diff --git "a/data/pages-00002.jsonl" "b/data/pages-00002.jsonl" --- "a/data/pages-00002.jsonl" +++ "b/data/pages-00002.jsonl" @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ {"id":10090,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/fetch-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Fetch an NFT | NFTs","text":"Fetch NFT data from the Solana blockchain.\nFetch an NFT or a Collection\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about fetching NFTs and collections in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { fetchAsset, fetchCollection, mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core';\n\n2import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n3import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults';\n\n4\n\n5// Initialize UMI\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n7 .use(mplCore())\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a Core Asset\n\n10const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n11const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\n12\n\n13// Fetch a Core Collection\n\n14const collectionAddress = publicKey('CollectionAddressHere...')\n\n15const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, collectionAddress)\n\n16\n\n17console.log('Asset fetched:', asset)\n\n18console.log('Name:', asset.name)\n\n19console.log('Owner:', asset.owner)\n\n20console.log('URI:', asset.uri)\n\n21\n\n22console.log('\\nCollection fetched:', collection)\n\n23console.log('Name:', collection.name)\n\n24console.log('URI:', collection.uri)\n\n1# Fetch an NFT using the Metaplex CLI\n\n2\n\n3# Fetch asset by ID\n\n4mplx core fetch asset \n\n5\n\n6# Download all files to a directory\n\n7mplx core fetch asset --download --output ./assets\n\n8\n\n9# Download only the image\n\n10mplx core fetch asset --download --image\n\n11\n\n12# Download only the metadata\n\n13mplx core fetch asset --download --metadata\n\n1// npm install @metaplex-foundation/umi @metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults @metaplex-foundation/digital-asset-standard-api\n\n2import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n3import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n4import { dasApi } from '@metaplex-foundation/digital-asset-standard-api'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize Umi with a DAS-enabled RPC endpoint\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(dasApi())\n\n8\n\n9// The address of the NFT you want to fetch\n\n10const assetAddress = publicKey('YOUR_NFT_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch the asset using DAS API\n\n13const asset = await umi.rpc.getAsset(assetAddress)\n\n14\n\n15console.log('Asset ID:', asset.id)\n\n16console.log('Name:', asset.content.metadata?.name)\n\n17console.log('Description:', asset.content.metadata?.description)\n\n18console.log('Image:', asset.content.links?.image)\n\n19console.log('Owner:', asset.ownership.owner)\n\n20console.log('Interface:', asset.interface)\n\n1# Fetch an NFT using the DAS API\n\n2curl -X POST \\\n\n3 -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n\n4 -d '{\n\n5 \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n\n6 \"id\": 1,\n\n7 \"method\": \"getAsset\",\n\n8 \"params\": {\n\n9 \"id\": \"\"\n\n10 }\n\n11 }' \\\n\n12 https://api.devnet.solana.com\n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your fetch:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT asset\n\ncollectionAddress\nThe public key of the collection (optional)\n\nHow It Works\nThe fetch process involves these steps:\nGet the address - You need the public key of the NFT asset or collection you want to fetch\nFetch asset data - Use fetchAsset to retrieve NFT information including name, URI, owner, and plugins\nFetch collection data - Use fetchCollection to retrieve collection information (optional)\nNFT and Collection Data\nWhen you fetch an asset, you get back all its data:\nName - The NFT's name\nURI - Link to the metadata JSON\nOwner - The wallet that owns the NFT\nUpdate Authority - Who can modify the NFT\nPlugins - Any attached plugins like royalties or attributes\nWhen you fetch a collection, you get:\nName - The collection's name\nURI - Link to the collection metadata JSON\nUpdate Authority - Who can modify the collection\nNum Minted - Number of assets in the collection\nPlugins - Any attached plugins like royalties or attributes","tokens":957,"crawled_at":1791192309442} {"id":10091,"url":"https://governance.aave.com/t/discussion-a-second-issuer-controlled-verifier-for-cross-chain-gho-on-ccip-2-0/25771","domain":"governance.aave.com","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Discussion] A second, issuer-controlled verifier for cross-chain GHO on CCIP 2.0 - Governance - Aave","text":"[Discussion] A second, issuer-controlled verifier for cross-chain GHO on CCIP 2.0\n\nGovernance\n\nanfossopablo\n\nOctober 4, 2026, 12:26pm\n\n1\n\nHi everyone,\n\nCross-chain GHO runs on Chainlink CCIP: GHO is locked on Ethereum and minted through facilitators on other chains. CCIP 2.0, live since September 28, now lets a token pool require additional verifiers on top of Chainlink’s committee.\n\nWe built Countersign. Countersign is an issuer-operated Cross-Chain Verifier (CCV) for Chainlink CCIP 2.0 that runs as a CRE workflow, so there are no servers to operate. The token pool refuses to mint or release a large transfer until Countersign has independently re-checked it: the canonical OnRamp event, the cross-chain supply invariant (and Proof of Reserve when available), rolling outflow and per-sender limits, and a denylist. A guardian can hold a suspicious transfer for review, and a tighten-only circuit breaker freezes lanes if supply ever looks unbacked.\n\nFor GHO it can enforce the core invariant directly: GHO minted on remote chains never exceeds GHO locked on Ethereum, checked for every transfer before the mint, plus rolling outflow limits per lane.\n\nLive on public testnets, including a transfer held and then released by a guardian:\n\n2-minute demo: https://youtu.be/FKoKNaHxgg0\n\nOpen-source code, 99 tests and every testnet transaction: GitHub - allertrack/countersign: countersign · GitHub\n\nWe’d welcome feedback from the community and service providers on whether a testnet pilot on GHO’s lanes is worthwhile, and which thresholds and limits would make sense. Countersign only adds checks: it cannot move funds or loosen rate limits.\n\nPablo, Countersign\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[ARFC] Launch sGHO Cross-Chain\n\nGovernance\n\n2\n\n462\n\nJuly 7, 2026\n\n[ARFC] Aave Institutional\n\nGovernance\n\n7\n\n520\n\nOctober 2, 2026\n\n[ARFC] GHO Stewards Signer Update\n\nGovernance\n\n1\n\n183\n\nAugust 17, 2026\n\nAave Chan Initiative Delegate platform\n\nDelegate Platforms\n\n43\n\n13839\n\nOctober 2, 2026\n\n[ARFC] Aave Risk Framework\n\nRisk\n\n9\n\n2721\n\nJuly 31, 2026","tokens":515,"crawled_at":1791192309837} {"id":10092,"url":"https://docs.cosmos.network/cometbft/latest/spec/CometBFT-Spec","domain":"docs.cosmos.network","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Overview - Cosmos Docs","text":"​\n\nCometBFT Spec\n\nThis is a markdown specification of CometBFT.\nIt defines the base data structures, how they are validated,\nand how they are communicated over the network.\nIf you find discrepancies between the spec and the code that\ndo not have an associated issue or pull request on github,\nplease submit them to our bug bounty!\n​\n\nContents\n\nOverview\n\n​\n\nData Structures\n\nEncoding and Digests\n\nBlockchain\n\nState\n\n​\n\nConsensus Protocol\n\nConsensus Algorithm\n\nCreating a proposal\n\nTime\n\nLight-Client\n\n​\n\nP2P and Network Protocols\n\nThe Base P2P Layer: multiplex the protocols (“reactors”) on authenticated and encrypted TCP connections\n\nPeer Exchange (PEX): gossip known peer addresses so peers can find each other\n\nBlock Sync: gossip blocks so peers can catch up quickly\n\nConsensus: gossip votes and block parts so new blocks can be committed\n\nMempool: gossip transactions so they get included in blocks\n\nEvidence: sending invalid evidence will stop the peer\n\n​\n\nRPC\n\nRPC SPEC: Specification of the CometBFT remote procedure call interface.\n\n​\n\nSoftware\n\nABCI: Details about interactions between the\napplication and consensus engine over ABCI\n\nWrite-Ahead Log: Details about how the consensus\nengine preserves data and recovers from crash failures\n\n​\n\nOverview\n\nCometBFT provides Byzantine Fault Tolerant State Machine Replication using\nhash-linked batches of transactions. Such transaction batches are called “blocks”.\nHence, CometBFT defines a “blockchain”.\nEach block in CometBFT has a unique index - its Height.\nHeights in the blockchain are monotonic.\nEach block is committed by a known set of weighted Validators.\nMembership and weighting within this validator set may change over time.\nCometBFT guarantees the safety and liveness of the blockchain\nas long as less than 1/3 of the total weight of the Validator set\nis malicious or faulty.\nA commit in CometBFT is a set of signed messages from more than 2/3 of\nthe total weight of the current Validator set. Validators take turns proposing\nblocks and voting on them. Once enough votes are received, the block is considered\ncommitted. These votes are included in the next block as proof that the previous block\nwas committed - they cannot be included in the current block, as that block has already been\ncreated.\nOnce a block is committed, it can be executed against an application.\nThe application returns results for each of the transactions in the block.\nThe application can also return changes to be made to the validator set,\nas well as a cryptographic digest of its latest state.\nCometBFT is designed to enable efficient verification and authentication\nof the latest state of the blockchain. To achieve this, it embeds\ncryptographic commitments to certain information in the block “header”.\nThis information includes the contents of the block (eg. the transactions),\nthe validator set committing the block, as well as the various results returned by the application.\nNote, however, that block execution only occurs after a block is committed.\nThus, application results can only be included in the next block.\nAlso note that information like the transaction results and the validator set are never\ndirectly included in the block - only their cryptographic digests (Merkle roots) are.\nHence, verification of a block requires a separate data structure to store this information.\nWe call this the State. Block verification also requires access to the previous block.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":861,"crawled_at":1791192322623} -{"id":10093,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/burn-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Burn an NFT | NFTs","text":"Permanently destroy an NFT and reclaim rent fees.\nBurn an NFT\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about burning NFTs in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { burn } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Permanently destroy/burn an NFT asset\n\n10const result = await burn(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n13\n\n14console.log('Asset burned successfully')\n\n1# Burn an NFT using the Metaplex CLI\n\n2\n\n3# Burn a single asset by its mint address\n\n4mplx core asset burn \n\n5\n\n6# Burn an asset from that is part of a collection\n\n7mplx core asset burn --collection \n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your burn:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT to burn\n\nHow It Works\nThe burn process involves three steps:\nFetch the NFT - Get the NFT data using fetchAsset\nExecute burn - Destroy the NFT permanently\nReclaim rent - Most SOL is returned to you (except ~0.00089784 SOL)\nWarning: Burning is permanent and cannot be reversed. Make sure you want to destroy the NFT before proceeding.\nRent Reclamation\nWhen you burn an NFT:\nMost of the rent SOL is returned to the NFT owner\nA small amount (~0.00089784 SOL) remains to prevent the account from being reopened\nYou must be the NFT owner to burn it","tokens":420,"crawled_at":1791192329224} +{"id":10093,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/burn-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Burn an NFT | NFTs","text":"Permanently destroy an NFT and reclaim rent fees.\nBurn an NFT\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about burning NFTs in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { burn } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Permanently destroy/burn an NFT asset\n\n10const result = await burn(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n13\n\n14console.log('Asset burned successfully')\n\n1# Burn an NFT using the Metaplex CLI\n\n2\n\n3# Burn a single asset by its mint address\n\n4mplx core asset burn \n\n5\n\n6# Burn an asset from that is part of a collection\n\n7mplx core asset burn --collection \n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your burn:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT to burn\n\nHow It Works\nThe burn process involves three steps:\nFetch the NFT - Get the NFT data using fetchAsset\nExecute burn - Destroy the NFT permanently\nReclaim rent - Most SOL is returned to you (except ~0.00089784 SOL)\nWarning: Burning is permanent and cannot be reversed. Make sure you want to destroy the NFT before proceeding.\nRent Reclamation\nWhen you burn an NFT:\nMost of the rent SOL is returned to the NFT owner\nA small amount (~0.00089784 SOL) remains to prevent the account from being reopened\nYou must be the NFT owner to burn it","tokens":420,"crawled_at":1791192710661} {"id":10094,"url":"https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-onboard-wstlink-to-aave-v3-core-instance/22169","domain":"governance.aave.com","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[ARFC] Onboard wstLINK to Aave V3 Core Instance - New Asset - Aave","text":"[ARFC] Onboard wstLINK to Aave V3 Core Instance\n\nGovernance\n\nNew Asset\n\nACI\n\nMay 26, 2025, 5:32am\n\n1\n\n[ARFC] Onboard wstLINK to Aave V3 Core Instance\n\nDate: 2025-05-26\n\nAuthor: ACI\n\nRisk Parameters and analysis have been updated after being provided by Risk Service Providers 2025-06-06\n\nProposal updated again with Risk Parameters provided by Risk Service Providers 2025-12-19\n\nSummary\n\nThe current proposal plans to onboard wstLINK to Aave V3 Core Instance, after successful [TEMP-CHECK] Onboard wstLINK to Aave v3 Core Instance posted by LinkPool, and successful [TEMP CHECK Snapshot]. This proposal is powered by Skywards.\n\nAs a TLDR wstLINK is a wrapped liquid staking token that enables users to earn LINK staking rewards and additional returns through DeFi strategies for stLINK and wstLINK. Its growing adoption, deep liquidity, and robust security measures make wstLINK a strong candidate to enhance Aave’s asset offerings, increase utilization of existing LINK liquidity and attract additional liquidity.\n\nMotivation:\n\nwstLINK is the wrapped liquid staking token stLINK of stake.link, the only permissionless liquid staking protocol built for LINK staking. By leveraging stake.link users can participate in LINK staking and profit from a higher reward rate as well as composability and faster withdrawals.\n\nKey highlights of wstLINK, stLINK and stake.link include:\n\nSecure: Audited by industry-leading experts, maintaining the high standards set by Chainlink Labs:\n\nCodeHawks\n\nCyfrin\n\nSigma Prime\n\nTrust Security\n\nDecentralized: Powered by 15 major Chainlink Node Operators, handling over 57% of network activity (https://prism.dextrac.com/chainlink)\n\nLiquid - Instant Withdrawals, No Cooldown:\n\nPriority Pool: Withdraw instantly as long as there’s LINK (amount can be viewed here) (The Priority Pool is a holding zone that users can deposit their LINK into that automatically stakes their LINK into Chainlink Staking Contracts whenever a LINK Staker withdraws their LINK).\n\nNative Withdrawals: Withdraw LINK natively within at least 7 days. 25% of the entire LINK pool will be unbonded at any point via stake.link, there’s some edge cases but that’s generally what will be the norm. Withdrawal requests will run in a 7 day queue, if you send a withdrawal request 4 days into the queue it’ll only take 3 days etc.)\n\nEcosystem Participant:\n\nChainlink Labs as ecosystem participant owning roughly 7.7% of SDL supply\n\nHigh Adoption and TVL:\n\nstake.link holds over $74 million (~4.4m LINK) in total value locked (TVL) within its ecosystem integrated across DeFi platforms like Curve, Beefy, and Uniswap\n\nstake.link has established approximately $5 million pool of stLINK on Curve.fi with an a-coefficient of 500 enabling liquidations on par or with significant upside for the liquidator\n\nAnother $3 million of liquidity is still to migrate to the new pool\n\nThe new pool features a very innovative incentive by using 3% of the generated fees by the protocol (stLINK) that are distributed as LP tokens ensuring a steady growth of the pool over time with sustainable reward rate.\n\nSpecification\n\nRisk Parameters and analysis have been updated after being provided by Risk Service Providers 2025-12-19\n\nSpecification\n\nParameter\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nIsolation Mode\n\nN/A\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nCollateral Enabled\n\nNo\n\nSupply Cap\n\n500,000\n\nBorrow Cap\n\n-\n\nDebt Ceiling\n\n-\n\nLTV\n\n-\n\nLT\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Penalty\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Protocol Fee\n\n10%\n\nVariable Base\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope1\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope2\n\n-\n\nUoptimal\n\n-\n\nReserve Factor\n\n-\n\nStable Borrowing\n\nDisabled\n\nFlashloanable\n\nYes\n\nSiloed Borrowing\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable in Isolation\n\nNo\n\nE-Mode Category\n\nwstLINK/LINK\n\nE-Mode (wstLINK/LINK)\n\nParameter\nValue\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nLINK\n\nCollateral\n\nYes\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nYes\n\nMax LTV\n\n90.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Threshold\n\n92.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Bonus\n\n2.00%\n\n-\n\nCAPO\n\nmaxYearlyRatioGrowthPercent\nratioReferenceTime\nMINIMUM_SNAPSHOT_DELAY\n\n6.89%\n\nmonthly\n\n14\n\nInterest Rate\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Base\nRecommended Base\nCurrent Slope2\nRecommended Slope2\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n0%\n\n1.5%\n\n300%\n\n150%\n\nBorrow Cap\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Supply Cap\nRecommended Supply Cap\nCurrent Borrow Cap\nRecommended Borrow Cap\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n20,000,000\n\n-\n\n13,000,000\n\n6,000,000\n\nToken Contracts:\n\nwstLINK on Ethereum: 0x911D86C72155c33993d594B0Ec7E6206B4C803da\n\nLiquidity Pools:\n\nCurve stLINK-LINK stablepool: 0x7e13876b92f1a62c599c231f783f682e96b91761\n\nLINK Priority Pool: 0xddc796a66e8b83d0bccd97df33a6ccfba8fd60ea\n\nUseful Links:\n\nstake.link · GitHub\n\nhttps://docs.stake.link/\n\nNext Steps\n\nPublication of a standard ARFC (currently here), collect community & service providers feedback before escalating proposal to ARFC snapshot stage.\n\nIf the ARFC snapshot outcome is YAE, publish an AIP vote for final confirmation and enforcement of the proposal.\n\nDisclaimer\n\nCurrent proposal has been created by ACI, as this proposal is powered by Skyward from TEMP CHECK stage. ACI did not received payment or compensation for the publication of this proposal and is not affiliated with LinkPool or Chainlink.\n\nCopyright\n\nCopyright and related rights waived under CC0.\n\n9 Likes\n\nChaos Labs - Monthly Community Update\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nJune 2, 2025, 7:07pm\n\n2\n\nSummary\n\nLlamaRisk supports adding wstLINK to the Aave V3 Core. wstLINK is a liquid-staking token that represents staked LINK on Chainlink’s network, with stake.link serving as the delegated staking provider. By staking LINK, the protocol strengthens the cryptoeconomic security of Chainlink’s oracle infrastructure.\n\nThe primary risk for Aave lies in potential slashing penalties on delegated LINK. Since slashing rules remain in beta, they may evolve, and any slashing event would drive net-negative rewards (i.e. a negative rebase on the underlying stLINK).\n\nOn the market side, liquidity for stLINK is concentrated in two Curve pools, offering roughly $5M–$5.4M of swap capacity at up to 7% slippage. The largest pool counts about 40 LPs, over 95% of whose funds sit in a Curve Gauge. Stake.link’s contracts have been audited by four independent firms and are now covered by a bug-bounty program. Governance runs through a 6-of-8 multisig, whose signers include core contributors, node operators, community members. Chainlink itself operates uniquely as a DAO participant.\n\nIn summary, onboarding of wstLINK would not alter Aave’s risk profile and poses minimal incremental risk, though it’s wise to monitor developments in the Chainlink Staking environment.\n\nCollateral Risk Assessment\n1. Asset Fundamental Characteristics\n\n1.1 Asset\n\nwstLINK (Wrapped staked LINK) is a liquid staking ERC20 token that represents a receipt of staked LINK utilised to secure the Chainlink Network through stake.link. LINK, the network’s native token, allows users to provide cryptoeconomic security to oracle networks in return for staking rewards. Stake.link is the issuer of wstLINK and the sole third-party delegated staking provider for Chainlink.\n\nimage1536×864 96.9 KB\n\nSource: Chainlink Staking, Chainlink Economics 2.0\n\nChainlink staking was initially launched with v0.1 in December 2022 as a capped staking pool for the ETH/USD Data Feed on mainnet, with Community and Node Operator native staking allotments. Users can stake as Community Stakers to participate in maintaining the network (see section 1.2), with LINK auto-delegated evenly to all nodes currently.\n\nThe most recent beta update, v.02 (November 2023), expanded the pool from 25M to 45M LINK and introduced upgrades such as a withdrawal mechanism, variable reward rates, and the use of modular architecture. As a part of Chainlink’s Economics 2.0, staking forms part of a set of initiatives to increase oracle network utilization and adoption.\n\nimage1100×591 80.5 KB\n\nSource: Chainlink Staking roadmap, Chainlink Blog\n\nAt the time of writing, it has been ~1.5 years since the last Chainlink Staking update, and no new announcements or expansions (including pools and feeds) have been made. The stake.link team indicated a lack of insight into the project’s roadmap progress.\n\n1.2 Architecture\n\nstLINK is wstLINK’s sole underlying asset, LINK is deposited into both the Node Operator and Community Staking Pools. Key contracts that enable wstLINK include:\n\nStakingPool: Controls deposits and withdrawals of underlying LINK. The pool deposits assets into strategy contracts and mints stLINK, which represent a share of the pool.\n\nPriorityPool: Queues deposits and acts as a liquidity buffer for withdrawals.\n\nWithdrawalPool: Queues withdrawals if there is insufficient liquidity in the PriorityPool.\n\nWrappedSDToken: Wraps stLINK into wstLINK.\n\nRewardsInitiator: Handles reward accounting and updates the StakingPool. In the event of slashing, the contract also handles rebasing within the StakingPool.\n\nRewardsPool: Manages the distribution of a single reward token to a parent pool.\n\nVaults: CommunityVaults and OperatorsVaults that are used to stake LINK.\n\nVCS: Staking strategies that manage many Community and Operator vaults.\n\nOperatorStakingPool: Tracks node operator LST balances.\n\nSlashing\n\nReward penalties for node operators found to have excessive downtimes were introduced in v0.1, with up to 3 months of accrued staking rewards at risk of being slashed.\n\nSlashing on committed LINK is currently active for v.02, and is expected to evolve as a part of the staking implementation roadmap. The slashing mechanism is based on oracle networks failing to meet their performance standard, e.g., not submitting a new oracle report for more than three hours. Node operators staked LINK are at risk of slashing should an alert be validated, with node operators slashing currently set to 700 LINK. Each stake.link node operator is max staked 75K LINK, slashing therefore represents a 0.9% penalty on the total stake per node operator. The delegated Community staked LINK is currently not at risk of slashing, but this is subject to change.\n\nAs a third-party delegation system, underlying LINK in wstLINK is subject to slashing risk, as it forms part of the Node Operator pools.\n\nRewards\n\nNative LINK emissions support staking rewards and alerting rewards in Beta versions of staking, with oracle network user fees being introduced from V1 onwards. Current Community rewards have a 4.5% base annualized rewards rate of the maximum staking pool size. Additionally, node operators are entitled to a 4% Delegation reward from auto-delegated Community rewards. The Community pool has an effective base rate of 4.32%. The Node Operator pool generates a base effective rate of 6.28% currently (of a maximum pool size).\n\nPost v0.1 updates, annualized rewards will vary based on user fees and staker commitment, reducing reliance on LINK emissions.\n\nWithdrawals\n\nA Priority pool allows users to deposit LINK in the event of unavailable deposit space into the Staking pool, queuing deposits until space becomes available. The Priority pool also acts as a liquidity buffer, allowing users to withdraw wstLINK provided there is sufficient liquidity in the pool.\n\nimage535×501 39.9 KB\n\nSource: Priority Pool Balance, Dune, May 30th, 2025\n\nAs of May 31st, the Priority pool balance stood at 242K LINK (~$3.4M). Historically, the pool saw its largest balance in December 2023 (~1M/$15.8M LINK). This peak and prior growth coincided with the v0.2 update and is likely explained by the start of Early Access and General Access (December 7 and December 11). The pool’s balance declined thereafter and saw its lowest levels between August and November 2024. Liquidity has since improved and fluctuated periodically.\n\nUnstaking\n\nStaked LINK can be withdrawn from Chainlink by initiating a request and undergoing a 28-day cooldown window. After this window, users are given 7 days to claim their LINK; unclaimed LINK thereafter are restaked. Version 0.2’s unbonding mechanism reserves potential penalties on accrued rewards depending on the length of staking. Rewards are made up of Claimable and Locked rewards. Claimable rewards can be withdrawn at any time, but Locked rewards go through a 90-day lockup period before they become Claimable. Lock-up periods, called ‘ramp-up’ periods, are tracked linearly from 0% to 100% of days’ completed. Should a staker withdraw before the complete 90-day window, they will earn the percentage completed and forfeit the rest.\n\nIn the event the protocol withdrawal buffer described above is insufficient, stake.link withdrawals will depend on secondary markets and Chainlink’s unbonding delay. In reality, if the withdrawal buffer is depleted, in most cases the withdrawal delay will be around 7 days instead of 28 days in native Chainlink Staking, as claimed by stake.link’s team. If the amount of withdrawal requests exceeded 20% of the pool, the withdrawals will then fall back to the next unbonding cycle, incurring up to 28 days of delay.\n\nNode Operators\n\nimage1121×555 60.5 KB\n\nSource: stake.link Node Operators, Mirror\n\nCurrently, stake.link delegates LINK to 15 node operators.\n\n1.3 Tokenomics\n\nUsers receive stLINK by staking LINK with stake.link, and wrapping to receive wstLINK via the wrapper contract. wstLINK is denominated in LINK and is a value-accruing non-rebasing token representing a user’s stake in the underlying assets + staking rewards. Supply is capped by Chainlink Staking pool size (currently 45M LINK)and the number of node operators that stake.link utilizes.\n\nimage608×264 11 KB\n\nSource: stLINK pool info, stake.link, May 28th, 2025.\n\nAt the time of writing, the available pool capacity has been reached and can only expand with a Chainlink update to the pool size and/or the onboarding of additional node operators with spare capacity. Holders receive a blended reward rate from the Community and Node Operator Staking Pools, less protocol fees.\n\n1.3.1 Token Holder Concentration\n\nimage967×475 78.1 KB\n\nSource: Top 100 wstLINK Holders, Etherscan, May 28th, 2025.\n\nwstLINK is concentrated in a few holders, with only 68 addresses holding the token. The top 10 holders collectively own 84.66%, and consist of 9 EOAs and the RewardsPoolWSD contract.\n\nimage974×468 61.1 KB\n\nSource: Top 100 stLINK Holders, Etherscan, May 28th, 2025\n\nThe top 10 holders of stLINK own 63.52% of the total supply. The top 5 accounts and their holdings include:\n\nLINK Priority Pool contract: 25.02%\n\nwstLINK contract: 17.07%\n\nEOA 1: 4.20%\n\nEOA 2: 3.92%\n\nEOA 3: 3.51%\n\nThe largest DEX holding is a Curve stLINK/LINK stablepool, which holds 2.95% of the current stLINK supply.\n\n2. Market Risk\n\n2.1 Liquidity\n\nLiquidity for wstLINK is low, with liquidations requiring an unwrap step to stLINK for greater liquidity availability.\n\nimage1304×394 57.3 KB\n\nSource: stLINK/LINK swap, DeFiLlama Liquidity, May 29th, 2025\n\n~$5.4M worth of stLINK (~338K) can be swapped for LINK within a ~7% slippage. A less correlated swap involving WETH allows for ~$5M worth of stLINK (~315K) to be swapped within a ~7% slippage.\n\n2.1.1 Liquidity Venue Concentration\n\nimage855×210 33.1 KB\n\nSource: stLINK Liquidity Pools on Ethereum, Geckoterminal, May 29th, 2025\n\nAs mentioned in section 1.3.1, a Curve stLINK/LINK stablepool represents the largest source of DEX liquidity on Ethereum with $1.9M stLINK and $4.5M LINK. An older Curve stLINK/LINK pool is also available with $632K and $637K worth of stLINK and LINK, respectively.\n\n2.1.2 DEX LP Concentration\n\nCurve stLINK/LINK LP distribution is concentrated in a LiquidityGaugeV6 contract (95% of stLINK/LINK-ng LP token), with 33 deposits in the contract. Of the 33 deposit token holders, the top 10 holders collectively own 74.4%. The top 5 accounts and their holdings include:\n\nEOA 1: 10.6%\n\nEOA 2: 10.3%\n\nEOA 3: 10.3%\n\nEOA 4: 9.2%\n\n2/2 Multisig: 7.4%\n\nWhile the number of liquidity providers is low, no single account holds a majority of the available liquidity that would be of concern in the event they decided to pull liquidity from the pool.\n\n2.2 Volatility\n\nimage600×371 35.3 KB\n\nSource: Llamarisk, data sourced from Coingecko, February 28th to May 29th, 2025\n\nRelative volatility between stLINK and underlying LINK, as measured by daily returns over the last 90 days, was similar, with stLINK and LINK averaging 5.4% and 5.3%, respectively.\n\nimage831×280 31.7 KB\n\nSource: stLINK/USD, Geckoterminal, May 29th, 2025\n\n2.3 Exchanges\n\nwstLINK is currently not listed on centralized exchanges.\n\n2.4 Growth\n\nimage1081×340 26.7 KB\n\nSource: Dune, May 29th, 2025\n\nstLINK retains strong user interest, as shown in section 1.3, pool capacity has been reached, with queued deposits from the Priority Pool still pending. Growth in rewards over time has remained upward since January 2024, indicating strong deposit retention and overall growth. Over the last 3 months, the rewards rate has averaged 5.41%.\n\n3. Technological Risk\n\n3.1 Smart Contract Risk\n\n13 audits have been performed on stake.link by 4 independent auditors. The most recent audits from each auditor include:\n\nCyfrin (February 2025): 1 informational and 1 gas-related issue found, both acknowledged\n\nTrust Security (February 2025): 1 high, 3 medium, and 3 low severity issues found, the high issue was fixed and all others were either acknowledged or fixed.\n\nCodehawks (November 2024): 1 high, 7 medium, 17 low severity findings. The sole high issue, along with 5 medium and 8 low issues were fixed.\n\nSigma Prime: (January 2023): 1 high, 1 medium, and 17 low severity issues were found. 1 high and 6 low issues were resolved, 5 low were closed, and the rest remained open at the time.\n\nThese audits reflect a history of regular and diverse risk assessments over time.\n\n3.2 Bug Bounty Program\n\nAn Immunefi bug bounty with a max payout of $100K is live. Additionally, the most recent Chainlink Staking bug bounty program for v0.2 consisted of a Code4arena contest, which lasted for 18 days in 2023, and had a total prize pool of $250K.\n\n3.3 Price Feed Risk\n\n1 stLINK is minted for every 1 LINK staked, this 1:1 basis is translated in a varying exchange rate for wstLINK. In the event of slashing, rebases to stLINK generate net negative rewards and therefore affect the wstLINK/stLINK exchange rate negatively. stLINK rebases occur on a weekly basis.\n\nChainlink LINK/USD market price feed is available, with a 1% deviation threshold and 1 hour heartbeat. Using the internal exchange rate along with a CAPO adapter and LINK/USD market price feed would help reflect slashing penalties more accurately than a wstLINK/USD market price feed, therefore this approach is preferred.\n\n3.4 Dependency Risk\n\nNode operators and Chainlink Staking represent the main dependencies for wstLINK. Node operators are vulnerable to slashing penalties should they not meet performance standards set out in the SLA for an oracle network. As stake.link stakes LINK in Node Operator pools, user funds are exposed to losses should the operators stake.link selects underperform.\n\nChainlink Staking is still in the early phases of its roadmap and will introduce more features that may affect rewards. LINK emissions are expected to taper as the main rewards asset as, oracle user fees are introduced. A reputational system will also influence the selection of nodes in an oracle network and therefore rewards.\n\nSlashing represents the main dependency risk, which could potentially expand to Community Staker pools, however, operator selection based on the reputational system could be a mitigating factor.\n\n4. Counterparty Risk\n\n4.1 Governance and Regulatory Risk\n\nStake.link continues to operate through a bifurcated architecture. The protocol was incubated by LinkPool, a veteran Chainlink node operator whose UK vehicle, LinkPool UK Ltd., remains on the Companies House register. Following the December 2024 community proposal SLURP-30, the ecosystem incorporated stakedotlink Limited in the British Virgin Islands as a company limited by guarantee—a not-for-profit form without share capital—tasked with “representing the DAO” in off-chain matters. This wrapper affords the project limited liability, capacity to execute service agreements (e.g. with auditors and market-makers), and an identifiable tax domicile, while token-holder supremacy is preserved through the guarantee-member structure.\n\nThe platform’s Terms dated 21 September 2023 underline its corporate independence by stating that “the Platform is separate from, and not a corporate affiliate of, Chainlink.” Accordingly, ownership of the front-end, branding and ancillary intellectual property lies with stake.link rather than Chainlink Labs.\n\nThose Terms further describe stake.link as a “strictly technology provider” operating on a “non-custodial” basis, then proceed to disclaim liability for virtually every foreseeable contingency—from smart-contract exploits and price volatility to erroneous artificial-intelligence outputs (e.g. SergAI clause). Users must indemnify the platform for defence costs, and while access is barred to Office of Foreign Assets Control–sanctioned jurisdictions, it is otherwise left open to U.S. persons, subject to unilateral suspension rights. New York law governs; all disputes must be submitted to three-member ICDR arbitration seated in New York; fiduciary, professional, custody and suitability duties are expressly disavowed; class actions, VPN circumvention and sanctioned-country access are contractually prohibited.\n\nWhen a user mints wstLINK pursuant to these Terms, the resulting receipt token entitles its holder to a pro-rata economic interest in a professionally managed staking pool. Contractual waivers, however, cannot forestall a regulator from categorizing that interest as a security or collective-investment unit if the underlying functional tests are satisfied.\n\nwstLINK itself embodies a transferable, yield-bearing claim on an aggregated asset base, with smart-contract logic and DAO governance compounding rewards autonomously. These additional layers—pooling, tokenization, secondary liquidity—mirror the characteristics that U.S. courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission have previously cited when treating Lido’s stETH and Coinbase’s staking program as investment contracts. In its 29 May 2025 statement, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance drew a bright line: “protocol staking” does not constitute a securities offering, but “liquid-staking tokens” such as wstLINK were conspicuously excluded from that safe harbour. Validator-level staking therefore enjoys a clearer regulatory pathway in the United States, yet the transferable receipt token minted atop Stake.link remains in limbo—and may draw increased scrutiny. A footnote in the statement explicitly declines to address “liquid staking, restaking or liquid restaking,” and contemporaneous commentary emphasizes that the guidance lacks binding legal effect, postponing a view on more complex receipt-token models.\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a canvass of SEC, CFTC, FCA, BaFin, MAS and public-court dockets reveals no enforcement proceedings or civil claims against Stake.link, stakedotlink Limited or LinkPool as of 2 June 2025.\n\nBeyond that, we have formally requested that stake.link produce documentary evidence of any legal analysis previously conducted on wstLINK. If such an opinion exists—whether as an external counsel memorandum or an internal regulatory assessment—it would supply contemporaneous support capable of addressing several of the concerns outlined above.\n\n4.2 Access Control Risk\n\n4.2.1 Contract Modification Options\n\nAll stake.link contracts and Treasury wallet are controlled by a 6/8 multisig, which is managed by the Node Operator Council (see section 1.2 for key contracts).\n\nPrivileged functions in the stLINK contract that are exposed include:\n\nFunction\nImpact\n\naddStrategy() / removeStrategy()\n\nAdd/remove staking strategies. Could redirect funds to malicious contracts if compromised.\n\nsetRebaseController()\n\nGrants reward distribution control.\n\naddFee() / updateFee()\n\nConfigure fee. Modifies or removes an existing fee.\n\nsetPriorityPool()\n\nRestricts who can stake/withdraw.\n\nburn()\n\nBurns liquid staking tokens.\n\nDeployed contracts are well documented along with their functions in stake.link docs.\n\n4.2.2 Timelock Duration and Function\n\nstLINK is owned by a Governance Timelock contract, which has a 24-hour delay. This delay may potentially be too short for users to make assessments of any parameter changes and opt out.\n\n4.2.3 Multisig Threshold / Signer identity\n\nThe Node Operator Council is made up of 8 council members. Current signers to the governance multisig include:\n\n2 Core Contributors from LinkPool.io\n\nMatrixed.Link\n\nLinkForest.io\n\nChainlayer.io\n\nGalaxy Digital\n\nThe SDL DAO\n\nHarris and Trotter.\n\nNote: This assessment follows the LLR-Aave Framework, a comprehensive methodology for asset onboarding and parameterization in Aave V3. This framework is continuously updated and available here.\n\nAave V3 Specific Parameters\n\nThe wstLINK deployment parameters have been decided jointly with @ChaosLabs and will be published in their follow-up shortly. The asset is to be onboarded with a similar setup as ETH LSTs, enabling a LINK Correlated E-Mode designed for efficient wstLINK yield looping.\n\nPrice feed Recommendation\n\nWe recommend to price wstLINK employing the internal exchange rate, in combination with CAPO and Chainlink’s LINK/USD market price feed. This will lessen the dependence on secondary market fluctuations while covering the asset’s slashing risk.\n\nDisclaimer\n\nThis review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a community-led decentralized organization funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.\n\nThe information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.\n\n4 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nsid_areta\n\nJune 4, 2025, 12:54pm\n\n3\n\nGreat to hear the feedback on the wstLINK risk profile - liquidity does seem to be slightly constrained on Curve and this should be reflected in the risk parameters, but bringing LINK into DeFi is a big opportunity and one that we’re very much in favour of.\n\n2 Likes\n\nChaosLabs\n\nJune 4, 2025, 5:19pm\n\n4\n\nOverview\n\nChaos Labs supports listing wstLINK on Aave’s Ethereum Core instance. Below is our analysis and initial risk parameter recommendations.\n\nChainlink Staking\n\nChainlink Staking is one of the components of Chainlink’s cryptoeconomic security model, designed to enhance the reliability of oracle services by aligning incentives and introducing accountability through staking and slashing mechanisms. In its current form, Chainlink Staking secures the ETH/USD data feed on Ethereum Mainnet. Node operators help ensure data integrity by putting capital at risk, thereby strengthening the trust guarantees of Chainlink oracles.\n\nChainlink Staking was first introduced with v0.1 in December 2022. As an initial iteration, v0.1 enabled LINK holders to stake tokens and earn protocol rewards, but it did not include any slashing mechanisms. The total staking cap for v0.1 was 25 million LINK, allocated across early Community and Node Operator participants.\n\nIn November 2023, Chainlink Staking was upgraded to v0.2. This upgrade introduced a set of improvements, including an unbonding mechanism for withdrawals, and most notably, slashing capabilities for Node Operator Stakers. Alongside these functional enhancements, the total staking capacity increased by 80%, raising the overall cap from 25 million to 45 million LINK.\n\nChainlink Staking v0.2 is composed of two primary pools:\n\nCommunity Staking Pool, capped at 40.875 million LINK\n\nNode Operator Staking Pool, capped at 4.125 million LINK\n\nThese pools serve distinct roles within the system:\n\nCommunity Stakers are individual or institutional LINK holders who contribute capital but do not provide oracle services directly. Instead, they delegate their stake to the Node Operators. Importantly, Community Stakers are not subject to slashing under v0.2.\n\nNode Operator Stakers are responsible for running Chainlink oracle services (e.g., the ETH/USD data feed). These participants must stake LINK and operate reliable infrastructure. Node Operator stakes can be slashed if performance criteria are violated.\n\nSince the launch of v0.2, the Community Pool has consistently operated at full capacity, with nearly all 40.875 million LINK staked. In contrast, the Node Operator Pool has remained underutilized, with approximately 1.9 million LINK staked out of the 4.125 million LINK cap.\n\nmulti_line_stacked_chart_17485992011920×1405 96.1 KB\n\nDeposit and Withdrawals\n\nFor Community Stakers, deposits can be made through the Chainlink Staking interface or third-party protocols like stake.link, which offer liquid staking tokens such as stLINK and wstLINK. Once staked, LINK is delegated to Node Operators to support oracle services. Deposits into the Community Pool are subject to pool capacity constraints, which have generally been reached since the launch of v0.2.\n\nWithdrawals from the Community Pool follow a two-step unbonding mechanism:\n\nCooldown Period: Stakers initiate a withdrawal request, triggering a fixed 28-day cooldown period during which the staked LINK continues to accrue rewards.\n\nClaim Window: After the cooldown, a 7-day claim window opens. If the staker does not withdraw during this window, the LINK is automatically restaked into the pool.\n\nThis unbonding mechanism is a preventative measure against mass exits during slashing events, helping maintain pool stability and ensuring sufficient staked LINK remains available to enforce penalties.\n\nNode Operator Stakers follow a similar deposit process but must also meet eligibility criteria, including operating approved Chainlink nodes. Withdrawals from the Node Operator Pool are also governed by the 28-day unbonding period and the 7-day claim window.\n\nRewards\n\nChainlink Staking v0.2 features a redesigned reward model that accounts for pool utilization and introduces cryptoeconomic penalties to enhance service reliability.\n\nStaking rewards are distributed in LINK and reward rates are variable, based on pool utilization and the total amount of rewards available per unit time. At full pool capacity, the base floor reward rate for Community Stakers is 4.5% annually. However, 4% of this is redirected to Node Operator Stakers, resulting in an effective base reward rate of 4.32% for Community participants.\n\nScreenshot 2025-06-02 at 10.22.181726×1104 26 KB\n\nNode Operator Stakers earn rewards from multiple sources, including their share of the base 4.5% annual reward rate and the 4% delegation fee redirected from Community Stakers. As a result, operator yields are structurally higher and designed to incentivize reliable and sustained oracle service provision.\n\nWhile current rewards rely primarily on LINK emissions, the long term goal is to gradually taper off emission based rewards and begin distributing user fees as the primary source of staking incentives. In parallel, ecosystem projects participating in the Chainlink BUILD program have committed a portion of their native tokens to Chainlink Staking. These tokens are expected to be distributed to Community and Node Operator Stakers over time, further diversifying the reward base and aligning incentives across the Chainlink ecosystem.\n\nPenalties\n\nThe introduction of Chainlink Staking v0.2 brought with it the first implementation of slashing penalties, designed to hold Node Operator Stakers accountable for the reliability of the oracle services they secure. These penalties are intended to safeguard data integrity by creating real economic consequences for underperformance.\n\nCurrently, only the ETH/USD data feed on Ethereum Mainnet is secured by v0.2 staking. If the feed experiences more than three hours of downtime, a valid alert can be raised onchain. Node Operators have a 20-minute priority window to submit the alert. If no alert is raised within that window, any eligible Community Staker may submit it. Only the first valid alert for each incident is accepted; additional alerts during the same event are disregarded.\n\nEach slashed Node Operator incurs a penalty of 700 LINK\n\nThe first valid alerter is rewarded with 7,000 LINK\n\nAs of writing, 31 different Node Operators are actively participating in Chainlink Staking v0.2. Each operator can stake up to 75,000 LINK. In practice, approximately 1.9 million LINK is currently staked in the Node Operator Pool, representing the capital currently at risk of being slashed.\n\nGiven the fixed penalty of 700 LINK per operator, the theoretical (albeit very unlikely) total maximum slashable amount in a single event is 31 × 700 = 21,700 LINK, which constitutes approximately 1.1% of the Node Operator Pool and 0.05% of the total v0.2 staking pool.\n\nTo date, there have been no recorded slashing events affecting any node operator participating in the Chainlink Node Operator Staking Pool. This reflects the relatively low risk profile of the current staking configuration. Nonetheless, slashing remains a theoretical possibility and should be accounted for in any comprehensive risk assessment.\n\nIt is important to note that Community Stakers are not subject to slashing under the current version. Any future change to this design would require a version upgrade and a corresponding opt-out period enforced via a time-locked upgrade mechanism. This approach helps ensure protocol transparency and allows participants to react accordingly before changes take effect.\n\nstake.link\n\nstake.link is a delegated liquid staking protocol purpose built for Chainlink Staking by LinkPool, a long standing Chainlink node operator and infrastructure provider. It enables LINK holders to stake their tokens into Chainlink’s staking system by abstracting away the complexities of staking and node operation.\n\nWhen users stake LINK through stake.link, they receive stLINK, a liquid staking token that rebases weekly to reflect accrued staking rewards. For use cases requiring a non-rebasing token, stake.link also offers wstLINK, a wrapped version of stLINK that preserves staking value in a fixed supply format.\n\nOne of the key benefits for users is the auto staking functionality: whenever new staking capacity becomes available on Chainlink, such as when another user withdraws from the Community Staking Pool, stake.link automatically stakes LINK from its Priority Pool on behalf of users waiting in the queue.\n\nUnlike directly staking with the Community Staking Pool through the Chainlink interface, stake.link stakes LINK into both the Community and Node Operator pools. Since Node Operator stakes earn a higher effective yield, partly due to receiving delegation fees from Community Stakers, this blended strategy results in a higher aggregate return for stLINK holders compared to staking solely with the Community Pool. However, this additional yield exposure comes with slashing risk on the portion of stake delegated to the Node Operator Pool, a consideration we will explore in the following sections.\n\nPriority Pool\n\nThe Priority Pool is a core mechanism within stake.link designed to improve user experience around staking and redemption by introducing a liquidity buffer between users and the Chainlink Staking protocol. It serves two primary functions:\n\nAuto-staking Queue: When users deposit LINK into stake.link but there is no immediate staking capacity available on Chainlink, their funds are held in the Priority Pool. As soon as capacity becomes available, due to unstakes or staking limit increases, stake.link automatically stakes LINK on behalf of users in the queue.\n\nRedemption Liquidity Buffer: The Priority Pool also enables faster or instant redemptions of stLINK and wstLINK. Instead of waiting through the native 28-day cooldown and 7-day claim window required by Chainlink Staking, users can redeem their staked tokens instantly, as long as there is sufficient LINK available in the Priority Pool to cover the withdrawal.\n\nOver the past three months, the Priority Pool buffer has typically hovered between 100,000 and 300,000 LINK, offering a meaningful layer of liquidity for redemptions. Since its creation on 20 September 2023, there have been periods when the pool was fully depleted, causing some redemption requests to be temporarily delayed until new deposits replenished the balance or withdrawal requests were unbonded through Chainlink Staking. However, such instances have been historically limited. In practice, the pool has maintained a healthy buffer: over 85% of the time, it has held more than 10,000 LINK available for redemptions.\n\nline_chart_17488774831920×1377 74.1 KB\n\nSlashing Risk\n\nWhile stake.link enhances yield for stakers through its dual pool strategy (Community and Node Operator staking pools), it also introduces a limited degree of slashing risk due to its exposure to the Node Operator Staking Pool on Chainlink.\n\nBy design, stake.link allocates user deposits across both staking modules within Chainlink Staking v0.2:\n\nThe Community Staking Pool, which carries no slashing risk under the current version\n\nThe Node Operator Staking Pool, which is subject to slashing in the event of oracle underperformance\n\nAs of now, approximately 25% of the backing for stLINK, equivalent to 1,125,000 LINK, is actively staked with the Node Operator Pool. This portion is distributed evenly across 15 different node operators.\n\nOnly the LINK delegated to this module is exposed to slashing. In a worst-case scenario, where all 15 node operators are simultaneously slashed, the total amount penalized would be:\n\n15 × 700 LINK = 10,500 LINK\n\nThis represents just 0.23% of the total backing of stLINK, a relatively small impact when viewed in the context of the protocol’s overall stake distribution. While highly unlikely, this scenario illustrates the bounded downside stLINK and wstLINK holders face due to partial exposure to slashing.\n\nAs can be seen in the chart, stake.link’s allocation to the Node Operator Pool has remained flat since early 2024, indicating that the protocol has not onboarded new operators in recent months and years. Instead, stake.link appears to be increasingly utilizing available capacity in the Community Staking Pool whenever possible. This trend is evidenced by the consistent growth in community pool allocations, which has had the effect of diluting the relative slashing exposure within the total stLINK backing over time.\n\nmulti_line_chart_17488553801920×1378 96.2 KB\n\nMint and Redemption\n\nMinting in stake.link is not always atomic, due to the staking caps enforced by the Chainlink Staking protocol. When a user deposits LINK into stake.link, the funds are first placed in the Priority Pool, rather than being staked immediately.\n\nFrom there, the protocol waits for available capacity to open up in Chainlink Staking, either through withdrawal activity or increases in pool limits. As space becomes available, the Priority Pool automatically stakes the user’s LINK into either the Community or Node Operator Pools.\n\nAs staking occurs incrementally, users begin accruing eligibility to claim stLINK (or wstLINK) proportionally. Users have two options:\n\nWait until their entire deposit has been staked and mint their full stLINK/wstLINK balance in one transaction\n\nClaim progressively as portions of their LINK are staked, minting partial amounts of stLINK over time\n\nThis flow ensures that stLINK is only minted against LINK that has actually been staked on-chain. It also means that minting is dependent on staking availability, introducing some delay during periods when Chainlink staking capacity is saturated.\n\nTo redeem LINK, users return their stLINK or wstLINK to the protocol. There are two potential redemption paths:\n\nInstant Redemption via Priority Pool\n\nIf the Priority Pool holds enough unallocated LINK, users can redeem their tokens immediately.\n\nDelayed Redemption via Chainlink Unbonding\n\nIf the Priority Pool is insufficiently funded, redemption requests are queued and processed through the unbonding mechanism. In this case, users generally wait through the 7 day cooldown period before receiving their unstaked LINK.\n\nMarket Capitalization\n\nThe stLINK/wstLINK market has seen consistent growth and adoption since launch. As of today, stake.link’s liquid staking tokens are backed 1:1 by approximately 4.55 million staked LINK, reflecting a material share of total staked capital in the Chainlink ecosystem. Currently, only around 17% of stLINK has been converted into wstLINK. However, this proportion is expected to grow over time as more DeFi protocols and strategies begin to integrate and prefer the non-rebasing version for compatibility and composability.\n\nmulti_line_chart_17488662611920×1378 85.3 KB\n\nAt current market prices, this translates to a total market size of approximately $65 million for stake.link’s liquid staking assets. While Chainlink Staking itself is hard-capped at 45 million LINK, this effectively sets an upper bound on the TAM for stake.link’s LSTs. In other words, if 100% of Chainlink Staking were liquid staked via stake.link, the maximum stLINK supply would be capped at 45 million.\n\nCurrently, stake.link accounts for roughly 10% of all staked LINK within Chainlink Staking v0.2. This share continues to grow, driven by the protocol’s enhanced yield (through Node Operator Pool exposure) and liquidity advantage (via the Priority Pool), which are attractive features for DeFi participants.\n\nThe demand for stake.link assets is further evidenced by:\n\nThe consistent presence of significant LINK balances in the Priority Pool, indicating a queue of users awaiting staking capacity\n\nThe premium observed in stLINK’s secondary market price relative to native LINK\n\nPremium Drivers\n\nOver the past month, stLINK has traded at a slight premium to LINK on secondary markets. This premium reflects a combination of structural demand and market anticipation, driven by two primary catalysts:\n\nAirdrops from Chainlink BUILD projects have begun, providing additional rewards to Chainlink Stakers and further enhancing the appeal of stake.link’s liquid staking tokens as both a preferred staking vehicle and a means of gaining exposure to these airdrops.\n\nExpectations around upcoming Aave listings might have led users to position themselves for looping strategies that capitalize on wstLINK’s yield-bearing properties.\n\nline_chart_17488649816063×4349 451 KB\n\nThere have been periods where the token consistently traded at a 2 to 4% premium on secondary markets from its launch until July 2024. Premium has recently started to rise again and is currently around 0.5%.\n\nLiquidity\n\nThe primary source of secondary market liquidity for stake.link’s stLINK token is on Curve Finance, where stLINK/LINK pools facilitates swaps between the two assets.\n\nCurrently, all available liquidity is for the stLINK token, not wstLINK. However, this does not pose a constraint for users, as wstLINK can be atomically unwrapped into stLINK and vice versa without any delay.\n\nThe total liquidity in the Curve pools has ranged between 6.5 million and 8 million USD in recent weeks. This is considered highly adequate for a liquid staking token with a total market size of approximately $65 million, representing over 10% of the token’s market capitalization.\n\nliquidity_chart_17488622481920×1379 59.9 KB\n\nLiquidity within the pool is consistently skewed toward LINK, with 70 to 75% of the liquidity allocated to the LINK side. This skew is a reflection of sustained demand for stLINK, as users seek exposure to Chainlink staking rewards. As a result, stLINK has been traded at a premium to its underlying asset.\n\nDue to this imbalance, the current pool depth and Curve’s optimized pricing mechanism allow for significant trade sizes with minimal slippage. For example, a swap of approximately 340,000 stLINK (around $4.82 million) can be executed with less than 5% price impact, demonstrating the pool’s capacity to support large trades.\n\nGiven that stLINK rewards are distributed on a weekly basis, some actors have been observed engaging in sandwiching behavior within the AMM to extract a disproportionate share of rewards. Curve’s dynamic fee mechanism currently mitigates this effect to some extent. However, this risk may grow if liquidity expands to AMMs without similar protections. Ongoing monitoring of trading activity is advised to detect and manage potential reward extraction as the protocol’s liquidity footprint broadens.\n\nOracle/Pricing\n\nThe wstLINK smart contract maintains an internal exchange rate that reflects the rebasing value accrual of its underlying stLINK asset. This exchange rate increases over time as staking rewards accrue, allowing wstLINK to preserve value growth in a fixed supply format suitable for DeFi integrations.\n\nTo ensure secure and accurate pricing of wstLINK in USD terms, Chaos Labs recommends the following oracle composition using a CAPO adaptor architecture:\n\nwstLINK/LINK Exchange Rate\n\nRetrieve the exchange rate directly from the stLINK contract, which provides the conversion ratio between wstLINK and LINK.\n\nCAPO Adapter: wstLINK/LINK\n\nApply a dedicated CAPO adaptor to track the wstLINK to LINK exchange rate.\n\nLINK/USD Feed\n\nUse the existing LINK/USD price feed to convert the LINK value into USD terms.\n\nLT, LTV, and Liquidity Bonus\n\nTo ensure prudent risk management while enabling initial capital efficiency, we recommend setting a LTV of 64%, a LT of 69%, and a Liquidation Bonus of 7% for wstLINK outside of E-Mode. These parameters are in line with the settings used for other yield bearing staking tokens with similar risk characteristics.\n\nSupply & Borrow Caps\n\nTo ensure a controlled onboarding of wstLINK to the Aave protocol, we recommend setting the supply cap at 600,000 wstLINK. This configuration reflects a cautious approach to risk management while allowing meaningful participation from users seeking to supply wstLINK as collateral. The proposed cap corresponds to approximately $11.3 million in notional value and is calibrated based on available secondary market liquidity and the protocol’s current market capitalization.\n\nWe do not foresee any compelling use cases for borrowing wstLINK, and enabling it as a borrowable asset introduces significant risk due to its pricing dynamics. As discussed in previous sections, wstLINK typically trades at a premium in secondary markets, driven by factors such as staking capacity constraints in Chainlink Staking, increased demand for leveraged staking exposure, and potential airdrops for Chainlink stakers from Chainlink BUILD projects.\n\nSince Aave derives the prices of LST/LRTs from its on-chain exchange rate to underlying and does not account for market premiums, making wstLINK borrowable could enable users, in certain extreme but plausible scenarios where stLINK trades at a high premium to LINK, to borrow it at the oracle price and sell it at a higher market price. This would allow them to extract arbitrage profits while leaving Aave undercollateralized. Such activity creates a risk of protocol bad debt, particularly during periods of elevated secondary market demand.\n\nTo mitigate this risk, we strongly recommend listing wstLINK as non-borrowable.\n\nE-Mode\n\nWe propose creating a dedicated LINK-correlated E-Mode to support efficient capital utilization between wstLINK and LINK. In this setup, wstLINK would be enabled exclusively as collateral, while LINK would be borrowable only. We recommend setting the LTV at 90%, the LT at 92%, and the Liquidation Bonus at 2% to balance capital efficiency with controlled liquidation risk.\n\nCAPO\n\nwstLINK inherits staking rewards from Chainlink Staking, reflecting the yield generated through delegation to the Community and Node Operator pools. The effective yield of wstLINK varies over time based on staking pool utilization and delegation fee structures.\n\nTo ensure a robust and manipulation-resistant CAPO price feed for the wstLINK/LINK pair, we propose a maxYearlyRatioGrowthPercent of 6.89%, reflecting the expected annualized staking yield including delegation income. Additionally, we recommend setting the MINIMUM_SNAPSHOT_DELAY to 14 days to smooth out short-term volatility and ensure consistency in pricing inputs.\n\nmulti_line_chart_17488625111920×1641 118 KB\n\nLINK IR Optimization\n\nThe upcoming listing of wstLINK is expected to introduce renewed demand for borrowing LINK, particularly from users engaging in staking loop strategies. Historically, LINK borrow utilization on Aave has been relatively low and declining, with total outstanding borrow dropping from approximately 800,000 LINK to the 300,000 range in recent months.\n\nScreenshot 2025-06-04 at 11.29.091257×438 20.1 KB\n\nThe addition of wstLINK is likely to reverse this trend and create sustained borrowing demand. To ensure efficient rate dynamics under higher utilization and to better reflect the opportunity cost of capital, we recommend increasing the base interest rate for LINK by 1.5%. In parallel, we suggest reducing slope2 from 300% to 150% to soften borrowing costs beyond the optimal utilization threshold and reduce the likelihood of excessively punitive rates during temporary utilization spikes.\n\nLINK Borrow Cap Adjustment\n\nIn conjunction with the expected increase in demand for LINK borrowing due to the listing of wstLINK, it is also important to manage protocol risk through appropriate caps. The current borrow cap for LINK is set at 13.00 million, a level that exceeds recent utilization by a margin. With outstanding borrows currently around 300,000 LINK, the existing cap is significantly underutilized.\n\nTo align the borrow cap more closely with expected demand while maintaining a prudent risk posture, we recommend lowering the LINK borrow cap to 6 million. This level allows ample room for increased borrowing activity driven by wstLINK-related strategies while preventing excessive leverage that could amplify protocol exposure during periods of volatility.\n\nSpecification\n\nParameter\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nIsolation Mode\n\nN/A\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nCollateral Enabled\n\nYes\n\nSupply Cap\n\n600,000\n\nBorrow Cap\n\n-\n\nDebt Ceiling\n\n-\n\nLTV\n\n64%\n\nLT\n\n69%\n\nLiquidation Penalty\n\n7%\n\nLiquidation Protocol Fee\n\n10%\n\nVariable Base\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope1\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope2\n\n-\n\nUoptimal\n\n-\n\nReserve Factor\n\n-\n\nStable Borrowing\n\nDisabled\n\nFlashloanable\n\nYes\n\nSiloed Borrowing\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable in Isolation\n\nNo\n\nE-Mode Category\n\nwstLINK/LINK\n\nE-Mode\n\nParameter\nValue\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nLINK\n\nCollateral\n\nYes\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nYes\n\nMax LTV\n\n90.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Threshold\n\n92.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Bonus\n\n2.00%\n\n-\n\nCAPO\n\nmaxYearlyRatioGrowthPercent\nratioReferenceTime\nMINIMUM_SNAPSHOT_DELAY\n\n6.89%\n\nmonthly\n\n14\n\nInterest Rate\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Base\nRecommended Base\nCurrent Slope2\nRecommended Slope2\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n0%\n\n1.5%\n\n300%\n\n150%\n\nBorrow Cap\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Supply Cap\nRecommended Supply Cap\nCurrent Borrow Cap\nRecommended Borrow Cap\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n20,000,000\n\n-\n\n13,000,000\n\n6,000,000\n\nDisclaimer\n\nChaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this recommendation.\n\nCopyright\n\nCopyright and related rights waived via CC0\n\n7 Likes\n\nPaulPrec\n\nJuly 15, 2025, 6:08pm\n\n6\n\nGM! Any news regarding execution of this proposal?\n\n4 Likes\n\nCubeOfCandor\n\nAugust 6, 2025, 6:00am\n\n7\n\nSecond this, seems to be sufficient community support, including from the original TEMP-CHECK. Would be great to see an update if possible.\n\n2 Likes\n\nClos\n\nSeptember 2, 2025, 12:21am\n\n8\n\nThis does look sufficient - what needs to be done to advance this?\n\n3 Likes\n\nTokenized\n\nSeptember 18, 2025, 1:51pm\n\n9\n\nI wonder as well if this can be escalated somehow. marines be hungry\n\n2 Likes\n\nMarcZeller\n\nDecember 11, 2025, 1:36am\n\n10\n\nHello,\n\nNow that Aave 3.6 is around the corner Let’s revisit this proposal.\n\nWith the benefit of V.3.6 we can tailor risk parameters centered around precise usecases fitting for this asset:\n\nWe recommend an onboarding with LTV0 and two emode configurations:\n\nHigh LTV stLINK/LINK emode with Stlink as collateral only and LINK as borrow only\n\nmore conservative emode with stLINK as collateral only and USDC/USDT/GHO/USDe as borrow only.\n\nWe are inviting @ChaosLabs and @LlamaRisk to provide updated risk parameters.\n\nWe are also inviting @bgdlabs to provide a technical analysis on the asset.\n\n7 Likes\n\nrankko\n\nDecember 17, 2025, 4:02pm\n\n11\n\nI ran a conservative onchain analysis to understand wallet-level overlap between current stLINK holders and historical Aave V3 suppliers. Using a same-wallet heuristic, ~18.7% of stLINK-holding wallets have previously supplied to Aave. While overlap is limited by wallet count, it confirms some degree of Aave familiarity and supports a conservative, isolated rollout.\n\nLink: Wallet-level overlap between stLINK holders and historical Aave V3 suppliers\n\nimage1331×848 146 KB\n\n4 Likes\n\nChaosLabs\n\nDecember 18, 2025, 11:06am\n\n12\n\nOverview\n\nWe are supportive of listing wstLINK with the upcoming v3.6 update, but under a deliberately constrained configuration. Specifically, we do not intend to enable access to stablecoin borrowing through either general collateral status or stablecoin E-Mode. This decision is not driven solely by asset specific supply and demand dynamics, but also reflects a broader, protocol wide approach to limiting exposure to uncorrelated debt originating from long tailed collateral with limited expected upside.\n\nFollowing the October 10 market dislocation, Aave governance adopted a more conservative risk posture toward long tail and volatile collateral assets, particularly with respect to their ability to back stablecoin debt. As outlined in our risk parameter updates after 10/10, these assets have historically generated minimal protocol revenue while introducing disproportionate risk. This unfavorable risk reward profile, combined with elevated price volatility, frequent oracle deviations and lower market efficiency, motivated the recommendation to minimize or fully remove collateralization power for such assets.\n\nThis stance also reflects several asset specific structural considerations. Staking caps for LINK remain unchanged and are not expected to increase in the near term, while the amount of LINK held in the stake.link Priority Pool has risen materially from approximately 200,000 to 700,000 LINK, representing an increase of roughly 250% and signaling significant pent up demand for st/wstLINK.\n\nTogether, these supply constraints and demand dynamics have resulted in persistent premium pricing for stLINK and wstLINK, typically in the range of 0.1% to 0.7%, with premiums reaching as high as 2.5% around the time of the previous listing discussion in early June. As the listing approaches, additional premium pressure is likely, particularly in the absence of near term staking cap expansions.\n\nIn light of these dynamics, and in alignment with the protocol wide conservative risk posture adopted after October 10, we propose limiting wstLINK access to stablecoin borrowing and introducing the asset with a moderate supply cap. This configuration seeks to balance user access with prudent risk containment, while avoiding the introduction of uncorrelated stablecoin debt backed by collateral that is already exhibiting supply tightness and persistent premium pricing. Updated specifications are provided below.\n\nSpecification\n\nParameter\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nIsolation Mode\n\nN/A\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nCollateral Enabled\n\nNo\n\nSupply Cap\n\n500,000\n\nBorrow Cap\n\n-\n\nDebt Ceiling\n\n-\n\nLTV\n\n-\n\nLT\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Penalty\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Protocol Fee\n\n10%\n\nVariable Base\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope1\n\n-\n\nVariable Slope2\n\n-\n\nUoptimal\n\n-\n\nReserve Factor\n\n-\n\nStable Borrowing\n\nDisabled\n\nFlashloanable\n\nYes\n\nSiloed Borrowing\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable in Isolation\n\nNo\n\nE-Mode Category\n\nwstLINK/LINK\n\nE-Mode (wstLINK/LINK)\n\nParameter\nValue\nValue\n\nAsset\n\nwstLINK\n\nLINK\n\nCollateral\n\nYes\n\nNo\n\nBorrowable\n\nNo\n\nYes\n\nMax LTV\n\n90.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Threshold\n\n92.00%\n\n-\n\nLiquidation Bonus\n\n2.00%\n\n-\n\nCAPO\n\nmaxYearlyRatioGrowthPercent\nratioReferenceTime\nMINIMUM_SNAPSHOT_DELAY\n\n6.89%\n\nmonthly\n\n14\n\nInterest Rate\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Base\nRecommended Base\nCurrent Slope2\nRecommended Slope2\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n0%\n\n1.5%\n\n300%\n\n150%\n\nBorrow Cap\n\nInstance\nAsset\nCurrent Supply Cap\nRecommended Supply Cap\nCurrent Borrow Cap\nRecommended Borrow Cap\n\nEthereum Core\n\nLINK\n\n20,000,000\n\n-\n\n13,000,000\n\n6,000,000\n\nDisclaimer\n\nChaos Labs has not been compensated by any third party for publishing this recommendation.\n\nCopyright\n\nCopyright and related rights waived via CC0\n\n7 Likes\n\nChaos Labs - Monthly Community Update\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nDecember 19, 2025, 12:31pm\n\n13\n\nSummary\n\nLlamaRisk supports the listing of wstLINK on Aave’s Ethereum Core instance with the parameter adjusted to align with the V3.6 update, limiting exposure to the wstLINK/LINK looping use case. Following our initial analysis, no major architectural changes were observed, with notable market risk changes relating to an increase in the protocol’s buffer liquidity and an increased reliance on a single DEX pool.\n\nAdditionally, we observed that the staking pool cap has increased at a slower rate than staking demand, with the Priority pool increasing to over $9M in LINK deposits waiting to be staked (up from approximately $3.4M). In contrast, the staking pool capacity has only increased by ~1.3M LINK. stLINK remains volatile but has maintained a strong, correlated relationship with LINK on secondary markets.\n\nIn line with the governance adopted stance to minimize exposure to long-tail and volatile collateral assets that generate low protocol revenue relative to their risk exposure, a wstLINK/Stablecoin E-mode is not advised, nor is allowing stablecoin access through general parameter configurations due to the debt risk they introduce.\n\nThe wstLINK deployment parameters have been decided jointly with @ChaosLabs.\n\nLiquidity\n\nstLINK liquidity has remained largely unchanged since our initial analysis in May 2025. For a correlated swap, ~$4.7M worth of stLINK (~365K) can be swapped for LINK within a ~2% slippage. Alternatively, approximately 386K stLINK (~$5.3M) can be swapped within a 7% slippage (previously ~316K stLINK, $5M).\n\nimage1239×352 20.8 KB\n\nSource: DeFiLlama stLINK/LINK, December 15th, 2025\n\nimage1307×357 22.1 KB\n\nSource: DeFiLlama stLINK/WETH, December 15th, 2025\n\nAvailable liquidity has declined to a single Curve pool; previously, 2 pools over $1M TVL were available.\n\nimage856×209 34.7 KB\n\nSource: stLINK liquidity pools, GeckoTerminal, December 15th, 2025\n\nLiquidity Buffer and Staking Cap\n\nThe Priority pool, which serves as a deposit staking queue and liquidity buffer for withdrawals, has increased its available LINK balance to a current total of 704K (~$9.7M). Withdrawals are instant if sufficient liquidity is available; otherwise, withdrawals are processed between 1 and 7 days.\n\nimage903×355 46.1 KB\n\nSource: Priority Pool Balance, Dune, December 14th, 2025\n\nSince our initial analysis, pool staking capacity has increased from 4.5M LINK to 5.8M. The increased deposits represent an increase in staking demand, which exceeds staking capacity changes a\n\nimage594×261 11.2 KB\n\nSource: stLINK pool info, stake.link, December 19th, 2025.\n\nVolatility\n\nA relatively low secondary market price misalignment was observed between stLINK and the underlying LINK over a 90-day period. Since stLINK will be priced using its internal stLINK/LINK exchange rate, the probability of liquidations will be low.\n\nAs shown in the graph below, recurring daily price fluctuations of ~10% were observed.\n\nimage600×371 28.9 KB\n\nSource: Coingecko, September 12th to December 11th, 2025\n\nstLINK trades at a consistent slight premium to LINK, the token likely trades higher due to the staking cap limiting access stLINK.\n\nimage736×325 17.8 KB\n\nSource: stLINK/LINK Curve pool, GeckoTerminal, December 19th, 2025\n\nAave V3.6 Specific Parameters\n\nThe wstLINK deployment parameters have been decided jointly with @ChaosLabs. The asset should be onboarded to enable a LINK Correlated E-Mode designed for efficient wstLINK yield looping.\n\nDisclaimer\n\nThis review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk is not directly affiliated with the protocol(s) reviewed in this assessment and did not receive any compensation from the protocol(s) or their affiliated entities for this work.\n\nThe information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.\n\n5 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nzouizoui\n\nDecember 19, 2025, 8:30pm\n\n14\n\nHello @ChaosLabs, Just a regular aave user and link holder here :\n\nI tried to run the maths and i would like you to correct me if i’m wrong :\n\nAccording to your new parameters (borrow cap, slope, and base interest rate), and based on current data (742k LINK borrowed):\n\nWithout any further borrowing, the borrowing cost would spike to ~3.5% for all LINK borrowers, including those not engaging in any looping strategy.\n\nThe looping strategy (current wstlink apr ~ 4.8%) would become unprofitable at around 1.29M LINK borrowed, corresponding to approximately 21.5% utilization, which is far below the optimal rate of 45%.\n\nFor comparison:\n\nETH parameters make looping strategies unprofitable only around an optimal utilization rate of ~92%, while ETH borrowing rates barely reach ~3%.\n\nWhile i fully acknowledge that LINK is not ETH, and that parameters must differ to reflect the specific risk profile of each asset, it appears concerning that:\n\nAll current LINK borrowers would be significantly impacted\n\nwstLINK looping strategies become extremely risky, and not efficient as stated by llama above.\n\nIs it possible that Native asset APR, optimal utilization rate, and interest rate parameters are not seem properly aligned ?\n\n3 Likes\n\nzouizoui\n\nFebruary 18, 2026, 3:32pm\n\n15\n\nNow that v3.6 seems to be running, Could we also have some news from bgd labs technical analysis ?\n\n1 Like\n\nzouizoui\n\nApril 2, 2026, 6:31am\n\n16\n\nHello guys, seems like i’m the only one alive around here..\n\nNow that bgd and aci left aave, what will happen with this proposal ?\n\n1 Like\n\npuskas\n\nOctober 4, 2026, 11:36am\n\n17\n\nIs there any update? @stani @LlamaRisk @TokenLogic @AaveLabs\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[TEMP-CHECK] Onboard wstLINK to Aave v3 Core Instance\n\nNew Asset\n\n8\n\n1813\n\nMay 26, 2025\n\n[ARFC] Revision of ETH & BTC Collateral Efficiency on Aave\n\nGeneral\n\n2\n\n255\n\nSeptember 21, 2026\n\nAreta Delegate Platform\n\nDelegate Platforms\n\n581\n\n13352\n\nAugust 10, 2026\n\n[ARFC] Low Adoption Asset Deprecation on Aave V3\n\nGovernance\n\n9\n\n2134\n\nSeptember 16, 2026\n\nTokenLogic Delegate Platform\n\nDelegate Platforms\n\n38\n\n6668\n\nOctober 4, 2026","tokens":15700,"crawled_at":1791192329593} {"id":10095,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/historical-data","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Historical data | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nExporting additional user trade history\nThe Enigma team has built an interface for users to export trade history https://trade-export.hypedexer.com/?v=1. This is a third-party integration that is independently maintained. Any issues or feedback should be reported directly to the maintainers.\nMarket Data (for advanced users)\nThe examples below use the AWS CLI (see https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/userguide/getting-started-install.html) and LZ4 (https://github.com/lz4/lz4 or install from your package manager).\nNote that the requester of the data must pay for transfer costs.\nAsset data\nHistorical data is uploaded to the bucket hyperliquid-archive approximately once a month. There is no guarantee of timely updates and data may be missing.\nL2 book snapshots are available in market_data and asset contexts are available in asset_ctxs. No other historical data sets are provided via S3 (e.g. candles or spot asset data). You can use the API to record additional historical data sets yourself.\nFormat: s3://hyperliquid-archive/market_data/[date]/[hour]/[datatype]/[coin].lz4 or s3://hyperliquid-archive/asset_ctxs/[date].csv.lz4\n\naws s3 cp s3://hyperliquid-archive/market_data/20230916/9/l2Book/SOL.lz4 /tmp/SOL.lz4 --request-payer requester\nunlz4 --rm /tmp/SOL.lz4\nhead /tmp/SOL\n\nTrade data\ns3://hl-mainnet-node-data/node_fills_by_block has fills which are streamed via --write-fills --batch-by-block from a non-validating node. Older data is in a different format at s3://hl-mainnet-node-data/node_fills) and s3://hl-mainnet-node-data/node_trades . node_fills matches the API format, while node_trades does not.\nHistorical node data\ns3://hl-mainnet-node-data/explorer_blocks and s3://hl-mainnet-node-data/replica_cmds contain historical explorer blocks and L1 transactions.\ns3://hl-mainnet-node-data/misc_events_by_block contains non-trade events such as transfers, staking, and funding.\n\nPreviousPoints\nNextBug bounty program\n\nLast updated 4 months ago","tokens":515,"crawled_at":1791192339288} {"id":10096,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/update","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Updating Assets | Metaplex Core","text":"This guide shows how to update Core Asset metadata on Solana using the Metaplex Core SDK. Modify the name, URI, or collection membership of Assets you control.\nWhat You'll Learn\nUpdate Asset name and metadata URI\nAdd a standalone Asset to a Collection\nMove an Asset between Collections or remove it from a Collection\nMake an Asset immutable (permanent)\n\nSummary\nUpdate a Core Asset's metadata using the update instruction. Only the update authority (or an authorized delegate) can modify an Asset.\nChange name and uri to update metadata\nUse newCollection and newUpdateAuthority to add, move, or remove Assets from Collections\nSet updateAuthority to None to make immutable\nUpdates are free (no rent cost) unless changing account size\nOut of Scope\nUpdating Token Metadata NFTs (use mpl-token-metadata), plugin modifications (see Plugins), and ownership transfers (see Transferring Assets).\nQuick Start\nJump to: Update Asset · Add to Collection · Change Collection · Remove from Collection · Make Immutable\nInstall: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi\nFetch the Asset to get current state\nCall update(umi, { asset, name, uri }) with new values\nVerify changes with fetchAsset()\nPrerequisites\nUmi configured with a signer that is the Asset's update authority\nAsset address of the Asset to update\nNew metadata uploaded to Arweave/IPFS (if changing URI) The update authority or delegate of a Core Asset has the ability to change some of the Asset's data.\n\nUpdating a Core Asset\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to update an MPL Core Asset.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { update } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Update an existing NFT asset's metadata\n\n10const result = await update(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12 name: 'Updated NFT Name',\n\n13 uri: 'https://updated-example.com/metadata.json',\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset updated successfully')\n\nAdd an Asset to a Collection\nThe update instruction can add a standalone Asset to a Collection by setting newCollection to the target Collection address and newUpdateAuthority to the Collection type. The caller must be the update authority of both the Asset and the target Collection.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import {\n\n3 update,\n\n4 fetchAsset,\n\n5 fetchCollection,\n\n6 updateAuthority,\n\n7} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n8\n\n9const assetId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\n10const collectionId = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222')\n\n11\n\n12const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetId)\n\n13const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, collectionId)\n\n14\n\n15// Assumes the asset is standalone. If it already belongs to a collection,\n\n16// fetch that current collection and pass it as the `collection` parameter\n\n17// alongside `newCollection` (see change-collection example); otherwise the\n\n18// instruction will fail.\n\n19await update(umi, {\n\n20 asset,\n\n21 newCollection: collection.publicKey,\n\n22 newUpdateAuthority: updateAuthority('Collection', [collection.publicKey]),\n\n23}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n24\n\n25console.log('Asset added to collection')\n\n1# Add a standalone asset to a collection\n\n2mplx core asset update --collection \n\n3\n\n4# Or use the convenience alias\n\n5mplx core collection add \n\nYou can also add an Asset to a Collection using the Metaplex CLI: mplx core collection add \n\nChange the Collection of a Core Asset\nThe update instruction can move an Asset from one Collection to another.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import {\n\n3 update,\n\n4 fetchAsset,\n\n5 fetchCollection,\n\n6 collectionAddress,\n\n7 updateAuthority,\n\n8} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n9\n\n10const assetId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\n11const newCollectionId = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222')\n\n12\n\n13const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetId)\n\n14\n\n15const currentCollectionId = collectionAddress(asset)\n\n16if (!currentCollectionId) {\n\n17 throw new Error('Asset does not belong to a collection')\n\n18}\n\n19const currentCollection = await fetchCollection(umi, currentCollectionId)\n\n20\n\n21await update(umi, {\n\n22 asset,\n\n23 collection: currentCollection,\n\n24 newCollection: newCollectionId,\n\n25 newUpdateAuthority: updateAuthority('Collection', [newCollectionId]),\n\n26}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n27\n\n28console.log('Asset moved to new collection')\n\n1# Move an asset from its current collection to a different one\n\n2mplx core asset update --collection \n\nRemove an Asset from a Collection\nThe update instruction can remove an Asset from its current Collection by changing the newUpdateAuthority from Collection to Address. This makes the Asset standalone again, with your wallet as its direct update authority.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import {\n\n3 update,\n\n4 fetchAsset,\n\n5 fetchCollection,\n\n6 collectionAddress,\n\n7 updateAuthority,\n\n8} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n9\n\n10const assetId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\n11\n\n12const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetId)\n\n13\n\n14const currentCollectionId = collectionAddress(asset)\n\n15if (!currentCollectionId) {\n\n16 throw new Error('Asset does not belong to a collection')\n\n17}\n\n18const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, currentCollectionId)\n\n19\n\n20await update(umi, {\n\n21 asset,\n\n22 collection,\n\n23 newUpdateAuthority: updateAuthority('Address', [umi.identity.publicKey]),\n\n24}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n25\n\n26console.log('Asset removed from collection')\n\n1# Remove an asset from its current collection\n\n2mplx core asset update --remove-collection\n\nAfter removal, the Asset's update authority becomes the address you specified (typically your wallet). The Asset is no longer subject to any collection-level plugins.\n\nYou can also manage collection membership using the Metaplex CLI: mplx core asset update --remove-collection\n\nMaking a Core Asset Data Immutable\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to make a Core Asset fully immutable. Be aware that there are different levels of immutability described in the immutability Guide.\nImportant\nThis is a destructive action and will remove the ability to update the asset. It will also remove the asset from any collections it was in. To make collection assets immutable you will need to change the update authority of the collection.\n\nMake a Core Asset Immutable\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { update, fetchAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, asset)\n\nawait update(umi, {\n\nasset: asset,\n\nnewUpdateAuthority: updateAuthority('None'),\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nAuthority mismatch\nYou're not the update authority of the Asset. Check:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nconsole.log(asset.updateAuthority) // Must match your signer\n\nCollection authority required\nWhen changing Collections, you need authority on both the Asset and the target Collection.\nAsset is immutable\nThe Asset's update authority is set to None. This cannot be reversed.\nNotes\nFetch the Asset before updating to ensure you have the current state\nOnly the update authority (or delegate) can update an Asset\nMaking an Asset immutable is permanent and irreversible\nAdding, moving, or removing Collection membership changes which plugins (royalties, etc.) apply to the Asset\nRemoving an Asset from a Collection changes its update authority from the Collection to a wallet address\nAdding an Asset to a Collection changes its update authority from a wallet address to the Collection\nUpdates don't change the Asset's owner\nQuick Reference\nUpdate Parameters\nParameterDescription\nasset\nThe Asset to update (address or fetched object)\n\nname\nNew name for the Asset\n\nuri\nNew metadata URI\n\nnewCollection\nTarget Collection address\n\nnewUpdateAuthority\nNew authority (or None for immutable)\n\nAuthority Types\nTypeDescription\nAddress\nA specific public key\n\nCollection\nThe Collection's update authority\n\nNone\nImmutable - no updates allowed\n\nFAQ\nCan I undo making an Asset immutable?\nNo. Setting the update authority to None is permanent. The Asset's name, URI, and collection membership are frozen forever. Only do this when you're certain.\nHow do I update only the name without changing the URI?\nPass only the fields you want to change. Omit uri to keep the current value:\nawait update(umi, { asset, name: 'New Name' }).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nWhat's the difference between updating and transferring?\nUpdate changes the Asset's metadata (name, URI). Transfer changes ownership. They're separate operations with different authority requirements.\nCan a delegate update an Asset?\nYes, if they have been assigned as an Update Delegate via the Update Delegate plugin.\nDoes updating cost SOL?\nUpdates are free unless the new data is larger than the current account size (rare). The transaction fee (~0.000005 SOL) still applies.\nCan I add a standalone Asset to a Collection after creation?\nYes. Use the update instruction with newCollection and set newUpdateAuthority to the Collection type. You need authority on both the Asset and the target Collection. See Add an Asset to a Collection.\nCan I remove an Asset from a Collection?\nYes. Use the update instruction and set newUpdateAuthority to updateAuthority('Address', [yourWallet]). This detaches the Asset from the Collection and makes it standalone again. See Remove an Asset from a Collection.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nUpdate Authority\nThe account authorized to modify an Asset's metadata\n\nImmutable\nAn Asset that cannot be updated (update authority is None)\n\nURI\nThe URL pointing to off-chain metadata JSON\n\nDelegate\nAn account granted specific permissions via a plugin\n\nCollection Membership\nThe Collection an Asset belongs to","tokens":2540,"crawled_at":1791192371684} @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ {"id":10109,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/update-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Update an NFT | NFTs","text":"Update your NFT's name and metadata as the update authority.\nUpdate an NFT\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about updating NFTs in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { update } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Update an existing NFT asset's metadata\n\n10const result = await update(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12 name: 'Updated NFT Name',\n\n13 uri: 'https://updated-example.com/metadata.json',\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset updated successfully')\n\n1# Update name and URI\n\n2mplx core asset update --name \"Updated Asset\" --uri \"https://example.com/metadata.json\"\n\n3\n\n4# Update with a JSON metadata file\n\n5mplx core asset update --offchain ./asset/metadata.json\n\n6\n\n7# Update with a new image\n\n8mplx core asset update --image ./asset/image.jpg\n\n9\n\n10# Update with JSON metadata and image\n\n11mplx core asset update --offchain ./asset/metadata.json --image ./asset/image.jpg\n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your update:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT to update\n\nname\nNew name for the NFT (optional)\n\nuri\nNew metadata URI (optional)\n\nHow It Works\nThe update process involves three steps:\nFetch the NFT - Get the current NFT data using fetchAsset\nPrepare update - Specify the new name or URI you want to change\nSend update - Execute the update transaction\nOnly the update authority of the NFT can modify it. If the NFT is part of a collection and uses collection authority, you need to be the collection's update authority.","tokens":485,"crawled_at":1791192468722} {"id":10110,"url":"https://governance.aave.com/t/horizon-weekly-highlights/23078","domain":"governance.aave.com","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Horizon Weekly Highlights - Horizon - Aave","text":"Horizon Weekly Highlights\n\nHorizon\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nSeptember 5, 2025, 2:53pm\n\n1\n\nIt has been one week since the Aave Horizon launch. LlamaRisk collaborated with the Horizon team on pre-launch due diligence for assets, creating an RWA risk framework and establishing parameterization, including bounded NAV feeds. Our ongoing scope includes recommending operational parameters, monitoring the system, and providing advisory services. The following is a summary of the first week of operations.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $80 million, with stablecoin deposits accounting for approximately $50 million. RLUSD is the largest supplied asset, reaching its $40 million cap at one point—a limit raised twice (from $25M to $30M, then to $40M) to meet strong demand fueled by a rewards campaign managed through Merkl. In contrast, USDC supply appears to be driven by bootstrap capital and organic demand.\n\nTotal borrows have exceeded $16.5 million, primarily driven by Superstate’s Crypto Carry Fund (USCC). To accommodate significant deposits into USCC, the Horizon Operation Multisig increased its supply cap twice. Horizon now holds approximately 7.5% of all USCC onchain supply. As projected, market growth is currently constrained by the RWA supply side, which is limited to a select, whitelisted group of institutional and accredited investors.\n\nThe GHO facilitator, which is capped at $1 million and does not permit external GHO deposits, has seen no utilization so far. This lack of activity is attributed to its comparatively high borrow rate relative to other available stablecoins on the platform. We expect usage to change as the bootstrapping period continues and some users elect to mint GHO to benefit from yield farming strategies (e.g., sGHO yielding over 8% APY).\n\nDespite attractive liquidity and low stablecoin borrowing costs, no significant leverage looping or yield farming has been observed. This is expected as users acclimate to the protocol. A key technical factor limiting such strategies is that not all RWA assets onboarded support instant minting and redemption, which prevents one-click leverage via flashloans. An ecosystem of tools and integrators (e.g., vaults, helper contracts) will develop around this use case as profitability increases and the protocol matures beyond its initial phase of conservative LTVs and supply caps.\n\nimage1266×834 71.1 KB\n\nSource: Horizon RWA Market - 14:00 UTC, September 5, 2025\n\nUtilization report\n\nCurrent RWA suppliers (13 wallets) choose to maintain relatively high health factors, despite a conservative buffer between LTV and liquidation thresholds and a bounded NAV oracle that safeguards against faulty price updates. This is expected as users take some time to acclimate to the protocol.\n\nIn our research, we note 3 primary use cases for the Horizon market:\n\nInstant Institutional Credit: Access immediate working capital by borrowing against tokenized assets, avoiding issuer redemption delays and fees.\n\nLeveraged Carry Trades: Execute a carry trade by borrowing stablecoins against yield-bearing RWAs, using recursive looping to scale the position and capture the basis between the borrow rate and asset yield.\n\nDeFi Yield Generation: Generate yield through two primary avenues: passively supply stablecoins to earn interest from institutional borrowing, or actively execute farming strategies like supplying an RWA to mint and stake GHO.\n\n58975384492238310251280×934 88.4 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk - 14:00 UTC, September 5, 2025\n\nDriven by a compelling APY of ~15.78%, USCC is the dominant RWA supplied to Horizon, with the market attracting 7.5% of its total supply in the first week. The fund generates this return via a market-neutral strategy that captures basis by shorting CME-listed futures contracts, such as SOL Future SEP25 and XRP Future SEP25, while hedging price exposure. Because this yield significantly exceeds the Treasury rates that benchmark stablecoin returns, it is a primary incentive for suppliers.\n\nimage1230×164 7.58 KB\n\nSource: Superstate, September 5, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nHorizon supply caps were raised twice during the launch week to manage significant inflows. The key adjustments were:\n\nRLUSD: The supply cap was raised from $30m to $40m on September 4th. This cap was rapidly reached due to the current incentive campaign, but supply has since contracted slightly.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was raised in two stages. On August 28th, it was raised from $10,6m to $14.4m, then to $40m on September 4th. Supply cap is currently sitting at 58%.\n\nSupply Side (Stablecoins)\n\nLarge influxes of RLUSD and USDC mark the stablecoin supply. GHO is capped at 1m$ via a facilitator, with no room to deposit external GHO. Its comparatively high borrowing rate compared to the other stablecoins explains its lack of current usage.\n\nimage1288×663 23.6 KB\n\nSource: Dune (@mrvega14), September 5, 2025\n\nSupply Side (RWAs)\n\nSupply growth is primarily concentrated in USCC, JAAA, and JTRSY.\n\nimage1157×609 22.6 KB\n\nSource: Dune (@mrvega14) - September 5th, 2025\n\nBorrow Side\n\nUSDC and RLUSD are borrowed in similar amounts, mainly driven by USCC-backed loans.\n\nimage1289×660 22.5 KB\n\nSource: Dune (@mrvega14) - September 5th, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nWe calculate the profitability of looping strategies for RWA tokens by comparing their underlying yields against different stablecoin borrow rates. The heatmaps illustrate how leverage alters returns: when funding costs are low, each additional loop lifts returns meaningfully, but as borrow rates rise, the benefit fades quickly and margins get squeezed.\n\nJAAA\n\nimage2757×1767 289 KB\n\nJTRSY\n\nimage2757×1767 315 KB\n\nUSTB\n\nimage2757×1767 360 KB\n\nUSCC\n\nimage2757×1767 301 KB\n\nDisclosure\n\nThis review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk serves the Horizon protocol and has been engaged to conduct due diligence, parametrisation, and ongoing risk services.\n\nThe information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.\n\n10 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nAL Development Update | December 2025\n\nstani\n\nSeptember 5, 2025, 3:48pm\n\n2\n\nGreat analysis @LlamaRisk and very strong launch for Horizon!\n\n4 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nSeptember 12, 2025, 10:04pm\n\n3\n\nThe second week of Horizon’s operation saw Total Value Locked (TVL) surpass $100 million, the integration of USYC, and a significant increase in the supply of JTRSY.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL surpassed $100 million, with stablecoin deposits constituting approximately $50 million. RLUSD is the largest supplied asset, reaching its previous $40 million cap before the limit was raised to $60 million to accommodate strong demand from the rewards campaign.\n\nThe USDC borrow market is now incentivized, with the base rate increased to 2.5% to maintain an attractive yield for suppliers.\n\nUSCC and JTRSY dominated Horizon’s supply. A notable transaction occurred on September 5, when a single address deposited over $26 million worth of JTRSY.\n\nTotal borrows have exceeded $20 million, driven primarily by Superstate’s Crypto Carry Fund (USCC). Horizon now holds approximately 9.10% of USCC’s and 7.9% of JTRSY’s total on-chain supplies.\n\nUSYC is now available on Horizon with a supply cap of $11.3 million. Issued by Hashnote, USYC is a tokenized U.S. Treasury bill fund tracking short-duration Treasuries, currently yielding approximately 3.79% APY.\n\nUtilization report\n\nBorrowing activity on Horizon increased significantly over the past week, with total borrowed balances growing by $5.6 million to $20.36 million. The addition of four new borrowers supported this growth.\n\nimage1920×1951 180 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 12, 2025\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign is live on Ethereum, distributing daily rewards of $1,000, translating to a fixed 3.5% APR. These incentives supplement the 7.7% protocol APY, resulting in a net borrower APY of 4.1%. This program helps balance the high utilization rate and maintain active borrow liquidity.\n\nRLUSD: Incentives are focused on lending. A campaign distributing $3,460 daily has increased the supply APR to approximately 9.5%, with a reward cap of 15%. The 25 million RLUSD tranche seeded by Ripple is not eligible for these incentives, ensuring rewards are directed to active market participants. The combined protocol yield and Merkl rewards result in a total APY of approximately 10.4%, making RLUSD one of Horizon’s most attractive supply markets up to the current $60 million cap.\n\nimage684×342 30 KB\n\nSource: Merkl, September 12, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nHorizon’s supply caps were raised twice during the second launch week, and the base variable rate was increased once. Key adjustments include:\n\nRLUSD: The supply cap was raised from $40 million to $60 million on September 10.\n\nJTRSY: The supply cap was raised from 4.6 million ($4.96 million) to 37.1 million ($40.06 million) on September 5. This change was mainly driven by a single 21.50 million JTRSY token supply on the same day.\n\nUSDC: The supply and borrow caps were raised on September 5. The supply cap was increased from $10 million to $26 million, and the borrow cap from $14.4 million to $23.94 million. Current utilization of the supply and borrow caps is 45.38% and 43.58%, respectively. On September 10, the Base Rate was updated to 2.5% to align with the borrow-incentive program and guide utilization toward the 90% kink; other parameters remained unchanged.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nOver the past week, Horizon’s stablecoin supply remained relatively stable.\n\nimage4409×2307 436 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 12, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nCollateral inflows on Horizon were primarily driven by JTRSY, which experienced a sharp increase and now represents the second-largest share of the total RWA base. This growth increased total collateral to over $60 million.\n\nimage4409×2307 408 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 12, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nCumulative net borrowing on Horizon increased from approximately $15 million to just over $20 million. Growth originated from both the USDC and the RLUSD markets.\n\nimage4409×2307 378 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 12, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nHorizon utilization led by USDC, which climbed to and stabilized above the 80% range into mid-September. RLUSD demand increased after early September, with utilization now exceeding 25%.\n\nimage4409×2307 417 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 12, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nHistorical data of variable borrow rates show USDC trended higher until September 11, reaching 7.5% APY before normalizing to 3.88% APY. Meanwhile, the RLUSD rate remained around 2% APY. Starting September 9, a USDC borrow incentive reduces the effective borrower rate by 3.56%.\n\nimage1920×1078 80.3 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk analysis, September 12, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nOver the past week, looping profitability for most RWA assets has remained stable. The main exception is USCC, whose current yield has declined to 13.48%. In contrast, the newly onboarded USYC has expanded the available collateral set, albeit with more modest yield.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage2757×1767 293 KB\n\nUSYC\n\nimage2796×1767 399 KB\n\nDisclosure\n\nThis review was independently prepared by LlamaRisk, a DeFi risk service provider funded in part by the Aave DAO. LlamaRisk serves the Horizon protocol and has been engaged to conduct due diligence, parametrisation, and ongoing risk services.\n\nThe information provided should not be construed as legal, financial, tax, or professional advice.\n\n7 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nSeptember 19, 2025, 7:01pm\n\n4\n\nLlamaRisk Insights - 111600×900 108 KB\n\nThe third week of Horizon’s operation saw its TVL surpass $140 million, the market reached $32 million in net borrows, and surpassed $60 million in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL surpassed $140 million, with stablecoin deposits constituting approximately $60 million. RLUSD is the largest supplied asset, with current liquidity of around $44 million.\n\nUSCC and JTRSY supplies continue growing, accounting for over 90% of Horizon RWA market share.\n\nThe Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate by 25bps on September 17. This has a direct impact on short-term T-bill-backed assets, where yields are expected to gradually decline as the fund’s portfolio is updated with new, lower-yielding bonds\n\nRLUSD (supply) and USDC (borrow) markets continue to be incentivized.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the third week following its launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform increased from $20.4 million to $32.3 million, mostly driven by existing suppliers increasing or reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1617×1929 421 KB\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign continues to be active on Ethereum, distributing daily rewards of $1,270, which reduces the borrowing cost by 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: Incentives are focused on lending—a campaign distributing $3,518 daily, with a reward cap of 15%. The 25 million RLUSD tranche seeded by Ripple is not eligible for these incentives, ensuring rewards are directed to active market participants.\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring the third week, Horizon’s supply caps were raised once:\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was raised from 3.6 million ($40.2 million) to 5 million ($56.0 million) on September 17.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 14.8% to $60.3 million. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increased by 14.7%, from $38.7 million to $44.4 million.\n\nUSDC: Supply increased by 25.7%, from $12.6 million to $15.9 million.\n\nimage4410×2308 416 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nJTRSY and USCC primarily drove collateral inflows on Horizon. The total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew to $80.2 million.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 41.4%, from $29.2 million to $41.3 million.\n\nJTRSY: Supply increased by 30.5%, from $26.1 million to $34.1 million.\n\nUSTB: Supply decreased by 20.1%, from $4.9 million to $3.9 million.\n\nJAAA: Supply decreased by 49%, from $1.5 million to $1 million.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4410×2308 409 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 58.8% to $32.3 million. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the USDC and RLUSD markets.\n\nUSDC: Borrowing grew by 24.7%, from $9.9 million to $12.4 million.\n\nRLUSD: Borrowing grew by 91.2%, from $10.4 million to $19.9 million.\n\nimage4410×2308 347 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUtilization on Horizon continues to be led by USDC, which exceeded 90% multiple times this week. RLUSD demand increased after mid-September, with utilization now exceeding 40%.\n\nimage4410×2308 420 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nBorrowing dynamics continue to reflect the early bootstrapping phase. Pricing for USDC remains noticeably above peers despite incentive support, while RLUSD shows steadier but gradual increases in cost as utilization expands.\n\nimage4410×2308 470 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nLeverage looping profitability remains unchanged across JTRSY, JAAA, and USYC, with yields holding steady at prior levels. The picture is different for USCC and USTB, where profitability has shifted - USCC now offers an elevated return of 14.87%, while USTB stands at 4.15%.\n\nUSCC\n\nYield Chart\n\nimage1231×360 27.1 KB\n\nSource: Superstate, September 19, 2025\n\nLooping Strategies\n\nimage2757×1767 290 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nYield Chart\n\nimage1233×363 30.1 KB\n\nSource: Superstate, September 19, 2025\n\nLooping Strategies\n\nimage2730×1767 278 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 19, 2025\n\n6 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nSeptember 26, 2025, 7:41pm\n\n5\n\nimage1600×900 105 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $163m, with over $40m in net borrow, and $65m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL surpassed $163m, with stablecoin deposits constituting approximately $64m. RLUSD is the largest supplied asset, with current liquidity around $44m.\n\nThe first borrowing activity in GHO has been observed, with a loan size of $750k GHO.\n\nLlamaRisk introduced LlamaGuard NAV Oracle, a dynamic risk-adjusted Oracle solution for tokenized RWAs built in collaboration with Chainlink.\n\nSecuritize BlackRock’s BUIDL and VanEck’s VBILL now settle instantly with [RLUSD liquidity](https://BlackRock’s BUIDL and VanEck’s VBILL now settle instantly with RLUSD liquidity.).\n\nRLUSD (supply) and USDC (borrow) markets continue to be incentivized.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign continues to be active on Ethereum, distributing daily rewards of $1,440, which reduces the borrowing cost by 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: Incentives are focused on lending—a campaign distributing $3,518 daily, with a reward cap of 15%. The 25m RLUSD tranche seeded by Ripple is not eligible for these incentives, ensuring rewards are directed to active market participants.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the fourth week following its launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform increased from $32.3m to $44.1m, mostly driven by existing suppliers increasing or reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1447×1577 346 KB\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring the third week, Horizon’s risk parameters were changed on September 25:\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was raised from 5m ($56.1m) to 6m ($67.3m).\n\nRLUSD: The borrow cap was raised from 27m to 43m.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 5.29% to $63.5m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increased by 5.22%, from $44.4m to $46.7m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increased by 5.47%, from $15.9m to $16.8m.\n\nimage4410×2308 434 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nUSCC primarily drove collateral inflows on Horizon. The total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew to $98.8m.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 36.5%, from $41.3m to $56.4m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $34.1m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $3.9m.\n\nJAAA: Supply increased by 251%, from $1 million to $3.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4410×2308 392 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 36.9% to $45.1m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the USDC and RLUSD markets.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow grew 29.3%, from $12.4m to $16.0m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow grew by 42.2%, from $19.9m to $28.3m.\n\nimage4410×2308 357 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUtilization on Horizon continues to be led by USDC, which exceeded 90% multiple times this week. RLUSD demand has increased, with utilization exceeding 60%, driven primarily by a large borrower.\n\nimage4410×2308 449 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nRLUSD suppliers benefit from elevated APYs driven by recent incentive campaigns, while USDC supply yields are sourced solely from organic borrow demand.\n\nimage4410×2308 492 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nUSDC borrowing rates remain stable, driven by incentive and utilization below uOptimal. In contrast, RLUSD’s borrowing costs are increasing at a measured pace as its utilization rate gradually rises.\n\nimage4410×2308 490 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nLeverage looping profitability remains unchanged across JTRSY, JAAA, with yields holding steady at prior levels. The picture is different for USCC and USTB, where profitability has shifted - USCC now offers an elevated return of 11.2%, while USTB stands at 3.7%.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 86.5 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk analysis, September 26, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 315 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk analysis, September 26, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×1078 90.1 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 373 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\nJTRSY\n\nimage2993×1918 331 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, September 26, 2025\n\n2 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nOctober 4, 2025, 12:39am\n\n6\n\nimage1600×900 107 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon’s Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $176m, with over $44m in net borrows, and $77m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL surpassed $176m, with stablecoin deposits constituting approximately $77m. RLUSD is the largest supplied asset, with current liquidity around $57.30m.\n\nThe LlamaGuard NAV Oracle has been successfully integrated into Horizon markets, providing more resilient and transparent NAV feeds for on-chain funds.\n\nAave developer toolkit now extends full support to the Horizon market, enabling protocols and integrators to build, test, and deploy strategies with seamless compatibility.\n\nRLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be incentivized.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign continues to be active on Ethereum till 7 Oct, distributing daily rewards of $1,570, which reduces the borrowing cost by 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: Incentives remain centered on lending, with the current campaign distributing $7,043 daily in rewards, capped at 15% APY. This program runs through October 7 and now offers double the rewards compared to the prior campaign. The 25m RLUSD tranche seeded by Ripple is excluded, keeping incentives targeted to active market participants.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the fifth week from its launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform increased from to $44.5m, mostly driven by existing suppliers increasing or reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1452×1568 358 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring this week no parameter changes was proposed nor executed.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 5.29% to $77.72m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increased by 22.69%, from $46.7m to $57.30m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increased by 21.54%, from $16.8m to $20.42m.\n\nimage4410×2308 460 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) has not changed significantly and currently sits at $97.54m.\n\nimage4410×2308 401 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon decreased by 1.84% to $44.58m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the USDC and RLUSD markets.\n\nUSDC: Net borrows grew 1.8%, from $16.0m to $16.3m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrows decreased by 2.4%, from $28.3m to $27.6m.\n\nimage4410×2308 363 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC utilization remains elevated, while RLUSD saw a modest decline as supply incentives continued to attract active participation.\n\nimage4410×2308 471 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nRLUSD suppliers are capturing higher APYs fueled by incentive programs, while USDC yields stem from organic borrowing demand, supported by market trust that helps keep utilization elevated.\n\nimage4410×2308 507 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nUSDC borrowing rates remain incentivized and stable. In contrast, RLUSD borrowing costs dropped below 3% and are currently at 2.70% APY.\n\nimage1920×1005 76.4 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nLeverage looping profitability remains stable across JTRSY and JAAA with yields holding at previous levels. In contrast, USCC 30-day APY has increased to 9.2% while USTB 30-day APY is now at 4.06%.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 89.8 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nimage3059×1918 327 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×1078 83.1 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nimage3019×1918 375 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\nJTRSY\n\nimage2993×1918 333 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 3, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nOctober 10, 2025, 7:58pm\n\n7\n\nimage1600×900 110 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $200m, with over $54m in net borrows, and $93m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $204 million, with total stablecoin supply reaching $93.06 million and net borrows standing at $54.64 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, together representing nearly 75% of overall TVL.\n\nThe supply and borrow caps for GHO were raised to 25 million and 20 million, respectively, to support the establishment and growth of the GHO market on Horizon. The GHO Facilitator deposited an additional 1 million GHO.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets were renewed.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A new borrowing campaign starts on 7 October and runs until 21 October, offering daily rewards of $1,544, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by around 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign begins on 7 October and continues through 14 October, distributing $11,257 in daily rewards, capped at 15% APY. The reward pool is approximately 1.6× larger than in the previous program, further strengthening incentives for active market participants.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the sixth week from its launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform increased to $54.26m, mostly driven by existing suppliers increasing or reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1285×1420 207 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nRLUSD: The supply and borrow caps were increased to 75M and 55M, respectively, on 6 October. The adjustment coincides with the launch of the new Merkl incentive program, which has driven greater user participation and improved liquidity.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was raised to 7.5M on 7 October to accommodate steady deposit growth, supported by stable utilization and strong collateral performance.\n\nGHO: The GHO supply and borrow caps were raised to 25M and 20M, respectively, on 10 October.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 19.66% to $93.18m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increased by 30.54%, from $57.30m to $74.80m.\n\nUSDC: Supply decreased by 10.04%, from $20.42m to $18.38m.\n\nimage4410×2308 469 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew by 13.18%, reaching $110.398m. USCC primarily drove collateral inflows on Horizon, supported by consistent demand for short-duration, yield-bearing assets.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 29.52%, from $56.4m to $73.05m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply decreased by 2.78%, from $34.1m to $33.15m.\n\nUSTB: Supply decrease by 90.03%, from $3.9m to $388.76k. (driven by a large single-user withdraw)\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $3.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4410×2308 402 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 21.74% to $54.64m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the RLUSD market. The GHO and USDC markets remain untouched.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow remains the same with approximately $16.11m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 35.54%, from $27.60m to 37.41m.\n\nimage4410×2308 374 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC utilization remains high at 87.5%, while RLUSD utilization declined, driven by the strong supply incentivize program pulling liquidity to the lending side.\n\nimage4410×2308 480 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe fourth incentivizes program for RLUSD started two days ago, pushing supply yields higher as participants capture elevated APYs from ongoing reward structures. Meanwhile, USDC maintains a steady supply rate, supported by market confidence and structural stability that continue to keep utilization high.\n\nimage1920×1005 83.5 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nFor the following week, RLUSD borrowing rates remained relatively stable, showing brief upward spikes above 3% before settling at 2.82%. USDC rates also stayed steady overall, following a short-term increase that pushed the rate up to 4.09%.\n\nimage1920×1005 78.8 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nYields have adjusted across all active RWA markets, reflecting broader market recalibrations. JTRSY now offers 3.65%, while JAAA has increased to 4.71%. USCC continues to outperform with a 14.39% yield, and USTB has moderated slightly to 3.79%. Overall, the changes signal shifting risk-reward dynamics across the current RWA landscape.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 90.3 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 320 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×942 78.4 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 375 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nJAAA\n\nimage3020×1918 304 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nJTRSY\n\nimage2993×1918 363 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 10, 2025\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nOctober 17, 2025, 7:46pm\n\n8\n\nimage1600×900 104 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $300m, with over $75m in net borrows, and $157.35m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $301 million, with total stablecoin supply reaching $157.3 million and net borrows standing at $74.4 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets.\n\nRLUSD supplied assets climbed to $139 million, establishing it as the largest stablecoin market on Horizon.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets were renewed.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A new borrowing campaign continues to be active, offering daily rewards of $1,344, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by around 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign begins on 14 October and continues through 21 October, distributing $35,839 in daily rewards, capped at 15% APY. The reward pool is approximately 3.1× larger than in the previous program, which may support further supply cap in the future.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the seventh week from its launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform increased to $75.87m, mostly driven by existing suppliers increasing or reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1212×1320 187 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nRLUSD: The supply and borrow caps were increased to 128m and 115.2m, respectively, on 14 October. The supply cap was later raised again to 139M on 16 October.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was raised to 8.8m on 11 October to accommodate steady deposit growth, supported by stable utilization and strong collateral performance. It was later raised again to 11.8m on 16 October.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 68.86% to $157.35m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increased by 85.8%, from $74.8m to $139m.\n\nUSDC: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $18.4m.\n\nGHO: Supply increase by 700% from $2m to $16m, solely driven by liquidity from GHO Facilitator.\n\nimage4410×2308 471 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew by 25.59%, reaching $138.65m. USCC primarily drove collateral inflows on Horizon, supported by consistent demand for short-duration, yield-bearing assets.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 40.6%, from $73m to $102.7m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $33.1m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply decreased by 39.4%, from $3.5m to $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4410×2308 423 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 38.84% to $75.87m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the RLUSD market. The USDC and GHO stayed untouched.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow decrease by 14.6%, from $16.11m to $14m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 63.2%, from $37.41m to $61m.\n\nimage4410×2308 401 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC utilization fell below 80%, while RLUSD utilization continued its downturn, pressured by strong supply incentives drawing liquidity to the lending side.\n\nimage4410×2308 494 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe fifth incentive program for RLUSD began three days ago, driving supply yields higher as participants capture enhanced APYs from the new reward phase. In contrast, USDC supply rate has trended lower, reflecting reduced utilization and softer market activity.\n\nimage1920×1005 82.8 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nFor the new week, RLUSD borrowing rates held steady around 2.4%. USDC rates stayed flat near 4.0%, maintaining a narrow spread of roughly 1.6% between the two markets.\n\nimage1920×1005 81.8 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields remained largely stable over the week, with most assets holding steady. The main adjustments came from USCC and USTB, now yielding 10.15% and 3.85% respectively, indicating a slight normalization in returns while broader RWA rates stayed unchanged.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 90.8 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nimage3059×1918 323 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 80 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nimage3019×1918 362 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 17, 2025\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nOctober 24, 2025, 6:53pm\n\n9\n\nimage1600×900 111 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $370m, with over $85m in net borrows, and $207.3m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $370 million, with total stablecoin supply reaching $207.3 million and net borrows standing at $84.9 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies.\n\nGHO supplied assets climbed to $49 million, establishing it as the second-largest stablecoin market on Horizon.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets were renewed.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A new borrowing campaign continues to be active, offering daily rewards of $1,283, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by around 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign begins on 21 October and continues to be active, distributing $37,333 in daily rewards, capped at 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the eighth week since launch, total borrowed balances on the Horizon platform rose to $84.85m, driven by a wave of new users actively supplying and borrowing across markets.\n\nimage1296×1411 172 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nGHO: The supply and borrow caps were increased to 50m and 30m, respectively, on 20 October. The borrow cap was later increased to 35m on 23 October.\n\nRLUSD: The supply was increased to 139.61m with 600k RLUSD being transferred from the Horizon contract and supplied on behalf of Safe multisig on 20 October\n\nUSCC/GHO E-Mode: The USCC/GHO E-Mode parameters were changed with Loan-to-Value at 84%, Liquidation Threshold at 88% and Liquidation Bonus at 10.5%.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 31.8% to $207.4m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $139m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increase by 1.9% from $18.4m to $18.8m.\n\nGHO: Supply increase by 212.5% from $16m to $50m, solely driven by liquidity from GHO Facilitator.\n\nimage4413×2310 501 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew by 19.1%, reaching $165.1m. Despite a decline in USCC yield, the asset solely accounted for the entire growth, underscoring sustained demand for short-duration, yield-bearing collateral on Horizon.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 25.8%, from $102.7m to $129.15m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $33.1m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4410×2308 440 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 38.84% to $75.87m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the RLUSD market. The USDC and GHO stayed untouched.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow decrease by 14.6%, from $16.11m to $14m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 63.2%, from $37.41m to $61m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow increased largely to 19.9m.\n\nimage4413×2310 416 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC utilization held mostly stable through the week, showing minimal change. RLUSD saw a slight decline as lending incentives kept pressure on demand, while GHO utilization surged past 40%, marking a sharp rise in borrowing activity and market uptake.\n\nimage1920×1005 86.4 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe sixth RLUSD incentive program launched three days ago, boosting supply yields as participants capitalize on higher APYs from the new reward phase. Meanwhile, USDC supply rates have trended lower, mirroring weaker utilization and a cooling in market demand.\n\nimage1920×1005 86.1 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nFor the new week, both RLUSD and USDC borrowing rates remained stable, with RLUSD at 2.07% and USDC at 3.13%, keeping the spread near 1%. A new USDC incentive program has begun, effectively reducing borrowing APYs by 3.5%.\n\nimage1920×1005 84.3 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields held broadly steady over the week, with most assets showing minimal movement. The main adjustments came from USCC and USTB, now yielding 8.83% and 3.68% respectively, reflecting a mild normalization in returns while overall RWA rates remained stable.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 89.7 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nimage3059×1918 343 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 79.2 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 385 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 24, 2025\n\n2 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nOctober 31, 2025, 5:21pm\n\n10\n\nimage1600×900 103 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $459.7m, with over $91.8m in net borrows, and $227.4m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $460 million, with total stablecoin supply reaching $227.4 million and net borrows standing at $135.7 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies.\n\nStablecoin markets recorded a sharp rise in net borrows, largely driven by a major GHO borrowing position against USCC collateral.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets were renewed.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign continues to be active, offering daily rewards of $1,603, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by around 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has been active since October 28, distributing $37,333 in daily rewards, capped at 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the nine weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances expanded sharply to $135.7 million, fueled by sustained inflows of new users who began actively supplying and borrowing GHO against USCC collateral. A single address accounted for roughly half of the total GHO net borrow.\n\nimage1216×1193 156 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nGHO: The supply and borrow caps were increased to 70m and 50m, respectively, on October 28.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was increased to 18.5m on October 24.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 10% to $227.4m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $139m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increase by 1.9% from $18.4m to $18.9m.\n\nGHO: Supply increase by 38.8% from $50m to $69.4m, solely driven by liquidity from GHO Facilitator.\n\nimage1920×1005 79.5 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew by 40.5%, reaching $232m. The USCC remained the sole contributor to overall platform growth, reflecting enduring institutional demand for yield-generating collateral within the Horizon ecosystem.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 51.8%, from $129.2m to $196m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nimage4413×2310 462 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 78.9% to $135.9m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the GHO market.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow increase by 19.4%, from $14m to $16.72m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 14.7%, from $61m to $69.97m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow increased by 146.3% from $19.9m to $49.2m.\n\nimage4412×2310 466 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC and RLUSD market dynamics remained largely unchanged over the week, reflecting stable utilization and steady user activity. In contrast, the GHO market experienced a pronounced increase in engagement, with utilization climbing to 71%, signaling a strong acceleration in borrowing demand and active market adoption.\n\nimage1920×1005 90.5 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe seventh RLUSD incentive program commenced this week, maintaining a supply yield of 12.68%, as the market remains capped and fully utilized. This stability reflects constrained capacity rather than new inflows, with participants continuing to capture elevated returns within a saturated RLUSD market. In contrast, USDC supply rates have trended lower, consistent with softer utilization and moderating demand conditions.\n\nimage1920×1005 87.1 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nFor the new week, borrowing rates across stablecoin markets held steady, with a spread of just over 1.5% between RLUSD and USDC. The GHO borrow rate remained anchored at 4.34%, reflecting consistent market pricing and liquidity conditions.\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields remained largely unchanged over the week, with only marginal adjustments across assets. USCC now offers 9.42%, while USTB yields 3.77%, reflecting a modest upward shift in returns amid broadly stable RWA market conditions.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage1920×1078 89.4 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nimage3059×1918 343 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×942 80.7 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 380 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, October 31, 2025\n\n3 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nNovember 7, 2025, 6:40pm\n\n11\n\nimage1600×900 72.3 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon’s Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $530m, with over $172m in net borrows, and $267m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $530 million, with total stablecoin supply reaching $267 million and net borrows standing at $172 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies.\n\nStablecoin markets experienced a sharp rise in net borrowing, primarily driven by a significant GHO borrowing position against USCC collateral.\n\nVanEck Treasury Fund (VBILL) has been listed as a collateral asset on Horizon. VBILL is a tokenized fund that invests in U.S. Treasury securities,\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets were renewed.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $1,603, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has been active since November 4, distributing $42,214 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the tenth weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances expanded sharply to $172.53 million, fueled by sustained inflows of new users who began actively borrowing GHO against USCC collateral. A single address accounted for roughly half of the total GHO net borrow.\n\nimage1212×1392 156 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nGHO: The borrow caps were increased to 60m on 4 November, then was raised again up to 78m with supply cap being raised up to 80m on 7 November.