made by adopting the 'Middle Way' should be embraced, as the alternative is not independence but rather unchanged Chinese dominance and control.


The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach. [1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'. [2]  [1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http :// sites . google . com / site / tibetanpoliticalreview / project - updates / investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway  [2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008.


The Dalai Lama is no longer relevant to Tibet's future  The Dalai Lama's influence and significance in the debate over Tibet’s future has been fading; he has resigned from all ‘formal authority’ and handed over his political role [1] , and his support for the 'Middle Way' strategy- over attempts to secure full independence- may well have reduced his influence. During the 2008 riots and protests in Lhasa in favour of Tibetan independence, a feeling of incongruity between the Dalai Lama and the desires of the Tibetan people was vocalized. A Tibetan teacher at the protests stated “We are demanding a peace dialogue between His Holiness and the Chinese. But at the moment, Dalai Lama is out of the picture. It's a Tibetan people's movement.” [2] Tibet appears to have moved beyond the 'Middle Way', but the Dalai Lama has not. For a new generation of Tibetans the Middle Way is considered to be an ineffective negotiation strategy, one that will not allow them to obtain the rights and political equality that they seek.  Many activists operating within Tibet itself believe that violent confrontations comparable to the Palestinian intifada will be more effective in extracting concessions from the Chinese than the non-violent protests advocated by the Dalai Lama. [3]  The Dalai Lama himself has recognized that the 'Middle Way' may become a redundant aspect of the Tibet debate. In 2003, he told a French reporter: “If no results can be achieved in two or three years of negotiations, I would find it hard to explain to the young that the 'middle way' is more effective than seeking independence... If I fail, these young people would raise torches and cry for independence”. [4]  Events on the ground are simply the Dalai Lama's own prediction coming true, as he become less relevant and less in touch. The Chinese government has also tried to discredit Dalai Lama. The Beijing authorities have released a documentary portraying the Dalai Lama as exploiting the Tibetan people to further his own political agenda. The documentary also emphasized the increased pace of economic development in the region. [5]  Quite simply, Tibet has moved beyond the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way', and both are increasingly irrelevant to Tibet's youth and future. The 'Middle Way' continues to be followed mostly out of a nostalgic fascination with the Dalai Lama, or out of the international community's desire for a single, moderate Tibetan voice, even if he does not represent the Tibetan people.  [1] Banyan, ‘The Dalai Lama resigns So long, farewell’, The Economist, 14 March 2011,   [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008.   [3] Sonam, Tenzing. “Until the Last Tibetan”. Tibet Writes. 26 December 2007.   [4] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007.   [5] Little, Matthew. “CCTV-4 Steps up Propaganda Against Dalai Lama”. Epoch Times. 10 April 2008.


The Chinese government is exploiting the 'Middle Way' against Tibet's interests  The Chinese government manipulates people every day, and it is clear how Beijing is manipulating the good intentions of the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way'. The Middle Path is therefore not only hopeless, but also dangerous.  Henry Kissinger once said that in politics, one never pays for goods that have already been delivered. True to form, China is using the moderate stance of Tibet’s leadership-in-exile to extort concessions while giving nothing of substance in return. For example, Beijing spread false rumours that the Dalai Lama would be invited to China to prevent demonstrations when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. The 'Middle Way' policy is sapping momentum from the Tibet movement, depriving it of focus, and obscuring its goals. People are drifting away from a movement that appears to be drifting itself; political fervour can be difficult to sustain – especially when the Tibetan government-in-exile actually asks its supporters to behave in a passive a non-confrontational fashion. [1]  By asking Beijing for an official agreement to grant autonomous status to Tibet, the Tibetan government-in-exile will be surrendering many of the rights they are now entitled to and locking the entire Tibetan people into a constricted and precarious situation from which they cannot withdraw. Chinese restrictions will remain on the practice of Tibetan religion, culture and traditions within "autonomous" Tibet, the promotion of Tibetan culture, religion and traditions abroad will either be prohibited or restricted as it concerns foreign affairs, and all foreign travel will be controlled and restricted by the Chinese. [2] Accepting the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' will forever close the door on independence but leave Tibet still victim to China's cultural repression and control, and so it should not be supported.  [1] Dondup, Ketsun Lobsang. “Independence as Tibet’s Only Option: Why the ‘Middle Path’ is a Dead End”. Phayul.com. 25 January 2007.   [2] Shakabpa, Tsoltim N. “The Case Against Autonomy for Tibet”. Tibet Writes. 2 January 2008.


