This argument misleadingly presents the nature of US influence as essentially coercive. In fact, it is America’s “soft power”—or the ability to get what it wants through the attractiveness of its culture and political institutions—that has been instrumental in spreading American values.[25] People across the globe—from Singapore, South Korea, and Japan to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—are fascinated by and have emulated what John Agnew terms America’s “Market-Place society,” defined by mass consumerism, the influx of American cultural products and the displacement of traditional social standards.[26] In this context, arguments of “cultural imperialism” exaggerate the level of control the US has over the process, as well as the extent to which conflicts arise.[27] The desirability of American culture and institutions in the eyes of many of the world’s people ensures that soft, and not hard, power has universalized American values.  [25] Nye, Joseph (2004), “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 2 (2004), pp. 255-270.  Nye, Joseph (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Basic Books, 2004)  [26] Agnew, John (2005). Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia)  [27] Sardar, Ziauddin and Merryl Wyn Davies (2003), Why Do People Hate America? (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd.), p. 130.


US support for democracy has been at best hugely inconsistent, and at worst criminally apathetic. During the Cold War, the US overthrew various democratic governments (for example Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s) and supported dictatorial regimes. This has continued into the post-Cold War era, as the US support for the coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in 2002 demonstrated. While the US professes support for democratic forces in the Arab world, it has also continued to give vital assistance to the strategically-important dictatorships of the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which have been responsible for grave human rights abuses in response to recent peaceful protests[14].The US also continues to support states such as Israel which violate international law, and also routinely flouts international law itself—as seen by wars such as Iraq, the treatment of terrorist suspects and breaches of the Geneva convention [15], the undermining of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the violation of countries’ sovereignty with ‘drone’ attacks. Clinical realpolitik, and not the pursuit of democracy and human rights, determines the use of US power.  [14] Goodman, Amy (2011), ‘Barack Obama must speak out on Bahrain bloodshed’, The Guardian: Comment is Free, April 2011.  , Accessed 14th May 2011.The US is not a hegemon at all, but an imperialist power-an empire.  [15] Chatham House, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion’.  , Accessed 15th May 2011.


The US has used its power to undermine the sovereignty of other nations, often through coercion and violence.  As Samuel P. Huntington has written, the US suffers from “benign hegemon syndrome.”[19] Its self-perception as an exceptional, virtuous superpower is at odds with the violent history of its foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, it has sought to overthrow over forty governments, and to destroy numerous populist-nationalist movements.[20] Its interventions in other countries have substantially increased following the end of the Cold War and the absence of a rival power balancing against it; one study has shown a 60% increase with an average of two interventions per year.[21] In addition, the US often interferes in the internal affairs of other countries; including through perverting elections, applying sanctions to change behaviour or influence domestic politics, propping up opposition forces, and even trying to assassinate foreign leaders (for example, Fidel Castro and more recently, arguably, Colonel Gaddafi). Therefore, while it may see itself as a benign hegemon, many see America as a rogue superpower.  [19] Huntington, Samuel P. (1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.  [20] Blum, William (2002). Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower (London).  [21] In Sardar, Ziauddin and Merryl Wyn Davies (2003), Why Do People Hate America? (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd.), pp. 67-68.


The US has established an unjust system of unequal relationships in order to exploit developing countries.  While Western Europe and Japan may have been awarded a privileged position in the international order the US constructed following the end of World War II, developing countries were incorporated as “subordinate elements in the global capitalist system.”[32] The global South has in effect been controlled and exploited through nominally multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and WTO, which are designed in a way that provides wealthy countries with de facto control. The United States has also set up a “hub and spoke” system to deal with subordinate states, which is built around bilateralism, client states, ‘special relationships’, and patronage-oriented foreign policy, which serves to translate America’s power advantage into concessions from other states.[33] When subordinate states have failed to comply, they have often faced US intervention—from Guatemala, to Iran, to Chile, to Iraq. Through this system of unequal relationships the US has gained access to markets for its corporations, and enjoyed geopolitical and political control of key strategic areas. Developing countries on the other hand have often faced economic stagnation, food crises, and various attacks on their sovereignty.  [32] Bello, Walden (2005). Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire, (London), pp. 153.  [33] For an elaboration of how a “hub and spokes” system works, see Ikenberry, John G. (2004), “Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age”, Review of International Studies, 30, pp. 609-630


The US eschews multilateralism and prefers unilateralism.  Rather than working through international institutions and gaining the consent of the international community as a ‘benign’ hegemon would be expected to do, the United States far too often undermines multilateralism and exercises its power unilaterally. President Clinton’s military interventions during the 1990s, George W. Bush’s unilateral launching of the Iraq War, and President Obama’s use of covert drone attacks illustrate this propensity to shun multilateralism in favour of the “imperial logic” of unilateralism.[28] Indeed, since the end of the Cold War the United Nations has frequently been ignored or devalued as an institution by America. Most American policymakers are what Robert Kagan refers to as “instrumental multilateralists.” They engage with multilateral institutions for pragmatic reasons, but act unilaterally when it serves the interests of the United States. This is in contrast to many European leaders, who Kagan describes as “principled multilateralists” that are interested in multilateralism as a cornerstone of world order.[29]  [28] Ikenberry, John G. (2003), ‘Is American Multilateralism in Decline?’, Perspective on Politics, Vol. 1.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.  [29] Kagan, Robert (2002), ‘Multilateralism, American Style’, The Washington Post, September 2002.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.


The US has arrogantly (and dangerously) sought to reshape the world in its own image.  A commitment to American ‘exceptionalism’ has led US policymakers to view the United States as the political and cultural centre of the world. Consequently, they expect others to follow their own standards on political, economic and cultural issues, with free and open markets, liberal democratic structures, and individualistic cultural norms serving as models for other countries to follow. This is not simply propaganda; the US has used considerable resources to influence other nations in this respect, including military interventions, coercive austerity measures through the IMF/World Bank/WTO, economic sanctions, and the categorization of certain countries as “rogue states” for not following American standards.[23] American corporations have also been responsible for a form of cultural imperialism by exporting consumerist and materialistic ways of life around the world, often threatening indigenous cultures. In some instances this has caused what Samuel P. Huntington calls a ‘clash of civilizations,’[24] leading other cultures to respond violently to the introduction of American cultural exports, as is the case in some conservative Muslim societies and in India, where a major political party (BJP) actively orchestrates opposition to Western ideals of sexual permissiveness and individualism.  [23] Huntington, Samuel P. (1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.  [24] Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, September 1993.  , Accessed 17th May 2001.


