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Airgun Technologies VIXEN – Features
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- Adjustable buttpad
- Safety catch
- 250cc capacity
- Available in .177 or .22
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What is a Refractory Symptom?
The importance of defining a refractory symptom is central in utilizing palliative sedation in a safe, efficacious, and ethical manner.
|A refractory symptom is one that cannot be adequately controlled despite aggressive efforts to identify a tolerable therapy that does not compromise consciousness (Cherny 1994).|
- A refractory symptom may be subjective and, at times, nonspecific.
- It is 2007-12-07ot;difficult” symptoms, since many symptoms considered refractory are at times successfully managed by specialized hospice and palliative care programs (Broeckaert 2002).
- The malignant tumors most often associated with refractory symptoms include those in the lungs, gastrointestinal tract, head and neck, colon, rectum, and breasts, though certainly any malignancy can cause refractory symptoms.
- Pain, dyspnea, persistent emesis, and agitated delirium are the symptoms most commonly requiring sedation (Rousseau 1999, Braun 2000).
- Nonmalignant disorders may exhibit refractory symptoms, including congestive heart failure (dyspnea etc), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and debilitating neurological ailments, such as dementia and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
- Most patients requiring palliative sedation demonstrate more than one refractory symptom (Cowan 2002; Cowan 2001).
- Palliative medicine experts reported that 34% of their patients received sedation for nonphysical symptoms (Charter 1994). In patients sedated for nonphysical symptoms, 60% were for neuropsychiatric symptoms, whereas 6% were for “anguish”.
- In deciding when a symptom is refractory, the clinician must perceive that further invasive and non-invasive interventions are :
- incapable of providing adequate relief,
- are associated with excessive and intolerable acute or chronic morbidity, or
- are unlikely to provide relief within a tolerable time frame.
Interestingly, in a study by Braun and associates (Braun 2000), 50% of patients receiving palliative sedation at the beginning of the study were sedated in response to symptoms that were not considered refractory. Moreover, after the implementation of clinical practice guidelines for palliative sedation, the incidence of palliative sedation was reported to be significantly reduced. Consequently, the importance of defining a refractory symptom is central in utilizing palliative sedation in a safe, efficacious, and ethical manner.

domain: health


text:
Where You Watch doesn’t allow download links or streams. We only report where and when they are online.
Zach Galligan, who played Billy Peltzer in the first two movies of the franchise, has confirmed that Warner Bros are well up for the movie.
Is Gremlins 3 available online? No. It has yet to be reported as either a pirated torrent or stream.
When will Gremlins 3 be available on digital platforms like iTunes or Amazon? As of now, there's no release data announced. This includes iTunes, Amazon, Blu-Ray or DVD.

domain: entertainment


The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system has increasingly become a target of hackers in 2016, as attackers attempt to exploit banks. Security vendor TrapX is now helping banks that use SWIFT to mitigate the risk of attack via deception technology.
The objective of TrapX’s deception technology platform is to trick attackers into thinking they are attacking a real service, when in fact they are not. The foundation of the TrapX system is a lightweight emulation engine that can mimic the way a real operating system works. With the new SWIFT capability, TrapX now can emulate a SWIFT terminal.
Attackers are attracted to the decoy SWIFT application, according to Greg Enriquez, CEO of TrapX. When interacting with TrapX’s SWIFT deception, attackers think they are attacking the real SWIFT system, he said. TrapX is able to monitor the emulated SWIFT terminal and see what procedures and methods attackers are using to infiltrate and exploit the system.
“It’s an emulation for SWIFT, and it’s so much more sophisticated than just attracting and luring attackers; we’re emulating the real devices,” Enriquez told eWEEK. “Our deception grid platform emulates dozens of operating environments, so we can do the operating system fingerprinting for anything.”
As TrapX sees new threats, it can build new deceptions to help enterprises, which it is now doing with the SWIFT capabilities, Enriquez said. He noted that TrapX didn’t need to license any technology from SWIFT to enable the deception. That said, TrapX has spoken with SWIFT, though there is no formal agreement or partnership between the two organizations, according to Enriquez.
SWIFT terminals are supposed to be on separate, isolated network segments. TrapX can be deployed on an organization’s separate virtual LAN (VLAN), though Enriquez noted that in many cases, networks that companies think to be isolated are often still connecting out to the public internet. He noted that TrapX’s goal is to help organizations lure hackers into the deception decoys, regardless of where they are coming in from.
Given that the SWIFT deception is intended to appear exactly like the real thing, there is a theoretical risk that a legitimate user could end up in the wrong place. However, according to Enriquez, TrapX’s deceptions have a low false-positive rate and don’t typically ensnare legitimate users.
“SWIFT hacking is a real problem,” he said. “It’s a very sensitive area for financial institutions.”
The SWIFT deception capability is being made available at no additional cost to existing TrapX customers.
TrapX raised $5 million in an extended Series B round of funding from Strategic Cyber Ventures (SCV) in April, bringing total funding to date for the company to $19 million.
“The investments we’ve taken have helped us to create more emulations for more environments,” Enriquez said. “Deception is a platform that has become a doctrine for cyber-warfare to help protect organizations from the bad things that can happen.”
Sean Michael Kerner is a senior editor at eWEEK and InternetNews.com. Follow him on Twitter @TechJournalist.


The Elm City is taking aim at childhood obesity.
New Haven kicked off Health in Your Hands, which is a community wellness program aimed to help Fair Haven and Hill neighborhoods.
The focus is more than 200 children and their families.
"Not just giving them a pamphlet, but making it engaging, making it fun,” New Haven Health Director Bryon Kennedy said. “Because when you have that going on is when you're going to have more of an impact. That's when it’s going to stick and that's when it’s going to be more sustainable."
In February, New Haven won first prize in the nationwide childhood obesity awards sponsored by the US Conference of Mayors. That grant is funding this program.
Copyright 2015 WFSB (Meredith Corporation). All rights reserved.


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Kelsea Ballerini took the country music world by storm this summer as her debut single, “Love Me Like You Mean It” raced up the charts to No. 1 and went Gold. Her second single, “Dibs” is doing the same thing, but now everybody knows the young singer’s name.
Ballerini’s latest song is heading along the same path as her first, just a little faster. She recently did the song acoustically for Vevo, but somehow it maintains its ultra-catchy vibe.
Ballerini was recently nominated for CMA Female Vocalist of the Year and Best New Artist.
Image Source: YouTube


PRATT WHITNEY PW127M MULTI RATED ENGINE
Airbus A320neos may get upgraded Pratt & Whitney engines starting this summer: COO Tom Williams
Williams didn't specify the month for the start of delivery of the engines. An airline executive in India said they should start coming in by July.
Pratt & Whitney suffering some jet engine delivery delays: Sources
The Geared Turbofan engine is about to go into service with the revamped A...
Vistara, Pratt & Whitney sign engine services agreement
Vistara, a TATA SIA joint venture airline company, has signed a services agreement to...
Stephen Pratt's Noodle.ai launches operations in India
Stephen Pratt said that the large talent pool in India was what made Noodle.ai set up its development centre in startup hub of the country.
Pratt & Whitney prepping for big production increase on F-35 jet engines
Production of the jets is slated to rise from 40 planes a year to more than 120 a year over the next three years.
Aircraft engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney opens training centre in Hyderabad
Aviation Minister Ashok Gajapati Raju inaugurated the facility. This is the third training centre of the company after the US and China.
IT firm Cyient buys Pratt & Whitney Global Engineering Services Asia
The deal is structured as an asset purchase and is expected close at the end of August.
Airbus finds 'minor damage' with Pratt & Whitney engine after A320neo test
Airbus Group SE said on Wednesday that the plane-maker found "minor damage" with an engine powering its new A320neo narrowbody jet after a flight test.
VietJet Air signs $3.04 billion deal with Pratt & Whitney
The engines will power the 63 Airbus A320neo and A321neo aircraft ordered by the carrier, VietJet said in a statement at the Singapore Airshow.
ISRO to test scramjet engine
The scramjet engine, used only during the atmospheric phase of the rocket's flight, will help in bringing down the launch cost by reducing the amount of oxidiser to be carried along with the fuel.
Tesla engineers fastest car
Electric-car maker Tesla Motors has planned to sell its S and X model electric cars with a battery packing to 100 kWh.
Airbus A320neo's engine problems to be solved by April -Pratt CEO
Any technical problems with the engines of Airbus's A320neo jetliner should be solved in the coming weeks, the head of engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney said.
Multi-discipline sports initiative of RIL Foundation launched
Over the next three months, the megapolis and its suburbs will see over 500 institutes fielding over 600 teams playing football at various grounds.
Pratt & Whitney to focus on powered-by-hour business model
Tanner said the airlines on this kind of programme enjoy low maintenance costs, fewer unscheduled removals and longer flying time.
ISRO successfully test launches scramjet rocket engine
The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on Sunday successfully tested its own scramjet - an engine that takes atmospheric oxygen to burn engine fuel - a senior ISRO official said.


