text: If coca cultivation were legalized, there would probably be mechanisms and policies to allow the plant and its derivatives to co-exist without this necessarily signifying an increase in harmful consumption, and to limit it being grown in the huge amounts needed for cocaine production. [1] The legalizing of coca cultivation for non-cocaine use could also undermine the supply basis of cocaine itself, as farmer would shift their production of coca from cocaine-purposed coca to open market coca production, as legal production would be much more secure from government action. Therefore legalizing coca production could actually help make cocaine less readily available.  [1] Transnational Institute Debate Papers. “Coca yes, cocaine, no?”. Transnational Institute. No. 2006/2. No. 13. May 2006.


title: th health general global law crime policing law general punishment house would

text: Legalising coca production would undemine the wider war on the drugs economy  The UN International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) said in 2011 that exceptions for Bolivia would undermine international narcotics control efforts: “[Allowing coca] would undermine the integrity of the global drug control system, undoing the good work of governments over many years.” [1] A US official said in January of 2011: “there is evidence to suggest that a substantial percentage” of the increased coca production in Bolivia over the past several years, registered in U.N. surveys, “has indeed gone into the network and the marketplace for cocaine.” [2] These examples thus show that legalizing coca cultivation would undermine the wider war on drugs, because it shifts the policy away from one of eradicating crops which could be turned into narcotics and instead turns towards making them acceptable on the global market. It encourages countries to take eradication efforts less seriously, and seemingly undermines the commitment of the international community to the war on drugs, once it gives in on this narcotic. This will make not just cocaine but many other drugs more widely available, leading to even more ruined lives through drug abuse.  [1] M&C News. “Bolivia undermines global anti-drug efforts, UN warns”. M&C News. Jul 5, 2011.   [2] Associated Press. “U.S. to fight Bolivia on allowing coca-leaf chewing”. The Portland Press Herald. January 19 2011.


text: Coca chewing is harmful and should be proscribed  The original decision to ban coca chewing was based on evidence that this was indeed harmful to human health. A 1950 report elaborated by the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Coca Leaf with a mandate from ECOSOC states that: "We believe that the daily, inveterate use of coca leaves by chewing ... is thoroughly noxious and therefore detrimental." [1] Therefore the risk of health harms should not be dismissed or undermined. Coca is also different to caffeine and other similar products in in its capacity to be diverted to highly potent, dangerous, and damaging use in cocaine. Therefore it has unique health considerations which make its prohibition acceptable.  [1] Jelsma, Martin. “Lifting the Ban on Coca Chewing”. Transnational Institute, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies Nr. 11. March 2011.


text: Unrestricted Coca production would increase the availability of cocaine  Cocaine can be readily extracted from the coca leaf. In 1992 the World Health Organization’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) undertook a ‘prereview’ of coca leaf at its 28th meeting. The 28th ECDD report concluded that, “the coca leaf is appropriately scheduled [as a narcotic] under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, since cocaine is readily extractable from the leaf.” [1] The active ingredient in coca leaf is the same as in cocaine, just more concentrated. Because the raw material of coca and its more potent relative cocaine are so closely aligned, it is impossible to disassociate the two, and so any attempt to consider cocaine a narcotic and stop its spread must also forbid coca. Globally, cocaine is also most produced where coca is legal, and this is a clear correlation. In Bolivia, coca eradication efforts in the 1980s and 90s helped reduce cocaine production. However, as Evo Morales took power and legalized coca production and consumption, cocaine production has shot up, despite his efforts to fight cocaine production. [2] Thus legalizing coca makes it easier for cocaine producers to operate. Legalizing the cultivation of the coca leaf would therefore simply make cocaine more readily available, thus increasing all the harms that come with widespread cocaine use in society.  [1] Jelsma, Martin. “Lifting the Ban on Coca Chewing”. Transnational Institute, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies Nr. 11. March 2011.  [2] Forero, Juan. “Bolivia's Knot: No to Cocaine, but Yes to Coca”. New York Times. February 12, 2006.


text: With no other narcotic drug are the components parts of that drug banned in of themselves. For example, the raw component parts of crystal meth are not banned. These components are a variety of household cleaning compounds. [1] It is wrong therefore to suggest that it is impossible to have an effective anti-narcotics effort unless the component parts are banned, as this exact approach is successful taken in other areas.  [1] Associated Press. “New 'shake-and-bake' method for making crystal meth gets around drug laws but is no less dangerous”. NYDaily News. Tuesday, August 25th 2009.


title: crime policing law general punishment society house would disclose previous

text: The verdict of an individual trial should not be predicated on trials which have already been carried out and concluded. The evidence which is being ‘withheld’ here is in fact irrelevant to the case at hand. While these countries recognise that juries have great value as a representative of the people [1] , it is also important to recognise that people are vulnerable to bias – as shown by the huge increase in convictions when previous offences are disclosed [2] . The benefits of disclosing past convictions is outweighed by the benefits of the jury remaining impartial as far as possible, as this is the best way to reach a fair and just verdict.  [1] Tickner, Joel and Ketelsen, Lee, ‘Democracy and the Precautionary Principle’, The Networker, Vol. 6 No.3, May 2001  [2] The Economist, ‘Tilting the balance’, 2 January 2003


text: Juries need to have all the information possible in order to reach a fair verdict.  It is nonsensical to withhold evidence from a jury that might be necessary for them to reach an accurate verdict. Just because their verdict might be more prone to conviction rather than acquittal does not necessarily mean that this is an unfair or even inaccurate conclusion; given that violent offenders are likely to re-offend [1] , it may illuminate the truth rather than confuse it. Jurors should be allowed to weigh the relevance of previous convictions and compare them with the accusations of the trail at hand. A criminal justice system which currently relies on the ability of the jury to make a decision [2] cannot legitimately choose to withhold evidence from them without innately biasing the trial itself. As the UK Government’s White Paper states, ‘we want less evidence to be withheld from the courts, on the principle that relevant evidence should be admissible . . . magistrates, judges and juries have the common sense to evaluate relevant evidence and should be trusted to do so’ [3] . If we cannot trust juries to decide which evidence is relevant to the verdict and which is not, then the entire use of juries in the criminal justice system should be reconsidered.  [1] CBC News, ‘Getting out of prison’, March 2008.  [2] Direct Gov, ‘Jury service – what happens in court and after the trial’, 10 October 2011.  [3] CPS, ‘Justice for all’, The Stationary Office, July 2002.


text: If anything, this is an argument to prevent the media from publishing and details of a case or its defendant before the trial has been carried out, or from being more proactive and disqualifying jurors who ‘research’ their case before it comes to court. We should not endorse this kind of behaviour, which jurors know is not allowed, by legitimising it within court and announcing previous convictions. The harm of bias, particularly among those who would go out of their way to read about the personal history of a defendant, could be incredibly dangerous to the principle of a fair trial.


text: Occasional disclosure of convictions leads to an inconsistent justice system.  At present in Britain, some previous convictions may be disclosed if they bear a striking resemblance to the case at trial, if the defendant falsely claims to be of good character, or if they attack the character of a prosecution witness [1] . However, different judges invariable interpret these criteria in different ways, which leads to a wavering standard of trail where previous convictions may or may not be revealed. It would be much more efficient and transparent to allow this motion and make court procedures more accessible.  [1] The Economist, ‘Tilting the balance’, 2 January 2003.


text: The current system is unfairly weighted in favour of criminals.  It is unfair that those who repeatedly re-offend should be treated in the same manner as those who have committed one offence; a singular offence could mark a mistake or accident in the defendant’s choices, but repeated criminal acts mark a habit and a lack of regret for past crimes. Failing to take past convictions into account can lead to many dangerous offenders being underestimated by the jury, and so released. This is particularly pertinent in cases of child molestation, where child molesters have a particularly high rate of re-offending – expected to be even ‘larger than the reported 50 per cent’ - but ‘only a small proportion of sexual offences against children result in a conviction’. This conviction rate, however, does rise for ‘those with a history of prior sexual offences’ [1] .  Under the current conditions, this system is unfairly weighted against the innocent victims of repeated crime. A higher conviction rate, informed by the knowledge of previous offences, helps to reach justice for these victims and their families, as well as promoting justice and the safety of the general public who find it frustrating that so many dangerous offenders are released without appropriate conviction [2] . Moreover, jurors themselves lose confidence in the justice system when they find out that they have just acquitted a defendant who has committed a similar crime before. One notable example of this was series of trials of Kirk Reid, who committed many sexual assaults against women including several instances of rape and who was ‘wrongfully acquitted’ of his first offence in 1996. Not only did his victim lose all sense of hope in the justice system – she had faced her attacked and been discredited – but one of the jurors at the trial who believed that he was guilty went on to criticise the justice system itself [3] . The current system seriously risks acquitting criminals who have already committed similar crimes; it is time to rebalance the justice system to acknowledge the needs of the victims who suffer through wrongful acquittal of their attackers.  [1] Victims of Violence, ‘Research – Protecting Children from Sexual Abuse’, 28 February 2011  [2] Hughes, David, ‘Sex offenders to lose right to get out of jail early’, The Daily Mail  [3] Lette, Kathy, ‘For sexual assault, justice is on trial’, The Guardian, 1 July 2010


text: While recidivism is obviously a problem, this motion fails to take into account any situation where an individual has previously committed a crime but is innocent of the crime going to trial. Given that conviction rates soar when previous convictions are disclosed [1] , this motion doesn’t rebalance the justice system to cater for the victims, but risks seriously prejudicing those who are innocent of the crime going to trial. A wrongful conviction is just as bad as a wrongful acquittal; the prejudicial effects on the jury’s ability to make a verdict [2] undermines the objectivity of the justice system, and seriously risks the possibility of a fair trial.  [1] The Economist, ‘Tilting the balance’, 2 January 2003.  [2] The Economist, ‘Tilting the balance’, 2 January 2003.


