title: RCW 9A.16.040

text:
(1) Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable in the following cases:
(a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or
(b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or
(c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid:
(i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony;
(ii) To prevent the escape of a person from a federal or state correctional facility or in retaking a person who escapes from such a facility;
(iii) To prevent the escape of a person from a county or city jail or holding facility if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or
(iv) To lawfully suppress a riot if the actor or another participant is armed with a deadly weapon.
(2) In considering whether to use deadly force under subsection (1)(c) of this section, to arrest or apprehend any person for the commission of any crime, the peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others. Among the circumstances which may be considered by peace officers as a "threat of serious physical harm" are the following:
(a) The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a weapon in a manner that could reasonably be construed as threatening; or
(b) There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.
Under these circumstances deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer, where, if feasible, some warning is given, provided the officer meets the good faith standard of this section.
(3) A public officer covered by subsection (1)(a) of this section shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section.
(4) A peace officer shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force in good faith, where "good faith" is an objective standard which shall consider all the facts, circumstances, and information known to the officer at the time to determine whether a similarly situated reasonable officer would have believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to the officer or another individual.
(5) This section shall not be construed as:
(a) Affecting the permissible use of force by a person acting under the authority of RCW 9A.16.020 or 9A.16.050; or
(b) Preventing a law enforcement agency from adopting standards pertaining to its use of deadly force that are more restrictive than this section.
[ 2019 c 4 s 3. Prior: 2019 c 1 s 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940); ( 2018 c 11 s 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940) repealed by 2019 c 4 s 8); (2018 c 10 s 3 repealed by 2019 c 4 s 8); 1986 c 209 s 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.040.]
Notes:
Effective date—2019 c 4: See note following RCW 43.101.455.
Short title—Intent—Liberal construction—Subject—2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See notes following RCW 43.101.450.
Rule making—2019 c 4; 2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See note following RCW 43.101.455.
Legislative recognition: "The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200, 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers." [ 1986 c 209 s 3.]

catchline: Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, person aiding—Good faith standard.


doc_type: statute

jurisdiction: wa

title: RCW 9A.16.046

text:
(1) When a peace officer who is charged with a crime is found not guilty or charges are dismissed by reason of justifiable homicide or use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040, or by reason of self-defense, for actions taken while on duty or otherwise within the scope of his or her authority as a peace officer, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action.
(2) If the trier of fact makes a determination of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.
(3) Whenever the issue of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense under this section is decided by a judge, or whenever charges against a peace officer are dismissed based on the merits, the judge shall consider the same questions as must be answered in the special verdict under subsection (4) of this section.
(4) Whenever the issue of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense under this section has been submitted to a jury, and the jury has found the defendant not guilty, the court shall instruct the jury to return a special verdict in substantially the following form:
answer yes or no
1.
Was the defendant on duty or otherwise acting within the scope of his or her authority as a peace officer?
. . . . .
2.
Was the finding of not guilty based upon justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense?
. . . . .
(5) Nothing in this section precludes the legislature from using the sundry claims process to grant an award where none was granted under this section or otherwise where the charge was dismissed prior to trial, or to grant a higher award than one granted under this section.
[ 2019 c 4 s 7.]
Notes:
Effective date—2019 c 4: See note following RCW 43.101.455.

license: public-domain-government-work

rule_set: Revised Code of Washington

catchline: Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by peace officer—Reimbursement of defendant for costs—Special verdict.

code: rcw

unit: section

court: Washington State Legislature


title: RCW 9A.16.050

text:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed either:
(1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or
(2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is.
[ 2011 c 336 s 354; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.050.]

catchline: Homicide—By other person—When justifiable.


title: RCW 9A.16.060

text:
(1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:
(a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and
(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and
(c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.
(2) The defense of duress is not available if the crime charged is murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse.
(3) The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself or herself in a situation in which it is probable that he or she will be subject to duress.
(4) The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse.
[ 1999 c 60 s 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.060.]

catchline: Duress.


title: RCW 9A.16.070

text:
(1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:
(a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person acting under their direction, and
(b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit.
(2) The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing only that law enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.070.]

catchline: Entrapment.


title: RCW 9A.16.080

text:
In any criminal action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer, by the owner of the mercantile establishment, or by the owner's authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit theft or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.080.]

catchline: Action for being detained on mercantile establishment premises for investigation—"Reasonable grounds" as defense.


title: RCW 9A.16.090

text:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state.
[ 2011 c 336 s 355; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.16.090.]

catchline: Intoxication.


title: RCW 9A.16.100

text:
(1) It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage parents and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it either: (a) Is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child; or (b) when occurring in an educational setting and involving an educator, actually or substantially complies with limitations on the use of student isolation and restraint under RCW 28A.600.485 including that it is used only when a student's behavior poses an imminent likelihood of serious harm.
(2) The following actions are presumed unreasonable when used to correct or restrain a child: (a) Throwing, kicking, burning, or cutting a child; (b) striking a child with a closed fist; (c) shaking a child under age three; (d) interfering with a child's breathing; (e) threatening a child with a deadly weapon; or (f) doing any other act that is likely to cause and which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks. The age, size, and condition of the child and the location of the injury shall be considered when determining whether the bodily harm is reasonable or moderate. This list is illustrative of unreasonable actions and is not intended to be exclusive.
[ 2024 c 219 s 6; 1986 c 149 s 1.]

catchline: Use of force on children—Policy—Actions presumed unreasonable.