Tibetans want independence, not the 'Middle Way'  The Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' is far from popular amongst the Tibetan population. Many ordinary Tibetans have criticised the Dalai Lama's conciliatory approach to China. His refusal to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games is symbolic of this conciliatory approach where the majority of the Tibetan population, particularly the young disagreed with him. "China does not deserve to host the Olympics. It's evident that they do not deserve the Olympics," said Tsewang Rigzin, the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, at Dharamshala in 2008. [1]  Tsewang Rigzin also stated “There is a growing frustration within the Tibetan community, especially in the [younger] generation... I certainly hope the Middle Way approach will be reviewed. As we can see from the protests here and all over the world, the Tibetan people remain committed to achieving independence.” [2]  The (sometimes violent) 2008 protests made it clear that many Tibetans don't support the Dalai Lama's peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-independence 'Middle Way'. The Dalai Lama even had to threaten to resign if violent protests continued. Clearly, these protests showed that the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' lacks support amongst the young of Tibet – the individuals who will comprise successive generations of political, religious and business leaders. [3]  Within Tibet, pro-independence protesters have recently had more leverage than 'Middle Way' voices. The 'Middle Way' is a nuanced approach to the Tibetan issue and, therefore, is a less potent rallying for Tibetans who have been marginalised or excluded by Chinese policies in the region. Calls for Tibetan Independence mobilise more support among grass-roots activists in other areas of the world. [4] This is valuable, and is an argument in favour of, at least, continuing to call for Tibetan Independence, not merely the 'Middle Way'; it has a greater impact.  In this situation, it makes no sense for the Dalai Lama to alienate so many of his young people, so many of the most dedicated to the Tibetan cause, by preaching his 'Middle Way' when he should be calling for what his people truly want and need -Tibetan independence.  [1] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008.   [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008.   [3] The Economist. “Trashing the Beijing Road”. The Economist. 19 March 2008.   [4] The Economist. “A flaming row”. 9 Arpil 2008.


The Dalai Lama is the only solution for Tibet. His political advocacy as a leader and religious figure is imperative for the problem of Tibet. His commitment for non-violence and cohabitation and cooperation serves the peaceful interests of Tibet while accommodating for moderate changes. His 'Middle Way' platform is the bridge between China Tibet and world-wide international consensus on the Tibetans' right to self-determination. If resistance to China becomes more violent, as it did in 2008, then the Dalai Lama’s third way will become much more relevant as a solution that both sides can potentially sign up to. It may become the only way forward towards a compromise.  Irrespective of some discontent, the Dalai Lama still enjoys the loyalty and respect of most Tibetans. [1] During the 2008 protests in Tibet, the protesters regularly chanted the Dalai Lama's name, displayed his picture and recited a "long life" prayer for him. [2] He remains the undisputed moral leader of Tibetan people, and as such his 'Middle Way' path still has weight.  [1] The Economist. “A colonial uprising”. The Economist. 19 March 2008.   [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008.


Status in the world is not based upon having one extremely powerful weapon; there are much more important factors such as a country’s economy and use of diplomacy. Britain would still be a major financial centre, a major economy, a member of the UNSC (which is not based on nuclear weapons) as well as being one of the biggest contributors to peace and security in the world through peacekeeping and aid.  ‘Status’ is one of the popular justifications for acquiring nuclear weapons. However while countries like North Korea that develop nuclear weapons may acquire deterrence they don’t gain any more diplomatic clout. Britain giving up its deterrent or combining it into a European deterrent would help to undermine this perception by showing that nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain a powerful role in the world.


Trident allows the UK to maintain its global status  Currently the UK is recognised as a nuclear power by the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty along with the USA, China, France and Russia. All of whom are either modernising or maintaining their current nuclear arsenals. This means to not replace Trident would mean that we'd suffer a severe loss of status in relation to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. This would also raise questions of whether the UK even deserves its place as a member there as it would show the UK’s declining global role and military power. Other countries that can be considered "more representative" such as India (the world's largest democracy) now would be an obvious replacement at the top table. [1]  Churchill said that the H bomb that it was "our badge to the Royal Enclosure [at Ascot]" [2] and today Trident remains one of our master keys to the Britain’s status at organisations such as the United Nations Security Council. There are already plenty of reasons why other countries might be more deserving of a security council place than the UK; we don’t need to add another.  [1] James Wirtz in "Contemporary Security Studies" Oxford University Press, First Edition 2007, Chapter 15, p273  [2] Adamson, Samuel H., ‘Supreme Effort: A lesson in British decline’, BC Journal, Vol. 16, 2010.


We already rely on the USA for our Trident missile systems so our ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ is already a fiction. The USA can at the moment easily pull the rug out from underneath us. While the UK maintains command and control over its weapons the United States is needed to keep the weapons operational. This means we are reliant on the United States one way or the other anyway.


Deterrence is still necessary.  The Trident Weapons System while it may be a "horrific part of our system" is still necessary even in today’s post-Cold War world. Firstly through deterrence it protects us from being blackmailed by any other states, and in particular so called "rogue states" like North Korea and potentially in the future Iran who could threaten our vital interests – such as closing the straits of Hormuz. [1]  Moreover having a second strike capability, the ability for nuclear weapons to survive a nuclear assault by an opponent so allowing retaliation, is also still necessary. [2] It may currently seem unlikely that any of the major nuclear armed states will threaten the United Kingdom however we do not know what may happen in the future and by the time a threat appears it would be too late to build a new nuclear second strike capability.  [1] The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’, Ministry of Defence, December 2006.  [2] James Wirtz in "Contemporary Security Studies" Oxford University Press, First Edition 2007, Chapter 15, p276


A deterrent is useless if no one thinks it will ever be used. The only conceivable use of Britain’s nuclear deterrent would be in the event of a nuclear attack on the UK, and if that has happened then there is little point in firing the missiles as there will be nothing left to save. Any blackmail today is likely to be much smaller, no state is going to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in order to get their way on trade. The only real possibility of nuclear blackmail is by terrorists who could not be deterred by a nuclear armament.