text: The more obvious and efficient solution to this problem is to ensure a clearer standard of when previous convictions may or may not be disclosed, so that judges may act by the same standards. There is a simple solution to this particular complication; it would be an overreaction to suddenly change the entire court process by allowing this motion.


text: Revealing past convictions could actually be detrimental in providing an accurate character profile of the defendant or prosecution witness, particularly if the defendant has previously been convicted but has also had successful rehabilitation. This disclosure undermines a key principle of the justice system – rehabilitation and reintegration [1] – by undermining any possibility that they could have changed their lifestyle or altered their character. As such, while it might serve one point of court, it seriously undermines other principles of justice which should not be compromised for such a small benefit.  [1] law.jrank.org, ‘Rehabilitation – What is Rehabilitation?’


text: Jurors are already aware of information which might ‘bias’ their verdict.  Jurors are frequently affected by media coverage of particular cases, which makes it almost impossible for them to remain impartial in the idealistic way which opposition naively believes possible. This creates a situation where the jury may be more affected by information which they have found out elsewhere – for example on the news or in newspapers – than the information which is presented to them in court. There have been some cases where jurors search the internet to find the backgrounds to their cases, despite the fact that this is not allowed [1] . This evidently reflects that jurors feel that they have not been adequately informed and so seek facts elsewhere. Given that this need has been reflected by the jurors themselves, the court should give jurors all possible information and bring previous convictions into the open to ensure that they can base their verdict on reliable fact presented in court rather than resorting to sensationalist media.  [1] Attorney General’s Office, ‘Juror convicted for internet research’, 23 January 2012.


text: Defendants who are innocent will be protected  This motion could allow innocent defendants to mount a stronger case. This is because, if allowed, the previous convictions of prosecution witnesses would be admitted as evidence. In this case, if a prosecution witness falsely claims good character in opposition to the defendant, any falsity could be more easily seen and weighed by the jury. This solves a problem under that status quo where ‘the threat of introducing his [the defendant’s] previous convictions will frequently inhibit him from introducing character evidence about the prosecution witness’ [1] ; fear that the defendant’s convictions may weigh against them where the prosecution witness remains untouchable creates a discrepancy in the justice system. However, if convictions on both sides were to be revealed anyway, then neither can falsely claim the character of the other and attempt to convince the jury of false information on this front.  [1] CPS, ‘Justice for all’, The Stationary Office, July 2002.


text: It is patronising to state the jurors cannot understand the difference between a conviction and an acquittal. However, knowledge of the defendant’s background might help to shed light on the case at hand and allow the jurors to view the wider picture when weighing up their verdict.


text: Unfortunately, empirical evidence shows that past offenders are more likely to commit further offences [1] . Revealing past convictions could be a good indicator of how likely it is that the defendant could have committed a crime, particularly if it is a similar crime to one committed in the past. Acquitting a defendant of a crime which they had previously committed could easily create public outrage and discredit the justice system; it is only fair that past convictions should be taken into account alongside the rest of the evidence.  [1] Edwards, Richard, ‘Half of all criminals re-offend within a year’, The Telegraph, 5 September 2008.


text: We already recognise that we cannot place complete trust in juries.  Although we recognise that juries can provide valuable insight and represent the will of the general public in court cases [1] (and especially the communities in which the crimes occurred [2] ), there is also recognition that juries can be subject to bias [3] . Britain has even suggested plans to restrict the right to trial by jury in order to prevent undue bias from affecting court cases [4] . Elsewhere, experts are debating over whether jurors should learn about ‘a victim’s sexual history in rape cases where the defendant asserts that the accuser consented to sex, or a victim's propensity for violence in murder cases where the accused claims self-defense’ [5] because of fears that it might cause juror bias. We do not grant ultimate knowledge to jurors, nor should we; it endangers the potential for an unbiased trial.  [1] Lawson Neal, and Simms, Andrew, ‘A People’s Jury of a thousand angry citizens’, The Guardian, 31 July 2011.  [2] New Jersey Courts, ‘Welcome to the New Jersey Court System’, judiciary.state.nj.us, 2011.  [3] Howard Nations, ‘Overcoming Jury Bias’  [4] Davies, Patricia Wynn, ‘Plans to restrict right to trial by jury condemned’, The Independent, 28 February 1997.  [5] Silverglate, Harvey A., and Poulson, Dan, ‘Getting Real at the SJC’, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, 30 May 2005 .


text: Allowing this motion would lead to a miscarriage of justice.  This motion removes the incentive for police to conduct vigorous investigations. Given the increasing pressure on policemen and women to gain convictions [1] , this motion will mean that their best chance of obtaining those convictions is simply to accuse those whose backgrounds could feasibly lead a jury to believe that they are not only capable of crime, but have committed the crime in question. Subsequently, the real culprits may be left to go free as suspicion is routinely pointed towards those who already have a criminal record. Given that poor police investigation [2] and poor case preparation by the prosecution [3] are currently a large source of dissatisfaction with the justice system, it is important to prevent either police or the prosecution from becoming dependent on the negative records of the defendants rather than properly fulfilling their roles.  [1] Bushywood, ‘CPS - Crown Persecution Service’.  [2] The Guardian, ‘The cost of poor policing’. 11 October 2010  [3] Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro’, 14 October 2004, D1607.


text: The disclosure of previous convictions could falsely characterize the defendant.  This motion is incredibly dangerous in a variety of ways as not only convictions but also acquittals and other past conduct could then be raised in a court trials. This means that a jury could be informed that somebody had questionable behaviour, such as a sexual interest in children, even if they had never been tried or much less convicted of an actual offence. This would allow the prosecution to unduly blacken the character of the defendant, and easily prejudice the jury against them for no valid reason, and without the evidence which formal proceedings would require. Studies into jury verdicts have found that a jury was ‘50% more likely to convict if it was told that the defendant had a conviction for a similar previous offence than if it was given no information’, particularly in regard to sexual offences [1] . This is proof that jurors are highly susceptible to prejudice when reaching a verdict.  [1] The Economist, ‘Tilting the balance’, 2 January 2003.


text: The motion completely undermines the assumption of innocence which accompanies a fair trial.  By projecting past convictions on to a new case, this disclosure greatly weakens the presumption of innocence which is the defendant’s right [1] . It is the jury’s duty to form a verdict based on the relevant case, and it should not be dependent on events from the defendant’s past life which may be completely irrelevant to the case in hand. Many people who mistakenly committed a crime at one point in their life realise that it was a mistake and do not go on to re-offend, particularly if they have received help or treatment from the state [2] . Even if the defendant has repeatedly committed crimes in their past, it does not necessarily follow that they are guilty of the particular offence which has gone to trial.  [1] Criminal Defense Department’ Every person is PRESUMED INNOCENT until Proven Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’, Parkes Law Group, 6 May 2011  [2] Public Safety Canada, ‘Treatment for sex offenders’, 28 December 2007


text: This point places too much importance on the defendant’s history. In any case, records of their previous convictions must be heard alongside of the facts of the primary crime; any history will always be tempered by discussion of the actual crime. Satisfaction from the justice system will be greater if the public are aware that juries are not simply allowing past offenders to walk free; and if police and prosecution forces are found to be failing at their jobs, then this should be separately addressed and regulated.


text: Better training for jurors could easily override this problem. If we continue to use juries as an essential part of the justice system, it is important to make sure that they are as well-informed as possible. Ensuring that they are blind to the truth is not a legitimate way to achieve a fair or unbiased verdict; rather, it innately limits the accuracy of any verdict and confines it to only a portion of the truth.


title: ure media television law international law house opposes televising all criminal

text: Giving evidence is a traumatic experience, TV coverage or otherwise. TV broadcasts can already have measures brought in to protect witnesses – for instance it could be agreed that they are not directly filmed. Anonymized witnesses at the ICC currently give evidence by video-link, of which the audio is distorted and the image pixelated out, save for those who are permitted to see it, such as the judges and counsel.  The ICC already enters in to arrangements with other states for the protection of witnesses in their physical safety.


