Sanctions provide leverage  In 2003 Senator John McCain argued "freedom for the Cuban people is not yet at hand, and the Castro brothers clearly intend to maintain their grip on power", [1] and this situation is likely to continue if sanctions are dropped unilaterally and the pressure is taken off Cuba. The United States however might be able to help the Cuban people gain more freedom in return for being willing to reduce and eventually drop sanctions when the Cuban people are free. Barak Obama while supporting improved relations with Cuba and an eventual dropping of sanctions argues that they provide leverage to encourage steps towards democracy. [2]  [1] McCain, John, quoted in AFP, ‘White House runners: Castro’s exit not enough’, 2008.   [2] Omestad, Thomas, ‘Cuban Official Rules Out Any Obama Preconditions for Improved Relations’, 2009.


Cuba deserves sanctions  Cuba is a repressive regime which operates one party rule, holds political prisoners and stifles opposition and economic freedom through constant harassment. The Cuban administration is on the U.S. list of sponsors of terror, [1] not least because it provides a safe haven to many American fugitives, [2] and has refused to give help with the search for Al-Qaeda suspects. Cuba is known to have a developmental biological weapons ‘effort’ [3] and is recorded as breaking international sanctions to export dual use technologies to other rogue states. [4] Finally, Cuba has failed to stop drug shipments through its waters [5] and its government profits directly from resources stolen from United States citizens in 1959.  [1] U.S. Department of State, ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’.   [2] 104th Congress, ‘H.R.927 -- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)’, 1996.   [3] NTI, ‘Cuba Profile Biological’, 2009.   [4] Bolton, John, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 2002.   [5] Adams, Nathan M., ‘Havana’s Drug-Smuggling Connection’, 1982.


The national security rationale for sanctions on Cuba has long since disappeared. The embargo was originally imposed in 1960 when Castro seized US property in Cuba and was tightened in 1962 in response to Cuban alignment to the Soviet Union. These sanctions were in order to neutralize Cuba as a potential threat through it being a proxy of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union has collapsed this is no longer a problem. Instead Cuba is left with no powerful friends and by itself its military power is negligible and is certainly in no position to threaten the world’s preeminent power. [1]  [1] Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security’, 1997.


Opening to trade is the way to human rights rather than cutting of contact. Trade and development encourage communications that help to undermine oppression. [1] Far from engaging in sanctions the United States should be encouraging Cubans to use mobile phones and the internet; technologies that can be vital in undermining authoritarian regimes as shown by the Arab Spring.  [1] Griswold, Daniel, ‘Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba’, 2005.


Failing states do not infect a whole region. The contagion theory is hard to apply beyond a small group of countries in West Africa - elsewhere failed states do not tend to drag down their neighbours with them. For example, countries bordering Somalia, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea, are far from perfect but none of them are close to being considered a failed state. In fact, whilst Somalia is seen as the basket case in the region after the failed U.N. intervention in 1992, the percentage of its population that lives on less than $1 a day is in fact less than those of its West African neighbours. [1] Therefore, in most cases the best solution to the problem of failed states is not intervention but for regional groups (e.g. ECOMOG in West Africa, the African Union in Western Sudan, the European Union in Macedonia, Australia in East Timor) to take responsibility for their areas rather than to overburden the USA and UN. In sum, ‘not all failing states pose true dangers to the peace’ and therefore the U.N.’s responsibility for ‘international peace and security’ is not a sufficient basis for action to resurrect all failing or failed states’. [2]  [1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.351  [2] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


Failing states can infect a whole region  It is in the interests of international stability that failing states are rescued before it is too late. Failed states often infect a whole region, as the collapse of Liberia did in West Africa - a problem known as contagion. Neighbouring states back different factions with arms and squabble over resources, such as the diamonds of Sierra Leone and the mineral wealth of Congo. Internally neighbours are destabilised by floods of refugees and weapons from next door. Their own rebel groups can also easily find shelter to regroup and mount fresh attacks in the lawless country just over their borders. Former U.N. Secretary Boutros-Ghali claimed, as his justification for support for failing states, that the U.N. has a responsibility under its Charter to ‘maintain international peace and security’ amid fears ‘the demise of a state is often marked by violence and widespread human rights violations that affect other states’. [1] Intervention prevents this by entailing the establishment of conditions for reconstruction which thereafter provides physical infrastructure, facilities and social services. The ultimate goal therefore of the intervention is to ensure that both the state concerned and the region as a whole require no further military or monetary support. [2]  [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:   [2] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.343


There is very limited evidence to support the theory that failed states become havens for terrorists. It is true that there are some Al-Qaeda sympathisers in Somalia, but these seem to be few in number and no greater in threat to the USA and its allies than similar groups in other countries. Nor is Afghanistan a good example of this theory; Osama Bin Laden was invited to take refuge there by an established government - the Taliban - only after they had successfully grabbed power in Afghanistan. Before this, Bin Laden was sheltered in Sudan - not in the war-torn and lawless south, but in the northern part where the government was in firm control. [1] Here the problem was not a failed state, but rather one with an extreme Islamist government. On the other hand, Iran and Syria are both accused of providing bases for terrorists, but neither could be considered a failed state.  [1] Hehir, A. (2007) ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 1/3, pp. 307-326


States should act to help civilians in failing states to prevent humanitarian crises  States should act to help the people of a failing state, as once it collapses no government services will be provided, including law and order. States should work with the UN in leading attempts at conflict resolution, and should engage in subsequent peacekeeping missions and investment in nation-building initiatives (e.g. funding and organising the reintegration of non-combatants into society, organising elections, building up civil society, creating effective government institutions, etc.). The failure of the UN operation in Somalia in 1990 is telling; the country has not had a functioning central government ever since. [1] Intervention to prevent such outcomes will require both greater willingness to commit funds on the part of the powerful states and a commitment to conflict resolution which has been largely lacking in recent national policy world-wide.  [1] CNN (2011, June 21) Somalia again is at top of failed states list. Retrieved June 23, 2011 from CNN Wire:


States should act to protect their own civilians first and foremost, not those in failing states. As such, soldiers should not be sacrificed for the lives of civilians elsewhere; that is not what soldiers enlist for nor does it fit a state’s role as a guarantor of security for its own citizens. Civilians in failing states are the ones that ultimately need to take the responsibility for usurping the incumbent powers in their state. Furthermore, even if it were the case that states should act to prevent failing states, there are means to do this that do not include intervention; charities can provide humanitarian assistance, states can offer mediation services if there is a dispute and diaspora communities can provide finance.


The United Nations has demonstrated that it lacks both the organizational ethos and the forces required to effectively prevent the failure of states. The veto power on the Security Council ensures that troops for intervention are only mandated when they suit the interests of the most powerful states. Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s forces, almost always composite forces made up of a number of different states, renders them ineffective once on the ground. The example of Sierra Leone is telling, a ceasefire was only agreed upon three years after the UN entered the state, and as late as 2009, the UN’s own head in the region noted the country is still in a precarious situation, ‘with ethnic and interreligious conflicts and increasing threats from international crime’. [1] Failure was not prevented, merely put off.  [1] Security Council (2009, September 14). Sierra Leone’s success in transition to stable democracy depends on government providing ‘peace dividend’, Security Council told. Retrieved June 21 from United Nations:


Failed states are havens for drug-smugglers and terrorists  Failed states also export dangers more widely, as they often provide an opportunity for drug crops such as Opium (Afghanistan) or Coca (parts of Colombia) to be grown, processed and traded without fear of authority, with devastating effects both locally and globally. Desperate people may also take refuge in religious or political extremism, which may in time come to threaten the rest of the world. In so doing, failed states often become havens for terrorists, who can find safety in them to plot against the West, to establish training camps for future terrorists, and to build up finance, weapons and other resources with which to mount campaigns. In what was a key claim that later underpinned the 2002 US National Security Strategy and the U.S. War on Terror, Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, has described failed states as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’. [1] This can be seen in Somalia, where states in recent years have ‘begun to fear al Qaeda will take advantage of the lawlessness’. [2] Other fragile states, such as Niger, Congo and Sierra Leone have radioactive and other valuable minerals which could be very dangerous in the hands of determined terrorists. The USA should work with the UN to strengthen governments so that they can more effectively maintain internal order while controlling their borders and tracking resource-flows.  [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:   [2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


The United Nations has the constitutional power and capability to intervene to prevent failed states  The United Nations, and its resident body, the Security Council, has both the right and the capability to intervene in countries in order to maintain the peace. Peace in this sense represents more than the absence of bloodshed, but also provides the means by which aid organizations can enter a territory and provide the requisite resources to prevent civilian suffering. The United Nations have proven their efficacy in this area, mandating an intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003 that sought to prevent the exacerbation of tensions between the government and rebel forces. [1] A ceasefire was eventually brokered in 2007 and the failure of the state averted. U.N. forces in Macedonia during the 1990s were also credited with ‘successfully contributing to the prevention of conflict spill over and having a stabilizing effect in the country’. [2] U.N. interventions to prevent the failure of states can and do work.  [1] BBC News (2003, February 5) UN backs Ivory Coast peacekeepers. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from BBC News:   [2] Kim, J. (1998, July 23). Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention. Retrieved September 9, 2011 from CRS Report for Congress:


The cost of intervention is lower than the cost of inactivity. Sometimes, as in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, the situation will become so bad that US military intervention is necessary - this is hugely costly compared to funding preventative action through the United Nations. The role of failed states as reservoirs from which refugees, narcotics, terrorism, illegal diamonds, etc. are exported means that the USA already spends many billions of dollars a year in dealing with the mess they create. Finally, there is an opportunity cost of lost trade and investment which applies to the developing world and developed economies alike (e.g. the benefits to the US of trade with oil-rich Angola, Sudan and Congo).


