Need to protect Russian civilians  It is the people of Crimea who are important and their interests should be considered. Putin told the Federation Council that Russia is responding to a “threat to the lives of citizens of the Russian Federation… and the personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian territory”. [1] Russia needs to protect both the Russian citizens who are in Crimea and the ethnic Russians who look to Moscow not Kiev.  The Crimean parliament has agreed to hold a referendum on 25th May on “Autonomous Republic of Crimea has state sovereignty and is a part of Ukraine, in accordance with treaties and agreements.” [2] This was put forward to 16th March with two options; Do you support Crimea's reunification with Russia? Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Crimean Republic dated 1992 and Crimea's status as a part of Ukraine? [3] The 97% vote for joining Russia and 83% turnout conclusively show that this is the will of the Crimean people. [4]  [1] RT, 1/3/2014  [2] RT, 27/2/2014  [3] Interfax-Ukraine, ‘Crimean parliament speeds up referendum, introduces question about joining Russia’, Kyiv Post, 6 March 2014  [4] Hewitt, 17/3/2014


Negotiating with the new government would mean recognising it. Russia may well recognise a new government after elections are held and the government is once more legitimate but until then there is little to negotiate. Moreover elections must be held only when there is stability. At the moment Russia won’t recognise any elections because they would be held under a situation of terror where “there is the danger that a fascist element will come to the fore, and some anti-semite will come to power.” [1]  [1] Siddique, 2014


Russia is hardly the first nation to send troops across a border without UN Security Council support, indeed there is quite a list; Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo. All undertaken by western powers. Russia is not threatening the use of force it is simply guaranteeing that its citizens will not come to harm and putting the military on standby just in case such protection is necessary.


Any cross border troop movements are a violation of sovereignty  States are allowed to take measures for “self-defence if an armed attack occurs”. [1] The movement of troops across the international border from Russia into Ukraine, and from the Russian base in Sevastopol clearly is a violation of sovereignty and Ukraine if it wishes has every right to use force to defend itself even if the Russians don’t fire first. [2]  [1] United Nations, ‘Article 51’, 1945  [2] Deeks, 2014


Damaging to Russia  The United States wants to isolate Russia economically with Kerry threatening Putting “He may find himself with asset freezes, on Russian business, American business may pull back, there may be a further tumble of the ruble.” [1] Even without economic action Russia is already suffering fallout from the markets. The Moscow stock exchange fell 11.2% - or almost $60billion. The ruble reached all-time lows against the dollar and the euro and the Central bank was forced to raise interest rates by 1.5% to prevent further losses. [2] Longer term investment is likely to be hit as US and European companies are less willing to invest in a country with an aggressive foreign policy.  [1] Swaine, 2014  [2] Adomanis, Mark, ‘The Invasion Of Crimea Is Crushing Russia's Stock And Currency Markets’, Forbes, 3 March 2014


What are the consequences of violating international norms?  President Putin has noted the west is being hypocritical by highlighting their role in the middle east over the last decade. And it is true that violating the prohibition against force does not carry any immediate sanction, and that which it does carry are discretionary to individual powers. However that does not mean the violation does not matter; instead it means that any attempt to annex Crimea will be seen as completely illegitimate. [1] International institutions are also likely to react, albeit slowly and not very effectively. Institutions such as the Council of Europe demand “Ukraine's territorial integrity must be respected and international commitments upheld” [2] while the OSCE is sending monitors to Ukraine. [3] Some institutions may exclude Russia altogether; there have been suggestions from Secretary of State Kerry that Russia could be thrown out of the G8. [4]  [1] Voeten, Erik, ‘International law and institutions look pretty weak now, but they will matter a lot down the road’, The Washington Post, 2 March 2014  [2] Jagland, T., ‘Secretary General Jagland warns against escalation in Ukraine's Crimea region’, Council of Europe, 1 March 2014  [3] AFP, ‘OSCE security monitors 'advance teams' in Ukraine tonight: US’, google.com, 4 March 2014  [4] Swaine, Jon, ‘Russia G8 status at risk over ‘incredible act of aggression’ in Crimea says Kerry’, theguardian.com, 2 March 2014


Russia should negotiate with the new government  If Putin is truly concerned about Ukraine’s government being illegitimate and unconstitutional then he should be supporting elections as soon as possible to settle the question of who the government. Putin himself accepts that Yanukovych has “no political future” and helped him for “humanitarian reasons”. [1] If this is the case then military action in Ukraine is superfluous; what Russia needs is a new government in Ukraine that is legitimate. The action in Crimea however simply unites Ukrainian opinion against him making it less likely that a pro-Russian candidate stands a chance of winning the election. Already 58% of Ukrainians support integration with the EU. [2] A rash attempt on Crimea could ensure Putin permanently loses Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence.  [1] Siddique, 2014  [2] Titchenko, Ilya, ‘The Deadly illusion of a divided Ukraine’, Kyiv Post, 2 March 2014


While there has been some economic fallout for Russia this is likely to only be temporary, as the risk of actual conflict goes away the markets will return to normal. There is almost no chance that there will be any sanctions that do real damage because much of Europe is dependent on Russia for gas; Germany gets around 39% of its gas from Russia, and this accounts for almost 9% of its energy consumption and other smaller economies in Eastern Europe are even more dependent. [1] Impose sanctions and Russia could squeeze gas supplies.  [1] Ratner, Michael et al., ‘Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification’, Congressional Research Service, 20 August 2013, p.10


It is an invasion without Security Council sanction  The legality of Russia’s invasion of Crimea is simple “Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine violates international law.” [1] The UN Charter is unambiguous “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. [2] Russia has both threatened the use of force by its parliament authorising the President to use force on Ukrainian territory [3] and actually done so by sending troops into Crimea. The only legal way for the UN Charter’s prohibition on force to be avoided is through a Security Council mandate. Which Russia does not have. [4]  [1] Posner, Eric, ‘Russia’s Military intervention in Ukraine: International Law implications’, ericposner.com, 1 March 2014  [2] United Nations, ‘Article 2’, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945  [3] RT, 1/3/2014  [4] Deeks, Ashley, ‘Russian Forces in Ukraine: A Sketch of the International Law Issues’, Lawfare, 2 March 2014


This action by Russia shows (once again) that the consequences of violating international norms is practically zero. As such the action damages the credibility of that norm, especially when applied to a powerful state like Russia. [1] The main problem is Russia is a member of these organisations; as a Security Council member the UN can do nothing, similarly it is blocking a full scale monitoring mission by the OSCE. [2] As for the G8, a talking shop, is Putin really likely to care? [3]  [1] Ku, Julian, ‘Russia Reminds the World (and International Lawyers) of the Limits of International Law’, Opinio Juris, 2 March 2014  [2] AFP, 2014  [3] Judah, 2014


“Ukraine is not [only] our closest neighbour, it is our fraternal nation... we will not go to war with the Ukrainian people.” [1] There have been no shots fired and the action is not a hostile act, it is simply to protect the Crimeans. Russia has not engaged in an armed attack as the forces in Crimea have not fired a shot.  [1] Siddique, 2014


The veto is not wielded as an ideological tool, but rather a tool of national interest like any other diplomatic tool. The recent case of Libya, whereby the veto power was not used by any of the P5, demonstrated the ability of the Security Council to align themselves to the cause of civilian protection. For this reason, it should also be noted that collective security is often indistinguishable from the national interests of the P5. The military might of each of the P5 members individually, and within separate groups, notably the UK and US axis within NATO, is such that the avoidance of disagreement is crucial to international peace. Even if the P5 did cast their vetoes for reasons of ideological self-interest, this cost is outweighed by the maintenance of unity that becomes ever more critical in the post-Cold War multipolar world.