text: Witnesses might be identified and placed in danger  Televising criminal trials may cause a number of problems with witnesses. It may make individuals less likely to give evidence, make them more likely to play to the television audience, or make the already intimidating process of giving evidence in court more so. Also, television broadcasts make it more likely that the identities of anonymized witnesses would leak out – something that has already happened at the ICC in the Ruto-Sang case [1] .  The ICC already has problems with witnesses, including allegations of bribing and intimidating prosecution witnesses in the Ruto case [2] , which has led to Walter Barasa, a Kenyan Journalist, being subject to an arrest warrant [3] . Ending the televising of trials may go some way to remedy those problems.  [1] Lattus, Asumpta, ‘Evenson: ‘First time arrest warrant has been issued in Kenya case’, Deutsche Welle, 2 October 2013,   [2] Stewart, Catrina, ‘ICC on trials along with Kenya’s elite amid claims of bribery and intimidation’, The Guardian, 1 October 2013,   [3] ‘ICC seeks Walter Barasa arrest for Kenya ‘witness tampering’, BBC News, 2 October 2013,


text: The Hussein trial identified the solution to problematic rants disrupting the trial - the TV feed cut to the judge and faded out Hussein’s sound [1] . This is part of the reason why the ICC broadcasts are on a 30 minute delay, on web and TV access – outbursts, material that should be redacted and other things can be redacted before it reaches viewers.  These antics have been used in trials before the rolling news era, such as in the Chicago Eight case in the US, the trial of eight activists (one of whose trials was separated) for conspiracy and incitement to riot for offences regarding demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. One of the defendants, Bobby Seale, launched in to a vicious vocal tirade against the judge, and was eventually bound and gagged in the courtroom. During the trial of the other seven, the defendants tried various antics including blowing kisses to the jury, wearing judicial robes which were removed to reveal police uniforms, not standing when the judge entered the court, and draping a North Vietnamese flag over the defence table [2] . The convictions – including those of the defence counsel for contempt of court – were overturned due to improper jury selection.  Television is not necessary for such behaviour.  [1] Engel, Richard, ‘Saddam trial outbursts, heard but not seen’, NBC News, 5 December 2005,   [2] Linder, Douglas O., ‘The Chicago Seven Conspiracy Trial’, University of Missouri Kansas City,


text: Televising turns justice into entertainment  Broadcasting trials would be likely to turn the court in to entertainment. The Simpson trial showed how harmful a televised high profile trial can be degenerating into a freak show. The ICC trials are among the most high profile in the world so are likely to be susceptible to this. Much of the interest in the SCSL Charles Taylor trial came along when Naomi Campbell gave evidence so giving the trial celebrity interest that had little to do with the legalities involved [1] .  Jurisdictions where cameras are not permitted in courts still can and do have accurate, informative and timely reports of cases, however high profile, without filming them. Courtroom sketches, written transcripts and other tools allow reportage without the use of original footage in a tawdry manner.  [1] Bowcott, Owen, ‘Charles Taylor and the ‘dirty-looking stones’ given to Naomi Campbell’, theguardian.com, 26 April 2012,


text: Court proceedings themselves aren’t, in general, entertaining. Live broadcasts would largely involve lawyers discussing intricate details of issues, including complex points of law. If there was a real prospect of an ICC trial becoming a matter of entertainment, it probably would have occurred with the existing trials.  Even high profile court cases will not get large viewing figures – the UK Supreme Court case in to the extradition of Julian Assange only got 14,500 viewers [1] . Existing regulations for the use of Supreme Court footage in the United Kingdom allow excerpts of the footage to be used in news and current affairs programmes, or educational uses, but bars the use of the footage in light entertainment or other programmes.  [1] Ministry of Justice, ‘Proposals to allow the broadcasting, filming, and recording of selected court proceedings’, gov.uk, May 2012,  at p10


text: Unruly defendants can play up to the cameras  Televising the trial can create extra incentives for defendants to attempt to disrupt the process. During his trial, Saddam Hussein regularly made outbursts and went on political rants – based on Iraqi law, he was able to examine witnesses after his lawyer. This was not new – Slobodan Milosevic tried various antics in front of the (televised) ICTY [1] , and Ratko Mladic used those tactics post-Hussein [2] . Milosevic’s approval ratings grew, and he even won a seat in the Serbian parliament while on trial.  A televised trial creates more of a risk of a political hijacking of the trial – something that has been shown to be a successful tactic by Milosevic. This both potentially damages the successor government by giving those on trial a platform and the court itself.  [1] Scharf, Michael P., Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling disruptive defendants and contumacious counsel in war crimes trials’, University of Galway  [2] Biles, Peter, ‘Mladic’s courtroom antics’, BBC News, 4 July 2011,


text: Transcripts and other forms of notation would also set a historical record. While the Nuremberg trials were filmed, live television broadcast was not technically possible, footage was used for newsreels at the time. The lack of continuous total film footage has not stopped the Nuremberg trial from setting a historical record – the written judgements and transcripts are enough.


text: While there is no jury that could be identified, or influenced, by the broadcast, there is still the other problems attached to televised trials – issues of legitimacy, lawyers and defendants acting up etc.


text: Open justice – crimes with large numbers of victims  The principle of open justice, including the right to a public trial [1] , is enshrined in many legal systems. The best show of commitment to open justice is to allow everyone to watch it, the best method of doing so is for the trial to be televised. This is all the more the case when the victims can't all be in court, either because of the numbers or because of the distance.  Television coverage will help bring the trial closer to the victims. International criminal trials regularly take place outside the location of the offences, either in The Netherlands such as the ICTY, ICC and Charles Taylor trial, or elsewhere, such as the ICTR sitting in Arusha, Tanzania. It would be helpful in terms of providing closure to the victims, who should be witnessing proceedings.  [1] See the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights


text: Broadcasting provides a public record  Unlike many other criminal trials, since Nuremberg a key principle of International Criminal Law is that it aims to set a historical record. The events that it deals with are important as they are heinous crimes that change regions forever. A trial helps to get to the bottom of events that happened preventing there being multiple conflicting versions of events. This record also can help to act as a deterrent to others considering similar measures.  Broadcasting the trial will bolster this record by providing footage of the trial itself (which may reduce myths about it being unfair, for example) and providing a voice to the victims through their evidence, in their own words, being recorded for posterity and future study.


text: ICC does not have same problems as other legal systems  The ICC as a court does not have many of the things that a domestic criminal trial would have in terms of disadvantages of televising. Like all other international tribunals, there is no jury, only a panel of professional judges. Judges are going to be less intimidated by there being television broadcasts even if broadcasts of trials typically aim to obscure the identity of the jury. Similarly, there is a competent system of witness protection, and other safeguards.


text: Few people would actually watch the entirety of the trial proceedings, most would probably just see clips of the footage of news reports; television news coverage of criminal trials can already take place without actual footage.  While televising trials will engage the victims and their families, televising a criminal trial may inflame tensions as well. During the trial of Saddam Hussein, Hussein made a number of calls to violence during his televised trial. Many of those who are on trial have a significant number of followers (see the widespread support for Uhuru Kenyatta) – television broadcasts would give them a means of communication


title: crime policing law general local government house would ban handguns washington dc

text: Opposition agrees that handguns have unique advantages over other weapons; however, banning handguns in this area would lead to worse problems which are mentioned here as well as in the first point of opposition.  The biggest issue with banning handguns, especially in a city, is that handguns will still be available to criminal classes willing to simply import the weapons from elsewhere. Due to their concealable nature it is very easy for them to smuggle handguns into an area where a handgun ban has been imposed. This is problematic because law abiding citizens in this area will now not have guns to defend themselves with. As such an asymmetry of power has been created where the people who bear guns, mainly criminals have weapons which give them significantly more power than the citizens in that area.  Under the status quo, the legality of handguns means that although they are more dangerous than other weapons, their availability works in citizens’ favour. This is because the asymmetry of power mentioned above is then weighted in the other direction. If a large proportion of the population have handguns for self-defence then there will be a greater chance that criminals attempting to commit violent acts will encounter individuals carrying weapons, resulting in an equality of power between both attacking and defending parties. The asymmetry is then pushed towards the defensive parties because presumably there are more law abiding citizens than criminals. As such those who wish to use guns for defensive purposes outnumber those who want to use guns for criminal purposes, weighting power in favour of those defending themselves. This is verified by the incredibly common use of handguns in self-defence; roughly 80% of self-defence actions involve handguns.4


text: Handguns are uniquely dangerous when compared with other weapons  Handguns are specifically worse than most other weapons. They are weapons which are both concealable and portable. Shotguns and Rifles can easily be identified from a long distance making it easier to avoid those who are carrying them or conversely for the authorities check their motives for carrying arms. Handguns, being ranged weapons (as opposed to knives), prevent people from opting to run away if they are confronted by an attacker and being concealable prevent any attempt at avoiding those carrying them.  Because of these unique capabilities they make excellent weapons for gang members who wish to remain inconspicuous to avoid being searched by the police. Further, they are also uniquely useful for other criminal actors such as drug dealers who need to be able to protect themselves, but also need to appear unassuming for clients.  As such, handguns, where they are freely available, are often used by most criminals for these purposes. Given that handguns are also more likely to cause accidental injuries- as a result of incompetence or recklessness- than a knife, it seems logical that handguns cause a much larger harm to citizens in places where they are freely available.4


text: Studies have been conducted on cities where a handgun ban has been implemented. It found that cities such as New York and DC continued to exhibit high rates of crime and proved to be some of the most dangerous cities in the world, regardless of the ban on guns.6  As mentioned, this is because criminal gangs and criminogenic neighbourhoods in these cities have become entrenched. Anyone desperate enough to seek out a handgun- either for use in a crime or as a means of defending themselves in a crime-ridden neighbourhood- is likely to be able to acquire one regardless of the legal control that city councils may attempt to put in place. In the case of stop and search laws, it proves that criminals are adaptable and change their methods based on this lower burden of proof. For example, many gangs opt to keep guns in armouries and only loan them out as and when they are necessary.


