Rainy, breezy Tuesday due to Tropical Storm Bill
UPDATE 9:20 p.m.: The system has been ugraded to Tropical Storm Bill.
Tuesday's going to be breezy and wet for much of Acadiana as a disturbance in the Gulf of Mexico moves ashore along the upper Texas coast.
As is typical of tropical systems, the heaviest rain and strongest winds are to the east of the poorly-defined center of circulation, which brings it across eastern Texas and southwestern Louisiana.
The system has about a 90 percent chance of development overnight, but even then it will be a very weak tropical storm, meteorologist Donald Jones with the National Weather Service in Lake Charles said at a 7 p.m. update Monday.
Lafayette Parish can expect 1-2 inches of rain Tuesday with sustained winds of 10-15 mph and gusts of 25-30 mph, Jones said.
Coastal parishes, including Cameron, Vermilion, Iberia and St. Mary, are under a coastal flood warning until 10 a.m. Tuesday.Parts of La. 82 in Cameron Parish, along with secondary roads, including part of Main Street in Cameron, could see minor flooding.
The expected flooding "is not significant enough to require evacuations, Jones said. He called it "nuisance flooding" where water may get to the bottoms of some houses but not inside.
Vermilion Parish can expect 35-40 mph gusts, especially the southern half of the parish, along with 1-2 inches of rainfall in most areas, with some isolated areas seeing 3 or more inches of rain.
Sand and bags are available at parish barns in Abbeville, Erath, Gueydan and Kaplan in Vermilion parish for those who want to fill them themselves.
St. Mary Parish can expect 1-2 inches of rainfall with sustained winds of 10-20 mph and gusts as high as 35-40 mph, Jones said. Coastal St. Mary Parish also can expect 1-2.5 feet of storm surge.
The St. Mary Parish Levee District was expected to close the Franklin Canal and Hanson flood gates Monday evening because of the storm and expected high tide.
Elsewhere, here's what you can expect Tuesday:
* Acadia Parish: 10-15 mph sustained winds, 25-30 mph gusts, scattered showers.
* Evangeline Parish: 1-2 inches of rain, with isolated areas getting 3 inches or more and winds around 20-25 mph.
* Iberia Parish: Scattered showers and thunderstorms all day, breezy.
* Jefferson Davis Parish: 1-3 inches of rainfall, 25-30 mph gusts.
* St. Landry Parish: 1-2 inches of rain, up to 3 inches or more possible in isolated areas and 20-25 mph winds.
* St. Martin Parish: 1-2 inches of rainfall, gusts 25-30 mph.
(Follow Claire Taylor on Twitter @ClaireTaylor TDA)


PXG’s mandate is to create the best performing clubs possible, regardless of the time or cost required to do so. And, with that, we bring you the company’s new X Collection woods for players who’d benefit from significantly lower spin rates. Of course, extra length and a pleasing feel is part of the package, too. The X series (available now) will complement the current models—0811 drivers, 0341 fairway woods and 0317 hybrids—rather than replace them.
The 0811X driver ($850) generates 600 to 800 rpm lower spin and slightly higher launch than the 0811. Company officials say this combination could lead to 10 to 15 extra yards. Plus, the 0811LX is weighs eight grams less (199 gram head weight). The new heads boasts a thin, light carbon fiber crown, honeycomb TPE (thermoplastic elastomer) insert, variable face, and enhanced weighting system.
The carbon fiber crown in the 0811X is 14 grams lighter than the titanium one found in the original 0811, allowing for an extremely low CG location for higher launch and more forgiveness. The TPE insert reduces vibration at impact, creating better sound and feel. It’s located in the rear portion of the sole and is the same material used in PXG irons.
The lightweight variable face design further contributes to the club’s low CG location and MOI. In addition, 10 weight ports in the sole can be fitted with high-density tungsten and low-density titanium plugs. Simply use the weights to create fade or draw-bias settings (up to 10 yards), as well as a more forward or rearward CG location, for up to 300 rpm lower spin or higher launch, respectively. Both models are available in 9°, 10.5°, and 12° lofts and can be tweaked +/- 1.5° with the adjustable hosel.
The 0341X fairway woods ($650 each) feature many of the same technologies as the 0811X driver including the carbon fiber crown, TPE insert, thin face and movable sole weights. Compared to 0341 woods, the new X model 3-wood produces 300 to 400 rpm less spin, up to 2-mph faster ball speed, and higher launch. And, the head is shallow front-to-back, which contributes to a low-forward CG for lower flight with less spin. According to company officials, this combination delivers as much as 11 extra yards. Nine weight ports in the sole allow for neutral, draw, or fade options (up to seven yards in either direction. Come in 2 (13°), 3 (15°), 5 (18°) and 7 (21°) lofts.
Complementary 0317X hybrids ($550 each) spin less by 200 to 300 rpm than the 0317, and produce faster ball speed and higher launch, which translates to seven yards more distance. Like its brethren, the hybrids are constructed with a light carbon fiber crown, TPE insert, have a shallow shape front-to-back with mass pushed towards the face, and seven movable weights in the sole. The head can be neutrally weighted, or set in draw- or fade bias positions. Lofts: 17°, 19°, 22°, 25° and 28°.


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I have rapid gastric emptying. It has been suggested to me that I take oleic acid in emulsion to allow for greater absorption of food and oral antibiotics I am taking. I am concerned that the oral meds are not being absorbed. Do you know where oleic acid is something that I can take in its free form ? Is there a company that makes oleic acid in emulsion for over the counter or prescription use?
Olive oil is mostly oleic acid. There are chemical labs which can provide pure oleic acid, but why not use olive oil; it has antioxidants and other healthy components.
Some people have rapid gastric emptying; when they eat, food doesn't stay in the stomach long enough but zips through the intestines causing cramping and diarrhea.
Oil at the beginning of a meal can cause the valve at the outlet of the stomach to close, slowing things down. This can also cause a sooner feeling of fullness and satiation, which explains why dipping bread in olive oil as an appetizer can actually cause people to eat less and lose weight by consuming fewer total calories.
An emulsion is a mixture of a fat and water. Salad dressings and mayonnaise are typical emulsions. You could easily make some mayonnaise from olive oil.
Many foods interfere with absorption of oral medications so it is a valid concern. You should ask your pharmacist about this in regards to your set of medications
Submit a question to The Olive Oil Source!

domain: health


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No Description Amount Rs.
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[PDF] A Business Plan on Cashew Nut Industry – Free Download PDF
UdyogCredit November 17, at As atthe market was dominated by Asia Pacific. We will also put measures in place to ensure that our employees receive regular training in line with the industry trend so as to make them more productive.
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Cashew Nut Processing Plant – Business Plans & Reports
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Cashew Nut Processing Plant – Business Plans & Reports – Meticulous
You can ask for all business planning reports related to subject. You can also sell your items online. Full Name Comment goes here. Who are the major players in the Cashew Nut Processing Industry? Our aim of establishing Crunchy Cashew Nuts Inc is not only to generate revenue and maximize profit but also to favorably compete against similar processed cashew nuts brands both new and existing, and be known as cashew nut processing business plan of the top five cashew nuts processing factories in the United States of America within five years.
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domain: finance


