September 23, 2002
Attention to portable nuclear devices (often referred to as “suitcase nukes”) peaked in 1997-early 1998 following well-publicized allegations by the late governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai and former Russian Security Council Secretary, General (Ret.) Alexander Lebed, that an unknown number of these weapons (possibly as many as several dozen) could not be accounted for. These devices represent probably the greatest threat if they end up in the hands of terrorists due to the combination of small size and full-scale nuclear explosion effects. Interception of “suitcase bombs” is difficult along land borders and practically impossible along maritime borders. At the same time, the political, psychological, and economic effects of a blast from a portable nuclear weapon would be far greater than, for example, those of a “dirty bomb.”
The first and only reliable line of defense against the acquisition or use of “suitcase nuclear weapons” by terrorists lies in the countries that possess such devices or have the capability to produce them. Lebed’s 1997 statements are particularly unnerving because the early 1990s (when, according to him, a number of portable nuclear devices were lost) represented the time of greatest risk with regard to nuclear weapons security in Russia. Governmental institutions were radically weakened, and a dramatic drop in the standard of living made individuals with access to these weapons extremely vulnerable to the temptation of easy illegal profit. Official denials, including the denials that such weapons even existed, are not a sufficient reason for complacency.
This paper revisits open-source information about suitcase nukes to assess the level of threat stemming from the possibility that a number of them could have ended in the hands of terrorists or states that support them.
It seeks to achieve that task by concentrating on the following objectives:
- reassess information from publicly available sources about portable nuclear devices and try to determine, in particular, whether these weapons actually existed;
- analyze the scenarios of their loss that were offered by the special commission charged with the accounting for portable nuclear devices in the mid-1990s; and
- based on these scenarios, assess the probability that portable nuclear devices could have fallen into the hands of international terrorist organizations or states that support them, as well as the probability that such devices could be used for terrorist purposes.
The paper reaches two main conclusions:
- First, the probability that any portable nuclear devices were lost prior to or after the breakup of the Soviet Union appears low; the scenarios of loss offered by the special commission in 1996 are actually the least plausible among other possible scenarios. This does not mean that the threat does not exist, but rather that at this moment, it is probably not the most immediate threat to the home security of the United States or to US armed forces abroad.
- Second, even if any devices were lost, their effectiveness should be very low or maybe even non-existent, especially if the loss occurred during the period of the greatest risk, in the early 1990s. Without scheduled maintenance, these devices apparently can produce only minimal yield and eventually possibly no yield at all, and can only serve as a source of small amounts of weapons-grade fissile materials.
That being said, open-source information has limited usefulness and can only yield probabilistic analysis instead of definitive answers. Consequently, it is necessary to continue efforts aimed at acquiring better and more reliable information about the status of Soviet/Russian portable nuclear devices, as well as about the parameters of threat they might pose in the hands of terrorists.
Information on Portable Nuclear Devices from Russian Open Sources
In a recent interview, the deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Alexei Arbatov, noted that complete silence had surrounded the subject of portable nuclear devices since the debate of the mid-1990s. Indeed, suitcase nukes often seem a matter of fiction rather than that of fact.
The “mythological” qualities of suitcase nukes derive not only from limited information—this is a common feature in almost everything concerning Russian nuclear weapons—but primarily from the fact that almost all available information dates to a very brief period (the second half of 1997 and early 1998) and is not very reliable. Comments about suitcase nukes are conspicuously absent in open sources prior to 1997. For example, one of the most authoritative Russian treatises on nonstrategic nuclear weapons published by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations does not mention them.
There are only two stories in which references to them could be suspected, and then only in hindsight. The first is a statement in 1995 by the director of the Ministry of Defense Ecological Center, Col. Boris Alexeev, about nuclear devices that weighed 90 kilograms (kg). The other was made by Anton Surikov, an outspoken nationalist expert on defense issues and son of a leading figure in the Soviet military-industrial establishment, who said in an interview with the Estonian newspaper Postimees in 1996 that in a scenario of NATO landing on the Russian Baltic Sea shores, Russia would resort to “miniature” nuclear weapons. Both statements are not conclusive proof; however, as it is not entirely clear whether the authors meant portable nuclear weapons or some other types of weapons.
Silence continued in the post-1998 period. It is hardly surprising that official sources remained mute, but non-governmental organizations did as well. For example, in the manuscript of a major study of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, an expert from the Moscow-based PIR Center, Ivan Safranchuk, referred to them as “so-called” and ultimately dropped the reference in the final version of the study published in 2000. A subsequent study of these weapons written by the deputy director of the PIR Center, Yuri Fedorov, did not mention them either. Alexei Arbatov, who earlier was cited complaining about the absence of information about portable nuclear devices, did not mention them in his 1999 study, which treated the subject of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in considerable detail.
Scarcity of information notwithstanding, hindsight has its advantages, and a reassessment of available data can yield tangible results, especially utilizing new information about the state of the Russian nuclear weapons complex that has become available in the last five years.
The “suitcase nukes saga” began in the fall of 1997, when General (Ret.) Alexander Lebed made several statements to the effect that during his short tenure as the Secretary of the Security Council in 1996, he received information that the separatist government in Chechnya possessed small nuclear devices. In an attempt to clarify the situation, he created a special commission under the chairmanship of his assistant, Vladimir Denisov. According to Lebed, the commission was only able to locate 48 such munitions of a total of 132, an indication that 84 were lost (subsequently Lebed changed the total number of suitcase nukes several times, stating in the end that the number was between 100 and 500, but probably closer to 100).
It should be noted that almost nothing is known about the methods of the commission’s work: for example, whether it checked only records or was able to compare the actual inventory to records as well (if only records were checked, it cannot be said with certainty whether more warheads were missing or whether any warheads were missing at all). Since the commission was disbanded before it was able to complete its work, it has remained unclear whether it was able to confirm the alleged loss of warheads (i.e., it looked everywhere and failed) or simply did not have time to clarify the situation (Denisov’s statement seems to imply the latter). It is not even known who the members of the commission were.
A well-known leader of the Russian ecological movement, academician Alexei Yablokov, immediately confirmed and expanded on Lebed’s statements. He announced that 700 such devices, which he called “nuclear mines,” had existed in the Soviet Union. Responding to statements from Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials that there were no portable nuclear devices in the records, Yablokov announced that these devices had been in the hands of the KGB, and thus, by definition, MOD records could not include them.
Official and semi-official Russian sources immediately denied Lebed’s and Yablokov’s stories, but their testimonies gradually revealed bits and pieces of information, raising suspicion that small nuclear devices did exist and even providing a glimpse of their properties. For example, the press secretary of Minatom, Georgi Kaurov, stated that, like the United States, the Soviet Union produced “very small nuclear weapons,” and that “the ability to manufacture miniature nuclear weapons demonstrates a state’s high level of technology and its ability to create multipurpose and even aesthetically attractive nuclear weapons.” Another official said that these devices did not exist, but that if they had existed, their production and maintenance would have been very expensive. The chief of the 12th GUMO, Igor Valynkin, recently disclosed that the serial number of one of the “suitcases” that Lebed made public, RA-115, represented a “production index” (i.e., the type of munitions) and that the whole type had already been eliminated.
The difficulty of assessing the situation stems, first and foremost, from the fact that many, if not all, participants to the 1997-98 scandal could have had ulterior motives. At that time, Lebed was running for the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, with an option of running for President again in 2000. Yablokov, a perennial fighter against Minatom, was (still is) prepared to support anything that would help his cause; from a technical point of view, his testimony is particularly questionable. Russian MOD and Minatom officials could be expected to deny anything, regardless of whether allegations were completely or even partially correct. Several remarks about suitcase nukes from Arab sources in the late 1990s-early 2000s could have been prompted by a desire to promote or expose Usama bin Laden’s terrorist organization. In the end, not a single source can be considered entirely reliable.
The Portrait of a Mini-Nuke
In hindsight, it is clear that statements made by both sides in the 1997-98 debate could have referred to different classes of nuclear devices. One class mentioned was nuclear mines, while another was the portable nuclear devices for Special Forces, which were the subject of Lebed’s statement. Even if portable devices did not exist, one can suspect that some types of nuclear mines were sufficiently small to generate “suspicious” statements by officials. Indeed, statements by MOD and Minatom representatives were worded very carefully and denied the existence of “nuclear suitcases,” but not necessarily the existence of other small nuclear devices. They could thus claim that they were telling the truth even if they knew all along that other small nuclear devices could be portable. The uncertainty about classification could also explain the silence of non-governmental experts.
Nuclear mines are a well-known class of nuclear weapons. They were used by the Engineering troops and deployed along Soviet borders, primarily along the border with China. Nuclear mines were intended to create obstacles in the path of advancing enemy troops by altering the landscape and creating areas with high levels of radioactive contamination. The total stockpile was 700—incidentally, the number Yablokov claimed represented the stockpile of suitcase nukes (and, potentially, evidence that Yablokov did not have adequate knowledge of the subject). Russian official sources reported that, in accordance with the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), all nuclear mines had been withdrawn to central storage facilities, and their elimination was “almost complete.” Judging from the available information, including from official and semi-official Russian sources, some of these devices were relatively small and could be portable. The often-cited weight was 90 kilograms (kg), and they could have low yield (0.02 to 1 kt).
On the other hand, the existence of smaller devices custom-designed for Special Forces, probably analogous to American small atomic demolition munitions (SADMs), should not be ruled out either. Lebed apparently referred to such munitions in his statements (some sources, including himself, mentioned the weight of 30 kg). Several broad considerations suggest that the story about portable nuclear devices should be taken seriously, with a caveat that their existence cannot be viewed as an established fact.
First and foremost, the very fact that the United States possessed such munitions makes it feasible that the Soviet Union produced them as well, if only to replicate the American experience (the habit of Soviet designers to duplicate American weapons systems or use them to justify their own research is well known from other major projects, such as development of solid-fueled missiles or MIRVed ICBMs). Furthermore, Soviet scientists are known for their propensity to explore every possible avenue, including the most powerful nuclear device; it is only logical to assume that they tried miniaturization as well. An artillery shell for 152-mm howitzers (which, in the Chelyabinsk-70 museum, is advertised as the smallest nuclear munition in the world) testifies to the ability to create a reasonably small and light nuclear explosive device. According to one Russian expert, the size of these shells (15 cm in diameter and 50 cm in length) apparently represents the smallest size of the nuclear device Russian designers were able to achieve (the 130-mm naval guns did not have nuclear shells).
Sifting through available evidence, one can conclude that if such devices existed, they likely had the following characteristics:
- Small size (60x40x20 cm) and relatively light weight (probably upward of 30 kg). These parameters are generally consistent with available information about Soviet 152-mm artillery shells, as well as with the US SADM.
- Low yield (less than 1 kt, maybe as low as 0.1 kt).
- Remained under control of the 12th GUMO (the Main Department at MOD in charge of handling all nuclear devices), were kept at or near MOD Special Forces (Spetsnaz) bases, as well as at central storage facilities, and were intended for transfer to Spetsnaz at short notice.
- Short life span between scheduled maintenance. According to the chief of the 12th GUMO, Igor Valynkin, small munitions required replacement of components every several months (other sources mentioned six months). Valynkin’s statement is the most direct corroboration of the allegations about the existence of portable nuclear devices. Stationary nuclear mines with such a short warranty period simply did not make sense, while portable devices for use behind enemy lines could still be acceptable.
- Were likely equipped with reasonably sophisticated permissive action links (PALs), which should preclude unauthorized use. Also, there is unconfirmed information that some small nuclear devices (munitions for 152-mm howitzers) were kept during peacetime in “half-assembled” state, i.e., parts were kept separately, although quick assembly in the case of war was possible.
Several of these statements require an in-depth discussion.
Control of portable nuclear devices is a highly contentious issue, and there has been little data except the claim of the 12th GUMO that it controlled all nuclear weapons and Yablokov’s claim that nuclear suitcases were controlled by the KGB. The latter claim appears insufficiently credible for two reasons.
First, the mission of portable nuclear devices should have been explosions in the enemy’s rear position during or just prior to the outbreak of war for the purpose of disrupting the infrastructure as well as sabotaging the enemy’s command and communications. This directly points to the MOD Spetsnaz as the likely custodian of these weapons since this use of the devices closely matches its type of missions. Spetsnaz representatives flatly denied possession of nuclear weapons, but their statements might refer to the fact that in peacetime, nuclear weapons remained in the custody of the 12th GUMO and were released to troops at a special command.
In contrast, the first KGB Spetsnaz group, Alpha, was created in 1974, whereas miniature nuclear devices were probably created in the 1960s, as in the United States or, at the latest, in the early 1970s. Until the end of the 1970s, KGB Spetsnaz was small and consisted of just one group. Furthermore, its mission was, from the very beginning, antiterrorist operations, in particular, rescue of hostages (the group was established immediately following the terrorist acts during the Olympic Games in Munich). The first combat mission of KGB Spetsnaz was in 1979 in Kabul, where they participated in the capture of Amin’s palace. Thus, possession of nuclear weapons was simply not in line with its mission.
One should be sensitive to the possibility that GRU Spetsnaz, as well as KGB Spetsnaz, if necessary, could have used the smaller versions of nuclear mines, which were technically within the purview of the Engineering Troops. Valynkin’s statement that one type of nuclear device mentioned by Lebed had been completely eliminated is an indirect corroboration of that hypothesis since all or almost all nuclear mines were eliminated during the 1990s. In that case, however, it cannot be doubted that during peacetime, portable nuclear mines remained in the custody of the 12th GUMO.
A short maintenance schedule is an intriguing feature of portable nuclear devices, which is particularly important from the counterterrorism perspective: If that information is correct, such devices would be useless or have limited utility after only a few years, begging the question of whether terrorists would envision the same purpose for such devices as the Soviet Union. The period between routine maintenance—only six months—might seem very short, but short maintenance periods appear to be a typical feature of all Soviet warheads.
Without detailed knowledge of the design of Soviet warheads, it would be impossible to know which components needed replacement at what time intervals. Two potential candidates are tritium and the neutron generator, which may use radioactive materials that decay over time. It seems possible, for example, that Soviet designers balanced on the threshold, using only just enough plutonium to achieve critical mass and relied on tritium to generate required yield. In that case, even modest degradation of tritium could have resulted in a significant drop of yield. Thus, it would be safe to assume that without proper maintenance, portable nuclear devices might still produce chain reaction, but yield would be minimal, and with time, possibly non-existent.
PALs were apparently introduced no later than in the mid- to late 1970s. Consequently, portable nuclear devices produced before that time probably did not have sophisticated means of preventing unauthorized use. Regardless, there is reason to believe that most of them eventually were equipped with such devices: Due to their short service life, they had to return to production facilities for a major overhaul (reportedly, service life of Soviet strategic warheads was about 15 years). During the disassembly-assembly process, the devices could have been fitted with better protection devices. Warheads produced in the late 1960s or in the 1970s should have undergone major maintenance at least once by the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Assessment of the Scenarios of Loss
It is, of course, impossible to reliably verify Lebed’s claim that nearly a hundred of these miniature nuclear devices could not be accounted for in 1996. According to Vladimir Denisov, the chair of the special commission established by Lebed in 1996 to account for suitcase nukes, the commission was able to account for the portable nuclear devices that had been present in the territory of Russia prior to 1990 or 1991, but could not vouch for the ones that could have remained in the territories of other former Soviet republics. This leaves three possible scenarios of loss of such devices: (1) some of them remained outside Russia when nuclear weapons were consolidated in the early 1990s; (2) a handful of such devices were assembled outside Russia using components that could have been produced or stolen; or (3) they were lost inside Russia, most likely in the early 1990s. The first two scenarios were implied by Denisov, while the third simply appears logical and requires attention. The following section assesses the probability of loss under each of these three scenarios.
Loss of Suitcase Nukes Outside Russia
The loss of nuclear explosive devices might have occurred in the early 1990s, just prior to or during the transfer of all nuclear weapons to the Russian territory. Tactical nuclear weapons were stored in the territories of all 15 republics that made up the Soviet Union. According to Lebed, portable devices were kept in republics around the perimeter of Soviet territory, which makes the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and South Caucasus particularly suspicious from the point of view of control of portable nuclear devices (since the Soviet Union was geared for a war with NATO, it is likely that nuclear weapons intended for use by Spetsnaz forces would be kept close to borders with NATO).
The period of 1990-91 was marked with increasing chaos, the emergence of nationalist and/or pro-independence movements in some republics, in particular in Ukraine, the Baltics, and South Caucasus. Many servicemen joined these organizations, whether openly or secretly, and thus opportunities for unauthorized access to nuclear warheads could not be ruled out.
Several stories published in Russian newspapers in the mid-1990s concentrated on this scenario. One such story, which fit Lebed’s allegation about Chechnya, described the purchase of two 30 kg “rucksack” nuclear devices by Chechen representatives in Lithuania in November 1991-January 1992. Another report about a “Chechen bomb” appeared in the fall of 1999, when Russian troops were starting a new war in Chechnya. The devices were reportedly stolen prior to the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia and hidden there until sold to Chechnya. It should be noted, however, that Russian newspapers, which published stories about the sale of nuclear weapons to the Chechens, are among the least reliable sources of information in Russia, so their evidence should be taken with a grain of salt. Lebed himself stated that the story about the diversion of portable nuclear devices to Chechnya, which prompted his investigation in the first place, was eventually found to be false. Incidentally, according to former Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, Chechen President Jokhar Dudaev approached the US government in 1993 claiming he possessed Soviet nuclear weapons, but could not support his claim.
The assessment of the validity of that scenario should take into account two considerations:
- First, accounting and control of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union was reasonably reliable, if primitive by today’s standards. The troops of the 12th GUMO, which controlled all nuclear devices, were privileged and passed through, by Soviet standards, a very rigorous selection process. In the general chaos of the late 1980s-early 1990s, troops charged with the control of nuclear weapons (the 12th GUMO, the SRF, parts of the Navy and the Air Force) were the last to see the weakening of morale and loyalty. In addition to other selection criteria, these troops were comprised, with few exceptions, of officers, sergeants, and privates of Slavic and, on rare occasions, Baltic origin. Representatives from the Caucasus (especially North Caucasus) or Central Asia, as well as non-Slavic people of Russia, were usually avoided. In this regard, the Baltic republics were, indeed, a likely candidate for the location of possible diversion of nuclear weapons, especially given the intensity of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiment in the late 1980s-early 1990s. Still, the probability of an “insider job” should be judged as remote. Chances are, in 1990-91, the loss of one or several nuclear devices would have been noticed.
- Second, all nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Soviet republics, with the exception of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to Russia as early as 1990 and definitely no later than the beginning of 1991. The early removal was usually conducted in secret and, in many cases apparently avoided the attention of US intelligence services (Presidential Nuclear Statements in September-October 1991 were reportedly motivated in part by the desire to facilitate the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia from other Soviet republics). This action was motivated by the increasing risk that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of various political movements that were rapidly developing at that time.