It is a hyperbole to suggest that American-led globalization and the spread of free and open markets has been “imposed” on developing countries; globalisation has been a far more impersonal and voluntary process. Moreover, rather than being exploited, the spread of free trade and open markets has benefited developing countries; one only needs to see the success of China, and India after 1991 when it embraced neoliberal reforms to find evidence of this. More generally too, World Bank reports have suggested that poorer countries that are “more globalized” have grown faster than even developed countries, while those that are “less globalized” have seen their GDPs drop.[34] The purportedly “hub and spoke” system the US has employed has also benefited many countries, which have received security guarantees from America, and can often count on the US to help tackle regional threats and ensure stability. Middle Eastern states that cooperate with the US to tackle terrorism and a resurgent and nuclear Iran provide examples of this.  [34] Meredith, Robyn and Suzanne Hoppough (2007), ‘Why Globalization is Good’, Forbes, March, 2007.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.  Schonwald, Josh (2002), ‘Johnson, economic development expert, discusses globalization and its benefits,’ The University of Chicago Chronicle, February 21, 2002, Vol. 21, No. 10.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.


The US is not a hegemon at all, but an imperialist power-an empire.  While the US may not have formal colonies like the empires of the past, it is still able to pursue imperialism through its massive military juggernaut and control of the world’s financial institutions. America possesses what Chalmers Johnson called an “empire of military bases,” which are located in dozens of countries across the world and provide the US with, as Jonathan Freedland puts it, ‘the same global muscle it would enjoy if it ruled those countries directly.’[16] This coupled with its entrenched military-industrial complex allows the US to contain rivals, maintain strategic control of resources (particularly oil), and to militarily intervene in countries that threaten its imperial “interests.” The US has also shaped and structured the international political economy in a way that has given it effective control of the global institutions which ensure it remains the pre-eminent power. This is not indicative of a ‘benign’ hegemon, but a modern Rome.[17]  [16] Freedland, Jonathan (2002). “Rome, AD... Rome, DC?”, The Guardian, September 18, 2002.  , Accessed 16th May, 2011.  [17] Wade, Robert (2002), “The American Empire,” The Guardian, 5th January, 2002.


It is true that the US sometimes resorts to unilateral action to advance its national security interests. However, its commitment to multilateralism is more than just instrumental and cynically selective. Even George W. Bush’s unilateralism—criticized as imperialist by even mainstream analysts—was restricted to certain issues, such as arms control, nonproliferation, and the use of force against certain threatening states. Unilateral military action was only used against Iraq, and even other “rogue” states (specifically Iran and North Korea) were dealt with through diplomatic and multilateral channels.[30] As John Ikenberry argues, the “foundational” multilateralism—as seen in the liberal, open international order the US built following World War II—is still a core part of US foreign policy.[31] Moreover, George Bush Sr.’s painstaking coalition building for the first Gulf War and more recently President Obama’s commitment to working through the UN Security Council for the intervention in Libya demonstrates America’s preference for consensus-based international action.  [30] Robbins, Carla Anne (2007). “Bush Foreign Policy: Grand Vision and its Application” in Fortier, John C. and Ornstein, Norman J. (eds.), Second-Term Blues: How George W. Bush Has Governed, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007), pp. 89-108.  [31] Ikenberry, John G. (2003), ‘Is American Multilateralism in Decline?’, Perspective on Politics, Vol. 1.  , Accessed 17th May, 2011.


While the US does have a long history of intervening in various countries across the globe, this has mostly been in response to genuine threats to national security, international peace, and basic human rights in line with the UN Charter. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new global discourse has emerged where state sovereignty is no longer regarded as absolute in instances where states endanger international peace and commit human rights abuses.[22] Post-Cold War US interventions (Haiti, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) have largely followed this discourse. Thus, rather than malignly intervening in other countries, the US has relatively benignly sought to apply pressure on violent and dictatorial regimes, with international law and the will of the international community being central to many of the actions taken. The carefully undertaken Libyan intervention demonstrates this.  [22] Annan, Kofi (1999), ‘Two concepts of sovereignty’, The Economist, 18th September 1999.  , Accessed 16th May, 2011.


The educational policies of developing states should not be tailored to the needs of businesses in the developing world. Arguably, cross border trade in commodities and products is as important for nations in the developing world as partnerships with wealthy companies in Europe and the USA. Cross border trade of this type requires skills distinct from those required by established forms of economic production (farming, heavy industry, resource extraction) and those required by the service industry.  Development theory encourages poorer states to increase both their workforce’s skill base and the adaptability of their economies. The more flexible an economy, the more resistant it will be to shocks and changes in individual markets. Side proposition’s argument would lead to developing economies exchanging dependence on agricultural and manufacturing activity for a dependence on outsourcing.  All forms of economic activity are vulnerable to crises and market failure. Side proposition can do little to prove that the service economy, or skilled manufacturing are inherently more robust forms of economic occupation than farming, craft or semi-skilled manufacture.  Side proposition believe that individuals who are trained to serve a service economy will be inherently more adaptable and employable than those trained in fields tied to more traditional forms of economic action. Why should these two areas of expertise be mutually exclusive? The large families and highly integrated communities that are predominant in the most populace developing states should encourage the acquisition of a wider range of skills – the better to ensure that all economic eventualities will yield some form of profit and prosperity.


Offshore outsourcing accelerates the development of poorer states citizens.  Offshore outsourcing incentivises wider engagement with education in developing states, for longer periods of time. While- even more so than in the wealthy world- education is seen by citizens of developing nations as offering a path out of poverty or subsistence-level economic activity, worries about property rights, the breakdown of families and communities and the acquisition of essential skills may lead to schooling becoming a lower priority for older children and young adults. The connection between education, skills acquisition and improvements in income and living standards are not immediate. There is little impetus for workers and parents to pay for forms of education that are not directly linked to the sorts of economic activity that are predominant in their communities. In developing states that lack a growing service sector, the value of a qualification in science, accounting or computing cannot be immediately realised. This situation may prevent social mobility in one of two ways.  Firstly, a child who is only educated to a certain standard, or who is encouraged to gain knowledge that is relevant only to a certain field, may be unable to adapt to changes in his economic circumstances later in life. A worker with training in computing will be able to compete for a much wider range of jobs than someone who only has a basic education that only focused on literacy.  Secondly, although it may be possible to educate a teenager on the finer points of irrigation engineering or vehicle maintenance, the utility of those skills will still be limited by environmental factors. A teenager trained to construct a modern irrigation system will still find that his father’s farm fails when it is caught up in a drought or crop blight. By linking education to “traditional” economic activities, families are unable to take advantage of alternative sources of trade or income.  Where a state fosters a healthy service economy, and offers additional benefits to foreign firms who employ its businesses as outsourcing partners, demand for highly educated workers will increase.