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Over the past three years, Russia has adopted laws that considerably accelerate the spread of dual citizenship in Ukraine and potentially in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. The new Russian policy facilitating this process can significantly strengthen Moscow’s influence and become one of the long-term factors cementing the post-Soviet space. What role does dual/multiple citizenship play in the modern system of international relations? How does the spread of dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space differ from similar processes in Central and Southeast Europe? Why do fundamental changes in Russian policy meet serious resistance both at home and abroad?
Russia is one of the countries whose cultural space is bigger than its national territory. Many important actors in international relations (apart from Russia there are China in East and Southeast Asia, and Iran and Turkey in the Middle East) are closely connected with millions of people who speak the same or very similar languages or are united by the same religion but live nearby in different states. Common cultural characteristics do not necessarily mean political loyalty, much less devotion of diasporas and religious communities to their “historical homeland” or “core state.” However, linguistic closeness, similar religious practices, and common history facilitate contacts between people, contribute to the establishment of economic ties, and motivate temporary and constant migration. The vast majority of immigrants and seasonal workers come to Russia from neighboring countries and speak Russian. Russia ranks fourth in the world by the number of migrants (about 12 million in 2019) (International Organization for Migration, 2020, pp. 26, 88).
The cultural space shared with neighbors and high intensity of human ties allow intellectuals in “core states” to back up their spheres of geopolitical influence with the concepts of civilization or the Russian world, pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism, etc. This, as a rule, evokes mixed reactions from the governments of neighboring countries and strong opposition from the United States.
Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space has faced serious challenges in recent years, primarily in the culturally closest countries, such as Ukraine and Belarus. One of the main reasons for setbacks is state-centered thinking. Moscow demonstrates unwillingness to work with non-traditional actors in international relations, such as political opposition, civil society institutions, and diasporas, as well as its inability to communicate directly with the citizens of neighboring states.
In practical terms, Moscow has at least one effective policy tool that helps it to take advantage of blurred cultural and linguistic borders that do not match state borders—the attractiveness of Russian citizenship for many people living in the region. However, it is extremely difficult to estimate how many people in the post-Soviet countries would potentially want, under favorable conditions, to obtain Russian passports. Most former Soviet republics do not recognize or expressly prohibit dual citizenship with Russia. In such circumstances one can hardly expect frank answers in opinion polls. Thorough sociological studies using the methods of focus group and in-depth interviews can provide a more adequate picture, both in terms of respondents’ attitude to dual citizenship and their political views. This is a big and promising research field for sociologists.
The accelerating spread of Russian passports in neighboring countries, especially in Ukraine, will increasingly affect their internal demographic, economic, social, and political development. Actions taken by public authorities, starting with the adoption of relevant citizenship laws, cause a chain reaction, including changes in the individual life strategies of millions of people, which, in turn, affects domestic and world politics.
The dual citizenship theory has been mostly explored in jurisprudence and political sociology, as well as in international migration studies (Spiro, 2008, 2016; Joppke, 2010). Political aspects of dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space are analyzed in the works of Oxana Shevel, Irina Molodikova, Eleanor Knott, and Ramesh Ganohariti (Shevel, 2009, 2012, 2017; Molodikova, 2017; Knott, 2018; Ganohariti, 2020). This article takes just the first step in understanding this phenomenon from the point of view of Russian foreign policy by studying rather radical changes in Russian citizenship acquisition in the context of global and regional trends. The main goal of the article is outlining a new area of research at the intersection of political science, international relations, and sociology, namely the study of post-Soviet transborder citizenship.
We are witnessing a “grand transformation of citizenship” (Shachar, 2020). Until the end of the last century, citizenship was acquired almost exclusively by birth: the term ‘birth lottery’ is widely used in the literature on social inequality which is secured by citizenship in countries with different levels of well-being (Shachar, 2009). It was possible to change citizenship only if a person moved and made his or her home in another country or if borders were moved and a territory and its population fell under another jurisdiction. Pursuing their own interests, states sought to make citizenship central to the identity of their nationals, for which reason they mythologized it as much as possible. Dimitry Kochenov claims that citizenship is “a traditionally violent and ultimately totalitarian status originating in the pre-modern era… Citizenship is a relic of a world where there were no ideals of equality and justice” (Kochenov, 2021).
Today, citizenship is turning into a flexible and dynamic status, which is not necessarily tightly linked to national territory, and is more and more often chosen freely and pragmatically by those who can afford it (Ong, 1999; Milanovich, 2016; Harpaz, 2019). As a result, dual/multiple citizenship becomes increasingly popular. At the same time, there is no credible statistics regarding the number of people with multiple citizenship in the world. For example, the United States keeps no such record, although the Supreme Court lifted the ban on multiple citizenship as far back as 1967. All people with dual citizenship in the United States are simply considered Americans, and acquisition of a second passport is one’s personal choice.
In the 21st century, second citizenship does not require its holder to give up the previous one, it is less often associated with a permanent move and it usually elevates one’s social status by creating additional opportunities and becoming a “global asset” of a sovereign individual. It is also a secure asset that is passed on to the next generation (Harpaz, 2019, pp. 2, 126-152). Nation-states gradually stop resisting this practice: the share of countries where citizenship is automatically lost upon acquisition of another citizenship fell from 63% in 1960 to 24% in 2020 (van der Baaren, 2020; Vink et al., 2020).
Until the end of the Cold War, many states demanded unconditional loyalty from their citizens, particularly their readiness to serve in the military. National identity was designed in such a way that a citizen was expected to be prepared to give his or her life for the country, if necessary.
With the transition to professional armed forces and the abolition of conscription, the increasing number of intermarriages between citizens of different states, the acceleration of international migration, and greater interdependence, other considerations have begun to prevail. Respect for the individual’s personal choice, the desire to win political support among immigrants, and the increasingly growing influence of diasporic organizations have become major factors boosting tolerance for multiple citizenship in Western countries. In Turkey (since 1981) and Mexico (since 1998), decisions to strengthen ties with expats by preserving their citizenship of the country of origin were dictated by other reasons, particularly by the desire to receive money transfers from them and expand the tax base (Joppke, 2003, p. 442).
Other factors explain the emergence of dual citizenship in Central and Southeast Europe. After the end of the Cold War, “non-resident ethnic citizenship” became widespread there.
Countries that had lost territories inhabited by ethnically identical groups began an active campaign to issue passports without requiring new citizens to move to their “historical homeland.” The relevant laws were adopted in Croatia and Romania in 1991, in Bulgaria in 2001, in Serbia 2004, and in Hungary, at the second attempt, in 2010-2011. As a result, these states started turning into subregional centers, attracting many people living in neighboring countries. As a rule, the spread of this kind of dual citizenship became possible due to the implementation of distinct national identity projects designed to compensate for the sense of historical defeat and loss of territories and population. Whereas in Western Europe and the United States dual citizenship is often promoted by left-wing and center-left forces seeking to include migrants from developing countries in the political system of their new homeland, in the east of the continent, it is mainly right-wing nationalist parties that recruit new citizens from among diaspora members (Joppke, 2003; Waterbury, 2014, pp. 36-49).
The philosophy of “non-resident ethnic citizenship” rests on a paradoxical combination of the traditional nativist approach based on the principles of ethnic kinship, and a postmodern view allowing multiple, dynamic, and situational identity of the individual. At the same time, many countries are trying to disguise its ethnic component. For example, in an effort to mitigate the negative reaction of the European Union (EU) and neighboring countries accusing the Viktor Orban government of ethno-national revisionism and the implementation of an ambitious plan to unite all Hungarians in one state, Budapest approved only two criteria for acquiring citizenship: direct descent from a Hungarian citizen and command of the language. Neither nationality, nor residence in Hungary, nor the termination of another citizenship is required. However, it is clear that if not the letter, then the spirit of Hungarian and other similar laws in Central and Southeast Europe links ethnicity to citizenship and separates both of them from residence, that is, from territory.
“Non-resident ethnic citizenship” is essentially the opposite of repatriation that encourages people to return to their historical homeland (Germany, Israel, Kazakhstan, as well as Russia, albeit with less success) (Zeveleva, 2013). However, such state programs cannot foresee and fully control the behavior of individuals. At the level of individual citizens and families, “non-resident ethnic citizenship” can smoothly turn into repatriation and vice versa. For example, having received a second passport, in a few years’ time a person may decide to move, that is, to repatriate. Repatriates, on the contrary, often go back to the country of origin, thus becoming “non-resident ethnic citizens.”
By making members of diasporas “non-resident ethnic citizens,” Central and Southeastern European governments usually pursue at least one of the following four objectives: get some sort of compensation for the national trauma from the loss of territories by maintaining contact with people who live on these territories; strengthen political influence in the region; change the country’s ethnic balance by increasing the dominance of the main ethnic group; or secure political support among new citizens for nationalist forces. In the 2014 election, 95% of Hungarians living in neighboring countries voted for Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party (Republikon Institute, 2014).
