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100 | En el evento de no obtenerse el consentimiento requerido en esta Ley, la persona afectada podrá presentar una acción para detener la utilización de dicha imagen y para recobrar los daños causados, incluyendo regalías dejadas de devengar o cualquier pérdida económica resultante de la violación... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
12
] | B. Derecho sobre la propia imagen | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
101 | Ahora bien, la precitada Ley, en su Artículo 8, estableció ciertas excepciones a su aplicación, entre ellas, cuando se utilice la imagen de la persona: i) como parte de un reportaje noticioso, ii) expresión política, iii) transmisión de evento deportivo o artístico, iv) una presentación que tenga un interés pú... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
12
] | B. Derecho sobre la propia imagen | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
102 | Es normativa reiterada que, las obligaciones nacen de la ley, de los contratos y cuasicontratos, de los actos ilícitos, u omisiones en que interviene culpa o negligencia, y cualquier otro acto idóneo
18 32 LPRA sec. 3153.
19 32 LPRA sec. 3157.
para producirlas. Art. 1042 del Código Civil 20 , 31 LPRA ant. sec. 2992;... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
12,
13
] | C. Teoría general de los contratos | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
103 | En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico se ha reconocido el principio de libertad de contratación, el cual permite a las partes pactar los términos y condiciones que tengan por convenientes. Pérez Rodríguez v. López Rodríguez , 210 DPR 163 (2022); Burgos López et al. v. Condado Plaza , 193 DPR 1, 7-8 (2015... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
13
] | C. Teoría general de los contratos | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
104 | 20 El derecho aplicable en el caso de epígrafe se remite al Código Civil de Puerto Rico de 1930, puesto que, la presentación de la Demanda y los hechos que dan base a esta tuvieron su lugar antes de la aprobación del nuevo Código Civil de Puerto Rico, Ley 55-2020, según enmendado.
cumplimiento de los contratos, y no d... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
13,
14
] | C. Teoría general de los contratos | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
105 | La concesión de honorarios de abogado está regulada por la Regla 44.1 (d) de Procedimiento Civil de 2009, 32 LPRA Ap. V, R. 44.1 (d). La misma autoriza al Tribunal a imponer honorarios de abogado cuando una parte o su abogado procede con temeridad o frivolidad. Pérez Rodríguez v. López Rodríguez , 210 DPR 163 (2022);... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
14
] | D. Honorarios de Abogado | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
106 | y la administración de la justicia.' Jarra Corp. v. Axxis Corp. , 155 DPR 764, 779 (2001).
Por otro lado, la frivolidad se define como 'aquello que no tiene razón de ser, sin méritos, sin peso ni lógica alguna.' Depto. Rec. v. Asoc. Rec. Round Hill , 149 DPR 91, 100 (1999). Sólo lo claramente irrazonable o inmeritori... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
15
] | D. Honorarios de Abogado | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
107 | Además, la imposición de honorarios de abogado, tiene como objetivo disuadir la litigación innecesaria y alentar las transacciones mediante la imposición de sanciones a la parte temeraria para compensar los perjuicios económicos y las molestias sufridas por la otra parte. Fernández v. San Juan Cement Co., Inc.... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
15,
16
] | D. Honorarios de Abogado | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
108 | Ahora bien, una vez el tribunal determina que se incurrió en temeridad, está obligado a imponer el pago de los honorarios de abogado a favor de la parte que prevaleció en el pleito. PR Fast Ferries et al. v. AAPP , 2023 TSPR 121, 213 DPR ____ (2023) citando a Torres Montalvo v. Gobernador ELA, 194 DPR... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
16
] | D. Honorarios de Abogado | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
109 | Según es sabido, las determinaciones de hechos y de credibilidad del tribunal sentenciador deben ser merecedoras de gran deferencia por parte de los foros apelativos, puesto que, el juzgador de instancia es quien -de ordinario -se encuentra en mejor posición para aquilatar la prueba testifical. Arg... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
16,
17
] | E. Deferencia Judicial | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
110 | Sin embargo, la deferencia judicial no es absoluta, pues podrá ser preterida en ciertas instancias. Nuestro Máximo Foro ha reiterado que, los tribunal es apelativos 'no debemos intervenir con las determinaciones de los juzgadores de primera instancia, salvo que medie pasión, prejuicio, parcialidad o error man... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
17
] | E. Deferencia Judicial | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
111 | En sus tres primeros señalamientos de error , la parte apelante sostiene que, la primera instancia judicial incidió al: 1) denegar la moción de desestimación por falta de jurisdicción sobre la materia; 2) concluir que entre las partes no existía un contrato escrito y 3) concluir que las demandadas no podían utiliza... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
17,
18
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
112 | 1. En o alrededor de noviembre de 2010 el Demandante cursó una propuesta a las Demandadas para la producción de unos infomerciales, en el cual detalló cual sería el proceso de preproducción, producción y postproducción, así como el tiempo requerido para completar esos infomerciales y el pago que estaría cobrando... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
18
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
113 | - posteriormente publicada en medios sociales durante su relación laboral entre el 2010 y el 2017.