The veto is wielded as an ideological tool.  In the rare recent circumstances in which the veto power has been utilised, it has been hijacked by ideological demands and petty national interests. The P5 are able to use their veto powers not to enforce legality, justice and transparency in the international environment, but rather appease their allies and punish their enemies. China prevented peacekeeping operations proceeding in Guatemala and Macedonia on account of the engagement of those countries with Taiwan1. The veto is no longer applied for the maintenance of collective security, but the substantiation of internal security. 1 He, Yin, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations', Institute for Security & Development Policy, July 2007,


The veto power is still as relevant as it ever was. As the opposition notes, the veto power was granted to ensure the victors in World War II that they could prevent the escalation to world war that had so ravaged their lands and populations. The maintenance of the 'long peace' over the subsequent half-century can be at least partially attributed to the effectiveness of the Security Council veto; the P5 are tempted away from military solutions towards diplomatic feuds due to their ability to bring overbearing political power to bear on rivals. For example, fears of Iran's acquirement of a nuclear weapon have been abetted by US-sponsored efforts to impose sanctions on the regime. Without the veto power, the Security Council would not remain in its current, useful form and may not have prevented a resort to war in this case.


The Security Council knows it has to reform.  All the Security Council members know that at some point there is going to have to be reform of the council. This will most likely mean more members being admitted to the Council. The three countries whose grasp on the Security Council is tenuous due to their relative power having declined; UK, France and Russia, will likely be willing to give up their veto in order to retain their seats. The United States and China would then have to follow or face the rest of the international community and devalue the United Nations. A half-way house would probably be agreed where the veto could be retained in a few areas much as it has been within the European Union decision making process. This could then be slowly eroded over time.


The veto power is a barrier to discourse, preventing the U.N. from acting where the majority of its member states want it to.  Purported U.N. actions that would clearly antagonise a member of the P5 never even reach the Security Council; such is the awareness that the veto would stall its progress. The statistics of the numbers of vetoes passed at any particular point in UN history does not reveal the true defect of the institutional arrangement. In an attempt to circumvent this, countries and military alliances are forced to act unilaterally. NATO initiated military action against Yugoslavia, under the imprimatur of the United States and the United Kingdom, without receiving Security Council authorisation. It had become evident that any UN military involvement would be vetoed by both China and Russia. Furthermore, the silence of the Security Council whilst Russia launched a relentless and brutal campaign against Chechnya was deafening. Nevertheless, there is little that can be done such is the absolute power of the veto that Russia and the other P5 members have.


The Security Council is a unifying force, regardless of its veto powers. Its history of mandating U.N. interventions to prevent humanitarian disasters is on the record and clear. Though many point to the Srebrenica massacre in the former Yugoslavia, few recall the success of the U.N. mission in bringing that conflict to a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, unilateral actions, undertaken without recourse to the Security Council, are often eventually rectified through the Council anyway. The legality of the NATO action in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo was subsequently scheduled for consideration by another organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice. Following the conflict NATO and Russia sought and achieved Security Council endorsement of the campaign. The Council then authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force in order to police Kosovo. The Security Council thus proved to be a unifying force despite the presence of the veto power.


The efficacy of the United Nations Security Council is dependent on the participation of the world's most powerful states, which is in large part due to the possession of the veto power. Removing the veto, or granting it only to those who contribute their fair share to the United Nations budget risks undermining the very structures that have made the Security Council the platform for co-ordinated international action. For example, whilst China is not one of the top contributors to the budget of the organization, it's economic and military strength are enormous and if the Security Council is to remain relevant, China must be encouraged to remain at the table. The veto power ensures unilateralism is a secondary thought.


The veto power is an anachronism that does not suit the contemporary international society and it's power relations.  The permanent five (P5) were given this privilege for two reasons that have no application in the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the Allied powers, with the addition of China, sought to bind themselves to the UN organisation that was designed to prevent the depredations of the Second World War ever recurring. Secondly, the P5 held unrivalled strategic might through their possession of nuclear weapon technology or imminent nuclear capacity. Yet, the UN is no longer in any danger of imminent collapse. The P5 will abandon neither the organisation nor the cause of global peace by loss of the veto power. Moreover, the global power balance has shifted dramatically since 1945; the P5 'do not reflect the geopolitical realities of today'1. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated in the past decade, such that inter alia India, Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq and Iran are developing inter-continental ballistic capacity. 1 Kafala, T. (2003, September 17). The veto and how to use it. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from BBC News


The Permanent Five no longer contribute to the United Nations to a degree expected of their special status.  Funding contributions to the United Nations should directly relate to the influence that member organizations thereafter have on its actions; with the veto in place, this is no longer the case. The Permanent Five, as the group of nations granted the most constitutional power in the United Nations, should contribute a proportional amount of resources to the institution. Initially, this was the case – however, by 2004, Japan was contributing 19 per cent of the UN budget, second only to that of the United States [1]. In third place, contributing 8 per cent, was Germany, another state lacking a veto power and any ability to overrule the interests of P5 nations, all bar one of whom contributed less to the UN budget [2]. Furthermore, India and Brazil, whilst not contributing financially to the degree of Japan and Germany, have permitted large swathes of their armed forces to join U.N. peacekeeping operations to fulfil the mandates handed down by the Security Council. Despite these financial and military contributions, the states concerned get no greater say in the interests and actions of the organization. A fairer, more equitable model would insist on a greater proportionality between one’s contribution to the United Nations and one’s ability to influence its actions.  [1] Blum, 2005  [2] ibid


Constitutional change within the UN is possible and thus worthy of full discussion. As Richard Butler has observed, a proper debate about the defects of the veto might at the least yield a more constructive interpretation of the nature of the veto and its application1. An informed public awareness of the potential for the Security Council to be bypassed or hijacked might lead to pressure for exercise of the power in accordance with the Charter aims. Notably, China was persuaded or compelled not to cast the veto in respect of the Council measures on Kosovo. This reasonable approach prevailed in spite of vocal Chinese opposition to the bombing campaign, and the destruction of the Chinese embassy by NATO forces. 1 Butler, R. (1999, August 19). Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from Chicago Tribune:


Treaties do not confer permanent and inalienable rights; they should be constantly subject to reform when their dictates conflict with the wishes of their voters. In an institution like the United Nations, which espouses self-determination, the existence of a power which is immune from reform is not a source of pride. If the veto powers had a right to the veto when they were first introduced, that right has now been lost in the chorus of disapproval found among the very same U.N. member states that granted them that right. In a political environment, if an elected official loses the will of their voters, the elected official does not get to choose whether they keep those elected powers. The power remains with they who grant the powers, the voters.


The veto power has proven a success in the maintenance of peace.  The veto power has been wielded with increasing success both during and since the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1990, 240 vetoes were cast1. Yet between 1990 and 1999 the power was utilised on only 7 occasions, whilst more than 20 peacekeeping operations were mandated. This figure exceeds the total number of operations undertaken in the entirety of the preceding 45 years. The prodigious use of the veto during the Cold War period might have saved the world from the realisation of nuclear war. Now, increasing nuclear proliferation is a reason for maintaining the unity of the P5 by means of the veto. The current rhetoric concerns 'rogue states' gaining possession of nuclear weapons. These are states whose potential deployment of arms is unpredictable and with whom there is limited international dialogue. If the P5 is split on a matter of international security, any one or more of its members could become equally 'rogue'. 1 Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from Global Policy Forum:


The veto power reduces the risk of nuclear escalation.  The P-5 veto holding members of the UN SC are unique in that they are the only countries that have nuclear arsenals (not simply a small stock of nuclear weapons). They are the only countries with the power to initiate full-scale nuclear war. Therefore, it is important that that they be able to end measures with their veto power to ensure that measures are not realized that could foment serious international tension and possibly nuclear war. In other words, 'you give (veto power) to the nations who- thanks to their nuclear missiles- already have effective veto power anyway'1. The gift of the veto power encourages such nuclear states to act within the system, ensuring that 'they have a stronger stake in acting within the system than acting outside of it'2. 1 Beck. (2004, December 5). The Security Council Veto Power, or Got Nuke? Retrieved May 13, 2011, from Incite: 2 Fassbender, B. (1998). UN Security Council Reform and the Right to Vote: A Constitutional Perspective. Hague: Kluwer Law International.