text: Individuals Should Not Have the Right to Bear Arms in DC  Under the status quo the state exists to protect the security of its citizens. It does so by maintaining a monopoly of violence with the consent of its citizens. US citizens have been allowed to bear small arms as a symbolic representation of their ability to rise up against state oppression should it ever occur. That is, to keep a check and balance upon the monopoly of violence that the state has.  It is important to note that the state has the monopoly of violence such that it can protect its citizens in the best possible way. In the same way, the right to bear arms exists such that citizens can protect themselves and prevent harm. This means that should the state visit harm upon the citizens of the state then its right to claim a monopoly on violence is revoked and the citizens can fight against the state.  In a similar fashion to the above, should the citizens of the state use their right to bear arms to visit harm upon one another, it seems reasonable that in the same way that the state’s monopoly on violence is revoked, the citizens should have their right to bear arms revoked.  Given that this does not occur in every single part of the U.S. it also seems reasonable to isolate the ban to areas where the spirit of the right to bear arms is being significantly violated. In this case the ban is limited to DC however it could potentially extend to other areas in the U.S. which suffer similar problems.2


text: The issue with Washington DC and certain states in the U.S. is that the police and the state are unable to protect people. The opposition believes that people who visit violence upon one another should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. However, within certain areas of DC, the state consistently fails to protect its citizens and enforce its monopoly of violence in a just and effective fashion.  In doing so the state is failing to uphold its part of its agreement with its citizens. Further, if police in these areas are corrupt in any way, then the state is actively visiting harm upon its citizens.  If the state is failing to maintain its monopoly on violence then the citizens of that area have to take over in order to provide for their own security. The citizens of DC have a right to bear arms in order to protect themselves.  The failure is thus on the part of the state for deaths in DC. Citizens within the state should not have their rights curtailed for what is essentially a failing of the state.3


text: A handgun ban reduces crime and deaths  Aside from the fact that handguns are uniquely dangerous weapons, when the handgun ban was in place in DC, there was a reported decrease in crime in the area. In 1977 the year immediately following the ban the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported robberies, assaults and homicides using handguns had fallen in DC sharply. Further, in 1991 the University of Maryland published a study in the New England journal of Medicine suggesting the gun ban had saved lives in the decade before 1991, claiming that the ban had prevented 47 deaths in DC per year.5  It is theorised that the handgun ban does this because it makes other police tactics, such as stop and search, significantly more effective. If criminals wish to get the tactical advantage of power that opposition mention then they have to carry hand guns in order to do it. However, it means that if they are caught with a gun they become very easily identifiable and can easily be arrested to prevent harm coming to the populace of large. Specifically, the handgun ban means that the police have a much lower burden required in order to arrest suspects and given that a lot of the time the police have a strong idea of who the criminals are, but simply can’t pin them for arrest, such a tactical advantage helps them get dangerous people off the street.


text: Democracy is designed to be a flexible mechanism that can change based on different circumstances and at different times. The American constitution should provide a legal basis for all citizens of the U.S.  However, the reason such a legal basis exists is such that citizens in the U.S. are fairly treated under the law and thus benefit through the stability that such fairness creates.  However, it is also feasible that at certain points, part of the constitution could work out very badly for the state in some areas. This is why a system of amendments to the constitution exists.  As such, it is feasible that the constitution should also be able to deal with transitional periods where certain areas should be allowed different rights under the constitution because each area requires different laws in order to work properly that cannot be created on a state level.  Whilst this might cause some tension, most people in DC, particularly the non-criminals would probably understand the reasons behind a ban on handguns in their area, and indeed did when handguns were initially banned there.13


text: Firstly, the deterrence effect created by guns disappears if the use of guns is considered normal behaviour among the populace. Many violent and opportunistic crimes are committed out of necessity. They are not based on a rational calculus of the sort that side opposition discusses. In a society where gun use is normalised, criminals are more likely to view death as a hazard of their occupation, similar to arrest and imprisonment. In these circumstances, the deterrent effect of widespread gun ownership will quickly abate, overridden by desperation. Further, if crimes are being committed by gangs then often, need for respect from the gangs or fear of reprisal will simply override any beliefs regarding deterrence. Finally, criminals are very careful to pick actors who aren’t likely to be well armed and to do so in secluded places. As such, it is incredibly unlikely that they will be deterred from crime.  Secondly, people are likely to have guns holstered. This means that should they be mugged by a criminal they will be unable to retrieve their weapons from their holsters because any movement toward the holster will likely result in them being shot. As such, any concept of a parity of power between actors simply does not exist under the status quo


text: Handguns are Required For Symbolic Reasons As A Defence Against the State Monopoly of Power  Handguns are legal in the U.S. for symbolic reasons. In Justice Scalla’s oral argument he stated “isn't it perfectly plausible, indeed reasonable, to assume that since the framers knew that the way militias were destroyed by tyrants in the past was not by passing a law against militias, but by taking away the people's weapons -- that was the way militias were destroyed. The two clauses go together beautifully: Since we need a militia, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”9 Guns are necessary to prevent the disarming of the people and as a statement that the citizens of the U.S. are allowed to stand up against the state.  In the formation of the state, the citizens of the state give up their freedoms and their ability to do violence upon each other in favour a state monopoly on violence. The implication is that the state, through this monopoly on violence, then prevents citizens from doing violence against one another.  However, it is possible for the state to use its monopoly on physical force in a reckless or subversive fashion. This means that the citizens should always be able to reassert the primacy of their rights and independence over the state, should the state begin to deviate from its mandated role as protector of those rights.  The right to carry firearms is part of this ability to assert one’s power over the state. However, as the state has become more powerful, ownership of small arms has become an increasingly symbolic gesture. Taking away the right to bear arms from any American is thus harmful, as it removes the symbol that the state’s power is not absolute and that ultimately the state is subservient to its people.10


text: The DC Handgun ban is inconsistent with other legislation in the U.S.  A change in legislation in DC that is markedly different from everywhere else in the U.S. is harmful. Whilst the constitution might be amended to give a specific change for DC, the rest of the U.S. will still be able to bear arms. The point of the American constitution is that it is meant to give an even field to all citizens under the law. Minor differences between people within different states is acceptable; owing to specific needs of specific states and all state legislation must be proved to be constitutional anyway. This difference is specifically problematic because of the nature of its interactions with both the constitution and the law.  This change is harmful because the state is dependent upon consistency within the law and perception of the law as being a fair mechanism for all people. Large inconsistencies within the law should not be tolerated as such inconsistencies often bring into debate the legitimacy of the state’s legal code. This is problematic as such debates and inconsistencies can lead to confusion about the reach of the law as well as doubt in the legitimacy of the law. The law is dependent upon citizens understanding and subscribing to the legal code, otherwise legal systems might suffer from problems such as people simply not reporting crime to the police owing to their doubt in the legal system and its ability to protect them, or otherwise law abiding citizens from other areas of the country inadvertently breaking the law by bringing guns into D.C.


text: Hand Guns Are Required For Self Defence.  Under the status quo handguns are legal. This means that should a criminal initially wish to consider mugging someone he has to consider the possibility that he might be shot should he choose to take this action. A visceral fear of death and injury means that a significant number of criminals will be deterred from engaging in burglaries, violent robberies or muggings if they suspect that they might face armed resistance. As such the presence of handguns within a community contributes to the general deterrence of crime within that community.7  Secondly, should someone try to attack someone else with a handgun, if the other person is armed then they are in a much better position to negotiate with their attacker and prevent harm to either party. Creating a public culture in which handguns are held and used sensibly, and in which firearms training is widely available, allows a parity of power to be created between ordinary citizens and criminals. However, this parity of power is changed in favour of the defender. This is because there are more law abiding citizens than criminals. If the mugger is caught by another citizen then it is possible that citizen will also have a handgun leading to a situation where the mugger will likely be arrested or risk death.8  Finally, the normalisation of handguns in society means that people are less likely to panic should they be attacked by a mugger who has one. Deaths from mugging can often be caused by the victim simply panicking in response to the mugger. Shots are often fired by desperate and unstable assailants who are unprepared for their victim’s reaction. In a society acclimatised to handguns and aware of the risk they present, incidents of this type- fuelled by panic, uncertainty and fear- are much less likely to occur.


text: The right for Americans to bear arms used to be important for symbolic reasons. However, now such a symbol does not serve to act in the same way that it once did. It was once realistic that American citizens would be able to counteract the monopoly of violence that the state has. However, in this age of modern warfare, such power simply does not exist in any real form any more. Weapons as symbols in this way are just symbolic of the loss of power that the citizens of the U.S. have undergone over time and further are symbolic of a fruitless endeavour in resistance of the state through violent means. The fact that the citizens of America feel the need to resort to violence as a symbol for the ability to stand up to the state harms what the state stands up for now, which is change through peaceful and democratic protest.  Further, even if the right to bear arms was still symbolic in a positive way, the good feeling such a symbol gives simply does not compare to the number of lives lost to things such as gun violence year on year.11


title: speech debate internet freedom law human rights digital freedoms freedom expression

text: A democracy’s first duty must always be to the citizens that elect it, not to foreign dissidents. Their duty therefore is to be engaging with these regimes to the benefit of their own citizens; through encouraging trade relations for example. Offering amnesty to individuals oppressive regimes consider to be criminals will serve only to alienate those regimes from the process of negotiation so actually runs counter to the interests of the electorate. Such alienation would result in even more repression, and a greater unwillingness to adopt reforms. If democracies want to promote their mode of government abroad they would be best advised not to pick fights with those they wish to influence.