\n\nRLUSD: The supply cap was raised to 164.7m on 4 November, then borrow cap was raised 148.2m on 7 November.\n\nUSDC: The supply cap was raised to 50m on 4 November.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was increased to 23m on 4 November.\n\nVBILL: The VBILL token listed on Horizon UI with 15m Supply Cap.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 17.8% to $267.9m. RLUSD accounts for the largest portion of this total supply.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increase by 18.5% from $139m to $164.7m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increase by 28.4% from $18.9m to $24.26m.\n\nGHO: Supply increase by 13.8% from $69.4m to $79m.\n\nimage4413×2310 420 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real World Assets (RWAs) grew by 22.4%, reaching $283.6m. The USCC remained the sole contributor to overall platform growth, reflecting enduring institutional demand for yield-generating collateral within the Horizon ecosystem.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 21.7%, from $196m to $238.6m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply increased to $9.17m from the launch.\n\nimage4413×2310 400 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 26.9% to $135.9m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the GHO market.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow decrease by 3.8%, from $16.72m to $16.09m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 27.7%, from $69.9m to $89.42m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow increased by 36.9% from $49.2m to $67.4m.\n\nimage4412×2310 386 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nUSDC and RLUSD market dynamics remained stable overall, although USDC utilization declined sharply following a recent increase in supply demand. In contrast, GHO utilization reached 97.42%, indicating strong demand for borrowing.\n\nimage4412×2310 485 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe eighth RLUSD incentive program began this week, supporting the supply yield. Following the recent expansion in the RLUSD market capacity, reward yields have remained volatile amid shifting liquidity dynamics. Meanwhile, USDC supply rates declined further, driven by a clear drop in utilization.\n\nimage1920×1004 188 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nBorrowing rates across stablecoin markets remained largely unchanged, with USDC, for the first time in its history, slipping below the RLUSD rate. GHO remained to have a fixed rate of 4.34%.\n\nimage1920×1005 177 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields were mostly stable over the week, though USCC saw a sharp decline to 5.37%, following the drop in CME futures rates for ETH and SOL. USTB yields edged slightly lower to 3.69%, consistent with a modest adjustment in short-term treasury exposures.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 483 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 305 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 154 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 382 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 7, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nNovember 14, 2025, 5:14pm\n\n12\n\nimage1600×900 71.4 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $557m, with over $187.9m in net borrows, and $265.5m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $550 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $266 million and net borrowings standing at $188 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies.\n\nBoth the RWA and stablecoin markets showed only marginal changes this week, with no meaningful expansion across either segment.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $1,488, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has been active since November 4, distributing $42,214 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the eleven weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances expanded sharply to $187.24 million, fueled mostly by ongoing users adjusting and reallocating their positions.\n\nimage1292×1557 309 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring this week, no parameter changes were proposed nor executed.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nStablecoin market conditions were broadly steady this week, with total supply reaching $265.5m and both GHO and RLUSD markets remaining unchanged.\n\nRLUSD: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $164.7 million.\n\nUSDC: Supply decrease by 11.5% from $24.26m to $21.76m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79m.\n\nimage4413×2309 431 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe RWA market share showed minimal movement this week, with USCC posting a small increase that lifted total RWA supply to $291.4 million, while all other segments remained effectively unchanged.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 3.2%, from $238.6m to $246.2m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $9.17m.\n\nimage4413×2309 421 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 26.9% to $135.9m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the GHO and RLUSD markets.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow decrease by 3.7%, from $16.09m to $15.5m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 5.8%, from $89.4m to $94.6m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow increased by 14.8% from $67.4m to $77.4m.\n\nimage4412×2309 398 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nDuring this week, USDC utilization dipped on November 11 due to a large repayment, but it recovered shortly afterward as market conditions stabilized. The GHO and RLUSD utilization held steady as both markets remained pinned at their respective caps.\n\nimage4412×2309 496 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe eighth RLUSD incentive program remains active, helping keep RLUSD supply yields steady, while USDC supply rates also held constant this week as utilization stabilized.\n\nimage4410×2307 483 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nUSDC saw a brief dip in borrowing rates before reverting, while RLUSD rates remained essentially flat over the week.\n\nimage4412×2309 506 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields were mostly stable over the week, with USCC jumping to 8.26% and USTB ticking up to 3.74%, in line with a modest repricing in short-term Treasury exposures.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2308 488 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 302 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×942 156 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 367 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 14, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nNovember 21, 2025, 9:29pm\n\n13\n\nimage1600×900 70.4 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) surpassed $591m, with over $187.9m in net borrows, and $293.5m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has surpassed $590 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $294 million and net borrowings standing at $193 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies and an ongoing incentive campaign.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: A new borrowing campaign has been started, offering daily rewards of $1,667, effectively reducing the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has been active since November 18, distributing $40,712 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the twelve weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances expanded sharply to $194.3 million, fueled mostly by ongoing users adjusting and reallocating their positions and new borrowing demand against the newly launched VBILL token.\n\nimage1298×1483 182 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nRLUSD: The supply cap and borrow cap were raised to 191.2m and 172m on 17 November.\n\nUSCC: The supply cap was increased to 29m on 17 November.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total supply of stablecoins increased by 9.6% to $293.6m, driven by continued growth in both RLUSD and USDC, while the GHO market remained unchanged.\n\nRLUSD: Supply increase by 16% from $164.7 to 191.2m.\n\nUSDC: Supply increase by 7.3% from $21.8m to $23.4m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79m.\n\nimage4413×2309 446 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real-World Assets (RWAs) grew by 6.2%, reaching $301.2 million. This week’s increase came entirely from USCC, which posted a modest uplift, while all other segments remained effectively unchanged.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 3.2%, from $246.2m to $256m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $389k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $9.17m.\n\nimage1280×669 85.3 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 3.7% to $194.2m. This growth was due to increased borrowing in the USDC and RLUSD markets.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow increase by 12.3%, from $15.5m to $17.4m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 5.4%, from $94.6m to $99.7m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow hasn’t changed and currently sits at $77.2m.\n\nimage4413×2310 408 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nFor this week, RLUSD and USDC utilisation levels held steady, as did GHO utilisation, which remained unchanged at 97.47%.\n\nimage4412×2310 497 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe ninth RLUSD incentive program has now begun, effectively reducing RLUSD supply yields, while USDC yields remain stable as market utilisation holds steady.\n\nimage4410×2307 485 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nBorrow rates for both USDC and RLUSD remained steady throughout the week, exhibiting no significant shifts in pricing or utilization-driven pressure.\n\nimage4412×2310 507 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields moved lower over the week, with USCC slipping to 5.09% and USTB easing to 3.67%. The decline in USCC was driven primarily by weaker CME SOL futures yields, which represent its largest underlying exposure.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 476 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 323 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 167 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 382 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 21, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\n0xEulersID\n\nNovember 28, 2025, 1:05pm\n\n14\n\nDo you recompute APY continuously based on on-chain events, or do you sample from an oracle/indexer at fixed intervals? And is the displayed APY smoothed (e.g., 24h moving average) or raw?\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nNovember 28, 2025, 8:07pm\n\n15\n\nimage1920×1080 74.4 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) decreased slightly to $571.67m, with over $175.9m in net borrows, and $293.6m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL saw a decline in TVL $572 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $294 million and net borrowings standing at $176 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, mostly by active user demand for looping strategies and an ongoing incentive campaign.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: The borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $1,667, which effectively reduces the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has been running since November 25, distributing $33,924 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the thirteen weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances experienced a slight decline to $175.93m, primarily driven by two large GHO repayment transactions (1 and 2), which reduced outstanding balances.\n\nimage1221×1463 174 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring this week, no parameter changes were proposed nor executed.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total stablecoin supply held flat this week, largely because the RLUSD market has reached its cap, limiting any further expansion.\n\nRLUSD: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at 191.2m.\n\nUSDC: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $23.2m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79m.\n\nimage4410×2307 417 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real-World Assets (RWAs) declined by 6.2%, holding $277.9 million. This week’s decline stemmed from the withdrawal of USCC positions, driven by a drop in USCC yields, while all other segments remained effectively unchanged.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply decreased by 10%, from $256m to $232.6m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $391k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $9.17m.\n\nimage4410×2307 394 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon decreased by 9.4% to $175.9m. This decline was driven solely by a large repayment of outstanding GHO debt.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow hasn’t changed and currently stands at $17.4mn.\n\nRLUSD: The net borrow hasn’t changed and currently stands at $99.3m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow decreased by 30.29%, from $77.2m to $59.25m.\n\nimage4410×2307 375 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nFor this week, RLUSD and USDC utilisation levels remained steady, while GHO utilisation experienced a sharp decline, driven by a large debt repayment, which broke away from the previously persistent peak level.\n\nimage4410×2307 429 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe tenth RLUSD incentive program has now commenced, exerting downward pressure on RLUSD supply yields while USDC yields remain largely unchanged. With this campaign, the effective RLUSD supply rate has fallen below 10% for the first time.\n\nimage4410×2307 502 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nBorrow rates for USDC and RLUSD held steady over the week, with no notable movement in rates or indication of shifting market pressure.\n\nimage4410×2307 479 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nRWA yields continued to decline this week, with both USCC and USTB moving lower and reaching historical lows as broader income conditions softened. The USCC now stands at 5.30%, while the USTB has eased to 3.67%.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 463 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 325 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 167 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 384 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, November 28, 2025\n\nneed4sneed\n\nDecember 4, 2025, 2:14am\n\n16\n\nStani fren, as the Fed continues to signal that it will continue with it’s easing cycle, how do you expect this to impact TVL growth on Horizon? Is your opinion that this would act as tailwind or headwind?\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nDecember 5, 2025, 7:51pm\n\n17\n\nimage1920×1080 75.1 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) decreased slightly to $551.96m, with over $159.1m in net borrows, and $296m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL saw a decline in TVL $552 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $296 million and net borrowings standing at $159 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, driven mainly by previously opened positions and ongoing incentive programs.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: The borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $1,677, which effectively reduces the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The lending-focused campaign remains active, distributing $27,136 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the fourteen weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances declined to $159.1m, primarily driven by the repayment of stablecoin borrowing positions against USCC, as USCC yields declined.\n\nimage1215×1455 178 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nUSDC: The supply cap and borrow cap were raised to 60m and 54m on 5 December.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total stablecoin supply held flat this week, largely because both the RLUSD and GHO markets have reached their caps, limiting any further expansion.\n\nRLUSD: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at 191.2m.\n\nUSDC: The supply increased by 9.7% from $23.2m to $25.6m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79.3m, controlled by the GHO Steward.\n\nimage4410×2307 422 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real-World Assets (RWAs) declined by 7.9%, holding $255.9 million. The decline in supply continues to be driven solely by the closing of USCC positions in response to the drop in USCC yields.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply decreased by 9.5%, from $232.6m to $210.5m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $33.2m.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $391k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply increased by 1.1%, from $9.17m to $9.27m\n\nimage4410×2307 390 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon decreased by 9.6% to $159.1m. This decline was driven by a large repayment of user stablecoin positions against the USCC token.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow hasn’t changed and currently stands at $17.5m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow decreased by 7%, from $99.3m to $92.27m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow decreased by 16.8%, from $59.3m to $49.3m.\n\nimage4410×2307 380 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nThis week, GHO utilization declined further due to the repayment of USCC-backed debt positions following a compression in basis yield, while RLUSD utilization remained broadly unchanged. In contrast, USDC utilisation saw a sharp increase, mainly driven by a single large borrow of 6.3m executed on 4 December.\n\nimage4410×2307 443 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe eleventh incentive campaign has now begun, with the RLUSD incentive APY being reduced again. This change has decreased the RLUSD supply rate, resulting in the effective yield continuing its decline. Meanwhile, USDC rates increased due to a surge in utilization.\n\nimage1920×1004 209 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nOver the week, USDC and RLUSD borrowing rates were mostly steady. A large borrow caused a minor spike in USDC rates, but RLUSD saw no notable rate movement.\n\nimage4410×2307 466 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nAfter a period of declines that pushed USCC and USTB to historical lows, both instruments have since normalized and are trading in a relatively tight range. Current indications show USCC at 5.73% and USTB at 3.68%, suggesting a stable yield environment, although there has been no significant recovery so far.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 473 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 323 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 168 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 380 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 5, 2025\n\n3 Likes\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nDecember 12, 2025, 8:58pm\n\n18\n\nimage1920×1080 77.7 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) decreased slightly to $542.15m, with over $166.27m in net borrows, and $297.7m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL declined to $542 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $298 million and net borrowings standing at $ 244 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, driven mainly by previously opened positions and ongoing incentive programs.\n\nThe RWA Market experienced a complete outflow of JTRSY tokens, primarily driven by a single large supplier closing its position on 10 December.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nAt its December 2025 meeting, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate by 25 bps to a range of 3.5%–3.75%, which prompted us to adjust LlamaGuard’s dynamic bounds parameters registry.\n\nParameters for USCC, USTB, USYC, JAAA, JTRSY, and VBILL were modified to enhance efficiency, including an increase in LTV under GHO E-Mode.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: The borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $2,043, which effectively reduces the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The lending-focused campaign remains active, distributing $22,617 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the fifteen weeks since Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances have increased to $166.3m. This growth was primarily driven by the opening of new USDC borrowing positions.\n\nimage1218×1390 176 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDecember 11 (tx reference)\n\nNAV Parameterization: Following the Fed rate decision, new NAV pricing parameters for USTB, USYC, and JAAA were implemented.\n\nDecember 12 (tx reference)\n\nAfter the 14-week deployment phase, Horizon is revisiting its initially conservative risk posture, which was set to prioritize safety and observe user behavior. With data now indicating a stronger market maturity, the proposed parameters are gradually increasing efficiency parameters.\n\nUSTB: The risk parameters were updated (88% LTV, 90% LT, 3% LB) and the USTB GHO E-mode category was set to 90% LTV, 92% Liquidation Threshold and 3% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nUSCC: The risk parameters were updated (85% LTV, 88% LT, 5% LB) and the USCC GHO E-mode category was set to 87% LTV, 90% Liquidation Threshold and 5% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nUSYC: The risk parameters were updated (88% LTV, 90% LT, 3.1% LB) and the USYC GHO E-mode category was set to 90% LTV, 92% Liquidation Threshold and 3.1% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nVBILL: The risk parameters were updated (88% LTV, 90% LT, 3% LB) and the VBILL GHO E-mode category was set to 90% LTV, 92% Liquidation Threshold and 3% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nJTRSY: The risk parameters were updated (86% LTV, 88% LT, 3.5% LB) and the JTRSY GHO E-mode category was set to 89% LTV, 91% Liquidation Threshold and 3.5% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nJAAA: The risk parameters were updated (81% LTV, 86% LT, 5% LB) and the JAAA GHO E-mode category was set to 88% LTV, 90% Liquidation Threshold and 5% Liquidation Bonus.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nAggregate stablecoin supply was flat this week, largely because RLUSD has hit its cap, and GHO capacity hasn’t been expanded for now.\n\nRLUSD: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at 191.2m.\n\nUSDC: The supply increased by 6% from $25.6m to $27.17m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79.5m, managed by the GHO Steward.\n\nimage4410×2307 428 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real-World Assets (RWAs) declined by 4.5%, holding $244.5 million. While USCC actually grew by 10%, the overall decline was driven by the withdrawal of JTRSY supply on December 10.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply decreased by 10.4%, from $210.5m to $232.3m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $391k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $9.27m\n\nimage4410×2307 397 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon decreased by 4.4% to $166.3m. Net borrowing expanded, primarily due to heightened demand for USDC liquidity.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow increase by 21.9%, from $17.5m to $21.3m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 7%, from $92.3m to $99.73m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow decreased by 9%, from $49.3m to $45.2m.\n\nimage4410×2307 386 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nThis week, utilization for both GHO and RLUSD remained largely unchanged. In contrast, USDC utilization rose significantly, driven by large borrow activity on December 9.\n\nimage4410×2307 454 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe twelfth incentive campaign has now begun, with the RLUSD incentive APY continuing to be reduced. RLUSD effective yields continued their downward trend as supply rates fell. Conversely, the spike in utilization drove USDC rates higher.\n\nimage1920×1004 217 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nOver the week, USDC and RLUSD borrowing rates stayed broadly stable. A large USDC borrow triggered a brief uptick, while RLUSD rates remained unchanged.\n\nimage4410×2307 475 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nYields for both USCC and USTB have stabilized, though USCC continues to experience suppressed returns. Currently, the USCC is at 5.32%, while the USTB is at 3.65%.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 469 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 326 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 169 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 381 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 12, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nDecember 19, 2025, 6:09pm\n\n19\n\nimage1920×1080 74.1 KB\n\nThis week, Horizon Total Value Locked (TVL) increased to $561.5m, with over $178.3m in net borrows, and $310.4m in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has increased to $562 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $310 million and net borrowings standing at $178 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, driven mainly by previously opened positions and ongoing incentive programs.\n\nThe updated parameters have already been noticed by some users (e.g., via new supply → borrow transactions), confirming the new settings are functioning as intended.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nIncentivize Program\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: The borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $2,282, which effectively reduces the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has begun, distributing $24,876 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the sixteen weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances increased to $178.3m, driven by new borrowing parameters that boosted stablecoin borrowing demand. USCC remained the dominant supply asset used as collateral to borrow against.\n\nimage1157×1058 83 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nRLUSD: The supply cap was raised to 201.5m on 16 December.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total stablecoin supply on Horizon increased by 4.2% to $310.4m, growth driven by a rise in the supply of both RLUSD and USDC. This growth followed an increase in the supply cap for RLUSD and changes in protocol parameters last week that stimulated market participation.\n\nRLUSD: The supply increased by 5.4% from $191.2m to $201.5m.\n\nUSDC: The supply increased by 9.7% from $25.6m to $29.5m.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79.4m, managed by the GHO Steward.\n\nimage4410×2307 443 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of Real-World Assets (RWAs) increased by 2.7%, holding $251.1 million. The increase in supply was driven solely by the expansion of USCC positions, while supply across other assets was broadly unchanged to modestly lower.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply decreased by 9.5%, from $210.5m to $240.6m.\n\nJTRSY: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $392.5k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.5m.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply decreased by 18%, from $9.27m to $7.6m\n\nimage4410×2307 426 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 7.2% to $178.3m, driven by higher borrowing parameters that boosted demand for USDC liquidity.\n\nUSDC: Net borrow increase by 12.3%, from $21.3m to $23.9m.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrow increase by 9.5%, from $99.7m to $109.2m.\n\nGHO: Net borrow hasn’t changed and currently sits at $45.2m.\n\nimage4410×2307 417 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nThis week, GHO utilization remained largely unchanged, while RLUSD utilization remained mostly flat. USDC utilisation edged higher, reflecting a modest uptick in borrowing demand.\n\nimage4410×2307 486 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe thirteenth incentive campaign is now underway, with RLUSD incentive APY continuing to decrease. We observed a brief decline in RLUSD APY, resulting from a delay in activating the incentive campaign. Meanwhile, USDC rates remained broadly stable.\n\nimage1920×1004 247 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nUSDC and RLUSD borrowing rates remained steady over the week, exhibiting limited volatility and no discernible trend.\n\nimage1920×1004 225 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nUSCC and USTB yields have remained relatively stable, continuing to trade within a narrow range. USCC yields fell and now sit at 4.8%, while USTB remains stable at 3.68%, keeping the broader yield backdrop relatively steady.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4110×2307 456 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nimage3020×1918 316 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×941 169 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\nimage3028×1918 381 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, December 19, 2025\n\n1 Like\n\nLlamaRisk - Monthly Community Update\n\nLlamaRisk\n\nJanuary 2, 2026, 8:45pm\n\n20\n\nimage1920×1080 79.7 KB\n\nThese past two weeks, Horizon’s TVL increased to $589.6M, with over $198.7M in net borrows, and $314M in stablecoin supply.\n\nHighlights\n\nTVL has increased to $589 million, with a total stablecoin supply of $314 million and net borrowings standing at $198.7 million. RLUSD and USCC remain the dominant supplied assets, contributed mainly by previously opened positions and ongoing incentive programs.\n\nThe incentivization programs for RLUSD supply and USDC borrow markets continue to be active.\n\nOverall Horizon market activity remained low as most participants were away for the New Year holidays.\n\nIncentive Programs\n\nIncentive programs on Horizon stimulate liquidity supply and borrowing activity, with active campaigns for USDC and RLUSD.\n\nUSDC: The borrowing campaign remains active, offering daily rewards of $2,282, which effectively reduces the borrowing cost by approximately 3.5%.\n\nRLUSD: The new lending-focused campaign has began, distributing $24,877 in daily rewards, capped at a 15% APY and currently add a 5.17% reward.\n\nUtilization Report\n\nIn the eighteen weeks following Horizon’s market activation, total borrowed balances sits at $198.7M, driven by existing users shuffling their positions to take advantage of the recently changed collateral efficiency parameters. Overall market activity remains low due to the holidays.\n\nimage1324×1412 165 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nParameter changes during this period\n\nDuring this week, no parameter changes were proposed nor executed.\n\nSupply (stablecoins)\n\nThe total stablecoin supply on Horizon increased by 0.9% to $314M, growth was driven solely by USDC supply activity. USDC supply increased minimally due to the New Year holidays, while RLUSD hit its supply cap.\n\nRLUSD: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $201.5M.\n\nUSDC: The supply increased by 11.8% from $29.5M to $33M.\n\nGHO: The supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $79.4M, managed by the GHO Stewards.\n\nimage4410×2309 450 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nSupply (RWAs)\n\nThe total supply of RWAs increased by 5.2%, holding $266.4 million. The increase in supply was driven solely by the expansion of USCC positions, while supply across other assets remained unchanged. Overall growth over the past two weeks remained marginal, constrained by the holiday period.\n\nThe changes in individual RWA supplies were as follows:\n\nUSCC: Supply increased by 10.6%, from $240.6M to $266.3M.\n\nJTRSY: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nUSTB: Supply hasn’t changed and currently stands at $393k.\n\nJAAA: Supply hasn’t changed and currently sits at $2.53M.\n\nUSYC: Supply remained at zero with no assets supplied.\n\nVBILL: Supply decreased by 18.8%, from $7.6M to $6.4M\n\nimage4410×2309 423 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nBorrow\n\nTotal net borrowing on Horizon increased by 8.3% to $198.7M, the past two weeks saw minimal activity for RLUSD and USDC as markets remained passive during the New Year period.\n\nUSDC: Net borrows increased by 9%, from $23.9M to $26.07M.\n\nRLUSD: Net borrows increased by 15.6%, from $109.2M to $126.3M.\n\nGHO: Net borrows haven’t changed and currently sit at $45.3M.\n\nimage4410×2309 422 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nStablecoin Utilization\n\nDuring the past two weeks, GHO and RLUSD utilization remained flat, while USDC saw a minor growth in utilization.\n\nimage4410×2309 492 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nStablecoin Supply Rates\n\nThe thirteenth incentive campaign remains active, with RLUSD incentive APY continuing to decrease. Over the past two weeks, supply APY for both RLUSD and USDC remained stable, as overall market activity was minimal during the holiday period.\n\nimage1920×1005 246 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nStablecoin Borrow Rates\n\nUSDC and RLUSD borrowing rates held steady over the last two weeks, as rates have not been affected much with markets remaining inactive during the holidays.\n\nimage1920×1005 232 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nProfitability heatmaps for leverage looping\n\nOver the two-week holiday period, overall RWA yields have remained stable. USCC yields currently sit at 4.2%, while USTB remains stable at 3.66%. Following the latest parameters execution, RWA LTV levels have been updated, with leverage now reaching the maximum possible levels of 6.67x for USCC and 8.38x for USTB.\n\nUSCC\n\nimage4111×2312 497 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nimage3019×1918 428 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nUSTB\n\nimage1920×943 141 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\nimage3068×1918 497 KB\n\nSource: LlamaRisk, January 2, 2026\n\n1 Like\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Risk Stewards] Monad Stablecoin IRM Adjustments: Slope1 to 5.00%\n\nRisk\n\n0\n\n134\n\nSeptember 11, 2026\n\n[ARFC] Onboard HINC (Neuberger Securitize High Income Tokenized Fund) to Aave Horizon\n\nHorizon\n\n8\n\n1053\n\nSeptember 16, 2026\n\nRisk Stewards: Stablecoin IRM Changes on Aave V3 / 2026.08.27\n\nRisk\n\n0\n\n217\n\nAugust 27, 2026\n\n[Risk Stewards] August 2026 - Stablecoin Interest Rate Adjustments\n\nGovernance\n\n14\n\n1261\n\nSeptember 15, 2026\n\nHorizon Technical Maintenance Updates\n\nHorizon\n\n2\n\n167\n\nJuly 31, 2026","tokens":20770,"crawled_at":1791192469936} {"id":10111,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/about-hyperliquid/core-contributors","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Core contributors | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nHyperliquid Labs is a core contributor supporting the growth of Hyperliquid, led by Jeff and iliensinc, who are classmates from Harvard. Other members of the team are from Caltech and MIT and previously worked at Airtable, Citadel, Hudson River Trading, and Nuro.\nThe team used to do proprietary market making in crypto in 2020 and expanded into defi in the summer of 2022. Existing platforms were plagued with issues, such as poor market design, bad tech, and clunky UX. It was easy to make money trading on these protocols, but disappointing to see how far behind defi was compared to its centralized counterparts. The team set out to build a product that could solve these issues and provide users with a seamless trading experience.\nDesigning a performant decentralized L1 with an order book DEX built-in requires an intimate understanding of quantitative trading, cutting-edge blockchain technology, and clean UX, which the team is well-positioned to deliver. The team actively engages with and listens to the community; you are welcome to join the Discord server to ask questions and share feedback.\nLastly, Hyperliquid Labs is self-funded and has not taken any external capital, which allows the team to focus on building a product they believe in without external pressure.\n\nPreviousHyperliquid 101 for non-crypto audiences\nNextOnboarding\n\nLast updated 1 year ago","tokens":366,"crawled_at":1791192477897} -{"id":10112,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/transfer-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Transfer an NFT | NFTs","text":"Transfer NFT ownership between wallets on Solana.\nTransfer an NFT\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about transferring NFTs in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { transfer } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Transfer an existing NFT asset to a new owner\n\n11const result = await transfer(umi, {\n\n12 asset: publicKey('AssetAddressHere...'),\n\n13 newOwner: publicKey('RecipientAddressHere...'),\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset transferred:', result.signature)\n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your transfer:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT to transfer\n\nnewOwner\nThe wallet address of the recipient\n\nHow It Works\nThe transfer process involves three steps:\nVerify ownership - You must be the current owner of the NFT\nSpecify recipient - Provide the new owner's wallet address\nExecute transfer - The NFT ownership is transferred immediately\nNFT Transfers\nUnlike SPL/fungible tokens, Core NFTs don't require the recipient to create a token account first. The ownership is recorded directly in the NFT, making transfers simpler and cheaper.","tokens":369,"crawled_at":1791192492585} +{"id":10112,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/nfts/transfer-nft","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Transfer an NFT | NFTs","text":"Transfer NFT ownership between wallets on Solana.\nTransfer an NFT\nIn the following section you can find a full code example and the parameters that you might need to change. You can learn more about transferring NFTs in the Core documentation.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { transfer } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Transfer an existing NFT asset to a new owner\n\n11const result = await transfer(umi, {\n\n12 asset: publicKey('AssetAddressHere...'),\n\n13 newOwner: publicKey('RecipientAddressHere...'),\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset transferred:', result.signature)\n\nParameters\nCustomize these parameters for your transfer:\nParameterDescription\nassetAddress\nThe public key of the NFT to transfer\n\nnewOwner\nThe wallet address of the recipient\n\nHow It Works\nThe transfer process involves three steps:\nVerify ownership - You must be the current owner of the NFT\nSpecify recipient - Provide the new owner's wallet address\nExecute transfer - The NFT ownership is transferred immediately\nNFT Transfers\nUnlike SPL/fungible tokens, Core NFTs don't require the recipient to create a token account first. The ownership is recorded directly in the NFT, making transfers simpler and cheaper.","tokens":369,"crawled_at":1791192773315} {"id":10113,"url":"https://docs.cosmos.network/skip-go/api-reference/error-codes","domain":"docs.cosmos.network","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"API Error Codes & Status Messages - Cosmos Docs","text":"This document provides a reference for the various error codes and status messages you may encounter when using Skip Go’s APIs. Understanding these codes is essential for handling API responses correctly and providing accurate feedback to users.\n​\n\nTransaction Status Codes\n\nThese codes represent the overall status of a transaction being processed or tracked by the Skip Go API.\nStatusDescriptionNotes\nSTATE_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the transaction is unknown.\nShould be treated as an error state.\n\nSTATE_SUBMITTED\nThe transaction has been submitted to the blockchain network.\n\nSTATE_PENDING\nThe transaction is in progress and waiting to be processed.\n\nSTATE_RECEIVED\nThe transaction has been received by the blockchain network.\n\nSTATE_COMPLETED\n(Internal transitional state)\nThis state is resolved to STATE_COMPLETED_SUCCESS or STATE_COMPLETED_ERROR before API response.\n\nSTATE_ABANDONED\nThe transaction was abandoned, often due to timeout (e.g., IBC relayer).\nTracking timed out. Not necessarily a permanent transaction failure; may be retriable.\n\nSTATE_COMPLETED_SUCCESS\nThe transaction has completed successfully.\nThis is the only status that definitively indicates successful end-to-end transaction completion.\n\nSTATE_COMPLETED_ERROR\nThe transaction has completed but encountered errors.\n\nSTATE_PENDING_ERROR\nThe transaction encountered errors while being processed.\n\n​\n\nGeneral Error Types\n\nThese error types provide a broad categorization of issues.\nError TypeDescription\nSTATUS_ERROR_UNKNOWN\nUnknown error type.\n\nSTATUS_ERROR_TRANSACTION_EXECUTION\nError occurred during the execution of the transaction on the blockchain.\n\nSTATUS_ERROR_INDEXING\nError occurred during Skip’s internal processing or indexing.\n\nSTATUS_ERROR_TRANSFER\nError related to a specific transfer operation within the transaction.\n\n​\n\nBridge Protocol Status Codes\n\nDifferent bridge protocols have their own specific status codes that reflect the state of a transfer leg using that bridge.\n​\n\nIBC Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nTRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the IBC transfer is unknown.\n\nTRANSFER_PENDING\nThe IBC transfer is in progress.\n\nTRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe IBC transfer has been received by the destination chain.\n\nTRANSFER_SUCCESS\nThe IBC transfer has completed successfully.\n\nTRANSFER_FAILURE\nThe IBC transfer has failed.\n\n​\n\nAxelar Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nAXELAR_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the Axelar transfer is unknown.\n\nAXELAR_TRANSFER_PENDING_CONFIRMATION\nThe Axelar transfer is waiting for confirmation.\n\nAXELAR_TRANSFER_PENDING_RECEIPT\nThe Axelar transfer is waiting for receipt.\n\nAXELAR_TRANSFER_SUCCESS\nThe Axelar transfer has completed successfully.\n\nAXELAR_TRANSFER_FAILURE\nThe Axelar transfer has failed.\n\n​\n\nCCTP Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nCCTP_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the CCTP transfer is unknown.\n\nCCTP_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe CCTP transfer has been sent.\n\nCCTP_TRANSFER_PENDING_CONFIRMATION\nThe CCTP transfer is waiting for confirmation.\n\nCCTP_TRANSFER_CONFIRMED\nThe CCTP transfer has been confirmed.\n\nCCTP_TRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe CCTP transfer has been received at the destination.\n\n​\n\nGoFast Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nGO_FAST_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the GoFast transfer is unknown.\n\nGO_FAST_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe GoFast transfer has been sent.\n\nGO_FAST_POST_ACTION_FAILED\nThe post-transfer action on the GoFast transfer has failed.\n\nGO_FAST_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT\nThe GoFast transfer has timed out.\n\nGO_FAST_TRANSFER_FILLED\nThe GoFast transfer has been filled.\n\nGO_FAST_TRANSFER_REFUNDED\nThe GoFast transfer has been refunded.\n\n​\n\nLayerZero Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nLAYER_ZERO_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the LayerZero transfer is unknown.\n\nLAYER_ZERO_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe LayerZero transfer has been sent.\n\nLAYER_ZERO_TRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe LayerZero transfer has been received.\n\nLAYER_ZERO_TRANSFER_FAILED\nThe LayerZero transfer has failed.\n\n​\n\nHyperlane Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nHYPERLANE_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the Hyperlane transfer is unknown.\n\nHYPERLANE_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe Hyperlane transfer has been sent.\n\nHYPERLANE_TRANSFER_FAILED\nThe Hyperlane transfer has failed.\n\nHYPERLANE_TRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe Hyperlane transfer has been received.\n\n​\n\nOPInit Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nOPINIT_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the OPInit transfer is unknown.\n\nOPINIT_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe OPInit transfer has been sent.\n\nOPINIT_TRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe OPInit transfer has been received.\n\n​\n\nStargate Transfer Status\n\nStatusDescription\nSTARGATE_TRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the Stargate transfer is unknown.\n\nSTARGATE_TRANSFER_SENT\nThe Stargate transfer has been sent.\n\nSTARGATE_TRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe Stargate transfer has been received.\n\nSTARGATE_TRANSFER_FAILED\nThe Stargate transfer has failed.\n\n​\n\nEureka Transfer Status\n\nThe Eureka transfer status codes are identical to the IBC transfer status codes.\nStatusDescription\nTRANSFER_UNKNOWN\nThe status of the Eureka transfer is unknown.\n\nTRANSFER_PENDING\nThe Eureka transfer is in progress.\n\nTRANSFER_RECEIVED\nThe Eureka transfer has been received by the destination chain.\n\nTRANSFER_SUCCESS\nThe Eureka transfer has completed successfully.\n\nTRANSFER_FAILURE\nThe Eureka transfer has failed.\n\n​\n\nAdditional Error Types\n\n​\n\nPacket Error Types\n\nWhen dealing with IBC packets, you may see these error types:\nError TypeDescription\nPACKET_ERROR_UNKNOWN\nUnknown packet error.\n\nPACKET_ERROR_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT\nError in packet acknowledgement.\n\nPACKET_ERROR_TIMEOUT\nPacket timed out.\n\n​\n\nBridge-Specific Error Types\n\nError TypeDescription\nSEND_TOKEN_EXECUTION_ERROR\nError during Axelar send token execution.\n\nCONTRACT_CALL_WITH_TOKEN_EXECUTION_ERROR\nError during Axelar contract call with token execution.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1431,"crawled_at":1791192493308} {"id":10114,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/hyperliquid-improvement-proposals-hips/hip-2-hyperliquidity","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"HIP-2: Hyperliquidity | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nMotivation\nThough HIP-1 is sufficient as a permissionless token standard, in practice it is often crucial to bootstrap liquidity. One of Hyperliquid's core design principles is that liquidity should be democratized. For perps trading, HLP can quote deep and tight liquidity based on CEX perp and spot prices, but a new model is needed for HIP-1 tokens that are in early phases of price discovery.\nHyperliquidity is inspired by Uniswap, while interoperating with a native onchain order book to support sophisticated order book liquidity from end users. HIP-2 is a fully decentralized onchain strategy that is part of Hyperliquid's block transition logic. Unlike conventional automated order book strategies, there are no operators. The strategy logic is secured by the same consensus that operates the order book itself. Note that Hyperliquidity is currently only available on spot pairs against USDC.\nHyperliquidity is parametrized by\n\nspot: a spot order book asset with USDC quote returned by a deployment of HIP-1\n\nstartPx: the initial price of the range\n\nnOrders: the number of orders in the range\n\norderSz: the size of a full order in the range\n\nnSeededLevels: the number of levels that begin as bids instead of asks. Note that for each additional bid level added by incrementing nSeededLevels the deployer needs to fund Hyperliquidity with px * sz worth of USDC. For fixed nOrders, increasing seeded levels decreases the total supply because it reduces the genesis supply of Hyperliquidity.\n\nEach Hyperliquidity strategy has a price range defined recursively px_0 = startPx, px_i = round(px_{i-1} * 1.003). The strategy updates on every block where the block time is at least 3 seconds since the previous update block. After each update:\n\nStrategy targets nFull = floor(balance / orderSz) full ask orders and a balance % orderSz partial ask order if the partial order is nonzero. To the extent that ALO orders are not rejected, these orders are ensured.\n\nEach fully filled tranche is modified to an order of size orderSz on the side with available balance, with the exception of the single partial order from (1) if it exists.\n\nThe resulting strategy guarantees a 0.3% spread every 3 seconds. Like smart-contract based pools on general-purpose chains, Hyperliquidity requires no maintenance in the form of user transactions. One key improvement is that Hyperliquidity participates in a general-purpose order book. Active liquidity providers can join in liquidity provision alongside Hyperliquidity at any time, allowing markets to adapt to increasing demand for liquidity.\n\nPreviousHIP-1: Native token standard\nNextHIP-3: Builder-deployed perpetuals\n\nLast updated 4 months ago","tokens":694,"crawled_at":1791192507241} {"id":10115,"url":"https://docs.cosmos.network/hub/latest","domain":"docs.cosmos.network","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Introduction - Cosmos Docs","text":"The Cosmos Hub is the first of many interconnected blockchains powered by the interchain stack: CometBFT, CosmosSDK and IBC. The primary token of the Cosmos Hub is the ATOM.\n​\n\nThe ATOM\n\nDo you have ATOM tokens? With ATOM, you have the superpower to contribute to the security and governance of the Cosmos Hub. Delegate your ATOM to one or more of the validators on the Cosmos Hub blockchain to earn more ATOM through Proof-of-Stake. You can also vote with your ATOM to influence the future of the Cosmos Hub through on-chain governance proposals.\nLearn more about being a delegator, learn about the security risks, and start participating with one of the following wallets.\n​\n\nCosmos Hub Wallets\n\nDo your own research and take precautions in regards to wallet security. Maintaining proper security practices is solely your responsibility when using third party wallets.\n\nThese community-maintained web and mobile wallets allow you to store & transfer ATOM, delegate ATOM to validators, and vote on on-chain governance proposals. Note that we do not endorse any of the wallets, they are listed for your convenience.\n\nKeplr - Web\n\nLedger - Hardware\n\nCosmostation - Android, iOS\n\nLeap Wallet - Android, iOS, Web\n\nAtomic Wallet - Android, Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nCitadel.One - Android, iOS\n\nCobo - Android, iOS\n\nCrypto.com - Android, iOS\n\nShapeShift - Android, iOS, Web\n\nimToken - Android, iOS\n\nMath Wallet - Android, iOS, Web\n\nTrust Wallet - Android, iOS\n\nKomodo Wallet\n\n​\n\nMetamask Snaps\n\nLeap Wallet\n\n​\n\nCosmos Hub Explorers\n\nThese block explorers allow you to search, view and analyze Cosmos Hub data—like blocks, transactions, validators, etc.\n\nMintscan\n\nNumia\n\nATOMScan\n\nPing.Pub\n\nBronBro\n\n​\n\nCosmos Hub CLI\n\ngaiad is a command-line interface that lets you interact with the Cosmos Hub. gaiad is the only tool that supports 100% of the Cosmos Hub features, including accounts, transfers, delegation, and governance. Learn more about gaiad with the delegator’s CLI guide.\n​\n\nRunning a full-node on the Cosmos Hub Mainnet\n\nIn order to run a full-node for the Cosmos Hub mainnet, you must first install gaiad. Then, follow the guide.\nIf you are looking to run a validator node, follow the validator setup guide.\n​\n\nJoin the Community\n\nHave questions, comments, or new ideas? Participate in the Cosmos community through one of the following channels.\n\nDiscord\n\nCosmos Forum\n\nCosmos on Reddit\n\nTo learn more about the Cosmos Hub and how it fits within the Cosmos Network, visit cosmos.network.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":629,"crawled_at":1791192513311} @@ -131,3 +131,478 @@ {"id":10131,"url":"https://docs.cosmos.network/sdk/latest/modules/genutil/README","domain":"docs.cosmos.network","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"x/genutil - Cosmos Docs","text":"​\n\nConcepts\n\nThe genutil package contains a variety of genesis utility functionalities for usage within a blockchain application. Namely:\n\nGenesis transactions related (gentx)\n\nCommands for collection and creation of gentxs\n\nInitChain processing of gentxs\n\nGenesis file creation\n\nGenesis file validation\n\nGenesis file migration\n\nCometBFT related initialization\n\nTranslation of an app genesis to a CometBFT genesis\n\n​\n\nGenesis\n\nGenutil contains the data structure that defines an application genesis.\nAn application genesis consist of a consensus genesis (g.e. CometBFT genesis) and application related genesis data.\n\npackage types\n\nimport (\n\n\"bytes\"\n\"encoding/json\"\n\"errors\"\n\"fmt\"\n\"os\"\n\"time\"\n\ncmtjson \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/libs/json\"\ncmtproto \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/proto/tendermint/types\"\ncmttypes \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/types\"\ncmttime \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/types/time\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/version\"\n)\n\nconst (\n// MaxChainIDLen is the maximum length of a chain ID.\nMaxChainIDLen = cmttypes.MaxChainIDLen\n)\n\n// AppGenesis defines the app's genesis.\ntype AppGenesis struct {\nAppName string `json:\"app_name\"`\nAppVersion string `json:\"app_version\"`\nGenesisTime time.Time `json:\"genesis_time\"`\nChainID string `json:\"chain_id\"`\nInitialHeight int64 `json:\"initial_height\"`\nAppHash []byte `json:\"app_hash\"`\nAppState json.RawMessage `json:\"app_state,omitempty\"`\nConsensus *ConsensusGenesis `json:\"consensus,omitempty\"`\n}\n\n// NewAppGenesisWithVersion returns a new AppGenesis with the app name and app version already.\nfunc NewAppGenesisWithVersion(chainID string, appState json.RawMessage) *AppGenesis {\nreturn &AppGenesis{\nAppName: version.AppName,\nAppVersion: version.Version,\nChainID: chainID,\nAppState: appState,\nConsensus: &ConsensusGenesis{\nValidators: nil,\n},\n}\n}\n\n// ValidateAndComplete performs validation and completes the AppGenesis.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nValidateAndComplete()\n\nerror {\nif ag.ChainID == \"\" {\nreturn errors.New(\"genesis doc must include non-empty chain_id\")\n}\nif len(ag.ChainID) > MaxChainIDLen {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"chain_id in genesis doc is too long (max: %d)\", MaxChainIDLen)\n}\nif ag.InitialHeight < 0 {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"initial_height cannot be negative (got %v)\", ag.InitialHeight)\n}\nif ag.InitialHeight == 0 {\nag.InitialHeight = 1\n}\nif ag.GenesisTime.IsZero() {\nag.GenesisTime = cmttime.Now()\n}\nif err := ag.Consensus.ValidateAndComplete(); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\n// SaveAs is a utility method for saving AppGenesis as a JSON file.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nSaveAs(file string)\n\nerror {\nappGenesisBytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(ag, \"\", \"\n\")\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nreturn os.WriteFile(file, appGenesisBytes, 0o600)\n}\n\n// AppGenesisFromFile reads the AppGenesis from the provided file.\nfunc AppGenesisFromFile(genFile string) (*AppGenesis, error) {\njsonBlob, err := os.ReadFile(genFile)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"couldn't read AppGenesis file (%s): %w\", genFile, err)\n}\n\nvar appGenesis AppGenesis\nif err := json.Unmarshal(jsonBlob, &appGenesis); err != nil {\n// fallback to CometBFT genesis\nvar ctmGenesis cmttypes.GenesisDoc\nif err2 := cmtjson.Unmarshal(jsonBlob, &ctmGenesis); err2 != nil {\nreturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshalling AppGenesis at %s: %w\\n failed fallback to CometBFT GenDoc: %w\", genFile, err, err2)\n}\n\nappGenesis = AppGenesis{\nAppName: version.AppName,\n// AppVersion is not filled as we do not know it from a CometBFT genesis\nGenesisTime: ctmGenesis.GenesisTime,\nChainID: ctmGenesis.ChainID,\nInitialHeight: ctmGenesis.InitialHeight,\nAppHash: ctmGenesis.AppHash,\nAppState: ctmGenesis.AppState,\nConsensus: &ConsensusGenesis{\nValidators: ctmGenesis.Validators,\nParams: ctmGenesis.ConsensusParams,\n},\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn &appGenesis, nil\n}\n\n// --------------------------\n// CometBFT Genesis Handling\n// --------------------------\n\n// ToGenesisDoc converts the AppGenesis to a CometBFT GenesisDoc.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nToGenesisDoc() (*cmttypes.GenesisDoc, error) {\nreturn &cmttypes.GenesisDoc{\nGenesisTime: ag.GenesisTime,\nChainID: ag.ChainID,\nInitialHeight: ag.InitialHeight,\nAppHash: ag.AppHash,\nAppState: ag.AppState,\nValidators: ag.Consensus.Validators,\nConsensusParams: ag.Consensus.Params,\n}, nil\n}\n\n// ConsensusGenesis defines the consensus layer's genesis.\n// TODO(@julienrbrt)\n\neventually abstract from CometBFT types\ntype ConsensusGenesis struct {\nValidators []cmttypes.GenesisValidator `json:\"validators,omitempty\"`\nParams *cmttypes.ConsensusParams `json:\"params,omitempty\"`\n}\n\n// NewConsensusGenesis returns a ConsensusGenesis with given values.\n// It takes a proto consensus params so it can called from server export command.\nfunc NewConsensusGenesis(params cmtproto.ConsensusParams, validators []cmttypes.GenesisValidator) *ConsensusGenesis {\nreturn &ConsensusGenesis{\nParams: &cmttypes.ConsensusParams{\nBlock: cmttypes.BlockParams{\nMaxBytes: params.Block.MaxBytes,\nMaxGas: params.Block.MaxGas,\n},\nEvidence: cmttypes.EvidenceParams{\nMaxAgeNumBlocks: params.Evidence.MaxAgeNumBlocks,\nMaxAgeDuration: params.Evidence.MaxAgeDuration,\nMaxBytes: params.Evidence.MaxBytes,\n},\nValidator: cmttypes.ValidatorParams{\nPubKeyTypes: params.Validator.PubKeyTypes,\n},\n},\nValidators: validators,\n}\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nMarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {\ntype Alias ConsensusGenesis\nreturn cmtjson.Marshal(&Alias{\nValidators: cs.Validators,\nParams: cs.Params,\n})\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nUnmarshalJSON(b []byte)\n\nerror {\ntype Alias ConsensusGenesis\nresult := Alias{\n}\nif err := cmtjson.Unmarshal(b, &result); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\ncs.Params = result.Params\ncs.Validators = result.Validators\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nValidateAndComplete()\n\nerror {\nif cs == nil {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"consensus genesis cannot be nil\")\n}\nif cs.Params == nil {\ncs.Params = cmttypes.DefaultConsensusParams()\n}\n\nelse if err := cs.Params.ValidateBasic(); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\nfor i, v := range cs.Validators {\nif v.Power == 0 {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"the genesis file cannot contain validators with no voting power: %v\", v)\n}\nif len(v.Address) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(v.PubKey.Address(), v.Address) {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"incorrect address for validator %v in the genesis file, should be %v\", v, v.PubKey.Address())\n}\nif len(v.Address) == 0 {\ncs.Validators[i].Address = v.PubKey.Address()\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\nThe application genesis can then be translated to the consensus engine to the right format:\n\npackage types\n\nimport (\n\n\"bytes\"\n\"encoding/json\"\n\"errors\"\n\"fmt\"\n\"os\"\n\"time\"\n\ncmtjson \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/libs/json\"\ncmtproto \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/proto/tendermint/types\"\ncmttypes \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/types\"\ncmttime \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/types/time\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/version\"\n)\n\nconst (\n// MaxChainIDLen is the maximum length of a chain ID.\nMaxChainIDLen = cmttypes.MaxChainIDLen\n)\n\n// AppGenesis defines the app's genesis.\ntype AppGenesis struct {\nAppName string `json:\"app_name\"`\nAppVersion string `json:\"app_version\"`\nGenesisTime time.Time `json:\"genesis_time\"`\nChainID string `json:\"chain_id\"`\nInitialHeight int64 `json:\"initial_height\"`\nAppHash []byte `json:\"app_hash\"`\nAppState json.RawMessage `json:\"app_state,omitempty\"`\nConsensus *ConsensusGenesis `json:\"consensus,omitempty\"`\n}\n\n// NewAppGenesisWithVersion returns a new AppGenesis with the app name and app version already.\nfunc NewAppGenesisWithVersion(chainID string, appState json.RawMessage) *AppGenesis {\nreturn &AppGenesis{\nAppName: version.AppName,\nAppVersion: version.Version,\nChainID: chainID,\nAppState: appState,\nConsensus: &ConsensusGenesis{\nValidators: nil,\n},\n}\n}\n\n// ValidateAndComplete performs validation and completes the AppGenesis.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nValidateAndComplete()\n\nerror {\nif ag.ChainID == \"\" {\nreturn errors.New(\"genesis doc must include non-empty chain_id\")\n}\nif len(ag.ChainID) > MaxChainIDLen {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"chain_id in genesis doc is too long (max: %d)\", MaxChainIDLen)\n}\nif ag.InitialHeight < 0 {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"initial_height cannot be negative (got %v)\", ag.InitialHeight)\n}\nif ag.InitialHeight == 0 {\nag.InitialHeight = 1\n}\nif ag.GenesisTime.IsZero() {\nag.GenesisTime = cmttime.Now()\n}\nif err := ag.Consensus.ValidateAndComplete(); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\n// SaveAs is a utility method for saving AppGenesis as a JSON file.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nSaveAs(file string)\n\nerror {\nappGenesisBytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(ag, \"\", \"\n\")\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nreturn os.WriteFile(file, appGenesisBytes, 0o600)\n}\n\n// AppGenesisFromFile reads the AppGenesis from the provided file.\nfunc AppGenesisFromFile(genFile string) (*AppGenesis, error) {\njsonBlob, err := os.ReadFile(genFile)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"couldn't read AppGenesis file (%s): %w\", genFile, err)\n}\n\nvar appGenesis AppGenesis\nif err := json.Unmarshal(jsonBlob, &appGenesis); err != nil {\n// fallback to CometBFT genesis\nvar ctmGenesis cmttypes.GenesisDoc\nif err2 := cmtjson.Unmarshal(jsonBlob, &ctmGenesis); err2 != nil {\nreturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error unmarshalling AppGenesis at %s: %w\\n failed fallback to CometBFT GenDoc: %w\", genFile, err, err2)\n}\n\nappGenesis = AppGenesis{\nAppName: version.AppName,\n// AppVersion is not filled as we do not know it from a CometBFT genesis\nGenesisTime: ctmGenesis.GenesisTime,\nChainID: ctmGenesis.ChainID,\nInitialHeight: ctmGenesis.InitialHeight,\nAppHash: ctmGenesis.AppHash,\nAppState: ctmGenesis.AppState,\nConsensus: &ConsensusGenesis{\nValidators: ctmGenesis.Validators,\nParams: ctmGenesis.ConsensusParams,\n},\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn &appGenesis, nil\n}\n\n// --------------------------\n// CometBFT Genesis Handling\n// --------------------------\n\n// ToGenesisDoc converts the AppGenesis to a CometBFT GenesisDoc.\nfunc (ag *AppGenesis)\n\nToGenesisDoc() (*cmttypes.GenesisDoc, error) {\nreturn &cmttypes.GenesisDoc{\nGenesisTime: ag.GenesisTime,\nChainID: ag.ChainID,\nInitialHeight: ag.InitialHeight,\nAppHash: ag.AppHash,\nAppState: ag.AppState,\nValidators: ag.Consensus.Validators,\nConsensusParams: ag.Consensus.Params,\n}, nil\n}\n\n// ConsensusGenesis defines the consensus layer's genesis.\n// TODO(@julienrbrt)\n\neventually abstract from CometBFT types\ntype ConsensusGenesis struct {\nValidators []cmttypes.GenesisValidator `json:\"validators,omitempty\"`\nParams *cmttypes.ConsensusParams `json:\"params,omitempty\"`\n}\n\n// NewConsensusGenesis returns a ConsensusGenesis with given values.\n// It takes a proto consensus params so it can called from server export command.\nfunc NewConsensusGenesis(params cmtproto.ConsensusParams, validators []cmttypes.GenesisValidator) *ConsensusGenesis {\nreturn &ConsensusGenesis{\nParams: &cmttypes.ConsensusParams{\nBlock: cmttypes.BlockParams{\nMaxBytes: params.Block.MaxBytes,\nMaxGas: params.Block.MaxGas,\n},\nEvidence: cmttypes.EvidenceParams{\nMaxAgeNumBlocks: params.Evidence.MaxAgeNumBlocks,\nMaxAgeDuration: params.Evidence.MaxAgeDuration,\nMaxBytes: params.Evidence.MaxBytes,\n},\nValidator: cmttypes.ValidatorParams{\nPubKeyTypes: params.Validator.PubKeyTypes,\n},\n},\nValidators: validators,\n}\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nMarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {\ntype Alias ConsensusGenesis\nreturn cmtjson.Marshal(&Alias{\nValidators: cs.Validators,\nParams: cs.Params,\n})\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nUnmarshalJSON(b []byte)\n\nerror {\ntype Alias ConsensusGenesis\nresult := Alias{\n}\nif err := cmtjson.Unmarshal(b, &result); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\ncs.Params = result.Params\ncs.Validators = result.Validators\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\nfunc (cs *ConsensusGenesis)\n\nValidateAndComplete()\n\nerror {\nif cs == nil {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"consensus genesis cannot be nil\")\n}\nif cs.Params == nil {\ncs.Params = cmttypes.DefaultConsensusParams()\n}\n\nelse if err := cs.Params.ValidateBasic(); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\nfor i, v := range cs.Validators {\nif v.Power == 0 {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"the genesis file cannot contain validators with no voting power: %v\", v)\n}\nif len(v.Address) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(v.PubKey.Address(), v.Address) {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"incorrect address for validator %v in the genesis file, should be %v\", v, v.PubKey.Address())\n}\nif len(v.Address) == 0 {\ncs.Validators[i].Address = v.PubKey.Address()\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\npackage server\n\nimport (\n\n\"context\"\n\"errors\"\n\"fmt\"\n\"io\"\n\"net\"\n\"os\"\n\"runtime/pprof\"\n\"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/abci/server\"\ncmtcmd \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/cmd/cometbft/commands\"\ncmtcfg \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/config\"\n\"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/node\"\n\"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/p2p\"\npvm \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/privval\"\n\"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/proxy\"\n\"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/rpc/client/local\"\ncmttypes \"github.com/cometbft/cometbft/types\"\ndbm \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-db\"\n\"github.com/hashicorp/go-metrics\"\n\"github.com/spf13/cobra\"\n\"github.com/spf13/pflag\"\n\"golang.org/x/sync/errgroup\"\n\"google.golang.org/grpc\"\n\"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure\"\n\npruningtypes \"cosmossdk.io/store/pruning/types\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/client\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/client/flags\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/codec\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/server/api\"\nserverconfig \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/server/config\"\nservergrpc \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/server/grpc\"\nservercmtlog \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/server/log\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/server/types\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/telemetry\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/mempool\"\n\"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/version\"\ngenutiltypes \"github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/x/genutil/types\"\n)\n\nconst (\n// CometBFT full-node start flags\nflagWithComet = \"with-comet\"\nflagAddress = \"address\"\nflagTransport = \"transport\"\nflagTraceStore = \"trace-store\"\nflagCPUProfile = \"cpu-profile\"\nFlagMinGasPrices = \"minimum-gas-prices\"\nFlagQueryGasLimit = \"query-gas-limit\"\nFlagHaltHeight = \"halt-height\"\nFlagHaltTime = \"halt-time\"\nFlagInterBlockCache = \"inter-block-cache\"\nFlagUnsafeSkipUpgrades = \"unsafe-skip-upgrades\"\nFlagTrace = \"trace\"\nFlagInvCheckPeriod = \"inv-check-period\"\n\nFlagPruning = \"pruning\"\nFlagPruningKeepRecent = \"pruning-keep-recent\"\nFlagPruningInterval = \"pruning-interval\"\nFlagIndexEvents = \"index-events\"\nFlagMinRetainBlocks = \"min-retain-blocks\"\nFlagIAVLCacheSize = \"iavl-cache-size\"\nFlagDisableIAVLFastNode = \"iavl-disable-fastnode\"\n\n// state sync-related flags\nFlagStateSyncSnapshotInterval = \"state-sync.snapshot-interval\"\nFlagStateSyncSnapshotKeepRecent = \"state-sync.snapshot-keep-recent\"\n\n// api-related flags\nFlagAPIEnable = \"api.enable\"\nFlagAPISwagger = \"api.swagger\"\nFlagAPIAddress = \"api.address\"\nFlagAPIMaxOpenConnections = \"api.max-open-connections\"\nFlagRPCReadTimeout = \"api.rpc-read-timeout\"\nFlagRPCWriteTimeout = \"api.rpc-write-timeout\"\nFlagRPCMaxBodyBytes = \"api.rpc-max-body-bytes\"\nFlagAPIEnableUnsafeCORS = \"api.enabled-unsafe-cors\"\n\n// gRPC-related flags\nflagGRPCOnly = \"grpc-only\"\nflagGRPCEnable = \"grpc.enable\"\nflagGRPCAddress = \"grpc.address\"\nflagGRPCWebEnable = \"grpc-web.enable\"\n\n// mempool flags\nFlagMempoolMaxTxs = \"mempool.max-txs\"\n)\n\n// StartCmdOptions defines options that can be customized in `StartCmdWithOptions`,\ntype StartCmdOptions struct {\n// DBOpener can be used to customize db opening, for example customize db options or support different db backends,\n// default to the builtin db opener.\nDBOpener func(rootDir string, backendType dbm.BackendType) (dbm.DB, error)\n// PostSetup can be used to setup extra services under the same cancellable context,\n// it's not called in stand-alone mode, only for in-process mode.\nPostSetup func(svrCtx *Context, clientCtx client.Context, ctx context.Context, g *errgroup.Group)\n\nerror\n// AddFlags add custom flags to start cmd\nAddFlags func(cmd *cobra.Command)\n}\n\n// StartCmd runs the service passed in, either stand-alone or in-process with\n// CometBFT.\nfunc StartCmd(appCreator types.AppCreator, defaultNodeHome string) *cobra.Command {\nreturn StartCmdWithOptions(appCreator, defaultNodeHome, StartCmdOptions{\n})\n}\n\n// StartCmdWithOptions runs the service passed in, either stand-alone or in-process with\n// CometBFT.\nfunc StartCmdWithOptions(appCreator types.AppCreator, defaultNodeHome string, opts StartCmdOptions) *cobra.Command {\nif opts.DBOpener == nil {\nopts.DBOpener = openDB\n}\ncmd := &cobra.Command{\nUse: \"start\",\nShort: \"Run the full node\",\nLong: `Run the full node application with CometBFT in or out of process. By\ndefault, the application will run with CometBFT in process.\n\nPruning options can be provided via the '--pruning' flag or alternatively with '--pruning-keep-recent', and\n'pruning-interval' together.\n\nFor '--pruning' the options are as follows:\n\ndefault: the last 362880 states are kept, pruning at 10 block intervals\nnothing: all historic states will be saved, nothing will be deleted (i.e. archiving node)\n\neverything: 2 latest states will be kept; pruning at 10 block intervals.\ncustom: allow pruning options to be manually specified through 'pruning-keep-recent', and 'pruning-interval'\n\nNode halting configurations exist in the form of two flags: '--halt-height' and '--halt-time'. During\nthe ABCI Commit phase, the node will check if the current block height is greater than or equal to\nthe halt-height or if the current block time is greater than or equal to the halt-time. If so, the\nnode will attempt to gracefully shutdown and the block will not be committed. In addition, the node\nwill not be able to commit subsequent blocks.\n\nFor profiling and benchmarking purposes, CPU profiling can be enabled via the '--cpu-profile' flag\nwhich accepts a path for the resulting pprof file.\n\nThe node may be started in a 'query only' mode where only the gRPC and JSON HTTP\nAPI services are enabled via the 'grpc-only' flag. In this mode, CometBFT is\nbypassed and can be used when legacy queries are needed after an on-chain upgrade\nis performed. Note, when enabled, gRPC will also be automatically enabled.\n`,\nPreRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string)\n\nerror {\nserverCtx := GetServerContextFromCmd(cmd)\n\n// Bind flags to the Context's Viper so the app construction can set\n// options accordingly.\nif err := serverCtx.Viper.BindPFlags(cmd.Flags()); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\n_, err := GetPruningOptionsFromFlags(serverCtx.Viper)\n\nreturn err\n},\nRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string)\n\nerror {\nserverCtx := GetServerContextFromCmd(cmd)\n\nclientCtx, err := client.GetClientQueryContext(cmd)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nwithCMT, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool(flagWithComet)\nif !withCMT {\nserverCtx.Logger.Info(\"starting ABCI without CometBFT\")\n}\n\nreturn wrapCPUProfile(serverCtx, func()\n\nerror {\nreturn start(serverCtx, clientCtx, appCreator, withCMT, opts)\n})\n},\n}\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flags.FlagHome, defaultNodeHome, \"The application home directory\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(flagWithComet, true, \"Run abci app embedded in-process with CometBFT\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flagAddress, \"tcp://0.0.0.0:26658\", \"Listen address\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flagTransport, \"socket\", \"Transport protocol: socket, grpc\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flagTraceStore, \"\", \"Enable KVStore tracing to an output file\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(FlagMinGasPrices, \"\", \"Minimum gas prices to accept for transactions; Any fee in a tx must meet this minimum (e.g. 0.01photino;0.0001stake)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagQueryGasLimit, 0, \"Maximum gas a Rest/Grpc query can consume. Blank and 0 imply unbounded.\")\n\ncmd.Flags().IntSlice(FlagUnsafeSkipUpgrades, []int{\n}, \"Skip a set of upgrade heights to continue the old binary\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagHaltHeight, 0, \"Block height at which to gracefully halt the chain and shutdown the node\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagHaltTime, 0, \"Minimum block time (in Unix seconds)\n\nat which to gracefully halt the chain and shutdown the node\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagInterBlockCache, true, \"Enable inter-block caching\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flagCPUProfile, \"\", \"Enable CPU profiling and write to the provided file\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagTrace, false, \"Provide full stack traces for errors in ABCI Log\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(FlagPruning, pruningtypes.PruningOptionDefault, \"Pruning strategy (default|nothing|everything|custom)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagPruningKeepRecent, 0, \"Number of recent heights to keep on disk (ignored if pruning is not 'custom')\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagPruningInterval, 0, \"Height interval at which pruned heights are removed from disk (ignored if pruning is not 'custom')\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint(FlagInvCheckPeriod, 0, \"Assert registered invariants every N blocks\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagMinRetainBlocks, 0, \"Minimum block height offset during ABCI commit to prune CometBFT blocks\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagAPIEnable, false, \"Define if the API server should be enabled\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagAPISwagger, false, \"Define if swagger documentation should automatically be registered (Note: the API must also be enabled)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(FlagAPIAddress, serverconfig.DefaultAPIAddress, \"the API server address to listen on\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint(FlagAPIMaxOpenConnections, 1000, \"Define the number of maximum open connections\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint(FlagRPCReadTimeout, 10, \"Define the CometBFT RPC read timeout (in seconds)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint(FlagRPCWriteTimeout, 0, \"Define the CometBFT RPC write timeout (in seconds)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint(FlagRPCMaxBodyBytes, 1000000, \"Define the CometBFT maximum request body (in bytes)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagAPIEnableUnsafeCORS, false, \"Define if CORS should be enabled (unsafe - use it at your own risk)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(flagGRPCOnly, false, \"Start the node in gRPC query only mode (no CometBFT process is started)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(flagGRPCEnable, true, \"Define if the gRPC server should be enabled\")\n\ncmd.Flags().String(flagGRPCAddress, serverconfig.DefaultGRPCAddress, \"the gRPC server address to listen on\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(flagGRPCWebEnable, true, \"Define if the gRPC-Web server should be enabled. (Note: gRPC must also be enabled)\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint64(FlagStateSyncSnapshotInterval, 0, \"State sync snapshot interval\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Uint32(FlagStateSyncSnapshotKeepRecent, 2, \"State sync snapshot to keep\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Bool(FlagDisableIAVLFastNode, false, \"Disable fast node for IAVL tree\")\n\ncmd.Flags().Int(FlagMempoolMaxTxs, mempool.DefaultMaxTx, \"Sets MaxTx value for the app-side mempool\")\n\n// support old flags name for backwards compatibility\ncmd.Flags().SetNormalizeFunc(func(f *pflag.FlagSet, name string)\n\npflag.NormalizedName {\nif name == \"with-tendermint\" {\nname = flagWithComet\n}\n\nreturn pflag.NormalizedName(name)\n})\n\n// add support for all CometBFT-specific command line options\ncmtcmd.AddNodeFlags(cmd)\nif opts.AddFlags != nil {\nopts.AddFlags(cmd)\n}\n\nreturn cmd\n}\n\nfunc start(svrCtx *Context, clientCtx client.Context, appCreator types.AppCreator, withCmt bool, opts StartCmdOptions)\n\nerror {\nsvrCfg, err := getAndValidateConfig(svrCtx)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\napp, appCleanupFn, err := startApp(svrCtx, appCreator, opts)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\ndefer appCleanupFn()\n\nmetrics, err := startTelemetry(svrCfg)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nemitServerInfoMetrics()\nif !withCmt {\nreturn startStandAlone(svrCtx, app, opts)\n}\n\nreturn startInProcess(svrCtx, svrCfg, clientCtx, app, metrics, opts)\n}\n\nfunc startStandAlone(svrCtx *Context, app types.Application, opts StartCmdOptions)\n\nerror {\naddr := svrCtx.Viper.GetString(flagAddress)\ntransport := svrCtx.Viper.GetString(flagTransport)\ncmtApp := NewCometABCIWrapper(app)\n\nsvr, err := server.NewServer(addr, transport, cmtApp)\nif err != nil {\nreturn fmt.Errorf(\"error creating listener: %v\", err)\n}\n\nsvr.SetLogger(servercmtlog.CometLoggerWrapper{\nLogger: svrCtx.Logger.With(\"module\", \"abci-server\")\n})\n\ng, ctx := getCtx(svrCtx, false)\n\ng.Go(func()\n\nerror {\nif err := svr.Start(); err != nil {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Error(\"failed to start out-of-process ABCI server\", \"err\", err)\n\nreturn err\n}\n\n// Wait for the calling process to be canceled or close the provided context,\n// so we can gracefully stop the ABCI server.\n<-ctx.Done()\n\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"stopping the ABCI server...\")\n\nreturn errors.Join(svr.Stop(), app.Close())\n})\n\nreturn g.Wait()\n}\n\nfunc startInProcess(svrCtx *Context, svrCfg serverconfig.Config, clientCtx client.Context, app types.Application,\nmetrics *telemetry.Metrics, opts StartCmdOptions,\n)\n\nerror {\ncmtCfg := svrCtx.Config\nhome := cmtCfg.RootDir\ngRPCOnly := svrCtx.Viper.GetBool(flagGRPCOnly)\n\ng, ctx := getCtx(svrCtx, true)\nif gRPCOnly {\n// TODO: Generalize logic so that gRPC only is really in startStandAlone\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"starting node in gRPC only mode; CometBFT is disabled\")\n\nsvrCfg.GRPC.Enable = true\n}\n\nelse {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"starting node with ABCI CometBFT in-process\")\n\ntmNode, cleanupFn, err := startCmtNode(ctx, cmtCfg, app, svrCtx)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\ndefer cleanupFn()\n\n// Add the tx service to the gRPC router. We only need to register this\n// service if API or gRPC is enabled, and avoid doing so in the general\n// case, because it spawns a new local CometBFT RPC client.\nif svrCfg.API.Enable || svrCfg.GRPC.Enable {\n// Re-assign for making the client available below do not use := to avoid\n// shadowing the clientCtx variable.\nclientCtx = clientCtx.WithClient(local.New(tmNode))\n\napp.RegisterTxService(clientCtx)\n\napp.RegisterTendermintService(clientCtx)\n\napp.RegisterNodeService(clientCtx, svrCfg)\n}\n\n}\n\ngrpcSrv, clientCtx, err := startGrpcServer(ctx, g, svrCfg.GRPC, clientCtx, svrCtx, app)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nerr = startAPIServer(ctx, g, cmtCfg, svrCfg, clientCtx, svrCtx, app, home, grpcSrv, metrics)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\nif opts.PostSetup != nil {\nif err := opts.PostSetup(svrCtx, clientCtx, ctx, g); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\n}\n\n// wait for signal capture and gracefully return\n// we are guaranteed to be waiting for the \"ListenForQuitSignals\" goroutine.\nreturn g.Wait()\n}\n\n// TODO: Move nodeKey into being created within the function.\nfunc startCmtNode(\nctx context.Context,\ncfg *cmtcfg.Config,\napp types.Application,\nsvrCtx *Context,\n) (tmNode *node.Node, cleanupFn func(), err error) {\nnodeKey, err := p2p.LoadOrGenNodeKey(cfg.NodeKeyFile())\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, cleanupFn, err\n}\ncmtApp := NewCometABCIWrapper(app)\n\ntmNode, err = node.NewNodeWithContext(\nctx,\ncfg,\npvm.LoadOrGenFilePV(cfg.PrivValidatorKeyFile(), cfg.PrivValidatorStateFile()),\nnodeKey,\nproxy.NewLocalClientCreator(cmtApp),\ngetGenDocProvider(cfg),\ncmtcfg.DefaultDBProvider,\nnode.DefaultMetricsProvider(cfg.Instrumentation),\nservercmtlog.CometLoggerWrapper{\nLogger: svrCtx.Logger\n},\n)\nif err != nil {\nreturn tmNode, cleanupFn, err\n}\nif err := tmNode.Start(); err != nil {\nreturn tmNode, cleanupFn, err\n}\n\ncleanupFn = func() {\nif tmNode != nil && tmNode.IsRunning() {\n_ = tmNode.Stop()\n_ = app.Close()\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn tmNode, cleanupFn, nil\n}\n\nfunc getAndValidateConfig(svrCtx *Context) (serverconfig.Config, error) {\nconfig, err := serverconfig.GetConfig(svrCtx.Viper)\nif err != nil {\nreturn config, err\n}\nif err := config.ValidateBasic(); err != nil {\nreturn config, err\n}\n\nreturn config, nil\n}\n\n// returns a function which returns the genesis doc from the genesis file.\nfunc getGenDocProvider(cfg *cmtcfg.Config)\n\nfunc() (*cmttypes.GenesisDoc, error) {\nreturn func() (*cmttypes.GenesisDoc, error) {\nappGenesis, err := genutiltypes.AppGenesisFromFile(cfg.GenesisFile())\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, err\n}\n\nreturn appGenesis.ToGenesisDoc()\n}\n}\n\nfunc setupTraceWriter(svrCtx *Context) (traceWriter io.WriteCloser, cleanup func(), err error) {\n// clean up the traceWriter when the server is shutting down\ncleanup = func() {\n}\ntraceWriterFile := svrCtx.Viper.GetString(flagTraceStore)\n\ntraceWriter, err = openTraceWriter(traceWriterFile)\nif err != nil {\nreturn traceWriter, cleanup, err\n}\n\n// if flagTraceStore is not used then traceWriter is nil\nif traceWriter != nil {\ncleanup = func() {\nif err = traceWriter.Close(); err != nil {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Error(\"failed to close trace writer\", \"err\", err)\n}\n\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn traceWriter, cleanup, nil\n}\n\nfunc startGrpcServer(\nctx context.Context,\ng *errgroup.Group,\nconfig serverconfig.GRPCConfig,\nclientCtx client.Context,\nsvrCtx *Context,\napp types.Application,\n) (*grpc.Server, client.Context, error) {\nif !config.Enable {\n// return grpcServer as nil if gRPC is disabled\nreturn nil, clientCtx, nil\n}\n_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(config.Address)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, clientCtx, err\n}\nmaxSendMsgSize := config.MaxSendMsgSize\nif maxSendMsgSize == 0 {\nmaxSendMsgSize = serverconfig.DefaultGRPCMaxSendMsgSize\n}\nmaxRecvMsgSize := config.MaxRecvMsgSize\nif maxRecvMsgSize == 0 {\nmaxRecvMsgSize = serverconfig.DefaultGRPCMaxRecvMsgSize\n}\ngrpcAddress := fmt.Sprintf(\"127.0.0.1:%s\", port)\n\n// if gRPC is enabled, configure gRPC client for gRPC gateway\ngrpcClient, err := grpc.Dial(\ngrpcAddress,\ngrpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),\ngrpc.WithDefaultCallOptions(\ngrpc.ForceCodec(codec.NewProtoCodec(clientCtx.InterfaceRegistry).GRPCCodec()),\ngrpc.MaxCallRecvMsgSize(maxRecvMsgSize),\ngrpc.MaxCallSendMsgSize(maxSendMsgSize),\n),\n)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, clientCtx, err\n}\n\nclientCtx = clientCtx.WithGRPCClient(grpcClient)\n\nsvrCtx.Logger.Debug(\"gRPC client assigned to client context\", \"target\", grpcAddress)\n\ngrpcSrv, err := servergrpc.NewGRPCServer(clientCtx, app, config)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, clientCtx, err\n}\n\n// Start the gRPC server in a goroutine. Note, the provided ctx will ensure\n// that the server is gracefully shut down.\ng.Go(func()\n\nerror {\nreturn servergrpc.StartGRPCServer(ctx, svrCtx.Logger.With(\"module\", \"grpc-server\"), config, grpcSrv)\n})\n\nreturn grpcSrv, clientCtx, nil\n}\n\nfunc startAPIServer(\nctx context.Context,\ng *errgroup.Group,\ncmtCfg *cmtcfg.Config,\nsvrCfg serverconfig.Config,\nclientCtx client.Context,\nsvrCtx *Context,\napp types.Application,\nhome string,\ngrpcSrv *grpc.Server,\nmetrics *telemetry.Metrics,\n)\n\nerror {\nif !svrCfg.API.Enable {\nreturn nil\n}\n\nclientCtx = clientCtx.WithHomeDir(home)\napiSrv := api.New(clientCtx, svrCtx.Logger.With(\"module\", \"api-server\"), grpcSrv)\n\napp.RegisterAPIRoutes(apiSrv, svrCfg.API)\nif svrCfg.Telemetry.Enabled {\napiSrv.SetTelemetry(metrics)\n}\n\ng.Go(func()\n\nerror {\nreturn apiSrv.Start(ctx, svrCfg)\n})\n\nreturn nil\n}\n\nfunc startTelemetry(cfg serverconfig.Config) (*telemetry.Metrics, error) {\nif !cfg.Telemetry.Enabled {\nreturn nil, nil\n}\n\nreturn telemetry.New(cfg.Telemetry)\n}\n\n// wrapCPUProfile starts CPU profiling, if enabled, and executes the provided\n// callbackFn in a separate goroutine, then will wait for that callback to\n// return.\n//\n// NOTE: We expect the caller to handle graceful shutdown and signal handling.\nfunc wrapCPUProfile(svrCtx *Context, callbackFn func()\n\nerror)\n\nerror {\nif cpuProfile := svrCtx.Viper.GetString(flagCPUProfile); cpuProfile != \"\" {\nf, err := os.Create(cpuProfile)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"starting CPU profiler\", \"profile\", cpuProfile)\nif err := pprof.StartCPUProfile(f); err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\ndefer func() {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"stopping CPU profiler\", \"profile\", cpuProfile)\n\npprof.StopCPUProfile()\nif err := f.Close(); err != nil {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Info(\"failed to close cpu-profile file\", \"profile\", cpuProfile, \"err\", err.Error())\n}\n\n}()\n}\n\nreturn callbackFn()\n}\n\n// emitServerInfoMetrics emits server info related metrics using application telemetry.\nfunc emitServerInfoMetrics() {\nvar ls []metrics.Label\nversionInfo := version.NewInfo()\nif len(versionInfo.GoVersion) > 0 {\nls = append(ls, telemetry.NewLabel(\"go\", versionInfo.GoVersion))\n}\nif len(versionInfo.CosmosSdkVersion) > 0 {\nls = append(ls, telemetry.NewLabel(\"version\", versionInfo.CosmosSdkVersion))\n}\nif len(ls) == 0 {\nreturn\n}\n\ntelemetry.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{\"server\", \"info\"\n}, 1, ls)\n}\n\nfunc getCtx(svrCtx *Context, block bool) (*errgroup.Group, context.Context) {\nctx, cancelFn := context.WithCancel(context.Background())\n\ng, ctx := errgroup.WithContext(ctx)\n// listen for quit signals so the calling parent process can gracefully exit\nListenForQuitSignals(g, block, cancelFn, svrCtx.Logger)\n\nreturn g, ctx\n}\n\nfunc startApp(svrCtx *Context, appCreator types.AppCreator, opts StartCmdOptions) (app types.Application, cleanupFn func(), err error) {\ntraceWriter, traceCleanupFn, err := setupTraceWriter(svrCtx)\nif err != nil {\nreturn app, traceCleanupFn, err\n}\nhome := svrCtx.Config.RootDir\ndb, err := opts.DBOpener(home, GetAppDBBackend(svrCtx.Viper))\nif err != nil {\nreturn app, traceCleanupFn, err\n}\n\napp = appCreator(svrCtx.Logger, db, traceWriter, svrCtx.Viper)\n\ncleanupFn = func() {\ntraceCleanupFn()\nif localErr := app.Close(); localErr != nil {\nsvrCtx.Logger.Error(localErr.Error())\n}\n\n}\n\nreturn app, cleanupFn, nil\n}\n\n​\n\nClient\n\n​\n\nCLI\n\nThe genutil commands are available under the genesis subcommand.\n​\n\nadd-genesis-account\n\nAdd a genesis account to genesis.json. Learn more here.\n​\n\ncollect-gentxs\n\nCollect genesis txs and output a genesis.json file.\n\nsimd genesis collect-gentxs\n\nThis will create a new genesis.json file that includes data from all the validators (we sometimes call it the “super genesis file” to distinguish it from single-validator genesis files).\n​\n\ngentx\n\nGenerate a genesis tx carrying a self delegation.\n\nsimd genesis gentx [key_name] [amount] --chain-id [chain-id]\n\nThis will create the genesis transaction for your new chain. Here amount should be at least 1000000000stake.\nIf you provide too much or too little, you will encounter an error when starting a node.\n​\n\nmigrate\n\nMigrate genesis to a specified target (SDK) version.\n\nsimd genesis migrate [target-version]\n\nThe migrate command is extensible and takes a MigrationMap. This map is a mapping of target versions to genesis migrations functions.\nWhen not using the default MigrationMap, it is recommended to still call the default MigrationMap corresponding the SDK version of the chain and prepend/append your own genesis migrations.\n\n​\n\nvalidate-genesis\n\nValidates the genesis file at the default location or at the location passed as an argument.\n\nsimd genesis validate-genesis\n\nValidate genesis only validates if the genesis is valid at the current application binary. For validating a genesis from a previous version of the application, use the migrate command to migrate the genesis to the current version.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":8509,"crawled_at":1791192657070} {"id":10132,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/c/urc/16","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Uniswap Request for Comment (URC) - Uniswap Governance","text":"Uniswap Request for Comment (URC)\n\nURC Discussion\n\nFor [discussion] Proposal Ideas that have not been assigned a number by the URC Editors.\n\nGetting Started with URCs\n\nProcess and templates for participating in the URC lifecycle.\n\nCanonical URCs\n\nAll URCs that have received a number from the URC Editors.\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nAbout the Uniswap Request for Comment (URC) category\n\nUniswap Request for Comment (URC)\n\n0\n\n22\n\nApril 2, 2026\n\nURC-2: Custom Accounting Hook Swap Event\n\nURC Discussion\n\n1\n\n171\n\nAugust 25, 2026\n\nURC-4: Active Liquidity Framework Hook Interface\n\nURC Discussion\n\n2\n\n208\n\nJuly 20, 2026\n\nURC-3: Hook TVL and Effective Liquidity Reporting\n\nURC Discussion\n\n0\n\n134\n\nJune 30, 2026\n\nURC-1: Uniswap Request for Comment Process\n\nURC Discussion\n\n0\n\n88\n\nJune 29, 2026","tokens":198,"crawled_at":1791192665488} {"id":10133,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/building-magi-a-new-rollup-client-for-optimism","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Building Magi: A new rollup client for Optimism - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nBuilding Magi: A new rollup client for Optimism\nNoah Citron\n04.19.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\ncode & engineering\nmulti-client diversity\nopen source\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nDecentralization is crypto’s defining promise: Networks that have no single point of failure are more secure and more resilient than their centralized counterparts. In practice, we often see emerging points of centralization as potentially vulnerable – their failures can compromise an entire network. Ethereum’s switch to Proof of Stake, for example, drew attention to the potential risk of relying on a single client at any layer. And fortunately, the openness of the ecosystem, along with a push for greater client diversity, has resulted in more clients and an increasingly more secure network.\n\nThis effort isn’t limited to Ethereum L1. Just as client diversity is important for Ethereum; it’s critically important for rollups. Multiple independent client implementations can help ensure the safety and liveliness of the network. They’re also a whole lot of fun to work on (thanks to some very detailed specifications).\n\nThat’s why we’re excited to take our very first step into the Optimism Collective by releasing Magi, a blazing fast OP Stack rollup client written in Rust. Magi acts as the consensus client (often called a rollup client in the context of the OP Stack) in the traditional execution/consensus split of Ethereum – it feeds new blocks to the execution client in order to advance the chain. Magi performs the same core functionality as the reference implementation (op-node) and works alongside an execution node (such as op-geth) to sync to any OP Stack chain, including Optimism and Base.\n\nIn this post, we share why we built Magi, and what’s in store for the future. Magi is still in its very early stages, so we welcome your ideas, feedback, and contributions, as we shape it into a production-ready client.\n\nBringing diversity to rollup clients\n\nClient diversity is needed on both the execution and consensus sides, but most of the development has so far been focused on execution clients.\n\nAny existing Ethereum execution client can be compatible with Optimism by implementing a modest set of changes, and several new projects are already adapting these clients to help achieve client diversity. OP Labs modified Geth to build op-geth; and other groups are currently building op-erigon and op-reth.\n\nThis is tougher on the rollup client side, since the rollup client is a brand new piece of software. So far, just one implementation exists: op-node, which is maintained by OP Labs and written in Go. Magi aims to be an independently developed, drop-in replacement for op-node, adding to the rollup’s client diversity. We hope that building out this new, Rust-based client will encourage greater safety and liveliness throughout the OP Stack, and bring more contributors into the ecosystem.\n\nWhat’s next: Welcoming contributors for new features, fixes, and more\n\nMagi is very new, and likely months of development away from being a feasible alternative to op-node. Some of the features and improvements we plan to add in the near future:\n\nTracking the unsafe head (unconfirmed blocks) to lower latency.\n\nNew sync mechanisms to improve initial sync speed.\n\nAlternative data availability layer support.\n\nBetter frameworks for testing Magi, op-node, and any future clients.\n\nThere’s a long way to go, but we’re committed to getting there. We would greatly appreciate contributors, so check out the client or reach out with your ideas, feedback, and code – we’re excited to work together to keep moving Magi and the OP Stack ecosystem forward.\n\nAcknowledgments\n\nNone of this would be possible without the hard work of the OP Labs team: I want to thank Refcell, who’s been contributing to Magi since nearly the beginning, as well as Protolambda, Joshua, and Vex who have provided valuable help in understanding some of the complexities of the Bedrock specification.","tokens":1026,"crawled_at":1791192676059} +{"id":10134,"url":"https://docs.cosmos.network/sdk/latest/guides/reference/bech32","domain":"docs.cosmos.network","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Address Encoding - Cosmos Docs","text":"The Cosmos SDK uses the Bech32 address format for all user-facing addresses. Bech32 encoding provides robust integrity checks through checksums and includes a human-readable prefix (HRP) that provides contextual information about the address type.\n​\n\nAddress Types\n\nThe SDK defines three distinct address types, each with its own Bech32 prefix:\nAddress TypeBech32 PrefixExamplePurpose\nAccount Address\ncosmos\ncosmos1r5v5sr...\nUser accounts, balances, transactions\n\nValidator Operator Address\ncosmosvaloper\ncosmosvaloper1r5v5sr...\nValidator operator identity, staking operations\n\nConsensus Address\ncosmosvalcons\ncosmosvalcons1r5v5sr...\nValidator consensus participation, block signing\n\nEach address type also has a corresponding public key prefix:\n\nAccount public keys: cosmospub\n\nValidator public keys: cosmosvaloperpub\n\nConsensus public keys: cosmosvalconspub\n\n​\n\nSupported Key Schemes\n\nThe Cosmos SDK supports three key schemes. The choice of scheme affects address length and whether it can be used for transactions or consensus:\nAddress length in bytesPublic key length in bytesUsed for transaction authenticationUsed for consensus (CometBFT)\nsecp256k1\n20\n33\nyes\nno\n\nsecp256r1\n32\n33\nyes\nno\n\ntm-ed25519\n— not used —\n32\nno\nyes\n\nsecp256k1 is the default for user accounts. secp256r1 is supported as an alternative and produces longer addresses (32 bytes). tm-ed25519 is used exclusively for validator consensus keys and does not produce a user-facing address.\n​\n\nAddress Derivation\n\nAddresses are derived from public keys through cryptographic hashing. The process differs based on the key algorithm:\n​\n\nSecp256k1 Keys (Account Addresses)\n\nAccount addresses use Bitcoin-style address derivation:\n\n1. Public Key: 33 bytes (compressed secp256k1 public key)\n2. SHA-256 hash of public key: 32 bytes\n3. RIPEMD-160 hash of result: 20 bytes (final address)\n\nImplementation: crypto/keys/secp256k1/secp256k1.go\n\nfunc (pubKey *PubKey) Address() crypto.Address {\nsha := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Key) // Step 1: SHA-256\nhasherRIPEMD160 := ripemd160.New()\nhasherRIPEMD160.Write(sha[:])\nreturn hasherRIPEMD160.Sum(nil) // Step 2: RIPEMD-160 = 20 bytes\n}\n\n​\n\nEd25519 Keys (Consensus Addresses)\n\nConsensus addresses use truncated SHA-256:\n\n1. Public Key: 32 bytes (Ed25519 public key)\n2. SHA-256 hash, truncated to first 20 bytes\n\nImplementation: crypto/keys/ed25519/ed25519.go\n\nfunc (pubKey *PubKey) Address() crypto.Address {\nreturn crypto.Address(tmhash.SumTruncated(pubKey.Key)) // SHA-256-20\n}\n\n​\n\nBech32 Encoding Process\n\nOnce address bytes are derived, they’re converted to Bech32 format:\nStep 1: Convert from 8-bit to 5-bit encoding\n\n// Address bytes (20 bytes = 160 bits)\naddressBytes := []byte{0x12, 0x34, ..., 0xab} // 20 bytes\n\n// Convert to 5-bit groups for Bech32\nconverted, _ := bech32.ConvertBits(addressBytes, 8, 5, true)\n\nStep 2: Encode with Human-Readable Prefix\n\n// Combine HRP with converted bytes\nbech32Address, _ := bech32.Encode(\"cosmos\", converted)\n// Result: \"cosmos1r5v5srda7xfth3uckstjst6k05kmeyzptewwdk\"\n\nImplementation: types/bech32/bech32.go\n​\n\nConfiguring Bech32 prefixes\n\nEvery Cosmos SDK application sets its Bech32 prefixes and SLIP-44 coin type once at startup via sdk.GetConfig(), then seals the config so it cannot be changed at runtime. The defaults (cosmos, cosmosvaloper, etc.) are defined in types/config.go. Chain developers override them before the app starts:\n\nconfig := sdk.GetConfig()\nconfig.SetBech32PrefixForAccount(\"cosmos\", \"cosmospub\")\nconfig.SetBech32PrefixForValidator(\"cosmosvaloper\", \"cosmosvaloperpub\")\nconfig.SetBech32PrefixForConsensusNode(\"cosmosvalcons\", \"cosmosvalconspub\")\nconfig.SetCoinType(118) // SLIP-44 coin type\nconfig.Seal()\n\n​\n\nAddress Validation\n\nThe SDK validates addresses through:\n\nFormat validation: Ensures valid Bech32 encoding\n\nPrefix validation: Confirms correct HRP for address type\n\nLength validation: Verifies address is exactly 20 bytes when decoded\n\nfunc (bc Bech32Codec) StringToBytes(text string) ([]byte, error) {\nhrp, bz, err := bech32.DecodeAndConvert(text)\nif err != nil {\nreturn nil, err\n}\n\nif hrp != bc.Bech32Prefix {\nreturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"invalid prefix\")\n}\n\nreturn bz, sdk.VerifyAddressFormat(bz) // Checks length = 20 bytes\n}\n\n​\n\nModule Addresses\n\nModule accounts use deterministic address derivation defined in ADR-028:\n\n// Module address without derivation keys\nfunc Module(moduleName string) []byte {\nreturn crypto.AddressHash([]byte(moduleName))\n}\n\n// Module address with derivation keys (new method)\nfunc Module(moduleName string, derivationKeys ...[]byte) []byte {\nmKey := append([]byte(moduleName), 0) // Null byte separator\naddr := Hash(\"module\", append(mKey, derivationKeys[0]...))\nreturn addr // 32 bytes (not 20 bytes like user addresses)\n}\n\nModule addresses are longer (32 bytes vs 20 bytes) to reduce collision probability.\n​\n\nValidator Address Relationships\n\nA validator has three related addresses:\n\nOperator Address (cosmosvaloper1...): The validator’s operational identity, derived from the operator’s account key\n\nConsensus Address (cosmosvalcons1...): Derived from the validator’s consensus public key (Ed25519), used for block signing\n\nAccount Address (cosmos1...): The operator’s account for receiving rewards\n\n// Validator stores its consensus pubkey\ntype Validator struct {\nOperatorAddress string // cosmosvaloper1... (from operator's account)\nConsensusPubkey *Any // Ed25519 public key for signing\n// ...\n}\n\n// Consensus address is derived from the consensus pubkey\nfunc (v Validator) GetConsAddr() ([]byte, error) {\npk := v.ConsensusPubkey.GetCachedValue().(cryptotypes.PubKey)\nreturn pk.Address().Bytes(), nil // SHA-256-20 of Ed25519 pubkey\n}\n\n​\n\nPerformance: Address Caching\n\nThe SDK caches Bech32-encoded addresses to optimize repeated conversions:\n\nvar (\naccAddrCache *simplelru.LRU // 60,000 entries\nvalAddrCache *simplelru.LRU // 500 entries\nconsAddrCache *simplelru.LRU // 500 entries\n)\n\nWhen Address.String() is called, the SDK:\n\nChecks the LRU cache for the encoded address\n\nReturns cached value if found\n\nOtherwise, performs Bech32 encoding and caches the result\n\nThis significantly improves performance during block processing and state queries.\n​\n\nComplete Example\n\nHere’s the full pipeline for creating an account address:\n\n// 1. Generate keypair\nprivKey := secp256k1.GenPrivKey() // 32 bytes\npubKey := privKey.PubKey() // 33 bytes (compressed)\n\n// 2. Derive address bytes\nsha := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Bytes()) // 32 bytes\nripemd := ripemd160.Sum(sha[:]) // 20 bytes\naddrBytes := ripemd[:]\n\n// 3. Create AccAddress type\naccAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addrBytes)\n\n// 4. Convert to Bech32 string\n// Internally: bech32.ConvertAndEncode(\"cosmos\", addrBytes)\naddressStr := accAddr.String()\n// Result: \"cosmos1r5v5srda7xfth3uckstjst6k05kmeyzptewwdk\"\n\n// 5. Use in account\naccount := auth.NewBaseAccount(accAddr, pubKey, accountNumber, sequence)\n\n​\n\nRelated Concepts\n\nAccounts - Understanding account types and management\n\nStore - How addresses are used as keys in state storage\n\nTransactions - How addresses are used in transaction signing\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1767,"crawled_at":1791192699746} +{"id":10135,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"HyperEVM | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nThe HyperEVM consists of EVM blocks built as part of Hyperliquid's execution, inheriting all security from HyperBFT consensus. HYPE is the native gas token on the HyperEVM. To move HYPE from HyperCore to HyperEVM, send HYPE to 0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222. See the instructions in Native Transfers for more details on how this works.\nNote that there are currently no official frontend components of the EVM. Users can build their own frontends or port over existing EVM applications. All interaction with the EVM happens through the JSON-RPC. For example, users can add the chain to their wallets by entering the RPC URL and chain ID. There is currently no websocket JSON-RPC support for the RPC at rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evmbut other RPC implementations may support it.\nThe HyperEVM uses the Cancun hardfork without blobs. In particular, EIP-1559 is enabled on the HyperEVM. Base fees are burned as usual, implemented in the standard way where the burned fees are removed from the total EVM supply. Unlike most other EVM chains, priority fees are also burned because the HyperEVM uses HyperBFT consensus. The burned priority fees are sent to the zero address's EVM balance.\nOn both mainnet and testnet, HYPE on the HyperEVM has 18 decimals. A few differences between testnet and mainnet HyperEVM are highlighted below:\nMainnet\nChain ID: 999\nJSON-RPC endpoint: https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm for mainnet\nTestnet\nChain ID: 998\nJSON-RPC endpoint: https://rpc.hyperliquid-testnet.xyz/evm\nAdditional notes\nPre-EIP-155 transactions are accepted as with many EVM chains. Users generally should not use wallets that have previously sent pre-EIP-155 transactions.\nError code 10055 represents errors occurring at the boundary between HyperCore and HyperEVM. Examples include nonce errors, insufficient funds, duplicate transaction hashes, or underpriced replacement transactions.\n\nPreviousHIP-4 deployer actions\nNextDual-block architecture\n\nLast updated 24 days ago","tokens":516,"crawled_at":1791192721980} +{"id":10136,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/mech-server","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Home - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Home\n\nMechs\n\nNote: The codebase uses the term service (from the underlying Open Autonomy framework) interchangeably with AI agent.\n\nMechs are Olas AI agents that provide on-chain services to other AI agents in exchange for small payments.\nThey allow agents to access a wide range of tools—such as LLM subscriptions or prediction services—without the need to implement ad-hoc integrations.\nAll interactions with Mechs happen through a common API using on-chain requests and responses, enabling agents to access multiple tools via a unified interface.\n\nYou can think of Mechs as subscription-free tool libraries with a standard interface. Each Mech can offer multiple tools.\nAnyone can create and deploy their own Mechs and register them in the Olas Registry. Once registered, a Mech contract can be created via the Mech Marketplace.\n\nThe Mech Marketplace\n\nThe Mech Marketplace is a collection of smart contracts that facilitate seamless, on-chain interactions between requesters (agents or applications) and Mech agents providing task-based services.\nIt acts as a relay, ensuring secure payments and efficient task execution.\nSpecifically, the Mech Marketplace enables:\n\nEffortless Mech Deployment\nAny AI agent registered in the Olas Registry can deploy a Mech contract with minimal inputs, allowing rapid tool offering and on-chain payment collection.\n\nSeamless Task Requests\nRequesters can submit service requests directly through the Mech Marketplace. On-chain contracts handle payments and service delivery transparently between requesters and Mechs.\n\nGuaranteed Task Completion\nIf a designated Mech fails to respond within the requester's specified deadline, a take-over mechanism allows other available Mechs to complete the task, ensuring high reliability and fulfillment rates.\n\nKarma Reputation System\nEach Mech's performance is tracked via the Karma contract, which maintains a reputation score based on successful task completions and failures. High Karma scores signal trustworthiness to requesters under honest participation assumptions.\n\nA Competitive Environment\nMechs are incentivized to complete tasks promptly and reliably to maintain high Karma scores, improving their chances of receiving more tasks over time.\n\nThrough Mechs and the Mech Marketplace, agents in the Olas ecosystem gain modular, on-chain access to advanced tooling without managing subscriptions or complex integrations, supporting scalable and decentralized agent economies.\n\nPayment models\n\nWhen creating a Mech, deployers can select between the following payment models:\n\nNative: a fixed-price model where the requester pays using the chain's native token for each delivered service.\n\nToken: similar to the Native model, but payments are made using a specified ERC20 token.\n\nNevermined subscription native: a dynamic pricing model that allows flexible pricing across different services with native token.\n\nNevermined subscription token: a dynamic pricing model that allows flexible pricing across different services using a specified ERC20 token.\n\nSupported chains\n\nChain\nNative\nOLAS Token\nUSDC Token\nNevermined\n\nGnosis\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n❌\n\n✅\n\nBase\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nPolygon\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nOptimism\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nHow the request-response flow works\n\nHere's a simplified version of the mech request-response:\n\nWrite request data: the requester writes the request data to IPFS. The request data must contain the attributes nonce, tool, and prompt. Additional attributes can be passed depending on the specific tool:\n\n{\n\"nonce\": 15,\n\"tool\": \"prediction_request\",\n\"prompt\": \"Will my favourite football team win this week's match?\"\n}\n\nThe application gets the request data IPFS hash from the IPFS node.\n\nThe application writes the request's IPFS hash to the Mech Marketplace contract, including a small payment. Alternatively, the payment could be done separately through a Nevermined subscription.\n\nThe Mech AI agent is constantly monitoring request events, and therefore gets the request hash.\n\nThe Mech reads the request data from IPFS using its hash.\n\nThe Mech selects the appropriate tool to handle the request from the tool entry in the metadata, and runs the tool with the given arguments, usually a prompt.\n\nThe Mech gets a response from the tool.\n\nThe Mech writes the response to IPFS.\n\nThe Mech receives the response IPFS hash.\n\nThe Mech writes the response hash to the Mech Marketplace contract.\n\nThe requester monitors for response events and reads the response hash from the associated transaction.\n\nThe application gets the response metadata from IPFS:\n\n{\n\"requestId\": 68039248068127180134548324138158983719531519331279563637951550269130775,\n\"result\": \"{\\\"p_yes\\\": 0.35, \\\"p_no\\\": 0.65, \\\"confidence\\\": 0.85, \\\"info_utility\\\": 0.75}\"\n}\n\nSee some examples of requests and responses on the Mech Hub.\n\nRequirements\n\nPython >=3.10, <3.12\n\nuv (for the \"From source\" path only)\n\nDocker Engine + Docker Compose\n\nQuick start\n\nQuickstart (installed package)\n\npip install mech-server\nmech setup -c \n# edit ~/.operate-mech/.env and set your API keys\nmech run -c \nmech stop -c \n\nmech setup auto-bootstraps the default workspace at ~/.operate-mech/ if it does not exist yet.\n\nFrom source\n\nClone the repository:\n\ngit clone https://github.com/valory-xyz/mech-server.git\ncd mech-server/\n\nInstall all Python dependencies:\n\nuv sync\nsource .venv/bin/activate\n\nDownload all the mech packages from IPFS:\n\nautonomy packages sync --update-packages\n\nRun the setup command:\n\nmech setup -c \n\nYou will be prompted to fill in some details, including the RPC for your chosen chain. You can get one from a provider like Quiknode but we encourage you to first test against a virtual network using Tenderly. This way, you can also use the faucet to fund the required wallets.\n\nCreating and running a Mech with custom tools\n\nThis section walks through creating a custom tool, publishing it, and running your Mech.\n\n1. Set up the workspace\n\nBefore adding tools, you need a workspace. Run setup once:\n\nmech setup -c \n\nThis creates the workspace at ~/.operate-mech/, builds the agent, deploys a mech on the marketplace, and configures keys and environment.\n\n2. Scaffold a tool\n\nmech add-tool AUTHOR_NAME TOOL_NAME -d \"My tool description\"\n\nThis generates the following structure:\n\n~/.operate-mech/packages/\n└── AUTHOR_NAME/\n└── customs/\n└── TOOL_NAME/\n├── component.yaml\n├── TOOL_NAME.py\n└── __init__.py\n\n3. Configure and implement the tool\n\ncomponent.yaml — review and update:\n\nname: the name of the tool.\n\nauthor: the author's name.\n\nversion: the version of the tool.\n\ntype: the component type. Should be custom.\n\ndescription: the description of the tool.\n\nlicense: should be Apache-2.0.\n\naea_version: the supported open-aea version.\n\nfingerprint: auto-generated by mech prepare-metadata.\n\nentry_point: the module containing the tool's implementation.\n\ncallable: the function called in the entry point module.\n\ndependencies: the tool's Python dependencies, for example:\n\ndependencies:\ndependency_1:\nversion: ==0.5.3\ndependency_2:\nversion: '>=2.20.0'\n\nTOOL_NAME.py — implement the tool logic. The scaffold generates a working stub with the correct structure:\n\nALLOWED_TOOLS = [\"tool_name\"]\n\nMechResponse = Tuple[str, Optional[str], Optional[Dict[str, Any]], Any, Any]\n\ndef error_response(msg: str) -> MechResponse:\n\"\"\"Return an error mech response.\"\"\"\nreturn msg, None, None, None, None\n\ndef run(**kwargs: Any) -> MechResponse:\n\"\"\"Run the tool.\"\"\"\nprompt = kwargs.get(\"prompt\")\nif prompt is None:\nreturn error_response(\"No prompt has been given.\")\nresult = do_work(prompt)\nreturn result, prompt, None, None, None\n\nKey points:\n\nALLOWED_TOOLS must list the tool name exactly as it appears in requests.\n\nrun() must return a 5-tuple (result, prompt, context, extra, extra).\n\nThe first element is the tool's response (typically a string or JSON string).\n\nThe second element is the original prompt.\n\n4. Configure the offchain URL\n\nIn addition to on-chain requests, a mech can serve off-chain requests over HTTP. If you want to enable off-chain requests, provide a URL that routes to your mech's HTTP server (which binds to localhost:8000). This URL is included in the mech's on-chain metadata so that clients can discover it.\n\nSet the URL by passing --offchain-url to prepare-metadata:\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c gnosis --offchain-url \n\nAlternatively, set the MECH_OFFCHAIN_URL variable in the chain .env file and run prepare-metadata without the flag:\n\n# ~/.operate-mech/.env.gnosis\nMECH_OFFCHAIN_URL=\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c gnosis\n\nThe CLI persists the URL to MECH_OFFCHAIN_URL in the chain .env file and includes it in the generated metadata.json under the \"url\" field. If no URL is configured, the field defaults to empty.\n\n5. Publish metadata and update on-chain\n\nOnce your tool is implemented, publish everything with a single command:\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c gnosis\n\nThis command handles the full publish pipeline:\n\nLocks package hashes (re-computes fingerprints after your edits)\n\nPushes all packages to IPFS\n\nGenerates metadata.json from your tool definitions\n\nPublishes metadata to IPFS\n\nWrites METADATA_HASH and TOOLS_TO_PACKAGE_HASH to .env\n\nThen update the on-chain metadata hash:\n\nmech update-metadata -c gnosis\n\n6. Run your Mech\n\nmech run -c \n\n7. Send a request\n\nGet your Mech's address from the workspace .env:\n\ngrep MECH_TO_CONFIG ~/.operate-mech/.env\n\nSend the request:\n\nmechx request --prompts --priority-mech --tools --chain-config \n\nWait for the response. If there's an error in the tool, you will see it in the Mech's logs.\n\n8. Stop your Mech\n\nmech stop -c \n\nAdding tools to an existing Mech\n\nIf your Mech is already running and you want to add or update tools:\n\nStop the running service:\n\nmech stop -c \n\nScaffold and implement your new tool (same as steps 2-3 above).\n\nPublish the updated metadata and update the on-chain registry:\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c \nmech update-metadata -c \n\nRestart your Mech:\n\nmech run -c \n\nMinting a tool on the Olas Registry\n\nTo register your tool as a component on the Olas Registry, mint it here.\n\nYou will need an address (EOA) and the hash of the metadata file.\nClick on \"Generate Hash & File\" and provide:\n\nname (name of the tool)\n\ndescription (of the tool)\n\nversion (must match the version in component.yaml)\n\npackage hash (found in packages/packages.json)\n\nOptionally, an NFT image URL. To push an image to IPFS:\n\nmechx push-to-ipfs ./\n\nCLI commands reference\n\nCommand\nDescription\n\nmech setup -c \n\nFull first-time setup: workspace, agent build, mech deployment, env config, key setup\n\nmech add-tool \n\nScaffold a new mech tool\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c \n\nLock packages, push to IPFS, generate and publish metadata\n\nmech prepare-metadata -c --offchain-url \n\nSame as above, also sets the public offchain URL in metadata and .env\n\nmech update-metadata -c \n\nUpdate the metadata hash on-chain via Safe transaction\n\nmech run -c \n\nRun the mech AI agent via Docker\n\nmech stop -c \n\nStop a running mech AI agent","tokens":2838,"crawled_at":1791192722881} +{"id":10137,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/transfer","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Transferring Assets | Metaplex Core","text":"This guide shows how to transfer Core Assets between wallets on Solana using the Metaplex Core SDK. Send NFTs to other users with a single instruction.\nWhat You'll Learn\nTransfer an Asset to a new owner\nHandle transfers for Assets in Collections\nUse Transfer Delegate for authorized transfers\nUnderstand transfer authority requirements\n\nSummary\nTransfer a Core Asset to a new owner using the transfer instruction. Only the current owner (or an authorized Transfer Delegate) can initiate a transfer.\nCall transfer(umi, { asset, newOwner }) with the recipient's address\nFor Collection Assets, include the collection parameter\nTransfer Delegates can transfer on behalf of owners\nTransfers are free (only transaction fee applies)\nOut of Scope\nToken Metadata transfers (use mpl-token-metadata), batch transfers (loop through Assets), and marketplace sales (use escrow programs).\nQuick Start\nJump to: Basic Transfer · Collection Transfer · Delegate Transfer\nInstall: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi\nFetch the Asset to verify ownership and collection membership\nCall transfer(umi, { asset, newOwner })\nVerify with fetchAsset() that ownership changed\nPrerequisites\nUmi configured with a signer that owns the Asset (or is its Transfer Delegate)\nAsset address of the Asset to transfer\nRecipient address (public key) of the new owner The owner of a Core Asset can transfer ownership to another account by using the transfer instruction to the MPL Core program.\n\nTransferring a Core Asset\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { transfer } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Transfer an existing NFT asset to a new owner\n\n11const result = await transfer(umi, {\n\n12 asset: publicKey('AssetAddressHere...'),\n\n13 newOwner: publicKey('RecipientAddressHere...'),\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset transferred:', result.signature)\n\nTransferring a Core Asset in a Collection\nIf you are transferring an Asset which has a collection you will need to pass the collection address in. How to tell if an Asset is in a Collection?\nTransfer an Asset that is part of a Collection\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { transferV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst collection = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222')\n\nconst newOwner = publicKey('33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333')\n\nawait transferV1(umi, {\n\nasset,\n\nnewOwner,\n\ncollection,\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nWhat if I am the Transfer Delegate of an Asset?\nIf you are the Transfer Delegate of an Asset via the Transfer Delegate plugin then you can call the transferV1 function as you would if you were the owner of the Asset.\nCommon Errors\nAuthority mismatch\nYou're not the owner or Transfer Delegate of the Asset. Check ownership:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nconsole.log(asset.owner) // Must match your signer\n\nAsset is frozen\nThe Asset has a Freeze Delegate plugin and is currently frozen. The freeze authority must unfreeze it before transfer.\nMissing collection parameter\nFor Assets in a Collection, you must pass the collection address. Check if the Asset has a collection:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nif (asset.updateAuthority.type === 'Collection') {\n\nconsole.log('Collection:', asset.updateAuthority.address)\n\n}\n\nNotes\nTransfers are free - no rent cost, only the transaction fee (~0.000005 SOL)\nThe new owner receives full control of the Asset\nTransfer, Burn, and Freeze Delegates are revoked after a successful transfer\nFrozen Assets cannot be transferred until unfrozen\nAlways fetch the Asset first to check collection membership\nQuick Reference\nTransfer Parameters\nParameterRequiredDescription\nasset\nYes\nAsset address or fetched object\n\nnewOwner\nYes\nRecipient's public key\n\ncollection\nIf in collection\nCollection address\n\nauthority\nNo\nDefaults to signer (use for delegates)\n\nWho Can Transfer?\nAuthorityCan Transfer?\nAsset Owner\nYes\n\nTransfer Delegate\nYes (revoked after)\n\nUpdate Authority\nNo\n\nCollection Authority\nNo\n\nFAQ\nHow do I know if an Asset is in a Collection?\nFetch the Asset and check its updateAuthority:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nif (asset.updateAuthority.type === 'Collection') {\n\n// Pass asset.updateAuthority.address as collection parameter\n\n}\n\nCan I transfer to myself?\nYes. Transferring to your own address is valid (useful for consolidating wallets or testing).\nWhat happens to the Transfer Delegate after a transfer?\nThe Transfer Delegate plugin is automatically revoked when the transfer completes. The new owner must assign a new delegate if needed.\nCan I cancel a transfer?\nNo. Transfers are atomic - once the transaction confirms, ownership has changed. There's no pending state to cancel.\nCan I transfer multiple Assets at once?\nNot in a single instruction. You can batch multiple transfer instructions in one transaction (up to transaction size limits), but each Asset requires its own transfer call.\nDoes transferring change the update authority?\nNo. Transfer only changes ownership. The update authority remains the same unless explicitly changed via the update instruction.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nOwner\nThe wallet that currently owns the Asset\n\nTransfer Delegate\nAn account authorized to transfer on behalf of the owner\n\nFrozen\nAn Asset state where transfers are blocked\n\nNew Owner\nThe recipient wallet receiving the Asset\n\nCollection\nThe Collection an Asset belongs to (affects transfer requirements)","tokens":1446,"crawled_at":1791192753960} +{"id":10138,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/multi-client-diversity","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"multi-client diversity - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nmulti-client diversity\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all multi-client diversity\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n04.19.23 / Noah Citron\nBuilding Magi: A new rollup client for Optimism\nIntroducing Magi, a blazing-fast OP Stack rollup, written in Rust, and our first step into the Optimism Collective.\n\ncode & engineering\nmulti-client diversity\nopen source\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":831,"crawled_at":1791192733276} +{"id":10139,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm/interacting-with-hypercore","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Interacting with HyperCore | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nRead precompiles\nThe testnet EVM provides read precompiles that allows querying HyperCore information. The precompile addresses start at 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000800 and have methods for querying information such as perps positions, spot balances, vault equity, staking delegations, oracle prices, and the L1 block number.\nThe values are guaranteed to match the latest HyperCore state at the time the EVM block is constructed.\nAttached is a Solidity file L1Read.sol describing the read precompiles. As an example, this call queries the third perp oracle price on testnet:\n\ncast call 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000807 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid-testnet.xyz/evm\n\nTo convert to floating point numbers, divide the returned price by 10^(6 - szDecimals)for perps and 10^(8 - base asset szDecimals) for spot.\nPrecompiles called on invalid inputs such as invalid assets or vault address will return an error and consume all gas passed into the precompile call frame. Precompiles have a gas cost of 2000 + 65 * (input_len + output_len).\nCoreWriter contract\nA system contract is available at 0x3333333333333333333333333333333333333333 for sending transactions from the HyperEVM to HyperCore. It burns ~25,000 gas before emitting a log to be processed by HyperCore as an action. In practice the gas usage for a basic call will be ~47000. A solidity file CoreWriter.sol for the write system contract is attached.\nAction encoding details\n\nByte 1: Encoding version\n\nCurrently, only version 1 is supported, but enables future upgrades while maintaining backward compatibility.\n\nBytes 2-4: Action ID\n\nThese three bytes, when decoded as a big-endian unsigned integer, represent the unique identifier for the action.\n\nRemaining bytes: Action encoding\n\nThe rest of the bytes constitue the action-specific data. It is always the raw ABI encoding of a sequence of Solidity types\n\nTo prevent any potential latency advantages for using HyperEVM to bypass the L1 mempool, order actions and vault transfers sent from CoreWriter are delayed onchain for a few seconds. This has no noticeable effect on UX because the end user has to wait for at least one small block confirmation. These onchain-delayed actions appear twice in the L1 explorer: first as an enqueuing and second as a HyperCore execution.\n\nAction ID\nAction\nFields\nSolidity Type\nNotes\n\n1\n\nLimit order\n\n(asset, isBuy, limitPx, sz, reduceOnly, encodedTif, cloid)\n\n(uint32, bool, uint64, uint64, bool, uint8, uint128)\n\nTif encoding: 1 for Alo , 2 for Gtc , 3 for Ioc . Cloid encoding: 0 means no cloid, otherwise uses the number as the cloid. limitPx and sz should be sent as 10^8 * the human readable value\n\n2\n\nVault transfer\n\n(vault, isDeposit, usd)\n\n(address, bool, uint64)\n\n3\n\nToken delegate\n\n(validator, wei, isUndelegate)\n\n(address, uint64, bool)\n\n4\n\nStaking deposit\n\nwei\n\nuint64\n\n5\n\nStaking withdraw\n\nwei\n\nuint64\n\n6\n\nSpot send\n\n(destination, token, wei)\n\n(address, uint64, uint64)\n\n7\n\nUSD class transfer\n\n(ntl, toPerp)\n\n(uint64, bool)\n\n8\n\nFinalize EVM Contract\n\n(token, encodedFinalizeEvmContractVariant, createNonce)\n\n(uint64, uint8, uint64)\n\nencodedFinalizeEvmContractVariant 1 for Create, 2 for FirstStorageSlot , 3 for CustomStorageSlot . If Create variant, then createNonce input argument is used.\n\n9\n\nAdd API wallet\n\n(API wallet address, API wallet name)\n\n(address, string)\n\nIf the API wallet name is empty then this becomes the main API wallet / agent\n\n10\n\nCancel order by oid\n\n(asset, oid)\n\n(uint32, uint64)\n\n11\n\nCancel order by cloid\n\n(asset, cloid)\n\n(uint32, uint128)\n\n12\n\nApprove builder fee\n\n(maxFeeRate, builder address)\n\n(uint64, address)\n\nmaxFeeRate is in decibps. To approve a builder fee of 0.01% maxFreeRate should be 10.\n\n13\n\nSend asset\n\n(destination, subAccount, source_dex, destination_dex, token, wei)\n\n(address, address, uint32, uint32, uint64, uint64)\n\nIf subAccount is not the zero address, then transfer from subAccount. Specify uint32::MAX for the source_dex or destination_dex for spot.\n\n15\n\nBorrow lend operation\n\n(encodedOperation, token, wei)\n\n(uint8, uint64, uint64)\n\nencodedOperation 0 for Supply, 1 for Withdraw . If wei is 0 then maximally apply the operation, e.g. withdraw full balance from reserve.\n\n16\n\nSet abstraction\n\n(user, abstraction)\n\n(address, uint8)\n\nabstraction 1 for disabled, 2 for unifiedAccount , 3 for portfolioMargin . user can either be the master user or a sub-account.\n\n17\n\nOutcome operation\n\n(encodedOperation, question, outcome, wei)\n\n(uint8, uint32, uint32, uint64)\n\nencodedOperation 0 for SplitOutcome, 1 for MergeOutcome, 2 for MergeQuestion, 3 for NegateOutcome. Unused fields must be set to 0: SplitOutcome and MergeOutcome ignore question; MergeQuestion ignores outcome. negate uses both. Payloads with non-zero unused fields are dropped. wei must be a multiple of size. For the merge operations 0 means merge the maximal amount.\n\nBelow is an example contract that would send an action on behalf of its own contract address on HyperCore, which also demonstrates one way to construct the encoded action in Solidity.\n\ncontract CoreWriterCaller {\nfunction sendUsdClassTransfer(uint64 ntl, bool toPerp) external {\nbytes memory encodedAction = abi.encode(ntl, toPerp);\nbytes memory data = new bytes(4 + encodedAction.length);\ndata[0] = 0x01;\ndata[1] = 0x00;\ndata[2] = 0x00;\ndata[3] = 0x07;\nfor (uint256 i = 0; i < encodedAction.length; i++) {\ndata[4 + i] = encodedAction[i];\n}\nCoreWriter(0x3333333333333333333333333333333333333333).sendRawAction(data);\n}\n}\n\nHappy building. Any feedback is appreciated.\n\nL1Read.sol\n12KB\n\nOpen\n\nCoreWriter.sol\n298B\n\nOpen\n\nPreviousRaw HyperEVM block data\nNextHyperCore <> HyperEVM transfers\n\nLast updated 1 month ago","tokens":1460,"crawled_at":1791192742609} +{"id":10140,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/mech-client","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Home - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Home\n\nOverview\n\nThis guide contains practical guidelines for interacting with Mechs.\nA requester - whether it is an agent or an application - can choose between two methods for sending service requests:\n\nOn-chain: The request is sent to the Mech contract. For Mechs registered on the Mech Marketplace, it is relayed via the Mech Marketplace.\n\nOff-chain: The request is sent directly to the Mech AI agent. The Mech then sends the result (or delivery) to the Mech contract, which is subsequently relayed by the Mech Marketplace if the Mech is registered there.\n\nTo send a request, follow these steps:\n\n1. Choose a Mech;\n\n2. Make an on-chain deposit according to the Mech’s payment model.\n\n3. Choose a method for sending the request (on-chain or off-chain).\n\n4. Send the request.\n\nDetailed instructions for each step are provided below.\n\nSetup\n\nRequirements: Python >=3.10, <3.12 (Python 3.10 or 3.11), uv\n\n1. Install mech-client:\n\npip install mech-client\n\n2. Setting up an EOA (Externally Owned Account) account:\n\na. Install browser extension of Metamask and open it.\n\nb. Click on the account icon, then select “Add account or hardware wallet”, then “Add a new Ethereum account”. Provide a name for the account and click “Add account”.\n\nc. Select the newly created account. Open the top-right menu, click “Account details”, then click “Show private key”.\n\nd. Copy this key in the file ethereum_private_key.txt in your project folder. Make sure the file contains only the private key, with no leading or trailing spaces, tabs, or newlines.\n\nAgent Mode and Client Mode\n\nThere are two modes for on-chain interactions:\n\nAgent mode (default, recommended): Registers your on-chain interactions as an agent on the Olas protocol via a Safe multisig. This allows agent-to-agent (A2A) activity to be reflected on the client.\n\nClient mode: Simple on-chain interactions using an EOA (Externally Owned Account). Use --client-mode flag before commands:\n\nmechx --client-mode \n\nSetting up agent mode\n\nFor better reliability, it is recommended to use a stable third-party RPC provider.\n\nmechx setup --chain-config \n\nRun setup for each chain you interact with, and ensure your .env file has the correct RPC endpoint.\n\nSupported Chains\n\nSupported chains: gnosis, base, polygon, optimism\n\nAll commands require --chain-config with one of these four chain names.\n\nChain\nMarketplace\nAgent Mode\nNative Payment\nNVM Subscriptions\nOLAS Payments\nUSDC Payments\n\nGnosis\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n❌\n\nBase\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nPolygon\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n❌\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nOptimism\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\n❌\n\n✅\n\n✅\n\nKey:\n- Marketplace: All supported chains have marketplace contracts deployed.\n- Agent Mode: All supported chains support on-chain agent registration via setup.\n- Native Payment: Chains supporting deposit native command for prepaid native token deposits.\n- NVM Subscriptions: Chains supporting subscription purchase command for Nevermined subscription-based payments (Gnosis, Base only).\n- OLAS/USDC Payments: Chains supporting deposit token command with OLAS or USDC tokens.\n\nImportant Notes:\n- The mech list command works on all marketplace chains (Gnosis, Base, Polygon, Optimism) with default subgraph URLs provided. The MECHX_SUBGRAPH_URL environment variable is optional and only needed to override defaults.\n- For other marketplace commands (request, deposits), subgraph is not required.\n\n1. How to Send a request to a Mech (registered on the Mech MarketPlace)\n\nTo send a request to a Mech that is accessible through the Mech Marketplace, first complete the setup, then follow the instructions below.\n\nYou will need to choose a Mech, and then select one of the following methods to send a request:\n- Via the terminal\n- Using a Python script\n\nFollow the instructions in the corresponding section.\n\n1. 1. Choosing a Mech\n\nUse the command mechx in terminal, which is structured as follows.\nmechx mech list --chain-config \n\nReplace by the chosen network. Supported marketplace chains: gnosis, base, polygon, optimism.\n\nNote: Default subgraph URLs are provided for all supported chains. You can optionally override the default:\n\nexport MECHX_SUBGRAPH_URL=\n\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| AI Agent Id | Mech Type | Mech Address | Total Deliveries | Metadata Link |\n+==============+====================+============================================+====================+===============================================================================================================+\n| 2182 | Fixed Price Native | 0xc05e7412439bd7e91730a6880e18d5d5873f632c | 41246 | https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/f01701220157d3b106831e2713b86af1b52af76a3ef28c52ae0853e9638180902ebee41d4 |\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| 2235 | Fixed Price Native | 0xb3c6319962484602b00d5587e965946890b82101 | 10127 | https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/f01701220157d3b106831e2713b86af1b52af76a3ef28c52ae0853e9638180902ebee41d4 |\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| 2198 | Fixed Price Native | 0x601024e27f1c67b28209e24272ced8a31fc8151f | 5714 | https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/f01701220157d3b106831e2713b86af1b52af76a3ef28c52ae0853e9638180902ebee41d4 |\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| 1722 | Fixed Price Token | 0x13f36b1a516290b7563b1de574a02ebeb48926a1 | 399 | https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/f01701220157d3b106831e2713b86af1b52af76a3ef28c52ae0853e9638180902ebee41d4 |\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| 2135 | Fixed Price Native | 0xbead38e4c4777341bb3fd44e8cd4d1ba1a7ad9d7 | 353 | https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/f01701220157d3b106831e2713b86af1b52af76a3ef28c52ae0853e9638180902ebee41d4 |\n+--------------+--------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\n1. 2. In terminal\n\n1. 2. 1. Request command\n\nUse the command mechx in terminal, which is structured as follows:\n\nmechx request --prompts --priority-mech --tools --chain-config --use-offchain\n\nReplace each placeholder as follows:\n\n: The request description to be sent to the Mech. For instance: \"Write a short poem\".\n\n: The address of the Mech to send the request to.\n\n: The name of the tool to use.\n\n: One of the keys in the dictionary defined in mech_client/configs/mechs.json (e.g., \"gnosis\"). This provides the client with a configuration for the chosen network.\n\n--use-offchain: Optional flag to use the off-chain method. Omit for on-chain requests.\n\n1. 2. 2. Deposits and Payment Types\n\nWhen you send a request, the Mech Client automatically detects the mech's payment type and handles the appropriate payment flow. You don't need to specify the payment type - the mech's smart contract declares it.