title: RCW 9A.16.110

text:
(1) No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030.
(2) When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) of this section is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action. To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact makes a determination of self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.
(3) Notwithstanding a finding that a defendant's actions were justified by self-defense, if the trier of fact also determines that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct substantially related to the events giving rise to the charges filed against the defendant the judge may deny or reduce the amount of the award. In determining the amount of the award, the judge shall also consider the seriousness of the initial criminal conduct.
Nothing in this section precludes the legislature from using the sundry claims process to grant an award where none was granted under this section or to grant a higher award than one granted under this section.
(4) Whenever the issue of self-defense under this section is decided by a judge, the judge shall consider the same questions as must be answered in the special verdict under subsection (4) [(5)] of this section.
(5) Whenever the issue of self-defense under this section has been submitted to a jury, and the jury has found the defendant not guilty, the court shall instruct the jury to return a special verdict in substantially the following form:
answer yes or no
1.
Was the finding of not guilty based upon self-defense?
. . . . .
2.
If your answer to question 1 is no, do not answer the remaining question.
3.
If your answer to question 1 is yes, was the defendant:
a.
Protecting himself or herself?
. . . . .
b.
Protecting his or her family?
. . . . .
c.
Protecting his or her property?
. . . . .
d.
Coming to the aid of another who was in imminent danger of a heinous crime?
. . . . .
e.
Coming to the aid of another who was the victim of a heinous crime?
. . . . .
f.
Engaged in criminal conduct substantially related to the events giving rise to the crime with which the defendant is charged?
. . . . .
[ 1995 c 44 s 1; 1989 c 94 s 1; 1977 ex.s. c 206 s 8. Formerly RCW 9.01.200.]
Notes:
Use of deadly force—Legislative recognition: See note following RCW 9A.16.040.

catchline: Defending against violent crime—Reimbursement.


title: RCW 9A.16.120

text:
(1) In a criminal action brought against the detainer by reason of a person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of an outdoor music festival or related campground for the purpose of pursuing an investigation or questioning by a law enforcement officer as to the lawfulness of the consumption or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs, it is a defense that the detained person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit the investigation or questioning by a law enforcement officer, and that a peace officer, owner, operator, employee, or agent of the outdoor music festival had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was unlawfully consuming or attempting to unlawfully consume or possess, alcohol or illegal drugs on the premises.
(2) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Illegal drug" means a controlled substance under chapter 69.50 RCW for which the person detained does not have a valid prescription or that is not being consumed in accordance with the prescription directions and warnings, or a legend drug under chapter 69.41 RCW for which the person does not have a valid prescription or that is not being consumed in accordance with the prescription directions and warnings.
(b) "Outdoor music festival" has the same meaning as in RCW 70.108.020, except that no minimum time limit is required.
(c) "Reasonable grounds" include, but are not limited to:
(i) Exhibiting the effects of having consumed liquor, which means that a person has the odor of liquor on his or her breath, or that by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise exhibits that he or she has consumed liquor, and either:
(A) Is in possession of or in close proximity to a container that has or recently had liquor in it; or
(B) Is shown by other evidence to have recently consumed liquor; or
(ii) Exhibiting the effects of having consumed an illegal drug, which means that a person by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise exhibits that he or she has consumed an illegal drug, and either:
(A) Is in possession of an illegal drug; or
(B) Is shown by other evidence to have recently consumed an illegal drug.
(d) "Reasonable time" means the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to allow a law enforcement officer to determine the lawfulness of the consumption or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs. "Reasonable time" may not exceed one hour.
[ 2003 c 219 s 1.]

catchline: Outdoor music festival, campground—Detention.


title: RCW 9A.16.900

text:
For the purposes of this chapter, the terms spouse, marriage, marital, husband, wife, widow, widower, next of kin, and family shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships as well as to marital relationships and married persons, and references to dissolution of marriage shall apply equally to state registered domestic partnerships that have been terminated, dissolved, or invalidated, to the extent that such interpretation does not conflict with federal law. Where necessary to implement chapter 521, Laws of 2009, gender-specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law shall be construed to be gender neutral, and applicable to individuals in state registered domestic partnerships.
[ 2009 c 521 s 22.]

catchline: Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521.


title: RCW 9A.20.010

text:
(1) Classified Felonies. (a) The particular classification of each felony defined in Title 9A RCW is expressly designated in the section defining it.
(b) For purposes of sentencing, classified felonies are designated as one of three classes, as follows:
(i) Class A felony; or
(ii) Class B felony; or
(iii) Class C felony.
(2) Misdemeanors and Gross Misdemeanors. (a) Any crime punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment is a misdemeanor. Whenever the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed, the committing of such act shall be a misdemeanor.
(b) All crimes other than felonies and misdemeanors are gross misdemeanors.
[ 1984 c 258 s 808; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.20.010.]
Notes:
Court Improvement Act of 1984—Effective dates—Severability—Short title—1984 c 258: See notes following RCW 3.30.010.

catchline: Classification and designation of crimes.


title: RCW 9A.20.020

text:
(1) Felony. Every person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished as follows:
(a) For a class A felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine;
(b) For a class B felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of not more than ten years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than twenty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine;
(c) For a class C felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of not more than five years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(2) Gross Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of up to three hundred sixty-four days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(3) Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of not more than ninety days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(4) This section applies to only those crimes committed prior to July 1, 1984.
[ 2011 c 96 s 12; 1982 c 192 s 9; 1981 c 137 s 37; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 s 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.20.020.]
Notes:
Findings—Intent—2011 c 96: See note following RCW 9A.20.021.
Effective date—Severability—1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38: See notes following RCW 9A.08.020.
Penalty assessments in addition to fine or bail forfeiture—Crime victim and witness programs in county: RCW 7.68.035.

catchline: Authorized sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 1984.


title: RCW 9A.20.021

text:
(1) Felony. Unless a different maximum sentence for a classified felony is specifically established by a statute of this state, no person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished by confinement or fine exceeding the following:
(a) For a class A felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for a term of life imprisonment, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of fifty thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine;
(b) For a class B felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for a term of ten years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of twenty thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine;
(c) For a class C felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for five years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of ten thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine.
(2) Gross misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of up to three hundred sixty-four days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(3) Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of not more than ninety days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(4) This section applies to only those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1984.
(5) The fines in this section apply to adult offenders only.
[ 2015 c 265 s 16; 2011 c 96 s 13. Prior: 2003 c 288 s 7; 2003 c 53 s 63; 1982 c 192 s 10.]
Notes:
Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.
Findings—Intent—2011 c 96: "The legislature finds that a maximum sentence by a court in the state of Washington for a gross misdemeanor can, under federal law, result in the automatic deportation of a person who has lawfully immigrated to the United States, is a victim of domestic violence or a political refugee, even when all or part of the sentence to total confinement is suspended. The legislature further finds that this is a disproportionate outcome, when compared to a person who has been convicted of certain felonies which, under the state's determinate sentencing law, must be sentenced to less than one year and, hence, either have no impact on that person's residency status or will provide that person an opportunity to be heard in immigration proceedings where the court will determine whether deportation is appropriate. Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to cure this inequity by reducing the maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor by one day." [ 2011 c 96 s 1.]
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Penalty assessments in addition to fine or bail forfeiture—Crime victim and witness programs in county: RCW 7.68.035.