In at least one case, in Azerbaijan, the local pro-independence Popular Front attempted to prevent the removal; the Soviet military had to fire warning shots to disperse the crowd that was blocking the runway at the Air Force base from which bombers with nuclear weapons were taking off. Troops were authorized to use deadly force if necessary, but luckily warning shots were sufficient. This case demonstrated the length to which the Soviet MOD was prepared to go to prevent the seizure of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the possibility that nuclear weapons could have been intercepted and captured by a local group seems low: Information about such an event could not have been concealed within the MOD and, furthermore, we would have known about the use of force to defend or recapture nuclear weapons.
This leaves Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as possible candidates for diversion. Tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from their territories in 1992, already after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to Arab sources, Usama bin Laden attempted to acquire (bought, some newspapers claimed) nuclear weapons in Ukraine (the Ukrainian government denied this) and Kazakhstan, among other countries (including Russia). One uncorroborated report in December 2000 claimed that the intelligence agency of an unnamed European country intercepted a shipment of approximately 20 nuclear warheads—originating from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine—intended for bin Laden and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. An attempt to acquire “suitcase” weapons was specifically mentioned in relation to Kazakhstan. An Israeli military intelligence report, which was supposedly leaked, claimed that bin Laden paid over £ 2 million to a middleman in Kazakhstan for a “suitcase” bomb. This claim, however, was also uncorroborated by other sources or physical evidence.
Among these three scenarios, the presence of portable devices in Kazakhstan is the least likely, since it was not a border republic. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kazakhstan proceeded smoothly, following the same procedure as the removal from other republics in 1990-1991 (i.e., the 12th GUMO remained part of an integrated command and was formally under the authority of the CIS Strategic Deterrence Forces, but in practice answered to the Russian MOD and the President of Russia). In other words, chances of diversion in these two republics should be assessed as about the same as with regard to other republics, except that the situation in 1992 was more chaotic and difficult to control.
Ukraine represented a different case. In 1991, the government announced a decision to become non-nuclear, but in early 1992 began to explore the possibility of keeping nuclear weapons. Of particular concern was the fact that in May 1992, the personnel of “Facilities S”—nuclear storage facilities controlled by the 12th GUMO—began to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, effectively meaning that the chain of custody and accounting began to break down. It is impossible to say with any certainty when erosion began—probably not earlier than February, when the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia was stopped for the first time. Air Force bases, including those with aircraft equipped for nuclear weapons (and with nuclear weapons stored inside the bases) began to take the Ukrainian oath in March 1992.
On the other hand, the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine was conducted under a special procedure codified in a Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed in March 1992. This procedure included thorough authentication of each warhead delivered from Ukraine by representatives of both sides, including the checking of serial numbers against the logs kept at the 12th GUMO in Moscow. In effect, the tense Russian-Ukrainian relationship generated a more reliable accounting and verification procedure than was the case with other republics. Consequently, the chance that any weapon entered in central logs remained in Ukraine is very low.
Based on this information, it seems unlikely that any nuclear devices, including portable ones, were lost or stolen outside Russia prior to their removal to the Russian territory. It is practically certain that, contrary to recent (1999-2001) reports, no nuclear warheads could have been bought in Ukraine or Kazakhstan simply because there have been no reports about the presence of non-strategic nuclear weapons in their territories after 1992.
This conclusion, however, rests on two assumptions: first, that original records were complete and accurate and, second, that all withdrawn warheads were checked against these records. These assumptions need further exploration in light of the above-quoted statement by Denisov—that his commission was unable to verify whether any portable nuclear devices remained outside Russia—since that statement implicitly questions the status of the records.
The following hypotheses are possible:
- Records are full and complete, as Igor Valynkin announced. No warheads are missing, and Denisov’s commission was simply unable to complete its job (Denisov admitted that the commission was, indeed, disbanded prematurely).
- As Yablokov speculated, portable nuclear devices were not entered into logs of the 12th GUMO, since they were under control of the KGB. This explanation does not seem very plausible, the special status of the KGB notwithstanding. Yablokov’s assertion contradicts all available information about the chain of custody of nuclear weapons, which were supposedly the sole responsibility of the 12th GUMO. In addition, it should be possible to check MOD records against logs of production facilities, and then any “unaccounted” devices would be revealed. This means that, in theory, the 12th GUMO or the Denisov commission had the opportunity to ascertain the existence or the absence of unaccounted warheads.
- A small number of nuclear weapons could have been moved to republics other than Russia in 1990-91, when Soviet institutions were weakened. This theory does not seem plausible either, simply because it would be illogical to send nuclear weapons to republics from which other weapons were being hastily withdrawn (again, possible exceptions are Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, where substrategic nuclear weapons remained until mid-1992).
- There is (or was) no single, complete, readily accessible repository of records, and comprehensive checks were not conducted before the creation of the Denisov commission in 1996. For example, records could be divided between the 12th GUMO and four production (dismantlement) facilities in Russia. In that case, the whereabouts of warheads withdrawn from outside Russia and subsequently eliminated or stored would be particularly vague. This appears a plausible explanation for Denisov’s statement about the inability to locate warheads that had been kept outside Russia prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. One hopes such a check has been conducted since 1996.
Thus, the hypothesis that a number of portable nuclear devices remained outside Russia or were stolen during the transfer to Russia does not appear convincing. Both the circumstances of that transfer and the likelihood that reasonably complete records exist (even though they might be divided among several holders) lead to a conclusion that former republics of the Soviet Union are an unlikely source of unaccounted for suitcase nukes.
Clandestine Production Outside Russia
The possibility that a handful of warheads could be produced outside Russia using components left, purchased, or stolen after the transfer of warheads to Russia was raised during the debate in 1997-98. However, this does not seem plausible: Design and production of nuclear weapons were concentrated solely in Russia, and, in all probability, nuclear research centers in other republics simply lacked specialized knowledge. However, it is possible that such information exists outside Russia, perhaps procured by officials contemplating the possibility of retention of Soviet nuclear weapons. Official and unofficial sources in 1997-98 asserted that the design of miniature nuclear devices was more complex than that of common warheads and could not be performed “at home” (thereby indirectly confirming that small devices did exist in the Soviet Union). In any event, the probability of assembly of a portable nuclear device is much smaller than the probability that a crude nuclear weapon could be assembled in a non-nuclear state or by terrorists.
Loss of Suitcase Nukes Inside Russia
Like all nuclear weapons that are not permanently deployed on delivery vehicles, portable nuclear devices should be kept at storage facilities, controlled by the personnel of the 12th GUMO. Consequently, they should be subject to the same risks as other weapons, exacerbated by their small size. Another potential weak link in the chain of custody is dismantlement facilities, where these devices are kept for some time prior to elimination. According to reports in late 1998, including a detailed one in the London-based, Arab daily, Al-Watan Al-Arabi, Chechens acquired approximately 20 “tactical” nuclear weapons from Russian facilities, to be subsequently transferred to bin Laden for a sum of $30 million in cash plus two tons of opium. These claims, too, were not corroborated by other sources or physical evidence. In the end, the feasibility of this scenario depends on the level of security provided by facilities, some of which in the last decade have benefited from American assistance.
Security risks at storage facilities have been well researched. It is sufficient here to briefly list the most relevant factors for the case of portable nuclear devices:
- There is an uncomfortably high probability of “insider threats” from personnel that work or previously worked at storage facilities. Although their salaries and living conditions are usually somewhat better than that of ordinary officers and sergeants, the standard of living is still low by today’s standards. Many officers are forced to take additional jobs “on the side” and could be easily co-opted by criminal organizations or foreign intelligence.
- All, or at least the majority, of key personnel live inside the outer security perimeter of storage facilities and often do not leave upon retirement unless provided housing by the government, as required by law. In the mid-1990s, for example, nearly 3,500 retired officers continued to live within the closed compounds of the 12th GUMO facilities. Close personal relations among active-duty officers, and between them and retired officers, can facilitate access to inner security perimeters. In at least one case, a retired officer who was still living at a nuclear weapons storage facility was able to arrange access for local criminals to the inner (most secure) zone to steal small arms intended for guards.
- Security systems at many storage facilities are old and often inadequate; only 47 percent of these facilities so far have been equipped with new fences and other equipment purchased through US funding under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The power supply is often unreliable. The accounting systems at many of the facilities are antiquated. All these problems continue to haunt nuclear weapons storage sites even today, but conditions were considerably worse in the early 1990s. It is difficult to be confident that any thefts that might have occurred a decade ago would have been noticed.
The situation is similar at production and dismantlement facilities, where components of warheads could be stolen by employees. Workers and engineers were and are plagued by the same woes, and the challenges are further exacerbated by the absence of military discipline (or what remains of it in post-Soviet conditions), as well as greater numbers of facilities and their location in large cities (the “closed” status of these cities offers only limited enhancement of security).
The early 1990s was a period of particularly high risk both due to socioeconomic conditions and also because the massive removal of nuclear weapons to Russia from outside the Soviet Union and from other former Soviet republics put an unusual stress on the system. At that time, storage facilities were literally overflowing, and many of them contained more warheads than allowed by safety regulations.
The open-source data on suitcase nukes is sketchy and incomplete. Still, even using this data, one can assess the nature of these weapons, the probability of an unknown number of them having been stolen, and the level of associated threat.
In spite of official denials, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the Soviet Union had one or more types of portable nuclear devices. Most likely, these were devices designed for the use by Special Forces (Spetsnaz), analogous to the American SADM, or using the physics package similar to that contained in artillery shells. The widely used word “suitcase” is misleading since these devices were quite heavy (no less than 60 lb, probably considerably more), but they could have been moved by one, but more likely, two people.
Without additional data, it is impossible to say with an acceptable level of certainty whether any number of these weapons was stolen during and following the breakup of the Soviet Union, as Alexander Lebed and a few other Russians claimed. Available evidence suggests that these stories were most probably not true, and that they were generated by incomplete information or ulterior motives. The probability that such weapons could be used by terrorists (assuming some were stolen) appears even lower.
The reasons for that conclusion are the following:
- Probably the most convincing evidence is the fact that no terrorist group has used such a device or even credibly threatened its use. There have been many instances, especially during the first and the second, ongoing wars in Chechnya. Yet, the worse case so far was limited to the burying of a container with radioactive isotopes in a Moscow park. Since the majority of feasible scenarios involve Chechens, and since the period of greatest risk was in the early 1990s, the inactivity of Chechens in this matter is significant.
- The scenario offered by Denisov, namely, that a number of portable nuclear devices were left outside Russia when nuclear weapons were withdrawn to its territory, appears unlikely. In most cases, the removal took place more than a year before the breakup of the Soviet Union, when the Soviet military, in particular troops charged with custody of nuclear weapons, were in relative order. In the only case in which an attempt to “conceal” a limited number of nuclear weapons could be suspected—in Ukraine—the removal was subject to enhanced accounting procedures.
- The risk of loss of nuclear weapons was the greatest in the early 1990s within the territory of Russia itself. At that time, large numbers of nuclear weapons were transported across the country, often by trains ill-suited for that purpose; accounting could be relatively lax, and personnel was undergoing the period of deepest uncertainty, depression, and precipitous drop in the standard of living. With time, the probability of the loss of portable nuclear devices decreased with gradual increase of stability and, even more important in terms of immediate effect, American assistance, which helped to improve accounting, transportation, and security of nuclear weapons.
- Yet another scenario offered by Denisov—assembly of portable nuclear devices from parts “forgotten” outside Russia—is the least believable. There was no nuclear weapons production outside Russia; consequently, the probability that parts of nuclear weapons could be found outside its territory is very unlikely. In addition, there was very little specialized expertise and know-how outside Russia, whereas portable nuclear devices were apparently very complicated in design and required highly skilled professionals to oversee their production and assembly.
Even assuming that some portable nuclear devices were lost, it would be very difficult to use them, and it is almost certain that the features that make portable nuclear devices so dangerous (small size and full-scale nuclear explosion effects) will not be taken advantage of.
- Information about unusually short maintenance periods for these weapons is probably true, although the extent and the pace of deterioration of nuclear weapons’ features cannot be determined from open sources. Since, as it was noted above, the period of greatest risk was in the early 1990s, the stolen devices, if any, have already missed as many as 20 routine component replacement procedures and are probably nearing the end of their service life. Consequently, it is nearly certain that they will be unable to produce the design yield and maybe will not be able to produce any yield at all.
- Most, if not all, portable nuclear warheads are equipped with some protection devices (e.g., PALs), making their unauthorized use difficult, though not completely impossible.
In effect, portable nuclear devices, if stolen, will hardly be usable, at least not in the fashion that they were originally designed for. They could be, of course, dismantled to extract weapons-grade plutonium, which could then be used in a cruder nuclear device or for a “dirty bomb”; but in this case, the problem of suitcase nukes is virtually indistinguishable from the broader problem of safety and security of all Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile materials.
That being said, low probability is not a sufficient reason for comfort or lower vigilance. Until the situation is sufficiently clarified, it will be necessary to guard against the infiltration of a portable nuclear device into US territory and, probably of even greater importance, to keep in mind the possibility that nuclear mines might be used against US troops abroad in more or less the same way the Soviet Union planned to use them against advancing NATO or Chinese troops.
Above all, it is necessary to strengthen the effort to obtain additional information about suitcase nukes, including the types of small (portable) weapons and their status (eliminated or stored; whether any were lost; and the safety and security procedures applied to the ones that are still kept), as well as the possible performance of the ones that could have been stolen and remained hidden for long periods of time.
 Salavat Suleimanov, “Ne Blagotvoritelnost, a Trezvyi Raschet: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie,” July 12, 2002.
 Alexei Arbatov, ed., “Yadernye Vooruzheniya i Bezopasnost,” Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 1997.
 The statement made in 1995 was quoted in Yevgeni Bai, “‘Yadernye Chemodanchiki’ Svplyvayut v Kongresse SShA,” Izvestiya, October 4, 1997.
 “Russia: Defense Expert Surikov on Baltic NATO Entry,” (FBIS-SOV-96-085), April 30, 1996.
 Ivan Safranchuk, “Takticheskoe Yadernoe Oruzhie v Novom Mire,” a manuscript. The final, shorter version was published under the title “Takticheskoe Yadernoe Oruzhie v Novom Mire i Nestrategicheskie Yadernye Sily Rossii” in the series “Doklady” (Reports) No. 15, March 2000.
 Yuri Fedorov, “Substrategicheskoe Yadernoe Oruzhie i Interesy Bezopasnosti Rossii,” Nauchnye Zapiski (Research Papers) No. 16, Moscow: PIR Center, 2001.
 Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and De-alerting: A Russian Perspective,” in Harold Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), 1999.
 Konstantin Eggert, “General Lebed Nameren Naiti ‘Yadernye Chemodanchiki’,” Izvestiya, October 7, 1997.
 Press conference of Alexander Lebed, Interfax News Agency, November 29, 1997; Jeffrey Smith and David Hoffman, “No Support Found for Report of Lost Russian Suitcase-Sized Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, September 5, 1997, p. 19; “Is Lebed Russia’s Loosest Cannon? An Exclusive NBC interview with Alexander Lebed,” October 2, 1997, www.msnbc.com.
 Yuri Shchekochikhin, “Vozmozhno My Vse Sidim Na Chemodanakh. Yadernykh,” Novaya Gazeta, September 22, 1997, pp. 1-2; “Former Yeltsin Aide Discusses ‘Pocket-Sized’ Atomic Bombs,” La Stampa, December 27, 1997, p. 8 (FBIS-SOV-97-362).
 Interview on Austrian ORT TV channel, December 28, 1997 (FBIS-TAC-97-362). In a different interview, however, Kaurov flatly denied the existence of “suitcase nukes,” described by Lebed and Yablokov. See Stanislav Tarasov and Andrei Filippov, “My Govorim s Nimi Ser’ezno, Oni Otnosyatsya k Nam Kak k Durakam,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, October 1, 1997, p. 3.
 Vladimir Georgiev, Igor Frolov,”Burya V Stakane: General-Leitenant Igor Valynkin Zayavlyaet: Yadernoe Oruzhie u Nas Pod Nadezhnoi Zashchitoi,” Nezavivimaya Gazeta, December 2, 1997, p. 1.
 Dmitri Safonov, “Individualnaya Planirovka,” Izvestiya, October 27, 2001.
 For the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in 1991 by category, see Alexei Arbatov, “Sokrashchenie Nestrategicheskikh Yadernykh Vooruzhenii” [Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons], in Alexei Arbatov, ed., Yadernye Vooruzheniya i Bezopasnost Rossii [Nuclear Weapons and Russia’s Security] (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997), p. 56; and Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and De-Alerting: A Russian Perspective,” in Harold Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 311.
 National Report of the Russian Federation on the Implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, April 25, 2000; Statement of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference Under Article VI of the Treaty (New York), April 11, 2002.
 This figure was mentioned in one of the rare statements on portable nuclear devices, which pre-date the scandal generated by Lebed in 1997. A 1995 statement by the director of the Ministry of Defense Ecological Center, Col. Boris Alexeev, was quoted in Yevgeni Bai, “‘Yadernye Chemodanchiki’ Svplyvayut v Kongresse SShA,” Izvestiya, October 4, 1997.
 M. Rastopshchin, “Inzhenernyye Boepripasy,” Tekhnika i Vooruzhenie, No. 10 (October 1998), pp. 1-6.
 Alexander Shirokorad, “Makaya Bomba Dlya Maloi Voiny,” Nezevisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 6, 1998, p. 6.
 According to NRDC, SADMs weighed 74 kg, or 164 lb (the W-54 warhead used in it weighed almost 60 lb); the dimensions of an SADM container were 89x66x66 cm (35x26x26 in). Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1: US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1984), p. 60.
 Press conference of Igor Valynkin, September 25, 1997 (distributed by Federal News Service). The data was also confirmed, with a reference to an unidentified source in the Ministry of Defense (probably the same Valynkin) in Natalia Timashova, “Nuclear Suitcases Exist Only on Paper,” Segodnia, November 1, 1997, p. 2 (FBIS-TAC-97-307); Vladimir Zaynetdinov, “Ministerstvo Oborony Klyanetsya, Chto Yadernykh Chemodanchikov Ne Bylo i Net,” Izvestia, September 26, 1997.
 Alexander Shaburkin, “Voennye Oprovergayut Zayavleniya Lebedya,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 10, 1997, p. 2.
 For the history of the Alpha Spetsnaz group, see Mikhail Boltunov, Alpha – Sverkhsekretnyi Otryad KGB; Dmitri Konyakhin, “Samoe Sekretnoe Podrazdelenie KGB,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, May 26, 2000.
 David Hoffman, “Suitcase Nuclear Weapons Safely Kept, Russia Says,” Washington Post, September 14, 1997, p. A23.
 Boris Vishnevski, “Eto Moglo Sluchitsya Tolko Zdes,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 1, 1996, p. 5; Aleksei Andreev, “Yadernaya Bomba Dlya Chechni,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 23, 1996; and Yusef Bodanski, “U Terrorista No 1 Yest Atomnaya Bomba,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 5, 1999.
 Konstantin Eggert, “General Lebed Nameren Naiti ‘Yadernye Chemodanchiki,” Izvestiya, October 7, 1997.
 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 444 (fn. 2).
 “Ukraine Denies Selling Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” Interfax Russian News, October 27, 1998.
 “Arab Security Sources Speak of a New Scenario in Afghanistan: Secret Roaming Networks that Exchange Nuclear Weapons for Drugs,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 24, 2000, www.asharqalawsat.com.
 Marie Colvin, “Holy War with US in his Sights,” Times (London), August 16, 1998; see also Dmitri Safonov, “‘Kuzkina Mat’ Osamy ben Ladena,” Izvestiya, September 21, 2001.
 “Report Links Bin-Ladin, Nuclear Weapons,” Al-Watan Al-Arabi, November 13, 1998 (FBIS FTS19981113001081); Emil Torabi, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Weapons,” Muslim Magazine (Winter 1998), www.muslimmag.org, accessed on July 13, 1999, no longer available; Michael Binyon, “Osama Bin Laden Said to Have Acquired Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Times (London), October 7, 1998.
 Parliamentary Hearings on the Security and Safety of Nuclear Facilities, in Yadernyi Kontrol, No. 34-35 (October-November 1997), p. 10.