Abolition of the veto is practically impossible.  The abolition of the power of veto is simply impossible to imagine. The P5 will not willingly cede their pre-eminent position in international politics. And unsurprisingly, each member would have the constitutional power of veto over any proposal to remove the veto. Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grants the P5 veto over amendments to the charter, requiring them to approve stripping away their own veto powers. Given the influence wielded by a veto-bearing state, it is unlikely that any of the P5 would agree to give up this privilege. Therefore, this whole debate is undermined by the sheer impossibility of it being removed, without the wholesale destruction of the United Nations as an organization or, at best, as a relevant organization.


The veto power was granted legally to the P5 by the other participating states, and therefore the P5 have a right to those powers.  There is no requirement in the UN Charter for the veto power to be distributed according to geopolitical realities. Whilst democracy and equality are the principles that direct the General Assembly, they were never intended to apply to the Security Council. The Security Council was conceived as the 'hegemonic' organ, designed to be responsible and effective. As such, the veto power was a tool to ensure the Security Council would not be encumbered by democracy. Therefore, the privileges of the P5 'appear as rights bestowed upon them' by the states who ratified the UN Charter in 19451. As a consequence, the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council have little to complain about when they themselves are responsible for their 'diminished status' under the Charter1. The price paid for their diminished status is the effectiveness of the Security Council. 1 Fassbender, B. (1998). UN Security Council Reform and the Right to Vote: A Constitutional Perspective. Hague: Kluwer Law International, p.264


Only the abolishment of the veto power would enable global action free from the political motives and inherent power politics of the veto powers. Absent of the veto, motions would be considered and passed on merit, not on the self-interest and political motives of the veto powers.As Tarik Kafala argues, 'the majority view at the Council would prevail and we might expect more resolutions passed, more situations identified as threats to world security, more cases of states being reprimanded and sanctions being imposed'1. Far from destabilising the world order, the removal of veto power would merely enshrine self-determination within the organization that purports to carry that principle to the world. 1 Kafala, T. (2003, September 17). The veto and how to use it. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from BBC News


Under international law there are only two instances where secession is possible; in the case of foreign occupation and as a result of decolonisation. The third category espoused by the proposition is disputed and naturally leads to absurd consequences: how small a group of people on how small a plot of land can unilaterally declare independence?  Moreover, the Kosovan claim for independence is not clear-cut. The population ratio of Kosovo-Albanian to Serb inhabitants of Kosovo is constantly in flux. In addition, the current ratio has far fewer Serbs because of enforced or fear-driven flight from the region after NATO intervention gave Kosovo-Albanians the upper hand in the region. In 1971 Serbs were 18.4% of the population. [1] The Kosovo-Albanians have suffered undeniably over the last decade. However, that should not lead us to ignore the very genuine historical significance of Kosovo to Serbia, particularly to the Orthodox faith. There is a historical tradition of both Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians inhabiting Kosovo. To effect a change in the sovereignty over a region on the basis of a temporary population ratio is to ignore the complexity of the issues that surround this territory.  [1] Howe, Marvine, ‘Exodus of Serbians stirs province in Yugoslavia’, The New York Times, 12 July 1982,


Self-determination is a human right  Self-determination is a right recognised by the United Nations Charter and forms the basis of relations between all nations on earth. Thus, Kosovo-Albanians have international law on their side in their pursuit of an independent homeland. If the UN Charter is not explicitly on the side of the Kosovo-Albanians it is difficult to see which people it does support. The very credibility of international law and international society depends on support for causes like that of Kosovan independence where the people in a region have had their right to self-determination internally totally frustrated. [1]  [1] Kumbaro, Dajena.‘The Kosovo Crisis in a International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO intervention’. NATO Office of Information and Press. 2001.


Ethnic Serbs are suffering right now in Kosovo. A large portion of them have been displaced from their homes and a significant number of Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries have been demolished or vandalised. It is hypocritical to use to suffering of one side to justify a transfer of sovereignty while simultaneously ignoring the suffering of the other side.


The people of Kosovo are distinct from their neighbours  Kosovo-Albanians are ethnically and culturally distinct from Serbs. They live in a geographically distinct location, Kosovo which is separated from Serbia by the Prokletije, Kopaonik and Zegovac mountains. They comprise 1.7 million people, living within a distinct area, who as the majority are ethnically Albanian and religiously Muslim are clearly different from the Serbs who until recently ruled over them. There was initially a peaceful resistance movement led by Ibrahim Rugova, established after the loss of autonomy and rights the region experienced in the 1990s. However once this failed to make progress in 1997 an armed resistance movement called the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged. [1] Slobodan Milosevic the Serbian leader responded with in ethnic persecution resulting in NATO intervention which in itself should be enough reason to support independence. For all these reasons, Kosovo-Albanians deserve to be allowed to govern themselves just as much as any other people.  [1] Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘Background Note: Kosovo’, U.S. Department of State, 16 November 2011,


An ethnic or religious difference from the rulers of one’s country is not a sufficient condition to necessitate independence. It is perfectly possible for example to be a Muslim in a predominantly Christian country, or someone of Irish heritage living in England, without calling for a separate "state within a state". Not just any minority group deserves to have its call for sovereign independence recognised. There have to be additional and better reasons, other than a simple difference in ethnicity or cultural heritage if a people are to ground a valid claim for sovereign independence.


Britain does though claim sovereignty over far away locations such as the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The controversy of those claims is not mitigated that they are populated by ethnic Britons who immigrated on assumption of British control.  Ethnic nationalism has a very bad history, both around the world and in the Balkans in particular. Out of the nineteenth century explosion in popularity of nationalistic ideologies grew the bitter tensions and wars of the twentieth century. The last thing that we should be doing is promoting a continuation and an extension of this divisive and destructive way of perceiving the world. Ultimately, an independent state would be created just because it was believed that there is too much bad blood between the Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians for them to live in harmony. To create an ethnically exclusive state because of animosity with another ethnic group is not a solution; it is a recipe for disaster.


Reversing de-facto sovereignty would be an affront to those who suffered from ethnic cleansing  The NATO action in Kosovo was justified as a humanitarian intervention to prevent the oppression and murder of Kosovo-Albanians. It makes a mockery of that action and the liberal-internationalist, humanitarian rhetoric that underpinned it, to then deny these over a million people the right to determine their own future free from outside interference. Tony Blair for example stated “We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed.” [1] If they should then choose to seek EU membership, then that is their right and a clear opportunity for them to gain greater prosperity outside Serbia.  Kosovar Albanians have suffered much over the last decade at the hands of Serbia. It is offensive to suggest that they must submit to any arrangement that preserves Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Serbia/Yugoslavia forfeited whatever right it had to govern Kosovo when it systematically discriminated against Kosovo-Albanians. It is also in Serbia’s own interests to put its own bloody past behind it and make a clean break in the interests of improving its economic and diplomatic relationships with its neighbours, and in seeking foreign aid and perhaps one day EU membership.  [1] Blair, Tony, ‘Prime Minister’s speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago’, 24 April 1999,


The popular sovereignty of the Kosovan people must take precedence over other considerations  The present fact of a distinct, Kosovo-Albanian people living in Kosovo must take precedence over any traditional, religious or historical claim to Serbian sovereignty over that land. It is certainly true that Kosovo is historically and culturally important to Serbia. It has a particular significance for the Orthodox faith. However, consider the following analogy. Great Britain is, officially, a Christian country. This fact gives the British no valid territorial claim to sovereignty over Bethlehem (the literal birth-place of Christianity), particularly when there are people already living in the area. Historico-religious, traditional associations with a place can never override the rights of an indigenous population to remain in possession of its land and sovereignty.  There are clear, historical precedents for granting Kosovo independence. These precedents can be seen regionally in the post-communist independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, as well as of the Baltic Republics. Globally, one can see precedents in the struggle of African countries for independence from European colonial rule. The relative proximity of Serbia to Kosovo in no way makes the situation dissimilar to the struggles of India against British rule - the British would not be content to be ruled by France just because the two countries are neighbours.