Nearly seven decades the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union went toe-to-toe with the best companies of the West. In some cases, he surprised the West cheap, innovative and effective weapons systems. And sometimes it is very difficult collecting the planes that flew poorly, and ships that are barely kept afloat.
To save the Soviet Union could not, no arms, but some species could change the contours of the disintegration of the country. The relationship between technology and the human factor in the war, including doctrine and organization are very complex. Decisions about specific weapons systems can have far-reaching consequences for the defense of any country.
Often the decision to refuse from creation of certain types of weapons are reasonable. Events occur in such a way that the nation is focusing on her real interests and needs, not the pursuit of fame and prestige. In the case of Advice many samples of “wonder weapons” remained safely in the realm of fantasy as enemies of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union itself.
Battleship of the type “Soviet Union”
In the period between the two world wars, the Soviet Union considered various options for development and improvement of its dilapidated fleet. Until the first decade of the 20th century kings were quite powerful and modern naval fleet. But after the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian shipbuilding is substantially behind the West, but the revolution has weakened the industry and the Navy.
By the end of 1930-ies of the Soviet economy recovered to such an extent that Stalin was able to think seriously about the program of naval construction. A priority in this ambitious plan took the battleships of the type “Soviet Union”, as well as cruisers and aircraft carriers. “The Soviet Union” was created approximately on the basis of the Italian ship Littorio, with a displacement of 60 thousand tons, 9 guns of 16-inch caliber (406.4 mm — approx. ed.) and possessing a speed of 28 knots. For its size it could compete with the most powerful battleships in the world, although due to lack of experience and poor building practices such ships could encounter numerous problems in sea battle.
The USSR in the period from 1938 to 1940 laid the four of the planned 16 battleships. The construction was carried out in Leningrad, Nikolayev (on the Black sea) and in Molotovsk (the White sea). The construction of one battleship in 1940 canceled due to low quality of work. The creation of the other three ships was suspended with the outbreak of the Second world war, but after its completion of construction in Leningrad set out to continue. But smart heads prevailed, and the ships were dismantled.
The construction of such ships required a colossal effort and money. If construction was started before the USSR would have spent a significant portion of its national income on three ships, two of which would not have been able to go to the Baltic and the Black sea, and the third was limited to the support of the convoys in the Arctic. Materiel and industrial capacity of the Soviet Union found a much better use than for the construction of these four battleships.
The carriers of the “eagle” and “Ulyanovsk”
The Soviet Union began to study the construction of aircraft carriers shortly after the revolution, but as in the history of battleships, economic difficulties, the backwardness of Soviet industry and the Second world war interrupted the design. After the war Stalin undertook several ambitious attempts in this direction, then the Soviet government began to develop a more modest project to build aircraft carriers. The class helicopter carrier “Moskva” entered the fleet in the mid 1960-ies, and then in1970-ies and 1980-ies came into service of the aircraft carriers with aircraft vertical and short takeoff and landing type “Kiev”.
Then everything became more complicated. Someone suggested to act gradually, but were supporters of the construction of a full carrier (talking about the project “eagle”). The Soviet Navy has chosen the first path, improving the ships of “Kiev” and putting forward the idea of building non-nuclear carriers of the “Admiral Kuznetsov” with a ramp for aircraft.
In the Soviet Navy was hoping “Ulyanovsk” will replace the “Kuznetsov”. Having a displacement of 80 thousand tons and nuclear power plants, “Ulyanovsk” has become the first real competitor to the American supervisores. The “Ulyanovsk” kept jumping, but also have established quite a powerful catapult to the deck could launch fighters with shock weapons and planes of distant radar detection. That is, he became more or less equal to the American carriers. For the first time in the Soviet Navy could get a carrier capable of conducting offensive operations at great distances around the world.
But as is often the case with Soviet weapons systems, disaster intervened. At the end of the cold war, when the collapse of the Soviet Union, to complete the construction “Ulyanovsk” has become extremely difficult, and only built building was dismantled. Looking back, you realize that the gradual approach to this construction was warranted, because the result of all these works is the emergence of aircraft carriers and personnel of the naval pilots. However, the decision to abandon the construction of supervisora meant only one thing: the Soviet Navy could not give friends such security assurances offered by the United States Navy. So he was forced to use the sea strategy of response, and not pre-emptive action resorted to by the Navy of the West. But by the time the Soviets anyway had nothing to offer.
Heavy bomber of the interwar period
Although the Soviet air force during the Second world war had a powerful strategic bomber force in the interwar period Moscow has actively experimented with four-engined bombers, long-range. Actually, in the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union aircraft of this type was greater than that of any other country. However, most of them were outdated TB-3.
At the beginning of the war, the Soviets decided to limit bomber PE-8, which very roughly resembled the British Avro 683 Lancaster and b-17 Boeing. PE-8 has not achieved such successes as these two aircraft, mainly because of design problems and supply. But the Soviet air force carried out a truly ambitious projects, including a heavy bomber K-7, which was similar to the feverish hallucination of the “Junkers” and crashed during the eighth test flight that killed 14 people on Board.
The most promising models are a family of TB-3 / ANT-20 / and TB-6. Just planes-monsters with six or more motors. The designers sacrificed speed and maneuverability for heavy weapons, on the theory that the bombers in the battle line capable of defend himself from their pursuit of aviation. Transportation of the ANT-20 had eight engines, and it could carry 72 passengers. At least, that was before the prototype machine fell in the suburbs, and 45 people died. The ANT-26 could be a bomber variant of the ANT-20 with 12 engines and a bomb load of over 15 tons, which is significantly more than the b-29.
In the sky up only prototypes of these aerial monsters, and got up for a while. If the Soviet Union decided to go in this direction, it certainly would have seriously hampered the development of Soviet tactical aircraft and would take significant resources from the land forces of the red Army. Giant ANT-26 would most probably be easy prey for the German interceptor aircraft, although he could fly from bases beyond the reach of the Luftwaffe. Unlike the Western allies, the Soviet Union could not afford to expend energy and money on lengthy and costly bombing campaign with the use of strategic aviation. He had to smash the Wehrmacht troops on the battlefield. If the USSR had gone the way of the development of strategic bombers, he could hardly hold back the German offensive.
Super-heavy tank of the Tu-42 (as in the text, talking about T-42 — approx. TRANS.)
In 1930-e years the Soviet and German tanks in its design was a bit similar because of a common experience of the Kazan tank school. Being rejected in the international arena, Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union in the late 1920-ies began a fruitful collaboration in the development of aviation, armored vehicles and chemical weapons. When came to power the Nazis, the partnership was minimized, but the Soviets and the Germans came innovative ideas about tank technology and about its combat application.
In the interwar period there were several countries that had planned to create super-heavy tanks. It is a combat vehicle weighing three and even four times larger than the standard tanks. In particular, the German designer, Edward Grotte (Grotte Edward) worked on the creation of super-heavy models to Germany and the Soviet Union. Among the most interesting specimens, presented by the Soviet General staff, was the hundred-ton monster with three towers and a crew of 14-15 people, T-42, develops a speed of 27 kilometers per hour.
The t-42 did not progress beyond prototypes, but in Soviet military circles he attached great importance. Among other, more realistic projects, was the T-35, T-100, SMK, KV-4 and KV-5. To the stage of production reached only 45-ton tank T-35 with five towers. Almost all of the 60 built cars was destroyed in the first days of operation “Barbarossa”. This usually occurred due to mechanical breakdowns and flight crew.
Like most heavy tanks, the T-42 was too heavy, expensive and slow, and the mass production did not go. If the Red army decided to purchase this monster, it could lead to disaster in the battles against Japan, Finland and Germany, and the Soviet tank doctrine would be distorted and would be useless.
Many of the Soviet bombers of the postwar period were the direct counterparts of the American samples. T-4 was in fact a direct copy of the American b-29. T-4 Sukhoi became a response to the Soviet Union on the b-70 Valkyrie. This large and incredibly fast bomber capable of flying at high altitudes, has become a real challenge for the Soviet defense industry (as many expected).
T-4 was to develop a speed of M=3, have a ceiling of 21 thousand kilometers. Visually and according to the characteristics he resembled In-70. But since the organizational structure of the Soviet air force differed from the American, T-4 was intended for tactical tasks such as reconnaissance and attacks by anti-ship missiles. Anti-ship missiles Kh-22 on Board. MT-4 is really scary.
But the technical requirements were for the Soviet Union, and the aircraft serial production did not. Tolerances at such speed and at such a high altitude is very strict, and the Soviet aircraft industry was unable to establish reliable production of new machines. Moreover, the T-4 was largely the same problems as the At-70, including the problems of interception and vulnerability to anti-aircraft missiles. Based on the T-4 was created by the plane is the successor of the Tu-160 with variable geometry wings. In General, it was built only 35 of these aircraft, and weapons they came about 10 years after the scheduled date of commissioning of the T-4.
If the Soviet Union still built T-4, he would have to abandon much of its tactical aviation. But he would get a modern supersonic bomber capable of delivering to target anti-ship missiles. Because of this, it would be much harder to organize the defense of the American carrier battle groups, than after the appearance of the Tu-22M of the smaller size and range. Production of the T-4 can make adjustments to U.S. procurement, and the United States probably would pay more attention to V-1A, and strategic aircraft-interceptors. T-4 are extremely expensive to operate and maintain, but some of them could survive the collapse of the Soviet Union and now would be in service in the Russian air force.
The Soviet military was grandiose aspirations and global ambitions, and the military-industrial base with major disadvantages. In some cases, because such restrictions could create great weapons such as the T-34 and the MiG-21. In other cases, these limitations have prevented the adoption of disastrous decisions in the interwar period, say, about creating a giant heavy bombers, huge battleships and heavy tanks. But the main conclusion is that although the decision on creation of weapons systems often have an impact on the entire military-industrial base, they very rarely change the fate of countries.
Robert Farley teaches at Petersenovskaya the school of diplomacy and international trade (Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce) at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and Maritime Affairs.
This article first appeared in 2014 and was reprinted because the reader’s interest.