The successful implementation of programs promoting “non-resident ethnic citizenship” requires three conditions: political will and a well-organized passportization system in the “core state,” a significant number of people in neighboring countries who wish to voluntarily acquire dual citizenship, and the lack of active resistance from the governments of countries where such people live.
In most cases the policy of “non-resident ethnic citizenship” is aimed at those neighboring countries that are less developed economically and weak politically. Croatia pursues such policy with regard to ethnic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania targets citizens of Moldova, Bulgaria aims at North Macedonia, Serbia’s policy covers Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, and Hungary directs its efforts at Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, and Slovakia. The latter is the only country that put up strong resistance to the “non-resident ethnic citizenship” approach by instantly responding to the Hungarian law with its own legislation adopted in the same year 2010, which denationalized anyone who had applied for a second passport (Arriaza, 2015, pp. 114-135).
Hungary carries out the most ambitious program to promote its “non-resident ethnic citizenship” project. Out of three million ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states, about one million have already received a Hungarian passport, having become persons with dual citizenship. Public authorities set target indicators for transborder citizenry and encourage their consulates and other government officials to work towards their implementation.
Israeli sociologist Yossi Harpaz has analyzed ample empirical material to show that global inequality in the value of citizenship of different countries is the main factor prompting people to obtain a second passport. For example, less than 2% of Americans eligible for Hungarian citizenship have used the chance, while a similar indicator is 30% in Romania, 61% in Serbia, and 96% in Ukraine (Harpaz, 2019, pp. 15, 33, 45). The inverse correlation of these indicators with the global status of the first citizenship is obvious.
So, the reasons why more and more countries believe that the proliferation of dual/multiple citizenship may serve, or at least does not contradict, their interests are quite different. These include attempts to provide political support for immigrants, ensure remittance flows, and increase the influence of the state in the region. However, there is enough evidence that the opportunities offered by dual citizenship are not always used by individuals as it was initially intended by the governments. For example, many ethnic Serbs in Vojvodina (an autonomous province of Serbia) started to learn Hungarian in order to obtain EU citizenship by taking advantage of the law adopted in Hungary in 2011 and intended for ethnic Hungarians (Harpaz, 2019, pp. 39-66).
The spread of dual/multiple citizenship in many regions of the world is yet another manifestation of the ongoing globalization, increasing international migration (in 2019 alone there were 272 million migrants in the world), the rise of intermarriage, and the growing number and soaring political importance of transnational communities, including diasporas (International Organization for Migration, 2020, p. 3). Proliferation of dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space is a special case.
RUSSIA: THREE PERIODS
For nearly thirty years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia has been looking for its own model of dual citizenship policy in the post-Soviet space. During this time strategy underwent significant changes at least twice, the most radical one quite recently, in 2020. Just like Croatia and Romania, in the early 1990s Russia led the way in promoting dual citizenship for the residents of neighboring countries. Because of its special role in the region, Russia’s policy could have had much bigger geopolitical consequences. However, from 1993 to 2007 Moscow’s efforts on this track were extremely inconsistent and brought very modest results. It seemed that Moscow had become disappointed at the possibility and expediency of promoting dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space. In 2008-2017, it became quite difficult to acquire a Russian passport as a second one. However, in 2017-2020, unexpectedly for many, Moscow got back to this idea and adopted a number of major amendments to the citizenship law which opened up prospects for a significant number of people in the countries vital for Russia’s national interests—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and also Moldova—to obtain dual non-resident citizenship.
The multi-layered and competitive intellectual environment, combined with the carefully guarded processes of political and administrative decision-making, explains why Moscow’s actions regarding dual citizenship have so far been inconsistent and hardly predictable.
Russia is not unique in this regard: Christian Joppke was one of the first experts to suggest analyzing the formation of citizenship as a political process connected with the construction of ethnic identity, believing that this approach is applicable to most countries of the world (Joppke, 2003). The contradictory nature of Russian citizenship policy is largely attributed to the elite conflicts. Based on Graham Allison’s analysis of bureaucratic politics, John Ikenberry describes groups fighting to advance their administrative decisions in the government as “epistemic communities of well-placed government specialists and intellectuals who form distinct schools of foreign policy thought” (Allison, 1969, pp. 689-718; Ikenberry, 1993, pp. 57-86).
Discussions about granting Russian citizenship to millions of citizens of former Soviet republics began almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and are still going on. In order to get a better idea of the origins, specific features and significance of contemporary dual citizenship policies in the post-Soviet space, it would be useful to briefly outline the evolution of Moscow’s approaches in the previous periods (Zevelev, 2008).
Since 1993, the Russian government had been regarding the protection of the rights of compatriots in neighboring countries as the main strategic foreign policy objective, and dual citizenship as the main tool for achieving this objective. Moscow saw three advantages of dual citizenship over the repatriation of ethnic Russians demanded by some nationalists. Firstly, this approach looked more “civilized” (a favorite word of the political elite in the early 1990s) than establishing a “special relationship” with ethnic Russians abroad. The emphasis was placed on the civil, not ethnic, nature of Russia’s policies. As then Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in his memoirs: “We cannot take the ethnic factor as a basis of our policy. This would lead to ethnic conflicts, as was the case in Yugoslavia” (Kozyrev, 1995, p. 98).
The second advantage of dual citizenship was that it supposedly could stop the uncontrolled influx of immigrants into Russia, giving them at least some security and peace of mind in the country of permanent residence. Amid the devastating economic crisis in the 1990s, the government believed that the accommodation of newcomers would require huge expenses, which Russia could not afford at the time.
The third advantage of dual citizenship was connected with the special role Russia played in the region. Dual citizenship could serve as a convenient and effective instrument for keeping the post-Soviet states in Moscow’s orbit. Russia assumed that the protection of its citizens abroad by a global or regional power was not a rare practice. This policy was often pursued by the United States in Latin America and by France in Africa. If Russia had had millions of its citizens in neighboring states, it would have been difficult to prevent its absolute and unrestricted dominance in the former Soviet Union.
Russian diplomacy initially refrained from unilateral actions and preferred to conclude bilateral agreements. However, Moscow faced fierce resistance from the governments of almost all of the other post-Soviet states as they feared that this would jeopardize their nation-building. Citizenship plays an important role in forming a new identity for young states, and their leaders did not want to allow a situation where their citizens would simultaneously be citizens of a neighboring state. They regarded Russia’s intention to introduce dual citizenship, albeit through relevant treaties, as an attempt to create an instrument of influence under the guise of concern about compatriots.
Bilateral negotiations in 1993-1995 were largely fruitless. The only results of the attempts to use this “essential tool” for achieving the “main strategic foreign policy objective” were agreements with Turkmenistan signed in December 1993 and with Tajikistan signed in September 1995 (Agreement, 1994; Treaty, 1996). Turkmenistan unilaterally withdrew from the agreement with Russia in 2003. In 2007, two more post-Soviet countries—Kyrgyzstan and Armenia—adopted laws allowing dual citizenship. In addition, Russian passports were issued to almost all residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (even before the events of 2008), as well as many residents of Transnistria.
In 1995, it became clear that Russia’s dual citizenship policy in countries that were most important for it had failed. Three quarters of ethnic Russians from the former Soviet Union live in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The lack of results at negotiations with these three countries essentially meant the failure of the Russian strategy to institutionalize dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space.
Failed negotiations with Ukraine were particularly painful for Russia. Despite his promises during the 1994 election campaign, President Leonid Kuchma took a tough stance against dual citizenship. This issue became one of the stumbling blocks that until May 1997 did not allow the two countries to sign a comprehensive bilateral treaty. As a result, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not contain a single provision mentioning dual citizenship, thus indicating a serious concession by Russia compared to its position before 1995 (Treaty, 1999).
As a result, by 1995, de jure dual citizenship in the post-Soviet countries, which had been proclaimed a strategic objective of the Russian foreign policy, began to gradually disappear from the political and diplomatic agenda as a matter of bilateral or multilateral relations. Despite serious efforts undertaken by diplomats, a very important tool of Russian politics was not formalized in international treaties. Faced with stubborn opposition from other governments, Moscow simply backed off.