catchline: Maximum sentences for crimes committed July 1, 1984, and after.


title: RCW 9A.20.030

text:
(1) If a person has gained money or property or caused a victim to lose money or property through the commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof or when the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's recommendation that the offender be required to pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea agreement, the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under RCW 9A.20.020, may order the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain or victim's loss from the commission of a crime. Such amount may be used to provide restitution to the victim at the order of the court. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to investigate the alternative of restitution, and to recommend it to the court, when the prosecuting attorney believes that restitution is appropriate and feasible. If the court orders restitution, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain or victim's loss from the crime, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the terms "gain" or "loss" refer to the amount of money or the value of property or services gained or lost.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section also applies to any corporation or joint stock association found guilty of any crime.
[ 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 s 12; 1979 c 29 s 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.20.030.]
Notes:
Severability—1982 1st ex.s. c 47: See note following RCW 9.41.190.
Restitution
condition of probation: RCW 9.95.210.
condition to suspending sentence: RCW 9.92.060.
disposition when victim dead or not found: RCW 7.68.290.

catchline: Alternative to a fine—Restitution.


title: RCW 9A.20.040

text:
In any prosecution under this title where the grade or degree of a crime is determined by reference to the degree of a felony for which the defendant or another previously had been sought, arrested, charged, convicted, or sentenced, if such felony is defined by a statute of this state which is not in Title 9A RCW, unless otherwise provided:
(1) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is twenty years or more, such felony shall be treated as a class A felony for purposes of this title;
(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is eight years or more, but less than twenty years, such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for purposes of this title;
(3) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is less than eight years, such felony shall be treated as a class C felony for purposes of this title.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.20.040.]

catchline: Prosecutions related to felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW.


title: RCW 9A.28.010

text:
In any prosecution under this title for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a felony defined by a statute of this state which is not in this title, unless otherwise provided:
(1) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is twenty years or more, such felony shall be treated as a class A felony for purposes of this title;
(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is eight years or more but less than twenty years, such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for purposes of this title;
(3) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is less than eight years, such felony shall be treated as a class C felony for purposes of this title.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.28.010.]

catchline: Prosecutions based on felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW.


title: RCW 9A.28.020

text:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.
(2) If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution of such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission.
(3) An attempt to commit a crime is a:
(a) Class A felony when the crime attempted is murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, arson in the first degree, child molestation in the first degree, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, rape of a child in the first degree, or rape of a child in the second degree;
(b) Class B felony when the crime attempted is a class A felony other than an offense listed in (a) of this subsection;
(c) Class C felony when the crime attempted is a class B felony;
(d) Gross misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a class C felony;
(e) Misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.
[ 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 354; 1994 c 271 s 101; 1981 c 203 s 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.28.020.]
Notes:
Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Purpose—1994 c 271: "The purpose of chapter 271, Laws of 1994 is to make certain technical corrections and correct oversights discovered only after unanticipated circumstances have arisen. These changes are necessary to give full expression to the original intent of the legislature." [ 1994 c 271 s 1.]
Severability—1994 c 271: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1994 c 271 s 1103.]

catchline: Criminal attempt.


title: RCW 9A.28.030

text:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she offers to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commission had such crime been attempted or committed.
(2) Criminal solicitation shall be punished in the same manner as criminal attempt under RCW 9A.28.020.
[ 2011 c 336 s 356; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.28.030.]

catchline: Criminal solicitation.


title: RCW 9A.28.040

text:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them takes a substantial step in pursuance of such agreement.
(2) It shall not be a defense to criminal conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(a) Has not been prosecuted or convicted; or
(b) Has been convicted of a different offense; or
(c) Is not amenable to justice; or
(d) Has been acquitted; or
(e) Lacked the capacity to commit an offense; or
(f) Is a law enforcement officer or other government agent who did not intend that a crime be committed.
(3) Criminal conspiracy is a:
(a) Class A felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is murder in the first degree;
(b) Class B felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class A felony other than murder in the first degree;
(c) Class C felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class B felony;
(d) Gross misdemeanor when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class C felony;
(e) Misdemeanor when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.
[ 1997 c 17 s 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.28.040.]

catchline: Criminal conspiracy.


title: RCW 9A.32.010

text:
Homicide is the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another, death occurring at any time, and is either (1) murder, (2) homicide by abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, or (5) justifiable homicide.
[ 1997 c 196 s 3; 1987 c 187 s 2; 1983 c 10 s 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.010.]
Notes:
Excusable homicide: RCW 9A.16.030.
Justifiable homicide: RCW 9A.16.040 and 9A.16.050.

catchline: Homicide defined.


title: RCW 9A.32.020

text:
(1) As used in this chapter, the premeditation required in order to support a conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree must involve more than a moment in point of time.
(2) Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect RCW 46.61.520.
[ 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.020.]

catchline: Premeditation—Limitations.


title: RCW 9A.32.030

text:
(1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person; or
(c) He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery in the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second degree, (3) burglary in the first degree, (4) arson in the first or second degree, or (5) kidnapping in the first or second degree, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants: Except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(c) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:
(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and
(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(2) Murder in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 1990 c 200 s 1; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 s 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.030.]
Notes:
Effective date—Severability—1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38: See notes following RCW 9A.08.020.

catchline: Murder in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.32.040

text:
Notwithstanding RCW 9A.32.030(2), any person convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
[ 1982 c 10 s 2. Prior: (1) 1981 c 138 s 21; 1977 ex.s. c 206 s 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.040. (2) 1981 c 136 s 55 repealed by 1982 c 10 s 18.]
Notes:
Severability—1982 c 10: See note following RCW 6.13.080.
Effective date—1981 c 136: See RCW 72.09.900.
Aggravated first degree murder: Chapter 10.95 RCW.