Interventions can, and do, fail, however so long as their intentions are good, they must still be attempted if the effects of failed states are to be prevented. Furthermore, the humanitarian catastrophes linked to failing and failed states: ‘mass migration, environmental degradation, regional instability; energy insecurity and transnational terrorism’ are not the fault of a failed intervention, but a failed state. [1] The U.S.-led intervention in Somalia in 1992 is a case in point; though the intervention failed and, it could be argued, exacerbated conditions in Somalia, it did not lead to the state’s failure, it merely failed to prevent it. As such, the U.S. cannot be blamed for attempting to stand with Somalis and save their state; that they failed is unfortunate, but the subsequent continuing humanitarian catastrophe is not the fault of intervening forces. So long as there is hope that interventions can prevent failed states, the success rate is above 0%, they should be attempted for the alternative is little better for the civilians concerned.  [1] Patrick, S. (2006) Weak states and global threats: Fact or fiction? Retrieved June 24, 2011 from the Washington Quarterly (29:2, p.27-53) p.27


Failing states should not be provided a safety net  Being willing to step into every fragile state could create a moral hazard. Irresponsible governments will assume that they will be bailed out by the powerful states, like the US, and the UN, who will always intervene to prevent unnecessary and wide-spread suffering. [1] This in itself makes future failures much more likely, as there is no incentive for governments to tackle corruption, crime or the other issues that push states to the brink of failure. [2] There needs to maintain a culpable fear of failure, separate from the regime change and economic reconstructing often enforced by the UN and IMF on failing states.  [1] Kuperman, A. (2006) ‘Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’ in T. Crawford and A. Kuperman eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention (London: Routledge).  [2] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:


Intervention in fragile states is simply a new form of imperialism  It is not for either the USA or the UN to impose a government upon individual countries. Doing so would deny the people of the failed state the right to chart their own future and be absent of the authorisation of the UN Charter, which states the organization is not allowed to intervene ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. [1] Furthermore, if the USA, or any one country, regularly intervened it would create more hostility towards that country, with accusations that it is acting out of a self-interested desire to exploit peoples economically. The personnel of that country could rapidly become a target for attacks. Nor is it desirable to encourage the UN to increase the level of its intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. This might start with weak countries but could rapidly become a habit and encourage the organisation in its ambitions to become a world government.  [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


International development is a more effective method of preventing failed states.  The current US approach to international development, in which aid, loans or market access are conditional upon good governance, should be maintained and even extended more widely. Such conditions provide incentives for developing countries to put constructive policies in place and reward those who fight corruption. As past failures show all too clearly, there is no point throwing money at chaotic, lawless and corrupt regimes - it will never reach the people anyway. In any case, humanitarian relief is not conditional and the USA continues to respond with compassion to emergencies anywhere in the world. It should also be noted that special measures to support states identified as at risk of failure could in themselves be harmful. Discussion of intervention will scare off investors and help to bring about economic collapse - becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.


The cost of intervention is too high  The cost of intervention is too high. The United Nations has neither the money nor the support of the international community to undertake speculative missions. Already it fails to meet its targets for troops to provide peacekeeping in countries which request its help. The USA already contributes nearly a quarter of the UN's peacekeeping budget and cannot afford more at a time when it is already stretched by major commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is difficult to see where else the necessary funds could come from. The reconstruction of Afghanistan is expected to cost as much as $15 billion over the next ten years, ‘plus the cost of training a new army and police force’. [1] At a time of financial austerity, American citizens are entitled to ask whether their money is being spent prudently. The lives of intervening soldiers are not pawns, they should not be unnecessarily sent into death-traps like Somalia in 1990. [2]  [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:   [2] Dickinson, E. (2010, December 14). WikiFailed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


The questionable foreign policy of previous U.S. administrations should not pre-empt future interventions, either by the United States or other nations genuinely intended to protect civilians in failing states, when mandated by the United Nations. The United Nations has expertise and is widely respected, which will be required considering the international reputation of the USA is now sufficiently damaged that the hostility it generates can undermine the good work it wishes to do. In partnership the USA can provide resources to enable the UN to secure the future stability of many fragile countries, while the UN's involvement can show that these operations are altruistic and pose no imperialist threat. Over time, commitment through the UN to international peace and humanitarian concerns will allow the USA to change the way it is viewed worldwide - an important aspect of the War on Terror. Regarding violations of sovereignty, former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali dismisses objections: ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality’. [1]  [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


Interventions can fail and eventually cause more harm than good  Interventions are not a panacea for failing states; they do not ensure the success of either the military offensive or subsequent reconstruction efforts on the ground during the occupation. If the intervention fails to overcome local forces, civilians are powerless to overcome a political hierarchy boosted by military victory and reliant on violence. Furthermore, even if the military offensive is successful, the underlying causes of the failure of the state are still present and may be exacerbated by the presence of an intervening force. As such, intervening forces must be aware that the decision is not simply whether intervention is necessary, but whether it will do more harm than good. Coyne describes this fallacy as the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, whereby states assume that the ‘grass is always greener on the other side’. ‘It is assumed that the foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an outcome preferable to that which would occur absent of these interventions’. The reality challenges these assumptions, for Minxim Pei calculates just a 26% success rate for U.S.-led reconstruction efforts since the late nineteenth century. [1] If an intervening force can’t be certain, even remotely, of the benefit to the state concerned, it has little justification in deploying and risking the exacerbation of an already-precarious problem.  [1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.344


Western aid ‘cannot reach its intended recipients because of violence, irreconcilable political divisions, or the absence of an economic infrastructure’. [1] There is a need to change the rules for access to US aid programmes (e.g. the Millennium Challenge Account) and trade preferences (e.g. the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and those of international organisations in which the USA is influential (e.g. the World Bank, G8 moves on debt relief). At present these programmes are structured to reward developing countries with particular government policies (e.g. protection of property rights, focus on education, sustainable budgets, anti-corruption measures, etc). Sensible though this seems, it denies international help to those states whose people need it most - those where government is weak or absent. Funding microcredit schemes, education, health and sanitation programmes in the more stable parts of failing states, and providing meaningful trade access could all provide long-term benefits to the USA.  [1] Ratner, S. R., & Helman, G. B. (2010, June 21). Saving Failed States. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Foreign Policy:


Punishment for the actions of irresponsible governments should not be handed down to civilians. The ‘safety net’ purports to protect civilians by preventing the failure of states; it does not guarantee the protection of those governments responsible for the near-failure. Furthermore, the fear of future failures is much more pronounced when states are left to fail, to export their anarchy to neighbouring states and their contraband to the world. As Rotberg therefore claims, ‘preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are…strategic and moral imperatives’. [1]  [1] Rotberg, R. I. (2002, July/August). Failed States in a World of Terror. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations:


The idea that the US and NATO have a moral obligation falls flat when considering that this would put the US and NATO in a position of having a moral obligation to many other third world countries that are struggling and in conflict. Yet, such a broader obligation obviously does not exist, so why should it exist in Afghanistan? The US/NATO cannot solve Afghanistan's problems, and may actually be doing more harm than good. In so far as a state cannot have a moral obligation to do something impossible, the US and NATO should not have a moral obligation to fulfil the impossible task of stabilizing Afghanistan.


American and NATO moral responsibility to Afghanistan  The US overthrew the Taliban in the winter of 2001. It has a moral obligation to ensure that when it does leave Afghanistan it does so secure in the knowledge that the country will never again be a launching pad for the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and that the country is on the way to a measure of stability and prosperity. [1]  Withdrawal before this has been achieved would amount to a terrible betrayal of the Afghan people, some of whose troubles are the result of Western intervention. Millions of refugees have returned and millions of children have the chance to go to school. But the West has failed to protect civilian lives, to bring the development it promised, to wean the economy off its poppy-addiction and to ensure fair elections—and failed even to agree about what it is trying to do in the country. Locally, NATO forces have done fine and heroic work. But too often the best initiatives are dropped when the best commanders end their tours. The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. [2]  US and NATO forces should persist in Afghanistan because they can do much better in terms of helping Afghanistan, and because they have a moral obligation to do so. It should be remembered that, for the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people - especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence. [3] The US and NATO have a moral obligation to prevent this, and to not withdraw until the future of Afghanistan is secured.  [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009.   [2] The Economist. "Obama's war. Why the Afghanistan war deserves more resources, commitment and political will.". 15 October 2009.   [3] Obama, Barack. "A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan". RealClearPolitics. 27 March 2009.