5. Durante el periodo que las partes mantenían una relación laboral entre el 2010 y el 2017, no hubo un solo video de Mech Tech en que la imagen del demandante saliera sin su consentimiento.
6. Según acordado y consentido... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
19
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
114 | 13. El demandante era el director y participaba como narrador en los anuncios en que participaba. También era el director y otras veces productor de los documentales en que trabajó. En algunos de esos documentales salía su imagen. Además, su imagen salía en los referidos anuncios y documentales con su consentim... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
19
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
115 | 15. La compensación que el demandante recibió en el periodo de 2010 al 2017 varió en dos ocasiones. Además, cuando viajaba como parte del proceso creativo de material videográfico, se le pagaba un per diem .
16. En un correo electrónico fechado 14 de noviembre de 2013, el demandante expresó las razones por las cu... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
20
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
116 | 22. El 5 de octubre de 2018, recibida por las demandadas el 17 de octubre de 2018, el demandante curso una carta de cese y desista en la cual expresamente solicitó a las demandadas que cesaran de utilizar su imagen y, además solicitó la remoción de todo material en el cual se utilizara su imagen de toda y ... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
20,
21
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
117 | La parte apelada sostiene que, luego de haberse culminado la relación obrero patronal entre las partes, la parte apelante no solicitó autorización para la utilización y diseminación de videos o el material en los cuales se incluye su propia imagen . Acotó que, la parte apelante continuaba utilizando su imagen... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
21
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
118 | La parte apelante apoya su contención en el testimonio vertido en corte abierta por la señora Carmen Teresa Vázquez Pérez, directora del Departamento de Contabilidad de Mech Tech, quien trabaja para la parte apelante desde el 23 de septiembre de 1996.
La señora Vázquez Pérez atestiguó que, para ella poder real... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
21,
22
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
119 | Consecuentemente, en ausencia de un contrato en el que claramente se estableciera el alcance de los trabajos contratados y la renuncia a su titularidad por parte del señor Friger Salgueiro, a cambio de cierta remuneración, no podemos concluir que estamos ante un contrato por encargo o work for hire . Colegimo... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
22,
23
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
120 | Luego de una revisión concienzuda y desapasionada de la transcripción de la prueba desfilada, colegimos que el señor Friger Salgueiro no logró probar su causa de acción. Si bien es cierto que, la parte apelante no logró persuadirnos de que el trabajo audiovisual realizado por el señor Friger Salgueiro -inc... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
23,
24
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
121 | Conforme se desprende del derecho previamente esbozado, la imposición de honorarios de abogado no procede en todos los casos, sino que, depende de la determinación discrecional que haga el tribunal en torno a si la parte perdidosa o su abogado, actuaron con temeridad o frivolidad, o de la existencia de ... | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
24
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
122 | 28 Íd ; Marrero Rosado v. Marrero Rosado , supra.
29 Jarra Corp. v. Axxis Corp. , supra, pág. 779.
la imposición de honorarios de abogado al palio del artículo 4 de la Ley 139-2011, supra , (2011).
En resumen, colegimos que, procede desestimar la Demanda que dio origen al recurso que nos atiene. | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
24,
25
] | III | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
123 | Por los fundamentos que anteceden, se revoca la Sentencia apelada.
Notifíquese.
Lo acordó y manda el Tribunal, y certifica la Secretaria del Tribunal de Apelaciones.
Lcda. Lilia M. Oquendo Solís Secretaria del Tribunal de Apelaciones | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc..pdf | [
25
] | IV | friger_salgueiro_osvaldo_v._mech-tech_college_llc._chunks.json |
124 | Christopher Mooney v. State of Maryland, No. 32, September Term, 2023
'REASONABLE JUROR' TEST -AUTHENTICATION THROUGH TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH KNOWLEDGE UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-901(b)(1) - AUTHENTICATION THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-901(b)(4) Supreme Court of Maryland held that 'reasona... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
1,
2
] | null | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
125 | No. 32
September Term, 2023
______________________________________ | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
2
] | OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
126 | v. | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
2
] | CHRISTOPHER MOONEY | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
127 | ______________________________________
Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J. Fader, C.J., concurs. Gould, J., dissents.