The question of whether Buccaneers receiver Antonio Brown supplied a fake vaccination card to the team (and in turn to the league) continues to be unresolved, in large part because the NFL has yet to say whether Brown’s card is legitimate or not.
The league has not announced or leaked any findings of its investigation, which began on Thursday. Surely, it wouldn’t take much to confirm or debunk Brown’s insistence that he secured a vaccination consistent with the information on the card that he gave to the team before training camp.
Early in Monday night’s game between the Giants and the Buccaneers, Lisa Salters of ESPN said that she has spoken to Brown’s lawyer, Sean Burstyn, who repeated his position that his client is innocent of any wrongdoing. (As if anyone’s lawyer ever comes out and says, “Yep, he’s guilty.”)
“Their position hasn’t really changed since this story was first reported on Thursday, that Brown is vaccinated, and that Brown has in the past and is still encouraging others to get vaccinated as well,” Salters said. “Burstyn told me that Brown got vaccinated over the summer, that he was accompanied by one of his personal trainers when he went to get his vaccination. He said his client turned in his vaccination card to the Buccaneers, like he was supposed to do. And that’s all they’re really gonna say about the situation.”
They need to say plenty more to put this issue to bed. The league has the power to compel Brown to do so. It’s unclear whether the league has done that, but it has already had plenty of time to do so.
The NFL knows how to move quickly when it wants answers. Remember the Boston Herald reported that the Patriots secretly videotaped the Rams’ walk-through practice before Super Bowl XXXVI? That story emerged just a few days before Super Bowl XLII, and the league IMMEDIATELY mobilized to commence a full investigation, New England’s preparations for that game be damned. (The Herald later retracted its claim, with a front-page story.)
Right or wrong, it shows that the league can and will move aggressively when it chooses to do so. In this case, there’s no indication that it has moved aggressively to get an answer to the seemingly important question of whether a player has committed the ultimate COVID protocol breach by lying about being vaccinated, with the assistance of a forged vaccination card.
Whatever the answer, it already should have been secured. The fact that the answer hasn’t been secured and/or shared is troubling — and it points to the very real possibility that the league isn’t interested in exploring just how widespread the practice of phony vaccination cards may be, because that specific outcome would make the league look like it doesn’t really care about its COVID protocols for 2021.
Then again, based on the half-hearted manner in which the league punished the Packers for the blatant and repeated COVID protocol breaches committed by Aaron Rodgers, we already know that the league doesn’t really care.