This argument depends upon how one defines the ‘territorial integrity’ of a state in Article 2. Certainly it would not be legitimate for a state to simply declare based on an old treaty or historic claim that its territory encompassed that of a neighbour and to invade, therefore the requirement to respect territorial integrity must only refer to de facto integrity. Given that Serbia has no actual control over the territory of Kosovo it is not a violation of the rights of the Serbian state to recognise it as an independent nation.


In the last decade Kosovo has leveraged remittances and direct investment from the Kosovar diaspora to achieve robust growth. It has also made significant progress in developing key social and economic institutions necessary for a viable state. In adopting the Euro as legal tender it has gained a strong financial anchor. Kosovo also benefits from low public debt and a strategic cash reserve. [1] It is also wrong to argue that Kosovo would be unviable because of its size as Kosovo has a population considerably larger than many independent states in Europe today (eg Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia).  [1] IMF ‘Republic of Kosovo: Concluding Statement of the 2011 Article IV Consultation Mission’. May 30 2011.


Now is not the appropriate time  There are still widely reported incidents between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs. [1] Mafia-style gangs dominate the area, [2] many associated with the KLA paramilitaries who struggled against Serbia, and are involved in international crimes such as drug and people trafficking. Moreover, there was an effective Serb boycott of recent elections in Kosovo. The region has clearly not yet healed its wounds and to put even more strain on the already tense relations between the two communities is simply not advisable.  In Serb-dominated North Kosovo, schools utilities and municipalities are integrated into Serbia’s system, not Kosovo’s.  [1] Potok, Zubin, ‘NATO soldiers wounded by gunfire in Kosovo clash’, Reuters, 28 November 2011,   [2] Lewis, Paul, ‘Kosovo PM is head of human organ and arms ring, Council of Europe reports’, guardian.co.uk, 14 December 2010,


It will be bad for regional stability  Not only will a move toward independence be bad news for the Serb minority population and for regional relations in general. Some areas of northern Kosovo are ethnically Serb, while parts of southern Serbia have an Albanian population, so the border is likely to be in dispute. It will also increase tensions in neighbouring Macedonia. There is a large, Albanian minority in the north of Macedonia. In the aftermath of NATO intervention in Kosovo separatists attempted to put the cause of independence from Macedonia on the map. The Macedonian government is not willing to cede any of its territory and any resurgence in separatist terrorism - which would be the inevitable consequence of independence for Kosovo - would lead to bloody conflict in that region. [1] Not only Serbia but also Macedonia and Greece fear a struggle for a Greater Albania. Thus, in the interests of preserving peace and preventing loss of life, we should postpone the settlement of the question of sovereignty until tensions between the different communities subside.  [1] Karon, Tony, ‘Why Macedonia Has NATO Worried’, TimeWorld, 12 March 2001,


The UN charter is against it.  Article 2 of the UN charter requires all member states to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’.  Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which authorised the deployment of an international force to Kosovo to manage security and governance, explicitly affirmed the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the name for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro which ended in 2006) and the other States to that region. [1]  Recognition of an independent Kosovo is a violation of the territorial integrity of Serbia and thus a violation of the rights of the Serbian state.  [1] UN Security Council Resolution 1244


An independent Kosovo is not a viable state  An independent Kosovo would be too small for it to be a viable state. It is one of the poorest regions in Yugoslavia, with a per capita GDP of only $2750, [1] and needs to be a part of a larger state for it to benefit from the development subsidies, economies of scale and labour movement rights that are offered by membership of a larger state. The creation of an independent sovereign state would entail the introduction of destructive tariffs and other bureaucratic obstacles to the regeneration of the region, which must be the first priority. The avid desire of Slovenia and other former communist countries to join the political and economic project of the European Union is a clear indication of the way that Balkan people should be directed.  [1] Background Note: Kosovo,


Whilst the ideal of Serb and Kosovar living in harmony is an honourable one, the international community should not waste energy trying to engineer such a society when both sides appear committed to exclusive, nation-state models which involve the political and social hegemony of one group over the other. Multicultural toleration is a fine liberal, democratic ideal but it does not fit every empirical reality. The tensions are too great to make such a system work.


The uncertainty over Kosovo’s status is a cause of tension. Drawing a line under the whole issue and making it clear that Kosovo will not revert to being part of Serbia again allows for a relaxing of nationalist tension and for serious discussions to begin over land swaps that would make the border more sensible.


This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.


Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence  For Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.  1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012,   2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012,   3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012,   4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012,


Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, "Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2  1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012,   2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012,


Catalans clearly want self determination  Every peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2  1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1,   2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012,


It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1  1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217  Para 126/7


Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1  1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012,


Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position  Catalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says "If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2  Ultimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.  1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012,   2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012,


If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result  The worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says "There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3  1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012,   2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012,   3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012,


It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2  1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010,   2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012,


Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2  1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978,  Section 2  2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012,


Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state  The issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1  The basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?  1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011,   2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012,


The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce  Both Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.  1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012,


Spain is one indivisible nation  The Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1  Moreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's  proposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3  1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978,  Section 2  2 Ibid, Section 92  3 Ibid, section 149


For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.


Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinians' legal case, their foremost argument for a 'right of return' has always rested on a claim of victimhood; this claim is highly disputed (as outlined below). Without this moral culpability on the part of Israel, there is no responsibility to right the situation on the part of the Israeli state.  Moreover, the 'individual' nature of the right of return is not helpful to the Palestinian case: Stig Jagerskiold argued in 1966 that the right of return was intended as an individual and not a collective right: "...[it] is intended to apply to individuals asserting an individual right. There was no intention here to address the claims of masses of people who have been displaced as a by-product of war or by political transfers of territory or population, such as the relocation of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe during and after the Second World War, the flight of the Palestinians from what became Israel, or the movement of Jews from the Arab countries." [1] The claimed legal 'right of return' was never intended to be invoked by masses of people, which would fundamentally alter the welfare and nature of the state they returned to, and so its use in this way is invalid.  [1] Lapidoth, Ruth. "LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE QUESTION". Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Jerusalem Letter / Viewpoints. 1 Septemebr 2002.


Palestinians have a right to return under international law  Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [1] This right clearly applies to the Palestinians, as shown by UN General Assembly Resolution 194: “The General Assembly, Having considered further the situation in Palestine ... Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." [2] This resolution was further clarified by UN General Assembly Resolution 3236 which reaffirms: "the inalienable right of Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return." Israel itself accepted Resolution 194 when it was allowed to join the UN on the condition that it accepted this resolution. [3]  Israel's own laws recognise the importance of the 'right of return' to a people in general through the fact that Jews are allowed to emigrate to Israel under Israel's Law of Return, even if their immediate ancestors have not lived in the area in recent years. [4] The fact that, conversely, Palestinian people who grew up in the area and whose immediate ancestors had lived there for many generations are forbidden from returning is thus a huge injustice even from Israel's own legal perspective. Moreover, this right of return applies not just to Palestinians as a group but also individually to all Palestinian refugees themselves. On March 15, 2000, a group of 100 prominent Palestinians from around the world expressed their opinion that the right of return is individual, rather than collective, and that it cannot therefore be reduced or forfeited by any representation on behalf of the Palestinians in any agreement or treaty. They argued that the right to property 'cannot be extinguished by new sovereignty or occupation and does not have a statute of limitation.' [5] Therefore the Palestinian right of return has a clear basis in international law, including in Israel's own law, and so it should be recognised.  [1] United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Wikisource. 10 December 1948.   [2] United Nations. "UN General Assembly Resolution 194". United Nations. 11 December 1948.   [3] Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. "Factsheet". Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition.   [4] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.   [5] Al-Ahram Weekly. "Affirmation of the Palestinian Right of Return". Al-Ahram Weekly Online. 9 - 15 March 2000.