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FOUNDED IN 1857
by Godfrey Hodgson
The day Daniel Patrick Moynihan arrived at Harvard in the spring of 1966, he met some of his new colleagues at the Faculty Club in Cambridge. One of those present that evening was Professor Seymour Martin Lipset of the Harvard government department. “Hello, Pat,” said Lipset, “guess what Coleman’s found?”
“Coleman” was James S. Coleman, professor of social relations at Johns Hopkins, who had been charged by the Johnson Administration with conducting an extensive survey of “the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities” by reason of race, religion, or national origin. And what the Coleman survey had found, as Lipset paraphrased its voluminous findings, could hardly have come as more of a surprise. He had found, as Lipset told Moynihan excitedly, that “schools make no difference; families make the difference.”
Some six years later, Moynihan arrived a few minutes late for lunch with a friend at the same club, in a mood of jubilant intellectual pugnacity unusual even for him. Both the delay and the mood, he explained, resulted from a demonstration he had run into on his way across Harvard Yard from a class. Some students were handing out leaflets. It was their content which had produced Moynihan’s mood of sardonic amusement. “Christopher Jencks,” they said, “is a tool of reactionary American imperialist capitalism.”
Christopher Jencks a tool of capitalism? In the dozen years since he graduated from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, where he is now an associate professor, Sandy Jencks (as he is called) had moved perceptibly from the liberal toward the radical position. While an editor of The New Republic he began working with the distinctly New Left Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. He got into the neighborhood community control thing, and he helped to found the Cambridge Institute, which looks for “alternative visions of the American future”: decidedly one of the rising intellectual reputations on the American left. Now he has written a book, Inequality, in association with other researchers, working in large part from the same Coleman report data which, in Lipset’s words, showed that “schools make no difference.”
Pat Moynihan had started on the left, too. Trained as an orthodox social scientist, he grew up among liberals, and then discovered a most unorthodox flair for polemical prose and persuasive speech. After a political apprenticeship working for Governor Averell Harriman of New York, he took office as a liberal intellectual in good standing as an Assistant Secretary of Labor in the Kennedy Administration, and stayed on for a period under Johnson.
For some years now, however, he could hardly have been called a man of the left. His intellectual voyage can be dated from the publication of his report on the Negro family in 1965. Many liberals and blacks reacted with outrage to his dour assessment of the likelihood that orthodox liberal policies could eliminate the problems of the black under-class. He was outraged in turn by what he perceived as the liberals’ dishonest and antiintellectual refusal to follow where social science led. And by the time he returned to Washington in 1969 to serve Richard Nixon as a Cabinet-rank Counselor, he could no longer be called a man of the left at all. In recent years he has in fact established himself as the shrewdest strategist and most flamboyant impresario of an intellectual movement which can perhaps be called neo-conservative— though Moynihan maintains that it is radical. Whatever the label, it is almost contemptuously skeptical of the New Left and of conventional liberal shibboleths alike.
Moynihan’s amusement at seeing his colleague Jencks leafleted in Harvard Yard was not due to malice or Schadenfreude. On the contrary, it seemed to him to confirm that the argument between him and his friends and the left was over: that he had won. “Jencks ends up,” he told me, “where Richard Nixon was in 1969.”
Christopher Jencks does not see it that way. In fact, it is a strange kind of argument: one in which the participants largely agree about the Coleman survey, greatly as it surprised them when they first grasped it, but disagree, sometimes vehemently, on what it implies. The fight calls into question certain propositions which, until the Coleman report, few social scientists and few liberals dreamed of doubting: principally, that one of the main causes of inequality in American life has been inequality in education; and that education could be used as a tool to reduce inequality in society. The crucial role which education has been assigned in the United States is under heavy challenge. Is there now to be a retreat from the traditional faith in education as a tool of social change in America?
Since the days of Horace Mann and John Dewey—indeed since the days of Thomas Jefferson, that child of the Enlightenment—education has occupied a special place in the optimistic vision of American progressives, and of many American conservatives, for that matter. As the historian David Potter pointed out in People of Plenty, the American left, encouraged by the opportunities of an unexhausted continent and by the experience of economic success, has always differed sharply from the European left in that it has generally assumed that social problems could be resolved out of incremental growth: that is, that the life of the have-nots could be made tolerable without taking anything from the haves. Education has always seemed one of the most acceptable ways of using the national wealth to provide opportunity for the poor without offending the comfortable. As a tool of reform, education had the advantage that it appealed to the ideology of conservatives, to that ethic of self-improvement which stretches back down the American tradition through Horatio Alger and McGuffey’s Readers to Benjamin Franklin himself. This was particularly true in the age of the Great Migration. The public school systems of New York and other cities with large immigrant populations really did provide a measure of equality of opportunity to the immigrant poor. By the time the New Deal coalition was formed (and educators of one sort and another were to be a significant part of that coalition), these assumptions about education were deeply rooted. And they were powerfully reinforced, and virtually certified with the authority of social science, by the Supreme Court’s 1954 desegregation decision in Brown v. The School Board of Topeka. Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 Supreme Court decision by which statutory and customary segregation in the South were reconciled with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, was not a school case. (As it happens, it concerned segregation on a Lake Pontchartrain ferry steamer.) But when, in the late 1930s and the 1940s, the NAACP, its lawyers, and its allies began to go to court to lay siege to segregation, they deliberately, and wisely, chose education as the field of attack. This was not accidental; they well knew that education was so firmly associated with equality in the public mind that it would be an easier point of attack than, say, public accommodations or housing. Not coincidentally, they worked their way up to the main citadel of the 1954 Brown decision by way of a series of law school cases: lawyers would find it hard to deny that segregation in law school was irrelevant to success in professional life.
In Brown, the NAACP’s lawyers deployed social science evidence in support of their contention that segregated education was inherently unequal, citing especially work done by psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark with black children and black and white dolls. The Clarks’ conclusions were that segregation inflicts psychological harm.
The historical accident of the circumstances in which school segregation came to be overthrown by the Supreme Court contributed to the currency of what turned out to be a shaky assumption. The great majority of American liberals, and this included large numbers of judges. Democratic politicians, and educators, came to suppose that there was incontrovertible evidence in the findings of social science to prove not just that segregated education was unequal but that if you wanted to achieve equality, education could do it for you. Or, to put the same point in a slightly different way, the prominence given to footnote 11 in the Brown judgment, which listed social science research showing that education could not be both separate and equal, had the effect of partially obscuring the real grounds for overthrowing segregation, which were constitutional, political, and moral.
Then a contemporary development put education right at the center of the political stage. President Johnson’s “Great Society” was to be achieved without alienating the power structure and, above all, the Congress. Education was an important part of the Great Society strategy from the start, but as other approaches to reducing poverty and racial inequality, notably “community action,” ran into political opposition, they fell apart, and so the proportional emphasis on educational programs in the Great Society scheme grew. In the end, the Johnson Administration, heavily committed to reducing inequality, was almost equally committed to education as one of the principal ways to do it.
Each of the events and historical developments sketched here increased the shock effect of the Coleman report—once its conclusions were understood. A handful of social scientists had indeed hinted, before Coleman, that the effect of schools on equality of opportunity might have been exaggerated. But such work had simply made no dent in the almost universal assumption to the contrary.
James Coleman himself has confessed he does not know exactly why Congress, in section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ordered the Commissioner of Education to conduct a survey “concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion or national origin.” The most likely reason is that Congress thought it was setting out to document the obvious in order to arm the Administration with a public relations bludgeon to overcome opposition. Certainly James Coleman took it for granted that his survey would find gross differences in the quality of the schools that black and white children went to. “The study will show.” he predicted in an interview more than halfway through the job, “the difference in the quality of schools that the average Negro child and the average white child are exposed to. You know yourself that the difference is going to be striking.”
He was exactly wrong. Coleman was staggered— in the word of one of his associates—to find the lack of difference. When the results were in, from about 600‚000 children and 60,000 teachers in roughly 4000 schools, when they had been collected and collated and computed, and sifted with regression analysis and all the other refinements of statistical science, they were astonishing. A writer in Science called them “a spear pointed at the heart of the cherished American belief that equality of educational opportunity will increase the equality of educational achievement.”
What did the figures say? Christopher Jencks later picked out four major points:
(1) Most black and white Americans attended different schools.
(2) Despite popular impressions to the contrary, the physical facilities, the formal curricula, and most of the measurable characteristics of teachers in black and white schools were quite similar.
(3) Despite popular impressions to the contrary, measured differences in schools’ physical facilities, formal curricula, and teacher characteristics had very little effect on either black or white students’ performance on standardized tests.
(4) The one school characteristic that showed a consistent relationship to test performance was the one characteristic to which poor black children were denied access: classmates from affluent homes.
Here is how James Coleman himself summed up the 737 pages of his report (not to mention the additional 548 pages of statistical explanation):