As the British learned in two wars with Afghanistan in the 1800s and the Soviets learned in their bloodbath of the 1980s, Afghanistan is no country at all. Rather, it's a diverse collection of primitive tribes occupying a harsh landscape pockmarked with tens of thousands of hiding places ideal for guerrilla warfare. The war there is a quagmire and makes Vietnam look like an easy place to conquer. [1] These tribes may consider themselves Afghani but this does not reflect any form of nationalism and does not show any more unity than that someone in Morocco and someone in Saudi Arabia may both consider themselves Arab.  Why should NATO countries continue to risk their troops in this death trap? Without the timetable for withdrawal, there is no end in sight to this war. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, (retired) Lieutenant General David Barno, a former commander in Afghanistan, said the counter-insurgency campaign that he and other experts are advocating could last until at least 2025. [2]  [1] Navarro, Peter. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now". OC Register. 25 September 2009.   [2] Fenton, Anthony. "Afghanistan: A Surge Toward Disaster". Asia Times Online. 18 March 2009.


The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security  The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1]  If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2]  This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3]  The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4]  Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5]  The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6]  Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7]  The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done.  [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [2] ibid  [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009.   [4] ibid  [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009.   [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.


Afghanistan is only of limited value to American and other NATO countries' security, especially in the context of other areas where the resources could be used. Amdrew Bacevich argued in 2009: "What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny. [...] For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbour—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude." [1]  The sort of fear-mongering about Pakistan, nuclear war and a new 9/11 is the same sort of scare tactics which were used to justify and perpetuate the war in Vietnam. As Peter Navarro argued, "During my senior year in high school, in 1966-67, our local congressman came to speak to us soon-to-be-draftees about the necessity of the Vietnam War. His basic pitch was a frothy combination of Red menace, yellow peril, and domino theory. [...] the speech rang as hollow as a beer keg after a frat party. [...] Today, I get the same kind of hollowness in my gut every time I hear President Barack Obama and a gaggle of Democratic and Republican hawks offer eerily similar arguments for the Afghanistan war. Terrorism is the new Red menace. Yellow peril has morphed into radical Islam. Dominoes, perhaps surprisingly, are still dominoes. In fact, sober analysis of the two major arguments in support of the war leads me to the same conclusion as my gut – let's get the hell out." [2]  Moreover the terrorist threat from Afghanistan is low, Zaid Hamid, head of Brass Tacks, a think-tank based in Pakistan, argues: "Their presence and capacity is greatly exaggerated. It is not possible that the so-called exaggerated threat perception by the West about another 9/11 attack being waged from Pakistan’s FATA or Afghanistan takes place." [3]  [1] Bacevich, Andrew J. "The War We Can't Win". Commonweal. 14 August 2009.   [2] Navarro, Peter. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now". OC Register. 25 September 2009.   [3] Leghari, Faryal. "Troop Surge in Afghanistan is a Military Fallacy". Khaleej Times. Spearhead Research. 20 February 2009.


Keeping NATO troops in Afghanistan is necessary for creating a successful Afghan state  Due to the impotence of the Afghan state and its fledgling armed forces, withdrawing by the timetabled date would most likely mean abandoning the project of building a successful Afghan state, a project which can be successful if NATO troops continue to play their vital role in it. It is a myth that Afghanistan is unconquerable or ungovernable. The level of violence in Afghanistan is actually far lower than most Americans believe. In 2008 more than 2,000 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the Taliban or coalition forces (almost 7 per ten thousand). This was too many, but it was also less than a quarter of the deaths in 2008 in Iraq, a country that is both more sparsely populated and often assumed to be easier to govern. Not only are Afghan civilians much safer under American occupation than Iraqis, they are also statistically less likely to be killed in the war than anyone living in the United States during the early 1990s, when the U.S. murder rate peaked at more than 24,000 killings a year (about 10 per ten thousand). [1]  An assertion that deserves a similarly hard look is the argument that nation building in Afghanistan is doomed because the country isn’t a nation-state, but rather a jury-rigged patchwork of competing tribal groupings. In fact, Afghanistan is a much older nation-state than, say, Italy or Germany, both of which were only unified in the late nineteenth century. Modern Afghanistan is considered to have emerged with the first Afghan empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, and so has been a nation for decades longer than the United States. Accordingly, Afghans have a strong sense of nationhood, and building a state there is possible so long as NATO forces do not abandon the project before it is completed. [2]  A successful Afghan state is in the interests of all NATO countries, for security reasons, and so a compelling reason to abandon the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan is that building a successful Afghan state is entirely possible if NATO stays the course and only withdraws once the job is done.  [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009.   [2] ibid


It seems deeply illogical to argue that withdrawing NATO forces, which would essentially allow the Taliban and Al Qaeda to win, could somehow lead to these parties being in a weaker position than if NATO forces remained in the country and continued military options against them. As the necessary consequence of withdrawal by the timetable is a Taliban and Al Qaeda victory, arguments that continuing NATO operations 'help' them should be ignored, as a NATO withdrawal would help them even more by removing the one player who could compete with them on the battlefield.


History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won  History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won: Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, has issued a taunting statement reminding Western leaders that for more than a millennium, would-be conquerors have tried and failed to subdue the mountain fastness known as the 'graveyard of empires' (Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C., the British in the 1800s, the Soviets from 1979 to 1989): 'The invaders should study the history of Afghanistan. The more the enemy resorts to increasing forces, the more they will face an unequivocal defeat.' [1]  As galling as it is to accept tutelage from one of Osama bin Laden's key enablers, this does seem to be what history teaches. Pouring forces into Afghanistan has always proved counterproductive. The presence of large numbers of foreign troops is the one thing that reliably unites Afghans, if only for long enough to drive the foreigners out. Tom Andrews, National Director of Win Without War, argued in February of 2009: "The first principle for someone who finds himself in a hole is to stop digging, The US policy 'hole' in Afghanistan is not of the new Administration's making. But it is important for the President to consider if adding new US combat forces in Afghanistan, without a new and comprehensive plan, for US policy there, might be digging an even bigger hole." [2]  This argument similarly applies to keeping NATO forces in Afghanistan past the timetabled withdrawal date: it is just digging a deeper hole. Ann Jones added in 2009 to the argument that the war cannot be won by noting the lack of potential for Afghan forces to ever handle their own security or build a meaningful state: "I went out to the training fields near Kabul where Afghan army recruits are put through their paces, and it was quickly evident just what's getting lost in translation. Our trainers, soldiers from the Illinois National Guard, were masterful... The Afghans were puny by comparison: hundreds of little Davids to the overstuffed American Goliaths training them. Keep in mind: Afghan recruits come from a world of desperate poverty. They are almost uniformly malnourished and underweight. Many are no bigger than I am (1.6 meters and thin) - and some probably not much stronger. Like me, many sag under the weight of a standard-issue flack jacket. [...] American military planners and policymakers already proceed as if, with sufficient training, Afghans can be transformed into scale-model, wind-up American Marines. That is not going to happen. Not now. Not ever. No matter how many of our leaders concur that it must happen - and ever faster.” [3]  Both history and NATO's own experiences in Afghanistan lead to the same conclusion: Afghanistan cannot be conquered, and so the timetable for withdrawal should be kept to.  [1] Robinson, Eugene. "In Afghanistan, Downsize." Real Clear Politics. 22 September 22 2009.  wnsize_98403  [2] Heuvel, Katrina vanden, ‘Don’t Bleed Resources in Afghanistan’, The Nation, 17 February 2009,   [3] Jones, Ann. "US wins mind, Afghan hearts are lost". Asia Times. 22 September 2009.