This argument again assumes that Israel is morally responsible for the current plight of the Palestinian refugees, which is untrue as Israel was not responsible for their exodus (as outlined below). Moreover, it is Arab countries, not Israel, which keep Palestinians in a state of limbo. It is the failure of Arab states to incorporate Palestinians into their societies by offering legal status which keeps the Palestinian refugees in their current indeterminate position, not Israeli policy. Furthermore, self-determination is not an absolute right. Not every territory and region in the world that seeks independence has the right to it. This is due in no small part to the fact that such a system would be unworkable. Certain criteria must be met for a territory and people to obtain a legitimate right to self-determination, including not compromising the fundamental security or nature of the original state, something which recognising the Palestinian right of return would do to Israel. Such policies are often pursued by Arab states explicitly as a tool against Israel: for example, Palestinians who moved from the West Bank (whether refugees or not) to Jordan, are issued yellow ID cards to distinguish them from the Palestinians of the "official 10 refugee camps" in Jordan.  Since 1988, thousands of those yellow-ID card Palestinians have had their Jordanian citizenship revoked in order to prevent the possibility that they might become permanent residents of the country. Jordan's Interior Minister Nayef al-Kadi said: "Our goal is to prevent Israel from emptying the Palestinian territories of their original inhabitants," the minister explained. "We should be thanked for taking this measure... We are fulfilling our national duty because Israel wants to expel the Palestinians from their homeland." [1]  [1] Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Amman revoking Palestinians' citizenship". The Jerusalem Post. 20 July 2009.


A Palestinians were forced to leave and so have a right to return  Especially in the 1948 War, Palestinians were forcibly removed from their homes and towns en masse by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). The traditional Israeli point of view arguing that Arab leaders encouraged Palestinian Arabs to flee is simply untrue. In fact, Arab leaders intended for the Palestinian Arab population stay put. Historians such as Benny Morris, Erskine Childers, and Walid Khalidi state that no evidence of widespread evacuation orders exists, and that Arab leaders in fact instructed the Palestinian Arabs to stay put. [1] [2] [3] .  According to Morris, whatever the reasons driving many into flight, temporary evacuation under local orders, contagious panic, fear of Jewish arms, or direct expulsion manu militari, the 700,000 odd Palestinians who did become refugees acquired that status as a result of compulsory displacement or expulsion, since they were not permitted by Israel to return.(1) In terms of the cause of the Palestinian flight, Morris argues that "Arab evacuees from the towns and villages left largely because of Jewish... attacks or fear of impending attack."(1) A report from the military intelligence SHAI of the Haganah entitled "The emigration of Palestinian Arabs in the period 1/12/1947-1/6/1948", dated 30 June 1948 affirms that up to 1 June 1948: "At least 55% of the total of the exodus was caused by our (Haganah/IDF) operations." To this figure, the report’s compilers add the operations of the Irgun and Lehi, which "directly (caused) some 15%... of the emigration". A further 2% was attributed to explicit expulsion orders issued by Israeli troops, and 1% to their psychological warfare. This leads to a figure of 73% for departures caused directly by the Israelis. In addition, the report attributes 22% of the departures to "fears" and "a crisis of confidence" affecting the Palestinian population.  As for Arab calls for flight, these were reckoned to be significant in only 5% of cases. [4] This clearly demonstrates not only Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian refugees of 1948, but also that Israel was aware of it while it was going on, thus showing that expelling the Palestinians was intentional Israeli policy. This is compounded by the fact that the dispossession and ethnic cleansing of the Arabs of Palestine was part of the Zionist project from the very beginning. Theodor Herzl, in effect the father of modern Zionism and the state of Israel, in the draft-agreement of The Jewish-Ottoman Land Company (JOLC) stated the company was 'for the purpose of settling Palestine and Syria with Jews' (the company lobbied for approval from Sultan Abdulhameed in Istanbul in 1901). In Article III of the same agreement the JOLC was given the right to deport the native populations, an act aimed at legitimizing ethnic cleansing, by granting "The right to exchange economic enclaves of its territory, with the exception of the holy places or places already designated for worship. The owners shall receive plots of equal size and quality procured by it (the JOLC) in other provinces and territories of the Ottoman Empire." [5] This intentional ethnic cleansing of Arabs from Palestine can therefore be seen as part of the Zionist project to create a Jewish majority state in Israel. Therefore, to deny the Palestinian right of return is to perpetuate this injustice and allow ethnic cleansing to succeed. Israel, a state founded by refugees of ethnic cleansing and the Holocaust, should not allow such an injustice to stand any longer.  [1] Morris, Benny. "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited". Cambridge University Press. 2004  [2] Childers, Erskine. "The Other Exodus". The Spectator. 12 May 1961  [3] Khalidi, Walid. "Why did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited". Journal of Palestinian Studies Vol 134, no. 2 (Win. 05).  [4] Morris, Benny. "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: The Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948". Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1986)  [5] Sakhnini, Nizar. "Dispossession and Ethnic Cleansing." Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. 12 July 2004.


The characterization of the 1948 Palestinian exodus as forced by Israel is incorrect. In the very same passage quoted opposite, Morris goes on to argue that only "an extremely small, almost insignificant number of the refugees during this early period left because of (Israeli) expulsion orders or forceful 'advice' to that effect". [1] Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator in Palestine, testified that "the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion." [2] Thus, Israel is not responsible for acts of flight from Palestine which were largely motivated by imagined fears, which were the cause of almost all the Palestinian refugees, as they were not directly expelled or threatened by the IDF.  The Palestinians of 1948 may have made a tragic choice, for themselves and for their descendants, but this does not make Israel morally responsible for this choice and its consequences, as in almost every case Israel was not to blame, and it is impossible to isolate and identify those few where it may have been. Even if Israel were somehow morally responsible, it does not follow from this that Israel should accept an unlimited Palestinian right of return on the part of every refugee, considering the massive harms this would inflict on the state of Israel (outlined below). Rather, as Israel has proposed in the past, the Palestinians could accept words of contrition from Israel, and generous allocations of international aid, in place of the right of every refugee and his descendants to go back to his old home inside Israel. [3] This would be a more acceptable alternative to Israel, and still help to heal Palestinian wounds.  [1] Morris, Benny. "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited". Cambridge University Press. 2004  [2] UN Progress Report, 16 September 1948, Part 1 Section V, paragraph 6; Part 3 Section I  [3] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.


Denying the right to return harms Palestinians  Palestinian refugees represent the longest suffering and largest refugee population in the world today. During the creation of Israel in 1948, approximately three quarters of a million Palestinians were forced to become refugees. Together with their descendants, more than 4.3 million of these refugees are today registered with the United Nations while over 1.7 million are not. Approximately 32,000 Palestinians also became internally displaced in the areas occupied in 1948. Today, these refugees number approximately 355,000 persons. Despite the fact that they were issued Israeli citizenship, Israel has also denied these refugees their right to return to their homes or villages. [1] The fact that these refugees are forced by Israel to continue living abroad, mostly in refugee camps, further harms Palestinians by denying them the right to self-determination in their homeland which they were expelled from.  The 1993 Vienna Declaration, which reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (and so sets the standard in current international law), unequivocally gives all peoples the right to self-determination: "All people have the right to self-determination. Owing to this right they freely establish their political status and freely provide their economic, social and cultural development...World Conference on Human Rights considers refusal of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and emphasizes the necessity of effective realization of this right". [2] By this measure, the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination in their homeland, allowing them to establish an independent state if they wish, any suppression of that right should be seen as a human rights violation. Therefore Israel's denial of the Palestinian’s right of return harms the Palestinians, and so it should be ended.  [1] Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. "Factsheet". Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition.   [2] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993.


The 1948 UN General Resolution 194 specifically applies the right of return to the Palestinian refugees. Paragraph 11 states "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." [1]  [1] United Nations. "UN General Assembly Resolution 194". United Nations. 11 December 1948.


