text stringlengths 3 21.4k | spans unknown | info unknown |
|---|---|---|
It can be seen that after the code leakage , the CEO of the HackingTeam organization said that the leaked code is only a small part is based on the facts , which also reflects that the network arms merchants have lowered the threshold of APT attacks to a certain extent , making more uncertainties of cyber attacks . | {
"Organization: HackingTeam": [
[
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],
"System: leaked code": [
[
99,
110
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003247",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In 2019 , the SectorJ04 group expanded its hacking activities to cover various industrial sectors located across Southeast Asia and East Asia , and is changing the pattern of their attacks from targeted attacks to searching for random victims . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
14,
23
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003249",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The SectorJ04 group mainly used their own backdoor , ServHelper and FlawedAmmy RAT , for hacking . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
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],
"Malware: ServHelper": [
[
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]
],
"Malware: FlawedAmmy RAT": [
[
68,
82
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003256",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
SectorJ04 also used the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) RAT , a legitimate remote management software created in Russia . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
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],
"Malware: Remote Manipulator System": [
[
24,
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]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003257",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Backdoors are installed in infected systems and SectorJ04 also distributed email stealers , botnet malware and ransomware through those backdoors . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
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],
"Malware: backdoors": [
[
136,
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]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003258",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Although the SectorJ04 group mainly targeted countries located in Europe or North America , it has recently expanded its field of activities to countries located in Southeast Asia and East Asia . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
13,
22
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003261",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
A new type of backdoor called AdroMut and a new malware called FlowerPippi was also found coming from SectorJ04 . | {
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],
"Malware: FlowerPippi": [
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],
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
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]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003263",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
But after 2019 SectorJ04 has changed its hacking strategy to attack using spam email . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
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],
"System: spam": [
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],
"System: email": [
[
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]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003264",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Prior to 2019 , the SectorJ04 group conducted large-scale hacking activities for financial gain using exploit kits on websites to install ransomware , such as Locky and GlobeImporter , along with its banking Trojan , on its victims computers . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
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]
],
"Malware: exploit kits": [
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],
"Malware: Locky": [
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],
"Malware: GlobeImporter": [
[
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]
],
"Malware: banking Trojan": [
[
200,
21... | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003266",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The SectorJ04 group has carried out large-scale hacking activities targeting South Korea , while also expanding the field of attacks to Southeast Asian countries such as Taiwan and the Philippines . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
4,
13
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003268",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In June , SectorJ04 group conducted hacking using spam emails written in various languages , including English , Arabic , Korean and Italian , and the emails were written with various contents , including remittance card , invoice and tax invoice . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
10,
19
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003269",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Spam emails and attachments written in Chinese were found in May , and the SectorJ04 group at that time targeted industrial sectors such as electronics and telecommunications , international schools and manufacturing . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
75,
84
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003270",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In addition to their preexist backdoor , ServHelper and FlawedAmmy , they have also been confirmed to use the backdoor called AdroMut and FlowerPippi . | {
"Malware: ServHelper": [
[
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],
"Malware: FlawedAmmy": [
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],
"Malware: AdroMut": [
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]
],
"Malware: FlowerPippi": [
[
138,
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]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003271",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The SectorJ04 group , which has been utilizing the same pattern of infection and the same malware for more than six months , is believed to be attempting to change its infection methods such as downloading malware directly from malicious documents without using MSI installation files , changing their spam email format ... | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
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]
],
"System: downloading malware": [
[
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]
],
"System: changing": [
[
287,
295