text: Democracies have an obligation to shield these people and to encourage further dissent  The universality of human rights, of the freedom of speech and of due process is all touted as crucial by the world’s democracies. Democratic countries are frequently vocal on the subject of liberty, on the superiority of their system of government that provides for the best protection of human dignity. By offering amnesty to bloggers, the people standing at the forefront of the democratic cause in oppressive regimes, Western countries take a largely low-cost action that provides for the security and safety of some the bravest people in the public arena. The West must stop kowtowing to oppression and make a stand to offer an umbrella of protection to those who need it. That protection is absolutely crucial to the development of more dissent in the blogosphere and on the ground. Only by nurturing dissent can it ever take root and overcome the vast powers of authoritarian government. The promise of protection is hugely powerful because it gives bloggers a safety net to fall back on. Those already active will feel more empowered to speak out against their oppressors, and some currently cowed by fear will have the courage to speak up. The guarantee of amnesty also removes the perceived randomness of such offerings that currently occur, as in the recent case of Cuba in which two bloggers of similar pedigree asked for asylum in the US, but only one received it. [1] Such inconsistency has bred fear in the minds of dissidents. This policy would correct for it and help bolster the cause of justice on all fronts. It is through offering amnesty that democracies can provide the catalyst for the change they avow to be the paramount aim of human civilization.  [1] Fox News Latino. “Cuba: Prominent Blogger-Dissidents Receive Contradictory Results on Visa Petitions”. 31 January 2013.


text: This policy will not be a public statement of anything other than Western attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of others. It is also a powerfully hypocritical message; many democracies have libel laws that prevent libel and misrepresentation and authoritarian states should be allowed to have the same laws which will sometimes impact on bloggers. [1]  [1] Li, Eric X, “The Life of the Party”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013,


text: These people are under serious threat for their pursuit of justice  The internet has become the paramount means of voicing dissent within repressive regimes. As the technology regimes have to keep control of their people increases, with access to high-tech surveillance technology adding to their already formidable arsenals of physical oppression, the internet has become the only platform to express meaningful dissent. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, for example, wherein people mobilized to overthrow their dictator has even been dubbed the Twitter Revolution. [1] Bloggers have become a major voice of dissent in other repressive regimes, including Cuba and China. Yet the blog platform is far from safe. Governments have sought to crack down on bloggers’ ability to dissent, using draconian methods like imprisonment to cow them into silence. In China the arrests of bloggers like Zhai Xiaobing, who was arrested and detained for simply posting a joke about Communist Party, have served to frighten many into silence. [2] So long as information is denied to the public, governments are able to maintain their repression. Only external help from democratic, or at least more liberal, states can provide the safe haven for people who have rubbed their governments the wrong way in their pursuit of reform and justice.  [1] Zuckerman, E. “The First Twitter Revolution?”. Foreign Policy. 14 January 2011.   [2] Wong, G. “Zhai Xiaobing, Chinese Blogger, Arrested for Twitter Joke About China’s Government”. Huffington Post. 21 November 2012.


text: Offering amnesty will not serve the cause of justice, it is responding to the symptom not the cause. It is unfortunate that individual bloggers suffer at the hands of governments, but seeking to give them amnesty will only serve to anger the regimes, leading to even further oppression and stifling of dissent. This unfortunately means that an individual is saved even as their actions may result in further reductions in the liberties of those who remain. As seen in China, the process of reform is slow and gradual. Upsetting that process could well increase the repression Western peoples feel to be so reprehensible.


text: This offer of amnesty serves as a powerful public statement in favour of free speech and rule of law  In offering amnesty Western governments make an exceptionally powerful public statement in the international arena, an area in which they already hold great sway as norm-setters. It is a statement that shows that they will not simply ignore the abuses of power used by repressive regimes to stifle dissent and the voices of reform. [1] Ultimately, the power of oppressors to act with impunity is the product of democracies’ unwillingness to challenge them. Authoritarian regimes often claim to value freedom of the press, for example article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China guarantees it, [2] and this policy challenges them to make their practice more like what they preach. A policy of amnesty for those threatened with the lash of tyranny serves to actively protect those people while at the same time upholding the avowed principles of justice and fairness the West proclaims. This will show that the West does not play favourites or turn a blind eye to these repressions, but is an active player, willing to step in to shield those who share its dreams of a freer world. The international ridicule these policies can generate will serve to shame regimes into relaxing their policies and to embrace at least a road to reform. Nor should it be assumed that this rhetoric will have no real consequences, many authoritarian regimes encourage investment by companies from democratic countries, such investment is less likely when that company’s home state is publically condemning that state by granting amnesties to dissident bloggers.  [1] Clinton, H. “Conference on Internet Freedom”. U.S. Department of State, 8 December 2011.   [2] Fifth National People’s Congress, “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China”, 4 December 1982,


text: People in oppressive regimes are smart enough to know when they are being duped. They will listen if the bloggers have a good point and are being unjustifiably persecuted. In the case of the Japan-China territorial dispute, there is the tangible fact that the islands are being fought over for nationalists to attach to irrespective of ideology. Offering amnesty is simply an offer to rescue people facing imminent unjust punishment. While governments will no doubt seek to paint them as foreign agents, their ideas will be able to continue to battle in the public sphere, rather than be shut off forever with the closing of a prison-cell door.


text: All countries, even authoritarian ones, desire to be considered legitimate and valued in the international community. The weight of condemnation that a policy of amnesty creates is one that bears down heavily on repressive regimes and can galvanize them to reform. Furthermore, it is essential that Western governments nurture dissidents and give them shelter so they can continue their mission to attain justice rather than be thrown into jail.


text: The liberal democratic paradigm is not the only legitimate model of government, a fact that democracies should accept and embrace  Ultimately, states’ laws have to be respected. Liberal democracy has not proven to be the end of history as Fukuyama suggested, but is rather one robust system of government among many. China has become the example of a state-led capitalist model that relies on a covenant with the people fundamentally different from that between democratic governments and their citizens. [1] Chinas ruling communist party has legitimacy as a result of its performance and its role in modernising the country. [2] China’s people have accepted a trade-off; economic growth and prosperity in exchange for their liberties. When dissidents challenge this paradigm, the government becomes aggrieved and seeks to re-establish its power and authority. If the dissidents are breaking that country’s laws then the state has every right to punish them. Singapore similarly has an authoritarian version of democracy that delivers an efficient, peaceful state at the expense of constraints on the ability to criticise the government. [3] This collective model of rights has no inherent value that is lesser to that of the civil liberties-centric model of liberal democracy. In the end, as the geopolitical map becomes complicated with different versions of governance, states must learn to live with one another. The problem of offering amnesty to bloggers is that democracies and the West seek to enforce their paradigm onto that of states that differ. This will engender resentment and conflict. The world economy and social system relies on cooperation, trade, and peace. The difference between systems and cultures should be celebrated rather than simply assuming that there is only one true model and all others are somehow inferior.  [1] Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. “Is State Capitalism Winning?”. Project Syndicate. 31 December 2012.   [2] Li, Eric X, “The Life of the Party”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013,   [3] Henderson, Drew, “Singapore suppresses dissident” Yale Daily News, 5 November 2010,


text: Democracies should be wary of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries  Authoritarian countries tend to guard their sovereignty jealously and will not take kindly to what they would consider to be interference in their internal affairs. In many cases this is exactly what the government offering an amnesty would be doing. Should foreign countries really be deciding that the justice system of a country was wrong in this or that case so amnesty should be provided? Where there are legal proceedings against a blogger that end up with the blogger being sent to jail those outside the country may think the sentences unjust but as countries that publically support the rule of law they should accept the result. It may well be the case that sometimes the judicial system has been used to persecute a blogger but it is difficult to see why an outside power with little interest in the case should believe they have the right to provide an alternative verdict through an amnesty. Where a country disapproves of the treatment of an individual this should be done by negotiating with the government in question and providing any alternative evidence they have. Cuba for example has released dissidents before as a result of negotiations with outside actors; the release 80 dissidents for the visit by Pope John Paul II in 1998 being merely the most successful example. [1]  [1] Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: Release of Dissidents Still Leaves Scores in Prison”, 8 July 2012,


text: The offer of amnesty allows home governments to discredit bloggers and paint them as foreign agents of disruption  When Western states and democracies offer amnesty to bloggers under threat from their home governments, the blogger’s views and comments immediately become coloured in the eyes of the public. The government is able to point to the Western powers offering this amnesty and can easily claim that their offers are the result of collusion between bloggers and their foreign patrons to spread propaganda, so the blogger is therefore guilty of treason. As unfortunate as it may be in individual cases, the result is that offering amnesty will only weaken the cause of democracy. Being sent to prison for their beliefs will do far more to serve their cause than seeking succour in the arms of another state, one that has demonstrated antagonism toward their homeland. The ability for governments to stoke nationalist fires has been thoroughly demonstrated in recent months by China’s reaction toward territorial disputes with Japan. [1] It is very easy to rile the public against a perceived external aggressor, especially given that these states often control much of the mainstream media outlets, and those who offer amnesty give themselves up on a platter as an adversary to be exploited in the public consciousness. The better plan for democracies in pursuit of their goals is to condemn acts of oppression and to seek diplomatic redress, but direct interference in the course of states’ justice will doing nothing but harm relations with regimes and turn the people against the proponents of reform.  [1] The Economist. “Barren Rocks, Barren Nationalism”. 25 August 2012.