Children were tested at the beginning of grades 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12. Achievement of the average American Indian, Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Negro (in this descending order)1 was much lower than the average white or Oriental American, at all grade levels . . . the differences are large to begin with, and they are even larger at higher grades. Two points, then, are clear: (1) these minority children have a serious educational deficiency at the start of school, which is obviously not a result of school, and (2) they have an even more serious deficiency at the end of school, which is obviously in part a result of school.
Coleman added that the survey showed that most of the variation in student achievement lay within the same school, and very little of it was between schools. Family background—whatever that might mean—must, he concluded, account for far more of the variation in achievement than differences between schools. Moreover, such differences as could be attributed to the schools seemed to result more from the social environment (Jencks’s “affluent classmates,” and also teachers) than from the quality of the school itself.
This was the most crucial point. For if quality were measured, as it had tended to be measured by administrators and educational reformers alike, in material terms, then the quality of the school, on Coleman’s data, counted for virtually nothing.
When other things were equal, the report said, factors such as the amount of money spent per pupil, or the number of books in the library, or physical facilities such as gymnasiums or cafeterias or laboratories, or even differences in the curriculum, seemed to make no appreciable difference to the children’s level of achievement. Nothing could have more flatly contradicted the assumptions on which the Administration in Washington, and urban school boards across the country, were pouring money into compensatory education programs.
As we shall see, the report exploded with immense force underground, sending seismic shocks through the academic and bureaucratic worlds of education. But on the surface the shock was not at first apparent. There were two main reasons for this. The first was that the report was, after all, long, tough, dry, and technical. It had been written in five months in order to comply with a congressional deadline, and it therefore made no attempt to point a moral or adorn a tale: it was essentially a mass of data. All of these characteristics militated against its being reported in detail by, for example, the Associated Press, the source from which most American newspapers get most of their outof-town news.
The Office of Education, which realized all too clearly how explosive the report was, didn’t exactly trumpet the news to the world. The report was released, by a hallowed bureaucratic stratagem, on the eve of July 4, 1966. Few reporters care to spend that holiday gutting 737 pages of regression analysis and standard deviations. And to head off those few who might have been tempted to make the effort if they guessed that there was a good story at the end of it, the Office of Education put out a summary report which can only be described as misleading. “Nationally,” it said, to take one example, “Negroes have fewer of some of the facilities that seem most related to academic achievement.” That was true. But it was not the significant truth.
The point was that the gap was far smaller than anyone expected it to be. To take one of the summary report’s own examples, it was true that Negro children had “less access” to chemistry labs than whites. But the difference was that only 94 percent of them, as compared to 98 percent of whites, went to schools with chemistry labs. That was hardly the kind of difference which could explain any large part of the gap between white and black achievements in school, let alone that larger gap, lurking in the back of every educational policy maker’s mind, between the average status and income of blacks and whites in life after they leave school.
A few attempts were made to discredit the survey. But the Coleman findings were in greater danger of being ignored than of being controverted when, at the beginning of the academic year in the fall of 1966, Pat Moynihan began to apply his talents to make sure that the report should not be ignored. He and Professor Thomas Pettigrew of the Harvard School of Education organized a Seminar on the Equality of Educational Opportunity Report (SEEOR). The seminar met every week at the Harvard Faculty Club, and by the end more than eighty people had taken part.
Moynihan had taken the precaution of getting a grant for expenses from the Carnegie Corporation, some of which was laid out on refreshments, stronger than coffee or cookies. “It was quite something, that seminar,” says Jencks, reminiscing. “Pat always had the very best booze and the best cigars.” But if Moynihan is a connoisseur of the good things in life, he also knows how to generate intellectual excitement, or to spot where it is welling up.
“When I was at the School of Education ten years ago,” Jencks says, “almost nobody who was literate was interested in education. The educational sociologists and psychologists, the educational economists, they were all pretty near the bottom of the heap. Suddenly that’s changed.”
“That seminar taught me something about Harvard,” Moynihan says. “People here are not interested in a problem when they think it’s solved. There are no reputations to be made there. But when something which people think was locked up opens up, suddenly they all want to get involved.” People started coming up to Moynihan in Harvard Yard and asking if they could take part: statisticians, economists, pediatricians‚ Professor Abram Chayes from the Law School (and the Kennedy State Department). Education had become fashionable. Jason Epstein of Random House and Charles E. Silberman from Fortune magazine started coming up from New York.
Harvard had seen nothing quite like it since the arms control seminars of the late 1950s, at which the future strategic policies of the Kennedy Administration were forged and the nucleus of the elite that was to operate them in government was brought together. In the intervening decade, domestic social questions had reasserted their urgency. Education had emerged as the field where all the agonizing problems of race, poverty, and the cities seemed to intersect.
If schools, as Seymour Martin Lipset paraphrased Coleman, “make no difference,” what could explain the inequalities of achievement in school and afterwards? One school of thought was ready and waiting in the wings with an answer. In the winter of 1969, the following words appeared in an article in the Harvard Educational Review:
There is an increasing realization among students of the psychology of the disadvantaged that the discrepancy in their average performance cannot be completely or directly attributed to discrimination or inequalities in education. It seems not unreasonable, in view of the fact that intelligence variation has a large genetic component, to hypothesize that genetic factors may play a part in this picture.
The author was Professor Arthur Jensen, not a Harvard man, but an educational psychologist from Berkeley with a national reputation. He had jabbed his finger at the rawest, most sensitive spot in the entire system of liberal thinking about education and equality in America. For after more than a generation of widespread IQ testing, it is an experimental finding, beloved of racists and profoundly disconcerting to liberals, that while the average white IQ is 100, the average black IQ is 85. Racists have seen in this statistical finding confirmation of a theory of innate biological inferiority. Conservatives have seen in it an argument against heavy expenditures on education, and against efforts to desegregate. And liberals have retorted that the lower average performance of blacks is due either to cultural bias in the tests used or to unfavorable environmental factors which require redoubled efforts on the part of social policy makers.
Jensen marched straight into the fiercest of this cross fire. He argued two propositions in particular in his article: that research findings suggest that heredity explains more of the differences in IQ between individuals than does environment, and that heredity accounts for the differences between the average IQ’s of groups as well as between those of individuals.
The article was scholarly in tone. In form it was largely a recital of research data. And it was tentative in its conclusion that perhaps more of the differential between blacks’ and whites’ average IQ’s was due to heredity than to environment. That did not stop it from causing a most formidable rumpus. It became a ninety days’ wonder in the press and the news magazines. It was discussed at a Cabinet meeting. And Students for a Democratic Society rampaged around the Berkeley campus chanting “Fight racism! Fire Jensen!”
Two years later, a long article in The Atlantic by Professor Richard Herrnstein on the history and implications of IQ provoked a reaction which showed that the sensitivity of the issue had by no means subsided. Herrnstein touched only gingerly on the racial issue. “Although there are scraps of evidence for a genetic component in the blackwhite difference,” he wrote, “the overwhelming case is for believing that American blacks have been at an environmental disadvantage ... a neutral commentator (a rarity these days) would have to say that the case is simply not settled, given our present stage of knowledge.”
Neutral commentators certainly proved rare among those who wrote in to the editor. Arthur Jensen wrote to say that Herrnstein’s essay was “the most accurately informative psychological article I have ever read in the popular press”; while a professor from the University of Connecticut said: “This is not new. Hitler’s propagandists used the same tactics in the thirties while his metal workers put the finishing touches on the gas ovens.”
If Herrnstein—understandably enough—tiptoed cautiously around the outskirts of the black-white IQ argument, he charged boldly enough into another part of the field. The closer society came to its ideal of unimpeded upward social mobility, the closer he predicted it would come to “meritocracy,” a visionary state of society described by the British sociologist Michael Young. A new upper class composed of the descendants of the most successful competitors with the highest IQ’s would defend its own advantage far more skillfully and successfully than did the old aristocracies. Herrnstein did not welcome this trend; he merely argued that it might be inevitable. “Our society may be sorting itself willy-nilly into inherited castes,” he concluded gloomily. Or, as his Harvard colleague David K. Cohen neatly epigrammatized Herrnstein’s long article in a rejoinder in Commentary, “His essay questioned the traditional liberal idea that stupidity results from the inheritance of poverty, contending instead that poverty results from the inheritance of stupidity.”
Cohen went on to disagree with Herrnstein’s prediction. “America is not a meritocracy,” he wrote, “if by that we mean a society in which income, status, or power are heavily determined by IQ. . . . Being stupid is not what is responsible for being poor in America.”
But that still left the original question open.
If differences in the quality of schools, as measured by money, facilities, and curricula, don’t explain inequality, because the differences between the schools attended by children of different racial groups are simply not that great in those respects, then what does? Genetic differentials in IQ, perhaps, says Jensen. Nonsense, says a majority of the educational community; the explanation is more likely to be integration—or rather the lack of it.
“I’m a Southern liberal,” says Tom Pettigrew. “There are only about thirty of us, and my wife says we all know each other.” Pettigrew comes from Richmond, Virginia, but his father immigrated from Scotland, and there is something about him that strikes one as more typically Scots than Southern. He is a shy man with a passion for methodological precision: “I really believe that data can free us,” he says. He also has a deceptive, because quiet, commitment to the liberal faith.