______________________________________
Filed: August 13, 2024
In this case... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
2,
3
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
128 | Maryland Rule 5-901(a) provides that '[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.' Maryland Rule 5-901(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of way... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
3,
4
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
129 | Second, under the 'silent witness' theory of authentication, a video can be authenticated where there is 'an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing' the video. Cole, 342 Md. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119-20 (cleaned up). Such a foundation can be laid where, for instance, a witness tes... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
4
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
130 | In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, after a trial by jury, Petitioner, Christopher Mooney, was found guilty of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, possession of a regulated firearm after conviction of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, illegal possession of am... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
5
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
131 | Mr. Zimmerman testified that he had watched the video in preparation for trial and that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred on the night of the shooting and did not appear to have been altered or edited. After the video was admitted into evidence, Mr. Zimmerman identified Mr. Mooney... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
6,
7
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
132 | We hold that, for video footage to be admissible, as with other evidence, there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be. In other words, the 'reasonable juror' test applies to authentication of videosi.e. , for a trial cou... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
7
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
133 | The part of the video depicting the shooting was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could have inferred that the video fairly and accurately depicted the shooting. The close tempo... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
8,
9
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
134 | The State charged Mr. Mooney with multiple offenses, including attempted firstdegree murder of Mr. Zimmerman. At trial, as a witness for the State, Mr. Zimmerman testified as follows. He and Mr. Mooney met each other at least approximately a decade before trial. Sometime during the summer of 2021, Mr. Zimmerman aske... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
9,
10
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
135 | Before requesting that the video be admitted into evidence, the prosecutor displayed an image from the video, which had been marked for identification as State's Exhibit 1A, and asked Mr. Zimmerman whether he recognized it. Mr. Zimmerman responded that he did and explained that the image showed him in his vehicle, the... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
10,
11
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
136 | [MR. MOONEY'S COUNSEL]: -- which is what I wanted to voir dire him on.
THE COURT: Yeah.
[PROSECUTOR]: He has watched it in view, in preparation of this trial, he has --
THE COURT: Well, you -- you can ask him all that before, you haven't laid the appropriate foundation for it yet. I don't know if that video --
[PROSEC... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
11,
12,
13
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
137 | State's #1A is a 1 minute and 51 second video showing a black SUV parked on the street with what appears to be a person in the front driver's seat of the vehicle. A person in a white shirt walks up the street, passing by the SUV on the passenger side, and then walks past the vehicle. That person appears to stop, t... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
13,
14
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
138 | [MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes.
[PROSECUTOR :] Okay. Where did you run off to?
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] I ran to the McDonald[']s.
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.
Mr. Zimmerman identified Mr. Mooney as the person in the video wearing the white shirt and identified himself as the person in the pink shirt. The circuit court also admitted into evide... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
14,
15
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
139 | The jury found Mr. Mooney guilty of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and gun offenses. 4 Mr. Mooney was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for seconddegree assault, 15 years consecutive for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, with the first 5 years to be served without parole, 3 years cons... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
15,
16
] | Proceedings in the Circuit Court | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
140 | The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed Mr. Mooney's convictions, explaining that the video was properly authenticated through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), which provides that evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial e... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
16,
17
] | Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
141 | On November 30, 2023, Mr. Mooney petitioned for a writ of certiorari , raising the following issue: 'Whether the Appellate Court lowered the requirement for authentication of video evidence through the 'pictorial testimony theory' of admission when the authenticating witness did not witness the entiret... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
17
] | Petition for a Writ of Certiorari | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
142 | An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's determination as to whether an exhibit was properly authenticated. See Sample, 468 Md. at 588, 228 A.3d at 189; Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 676, 113 A.3d 695, 721 (2015); Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 357, 19 A.3d 415, 423 (2011). | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
17
] | A. Standard of Review | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