The continued presence of American and NATO forces benefits the Taliban and Al Qaeda  The on-going NATO mission means continued combat confrontations and an ever-increasing risk to the civilian population of Afghanistan. These sorts of deaths, injuries and destruction of property have so far been demonstrably destructive to the U.S.-led international effort to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the violent insurgency being waged by the Taliban and other militant groups. [1]  According to a report released last January by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the 2,118 civilians killed in 2008 was an increase of 40% over 2007. [2]  The continued presence of American troops into ethnic Pashtun areas in the Afghan south only galvanizes local people to back the Taliban in repelling the infidels. [3]  A 2009 study by the Carnegie Endowment concluded that "the only meaningful way to halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops. The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving the resurgence of the Taliban." [4]  What the timetable for withdrawal acknowledges is that there is no state-building military solution in Afghanistan. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad-Mahdi Akhondzadeh said in April of 2009, "The presence of foreign forces has not improved things in the country". [5]  The long-term security interests of the US and NATO would be better served by a military operation centred around targeted strikes against terrorist training camps from offshore or out-of-country special forces or drones, as this removes the aggravating presence of troops on the ground and would lead to fewer civilian casualties. [6]  Looking beyond to the wider world, the NATO mission in Afghanistan has inflamed global Muslim anger and terrorism since its inception, and will continue to do so until it ends. This makes it more difficult for Western and Middle Eastern countries to work together toward mutual objectives, such as peace between Israel and Palestine, a conflict which drives support for terrorism worldwide and helps Al Qaeda recruit. [7]  Al Qaeda has realized all this and aims to drain US resources in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden made the following statement in 2004: "All we have to do is send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the [U.S.] generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses ... so we are continuing this policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy." [8]  Keeping troops in Afghanistan past the withdrawal date would just play into Al Qaeda's plan to trap the US. Therefore the withdrawal date should be adhered to and NATO troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.  [1] Gharib, Ali. "Inevitable: Obama's Surge in Afghanistan Will Bring a Surge in Civilian Deaths". IPS News. 18 February 2009.   [2] Fenton, Anthony. "Afghanistan: A Surge Toward Disaster". Asia Times Online. 18 March 2009.   [3] Kristof, Nicholas. "The Afghanistan Abyss". The New York Times. 5 September 2009.   [4] Dorronsoro, Gilles. ‘Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009.   [5] Tehran Times. "Iran says Afghan troop surge will be unhelpful". Tehran Times. 4 April 2009.   [6] Los Angeles Times. "U.S. considers sending special ops to Afghanistan". Los Angeles Times.26 October 2008.   [7] Friends Committee on National Legislation. "FCNL to Obama: No More Troops to Afghanistan! Invest in Diplomacy & Development". Friends Committee on National Legislation.23 February 2009.   [8] Ignatius, David. "Road Map for Afghanistan". RealClearPolitics. 19 March 2009.


Peter Bergen argues that "Objections to Obama’s ramp-up in Afghanistan begin with the observation that Afghanistan has long been the "graveyard of empires"—as went the disastrous British expedition there in 1842 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, so too the current American occupation is doomed to follow. In fact, any number of empire builders, from Alexander the Great to the Mogul emperor Babur in the sixteenth century to the British in the Second Afghan War three decades after their infamous defeat, have won military victories in Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés." [1]  NATO can succeed in nation-building if it persists in empowering and protecting the Afghan state. It should be remembered that Afghanistan has been a successful, stable nation in the past, and could be so again. Afghanistan’s majestic mountains, verdant valleys, and jasmine-scented gardens may once again draw the tourists that once flocked there. [2]  [1] Bergen, Peter. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009.   [2] ibid


An ineffective message in this case might well have been worse than no message. Had the West attempted to intervene, either by setting up a no-fly zone or even sending in ground troops, and the killings not stopped, it would have sent a message that Western threats and Western power are a paper tiger.  Worse, if the genocide had reversed itself after Western intervention, the West would have found itself with both the moral and the political responsibility for the violence, and accusations of Western bias and even complicity would spread rapidly.


The West has demonstrated that hiding behind China is a viable strategy  Perhaps as damaging as the humanitarian consequences of the failure to intervene is the message it sent to other leaders considering solving their political and ethnic problems in a similar manner to Khartoum.  Rather than deterring them from following in Bashir’s footsteps, the West by doing nothing, gave the impression that Bashir survived not through his own efforts, but because China protected him.  Given the rapid expansion of Chinese influence around in Africa, this makes accepting Chinese investment instead of western investment vastly more attractive because in addition to the economic benefits, it is now perceived as buying Chinese political cover.  In turn, this increasing interest in seeking out Chinese political cover will lead to more states being willing to imitate Bashir in the future, safe the knowledge that they will not be bombed.


Past experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that terrorism tends to flourish when states are weak. An Invasion of Sudan, especially if it had led to a collapse of the Sudanese state, would have create a vacuum terrorists could kill, especially when the very invasion would provide the resentment and motivation for thousands of jihadi volunteers to fight the Western “crusaders”


The conflict has a racial identity  The conflict in Sudan took on racial overtones. The inhabitants of Darfur are largely black, the government forces of Arab descent. Much of their treatment, including kidnapping and slavery, is a legacy of centuries of racist mistreatment and conflict between “white” and “dark” Muslims. [1]  As a strong opponent of Racism, the West had a duty to act, given that the conflict was reinforcing negative views in the Arab world against those of darker skin. [2]  [1] Mutua, Makau, ‘Racism at root of Sudan’s Darfur crisis’, The Christian Science Monitor, 14 July 2004,   [2] Fatah, Tarek, ‘From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism among Muslims’,  , 24 April 2009,


The Behaviour of the Sudanese government was tantamount to Genocide  The violence that occurred in the Darfur region of Western Sudan since 2003, approached genocide proportions with the death toll estimated between 300,000 and 500,000 out of a population of a little over a million and a half.  Not only was this a human tragedy. It was also a political crisis. The West invested enormous political capital in the idea that genocide, whether deliberate or through governmental negligence, is unacceptable, and George Bush even termed the events in Darfur a genocide in 2007 . [1]  By having called the events a genocide and then failed the West discredited itself, both as a moral force(showing it cared more about SE Europe than it did Africa) and indicated to dictators that they have no reason to fear a Western response in the future.  [1] ‘Bush blasts Darfur 'genocide'’, MailOnline, 29 May 2007,


The events in Darfur were first and foremost a Civil War, even if their consequences included a major humanitarian crisis.  Darfur rose in rebellion against the central government first, and even the local conflict was a civil war, the Abbala tribe from which the janjaweed are drawn has a long history of conflict with settled Darfur tribes, which drove them off their land centuries ago.  That the death toll in these conflicts was raised by the introduction of modern armaments is clear. What is not clear is how Western intervention would have solved either the underlying problems, or created a deterrent. The most likely outcome would have been genocide of the Abbala, as the West already demonstrated in Kosovo that it is unable to protect the “perpetrators” of genocide from its “victims” even with large military forces present.


The Sudanese government has long been integrated, and black Sudanese as well as Arabs serving in the cabinet and Army. The rebellion in Darfur is primarily political and was launched by former supporters of the government. There is no clear evidence it is based on race.


There was and continues to be a compelling case for a humanitarian response to the crises, but this does not suggest that military intervention would have solved the situation.  Military intervention and the collapse of the Sudanese state would have quite possibly led to far greater destabilization. Rather than only one group of refugees, it would likely have led to the Abbala fleeing over the border into Chad as well. Potentially this could have meant the development of a situation akin to that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, were the refugees refought the Civil War among themselves.


The Sudanese regime has a history of supporting terrorism and other unsavoury groups  The Sudanese government’s unsavoury behaviour goes beyond its actions in Darfur. Its campaign against the southern rebels was replete with atrocities, and it has a long history of supporting terrorism including hosting Osama Bin Ladin in the early 1990s. [1]  While Sudan has been more cooperative in recent years against Al-Quada, it continues to harbour Islamic extremist groups responsible for attacks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  Combined with the conflict in Darfur there was a pressing case for regime change, and reason to think Sudan’s neighbours would be open and supportive of the idea as well.  [1] Bhattacharji, Preeti, ‘State Sponsors: Sudan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 April 2008,


The Chaos in Darfur is a threat to regional security  Sudan’s internal problems actively destabilized the entire region. More than a million refugees fled Darfur, many travelling to refuge e camps in Chad and Southern Sudan. This in turn has placed stresses on local resources. [1]  Furthermore, the tendency for resistance forces to base themselves in these refugee camps, threatened and continues to threaten to spread the war into these regions, either igniting the north-south Civil War in Sudan, or destabilizing Chad’s government.  [1] Polgreen, Lydia, ‘Attacks Pushing Darfur Refugees Into Chad’, The New York Times, 11 February 2008,


Even if the conflict was inter-tribal, it had been brought to a boil and allowed to turn genocidal by the Sudanese government. It may well be that the conflict would have continued of its own accord without Sudanese intervention, though the continued air support provided consistently by the Sudanese government to the Janjaweed argues against this. [1]  And all interventions are by nature one-sided – that reconstruction might be difficult is a reason to plan for it, but in and of itself it does not justify allowing thousands to die and for Western opposition to genocide to be left an empty letter.  [1] ‘Sudan: Government and Militias Conspire in Darfur Killings’, Human Rights Watch, 22 April 2004,