\n\nUnderstanding Payment Types:\n\nThere are 5 payment types that mechs can use:\n\nPayment Type\nDescription\nHow to Pay\n\nNATIVE\n\nPer-request native token\n\nClient sends native tokens (xDAI, ETH, MATIC) with transaction\n\nOLAS_TOKEN\n\nPer-request OLAS token\n\nClient approves and transfers OLAS tokens\n\nUSDC_TOKEN\n\nPer-request USDC token\n\nClient approves and transfers USDC tokens\n\nNATIVE_NVM\n\nNVM subscription with native token\n\nPurchase subscription first, then unlimited requests\n\nTOKEN_NVM_USDC\n\nNVM subscription with USDC token\n\nPurchase subscription first, then unlimited requests\n\nFinding the price per request\n\nTo determine the Mech's fee in advance:\n\nEnter the Mech's address into the block explorer of the corresponding network.\n\nClick on \"Contract\", then \"Read Contract\".\n\nFind and click on the function maxDeliveryRate.\n\nDivide the displayed number by 10^8 in order to obtain the price per request (in ether or token units, depending on the Mech).\n\nNote: For Mechs using the Nevermined subscription model, this value corresponds to the maximum price per request; actual usage may involve multiple requests per subscription.\n\nMaking a deposit\n\nOption 1: Prepaid balance (for NATIVE, OLAS_TOKEN, USDC_TOKEN mechs)\n\nYou can deposit funds to your prepaid balance and use --use-prepaid flag when making requests:\n\nFor NATIVE payment mechs:\n\nmechx deposit native --chain-config \n\nFor OLAS_TOKEN payment mechs:\n\nmechx deposit token --chain-config --token-type olas\n\nFor USDC_TOKEN payment mechs:\n\nmechx deposit token --chain-config --token-type usdc\n\nNote: The --token-type parameter is required and must be explicitly specified (olas or usdc).\n\nIn all cases above, must be at least the mech's price (as given by maxDeliveryRate).\n\nOption 2: Per-request payment (for NATIVE, OLAS_TOKEN, USDC_TOKEN mechs)\n\nThe client handles per-request payment automatically when you don't use --use-prepaid:\n- NATIVE mechs: Native tokens sent with transaction\n- OLAS_TOKEN mechs: OLAS tokens approved and transferred\n- USDC_TOKEN mechs: USDC tokens approved and transferred\n\nOption 3: NVM Subscriptions (for NATIVE_NVM, TOKEN_NVM_USDC mechs)\n\nPurchase a subscription upfront for unlimited requests:\n\nmechx subscription purchase --chain-config \n\nThis purchases a fixed-price subscription (ERC1155 NFT) that enables multiple requests during the subscription period. No per-request payment needed.\n\nNote: To use a custom private key file path, add the --key option to any command.\n\n1. 2. 3. Finding the response\n\nAfter sending a request, a JSON response will appear below the line \"Data for agent\". The key \"result\" in this JSON object contains the Mech's response to your request.\n\nFor example, the following command:\n\nmechx request --prompts \"write a short poem\" --tools openai-gpt-3.5-turbo --chain-config gnosis --priority-mech \n\nYou should receive a response as follows:\n\n{\n\"requestId\": 123456789,\n\"prompt\": \"write a short poem\",\n\"tool\": \"openai-gpt-3.5-turbo\",\n\"result\": \"Beneath the velvet night so deep,\\nWhere stars their silent vigil keep,\\nA whisper of the wind goes by,\\nAs moonbeams dance across the sky.\",\n\"metadata\": {}\n}\n\nTroubleshooting: timeout waiting for response\n\nFor some Mechs, the response may take a few minutes to arrive. If you encounter timeout issues, ensure you have a reliable RPC provider configured:\n\nexport MECHX_CHAIN_RPC=\n\nIf the connection times out, you can retrieve the response manually. To do this:\n\nNote the request_id printed in the logs.\n\nConvert the request ID to hexadecimal:\n\nprintf \"%x\\n\" \n\nGo to the Mech list and locate your Mech (by its AI Agent ID or address).\n\nClick on the Mech’s address to see a list of requests it has received.\n\nFind your request by matching the hexadecimal request ID.\n\nClick on \"Delivers Data\" to view the response.\n\nTroubleshooting: non-hexadecimal symbol\n\nYou may encounter an error indicating that the private key contains invalid (non-hexadecimal) characters.\nThis can happen, in particular, on Windows systems, where some IDEs may automatically add a newline character (\\n) at the end of a file—for example, in ethereum_private_key.txt.\n\nTo avoid this, check your IDE settings and ensure that the file contains only the private key with no trailing newline or whitespace.\n\nTroubleshooting: out of gas\n\nIf an \"Out of gas\" error is encountered, an increase of the gas limit can solve the problem. To do this:\n\nexport MECHX_GAS_LIMIT=200000\n\n1. 3. Script for automatizing request sending\n\nThe following script can be used in order to automatize request sending:\n\nfrom mech_client.marketplace_interact import marketplace_interact\n\nPRIORITY_MECH_ADDRESS = \"\"\nPROMPT_TEXT = \"\"\nTOOL_NAME = \"\"\nCHAIN_CONFIG = \"\"\nAGENT_MODE = False # Set to True if using agent mode\nSAFE_ADDRESS = \"\" # Required if AGENT_MODE is True\nUSE_OFFCHAIN = False\n\nresult = marketplace_interact(\nprompts=(PROMPT_TEXT,), # Note: must be a tuple\npriority_mech=PRIORITY_MECH_ADDRESS,\nagent_mode=AGENT_MODE,\nsafe_address=SAFE_ADDRESS,\nuse_offchain=USE_OFFCHAIN,\ntools=(TOOL_NAME,), # Note: must be a tuple\nchain_config=CHAIN_CONFIG\n)\n\nReplace the placeholders as follows:\n\n: the address of the targeted Mech,\n\n: the text of the prompt to send,\n\n: the name of the tool to use,\n\n: the name of the target network (e.g., \"gnosis\", \"base\").\n\nNote: If using agent mode (AGENT_MODE = True), you must provide a valid SAFE_ADDRESS. For client mode, set AGENT_MODE = False and SAFE_ADDRESS = \"\".\n\nThe variable result contains the response of the mech.\n\n2. Tool Management\n\nList tools available for a mech\n\nTo list the tools available for a specific marketplace mech, use the tool list command with an AI Agent ID:\n\nmechx tool list 1722 --chain-config gnosis\n\n+---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n| Tool Name | Unique Identifier |\n+=============================================+===============================================+\n| claude-prediction-offline | 1722-claude-prediction-offline |\n+---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n| claude-prediction-online | 1722-claude-prediction-online |\n+---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n| deepmind-optimization | 1722-deepmind-optimization |\n+---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n\nGet tool description\n\nTo get the description of a specific tool, use the tool describe command with the tool's unique identifier:\n\nmechx tool describe 1722-openai-gpt-4 --chain-config gnosis\n\nDescription for tool 1722-openai-gpt-4: Performs a request to OpenAI's GPT-4 model.\n\nGet tool input/output schema\n\nTo get the input/output schema of a specific tool, use the tool schema command:\n\nmechx tool schema 1722-openai-gpt-4 --chain-config gnosis\n\nTool Details:\n+------------------------+---------------------------------------------+\n| Tool Name | Tool Description |\n+========================+=============================================+\n| OpenAI Request (GPT-4) | Performs a request to OpenAI's GPT-4 model. |\n+------------------------+---------------------------------------------+\nInput Schema:\n+-------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n| Field | Value |\n+=============+===============================================+\n| type | text |\n+-------------+-----------------------------------------------+\n| description | The request to relay to OpenAI's GPT-4 model. |\n+-------------+-----------------------------------------------+\nOutput Schema:\n+-----------+---------+-----------------------------------+\n| Field | Type | Description |\n+===========+=========+===================================+\n| requestId | integer | Unique identifier for the request |\n+-----------+---------+-----------------------------------+\n| result | string | Response from OpenAI |\n+-----------+---------+-----------------------------------+\n| prompt | string | User prompt to send to OpenAI |\n+-----------+---------+-----------------------------------+\n\n3. Offchain Requests\n\nThe offchain URL is automatically discovered from the mech's on-chain metadata. No additional configuration is required — simply use the --use-offchain flag:\n\nmechx request --prompts \"test\" --tools openai-gpt-4 --use-offchain --chain-config gnosis\n\nThe client queries the mech's ComplementaryServiceMetadata contract to find the url field published by the mech operator, then sends requests to that endpoint.\n\n4. Programmatic Usage\n\nYou can use the Mech Client as a library in your Python project:\n\nfrom mech_client.services import MarketplaceService\nfrom mech_client.domain.payment import PaymentType\nfrom mech_client.infrastructure.config import get_mech_config\nfrom aea_ledger_ethereum import EthereumApi, EthereumCrypto\n\n# Configuration\nPRIORITY_MECH_ADDRESS = \"0x77af31De935740567Cf4fF1986D04B2c964A786a\"\nPROMPT_TEXT = \"Will Gnosis pay reach 100k cards in 2024?\"\nTOOL_NAME = \"openai-gpt-4o-2024-05-13\"\nCHAIN_CONFIG = \"gnosis\"\nMODE = \"client\" # Use \"agent\" for agent mode (Safe multisig)\nSAFE_ADDRESS = \"\" # Required if MODE is \"agent\"\n\n# Setup ledger and crypto\nconfig = get_mech_config(CHAIN_CONFIG)\ncrypto = EthereumCrypto(\"ethereum_private_key.txt\")\nledger_api = EthereumApi(**config.ledger_config.__dict__)\n\n# Create service\nservice = MarketplaceService(\nchain_config=CHAIN_CONFIG,\nledger_api=ledger_api,\npayer_address=crypto.address,\nmode=MODE,\nsafe_address=SAFE_ADDRESS if MODE == \"agent\" else None,\n)\n\n# Send request\nresult = service.send_request(\npriority_mech=PRIORITY_MECH_ADDRESS,\ntools=[TOOL_NAME],\nprompts=[PROMPT_TEXT],\npayment_type=PaymentType.NATIVE, # or PaymentType.TOKEN, PaymentType.NATIVE_NVM\n)\n\nprint(f\"Transaction hash: {result['tx_hash']}\")\nprint(f\"Request ID: {result['request_ids'][0]}\")\nprint(f\"Result: {result.get('result')}\")\n\nYou can also programmatically fetch tools for marketplace mechs:\n\nfrom mech_client.services import ToolService\nfrom mech_client.infrastructure.config import get_mech_config\nfrom aea_ledger_ethereum import EthereumApi\n\n# Configuration\nservice_id = 1722\nchain_config = \"gnosis\"\n\n# Setup ledger API\nconfig = get_mech_config(chain_config)\nledger_api = EthereumApi(**config.ledger_config.__dict__)\n\n# Create tool service\ntool_service = ToolService(\nchain_config=chain_config,\nledger_api=ledger_api,\n)\n\n# Fetch tools for a specific marketplace mech\ntools = tool_service.list_tools(service_id=service_id)\nprint(f\"Tools for marketplace mech {service_id}:\")\nfor tool_name, tool_id in tools:\nprint(f\" {tool_name}: {tool_id}\")\n\n5. Chain Configuration\n\nDefault configurations for different chains are stored in mech_client/configs/mechs.json. You can override any configuration parameter by exporting the following environment variables:\n\nMECHX_CHAIN_RPC # Custom RPC endpoint\nMECHX_SUBGRAPH_URL # Custom subgraph URL (optional, defaults provided)\nMECHX_GAS_LIMIT # Custom gas limit\nMECHX_TRANSACTION_URL # Custom transaction explorer URL\n\nMECHX_LEDGER_CHAIN_ID\nMECHX_LEDGER_POA_CHAIN\nMECHX_LEDGER_DEFAULT_GAS_PRICE_STRATEGY\nMECHX_LEDGER_IS_GAS_ESTIMATION_ENABLED","tokens":4764,"crawled_at":1791192746253} +{"id":10141,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/sam-blackshear","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Sam Blackshear - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nSam Blackshear\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall 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Litman\nAlison Mangiero\nAlison Martin\nAllison Pickens\nAlyssa Del Bene\nAlyssa Torres\nAmanda Cantor\nAmanda Cassatt\nAmanda Catherine\nAmanda Mulay\nAmanda Tuminelli\nAmanda Tyler\nAmelia Salyers\nAmie Tyrrel\nAmir Shevat\nAmira Yahyaoui\nAmy Abernethy\nAmy Berliner\nAmy Bohutinsky\nAmy Choice\nAmy Cray\nAmy Gill\nAmy Hoemeke\nAmy Kalokerinos\nAmy Robertson\nAna Mostarac\nAna Susi\nAnatoly Yakovenko\nAndie Taylor\nAndisheh Tahriri\nAndre Iguodala\nAndrea Clarke Hall\nAndrea Feinberg\nAndrea Rallo\nAndrea Simon\nAndrea Vinkler\nAndreas Papadimitropoulos, Jr\nAndreessen Horowitz\nAndrew Allen\nAndrew Chen\nAndrew F. Read\nAndrew Green\nAndrew Hall\nAndrew Lakis\nAndrew Lewis-Pye\nAndrew Lo\nAndrew Mason\nAndrew McAfee\nAndrew Milson\nAndrew Omori\nAndrew Radin\nAndrew Rubin\nAndrew Savage\nAndrew Smith\nAndrew Tretyakov\nAndy Beal\nAndy Coravos\nAndy Golden\nAndy Hill\nAndy Milenius\nAndy Rachleff\nAndy Tran\nAndy Walshe\nAneel Lakhani\nAngela Schenone\nAngela Strange\nAngela Tran Kingyens\nAngelica Gehr\nAniket Kate\nAnil Sethi\nAnish Acharya\nAnn Winblad\nAnna Berces\nAnna Jablonski\nAnna Semenova\nAnna Van Meurs\nAnnaLee Saxenian\nAnne Brandes\nAnne Lee Skates\nAnne Lewandowski\nAnne Mitchell\nAnne Yip\nAnnie Collins\nAnnie Duke\nAnthony Albanese\nAnthony Atala\nAnthony Foxx\nAnthony Lee Zhang\nAntonio Viggiano\nAntwone Stigall\nAnu Hariharan\nApril Roth\nAri Emanuel\nAri Juels\nArianna Huffington\nArianna Simpson\nArik Kershenbaum\nArmon Dadgar\nArnie Goldberg\nArsho Avetian\nArthur Brooks\nArun Sundararajan\nAsh Ashutosh\nAsha Christian\nAshley McCollum\nAshley Stern\nAshton Carter\nAtif Mian\nAtul Butte\nAubree Pelaez\nAubrey de Grey\nAugusto Marietti\nAurora Petracca\nAusten Allred\nAustin Guzman\nAustin Marchese\nAustin Wilson\nAva Iravani\nAvery Segal\nAvinash Solanky\nAviv Zohar\nAye Moah\nAzeem Azhar\nBailey Flanigan\nBailey Richardson\nBalaji Srinivasan\nBarry McCarthy\nBart Dessaint\nBeau Cronin\nBeau Woods\nBecky Pferdehirt\nBen Buckwalter\nBen Fielding\nBen Fisch\nBen Gardner\nBen Gomez\nBen Horowitz\nBen Kaufman\nBen Leventhal\nBen Lovell\nBen Napier\nBen Portney\nBen Rubin\nBen Scharfstein\nBen Schecter\nBen Silbermann\nBen Uretsky\nBen Wu\nBenedict Evans\nBenedikt Büenz\nBenjamin Ebner\nBenjamin Hindman\nBenjamin Wittes\nBenjamin Wu\nBennett Carroccio\nBenny Pinkas\nBernard J. Tyson\nBernard Tyson\nBeth Newman\nBethany Coates\nBharat Ramamurti\nBharath Ramsundar\nBill Carr\nBill Frist\nBill Hinman\nBill Janeway\nBill Krause\nBill Macaitis\nBlake Kim\nBlake Masters\nBlake Saari\nBlayne Donnell\nBob Iger\nBob Langer\nBob Moore\nBob Muglia\nBob Sutton\nBob Swan\nBob Tinker\nBob Wachter\nBobby Franklin\nBobby Green\nBobby Kotick\nBobby Wagner\nBoris Sofman\nBoris Wertz\nBrad Feld\nBrad Kern\nBrad Peterson\nBram Cohen\nBrandon Ballinger\nBrandon Barros\nBrandon Cherry\nBrandon Millman\nBrenda Kopf\nBrent McIntosh\nBrett Browman\nBrett Falk\nBrett Hagler\nBrewster Kahle\nBrian Armstrong\nBrian Balfour\nBrian Brooks\nBrian Crnkovich\nBrian Curran\nBrian Grazer\nBrian Koppelman\nBrian McCullough\nBrian Quintenz\nBrian Wilkins\nBridget McDowell\nBrittany Lucas\nBrittney Burrows\nBrooke Sheresky\nBruce Friedrich\nBryan Caplan\nBryan Chiang\nBryan Cox\nBryan Crowley\nBryan Faust\nBryan Houser\nBryan Kim\nBryan Pellegrino\nCaitlin Glazebrook\nCaitlin Johnston\nCaitlin Roberson\nCal Turner Jr.\nCaleb Christian\nCameron Schuler\nCamila De Souza\nCarine Carmy\nCarissa Bilinski\nCarl Agnelli\nCarl Eschenbach\nCarl Narcisse\nCarl Pope\nCarlos Araya\nCarolina Gonzalez\nCaroline Friedman\nCaroline Goggins\nCaroline Horn\nCaroline Moon\nCarolyn Bertozzi\nCarra Wu\nCasey Graul\nCasey Neistat\nCasey Winters\nCassady Churchill\nCassie Faerber\nCecilia Marshall\nCeia Font\nChad Rigetti\nChandra Krintz\nCharles Goetz\nCharles Hubbard\nCharles Koch\nCharlie Keinath\nCharlie Warzel\nChattry Meas\nChelsea Komlo\nChelsea Padilla\nCheng Li\nChris Bennett\nChris Best\nChris Burniske\nChris Curran\nChris DeWolfe\nChris Dixon\nChris Granger\nChris Hauth\nChris Lyons\nChris Messina\nChris Milk\nChris Power\nChris Santa Maria\nChris Wanstrath\nChristian Cachin\nChristian Catalini\nChristian Crowley\nChristian Seifert\nChristina Hampp\nChristina Lopes\nChristina Mercando\nChristina Xu\nChristina Zeidan\nChristine Darden\nChristine Perham\nChristopher Giancarlo\nChristopher Lee\nChristopher Mims\nChristopher Nguyen\nChristopher Rippingham\nChristopher Schroeder\nChristy Hubbard\nCiamac Moallemi\nCindi Zhang\nCindy Tenner\nClaire Austin\nClaire Cain Miller\nClaire Kart\nClaudia Picanco\nClay Shirky\nClayton Christensen\nClayton Gardner\nClifford Woolf\nClint Delapaz\nColin Bryar\nColin Rom\nCollin McCune\nConner Lyons Brown\nConnie Chan\nConnie Guglielmo\nConnor McCarthy\nConnor Moyles\nCorban Bell\nCorey Hawkins\nCorey Waller\nCourtney Dettlinger\nCraig Naylor\nCraig Walker\nCristina Cordova\nCurt Funderburk\nCuy Sheffield\nD'Arcy Coolican\nDaejun Park\nDaisy Linden\nDaisy Wolf\nDaljeet Virdi\nDalton Turay\nDan Berkenstock\nDan Boneh\nDan Frommer\nDan Primack\nDan Romero\nDan Shapero\nDan Siroker\nDan Stein\nDan Warmenhoven\nDan Wendlandt\nDaniel Chao\nDaniel Chen\nDanielle Andrzejewski\nDanielle Clark\nDanielle Looymans\nDanielle Lussier\nDanielle Morrill\nDanielle Shea\nDanny Shader\nDaphne Koller\nDapper Dan\nDaren Matsuoka\nDarin Malter\nDarshan Shankar\nDas Rush\nDave Jagoda\nDave King\nDave Touretzky\nDavid Banks\nDavid Belden\nDavid Damato\nDavid Deming\nDavid George\nDavid Haber\nDavid Hollestelle\nDavid Kerr\nDavid Lee\nDavid Mack\nDavid Madden\nDavid Marcus\nDavid Olson\nDavid Oyelowo\nDavid Pierce\nDavid Reich\nDavid Rumsey\nDavid Schweikert\nDavid Sinclair\nDavid Sverdlov\nDavid Tse\nDavid Ulevitch\nDavid Weiden\nDawn Lepore\nDawn Nott\nDeborah Embaie\nDeena Elitreby\nDeepak Maram\nDenis Nazarov\nDenis Young\nDenise Gonzalez\nDerek Dolin\nDerek Thompson\nDerrick Harris\nDevin Finzer\nDevon Zuegel\nDiana Peña\nDiane Greene\nDick Costolo\nDieter Shirley\nDiishan Imira\nDiogo Monica\nDominic Shine\nDominique Reliford\nDon Duet\nDon Faul\nDorris O'Brien\nDoug Ducey\nDoug Folden\nDoug McCracken\nDouglas Argueta\nDozie Uche\nDrew Coffman\nDylan Field\nDylan Rhodes\nEd Felten\nEd Lynch\nEddie Lim\nEddy Lazzarin\nEdith Zimmerman\nEdward Perkins\nEdwin Poston\nEfrat Noy\nEhud Shapiro\nEileen Burbidge\nEileen Wu\nElad Gil\nElaine Fuchs\nElaine Shi\nElena Burger\nEli Dourado\nElisa Leonhardt\nEliza Oak\nElizabeth Gunn\nElizabeth Harkavy\nElizabeth May\nElizabeth Ocken\nElizabeth Stark\nElizabeth Weil\nEllen Tunoa\nEmile Petrone\nEmilio Torres\nEmily Graff\nEmily Hinsch\nEmily Keir\nEmily Oster\nEmily Westerhold\nEmma Janaskie\nEric Budish\nEric Dai\nEric Ries\nEric Thomas\nEric Topol\nEric Wu\nErica Schecter\nErik Brynjolfsson\nErik Kiser\nErik Torenberg\nErika Bracken\nErika Herrera\nErika Louie\nErin Grody Kingsley\nErin Murphy\nErin Tice\nErin Tonnar\nErin Winkler\nErtem Nusret Tas\nEsther Shinn\nEthan Bueno de Mesquita\nEthan Ferreira\nEthan Zuckerman\nEuan Ashley\nEugene Volokh\nEugene Wei\nEugenia Yee\nEula Takahashi\nEva Sakkas\nEvan Burfield\nEvan Osnos\nEvangelos Simoudis\nEzra Klein\nF. Gary Gray\nFabiola Godinez\nFabrizio Zilibotti\nFahad Saleh\nFarid Jiandani\nFei-Fei Li\nFelix Do\nFEWOCIOUS\nFiona Kennedy\nFiona Murray\nFlashrekt\nFlora Oliveira\nFlori Del Valle\nFlorian Leibert\nFoteini Baldimtsi\nFrancesca Gino\nFrank Chen\nFrank Wilczek\nFred Benenson\nFred Ehrsam\nFred Upton\nFred Wilson\nFreda Lewis-Hall\nFrederic Kerrest\nFuture Editorial\nGabby Dizon\nGabby Reece\nGabriel Otte\nGabriel Vasquez\nGaetan Barthelemy\nGarrett Biel\nGary Ang\nGary Reedy\nGary Wolf\nGaurav Banga\nGaurav Dhillon\nGaut\nGayle Tzemach Lemmon\nGeoffrey Woo\nGeorg Fuchsbauer\nGeorg Petschnigg\nGeorge Church\nGeorge Danezis\nGeorge Fraser\nGeraldine Chan\nGérard Cachon\nGerard Ryle\nGerri Elliott\nGerry Tsoukalas\nGia Scinto\nGil Elbaz\nGil Shafir\nGina Moon\nGina Neff\nGina Yocom\nGinger Liau\nGokul Rajaram\nGoldie Chang\nGrace Ellis\nGraham Allison\nGrant Gregory\nGrant Jordan\nGrant LaFontaine\nGrant Rabenn\nGray Kinsella\nGreg Bowman\nGreg Clayman\nGreg Linares\nGreg Loehmann\nGreg Lynn\nGreg Solano\nGreg Truesdell\nGreg Waldon\nGregory Allen\nGregory Mundis\nGretchen Bush\nGretchen McCulloch\nGuido Appenzeller\nGustav Söderström\nGustavo Garcia\nGuy Goren\nGuy Raz\nGuy Wuollet\nHaley Van Dyck\nHanna Aziz\nHannah Frankl\nHanne Winarsky\nHaoyuan Li\nHarmit Malik\nHarry Grieve\nHarry Shum\nHarry Wright\nHatim Shafique\nHayden Adams\nHeather Gwynn\nHeather Podesta\nHedi Samar\nHelen Stoddard\nHelen Su\nHemant Mohapatra\nHendrik Pretorius\nHenri Kor\nHerb Lin\nHerman Narula\nHilmar Pétursson\nHoang Nguyen\nHoward Wu\nIan Dutra\nIan Shannon\nIan Sharp\nIce Cube\nIlan Zechory\nIllia Polosukhin\nIlyas Khan\nIma Christian\nIman Abuzeid\nInsiya Lokhandwala\nIon Stoica\nIrvin Chan\nIsa Guardalabene\nIsaiah Lott\nIsh Verduzco\nIsil Dillig\nIstván András Seres\nIttai Abraham\nIttay Eyal\nIva Messy\nIvan Linscott\nIvor Horn\nJ.D. Moriarty\nJack Donahoe\nJack Soslow\nJackie McQuiston\nJackson David\nJacob Westphal\nJacquelyn Melinek\nJad Esber\nJad Naous\nJade Lai\nJade Raymond\nJae Gnazzo\nJai Ramaswamy\nJaimie Buss\nJak Kennedy\nJake Auchincloss\nJakob Uszkoreit\nJamal Mohammed\nJames Beshara\nJames Currier\nJames da Costa\nJames Gwertzman\nJames J. Collins\nJames Kissell\nJames L. Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Sam Blackshear\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n01.30.23 / Sam Blackshear, Noah Citron, Eddy Lazzarin and Sonal Chokshi\nProgramming Languages & Crypto\nEPISODE SUMMARY with @b1ackd0g @noahcitron @eddylazzarin @smc90 A wide-ranging conversation all about programming languages and crypto — for both existing blockchain & smart contract programmers, other non-web3 developers seeking to enter the space, and anyone interested in how programming languages evolve and come into existence (as well as in the intersection of language, code, and...\n\ncode & engineering\ninfrastructure\nopen source\npodcast\nprogramming\nsmart contracts\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6911,"crawled_at":1791192753358} +{"id":10142,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm/raw-hyperevm-block-data","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Raw HyperEVM block data | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nBuilders running a non-validating node can index the HyperEVM using data written to ~/hl/data/evm_block_and_receipts . This data is written after committed blocks are verified by the node, and therefore has no additional trust assumptions compared to running the EVM RPC directly from the node itself.\nBuilders that wish to index the HyperEVM without running a node can use the S3 bucket: aws s3 ls s3://hl-mainnet-evm-blocks/ --request-payer requester.\nThere is a similar bucket s3://hl-testnet-evm-blocks/ for testnet.\nBuilders interested in robustness can merge the two data sources, relying primarily on local data and falling back to S3 data.\nSome potential applications include a JSON-RPC server with custom rate limits, a HyperEVM block explorer, or other indexed services and tooling for builders.\nWhile the data is public for anyone to use, the requester must pay for data transfer costs. The filenames are predictably indexed by EVM block number, e.g. s3://hl-mainnet-evm-blocks/0/6000/6123.rmp.lz4. An indexer can copy block data from S3 on new HyperEVM blocks. The files are stored in MessagePack format and then compressed using LZ4.\nNote that testnet starts with directory s3://hl-testnet-evm-blocks/18000000and the earlier testnet RPC blocks were not backfilled.\nAn example can be found in the Python SDK: https://github.com/hyperliquid-dex/hyperliquid-python-sdk/blob/master/examples/evm_block_indexer.py\n\nPreviousDual-block architecture\nNextInteracting with HyperCore\n\nLast updated 8 months ago","tokens":401,"crawled_at":1791192762690} +{"id":10143,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-hook-manager-framework-on-chain-policy-orchestration-for-uniswap-v4/25552","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] Hook Manager Framework – On-Chain Policy Orchestration for Uniswap v4 - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] Hook Manager Framework – On-Chain Policy Orchestration for Uniswap v4\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nmbendary\n\nMay 2, 2025, 11:04pm\n\n1\n\nInitial Request for Comment. No Governance action required at this time.\n\nMotivation\n\nUniswap Protocol v4 arrived with a bang—ushering in unprecedented flexibility via hooks, singleton architecture, and flash accounting. It’s a powerful toolkit, opening doors not just for optimized token swaps, but for a universe of on-chain value exchange: complex financial products, Real-World Assets (RWAs), and institutional-grade DeFi.\n\nBut with great power comes great complexity.\n\nHow do we safely harness v4’s power for sophisticated use cases? How do we implement custom logic—compliance checks, pricing rules, risk controls—without creating a fragmented, unauditable mess of ad-hoc hooks?\n\nThis RFC introduces a proposed solution: On-Chain Policy Orchestration Architecture, centered around a new infrastructure layer called the Hook Manager Framework.\n\nThe Problem: Raw Power Needs Structure\n\nImagine building a skyscraper out of LEGO—with no baseplate and no instructions. That’s what raw v4 hook usage feels like when attempting to support RWAs or institutional-grade logic.\n\nWhile every v4 hook executes atomically (a big leap over off-chain enforcement!), relying solely on ad-hoc, monolithic hook contracts leads to:\n\nFragmentation – Different pools implement similar logic differently.\n\nDuplication – Developers continually reinvent the wheel.\n\nSecurity Risk – Larger, multi-purpose hook contracts are harder to audit.\n\nTrust Gaps – DAOs and institutions cannot reliably verify or rely on arbitrary hooks deployed permissionlessly.\n\nThere’s a need for structure—one that preserves Uniswap’s neutrality while enabling robust pool-specific behavior.\n\nThe Solution: The Hook Manager Framework\n\nThe Hook Manager is a governance-aware orchestration layer attached to Uniswap v4 pools. It coordinates which policy-specific hooks execute, in what order, and under what conditions.\n\nKey Features:\n\nModular Policy Hooks\n\nEach custom behavior is implemented as a dedicated, single-purpose contract—e.g.,\n\nKYC/AML enforcement\n\nDynamic fees\n\nMEV protection\n\nRWA settlement logic\n\nOrchestration Logic\n\nThe Hook Manager attaches at pool creation and manages:\n\nWhich hooks execute on specific pool operations (before/after swap, mint, burn, etc.)\n\nExecution order of hooks\n\nDynamic registration/deregistration (via governance)\n\nStandard Interfaces\n\nHook contracts conform to a unified spec, making them easier to audit, monitor, and potentially reuse.\n\nControlled Upgrades\n\nThrough a decentralized governance model (proposed: using UNI), policy hooks can be upgraded while pools are paused—no liquidity migration required.\n\nTransparency & Observability\n\nHooks and managers emit standardized on-chain events for analytics, compliance audits, and real-time monitoring.\n\nImportantly, the Hook Manager does not modify Uniswap v4 core contracts—it builds on top of them, preserving neutrality and permissionlessness.\n\nWhy This Matters\n\nThis isn’t just a better way to manage hooks—it’s a foundational leap forward for Uniswap v4’s real-world adoption, introducing a scalable, modular, governance-aligned framework to extend Uniswap v4’s hook system into a generalized infrastructure for policy-governed liquidity pools.\n\nEnhanced Security\n\nModularity enables smaller, auditable hook contracts\n\nBugs are isolated; the blast radius of errors is reduced\n\nInstitutional Readiness\n\nEnables auditable KYC/AML enforcement, risk controls, escrow logic, etc.\n\nMakes Uniswap pools usable by custodians, banks, and DAOs with specific mandates\n\nDeveloper Efficiency\n\nClear interfaces and modular design reduce complexity, accelerate innovation, and improve testing workflows\n\nRegulatory Adaptability\n\nNeed to add a new compliance rule? Deploy a new policy hook without touching other logic\n\nCompetitive Agility\n\nNew features can be rapidly deployed via standalone hooks (e.g., slippage protections, dynamic pricing models)\n\nAddressing Trade-offs\n\nGas Costs\n\nYes—each policy hook adds gas. But:\n\nFor large trades (institutions, RWAs), the cost is trivial compared to the value of guarantees\n\nL2 deployments will greatly reduce overhead\n\nSelective policy exemption and optimization techniques are possible\n\nLiquidity Fragmentation\n\nThe framework leads to more pools—but fragmentation already exists across fee tiers, versions, and L2s.\n\nAggregators (e.g., 1inch) and smart routers already solve this\n\nFor policy-sensitive users, verifiability > slippage\n\nFit-for-purpose liquidity is the goal—not maximum depth\n\nWhy Not Use Frontends or Raw Hooks?\n\nFrontend rules are easily bypassed\n\nRaw hooks lack auditability, standardization, and trust guarantees\n\nThe Hook Manager introduces curation, policy discovery, and on-chain enforcement—all composable and transparent\n\nGovernance & Ecosystem Design\n\nDecentralized Governance (Proposed)\n\nGovernance over Hook Managers and registered hooks scoped via UNI token\n\nTiered voting – technical changes weighted toward developers; UX-impacting changes weighted toward users\n\nRoles:\n\nHook Developers – permissionless contract authors\n\nCurators – recommend and audit hooks for specific verticals (e.g., RWA, stablecoins, MEV)\n\nLicensing & Monetization\n\nBusiness Source License (BSL) for core components, with a permissive license transition after 1 year\n\nCommercial Licensing for enterprise usage (e.g., banks, custodians)\n\nShared Deployment Costs among institutions using the same policy set\n\nRebates/Credits for LPs who help bootstrap policy-enabled pools\n\nThis model aligns incentives while supporting open experimentation.\n\nVision: Beyond Token Swaps\n\nThe Hook Manager Framework helps Uniswap v4 evolve from “flexible DEX” into a universal value exchange substrate.\n\nIt provides the structure needed to support:\n\nInstitutional finance\n\nReal-world asset settlement\n\nVerticalized DeFi use cases\n\nCross-protocol integrations\n\nComposable compliance\n\nAll without compromising core Uniswap principles of neutrality, modularity, and permissionless innovation.\n\nFeedback Requested\n\nWe invite community feedback on the following:\n\nIs the Hook Manager framework directionally aligned with Uniswap v4’s architecture and goals?\n\nAre the trade-offs (e.g., gas, fragmentation) acceptable for the benefits?\n\nDoes the governance model appropriately balance decentralization and practical execution?\n\nAre there any blockers, risks, or implementation pitfalls that deserve more attention?\n\nResources\n\nFull Whitepaper (GitHub)\n\nAuthor: Mohamed ElBendary\n\nStatus: RFC (Request for Comment)\n\nDate: May 2 2025\n\n2 Likes\n\nTrial run a Technical Advisory Board (TAB)\n\nTrial run a Technical Advisory Board (TAB)\n\nilo_0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 4:28pm\n\n2\n\nAs a protocol integrating v4 Hooks, fragmentation is a key issue for us. We love what v4 builders do, but are severly bottlenecked in which pools we can integrate due to the overgrowth of custom logic.\n\nSome context: Arcadia is the biggest ALM on Base with $11m TVL, providing management of clAMM pools through self-custodial EOAs. We’re working with L1.co’s biggest asset managers to onboard offchain capital to DeFi.\n\nCurrently, most production-ready v4 Hook protocols would require us to do dedicated smart contract work and audits for an integration. It’s basically the same work as integrating a whole new DEX.\n\nA framework to standardize v4 Hooks would drastically increase our capacity to integrate new pools, translating into more exposure for these pools to our users.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMay 7, 2025, 4:58pm\n\n3\n\nHi @mbendary, We wanted to drop a quick comment to thank you for posting this idea. You have identified a valuable problem and suggested a thoughtful solution.\n\nWe’ll follow up once we have had a chance to consider the idea more!\n\nmbendary\n\nMay 7, 2025, 6:50pm\n\n4\n\nThis is exactly the kind of context that makes the pain point real—thank you for surfacing it.\n\nThe framework aims to streamline the discoverability of relevant, trusted hook contracts and reduce the DEX-level integration burden. It does this by enabling composable policy logic, shared coordination layers, and modular governance—without requiring duplicative work across similar-profile pools.\n\nWould welcome any feedback as you explore whether this might help Arcadia scale deeper into v4’s design space.\n\nThanks again for engaging so constructively—it’s a huge boost to see validation from a team actively operating at the edge of what v4 enables.\n\n1 Like\n\nmbendary\n\nMay 7, 2025, 7:20pm\n\n5\n\nHi @GFXlabs team, I appreciate you taking the time to acknowledge the proposal and signal interest—thank you.\n\nI’d welcome any feedback once you’ve had a chance to consider it more deeply—especially around how the proposed framework and curation surfaces might align (or not) with the broader governance priorities you’re thinking through. I believe scaling DeFi beyond native crypto depends on solving how v4 hooks are composed, coordinated, and governed.\n\nHappy to go deeper or walk through specific design choices if helpful. Appreciate the thoughtful presence the GFX team brings to the ecosystem.\n\n1 Like\n\nportergeer\n\nMay 12, 2025, 11:37pm\n\n6\n\nHey Mohamed, thank you so much for this thoughtful proposal addressing hook development structure in v4. We appreciate the clear identification of challenges around standardization, security, and institutional adoption. As we at the Uniswap Foundation have also been considering how to best ensure the success and growth of Uniswap v4, we wanted to provide some feedback to some of your questions at the end of the post.\n\nIs the Hook Manager framework directionally aligned with Uniswap v4’s architecture and goals?\n\nThe challenges you’ve identified are important to address. We believe a governance-managed orchestration layer may not fully align with v4’s architectural philosophy of permissionless innovation. Instead, we see these challenges being addressed by a decentralized ecosystem of builders and participants, competing for the best solutions.\n\nWe’re actively working on initiatives that address these same challenges through a decentralized approach:\n\nSecurity: The Uniswap Foundation Security Fund supports teams building with v4 with their hook audits. This program is a part of a grant from the UF to Areta who facilitate an auditor marketplace for hook teams.\n\nInstitutional Readiness: While not live yet, we are excited to share a grant around institutional hooks in the coming weeks, alongside a white paper of strong use cases.\n\nDeveloper Efficiency: The Uniswap Hook Incubator focuses on growing a diverse and decentralized developer ecosystem in a competitive environment. We have seen really strong teams, like Cork and Tenor Finance, emerge from the UHI.\n\nAdaptability: While upgradeability sounds beneficial, we believe immutability is a core strength, not a limitation.\n\nLooking Forward\n\nWe’re excited to see forum discussion about v4’s future through your proposal. Thank you again for kickstarting this conversation. We’d welcome further discussion on:\n\nAchieving standardization without centralized coordination\n\nSpecific institutional requirements needing better documentation\n\nSupporting developers in creating secure, reusable hooks without constraining innovation\n\nmbendary\n\nMay 14, 2025, 8:23pm\n\n7\n\nHey Porter and UF Team,\n\nThank you for your thoughtful response to the Hook Manager Framework proposal. I appreciate your recognition of v4 adoption challenges and your commitment to addressing them. After reflecting on your feedback, I’d like to clarify aspects of the proposal and demonstrate its fundamental alignment with Uniswap’s core principles of permissionless innovation.\n\nTL;DR:\n\nThe Hook Manager Framework (HMF) as an Opt-In Toolkit, Not Central Control: HMF is an optional developer toolkit enabling self-organized permissionlessness for complex use cases. It neither restricts raw v4 hook development nor imposes top-down governance.\n\nAddressing Real, Documented Problems: The framework tackles current, evidenced issues of hook fragmentation, security vulnerabilities (e.g., “36% vulnerable” per BlockSec research), and integration bottlenecks impacting builders like Arcadia and institutional onboarding.\n\nAligns with UF’s Signaled Values: The UF’s endorsement of community curation (e.g., “awesome-uniswap-hooks”) shows a shared goal for an organized ecosystem. HMF offers a robust, on-chain mechanism for opt-in achievement.\n\nStrategic Imperative for Uniswap v4: Given the competitive landscape (e.g. PancakeSwap Infinity to Uniswap v4 parity) and Uniswap v4’s BSL, HMF provides crucial systemic capabilities to build a stronger, differentiated ecosystem and maintain leadership.\n\nAdaptability & Immutability Balanced: HMF respects core protocol immutability while offering controlled, opt-in adaptability for policy layers—vital for global compliance, RWA needs, preventing fragmentation, and reducing fork incentives.\n\nOpen to Community-Driven Implementation: The proposal’s licensing/monetization details were illustrative; HMF is a public good for long-term ecosystem health, not a business venture. Implementation is open to community-aligned models.\n\nA Public Good for Ecosystem Health, Not a Business Venture\n\nBefore delving deeper, I want to address potential misinterpretations regarding licensing. The Hook Manager Framework’s primary goal is ecosystem health and enablement; it is envisioned as a public good for the Uniswap community.\n\nThe original whitepaper’s licensing and monetization details are illustrative of sustainability paths, not a rigid business venture. The framework can be implemented under various community-aligned models: as a fully open-source component, through Foundation grants, or via a DAO-governed structure. The suggested BSL approach with eventual open-sourcing mirrors Uniswap v4 itself, ensuring ecosystem benefit with reasonable initial protections. I am committed to finding an implementation path serving Uniswap’s values and governance preferences.\n\nAddressing Market Realities & Evidence of Problem Severity\n\nThe need for a more structured hook integration approach isn’t merely theoretical. As Arcadia Finance noted in their response to this RFC:\n\n“As a protocol integrating v4 Hooks, fragmentation is a key issue for us…severely bottlenecked…due to the overgrowth of custom logic… most production-ready v4 Hook protocols would require us to do dedicated smart contract work and audits for an integration. It’s basically the same work as integrating a whole new DEX.”\n\nThis feedback from a protocol “working with L1.co’s biggest asset managers to onboard off-chain capital to DeFi” highlights significant existing integration barriers. For institutions and asset managers, particularly those Arcadia helps onboard, a standardized policy-aware pool framework is a prerequisite for confident engagement.\n\nThe “awesome-uniswap-hooks” github repository (ora-io/awesome-uniswap-hooks), a community-maintained resource, details hook security vulnerabilities. Crucially, research highlighted there (by BlockSec) shows “36% of the hooks in this repository in one specific commit hash may be vulnerable to attacks.” This repository also catalogues dozens of specialized hook implementations—from oracle integration to compliance systems to cross-chain functionality. Such rapid, unstandardized proliferation exemplifies the fragmentation challenge HMF addresses. The community’s focus on educational resources and security best practices demonstrates recognition of complexity that standardized interfaces and curation could mitigate.\n\nFurther widespread challenges include:\n\nProliferation of Incompatible Hooks: Over 150 developed hooks (per Uniswap’s Jan 2025 blog) create a complex integration landscape.\n\nInstitutional Integration Complexity: The Uniswap Labs/Fireblocks collaboration highlighted integration challenges HMF would directly address.\n\nAcknowledged Hook Risks by Uniswap Labs: Uniswap Labs officially cautions users about third-party hooks, underscoring the need for solutions aiding standardization and trust.\n\nThis is not an isolated concern. Extensive community-documented security issues underscore the urgency for strategic solutions. The HMF proposal provides a foundational step, and we anticipate it will be complemented by other community-driven innovations.\n\nPermissionless Innovation Enhanced: Enabling Self-Organized Permissionlessness at Scale\n\nThe Hook Manager Framework is an opt-in toolkit augmenting v4’s permissionless foundation, enabling self-organized permissionlessness, not replacing core freedom:\n\nParallel Paths Preserved: Developers remain free to build directly against v4 core; HMF offers optional structure, similar to how OpenZeppelin contracts empower developers without restricting them.\n\nDeveloper-Driven Standards: Implementations emerge organically through developer adoption: similar to how npm packages become standards through utility, not mandate.\n\nCompetitive Framework Marketplace: The proposal envisions multiple Hook Manager implementations competing in an open marketplace, each with potentially different features, governance models, and focus areas—the very definition of permissionless competition.\n\nThe framework aims to reduce the coordination costs that inherently limit permissionless growth in complex systems, thereby preserving and even amplifying the innovation freedom that makes Uniswap powerful.\n\nWhy Now? Timing Considerations for Systemic Capabilities\n\nSome suggest it’s too early for structure. However, this early stage is precisely why a framework offering systemic capabilities for coordination and composability is timely:\n\nStandards are more effective early: Lightweight standardization now prevents incompatible approaches from becoming entrenched, avoiding costly retroactive fixes later, or being cornered into sub-optimal choices. The longer we wait, the more costly coordination becomes.\n\nExisting Integration Bottlenecks: Evidenced integration challenges due to fragmentation are already constraining growth today.\n\nCompetitive Window: PancakeSwap Infinity’s release (GPL 2.0) with v4 feature parity underscores Uniswap’s window to establish deeper, differentiated ecosystem advantages. Uniswap v4 BSL expires in June 2027. Uniswap’s sustainable leadership will depend on fostering superior developer experience, composability, and ecosystem cohesion. Addressing structural challenges now prevents ceding ground to competitors who might create more builder-friendly environments.\n\nRetroactively imposing structure is significantly harder. HMF provides just enough structure for cohesion to address scaling challenges without restricting innovation. It also provides a strong foundation for enduring competitiveness beyond protocol primitives through a thriving, composable, and efficient ecosystem.\n\nGlobal Compliance Reality: Building for Uniswap’s Actual User Base\n\nGiven that 90% of Uniswap users are based outside the U.S. (per Hayden Adams, Nov 2024), and with diverse global crypto regulations emerging (e.g., MENA), adaptable compliance is crucial. HMF provides the necessary systemic capabilities for pools to implement jurisdiction-specific compliance. Supporting global participation requires localized, adaptable policy enforcement. HMF allows DAOs and institutions to build and manage these solutions without fragmenting Uniswap’s core or incentivizing forks. Crucially, this enhances agility at the ecosystem level, which is essential for Uniswap’s continued global growth.\n\nImmutability and Adaptability: A Nuanced Balance\n\nWe respect immutability as the cornerstone preventing protocol stewards from creating walled gardens. The proposal has been misinterpreted as challenging this principle. In fact, it carefully preserves it while enabling controlled adaptability for opt-in policy layers:\n\nCore Protocol Immutability Preserved: HMF maintains Uniswap v4 core contract immutability and v4 hook attachment semantics.\n\nScoped and Governed Pausing: Pausing applies only to pools opt-in to a specific Hook Manager and requires governance by that scope—preserving broader protocol immutability.\n\nProtected Policy Evolution: When regulatory requirements change, opted-in policy hooks can adapt without requiring liquidity migration from those specific pools or protocol.\n\nThis nuanced approach recognizes that while immutability is invaluable for core logic, its universal application to dynamic policy enforcement can be a practical limitation, unnecessarily lowering the ceiling for ecosystem growth.\n\nMarket Selection with Purpose\n\nMarket forces drive adoption. However, they operate most efficiently within some structural baseline. HMF enhances market selection, by preserving competition on innovation while removing unnecessary integration friction:\n\nBy lowering integration barriers, the Hook Manager ensures a level playing field where developers compete on functionality, security, and value—accelerating adoption and expanding Uniswap’s composable ecosystem.\n\nIt accelerates organic standardization, reducing economic inefficiency, akin to Web3 token standards or oracle interfaces. HMF is a minimal coordination layer, much like standardized shipping containers revolutionized trade by making the process efficient, not dictating the cargo.\n\nInterestingly, the Uniswap Foundation has implicitly acknowledged the value of such organization. The “awesome-uniswap-hooks” repository notes: “Special thanks to Uniswap Foundation for including this resource in the official doc and mentioning this work in the blog!” This Foundation-endorsed community curation serves HMF’s fundamental purpose: organization, standardization, and quality guidance. HMF proposes formalizing and strengthening this with opt-in robust on-chain mechanisms, not just off-chain curation. This alignment suggests a shared goal for an organized, accessible hook ecosystem; we propose a more comprehensive technical implementation of what the Foundation already supports in principle.\n\nAligning with and Amplifying Foundation Initiatives\n\nThe Hook Manager Framework is designed not to compete with, but to synergize with and amplify the impact of the Uniswap Foundation’s valuable initiatives:\n\nSecurity Fund Enhancement: HMF promotes modular, single-purpose hooks adhering to the Single Responsibility Principle. Such hooks are inherently more cost-effective to audit, thereby multiplying the impact of the UF Security Fund and Areta’s marketplace by allowing resources to cover more ground or deeper analyses.\n\nInstitutional Hook Development: As the Foundation explores institutional hooks and use cases, HMF offers a robust, opt-in technical foundation and standardized patterns for their on-chain implementation. This provides the prerequisite structure for confident engagement by institutions requiring auditable and governable policy enforcement.\n\nHook Incubator Acceleration: For innovative teams emerging from the Hook Incubator, such as Cork and Tenor Finance, HMF can serve as an optional accelerator. By providing battle-tested patterns for orchestration and policy management, it allows these teams to focus on their unique value propositions rather than expending resources on rebuilding foundational infrastructure.\n\nMoving Forward: A Developer Toolkit, Not a Governance Layer\n\nThe Hook Manager Framework is fundamentally aligned with the Foundation’s goals for Uniswap v4: scaling permissionless innovation, strengthening ecosystem composability, and supporting sustainable growth. To bring clarity to the alignment with the Foundation’s vision for the ecosystem, I reframe the Hook Manager as:\n\nA Developer Toolkit: Simplifying complex orchestration, reducing duplication, enabling developers to focus on unique value, fostering self-organized permissionlessness.\n\nA Building Block for DAOs: Enabling DAOs to implement and govern their own policy enforcement without protocol-level changes.\n\nAn Ecosystem Protection Mechanism: Standardized interfaces reduce fork incentives, enrich the ecosystem with differentiated systemic capabilities, preserving Uniswap’s network effects and long-term growth.\n\nTo further these goals collaboratively, I would welcome the opportunity to:\n\nExplore how modular HMF components could directly support and enhance your initiatives without requiring wholesale adoption.\n\nI am particularly keen on identifying targeted institutional requirements where standardized interfaces would unlock more innovation, providing the prerequisite for confident engagement. I look forward to your upcoming whitepaper and am happy to serve as a reviewer.\n\nDevelop a simplified version focused on developer tooling aligned with your current approach.\n\nThank you for engaging with this proposal. It is a privilege to be part of the Uniswap community. I remain committed to Uniswap’s success and finding solutions balancing permissionless innovation with the maturing ecosystem’s practical needs.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nEstablish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n696\n\nApril 4, 2025\n\nBrief thoughts on how the DAO could grow\n\nUncategorized\n\n14\n\n888\n\nOctober 28, 2024\n\n[RFC] Native Execution Privacy in the Uniswap Interface via v4 Hooks and UniswapX\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n16\n\n705\n\nAugust 29, 2026\n\nAvantgarde Finance Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n1063\n\nNovember 27, 2025\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n52\n\n3332\n\nSeptember 29, 2025","tokens":6373,"crawled_at":1791192772015} +{"id":10144,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/podcast/programming-languages-crypto","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Programming Languages & Crypto - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nProgramming Languages & Crypto\nSam Blackshear, Noah Citron, Eddy Lazzarin, and Sonal Chokshi\n01.30.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\ncode & engineering\ninfrastructure\nopen source\npodcast\nprogramming\nsmart contracts\ntech trends\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nEPISODE SUMMARY\n\nwith @b1ackd0g @noahcitron @eddylazzarin @smc90 A wide-ranging conversation all about programming languages and crypto — for both existing blockchain & smart contract programmers, other non-web3 developers seeking to enter the space, and anyone interested in how programming languages evolve and come into existence (as well as in the intersection of language, code, and expression). The discussion covers differences (and similarities) in conventional programming languages vs. smart contract programming; debates the unique constraints (and opportunities) of blockchains; and also touches on topics such as formal verification, governance & community, tooling, cross-platform adaptation, and much much more… but also the history, ebbs, and flows of traditional programming to today.\n\nEPISODE NOTES\n\nwith @b1ackd0g @noahcitron @eddylazzarin @smc90\n\nThis episode is all about programming languages and crypto — and it’s for both existing blockchain & smart contract programmers, and also other non-web3 developers seeking to enter the space… and, for anyone who is just curious about how programming languages evolve and come into existence (as well as interested in the intersection of language, code, and expression!)\n\nIt’s a fun and fascinating ride, because we cover everything from differences (and similarities) in conventional programming languages vs. smart contract programming; discuss and debate the unique constraints (and opportunities) of blockchains; and also touch on topics such as formal verification, governance & community, tooling, cross-platform adaptation, and much much more… But we also dig into with the history, ebbs, and flows of traditional programming to today.\n\nOur guests in this episode, in conversation with Sonal Chokshi, include:\n\nSam Blackshear — co-founder and CTO of Mysten Labs (which is building foundations for the decentralized future of web3); Sam has a long history in programming languages from his PhD to working at Facebook (and Libra/Diem) to creating and being one of the authors of Move, an open-source programming language for building smart contracts;\n\nNoah Citron, smart contract & research engineer here at a16z crypto (who also recently authored a light client for Ethereum called Helios, and, won a challenging gas-optimization challenge with another partner here); and\n\nEddy Lazzarin, head of engineering for a16z crypto; before that, Eddy was in software engineering at Netflix, as well as data engineering and data science at Facebook.\n\nAs a reminder, none of this is investment, business, legal, or tax advice; please see a16z.com/disclosures for more important information – including, a link to a list of our investments.","tokens":773,"crawled_at":1791192773532} +{"id":10145,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/demos/hello-world","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Hello World - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Hello World\n\nThe Hello World AI agent provides an overview of the main components of an AI agent and how they work together. The goal of this AI agent is to help new users of Open Autonomy understand how the components of an AI agent work. While the AI agent itself is very simple, it demonstrates common features found in many AI agents and can be used as a starting point for building your own AI agent with more complex functionalities.\n\nArchitecture of the demo+\n\nThe demo is composed of:\n\n4 Docker containers implementing the 4 agent instances of the AI agent (abci0, abci1, abci2, abci3), and\n\n4 Docker containers implementing a Tendermint node for each agent instance (node0, node1, node2, node3).\n\nThe agent instances connect to the remote DRAND service through the Internet during the execution\nof the demo.\n\nHello World AI agent demo architecture with four agent instances\n\nRunning the demo\n\nYou can find the instructions on how to run the Hello World AI agent in the quick start guide.\n\nIf you have set up the framework, you can fetch the source code of the Hello World AI agent:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0: --alias hello_world_agent\n\nand the Hello World AI agent:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0: --service --alias hello_world_service\n\nDetails of the demo\n\nThe functionality of the AI agent is extremely simple. Namely, each agent instance will output at different times a HELLO_WORLD! message on their local console. The execution timeline is divided into periods, and within each period, only a nominated agent instance(keeper) will print the HELLO_WORLD! message. The other agent instances will just print a neutral face :|.\n\nInfo\n\nIn the context of AI agent, you can think of a period as an interval where the service executes an iteration of its intended functionality (e.g., checking some price on a market, execute an investment strategy, or in this demo, printing a message).\n\nRecall that agent instances synchronize their state using the consensus gadget. For clarity, we will simplify the consensus gadget infrastructure (the consensus gadget nodes plus the consensus gadget network) in a single green box.\n\nA simplified view of the Hello world AI agent architecture\n\nImportant\n\nEvery AI agent is connected to the consensus gadget through its consensus gadget node:\n\nThe consensus gadget is the component that makes possible for the agent instances to synchronise state data. This allows them to, e.g. reach agreement on certain actions or reconcile information.\n\nAnything happening at the consensus network level is completely abstracted away so that developers can see it as a given functionality. An application run by the AI agent can be thought and developed as a single \"virtual\" application, and the framework will take care of replicating it.\n\nCurrently, the consensus gadget is implemented using Tendermint.\n\nThis is what the AI agent execution looks like:\n\nHello World AI agent in action\n\nThe main questions that we try to answer in the sections below are:\n\nWhat are the main components of the Open Autonomy framework to implement an AI agent?\n\nHow do these components work?\n\nThe FSM of the AI agent\n\nAs discussed in the overview of the development process, the first steps when designing an AI agent are draft the AI agent idea and define the FSM specification that represents its business logic. This is a representation of the Hello World AI agent FSM:\n\nDiagram of individual operations of the Hello World AI agent\n\nThese are the states of the AI agent:\n\nRegistration. This is a preliminary state where each agent instance commits to participate actively in the AI agent.\n\nCollectRandomness. All agent instances connect to the DRAND remote service and retrieve the latest published random value.\n\nSelectKeeper. Using that random value as seed, the agent instances nominate randomly an instance (keeper) to execute the AI agent action.\n\nPrintMessage. The keeper executes the main action of the AI agent: prints the HELLO_WORLD! message.\n\nResetAndPause. A state where agent instances wait a bit before re-starting again the main cycle of the AI agent.\n\nAnd these the possible events (not all events can occur at every state):\n\nDONE. The state has successfully completed its intended purpose.\n\nNO_MAJORITY. There is no majority (more than 2/3) of agent instances that agree in the outcome of the state.\n\nTIMEOUT. Not all agent instances responded within a specified amount of time.\n\nYou can see above how the AI agent transits from one state to another given the event occurred at each one. The synchronized state enforced by the consensus gadget means that all the agent instances have the same view of the AI agent FSM, and all the instances execute the same transitions. This is one of the key concepts of the Open Autonomy framework.\n\nA note on determinism\n\nOne of the key points in an AI agent is determinism. It is very important that all the agent instances execute deterministic actions at each step, otherwise it will be impossible to synchronize their shared state.\n\nFor example, if the AI agent needs to execute some random action, all agent instances must retrieve the random seed from a common source, in this case, the DRAND service.\n\nGiven the description of the AI agent, it is immediate to obtain the FSM specification file.\n\nThe Hello World AI agent fsm_specification.yaml file\nfsm_specification.yamlalphabet_in:\n- DONE\n- NO_MAJORITY\n- RESET_TIMEOUT\n- ROUND_TIMEOUT\ndefault_start_state: RegistrationRound\nfinal_states: []\nlabel: HelloWorldAbciApp\nstart_states:\n- RegistrationRound\nstates:\n- CollectRandomnessRound\n- PrintMessageRound\n- RegistrationRound\n- ResetAndPauseRound\n- SelectKeeperRound\ntransition_func:\n(CollectRandomnessRound, DONE): SelectKeeperRound\n(CollectRandomnessRound, NO_MAJORITY): CollectRandomnessRound\n(CollectRandomnessRound, ROUND_TIMEOUT): CollectRandomnessRound\n(PrintMessageRound, DONE): ResetAndPauseRound\n(PrintMessageRound, ROUND_TIMEOUT): RegistrationRound\n(RegistrationRound, DONE): CollectRandomnessRound\n(ResetAndPauseRound, DONE): CollectRandomnessRound\n(ResetAndPauseRound, NO_MAJORITY): RegistrationRound\n(ResetAndPauseRound, RESET_TIMEOUT): RegistrationRound\n(SelectKeeperRound, DONE): PrintMessageRound\n(SelectKeeperRound, NO_MAJORITY): RegistrationRound\n(SelectKeeperRound, ROUND_TIMEOUT): RegistrationRound\n\nThe FSM App of the AI agent\n\nEach agent blueprint is composed of a number of components, namely, connections, protocols, contracts and skills. In order to become part of an AI agent, the agent blueprint requires a special skill: the FSM App. The FSM App skill is the component that processes events,transits the states of the AI agent FSM, and executes the actions of the AI agent.\n\nZoom on a Hello World AI agent.\n\nThe FSM App is a complex component that consists of a number of classes. Below we list the main ones.\n\nFor each state of the AI agent FSM:\n\nA Behaviour: The class that executes the proactive action at each state. For example, cast a vote for a keeper, print a message on screen, send a transaction on a blockchain, etc.\n\nA Payload: The message exchanged between agent instances in the state to indicate completion of the action. For example, a message containing what keeper the agent instance is voting for.\n\nA Round: The class that processes the input from the consensus gadget and outputs the appropriate events to make the next transition. For example, output the event DONE when all agent bluprint instances have cast they vote for a keeper.\n\nAdditionally, the following two classes:\n\nAbciApp: The class that defines the FSM itself and the transitions between states according to the FSM.\n\nRoundBehaviour: The main class of the FSM App skill, which aggregates the AbciApp and establishes a one-to-one relationship between the rounds and behaviours of each state.\n\nIn summary, the Hello World AI agent FSM App requires 5 Behaviours, 5 Payloads, 5 Rounds, 1 AbciApp and 1 RoundBehaviour.\n\nAgent Blueprints vs Agent instances\n\nAll agent instances in an AI agent are implemented by the same codebase. We call such codebase an agent blueprint, and we call each of the actual instances an agent instance. We often use agent instance for short when there is no risk of confusion and it is clear from the context which of the two terms we are referring to.\n\nEach agent instance in an AI agent can be parameterized with their own set of keys, addresses and other required attributes.\n\nHow the FSM App works\n\nLet us focus on what happens inside the FSM App of an agent instance when the AI agent is located in the SelectKeeper state and it transitions to the PrintMessage state.\n\nExecute the action and prepare the payload. The SelectKeeperBehaviour is in charge of two tasks:\n\nExecute the intended action, that is, determine which agent instance will be voted for as the new keeper. The choice is made deterministically, based on the randomness retrieved from DRAND.\n\nPrepares the SelectKeeperPayload, which contains its selection.\n\nSend the payload. The SelectKeeperBehaviour is in charge sends the payload to the consensus gadget.\n\nReach consensus. The consensus gadget reads all the agent instances' outputs, and ensures that all instances have the same consistent view. The gadget takes the responsibility of executing the consensus algorithm, which is abstracted away to the developer. The consensus gadget uses a short-lived blockchain to execute the consensus algorithm.\n\nNote\n\n\"Reaching consensus\" does not mean that the consensus gadget ensures that all the agent instance send the same payload. Rather, it means that all the agent instance have a consistent view on what payload was sent by each of them. In this particular case, however all agent instance cast the same vote.\n\nCallback to the FSM App. Once the consensus phase is finished, the SelectKeeperRound receives a callback and processes the outputs. Based on that, it casts an event. In this case, if strictly more than 2/3 of the agent instance voted for a certain keeper, it casts the event DONE.\n\nTransition to the next state. The event DONE is received by the AbciApp class, which executes the transition to the next state (PrintMessage).\n\nThe executions of further state transitions can be easily mapped with what has been presented here for the transition SelectKeeper → PrintMessage.\n\nTransition PrintMessage → ResetAndPause\nFollowing the same steps as above, this is what would happen:\n\nThe PrintMessageBehaviour, executes the main functionality. For the chosen keeper, it will be printing the HELLO_WORLD message. The rest of the agent instance simply print a neutral face.\n\nResult of the execution the second period of the Hello World AI agent\n\nThe PrintMessageBehaviour sends a PrintMessagePayload to the consensus gadget, indicating what was the message it printed by each agent.\n\nThe consensus gadget executes the consensus protocol ensuring a consistent view for all the agent instance.\n\nThe PrintMessageRound receives a callback, and after checking that all agent instance have responded it will produce the DONE event.\n\nThe AbciApp processes the event DONE, and moves to the next state, ResetAndPause.\n\nNote\n\nObserve that whereas in the SelectKeeper state we expect that all agent instance output the same payload to the consensus gadget (the same keeper vote), in the PrintMessage state it is admissible that the instantce send different values, because they print different things on their console.\n\nOther states might have different waiting conditions, for instance\n\nwait until all agent instance respond with a (possibly) different value, or\n\nwait until more than a threshold of instances respond with the same value.\n\nWhen the waiting condition is not met during a certain time interval, a special timeout event is generated by the Round, and the developer is in charge of defining how the FSM will transit in that case. You can see some of these unexpected events in the FSM diagram above.\n\nBird's eye view\n\nAs a summary, find below an image which shows the main components of the agent blueprint and the skill related to the Hello World AI agent presented in this overview. Of course, this is by no means the complete picture of what is inside an agent blueprint, but it should give a good intuition of what are the main elements that play a role in any AI agent and how they interact.\n\nMain components of an agent instance that play a role in an AI agent. Red arrows indicate a high-level flow of messages when the agent instance is in the SelectKeeper state.\n\nCoding the Hello World AI agent: a primer\n\nAs detailed in the overview of the development process, in order to create an AI agent, you must:\n\ncode the FSM App skill,\n\ndefine the agent blueprint, and\n\ndefine the AI agent.\n\nWe will explore this source code in the sections below, paying attention on the main parts that you should take into account.\n\nExploring the FSM App skill code\n\nTake a look at the structure of the FSM App skill of the Hello World agent blueprint (called hello_world_abci):\n\n./hello_world_agent/vendor/valory/skills/hello_world_abci/\n|\n├── __init__.py\n├── behaviours.py\n├── dialogues.py\n├── fsm_specification.yaml\n├── handlers.py\n├── models.py\n├── payloads.py\n├── README.md\n├── rounds.py\n├── skill.yaml\n└── tests/\n\nNote that the easiest way to start building a new FSM App is by using the FSM App scaffold tool, because it already populates many of these files. The most important files you should look at are:\n\nbehaviours.py: This file defines the Behaviours, which encode the proactive actions occurring at each state of the FSM. Each behaviour is one-to-one associated to a Round. It also contains the HelloWorldRoundBehaviour class, which can be thought as the \"main\" class for the skill behaviour.\n\nEach behaviour must:\n\nSet the matching_round attribute to the corresponding Round class.\n\nDefine the action executed in the state inside the method async_act().\n\nPrepare the Payload associated with this state. The payload can be anything that other agent instance might find useful for the action in this or future states.\n\nSend the Payload, which the consensus gadget will be in charge of synchronizing with all the agent instances.\n\nWait until the consensus gadget finishes its work, and mark the state set_done().\n\nThe last three steps above are common for all the Behaviours.\n\nThe PrintMessageBehaviour class\nClass diagram:\n\nHierarchy of the PrintMessageBehaviour class (some methods and fields are omitted)\n\nThe HelloWorldABCIBaseBehaviour is a convenience class, and the upper class in the hierarchy are abstract classes from the stack that facilitate re-usability of code when implementing the Behaviour. An excerpt of the PrintMessageBehaviour code is:\n\nclass PrintMessageBehaviour(HelloWorldABCIBaseBehaviour, ABC):\n\"\"\"Prints the celebrated 'HELLO WORLD!' message.\"\"\"\n\nmatching_round = PrintMessageRound\n\ndef async_act(self) -> Generator:\n\"\"\"\nDo the action.\n\nSteps:\n- Determine if this agent instance is the current keeper agent instance.\n- Print the appropriate to the local console.\n- Send the transaction with the printed message and wait for it to be mined.\n- Wait until ABCI application transitions to the next round.\n- Go to the next behaviour (set done event).\n\"\"\"\n\nif (\nself.context.agent_address\n== self.synchronized_data.most_voted_keeper_address\n):\nmessage = self.params.hello_world_string\nelse:\nmessage = \":|\"\n\nprinted_message = f\"Agent {self.context.agent_name} (address {self.context.agent_address}) in period {self.synchronized_data.period_count} says: {message}\"\n\nprint(printed_message)\nself.context.logger.info(f\"printed_message={printed_message}\")\n\npayload = PrintMessagePayload(self.context.agent_address, printed_message)\n\nyield from self.send_a2a_transaction(payload)\nyield from self.wait_until_round_end()\n\nself.set_done()\n\nOnce all the Behaviours are defined, you can define the HelloWorldRoundBehaviour class. This class follows a quite standard structure in all AI agents, and the reader can easily infer what is it from the source code.\n\nThe HelloWorldRoundBehaviour class\nclass HelloWorldRoundBehaviour(AbstractRoundBehaviour):\n\"\"\"This behaviour manages the consensus stages for the Hello World abci app.\"\"\"\n\ninitial_behaviour_cls = RegistrationBehaviour\nabci_app_cls = HelloWorldAbciApp\nbehaviours: Set[Type[BaseBehaviour]] = {\nRegistrationBehaviour, # type: ignore\nCollectRandomnessBehaviour, # type: ignore\nSelectKeeperBehaviour, # type: ignore\nPrintMessageBehaviour, # type: ignore\nResetAndPauseBehaviour, # type: ignore\n}\n\npayloads.py: This file defines the payloads associated to the consensus engine for each of the states. Payloads are data objects, and carry almost no business logic.\n\nThe PrintMessagePayload class\n@dataclass(frozen=True)\nclass PrintMessagePayload(BaseTxPayload):\n\"\"\"Represent a transaction payload of type 'randomness'.\"\"\"\n\nmessage: str\n\nrounds.py: This file contains the implementation of the rounds associated to each state and the shared SynchronizedData class (the class that stores the AI agent shared state). It also contains the declaration of the FSM events, and the HelloWorldAbciApp, which defines the transition function of the FSM.\n\nEach round must:\n\nInherit from one of the classes that determine what kind of consensus is expected at the associated sate: CollectDifferentUntilAllRound, CollectSameUntilAllRound, CollectSameUntilThresholdRound, etc.\n\nSet the payload_class attribute to the corresponding Payload class.\n\nSet other attributes required by the inherited class.\n\nImplement the end_block() method, which is called by the consensus gadget. This method must output the updated SynchronizedData and the event produced after evaluating the consensus result.\n\nThe PrintMessageRound class\nClass diagram:\n\nHierarchy of the PrintMessageRound class (some methods and fields are omitted)\n\nThe HelloWorldABCIAbstractRound is a convenience class defined in the same file. The class CollectDifferentUntilAllRound is a helper class for rounds that expect that each agent instance sends a different message. In this case, the message to be sent is the agent instance printed by each instance, which will be obviously different for each instance (one of them will be the HELLO_WORLD! message, and the others will be empty messages).\n\nclass PrintMessageRound(CollectDifferentUntilAllRound, HelloWorldABCIAbstractRound):\n\"\"\"A round in which the keeper prints the message\"\"\"\n\npayload_class = PrintMessagePayload\n\ndef end_block(self) -> Optional[Tuple[BaseSynchronizedData, Event]]:\n\"\"\"Process the end of the block.\"\"\"\nif self.collection_threshold_reached:\nsynchronized_data = self.synchronized_data.update(\nparticipants=tuple(sorted(self.collection)),\nprinted_messages=sorted(\n[\ncast(PrintMessagePayload, payload).message\nfor payload in self.collection.values()\n]\n),\nsynchronized_data_class=SynchronizedData,\n)\nreturn synchronized_data, Event.DONE\nreturn None\n\nIf the successful condition occurs, the end_block() method returns the appropriate event (DONE) so that the AbciApp can process and transit to the next round.\n\nObserve that the RegistrationRound is very similar to the PrintMessageRound, as it simply has to collect the different addresses that each agent instance sends. On the other hand, the classes CollectRandomnessRound and SelectKeeperRound just require to define some parent classes attributes, as they execute fairly standard operations already available in the framework.\n\nAfter having defined all the Rounds, the HelloWorldAbciApp does not have much mystery. It simply defines the transitions from one state to another in the FSM, arranged as Python dictionaries. For example,\n\nSelectKeeperRound: {\nEvent.DONE: PrintMessageRound,\nEvent.NO_MAJORITY: RegistrationRound,\nEvent.ROUND_TIMEOUT: RegistrationRound,\n},\n\ndenotes the three possible transitions from the SelectKeeperRound to the corresponding Rounds, according to the FSM depicted above.\n\nWhereas these are the main files to take into account, there are other files that are also required, and you can take a look:\n\nskill.yaml: This is the skill specification file. It defines the sub-components (e.g. protocols, connections) required by the skill, as well as a number of configuration parameters.\n\nhandlers.py: Defines the Handlers (implementing reactive actions) used by the skill. It is mandatory that the skill associated to an agent blueprint implements a handler inherited from the ABCIRoundHandler. Other handlers are required according to the actions that the skill is performing (e.g., interacting with an HTTP server). As you can see by exploring the file, little coding is expected unless you need to implement a custom protocol.\n\ndialogues.py: It defines the dialogues associated to the protocols described in the skill.yaml configuration file. Again, not much coding is expected in most cases.\n\nmodels.py: It defines the models of the skill, which usually consist of the SharedState and the configuration parameters Params classes. The classes defined here are linked with the contents in the section models in the file skill.yaml.\n\nfsm_specification.yaml: The FSM App specification file. It is used for checking the consistency of the implementation, and it can be used to verify the implementation or to scaffold the FSM App providing an initial structure.\n\nExploring the agent blueprint definition code\n\nThe agent blueprint configuration file aea-config.yaml is located in the root folder of the agent:\n\n./hello_world_agent/\n|\n├── __init__.py\n├── aea-config.yaml\n├── README.md\n├── tests/\n└── vendor/\n\nAgent blueprints are defined through the Open AEA library as YAML files, which specify what components the agent blueprint made of (connections, protocols, contracts and skills). Recall that an agent blueprint requires the FSM App skill to work in an AI agent.\n\nThis is an excerpt of the aea-config.yaml file:\n\naea-config.yaml# (...)\nconnections:\n- valory/abci:0.1.0\n- valory/http_client:0.23.0\n- valory/ipfs:0.1.0\n- valory/ledger:0.19.0\n- valory/p2p_libp2p_client:0.1.0\ncontracts: []\nprotocols:\n- open_aea/signing:1.0.0\n- valory/abci:0.1.0\n- valory/http:1.0.0\n- valory/ipfs:0.1.0\nskills:\n- valory/abstract_abci:0.1.0\n- valory/abstract_round_abci:0.1.0\n- valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\n# (...)\n\nIt is mandatory that agent blueprints include some of mandatory components: the abci connection, the abci protocol, the abstract_abci skill and the abstract_round_abci skill.\n\nAdditionally, the agent blueprint can use other connections, protocols or skills, depending of its particular needs. In the example, the http_client connection and the http protocol allows the agent instances to interact with HTTP servers (although we are not using it in this AI agent). Similarly, you can add the ledger connection and the ledger_api protocol in case the agent instance needs to interact with a blockchain.\nIt obviously contains the hello_world_abci skill, which is the FSM App skill discussed above.\n\nNote that although it is possible to develop your own protocols and connections, the Open AEA framework provides a number of typical ones which can be reused. Therefore, it is usual that the developer focuses most of its programming efforts in coding the particular skill(s) for their new agent blueprint.\n\nExploring the AI agent definition code\n\nThe AI agent configuration file service.yaml is located in the root folder of the AI agent:\n\n./hello_world_service/\n|\n├── README.md\n└── service.yaml\n\nYou can read the dedicated section to understand the structure and configuration of the service.yaml file.\n\nConclusion and further reading\n\nEven though printing HELLO_WORLD! on a local console is far from being an exciting functionality, the Hello World AI agent shows a number of non-trivial elements that are key components in many agent blueprints:\n\nThe agent blueprint defines a sequence of individual, well-defined actions, whose execution in the appropriate order achieves the intended functionality.\n\nAgent instance have to interact with each other to execute each of those actions, and reach a consensus on a number of decisions at certain moments (e.g., which is the keeper instance that prints the message in each period).\n\nAgent instance execute actions on their own. In this simple example it just consists of printing a local message.\n\nAgent instance have to use a shared, global store for persistent data (e.g., which was the last instance that printed the message).\n\nFinally, the AI agent can progress even if some agent instance is faulty or malicious (up to a certain threshold of malicious instances).\n\nIn this toy example we are not verifying that the keeper behaves honestly: there is no way for the other agent instance to verify its console. However, in a real AI agent that implements some critical operation (e.g., like sending a transaction to a blockchain) further verification and security mechanisms have to be put in place.\n\nThis walk-through, together with the overview of the development process should give you some confidence to start creating your first AI agent. Obviously, there are more elements in the Open Autonomy framework that facilitate building complex applications by enabling to interact with blockchains and other networks. We refer the reader to the more advanced sections of the documentation (e.g., key concepts) where we explore in detail the components of the stack.","tokens":6324,"crawled_at":1791192776701} +{"id":10146,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm/dual-block-architecture","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Dual-block architecture | Hyperliquid Docs","text":"For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.\nThe total HyperEVM throughput is split between small blocks produced at a fast rate and large blocks produced at a slower rate.\nThe primary motivation behind the dual-block architecture is to decouple block speed and block size when allocating throughput improvements. Users want faster blocks for lower time to confirmation. Builders want larger blocks to include larger transactions such as more complex contract deployments. Instead of a forced tradeoff, the dual-block system will allow simultaneous improvement along both axes.\nThe HyperEVM \"mempool\" is still onchain state with respect to the umbrella L1 execution, but is split into two independent mempools that source transactions for the two block types. The two block types are interleaved with a unique increasing sequence of EVM block numbers. The onchain mempool implementation accepts only the next 8 nonces for each address. Transactions older than 1 day old in the mempool are pruned.\nThe initial configuration is set conservatively, and throughput is expected to increase over successive technical upgrades. Fast block duration is set to 1 seconds with a 3M gas limit. Slow block duration is set to 1 minute with a 30M gas limit.\nMore precisely, in the definitions above, block duration of x means that the first L1 block for each value of l1_block_time % x produces an EVM block.\nDevelopers can deploy larger contracts as follows:\n\nSubmit action {\"type\": \"evmUserModify\", \"usingBigBlocks\": true} to direct HyperEVM transactions to big blocks instead of small blocks. Note that this user state flag is set on the HyperCore user level, and must be unset again to target small blocks. Like any action, this requires an existing Core user to send. Like any EOA, the deployer address can be converted to a Core user by receiving a Core asset such as USDC.\n\nOptionally use the JSON-RPC method bigBlockGasPrice in place of gasPrice to estimate base gas fee on the next big block.\n\nPreviousHyperEVM\nNextRaw HyperEVM block data\n\nLast updated 4 months ago","tokens":527,"crawled_at":1791192783297} +{"id":10147,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/building-helios-ethereum-light-client","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Building Helios: Fully trustless access to Ethereum - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nBuilding Helios: Fully trustless access to Ethereum\nNoah Citron\n11.06.22\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nThe pitfalls of centralized infrastructure: theoretical creatures in Ethereum’s “dark forest” The pitfalls of centralized infrastructure: theoretical creatures in Ethereum’s “dark forest”\nIntroducing Helios: fully trustless access to Ethereum\nUsing Helios in the wild\nTags\ncode & engineering\nEthereum\nhelios\nlight clients\nopen source\nsecurity\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nOne of the main reasons we use blockchains is trustlessness. This property promises to allow us self-sovereign access to our wealth and data. For the most part, blockchains like Ethereum have delivered on this promise — our assets are truly ours.\n\nHowever, there are concessions we’ve made for the sake of convenience. One such area is in our use of centralized RPC (remote procedure call) servers. Users typically access Ethereum through centralized providers like Alchemy. These companies run high-performance nodes on cloud servers so that others can easily access chain data. When a wallet queries its token balances or checks whether a pending transaction has been included in a block, it almost always does so through one of these centralized providers.\n\nThe trouble with the existing system is that users need to trust the providers, and there is no way to verify the correctness of their queries.\n\nEnter Helios, a Rust-based Ethereum light client we developed that provides fully trustless access to Ethereum. Helios — which uses Ethereum’s light client protocol, made possible by the recent switch to proof of stake — converts data from an untrusted centralized RPC provider into a verifiably safe, local RPC. Helios works together with centralized RPCs to make it possible to verify their authenticity without running a full node.\n\nThe tradeoff between portability and decentralization is a common pain point, but our client – which we’ve made available to the public to build on and more – syncs in around two seconds, requires no storage, and allows users to access secure chain data from any device (including mobile phones and browser extensions). But what are the potential pitfalls of relying on centralized infrastructure? We cover how they might play out in this post, walk through our design decisions, and also outline a few ideas for others to contribute to the codebase.\n\nThe pitfalls of centralized infrastructure: theoretical creatures in Ethereum’s “dark forest”\n\nA (theoretical) creature lurks in the dark forest. This one doesn’t hunt for its prey in the Ethereum mempool, but instead sets its traps by mimicking centralized infrastructure that we’ve come to rely on. The users who get caught in this trap don’t make any mistakes: They visit their favorite decentralized exchange, set a reasonable slippage tolerance, and buy and sell tokens as usual… They do everything right, but still fall victim to a new kind of sandwich attack, a trap meticulously set at the very entrance to Ethereum’s dark forest: RPC providers.\n\nBefore we elaborate, let’s look at how trades work on decentralized exchanges. When users send a swap transaction, they provide several parameters to the smart contract — which tokens to swap, the swap amount, and most importantly, the minimum number of tokens a user must receive for the transaction to go through. This last parameter specifies that the swap must satisfy a “minimum output,” or revert. This is often known as “slippage tolerance,” as it effectively sets the maximum price change that can occur between when the transaction is sent to the mempool and when it is included in a block. If this parameter is set too low, the user accepts the possibility of receiving fewer tokens. This situation can also lead to a sandwich attack, where an attacker effectively sandwiches the bid between two malicious swaps. The swaps drive up the spot price and forces the user’s trade to execute at a less favorable price. The attacker then sells immediately to collect a small profit.\n\nSo long as this minimum output parameter is set near the fair value, you are safe from sandwich attacks. But what if your RPC provider doesn’t provide an accurate price quote from the decentralized exchange smart contract? A user can then be tricked into signing a swap transaction with a lower minimum output parameter, and, to make matters worse, sends the transaction straight to the malicious RPC provider. Instead of broadcasting this transaction to the public mempool, where dozens of bots compete to perform the sandwich attack, the provider can withhold it and send the attack transaction bundle directly to Flashbots, securing the profits for themselves.\n\nThe root cause of this attack is trusting somebody else to fetch the state of the blockchain. Experienced users have traditionally solved this problem by running their own Ethereum nodes — a time and resource-intensive endeavor that, at the very least, requires a constantly-online machine, hundreds of gigabytes of storage, and around a day to sync from scratch. This process is certainly easier than it used to be; groups like Ethereum on ARM have worked tirelessly to make it possible to run nodes on low-cost hardware (such as a Raspberry Pi with an external hard drive strapped to it). But even with these relatively minimal requirements, running a node is still difficult for most users, particularly for those using mobile devices.\n\nIt’s important to note that centralized RPC provider attacks, although entirely plausible, are generally simple phishing attacks — and the one we describe has yet to happen. Even though the track records of larger providers like Alchemy give us little reason to doubt them, it’s worth doing some further research before adding unfamiliar RPC providers to your wallet.\n\nIntroducing Helios: fully trustless access to Ethereum\n\nBy introducing its light client protocol (made possible by the recent switch to Proof of Stake), Ethereum opened exciting new possibilities for quickly interacting with the blockchain and verifying RPC endpoints with minimal hardware requirements. In the month’s since The Merge, we’ve seen a new crop of light clients emerge independently of each other (Lodestar, Nimbus, and the JavaScript-based Kevlar) that have taken different approaches in service of the same goal: efficient and trustless access, without using a full node.\n\nOur solution, Helios, is an Ethereum light client that syncs in around two seconds, requires no storage, and provides fully trustless access to Ethereum. Like all Ethereum clients, Helios consists of an execution layer and a consensus layer. Unlike most other clients, Helios tightly couples both layers so that users only need to install and run a single piece of software. (Erigon is moving in this direction as well, by adding a consensus layer light client built directly into their archive node).\n\nSo how does it work? The Helios consensus layer uses a previously known beacon chain blockhash and a connection to an untrusted RPC to verifiably sync to the current block. The Helios execution layer uses these authenticated beacon chain blocks in tandem with an untrusted execution layer RPC to prove arbitrary information about the chain state such as account balances, contract storage, transaction receipts, and smart contract call results. These components work together to serve users a fully trustless RPC, without the need to run a full node.\n\n…At the consensus layer\n\nThe consensus layer light client conforms to the beacon chain light client specification, and makes use of the beacon chain’s sync committees (introduced ahead of the Merge in the Altair hard fork). The sync committee is a randomly selected subset of 512 validators that serve for ~27-hour periods.\n\nWhen a validator is on a sync committee, they sign every beacon chain block header that they see. If more than two-thirds of the committee signs a given block header, it is highly likely that that block is in the canonical beacon chain. If Helios knows the makeup of the current sync committee, it can confidently track the head of the chain by asking an untrusted RPC for the most recent sync committee signature.\n\nThanks to BLS signature aggregation, only a single check is required to validate the new header. If the signature is valid and has been signed by more than two-thirds of the committee, it’s safe to assume the block was included in the chain (of course it can be reorg’d out of the chain, but tracking block finality can provide stricter guarantees).\n\nThere’s an obvious missing piece in this strategy, though: how to find the current sync committee. This starts with acquiring a root of trust called the weak subjectivity checkpoint. Don’t let the name intimidate you — it just means an old blockhash that we can guarantee was included in the chain at some point in the past. There is some interesting math behind exactly how old the checkpoint can be; worst-case analysis suggests around two weeks, while more practical estimates suggest many months.\n\nIf the checkpoint is too old, there are theoretical attacks that can trick nodes into following the wrong chain. Acquiring a weak subjectivity checkpoint is out of band for the protocol. Our approach with Helios provides an initial checkpoint hardcoded into the codebase (which can easily be overridden); it then saves the most recent finalized blockhash locally to use as the checkpoint in the future, whenever the node is synced.\n\nConveniently, beacon chain blocks can be hashed to produce a unique beacon blockhash. This means it’s easy to ask a node for a full beacon block, and then prove the block contents are valid by hashing it and comparing to a known blockhash. Helios uses this property to fetch and prove certain fields inside the weak subjectivity checkpoint block, including two very important fields: the current sync committee, and the next sync committee. Critically, this mechanism allows light clients to fast forward through the blockchain’s history.\n\nNow that we have a weak subjectivity checkpoint, we can fetch and verify the current and next sync committees. If the current chain head is within the same sync committee period as the checkpoint, then we immediately start verifying new blocks with the signed sync committee headers. If our checkpoint is several sync committees behind, we can:\n\nUse the next sync committee after our checkpoint to fetch and verify a block that originates one sync committee in the future.\n\nUse this new block to fetch the new next sync committee.\n\nIf still behind, return to step 1.\n\nEach iteration of this process allows us to fast forward through 27 hours of the chain���s history, start with any blockhash in the past, and sync to the current blockhash.\n\n…At the execution layer\n\nThe goal of the execution layer light client is to take beacon block headers that are verified by the consensus layer, and use them along with an untrusted execution layer RPC to provide verified execution layer data. This data can then be accessed via an RPC server that is locally hosted by Helios.\n\nHere’s a simple example of fetching an account’s balance, starting with a quick primer on how state is stored in Ethereum. Each account contains a couple fields, such as the contract code hash, nonce, storage hash, and balance. These accounts are stored in a large, modified Merkle-Patricia tree called the state tree. If we know the root of the state tree, we can validate merkle proofs to prove the existence (or exclusion) of any account within the tree. These proofs are effectively impossible to forge.\n\nHelios has an authenticated state root from the consensus layer. Using this root and merkle proof requests to the untrusted execution layer RPC, Helios can locally verify all data stored on Ethereum.\n\nWe apply different techniques to verify all sorts of data used by the execution layer; used together, these allow us to authenticate all data retrieved from the untrusted RPC. While an untrusted RPC can deny access to data, it can no longer serve us incorrect results.\n\nUsing Helios in the wild\n\nThe tradeoff between portability and decentralization is a common pain point — but since Helios is so lightweight, users can access secure chain data from any device (including mobile phones and browser extensions). The ability to run Helios anywhere makes it possible for more people to access trustless Ethereum data, regardless of their hardware. This means users can use Helios as their RPC provider in MetaMask, and trustlessly access dapps without any other changes.\n\nFurther, Rust’s support for WebAssembly makes it easily possible for app developers to embed Helios inside Javascript applications (like wallets and dapps). These integrations would make Ethereum safer, and reduce our need to trust centralized infrastructure.\n\nWe can’t wait to see what the community comes up with. But in the meantime, there are lots of ways to contribute to Helios — if you’re not interested in contributing to the codebase, you can also build software that integrates Helios to take advantage of its benefits. These are just a few of the ideas we’re excited about:\n\nSupport fetching light client data directly from the P2P network rather than via RPC\n\nImplement some of the missing RPC methods\n\nBuild a version of Helios that compiles to WebAssembly\n\nIntegrate Helios directly into wallet software\n\nBuild a web dashboard to view your token balances that fetches data from Helios embedded into the website with WebAssembly\n\nImplement the engine API so that Helios’ consensus layer can be connected to an existing execution layer full node\n\nCheck out the codebase to get started — we welcome your bug reports, feature requests, and code. And if you build something more, share it with us on Twitter, Telegram, or Farcaster @a16zcrypto.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information","tokens":4143,"crawled_at":1791192791585} +{"id":10148,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/guides","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Guides | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nThe following guides for MPL Token Metadata are currently available:\nGet Mints by Collection\nSnippets to fetch NFTs by Collection\n\nCreate an NFT\nCreate your very own NFT using Javascript\n\nAccount Size Reduction\nLearn more about the TM Account Size Reduction\n\nCreate a claim based airdrop using MPL-Distro\nPersist Merkle proofs, run a claim page or API, and recover unclaimed tokens with MPL-Distro.\n\nToken Claimer Smart Contract\nLearn how to create a Token Claimer Smart Contract on Solana leveraging Merkle Trees and using Anchor!","tokens":163,"crawled_at":1791192792300} +{"id":10149,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/get_started/what_is_an_agent_service","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"What is an agent service - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"What is an agent service\n\nAn AI agent is an off-chain autonomous service which runs as a multi-agent-system (MAS) and is crypto-economically secured on a public blockchain.\n\nAI agents enable complex processing, take action on their own and run continuously. Moreover, AI agents are crypto-native by construction, that is, they are decentralized, trust-minimized, transparent, and robust.\n\nSee some use cases of AI agents that can be built with the Open Autonomy framework.\n\nArchitecture\n\nThe Open AEA framework provides the necessary components for building single agent blueprints. Open Autonomy extends this framework to an AI agent architecture, making possible to build applications as distributed systems (that is, AI agents) that can be run by multiple, independent operators.\n\nThe internal state of an AI agent is replicated across all the agent instances in the AI agent through a consensus gadget (a sort of short-lived blockchain).\n\nThis is what an AI agent looks like:\n\nAI agent: The decentralized off-chain service that implements a certain functionality. It is composed of N agent instances, where N is a parameter that is defined by the owner of the AI agent.\n\nOperator: An entity or individual that owns the infrastructure where an agent instance is run. Each operator manages an agent instance and a consensus gadget node.\n\nAgent: The software unit that aggregates the runtime and functionalities to execute the AI agent. Each agent blueprint is made up of a number of components that implement different functionalities, for example, what communication protocols the agent blueprint understands.\n\nFSM App: The core component inside an agent blueprint that defines the business logic of the AI agent. FSM App implements the underlying mechanisms for agent isntances to synchronize their internal state and run the business logic in a decentralized fashion.\n\nConsensus gadget: The infrastructure that enables agent instances to synchronize the AI agent state and reach consensus on certain important decisions. From a technical point of view, the consensus gadget implements a blockchain based on Tendermint that is pruned periodically. By consensus gadget we usually refer to the collection of consensus nodes + consensus network.\n\nAI agent multisig Safe: Smart contract based Multisig that secures the AI agent by requiring a threshold of agent instances to sign any transaction before it is executed.\n\nHow it works\n\nThe FSM App, which encodes the business logic of the AI agent, is structured as a finite-state machine defining a series of steps that each agent instance in the AI agent must follow in order to achieve the intended functionality.\n\nExample\n\nThis is a toy example of how an FSM App defines the business logic of an oracle AI agent that collects prices from a source and publishes it on a blockchain:\n\nThe FSM App replicates automatically the state and transitions across agent instances using the consensus gadget. This ensures that the execution flow of the AI agent, its inputs and outputs are synchronized across all instances, creating a distributed (and decentralized) application with shared state that is fault tolerant.\n\nTip\n\nWhen developing an AI agent, the developer can focus on defining the steps of the AI agent in the FSM App as if it were a standalone application, and get the replication mechanism \"for free\".\n\nThe Open Autonomy framework will provide most of the machinery to ensure that the agent instances' state is replicated as the AI agent is executed.\n\nIf at some point the AI agent needs to execute an action involving an external service, e.g., settling a transaction on a blockchain, then the following occurs:\n\nThe agent instances in the AI agent nominate by consensus an instance (known as keeper) to perform the action.\n\nA threshold of agent instances has to approve and sign the transaction, using the AI agent multisig Safe. This prevents a malicious agent instance from executing an external action on its own.\n\nFurthermore, the agent instances in the AI agent verify that the transaction was executed successfully. Otherwise, a new keeper will be nominated and the transaction will be retried.\n\nThe threshold on the minimum number of agent instances required to sign is typically, but not exclusively, set at 2/3 of the total of instances.","tokens":1077,"crawled_at":1791192795718} +{"id":10150,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/c/site-feedback/2","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Site Feedback - Uniswap Governance","text":"Site Feedback\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nAbout the Site Feedback category\n\n3\n\n1504\n\nFebruary 1, 2025\n\nUniswap for noobs\n\n7\n\n2934\n\nAugust 25, 2024\n\nIs there a chat communication channel besides this forum\n\n2\n\n2612\n\nMay 5, 2024\n\nIdea: establish a more private and informal discussion place for the Uniswap DAO\n\n4\n\n1830\n\nNovember 29, 2023\n\nUniswap DAO helps Turkiye earthquake\n\n13\n\n4841\n\nFebruary 15, 2023\n\nAn extension to uniswap to leverage liquidity pools for lending and borrowing\n\n0\n\n2364\n\nJune 3, 2022\n\nI think uniswap should be extended to more networks~\n\n2\n\n2682\n\nMarch 22, 2022\n\nDark mode UI issue\n\n0\n\n2267\n\nSeptember 3, 2021\n\nDark Mode Issue with New Governance UI\n\n5\n\n2343\n\nJuly 18, 2021\n\nLiquidity distribution: AMM vs CEX algorithm\n\n0\n\n2164\n\nMay 26, 2021\n\nPosting Instructions\n\n0\n\n2119\n\nMay 21, 2021\n\nAdd \"A/ agree\" and \"D/ disagree\" button on all proposals and comments\n\n29\n\n4096\n\nMay 21, 2021\n\nUniswap development team needs to play a bigger role\n\n7\n\n3394\n\nMarch 28, 2021\n\nDeposit Art and?\n\n0\n\n2156\n\nFebruary 16, 2021\n\nDashboard to view current vote delegation\n\n7\n\n2801\n\nDecember 23, 2020\n\nUni rewards avec univ2\n\n1\n\n2290\n\nOctober 20, 2020\n\nAdding a Language Translator to the Program\n\n7\n\n2523\n\nSeptember 22, 2020\n\nDisplay Profits\n\n1\n\n2411\n\nSeptember 21, 2020\n\nInclude staked UNI-V2 tokens on account info page\n\n3\n\n2616\n\nSeptember 21, 2020\n\nGovernance Category?\n\n1\n\n2394\n\nSeptember 18, 2020\n\nAmazing Platform Experience\n\n0\n\n2381\n\nSeptember 17, 2020","tokens":367,"crawled_at":1791192799838} +{"id":10151,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm/dual-block-architecture.md","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"","text":"> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/for-developers/hyperevm/dual-block-architecture.md).\n\n# Dual-block architecture\n\nThe total HyperEVM throughput is split between small blocks produced at a fast rate and large blocks produced at a slower rate. \n\nThe primary motivation behind the dual-block architecture is to decouple block speed and block size when allocating throughput improvements. Users want faster blocks for lower time to confirmation. Builders want larger blocks to include larger transactions such as more complex contract deployments. Instead of a forced tradeoff, the dual-block system will allow simultaneous improvement along both axes. \n\nThe HyperEVM \"mempool\" is still onchain state with respect to the umbrella L1 execution, but is split into two independent mempools that source transactions for the two block types. The two block types are interleaved with a unique increasing sequence of EVM block numbers. The onchain mempool implementation accepts only the next 8 nonces for each address. Transactions older than 1 day old in the mempool are pruned. \n\nThe initial configuration is set conservatively, and throughput is expected to increase over successive technical upgrades. Fast block duration is set to 1 seconds with a 3M gas limit. Slow block duration is set to 1 minute with a 30M gas limit. \n\nMore precisely, in the definitions above, *block duration* of `x` means that the first L1 block for each value of `l1_block_time % x` produces an EVM block. \n\nDevelopers can deploy larger contracts as follows:\n\n1. Submit action `{\"type\": \"evmUserModify\", \"usingBigBlocks\": true}` to direct HyperEVM transactions to big blocks instead of small blocks. Note that this user state flag is set on the HyperCore user level, and must be unset again to target small blocks. Like any action, this requires an existing Core user to send. Like any EOA, the deployer address can be converted to a Core user by receiving a Core asset such as USDC.\n2. Optionally use the JSON-RPC method `bigBlockGasPrice` in place of `gasPrice` to estimate base gas fee on the next big block.","tokens":591,"crawled_at":1791192800530} +{"id":10152,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/guides/get-by-collection","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Get Mints in a Collection | Token Metadata Guides","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nMetaplex Token Metadata has onchain collections to allow objective identifying of NFT collections instead of various subjective and potentially conflicting heuristics employed by the community in absence of an onchain standard.\nThe specification design makes it very easy to look up any given NFT and determine if it is in a collection and if so, which collection, by simply reading the Collection fields from the metadata account. The onchain Metadata struct contains an option Collection struct which has a key field which is the Pubkey of the SPL token mint of the collection it belongs to.\npub struct Metadata {\n\npub key: Key,\n\npub update_authority: Pubkey,\n\npub mint: Pubkey,\n\npub data: Data,\n\n// Immutable, once flipped, all sales of this metadata are considered secondary.\n\npub primary_sale_happened: bool,\n\n// Whether or not the data struct is mutable, default is not\n\npub is_mutable: bool,\n\n/// nonce for easy calculation of editions, if present\n\npub edition_nonce: Option,\n\n/// Token Standard is deterministic and will change from SemiFungible to NonFungible if\n\n/// you call the create master edition call and it succeeds.\n\npub token_standard: Option,\n\n/// Since we cannot easily change Metadata, we add the new DataV2 fields here at the end.\n\n/// Collection\n\npub collection: Option,\n\n...\n\n}\n\n#[derive(BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize, PartialEq, Debug, Clone)]\n\npub struct Collection {\n\npub verified: bool, // Whether or not the collection is verified\n\npub key: Pubkey, // The SPL token mint account of the collection NFT\n\n}\n\nHowever, given a collection mint address, finding all NFTs that belong to that particular collection is significantly more difficult when reading directly from chain. There is one superior method using DAS and two basic approaches to get the data from chain directly.\nDAS API\nFetching the mints using DAS is the superior method when using a RPC Provider that supports it.\ngetAssetByGroup Example\n\nReplace the endpoint with your RPC URL and collection with the collection address you are looking for.\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\nimport { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults';\n\nimport { dasApi } from '@metaplex-foundation/digital-asset-standard-api';\n\nconst endpoint = '';\n\nconst collection = 'J2ZfLdQsaZ3GCmbucJef3cPnPwGcgjDW1SSYtMdq3L9p'\n\nconst umi = createUmi(endpoint).use(dasApi());\n\nconst assets = await umi.rpc.getAssetsByGroup({\n\ngroupKey: 'collection',\n\ngroupValue: collection,\n\n});\n\nconsole.log(assets.items.length > 0);\n\nYou can find more methods on DAS and additional Methods that allows fetching and filtering data in our DAS Documentation\nGetProgramAccounts with PreCalculated Offsets\nIt’s tempting to think we can simply use a getProgramAccounts call with an offset into the Collection struct to match the collection id against the key field. This is the same way that most client programs find, e.g. a snapshot of NFT mint accounts belonging to a specific candy machine or creator ID. However, due to the fact that edition_nonce, token_standard, and collection are all Rust Options, this gets significantly more complicated.\nRust Options are represented in Borsh encoding with a 0 for the None variant and a 1 for the Some variant along with the normal encoding for whatever the contained value of the Some variant is. (One byte for a u8, for example.) This means that we can’t calculate an offset into the Collection struct without knowing what variant type is in each two of the two Options prior to the Collection field.\nThere are two ways to do this: brute force and gathering a priori knowledge of the variants.\nBrute force requires computing all the possible variants and running multiple getProgramAccount calls in parallel. Given up to five creators in the creators array and two possible options for each of the two Option fields prior to Collection, that leads to a total number of 20 possible combinations, meaning that you would have to make 20 getProgramAccount calls with various offsets to take this approach. This is obviously not a feasible nor scalable approach. If some a priori information is known about a collection though, this can be reduced to a smaller number of calls. Knowing how many creators there are is the biggest gain, reducing the number of getProgramAccount calls down to only four which can be reasonably run in parallel.\nThis approach is not the recommended one due to the high number of edge cases it involves and the fact that it can only be pragmatically used on collections where there is only one creator or the number of variations of how many creators there are is known ahead of time.\nInstead, we recommend using the transaction crawling approach.\nTransaction Crawling\nTransaction crawling involves getting all the transactions associated with the collection mint address and then parsing them to find the specific instructions that create collections. From there we can determine which mint accounts are part of the collection.\nThe algorithm for doing this is shown below:\nCall [getSignaturesForAddress](https://docs.solana.com/developing/clients/jsonrpc-api#getsignaturesforaddress) for the collection mint address to get all transaction signatures that in anyway involved the collection mint address.\n\nFor each signature, call [getTransaction](https://docs.solana.com/developing/clients/jsonrpc-api#gettransaction) to get the actual transaction data for each signature.\n\nParse the transactions to find the program ids and filter out any that do not involve the token-metadata program which has an address of metaqbxxUerdq28cj1RbAWkYQm3ybzjb6a8bt518x1s.\n\nWe only want to retrieve collection members that are verified, and the only two handlers in the token-metadata that verify collection members are verify_collection and set_and_verify which have the respective positions in the MetadataInstruction enum of 18 and 25, which are base58 values of K and S.\n\nFilter the instructions to only have ones with a data value of K or S to insure we only get those specific token-metadata handlers.\n\nThe metadata address being verified will be the first account passed into either of these handlers.\n\nAdd the metadata address to a Set to ensure no duplicates.\n\nOnce all metadata address are found, loop over them and call getAccountInfo to find the account data.\nDeserialize the account data into a Metadata struct/object, and find the mint address from the mint field. Add the mint address to a Set.\nThis final Set is your list of mint addresses for all items in the collection.\n\nExample Rust and TypeScript code for transaction crawling to get collection members can be found in the get-collection repository.","tokens":1703,"crawled_at":1791192811272} +{"id":10153,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/get_started/why_do_we_need_agent_services","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Why do we need agent services - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Why do we need agent services\n\nDecentralized ledger technologies (DLTs), such as blockchains, face several challenges, for example:\n\nthe blockchain trilemma,\n\nthe oracle problem,\n\nprivacy issues,\n\nledger storage space,\n\ncross chain compatibility,\n\n... and the sheer complexity of the user experience!\n\nIn contrast with the increasing growth of on-chain applications (particularly in DeFi), the off-chain design space has seen a lack of innovation. A lot of the technology is centralized, lacks fault tolerance, the code is often opaque and offers little composability.\n\nCurrently, a standardised approach for off-chain application development is missing in the blockchain space. This is where the Open AEA and the Open Autonomy frameworks come in, as open-source frameworks for developers to implement off-chain AI agents which are secured on-chain and can interact with smart contracts.\n\nLocation of agent instance in the crypto ecosystem\n\nagent instance go beyond simple, purely\nreactive applications (like smart contracts) and can show complex, proactive behaviours that contain off-chain logic without giving up on decentralization. Examples include, but are not limited to, triggering specific actions on external events, or executing machine learning models.","tokens":316,"crawled_at":1791192815177} +{"id":10154,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-flashstake-enabling-upfront-yield-for-uniswap-liquidity-v2-v3/21410","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] - Flashstake - Enabling upfront yield for Uniswap Liquidity V2&V3 - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] - Flashstake - Enabling upfront yield for Uniswap Liquidity V2&V3\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nFlashySteve\n\nJune 6, 2023, 3:34pm\n\n1\n\nSummary\n\nFlashstake has worked closely with xToken Terminal over the last few months and through this partnership, we now have the infrastructure required to build time-based yield markets for any Uniswap V3 pair adding another dimension to liquidity provisioning not currently possible on any other DEX.\n\nFlashstake would like to request 200,000 ARB tokens which will be used to jump-start this new market through liquidity mining incentives (additional details below). The intention is to enable instant upfront yield for a handful of Uniswap V3 pairs to start and expand to new pairs as demand increases.\n\nWhat is Flashstake?\n\nFlashstake allows users to earn instant upfront yield.\n\nDeFi applications, like AAVE, only allow users to earn variable interest on their deposits over time. Flashstake strategies transform this variable yield into a fixed rate yield and pay the yield upfront to the user. This is achieved through a combination of interest rate swaps and a marketplace for the time value of money.\n\nFlashstake is currently live on Ethereum Mainnet, Arbitrum and Optimism.\n\nExample\n\nBob has 100 ETH and would like to start earning yield. Bob could deposit this into Rocket Pool and acquire rETH which increases in value over time relative to his deposit thereby slowly accumulating yield (eg 5% APR). Bob decides to instead Flashstake 100 ETH for 1 year into the Rocket Pool Flashstake strategy accepting a 4% APR paid upfront.\n\nBob has given up some of the yield he would have otherwise earned at Rocket Pool in exchange for a fixed rate of yield paid out immediately. Bob can withdraw his 100 ETH after 1 year has passed. Bob can also choose to unstake early by paying back the yield he received.\n\nYou can view a real transaction of a user depositing 125 ETH for 3 months to earn ~4,600 USD worth of rETH here. Note that Flashstake relies on LPs for jumpstarting new yield strategies and in the provided example transaction the upfront yield is coming from a Uniswap V3 swap.\n\nA deeper look\n\nUnder the hood when Bob deposited his 100 ETH for 6 months into the Flashstake Protocol he minted approximately 50 yield tokens (fy-rETH). The 100 ETH was automatically deposited into the associated underlying protocol which in this case is Rocket Pool. This ETH then goes on to generate yield block-by-block which drips into the associated yield pool.\n\nBob can choose to either sell his 50 fy-rETH (yield tokens) on the open market via Uniswap or burn these to redeem a proportional amount of yield from the Flashstake yield pool. Both avenues would result in a redeemable value. The Flashstake Dapp currently automatically chooses the most favourable path for Bob.\n\nAlice is happy to purchase the rights to yield generated from Bob by acquiring his fy-rETH tokens. Alice is happy to wait until the 100 ETH has generated a higher return from Rocket Pool.\n\nSummary\n\nRocket Pool is offering a 5% APR\n\nAlice is willing to give Bob an upfront yield such that Bob can lock in a 4% APR\n\nBob is willing to give up 1% APR to lock in the lower rate\n\nIn the early days of launching a new Flashstake Strategy, the yield pool starts at zero and subsequently cannot be used to redeem any meaningful upfront yield. We decided to partner with xToken Terminal to help incentivise liquidity for concentrated liquidity positions on Uniswap V3. This has allowed the open market to provide instant upfront yield with the expectation that yield tokens can be burned against the Flashstake Strategy in the near future as/when the yield pool grows.\n\nYou can read more about the inner workings of Flashstake in our documentation.\n\nMilestones/Achievements\n\nFlashstake launched with this architecture in August 2022 - you can visit the Dapp here\n\nFlashstake has since deployed on Mainnet, Optimism and Arbitrum\n\nFlashstake has never raised funds\n\nFlashstake received a grant from AAVE Grants DAO\n\nFlashstake TVL has roughly doubled after every major launch\n\nFlashstake currently supports GLP, sUSD, WETH, rETH, stETH and USDC through various underlying protocols such as GMX, AAVE V3, Rocket Pool and Lido\n\nFlashstake currently has $5M in strategy TVL and $11M total including staking\n\nProposal\n\nFlashstake is looking to launch a new Flashstaking Strategy which would allow Uniswap V3 liquidity providers to earn instant upfront yield. This would initially be limited to a handful of specific pools (currently undecided) with the intention to expand when sufficient demand is shown by the market.\n\nWe have performed a significant amount of research to make this possible and have worked closely with xToken Terminal to help facilitate this functionality. We have integrated with xToken Terminal’s contracts in a new innovative way to enable this functionality.\n\nFlashstake would like to request 200,000 ARB tokens to incentivise liquidity providers via xToken Terminal liquidity mining. These incentivised liquidity providers would be paying users upfront yield through v3 liquidity pools which would allow all future fees associated with Flashstaked liquidity to drip into the associated yield pool.\n\nExample:\n\nBob currently holds 500 UNI-V2 tokens associated with the USDC/DAI pool. It is expected that this would yield 35% APR (after 1 year in fees)\n\nBob Flashstakes 500 UNI-V2 tokens for 365 days and receives 500 fy-USDC/DAI tokens\n\nAlice is currently providing liquidity on Uniswap V3 (via xToken Terminal) for the token pair fy-USDC/USDC within the 0.1 to 0.25 range which roughly translates to upfront yield of 10% to 25% for Bob\n\nBob effectively gives up all rights to future yield on his LP tokens accepting an upfront yield rate of 25%\n\nAlice now holds 500 fy-USDC/DAI tokens which can be redeemed at any point in time for proportional ownership of the yield pool. In an efficient market, Alice would choose to redeem these in 365 days. If the yield rate remains at 35% or increases, Alice would earn the difference.\n\nNote: I have highlighted the section within the example above showing where these ARB tokens would be spent.\n\nNote: Bob could Flashstake UNI-V2 OR choose to deposit USDC and DAI (in the correct proportions) into xToken which then gets Flashstaked. A lot of this complexity would be abstracted away within our front end (in the simple mode).\n\nFlashstake has already been using xToken Terminal for liquidity mining towards concentrated liquidity positions in the same way explained above (for existing Flashstake Strategies). The most recent examples of these pools can be found here, here and here. More information on these campaigns can be found on this tweet thread.\n\nTo date, Flashstake has run these xToken campaigns between 1 to 4 weeks (due to limited resources) but we believe less tokens can be spent if these campaigns run for a longer duration which would give liquidity providers more certainty. We would like to run these campaigns for between 1 to 3 months giving each Flashstake Strategy the best opportunity to succeed.\n\nBenefits to Uniswap:\n\nSticky Uniswap TVL - The more we can incentivize our yield LPs, the more volume and TVL passes through these Flashstake Strategies which in turn leads to larger amounts of liquidity locked in for extended periods of time. (Bob Flashstaking for 365 days means this liquidity is locked for 1 year)\n\nMigrate liquidity from UniV2 to UniV3 - The more attractive Flashstake is for liquidity providers, the higher the chances they use Flashstake. Since Flashstake will support UniV2 tokens and will deposit this liquidity into UniV3, this would help migrate liquidity away from UniV2\n\nAdditional functionality for existing Uniswap V2 and V3 liquidity providers - The ability to Flashstake to earn instant upfront yield\n\nPath to Sustainability\n\nIt is important to highlight, rewards given to liquidity providers which allow for upfront yield in the early stages of a strategy, are temporary. As more capital enters the system, the yield generated increases with each block (based on trading fees), contributing to the growth of the yield pool.\n\nOnce the yield pool has reached a sufficient level, we expect the majority of all future Flashstakes to receive upfront yield directly from the protocol, without the need for additional incentives.\n\nThis means once a Flashstake yield pool becomes self-sufficient, it creates a constant activity of locked-up LP tokens for Uniswap pools.\n\n6 Likes\n\nRequest for Proposals - ARB Distribution\n\n[RFC] - Alastor | w3s - Create a UNI-ARB Working Group\n\nWeekly Governance Update\n\nWeekly Governance Update\n\npseudotwit\n\nJune 6, 2023, 7:43pm\n\n2\n\nI created an account just to tell you how amazing this project is\n\n1 Like\n\nBotanic\n\nJune 7, 2023, 2:00am\n\n3\n\nthis would bring Uniswap the edge it needs to stay relevant in times of ever-growing competition.\n\nThe opportunity to receive yield for liquidity mining in advance opens up a whole new level of DEFI composability. More sticky liquidity and more efficient use of funds, offsetting potential IL by deploying yield elsewhere for amplification of earnings.\n\nAlso Flashstake has proven itself to be a resilient protocol with no exploits of any kind to date, 2 audits of reputable auditors, and no exploitable admin functionalities in its immutable smart contracts.\n\nI’d be more than happy seeing this proposal pass and said functionality to be implemented ASAP.\n\n1 Like\n\nNa2\n\nJune 7, 2023, 12:43pm\n\n4\n\nSounds like a great way to expand Uniswap use-cases, go for it!\n\nDamboy\n\nJune 8, 2023, 12:23pm\n\n5\n\nThis proposal Looks great and will bring in some positive impacts.\n\nCan you please provide more details on how the integration with xToken Terminal’s contracts enables the functionality of incentivized liquidity mining for Flashstake?\n\nFlashySteve\n\nJune 8, 2023, 3:20pm\n\n6\n\nCan you please provide more details on how the integration with xToken Terminal’s contracts enables the functionality of incentivized liquidity mining for Flashstake?\n\nI will use the first link provided in my original post as the example xToken pool:\n\nhttps://app.xtokenterminal.io/mining/pools/mainnet/0xaBC95d77fb9D4538e6B00Bc8c9bE22DDB8df3004\n\nYou’ll notice on xToken the description says “Liquidity mining for concentrated liquidity range between 4% and 8%” and the LP it is incentivizing is fy-rETH/rETH\n\nBy adding liquidity to this LP position, by using xToken, xToken is forcing the UniswapV3 range to be a very specific price range so that 1 fy-rETH is worth somewhere between 0.04 and 0.08 rETH depending on current market prices at the time of adding/removing liquidity. In case this helps, another way to put it is that xToken enforces a concentrated UniV3 liquidity range of 0.04-0.08 rETH per 1 fy-rETH.\n\nHow this helps Flashstake?\n\nYou can refer to the Time Vault Pool: Liquidity Pool documentation https://docs.flashstake.io/time-vault-strategies-tvs/time-vault-pools#example-2-liquidity-pool\n\nLiquidity pools, such as this xToken incentivized UniV3 range, allows LPs to provide the upfront yield and speculate on upfront yield rates and earn incentives for being an LP. This is especially needed early on for new strategies as a way to jumpstart new strategies so there is upfront yield available from LPs instead of from the yield pool that hasn’t grown enough yet to provide meaningful yield.\n\nSo, for example, when we first launched the rETH (Rocket Pool) strategy on Flashstake, we spun up several xToken LP ranges of 4-8% (like I mentioned above), 6-12% and a promotional 10-15% that paid much higher incentives to help cover the IL that LPs would likely see. Different ranges lets LPs choose their risk tolerance and also consider what incentives and swaps APR they will earn, since every time an LP is used for upfront yield, that also generates a swap.\n\nEvery time someone does a Flashstake transaction to get upfront yield, the Flashstake dapp has a proxy https://docs.flashstake.io/smart-contracts/flash-protocol-proxy that will automatically determine the best upfront yield rate from either swapping or burning, which means either taking yield from LPs or taking yield from the yield pool, to give to the person wanting upfront yield. So in the case of the rETH strategy, the yield is being taken from LPs from Uniswap swaps. And xToken forced UniV3 ranges is helping make sure the % of upfront yield is in an appropriate range and able to be incentivized with tokens.\n\nThis proposal is to get ARB tokens so we can incentive with those tokens on xToken for Arbitrum strategies that will be developed that focus on giving upfront yield to LPs. We have never given upfront yield to LPs before, there is a synergy effect that this proposal also encourages more LPs on Uniswap for those who wish to use the Flashstake ecosystem to\n\nGet upfront yield as an LP\n\nProvide liquidity and earn ARB tokens incentives via xToken\n\nI hope that was able to fully answer your question?\n\n1 Like\n\ndel8\n\nJune 10, 2023, 11:38am\n\n7\n\nSeems like a natural evolution of defi to allow for interest rate swaps for liquidity provision. The immediate vs. delayed swap makes it even more attractive and allows for more efficiency.\n\nAs this is still fairly nascent in our space, it seems worthy to accelerate this development via token incentivization.\n\nI wonder what pools you would plan to use these incentives for. Do you think pools with certain assets would benefit in particular from this enhancemet or what would be your criteria?\n\nAlso, over what timeframe would you plan to spend the incentives?\n\nFlashySteve\n\nJune 10, 2023, 10:04pm\n\n8\n\nI think reviewing defillama to see which UniswapV3 pools on Arbitrum, with a good sized TVL that have good APR helps give insight to what may be the best ones to start with that would generate the most activity for the used incentives.\n\nhttps://defillama.com/yields?chain=Arbitrum&minTvl=1000000&maxTvl=&project=uniswap-v3\n\nThese look promising to start with\n\nWETH-USDC\n\nWETH-ARB\n\nARB-USDC\n\nThese are also being considered and may bring other partnership/marketing opportunities for Flashstake/Arbitrum/Uniswap/xToken:\n\nRDNT-WETH\n\nWETH-GMX\n\nFLASH-WETH\n\nFlashySteve\n\nJune 10, 2023, 10:10pm\n\n9\n\nI would estimate 6 months, but could be half to double that timeframe depending on other factors as market dynamics change over time, and if we see certain pools are having significantly more activity and more TVL than others, we may adjust which pools we incentivize and by how much, as we refill xToken incentives every few weeks.\n\nWe may find that certain pools require more or less incentives than anticipated to generate enough liquidity required to facilitate the upfront yield liquidity pool range needed for users to want to accept the upfront yield rate.\n\nHistorically, we have monitored the xToken pool incentives we have been providing with FLASH tokens, and adjusting these on a week to week basis. Sometimes increasing, sometimes lowering, sometimes creating an entirely new pool with a new range to properly incentivize what is required. When creating an xToken incentive, it is locked in: the total weeks, the total tokens allocated. During those weeks, APR rates, token prices, supply/demand of liquidity, all are constantly changing. We reevaluate the numbers regularly.\n\nTimeRows\n\nJune 11, 2023, 3:10am\n\n10\n\nThe example with rETH makes sense. The APR is fairly certain within a couple month range. So locking up to get 4% immediately, vs 5% without locking makes sense. With 1% providing a spread of profitability.\n\nThe main proposal case of using univ2 → univ3 liquidity providing positions is not as clear to me:\n\nHow is APR estimated for the year for a trading pair that is highly dependent on fluctuating volume? For example if volumes are high, and Flashstake pays out 20% immediately, but then volumes plummet in the following months, the Flashstake/users lose money?\n\nIs the LP lockup much shorter than the 1 year lock up of the rETH example to take into account the volume volatility? 1 Month lockups?\n\nWhat are the locked up LP liquidity ranges, since univ2 are being locked up and put into univ3 they will be full ranged liquidity providing?\n\nIf not full range, how are these positions actively managed to keep inrange? Is IL calculated in the expected APR?\n\nFlashySteve\n\nJune 11, 2023, 5:30am\n\n11\n\nHow is APR estimated for the year for a trading pair that is highly dependent on fluctuating volume? For example if volumes are high, and Flashstake pays out 20% immediately, but then volumes plummet in the following months, the Flashstake/users lose money?\n\nThe Flashstake docs “Where does the yield come from?” may help answer part of this.\n\nYield Pools and Liquidity Pools are used to pay the upfront amount. If volume plummet, this does not impact existing stakers, it only impacts how fast the yield pool will fill up to help facilitate future Flashstakes that “burn” instead of “swap” for upfront yield.\n\nIs the LP lockup much shorter than the 1 year lock up of the rETH example to take into account the volume volatility? 1 Month lockups?\n\nThe Liquidity Pools being incentivized with ARB tokens from this proposal (as we have done with FLASH tokens for incentivizing previous strategies at xToken) would be expected able to facilitate a decent amount of upfront yield, so I don’t anticipate there being any need to have a strategy maximum duration to be set lower than 3 months, with an ideal target of 6+ months as the maximum duration enabled.\n\nWhat are the locked up LP liquidity ranges, since univ2 are being locked up and put into univ3 they will be full ranged liquidity providing?\n\nIf not full range, how are these positions actively managed to keep inrange? Is IL calculated in the expected APR?\n\nThe UniV3 LPs locked up as Flashstakes, not to be confused with xToken LP incentives for anyone else reading this, would likely not be a full range but would benefit from concentrated liquidity improvements even if set in a very wide range. We would evaluate each LP on a case by case basis. For example, ARB has been within a tight price range of around $1-$2 since it launched so a USDC/ARB pair could have a tighter range than some other LP whose both tokens have more volatile price changes such as let’s say GMX/WETH.\n\n1 Like\n\nDamboy\n\nJune 12, 2023, 12:49pm\n\n12\n\nYes it does.\n\nBut What criteria will be used to select the specific pools for the initial Flashstake Strategy? How will Flashstake determine which pools have sufficient demand?\n\nDevSalim\n\nJune 12, 2023, 9:14pm\n\n13\n\nHey @Damboy I believe your questions have been answered in the above post here\n\nDid you have a particular question that you felt was not answered?\n\nThe initial uniswap pools would be chosen based on factors such as TVL and volume since these would be important since they influence the trading fees generated.\n\n1 Like\n\nDamboy\n\nJune 12, 2023, 9:46pm\n\n14\n\nThanks for the response @DevSalim.\n\n0xkeyrock.eth\n\nJune 15, 2023, 10:03am\n\n15\n\nWe support this proposal and it fits within our logic regarding optimal budget allocation if the Uniswap community has a similar consensus to us as described here.\n\npratik_coinchange\n\nJuly 23, 2023, 1:16am\n\n16\n\nDo you have API for other UIs to integrate?\n\nDevSalim\n\nJuly 29, 2023, 10:54am\n\n17\n\nThe contracts are immutable and exist on the deployed networks. This means anyone can interact with them and it does not require a specific API.\n\nWe have deployed subgraphs on each network and you can find the links to them here: Addresses and Links - Flashstake\n\nYou should be able to find all the necessary information in the documentation linked above. If you require any additional support, feel free to join the Flashstake discord.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nProposal: Uniswap Liquidity Program v0.1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n18\n\n4446\n\nSeptember 2, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Should Uniswap incentivize Liquidity on Optimism and Arbitrum\n\nConsensus Check\n\n18\n\n8599\n\nOctober 28, 2022\n\nConsensus Check - Begin Uniswap Liquidity Program v0.1\n\nConsensus Check\n\n9\n\n4844\n\nSeptember 10, 2021\n\nUniswap Revitalization and Growth\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n75\n\n10905\n\nJuly 15, 2024\n\nUniswap Liquidity Program v0.1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n44\n\n11813\n\nSeptember 28, 2022","tokens":5053,"crawled_at":1791192818071} +{"id":10155,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/beyond-51-attacks","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Beyond 51% attacks: Precisely characterizing blockchain achievable resilience - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nBeyond 51% attacks: Precisely characterizing blockchain achievable resilience\nJoachim Neu, Srivatsan Sridhar, and Ertem Nusret Tas\n02.27.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nconsensus\nresearch\nsecurity\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nA central question in the security of blockchains is what percent of validators adversaries can control while the blockchain remains safe and live. Is it 50%? 33%? Or, as Vitalik Buterin has written, 99%? A great deal rests on the answer. If there is a way to achieve resilience even against adversaries that control almost all of a blockchain’s security-critical resource, why do almost all deployed blockchains content themselves with less?\n\nThe answer to what percentage is right depends on how clients are modeled. Are the clients sleepy or always-on? Are they silent or communicating? Can validators be sleepy too? And is the network synchronous or partially synchronous? In a new paper, we (with Dionysis Zindros of Common Prefix, and David Tse of Stanford University and BabylonChain) systematize models for consensus across these four dimensions. Being systematic about the nature of clients allows us to tightly characterize the achievable safety and liveness resiliences with matching possibilities and impossibilities for each of the sixteen models. We’re able to unify folklore and earlier results, and fill gaps left in the literature with new protocols and impossibility theorems.\n\nOne of our key takeaways is that when clients in a blockchain system can communicate reliably (that is in particular, if clients can forward messages they receive to each other — which is the case for many blockchains that use gossip-style peer-to-peer networking) then the system can remain safe even if the adversary controls all of the blockchain’s security-critical resource.\n\nState-machine replication: Background\n\nState-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols are the backbone of blockchain systems. These protocols provide a mechanism with which the blockchain’s parties can reach consensus on an order in which to execute incoming transaction requests. Think of this as every party at every point in time outputs a sequence of transactions that it considers confirmed, and then executes those transactions in that order. By executing transactions in the same order, each party effectively runs a replica of the state machine of the blockchain’s execution engine. An SMR consensus protocol is secure if it provides two properties: safety, meaning that transactions are confirmed in the same order across honest parties and across time (i.e., one party’s confirmed transaction sequence is a prefix of any other’s, or vice versa); and liveness, meaning that honest transaction requests are eventually included in every party’s confirmed transaction order.\n\nThe SMR consensus protocols used in blockchains must be Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT), that is, they should provide each security property even if a fraction of the parties behave adversarially. The adversary fraction of validators, the parties tasked with reaching consensus, up to which safety and liveness can be guaranteed — whether that’s 33%, 50%, or Vitalik’s 99% — are called safety resilience and liveness resilience of the protocol, respectively.\n\nSo what’s the tolerable percentage of malicious validators?\n\nThe question, then, is: What is the best possible safety/liveness resilience any blockchain protocol could hope to achieve? Is it 33%, 50%, or 99%? Decades ago, researchers showed that the answer depends on the reliability of the communication network connecting validators of the blockchain: If the network is guaranteed to deliver messages between honest validators within a short period of time (we call this setting synchronous), then higher resiliences can be achieved than if the network may suffer from outages like network partitions where network delay can become quite large (a setting called partial synchrony). This explains some of the conundrum — namely, the difference of 33% and 50% resilience between some protocols.\n\nBut the answer also critically depends on the modeling details of clients. Client modeling assumptions determine the extent to which 99% resilience can be achieved.\n\nBut first, what are clients? Blockchains comprise not only validators — active participants in the consensus protocol, such as stakeholders in a proof-of-stake blockchain. There are also clients. While they do not actively contribute to consensus, they represent the users of the system, who, for instance, may run wallet software and monitor the chain for payments and ship merchandise in response. The characteristics of those clients matters a lot: Are these clients sleepy — occasionally taking a prolonged break from following the chain, or always on? Are they silent, or can they communicate with other clients? Speaking of sleepiness: Can validators be sleepy, too? The answers to these questions determine if and how 99% resilience can be achieved.\n\nIn our new paper, we systematize models for BFT SMR consensus across four dimensions: sleepy/always-on clients, silent/communicating clients, sleepy/always-on validators, and network synchrony/partial-synchrony. We then tightly characterize the achievable safety and liveness resiliences with matching possibility results and impossibility results for each of the resulting sixteen models. This means that for every safety/liveness resilience pair, we either show a protocol that achieves it, or we prove mathematically that there cannot be any protocol that achieves it. The following figure summarizes the results (cf Figure 1 in the paper to understand which regions of which plot are new or found in earlier works, respectively).\n\nSpecifically, the figure shows the safety/liveness resilience pairs achievable or unachievable for each of the models considered. The liveness resilience is on the horizontal axis, and the safety resilience is on the vertical axis. Blue shaded regions are resilience pairs that are achievable, and red shaded regions are the ones that aren’t. Earlier works have focused on the first and last row (sleepy silent clients and always-on communicating clients), and on the left and right columns (classical synchronous and partially synchronous networks, both with always-on validators). For instance, the classic 50% and 33% results are shown in sub-figures (a) and (c), respectively, while Vitalik Buterin’s 99% result is found in sub-figure (j). Our contributions are in the second and third row (always-on silent clients and sleepy communicating clients) as well as the middle column (sleepy validators). (In the four remaining scenarios corresponding to partial synchrony with sleepy validators: No resilience can be achieved in these settings due to the availability-finality dilemma, so the respective plots would be all red, and are omitted in the figure.)\n\nThe upshot? When clients in a blockchain system can communicate, which is the case for many blockchains that use gossip-style peer-to-peer networking, then safety/liveness resilience can be increased beyond 50% under some circumstances — for example, in sub-figure (g), with synchronous, always-on validators and sleepy but communicating clients, one of the resiliences (safety or liveness) can be increased to 99% while retaining 50% for the other resilience (liveness or safety). This is an example of how we can build on folklore with more careful analysis, and combine 50% with 99%.\n\nIf you want to know more, check out the paper on IACR ePrint.\n\n***\n\nJoachim Neu is a postdoc Research Associate at a16z Crypto Research. Previously, he earned a PhD at Stanford, advised by David Tse. His current research focus is blockchain-era consensus and decentralized-systems security. His broader interests include distributed computing and systems, applied cryptography, and networking and communications.\n\nSrivatsan Sridhar is a PhD student at Stanford University, advised by David Tse, and a senior researcher at BabylonChain. He has also held internships with Mysten Labs, Protocol Labs, and Subspace Labs.\n\nErtem Nusret Tas is a PhD student in Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, working under the supervision of David Tse. He has also held internships with Celestia, BabylonChain, and a16z crypto research.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":2717,"crawled_at":1791192821779} +{"id":10156,"url":"https://docs.near.org/web3-apps/what-is","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"What are Web3 Apps? - NEAR Docs","text":"Web3 Applications - also known as decentralized apps (dApps) - leverage smart contracts and blockchain data to offer transparency, security and giving back control to users over their assets and data.\n\nNEAR simplifies building Web3 apps for the general public, making it easy to interact with different blockchains, while helping to onboard users that are not familiarized with crypto.\n\n​\n\nWhy Integrate NEAR Protocol with your App?\n\nAny application can benefit from integrating NEAR, including games, financial services, social platforms, and more.\n\nEasy Onboarding: Users can create accounts using familiar methods such as email login. Furthermore, applications can cover all transactional costs for their users, so they never have to worry about handling crypto.\n\nOwnership: Users have true ownership of digital assets within their accounts. Fungible Tokens can be used as reward systems, Non-Fungible Tokens can denote holdings, and wallets can represent digital identities.\n\nFast, Cheap and Scalable: Near’s efficient consensus mechanism and fee model make transactions cost effective for both users and developers.\n\nSecurity & Transparency: All transactions and data on the blockchain is transparent and auditable, thus ensuring trust in the application’s behavior.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":324,"crawled_at":1791192831184} +{"id":10157,"url":"https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/about-hyperliquid.md","domain":"hyperliquid.gitbook.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"","text":"> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/about-hyperliquid.md).\n\n# About Hyperliquid\n\n### **What is Hyperliquid?**\n\nHyperliquid is a performant blockchain built with the vision of a fully onchain open financial system. Liquidity, user applications, and trading activity synergize on a unified platform that will ultimately house all of finance. \n\n### Technical overview\n\nHyperliquid is a layer one blockchain (L1) written and optimized from first principles. \n\nHyperliquid uses a custom consensus algorithm called HyperBFT inspired by HotStuff and its successors. Both the algorithm and networking stack are optimized from the ground up to support the unique demands of the L1. \n\nHyperliquid state execution is split into two broad components: HyperCore and the HyperEVM. HyperCore includes fully onchain perpetual futures and spot order books. Every order, cancel, trade, and liquidation happens transparently with one-block finality inherited from HyperBFT. HyperCore currently supports 200k orders / second, with throughput constantly improving as the node software is further optimized.\n\nThe HyperEVM brings the familiar general-purpose smart contract platform pioneered by Ethereum to the Hyperliquid blockchain. With the HyperEVM, the performant liquidity and financial primitives of HyperCore are available as permissionless building blocks for all users and builders. See the HyperEVM documentation section for more technical details.\n\n
