TITLE: Why is the axiom of choice separated from the other axioms?
QUESTION [46 upvotes]: I don't know much about set theory or foundational mathematics, this question arose just out of curiosity. As far as I know, the widely accepted axioms of set theory is the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms with the axiom of choice. But the last axiom seems to be the most special out of these axioms. A lot of theorems specifically mention that they depend on the axiom of choice. So, what is so special about this axiom?
I know that a lot of funny results occur when we assume the axiom of choice, such as the Banach-Tarski paradox. However, we are assuming the other ZF axioms at the same time. So why do we blame it to the axiom of choice, not the others? To me, the axiom of regularity is less convincing than the axiom of choice (though it's probably due to my lack of understanding).

REPLY [4 votes]: The basic axiom of "naive set theory" is general comprehension: For any property $P$, you may form the set consisting of all elements satisfying $P$. Russell's paradox shows that general comprehension is inconsistent, so you need to break it down into more restricted types of comprehension.
The other axioms of ZF (except for well-foundedness) are all special cases of general comprehension. For example, the Power Set axiom asserts that the class of all subsets of $X$ is a set. Replacement with respect $\phi(x,y)$ asserts that the class of pairs $(x,y)$ satisfying $\phi(x,y)$ is a set. Separation asserts is obviously a sub-case of general comprehension.
Choice is very different, because it asserts the existence of a set which does not satisfy a specific defining sentence.