Even eliminating the Sudanese Air Force would have had a major impact, as one rebel group argued that the Air Force was responsible for 60% of the attacks launched by Sudanese forces in the region. [1]  Even if a non-Fly zone did not completely eliminate the Sudanese military forces, it would even the playing field and perhaps persuaded the government to sue for peace.  Furthermore, the difficulty of gaining over-flight rights was also an issue with the air war in Kosovo, eventually forcing the use of German bases and carrier launched planes due to Italian reluctance. Such issues can be overcome, and the Sudanese air force poses little threat with its aged inventory.  [1] Polgreen, Lydia, ‘Attacks Pushing Darfur Refugees Into Chad’, The New York Times, 11 February 2008,


Intervention might destabilize the peace deal in the South  The focus on the failure to act in Darfur ignores the real progress that has been achieved in ending decades long violence in Sudan. In 2011 Southern Sudan peacefully voted to secede and all indications are that the process will not be contested by Khartoum.  The United States under George Bush played a key role in the peace accords which ended that part of the Civil War, with Prospect Magazine noting that the President “deserves much of the credit” for the agreement . [1] While the government in Khartoum has accepted them, it seems likely that if the US were to have participated in a bombing campaign or invasion, that the Sudanese government would have responded by tearing up the accords.  This is especially true as they would have a pressing motive that does not exist in Darfur, namely the Oil reserves that will be leaving the country with the rest of the South. [2]  [1] De Waal, Akex, ‘Sudan’s chance’, Prospect, 28 August 2005,   [2] ‘South Sudan says agreement reached with Khartoum on oil fees’, Sudan Tribune, 13 December 2011,


The West should not atagonise the Muslim world  Any intervention by the West in Sudan, following so closely on Iraq and Afghanistan would have been looked upon as a further attack on the Muslim world and therefore act as a recruiting tool for terrorism.  While it is true that the intervention would have been couched in terms of helping oppressed Muslims, so too were the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  An attack, especially if it was air-only, and therefore left Bashir in power in Khartoum might also have strengthened the regime by providing it with religious legitimacy, and might well have as a result inspired volunteers to enlist in order to fight in a jihad to protect it.  The latter would be even more true in the event ground troops were used, in which case volunteers might flood in from around the world to fight the “Crusaders”.  Such an added dimension could not have helped but place the Christian Southern Sudanese in an awkward and very uncomfortable position.


The Conflict is an internal inter-tribal conflict – arming the Darfur tribes would be better  The conflict in Darfur has been largely inter-tribal, and even the Sudanese government, lacking the full resources needed to suppress the opposition itself, has resorted to playing on these differences.  Any Western effort to intervene would have been seen as intervening on one side by virtually all of the locals. The Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit would have seen the West as intervening to support them – the Abbala and the Janjaweed, as intervening to attack them.  In this context intervention would be seen as a pretext to reverse the sides in the war rather than to end it.  If our sole goal was to push for a settlement, it would have made far more sense to attempt to pay off the Janjaweed to turn on the government forces, and then to arm the Darfur tribes. It would have been cheaper, and prevented the Sudanese from playing the sides off against each other.


Airstrikes would likely be politically ineffective  Military intervention, unless launched against the Sudanese state itself, was very unlikely to have been effective.  While a no-fly zone would have limited the participation of the Sudanese air force in Darfur, the Sudanese air force was and is not vital to the continued genocide, as Sudanese ground forces and the Janjaweed would still be able to operate.  Any air operations would furthermore have required over flight rights from Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and either Somalia or Eritrea. Libya until Gaddaffi’s overthrow was unlikely to work with the West, and the new government is moving closer to Khartoum . [1] Chad would have feared military retaliation, whereas Revolutionary Egypt is in no condition to make major decisions about anything. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have human rights concerns of their own.  Avoiding overflights would limit NATO to using carrier based aircraft from the Red Sea that would have had to cross more than a 1000 KM of Sudan to reach the area. This would have made it very difficult to supply a force in Darfur and would have limited operational effectiveness even of the air force.  As for the deployment of ground troops, there are few overland supply routes to the Darfur region, and supplying a military force there would have been next to impossible with the opposition of a still existent Sudanese government.  [1] Newman, Alex, ‘Libya Rulers Vow ‘Integration’ with Sudan Terror Regime’, NewAmerican, 26 November 2011,


The United States at least had already stepped on various religiously sensitive toes due to its support of the Christian Southern Sudanese. These groups had support and lobbying in Washington from influential evangelical Christian groups,[1] and President Bush mentioned their religion in his speech celebrating the Peace settlement. [2]  If this failed to produce an upsurge in Islamist sentiment, it is hard to see how helping Muslims who are being slaughtered would have, especially if Western intervention was limited to providing air cover.  [1] Phares, Walid, ‘The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion’, The Middle East Quarterly, March 1998,   [2] Hamilton, Rebecca, ‘U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long Journey to Independence’, the Atlantic, 9 July 2011,


It is unclear whether the Northern government has any desire to go back to war with the South even if an excuse existed. The Foreign Minister denied any such interest in December of 2011, [1] and the fact is that Sudan ended the war because it was costing far more to wage than could possible have been recovered. Furthermore, after 20 years government forces were losing, and it is hard to see how they would do better with a war on two fronts.  Secondly, even if it would destabilize the Peace Agreement, that means in effect that the international community is allowing the South Sudanese to be used as hostages for their “good behaviour” regarding Darfur. If so, that seems less like a triumph of Diplomacy and more like a bad deal. It would incentivise dictators like Mugabe to attempt to make similar deals, say offering to compensate white farmers in exchange for the West ignoring his treatment of black opponents.  [1] ‘Sudan’s FM rules out return to war with South Sudan’, Sudan Tribune, 14 December 2011,


Every country engages in spying against other countries and so are not surprised by the revelations. These countries leaders are obliged to sound like they are outraged but in practice they will already have known such actions occur – they might be interested to learn the details but little else. Hollande’s own Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure (DGSC) has been described by Bernard Barbier, its former technical director, as "probably the biggest information centre in Europe after the English". It uses similar methods to the NSA with systematic collection of emails, sms messages, phone records, social media posts which is then all stored for years. [1] President Obama is right to point out “I guarantee you that in European capitals, there are people who are interested in, if not what I had for breakfast, at least what my talking points might be should I end up meeting with their leaders. That's how intelligence services operate.” [2]  [1] Follorou, Jaques, and Johannès, Franck, ‘Exclusive: French intelligence has its own version of PRISM’, Le Monde, 4 July 2013,   [2] Chu, Henry, ‘European leaders angered by U.S. spying reports’, Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2013,


Damages diplomatic relations with allies  Every country needs friends and historically the United States has managed to maintain a large number of close relationships with states around the world; it has alliances with various Asian states such as South Korea and Japan, with many Middle Eastern states, and with almost the whole of Europe. The NSA’s spying has damaged these relationships. French President Hollande said “We cannot accept this kind of behavior from partners and allies,” [1] while the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz complained “the United States of America treats its closest partners, including Germany for example, but also the European Union as a whole like hostile powers”. There have even been suggestions that this would jeopardise trade talks as warned by the Commissioner Viviane Reding that “if there is any doubt that our partners are bugging the offices of European negotiators, then the future trade talks could be in difficulty”. [2]  [1] Chu, Henry, ‘European leaders angered by U.S. spying reports’, Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2013,   [2] Hewitt, Gavin, ‘EU anger at US spy scandal softened by trade talks’, BBC News, 2 July 2013,


Most other states accept that there is a large degree of self interest in the United States opposing Russian and Chinese proposals for internet governance, finding out that there is some hypocrisy too is unlikely to sway their votes.


Indiscriminate spying damages trust  Trust is important in international relations. Whenever there is an international agreement each side has to trust that the other side will fulfil its side of the bargain; there is no court to step in and ensure that they do. Trust therefore needs to be built up. A large part of this is simply fulfilling promises that have been made in such treaties but trust can also be about being open with each other. When a country engages in an immense spying operation against another nation it is clearly damaging the trust between those nations. With the United States this is just one in a long line of issues that have undermined trust in the US government; the Iraq war, Guantanamo bay, drone strikes etc. and the continued violations of international law these represent have all undermined trust in the United States internationally. [1]  [1] Dunn, Matthew, ‘PRISM: An International Relations Disaster?’, Huffington Post, 10 July 2013,


It is not so much the spying that damages trust as the revelations that do so. As former CIA director Michael Hayden commented “Who on this planet [now] believes the Americans can keep a secret? This really erodes the kind of corporation that our intelligence service has with other intelligence agencies.” [1] Trust comes from working together and this is just as true in the intelligence sphere as elsewhere. Governments already knew the NSA spies on them, that so much information about the how and when has been revealed will be what is the shock.  [1] Coleman, Michael, ‘Besides Bruised Egos, Will NSA Spy Leaks Cause Lasting Pain?’, The Washington Diplomat, 30 July 2012,


There is no reason for foreign companies to be worried about NSA surveillance. The companies involved such as Google have denied involvement “we have not joined any program that would give the U.S. government—or any other government—direct access to our servers. Indeed, the U.S. government does not have direct access or a “back door” to the information stored in our data centers. We had not heard of a program called PRISM until yesterday.” [1] There should be no concern about companies’ data as the NSA is about protecting national security and is not interested in the commercial work of millions of businesses around the world.  [1] Page, Larry, and Drummond, David, ‘What the …?’, Google Official Blog, 7 June 2013,