The issue of dual citizenship unexpectedly resurfaced in 2004. Seeking to attract pro-Russian voters during the Ukrainian elections in 2004, Leonid Kuchma and Victor Yanukovich agreed to work out a dual citizenship agreement with Russia. However, it was not quite clear whether the Verkhovna Rada would ratify such an agreement and whether Yanukovich would be consistent enough in pursuing the matter. Nevertheless, Russian federal agencies started to draft the treaty, but the Orange Revolution botched all plans. The revival of the idea of dual citizenship in 2004 indicated that Russia was ready to address this issue again under favorable conditions. The resistance of neighboring states was the main reason why it was removed from the agenda. First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said in December 2006: “As for the introduction of dual citizenship, the international practice of recent decades rejects this institution.” But he hurried to add that the question of dual citizenship in the CIS could come back on the agenda when the level of integration would reach that in the European Union (Dmitriev, 2006). And yet, the barely controllable process of obtaining dual citizenship in the post-Soviet space went on.
In 2008-2017, the dominant positions in the internal bureaucratic struggle around dual citizenship were held by those who opposed easy acquisition of Russian passports by residents of neighboring countries. According to this part of the bureaucratic apparatus, Russia had to strengthen the state and its institutions within its own national borders. Law enforcement and security agencies agreed with this view. They claimed that it would be virtually impossible to run background checks on newly arriving citizens. In addition, the rapid spread of Russian citizenship outside Russia could jeopardize state instruments of control. There were also many fears that the liberal citizenship law would further open the door to Russia for Central Asians and thereby increase the threat of terrorism from neighboring Afghanistan. The Ministry of Internal Affairs set up numerous bureaucratic obstacles to prevent easy access to Russian citizenship. And yet, despite these difficulties, almost three million people received Russian passports from 1992 to 2002, and another 3.3 million in 2014-2017 (Gulina, 2020).
The Russian Citizenship Law of 2002 introduced a serious restriction that prevented further spread of dual citizenship: Article 13 required applicants for a Russian passport to give up the citizenship of another state (Law, 2002). The provisions of the law, which seriously limited the spread of dual citizenship and complicated the acquisition of a Russian passport, entered into force in 2007. It seemed that Russia drew the line.
By that time dual citizenship had become popular only in small countries and territories that were completely dependent on Russia economically and where Russia maintained its military presence: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Besides, about 100,000 Russians lived in Latvia and Estonia, but most of them did not have dual citizenship, even though they would have preferred it.
This could hardly be called “non-resident ethnic citizenship,” since the share of ethnic Russians (with the exception of Transnistria, albeit with some reservations) in those countries was extremely small. The total number of persons in these countries who hold a Russian passport as a second one can be estimated at about one and a half million. In the whole of the post-Soviet space, by 2019-2020, the total number of persons with de facto dual citizenship, who were not at all eager to report this to the authorities of their home countries, had exceeded two million. This is less than 1.5% of Russia’s population (for comparison, this figure is about 10% in Hungary).
Until 2017, Russia’s citizenship laws, repatriation program and migration policy did not distinguish between ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking people and East Slavs, on the one hand, and members of other ethnic groups, on the other. Until 2020, when Russia began an active campaign to issue passports to residents of Eastern Ukraine, the absolute majority of persons with two passports in the post-Soviet space were not ethnic Russians. This evoked resistance in the Russian government agencies which opposed further spread of dual citizenship. A certain part of the Russian elite found this policy inconsistent and even absurd. Mikhail Remizov, a prominent and influential author and political strategist, complained: “Russians outside the Russian Federation have been deprived of any advantages in obtaining its citizenship, and have not been covered by its diasporic and resettlement policy” (Remizov, 2016, p. 11).
In 2017-2020, a number of important amendments to the citizenship law were adopted. They did not explicitly offer any advantages to ethnic Russians or East Slavs, but essentially established a fast-track passport acquisition procedure for them. Russia basically followed in the footsteps of Hungary, which by 2011 had created a system of preferences for ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, while avoiding open ethno-nationalist justification of its policy. A liberal approach to citizenship is supported by fairly large groups within the Russian elite: the “imperialists,” who see dual citizenship as an effective tool of Moscow’s regional domination; Communist Party members who are still nostalgic for the ideals of Soviet-era “friendship of peoples,” which in most cases go hand in hand with ethno-nationalist motives (Zyuganov, 2020); the so-called economic bloc in the executive branch, which, like many liberal economists, insists that the Russian economy needs an influx of low-cost labor with a good command of the Russian language (President of Russia, 2018).
This broad and diverse coalition gained the upper hand in 2017, when the Kremlin became increasingly aware of the fact that it was impossible to bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence by previous methods, Kazakhstan and Belarus were seeking to pursue a “multi-vector” foreign policy, and European orientation was gaining popularity in Moldova. So the Kremlin agreed to drastic changes in legislation and offered a fast-track procedure for the acquisition of Russian citizenship by millions of citizens in key post-Soviet countries.
In 2017-2020, the Federal Assembly, prompted by the Kremlin, adopted three sets of amendments to the citizenship law. This meant a radical revision of Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space, primarily with regard to Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova (Zevelev, 2020).
Firstly, in 2017, citizens of Ukraine acquired a special status in Russian legislation. It no longer required documents confirming the consent of the Ukrainian government to the termination of Ukrainian citizenship as a condition for obtaining Russian citizenship. From then on, a copy of an application for abandoning Ukrainian citizenship was enough (Law, 2017).
Secondly, in 2019, Russian legislation was amended to specify the categories of individuals entitled to fast-track naturalization. On Putin’s instructions, this status was initially awarded to residents of the unrecognized Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR). Later, Putin granted this right to everyone who lived in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, which are geographically larger than the “people’s republics” (President of Russia, 2019b; Decree, 2019). As a result, about seven million people became eligible to acquire Russian citizenship easily and quickly. So, in 2017-2019, the Kremlin basically introduced a special Russian citizenship regime in certain parts of Ukraine. At the same time, many residents of the unrecognized DNR and LNR republics, just like two million Crimeans back in 2014, became persons with dual citizenship, since from the point of view of Ukrainian legislation they did not forfeit Ukrainian citizenship.
Thirdly, in April 2020, a new package of amendments to the citizenship law simplified the application procedure for all citizens of Ukraine, as well as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. The provision requiring five years of continuous residence in Russia was abolished. In most cases, the time needed for obtaining citizenship was reduced to one year. What is crucial is that the latest amendments to the law allow a person to apply for a Russian passport without losing the citizenship of another country (Law, 2020). The amendments entered into force on July 24, 2020.
Citizens of Ukraine were the first to grab the opportunities offered by the aforementioned legislative measures. They firmly hold first place by the number of obtained Russian passports: in 2020 they made up 410,000, or 63% of all new citizens (Migration, 2020). Russian citizenship is much less attractive in Belarus and Kazakhstan than in Ukraine: agreements concluded within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Union State with Belarus provide for free movement of labor. However, they do not allow permanent residence in another country without a work contract, which in some cases may become an issue (Pirker and Entin, 2020). The prospect of obtaining a Russian passport appears to be attractive for only small groups of population in Belarus and Kazakhstan (these are mainly ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan as well as political oppositionists and activists). For many Moldovans, the possibility of obtaining a Romanian passport looks more attractive than Russian citizenship, although the latter may be of interest to some seasonal workers.
The main targets of the new legislation are two groups of citizens of Ukraine, as well as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and, to a lesser extent, Moldova. Each of these groups potentially includes several million people. The first category is made up of those who plan to move to Russia for permanent residence. The Kremlin understands that the country is facing serious demographic problems, especially in Siberia and the Far East. The concept of state migration policy for 2019-2025 clearly states that attracting foreigners and migrants for resettlement in these areas is a priority (President of Russia, 2018). At first glance, these changes in the citizenship policy reflect the position of the “economic bloc” in the government and are intended to inspire a new migration policy in Russia. However, the president is counting on the support of other segments of Russian society as well. In December 2019, Putin explained which foreigners he would like to come to Russia: “Of course, it is easier for people who know and respect Russian culture and who speak Russian to adapt to the situation in Russia. This is why it is easier, for example, for Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans, because it is just simpler for them. And the locals take it easier. There are three million Ukrainians living in Russia, and almost the same number came after the tragic events in Donbass. It is more difficult to adapt for people, say, from Central Asia” (President of Russia, 2019c).
The second category includes those who will remain residents of Ukraine or the three other countries, but, nevertheless, will obtain Russian citizenship. Technically, the amendments of 2020 apply only after a person has moved to Russia. Chairman of the State Duma Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots Leonid Kalashnikov (Communist Party) and his first deputy Konstantin Zatulin (United Russia) have vigorously supported the lifting of the provision requiring a person to move to Russia in order to obtain citizenship. In April 2020, together with Kazbek Taysaev (Communist Party), they tried to include the relevant amendment in the law, but the executive branch balked (Bill, 2020; Yakunin, 2020). In practice, however, the removal of the provision requiring the termination of original citizenship would encourage many people to have a domicile in two countries.