catchline: Murder in the first degree—Sentence.


title: RCW 9A.32.050

text:
(1) A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person but without premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(b) He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony, including assault, other than those enumerated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(b) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:
(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and
(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a class A felony.
[ 2003 c 3 s 2; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 s 4; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.050.]
Notes:
Findings—Intent—2003 c 3: "The legislature finds that the 1975 legislature clearly and unambiguously stated that any felony, including assault, can be a predicate offense for felony murder. The intent was evident: Punish, under the applicable murder statutes, those who commit a homicide in the course and in furtherance of a felony. This legislature reaffirms that original intent and further intends to honor and reinforce the court's decisions over the past twenty-eight years interpreting "in furtherance of" as requiring the death to be sufficiently close in time and proximity to the predicate felony. The legislature does not agree with or accept the court's findings of legislative intent in State v. Andress, Docket No. 71170-4 (October 24, 2002), and reasserts that assault has always been and still remains a predicate offense for felony murder in the second degree.
To prevent a miscarriage of the legislature's original intent, the legislature finds in light of State v. Andress, Docket No. 71170-4 (October 24, 2002), that it is necessary to amend RCW 9A.32.050. This amendment is intended to be curative in nature. The legislature urges the supreme court to apply this interpretation retroactively to July 1, 1976." [ 2003 c 3 s 1.]
Effective date—2003 c 3: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [February 12, 2003]." [ 2003 c 3 s 3.]
Effective date—Severability—1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38: See notes following RCW 9A.08.020.

catchline: Murder in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.32.055

text:
(1) A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if, under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person.
(2) As used in this section, "dependent adult" means a person who, because of physical or mental disability, or because of extreme advanced age, is dependent upon another person to provide the basic necessities of life.
(3) Homicide by abuse is a class A felony.
[ 1987 c 187 s 1.]

catchline: Homicide by abuse.


title: RCW 9A.32.060

text:
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 357; 1997 c 365 s 5; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.060.]

catchline: Manslaughter in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.32.070

text:
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person.
(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class B felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 358; 1997 c 365 s 6; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.32.070.]

catchline: Manslaughter in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.011

text:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm:
(a) Assaults another with a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death; or
(b) Transmits HIV to a child or vulnerable adult; or
(c) Administers, exposes, or transmits to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or
(d) Assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.
(2) Assault in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 2020 c 76 s 16; 1997 c 196 s 1; 1986 c 257 s 4.]
Notes:
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.

catchline: Assault in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.021

text:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree:
(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or
(b) Intentionally and unlawfully causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn quick child by intentionally and unlawfully inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child; or
(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or
(d) With intent to inflict bodily harm, administers to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or
(e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults another; or
(f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture; or
(g) Assaults another by strangulation or suffocation.
(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, assault in the second degree is a class B felony.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835 or 13.40.135 is a class A felony.
[ 2011 c 166 s 1; 2007 c 79 s 2; 2003 c 53 s 64; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 355; 1997 c 196 s 2. Prior: 1988 c 266 s 2; 1988 c 206 s 916; 1988 c 158 s 2; 1987 c 324 s 2; 1986 c 257 s 5.]
Notes:
Finding—2007 c 79: "The legislature finds that assault by strangulation may result in immobilization of a victim, may cause a loss of consciousness, injury, or even death, and has been a factor in a significant number of domestic violence related assaults and fatalities. While not limited to acts of assault against an intimate partner, assault by strangulation is often knowingly inflicted upon an intimate partner with the intent to commit physical injury, or substantial or great bodily harm. Strangulation is one of the most lethal forms of domestic violence. The particular cruelty of this offense and its potential effects upon a victim both physically and psychologically, merit its categorization as a ranked felony offense under chapter 9A.36 RCW." [ 2007 c 79 s 1.]
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Effective date—1988 c 266: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1988 c 266 s 3.]
Effective date—1988 c 206 ss 916, 917: "Sections 916 and 917 of this act shall take effect July 1, 1988." [ 1988 c 206 s 922.]
Effective date—1988 c 158: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Effective date—1987 c 324: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.

catchline: Assault in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.031

text:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree:
(a) With intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself, herself, or another person, assaults another; or
(b) Assaults a person employed as a transit operator or driver, the immediate supervisor of a transit operator or driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, by a public or private transit company or a contracted transit service provider, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(c) Assaults a school bus driver, the immediate supervisor of a driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, employed by a school district transportation service or a private company under contract for transportation services with a school district, while the person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(d) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm; or
(e) Assaults a firefighter or other employee of a fire department, county fire marshal's office, county fire prevention bureau, or fire protection district who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering; or
(g) Assaults a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or
(h) Assaults a peace officer with a projectile stun gun; or
(i) Assaults a nurse, physician, or health care provider who was performing his or her nursing or health care duties at the time of the assault. For purposes of this subsection: "Nurse" means a person licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW; "physician" means a person licensed under chapter 18.57 or 18.71 RCW; and "health care provider" means a person certified under chapter 18.71 or 18.73 RCW who performs emergency medical services or a person regulated under Title 18 RCW and employed by, or contracting with, a hospital licensed under chapter 70.41 RCW; or
(j) Assaults a judicial officer, court-related employee, county clerk, or county clerk's employee, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault or as a result of that person's employment within the judicial system. For purposes of this subsection, "court-related employee" includes bailiffs, court reporters, judicial assistants, court managers, court managers' employees, and any other employee, regardless of title, who is engaged in equivalent functions; or
(k) Assaults a person located in a courtroom, jury room, judge's chamber, or any waiting area or corridor immediately adjacent to a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber. This section shall apply only: (i) During the times when a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber is being used for judicial purposes during court proceedings; and (ii) if signage was posted in compliance with RCW 2.28.200 at the time of the assault; or
(l) Is a licensed health care provider who implants or causes another to implant the provider's own gametes or reproductive material into a patient during an assisted reproduction procedure. For the purposes of this subsection, "gamete" means sperm, egg, or any part of a sperm or egg, and "reproductive material" means a human gamete or a human organism at any stage of development from fertilized ovum to embryo.
(2) Assault in the third degree is a class C felony.
[ 2024 c 220 s 1; 2013 c 256 s 1. Prior: 2011 c 336 s 359; 2011 c 238 s 1; 2005 c 458 s 1; 1999 c 328 s 1; 1998 c 94 s 1; 1997 c 172 s 1; 1996 c 266 s 1; 1990 c 236 s 1; 1989 c 169 s 1; 1988 c 158 s 3; 1986 c 257 s 6.]
Notes:
Effective date—1988 c 158: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.