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What Is typically the most popular Casino Games?
There are three main types of casino games: table games, gaming machines, and online slots. Most gaming machines, including slot machines and pachinkyo, are played by only 1 player at a time in a casino and don’t require the eye of casino staff to play. Online slots are available twenty-four hours a day, 7 days per week, all with no set closing time. In any case, players are responsible for finding a casino close to them which has the game they wish to play, playing it, and removing the winnings from their accounts prior to the end of the designated session. Some online casinos require payment, via bank cards, while some allow players to donate money to favored slot machines.
One of the greatest known and most popular casino games is video poker. Video poker is played on a closed circuit, with players entering specific codes to spin the reels. The house advantage, which refers to the difference between your amount won and the 007 카지노 로얄 토렌트 amount kept by the house, is known as to be one of the lowest of casino games. Players can minimize their house advantage by choosing pay tables with extreme house advantages and playing at off-hour times. This means that they keep more of these winnings.
A lot of the same considerations apply to other styles of casino games, including blackjack, roulette, baccarat, and video poker. These games also require strategy and good timing. Blackjack, for instance, can be a very fun game to play, nonetheless it can also be highly stressful due to the high house advantage. Placing large bets which have a low probability of coming off in the same direction over a long period of time can become addictive. The roulette and baccarat can also be very enjoyable, but they may also be highly stressful and will leave one with the sensation that gambling is simply not worth the strain and frustration.
Besides these differences, one of the primary differences between online blackjack and real world casino games is the random number generators. Generally in most casinos, the random number generators are internal computer programs that are designed to ensure that the chances of winning against you are as likely as possible. The random number generators in online casinos are internal software packages that are proprietary. For that reason, nobody except the owners and technicians get access to these internal systems and cannot alter them in any way.
Many factors take into account the truth that casino games with house edge are a lot more difficult to play than games without house edge. To begin with, the size of the home makes it far more difficult to achieve a straight spread. Another reason may be the location of the casino. In a small town with a little population of players, the overall game would be much easier to play because there are far fewer players and fewer people would be able to manipulate the odds in your favor. THE WEB allows players from anywhere in the world to participate in virtual blackjack, which means if you’re playing in Las Vegas, the home edge is much higher than if you were playing in NEW YORK.
Minimal popular type of casino games is slots. Slots are very popular with online players because they offer instant gratification, as well as a great way to win extra money, but slots also have a negative reputation for being a lot of work, with jackpot sizes which range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to millions. Online slot machines certainly are a closely guarded trade by casinos, but a skilled online slot player can take advantage of a few of these casinos’ slot machine game bonus offers, and over time, beat the odds on slots.
Another type of casino game that has fallen out of favor is live casino floor games such as for example Roulette, Baccarat, Keno and Poker. While live gaming floors remain available in many smaller casinos, the trend of slots overtaking the casino floor and leaving the casino floor surface completely blank has begun to recede. Live table games are generally simpler gambling machines that pay off small amounts (a penny or less) at an individual time. This type of casino game might not appeal as much to today’s casino goers, that are searching for quick easy payouts.
Casino games are designed to simulate gambling, but many of today’s newer casino games use slot machines, video poker games and electronic goods such as for example roulette wheels, electronic baccarat tables along with other electronic gaming items to create an exciting casino experience. However, it is important to remember that most of these items could cause undue delay and expense in the overall game, because of the slow response times that result. Slots machines tend to be the cause of casino games taking longer to settle down. If you are searching for one of these types of gambling machines, you should research your options carefully so as to get the best machine possible.