Undermines US position on internet freedom  The United States, along with Europe, has been the key voice arguing for freedom on the internet and in particular that the internet should not be controlled nationally. Russia and China in particular have been advocating for much more control over the internet by states with Russia’s proposal advocating that “Member States shall have equal rights to manage the Internet” and “Member States shall have the sovereign right to establish and implement public policy… on matters of Internet governance, and to regulate the national Internet segment”. [1] Essentially every state should have the right to censor and surveil their chunk of the internet. With the United States already doing this countries that have previously been wavering may be much more inclined to support these proposals over US objections. [2] The US would stand to lose out as it is currently the country with most control over internet governance.  [1] Russian Federation ‘Proposals for the work of the conference’, International Telecommunications Union, 17 November 2012,   [2] Dourado, Eli, ‘So much for America’s internet freedom agenda’, theguardian.com, 7 August 2013,


Damages US commercial interests  The United States is the preponderant power in internet commerce; most of the big internet companies, the big software companies, even many of the hardware companies are companies that are based in the United States. This both enables US use of these systems for spying as occurred with PRISM because it happens that most web traffic passes through the United States, and makes the United States vulnerable when the world’s consumers think these companies have been betraying their trust. If consumers don’t think US companies can guarantee their data and privacy it should be no surprise that they will consider transferring their business. [1] Cloud computing is particularly affected, among the revelations has been that Microsoft helps the NSA with access to its cloud storage service skydrive. [2] According to a survey by the Cloud Security Alliance 10% of non US responders had cancelled a project with US based providers since the leaks about NSA projects and 56% say they would be less likely to use a US based service. The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimates this could cost the US cloud computing industry between $21.5 and $35bln in revenues over the next three years. [3] And this is just one part of the computing and software industries, other areas are likely to be less affected but may well still lose business.  [1] Naughton, John, ‘Edward Snowden’s not the story. The fate of the Internet is’, The Observer, 28 July 2013,   [2] Greenwald, Glenn et al., ‘How Microsoft handed the NSA access to encrypted messages’, The Guardian, 12 July 2013,   [3] Taylor, Paul, ‘Cloud computing industry could lose up to $35bn on NSA disclosures’, FT.com, 5 August 2013,


While this is clearly a benefit of spying it is not so much of a benefit of the kind of indiscriminate spying such as the PRISM program. Tapping diplomats mobile phones and setting up fake internet cafes is clearly not indiscriminate, far from it this is targeted surveillance.


No one disputes that some surveillance is necessary, the question is how much. Is the use of bulk catch all surveillance useful? In the case cited it seems not – this was the monitoring of specific individuals who were already known to US intelligence services; Ayaman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s leader and Nasser al Wahishi the head of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. [1] Normal intelligence methods without the broad based surveillance would have caught the same messages. Monitoring the communications of known terrorist leaders was done long before the internet was on the scene.  [1] Associated Press, ‘AP sources: Al-Qaida chief’s intercepted m,essage to deputy in Yemen caused embassy closures’, The Washington Post, 5 August 2013,


Broad web surveillance prevents terrorist attacks  Over the last ten years, and right up to the present day, the most important national security interest of the United States has been preventing terrorism. A fight against terrorism requires a large amount of resources invested in tracking terrorist networks and in finding those who may turn to terrorism. Intelligence gathering cannot just focus on those we already know to be terrorists as people can easily become radicalised while not meeting any individuals already considered to be terrorists. This means that there needs to be a broad brush intelligence gathering operation that finds those who are on the path to terrorism. This is why operations like PRISM and xkeyscore are so important; they allow the United States to find people who are being radicalised by material online or those who are just working out how to launch an attack themselves. The NSA Director Keith Alexander has stated that the surveillance has helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11.”, with PRISM contributing to 90% of the information on these plots. As only 10 were domestic the surveillance is a benefit to other countries as well as the United States. [1]  [1] Nakashima, Ellen, ‘Officials: Surveillance programs foiled more than 50 terrorist plots’, The Washington Post, 18 June 2013,


Allows monitoring of foreign governments  Governments expect to be monitored by other governments and do so themselves as well. Monitoring other governments provides major advantages even when those governments are ostensibly friendly as no government is going to tell even its allies everything there need to be other ways to learn such information. Surveillance can provide advantages in negotiations; it can let you know how far the other side is willing to go. GCHQ for example engaged in intercepting communications by monitoring phones and even setting up fake internet cafes during the G20 meetings in London in 2008. [1]  [1] MacAskill, Ewen et al., ‘GCHQ intercepted foreign politicians’ communications at G20 summits’, The Guardian, 17 June 2013,


Surveillance is necessary to protect national security  The primary concern of the state is the protection of its people from foreign powers. This usually means physical protection but this physical protection relies upon knowing what others are doing; where the threats are coming from. That means surveillance. There needs to be monitoring of groups that potentially pose a threat to the state or to its citizens. In a world where terrorism is as much a threat as other states there is a clear need to be watching as many people as possible around the world. Threats such as that to western interests in Yemen at the start of August 2013 demonstrate the need to be watching out for threats as intelligence picked up high level threats to western interests so allowing the United States and others to take pre-emptive action by closing embassies and evacuating personnel. [1]  [1] Hicks, Josh, ‘Chambliss: Threats ‘very reminiscent of what we saw pre-9/11’, The Washington Post, 4 August 2013,


Clearly the intelligence efforts on such a scale must provide some return in terms of stopping terrorism or they would not be worth the cost. However it is open to question whether the impact has been nearly as big as had been cited by the intelligence agencies. We clearly don’t know if these terrorists would have been detected through other methods. Additionally in at least one case where the FBI and NSA have stated that electronic surveillance has played a key role it has turned out not to be the case. FBI deputy director Sean Joyce has claimed that an attack on the New York Stock exchange was foiled by electronic surveillance; “We went up on the electronic surveillance and identified his co-conspirators” yet the emails involved were perfectly ordinary – the only information gained from the broad brush surveillance was that the plotter was in contact with al Qaeda leaders in Yemen. Something which surely could have been caught the other way around – by looking at the al Qaeda leaders communications. [1] Other cases such as that of Basaaly Moalin who was convicted of sending $8,500 to support Somali terrorist group al Shabab that have been highlighted by the NSA have similarly not required such broad surveillance. [2]  [1] Ross, Brian et al., ‘NSA Claim of Thwarted NYSE Plot Contradicted by Court Documents’, ABC News, 19 June 2013,   [2] Nakashima, Ellen, ‘NSA cites case as success of phone data-collection program’, The Washington Post, 8 August 2013,


If Ceuta and Melilla were to be given to Morocco, then immigration would not halt. The higher standard of living in Spain would still attract immigrants who would face greater perils than restriction of movement and employment. Irregular migrants and refugees already attempt to travel from Morocco to Italy and Malta (the strait of Gibraltar is too well guarded)1 and numbers would only increase if the land route were dismantled. Hundreds of irregular migrants will hide on inadequate boats trying to reach Europe and thousands die every year in the attempt2. One boat which sunk off the Italian island of Lampedusa resulting in more than 300 deaths3. Despite these risks, high risk migration continues which that immigration numbers would continue even without a land border.  1) Peters,K. ‘Ceuta and Melilla: Europe’s High-Tech African Fortress’, 10 August 2011  2) Herman,M. ‘From Africa to Europe: A Surprisingly Dangerous Journey for Migrants’, 3 December 2013  3) BBC, ‘Italy to hold state funeral for shipwreck migrants’, 9 October 2013


Decrease immigration to Spain  The Spanish possession of Ceuta and Melilla has resulted in an influx of illegal immigrants. Due to their positioning and membership to the EU, the two cities are subject to numerous attempts by immigrants to gain access to Europe1. In Melilla this has resulted in a social experiment with dire implications. To discourage illegal immigration, non-Moroccans who illicitly gain access to the country will not be permitted to move on from the city. They are trapped in Melilla without legal rights and generally live in extremely poor conditions with no means of legal work2. If the Spanish relinquished control of the two cities then these then there would be no permeable land border for illegal immigrants to gain access to.  1) Ribas,X. ‘The Border Fences of Cueta and Melilla. A Landscape for the Future’  2) Davies,N. ‘Melilla: Europe’s dirty secret’, The Guardian, 17 April 2010


Spain claims that there is a difference between Gibraltar and its own territories. While Gibraltar is an overseas territory, otherwise known as a colony, Ceuta and Melilla are part of Spain and maintain the same semi-autonomous status which other regions in Spain have1. The United Nations maintains a similar view, recognising Gibraltar as an ‘overseas territory’ which is reviewed annually by the Committee on Decolonisation2.  1) Govan,F. ‘The battle over Ceuta, Spain’s African Gibraltar’ 10 August 2013  2) United Nations General Assembly, ‘2231 (XXI) Question of Gibraltar’, 20 December 1966