The Coleman report gave only three pages to the effects of desegregation, and Pettigrew didn’t think that was enough. At Jim Coleman’s explicit insistence, the data bank of the survey was to be made generally available for the cost of the computer tapes. Pettigrew persuaded the Civil Rights Commission to take advantage of this and to reanalyze the data to see what light it cast on the effects of desegregation. David Cohen and Pettigrew were the main authors of the resulting survey, which came out in 1967 as Racial Isolation in the Public Schools and gave the impression that the Coleman data supported desegregation. This was true up to a point. Coleman had concluded that desegregation did have an effect. But his report also showed that social class had a greater effect. Pettigrew is not much troubled by this, because of the close connection between race and social class in America. “Two-thirds of the whites are middleclass,” he says, “and two-thirds of the blacks are working-class.”
Pettigrew also draws a sharp distinction between desegregation and integration. By integration he means an atmosphere of genuine acceptance and friendly respect across racial lines, and he believes that mere desegregation won’t help blacks to do better in school until this kind of atmosphere is achieved. He is impressed by the work of Professor Irwin Katz, who has found that black children do best in truly integrated situations, moderately well in all-black situations, and worst of all in “interracial situations characterized by stress and threat.”
Pettigrew believes, in other words, that integration, as opposed to mere desegregation, will be needed to bring black children’s achievement up to equality with whites’. And he argues that no one can say that integration hasn’t worked, for the simple reason that it hasn’t been tried.
“The U.S. is going through a period of self-flagellation,” he said to me. “I dispute the argument that Moynihan is forever putting out. He says liberalism was tried and didn’t work.” This, as we shall see, misstates Moynihan’s views. The difficulty is partly semantic. Moynihan believes that past policies, which can be called “liberal,” have “worked” in the sense that they have produced a surprising degree of equality in terms of all the resources that go into schools, without, however, achieving equality of outcome. “I say liberalism hasn’t been tried,” Pettigrew goes on. “Racial integration has yet to be tried in this country.” Desegregation proceeded so slowly, Pettigrew says, that the courts “got mad and started ruling for busing in 1969 and 1970.” Until desegregation is achieved, he argues, we won’t know whether integration works.
The Civil Rights Commission’s report on racial isolation did recommend that the federal government set a national standard that no black children should go to a school that was more than 50 percent black. In practical terms, that meant busing. And, in fact, Pettigrew argues that some busing will be needed to achieve desegregation—and thus to produce the physical circumstances in which integration as he understands it can take place. He has been actively involved as a witness in several desegregation suits in which he has advocated busing.
It is, therefore, as Pettigrew himself wryly remarks, an irony that he should have suggested to one of his junior colleagues at the Harvard School of Education that he do a study on busing. The colleague’s name was David Armor, and Pettigrew’s idea was that it would be interesting to take a look at Project Metco, a scheme for busing children out of Roxbury, the main Boston ghetto, into nearby white suburban schools.
That was in 1969. Three years later, a paper by David Armor called “The Evidence on Busing” was published in The Public Interest. Armor said he had concentrated on the question of whether “induced integration”—that is, busing—“enhances black achievement, self-esteem, race relations, and opportunities for higher education.” In a word‚ Armor maintained that it did not.
The article used data not only from Project Metco but from reports of four other Northern programs for induced integration: in White Plains, New York; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Riverside, California; and New Haven and Hartford, Connecticut. And on the basis of this data,2 Armor maintained that “the available evidence . . . indicates that busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of blacks or for increasing interracial harmony.”
“None of the studies,” said Armor, “were able to demonstrate conclusively that integration has had an effect on academic achievement as measured by standardized tests.” Aspirations, indeed, were high among the black children in Project Metco. But they might be too high, in view of the fact that, while 80 percent of them started college, half of them dropped out. As for race relations, Armor found the bused students not only more militant but actually more hostile to integration than the study’s “control group,” which was not bused. Militancy, as measured, for example, by sympathy with the Black Panthers, seemed to be particularly rife among those children who had high aspirations (such as going to college) but were getting C grades or below in competitive suburban high schools.
But Armor did not limit himself to reporting the results of his own Metco study and the other four studies. His article was a sweeping, slashing attack on the whole tradition of liberal social science. He described what he called the “integration policy model,” based on social science research going back to the time of John Dollard and Gunnar Myrdal. Though the “real goals of social science and public policy are not in opposition,” Armor said, he claimed that almost all of the “major premises of the integration policy model are not supported by the data”—by which he meant the studies he quoted.
It was a frontal assault on the liberal tradition in the social sciences for a generation: on “forty years of studies,” as one of his opponents put it. At one point Armor came close to accusing his opponents of deliberate dishonesty: “There is the danger that important research may be stopped when the desired results are not forthcoming. The current controversy over the busing of schoolchildren affords a prime example.”
It was not likely that such an attack would go unanswered, and, in fact, the response was both swift and severe. Pettigrew and three colleagues fired back a critique which called Armor’s article “a distorted and incomplete review.” To back up their charge, they argued that the studies Armor had cited as “the evidence on busing” were highly selective. Armor had not discussed seven other studies which they said met his own methodological criteria—from New York, Buffalo, Rochester, Newark, Philadelphia, Sacramento, and North Carolina—surveys which had reported positive achievement results for bused blacks. The integrationists also found what they claimed were disastrous weaknesses in Armor’s own Metco study. For one thing, they said, he compared the bused children with a control group which included children who were also attending desegregated schools, though not under Project Metco. “Incredible as it sounds,” Pettigrew and his colleagues commented, “Dr. Armor compared children who were bused to desegregated schools with other children many of whom were also bused to desegregated schools. Not surprisingly he found few differences between them.”
“We respect Dr. Armor’s right to publish his views against mandatory busing,” they said. “But we challenge his claim that those views are based on scientific evidence.” (Armor is replying to the critique in The Public Interest, the journal which published his paper.)
If the tone of the public controversy sounds rough, it was positively courtly compared to the atmosphere inside William James Hall, the new Harvard high-rise where Pettigrew and Armor had their offices, two doors apart.
Armor, too, started out on the left. He was president of the student body at Berkeley in 1959-1960, and head of SLATE, a forerunner of the radical Free Speech Movement there. He was also a protégé of Pettigrew’s at Harvard, and indeed a close friend. But by the spring of 1972, Pettigrew realized that Armor had become vehemently opposed to mandatory busing.
Both men became very bitter. Armor failed to get tenure at Harvard, and has now moved to a visiting professorship at UCLA. Armor accused one of Pettigrew’s assistants of breaking into his office to steal his Metco data. Pettigrew wrote to the New York Times: “There is no evidence beyond the allegation itself for the charge, much less any link between the paper’s critics and the alleged intrusion.” Armor accused Pettigrew of suppressing his paper; Pettigrew does concede that he told Armor that he had done “incomparable harm” by publishing it.
Tempers, in short, were comprehensively lost over the Armor affair. Much of the bitterness, no doubt, must be put down to personal factors. But it would be wrong to dismiss the episode as a mere squabble between professors. For it shows just how traumatically a world where consensus reigned half a dozen years ago has been affected by the pressure to abandon certain cherished premises. And the issue, after all, is the interrelationship of education, race, and equality in America, which is not exactly a recondite academic quibble.
To an unbiased eye (“a rarity these days,” as Richard Herrnstein might say), Armor’s paper has been rather seriously impugned. It does not follow that his central thesis is entirely discredited. Even Pettigrew was quoted, at the height of the row, as saying that “nobody is claiming that integration has been a raving success.” “That’s not what they were saying before,” says Moynihan. And Christopher Jencks, who can hardly be accused of conservative prejudice, has summed up the evidence in the most cautious and equivocal way. Blacks, he says, might do much better in “truly integrated schools, whatever they may be.” Failing that consummation, devoutly to be wished, the benefits of desegregation appear to be spotty, and busing can be expected to yield contradictory results.
Jencks’s position is easily misunderstood. In an interview, he drew some distinctions for me. He reminded me that he had himself written that the Coleman report “put the weight of social science behind integration.” It was not until Armor’s article was published, he said, that social scientists began to argue that desegregation itself might not work. Jencks personally feels that Armor’s data were shaky, and that the effect of Armor’s paper came from its review of other studies—a review which, as Pettigrew pointed out, does not refer to all the available studies. Jencks himself thinks that desegregation is probably necessary, simply in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, in virtually every urban school district in the country. He does, however, have personal reservations about mandatory busing, on libertarian grounds. The furthest he would go was to say, “I think that a case can be made out that busing might be a useful part of an overall strategy of desegregation.” That is not to say that he has any tenderness toward segregation. On the contrary, he rejects it as absolutely as any of the “integrationists.” The difference is that Jencks does not think that segregation explains nearly as much of existing inequality as the integrationists think it does.
But with Armor’s paper and its reception, we are getting ahead of the story. The Coleman report came out in 1966. It was not until 1972 that two major books appeared, each an attempt to reassess the whole question of the relationship between education and equality in America in the light of the Coleman data. Each was collaborative.
The first of these two books was the Random House collection of papers arising out of the SEEOR seminar, which was published as On Equality of Educational Opportunity, with Frederick Mosteller (professor of mathematical statistics at Harvard) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan as co-editors. Most of the leading participants in the debate contributed chapters: Pettigrew and Armor, Coleman, David Cohen, and Christopher Jencks among them. The introductory essay was signed jointly by Mosteller and Moynihan. If much of the technical analysis and of the drafting were Mosteller’s, the essay’s style and conclusions are vintage Moynihan.