Can we rely on US nuclear umbrella?  The UK nuclear weapons programme was first created in late 1945 a time when people were concerned about the US commitment to Europe which was uncertain as the rise of the Iron Curtain had not been yet apparent. Currently if we didn't replace trident and disarmed more likely than not we would fall under the American strategic nuclear umbrella which would be fair enough in the short term and medium term as the relationship is currently strong despite certain cobblestones. A similar thing also applies with the French  But can we really rely on the Americans to keep that umbrella extended over the long term when their interests and emphasis may shift, regardless of cultural or ideological links? Relying on someone else’s deterrent will always be risky as the US or France would not want to put themselves at risk of being attacked in order to deter an attack on us. [1] An independent deterrence arsenal is necessary to maintain deterrence.  [1] The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’, Ministry of Defence, December 2006, p.18.


That Britain is not currently threatened with nuclear Armageddon as it was during the cold war does not mean that such a threat could never again occur. Britain must remain prepared for any eventuality which has to include the unthinkable such as the United States no longer being an ally.  The world is not yet a safe place there are many unstable states, such as North Korea, developing nuclear weapons capabalities. Beyond these dangers it is easily conceivable that the world will once again face tensions similar to those of the cold war. Given the length of time it would take to rearm should such tensions occur Britain would be safer to keep its nuclear armament.


A state of the art nuclear weapons system is always going to be costly and no one wants to cut corners for the risks that could create. Yet it is money well spent when compared to the damage which would be caused if Britain was attacked due to not having a nuclear deterrent.


The UK should encourage others to reduce their own stocks of nuclear weapons.  Britain as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty the United Kingdom is obliged to pursue “nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” [1] While complete disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons is a long way off the United Kingdom could make a good start by getting rid of its own weapons. A Nuclear Weapons state giving up its weapons after sixty years would show that nations can manage without nuclear weapons and so act as an encouragement to others to do the same.  [1] ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970, Article VI.


Trident is not an independent weapons system  Britain tries to maintain that it has an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ but this is just a fiction. Britain has not had an independent nuclear deterrent for fifty years. The United Kingdom has used American missiles since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963 first with the United States supplying Polaris missiles and then Trident missiles. [1] The UK does not own its missiles, they are leased, and the UK is completely dependent on the US for the maintenance of the missiles and even for targeting data. [2] The United States certainly appears to consider Britain’s deterrent to be dependent on them; wikileaks revealed that the US handed over the serial numbers of the missiles it transfers to the UK over to Russia to help the Russians verify the number of UK missiles. [3]  [1] Jimmy Carter: "Sale of Trident I Missiles to the United Kingdom Exchange of Letters Between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom. ," July 14, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  [2] ‘UK’s Trident system not truly independent’, Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence, 7 March 2006.  [3] ‘Geneva: Agreed statements meeting, 10Geneva135 26 February 2010’, The Telegraph, 4 February 2011.


Nuclear weapons are no longer needed  When the United Kingdom first tested Nuclear Weapons in 1952 she was still a great power with a large empire to defend. In the early 1980s when trident was being conceived [1] the UK fought a war with Argentina and the Cold War was perhaps at its deepest following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The Country was therefore in an international situation in which nuclear weapons were potentially required to deter the Soviet Union.  A study of the vulnerability of Nuclear Weapons states shows that the UK is the least vulnerable nuclear weapons state because the country is surrounded by allies and is nowhere near any states that may potentially become failed states. [2] The only conclusion from this can be that the UK no longer has any need for nuclear weapons.  [1] Fairhall, David, ‘£5 billion Trident deal is agreed’, The Guardian, 16 July 1980.  [2] Asal, Victor, and Early, Bryan, ‘Are We Focusing on the Wrong Nuclear Threat?’, Foreign Policy, 24 May 2012.


The cost of replacing trident is prohibitive  Britain is in the longest recession it has ever been in – longer even than the great depression of the 1930s – with the economy not having recovered to pre-recession levels four years after the start of the downturn. [1] This is obviously completely the wrong time to be wasting money on ruinously expensive new weapons systems. The cost of replacing trident is disputed with the Government saying it would be between £15 and £20 billion [2] but campaign group Greenpeace puts the total cost at £97billion once running costs over the missiles thirty year lifetime are included. [3] Both figures are incredibly costly for a system which we hope we won’t ever have to use and for which we have allies with similar systems. The money should instead be spent on helping to get the economy moving or services that benefit society such as health and education.  [1] Oxlade, Andrew, ‘Economy watch: What caused the return to recession and how long will it last?’, This is Money.co.uk, 4 May 2012.  [2] BBC News, ‘Q&A: Trident replacement’, 22 September 2010.  [3] Greenpeace, ‘£97billion for Trident: five times government estimates’, 18 September 2009.


Sharing procurement of nuclear weapons delivery systems makes simple sense through sharing the cost. The UK only contributed 5% of the original cost of trident but the UK systems are just as potent. This however does not mean that the UK weapons systems are not independent. Operationally the UK has complete control over its weapons. The USA cannot in any way prevent, veto or forbid the UK from using its own nuclear weapons. [1] It is independent in the way that matters.  [1] Directorate of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Policy, ‘Your freedom of information request about the UK Nuclear deterrent’, 19 July 2005.