text: An amnesty policy will serve only to alienate regimes, shutting down the possibility of discourse or reform  It is a natural conclusion that a repressive regime, which operates largely by force and the control of its population, will react rather negatively to an action by the West that appears to be a calculated, public, and on-going subversion of their power in favour of criminal dissidents. The result of such action by Western democracies will not be any positive discourse between the targeted regime and the West, but will rather cause a breakdown in communication. They will be reticent to engage for the very reason that the states seeking to influence them are clearly not interested in dealing on an equal footing, but rather wish to undermine their way of life in favour of asserting their own superiority. The best way to actually get talks about reform started, and to empower those who wish for more democracy and press freedom, is to patiently engage with these regimes, to coax them peaceably toward reform without threatening their core aims. [1] Aggression toward them will generate aggression in return as is shown again and again by North Korea and the responses to its actions by the United States. While incremental change may feel glacial, the long game is the only way to get changes without letting blood flow through the streets. The only possible outcome of this policy would be a harsher crackdown on bloggers by these governments.  [1] Larison, D. “Engagement is Not Appeasement”. The American Conservative. 17 December 2012.


text: An amnesty would clearly only be offered under certain circumstances. In cases where there are judicial proceedings then the offer of an amnesty could only take effect when the individual being offered it is released and able to take advantage of the offer. It is also wrong to consider that an offer of an amnesty is unwarranted interference in internal affairs; the country in question clearly objects to what the blogger is doing so this is opening an avenue where both the state and blogger get what they want.


text: Liberal democracy is in a clash of ideologies with other competing systems, they promote their own systems through other means such as aid to regimes that are considered to be backsliding by liberal democracies with no strings attached. It is critical that the democratic paradigm not submit to the demands of other systems that would undermine the rights and values that democracy has come to view as universal. While liberal democracy may not be the only legitimate form of governance there are universal right, such as freedom of expression, which must be accepted by all states and should be protected both at home and abroad. China’s vibrant dissident community is example enough that the alternative rights framework that the Communist Party offers is deficient. Rather than let those fresh shoots of democratic advocacy be smothered, the West should nurture them, and give them protection when they face vicious threats from cruel regimes.


title: rnational middle east law human rights international law house believes israels west

text: First, it is unclear if this is even true. A 2010 poll showed support for dismantling settlements in exchange for Peace at an all-time high in Israel. [1]  Secondly, even if it is true that settlements complicate the internal Israeli political picture, the impact on the Peace Process is limited to the extent to which one accepts that the West Bank borders are sacrosanct. Beyond that, the difference in political cost between uprooting 180,000 and 300,000 settlers is marginal at best – both are likely impossible concessions for any Israeli government to make except under enormous international pressure in which case the numerical difference is of limited importance.  Far more important is accepting that the assumption that the West Bank boundaries are sacrosanct has done far more harm than good. It gives neither side room to compromise on the issues of vital importance to them. For Israel, providing defence in depth for Tel Aviv which is only sixteen miles from Jerusalem, for the Palestinians, ensuring that their national home is economically viable.  Far better would be to use the existent of the settlements to pressure both sides to accept that some portion of the West Bank will remain with Israel in any settlement, while in exchange, some portion of Israel proper approximately equal in size will be transferred to a future Palestinian entity. Once both sides accept this premise, the number of options for an agreement and for compensations on the issues of dispute increase astronomically.  It is perhaps for this reason that support for this exchange has moved from the fringes to the mainstream of Israel Political thinking with even Tzipi Livni of the Center-Left Kadima now open to it. [2]  [1] Richman, Alvin, ‘Israeli Public’s Support for Dismantling Most Settlements Has Risen to a Five-Year High’, World Public Opinion.org, 15 April 2010,   [2] Carlstrom, Gregg, ‘Lieberman sees common ground with Livni’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2011,


text: The Settlements commit future Israeli governments to a harder stand in future negotiations  Whether deliberate or not, the settlements are changing the “facts on the ground” by changing the political calculus for future Israeli governments.  While most Israeli politicians accept the need to abandon some smaller settlements, the vast majority are unlikely to be evacuated. It was politically divisive to the point of breaking the Likud party in two when Ariel Sharon, a man with more credit than anyone else on the Israeli right pulled out of Gaza in 2005, and there were only a little over 7000 Israeli settlers there. By contrast there are now more than 300,000 settlers in the West Bank, and this number is rising fast. [1] There were less than 200,000 in 2000. [2]  Of these settlers, many are religious and vote for the Haridam (Orthodox) parties like the National Religious Party . [3] Because the party has served in governments of both the Left and the Right in recent years, in practice they and the ultra-nationalist Israel Beitinu tend to hold the balance of power in the Israeli Knesset.  Therefore every time Israel expands settlements, they are reducing their room to manoeuvre in future Peace Negotiations, and forcing themselves to take a harder stance. This means that Peace will either become less likely (because Israel will set more extreme terms) or that Israel will face more internal divisions in order to offer it. In either case, as the settlements expand  [1] Levinson, Chaim, ‘IDF: More than 300, 000 settlers live in West Bank’, Haaretz.com, 27 July 2009,   [2] Wikipedia, ‘Population statistics for Israeli West Bank settlements’, en.wikipedia.org,  , accessed 20 January 2012  [3] Etkes, Dror, ‘The Ultra-Orthodox Jews in the West Bank’, Peace Now, October 2005,


text: The settlements at the current time occupy less than 3% of the West Bank, [1] and even if one were to take into account the land needed for their security in any settlement, most have predicted that at most 9-11% of the region would be affected, much less than the area currently controlled by the settlements, [2] and this would be subject to compensation elsewhere.  The vast majority of this growth is taking place existing settlements or adjacent to them, so even large amounts of proportional growth are not shifting the percentages sharply.  Furthermore, a time factor is far from a uniform negative. A large portion of the Palestinian strategy from the mid-1990s onwards has arguably been to drag out negotiations while hoping that a better international climate would lead other countries to exert pressure on Israel for concessions. This strategy has seen their negotiating position deteriorate and undermined support for an agreement within Israel.  By adding a time element, it incentives the Palestinians to think seriously about pressing for an agreement now, rather than looking to fantasy solutions like potential UN recognition that would do nothing to alter the fundamental fact that any possible agreement will have to be made with, and therefore be acceptable to, Israel.  [1] Fleischer, Tzvi, ‘How much land do West Bank settlements take up?’, Australian/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council,   [2] CBS News, ‘Group: Israel Controls 42% of West Bank’, 6 July 2010,


text: The Settlements are illegal, and demonstrate the impotence of the international community  The Settlements, constructed on land that is neither recognizably Israel’s nor which Israel has even claimed to annex are illegal, encroaching on the territory of a future Palestinian state.  It is absurd for the international community to demand the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, and yet allow Israel to establish its population on that land in settlements that view themselves and are viewed by Israel as Israeli territory. [1]  Furthermore, their continued expansion is something that each and every Palestinian can see every day. As a result, the continued expansion both: 1. Destroys Palestinian confidence in the ability and willingness of the International community to enforce its own promises, especially after repeated American and European promises to stop their construction.  2. Convinces Palestinian opinion that the negotiating process is an Israeli game to buy time until they have changed the facts on the ground.  As a consequence of these two factors, the continued expansion of settlements has an impact in driving Palestinians towards violent resistance even beyond the direct impact of the settlement construction by undermining their faith in International Law, and by adding a sense of urgency to their grievances.  [1] MacIntyre, Donald, ‘The Big Question: What are Israeli settlements, and why are they coming under pressure?’, the Independent, 29 May 2009,


text: The settlements are a sideshow that provide a convenient excuse for the Palestinians and their foreign friends to ignore the real (and difficult to solve) issues such as Jerusalem and what sort of sovereignty a Palestinian state would have.  For one thing, international law is very unclear on who owns the West Bank. Jordan gave up all claim to it in 1988, but its unclear as to whether their annexation in 1949 was legitimate in the first place. [1] Only Pakistan and Great Britain ever legally recognized Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank. Secondly, the current border of the West Bank are arbitrary, the results of the military conflict of 1948-49 for which they represent the cease-fire line. As a consequence, even if one accepts the principle that there should be a Palestinian state in the West Bank, it does not follow that the final international border should follow the regions border exactly. It might for instance to make sense, as Israelis like Avigador Lieberman have suggested, to trade Arab villages in Israel proper for settlement areas on the West Bank. [2]  The Settlement issue mainly serves the purpose of putting Israel in the wrong, so as to distract from the need on the part of the Palestinians to define what sort of state they are willing to accept. The problem is not territory per se, but what happens to that territory and it’s on that issue that previous efforts to reach peace deals have faltered.  [1] ‘Jordan Renounced Claims to West Bank, 1988’, Palestine Facts,   [2] Carlstrom, Gregg, ‘Lieberman sees common ground with Livni’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2011,


text: First of all, the security precautions are not a perquisite of settlements in and of themselves, but a consequence of the violent condition of the West Bank. Similar settlements in the Negev do not require anywhere near the degree of investment in security and protection.  Such precautions will almost certainly be removed not only in a final settlement but also in any intermediate ones. Israel has already shown a preparedness of to lift travel restrictions on Palestinians in exchange for reductions in violence. [1]  [1] Hass, Amira, ‘Israel to lift restrictions on Palestinian Jordan Valley travel’, Haaretz.com, 26 April 2007,


text: The Settlements are seen by Palestinians as a sign of bad faith on the part of Israel, and therefore weaken the hand of Pro-Peace elements  As important as the existence of the settlements themselves is their continued growth. The very fact that Israel has continued to ostensibly negotiate for the independence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank on one hand while rapidly expanding the population and the size of Israeli settlements can be interpreted as a sign of bad faith.  For one thing, it raises questions of the seriousness with which Israel is attempting to reach an agreement. Even if the programs of Settlement expansion are intended as a temporary policy in lieu of a settlement, the very fact that Israel’s plan B is arguably as popular as peace, and being pursued with far more vigour could lead many Palestinians to conclude that Israel is attempting to run out the clock.  The consequences of this are inauspicious for the Peace Process. As Palestinian faith in the prospect of peaceful negotiations falters, groups like Hamas are likely to find an increasingly receptive audience for their view that only force will compel Israel to negotiate seriously. This in turn will make compromise all the more difficult to achieve.