catchline: Assault in the third degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.041

text:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another.
(2) Assault in the fourth degree is a gross misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
(3)(a) Assault in the fourth degree occurring after July 23, 2017, and before March 18, 2020, where domestic violence is pleaded and proven, is a class C felony if the person has two or more prior adult convictions within ten years for any of the following offenses occurring after July 23, 2017, where domestic violence was pleaded and proven:
(i) Repetitive domestic violence offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
(ii) Crime of harassment as defined by RCW 9A.46.060;
(iii) Assault in the third degree;
(iv) Assault in the second degree;
(v) Assault in the first degree; or
(vi) A municipal, tribal, federal, or out-of-state offense comparable to any offense under (a)(i) through (v) of this subsection.
For purposes of this subsection (3)(a), "family or household members" for purposes of the definition of "domestic violence" means spouses, domestic partners, former spouses, former domestic partners, persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time, persons sixteen years of age or older who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship, and persons sixteen years of age or older with whom a person sixteen years of age or older has or has had a dating relationship. "Family or household member" also includes an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020.
(b) Assault in the fourth degree occurring on or after March 18, 2020, where domestic violence against an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020 is pleaded and proven, is a class C felony if the person has two or more prior adult convictions within ten years for any of the following offenses occurring after July 23, 2017, where domestic violence against an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020 or domestic violence against a "family or household member" as defined in (a) of this subsection was pleaded and proven:
(i) Repetitive domestic violence offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
(ii) Crime of harassment as defined by RCW 9A.46.060;
(iii) Assault in the third degree;
(iv) Assault in the second degree;
(v) Assault in the first degree; or
(vi) A municipal, tribal, federal, or out-of-state offense comparable to any offense under (b)(i) through (v) of this subsection.
[ 2021 c 215 s 106; 2020 c 29 s 7; 2017 c 272 s 1; 1987 c 188 s 2; 1986 c 257 s 7.]
Notes:
Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Effective date—2020 c 29: See note following RCW 7.77.060.
Effective date—1986 c 257 ss 3-10: See note following RCW 9A.04.110.
Effective date—1987 c 188: See note following RCW 9A.36.100.
Severability—1986 c 257: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

catchline: Assault in the fourth degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.045

text:
(1) A person is guilty of drive-by shooting when he or she recklessly discharges a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 in a manner which creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person and the discharge is either from a motor vehicle or from the immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the firearm, or both, to the scene of the discharge.
(2) A person who unlawfully discharges a firearm from a moving motor vehicle may be inferred to have engaged in reckless conduct, unless the discharge is shown by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such recklessness.
(3) Drive-by shooting is a class B felony.
[ 1997 c 338 s 44; 1995 c 129 s 8 (Initiative Measure No. 159); (1994 sp.s. c 7 s 511 repealed by 1995 c 129 s 19 (Initiative Measure No. 159)); 1989 c 271 s 109.]
Notes:
Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.
Severability—Effective dates—1997 c 338: See notes following RCW 5.60.060.
Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.
Finding—Intent—Severability—Effective dates—Contingent expiration date—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.
Finding—Intent—1989 c 271 ss 102, 109, and 110: See note following RCW 9A.36.050.
Application—1989 c 271 ss 101-111: See note following RCW 9.94A.510.
Severability—1989 c 271: See note following RCW 9.94A.510.

catchline: Drive-by shooting.


title: RCW 9A.36.050

text:
(1) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.
(2) Reckless endangerment is a gross misdemeanor.
[ 1997 c 338 s 45; 1989 c 271 s 110; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.36.050.]
Notes:
Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.
Severability—Effective dates—1997 c 338: See notes following RCW 5.60.060.
Finding—Intent—1989 c 271 ss 102, 109, and 110: "The legislature finds that increased trafficking in illegal drugs has increased the likelihood of "drive-by shootings." It is the intent of the legislature in sections 102, 109, and 110 of this act to categorize such reckless and criminal activity into a separate crime and to provide for an appropriate punishment." [ 1989 c 271 s 108.]
Application—1989 c 271 ss 101-111: See note following RCW 9.94A.510.
Severability—1989 c 271: See note following RCW 9.94A.510.
Criminal history and driving record: RCW 46.61.513.

catchline: Reckless endangerment.


title: RCW 9A.36.060

text:
(1) A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.
(2) Promoting a suicide attempt is a class C felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 360; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.36.060.]

catchline: Promoting a suicide attempt.


title: RCW 9A.36.070

text:
(1) A person is guilty of coercion if by use of a threat he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from, or to abstain from conduct which he or she has a legal right to engage in.
(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:
(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or
(b) Threats as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27) (a), (b), or (c).
(3) Coercion is a gross misdemeanor.
[ 2011 c 336 s 361; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.36.070.]
Notes:
*Reviser's note: RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2011 c 166 s 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).

catchline: Coercion.


