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From Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-91.
"From time immemorial in Guinea, every man betrays his neighbor." -- Crèole proverb
"The Americans, in short, had modernized everything but Haiti and the Haitians." -- Robert and Nancy Heinl, on the US occupation of Haiti, 1915-34
Some time ago I published a bleak, though by no means hopeless analysis of Haiti's political and socioeconomic prospects, arguing that in spite of the substantive progress that had been made since the US-led multinational intervention in September 1994, there was still a long way to go. The political situation remained extremely fragile, and the prospects for economic development were at best problematic. The latter was all the more doubtful because of the suspension of over $130 million in foreign aid due to the Aristide administration's failure to rationalize the economy in accordance with the prescriptions of international lenders. Unless this deadlock were to be broken, the tactical success that had been achieved to that point would likely, sooner or later, turn into a strategic failure.
Subsequent developments have served only to confirm and lend urgency to that prognosis. The past year has witnessed an intensification of both political and nonpolitical violence. National unity has dissipated, as the ruling "Lavalas" coalition has splintered into hostile factions, the largest of which opposes the Préval administration's structural adjustment program. In April 1997, flawed elections led to a major political crisis. Meanwhile, the government's inability to implement reforms in a timely fashion has once again jeopardized substantial amounts of foreign aid. The upshot is that economic recovery has been stymied, and public unrest is reaching dangerous proportions.
All this has once again raised questions about the viability of the Haitian experiment. Moreover, it comes at a time when the UN peacekeeping effort is winding down. Though 650 soldiers, 250 civilian police, and a 50-member military headquarters staff are to stay on until December 1997, by the time this article appears Haiti essentially will be on its own. At that point, the Préval government and the Haitian National Police will face a moment of truth. Will they be able to maintain political stability and the rule of law, or will things fall apart?
Cycles of Violence or a Descending Spiral?
Political violence in Haiti tends to come in waves, two of which occurred in the past 18 months. In the summer of 1996, there was a flurry of political arrests, conspiracies, and assassinations, the most troubling of which occurred in August, when Haitian police arrested some 20 members of the ultra-right-wing Mobilization for National Development (MND), most of whom were former members of the disbanded Haitian military (Forces Armées d'Haiti, or FAdH) said to have been planning political assassinations. These arrests were followed by an attack on the national police headquarters and the parliament building by gunmen wearing military-style uniforms, and by the killing of two MND politicians, Jacques Fleurival and Antoine Leroy, by elements linked to President René Préval's security guard.
While Préval himself was not involved in the killings, the problem could not be ignored lest the Clinton Administration's Haiti policy become an issue in the US presidential election campaign. Under US pressure, the Haitian president agreed to clean house. The head of the presidential security unit and his chief deputy were transferred, and it was announced that other members of the force would be suspended. At the same time, the Americans and Canadians quickly placed a protective cocoon around Préval. Several dozen armed Canadians surrounded the Presidential Palace, and a score of State Department agents were rushed to Port-au-Prince to join a smaller contingent of security personnel that had been in place ever since Aristide's return two years earlier. The retaking of the Presidential Palace--as one scribe referred to it--dramatically underscored the fragility of Haitian political stability. The United States found itself in the position of having to protect Préval from his own US-trained bodyguards while these units were investigated, given additional training, and turned into a security force that he could trust.
In the weeks that followed, violence diminished and a semblance of order was restored. In mid-February 1997, however, a new cycle began. Over the next six weeks, several dozen people would be killed. The carnage began with a war between rival drug gangs in the sprawling Port-au-Prince slum of Cité Soleil and quickly spread to more upscale areas. In part, this was a reaction to pressures from the Haitian National Police (HNP), which had stepped up its operations in the slum. The gangs retaliated by targeting officers and extending their activities to areas where the HNP was less active. Some of the violence, too, came from the police, who occasionally engaged in extrajudicial executions or killed innocent bystanders. Some also appears to have been political. As conflicts within Lavalas intensified, competing factions began accusing each other of directing the violence. Some ex-military, "macoutes," and other elements sympathetic to the Duvalier dictatorship reappeared to take advantage of the chaos, and anti-government demonstrations assumed increasingly menacing overtones.
Like the wave of the previous summer, the violence of February and March 1997 eventually ran its course. But the recurrent appearance of these outbursts--and these were only the most recent--suggested a pattern that was likely to continue. The violence was coming from multiple sources, some of which were interacting in a pattern of threat and retaliation, and there was a widespread fear that the situation might grow worse. And once the UN peacekeepers departed, an important psychological and physical barrier would be removed. One could not but be apprehensive that the cycles of violence might evolve into a descending spiral.
The Politics of Self-Destruction
The Haitian crisis involves much more than a simple propensity for violence. No sooner had the turmoil of August 1996 begun to die down than former President Aristide attacked the Préval administration, claiming that the machinery of government had become loaded down with corruption and disorder, and that certain politicians had become blinded by power and had given up on the people. An economic coup was underway, he asserted; privatization was a trap that had sown division, confusion, and conflict within Lavalas. If order were to be restored, there must be good relations between the Lavalas in power and the Lavalas out of power.
Relations between Préval and Aristide had long been the subject of speculation. Though the two men have been close for years--Préval served as Aristide's prime minister in 1991, and they have often been referred to as twins--their temperaments and styles are quite different. Whereas Aristide is intense, Préval is low-key. One is a rabble-rouser, with an enormous public following based largely on his messianic presence; the other is an administrator, whose popular support flows from his constitutional authority and the backing he has received from Aristide. Lacking a strong independent political base of his own, Préval's continuing public support depends on his ability to improve living conditions, provide public security, and, above all, maintain good relations with his political benefactor. This last requirement partially accounts for his reluctance to purge his security detail, since it was composed largely of Aristide loyalists, some of whom had been with the former president when he was in exile.
It is no secret that Aristide has ambitions to regain the presidency. The constitution will allow him to run for office again in 2000, and his statement was an attempt to stay in the public spotlight while distancing himself from a government whose policies were not likely to improve living conditions. Equally important, the government's modernization program was on the verge of receiving final approval in the Haitian Senate. The plan, which combined the partial privatization of nine state enterprises with a series of belt-tightening measures and was intended to reopen the sluicegates of international aid, had been rejected by Aristide when he was president. Nothing that had happened since had changed his mind.
This was the beginning of a major political offensive. In November 1996, Aristide announced the creation of a new umbrella movement, the Lavalas Family (Fanmi Lavalas, or FL), which, he claimed, was not intended to challenge the president or create more division, but merely reinvigorate and unify the Lavalas coalition. At the same time, however, he criticized international financial institutions for having imposed regressive economic reforms on Latin America and the Caribbean, and spoke of "traitors, invisible enemies, and disinformation . . . aimed at destabilizing the population." Even as he was denying that there were divisions within Lavalas, activists from opposing factions distributed leaflets to the audience accusing him of sowing division, misusing funds, and treason. Since then, things have gone downhill.
Notwithstanding Aristide's initial denials that the Lavalas Family was a political party, in January 1997 his associates registered it as such and began recruiting candidates for elections scheduled that April. About the same time, pro-Aristide groups opposed to the government's economic program called a general strike, triggering riots in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and Gonaïves. A second strike in March proved less successful, but both actions--accompanied by threats against those who refused to respect the calls--added to the incivility that was increasingly suffusing Haitian political life. The concerted campaign to force the resignation of Prime Minister Rosny Smarth, who had become a lightning rod for the administration's critics, became a significant feature of opposition rhetoric.
In the local and national elections held in April, the balloting was boycotted by some parties, and only about five to ten percent of the voters bothered to turn out. There was an almost total breakdown in the collection and consolidation of ballots and other electoral materials, which were often strewn about or left unsecured and unlogged. There were numerous instances of ballot stuffing--some precincts reported over 100-percent turnout rates--as well as some cases of voter intimidation--and blank ballots were not counted, which allowed two Lavalas Family senatorial candidates to obtain majorities in the first round. The Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) and other parties concluded that the election was stacked in favor of the Lavalas Family and declined to participate in the scheduled run-offs. Under heavy foreign and domestic pressure, the government was forced to postpone the second round indefinitely.
Haiti now plunged into a full-scale political crisis. The growing split within the Lavalas movement had immobilized both the executive and the legislature, where for weeks neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies could reach a quorum. Legislation needed to comply with international agreements and rebuild decrepit institutions was not being passed, the budget was seven months overdue, ministries were strapped for cash, and employees went unpaid. Crucial economic and development programs needed to create jobs and reduce mounting social tension remained stalled.
President Préval, too, seemed paralyzed, torn between his loyalty to and dependence on Aristide and his commitments to the OPL (which supported the economic reforms) and to his international sponsors who provided some 70 percent of the government's budget. Increasingly passive, he appeared unable to perform the critical tasks of political communication that were necessary to obtain public and congressional support for his programs, seemingly isolated within his own administration. By June, all of his cabinet except Prime Minister Smarth had gone over to Aristide's party--and on 9 June, Préval lost Smarth as well. After months of vitriolic attacks from Aristide and his followers, the prime minister resigned, declaring that he was stepping down because he did not want to be party to electoral fraud. "In our country," he noted, "power is a disease."
Aristide, meanwhile, pressed his advantage, first encouraging his followers to join a nationwide teachers' strike which ended in riots, then attacking the government's economic program in fiery speeches, branding it economic "schizophrenia," and accusing the international community of trying to undermine the country's democratic forces: "If they believe they can discharge the battery of our morale by programming hunger and the high cost of living, they have miscalculated." Haiti, he warned, must never become "indebted to imperialism." Nationalism flourished as some congressmen and leaders of popular organizations called for an end to the foreign "occupation." In July 1997, demonstrators burned tires and threw rocks at UN peacekeepers during a general strike held to demand the departure of international troops.
Haiti was slowly drifting towards chaos. As of September 1997, Préval had still not found a new prime minister; in August the Congress had rejected his nominee, Eric Pierre, and he had not yet selected another. While Haitian politicians hesitated, the economy stagnated. Unemployment was widely estimated at around 70 percent, and even the traditional oligarchy--the much-reviled Morally Repugnant Elites, or MRE's--were doing poorly. The resulting frustration was leading to growing disillusionment with the Préval government and--more seriously--with democracy itself; several disturbing acts of violence occurred, including an assassination attempt against the foreign minister and the execution-style killing of a presidential bodyguard. While these attacks had not produced another full-scale cycle of violence, by early autumn 1997 the conditions for such a development seemed to be building.
The Security Problem in Perspective
The situation is not totally bleak, however; there have been some very real gains made over the past three years, and these need to be recognized lest one conclude that nothing has been accomplished or that Haiti is a hopeless case.