One country disarming is not going to persuade others, particularly those like China and Russia that still consider themselves great powers, to do so. At the same time the United Kingdom’s situation can never be compared to other countries; Israel would argue it is surrounded by enemies, China that it needs them if the US has them etc. These countries would only consider whether to disarm based upon their own national interests not what other states have done. We should do the same and renew trident as being necessary for the defence of the realm.


States seek nuclear weapons not primarily in order to use them, but in order to take advantage of the security they offer. If states existed in a world post-disarmament, the incentives to develop nuclear weapons for reasons of security would not have disappeared, in fact they would have increased as no other state would be able to use their more powerful conventional forces against that state. As Paul Robinson notes, ‘conventional armaments…will remain the backbone of U.S. defence forces, but the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts from starting, prevent their escalation, as well as bring (them) to a swift and certain end (Robinson, 2001)’. Such potential advantages will not be lost on states in a nuclear-free world.


The purported efficacy of nuclear deterrence drives nuclear proliferation and therefore increases the risk of nuclear weapons being utilized  By claiming the efficacy of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent, the current nuclear powers encourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Krieger, 2003). To be a part of the so-called 'nuclear club' is seen as a matter of great prestige; when India and Pakistan recently declared their nuclear capability and held mutual tests in the 1990s, it was seen in both countries as increasing their international status. Nevertheless, tensions in the region have only increased since the mutual announcements, not least the Kargil War of 1999 that almost precipitated a nuclear war. Nations opposed to a nuclear power therefore feel that they need to develop their own capability in order to protect themselves. The declared nuclear powers must therefore take the lead in disarmament, as an example for the rest of the world.


The abolishment of nuclear weapons does not reduce the risk of them falling into the wrong hands. While nuclear weapons can be dismantled, the weapons-grade plutonium which forms their warheads cannot simply be destroyed. Instead, they must be stored in special facilities; in Russia, there are some three hundred sites were military nuclear material is stored (National Intelligence Council, 2002). It is producing this plutonium which is in fact the most difficult stage in building a weapon - by dismantling missiles, you are therefore not destroying their most dangerous part, and hence the risk of theft does not decrease. In fact, it may increase: missile silos in Russia are still the most heavily funded part of the military, whereas in recent years it has become clear that security at storage facilities is often inadequate. Moreover, it is far easier to steal a relatively small quantity of plutonium than an entire Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; there were three such incidents in Russia in the 1990s of weapons-grade uranium theft (National Intelligence Council, 2002). Ironically, the safest place for plutonium in present-day Russia may be on top of such a missile.


Nuclear weapons can be abolished through the co-operation of nuclear powers and the establishment of an independent verification system  The co-operation of the United States and Russia, demonstrated in their regularly-renewed START treaties, confer the ability of nuclear powers to work towards a reduction in nuclear stockpiles. A new campaigning body, Global Zero, has laid out the path to nuclear abolishment, concerning first bilateral accords to reduce stockpiles in the manner already occurring. From there, they advocate the ‘universal acceptance of a comprehensive verification and enforcement system accompanied by tighter controls on fissile materials produced by civil-nuclear programmes’ (The Economist, 2011). The process will not be swift, but it is plausible and not a stretch considering the success of previous START treaties and the example of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an independent body charged with verifying nuclear installations.


States should not possess such destructive, cataclysmic weapons  Nuclear weapons are, by their very nature, indiscriminate and disproportional; any weapon which could not possibly be used in a responsible manner should not be permitted. Over the past fifty years, we have seen a general tendency towards limited warfare and precision weapons, allowing military objectives to be achieved with minimal loss of civilian life. The entire point of nuclear weapons, however, is their massive, indiscriminate destructive power. Their use could kill tens of thousands of civilians directly, and their catastrophic environmental after-effects would harm many more all around the world. These effects could never be morally acceptable, particularly as the basis of one’s national security strategy. They place ‘humanity and most forms of life in jeopardy of annihilation’ (Krieger, 2003). No state or leader can be entrusted, morally, with a power and responsibility that could come close to annihilating humanity.


States have the right to possess any weapon that will materially support their ambitions of survival, regardless of their destructive power. There is no greater principle than that of self-defence, and a state is entitled to develop any means by which it improves its position vis-à-vis an enemy and subsequently promotes peace in the region and internationally. Furthermore, the damage done by a nuclear weapon is no more indiscriminate or disproportional than the damage potentially caused by a prolonged aerial bombardment. In World War II for instance, far more damage was wrought by fire-bombing Tokyo than either of the nuclear attacks. The issue is therefore not whether nuclear weapons should be held, but under which circumstances they are used, or threatened. Either way, they should not be abolished.


The process is implausible, primarily because whilst the actual weapons can be dismantled, the technology remains and the only effective means to deter the development of a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. Even if this were not the case, such a gradual and incremental process of disarmament does not account for the weapons held by states who have not officially declared their presence, like Israel. Furthermore, though a verification agency may have universal access to nuclear stockpiles, it has little power to enforce states to adhere to treaties, precipitating the scenario whereby one state refuses to give up its final weapon and stalling the process indefinitely. Finally, this process assumes that states wish to see nuclear weapons abolished, rather than the more common assumption that states view nuclear weapons as necessary, not merely to deter other nuclear powers but for traditional deterrence and nuclear blackmail. Would all states willingly give that up?