Side proposition’s description of the economic processes underlying off shore outsourcing is overly optimistic, and makes claims about educational and industrial development in the first world that are highly contestable.  By shifting production and support services to the developing world, western businesses are, in effect, circumventing protections built into first world employment laws designed to ensure that the demands of the market do not abrogate individual liberty or basic standards of welfare. Limitations imposed on market freedom, such as the minimum wage, are justified by the risk of incentivising businesses to cut wages to such a level that employees are forced into lives of subsistence, with restrictions on their spending power and mobility effectively tethering them to a particular employer or trade.  Offshoring presents a direct challenge to the creation of liberal democratic ideas, norms and institutions within developing states. Offshoring favours states that provide a consistent supply of cheap, reliable labour – even if the availability of that labour is a result of poverty or government authoritarianism. An authoritarian state may ban unions, or create unbalanced labour laws that give no protection to employees.  Businesses that engage in offshoring have no control over the uses that the taxes paid by their overseas partners are put to. It is frequently the case that undeveloped states will continue to underinvest in infrastructure and public services. Instead, tax revenue will be kept low enough to attract further investment, with takings spent on entrenching the position of undeveloped states’ controlling institutions and social elites. Such practices may ultimately undermine the development process within poorer nations. A diminishing supply of workers will be obliged to taken on the burden of a declining standard of living. Workers will be forced to pay for increasingly costly educational and medical services in order to meet the needs of their families and extended families. Payment of bribes will become common. Without sensible reinvestment of tax revenues, workers are likely to become dependent on foreign in order to meet their domestic needs. Eventually, excessive growth in dependency may push an economy into competitive decline, as the state fails to maintain the size or education standards of its working population.


Offshore outsourcing is consistent with existing labour distribution patterns.  Offshore outsourcing lowers the cost of goods and services. There is no real need for all of the goods and services that are consumed within a highly developed economy to be produced in that economy. The sale price of a particular form of good or service is determined by a wide range of factors, including the pay demands made by the workers assembling the good or providing the service. Seeking out a labour force willing to accept lower wages and work longer hours enables a business to reduce the price and increase the overall supply of the products it offers [i] .  As more expensive and elaborate goods become available to more people- due to reductions in price- living standards throughout an economy will rise. Concurrently, increased demand for goods produced abroad will lead to increased business for offshore firms that take on outsourced work, leading to more money flowing into developing economies. Standards of living will also increases in these economies – albeit at a lower rate than in the import economy.  Offshore outsourcing does nothing more than reflect labour distribution patterns that already exist in domestic economies [ii] . Different types of activity will be carried out in centralised urban areas- where land and operating costs may be higher- than in the countryside or peripheral, industrialised districts. Certain regions of a state, by dint of geography or earlier investment decisions, may produce a concentration of certain type of worker, service or skillset. Competition within these areas will drive labour costs down – but a downward trend in service and production costs will usually lead to an upward trend in demand. This interrelationship has successfully fostered developed within all of the worlds’ largest economies, without creating unmanageable regional inequalities and without undermining workers’ rights.  Greater social mobility and education attainment within developed economies reduces the availability of the types of skilled and semi-skilled manufacturing-oriented labour that drove first-world economies during the twentieth century. First world nations now compete in knowledge-led economies, seeking to provide research new technologies and provide novel services to consumers in other highly developed nations. The residual power of collective bargaining mechanisms such as unions, coupled with expectations of high pay and highly refined working conditions mean the relative competitiveness of first-world manufacturing industries has dropped. Even if a state were to give preferential treatment to domestic manufacturers and low-level service providers, it would still run the risk of being out-competed by its counterparts in the developing world.  Better standards of education, growing personal wealth and the frequent use of credit to purchase assets have created a collective action problem in first world states that practice off shoring. While, in the long-term, the number of highly skilled workers within domestic economies will grow, in the short term, a significant number of older manual and clerical workers may become unemployable as a result of more intense overseas competition. However, side proposition argues that this constitutes a marginal and bearable cost in term of the wider benefits to quality of life that outsourcing achieves.  Further, the potential costs of assisting excluded domestic workers to re-enter the job market will be covered by increased taxation and excise revenues resulting from more frequent trade with offshore outsourcing firms.  [i] “Idea. Offshoring.” The Economist, 28 October 2009.   [ii] “The once great offshoring debate.” Real Clear Politics, 16 May 2007.


Failures and defects in outsourced labour and products take longer to detect and are more expensive to remedy. Whilst customer feedback or angry employees may indicate flaws in outsourced support or payroll services, a company may only realise that a component manufactured by an offshore partner is faulty when they take delivery of it. The process of returning the component to its place of origin adds further expense to the costs caused by the delayed completion of a client firm’s product.  Offshore outsourcing reduces the amount of control that a client firm can exercise over component manufacturing even further. The expense of sending supervisors to contractor’s factories will increase. In addition, an offshore contractor may engage in outsourcing itself, entering into relationships with dozens of sub-contractors. This practise further limits the client firm’s ability to control the practices used to produce the materials it has ordered. A client may not be provided with complete information on the actions of sub-contractors; inadequate auditing of a lead contract may conceal the existence of sub-contractors.  In 2004, the aircraft company Boeing announced that it would use subcontractors (many of them offshore) to build the majority of the components that would make up its new 787 passenger jet. Many of Boeing’s offshore partners produced substandard components that failed to fit together or function properly [i] . Boeing inadvertently became entangled with a number of sub-sub-contractors who had been hired in order to meet deadlines imposed on sub-contractors without Boeing’s authority. When a number of firms engaged in the manufacture of key 787 components came close to financial failure, Boeing was forced to take them over and settle their debts. Boeing had concluded that the cost of bailing out its offshore partners would be lower than the expenses incurred by delaying the launch of its aircraft.  Takeovers of failing outsourcing partners by larger firms are becoming an increasingly common occurrence [ii] . While, in the short term, this practice may enable the client firm to maintain production schedules, in the long term the cost of integrating a new subsidiary into a larger business may prove crippling. Moreover, bailing out an outsourcing partner does not provide a guarantee that they will complete the tasks assigned to them in a timely and efficient fashion.  Especially in manufacturing dependent industries, but also in other sectors of developed economies, offshore outsourcing is indicative of flawed, short term strategizing that attempts to engineer higher profits by reducing investment in staff and taking unacceptable risks.  [i] “The trouble with outsourcing.” The Economist, 30 July 2011.   [ii] “Boeing’s woes. Nightmareliner.” The Economist, 03 September 2011.