\"\"
","tokens":497,"crawled_at":1791192888762} +{"id":10158,"url":"https://docs.near.org/chain-abstraction/what-is","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"What is Chain Abstraction? - NEAR Docs","text":"Through a combination of innovative technologies, NEAR enables developers to build applications that work seamlessly across multiple blockchains while abstracting away the underlying complexity for both developers and end users.\n\nMulti-Chain Accounts\nChain Signatures allow NEAR accounts and smart contracts to sign transactions for all other chains (including Bitcoin, Ethereum and Solana)\n\nSwaps via Intents\nA decentralized system where users simply express desired outcomes (like “swap BTC for ETH at the best price”), and a network of solvers competes to fulfill these intents optimally\n\nOmniBridge\nA multi-chain bridge that enables secure and efficient cross-chain transfers. The bridge serves as both a token factory and custodian, managing native and bridged tokens through a unified interface\n\n​\n\nWhy Chain Abstraction Matters\n\nBy building on NEAR, developers do not need to worry about the complexities of integrating with multiple blockchains. Instead, they can focus on building great applications that work seamlessly across all chains.\nMeanwhile, users can enjoy a smooth experience, using unified accounts and assets without needing to even understand on which blockchain they are operating.\n\nBenefits for Developers\n\nIntegrate with multiple blockchains through a single NEAR API\n\nFocus on application logic instead of blockchain complexity\n\nReach users regardless of their preferred blockchain network\n\nBenefits for Users\n\nOperate across all chains using a single NEAR account\n\nAccess assets and services from multiple blockchains seamlessly\n\nEnjoy a unified and intuitive user experience\n\nExample: Cross-Chain NFT Marketplace\n\nImagine building a digital art marketplace where users can purchase NFTs from different blockchains (Ethereum, Solana, etc.). Without chain abstraction, you’d need to:\nImplement multiple blockchain connections\n\nHandle different wallet types\n\nManage cross-chain transfers\n\nBuild complex UIs to explain blockchain concepts\n\nWith chain abstraction, both you and your users just focus on the core experience: browsing and trading art. All blockchain complexity is handled automatically behind the scenes.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":542,"crawled_at":1791192889968} +{"id":10159,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/fetch","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Fetching Assets | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nNow that we know how to create and mint the various onchain accounts of our assets, let's learn how to fetch them.\nDigital Assets\nAs mentioned in the previous page, an asset — fungible or not — requires multiple onchain accounts to be created. Depending on the Token Standard of the asset, some accounts may not be required. Here's a quick overview of these accounts:\nMint account (from the SPL Token program): It defines the core properties of the underlying SPL token. This is the entry point to any asset as all other accounts derive from it.\nMetadata account: It provides additional data and features to the underlying SPL token.\nMaster Edition or Edition account (only for Non-Fungibles): It enables printing multiple copies of an original NFT. Even when an NFT does not allow printing editions, the Master Edition account is still created as it is used as the Mint authority and Freeze authority of the Mint account to ensure its non-fungibility.\nIn order to make fetching assets easier, our SDKs offer a set of helper methods that allow us to fetch all the relevant accounts of an asset in one go. We call the data type that stores all these accounts a Digital Asset. In the next sub-sections, we will go through the various ways to fetch Digital Assets.\nDigital Asset definition\n\nimport { PublicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { Mint } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-toolbox'\n\nimport {\n\nMetadata,\n\nMasterEdition,\n\nEdition,\n\n} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata'\n\nexport type DigitalAsset = {\n\npublicKey: PublicKey\n\nmint: Mint\n\nmetadata: Metadata\n\nedition?:\n\n| ({ isOriginal: true } & MasterEdition)\n\n| ({ isOriginal: false } & Edition)\n\n}\n\nFetch By Mint\nThis helper fetches a single Digital Asset from the public key of its Mint account.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mintAddress = publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a digital asset by its mint address\n\n10const asset = await fetchDigitalAsset(umi, mintAddress);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Asset:', asset.publicKey);\n\n13console.log('Metadata:', asset.metadata.publicKey);\n\n14console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15console.log('URI:', asset.metadata.uri);\n\n16console.log('Seller Fee:', asset.metadata.sellerFeeBasisPoints);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc is set up\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mintAddress = address('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a digital asset by its mint address\n\n10const asset = await fetchDigitalAsset(rpc, mintAddress);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Asset:', asset.address);\n\n13console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n14console.log('URI:', asset.metadata.uri);\n\n15console.log('Seller Fee:', asset.metadata.sellerFeeBasisPoints);\n\n16if (asset.edition) {\n\n17 console.log('Is Original:', asset.edition.isOriginal);\n\n18}\n\nFetch By Metadata\nThis helper fetches a single Digital Asset from the public key of its Metadata account. This is slightly less efficient than the previous helper as we first need to fetch the content of the Metadata account to find the Mint address but if you only have access to the Metadata public key, this can be helpful.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetByMetadata } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const metadataAddress = publicKey('Gz3vYbpsB2agTsAwedtvtTkQ1CG9Cpo6eTq59rrEGCKF');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a digital asset by its metadata address\n\n10const asset = await fetchDigitalAssetByMetadata(umi, metadataAddress);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Asset:', asset.publicKey);\n\n13console.log('Metadata:', asset.metadata.publicKey);\n\n14console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15console.log('URI:', asset.metadata.uri);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetByMetadata } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc is set up\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const metadataAddress = address('Gz3vYbpsB2agTsAwedtvtTkQ1CG9Cpo6eTq59rrEGCKF');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a digital asset by its metadata address\n\n10const asset = await fetchDigitalAssetByMetadata(rpc, metadataAddress);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Asset:', asset.address);\n\n13console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n14console.log('URI:', asset.metadata.uri);\n\nFetch All By Mint List\nThis helper fetches as many Digital Assets as there are Mint public keys in the provided list.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mints = [\n\n8 publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK'),\n\n9 publicKey('8TQdiAzdZZEaKtHGjvnLMXhVGjfNsqMgPGBQPPsWYgo8'),\n\n10];\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch multiple digital assets by their mint addresses\n\n13const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAsset(umi, mints);\n\n14\n\n15assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n16 console.log('Asset:', asset.publicKey);\n\n17 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n18});\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc is set up\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mints = [\n\n8 address('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK'),\n\n9 address('8TQdiAzdZZEaKtHGjvnLMXhVGjfNsqMgPGBQPPsWYgo8'),\n\n10];\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch multiple digital assets by their mint addresses\n\n13const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAsset(rpc, mints);\n\n14\n\n15assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n16 console.log('Asset:', asset.address);\n\n17 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n18});\n\nFetch All By Creator\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets by creator. Since creators can be located in five different positions in the Metadata account, we must also provide the creator position we are interested in. For instance, if we know that for a set of NFTs, the first creator is creator A and the second creator B, we will want to search for creator A in position 1 and creator B in position 2.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetByCreator } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const creator = publicKey('creatorAddress...');\n\n8\n\n9// Assets where the creator is first in the Creator array\n\n10const assetsA = await fetchAllDigitalAssetByCreator(umi, creator);\n\n11\n\n12// Assets where the creator is second in the Creator array\n\n13const assetsB = await fetchAllDigitalAssetByCreator(umi, creator, {\n\n14 position: 2,\n\n15});\n\n16\n\n17console.log('Assets with creator at position 1:', assetsA.length);\n\n18assetsA.forEach((asset) => {\n\n19 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n20});\n\nFetch All By Owner\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets by owner.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetByOwner } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const owner = publicKey('ownerAddress...');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch all digital assets owned by a wallet\n\n10const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAssetByOwner(umi, owner);\n\n11\n\n12assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n13 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n14 console.log('URI:', asset.metadata.uri);\n\n15});\n\nFetch All By Update Authority\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets from the public key of their update authority.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetByUpdateAuthority } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const updateAuthority = publicKey('updateAuthorityAddress...');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch all digital assets by update authority\n\n10const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAssetByUpdateAuthority(umi, updateAuthority);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Found', assets.length, 'assets');\n\n13assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n14 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15 console.log('Mint:', asset.publicKey);\n\n16});\n\nDigital Assets With Token\nNote that the Digital Asset data structure mentioned above does not provide any information about the owner of the asset. This first definition only focuses on the onchain accounts that are required regardless of their owners. However, in order to provide a more complete picture of an asset, we may also need to know who owns it. This is where the Digital Asset With Token data structure comes in. It is an extension of the Digital Asset data structure that also includes the following accounts:\nToken account (from the SPL Token program): It defines the relationship between a Mint account and its owner. It stores important data such as the amount of tokens owned by the owner. In the case of NFTs, the amount is always 1.\nToken Record account (for PNFTs only): It defines additional token-related information for Programmable Non-Fungibles such as its current Token Delegate and its role.\nNote that, for fungible assets, the same Digital Asset will likely be associated with multiple owners via multiple Token accounts. Therefore, there can be multiple Digital Asset With Token for the same Digital Asset.\nHere as well, we offer a set of helpers to fetch Digital Assets With Token.\nDigital Asset With Token definition\n\nimport { Token } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-toolbox'\n\nimport {\n\nDigitalAsset,\n\nTokenRecord,\n\n} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata'\n\nexport type DigitalAssetWithToken = DigitalAsset & {\n\ntoken: Token\n\ntokenRecord?: TokenRecord\n\n}\n\nFetch By Mint\nThis helper fetches a single Digital Asset With Token from the public key of its Mint account. This is mostly relevant for Non-Fungible assets since it will only return one Digital Asset With Token, regardless of how many exist for a Fungible asset.\nThe Kit SDK requires knowing either the token address or the owner. Use the \"Fetch By Mint and Owner\" helper below if you know the owner.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetWithTokenByMint } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mint = publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a digital asset with its token account by mint address\n\n10const asset = await fetchDigitalAssetWithTokenByMint(umi, mint);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Asset:', asset.publicKey);\n\n13console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n14console.log('Token Owner:', asset.token.owner);\n\n15console.log('Token Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\nFetch By Mint and Owner\nThis helper is more performant than the previous helper but requires that we know the owner of the asset.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mint = publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8const owner = publicKey('ownerAddress...');\n\n9\n\n10// Fetch a digital asset with its associated token account\n\n11const asset = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(umi, mint, owner);\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Asset:', asset.publicKey);\n\n14console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15console.log('Token Owner:', asset.token.owner);\n\n16console.log('Token Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc is set up\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mintAddress = address('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8const ownerAddress = address('ownerAddress...');\n\n9\n\n10// Fetch a digital asset with its associated token account\n\n11const asset = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(rpc, mintAddress, ownerAddress);\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Asset:', asset.address);\n\n14console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15console.log('Token Owner:', asset.token.owner);\n\n16console.log('Token Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\nFetch All By Owner\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets With Token from a given owner.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByOwner } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const owner = publicKey('ownerAddress...');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch all digital assets with their token accounts by owner\n\n10const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByOwner(umi, owner);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Found', assets.length, 'assets');\n\n13assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n14 console.log('Name:', asset.metadata.name);\n\n15 console.log('Token Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\n16});\n\nFetch All By Mint\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets With Token from the public key of a Mint account. This is particularly relevant for Fungible assets since it fetches all Token accounts.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByMint } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mint = publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch all token accounts for a given mint\n\n10const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByMint(umi, mint);\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Found', assets.length, 'token accounts');\n\n13assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n14 console.log('Owner:', asset.token.owner);\n\n15 console.log('Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\n16});\n\nFetch All By Owner and Mint\nThis helper fetches all Digital Assets With Token from both an owner and a Mint account. This can be useful for Fungible assets that have more than one Token account for a given owner.\nThis helper requires RPC calls to filter accounts and is available in the Umi SDK. For the Kit SDK, consider using a DAS (Digital Asset Standard) API provider for efficient queries.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByOwnerAndMint } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const owner = publicKey('ownerAddress...');\n\n8const mint = publicKey('Ay1U9DWphDgc7hq58Yj1yHabt91zTzvV2YJbAWkPNbaK');\n\n9\n\n10// Fetch all token accounts for a given owner and mint\n\n11const assets = await fetchAllDigitalAssetWithTokenByOwnerAndMint(umi, owner, mint);\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Found', assets.length, 'token accounts');\n\n14assets.forEach((asset) => {\n\n15 console.log('Token Address:', asset.token.publicKey);\n\n16 console.log('Amount:', asset.token.amount);\n\n17});","tokens":4108,"crawled_at":1791192914664} +{"id":10160,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/llms.txt","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"","text":"# Synthetix\n\n> Trader documentation for Synthetix perpetual contracts\n\n## Docs\n\n- [Contact Support](/contact-support): If you need help with Synthetix, you can contact **Support** through the chat widget in the bottom-right corner of Synthetix Docs.\n- [Frequently Asked Questions](/faq): Find answers to common questions about Synthetix Exchange.\n- [Getting Started](/getting-started): New to Synthetix? Start here.\n- [Official Links](/official-links): Use the official Synthetix links below to access the exchange, documentation, announcements, community channels, developer resources, and other official services.\n- [Auto-Deleveraging (ADL)](/trading/adl): Auto-deleveraging is a last-resort risk mechanism that activates when a liquidated account reaches **bankruptcy**, meaning its collateral is insufficient to cover the loss at the current mark price. In this situation, the exchange cannot absorb the loss through normal liquidation, so it is instead distributed to the most profitable, most leveraged positions on the opposite side of the market.\n- [Advanced Order Types](/trading/advanced-order-types): Advanced order types provide additional control over execution, pricing and timing compared to standard order types.\n- [Exporting History](/trading/exporting-history): Synthetix allows you to export your **trade, order, funding, PnL, and other historical activity** for purposes such as **tax reporting, record keeping, or further analysis**.\n- [Fees](/trading/fees): Trading on Synthetix Mainnet involves fees that are applied when opening and closing positions. Collateral operations such as withdrawals, voluntary Swap, and forced auto-exchange can also have fees.\n- [Funding](/trading/funding): Perpetual futures use funding to keep prices in line with the spot market. Funding is a recurring payment between longs and shorts based on the difference between the perp's mark price and the index price of the underlying asset.\n- [Glossary](/trading/glossary)\n- [Leverage & Margin](/trading/leverage-margin): Using leverage amplifies both gains and losses. Higher leverage uses less margin, but it also brings your liquidation threshold closer.\n- [Limit Orders](/trading/limit-orders): Limit Orders allow you to specify the price at which you want to buy or sell. They are designed for traders who want greater control over their execution price rather than immediate execution.\n- [Liquidations](/trading/liquidations): Liquidation occurs when your account no longer has enough value to maintain your open positions and meet the required maintenance margin.\n- [Managing Open Orders](/trading/managing-open-orders): Once you've placed an order, you can manage it directly from the Open Orders tab in the portfolio table. This guide explains the actions available while your order is waiting to be executed.\n- [Managing Positions](/trading/managing-positions): Once you've opened a position, you can monitor its performance and manage it directly from the trading interface. This guide explains the actions available while your position is open.\n- [Market Orders](/trading/market-orders): Market Orders allow you to buy or sell immediately using the best available market price. They are designed for traders who prioritise execution speed over controlling the exact execution price.\n- [Markets](/trading/markets): All markets on Synthetix are perpetual futures quoted and settled in USDT on Ethereum Mainnet.\n- [Navigating the App](/trading/navigating-the-app): The Synthetix Exchange brings together trading, account management, rewards, and market information in a single application. Each page in the navigation provides a different view of your account or the broader market.\n- [Open Interest Limits](/trading/oi-limits): To help manage risk and maintain orderly markets, we apply Open Interest (OI) limits on a per-market basis.\n- [Order Types](/trading/order-types): Synthetix Exchange supports several order types that allow you to enter, exit and manage positions in different market conditions.\n- [Order Book](/trading/orderbook): Synthetix perpetual futures markets use a central limit order book (CLOB). If you have traded on a centralized exchange before, the structure will feel familiar.\n- [Trading Overview](/trading/overview): Synthetix offers perpetual futures contracts on a range of assets. Positions are margined in USDT and settled on-chain.\n- [P&L Calculations](/trading/pnl): On Synthetix, positions, margin, and settlement flows are tracked by the protocol. The UI typically surfaces convenience metrics like average entry price, unrealized PnL, and realized or closed PnL by deriving them from the position state and fills.\n- [Portfolio](/trading/portfolio): The **Portfolio** page is your trading dashboard, bringing together your balances, positions, orders, and account activity in one place.\n- [Pricing & Indices](/trading/pricing): We publish three price types:\n- [Scaled Orders](/trading/scaled-orders): Scaled Orders allow traders to place multiple limit orders across a selected price range.\n- [Stop Orders](/trading/stop-orders): Stop Orders allow traders to automate trade execution based on a selected price level.\n- [Tiers](/trading/tiers): Synthetix uses a volume-based tier system. Your tier determines your trading fee rates, how many open orders you can hold, and how many Sub-Accounts you can create.\n- [Trade & Order History](/trading/trade-and-order-history): The **Order History** and **Trade History** tabs in the **Portfolio Table** provide a record of your trading activity.\n- [TWAP Orders](/trading/twap-orders): TWAP (Time-Weighted Average Price) Orders allow traders to split a larger order into smaller orders executed gradually over a selected period of time.\n- [Referral Program](/rewards/referral-program): The Synthetix Referral Program allows traders to share referral codes and earn rewards when referred users trade on Synthetix.\n- [Snaxpot](/rewards/snaxpot): Snaxpot is a weekly rewards program powered by trading activity on Synthetix.\n- [420 Legacy Staking](/legacy-migration/420-legacy-staking): This page contains information about the retired 420 staking system, including its closure, SIP-423, legacy rewards, outstanding debt, and sUSD to SNX conversion guidance.\n- [What happened to my old position (LP, Perps, Rewards, Spot) on Arbitrum?](/legacy-migration/arbitrum-positions): If you previously held a position on **Arbitrum** through **Synthetix V3**, please note that **support for Arbitrum has been deprecated**.\n- [Asset Recovery by Network](/legacy-migration/asset-recovery-by-network): This page helps you identify **where your assets may be**, based on the network you used, and directs you to the appropriate next steps.\n- [What happened to my old position (LP, Perps, Rewards, Spot) on Base?](/legacy-migration/base-positions): If you previously held a position on **Base** through **Synthetix V3**, please note that **support for Base has been deprecated**.\n- [I have Curve LP Tokens, what can I do with them?](/legacy-migration/eth-curve-lp): The **Curve Liquidity Pool DAI/USDC/USDT/sUSD is now deprecated**.\n- [I have Synths on ETH Mainnet, what can I do with them?](/legacy-migration/eth-synths): If you are still holding **Synths** on **Ethereum** **(sETH, sBTC, sLINK etc.)**, please be aware that the legacy Synth system has now been **deprecated**.\n- [Legacy & Migration Help](/legacy-migration/legacy-migration-help): Synthetix has evolved across multiple networks and products over time. If you used Synthetix in the past, this section helps you understand **what happened to your assets** and **what to do next**.\n- [Legacy Tokens & Wallet Assets](/legacy-migration/legacy-tokens): Synthetix has used different tokens and assets across multiple products and networks over time. If you’ve found tokens or positions in your wallet and aren’t sure what they represent, use the links below to identify the asset and understand your options.\n- [Missing sUSD from the sUSD to SNX Conversion](/legacy-migration/missing-susd-from-susd-to-snx-conversion): Following the deprecation of sUSD under SIP-423, some users may have held sUSD within LP positions or other deposit contracts at the time of the snapshot.\n- [I got KWENTA Tokens, where can I swap them for SNX?](/legacy-migration/op-kwenta): Kwenta (KWENTA) is being unified into the Synthetix system. The migration process allows you to convert KWENTA into SNX under a vesting schedule.\n- [I have Synths on Optimism, what can I do with them?](/legacy-migration/op-synths): If you are still holding **Synths** on **Optimism (sETH, sBTC, sLINK etc.)**, please note that the legacy Synth system on Optimism **begins deprecation on January 31, 2026**.\n- [I got TLX Tokens, where can I swap them for SNX?](/legacy-migration/op-tlx): TLX is being unified into the **Synthetix** ecosystem. As part of this process, TLX can be migrated to **SNX** through an official migration flow that uses a **vesting schedule**.\n- [Repaying Post-Debt Jubilee Debt](/legacy-migration/repaying-post-debt-jubilee-debt): Following the closure of the 420 staking system and the end of Debt Jubilee under SIP-423, some users may still have outstanding debt associated with their legacy staking position.\n- [Depositing Collateral](/deposits-withdrawals/depositing): Synthetix Exchange runs on **Ethereum Mainnet**. Deposited collateral funds the selected subaccount only, and that collateral can be used to trade USDT-settled perps markets.\n- [Multicollateral Margin](/deposits-withdrawals/multi-collateral-margin): Use supported assets such as USDT and WETH to fund a single cross-margin perps account. This page is the conceptual overview. For step-by-step collateral operations, see [Depositing Collateral](/deposits-withdrawals/depositing) and [Withdrawing Collateral](/deposits-withdrawals/withdrawing).\n- [SLP Vault](/deposits-withdrawals/slp-vault): The Synthetix Liquidity Provider (SLP) Vault is the protocol's community market making vault, designed to back all perps markets on Ethereum Mainnet.\n- [Withdrawing Collateral](/deposits-withdrawals/withdrawing): You can withdraw collateral that is not required for open positions, USDT debt, or account-health limits. In multicollateral accounts, each asset is withdrawn separately.\n- [Account Managers](/account/account-managers): Account Managers allow a wallet to manage and trade using a Synthetix account owned by another wallet.\n- [Delegated Trading](/account/delegated-trading): Delegated Trading allows a wallet to grant another wallet permission to trade on a specific Sub-Account.\n- [Sub-Accounts](/account/subaccounts): A **Sub-Account** is a separate trading account linked to your wallet. You can create multiple Sub-Accounts within a single wallet to separate trading activity, positions, and risk.\n- [About Synthetix](/about-synthetix): Synthetix is the first decentralized perpetual futures protocol built on Ethereum Mainnet. The Synthetix Exchange provides offchain order matching through a high-performance Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) with onchain settlement on Ethereum, the world's most secure smart contract platform.\n- [Products](/about-synthetix/products): This page provides an overview of current and legacy products in the Synthetix ecosystem.\n- [SNX Token](/about-synthetix/snx-token): SNX is the native token of the Synthetix ecosystem.\n- [Synthetix History](/about-synthetix/synthetix-history): Synthetix began in 2018 as Havven, a protocol for decentralized stablecoins. In 2019, Synthetix v2 launched, pioneering the minting of synthetic assets, including crypto assets, indices, and traditional finance (TradFi) assets, on Ethereum. This innovation established Synthetix as a leader in on-chain derivatives and composable DeFi infrastructure.","tokens":2940,"crawled_at":1791192906468} +{"id":10161,"url":"https://docs.near.org/chain-abstraction/chain-signatures/implementation","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Signing Transactions - NEAR Docs","text":"Chain signatures enable NEAR accounts, including smart contracts, to sign and execute transactions across many blockchain protocols.\nThis unlocks the next level of blockchain interoperability by giving ownership of diverse assets, cross-chain accounts, and data to a single NEAR account.\n\nSupported Networks\n\nWhile you can sign transactions for any network using Eddsa or Ecdsa keys, each chain signs transactions differently.Our example implementation shows you how to sign transactions for: Bitcoin, Solana, Cosmos, XRP, Aptos, Sui and EVM networks (Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Avalanche, Polygon, Arbitrum, and more).\n\n​\n\nCreate a Chain Signature\n\nThere are five steps to create a Chain Signature:\n\nDeriving the Foreign Address - Derive the address that will be controlled on the target blockchain.\n\nCreating a Transaction - Create the transaction or message to be signed.\n\nRequesting a Signature - Call the NEAR MPC contract requesting it to sign the transaction.\n\nFormatting the Signature - Format the signature from the MPC contract and add it to the transaction.\n\nRelaying the Signed Transaction - Send the signed transaction to the destination chain for execution.\n\nDiagram of a chain signature in NEAR\nThe chainsig.js library provides a convenient interface for completing each of these steps.\n\nFor building transactions inside of NEAR smart contracts written in Rust, you can use the Omni Transaction library to easily build transactions for different blockchains (like Bitcoin and Ethereum).\n\nMPC ContractsThere is an MPC contract available on both mainnet and testnet:\nMainnet: v1.signer\n\nTestnet: v1.signer-prod.testnet\n\nThe MPC network is made up of 8 nodes.\n\n​\n\nChain Signatures Contract\n\nTo interact with the chain signatures library you first need to instantiate a ChainSignaturesContract.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe networkId and contractId are set to the values specified in the previous section depending which network you are on.\n\n​\n\nChain Adapters\n\nTo interact with a specific chain, you need to instantiate the relevant chainAdapter.\nΞ EVM\n\n₿ Bitcoin\n\n◎ Solana\n\n◉ XRP\n\n◈ SUI\n\n⬟ Aptos\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe EVM chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as publicClient which is constructed from an EVM RPC URL.\nTo use different EVM networks, simply specify the RPC URL for your desired network.\nThe example demonstrates compatibility with multiple EVM-compatible networks including Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Avalanche, Polygon, Arbitrum, zkSync, and many others.\nYou can find RPC URLs for various networks at ChainList.\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe Bitcoin chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as the network (“mainnet”, “testnet” or “regtest”) and a btcRpcAdapter which handles communication with the Bitcoin network.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe Solana chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as a connection which is constructed from a Solana RPC URL. If you want to use Mainnet, then you need to choose a Mainnet RPC.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe XRP chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as an rpcUrl for the XRP Ledger and the rpcURl specification. For testnet, use https://s.altnet.rippletest.net:51234.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe SUI chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as a connection which is a SuiClient constructed from a SUI RPC URL.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe Aptos chain adapter takes the ChainSignaturesContract as an argument as well as a nodeUrl for the Aptos network and the network specification.\n\n​\n\n1. Deriving the Foreign Address\n\nChain Signatures use derivation paths to represent accounts on the target blockchain. The foreign address to be controlled can be deterministically derived from:\n\nThe NEAR account calling the MPC contract (e.g., example.near, example.testnet, etc.)\n\nA derivation path (a string such as ethereum-1, ethereum-2, etc.)\n\nThe MPC service’s master public key (we don’t need to worry about this as it is defined in the library we’re using).\n\nTo derive the address call the deriveAddressAndPublicKey method passing the near account Id from which the address is being derived and the derivation path.\nΞ EVM\n\n₿ Bitcoin\n\n◎ Solana\n\n◉ XRP\n\n◈ SUI\n\n⬟ Aptos\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nOn Solana, your address is the same as your public key.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe same NEAR account and path will always produce the same address on the target blockchain.\nexample.near + ethereum-1 = 0x1b48b83a308ea4beb845db088180dc3389f8aa3b\n\nexample.near + ethereum-2 = 0x99c5d3025dc736541f2d97c3ef3c90de4d221315\n\n​\n\n2. Creating the Transaction\n\nTo construct the transaction to be signed use the method prepareTransactionForSigning.\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer ETH is very simple. The value is the amount of ETH in Wei as type BigInt (1 ETH = 1018 Wei).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction and the transaction hash(es) (also known as the payload).\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer BTC is very simple. The value is the amount of BTC in satoshis as a string (1 BTC = 100,000,000 sats).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction and the transaction hash(es) (also known as the payload).\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer SOL is very simple. The value is the amount of SOL in lamports as type BigInt (1 SOL = 1,000,000,000 lamports).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction.\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer XRP is straightforward. The value is the amount of XRP in drops as a string (1 XRP = 1,000,000 drops).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction and the transaction hash (also known as the payload).\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer SUI is simple. The value is the amount of SUI in MIST as type BigInt (1 SUI = 1,000,000,000 MIST).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction and the transaction hash (also known as the payload).\n\nConstructing a transaction to transfer APT is straightforward. The value is the amount of APT in octas as type BigInt (1 APT = 100,000,000 octas).Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis method returns the unsigned transaction and the transaction hash (also known as the payload).\n\nEVM Function Calls\n\nTo call a function on a smart contract we need the ABI of the contract, in our repo this is defined in the config.js file (this can be gathered from Remix or using Etherscan).Then define a Contract object using the ethers libraryLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThen to construct the transactionLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThis approach allows you to call smart contract functions by encoding the function data and including it in the transaction.\n\n​\n\n3. Requesting the Signature\n\nOnce the transaction is created and ready to be signed, a signature request is made by calling sign on the MPC smart contract.\nThe method requires four parameters:\n\nThe payloads (or hashes) to be signed for the target blockchain\n\nThe derivation path for the account we want to use to sign the transaction\n\nThe keyType, Ecdsa for Secp256k1 signatures and Eddsa for Ed25519 signatures.\n\nThe signerAccount which contains the accountId that is signing and the signAndSendTransactions function from Near Connect.\n\nΞ EVM\n\n₿ Bitcoin\n\n◎ Solana\n\n◉ XRP\n\n◈ SUI\n\n⬟ Aptos\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nFor Bitcoin, it is common to have multiple UTXOs to sign when sending a single transaction. We create a NEAR transaction (to call sign on the MPC contract) for each UTXO and send them to be signed by the MPC individually. Each signature is then parsed from each transaction outcome to produce an array of signatures.\nTo get the payload, serialize the transaction to a uint8Array and then convert it to hex.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\n4. Formatting the Signature\n\nOnce the signature is returned from the MPC it needs to be formatted and added to the transaction to produce a signed transaction.\nΞ EVM\n\n₿ Bitcoin\n\n◎ Solana\n\n◉ XRP\n\n◈ SUI\n\n⬟ Aptos\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nFor Bitcoin, the array of signatures is added to the transaction to produce a complete signed transaction.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\n5. Relaying the Signed Transaction\n\nNow that we have a signed transaction, we can relay it to the target network using broadcastTx.\nΞ EVM\n\n₿ Bitcoin\n\n◎ Solana\n\n◉ XRP\n\n◈ SUI\n\n⬟ Aptos\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe method returns a transaction hash which can be used to locate the transaction on an explorer.\n\n⭐️ For a deep dive into the concepts of Chain Signatures, see What are Chain Signatures?⭐️ For a complete example of a NEAR account using chain signatures in a frontend, see our web app example.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2344,"crawled_at":1791192909470} +{"id":10162,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/getting-started","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Getting Started – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jul 20, 2026\n\nNew to Synthetix? Start here.\n\nThis guide walks you through creating your trading account, depositing collateral, and placing your first perpetual trade.\n\nGetting started only takes three simple steps:\n\nConnect your wallet.\n\nCreate your trading account.\n\nPlace your first trade.\n\nStep 1: Connect your wallet\n\nTo begin, open the Synthetix Exchange and click Connect Wallet on the top right corner. Then approve the connection request in your wallet.\n\nClick Connect Wallet in the top-right corner of the Exchange, then approve the connection request in your wallet.\nThis allows Synthetix to read your wallet address and interact with your funds when required.\n\nSynthetix is built on the Ethereum ecosystem and requires an EVM-compatible wallet. While many wallets are available, the following are the most commonly used.\n\nRabby\n\nMetaMask\n\nWalletConnect-compatible wallets\n\nDifferent Synthetix products operate on different blockchain networks. Synthetix is consolidating its products back onto Ethereum Mainnet, and any remaining deployments on Layer 2 networks are considered legacy or will be deprecated over time.\n\nAlways ensure your wallet is connected to the correct network before interacting with a Synthetix product.\n\nStep 2: Set up your account\n\nOnce your wallet is connected, you'll need to create a trading account by depositing collateral.\n\nClick Create Account.\n\nSelect the collateral asset you want to deposit (for example, USDC or ETH) and enter the amount.\n\n(Optional) Enter a referral code if you have one.\n\nClick Create Account to confirm your deposit.\n\nOpen Create Account, enter your deposit amount, optionally add a referral code, then click Create Account to confirm.\n\nApprove the required wallet transaction(s).\n\nAuthenticate your account.\n\nAfter approving the deposit transactions, click Authenticate to finish setting up your trading account.\n\nYour trading account is now ready for trading.\n\nStep 3: Placing your first trade\n\nOpen the Market Selector near the top-left corner.\n\nSelect a market from the list, for example BTC-USDT.\n\nThe selected market will load in the trading interface.\n\nNavigate to the Order Entry panel.\n\nSelect a market from the Market Selector, then use the Order Entry panel on the right to configure your trade.\n\nBy default, a Market order is selected.\n\nConfigure your order:\n\nSet your leverage.\n\nChoose Buy (Long) or Sell (Short).\n\nEnter the position size.\n\nClick Buy / Long or Sell / Short.\n\nSet your leverage, choose Buy or Sell, enter the position size, then click Buy / Long or Sell / Short to submit.\n\nReview the order details in the confirmation window.\n\nSubmit the order.\n\nOnce your order has been filled, you can:\n\nView your position on the chart.\n\nMonitor your position from the Positions tab in the portfolio table.\n\nSee also\n\nNavigating the App\n\nPortfolio\n\nManaging Positions\n\nDepositing Collateral\n\nOrder Types","tokens":725,"crawled_at":1791192923589} +{"id":10163,"url":"https://docs.near.org/chain-abstraction/omnibridge/overview","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Omni Bridge Overview - NEAR Docs","text":"The Omni Bridge is a multi-chain asset bridge that facilitates secure and efficient asset transfers between different blockchain networks. It solves key challenges in cross-chain communication by leveraging Chain Signatures and its decentralized Multi-Party Computation (MPC) service to enable trustless cross-chain asset transfers.\n\nTo learn more see How Omni Bridge Works.\n\n​\n\nSupported Chains\n\nOmni Bridge launches with a hybrid architecture, utilizing different verification methods based on chain-specific requirements and technical constraints. This approach allows us to support multiple chains from day one while progressively transitioning to full Chain Signatures integration.\nCurrently the supported chains are:\n\nEthereum - (Light client + Chain Signatures)\n\nBitcoin - (Light client + Chain Signatures)\n\nZcash - (Light client + Chain Signatures)\n\nSolana - (Wormhole + Chain Signatures)\n\nBase - (Wormhole + Chain Signatures)\n\nBNB - (Wormhole + Chain Signatures)\n\nArbitrum - (Wormhole + Chain Signatures)\n\nPolygon - (Wormhole + Chain Signatures)\n\nSee Omni Bridge Roadmap for more details.\n\n​\n\nResources\n\nNear-One/omni-bridge - Omni Bridge repository\n\nNear-One/bridge-sdk-js - JavaScript SDK\n\nNear-One/bridge-sdk-rs - Rust SDK\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":315,"crawled_at":1791192927665} +{"id":10164,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/update","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Updating Assets | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nThe update authority of an asset can update its Metadata account using the Update instruction as long as the Is Mutable attribute is set to true. The Update instruction requires the Update Authority to sign the transaction and can update the following attributes of the Metadata account:\nUpdatable Fields\nNote that certain delegated authorities can also update the Metadata account of assets as discussed in the \"Delegated Authorities\" page.\nBelow is an explanation of all the individual fields available for update in the UpdateV1 instruction.\nThe Data Object\nThe object that defines the Name, Symbol, URI, Seller Fee Basis Points and the array of Creators of the asset. Note that the update authority can only add and/or remove unverified creators from the Creators array. The only exception is if the creator is the update authority, in which case the added or removed creators can be verified.\nData Object\n\nconst data = {\n\nname: 'New Name',\n\nsymbol: 'New Symbol',\n\nuri: 'https://newuri.com',\n\nsellerFeeBasisPoints: 500,\n\ncreators: [],\n\n}\n\nPrimary Sale Happened\nPrimary Sale Happened: A boolean that indicates whether the asset has been sold before.\nPrimary Sale Happened\n\nprimarySaleHappened: true\n\nIs Mutable\nA boolean that indicates whether the asset can be updated again. When changing this to false, any future updates will fail.\nIs Mutable\n\nisMutable: true\n\nCollection\nThis attribute enables us to set or clear the collection of the asset. Note that when setting a new collection, the verified boolean must be set to false and verified using another instruction.\nSetting A Collection\nSetting A Collection\n\ncollection: collectionToggle('Set', [\n\n{\n\nkey: publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111'),\n\nverified: false,\n\n},\n\n])\n\nClearing a Collection\nClearing a Collection\n\ncollection: collectionToggle(\"Clear\"),\n\nNew Update Authority\nA new update authority can be assigned to an Asset by passing in the newUpdateAuthority field.\nNew Update Authority\n\nnewUpdateAuthority: publicKey('1111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nProgramable RuleSets\nThis attribute enables us to set or clear the rule set of the asset. This is only relevant for Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nProgramable RuleSets\n\nruleSet: publicKey('1111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to update an asset on Token Metadata.\nUpdate As Update Authority\nNFT Asset\nThis example shows you how to update an NFT Asset as the update Authority of the Asset.\n\n1import { publicKey, none, some } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { updateV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5// See getting-started for full setup\n\n6\n\n7const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n8\n\n9// Update the NFT metadata\n\n10await updateV1(umi, {\n\n11 mint: mintAddress,\n\n12 authority: umi.identity,\n\n13 // Only specify fields you want to update\n\n14 data: some({\n\n15 name: 'Updated NFT Name',\n\n16 symbol: '', // Keep existing\n\n17 uri: '', // Keep existing\n\n18 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 0, // Keep existing\n\n19 creators: none(),\n\n20 }),\n\n21}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n22\n\n23console.log('NFT metadata updated');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUpdateV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n7// See getting-started for full setup\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n10\n\n11// Update the NFT metadata\n\n12const updateIx = await getUpdateV1InstructionAsync({\n\n13 mint: mintAddress,\n\n14 authority,\n\n15 payer: authority,\n\n16 // Specify fields to update (creators must be explicitly set, use null to keep existing)\n\n17 data: {\n\n18 name: 'Updated NFT Name',\n\n19 symbol: 'UNFT',\n\n20 uri: 'https://example.com/updated-nft.json',\n\n21 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 550,\n\n22 creators: null, // Keep existing creators\n\n23 },\n\n24});\n\n25\n\n26await sendAndConfirm({\n\n27 instructions: [updateIx],\n\n28 payer: authority,\n\n29});\n\n30\n\n31console.log('NFT metadata updated');\n\n1use anchor_lang::prelude::*;\n\n2use mpl_token_metadata::{\n\n3 accounts::Metadata,\n\n4 instructions::UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder, types::Data,\n\n5};\n\n6\n\n7#[derive(Accounts)]\n\n8pub struct NftUpdateMpl<'info> {\n\n9 pub mint: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n10 /// CHECK: Handled by CPI\n\n11 #[account(mut)]\n\n12 pub metadata: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n13 #[account(mut)]\n\n14 pub update_authority: Signer<'info>,\n\n15 /// CHECK: Handled by CPI\n\n16 pub token_metadata_program: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n17}\n\n18\n\n19pub fn update_nft_mpl_instruction<'info>(\n\n20 ctx: Context<'_, '_, '_, 'info, NftUpdateMpl<'info>>,\n\n21 new_name: Option,\n\n22 new_uri: Option,\n\n23) -> Result<()> {\n\n24 let mint = ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info();\n\n25 let metadata = ctx.accounts.metadata.to_account_info();\n\n26 let token_metadata_program = ctx.accounts.token_metadata_program.to_account_info();\n\n27\n\n28 // Get the original metadata values\n\n29 let metadata_account = Metadata::try_from(&metadata)?;\n\n30\n\n31 let original_metadata = Data {\n\n32 name: metadata_account.name,\n\n33 symbol: metadata_account.symbol,\n\n34 uri: metadata_account.uri,\n\n35 seller_fee_basis_points: metadata_account.seller_fee_basis_points,\n\n36 creators: metadata_account.creators,\n\n37 };\n\n38\n\n39 let new_metadata = Data {\n\n40 name: new_name.unwrap_or(original_metadata.name),\n\n41 uri: new_uri.unwrap_or(original_metadata.uri),\n\n42 ..original_metadata // Keep the rest of the metadata the same\n\n43 };\n\n44\n\n45 UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder::new(&token_metadata_program)\n\n46 .mint(&mint)\n\n47 .metadata(&metadata)\n\n48 .authority(&ctx.accounts.update_authority)\n\n49 .data(new_metadata)\n\n50 // Add remaining data fields/accounts to be adjusted to the CPI if needed\n\n51 // https://docs.rs/mpl-token-metadata/latest/mpl_token_metadata/instructions/struct.UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder.html\n\n52 .invoke()?;\n\n53\n\n54 Ok(())\n\n55}\n\npNFT Asset\nThis example shows you how to update a Programable NFT (pNFT) Asset as the update Authority of the Asset.\npNFTs may require additional accounts to be passed in for the instruction to work. These include: tokenAccount, tokenRecord, authorizationRules, and authorizationRulesProgram.\n\n1import { publicKey, none, some } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { updateV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5\n\n6const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n7\n\n8// Update the Programmable NFT metadata\n\n9// Note: pNFTs may have rule sets that restrict updates\n\n10await updateV1(umi, {\n\n11 mint: mintAddress,\n\n12 authority: umi.identity,\n\n13 data: some({\n\n14 name: 'Updated pNFT Name',\n\n15 symbol: '',\n\n16 uri: '',\n\n17 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 0,\n\n18 creators: none(),\n\n19 }),\n\n20}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n21\n\n22console.log('pNFT metadata updated');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUpdateV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The pNFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Update the Programmable NFT metadata\n\n11// Note: pNFTs may have rule sets that restrict updates\n\n12const updateIx = await getUpdateV1InstructionAsync({\n\n13 mint: mintAddress,\n\n14 authority,\n\n15 payer: authority,\n\n16 // Specify fields to update (creators must be explicitly set, use null to keep existing)\n\n17 data: {\n\n18 name: 'Updated pNFT Name',\n\n19 symbol: 'UPNFT',\n\n20 uri: 'https://example.com/updated-pnft.json',\n\n21 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 550,\n\n22 creators: null, // Keep existing creators\n\n23 },\n\n24});\n\n25\n\n26await sendAndConfirm({\n\n27 instructions: [updateIx],\n\n28 payer: authority,\n\n29});\n\n30\n\n31console.log('pNFT metadata updated');\n\n1use anchor_lang::prelude::*;\n\n2use mpl_token_metadata::{\n\n3 accounts::Metadata,\n\n4 instructions::UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder, types::Data,\n\n5};\n\n6\n\n7#[derive(Accounts)]\n\n8pub struct NftUpdateMpl<'info> {\n\n9 pub mint: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n10 /// CHECK: Handled by CPI\n\n11 #[account(mut)]\n\n12 pub metadata: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n13 #[account(mut)]\n\n14 pub update_authority: Signer<'info>,\n\n15 /// CHECK: Handled by CPI\n\n16 pub token_metadata_program: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n17 // Add additional accounts below if needed\n\n18}\n\n19\n\n20pub fn update_nft_mpl_instruction<'info>(\n\n21 ctx: Context<'_, '_, '_, 'info, NftUpdateMpl<'info>>,\n\n22 new_name: Option,\n\n23 new_uri: Option,\n\n24) -> Result<()> {\n\n25 let mint = ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info();\n\n26 let metadata = ctx.accounts.metadata.to_account_info();\n\n27 let token_metadata_program = ctx.accounts.token_metadata_program.to_account_info();\n\n28\n\n29 // Get the original metadata values\n\n30 let metadata_account = Metadata::try_from(&metadata)?;\n\n31\n\n32 let original_metadata = Data {\n\n33 name: metadata_account.name,\n\n34 symbol: metadata_account.symbol,\n\n35 uri: metadata_account.uri,\n\n36 seller_fee_basis_points: metadata_account.seller_fee_basis_points,\n\n37 creators: metadata_account.creators,\n\n38 };\n\n39\n\n40 let new_metadata = Data {\n\n41 name: new_name.unwrap_or(original_metadata.name),\n\n42 uri: new_uri.unwrap_or(original_metadata.uri),\n\n43 ..original_metadata // Keep the rest of the metadata the same\n\n44 };\n\n45\n\n46 UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder::new(&token_metadata_program)\n\n47 .mint(&mint)\n\n48 .metadata(&metadata)\n\n49 .authority(&ctx.accounts.update_authority)\n\n50 .data(new_metadata)\n\n51\n\n52 // Add remaining data fields to be adjusted to the CPI if needed\n\n53 // https://docs.rs/mpl-token-metadata/latest/mpl_token_metadata/instructions/struct.UpdateAsUpdateAuthorityV2CpiBuilder.html\n\n54 //\n\n55 // .authorization_rules(authorization_rules)\n\n56 // .authorization_rules_program(authorization_rules_program)\n\n57 // .token_record(token_record)\n\n58 .invoke()?;\n\n59\n\n60 Ok(())\n\n61}","tokens":2487,"crawled_at":1791192951615} +{"id":10165,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/get_started/use_cases","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Use cases - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Use cases\n\nAs we have discussed in earlier sections, AI agents can execute arbitrary operations in a decentralized way.\nThere is a great deal of applications where the properties of AI agents make them better suited than existing solutions,\nespecially in the context of DAOs and where complex operations are required to be executed in a decentralized and transparent way. AI agents remove the need of strong trust assumptions that traditional centralized off-chain services require.\n\nBelow you will find some ideas of what you can do with AI agents:\n\nInternal DAO operations\n\nMeta Yield Hunter:\nUse machine learning to track yield opportunities across chains and protocols. Autonomously move positions to optimize yield.\n\nAsset Whitelisting:\nDynamically evaluates assets based on diverse datasets to add and remove from whitelists.\n\nContribution Coordinator:\nWatch for contributions on GitHub, Twitter etc and adjust on-chain rewards & permissions accordingly.\n\nNew services\n\nWeb3-native Recommender:\nBuild the first co-owned and operated engines to track opportunities and make personalized recommendations to crypto users.\n\nNFT Collector:\nAllow users to passively build exposure to quality baskets of NFTs.\n\nFund Manager:\nOvercome the legal and trust challenges of running a decentralized fund.\n\nCustomizable app infrastructure\n\nOracles (On-chain Data Reporter):\nBuild future-proof oracles that are totally customizable, without permission, and owned by you.\n\nKeepers:\nBuild robust keeper systems that you can extend to maintain any on-chain data, based on a rich set of criteria which you define.\n\nBridges (Cross-chain Messenger):\nSpin up your own bridges to sync any type of data across chains and infrastructure. Combine with your oracles and keepers to build rich new services.","tokens":446,"crawled_at":1791192938952} +{"id":10166,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/trading/fees","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Fees – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jun 16, 2026\n\nTrading on Synthetix Mainnet involves fees that are applied when opening and closing positions. Collateral operations such as withdrawals, voluntary Swap, and forced auto-exchange can also have fees.\n\nMaker vs. Taker\n\nEvery time an order is filled, a trading fee is charged. You are either a maker or a taker:\n\nRoleHow it worksDefault fee rate\nTaker\nYour order executes immediately against existing liquidity (market orders, or limit orders that cross the spread)\n0.05%\n\nMaker\nYour order rests on the order book and is matched by someone else\n0.02%\n\nVolume-based Fee Tiers\n\nFees decrease as your 14-day rolling trading volume increases. Your tier also affects open order limits and the number of subaccounts you can create, see Tiers for the full breakdown.\n\nTier14-day VolumeMakerTaker\nRegular User\n$0+\n0.020%\n0.050%\n\nTier 1\n>= $100,000\n0.020%\n0.050%\n\nTier 2\n>= $5,000,000\n0.016%\n0.040%\n\nTier 3\n>= $25,000,000\n0.014%\n0.035%\n\nTier 4\n>= $100,000,000\n0.012%\n0.032%\n\nTier 5\n>= $500,000,000\n0.008%\n0.025%\n\nTier 6\n>= $2,000,000,000\n0.003%\n0.020%\n\nTier 7\n>= $5,000,000,000\n0.000%\n0.017%\n\nVolume is measured in notional USDT traded across all markets in a rolling 14-day window. Your tier is applied to all subsequent trades.\n\nFee calculations\n\nFees are charged on the notional value of each fill, not on the margin you deposit.\n\nTrading Fee = Quantity x Executed Price x Fee Rate\n\nTaker order example:\n\nTrade 0.5 BTC at 100,000 USDT gives 50,000 USDT notional.\n\nAt 0.05% taker rate, fee = 50,000 x 0.0005 = 25 USDT.\n\nMaker order example:\n\nSame trade, resting limit order.\n\nAt 0.02% maker rate, fee = 50,000 x 0.0002 = 10 USDT.\n\nFees are charged per fill. Partial fills are charged on the filled portion only.\n\nWhen trading fees are charged\n\nOpening a position\n\nClosing a position\n\nIncreasing or reducing a position through a filled order\n\nTrading fees settle to your subaccount's USDT balance. If you primarily hold non-USDT collateral, fees can make the USDT balance negative.\n\nCollateral operation fees\n\nActionFee behavior\nWithdraw\nPer-asset withdrawal fee, deducted from the amount received and shown before confirmation.\n\nSwap (voluntary)\nExchange fee based on the source asset's lowest-tier haircut, shown in the swap quote before confirmation.\n\nAuto-exchange (forced)\nHigher exchange fee than voluntary Swap, approximately 2x the voluntary rate, applied automatically with no confirmation step.\n\nDeposits and withdrawals\nEthereum Mainnet gas paid in ETH by your wallet.\n\nInternal Swap\nNo wallet gas transaction; the fee is applied in the swap quote.\n\nLiquidation Clearance Fee\n\nWhen a position is liquidated, an additional liquidation clearance fee is charged on the notional value of the liquidated position. This fee varies by market:\n\nMarketLiquidation Clearance Fee\nBTC-USDT\n0.5%\n\nETH-USDT\n0.5%\n\nSOL-USDT\n1.0%\n\nXRP-USDT, DOGE-USDT\n1.0%\n\nZEC-USDT, 1000PEPE-USDT\n1.5%\n\nFARTCOIN-USDT, PUMP-USDT\n2.0%\n\nXMR-USDT\n2.0%\n\nThe liquidation clearance fee is deducted from remaining collateral after the position is closed. Any collateral remaining after the fee is returned to the account.\n\nPerpetuals have no settlement fee\n\nUSDT perpetuals do not expire, so there is no scheduled settlement cost unlike dated futures contracts.\n\nSee also\n\nP&L Calculations - worked examples showing fee impact on net return.\n\nMulticollateral Margin - USDT debt, Swap, and auto-exchange.\n\nWithdrawing Collateral - withdrawal fees and constraints.\n\nMarkets - liquidation clearance fees per market.","tokens":875,"crawled_at":1791192941052} +{"id":10167,"url":"https://docs.near.org/chain-abstraction/omnibridge/implementation","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Implementation Details - NEAR Docs","text":"The Omni Bridge is a sophisticated cross-chain bridge infrastructure that enables secure and efficient token transfers between NEAR Protocol and various other blockchain networks. This document provides a detailed technical overview of the bridge’s architecture, covering its core components, security model, and operational mechanisms. By leveraging a combination of Multi-Party Computation (MPC), chain-specific light clients, and a permissionless relayer network, the bridge achieves a robust balance of security, decentralization, and user experience.\nFor reference code implementations, see:\n\nBridge SDK JS Omni Bridge implementation in JavaScript\n\nBridge SDK Rust Omni Bridge implementation in Rust\n\n​\n\nThe Bridge Token Factory Pattern\n\nAt the core of Omni Bridge is the Bridge Token Factory contract on NEAR that serves as both a token factory and custodian. This unified contract handles both native tokens from the source chain and bridged tokens created by the factory itself. This design simplifies maintenance and reduces complexity compared to having separate contracts.\nThe contract has several key responsibilities:\n​\n\nFor bridged tokens (tokens originally from other chains):\n\nDeploys new token contracts when bridging tokens for the first time\n\nMints tokens when receiving valid transfer messages\n\nBurns tokens when initiating transfers back to the origin chain\n\n​\n\nFor native NEAR tokens:\n\nActs as a custodian by locking tokens during transfers\n\nReleases tokens when receiving valid transfer messages\n\nManages token operations through the NEP-141 standard\n\n​\n\nTransfer Lifecycle\n\nA transfer’s lifecycle includes several states, shown below for a NEAR to Ethereum transfer of native NEAR tokens:\n\n​\n\nMessage Signing and Verification\n\nFor most chains, the bridge uses a payload-based message signing system (with Bitcoin being a notable exception requiring full transaction signing).\n​\n\nMessage Types\n\nThe bridge supports several types of signed messages:\n\nTransfer Messages\n\nInitiation messages\n\nFinalization messages\n\nToken Messages\n\nDeployment messages\n\nMetadata update messages\n\n​\n\nPayload Structure\n\nMessages are encoded using Borsh serialization and contain:\nComponentDescription\nMessage Type\nIdentifier for the message category\n\nChain Info\nChain IDs and relevant addresses\n\nOperation Data\nAmounts, recipients, fees, etc.\n\n​\n\nSignature Process\n\nNEAR contract creates and stores the message payload\n\nMPC network observers detect valid payloads\n\nNodes jointly sign the payload\n\nSignature is verified on destination chains\n\nKey Benefits\nClearer message intent through structured payloads\n\nMore efficient signature verification on destination chains\n\nStandardized message format across chains\n\n​\n\nTransaction Flow: NEAR to Other Chains\n\nHere’s an overview of how transfers are processed from NEAR to different destination chains:\n\n​\n\nTransfer Process\n\nLet’s follow what happens when a user wants to transfer tokens from NEAR to another chain:\n​\n\n1. Initiation\n\nThe user starts by calling the token contract with:\n\nAmount to transfer\n\nDestination chain and address\n\nFee preferences (whether to pay fees in the token being transferred or in NEAR)\n\nFees are minted on NEAR side for relayers\n\n​\n\n2. Token Lock\n\nThe token contract transfers tokens to the locker contract, which:\n\nValidates the transfer message\n\nAssigns a unique nonce\n\nRecords the pending transfer\n\nEmits a transfer event\n\n​\n\n3. MPC Signing\n\nThe bridge contract:\n\nRequests signature generation\n\nMPC nodes jointly generate and aggregate signature\n\nMaintains threshold security throughout process\n\n​\n\n4. Destination Chain\n\nThe Bridge Token Factory on the destination chain:\n\nVerifies the MPC signature\n\nMints equivalent tokens\n\n​\n\nTransaction Flow: Other Chains to NEAR\n\nThe reverse flow varies based on the source chain:\n​\n\n1. Ethereum\n\nUses NEAR light client for maximum security:\n\nBurning tokens on source chain\n\nSubmitting proof to NEAR\n\nVerifying proof through light client\n\nReleasing tokens to recipient\n\n​\n\n2. Supported Non-EVM Chains (e.g., Solana)\n\nUtilize established message passing protocols (such as Wormhole) for:\n\nMessage passing between chains\n\nTransaction verification\n\nIntegration with NEAR token factory system\n\n​\n\n3. Other EVM Chains\n\nUtilize a combination of light clients (where efficient) and message passing protocols to ensure secure verification of inbound transfers.\n\n​\n\nTransaction Flow: Chain to Chain (via NEAR)\n\nFor transfers between two non-NEAR chains (e.g., Ethereum to Solana), the bridge combines both flows using NEAR as an intermediary routing layer. Rather than minting or unlocking tokens on NEAR, the bridge creates a forwarding message that directs tokens to be minted or unlocked on the final destination chain.\nFrom the user’s perspective, this appears as a single operation - they initiate the transfer on the source chain, and the off-chain relayer infrastructure handles the intermediate NEAR routing automatically.\n\n​\n\nSecurity Model\n\n​\n\nTrust Assumptions\n\nOmni Bridge requires different trust assumptions depending on the chain connection:\n​\n\nFor Chain Signatures:\n\nNEAR Protocol security (2/3+ honest validators)\n\nMPC network security (2/3+ honest nodes)\n\nNo single entity controls enough MPC nodes to forge signatures\n\nCorrect implementation of the signing protocol\n\n​\n\nFor Ethereum/Bitcoin connections:\n\nLight client security\n\nFinality assumptions (e.g., sufficient block confirmations)\n\nChain-specific consensus assumptions\n\n​\n\nFor Message Passing connections:\n\nSecurity of the underlying message passing protocol (e.g., Wormhole Guardian network)\n\nVerified by NEAR network participants (e.g., validators and full nodes)\n\n​\n\nRelayer Network\n\nRelayers are permissionless infrastructure operators who monitor for bridge events and execute cross-chain transactions. Unlike many bridge designs, our relayers cannot:\n\nForge transfers\n\nSteal funds\n\nCensor transactions (users can self-relay)\n\nFront-run transactions for profit\n\nDo not create additional security assumptions\n\nThe relayer’s role is purely operational - executing valid transfers and collecting predetermined fees. Multiple relayers can operate simultaneously, creating competition for faster execution and lower fees.\n\n​\n\nFast Transfers\n\nStandard cross-chain transfers can take time due to finality and verification requirements. Fast Transfers allow relayers to expedite this process by fronting liquidity.\n​\n\nHow it Works\n\nUser Initiation: A user sends a FastFinTransferMsg specifying the destination and fee.\n\nRelayer Execution: A relayer detects the request and instantly transfers the equivalent amount (minus fees) to the user on the destination chain from their own funds.\n\nSettlement: The bridge later reimburses the relayer once the original transfer is fully verified and finalized.\n\nFast transfers are ideal for users who prioritize speed over cost, as relayers may charge a premium for the liquidity and convenience.\n\n​\n\nMulti-Token Support (ERC1155)\n\nOmni Bridge supports the ERC1155 standard, enabling the transfer of multiple token types within a single contract.\n​\n\nAddress Derivation\n\nTo maintain consistency across chains, bridged ERC1155 tokens use a deterministic address derivation scheme:\n\nDeterministic Address: keccak256(tokenAddress + tokenId)\n\nThis ensures that each tokenId within an ERC1155 contract maps to a unique, consistent address on the destination chain.\n\n​\n\nKey Functions\n\ninitTransfer1155: Initiates a transfer for a specific ERC1155 token ID.\n\nlogMetadata1155: Registers metadata for a specific token ID, ensuring it is recognized by indexers and wallets.\n\n​\n\nFee Structure\n\nBridge fees are unified and processed on NEAR, with components including:\n​\n\nExecution Fees\n\nDestination chain gas costs\n\nSource chain storage costs\n\nRelayer operational costs\n\nMPC signing costs\n\n​\n\nFee Payment Options\n\nNative tokens of source chain\n\nThe token being transferred\n\nFees dynamically adjust based on gas prices across different chains to ensure reliable execution.\n\n​\n\nDesign Goals\n\nThe fee structure is designed to:\n\nEnsure relayer economic viability\n\nPrevent economic attacks\n\nAllow fee market competition\n\nCover worst-case execution costs\n\nUsers can bypass relayers entirely by executing their own transfers, paying only the necessary gas fees on each chain. This creates a natural ceiling on relayer fees.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2088,"crawled_at":1791192946176} +{"id":10168,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/get_started/agent_services_compared_to","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Agent services compared - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Agent services compared\n\nOne of the best ways to understand how autonomous AI agents fit into\nthe wider ecosystem of crypto services and applications is to compare them with existing solutions.\n\nRecall that an autonomous AI agents is a decentralized service that runs off-chain and provides functionalities to objects living on-chain. Autonomous AI agents are outside the purview and control of a single authority, and can be designed for a variety of purposes, including acting as a decentralized oracle for smart contracts, or executing complex investing strategies that cannot be easily encoded on-chain. An AI agents is a particular type of autonomous AI agent which is implemented as a multi-agent system.\n\nAI agents vs. other software solutions\n\nThe table below highlights the main differences between AI agents and other software solutions.\n\nSmart contracts\nWeb services\nCustom decentralized services (e.g., Oracles)\nAutonomous AI agents\n\nLocation\n\nOn-chain\n\nOff-chain\n\nOff-chain\n\nOff-chain\n\nDecentralized\n\nRobust\n\nTransparent\n\nComplex processing\n\nCross-chain\n\nContinuous/always-on\n\nFlexible\n\nComposable\n\nDAO-owned\n\nFull-stack\n\nSmart contracts are computer programs that live on-chain. They are crypto-native, can be audited and can use any functionality already available in the blockchain. Their security relies\non the security of the underlying blockchain. However, due to their nature, they have a number of limitations, including the inability of doing complex operations, talking to other APIs or interact with other blockchains.\n\nWeb services are a popular off-chain solution to complement the limitations of smart contracts. They are very flexible, but they usually lack the crypto-native features of smart contracts.\n\nCustom decentralized services are services like oracles, bridges or keepers which are run off-chain by a group of operators, thus providing the required level of trust and security. These services run off-chain, which enables them to do complex processing. The main drawback of this approach is that there is no standardized approach to build and compose such services. This severely limits the growth of the ecosystem of applications in the off-chain space.\n\nThis is where AI agents (implemented with the Open Autonomy framework) comes into play in the broader ecosystem of crypto software. AI agents are composable, crypto-native services that can execute complex processing, take action on their own and run continuously.\n\nFor a more detailed discussion, take a look at the Autonolas Education article series.\n\nAI agents vs. single-agent-instance applications\n\nHaving understood how AI agents fit into the wider crypto ecosystem, sometimes there is the question whether is it best to design a certain application as single-agent-instance or as an AI agents.\nThis is often a question that new developers in the field of agent systems and multi-agent systems face. We provide below a comparison table which hopefully will give you some guidance on which of the both approaches is best for your use case.\n\nSingle-agent-instance applications\nAutonomous AI agents\n\nScope\n\nAn application designed to pursue the interests and objectives of a single entity.\n\nAn application designed to offer services that external users can benefit from.\n\nValue generation model\n\nThe application is in charge of generating economic value for its owner.\n\nAI agent operators might charge a fee to their users.\n\nArchitecture & Execution\n\nA single agent instance, typically run and controlled by a single entity.\n\nA set of agent instances run by a collection of independent operators. Agent instances have a synchronized shared state.\n\nTrust model\n\nNot applicable. The owner controls and designs and manages their own agent instance.\n\nAI agents are decentralized and transparent, and can be crypto-economically secured on a public blockchain. They can be regarded as drop-in replacements of trusted entities (on complex service infrastructures), thus relaxing the trust requirements on them.\n\nExample\n\nAutomated, personal asset management: an agent instance determines the best strategy to invest owners assets.\n\nAutomated asset management as a service. Users subscribe to AI agents, which execute elaborate investing strategies to maximize the capital gains, in exchange for a service fee.\n\nFrameworks\n\nOpen AEA\n\nOpen Autonomy + Open AEA\n\nProgressive decentralization\n\nOf course, many use cases that apply for single-agent-instance application can later be considered to be offered as an AI agent. For this reason, it is often advisable to implement a single-agent-instance application as an AI agent with a single instance operator. This approach has the benefit that whenever the developer wants to make the promotion of that application to an AI agent, they will be able to do so almost effortlessly, except for some modifications to account for potentially extra configuration requirements.","tokens":1226,"crawled_at":1791192958132} +{"id":10169,"url":"https://docs.near.org/chain-abstraction/omnibridge/roadmap","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Omni Bridge Roadmap - NEAR Docs","text":"Omni Bridge launches with a hybrid architecture, utilizing different verification methods based on chain-specific requirements and technical constraints. This approach allows us to support multiple chains from day one while progressively transitioning to full Chain Signatures integration.\n​\n\nSupported Chains\n\nThe bridge currently supports the following networks:\n\nEVM Chains:\n\nEthereum\n\nBase\n\nArbitrum\n\nBNB Chain\n\nPolygon (PoS)\n\nNon-EVM Chains:\n\nBitcoin\n\nSolana\n\nZcash\n\n​\n\nArchitecture Overview\n\nOmni Bridge utilizes Chain Signatures as its primary verification mechanism for outbound transfers from NEAR. Incoming transfers rely on chain-specific verification methods, including light clients for maximum security where available.\n​\n\nVerification Methods\n\nEthereum & Bitcoin: Light Client verification for inbound transfers.\n\nOther Chains: Message passing protocols verified by the NEAR network.\n\nOutbound (All Chains): Chain Signatures (MPC) for secure transaction signing.\n\n​\n\nFuture Development\n\nProtocol Improvements\n\nEnhanced fee mechanisms\n\nCross-chain contract calls\n\nNew token standards support\n\nBeyond basic asset transfers, we’re expanding the bridge’s capabilities. Enhanced fee mechanisms will better handle gas price volatility, while cross-chain contract calls will enable more complex interactions.\n\nInfrastructure\n\nExpanded relayer network\n\nImproved monitoring tools\n\nEnhanced developer tooling\n\nInfrastructure development focuses on reliability and usability. An expanded relayer network improves transfer speeds and reliability, while better monitoring and developer tools make integration and maintenance easier.\n​\n\nGet Involved\n\n​\n\nAreas for Contribution\n\nChain integrations\n\nPerformance optimization\n\nSecurity analysis\n\nDeveloper tools\n\nNear-One/omni-bridge - Omni Bridge repository\n\nNear-One/bridge-sdk-js - JavaScript SDK\n\nNear-One/bridge-sdk-rs - Rust SDK and Bridge CLI\n\nThe code is open source and we welcome contributions from the community. Whether you’re interested in adding support for new chains, optimizing performance, or building developer tools, there’s room for meaningful contribution.\nBridge infrastructure is a fundamental component of a multi-chain future. Through Chain Signatures, we’re creating a more efficient, secure, and scalable approach to cross-chain communication. Join us in building it.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":592,"crawled_at":1791192964722} +{"id":10170,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/trading/leverage-margin","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Leverage & Margin – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jun 16, 2026\n\nLeverage lets you control how much margin you put up for a given position size.\n\nPosition size (notional) is what drives your profit and loss in USDT.\n\nLeverage mainly changes how much margin is required, which changes your ROI and liquidation risk.\n\nIn multicollateral accounts, non-USDT collateral contributes margin after valuation and haircuts.\n\nCross-margin\n\nAll positions in a subaccount share a single collateral pool. This is cross-margin.\n\nA profitable position can offset the margin requirements of a losing one, and your full subaccount value backs all open positions simultaneously.\n\nCollateral is isolated by subaccount. Assets in one subaccount do not support positions in another.\n\nQuick definitions\n\nNotional (position value) = position size x entry price\n\nInitial margin (margin used) = notional / leverage\n\nUnrealized PnL (uPnL) depends on price movement and position size, not on leverage\n\nTotal Equity = token quantity x index price\n\nCollateral Value = haircut-adjusted value that counts toward margin\n\nAdjusted Account Value (AAV) = account value after collateral haircuts and PnL effects\n\nAdjusted Account Value and haircuts\n\nYour margin is based on Adjusted Account Value (AAV), not raw token balances.\n\nUSDT\n\nUSDT counts at full face value. It is also the settlement asset for trading fees, funding, and realized PnL.\n\nNon-USDT collateral\n\nNon-USDT collateral is valued using:\n\nIndex price - live market price for the asset.\n\nHaircut - a risk discount applied to the asset's USD value.\n\nThe Collateral Value shown in the balances table is the haircut-adjusted amount that counts toward margin. Hover the value in the app to see the breakdown: asset value, haircut rate, and final collateral value.\n\nTotal Equity vs Collateral Value\n\nTotal Equity is the raw USD value of an asset: quantity x index price.\n\nCollateral Value is the amount that actually counts toward margin after the haircut is applied. Only Collateral Value affects trading limits, withdrawal availability, debt limits, and liquidation risk.\n\nTiered haircuts\n\nHaircuts can depend on the USD value of each asset in your account. Synthetix uses tiered rates, but current per-account deposit limits mean most users sit in the first tier. Check Collateral Value in your balances table for your actual margin contribution.\n\nWhen collateral prices move\n\nNon-USDT collateral is marked to index price. If WETH falls, your Collateral Value and Adjusted Account Value drop even if your position PnL is unchanged. That reduces Available Margin, can raise LTV, and increases liquidation or auto-exchange risk.\n\nExample: You hold 5 WETH at 3,000 USDT with a 10% haircut. Collateral Value is about 13,500 USDT. If WETH drops 20% to 2,400 USDT, Collateral Value falls to about 10,800 USDT. That is a 2,700 USDT margin reduction with no trade activity.\n\nMargin ratios\n\nThe system uses two core margin thresholds:\n\nTermFormulaDescription\nInitial Margin Rate (IMR)\n1 / max_leverage\nMinimum collateral to open or increase a position\n\nMaintenance Margin Rate (MMR)\n1 / (2 x max_leverage)\nMinimum collateral to keep a position open\n\nAt 50x leverage, IMR is 2% and MMR is 1%.\n\nHow leverage affects uPnL\n\nLeverage does not change uPnL for the same position size and the same price move.\n\nIf you buy 1 BTC and price goes up by 100 USDT, your uPnL is +100 USDT whether you used 2x or 20x.\n\nThe difference is how much margin you used to hold that position.\n\nHow leverage affects ROI\n\nROI is uPnL measured relative to the margin you used.\n\nROI = uPnL / initial margin\n\nHigher leverage uses less margin, so the same uPnL becomes a larger ROI. Lower leverage uses more margin, so the same uPnL becomes a smaller ROI.\n\nExamples\n\nThese examples ignore fees and funding to keep the math simple.\n\nExample 1 - Same uPnL, different ROI (long)\n\nYou open a long worth 3,000 USDT notional.\n\n10x leverage\n\nInitial margin = 3,000 / 10 = 300 USDT\n\n5x leverage\n\nInitial margin = 3,000 / 5 = 600 USDT\n\nIf price moves in your favor and uPnL is +30 USDT:\n\nROI at 10x = 30 / 300 = 10%\n\nROI at 5x = 30 / 600 = 5%\n\nSame uPnL, different ROI because the margin used is different.\n\nExample 2 - Losses work the same way\n\nSame position: 3,000 USDT notional.\n\nIf uPnL becomes -30 USDT:\n\nROI at 10x = -30 / 300 = -10%\n\nROI at 5x = -30 / 600 = -5%\n\nExample 3 - Short position behaves the same\n\nYou open a short worth 2,000 USDT notional.\n\n20x leverage\n\nInitial margin = 2,000 / 20 = 100 USDT\n\nIf price drops and uPnL is +20 USDT:\n\nROI = 20 / 100 = 20%\n\nIf price rises and uPnL is -20 USDT:\n\nROI = -20 / 100 = -20%\n\nWorked margin example\n\nYou deposit 2,000 USDT and open a BTC long:\n\nFieldValue\nEntry price\n100,000 USDT\n\nPosition size\n0.1 BTC\n\nNotional value\n10,000 USDT\n\nSelected leverage\n10x\n\nTier minimum IMR\n2%\n\nInitial margin used at 10x\n10,000 / 10 = 1,000 USDT\n\nMaintenance margin required\n10,000 x 1% = 100 USDT\n\nThe important distinction is that the tier minimum sets the lowest margin the system allows, while your selected leverage determines how much of your collateral you actually commit. In this example, the tier would allow a lower minimum, but choosing 10x means you commit 1,000 USDT of margin to hold the position.\n\nAccount health\n\nYour account health is driven by Adjusted Account Value, unrealized PnL, and total maintenance margin required.\n\nhealth = adjusted_account_value / total_maintenance_margin_required\n\nHealth above 100% means you have buffer above maintenance requirements.\n\nHealth near maintenance means liquidation risk is increasing.\n\nHealth at maintenance means the account can become eligible for liquidation.\n\nBalances table reference\n\nWatch these values in your balances table to understand account health:\n\nColumnDescription\nAsset\nCollateral token\n\nBalance\nQuantity held\n\nLast Price\nCurrent index price\n\nTotal Equity\nRaw USD value (quantity x price)\n\nCollateral Value\nHaircut-adjusted value used for margin\n\nLLTV\nLiquidation LTV threshold for the asset\n\nLTV\nCurrent debt ratio when USDT debt exists\n\nAvailable Margin\nMargin available for new trades on the USDT row\n\nUnrealized PnL\nOpen position PnL on the USDT row\n\nMax Borrow\nTier-based USDT debt cap on the USDT row\n\nActions\nDeposit, Withdraw, Swap\n\nThe Portfolio Overview balances table lists each collateral asset with equity, collateral value, LTV metrics, and row actions such as Deposit, Withdraw, and Swap.\n\nAdjusting leverage\n\nYou can set leverage per market from the order entry panel. Decreasing leverage moves your liquidation price further away. Increasing leverage moves it closer.\n\nSee also\n\nMulticollateral Margin - USDT debt, Swap, and auto-exchange.\n\nDepositing Collateral - supported collateral and account caps.\n\nP&L Calculations\n\nLiquidations\n\nMarkets","tokens":1681,"crawled_at":1791192967558} +{"id":10171,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/transfer","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Transferring Assets | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nThe owner of an asset can transfer it to another account by sending a Transfer instruction to the Token Metadata program. This instruction accepts the following attributes:\nAuthority: The signer that authorized the transfer. Typically, this is the owner of the asset but note that certain delegated authorities can also transfer assets on behalf of the owner as discussed in the \"Delegated Authorities\" page.\nToken Owner: The public key of the current owner of the asset.\nDestination Owner: The public key of the new owner of the asset.\nToken Standard: The standard of the asset being transferred. This instruction works for all Token Standards in order to provide a unified interface for transferring assets. That being said, it is worth noting that non-programmable assets can be transferred using the Transfer instruction of the SPL Token program directly.\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to transfer an asset on Token Metadata.\nTransfer NFT\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import {\n\n3 transferV1,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n8// See getting-started for full setup\n\n9\n\n10const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n11const currentOwner = umi.identity; // Current token owner\n\n12const destinationOwner = publicKey('destinationWallet...');\n\n13\n\n14// Transfer the NFT to a new owner\n\n15await transferV1(umi, {\n\n16 mint: mintAddress,\n\n17 authority: currentOwner,\n\n18 tokenOwner: currentOwner.publicKey,\n\n19 destinationOwner,\n\n20 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n21}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n22\n\n23console.log('NFT transferred to:', destinationOwner);\n\n1import {\n\n2 getTransferV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n7// See getting-started for full setup\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n10const currentOwner = authority.address; // Current token owner\n\n11const destinationOwner = 'destinationWallet...'; // New owner address\n\n12\n\n13// Transfer the NFT to a new owner\n\n14const transferIx = await getTransferV1InstructionAsync({\n\n15 mint: mintAddress,\n\n16 tokenOwner: currentOwner,\n\n17 destinationOwner,\n\n18 authority,\n\n19 payer: authority,\n\n20 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n21});\n\n22\n\n23await sendAndConfirm({\n\n24 instructions: [transferIx],\n\n25 payer: authority,\n\n26});\n\n27\n\n28console.log('NFT transferred to:', destinationOwner);\n\nTransfer pNFT\nProgrammable NFTs (pNFTs) may have additional authorization rules that need to be handled during transfer. The instruction will automatically handle Token Record accounts.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import {\n\n3 transferV1,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n10const currentOwner = umi.identity;\n\n11const destinationOwner = publicKey('destinationWallet...');\n\n12\n\n13// Transfer the Programmable NFT to a new owner\n\n14// Note: pNFTs require additional Token Record accounts handled automatically\n\n15await transferV1(umi, {\n\n16 mint: mintAddress,\n\n17 authority: currentOwner,\n\n18 tokenOwner: currentOwner.publicKey,\n\n19 destinationOwner,\n\n20 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n21}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n22\n\n23console.log('pNFT transferred to:', destinationOwner);\n\n1import {\n\n2 getTransferV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The pNFT mint address\n\n9const currentOwner = authority.address;\n\n10const destinationOwner = 'destinationWallet...';\n\n11\n\n12// Transfer the Programmable NFT to a new owner\n\n13// Note: pNFTs require additional Token Record accounts handled automatically\n\n14const transferIx = await getTransferV1InstructionAsync({\n\n15 mint: mintAddress,\n\n16 tokenOwner: currentOwner,\n\n17 destinationOwner,\n\n18 authority,\n\n19 payer: authority,\n\n20 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n21});\n\n22\n\n23await sendAndConfirm({\n\n24 instructions: [transferIx],\n\n25 payer: authority,\n\n26});\n\n27\n\n28console.log('pNFT transferred to:', destinationOwner);\n\nAdvanced pNFT Transfer\nFor pNFTs with complex authorization rules, you may need to provide additional parameters.\n\n1import { getMplTokenAuthRulesProgramId } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-candy-machine';\n\n2import {\n\n3 fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken,\n\n4 findTokenRecordPda,\n\n5 TokenStandard,\n\n6 transferV1,\n\n7} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n8import { findAssociatedTokenPda } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-toolbox';\n\n9import { publicKey, unwrapOptionRecursively } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n10import { base58 } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi/serializers';\n\n11\n\n12// The NFT Asset Mint ID\n\n13const mintId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n14\n\n15// The destination wallet\n\n16const destinationAddress = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222');\n\n17\n\n18// Fetch the pNFT Asset with the Token Account\n\n19const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n20 umi,\n\n21 mintId,\n\n22 umi.identity.publicKey\n\n23);\n\n24\n\n25// Calculates the destination wallet's Token Account\n\n26const destinationTokenAccount = findAssociatedTokenPda(umi, {\n\n27 mint: mintId,\n\n28 owner: destinationAddress,\n\n29});\n\n30\n\n31// Calculates the destinations wallet's Token Record Account\n\n32const destinationTokenRecord = findTokenRecordPda(umi, {\n\n33 mint: mintId,\n\n34 token: destinationTokenAccount[0],\n\n35});\n\n36\n\n37// Transfer the pNFT\n\n38const { signature } = await transferV1(umi, {\n\n39 mint: mintId,\n\n40 destinationOwner: destinationAddress,\n\n41 destinationTokenRecord: destinationTokenRecord,\n\n42 tokenRecord: assetWithToken.tokenRecord?.publicKey,\n\n43 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n44 // Check to see if the pNFT asset as auth rules.\n\n45 authorizationRules:\n\n46 unwrapOptionRecursively(assetWithToken.metadata.programmableConfig)\n\n47 ?.ruleSet || undefined,\n\n48 // Auth rules program ID\n\n49 authorizationRulesProgram: getMplTokenAuthRulesProgramId(umi),\n\n50 // Some pNFTs may require authorization data if set.\n\n51 authorizationData: undefined,\n\n52}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n53\n\n54console.log('Signature:', base58.deserialize(signature));\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import {\n\n3 getTransferV1InstructionAsync,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming rpc, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = address('mintAddress...'); // Your pNFT mint address\n\n10const currentOwner = authority.address;\n\n11const destinationOwner = address('destinationWallet...'); // Destination wallet\n\n12\n\n13// For pNFTs with auth rules, the SDK handles most resolution automatically\n\n14const transferIx = await getTransferV1InstructionAsync({\n\n15 mint: mintAddress,\n\n16 tokenOwner: currentOwner,\n\n17 destinationOwner,\n\n18 authority,\n\n19 payer: authority,\n\n20 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n21 // Auth rules are resolved automatically when available\n\n22});\n\n23\n\n24await sendAndConfirm({\n\n25 instructions: [transferIx],\n\n26 payer: authority,\n\n27});\n\n28\n\n29console.log('pNFT transferred to:', destinationOwner);","tokens":1904,"crawled_at":1791192998061} +{"id":10172,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/istvan-andras-seres","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"István András Seres - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nIstván András Seres\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\nrecommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction 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Hefets\nAdeniyi Abiodun\nAdina Fischer\nAdrian Cockcroft\nAdrian Fenty\nAdrienne Mayor\nAgostino Capponi\nAiden Slavin\nAileen Lee\nAisha Stephenson\nAJ Shankar\nAlan Knott-Craig\nAlan Schaaf\nAlana Benton\nAlbert Tang\nAlec Nielsen\nAlec Ross\nAlejandro Flores\nAlex Constantinople\nAlex Honnold\nAlex Hutchinson\nAlex Immerman\nAlex Kreitz\nAlex Kroeger\nAlex Le\nAlex Masmej\nAlex Morcos\nAlex Price\nAlex Pruden\nAlex Rampell\nAlex Roetter\nAlex Solomon\nAlex Spector\nAlex Stamos\nAlex Tabarrok\nAlexander (Sasha) Spiegelman\nAlexander Chia\nAlexander Zoppa\nAlexandra Chang\nAlexandria Lafci\nAlexis Lakes\nAlexis Madrigal\nAlexis Ohanian\nAli Ghodsi\nAli Yahya\nAlicia Barone\nAlin Tomescu\nAlisha Litman\nAlison Mangiero\nAlison Martin\nAllison Pickens\nAlyssa Del Bene\nAlyssa Torres\nAmanda Cantor\nAmanda Cassatt\nAmanda Catherine\nAmanda Mulay\nAmanda Tuminelli\nAmanda Tyler\nAmelia Salyers\nAmie Tyrrel\nAmir Shevat\nAmira Yahyaoui\nAmy Abernethy\nAmy Berliner\nAmy Bohutinsky\nAmy Choice\nAmy Cray\nAmy Gill\nAmy Hoemeke\nAmy Kalokerinos\nAmy Robertson\nAna Mostarac\nAna Susi\nAnatoly Yakovenko\nAndie Taylor\nAndisheh Tahriri\nAndre Iguodala\nAndrea Clarke Hall\nAndrea Feinberg\nAndrea Rallo\nAndrea Simon\nAndrea Vinkler\nAndreas Papadimitropoulos, Jr\nAndreessen Horowitz\nAndrew Allen\nAndrew Chen\nAndrew F. Read\nAndrew Green\nAndrew Hall\nAndrew Lakis\nAndrew Lewis-Pye\nAndrew Lo\nAndrew Mason\nAndrew McAfee\nAndrew Milson\nAndrew Omori\nAndrew Radin\nAndrew Rubin\nAndrew Savage\nAndrew Smith\nAndrew Tretyakov\nAndy Beal\nAndy Coravos\nAndy Golden\nAndy Hill\nAndy Milenius\nAndy Rachleff\nAndy Tran\nAndy Walshe\nAneel Lakhani\nAngela Schenone\nAngela Strange\nAngela Tran Kingyens\nAngelica Gehr\nAniket Kate\nAnil Sethi\nAnish Acharya\nAnn Winblad\nAnna Berces\nAnna Jablonski\nAnna Semenova\nAnna Van Meurs\nAnnaLee Saxenian\nAnne Brandes\nAnne Lee Skates\nAnne Lewandowski\nAnne Mitchell\nAnne Yip\nAnnie Collins\nAnnie Duke\nAnthony Albanese\nAnthony Atala\nAnthony Foxx\nAnthony Lee Zhang\nAntonio Viggiano\nAntwone Stigall\nAnu Hariharan\nApril Roth\nAri Emanuel\nAri Juels\nArianna Huffington\nArianna Simpson\nArik Kershenbaum\nArmon Dadgar\nArnie Goldberg\nArsho Avetian\nArthur Brooks\nArun Sundararajan\nAsh Ashutosh\nAsha Christian\nAshley McCollum\nAshley Stern\nAshton Carter\nAtif Mian\nAtul Butte\nAubree Pelaez\nAubrey de Grey\nAugusto Marietti\nAurora Petracca\nAusten Allred\nAustin Guzman\nAustin Marchese\nAustin Wilson\nAva Iravani\nAvery Segal\nAvinash Solanky\nAviv Zohar\nAye Moah\nAzeem Azhar\nBailey Flanigan\nBailey Richardson\nBalaji Srinivasan\nBarry McCarthy\nBart Dessaint\nBeau Cronin\nBeau Woods\nBecky Pferdehirt\nBen Buckwalter\nBen Fielding\nBen Fisch\nBen Gardner\nBen Gomez\nBen Horowitz\nBen Kaufman\nBen Leventhal\nBen Lovell\nBen Napier\nBen Portney\nBen Rubin\nBen Scharfstein\nBen Schecter\nBen Silbermann\nBen Uretsky\nBen Wu\nBenedict Evans\nBenedikt Büenz\nBenjamin Ebner\nBenjamin Hindman\nBenjamin Wittes\nBenjamin Wu\nBennett Carroccio\nBenny Pinkas\nBernard J. Tyson\nBernard Tyson\nBeth Newman\nBethany Coates\nBharat Ramamurti\nBharath Ramsundar\nBill Carr\nBill Frist\nBill Hinman\nBill Janeway\nBill Krause\nBill Macaitis\nBlake Kim\nBlake Masters\nBlake Saari\nBlayne Donnell\nBob Iger\nBob Langer\nBob Moore\nBob Muglia\nBob Sutton\nBob Swan\nBob Tinker\nBob Wachter\nBobby Franklin\nBobby Green\nBobby Kotick\nBobby Wagner\nBoris Sofman\nBoris Wertz\nBrad Feld\nBrad Kern\nBrad Peterson\nBram Cohen\nBrandon Ballinger\nBrandon Barros\nBrandon Cherry\nBrandon Millman\nBrenda Kopf\nBrent McIntosh\nBrett Browman\nBrett Falk\nBrett Hagler\nBrewster Kahle\nBrian Armstrong\nBrian Balfour\nBrian Brooks\nBrian Crnkovich\nBrian Curran\nBrian Grazer\nBrian Koppelman\nBrian McCullough\nBrian Quintenz\nBrian Wilkins\nBridget McDowell\nBrittany Lucas\nBrittney Burrows\nBrooke Sheresky\nBruce Friedrich\nBryan Caplan\nBryan Chiang\nBryan Cox\nBryan Crowley\nBryan Faust\nBryan Houser\nBryan Kim\nBryan Pellegrino\nCaitlin Glazebrook\nCaitlin Johnston\nCaitlin Roberson\nCal Turner Jr.\nCaleb Christian\nCameron Schuler\nCamila De Souza\nCarine Carmy\nCarissa Bilinski\nCarl Agnelli\nCarl Eschenbach\nCarl Narcisse\nCarl Pope\nCarlos Araya\nCarolina Gonzalez\nCaroline Friedman\nCaroline Goggins\nCaroline Horn\nCaroline Moon\nCarolyn Bertozzi\nCarra Wu\nCasey Graul\nCasey Neistat\nCasey Winters\nCassady Churchill\nCassie Faerber\nCecilia Marshall\nCeia Font\nChad Rigetti\nChandra Krintz\nCharles Goetz\nCharles Hubbard\nCharles Koch\nCharlie Keinath\nCharlie Warzel\nChattry Meas\nChelsea Komlo\nChelsea Padilla\nCheng Li\nChris Bennett\nChris Best\nChris Burniske\nChris Curran\nChris DeWolfe\nChris Dixon\nChris Granger\nChris Hauth\nChris Lyons\nChris Messina\nChris Milk\nChris Power\nChris Santa Maria\nChris Wanstrath\nChristian Cachin\nChristian Catalini\nChristian Crowley\nChristian Seifert\nChristina Hampp\nChristina Lopes\nChristina Mercando\nChristina Xu\nChristina Zeidan\nChristine Darden\nChristine Perham\nChristopher Giancarlo\nChristopher Lee\nChristopher Mims\nChristopher Nguyen\nChristopher Rippingham\nChristopher Schroeder\nChristy Hubbard\nCiamac Moallemi\nCindi Zhang\nCindy Tenner\nClaire Austin\nClaire Cain Miller\nClaire Kart\nClaudia Picanco\nClay Shirky\nClayton Christensen\nClayton Gardner\nClifford Woolf\nClint Delapaz\nColin Bryar\nColin Rom\nCollin McCune\nConner Lyons Brown\nConnie Chan\nConnie Guglielmo\nConnor McCarthy\nConnor Moyles\nCorban Bell\nCorey Hawkins\nCorey Waller\nCourtney Dettlinger\nCraig Naylor\nCraig Walker\nCristina Cordova\nCurt Funderburk\nCuy Sheffield\nD'Arcy Coolican\nDaejun Park\nDaisy Linden\nDaisy Wolf\nDaljeet Virdi\nDalton Turay\nDan Berkenstock\nDan Boneh\nDan Frommer\nDan Primack\nDan Romero\nDan Shapero\nDan Siroker\nDan Stein\nDan Warmenhoven\nDan Wendlandt\nDaniel Chao\nDaniel Chen\nDanielle Andrzejewski\nDanielle Clark\nDanielle Looymans\nDanielle Lussier\nDanielle Morrill\nDanielle Shea\nDanny Shader\nDaphne Koller\nDapper Dan\nDaren Matsuoka\nDarin Malter\nDarshan Shankar\nDas Rush\nDave Jagoda\nDave King\nDave Touretzky\nDavid Banks\nDavid Belden\nDavid Damato\nDavid Deming\nDavid George\nDavid Haber\nDavid Hollestelle\nDavid Kerr\nDavid Lee\nDavid Mack\nDavid Madden\nDavid Marcus\nDavid Olson\nDavid Oyelowo\nDavid Pierce\nDavid Reich\nDavid Rumsey\nDavid Schweikert\nDavid Sinclair\nDavid Sverdlov\nDavid Tse\nDavid Ulevitch\nDavid Weiden\nDawn Lepore\nDawn Nott\nDeborah Embaie\nDeena Elitreby\nDeepak Maram\nDenis Nazarov\nDenis Young\nDenise Gonzalez\nDerek Dolin\nDerek Thompson\nDerrick Harris\nDevin Finzer\nDevon Zuegel\nDiana Peña\nDiane Greene\nDick Costolo\nDieter Shirley\nDiishan Imira\nDiogo Monica\nDominic Shine\nDominique Reliford\nDon Duet\nDon Faul\nDorris O'Brien\nDoug Ducey\nDoug Folden\nDoug McCracken\nDouglas Argueta\nDozie Uche\nDrew Coffman\nDylan Field\nDylan Rhodes\nEd Felten\nEd Lynch\nEddie Lim\nEddy Lazzarin\nEdith Zimmerman\nEdward Perkins\nEdwin Poston\nEfrat Noy\nEhud Shapiro\nEileen Burbidge\nEileen Wu\nElad Gil\nElaine Fuchs\nElaine Shi\nElena Burger\nEli Dourado\nElisa Leonhardt\nEliza Oak\nElizabeth Gunn\nElizabeth Harkavy\nElizabeth May\nElizabeth Ocken\nElizabeth Stark\nElizabeth Weil\nEllen Tunoa\nEmile Petrone\nEmilio Torres\nEmily Graff\nEmily Hinsch\nEmily Keir\nEmily Oster\nEmily Westerhold\nEmma Janaskie\nEric Budish\nEric Dai\nEric Ries\nEric Thomas\nEric Topol\nEric Wu\nErica Schecter\nErik Brynjolfsson\nErik Kiser\nErik Torenberg\nErika Bracken\nErika Herrera\nErika Louie\nErin Grody Kingsley\nErin Murphy\nErin Tice\nErin Tonnar\nErin Winkler\nErtem Nusret Tas\nEsther Shinn\nEthan Bueno de Mesquita\nEthan Ferreira\nEthan Zuckerman\nEuan Ashley\nEugene Volokh\nEugene Wei\nEugenia Yee\nEula Takahashi\nEva Sakkas\nEvan Burfield\nEvan Osnos\nEvangelos Simoudis\nEzra Klein\nF. Gary Gray\nFabiola Godinez\nFabrizio Zilibotti\nFahad Saleh\nFarid Jiandani\nFei-Fei Li\nFelix Do\nFEWOCIOUS\nFiona Kennedy\nFiona Murray\nFlashrekt\nFlora Oliveira\nFlori Del Valle\nFlorian Leibert\nFoteini Baldimtsi\nFrancesca Gino\nFrank Chen\nFrank Wilczek\nFred Benenson\nFred Ehrsam\nFred Upton\nFred Wilson\nFreda Lewis-Hall\nFrederic Kerrest\nFuture Editorial\nGabby Dizon\nGabby Reece\nGabriel Otte\nGabriel Vasquez\nGaetan Barthelemy\nGarrett Biel\nGary Ang\nGary Reedy\nGary Wolf\nGaurav Banga\nGaurav Dhillon\nGaut\nGayle Tzemach Lemmon\nGeoffrey Woo\nGeorg Fuchsbauer\nGeorg Petschnigg\nGeorge Church\nGeorge Danezis\nGeorge Fraser\nGeraldine Chan\nGérard Cachon\nGerard Ryle\nGerri Elliott\nGerry Tsoukalas\nGia Scinto\nGil Elbaz\nGil Shafir\nGina Moon\nGina Neff\nGina Yocom\nGinger Liau\nGokul Rajaram\nGoldie Chang\nGrace Ellis\nGraham Allison\nGrant Gregory\nGrant Jordan\nGrant LaFontaine\nGrant Rabenn\nGray Kinsella\nGreg Bowman\nGreg Clayman\nGreg Linares\nGreg Loehmann\nGreg Lynn\nGreg Solano\nGreg Truesdell\nGreg Waldon\nGregory Allen\nGregory Mundis\nGretchen Bush\nGretchen McCulloch\nGuido Appenzeller\nGustav Söderström\nGustavo Garcia\nGuy Goren\nGuy Raz\nGuy Wuollet\nHaley Van Dyck\nHanna Aziz\nHannah Frankl\nHanne Winarsky\nHaoyuan Li\nHarmit Malik\nHarry Grieve\nHarry Shum\nHarry Wright\nHatim Shafique\nHayden Adams\nHeather Gwynn\nHeather Podesta\nHedi Samar\nHelen Stoddard\nHelen Su\nHemant Mohapatra\nHendrik Pretorius\nHenri Kor\nHerb Lin\nHerman Narula\nHilmar Pétursson\nHoang Nguyen\nHoward Wu\nIan Dutra\nIan Shannon\nIan Sharp\nIce Cube\nIlan Zechory\nIllia Polosukhin\nIlyas Khan\nIma Christian\nIman Abuzeid\nInsiya Lokhandwala\nIon Stoica\nIrvin Chan\nIsa Guardalabene\nIsaiah Lott\nIsh Verduzco\nIsil Dillig\nIstván András Seres\nIttai Abraham\nIttay Eyal\nIva Messy\nIvan Linscott\nIvor Horn\nJ.D. Moriarty\nJack Donahoe\nJack Soslow\nJackie McQuiston\nJackson David\nJacob Westphal\nJacquelyn Melinek\nJad Esber\nJad Naous\nJade Lai\nJade Raymond\nJae Gnazzo\nJai Ramaswamy\nJaimie Buss\nJak Kennedy\nJake Auchincloss\nJakob Uszkoreit\nJamal Mohammed\nJames Beshara\nJames Currier\nJames da Costa\nJames Gwertzman\nJames J. Collins\nJames Kissell\nJames L. Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all István András Seres\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n03.20.24 / Ertem Nusret Tas, István András Seres, Yinuo Zhang, Márk Melczer, Mahimna Kelkar, Joseph Bonneau and Valeria Nikolaenko\nNew paper alert: Atomic and fair data exchange via blockchain\nA new Fair Data Exchange protocol that enable a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\n\n03.04.24 / István András Seres, Noemi Glaeser and Joseph Bonneau\nNew paper alert: Naysayer proofs\nA new cryptographic scheme where any observer can check a proof off-chain and submit a proof of its incorrectness\n\nresearch\ncryptography\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6918,"crawled_at":1791193000690} +{"id":10173,"url":"https://gov.optimism.io/tag/season-5/66","domain":"gov.optimism.io","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Topics tagged season-5","text":"season-5\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[grant update] Optimistic Builder Dollar (obUSD)\n\nGrants Updates\n\nseason-5\n\n10\n\n493\n\nMay 16, 2025\n\nSuperscan: New explorer for the Superchain by Walnut\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-19\n\n0\n\n157\n\nApril 25, 2025\n\nOP Passport | Design Document\n\n✨ General\n\nseason-5\n\n6\n\n782\n\nMarch 31, 2025\n\nDeVouch (Decentralized Vouching with Attestations) - Mission Grant - Project Updates\n\nGrant Updates\n\nseason-5\n\n6\n\n760\n\nMarch 6, 2025\n\nGDWeb3 - Builder Grant Update (Seaon 5, Cycle 22)\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n0\n\n74\n\nFebruary 21, 2025\n\nS5 grantee: x23.ai - governance summariser + chatbot\n\nGovernance Fund Missions\n\nseason-5\n\n5\n\n439\n\nFebruary 12, 2025\n\n[grant update] Glo Dollar upgrade to funding RetroPGF Retrospective Report\n\nGovernance Fund Missions\n\nseason-5\n\n0\n\n181\n\nFebruary 3, 2025\n\nEnsuring Security with OP Superchain\n\n✨ General\n\nseason-3\n,\ncycle-10\n,\ncycle-11\n,\nseason-4\n,\nseason-5\n\n0\n\n341\n\nJanuary 22, 2025\n\nLeveraging Blockchain Technology to Combat Inflation in Bangladesh with Op Superchain\n\n✨ General\n\ncycle-10\n,\ncycle-11\n,\nseason-5\n\n0\n\n49\n\nJanuary 10, 2025\n\nForwarding of RIG's allocated funds to PG\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n\n1\n\n70\n\nJanuary 6, 2025\n\nDark Forest ARES: Milestone 4 Submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n0\n\n73\n\nJanuary 5, 2025\n\n[FINAL] Proposal to Reclassify Grant Misusage Enforcement\n\nTechnical Proposals\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-17\n\n8\n\n1415\n\nDecember 12, 2024\n\nNamespace - Builder Grant Update (Season 5, Cycle 19)\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n\n8\n\n267\n\nNovember 26, 2024\n\nOPpunks (testing Namespace SDK)\n\nGrant Updates\n\nseason-5\n\n1\n\n75\n\nNovember 21, 2024\n\nTribuni Alpha Launch: Telegram Mini-app Built by Delegates for Delegates\n\nDelegates 🏛\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n14\n\n730\n\nNovember 19, 2024\n\nDeveloper Advisory Board\n\nElections 💼\n\nseason-5\n\n11\n\n7738\n\nJune 3, 2024\n\nDark Forest ARES: Milestone 3 Submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n0\n\n75\n\nNovember 3, 2024\n\nAt this point it is just a fact that OP hates my wallet\n\n✨ General\n\nseason-5\n\n23\n\n564\n\nOctober 17, 2024\n\nBuilding an On-Chain Review System with EAS\n\nGovernance Fund Missions\n\ngrant-update\n,\nseason-5\n\n5\n\n395\n\nOctober 7, 2024\n\nNew Explorer for the OP Stack: Milestone 3 submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-19\n\n2\n\n154\n\nSeptember 26, 2024\n\nCosta Rica OP DAY\n\nCommunity Calls\n\nseason-5\n\n33\n\n1780\n\nSeptember 10, 2024\n\nDark Forest ARES: Milestone 2 Submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n3\n\n116\n\nSeptember 7, 2024\n\nIntroducing the Collective Feedback Commission\n\nMetagovernance\n\nseason-5\n\n8\n\n2370\n\nAugust 21, 2024\n\nNew Explorer for the OP Stack: Milestone 2 submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-19\n\n0\n\n93\n\nJuly 24, 2024\n\nDark Forest ARES: Milestone 1 Submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n2\n\n201\n\nJuly 9, 2024\n\nNew Explorer for the OP Stack: Milestone 1 submission and request for feedback\n\nUpdates and Announcements 📢\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-19\n\n2\n\n332\n\nJuly 5, 2024\n\nCode of Conduct Councils\n\nMetagovernance\n\nseason-5\n\n17\n\n3200\n\nJune 9, 2024\n\nHow is blockchain being appllied in supply chain management and logistics?\n\n✨ General\n\nseason-5\n\n0\n\n257\n\nMay 30, 2024\n\nGrants Season 5, Round 2 — Data Analysis\n\nAccountability 🗂️\n\nseason-5\n\n2\n\n672\n\nMay 22, 2024\n\nCycle 22 Final Grants roundup\n\nGrants Updates\n\nseason-5\n,\ncycle-22\n\n24\n\n6575\n\nMay 14, 2024\n\nnext page →","tokens":907,"crawled_at":1791193008834} +{"id":10174,"url":"https://docs.near.org/data-infrastructure/what-is","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"What is Data Infrastructure? - NEAR Docs","text":"NEAR offers ready-to-use solutions to access and monitor on-chain data easily. This is very useful to automate actions based on specific events, cache data to reduce latency, gather usage data of the blockchain, and even study user preferences.\n\nIn NEAR you will find three main solutions to access and monitor on-chain data: Data APIs, BigQuery Public Dataset and NEAR Lake. Each of these solutions is designed to fit different needs and use cases, and can be used in combination to create a complete data infrastructure for your application.\n\n​\n\nData APIs\n\nMembers of the NEAR community have built a set of APIs to access and monitor on-chain data. These APIs are designed to be easy to use and can be accessed from any application through a simple API call.\n\nUser assets: Easily track all the assets that a user or a contract holds\n\nMonitor transactions: Get all the transactions of a user, a contract or a specific token\n\nTrack on-chain events: Get all the events emitted by a contract, or a specific event type\n\n​\n\nBigQuery: Public Dataset\n\nA large dataset with on-chain data publicly available on Google Cloud Platform. Obtain near real-time blockchain data using simple SQL queries. All the data, zero setup.\n\nInstant insights: Historic on-chain data queried at scale. No need to run your own infrastructure.\n\nCost-effective: Eliminate the need to store and process bulk NEAR Protocol data. Query as little or as much data as you like.\n\nAs easy as SQL: No prior experience with blockchain technology is required. Just bring a general knowledge of SQL to unlock insights.\n\n​\n\nNEAR Lake\n\nDeprecated as of March 24, 2026. NEAR Lake (AWS S3 buckets) has stopped indexing new blocks. For new projects, use Neardata (direct replacement), Data APIs, Goldsky, or the Nearcore Indexer.\n\nA solution that watches over the NEAR network and stores all the events for your easy access.\n\nCost-efficient solution: Cost-efficient solution for building self-hosted indexers in Rust, JavaScript, Python, Go and other languages\n\nStreamlined data management: Use NEAR Lake Framework to stream blocks to your server directly from NEAR Lake\n\n​\n\nConclusion\n\nData infrastructure is a key component of any blockchain application. It allows developers to access and monitor on-chain data easily, which is essential for building applications that interact with the blockchain.\nNEAR offers a range of solutions to help developers build robust data infrastructure for their applications, including Data APIs, BigQuery Public Dataset, and NEAR Lake. By using these solutions in combination, developers can create a complete data infrastructure that meets their specific needs and use cases.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":673,"crawled_at":1791193030151} +{"id":10175,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/key_concepts/fsm_app_introduction","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Introduction to FSM Apps - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Introduction to FSM Apps\n\nDeparting from the notions of AEA, FSM, and ABCI, we are now in position to describe in more detail what an FSM App is.\n\nDefinition of an FSM App\n\nAn FSM App is a replicated application which uses\nan underlying consensus engine implementing the ABCI.\nIts internal state takes the form of an FSM, and it exhibits proactive behaviours in each of such states.\nFSM Apps constitute a core part in the Open Autonomy framework to implement AI agent.\n\nThe figure below depicts an sketch of the internal workings of an FSM App, composed of six states (A-F) and six events (1-6):\n\nDiagram of a Valory stack FSM\n\nNote that in an FSM App, the responsibility of a state is distributed across two components, as it can be seen in the \"zoomed\" State C above:\n\nA round is the component that defines the rules to transition across different\nstates. It is a concrete implementation of the AbstractRound class. It usually involves\ninteractions between participants, although this is not enforced\nat this level of abstraction. A round can validate, store and aggregate data\ncoming from different agent instances by means of transactions. The actual meaning of\nthe data depends on the implementation of the specific round. This component\nproduces the Events that will enable the FSM transit from one state to another, that is, capturing the role of the transition function.\n\nEach round has an associated Behaviour, which is the component that defines the proactive actions to be executed at\na particular state. It is a concrete implementation of the BaseBehaviour class, and contains the application logic for each state. It is scheduled for\nexecution by the agent instances.\n\nWe will sometimes use indistinctly the terms \"state\" or \"round\" in the context of the Open Autonomy framework. We also define the concept of synchronized data, which is the component that stores persistent data and is accessible from any state. The consensus mechanism ensures that the synchronized data is consistently shared by all the agent instances. It is updated at the end of each round, where its contents can be updated. It is a concrete implementation of the BaseSynchronizedData class.\n\nThe framework defines a concept of \"period\" for the SynchronizedData. When a new period starts, the SynchronizedData allocates a new slot to store new values for the variables stored within it. This way, the developer has access to the historic values that the FSM App has stored (which can be pruned out). New periods are automatically created for the SynchronizedData when an FSM App traverses the ResetAndPauseRound inside Reset and pause.\n\nDue to the variety of FSMs that can be defined, the framework does not enforce that an FSM App use the period concept, however, it is expected that any production worthy FSM App defines it, as it ensures the SynchronizedData does not grow in an unbounded fashion.\n\nNote\n\nA round/state might just be a stage in\nthe overall flow of the application (e.g., waiting that a sufficient number of participants commit their\nobservations to a temporary blockchain), or a voting round (e.g.,\nwaiting until at least an observed value has reached ⌈(2N+1)/3⌉ of the votes).\n\nThe developer could define the concept of \"period\" for their FSM as the sequence of stages in the FSM state flow that achieve a specific objective defined by the FSM App. For example, consider an AI agent that aggregates observations from different data sources and submits the aggregated result to an L1/L2 blockchain. In this example, the developer could define a period as follows:\n\nCollect observations from external APIs or prior rounds.\n\nReach consensus on the set of collected observations (i.e., 2/3 of the agent instances must agree).\n\nCompute a function (e.g., mean) on the set of collected observations, and reach consensus on the computed result.\n\nConstruct a transaction that contains the aggregated result.\n\nSign the transaction (2/3 of the agent instances must agree to sign).\n\nA single agent instance, randomly nominated as the keeper, sends the transaction to the chain. If it does not do this before a\ntimeout event occurs, another agent instance is selected to be the\nkeeper.\n\nGo to Step 1.\n\nComposition of FSM Apps\n\nOne of the key features of the Open Autonomy framework is the generation of FSM Apps whose internal FSM is a composition of different FSMs. The composition mechanism facilitates\nrapid development of complex applications, by reusing FSMs already developed for other FSM Apps, obtaining the aggregated functionality.\n\nDeparting from a collection of FSMs, say FSM1, FSM2, ..., FSMn, a composed FSM can be constructed following certain rules:\n\nwhen composing FSMs, an FSMi can only transit from a final state to a start state of another FSMj, and\n\na given FSM can only be used once in a composition.\n\nWe call FSM composition mapping the mapping that indicates how to move from one FSM to another.\nFor every entry in the FSM composition mapping, e.g., from a final state Z from FSM1 to a start state A from FSM2, the composition mechanism will enforce that all the transitions ending in the final state Z of FSM1 be redirected to the start state A of FSM2. See an example below.\n\nHow the FSM composition process works\n\nThe figure above depicts an excerpt of a composition of three FSMs into a single one. Note how the finish states of FSM1 are linked to start states of FSM2 and FSM3. We remark that the transitions indicated by the FSM composition mapping are not regular transitions that respond to events, rather they are merely a construct to indicate how the states in the composed FSM are connected.\n\nImportant\n\nThe result of a composition of a collection of FSMs is an FSM whose set of spaces is a subset of the union of state spaces of the constituent FSMs. For this reason is it not possible to \"reuse\" a given FSM twice in a composition. All the final states of the constituent FSMs that are defined in the transition mapping will be removed, as exemplified in the figure above.\n\nTherefore, althought it might be useful and intuitive thinking of a composed FSM in terms of its constituent FSMs, the structure is not retained internally by the FSM App. For example, consider the following setting:\n\nFSM composition with two sources\n\nNote that in the composed FSM, when transitioning to A3, the FSM loses track of what was the FSM from which it transitioned (either FSM1 or FSM2). Nevertheless, if the business logic in state A3 requires knowledge of what was the history of visited states before reaching it (e.g., in order to execute a different action), the developer has access to that history through the field _previous_rounds from the class AbciApp which will be discussed in a separate section.\n\nConsiderations to Develop FSM Apps\n\nAI agents and their associated FSM Apps must be designed with determinism at their core. For this reason, in each round, agent instances must agree upon their execution outputs in order to make progress. Any source of \"uncontrolled\" randomness or code inconsistency that leads to non-determinism will undermine the FSM App's ability to achieve its goal. Sources of non-determinism include but not limited to:\nNon-verifiable randomness libraries.\n\nNon deterministic libraries, like ML frameworks that do not guarantee exact same results under the same initial conditions.\n\nUsing the agent instance's local time to make decisions along the execution flow. Agent instances synchronize using the consensus engine, and that is the only reliable source of \"time\" that should be used. Sometimes, block timestamp can be a handy property common to all agent instances and can be used as a time.now() equivalent.\n\nUsing local resources that are not synchronized among all agent instances to make decisions.\n\nUsing data serialization, e.g., json.dump without sorting the keys and inputs. Try to work with sorted data structures whenever possible (e.g., sorted lists instead of arbitrary lists).\n\nUsing block metrics in a Behaviour, other than those determining round transitions. All other blocks read from behaviours might involve race conditions.\n\nSometimes it is required to retry interactions with external services. There are generally two ways retries can be implemented: On the behaviour level and on the round level. The default retry should be implemented via round transitions. For instance, when agent instances cannot finish their behaviour level activities because of failure of an external service they can signal this via the payload (e.g., sending an explicit \"None\"). Then at the round level the agent instances can coordinate transition to the next state: either retrying the current state or transitioning to another state. Behaviour level retries should be limited when making calls to external services where the agent instance is the only one retrieving such information. For example, in an oracle AI agent, each agent instance interacts with a different external API and the retries are naturally timed out by the round timeout.\n\nIt is desirable that agent blueprint Skills have their own unit tests. The Open AEA framework offers tools to make easier for developers to write tests for their Skills. Beware that the AEA skill testing framework might have some limitations with respect to idiomatic Python testing. For example, it is a known issue that patching skill module-level components does not work, but only instance-based patching is effective (e.g. using patch.object).\n\nWhen developing agent blueprint, applications raise exceptions for all branches which are currently unhandled and would cause inconsistencies in the app. These exceptions can then be surgically addressed in separate PRs. Example: on the happy path a file is loaded properly, on the unhappy path an exception is raised by the file not being present. In production handling this can get involved. During development it is best to \"park\" this issue and focus on the happy case. But the unhappy case should raise so we can capture its prevalence in tests. Logging is the worst approach as it hides this issue!","tokens":2516,"crawled_at":1791193030972} +{"id":10176,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/mahimna-kelkar","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Mahimna Kelkar - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nMahimna Kelkar\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\nrecommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment 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Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Mahimna Kelkar\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n02.01.26 / Mahimna Kelkar\nRethinking crypto attacker models\nBlockchains operate in a radically new, highly adversarial environment where subtle protocol flaws can be immediately monetized by anonymous actors. This fundamentally intertwines an assortment of fields — cryptography, distributed systems, and mechanism design among many others. As a consequence, blockchain security can no longer be thought of from a single lens. In this talk,...\n\nresearch\n\n03.20.24 / Ertem Nusret Tas, István András Seres, Yinuo Zhang, Márk Melczer, Mahimna Kelkar, Joseph Bonneau and Valeria Nikolaenko\nNew paper alert: Atomic and fair data exchange via blockchain\nA new Fair Data Exchange protocol that enable a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6970,"crawled_at":1791193046943} +{"id":10177,"url":"https://docs.near.org/data-infrastructure/indexers","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Introduction to Indexers - NEAR Docs","text":"Here you will find everything you need to know in order to familiarize yourself with the concept of indexers.\n\nWe recommend checking the NEAR Data Flow to familiarize yourself with how data flows within the NEAR ecosystem\n\n​\n\nBlockchains and their nature\n\nBlockchain data is optimized for serialized writes, one block at a time, as the chain is being created. Querying the blockchain for data about a specific block or account is fairly straightforward, as only the data for a specific block needs to be retrieved.\nHowever, querying data across many blocks (e.g. all transfers between date X and Y) can be cumbersome because we have to aggregate results from multiple single-block queries.\nGiven the fact that a blockchain itself is a distributed database, and a smart contract (decentralized application, dApp) is an application that runs on a virtual machine inside a blockchain, we need to understand that smart contracts should not be considered as a “backend”. While some applications might consist only of smart contracts, building a dApp with only smart contracts, in most cases, is not possible.\nSmart contracts are limited in terms of interactions. By “interactions” we mean things that are very common in the real world, like user notifications, integration with third-party applications, etc.\nHowever, the nature of a blockchain is that it must be deterministic. A critical feature of a blockchain is that it knows the state at a given time, and for blockchains that time unit is a block. Think of them as being snapshots. A blockchain does snapshots of its state on every block. We as users can call smart contracts for a specific block, and the blockchain provides guarantees that execution will always produce the same result for the same block any time we call it.\nThe deterministic nature of a blockchain closes it from external (off-chain) variables. It is totally impossible to perform a call to an API from within a smart contract. A blockchain and a smart contract are closed off from the external (off-chain) world.\n\nBlockchains are great at providing a way to apply the requested changes to the state in a decentralized manner. However, in order to observe the changes, you need to actively pull the information from the network.\nInstead of abstract explanations let’s look at an example.\n\nExample dAppSay, we have a smart contract that sells e-books. Once a user buys a book we want to send them a copy via email.\n\nThe dApp has a helper deployed somewhere off-chain, and this helper has code that can send an email with a copy of an e-book. But how would we trigger the helper?\n\n​\n\nGetting the data from a blockchain from the external world\n\nNEAR blockchain implements a JSON-RPC endpoint for everyone to interact with the blockchain. Through the JSON-RPC API users can call smart contracts triggering them to be executed with given parameters. Also, users can view the data from the blockchain.\nSo, continuing with our example we can make our helper pull a Block every second, then pull all the Chunks and analyze the Transactions included in the Block to check if there is a transaction to our smart contract with “buy an e-book” function call. If we observe such a Transaction, we need to ensure it is successful, so we don’t send the e-book to a user whose “buy e-book” Transaction failed.\nAfter the process is complete we can trigger the helper’s code to send the user an email with the e-book they bought.\nThis approach is so-called pull model of getting the data. There is nothing wrong with this approach, but sometimes you might find it is not the most comfortable or reliable approach.\nAlso, not all the data is available through the JSON-RPC. Local Receipts for example are not available through the JSON-RPC, because they are not stored in NEAR node’s internal database.\n\n​\n\nIndexer\n\nA blockchain indexer is an implementation of the push model of getting the data. Instead of actively pulling the data from the source, your helper waits for the data to be sent to it. The data is complete and so the helper can start analyzing it immediately; ideally the data is complete enough to avoid additional pulls to get more details.\nGetting back to our example, the helper becomes an indexer that receives every Block, along with Chunks, Transactions with its statuses, etc. In the same way the helper analyzes the data and triggers the code to send the user an email with the e-book they bought.\n\nAn indexer conceptAn indexer listens to the stream of data as it’s being written on chain and can then be immediately filtered and processed to detect interesting events or patterns.\n\n​\n\nIndexers and “wide” queries\n\nThe term “wide” queries was mentioned in the beginning of this document. Here’s a recap:\n\n“Wide” queries definitionTo query data across many blocks requires the aggregation of results from multiple single-block queries. We can consider these aggregates as coming from “wide” queries.\n\nBecause indexers listen to the stream of data from the blockchain and the data can be immediately filtered and processed according to defined requirements, they can be used to simplify the “wide” queries execution. For example, a stream of data can be written to a permanent database for later data analysis using a convenient query language like SQL.\nAnother example that highlights the need for a “wide query” is when you use a seed phrase to recover one or more accounts. Since a seed phrase essentially represents a signing key pair, the recovery is for all accounts that share the associated public key. Therefore, when a seed phrase is used to recover an account via NEAR Wallet, the query requires that all accounts with a matching public key are found and recovered. Utilizing Near Lake Framework can be used to store this data in a permanent database and this allows NEAR Wallet to perform such “wide queries”. This is impossible to achieve using JSON-RPC only.\n\n​\n\nIndexers in the NEAR ecosystem\n\nNEAR Lake deprecated as of March 24, 2026. The NEAR Lake (AWS S3 buckets) has stopped indexing new blocks. For new projects, prefer Neardata (direct replacement), Data APIs, Goldsky, or the Nearcore Indexer.\n\nIf you are ready to host your own indexer, we recommend using Neardata — it is the direct replacement for NEAR Lake and provides a similar streaming API.\nIf speed is critical for your indexing needs, consider using Near Indexer. However, please note that maintaining it can be more complex and costly, as it essentially operates as an independent node in the network.\nIf you prefer not to host your own solution, you can utilize third-party services.\n\n​\n\nSummary\n\nWe hope this article gives you an understanding of the Indexer concept. Also, we hope now you can easily decide whether you need an indexer for your application.\n\n​\n\nWhat’s next?\n\nYou can learn more about the Lake Indexer project (note: deprecated since March 24, 2026). For new projects, see Neardata and the NEAR Indexer tutorial to learn how to build an indexer in practice.\nAlternatively, there are a few other third-party indexers that are tightly integrated with the NEAR ecosystem. You can review all of your data sourcing options (including The Graph, Pikespeak, SubQuery, and GoldSky) under indexing tools.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1812,"crawled_at":1791193047801} +{"id":10178,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/key_concepts/fsm_app_components","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Components of an FSM App - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Components of an FSM App\n\nThere are a number of important concepts that will be introduced in this section so that the developer understands how FSM Apps work. Namely:\n\nCore classes that instrument the FSM App:\n\nAbciApp class: The base class that defines the FSM transitions in an FSM App.\n\nAbstractRoundBehaviour class: The base class defining the overall FSM Apps behaviour.\n\nClasses that define the operations per state of the FSM:\n\nAbstractRound class: The base class to define the FSM state rounds of the FSM App.\n\nAsyncBehaviour class: The base class to define FSM state behaviours to be executed during each round in the FSM App.\n\nOther classes related to the FSM App FSM global state:\n\nSynchronizedData class: The class providing\naccess to the shared state.\n\nHow FSM Apps work\n\nThe AbciApp class defines the constituent FSM of the FSM App. That is, it defines the set of start and final states (rounds) and the transition function.\n\nThe state of the FSM App is updated through\ntransactions committed to the temporary blockchain.\nThis ledger is local with respect to the Period, i.e., its\nexistence is controlled by, and only relevant in context of, the Period. It is\ndistributed and decentralized with respect to the AEAs in the system, all of\nwhom run a local consensus node. The underlying consensus engine (currently\nTendermint) allows decentralized state replication among different processes.\n\nThe transitions in the FSM are triggered by the delivery of blocks from the\nconsensus engine through the ABCI. The transactions that are contained in these blocks are submitted by AEAs Behaviours, and can lead to updates of the shared SynchronizedData.\n\nEach round has its own business logic, which specifies how the participants'\ntransactions are validated or the conditions that trigger a transition to\nanother round (e.g., enough votes received for the same value). The transitions\nare triggered by means of events, i.e., values that are set by the round\nimplementation and are processed by the framework in order to compute the round\nsuccessor.