The Count was only asked to provide an advisory opinion; their adjudication had no subsequent basis in law. Anyhow, the very same jury voted unanimously that ‘there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such’ (International Court of Justice, 1996). Unlike biological and chemical weapons, for which specific treaties have been developed to regulate and prevent their use, the absence of regulation for nuclear weapons implicitly recognizes wide-held appreciation for their deterrent effects


Risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands  While nuclear weapons exist, they can fall into the wrong hands. This is particularly prevalent in an environment whereby there are extremist groups actively seeking to cause instant, egregious harm to their ideological and political enemies. Such groups do not lack for funding; therefore the fear of weapons falling into the wrong hands has never been higher. This is particularly true in Russia, which now has control of all of the nuclear weapons which were distributed around the former Soviet Union. In particular during the 1990s the military was disastrously underfunded; technicians and officers who were used to a high standard of living found themselves without pay, sometimes for years. At the same time, other states and extremist groups are willing to pay substantial sums for their services, and to gain access to nuclear weapons. This same danger is now as much, if not more, of a problem in Pakistan (Ambinder, 2011). The danger of a weapon being stolen, or a nuclear base being taken over by disgruntled members of the military or other extremists, can only be ended by destroying the weapons (Allison, 1997).


Both the use and threat of nuclear weapons are illegal  The disproportionate and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons use renders their possession illegal under international humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice in 1996, asked to provide an advisory opinion, declared unanimously that any use or threat of nuclear weapons had to be compatible with existing international law relating to armed conflict (International Court of Justice, 1996). The principles of discrimination and proportionality inherent in the laws of wars are codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and are quite clearly violated by nuclear weapons. As such, a majority of the judges present felt that any such use or threat would ‘generally be contrary’ to those rules of international law and therefore, unanimously, ‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control’ (International Court of Justice, 1996).


Nuclear weapons provide the source of the greatest possible barbarity in warfare; therefore it is disingenuous to suggest that their abolishment would only exacerbate conflicts. States do not start wars with major powers contemporaneously merely because those major powers happen to have nuclear weapons; traditional deterrence will still be as effective as it is currently. Furthermore, the abolishment of nuclear weapons would allow thereafter mutual co-operation on the issue of non-proliferation without the current fear that others are only concerned with preventing proliferation in countries likely to be opposed to their interests.


The idea of a so-called 'nuclear deterrent' no longer applies – the United States would not be deterred from attacking a newly nuclear Iran because the U.S. would have a first strike capability so would be able to wipe our Iranian nuclear weapons before they could be used. While it is true that political leaders on both sides during the Cold War were terrified of a nuclear conflict it was as much the balance of power that maintained the peace. Neither superpower had an advantage large enough to be confident of victory. However, there is no longer nuclear deterrence. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some rogue states may develop the ability to strike at enemies who have no nuclear weapons of their own. Unless the country under attack is allied to another nuclear power It is not clear that any of the major nuclear powers would then strike back at the aggressor. This is further complicated by the fact that most of the emerging nuclear threats would not be from legitimate governments but from dictators and terrorist groups. Would it ever be acceptable to kill thousands of civilians for the actions of extremists?


Abolishment is an unrealistic goal  The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and there is no way to go back. Nuclear technology exists, and there is no way to un-invent it (Robinson, 2001). Much as the ideal of global disarmament is fine, the reality is that it is impossible: it takes only one rogue state to maintain a secret nuclear capability to make the abolition of the major powers' deterrents unworkable. Without the threat of a retaliatory strike, this state could attack others at will.  Similarly, the process by which nuclear weapons are produced cannot easily be differentiated from the nuclear power process; without constant oversight it would be possible for any state with nuclear power to regain nuclear capability if they felt threatened. This is the same as the nuclear ‘breakout’ capability that many states such as Japan have whereby they can create a nuclear bomb in a matter of weeks or days – if a country has nuclear power and the technology they have this capability even when they have disarmed their nuclear weapons.


Abolishment would be counter-productive and only lead to greater barbarity in warfare  Nuclear weapons have a restraining effect on warfare, preventing escalation through fear of their destruction. To abolish them is therefore to act counter-productively: ‘it will not advance substantive progress on non-proliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability’ (Robinson, 2001) Nuclear weapons are a necessary evil; the doctrine of mutually assured destruction prevented the outbreak of nuclear war during the Cold War because in the neither side was willing to risk the response and neither side could risk even a small scale war due to the threat of escalation. Nuclear weapons therefore act as a check upon the very institution of war between those states that have nuclear weapons, restraining aggressors through fear of escalation and certain destruction.


Nuclear weapons are required for deterrence  The use of nuclear weapons would indeed be a great tragedy; but so, to a greater or lesser extent, is any war. The reason for maintaining an effective nuclear arsenal is in fact to prevent war. By making the results of conflict catastrophic, a strategic deterrent discourages conflict. The Cold War was in fact one of the most peaceful times in history, particularly in Europe, largely because of the two superpowers' nuclear deterrents: ‘the principal function of nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear attack’ (Record, 2004). During the Gulf War, for example, one of the factors which prevented Iraq from launching missiles tipped with chemical weapon warheads against Israel was the threat the USA would retaliate with a nuclear strike. Although there is no longer as formal a threat of retaliation as there was during the Cold War, the very possibility that the use of nuclear weapons by a rogue state could be met a retaliatory strike is too great a threat to ignore. Moreover, although the citizens of the current nuclear powers may be against the use of force against civilians, their opinions would rapidly change if they found weapons of mass destruction being used against them.