title: RCW 9A.36.078

text:
The legislature finds that crimes and threats against persons because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disabilities are serious and increasing. The legislature also finds that crimes and threats are often directed against interracial couples and their children or couples of mixed religions, colors, ancestries, or national origins because of bias and bigotry against the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of one person in the couple or family. The legislature finds that the state interest in preventing crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in preventing other felonies or misdemeanors such as criminal trespass, malicious mischief, assault, or other crimes that are not motivated by hatred, bigotry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias. Therefore, the legislature finds that protection of those citizens from threats of harm due to bias and bigotry is a compelling state interest.
The legislature also finds that in many cases, certain discrete words or symbols are used to threaten the victims. Those discrete words or symbols have historically or traditionally been used to connote hatred or threats towards members of the class of which the victim or a member of the victim's family or household is a member. In particular, the legislature finds that cross burnings historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass African Americans and their families. Cross burnings often preceded lynchings, murders, burning of homes, and other acts of terror. Further, Nazi swastikas historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass Jewish people and their families. Swastikas symbolize the massive destruction of the Jewish population, commonly known as the holocaust. Therefore, the legislature finds that any person who burns or attempts to burn a cross or displays a swastika on the property of the victim or burns a cross or displays a swastika as part of a series of acts directed towards a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular group, knows or reasonably should know that the cross burning or swastika may create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the person, the person's family and household members, or the group.
The legislature also finds that attacks on religious places of worship and threatening defacement of religious texts have increased, as have assaults and attacks on those who visibly self-identify as members of a religious minority, such as by wearing religious head covering or other visible articles of faith. The legislature finds that any person who defaces religious real property with derogatory words, symbols, or items, who places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim, or who attacks or attempts to remove the religious garb or faith-based attire of a victim, knows or reasonably should know that such actions create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the victim.
The legislature also finds that a hate crime committed against a victim because of the victim's gender may be identified in the same manner that a hate crime committed against a victim of another protected group is identified. Affirmative indications of hatred towards gender as a class is the predominant factor to consider. Other factors to consider include the perpetrator's use of language, slurs, or symbols expressing hatred towards the victim's gender as a class; the severity of the attack including mutilation of the victim's sexual organs; a history of similar attacks against victims of the same gender by the perpetrator or a history of similar incidents in the same area; a lack of provocation; an absence of any other apparent motivation; and common sense.
The legislature recognizes that, since 2015, Washington state has experienced a sharp increase in malicious harassment offenses, and, in response, the legislature intends to rename the offense to its more commonly understood title of "hate crime offense" and create a multidisciplinary working group to establish recommendations for best practices for identifying and responding to hate crimes.
[ 2019 c 271 s 1; 1993 c 127 s 1.]
Notes:
Severability—1993 c 127: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1993 c 127 s 7.]

catchline: Hate crime offenses—Finding.


title: RCW 9A.36.080

text:
(1) A person is guilty of a hate crime offense if the person maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts in whole or in part because of their perception of another person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:
(a) Assaults another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim. Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
(2) In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a Nazi emblem, symbol, or hakenkreuz;
(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;
(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;
(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim's person without the victim's authorization; or
(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(5) Every person who commits another crime during the commission of a crime under this section may be punished and prosecuted for the other crime separately.
(6) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Gender expression or identity" means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.
(b) "Sexual orientation" means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.
(c) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for hate crime offenses do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.
[ 2025 c 249 s 1; 2024 c 34 s 1; 2023 c 52 s 1; 2019 c 271 s 2; 2010 c 119 s 1; 2009 c 180 s 1; 1993 c 127 s 2; 1989 c 95 s 1; 1984 c 268 s 1; 1981 c 267 s 1.]
Notes:
Severability—1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
Construction—1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [ 1989 c 95 s 3.]
Severability—1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1989 c 95 s 4.]
Harassment: Chapter 9A.46 RCW.

catchline: Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty.


title: RCW 9A.36.083

text:
In addition to the criminal penalty provided in RCW 9A.36.080 for committing a hate crime offense, the victim may bring a civil cause of action for the hate crime offense against the person who committed the offense. A person may be liable to the victim of the hate crime offense for actual damages, punitive damages of up to one hundred thousand dollars, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the action.
[ 2019 c 271 s 3; 1993 c 127 s 3.]
Notes:
Severability—1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.

catchline: Hate crime offense—Civil action.


title: RCW 9A.36.090

text:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the governor of the state or his or her immediate family, the governor-elect, the lieutenant governor, other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor of the state, or the lieutenant governor-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the governor, governor-elect, lieutenant governor, other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor, or lieutenant governor-elect, shall be guilty of a class C felony.
(2) As used in this section, the term "governor-elect" and "lieutenant governor-elect" means such persons as are the successful candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, as ascertained from the results of the general election. As used in this section, the phrase "other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor" means the person other than the lieutenant governor next in order of succession to the office of governor under Article 3, section 10 of the state Constitution.
(3) The Washington state patrol may investigate for violations of this section.
[ 2011 c 336 s 362; 1982 c 185 s 1.]

catchline: Threats against governor or family.


title: RCW 9A.36.100

text:
(1) A person is guilty of custodial assault if that person is not guilty of an assault in the first or second degree and where the person:
(a) Assaults a full or part-time staff member or volunteer, any educational personnel, any personal service provider, or any vendor or agent thereof at any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facilities who was performing official duties at the time of the assault;
(b) Assaults a full or part-time staff member or volunteer, any educational personnel, any personal service provider, or any vendor or agent thereof at any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facilities who was performing official duties at the time of the assault;
(c)(i) Assaults a full or part-time community correction officer while the officer is performing official duties; or
(ii) Assaults any other full or part-time employee who is employed in a community corrections office while the employee is performing official duties; or
(d) Assaults any volunteer who was assisting a person described in (c) of this subsection at the time of the assault.
(2) Custodial assault is a class C felony.
[ 1988 c 151 s 1; 1987 c 188 s 1.]
Notes:
Effective date—1987 c 188: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect July 1, 1987." [ 1987 c 188 s 3.]

catchline: Custodial assault.


title: RCW 9A.36.120

text:
(1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the first degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person:
(a) Commits the crime of assault in the first degree, as defined in RCW 9A.36.011, against the child; or
(b) Intentionally assaults the child and either:
(i) Recklessly inflicts great bodily harm; or
(ii) Causes substantial bodily harm, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (A) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater than transient physical pain or minor temporary marks, or (B) causing the child physical pain or agony that is equivalent to that produced by torture.
(2) Assault of a child in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 1992 c 145 s 1.]

catchline: Assault of a child in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.130

text:
(1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the second degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person:
(a) Commits the crime of assault in the second degree, as defined in RCW 9A.36.021, against a child; or
(b) Intentionally assaults the child and causes bodily harm that is greater than transient physical pain or minor temporary marks, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (i) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks, or (ii) causing the child physical pain or agony that is equivalent to that produced by torture.
(2) Assault of a child in the second degree is a class B felony.
[ 1992 c 145 s 2.]