Later in the year, Christopher Jencks and seven of his colleagues (two of whom, Marshall Smith and David Cohen, had also contributed to the Mosteller-Moynihan volume) published an only slightly less massive book: Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America. This work displays considerably more intellectual cohesion than the Mosteller-Moynihan book, presumably because Jencks actually wrote his group’s text himself from start to finish and, according to the preface, it “embodies his prejudices and obsessions, and these are not shared by all the authors.” But again, though the book draws upon data from dozens of other largeand smallscale surveys, the data from the Coleman survey are the bedrock and foundation.
The enormous body of analysis and reinterpretation in these two books represents the completion of the first stage of the reaction to Coleman. I began by quoting Professor Lipset’s hasty shorthand for Coleman’s central discovery: “schools make no difference.” Professor Pettigrew draws an important distinction. “Never once was it said that schools make no difference. The belief that Coleman hit was the belief that you could make a difference with money.” (He added: “Americans are crazy in the head about money; they think you can do everything with money.”) However that may be, the nub of the discovery that has set off the whole prolonged, disturbing, confusing, sometimes bitter debate can be expressed as a simple syllogism:
(1) The “quality” of the schools attended by black and white children in America was more nearly equal than anyone supposed. (2) The gap between the achievement of black and white children got wider, not narrower, over twelve years at school. (3) Therefore there was no reason to suppose that increasing the flow of resources into the schools would affect the outcome in terms of achievement, let alone eliminate inequality.
Among the social scientists, the central ground of debate about the meaning of those findings now lies between Jencks and Moynihan. It is a strange debate, for the two protagonists have much in common, even if one does have New Left loyalties, and the other served in Nixon’s White House and now as Nixon’s Ambassador to India. Both use the same data. Indeed, the spectacle of social scientists reaching into the same data bank for ammunition to fire at each other is sometimes reminiscent of war between two legs of the same octopus. Both agree on many of the implications of the data, and on many of the conclusions to be drawn from them. Yet those who lump the two professors together, as many practical educators and civil rights lawyers do, as “Moynihan and Jencks and those people up at Harvard,” could hardly be more wrong. The two men are divided by temperament and ideology in the preconceptions they bring to the data, and ultimately in the policy prescriptions they draw from that data.
Perhaps the very heart of their disagreement, after all, comes down to a matter of temperament. Is a glass half empty, or is it half full? A pessimist will say it is half empty when an optimist says it is half full. Pat Moynihan (and his co-author Mosteller—but I should be surprised if these particular thoughts were not Moynihan’s contribution, since they coincide with so much that he has said and written elsewhere) looked at the Coleman data and made the very reasonable inference that if the differences in quality between the schools attended by different groups of children in the United States were so much smaller than everyone had expected to find them, then the United States had come much closer to realizing the goal of equality of educational opportunity than most people realized. He then chose to relate this to the general question of social optimism versus social pessimism. At the time of the Coleman report’s publication, “a certain atmosphere of ‘cultural despair’ was gathering in the nation,” they wrote, “and has since been more in evidence. Some would say more in order. We simply disagree with such despair.”
One of the specific recommendations of the Mosteller-Moynihan essay is optimism. The electorate should maintain the pressure on government and school boards, the essay urges, “with an attitude that optimistically expects gains, but‚ knowing their rarity, appreciates them when they occur.” Yet on examination this is a strange use of the word optimism. For optimism normally connotes an attitude toward the future. But the emotion that is being evoked here has more to do with the past: it is not optimism so much as pride. “The nation entered the middle third of the twentieth century bound to the mores of caste and class. The white race was dominant. . . . Education beyond a fairly rudimentary point was largely determined by social status. In a bare third of a century these circumstances have been extensively changed. Changed! Not merely a sequence of events drifting in one direction or another. To the contrary, events have been bent to the national will.” True, the essay concedes, the period ended with racial tensions higher than ever before, and with dissatisfaction with the educational system approaching crisis. Nevertheless, say Moynihan and Mosteller, we should accentuate the positive. “It is simply extraordinary that so much has been done. . . . No small achievement! In truth, a splendid one. . . . It truly is not sinful to take modest satisfaction in our progress.”
Swept along by the dithyrambic rhythm of these tributes to past policies, it would be easy to conclude that Moynihan thinks they should be pressed to the utmost. But he does not. When I asked him why not, he replied promptly, if cryptically: “Production functions.” In an article in the fall, 1972, issue of The Public Interest, he spells out what he means. The argument is characteristically simple, forceful, and provocative.
Proposition 1: “The most striking aspect of educational expenditure is how large it has become.” It has now reached $1000 per pupil per annum, and it has been rising at 9.7 percent annually for the last ten years, while the GNP has risen 6.8 percent.
Proposition 2 (the Coleman point): Maybe not much learning takes place in a school without teachers or a roof. But “after a point school expenditure does not seem to have any notable influence on school achievement.”
There are, Moynihan concedes, considerable legional‚ class, racial, and ethnic variations in achievement, and he would like to see them disappear. “But it is simply not clear that school expenditure is the heart of the matter.”
This is where the production function, or what is more familiar to laymen as the law of diminishing returns, comes in, according to Moynihan. The liberal faith held that expenditure of resources on education would produce not merely a greater equality in scholastic achievement, but greater equality in society. On the contrary, says Moynihan, additional expenditure on education (and indeed on certain other social policies) is likely to produce greater inequality, at least of income.
The day the students leafleted Christopher Jencks in Harvard Yard, Moynihan said to me: “They’re defending a class interest.” What he meant was that as future teachers, or social workers‚ or administrators of education or social policies, left-wing students had a vested economic interest in the high-investment “liberal” policies they defended.
“Any increase in school expenditure,” Moynihan wrote in The Public Interest, “will in the first instance accrue to teachers, who receive about 68% of the operating expenditure of elementary and secondary schools. That these are estimable and deserving persons none should doubt”—Brutus is an honorable man—“but neither should there be any illusion that they are deprived.” With teachers earning some $10,000 a year on the average, he argues, and with many of them married women with well-paid husbands, “increasing educational expenditures will have the short-run effect of income inequality.”
As a matter of statistical fact, that may be literally true. But it is a peculiar argument nonetheless, for several reasons. For, leaving aside the matter of their spouses’ incomes, teachers are not, relatively, a highly paid group. Marginal increases in their salaries have an imperceptible effect on inequality in the national income distribution.
Whatever its merits, however, Moynihan’s position is plain. But it is worth noting that this position fits oddly with an exhortation to optimism. There is indeed nothing sinful about taking satisfaction in past progress; but when this attitude is combined with skepticism about the benefits to be expected from future public expenditure, it is usually called not optimistic but conservative.
Like Moynihan, Christopher Jencks is concerned with equality, not only in the schools but also in the world after school. The essence, and the originality, of his thinking lie in the use he makes of two crucial, though in themselves unoriginal‚ distinctions.
The first distinction is between equality of opportunity and equality of condition. Most Americans say they are in favor of equality. But what most of them mean by this is equality of opportunity. What we have learned from the Coleman report, says Jencks, and from the fate of the reforms of the 1960s, is that contrary to the conventional wisdom, you cannot have equality of opportunity without a good deal of equality of condition—now and not in the hereafter.
This is where the second of Jencks’s distinctions comes in. Where the Coleman survey, and most of the work published in the Mosteller-Moynihan volume, looked at the degree of equality between groups, Jencks is more interested in inequality between individuals. Coleman’s conception of equality looked at the distribution of opportunity between two groups. For Coleman, as Marshall Smith puts it, if you laid the distribution curve of one group over the distribution curve of the other, and they coincided exactly, then you could say that the two groups were equal. And Coleman found that between white and black Americans, this was closer to being true than most people had suspected. “Sandy Jencks is saying that though this may apply as between groups, this approximate equality disappears when you look at individuals.”
It is cause for shock, he says in the preface to his book, “that white workers earn 50 percent more than black workers.” But it is a good deal more shocking “that the best-paid fifth of all white workers earns 600 percent more than the worstpaid fifth. From this point of view, racial inequality looks almost insignificant”—by comparison with economic inequality.
Is the glass half empty, or half full? If Moynihan’s instinct is to emphasize the real progress that has been made toward reducing inequality in America, Jencks stresses how much inequality remains, not only in educational opportunity, in learning skills, and in educational credentials but also in job status, in job satisfaction, and in income.
The trouble is, he points out—and here I am summarizing an argument which is based, step by step, on mountains of statistical data—that whatever measure you take—income, socioeconomic status, or education—there is plenty of inequality among Americans. But the same people by no means always come out at the same point on each measure. In the social scientists’ terms, these different kinds of inequality don’t “correlate” very closely. It follows that school reform is not likely to effect much greater equality outside the school. The “factory model,” which assumes that the school’s outcome is the direct product of its inputs, must be abandoned, says Jencks. For him, a school is in reality more like a family than a factory.
This idea underlies a surprising strand in Jencks’s thought. If there is no direct correlation between expenditure on schools and effects on society—for example, in producing greater equality between racial groups—some would draw the lesson that it is not worth spending more than a (possibly quite high) minimum on schools. (That is something like Moynihan’s theoretical position, as we have seen.) No, says Jencks, spend more money; not because of the benefits it will bring in some sociological hereafter but simply because people spend something close to a fifth of their life in school, and it is better that they spend that time in a pleasant and comfortable environment.