Perhaps the most important achievement has been a marked improvement in the security situation. This has been due largely to the dissolution of the Haitian armed forces and allied paramilitary organizations, but not without creating a certain irony. US officials originally had wanted to keep the FAdH--to purge it, professionalize it, and maintain it at a reduced level of manpower--which was a terrible idea considering the predatory nature of the institution and its near total lack of legitimacy. But Aristide outmaneuvered them, effectively dissolving it. Had the army remained intact, the danger of a coup would always have been in the background. Haitian presidents would have been forever looking over their shoulders, since the very existence of the military would have undercut public confidence in the government. To have been associated with it in any way would have had a delegitimizing effect.
Now, instead, there is a Haitian National Police (HNP) which, for all its weaknesses and faults, is still infinitely preferable to what existed before. While human rights abuses continue, they are not massive, systematic, or centrally directed, as was the case under the de facto regime (1991-94) when at least 3000 people died. According to one report, 114 people had been killed by the police since the force began operations in July 1995, with 20 of the deaths occurring in the first six months of 1997. Most close observers, however, believe that the HNP is gradually improving, and that most officers are doing a credible job in spite of inexperience and a debilitating lack of equipment. And while the Director and the Inspector General of the HNP appear committed to ending the practice of impunity under which police have traditionally operated, the concept of police accountability is foreign to Haiti, and resources to investigate, try, and punish abuses are very limited. Though 33 officers were in jail awaiting trial in September 1997, not a single murder conviction had yet been obtained. Even so--and in spite of all the problems the HNP faced--most urban Haitians, at least, seemed to believe that a fair amount of progress had been made in creating an effective police force.
At the same time, the security situation is not quite as bad as it might seem from reading the US press. Since the events of August 1996, the Presidential Security Unit and the National Palace and Residential Guard have been reevaluated, retrained, and brought under the control of the HNP. The investigation into the 1996 killing of the two MND politicians, Fleurival and Leroy, has progressed, albeit slowly. A prime suspect reportedly has been identified, and a solid case is being built. These killings have been linked to a number of murders that occurred in 1995. Apparently, some of the gunmen in those killings were working at the National Palace at the time.
Fortunately those anti-government forces that have been resorting to violence are still weak and disorganized. Politically, the Duvalierists appear to be a spent force. They have no leadership, organization, or army. While some ex-members of FAdH have held disruptive protests and threatened to take up arms if they did not receive certain benefits, government concessions seem to have defused their movement. Still, there continues to be a large reservoir of unemployed, violence-prone former military and paramilitary, many of whom are engaging in criminal activities or selling their services to any available bidder. There are also small political groups on both the extreme right and left who are trying to manipulate these elements and draw them into conspiratorial activities. These groups view democracy and the rule of law as threats to their own privileges and ambitions and prefer a police force they might be able to subvert or control to one that is professional and apolitical.
Three other security issues must be mentioned. One involves the criminal gangs that have proliferated in recent years. The increased circulation of weapons and more sophisticated forms of organized crime have created a serious problem. The police have long been afraid to go into some of the slums for fear they will be attacked. (Even US Embassy personnel have been forbidden to go into Cité Soleil without special permission.) As the HNP becomes more effective in combating these groups, the potential for violent confrontations will increase. Still, there is a distinction between criminal violence and political violence. There are five or six identifiable gangs in Cité Soleil, but they don't cooperate with one another and often shoot at each other. Even the most notorious--the so-called Red Army--is not a well-organized, cohesive entity. While some of its members may share a fantasy of being part of a popular army, they have no idea how to organize or discipline themselves. On the other hand, with guns plentiful and opportunities for enrichment scarce it should not be surprising that some might hire themselves out as thugs or assassins.
Another concern is the proliferation of private security forces. Currently, there are about a dozen government-licensed security companies, as well as scores of unlicensed security forces organized by local authorities and wealthy families. In Port-au-Prince, there are more private security agents than police officers, and they are often more experienced and better armed. Many are former FAdH, who are putting to use the skills they learned in the military. While the HNP was initially limited to sidearms, the resulting imbalance in weaponry between the police and their potential rivals in the criminal gangs and private security forces recently led Congress to authorize some specialized units (e.g., SWAT and crowd-control teams) to carry semiautomatic weapons.
Finally, there is a concern over the growing violence between Lavalas factions and other political groups. While the good news is that most Haitian politicians continue to reject violence in favor of the democratic process, the potential for an escalation of conflict and bloodshed cannot be ignored.
The bottom line is that no group presently has the capability of overthrowing the government. The most they can do--for the time being, at least--is to continue engaging in sporadic violence. Under these circumstances, the threat is not so much a coup, which is unlikely to be successful and in any case could not be consolidated in the face of the foreign military presence (as long as that lasts). Rather, the primary dangers are the assassination of Préval, Aristide, or both, leading to massive violence between their followers and those perceived to be responsible for the killings; the triggering of a dialectic of revolution in which ongoing violence from each side accelerates the violence of the other; and the creation of such chaos and anxiety as to undermine and destroy the government's ability to maintain order and public confidence, thus preparing the way for its eventual collapse or overthrow.
This is the real meaning of the cycles of violence. Pre-revolutionary conditions are being created which, if not contained, could lead to something much worse. The problem is complicated by the fact that the government's security forces show signs of overreacting to threats and provocations. The Leroy and Fleurival killings were only the most notorious cases. While reports on the HNP by the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission generally have been favorable, they have documented continuing high levels of police violence. Though not all of these incidents constitute abuse, human rights violations have been all too common. Efforts to investigate and punish the guilty still leave much to be desired. Since April 1996, moreover, scores of people have been arrested on vague charges of subversion, sometimes without warrants, leading to accusations that the government has been targeting its political opponents.
The Window of Opportunity: Opening or Closing?
One of the most notable achievements during the past three and a half years has been Haiti's political transition. For the first time in its history, there was a peaceful turnover of office from one democratically elected president to another. At the same time, several rounds of elections have been conducted without violence. Clearly, these are important steps in the right direction.
This progress was not always apparent, however. The June 1995 elections that ushered in the new legislature were seriously flawed, and were roundly denounced by critics. By the same token, the landslide victory by Lavalas gave rise to fears that Haiti was developing a one-party state dominated by radical elements in the Aristide camp. In retrospect, however, those concerns seem exaggerated. The problem with the elections was primarily one of chaos and incompetence, rather than systematic fraud or violence, and was largely confined to the initial round of balloting. No serious observer doubts that Lavalas would have won an overwhelming victory even under the most pristine conditions. The Congress that emerged is a broadly representative body--the first really representative legislature Haiti has ever had--and the deputies have been taking their jobs seriously. (In contrast, the previous parliament was overflowing with opportunists.)
As for Lavalas, it was never a monolithic organization. The Lavalas movement is a coalition of groups, several of which have representatives in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. There is no party discipline; Gérard Pierre-Charles, the leader of the Lavalas Political Organization, which is still the largest of these blocs, claims he doesn't know how many deputies he has. And certainly they don't always do what the executive wants. The legislators have rejected a number of presidential appointments and programs, and even an Inter-American Development Bank loan that was considered inappropriate. Whatever else this parliament might be, it is no rubber stamp.
The name of the game is responsible co-government. Not the least of this Congress's virtues is that it is serving as a check on the president, in contrast to the traditional Haitian propensity to place all power in the hands of the executive. And in spite of all its recent problems and an incredible lack of resources, the legislature is not without accomplishments. Keep in mind that there is no party machinery to advance the process of legislation, and almost no trained staff. There is no legislative research service, and few people to help draft bills. There are not enough secretaries, copy machines, telephones, or desks. Nor is there air conditioning. (The temperature in the Chamber of Deputies is often around 95° F.) The Senate does not even have a chamber of its own in which to meet; it has had to adapt a conference room for that purpose.
Yet, even under these conditions, some progress has been made. Notwithstanding Aristide's opposition, a major modernization law providing for the partial privatization of nine state enterprises has been passed. So has a civil service law designed to help streamline the bureaucracy. These reforms, part of the price for restarting the flow of aid from international lending institutions, are also necessary if Haiti is to attract investment and construct an economy that is capable of operating with some semblance of efficiency. The government monopolies, in particular, have been notorious sources of graft, overstaffing, and incompetence: ghost workers abound, most enterprises lose money or do not operate at all, and the only way the telephone company can turn a profit is by charging inflated prices for overseas calls. Without reforms, Haiti's prospects for developing self-sustaining economic growth are nil.
President Préval, too, deserves credit. During his first year in office, he displayed leadership and courage in pressing for these changes. Some of his appointees--like Pierre Denizé, chief of the HNP; Robert Manuel, the Minister for Public Safety; and Leslie Delatour, the Central Bank Governor--are competent technocrats who are committed to economic reforms, human rights, and all the other things that must be done if Haiti's future is not to be a repeat of her past.
It is precisely because Préval's first year was so promising that his second year has been so frustrating. As matters now stand, all that has been accomplished is in jeopardy. Unless the warring Lavalas camps can reach some compromise, there will be no more reforms, and those that have been passed may never be implemented or may be implemented badly. The downsizing of the civil service has not yet been approved, and while the process of privatizing state enterprises is continuing, it has been very slow. There is still a danger that political conflict may discourage potential bidders or torpedo the program altogether. At stake is the confidence of domestic and foreign investors, whose capital is essential to the country's economic and social development.
In short, one has the impression that a window of opportunity is closing. Haiti has only so much time before the international community loses interest and turns its attention elsewhere. Currently, some $100 million in vital foreign aid remains undistributed because of the paralysis in parliament. Unless the logjam is broken and the money starts flowing, economic recovery could be delayed indefinitely. If that happens, there will likely be even more social and political unrest, which, in turn, will make it even more difficult to generate growth.
The Immensity of the Challenge
In the three years since Aristide was restored, there has been a fair amount of progress in building the institutional bases of democracy, but much less in changing the political culture. The old values, attitudes, and behavior live on; they are an enormous weight dragging the country down even as it continues the struggle to get to its feet. Thus, just when it appeared that Haiti was entering a new stage of political development, under a technocratic leadership with the skills needed to pull the country out of underdevelopment, there has been a reversion to the politics of egocentrism and charisma. The creation of the Lavalas Family has little to do with modernization. Rather than helping institutionalize the political party system, Aristide has chosen--in traditional Haitian fashion--to create a vehicle for his own ambitions.