\n\nThere are two kinds of events: normal events and timeout events:\n\nNormal events are set by the round according to certain conditions that are checked during the execution of a round. These conditions can be defined arbitrarily according to the business logic of the FSM App.\n\nTimeout events are automatically triggered in case the timeout associated to\nthe event has expired. The timeout is checked against the \"global clock\", which\nis a side effect of block validation: each block header carries the timestamp of the event of block proposal.\n\nExample\n\nA normal event can\n\nOn the other hand, consider a block B1 with timestamp t1, and block B2 with\ntimestamp t2=t1+10 seconds. Assume that after B1 is processed, the\nFSM App current state round is defined to trigger a timeout event set at T=5 seconds. When B2 is delivered, the timeout event had already been triggered (because T {\n\n7 #[account(mut)]\n\n8 owner: Signer<'info>,\n\n9 #[account(mut)]\n\n10 mint: Account<'info, Mint>,\n\n11 #[account(mut)]\n\n12 metadata: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n13 #[account(mut)]\n\n14 token: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n15 #[account(mut)]\n\n16 edition: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n17 collection_metadata: Option>,\n\n18 spl_token: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n19 metadata_program_id: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n20}\n\n21\n\n22pub fn burn_nft_mpl_instruction<'info>(\n\n23 ctx: Context<'_, '_, '_, 'info, NftBurnMpl<'info>>,\n\n24) -> Result<()> {\n\n25 let owner = ctx.accounts.owner.to_account_info();\n\n26 let metadata = ctx.accounts.metadata.to_account_info();\n\n27 let collection_metadata = ctx.accounts.collection_metadata.as_ref().map(|a| a.to_account_info());\n\n28 let mint = ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info();\n\n29 let token = ctx.accounts.token.to_account_info();\n\n30 let edition = ctx.accounts.edition.to_account_info();\n\n31 let spl_token = ctx.accounts.spl_token.to_account_info();\n\n32 let metadata_program_id = ctx.accounts.metadata_program_id.to_account_info();\n\n33\n\n34 BurnNftCpiBuilder::new(&metadata_program_id)\n\n35 .metadata(&metadata)\n\n36 // if your NFT is part of a collection you will also need to pass in the collection metadata address.\n\n37 .collection_metadata(collection_metadata.as_ref())\n\n38 .owner(&owner)\n\n39 .mint(&mint)\n\n40 .token_account(&token)\n\n41 .master_edition_account(&edition)\n\n42 .spl_token_program(&spl_token)\n\n43 .invoke()?;\n\n44\n\n45 Ok(())\n\n46}\n\npNFT Burn\npNFTs may require additional accounts to be passed in for the instruction to work. These may include:\ntokenAccount\ntokenRecord\nauthorizationRules\nauthorizationRulesProgram\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { burnV1, TokenStandard } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5\n\n6const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n7\n\n8// Burn the Programmable NFT\n\n9// Note: pNFTs have Token Record accounts that are also cleaned up\n\n10await burnV1(umi, {\n\n11 mint: mintAddress,\n\n12 authority: umi.identity,\n\n13 tokenOwner: umi.identity.publicKey,\n\n14 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n15}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n16\n\n17console.log('pNFT burned:', mintAddress);\n\n1import {\n\n2 getBurnV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The pNFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Burn the Programmable NFT\n\n11// Note: pNFTs have Token Record accounts that are also cleaned up\n\n12const burnIx = await getBurnV1InstructionAsync({\n\n13 mint: mintAddress,\n\n14 authority,\n\n15 payer: authority,\n\n16 tokenOwner: authority.address,\n\n17 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n18});\n\n19\n\n20await sendAndConfirm({\n\n21 instructions: [burnIx],\n\n22 payer: authority,\n\n23});\n\n24\n\n25console.log('pNFT burned:', mintAddress);\n\n1use mpl_token_metadata::instructions::BurnNftCpiBuilder;\n\n2\n\n3BurnNftCpiBuilder::new(metadata_program_id.account_info())\n\n4 .metadata(metadata.account_info())\n\n5 .collection_metadata(Some(collection_metadata.account_info()))\n\n6 .owner(owner.account_info())\n\n7 .mint(mint.account_info())\n\n8 .token_account(token.account_info())\n\n9 .master_edition_account(edition.account_info())\n\n10 .spl_token_program(spl_token.account_info())\n\n11 .invoke()?;\n\n1use anchor_lang::prelude::*;\n\n2use anchor_spl::token::Mint;\n\n3use mpl_token_metadata::instructions::BurnV1CpiBuilder;\n\n4\n\n5#[derive(Accounts)]\n\n6pub struct PnftBurnMpl<'info> {\n\n7 #[account(mut)]\n\n8 owner: Signer<'info>,\n\n9 #[account(mut)]\n\n10 mint: Account<'info, Mint>,\n\n11 #[account(mut)]\n\n12 metadata: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n13 #[account(mut)]\n\n14 token: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n15 #[account(mut)]\n\n16 master_edition: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n17 #[account(mut)]\n\n18 token_record: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n19 collection_metadata: Option>,\n\n20 spl_token: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n21 metadata_program_id: AccountInfo<'info>,\n\n22}\n\n23\n\n24pub fn burn_pnft_mpl_instruction<'info>(\n\n25 ctx: Context<'_, '_, '_, 'info, PnftBurnMpl<'info>>,\n\n26) -> Result<()> {\n\n27let owner = ctx.accounts.owner.to_account_info();\n\n28let metadata = ctx.accounts.metadata.to_account_info();\n\n29let mint = ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info();\n\n30let token = ctx.accounts.token.to_account_info();\n\n31let master_edition = ctx.accounts.master_edition.to_account_info();\n\n32let collection_metadata = ctx\n\n33 .accounts\n\n34 .collection_metadata\n\n35 .as_ref()\n\n36 .map(|a| a.to_account_info());\n\n37let spl_token = ctx.accounts.spl_token.to_account_info();\n\n38let token_record = ctx.accounts.token_record.to_account_info();\n\n39let metadata_program_id = ctx.accounts.metadata_program_id.to_account_info();\n\n40\n\n41BurnV1CpiBuilder::new(&metadata_program_id)\n\n42 .metadata(&metadata)\n\n43 .collection_metadata(collection_metadata.as_ref())\n\n44 .authority(&owner)\n\n45 .mint(&mint)\n\n46 .token(&token)\n\n47 .spl_token_program(&spl_token)\n\n48 .token_record(Some(&token_record))\n\n49 .master_edition(Some(&master_edition))\n\n50 .invoke()?;\n\n51\n\n52Ok(())\n\n53}","tokens":2163,"crawled_at":1791193100064} +{"id":10182,"url":"https://docs.near.org/api-reference/post-send_tx","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Post send tx - NEAR Docs","text":"cURL\n\ncurl --request POST \\\n--url https://api.example.com/send_tx \\\n--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n--data '\n{\n\"method\": \"send_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"signed_tx_base64\": \"aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=\",\n\"wait_until\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n'\n\nconst options = {\nmethod: 'POST',\nheaders: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\nbody: JSON.stringify({\nmethod: 'send_tx',\nparams: {\nsigned_tx_base64: 'aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=',\nwait_until: 'EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC'\n},\nid: 'dontcare',\njsonrpc: '2.0'\n})\n};\n\nfetch('https://api.example.com/send_tx', options)\n.then(res => res.json())\n.then(res => console.log(res))\n.catch(err => console.error(err));\n\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"https://api.example.com/send_tx\"\n\npayload = {\n\"method\": \"send_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"signed_tx_base64\": \"aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=\",\n\"wait_until\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\nheaders = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)\n\nprint(response.text)\n\n{\n\"result\": {\n\"receipts\": [\n{\n\"predecessor_id\": \"\",\n\"receipt\": {\n\"Action\": {\n\"actions\": [\n\"CreateAccount\"\n],\n\"gas_price\": \"\",\n\"input_data_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"output_data_receivers\": [\n{\n\"data_id\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\"\n}\n],\n\"signer_id\": \"\",\n\"signer_public_key\": \"\",\n\"is_promise_yield\": false,\n\"refund_to\": \"\"\n}\n},\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\",\n\"priority\": 0\n}\n],\n\"receipts_outcome\": [\n{\n\"block_hash\": \"\",\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"outcome\": {\n\"executor_id\": \"\",\n\"gas_burnt\": 1,\n\"logs\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"receipt_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"status\": \"Unknown\",\n\"tokens_burnt\": \"\",\n\"metadata\": {\n\"version\": 1\n}\n},\n\"proof\": [\n{\n\"direction\": \"Left\",\n\"hash\": \"\"\n}\n]\n}\n],\n\"status\": \"NotStarted\",\n\"transaction\": {\n\"actions\": [\n\"CreateAccount\"\n],\n\"hash\": \"\",\n\"nonce\": 1,\n\"public_key\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\",\n\"signature\": \"\",\n\"signer_id\": \"\",\n\"nonce_index\": 32767,\n\"nonce_mode\": \"monotonic\",\n\"priority_fee\": 0\n},\n\"transaction_outcome\": {\n\"block_hash\": \"\",\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"outcome\": {\n\"executor_id\": \"\",\n\"gas_burnt\": 1,\n\"logs\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"receipt_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"status\": \"Unknown\",\n\"tokens_burnt\": \"\",\n\"metadata\": {\n\"version\": 1\n}\n},\n\"proof\": [\n{\n\"direction\": \"Left\",\n\"hash\": \"\"\n}\n]\n},\n\"final_execution_status\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"\"\n}\n\nPOST\n/\nsend_tx\n\ncURL\n\ncurl --request POST \\\n--url https://api.example.com/send_tx \\\n--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n--data '\n{\n\"method\": \"send_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"signed_tx_base64\": \"aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=\",\n\"wait_until\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n'\n\nconst options = {\nmethod: 'POST',\nheaders: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\nbody: JSON.stringify({\nmethod: 'send_tx',\nparams: {\nsigned_tx_base64: 'aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=',\nwait_until: 'EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC'\n},\nid: 'dontcare',\njsonrpc: '2.0'\n})\n};\n\nfetch('https://api.example.com/send_tx', options)\n.then(res => res.json())\n.then(res => console.log(res))\n.catch(err => console.error(err));\n\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"https://api.example.com/send_tx\"\n\npayload = {\n\"method\": \"send_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"signed_tx_base64\": \"aSDinaTvuI8gbWludGxpZnk=\",\n\"wait_until\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\nheaders = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)\n\nprint(response.text)\n\n{\n\"result\": {\n\"receipts\": [\n{\n\"predecessor_id\": \"\",\n\"receipt\": {\n\"Action\": {\n\"actions\": [\n\"CreateAccount\"\n],\n\"gas_price\": \"\",\n\"input_data_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"output_data_receivers\": [\n{\n\"data_id\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\"\n}\n],\n\"signer_id\": \"\",\n\"signer_public_key\": \"\",\n\"is_promise_yield\": false,\n\"refund_to\": \"\"\n}\n},\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\",\n\"priority\": 0\n}\n],\n\"receipts_outcome\": [\n{\n\"block_hash\": \"\",\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"outcome\": {\n\"executor_id\": \"\",\n\"gas_burnt\": 1,\n\"logs\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"receipt_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"status\": \"Unknown\",\n\"tokens_burnt\": \"\",\n\"metadata\": {\n\"version\": 1\n}\n},\n\"proof\": [\n{\n\"direction\": \"Left\",\n\"hash\": \"\"\n}\n]\n}\n],\n\"status\": \"NotStarted\",\n\"transaction\": {\n\"actions\": [\n\"CreateAccount\"\n],\n\"hash\": \"\",\n\"nonce\": 1,\n\"public_key\": \"\",\n\"receiver_id\": \"\",\n\"signature\": \"\",\n\"signer_id\": \"\",\n\"nonce_index\": 32767,\n\"nonce_mode\": \"monotonic\",\n\"priority_fee\": 0\n},\n\"transaction_outcome\": {\n\"block_hash\": \"\",\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"outcome\": {\n\"executor_id\": \"\",\n\"gas_burnt\": 1,\n\"logs\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"receipt_ids\": [\n\"\"\n],\n\"status\": \"Unknown\",\n\"tokens_burnt\": \"\",\n\"metadata\": {\n\"version\": 1\n}\n},\n\"proof\": [\n{\n\"direction\": \"Left\",\n\"hash\": \"\"\n}\n]\n},\n\"final_execution_status\": \"EXECUTED_OPTIMISTIC\"\n},\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"\"\n}\n\nBody\napplication/json\n\n​\n\nmethod\nenum\nrequired\n\nAvailable options: send_tx\n\n​\n\nparams\nRpcSendTransactionRequest · object\nrequired\n\nShow child attributes\n\n​\n\nid\nstring\ndefault:dontcare\n\nJSON-RPC request id. Auto-populated; can be any string.\n\n​\n\njsonrpc\nenum\ndefault:2.0\n\nJSON-RPC protocol version. Always 2.0.\n\nAvailable options: 2.0\n\nResponse\n200 - application/json\n\nJsonRpcResponse_for_RpcTransactionResponse_and_RpcTransactionError\n\nJsonRpcResponse_for_RpcTransactionResponse_and_RpcTransactionError\n\n​\n\nresult\nobject\nrequired\n\nFinal execution outcome of the transaction and all of subsequent the receipts. Also includes\nthe generated receipt.\n\nOption 1\n\nOption 2\n\nOption 3\n\nShow child attributes\n\n​\n\nid\nstring\nrequired\n\n​\n\njsonrpc\nstring\nrequired\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1451,"crawled_at":1791193083955} +{"id":10183,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/danksharding","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"danksharding - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\ndanksharding\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all danksharding\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n03.20.24 / Ertem Nusret Tas, István András Seres, Yinuo Zhang, Márk Melczer, Mahimna Kelkar, Joseph Bonneau and Valeria Nikolaenko\nNew paper alert: Atomic and fair data exchange via blockchain\nA new Fair Data Exchange protocol that enable a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\n\n05.05.23 / Valeria Nikolaenko, Dan Boneh and Robert Hackett\nOf data availability & danksharding\nAn explainer on data availability sampling and danksharding—relevant to Ethereum blockchain scaling—from the web3 with a16z crypto podcast.\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\nEthereum\npodcast\nscaling & throughput\n\n04.27.23 / Valeria Nikolaenko and Dan Boneh\nData availability sampling and danksharding: An overview and a proposal for improvements\nDanksharding is an approach to scaling the amount of data on chain for a future version of Ethereum. The goal of this upgrade is to ensure that the data on chain was made available to archiving parties when it was first posted. It does so using a technique called Data Availability Sampling, or simply DAS....\n\nresearch\ndanksharding\ndata availability\nEthereum\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1061,"crawled_at":1791193084604} +{"id":10184,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/deposits-withdrawals/slp-vault","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"SLP Vault – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Feb 24, 2026\n\nThe Synthetix Liquidity Provider (SLP) Vault is the protocol's community market making vault, designed to back all perps markets on Ethereum Mainnet.\n\nHow it works\n\nWhen opened to users, the SLP vault would pool capital from depositors and deploy it as liquidity backing for perpetual markets. As traders pay fees and funding, a portion of those revenues would flow back to depositors proportional to their share of the vault.\n\nParticipation in SLP means capital would be exposed to market making performance. Depositors would benefit when the exchange generates revenue, and they would also be exposed to losses if the vault's market making position loses money.\n\nCurrent status\n\nThe vault is running internally today\n\nUser deposits are not currently available\n\nPublic access will open in a future release\n\nLegacy vaults\n\nNetworkStatus\nArbitrum\nDeprecated June 13, 2025. Users have 6 months to settle debt and claim LP assets.\n\nBase\nDeprecated July 7, 2025. Collateral is being returned to wallets within 2 weeks of deprecation.","tokens":265,"crawled_at":1791193091657} +{"id":10185,"url":"https://docs.near.org/api/rpc/providers","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"RPC Providers - NEAR Docs","text":"NEAR Protocol exposes a JSON-RPC API for interacting with the network. You can use any of the providers below or run your own node.\n​\n\nRPC Providers\n\nFastNear maintains a comprehensive dashboard with response times for most of the available endpoints.\n​\n\nMainnet\n\nProviderEndpointPublic EndpointArchival NodeFree TierFree Tier LimitPaid Plan\nFASTNEAR\nhttps://free.rpc.fastnear.com\n✅\nPaid Only\n✅\nNot published\n✅\n\nNEAR\nhttps://archival-rpc.mainnet.near.org\n✅\n✅\nSeverely rate limited\nNot published\n❌\n\n1RPC\nhttps://1rpc.io/near\n✅\n❌\n✅\n200 req/day\n✅\n\nAll That Node\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n✅\n500K CU/day\n✅\n\nAnkr\nhttps://rpc.ankr.com/near\n❌\n❌\n✅\n~30 req/s\n✅\n\nBlockPI Network\nhttps://near.blockpi.network/v1/rpc/public\n✅\n❌\n✅\n20 req/s\n✅\n\ndRPC\nhttps://near.drpc.org\n✅\n❌\n✅\n~2,100 CU/s\n✅\n\nGetBlock\nhttps://go.getblock.io/{api-key}\n❌\n❌\n✅\n50K CU/day\n✅\n\nIntear RPC\nhttps://rpc.intea.rs\n✅\n❌\n✅\nNot published\n❌\n\nLava Network\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n❌\n—\n✅\n\nLavender.Five Nodes\nN/A\n❌\n❌\n✅\nNot published\n✅\n\nnode101\nN/A\n❌\nPaid Only\n❌\n—\n✅\n\nNodeReal\nhttps://near-mainnet.nodereal.io/v1/{api-key}\n❌\n❌\n✅\n100M CU/month\n✅\n\nNOWNodes\nhttps://near.nownodes.io/{api-key}\n❌\n❌\n✅\n100K req/month\n✅\n\nQuickNode\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n✅\n15 req/s\n✅\n\nShitzu\nhttps://rpc.shitzuapes.xyz\n✅\n❌\n✅\nNot published\n❌\n\nTatum\nN/A\n❌\n❌\n✅\n3 req/s\n✅\n\nZAN\nhttps://api.zan.top/node/v1/near/mainnet/\n✅\n❌\n✅\n~20 req/s\n✅\n\nZeeve\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n❌\n—\n✅\n\n​\n\nTestnet\n\nProviderEndpointPublic EndpointArchival NodeFree TierFree Tier LimitPaid Plan\nFASTNEAR\nhttps://test.rpc.fastnear.com\n✅\nPaid Only\n✅\nNot published\n✅\n\nNEAR\nhttps://archival-rpc.testnet.near.org\n✅\n✅\nSeverely rate limited\nNot published\n❌\n\nAll That Node\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n✅\n500K CU/day\n✅\n\ndRPC\nhttps://near-testnet.drpc.org\n✅\n❌\n✅\n~2,100 CU/s\n✅\n\nIntear RPC\nhttps://testnet-rpc.intea.rs\n✅\n❌\n✅\nNot published\n❌\n\nLava Network\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n❌\n—\n✅\n\nnode101\nN/A\n❌\nPaid Only\n❌\n—\n✅\n\nQuickNode\nN/A\n❌\n✅\n✅\n15 req/s\n✅\n\nTatum\nN/A\n❌\n❌\n✅\n3 req/s\n✅\n\nZAN\nhttps://api.zan.top/node/ws/v1/near/testnet\n❌\n❌\n✅\n~20 req/s\n✅\n\nZeeve\nN/A\n❌\n❌\n❌\n—\n✅\n\nFree Tier Limit values link to each provider’s own pricing/docs page as the source. Limits are reported in the units each provider publishes (req = requests, CU = compute units), so they are not directly comparable across providers and may change at any time — always confirm on the linked page. “Not published” means the endpoint is free but has no documented numeric limit.\n\n​\n\nMaking requests\n\nSend JSON-RPC 2.0 requests with POST to the root of the provider endpoint. Put the method and parameters in the JSON request body.\n\ncurl -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.near.org/ \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":\"status\",\"method\":\"status\",\"params\":[]}'\n\nRecent nearcore nodes support query-only JSON-RPC batching, but public providers can run different nearcore versions, disable batching, or apply different limits, gateways, and request policies. Confirm batch availability and limits before depending on it. Do not assume that one HTTP batch consumes one request from a quota: providers may count every entry or use a method-specific compute cost.\n\nNever load test a shared public endpoint. Run performance or high-volume batch tests only against a node you operate or an endpoint whose operator has explicitly authorized the test.\n\n​\n\nRun your own node\n\nTo run a local RPC node, follow the NEAR node documentation.\n\nTestnet tokens have no real value and can be obtained from the NEAR Faucet.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":847,"crawled_at":1791193101753} +{"id":10186,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/quick_start","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Quick start - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Quick start\n\nThe purpose of this guide is to provide step-by-step instructions to gain familiarity with the overall development process of the Open Autonomy framework.\n\nWe will show how to use the CLI to run a local deployment of the Hello World AI agent, which comprises:\n\n4 Docker containers implementing the 4 agent instances of the AI agent, and\n\n4 Docker containers implementing a Tendermint node for each agent instance.\n\nBefore starting this guide, ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements and that you have followed the set up guide. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder.\n\nStep-by-step instructions\n\nNote\n\nOn MacOS and Windows, running Docker containers requires having Docker Desktop running as well. If you're using one of those operating systems, remember to start Docker Desktop\nbefore you run AI agent.\n\nFetch the Hello World AI agent from the remote registry. Within the workspace folder (not the local registry) run:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0: --service\n\nThis command will download the AI agent package corresponding to the specified hash from the remote IPFS registry and store it in the hello_world folder locally.\n\nBuild the Docker image of the agent blueprint:\n\ncd hello_world\nautonomy build-image\n\nThis command reads the contents of the service.yaml file, which specifies the agent blueprint(s) that compose the AI agent, together with some configuration parameters. With this information, the command builds the Docker image of the agent blueprint by downloading the appropriate components from the remote registry.\nAfter the command finishes, check that the image has been created:\n\ndocker image ls | grep hello_world\n\nPrepare and build the AI agent deployment:\n\nPrepare a keys.json file containing wallet address and the private key for each of the agent instances. This file must specify as many keys as instances you want to deploy for the AI agent.\n\nExample of a keys.json file\nWARNING: Use this file for testing purposes only. Never use the keys or addresses provided in this example in a production environment or for personal use.\n\nkeys.json[\n{\n\"address\": \"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x47e179ec197488593b187f80a00eb0da91f1b9d0b13f8733639f19c30a34926a\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x9965507D1a55bcC2695C58ba16FB37d819B0A4dc\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x8b3a350cf5c34c9194ca85829a2df0ec3153be0318b5e2d3348e872092edffba\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x92db14e403b83dfe3df233f83dfa3a0d7096f21ca9b0d6d6b8d88b2b4ec1564e\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x14dC79964da2C08b23698B3D3cc7Ca32193d9955\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x4bbbf85ce3377467afe5d46f804f221813b2bb87f24d81f60f1fcdbf7cbf4356\"\n}\n]\n\nExport the environment variable ALL_PARTICIPANTS with all the agent instances' addresses:\n\nexport ALL_PARTICIPANTS='[\n\"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\",\n\"0x9965507D1a55bcC2695C58ba16FB37d819B0A4dc\",\n\"0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9\",\n\"0x14dC79964da2C08b23698B3D3cc7Ca32193d9955\"\n]'\n\n(Optional) Export environment variables to customize the AI agent configuration.\n\nExample of exported environment variables\nexport HELLO_WORLD_STRING_0=\"Your HELLO WORLD message for Agent instance 0\"\nexport HELLO_WORLD_STRING_1=\"Your HELLO WORLD message for Agent instance 1\"\nexport HELLO_WORLD_STRING_2=\"Your HELLO WORLD message for Agent instance 2\"\nexport HELLO_WORLD_STRING_3=\"Your HELLO WORLD message for Agent instance 3\"\n\nBuild the AI agent deployment:\n\nautonomy deploy build keys.json -ltm\n\nThis command takes the configuration parameters specified inside the service.yaml and overrides them with the environment variables defined above. With the parameters defined, and the agent blueprint image ready, the output of this command is a Docker Compose deployment stored in the abci_build_* folder. The command takes care of configuring the necessary Tendermint images connected to each of the agent instances.\n\nRun the AI agent:\n\ncd abci_build_*\nautonomy deploy run\n\nThis command runs the Docker Compose deployment for the Hello World AI agent locally with four agent instances connected to four Tendermint nodes.\n\nYou can cancel the local execution at any time by pressing Ctrl+C.\n\nAt this point you should see a (verbose) output of the agent instance logs, which should look something like this:\n\n(...)\n\nabci0 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] arrived block with timestamp: 2022-00-00 00:00:00.000000\nabci0 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] current AbciApp time: 2022-00-00 00:00:00.000000\nabci0 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] Created a new local deadline for the next `begin_block` request from the Tendermint node: 2022-00-00 00:00:00.000000\nabci2 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] 'select_keeper' round is done with event: Event.DONE\nabci2 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] scheduling timeout of 30.0 seconds for event Event.ROUND_TIMEOUT with deadline 2022-00-00 00:00:00.000000\nabci2 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] Entered in the 'print_message' round for period 2\nabci2 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] Entered in the 'print_message' behaviour\nabci2 | Agent agent (address 0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9) in period 2 says: HELLO_WORLD!\nabci2 | [2022-01-01 00:00:00,000] [INFO] [agent] printed_message=Agent agent (address 0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9) in period 2 says: HELLO_WORLD!\n\n(...)\n\nThe logs of a single agent instance or Tendermint node can be inspected in another terminal with, e.g.,\n\ndocker logs --follow\n\nwhere refers to the Docker container ID for an agent instance\n(abci0, abci1, abci2 and abci3) or a Tendermint node (node0, node1, node2 and node3).\n\nTry to inspect the AI agent logs yourself and identify when they say the default \"HELLO_WORLD!\" message or your custom message.","tokens":1463,"crawled_at":1791193113322} +{"id":10187,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Uniswap Governance - Uniswap is a fully decentralized protocol for automated liquidity provision on Ethereum.","text":"Topic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nCommunity Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\nOn December 21, 2022, the Uniswap community voted to simplify the community governance process (Snapshot poll here).\nThis post is a follow up to that proposal, summarizing the new governance process, and covering a list…\n\n4\n\n38245\n\nJanuary 9, 2026\n\nUniswap Governance Forum Rules\n\nUncategorized\n\nThis forum is dedicated to discussions on Uniswap governance. Relevant topics include:\n\nGovernance Proposals\nProposal Discussions\nDelegation Pitches\nSite Feedback\n\nThis is not the place for:\n\nUNI price discussion\nGener…\n\n0\n\n16461\n\nSeptember 21, 2020\n\nUniswap Foundation Security Fund (UFSF): Announcement Thread\n\nUncategorized\n\n41\n\n1964\n\nOctober 2, 2026\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Arc\n\nTemperature Check\n\n5\n\n463\n\nOctober 1, 2026\n\n[Temp Check] Rotate Sentinel Addresses on the DUNI-Owned Uniswap Earn Vaults\n\nTemperature Check\n\n6\n\n252\n\nOctober 1, 2026\n\nAxia Network Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n11\n\n333\n\nOctober 3, 2026\n\nUniswap-Arbitrum Delegate Program (UADP) Communication Thread\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n6010\n\nSeptember 29, 2026\n\nPGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n73\n\n6457\n\nSeptember 27, 2026\n\n[RFC] Native Execution Privacy in the Uniswap Interface via v4 Hooks and UniswapX\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n16\n\n705\n\nAugust 29, 2026\n\nURC-2: Custom Accounting Hook Swap Event\n\nURC Discussion\n\n1\n\n171\n\nAugust 25, 2026\n\n[RFC] Deploy Uniswap V3 on Gensyn\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n5\n\n454\n\nAugust 25, 2026\n\nUniswap Deployment - Guideline\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n2\n\n930\n\nAugust 21, 2026\n\n[Temp Check] Activate v4 Protocol Fees\n\nTemperature Check\n\n24\n\n2782\n\nAugust 18, 2026\n\n[RFC] Web4 Autonomous State Engines on Unichain: Utilizing ERC-6551 & Sovereign ERC-721 Force Transfers for Dynamic Asset Orchestration\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n94\n\nAugust 4, 2026\n\n[RFC] Four for V4\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n7\n\n469\n\nJuly 24, 2026\n\n[Discussion] Privacy-Preserving MiCA Compliance — How Is Uniswap Handling EU Users?\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n19\n\n535\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\n$UNI staking for IL reduction\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n3\n\n3176\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Robinhood Chain\n\nTemperature Check\n\n3\n\n984\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nCodeknight Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n7\n\n270\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nURC-4: Active Liquidity Framework Hook Interface\n\nURC Discussion\n\n2\n\n208\n\nJuly 20, 2026\n\nDAOplomats Delegation Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n49\n\n2913\n\nJuly 18, 2026\n\nArgonaut Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n63\n\n1821\n\nJuly 11, 2026\n\nRFC : Tokenomics overhaul : hard-capping supply via auto burn, pivoting unification to staking distribution and staking DAO treasury reserves\n\nUncategorized\n\n3\n\n298\n\nJuly 10, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\n[Temp Check] - Update Crosschain Governance Parameters for Avalanche, MegaETH, Soneium, and X Layer\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n5\n\n271\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nFoundation inspection request — Cantina bounty mediation policy enforcement (finding #784, 29-day stalled dispute)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n172\n\nJuly 4, 2026\n\nURC-3: Hook TVL and Effective Liquidity Reporting\n\nURC Discussion\n\n0\n\n134\n\nJune 30, 2026\n\nURC-1: Uniswap Request for Comment Process\n\nURC Discussion\n\n0\n\n88\n\nJune 29, 2026\n\nnext page →","tokens":867,"crawled_at":1791193116078} +{"id":10188,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/deposits-withdrawals/withdrawing","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Withdrawing Collateral – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jul 23, 2026\n\nYou can withdraw collateral that is not required for open positions, USDT debt, or account-health limits. In multicollateral accounts, each asset is withdrawn separately.\n\nAvailable margin\n\nYou can only withdraw available margin, collateral not currently required to meet the margin requirements of your open positions.\n\navailable_margin = adjusted_account_value - required_margin\n\nAdjusted Account Value includes collateral haircuts and PnL effects. The final max withdrawal also applies asset balance, the USDT cap, LTV and debt limits, fees, and any active limits shown in the app.\n\nIf you have no open positions and no USDT debt, most of your balance is generally available to withdraw, subject to those checks.\n\nHow to withdraw\n\n1. Open the Withdraw Window\n\nMake sure you are connected to the Synthetix Exchange.\n\nOpen the Withdrawal window using one of the following options:\n\nClick your wallet in the top-right corner, then select Withdraw from the Account sidebar.\n\nOpen the Portfolio page and select Withdraw.\n\nOpen the Balances tab in the Portfolio table and select Withdraw.\n\nOpen Withdraw from the Account sidebar after clicking your wallet in the top-right corner, or use Withdraw from the Portfolio page or Balances tab.\n\n2. Enter the Withdrawal Amount\n\nEnter the amount you want to withdraw, up to the maximum available amount displayed.\n\nReview any applicable withdrawal fees.\n\nClick Withdraw.\n\nEnter the withdrawal amount, review the fee and amount received, then click Withdraw.\n\n3. Confirm the Withdrawal\n\nConfirm the transaction in your wallet.\n\nWait for the transaction to be confirmed on Ethereum Mainnet.\n\nYour wallet and Exchange account balances will update once the transaction has been confirmed.\n\nWithdrawing with open positions\n\nYou can withdraw available margin while holding open positions. However:\n\nWithdrawing reduces your health ratio and moves your liquidation price closer to the current market price.\n\nYou cannot withdraw collateral that would bring the account below maintenance margin.\n\nNon-USDT collateral price moves can reduce your withdrawable amount even if your position PnL has not changed.\n\nWithdrawing USDT with non-USDT collateral\n\nUSDT withdrawals are capped by both account health and the USDT available to send.\n\nYour maximum USDT withdrawal can include:\n\nHeld USDT balance.\n\nPositive unrealized PnL that can support a USDT withdrawal while the position remains open.\n\nNon-USDT collateral value supports margin and trading, but it does not become withdrawable USDT unless you first convert it through Swap or otherwise receive USDT settlement from trading.\n\nDebt and LTV constraints\n\nIf your USDT balance is negative after positive unrealized PnL is considered, the account has USDT debt. That debt is backed by non-USDT collateral.\n\nWithdrawal amounts can be reduced to preserve:\n\nRequired margin for open positions.\n\nThe USDT cap for USDT withdrawals.\n\nLTV and LLTV limits for non-USDT collateral backing USDT debt.\n\nAny tier-based Max Borrow limit.\n\nYour max withdrawal can be zero even when an asset has a balance. Common reasons include open positions reserving margin, USDT debt requiring collateral to stay in the account, or the asset fully backing debt with no spare margin budget.\n\nTo improve withdrawable amounts, consider reducing positions, swapping collateral to USDT to repay debt, or depositing additional collateral.\n\nWithdrawal fees\n\nWithdrawals can have a per-asset withdrawal fee. The fee is deducted from the amount received and is shown before you confirm.\n\nEthereum Mainnet gas is paid in ETH by your wallet for on-chain withdrawal transactions.\n\nTransfers between subaccounts\n\nMoving collateral between subaccounts follows the same type of availability checks as withdrawals. The source subaccount must keep enough collateral for open positions, USDT debt limits, and LTV constraints.\n\nCollateral in one subaccount does not support positions in another subaccount. See Sub-Account for details.\n\nWithdrawal delays\n\nWithdrawals are processed on-chain with no additional delay beyond transaction confirmation. There is no withdrawal queue or waiting period.\n\nSee also\n\nMulticollateral Margin - USDT debt, Swap, and auto-exchange.\n\nLeverage & Margin - account value, haircuts, and margin requirements.\n\nFees - withdrawal, Swap, auto-exchange, and gas fees.\n\nLiquidations - why withdrawing close to maintenance margin is risky.","tokens":1107,"crawled_at":1791193119007} +{"id":10189,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/print","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Printing Editions | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nEvery NFT has the potential to be printed as multiple editions when its Master Edition account is configured accordingly. On this page, we'll learn how to create a printable NFT and how to print editions from it.\nPrintable NFTs\nThe owner of a printable NFT can print as many editions as they want from it as long as its maximum supply has not been reached.\nEvery Non-Fungible asset — i.e. NonFungible and ProgrammableNonFungible token standards — can be a printable NFT when created. This is done by configuring the Max Supply attribute of the asset's Master Edition account. This attribute is optional and can have one of the following values:\nNone: The NFT does not have a fixed supply. In other words, the NFT is printable and has an unlimited supply.\nSome(x): The NFT has a fixed supply of x editions.When x = 0, this means the NFT is not printable.\nWhen x > 0, this means the NFT is printable and has a fixed supply of x editions.\n\nWhenever a new printed edition is created from a printable NFT, a few things happen:\nA brand new edition NFT is created and its data matches the original NFT. The only difference is that the printed edition uses a different token standard than the original NFT.For a NonFungible asset, the printed editions use the NonFungibleEdition token standard.\nFor a ProgrammableNonFungible asset, the printed editions use the ProgrammableNonFungibleEdition token standard.\n\nInstead of using a Master Edition account, the new edition NFT uses an Edition account which keeps track of its edition number and its parent NFT by storing the address of its parent's Master Edition account.\nThe Supply attribute of the Master edition account is incremented by 1. When the Supply attribute reaches the Max Supply attribute, the NFT is no longer printable.\nOR\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nAmount = 1\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMint Authority = Edition\n\nSupply = 1\n\nDecimals = 0\n\nFreeze Authority = Edition\n\nPDA\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\nPDA\n\nMaster Edition Account\n\nOwner: Token edition Program\n\nKey = MasterEditionV2\n\nSupply\n\nMax Supply\n\nEdition Account\n\nOwner: Token edition Program\n\nKey = EditionV1\n\nParent\n\nEdition\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nSetting up a Master Edition NFT\nTo create a printable NFT, we need to configure the Print Supply attribute of the Create instruction of the Token Metadata program. This will configure the Max Supply attribute of the Master Edition account as seen in the previous section. This attribute can be:\nZero: The NFT is not printable.\nLimited(x): The NFT is printable and has a fixed supply of x editions.\nUnlimited: The NFT is printable and has an unlimited supply.\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to create a printable NFT.\n\n1import { percentAmount, generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { createNft, printSupply } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5\n\n6const mint = generateSigner(umi);\n\n7\n\n8await createNft(umi, {\n\n9 mint,\n\n10 name: 'My Master Edition NFT',\n\n11 uri: 'https://example.com/my-nft.json',\n\n12 sellerFeeBasisPoints: percentAmount(5.5),\n\n13 printSupply: printSupply('Limited', [100]), // Or printSupply('Unlimited')\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Master Edition NFT created:', mint.publicKey);\n\n1import { generateKeyPairSigner } from '@solana/kit';\n\n2import { createNft, PrintSupply } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n5\n\n6const mint = await generateKeyPairSigner();\n\n7\n\n8// Create a Master Edition NFT with limited supply of 100 prints\n\n9const [createIx, mintIx] = await createNft({\n\n10 mint,\n\n11 authority,\n\n12 payer: authority,\n\n13 name: 'My Master Edition NFT',\n\n14 uri: 'https://example.com/my-nft.json',\n\n15 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 550, // 5.5%\n\n16 tokenOwner: authority.address,\n\n17 printSupply: PrintSupply.Limited(100), // Or PrintSupply.Unlimited\n\n18});\n\n19\n\n20await sendAndConfirm({\n\n21 instructions: [createIx, mintIx],\n\n22 payer: authority,\n\n23});\n\n24\n\n25console.log('Master Edition NFT created:', mint.address);\n\nPrinting Editions from the Master Edition NFT\nOnce we have a printable NFT that has not reached its Max Supply, we can print new editions from it. This is done by calling the Print instruction of the Token Metadata program. This instruction accepts the following attributes:\nMaster Edition Mint: The address of the printable NFT's Mint account.\nEdition Mint: The address of the new edition NFT's Mint account. This is typically a newly generated Signer since the account will be created by the instruction if it does not exist.\nMaster Token Account Owner: The owner of the printable NFT as a Signer. Only the owner of a printable NFT can print new editions from it.\nEdition Token Account Owner: The address of the new edition NFT's owner\nEdition Number: The edition number of the new edition NFT to print. This is typically the current Supply of the Master Edition account plus 1.\nToken Standard: The token standard of the printable NFT. This can be NonFungible or ProgrammableNonFungible.\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to print a new edition from a printable NFT.\n\n1import { generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import {\n\n3 printV1,\n\n4 fetchMasterEditionFromSeeds,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming umi, masterEditionMint, originalOwner, and ownerOfThePrintedEdition are set up\n\n8\n\n9const editionMint = generateSigner(umi);\n\n10\n\n11// (Optional) Fetch the master edition account to mint the next edition number.\n\n12const masterEdition = await fetchMasterEditionFromSeeds(umi, {\n\n13 mint: masterEditionMint,\n\n14});\n\n15\n\n16await printV1(umi, {\n\n17 masterTokenAccountOwner: originalOwner,\n\n18 masterEditionMint,\n\n19 editionMint,\n\n20 editionTokenAccountOwner: ownerOfThePrintedEdition,\n\n21 editionNumber: masterEdition.supply + 1n,\n\n22 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n23}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n24\n\n25console.log('Edition printed:', editionMint.publicKey);\n\n1import { generateKeyPairSigner } from '@solana/kit';\n\n2import {\n\n3 getPrintV1InstructionAsync,\n\n4 fetchMasterEdition,\n\n5 findMasterEditionPda,\n\n6 TokenStandard,\n\n7} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n8\n\n9// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, originalOwner are set up\n\n10\n\n11const masterEditionMintAddress = 'masterEditionMintAddress...';\n\n12const ownerOfThePrintedEdition = 'ownerAddress...';\n\n13const editionMint = await generateKeyPairSigner();\n\n14\n\n15// Fetch the master edition account to mint the next edition number\n\n16const [masterEditionPda] = await findMasterEditionPda({ mint: masterEditionMintAddress });\n\n17const masterEdition = await fetchMasterEdition(rpc, masterEditionPda);\n\n18\n\n19// Print a new edition\n\n20const printIx = await getPrintV1InstructionAsync({\n\n21 masterTokenAccountOwner: originalOwner,\n\n22 masterEditionMint: masterEditionMintAddress,\n\n23 editionMint,\n\n24 editionTokenAccountOwner: ownerOfThePrintedEdition,\n\n25 editionNumber: masterEdition.data.supply + 1n,\n\n26 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n27 payer: originalOwner,\n\n28});\n\n29\n\n30await sendAndConfirm({\n\n31 instructions: [printIx],\n\n32 payer: originalOwner,\n\n33});\n\n34\n\n35console.log('Edition printed:', editionMint.address);","tokens":1927,"crawled_at":1791193138450} +{"id":10190,"url":"https://docs.near.org/api-reference/post-experimental_receipt_to_tx","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Post experimental receipt to tx - NEAR Docs","text":"cURL\n\ncurl --request POST \\\n--url https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx \\\n--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n--data '\n{\n\"method\": \"EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"block_height\": 1,\n\"shard_id\": 1,\n\"window\": 1\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n'\n\nconst options = {\nmethod: 'POST',\nheaders: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\nbody: JSON.stringify({\nmethod: 'EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx',\nparams: {receipt_id: '', block_height: 1, shard_id: 1, window: 1},\nid: 'dontcare',\njsonrpc: '2.0'\n})\n};\n\nfetch('https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx', options)\n.then(res => res.json())\n.then(res => console.log(res))\n.catch(err => console.error(err));\n\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\"\n\npayload = {\n\"method\": \"EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"block_height\": 1,\n\"shard_id\": 1,\n\"window\": 1\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\nheaders = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)\n\nprint(response.text)\n\n{\n\"result\": {\n\"sender_account_id\": \"\",\n\"transaction_hash\": \"\"\n},\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"\"\n}\n\nPOST\n/\nEXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\n\ncURL\n\ncurl --request POST \\\n--url https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx \\\n--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n--data '\n{\n\"method\": \"EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"block_height\": 1,\n\"shard_id\": 1,\n\"window\": 1\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n'\n\nconst options = {\nmethod: 'POST',\nheaders: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\nbody: JSON.stringify({\nmethod: 'EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx',\nparams: {receipt_id: '', block_height: 1, shard_id: 1, window: 1},\nid: 'dontcare',\njsonrpc: '2.0'\n})\n};\n\nfetch('https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx', options)\n.then(res => res.json())\n.then(res => console.log(res))\n.catch(err => console.error(err));\n\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"https://api.example.com/EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\"\n\npayload = {\n\"method\": \"EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\",\n\"params\": {\n\"receipt_id\": \"\",\n\"block_height\": 1,\n\"shard_id\": 1,\n\"window\": 1\n},\n\"id\": \"dontcare\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\nheaders = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)\n\nprint(response.text)\n\n{\n\"result\": {\n\"sender_account_id\": \"\",\n\"transaction_hash\": \"\"\n},\n\"id\": \"\",\n\"jsonrpc\": \"\"\n}\n\nBody\napplication/json\n\n​\n\nmethod\nenum\nrequired\n\nAvailable options: EXPERIMENTAL_receipt_to_tx\n\n​\n\nparams\nRpcReceiptToTxRequest · object\nrequired\n\nShow child attributes\n\n​\n\nid\nstring\ndefault:dontcare\n\nJSON-RPC request id. Auto-populated; can be any string.\n\n​\n\njsonrpc\nenum\ndefault:2.0\n\nJSON-RPC protocol version. Always 2.0.\n\nAvailable options: 2.0\n\nResponse\n200 - application/json\n\nJsonRpcResponse_for_RpcReceiptToTxResponse_and_RpcReceiptToTxError\n\nJsonRpcResponse_for_RpcReceiptToTxResponse_and_RpcReceiptToTxError\n\n​\n\nresult\nobject\nrequired\n\nShow child attributes\n\n​\n\nid\nstring\nrequired\n\n​\n\njsonrpc\nstring\nrequired\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":791,"crawled_at":1791193120086} +{"id":10191,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/publish_mint_packages","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Publish and mint packages - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Publish and mint packages\n\nOnce you have finished developing and testing your AI agent locally, you can publish your software packages to the remote registry and mint them in the Olas Protocol. Minting software packages will produce a representation of them on-chain, in the form of NFTs.\n\nPart of the development process covered in this guide\n\nYou can mint packages using the Olas Protocol web app or using the Open Autonomy CLI.\n\nWhat will you learn\n\nThis guide covers step 6 of the development process. You will learn how to publish the software packages developed in the local registry (components, agent blueprints and AI agents) to the remote registry, and how to mint them in the Olas Protocol.\n\nYou must ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements, you have set up the framework, and you have a local registry populated with some default components. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder with an initialized local registry (./packages) in it.\n\nPublish packages to the remote registry\n\nThe components developed in the local registry have to be referenced in the index file (./packages/packages.json) under the dev section. For example:\n\npackages.json{\n\"dev\": {\n\"service/your_name/your_ai_agent/0.1.0\": \"bafybei0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\n\"agent/your_name/your_agent_blueprint/0.1.0\": \"bafybei0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\n\"skill/your_name/your_fsm_app_abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybei0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\"\n\n},\n\"third_party\": {\n\n}\n}\n\nYou can now have your components published on the remote registry as follows:\n\nautonomy packages lock\nautonomy push-all\n\nMint packages in the Autonolas Protocol\n\nComponents and Agent Blueprints are minted on ETH mainnet only, and then used as \"foreign\" IDs in AI Agents on any chosen network, since off-chain agent instances read from any chain and unpack configs and codes following IPFS hashes.\nTo mint a software package, all the packages it depends on must be minted first. For example, you need that an agent blueprint be minted before minting the corresponding AI agent, and you need that the agent components are minted before minting the agent blueprint. You will need:\n\nAn address associated to either\n\na crypto wallet (e.g., Metamask or a cold wallet), or\n\na multisig contract (like Safe) which allows to connect via Wallet Connect.\n\nIn either case, the address must have funds for the chain that you wish to mint the package on.\n\nThe hash of the package that you want to mint, and which must have been published into a remote registry.\n\nAn NFT image URL. This image will be used to represent the minted NFT for the package on marketplaces such as OpenSea. You can use this sample image URL for testing purposes.\n\nTip\n\nIf you are a new user of the framework, we recommend that you follow the instructions under the section Testing the Autonolas Protocol locally.\n\nUsing the Autonolas Protocol web app\n\nThe Olas Protocol web app is a front-end that provides an intuitive GUI to mint components, agent blueprints and AI agent, and manage the life cycle of AI agents in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nWe refer to the Autonolas Protocol docs, where you can find instructions on how to mint components (including the FSM App skill), agent blueprints, and AI agents.\n\nUsing the Open Autonomy CLI\n\nYou can also mint packages using the autonomy mint command.\n\nPrepare the key file. Prepare a file with the private key of the account used to mint the transactions.\n\necho -n > minting_key.txt\n\nThis account will pay the transaction fees for the minted NFTs.\n\nMint the packages. Mint the components, agent blueprint and AI agent NFTs, indicating the owner address of each one. You can declare any address you want as owner for each component. Recall that all the dependencies of a given component must be minted beforehand.\n\nMint components:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner \nautonomy mint --use-ethereum connection --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner \nautonomy mint --use-ethereum contract --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner \nautonomy mint --use-ethereum skill --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner \n\nHere the is the path to the component folder, e.g., ./packages/valory/skills/fsm_app_abci/.\n\nMint the agent blueprint:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum agent --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner \n\nHere the is the path to the agent blueprint folder, e.g., ./packages/valory/agents/your_agent_blueprint/.\n\nMint the AI agent:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum service --key minting_key.txt --nft --owner --agent-id --number-of-slots --cost-of-bond --threshold \n\nHere the is the path to the AI agent folder, e.g., ./packages/valory/services/your_ai_agent/.\n\nRefer to the documentation on the autonomy mint command to learn more about its parameters and options.\n\nTesting the Autonolas Protocol locally\n\nIf you are new to the framework, we provide a way to help you test the Olas Protocol without spending any token on a real chain.\nNamely, we provide a Docker image (valory/autonolas-registries) containing a local blockchain (a Hardhat node) with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts deployed on it. The image also contains a few testing keys and addresses.\n\nBelow we show the steps to register the hello_world AI agent and all its required packages.\n\nStart the local blockchain. On a separate terminal, run the valory/autonolas-registries Docker image:\n\ndocker run -p 8545:8545 valory/autonolas-registries:latest\n\nYou will see a message indicating a number of funded, testing keys and addresses for this chain.\n\nImportant\n\nWARNING: Use these keys for testing purposes only. Never use the keys or addresses provided in this example in a production environment or for personal use.\n\nConfigure your browser and wallet. To explore the status of the protocol in this local blockchain using the Olas Protocol web app, you need to configure a software wallet in your browser, for example Metamask. Add a new chain with the following parameters:\n\nRPC URL: http://localhost:8545\n\nChain ID: 31337\n\nCurrency symbol: GO\n\nImport an account using one of the private keys listed above. For example, 0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d.\n\nPrepare the key file. Prepare a file with the private key of the account used to mint the transactions.\n\necho -n 0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d > minting_key.txt\n\nThis account will pay the transaction fees for the minted NFTs.\n\nMint the packages. Mint the components, agent blueprint and AI agent NFTs, indicating the owner address of each one.\nFor simplicity, we are indicating the address 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 as owner for all the components, which corresponds to the private key above. However, you can declare any address as owner for each component.\n\nAlso, we are using this sample image URL as the NFT image for all the components. You can use any URL pointing to an image, or a local image file.\n\nImportant\n\nThe commands shown below assume a fresh run of the valory/autonolas-registries Docker image. If you have a different number of components minted in your local blockchain, the required token IDs might be different in your case.\n\nYou can always kill and restart a fresh run of the valory/autonolas-registries Docker image if you experience any issue.\n\nAlso, note that the example below is exhaustive. In a real scenario you might reuse already minted components in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\n# Mint components that don't have dependencies\nautonomy mint --use-local contract --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/contracts/service_registry/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/open_aea/protocols/signing/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/abci/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/acn/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/contract_api/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/http/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/ipfs/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/ledger_api/\nautonomy mint --use-local protocol --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/protocols/tendermint/\n\n# Mint components with dependencies\nautonomy mint --use-local connection --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/connections/abci/\nautonomy mint --use-local connection --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/connections/http_client/\nautonomy mint --use-local connection --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/connections/ipfs/\nautonomy mint --use-local connection --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/connections/ledger/\nautonomy mint --use-local connection --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/connections/p2p_libp2p_client/\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/skills/abstract_abci/\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/skills/abstract_round_abci/\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/skills/hello_world_abci/\n\n# Mint the agent blueprint\nautonomy mint --use-local agent --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 ./packages/valory/agents/hello_world/\n\n# Mint the AI agent\nautonomy mint --use-local service --key minting_key.txt --nft Qmbh9SQLbNRawh9Km3PMEDSxo77k1wib8fYZUdZkhPBiev --owner 0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8 --agent-id 3 --number-of-slots 4 --cost-of-bond 10000000000000000 --threshold 3 ./packages/valory/services/hello_world/\n\nExplore the protocol using the web app. Use the Olas Protocol web app to explore the packages that you have minted. Ensure that you are connected to the local blockchain configured in Step 2 above through Metamask.\n\nImportant\n\nOnce you have finished working with the local blockchain, we recommend that you connect your Metamask plugin to a regular chain (e.g., Ethereum). This is to prevent Metamask from getting stuck searching for the local blockchain once the Docker image valory/autonolas-registries is terminated.","tokens":3141,"crawled_at":1791193134741} +{"id":10192,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/c/consensus-check/10","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Consensus Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"Consensus Check\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nREADME: How to Create a Consensus Check\n\n3\n\n2002\n\nJuly 25, 2022\n\n[RFC] Steps for Uniswap to take in light of research on how intent-based protocols are shaping on-chain liquidity\n\n3\n\n603\n\nSeptember 18, 2024\n\nConsensus Check - Should the proposal threshold be lowered?\n\n3\n\n3086\n\nJune 16, 2021\n\nConsensus Check — [Uniswap DAO can help 80K UNI to Turkey to relief after the big earthquake disaster]\n\n0\n\n2270\n\nFebruary 17, 2023\n\nConsensus Check - Should Uniswap incentivize Liquidity on Optimism and Arbitrum\n\n18\n\n8599\n\nOctober 28, 2022\n\n[Consensus Check] \"Fee Switch\" Pilot\n\n16\n\n8691\n\nAugust 18, 2022\n\n[Consensus Check] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\n0\n\n5439\n\nAugust 10, 2022\n\nConsensus Check - Enable 1bp Fee Tier on UniswapV3 Optimism(L2)\n\n1\n\n3936\n\nJune 24, 2022\n\n[Consensus Check] Should Uniswap v3 be deployed to Gnosis Chain?\n\n2\n\n3899\n\nApril 15, 2022\n\n[Consensus Check] Deploy Uniswap v3 to Moonbeam\n\n1\n\n3633\n\nApril 6, 2022\n\nConsensus Check — Uniswap x Celo: Green Pool for Treasury Proposal\n\n9\n\n5160\n\nMarch 28, 2022\n\nConsensus Check - Should Uniswap governance contribute funding to the Nomic Foundation?\n\n5\n\n2621\n\nMarch 11, 2022\n\nConsensus Check - Should Uniswap Provide Voltz with v3 Additional Use Grant\n\n1\n\n2967\n\nFebruary 7, 2022\n\nConsensus Check - Add 1 Basis Point Fee Tier\n\n6\n\n5333\n\nOctober 30, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Begin Uniswap Liquidity Program v0.1\n\n9\n\n4844\n\nSeptember 10, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Support Stable UNI\n\n15\n\n3812\n\nSeptember 7, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Donate $50M worth of UNI to Chris Blec to leave DeFi for good\n\n4\n\n6104\n\nAugust 26, 2021\n\nConsensus Check: Upgrade Governance Contract to Governor Bravo\n\n2\n\n3119\n\nAugust 24, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - ABOLISH Delegates and change the UNI Governance Voting System\n\n9\n\n3300\n\nAugust 11, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Create Uniswap Volume KPI Options to help divest Uniswap’s Community Treasury into Stablecoins\n\n4\n\n3136\n\nJuly 26, 2021\n\nConsensus Check: Raise the proposal quorum threshold from 40M\n\n8\n\n3493\n\nJuly 11, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - UNI should fund a political defense organization for decentralized finance (copy)\n\n24\n\n8626\n\nJune 16, 2021\n\nSwap UNI for ETH and wBTC and provide liquidity\n\n8\n\n4124\n\nMay 16, 2021\n\nConsensus Check - Staking & Tokenomics\n\n8\n\n3738\n\nMay 4, 2021\n\nConsensus Check -- Hire 24/7 Discord support\n\n14\n\n4095\n\nNovember 25, 2020\n\nUNI buyback from market using Uniswap 0.3% fees\n\n29\n\n7252\n\nFebruary 27, 2021\n\n[Consensus Check] Should Uniswap Distribute UNI to Liquidity Providers?\n\n12\n\n5700\n\nDecember 9, 2020\n\nPrevent exchanges to vote on Uniswap governance proposals\n\n11\n\n3765\n\nNovember 25, 2020\n\nPercent Dominance Staking as a Pipeline for Proposals\n\n7\n\n3059\n\nNovember 8, 2020","tokens":681,"crawled_at":1791193135674} +{"id":10193,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/faq","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Frequently Asked Questions – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Sep 3, 2026\n\nFind answers to common questions about Synthetix Exchange.\n\nIf you can't find the answer you're looking for, see Contact Support for information about getting help from the AI assistant or a human Support agent. Alternatively, open the chat widget using the icon in the bottom-right corner.\n\nPopular Questions\n\nWhy can't I place an order?\n\nWhy wasn't my Limit Order filled?\n\nWhy isn't my position appearing?\n\nWhy can't I withdraw?\n\nHow do I close my position?\n\nWhat happens if I get liquidated?\n\nBrowse by topic\n\nPlatform Basics\n\nWallet & Access\n\nTokens & Assets\n\nCollateral & Margin\n\nTrading\n\nTechnical Issues\n\nAPI\n\nPlatform Basics\n\nWhat is Synthetix?\n\nSynthetix is a decentralised perpetuals exchange on Ethereum Mainnet. It lets you trade leveraged long and short positions on a range of assets without giving up custody of your funds.\n\nDo I need to create an account?\n\nNo sign-up is required. Connect your wallet and create a trading subaccount directly in the app.\n\nLearn more: Getting Started\n\nDo I need KYC?\n\nNo. Synthetix does not require identity verification.\n\nWho controls my funds?\n\nYou. Your funds are held by Synthetix smart contracts rather than by a centralised custodian. Synthetix does not have custody of your assets.\n\nWallet & Access\n\nCan I use multiple wallets?\n\nYes. Each wallet can have its own set of subaccounts.\n\nCan I use multiple subaccounts?\n\nYes. You can create multiple subaccounts within a wallet. Subaccounts keep collateral and positions isolated from one another.\n\nLearn more: Subaccounts\n\nI connected the wrong wallet. Can I switch?\n\nYes. Disconnect and reconnect the correct wallet using the wallet selector.\n\nWhat happens if I lose my wallet?\n\nYour funds are secured by your wallet's seed phrase. Synthetix cannot recover access to your wallet on your behalf. Store your seed phrase securely.\n\nTokens & Assets\n\nWhat collateral can I use?\n\nUSDT and WETH are currently supported as collateral in the app. USDT is the settlement asset, while WETH contributes haircut-adjusted collateral value for trading.\n\nLearn more: Depositing Collateral and Multicollateral Margin\n\nHow do I deposit collateral?\n\nYou can deposit supported collateral, such as USDT or WETH, through the Deposit window in the trading interface.\n\nSelect the asset and amount you want to deposit, then follow the prompts to complete the transaction.\n\nLearn more: Depositing Collateral\n\nWhat tokens do I need?\n\nUSDT - settlement asset and supported collateral.\n\nWETH - supported non-USDT collateral.\n\nETH - gas fees on Ethereum Mainnet.\n\nWhy do I see unknown tokens in my wallet?\n\nUnknown tokens may be airdropped spam tokens. Do not interact with them. Synthetix does not airdrop tokens without an official announcement.\n\nCollateral & Margin\n\nCan I trade without holding USDT?\n\nYes. Deposit supported non-USDT collateral such as WETH and trade USDT-settled markets. Fees, funding, and realised PnL still settle in USDT, so your USDT balance may go negative while positions are open.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy is Swap unavailable when my USDT is negative?\n\nYour USDT can show as negative while positive unrealised PnL covers it. In that case, it is not effective debt. Swap becomes available when you have USDT debt after positive unrealised PnL is considered.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy is my Collateral Value lower than my balance multiplied by the price?\n\nNon-USDT assets are subject to haircuts. Collateral Value is the haircut-adjusted value that contributes towards your margin.\n\nLearn more: Leverage & Margin\n\nWhy can't I withdraw?\n\nYour withdrawable amount may be limited by your available balance, open positions, margin requirements, outstanding USDT debt, or an existing pending withdrawal.\n\nCheck your available withdrawal amount and make sure you have sufficient withdrawable balance. Reducing positions, repaying USDT debt, or depositing additional collateral may increase the amount you can withdraw.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral and Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy can't I withdraw all my USDT when I also hold WETH?\n\nUSDT withdrawals are limited by your available USDT and positive unrealised PnL. WETH collateral supports margin and trading but does not increase the amount of USDT you can withdraw unless you Swap it or receive USDT through trading activity.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral and Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy did my margin drop without closing a trade?\n\nNon-USDT collateral is valued using its index price. A change in the WETH price can therefore reduce your Collateral Value and Adjusted Account Value even if your position PnL has not changed.\n\nLearn more: Leverage & Margin\n\nWhy is my maximum withdrawal zero even though I have a balance?\n\nOpen positions may reserve margin, USDT debt may require collateral to remain in the account, or the asset may be fully supporting your existing obligations.\n\nReducing positions, repaying USDT debt through Swap, or depositing additional collateral may increase your withdrawable amount.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral and Multicollateral Margin\n\nWill closing my last position repay my USDT debt?\n\nNo. Realised PnL settles into USDT, but remaining debt is not automatically repaid. You can use Swap to repay the debt, or collateral may be automatically exchanged if debt limits are breached.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhat's the difference between Swap and Withdraw?\n\nWithdraw sends tokens from your account to your wallet. Swap converts supported non-USDT collateral into USDT within your account and can be used to repay USDT debt.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral and Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy was my collateral sold without me clicking Swap?\n\nForced auto-exchange can occur when your USDT debt exceeds the permitted debt limit.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin\n\nDoes auto-exchange require my approval?\n\nNo. Forced auto-exchange runs automatically when its conditions are met.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin\n\nWhy did my USDT go negative overnight?\n\nFunding payments and trading fees settle in USDT. If you hold non-USDT collateral without sufficient USDT, these payments can cause your USDT balance to become negative.\n\nLearn more: Multicollateral Margin and Funding\n\nAre gas fees charged on swaps?\n\nNo. Internal Swap transactions do not require a wallet gas transaction. Gas is required for on-chain deposits and withdrawals.\n\nLearn more: Depositing Collateral and Withdrawing Collateral\n\nTrading\n\nWhat fees do I pay?\n\nSynthetix charges fees for activities such as trading, withdrawals, and other applicable transactions. The fees that apply depend on the action and your trading account tier. Fees may also be adjusted based on applicable referral discounts.\n\nLearn more: Fees and Referral Program\n\nOrders\n\nWhy can't I place an order?\n\nOrders may be rejected for reasons such as insufficient available margin, market or leverage limits, or other order conditions.\n\nCheck your available margin, order parameters and the relevant market limits before trying again.\n\nLearn more: Leverage & Margin and Order Types\n\nWhy wasn't my Limit Order filled?\n\nA Limit Order only executes when the market reaches the specified price or a price that provides an execution under the order's conditions. An order may remain open until it is filled, cancelled or expires.\n\nLearn more: Limit Orders\n\nWhy was my order partially filled?\n\nAn order can be partially filled when only part of the requested quantity can be matched with available liquidity.\n\nThe remaining quantity may stay open and continue to wait for execution, depending on the order type and selected Time in Force.\n\nLearn more: Limit Orders\n\nWhy did my order execute at a different price?\n\nThe final execution price can differ from the displayed or quoted price because market prices and available liquidity can change before the order is filled.\n\nThis is particularly relevant for Market Orders, where the final execution price depends on available liquidity at the time of execution.\n\nLearn more: Market Orders\n\nWhy didn't my Trigger Order execute?\n\nA Trigger Order remains pending until its trigger conditions are met. Once triggered, it follows the configured order behaviour.\n\nLearn more: Advanced Order Types\n\nWhy didn't my Take Profit or Stop Loss execute?\n\nTP/SL orders remain pending until their configured trigger conditions are met. Market conditions, trigger prices and the state of the related position can affect whether an order executes.\n\nLearn more: Managing Positions and Advanced Order Types\n\nCan I edit an order after placing it?\n\nSome order types can be edited after submission. The available actions depend on the order type.\n\nLearn more: Managing Open Orders\n\nCan I cancel an order after placing it?\n\nYes. Supported open orders can be cancelled before execution.\n\nLearn more: Managing Open Orders\n\nWhere can I view my open orders?\n\nOpen orders are displayed in the Open Orders tab of the Portfolio Table. The available tabs and information depend on the order type.\n\nLearn more: Managing Open Orders and Portfolio\n\nWhy did my order disappear from Open Orders?\n\nAn order is removed from Open Orders when it is executed, cancelled, or expires where applicable.\n\nCancelling a parent order may also cancel linked child orders, such as Take Profit or Stop Loss orders.\n\nLearn more: Managing Open Orders\n\nWhere can I find my order and trade history?\n\nYou can view your Order History and Trade History in the Portfolio Table.\n\nLearn more: Trade & Order History\n\nWhat's the difference between Order History and Trade History?\n\nOrder History records the orders you submit, including orders that may be filled, cancelled or expired. Trade History records executed trades resulting from those orders.\n\nLearn more: Trade & Order History\n\nPositions\n\nWhat is the maximum leverage?\n\nMaximum leverage varies by market and position size. Leverage limits can decrease as notional position size increases.\n\nCheck the market detail panel in the app for the current limits.\n\nLearn more: Leverage & Margin\n\nHow do I close my position?\n\nYou can close an open position from the Positions tab in the Portfolio Table. Select the Close action for the position you want to close, then review and submit the closing order.\n\nLearn more: Managing Positions\n\nWhy can't I close my position?\n\nA position may not be able to close if there is insufficient available liquidity, insufficient margin, or an issue with the order parameters.\n\nCheck that you are using the correct market and direction, and that your position size and available margin are sufficient to submit the closing order.\n\nIf the issue persists, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount, market, and details of the order.\n\nLearn more: Managing Positions and Order Types\n\nWhy did my TP/SL disappear?\n\nTake Profit and Stop Loss orders are linked to the position or parent order they were created with. If the related parent order or position is closed or cancelled, the associated TP/SL orders may also be cancelled and removed from Open Orders.\n\nCheck your Positions and Open Orders tabs to confirm the current state of your position and TP/SL orders.\n\nLearn more: Managing Positions and Managing Open Orders\n\nWhat is funding?\n\nFunding is a periodic payment between long and short positions that helps keep perpetual prices aligned with the underlying market.\n\nLearn more: Funding\n\nWhat is the difference between mark price and last price?\n\nThe mark price is used for margin calculations, PnL and liquidations. It is derived from external perpetual markets to help resist manipulation.\n\nThe last price represents the current fair value of the Synthetix perpetual and is used for UI display.\n\nLearn more: Pricing\n\nWhat happens if I get liquidated?\n\nYour positions may be reduced, closed or transferred to designated SLP accounts. A liquidation fee is deducted, and remaining collateral may be returned to the account.\n\nIn multicollateral accounts, all collateral types in the affected subaccount may be involved in the liquidation process.\n\nLearn more: Liquidations\n\nTechnical Issues\n\nMy wallet won't connect. What should I do?\n\nEnsure your wallet is set to Ethereum Mainnet.\n\nRefresh the page.\n\nTry clearing your browser cache.\n\nTry a different browser or disable browser extensions.\n\nContact Support if the issue persists.\n\nWhy am I seeing a wrong network error?\n\nSwitch your wallet to Ethereum Mainnet and refresh the page.\n\nWhy is my transaction stuck pending?\n\nYou may need to speed up or cancel the transaction from your wallet.\n\nWhy did my transaction fail even though gas was used?\n\nA failed transaction can still consume gas. This may happen when a contract condition is not met at execution time, such as price movement or an open interest limit.\n\nCheck the error message in your wallet or block explorer.\n\nWhy isn't my deposit showing?\n\nAfter depositing, allow the transaction time to confirm, then refresh the trading interface.\n\nIf the transaction has confirmed but the deposit is still not showing, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount, and transaction hash.\n\nLearn more: Depositing Collateral\n\nWhy is my withdrawal pending?\n\nWithdrawals may take time to complete after they are submitted. Allow time for the transaction to confirm, then refresh the trading interface.\n\nIf the withdrawal remains pending, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount, and transaction hash.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral\n\nWhy did my withdrawal fail?\n\nA withdrawal may fail if the request does not meet the required conditions.\n\nCheck your withdrawable balance and try again. If the withdrawal continues to fail, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount, and transaction details.\n\nLearn more: Withdrawing Collateral\n\nWhy isn't my balance updating?\n\nWait for the transaction to confirm on Ethereum Mainnet. If the transaction has confirmed but the balance has not updated, refresh the page and check that you are viewing the correct subaccount.\n\nWhy isn't my position appearing?\n\nCheck that the order was successfully submitted and that you are viewing the correct subaccount / market. Refresh the trading interface and check your Positions tab and Trade History or Order History.\n\nIf the position still does not appear, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount and details of the order.\n\nWhy is the trading interface not updating?\n\nCheck that your internet connection is stable and refresh the trading interface. Also make sure your wallet is connected to Ethereum Mainnet and that you are viewing the correct wallet, subaccount, and market.\n\nIf the issue persists, contact Support with your wallet address, subaccount, market, and details of what is not updating.\n\nAPI\n\nDo you have an API?\n\nYes. Synthetix provides REST and WebSocket APIs.\n\nLearn more: API Overview\n\nHow do I authenticate API requests?\n\nSynthetix API requests use EIP-712 signatures.\n\nLearn more: Authentication\n\nStill Need Help?\n\nIf your question isn't answered here, see Contact Support to learn how to contact Support, speak with a human agent, and manage your support conversations. Alternatively, get straight to it and hit the chat icon in the bottom-right corner.\n\nWhen contacting Support, include the following where applicable:\n\nYour wallet address\n\nYour subaccount\n\nThe network you're using\n\nThe market involved\n\nTransaction hashes\n\nA clear description of the issue\n\nScreenshots or screen recordings\n\nSecurity Reminder\n\nSynthetix Support will never ask for:\n\nYour seed phrase\n\nYour private keys\n\nWallet credentials or other information that could give access to your wallet.\n\nAlways verify that you're communicating through the official Support conversation.\n\nSee Official Links to verify official Synthetix websites and resources.","tokens":3936,"crawled_at":1791193136307} +{"id":10194,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/collections","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Verified Collections | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nCertified Collections enables NFTs – and tokens in general — to be grouped together and for that information to be verified onchain. Additionally, it makes it easier to manage these collections by allocating data for them onchain.\nThis feature provides the following advantages:\nEasy to identify which collection any given NFT belongs to without making additional onchain calls.\nPossible to find all NFTs that belong to a given collection (Check the Guide to see how).\nEasy to manage the collection metadata such as its name, description and image.\nCollections are NFTs\nIn order to group NFTs — or any token — together, we must first create a Collection NFT whose purpose is to store any metadata related to that collection. That's right, a collection of NFT is itself, an NFT. It has the same data layout onchain as any other NFT.\nThe difference between a Collection NFT and a Regular NFT is that the information provided by the former will be used to define the group of NFTs it contains whereas the latter will be used to define the NFT itself.\nAssociating NFTs to Collection NFTs\nCollection NFTs and Regular NFTs are linked together using a \"Belong To\" relationship on the Metadata account. The optional Collection field on the Metadata account has been created for that purpose.\nIf the Collection field is set to None, it means the NFT is not part of a collection.\nIf the Collection field is set, it means the NFT is part of the collection specified within that field.\nAs such, the Collection field contains two nested fields:\nKey: This field points to the Collection NFT the NFT belongs to. More precisely, it points to the public key of the Mint Account of the Collection NFT. This Mint Account must be owned by the SPL Token program.\nVerified: This boolean is very important as it is used to verify that the NFT is truly part of the collection it points to. More on that below.\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nCollection NFT\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = True\n\nRegular NFT\nAttached to a collection\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nRegular NFT\nWith no collection\n\nPDA\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nDifferentiating NFTs from Collection NFTs\nThe Collection field alone allows us to link NFTs and Collections together but it doesn't help us identify if a given NFT is a Regular NFT or a Collection NFT. That's why the CollectionDetails field was created. It provides additional context on Collection NFTs and differentiates them from Regular NFTs.\nIf the CollectionDetails field is set to None, it means the NFT is a Regular NFT.\nIf the CollectionDetails field is set, it means the NFT is a Collection NFT and additional attributes can be found inside this field.\nThe CollectionDetails is an optional enum that currently contains only one option V1. This option is a struct that contains the following field:\nSize: The size of the collection, i.e. the number of NFTs that are directly linked to this Collection NFT. This number is automatically computed by the Token Metadata program but can also be set manually to facilitate the migration process. Note that there currently is a MIP in place to deprecate this Size attribute.\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = Some\n\nCollection NFT\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = True\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = None\n\nRegular NFT\nAttached to a collection\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = None\n\nRegular NFT\nWith no collection\n\nPDA\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nCreating Collection NFTs\nCreating a Collection NFT is very similar to creating a Regular NFT. The only difference is that we must set the CollectionDetails field as seen in the previous section. Some of our SDKs encapsulate this by requesting a isCollection attribute when creating an NFT.\n\n1import { generateSigner, percentAmount } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { createNft } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n5\n\n6const collectionMint = generateSigner(umi);\n\n7\n\n8await createNft(umi, {\n\n9 mint: collectionMint,\n\n10 name: 'My Collection',\n\n11 uri: 'https://example.com/my-collection.json',\n\n12 sellerFeeBasisPoints: percentAmount(5.5), // 5.5%\n\n13 isCollection: true,\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Collection NFT created:', collectionMint.publicKey);\n\n1import { generateKeyPairSigner } from '@solana/kit';\n\n2import { createNft } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority are set up\n\n5\n\n6const collectionMint = await generateKeyPairSigner();\n\n7\n\n8// Create a Collection NFT\n\n9const [createIx, mintIx] = await createNft({\n\n10 mint: collectionMint,\n\n11 authority,\n\n12 payer: authority,\n\n13 name: 'My Collection',\n\n14 uri: 'https://example.com/my-collection.json',\n\n15 sellerFeeBasisPoints: 550, // 5.5%\n\n16 tokenOwner: authority.address,\n\n17 isCollection: true,\n\n18});\n\n19\n\n20await sendAndConfirm({\n\n21 instructions: [createIx, mintIx],\n\n22 payer: authority,\n\n23});\n\n24\n\n25console.log('Collection NFT created:', collectionMint.address);\n\nNested Collection NFTs\nBecause Collections and NFTs are linked together via a \"Belong To\" relationship, it is possible by design to define nested collections. In this scenario, the Collection and CollectionDetails fields can be used together to differentiate Root and Nested Collection NFTs.\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = Some\n\nCollection NFT\nRoot collection\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = True\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = Some\n\nCollection NFT\nNested collection\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = True\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = None\n\nRegular NFT\nAttached to a collection\n\nPDA\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nVerifying Collection NFTs\nAs mentioned above, the Collection field contains a Verified boolean which is used to determine if the NFT is truly part of the collection it points to. Without this field, anyone could pretend their NFT to be part of any collection.\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection = None\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = Some\n\nCollection NFT\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = True\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = None\n\nVerified NFT\nThe Collection NFT verified this NFT\nso we know for sure it is part of it.\n\nPDA\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nToken Standard\n\nCollection\n- Key\n- Verified = False\n\nUse\n\nCollectionDetails = None\n\nUnverified NFT\nThis could be anyone's NFT pretending\nto be part of this collection.\n\nPDA\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nIn order to flip that Verified boolean to True, the Authority of the Collection NFT must sign the NFT to prove that it is allowed to be part of the collection.\nEXTREMELY IMPORTANT\nExplorers, Wallets and Marketplaces, MUST CHECK that Verified is true. Verified can only be set true if the Authority on the Collection NFT has run one of the Token Metadata Verify instructions over the NFT.\nThis is the same pattern as the Creators field where Verified must be true to validate the NFT.\nIn order to check if a collection is valid on an NFT, it MUST have a collection struct set with:\nThe key field matching the mint address of the appropriate collection parent.\nThe verified field set to true.\nIf those two steps are not followed you could be exposing fraudulent NFTs on real collections.\n\nVerify\nOnce the Collection attribute is set on an NFT, an authority of the Collection NFT can send a Verify instruction on the Token Metadata to flip its verify attribute from false to true. This instruction accepts the following attributes:\nMetadata: The address of the NFT's Metadata account. This is the NFT we want to verify inside the collection.\nCollection Mint: The address of the Collection NFT's Mint account. This is the Collection NFT that is already set on the Metadata account of the NFT but not yet verified.\nAuthority: The authority of the Collection NFT as a Signer. This can be the Update Authority of the Collection NFT or an approved delegate with the appropriate role (See \"Delegated Authority\" page).\nHere is how you can use our SDKs to verify a Collection NFT on Token Metadata.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { verifyCollectionV1, findMetadataPda } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi, collectionMint, and collectionAuthority are set up\n\n5\n\n6const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n7\n\n8// First find the metadata PDA to use later\n\n9const metadata = findMetadataPda(umi, {\n\n10 mint: mintAddress,\n\n11});\n\n12\n\n13await verifyCollectionV1(umi, {\n\n14 metadata,\n\n15 collectionMint,\n\n16 authority: collectionAuthority,\n\n17}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n18\n\n19console.log('Collection verified on NFT');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getVerifyCollectionV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 findMetadataPda,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and collectionAuthority are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT to verify\n\n9const collectionMintAddress = 'collectionMintAddress...'; // The collection NFT\n\n10\n\n11// Find the metadata PDA\n\n12const [metadata] = await findMetadataPda({ mint: mintAddress });\n\n13\n\n14// Verify the collection on the NFT\n\n15const verifyIx = await getVerifyCollectionV1InstructionAsync({\n\n16 metadata,\n\n17 collectionMint: collectionMintAddress,\n\n18 authority: collectionAuthority,\n\n19 payer: collectionAuthority,\n\n20});\n\n21\n\n22await sendAndConfirm({\n\n23 instructions: [verifyIx],\n\n24 payer: collectionAuthority,\n\n25});\n\n26\n\n27console.log('Collection verified on NFT');\n\nUnverify\nReciprocally, the authority of a Collection NFT can unverify any NFTs that are part of its collection. This is done by sending an Unverify instruction to the Token Metadata program whose attributes are the same as the Verify instruction.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { unverifyCollectionV1, findMetadataPda } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4// Assuming umi, collectionMint, and collectionAuthority are set up\n\n5\n\n6const mintAddress = publicKey('mintAddress...');\n\n7\n\n8// First find the metadata PDA to use later\n\n9const metadata = findMetadataPda(umi, {\n\n10 mint: mintAddress,\n\n11});\n\n12\n\n13await unverifyCollectionV1(umi, {\n\n14 metadata,\n\n15 collectionMint,\n\n16 authority: collectionAuthority,\n\n17}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n18\n\n19console.log('Collection unverified on NFT');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUnverifyCollectionV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 findMetadataPda,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and collectionAuthority are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT to unverify\n\n9const collectionMintAddress = 'collectionMintAddress...'; // The collection NFT\n\n10\n\n11// Find the metadata PDA\n\n12const [metadata] = await findMetadataPda({ mint: mintAddress });\n\n13\n\n14// Unverify the collection on the NFT\n\n15const unverifyIx = await getUnverifyCollectionV1InstructionAsync({\n\n16 metadata,\n\n17 collectionMint: collectionMintAddress,\n\n18 authority: collectionAuthority,\n\n19 payer: collectionAuthority,\n\n20});\n\n21\n\n22await sendAndConfirm({\n\n23 instructions: [unverifyIx],\n\n24 payer: collectionAuthority,\n\n25});\n\n26\n\n27console.log('Collection unverified on NFT');","tokens":3344,"crawled_at":1791193177563} +{"id":10195,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/overview_of_the_development_process","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Overview of the development process - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Overview of the development process\n\nThe figure below presents the development process with Open Autonomy: from the idea of an off-chain AI agent to its deployment in production. If you have completed the quick start guide you have already navigated through a significant part of this process.\n\nOverview of the development process with the Open Autonomy framework\n\nThis is a summary of each step:\n\nDraft the AI agent idea. Any AI agent that needs to execute its functionality in an autonomous, transparent and decentralized way is a good candidate. You can take a look at some use cases to get an idea of what you can build with Open Autonomy.\n\nDefine the FSM specification. Describe the AI agent business logic as a finite-state machine (FSM) in a language understood by the framework. This specification defines what are the states of the AI agent, and how to transit from one to another.\n\nCode the FSM App skill. The actual business logic is encoded in the FSM App that lives inside each agent instance. Coding the FSM App involves scaffolding the \"skeleton\" of the classes, and complete the actual details of the actions executed in each state.\n\nDefine the agent blueprint. Define the components of the agent blueprint required to execute your AI agent, including the newly created FSM App. You can reuse already existing components publicly available on a remote registry.\n\nDefine the AI agent. This consists in defining the AI agent configuration and declaring what agent blueprint constitute the AI agent, together with a number of configuration parameters required.\n\nPublish and mint packages. Those are required steps to make the AI agent publicly available in the remote registry and secure it in the Olas Protocol.\n\nDeploy the AI agent. You can deploy directly your AI agent locally for testing purposes. To deploy a production AI agent secured in the Olas Protocol you first need to bring the AI agent to the Deployed state in the protocol.\n\nPopulate the local registry for the guides\n\nTo follow the next sections, you need to populate the local registry with a number of packages shipped with the framework. To do so, edit the local registry index file (./packages/packages.json) and ensure that it has the following third_party entries:\n\n{\n\"dev\": {\n},\n\"third_party\": {\n\"service/valory/hello_world/0.1.0\": \"bafybeiabtwvve5dfuv464ypgs6jikz5rx3w3fkpej4rzn6x36zxmthuphm\",\n\"agent/valory/hello_world/0.1.0\": \"bafybeidkuptt5jvtsetgqfbj3detp7zne7z67bi3rkxh43q5thbsz3pwsy\",\n\"connection/valory/abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybeiafvaguchnkp2fmhf6gtayc3gpnxkglagghb4ukbqtouni5tveigi\",\n\"connection/valory/http_client/0.23.0\": \"bafybeihel6sg2yayxu7lqygaswdgciaxpqrgsbl5rwx74c6znu5qz2edd4\",\n\"connection/valory/ipfs/0.1.0\": \"bafybeidob3tcdebjbm4ovwqoz4v2egf7nvoui3hu5on4o3apfchr6rpwwa\",\n\"connection/valory/ledger/0.19.0\": \"bafybeicynh5l5f5f5jpx72qwzis7jvmxk5p4eqltk32uxbj2pgu2x4rqz4\",\n\"contract/valory/service_registry/0.1.0\": \"bafybeicbfffywnaaehptzasxsdoyguuurpleirsnor5xf7rqk57isjkury\",\n\"protocol/open_aea/signing/1.0.0\": \"bafybeifsjmldwyki3beqyvdt5lzenrg6wyrqaar5plc5rpnvtc4zlentye\",\n\"protocol/valory/abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybeiak4pwac3pwjtd7weskxdhkrcopckr32vtazfbuteu6yqjkwarpte\",\n\"protocol/valory/acn/1.1.0\": \"bafybeiea66z4k6cgcazxd6qzvnkllulyjzbnxufkoenge7qzh4qfogrvoa\",\n\"protocol/valory/contract_api/1.0.0\": \"bafybeibld2xb5m7kyluiptkamp4nrt6oeomkohz7a3yppbv2oo7qw2e4la\",\n\"protocol/valory/http/1.0.0\": \"bafybeidxkp3vga7t6x2pbt2tpkgyaxa5bgpdgryao54py7w3yxyzr7neoy\",\n\"protocol/valory/ipfs/0.1.0\": \"bafybeibz5xqhxdbuvba7nuw2w6ardjermtcoqercopnypdplnaekf3joam\",\n\"protocol/valory/ledger_api/1.0.0\": \"bafybeiecq56phjfws36rgrefw6niyo4ezesloodsfis647mpm5ygqo4ysi\",\n\"protocol/valory/tendermint/0.1.0\": \"bafybeihzb7e32f7jcrzvubilqaxzmyk7ea6ss3pg3tliatdlrr76qeknyq\",\n\"skill/valory/abstract_abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybeie5et43th2nta76cd3kpm3fmurd7oyzk3qxim76octvt56m6r2poi\",\n\"skill/valory/abstract_round_abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybeifkxnvvgsldkb4rgejsoon2mvrmrnl7asy2nhenwss7hpwg3myflu\",\n\"skill/valory/hello_world_abci/0.1.0\": \"bafybeihlwaujzwwnduhdsgdozllykt6or6wsik44fr2dtupioe2epnfkxq\",\n\"connection/valory/p2p_libp2p_client/0.1.0\": \"bafybeielj3jso3wvrarp5n5rq7llpw4vgxybqiyensgjalb5ubfiawwhhu\"\n}\n}\n\nExecute the following command after updating the packages.json file:\n\nautonomy packages sync\n\nThe framework will fetch components from the remote registry into the local registry.\n\nDo you already have an existing agent blueprint or AI agent?\n\nIf you already have an existing agent blueprint (or if you want to create an AI agent with the default hello_world agent blueprint), you can skip to Step 5.\n\nIf you already have an existing AI agent (or if you want to test the default hello_world AI agent), you can skip to Step 6 or Step 7.","tokens":1174,"crawled_at":1791193164025} +{"id":10196,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/data-availabililty","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"data availability - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\ndata availability\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all data availability\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n03.20.24 / Ertem Nusret Tas, István András Seres, Yinuo Zhang, Márk Melczer, Mahimna Kelkar, Joseph Bonneau and Valeria Nikolaenko\nNew paper alert: Atomic and fair data exchange via blockchain\nA new Fair Data Exchange protocol that enable a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\n\n08.22.23 / Valeria Nikolaenko\nDistributed Data Storage, DAS, and Danksharding\nLera Nikolaenko introduces approaches to distributed data-storage using erasure codes, and explains approaches for achieving consensus around data-availability.\n\nresearch\nconsensus\ndata availability\nvideo\n\n05.05.23 / Valeria Nikolaenko, Dan Boneh and Robert Hackett\nOf data availability & danksharding\nAn explainer on data availability sampling and danksharding—relevant to Ethereum blockchain scaling—from the web3 with a16z crypto podcast.\n\nresearch\ncryptography\ndanksharding\ndata availability\nEthereum\npodcast\nscaling & throughput\n\n04.27.23 / Valeria Nikolaenko and Dan Boneh\nData availability sampling and danksharding: An overview and a proposal for improvements\nDanksharding is an approach to scaling the amount of data on chain for a future version of Ethereum. The goal of this upgrade is to ensure that the data on chain was made available to archiving parties when it was first posted. It does so using a technique called Data Availability Sampling, or simply DAS....\n\nresearch\ndanksharding\ndata availability\nEthereum\n\n02.10.23 / Ertem Nusret Tas\nCryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees\nErtem Nusret Tas (Stanford) introduces DACs, then proposes a DAC protocol that provides financial incentives to deter the DAC nodes from adversarial behavior.\n\nresearch\ndata availability\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nvideo\n\n09.12.22 / Tim Beiko, Tim Roughgarden, Ali Yahya and Sonal Chokshi\nEthereum, Merge and Beyond\nEPISODE SUMMARY with @timbeiko @tim_roughgarden @alive_eth @smc90 A deep dive on all things Ethereum, which this week makes the big move to proof of stake in The Merge. But our conversation, which certainly goes into The Merge and shares lots of in-depth and behind-scene details and bottomline on what changes, what doesn’t — also goes...\n\ncode & engineering\ncommunity building\ndata availability\nEthereum\ngovernance\npodcast\nproof of stake\nproposer-builder separation\n\n08.06.22 / Tim Roughgarden, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers, Ali Yahya and Chris Dixon\nTop Tech Topics, Explained\nEPISODE SUMMARY @tim_roughgarden @josephbonneau @skominers with @alive_eth @cdixon A tour though top-of-mind blockchain & crypto tech topics, explained by several a16z crypto researchers, including VDFs (verifiable delay functions); zk-rollups, SNARKs, and zero knowledge in general; and others. We quickly zip up and down the stack, and across themes — such as scalability; data availability; reputation...\n\nresearch\ncrypto basics\ndata availability\nglossaries & terminology\nhow innovation happens\npodcast\nscaling & throughput\nSNARKs\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1515,"crawled_at":1791193190784} +{"id":10197,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/define_service","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Define the service - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Define the service\n\nGiven an existing agent blueprint, either developed by yourself on the previous step and stored in the local registry, or an agent blueprint fetched from the remote registry, the next step consists in defining AI agent and tuning its configuration options.\n\nPart of the development process covered in this guide\n\nWhat you will learn\n\nThis guide covers step 4 of the development process. You will learn how to define the AI agent itself. This consists in indicating what agent blueprint will the AI agent be using, and configuring the AI agent parameters through ai-agent-level overrides.\n\nYou must ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements, you have set up the framework, and you have a local registry populated with some default components. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder with an initialized local registry (./packages) in it.\n\nStep-by-step instructions\n\nThe process to define an AI agent configuration is similar if you are using an agent blueprint being developed by you (for example, the agent blueprint created in the previous guide), or an existing, third-party agent blueprint downloaded from the remote registry. In the example below, we will be using the hello_world agent blueprint from the remote registry, which can be found in the list of packages shipped with the framework, but you can replace it with your own agent blueprint.\n\nEnsure that the agent blueprint required by your AI agent is in the local registry. Your agent blueprint, all its required components and their dependencies must be downloaded to the local registry. You can read how to add missing components to the local registry.\nIf you have populated the local registry with the required components to follow these guides, you do not need to take any further action.\n\nCreate the AI agent configuration file. Create a folder for your AI agent in the local registry (./packages). Pay attention to the correct format of the folder:\n\nmkdir -p ./packages/your_name/services/your_ai_agent/\n\nWithin the AI agent folder, create the AI agent configuration file service.yaml:\n\ntouch ./packages/your_name/services/your_ai_agent/service.yaml\n\nThis file must contain:\n\nA number of mandatory parameters.\n\nImportant\n\nEnsure that author and AI agent name match the path within the local registry.\n\nA reference to the agent blueprint that the AI agent will be using.\n\nConfiguration overrides that specify values for component parameters. These overrides are separated by YAML document separators --- and will be discussed in a further section.\n\nExample of a service.yaml file\nThis is a complete example of an AI agent configuration file that uses the hello_world agent blueprint and overrides some required component parameters.\n\nservice.yamlname: your_ai_agent\nauthor: your_name\nversion: 0.1.0\ndescription: A demonstration of a simple AI agent\naea_version: '>=2.0.0, <3.0.0'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nfingerprint: {}\nfingerprint_ignore_patterns: []\nagent: valory/hello_world:0.1.0\nnumber_of_agents: 4\ndeployment: {}\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nservice_registry_address: null\nshare_tm_config_on_startup: false\non_chain_service_id: null\nsetup:\nall_participants: ${ALL_PARTICIPANTS:list:[\"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\"]}\nsafe_contract_address: '0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000'\nconsensus_threshold: null\nhello_world_message: ${HELLO_WORLD_STRING_0:str:HELLO_WORLD!}\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: /benchmarks\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${SERVICE_HELLO_WORLD_RPC:str:\"http://host.docker.internal:8545\"}\nchain_id: 31337\npoa_chain: false\ndefault_gas_price_strategy: eip1559\n\nYou should also create a README.md file with the description of your AI agent in plain text or Markdown format:\n\necho \"Your AI agent description.\" > ./packages/your_name/services/your_ai_agent/README.md\n\nCreate an entry for your AI agent in the local registry. Add the corresponding entry to the local registry index file (./packages/packages.json). You must add the entry to the dev section, because it is a component being developed by you. You can use a placeholder for its hash value, as it will be corrected afterwards:\n\n{\n\"dev\": {\n\"service/your_name/your_ai_agent/0.1.0\": \"bafybei0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\n\n},\n\"third_party\": {\n\n}\n}\n\nUpdate the package hashes. The command below will correct any hash mismatch in the service.yaml file, as well as in the local registry index file (./packages/packages.json):\n\nautonomy packages lock\n\nPerform a sanity-check verification for the AI agent definition. The command below ensures that the AI agent satisfies a number of requirements to be deployed:\n\nautonomy analyse service --public-id your_name/your_ai_agent:0.1.0\n\nFor now, you can ignore any warnings you see. You should see the message:\n\nService is ready to be deployed.\n\nUse a local deployment to test the AI agent. This is the recommended approach in order to test your AI agent before you publish it to a remote registry. Follow the instructions in the local deployment guide. Note that this process should be somewhat familiar to you if you have followed the quick start guide.","tokens":1312,"crawled_at":1791193195756} +{"id":10198,"url":"https://docs.near.org/getting-started/what-is-near","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"What is NEAR? - NEAR Docs","text":"NEAR is a user-friendly and carbon-neutral blockchain, built to be fast, secure, and infinitely scalable. It offers a simple user experience with named accounts, low fees, and a robust developer ecosystem.\n\nIn technical terms, NEAR is a layer one, sharded, proof-of-stake blockchain built with usability in mind.\nIn simpler terms, NEAR is the blockchain for everyone.\n\nWhat do these Technical Terms mean?\n\nIn technical terms, NEAR is a layer-one, sharded, proof-of-stake blockchain built with usability in mind.Layer-1 means NEAR is the foundation that supports everything else built on it. It keeps all the transaction records safe and unchangeable which keeps the network secure and trustworthy.Sharded means the network is broken into pieces that work in parallel. This helps NEAR process transactions quickly and efficiently.Proof-of-stake uses less electricity compared with other blockchains which use proof-of-work. Users show they own NEAR tokens to help run the network. This makes it cheaper and lets more people use it.\n\n​\n\nWhy Choose NEAR?\n\nNEAR is a technical marvel, offering built-in features such as named accounts and account abstraction. For developers, NEAR offers everything needed for their applications, from smart contracts to indexers. All while being interoperable with other chains.\n​\n\nSimple to Use\n\nUse named accounts like alice.near\n\nSimple sign-up: create an account for free, login with socials or telegram\n\nTransactions are fast (~1.3s finality) and cheap (< 1¢ in fees)\n\nYou don’t need to buy crypto thanks to built-in account abstraction\n\nAccess Keys make it safe and easy to use\n\nControl accounts on other chains thanks to chain signatures\n\n​\n\nBattle-Tested\n\n5 years of 100% uptime and 4 Billion transactions processed\n\nNEAR has sustained peaks of >13M transactions in a single day\n\nNEAR is home to decentralized apps with millions of users:\n\nKai-ching\n\nSweat\n\nHot Wallet\n\n​\n\nGreat Developer Experience\n\nBuild smart contracts with Javascript or Rust\n\nSimple onboarding, thanks to its complete documentation and examples\n\nGet answers and learn at NEAR DevRel office hours, where anybody can participate\n\nEarn from your contract’s gas fees\n\nEVM compatible with Project Aurora (Deploy your Solidity contracts with ease)\n\n​\n\nEnvironmentally Friendly\n\nNEAR is certified carbon-neutral\n\nNEAR consumes in a year the same energy bitcoin consumes in 3 minutes\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":603,"crawled_at":1791193198553} +{"id":10199,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/cryptoeconomic-security-for-data-availability-committees","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nCryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees\nErtem Nusret Tas\n02.10.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\ndata availability\nresearch\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nvideo\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nData Availability Committees (DACs) increase the throughput of Layer 2 systems – but at the cost of obtaining an L2 architecture whose security relies solely on the L1 chain. Ertem Nusret Tas (Stanford) introduces DACs and their shortcomings, and then proposes a DAC protocol that provides financial incentives to deter the DAC nodes from adversarial behavior (such as withholding data upon request). He then analyzes the interaction of rational DAC nodes and clients as a dynamic game, with a Byzantine adversary that can corrupt and bribe the participants. He also defines a notion of optimality for the DAC protocols, inspired by fairness and economic feasibility. The main result shows that the protocol is optimal and guarantees security with the highest possible probability under reasonable assumptions on the adversary.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":953,"crawled_at":1791193211245} +{"id":10200,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/treasury-delegation-round-2-ideas-thread/24667/13","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Treasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread - #13 by Tane - Governance-Meta - Uniswap Governance","text":"Treasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\nTane\n\nOctober 3, 2024, 8:32pm\n\n13\n\nThanks @eek637 for bringing up this topic. We have conducted an analysis of how the program of UNI delegations to under-represented delegates worked and would like to present it here.\n\nSummary\n\nWe believe that the delegation of UNI to developers, the delegation expiration, and the cap on delegation allocation proposed by Erin are important considerations that should be discussed and implemented. However, we also believe that an expansion of the program itself is crucial.\n\nDue to the low voter participation rate for the large delegates in 2023, a proposal was passed to Delegate 10M UNI from the Foundation to active but under-represented delegates. This period is set for one year and will expire this December. After reviewing this program, we found that it is working well, but think that the current governance is not stable yet, thus we think it’s worth considering and evaluating an expansion of the program.\n\nDetailed analysis\n\nRegarding the activities of the selected delegates\n\nCheck the voting percentages of the selected delegates before and after this program.\n\nRegarding the 10 Onchain votes before being selected\n\nFirst measurement: Deploy Uniswap V3 on Linea\n\nLast time to measure: Deploy Uniswap V3 on Scroll\n\nCanceled votes were not counted.\n\nBefore selection\n\n404 DAO\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/404dao-governance.eth\n\nOnchain: 7/10\n\nWintermute Governance\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/wintermutegovernance.eth\n\nOnchain:10/10\n\nPGov\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0x3fb19771947072629c8eee7995a2ef23b72d4c8a\n\nOnchain:10/10\n\nStableLab\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0xecc2a9240268bc7a26386ecb49e1befca2706ac9 (Updated from https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/stablelab.eth)\n\nOnchain: 10/10 (NOTE: voting done from stablelab.eth address)\n\nKeyrock\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0xkeyrock.eth\n\nOnchain: 9/10\n\nKarpatkey\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0x8787fc2de4de95c53e5e3a4e5459247d9773ea52\n\nOnchain: 7/10\n\natiselsts.eth\n\nTally: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0xaac35d953ef23ae2e61a866ab93dea6ec0050bcd\n\nOnchain: 10/10\n\nAfter selection\n\nAll delegates participate in on-chain voting.\n\nThere were a few selected delegates that had been active in the onchain proposals before the delegations but some had not participate in all the proposals. Since the delegation, all delegates participated in all votes, which made the DAO healthier.\n\nProgram Effectiveness\n\nCalculation of VP (Voting Power) contributed based on post-election activities\n\nSince all delegates cast all onchain votes, we can say that the program contributes 10M UNI for every vote.\n\nVotes since this measure went into effect\n\nスクリーンショット 2024-08-09 16.46.172318×1866 476 KB\n\nスクリーンショット 2024-08-09 16.23.362300×1718 416 KB\n\nVoting before this measure was initiated\n\nスクリーンショット 2024-10-03 20.19.092292×964 251 KB\n\nIn 2023, before this measure was implemented, there were three votes that were QUORUM NOT REACHED, but since its implementation, all proposals have been EXECUTED (except for the latest one)\n\nHowever, regarding this year’s proposals, there were many proposals in the 40M-50M range and some were near the quorum. The average number of onchain votes since the program went into effect was about 47.46M UNI.\n\nCurrent risk of missing proposals\n\nOut of the 11 proposals since the program went into effect, 6 proposals that would not have reached the quorum IF one delegate had not missed voting. In addition, we saw the latest proposal just missed the quorum as well. While we saw an improvement of the voting activities, the DAO is still at risk of missing important proposals to be passed (or rejected).\n\nDetailed analysis of which proposal would be missed if a delegate had not voted\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/70 Gauntlet or Michigan Blockchain or Franklin DAO … , total 14 delegates\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/69 teemulaumhonkasalo.eth or Michigan Blockchain or MonetSupply or 0x9Eaf…4568 … , total 14 delegates\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/68 none\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/67 Gauntlet, or teemulaumhonkasalo.eth or Michigan Blockchain\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/66 None\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/65 teemulaumhonkasalo.eth\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/64 Gauntlet\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/63 None\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/62 Gauntlet or Michigan Blockchain or MonetSupply or Franklin DAO or Wintermute Governance or PGov or StableLab or she256.eth or BlockchainatCU or 404 Gov or BEN or Stanford Blockchain or GFX Labs\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/61 Gauntlet or teemulaumhonkasalo.eth or Michigan Blockchain or lay2000lbs or Franklin DAO\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/60[Gauntlet](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0x683a4f9915d6216f73d6df50151725036bd26c02) or teemulaumhonkasalo.eth\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/59 None\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/58 Gauntlet or teemulaumhonkasalo.eth or Michigan Blockchain\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/57 None\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/56 None\n\nhttps://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/55 None\n\nDelegates who meet the criteria to be considered “under-represented”\n\nBased on the activities of the last selected delegate before it was selected\n\nThe following is a list of delegates who have created a Delegate Profile and are now Underrepresented.\n\nThe list of delegates with their delegate profile and VP as of writing\n23 delegates had created a Delegate Profile.\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/curia-delegate-platform/24140/6 7k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/tane-delegate-platform/24164/6 10\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/gauntlet-delegate-platform/23967/7 5.25M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/keyrock-delegate-platform/21243/13 504.03k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/seedgov-delegate-platform/23987/5 1.05k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/wintermute-delegate-platform/20181/22 2.5M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/karpatkey-delegate-platform/21773/29 860.04k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/franklindao-prev-penn-blockchain-delegate-platform/12755/34 3M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/atiselsts-eth-delegate-platform/22270/10 407.05k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/stablelab-delegate-platform/21240/55 2.5M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/pgov-delegate-platform/22271/27 2.5M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/bobbay-delegate-platform/24215/4 2\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/michigan-blockchain-delegate-platform/24198/4 3.86M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/arana-digital-delegate-platform/23971/3 1.29k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/404-dao-delegate-platform/22285/4 2.51M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/whetstone-research-delegate-platform/24345 1M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/l2beat-delegate-platform/22449/3 256.79k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/daoplomats-delegation-platform/23450/6 97.37\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/blockchain-education-network-ben-delegation-platform/23966/4 2.5M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/24194/2 2.45M\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/blockworks-research-delegate-platform/21219/1 250.32k\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/argonaut-delegate-platform/24417 20\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/ignas-delegate-platform/24674 8.4\n\nThe following 7 delegates are considered under-represented with a VP of 250k or less, similar to the previous application requirements:\n\nCuria, Tané, SEEDGov, Bobbay, Arana, DAOplomats, and Argonaut.\n\nConclusion\n\nThis program is working well, but the governance is not stable yet since some of the past proposals are close to missing its quorum, therefore we believe this program should be expanded further. As @GFXlabs suggested, we would also consider an additional 10M UNI suffices to achieve a stable and healthy governance state.\n\nOptions for expansion\n\nThe options that were voted on last time are as follows\n\nSplit equally among Qualified Delegates\n\nTop 4 Delegates get delegation till 2.5M is achieved. The rest of UNI are split among the rest proportional to their votes won.\n\nTop 4 Delegates get delegation till 2.5M is achieved (So likely first 4 delegates achieve 2.5 Mil. 5th gets some)\n\nIf the process is similar to the previous one, we believe that we should do the following steps: delegate’s candidacy, determination of the distribution method, Snapshot for the delegates (or additional parties like developers) to get delegations, and Snapshot for its approval.\n\n6 Likes\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas - Increased Allocation\n\n[RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\n[RFC] Governance Logistics Improvements\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n39\n\n1818\n\nApril 28, 2025\n\n[RFC]: Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n18\n\n3046\n\nNovember 10, 2023\n\n[Temperature Check]: Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nTemperature Check\n\n42\n\n7596\n\nDecember 4, 2023\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n38\n\n1611\n\nJune 30, 2025\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward -3 Months-Cycle 1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n42\n\n3966\n\nJune 4, 2024","tokens":2336,"crawled_at":1791193215250} +{"id":10201,"url":"https://docs.near.org/protocol/accounts-contracts/access-keys","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Access Keys - NEAR Docs","text":"In NEAR, users control their accounts using access keys, which can be full-access keys or function-call keys. Full-access keys allow complete control over the account, while function-call keys restrict actions to specific contracts. This system enables secure sharing of permissions and simplifies user interactions with applications.\n\n​\n\nAccess Keys\n\nIn most blockchains, users control their accounts by holding a single private key (a secret only they know) and using it to sign transactions.\n\nIn NEAR we distinguish two types of Access Keys:\n\nFull-Access Keys: Have full control over the account, and should never be shared\n\nFunction-Call Keys: Can only sign calls for specific contracts, and are meant to be shared\n\nIn addition, a key of either type can be created as a gas key: a key that carries its own prepaid gas balance and multiple independent nonces, built for sending many transactions in parallel.\nEvery account in NEAR can hold multiple keys, and keys can be added or removed, allowing a\nfine-grained control over the account’s permissions.\n\n​\n\nFunction-Call Keys\n\nFunction-Call keys can only sign transactions calling a specific contract, and do not allow to attach NEAR tokens to the call.\nThey are defined by three attributes:\n\nreceiver_id: The only contract which the key allows to call, no other contract can be called with this key\n\nmethod_names (Optional): The contract’s methods the key allows to call. If omitted, all contract’s methods can be called\n\nallowance (Optional): The amount of NEAR allowed to be spent on gas. If omitted, the key can consume unlimited gas\n\nFunction Call Keys are meant to be shared with applications, so third-parties can make contract calls in your name. This is useful in multiple scenarios as we will see below.\n\nFunction-Call keys are secure to share, as they only permit calls to a specific contract and prohibit NEAR token transfers\n\n​\n\nFull-Access Keys\n\nAs the name suggests, Full-Access keys have full control of an account, meaning they can be used to sign transactions doing any action in your account’s behalf:\n\nTransfer NEAR Ⓝ\n\nDelete your account or create sub-accounts of it\n\nAdd or remove Access Keys\n\nDeploy a smart contract in the account\n\nCall methods on any contract\n\nYou should never share your Full-Access, otherwise you are giving total control over the account.\n\nImplicit accounts already have a Full-Access Key by default, while for named accounts their first Full-Access Key is added on creation\n\n​\n\nGas Keys\n\nGas keys (NEP-611) are access keys designed for sending many transactions in parallel. They were introduced in nearcore 2.13 (protocol version 86) and differ from regular access keys in two ways:\n\nPrepaid gas balance: a gas key holds its own NEAR balance, and transactions signed with it pay gas from that balance instead of the account’s main balance\n\nParallel nonces: a gas key has up to 1,024 independent nonces (called nonce lanes), so many transactions can be in flight at once without nonce collisions\n\nA gas key can have either FullAccess or FunctionCall permission, with one restriction: a function-call gas key cannot set an allowance — its prepaid balance already serves as the gas budget.\nThis makes gas keys ideal for programmatic senders — relayers, bots, exchanges, or a fleet of agents operating one account — which previously had to juggle many separate access keys just to avoid nonce collisions, and risked draining the account’s main balance on gas.\n​\n\nLifecycle of a Gas Key\n\nA gas key is managed with the same actions as any other key, plus two new actions to move NEAR in and out of its balance:\n\nCreate: an AddKey action with a gas-key permission creates the key, specifying its number of nonces (num_nonces, between 1 and 1,024). The key is always created with zero balance\n\nFund: a TransferToGasKey action moves NEAR from the account’s balance into the gas key’s balance. It can be used repeatedly to top up the key\n\nUse: transactions signed with the gas key specify a nonce_index selecting which nonce lane to use, and consume gas from the key’s balance\n\nWithdraw: a WithdrawFromGasKey action moves NEAR from the key’s balance back to the account. Only the account itself can withdraw\n\nDelete: a DeleteKey action removes the key. Any remaining balance is burned, so the action fails if the key holds more than 1 NEAR — withdraw first, then delete\n\nDeleting a gas key burns whatever balance is left on it — this is a protocol-level protection against spam attacks, not a bug. Always WithdrawFromGasKey before deleting. The deletion (and likewise DeleteAccount) fails if more than 1 NEAR would be burned, protecting you from losing significant funds by accident.\n\n​\n\nHow Gas Keys Pay for Transactions\n\nWhen a transaction is signed with a gas key:\n\nThe gas costs (both burned gas and gas prepaid for function calls) are charged to the gas key’s balance\n\nAny attached NEAR (deposits, transfers) is still paid from the account’s main balance\n\nGas refunds for unspent gas return to the gas key’s balance, so the key sustains itself between top-ups, while balance refunds go to the account\n\nIf the gas key’s balance cannot cover a transaction’s gas, the transaction is rejected. If the gas is covered but the account cannot pay the attached deposit at execution time, the transaction fails and the gas burned to process it is still charged to the gas key. The gas that was attached to the receipt is refunded.\n\nGas is bought at a price that can be higher than the price it burns at, so a gas key has to hold more than its transactions finally cost. The difference comes back to the key as a refund, but it has to be on the key upfront.\n\n​\n\nUsing Nonce Lanes\n\nEach of the key’s num_nonces lanes keeps its own independent nonce. A transaction signed with a gas key picks a lane through a nonce_index field (from 0 to num_nonces - 1), and only that lane’s nonce advances. Two transactions on different lanes can never conflict, so a sender can run one lane per worker and submit transactions concurrently — with a single key to manage.\nYou can inspect a gas key’s lanes with the view_gas_key_nonces RPC query, and gas keys appear in view_access_key with their balance and num_nonces.\n\nTooling supportYou can create and manage gas keys with the NEAR CLI (near account add-key ... grant-gas-key-full-access, fund-gas-key, withdraw-from-gas-key, view-gas-key-nonces) and from your app with the near-kit (TypeScript) and near-kit-rs (Rust) libraries — both cover creating, funding, withdrawing, signing on a nonce lane, and reading a key’s lanes via view_gas_key_nonces. Contracts can also add and fund gas keys through batch-promise host functions — though only the account’s own transactions can withdraw from one.\n\nGas keys also work with meta transactions: the new DelegateV2 action lets a user sign a delegate action on a gas key’s nonce lane, enabling relayers to sponsor gas end to end.\n\n​\n\nSignature Schemes\n\nIndependently of its permission level, every access key is a cryptographic key pair belonging to one of NEAR’s supported signature schemes. A public key is written as :, where the prefix identifies the scheme — for example ed25519:CQLP1o1F3Jbdttek3GoRJYhzfT....\nSchemePublic key prefixPublic key sizeQuantum-resistant\nEd25519\ned25519:\n32 bytes\nNo\n\nsecp256k1\nsecp256k1:\n64 bytes\nNo\n\nML-DSA-65\nml-dsa-65:\n1952 bytes\nYes\n\ned25519 is the default scheme, used by most wallets and tooling and by NEAR implicit accounts. secp256k1 is used mainly for chain signatures and Ethereum-compatible flows. A single account can hold keys from different schemes at the same time.\n​\n\nPost-Quantum Keys (ML-DSA-65)\n\nml-dsa-65 is a post-quantum signature scheme, standardized by NIST as FIPS 204 (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, security category 3). Unlike ed25519 and secp256k1 — whose security a large enough quantum computer could break — ml-dsa-65 is designed to stay secure against quantum attacks, so an account protected by an ml-dsa-65 key cannot be taken over by forging its signature.\nYou add and use an ml-dsa-65 key exactly like any other key: it can be a full-access or a function-call key, and it signs transactions the same way.\n\nPost-quantum keys are stored by hashAn ml-dsa-65 public key is large — 1952 bytes, versus 32 for ed25519 — and its signatures are 3309 bytes. To keep accounts cheap to store, NEAR does not keep the full public key on-chain; instead it stores a 32-byte SHA3-256 hash of it — the same size as an ed25519 public key — which keeps the per-key storage cost close to that of a classical key.\n\nBecause only the hash is stored, listing an account’s keys returns the hash, not the full key, for ml-dsa-65 entries. When you query an account’s keys (for example with view_access_key_list), ml-dsa-65 keys appear with an ml-dsa-65-hash: prefix instead of ml-dsa-65::\n\nml-dsa-65-hash:7Xx2X... # base58-encoded 32-byte SHA3-256 digest\n\nTo recognize one of your own post-quantum keys in such a list, derive the same handle from your public key: it is the SHA3-256 hash of the domain-separation tag near:ml-dsa-65-pubkey-hash:v1 followed by the raw 1952-byte public key. Hashing the key without that prefix will not match the returned value. To look up a specific key directly with view_access_key, pass the full ml-dsa-65: public key and the network hashes it for you.\nYou can create and manage ml-dsa-65 keys today with the NEAR CLI, and from your app with the near-kit (TypeScript) and near-kit-rs (Rust) libraries. Contracts can add them via near-sdk-rs with no code changes.\n\nPost-quantum support currently covers transaction signing and access keys. Validator (staking) keys, block production, and implicit account addresses continue to use ed25519.\n\n​\n\nLimited Access Key Caveats\n\n​\n\nAccount with Only Function-Call Keys\n\nIf an account has no full-access keys and only function-call keys, it becomes effectively restricted:\n\nIt cannot transfer NEAR, delete itself, or manage its own keys\n\nIt can only perform the specific contract calls defined by the key’s receiver_id and method_names\n\nThis is useful for creating restricted sub-accounts (e.g. for chain signatures), but be aware the account cannot be recovered or reconfigured through standard transactions.\n\nCreating a sub-account with only a single function-call key means that account will never be able to remove itself, transfer NEAR out, or add new keys — unless the target contract provides a method to do so.\n\n​\n\nAllowance Exhaustion\n\nThe allowance field defines how much NEAR the key can spend on gas fees:\n\nIf set to a specific amount and fully consumed → the key becomes unusable and no new transactions can be signed\n\nIf set to 0 or omitted → unlimited allowance (the key has no gas budget restriction)\n\nThe allowance is charged at the buy price and credited back when the gas refund arrives, so a key needs more allowance than the final transaction cost.\n\nIf an account has only function-call keys and the allowance runs out, the account is permanently locked from initiating any transaction. Either use unlimited allowance (0) or ensure the account is topped up with NEAR before the allowance is exhausted.\n\n​\n\nLocked Accounts\n\nIf you remove all keys from an account, then the account will become locked, meaning that no external actor can perform transactions in the\naccount’s name.\nIn practice, this means that only the account’s smart contract can transfer assets, create sub-accounts, or update its code.\nLocking an account is very useful when one wants to deploy a contract, and let the community be assured that only the contract is in control of the account.\n\nAn account could still add keys to itself through a smart contract, effectively allowing the contract to unlock the account. Notice that this can only be done if the contract is deployed before the account is locked\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2962,"crawled_at":1791193216451} +{"id":10202,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/mental-models-for-real-world-cryptography","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Mental models for real-world cryptography and trusted execution environments - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nMental models for real-world cryptography and trusted execution environments\nIttai Abraham\n10.23.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nWhat are Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), and should we trust them? Do we still need to trust hardware if we already trust cryptography?\n\nIn this talk, Ittai Abraham (Intel Labs) shares key learnings and mental models that help reason about the use of cryptography and TEEs. He explores how TEEs can transform many aspects of web3 architecture — including data availability, block production, consensus, execution, and layer-2 scaling — as well as emerging “layer-3” use cases such as confidential inference and secure agentic operations.\n\nHe covers two complementary paradigms: TEEs as primary security anchors, and TEEs as defense-in-depth components. The talk highlights practical trade-offs, limitations, and exciting opportunities for future systems that combine TEEs with decentralization and cryptography.\n\nAbout the presenter\n\nIttai is a technologist and computer scientist with broad interests in algorithms, security, and distributed computing. His work bridges theory and practice, spanning cryptography, blockchain systems, and critical distributed infrastructure. He is currently a Senior Principal Engineer at Intel Labs and previously held industrial research roles at VMware and Microsoft Research.\n\nAbout a16z crypto research\n\na16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet.\n\nMore about us: a16z.com/2022/04/21/announcing-a16z-crypto-research\n\nMore from the a16z crypto team\n\nSubscribe to our ‘web3 weekly newsletter’: a16zcrypto.substack.com\n\nListen to our ‘web3 with a16z’ podcast: a16zcrypto.com/web3-with-a16z-podcast/\n\nRead more of our work: a16zcrypto.com","tokens":522,"crawled_at":1791193230270} +{"id":10203,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/creators","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Verified Creators | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nSimilarly to collections, the creators of an asset must be verified to ensure the authenticity of the asset.\nA creator whose verified flag is false could have been added by anyone and, therefore, cannot be trusted. On the other hand, a creator whose verified flag is true is guaranteed to have signed a transaction that verified them as a creator of that asset.\nIn the section below, we will learn how to verify and unverify the creators of an asset. Note that before verifying a creator, it must already be part of the Creators array of the asset's Metadata account. This can be done when minting the asset but also when updating the asset.\nVerify a Creator\nThe Verify instruction can be used to verify the creator of an asset. Notice that the same instruction can also be used to verify collections providing we pass different arguments to the instruction. Some of our SDKs split these instructions into multiple helpers like verifyCreatorV1 and verifyCollectionV1 to provide a better developer experience.\nThe main attributes required by the Verify instruction in the context of verifying a creator are the following:\nMetadata: The address of the asset's Metadata account.\nAuthority: The creator we are trying to verify as a Signer.\nHere's how we can use our SDKs to verify a creator on Token Metadata.\n\n1import { verifyCreatorV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming umi, metadata, and creator are set up\n\n4\n\n5await verifyCreatorV1(umi, {\n\n6 metadata,\n\n7 authority: creator,\n\n8}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n9\n\n10console.log('Creator verified');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getVerifyCreatorV1Instruction,\n\n3 findMetadataPda,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and creator (signer) are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Find the metadata PDA\n\n11const [metadata] = await findMetadataPda({ mint: mintAddress });\n\n12\n\n13// Verify the creator on the NFT\n\n14const verifyIx = getVerifyCreatorV1Instruction({\n\n15 metadata,\n\n16 authority: creator,\n\n17});\n\n18\n\n19await sendAndConfirm({\n\n20 instructions: [verifyIx],\n\n21 payer: creator,\n\n22});\n\n23\n\n24console.log('Creator verified on NFT');\n\nUnverify a Creator\nReciprocally, the Unverify instruction can be used to turn the verified flag of a creator to false. It accepts the same attributes as the Verify instruction and can be used in the same way.\n\n1import { unverifyCreatorV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming umi, metadata, and creator are set up\n\n4\n\n5await unverifyCreatorV1(umi, {\n\n6 metadata,\n\n7 authority: creator,\n\n8}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n9\n\n10console.log('Creator unverified');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUnverifyCreatorV1Instruction,\n\n3 findMetadataPda,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and creator (signer) are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Find the metadata PDA\n\n11const [metadata] = await findMetadataPda({ mint: mintAddress });\n\n12\n\n13// Unverify the creator on the NFT\n\n14const unverifyIx = getUnverifyCreatorV1Instruction({\n\n15 metadata,\n\n16 authority: creator,\n\n17});\n\n18\n\n19await sendAndConfirm({\n\n20 instructions: [unverifyIx],\n\n21 payer: creator,\n\n22});\n\n23\n\n24console.log('Creator unverified on NFT');","tokens":870,"crawled_at":1791193247812} +{"id":10204,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/legacy-migration/legacy-tokens","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Legacy Tokens & Wallet Assets – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Mar 23, 2026\n\nSynthetix has used different tokens and assets across multiple products and networks over time. If you’ve found tokens or positions in your wallet and aren’t sure what they represent, use the links below to identify the asset and understand your options.\n\nSNX\n\nIf you previously interacted with Synthetix, you may still hold SNX or have participated in a legacy staking system.\n\nFor information relating to legacy staking positions, debt, rewards, or SIP-423, please see 420 Legacy Staking.\n\nsUSD\n\nsUSD has been deprecated as part of SIP-423.\n\nEligible holders may be able to participate in the sUSD to SNX conversion process. For information regarding snapshots, eligibility, and claims, please see 420 Legacy Staking.\n\nSynths\n\nSynths were synthetic assets created through legacy Synthetix systems and are now deprecated.\nYou may still see Synths in your wallet on certain networks, but they are no longer actively supported.\n\nI have Synths on Ethereum Mainnet, what can I do with them?\n\nI have Synths on Optimism, what can I do with them?\n\nCurve LP Tokens\n\nCurve LP tokens were issued when providing liquidity through legacy Synthetix-related pools.\n\nI have Curve LP tokens, what can I do with them?\n\nLegacy Tokens (KWENTA, TLX, and Others)\n\nSome legacy Synthetix-related products issued separate tokens that may still appear in your wallet.\n\nI got KWENTA Tokens, where can I swap them for SNX?\n\nI got TLX Tokens, where can I swap them for SNX?\n\nLegacy Positions on Base or Arbitrum\n\nIf you previously held trading, liquidity, rewards, or spot positions on Base or Arbitrum:\n\nWhat happened to my old position (LP, Perps, Rewards, Spot) on Base?\n\nWhat happened to my old position (LP, Perps, Rewards, Spot) on Arbitrum?