The dispute damages Morocco-Spain relations  The dispute over the two cities only serves to harm co-operation between Morocco and Spain. Bilateral disagreements have prevented the resolution of other issues and generally heightened diplomatic tensions between these geographically close countries. When the Prime Minister and King of Spain both visited Morocco to resolve the Perejal crisis and Western Sahara issues, relations periodically improved. However a subsequent visit by the PM and King to Ceuta and Melilla in 2006 and 2007 reversed the progress made due to Moroccan outrage1. If Spain ceded these cities to Morocco then relations would improve, which could lead to increased co-operation on other issues.  1) Arieff,A. ‘Morocco: Current Issues’ 30 June 2011


The disagreements between Morocco and Spain over Ceuta and Melilla have had minimal impact on diplomacy between the two countries, which generally remains positive. Co-operation on counter-terrorism, counternarcotics and illegal immigration all continue to progress in a productive manner1. Joint operations between the two countries’ military forces continue on the strait of Gibraltar and a joint police panel has been proposed2, implying relations are still constructive.  1) Arieff,A. ‘Morocco: Current Issues’ 30 June 2011  2) Benmehdi,H. ‘Morocco, Spain partner against terrorism’


Spain is being hypocritical  Spain refusing to cede Cueta and Melilla to Morocco is inconsistent with its policy towards Gibraltar. Whilst the Spanish refuse to cede their two cities to Morocco, they expect the British to return the circumstantially similar Gibraltar. Gibraltar is a British overseas territory which is located in southern Spain, taken from the Spanish by an Anglo-Dutch fleet in 1704. Spain asserts a claim to this territory as it was once part of its own lands, despite signing the Treaty of Utrecht and relinquishing the land ‘in perpetuity’1. The claim that a state should return exclaves which rightfully belong to the nation which originally owned them is therefore inconsistent with their policy towards Ceuta and Melilla2. If Spain expects to reclaim Gibraltar then they should also expect to relinquish control over Cueta and Melilla.  1) ‘Treaty of Utrecht’ April 1713  2) Tremlett,G. ‘A rocky relationship’ 14 January 2014


While they were not a recognised state in the same sense as Spain is, [1] Berbers have lived in Morocco for thousands of years; making Ceuta and Melilla part of their history as well. The presence of the Berbers in Morocco can be traced back 4,000 years, with today’s Berbers maintaining a similar language and customs1. Their association with this territory means that many Berbers see these cities as their land and feel they have a stronger claim to it than Spain.  1) Morris,C. ‘Who are the Morocco Berbers?’, Journey Beyond Travel, data accessed 21 January 2014  [1] This should not be surprising; our current notion of the state is a Western European invention.


The wishes of a population are often overlooked by governments when deciding upon territorial sovereignty. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to the German alliance. The majority of citizens were French, or preferred French to Prussian leadership1. This factor was disregarded however, as it usually is in the redrawing of boundaries. Morocco does not appear to have addressed this argument as they do not deem it relevant against their territorial interests.  Spain has also been hypocritical by its claim to respect the people’s decision on sovereignty, particularly while observing the situation in Catalonia. As of early 2014, the Spanish government has stated it will not allow any form of referendum concerning the independence of the Eastern Spanish state, despite the population’s wishes2.  1) Wikipedia, ‘Alsace-Lorraine’, date accessed 21 January 2014  2) Vilaweb, ‘The Spanish Government “will not allow” and “will not negotiate” on Catalonia’s self-determination vote’, 13 December 2013


The cities are a source of revenue for Spain  Ceuta and Melilla are economic assets to Spain; it is in Spain’s interest to maintain them. Spain was particularly damaged by the 2008 economic recession which left many of the richest countries in decline1. With no sign of rapid recovery in the near future, it is within Spain’s interests to hold on to two cities which have strong economies2. The ports of Cueta and Melilla are of particular importance as they provided a large portion of the cities’ income, catering to many luxurious boats. The low tax zones also encourage a lot of financial activity3. Spain’s economic position therefore dictates that they should not cede them.  1) Cala,A. ‘Why is Morocco Picking a Fight with Spain?’ 15 August 2010  2) Sotogrande, ‘Ceuta and Melilla’, data accessed 20 January 2014  Ibid


They have been Spanish possessions for centuries  The cities of Ceuta and Melilla have been an integral part of Spain’s territory and to cede them would be a compromise of territorial integrity. The two cities have been part of Spain for almost as long as the country has existed. The marriage of Isabelle I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon united two major regions of Spain in 1469. The conquest of Granada finally joined the South of the country with the North in 1492. The capture of Melilla was only five years later, and Ceuta was merged in to the country less than a century afterwards. These cities are an integral part of Spain and should therefore remain Spanish.  1) Snelling,N. ‘The history of Spain, Spain’s unification and elevation to world power’, Culture Spain, data accessed 21 January 2014


The citizens do not want to be ceded  Many of those living in Ceuta and Melilla do not want to join Morocco, to cede them would be unjust. Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, claims that the only people who should decide who has sovereignty over a territory are the population of said land1. If the people associate themselves with Spain, then it is only right that Spain continues to rule over them. This is the case with Ceuta and Mellia, where there is a nearly universal feeling of belonging to Spain2. Morocco and Spain should therefore respect the wishes of the population.  1) Walzer,M. ‘Just and Unjust wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations'  2) Govan,F. ‘The battle over Ceuta, Spain’s African Gibraltar’


The financial future of the two cities is uncertain. It has cost copious sums of money to protect the border against immigrants who travel from as far as India to reach EU territory. In 2011, €30 million was spent on fortifying the border fences of Ceuta and Melilla1. Not only was this a financial burden, but it served to worsen relations with Morocco who temporarily halted trade with the cities in 2010, leaving Melilla’s market stalls empty.  The development of the Moroccan ‘super-port’, known as the Tanger Med project also financially threatens the ports if Ceuta and Melilla2. Built on the straits of Gibraltar, it is designed to intercept shipping traffic which would usually go to Ceuta and Melilla.  1) Peters,K. ‘Ceuta and Melilla: Europe’s High-Tech African Fortress’, 10 August 2011  2) Arieff,A. ‘Morocco: Current Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 30 June 2011


The UN’s own failures in the past should be a warning, not a motivation, regarding involvement in a conflict where it has limited power to implement an outcome.  The UN’s goal needs to be the creation of a stable Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. This policy would in reality encourage the exact opposite. While it would do little to help the Palestinians, delegitimizing Israel’s creation would be a tool in the hands of figures in the Arab world and elsewhere whose interests in the region are not in peace with Israel but in its destruction. It seems likely Iran at the very minimum would seize on a claim that Israel’s license to exist has been withdrawn.  In turn, if Israel interpreted the UN’s move as a an attack on its legitimacy as a state, it would be likely to interpret the move as having anti-Semitic overtones, strengthening the hands of those in Israel who see the UN as a stalking horse for anti-Semitism, and thereby reducing the UN’s ability to play a future role in resolving the conflict.


Such a move is historically and morally justified  There is significant justification, both for recognition of a Palestinian state and for the UN recognition in particular to carry more weight than it otherwise might.  For one thing, Israel was created by a resolution of the UN General Assembly, and to the extent Israel denies the legitimacy of the UN’s actions and its right to engage in them, it is implicitly questioning the legitimately of its own creation and continued existence, leaving them both a product of “blood and iron.”  Secondly, the UN has a responsibility to help resolve a situation its own failures helped create. By passing a partition plan, and then doing nothing to prevent first its collapse into wholesale war, and then the Jordanian occupation of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank , the UN has a an obligation to the Palestinians. [1]  [1] Palestine Facts, ‘Jordan Renounced Claims to West Bank, 1988’,


In the long-run UN action may freeze the negotiations into a discussion of a two-state solution, but UN action is not required to reach this eventuality. Even Avigdor Lieberman on the Far Right accepts that there will be two states, and that has been the basic premise of the Peace Process since 1994.  On the issues which have actually prevented a two state solution from coming to fruition- disputes about borders, armaments, security, and settlements, the UN would accomplish nothing. Furthermore, it might well make both sides intransigent, the Israelis due to perceiving themselves as being backed into a corner internationally, the Palestinians due to the belief they no longer need to make concessions.