“There is no evidence,” Jencks writes, “that building a school playground will affect the students’ chances of learning to read, getting into college, or earning $50,000 a year when they are fifty. Building a playground may, however, have a considerable effect on the students’ chances of having a good time during recess when they are eight.” And in a recent statement protesting the use of the conclusions which Inequality reaches “to justify limiting educational expenditures and abandoning efforts at desegregation,” Jencks writes that “educators will have to keep struggling,” and that “they need more help than they are currently getting.” But he concludes that the egalitarian trend in American education over the last thirty years has not made the distribution of either income or status outside the schools much more equal. He writes: “As long as egalitarians assume that public policy cannot contribute to economic equality directly, but must proceed by ingenious manipulation of marginal institutions like the schools, progress will remain glacial.”
“Marginal institutions like the schools”! The phrase sets Jencks every bit as far outside the old liberal orthodoxy as Moynihan’s suggestion that spending money on schools may actually increase inequality. Fourteen words from the end of his book Jencks unfurls a word which startles many of his readers. “If we want to move beyond this tradition, we will have to establish political control over the economic institutions that shape our society. That is what other countries usually call socialism. Anything less will end in the same disappointment as the reforms of the 1960s.”3
Norman Drachler was superintendent of the huge, tormented Detroit public school system from 1966 to 1971. When I talked to him recently, he was going through the anguish of liberal educators who had the intellectual honesty to try to reconcile the new teachings of the social scientists with the working assumptions of a lifetime of effort.
He showed me a headline from the New York Times of December 4, 1966, which perfectly summed up the pre-Coleman orthodoxy, WHEN SPENDING FOR EDUCATION IS LOW, it said, ARMY INTELLIGENCE TEST FAILURES ARE HIGH. And he showed me figures to prove that when federal money under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was concentrated on the schools with the greatest need in Detroit, reading scores improved by two months from 1965 to 1971, while the city-wide average declined by two months. “In the worst schools, Title I helped to arrest a disastrous fall,” says Drachler. “Where we spent more money, we did do better.”
How did he square this with the Coleman report?
“I think Coleman is basically correct. With better schools we can only make a small difference. But it is worth that investment.”
The post-Coleman challenge to the case for spending money on education is beginning to echo through the halls of Congress, ominously for the supporters of federal aid to education, who include both Representative John Brademas, Democrat of Indiana, the chairman of the House Select Subcommittee on Education, and one of his Republican colleagues‚ Representative Albert Quie of Minnesota. In a recent speech Quie has made it plain that he remains to be convinced that compensatory education makes no difference. John Brademas is afraid that the social science findings, misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented, will be used to justify savage cuts in federal aid to elementary and secondary education and to make opposition to such programs respectable. He is deeply skeptical of the case against the efficacy of educational spending, pointing out not only that federal aid still amounts to only 7 percent of the cost of elementary and secondary schooling but also that in many cases funds intended under Title I for compensatory education for underprivileged children have been indiscriminately spent for political reasons on middle-class children, so that few valid conclusions can be drawn from the experience of Title I. He feels adrift without adequate information, while the opponents of educational spending are able to use the social scientists’ evidence, often disingenuously. In his own reelection campaign in Indiana last fall he was amused, but not happy, to find his Republican opponent quoting what he called the “Colombo report” (meaning the Coleman report) at him.
Education lobbyists claim that the “Jencks report” has been freely cited by the Nixon Administration’s Office of Management and Budget on Capitol Hill in justification of the cuts in the fiscal 1974 budget. And even in some of the more conservative governors’ offices, one lobbyist for elementary and secondary education told me there is a widespread feeling that “Coleman and Jencks” have the effect of giving education a low priority.
Money is one issue; integration is another. Although‚ as Christopher Jencks put it to me, “the impact both of Coleman and of the MoynihanMosteller book is to put the support of social science behind integration,” and even though a majority of the social scientists who have spoken up remains integrationist, there is no mistaking the chill which the Armor paper, supported as it has been to some extent by various influential figures in the intellectual community, has sent down the spines of the integrationists. Last November, for example, Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner for Education in the Johnson Administration (he is now with the Ford Foundation), conceded that “the lively researches of statistically oriented social scientists have cast some shadows on conventional assumptions about the benefits of integration, particularly in the schools.”
The first place where those shadows would fall is in the courts, which are now jammed with cases arising from the tough desegregation orders made by federal judges in all parts of the country since 1969, Integrationists insist that the law requires school desegregation under the Fourteenth Amendment, wholly independent of social science data regarding its effect. As former Chief Justice Earl Warren put it in a recent interview with Dr. Abram Sachar of Brandeis, Brown was a race case, not an education case. And so far the judges have upheld the principle that the requirement of desegregation in the law is independent of evidence about its effect.
But already the courts have begun to hear social science evidence about the equality of achievement in schools. In Keyes (the Denver school desegregation case which the Supreme Court has already heard, but on which it has not yet handed down its opinion), Judge William Doyle, in the district court, asked for evidence about the achievement of seventeen schools which he found to be segregated, though not as a result of public policy. James Coleman himself was one of the witnesses, and he testified that while compensatory education had proved disappointing, desegregation might be helpful.
David Armor was a witness on the other side in one of the Detroit desegregation hearings. But in the Memphis case, where his paper was produced in evidence, the court of appeals gave it short shrift. Judge Anthony Celebrezze (a former Democratic Secretary of HEW) dismissed it as “a single piece of much criticized sociological research,” and said “it would be presumptuous in the extreme for us to refuse to follow a Supreme Court decision on the basis of such meager evidence.”
Judicial reaction generally, says Louis Lucas, a Memphis lawyer who appeared for plaintiffs in both the Detroit and Memphis cases, “has been to say ‘a plague on both your houses’ to the social scientists. They have noticed how much criticism of the new findings there has been, and they say in effect, ‘We are not going to re-try Brown.’”
But that is exactly what less sanguine integrationists are afraid the Supreme Court will do, with respect to the most difficult Northern desegregation cases: not frontally, but by erosion. Norman Drachler‚ for example, told me he thought it very probable that the Burger Court would find some way to re-try Brown without seeming to do so. Nick Flannery, of the Harvard Center for Law and Education, told me that “the Burger Court will almost certainly be looking for distinctions to draw that will narrow the scope of Brown. ”
Flannery suggested some possibilities. The Court could adopt Judge Doyle’s argument (in the Denver case) that not all segregation results from public policy. Or it could adopt the Justice Department’s contention that the wrong to be remedied is not segregation itself, but discrimination, so that the plaintiff can get relief only when he can show not merely generalized segregation but particular instances of discrimination. In the Swann case, in 1971, having to do with Charlotte, North Carolina, Chief Justice Warren Burger laid down the principle that the scope of the remedy need not exceed the scope of the violation. That might seem to lay the groundwork for limiting Brown in this way. Alternatively, the Court might reverse the integrationist doctrine that has been developing in the lower courts, by imposing burdens of proof on the plaintiffs which would make the process of bringing a school desegregation case even lengthier and more expensive than it is already.
Some years ago, the great historian of the South, C. Vann Woodward of Yale, compared the civil rights movement of the 1960s to the Reconstruction period after the Civil War and said that he thought this second Reconstruction was ending. There is a parallel in the intellectual world that Woodward did not draw. The 1870s—the years of “reunion and reaction,” when the nation wearied of the political impasse created by white resistance to the Radicals’ drive for Negro equality—were also the years when American intellectual life was swept by the ideas of Herbert Spencer and his followers, the Social Darwinists. Their enthusiasm for ruthless competition that would drive the weakest to the wall, for “anarchy with a policeman” as the type of society most likely to produce the highest evolution of man, did much to rationalize and to justify public indifference as white supremacy reasserted itself after Reconstruction. The skepticism about the efficacy of social reform which seems to be emerging from the social science of the Nixon era in itself, of course, bears no resemblance to the harsh Social Darwinism of the age of the Robber Barons. The only parallel would lie in the danger that this new skepticism which is eroding the confident liberal assumptions could be distorted and used to rationalize a second period of indifference in a nation once again weary of the stress of reform.
What can be said, at the end of the first stage of the reception of the Coleman doctrine, is that— whether you believe with Daniel Patrick Moynihan that liberal education policies of the last few generations have succeeded so well that they have run into diminishing returns, or with Christopher Jencks that they have proved disappointing—those policies, and the intellectual assumptions on which they were built, are in bad trouble. They have lost support in the ranks of the social scientists who provided America, from Roosevelt to Johnson, with a major part of its operating ideology. □
- Coleman oversimplified his own report slightly on this point: in the first grade blacks did better than Puerto Ricans, while in the twelfth grade Mexican Americans did better than American Indians.↩
- Armor mentioned three other studies: one from Berkeley, California, one from Evanston, Illinois, and one from Rochester, New York.↩
- In one sense‚ Moynihan is closer to Jencks than is generally supposed. When he went to work for President Nixon, both he and the President were fully aware of the Coleman conclusions. At that point, in February, 1969, two documents arrived on Moynihan’s desk within seventy-two hours. The first was Arthur Jensen’s article, which started from the proposition that compensatory education wasn’t working. The second document, the Ohio Westinghouse report, was a gloomy appraisal of one major experiment with compensatory education. Project Headstart. Moynihan says that the conception of his Family Assistance Plan was directly influenced by the social science findings about education and equality. “The argument was put to the President,” he says, “that enormous expectations had built up that you could achieve racial equality through compensatory education‚ and it was not working. Point two: a proposition had been put forward by Dr Jensen which the democracy could not live with. Therefore, point three: you had to move directly to income redistribution.” There is an ironic parallel here—if a distant one—to the way in which Christopher Jencks concludes his book Inequality.↩