Haiti is a society built on mistrust. The old fears and suspicions continue to exist just below the surface, and all it takes to bring them into the open are events such as those of early 1997. At the same time, there is a propensity for violence which, while not manifested in the daily lives of ordinary people, can easily break out at moments of stress, as occurred in the aftermath of the Duvalier regime's fall when hundreds of Tonton Macoutes and Vodou clergy were hunted down and killed. Even today, there are well over a hundred cases of vigilante justice every year. This says much about the low public confidence in Haiti's law enforcement capabilities, especially the judicial system. It also reflects a lack of understanding of the role that the police and courts play in a democracy. The idea that one can look to those sources for justice--as opposed to taking matters into one's own hands--is a new idea for Haitians and will require time to take root.
Beyond this, there is a deeply ingrained, 200-year tradition of predation to overcome. This has been a political culture in which, traditionally, everyone has been out for himself. Every politician wanted to be president, or at least get his share of the spoils. Given that mentality, it should not be surprising that the state would become a mechanism to extract wealth for the benefit of those who controlled it. When combined with grinding poverty, endemic corruption, and deep-seated distrust and insecurity, the result was chronic violence. For those with the means, force or the threat of force was often the option of first resort, and those without means became not merely the objects but sometimes the instruments of terror. While the Duvalierists have been ousted, the political culture that spawned them has been only partially uprooted. As long as there are weapons available and elements in the government and opposition willing to resort to violence, democracy will remain vulnerable.
Political culture is important in other ways as well. One can see it in the oligarchy and many (though by no means all) businessmen, whose pursuit of wealth at any cost to national development has helped make Haiti the poorest country in the hemisphere. Again, this has been a predatory elite, with no sense of identity with or responsibility to the Haitian people. And that raises the question of the role these elements will play in the "new Haiti." Clearly, their talent and capital must be tapped if the country is to have any hope of escaping underdevelopment. Incentives will be needed to get these elites to invest in their own country, especially when it is safer to send one's money abroad. Even if their capital can be attracted, there is no assurance that it will be invested in ways that promote the national interest, as well as their own private interests.
Part of the problem with the economic strategy international lenders have imposed on Haiti is that, given the norms and habits of that political culture, it may perpetuate or even intensify certain abuses. There can be no assurance that privatized state monopolies will not become private monopolies continuing many of the same exploitative practices (e.g., high prices, low wages) that have marked past behavior. And it is difficult to imagine how one might prevent the kinds of corruption that have accompanied privatization in so many other countries. In an environment like Haiti's, where graft is endemic and socioeconomic inequalities immense, the danger is that neoliberal reforms may lead to even greater inequalities and hardships, an outcome that is generally conceded for the short run. Haitian officials estimate that as many as 3000 workers will be laid off at the overstaffed port, telephone, and electric companies and another 7500 from the civil service. The hope is that in the longer term more jobs will be created than eliminated, but there are no guarantees.
Another area of concern is the extent of foreign ownership of business and industry. Because most Haitian businessmen do not have the capital to buy the larger privatized entities, the major industries are likely to be transferred to US, Canadian, or French control. While it can be argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing--the capital has to come from somewhere and foreign owners may be less susceptible to corruption and more sensitive to their social responsibilities than Haitians--it is already a source of discontent among some nationalists and businessmen and could lead to a backlash.
This not an argument against reform. The old predatory and parasitic structures and relationships must be changed if Haiti is to move forward. But such transitions are always difficult and painful. Social safety nets will be needed to catch those who are endangered, with mechanisms of oversight and accountability to prevent abuses. Otherwise the damage done may offset any improvements made. For its part, the Haitian government has attempted to ameliorate some of these problems by retaining a state role in the companies that are to be privatized. But how this will work out in practice--if, indeed, it works at all--remains to be seen.
Complicating all these challenges is a staggering lack of human and material resources. While the quality of personnel at the top of the executive branch is mixed, there is an appalling lack of competence below the ministerial level. In effect, what you have are ministers without ministries. The comparative handful of talented and dedicated people are constantly being bombarded--indeed, overwhelmed--by demands. Lacking proper administrative support, they have to deal with problems that should be dealt with at lower levels of the bureaucracy. As a result, things move very slowly. Nor is there any assurance that the decisions and policies made will be carried out by those responsible for implementing them.
Challenges in the justice system
The Haitian National Police often lacks the means to conduct basic operations. It needs more officers and vehicles, heavier weapons, more money, better leadership--in short, more of everything. Due to the financial crisis, the police have sometimes gone months without pay. They suffer from a shortfall of leadership and management at all levels; as of July 1997 the HNP, with an authorized strength of about 5300, lacked 49 senior officers, 162 inspectors, and 292 upper-level agents. Morale and public support continue to be fragile, as officers increasingly become targets of political or gang violence and resort to unnecessary violence in return.
But the police at least function, which is more than can be said for the judicial system. There the problems are simply mind-boggling. In the words of one observer:
Haitian justice lacks everything: financial resources, materials, competent personnel, independence, stature and trust. Court facilities are a disgrace, courthouses often indistinguishable from small shops or run-down residences in Haitian cities and towns. Judges and prosecutors, ill-trained and often chosen because of their connections or willingness to comply with their benefactors' demands, dispense justice to the highest bidder or to the most powerful. No judge or prosecutor in Haiti, until mid-1995, had received any specialized professional training. Law schools are woefully inadequate and lack the most rudimentary necessities like decent classrooms and a law library; cronyism reigns, professors are ill-trained, students ill-prepared, passing grades bought and sold.
One of the advantages police reform has had over judicial reform is that Haiti could construct a new police force more-or-less from scratch after the old police (which had been part of the FAdH) had been dissolved. In contrast, the new Haiti has inherited the old Haiti's judicial system lock, stock, and barrel, including personnel. While some progress has been made in getting rid of corrupt or incompetent judges and prosecutors, training new ones, and distributing law books, judicial reform has taken a back seat to the more immediate demands of security. As a result, the process of improving law enforcement and judicial procedures has been disrupted. It matters little that the police can apprehend criminals if the courts cannot try them. The resulting breakdown in the justice system has added to the morale problems of the police, fostering apathy, cynicism, corruption, and extrajudicial punishment in the field.
Rejuvenation of the countryside
Uli Locher once commented that "rural Haiti as we know it is doomed." It is easy to see what he meant. Deforestation and soil erosion are turning parts of the country into a desert; a mere three percent of the original forest cover remains, and tropical storms have carried some 20 percent of the topsoil to the sea. In the last half of the 20th century, arable land per capita will have decreased from 0.38 hectares to about 0.16 hectares, a casualty of an exploding rural population, overworked lands, deforestation, and erosion. With only about 11 percent of its land still arable, Haiti can no longer feed itself.
Reversing this decline will require not only a major long-term reforestation program, but fundamental changes in Haitian behavior. Population growth and the demand for charcoal (which accounts for much tree-cutting) must be sharply reduced, and economic incentives and means provided to enable farmers to cultivate crops in more efficient and less destructive ways. Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt whether either the Haitian government or its international sponsors will be up to the challenge. The former has been ambivalent about family planning, with the result that little has been accomplished. Over the last decade, moreover, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has cut funding for such purposes by almost half. And as for reforestation, the USAID track record provides ample reason for skepticism: During the 1980s, reforestation was a top priority, and by 1990 about ten million trees a year were being grown. Even that, however, was far from sufficient, for simultaneously an estimated 15 to 20 million trees were being cut down. USAID terminated the program in 1991, shortly before the coup that deposed President Aristide, and annual tree planting immediately dropped to less than one million. While that decision has since been reversed, current efforts appear likely to provide for only two to four million hardwood seedlings a year, a small fraction of what is needed.
In 1994, Haiti had a population of roughly seven million people. By 2025, it will have an estimated 13.1 million. This is bad enough, but whereas in 1994 the populace was only 30.9 percent urban, by 2025 the percentage is expected to be around 53.9 percent. While the rural population may grow only modestly, from 4.86 million to 6.1 million, the urban population could explode from 2.2 million to an estimated 7.1 million. Port-au-Prince, now roughly 1.5 million people, could contain an estimated four million people. Even today, in the most crowded areas people frequently sleep in shifts or upright: One person leans against the wall with his head in his arms, another leans against him, and so on, sometimes as many as three or four in a row.
Keeping in mind the current astronomical unemployment rate, one must ask whether enough jobs can be created to absorb the newcomers. If not, what are the implications for political stability and crime? This is not to mention pollution, housing, education, and health services. Only half the capital's population today has potable water. Raw sewage pollutes the roadsides. In the face of growing demand, the water table below the city will continue to recede. Some observers estimate that the water will turn brackish in the next few years.
Even before the current crisis, Haiti had the lowest per capita income ($360) and life expectancy (48 years), and the highest infant mortality (124 per 1000) and illiteracy (63-90 percent) rates in the Western Hemisphere. At least 70 percent of the children suffered from malnutrition, and about 33 percent were seriously malnourished. With only 810 doctors and even fewer nurses to serve a population of six to seven million people, Haitians could not even begin to cope with their severe health problems. To the traditional afflictions of tuberculosis (affecting ten percent of the population), malaria, salmonellosis, venereal disease, and the endemic illnesses associated with malnutrition has recently been added the AIDS virus. Between seven and ten percent of pregnant women in urban areas tested HIV positive.
These conditions worsened considerably during military rule (1991-94), in part because of the international embargo of the regime, when per capita income fell to around $250. Subsequently, that deterioration was checked by the influx of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. Unfortunately, much of this assistance was in the form of short-term, quick-impact projects imposed from above, without consulting the local populace about its needs and desires. As a consequence, "few durable new investments materialized and fewer still benefited the poor majority." Moreover, the aid freezes resulting from repeated deadlocks between the Haitian government and its foreign sponsors postponed costly infrastructure projects and prevented any sustained economic recovery. Relatively few permanent jobs have been created, and the problem of chronic poverty has been largely ignored. Popular expectations that democracy would bring improved living conditions have been frustrated, resulting in growing disillusionment and a heightened potential for violence.
Haiti's absorptive capacity
Because of widespread corruption and incompetence, Haiti has only a limited ability to use the aid that is being doled out. In 1996 only about 200 of the 500 vehicles given to the Haitian National Police were still functioning, primarily because many of the HNP's recruits did not know how to drive (almost none had licenses at the time they entered the force), and many others were unfamiliar with even the basics of maintenance, such as the need to occasionally put oil in their vehicles. In the carnage that followed the fielding of the HNP's automobile fleet, scores of cars and trucks were wrecked or broke down because of negligence. Partially as a result, the police today are frequently unable to respond to calls for help.
There must be some balance between the justifiable concern of donors that their assistance not be wasted and the need for such aid to better serve locally established priorities and be managed by Haitian institutions. One should remember that aid can also be squandered on highly paid foreign consultants. As one observer has noted, the cost of a single day of a World Bank consultant's time, including travel, translation, and local expenses, could pay the operating costs of a privately run health clinic in a Port-au-Prince slum for two or three days. This is one reason, among many, why there has been such a disparity between the massive international resources expended on Haiti and the lack of sustainable results.