Independence Matters – there are real legal and diplomatic consequences to such a move  Going to the UN would transform the legal status of Palestine. While this would not immediate change the physical contours of the conflict – Israeli incursions, the occupation, the existence of settlements, it would transform the context in which they take place.  For one thing, there would no longer be ambiguity about the status of the West Bank and the settlements on it. [1] The UN would be making clear that in the eyes of international law they would be illegal.  This might not force an immediate withdrawal from the settlements, but it would incentivise the settlers themselves to crave the legal legitimacy of a settlement that could confirm them in possession of their property. After all, who would want to invest as much in land that might have to be abandoned? This in turn might make Israel more likely to make concessions elsewhere, because the Palestinian signatures on an agreement recognizing the legality of settlements would have real value in the future.  Furthermore, while no new physical force would be preventing the Israeli army from engaging in military operations in Gaza or the West Bank, the legal optics of marching in and out of a recognized state would present difficulties.  In addition, one of the great banes of Palestinian existence is that they are stateless. For all practical purposes Palestinians need Israeli permission to travel abroad. A recognized passport would allow them alternative means to travel and work in countries which do recognize Palestine even if those are a minority.  Finally it would put pressure on governments that voted for a Palestinian state to put their money where their mouth is and actually respond to the fact that a legal state is being occupied. Otherwise they might well face popular pressure at home.  [1] MacIntyre, Donald, ‘The Big Question: What are Israeli settlements, and why are they coming under pressure?’, The Independent, 29 May 2009,


The UN proclaiming Palestine an independent state would do no more to advance the cause of peace than the UN proclaiming a Palestinian and a Jewish State in 1948 did. The day after the declaration the Israeli Army would remain, the settlements would still be there, and the Israelis would be determined to prove exactly how little the UN’s actions means to them. As a result it’s likely that military incursions rather than declining would increase. Israel already has a bad reputation, and has long since given up any ambition to be loved by its neighbours in the short-run. On the contrary in some cases it has deliberately fostered a sense of fear, perhaps best illustrated by its non-denial policy regarding its officially non-existent nuclear program , [1] and the Mossad’s efforts to build up a reputation for invincibility as well as the motive for fear of Iranian nuclear weapons. [2]  Bowing to the world community would badly damage Israeli’s deterrence in this respect. The best way of maintaining that fear would be to launch a new series of incursions and settlement expansions in the face of UN protests to demonstrate Israel’s willingness to ignore the UN.  Israel furthermore is unlikely to be threatened by international support for Palestinians. If countries are hostile enough to cut off aid in event of UN recognition, they probably have minimal relations with Israel in the status quo. If anything, the main consequence legally is likely to be for Israel to expel UN agencies and observers which might very well worsen the human rights situation.  [1] Baliga, Sandeep, and Sjöström, Tomas, ‘Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation’, NorthWestern University,   [2] Roth, Ariel Ilan, ‘The Root of All Fears Why Is Israel So Afraid of Iranian Nukes?’, Foreign Affairs, 24 November 2009,


While issues like the “Right of Return” might benefit from an international approach, it’s hard to see why international recognition would make neighbouring states more likely to pay for or allow the settlement of, Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, a “sovereign” state may feel less inclined to compromise on its rights, especially if the International Community seems to have just conceded the legitimacy of those claims.


The will make that a two-state solution will be the final settlement even if its contours are unclear  The recognition of a Palestinian state by the UN would have de facto effect of freezing out alternative plans for a settlement – i.e. a one state solution, or some sort of autonomy – and making clear that the end result, if not necessarily two states on boundaries approximating those of 1967, will none the less be two states in some form.  This is because the Palestinians, once they have gained recognition as a state, are unlikely to ever bargain it away. This in turn removes a number of the fantasies about “autonomy” floating around in Israel, as well as fears about Jews being swamped in a bi-national state.  The issues of dispute will therefore be reduced to those of settling boundaries, setting up trade and customs policies, and deciding on sovereignty over holy places. [1]  [1] Rosenberg, M.J., ‘Obama Should Support Palestinian Statehood at the United Nations’, HuffPost World, 22 July 2011,


A UN move would internationalize the problem, and pave the way for broader for international solutions  One of the major problems with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up to now is that it has been localized between the Israelis and Palestinians, with outside involvement limited to putting pressure on one side or the other at various times.  The result is that negotiations have become a zero-sum game where concessions from one side have to be extracted from the other. Allowing the Israelis to keep settlements means that the Palestinians must give up land. Allowing a “Right of return” to Palestinians is seen is something Israel alone must carry the burden of, when the vast majority live in other Arab states that perhaps should play a part in any sort of compensation scheme.  Consequently, negotiations have been far more brutal than they otherwise might have been. UN Recognition or at least a debate about it would move the forum of the discussion away from bilateral talks, and into the international sphere. The UN, by acknowledging responsibility for mishandling things on the Palestinian side in 1948, would in effect pave the way to help solve issues like the right of return and the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab states that cannot be resolved satisfactorily on a bilateral basis.


Israel’s concerns are not with sovereignty per se, but with the willingness of Palestinians to behave in a legally responsible manner becoming of an international state.  Adopting a policy of seeking legitimacy at the UN and then asserting their rights legally is probably the best Palestinian strategy in this respect, as it makes clear that they wish to move the conflict from one of either violent or nonviolent resistance to one of legal arguments under international law.  Rather than denying Palestine sovereignty Israel instead should be seeking to gain guarantees within treaties that Palestine will not allow any foreign bases on its soil. Russia does not want NATO bases in the former Soviet Union but this does not mean it denies these states sovereignty.


The problem of expectations exists on both sides. The Israelis also have an expectation that they can continue the status quo indefinitely, that the Palestinian “problem” is a containable security issue, especially after the success of the “wall”, and that the international community is all bark.  UN action, especially if the US were to allow it through an abstention rather than a positive vote would indicate that both international and American patience are not infinite and probably have as great an impact on Israel as the recognition would have on the Palestinians.


Israel remembers past failures of the international community when it came to Jews and doubts the UN’s Impartiality  Regardless of whether some degree of outside impetus might be of benefit, the UN is a particularly bad actor for pressuring Israel.  For one thing, the UN is not viewed as an impartial entity. Israeli government officials have repeatedly claimed it is biased against them, and the UN has not tried particularly hard to dispel these impressions with its recent conferences at on racism, most prominently at Durban in South Africa, dissolving into denunciations of Zionism and holocaust comparisons. [1]  Reinforcing this is the persistent feeling that the world did nothing for the Jews when they were facing annihilation, which feeds into the narrative that while the international community may talk endlessly about Palestinian rights, they would do little for Israelis if the balance of power ever shifted. When Israeli politicians can state that they know exactly what would happen (a second Holocaust) if Arabs were to ever defeat them they are likely to see this action on the part of the UN reinforcing all of their negative impressions.  This in turn may well produce a siege mentality in which they view themselves as on their own and become unwilling to make any concessions. This would be especially true if the United States were to seem to abandon them by at least abstaining on UN recognition.  [1] Braun, Elihai, ‘The UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, South Africa’, Jewish Virtual Library,


Even a successful move for statehood would place the United States in a challenging position, and alienate American opinion which the Palestinians are dependent on  Any UN Recognition of Palestinian statehood would require at the very least US abstention. Even if this were to be achieved, it would only come after the request had placed the United States in a very awkward position.  Vetoing Palestinian statehood at the UN would force the US to alienate world opinion, while abstaining or supporting the Palestinian demand would mean a clash with Israel with all the US domestic costs that entails for any American politician. [1] Barack Obama’s less than stringent support of Israel was seen as contributing to the defeat of his Democratic party in a 2011 special election in a heavily Democratic and heavily Jewish seat in NYC. It is likely a future US President would face worse.  Furthermore, allowing the UN to recognize Palestinian statehood explicitly brings the UN into the Peace Process, undermine the United States’ role as the preeminent outside actor. Even if the United States were to acquiesce in such, it’s hard to see it appreciating the consequences.  Therefore it can be assumed that the Palestinians, in exchange for cosmetic benefits, would likely alienate the United States, which at the end of the day is the only outside actor whose opinions Israel values, and therefore the only outside actor that can genuinely make the creation of a Palestinian state a reality.  [1] Staff, ‘Did the First President Bush Lose His Job to the Israel Lobby?’, The New York Observer, 17 July 2006,


An attempt to build up international support reinforces Israeli fears of a Palestinian state being used as a platform for attacks against them  Among Israel’s prime security concerns about a prospective Palestinian state is that it might become a base for Israel’s other enemies to attack it.  Israel is particularly vulnerable strategically from the West Bank, and the distance between East Jerusalem and Tel Aviv is barely 15 miles. [1]  The great fear therefore is that a legitimately independent Palestinian state might well allow the basing of Iranian weapons on its territory, or provides a base for Israeli Arab dissidents to launch an attack. While there would be little practical change in the ability of Israel to stop foreign forces being allowed into Palestine the Palestinians would be able to claim that they are within their sovereign rights to allow foreign basing rights just as many other countries around the world do.  Repeated efforts to bring in International support, and a focus on legal sovereignty to the exclusion of actual concrete steps to reassure Israel such as disarming Hamas, will only reinforce these concerns on the part of Israel.  [1] Gold, Dore, ‘Military-Strategic Aspects of West Bank Topography for Israel's Defense’, Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace, 2005,