text: Settlements remove Palestinians from their own land, and they produce a self-perpetuating cycle in their sear  The settlements themselves are self-perpetuating in a manner that makes them pernicious to the rights and very existence of neighbouring Palestinian communities.  For one thing, a settlement cannot function in isolation. It needs a road for its residents to safely travel to and from work in Israel. Security needs subsequently require that this road be protected from attacks by creating a large military presence along its route, and in many cases moving existing Palestinian settlements. At the very least Palestinian areas are bisected by impassable thoroughfares. [1]  In turn settlements require their fields to be protected by high walls and electric fences to protect them from attack, and the construction crews building them also require protection.  The result is that even a settlement of a few hundred families rapidly requires the takeover of an amount of land out of all proportion to the actual number of settlers involved, and any further expansion compounds the problem. [2] The security needs of settlements create a situation which makes the livelihood of Palestinians impossible. The existence of the settlements makes these security policies a necessity. As a consequence, the only clear solution is the removal of the settlements.  [1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies’, January 2012,   [2] CBS News, ‘Group: Israel Controls 42% of West Bank’, 6 July 2010,


text: It is absurd to argue that because someone is hypocritical that they lose their rights. The fact is that the Palestinians today are not guilty of the crimes of their ancestors anymore than the Israelis are.  Rather than being evaluated based on history, they should be evaluated based on what is justified now. And settlements make both sides less secure, and render peace less and less likely.


text: The Palestinians themselves did not enjoy self-rule after 1948 and the blame for the expulsions should not be placed on them but on the Jordanian authorities, and they are the ones who should be obligated to provide compensation if any is due. And the Palestinians played no role in the expulsion of Jews from states like Iraq and Egypt and therefore to impose compensation at their expense is deeply unfair.  Furthermore, while many of the settlement may have been built near the sites of abandoned Jewish communities, most have expanded far beyond those locations and the need to provide security for them has led to the confiscation of historically Arab land.


text: Settlements provide economic investment in the Occupied Territories  The fundamental fact is that the West Bank, whatever its status, is not an economically viable entity on its own. It produces few goods, while Gaza produces next to none, and independence without a major influx of capital will not change this situation.  The best source for a supply of capitol in the region lies in Israel, which has an enormous demand for a low-wage work-force. Millions of Palestinians worked in Israel until after 2000, and with travel into Israel proper restricted, settlement construction and cultivation provide economic development opportunities for the region and create jobs for Palestinians. [1] This is an important prospect when the unemployment figures for the Palestinians are at nearly 30%. [2]  Furthermore the very need for such labor is likely to further incentivise Israel to loosen restrictions on Palestinian workers in the West Bank and Gaza.  [1] Hass, Amira, ‘Israel to lift restrictions on Palestinian Jordan Valley travel’, Haaretz.com, 26 April 2007,   [2] ‘Palestinian unemployment shows gradual decline’, Jmcc, 21 February 2010,


text: There is nothing legal or sacred about the West Bank’s borders – it was an ad-hoc armistice line never recognized internationally  The West Bank is not some sort of recognized entity with legally or internationally recognized boundaries. Its borders were the 1948 cease-fire line between Israeli and Jordanian forces, and Jordan’s annexation of the region, and hence the borders were only recognized by two countries – the United Kingdom and Pakistan. [1]  This is important, because the entire challenge to the legality of the settlements, i.e. Why they are unacceptable in Hebron but not in the Negev, is due to the belief that Israel is somehow annexing Palestinian territory. While some of the West Bank was intended to be part of a Palestinian state in 1948, and some will be incorporated into a new one in the future, Israel is under no responsibility to the international community or any comprehension of International law to recognize boundaries that have no legal force and do not legally exist.  [1] ‘Jordan Renounced Claims to West Bank, 1988’, Palestine Facts,


text: The Palestinians were full participants in the 1948 War against Israel  Before the discussion of the Palestinians as the innocent victims of Israeli oppression can be established, it should be noted that the Palestinian leadership were full participants in rejecting the 1948 partition plan and the war that followed. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem rejected any form of compromise, and urged the removal of the region’s Jewish population, while massacres of Jewish settlers at Palestinian hands and the complete elimination of the Jewish presence in the areas of Palestine that the Israelis did not secure in 1948 speaks to a certain degree of popular enthusiasm. [1]  Following 1948, Israeli law provided for compensation or the return of land for any exiled Palestinians who returned to Israel proper and took an oath to the state.  This does not justify the actions of Israel in their entirety, but the tragedy of the Palestinian people is partially of their own making, and if one accepts the principles of the right of return, then the creation of Israeli settlements furthers this on the Israeli side.  Furthermore, it calls into question what, if any legal claim the Palestinians can have to any land on the basis of a UN partition plan they rejected, and on the basis of principles and practices they themselves have subverted.  [1] Dershowitz, Alan, ‘Has Israel’s Victimization of the Palestinians Been the Primary Cause of the Arab-Israeli Conflict?’, The Case for Israel, Chapter 10, 2003,


text: The Settlements are justified based on the expulsion of Jews from Arab lands after 1967  Settlement construction, and in fact the whole settlement of Jews in the West Bank has to be viewed in the wider context of the Middle East conflict as a whole.  Jews lived in the West Bank for thousands of years before the creation of Israel, and it was only after the 1948 war when Jews were fully ethnically cleansed from the region. While a Diaspora took place among the Arabs of Israel it was neither as deliberate nor as thorough – a large Arab population remained. No Jews remained in the West Bank under Jordanian rule.  As such many of these settlements are not artificial constructions but built on the ruins of pre-1948 Jewish communities.  Furthermore, the same 1967 War that brought on the Israeli conquest of the West Bank was also followed by a new round of pogroms against the nearly 800,000 Jews living in Arab countries more than 95% of which were driven into exile in Israel. [1] Israel has not responded by expelling or compensating them at the expense of their own Arabs, as they would be morally justified in doing, but rather has settled them on empty land in the West Bank. Any claim that the Palestinians have an inherent right to property which they do not explicitly own must also take into account Israel’s need to compensate these refugees.  [1] Aharoni, Ada, ‘The Forced Migration of Jews From Arab Countries and Peace’, August 2002, Historical Society of Jews from Egypt,


text: If de facto boundaries exist for a long enough time they gain legal force. The border between North and South Korea is a legal armistice line, rather than an official international boundary, but anyone attempting to make that argument upon crossing it would be likely to receive a cool reception.  The boundaries of the West Bank were de facto recognized, first when Israel and Jordan agreed to abide by them for twenty years after 1948, second when Jordan ceded all claim to the territories, and third implicitly by Israel itself which has made no claim to annex the territory, even in areas where settlements are located. They have not bothered with this sort of diplomatic care when it comes to the Golan Heights which they annexed. [1]  As a consequence it can be implied that at least Israel believes that its claims to the West Bank are questionable, and would like to ensure them through negotiation and this makes the claim that they don’t know exactly what they are doing in the West Bank and that it’s a de facto violation of International Law something less than plausible..  [1] Wikipedia, ‘Golan Heights’, en.wikipedia.org,  , accessed 20 January 2012


text: It is ironic that when the agricultural basis of the Palestinian economy is being strangled by settlement construction and the seizure of groves involved, that Palestinians should be grateful for the job opportunities provided in low-wage service positions in the Israeli settlements. [1]  Furthermore, even if one accepts the economic premises of the government’s argument, one is left with the fact that Israel’s policies are creating a climate of economic dependence that will ensure that any future Palestinian entity is economically and therefore politically dependent on Israel.  The Palestinian movement is as much a resistance against colonial exploitation as it is a revolt against a legal denial of independence, and it is unlikely their grievances will be settled when similar arrangements have left Israeli Arabs more alienated from the Jewish state than ever before. [2]  [1] Alwazir, Atyaf, ‘Uprooting Olive Trees in Palestine’, American.edu, November 2002,   [2] Telhami, Shibley, ‘The 2011 Public Opinion Poll of Jewish and Arab Citizens of Israel’, Brookings, 1 December 2011,


title: crime policing international law house believes icc should have its own enforcement

text: States are capable of their own enforcement, even in the difficult cases – for example, Radovan Karadzic was arrested by the Serbian authorities for his trial by the ICTY, and would not necessarily have been arrested faster by an outside force rather than the Serbian police. A large number of states have been pouring resources in to capturing the Lord’s Resistance Army fugitives such as Joseph Kony – if they cannot do capture him, there is no reason to believe that an ICC Police would be able to. Recently the Ugandan Army has been willing to cross borders to chase Kony, so far with little to show for it. [1]  [1] Van Woudenberg, Anneke, ‘How to Catch Joseph Kony’, Human Rights Watch, 9 March 2012,


text: An ICC enforcement arm would be quicker  If international criminals are to be caught it needs to be clear that there is an organisation with the responsibility and authority to catch them. This is especially important when the criminal in question is able to slip across borders to avoid the national authorities in one state as Joseph Kony has done as the ICC would be able to cross borders itself and coordinate the response from multiple countries. The importance of an organisation that is able to catch international criminals can be highlighted by the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia where despite a Memorandum of Understanding relating to the detention of war criminals in Bosnia NATO denied it had the power to make arrests so leading to patrols actively avoiding wanted men to avoid a situation in which they might have to engage in arrests. [1] A lack of clarity over whether an organisation can enforce its warrants for arrest results in arrests not being made. Ultimately the ICTY was successful because this situation was resolved with the creation of multinational police forces backed up with traditional NATO military power if necessary leading to the arrest of 126 individuals. [2]  [1] Zhou, Han-Ru, ‘The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International Forces From the ICTY to the ICC’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol.4, 2006, pp.202-18,  pp214-6  [2] Ibid, p.203


text: An enforcement arm would still have finite resources. There is no guarantee that an ICC in-house enforcement system would arrest more suspects than the existing system of state bilateral co-operation. This is particularly the case in relation to the most thorny problems the ICC faces – how to catch those who have the backing of their state. An independent force would not enable the ICC to snatch Omar al-Bashir out of Sudan unless the proposal was to create a special forces style force and any such action would have large diplomatic repercussions.