Offshore outsourcing accelerates the development of poorer states’ infrastructure.  Offshoring spurs the development of poorer states. Offshoring relies on the existence of a basic industrial base and certain essential forms of state infrastructure, including an education system. These facilities are likely to be partially or wholly absent in a developing economy. The readily available capital that is located in the developed world, along with the example provided by other developing states that have successfully engaged in offshoring projects incentivises investment in service infrastructure and high quality education.  Many contemporary development strategies focus on developing a state’s industrial and agricultural sectors before its service economy. Expansion of developing states agricultural sectors is already proving to be a politically contentious issue, thanks to the generous and entrenched subsidies that farmers in the developed world are provided with. Resource extraction from developing states is not possible without ceding control of land and hiring of employees to wealthy supermajor oil firms, which exercise an effective monopoly over skilled geologists, miners, scientists and oil drilling experts. Under these circumstances, a conservative approach to development is likely to take an extremely long time to substantially improve economic prosperity and living standards within a poor state. However, an immediate focus on the service sector may allow a state to “leap frog” these developmental stages [i] .  Offshoring provides businesses within a developing state with access to foreign markets far larger than those in their native economy may contain. This will allow offshoring businesses to take advantage of economies of scale and capital inflow in order to develop with greater speed.  A state’s political culture will also stand to benefit from increased outsourcing. Offshore businesses will demand increasingly accountable, predictable and non-arbitrary forms of national governance. A level of reliability and foreseeability is essential in any system of civil law; so is a restrained, stable government that is prevented from using its power to expropriate private assets or spend tax revenue capriciously.  [i] “Strengthening India’s offshoring industry.” McKinsey Quaterly, August 2009.


It must be remembered that the offshore manufacturing and service sectors are relatively young. Workers have not yet had the opportunity to develop coherent collective bargaining strategies. It takes time for those involved in an industry to learn how to act as advocates for their own and their colleagues’ interests. Once these skills have become commonplace throughout the offshoring industry, workers will be better equipped to form unions and to hold their own governments to account over the lacunae and lax policy making identified by side opposition.  Side opposition have adopted a somewhat orientalist line of argument by suggesting that developing economies are inherently weak and easy to subvert. In jurisdictions such as India quite the opposition is true; governments eager to control the effect of globalisation on domestic markets have adopted policies that inhibit the involvement of foreign firms in their economies. Businesses and politicians- both local and foreign- expend a great deal of political capital in order to make developing states accessible to the offshoring industry – often on terms that require workers’ welfare to be strictly monitored.


Side opposition have created an argument for increasing the quality and affordability of education within developing states. Thanks to Trade Union’s intensive involvement in the decisions taken by large western businesses, companies that engage in offshoring are often compelled to invest a portion of the savings that they make from offshoring their operations into retraining schemes for staff at risk of redundancy. In 2005, the large IT services company CSC reached an agreement with the Union Amicus that required it to share a portion of the savings that it made through expanding its use of outsourcing with its staff [i] . Rather than declaring any redundancies, CSC gave its staff the opportunity to retrain by devoting almost £5000 for each of its English employees to education and development schemes.  It is conceded that the offshoring relationships formed between America and India and China during the nineteen nineties formed the basis of the industrial booms that both of those states are currently experiencing. An influx of expertise and increases in education and living standards funded by companies specialising in offshore have enabled both Indian and China to reduce their dependence on US manufacturers in many areas of their economy. However, the transition of manufacturing-led industries into developing economies is only one aspect of the offshoring narrative.  Increases in living standards within the developed nations of Europe and north America will only be sustainable if the individuals benefitting from higher wages and access to global markets for goods and services are able to maintain access to these advantages independently of the state’s intervention and changes in industrial practices. This goal is only possible if levels of education within a state are increased. Although side proposition believe that the increased burden on state support services that offshoring may cause is intractable, investment in education can limit the impact of such negative trends to only a single generation.  The affluence of many developed states is also reflected in intense entrepreneurial activity within their economies. In states such as Germany the proliferation in highly specialised small and medium sized businesses- that are unable to afford the services of offshoring businesses- has sustained demand for skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Many of these firms are sustained by larger businesses seeking outsourcing opportunities that are unwilling to engage in offshore outsourcing.  The size and relatively low individual incomes of German-style mittelstand enterprises prevents them from taking advantage of offshore outsourcing, often seen as (proportionately) too expensive and too risky [ii] by mittelstand executives. Such companies also help to sustain employment within economies that place a high premium on specialised technical and professional knowledge, but neglect equally complex and specialised vocational and craft skills.  [i] “CSC to retain staff with offshoring cash.” 09 August 2005.   [ii] “Big is back.” The Economist, 27 August 2009.


Outsourcing reduces businesses’ control over their supply chains. Offshoring firms are difficult to manage and cannot easily be held to account for failings and errors.  Companies that rely on directly hiring new employees to cover their back-office, estates and maintenance needs will not run the risk that the cost efficiency of those services might suffer as a result of union action or state regulation of pay.  Companies that rely on outsourced offshored labour to fill back-office and administrative roles expose themselves to the risk that those relationships will be undermined, damaged or abused by legal disputes or negotiation failures.  When a dispute develops between a business and a worker that it employs directly, the consequences of that dispute- in terms of lost productivity and lost profits- will usually be limited by the nature of the role that the employee occupies. It will be relatively cheap for a multinational firm to settle a dispute with a sacked cleaner. In addition, the loss of a single cleaner from a large facilities department will not compromise a company’s ability to do business.  The situation is quite different when the services and productivity of an entire company department are dependent on a relationship with an outsourcing firm. The collapse of the relationship between the media firm BskyB and its outsourcing partner EDS resulted in combined legal costs of $70,000,000 and a court case that lasted for almost five months [i] . A dispute over the terms of a contract or a crisis within the state in which an offshore outsourcing service is based can cut a company off from the workers and systems that it has hired. If a company has transferred all responsibility for its payroll or customer support operations to an offshore location, it will be completely paralysed by disagreements or emergencies of this type.  Ordinarily, the equity value and insurance liabilities of businesses could only be directly threatened by large scale union action, a failed product launch or the departure of a senior manager. However, the web of high dependency relationships that a business must enter into to remain competitive has now grown. By decentralising their authority and giving up their right to regulate relationships with its labour force on a one-to-one basis, businesses have exposed themselves to a greater amount of risk.  [i] “The trouble with outsourcing.” The Economist, 30 July 2011.


Offshoring exploits both individual workers and under developed states.  Investment in offshore outsourcing can easily develop into a form of economic and cultural imperialism. Offshoring encourages first-world governments and businesses to perceive underdeveloped countries as little more than cheap sources of labour and support for developed economies. The discourse that outsourcing creates does not focus on development strategies or the strengthening of weak economies, but on exploitation of the flaws and gaps inherent in the labour markets of developing nations [i] .  Moreover, wide-scale exporting of roles dependent on specific forms of linguistic and cultural knowledge forces workers to adopt alien and over-simplified cultural practises – directly echoing the relationships between colonial-era employers and native service providers.  [i] “The new masters of management.” The Economist, 15 April 2010.