domain: entertainment


text:
HESI Case Studies: RN Fundamentals Collection (1 Year Version), 1st Edition
HESI Case Studies - Access Card
Use your knowledge of Fundamentals skills and apply key concepts to realistic patient care scenarios.
HESI Fundamentals Case Studies provide real-world patient care scenarios accompanied by application-based questions and rationales that will help you learn how to manage complex patient conditions and make sound clinical judgments. Questions cover nursing care for patients with a wide variety physiological and psychosocial alterations, as well as related management, pharmacology and nursing concepts. HESI Case Study questions also include alternate item formats to provide additional practice with the types of questions you’ll see on the actual NCLEX® examination!
Duration for access to this product, which may be at the discretion of your institution, is up to 12 months. Elsevier reserves the right to restrict or remove access due to changes in product portfolio or other market conditions.
RN Fundamentals Case Studies include:
- Altered Nutrition
- Breathing Patterns
- Fluid Balance
- Loss, Grief, and Death
- Perioperative Care
- Sensory Function
- Skin Integrity
- Sleep Patterns
- Urinary Patterns

domain: health


text:
Sharing the burdens of business
Thu, 07/31/2014 - 6:00am News Staff
Crested Butte’s culinary co-ops taking creative approach
By Chris Rourke.
Mark and Ali Drucker moved to Crested Butte from Manhattan 10 years ago with the dream of opening a coffee shop. But with property and rental prices sky-high, and amid an already saturated market, they put that dream on hold. Chris Sullivan has a passion for wholesome baked foods. He can tell you the history of grains and why certain types of bread are better than others. But after five years running Mountain Oven Organic Bakery, he was outgrowing his space.

domain: food


Two injured in south Lansing crash
LANSING - Two people were injured in a two-vehicle crash Tuesday night in south Lansing.
A vehicle was driving north on South Cedar Street at 10:57 p.m. when it ran a red light at the intersection with East Jolly Road and collided with another car, said Lansing Police Public Information Director Robert Merritt.
Both drivers were hospitalized with non-life-threatening injuries, he said.
Merritt wasn't immediately able to provide additional information about the drivers, such as age or gender.
One of the vehicles crashed into a switch box that controls traffic lights at the intersection, he said.
The crash remains under investigation.
Contact Christopher Haxel at 517-377-1261 or email@example.com. Follow him on Twitter @ChrisHaxel.


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Gimp is a very popular Image editor. It is both opensource and cross-platform which might explain why it is so advanced. With a very strong community behind it, Gimp can suit to Designer, photographer, illustrator or even scientist for free !
Gimp is a very cool open source project created to make image edition accessible for free. Gimp is cross-platform and support tons of files format. I wanted to test something for a while now. 3D printer are great to print 3D stuff. But did you now that you can also print picture using 3D printer ?
This process is called lithophany. Originally, lithopahny is an engraving method which material thickness to create shade onto a sheet.
At this time, this kind of image was make by hand by engraving stone with a chisel or scrapper.
Now, engraving isn’t needed since we have the opportunity to print directly the 2D-3D part from a digital file. However, lithopahy require preparation. To start I’ll use a picture that I want to transform.
Before jumping on lithophanes, a few words about Gimp. Gimp is a raster software which mean it is very powerful for manipulating pixels. This tool can be use for pixelart or even for photo retouch. Scientist, photographer, illustrator are using it for several purposes. Forget Microsoft paint, photoshop et al., Gimp is free, opensource and very powerful.
Let’s create something with Gimp. Fortunately I have a graphic tablet. So I installed Gimp on my Surface Pro and started to draw with my pen. To enable pressure and inclination sensitivity (for natural drawing feeling) I needed to install the wintab driver available here
If your interested in gimp, please check this series of tutorials.
Here is my first drawing with gimp. Unlike Inkscape, gimp create raster image which mean you cannot zoom infinitely on a feature. Raster image are composed of pixels instead of vectors. Those images are basically a matrix of color describing the final image. And as every matrix, you can transform them easily. That’s exactly what gimp does.
As I said above, you can also apply color transform to the whole image. Just as Instagram does to “improve” pictures. Here I’m manipulating color using the HUE slider. This change the tint of the whole image. The second slider Chroma is raising the color contrast to
Preparing a picture for litophanes
For sample, I’ll use this picture from my cat : Merlin
First we need to convert our colorful picture of Merlin to a grayscale format.
Then, I added a black border to the Image using the selection tools of Gimp, I selected a rectangle which will be be inside the border. Then I inverted the selection to select the outer border.
Using the Filling tool, I painted it to full black.
After that step, I adjusted the contrast to limit the depth of the image, unless the print may fail. I used the Constrast/Brigthness tool to do so.
Then the file is ready. I just need to export this picture and import it in cura. Here is the final image :
I placed the part vertically to maximize the quality. On a 3D printer, the Z axis as always a bad resolution due to slicing. To improve the overral quality, placing it is advantageous because XY axis have a greater resolution.
I printed this part using white ABS. I hope it will let light go through to let us see the shadows and by chance my cat !
Here is the final part :
Not very impressive right ? But now look again with a light passing through !
It works with the sunlight, or with a warm artificial light (Make me think about vintage sepia photos)
I used an old LED project to light it up :
I also had an idea to make an hidder QRCode using the same principle :