Ukraine’s President-elect Vladimir Zelensky responded to Putin’s plan to simplify the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to citizens of Ukraine by posting a statement on Facebook in April 2019. He promised to grant Ukrainian citizenship to persons of all countries who suffered from authoritarian and corrupt regimes, but above all, to “Russians who suffer probably the most today” (Zelensky, 2019). In August, Zelensky signed a decree that simplified the process of obtaining Ukrainian citizenship for “Russian citizens persecuted for political reasons” (Moscow Times, 2019). Vladimir Putin replied by saying: “I have said on many occasions that Ukrainians and Russians are fraternal peoples. And even more: I think this is actually one people with its specific features—cultural, linguistic and historical—but in essence it is a single people. And if we have common citizenship, both Russians and Ukrainians would only gain: we will be stronger and more efficient… If Ukraine begins issuing passports to Russian citizens and we in Russia issue passports and grant citizenship to Ukrainians, then sooner or later we will inevitably come to the expected result: everybody will have single citizenship. This must be welcomed” (President of Russia, 2019a).
In 2021, the Ukrainian government has become firmly determined to prevent dual citizenship with Russia. Work is underway to draft a bill that will completely exclude any possibility of holding both a Ukrainian and a Russian passport at the same time. Previous attempts to introduce penalty for dual citizenship failed. The last such attempt was made in May 2020, but the Verkhovna Rada refused to consider the bill proposed by the president. In February 2021, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) announced that the government would develop a mechanism for identifying dual/multiple citizenship, primarily among Ukrainians who apply for elected or high-ranking positions. Drawing on the experience of the Baltic countries, Ukraine plans to allow dual citizenship with the EU countries and a number of other states, but not with Russia. According to the NSDC’s decision, the government should begin an interstate dialogue on the conclusion of bilateral agreements on dual citizenship with interested countries, except for the “aggressor state,” that is, Russia. There is another draft law currently under discussion which will introduce prison terms of two to five years for any citizen of Ukraine who conceals his or her Russian passport (Kommersant, 2021; TASS, 2021).
Until now, none of Kiev’s attempts to prevent dual citizenship has been successful. The experience of Central and Southeast Europe (Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, and Romania) shows that citizens of low-income countries seek employment, education and medical care in neighboring higher-income countries, and dual citizenship simplifies and accelerates all procedures and allows them to maintain close ties with their homeland. This may have serious political consequences. For example, persons with dual, Ukrainian and Russian, citizenship would most likely want labor migration to be simple and easy, and therefore would probably prefer to vote for those politicians in Ukraine who promise a “constructive” policy towards Moscow. This group of Ukrainian citizens can become an instrument of Russia’s influence on the neighboring state.
While talking about “one people” and simplifying and accelerating the procedure for obtaining Russian passports for many categories of citizens in the post-Soviet space, the Kremlin in December 2020 initiated new legislative restrictions for persons with dual citizenship. This is in line with the tough stance assumed in 2014, when all Russian citizens permanently residing in Russia and holding another citizenship or a residence permit of another country were required to notify the Ministry of Internal Affairs thereof (Law, 2014). The new package of restrictions submitted by the president to the State Duma in 2020 prohibits such persons from holding many federal, regional and even municipal positions as well as from working in security and law enforcement agencies (State Duma, 2020). The attitude of the state towards persons with dual citizenship was ironically formulated by the presidential representative in the State Duma, Garry Minkh. “Be so kind and make up your mind as to which state you serve,” he addressed the potential “targets” of the bill. “Because the servant of two masters is a famous character, but he is also a little comedic…» (Zamakhina, 2021).
Apparently, the security forces standing behind this legislative initiative balanced what they think is an overly liberal approach to dual citizenship, which served as the basis for the legislative amendments adopted in 2017-2020. From the point of view of modern international standards, measures limiting the rights of persons with dual citizenship, including a ban on holding certain positions in the government, are illegal, as they violate human rights (Spiro, 2010).
In the future, further promotion of dual citizenship, as a convenient foreign policy tool in the post-Soviet space, will face continuous resistance from the security forces which are quite suspicious of Russians living in the country with two passports. Mass “non-resident ethnic citizenship” projects in many parts of the world are temporary, flexible and depend on changing political circumstances, and Russia will not be an exception (Brubaker and Kim, 2017; Waterbury, 2014).
GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: THREE SCENARIOS
Over the past three years, Russia has adopted laws that significantly accelerate the spread of dual citizenship in Ukraine and potentially in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Like in some Central and Southeastern European countries, the new Russian policy is designed to strengthen political influence in the region and compensate for the territorial losses by maintaining ties with people living in the newly independent states. There are quite a few people in the post-Soviet space who would like to become Russian citizens, but many of them would prefer to keep their current passports as well. There is not yet a system of organized passportization of residents of neighboring countries (with the exception of the unrecognized Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics), but Russia has already created legislative prerequisites for that. There is no doubt that the governments of neighboring countries will soon start taking new measures to make it difficult for their citizens to obtain Russian passports.
In fact, instead of redrawing the borders again, it can use softer measures to influence the identity of people living in neighboring countries and their sense of belonging (Waterbury, 2014, p. 38; Kivisto, 2007, p. 286). Russia’s ability to engage with citizens and compatriots in the post-Soviet states, especially those located west of Russia, may become one of the key instruments of its policy in the region in the coming years. The governments of the post-Soviet countries regard such a policy as “passport aggression” on the part of Russia, even though many of their citizens would like to have two passports. The rapid spread of Russian citizenship in Ukraine, and possibly in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova, may call into question the sovereignty of these countries (Melvin, 2020).
Three scenarios may be sketched out for the possible direction of the dual citizenship situation in the post-Soviet space in the coming decade. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive.
Under the first scenario, if the post-Soviet space completely falls apart and its separate parts get incorporated into other regional systems forming around the West, China, and Turkey, the attractiveness of Russian citizenship will decrease. European countries are unlikely to want to include countries with a large number of Russian passport holders in their institutions, which will encourage the governments of the former Soviet republics to resolutely block further spread of dual citizenship. It will not be easy to do. The very existence of dual citizenship will slow down the disintegration of the post-Soviet space.
The second scenario envisions turning the region into a system with a clearly defined center surrounded by close and distant neighboring countries. In this case, citizens of post-Soviet states would prefer dual citizenship to be freely available. However, under this scenario, too, the governments will try to limit the spread of dual citizenship, fearing the loss of sovereignty. Some elements of this scenario already exist today, and dual citizenship can become an additional factor that will keep the system from falling apart completely and developing by the first scenario.
Finally, the third scenario envisages the transformation of the post-Soviet space into a community where states cede more and more functions to subnational and transnational actors. People will increasingly define their relationships and identities outside the realms of national governments. Transnational social groups based on common values, interests, joint work, economic and friendly ties will form faster. In this case, dual/multiple citizenship will spread rapidly and serve as one of the mechanisms for strengthening a new type of regional community. The blurred political map of the post-Soviet space, where the place of birth and residence do not necessarily coincide with one’s citizenship, will be viewed by most countries of the region as a positive phenomenon. All may realize that dual/multiple nationality is better for peace and security than the old system of well-defined states with clearly drawn borders, which emerged in Europe from bloody wars and allowed only single citizenship. Borders between states will become less important due to the free movement of people who will call not just one, but two or even several countries their home. The old Westphalian system, which prioritizes nation-states, can gradually be replaced by a structure with an emphasis on free citizens with multiple, flexible and changing national identities. The implementation of the third scenario in the post-Soviet space would require the resolution of conflicts, a high level of regional integration, and at least partial democratization. Needless to say, all this looks quite illusory today. The current spread of dual citizenship is a step leading to the implementation of the second scenario, and in the long term, possibly even the third one.
The wide spread of dual citizenship in the region can contribute to the erosion of political boundaries and hinder efforts to build national identities and nation-states. However, dual/multiple citizenship will continue proliferating across the post-Soviet space. This is a regular process that is developing in line with global trends. Public policy can speed it up or slow it down, but it cannot stop or reverse it. Analysis of the impact of dual citizenship on Russian and post-Soviet domestic processes is beyond the scope of this article, but this is a very promising area for future research.
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Zeveleva, O., 2013. Repatriatsiya i natsional’naya identichnost’: opyt Rossii i Germanii [Repatriation and National Identity: Russian and German Experiences]. In: Rossiya i Germaniya v prostranstve evropeiskih kommunikatsy [Russia and Germany in the European Communication Space]. Tyumen: Izdatel’stvo Tyumenskogo Gosudarstvennogo universiteta, pp.246-263. Available at: <https://publications.hse.ru/chapters/109977478> [Accessed 7 March 2021].
Zyuganov, 2020. Russky sterzhen Derzhavy. Statya-manifest Predsedatelya TsK KPRF G.A. Zyuganova [Russian Core of the Great Power: Article-Manifesto by the CPRF Central Committee Chairman G.A. Zyuganov]. Available at: <https://kprf.ru/party-live/cknews/194458.html> [Accessed 7 March 2021].