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003273",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Until 2019 , SectorJ04 group had carried out massive website-based hacking activities that mainly utilize ransomware and banking trojans for financial profit , and has also been carrying out information gathering activities to secure attack resources such as email accounts and system login information from users since ... | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
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]
],
"Malware: ransomware": [
[
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]
],
"Malware: banking trojans": [
[
121,
136
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003274",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
SectorJ04 group conducted hacking activities targeting financial institutions located in India and Hong Kong around April 2019 . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
0,
9
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003279",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In late July , SectorJ04 group used FlawedAmmy RAT to carry out hacking attacks on companies and universities in sectors such as education , job openings , real estate and semiconductors in South Korea . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
15,
24
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003281",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In early August , the SectorJ04 group carried out extensive hacking activities targeting the users around the world , including South Korea , India , Britain , the United States , Germany , Canada , Argentina , Bangladesh and Hong Kong . | {
"Organization: SectorJ04": [
[
22,
31
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003282",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Silence also started using Ivoke , a fileless loader , and EDA agent , both written in PowerShell . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
0,
7
]
],
"Malware: Ivoke": [
[
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]
],
"Malware: EDA agent": [
[
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68
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003288",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
In 2018 , Silence conducted test campaigns to update their database of current targets and expand their attack geography . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
10,
17
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003294",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Since our last public report , Silence has sent out more than 170 , 000 recon emails to banks in Russia , the former Soviet Union , Asia and Europe . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
31,
38
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003298",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
As part of their phishing campaigns , silence still uses Microsoft Office documents with macros or exploits , CHM files , and .LNK shortcuts as malicious attachments . | {
"System: phishing": [
[
17,
25
]
],
"Organization: silence": [
[
38,
45
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003303",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
As the CnC server , Silence use CnC-3 server running Windows , from which they send commands to download additional modules . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
20,
27
]
],
"Malware: CnC-3 server": [
[
32,
44
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003307",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The attackers used the server deployed on 6 June 2019 to control compromised workstations in these banks . | {
"Organization: attackers": [
[
4,
13
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003318",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
According to local media reports , in 2019 Silence successfully withdrew money from the Bangladeshi bank twice within 2 months . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
43,
50
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003322",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
On 16 January 2019 , Silence sent out phishing emails with malicious attachments disguised as invitations to the International Financial Forum iFin-2019 (see section ‘Attack timeline’) . | {
"Organization: Silence": [
[
21,
28
]
],
"System: phishing emails": [
[
38,
53
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003326",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Since at least 2011 , these hackers have been using malware to spy on corporate networks . | {
"Organization: hackers": [
[
28,
35
]
],
"Malware: malware": [
[
52,
59
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003330",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The corporation conrms the Winnti incident and issues the following statement: The cyberattack was discovered in the summer of 2014 and Henkel promptly took all necessary precautions.” Henkel claims that a very small portion” of its worldwide IT systems had been aected — the systems in Germany . | {
"Organization: Winnti": [
[
27,
33
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003333",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The tool was written by sta of Thyssenkrupp , because the industrial giant—company number eleven—had been spied on by Winnti . | {
"Malware: Thyssenkrupp": [
[
31,
43
]
],
"Organization: Winnti": [
[
118,
124
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003335",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Hackers are charged with spying on a manufacturer of gas turbines . | {
"Organization: Hackers": [
[
0,
7
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003336",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Characterized by relatively unsophisticated technical merit and extensive use of spear phishing , the Magic Hound targeted individuals and organizations in the Middle East (including targets inside Iran itself) , as well as across Europe and in the United States . | {
"System: spear phishing": [
[
82,
96
]
],
"Organization: Magic Hound": [
[
103,
114
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003348",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The activity surfaced in Southeast Asia , a region where APT10 frequently operates . | {
"Organization: APT10": [
[
57,
62
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003350",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Other commodity RAT malware families , such as AdwindRAT and RevengeRAT , were also linked to suspected APT33 domain activity . | {
"Malware: AdwindRAT": [
[
47,
56
]
],
"Malware: RevengeRAT": [
[
61,
71
]
],
"Organization: APT33": [
[
104,
109
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003363",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Western and Saudi organizations in industries that have been historically targeted by APT33 should be monitoring geopolitical developments and increasing the scrutiny of operational security controls focusing on detection and remediation of initial unauthorized access , specifically from phishing campaigns , webshells ... | {
"Organization: APT33": [
[
86,
91