The inalienable rights of refugees are not negotiable, nor are they subject to the interests of the state which they would be returning to. International law considers agreements between an occupier and the occupied to be null and void if they deprive civilians of recognized human rights including the rights to repatriation and restitution. [1] Therefore the interests of the state of Israel are not legitimate reasons to deny the right of return which is owed to Palestinian refugees. Moreover, the right of return is feasible in Israel due to the availability of empty land. 80% of Israelis live in 15 percent of the land and that the remaining 20% live on 85% of the land that belongs to the refugees. Further, of the 20%, 18% live in Palestinian cities while the remaining 2% live in kibbutzim and moshavs. By contrast, more than 6,000 refugees live per square kilometer in the Gaza Strip, while over the barbed wire their lands are practically empty. [2]  [1] Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. "Factsheet". Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition.   [2] Sakhnini, Nizar. "Dispossession and Ethnic Cleansing." Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. 12 July 2004.


The Palestinian refugee crisis was created and is perpetuated by the Arab states and the Palestinians themselves  The current Palestinian refugee crisis is largely the creation of the Palestinian people themselves, who largely left voluntarily (or at least not by Israeli force) in 1948, and the Arab states who both started the 1948 war against Israel and who have kept the Palestinians in limbo ever since instead of integrating them.  Firstly, Palestinian flight from Israel was not compelled but was predominantly voluntary, as a result of seven Arab nations declaring war on Israel in 1948. Israel officially denies any responsibility for the Palestinian exodus, stating that their flight was caused by the Arab invasion. Efraim Karsh states that most Palestinians chose their status as refugees themselves, and therefore Israel is therefore absolved of responsibility. [1] Morris argues that only "an extremely small, almost insignificant number of the refugees during this early period left because of (Israeli) expulsion orders or forceful 'advice' to that effect". [2] Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator in Palestine, testified that "the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion." [3] Therefore Israel is absolved of moral responsibility for the Palestinian exodus, as the vast majority of it was caused by the Palestinian people themselves.  Further, Arab states instigated the 1948 and 1967 wars, and so they bear responsibility for their outcomes, including the refugees that resulted. Israeli official sources, foreign press, and officials present at the time, and historians such as Joseph Schechtman have long claimed that the 1948 refugee crisis was instigated by the invading Arab armies, who ordered Palestinian civilians to evacuate the battle zone. Israel officially denies any responsibility for the Palestinian exodus, stating that their flight was caused by the Arab invasion. [4] [5] Thus the responsibility for housing and integrating Palestinian refugees into established, recognised nations in fact lies with the Arab states. However, this is a responsibility that the Arab world has neglected since 1948.  It is the failure of Arab states to incorporate Palestinians into their societies by offering legal status which keeps the Palestinian refugees in limbo, not Israeli policy. Refugees and their descendants are usually kept in refugee camps and not allowed to integrate into the Arab nations in which they reside. [6] Such policies are often pursued by Arab states explicitly as a tool against Israel: for example, Palestinians who moved from the West Bank (whether refugees or not) to Jordan, are issued yellow ID cards to distinguish them from the Palestinians of the "official 10 refugee camps" in Jordan. Since 1988, thousands of those yellow-ID card Palestinians have had their Jordanian citizenship revoked in order to prevent the possibility that they might become permanent residents of the country. Jordan's Interior Minister Nayef al-Kadi said: "Our goal is to prevent Israel from emptying the Palestinian territories of their original inhabitants. "We should be thanked for taking this measure... We are fulfilling our national duty because Israel wants to expel the Palestinians from their homeland." [7] Thus, the Palestinian refugee problem was brought about through choices made by Palestinians themselves, during a war against Israel initiated by Arab states. The crisis has since been perpetuated by other Arab governments. Many states- such as Jordan- have pursued policies that call for the exclusion and marginalisation of Palestinians, in the interest of weakening Israeli claims to statehood and maintaining and deepening Palestinian and Arab resentment of Israel. Israel is not therefore the morally culpable actor, and so has no responsibility to recognise the Palestinian 'right of return'.  [1] Karsh, Efraim. "Fabricating Israeli History: The "New Historians"". Cass. 1997  [2] Morris, Benny. "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited". Cambridge University Press. 2004  [3] UN Progress Report, 16 September 1948, Part 1 Section V, paragraph 6; Part 3 Section I  [4] UN Progress Report, 16 September 1948, Part 1 Section V, paragraph 6; Part 3 Section I  [5] Schechtman, Joseph. "The Arab Refugee Problem". 1952.  [6] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.   [7] Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Amman revoking Palestinians' citizenship". The Jerusalem Post. 20 July 2009.


No real 'right of return' exists in international law  Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not guarantee a right of return because the clause "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" was meant to guarantee the right to leave.  According to its legislative history, Article 13 was aimed at governments which imprisoned certain subgroups of their own nationals by preventing them from moving beyond their national borders. According to its sponsor, the mention of a "right to return" was included to assure that "the right to leave a country, already sanctioned in the article, would be strengthened by the assurance of the right to return. [1] Moreover, Article 13 only guarantees a specific right to return "to his own country". [2] But, the Palestinians who were displaced were never citizens or legal residents of Israel. Therefore, they can have no right of return to Israel. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, furthermore, does not specify a 'right', but rather says refugees "should" be allowed to return. [3] Hence Israel is under no obligation to recognise a 'right', but rather merely to accept that Palestinians have some claim to return or to compensation for not being able to return. This is distinct from a total and inalienable 'right' to do so, regardless of the consequences for Israel. Also, there is no formal mechanism in international law to demand repatriation of refugees and their descendants in general or Palestinians specifically. No international legislation, binding UN resolutions or agreements between Israel and the Palestinians require this. This is demonstrated by international precedent, especially by the case of the 758,000-866,000 Jews who were expelled, fled or emigrated from the Arab Middle East and North Africa between 1945 and 1956, with property losses of $1 billion. [4] Since these refugees were neither compensated nor allowed return—to no objection on the part of Arab leaders or international legal authorities—the international community has accepted this migration of Jews as fait accompli, and thereby set legal precedent in the region against a right of return for Palestinians also.  Finally, most of the inhabitants of the Palestinian refugee camps abroad were not actually alive in either 1948 or 1967, and there is no reason to believe that their descendants automatically inherit any 'right of return' which their ancestors may have held. Therefore Israel should not recognise the Palestinian 'right of return' as no such right really exists under international law.  [1] Dinstein, Yoram. "Israel Yearbook on Human Rights". Volume 16; Volume 1986  [2] United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Wikisource. 10 December 1948.   [3] United Nations. "UN General Assembly Resolution 194". United Nations. 11 December 1948.   [4] Schwartz, Adi. "All I wanted was justice". Haaretz/adi-schwartz.com. 4 January 2008.