143 | '[T]he bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high.' Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (cleaned up). In Sublet, id. at 638, 113 A.3d at 698, we adopted a straightforward test for authentication of social media evidence, holding that, 'to authenticate evidence derived from a social... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
17,
18
] | B. Authentication of Evidence: The 'Reasonable Juror' Test | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
144 | 7 At trial, the State had attempted to introduce evidence that was purportedly a printout from the MySpace page of the girlfriend of the defendant (whose nickname was allegedly 'Boozy') to demonstrate that the girlfriend had threatened a State's witness. See Griffin, 419 Md. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419. The pa... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
18,
19
] | B. Authentication of Evidence: The 'Reasonable Juror' Test | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
145 | Four years later, in Sublet, 442 Md. at 637-38, 113 A.3d at 697-98, we adopted the reasonable juror test for social media evidence and applied it in the three cases that were consolidated for purposes of the opinion: Sublet v. State, Harris v. State, and MongeMartinez v. State. We explained that, in Unite... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
19
] | B. Authentication of Evidence: The 'Reasonable Juror' Test | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
146 | the more likely than not standard, and we reaffirmed that, under Maryland Rule 5901(b)(4), social media evidence may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence. We stated that, with respect to the authentication of social media evidence through circumstantial evidence under Maryland R... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
20
] | B. Authentication of Evidence: The 'Reasonable Juror' Test | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
147 | We have previously addressed issues as to authentication of videos in three instances. See Cole, 342 Md. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1123; Washington, 406 Md. at 646, 961
8 In a civil case, Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Pifer, 478 Md. 645, 651, 674-75, 276 A.3d 533, 536, 550 (2022), we applied the 'reasonable jur... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
20
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
148 | A.2d at 1112; Jackson, 460 Md. at 119, 188 A.3d at 982. In Cole, 342 Md. at 26-27, 672 A.2d at 1122-23, as a matter of first impression, we held that the 'silent witness' theory of authentication can apply to videos and affirmed the admission of a video under that theory. In Cole, id. at 18, 672 A.2d at 1118, ... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
21
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
149 | knowledge of the content of the video is not required. Id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119. We refrained from setting forth rigid prerequisites for the foundation necessary to authenticate under the 'silent witness' theory, explaining that '[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the photographic evidenc... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
22,
23
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
150 | See id. at 652-55, 961 A.2d at 1115-17. Citing Cole, 342 Md. at 20, 672 A.2d at 1119, we explained that '[a] videotape is considered a photograph for admissibility purposes. It is admissible in evidence and is subject to the same general rules of admissibility as a photograph.' Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
23
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
151 | testimony' theory and the 'silent witness' method of authentication allow photographic evidence to be authenticated. Id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1116. We reiterated that, 'to satisfy the evidentiary requirement for authentication, the proponent of the evidence must show that the evidence is 'sufficient to support a findi... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
24
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
152 | 111, 188 A.3d at 977. The trial court admitted into evidence two CDs, each with a surveillance video of the ATM-one from a twenty-minute period on the night of the robbery, and one from a twenty-minute period in the early morning hours on the following date. See id. at 112, 188 A.3d at 97... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
25
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
153 | A.3d at 982, 988. We noted that we had 'previously explained that, for purposes of admissibility, a videotape is subject to the same authentication requirements as a photograph.' Id. at 116, 188 A.3d at 980 (citing Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115). Quoting Washington, 406 Md. a... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
26
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
154 | shooting, he received an alert on his phone that the home security camera had begun recording. See id. at 609, 292 A.3d at 423. The witness testified that he reviewed the resulting video, which showed the shooting, and emailed the video to law enforcement. See id. at 609, 612, 292 A.3d at 423, 425. The... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
27,
28
] | C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
155 | Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that video footage was sufficiently authenticated through circumstantial evidence, and, in some instances, courts have explained that video footage may be authenticated by various forms of evidence. In Commonwealth v. Davis, 168 N.E.3d 294, 3... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
28,
29
] | D. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
156 | The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the surveillance video into evidence. See id. at 311. The Court observed that a vehicle depicted in the video that had crashed into the pole was the same color and body style as a vehicle in photographs tak... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
29
] | D. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
157 | 13, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022), the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded, under a statute providing for authentication through 'testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be[,]' that there was 'ample circumstantial evidence . . . to authenticate [a] video' that the defe... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
30
] | D. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