Offshore outsourcing reduces living standards and limits social mobility.  Reliance on offshoring and offshore outsourcing is likely to lead to increases in inequality and reductions in social mobility within developed western liberal democracies.  Trade with developing economies typically results in a price premium becoming attached to specialised, skilled labourers and service providers in western economies. Poorer countries- even rapidly growing states such as India- produce smaller quantities of highly educated, highly skilled workers, such as vehicle designers, microchip fabricators and architects. In view of this, developing states concentrate on creating semi-skilled jobs that can be assigned to workers lacking- for example- university degrees. A larger proportion of Indian citizens are educated to a lower standard, so the creation of jobs accessible to them will generally be seen as politically astute. Opportunities for employment as a call centre operative or a pay roll clerk will rise in a developing state in response to an increased interest in offshoring by first world businesses.  Concurrently, as some of the money businesses save by offshoring is reinvested in advanced training, consultation exercises and research and development, demand for the services of specialists and highly skilled professionals will rise. Less skilled workers in a developed economy will see a decline in both employment opportunities [i] and pay. Professionals and those who can afford postgraduate education are likely to see their salaries increase. The gap between the rich and poor strata of society within developed economies will grow.  In short, while professionals, executives and decision makers will benefit from offshoring, seeing demand for their services rise, foreign competition is likely to undermine the domestic market for less skilled labour [ii] .  A reduction in demand for white-collar clerical workers, bookkeepers and assembly line workers will increase the burden placed on state social support schemes such as public housing, jobseekers’ payments and subsidised medical care [iii] . Although businesses may benefit from cheap overseas labour, the state will be left to contend with increasing expenditure in the short term and impaired educational and welfare standards in the long term. Children and communities within developed states that lose jobs to offshore operations will be less able to access further and higher education and are more likely to suffer  The social costs engendered by outsourcing do not balance against the financial benefits that accrue to businesses and professionals. Attempts to tax profits generated as a result of offshoring practices may fill a state’s coffers, but will not provide and effective solution to job losses and an increasing dependence on state assistance within less economically mobile communities within the developing world.  Finally, it should be noted that companies encountering financial difficulty or attempting to adapt to recessions come under intense pressure to cut costs. Increasingly, large businesses achieve these savings by engaging in outsourcing [iv] . For the reasons described above, such a practice may exclude a large number of individuals from the labour market. Outsourcing may therefore entrench and prolong a recession.  [i] Fig 3, “Labour-market trends. Winners and losers.” The Economist, 10 September 2011.   [ii] “Free Trade’s great, but offshoring rattles me.” Blinder, A S. The Washington Post, 06 May 2007.   [iii] “Idea. Offshoring.” The Economist, 28 October 2009.   [iv] “Passage to India.” The Economist, 24 June 2010.


Greater risk will simply oblige companies to be more diligent in screening and selecting the outsourcing firms that they choose to do business with.  While examples such as the construction of the Boeing Dreamliner serve to demonstrate how outsourcing can go wrong, they do not undermine the value of the idea itself. Indeed, an increased emphasis on closely supervised and responsible outsourcing will only serve to bolster the business of firms offering legal and auditing services (some of which are off-shore operations themselves)– and a slight increase in transaction costs is not likely to deter the majority of companies who have already observed the benefits of outsourcing reflected in their annual accounts.  It should also be pointed out that all sensibly run businesses should attempt to guard against the risks inherent in adopting new practices or forming new relationships by taking out insurance. Many insurers and underwriters are gearing up to assess and cover the costs of a collapse in the relationship between a businesses and an outsourcing partner.  If the worst happens and a company is forced to pull out of an offshoring agreement, it will be able to use the money that it receives from its insurer to bring troubled back-office operations or subcontracted tasks back in-house.  Increased competition within the outsourcing market, from both offshore and domestic businesses, will have the effect of forcing outsourcing firms to increase the quality and reliability of their services above the standard offered by their rivals [i] . Competition is likely to result in a net improvement of the standard or service available throughout the outsourcing industry.  [i] Drezner, W D. 26 July 2007.


Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.  Further, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.  In many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.


Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.  Due to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.  Second, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.  [1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).


Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.  Studies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.  [1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.  [2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.


Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.  Giving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.


Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.  Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.  In the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.  [1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.


Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.  In the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.  [1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.


Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.


The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]  In societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.  [1] Bikorimana, 2012.


Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.  Access to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]  In the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.  [1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.


Land titles will help end violence against women.  One of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.  Additionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.  [1] Defined by WHO, 2013.  [2] Sweetman, 2008.  [3] Migiro, 2013.


Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.  Having access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.


The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.


Land titles are not affordable to poor women  The cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.  Cheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.  [1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.  [2] Frederikse 2011


Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.  Land title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.  [1] Lemanski, 2010.


Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.  About 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.  [1] Edwards, 1990, p.255


Land titling will increase female poverty.  Titles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.  [1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.


Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.


Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.  On the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.  On another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.


Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.  [1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.


Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.


If there were similar crises without the EU existing as a balm and place where all countries can talk regularly and confront problems together then the security situation would be much worse. In the past it has only taken small incidents to spark a war – usually exemplified by the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand starting off world war I, but there have also been wars started by trade such as the ‘War of Jenkins Ear’ which became part of the war of Austrian Succession. Today the EU provides a place to negotiate disputes between members making war between member states unthinkable. Of course war would still be a very unlikely response to a dispute, but leaving the EU would mean getting rid of one of the organisations that reduces that possibility by mitigating crises.


The EU causes instability  According to Boris Johnson the European Union is “a force for instability and alienation” [1] that increasingly causes security problems such as the migration crisis. The EUs inability to solve its crises such as the economic difficulties of peripheral countries like Greece and Portugal are causing resentment and warnings that one may fall out of the Euro block. It is the EU that is creating these problems by not dealing with its crises but leaving them to fester and grow. In Greece for example only a third of Greeks have a positive view of the EU and only 17% believe integration has been good for Greece. [2]  [1] ‘EU referendum: Cameron warns UK exit could put peace at risk’, BBC News, 9th May 2016,   [2] Stokes, Bruce, and Goo, Sara Kehaulani, ‘5 facts about Greece and the EU’, PewResearchCenter, 7 July 2015,


Control of borders is important. However it is also not relevant to the debate as the UK not being a party to the Schengen agreement already has control over its borders; the UK checks passports and visas at the border just as would happen if the country were to leave the EU. Leaving would make no difference to UK border security.


A nation state can only rely on itself for security  In the security sphere it is national interests that are most important and no state can expect other states to have exactly the same interests. Everyone therefore needs to look after their own. In the case of the EU Britain cannot expect France or Germany to have the same security interests as the UK with its different situation – being an island rather than part of the continent. Germany is much more concerned with Eastern Europe than the UK, France much more with Northern Africa. Freedom from the EU means greater freedom for the UK to focus on its own national interests on security; terrorism, maritime defence, and building up NATO rather than any competing European force.


While keeping sight of the UKs national interests is important almost all of them can be carried out as well with the European Union as outside it. In particular the whole of Europe is interested in preventing terrorism. In other areas such as maritime security it makes sense for the UK to specialise in it while other countries specialise in other areas such as having larger armies. Moreover it should be noted that the UK is in one of the safest areas of the world with no hostile states in any direction. In this sense the EU is a buffer between the UK and less stable areas such as North Africa, the Middle East, or Russia so it makes sense to work with them as part of the same organisations including the EU.