domain: politics


MANITOU SPRINGS, Colo. (AP) – Authorities are warning people who live in and around the area burned by the Waldo Canyon wildfire to watch out for possible flooding and mudslides triggered by afternoon thunderstorms.
A series of mudslides triggered by rain that started Monday temporarily shut down U.S. 24 west of Colorado Springs through Tuesday morning. A state transportation department spokesman told The Gazette the mud was as deep as 5 feet in one area.
El Paso County sheriff’s Lt. Jeff Kramer said two homes in Green Mountain Falls also suffered significant flooding damage. They are located in an area downhill from the 28 square mile area burned in June.
More rain is possible Tuesday and the National Weather Service says there’s an elevated potential for flash flooding because the ground is already so wet.
(© Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.)


text:
In self-pity, here I wallow,
'cause inside I'm feeling hollow,
And it seems the only thing I know is pain.
But I carry on my life,
Even though I have no wife,
And I hope that I will learn to love again.
On the outside I seem cheery,
On the inside I feel weary,
And to see me you would never really know,
That when she left she broke my heart,
And sadly now that we're apart,
I can't imagine where my life will likely go.
Wednesday, January 3, 2007
I had a very very bad night. Unfortunately, a bad morning usually follows. I'll have an update post coming later in the day with details, but I mentally composed a poem in the shower this morning, and I thought I'd share it.

domain: artistic


text:
Lands bill suffers setback in House
Pair of wilderness areas left in limbo after narrow defeat
A bill that enjoyed some bipartisan support and seemed set for approval, setting aside nearly 276,000 acres in Mesa County as wilderness and conservation areas, was narrowly defeated Wednesday in the U.S. House of Representatives.
The measure, S.22, would have created a 209,610-acre Dominguez-Escalante National Conservation Area and a 66,280-acre Dominguez Canyon Wilderness Area in addition to protecting other areas in Colorado and nine other states.
The bill failed by two votes, but the Omnibus Public Lands Act Package of 2009 is expected to be amended and voted on again within the next couple of weeks, said Eric Wortman, spokesman for Congressman John Salazar, D-Colo.
“We were very close,” said Wortman, whose boss voted in favor of the measure. “It’s a bill that is very important to him.”
The bill was defeated 282-144, two votes shy of the necessary two-thirds of the representatives who were present.
Wednesday’s failure of the bill is frustrating, because it leaves the thousands of acres in limbo without directions for federal land managers on how to protect it, said Kate Graham, public lands organizer of Colorado Environmental Coalition. It also could have a negative effect on recreational-based tourism in the area southeast of Grand Junction, she said.
“It’s really a shame,” Graham said. “There was a huge amount of support. You feel like you do your groundwork and you run into these roadblocks.”
The bill would have designated 240,000 acres as wilderness area in Rocky Mountain National Park.
Graham said it’s nerve-wracking knowing the bill would have passed if two other Colorado representatives, Mike Coffman and Doug Lamborn, both Republicans, had voted for the bill.
Graham said members of her environmental organization had reached out to the Colorado lawmakers, but they seemed “on the fence” about how they would vote. All of the state’s Democratic representatives voted in favor of the bill.
The bill’s opponents have said the added protections may block oil and gas development.
“I can’t reiterate enough how important it is to have these two national conservation areas in such close proximity,” Graham said. “If anything, the lopsided vote, 282-144, shows us that Congress is overwhelmingly in favor of protecting these special places and that this isn’t the end of the story.”

domain: geography


You’re probably familiar with traditional mall music – it goes by a few different names: elevator music, piped music, the list goes on. While this older royalty free background music can come across as cheesey to modern day ears, it’s actually based on years of research. Thankfully, this research applies to modern day music too.
One such study on background music’s effects on purchasing, has raised some intriguing topics. So, we’ve hand-picked the 3 most interesting findings from the study. Enjoy!
A study was done which compared playing chart hits vs unfamiliar music in a shop. Which one do you think led to more spending? If you said “unfamiliar music” you’d be absolutely right!
In fact, playing unfamiliar music caused an 8% increase in time spent at the shop. Because more time spent browsing equals more sales, it makes good sense to play new and exciting music. The theory is that unfamiliar music makes time appear to pass more quickly.
One of the key reasons our royalty free background music service is so popular is because we don’t play chart hits. While the main benefit is saving money on music licence fees, it also means your customers are getting that unfamiliar music that leads to more spending.
The Speed of Your Background Music
A 1982 study revealed that the speed of which you play your in store background music can make a world of difference. Slower music was found to increase time spent browsing and faster music was found to have the opposite effect.
That means slower music is always better, right? Well, not always. Slower music is perfect for getting people to order more drinks at your bar or spend more time browsing your gift shop.
But, if what if you have a business with a high customer turnover? Let’s say a kebab shop for example’s sake. If you’re struggling to get people to leave and make room for more customers on a saturday night, then ramping up the music might be just what you need.
Which Music Genre?
It’s no secret that the genre of your background music can have an effect on the mood of your business. However, what you might not have realised is certain genres of music help sell certain varieties of product.
In a study, it was found that a florist sold more flowers by playing music seen as “romantic”. It’s also been seen that uptempo pop music is a great way to sell to teenage audiences.
The lesson from all of this? Our jazz radio station might be perfect for florist and coffee shop, but if you’re trying to sell to a young audience, it might be time to switch to our dance station.