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003365",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Since late March , suspected APT33 threat actors have continued to use a large swath of operational infrastructure , well in excess of 1 , 200 domains , with many observed communicating with 19 different commodity RAT implants . | {
"Organization: APT33": [
[
29,
34
]
],
"Malware: RAT": [
[
214,
217
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003377",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
APT34 is an Iran-nexus cluster of cyber espionage activity that has been active since at least 2014 . | {
"Organization: APT34": [
[
0,
5
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003384",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
One of the most prolific APT-style cyberattacks , specifically targeting the financial sector , is known as Carbanak . | {
"Organization: Carbanak": [
[
108,
116
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003394",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The Carbanak group , which has a long track record of compromising infrastructure belonging to financial institutions , is still active . | {
"Organization: Carbanak": [
[
4,
12
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003401",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Its purpose remains to manipulate financial assets , such as transferring funds from bank accounts or taking over ATM infrastructures and instructing them to dispense cash at predetermined time intervals . | {
"Organization: Its": [
[
0,
3
]
],
"System: financial": [
[
34,
43
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003402",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The actors uploaded a variety of tools that they used to perform additional activities on the compromised network , such as dumping credentials , as well as locating and pivoting to additional systems on the network . | {
"Organization: actors": [
[
4,
10
]
],
"Malware: dumping credentials": [
[
124,
143
]
],
"System: locating": [
[
157,
165
]
],
"System: pivoting": [
[
170,
178
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003404",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Bitdefender’s investigation shows the attackers’ main methods remain to quietly infiltrate the infrastructure by establishing a foothold on an employee’s system , then move laterally across the infrastructure or elevate privileges to find critical systems that manage financial transactions or ATM networks . | {
"Organization: Bitdefender’s": [
[
0,
13
]
],
"System: establishing": [
[
113,
125
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003406",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
We also found the China Chopper webshell on the SharePoint servers , which has also been used by the Emissary Panda threat group . | {
"Malware: China Chopper webshell": [
[
18,
40
]
],
"Organization: Emissary Panda": [
[
101,
115
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003407",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
This webshell activity took place across three SharePoint servers hosted by two different government organizations between April 1 , 2019 and April 16 , 2019 , where actors uploaded a total of 24 unique executables across the three SharePoint servers . | {} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003410",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The timeline shows three main clusters of activity across the three webshells , with activity occurring on two separate webshells (green and orange) within a very small window of time on April 2 , 2019 and the activity involving the third webshell two weeks later on April 16 , 2019 . | {} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003411",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
We also observed the actors uploading custom backdoors such as HyperBro which is commonly associated with Emissary Panda . | {
"Organization: actors": [
[
21,
27
]
],
"Malware: HyperBro": [
[
63,
71
]
],
"Organization: Emissary Panda": [
[
106,
120
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003414",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
We also observed the actors uploading the HyperBro backdoor to one of the webshells , as well as legitimate executables that would sideload malicious DLLs that have overlapping code associated with known Emissary Panda activity . | {
"Organization: actors": [
[
21,
27
]
],
"Malware: HyperBro backdoor": [
[
42,
59
]
],
"System: sideload malicious": [
[
131,
149
]
],
"System: DLLs": [
[
150,
154
]
],
"Organization: Emissary Panda": [
[
204,
... | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003417",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The list also includes several hack tools , such as Mimikatz for credential dumping and several compiled python scripts used to locate and compromise other systems on the local network . | {
"Malware: hack tools": [
[
31,
41
]
],
"Malware: Mimikatz": [
[
52,
60
]
],
"Malware: python scripts": [
[
105,
119
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003423",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The group’s implants are characterized by the employment of information stealing tools among them being screenshot and document stealers delivered via a SFX , and made to achieve persistence through a scheduled task . | {
"Organization: group’s": [
[
4,
11
]
],
"Malware: stealing tools": [
[
72,
86
]
],
"Malware: document stealers": [
[
119,
136
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003435",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The finding shows that EvilGnome operates on an IP address that was controlled by the Gamaredon group two months ago . | {
"Malware: EvilGnome": [
[
23,
32
]
],
"Organization: Gamaredon group": [
[
86,
101
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003436",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
FIN7 operations are linked to numerous intrusion attempts having targeted hundreds of companies since at least as early as 2015 . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
0,
4
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003437",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The FIN7 intrusion set continued its tailored spear phishing campaigns throughout last year . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
4,
8
]
],
"System: spear phishing": [
[
46,
60
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003438",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Interestingly , following some open-source publications about them , the FIN7 operators seems to have developed a homemade builder of malicious Office document using ideas from ThreadKit , which they employed during the summer of 2018 . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
73,
77
]
],
"Malware: malicious Office document": [
[
134,
159
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003442",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