No Easy Answers
So, is Haiti a "success" or a "failure?" There is no easy answer. In making judgments, however, the proper frame of reference is a country's past, rather than some idealistic--and invariably culture-bound--standard of what its future ought to be. On this basis, US policy must still be judged a qualified (though very shaky) success: Aristide was restored and political power transferred from one duly elected government to another; a new police force has been created which, for all its limitations, is functioning reasonably well under extremely difficult conditions; though political violence and human rights violations persist, they are not the massive problem they have been in the past. Even today--in spite of all their problems--Haitians do not expect or want a return to dictatorship.
The trouble is that when one looks to the future, judgments become much more tenuous. Clearly, democratization is not irreversible, and in 1997 Haiti has been sliding in the wrong direction. While it is still possible to reverse that trend, one must be realistic. Time is running out, and the odds against long-term success are formidable. It is now clear that the United States and the international community greatly underestimated the Haitian challenge. After the success of the 1994 military intervention, it was assumed that the tasks of political and economic development would be relatively easy. This was an illusion. In fact, there is an inverse relationship between these operations. The very Haitian weaknesses which made the military engagement so easy make the political and socioeconomic challenges so difficult. The debility of Haitian institutions provided no basis for resisting an invasion; neither did they--or the self-destructive political culture that had emaciated them--provide a foundation for democracy and economic development.
In short, Haiti's problems are so huge, its resources so limited, and the weight of political tradition so great that it is difficult to be optimistic. Even if Haitians can forge a stable democracy--and this will be no easy task--the socioeconomic challenges will be even more difficult. Privatization will not solve all the country's socioeconomic ills, and it may even create some new ones. Haiti is in the process of transformation from a rural-agrarian society into an urban-light industrial society. Traditional society is crumbling because its economic base is disintegrating, and there is no guarantee that Haitians will be much better off in the new society that is emerging than in the old one they are leaving.
The bottom line is that if Haiti is to have any chance at a brighter future, it will need a lot of help over a long period. One of the dangers is that the international community--especially the United States--will not stay the course. This would be shortsighted, for Haitians are not likely to let us forget them. If political and socioeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate, the flow of boat people will at some point resume. There are already roughly a million Haitians in the United States. How many more come will in part be determined by the long-term success or failure of the current experiment.
What, specifically, should the international community and the United States do? A few brief observations may be illustrative.
. The United States and the international community need to reevaluate their minimalist approach toward Haiti. Much of what has been done has been piecemeal and inadequate. Thus, there were only limited efforts to carry out disarmament, though an effective program was crucial to Haiti's prospects for stability. The newly created HNP was rushed onto the job with insufficient training (only four months, whereas police trainers tell us cadets need a year). Judicial reforms were neglected, though without them police reform could not ultimately succeed. Foreign aid was distributed in a stop-start pattern which undercut economic recovery. The UN peacekeeping force was limited to repeated short-term extensions, which gave hope to subversives that all they had to do was bide their time until the foreigners left. Halfway actions lead to halfway, ineffective results.
. A major international effort will be needed to resolve the current political and economic impasse. This initiative must involve all major Haitian actors, especially Aristide. Whatever one thinks of the former president, he continues to have a huge base of popular support, and efforts to isolate him will likely be counterproductive. If he is not part of the solution, he will be part of the problem, and his potential for mischief is enormous.
. Aristide's criticisms of the modernization program have to be taken seriously. The concept of modernization should be broadened to include social modernization. Most important, ways must be found to alleviate the crushing 70-percent jobless rate. It is not reasonable to expect Haitians to accept more unemployment as the price for economic reform. If this requires a temporary, large-scale public works program, then so be it. The bottom line is that unless living conditions improve, political and social turmoil will increase, undermining economic recovery in a vicious spiral that could well end in an explosion.
. A moment of truth will occur when foreign peacekeepers leave Haiti. At this writing, the HNP is still not capable of maintaining law and order by itself. UN troops continue to patrol Port-au-Prince and provide essential helicopter transportation for Haitian crowd-control units. UN military personnel protect the National Palace and the residence of former President Aristide. Civilian police sponsored by the UN are deployed in the capital and provinces, providing vital training as they accompany HNP officers on patrols. These activities should continue. Either the UN presence has to be extended, or other multilateral or bilateral arrangements have to be made.
. An accelerated effort should be made to create a functioning judicial system. In comparison to the energy and resources that have gone into the Haitian National Police, this sector of law enforcement has been sorely neglected. Yet, without just and effective courts, attempts to institute the rule of law will be doomed. Put another way, the sooner Haiti has an effective judicial system to complement the professional police force that is being developed, the sooner foreign peacekeepers can go home.
. Much more attention needs to be given to the task of creating an ecologically viable Haiti. Deforestation, erosion, soil exhaustion, water depletion, desertification, and rapid population growth cannot be allowed to continue, or the country will become utterly uninhabitable. Of all the problems Haiti faces, this complex of maladies, with their built-in momentum, poses the greatest danger to the country's survival.
. There is a need to continue pressing the Haitian government with regard to human rights violations. If allowed to continue, political violence could destroy everything that has been accomplished. One should caution, however, that it makes little sense to cut off aid for the HNP, as has sometimes been proposed. Rather, the police need more officers, equipment, and training, including continuing human rights instruction. One does not create a better police force by denying it the means to become a truly professional and competent organization. Quite the opposite.
. Finally, the United States should convert its military support mission into a semipermanent operation (preferably military, but civilian if a military operation is not an option) with ongoing infrastructural and humanitarian responsibilities. One of the mistakes the United States made when it went into Haiti was imposing severe limitations on nationbuilding operations. This was a golden opportunity lost. Haitians would have loved for the United States to have done more of this kind of thing, and they still would. Certainly, the need is there.
1. See Donald E. Schulz, Whither Haiti? (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996).
2. Lavalas generally refers to Aristide and Préval's political movement. Macoutes are the Tonton Macoutes, the paramilitary arm of the Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986).
3. Christopher Marquis and Sandra Marquez García, "Aristide Says Corruption, Chaos Tainting Préval's Government," Miami Herald, 20 September 1996; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: Latin America, 24 September 1996.
4. FBIS, Daily Report: Latin America, 6 November 1996.
5. Michael Norton, "Aristide Reasserts His Past--Attributing Haiti's Troubles to Imperialism," The Washington Post, 15 June 1997.
6. According to a July 1997 USIA opinion poll of 1351 adults in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes, Gonaïves, and Jacmel, 54 percent of the urban public now has little or no confidence in the Préval administration. Over half doubt that senators, deputies, or local mayors care anything at all about the problems of their constituents. More people now believe that Haiti is not a democracy than that it is. Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA Briefing Paper, 15 August 1997.
7. The casualty figures are from Serge F. Kovaleski, "Haitians Find New Police Force Too Similar to Old," The Washington Post, 14 July 1997. The most balanced evaluation of the HNP may be found in Rachel Neild et al., "The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police," Washington: Human Rights Watch/Americas, National Coalition for Haitian Rights, and Washington Office on Latin America, January 1997.
8. US House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, "CODEL Conyers Haiti Trip Report," 29 June - 2 July 1997, p. 6.
9. Eighty percent, according to the July 1997 USIA survey (see note 6).
10. A weapon found at the site of the Leroy killing has been traced to an arms cache at the National Palace, as has a gun found in the possession of suspects in the March 1995 assassination of Mireille Durocher Bertin. There may also be a connection to several former members of the FAdH, who subsequently became Aristide security aides and, more recently, Lavalas Family political candidates. See Roger Noriega and Denis McDonough, "Bipartisan Report on Current Conditions in Haiti," US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, p. 6.
11. OAS/UN International Civilian Mission, La Police Nationale d'Haiti et les Droits de l'Homme, July 1996, p. 55; and Report of the UN Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, A/51/703, 2 December 1996; Kovaleski, "Haitians Find New Police Force Too Similar to Old."
12. Actually, Delatour was originally appointed by Aristide, but Préval kept him on.
13. See the UN Secretary-General's reports on the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, and Haiti--UNSMIH, S/1997/564, 19 July 1997.
14. Rachel Neild tells the story of how the residents of Gonaïves lost respect for the police because the latter were "too nice." After the populace began challenging and throwing stones at them, officers began beating up detainees and committing other abuses, which in turn led to greater popular respect for the HNP. "Police Reform in Haiti: The Challenge of Demilitarizing Public Order and Establishing the Rule of Law," a presentation at a conference organized by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 7-8 November 1996, p. 6.
15. Michel-Rolf Trouillot, for instance, has remarked on the number of extreme abuses committed by the Duvalier regime's henchmen. He notes that the perpetrators were mostly "miserable wretches whose average incomes hardly exceeded what some elite families spend for four servants." See Haiti: State Against Nation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), p. 155.
16. Report of the Secretary-General, Haiti--UNSMIH.
17. William G. O'Neill, "No Longer a Pipe-Dream? Justice in Haiti," in Haiti Renewed, ed., Robert I. Rotberg (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 200.
18. Uli Locher, "Land Distribution, Land Tenure and Land Erosion in Haiti," paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Society for Caribbean Studies, 12-14 July 1988, p. 16.
19. Mats Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined: Lessons From the Past in the Light of Some New Economic Theory," in Rotberg, ed., Haiti Renewed, p. 85; Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 5.
20. Ernest H. Preeg, The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp. 33-34, 37-39.
21. Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, United Nations, 1994 Revision. Electronic document: gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/ungophers/popln/wdtrends/ urban, 13 December 1995.
22. Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti Since Duvalier (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 18.
23. Schulz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, pp. 3-4.
24. Robert Maguire et al., Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood, 1986 to 1996, Occasional Paper No. 23 (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1996), p. 95.
25. Elsewhere, the author has presented a detailed list of policy recommendations, and these need not be repeated here. See Schulz, Whither Haiti?, pp. 35-42; and Max Manwaring, et al., The Challenge of Haiti's Future (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997).
26. Neild et al., The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police, p. 31.
27. Sixty-three percent, according to the July 1997 USIA survey (see note 6).
Dr. Donald E. Schulz is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. He is the coauthor of Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti and The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central America, and coeditor of Mexico Faces the 21st Century, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, Cuba and the Future, and Political Participation in Communist Systems. His articles have appeared in Foreign Policy, Orbis, the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, and Small Wars and Insurgencies, as well as such media outlets as Newsweek, The Washington Post, the Miami Herald, and the Christian Science Monitor.
Reviewed 24 November 1997. Please send comments or corrections to firstname.lastname@example.org