A Palestinian right of return would destroy the 'Jewish State' in Israel  If all or a large majority of Palestinian refugees and their descendants were to implement a 'right of return', it would make Arabs the majority within Israel and Jews an ethnic minority. This amounts to abolishing the Jewish people's right to self-determination, which they hold under the 1993 Vienna Declaration. [1] It would also mean eradicating Israel as a Jewish state, which was the intention behind its foundation. The majority of Israelis find a literal right of return for Palestinian refugees to be unacceptable, pointing to this worry that as they become a minority Israel as a Jewish state would be undermined. [2]  Re-enforcing the need for the existence of a Jewish state (as a safe haven for persecuted Jews) is the presence in Israel of 758,000-866,000 Jews who were expelled, fled or emigrated from the Arab Middle East and North Africa between 1945 and 1956, to whom the Arab states which expelled them are not willing to offer any 'right of return' of their own. [3] An open letter to the Palestinian leadership published in 2001 by Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua and other Israeli intellectuals and peace activists dramatically demonstrated the agreement even among the 'peace camp' in Israel that a total right of return for Palestinians can never be acceptable to the Israeli people: “We shall never be able to agree”, they wrote, “to the return of the refugees to within the borders of Israel. The meaning of such a return would be the elimination of the state of Israel.” Yossi Sarid, chairman of the Meretz Party, stated baldly that “Israel can survive without sovereignty over Temple Mount, but it cannot survive with the right of return. If the Palestinians insist on it, there will be no (peace) agreement.” [4] Thus asking Israel to recognise the Palestinian right of return is tantamount to asking Israel to accept its own destruction as a state, and is thus totally unacceptable.  There are further reasons that recognising the Palestinian right of return would be fundamentally harmful to Israel's welfare, and thus an invalid action. Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that rights can be limited by law solely for securing 'due recognition and respect for the rights of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and general welfare in a democratic society.' Article 30 states that nothing in the declaration may be interpreted as permitting any state, group, or person to engage in activity aimed at the destruction of any rights or freedoms guaranteed. The 'rights' and 'general welfare' of Israel's Jewish citizens would be endangered if millions of Palestinians who were openly hostile to Israel's existence became a majority. Article 3 of the declaration further states that "these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations". [5] The Palestinian right of return would result in the loss of Israeli sovereignty and its replacement with an Arab-majority state, and the dismantling of Israeli society in favour of an Arab-Muslim dominated society, resulting in the destruction of a UN member state: a violation of the United Nations Charter. For this reason, a Palestinian right of return is invalidated.  A right of return would also result in a flood of Palestinians stating their 'right of return' as justification for entering Israel at any time and in unlimited numbers and laying claim to old homes. This creates an unworkable legal nightmare, clouded by historical ambiguities. Such an extended legal nightmare would last for decades, and hurt the reconciliation process. [i-[1]  There are many things that Israel can and has offered to Palestinian refugees: compensation, assistance in resettlement, and return for an extremely limited number of refugees based solely on family reunification or humanitarian considerations. But an unlimited right of return for all refugees and their descendants simply goes too far. This is largely because it is purely unworkable to allow millions of Palestinians to return back to a territory that is already overcrowded. [i-[2] [6] For all these reasons, recognising the Palestinian right of return would destroy Israel as a 'Jewish state' and fundamentally harm the welfare of its current legal inhabitants by infringing on their rights, and so Israel should not pursue this recognition.  [1] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993.   [2] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.   [3] Schwartz, Adi. "All I wanted was justice". Haaretz/adi-schwartz.com. 4 January 2008.   [4] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.   [5] United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Wikisource. 10 December 1948.   [6] The Economist. "The Palestinian right of return". The Economist. 4 January 2001.


The Zionist project which led to the state of Israel intended to displace Palestinians from the very beginning, long before the so-called Arab 'aggression' in 1948. Theodor Herzl, who presided the First Zionist Congress, had provided the ideological underpinnings of the Zionist movement in his pamphlet, Der Judenstaat, which was published in 1896. Herzl called for a colonial project for the exclusive benefit of the Jews and suggested that Der Judenstaat would 'form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.' Efforts of the Zionist political movement to implement their project, with the support of the Imperialist Great Powers, in complete disregard to the Palestinian rights and human reality in Palestine, were responsible for initiating and prolonging the conflict in and around Palestine. The establishment of an exclusive Jewish State in a country where the majority of its people were not Jewish meant transplanting Jews from all corners of the world and bringing them to Palestine. Simultaneously, it meant dispossession and ethnic cleansing for the Palestinians. This was, and still is, the core issue in the conflict. All subsequent events are derivative and irrelevant as a consequence. [1]  [1] Sakhnini, Nizar. "The Core Issue". Al-Awda - The Palestinian Right of Return Coalition. 11 July 2004.


A great many of the world’s leading states are multicultural/ethnic rather than ethnic states. The United States, Brazil, India, and Indonesia to take just a few. These states have been able to construct national identities that are not just based upon ethnicity. For cosmopolitan democratic states the border being an accident of history does not matter [1] ; this is what African states need to do as well not carve themselves up.  [1] Ratner, 1996, p.591


Ethnic borders allow nation states  In Africa borders are artificial often running through ethnic groupings without consideration for culture or even local geography with the exception of water courses. [1] Altering these borders to reflect ethnicities and culture would help states to create their own national identity as their identities would not be split. Having the whole of an ethnicity within one state will help prevent misappropriation of culture and history by another state.  [1] Michalopoulos, 2011, p.19


That such a move will reduce conflict relies on a lot of assumptions; most notably that the changes won’t spark a lot of new conflicts. Territory is the biggest source of violent conflicts among states and this will create a large number of new such conflicts. When there is a response 76.6% of the time it will be military when territory is in dispute compared to 49% when something else is the cause, and such disputes are three times as likely to escalate to war (7.3% to 2.5%). [1] The redrawing process would also mean suffering as states attempt to pre-empt new borders by moving those of the ‘wrong’ ethnicity and as insurgencies are stepped up. The Abyei area of Sudan shows what is likely to happen; it was to have a referendum to decide whether to join the North or South but the north occupied the region before it could be carried out. [2]  [1] Hensel, 1998, pp.20-1  [2] Copnall, 2011


Redrawing could be democratic  A redrawing of borders would allow for democratic participation in the building of new African states. There would have to be plebiscites in local areas to determine where borders should run and extensive consultation so that the borders are drawn based on the wishes of the people this time. The opposite of what happens at the moment. For example much of the Bakassi homeland was ceded by Nigeria to Cameroon as a result of an International Court of Justice ruling on the colonial border and many people are asking Nigeria to resettle them as they don’t share Cameroon’s culture. [1] Clearly the people would surely much prefer to have their destiny in their own hands than letting the borders be settled by an international court pouring over 19th century maps. [2]  [1] Chinwo, 2012  [2] Fisher, 2012


Ethnic borders erase a wrong of history  Imperialism and Colonisation is one of the great wrongs of history where much of the globe was carved up without any reference to the facts on the ground. When the west drew borders peoples were split, and kingdoms and cultures carved up. Independence may have ended some of the worst aspects of imperialism but it exacerbated the problem of borders. [1] Africa has since seen the problems that this has created and should realise the need to break from the colonial legacy.  [1] Michalopoulos, 2011, p.4


Changing borders won’t erase the wrong – it happened and that should be recognised. Borders are simply one by-product and if there are individual borders that are particularly problematic then they might need to be redrawn but there should not be a comprehensive change. To do so might simply create a new wrong with thousands of conflicts over where borders should run.


Plebiscites and consultation across the whole of Africa. The project would take years or decades to come up with agreed upon borders. Small areas state might wish to be ceded to a neighbouring state when those closer don’t creating enclaves and exclaves [1] as well as a recipe for conflict.  [1] Exclave.eu


First changing borders encouraging development relies on the assumption that there won’t be conflict. Second if independence movements gain independence then there will be a lot more international borders and the barriers to trade these impose. Finally we need to think about this the other way around; when there are ethnic groups on both sides of the trade they are encouraging and facilitating trade between the two states – this is something to be encouraged not changed. Having the same ethnicity on both sides of the border works in the same way as having emigration in encouraging trade. Because of networks overlapping between the two countries trade will increase. In Spain for example doubling the number of immigrants leads to an increase in exports to the immigrant’s country of origin by 10%. [1] Economic development is not always stifled at borders; two of the four Nigerian states with GDP per capita of over 2000NGN are on the border with Benin. [2]  [1] Peri, 2010  [2] AlifArabia, 2013


Preventing conflict  Redrawing borders could help resolve conflict in Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou find "civil conflict intensity, as reflected in war casualties and duration, is approximately 35% higher in areas where partitioned ethnicities reside." Conflict duration is 18.5% higher. [1]  They identify seven different ways in which artificial borders lead to, or intensify conflict;  1, partitioning ethnicities creates irredentist demands  2, partitioning makes an independence movement more likely  3, when borders are not marked the ethnic group has a reason to attempt to change the border  4, patronage politics leads to discrimination against minorities  5, splitting ethnicities encourages smuggling and criminalisation  6, splitting resources that were previously part of an ethnic group’s homeland will leave the ethnic group trying to engineer the resources return  7, partitioning reduces development so increases inequality with and resentment towards the center of the state. [2]  Getting rid of all of these reasons for conflict would help make Africa more peaceful in the long run.  [1] Michalopoulos, 2011, p.22  [2] Michalopoulos, 2011, pp.4-6