text:
Happy weekend ❤ Enjoyed reading the blog Komikerfrue this week, the blogger is married to a Norwegian comedian. Her entries are lively and real, the language Norwegian.
Sunday, last week the fabulous Leslie Mann entertained in “The Other Woman.” A movie I found myself liking, just the kind of movie in true Friday movie spirits. Have you seen it?
Necklace Never Naked, Dress (old) Oasis

domain: entertainment


text:
Holistic nursing is defined as all nursing practice that has healing the whole person as its goal. (AHNA, 1998)
As the definitive voice for holistic nursing, the American Holistic Nurses Association (AHNA) promotes the education of nurses, other health care professionals and the public in all aspects of holistic caring and healing. AHNA is a non-profit membership association serving more than 4,300 members and 160 local chapters/networks across the U.S. and abroad.
In December of 2006, due to the efforts of AHNA, holistic nursing was recognized as an “official nursing specialty” by the American Nurses Association with its own defined scope and standards of practice.
AHNA serves as a bridge between conventional healthcare and complementary/alternative healing practices. As health care professionals, holistic nurses may integrate complementary and alternative modalities (CAM) into clinical practice to treat the whole person and view healing as a partnership between a person seeking treatment and his or her practitioner. For more information contact the AHNA National Office at 323 N. San Francisco St. Suite 201, Flagstaff, AZ : (800) 526-2752 or online at www.ahna.org
The American Holistic Health Association (AHHA — that’s Ah Ha!) is a free and impartial information resource for wellness and healing. The AHHA is endorsed by leading healthcare professionals worldwide. Their sole purpose is to offer holistic health resources — both alternative and traditional — in an impartial manner and help people become more active and confident in their health decisions.
AMERICAN HOLISTIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION
The Free & Impartial Wellness Resource
Connecting You to the Power of Choice
PO Box 17400
Anaheim, CA 92817-7400 USA
Phone (714) 779-6152

domain: medical


text:
Three ‘Hoos selected on Day 1 of MLS SuperDraft
Three Virginia Soccer alums were selected in the first two rounds of the MLS SuperDraft on Thursday – a program first.
Striker Daryl Dike, defender Henry Kessler and senior Robin Afamefuna were among the 52 collegiate players selected on day one.
Dike and Kessler were selected back-to-back, as the fifth and sixth overall picks, respectively. Dike will join Orlando SC. Kessler will join the New England Revolution, headed by former Virginia coach Bruce Arena.
Afamefuna was taken with the 37th overall pick by the Colorado Rapids.
The Cavalier program has now had 25 players selected, including nine first-rounders, since the inception of the draft, and all have come under head coach George Gelnovatch.
A total of seven Virginia men’s soccer players have been taken in the last three drafts.

domain: sports


TriStar® L-120 9mm Semi-automatic Pistol.
A serious shooter's dream. Constructed of steel alloy for full strength at a fraction of the weight... you'll notice the difference aiming downrange as well as carrying on the hip. Snag-free sights ensure a smooth draw, and the two included 17-round magazines provide enough firepower when you need it. The chrome Cerakote® finish offers all-weather durability, so if you're using the L-120 as a sidearm on a hunting trip it will stand up to whatever Mother Nature throws your way. TriStar builds firearms with the shooter in mind, and you'll feel the difference when you unholster the L-120.
TriStar L-120 9mm Pistol special features:


text:
Teal Green & Lime Green - Kanchipuram Silk
Sublime, chic and pretty Teal Green Kanchipuram Silk Saree charms with aesthetically crafted floral paisley motifs . The delightful weave is lent a mystical twist with a zari kaddi border with floral vines and brocade. The rich self zari brocade pallu with zari stripes & kaddi lends a gorgeous complement. The plain lime green blouse with zari border is a perfect fit.
Approximate Length - 5.5 mtrs + 0.8 to 0.9 mtrs (attached blouse)
Height - 46 - 50"
Approximate weight - 500-650 gms
Note : The colours you see on your device may vary due to the varying colour reproduction, brightness, resolution and temperature of individual devices. If you'd like more clarity before your purchase, please contact our customer engagement team at +919003003841
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NODAL OFFICER DETAIL
Santhosh - email@example.com

domain: design


text:
Rural Water - Quarter 3, 2013 - (Page 11)
From the President
RURAL AMERICA, LIKE the rest of America, is diverse. Rural
America, like the rest of America, is changing.
It’s been said that today’s decisions determine tomorrow’s destiny, and rural
residents and policymakers face many decisions that will determine the destiny of
the water and wastewater industry, as well as rural America’s destiny.
Rural America is the foundation of our economy. It’s where our food is produced,
our energy generated and our fuel and raw material mined. We’re being asked to
make decisions on what the economic needs, opportunities and possibilities are in
rural areas – and, ultimately, how rural areas and people can achieve the goals
Rural America has been and continues to be a vital part of the nation. Today,
rural America is comprised of 2,288 counties. It contains 83 percent of the nation’s
land and is home to 21 percent (51 million) of its people. Rural counties supply
18 percent of the nation’s jobs and generate 14 percent of its earnings. Rural people
BY DOUG ANDERTON,
and communities are engaged in a wide range of economic activities – from manuNRWA PRESIDENT
facturing to mining, from recreational services to agriculture and everything in
Concern for rural America, its conditions and its future, is real.
And, while rural America is a producer of critical goods and services,
our concerns go beyond economics. Rural America is also home
The ambiance of rural America is not
to a ﬁfth of the nation’s people; keeper of most of our natural
a myth — it’s as real as the people
amenities and national treasures, and the guardians of a unique
part of American culture, tradition and history.
who reside there, who cherish oldThe ambiance of rural America is not a myth — it’s as real as
fashioned values, who are neighborly
the people who reside there, who cherish old-fashioned values, who
are neighborly and know what it is to be hospitable. People who travel
and know what it is to be hospitable.
rural America are looking for something special. They want to “experience” merchandise that is home grown or homemade. They know
that heritage shapes a community and rural communities preserve
their heritage, and therefore, their integrity. Visitors to rural America
ﬁnd worth in historic relics, architecture and art. They enjoy touring
a small, local museum, shopping for antiques, and ending their day with a quiet
dinner. They enjoy festivals where family is still the focal point, and ﬁnally, they
respect the opportunity to create their own memories.
Rural Water has been a part of America for more years than even I can remember.
With your help, we’ll continue to be at the forefront in promoting “everything rural.”
Rural is our middle name, but, more importantly, deﬁnes WHO we are!
Think rural and small communities. Thank rural America
Third Quarter 2013 • 11
Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of Rural Water - Quarter 3, 2013
FROM THE PRESIDENT
PROJECTS THAT START IN RURAL AMERICA TOUCH THE LIVES OF ALL AMERICANS
WHAT DOES RURAL MEAN?
PROTECTING THE LAND
THE POWER OF AN ASSOCIATION
OLD CONSERVATION IDEA STILL IN VOGUE
THROWING MY LOOP
INDEX TO ADVERTISERS/ ADVERTISERS.COM
FROM THE CEO
Rural Water - Quarter 3, 2013


Z-Trip Remix of The Dead Weather's "Treat Me Like Your Mother"
Z-Trip might not live in Arizona anymore -- despite his inclusion on the Republic's list of the Valley's most intriguing people -- but he's still one of the best DJs in the world.
I'm reminded of that fact by this remix of The Dead Weather's "Treat Me Like Your Mother," featuring a verse by Slug of Atmosphere, which So Much Silence shared in early February but which I didn't get around to listening to until today. Count me among the people who thought The Dead Weather record pretty much sucked but who really appreciate what Z did with this track.
You can stream it below or download here.
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Keep your thumb on the local music scene each week with music news, trends, artist interviews and concert listings. We'll also send you special ticket offers and music deals.