domain: politics


In 2008, more wind power was installed in the EU than any other electricity generating technology. Statistics released by the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) today show that 43% of all new electricity generating capacity built in the European Union last year was wind energy, exceeding all other technologies including gas, coal and nuclear power.
For the first time, wind energy is the leading technology in Europe. A total of 64,949 MW of installed wind energy capacity was operating in the EU by end 2008, 15% higher than in 2007. “The figures show that wind energy is the undisputed number one choice in Europe’s efforts to move towards clean, indigenous renewable power”, said Christian Kjaer, EWEA Chief Executive.
On average, 20 wind turbines were installed for every working day of 2008.
By the end of the year, a total of 160,000 workers were employed directly and indirectly in the sector, which saw investments of about €11 billion in the EU. The wind power capacity installed by end 2008 will, in a normal wind year, produce 142 TWh of electricity, equal to about 4.2% of the EU’s electricity demand, and avoid the emission of 108 million tonnes of C0 2 per year, the equivalent of taking more than 50 million cars off Europe’s roads. (Learn More here)
Thanks to a Good News Agency email, produced by my good friend in Italy, Sergio Tripi, for the story!


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Dolemite Is My Name
Dolemite is My Name is a typical biopic buoyed by its unrelenting hilarity, its affection for its subject and commitment to the time and place…
* This filmography is not intended to be a comprehensive list of this artist’s work. Instead it reflects the films this person has been involved with that have been reviewed on this site.
A look at the latest on Blu-ray, including several Criterion releases, "Their Finest," "The Fate of the Furious," and "The Lost City of Z"!
An overview of Ralph Bakshi's masterful career in animation.

domain: artistic


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So how will Dhanush, Sivakarthikeyan and their team of friends unwind themselves during break? No prizes for guessing this IPL season, as they will play the country’s favourite game- cricket.
“Dhanush sir, Anirudh, Atlee, Sathish, Suri annan, our college friends and myself will split teams among ourselves and play cricket. Dhanush and I will always be in opposite camps,” smiles Sivakarthikeyan.
“More than winning the game, it is important to gather 11 members for each team and to play without any fights. That’s our biggest achievement,” says the anchor-turned-actor, who is all geared up to promote ‘Rajini Murugan’.


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Wife of Robby Krieger of The Doors
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Lynn Krieger has been in a relationship with Jim Morrison (1967).
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domain: celebrity


(Photo courtesy Darrin Godin)
Darrin Godin, a previous St. Joseph employee, found himself fighting for his life against COVID-19 this past March. He can’t recall much about his stay but credits the care and comfort provided by his nurses to his ability to fight the virus. As “patient one” at St. Joseph Hospital in Orange, the experience for his family and hospital workers were scary to say the least.
“When he got sick, Darrin scared everyone so much because he didn’t fit the profile. He wasn’t old. He hadn’t traveled recently. He didn’t have co-morbidity, another medical condition that would make him vulnerable. He was young and fit and seriously ill.” After a rollercoaster of a fight, Darrin was able to go home on April 1. Although he was in isolation, he says that he “always felt the presence of God” when the nurses were in his room and that he has “this overwhelming feeling of indebtedness” and that “it feels like there was an army of people fighting for [him].”
About the AuthorMore Content by Providence News Team


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Because sometimes you just need a stronger drink than tea, conservative Nevadans George Harris and Irma Aguirre filed the official papers last week to form the Tequila Party of Nevada.Harris, a former state GOP official, and Aguirre are co-owners of a Mexican restaurant in Las Vegas.
As Jon Ralston, one of the state’s top political journalists, writes at the Las Vegas Sun:
Harris, in case you don’t know, is best known for being wrong more times than any single individual in Nevada political history. If he makes a prediction — on Election Day, he told folks Sharron Angle would surely win by a couple of points — bet the opposite. This is just a stunt, and a silly one.
Democratic Hispanic activist Fernando Romero reportedly floated the idea to Harris of starting this political party, one that would address Latino issues better than the two major parties.
So Aguirre gathered the necessary signatures and drafted up the party’s official preamble, which includes some of its core tenets:
- We believe that Americans are Americans, not hyphenated-Americans.
- We believe political education and information is needed to allow Hispanics to make more informed political decisions.
- We believe in common sense immigration reform.
- We believe in low taxes and small government.
- We believe that free-market capitalism is the best vehicle for achieving the American dream.
- We believe Hispanic families should have the right and the means to choose the schools that are best for their children.
Doesn’t sound all that different from that other drink-based party, does it?
Read the Tequila Party of Nevada’s filing papers here.
Harris did not respond to TPM’s request for comment.
Check out a local news report on the party here:

domain: news


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Three of the top players in Canadian college football have tested positive for banned substances, a development that comes with doping experts saying Canadas university athletics have become a "wild west" where athletes are gaming the system. Tyrell Williams Jersey . The players tested positive during a training camp for the top 37 collegiate players that were hosted earlier this year in Edmonton by the Canadian Football League, TSN has learned. The testing was performed by the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, whose officials have informed the players schools about the infractions, according to two senior university officials familiar with the matter. Pierre Lafontaine, chief executive of Canadian Interuniversity Sport, the governing body for university athletics in Canada, confirmed "multiple players" tested positive for banned substances at the March CFL combine. The players names have not been disclosed publicly. Its unclear which schools they attend and what drugs they took. Lafontaine said schools may disclose details about the tests next month. The positive tests mark the latest chapter in a decades-long struggle by schools and sports leagues to contain steroid use by athletes who are looking for an edge. Steroids build muscle strength, add weight, and can help players recover faster from injuries, but also come with potentially life-threatening side effects. Steroid users can develop tumours and suffer other harmful side effects. But as athletes have taken more personal risks, testing has improved. At least 14 Major League Baseball players have been suspended for testing positive for banned substances, and the reputation of cyclist Lance Armstrong is in tatters because of his positive tests. The latest positive tests in Canadian college football come four years after a steroids scandal rocked a major schools football program. In 2010, eight players at the University of Waterloo were suspended for anti-doping rules violations after testing or admitting to using steroids and three years later, a ninth player at the centre of the scandal was sentenced for possession of steroids for the purpose of trafficking, among other charges. Since the Waterloo scandal, 14 other Canadian college football players have tested positive for banned substances, including Concordia University lineman Quinn Smith, who tested positive for an anabolic steroid in March at a combine event in Toronto - days before the Edmonton training camp. "(Steroids in Canadian colleges) have gone under the radar because the attention has been fixed on professional sports and the individual elite-level athletes," Bob Copeland, Waterloos former athletic director, said in an interview. "Theres no question its still a problem, and its tough to say who is doing it. At Waterloo some of the players who admitted using or tested positive were second-string players." Copeland and others say that immediately after the scandal at Waterloo, schools across Canada committed to improve the testing of players in all sports. Yet since then, costs have climbed to $1,000 per test. Public funding for testing has been frozen. Ira Jacobs, dean of the University of Torontos Faculty of Kinesiology and Physical Education and an expert on doping, says the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sports is being pressured by the federal government to focus efforts on students who participate in Olympic sports - at the cost of policing college athletes who play hockey and football. "Its a wild west because we have no (effective doping) controls in place and the athletes know," Jacobs told TSN. Paul Melia, president of the CCES, said funding from Sport Canada to the CCES has been fixed at $5.4 million in recent years. Much of that funding goes to pay for 85 doping control officers and for contracts with labs, he said. The CCES pays $1.7 million-a-year alone to two labs in Ontario and Quebec, said Melia, who declined to comment on the positive drug tests at the CFL combine. "We have to monitor 10,000 CIS athletes, 800 Olympic level athletes, 250 alone at the Commonwealth Games (recently in Scotland)," he said. With Sport Canada demanding more frequent testing of Olympic athletes, presumably to prevent embarrassing sports scandals that might tarnish Canadas image at the Olympics and other international competitions, theres less money left to test Canadian university athletes. Its a problem Canadian schools have pledged to address. CIS schools recently agreed to give the CCES money to be used for CIS athlete testing during coming years. While that funding will allow the CCES plans to conduct as many as 200 tests of CIS athletes, that is far below the number of tests conducted on athletes in past years, which makes it easier for athletes to dodge detection. During 2011-12, for instance, the CCES conducted 455 tests of CIS athletes. Melia said the CCES faces challenges in coming months. Anabolic steroids remain the second-most seized drug at the Canada-U.S. border, he said. "We dont know who is being arrested or where the drugs are headed because of Canadas privacy legislation," Melia said, adding that steroids are also the No. 1 imported drug to Quebec. It is similarly difficult for police to make headway on many steroid-related cases. Police officials have said finding steroids is rare because users dont often overdose and end up in a hospital. Police come into contact with steroid traffickers far less often than they do with drug dealers who peddle recreational drugs such as cocaine, said one Toronto-area police official who has worked on drug cases. With costs spiralling up, the CCES has agreed to adopt in 2015 a new drug-code passed by the World Anti-Doping Agency that is certain to further hike costs, Copeland said. Agreeing to that code will force the CCES to invest more money in random testing and developing so-called biological passports for athletes. The passports will establish baseline levels for testosterone and other chemicals and proteins in an athletes blood over a series of tests, so that subsequent test results can be compared. Melia said the CCES is similarly trying to expand intelligence gathering. A doping hotline established last fall has attracted 50 to 100 tips so far, he said. "We are also trying to get stats from schools about how much athletes can bench press or how they do in the 50 metres, so we can compare later results to see if there are big changes," he said. CFL spokesman Jamie Dykstra said the league pays for the testing of prospects at combines but since they athletes are still in university, "they dont fall under our drug policy which was collectively bargained with our players association." Copeland said hes been struck by the fact that second-string players are just as likely users of steroids as A-list players. "I can see why users might justify this in the U.S. for the chance to land a big contract, even though its still a long shot, but these guys in Canada are taking these risks for the chance for an entry-level contract in the CFL," Copeland said. "Thats a $50,000 contract. It doesnt make sense." Travis Benjamin Jersey .J. - The New Jersey Devils know the odds are against them as they chase a playoff spot in the Eastern Conference. Tre Boston Jersey . -- DeMarcus Cousins had 25 points and 16 rebounds to help the Sacramento Kings snap a seven-game losing streak by defeating the Chicago Bulls 99-70 on Monday night. http://www.chargersprofansshop.com/Black-Forrest-Lamp-Chargers-Jersey.html?cat=918 . John Albert Elway, 24, was booked into jail early Saturday morning after an incident near a college campus in downtown Denver, according to jail records.Philadelphia has the leagues most productive duo, Fleurys strong season continues and Colorados senior citizens are leading the team; lots of lineup news, Fantasy tips and more in Scott Cullens Statistically Speaking. HEROES Giroux & Voracek – Philadelphias dynamic duo each had four points (Claude Giroux with two goals, two assists; Voracek with four assists) in a 7-4 win at Toronto Saturday, then Voracek added two more goals and Giroux an assist in Sundays 4-3 overtime win at Winnipeg. Among common linemates, Voracek and Giroux, the first and third-leading scorers in the league, are at the top of the class. TOP PAIRS DUO TEAM TOTAL G TOTAL PTS EV CORSI% Jakob Voracek-Claude Giroux Philadelphia 24 84 57.2% Tyler Seguin-Jamie Benn Dallas 35 72 53.9% Phil Kessel-James van Riemsdyk Toronto 31 65 42.7% Vladimir Tarasenko-Jaden Schwartz St. Louis 31 64 52.2% Tyler Johnson-Nikita Kucherov Tampa Bay 23 64 57.6% Steven Stamkos-Ryan Callahan Tampa Bay 30 63 58.3% Sidney Crosby-Patric Hornqvist Pittsburgh 21 62 55.0% Patrick Kane-Kris Versteeg Chicago 25 61 54.9% Nicklas Backstrom-Alex Ovechkin Washington 25 61 56.2% Ryan Getzlaf-Corey Perry Anaheim 26 59 49.2% Marc-Andre Fleury – Turned aside 45 of 46 shots in a 3-1 win over Florida Saturday, continuing his career-best season, posting a .933 save percentage (his previous best was .921 in 2007-2008) with a league-leading six shutouts. Colorados seniors – Jaromie Iginla and Alex Tanguay each had three points in Saturdays 5-1 win at Buffalo. Iginla now has 11 points (5 G, 6 A) in the past dozen games and Tanguay has been even more productive, with 13 points (5 G, 8 A) in his past dozen games. Tanguay and Iginla have moved into the top two spots on the Colorado scoring chart, with a relatively-modest 22 and 21 points, respectively. These are the top scoring forwards, aged 35 or older, this season: LEADING 35-AND-OVER SCORERS PLAYER TEAM POS GP G A PTS Joe Thornton San Jose C 34 8 21 29 Patrick Marleau San Jose LW 34 7 20 27 Pavel Datsyuk Detroit C 23 13 11 24 Martin St. Louis N.Y. Rangers RW 31 10 13 23 Alex Tanguay Colorado LW 30 11 11 22 Marian Hossa Chicago RW 34 6 15 21 Jarome Iginla Colorado RW 32 7 14 21 Mark Streit Philadelphia D 33 4 17 21 Jaromir Jagr New Jersey RW 34 5 15 20 Chris Kunitz Pittsburgh LW 24 9 11 20 ZEROES Andy Greene – The Devils blueliner was buried in the defensive zone against Tampa Bay Friday, finishing with 13.8% possession (4 shot attempts for, 25 against), paired mostly with Jon Merrill and matched frequently against Tampa Bay’s top line of Steven Stamkos, Jonathan Drouin and Ryan Callahan. Mark Fayne – The Edmonton defenceman played more than 23 minutes against Dallas Sunday, but was thumped in possession (5 shot attempts for, 34 against, 12.8%). Fayne has had a somewhat difficult transition to Edmonton, going from a 55% Corsi performer in New Jersey last year to 49% with the Oilers this year. Goalies: Ilya Bryzgalov – The Ducks goaltender allowed six goals on 31 shots at Ottawa Friday. Jonathan Bernier – Toronto’s number one between the pipes surrendered seven goals on 41 shots against Philadelphia Saturday. Darcy Kuemper – Minnesota’s puck-stopper gave up three goals on 14 shots in Saturday’s 6-5 overtime loss to Nashville. Pekka Rinne – Quite possibly the frontrunner for the Vezina Trophy, the Predators goalie allowed five goals on 27 shots in 6-5 win at Minnesota Saturday. Kari Lehtonen – Dallas’ starter was yanked from the cage after allowing