In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty, which calls for an end to all nuclear testing, includes provisions for extensive and independent mechanisms for the monitoring of nuclear activities. Such mechanisms could easily be co-opted for use in implementing, monitoring and verifying any future nuclear disarmament process.  "The de facto global nuclear test moratorium and CTBT’s entry into force are crucial barriers to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and are essential to the future viability of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are the first two of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament that were unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (Kimball, 2005).” Even if countries could rapidly produce a bomb without any testing they would not be able to see if it works and any state engaged in breakout would take time to make their bomb deployable on delivery vehicles.


It is clearly too early to condemn Erdoğan’s desire to change Turkey to a presidential system. We do not yet have much idea what this actually means and there is no clear reason why this could not be a step forward. Erdoğan clearly wants a powerful presidency but there is no saying that this is what he will get once the horse trading is done and even if he does there are systems with powerful presidents that are clearly democratic such as the US and French systems. The change to a presidential system could also solve problems; it would replace a constitution that was drafted under military rule, and it would increase regional autonomy, [1] but much more importantly if done correctly it could create strong durable institutions that will ensure democratic rule far into the future. [2]  [1] ‘Presidential Dreaming’, The Economist, 16 March 2013,   [2] Tremblay, Pinar, ‘Will Presidential System Move Turkey Forward?’, Al Monitor, 14 April 2013,


Attempts to change into an executive presidential system  Turkey has been heading towards being a one party, even a one person, state. Erdoğan is intending to change the constitution is an attempt to institutionalise this. His new presidency would have the power to issue decrees with force of law, dissolve parliament and call elections, and to command the military. [1] The attempt to change to a presidential system is clearly a move to enable Erdoğan to avoid the limit of three terms in much the same way as Vladimir Putin did by switching jobs. A presidential system is not bad in principle but it should not be simply used as a vehicle for a particular politician. Moreover any change of such a magnitude in a democratic country should be done only with popular consent – something that this change does not have. In a February 2013 poll 65.8% of Turks favoured keeping the parliamentary system and only 21.2% were in favour of a change to a presidential system. [2]  [1] The Editors, ‘Erdogan Shows Why Turkey Shouldn’t Give Him More Power’, Bloomberg, 3 June 2013,   [2] ‘Majority of Turks against switch to presidential system, survey reveals’, Today’s Zaman, 19 February 2013,


Having one dominant party does not make the country an autocracy or prevent Turkey being a liberal democracy. There have been many countries that are considered democratic that have had single parties ruling for long periods. In the UK the Conservatives in the 1980’s and Labour in the 2000’s won three elections just as the AKP has. In Japan the LDP has only lost two elections since the start of Japan’s post World War II democratic system yet it is accepted as being a legitimate democracy. Rather than worrying about a single party dominance we should be applauding parties that are successful in putting together such a broad coalition that they can win election after election, they clearly represent most of the population which is the point of democracy.


Decline of secularism  The AKP is not just making Turkey authoritarian it is making it an Islamic authoritarian state. Since a 1928 amendment to the constitution Turkey has been a secular state. Recently Turkey rushed through restrictions on the sale of alcohol prohibiting sale overnight. [1] More worryingly than minor restrictions is a decline in gender equality and respect for religious minorities; in 2002, the year the AKP came to power Turkey was ranked 63rd in the UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure, by 2009 it had dropped to 101st out of 109 countries. [2] Without respect for these groups it is difficult to see how Turkey can be considered a liberal democracy that provides for equal and personal rights.  [1] Letsch, Constanze, ‘Turkey alcohol laws could pull the plug on Istanbul nightlife’, guardian.co.uk, 31 May 2013,   [2] Onanç, Gülseren, ‘Women’s place in Turkey is alarming’, United Nations Development Programme, New Horizons Issue 47 November 2009,


Turkey does not have the freedoms associated with democracy  The rule of law, limits on the power of the state, and the provision of personal rights are key to any country being considered to be a liberal democracy but these are being undermined in Turkey. This is most noticeable when it comes to freedom of the press. Turkey’s press freedoms have been in decline. It is a dismal 154th on the press freedom index [1] and most notable is that it is the country with the most imprisoned journalists with at least 76 imprisoned, mostly without having been convicted and as a result of their work. [2] The lack of freedom of the press and how cowed the press is has been shown in the recent rioting; CNN covered the protests live, at the same time its Turkish language subsidiary CNN Turk was broadcasting a cooking show. [3]  [1] ‘21013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring’, Reporters Without Borders, 2013,   [2] Greenslade, Roy, ‘Turkish press freedom crisis’, guardian.co.uk, 23 October 2012,   [3] Cook, Steven A., and Koplow, Michael, ‘How Democratic Is Turkey?’, Foreign Policy, 3 June 2013,


Each country should be free to decide which freedoms are important to it and fit with its own culture rather than having to fit into a western straitjacket in order to be considered ‘democratic’. It is true that press freedoms are a difficult issue but it is not the full story to simply point to the numbers of journalists in prison as the media can still be effective even when some journalists are imprisoned. The OSCE when looking at the 2011 elections said “The media landscape in Turkey is diverse and lively” for example all parties are able to purchase airtime under equal conditions. [1]  [1] Election Assessment Mission, ‘Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections 12 June 2011’, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 31 October 2011,  , pp.2, 19