text:
thanks so much, better late than never. In fact, the timing is great.
Nielsen has been helpful, but they will not let me buy directly. Am spoiled and hate to pay retail, especially when I have a project that needs 10 22 X 28 frames.
I will give them a call, as the print is a little small for my "old eyes".


text:
Twenty-five tales of horror and the weird, stories that encapsulate the dark, the desolate and the downright creepy. Stories that will send that quiver of anticipation and dread down your spine and stay with you long after the lights have gone out.
Who is Len Binn, a comedian or something worse? What secrets are locked away in Le Trénébreuse? The deadline for what? Who are the little people, the garbage men, the peelers? What lies behind the masks? And what horrors are found down along the backroads?
With stories by Ramsey Campbell, Storm Constantine, Stephen Laws, Samantha Lee, Stan Nicholls, Tony Richards and many, many others.
There’s a rather wonderful review of The Alchemy Press Book of Horrors in the latest issue (number 9) of Phantasmagoria Magazine:
…It is definitely one of the best anthologies I have come across for quite some time and I would highly recommend it… If the stories weren’t enough, the book is also illustrated throughout with finely drawn headers for each of the stories by the talented Jim Pitts, adding that extra touch of quality to this book…
Read the full review here (scroll down the page to read it).
We’ve received many submissions to The Alchemy Press Book of Horrors 2 so far,and they continue to arrive everyday. We try to acknowledge these within a day or so. Unfortunately we are a bit behind schedule but hope to acknowledge all in due course. If you haven’t heard from us within a week of the submission window closing (at the end of this month) please email us.
CAVE VENUS ET STELLA – Anna Vaught
WORMCASTS – Thana Niveau
THEY TELL ME – Carly Holmes
DISAGREEABLY HITCHED – Gary Fry
PACK YOUR COAT – Aliya Whiteley
VOICES IN THE NIGHT – Lisa Tuttle THE FULLNESS OF HER BELLY – Cate Gardner
MAW – Priya Sharma TEUFELSBERG – Madhvi Ramani
THE OTHER TIGER – Helen Marshall
SENTINEL – Catriona Ward THE WORM – Samantha Lee
THE ADJOINING ROOM – AK Benedict
THE GOLDEN HOUR – Rosanne Rabinowitz
THE PERFECT DAY TO BE AT SEA – Kayleigh Marie Edwards
THE HARDER IT GETS THE SOFTER WE SING – Steven Dines
THE DEMON L – Carly Holmes
BY SEVERN’S FLOOD – Jane Jakeman
FISH HOOKS – Kit Power
OLD TRASH – Jenn Ashworth
BOBBO – Robert Shearman
We’ve highlighted the stories from Horrors.
The Alchemy Press Book of Horrors is available in print form and for a variety of eBook platforms. And while you wait for the next volume of Best British Horror we suggest you read this year’s book (published by the excellent Newcon Press). The cover for BBH 2018 is by the extremely talented Daniele Serra.
In the run up to Christmas, we are selling some of our books at super knockdown prices. Many of these titles are in low supply so this offer applies while in-house stocks last. The following paperbacks are on offer at £5.00 each plus p&p (£2.00 per book or £3.00 for two or more books up to 2 Kg in weight. UK orders; for overseas queries please email (see end of this post).
First up are anthologies, a fantastic place to discover new stories by a variety of authors.

domain: literature


text:
Support sustainable innovation in opera and dance
Elsewhere © Shawn Fitzgerald Ahern i
Elsewhere is a new opera by Irish composer Michael Gallen, bringing together an international team of celebrated and emerging artists, which tells the story of the 1919 Monaghan Asylum Soviet - when the striking staff of a rural Irish Asylum barricaded the gates and declared their independence.
Elsewhere is based on a radical 1919 event, when the striking staff of Monaghan Asylum barricaded themselves in and declared a Soviet, integrating the patients into its function. Their moment is in constellation with our own, occurring during the 1918 flu pandemic. Marked by death and hardship, the strikers overcame sectarian divides to demand humane conditions. Dealing with themes of freedom, care and mental illness, Elsewhere explores the imagined future of a forgotten past.
Elsewhere’s events unfold through the visions of Celine, a patient who decades later remains ‘locked in’ to the moment of the Soviet. Through her interactions with the charismatic Inspector of Lunatics, we tread the borders between fantasy and incarceration. Performers play a range of characters from patients and strikers to Marx and Jehovah, shape-shifting between work routines, football games, negotiations and dances. Over time we uncover how Celine’s fate and that of the Soviet are entwined.
Elsewhere is a new opera by one of Ireland’s most celebrated young composers, Michael Gallen. Produced by the composer’s own Straymaker company in partnership with the Abbey (National Theatre of Ireland) and leading French contemporary music ensemble Miroirs Etendus, the opera will premiere at the Abbey in November of 2021 and has been shortlisted for the prestigious Fedora Prize for Opera.
We believe that this project’s unique musical language, its groundbreaking multidisciplinary form, and its story so pertinent to our current historical moment, will be of interest to audiences far beyond our corner of the world.
In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the question of how our societies will rebuild will become a most vital one. Elsewhere promotes care as our most radical political act, and advocates for an “other” form of thinking that can only occur on the margins of society.
This work will be highly impactful for its audiences, encouraging them to think and feel in new ways.
Composer & Librettist
Annemarie Ní Churreain
Dylan Coburn Gray
Set & Costume Designer
Vocal Director & Pianist
Opéra de Rouen Normandie
Centre Culturel Irlandais
Anonymous donated 2 years ago


text:
Residents of the two neigbouring border districts of Ntoroko and Bundibugyo have welcomed the deployment of Ugandan troops to DR Congo to flush out ADF rebels.
The locals say the UPDF presence in Congo will guarantee the safety of their lives and property.
Uganda launched air and artillery strikes against ADF rebels in DR Congo on Tuesday. It is reported that large numbers of Ugandan soldiers who walked on foot and a column of armoured vehicles entered the DR Congo through Nobili border post into North Kivu Province.
When this reporter visited the Ugandan-DR Congo border at Lamia in Bundibugyo, there was heavy deployment of security forces.
Trucks carrying UPDF soldiers were seen deployed at strategic points at lamia in Busunga Town Council guarding the border points.
Residents yesterday said they now feel secure after the deployment.
Ms Consolato Nanjara, 68, a resident of Basongora Village, said: “When we heard the gunshots being targeted at the rebels, we knew we had been attacked. The news that it was the UPDF’s offensive against ADF brought us relieve.”
Mr Tito Burawule, a resident of Busunga Town Council, said the sight of UPDF soldiers waving to residents as they headed to DR Congo excited them.
Ms Daphne Katusabe, a resident of Karugutu Town Council in Ntoroko, is optimistic the ADF will be defeated.
Mr John Chance, the chairperson of Katumba Village in Bundingoma Sub-county, Bundibugyo, however, advised security forces to first alert locals ahead of such operations.
He said many people were traumatised by the gunshots.
By Wednesday evening, people were going about with their businesses normally. Some of the UPDF soldiers were also seen camping at Bubandi Primary School in Bubandi Sub-county and Bundingoma Primary School in Bundingoma Sub-county.
The Resident District Commissioner of Bundibugyo, Mr Amos Asiimwe, said they recently carried out a joint security operation and arrested 14 suspected ADF militans who were posing as refugees in Bubukwanga Transit Camp. At the beginning of last month, 10 suspected ADF militans were arrested in Ntoroko. On November 17, another four suspected ADF rebels were shot dead near Kisenge Trading Centre in Ntoroko.

domain: news