FIN7’s last campaigns were targeting banks in Europe and Central America . | {
"Organization: FIN7’s": [
[
0,
6
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003447",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
After a successful penetration , FIN7 uses its own backdoors and the CobaltStrike framework or Powershell Empire components to hop to interesting parts of the network , where it can monetize its access . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
33,
37
]
],
"Malware: backdoors": [
[
51,
60
]
],
"Malware: CobaltStrike framework": [
[
69,
91
]
],
"Malware: Powershell": [
[
95,
105
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003448",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Interestingly , this actor targeted financial entities and companies in one African country , which lead us to think that CopyPaste was associated with cybermercenaries or a training center . | {
"Organization: actor": [
[
21,
26
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003454",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
At the end of 2018 , the cluster started to use not only CobaltStrike but also Powershell Empire in order to gain a foothold on the victims’ networks . | {
"Organization: cluster": [
[
25,
32
]
],
"Malware: CobaltStrike": [
[
57,
69
]
],
"Malware: Powershell": [
[
79,
89
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003462",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
FIN7 thus continues to use effective spearphishing campaigns in conjunction with well-known MS Office exploits generated by the framework . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
0,
4
]
],
"System: spearphishing": [
[
37,
50
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003463",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
FIN7 thus continue to use effective spearphishing campaigns in conjunction with well-known MS Office exploits generated by the framework . | {
"Organization: FIN7": [
[
0,
4
]
],
"System: spearphishing": [
[
36,
49
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003466",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Instead , the campaign used compromised legitimate accounts to trick victims into installing malware . | {
"Malware: compromised legitimate accounts": [
[
28,
59
]
],
"System: installing malware": [
[
82,
100
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003468",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Notably , the group’s use of email as infection vector seems to yield success for their campaigns . | {
"Organization: group’s": [
[
14,
21
]
],
"Malware: email": [
[
29,
34
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003469",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The attacker also connected to the compromised servers from IP addresses that were linked to dynamic domain names used as C&Cs by the delivered payloads . | {
"Organization: attacker": [
[
4,
12
]
],
"System: connected": [
[
18,
27
]
],
"Malware: delivered payloads": [
[
134,
152
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003471",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
By March 2016 , one of Scattered Canary’s members had built enough trust with a romance victim—who we’ll call Jane—that she became a frequent source of new mule accounts for the group . | {
"Organization: Scattered Canary’s": [
[
23,
41
]
],
"Organization: group": [
[
178,
183
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003483",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The first type of attack Scattered Canary pivoted to was credential phishing . | {
"Organization: Scattered Canary": [
[
25,
41
]
],
"System: credential phishing": [
[
57,
76
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003486",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
For over eighteen months from March 2017 until November 2018 , Scattered Canary’s frequent enterprise-focused credential phishing campaigns almost exclusively targeted businesses in the United States and Canada . | {
"Organization: Scattered Canary’s": [
[
63,
81
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003491",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Just as with romance scams , actors make use of scripts and templates they can copy-and-paste without having to create something on their own . | {
"Organization: actors": [
[
29,
35
]
],
"Malware: scripts": [
[
48,
55
]
],
"Malware: templates": [
[
60,
69
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003496",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
When it comes to engaging targets , Scattered Canary frequently maximized efficiencies through the use of scripts , or as some members of the group call them , formats.” These formats are templated text documents that can contain several layers of phishing messages to send to potential victims . | {
"Organization: Scattered Canary": [
[
36,
52
]
],
"System: phishing": [
[
248,
256
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003497",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
It used GitHub and Slack as tools for communication between the malware and its controller . | {
"Organization: It": [
[
0,
2
]
],
"Malware: GitHub": [
[
8,
14
]
],
"Malware: Slack": [
[
19,
24
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003506",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
During this attack , we found that the SLUB malware used two Slack teams sales-yww9809” and marketing-pwx7789 . | {
"Organization: SLUB": [
[
39,
43
]
],
"System: used two Slack": [
[
52,
66
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003511",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
SWEED remains consistent across most of their campaigns in their use of spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments . | {
"Organization: SWEED": [
[
0,
5
]
],
"System: spear-phishing": [
[
72,
86
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003512",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
We found them targeting countries in the Middle East such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia , as well as other countries such as India , Japan , Argentina , the Philippines , and South Korea . | {
"Organization: them": [
[
9,
13
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003515",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
It fetches the same FlawedAmmyy downloader .msi file , then downloads the FlawedAmmyy payload . | {
"Organization: It": [
[
0,
2
]
],
"System: FlawedAmmyy downloader": [
[
20,
42
]
],
"Malware: FlawedAmmyy payload": [
[
74,
93
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003520",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
It later delivered an information stealer named EmailStealer , ” which stolesimple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) credentials and email addresses in the victim’s machine . | {
"Organization: It": [
[
0,
2
]
],
"Malware: EmailStealer": [
[
48,
60
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003523",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