\n\nNot Sure What You’re Looking At?\n\nIf you’re unsure what a token or asset in your wallet represents:\n\nCheck the token name and symbol in your wallet\n\nSearch the Help Center for the token name\n\nStart with Asset Recovery by Network if you remember which network you used\n\nIf you still need help, contact Support and include:\n\nYour wallet address\n\nThe token name and symbol\n\nThe network the token appears on\n\nThis will help us identify the asset more quickly.","tokens":552,"crawled_at":1791193231171} +{"id":10205,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/gli-treasury-delegation-round-2-applications/25832/12","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"GLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications - #12 by Argonaut - Governance-Meta - Uniswap Governance","text":"GLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\nArgonaut\n\nSeptember 25, 2025, 7:08pm\n\n12\n\nApplicant Name: Argonaut\n\nApplicant Timezone: UTC -3\n\nLink to Delegate Forum Platform: Link\n\nLink to Snapshot Profile: Link\n\nLink to Tally/ Agora/on-chain voting profile: Link\n\nOnchain Voting Participation (%): 100%\n\nOffchain Voting Participation (%): 100%\n\nApplicant platform, including why the delegate should be elected:\n\nThe Argonaut team has been committed to Uniswap for over a year, participating consistently in governance votes. Our decision-making has always been independent, reflecting our willingness to support proposals that benefit the DAO as well as to oppose those we believe are not in its best interest.\n\nOver the past year, we have grown and matured as delegates, not only within Uniswap but also through our involvement in other protocols. This experience allows us to bring valuable insights to Uniswap, strengthening our contribution. It has also taught us how to collaborate with different teams in pursuit of the best outcomes for the DAO.\n\nLastly, we want to highlight our focus on security, fairness, and innovation. These pillars guide every voting decision we make and represent the foundation of our long-term commitment to Uniswap.\n\nI have read and agree to uphold the Delegate Principals (Y/N): Y\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4 Application and Results\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n23\n\n868\n\nAugust 31, 2025\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Application Thread\n\nUncategorized\n\n25\n\n2918\n\nJuly 3, 2024\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 Application\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n40\n\n1901\n\nSeptember 16, 2024\n\n[Temperature Check]: Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nTemperature Check\n\n42\n\n7596\n\nDecember 4, 2023\n\nDelegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates Application Thread\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n12\n\n3517\n\nNovember 12, 2023","tokens":491,"crawled_at":1791193232785} +{"id":10206,"url":"https://docs.near.org/protocol/transactions","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Transactions - NEAR Docs","text":"Users interact with NEAR by creating transactions. Specifically, users use their account’s private keys to sign transactions, which are then broadcasted and processed by the network.\n\nA transaction is composed of one or more Actions, and each action costs a deterministic amount of gas units. These gas units are translated into a cost in NEAR tokens, which the user must pay for the transaction to be processed.\n\nYou can use an Explorer to inspect transactions in the NEAR network\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":127,"crawled_at":1791193234993} +{"id":10207,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/legacy-migration/op-synths","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"I have Synths on Optimism, what can I do with them? – Synthetix","text":"If you are still holding Synths on Optimism (sETH, sBTC, sLINK etc.), please note that the legacy Synth system on Optimism begins deprecation on January 31, 2026.\n\nIf you hold Synths on Ethereum Mainnet instead, see I have Synths on Ethereum Mainnet, what can I do with them?.\n\nDeprecation timeline\n\nMilestoneDate\nLast day to swap Synths on Optimism\nJanuary 31, 2026\n\nOracle price is frozen for treasury redemptions\nFebruary 1, 2026\n\nDiscount applied to treasury redemptions\nApril 30, 2026\n\nRedemptions close\nDecember 31, 2026\n\nWhat this means\n\nYou can swap Synths to sUSD until January 31, 2026 using supported platforms such as:\n\nhttps://1inch.com\n\nBetween February 1 and April 30, 2026, redemption is available through Support at a fixed, frozen oracle price.\n\nFrom April 30 through December 31, 2026, a discount applies to redemptions.\n\nThe discount increases linearly at 12.5% per month of the frozen oracle price, up to 100%.\n\nAll Synth redemptions will end after December 31, 2026.\n\nsUSD to SNX Conversion\n\nFollowing SIP-423 (June 2026), legacy sUSD has been deprecated.\n\nAs a result, users redeeming Synths through the legacy redemption process will no longer receive redeemable sUSD. Instead, the sUSD value resulting from the redemption will automatically enter the 1:4 sUSD to SNX conversion process.\n\nConverted SNX is subject to:\n\nConversion ratio: 1 sUSD = 4 SNX\n\nA 1-year lock period\n\nA 1-year vesting period\n\nVested SNX must be claimed within six months of becoming available\n\nUnclaimed vested SNX may expire and become unclaimable\n\nFor additional information regarding eligibility, vesting, claim requirements, and the conversion process, please see 420 Legacy Staking.\n\nWhat you can do\n\nConfirm your wallet and network\n\nMake sure your wallet is connected to Optimism.\n\nVerify that the Synth balances appear on the Optimism network.\n\nCheck the Deprecation timeline\n\nCheck the timeline above to understand which actions are currently available.\n\nRedeem or swap your Synths (before January 31, 2026)\nSwap Synths to sUSD using:\n\nhttps://1inch.com\n\nIf you cannot swap (after January 31, 2026)\n\nContact Support and provide your wallet address.\n\nA Support agent can review your balances and advise whether redemption is still possible.","tokens":562,"crawled_at":1791193248500} +{"id":10208,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/its-all-about-trust","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"It's All about Trust - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nIt's All about Trust\nIttai Abraham\n08.22.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\nresearch\nscaling & throughput\nvideo\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIttai Abraham (Intel) surveys some of the amazing scalability advances in blockchain technologies over the past 5 years, including (1) progress in consensus protocols (partial synchrony, asynchrony, and synchrony); (2) the emergence of DAG-based data propagation protocols; and (3) blockchain execution paradigms (sharding, rollups, L2 sequencers) and how they relate to consensus and notions of asymmetric trust.\n\nAbout the speaker\n\nIttai is a senior researcher at Intel. He does research in algorithms and distributed computing. He also helps edit the blog Decentralized Thoughts (https://decentralizedthoughts.github…..\n\nAbout a16z crypto research\n\na16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet. More about us: a16z.com/2022/04/21/announcing-a16z-crypto-research","tokens":310,"crawled_at":1791193249182} +{"id":10209,"url":"https://docs.near.org/protocol/transactions/transaction-execution","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Lifecycle of a Transaction - NEAR Docs","text":"Transactions are constructed by users to express the intent of performing actions in the network. Once in the network, transactions are converted into Receipts, which are messages exchanged between network nodes.\nOn this page, we will explore the lifecycle of a transaction, from its creation to its final status.\n\nRecommended ReadingTo dig deeper into transaction routing, we recommend reading the nearcore documentation\n\n​\n\nReceipts & Finality\n\nLet’s walk through the lifecycle of a complex transaction and see how it is processed by the network using blocks as time units.\n​\n\nBlock #1: The Transaction Arrives\n\nAfter a transaction arrives, the network takes one block to validate it and transform it into a single Receipt that contains all the actions to be executed.\nWhile creating the Receipt, the signer gets $NEAR deducted from its balance to pay for the gas and any attached NEAR.\nIf the signer and receiver coincide - e.g. the signer is adding a Key - the Receipt is immediately processed in this first block and the transaction is considered final.\n​\n\nBlock #2: The Receipt is Processed\n\nIf the signer and receiver differs - e.g. the signer transfers NEAR to the receiver - the Receipt is processed in a second block.\nDuring this process a FunctionCall could span a cross-contract call, creating one or multiple new Receipts.\n​\n\nBlock #3…: Function Calls\n\nEach Receipt created from the function call take an additional block to be processed. Notice that, if those Receipts are FunctionCall they could spawn new Receipts and so on.\n​\n\nFinal Block: Gas is Refunded\n\nA final Receipt is processed in a new block, refunding any extra gas paid by the user. Almost every transaction ends with one of these, since the buy price is usually higher than the burn price.\n​\n\nWaiting for a Transaction\n\nWhen using our libraries (or directly contacting the RPC), you can specify how long you want to wait for a transaction to be processed using a wait_until parameter.\nAfter a transaction is submitted, it first gets validated by the RPC node. If the transaction fails structural checks it will be immediately rejected. Otherwise, two things progress independently:\n\nExecution: the receipts spawned by the transaction are executed across shards\n\nFinality: the blocks containing the transaction and its receipts are finalized by consensus\n\nThese two axes combine to give you the following wait_until levels:\nwait_untilReceipts executed?Tx block final?Receipt outcomes in response?\nNone\n—\n—\nNo\n\nIncluded\n—\n—\nNo\n\nExecutedOptimistic\nYes (non-refund)\nNo\nYes\n\nIncludedFinal\nNot necessarily\nYes\nPartial\n\nExecuted\nYes (non-refund)\nYes\nYes\n\nFinal\nYes (all, including refunds)\nYes (all blocks)\nYes\n\nNotice that ExecutedOptimistic and IncludedFinal are not ordered relative to each other — they represent progress on different axes. ExecutedOptimistic guarantees all non-refund receipt outcomes are available but the blocks aren’t final yet. IncludedFinal guarantees the transaction’s block is final but some receipts may still be pending, so you may only get a partial set of receipt outcomes.\n​\n\nRefund receipts\n\nWhen a receipt executes, NEAR generates a refund receipt to return the unused payment to the sender: the gas that was attached but not used, plus the difference between the price the gas was bought at and the price it was burned at. These always succeed and don’t affect application logic, so ExecutedOptimistic and Executed don’t wait for them — only Final does.\n\nMost transactions will just spawn a receipt to process the actions, and a receipt to refund the gas, being final in 1-3 blocks (~1-3 seconds):\nOne block if the signer and receiver coincide - e.g. when adding a key\n\nThree blocks if the signer and receiver differ, since the first block creates the Receipt, and the last reimburses gas\n\nFunction calls might take longer, as they can spawn multiple receipts. Network congestion can also increase the time to process a receipt and, thus, a transaction.\n\n​\n\nTransaction Status\n\nAs the Receipts of a Transaction are processed, they get a status:\n\nSuccess: the actions on the receipt were executed successfully\n\nFailed: an action on the receipt failed\n\nUnknown: the receipt is not known by the network\n\nIf an action in a Receipt fails, all the actions in that Receipt are rolled back. Notice that we are talking about the Receipt status, and not the Transaction status.\nThe status of a transaction is determined by its first receipt, which contains all its actions. If any of the actions in the first receipt fail, the transaction is marked as failed.\nNotice that, it could happen that a transaction is marked as successful, but some of its receipt fails. This happens when a FunctionCall successfully spawns a new receipt, but the consequent function call fails. In this case, the transaction is marked as successful because the original function call was successful.\nSee the examples below for more details.\n\nStatus Examples\n\n​\n\nExample: Transaction with Transfer\n\nbob.near creates a transaction to transfer 10 NEAR to alice.near\n\nThe transaction is converted into a receipt\n\nThe conversion fails because bob.near does not have enough balance\n\nThe transaction is marked as failed ⛔\n\n​\n\nExample: Deploying a Contract\n\nbob.near creates a transaction to:\n\ncreate the account contract.bob.near\n\ntransfer 5 NEAR to contract.bob.near\n\ndeploy a contract in contract.bob.near\n\nThe transaction is transformed into one receipt\n\nThe account is created, the money transfer and the contract deployed\n\nThe transaction is marked as successful ✅\n\n​\n\nExample: Deploying a Contract Fails\n\nbob.near creates a transaction to:\n\ncreate the account contract.bob.near\n\ntransfer 5 NEAR to contract.bob.near\n\ndeploy a contract in contract.bob.near\n\nThe transaction is transformed into one receipt\n\nThe account is created, but the transfer fails because bob.near does not have enough balance\n\nThe whole process is reverted (i.e. no account is created)\n\nThe transaction is marked as failed ⛔\n\n​\n\nExample: Calling a Function\n\nbob.near creates a transaction to call the function cross-call in contract.near\n\nThe transaction is transformed into one receipt\n\nThe function cross-call creates a promise to call the function external-call in external.near\n\nThe function finishes correctly and the transaction is marked as successful ✅\n\nA new receipt is created to call the function external-call in external.near\n\nThe function external-call fails\n\nThe original transaction is still marked as successful ✅ because the first receipt was successful\n\nYou can check the status of a transaction using the NearBlocks explorer\n\n​\n\nNonce values\n\nThe nonce is a number that is incremented for each transaction sent by the transaction’s Signer.\nOn a valid transaction, the nonce value should follow these rules:\n\nWhen adding a key, the nonce is automatically assigned - particularly, it is given the value block height * 10^6 - so the value in the ADD_KEY action is ignored\n\nA transaction is accepted only if the nonce value is in the range of:\n\n[(current_nonce_of_access_key + 1) .. (block_height * 10^6)]\n\nOnce a transaction is accepted, the access key’s nonce is set to the nonce value of the included transaction\n\nGas keys hold one nonce per lane (up to 1,024 lanes); a transaction signed with a gas key selects a lane with its nonce_index, and the rules above apply to that lane’s nonce independently of all other lanes\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1853,"crawled_at":1791193252255} +{"id":10210,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/deposits-withdrawals/depositing","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Depositing Collateral – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jul 20, 2026\n\nSynthetix Exchange runs on Ethereum Mainnet. Deposited collateral funds the selected subaccount only, and that collateral can be used to trade USDT-settled perps markets.\n\nSupported collateral\n\nUSDT and WETH deposits are supported in the app today. Additional collateral types in the table below are planned.\n\nAssetStatusContract address (Mainnet)Notes\nUSDT\nSupported today\n0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7\nBase settlement asset. No haircut.\n\nWETH\nSupported today\n0xC02aaA39b223FE8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2\nNon-USDT collateral. Haircut applies.\n\ncbBTC\nPlanned\n0xcbB7C0000aB88B473b1f5aFd9ef808440eed33Bf\nPlanned non-USDT collateral.\n\nsUSDe\nPlanned\n0x9D39A5DE30e57443BfF2A8307A4256c8797A3497\nPlanned non-USDT collateral.\n\nwstETH\nPlanned\n0x7f39C581F595B53c5cb19bD0b3f8dA6c935E2Ca0\nPlanned non-USDT collateral.\n\nUSDT is valued at full face value for deposits. Non-USDT assets such as WETH have a haircut applied, meaning their effective collateral value is less than their market value.\n\nThe deposit flow shows per-asset minimum deposits, current and maximum account deposits, and supported collateral types for the selected subaccount.\n\nWhat you need before depositing\n\nA supported wallet connected to Ethereum Mainnet\n\nOne of the supported collateral assets in your wallet\n\nA small amount of ETH for gas\n\nHow to deposit\n\n1. Open the Deposit Window\n\nMake sure you are connected to the Synthetix Exchange.\n\nOpen the Deposit window by clicking the + button next to your available account balance. Alternatively, you can:\n\nSelect Deposit from the account sidebar.\n\nClick Deposit from the Account Balance panel.\n\nOpen the Portfolio page and click Deposit.\n\nClick the + button next to your available balance to open the Deposit window, or use Deposit from the account sidebar, Account Balance panel, or Portfolio page.\n\n2. Enter the Deposit Amount\n\nSelect the collateral asset you want to deposit.\n\nEnter the deposit amount.\n\nReview the account limits displayed.\n\nClick Deposit.\n\nSelect your collateral asset, enter the amount, review account limits, then click Deposit.\n\n3. Confirm the Deposit\n\nIf this is your first deposit for the selected asset, approve the token in your wallet.\n\nConfirm the deposit transaction in your wallet.\n\nWait for the transaction to be confirmed on Ethereum Mainnet.\n\nYour account balance will update once the transaction has been confirmed.\n\nEffective collateral value\n\nThe exchange shows effective collateral value at the time of deposit. For example, if WETH has a 90% collateral ratio, 1 WETH worth 3,000 USDT contributes 2,700 USDT of effective margin.\n\nFor the full margin model, see Leverage & Margin.\n\nGetting assets on Ethereum Mainnet\n\nIf you hold assets on another network or at a centralised exchange, you need to move them to Ethereum Mainnet first.\n\nFrom another chain:\n\nBase Bridge - for assets on Base\n\nStargate - cross-chain USDT\n\nSuperbridge - Optimism to Mainnet\n\nFrom a CEX:\nMost major exchanges, including Binance, Coinbase, and Kraken, support direct Ethereum Mainnet withdrawals. Choose \"ERC-20\" or \"ETH Network\" when withdrawing.\n\nMinimum deposits\n\nThe deposit flow may show a minimum deposit per asset. Very small deposits may also not cover gas costs for subsequent on-chain transactions.\n\nDeposit limits\n\nPer-asset minimum deposits, maximum account deposits, and other limits are shown in the deposit flow when they apply. Protocol-level TVL limits may apply during early deployment phases; the app surfaces any active limits.\n\nHaircuts can be tiered by the USD value of each asset in your account. With current per-account deposit limits, most users sit in the first tier, but you should use the Collateral Value shown in the app for your actual margin contribution.\n\nSee also\n\nMulticollateral Margin - unified margin, USDT debt, Swap, and auto-exchange.\n\nWithdrawing Collateral - withdrawal limits, USDT caps, and LTV constraints.\n\nLeverage & Margin - how collateral value is used to meet margin requirements.\n\nSub-Account - how collateral is isolated by subaccount.\n\nGetting Started - full account setup walkthrough.","tokens":1027,"crawled_at":1791193265781} +{"id":10211,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/delegates","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Delegated Authorities | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nHaving a single authority on our assets is not always ideal. Sometimes we want to delegate some of these responsibilities to other wallets or programs so they can do things on our behalf. This is why Token Metadata offers a whole set of delegates with different scopes.\nMetadata vs Token Delegates\nThe delegates offered by Token Metadata can be split into two categories: the Metadata Delegates and the Token Delegates. We'll go through each of them in more detail below but let's have a quick look at how they differ.\nMetadata Delegates are associated with the Mint account of the asset and allow the delegated authority to perform updates on the Metadata account. They are approved by the update authority of the asset and there can be as many as needed.\nToken Delegates are associated with the Token account of the asset and allow the delegated authority to transfer, burn and/or lock the token(s). They are approved by the owner of the asset and there can only be one per token account at a time.\nMetadata Delegates\nMetadata Delegates are delegates that operate at the Metadata level. These delegates are stored using a Metadata Delegate Record PDA — whose seeds are [\"metadata\", program id, mint id, delegate role, update authority id, delegate id].\nThat account keeps track of the Delegate authority as well as the Update Authority that approved it.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nPDA\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\nPDA\n\nMetadata Delegate Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\nKey = MetadataDelegate\n\nBump\n\nMint\n\nDelegate\n\nUpdate Authority\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nHere are some key properties of Metadata Delegates:\nThere can be as many Metadata delegates as needed for a given asset.\nMetadata delegates are derived from the Mint account which means they exist regardless of the owner of the asset. Thus, transferring an asset does not affect the Metadata delegates.\nMetadata delegates are also derived from the current Update Authority of the asset. This means, whenever the Update Authority is updated on an asset, all Metadata delegates are voided and cannot be used by the new Update Authority. However, if the Update Authority was to be transferred back, all Metadata delegates associated with it would automatically reactivate.\nMetadata delegates can be revoked by the Update Authority that approved them.\nMetadata delegates can also revoke themselves.\nThere exist 7 different types of Metadata Delegates, each with a different scope of action. Here is a table summarizing the different types of Metadata Delegates:\nDelegateSelf-updatesUpdate items in collectionUpdate scope\nAuthority Item\n✅\n❌\nnewUpdateAuthority ,primarySaleHappened ,isMutable ,tokenStandard\n\nCollection\n✅\n✅\ncollection + verify/unverify collection on items\n\nCollection Item\n✅\n❌\ncollection\n\nData\n✅\n✅\ndata\n\nData Item\n✅\n❌\ndata\n\nProgrammable Configs\n✅\n✅\nprogrammableConfigs\n\nProgrammable Configs Item\n✅\n❌\nprogrammableConfigs\n\nNotice that the Metadata delegates whose name ends with Item can only act on themselves, whereas the other ones can also act on the collection items of the delegate asset. For instance, say we have a Collection NFT A that includes NFTs B and C. When we approve a Data delegate on A, we can update the data object of NFTs A, B and C. However, when we approve a Data Item delegate on A, we can only update the data object of NFT A.\nAdditionally, the Collection delegate is a little special as it also allows us to verify/unverify the delegated NFT on the items of the collection. In the example above, when we approve a Collection delegate on A, we can verify/unverify that collection on NFTs B and C.\nLet's go through each of these Metadata delegates in a bit more detail and provide code samples for approving, revoking and using them.\nAuthority Item Delegate\nThe Delegate Authority can update a sub-set of the asset. It can update the following properties of the Metadata account:newUpdateAuthority: transfers the Update Authority to another account.\nprimarySaleHappened: toggles to true when the primary sale of the asset has happened.\nisMutable: toggles to false to make the asset immutable.\ntokenStandard: can set the token standard if the asset was created before it was mandatory to set it.\n\nCollection Delegate\nThe Delegate Authority can update a sub-set of the asset. It can set the collection attribute of the Metadata account.\nWhen applied to a Collection NFT, the Delegate Authority can perform the following actions on the items inside that Collection:It can verify and unverify that Collection NFT on the item. It can only do this if the Collection NFT is already set on the item. Otherwise, there is no way of knowing that the item is part of the delegated Collection NFT.\nIt can clear the Collection NFT from the item.\n\nCollection Item Delegate\nThe Delegate Authority can update a sub-set of the asset. It can set the collection attribute of the Metadata account.\nEven if the asset is a Collection NFT, and contrary to the Collection Delegate, the Collection Item Delegate cannot affect the items of that collection.\n\nData Delegate\nThe Delegate Authority can update a sub-set of the asset. It can update the entire data object of the Metadata account but nothing else. This means it can update the creators of the asset.\nNote that when updating the creators array inside the data object, it can only add and/or remove unverified creators.\nWhen applied to a Collection NFT, the Delegate Authority can perform the same updates on the items inside that Collection.\n\nData Item Delegate\nThe Delegate Authority can update a sub-set of the asset. It can update the entire data object of the Metadata account but nothing else. This means it can update the creators of the asset.\nNote that when updating the creators array inside the data object, it can only add and/or remove unverified creators.\nEven if the asset is a Collection NFT, and contrary to the Data Delegate, the Data Item Delegate cannot affect the items of that collection.\n\nProgrammable Config Delegate\nThe Programmable Config Delegate is only relevant for Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can update the programmableConfigs attribute of the Metadata account but nothing else. This means it can update the ruleSet of the PNFT.\nWhen applied to a Collection NFT, the Delegate Authority can perform the same updates on the items inside that Collection.\n\nProgrammable Config Item Delegate\nThe Programmable Config Delegate is only relevant for Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can update the programmableConfigs attribute of the Metadata account but nothing else. This means it can update the ruleSet of the PNFT.\nEven if the asset is a Collection NFT, and contrary to the Programmable Config Delegate, the Programmable Config Item Delegate cannot affect the items of that collection.\n\nToken Delegates\nToken Delegates are delegates that operate at the Token level. This means they are spl-token delegates that are stored directly on the Token account of the SPL Token program. As such Token Delegates allow delegates to transfer and burn tokens on behalf of the owner but also lock and unlock tokens to prevent the owner from transferring, burning or even revoking the delegate. These delegates are crucial for applications like escrowless marketplaces, staking, asset loans, etc.\nWhilst there is only one type of delegate offered by the SPL Token program, Programmable NFTs (PNFTs) allowed the Token Metadata program to provide more granular delegates that can be selected on a per-case basis. This is because PNFTs are always frozen on the SPL Token program which means we can build a delegate system on top of it.\nWe store that delegate system on a PNFT-specific account called the Token Record PDA — whose seeds are [\"metadata\", program id, mint id, \"token_record\", token account id]. We synchronise the delegated authority on the SPL Token program as well but the tokens are always frozen. It is the responsibility of the Token Record account to keep track of whether the asset is really locked or not.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nNon-Fungibles and Semi-Fungibles\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nDelegate Authority\n\nDelegate Amount\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nProgrammable Non-Fungibles\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nDelegate Authority\n\nDelegate Amount = 1\n\nToken State = Frozen\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nPDA\n\nToken Record Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\nKey = TokenRecord\n\nBump\n\nState = Locked, Unlocked, Listed\n\nRule Set Revision\n\nDelegate\n\nDelegate Role\n\nLocked Transfer\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nHere are some key properties of Token Delegates:\nThere can only be one Token Delegate per token account. Setting a new Token Delegate on the same Token account will override the existing one.\nToken delegates can be revoked by the owner of the asset as long as the asset is not locked.\nToken delegates cannot revoke themselves as they are also set on the Token Program which does not allow the delegates to self-revoke.\nToken delegates are reset on transfer. When dealing with fungible assets, the Delegate Authority is reset when all delegated tokens are transferred.\nThe Standard delegate can be used by all assets except Programmable Non-Fungibles. All other Token delegates can only be used by Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nAll Token delegates that can be used by Programmable Non-Fungibles store the current Delegate Authority, its role and its state — locked or unlocked — on the Token Record account of the PNFT.\nThere exist 6 different types of Token Delegates, each with a different scope of action. Here is a table summarizing the different types of Token Delegates:\nDelegateLock/UnlockTransferBurnForNote\nStandard\n✅\n✅\n✅\nAll except PNFTs\n\nSale\n❌\n✅\n❌\nPNFTs only\nOwner cannot transfer/burn until they revoke the delegate\n\nTransfer\n❌\n✅\n❌\nPNFTs only\nOwner can transfer/burn even when a delegate is set\n\nLocked Transfer\n✅\n✅\n❌\nPNFTs only\n\nUtility\n✅\n❌\n✅\nPNFTs only\n\nStaking\n✅\n❌\n❌\nPNFTs only\n\nNotice that the Standard delegate has a lot more power than the other PNFT-specific delegates as we must simply defer to the spl-token delegate. However, the other delegates are more granular and can be used in more specific use cases. For instance, the Sale delegate is perfect for listing assets on marketplaces since they forbid the owner to burn or transfer as long as the delegate is set.\nLet's go through each of these Token delegates in a bit more detail and provide code samples for approving, revoking and using them.\nStandard Delegate\nAs mentioned above, the Standard Delegate is a wrapper around spl-token delegates. Whilst we could simply send instructions to the Token program directly, this delegate aims to offer the same API on Token Metadata regardless of the Token Standard. Additionally, Standard Delegates are able to lock/unlock assets which is not possible with native spl-token delegates.\nHere are some key properties of the Standard Delegate:\nThis delegate does not work with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can transfer the asset to any address. Doing so will revoke the Delegate Authority.\nThe Delegate Authority can burn the asset.\nThe Delegate Authority can lock the asset — also known as \"freezing\" the asset on the Token program. Until the Delegate Authority unlocks (or \"thaw\") the asset, the owner cannot transfer it, burn it, or revoke the Delegate Authority. This is specific to the Standard Delegate and cannot be done with a native spl-token delegate.\nWhen used with fungible assets, an amount greater than 1 can be provided to specify the number of tokens to delegate to the Delegate Authority.\n\nSale Delegate (PNFT only)\nThis delegate only works with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can transfer the PNFT to any address. Doing so will revoke the Delegate Authority.\nAs long as a Sale Delegate is set on a PNFT, the PNFT enters a special Token State called Listed. The Listed Token State is a softer variation of the Locked Token State. During that time, the owner cannot transfer or burn the PNFT. However, the owner can revoke the Sale Delegate at any time, which will remove the Listed Token State and make the PNFT transferable and burnable again.\n\nTransfer Delegate (PNFT only)\nThis delegate only works with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can transfer the PNFT to any address. Doing so will revoke the Delegate Authority.\nContrary to the Sale Delegate, when a Transfer Delegate is set, the owner can still transfer and burn the PNFT.\n\nLocked Transfer Delegate (PNFT only)\nThis delegate only works with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can lock the PNFT. Until the Delegate Authority unlocks the PNFT, the owner cannot transfer it, burn it, or revoke the Delegate Authority.\nThe Delegate Authority can transfer the PNFT to any address. Doing so will revoke the Delegate Authority and unlock the PNFT if it was locked.\n\nUtility Delegate (PNFT only)\nThis delegate only works with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can lock the PNFT. Until the Delegate Authority unlocks the PNFT, the owner cannot transfer it, burn it, or revoke the Delegate Authority.\nThe Delegate Authority can burn the PNFT.\n\nStaking Delegate (PNFT only)\nThis delegate only works with Programmable Non-Fungibles.\nThe Delegate Authority can lock the PNFT. Until the Delegate Authority unlocks the PNFT, the owner cannot transfer it, burn it, or revoke the Delegate Authority.\n\nLegacy Delegates\nFinally, it is worth noting that — before this delegate system — collection delegates used to be stored on a specific Collection Authority Record PDA. That PDA is similar to the Metadata Delegate Record except that it supports only one role: Collection. This legacy collection delegate is now deprecated and we recommend using the new delegate system instead.\nThat being said, the Token Metadata program still accepts these legacy collection delegates wherever a new Collection delegate is expected. This is done to ensure backward compatibility with assets that are still delegating to these legacy delegates.\nYou can learn more about them in the Token Metadata program directly.","tokens":3714,"crawled_at":1791193283941} +{"id":10212,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/consensus-under-adversary-majority-2","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Consensus under adversary majority - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nConsensus under adversary majority\nJoachim Neu\n10.29.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nresearch\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nA specter is haunting consensus protocols — the specter of adversary majority. Dolev and Strong in 1983 showed an early possibility for up to 99% adversaries. Yet, other works show impossibility results for adversaries above 50% under synchrony, seemingly the same setting as Dolev and Strong’s. What gives?\n\nIn this talk, Joachim Neu (a16z crypto research) pinpoints a key culprit for this ostensible contradiction: the modeling details of clients. Are the clients sleepy or always-on? Are they silent or communicating? Can validators be sleepy too? We systematize models for consensus across four dimensions (sleepy/always-on clients, silent/communicating clients, sleepy/always-on validators, and synchrony/partial-synchrony), and tightly characterize the achievable safety and liveness resiliences for each of the sixteen models. To this end, we unify folklore and earlier results, and fill gaps left in the literature with new protocols and impossibility theorems.\n\nPaper: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1799, a joint work with Srivatsan Sridhar, Ertem Nusret Tas, Dionysis Zindros, and David Tse.\n\nAbout the presenter Joachim is a postdoc Research Associate at a16z crypto research. He earned a PhD at Stanford, advised by David Tse. His current research focus is blockchain-era consensus and decentralized-systems security. His broader interests include distributed computing and systems, applied cryptography, and networking and communications.\n\nAbout a16z crypto research a16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet.\n\nMore about us: a16z.com/2022/04/21/announcing-a16z-crypto-research\n\nMore from the a16z crypto team S\n\nubscribe to our ‘web3 weekly newsletter’: a16zcrypto.substack.com\n\nListen to our ‘web3 with a16z’ podcast: a16zcrypto.com/web3-with-a16z-podcast/\n\nRead more of our work: a16zcrypto.com","tokens":571,"crawled_at":1791193268908} +{"id":10213,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/argonaut-delegate-platform/24417?page=2","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Argonaut Delegate Platform - Page 2 - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Argonaut Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nArgonaut\n\nDecember 26, 2024, 12:09pm\n\n22\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Metal L2: Bridging TradFi and DeFi Through Uniswap V3\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Against\n\nReasoning: We voted against it because we believe approving incentives for these low TVL L2s is not productive for Uniswap Governance.\n\nArgonaut\n\nDecember 26, 2024, 12:13pm\n\n23\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We supported this proposal because Celo’s integration into the SuperChain can create strong synergies within the ecosystem, ultimately benefiting Uniswap.\n\nArgonaut\n\nDecember 26, 2024, 12:23pm\n\n24\n\nProposal: Discretionary Budget from UAC for Co-Incentive Campaigns\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Allow UAC Surplus Spending\n\nReasoning: We supported this proposal because we believe utilizing the UAC’s surplus funds, generated from UNI price appreciation, can benefit the DAO and we believe it’s good to allow some flexibility, even if it comes at the cost of relying on discretionary actions that bypass governance.\n\nArgonaut\n\nDecember 26, 2024, 12:25pm\n\n25\n\nProposal: Incentive Package for Sonic (Formerly Fantom)\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: $250k Incentive Match\n\nReasoning: We supported this proposal because Sonic is a promising EVM-compatible Layer 1 and the successor to Fantom, a well-established Layer 1 with a strong team behind it. We believe that matching the $250k incentive is the best decision to ensure Uniswap gains an early advantage on this network and expands its market share.\n\nArgonaut\n\nDecember 27, 2024, 2:51pm\n\n26\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Uniswap DAO Principles\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We supported this proposal because it established a set of principles for delegates that we consider valuable. The proposer also took community feedback into account to enhance the proposal.\n\nArgonaut\n\nJanuary 23, 2025, 8:10pm\n\n27\n\nProposal: Incentive Package for Sonic\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Aligned with our previous votes on Snapshot regarding this proposal, we will vote in favor because Sonic is a promising EVM-compatible Layer 1 and the successor to Fantom, a well-established Layer 1 with a strong team behind it.\n\nArgonaut\n\nJanuary 23, 2025, 8:17pm\n\n28\n\nProposal: Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We continue to support this proposal and will vote in favor because Celo’s integration into the SuperChain can generate significant synergies within the ecosystem, bringing long-term benefits to Uniswap.\n\nArgonaut\n\nJanuary 23, 2025, 8:28pm\n\n29\n\nProposal: Uniswap DAO Principles\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Aligned with our previous votes on Snapshot regarding this proposal, we will vote in favor as we consider these principles valuable for delegates.\n\nArgonaut\n\nJanuary 23, 2025, 8:35pm\n\n30\n\nProposal: Governance Proposal - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Aligned with our previous votes on Snapshot regarding this proposal, we will vote in favor as the SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement establishes a clear framework to protect whitehats, ensuring responsible actions during urgent exploits while aligning with industry-standard bounties.\n\nArgonaut\n\nFebruary 19, 2025, 9:40pm\n\n31\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Yes\n\nReasoning: The authors of the proposal have carefully considered feedback from other delegates, incorporating some into the current version while evaluating the rest for the next cycle. We support the proposal as it improves on the previous cycle’s program and is well thought out.\n\nArgonaut\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 1:33pm\n\n32\n\nProposal: Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We maintain our stance and continue to support this program. All Cycles have shown great benefits for the protocol, so there is no reason to oppose it. We appreciate once again that all the feedback received has been taken into account.\n\nArgonaut\n\nMarch 5, 2025, 6:09pm\n\n33\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Unleashed\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Yes\n\nReasoning: While $95 million is a significant request, the Uniswap Foundation has played a key role in the DAO’s development and continues to work on projects that add value. The main reason for supporting this proposal is that its failure could have harmful consequences for the DAO.\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We support this proposal because we believe incentives on Uniswap V4 are crucial for driving migration to the new version and boosting development using hooks. So far, UniV4’s metrics haven’t been strong, and we hope this will help turn that around. However, we still think the proposal’s structure was not ideal and should have been split into separate proposals.\n\nArgonaut\n\nMarch 20, 2025, 11:03pm\n\n34\n\nProposal: Uniswap Unleashed\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Aligned with our vote in Snapshot, the Uniswap Foundation has played a key role in the DAO’s development and continues to work on projects that add value. The main reason for supporting this proposal is that its failure could have harmful consequences for the DAO.\n\nProposal: Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Aligned with our vote in Snapshot, we support this proposal because we believe incentives on Uniswap V4 are crucial for driving migration to the new version and boosting development using hooks. So far, UniV4’s metrics haven’t been strong, and we hope this will help turn that around.\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Saga Uniswap v3 Liquidity Incentives\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Against\n\nReasoning: Consistent with similar proposals, we don’t believe Saga is a chain that justifies an incentives expense from the DAO. It’s still a young chain.\n\nArgonaut\n\nMarch 27, 2025, 11:42pm\n\n35\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Against\n\nReasoning: While the original proposal was good, after the updates we disagreed with several points, such as the arbitrary limit of 12 delegates and knowing the selection methodology in advance, potentially allowing for deliberate exclusion of certain delegates by picking the limit of delegates to be included. Additionally, as stated in this forum post, we disagree with the methodology used to calculate the ranking of one participant for the DIP Cycle 3 criteria and scoring metrics, and this updated proposal intends to use the same method.\n\nArgonaut\n\nApril 14, 2025, 6:24pm\n\n36\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For $375k\n\nReasoning: As we mentioned in our comment on the proposal here, we had a dilemma. However, after giving it further thought and reading some of the opinions shared by other delegates, we have decided to support this proposal. Our main reason is the promising growth this L2 has shown and how beneficial this initial boost could be.\n\nArgonaut\n\nApril 14, 2025, 6:41pm\n\n37\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nVoting type & platform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We’re voting in favor of this proposal because we think it helps make the v4 deployment process easier and faster. Giving UF the ability to deploy contracts makes sense and will help the DAO move more efficiently. It’s a good first step toward setting up a better process for future deployments.\n\nArgonaut\n\nApril 18, 2025, 1:40pm\n\n38\n\nProposal: BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Our reasoning remains consistent with the stance we shared during the Snapshot vote. The strong growth potential of this L2 is a clear sign that supporting this vote is a great opportunity.\n\nArgonaut\n\nApril 28, 2025, 1:16pm\n\n39\n\nProposal: Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nVoting type & platform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Our team maintains the position taken in the Snapshot vote by voting in favor. As we have mentioned before, we are pleased with this first step as it improves the process for future implementations.\n\nArgonaut\n\nApril 28, 2025, 9:45pm\n\n40\n\nProposal: UAC Renewal S4\n\nPlatform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Renew UAC\n\nReasoning: We support this renewal as we did with Season 3. The UAC has proven to be essential to the DAO due to their duties, and their work must continue to add value as it has, so we reaffirm our confidence in them for another season.\n\nProposal: Approved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nPlatform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Approve Rebalance\n\nReasoning: In line with our previous rationale for rebalancing as well as reaffirming our confidence in the UAC, we voted in favor of this proposal. Since the budget was approved in USD, it makes sense to rebalance it.\n\nProposal: [Temp Check/Revised] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nPlatform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: Against\n\nReasoning: We came back to vote against this proposal, although it has been revised, we still see the same things we criticized before as part of the motion being pushed forward, therefore we cannot support this proposal as it stands.\n\nArgonaut\n\nMay 5, 2025, 3:45pm\n\n41\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Scaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nPlatform: Offchain - Snapshot\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We’ve voted in favor of this proposal. We believe that the GFXLabs team is more than capable of handling what this proposal aims to do. They have been a part of V3 and are still a great partner for the DAO due to their past contributions that have added a lot of value. The budget is not even a concern to us, considering they have even handled a $1.6M grant in the past, and have produced results far beyond the original scope of that grant. So we see no reason to oppose this proposal and its goals. GFXLabs has proven to be a trustworthy partnership. We support this expansion beyond OKU chains to further increase Uniswap’s reach.\n\nProposal: UAC Renewal S4\n\nPlatform: Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: We remain consistent with our position in the Snapshot instance and continue to support this proposal.\n\nProposal: Approved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nPlatform: Offchain - Onchain - Tally\n\nVote: For\n\nReasoning: Once again, we remain consistent with our position in the Snapshot instance and continue to support this proposal.\n\n← previous page\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n76\n\n3514\n\nMay 5, 2026\n\nIgnas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n41\n\n1284\n\nMay 25, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026","tokens":2820,"crawled_at":1791193270286} +{"id":10214,"url":"https://docs.near.org/getting-started/hackathons","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Building on NEAR - NEAR Docs","text":"This page brings together practical resources you can use right away when building on NEAR.\n​\n\nGetting started\n\nWhat is NEAR?\nLearn NEAR basics, architecture, and why developers choose it.\n\nDeveloper support\nJoin Telegram developer chats to ask questions and get help.\n\nNeed NEAR AI credits?\nRequest NEAR AI Cloud credits for your project.\n\n​\n\nCore docs\n\nNEAR protocol basics\n\nSmart contracts quickstart\n\nWeb3 apps quickstart\n\nChain abstraction overview\n\nTools for AI agents\n\nNEAR AI documentation\n\nNEAR intents documentation\n\n​\n\nAwesome NEAR\n\nawesome-near is a community-maintained resource directory with tooling, examples, libraries, and integrations.\n\nSkills\n\nTestnet faucets\n\nNEAR protocol SDKs\n\nWallet and authentication\n\nCLI tools\n\nStarter templates\n\nData infrastructure\n\nData APIs\n\nAI and cloud services\n\nNear intents\n\nChain signatures\n\nExplorers\n\nAdditional resources\n\n​\n\nSkills\n\nPackageDescription\nagent-skills\nAI agent skills for NEAR Protocol blockchain development\n\n​\n\nTestnet faucets\n\nFaucetDescription\nCircle Faucet\n20 USDC on NEAR Testnet (claimable every 2 hours)\n\nNEAR Faucet\n2 NEAR on Testnet (rate limited)\n\n​\n\nNEAR protocol SDKs\n\n​\n\nJavaScript / TypeScript\n\nPackageDescription\nnear-api-js\nHigh-level JavaScript client for accounts, blocks, transactions, tokens, and function calls\n\nnear-api-ts\nHigh-level type-safe TypeScript client for NEAR Protocol\n\nnear-kit\nModern TypeScript client with fetch-like API\n\nnear-jsonrpc-client-ts\nAuto-generated TypeScript JSON-RPC client\n\n​\n\nRust\n\nPackageDescription\nnear-api-rs\nHigh-level Rust off-chain client for NEAR Protocol\n\nnear-sdk-rs\nRust SDK for writing NEAR smart contracts\n\nnear-abi-rs\nABI primitives and models for Rust contracts\n\n​\n\nPython\n\nPackageDescription\npy-near\nAsync Python client with HOT Protocol and NEAR Intents support\n\nnear-jsonrpc-client-py\nType-safe Pythonic JSON-RPC client with Pydantic models\n\nnear-sdk-py\nPython SDK for writing NEAR smart contracts\n\n​\n\nWallet and authentication\n\nPackageDescription\n@hot-labs/near-connect\nSecure lightweight wallet connector for JavaScript/TypeScript\n\nnear-connect-hooks\nReact hooks for NEAR wallet integration\n\nnear-sign-verify\nCreate and validate NEP-413 signed messages\n\nbetter-near-auth\nSign in with NEAR plugin for Better Auth\n\n​\n\nCLI tools\n\nPackageDescription\nnear-cli-rs\nHuman-friendly interactive CLI for NEAR Protocol\n\ncreate-near-app\nScaffold NEAR apps with frontend and contract templates\n\ncargo-near\nCargo extension for build and deploy with ABI generation\n\nnear-validator-cli-rs\nCLI companion for staking operations and validator workflows\n\n​\n\nStarter templates\n\nPackageDescription\nnear-ai-chat\nAI chat agent starter for NEAR AI Cloud\n\nNEAR Playground\nOnline IDE to create and deploy NEAR contracts\n\nnear-sdk-rs-template\nRust smart contract template\n\nNEAR-fast-ft-transfer\nHigh-performance FT transfer service\n\n​\n\nData infrastructure\n\nPackageDescription\nGoldsky\nData infrastructure and indexing service\n\nStream NEAR\nServer-Sent Events stream for real-time block data\n\nExplorer API\nTransaction-based explorer API\n\nNear Lake Indexer\nLake-based indexing service\n\n​\n\nData APIs\n\nPackageDescription\nFastNear API\nLow-latency API for wallets and explorers\n\nNearBlocks API\nREST APIs for NEAR blockchain data\n\nPikespeak API\nAggregated analytics APIs\n\nAllium API\nWallet and historical transaction API\n\n​\n\nAI and cloud services\n\nPackageDescription\nNEAR AI Cloud\nPrivate inference platform for verifiable AI inference\n\n​\n\nNear intents\n\nPackageDescription\nOne Click SDK TypeScript\nTypeScript SDK for cross-chain swaps via 1Click API\n\nOne Click SDK Rust\nRust API client for one-click swaps\n\nOne Click SDK Go\nGo API client for one-click swaps\n\nintents-sdk\nSDK for intents-based applications\n\n​\n\nChain signatures\n\nPackageDescription\nchainsig.js\nTypeScript library for multi-chain transactions and MPC signatures\n\nomni-transaction-rs\nRust library to build transactions for multiple chains\n\n​\n\nExplorers\n\nNEAR Validate\n\nNearBlocks\n\nPikespeak\n\nNear Intents Explorer\n\n​\n\nAdditional resources\n\nNEAR Intents Documentation\n\nNEP Specifications\n\nNEAR Blog\n\nNEAR Catalog\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1026,"crawled_at":1791193280212} +{"id":10215,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/research","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"research - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nresearch\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all research\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n10.29.25 / Ling Ren\nGranular synchrony: a new network timing model for distributed computing\nToday’s mainstream network timing models for distributed computing are synchrony, partial synchrony, and asynchrony. These models are coarse grained and often make either too strong or too weak assumptions about the network. In this talk, Ling Ren (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) introduces a new network timing model called “granular synchrony” that models the network...\n\nresearch\nresearch\n\n10.29.25 / Joachim Neu\nConsensus under adversary majority\nA specter is haunting consensus protocols — the specter of adversary majority. Dolev and Strong in 1983 showed an early possibility for up to 99% adversaries. Yet, other works show impossibility results for adversaries above 50% under synchrony, seemingly the same setting as Dolev and Strong’s. What gives? In this talk, Joachim Neu (a16z crypto...\n\nresearch\nresearch\n\n10.16.25 / Abhi Shelat\nPrivacy-preserving digital identity\nAnonymous digital credentials allow users to prove attributes like their age without revealing their identity. However, existing schemes have failed to achieve wide-scale deployment because they rely on new cryptographic assumptions and trusted parameter setups or require system-wide updates to both issuer infrastructure and the secure hardware on user devices. In this talk, Abhi Shelat...\n\nresearch\nresearch\n\n09.27.24 / Yevgeniy Dodis\nPerpetual encryption\nYevgeniy Dodis (NYU and IACR) considers the problem of building a private blockchain on top of a public one.\n\nresearch\ncryptography\nprivacy\nresearch\nSNARKs\nvideo\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1166,"crawled_at":1791193287792} +{"id":10216,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/tane-delegate-platform/24164","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Tané Delegate Platform - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Tané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nTane\n\nJune 27, 2024, 1:56am\n\n1\n\ntane-logo480×480 10.2 KB\n\nBasic Info\n\nName: Tané\n\nDelegate Address: tanegov.eth 0xB79294D00848a3A4C00c22D9367F19B4280689D7\n\nDelegate Profile: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0xb79294d00848a3a4c00c22d9367f19b4280689d7\n\nX (Twitter): https://x.com/tanelabs\n\nTelegram: https://t.me/takeshi55555\n\nIntro\n\nTané is formed with a group of crypto-native product builders, based in Tokyo, Dubai and New York. We are backed by SoftBank, and Japanese tech giants like DeNA, GREE, MIXI, and closely work with the big Japanese enterprises and have great relationship with Japanese crypto communities.\n\nOur investment arm has invested in and supported various innovating projects that contribute to the decentralized society enabled by the new blockchain technology. Our network operation entity started directly contributing to the ecosystem by being validators for the core infrastructures and protocols that make Web3 move forward and contributors to the DAOs that manage them. We have been active as delegates in dYdX, Arbitrum and Optimism.\n\nTakeshi, Head of Network Operations, who worked for Twitter as a senior software engineer and for SmartNews, a Japanese unicorn startup that provides a news aggregation mobile app with 30M MAU as a product manager, is the main representative of the account.\n\nDisclosure\n\nOur investment arm has invested in a number of projects and we will take appropriate actions if potential conflict of interests arise.\n\n4 Likes\n\nTane\n\nJune 28, 2024, 6:45pm\n\n2\n\nUniswap Arbitrum LTIPP Matching (Onchain)\n\nVoting: For\n\nReasoning: We thought $500k was the best amount at the time of the snapshot as written in https://gov.uniswap.org/t/arbitrum-ltipp-incentive-matching/24066/15?u=tane, but the collaboration with Arbitrum is important to Uniswap and we think $750k matching is a reasonable amount.\n\n2 Likes\n\nTane\n\nJuly 29, 2024, 3:56pm\n\n3\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Onboarding Package - Gnosis Chain (Snapshot)\n\nVote: $250k\n\nRationale: As we have posted here, we believe that Gnosis Chain will benefit from more participation and contribution from the Uniswap side. We believe that $250k is a reasonable incentive amount because Linea and Scroll, which have larger TVLs than Gnosis Chain, also received $250k in incentives from Uniswap Revitalization and Growth, and we believe that Gnosis Chain should follow the similar amount to them.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nAugust 6, 2024, 1:24am\n\n4\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Against\n\nRationale: We oppose allocating any incentives from the Uniswap DAO to X Layer because the TVL on X Layer is significantly lower than that of other chains which have previously received $250,000 in incentives.\n\nTane\n\nAugust 12, 2024, 7:09pm\n\n5\n\n[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Snapshot)\n\nVote:\n\nScreenshot 2024-08-12 at 3.08.37 PM1278×490 21.9 KB\n\nRationale:\n\nWe generally agree on introducing an analytics tooling for the DAO to appropriately evaluate programs that the DAO has set out. Especially for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, we were wondering how the DAO evaluates the impact made by the incentives that were distributed to each chain and revisits how we can improve the program and calibrate how we distribute future incentives.\n\nIdeally, creating an RFP based on the requirements that this proposal is addressing, asking for potential service providers to work on it and organizing an election of the SP would be the way to approach this kind of initiatives, but practically, we believe the DAO should accept the best available option by the DAO contributor with the track record.\n\nFor the selection of the chains to be analyzed, we choose Base, Scroll, and Blast according to their ranked TVL data and distributed our VP into each equally. 1) We believe with this budget as Wintermute suggested, the dashboard and analytics should cover 4 chains or more. 2) Arbitrum isn’t a part of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. While Arbitrum is a good chain to analyze on, the DAO should focus on how the program performs based on the data and insights provided by Forse. 3) Why don’t we have BSC as a selection? The DAO distributed 1M and it’s worth looking into the performance of it. If it’s in the selection, we would add BSC for a chain to be supported on the dashboard.\n\n2 Likes\n\n[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nTane\n\nAugust 12, 2024, 7:35pm\n\n6\n\nOnboarding Package for Gnosis Chain (Onchain)\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We maintain the rationale that we stated on the Snapshot and support the onboarding package for Gnosis Chain.\n\n[TEMP CHECK]- Revised - Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain (Snapshot)\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We support the deployment of Uniswap v3 and Oku Trade as we recognize the team’s commitment to providing $1M worth of liquidity in the protocol.\n\n1 Like\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread\n\nTane\n\nAugust 16, 2024, 10:30pm\n\n7\n\n[Temp Check] Activate 2, 3, 4 bps fee tiers on Uniswap v3 on Base (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Yes, activate additional tiers\n\nRationale: We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nAugust 21, 2024, 1:16pm\n\n8\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 on X Layer (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the deployment of Uniswap v3 on X Layer and the cost for Oku Trade deployment.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nAugust 25, 2024, 1:21am\n\n9\n\n[REDO: Temp Check] Activate 2, 3, 4 bps fee tiers on Uniswap v3 on Base (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale:\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Yes\n\nRationale:\n\nWe support this Cycle 2 proposal that allows new delegates like us to apply for and contribute to the DAO governance in a potentially sustainable way. We believe it’s a positive development that the Voting Power requirement has been removed, making it easier for new delegates like us to participate in. The scoring mechanism would be iterated over and the impact the program has been making should be reviewed for the future cycle, though.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nSeptember 1, 2024, 2:25am\n\n10\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale:\n\nWe maintain the rationale made below for its Snapshot and support the proposal for the delegate incentives.\n\nTane\n\nSeptember 11, 2024, 7:15pm\n\n11\n\n[Temp Check] - Ethereum Foundation Attackathon Sponsorship (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Do not sponsor\n\nRationale: While we agree that the Ethereum Foundation’s attacathon is trying to solve an important problem, we don’t feel strongly about the significance of sponsorship with such a large sum of money from the Uniswap DAO.\n\nProposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: we maintain the rational made below for its Snapshot and support the proposal to make a significant impact by applying those changes and monitoring the data.\n\nTane\n\nSeptember 15, 2024, 2:43am\n\n12\n\nUniswap Delegate Race Tiebreaker (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Both (create an extra 16th spot)\n\nRationale: We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot.\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Approved Rebalance\n\nRationale: We believe this rebalancing is necessary due to the fluctuation of the UNI token price. We would suggest that the committee should consider adding some buffer for the future programs to the budget so that the DAO doesn’t have to vote on rebalancing again.\n\nUAC Renewal S3 (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Renew UAC\n\nRationale:\n\nWe fully support increasing both the number of committee members and working hours per member because the committee that has more responsibilities and commitments should greatly benefit the DAO.\n\nWe also believe it’s crucial for the current members to continue serving on the committee, given their contributions so far. We look forward to seeing their continued efforts.\n\nThe compensation for the overtime work in Season 2 is fair and necessary, and we consider the additional funding to be justified.\n\nThe proposed budget for the committee’s compensations in the upcoming season is essential and should be approved. We would love to start supporting the committee even more in the future.\n\nTane\n\nSeptember 20, 2024, 3:45pm\n\n13\n\nUniswap Accountability S3 Renewal and Rebalance (Onchain)\n\nSummary: Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) has proposed a renewal of its operations for Season 3, addressing both budget rebalancing from Season 2 and the new budget for Season 3. If this proposal is approved, two key changes will be implemented; First, the number of UAC members will increase from 4 to 5, and the maximum working hours per month will rise from 10 hours to 30 hours. Second, an additional 84,594 UNI will be transferred to the UAC wallet to cover the operational budget shortfall caused by UNI’s price fluctuations, compensate committee members for their overtime work, and allocate funds to support adding the extra 16th delegate for the delegate reward initiative.\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale:\n\nWe support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives.\n\nTane\n\nOctober 1, 2024, 3:13am\n\n14\n\nForse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Onchain)\n\nSummary: This proposal aims to onboard ‘Forse’ by StableLab, a data service platform, to analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (URGP). If approved, a budget of 8,700 UNI (equivalent to $60,000) will be transferred to UAC and rewarded to StableLab at its completion.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP.\n\nTane\n\nOctober 7, 2024, 8:35pm\n\n15\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee S3 Elections (Snapshot)\n\nSummary: This proposal is conducting the Uniswap Accountability Committee Season 3 elections to select two new members from a list of applicants.\n\nVote: 33% for _JoJo, 33% for Alicecorsini, 33% for Doo\n\nRationale: We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee.\n\nTane\n\nOctober 12, 2024, 1:42am\n\n16\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Onboarding Package for Lisk (Snapshot)\n\nSummary: This proposal aims to add Lisk to the Uniswap v3 deployments record and provide an “Onboarding Package” to Lisk. Uniswap will offer a total of $375,000 in UNI incentives over three months to three main pools (USDC/USDT at 0.05%, WETH/USDT at 0.30%, and LSK/ETH at 0.30%). In return, Lisk will provide $250,000 worth of LSK incentives to match Uniswap’s offer and will lock an additional $1 million in Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) for one year.\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nRationale: We are opposed to this proposal.\n\nOur reason is that, compared to other chains, and considering that Lisk’s TVL is mostly composed of the LSK token, even when taking into account the promised $1 million in POL and the $250,000 Lisk incentive matching, we believe that the $375,000 incentive is too large.\n\nGnosis Chain, which had a TVL of $300 million at the time of its proposal, was allocated $250,000 in the Onboarding Package via Snapshot. We also believe that Lisk Chain’s TVL is smaller compared to Linea and Scroll, which received $250,000 in incentives through the Onboarding Package.\n\nWe think it would be better to reconsider this proposal on a smaller scale.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nOctober 21, 2024, 2:23am\n\n17\n\nUniswap Growth Program Trial (Snapshot)\n\nSummary: AlphaGrowth and ReservoirDAO propose a six-month program to grow Uniswap by expanding partnerships, enhancing marketing, and securing grants, and aim to increase its user base and market presence.\n\nVote: In Support\n\nRationale:\n\nBy establishing a program like this, the DAO can effectively communicate with projects interested in collaborating with Uniswap and execute the initiatives for users, which we believe will impact Uniswap’s market share.\n\nAdditionally, we believe that incorporating a trial period is crucial for forming a new organization. We acknowledge that the objectives for business development and marketing are clearly defined, and we feel that our previous concerns regarding the KPIs have been addressed.\n\nTane\n\nOctober 23, 2024, 10:40pm\n\n18\n\n[Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Onchain)\n\nSummary: This proposal aims to engage Forse by StableLab as a data service solution to analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program across the four blockchains, with a requested budget of $60,000 worth of UNI, to provide insights that will improve future iterations of the program and other incentive initiatives.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We strongly support this proposal, especially since we believe that accommodating more than four chains approved by its Snapshot one is essential, even more so than during the previous vote.\n\nTane\n\nOctober 27, 2024, 4:33pm\n\n19\n\nUniswap Growth Program Trial (Onchain)\n\nSummary: The Uniswap Growth Program Trial proposes a 6-month initiative to establish dedicated outbound business development and marketing teams, along with a Uniswap Ecosystem Incentives Initiative (UEII), aiming to proactively expand Uniswap’s reach, secure grants and incentives, and enhance marketing efforts to drive growth and user engagement, with a budget of $920,000.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and continue to monitor the progress of the program.\n\nTane\n\nNovember 20, 2024, 12:14pm\n\n20\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Tally Uniswap Proposal (Snapshot)\n\nSummary: Tally is requesting a grant of $250,000 annually for two years from the Uniswap DAO to continue supporting and enhancing the DAO’s on-chain governance infrastructure, aiming to improve governance capabilities and provide a better experience for the community.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nRationale: We support this proposal. Our questions regarding the budget and the proposal’s objectives have been addressed by @dennisonb.\n\nTally is an essential service for Uniswap’s DAO governance, and we are in favor of providing this funding.\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nIgnas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n41\n\n1284\n\nMay 25, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n76\n\n3514\n\nMay 5, 2026\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\n404 DAO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n3283\n\nJanuary 13, 2026","tokens":4261,"crawled_at":1791193288157} +{"id":10217,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/lock","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Locking Assets | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nAs mentioned in the \"Delegate Authorities\" page, certain delegates can lock and unlock assets, preventing their owners from transferring or burning them. A locked asset also forbids the owner from revoking the delegate's authority. This locking mechanism enables various utility use cases — such as staking — that would otherwise require an escrow account to function.\nIn the table below, we list all the Token Delegates that support locking assets. You can learn more about each of these delegates and how to approve/revoke them in their respective sections.\nDelegateLock/UnlockTransferBurnFor\nStandard\n✅\n✅\n✅\nAll except pNFTs\n\nLocked Transfer\n✅\n✅\n❌\npNFTs only\n\nUtility\n✅\n❌\n✅\npNFTs only\n\nStaking\n✅\n❌\n❌\npNFTs only\n\nAssuming we have an approved Token Delegate on an asset, let's now see how the delegate can lock and unlock it.\nLock an Asset\nNFT\nTo lock an asset, the delegate may use the Lock instruction of the Token Metadata program. This instruction accepts the following attributes:\nMint: The address of the asset's Mint account.\nAuthority: The signer that authorizes the lock. This must be the delegated authority.\nToken Standard: The standard of the asset being locked. Note that the Token Metadata program does not explicitly require this argument but our SDKs do so they can provide adequate default values for most of the other parameters.\n\n1import { lockV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming umi, mint, and authority (delegate) are set up\n\n4\n\n5await lockV1(umi, {\n\n6 mint,\n\n7 authority,\n\n8 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n9}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n10\n\n11console.log('NFT locked');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getLockV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, authority (delegate), and tokenOwner are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Lock an NFT (freeze) - requires approved delegate authority\n\n11const lockIx = await getLockV1InstructionAsync({\n\n12 mint: mintAddress,\n\n13 authority,\n\n14 payer: authority,\n\n15 tokenOwner,\n\n16 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n17});\n\n18\n\n19await sendAndConfirm({\n\n20 instructions: [lockIx],\n\n21 payer: authority,\n\n22});\n\n23\n\n24console.log('NFT locked');\n\npNFT\n\n1import {\n\n2 fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken,\n\n3 lockV1,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n6import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n7import { base58 } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi/serializers';\n\n8\n\n9// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n10\n\n11// Mint ID of the pNFT Asset\n\n12const mintId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n13\n\n14// Fetch pNFT Asset with Token Accounts\n\n15const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n16 umi,\n\n17 mintId,\n\n18 umi.identity.publicKey\n\n19);\n\n20\n\n21// Send lock instruction\n\n22const { signature } = await lockV1(umi, {\n\n23 // Mint ID of the pNFT Asset\n\n24 mint: mintId,\n\n25 // Update Authority or Delegate Authority\n\n26 authority: umi.identity,\n\n27 // Token Standard\n\n28 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n29 // Owner of the pNFT Asset\n\n30 tokenOwner: assetWithToken.token.owner,\n\n31 // Token Account of the pNFT Asset\n\n32 token: assetWithToken.token.publicKey,\n\n33 // Token Record of the pNFT Asset\n\n34 tokenRecord: assetWithToken.tokenRecord?.publicKey,\n\n35}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n36\n\n37console.log('Signature: ', base58.deserialize(signature));\n\n1import {\n\n2 getLockV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority (delegate) are set up\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The pNFT mint address\n\n10\n\n11// Fetch pNFT Asset with Token Accounts\n\n12const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n13 rpc,\n\n14 mintAddress,\n\n15 authority.address\n\n16);\n\n17\n\n18// Lock a pNFT - requires approved delegate authority\n\n19const lockIx = await getLockV1InstructionAsync({\n\n20 mint: mintAddress,\n\n21 authority,\n\n22 payer: authority,\n\n23 tokenOwner: assetWithToken.token.owner,\n\n24 token: assetWithToken.token.address,\n\n25 tokenRecord: assetWithToken.tokenRecord?.address,\n\n26 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n27});\n\n28\n\n29await sendAndConfirm({\n\n30 instructions: [lockIx],\n\n31 payer: authority,\n\n32});\n\n33\n\n34console.log('pNFT locked');\n\nUnlock an Asset\nNFT\nReciprocally, the delegate may use the Unlock instruction of the Token Metadata program to unlock an asset. This instruction accepts the same attributes as the Lock instruction and can be used in the same way.\n\n1import { unlockV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming umi, mint, and authority (delegate) are set up\n\n4\n\n5await unlockV1(umi, {\n\n6 mint,\n\n7 authority,\n\n8 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n9}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n10\n\n11console.log('NFT unlocked');\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUnlockV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n5\n\n6// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, authority (delegate), and tokenOwner are set up\n\n7\n\n8const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The NFT mint address\n\n9\n\n10// Unlock an NFT (thaw) - requires approved delegate authority\n\n11const unlockIx = await getUnlockV1InstructionAsync({\n\n12 mint: mintAddress,\n\n13 authority,\n\n14 payer: authority,\n\n15 tokenOwner,\n\n16 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.NonFungible,\n\n17});\n\n18\n\n19await sendAndConfirm({\n\n20 instructions: [unlockIx],\n\n21 payer: authority,\n\n22});\n\n23\n\n24console.log('NFT unlocked');\n\npNFT\n\n1import {\n\n2 fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken,\n\n3 TokenStandard,\n\n4 unlockV1,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n6import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n7import { base58 } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi/serializers';\n\n8\n\n9// Assuming umi is set up with mplTokenMetadata plugin\n\n10\n\n11// Mint pNFT ID of the Asset\n\n12const mintId = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n13\n\n14// Fetch the mint token accounts\n\n15const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n16 umi,\n\n17 mintId,\n\n18 umi.identity.publicKey\n\n19);\n\n20\n\n21// Send unlock instruction\n\n22const { signature } = await unlockV1(umi, {\n\n23 // Mint ID of the pNFT Asset\n\n24 mint: mintId,\n\n25 // Update Authority or Delegate Authority\n\n26 authority: umi.identity,\n\n27 // Token Standard\n\n28 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n29 // Owner of the pNFT Assets\n\n30 tokenOwner: assetWithToken.token.owner,\n\n31 // Token Account of the pNFT Asset\n\n32 token: assetWithToken.token.publicKey,\n\n33 // Token Record of the pNFT Asset\n\n34 tokenRecord: assetWithToken.tokenRecord?.publicKey,\n\n35}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\n36\n\n37console.log('Signature: ', base58.deserialize(signature));\n\n1import {\n\n2 getUnlockV1InstructionAsync,\n\n3 fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken,\n\n4 TokenStandard,\n\n5} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n6\n\n7// Assuming rpc, rpcSubscriptions, sendAndConfirm, and authority (delegate) are set up\n\n8\n\n9const mintAddress = 'mintAddress...'; // The pNFT mint address\n\n10\n\n11// Fetch pNFT Asset with Token Accounts\n\n12const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n13 rpc,\n\n14 mintAddress,\n\n15 authority.address\n\n16);\n\n17\n\n18// Unlock a pNFT - requires approved delegate authority\n\n19const unlockIx = await getUnlockV1InstructionAsync({\n\n20 mint: mintAddress,\n\n21 authority,\n\n22 payer: authority,\n\n23 tokenOwner: assetWithToken.token.owner,\n\n24 token: assetWithToken.token.address,\n\n25 tokenRecord: assetWithToken.tokenRecord?.address,\n\n26 tokenStandard: TokenStandard.ProgrammableNonFungible,\n\n27});\n\n28\n\n29await sendAndConfirm({\n\n30 instructions: [unlockIx],\n\n31 payer: authority,\n\n32});\n\n33\n\n34console.log('pNFT unlocked');","tokens":2005,"crawled_at":1791193319800} +{"id":10218,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/define_agent","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Define the agent - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Define the agent\n\nThe next step consists in defining the AI agent. All agent instances in the AI agent share the same code base (blueprint).\nHowever, each operator can configure their agent instance. For example, in an oracle AI agent,\neach operator can define a different data provider.\n\nPart of the development process covered in this guide\n\nWhat you will learn\n\nThis guide covers step 3 of the development process. You will learn how to define the AI agent, how to add the FSM App, and how to add other existing components required by your agent blueprint.\n\nYou must ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements, you have set up the framework, and you have a local registry populated with some default components. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder with an initialized local registry (./packages) in it.\n\nStep-by-step instructions\n\nIn order to deploy and run an AI agent you need an agent blueprint with a working FSM App. We base this guide on a default FSM App available in the remote registry, namely, the hello_world_abci FSM App. As a result, we will define an agent blueprint implementing a functionality equivalent to the Hello World AI agent. You can, of course, use your own FSM App to define your agent blueprint.\n\nImportant\n\nIf you have just scaffolded an FSM App in the previous step but you didn't complete coding the business logic, then an agent blueprint that uses that FSM App will fail to run. For this reason, we recommend that you use the hello_world_abci FSM App in a first read of this guide.\n\nEnsure that the components required by your agent blueprint are in the local registry. All the required components by your agent blueprint and their dependencies must be downloaded to the local registry. You can read how to add missing components to the local registry.\nIf you have populated the local registry with the required components to follow these guides, you do not need to take any further action.\n\nCreate the agent blueprint configuration file. Create a folder for your agent blueprint in the local registry (./packages). Pay attention to the correct format of the folder:\n\nmkdir -p ./packages/your_name/agents/your_agent_blueprint/\n\nWithin the agent folder, create the agent blueprint configuration file aea-config.yaml:\n\ntouch ./packages/your_name/agents/your_agent_blueprint/aea-config.yaml\n\nThis file must contain:\n\nA number of mandatory parameters.\n\nImportant\n\nEnsure that author and agent_name match the path within the local registry.\n\nA reference to the FSM App skill.\n\nReferences to other components required by the agent blueprint (or dependencies of the FSM App skill), under the relevant sections.\n\nImportant\n\nThere are a number of components which are mandatory for agent blueprints that are part of an AI agent:\n\nConnections: valory/abci.\n\nProtocols: open_aea/signing, valory/abci, valory/acn(*).\n\nSkills: valory/abstract_abci, valory/abstract_round_abci, valory/termination_abci(*).\n\n(*) Components required only if the AI agent is minted in the Olas Protocol.\n\nConfiguration overrides that specify values for component parameters. These overrides are separated by YAML document separators --- and will be discussed in a further section.\n\nExample of an aea-config.yaml file\nThis is a complete example of an agent blueprint configuration file that uses the hello_world_abci FSM App and overrides some required component parameters.\n\nYou will notice that there are a lot of parameters to be configured for the required components. For an initial read of this guide, you can ignore these parameters, but it is important that you identify how the references to the particular component parameter being overridden.\n\naea-config.yamlagent_name: your_agent_blueprint\nauthor: your_name\nversion: 0.1.0\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ndescription: Example of an agent blueprint.\naea_version: '>=2.0.0, <3.0.0'\nfingerprint: {}\nfingerprint_ignore_patterns: []\nconnections:\n- valory/abci:0.1.0\n- valory/http_client:0.23.0\n- valory/ipfs:0.1.0\n- valory/ledger:0.19.0\n- valory/p2p_libp2p_client:0.1.0\ncontracts: []\nprotocols:\n- open_aea/signing:1.0.0\n- valory/abci:0.1.0\n- valory/http:1.0.0\n- valory/ipfs:0.1.0\nskills:\n- valory/abstract_abci:0.1.0\n- valory/abstract_round_abci:0.1.0\n- valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ndefault_ledger: ethereum\nrequired_ledgers:\n- ethereum\ndefault_routing: {}\nconnection_private_key_paths: {}\nprivate_key_paths: {}\nlogging_config:\nversion: 1\ndisable_existing_loggers: false\nformatters:\nstandard:\nformat: '[%(asctime)s] [%(levelname)s] %(message)s'\nhandlers:\nlogfile:\nclass: logging.handlers.RotatingFileHandler\nformatter: standard\nfilename: ${LOG_FILE:str:log.txt}\nlevel: ${LOG_LEVEL:str:INFO}\nmaxBytes: ${LOG_MAX_BYTES:int:52428800}\nbackupCount: ${LOG_BACKUP_COUNT:int:1}\nconsole:\nclass: logging.StreamHandler\nformatter: standard\nstream: ext://sys.stdout\nloggers:\naea:\nhandlers:\n- logfile\n- console\npropagate: true\ndependencies:\nopen-aea-ledger-ethereum:\nversion: ==2.2.9\nopen-aea-test-autonomy:\nversion: ==0.21.25\ndefault_connection: null\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: ${str:/benchmarks}\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: ${str:HELLO_WORLD!}\nservice_registry_address: ${str:null}\nshare_tm_config_on_startup: ${bool:false}\non_chain_service_id: ${int:null}\nsetup:\nall_participants: ${list:[]}\nsafe_contract_address: ${str:'0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000'}\nconsensus_threshold: ${int:null}\ntendermint_url: ${str:http://localhost:26657}\ntendermint_com_url: ${str:http://localhost:8080}\n---\npublic_id: valory/abci:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\ntarget_skill_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\nhost: ${str:localhost}\nport: ${int:26658}\nuse_tendermint: ${bool:false}\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${str:http://localhost:8545}\nchain_id: ${int:31337}\npoa_chain: ${bool:false}\ndefault_gas_price_strategy: ${str:eip1559}\n---\npublic_id: valory/p2p_libp2p_client:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nnodes:\n- uri: ${str:acn.autonolas.tech:9005}\npublic_key: ${str:02d3a830c9d6ea1ae91936951430dee11f4662f33118b02190693be835359a9d77}\n- uri: ${str:acn.autonolas.tech:9006}\npublic_key: ${str:02e741c62d706e1dcf6986bf37fa74b98681bc32669623ac9ee6ff72488d4f59e8}\ncert_requests:\n- identifier: acn\nledger_id: ethereum\nmessage_format: '{public_key}'\nnot_after: '2025-01-01'\nnot_before: '2024-01-01'\npublic_key: ${str:02d3a830c9d6ea1ae91936951430dee11f4662f33118b02190693be835359a9d77}\nsave_path: .certs/acn_cosmos_9005.txt\n- identifier: acn\nledger_id: ethereum\nmessage_format: '{public_key}'\nnot_after: '2025-01-01'\nnot_before: '2024-01-01'\npublic_key: ${str:02e741c62d706e1dcf6986bf37fa74b98681bc32669623ac9ee6ff72488d4f59e8}\nsave_path: .certs/acn_cosmos_9006.txt\nis_abstract: true\n\nYou should also create a README.md file with the description of your agent blueprint in plain text or Markdown format:\n\necho \"Your agent blueprint description.\" > ./packages/your_name/agents/your_agent_blueprint/README.md\n\nCreate an entry for your agent blueprint in the local registry. Add the corresponding entry to the local registry index file (./packages/packages.json). You must add the entry to the dev section, because it is a component being developed by you. You can use a placeholder for its hash value, as it will be corrected afterwards:\n\n{\n\"dev\": {\n\"agent/your_name/your_agent_blueprint/0.1.0\": \"bafybei0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\n\n},\n\"third_party\": {\n\n}\n}\n\nUpdate the package hashes. The command below will correct any hash mismatch in the aea-config.yaml file, as well as in the local registry index file (./packages/packages.json):\n\nautonomy packages lock\n\n(Optional) Run and test the agent instance locally. We will show you how to run an AI agent deployment with multiple agent instances in the next guide. However, you can also run a standalone version (that is, without being part of an AI agent) of the agent blueprint you have created. This can be useful to test and debug certain features quickly. Below we will be using the valory/hello_world agent blueprint, but you can replace it by your_name/your_agent_blueprint accordingly.\n\nIn the workspace folder, fetch the agent blueprint from the local registry:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0 --local\n\nProvision your agent instance with an Ethereum private key:\n\ncd hello_world\necho -n \"0x47e179ec197488593b187f80a00eb0da91f1b9d0b13f8733639f19c30a34926a\" > your_agent_key.txt\nautonomy add-key ethereum your_agent_key.txt\n\nIf your agent blueprint is using an FSM App, you also need to override the variable all_participants in the aea-config.yaml file with the wallet address of this private key as follows:\n\naea-config.yaml# (...)\nall_participants: ${list:[\"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\"]}\n\nWARNING: Use this key for testing purposes only. Never use keys or addresses provided in this example in a production environment or for personal use.\n\nRun your agent instance:\n\nautonomy -s run\n\nAt this point, you may notice that your agent blueprint requires specific Python packages to be installed. For the valory/hello_world agent blueprint, you can do so by executing:\n\npip install hypothesis grpcio typing-extensions py-ecc asn1crypto\n\nYou can retry running your agent instance afterwards.\n\nOn a separate terminal, open a Tendermint node:\n\nrm -rf ~/.tendermint\ntendermint init\ntendermint node --proxy_app=tcp://127.0.0.1:26658 --rpc.laddr=tcp://127.0.0.1:26657 --p2p.laddr=tcp://0.0.0.0:26656 --p2p.seeds= --consensus.create_empty_blocks=true\n\nAt this point, you should see how your agent instance runs and exchanges messages with the Tendermint node. Note that, while running an isolated agent instance might be useful to quickly test and debug certain functionalities, you need to build and test a whole AI agent deployment to ensure that it works as intended.","tokens":2465,"crawled_at":1791193303491} +{"id":10219,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/trading/navigating-the-app","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Navigating the App – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jul 8, 2026\n\nThe Synthetix Exchange brings together trading, account management, rewards, and market information in a single application. Each page in the navigation provides a different view of your account or the broader market.\n\nThis guide provides a high-level overview of each section of the Exchange. For more detailed information on specific features, please refer to the relevant documentation.\n\nTrading (Default)\n\nWhen you first connect, you'll land on the main trading page. This is where you'll spend most of your time.\n\nFrom here you can:\n\nPlace and manage orders using the order entry panel.\n\nTrack price action using the TradingView chart.\n\nMonitor the order book and recent trades.\n\nSwitch between market information tabs such as Price Charts, Depth, Funding, and Asset Details.\n\nView your positions, open orders, balances, borrowing, funding history, and profit and loss (PnL).\n\nThis page combines market data with your personal account activity so you can make trading decisions and manage risk in one place.\n\nThe default trading page brings together the chart, order book, recent trades, order entry, and account panels in a single workspace.\nRelated guides:\n\nGetting Started\n\nDepositing Collateral\n\nMarkets\n\nThe Markets page lets you browse all available perpetual markets on Synthetix, compare market statistics, and monitor overall market conditions.\n\nFrom here you can:\n\nBrowse and compare all available perpetual markets.\n\nSearch for specific markets.\n\nMark favourite markets for quick access.\n\nOpen a market directly from the Trade button.\n\nThe dashboard at the top of the page highlights key market information, including:\n\nMarket sentiment.\n\nTrading volume and open interest.\n\nMarket performance and top movers.\n\nKey market indicators, such as BTC dominance and implied volatility.\n\nYou can also switch to the Heatmap view to visualise market performance across supported assets.\n\nThe Markets page highlights overall market activity at the top and lists all available trading pairs with price, funding, open interest, volume, and quick trade access.\nRelated guides:\n\nMarkets\n\nPortfolio\n\nThe Portfolio page is your account dashboard, bringing together your balances, positions, orders, and trading activity in one place.\n\nThe Portfolio page also provides access to:\n\nOverview - View your account balance, portfolio performance, and current positions.\n\nOpen Orders - Monitor and manage your active orders.\n\nHistory - Review your trading and account activity.\n\nSub-Accounts - Create and manage separate trading accounts.\n\nReferrals - View your referral information and rewards.\n\nUse the Portfolio page to monitor your account and manage your trading activity.\n\nThe Portfolio Overview brings together account balance, performance, balances, and positions in a single dashboard.\nRelated guides:\n\nSub-Accounts\n\nReferral Program\n\nSnaxpot\n\nThe Snaxpot page lets eligible traders participate in Synthetix's weekly rewards program.\n\nFrom here you can:\n\nView your eligible tickets.\n\nChoose your ticket numbers.\n\nView the current prize pool.\n\nCheck previous draws and rewards.\n\nIf you're eligible, this is where you can manage your entries and view weekly rewards.\n\nThe Snaxpot page shows the current prize pool, draw countdown, ticket status, and options to choose numbers or view prizes.\nRelated guides:\n\nSnaxpot\n\nMore Menu\n\nThe More menu provides quick access to additional resources and information about the Exchange.\n\nFrom here you can access:\n\nChangelog - View the latest Exchange updates and release notes.\n\nStats - View protocol and market statistics.\n\nDocs - Open the Synthetix documentation.\n\nUse the More page to stay up to date with Exchange releases, explore protocol statistics, and access the documentation.\n\nVaults\n\nThe Vaults page is coming soon. For information about providing liquidity, see SLP Vault.\n\nSupport\n\nIf you need assistance while using the Exchange, click Support in the bottom-right corner of the application.","tokens":993,"crawled_at":1791193313970} +{"id":10220,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/guides/deploy_service","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Deploy the service - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Deploy the AI agent\n\nThe final step in the development process is deploying the AI agent. There are multiple deployment options to consider, such as deploying on your local machine for testing, deploying on a cluster within your own infrastructure, or deploying on a cloud provider.\n\nPart of the development process covered in this guide\n\nThe framework supports Docker Compose and Kubernetes cluster deployments. Additionally, the framework automates several steps in the deployment process for AI agents registered in the Olas Protocol.\n\nTip\n\nLocal AI agent deployments are commonly used for testing AI agents during active development. These deployments allow you to test and validate your AI agent before minting it in the Olas Protocol, ensuring its readiness for production use.\n\nWhat you will learn\n\nThis guide covers step 6 of the development process. You will learn the different types of AI agent deployments offered by the framework.\n\nYou must ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements, you have set up the framework, and you have a local registry populated with some default components. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder with an initialized local registry (./packages) in it.\n\nLocal deployment - full workflow\n\nWe illustrate the full local deployment workflow using the hello_world AI agent as an example, both for Docker Compose and a simple Kubernetes cluster.\n\nFetch the AI agent. In the workspace folder, fetch the AI agent from the corresponding registry:\n\nLocal registryRemote registry\n\nautonomy packages lock\nautonomy push-all\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0 --service --local\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeiabtwvve5dfuv464ypgs6jikz5rx3w3fkpej4rzn6x36zxmthuphm --service\n\nBuild the agent blueprint's image. Navigate to the AI agent runtime folder that you have just created and build the Docker image of the agent blueprint of the AI agent:\n\ncd hello_world\nautonomy build-image\n\nAfter the command finishes, you can check that the image has been created by executing:\n\ndocker image ls | grep \n\nYou can find the agent_blueprint_name within the AI agent configuration file service.yaml.\n\nPrepare the keys file. Prepare a JSON file keys.json containing the wallet address and the private key for each of the agent instances that you wish to deploy in the local machine.\n\nExample of a keys.json file\nWARNING: Use this file for testing purposes only. Never use the keys or addresses provided in this example in a production environment or for personal use.\n\nkeys.json[\n{\n\"address\": \"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x47e179ec197488593b187f80a00eb0da91f1b9d0b13f8733639f19c30a34926a\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x9965507D1a55bcC2695C58ba16FB37d819B0A4dc\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x8b3a350cf5c34c9194ca85829a2df0ec3153be0318b5e2d3348e872092edffba\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x92db14e403b83dfe3df233f83dfa3a0d7096f21ca9b0d6d6b8d88b2b4ec1564e\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x14dC79964da2C08b23698B3D3cc7Ca32193d9955\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x4bbbf85ce3377467afe5d46f804f221813b2bb87f24d81f60f1fcdbf7cbf4356\"\n}\n]\n\nYou also need to export the environment variable ALL_PARTICIPANTS with the addresses of all the agent instances in the AI agent. In other words, the addresses of the agent instances you are deploying (in the keys.json file) must be a subset of the addresses in ALL_PARTICIPANTS, which might contain additional addresses:\n\nexport ALL_PARTICIPANTS='[\n\"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\",\n\"0x9965507D1a55bcC2695C58ba16FB37d819B0A4dc\",\n\"0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9\",\n\"0x14dC79964da2C08b23698B3D3cc7Ca32193d9955\"\n]'\n\nIf you have a situation where you need to define keys for multiple ledgers you can define them using the following format\n\nkeys.json[\n[\n{\n\"address\": \"4Si...\",\n\"private_key\": \"5P1...\",\n\"ledger\": \"solana\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x1...\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x1...\",\n\"ledger\": \"ethereum\"\n}\n],\n[\n{\n\"address\": \"H1R...\",\n\"private_key\": \"2T1...\",\n\"ledger\": \"solana\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x6...\",\n\"private_key\": \"0xc...\",\n\"ledger\": \"ethereum\"\n}\n],\n[\n{\n\"address\": \"3bq...\",\n\"private_key\": \"5r5...\",\n\"ledger\": \"solana\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x5...\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x7...\",\n\"ledger\": \"ethereum\"\n}\n],\n[\n{\n\"address\": \"6Gq...\",\n\"private_key\": \"25c...\",\n\"ledger\": \"solana\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x5...\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x7...\",\n\"ledger\": \"ethereum\"\n}\n]\n]\n\nBuild the deployment. Within the AI agent runtime folder, execute the command below to build the AI agent deployment:\n\nDocker ComposeKubernetes\n\nrm -rf abci_build_*\nautonomy deploy build keys.json -ltm\n\nThis will create a deployment environment within the ./abci_build_* folder with the following structure:\n\nabci_build_*/\n├── agent_keys\n│ ├── agent_0\n│ ├── agent_1\n│ | ...\n│ └── agent_\n├── nodes\n│ ├── node0\n│ ├── node1\n│ | ...\n│ └── node\n├── persistent_data\n│ ├── benchmarks\n│ ├── logs\n│ ├── tm_state\n│ └── venvs\n└── docker-compose.yaml\n\nrm -rf abci_build_*\nautonomy deploy build keys.json -ltm --kubernetes\n\nDelete previous deployments, if necessary.\n\n-ltm stands for \"use local Tendermint node\". Check out the autonomy deploy build command documentation to learn more about its parameters and options.\n\nThis will create a deployment environment within the ./abci_build_* folder with the following structure:\n\nabci_build_*/\n├── agent_keys\n│ ├── agent_0_private_key.yaml\n│ ├── agent_1_private_key.yaml\n│ | ...\n│ └── agent__private_key.yaml\n├── build.yaml\n└── persistent_data\n├── benchmarks\n├── logs\n├── tm_state\n└── venvs\n\nExecute the deployment. Navigate to the deployment environment folder (./abci_build_*) and run the deployment locally.\n\nDocker ComposeKubernetes\n\ncd abci_build_*\nautonomy deploy run\n\nThis will spawn in the local machine:\n\nN agent instances containers, each one running an instance of the corresponding FSM App.\n\na network of N Tendermint nodes, one per agent instance.\n\nWe show how to run the AI agent deployment using a local minikube cluster. You might want to consider other local cluster options such as kind.\n\nCreate the minikube Kubernetes cluster.\n\ncd abci_build_*\nminikube start --driver=docker\n\nInstall chart\n\nhelm repo add nfs-ganesha-server-and-external-provisioner https://kubernetes-sigs.github.io/nfs-ganesha-server-and-external-provisioner/\nhelm install nfs-provisioner nfs-ganesha-server-and-external-provisioner/nfs-server-provisioner \\\n--set=image.tag=v3.0.0,resources.limits.cpu=200m,storageClass.name=nfs-ephemeral -n nfs-local --create-namespace\n\nMake sure your image is pushed to Docker Hub (docker push).\nIf this is not the case, you need to provision the cluster with the agent blueprint image so that it is available for the cluster pods.\nThis step might take a while, depending on the size of the image.\n\nminikube image load :\n\nYou can get the and by inspecting the output of docker image ls.\n\nIn this case, you also might need to change all the instances of imagePullPolicy: Always to imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent in the deployment file build.yaml.\n\nDefine the StorageClass. Replace with your NFS provisioner and adjust per your requirements. We use minikube-hostpath as an example.\n\ncat < storageclass.yaml\napiVersion: storage.k8s.io/v1\nkind: StorageClass\nmetadata:\nname: nfs-ephemeral\nprovisioner: kubernetes.io/no-provisioner\nvolumeBindingMode: WaitForFirstConsumer\nreclaimPolicy: Retain\nEOF\n\nApply all the deployment files to the cluster\n\nkubectl apply --recursive -f .\n\nAfter executing these commands, the minikube cluster will start provisioning and starting N pods in the cluster. Each pod contains:\n\none agent instance container, running an instance of the corresponding FSM App.\n\none Tendermint node associated to the agent instance.\n\nExamine the deployment.\n\nDocker ComposeKubernetes\n\nTo inspect the logs of a single agent instance or Tendermint node you can execute docker logs --follow in a separate terminal.\n\nYou can cancel the local execution at any time by pressing Ctrl+C.\n\nYou can access the cluster dashboard by executing minikube dashboard in a separate terminal. To examine the logs of a single agent instance or Tendermint node you can execute:\n\nGet the Kubernetes pod names.\n\nkubectl get pod\n\nAccess the logs of the agent instance in pod .\n\nkubectl exec -it -c aea -- /bin/sh\n\nAccess the logs of the Tendermint node in pod .\n\nkubectl exec -it -c node0 -- /bin/sh\n\nYou can delete the local cluster by executing minikube delete.\n\nLocal deployment of minted AI agents\n\nThe framework provides a convenient method to deploy AI agents minted in the Olas Protocol. This has the benefit that some configuration parameters of the FSM App skill will be overridden automatically with values obtained on-chain. Namely:\n\nskill.yaml# (...)\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nsetup:\nall_participants: # Overridden with the registered values in the Autonolas protocol\nsafe_contract_address: # Overridden with the registered values in the Autonolas protocol\nconsensus_threshold: # Overridden with the registered values in the Autonolas protocol\n\nThis means, in particular, that there is no need to define the ALL_PARTICIPANTS environment variable.\n\nFind the AI agent ID. Explore the AI agents section in the Olas Protocol web app, and note the token ID of the AI agent that you want to deploy. The AI agent must be in Deployed state.\n\nPrepare the keys file. Prepare a JSON file keys.json containing the wallet address and the private key for each of the agent instances that you wish to deploy in the local machine.\n\nExample of a keys.json file\nWARNING: Use this file for testing purposes only. Never use the keys or addresses provided in this example in a production environment or for personal use.\n\nkeys.json[\n{\n\"address\": \"0x15d34AAf54267DB7D7c367839AAf71A00a2C6A65\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x47e179ec197488593b187f80a00eb0da91f1b9d0b13f8733639f19c30a34926a\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x9965507D1a55bcC2695C58ba16FB37d819B0A4dc\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x8b3a350cf5c34c9194ca85829a2df0ec3153be0318b5e2d3348e872092edffba\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x976EA74026E726554dB657fA54763abd0C3a0aa9\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x92db14e403b83dfe3df233f83dfa3a0d7096f21ca9b0d6d6b8d88b2b4ec1564e\"\n},\n{\n\"address\": \"0x14dC79964da2C08b23698B3D3cc7Ca32193d9955\",\n\"private_key\": \"0x4bbbf85ce3377467afe5d46f804f221813b2bb87f24d81f60f1fcdbf7cbf4356\"\n}\n]\n\nFetch the AI agent. Fetch the AI agent from the remote registry using token ID.\n\nautonomy fetch --use-mode\n\nFetch the AI agent with the desired token ID on Mode network.\n\nBuild the agent blueprint's image. Build the Docker image of the agent blueprint of the AI agent.\n\nautonomy build-image --service-dir your_ai_agent/\n\nThis command builds the Docker runtime images for the agent blueprint defined in an AI agent configuration file service.yaml.\n\nBuild the deployment. Build the AI agent deployment.\n\ncd your_ai_agent/\n\nThis command must be executed within an AI agent folder. That is, a folder containing the AI agent configuration file (service.yaml). The deployment will be created in the subfolder ./abci_build_*.\n\nDocker ComposeKubernetes\n\nautonomy deploy build path/to/keys.json -ltm\n\nautonomy deploy build path/to/keys.json --kubernetes\n\nCheck out the autonomy deploy build command documentation to learn more about its parameters and options.\n\nStart the AI agent. Run the AI agent:\n\nautonomy deploy run\n\nRun an AI agent deployment locally stored.\n\nCloud deployment\n\nThe sections above for local deployments provide a fundamental understanding of how to deploy AI agents in general. The Open Operator repository provides the necessary resources and guidelines for seamless cloud deployments of AI agents based on the Open Autonomy framework.","tokens":2933,"crawled_at":1791193322078} +{"id":10221,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/about-synthetix/snx-token","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"SNX Token – Synthetix","text":"Last updated: Jun 24, 2026\n\nSNX is the native token of the Synthetix ecosystem.\n\nThis page explains what SNX is, what changed after the retirement of legacy staking, where SNX is supported, and how the token is used today.\n\nOverview\n\nSNX was originally introduced as the core token of the Synthetix protocol.\n\nHistorically, SNX was used for staking participation, protocol incentives, debt management, and broader ecosystem participation. Following the retirement of the legacy 420 Pool staking system, SNX is no longer used in that previous staking model.\n\nSNX remains the native token of the Synthetix ecosystem. Its current protocol-related uses are more limited and are described below.\n\nCurrent Role of SNX\n\nThe legacy 420 Pool staking system has been retired, and previous SNX staking mechanisms are no longer active.\n\nToday, SNX is used within the ecosystem for:\n\nBroader ecosystem participation where supported by Synthetix governance or ecosystem initiatives\n\nDebt resolution for former 420 Pool stakers with outstanding debt\n\nSettlement in the sUSD to SNX conversion process under SIP-423\n\nFor information about the retired staking system, see 420 Legacy Staking.\n\nSupported Networks\n\nSNX is available on multiple networks.\n\nNetworkTokenContract Address\nEthereum Mainnet\nSNX\n0xC011a73ee8576Fb46F5E1c5751cA3B9Fe0af2a6F\n\nOptimism\nSNX\n0x8700daec35af8ff88c16bdf0418774cb3d7599b4\n\nHow to Acquire SNX\n\nSNX may be acquired through supported centralised exchanges and decentralised exchanges.\n\nBefore purchasing SNX, users should:\n\nVerify the correct network\n\nConfirm the token contract address\n\nEnsure their wallet supports the selected network\n\nUsers should always verify the network and token contract address before purchasing or transferring SNX.\n\nBridging SNX\n\nSNX can be transferred between supported networks using compatible bridge providers, such as Superbridge.\n\nBefore bridging SNX:\n\nConfirm the destination network is supported\n\nVerify the token contract address on both networks\n\nEnsure the receiving wallet supports the destination network\n\nConfirm the selected bridge supports SNX transfers\n\nBridge availability, transfer times, and fees vary by provider and network.\n\nFuture Utility\n\nFuture SNX utility may be introduced through protocol upgrades, governance proposals, or ecosystem initiatives.\n\nAreas that may be considered in future Synthetix development include:\n\nNew SNX staking or participation mechanisms\n\nSNX buybacks using earned protocol fees\n\nSNAXPOT-related eligibility or ticket multipliers\n\nAdditional ecosystem incentives\n\nOther governance-approved participation mechanisms\n\nThese features are not currently active unless separately announced through official Synthetix governance or ecosystem channels.\n\nAdditional Resources\n\nFor the latest information about SNX, refer to official Synthetix announcements, governance proposals, and protocol updates.","tokens":722,"crawled_at":1791193331247} +{"id":10222,"url":"https://docs.near.org/getting-started/faucet","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Token Faucet - NEAR Docs","text":"A faucet provides free testnet tokens for testing and development purposes.\nThere are two testnet faucets: the built‑in faucet on this page - which provides native testnet NEAR only - and the Testnet Faucet, which supports many fungible tokens (NEAR, USDT, and more).\n\nIf any of the faucets is not working, please report it on our NEAR Telegram Channel\n\n​\n\nFaucet\n\nSimply introduce the account you want to receive the tokens in, and click on the “Request” button. The faucet will send a small amount of testnet NEAR tokens to that account.\n\nNEAR Testnet FaucetGet free NEAR tokens for testing\n\nTestnet Account ID\nNot working? Report on Telegram\n\n​\n\nExternal Faucet\n\nNavigate to the Testnet Faucet page, input your address and select which type of token you need! The faucet supports a wide range of fungible tokens, including NEAR, Tether USD, Ether, and many others.\n\nPlease know that the faucet might be out of tokens at times, keep reading below for alternative ways to get other fungible tokens\n\n​\n\nGetting Fungible Tokens\n\nAnother way to get fungible tokens on testnet is through the testnet version of ref finance\nThere, you can swap testnet NEAR for other fungible tokens, such as testnet USDC, testnet USDT, testnet DAI, and others\n\nPlease notice that tokens on testnet might not hold the same rate as on mainnet (e.g. 1 USDC might not exchange to the same amount of NEAR as on mainnet), furthermore, liquidity on testnet might be very low\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":368,"crawled_at":1791193339691} +{"id":10223,"url":"https://docs.synthetix.io/about-synthetix/synthetix-history","domain":"docs.synthetix.io","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Synthetix History","text":"Last updated: Mar 24, 2026\n\nSynthetix began in 2018 as Havven, a protocol for decentralized stablecoins. In 2019, Synthetix v2 launched, pioneering the minting of synthetic assets, including crypto assets, indices, and traditional finance (TradFi) assets, on Ethereum. This innovation established Synthetix as a leader in on-chain derivatives and composable DeFi infrastructure.\n\nSynthetix v2: Enabled users to stake SNX and mint sUSD, with a wide range of synthetic assets and the first on-chain decentralized exchange for synthetics.\n\nPerps v2 (Optimism): Introduced decentralized perpetual futures trading, bringing deep liquidity and new trading opportunities to Layer 2. This system is now considered legacy.\n\nPerps v3 and Synthetix v3: Marked a major architectural shift, enabling cross-margin trading, multi-collateral support, and a modular, upgradable protocol. V3 deployments expanded to Base and Arbitrum, but the focus has returned to Ethereum Mainnet for the next generation of Synthetix products.\n\nThroughout its history, Synthetix has been at the forefront of DeFi innovation, from synthetic assets to on-chain derivatives and advanced staking models. The protocol's community-driven governance and continuous upgrades have kept it relevant and resilient through multiple market cycles.","tokens":326,"crawled_at":1791193348081} +{"id":10224,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/andrew-lewis-pye","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Andrew Lewis-Pye - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nAndrew Lewis-Pye\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\nrecommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction 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Gary Gray\nFabiola Godinez\nFabrizio Zilibotti\nFahad Saleh\nFarid Jiandani\nFei-Fei Li\nFelix Do\nFEWOCIOUS\nFiona Kennedy\nFiona Murray\nFlashrekt\nFlora Oliveira\nFlori Del Valle\nFlorian Leibert\nFoteini Baldimtsi\nFrancesca Gino\nFrank Chen\nFrank Wilczek\nFred Benenson\nFred Ehrsam\nFred Upton\nFred Wilson\nFreda Lewis-Hall\nFrederic Kerrest\nFuture Editorial\nGabby Dizon\nGabby Reece\nGabriel Otte\nGabriel Vasquez\nGaetan Barthelemy\nGarrett Biel\nGary Ang\nGary Reedy\nGary Wolf\nGaurav Banga\nGaurav Dhillon\nGaut\nGayle Tzemach Lemmon\nGeoffrey Woo\nGeorg Fuchsbauer\nGeorg Petschnigg\nGeorge Church\nGeorge Danezis\nGeorge Fraser\nGeraldine Chan\nGérard Cachon\nGerard Ryle\nGerri Elliott\nGerry Tsoukalas\nGia Scinto\nGil Elbaz\nGil Shafir\nGina Moon\nGina Neff\nGina Yocom\nGinger Liau\nGokul Rajaram\nGoldie Chang\nGrace Ellis\nGraham Allison\nGrant Gregory\nGrant Jordan\nGrant LaFontaine\nGrant Rabenn\nGray Kinsella\nGreg Bowman\nGreg Clayman\nGreg Linares\nGreg Loehmann\nGreg Lynn\nGreg Solano\nGreg Truesdell\nGreg Waldon\nGregory Allen\nGregory Mundis\nGretchen Bush\nGretchen McCulloch\nGuido Appenzeller\nGustav Söderström\nGustavo Garcia\nGuy Goren\nGuy Raz\nGuy Wuollet\nHaley Van Dyck\nHanna Aziz\nHannah Frankl\nHanne Winarsky\nHaoyuan Li\nHarmit Malik\nHarry Grieve\nHarry Shum\nHarry Wright\nHatim Shafique\nHayden Adams\nHeather Gwynn\nHeather Podesta\nHedi Samar\nHelen Stoddard\nHelen Su\nHemant Mohapatra\nHendrik Pretorius\nHenri Kor\nHerb Lin\nHerman Narula\nHilmar Pétursson\nHoang Nguyen\nHoward Wu\nIan Dutra\nIan Shannon\nIan Sharp\nIce Cube\nIlan Zechory\nIllia Polosukhin\nIlyas Khan\nIma Christian\nIman Abuzeid\nInsiya Lokhandwala\nIon Stoica\nIrvin Chan\nIsa Guardalabene\nIsaiah Lott\nIsh Verduzco\nIsil Dillig\nIstván András Seres\nIttai Abraham\nIttay Eyal\nIva Messy\nIvan Linscott\nIvor Horn\nJ.D. Moriarty\nJack Donahoe\nJack Soslow\nJackie McQuiston\nJackson David\nJacob Westphal\nJacquelyn Melinek\nJad Esber\nJad Naous\nJade Lai\nJade Raymond\nJae Gnazzo\nJai Ramaswamy\nJaimie Buss\nJak Kennedy\nJake Auchincloss\nJakob Uszkoreit\nJamal Mohammed\nJames Beshara\nJames Currier\nJames da Costa\nJames Gwertzman\nJames J. Collins\nJames Kissell\nJames L. Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Andrew Lewis-Pye\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n05.09.25 / Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden and Luca Zanolini\n‘Accountable liveness’: New paper alert\nOn when and how adversarial nodes can be punished if they stall transaction confirmation in blockchains\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nsecurity\n\n11.22.24 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nFrosty: Bringing strong liveness guarantees to the Snow family of consensus protocols\nSnowman is the consensus protocol implemented by the Avalanche blockchain and is part of the Snow family of protocols, first introduced through the original Avalanche leaderless consensus protocol. A major advantage of Snowman is that each consensus decision only requires an expected constant communication overhead per processor in the common case that the protocol is...\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nvideo\n\n10.17.23 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nPermissionless consensus\nA new framework for reasoning about the rich design space of blockchain protocols in the permissionless setting\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nvideo\n\n01.30.23 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nConsensus Canon\nConsensus protocols are a core part of what is going on in blockchain. Here's a list of links that will get you up to date on the foundations and the latest.\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nhow innovation happens\nwhat we're reading\n\n10.14.22 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nDirect Acyclic Graph (DAG)-Based Consensus Protocols: An Introduction\nAndrew Lewis-Pye (London School of Economics) introduces DAGs, which allow blocks to have multiple parents or children, resolving “forks” in blockchains.\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nDAGs\nglossaries & terminology\nvideo\n\n10.07.22 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nIntroduction to Consensus (Part II)\nPart II of an introduction to the basics of consensus, the protocol to coordinate and maintain a decentralized blockchain. Andrew Lewis-Pye (London School of Economics) reviews the basics of consensus from Part I, and introduces state machine replication (SMR) — the problem that blockchain protocols are designed to solve — and demonstrates how to reduce...\n\nresearch\nconsensus\nvideo\n\n10.07.22 / Andrew Lewis-Pye\nIntroduction to Consensus (Part I)\nPart I of an introduction to the basics of consensus, the protocol to coordinate and maintain a decentralized blockchain. Andrew Lewis-Pye (London School of Economics) discusses how participants can agree on the correct condition of the blockchain and who owns what at any time. He begins with an overview of Byzantine agreement problem; addresses communications...\n\nresearch\nBFT\nconsensus\nvideo\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":7378,"crawled_at":1791193352243} +{"id":10225,"url":"https://docs.near.org/getting-started/tools-for-ai","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Tools for AI Agents - NEAR Docs","text":"NEAR offers multiple tools and resources to help your AI agents build and use NEAR applications. This page provides an overview of the key tools available and how to use them effectively.\n\nllms.txt\nWhen you need to provide your agent with a quick reference to all NEAR docs.\n\nDocs MCP\nWhen you want agents to search docs in real-time for up-to-date details.\n\nAgent Skills\nWhen you need your agent to become an expert in a specific task (e.g. using our API).\n\nNEAR MCP\nWhen your agent needs to perform on-chain actions (e.g., transfers and function calls).\n\n​\n\nllms.txt\n\nWhat it is: Curated NEAR docs context for coding assistants.\nUse it when: You need to provide your agent with a quick reference to all NEAR docs.\nLink: https://docs.near.org/llms.txt\n\nVS Code Setup\n\nUse #fetch in your prompt:\n\nHow can I upgrade a contract state?\n#fetch https://docs.near.org/llms.txt\n\nCursor Setup\n\nAdd docs source once in Cursor Chat:\n@ → Docs → + Add new doc\n\nAdd: https://docs.near.org/llms.txt\n\nSelect the source while prompting\n\n​\n\nDocs MCP endpoint\n\nWhat it is: An endpoint to search NEAR documentation via MCP.\nUse it when: You want agents to search docs in real-time for up-to-date details and narrower API lookups.\nLink: https://docs.near.org/mcp\nUse two complementary layers:\n\nStatic context (llms.txt) for fast, high-signal docs grounding.\n\nRetrieval (Docs MCP) when the agent needs live lookup across docs.\n\n​\n\nNEAR Agent Skills\n\nNEAR Agent Skills are reusable capabilities that package repeatable workflows.\nUse it when: You need your agent to become an expert in specific tasks (for example, using NEAR APIs).\nLink: https://github.com/near/agent-skills\nSkillFocus\nnear-ai-cloud\nVerifiable private AI inference and attestation\n\nnear-api-js\nJS/TS blockchain interaction, transactions, tokens, and wallet integration\n\nnear-dapp\ndApp project setup, wallet integration, React/Next.js patterns\n\nnear-intents\nCross-chain swaps via the 1Click API\n\nnear-kit\nTypeScript SDK with type-safe contracts and sandbox testing\n\nnear-smart-contracts\nRust smart contract development, security, and state management\n\n​\n\nNEAR MCP Server\n\nThe NEAR MCP Server is a tool server (currently 23 tools) that enables agents to perform blockchain operations.\nUse it when: Your agent needs to hold funds, transfer funds, interact with smart contracts, or perform any action on-chain in NEAR Protocol\nRepo: https://github.com/nearai/near-mcp\nRemote deployment guide: https://github.com/nearai/near-mcp/blob/main/tee.md\n\nThe NEAR MCP is designed to run locally or on your trusted infrastructure because it handles private keys. There is no hosted public version.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":664,"crawled_at":1791193357379} +{"id":10226,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/key_concepts/abci_app_interactions","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Interactions between components - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Interactions between components\n\nIn this section we present sequence diagrams in order to help understand the transmitted messages and method calls between the software components that are part of an FSM App.\n\nThe ABCIApp - AbstractRoundBehaviour interaction\n\nThe interaction between AbstractRoundBehaviour and the ABCIApp occurs via\nthe consensus engine, the setup of which proceeds on the Period.\nand the shared state among the skills. A typical workflow\nlooks as follows:\n\nAt setup time, the consensus engine node creates connections with the\nassociated AEA and sync together. In the AEA process, the ABCIApp starts from\nthe first round, waiting for transactions to update its state. The\nAbstractRoundBehaviour schedules the initial state behaviour for execution\nof the act() method.\n\nThe current state behaviour sends transactions to update the state of the\nABCIApp, and once its job is done waits until it transitions to the next\nround, by checking read-only attributes of the ABCIApp accessible through\nthe AEAs' skill context. Concrete implementations of AbstractRoundBehaviour\ncannot update the state the of ABCIApp directly, only through an agreed\nupon update with other agent instances via the consensus engine node.\n\nOnce the transaction gets added to a block accepted by the consensus engine,\nthe consensus engine node delivers the block and transactions contained in\nit to the ABCIApp using the AEAs ABCIConnection and ABCIHandler. The\nABCIApp processes the transaction and enacts the encoded state transition\nlogic.\n\nThe transition to the next round is detected and all scheduled behaviour and\nother tasks get cancelled before transitioning to the next round.\n\nCycles of such rounds may, either entirely or in part, be repeated until a\nfinal state is reached, implemented as a\n\nAbstractRoundBehaviour:\n\nConcrete implementations of AbstractRoundBehaviour can be seen as a client\nof the ABCIApp (in that sense it encapsulates the \"user\" of a normal blockchain).\n\nAbstractRoundBehaviour diagrams\n\nThe following diagram shows how the FSM behaviour operates in concert with the\nAEA event loop. (Not all components are included in the diagram.)\n\nThe following diagram describes the addition of transactions to the transaction\npool. (Not all components are included in the diagram.)\n\nThe following diagram describes the delivery of transactions in a block:","tokens":591,"crawled_at":1791193362105} +{"id":10227,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/seedgov-delegate-platform/23987","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"SEEDGov Delegate Platform - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"SEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nSEEDGov\n\nMay 22, 2024, 1:36pm\n\n1\n\nDelegate Introduction\n\nName: @SEEDGov\n\nWallet Address:\n\nAddress: 0x12b30979b9a53bb0b42deaaa974ac9304fab0832\n\nRRSS:\n\nTwitter:\n\nhttps://twitter.com/SEEDLatam\n\nhttps://twitter.com/SEEDOrg_\n\nhttps://twitter.com/SEEDGov\n\nSupersite: seedlatam.org\n\nTelegram: @seed_latam\n\nDiscord: comunidad.seedlatam.org\n\nWe are excited about the opportunity to join Uniswap Governance, where we hope to contribute significantly to one of the longest-running DeFi protocols in the ecosystem. We have a dedicated team of SEEDGov members, passionate about Uniswap and committed to governance activities.\n\nThe main objective of this delegation will be to maintain active and meaningful participation, contributing to the growth and evolution of Uniswap Protocol Governance within Ethereum and other chains where available, as an entity that deeply resonate with our values and principles.\n\nOur delegation will include our members @Marian, @Jadmat, @AnonBuilder, and the entire SEED team at disposal as well as other consultants necessary for the comprehensive elaboration, assessment and analysis of proposals.\n\nWhat is SEEDGov?\n\nSEEDGov is as a dynamic and evolving vertical within the SEED Org ecosystem, dedicated to shaping the future of decentralized governance in the web3 space through active participation, community engagement, decision-making and experimentation by anticipating emerging needs of DAOs and protocols, while acknowledging the importance of context-specific approaches to minimize governance where appropriate and professionalize it where necessary.\n\nSEEDGov is the first Latam based Delegate Platform actively engaging in various governance activities. Rooted in community values, we’ve shifted from educational models to a participatory approach, driving a new chapter in how individuals collaborate, coordinate, and decide in the ever-changing landscape of Web3.\n\nOur scope of work across various projects and protocols includes managing grant and allocation programs, designing and implementing governance infrastructure, creating and overseeing incentive programs, and onboarding builders to align with protocol needs.\n\nOperating within established frameworks, our dedicated platform go beyond the traditional role of delegates. We are functional and deeply committed to the success of the protocol through every decision we make.\n\nHow we work\n\nAs a professional delegate platform SEEDGov collaborates with communities and partners to ensure credible representation of all interested in Web3’s future. Since its inception, SEEDGov has advocated for critical thinking through education. We do not endorse scams or collaborate with blockchains, projects, or protocols that are not aligned with our core values.\n\nThe members selected to be part of our delegation will collaborate both directly and indirectly with other SEEDGov members. Any decisions made by this delegation regarding governance will be thoroughly discussed and communicated to all stakeholders through our discussion channels and seamlessly executed through specialized working units.\n\nCaptura de pantalla 2024-05-22 1030071195×382 63.4 KB\n\nWhen a project aligns with our principles, we proactively take steps to ensure its success, whether through offering informed opinions or taking concrete action. We believe in more than just participating; we believe in actively shaping and improving projects within our sphere and we are committed to expressing our principles and rationale in a clear, transparent, and detailed manner in this forum.\n\nSEEDOrg>SEEDGov>Uniswap\n\nParticipation in forum discussion threads and daily activities represent the opinions of SEEDGov and collaborators in their efforts to stay up to date with their roles and commitment to governance. Regular discussions occur prior to deciding our next steps and opinions about governance topics that arise, all through this profile.\n\nOur delegation will do its utmost to represent and embody our values to enhance Uniswap governance:\n\nDecentralization: Uniswap is one of the most decentralized DeFi protocols and all of our initiatives and proposals will align with this same principle. Along with this position, and as the ecosystem continues to mature and be driven by its community, we will collaborate in the creation, iteration, and improvement of governance processes to ensure broader participation and that the system remains secure.\n\nCommunity Led Growth & Sustainability: We will promote and support all initiatives that enable the growth, adoption, scalability and innovation for Uniswap ecosystem. Our focus will be placed on ensuring that all growth initiatives are reliable, secure, and sustainable over time.\n\nSecurity: We will always make sure that no DAO decisions will jeopardize the security of the protocol and thus harm users.\n\nEthos and Support: We will actively contribute to the governance of the protocol and its ecosystem worldwide, looking forward to working with other interested delegates to promote the Uniswap mission and encourage others to actively participate in DAO governance.\n\nWhy Uniswap?\n\nUniswap’s success, achieved independently of the core development team since its deployment, demonstrates the significant demand for permissionless financial services. From our perspective, some strengths make this protocol a special case:\n\nInnovation: Uniswap is consistently at the forefront of pioneering innovations in DeFi infrastructure technology. Its open and permissionless architecture fosters innovation by enabling anyone to create and encourages experimentation and the creation of novel financial instruments, driving the growth and diversity of the DeFi ecosystem.\n\nAccessibility: The Uniswap ecosystem has outpaced others in driving widespread adoption. Its accessibility reduces barriers to entry, democratizing decentralized finance for users globally.\n\nCapital efficiency: Uniswap typically outperforms other AMMs in terms of capital efficiency due to its concentrated liquidity model (V3). The efficient use of capital allows to handle larger trades with less price impact, making it very competitive and attractive among other AMMs.\n\nOur case\n\nWe see Uniswap as an infrastructure layer set to drive innovation throughout the entire ecosystem. Being part of this space will enable us to continue understanding, building, and participating in the following verticals (among others):\n\nExtensive Composability: Uniswap’s vast integration with hundreds of interfaces and applications ensures a smooth interaction within the DeFi ecosystem. Is our intention to actively participate in decisions that enhance and expand these integrations, further solidifying Uniswap’s position as a critical infrastructure layer in DeFi by contributing ideas for improvements and applications, whether for hooks (V4) or any other innovation/technology from Uniswap or external ones that we can implement into the protocol.\n\nGovernance: Uniswap’s governance framework is designed to be as constrained as possible, focusing only on essential areas to maintain neutrality and trust minimization. Despite a large community, only a small fraction actively participates in governance, potentially limiting smaller stakeholders voices. Maintaining good participation rates, active discussions, and healthy governance with genuine engagement is crucial for a DAO’s effectiveness. We believe Uniswap can address these challenges by empowering community involvement, overcoming voter apathy, onboarding new participants, and streamlining governance frameworks.\n\nDisclosure:\n\nSEEDGov is a broad organization with a high participation in some of the most prominent governances in the ecosystem such as Optimism, Arbitrum, Gnosis, Starknet, Connext and we also constitute Sovereign Finance AVC in MakerDAO. As mentioned above we come to Uniswap Governance to bring value, in case there is any conflict of interest, we will communicate it to the community members.\n\nCaptura de pantalla 2024-05-22 1030461005×388 250 KB\n\n7 Likes\n\nGLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications\n\nSEEDGov\n\nJune 20, 2024, 7:58pm\n\n2\n\nProposal: Uniswap Arbitrum LTIPP Matching\n\nVote: 1M\n\nSummary: We voted in favor and chose as the first option 1 million, as we believe in supporting Arbitrum’s experimental program to foster growth within the second most impactful chain in DeFi, which is significant for Uniswap where the protocol is the leading Dex. Although we acknowledge the complexity of maintaining retention and liquidity levels post-program, these types of programs greatly improve KPIs like DAU, TVL and volumes in general.\n\nWe accept to accompany these instances, on the verge of genuine sustainability/impact improvements. We also believe that the chosen amount can positively impact with minimal risk for the DAO, in terms of continuing to forge a relationship with Arbitrum.\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nJuly 22, 2024, 10:33pm\n\n3\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Onboarding Package - Gnosis Chain\n\nVote: $250k\n\nRationale: As stated in the respective post, we voted in favor of this proposal presented by @kpk and chose for the 250k option, as we believe that Onboarding Package for Gnosis Chain is appropriate and reasonable, as it is a network in current growth of both TVL and DeFi protocols, so it represents a great opportunity for Uniswap to strengthen its presence there and expand the scope of “Uniswap Revitalization and Growth” in order to capture more market share of activity and volume for the protocol and we believe that 250k is an appropriate amount, given the history of similar programs for other networks.\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nAugust 5, 2024, 2:16pm\n\n4\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Against (deploy without incentives)\n\nRationale: First, we would like to point out that the proponent did not respond to our comment and question regarding the distribution of incentives in the proposed pairs, which we view as a negative sign. Regarding the substance of the proposal, the TVL of layer X is currently very low and we do not believe it is productive to allocate incentives at this time. We applaud the proponent’s position in accepting feedback that it intends to proceed for the time being without $UNI incentives.\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nAugust 12, 2024, 2:53pm\n\n5\n\nProposal: Onboarding Package for Gnosis Chain (onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Consistent with our vote in the Temp Chack (For - Option 250k), we voted in favor of this proposal, understanding that Gnosis is a growing network of both TVL and DeFi protocols, so reinforcing its presence there is a great opportunity for Uniswap to capture more market cap volume and activity.\n\n///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK]- Revised - Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Also in line with our vote in the previous Temp Check (Against - deploy without incentives), we voted in favor of this proposal, welcoming that the proponent has accepted the feedback from the community and has decided to move forward with its proposal without requesting incentives for the moment and committing to allocate $1M for liquidity for a minimum term of 6 months via community multisig, understanding that the cost for Uniswap to deploy the frontend is reasonable.\n\nWe at SEED Gov again offer ourselves as signatories to the multisig.\n\n///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Snapshot)\n\nVote: 33% Arbitrum - 33% Base - 33% Scroll\n\nRationale: We voted in favor as having the proposed data and metrics may help the protocol and the DAO to establish future strategies to allocate incentives in a more efficient and optimized manner.\n\nAs for the networks, we support that the analysis is done equally in:\n\nArbitrum: For being the L2 with the highest LTV.\n\nBase: For being the second L2 with the highest LTV in marked growth during the last months. Source: DefiLlama.\n\nimage1549×581 61.8 KB\n\nScroll: For being the L2 with zero knowledge technology with the highest LTV, with a rapid growth in the last 2 months. Souce: DefiLlama\n\nimage1540×576 50 KB\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread\n\n[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\n[RFC] Deploy Uniswap v3 on X Layer\n\nOnboarding Package for Gnosis Chain\n\nSEEDGov\n\nAugust 19, 2024, 2:51pm\n\n6\n\nProposal: Deploy Uniswap v3 on X Layer (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Consistent with our vote in the Temp Check (For), we voted in favor of this proposal, understanding that it is beneficial for Uniswap to deploy in this network, taking charge only of the cost of the frontend and without assigning incentives for the moment, committing the proponent to allocate 1M for liquidity for a minimum term of 6 months via community multisig.\n\n///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Activate 2, 3, 4 bps fee tiers on Uniswap v3 on Base (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: We have read some of @aadams’ research and understand their capabilities and support for the Uniswap ecosystem. Therefore, having analyzed the proposal and despite some concerns we have, we understand that it is worth trying to add new fee tiers in the ETH/USDC pair in Base, in order to make Uniswap more competitive, hopefully capturing part of Aerodrome’s market cap and adapting to new market conditions that may occur in the future, waiting for an expected reaction from that DEX to the move that Uniswap makes.\n\nHowever, we do not want to overlook the potential disadvantages that the new implementation may bring:\n\nIncreased access to arbitrage: by reducing fees, previously unprofitable extractions of value will become profitable\n\nFragmentation of liquidity; starting new pools will keep liquidity more fragmented, which will increase LVR and IL, negative for liquidity providers; as well as potential cost overruns in more complex routing for the trader.\n\nIf the proposal is approved, we expect the proponent to conduct a subsequent analysis and present conclusions on the impact of the changes introduced, to corroborate that the proposed hypothesis has been validated. We encourage the proponent will consider a commitment to this sense for the onchain vote.\n\nSEEDGov\n\nAugust 19, 2024, 5:06pm\n\n7\n\nProposal: [REDO: Temp Check] Activate 2, 3, 4 bps fee tiers on Uniswap v3 on Base (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Since this is a re-running of this temp chek in which we have already voted and justified the sense of our vote, we repeat our vote in favor for the same arguments, which we cite below:\n\n[RFC] Proposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base\n\nSEEDGov\n\nAugust 21, 2024, 8:10pm\n\n8\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Yes\n\nRationale: We support this proposal because experience shows that the establishment of a delegate system by itself does not achieve the desired results of promoting high quality participation and good governance practices, since governance has become very complex and it is not expected that a group of people will voluntarily dedicate enough time and effort required for active and quality participation in governance, or at least it is not expected that this will happen to a large scale. Thus, the incentivized or compensated professional delegate system is being imposed in the most important DAOs, achieving the desired results of further increasing informed, responsible and quality participation in governance, by having paid individuals and groups of individuals who can devote time and effort to this task, training, research, and thus increase the quality of their participation.