Liberal democracy is flexible; it can incorporate secular and non-secular, different religions, cultures, or views of the role of the state. Many liberal democracies have restrictions on the sale of alcohol; some parts of the United States are entirely dry. Gender equality is more of an issue but women are allowed to vote in Turkey – which is essential to democracy. [1] Other rights however are up to individual culture to decide. Even if we don’t like a lack of gender equality in Turkey we should not consider the country not to be democratic because of it.  [1] ‘February 6, 1935 Turkey Holds First Election That Allows Women to Vote’, OUPblog, 6 February 2012,


This is one of the flaws of a parliamentary system; when a single party has a large majority, as the AKP does, they can essentially get whatever they want through parliament. This is why systems such as Britain’s have been called elective dictatorship, something which a change in the constitution could potentially solve but clearly does not preclude the country in question being considered to be a liberal democracy.


One party state  Under the AKP Turkey has effectively become a one party state; this means that there is not the competition necessary to make Turkey a genuine liberal democracy. Yes alternative parties exist but this does not mean they are going to get any power any time soon if the government can help it. The AKP has been able to get twice as many votes as its nearest rival making it by far the dominant party. The party consolidates power and there are signs that competition in the party is more important than with other parties. [1] The rioting across the country has shown this in several ways. First the resort to violent and street protest shows the opposition don’t think they can oust the AKP at the ballot box. Secondly the response from the leaders of the AKP have been mixed. While Erdoğan has vehemently condemned the protests while President Abdullah Gül has taken a more nuanced line saying “Democracy is not just about elections” and that “If there are objections, there is nothing more natural than voicing them” effectively endorsing some protest. [2]  [1] Yinanç, Barçin, ‘AKP ushering in 'dominant-party system,' says expert’, Hürriyet Daily News, 17 June 2011,   [2] ‘Democracy is no just about elections, says Turkish President’, Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2013,


Railroading without consultation  The trigger for the rioting; construction projects building over a park and a square are a good analogy for the government as a whole. The AKP government does not care for public opinion and is happy to push through projects without reference to it. In the case of Taksim square the government did not consult about plans to bulldoze the park despite it being the site of a massacre in 1977 making it a place of historical significance. A court ruling to stop construction was also ignored. [1] It is the same with legislation, the controversial changes to alcohol laws were only proposed a month before they were passed and debate was limited to two days, [2] while some important business particularly involving day to day running of foreign and defence has very little oversight. [3]  [1] Yackley, Ayla Jean, ‘Insight: Simmering anger at Erdogan's authoritarianism boils over in Turkey’, Reuters, 2 June 2013,   [2] Resneck, Jacob, ‘Anti-alcohol bill leaves many Turks dispirited’, USA Today, 29 May 2013,   [3] ‘Turkey Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (T.B.M.M) (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)’, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009,


We do not yet know if this is a false dawn when it comes to peace with the Kurds. Erdoğan could simply be using the process for his own ends; either to secure the Olympics for Istanbul or to secure a powerful presidency for himself. Alternatively he may simply be seeking to divide the Kurds so making them easier to defeat. [1] As yet with no political deal or real knowledge of what the settlement might be considering this a democratic advance seems a bit farfetched.  [1] Hannah, John, ‘Erdogan's Great Gamble’, Foreign Policy, 14 May 2013,


High electoral turnout is in large part a result of turkey having compulsory voting so it is difficult to see how this statistic is an indicator of the democratic health of the country. There is also a big difference between having a liberal democracy and a ‘tyranny of the majority’ Turkey under AKP has been much more the latter. Erdoğan has threatened the opposition “if you gather 100,000 people, I can gather a million” showing that the majority and numbers are simply being used to browbeat anyone who opposes his plans. [1] A democracy means more than holding regular elections; even regimes everyone recognizes as authoritarian, such as Kazakhstan or Iran, hold them.  [1] Cook, Steven A., and Koplow, Michael, ‘How Democratic Is Turkey?’, Foreign Policy, 3 June 2013,


Less army influence – no coups  There has now been more than thirty years without an army coup but it has only been during the AKP government that the army has finally been cowed with the army being forced to defend its actions in court. [1] The AKP has brought about a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the military and civilian governments reducing the military’s influence; consistent with military subservience to civilian authority in other democracies. The National Security Council was turned from a executive body into an advisory board that was dominated by civilians and Parliamentary control over the military’s budget was strengthened. The Government’s control over the military was shown by the Ergenekon trials where senior army generals were accused of plotting a coup, with the result that the government showed the power of the judiciary over the military and took control over promotion. [2]  [1] Demir, Firat, ‘Here's What You Need to Know about the Clashes in Turkey’, Foreign Policy, 1 June 2013,   [2] Balta-Parker, Evren, and Akça, Ismet, ‘Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government’, in Ebru Canan-Sokullu ed., Debating Security in Turkey, 15 December 2012,  , pp.80, 87