domain: politics


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Looking for the best Kulula Airlines specials online? ClickClickGo enables you to compare Kulula.com flight prices to other low cost carriers’ fares. Book your own flights online – 24/7, 365! Find out more about Kulula’s flight routes, specials and the airline’s fleet below. To book your tickets, input your travel dates using our booking engine right now.
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About the airline
Kulula Airlines, also known as Kulula.com, is a trading name brand of South African airline Comair. Comair also operates scheduled passenger flights as a British Airways franchisee. South African travelers just love Kulula, especially for being South Africa’s first no-frills low cost carrier. Its especially known for its entertaining (and typically competitive) advertising campaigns. During 2010, for example, the airline was forced to stop a FIFA focused ad campaign. They opted to position theselves as “The Unofficial National Carrier of the You-Know-What”. During 2015, the airline has also been judged to be one of the safest airlines in the world by the aviation website AirlineRatings.com. Read all about that here.
Rather than focusing only on cheap flights, the airline positioned itself as a “full-on travel” solution, giving air travelers the ability to book, pay and travel without the need to deal with a travel agency. Kulula Airlines was founded in 2001, and flies to 6 key cities around South Africa from its flight hubs at OR Tambo International and Lanseria International Airports. The airline is headquartered in Kempton Park, Gauteng, and operates scheduled services to most major South African business hubs. The airline’s branding is bold, and bright green, and their livery is frequently hilarious. As is to be expected aboard any low cost carrier, snacks and refreshments are available for purchase. The airline’s in-flight magazine, Khuluma, has a readership of over 200,000 people per month. The check-in counters for Kulula open 90 minutes before departure, and close 30 minutes prior to take-off.
Kulula Airlines Specials
Kulula offers ongoing specials on flights and holiday packages. Keep an eye on ClickClickGo’s coverage of the latest Kulula specials, or visit www.kulula.com for more information.
Kulula Flight Routes
Kulula Airlines flies to several key cities within South Africa on a near daily basis, including between Cape Town and Johannesburg, Johannesburg and Cape Town to Durban and back, as well as to George, East London and Johannesburg’s Lanseria International Airport, a destination that is ideal for business travelers wishing to commute to the north of Johannesburg. To find out more about the Kulula.com flight schedule, click here.
By November 2014, the Kulula fleet comprised of 10 next-generation Boeing 737s with an average age of 11.2 years.
Each passenger is allowed one free piece of checked baggage no bigger than the following maximum dimensions: 90 x 75 x 43cm (35.5 x 29.5 x 16 inches). The maximum weight limit per bag is 20kg, with anything heavier being subject to a heavy bag fee of R350 per bag at the airport. Extra bags can also be purchased at the airport. Infants under the age of 2 years get one free checked bag not exceeding 20kg, in addition to one collapsible pram and a child seat. Passengers can bag one additional bag online by credit card two hours before flight departure at a price of R245 per bag, or through the Kulula Airlines Contact Centre: 0861 KULULA (585852). If purchased at the airport, the price per additional bag is R350.
Kulula Reservations Contact Details
Call Centre: 0861 KULULA / 0861 585 852
Physical Address: Cnr 1 Marignane Drive and Atlas Road, Bonaero Park, 1619, South Africa
Booking Kulula Airlines Flights
Book your own Kulula flights online using the above flight search tool or call o861 KULULA to speak to one of their flight consultants now about the latest Kulula Airlines flight specials.

domain: travel


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Challenging dishes to cook at home
Making spaghetti or a pot roast at home? No problem! Preparing a lamb ragu or rabbit terrine? Not always so simple. If you have ever wanted to expand your cooking repertoire but certain dishes or products make you nervous, this show is for you. Tony and Chef Cindy go over approaches and preparations for spring dishes including duck, lamb, and rabbit. Plus, the return of the Chef's Challenge!

domain: food


If you’re considering installing a backup generator for your home, it’s important to understand the differences between a standby generator and a backup system. A backup generator is designed to provide power during a power outage, but most backup systems only come with a few outlets. As a result, you will want to be very judicious about what appliances you’ll use in an emergency.
Cost of a standby generator
A standby generator costs anywhere from $2,000 to over $20,000 and can run all of your household appliances and air conditioning. Smaller models are designed to keep your refrigerator and air conditioner running, while larger models are designed to run your entire house. Unlike portable generators, a standby generator cannot be moved. It uses natural gas or propane from your existing line. A larger unit needs a propane hookup and is more expensive.
The cost of standby generators varies greatly, with the smallest costing $2,500 while larger models can cost as much as $15,000. The difference in cost is in the type of fuel used and the size of the generator. If you’re considering a large standby generator, remember to factor in the cost of a concrete pad. It can cost $50-$75 per square foot to install.
If you’re thinking of purchasing a standby generator, make sure you know how much electricity it needs to run your appliances. You’ll need at least 16 kilowatts of power for your appliances. The mid-range 10 to 16 kW standby generators are more than enough to run major appliances and central air conditioning, and some even work with a smart load manager. On the other hand, a small portable generator may be enough to run a few lights, a single refrigerator, or an RV.
Cost of a backup generator
When a business experiences a power outage, it can be devastating. In addition to losing revenue, customers and property, it could also suffer damage to its reputation. Power outages can be avoided by having a backup generator. However, a backup generator is not free. The cost of maintaining and replacing your equipment during a power outage can be much higher than the cost of a backup generator.
The cost of a backup generator varies according to the size of your system. Smaller systems can be powered by UPS battery backup sources, while larger systems require a centralized generator power source. For example, a single backup generator with a capacity of 10,000-12,000 watts can power more than 100 video cameras and recording equipment. A backup generator can cost between $25,000 and $35,000 for a commercial site. An individual UPS can cost between $50 and $200 per unit.
The cost of a backup generator varies, depending on the size of your business and the amount of power that you use. However, the cost of not having a backup generator is much higher. Businesses can lose between three to five thousand dollars per hour in revenue during a power outage. Power outages affect the U.S. economy by causing 150 billion dollars in lost revenue each year. Of this, 75 billion dollars are due to weather related outages.
Cost of a battery backup system
The cost of a battery backup system can be significant, depending on the system’s size and type. Battery backup systems run on electricity, and can be charged from utility power or solar power. Depending on the type of system you purchase, the battery backup system may not be enough to supply all of your energy needs for a few days.
Battery backup systems can cost anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000 for a medium-sized home. However, the cost of a battery backup system will vary according to the size of your home and the number of batteries. A typical system will provide enough energy to run a home for a day.
The battery backup system can also be used to power your home during blackouts or natural disasters. In addition to providing immediate power, these systems provide security and stability. They also offer a means of energy conservation, which can allow you to harness solar power instead of using expensive grid power.
Lifespan of a standby generator
The life span of a standby generator varies depending on its size and type. In general, a standby generator can last anywhere from 1500 to 3000 hours. However, the actual life span depends on how well it is maintained and how often it is used. A well-maintained standby generator will last longer, and the less frequently you use it, the longer its life will be.
The backup generator has a shorter lifespan than the standby generator. Backup generators can last for a few days, if you use them moderately. However, you should not leave your backup generator running continuously for more than 12 hours a day. In addition, you must check its fuel level every few hours, which can be done by turning it off for a few minutes. Furthermore, you should change the oil in your backup generator at least once a year.
A standby generator can run for as long as three thousand hours if it is well-maintained. However, it should not be used for more than 500 hours per year. A battery backup system is more environmentally friendly, is easier to install, and has a longer warranty than a standby generator.


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|Dimensions||34 × 14 × 10 in|
This is a players Conn tenor – recently overhauled really well, and pads are still fresh. Original satin silver plate with gold wash in the bell. It’s been played a lot, because it plays well! The fresh overhaul feels great under the fingers. This is a horn that needs nothing and plays its best right out of the case. It has flat metal reso-techs and Pisoni leather pads, strap hook moved for balance, and the desirable art deco engraving.
The 238-247k serial range is among the most prized among tenor players who love Conns. These tenors have a huge sound like the New Wonder II, but some key work and tuning improvements looking toward the 10M. This is a really fine playing example that should make anyone happy who wants a huge Conn tone on a horn that they don’t have to overhaul or plan on spending any money on anytime in the near future. Only one available!

domain: artistic