Encouraging development  Using data from satellites measuring luminosity Michalopoulos and Papaioannou find that border areas with partitioned ethnic groups are up to 60% less developed than those towards the centre of countries so are not artificially split. Ethnicity is significant for trade. For example between Niger and Nigeria prices of millet increase at the border by 23.2% when it is also the border between ethnicities but only 9.3% when the same ethnicity is on both sides of the border for cowpea the figures are 20.2% and 14.4%. [1] Moreover internally where there is an ethnic border between markets there is a similar increase of 21% for millet and 22% for cowpea. [2] Ethnicity may also affect the ability to gain credit from other traders. [3] It therefore makes sense economically to have borders at ethnic boundaries due to the natural trading relations within an ethnic group. Splitting an ethnic group creates unnecessary hardship by making it more difficult to trade.  [1] Aker, 2010, p.16  [2] Ibid, p.21-2  [3] Ibid, p.25


There are many ‘odd borders’ around the world without problems. Not least between Belgium and the Netherlands. There are about twenty tiny enclaves at Baarle as 5732 parcels of land in a 50km border region were parcelled out separately. [1] Yet there has been no conflict between the two since Belgian independence. Odd borders don’t matter – it’s the willingness to cooperate that counts.  [1] Smith


It has since been accepted in the 1989 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal case that a colony gaining independence need not be bound by agreements concluded by the imperial power. [1] Borders have never in the past been fixed, they have changed usually as a result of conflict but also more peaceful changes such as demarcation or unification. African states should not be binding themselves to an out of date territorial system forced upon them by their imperial oppressors.  [1] Ratner, 1996, p.620


Encourages Secessionism  There are at least 834 different ethnicities in Africa [1] and could be as many as 3315. [2] If the ethnicities along the borders are being allowed to choose where they belong then every other ethnicity should, anything else is inconsistent. This is necessary to solve long running campaigns for independence such as by Western Sahara where the people would not want to have to choose between Morocco and Mauritania. [3] On the other hand if only groups which are already in revolt are asked whether they wish independence then such a proposal is simply hypocritical failing to take into account that groups that have been non-violent may also wish independence.  [1] Michalopoulos, 2011, p.1  [2] Wentzel, 2013  [3] BBC News, 2013


Damages dreams of African unity  The African Union Constitutive Act has as an objective to “achieve greater unity and solidarity”. This is something that is damaged by making borders open to question. Borders at the moment are a settle but redrawing borders will open up disputes between African countries as every state will fear losing valuable pieces of territory. It will make that the primary international issue for decades setting back cooperation on peacekeeping or a common market.  If African unity is the ultimate objective then borders should not matter.


Would create odd borders.  Unfortunately ethnic groups don’t all live in a block with clear dividing lines between them and the neighbouring group. Borders reflecting ethnicities will be squiggly. Often there will be enclaves. Even enclaves may not be enough to get everybody from each ethnicity in the ‘right’ nation. This is shown in the former Yugoslavia where when a nation for Kosovars was created Serbs were suddenly on the wrong side of the border.  This is the problem with not going based upon administrative borders. The question is immediately raised; how finely grained should the border be calibrated? A border cannot be moved to suit every individual.


Violates current states sovereignty  One of the core principles of sovereignty is that of territorial integrity. In the process of decolonisation this was expressed through the principle of uti possidetis, that the administrative divisions of the previous state should form the borders the new states so as to prevent gaps in sovereignty and the conflict that would create. [1] The OAU in 1964 went so far as to solemnly declare “that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” [2] Any alteration to borders would be attacking this principle. No African state is going to accept a change that is likely to redraw many of their borders, open disputes with neighbours and possibly create new states.  [1] Shaw, 1997, p.356  [2] OAU, 1964


Solving the conflicts and preventing violence is the first step to real African unity and cooperation. Redrawing the borders is a radical solution that has yet to be tried as it will makes stronger and reduce the threat of secession movements it should make African leaders more willing the work with neighbours.


In addition to meeting the demands of some independence movements, there could be a decrease in the number of such organisations due to reduced prospects. If it is unlikely to get a whole province then they may be less inclined to attempt to secede. [1]  There have been conflicts in Kivu, DR Congo, but the Banyamulenge the main group involved only makes up around 4% of the population [2] – would they desire to split from Congo if they were not likely to take the whole province?  [1] Ratner, 1996, p.591  [2] Wikipedia


Not all rebels have disarmed; the FDLR group has said it will disarm but has not done so. [1] The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme faces coordination and financial problems. There is a security threat from volatile border regions that might reverse the whole DDR effort as militias and military units struggle for control over resources and terrorise the local population. MONUSCO can't protect the repatriated civilians, which may mean any demobilisation is only temporary. If violence flares then so will guns be taken up once more.  [1] Mvano, Chrispin, ‘U.N. Congo peacekeepers question Rwandan rebel disarmament claim’, Reuters, 4 February 2014,


There has been disarmament and demobilisation  In a war-torn society MONUSCO helps with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). DDR is of crucial importance for the future stability of the DRC. They have used the latest technology and decades of UN experience with visible success. Thousands of ex-combatants have already been returned to their homes and reintegrated into the lives of their communities. By March 2011 almost 210,000 ex-combatants had been through the demobilisation process – out of an estimated total of 300-330,000. [1] And almost 32,000 of 39,000 child soldiers had been reunited with their parents. [2]  [1] ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and reform of the army’, Amnesty International, 25 January 2007,   [2] ‘Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, The World Bank, 11 March 2013,


The presence of the UN has not stopped human rights abuses. A recent UN report has highlighted that the Congolese army itself has been involved in such abuses particularly sexual violence. Convictions by the ICC are welcome but prosecuting a tiny number of leaders is a drop in the ocean of criminality that occurred, and still occurs in the DRC.


Elections have been a success  The elections process is moving ahead well. While elections cannot be said to be an unqualified success there have been two general elections, in 2006 and 2011. Local media is vibrant and competitive. And there were a large number of candidates. In the 2011 elections the observers from the African Union and other organisations welcomed “the successful holding of elections” and “the spirit of cooperation and solidarity”. [1] Moreover the whole election process is moving ahead; the country’s first ever local elections are planned for 2014. [2] This will provide the people with much more say over their daily lives. In a country with little centralised power like the DRC local elections are as important as national ones.  [1] African Union et al., ‘Joint Declaration on the presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, au.int, 30 November 2011,   [2] Enough Team, ‘A First for Congo: Local Elections Announced for 2014’, enough, 26 November 2013,


Elections do not show the UN is moving Congo towards becoming a functioning democracy. In 2011 President Kabila has changed the election system to strengthen his own chances of re-election. The elections were hardly free and fair; the AU election monitors have every incentive to praise the elections but even they noted violence occurring. The US state department said “we believe that the management and technical execution of these elections were seriously flawed, lacked transparency and did not measure up to the democratic gains we have seen in recent African elections.” [1] The Carter Center found “multiple locations… reported impossibly high rates of 99 to 100 percent voter turnout with all, or nearly all, votes going to incumbent President Joseph Kabila.” [2] Worse the elections were marred by violence with at least 18 people killed in the run up to the vote. [3]  [1] Nuland, Victoria, ‘State Department on Results of Presidential Election in DRC’, US State Department, 14 December 2011,   [2] ‘Carter Center: DRC Presidential Election Results Lack Credibility’, The Carter Center, 10 December 2011,   [3] Callimachi, Rukmini, ‘Congo Elections 2011: Violence Kills At Least 18 People’, Huffington Post, 2 December 2011,