Turkey has an effective and legitimate government  It is clear that the government is legitimate; it received 49% of the vote in the 2011 elections, an increase. By comparison Tony Blair’s ‘landslide’ win in 1997 was achieved with 43.2% of the vote. [1] And it is a legitimate government in large part because it is an effective government. This has particularly been the case on the economic front. There are of course a few problems, as there always are even in booming economies, but Turkey has an enviable record over the ten years of AKP rule. Public debt fell from 74% in 2002 to 40% in 2011, productivity growth has averaged 3-3.5%, economic growth has hovered around 8% and inflation took a tumble from almost 70% when the AKP was elected to high single figures. [2] It is no surprise that the electorate has rewarded the government that has pulled this off.  [1] Johnson, Ron, et al., ‘Anatoimy of a Labour Landslide: The Constituency System and the 1997 General Election’, Parliamentary Affairs, 1998,  , p.1  [2] ‘Istanbuls and bears’, The Economist, 7 April 2012,


Ending the conflict with the Kurds – inclusive government  Democracies are only truly democratic when they accept that their minorities have rights and deserve a place in the political system even if those minorities themselves want a separate state. Only then does the country truly represent and work for everyone within the state. It has only been during Erdoğan’s time as Prime Minister that this has happened in Turkey.  Turkey has spent its history since its founding ninety years ago discriminating against the Kurds by denying they are a separate ethnicity. Now however there is a cease fire in place and serious consideration for major constitutional changes that would recognize the Kurds. [1] Already there have been significant changes like allowing the use of Kurdish in public life and the launch of a Kurdish language TV station and courses in universities. [2]  [1] Hannah, John, ‘Erdogan's Great Gamble’, Foreign Policy, 14 May 2013,   [2] Zalewski, Pitr, ‘The Kurds’ Last Battle in Turkey: Teaching Kids Kurdish’, The Atlantic, 9 May 2013,


Turkey has elections, it is a democracy  The most fundamental part of democracy is the ability of the people to influence their government. In almost all democracies this is done through elections to parliament. This is the case in Turkey. There was general acceptance that the elections that the AKP won were free elections. The US state department said the elections were carried out “in a free and fair manner” [1] while the OSCE election observers said “The parliamentary elections demonstrated a broad commitment to hold democratic elections” although there was the odd complaint. [2] Turnout in elections is very high compared to many democracies and is actually rising; it was 79% in 2002, the election that brought AKP to power, increasing to 88% in 2011. [3] If turnout is any indicator (and clearly it is or else mature democracies such as the UK would not be worried about their own falling turnout) the AKP would appear to be strengthening democracy in the eyes of voters.  [1] Toner, Mark, ‘US Congratulates Turkey on Elections’, Embassy of the United States Turkey, 13 June 2011,   [2] Election Assessment Mission, ‘Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections 12 June 2011’, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 31 October 2011,  , p.1  [3] ‘Voter turnout data for Turkey’, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 5 October 2011,


Democratic legitimacy cannot simply be equated with economic growth even if most people see the economy as the main issue when it comes to voting. The economy is important but there are plenty of countries which have used economic growth to buttress undemocratic regimes; China being the obvious example where the state’s legitimacy is intimately bound up with economic growth. [1]  [1] Li, Eric X, “The Life of the Party”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013,


While coups were frequent during the twentieth century each time power was quickly returned to civilian hands meaning that even including the coups Turkey had a vibrant democracy. [1]  [1] Baran, Zeyno, ‘Is Kemalism Dead in Turkey?’, Defining Ideas, 13 December 2010,


This happens in theory but in practise does not work this way. Precedent in the United States has shown that political discourse is still fractious despite the presence of Open Primaries as it is still the ideologically focussed base that that vote and decide such elections on a low turnout.  Even if Propositions contentions were true, it can be argued that it is the lack of clear dividing lines between parties that can cause major disillusionment in politics, with many parties now subscribing to a broadly neoliberal world view as has happened in the UK where parties regularly cross-dress, appeal to the same groups and steal each other’s policies. [1] The lack of clear ideology engendered by Open Primaries would make such disillusionment worse. Two parties that agree on everything would seriously damage turnout as no clear choice is presented to the electorate.  [1] Ash, Timothy Garton, ‘If our political parties did not exist would we ever need to invent them?’, The Guardian, 25 October 2007,


Open primaries promote moderate, non-partisan politics  By creating a situation whereby all voters have a potential say in selecting candidates, it can prevent overweening control by party grass roots who may vote for overtly ideological candidates who turn off the moderate voters needed to win elections.  An Open Primary is more likely to choose more centrist candidates for the general election, providing a degree of moderation to the process of election and politics in general. This in turn can help foster a consensual atmosphere in political discourse with general agreed points, focusing the debate on more core issues between the main parties. [1]  This then means that much more is likely to get done. At the moment American politics is plagued by gridlock both in the states and in Congress. Individuals elected under open primaries are much more likely to be willing to compromise across the aisle. [2] As a result government will begin moving again.  [1] ‘Editorial: California should switch to open primary elections’, The Stanford Daily, 12 May 2010,   [2] Michael Alvarez, R., and Sinclair, Betsy, ‘Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: The Effects of Primary Processes’, P.2


The whole point of Democracy is that there are losers as well as winners. It is not up to political parties to accommodate those who disagree with them by accommodating their policies. Parties and the candidates who stand on their behalf must be able to justify their own views and polices to the electorate, without them being diluted by the outside influence of those who may actually fundamentally disagree with what the party believes in. Those on the fringe are better off advocating their policies better instead of voting for candidates of the party they do not support.  Very occasionally an open primary may allow an independent to seriously run, but this will be so rare that it will not compensate for having their independent platforms at elections.