text: An ICC enforcement is a necessity if there is to be international criminal justice  The remit of the ICC is unlike the remit of any national court. It deals exclusively in crimes so unacceptable there is an international consensus behind their illegality and the need for prosecutions. The parties that signed up to the Rome Statute’s reason for the creation of the ICC was “that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” the perpetrators of such crimes clearly need to be brought to book, and to do that they need to be apprehended. The same agreement said the signatories were “Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice” if this is the case then there should be agreement on enabling that enforcement by creating an ICC enforcement arm. Again the Rome statute makes clear that the agreement “shall not be taken as authorizing” intervention by another state. This is why the enforcement needs to be done by a separate international force who could not be considered a threat to any state. [1] Quite simply there is little point in international criminal justice if there is no force to bring the criminals to the court.  [1] ‘Preamble’ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002,


text: While the ICC is a multinational body, it is designed to have a respect for individual nations court systems. It is mainly a “backstop” court, it is happy to see nations prosecute those offences – the Rome Statute mandates that they be added to the domestic criminal law. This is the principle of complementarity. As such there is no need for an international force as the enforcement of international criminal law is provided by the member state’s police forces who will catch the criminals that the ICC wishes to prosecute and send them to the court.


text: Just creating a force to bring suspects to trial would not necessarily be enough to make the ICC a more credible organization. That would have to come through more measures and building multilateral support in areas where situations have been referred to the council. This increase in credibility of the ICC also comes at the expense of the sovereignty of the states that call the ICC force in. Many nations would much prefer the current system where it is clearly solely within their purview to arrest criminals on their soil, creating a competitor with its own police force will be considered by many to be undermining their sovereignty so damaging not improving the chances of a state being willing to involve the ICC.


text: An ICC Enforcement arm would bring in a higher proportion of defendants in to trial  Eight out of the thirty people indicted by the ICC (four in the Darfur situation, including Omar al-Bashir, three Lord’s Resistance Army leaders in Uganda and one in the DR Congo investigation) are still alive and avoiding justice. An in-house enforcement arm would be more effective at capturing indictees than many of the forces of the state parties, as it is likely to be more competent than many of the under-resourced or under-trained national forces. An in house force would be solely focused on capturing the wanted war criminals so would both be focusing resources and much less likely to be sidetracked by other priorities (many of which may be influenced by politics) than national forces. One of the suggested solutions to the failure to capture Joseph Kony and leaders of the LRA is to have greater involvement of peacekeepers; an ICC force would provide the same kind of help. [1]  [1] Van Woudenberg, Anneke, ‘How to Catch Joseph Kony’, Human Rights Watch, 9 March 2012,


text: An ICC enforcement arm would make the ICC more credible as an organization  To its critics, the ICC is an organization that can be mocked with Stalin’s dismissal of the influence of the Pope: “how many divisions does he have?”  An ICC capable of arresting its own fugitives would become a more credible organization, not only due to the show of competence through the arrests – it would lead to more trials, and more convictions, that would help contribute to the acceptance of the ICC as a serious court that is effective at bringing international criminals to justice. A legal institution needs to be effective to remain credible. [1] This would make countries much more likely to cooperate because the ICC would be doing more to help them by providing some of the necessary resources.  Henry Kissinger apparently said “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” (he is not sure he said it) because there is no single European leader, and if the US wants political or military cooperation it calls the UK or France. In much the same way if countries need help apprehending and convicting someone they are much more likely to call in the ICC if it can actually help them catch the wanted person. [2]  [1] Perritt, Henry H., ‘Policing International Peace and Security: International Police Forces’, Chicago-Kent College of Law, March 1999,  p.293  [2] Sobczyk, Marcin, ‘Kissinger Still Lacks a Number to Call Europe’, The Wall Street Journal, 27 June 2012,


text: Those arguments are similar ones to those used against the ICC. An ICC police force, comprised of officers from individual state and supervised by an independent authority appointed by a similar mechanism to the judges, would use the existing frameworks in place for the use of the ICC. If states are happy to have their nationals indicted for international crimes then it stands to reason that these nations should welcome a force that can enforce such indictments and bring these war criminals to trial.


text: An ICC police would be able to provide independent assistance to these states to aid those that do not have enough resources. The ICC has a poor track record of capturing suspects. This is not due to a lack of trying by the ICC – in some cases, it is due to the lack of trying of states such as those that have played host to Omar Al-Bashir. While individual states do, and should, have a role to play in enforcement, in some cases they are unwilling or unable to arrest suspects. Just as the ICC is there if a state is unable or unwilling to try an individual, they can have a role if they are unable or unwilling to arrest them.


text: An ICC enforcement arm would be unduly expensive  In a climate where the ICC’s budget is determined exclusively by contentious negotiation between states (at a time where the ICC itself has threatened to close down investigations due to a lack of funds [1] ), many of whom are undergoing austerity, an enforcement arm is not the best use of scarce funds when its role can be taken by the state parties. The ICC is already expensive enough – it cost over €100M in 2009.  [1] Nzau Musau, “Kenya: ICC Threatens to Drop cases for Lack of Funds”, The Star (Kenya), 2013,


text: ICC enforcement would create resentment  There are good reasons for why an ICC enforcement arm would be ineffective on its own. It may have all the necessary equipment and training but it would be a foreign force, that may or may not be seen as legitimate, attempting to arrest a native of that country. The result would be resentment in the community at the intrusion. This regularly occurs to national police forces when policing in minority areas. In London the Brixton race riots were seen by one inquiry as “essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police” as the police did not represent them. [1] The result with the ICC as elsewhere would likely to at the least be a lack of cooperation, and with most of the force unable to speak the native language altering perceptions would be difficult. Such a force may bring even fewer results than using local forces and would provide a scapegoat for local politicians. [2]  [1] Bowling, Ben, and Phillips, Coretta, ‘Policing ethnic minority communities’, LSE Research Online, 2003,  p.4  [2] Perritt, Henry H., ‘Policing International Peace and Security: International Police Forces’, Chicago-Kent College of Law, March 1999,  p.294


text: An ICC enforcement arm would be highly detrimental to the relations between the ICC and state parties  Currently the ICC functions based on a relationship of trust and understanding with the state parties to the ICC – a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. This is backed up by the court’s respect for the for the principle of complementarity – it is hoped that national courts are capable of prosecuting the crimes, and the ICC only takes a role if the state is unwilling or unable to do so. Being willing to use an international force to catch criminals would make a mockery of this determination to leave power and responsibilities at the national level wherever possible.  Having ICC forces on a country’s territory would be humiliating, showing that the international community does not trust that nation to catch war criminals itself. While this model did not provide for attempting to snatch government officials who have been indicted it does leave open the possibility of an international force intruding on states sovereignty without consent. This would diplomatically backfire and could even lead to an ICC force being involved in fighting with government forces protecting their national sovereignty.


text: An ICC enforcement arm is unnecessary  To create an enforcement arm for the ICC would be to accept that state parties are incapable of enforcing decisions themselves, that is not necessarily the case. State parties have supplied the ICC with many of the defendants that it desires to face trial, including Bemba and the Gbagbos. Some, such as Uhuru Kenyatta have appeared voluntarily. The current system is working in many cases. While it does not in all, there are some that will be extremely difficult to capture by anyone.


text: Apart from the visibility due to the diversity of the force the ICC force may well be very similar to national forces in this regard. Often a problem with arresting wanted international criminals is their support in the community – that they have often been claiming to be fighting for. The national government’s enforcement arm may be as unwelcome as the ICC. In such circumstances the ICC at least has the advantage of being a new quantity with a blank slate rather than being known for any excesses, human rights violations or bribery. The ICC force will be able to treat the local populace fairly and win their trust.


text: What price justice? The ICC has been supported by a large number of states who accept that, while it does cost money, the ICC is the only effective way to bring war criminals and those who commit crimes against humanity to trial, provide them with a fair trial and sentence them appropriately. If that is the goal, states should be willing to finance means towards it. While the ICC’s existing budget of over €100M is substantial, it is dwarfed by, for example, the £4bn budget of London’s Metropolitan Police. In such context €100M is not a large amount to pay to bring international criminals to justice. The people the ICC pursue often engage in widespread destruction, apprehending them quickly may actually save rather than cost money by preventing such damage.