158 | We have not previously addressed whether a video can be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) or whether the 'reasonable juror' test applies to authentication of video evidencei.e. , these are matters of first impression. We now unequivocally hold that... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
30,
31
] | E. The Applicable Standard in this Case | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
159 | We have never held that the 'pictorial testimony' and 'silent witness' theories of authentication-or the 'business record' theory, for that matter-are the only ways to authenticate a video, or that a video cannot be authenticated through other means. Such reasoning would be at odds with the principle that, ... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
31
] | E. The Applicable Standard in this Case | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
160 | Washington, 406 Md. at 652-55, 961 A.2d at 1115-17, does not stand for the proposition that they are the exclusive methods for authentication of video footage. Our holding in Washington, id. at 655-56, 658, 961 A.2d at 1117-18, 1119, was that the video at issue was not properly authenticated because the State failed t... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
32
] | E. The Applicable Standard in this Case | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
161 | Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), or a combination of both, as is the circumstance in this case. There need not be a witness with personal knowledge of every single event depicted in a video for the video to be authenticated. What matters is that the pro... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
33
] | E. The Applicable Standard in this Case | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
162 | In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video at issue because it was properly authenticated through a combination of the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
33,
34
] | F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
163 | To be sure, Mr. Zimmerman did not testify that he saw the shooting, and he lacked firsthand knowledge of who the shooter was. Even so, the part of the video depicting the shooting was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
34,
35
] | F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
164 | The temporal proximity of relevant events can be significant where evidence is authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). In Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we determined that 'the temporal proximity of the attempted armed robbery to the unfriend... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
35,
36
] | F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
165 | Another important circumstance supporting the conclusion that a reasonable juror could have found that the video fairly and accurately depicted the shooting involves the nature and origin of the video. Detective Liu testified that, when officers arrive at a crime scene, the first thing they do is look for witnesses an... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
36,
37
] | F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
166 | While there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in favor of authentication in this case, authentication of video footage through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) will generally require more fulsome questioning than the type of inquiry typically used to establish th... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
37,
38
] | F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
167 | Video footage, like social media evidence, is susceptible to alteration, and the increased availability of new technology, particularly the advent of image-generating artificial intelligence, may present unique challenges in authenticating videos and photographs. As we have noted, '[p]hoto... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
38,
39
] | G. Conclusion | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
168 | Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 121280030
Argued: June 3, 2024 | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
40
] | JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS. | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
169 | No. 32
September Term, 2023
______________________________________ | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
40
] | OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
170 | v. | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
40
] | CHRISTOPHER MOONEY | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
171 | ______________________________________
Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Fader, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 13, 2024
I join the Majority opinion in full.... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
40,
41,
42
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
172 | No. 32
September Term, 2023
______________________________________ | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
42
] | OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
173 | v. | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
42
] | CHRISTOPHER MOONEY | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
174 | ______________________________________
Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 13, 2024
I respectfully dissent to the Majority's wel... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
42,
43
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
175 | Before delving into my analysis, I must emphasize that this dissent does not and should not be interpreted as calling into question the integrity of the officers, detectives, attorneys, or anyone else who may have touched the video exhibit at issue here. I have no reason to believe-and thus I do not believe-that the vi... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
43
] | STATE OF MARYLAND | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
176 | At trial, the State relied solely on the 'pictorial testimony' method of authentication. See Mooney v. State , No. 1561, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 6783388, at *9 n.3 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 13, 2023). Under that method, a video may be authenticated if a witness with firsthand knowledge of events testifies that the ... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
44,
45
] | The Pictorial Testimony Method | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
177 | [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.
THE COURT: And is it a fair and accurate representation of what happened. I mean, I'm not trying --
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.
THE COURT: Ask some more foundational questions.
[PROSECUTOR]: Sure.