domain: hobby


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Language: Hindi / 160 mins Direction: Neeraj Pandey Produced by: Friday Filmworks, Shital Bhatia, Dhaval Gada, Jayantilal Gada, Akkshay Gada, Karan Shah Cast: Manoj Bajpayee, Siddharth Malhotra, Kumud Mishra, Adil Hussain, Rakul Preet Singh, Naseeruddin Shah, Anupam Kher Cinematography: Sudhir Palsane; Editing: Praveen Kathikuloth Music: Sanjoy Chowdhury
Hindi | Drama, Political | 157 Mins | India | 2018
When a filmmaker evolves, he sees unidimensional growth (usually). In other words, he debuts with an easy-to-handle, small budget script shot in limited locations with a cast that he can control. If it sees success, he grows a little more confident and bigger, expanding exponentially and along predictable lines. The results too are on expected lines. For eg, think Yash Chopra; there is Yash Chopra who always made films around love stories. He did it in predictable ways - foreign locations, chiffon sarees, well-manicured heroes, powder puff and candy floss. Raju Hirani addresses pressing issues with soft punchlines, peppering his work with good humour. Sanjay Bhansali has not yet moved out of his love-me-and-my-opera style. You get the drift. Basically, you know what to expect with every filmmaker as patterns emerge over a period of time and successive films.
But rare is a man who delves within. Who taps his other dimensions; who likes to dig deep and intense. A man who builds layers into his craft and creates complex pictures - like creating a 3D image with 2D material. Rare is such a man and Neeraj Pandey is his name. Aiyaary is not just about the ‘aiyaars’ / shape shifters / Military Intelligence (MI) officers of the Indian Army who change their appearance at will and are on surveillance duties. Being an aiyaar is only its starting point. The story itself weaves a slightly more complex plot involving the Indian Army and international Arms Dealers; MI officers turning rogue; ex-generals turned middlemen brokering weapon deals across continents; girlfriends getting caught in the web and, of staked reputations. So who are the real Aiyaars?
So, Major Jai Bakshi (Siddharth Malhotra) has been taught that, ‘listening is a fine art’ by his boss Col. Abhay Singh (Manoj Bajpayee). Being part of a special MI unit makes him privy to confidential conversations and one such conversation between the Army chief (Vikram Gokhale) and General Gurinder Singh (Kumud Mishra) leads him to a key decision in his life. He turns rogue, suddenly posing a danger to the very institution that has nurtured him. Bajpayee is put on the job to ensure that the culprit be brought to book. But there is more that is at stake. Billion dollar Arm deals which could go down the drain; media tip-offs which promise a circus at some point; hackers roped in to aid and abet these operations across continents.
The characters of Jai Bakshi and Abhay Singh are complementary but juxtaposed; they seem to be working at cross-purposes yet in tandem; they are wired into the same networks and same people, both moving in the same direction but will likely arrive at different results. And they are both ruthless but humane. Taken together they are but an oxymoron – to borrow a figure of speech. Two sides of the same coin. But are they?
Others characters include a Retd General Gurinder Singh (played by a rotund and effective Kumud Mishra) a wily right hand man to an international arms dealer Mukesh Kapoor (suave and graying Adil Hussain) who brokers deals with the Army. Sonia Gupta (Rakul Preet Singh) a hacker who also doubles up as Jai Bakshi’s girlfriend. And finally there is Naseeruddin Shah, the common man who is key to all the chaos playing out around him.
And Aiyaary is a film which though bereft of 3D effects, gives you that multi-dimensional feel – so finely layered, structured and crafted it is. No one character is less or more important and, there doesn’t seem to be one streamlined plot moving from point A to B with predictable results. Additionally, the filmmaker pushes you – the audience, to keep up with all that is happening simultaneously but seamlessly.
That is Pandey’s craft as a screenplay writer and that of his editor Praveen Kathikuloth. Pandey scores big on screenplay. The dialogues are pithy, the action rapid and overall the script makes zero concession for audiences used to spoon feeding. It does not follow traditional, linear structure of a Hindi film. Aiyaary, for those who can keep up with its fast pace is a thrilling journey for most part. Yet, all is not perfect.
Like all makers, Pandey too falters. Its music, composed by Sanjoy Chowdhury (legendary Salil Chowdhury’s son) in parts is reminiscent of Pandey’s last film, Baby’s background score. It is repetitive in portions. As in the past, there is a monologue by a key character (remember Shah in ‘A Wednesday’) – in this case its Jai Bakshi, justifying why he is doing what he is. But it makes for a convincing argument from the perspective of a common man. Pandey details even his minor characters usually, but his female characters this time, especially Singh’s wife and Bakshi’s mother give you a feeling of déjà vu. Only that Akshay Kumar’s wife in ‘Baby’ was far more believable.
Yet, Aiyaary is a film to be watched. It may just turn out to be a sleeper hit, like most of Pandey’s films so far. Go for it. You’ll not come home disappointed.

domain: artistic


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The unfolding events between Russia and Ukraine have had far-reaching effects across the globe.
Global sunflower oil prices have increased by 50% since the conflict began late February. This led to a sharp rise in the prices of other vegetable oils such as palm and soya bean oil.
Meanwhile, bread prices are also expected to increase, but that’s only expected in the next few months.
Could South Africa have done more to protect citizens from these increases?
Guest: Dr Christo Joubert, manager of Agro-food chains at the Market and Economic Division of the National Agricultural Marketing Council
More Posts for Show: NRA