four goals on 19 shots against Edmonton Sunday. LINEUP NEED TO KNOW James Neal – Nashville’s top-line right winger missed Saturday’s win over Minnesota due to illness, though it’s reportedly not the mumps. Craig Smith replaced Neal on the top line and had a goal and an assist while playing a season-high 18:44. Jimmy Howard – Detroit’s starting goaltender suffered a lower-body injury Friday against the Islanders. With Jonas Gustavsson already out, Petr Mrazek will start in Howard’s absence and Thomas McCollum was recalled to fill the backup role. Mikael Granlund – The Minnesota Wild pivot missed Saturday’s game against Nashville due to illness. Charlie Coyle moved up to play with Zach Parise and Thomas Vanek, and registered a pair of assists in a season-high 19:43. Matt Cooke – Minnesota’s veteran checking winger returned to action Saturday against Nashville, playing his first game since being sidelined by a lower-body injury in late October. Brad Richards – The veteran Blackhawks centre missed Sunday’s game against Toronto with an upper-body injury. For a bit of a twist, the Blackhawks put Patrick Sharp at centre with Patrick Kane and Kris Versteeg, and Sharp responded with three assists. Derick Brassard – Returned to action for both of the Rangers’ games against Carolina on the weekend, after missing a week with the mumps. Jonathan Drouin – The Tampa Bay rookie has seen his ice time increasing, playing a season-high 21:15 at New Jersey Friday, skating most frequently on the top line with Steven Stamkos and Ryan Callahan. Ondrej Palat – Returned to the Lightning lineup Friday after missing 10 days with a lower-body injury. Radko Gudas – Tampa Bay’s bruising blueliner returned to the lineup Friday after missing eight days with a lower-body injury. Grant Clitsome – On the depleted Winnipeg blueline, Played 24:43 against Boston Friday, then 20:19 against Philadelphia Sunday. Considering that Clitsome averaged 19:47 per game last season, and is at 15:09 per game this season, he’s a logical candidate to take on a bigger role while the Jets’ defence is overrun by injuries. Chris Kunitz – Returned to the Penguins’ lineup Saturday after missing three weeks with a broken foot. Patrick Bordeleau – The Colorado tough guy, recovered from a back injury, got into the Avs lineup for the first time this season during Saturday’s win at Buffalo. Rasmus Ristolainen – The second-year Sabres defenceman played a career-high 27:01 Saturday against Colorado, then followed up by playing 26:46 at Boston Sunday. Ristolainen has also contrributed three points (2 G, 1 A) in the past four games. Kenny Wiggins Jersey. . Tyler Myers – The main reason Ristolainen saw the increased workload is that Myers suffered a lower-body injury and was forced to leave early Saturday. Mark Barberio – The Lightning blueliner skated in a career-high 22:29, in his 63rd career game, at the Islanders Saturday, due to Jason Garrison leaving early with an undisclosed injury. Jannik Hansen – The Canucks winger collapsed on the bench during Saturday’s 3-2 overtime win vs. Calgary, though appears to be fine since the incident. Brian Gionta – The Sabres captain left Sunday’s game against Boston early after a questionable hit from Bruins D Matt Bartkowski. Anton Lander – The perennial Oilers prospect was promoted again and had a team-leading six shots on goal in 16:39 against Dallas, then was sent right back to Oklahoma City of the AHL, where he has 27 points (8 G, 19 A) in 26 games this season. SHORT SHIFTS Ducks C Ryan Getzlaf scored both of Anaheim’s goals in a 6-2 loss at Ottawa Friday, giving him 18 points (6 G, 12 A) in the past 11 games…Senators RW Bobby Ryan registered a pair of assists, giving him eight points (2 G, 6 A) in the past seven games…Senators C Kyle Turris had a goal and an assist against Anaheim Friday, and now has seven points (3 G, 4 A) in the past five games…Senators C Mika Zibanejad registered a goal and an assist against the Ducks and has 11 points (6 G, 5 A) in the past nine games…Penguins RW Steve Downie had two assists and 17 PIM in 5:56 of ice time against Florida Saturday…Penguins LW Nick Spaling had a goal and an assist in a 3-1 win over Florida, giving him six points (2 G, 4 A) in the past six games…Canadiens C Alex Galchenyuk had a goal and an assist in Saturday’s 4-1 win over Ottawa; he has six points (4 G, 2 A) in the past three games and, moving to centre, has pushed David Desharnais to left wing…Canadiens LW Max Pacioretty recorded two assists against Ottawa, giving him seven points (1 G, 6 A) in the past five games…Kings C Anze Kopitar had three assists in Saturday’s 4-2 win vs. Arizona and has nine points (1 G, 8 A) in the past three games…Flyers C Sean Couturier had a goal and an assist in Philadelphia’s 7-4 win at Toronto, giving him nine points (4 G, 5 A) in the past nine games…Capitals C Nicklas Backstrom had two goals and an assist in Saturday’s 4-0 win at New Jersey; he has nine points (5 G, 4 A) in the past six games. Stars C Tyler Seguin recorded two goals and an assist with 11 shot attempts (9 SOG) in Sunday’s 6-5 shootout win at Edmonton; he has 20 points (13 G, 7 A) in the past 14 games…Blackhawks RW Patrick Kane had a goal and two assists in Chicago’s 4-0 win over Toronto and now has 26 points (12 G, 14 A) in the past 18 games…Flyers C Vincent Lecavalier tallied a pair of goals in Sunday’s 4-3 overtime win at Winnipeg. Lecavalier had zero goals (and two assists) in his previous 14 games… Predators D Roman Josi had a goal and an assist in Saturday’s 6-5 overtime win at Minnesota; Josi has 12 points (3 G, 9 A) in the past 16 games…After two assists against Minnesota, Predators D Shea Weber has 14 points (2 G, 12 A) in those same 16 games…Wild RW Jason Pominville had a pair of assists in Saturday’s 6-5 overtime loss to Nashville, and has 10 points (3 G, 7 A) in the past ten games…Wild LW Zach Parise had two goals and an assist against Nashville, giving him 12 points (5 G, 7 A) in the past 10 games…Wild D Ryan Suter had a pair of assists vs. Nashville and has 10 assists in the past eight games. Stars C Cody Eakin (20 shot attempts for, 5 against) and D Jamie Oleksiak (17 shot attempts for, 4 against) both had at least 80% possession against Calgary Friday…Senators RW Alex Chiasson had a stellar possession game (21 shot attempts for, 4 against, 84.0%), with only 14.3% offensive zone starts, against Montreal Saturday…Islanders C Frans Nielsen delivered a strong possession game (12 shot attempts for, 1 against, 92.3%) against Tampa Bay Saturday…In a little over seven minutes of even-strength ice time against the Rangers Saturday, Hurricanes LW Zach Boychuk was crushed (1 shot attempt for, 12 against, 7.7%) in possession terms…In Sunday’s 4-3 win over Buffalo, the Bruins had five forwards – Chris Kelly, Carl Soderberg, Patrice Bergeron, Reilly Smith and Brad Marchand – finish with at least 80% of the even-strength shot attempts. Jets G Michael Hutchinson stopped 30 of 31 shots for a 2-1 win over Boston Friday, lifting his save percentage to a league-leading .940…Avalanche G Calvin Pickard turned back 62 of 64 shots in weekend wins over Buffalo and Detroit, raising his save percentage to .939…Lightning G Andrei Vasilevsky had 45 saves on 47 shots in Saturday’s 3-1 loss at the Islanders…Capitals G Braden Holtby had a 21-save shutout at New Jersey Saturday. He has a .927 save percentage in December (after .907 and .913 in the first two months of the season)…Blackhawks G Antti Raanta stopped all 31 shots he faced in Sunday’s 4-0 win over Toronto. FIRSTS Derrick Pouliot – Pittsburgh’s highly-touted rookie blueliner, the eighth overall pick in 2012, scored his first NHL goal, on his first NHL shot, against Florida Saturday. With Christian Ehrhoff and Paul Martin hurt, Pouliot finally has an opportunity to show his stuff. Keith Kinkaid – New Jersey’s backup goalie stopped 26 of 28 shots against Tampa Bay Friday for the first win of his career. Johan Larsson – The Buffalo left winger scored his first career goal, in his 34th game, during Saturday’s 5-1 loss to Colorado. Tim Schaller – Buffalo’s rookie centre scored his first NHL goal, in his third NHL game, in Sunday’s 4-3 loss at Boston. Rob Zepp – Philadelphia’s 33-year-old goaltender made his NHL debut and allowed three goals on 28 shots, good enough to secure the win in a 4-3 overtime win at Winnipeg. A fourth-round pick in 1999 (Atlanta) and 2001 (Carolina), Zepp has been bouncing around in places where reaching the NHL is more than a little unexpected. Zepp spent the previous seven seasons playing in Germany, two more in Finland and logged a total of seven AHL games (and 115 ECHL games) prior to this season. FANTASY FOCUS With a half dozen games on tap tonight, here are some players to consider for your lineup: Mike Fisher – After taking a few games to get rid of the rust as he recovered from his summer Achilles injury, Fisher has six points (2 G, 4 A) in the past seven games. Nick Spaling –Spaling has six points (2 G, 4 A) in the past six games, though the return of Chris Kunitz does bump Spaling off Sidney Crosby’s wing, and thats kind of a big deal. Mike Hoffman – The Senators’ leading goal-scorer, with 10, is skating on a productive line with Mika Zibanejad (recommend him too) and Bobby Ryan. Much of the data included comes from www.war-on-ice.com, www.puckalytics.com, www.hockeystats.ca and www.naturalstattrick.com Scott Cullen can be reached at email@example.com China Jerseys Cheap Jerseys Wholesale Jerseys Wholesale Cheap NFL Jerseys Authentic Wholesale Jerseys From China Cheap Jerseys Free Shipping Cheap NFL Jerseys China ' ' '
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During these days, the D’Alema Case exploded in the Italian Parliament, at the same time the reform about tapping strikes back. Tapping are vital yet delicate proofs because it restricts the right of secrecy of communications. It has been discussed for years but no decision was taken. The Commission discussed it and traced a possible draft. There is news about the crime of “complete release of tapping” and the prohibition of integral transcriptions – via phone, video or letter – unless it is relevant as proof”. Nicola Gratteri, president of the Commission, proposed it. It is part of a group of propositions aiming to ensure the solving of the problems that came up about rights of defense and of privacy.
The attorney of Reggio Calabria called it the ‘unusual prohibition’. He was not allowed to release the complete tapping. This decision aims to protect privacy eliminating divulgation. Gratteri wants to stop the possibility of damages due to what may be brought to surface by tapping.
In order to protect the defense, the PM granted lawyers to have a copy of tapping. The commission also grants the usage of tapping of videos and letters.
Translation provided by Mary Ann D’Costa


text: Little Caesars is known for its many innovations in the fast food industry. It offers pizza and bread sticks in minutes at a very reasonable price. Little Caesars pizza is made with dough freshly made daily with vine ripened tomatoes and fresh cheese. Pizza is available for take-out. Little Caesars also offers franchise opportunities.