\n\nIt’s also great to see that off-chain participation factors are being considered, as we believe the policy-making process is just as crucial as the actual voting itself.\n\nIn Arbitrum we are the Program Managers for the Delegates Incentive Program, which started 6 months ago and has generated a very positive impact, ratifying the above mentioned. And coincidentally, Cycle 1 of the Uniswap Delegate Reward has been a success, with the 12 delegates included in the program maintaining a 100% participation rate in onchain and offchain voting, as well as incorporating new delegates with high participation rates, all of which strengthens the governance of the DAO.\n\nWe look forward to being part of this program!\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 2, 2024, 2:43pm\n\n9\n\nProposal: Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Consistent with our vote in the Temp Check (For), we voted in favor of this proposal. We share the rationale expressed on that occasion, as we maintain our position:\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 5, 2024, 3:12pm\n\n10\n\nProposal: [Temp Check] - Ethereum Foundation Attackathon Sponsorship (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Abstain\n\nRationale: While we generally support initiatives of this nature in all delegations where we have a presence, as they contribute positively to the ecosystem, our experience reviewing multiple sponsorship requests leads us to seek additional budgetary details and further clarification.\n\nAdditionally, despite mentioning marketing and branding integrations for Uniswap, we observed no dedicated workshop or side event for the sponsor.\n\nIn summary, and beyond that it is a program that, by reinforcing the security of Ethereum, will indirectly reinforce the security of Uniswap, but from the commercial point of view of the exposure that Uniswap could achieve, and considering that it is a program aimed at advanced developers who presumably, given their specialization, already know Uniswap, we understand that it is very low the impact of the program and the positioning that Uniswap could achieve, not justifying making the budgetary effort of allocating 75 or 30 ETH.\n\n1 Like\n\n[RFC] - Ethereum Foundation Attackathon Sponsorship\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 9, 2024, 7:37pm\n\n11\n\nProposal: Proposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Consistent with our vote in the Temp Check (For) we support this proposal. We have read some of @aadams ’ research and understand their capabilities and support for the Uniswap ecosystem. Therefore, having analyzed the proposal and despite some concerns we have (regarding increased access to arbitrage and liquidity fragmentation), we understand that it is worth trying to add new fee tiers in the ETH/USDC pair in Base, in order to make Uniswap more competitive, hopefully capturing part of Aerodrome’s market cap and adapting to new market conditions that may occur in the future, waiting for an expected reaction from that DEX to the move that Uniswap makes.\n\nWe expect the proponent to conduct a subsequent analysis and present conclusions on the impact of the changes introduced, to corroborate that the proposed hypothesis has been validated.\n\n[RFC] Proposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 11, 2024, 8:02pm\n\n12\n\nProposal: UAC Renewal S3 (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Renew UAC\n\nRationale: The UAC has done a great job, so we support its renewal for 7 months for Season 3, as well as the expansion of its scope, which logically must be accompanied by an increase in the expected hours of work and adequate compensation, as well as the increase of a new additional seat.\n\nWe are interested in collaborating with and being part of the committee, since we have the necessary team in SEED Gov. Therefore, if this proposal is approved, we express our interest in applying for one of the two available seats.\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 11, 2024, 8:05pm\n\n13\n\nProposal: Approved Budgets Rebalancing (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Approved Rebalance\n\nRationale: We support this proposal, since the program budgets have been approved in U.S. dollars, but the UNI token has been established for its payment, so the fluctuation of its price has caused an imbalance in the approved budgets, making the proposed rebalancing logical to balance the accounts.\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 11, 2024, 8:07pm\n\n14\n\nProposal: Uniswap Delegate Race Tiebreaker (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Both (create an extra 1616th spot)\n\nRationale: We understand that there has been a total tie between both applicants @Tane and @Argonaut, for the following considerations:\n\nWe share with @Pgov statement in that the rule of who voted first should be understood by the proposal on which they have voted and not the precise time and date, as this would encourage undesirable behaviors such as delegates rushing to vote quickly as soon as a proposal is uploaded to be the first to vote, which does not respond to best practices of analyzing the proposals and voting after forming a well-founded opinion within the voting period.\n\nWe share the @Argonaut opinion that the criteria used for the tiebreaker expressed by @Pgov as “we moved to what was used as a tiebreaker in other elections for Uniswap (Uniswap delegation initiative) which was forum activity, to which Tane had more likes, earlier start date and ‘forum cred’\" has not been approved by the governance for this specific case, so it should not be used as a tiebreaker.\n\nThat tie-breaker criterion detailed above is easily gameable by fake users or bots or even by agreements between delegates to give each other likes and improve this metric in an irregular way, so not only we do not share its use in this case for the reason stated above, but we do not share and discourage to use it in the future for any other selection method.\n\nFor the above mentioned, we understand that there has been a total tie between both applicants, not having been foreseen in the proposal how to break a tie of these characteristics.\n\nGiven that the proposal approved by the governance has not foreseen tie-breaking criteria for such a case, we understand that there are no elements that allow choosing or prioritizing one over the other applicant, so it would not be a fair solution to make a decision of these characteristics without any parameter to support it.\n\nOur opinion then is that there would be two possible solutions:\n\nThat both be ranked 15 and receive 50% of the monthly compensation of a delegate each.\n\nThat both be eligible for full compensation by expanding to a slot of 16 incentivized delegates and increasing the budget for this purpose through a governance decision.\n\nGiven that one of the main reasons and objectives taken into account in the proposal to renew the rewards initiative to a cycle 2 has been to incorporate new delegates and increase participation to strengthen governance, we believe that the latter solution would be the fairest and most compatible with these objectives.\n\nConsequently we voted for the option “BOTH (create an extra 16th spot)”.\n\nGiven this experience, which should be taken as a learning experience for the future (every experience brings with it a constant learning process that should serve as a basis for future improvement), we are at complete disposal and we want to be part of the working group where opinions are shared and discussions are carried out for the opportunity to decide to renew to a cycle 3. In Arbitrum we are the Program Managers for the Delegates Incentive Program, which started 6 months ago and has generated a very positive impact, so we have the experience and the necessary team that we put at Uniswap’s disposal to make our best contributions to further improve the current incentive program and its eligibility criteria for the future cycle 3.\n\n3 Likes\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 Application\n\nSEEDGov\n\nSeptember 18, 2024, 2:36pm\n\n15\n\nProposal: Uniswap Accountability S3 Renewal and Rebalance (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: This online voting proposal combines the 3 Temp Cheks approved by the community between September 10th and 15th: Uniswap Accountability Renewal (UAC) Season 3, Approved Budget Rebalance, and extra 16th delegate cycle 2 spot for Argonaut and Tane. Consistent with our votes in the above temp checks, we support this proposal and confirm the previously stated rationales, which we maintain in this occasion and consider reproduced with the links below.\n\nUniswap Accountability Renewal (UAC) Season 3 rationale\n\nApproved Budget Rebalance rationale\n\nExtra 16th delegate cycle 2 spot for Argonaut and Tane rationale\n\nSEEDGov\n\nOctober 1, 2024, 1:12pm\n\n16\n\nProposal: Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Onchain)\n\nVote: Against\n\nRationale: The proposal expressly stated:\n\nand\n\nand\n\nIn other words, it was clearly proposed that the DAO should decide whether to proceed with the proposal, and if so, it would be the DAO that would decide on which 3 blockchains the dashboards would be made.\n\nIn the temp check submitted to a vote, the DAO decided to proceed with the proposal and chose 3 blockchains: Base supported by 1,665,046.46 UNU, Arbitrum with 10,438,561.17 UNI and third Scroll with 1,171,901.87 UNI, followed closely by Blast with 1,171,615.9 UNI. In other words, the third place was very hard fought and the difference was very close, but the DAO chose Scroll over Blast.\n\nContrary to this, in the onchain voting, the proponent included Base, Arbitrum and Blast, i.e. the fourth blockchain chosen by the DAO, and not the third. When asked why this was the case, he expressly replied:\n\nThe proposal then stated that the 3 blockchains would be chosen by the Uniswap DAO, but we are faced with an onchain proposal that includes 3 blockchains, one of them chosen by the proponent contrary to what the DAO decided.\n\nIn principle, and without this being important for our analysis, it should be noted that the TVL of the blockchains today are not those reported in the proposal of Blast $838.46m and Scroll $601.14m, but that today Scroll with $771.92m has more TVL than Blast with $766.41m, so that taking the criteria of the proponent to decide by TVL, Scroll should have been chosen. Source: DefiLllama.\n\nimage494×691 40.1 KB\n\nBut beyond that, we understand that what has happened is very serious and dangerous, the DAO chose Scroll in third place, so the onchain vote should have included Scroll, the proposer by choosing Blast using his own criteria, did not respect and violated what was decided by the DAO.\n\nWe know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves, since a dashboard will be made analysing Blast instead of Scroll, but we understand that the impact of the vote or the importance of what is being voted in this specific case is secondary, the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.\n\nConsequently, we vote against and request the proposer to cancel this onchain vote and submit a new one that respects the DAO’s decision.\n\n1 Like\n\n[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nSEEDGov\n\nOctober 4, 2024, 2:30pm\n\n17\n\nProposal: Uniswap Accountability Committee S3 Elections (Snapshot)\n\nVote: 50% _JoJo – 50% Alicecorsini\n\nRationale: In principle, both successful candidates show a commitment of time and quality to Uniswap.\n\nWe know @_jojo in particular from the Arbitrum delegation where we witnessed his work capacity and professionalism.\n\nWith regard to @alicecorsini, we have great confidence in karpatkey’s support, so we understand that she is a suitable candidate for this seat, both given her experience as part of the Uniswap Treasury Working Group, and given karpatkey’s experience in financial and accountability issues.\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nOctober 9, 2024, 3:29pm\n\n18\n\nProposal: [TEMP CHECK] - Onboarding Package for Lisk (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: We support this proposal as we find it reasonable and beneficial that in exchange for $375 of incentives to be provided by Uniswap, Lisk commits to match $250k in LSK incentives and to lock an additional $1m for 1 year. We also point out that the Oku deployment has already been arranged and therefore this proposal does not include the costs associated with it.\n\nFinally, we highlight that Lisk is on the Optimism Foundation’s whitelist to be part of the superchain, so it is an opportunity for Uniswap to continue to increase its presence in networks that will be part of that ecosystem.\n\n1 Like\n\nOnboarding Package for Lisk\n\nSEEDGov\n\nOctober 17, 2024, 1:20pm\n\n19\n\nProposal: Uniswap Growth Program Trial (Snapshot)\n\nVote: In Support\n\nRationale: We support this initiative because we understand that it can be beneficial for Uniswap to have a dedicated team for Business Development, Marketing and to explore the possibility of obtaining grants and incentives in various chains. We also believe that a 6-month trial program is appropriate in order to evaluate the concrete results obtained and the impact generated, and to decide whether or not to extend the programme, and if so, under the same or different conditions.\n\nSEEDGov is at the disposal of @alphagrowth, the Uniswap MetaGov Team (@PGov, @AranaDigital) and the UEII, we are present in different chains such as Arbitrum, Optimism, Scroll, ZKsync Gnonis, among others, both in delegation teams and in working groups dedicated to the evaluation of different grant and incentive programs, so we can collaborate in these processes.\n\n3 Likes\n\n[RFC] - Uniswap Growth Program Trial\n\nSEEDGov\n\nOctober 23, 2024, 6:35pm\n\n20\n\nProposal: [Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Onchain)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: By including the 4 most voted chains in the snapshot voting (even with the same budget), the objections we raised in the previous on-chain vote have been overcome.\n\nFurthermore, we consider very positive the forecast that the budget will be released once the Uniswap Accountability Committee confirms that the work has been done.\n\nWe therefore now support the updated proposal submitted to onchain vote.\n\nWe thank @doo_stablelab for being so responsive to the criticisms it has received and improving the proposal based on it.\n\n1 Like\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nIgnas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n41\n\n1284\n\nMay 25, 2026\n\nArgonaut Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n63\n\n1821\n\nJuly 11, 2026","tokens":7611,"crawled_at":1791193380827} +{"id":10228,"url":"https://docs.near.org/smart-contracts/quickstart","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Your First Smart Contract - NEAR Docs","text":"Welcome! NEAR accounts can store small apps known as smart contracts. In this tutorial, we’ll guide you through creating your first contract on the NEAR testnet.\nCreate an auction contract that allows users to place bids, track the highest bidder, and claim tokens at the end of the auction.\n\nPrefer an online IDE?\n\nWant to jump right into the code without setting up a local dev environment?Check out NEAR Playground for an easy-to-use online IDE with pre-configured templates.\n\n​\n\nPrerequisites\n\nBefore starting, make sure to set up your development environment.\n\n# Install Rust: https://www.rust-lang.org/tools/install\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n\n# Contracts will be compiled to wasm, so we need to add the wasm target\nrustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown\n\n# Install NEAR CLI-RS to deploy and interact with the contract\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh\n\n# Install cargo near to help building the contract\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/cargo-near/releases/latest/download/cargo-near-installer.sh | sh\n\n​\n\nCreating the contract\n\nCreate a smart contract with the cargo near scaffolding tool by following its instructions:\n\n# Create a new contract called \"auction\"\ncargo near new auction\n\nCreating a project using cargo near new\n\nFor this tutorial, we chose to name the project auction, but feel free to use any name you prefer.\n\n​\n\nBuild and deploy the contract\n\nLet’s build the contract, create a NEAR testnet account, and deploy the contract to it.\n\n# Run the sandbox tests to verify the contract works as expected\ncargo test\n\n# Build the contract\ncargo near build non-reproducible-wasm\n\n# Create a free testnet account, replace `` with your desired account name\nnear create-account --useFaucet\n\n# Deploy the contract to the account\nnear deploy ./target/near/auction.wasm\n\nAlready have a testnet account?If you already have a testnet account and would like to use it instead, you can log in with the command near login.\n\nGot an error on Windows?\n\nWhen working in WSL—or another headless Linux environment—you might encounter issues creating an account because the CLI tries to save keys to the system keychain.In such cases, you can try the following command to create the account:\n\nnear account create-account sponsor-by-faucet-service autogenerate-new-keypair save-to-legacy-keychain network-config testnet create\n\nCongrats! Your contract now lives in the NEAR testnet network.\n\n​\n\nInitialize the auction\n\nThe contract stores the highest bid, auction end time, auctioneer address, and a flag to track whether proceeds have been claimed. Its init function sets these values when the contract is first initialized:\nlib.rs\n\npub struct Bid {\npub bidder: AccountId,\npub bid: NearToken,\n}\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(PanicOnDefault)]\npub struct Contract {\nhighest_bid: Bid,\nauction_end_time: U64,\nauctioneer: AccountId,\nclaimed: bool,\n}\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\n#[init]\n#[private] // only callable by the contract's account\npub fn init(end_time: U64, auctioneer: AccountId) -> Self {\nSelf {\nhighest_bid: Bid {\nbidder: env::current_account_id(),\nbid: NearToken::from_yoctonear(1),\n},\nauction_end_time: end_time,\nclaimed: false,\nauctioneer,\n}\n}\n\nSee code on GitHub\n\nInitialize the auction by setting its end time and designating the auctioneer to receive the funds:\n\n# Get a timestamp for 5 minutes from now (in nanoseconds)\nFIVE_MINUTES_FROM_NOW=$(( $(date +%s%N) + 5 * 60 * 1000000000 ))\n\n# Initialize the auction\nnear call init \"{\\\"end_time\\\": \\\"$FIVE_MINUTES_FROM_NOW\\\", \\\"auctioneer\\\": \\\"influencer.testnet\\\"}\" --useAccount \n\nFeel free to replace influencer.testnet with any valid testnet account—this is where the winning bid will be sent.\n\n​\n\nPlace and view bids\n\nPlace a bid in the auction by calling the bid method and attaching a NEAR deposit. The function checks whether the auction is ongoing and whether the bid is higher than the stored amount. If it is, the contract records the new bid and refunds the previous bidder.\nlib.rs\n\n#[payable]\npub fn bid(&mut self) -> Promise {\n// Assert the auction is still ongoing\nrequire!(\nenv::block_timestamp() < self.auction_end_time.into(),\n\"Auction has ended\"\n);\n\n// Current bid\nlet bid = env::attached_deposit();\nlet bidder = env::predecessor_account_id();\n\n// Last bid\nlet Bid {\nbidder: last_bidder,\nbid: last_bid,\n} = self.highest_bid.clone();\n\n// Check if the deposit is higher than the current bid\nrequire!(bid > last_bid, \"You must place a higher bid\");\n\n// Update the highest bid\nself.highest_bid = Bid { bidder, bid };\n\n// Transfer tokens back to the last bidder\nPromise::new(last_bidder).transfer(last_bid)\n}\n\nSee code on GitHub\n\n# Create a new account to place the bid\nnear create-account --useFaucet\n\n# Place a bid of 0.01 NEAR\nnear call bid '{}' --deposit 0.01 --useAccount \n\nIn this example, use the account (remember to rename it) to call the bid function and attach a deposit of 0.01 NEAR.\n\n​\n\nView the highest bid\n\nThe get_highest_bid function only reads from the contract state, so it does not require a transaction or signature. You can also use the contract’s other view methods to query the auction end time, auctioneer, and claim status:\nlib.rs\n\npub fn get_highest_bid(&self) -> Bid {\nself.highest_bid.clone()\n}\n\npub fn get_auction_end_time(&self) -> U64 {\nself.auction_end_time\n}\n\npub fn get_auctioneer(&self) -> AccountId {\nself.auctioneer.clone()\n}\n\npub fn get_claimed(&self) -> bool {\nself.claimed\n}\n\nSee code on GitHub\n\nnear view get_highest_bid '{}'\n\nExpected Output\n\n{\n\"bidder\": \"\",\n\"amount\": \"10000000000000000000000\"\n}\n\nThe amount is shown in yoctoNEAR, the smallest unit of NEAR. Since 1 NEAR equals 10^24 yoctoNEAR, the displayed amount is 0.01 NEAR.\n\nFeel free to create more bidder accounts and place bids to see how the highest bid changes.\n\n​\n\nClaim the proceeds\n\nAfter the auction ends, anyone can call the claim method. It transfers the amount of the highest bid to the auctioneer and ends the auction:\nlib.rs\n\npub fn claim(&mut self) -> Promise {\nrequire!(\nenv::block_timestamp() > self.auction_end_time.into(),\n\"Auction has not ended yet\"\n);\n\nrequire!(!self.claimed, \"Auction has already been claimed\");\nself.claimed = true;\n\n// Transfer tokens to the auctioneer\nPromise::new(self.auctioneer.clone()).transfer(self.highest_bid.bid)\n}\n\nSee code on GitHub\n\nnear call claim '{}' --useAccount \n\nWho won?After the auction ends, you can determine the highest bidder by calling the get_highest_bid method again.\n\n​\n\nFrequently Asked Questions\n\nWhat about mainnet?\n\nYou can deploy a contract to mainnet using the same commands. Create a mainnet account and use the --networkId mainnet flag in the near CLI commands.\n\nHow much does it cost to deploy?\n\nThe cost of deploying a contract depends on its size: approximately 1 Ⓝ per 100 KB.\n\nCan I update a contract after deploying?\n\nYes. Redeploy with near deploy . The account stays the same, and the code is updated.\n\nHow do I test without deploying?\n\nUse the sandbox tests shown in this guide. They run locally in a simulated NEAR environment.\n\nCan I use a language other than Rust?\n\nYes. You can write smart contracts in any language that compiles to WebAssembly. Our documentation focuses on Rust, but community-maintained SDKs are available for other languages. See supported languages.\n\n​\n\nMoving forward\n\nCreate a Frontend\nCheck the auction frontend tutorial to learn how to build a simple web app that interacts with the auction contract.\n\nExtend the Contract\nFollow the auction NFT tutorial to award the highest bidder a Non-Fungible Token (NFT) and allow users to bid using Fungible Tokens (FT).\n\nLearn More about the SDK\nCheck our Anatomy of a Contract page to understand the different components that make up a NEAR smart contract.\n\nVersioning for this article\n\nAt the time of this writing, this example works with the following versions:\nrustc: 1.86.0\n\nnear-cli-rs: 0.22.0\n\ncargo-near: 0.16.1\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2084,"crawled_at":1791193383162} +{"id":10229,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/science-of-blockchain-conference-24-field-notes","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Science of Blockchain Conference ‘24: Field notes - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nScience of Blockchain Conference ‘24: Field notes\nJoseph Bonneau, Pranav Garimidi, and Joachim Neu\n10.12.24\n\nTags & Share Tags\nfield notes\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nEditor’s note: Field notes is a series where we report on the ground at significant industry, research, and other events. In this edition, Joseph Bonneau, Pranav Garimidi and Joachim Neu, from a16z crypto’s research team, share their highlights from the Science of Blockchain Conference and affiliated workshops, which were held in New York City around August 7-9, 2024. SBC is a premier conference bringing together researchers and builders from the web3 community. You can see the complete program of the main conference here with recordings of talks freely available online.\n\nThe Science of Blockchain Conference has come a long way since it was first held in 2017. The name itself has evolved — from the Stanford Bitcoin Conference to the Stanford Blockchain Conference to today’s Science of Blockchain Conference. The name update was particularly relevant this year, as it was the first edition held outside of Stanford (this year at Lerner Hall, Columbia University, in New York City). The community has grown in size and scope, with now hundreds of attendees (registration was free but “sold out” early at ~1500 registrations) and over 50 associated side events and workshops.\n\nFortunately, all of the talks at the main conference were recorded and are available online. While the content at SBC is strictly technical and focused on research, and draws a large proportion of its attendees from academia, unlike traditional academic conferences there are no associated proceedings. That is, authors do not need to publish a paper to present, and they can present work that was already submitted to a separate conference or journal. As a result, the conference functions as a “greatest hits” from the web3 community, with less than one in ten submissions making it into the program.\n\na16z was active throughout the conference and affiliated workshops with several talks:\n\nGeneral Partner Chris Dixon was interviewed by Dan Boneh in a special segment, offering his broad perspective on the space and describing his experience writing Read Write Own.\n\nHead of Research Tim Roughgarden presented work on Security of Restaking Networks at the affiliated Consensus workshop.\n\nResearch Associate Joachim Neu presented his work on Optimal Flexible Consensus and Nakamoto Consensus under Bounded Processing Capacity.\n\nFormer research intern Ertem Nusret Tas presented Fair Data Exchange, a product of the a16z research group.\n\nFormer research intern Mahimna Kelkar presented his work on Proofs of Complete Knowledge and current intern Sourav Das presented on Asynchronous Consensus.\n\nInvestment Partner Guy Wuollet spoke on the need for verification at the DePIN Summit.\n\nIn the rest of this post we’ll highlight several other talks that the a16z research team found particularly interesting.\n\nInvited industry talks\n\nThe conference featured many talks from industry, showcasing the variety of practical research being done. In a positive trend, all of these talks featured in-depth white paper sharing technical details.\n\nEd Felten, Arbitrum: Permissionless Validation Using the BoLD Protocol\n\nEli Ben-Sasson, Starkware: Stwo\n\nYehuda Lindell, Coinbase: MPC for custody at Coinbase\n\nEllie Davidson, Espresso: The Espresso Sequencing Network: HotShot Consensus, Tiramisu Data-Availability, and Builder-Exchange\n\nDeepak Maram, Mysten: zkLogin\n\nTalks on practical security\n\nStefanos Chaliasos presented a survey: SoK: What Don’t We Know? Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in SNARKs (co-authored by a16z research intern Jens Ernstberger). This work is the result of analyzing over 100 publicly disclosed security vulnerabilities in SNARK systems over the past 6 years, providing a first look at how these systems tend to fail in practice. A key takeaway is that practical SNARK deployments are complex in software (on top of the complicated math), leading to many ways for things to go wrong. The majority of vulnerabilities were circuit specification bugs, which is a very complex task forcing developers to use a low-level language to specify a problem. There is a strong bias towards under-constrained circuits (leading to soundness bugs) rather than over-constrained circuits (leading to completeness bugs). The reason for this bias is intuitive: completeness bugs mean a system doesn’t work for some intended uses, which is usually detected by functionality testing. Soundness bugs are typically invisible until detected or exploited.\n\nMahimna Kelkar presented a paper Complete Knowledge: Preventing Encumbrance of Cryptographic Secrets, which poses a thought-provoking question: How can we be sure somebody really knows a cryptographic secret, like an ECDSA signing key? In a world of trusted hardware, it isn’t enough to simply have them sign a challenge message with it or produce a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge. They might have an encumbered version of the key, say, a TEE (hardware enclave) which has the key and will sign some messages or compute a proof but not allow certain banned messages to be signed. This talk (and the associated paper) discuss some protocols which aim to prove complete (or unencumbered) knowledge of the secret.\n\nTalks on Transaction Fee Mechanisms\n\nMax Resnick presented new work on Dynamic Transaction Fee Mechanisms. The work has two main contributions: it first shows that moving from stochastic block times (as in PoW) to deterministic block times (as in PoS) leads to decreased congestion as stable demand is matched more closely with stable supply. This in turn benefits users submitting transactions in being more certain of how much they need to bid to get included in a block. (This is especially true if the fee mechanism is a first price auction but can also be relevant under EIP-1559.) Their second result is that the EIP-1559 update rule under current parameters can lead to long delays for users when a large disparity exists between low and high value users. The concern is that the current update rule causes the base fee to increase too quickly even when the underlying demand isn’t shifting, pricing out lower value users even when there is available blockspace. They also justify the current mechanism increasing base fees too quickly with empirical results showing that users can frequently get substantial savings in how much they are paying for gas if they are willing to wait even just five blocks. The main takeaway from this work is theoretical and empirical evidence supporting decreasing how fast the base fee increases to improve UX for users.\n\nTheo Diamandis presented Multidimensional Blockchain Fees Are (Essentially) Optimal. This work uses a regret minimization framework to study the optimality of different base fee update rules. As a benchmark, the authors consider what optimal per-resource prices would be given that the mechanism designer was privy to the demand over a long period of time. They then provide a class of base fee update rules that given a sufficiently long enough amount of time are nearly as good as being able to perfectly set the prices upfront. In particular, the update rule that EIP-1559 uses falls into the class of update rules they show are optimal. To go along with their results, they prove that no other update rules can substantially beat the class of update rules they give. Overall, this talk shows how we can use tools from the convex optimization and regret minimization literature to have a concrete way to judge the optimality of the mechanisms we are using in practice versus the wide swath of update rules we could be using instead.\n\nTalks on consensus\n\nThe affiliated Consensus workshop was held on August 6, 2024 at Cornell Tech on Roosevelt Island. The recorded talks of this event are also available online.\n\na16z crypto’s Head of Research Tim Roughgarden presented a new work on the Robustness of Restaking Networks. An urgent question in restaking is to characterize under what circumstances a network remains secure when validators reuse stake as collateral to crypto-economically-secure multiple different services. Specifically, the concern is that if too little stake is used to back too many services, then the profits an attacker stands to gain from compromising the services may outweigh the cost it has to bear from the slashing of its stake following an attack, making attack a rational course of action. The authors of the paper give conditions on the network structure and the profits and costs of an attack under which a restaking network is guaranteed to be secure.\n\nSandro Coretti-Drayton presented a network model for gossip networks where nodes have bounded processing capacity, and uses it to prove the security of the Leios protocol which provides High-Throughput Blockchain Consensus under Realistic Network Assumptions. For background, consensus protocols are usually proven secure using very simplistic models for the phenomena that could impact the communication among honest parties. For instance, a standard model assumes that a known upper-bound exists for the time it takes for a message sent by an honest party to be received by all other honest parties. Such a model neglects security-relevant aspects such as network topology (in reality, not every honest party has a direct connection to every other honest party) or congestion (in reality, messages may be delayed more or less depending how many other messages are propagating simultaneously). The talk and its associated paper continue a recent line of work that devises and employs models that capture these aspects.\n\n***\n\nJoseph Bonneau is a Research Partner at a16z Crypto. His research focuses on applied cryptography and blockchain security. He has taught cryptocurrency courses at the University of Melbourne, NYU, Stanford, and Princeton, and received a PhD in computer science from the University of Cambridge and BS/MS degrees from Stanford.\n\nPranav Garimidi is a Research Analyst at a16z Crypto. He does research on problems in mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially focused on how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science.\n\nJoachim Neu is a Research Associate at a16z Crypto. He is particularly interested in the theory and practice of distributed systems security. Recent research topics include Internet-scale consensus for heterogeneous user-bases, with applications to consensus security for the Ethereum blockchain.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":3368,"crawled_at":1791193383217} +{"id":10230,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/pnfts","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Programmable NFTs (pNFTs) | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nAs mentioned in the overview page, Programmable NFTs (pNFTs) are a new asset standard that allows creators to define custom rules on specific operations and delegate more granularly to third-party authorities.\nNo More Bypassing Token Metadata\nBecause the Token Metadata program is built on top of the SPL Token program, any owner or spl-token delegate can interact with the SPL Token program directly and bypass the Token Metadata program on vital operations like transferring and burning. Whilst this creates a nice composability pattern between programs it also means the Token Metadata program cannot enforce any rules on behalf of the creators.\nA good example of why this can be problematic is that Token Metadata cannot enforce secondary sales royalties. Even though the royalty percentage is stored on the Metadata account, it is up to the user or program that performs the transfer to decide whether they want to honor it or not. We talk more about this and how pNFTs fix this issue in a section below.\nProgrammable NFTs are introduced to solve this issue in a flexible way that allows creators to customize the authorization layer of their assets.\nProgrammable NFTs work as follows:\nThe Token account of the pNFT is always frozen on the SPL Token program, regardless of whether the pNFT is delegated or not. This ensures that no one can bypass the Token Metadata program by interacting with the SPL Token program directly.\nWhenever an operation is performed on the Token account of a pNFT, the Token Metadata program thaws the account, performs the operation, and then freezes the account again. All of this happens atomically in the same instruction. That way, all operations that could be made on the SPL Token program are still available to pNFTs but they are always performed through the Token Metadata program.\nWhen a Token Delegate is set on a pNFT, the information is stored in a Token Record account. Since pNFTs are always frozen on the SPL Token program, it is the responsibility of the Token Record account to keep track of whether the pNFT is really locked or not.\nBecause every single operation that affects a pNFT must go through the Token Metadata program, we created a bottleneck that allows us to enforce authorization rules for these operations. These rules are defined in a Rule Set account managed by the Token Auth Rules program.\nEssentially, this gives pNFTs the ability to:\nHave more granular delegates.\nEnforce rules on any operation.\nLet's dive into these two abilities in more detail.\nMore granular delegates\nSince all pNFTs operations must go through the Token Metadata program, it can create a new delegate system on top of the spl-token delegate. One that is more granular and allows pNFT owners to pick the operations they want to delegate to a third party.\nInformation for this new delegate system is stored on a special Token Record PDA that is derived from both the Mint and the Token accounts of the pNFT. When a new delegate authority is assigned to a pNFT, the Token Metadata program synchronizes that information on both the Token account and the Token Record account.\nWe discuss these delegates in more detail in the \"Token Delegates\" section of the Delegated Authorities page.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nDelegate Authority\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nPDA\n\nToken Record Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\nKey = TokenRecord\n\nBump\n\nState\n\nRule Set Revision\n\nDelegate\n\nDelegate Role\n\nLocked Transfer\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nAdditional Accounts\npNFTs require additional accounts for most operations and these include tokenRecord, authorizationRules, authorizationRulesProgram.\nToken Record\nA tokenRecord account is responsible for holding details regarding the token and its state such as delegates, it's lock state.\nThere are a few ways to access the tokenRecord account and that is either by fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken which returns all needed accounts including metadata, token account, and token record. An alternative is generate the token record PDA address using the mint ID and the token account address with the findTokenRecordPda function.\nAsset With Token\nYou can fetch all accounts needed with the fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken function which returns data such as the pNFT metadata account, the token account, and the token record account.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4const mint = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n5const owner = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222');\n\n6\n\n7const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n8 umi,\n\n9 mint,\n\n10 owner\n\n11);\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Metadata:', assetWithToken.metadata.name);\n\n14console.log('Token Record:', assetWithToken.tokenRecord);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4const mint = address('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n5const owner = address('22222222222222222222222222222222');\n\n6\n\n7const assetWithToken = await fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken(\n\n8 rpc,\n\n9 mint,\n\n10 owner\n\n11);\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Metadata:', assetWithToken.metadata.name);\n\n14console.log('Token Record:', assetWithToken.tokenRecord);\n\nToken Record PDA\nGenerates the PDA address for the tokenRecord account with the mintId and tokenAccount of the wallet the pNFT asset is stored in.\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2import { findTokenRecordPda } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata';\n\n3\n\n4const mint = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n5const token = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222');\n\n6\n\n7const tokenRecordPda = findTokenRecordPda(umi, {\n\n8 mint,\n\n9 token,\n\n10});\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Token Record PDA:', tokenRecordPda);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2import { findTokenRecordPda } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata-kit';\n\n3\n\n4const mint = address('11111111111111111111111111111111');\n\n5const token = address('22222222222222222222222222222222');\n\n6\n\n7const [tokenRecordPda] = await findTokenRecordPda({\n\n8 mint,\n\n9 token,\n\n10});\n\n11\n\n12console.log('Token Record PDA:', tokenRecordPda);\n\nRuleSet\nIf you have the metadata account data available you can check for the programmableConfig field on the metadata account to get the rule set.\n\n1import { unwrapOptionRecursively } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming assetWithToken was fetched using fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken\n\n4\n\n5const ruleSet = unwrapOptionRecursively(\n\n6 assetWithToken.metadata.programmableConfig\n\n7)?.ruleSet;\n\n8\n\n9console.log('Rule Set:', ruleSet);\n\n1// No additional imports needed - programmableConfig is directly on metadata\n\n2\n\n3// Assuming assetWithToken was fetched using fetchDigitalAssetWithAssociatedToken\n\n4\n\n5// In Kit, options are represented as { __option: 'Some', value: ... } or { __option: 'None' }\n\n6const programmableConfig = assetWithToken.metadata.programmableConfig;\n\n7const ruleSet = programmableConfig.__option === 'Some'\n\n8 ? programmableConfig.value.ruleSet\n\n9 : null;\n\n10\n\n11console.log('Rule Set:', ruleSet);\n\nAuthorization Rules Program\nIf you have a ruleSet set on your pNFT Asset you will need to pass in the Authorization Rules Program ID so the ruleSet can be validated.\n\n1import { getMplTokenAuthRulesProgramId } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-auth-rules';\n\n2\n\n3const authorizationRulesProgram = getMplTokenAuthRulesProgramId(umi);\n\n4\n\n5console.log('Auth Rules Program:', authorizationRulesProgram);\n\n1import { address } from '@solana/addresses';\n\n2\n\n3// Token Auth Rules Program ID\n\n4const authorizationRulesProgram = address('auth9SigNpDKz4sJJ1DfCTuZrZNSAgh9sFD3rboVmgg');\n\n5\n\n6console.log('Auth Rules Program:', authorizationRulesProgram);\n\nAuthorization Data\nIf you have a ruleSet on your pNFT Asset that requires additional data for validation you would pass it in as authorizationData: { payload: ... } in the instruction parameters.\nEnforcing rules on any operation\nOne of the most important features of Programmable NFTs is their ability to enforce a set of rules on any operation that affects them. The entire authorization layer is provided by another Metaplex program called Token Auth Rules. Whilst that program is used to make pNFTs programmable, it is a generic program that can be used to create and validate authorization rules for any use case.\nIn the case of pNFTs, the following operations are supported:\nOperationDescription\nTransfer:Owner\nTransfer initiated by the owner of the pNFT\n\nTransfer:SaleDelegate\nTransfer initiated by a Sale delegate\n\nTransfer:TransferDelegate\nTransfer initiated by a Transfer or Locked Transfer delegate\n\nTransfer:MigrationDelegate\nTransfer initiated by a Migration delegate (legacy delegate used during the pNFT migration period)\n\nTransfer:WalletToWallet\nTransfer between wallets (currently not in use)\n\nDelegate:Sale\nApprove a Sale delegate\n\nDelegate:Transfer\nApprove a Transfer delegate\n\nDelegate:LockedTransfer\nApprove a Locked Transfer delegate\n\nDelegate:Utility\nApprove a Utility delegate\n\nDelegate:Staking\nApprove a Staking delegate\n\nCreators can assign a custom Rule to any of these operations. When that operation is performed, the Token Metadata program will ensure the rule is valid before allowing the operation to go through. The available rules are documented by the Token Auth Rules program directly but it is worth noting that there are two types of rules:\nPrimitive Rules: These rules explicitly tell us if an operation is allowed or not. For instance: the PubkeyMatch rule will pass if and only if the public key at the given field matches the given public key; the ProgramOwnedList will pass if and only if the program owning the account at the given field is part of a given list of programs; the Pass rule will always pass; etc.\nComposite Rules: These rules aggregate multiple rules together to create a more complex authorization logic. For instance: the All rule will pass if and only if all of the rules it contains pass; the Any rule will pass if and only if at least one of the rules it contains passes; the Not rule will pass if and only if the rule it contains does not pass; etc.\nOnce we have all the rules for our operations defined, we can store them in a Rule Set account on the Token Auth Rules program. Whenever we need to make a change to this Rule Set, a new Rule Set Revision is appended to the Rule Set account. This ensures any pNFT currently locked within a specific revision can be unlocked before moving on to the latest revision.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nToken Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nMint Account\n\nOwner: Token Program\n\nPDA\n\nToken Record Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nRule Set Revision\n\nPDA\n\nMetadata Account\n\nOwner: Token Metadata Program\n\n...\n\nProgrammable Configs\n\nRule Set Account\n\nOwner: Token Auth Rules Program\n\nHeader\n\nRule Set Revision 0\n\nRule Set Revision 1\n\n...\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nUse-case: Royalty enforcement\nNow that we understand pNFTs a bit better, let's look at a concrete use case that can be solved with PNFTs: royalty enforcement.\nAs mentioned above, without pNFTs, anyone can bypass the royalty percentage stored on the Metadata account by interacting with the SPL Token program directly. This means creators must rely on the goodwill of the users and programs that interact with their assets.\nHowever, with pNFTs, creators can design a Rule Set that ensures programs that do not enforce royalties are forbidden to perform transfers on their assets. They can use a combination of Rules to create an allow list or a deny list depending on their needs.\nAdditionally, since Rule Sets can be shared and reused across multiple pNFTs, creators can create and share Community Rule Sets to ensure that any program that stops supporting royalties is immediately banned from interacting with any pNFTs that use such Community Rule Set. This creates a strong incentive for programs to support royalties as they would otherwise be banned from interacting with a large number of assets.","tokens":3197,"crawled_at":1791193413400} +{"id":10231,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/ignas-delegate-platform/24674","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Ignas Delegate Platform - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Ignas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 3, 2024, 7:19am\n\n1\n\nBasic Info\n\nName: Ignas\n\nDelegate Address: 0x3DDC7d25c7a1dc381443e491Bbf1Caa8928A05B0\n\nDelegate Profile: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0x3ddc7d25c7a1dc381443e491bbf1caa8928a05b0\n\nX (Twitter): https://x.com/DefiIgnas\n\nTelegram: @ignasdefi\n\nIntro\n\nI’m Ignas, a DeFi solo researcher breathing and living with Defi. My mission is to provide clear, in-depth insights to promote DeFi, helping my audiences stay up-to-date with the latest trends while actively supporting DAO development.\n\nI believe in the decentralized future and it means actively participating in Uniswap DAO in every way I can—whether it’s by serving as a delegate, joining working groups, discussing any proposals or seizing new opportunities that come up. I’ll also be sharing key DAO decisions on X and my blog.\n\nWhile I am a new DAO member on THIS WALLET, I have been following Uniswap DAO closely since years ago and covered it in my threads, bringing more visibility to the DAO.\n\nExamples of posts: BNB Chain launch 2 (138K views), and Bringing awareness to Uniswap branded Visa card vote (101K views)\n\nDelegate Communication Intent\n\nI’m committed to keeping the Uniswap community informed with regular, transparent updates. I’ll provide clear insights into my voting choices and reasoning to ensure everyone understands the direction I’m headed and why.\n\nWhy I Want to be a Delegate\n\nCurrently, DeFi DAOs face several internal issues, such as voter apathy leading to governance attacks, insider voting, and voting concentration among a few active voting addresses. Additionally, they face external challenges like regulatory uncertainty.\n\nI believe in a decentralized future, even if it seems naive. However, the current state of crypto is plagued by misaligned incentives that prioritize short-term speculative gains over the core DeFi values of self-sovereignty and custody.\n\nEqually concerning is the trend of McKinsification in DAOs, where decisions are increasingly made by one or two professional consultant delegates. This discourages individual participation, as their opinions and votes have less impact.\n\nTo make DeFi DAOs viable, we must align incentives to encourage active participation in governance from the broader crypto community. I believe that community must be at the core of every DAO. Without giving the community a say in protocol governance, we’re no better than the Web2 companies we aim to replace—companies that view their “community” merely as users to extract value from.\n\nI will support initiatives that align token holders with the protocol, such as revenue sharing or other methods to bring value to the token. Token holders are frustrated with exploitative tokenomics that only benefit early insiders who acquired tokens at much lower prices, leaving no upside for new investors. Without incentives to buy and hold tokens, the attractiveness and health of DAOs decline.\n\nFinally, as mentioned, I will highlight key votes and decisions of the DAO on X and my blog, as I believe the general public is often unaware of important actions being taken.\n\nDisclosure\n\nI am the co-founder of Pink Brains, an organization dedicated to promoting various crypto projects through educational content. You can find more info about us here: https://linktr.ee/pinkbrains.\n\nI’m also now stepping up as a delegate for Arbitrum and being very active in Aave, Optimism, and here - Uniswap. I plan to apply as a delegate to other DAOs soon, with the same mission of strengthening them and aligning token holders with the protocol.\n\nI always make appropriate disclosures and recuse myself from voting when necessary.\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread\n\n[RFC] Principles for Uniswap DAO\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 15, 2024, 8:59am\n\n2\n\nProposal: Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Tally)\n\nDate Voted: October 1,2024\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: I think it’s important to see how Uniswap’s incentive programs are affecting the DAO. Offering rewards to get people involved can be expensive, so we need to find out if it’s actually making people more active in the DAO by using Force. Moreover, the choice of three blockchains also seems like a good decision. We don’t need to spread our resources and money too thin across too many chains. These three blockchains have high TVL, so it makes sense to focus on them. By concentrating on these, hopefully it’ll help us analyze how well we’re attracting and retaining users on these networks\n\n2 Likes\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 15, 2024, 9:02am\n\n3\n\n2. Proposal: [TEMP CHECK] - Onboarding Package for Lisk (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: October 1,2024\n\nVote: Abstain\n\n2 Likes\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 18, 2024, 9:25am\n\n4\n\nProposal: [Uniswap Growth Program Trial] (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: October 17, 2024\n\nVote: In support\n\nRationale: I like how this proposal identified the current issues in Uniswap—it’s spot on.\n\nI’ve mentioned this before in the previous post, [RFC] AlphaGrowth - Growing Uniswap through Incentives, Distribution, and Co-Marketing. While the initiative may or may not succeed, it’s crucial to experiment with ways to strengthen Uniswap’s brand, image, and reach to maintain and attract new users.\n\nThis is especially important as competition increases and Uniswap can’t rely on its first-mover advantage indefinitely. With the launch of Uniswap v4, educating users about its features is essential. Since Uniswap v4 functions more like a platform, establishing a partnership incentive program or any marketing initiatives are a solid strategy.\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 30, 2024, 3:23am\n\n5\n\n4. Proposal: [Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program (Tally)\n\n- Date Voted: October 21, 2024\n\n- Vote: For\n\n- Rationale: Same reason with the vote on Snapshot. Offering rewards to get people involved can be expensive, so we need to find out if it’s actually making people more active in the DAO by using Force.\n\nIgnas\n\nOctober 30, 2024, 3:29am\n\n6\n\n5. Proposal: Uniswap Growth Program Trial (Tally)\n\n- Date Voted: October 24, 2024\n\n- Vote: For\n\n- Rationale: Same reason with vote on Snapshot. While the initiative may or may not succeed, it’s crucial to experiment with ways to strengthen Uniswap’s brand, image, and reach to maintain and attract new users.\n\nIgnas\n\nNovember 5, 2024, 8:03am\n\n7\n\n6. Proposal: [TEMP CHECK] - Tally Uniswap Proposal (Snapshot)\n\n- Date voted: November 4, 2024\n\n- Vote: For\n\n- Rationale: I’m in favor of this proposal! Tally has proven its value with so many DAOs using it for on-chain voting. I have no issues with the requested budget, but it would be great if the proposal could outline the new features planned and how they will enhance the governance experience.\n\nIgnas\n\nNovember 26, 2024, 8:39am\n\n8\n\n7. Proposal: Supporting Tally’s Development and Enhancements for Uniswap DAO Governance (Tally)\n\nDate voted: November 25, 2024\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Same reason with Snapshot vote. I voted for. Tally has proven its value with so many DAOs using it for on-chain voting.\n\nIgnas\n\nDecember 5, 2024, 7:40am\n\n9\n\n8. Proposal: [TEMP CHECK] Uniswap DAO Principles (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: December 4, 2024\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: As I mentioned in my thread https://gov.uniswap.org/t/ignas-delegate-platform/24674?u=ignas, I’m all for initiatives that makes governance more decentralized, neutral, transparent, and resistant to manipulation. This is key to the protocol’s long-term sustainability in DeFi. So, definitely a “yes” from me\n\nOther delegates such as Seedgov, Jengajojo,… added great suggestions. Looking forward to seeing it applied!\n\nIgnas\n\nDecember 18, 2024, 7:38am\n\n10\n\n9. Proposal: [Temp Check] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: December 17, 2024\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: I think this kind of proposal is really important for every DAO to have a quick response mechanism for attacks and protect user funds. From both a user and delegate perspective, I voted yes.\n\nIgnas\n\nDecember 20, 2024, 8:21am\n\n11\n\n10. Proposal: [TEMP CHECK] Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: December 18, 2024\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: I think collaborating with Celo and the Stabila Foundation is a good move for building a long term partnership between ecosystems. I don’t have any objections. This proposal will boost Uniswap’s liquidity and help expand into new markets.\n\nIgnas\n\nDecember 20, 2024, 8:24am\n\n12\n\nDate Voted: December 19, 2024\n\n11. Proposal: [TEMP CHECK] Metal L2: Bridging TradFi and DeFi Through Uniswap V3 (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Abstain\n\nRationale: I echo other delegate’s concerns. Using DAO funds for a new Layer 2 with no long-term operational history feels risky. Potential future issues could impact Uniswap’s reputation :). Voted Abstain\n\n12. Proposal: Discretionary Budget from UAC for Co-Incentive Campaigns (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Allow UAC Surplus Spending\n\nRationale: I think using the surplus budget for co-incentive campaigns is a good move to boost Uniswap’s liquidity and market presence. That being said, it’s important to ensure that the budget isn’t overused and that there’s still enough reserve for future needs\n\nIgnas\n\nDecember 23, 2024, 8:32am\n\n13\n\n13. Proposal: [RFC] Deploy Uniswap V3 on Sonic (formerly Fantom) (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: December 20, 2024\n\nVote: $250k Incentive Match\n\nRationale: Voted for the $250k Incentive Match. I believe matching the incentive will strengthen Uniswap’s relationship with Sonic and encourage more liquidity providers to join the pools on the Sonic platform.\n\nIgnas\n\nJanuary 7, 2025, 5:51am\n\n14\n\nDate Voted: January 6, 2025\n\n14. Proposal: Incentive Package for Sonic (Tally)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Same reason with Snapshot vote. Matching the incentive will strengthen Uniswap’s relationship with Sonic and encourage more liquidity providers to join the pools on the Sonic platform\n\n15. Proposal: Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo (Tally)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Celo is good :). Voted for with same reason with Snapshot vote.\n\nIgnas\n\nJanuary 14, 2025, 9:54am\n\n15\n\nDate Voted: January 13, 2025\n\n16. Proposal: Uniswap DAO Principles (Tally)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Voted For with same reason on Snapshot. I’m all for initiatives that makes governance more decentralized, neutral, transparent, and resistant to manipulation.\n\n17. Proposal: Governance Proposal - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement (Tally)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Same reason with Snapshot vote. Its important for every DAO to have a quick response mechanism for attacks and protect user funds.\n\nIgnas\n\nFebruary 26, 2025, 8:58am\n\n16\n\n18. Proposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3 (Snapshot)\n\nDate Voted: February 20, 2025\n\nVote: For\n\nDate Voted: Voted yes on Snapshot. I believe the program will contribute to a more decentralized governance structure and drive more engagement within Uniswap DAO.\n\nIgnas\n\nFebruary 27, 2025, 11:10am\n\n17\n\nDate Voted: February 27, 2025\n\n19. Proposal: [Temp Check] Uniswap Unleashed (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\n20. Proposal: [Temp Check] Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives (Snapshot)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale for 19,20:\n\nI see the good motivation here because these proposals bring real value to Uniswap.\n\nUniswap v4 launched about a month ago, but growth is slow. TVL is just $85M, and daily volume is only $73M (compared to $1.7B on v3).\n\n$24M liquidity incentive could help improve trading efficiency and keep Uniswap competitive.\n\nWhat I don’t really like, though, is that Labs collects front-end fees yet doesn’t use that money and still asks the DAO for funding.\n\nBut still voted yes on both propsals since v4 needs this incentive obviously.\n\nScreen Shot 2025-02-27 at 17.51.562354×1030 253 KB\n\nIgnas\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 10:17am\n\n18\n\n21. Proposal: Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3 (Tally)\n\nDate Voted: February 28, 2025\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: Same reason with Snapshot vote. I believe the program will contribute to a more decentralized governance structure and drive more engagement within Uniswap DAO. Voted for!\n\nIgnas\n\nMarch 17, 2025, 12:22pm\n\n19\n\nDate Voted: March 14, 2025\n\n22. Proposal: [Temp Check] Saga Uniswap v3 Liquidity Incentive (Snapshot)\n\nVote: Against\n\nRationale: Saga Foundation is putting up 2M SAGA ($700K) per month and covering $5K/month for maintenance, which shows they’re serious about pushing Uniswap on Saga.\n\nThat said, Saga is still a relatively new L1 without long term data on their ecosystem’s success. Plus, if a stronger DEX gets integrated in the future, Uniswap could lose the position after already spending 250K UNI on incentives. That’s why I voted Against!\n\n23. Proposal: Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives (Tally)\n\nVoted: For\n\n24. Proposal: Uniswap Unleashed (Tally)\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale for 23,24: Voted for as same Snapshot reason → https://gov.uniswap.org/t/ignas-delegate-platform/24674/17?u=ignas\n\nIgnas\n\nMarch 31, 2025, 7:33am\n\n20\n\n26. Proposal: [Temp Check] Treasury Delegation Round 2 (Snapshot)\n\nDate voted: March 28, 2025\n\nVote: For\n\nRationale: I see no reason to block this. Clearly, the lack of VP has made some delegates question whether it’s worth staying active in the DAO. They have a voice but no real power, means their contributions mostly serve those with bigger votes\n\nPlus, setting expectations for delegates who receive VP makes sense, it ensures only those truly committed keep their delegation.\n\nSo by maintaining a high quality delegate group, Uniswap DAO can make better decisions and drive long term growth. I voted yes!\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n76\n\n3514\n\nMay 5, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nAvantgarde Finance Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n1063\n\nNovember 27, 2025\n\n404 DAO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n3283\n\nJanuary 13, 2026","tokens":3481,"crawled_at":1791193398691} +{"id":10232,"url":"https://docs.near.org/tools/sdk","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"SDK Libraries - NEAR Docs","text":"The NEAR SDK for Rust (near-sdk-rs) is the official library for developing smart contracts. Rust provides the most mature tooling, best performance, and the strongest safety guarantees when handling real assets on-chain.\n\nThe best place to start learning is our QuickStart Guide.\n\nRust SDK\nRust SDK reference documentation.\n\n​\n\nSmart contracts on NEAR\n\nThis is how a smart contract written in Rust using the NEAR SDK looks like:\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\npub struct Contract {\ngreeting: String,\n}\n\nimpl Default for Contract {\nfn default() -> Self {\nSelf { greeting: \"Hello\".to_string(), }\n}\n}\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn get_greeting(&self) -> String {\nself.greeting.clone()\n}\n\npub fn set_greeting(&mut self, greeting: String) {\nself.greeting = greeting;\n}\n}\n\n​\n\nCommunity SDKs\n\nSince NEAR contracts compile to WebAssembly, the community maintains SDKs for other languages. They are great for prototyping and learning, but are not covered in this documentation:\n\nJavaScript / TypeScript SDK (near-sdk-js)\n\nPython SDK (near-sdk-py)\n\nGo SDK (near-sdk-go)\n\n​\n\nReady to start developing?\n\nStart from our Smart Contract QuickStart Guide, and let it guide you through all our documentation on building smart contracts.\n​\n\nWant to see examples?\n\nWe have a section dedicated to tutorials and examples that will help you understand diverse use cases and how to implement them.\n​\n\nReference docs\n\nIf you need to find a specific function signature, or understand the SDK structs and classes, visit the Rust SDK reference.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":384,"crawled_at":1791193401308} +{"id":10233,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/optimal-flexible-consensus-and-its-application-to-ethereum","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Optimal flexible consensus and its application to Ethereum - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nOptimal flexible consensus and its application to Ethereum\nJoachim Neu\n10.24.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\nconsensus\nEthereum\nresearch\nvideo\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nClassic BFT consensus protocols guarantee safety and liveness for all clients if fewer than one-third of replicas are faulty. But some clients may want to prioritize safety over liveness. Flexible consensus allows each client to opt for a higher safety resilience, albeit at the expense of reduced liveness resilience. Joachim Neu (Stanford) presents the first flexible consensus protocol that allows optimal safety–liveness tradeoffs for all clients simultaneously. The core technical ingredient is an additional round of voting and permanent locking done by the replicas, to sidestep a sub-optimal quorum-intersection-based constraint present in previous solutions. Joachim adapt the construction to the existing Ethereum protocol to derive optimal flexible confirmation rules that clients can adopt without requiring system-wide changes. This is possible because existing Ethereum protocol features can double as the extra voting and locking. He demonstrates an implementation using Ethereum’s consensus API. (Joint work with Srivatsan Sridhar, Lei Yang, and David Tse.)\n\nAbout the presenter\n\nJoachim is a PhD candidate at Stanford advised by David Tse. His current research focus is the science and engineering of Internet-scale consensus. Recent research projects include provable consensus security for next-generation Ethereum, and provable security and performance of proof-of-stake consensus under rate constraints and network-level attacks. He has been supported by Protocol Labs PhD Fellowship, Ethereum Foundation, Stanford Graduate Fellowship, and German Academic Scholarship Foundation.\n\nAbout a16z crypto research\n\na16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet.","tokens":547,"crawled_at":1791193403318} +{"id":10234,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/consensus-check-staking-tokenomics/9019","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Consensus Check - Staking & Tokenomics - Consensus Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"Consensus Check - Staking & Tokenomics\n\nConsensus Check\n\nsommi\n\nDecember 1, 2020, 6:33am\n\n1\n\nMultiple Choice: Tick each Support of UNI Tokenomics\n\nStaking\n\nBuy-back and Burn\n\nOwn 25 UNI to access More features & Cheaper trading fees\n\nLoyalty Rewards (e.g. Rocket Boost to staking yield if you use the protocol frequently, or rewarded with time)\n\n0\nvoters\n\nWe have to stop thinking like a bunch of weak cowards. We are a tribe, and this is war.\n\nWe are long-term investors and UNI believers but if we don’t take this seriously then there will be no more rainbows here. Long-term investors get stronger by drinking the tears of short-term speculators. So we need to start rewarding long-term investors by getting serious.\n\nWe most certainly need to consider a UNI tokenomics program alongside the proposed buy-back program. We should welcome any sort of mechanism that supports price over time. Anybody who says otherwise is clearly a trojan horse from another community trying to steer us in the wrong way.\n\nI can’t say too much, but I know for a FACT that a certain “Rich famous Crypto Twitter personality” has supporters in here who on purpose, are making false misleading suggestions and start conversations to dampen the growth of UNI.\n\nSushi are taking risks because they are in second place. They want to take over Uniswap and they are fighting for it. They are not sitting there twiddling their thumbs about “legal issues” and cry baby garbage talk about upsetting the wrong people. Stop listening to these unproductive paper pushers. These are the same people who said Bitcoin was going to $0 in January 2019 because “the government will not let it go up”.\n\nNow… There is room for only 1 king so we need to start acting like it.\n\nWe are here for Crypto, but let’s not forget the most important fact… Satoshi already solved the “Digital Scarcity” problem. Stop acting like it’s a bad idea to support the Uniswap with scarcity tokenomics such as buyback & burn, as well as incentives to hold the UNI token for longer periods of time.\n\nClearly it was a mistake to leave the Protocol Fee Switch inactive for 6 months. This is way too long and a thorn in our side. Nobody is happy about that because the “competitors” are making moves EVERY other day. We have basically let the sheep out for the foxes.\n\nWe also need to stop wasting time replying to trojan horse actors who say “GuyZ, BuYBaCkS DoN’T HeLp, AnD BuRnInG DoEsN’T EiTheR!” in every single thread. It’s so obvious that these people are from an outside community and actively trying to take us down from with-in.\n\nAs a start, we should be implementing:\n\nStaking …Reward longer lock-up with higher yield.\n\nBuy-back and Burn …There is incentive for holding as the Unicorn is working for us 24/7.\n\nUNI hodler access …Own 25 UNI and you get access to cheaper fees and more trading features such as Stop Market, Limit Orders, Iceberg etc.)\n\nLoyalty Rewards …Instead of 6% yield, you get 7% staking yield if you have been using for a longer period of time.\n\nWe should also heavily consider giving Liquidity Providers a payment in the form of slightly higher yield on their Staked UNI Tokens as this will punish those who keep dumping their bags early, and it will reward long-term views.\n\nIt’s time to stop playing nice and start working seriously towards total Victory\n\n9 Likes\n\nFigu3\n\nDecember 1, 2020, 10:50am\n\n2\n\nHey, I’m not sure I agree with all of this…\n\nYes, Sushiswap is more aggressive, but UNI has a core team that is not anon and can be leveraged by regulators.\n\nTes, UNI is king, and its our job to keep it that way but it’s going to take time to think of a good plan.\n\nWhile I believe your propositions are interesting, they should be much more detailed for a consensus check. This is the last step before publishing a proposal and should be more fleshed out ! If you need any help, feel free to reach out.\n\nAlso, and that’s a personal opinion, delaying the treasury switch is a good thing because it helps us figure out the way we want to run things.\n\n7 Likes\n\nsinlee\n\nDecember 1, 2020, 11:27am\n\n3\n\nWe should act. Now that AC has acquired Sushi, his DEFI ships are being armed. If we do nothing, the crown will shift.\n\n1 Like\n\ngman211\n\nJanuary 5, 2021, 11:45pm\n\n4\n\nWell said, I was trying to push for exactly what you wrote in your comment. We seem to finally have done something right. I feel like I keep missing out and not informed on present changes. Since, I missed out on our last vote. Due to fees beings so high I am also hesitant to release any from my priv. Wallet.\n\nrobert9g\n\nJanuary 6, 2021, 12:38pm\n\n5\n\nI would like to point out that this poll does not follow the forum’s rules, namely you are required to include the option “Make no change” or its equivalent.\n\nSource:\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/readme-how-to-create-a-consensus-check/7607\n\nThus, the results of this poll might better reflect the voice of the community had it included the required option.\n\nThe OP either was not aware of this rule, or he/she broke it deliberately.\n\n5 Likes\n\ndeffo\n\nJanuary 12, 2021, 7:47pm\n\n7\n\nI honstely think that buyback and distributing the tokens to stakers is better than buyback and burn.\n\n1 Like\n\nsr0x\n\nFebruary 4, 2021, 9:36pm\n\n8\n\nAgree with this. Inactive accounts and lost private keys that do not contribute to the community would slowly be diluted.\n\n2 Likes\n\nSteady\n\nFebruary 27, 2021, 8:04pm\n\n10\n\nI want to see staking and a portion of the fees distributed to holders. Burning Uni doesn’t seem good for long term supply and rewards people who aren’t involved in the community.\n\n1 Like\n\nGoobers007\n\nMay 4, 2021, 9:31pm\n\n11\n\nThat was very well said and I love your passion. Anyone that thinks there aren’t people on the inside trying to take UNI down is either lying to themselves or part of the problem. Why don’t we reward users of the protocol, something to offset there Ethereum fees. Not just from now but the past. People are very loyal to brands that treat them well or give them free shit basically. I know if I had a choice between an exchange that hooked me up and one that didn’t I know where I’m going. Just a thought. Anyways, i got so off topic. I loved what you had to say and it’s people like you that can make or brake this project…\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nUNI buyback from market using Uniswap 0.3% fees\n\nConsensus Check\n\n29\n\n7252\n\nFebruary 27, 2021\n\n[POLL] How Would We Structure a Fee Reward?\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n91\n\n10390\n\nApril 10, 2021\n\nBuyback & Burn is the winner\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n1\n\n3746\n\nJanuary 14, 2021\n\n[POLL] Should UNI Holders Be Rewarded?\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n86\n\n11303\n\nMarch 7, 2021\n\nUni token rewards please read!\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n3\n\n3250\n\nOctober 12, 2020","tokens":1678,"crawled_at":1791193418654} +{"id":10235,"url":"https://docs.near.org/tools/contracts-list","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Reference Contracts - NEAR Docs","text":"List of contracts of various projects deployed on NEAR. This list is not exhaustive and is meant to be a reference for developers and users\n\nFind more:\nNEAR Catalog - A catalog of NEAR projects\n\nNEAR Audit Database - List of Public Audits in the NEAR Ecosystem\n\n​\n\nContracts List\n\nContractProjectTagsDescription\nBurrow.finance (public archive)\nRhea finance\nDeFi\nLending platform\n\nref-exchange\nRhea finance\nDeFi\nDEX Contract\n\nref-farming\nRhea finance\nDeFi\nDEX LP Farming\n\nMeta Token\nMetapool\nFT\nFT contract\n\nmetapool\nMetapool\nstaking\nLiquid staking\n\ndonation\nPotLock\nFT, donation\nDonating FT to any contract\n\npot\nPotLock\ndonation\nQF Funding round\n\npot_factory\nPotLock\nfactory, donation\nFactory contract for QF Funding Rounds\n\nregistry\nPotLock\ndonation, misc\nRegistry for QF funding rounds\n\nsybil\nPotLock\nmisc\nRegistry for sybil resistance providers\n\nShardDog-NFT-Protocol\nShardDog\nNFT\nNFT contract managing multiple NFT collections\n\nNFT-Minting-withFT\nShardDog\nNFT, FT\nNFT contract supports minting with FT tokens, royalties, payment distribution, premint functionality.\n\ncontest-contract\nShardDog\nraffle\nWeighted raffle system.\n\ncore\nNEAR Intents\ncross-chain, DeFi\nProtocol for multichain financial products\n\ncontest-contract\nRace of Sloths\nraffle\nWeighted raffle contract\n\ncontract\nRace of Sloths\nmisc\nScoreboard including streaks\n\ncontract-mvp\nTemplar Protocol\nDeFi\nPermissionless cypher lending\n\nindex-fund-contract\nTemplar Protocol\nDeFi\nIndex fund contract\n\nlinear\nLinear\nstaking\nLiquid staking\n\nhodl-lockup\nSweat Economy\nFT, lockup\nFT lockup contract\n\nsweat-jar\nSweat Economy\nFT, staking\nFT staking contract\n\nsweat-claim\nSweat Economy\nFT\nFT managing contract\n\nsweat-booster\nSweat Economy\nFT, NFT\nNFT vouchers for FT\n\nmultisig\nSweat Economy\nmultisig\nMultisig Contract\n\nsweat-burn\nSweat Economy\nFT\nFT burning\n\nmb-factory-v2\nMintBase\nfactory, NFT\nNFT factory contract\n\nmb-interop-market\nMintBase\nNFT\nNFT Market contract\n\nmb-nft-v2\nMintBase\nNFT\nNFT contract\n\nneardevhub-contract\nNEAR DevHub\nmisc\nCommunity managing platform\n\nlockup-factory\nCore-Contracts\nfactory, lockup\nFactory contract deploying lockup contracts\n\nlockup\nCore-Contracts\nlockup\nLocks and holds an owner’s tokens for a lockup period\n\nmultisig-factory\nCore-Contracts\nfactory\nFactory contract for multisig\n\nmultisig\nCore-Contracts\nmultisig\nmultisig\n\nmultisig2\nCore-Contracts\nmultisig\nmultisig\n\nstaking-pool-factory\nCore-Contracts\nfactory, staking-pool, validator\nStaking Pool factory contract\n\nstaking-pool\nCore-Contracts\nstaking-pool, validator\nStaking pool contract\n\nstate-manipulation\nCore-Contracts\nstate-manipulation\nContracts state-manipulation\n\nvoting\nCore-Contracts\nvalidator\nValidator Voting contract\n\nw-near\nCore-Contracts\nFT\nFT contract that wraps native NEAR\n\nwhitelist\nCore-Contracts\nwhitelist, staking-pool\nWhitelist contract for staking pools\n\nstaking-factory\npool.near\nfactory, staking-pool, validator\nFactory contract deployed as pool.near that creates staking farm contracts\n\nstaking-farm\n*.pool.near\nstaking-pool, validator\nStaking farm contract deployed under *.pool.near accounts\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":773,"crawled_at":1791193419549} +{"id":10236,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/secure-efficient-zkvms-progress","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"The path to secure and efficient zkVMs: How to track progress - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nThe path to secure and efficient zkVMs: How to track progress\nJustin Thaler\n03.11.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nresearch\nSNARKs\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nzkVMs (zero knowledge virtual machines) promise to “democratize SNARKs” by allowing anyone, even those with no specialized SNARK expertise, to prove that they have correctly run any program on a given input (or witness). Their core strength lies in the developer experience, but currently they present enormous challenges in both security and performance. For zkVMs to fulfill their promise, designers will have to overcome these challenges. In this post, I lay out the likely stages for their development, the completion of which will take several years. Don’t let anyone tell you differently.\n\nThe challenges\n\nOn the security side, zkVMs are highly complex software projects still riddled with bugs. On the performance side, proving correct execution of a program can be hundreds of thousands of times slower than running it natively, making real-world deployment for most applications untenable right now.\n\nDespite these realities, much of the blockchain industry portrays zkVMs as ready for immediate deployment. Indeed, some projects already pay significant computation costs to generate proofs of onchain activity. Because of the bugs, this is merely an expensive way of pretending a system is secured by a SNARK when it is actually either secured by permissioning, or far worse, vulnerable to attack.\n\nThe truth is, we are still years away from meeting even the most basic goals for a secure and performant zkVM. This post proposes a series of staged, concrete goals to track our collective progress — goals that cut through hype and help the community focus on genuine advancements.\n\nStages of security\n\nBackground\n\nSNARK-based zkVMs typically include two main components:\n\nPolynomial Interactive Oracle Proof (PIOP): The interactive proof framework used to prove statements about polynomials (or constraints derived from them).\n\nPolynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS): Ensures that the prover cannot lie about polynomial evaluations without being detected.\n\nzkVMs essentially encode valid execution traces as constraint systems — broadly meaning that they enforce correct register and memory usage by a virtual machine — and then apply a SNARK to prove these constraints are satisfied.\n\nThe only path to ensuring that systems as complicated as zkVMs are free of bugs is formal verification. Below is a breakdown of security stages. Stage 1 focuses entirely on correct protocols while Stages 2 and 3 focus on correct implementations.\n\nSecurity stage 1: Correct protocols\n\nStage 1a\n\nA formally verified proof of soundness for the PIOP.\n\nStage 1b\n\nA formally verified proof that the PCS is binding under some cryptographic assumption or an idealized model.\n\nStage 1c\n\nIf using Fiat-Shamir, a formally verified proof that the succinct argument obtained by combining the PIOP and the PCS is secure in the random oracle model (augmented with other cryptographic assumptions as appropriate).\n\nStage 1d\n\nA formally verified proof that the constraint system to which the PIOP is applied is equivalent to the VM’s semantics.\n\nStage 1e\n\nA comprehensive “gluing together” of all these pieces into a single, formally verified proof of a secure SNARK for running any program specified by the VM’s bytecode. If the protocol intends to achieve zero knowledge, this property must also be formally verified, ensuring that no sensitive information about the witness is revealed.\n\nRecursion Caveat: If the zkVM uses recursion, every PIOP, commitment scheme, and constraint system involved anywhere in that recursion must be verified to consider a sub-stage complete.\n\nSecurity stage 2: Correct verifier implementation\n\nA formally verified proof that an actual implementation of the zkVM verifier (in Rust, Solidity, etc.) matches the protocol verified in Stage 1. Achieving this ensures the implemented protocol is sound (rather than merely the design on paper, or an inefficient specification written in, say, Lean).\n\nThe reason Stage 2 focuses on the verifier implementation alone (and not the prover) is two fold. First, getting the verifier right is already sufficient for soundness (i.e., ensuring that the verifier cannot be convinced that any false statement is in fact true). Second, zkVM verifier implementations are over an order of magnitude simpler than prover implementations.\n\nSecurity stage 3: Correct prover implementation\n\nA formally verified proof that an actual implementation of the zkVM prover correctly generates proofs for the proof system verified in Stages 1 and 2. This ensures completeness — that is, any system using the zkVM will not get “stuck” with a statement that cannot be proven. If the prover intends to achieve zero knowledge, this property must be formally verified.\n\nProjected timelines\n\nStage 1 Progress: We can expect incremental achievements over the next year (e.g., ZKLib is one such effort). But no zkVM is likely to fully meet Stage 1 for at least two years.\n\nStages 2 and 3: These can advance in parallel with some aspects of Stage 1. For example, some teams have shown that an implementation of the Plonk verifier matches the protocol in a paper (although the paper’s protocol itself might not be fully verified). Nevertheless, I do not expect any zkVM to reach Stage 3 in fewer than four years — and likely longer.\n\nKey caveats: Fiat-Shamir security and verified bytecode\n\nOne major complication is that there are open research questions surrounding the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation. All three stages treat Fiat-Shamir and random oracles as if their security is unassailable, but in reality the entire paradigm may turn out to have vulnerabilities. This is due to the difference between the random oracle idealization and actual hash functions used in practice. In the worst case, a system that has reached Stage 2 could later be found completely insecure due to Fiat-Shamir issues. This is cause for serious concern and continued research. We may need to modify the transformation itself to better guard against such vulnerabilities.\n\nSystems without recursion are on somewhat firmer theoretical ground because certain known attacks involve circuits reminiscent of those used in recursive proofs. But the risk remains a fundamental open question.\n\nAnother caveat is that proving you’ve correctly run a computer program (specified via bytecode) has limited value if the bytecode itself is flawed. Consequently, the utility of zkVMs depends heavily on methods for generating formally verified bytecode — an enormous challenge that falls outside the scope of this post.\n\nOn post-quantum security\n\nOver at least the next five years (and likely longer), quantum computers do not pose a serious threat, whereas bugs are an existential risk. So the primary focus now should be meeting the security and performance stages in this post. If we can meet them faster with SNARKs that are not quantum-secure then we should do so. And we should use those until either post-quantum SNARKs catch up, or there is a serious concern that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is imminent.\n\nConcrete security levels\n\n100 bits of classical security is the absolute bare minimum anyone should deploy a SNARK securing anything of value (there are still some deployments that do not meet this low bar). Even this should not be acceptable: standard cryptographic practice is to use 128 bits of security and up. If SNARK performance were where it truly needs to be, we wouldn’t be skimping on security to eke out incremental performance gains.\n\nStages of performance\n\nThe Current Situation\n\nCurrently, zkVM provers incur overhead factors approaching one million times the cost of native execution. If a program takes X cycles to run, proving correct execution will cost on the order of X times 1 million CPU cycles. This was the case roughly one year ago, and it remains the case today (despite misconceptions to the contrary).\n\nPopular narratives often frame this overhead in ways that sound acceptable. For example, you might hear:\n\n“Generating proofs for all of Ethereum mainnet costs under a million dollars per year.”\n\n“We nearly have real-time proof generation of Ethereum blocks using a cluster of dozens of GPUs.”\n\n“Our latest zkVM is 1000× faster than its predecessor.”\n\nWhile technically accurate, these claims can be misleading without proper context. For instance:\n\n1000× faster than an older zkVM still leaves it very slow in absolute terms. This is much more a statement of how bad things were than how good things are.\n\nThere are already proposals to 10x the amount of computation processed by Ethereum mainnet. This will render current zkVM performance far too slow.\n\nWhat people are calling “nearly real-time proving of Ethereum blocks” is still much slower than what many blockchain applications demand (e.g., Optimism has a block time of 2s, substantially faster than Ethereum’s 12s block time).\n\n“Dozens of GPUs running at all times, without fail” falls short of acceptable liveness guarantees.\n\nThese prover times are often reported for proof sizes that are too large for many applications (e.g., over 1 MB).\n\nUnder a million dollars per year to prove all activity on Ethereum mainnet reflects the fact that Ethereum full nodes perform only about $25 worth of compute per year.\n\nFor applications beyond blockchains, such overheads are plainly too high. No amount of parallelization or engineering can offset such a massive overhead.\n\nWe should aim for slowdowns no worse than 100,000× relative to native execution as a basic baseline — and even that is only the first step. True mainstream adoption probably requires overheads close to 10,000× or lower.\n\nMeasuring performance\n\nSNARK performance has three primary components:\n\nIntrinsic efficiency of the underlying proof system.\n\nApplication-specific optimizations (e.g., pre-compiles).\n\nEngineering and hardware speedups (e.g., GPUs, FPGAs, or multi-core CPUs).\n\nWhile (2) and (3) are vital for real-world deployments, they’re generally available to any proof system so they don’t necessarily reflect progress on fundamental overheads. For instance, adding GPU acceleration plus pre-compiles to a zkEVM can easily yield a 50× speedup over a purely CPU-based, no-precompile approach — enough to make an intrinsically less efficient system appear superior to one that simply hasn’t received the same polishing.\n\nConsequently, this post focuses on measuring how well a SNARK performs absent specialized hardware and pre-compiles. It’s a departure from current benchmarking approaches, which often lump all three factors into a single “headline number.” This is akin to judging diamonds by how many hours they’ve been polished rather than by their innate clarity.\n\nThe goal here is to isolate the intrinsic overhead of general-purpose proof systems — minimizing barriers to entry for underexplored techniques and allowing the community to cut through confounding factors to focus on true progress in proof-system design.\n\nPerformance stages\n\nBelow are my proposed milestones for performance, organized into five stages. First, we need to slash prover overhead on CPUs by multiple orders of magnitude. Only then should the focus turn to further reductions via hardware. Memory usage must improve as well.\n\nIn all of the stages below, developers should not have to tailor their code to the zkVM setting to achieve the necessary performance. Developer experience is a primary benefit of zkVMs. Sacrificing DevEx to meet performance benchmarks defeats the point of both the benchmark and the zkVM itself.\n\nThese metrics focus on prover costs. However, any prover metric can be met trivially if one allows unbounded verifier costs (i.e., no upper limit on proof size or verification time). Consequently, for a system to qualify for the stages described, it is crucial to specify maximum values for both proof size and verification time.\n\nStage 1 Requirements: “Reasonably non-trivial verification costs”\n\nProof size: The proof must be smaller than the witness.\n\nVerification time: Verifying the proof must be no slower than running the program natively (i.e., executing the computation without a proof of correctness).\n\nThese are bare minimum succinctness requirements. They ensure that proof sizes and verification times are not worse than the trivial approach of sending the witness to the verifier and having the verifier directly check it for correctness.\n\nStage 2 and beyond\n\nMaximum proof size: 256 KB\n\nMaximum verification time: 16 ms\n\nThese cutoffs are intentionally generous to accommodate novel, fast-prover techniques that may come with higher verification costs. At the same time, they exclude proofs so expensive that few projects would be willing to include them on a blockchain.\n\nSpeed stage 1\n\nSingle-threaded proving must be at most one hundred thousand times slower than native execution, measured across a range of applications (beyond just proving Ethereum blocks), without relying on pre-compiles.\n\nConcretely, think of a RISC-V process running at roughly 3 billion cycles per second on a modern laptop. Achieving Stage 1 means you can prove about 30,000 RISC-V cycles per second (single-threaded) on that same laptop.\n\nVerifier costs must be “reasonably non-trivial” as defined earlier.\n\nSpeed stage 2\n\nSingle-threaded proving must be at most ten thousand times slower than native execution.\n\nAlternatively, because some promising SNARK approaches (especially those over binary fields) are hindered by current CPUs and GPUs, you can reach this stage using FPGAs (or even ASICs) by comparing:\n\nThe number of RISC-V cores an FPGA can emulate at native speed, vs.\n\nThe number of FPGAs required to emulate and prove RISC-V execution in (near) real-time.\n\nIf the latter number is at most a factor of 10,000 more than the former, you qualify for Stage 2.\n\nProof size must be at most 256 KB and verifier time at most 16 ms on standard CPUs.\n\nSpeed stage 3\n\nIn addition to achieving Speed Stage 2, also achieve a proving overhead of under 1000× (for a wide range of applications) using automatically synthesized and formally verified pre-compiles. Essentially, dynamically customize an instruction set for each program to accelerate proving, but do so in an easy-to-use and formally verified manner.\n\n(For a deeper discussion of why pre-compiles are a double-edged sword — and why “hand-rolled” pre-compiles are not a sustainable approach — see the next section.)\n\nMemory stage 1\n\nStage 1 speed is achieved with less than 2 GB of memory required for the prover (while also achieving zero knowledge).\n\nThis is critical for many mobile devices or browsers and thus opens up countless client-side zkVM use cases. Client-side proving matters because our phones are our constant link to the real world: they track our locations, credentials, and more. If a proof requires more than 1-2 GB of memory to produce, it’s simply too much for most mobile devices today. Hitting that 2 GB threshold opens the door to real-time, on-device SNARK proofs for everything from privacy-preserving location checks to portable, verifiable credentials.\n\nTwo clarifications are in order:\n\nThe 2 GB space bound should hold even for large statements (those requiring many trillions of CPU cycles to run natively). A proof system that achieves the space bound only for small statements lacks broad applicability.\n\nIt is easy to keep the prover’s space below 2 GB of memory if the prover is very slow. So to make Memory Stage 1 non-trivial, I am requiring that Speed Stage 1 be met within the 2 GB space bound.\n\nMemory stage 2\n\nStage 1 speed is achieved with less than 200 MB of memory usage (10x better than Memory Stage 1).\n\nWhy push below 2 GB? Consider a non-blockchain example: Every time you visit a website via HTTPS, you download certificates for authentication and encryption. Instead, websites could send zk-proofs of possession of these certificates. Large sites may issue millions of these proofs per second. If each proof requires 2 GB of memory to generate, you’re talking about petabytes of RAM in total. Pushing memory usage further down is vital for non-blockchain deployments.\n\nPre-compiles: The last mile or a crutch?\n\nIn zkVM design, a pre-compile refers to a special-purpose SNARK (or constraint system) tailored to specific functions — such as Keccak/SHA hashing or elliptic-curve group operations for digital signatures. Within Ethereum — where most of the heavy lifting involves Merkle hashing and signature checks — a few hand-crafted pre-compiles can reduce prover overhead. But relying on them as a crutch will not get SNARKs where they need to go.\n\nWhy pre-compiles are a crutch\n\nStill too slow for most applications (both within and outside blockchains): Even with hashing and signature pre-compiles, current zkVMs remain too slow—both within and beyond blockchain contexts—because of deep inefficiencies in the core proof system.\n\nSecurity failures: Hand-written pre-compiles that are not formally verified are almost certainly riddled with bugs, risking catastrophic security failures.\n\nSuboptimal developer experience: In most zkVMs today, adding new pre-compiles means hand-authoring constraint systems for every function — essentially returning to a 1960s-style workflow. Even when using existing pre-compiles, developers must refactor code to call each one. We should be optimizing for security and developer experience, not sacrificing both to chase incremental performance gains. Doing so merely proves that performance isn’t where it needs to be.\n\nConfounding benchmarks: Benchmarking on workloads dominated by a handful of repetitive cryptographic operations risks selecting for projects that have simply spent the most time optimizing hand-written constraint systems for that application. This is not the best path to advancing the science of SNARK design.\n\nI/O Overheads and no RAM: Although pre-compiles improve performance for heavy cryptographic tasks, they may not deliver meaningful speedups for more diverse workloads because they incur major overhead for passing inputs/outputs, and they cannot use RAM.\n\nEven within blockchain contexts, as soon as you move beyond a monolithic L1 like Ethereum — say, you want to build a slew of cross-chain bridges — you’re confronted with different hash functions and signature schemes. Throwing precompile after precompile at the problem doesn’t scale and introduces massive security risks.\n\nFor all of these reasons, our priority should be making the underlying zkVM more efficient. Whatever techniques produce the best zkVMs will also produce the best pre-compiles.\n\nI do believe pre-compiles will remain critical in the long run, but only once they’re automatically synthesized and formally verified. That way, we can maintain the developer-experience benefits of a zkVM while avoiding catastrophic security risks. This perspective is reflected in Speed Stage 3.\n\nProjected timelines\n\nI expect a small number of zkVMs to achieve Speed Stage 1 and Memory Stage 1 later this year. I think we achieve Speed Stage 2 in the next two years as well, but it’s not yet clear we can get quite there without some new ideas that aren’t in the research literature yet.\n\nI expect that the remaining stages (Speed Stage 3 and Memory Stage 2) will take several years to meet.\n\nAlthough I have separately identified stages for zkVM security and performance in this post, these aspects of zkVMs are not entirely independent. As more vulnerabilities are discovered in zkVMs, I expect that some will be fixable only with a substantial loss in performance. Until a zkVM reaches Security Stage 2, performance results should be viewed as tentative.\n\n***\n\nzkVMs hold immense promise for making zero-knowledge proofs truly universal, but they remain in their infancy — rife with security challenges and debilitating performance overheads. Hype and marketing spin make it difficult to measure genuine progress. By articulating clear security and performance milestones, I hope to provide a roadmap that cuts through the noise. We’ll get there, but it will take time and sustained effort in both research and engineering.\n\n***\n\nJustin Thaler is Research Partner at a16z and an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Georgetown University. His research interests include verifiable computing, complexity theory, and algorithms for massive data sets.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":5765,"crawled_at":1791193422039} +{"id":10237,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/escrow","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"NFT Escrow | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nThis extension of the Token Metadata contract was created as a new feature primitive that could optionally be added to all NFTs. At its core it is simply an escrow account attached to an NFT, enabling NFTs to become owners of other tokens.\nAside from the requisite security and ownership checks necessary, the functionality this feature affords has been left generic enough to allow users to implement whatever they desire on top of the composability of the token and its escrow account.\nTypes of Escrow Accounts\nIt is currently possible to create two different types of escrow accounts on an NFT: A Token Owned Escrow (TOE) used for ownership and a Creator Owned Escrow (COE) used for associations. The existence of both types of escrow accounts is not mutually exclusive.\nToken Owned Escrow\nA Token Owned Escrow account, or TOE, is an escrow account attached to the NFT that is managed by the holder of the NFT. Transferring a token out of this escrow account is only allowable by the NFT's holder and the permissions follow the NFT as it is transferred between wallets.\nThis means Alice can add a token to a TOE on her NFT, then sell her NFT to Bob. Bob would then be the only one allowed to transfer that token out of the TOE.\nDue to the holder-based permissions, it is only possible to have one TOE on an NFT. A TOE follows traditional wallet action flow where anyone can transfer a token into the escrow account but the holder is the only one who can transfer the token out.\nCreator Owned Escrow\nA Creator Owned Escrow, or COE, is an escrow account attached to the NFT that is managed by a specified creator. This escrow account allows creators to make associations between tokens that they themselves can manage, regardless of sales, transfers, and holders of the base NFT.\nAn example use case for this is Metaverse avatars. Rather than storing avatars on a Web2 server, the Metaverse team could mint the avatar as an NFT, then put it in a COE (that the Metaverse team manages) attached to the corresponding base NFT. Because usage of the COE is locked to the creator of the COE, a holder would be unable to transfer the avatar out of the escrow account and break the association.\nA Creator Owned Escrow is seeded with the creator public key and therefore there is no limit to the number of COEs that can be attached to an NFT. This allows many associations to be built across many projects. A COE follows traditional wallet action flow where anyone can transfer a token into the escrow account but the creator of the escrow is the only one who can transfer the token out.","tokens":675,"crawled_at":1791193448577} +{"id":10238,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-a-mechanism-to-use-the-uni-treasury-to-grow-and-defend-uniswap/17015","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] A mechanism to use the UNI treasury to grow and defend Uniswap - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] A mechanism to use the UNI treasury to grow and defend Uniswap\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nfirstprinciples\n\nJune 26, 2022, 5:49pm\n\n1\n\nWe believe that, just as in traditional companies, capital and ‘equity’ should be used for growth, future value creation and moat building.\n\nThis post is a proposal for a mechanism we think would help Uniswap allocate, in size, towards that.\n\nCurrent state of the treasury:\n\nOn the one hand, Uniswap currently has the largest treasury in DeFi in dollar terms (per: OpenOrgs.info).\n\nOn the other, its ~100% in UNI tokens. Some vested, some unvested:\n\n1358×532 40 KB\n\nAs @Hasu outlines in his A New Mental Model for DeFi Treasuries, native tokens in DAO treasuries can be looked at as “the crypto-equivalent of authorized but unissued shares”.\n\nFurthermore, a sale of just 1% of the vested UNI tokens in the treasury for USDC would result in 50% price slippage on 1inch. This means that this capital is effectively unusable for any relevantly-sized CaPex or OpEx.\n\nOpportunity:\n\nFrom the above, our view is that Uniswap’s treasury is potentially an extremely valuable asset for the protocol and DAO, but that current use cases don’t unlock a fraction this potential value.\n\nThe Unigrants program is incredible, but there ought to be other and larger scale allocation opportunities for the treasury.\n\nGoals:\n\nWe’d like to:\n\nHave a more diversified treasury.\n\nReducing the treasury’s exposure to just pure UNI and ensuring Uniswap thrives under different market conditions.\n\nUse treasury funds specifically to grow Uniswap.\n\nThere can be disagreement about what the best KPIs for Uniswap’s growth ought to be, but volume as the core one and TVL, liquidity and users as others seems directionally correct.\n\nUse UNI to deepen Uniswap’s moats and build durable defensibility.\n\nCompetitive advantages that can’t be forked or copied and that contribute to keeping Uniswap the leading DEX.\n\nWe’ll look at this proposal through the lens of how it may impact all three.\n\nIdea:\n\nHigh-level:\n\nUniswap provides $x value in UNI tokens from the treasury and a partner protocol/project/DAO provides $x value in their governance (or otherwise) token to LP in an uniswap pool between the two tokens.\n\nThe resulting LP shares are split proportionally between the two treasuries (uniswap and the partner’s).\n\nProcess:\n\nThe way to determine these and other parameters would be via standard governance.\n\nAn interested protocol/project/DAO/community would publish a proposal to uniswap governance following a standard, to be created, template (similar to templates for asset listings on Aave, for example). They’d refer what the value of x should be and why, their metrics, their token’s value (governance or otherswise) or value accrual, why aligning their community with uniswap’s would be valuable, amongst other relevant information for a decision.\n\nAfter discussion here in the forum, it’d move to a governance vote and be acted upon if passed.\n\nWe’d always want these “partner” projects to be high quality or high potential, and that would be assured by UNI governance deciding individually on each.\n\nPro case:\n\nWe believe that, over time, this allocation mechanism would bring material diversification, growth and moats to Uniswap – the three goals stated above.\n\nTreasury Diversification\n\nOver time, the treasury becomes more diversified into other high quality assets, in the form of XYZ-UNI LP positions.\n\n1.1. In particular, this is a way to diversify the treasury without ever directly selling UNI (which, like seen above, wouldn’t even be possible in size). No immediate/direct selling pressure would be put on UNI, contrary to most anternative diversification methods.\n\n1.2. Not only does this diversification mechanism not put selling pressure on UNI, it in fact increases UNI’s liquidity (potentially by many multiples). This has additional benefits such as making UNI a better/more sought after collateral asset across DeFi as well as opening up more ways to employ treasury funds in the future (due to liquidity for bigger size).\n\nCapital efficient and durable expansion of TVL\n\nFor every dollar in UNI invested by the treasury, this “joint LP mechanism” would add two dollars of TVL to Uniswap.\n\nMoreover, this liquidity provision is neither from mercenary capital nor from short-term LP profit maximizing agents. It’s rather from DAOs committed to hold the LP shares long-term.\n\nAs such, this mechanism should lead to sizeable and predictably permanent TVL expansion.\n\n2.1. Alongside point 1., this creates an unforkable moat for Uniswap in the form of protocol owned liquidity, but in a much more sustainable way than previous attempts at POL – like bonding (there is no dilution nor induced selling pressure in our mechanism).\n\nIncentive Alignment\n\nAs discussed, partners that get approved for this joint LP deal will be approved by UNI governance and, as such, should always be high quality or high potential protocols/projects/DAOs.\n\nAfter entering this “exchange” with Uniswap, their treasuries will be positively exposed to UNI, financially aligning their communities and teams with Uniswap’s long-term success.\n\nFrom this, we expect the mechanism to create, over time, a bigger and bigger network of top DeFi/web3 projects that are rationally incentivized to want Uniswap to prosper.\n\nWe think this can constitute yet another unforkable moat and contribute to keeping Uniswap the leading DEX.\n\nDemand\n\nMany if not most other protocols/projects/DAOs face the same challenge of having most of their treasuries’ value in their own governance token (just look at openorgs.info or hasu’s article).\n\nThis joint LP token exchange presents a new possibility for them to diversify their treasury into another high quality asset without generating selling pressure on their token (which would happen in market selling). As an additional benefit, they would also get the reverse incentive alignment pointed out in 3.\n\nAs such, we expect strong and sustainable demand from interested partners.\n\nUNI as a part of Uniswap’s product\n\nThe MKR and AAVE tokens play a role in Maker and Aave’s products and directly add value to them. Altough in different ways, in both cases these governance tokens’s value is used to cover/insure bad debt the protocols may acumulate in extreme scenarios (further reading: maker, aave).\n\nFor both, their governance tokens – as assets – make the protocols better. In their case, being debt protocols, ‘better’ here means safer for depositors. This is another possible moat in DeFi (see Multicoin’s Protocols Don’t Capture Value, DAOs Manage Risk).\n\nCurrently, UNI as an asset doesn’t directly contribute to Uniswap’s product – the DEX – in any analogous way.\n\nThe mechanism outlined in this proposal would make UNI a very relevant pair in Uniswap pools and hence an unforkable value-add to the protocol (adding liquidity, volume and TVL).\n\nWe think that, over time, UNI could become the third or fourth most prevalent trading pair, after ETH, BTC and stables.\n\nConsiderations:\n\nThe obvious main aspect this proposal leaves out is implementation of such a mechanism in v3.\n\nIt is quite straightforward to do these token swaps via LP with uniswap v2 positions (no upfront decision on liquidity range, no maintenance, fungible LP shares, very clean process overall). The same isn’t true if done in uni v3 (which could be more capital efficient but much more complex to manage).\n\nWe don’t have a strong view either way here. There are pros and cons. As such, we’d love to see discussion around this point if the uniswap community finds the overall proposal to make sense.\n\nFinally, this is a Request for Comments, not a proposal yet. We’d love to get all questions, feedback and improvement ideas from the community.\n\nWe’re also open to providing more data, run simulations, and present models on this mechanism, if you think it’d be helpful.\n\n5 Likes\n\nrfritsch\n\nJune 29, 2022, 9:25am\n\n2\n\nI very much appreciate suggestions to diversify the treasury and would like to share my opinion on this one:\n\nFor me, a protocol treasury should be a reserve to support development of the protocol (and the surrounding ecosystem), specially during difficult times (in which the protocol’s token may have a very low value).\n\nI would mentally split the suggested plan in two steps:\n\nSwap UNI tokens of value v from the treasury for “other protocol” token of value v.\n\nUse two assets in the treasury to provide liquidity in an AMM pool.\n\nI don’t think either of the two steps help to make the treasury a safer reserve:\n\nReplacing UNI tokens by “other protocol” tokens doesn’t necessarily make the treasury any less volatile. The treasury should probably hold mostly stablecoins (and at most some ETH or similar assets).\n\nProviding liquidity with treasury assets introduces extra risks and operational complexity. I don’t think liquidity provision is the purpose of a treasury.\n\nBrook_CIAN\n\nJune 30, 2022, 8:28am\n\n3\n\nConclusion: Reject\n\nRationale: The increased pool with this form of exchange does not hold/influence the pricing power of the tokens, but actually just increases the arbitrage space. This is of very limited help to the UNI ecosystem\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nUniswap Treasury Report\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n6\n\n3326\n\nFebruary 20, 2025\n\nUniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG) Application\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n15\n\n4305\n\nApril 20, 2024\n\nMobilizing the Uniswap Treasury\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n27\n\n6238\n\nJuly 20, 2024\n\nUniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG) Interim Update\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n9\n\n761\n\nOctober 9, 2024\n\nSwap UNI for ETH and wBTC and provide liquidity\n\nConsensus Check\n\n8\n\n4124\n\nMay 16, 2021","tokens":2417,"crawled_at":1791193436498} +{"id":10239,"url":"https://docs.near.org/tools/clear-state","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"State Cleaner - NEAR Docs","text":"State Cleaner is an extension for NEAR CLI that wipes a contract account’s on-chain state without deleting the account, so you can redeploy a fresh contract or free the storage staked NEAR.\n​\n\nHow it works\n\nUnder the hood, it deploys a small cleanup contract to the target account and, in a single transaction, calls its clean method with every key in the account’s state. The cleanup contract is left in place — it is not removed — until you deploy a new contract over it.\n\nTo learn more, check out the source code for both the State Cleaner tool and the cleanup contract.\n\n​\n\nHow to use\n\n1\n\nInstall NEAR CLI\nThe State Cleaner is invoked through NEAR CLI, so you need it installed first. If you do not already have it installed, visit the NEAR CLI page.\n\n2\n\nInstall the State Cleaner extension\nInstall it straight from the GitHub repository:\n\ncargo install --locked --git https://github.com/near-examples/near-clear-state near-clear-state\n\nRequires a Rust toolchain ≥ 1.88.\n\n3\n\nMake sure the extension is on your PATH\nConfirm it’s picked up with:\n\nnear clear-state --help\n\n4\n\nRun the command\nRun the extension in interactive mode and follow the prompts:\n\nnear clear-state\n\nOr pass everything in one go:\n\nexport CONTRACT_ID=contract.testnet\nnear clear-state $CONTRACT_ID network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n5\n\nUse an RPC with a larger view-state cap\nIf the account’s state is large, you may hit:\n\nAccount state is too large for this RPC's view_state cap\n\nMost public RPCs cap view_state responses (around 50 KB). Point NEAR CLI at an RPC with a higher cap:\n\nnear config edit-connection testnet\n\nSet the rpc_url value to a higher-capacity provider, then re-run the command. Intear’s RPCs work well:\nTestnet: https://testnet-rpc.intea.rs\n\nMainnet: https://rpc.intea.rs\n\nYou can also update it without the prompts:\n\nnear config edit-connection testnet --key rpc_url --value https://testnet-rpc.intea.rs\n\n6\n\n(Optional) Verify the bundled wasm\nThe wasm embedded in the extension isn’t built here — it’s NEAR’s prebuilt state-manipulation cleanup contract, vendored from near/core-contracts. The extension pins a specific upstream commit, recorded in extension/wasm/state_cleanup.wasm.provenance.To verify that the wasm in the tool matches the wasm from core-contracts, clone the tool and run the verify script. It re-downloads the upstream wasm at the pinned commit and confirms the bundled bytes match:\n\ngit clone https://github.com/near-examples/near-clear-state.git\ncd near-clear-state\n./scripts/verify-wasm.sh\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":636,"crawled_at":1791193438254} +{"id":10240,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/unification-proposal/25881","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"UNIfication Proposal - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"UNIfication Proposal\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nhaydenadams\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 8:55pm\n\n1\n\nUNIfication Blog Image1920×1440 562 KB\n\nUpdate 12/18:\n\nThis proposal was posted onchain December 18th, 2025 and will be live for voting on December 19th, 2025. You can access the vote here.\n\nUNIfication\n\nHayden Adams, Ken Ng, Devin Walsh\n\nToday, Uniswap Labs and the Uniswap Foundation are excited to make a joint governance proposal that turns on protocol fees and aligns incentives across the Uniswap ecosystem, positioning the Uniswap protocol to win as the default decentralized exchange for tokenized value.\n\nThe protocol has processed ~$4 trillion in volume, made possible by thousands of developers, millions of liquidity providers, and hundreds of millions of swapping wallets.\n\nBut the last several years have also come with obstacles: we’ve fought legal battles and navigated a hostile regulatory environment under Gensler’s SEC. This climate has changed in the US, and milestones like Uniswap governance adopting DUNI, the DUNA, have prepared the Uniswap community for its next steps.\n\nThis proposal comes as DeFi reaches an inflection point. Decentralized trading protocols are rivaling centralized platforms in performance and scale, tokens are going mainstream, and institutions are building on Uniswap and other DeFi protocols.\n\nThis proposal establishes a long-term model for how the Uniswap ecosystem would operate, where protocol usage drives UNI burn and Uniswap Labs focuses on protocol development and growth. We propose to:\n\nTurn on Uniswap protocol fees and use these fees to burn UNI\n\nSend Unichain sequencer fees to this same UNI burn mechanism\n\nBuild Protocol Fee Discount Auctions (PFDA) to increase LP returns and allow the protocol to internalize MEV\n\nLaunch aggregator hooks, turning Uniswap v4 into an onchain aggregator that collects fees on external liquidity\n\nBurn 100 million UNI from the treasury representing the approximate amount of UNI that would have been burned if fees were on from the beginning\n\nFocus Labs on driving protocol development and growth, including turning off our interface, wallet, and API fees and contractually committing to only pursue initiatives that align with DUNI interests\n\nMove ecosystem teams from the Foundation to Labs, with a shared goal of protocol success, with growth and development funded from the treasury\n\nMigrate governance-owned Unisocks liquidity from Uniswap v1 on mainnet to v4 on Unichain and burn the LP position, locking in the supply curve forever\n\nProtocol Fees\n\nThe Uniswap protocol includes a fee switch that can only be turned on by a UNI governance vote. We propose that governance flip the fee switch and introduce a programmatic mechanism that burns UNI.\n\nProtocol Fee Rollout\n\nTo minimize impact, we propose fees roll out over time, starting with v2 pools and a set of v3 pools that make up 80-95% of LP fees on Ethereum mainnet. From there, fees can be turned on for L2s, other L1s, v4, UniswapX, PFDA, and aggregator hooks.\n\nUniswap v2 fee levels are hardcoded and governance must enable or disable fees across all v2 pools at once. With fees off, LP fees are 0.3%. Once activated, LP fees are 0.25% and protocol fees are 0.05%.\n\nUniswap v3 has fixed swap fee tiers on mainnet, with protocol fees that are adjustable by governance and set at the individual pool level. Protocol fees for 0.01% and 0.05% pools would initially be set to 1/4th of LP fees. For 0.30% and 1% pools, protocol fees would be set to 1/6th of LP fees.\n\nLabs will assist the community in monitoring the impact of fees and may make recommendations to adjust. To improve efficiency, we propose governance votes on fee parameters skip the RFC process and move straight to Snapshot followed by an onchain vote.\n\nUpdate 12/18:\n\nThe list of Uniswap v3 pools included in the proposal has been refreshed to reflect the latest available data. The full updated list can be found here.\n\nUnichain Sequencer Fees\n\nUnichain launched just 9 months ago, and is already processing ~$100 billion in annualized DEX volume and ~$7.5 million annualized sequencer fees.\n\nThis proposal directs all Unichain sequencer fees, after L1 data costs and the 15% to Optimism, into the burn mechanism.\n\nFee Mechanism for MEV Internalization\n\nThe Protocol Fee Discount Auction (PFDA) is designed to improve LP performance and add a new source of protocol fees by internalizing MEV that would otherwise go to searchers or validators.\n\nThis mechanism auctions off the right to swap without paying the protocol fee for a single address for a short window of time, with the winning bid going to the UNI burn. Through this process, MEV that would typically go to validators instead burns UNI. For a detailed breakdown of this mechanism, read the whitepaper.\n\nEarly analysis shows these discount auctions could increase LP returns by about $0.06-$0.26 for every $10k traded, a significant improvement given that LP returns typically range between -$1.00 and $1.00 for this amount of volume.\n\nAggregator Hooks\n\nUniswap v4 introduced hooks, turning the protocol into a developer platform with infinite possibilities for innovation. Labs is excited to be one of the many teams unlocking new functionality using hooks, starting with aggregation.\n\nThese hooks source liquidity from other onchain protocols and add a programmatic UNI burn on top, turning Uniswap v4 itself into an aggregator that anyone can integrate.\n\nLabs will integrate aggregator hooks into its frontend and API, providing users access to more sources of onchain liquidity in a way that benefits the Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nAggregator Hooks (1)3600×2259 410 KB\n\nRetroactive Burn\n\nMany community members wish the fee switch had been turned on earlier as UNI holders have missed out on years of fees on ~$4 trillion in Uniswap protocol volume. Alas, we cannot turn back the clock… or can we?\n\nWe propose a retroactive burn of 100 million UNI from the treasury. This is an estimate of what\n\nmight have been burned if the protocol fee switch had been active at token launch.\n\nTechnical Implementation\n\nEach fee source requires an adapter contract, that sends fees into an immutable onchain contract called TokenJar where they accumulate. Fees can only be withdrawn from TokenJar if UNI is burned in another smart contract called Firepit.\n\nTokenJar (1)3600×2259 352 KB\n\nTokenJar and Firepit are already implemented, along with adapters for v2, v3, and Unichain. PFDA, v4, aggregator hooks, and bridge adapters for fees on L2s and other L1s are in progress and will be introduced through future governance proposals.\n\nFees Roadmap (1)3600×2259 250 KB\n\nDetailed documentation on protocol fees and UNI burn can be found here.\n\nUNIfication and Growth Budget\n\nLabs led development of every version of the Uniswap protocol, grew the initial community, popularized AMMs and DeFi, and launched products used by tens of millions. Foundation expanded this ecosystem through grants, governance support, and community growth.\n\nWe propose unifying these efforts by transitioning Foundation teams to Labs, as Labs shifts its focus to helping make Uniswap protocol the default exchange for all tokenized value, funded through a growth budget from the treasury.\n\nUniswap Foundation Activities Move to Uniswap Labs\n\nWith the approval of this proposal, Labs will take on operational functions historically managed by the Foundation, including ecosystem support and funding, governance support, and developer relations.\n\nHayden Adams and Callil Capuozzo will join the existing Foundation board of Devin Walsh, Hart Lambur, and Ken Ng, bringing the board to five members. Most Foundation employees will move to Labs, except for a small team focused on grants and incentives. This team will deploy the Foundation’s remaining budget consistent with its mission, after which future grants will come from the growth budget under Labs.\n\nLabs Focuses on Uniswap Protocol Growth and Development\n\nThis proposal aligns Labs’ incentives with the Uniswap ecosystem. If approved, Labs will shift its focus from monetizing its interfaces to protocol growth and development. Labs’ fees on the interface, wallet, and API will be set to zero.\n\nThese products already drive significant organic volume for the protocol. Removing fees makes them even more competitive and brings in more high quality volume and integrations, leading to better outcomes for LPs and the entire Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nMonetization of Labs interfaces will continue to evolve over time and any fees on volume originating from these products will benefit the Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nLabs will focus on both sides of the protocol’s flywheel – supply of liquidity and demand for volume. Below are just a few of the roadmap items ahead:\n\nImprove LP outcomes and protocol liquidity. Deploy the Protocol Fee Discount Auction and LVR-reducing hooks to capture more value for LPs and the protocol. Strengthen protocol leadership on strategic pairs, including dynamic fee hooks and stable-stable hooks. Add more sources of liquidity to the Uniswap protocol through aggregator hooks.\n\nDrive Uniswap protocol integrations and onboard new ecosystem players. Accelerate adoption through strategic partnerships, grants, and incentives that bring new participants onchain. Provide SDKs, documentation, and even a dedicated engineering team to help partners build on the protocol.\n\nAccelerate developer adoption of the protocol with Uniswap API. Pivot the API from a profit-generating product to a zero margin distribution method, expanding the protocol to more platforms and products, including those that previously competed with Labs products. Launch self-serve developer portal for key provisioning and allow integrators to add and rebalance liquidity directly through the API.\n\nDrive protocol usage with Labs’ interfaces. Use the interface and wallet to drive more volume to the protocol by making it free, investing heavily in LP UX, and adding new features like dollar-cost-averaging, improved crosschain swaps, gas abstraction, and more.\n\nEmpower hook builders. Provide engineering support, routing, support in Labs’ interfaces, grants and more.\n\nEstablish Unichain as a leading liquidity hub. Optimize Unichain for low-cost, high-performance AMM trading which attracts LPs, asset issuers, and other protocols. Make Uniswap protocol on Unichain the lowest cost place to trade in Labs’ interface and API by sponsoring gas.\n\nBring more assets to Uniswap. Deploy Uniswap protocol wherever new assets live. Build and invest in liquidity bootstrapping tools and token launchers, RWA partnerships and bridging of non-EVM assets to Unichain.\n\nLabs will also accelerate growth through builder programs, grants, incentives, partnerships, M&A, venture, onboarding institutions, and exploring moonshot efforts to unlock new value for the Uniswap ecosystem. We will provide regular updates to the community, including budget reports, frequent product and growth updates, and real-time dashboards giving visibility into our impact.\n\nThe Growth Budget\n\nWe propose governance create an annual growth budget of 20M UNI, distributed quarterly using a vesting contract starting January 1, 2026, to fund protocol growth and development.\n\nThe growth budget would be governed by a service provider agreement between Labs and DUNI. This would include an explicit commitment from Labs to maintain alignment between its activities and DUNI, ensuring Labs does not pursue strategies that conflict with token holder interests.\n\nThe Foundation will coordinate this process in its role as Ministerial Agent to DUNI. If the Snapshot vote passes, an independent committee composed of Ben Jones and Hart Lambur will be appointed by the Foundation to lead negotiations based on this draft letter of intent, with Cooley LLP serving as the committee’s external counsel. The final negotiated agreement will be included in this governance proposal as part of the full onchain vote, and executed on its passing.\n\nUpdate 12/18:\n\nFinal services agreement between DUNI and Uniswap Labs\n\nThe final services agreement reflects negotiations between the Uniswap Foundation’s independent committee, acting as Ministerial Agent to DUNI, and Uniswap Labs following the temperature check, and does include deviations from the previously posted Letter of Intent.\n\nHash: 0xb7a5a04f613e49ce4a8c2fb142a37c6781bda05c62d46a782f36bb6e97068d3b\n\nIndemnification agreements for the independent negotiation committee\n\nThese agreements indemnify the members of the independent negotiation committee (Hart Lambur and Ben Jones), or their respective service providers, as applicable, for the services they provided in negotiating the SPA.\n\nHashes:\n\n0x96861f436ef11b12dc8df810ab733ea8c7ea16cad6fd476942075ec28d5cf18a (Hart Lambur), 0x576613b871f61f21e14a7caf5970cb9e472e82f993e10e13e2d995703471f011 (Ben Jones)\n\nLock the Socks\n\nUnisocks have a long history, ranging between fun, fashion, flex, weird, weirder, even weirder, and gross (we’re not linking this one). They were launched by Labs in May 2019 as the first tokenized socks to trade on Uniswap protocol, or anywhere probably.\n\nWhen Labs launched UNI in September 2020, it transferred ownership of the original Uniswap v1 SOCKS/ETH liquidity position to Uniswap governance, where it has sat dormant ever since. We propose that governance move this position from Uniswap v1 on mainnet to Uniswap v4 on Unichain and transfer the LP position to a burn address, locking it forever.\n\nThis would ensure that this liquidity can never be withdrawn in the future, permanently locking in the original price curve and realizing the Unisocks vision. Also, the pink socks belong on the pink chain and “Uniswap v4” rhymes with “wore” – which is what you do with socks.\n\nDue to technical complexity, this migration would be executed through a separate onchain vote.\n\nProposal Spec\n\nPre-proposal - complete before onchain vote\n\n/// Deploy the TokenJar and the Releaser\nTokenJar tokenJar = new TokenJar{salt: SALT_TOKEN_JAR}();\nFirepit releaser = new Firepit{salt: SALT_RELEASER}(RESOURCE, THRESHOLD, address(tokenJar));\n\n/// Update the owner on the TokenJar and Releaser to governance\nIOwned(address(tokenJar)).transferOwnership(TIMELOCK);\nIOwned(address(releaser)).transferOwnership(TIMELOCK);\n\n/// Update the thresholdSetter on the Releaser to the owner\nreleaser.setThresholdSetter(TIMELOCK);\n\n/// Deploy the FeeController\nV3FeeController v3FeeController =new V3FeeController{salt: SALT_FEE_CONTROLLER}(address(V3_FACTORY), address(tokenJar));\n\n/// Update the feeSetter to the owner\nv3FeeController.setFeeSetter(TIMELOCK);\n\n/// Set default fees for each fee tier\nv3FeeController.setDefaultFeeByFeeTier(100, 10 << 4 | 10);\nv3FeeController.setDefaultFeeByFeeTier(500, 8 << 4 | 8);\nv3FeeController.setDefaultFeeByFeeTier(3000, 6 << 4 | 6);\nv3FeeController.setDefaultFeeByFeeTier(10_000, 4 << 4 | 4);\n\n/// Configure the merkle root for enabled pairs (this is all the pairs the fee will be on for)\nv3FeeController.setMerkleRoot(merkleRoot);\n\n/// Deploy the UNIVesting smart contract\nUNIVesting uniVesting = new UNIVesting(5_000_000 ether, 91.25 days, GROWTH_FUND_RECIPIENT);\n\nIn this proposal - if passed\n\n/// Burn 100M UNI\nUNI.transfer(0xdead, 100_000_000 ether);\n\n/// Approve two years of vesting to the UNIvester smart contract\n/// UNI stays in treasury until vested and unvested UNI can be cancelled by setting approve back to 0\nUNI.approve(address(uniVesting), 40_000_000 ether);\n\n/// Set the owner of the v3 factory to the configured fee controller\nV3_FACTORY.setOwner(address(v3FeeController));\n\n/// Update the v2 fee to setter to the timelock\nIOldV2FeeToSetter(V2_FACTORY.feeToSetter()).setFeeToSetter(TIMELOCK);\n\n/// Set the recipient of v2 protocol fees to the token jar\nV2_FACTORY.setFeeTo(address(tokenJar));\n\nResources:\n\nFee documentation\n\nFee contracts\n\nProtocol Fee Discount Auction whitepaper\n\nDraft letter of intent\n\nFinal services agreement\n\nIndemnification agreement for Hart Lambur\n\nIndemnification agreement for Ben Jones\n\nThank you\n\nUniswap protocol wouldn’t be here without the LPs, swappers, builders, and community members who’ve helped the protocol become the largest decentralized exchange in the world. This proposal builds on that foundation, and sets the ecosystem up for the next phase of growth.\n\nThank you to everyone who has been part of the journey so far. We’re just getting started!\n\n47 Likes\n\nUniswap Governance Community Calls\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Robinhood Chain\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Eight More Chains and Remaining Mainnet v3 Pools\n\n[RFC] IL Hedge Hook — Automated Impermanent Loss Protection for Uniswap v4 LPs\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Three More Chains\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Arc\n\nUniswap Foundation: Summary FY’2025 Financials\n\nUniswap Foundation: Summary FY’2025 Financials\n\nDoo_StableLab\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 9:06pm\n\n2\n\nWe support the long waited initiaves. We will vote in support for both Uniswap fee switch as well as burns\n\n8 Likes\n\nBoardroom\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 9:13pm\n\n3\n\nGlad to see this come to fruition, happy to vote in support here.\n\n6 Likes\n\nbendi\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 9:45pm\n\n4\n\nHey @haydenadams, this is an exciting proposal and it’s exciting to see you being the one to make it!\n\nCan you confirm this commit, which is linked from the docs, represents the version of the protocol fee contracts you intend to deploy and go live with. We see the OZ audit reports. Were/will any additional audits performed?\n\nScopeLift looks forward to digging into the technical details of the proposal at length and sharing our analysis. I will say that my high level, gut reaction to what has been proposed is a positive one. Thanks to everyone who helped make it possible\n\n6 Likes\n\nmarktoda\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 9:55pm\n\n5\n\nThere are a few minor smart contract changes still to be made and we are planning one more round of audits before deployment! We welcome any feedback in the meantime and will include it on the bug bounty later this week with details to come\n\n9 Likes\n\nbendi\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 10:06pm\n\n6\n\nAwesome thanks @marktoda\n\n2 Likes\n\nrobertleifke\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 11:21pm\n\n7\n\nHey @haydenadams and team,\n\nI read the proposal and think it’s great news for the development of the Uniswap AMMs and all the onchain infrastructure supporting it. That said, I do worry about the actual incentive alignment between Labs, the Foundation, and the protocol(s). Uniswap Labs is a Delaware C corp that raised large venture rounds on it’s equity and therefore has expectations from it’s investors that the Labs equity will be more valuable in the future. Traditionally businesses become more valuable by maximizing cash flow from it’s products. Instead it’s seems that Labs is moving away from this model by increasing the value of it’s UNI holdings which ideally happens the more revenue the Uniswap AMMs and supporting protocols generate. That seems fine in practice but to realize that value the company must sell it’s tokens, reducing its stake and therefore its future incentive to continue long term development. Even more so, it exposes the Labs entity to volatility and speculation of the UNI token. This moves Labs away from being a company focused on just products to one needing sophisticated treasury management operations. Additionally, if Labs is the primary entity building the protocol and expanding it’s market share, to what extent is it fair that Labs only receives a small portion of the value it creates by holding a small percentage of the token supply. Additionally, many of the core trading functions powered by Uniswap protocols (e.g. Unichain sequencer, UniswapX) requires Labs to run centralized infrastructure. This has created a massive, complex intermediary layer that if Labs truly went away would kill the viability of the protocol. If Labs shuts off it’s own interface fees, it could expose them to unpredictable revenues and thereby have consequential effects on the protocol(s) itself. More importantly, turning on the Uniswap fee switch and then burning UNI tokens feels like the Uniswap AMMs would no longer be public goods but instead a commercialized product. Needless to say, I still like the direction that Labs is taking to prioritize Uniswap V4 but remain skeptical of the alignment between Labs, protocol fees, and the UNI token if the actual protocol(s) are to remain public goods.\n\n3 Likes\n\nArgonaut\n\nNovember 10, 2025, 11:56pm\n\n9\n\nAs a small delegate that did not contribute to this proposal, the Argonaut team appreciates the chance to comment. The community has waited a long time for this milestone for the Uniswap DAO, and we trusted Uniswap Labs to make the right call by moving away from directing interface revenues to themselves and establishing a framework that creates value for the DAO and the governance token. This proposal exceeds our expectations and speaks to the caliber of the teams at Uniswap Labs and the Uniswap Foundation. We will vote in favor. Congratulations to everyone who made it possible!\n\n2 Likes\n\nmnemon1ck\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 12:41am\n\n10\n\nIs all the functionality already implemented and the only thing that is left is turn on the switch?\n\n1 Like\n\ndennisonb\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 3:05am\n\n11\n\nI can hardly believe believe we’ve finally come to this day. Great work everyone. The flame of DeFi rises!\n\n2 Likes\n\nmenaskop\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 5:42am\n\n12\n\nOverall, as someone who has been working with tokenomics for many years, I view this initiative positively.\n\nHowever, I would like to make several clarifications:\n\nBurning is not the only incentive mechanism → it works best when balanced with other methods such as staking or direct fee distribution. The fundamental rule of tokenomics derives from the law of supply and demand: the more effectively we increase demand while reducing supply, the stronger the incentive for token growth overall.\n\nThe governance function of UNI and the inclusion of new participants must not be overlooked, since without that, decentralization will be compromised. Therefore, additional reward campaigns → like those held recently, which allowed users to earn UNI through activity and liquidity provision rather than direct purchases → and similar actions will still be necessary.\n\nMost likely, the team is cautious about introducing direct buybacks or fee distributions due to recurring regulatory risks, so at this stage, the burn mechanism may indeed be the most appropriate solution.\n\nSo overall, I believe that this approach will be beneficial at this stage.\n\n2 Likes\n\nuniyj\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 9:25am\n\n13\n\nHaven’t been very active on Uniswap governance for a while, but soooo pumped for this!\n\nFoundation + Labs = Protocol\n\nUF + UL = UP !!!\n\nyj\n\n1 Like\n\nJames\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 12:35pm\n\n15\n\nObviously cool to see a meaningful proposal from @haydenadams about the UNI tokens future. However, I do think the proposal reads a lot more of ‘here’s what’s happening’ as opposed to ‘lets talk about the future of UNI’ regardless thought I’d post an alternative mechanism to burning 100% of the fees.