catchline: Assault of a child in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.140

text:
(1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1) (d) or (f) against the child.
(2) Assault of a child in the third degree is a class C felony.
[ 1992 c 145 s 3.]

catchline: Assault of a child in the third degree.


title: RCW 9A.36.150

text:
(1) A person commits the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence if the person:
(a) Commits a crime of domestic violence, as defined in RCW 10.99.020; and
(b) Prevents or attempts to prevent the victim of or a witness to that domestic violence crime from calling a 911 emergency communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to any law enforcement official.
(2) Commission of a crime of domestic violence under subsection (1) of this section is a necessary element of the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.
(3) Interference with the reporting of domestic violence is a gross misdemeanor.
[ 1996 c 248 s 3.]

catchline: Interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.


title: RCW 9A.36.160

text:
A person is guilty of the crime of failing to summon assistance if:
(1) He or she was present when a crime was committed against another person; and
(2) He or she knows that the other person has suffered substantial bodily harm as a result of the crime committed against the other person and that the other person is in need of assistance; and
(3) He or she could reasonably summon assistance for the person in need without danger to himself or herself and without interference with an important duty owed to a third party; and
(4) He or she fails to summon assistance for the person in need; and
(5) Another person is not summoning or has not summoned assistance for the person in need of such assistance.
[ 2005 c 209 s 1.]

catchline: Failing to summon assistance.


title: RCW 9A.36.161

text:
A violation of RCW 9A.36.160 is a misdemeanor.
[ 2005 c 209 s 2.]

catchline: Failing to summon assistance—Penalty.


title: RCW 9A.36.170

text:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a person is guilty of female genital mutilation when the person knowingly:
(a) Commits female genital mutilation on a minor; or
(b) Transports a minor, or causes or permits the transport of a minor, for the purpose of the performance of female genital mutilation on the minor.
(2) Female genital mutilation is a gross misdemeanor.
(3) A medical procedure is not a violation of this section if it is performed by a licensed health care provider and is necessary to the health of the minor.
(4) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that a person believes the person's actions were conducted as a matter of culture, custom, religion, or ritual, or that the minor on whom female genital mutilation was performed consented to female genital mutilation, or that the minor's parent or guardian consented to female genital mutilation.
(5) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Female genital mutilation" has the meaning provided in RCW 9A.36.175; and
(b) "Minor" means any person under the age of 18.
[ 2023 c 122 s 7.]
Notes:
Finding—Intent—2023 c 122: "(1) The legislature finds that over 500,000 women in the United States are at risk of or have undergone female genital mutilation. The existence, incidence, and effects of female genital mutilation is often shrouded in secrecy. Federal law prohibits the performance of female genital mutilation in the United States.
(2) The legislature intends to create a private right of action for victims of female genital mutilation and create a disciplinary violation under the uniform disciplinary act. The legislature further intends to establish education and outreach initiatives to prevent female genital mutilation, and provide care for victims of female genital mutilation." [ 2023 c 122 s 1.]
Effective date—2023 c 122: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [April 20, 2023]." [ 2023 c 122 s 9.]

catchline: Female genital mutilation—Minors.


title: RCW 9A.36.175

text:
(1) A victim of female genital mutilation under RCW 9A.36.170 may bring a civil cause of action against the person who committed the female genital mutilation for economic and noneconomic damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the action.
(2) A civil cause of action for female genital mutilation under this section must be commenced within 10 years of the acts alleged to have caused the injury. However, the time limit for commencement of an action under this section shall be tolled for a minor until the minor reaches the age of 18 years.
(3) For purposes of this section, "female genital mutilation" means any procedure performed for nonmedical reasons that involves partial or total removal of, or other injury to, the external female genitalia, including but not limited to a clitoridectomy or the partial or total removal of the clitoris or the prepuce or clitoral hood, excision or the partial or total removal (with or without excision of the clitoris) of the labia minora or the labia majora, or both, infibulation or the narrowing of the vaginal opening (with or without excision of the clitoris), or other procedures that are harmful to the external female genitalia, including pricking, incising, scraping, or cauterizing the genital area.
[ 2023 c 122 s 2.]
Notes:
Finding—Intent—Effective date—2023 c 122: See notes following RCW 9A.36.170.

catchline: Female genital mutilation—Minors—Civil action.


title: RCW 9A.40.010

text:
The following definitions apply in this chapter:
(1) "Abduct" means to restrain a person by either (a) secreting or holding him or her in a place where he or she is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly force.
(2) "Commercial sex act" means any act of sexual contact or sexual intercourse for which something of value is given or received.
(3) "Forced labor" means knowingly providing or obtaining labor or services of a person by: (a) Threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person; or (b) means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.
(4) "Involuntary servitude" means a condition of servitude in which the victim was forced to work by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, by the use of threat of coercion through law or legal process, or as set forth in RCW 9A.40.110. For the purposes of this subsection, "coercion" has the same meaning as provided in RCW 9A.36.070.
(5) "Relative" means an ancestor, descendant, or sibling, including a relative of the same degree through marriage or adoption, or a spouse.
(6) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his or her liberty. Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation, or deception, or (b) any means including acquiescence of the victim, if he or she is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and if the parent, guardian, or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him or her has not acquiesced.
(7) "Serious harm" means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor, services, or a commercial sex act in order to avoid incurring that harm.
[ 2014 c 52 s 2. Prior: 2011 c 336 s 363; 2011 c 111 s 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.40.010.]

catchline: Definitions.


title: RCW 9A.40.020

text:
(1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree if he or she intentionally abducts another person with intent:
(a) To hold him or her for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
(b) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on him or her; or
(d) To inflict extreme mental distress on him, her, or a third person; or
(e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental function.
(2) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 364; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.40.020.]

catchline: Kidnapping in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.40.030

text:
(1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she intentionally abducts another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree.
(2) In any prosecution for kidnapping in the second degree, it is a defense if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the abduction does not include the use of or intent to use or threat to use deadly force, and (b) the actor is a relative of the person abducted, and (c) the actor's sole intent is to assume custody of that person. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, any other crime.
(3)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835 or 13.40.135 is a class A felony.
[ 2003 c 53 s 65; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 356; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.40.030.]
Notes:
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

catchline: Kidnapping in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.40.040

text:
(1) A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he or she knowingly restrains another person.
(2) Unlawful imprisonment is a class C felony.
[ 2011 c 336 s 365; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.40.040.]