domain: news


Print and download Kiss the Rain sheet music by Piano Tutorial Easy arranged for Piano. Instrumental Solo in Ab Major. SKU: MN020686 Click the í ½í´ to always be notified on new uploads! Learn piano songs quickly and easily with flowkey*: https://go.flowkey.com/pianofinity Instagram: https://b.. kiss the rain sheet music is a fascinating and beautiful piano music sheet. I recommend for you to download. This piano music piece is an advanced score as by Korean composer and pianist Lee Ru-ma spread around the world and the music. And on my last post, I reveal a link to Download Maple Leaf Rag sheet music by Scott Joplin in PDF
Yiruma - Kiss The Rain Piano Tutorial Kiss the Rain was originally written for the Korean (Yiruma's place of birth) Drama A Moment To Remember. Alongside with May Be and River Flows in You (First Love), this is the most famous piece by the composer Jul 31, 2016 - Free Kiss the Rain piano sheet music is provided for you. Kiss the Rain is written by YIRUMA who was born in South Korea Print and download Kiss the Rain sheet music by Yiruma arranged for Piano. Instrumental Solo in Ab Major. SKU: MN010045 Kiss The Rain Yiruma ì´ë£¨ë§ 3ì§ ' From The Yellow Room ' &? bbbb bbbb 18. Kiss The Rain Flute Piano. Preview kiss the rain flute piano is available in 3 pages and compose for early intermediate difficulty. This music sheet has been read 1424 times and the last read was at 2020-11-15 16:10:52
Aug 1, 2016 - Kiss the Rain, one of the popular pieces of Lee Ru-ma also known by his stage name, Yiruma. Yiruma is a pianist and composer from South Korea. Yiruma frequently performs at sold-out concerts in Asia, Europe and North America. His alma mater, King's College London, England helped him gain European popularity and recognition Play Kiss The Rain on Virtual Piano. Use your computer keyboard, mobile or tablet to play this song on Virtual Piano. It's fun & simple to do Kiss The Rain Easy Piano. Preview kiss the rain easy piano is available in 2 pages and compose for early intermediate difficulty. This music sheet has been read 1028 times and the last read was at 2020-11-07 09:26:11 Download this Piano Sheet Music for free, keep busy download the PDF file in Google.com Bing.com or Yahoo.com and Intsall first upon your laptop, taking into consideration the belong to data Download Kiss the rain sheet piano ÄÆ¡n giáº£n for Download Relatively easier to play than 'River Flows in You', another of Yiruma's successes, 'Kiss The Rain' is a very expressive composition with the atmosphere of a lullaby. Play the Piano Sheet Music of 'Kiss The Rain' by Yiruma and listen to the professional recording of the piece just for pleasure or for inspiration
Print and download sheet music for Kiss the Rain [easy] by Piano Tutorial Easy. Sheet music arranged for Easy Piano in C Major. SKU: MN019052 All things piano related! Press J to jump to the feed. Press question mark to learn the rest of the keyboard shortcuts. Log In Sign Up. User account menu â¢ Kiss the Rain í ¼í¾¹ Playing/Composition (me) Close â¢ Posted by 24 minutes ago. Kiss the Rain. Yiruma is one of the biggest names in contemporary piano composition. His song Kiss the Rain is guaranteed to make any listener reflect honestly on their life in a way that few songs ever have been, and in this video you'll learn how to play the whole thing on piano. It's not easy, but you can do it
Kiss The Rain Yiruma Simplified Piano Solo. Preview kiss the rain yiruma simplified piano solo is available in 3 pages and compose for early intermediate difficulty. This music sheet has been read 4001 times and the last read was at 2020-11-09 08:55:10 Yiruma Kiss The Rain sheet music notes, chords for Easy Piano. Transpose printable Classical composition or download, save as PDF. Learn to play score in minutes. SKU 155634 Apr 10, 2018 - Free Kiss the Rain piano sheet music is provided for you. Kiss the Rain is written by YIRUMA who was born in South Korea High quality Piano sheet music for Kiss the Rain by Yiruma. Download the PDF, print it and use our learning tools to master it Kiss the Rain Yiruma. Mad World Someone like you An den schÃ¶nen Blauen Donau Apologize As Time go`s by Ave Maria Bad Day Ballade pour Adeline Because of you Bellas Lallaby Billy Jean Bridge over treubeled Water Bright Eyes Die Fabelhafte Welt der Amelie Die Moldau Do you Endless Love Father and Son FÃ¼r Elise Grenade James Bond Theme Just the Way you are Kiss the Rain.
[Ab Ebm D F Db Eb B Cm Abm G Gbm Dbm Gb C Bm Fm Dm Bb] Chords for Piano tutorial- Kiss The Rain ( Right Hand Part 1 ) with capo transposer, play along with guitar, piano, ukulele & mandolin Nov 5, 2017 - Download Kiss The Rain Sheet Music Yiruma. Download free Kiss The Rain Sheet Music Yiruma PDF for Piano Sheet Music. More Sheet Music PDF fre
Learn how to play the Part 1 of 'Kiss The Rain' by Yiruma. This is a free Hybrid Piano Lesson by HDpiano. Try a Free Trial to gain access to thousands of video sections . Okies, someone requested this cover. Sorry if I screwed up your favorite piece. I love Yiruma as well. =) I can never be compared to him. HAHA. He is my idol. Hope you guys enjoy..
Download and Print Kiss The Rain sheet music for Piano Solo by Yiruma from Sheet Music Direct. Unlimited access to 200,000+ titles for every instrument, genre & skill level Start Your Free Month Get your unlimited access PASS! 1 Month Fre Lyrics to 'Kiss The Rain' by Yiruma: I often close my eyes and I can see you smile you reach out for my hand and I'm woken from my dream although your heart is min Ca khÃºc Kiss The Rain do ca sÄ© Yiruma thá» hiá»n, thuá»c thá» loáº¡i KhÃ´ng Lá»i.CÃ¡c báº¡n cÃ³ thá» nghe, download (táº£i nháº¡c) bÃ i hÃ¡t kiss the rain mp3, playlist/album, MV/Video kiss the rain miá» n phÃ táº¡i NhacCuaTui.com Download Kiss The Rain Clarinet Piano sheet music PDF that you can try for free. We give you 3 pages notes partial preview, in order to continue read the entire Kiss The Rain Clarinet Piano sheet music you need to signup, download music sheet notes in pdf format also available for offline reading Play the music sheets for the original version for piano solo or choose from our three different piano adaptations best suited to your level (Level 1, 2 & 3). If you have trouble reading music, then try our easy piano music Level 1 with note names instead of symbols. Kiss the Rain features on Yiruma's popular debut album First Love release
Kiss The Rain Lyrics: I often close my eyes / And I can see you smile / You reach out for my hand / And I'm woken from my dream / Although your heart is mine / It's hollow inside / I never had. Billie Myers (born 14 June 1971, Coventry, UK) is an English rock singer-songwriter. She is known principally for her 1998 transatlantic hit, Kiss the Rain (co-written with Eric Bazilian and Desmond Child).Possessing both the introspective nature of Tracy Chapman and the unbridled spunk of Chrissie Hynde, Myers excels at weaving poetic narratives around starkly honest portraits of her life. Download and print in PDF or MIDI free sheet music for Kiss the Rain by Yiruma arranged by kxren for Piano, Flute (Solo Music Sheet: w t y 8y u u w t w t y u 5y o o w r w o p a 6a s tus t u d d-f d s 3a w r w 3 s a o qo p p t i t o i 3i o o w r w t y 9u i eyi e y e o i 5u w r.
Stream kiss the rain- yiruma| cover ( piano & cello) m.fouad &m.saeid by Salma Spy from desktop or your mobile devic Print and Download Kiss The Rain sheet music. Tranposable music notes for sheet music by Yiruma, : Hal Leonard - Digital Sheet Music at Sheet Music Plus. (HX.283424) Download and print Kiss The Rain piano sheet music by Yiruma. Piano sheet is arranged for Piano and available in easy and advanced versions . Everyone can't finger pick, so it's also a nice slow novice. Taken from piano sheet music so it is 100% accurate. I also tabbed out a higher octave section for the climax of the song to spice it up if people.
Listen to Kiss the Rain by Satin Piano, 147 Shazams Official sheet music for Kiss The Rain (Yiruma) for piano - PDF download, instant print & online streaming - âª audio samples (video) â« Key: A-flat Major â¬ Album: From the Yellow Roo Learn how to play Kiss The Rain - Yiruma on the piano. Our lesson is an easy way to see how to play these Sheet music. Join our community
Browse links for kiss the rain Free sheet music Instrumentations & Opus. ELYSE Daixant, Christian . ELYSE Daixant, Christian . ELYSE Daixant, Christian . Mendoza, David : Two Songs for tenor and piano Voice Tenor, Piano / 1 PDF / 2 MP3. Added the 05-12-2011. Kiss The Rain (ë¹ë¥¼ ë§ë¤) Yiruma ì´ë£¨ë§ ì§ ìë¡ê³¡ 3 ' From The Yellow Room ' (2003.10.23) &? bbbb bbbb 18. Item Number: S0.567831. THE MOST ROMANTIC PIANO SOLO PIECE IN THE WORLD, KISS THE RAIN-YIRUMA PIANO SOLO KEY- C MAJOR. About SMP Press. This product was created by a member of SMP Press, our global community of independent composers, arrangers, and songwriters Kiss the Rain Yiruma Piano solo. Yiruma . Sony. $5.50 Piano solo Musicnotes Musicnotes. The Legend of Zeldaâ¢: Symphony of the Goddesses - Movement IV: Time of the Falling Rain. Kiss the Rain is a song by British singer Billie Myers, from her debut album Growing, Pains. It was released in 1997 as the lead single of the album by Universal Records. The song, produced by Desmond Child, is considered Myers' signature song and is her only notable hit
Oct 3, 2016 - Download Kiss The Rain Sheet Music Yiruma. Download free Kiss The Rain Sheet Music Yiruma PDF for Piano Sheet Music. More Sheet Music PDF fre Yiruma (ÑÐ¾Ð´. 15 Ð¤ÐµÐ²ÑÐ°Ð»Ñ 1978Ð³.; Ð¡ÐµÑÐ», ÐÐ¾ÑÐµÑ) â ÑÐ¶Ð½Ð¾ÐºÐ¾ÑÐµÐ¹ÑÐºÐ¸Ð¹ ÐºÐ¾Ð¼Ð¿Ð¾Ð·Ð¸ÑÐ¾Ñ. ÐÐµÐ½Ð°Ñ Ð½Ð° Ð±ÑÐ²ÑÐµÐ¹ Ð¼Ð¸ÑÑ ÐÐ¾ÑÐµÑ.
Print and Download Kiss The Rain sheet music. Tranposable music notes for Easy Piano sheet music by Yiruma, Yiruma,: Hal Leonard - Digital Sheet Music at Sheet Music Plus. (HX.315806) Print and Download Kiss The Rain sheet music. Tranposable music notes for sheet music by Yiruma, Yiruma,: Hal Leonard - Digital Sheet Music at Sheet Music Plus. (HX.286535) Well, it's not like any piece would be easy by the technique. The most important thing is that you find in this piece something you like. But it's fine. Here are some easy pieces reccomended for beginners: Minuet in G major- Christian Petzold (Yes.. Partition Piano de grande qualitÃ© pour Kiss the Rain de Yiruma. TÃ©lÃ©chargez le PDF, imprimez-le et aidez-vous de nos outils interactifs pour jouer la chanson
Thumb Piano Ranch Kalimba 17 keys Finger Mbira with Online 5 Free Lessons Solid Wood Mahogany - Angel Heart. Sale Product on sale $ 69.95 $ 19.99. Or the written Numbered Notation version of kiss the rain. It is easy to read. It is a lovely song, hope you learn it soon Yiruma Kiss The Rain sheet music arranged for Piano Solo and includes 4 page(s). The style of the score is Classical. Catalog SKU number of the notation is 49627. The arrangement code for the composition is Piano. Minimum required purchase quantity for these notes is 1 ãVirtual PianoãKiss the rain - Yiruma. Search. Library. Log in. Sign up. Watch fullscreen. 5 years ago | 73 views ãVirtual PianoãKiss the rain - Yiruma. Stoney Heber. Follow. Yiruma - Kiss the rain, ì´ë£¨ë§- Kiss the rain, DMC Festival 2015. MBC Kpop. 3:05. Yiruma - Kiss The Rain, ì´ë£¨ë§ - Kiss The Rain [ì´ë£¨ë§ì. DOMusicOnline é¼ç´æå¸ Piano Tutorial 1,738 Followers Â· Song Pages Interest Performing Arts Wusirsir Piano Videos ãå è²»ç´èãKiss the rainï¼Yiruma Piano Cove
zacharus moved Kiss the Rain - Yiruma from Piano Songs to Piano Songs ãDifficult-ã zacharus renamed Kiss the Rain - Yiruma (from Kiss the Rain) zacharus changed description of Kiss the Rain. zacharus added Kiss the Rain to Piano Songs Board vp/mpp sheets Yiruma Kiss The Rain sheet music arranged for Easy Piano and includes 4 page(s). The style of the score is Classical. Catalog SKU number of the notation is 162036. The arrangement code for the composition is EPF. Minimum required purchase quantity for these notes is 1. * Please check if transposition is possible before your complete your purchase Kiss the Rain - Yiruma 1 - Yiruma - Kiss The Rain . Addeddate 2011-02-12 16:52:08 Identifier KissTheRain-Yiruma. plus-circle Add Review. comment. Reviews There are no reviews yet. Be the first one to write a review. 27,764 Views . 4 Favorites . DOWNLOAD OPTIONS download 1 file. Learn Yiruma Kiss The Rain Sheet Music, Piano Notes, Chords in minutes. Download or print the composition, watch presented free video for a quick start. Download Original Notes. Sheet Music & Chords. This easy-to-learn 4-page composition was entirely written by the Korean artist. It was arranged for keyboard and it can be transposed into.
[Ab Cm Fm Db Bbm Eb G F E A Dbm Gb Gbm D Bm] Chords for Yiruma - Kiss The Rain - Piano Tutorial Easy - How To Play (Synthesia) with capo transposer, play along with guitar, piano, ukulele & mandolin Kiss The Rain (Yiruma - From the Yellow Room) Noter HÃ¤mtning och Skriv U
Easy Piano. Includes 4 page(s). Genre: Classical. Download or print Yiruma Kiss The Rain sheet music notes, chords in minutes. Check if it is transposable. SKU of the score is 162036 Watch the video for Kiss The Rain - Original by Yiruma for free, and see the artwork, He was born in Feb 15, 1978 and started to learn the piano at home at the age of 5. In 1988 he moved to England, and in December 1996 he participated in the album The Musicians of Purcell (Decca) Kiss the rain ist eines der bekanntesten Werke/StÃ¼cke des Komponisten Yiruma. Das Lied wird als Soundtrack fÃ¼r den Film Twilight verwendet. Dieses sinnliche und zarte StÃ¼ck/Werk scheint eine Mischung aller menschlichen GefÃ¼hle zu sein - Trauer, Liebe, Melancholie und vieler Erinnerungen.. [Ab Cm Fm Db Bbm Eb F G E A Dbm Gbm Gb D Bm] Chords for Yiruma - Kiss The Rain - Piano Cover with capo transposer, play along with guitar, piano, ukulele & mandolin
Jul 16, 2018 - Spring comes, and everything looks so beautiful. Then i go to a garden and record this video. Last time i played the song RIVER FLOWS IN YOUãhttps. Kiss the rain - yurima ( instrumental piano ) Report. Browse more videos. Playing next. 2:45. Long December Rain - Summer Rain (piano Instrumental) Mock Jensen. [Chorus 1] A C#m7 Kiss the rain, whenever you need me, D E Kiss the rain, whenever I'm gone too long. A C#m7 D If your lips feel hungry and thirsty, kiss the rain E and wait for the dawn. A C#m7 D Keep in mind we're under the same sky, and the nights F#m E as empty for me as for you Kiss The Rain Piano Midi Free To Recommend Be respectful of artists, readers, and your fellow reviewers. Note: Budget AirGround takes a little longer than our other shipping options, but its a great value if youre not in a rush
Guitar Ukulele Piano. PhiÃªn báº£n khÃ¡c (2) ÄÄng phiÃªn báº£n má»i . I [A]often close my eyes [E]And I can see you smil Báº£n chÃnh (18) katuma . A E F#m C#m D Bm F Bb Gm Dm D# Cm 3 . PhiÃªn báº£n Kiss The Rain -Linhkid. Download and print Kiss The Rain piano sheet music by Desmond Child. Piano sheet is arranged for Piano and available in easy and advanced versions Kiss The Rain. Partition Kiss The Rain Pdf. Arrangement pour Piano, Paroles, SSA et Vocal. De Billie Myers, Desmond Child et Yiruma. Formation Accords, Tab, Paroles et Scorc Yiruma: Kiss The Rain 21:59 on Thursday, January 24, 2008 . ttdevelop (19 points) Posted by ttdevelo Partitura Kiss The Rain. Arreglo para Piano, SSA, Vocal y Letras. De Billie Myers, Desmond Child y Yiruma. Incluye Acordes, Tabs y Letra
Disney - Tangled - I See The Light for Piano Solo HD by Dizzy published on 2013-06-16T07:12:37Z Yiruma - Love Hurts By AnÄ±l Meydan (Guitar&Piano Solo) by AnÄ±l Meydan published on 2014-09-28T15:35:57Z. Users who like Yiruma - Kiss The Rain (Piano Cover) Users who reposted Yiruma - Kiss The Rain (Piano Cover kiss the rain piano learning Leave a comment January 2, 2018 January 2, 2018 1 Minute. First blog post. This is your very first post. Click the Edit link to modify or delete it, or start a new post. If you like, use this post to tell readers why you started this blog and what you plan to do with it By 1993, he had given us Little Red Corvette and 1999, Raspberry Beret and Kiss, Batdance and Cream and Purple Rainâthe song, the album, and the film. On the 14 studio albums he had relea