In a letter to the Telegraph five former Secretary-Generals of NATO stated “The European Union… is a key partner for NATO” and that “Brexit would undoubtedly lead to a loss of British influence, undermine NATO and give succour to the West’s enemies just when we need to stand shoulder-to-shoulder across the Euro-Atlantic community against common threats”. They give sanctions imposed by the EU on Iran and Russia as examples of where the EU has lead on enhancing regional security. [1] Moreover if the EU is to create an EU force this will happen regardless of Brexit. Britain stands a much greater chance of stopping it when it has a voice in the EU with which to object.  [1] Lord Carrington, Javier Solana, Lord Robertson, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Letters: At a time of global instability, Britain needs to stand united with its EU allies’, The Telegraph, 10 May 2016,


Strong control of borders is needed to keep the country secure  Terrorism is often considered the biggest security threat to the UK. Ian Duncan Smith has argued that being in the EU “exposes UK to terror risk” because an “open border does not allow us to check and control people”. [1] The Schengen agreement on the free movement of people makes it easier for terrorists to move about in Europe as shown by the terrorist attacks on Paris which were planned in Brussels.  [1] ‘Staying in EU 'exposes UK to terror risk', says Iain Duncan Smith’, BBC News, 21 February 2016,


British security is dependent upon NATO not the EU  NATO is “the most successful defensive alliance in history”, it saw off the USSR and Warsaw pact without a fight and has created a single security regime throughout most of Europe. [1] With its’ record NATO is clearly most important for security in Europe; it is still needed to deter Russia. The creation of an EU army on the other hand will undermine NATO and is something that will be pushed through after the referendum. [2] Britain could likely opt out, but with cooperation taking place under EU rather than NATO auspices the alliance that has kept the peace would be badly damaged.  [1] London Declaration quoted by Reeve, Richard, ‘We need to talk about NATO’, OxfordResearchGroup, 17 September 2015,   [2] Kemp, Richard, ‘It is an EU army that could bring about war’, The Telegraph, 9 May 2016,


Since the end of World War II Germany and national rivalries in Western Europe not been the main threat to Europe. Instead that threat has emanated from outside the EU; largely from Russia, and then from more nebulous threats such as terrorism. In both these cases it has been military alliances such as NATO and nuclear deterrence that have kept the peace.


The EU simply adds to an alphabet soup of organisations that work on security in Europe. The two which matter, NATO and EUROPOL, both have little to do with the EU and would work just as well with the UK out.


Leaving will mean less communication with other security services  Leaving the EU may damage relationships with key security partners such as France and Germany. Both countries would have much less reason to cooperate on security issued when not in the same organisation. There would certainly still be some cooperation but the former heads of Mi5 and Mi6, Lord Evans and Sir John Sawers have stated that the UK would lose out through not being able “to take part in the decisions that frame the sharing of data, which is a crucial part of counter-terrorism and counter-cyber work”. Sawers points out that data sharing in the EU allowed France to transfer DNA and fingerprints of one of the Brussels bombers within months – previous to EU data sharing it would have taken months slowing down critical investigations. [1]  [1] ‘Row as ex-intelligence chiefs say EU membership protects UK security’, BBC News, 8 May 2016,


The EU brings together former enemies  The EU has created peace among states that formerly fought each other. Most notably Germany and France had fought each other three times in seventy-five years prior to the formation of the EU. The EU has helped make such a conflict unthinkable now. The EU as a structure restrains old rivalries through giving a joint project and goal. It ensures cooperation particularly in places where there are competing interests like Gibraltar where continued cross border access is guaranteed by being a member of the EU. [1]  [1] Hague, William, ‘Leaving the EU would be disastrous for the Falklands, Gibraltar and Ulster’, The Telegraph, 9 May 2016,


Security is better shared  Security is not a zero sum game – our security does not get better if our neighbours is worse. On the contrary good French, Irish, Belgian and Norwegian security helps ensure good British security. Being in the EU provides an opportunity for cooperation between member states by creating interaction on all levels. Some integration ensures a common and cooperative response to international threats. The EU is the most obvious place to develop a coordinated response to terrorism and other, particularly non-military, security concerns throughout the region. [1]  [1] Galbreath, David, ‘Professor David Galbreath on: Security in, secure out: Brexit’s impact on security and defence policy’, University of Bath IPR Blog, 24 March 2016,


There would still be data sharing between Britain and its neighbours even if the UK left the EU. No intelligence agency would sit on information that could save lives in another country simply because that country is no longer in the same organisation. Moreover the UK could still negotiate data sharing agreements with relevant intelligence agencies to ensure that information sharing remains fast and comprehensive.


The two-state solution would have Israel relinquish the West Bank, known to the Israelis as “Judea and Samaria”. Yet, these are historic regions to the Jews. Israel would similarly have to undermine its identity to give up these two regions, and so any two-state solution acceptable to Israel would have to mean the retention of Judea and Samaria. Because of the large Palestinian population in the West Bank, even a two-state solution would mean Israel could not be both Jewish and democratic.(3)


A one-state solution mean Israel would cease to be either democratic or Jewish  As described in the above quote by Peres, the vast majority of Israelis desire to live in a Jewish homeland in which they can define their own institutions and culture in light of their Jewish heritage. A one-state solution, however, would undermine Israel's legitimacy and internationally recognized right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state in the land of the Jewish forefathers.  From Israel's perspective, it is not possible for the Jewish people to accept an arrangement that signifies the end of the existence of a Jewish state, which would be the result of a one-state solution, as the state could not be considered a Jewish one if it housed a very large Palestinian population, possibly even a Palestinian majority.(1) For this reason it is unlikely that any one-state solution would be truly democratic, and rather would be a situation of an Israeli minority ruling over a Palestinian majority, who would be largely excluded from the running of the country and determining their own affairs.(4) A one-state solution would only produce an explosive situation in which Jews would dominate the economy and most other aspects of the new state, creating a reality of exploitation. At that point in time, the new state would be a new form of occupation that would only set the conflict on a more violent track.(5) Therefore, the new state created by a one-state solution would be unacceptable either to Israelis or to Palestinians, as it would cease to be either Jewish or democratic, and so would not be a just outcome.  Only a two-state solution can keep Israel Jewish and democratic, and allow a Palestinian state similarly to be Arab and democratic, as it would most likely wish.