On June 17 , we observed the campaign’s spam emails delivering malware-embedded Excel files directly as an attachment . | {} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003527",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Another new malware we found that TA505 is using in their campaigns last June 20 against targets in Japan , the Philippines , and Argentina is FlowerPippi . | {
"Organization: TA505": [
[
34,
39
]
],
"Malware: FlowerPippi": [
[
143,
154
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003532",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The comparison of the infection chains reveals in both cases TA505 used a couple of SFX stages to deploy the RMS” software: a legitimate remote administration tool produced by the Russian company TektonIT . | {
"Organization: TA505": [
[
61,
66
]
],
"System: deploy the RMS”": [
[
98,
113
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003535",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
The TA505 group is one of the most active threat groups operating since 2014 , it has traditionally targeted Banking and Retail industries , as we recently documented during the analysis of the Stealthy Email Stealer” part of their arsenal . | {
"Organization: TA505": [
[
4,
9
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003536",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Turla is believed to have been operating since at least 2008 , when it successfully breached the US military . | {
"Organization: Turla": [
[
0,
5
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003539",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
This is not the first time Turla has used PowerShell in-memory loaders to increase its chances of bypassing security products . | {
"Organization: Turla": [
[
27,
32
]
],
"Malware: PowerShell": [
[
42,
52
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003540",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
However , it is likely the same scripts are used more globally against many traditional Turla targets in Western Europe and the Middle East . | {
"Organization: Turla": [
[
88,
93
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003541",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
This new research confirms our forecast and shows that the Turla group does not hesitate to use open-source pen-testing frameworks to conduct intrusion . | {
"Organization: Turla": [
[
59,
64
]
],
"Malware: frameworks": [
[
120,
130
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003545",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
One attack during this campaign involved the use of infrastructure belonging to another espionage group known as Crambus aka OilRig , APT34 . | {
"Organization: Crambus": [
[
113,
120
]
],
"Organization: OilRig": [
[
125,
131
]
],
"Organization: APT34": [
[
134,
139
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003547",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Waterbug has been using Meterpreter since at least early 2018 and , in this campaign , used a modified version of Meterpreter , which was encoded and given a .wav extension in order to disguise its true purpose . | {
"Organization: Waterbug": [
[
0,
8
]
],
"Malware: Meterpreter": [
[
24,
35
],
[
114,
125
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003548",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Waterbug’s intrusions on the victim’s network continued for much of 2018 . | {
"Organization: Waterbug’s": [
[
0,
10
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003557",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
Waterbug also used an older version of PowerShell , likely to avoid logging . | {
"Organization: Waterbug": [
[
0,
8
]
],
"Malware: PowerShell": [
[
39,
49
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003559",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
APT10 is a Chinese cyber espionage group that FireEye has tracked since 2009 . | {
"Organization: APT10": [
[
0,
5
]
],
"Organization: FireEye": [
[
46,
53
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_train_003587",
"source": "dnrti_train"
} |
" PittyTiger " is a mutex used by the malware . | {
"Organization: PittyTiger": [
[
2,
12
]
],
"Malware: mutex": [
[
20,
25
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005312",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
This RAT is the origin of the attackers ' group name . | {
"Malware: RAT": [
[
5,
8
]
],
"Organization: attackers": [
[
30,
39
]
],
"Organization: group": [
[
42,
47
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005313",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
It also appears the attackers use this as second-stage malware . | {
"Organization: attackers": [
[
20,
29
]
],
"Malware: second-stage malware": [
[
42,
62
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005323",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
This section describes some of the tools used by the group . | {
"Organization: group": [
[
53,
58
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005351",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
Take advantage of native mitigations built into Windows 10 . | {} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005370",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
Poseidon has maintained a consistently evolving toolkit since the mid-2000s . | {
"Organization: Poseidon": [
[
0,
8
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005393",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
To retrieve IP addresses that have ARP entries , Ryuk calls GetIpNetTable . | {
"Malware: Ryuk": [
[
49,
53
]
],
"Malware: GetIpNetTable": [
[
60,
73
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005436",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
The report authors renamed the malware " FriedEx " . | {
"Malware: FriedEx": [
[
41,
48
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005461",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
These gtags have been closely associated with LUNAR SPIDER activity . | {
"Malware: gtags": [
[
6,
11
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005489",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
BOSS SPIDER used both enterprise and per-host pricing during their campaigns . | {
"Organization: BOSS SPIDER": [
[
0,
11
]
],
"Malware: enterprise": [
[
22,
32
]
],
"Malware: per-host pricing": [
[
37,
53
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005529",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
Public cloud infrastructure is one of the main targets for Rocke . | {
"Organization: Rocke": [
[
59,
64
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005539",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
There have been reports of real-time phishing in the wild as early as 2010 . | {
"System: phishing": [
[
37,
45
]
]
} | {
"id": "dnrti_valid_005633",
"source": "dnrti_valid"
} |
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