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Back to Our Egypt Trip
El-Gouna is in a resort community located about 150 miles South of the Suez Canal on the Western bank of the Red Sea. There are hundreds of new resorts under construction from El-Gouna to at least 100 miles to the South. El-Gouna has a large marina with hundreds of yachts. It has hundreds of shops, stores and some bars.
A "rest stop" on the way from the Suez area to El-Gouna.
The Arena Inn. We stayed 2 nights.
The pool overflows into the lake.
The pool area.
A gingerbread house, set up in the lobby, for Christmas.
A pic of some of the new construction at the resort.
Pics of the El-Gouna resort, showing the other resort communities around one of the golf courses.
This unique structure is called the "turtle house" and is right on the edge of one of the golf courses.

domain: geography


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Villa dei Cedri with park, Bellinzona.
The offer is available in the following categories
The current Villa dei Cedri in Bellinzona is the result of architectural modifications in the Palladian style, which were carried out in the 1920s on the original 19th century building.
Today, the villa is a museum for visual arts. It houses a collection of works originating between the first half of the 19th century and today. The villa is also appreciated as an oasis of relaxation for its attractive park from the 19th century.

domain: history


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Not all things that stop you doing what you love is due to over use or tendon injury. Some times it can be be a painful corn, stubborn verruca, even a fungal infection. Fixing these problems are just as important in helping to staying active.
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domain: medical


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As the leaves begin to change colour to prepare for autumn, music fans in Vancouver are preparing for some of the year’s biggest shows this month.
From incredible producers to pop queen Madonna, it’s almost tough to choose which concerts to go to this month – especially when three artists play the exact same night. And don’t worry Rock & Roll fans, there are a couple of legends in town for you this month as well. Get ready for a month filled with pumpkin spice, turkey, and some highly anticipated concerts.
In terms of songcraft, Neil Young is the master craftsman – he’s sold more than 80 million albums worldwide and has collected seven Juno Awards over the course of his amazing five decade-long career. The Canadian superstar’s latest album, “The Monsanto Years,” is a collaboration with Promise of the Real who are accompanying Young on his 25-city fall tour. Ontario’s City and Colour (aka Dallas Green) has the honour of serving as Young’s opener.
With the fresh release of her sixth studio album, RUB, Toronto’s Peaches brings her unique sound and sense of style to Vancouver this October. The electronic musician, also known as Merrill Beth Nisker, produces her own albums – writing songs that often push comfort boundaries. Featured in many television series and movies, Peaches mixes electronic beats with explicit lyrics (like her early single “F*ck the Pain Away”). It’s been a few years since her last Vancity stop, so if you’re a fan, make sure you catch Peaches and her futuristic dance moves at the Commodore.
Now if we’re talking bodies of work, Tove Lo has got a perfect one. Her debut album “Queen of the Clouds” was released last year to rave reviews and breakout song “Habits (Stay High)” has collected more than 400 million(!) YouTube views to date. Music critics have dubbed her “the saddest girl in Sweden”, but Lo has nothing to be sad about – her 16-city North American tour is virtually sold out and current single “Moments” is just about to catch fire on pop radio. Be sure to catch her at the Vogue Theatre before she undoubtedly graduates to arenas a year from now.
So, October 6 is a big music night in the city. The third show you may want to check out on this special musical Tuesday is Mikky Ekko. If Peaches is too racy, and Tove Lo is not your cup of tea, Mikky Ekko is the soulful Nashville sound combined with electro beats and ballads that will fill your night with groovy slow-dance moves. Known for his hit with Rihanna, ‘Stay’, this producer and songwriter is currently touring his debut studio album, Time. After opening for Broods at the Imperial earlier this year, Mikky Ekko is back headlining his own show at Venue.
Happy 18th Anniversary, Blueprint! Celebrations for the anniversary will take place at Pacific Coliseum on Thanksgiving long weekend, with Swedish electronic producer Alesso, along with Audien, Project 26, Matoma and Timeline. Probably one of the largest names in EDM, Alesso released his debut full-length album, Forever, earlier this summer through Def Jam Recordings. The album includes Alesso’s major singles “Under Control” with Calvin Harris, “If I lose Myself” with OneRepublic, and club favourite “Heroes (We Could Be)” with Tove Lo. This is bound to be an epic long weekend celebration.
As far as rock bands go, Slash is arguably one of the best guitarists of the century from one of the most legendary bands of all time – Guns N’ Roses. Last year, Slash released his third solo album “World on Fire” which featured Myles Kennedy and the Conspirators. Rocking the top-hat and leather everything for over 20 years, Slash is a symbol of rock. For his highly anticipated Vancouver stop, fans can expect a mix of songs that include some classic GNR, and songs by his other band Velvet Revolver. Canadians may recognize Slash’s bassist, Todd Kerns- once lead singer of Age of Electric. Kerns takes lead vocals on a couple of tracks during the tour. Get ready to be welcomed to the jungle, Slash fans! He’s almost here.
Full disclosure – one of our concert writers is a HUGE Madonna fan and he’s been avoiding all spoilers regarding her upcoming “Rebel Heart Tour,” so don’t come looking for them here. What we can tell you is that the Queen of Everything is set to dazzle Vancouver with a mix of songs from this year’s critically-adored Rebel Heart album and a handful of classics from her kickass catalogue. And if anyone in Madonna’s camp is reading this, there’ll be a dashing young(ish) man in row 3, seat 14 who promises to vogue his ass off (especially if she busts out old school jams like “Borderline” and “Deeper & Deeper”). You’ve been warned.
From legendary pop and rock concert, to one of the most talented producers and DJ’s of recent years, Hudson Mohawke. The Scottish producer, also known as Ross Birchard or HudMo, gained global attention for producing with the man himself Kanye West. HudMo also has rooted Canadian ties, as he was one half of trap music duo TNGHT with Montreal’s Lunice. HudMo released his second studio album in June, “Lantern,” six years after his debut album, and is currently touring the recent release. Lucky for Vancouver fans, also on this tour is R&B and pop producer The-Dream. This is a double bill made in electronic music heaven, and is bound to sell-out.
Vancouverite Claire Boucher, better known as Grimes, plays a hometown show this month after a busy summer touring with Lana Del Rey. Part of her Rhinestone Cowgirl Tour, the Juno Award-winner is currently working on her fourth album here in B.C. Touring with Nicole Dollanganger, this is the “Oblivion” singer’s first headlining tour since 2012. Although tickets are sold out online, limited tickets may be available at the door on a first come first serve basis on the day of the show.
It’s been another crazy year for English rockers Florence + the Machine. They headlined Lollapalooza and Bonnaroo this summer and filled in for the Foo Fighters at Glastonbury after Dave Grohl fractured his leg at a show in Sweden. All that hard work has clearly paid off – the band scored their first number one album with this year’s fantastic How Big, How Blue, How Beautiful and as expected, decent seats for their show at Rogers Arena are going for $250 or more on various resale sites. Indie darlings The Ghost of a Saber Tooth Tiger will serve as openers.