After the bench conference, the State questioned Mr. Zimmerman in the manner suggested by the court and the cou... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
45,
46
] | The Pictorial Testimony Method | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
178 | Zimmerman's testimony that the depiction of the shooting was true, accurate, and unaltered. Thus, that part of the video should have been edited out of the version presented
to the jury. | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
46
] | The Pictorial Testimony Method | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
179 | The Majority concludes that the footage depicting the shooting was authenticated by circumstantial evidence. One such piece of circumstantial evidence, according to the Majority, is the 'close temporal proximity' of the relevant events. Maj. Op. at 31-33. 'Temporal proximity' refers to the amount of time b... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
47,
48
] | Circumstantial Evidence | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
180 | The Majority relies on two cases for its temporal proximity analysis: Sublet v. State , 442 Md. 632 (2015) and State v. Sample , 468 Md. 560 (2020). If the Majority's reliance on these cases is limited to the proposition that temporal proximity can theoretically provide circumstantial evidence of authentici... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
48
] | Circumstantial Evidence | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
181 | showed the defendant was trying to distance himself from his alleged accomplice. See id. at 567. The names on the accounts of both the person who did the unfriending and the person who was unfriended did not identify the real names of the account holder. Thus, the authenticity challenge was twofold: (1) to show ... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
49
] | Circumstantial Evidence | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
182 | The Majority tries to fill the gap left by the pictorial method by using the 'silent witness' approach to authenticating the video, pointing to 'the nature and origin of the video.' Maj. Op. at 34. Recall that the State introduced and entered the video into evidence through the testimony of Mr. Zimmerman. Detective Liu... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
50
] | Silent Witness Testimony | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
183 | this Court has set for the 'silent witness' approach to authenticating photos or videos. Which type of camera was used? What media was used to record the images? Where were the images from the camera stored? Did Detective Liu receive a copy of the video or the original? If it was a copy, who made the copy,... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
51,
52
] | Silent Witness Testimony | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
184 | Finally, in Reyes v. State , 257 Md. App. 596 (2023), the Appellate Court of Maryland held that a video taken by a man's residential security camera was properly authenticated when he testified to the camera's 'general reliability' and other pertinent facts, including that he had installed the camera in the... | mooney_v._state.pdf | [
52
] | Silent Witness Testimony | mooney_v._state_chunks.json |
185 | NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSELORS, et al. ,
Plaintiffs, v.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, et al. ,
Defendants. | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
1
] | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
186 | This action was commenced over five years ago by the plaintiffs, National Security Counselors ('NSC'), and three individuals (collectively, the 'plaintiffs'), against the Central Intelligence Agency ('CIA') and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ('ODNI') (collectively, the 'defendants'), pursuant to th... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
1
] | MEMORANDUM OPINION | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
187 | The factual and procedural history of this case is fully described in prior opinions issued in this case and, thus, the background summary here is limited to that relevant to Count Sixteen, the only count remaining at issue. See Nat'l Sec. Counselors v. CIA (' NSC I '), 316 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying plaintiffs... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
2
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
188 | Count Sixteen claims that the CIA failed to comply with its FOIA obligations in responding to NSC's FOIA request number F-2011-01679, submitted on June 20, 2011, 'for records pertaining to the search tools and indices available to the components in the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Area ('DCIA Area') for ... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
2
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
189 | No. 74-4 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lutz Decl., Ex. TT, Letter from Kel McClanahan to Susan Viscuso, CIA, dated June 20, 2011 ('FOIA Request') at 113, ECF No. 74-5). The plaintiffs subsequently clarified, in the course of litigation, that the request did not encompass 'standard training and help documents for pro... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
3
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
190 | 2 Although each exhibit and submission from the parties in support of and in opposition to the pending motions has been reviewed, only those exhibits necessary to provide context for resolution of the pending motions are cited herein.
withhold material that does not pertain to CIA personnel [wa]s misplaced,' id. at *24... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
3,
4
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
191 | For the supplemental search conducted after NSC IV , the CIA focused on fourteen offices that, prior to an agency reorganization in 2015, had made up the DCIA Area. Id. ¶ 16. These offices either searched their databases using key words, such as 'guides,' 'search guides,' and 'reference guides,' or conducted 'manual s... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
4,
5
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
192 | Exemption (7)(E) (Docs. 635, 636, and 638), see Pls.' Mem. at 7; Suppl. Vaughn Index at 1-4. | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
5
] | I. BACKGROUND | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
193 | Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted 'if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
3
The plaintiffs also allege that the 'CIA failed to release all reasonably segregable non-exempt material' as directed in
NSC IV
by failing ... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
5
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
194 | entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 'In FOIA cases, 'summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the recor... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
6
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
195 | Reflecting the necessary balance between the public's interest in governmental transparency and 'legitimate governmental and private interests that could be harmed by release of certain types of information,' United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Def. , 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and al... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
6
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
196 | exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.' Dep't of Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). In litigation challenging the sufficiency of 'the release of information under the FOIA, 'the agency has the burden of showing that requested information... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
7
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
197 | This burden does not shift even when the requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment because 'the Government 'ultimately [has] the onus of proving that the [documents] are exempt from disclosure,'' while the 'burden upon the requester is merely 'to establish the absence of material factual issues before a summa... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
7
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
198 | adversary system to operate. 5 See Judicial Watch , 726 F.3d at 215 ('In FOIA cases, 'summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the rec... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
8
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
199 | 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). District courts must 'determine de novo whether non- disclosure was permissible,' Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 777 F.3d
5
'A
Vaughn index describes the documents withheld or redacted and the FOIA exemptions invoked, and
explains why each exemption applies.'
, 787 F... | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency.pdf | [
8,
9
] | II. LEGAL STANDARD | national_security_counselors_v._central_intelligence_agency_chunks.json |
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