catchline: Unlawful imprisonment.


title: RCW 9A.40.060

text:
(1) A relative of a child under the age of eighteen or of an incompetent person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child or incompetent person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person and:
(a) Intends to hold the child or incompetent person permanently or for a protracted period; or
(b) Exposes the child or incompetent person to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or
(c) Causes the child or incompetent person to be removed from the state of usual residence; or
(d) Retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person in another state after expiration of any authorized visitation period with intent to intimidate or harass a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having lawful right to physical custody or to prevent a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person with lawful right to physical custody from regaining custody.
(2) A parent of a child is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child, with the intent to deny access, from the other parent having the lawful right to time with the child pursuant to a court order making residential provisions for the child, and:
(a) Intends to hold the child permanently or for a protracted period; or
(b) Exposes the child to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or
(c) Causes the child to be removed from the state of usual residence.
(3) A parent or other person acting under the directions of the parent is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent or other person intentionally takes, entices, retains, or conceals a child, under the age of eighteen years and for whom no lawful custody order or order making residential provisions for the child has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, from the other parent with intent to deprive the other parent from access to the child permanently or for a protracted period.
(4) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class C felony.
[ 2015 c 38 s 2; 1998 c 55 s 1; 1994 c 162 s 1; 1984 c 95 s 1.]
Notes:
Intent—2015 c 38: "It is the intent of the legislature to address the Washington supreme court's decision in State v. Veliz, 176 Wn.2d 849 (2013). The court held that a parent cannot be charged with custodial interference under RCW 9A.40.060(2) if a parent withholds the other parent from having access to the child in violation of residential provisions of a domestic violence protection order. The legislature intends that the provisions of RCW 9A.40.060(2) and 9A.40.070(2) be applicable in cases in which a court has entered any order making residential provisions for a child including, but not limited to, domestic violence protection orders that include such residential provisions." [ 2015 c 38 s 1.]
Severability—1984 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [ 1984 c 95 s 8.]

catchline: Custodial interference in the first degree.


title: RCW 9A.40.070

text:
(1) A relative of a person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree if, with the intent to deny access to such person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person. This subsection shall not apply to a parent's noncompliance with a court order making residential provisions for the child.
(2) A parent of a child is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree if: (a) The parent takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child, with the intent to deny access, from the other parent having the lawful right to time with the child pursuant to a court order making residential provisions for the child; or (b) the parent has not complied with the residential provisions of a court-ordered parenting plan after a finding of contempt under RCW 26.09.160(3); or (c) if the court finds that the parent has engaged in a pattern of willful violations of a court order making residential provisions for the child.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2)(b) of this section prohibits conviction of custodial interference in the second degree under subsection (2)(a) or (c) of this section in absence of findings of contempt.
(4)(a) The first conviction of custodial interference in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.
(b) The second or subsequent conviction of custodial interference in the second degree is a class C felony.
[ 2015 c 38 s 3; 2003 c 53 s 66; 1989 c 318 s 2; 1984 c 95 s 2.]
Notes:
Intent—2015 c 38: See note following RCW 9A.40.060.
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Severability—1989 c 318: See note following RCW 26.09.160.
Severability—1984 c 95: See note following RCW 9A.40.060.

catchline: Custodial interference in the second degree.


title: RCW 9A.40.080

text:
(1) Any reasonable expenses incurred in locating or returning a child or incompetent person shall be assessed against a defendant convicted under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070.
(2) In any prosecution of custodial interference in the first or second degree, it is a complete defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(a) The defendant's purpose was to protect the child, incompetent person, or himself or herself from imminent physical harm, that the belief in the existence of the imminent physical harm was reasonable, and that the defendant sought the assistance of the police, sheriff's office, protective agencies, or the court of any state before committing the acts giving rise to the charges or within a reasonable time thereafter;
(b) The complainant had, prior to the defendant committing the acts giving rise to the crime, for a protracted period of time, failed to exercise his or her rights to physical custody or access to the child under a court-ordered parenting plan or order granting visitation rights, provided that such failure was not the direct result of the defendant's denial of access to such person;
(c) The acts giving rise to the charges were consented to by the complainant; or
(d) The offender, after providing or making a good faith effort to provide notice to the person entitled to access to the child, failed to provide access to the child due to reasons that a reasonable person would believe were directly related to the welfare of the child, and allowed access to the child in accordance with the court order within a reasonable period of time. The burden of proof that the denial of access was reasonable is upon the person denying access to the child.
(3) Consent of a child less than sixteen years of age or of an incompetent person does not constitute a defense to an action under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070.
[ 1989 c 318 s 5; 1984 c 95 s 3.]
Notes:
Severability—1989 c 318: See note following RCW 26.09.160.
Severability—1984 c 95: See note following RCW 9A.40.060.
Child custody, action by relative: RCW 26.09.255.

catchline: Custodial interference—Assessment of costs—Defense—Consent defense, restricted.


title: RCW 9A.40.090

text:
(1) A person commits the crime of luring if the person, with the intent to harm the health, safety, or welfare of the minor or person with a developmental disability or with the intent to facilitate the commission of any crime:
(a) Orders, lures, or attempts to lure a minor or a person with a developmental disability into any area or structure that is obscured from or inaccessible to the public, or away from any area or structure constituting a bus terminal, airport terminal, or other transportation terminal, or into a motor vehicle;
(b) Does not have the consent of the minor's parent or guardian or of the guardian of the person with a developmental disability; and
(c) Is unknown to the child or developmentally disabled person.
(2) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Minor" means a person under the age of sixteen;
(b) "Person with a developmental disability" means a person with a developmental disability as defined in RCW 71A.10.020.
(3) Luring is a class C felony.
[ 2016 c 11 s 1; 2012 c 145 s 1; 1995 c 156 s 1; 1993 c 509 s 1.]
Notes:
Effective date—2012 c 145: "This act takes effect January 1, 2013." [ 2012 c 145 s 2.]

catchline: Luring.