domain: food


text:
The Dutch House anthem Doing it Right by Afrojack sprinkled with John Legends’ soulful voice covering Adele’s “Rolling in the Deep”.
It was included in the July mix, here it is for your own pleasure.
The first of a hopefully long series of rework, remixes and other mashups.
Like it? Say it and share it!


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A new development has occurred in Kenya Airways’ flight schedule as there will now be three non-stop flights from its facility at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport to Cape Town, South Africa. This would aid in expanding its network across Africa, thereby creating avenues for trade, investment and tourism.
At the moment, the airline operates seven flights to Cape Town every week. Three weekly flights via the resort town of Victoria Falls on Mondays, Thursdays and Saturdays, four flights via Livingstone, Zambia, departing Nairobi on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Fridays and Sundays. This brings about a total of 10 weekly flights to Cape Town from Nairobi.
The non-stop flights to Cape Town, South Africa will depart Nairobi, Kenya on Wednesdays, Fridays and Sundays at 3:30pm.
“We are indeed very proud to increase our frequencies to South Africa to cater for the growing number of our customers who travel between Nairobi and Cape Town. In addition to enhancing Africa integration, this new route will be beneficial to the tourism industry as it establishes vital links with our global network,” said the Kenya Airways Chief Commercial Officer, Vincent Coste.

domain: geography


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Last week was a volatile but mostly positive week for global stock markets as traders become comfortable with the growing consensus that the Fed will not be hiking at next week’s FOMC meeting.
That’s not to say the argument is settled. Far from it. Analysts are more 50:50 than the market’s current pricing of around a 30% chance.
But stock traders managed to push the Dow and S&P 500 up 2% on the week, the Nasdaq gained almost 3%, The Nikkei’s 2.65% rise masked incredible intra-week volatility which included a 7.7% rally and multiple falls of more than 2.5%, while Shanghai’s 1.26% rise masked its own 5.9% fall intra-week.
In Australia the ASX only rose 30 points over the week with the 200 index ending the week at 5,071. Like other markets that gain of just 0.6% masked a 2% gain and then reversal on consecutive days during the week.
It could have been the thrall of the nice weather and an early start to the weekend, but quite possibly the collapse of volumes on the ASX Friday, to around $2.6 billion from the usual $4-$4.5 billion, suggests traders are already getting set for the announcement by the Fed this coming Friday morning at 4am AEST.
So, it could be a long week for markets at home in Australia and around the globe. But low volumes and thin trade are the type of markets that often lead into big events and thin, low volume markets can often lead to whippy and volatile movements.
Locally it’s a very quiet week on the data front with nothing out on Monday. But there could be some focus on data released in China over the weekend. In the year to August retail sales did better than expected with a 10.8% gain against 10.5% which the market forecast. But, industrial output and fixed-asset investment both undershot expectations with a print of 6.1% and 10.9% respectively.
Tuesday in Australia sees the release of new motor vehicle registrations and the RBA minutes at 11.30am AEST. Annette Beacher, TD Securities chief Asia-Pac macro strategist said in her weekly outlook that, “there was nothing new in the Bank’s statement on 1 Sept and we don’t expect anything new in these Minutes either.”
Wednesday we get the Westpac Leading Index of economic growth for Australia. Normally a second or third tier release given the current discussion within the economy on where the economy is headed this will be an important indicator. Writing in his weekly outlook Westpac chief economist Bill Evans said that after July’s weaker result:
The August update could see another lurch lower. It will include weaker updates for most components, with a particularly sharp fall in the ASX 200 (–8.1%mth after choppy moves in July and June). Amongst the other components: the WestpacMI Consumer Expectations Index slipped back 2% after a 7.3% bounce last month; the Westpac Unemployment Expectations Index deteriorated 5.6% after a 2% improvement last month; commodity prices slipped 1% in AUD terms; and the yield spread narrowed nearly 18bps (a weaker growth signal). Total hours worked were flat, while dwelling approvals rebounded 4.2% after a 5.2% fall in Jun.
Markets may not react terribly much to this release but it is an extremely important one nonetheless.
Also Wednesday we get a speech from Guy Debelle, RBA Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) on Bond Market Liquidity, Long Term Rates and China. He’s speaking at the Actuaries Institute in Sydney at 9.30am.
Thursday is quiet with the release of the RBA’s Bulletin the only major event. No doubt with everything going on in the economy at the moment there will be something interesting, but it’s unlikely to be market moving.
Friday is set to be very different though. Australian markets will be reacting to the FOMC’s decision at 4am AEST and then at 9.30am Reserve Bank Governor meets with House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics in Canberra. The opening statement is likely to be fairly vanilla. But the questions could be very interesting.
Offshore traders will be watching the movements in the S&P 500 which is primed for a big technical move.
That’s important because the market hasn’t priced for a rate hike. Bill Evans said in his note that:
We expect the US Federal Reserve to start raising rates next week (the first time it has instigated a tightening cycle since June 2004). The market is not prepared for this historic event.
We have been forecasting that the FED would start raising rates in September 2015 for around two years. It has been a long wait and, despite market pricing only giving a 30% probability to the hike occurring, we are sticking with the view.
So a move to tighten could shock people. Equally no move could see stocks rally sharply. But most technical traders would expect the current pattern in the S&P 500 to be resolved in the negative. In the lead-up to the FOMC stock traders will be watching this set up and could be a little skittish.
To the data and Monday is fairly quiet with the release of Japanese industrial production, Swiss import prices and retail sales, Italian CPI and EU production.
Tuesday the Bank of Japan has a monetary policy decision, French CPI and then in Britain we get CPI and PPI which will important for the deabte about what the Bank of England is going to do as they edge toward their first tightening. ZEW economic survey is out in Germany along with EU data on employment, trade, and the wider ZEW survey. In the US it’s the vitally important retail sales releease for August which could be important as the FOMC sits down to meet the next day.
Wednesday The BoJ economic survey is out while in the UK it labour force day. In the EU the CPI is out as is US CPI. Retail sales and CPI just before and during the FOMC meeting could influence the decision and so markets will be watching both these data points closely. The NAHB housing index is out along with TIC flows in the US. Traders will be watching the TIC flows to see if the recent Chinese reserve reduction has been accompanied with selling US Treasuries.
Thursday Kiwi traders will be closely watching the release of New Zealand’s GDP. Japanese trade is out, along with foreign investment stats. In Europe the Swiss National Bank releases its interest rate decision and the UK releases retail sales. The US has initial jobless claims, housing starts and building permits and of course, the FOMC decision.
Friday markets will be reacting to the Fed but we also get the BOJ meeting minutes, EU current account and CPI in Canada.
As the week ticks by there will be plenty of political speculation about the future of Tony Abbott’s leadership, depending on the outcome of the Canning by-election in WA to be held on Saturday.
It’s also the countdown to the start of the Rugby World Cup, which kicks off on Saturday with England playing Fiji at Tickenham on Friday night. Australia’s first game is next Wednesday night, also against Fiji.
Here’s Westpac’s full diary of all the key events and data for the week.
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The move was projected by several media through the last few weeks, as it was quite clear the Charlotte-based US F1 will not survive the financial turmoil they got themselves into. With Campos Meta being restructured last weekend, Lopez' manager admitted that talks have been in place for his client's switch to the Spanish team.
“We had six hours of meetings with the investors of the USF1 and the new owners of the Campos Meta team. We discussed the possibility of a merger, but most important is that whatever the outcome, Jose Maria is included in the project,” said Felipe McGough to radio Cadena 3 Cordoba.
Although Indian driver Karun Chandhok is also in contention for the vacant seat at Campos, it is believed that both Bernie Ecclestone and the Spanish team are looking forward to signing Lopez rather than the ex-GP2 racer. And that's because, as stated before, the Argentine government is involved in the backing process for the 26-year old driver.
According to Argentine daily newspaper La Nacion, Ecclestone will meet with the Formula One Management representatives (a company that he actually owns) and Lopez' management on Wednesday to conclude the talks. A decision is expected to emerge in the upcoming 24 hours and, as McGough told the media earlier this week, “the outlook for Lopez is clearer.”
Should Lopez finally sign a deal with Campos, it will practically mark the end of US F1 as a team. The North-American outfit will remain without a single driver for the 2010 season – hence the money from the Argentine government – and will have to close down all F1 operations.


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