Palestinian support for two-state solution declined around 2008, and is waning even among the 'moderate' Palestinian camp, as well as among additional Arab elements.(8) It is also naïve to think that a two-state solution would gain the favour or even support of Iran. Iran wants to be the dominant power in the Middle East, and it wants nuclear weapons so that it can threaten not only Israel but other states in the region.(9) To this end, Iran has an incentive to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict big and bloody so as to distract the West from its own regional agenda. Furthermore, an independent Palestinian state would probably be perceived as a security threat to some of its neighbours, particularly Jordan, and thus might actually prompt further tensions.(9)


A two-state solution is best for peace  Palestinians and Israelis will not be able to live together in peace in the same state any time in the foreseeable future. The idea that Palestinians and Israelis can live in peace and harmony in one state, with tolerance for each other and in keeping with democratic principles of inclusion, is simply naive. This idea has been made impossible by nearly a century of direct conflict between these people. While this might change in coming centuries, it is unacceptable to adopt a one-state policy now based on these naive ideas.  Israeli President Shimon Peres has argued: “Establishing a single multinational country is a tenuous path that does not bode well for peace but, rather, enforces the conflict's perpetuation. Lebanon, ravaged by bloodshed and instability, represents only one of many examples of an undesirable quagmire of this nature.”(1)  This stance has been endorsed by leaders and officials from around the world: US special envoy George Mitchell has stated “In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we believe that the two-state solution, two states living side by side in peace, is the best and the only way to resolve this conflict.”(2)  Pope Benedict XVI has similarly called on Israel’s leadership to embrace the two-state solution for peace with the Palestinians: “I plead with all those responsible to explore every possible avenue in the search for a just resolution of the outstanding difficulties, so that both peoples may live in peace in a homeland of their own, within secure and internationally recognized borders.”(3)  Even Colonel Gaddafi, the late Libyan leader, argued that a two-state solution was essential for peace.(1) The reason the two-state solution has been recognised as the best for peace is because it respects the democratic will of both peoples for a state of their own.  As Peres argues, “The Jewish people want and deserve to live in peace in their rightful, historical homeland. The Palestinian people want and deserve their own land, their own political institutions and their right to self-determination. It is vital that this cause be based on the prospect of coexistence between Jews and Arabs, which translates into cooperation in fields such as the economy, tourism, the environment and defence. Achieving all this will be possible only by granting each people its own state and borders, to enable their citizens to pray according to their faiths, cultivate their cultures, speak their own languages and safeguard their heritages.”(1) Because only a two-state solution allows for this peaceful co-existence and development, a two-state solution is best for peace and thus more justified than a one-state solution.


Simply because past conflict has existed is no reason to believe that peace and understanding cannot be established through co-operation, shared institutions and interaction. This is exactly what a one-state solution would foster in the long term, but which a two-state solution prevents by separating the two communities. Even if they each have a state of their own, unless the Israelis and Palestinians learn to live in proximity to each other in co-operation, there will be no peace.


Only a two-state solution can satisfy both sides  A two-state solution can offer sufficient territory for both Israelis and Palestinians. For Israel this would mean keeping the vast majority of areas inhabited by Israeli citizens within the state of Israel. The two-state solution would also, however, offer sufficient land to the Palestinians.  While cynics might question the size of the West Bank and Gaza, optimists should look no further than Singapore for reassurance. The area of the West Bank and Gaza is nine times as large as Singapore's, yet the combined population of Palestinians in both regions is smaller than that of Singapore. Singapore enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world. The Palestinians are capable of achieving similar success, through instituting a modern economy based on science, technology and the benefits of peace.(1)  Moreover, throughout the years polls have consistently showed respectable Israeli and Palestinian majorities in favour of a negotiated two-state settlement.(6) Even the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad has stated that Iran would support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The success of a two-state solution, therefore, would, at a minimum, gain the support and possibly cooperation of the Iranians. This would be valuable diplomatically, particularly in resolving the larger conflict between Iran and the West.(7) Therefore, the best way to satisfy both sides and achieve peace is to adopt a two-state solution, which is therefore the most just solution.


The most just outcome is that which best secures peace. Both sides will be compelled to make certain concessions, and some inequalities and discrepancies between the two new states are unavoidable. However, on balance the benefits of peace and security for both peoples will outweigh the harms of any concessions or inequalities, so long as both peoples receive a state of their own in which they can control their own destinies, which is the only way to ensure peace.


These arguments about 'sympathetic cooperation' ignore the realities on the ground of two people who are and seem certain to remain violently opposed to each other as long as they struggle over control over a single state rather than each having a state of their own. Furthermore, offering the Palestinians a sovereign state of their own, free from Israeli control, would likely go a long way to satisfying the vast majority of Palestinians, and thus actually make a war against Israel far less likely. As Peres argues: “Indeed, six miles will be too narrow to guarantee full security, which only reinforces our belief that Israel's safety is not embedded only in territorial defence but in peace. Peace provides breadth of wings, even when the waist is narrow.”(1)


Israelis and Palestinians are too intermingled for a two-state solution  A million Palestinians live throughout Israel even without the West Bank and Gaza strip, and when the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are considered also, it becomes clear that dividing these two populations is simply unfeasible. By comparison, the feasibility of a bi-national state, with the two peoples living in a kind of federation, seems workable. Given this 'reality' on the ground, the most practical solution seems to be a united democratic state offering equal citizenship for all: One Person, One Vote.(12)  The ever-expanding Israeli settlements in the West Bank particularly represent a barrier to the separation of the two peoples into two states. In 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat famously shook hands on the White House lawn, there were 109,000 Israelis living in settlements across the West Bank (not including Jerusalem). Today there are 275,000, in more than 230 settlements and strategically placed 'outposts' designed to cement a permanent Jewish presence on Palestinian land.(10)  Forcibly removing settlers would be too difficult, could foment civil strife among Jewish Israeli citizens, and would create a level of resentment among fundamentalist Jews that would likely inflame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Only a one-state solution can guarantee equal rights for all  A one-state solution is the most just because a two-state solution would inherently result in a worse situation for the Palestinians than the Israelis, whereas a one-state solution would guarantee equal rights for all. The July 2007 Madrid meeting in favour of a one-state solution put firth that: “A two-state solution is predicated on the unjust premise that peace can be achieved by granting limited national rights to Palestinians living in the areas occupied in 1967, while denying the rights of Palestinians inside the 1948 borders and in the Diaspora.” Thus, the two-state solution condemns Palestinian citizens of Israel to permanent second-class status within their homeland, in a racist state that denies their rights by enacting laws that privilege Jews constitutionally, legally, politically, socially and culturally. Moreover, the two-state solution denies Palestinian refugees their internationally recognized right of return.”(14)  A two-state solution, particularly one that enables a Jewish state, would also most likely alienate the Palestinian population remaining within Israel. At best, they would be second class citizens. At worst, they would be pushed out, directly or indirectly.(13)  A two-state solution, and the establishment of a Jewish state, would also kill the idea of the return of Palestinian refugees that were expelled from Israel during various wars and conflicts. The Palestinian state created would also- if past experience is any judge- be highly divided (between factions such as Hamas and Fatah) and dysfunctional. This situation would have a material impact on the quality of life of citizens of the new Palestinian.(15)(16) Therefore, a one-state solution is more just than a two-state solution.


Only a one-state solution can end the conflict  It was no less a man than Albert Einstein who believed in 'sympathetic cooperation' between 'the two great Semitic peoples' and who insisted that 'no problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.' A relative handful of Israelis and Palestinians are beginning to survey the proverbial new ground, considering what Einstein's theories would mean in practice. They might take heart from Einstein's friend Martin Buber, the great philosopher who advocated a bi-national state of 'joint sovereignty,' with 'complete equality of rights between the two partners,' based on 'the love of their homeland that the two peoples share.'(10) This position has been adopted by some Palestinian leaders: In October 2005, Nusseibeh, then president of al-Quds University in Jerusalem, and several other liberal Palestinian political activists and intellectuals held a press conference in Jerusalem, stating: “We are pressing now for equal political and legal rights within a single, democratic Israel, and we are confident that our Israeli brothers and sisters will welcome us and that together we will build a free and democratic state in which Jews and Arabs will live together in peace.”(5)  A two-state solution, however, would most likely foster continued conflict, for two reasons. Firstly, a Palestinian state would be base for terrorism. As seen when Israel withdrew from Gaza, the Palestinians there did not embrace the two-state solution, but the Muslim hardliners who controlled Gaza continued to want nothing less than Israel's destruction, and Gaza's newly-elected Hamas government spent much of its money not on the welfare of Palestinians but on attacking Israel.(11)  Similarly, a two-state solution makes Israel too narrow and vulnerable. A two-state solution would make Israel only 6 miles wide at a number of points where the West Bank juts into Israeli territory.(1) This creates a number of vulnerabilities, particularly the risk that Israel may become divided during a war (a not unlikely prospect). For all these reasons, a two-state solution cannot offer true peace, but a one-state solution built on co-operation and equal rights can, and so a one-state solution is more just.


A two-state solution could succeed in partitioning the land and the two peoples by including the largest Israeli settlements within Israel, possibly by allowing for non-contiguous “islands” of Israeli territory around the larger settlements surrounded by the new Palestinian state.(13)  In any case, a two-state solution can find practical solutions to these problems, while having the advantage of solving the inherent and insolvable problems of having two opposed nations and identities in perpetual conflict within a single state.


There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.  [1] Loveluck, 2013  [2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013


Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis  The official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.  [1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013  [2] Loveluck, 2013  [3] Maqbool, 2013  [4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013  [5] Bowen, 2013


The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.  [1] The World Bank, accessed 2013  [2] Bakr, 2012


Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles  Separation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .  [1] Wikipedia  [2] CNN Staff, 2013  [3] Spencer, 2012  [4] Reuters, 2013


The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.  [1] G uerin, 2013  [2] el-Deen, 2013  [3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013


Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.  [1] El Amrani, 2011


Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular  Morsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.  [1] Werr, 2013  [2] Ahram Online, 2013  [3] Fam & Shahine, 2013  [4] Zogby Research Services, 2013


Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country  Another major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.  [1] Khalil, 2012


The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.  [1] May et al., 2004  [2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16


While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.  [1] Smith, 2013


Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected  It was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.


The army has no place in a modern democracy  The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.  [1] May et al., 2004  [2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16


Most Egyptians still supported Morsi  A poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.  [1] Smith, 2013


The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.  [1] CNN Staff, 2013


The proposed right of family reunification is too much of a burden on receiving countries, making it an obstacle to a migrant rights treaty. Indeed, states have levelled as an argument against the Migrant Workers Convention, and against other possible international migrant treaties, concerns about a robust right of family reunification to all migrant workers present in migrant-receiving countries. This could offer family members a right to migrate into the state in question, resulting in large increases in population size. And, there is no doubt that the text of the Migrant Workers Convention aims to create a "right" to family reunification. Even if it provides flexibility on how a nation attempts to facilitate reunification, it still requires that states reunite families in some way. Under this treaty, therefore, any migrant could sue the state for not allowing his family (and perhaps extended family) to immigrate as well. In overpopulated and strained migrant-receiving countries, particularly in Western Europe, such a proposition is untenable, which is why so many migrant-receiving nations oppose the treaty.


Migrants ought to have a right to family reunification.  The right to family is widely recognized as an essential human right. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that the family is the fundamental unit of society. Within the right to family is the right to family reunification for migrants who are separated from their loved ones. The Human Rights Education Associates argue, “states are obliged to facilitate contacts and deal with requests to enter or leave a state party for the purpose of reunification in a humane and expeditious manner.” [1] This right is especially important for refugees, who have often been torn from their families by force, and although they have not been separated by force economic migrants are also separated from their families and at the very least should be able to visit their families, and it is not granted by many countries.  [1] Asmita Naik, “The Right to Family,” Human Rights Education Associates,” Accessed June 30, 2011,  .


The receiving countries would not accept a regulatory body. The current international regulatory bodies such as the WTO and World Bank are essentially run by the rich countries for the benefit of the rich countries and so they accept it. Any body regulating migrants’ rights would, however, be doing the opposite-- benefiting the poorest -- meaning the rich countries would try to prevent the creation of such an organisation.  In the unlikely event that the regulatory body could be created it would face a gargantuan task. How could global migration be monitored and regulated by an international body when even national bodies in rich countries are not able to keep track of all migrants in their nations? Yet the international body would also have to monitor the conditions of migrants in many much poorer countries where the infrastructure currently does not exist.


Economic and social protections prevent the exploitation of migrants.  Migrants face a number of challenges when they reach their destination, such as finding housing and in integrating into the workforce, and the opportunities to exploit them can be dangerous. According to Dr Tasneem Siddiqui, "In 1929, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) identified the migrant workers as the most vulnerable group in the world. Seventy years have elapsed since then, but they still belong to that group." [1]  This is something that the U.N. Convention attempts to address creating specific changes in many countries that would make migrants less vulnerable. For example, in all of the Gulf States, migrants are prohibited or at least restricted from “participation in independent trade union activities.” [2] Protecting the right to unionize, as the U.N. Convention does with Article 40(1), allows migrants to fight for their own rights in the workplace, allowing migrants to fight and ensure their own rights is the best way to ensure that they will be protected in the long-term.  Migrants have the same fundamental rights as any other segment of the population as recognised by all states when they signed the universal declaration of human rights. Yet while migrants often initially migrate due to the dream of a better life they often find themselves in terrible living conditions, even in developed countries like Britain they often end up in what are essentially shanty towns, in London for example even if they manage to stay off the streets many new immigrants are housed in sheds and garages. [3] All governments should recognise their responsibility to ensure the minimum rights of migrants when it comes to shelter, education, and health are protected.  [1] Daily Star, “Ratify UN convention on migrant workers’ rights,” May 3, 2009,  .  [2] Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia/GCC States.”  [3] Rogers, Chris, ‘The illegal immigrants desperate to escape squalor of Britain’, BBC News, 28 February 2012,