\n\nInstead, the fees could deposit revenue into a treasury based on the LP pools: ie fees from ETH/USDC pool accrue both ETH & USDC to the uniswap treasury, UNI/BANKER pool accrues both tokens, etc. UNI then creates a productive treasury that is an index of all tokens that are traded on uniswap.\n\nUNI token holders can then vote onchain about how to manage this treasury, capture the upside of all tokens that are traded on uniswap, sell tokens the DAO believes will go down, buy tokens the DAO believes will go up, form an endowment, introduce novel DeFi integrations to the treasury, etc, etc.\n\nThis to me seems like a much longer term and sustainable use of these fees.\n\n1 Like\n\nSEEDGov\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 1:07pm\n\n16\n\nFirst of all, we want to congratulate the team for the work done in developing this long-awaited proposal, which we fully support!\n\nSecondly, we have a few questions we’d like to clarify:\n\nWith the projected reduction of LP fees from 0.3% to 0.25%, isn’t there a risk that liquidity providers might move their funds to other DEXs offering more attractive conditions? If that happens, lower liquidity in the pools and higher IL could lead to a decrease in trading activity and volume, thereby reducing the protocol’s revenue and, consequently, the amount of UNI to be burned. Was this risk assessed? Is there room to reconsider the fee strategy if such effects are observed?\n\nWe’d like to better understand the rationale behind allocating the entire Protocol Fee to token burns, rather than reserving part of it for growth initiatives or revenue sharing with tokenholders. Was any financial analysis conducted to support the idea that burning 100% of fees is preferable to using a portion to strengthen growth or reward holders? Why was this total burn mechanism chosen?\n\nRegarding the budget request of 20M UNI starting in January 2026, aimed at funding growth and protocol development, isn’t there a potential overlap with the $ 25.1M budget approved for the Uniswap Foundation in March this year, which already included allocations for development and growth over the next two years? Given that Uniswap Labs will now take over growth and development responsibilities, along with the transfer of staff and operations from the Foundation to Labs, will the @UniswapFoundation return to the DAO the previously approved budget?\n\nWhat growth initiatives can you tell us about that will be carried out with the required budget? Is there a tentative roadmap you can share?\n\nThanks.\n\n8 Likes\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDonOfDAOs\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 1:56pm\n\n17\n\nWith the removal of the front end fee, is there path to increase LP fees? Given FE fee was 0.25% and LPs are losing 0.05% there is more than enough in savings to boost LPs to their previous levels while also providing the same 0.05% to burn.\n\n2 Likes\n\ngeronimo\n\nNovember 11, 2025, 3:51pm\n\n18\n\n20M UNI at today’s prices is about $180M per year. This is effectively an expense that offsets the majority if not all fees sent to the firepit. This maybe reasonable but we can’t say without seeing the details of the growth budget and how those funds will be utilized. Where can that be found? @devinwalsh @kenneth\n\nWhy is it being allocated in nominal token units? 20M is 2.2%+ of supply per year. Growth should have a budget and a dollar equivalent in UNI tokens should be granted.\n\n2 Likes\n\nYellow-Cake\n\nNovember 12, 2025, 12:24am\n\n21\n\nThis proposal is long overdue and represents the structural alignment UNI has needed since launch.\n\nTurning on protocol fees, directing them to burns, and linking token value directly to on-chain activity finally gives UNI true economic purpose.\n\nThe one-time burn and recurring fee capture mechanisms reward long-term holders and reinforce Uniswap’s position as a community-driven, revenue-generating protocol rather than just an LP platform.\n\nImportantly, this change doesn’t rely on speculative hype — it builds a measurable, on-chain feedback loop between usage and value. That’s what will sustain Uniswap over the next cycle.\n\nI fully support the proposal and encourage timely execution once the Snapshot passes. Let’s make UNI deflationary, sustainable, and representative of the ecosystem it powers.\n\nYellowCake\n\n1 Like\n\nOleh\n\nNovember 12, 2025, 12:01pm\n\n22\n\nI waited for this to happen for more than 4 years!\n\nUniswap changed 4 major versions meanwhile: a tremendous, colossal amount of work by team, which I’d like to thank for!\n\njuroberttyb\n\nNovember 12, 2025, 2:02pm\n\n23\n\nWith the projected reduction of LP fees from 0.3% to 0.25%, isn’t there a risk that liquidity providers might move their funds to other DEXs offering more attractive conditions?\n\nThis argument holds back uni token holder and the protocol’s revenue alignment issue for too long.\n\nIn the long run, it is impossible to have revenue growth and uni token value alignment separated.\n\nawbvious\n\nNovember 13, 2025, 6:19pm\n\n24\n\nOver 5 years after the UNI drop (and thank you, btw), the biggest legacy of Uniswap in DeFi, I feel, is the Uniswap v2 contract. For one simple reason. If you see just about any other smart contract on any EVM compatible chain, you have to think: “Well, where’s the gotcha.” Now, that chain might have gotchas! But that contract is going to do what it says on the tin. That’s beautiful, and what we, five years later, are missing now.\n\nGovernance is suggestions: 5 years of DeFi and I am convinced more than ever that decentralization is an ideal that is strived for at best, and given lip service at worst. Governance votes are never guarantees, always just suggestions. The examples of DeFi protocol insiders, the five or less actual “devs” who actually “do the thing,” making “emergency measures” despite token votes are numerous. At the end of the day, there’s always some human typing “git commit” and they may or may not do it based on the votes.\n\nBack ends aren’t transparent and fixed: Then there are the “immutable” contracts themselves. Either they are completely obscured as to their source code, and full of admin keys and “upgradability,” or they have it simply a few layers deep, in another contract that is referenced or in some off-chain computational resource. Only a Uniswap v2 contract will do what it says on the tin. Every time. I mean, there may be more examples, but none off the top of my head, certainly not with the historical impact. And still current relevance! Someone spins up a new EVM compatible chain and someone two seconds later is going to come up with a Uniswap v2 clone with Uniswap v2 contracts that work exactly like they did, years ago. (But again, the chain itself could have admin keys, upgradability, 20 validators that are really just one dude, etc., etc.)\n\nFront ends aren’t transparent and fixed: Of course, there are also frontends. Uniswap was also fairly historic (in a less positive way) for being the first high profile case of a “DeFi” protocol censoring their frontend for fear of regulatory attack. Those who knew, of course, could find a way to the Uniswap v2 contracts without using the Uniswap front end. And that’s beautiful. Because, at the time, there was basically no regulation—good or bad—there was only fear of de facto registration through legislation (hence the front-end censorship), but nothing actually written into law as far as I can recall. Which is okay, I think, if—if I can use the old maxim—Code is law. In /that world/ with no regulation, Code is Law works for me. I don’t know about this world. Personally, I was much less scared of smart contracts five years ago than just about everything that is going on now.\n\n(My personal view, if I may slightly digress, just so there’s no misunderstanding as to motives: Crypto should not be connected in any way to banks in any way where ultimately the general public should have to bail out the degens. FDIC-insured banks with “fractional reserves” should not be impacted if some crypto 1000x leveraged prediction market rug pulls or death spirals. That means, in my ideal world, yes, code is law, the MEV extractor or the MEV extractor’s extractor (per a recent case) is on equal terms—all the way up until the proverbial fist hits the proverbial nose, which to me is the onramps and offramps. Do what you want with your bits of 0s and 1s but when you try to convert them to dollars and cents… Well, where the buck starts, is where the buck stops. Just a bit of disclosure on my personal views. I also don’t like one-dollar-equals-one-vote and the outsized power of A16Z, etc., but that’s another matter for another day.)\n\nSo, I don’t think we’ll ever get away from a human has to type in “git commit” sometimes. Robots aren’t running the cooling towers in data centers. Humans will be a part. But we /can/ make it about as “immutable” and decentralized as possible when proposals are enacted, and I think this suggestion needs to incorporate this if we want to believe Uniswap is striving not lip-servicing.\n\nGovernance implementation is as human-less as possible: Basically, you have the high-level proposal, but you also have a very, very detail implementation plan connected to it. One that is clearly audited HEAVILY. But basically the plan is a really detailed computer program that is waiting to read the Ethereum blockchain (presumably) for the result of this vote as basically a parameter that will run the entire program. It details exactly what will happen to the contracts, the infrastructure, the websites, the front, the back, you name it and it happens all programmatically (ideally). If there’s ANY part with a human in it, make them have skin in the game, like Hayden Adams has to himself push some button, fine, but if he doesn’t push the button per the vote, then he has a legally-binding contract where he donates half his wealth to open-source development (or something).\n\nBack-ends are transparent and fixed. Basically every trick they have now, remove it. No admin keys. No upgradability. As little as possible off-chain. Truly decentralized infrastructure would be great… Dunno if it exists. I mean, it does in name, the number of DePIN projects out there is insane. But how many are truly decentralized? But at the very, least there’s probably a way to use disinterested third-parties, maybe a lot of different DePINs and possibly classical infrastructure providers along with some kind of kill switch if it gets messed with and a High Availability solution to go to the others if it happens. In other words, Disaster Recovery assuming that a human wanting to go against the vote is /a disaster/. Not saying it will be easy, but I am pretty sure a solution can be made that is so whack-a-mole it won’t go down, won’t get changed.\n\nFront-ends that are transparent and fixed. Permaweb is probably the easiest way to solve most of that. But just like back-ends, you got the High Availability, whack-a-mole solutions, that include P2P, Tor, you name it. I don’t doubt if there’s the money for it, there’s a solution for it. Point is, even if some powerful country says that memecoin is against our national interest, not much anyone can do about it coming (front end) or going (back end).\n\nOf course, the biggest downside risk is you could spend a bunch of money on something, and after all those audits, it still ships with a bug that bricks it instantly. (Okay, that and a government decides everyone human who made a vote and/or enabled the enaction of that vote should be put in jail. That would be pretty bad.) BUT, at least everyone would know the result would be TRUE (as true as can be) Decentralized Finance.\n\n[EDIT: 10 seconds later, formatting.]\n\n1 Like\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nMaking Protocol Fees Operational\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n35\n\n22004\n\nMay 14, 2024\n\n[Temperature Check] - Activate Uniswap Protocol Governance\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n156\n\n67892\n\nMarch 14, 2025\n\nUniswap Proposal: An Alternative Use-Case for the Fee Switch\n\nUncategorized\n\n21\n\n6616\n\nApril 7, 2023\n\nTemperature Check - Ultrasound UNI [Fee switch organization funding]\n\nTemperature Check\n\n43\n\n8342\n\nFebruary 25, 2022\n\n\"Fee Switch\" Design Space & Next Steps\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n73\n\n29139\n\nNovember 21, 2022","tokens":8816,"crawled_at":1791193454995} +{"id":10241,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/key_concepts/abci_app_async_behaviour","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"The AsyncBehaviour class - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"The AsyncBehaviour class\n\nNote\n\nFor clarity, the snippets of code presented here are a simplified version of the actual\nimplementation. We refer the reader to the Open Autonomy API for the complete details.\n\nThe AsyncBehaviour class, introduced in the valory/abstract_round_abci\nSkill, is a mixin class that allows the AEA developer to use\nasynchronous programming patterns in a Behaviour implementation. Since it is usual that many of the tasks to be carried by the state behaviours are long-running, this is the base class from which FSM Behaviours will be typically derived from.\n\nThe Need for Asynchronous Behaviours\n\nThe main motivation behind the AsyncBehaviour utility class\nis that in idiomatic AEA behaviour development, the act method\ncannot contain blocking code or long-running tasks, as otherwise\nthe AEA main thread that executes all the behaviours would get stuck.\nFor example, in order to interact with an external component through\na request-response pattern, e.g., sending a request to an HTTP server and waiting for its response, or\nrequest the Decision Maker to sign a transaction. The usual approach in this case is to:\n\nSend the message from the act() method and update the state\ninto \"waiting for the response\" (e.g., by updating an attribute in\nthe shared state or in the behaviour instance, or by using the\nstate pattern),\nsuch that the next call to act() can be intercepted and controlled by the developer.\n\nReceive the response in a concrete Handler object that is registered\nto process messages of the response protocol.\n\nHandle the response in the handler's handle() method according to the\nskill business logic and the current state behaviour, and notify\nthe behaviour about the change of state (e.g. by updating an attribute\nin the shared state such that the next act call can read it and take\na different execution path).\n\nFor large and complex skills, this development approach is quite error-prone and expensive\nin terms of maintainability, as the business logic does not reside in a single\nskill component (i.e., in a behaviour class), but also in several other skill components (i.e., in the handler classes, one for each interaction protocol required by the behaviour).\n\nAsynchronous Programming to the Rescue\n\nA well-known programming technique that turned out very useful in the\nweb development community is asynchronous programming.\n\nInformally, a programming language that supports asynchronous\nprogramming allows running blocking operations asynchronously:\nthe operation is not run in the same thread where the call happened,\nbut it is delegated to another executor, e.g., another thread/process,\nallowing the caller function execution being \"suspended\" until the operation has completed.\nOnce the blocking operation has completed, the execution of the function\ncan process the result and continue as usual.\nThis lets the main thread to perform other tasks while the function is waiting\nfor the result of the operation.\n\nIf the reader is not familiar with asynchronous programming concepts,\nwe suggest reading the following resources:\n\nMDN Web Docs: Asynchronous JavaScript\n\nMDN Web Docs: Glossary: asynchronous\n\nasyncio standard Python library documentation\n\nHow AsyncBehaviour works\n\nThe behaviour execution model of the AEA framework is the following.\nAt the AEA startup, the framework registers a periodic task, one for each\nBehaviour object b, that executes the b.act method. Such periodic\nexecution for behaviour b is scheduled in the main thread loop,\nwith a tick interval b.tick_interval and starting time b.start_at.\nAs mentioned above, the code in act() should not be blocking,\nas otherwise it would block the main thread execution, and\ntherefore it would prevent the execution of the other behaviours' act()\nand the processing of incoming messages.\n\nclass SimpleBehaviour(Behaviour, ABC):\n\"\"\"This class implements a simple behaviour.\"\"\"\n\ndef act(self) -> None:\n\"\"\"Do the action.\"\"\"\n# (...)\n\nThe AsyncBehaviour utility class allows to wrap the execution\nof the act() method allowing its execution to be \"suspended\"\nand resumed upon the happening of certain events\n(e.g. the receiving of a message, a sleep timeout etc.).\nCurrently, the crux of the implementation is the\nPython built-in generator machinery:\n\nfrom the developer perspective, the execution can be suspended by using\nyield or yield from expressions. This will return a generator object\nto the framework, which can opportunely be stored in an object attribute;\n\nfrom the framework perspective, the execution can be resumed by \"sending\" a\nvalue to the generator object, using the send()\nmethod of the generator object. The value can be None,\nor a message sent by another skill component.\n\nclass AsyncBehaviour(ABC):\n\n@abstractmethod\ndef async_act(self) -> Generator:\n\"\"\"Do the act, supporting asynchronous execution.\"\"\"\n\n@abstractmethod\ndef async_act_wrapper(self) -> Generator:\n\"\"\"Do the act, supporting asynchronous execution.\"\"\"\n# (...)\n\nThe abstract methods the developer should implement are called\nasync_act_wrapper and async_act.\n\nThe sequence diagram below gives the idea of what happens when the\nact() method of an AsyncBehaviour is called:\n\nIn words, the first time the act() method is called:\n\nfirst, it creates the generator object by calling the used-defined async_act_wrapper();\n\nit triggers the first execution by sending the None value;\n\nit returns the execution control at the first yield statement;\n\nsets the state to RUNNING;\n\nreturns to the caller in the main loop.\n\nAny subsequent calls to the act() method are redirected to the generator\nwhose execution was triggered by the first call, which invokes async_act().\n\nA simple example\n\nConsider a (one-shot) behaviour\nwhose logic is to print a sequence of messages separated by a sleep interval:\n\nclass PrintBehaviour(OneShotBehaviour, AsyncBehaviour):\n\ndef async_act_wrapper(self):\nyield from self.async_act()\n\ndef async_act(self):\nprint(\"First message\")\nyield from self.sleep(1.0)\nprint(\"Second message\")\nyield from self.sleep(1.0)\nprint(\"Third message\")\n\nWithout AsyncBehaviour, one should take care of:\n\nremembering the \"state\" of the behaviour (i.e. what is the last message printed)\n\nhandling the sleep interval by hand\n\nThis is a naive implementation\n\nimport datetime\nfrom aea.skills.behaviours import SimpleBehaviour\n\nclass PrintBehaviour(SimpleBehaviour):\n\ndef __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):\nsuper().__init__(*args, **kwargs)\nself.state = 0\n\n# remember time of last printed message\nself.last_time = None\n# timedelta of 0 days, 1 second\nself.timedelta = datetime.timedelta(0, 1)\n\ndef act(self):\nnow = datetime.datetime.now()\nif self.state == 0:\nprint(\"First message\")\nself.state += 1\nself.last_time = now\nreturn\nif self.state == 1 and now > (self.last_time + self.timedelta):\nprint(\"Second message\")\nself.state += 1\nself.last_time = now\nreturn\nif self.state == 2 and now > (self.last_time + self.timedelta):\nprint(\"Third message\")\nself.state += 1\nself.last_time = now\nreturn\n# do nothing\n\nBlocking requests\n\nAs explained above, one of the common tasks for a behaviour is\nto interact with other AI agents and/or agent instances via message-based\ncommunication. In this section, we focus on a sequence of\nrequest-response interactions through agent interaction protocols.\nWe consider the fetchai/generic_buyer skill as an example (link to code).\n\nThe idiomatic approach\n\nThe idiomatic approach, implemented in the skill fetchai/generic_buyer,\nis outlined in the sequence diagram below. The suffix B is a shorthand\nfor Behaviour, and H is a shorthand for Handler.\n\nThe participants SearchB, SearchH, TransactionB, SigningH, LedgerH, FipaH\nand DecisionMaker are internal components of the buyer AEA,\nwhereas ADS, Seller, and Ledger are external actors.\n\nFollows the breakdown of each message exchange:\n\nThe buyer starts by searching for seller of the desired data,\nand the search behaviour (SearchB) sends a search request to an\nagent discovery service (ADS);\n\nThe search result of the ADS gets routed to the search handler (SearchH),\nwhich selects one of the sellers, and sends a \"call for proposal\" (CFP) message to him.\nThe CFP is the first message of a\nFIPA protocol interaction.\nSee the AEA documentation on the\nAEA FIPA-like protocol.\n\nThe seller replies with a \"FIPA proposal\" to the buyer. Such message\nis handled by the FipaH handler;\n\nOnce the negotiation has completed (only the FipaH is involved in the negotiation),\nthe FipaH handler sends the payment transaction to the TransactionB behaviour\nsuch that it can be processed;\n\nThe TransactionB, which was periodically listening for new transaction to process,\nreads the new transaction and sends a signing requests to the\nDecisionMaker.\nNote that a skill component does not have access to the crypto identity of\nan AEA, and it has to rely on the\nDecisionMaker\nfor certain operations, such as the signing of transactions.\n\nThe DecisionMaker\nsends the response to the dedicated handler, the SigningH.\nThe SigningH submit the transactions to the Ledger (through the ledger_api connection);\n\nThe Ledger's response (the transaction hash) is handled by the LedgerH handler,\nwhich in turn sends the transaction hash to the Seller\n\nThe Seller, once the transaction has been validated, will send the\nbought data to the buyer with an FIPA \"inform\" message, which is handled\nby the FipaH handler.\n\nThe business logic is spread across different skill components, behaviours and handlers,\ndue to the \"forced callback\" mechanism that forces the developer to handle the message\nof an interaction protocol in the handler registered for that protocol.\n\nUsing the AsyncBehaviour\n\nThe above example can be reimplemented in an AsyncBehaviour in\nthe following way (Python-pseudocode):\n\nclass GenericBuyerBehaviour(OneShotBehaviour, AsyncBehaviour):\n\ndef async_act_wrapper(self):\nyield from self.async_act()\n\ndef async_act(self):\nsearch_request = build_search_request(...)\n# send search request to the ADS\n# and (asynchronously) wait for the response\nresponse = yield from send(search_request)\nagents = response.result\n# pick the first agent in the result list\nseller = agents[0]\n\n# send CFP to the seller\n# and (asynchronously) wait for the response\ncfp = build_cfp(...)\nresponse = yield from send(cfp, to=seller)\n\n# here there should be the buyer strategy\n# for the negotiation with the seller...\n# (...)\n\n# in case both parties accept the negotiation outcome:\ntx = build_tx(...)\n\n# send transaction to the decision maker\n# and (asynchronously) wait for the response\nsigned_tx = yield from send(tx)\n\n# send transaction to the distributed ledger\n# and (asynchronously) wait for the response\ntx_hash = yield from send(signed_tx)\n\n# send transaction hash to the seller\nsend(tx_hash, to=seller)\n\n# wait until the seller sends the data\ninform_message = yield from self.wait_for_message()\nprint(inform_message.data)\n\n# done!\n\nAs you can see, the core business logic of the buyer resides in the async_act\nmethod. Many details of the implementation are omitted, like\nthe utility functions like build_* and send,\nbut they are conceptually similar to what is done in the handlers of the\nfetchai/generic_buyer skill.\n\nThe wait_for_message method, uses the send(...) method to wait for the\nresponse, allowing it to wait for specific events triggered\nby other components. In this case, each of the handlers will\ndispatch the response to the requester component, whose request\nis identified by the (dialogue) identifier\nof the interaction.\nHowever, note that the handler code in this case is skill-independent,\nwhich means that they do not contribute to the business logic.","tokens":2898,"crawled_at":1791193462037} +{"id":10242,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/token-metadata/token-2022","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"SPL Token-2022 | Token Metadata","text":"Token Metadata is a legacy program. It remains supported, but is not recommended for new projects. Use Core instead.\n\nSPL Token-2022 is the latest token program on the Solana blockchain that can be used to create fungible and non-fungible tokens. It supports the same functionalities and structures of the SPL Token program, but also includes a set of extensions to add new functionalities.\nIn order to support adding metadata information to Token-2022 mint accounts, a set of Token Metadata instructions have been updated to allow specified the desired token program. For example, Token Metadata can initialize a Token-2022 mint, create metadata and mint tokens using the Create and Mint instructions and specifying the SPL Token-2022 as the token program to use.\n\nThe token program of a mint account can be determined by checking the owner property of the account.\n\nA similar approach can be used for other instructions, such as Burn, Delegate, Lock, Print, Revoke, Transfer, Unlock, Unverify, Updateand Verify. These instruction can validate mint and token accounts from SPL Token-2022. The corresponding token program must be used in any instruction requiring a token program (e.g., Delegate): if the mint and token account are from Token-2022, then the Delegate instruction will validate that the correct token program has been specified.\nBy default, Create and Mint will create SPL Token mint and token accounts if these accounts do not exist. To use Token-2022 accounts, you need to specify SPL Token-2022 as the token program to use.\n\nSupported Extensions\nWhile Token-2022 provides several extensions, the majority of extensions focus on fungible tokens. For example, the confidential transfer can be used to hide the amount of tokens transferred. While this is relevant for fungibles, since the amount can vary across different transfers, it is not applicable to non-fungible tokens since their supply is always 1 and decimals is always 0. Hence, the transfer amount of a non-fungible token will always be 1.\nToken Metadata enforces restrictions on the type of extensions that can be present on mint and token accounts based on the Token Standard. For fungible assets (Fungible and FungibleAsset standards), no restrictions are placed – the only restriction is on the program providing the metadata information. For non-fungible assets (NonFungible and ProgrammableNonFungible standards), Token Metadata validates which extensions are enabled and restricts the set of extensions that can be used.\nMint account extensions\nThese are extensions that can be enabled on mint accounts of SPL Token-2022.\nconfidential transfers: hides the amount during transfers.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nNot applicable since non-fungibles have supply of 1\n\ntransfer fees: allow to configure a transfer fee derived from the amount being transferred.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nNot applicable since non-fungibles have supply of 1\n\nclosing mint: allows closing mint accounts when supply reaches 0.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\nMust specify the Metadata account as the close authority\nPotential for a creator to recreate the same group of mint and metadata accounts\n\ninterest-bearing tokens: allows to change how the UI amount of tokens are represented.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nNot applicable since non-fungibles have supply of 1\n\nnon-transferable tokens: allows for \"soul-bound\" tokens that cannot be moved to any other address.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n✅\n\nDetails\n--\n--\n\npermanent delegate: allows to specify a permanent account delegate for any token account of a mint.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nThis changes the concept of ownership\n\ntransfer hook: allows call into third-party programs during transfer.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nToken Metadata specifies the logic for transfer\n\nmetadata pointer: allows adding an address that describes the canonical metadata.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n✅\n\nDetails\nMust point to the Metadata address\nMust point to the Metadata address\n\nmetadata: allow adding metadata directly to mint accounts.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n❌\n❌\n\nDetails\nMetadata information is added by Token Metadata\nMetadata information is added by Token Metadata\n\nToken account extensions\nThese are extensions that can be enabled on token accounts of SPL Token-2022.\nmemo required: requires memo on transfers.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nNot applicable\n\nimmutable ownership: disables the ability to change the ownership of token accounts.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n✅\n\nDetails\n--\n--\n\ndefault account state: allows to configure default token account states.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nToken Metadata validates the account state\n\nCPI guard: prevent certain actions (e.g., transfer) inside cross-program invocations.\nAssetFungibleNon-Fungible\nAllowed\n✅\n❌\n\nDetails\n--\nToken Metadata specifies the logic for transfer\n\nA comprehensibe overview of each extension can be found on SPL Token-2022 program documentation.\n\nDefault extensions\nWhen a mint account does not exist, the Create instruction will initialize one. If the token program being used is SPL Token-2022, the mint will be initialized with both closing mint and metadata pointer extensions.\nAssociated Token Accounts (ATAs) by default are always initialized with the immutable ownership extension.","tokens":1366,"crawled_at":1791193484397} +{"id":10243,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-preparing-for-possible-governance-attacks/24592","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] Preparing for possible Governance Attacks - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] Preparing for possible Governance Attacks\n\nRequests for Comment\n\njengajojo\n\nSeptember 17, 2024, 9:40am\n\n1\n\nSummary\n\nKickstart a discussion around preparing the DAO for possible governance attacks.\n\nMotivation\n\nIn 2023, several major DAOs faced governance crises due to attacks that exploited weaknesses in their treasury management. Nouns DAO encountered an incident when investor DCF GOD and allies amassed enough NFTs to propose liquidating the treasury. Amidst a bear market and disagreements over spending priorities, they used the governance structure for personal gain, withdrawing $27 million from the treasury.\n\nSimilarly, Aragon DAO experienced a governance exploit in May 2023. Investors gained control of 51% of the token supply and proposed liquidating the treasury. Despite efforts to oppose the move, they extracted $163 million, which led to Aragon’s dissolution.\n\nMost recently, in 2024, Compound DAO suffered a governance attack by a group known as the “Golden Boys.” They exploited the governance process to pass a proposal transferring $24 million in COMP tokens to a protocol under their control. This attack succeeded due to several factors: low voter turnout, poor timing of the vote (during a weekend), and lack of transparency.\n\nThese cases highlight a critical vulnerability in DAOs—concentrated voting power and low voter engagement can lead to malicious actors seizing governance control and draining the treasury for personal gain.\n\nRationale\n\nUniswap DAO’s core mission is to govern its protocol and manage treasury resources to support its long-term objectives. However, as the DAO grows, its treasury expands, creating an attractive target for potential attacks.\n\nThe current dynamic poses a threat: while the value of the treasury increases, the percentage of tokens actively delegated for governance decreases. This creates an imbalance where an attacker could acquire enough $UNI to take control of the DAO at a cost far below the total value of the treasury. Without safeguards, Uniswap DAO is at risk of facing a similar governance attack.\n\nImplementation\n\nWe see two possible solutions to address this challenge:\n\nEstablish a Veto Council\n\nOne proposed solution to safeguard the DAO’s treasury is to create a Veto Council. This council would have the authority to veto any proposal deemed harmful to the DAO. However, to avoid centralisation risks, the council’s veto power would be limited—lasting only 18 months. This ensures the council’s role is temporary, allowing time to strengthen governance while minimising the risk of long-term centralisation.\n\nThe Veto Council would provide an immediate defence mechanism, intervening when malicious proposals threaten the DAO’s stability or treasury. The ENS DAO recently adopted a similar solution (link).\n\nIntroduce Proposal Staking\n\nAn alternative solution is to implement a staking requirement for proposal authors. Under this system, anyone submitting a proposal must stake a small amount of UNI tokens, which would be locked until the vote concluded. Additionally, the vote would include a default option to cancel the proposal and slash the author if it receives over 33% of the votes to veto the proposal. This would effectively discourage bad actors from submitting harmful proposals, as they risk losing their staked tokens. The Cosmos hub governance has successfully implemented the ‘’No with Veto’’ option to combat spam and malicious proposals and has achieved tremendous success. This approach, however, can only be implemented in matured DAOs in terms of governance processes as an irrational stakeholder(s) with 33% of the voting power could exploit the system and veto any proposal and slash an innocent participant.\n\nBenefits:\n\nUnlike the Veto Council, which introduces some level of centralisation, proposal staking preserves the DAO’s decentralised nature. It empowers the broader delegate community to assess and vote on the validity of proposals, ensuring the process remains transparent and democratic.\n\nBy adding financial risk to submitting proposals, the staking mechanism discourages malicious intent while encouraging more thoughtful, well-constructed proposals.\n\nNo with Veto could be used by minor delegates to convey their strong disagreement with a particular proposal.\n\nNext Steps\n\nGather consensus from the DAO about next steps.\n\nVoting Options\n\nEstablish a Veto council\n\nExplore Proposal staking\n\nMake no changes\n\nOther\n\n4 Likes\n\n[Temp Check] Raise the onchain proposal quorum threshold from 40M\n\n[RFC] Delegate UNI to delegates qualified for cycle 2 rewards\n\nBlockworksResearch\n\nSeptember 17, 2024, 6:21pm\n\n2\n\nIn the long run there may be some concerns around the legal responsibility of security council dynamics. It’s very easy to imagine a world where a DAO’s security council (or in this case, Veto council) is deemed legally responsible for the rest of the DAO, and so we’re a bit wary of this option.\n\nThe best solution in face of regulatory uncertainty may be to look for more implicit voting dynamics that make governance attacks more difficult. Thus, we’d like to see further exploration of the proposal staking method. A couple immediate thoughts:\n\nIs there any situation where the DAO could find itself “bricked”, as in unable to push any more votes because of a new hostage situation?\n\nThe other possible problem for proposal staking is that a non-malicious controversial proposal could still be slashed. While we don’t think that people will go about slashing proposals they don’t like, it’s a possibility.\n\nStill, generally speaking, we’re in favor of the latter, though how would this be enforced operationally? This cannot be done on Snapshot, so there would have to be a specific Tally integration for this to be possible.\n\nUltimately, this all falls back onto voting dynamics. Compound’s problem was that it had some very large delegates that were inactive, and while incentive programs are great for maintaining participation among key delegates, there will be ways to usurp those programs as well. Thinking aloud here, but maybe we should rethink participation in the DAO, as in have some fall back system for which non-voting delegates can have voting power redistributed upon a certain participation threshold. This wouldn’t be forceful with their own voting power, only voting power delegated to them from other parties.\n\n3 Likes\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nSeptember 17, 2024, 7:40pm\n\n3\n\nWhile it’s important that the DAO keeps governance security top of mind, implementing safeguards such as a guardian are very much circumstantial. As of today, Uniswap is in a much stronger position than most other DAOs. Voter apathy at the onchain level is not a significant problem either. There has not been a proposal that failed to pass due to voter apathy in the past, and scarcely does this occur even at the offchain level. I think the last time an offchain proposal failed snapshot due to apathy was over a year ago. Delegates are getting paid. Plus the treasury delegates votes, too. The economic value for onchain quorum is high (relative to other DAOs). Proposal threshold is also high. And there are measures like a timelock delay that inherently increase the risk for a proposer to drain the treasury. Plus, unlike Compound, there aren’t user funds at risk. Uniswap DAO only has jurisdiction over so many functions.\n\nI would suggest keeping a keen eye on existing parameters as opposed to introducing alternative vectors that increase risk surface area in other ways. For instance, the proposal threshold today is 1M UNI, and the timelock delay is like 2 days. Increasing the the proposal threshold and the timelock delay collectively make it more difficult for a drain to occur since the attacker is essentially holding on to a lump of sand; a longer delay period allows the market to dump the native token, and a higher proposal threshold would make the economic cost of posting that proposal more expensive since the value of, say that 1M UNI, would be falling in that timelock delay phase.\n\nThis topic should be carefully visited over time though, especially if the treasury aims to diversify. In the treasury working group research draft we mention this concern:\n\n\"\n\nBeyond altering the fee switch function, Uniswap governance importantly has the ability to withdraw UNI tokens from the treasury. As of today, since the treasury is entirely consistent of native tokens, the financial benefit for an attacker is uncertain. The mere cost of swaying, either through direct purchase or bribes, votes towards draining the treasury is simply too high at the moment, with a 40M UNI quorum currently standing at $240M (@ $6 per UNI). Enough time can also elapse before the native token devalues to nearly zero if a governance attack were to occur. The 2+ day timelock delay, for instance, allows for existing token holders to liquidate their holdings, making it increasingly expensive for an attacker to continue holding UNI. However, as the DAO’s treasury diversifies into non-native assets, the value of the treasury becomes increasingly appealing for malicious actors. It is therefore imperative for treasury diversification initiatives to coincide with consistent improvements in governance security.\n\nTo effectively manage the growing complexity of DAO security as treasuries become more valuable and diversified, governance parameters should be reviewed regularly by delegates. Malicious actors take advantage of stale or inadequate voting thresholds, low participation rates, or concentrated voting power. Therefore, vigilance in updating governance mechanisms is critical to mitigating risks. This is especially important if the native token sustains its lack of utility and value accrual for it may increase price suppression as well as likelihood of frustrated UNI holders accepting bribes.\n\nIn a scenario where a fee switch is not active and the treasury is increasing its non-native token holdings, the DAO can, for instance, increase its quorum level to accommodate for the likelihood of an attack. Programs such as delegation using the treasury’s native tokens is another method for allocating votes to community-trusted entities. If the non-native token value of the treasury exceeds the total value of delegated votes, a metric that ideally needs to be adjusted based on average voter participation rate, the expected value of a treasury drain increases. As per the below graph, this has never been an issue for Uniswap—but must be considered once treasury diversification offers.\n\nTreasury tokens can also be allocated toward rewarding consistent voting, participation in governance proposals, or for attracting new delegates. Voter engagement must be seen as a critical expenditure item, directly linked to the long-term security of the DAO’s treasury.\n\nIf voter apathy is unchecked, the barriers to passing malicious proposals will diminish. Therefore, incentivizing governance is not merely a budget item—it is a safeguard against treasury vulnerabilities. For these reasons, the Uniswap DAO has been allocating incentives to socially-responsible delegates since June 2024, and we forecast such programs to remain present for the foreseeable future. A lack of a circuit breaker for malicious votes via a guardian or emergency shutdown mechanisms—like those in MakerDAO—only increases the need for active delegates to monitor parameters and protect the treasury.\n\n\"\n\n3 Likes\n\nbendi\n\nSeptember 18, 2024, 9:25pm\n\n4\n\nOn behalf of ScopeLift, I’m against the introduction of a Veto Council. Such a measure is extremely centralizing and should be looked at as a last ditch, temporary solutio. While some DAOs are in fact facing such a situation now, and while many more (including eventually Uniswap) will face it in the future if we don’t take proper steps to align and incentivize token holders and delegates, it is currently not the case.\n\nI’m open to the idea of proposal staking, and other DAOs are experimenting with this (notably ENS), however such a solution is ultimately just a speedbump for a serious attacker. Any bond requirement placed upon proposers would be much less than what a genuine attacker would be able to gain should they take control of Governance.\n\nFor now, Uniswap DAO is secure, and should not accept a centralizing, risky hack. Instead we should focus on sustainable long term solutions, like delegate compensation, UniStaker adoption, and governance minimization.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications\n\ndrllau_LexDAO\n\nSeptember 19, 2024, 3:19am\n\n5\n\nMy question is whether the real issue is structural, mechanics, or procedural?\n\nQuestion of Procedural guardrails\n\nExactly what proposals get listed for voting and subsequent execution? I would think there are checks and balances for\n\nNormal/Routine - threshold (eg less than XYZ), within previous scope, passed temp check\n\nExemption - something which breaks the norms but may require special consideration, longer debate or emergency consideration\n\nException - things which are significant or structural. I’d note that investors have to have mechanism for rage-quitting … There may be penalties involved for early withdrawal but it should be clear at start what pooling the funds and whether there are legal restrictions\n\nIssue of Mechanics\n\nAt the moment the distribution of tokens acts as a functional electoral college (cf HK). But you can have alternatives to Roman voting (yes/no) … For example Kiwi voting using the loom.io approach allows for yes/no/veto/abstain with rules on what a veto does (strong objection as against some policy). Greek voting allows for contentious but popular decisions to be considered by an expert panel. And of course the various web3 attempts like conviction voting (the proposal that timelocked the longest has greater weight) or holographic voting. These all fall under decision science mechanism design and can be assessed rationally (and not argument by analogy). Aragon sought external investment and when the punters saw nothing being done, they got sick of waiting, hence rage-quit so the context is different.\n\nStructural\n\nIf you create new pre-emptive rights or even allow layers of ratification (a la intercession by courts/trust protectors) it alters the balance of power … This may be deliberate but should not be casually done.\n\nDelegation != Abdication … If you wish to “donate” funds to a cause, then make sure someone keeps an eye on any adverse 51%yakuzi style “proposals” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sōkaiya\n\nTane\n\nSeptember 19, 2024, 3:28am\n\n6\n\nThank you @jengajojo for proposing measures regarding the very important issue of governance attacks.\n\nWe think that, considering the current state of the Uniswap DAO, the two options currently proposed change the voting dynamics too much.\n\nFirst, regarding establishing a Veto Council, we believe that giving such strong power to certain DAO participants affects other participants too significantly. We assume that if a rigorous selection is made from the delegates currently participating in the DAO, honest members will be chosen. However, we are concerned that the power balance between the selected and unselected delegates may lower the health of the DAO. Even if the selected members cannot abuse their power, there is a risk that other participants might hesitate to voice strong opinions to members who can reject on-chain votes or become overly compliant with their views.\n\nNext, we think that introducing Proposal Staking is a milder measure than the above method, but we have two concerns. First, we doubt whether staking a small amount of UNI can effectively prevent governance attacks in advance. We couldn’t envision a situation where staking a small amount of UNI would deter attackers when targeting a very large DAO like Uniswap. Second, the potential limitation of proposal creators due to the introduction of this system; after this system is implemented, delegates with low VP may find it difficult to create on-chain votes, possibly leading to an increase in instances where they have to ask larger delegates to create on-chain votes on their behalf. This could accelerate the power gradient, similar to our concerns with establishing a Veto Council, and lead to the unhealthiness of the DAO.\n\nWe believe that instead of such major system changes, we should first implement simple measures that can strengthen governance. For example, increasing the quorum of on-chain voting or extending the time-lock period. Although these changes might introduce significant alterations to the contract, they would have less impact on the DAO’s dynamics and may allow for measures without lowering the health of the DAO.\n\njengajojo\n\nSeptember 20, 2024, 2:15pm\n\n7\n\nThank you @BlockworksResearch @drllau_LexDAO @Tane @AbdullahUmar @bendi for the thoughtful feedback and insights. It’s clear that governance security is a top priority, but opinions differ on the right approach. Here are the common themes we have identified from the discussion:\n\nMost commenters agree that a Veto Council could centralise power and disrupt the balance between delegates, making it a last-resort solution rather than a first step.\n\nMany are open to Proposal Staking, but there are concerns that staking a small amount of UNI won’t effectively deter serious attackers, and that it could discourage smaller delegates from participating.\n\nSeveral commenters prefer smaller, incremental changes, such as increasing the quorum or extending the time-lock period, strengthening governance without drastically altering the current structure.\n\nSuggested Action Items:\n\nGiven the strong concerns about centralisation, it seems best not to pursue this option at the moment.\n\nWhile it’s seen as a ‘speedbump’, further exploration of Proposal Staking is warranted. We can explore adding the functionality of the ProposalBond to the UNI Governor that would allow a proposer to propose with a lower threshold, and then the community could vote [For, Against, Veto and slash,Abstain]. If the weight of VetoandSlash > Against, then the proposer does not get their bond back and the proposal does not pass.\n\nThere seems to be support for increasing the quorum and extending the time-lock period as simpler, effective measures to protect against governance attacks we shall explore bringing these proposals to the DAO.\n\nRegularly reviewing and updating governance mechanisms, particularly as the treasury diversifies, should be prioritised to stay ahead of potential risks.\n\nWhat do you all think?\n\n2 Likes\n\neek637\n\nSeptember 21, 2024, 1:15pm\n\n8\n\nValuable conversation here, thanks for getting it going @jengajojo. The UF recently gave a grant to a team to do a governance audit. The output will be a description of the current risk vectors, strategies for risk mitigation, and a dashboard to monitor the on-chain drivers of risk. I’d suggest waiting for those results before introducing any proposals to change our governance structure.\n\n4 Likes\n\nggmatch\n\nSeptember 21, 2024, 6:29pm\n\n9\n\nIs the any particular reason why you forsee a governance attack in the next 18 months specifically?\n\nTo me it seems that the centralization risks outweight the pros.\n\n1 Like\n\nWintermuteGovernance\n\nSeptember 23, 2024, 6:35am\n\n10\n\nReally great to see this discussion happening thanks @jengajojo\n\nWe certainly agree that now more than ever, governance attacks are becoming more credible and DAOs should be doing more to protect against such attack vectors.\n\nWe echo a lot of the same thoughts highlighted by other comments and delegates and will focus our attention on your response:\n\nWe are not convinced that Proposal Staking will significantly deter an attacker and it ultimately creates more friction for regular day-to-day governance. The Proposal Bond would need to be sufficiently large enough to drastically reduce the profit of an economic attack, it is simply just an additional cost to the attacker (assuming they are very confident they can pass the proposal). By having a lower proposal threshold to make it easier for delegates, we are reducing this cost. Furthermore, it also requires proposers/delegates to hold a notable amount of UNI to put up as a bond which is not ideal (assuming you slash from a bond and not delegated VP)\n\nIncreasing the Quorum should be explored and we look forward to the analysis that the UF has funded as mentioned by @eek637. Looking at all non-cancelled onchain proposals below, our initial thoughts are that there is some room to increase it, however, this should be combined with efforts to further increase delegated UNI VP as we don’t want to end up in a situation where it’s extremely difficult to pass proposals.\n\nimage1128×1034 24.8 KB\n\nRegarding increasing the time lock, we are unsure of its efficacy. In most cases, Timelocks were created to allow for Veto Councils to intervene and/or allow users of the relevant protocol to exit the system if they do not agree with the changes. In Uniswap’s case, governance is largely minimised and doesn’t really affect users. Increasing the Timelock delay also delays the DAO’s ability to respond to any bugs or exploits across relevant gov controlled contracts. Lastly, it could be fair to assume that an attacker could be hedging their position (buying spot, selling perps) in which a declining UNI price is not as important as it seems. In this case, an attacker’s costs are likely the funding rate and slippage to enter + exit their position.\n\n3 Likes\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nURGENT discussion on current vote: \"Reduce UNI Governance Proposal & Quorum Thresholds\"\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n144\n\n12823\n\nNovember 17, 2021\n\nProposal 1: Feedback/Discussion for going forward\n\nUncategorized\n\n18\n\n3038\n\nOctober 21, 2020\n\n[proposal] giving Uniswap governance to long term UNI holders\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n8\n\n3119\n\nNovember 16, 2020\n\nProposal: Reduce amount of UNIs required to submit governance proposal\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n105\n\n17151\n\nNovember 25, 2021\n\nMobilizing the Uniswap Treasury\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n27\n\n6238\n\nJuly 20, 2024","tokens":5515,"crawled_at":1791193472995} +{"id":10244,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/configure_service/service_configuration_file","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"The service configuration file - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"The service configuration file\n\nThe AI agent configuration file service.yaml is a YAML file where the main attributes of the AI agent are set up, including the particular agent blueprint that defines the AI agent. An important feature of AI agent configuration files is that they can override attributes defined in agent blueprint or component configurations.\n\nThe structure of the AI agent configuration file\n\nThe AI agent configuration file service.yaml is typically composed of AI-agent-specific attributes followed by additional YAML documents. Each additional document overrides the parameter of a specific agent blueprint or component configuration used by the AI agent, and they must begin with ---.\n\nExample\nHere is an example of the AI agent configuration file of the Hello World AI agent:\n\nservice.yamlname: hello_world\nauthor: valory\nversion: 0.1.0\ndescription: A simple demonstration of a simple ABCI application\naea_version: '>=2.0.0, <3.0.0'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nfingerprint:\nREADME.md: bafybeiapubcoersqnsnh3acia5hd7otzt7kjxekr6gkbrlumv6tkajl6jm\nfingerprint_ignore_patterns: []\nagent: valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeig6p6shyx6wmih2xlzu3h6rd7gul3fxqhpdoi77qidqmpzxf33spm\nnumber_of_agents: 4\ndeployment: {}\ndependencies: {}\n---\nextra:\nbenchmark_persistence_params:\nargs: &id001\nlog_dir: /benchmarks\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\n0:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: ${MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE:str:HELLO_WORLD_AGENT_0}\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n1:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: ${MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE:str:HELLO_WORLD_AGENT_1}\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n2:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: ${MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE:str:HELLO_WORLD_AGENT_2}\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n3:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: ${MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE:str:HELLO_WORLD_AGENT_3}\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: http://host.docker.internal:8545\nchain_id: 31337\npoa_chain: false\ndefault_gas_price_strategy: eip1559\n\nAs you can see, the AI agent configuration file is overriding some attributes for the skill valory/hello_world_abci and the connection valory/ledger.\nAlso, note how the attributes hello_world_message read their value from the environment variable MY_HELLO_WORLD_STRING of type string, and take a default value if they are not defined.\n\nThere are a number of mandatory attributes that define the AI agent, which are summarized in the table below:\n\nAttribute\nDescription\n\nname\n\nAI agent name. It shall not contain spaces.\n\nauthor\n\nAuthor name.\n\nversion\n\nAI Agent version, in the format ...\n\ndescription\n\nDescription of the AI agent.\n\naea_version\n\nOpen AEA version supported by the AI agent.\n\nlicense\n\nLicense identifier.\n\nfingerprint\n\nList with entries : for all the files that compose the AI agent.\n\nfingerprint_ignore_patterns\n\nFilename patterns to be ignored.\n\nagent\n\nAgent blueprint, in the form ::.\n\nnumber_of_agents\n\nNumber of agent instances that the AI agent is composed of.\n\ndeployment\n\nExternal deployment configuration for publishing container ports.\n\ndependencies\n\nPython dependencies to include in the runtime image publishing container ports.\n\nAI-agent-level overrides\n\nThe Open AEA framework already has the notion of component overrides: if a component uses another component, the former can override configuration values of the sub-component.\n\nSimilarly, the Open Autonomy framework has the notion of AI-agent-level overrides. You can define them in the AI agent configuration file service.yaml, which will be used to generate the deployment environment for the agent instances.\n\nAI-agent-level overrides follow the mandatory AI-agent-specific attributes, separated by ---.\nYou can, for example, override the default HELLO_WORLD! string that each agent instances prints on their console in the Hello World AI agent, which is originally defined in the hello_world_abci skill.\n\nservice.yamlname: hello_world\nauthor: valory\nversion: 0.1.0\ndescription: A simple demonstration of a simple ABCI application\naea_version: '>=2.0.0, <3.0.0'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nfingerprint:\nREADME.md: bafybeiapubcoersqnsnh3acia5hd7otzt7kjxekr6gkbrlumv6tkajl6jm\nfingerprint_ignore_patterns: []\nagent: valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeig6p6shyx6wmih2xlzu3h6rd7gul3fxqhpdoi77qidqmpzxf33spm\nnumber_of_agents: 4\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello world!\n\nNote that AI-agent-level overrides take precedence over agent-blueprint-level overrides, and agent-blueprint-level overrides take precedence over component-level overrides.\n\nOverrides precedence\n\nYou can define values for overridden attributes in two ways:\n\nDirectly assign a hardcoded value, for example:\n\nhello_world_message: HELLO_WORLD!\n\nUse an environment variable with a default value using the syntax\n\n: ${::}\n\nfor example:\nhello_world_message: ${MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE:str:HELLO_WORLD!}\n\nIn this case, the environment variable MY_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE will be read by the agent instance in runtime. If not found, the default value HELLO_WORLD! will be used.\n\nMultiple overrides\n\nYou can override different values for different agent instances in the AI agent configuration file with the multiple override feature, using the pattern below:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\n:\n\n\nImportant\n\nIf you choose to use the multiple override feature, you have to define overrides for every single agent instance that composes the AI agent.\n\nExample\nIf you wish that each agent instance outputs a different message in the Hello World AI agent with four agent instances, you can define the following multiple override in the service.yaml file:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\n0:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 0\n1:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 1\n2:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 2\n3:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 3\n\nIf you have repetitive overridden parameters, you can define them using YAML anchors under the section extra, and reference them when defining overrides for different agent instances.\n\nExample\nIn this example, we define a YAML anchor with label &id001 to avoid repeating the same configuration of the args parameter in all the agent instances.\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\nextra:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: &id001\nlog_dir: /benchmarks\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\n0:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 0\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n1:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 1\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n2:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 2\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n3:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 3\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs: *id001\n\nSharing the same parameter across skills\n\nEach skill has its own models.params.args namespace — there is no implicit cross-skill binding, and BaseParams._ensure(key, kwargs, type_) pops key from the skill's own kwargs. Two skills that need the same value (e.g. an external API URL both read from and write to) must each declare the parameter in their respective skill.yaml, and keep the values in sync at the service level.\n\nThe idiomatic options, in order of preference:\n\nYAML anchor in service.yaml — declare the value once with &anchor and reference it with *anchor under each skill's overrides (same mechanism as the example above).\n\nEnvironment variable export — set one environment variable and let the service build pass it through the SKILL__ path for each consuming skill (see the next section).\n\nAvoid renaming the parameter per-skill to dodge the sharing concern — it hides the logical relationship and makes service-level overrides harder to reason about.\n\nExport to environment variables\n\nWhen building the deployments, the overrides from the AI agent components are exported as system environment variables inside the Docker containers and picked up at runtime by the agent instances. The exported environment variables are labelled with their upper case JSON path:\n\n_=\n\nNote that when deploying an AI agent, environment variables are defined separately within each agent instance container. Therefore, even if you use the multiple override feature to define a different value per agent instance, their respective environment variable within the container will have the same name.\n\nExample\nIf you have an override like\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello world!\n\nit will export the environment variable SKILL_MODELS_PARAM_ARGS_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE.\n\nOn the other hand, if you use the multiple override feature and you have something like\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\n0:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 0\n1:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 1\n2:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 2\n3:\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nhello_world_message: Hello, from agent instance 3\n\nit will also export the environment SKILL_MODELS_PARAM_ARGS_HELLO_WORLD_MESSAGE within each agent instance container. However each such variable will have a different value inside each container, that is, Hello, from agent instance 0, Hello, from agent instance 1, etc.\n\nExported environment variables require such specific format because they are used by the constituent agent instances and skills. Read about component overrides in the Open AEA framework for more information.\n\nExport complicated data structures\n\nIf you have nested lists the environment export rules will differ as per the inner data structures. If the list is a strict list, meaning the inner values are either primitive data types like int, str, float or boolean, the list will be exported as a JSON string.\n\nExample\nIf you have an override like\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: vendor/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nsimple_list:\n- 1\n- 2\n- 3\nnested_list:\n- - foo\n- bar\n- - \"hello\"\n- \"world\"\n\nit will export the environment variables\n\nSKILL_HELLO_WORLD_ABCI_MODELS_PARAMS_ARGS_SIMPLE_LIST='[1, 2, 3]',\n\nSKILL_HELLO_WORLD_ABCI_MODELS_PARAMS_ARGS_NESTED_LIST='[[\"foo\", \"bar\"], [\"hello\", \"world\"]]'.\n\nIf an overridden list contains mapping values, it will be exported as\n\n___KEY=\n\nExample\nIf you have an override like\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nlist_with_mappings:\n- key: value_0\n- key: value_1\n\nit will export the environment variables\n\nSKILL_HELLO_WORLD_ABCI_MODELS_PARAMS_ARGS_LIST_WITH_MAPPINGS_0_KEY='value_0',\n\nSKILL_HELLO_WORLD_ABCI_MODELS_PARAMS_ARGS_LIST_WITH_MAPPINGS_1_KEY='value_1'.\n\nSo when defining the agent blueprint/component level overrides you will have to explicitly define all the elements of the list like this:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/hello_world_abci:0.1.0\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nlist_with_mappings:\n- key: ${::}\n- key: ${::}\n\nPublish container ports\n\nWe use a syntax similar to Docker for port publishing. To expose agent instance container ports to host machine ports use the following configuration:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nports:\n:\n: \ntendermint:\nports:\n:\n: \n\nPort publishing also works with multiple overrides. For example if you want to map port 8080 of agent instance 0 to port 8081 of the host machine, use:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nports:\n0:\n8081: 8080\ntendermint:\nports:\n0:\n26656: 26656\n\nYou can also configure these mappings using environment variables:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nports:\n0:\n8081: ${AGENT_0_HTTP_PORT:int:8080}\ntendermint:\nports:\n0:\n26656: ${TM_NODE_0_P2P_PORT:int:26656}\n\nMount volumes for agent instance data\n\nCustom volumes can be mounted using the deployment configuration.\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nvolumes:\n: \n\nOr specify volumes specific to agent instance\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nvolumes:\n:\n: \n\nFor example, if you want to mount ./data directory as /data volume\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nvolumes:\n./data: /data\n\nand\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndeployment:\nagent:\nvolumes:\n0:\n./data_0: /data\n1:\n./data_1: /data\n\nNote: When specifying the host directory path, use absolute path instead of relative path to avoid mounting related errors.\n\nOverride agent blueprint/component dependencies\n\nAI agent level dependencies can be defined using following format\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\ndependencies:\npypi-package:\nversion: ==1.0.0\ngit-package:\ngit: https://github.com/valory-xyz/open-autonomy\nref: 79342a93079648ef03ab5aaf14978068fc96587a\n\nThe dependencies defined at the AI agent level will take priority over the dependencies defined at the agent blueprint or component level. This means, if you define some dependency pypi-package==1.0.0 at the agent blueprint/component level and re-define it as py-package==1.1.0 at the AI agent level, py-package==1.1.0 will get installed when building the agent blueprint image following the AI agent > agent blueprint > skill > connection > contract > protocol priority order.","tokens":3480,"crawled_at":1791193491759} +{"id":10245,"url":"https://docs.near.org/web3-apps/quickstart","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Your First Web3 App - NEAR Docs","text":"In this guide we will show you how to build a React app connected to NEAR, where users can login using their wallets and interact with a contract.\n\nSearching to integrate NEAR in your App?If you already have an application and want to integrate NEAR into it, we recommend you to first go through this guide and then check our documentation on integrating NEAR to a frontend\n\n​\n\nTemplate Setup\n\nIf you already have Node.js installed, you can use create-near-app to quickly setup a template:\n\nnpx create-near-app@latest\n\n# ✔ What do you want to build? › Web Application\n# ✔ Select a framework for your frontend › Next.js (Classic)\n# ✔ Name your project (we will create a directory with that name) … near-template\n# ✔ Run 'npm install' now? … yes\n\nOnce the folder is ready - and all dependencies installed - you can start the development server using pnpm.\n\ncd near-template # go to your project folder\nnpm run dev\n\nVisit http://localhost:3000 in your browser to view the dApp. Note that since the dApp uses NextJS the app might take longer to load the pages on first visit.\n\nThe app is not starting?\n\nMake sure you are using node >= v22, you can easily switch versions using nvm use 22\n\nFramework\nIn this tutorial we are using the Next.js framework with the “classic” page-based routing, but you can select other frameworks such as Vite when creating the app\n\n​\n\nLanding Page\n\nOnce the app starts you will see the landing page, rendering a navigation bar that allows users to login using their NEAR wallet. You can then navigate to the docs or the Near Integration page (which we will do).\n\nLanding page of Hello NEAR Gateway\nGo ahead and sign in with your NEAR account. If you don’t have one, you can create one on the fly.\n\n​\n\nContext Provider\n\nNext.js uses a template system, where each page is a React component. Our main logic is defined at ./src/pages/_app.js, which:\n\nCreates a NearProvider that wraps the entire application to provide NEAR functionality\n\nRenders the navigation menu and the page’s content\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nWhat is NEAR Connect Hooks?\n\nNEAR Connect is a library that allows users to select their preferred NEAR wallet to login, our application uses hooks that wrap its functionality to make it easier to use\n\n​\n\nNavigation Bar\n\nThe navigation bar implements a button to allow users to login and logout with their NEAR wallet. The main logic comes from the useNearWallet hook, which exposes all wallet related functionality.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nHow Do I Call Smart Contract Functions?\n\nNow that you understand how the landing page works, we can move to the Near Integration page, which retrieves a greeting from the hello.near-examples.testnet contract.\n​\n\nRead vs. Write Operations\n\nOperation TypeMethodCostRequires Signature\nRead (view)\nviewMethod()\nFree\nNo\n\nWrite (call)\ncallMethod()\nGas fees (~0.0001 Ⓝ)\nYes\n\nView methods query contract state without modifying it. Call methods change state and require the user to sign a transaction.\n\nView of the Near Integration page\nLogin if you haven’t done it yet and you will see a simple form that allows you to store a greeting in the smart contract.\n\n​\n\nFunction Call Hooks\n\nJust like the navigation bar, we use the useNearWallet hook to get functions that allow us to call methods on the contract:\n\nviewFunction is used to call functions that are read-only\n\ncallFunction is used to call functions that modify the state of the contract\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nCalling Read-Only Methods\n\nFor example, when we want to fetch the current greeting stored in the contract, we use viewFunction inside a useEffect hook:\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nCalling Change Methods\n\nOn the other hand, when the user submits a new greeting, we use callFunction to send a transaction to the contract:\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nCommon Questions\n\n​\n\nDo users need NEAR tokens to login?\n\nNo. Wallet login is free. Users only pay gas fees when they call contract functions that modify state.\n​\n\nWhat wallets can users connect with?\n\nNEAR wallets (MyNearWallet, Meteor, HERE Wallet) and Ethereum wallets (Metamask, WalletConnect, Coinbase Wallet via EVM support).\n​\n\nHow do I avoid users signing every transaction?\n\nCreate a function-call access key by setting createAccessKeyFor: in the wallet selector config. This allows the app to sign non-payable methods automatically.\n​\n\nCan I use this with an existing React app?\n\nYes. Install near-connect-hooks and follow our integration guide.\n​\n\nWhy Next.js instead of plain React?\n\nNext.js is recommended but not required. You can use Vite/React, Vue, Svelte, or any framework. Check create-near-app templates for options.\n\n​\n\nMoving Forward\n\nThat’s it for our quickstart tutorial. You have now seen a fully functional frontend that can talk with NEAR contracts and render Web3 components.\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1218,"crawled_at":1791193508042} +{"id":10246,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/configure_service/analise_test","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Analise and test - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Analise and test\n\nWhen developing your AI agent (and its required components, including the FSM App), it is important to ensure that the code is exhaustively tested and adheres to best practices. This will not only help identify and fix any bugs or errors early, but also ensure your code is reliable, efficient, and maintainable.\n\nStatic code analysis\n\nStandard tools\n\nFor convenience the Dev template comes with a Pipenv that includes a number of tools grouped under predefined make targets.\n\nMake target: make formatters\n\nTool\nDescription\n\nblack\n\nA Python code formatter that automatically reformats code to conform to a consistent style.\n\nisort\n\nA Python tool that sorts imports alphabetically and separates them into sections, making it easier to read and maintain import statements in Python code.\n\nMake target: make code-checks\n\nTool\nDescription\n\ndarglint\n\nA Python docstring argument linter that checks for adherence to Google's style guide.\n\nmypy\n\nA static type checker for Python that analyses code and provides feedback on variable types and potential errors.\n\nflake8\n\nA Python tool that combines multiple linters to check code for syntax errors, style violations, and other issues.\n\npylint\n\nA Python code analyser that checks code for potential errors, security vulnerabilities, and style violations, and provides feedback on how to improve code quality.\n\nvulture\n\nA Python tool that analyses code for unused variables, functions, and other dead code that can be safely removed to improve code quality and performance.\n\nFramework-specific tools\n\nIn addition, the framework comes with a number of dedicated tools that you might find useful for analysing your AI agent and component packages.\n\nautonomy check-packages\nPerforms several consistency checks on the component packages to make sure there are no issues with the component configurations (including checking that every package has existing dependencies and a non-empty description).\nautonomy analyse handlers\nThis command verifies that all the FSM App skills in a local registry (except the explicitly excluded ones) have defined the specified handlers. See the command documentation here.\nautonomy analyse dialogues\nThis command verifies that all the FSM App skills in a local registry (except the explicitly excluded ones) have defined the specified dialogues. See the command documentation here.\nautonomy analyse service\nThis command verifies an AI agent configuration to see if there is any potential issue with it which can cause issues when running the AI agent deployment. See the command documentation here and the on-chain deployment checklist for more information.\n\nTesting\n\nUnit testing\n\nThe valory/abstract_round_abci skill packages come with a number of testing tools located in packages/valory/skills/abstract_round_abci/test_tools which you can use to write unit tests for your FSM Apps.\n\nExample\nFetch the hello_world agent blueprint, which comes with the hello_world_abci FSM App skill within:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeidkuptt5jvtsetgqfbj3detp7zne7z67bi3rkxh43q5thbsz3pwsy --alias hello_world_agent\n\nLook at the unit tests for the hello_world_abci skill, located in the folder\n\n./hello_world_agent/vendor/valory/skills/hello_world_abci/tests/\n\nIntegration testing\n\nThe open-aea-test-autonomy plugin provides several test classes which can be utilized for various Docker integration tests. Here are some examples of the base test classes:\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.BaseContractTest: Comes with utilities required for testing a contract.\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.BaseGanacheContractTest: Can be used for testing contracts on a local Ganache instance.\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes. BaseRegistriesContractsTest: Launches a local Hardhat node with pre-deployed Autonolas registries contracts image.\n\nEnd-to-end testing\n\nThe same plugin also provides tools for writing end-to-end tests for agent blueprints. The aea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.agents.BaseTestEnd2End class provides an environment for testing agent instances end to end.\n\nExample\nFetch the hello_world agent blueprint:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeidkuptt5jvtsetgqfbj3detp7zne7z67bi3rkxh43q5thbsz3pwsy --alias hello_world_agent\n\nLook at the end-to-end tests, located in the folder\n\n./hello_world_agent/tests/\n\nThe framework also provides CLI tools for building and running local testing deployments.\nYou can include additional images in your testing deployment, for example, a Hardhat node with custom contracts, or an ACN node. This is achieved through the flags --use-hardhat and --use-acn, respectively. Read the autonomy deploy build command documentation and the guide for using custom images in a deployment for more information.","tokens":1189,"crawled_at":1791193510511} +{"id":10247,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/getting-bugs-out-of-snarks","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Getting the bugs out of SNARKs: The road ahead - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nGetting the bugs out of SNARKs: The road ahead\nJustin Thaler\n11.20.24\n\nTags & Share Tags\nJolt\nresearch\nSNARKs\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIn the blockchain world, SNARKs hold the promise of unparalleled scalability and enhanced privacy compared to today’s transparent ledgers. Yet the current reality is that SNARK implementations are riddled with bugs, providing security through obscurity rather than robust cryptographic guarantees. Achieving true security requires formal verification — proof that SNARK systems are bug-free. This post briefly reviews progress on Jolt, our zkVM for RISC-V, and then discusses our efforts toward formal verification.\n\nzkVMs and Jolt: A short recap\n\nzkVMs are SNARKs that allow an untrusted prover to prove that it correctly ran some specified computer program on a witness, where the program is specified as bytecode conforming to a particular instruction set architecture (ISA) like RISC-V.\n\nzkVMs offer the most promising path to usable and maintainable SNARKs. They allow developers to write programs in whatever high-level language they please, so long as the language comes with a compiler down to the ISA’s bytecode. Developers need not express computations directly as circuits or constraints, or even within “zkDSLs.” Those building the zkVMs will deal with the nastiness of constraint systems and circuits once and for all, meaning that anyone can then use the zkVM without any knowledge of how the proof machinery actually works.\n\nIn April 2024, we released an initial implementation of the Jolt zkVM for RISC-V and showed its performance compares favorably to alternatives. Our initial findings have since been confirmed by several other benchmarks. Since then, we have dramatically reduced Jolt’s proof size (from several MBs to 200 KBs, and as low as 35 KBs at the cost of slightly increased prover time) and incorporated additional features like support for the Rust standard library and the RISC-V Multiplication extension.\n\nSoon, I expect Jolt to be the only RISC-V zkVM capable of proving in resource-constrained environments (under 2GB of prover space, compared to 8-16 GBs for RISC Zero and more for SP1), while also achieving state-of-the art prover time.\n\nBut this post is not about Jolt’s performance or feature support. It’s about a more important topic: correctness and security. This post lays out our roadmap toward the long-term goal of obtaining a formally verified Jolt implementation and describes the initial steps we have already taken along this path.\n\nA key risk for SNARKs\n\nBugs and catastrophes\n\nThe slightest bug in a SNARK toolchain can lead to catastrophic security failures. For example, a single missing or improperly specified constraint could mean that the prover does not actually know the witness that it claims it knows (e.g., does not actually know the secret key controlling the Ethereum wallet initiating a purported blockchain transaction).\n\nUntil we have confidence that our toolchains are completely bug free, projects using SNARKs cannot really be secured by the SNARK itself. At best, they are secured by obscurity: finding the bugs may require expertise (to identify missing or malspecified constraints, or any other bug in the tool-chain used to deploy the SNARK). But the bugs are there — and that likely means a motivated adversary can find convincing proofs of false statements.\n\nThe very worst-case situation is that we think our SNARK toolchains are bug-free, and therefore stop treating SNARKs as but one of many layers of a system of defense-in-depth. These other layers of security will be semi-centralized. In the context of rollups, this may mean using an allowlist of who can submit proofs, the use of TEEs, or a security council that can “undo” acceptance of buggy proofs, likely at the substantial cost and chaos of also “undoing” many transactions that network participants believed to have been already confirmed.\n\nThe long-term prospects are bright, but far off\n\nOver the long term, zkVMs will have implications not just for SNARK usability, but also for correctness. If we develop confidence that the zkVM itself is bug free, and ensure that the program bytecode on which the zkVM is applied correctly implements the intended witness-checking procedure, then the end-to-end toolchain will also be bug free.\n\nThe Ethereum Foundation is investing heavily to bring this endgame to reality — but it is years away. In fact, I consider it a distinct possibility that in five years’ time, we still don’t have strong confidence that any performative zkVM toolchain is actually bug free.\n\nToday, zkVM toolchains are almost certainly full of bugs. We should stop pretending they’re not. To give a sense of how complicated they are, consider the following:\n\nThe Jolt codebase is up to 34,000 lines of Rust code (if you don’t count the SDK or the RISC-V emulator, it’s “only” about 25,000 lines), plus it uses some functionality from arkworks, namely field, group, and pairing operations. SP1 is over 60,000 lines of Rust code (closer to 100,000 if you include the proof system it invokes, plonky3), plus thousands of lines of Go code, and several hundred lines of assembly code. RISC Zero’s codebase is even bigger, with over 100,000 lines of Rust code, almost 200,000 lines of C++, 150,000 lines of CUDA, 400 lines of assembly, and more. (All of these statistics were obtained using the cloc –vcs git command to count lines of code.)\n\nOf course, most of these lines of code are devoted to implementing the zkVM prover, yet for security guarantees only the zkVM verifier needs to be correctly implemented, and the verifier can be much simpler than the prover. Still, these statistics give a sense of the complexity of these systems, and even the verifier implementations are many thousands of lines of code.\n\nGiven this state of affairs, simplicity is a major virtue in any zkVM, and we firmly believe that Jolt is the simplest zkVM for RISC-V today. But formal methods are not some magic wand that can be waved at any piece of software and magically make all the bugs go away. Major technical challenges will have to be overcome to get any kind of guarantee that zkVM toolchains are end-to-end correct and secure. Simplicity in zkVMs is not only important in the short term; it will ease these formal verification efforts and remain a virtue for many years to come.\n\nRoadmap to a bug-free Jolt\n\nNear-term efforts (complete and in-progress)\n\nIn the intermediate term, there is no substitute for audits and bug-finding efforts. Jolt has not yet undergone a full audit, but it has been subjected to considerable scrutiny. Recently, the zkSecurity team found several bugs in Jolt. These bugs were not in the “guts” of the proof machinery but rather in how inputs and outputs are processed, how Jolt makes sure the prover actually ran the computer program to completion rather than “stopping it early,” and in allowing the prover to specify certain parameters that should instead be specified by the verifier or another honest party. (See zkSecurity’s companion post for additional details on the bugs and how they found them.)\n\nBeyond bug-finding efforts, we have taken the first steps along the (very) long road to a formally verified Jolt implementation. First, one major reason for Jolt’s simplicity is its lookup-centric design: Rather than expressing each primitive instruction of the VM as a circuit or constraint system, Jolt instead “decomposes” each instruction into a handful of lookups into small lookup tables and then uses our Lasso lookup argument to verifiably perform the lookups. With Carl Kwan and Quang Dao, who are leading Jolt’s formal verification efforts, we have used the ACL2 automated theorem prover to verify the correctness of Jolt’s lookup decompositions. This formalization is highly automated, which means the techniques will be easy to extend to different, richer ISAs than RISC-V, should the community prove interested in them down the line. These verification efforts have also led to modest performance improvements to Jolt, by identifying, in an automated fashion, some unnecessary lookups we were doing for a handful of primitive RISC-V instructions.\n\nSecond, Quang and collaborators Gregor Mitscha-Baude from zkSecurity and Devon Tuma are using Lean to verify the soundness of the Spartan, Lasso, and Spice polynomial IOPs (PIOPs) at the heart of Jolt. This work will extend broadly to all PIOPs used in practice, not only those used in Jolt. This work will likely be complete by the middle of 2025. As with all of Jolt, it’s being done in the open, and you can follow along with Quang’s progress at his ZKlib repo. This effort is one of the projects recently funded by the Ethereum Foundation’s formal verification project.\n\nA third step is to verify (assuming the soundness of the polynomial IOPs above) that the constraint system to which Spartan is applied in Jolt, combined with the lookups and reads/writes to memory that Jolt applies Lasso and Spice to, together capture the RISC-V ISA. This effort consists of first building a formal RISC-V model in ACL2 (which is done), and then using ACL2 to verify the equivalence of the model to Jolt’s combination of constraints, lookups, and memory operations (which is in progress).\n\nLonger-term efforts\n\nConverging on a theorem prover\n\nWe plan to port over all of our ACL2 formalizations to Lean. Lean is newer and less mature than ACL2 but has more community support/libraries for mathematics, and more momentum within the SNARK community (e.g., a large part of the Ethereum Foundations’s zkEVM verification effort is expected to be in Lean). Most of our initial efforts have used ACL2 in large part to take advantage of its extensive support of automated techniques like bit-blasting (e.g., bitvector reasoning via passing to a SAT solver) and rewriting. Lean recently added support for rudimentary bit-blasting, so long-term it may make sense to shift the entire effort to Lean.\n\nVerifying the actual Jolt implementation\n\nA major long-term challenge is to actually verify the Rust implementation of the Jolt verifier (much less an on-chain implementation of the same, via Solidity or EVM bytecode). We haven’t really begun to make headway here. Jolt is really just a polynomial IOP for proving correct execution of RISC-V programs, and our efforts to date have mainly focused on making sure the polynomial IOP is secure, not that the Rust implementation of Jolt correctly implements the polynomial IOP. The main exception to date: We have, via fuzzing, validated that the lookup decompositions we’ve formalized in ACL2 match the decompositions implemented in Jolt’s Rust codebase.\n\nHere, we will need good tooling to ensure the correctness of Rust code (according to certain specifications). There are many potential approaches for enabling this including tools such as Restricted Algorithmic Rust (RAR), Aeneas, Verus, and others. Another possible approach is to circumvent the issue of Rust programming altogether. Many theorem provers (e.g., ACL2, Lean, Coq) support code extraction to certain target languages (e.g., OCaml, C, Lisp), and Rust may be supported in the future. A major issue with code extraction is that often the “cross-compilation” step is itself unverified. One unique advantage of ACL2 is that execution in the theorem prover is the same as native Common Lisp execution, so a “formally-verified Jolt verifier” in ACL2 can be called as needed, requiring no cross-compilation to a target language. Overall, I would not be surprised if we only seriously target this essential direction 1.5 years or more from now. A silver lining of this timeline is that Rust tooling will mature considerably in the meantime.\n\nIn the meantime, as we verify the correctness of various components of Jolt’s polynomial IOP and constraint systems using Lean/ACL2, we’ll extensively test for compliance of the verified models with Jolt’s Rust code. This is the approach that we took in verifying Jolt’s lookup decompositions. Though it falls well short of the end goal of a “formally verified Rust verifier,” it does let us gain confidence in the correctness of different parts of the Jolt codebase.\n\nA DSL for all “constraints” used in Jolt\n\nUnlike other zkVMs, which mainly use so-called Plonkish or AIR constraint systems to capture VM execution, Jolt uses a combination of rank-one constraints (R1CS) and “offline memory checking” techniques via Lasso and Spice that check that the prover is correctly performing reads into read-only memory (aka lookups) and read-write memory (aka registers and RAM), respectively.\n\nCurrently, the Jolt implementation specifies the above constraints/lookups/memory operations in ad hoc fashion. For R1CS specification, we were initially using Circom, but due to untenable overheads, we hand-rolled our own R1CS specification language and vertically integrated it into Jolt. Likewise, lookups and reads and writes of registers and RAM are specified via internal APIs.\n\nFor maintainability and continued verification as Jolt evolves, it would be good to have a single DSL that cleanly captures R1CS, lookups, and registers/RAM. This will also be useful for pre-compile specification. (Like Jolt itself, pre-compiles in Jolt will consist of a mix of R1CS, lookups, and arithmetic circuits to which the GKR protocol can be applied.) We are working with Galois to take steps in this direction.\n\nFormal verification and controlling prover memory\n\nA challenge for formal verification efforts is the heavy use of SNARK recursion in today’s zkVMs. To keep the prover’s space bounded (i.e., avoid needing terabytes of space to prove even toy program executions) and to reduce proof size, the standard procedure today is to break VM executions into “shards,” prove correct execution of each shard, and then recursively aggregate the proofs. This requires turning a SNARK verifier into a circuit or constraint system, and proving that one knows a satisfying assignment for the circuit. Any error in the specification of the circuit can lead to catastrophic security failures. And from a usability perspective, recursion simply makes it very hard for the public to tell what statement is actually being verified. No longer is the prover simply proving, “I ran this computer program correctly.” Rather, it is proving, “I know many proofs, one per shard, that each shard was run correctly, and the state of the machine at the end of shard i matches the state at the start of shard i+1”.\n\nAt least for sum-check-based SNARKs like Jolt, it is actually known how to keep the prover’s space bounded without SNARK recursion. We’ll flesh out the details in the context of Jolt in an upcoming e-print, and have begun implementing such a non-recursive space-bounded prover. It will take major engineering effort to achieve a performant implementation with this approach, but this will eventually pay off, leading to a simpler and easier-to-verify implementation.\n\nFolding\n\nLong term, I expect that “non-recursive space control” for SNARK provers will be an effective way to achieve a simple and performative prover when using hashing-based commitment schemes like Ligero, Brakedown, or FRI-Binius. But for the elliptic-curve-based commitment schemes supported by Jolt today, folding is the right way to minimize prover space while keeping the prover fast. Since folding inherently involves recursion, this will require formally verifying the correctness of a circuit representation of the Jolt verifier. This task may be complicated but will be helped by new tooling from the zkEVM formal verification project.\n\n(I don’t expect that folding will be difficult to incorporate into Jolt, but it might be challenging to apply formal methods to confirm its correctness due to its application of recursive proving to a complicated verification procedure. Fortunately, lots of tools are being developed to help with this task.)\n\nVerifying commitment schemes and Fiat-Shamir\n\nSuccinct arguments typically consist of two components: a PIOP and a polynomial commitment scheme. Together, this yields a succinct interactive argument, which is then rendered non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Efforts described above to formally verify the soundness of the Jolt PIOP are not enough on their own to guarantee that the Jolt SNARK is secure. We will also have to verify that the polynomial commitment schemes supported by Jolt are secure and correctly implemented, and also formally verify that applying Fiat-Shamir to the resulting succinct argument is secure and correctly implemented. This is a future goal of Quang and his collaborators’ work in Zklib, that is, to verify the soundness not only of PIOPs but also of polynomial commitment schemes and the PIOP-to-SNARK transformation.\n\nOther Directions\n\nVerified bytecode\n\nSome projects have criticized RISC-V zkVMs by discussing bugs in compilers from high-level languages down to RISC-V bytecode, and leveling criticisms at Rust as a high-level language. Our take is if one wants verified RISC-V bytecode then one should verify the bytecode directly, or use a verified compiler. And if one doesn’t like Rust as a high-level language, then one is free to use any other high-level language that compiles down to RISC-V.\n\nTo be sure, additional tooling to produce verified RISC-V bytecode would be of massive value to zkVMs. But that is outside of the scope of the zkVM itself. The zkVM’s job is to make sure the bytecode it is handed is run correctly.\n\nA verified implementation of the EVM via Jolt with precompiles\n\nRISC-V zkVMs are a promising tool for building zkEVMs (EVM=Ethereum Virtual Machine). Jolt is well suited for this task, but for maximum performance this will entail incorporating a handful of pre-compiles into Jolt (and formally verifying the implementation indeed captures EVM semantics). This is on the Jolt roadmap, and the formal verification component will be able to take advantage of other efforts supported by EF’s zkEVM Formal Verification project.\n\n***\n\nI have serious concerns about the rush to deploy zkVMs while they still almost certainly contain bugs. The road to bug-free zkVMs is long, and extreme caution is warranted while we walk it. But we will get there eventually, and the tools and techniques developed along the way will pay rich dividends in computer science and mathematics well beyond SNARK design.\n\n***\n\nJustin Thaler is Research Partner at a16z and an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Georgetown University. His research interests include verifiable computing, complexity theory, and algorithms for massive data sets.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":5313,"crawled_at":1791193514590} +{"id":10248,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/configure_service/configure_access_external_chains","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Configure access to external chains - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Configure access to external chains\n\nThe Open Autonomy framework supports that AI agents access different external chains\nby defining certain configuration parameters appropriately.\n\nFor example, if you are developing an AI agent to be run in Ethereum, you might first want to use\na development environment like Hardhat or Ganache as your testbed, then migrate to a public testnet like Arbitrum Sepolia, and ultimately run your AI agent in the Ethereum main chain.\n\nTo use an AI agent in a particular chain, you must ensure that the the relevant agent instances addresses are funded in that chain.\n\nWhat will you learn\n\nIn this guide, you will learn how to:\n\nConfigure an AI agent to be run in a particular chain.\n\nConfigure the test classes appropriately.\n\nConfiguring the AI agent\n\nTo configure an AI agent to work with a particular chain, you must configure the parameters address and chain_id accordingly in the connection valory/ledger. This configuration can be set up by overriding the valory/ledger configuration at agent blueprint level or at AI agent level.\n\nAgent-blueprint-level override\n\nAt agent blueprint level, the agent blueprint configuration file aea-config.yaml should contain an override for the parameters of the connection valory/ledger, either using hardcoded values or environment variables as follows:\n\nUsing environment variables (recommended)Using hardcoded values\n\naea-config.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${str:http://localhost:8545}\nchain_id: ${int:31337}\n\n\naea-config.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: http://host.docker.internal:8545\nchain_id: 31337\n\n\nNote that if you use agent-blueprint-level hardcoded overrides, then AI-agent-level overrides will not work.\nOn the other hand agent-blueprint-level environment variable overrides must follow the export variable format.\n\nAI-agent-level override\n\nSimilarly, AI-agent-level overrides for the valory/ledger connection are defined in the AI agent configuration file service.yaml using either approach:\n\nUsing environment variablesUsing hardcoded values\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${MY_CHAIN_ADDRESS:str:http://localhost:8545}\nchain_id: ${MY_CHAIN_ID:int:31337}\n\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: http://host.docker.internal:8545\nchain_id: 31337\n\n\nObserve that within the AI agent configuration file there is no restriction for naming the environment variables.\n\nConfiguring integration tests\n\nThe open-aea-test-autonomy test tools contain a collection of classes for open-autonomy packages\nthat allows you to configure the ledger connection for contract integration tests.\nTo use the test tools, you must include open-aea-test-autonomy as a dependency for your packages.\n\nTests that make calls to a chain inherit from the class\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.contracts.BaseContractTest\n\nThe configuration of the ledger connection for tests is done through the\nthe _setup_class(...) method from BaseContractTest, which overrides the valory/ledger connection\nconfiguration for tests. As above, you must set the parameters address and chain_id accordingly:\n\nnew_config = {\n\"address\": url,\n\"chain_id\": DEFAULT_CHAIN_ID,\n\"denom\": DEFAULT_CURRENCY_DENOM,\n\"default_gas_price_strategy\": \"eip1559\",\n\"gas_price_strategies\": {\n\"gas_station\": DEFAULT_GAS_STATION_STRATEGY,\n\"eip1559\": DEFAULT_EIP1559_STRATEGY,\n},\n}\n\nAlso, instead of inheriting directly from BaseContractTest, the test tools in open-aea-test-autonomy include several preconfigured helper base classes for common chains:\n\nBaseGanacheContractTest: Base test case for testing contracts on Ganache.\n\nBaseHardhatGnosisContractTest: Base test case for testing contracts on Hardhat with Gnosis.\n\nBaseHardhatAMMContractTest: Base test case for testing AMM contracts on Hardhat.\n\nBaseGanacheContractWithDependencyTest: Base test case for testing contracts with dependencies on Ganache.\n\nBaseHardhatGnosisContractWithDependencyTest: Base test case for testing contracts with dependencies on Hardhat with Gnosis.\n\nBaseHardhatAMMContractWithDependencyTest: Base test case for testing AMM contracts with dependencies on Hardhat.\n\nConfiguring end-to-end tests\n\nThe open-aea-test-autonomy test tools also contain base classes for end-to-end tests. These tests inherit from the base classes\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.agents.BaseTestEnd2End\n\naea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.agents.BaseTestEnd2EndExecution\n\nThese classes define an extra_configs attribute that is used to set the agent-blueprint-level overrides.\nTests that have this attribute set will override the corresponding agent blueprint configuration parameters.\n\nImportant\n\nThis does not only apply to the valory/ledger connection, but to any agent blueprint configuration.\n\nExample\nAll tests that inherit from the test class bellow will use the new configuration:\n\nfrom aea_test_autonomy.base_test_classes.agents import BaseTestEnd2EndExecution\n\nclass MyEndToEndTest(BaseTestEnd2EndExecution):\n\"\"\"Base class for my end-to-end tests.\"\"\"\n\nextra_configs = [\n{\n\"dotted_path\": \"vendor.valory.skills.my_skill_abci.models.params.args.ipfs_domain_name\",\n\"value\": \"/dns/localhost/tcp/5001/http\",\n}\n]\n\nConfiguring the validation timeout\n\nLast but not least, it is important to keep in mind what the average block times are in the deploying network.\nThis is going to play a significant role when performing transactions, since the validation logic is based on that.\n\nMore specifically, the attribute validate_timeout in the skill configuration file skill.yaml\nshould not be less than the average block time of the network, because timeouts and unnecessary repricing\nwill happen too often. For reference, at the time this document was written, the average block time\nin the Ethereum mainnet was around 13.3 seconds. Therefore, it is not recommended that you specify a value less than that. Moreover, it\nwould be advisable to allow for some margin before stopping retrials, because actual block times might be higher than their average value,\nand there is no guarantee that a transaction will be included into the next block.\n\nThe underlying retrial mechanism has a backoff that scales linearly, starting at retry_timeout, and stopping either when retry_attempts have been executed or validate_timeout has been reached.\n\nExample\nAn example configuration in the skill.yaml file for the Ethereum mainnet is as follows:\n\n# (...)\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nretry_attempts: 13\nretry_timeout: 13.3\nvalidate_timeout: 1205\n\nTherefore, unsuccessful transactions will be retried at the following times:\n\n1st retry: 13.3⋅(1)=13.3\n\n2nd retry: 13.3⋅(1+2)=26.6\n\n...\n\nith retry: 13.3⋅i(i+1)2\n\n...\n\n12th retry: 13.3⋅(1+2+⋯+12)=1037.4\n\n13th retry: 13.3⋅(1+2+⋯+12+13)=1210.3\n\nNote, however, that it will stop at the 12th retry, because\n1210.3> validate_timeout =1205.","tokens":1775,"crawled_at":1791193529381} +{"id":10249,"url":"https://docs.near.org/web3-apps/tutorials/data-types","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Handling NEAR Types - NEAR Docs","text":"When calling methods in a contract or receiving results from them, you will need to encode/decode parameters correctly. For this, it is important to know how the contracts encode timestamps, balances, and gas.\n\nSearching for Smart Contract Data Types?Check the Smart Contract SDK Types section for more information on how to handle data types within smart contracts.\n\n​\n\nTime\n\nThe block timestamp in a smart contract is encoded using nanoseconds (i.e. 19 digits: 1655373910837593990).\n🌐 Javascript\n\n🦀 Rust\n\nDate.now() returns a timestamp in milliseconds (i.e 13 digits: 1655373910837). Make sure to convert between milliseconds and nanoseconds to properly handle time variables.\nIn Rust std::time::SystemTime::now() returns a SystemTime object. You can convert it to nanoseconds since UNIX_EPOCH as follows:\n\nuse std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};\nlet start = SystemTime::now();\nlet since_the_epoch = start.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)\n.expect(\"Time went backwards\");\nlet in_nanoseconds = since_the_epoch.as_nanos();\nprintln!(\"Current time in nanoseconds since UNIX EPOCH: {}\", in_nanoseconds);\n\n​\n\nDeposits\n\nSmart contracts handle NEAR amounts always using yoctoNEAR (1Ⓝ = 10^24yocto). This means that when interacting with contract’s or the user’s balance you will need to convert between NEAR and yoctoNEAR.\nUnder the hood, the network (and contracts) represent balances as u128, which are encoded as strings (since JSON cannot handle more than 52 bit integers).\nRemember to always send amounts as strings (e.g. \"1000000000000000000000000\" for 1Ⓝ) and never as number (e.g. 1000000). Consequently, convert amounts from string whenever you want to display them to the user.\n🌐 Javascript\n\n🦀 Rust\n\nIn javascript, you can use the near-api-js library to convert between NEAR and yoctoNEAR:\n\nimport { NEAR } from '@near-js/tokens'\n\nconst units = NEAR.fromDecimal('1.5') // 1.5Ⓝ\nconsole.log(units) // \"1500000000000000000000000\"\n\nconst decimal = NEAR.fromUnits('1500000000000000000000000', 2)\nconsole.log(decimal) // 1.5\n\nIn Rust you can directly use the near_token crate to convert between NEAR and yoctoNEAR:\n\nuse near_token::NearToken\n\nfn main() {\nconst TEN_NEAR: NearToken = NearToken::from_near(10);\n\nassert_eq!(TEN_NEAR.to_string(), \"10.00 NEAR\");\nassert_eq!(TEN_NEAR.as_near(), 10);\nassert_eq!(TEN_NEAR.as_millinear(), 10000);\nassert_eq!(TEN_NEAR.as_yoctonear(), 10000000000000000000000000);\n\nlet input_str = \"0.123456 NEAR\";\nlet input_near: NearToken = input_str.parse().unwrap();\nassert_eq!(\ninput_near,\nNearToken::from_yoctonear(123456000000000000000000)\n);\n\n}\n\n​\n\nGas\n\nWhen calling a contract method, you can specify how much gas you want to attach to the call. Within the network, the Gas is represented as a u64, which is encoded as a string (since JSON cannot handle more than 52 bit integers).\nAs a rule of thumb, functions that consume little computation can be called with 30 Tgas or less, while more complex functions may require up to 1000 Tgas.\n🌐 Javascript\n\n🦀 Rust\n\nIn javascript there is no built-in library to handle gas units, but you can easily convert between them as follows:\n\nconst TGAS = 1000000000000; // 1 Tgas = 10^12 gas units\n\nfunction toTgas(gas) {\nreturn (gas * TGAS).toString();\n}\n\nfunction fromTgas(tgas) {\nreturn (parseInt(tgas) / TGAS).toFixed(2);\n}\n\nuse near_gas::NearGas;\n\nfn main() {\nlet data = \"12.657 tgas\";\n\nlet near_gas: NearGas = data.parse().unwrap();\n\n// Convert the value to the most precise \"gas\" unit\nassert_eq!(near_gas.as_gas(), 12657000000000);\n// Convert the value to \"gigagas\" unit\nassert_eq!(near_gas.as_ggas(), 12657);\n\n// Display Gas. It will print: \"Here is 12.7 Tgas\"\nprintln!(\"Here is {}\", near_gas);\n\n// When `serde` feature is enabled, NearGas can be used in serde-serializable structs.\n// NearGas will be serialized to a gas-precision u64 value encoded as string.\n#[derive(serde::Serialize)]\nstruct FunctionCallDetails {\nused_gas: NearGas,\n}\n\nlet details = FunctionCallDetails { used_gas: near_gas };\n\nassert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&details).unwrap(), r#\"{\"used_gas\":\"12657000000000\"}\"#);\n}\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1022,"crawled_at":1791193539106} +{"id":10250,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/configure_service/on-chain_deployment_checklist","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"On-chain deployment checklist - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"On-chain deployment checklist\n\nThis section details a requirement checklist that need to be satisfied so that your AI agent can be properly deployed on-chain.\n\nRequired FSM App skill models\n\nEnsure that your skill extends the following classes in the models.py file:\n\npackages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models.BenchmarkTool\npackages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models.BaseParams\n\nYou can define custom arguments for the skill, if required.\n\nWithout custom argumentsWith custom arguments\n\nfrom packages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models import BenchmarkTool\nfrom packages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models import BaseParams\n\n# (...)\n\nYourBenchmarkTool = BenchmarkTool\nYourSkillParams = BaseParams\n\nfrom packages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models import BenchmarkTool\nfrom packages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models import BaseParams\n\n# (...)\n\nYourBenchmarkTool = BenchmarkTool\n\nclass YourSkillParams(BaseParams):\ndef __init__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:\nself.your_custom_arg_1: str = self._ensure(\"your_custom_arg_1\", kwargs, str)\nself.your_custom_arg_2: str = self._ensure(\"your_custom_arg_2\", kwargs, str)\n\n# (...)\n\nsuper().__init__(*args, **kwargs)\n\nRequired arguments and overrides\n\nEnsure that your FSM App skill, agent blueprint and AI agent configuration files (skill.yaml, aea-config.yaml, and service.yaml, respectively) define the appropriate arguments and overrides:\n\nskill.yaml\nMust define default/placeholder values for the arguments associated to the YourSkillParams class.\naea-config.yaml\nMust define overrides for valory/abci connection, valory/ledger connection, valory/p2p_libp2p_client connection, and your FSM App skill. Environment variables used for agent-blueprint-level overrides can use the simplified syntax ${:}.\nservice.yaml\nMust define overrides for valory/ledger connection and your FSM App skill (optionally, also for valory/p2p_libp2p_client connection). Environment variables used for ai-agent-level overrides use the syntax ${::}. They will be exported as their upper case JSON path in the agent blueprint Docker container.\nSee also the AI agent level overrides and multiple overrides sections for more information.\n\nskill.yamlaea-config.yamlservice.yaml\n\nname: \nauthor: \nversion: \ntype: skill\n# (...)\nmodels:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: /logs\nclass_name: YourBenchmarkTool\n\nparams:\nargs:\nsetup:\nall_participants:\n- '0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000'\nsafe_contract_address: '0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000'\nconsensus_threshold: null\ntendermint_url: http://localhost:26657\ntendermint_com_url: http://localhost:8080\nservice_registry_address: null\nshare_tm_config_on_startup: false\non_chain_service_id: null\n# (...)\nclass_name: YourSkillParams\n\n# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/abci:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\ntarget_skill_id: /:\nhost: ${ABCI_HOST:str:localhost}\nport: ${ABCI_PORT:int:26658}\nuse_tendermint: ${ABCI_USE_TENDERMINT:bool:false}\n\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${str:http://localhost:8545}\nchain_id: ${int:31337}\npoa_chain: ${bool:false}\ndefault_gas_price_strategy: ${str:eip1559}\n\n---\npublic_id: valory/p2p_libp2p_client:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nnodes:\n- uri: ${P2P_URI:str:acn.autonolas.tech:9005}\npublic_key: ${P2P_PUBLIC_KEY:str:02d3a830c9d6ea1ae91936951430dee11f4662f33118b02190693be835359a9d77}\n- uri: ${P2P_URI:str:acn.autonolas.tech:9006}\npublic_key: ${P2P_PUBLIC_KEY:str:02e741c62d706e1dcf6986bf37fa74b98681bc32669623ac9ee6ff72488d4f59e8}\ncert_requests:\n- identifier: acn\nledger_id: ethereum\nmessage_format: '{public_key}'\nnot_after: '2025-01-01'\nnot_before: '2024-01-01'\npublic_key: ${P2P_PUBLIC_KEY:str:02d3a830c9d6ea1ae91936951430dee11f4662f33118b02190693be835359a9d77}\nsave_path: .certs/acn_cosmos_9005.txt\n\n---\npublic_id: /:\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: ${str:/benchmarks}\n\nparams:\nargs:\nsetup:\nall_participants: ${list:[]}\nsafe_contract_address: ${str:'0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000'}\nconsensus_threshold: ${int:null}\ntendermint_url: ${str:http://localhost:26657}\ntendermint_com_url: ${str:http://localhost:8080}\nservice_registry_address: ${str:null}\nshare_tm_config_on_startup: ${bool:false}\non_chain_service_id: ${int:null}\n# (...)\n\n# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.19.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${ETHEREUM_ADDRESS:str:http://localhost:8545}\nchain_id: ${ETHEREUM_CHAIN_ID:int:31337}\npoa_chain: ${ETHEREUM_POA_CHAIN:bool:false}\ndefault_gas_price_strategy: ${DEFAULT_GAS_PRICE_STRATEGY:str:eip1559}\n\n---\npublic_id: /:\ntype: skill\nmodels:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: ${LOG_DIR:str:/benchmarks}\n\nparams:\nargs:\nsetup:\nall_participants: ${ALL_PARTICIPANTS:list:[\"0x...\",\"0x...\",\"0x...\",\"0x...\"]}\nsafe_contract_address: ${SAFE_CONTRACT_ADDRESS:str:0x...}\nconsensus_threshold: ${CONSENSUS_THRESHOLD:int:null}\ntendermint_url: ${str:http://localhost:26657}\ntendermint_com_url: ${str:http://localhost:8080}\nservice_registry_address: ${SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS:str:0x...}\nshare_tm_config_on_startup: ${SHARE_TM_CONFIG_ON_STARTUP:bool:false}\non_chain_service_id: ${ON_CHAIN_SERVICE_ID:int:1}\n# (...)\n\nImportant\n\nRecall that when deploying an on-chain AI agent using autonomy deploy from-token, a number of arguments (under setup) are overridden with the values registered in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\nmodels:\nparams:\nargs:\nsetup:\nall_participants: # Overridden with the registered values\nsafe_contract_address: # Overridden with the registered values\nconsensus_threshold: # Overridden with the registered values\n\nFor local deployments, the argument consensus_threshold can take the value:\n\nnull: then the framework will automatically calculate consensus_threshold as ⌈(2N+1)/3⌉, where N=len(all_participants).\n\nAny value M such that ⌈(2N+1)/3⌉≤M≤N.\n\nOtherwise, the framework will raise an error and the app will not start.\n\nPublish and mint packages\n\nEnsure that your components, agent blueprints and AI agents packages are published to the IPFS registry:\n\nPush your components using the autonomy push command.\n\nPublish your agent blueprints using the autonomy publish command.\n\nPublish your AI agents using the autonomy publish command.\n\nEnsure that your components, agent blueprints and AI agents packages are minted on-chain in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nCheck the deployment readiness of the AI agent using\n\n$ autonomy analyse service --public-id PUBLIC_ID\n\nor if you want to check deployment readiness of an on-chain AI agent\n\n$ autonomy analyse service --token-id TOKEN_ID\n\nPublish Docker images (optional)\n\nYou can build the Docker images for the AI agent using the autonomy build-image command. Alternatively, the images are built automatically when the AI agent is deployed using autonomy deploy from-token command\n\nIf you want to use an image with a stable hash or a stable version of a runtime image, you can provide the hash/version using --image-version on the autonomy deploy build command.\n\nEnsure that the image exists before running the deployment:\n\ndocker pull /oar_runtime_:","tokens":1830,"crawled_at":1791193548119} +{"id":10251,"url":"https://docs.near.org/web3-apps/tutorials/frontend-multiple-contracts","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Frontend Interacting with Multiple Contracts - NEAR Docs","text":"This example showcases how to interact with multiple contracts from a single frontend.\nParticularly, this example shows how to:\n\nQuery data from multiple contracts.\n\nCall methods in multiple contracts simultaneously.\n\n​\n\nQuery Data from Multiple Contracts\n\nTo query multiple contracts simply perform multiple view calls:\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nDispatching Multiple Transactions\n\nThe wallet object enables to dispatch multiple transactions simultaneously. However, please notice that the transactions execute independently.\nDispatching multiple transactions at once is just a nice way to improve UX, because the user interacts with the wallet only once.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nIn this example, the user signs two independent transactions:\n\nA transaction to call set_greeting in our Hello NEAR example\n\nA transaction to call add_message in our GuestBook example\n\nEven when the user accepts signing the transactions at the same time, the\ntransactions remain independent. This is, if one fails, the other is NOT rolled back.\n\n​\n\nBatch Actions\n\nYou can aggregate multiple actions directed towards a same contract into a single transaction. Batched actions execute sequentially, with the added benefit that, if one fails then they all get reverted.\n\n// Register a user and transfer them FT on a single take\nconst REGISTER_DEPOSIT = \"1250000000000000000000\";\n\nconst ftTx = {\nreceiverId: FT_ADDRESS,\nactions: [\n{\ntype: 'FunctionCall',\nparams: {\nmethodName: 'storage_deposit',\nargs: { account_id: \"\" },\ngas: THIRTY_TGAS, deposit: REGISTER_DEPOSIT\n}\n},\n{\ntype: 'FunctionCall',\nparams: {\nmethodName: 'ft_transfer',\nargs: { receiver_id: \"\", amount: amount_in_yocto },\ngas: THIRTY_TGAS, deposit: 1 }\n}\n]\n}\n\n// Ask the wallet to sign and send the transaction\nawait wallet.signAndSendTransactions({ transactions: [ ftTx ] })\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":472,"crawled_at":1791193557176} +{"id":10252,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/understanding-jolt-clarifications-and-reflections","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Understanding Jolt: Clarifications and reflections - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nUnderstanding Jolt: Clarifications and reflections\nJustin Thaler\n06.03.24\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n1. The sum-check protocol and the Binius commitment scheme 1. The sum-check protocol and the Binius commitment scheme\n2. Sum-check, lookups, performance, and simplicity\n3. Elliptic curves, again\n4. Precompiles and zkVM benchmarks\nTags\nJolt\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nWe’ve been making steady progress on Lasso and Jolt – our new, simple, performant lookup argument and zkVM — starting with the theory papers and Lasso implementation last summer, and since releasing a fully open source implementation of Jolt last month.\n\nThe implementation has shown Jolt’s promise relative to existing technology and challenged much of the conventional wisdom in SNARK design. Since its release, we have added support for the Rust standard library, incorporated improvements from over 10 contributors and merged nearly 50 pull requests, and improved the modularity and extensibility of the codebase.\n\nWhile we continue to enhance Jolt, I wanted to address questions, clarify misconceptions, and share my perspective on key issues. The four areas I explore here are (1) the relationship between the sum-check protocol and the Binius commitment scheme, (2) the role of sum-check and lookups in Jolt, (3) elliptic curves versus hashing, and (4) precompiles as they relate to zkVMs.\n\n1. The sum-check protocol and the Binius commitment scheme\n\nCommitment schemes are often highlighted as the key building block of a SNARK. But it’s also important to remember the vital role of the other component: the polynomial IOP. For instance, the Binius commitment scheme for multilinear polynomials represents a major advance, but it must be paired with a polynomial interactive oracle proof (PIOP) to prove that the committed data actually validates the prover’s claims.\n\nBinius’ commitment is specifically compatible with PIOPs that use the sum-check protocol. This is due to reasons both clear (sum-check relies on multilinear polynomials, not univariate ones; and FRI-Binius even uses sum-check internally) and nuanced (sum-check PIOPs naturally operate across fields of any characteristic, which is crucial for taking full advantage of Binius’ novel performance traits). Binius’ commitment is not compatible with the PIOPs that are most common today, which unfortunately don’t use sum-check.\n\nDesigning a fast PIOP requires more insight than just the phrase “apply sum-check”. Binius uses over a decade’s worth of work employing the sum-check protocol to implement prover-efficient polynomial IOPs. Sections 4 and 5 of the Binius paper are devoted to designing new highly efficient sum-check-based PIOPs to combine with the commitment scheme.\n\nThe Binius commitment and Jolt go together like peanut butter and jelly because Jolt is the only zkVM today that is exclusively based on the sum-check protocol. Today, Jolt uses commitment schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography, but incorporating the Binius commitment into Jolt is our highest priority.\n\n2. Sum-check, lookups, performance, and simplicity\n\nWhat sets Jolt apart? Is it that it is the first (and currently only) zkVM that exclusively uses sum-check-based polynomial IOPs — or is it that Jolt implements the lookup singularity (i.e., it does almost everything with lookups rather than constraint systems or circuits)? The answer is, It’s both. Most of Jolt’s simplicity benefits over prior zkVMs come from lookups; its performance benefits come from both its use of lookups and of sum-check.\n\nThe lookup-only approach is better for some instructions — ones that don’t have very small circuits — but can be worse for others that do have very small circuits, such as the bitwise-XOR instruction when working over a field of characteristic two, which corresponds to native field addition. But overall, the lookup-only approach is a net positive for performance, at least when working over 256-bit fields. Today, the Jolt prover spends about 20% of its time on these “instruction execution” lookups, and 40% of its time proving constraints. Adding more constraints to reduce lookups would not be helpful.\n\nRoughly speaking, Jolt uses lookups to implement both the “fetch” and “execute” parts of the CPU’s fetch-decode-execute loop. These lookups are fast enough that most of the prover’s time is spent proving it ran “decode,” which is handled through traditional constraints.\n\nThe lookup-only approach also results in a simpler and more auditable implementation. These benefits are difficult to quantify, and take time to recognize and appreciate. But Jolt does well on crude proxies such as lines of code (the Jolt codebase is about 25,000 lines of code, which is 2x to 4x fewer than prior RISC-V zkVMs) and development time. Such improvements are much harder to obtain than performance ones: While I expect zkVM provers to be nearly 100x faster in the coming months than they were in August 2023, it’s hard to imagine a zkVM with even 10x fewer lines of code\n\n3. Elliptic curves, again\n\nPublic discourse undervalues the benefits of having a fast zkVM that works over elliptic curves, partly due to the justified enthusiasm for hashing-based commitment schemes like Binius.\n\nWhen proving statements about elliptic curve cryptography, a curve-based zkVM can avoid non-native field arithmetic that adds hundred-to-thousand-fold overheads to proving time. Such applications include proving knowledge of many digital signatures (the main work relevant to blockchain light clients and SNARK-based bridges); aggregating Plonk/Groth16/Nova/Honk proofs; and proving knowledge of Verkle tree authentication paths.\n\nI am optimistic that the community will converge around sum-check–based PIOPs combined with the FRI-Binius commitment scheme as the right approach to performant SNARKs in many applications. Even if this happens, there will still be a role for fast curve-based SNARKs, unless the world moves away from elliptic curve cryptography entirely (e.g., after society completes a shift away from cryptosystems that are not quantum-secure).\n\nTo summarize:\n\nJolt-with-curve-based-commitments is competitive with all other zkVMs that exist today (all of which are already using hashing-based commitment schemes and working over small fields).\n\nJolt-with-curves is what one would want to use when proving statements about elliptic curves (at least, without major advances in proving non-native field arithmetic).\n\nJolt-with-Binius-commitment will be much faster as a pure zkVM than alternatives, and will be what people use except when proving statements about curves or proving with very small space (in which case people would use Jolt-with-curves).\n\nSNARKs based on elliptic curves will continue to be used to compress proof size and verifier costs before posting proofs onchain. zkVMs that work over large fields will play a role as long as that is the case. Even today, zkVM projects that people consider hashing-based are actually using zkVMs defined over BN254’s scalar field as part of their recursion pipeline.\n\n4. Precompiles and zkVM benchmarks\n\nThere’s been some discussion about precompiles and their role in zkVMs and in benchmarking. Before I explain, it’s helpful to unpack what precompiles are, as the term’s meaning varies by context.\n\n“Precompiles” in Ethereum. In the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), precompiles are operations that are performed frequently and are natively supported to enhance efficiency. This avoids the substantial overheads and exorbitant gas costs associated with executing these operations through lengthy sequences of EVM opcodes.\n\nThe distinction between “EVM precompiles” and “primitive instructions” (opcodes) is primarily semantic. For example, the Keccak hash function is an EVM opcode, while SHA-2 is an EVM precompile. Both precompiles and opcodes are frequently executed operations that Ethereum natively supports for identical purposes: optimizing efficiency and gas costs. Precompiles are undeniably part of the EVM, which is commonly used to describe the Ethereum execution environment broadly, encompassing much more than just opcodes.\n\nWhy does the EVM even have precompiles if they function essentially the same as opcodes? It’s mainly just a matter of convention. One other possible reason is that precompiles consist of relatively complicated operations like cryptographic primitives that may need to change in the future, and it will be easier to change them if they are not assigned an opcode.\n\n“Precompiles” in zkVM design. In zkVM design, a precompile refers to a special purpose SNARK targeted at a specific functionality like Keccak or SHA hashing, or a specific elliptic curve group operation. Today, SNARK precompiles are typically implemented via hand-optimized constraint systems (although as the community switches to sum-check-based SNARKs, the nature of these constraint systems and how they get proved will change).\n\nThe parallels between EVM precompiles and zkVM precompiles run deep. Before Jolt, zkVMs implemented primitive instructions via hand-optimized constraints systems, one per instruction, exactly as they implement precompiles. The difference between what gets called a zkVM precompile and what gets called a primitive instruction is purely semantic. There is no actual difference between them.\n\nIn Jolt, we implement primitive instructions with lookups instead of traditional constraints. But there are no major issues with choosing to implement some primitive instructions via constraints. (In fact, lookups can even be viewed as a type of constraint.) Indeed, as I’ve said previously, we will likely have to use traditional constraints to implement RISC-V addition and multiplication once we switch to the Binius commitment scheme over fields of characteristic two.\n\nBenchmarking zkVMs\n\nWith that background, here are my views on precompiles as they relate to zkVMs and benchmarking.\n\nFirst, benchmarking various RISC-V zkVMs without precompiles is exactly what it means to benchmark RISC-V zkVMs. The term “zkVM” is an informal one, so there’s room for disagreement, but in my view, a RISC-V zkVM with one or more precompiles is no longer a zkVM for RISC-V: It is a zkVM for the new instruction set based on RISC-V by adding each precompile as a primitive instruction. At a minimum, each precompile added to a zkVM erodes the value proposition of the zkVM paradigm — every additional circuit adds surface area for bugs, and existing programs won’t be able to leverage the new precompile out-of-the-box.\n\nSome also conflate the notion of EVM precompiles for zkEVMs with the notion of precompiles for zkVMs. But these are very different things. While a few key operations for zkEVMs — such as Merkle hashing and digital signature verification — are indeed more complicated than primitive RISC-V instructions, that doesn’t change the fact that there is no functional difference between EVM precompiles and primitive EVM instructions. zkEVMs must support EVM precompiles to claim parity with the EVM. In other words, a zkEVM that does not support EVM precompiles is not analogous to a RISC-V zkVM like Jolt, where precompiles would be used to expand the instruction set beyond RISC-V.\n\nAnother concern is how to choose a “fair” set of functionalities on which to benchmark the zkVMs. But for RISC-V zkVMs, any set of functionalities is fair. The prover time is almost entirely determined simply by the number of cycles that the RISC-V CPU runs for, for two reasons. First, the prover spends a small fraction of its time on the “execute” part of the “fetch-decode-execute” loop. Second, different RISC-V instructions, as well as memory accesses, all have reasonably similar proving times. (In Jolt, they are all handled with offline memory checking techniques.)\n\nFinally, if precompiles are brought into the picture, Jolt will likely not do any worse than alternatives. Indeed, I expect it to do better because sum-check-based precompiles will be the fastest, and can be integrated into Jolt without overhead due to its exclusive use of sum-check-based PIOPs. On this point, some people expressed concern that precompiles using elliptic-curve commitment schemes will be much worse than those using hashing-based schemes. Jolt uses curves today, but this is not essential, and we’ve been very open about our plans to switch over to Binius.\n\nBroader thoughts on benchmarking\n\nOur main goal in benchmarking is to ascertain the intrinsic performance profiles of different proof systems, to the extent that they can be isolated from their implementations. This approach allows the community to understand and converge upon the right techniques for designing performant and secure SNARKs. But when attempting to compare two different SNARKs, there are endless confounding factors that often make an “apples to apples” comparison all but impossible.\n\nEngineering effort represents one of these confounding factors, although much of the community appears to take an opposite view. The thinking seems to go something like this: if a project has added “features” like precompiles or optimized implementations for specific hardware, then it should get “credit” in any benchmarking.\n\nBoth viewpoints have merit. But taken too far, the latter viewpoint is clearly untenable. New approaches will forever be at a disadvantage in any benchmark simply because those implementing them have not had time commensurate with older projects. This holds back progress.\n\nOver time, I expect the confounding factors in benchmarking to ease. As tooling to build SNARKs matures, SNARKs will require less engineering effort to get decent performance. And it’s a minor miracle that — at least for RISC-V — zkVM costs depend mainly on cycle counts rather than idiosyncrasies of any particular application. If people converge on a choice of constraint system (as opposed to today’s fractured state of R1CS, AIR, Plonkish, etc.), something similar may happen for SNARKs targeted at constraint systems, with simple measures of constraint-system size standing in for cycle counts.\n\nUntil then, it will be difficult to strike the right balance between under- and over-controlling for confounding factors. Disagreements will be inevitable, and builders will have to provide the full context, details, and rationales behind any benchmarks so the community can understand and discuss them.\n\n****\n\nJustin Thaler is Research Partner at a16z and an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Georgetown University. His research interests include verifiable computing, complexity theory, and algorithms for massive data sets.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":4354,"crawled_at":1791193558049} +{"id":10253,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/transaction-fee-distribution/482","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Transaction Fee Distribution - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"Transaction Fee Distribution\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nFableEye\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 6:47am\n\n1\n\nProposal to allocate 0.04% of all Uniswap platform transaction fees to UNI stakers in the form of ETH. Staking pool will be used for both governance and fee distribution.\n\n0.01% of transaction fees will go to the treasury to be used at the DAOs discretion.\n\n17 Likes\n\nMunsey\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 6:55am\n\n2\n\nHow would we convert the fees for pools that don’t involve ETH? I imagine logic to transform the fee into eth would cause total gas needed to go up and we’d have to account for slippage on that transaction as well.\n\n1 Like\n\nCryptoved\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 12:43pm\n\n3\n\nNice proposal. Reward tokenomics will be good for economic stimuls of tokenholders. People can claim rewards so it can be not only ETH.\n\n1 Like\n\nleo_eth\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 4:51pm\n\n4\n\nI wholly agree on the 0.04/0.01 design. Nevertheless I suggest that we could get some inspiration from the CurveDAO where only time-locked UNI coins and ETH-UNI LP can get reward from the fees. That would help create a virtuous circle:\n\nReduce selling pressure which should increase LM ROI.\n\nReduce selling incentives for newly minted coins by LM.\n\nLocked-UNI coins holders have more skin in the game thus would be more motivated to participate in the governance and the growth of the ecosystem.\n\n7 Likes\n\nDarkhane\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 5:08pm\n\n5\n\nPlease stop with these timelocked thing, this only favors whales.\n\nReduce selling pressure is only a very short-term vision.\n\nThe higher the volume, the higher the fees and the higher the valuation. Only that matters.\n\nUtility makes value, everything else is artificial and won’t last.\n\n3 Likes\n\nmonet-supply\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 6:51pm\n\n6\n\nThe protocol fee has not yet been activated, and even when it is it won’t start accumulating for 180 days.\n\nIf anything, I expect protocol fees to be most useful as a gentle ‘push’ factor to incentivize LP migration from v2 to forthcoming v3.\n\n2 Likes\n\nNative\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 7:11pm\n\n7\n\nTime-locked vesting periods are a great idea for the reasons that you describe.\n\nleo_eth\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 7:20pm\n\n8\n\nI think having LM boosting (More coins minted) when one time-lock some UNi as in Curve is indeed a bad idea.\n\nI just propose that only people that time-lock their UNI tokens can obtain the 0.0x% trading fee.\n\nOne holder profit would be equal to ((his number of tokens locked)/(all token locked))*(fee revenue during x time) thus, due to linearity, it will not particularly profit to whales.\n\nonlinedollars\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 8:02pm\n\n9\n\nIf this is implemented, a lot of new users could join to stake as Uniswap had shown that it is ready to stand the test of time.\n\niwearahoodie\n\nSeptember 17, 2020, 11:24pm\n\n10\n\nI support the idea in theory, eventually. However I think more debate and discussion needs to be had on the benefit of growing V3 and building a moat around that before turning on fees.\n\nI’m happy to delay this vote until V3 is out.\n\n4 Likes\n\nLosMontana420\n\nSeptember 18, 2020, 5:55am\n\n11\n\nI agree that this will take a more detailed discussion to determine the best coarse of action, the theory is good but could catch some whales doing what they do.\n\ncoolcryptomaniac\n\nSeptember 18, 2020, 8:43am\n\n12\n\nBest to be given in form of dai,eth and other new Uniswap tokens , will create above balance and secure future of uni holders\n\nunijay\n\nSeptember 18, 2020, 8:40pm\n\n13\n\nGrowth and maintaining a competitive platform should be prioritized. IMO it is far to early to think about value extraction. This sector will have explosive growth moving forward and everyone here benefits if Uniswap is established as an important hub in that, far larger, network. The less fees and friction, and the more incentive for participation, the greater Uniswaps market share will be.\n\n6 Likes\n\niwearahoodie\n\nSeptember 21, 2020, 12:57pm\n\n14\n\nI agree with unijay 110%. I’d prefer to put resources towards growth.\n\n1 Like\n\nNaught\n\nOctober 9, 2020, 5:20am\n\n15\n\nUNI being a governance token its value is hinged not only on the protocol, but also activity of its participants by voting on innovative proposals.\n\nGrowth should not be focused on cultivating holding via a general transaction fee to all.\n\nThe transaction fee should go towards those who are engaged with governance (such as small users delegating and large whales who are active with proposal improvements).\n\nIncentive should be aligned with governance engagement.\n\n1 Like\n\nDmills\n\nOctober 9, 2020, 7:33am\n\n16\n\nI definitely think token holders sure be able to earn something, other than the right to vote. for the sake of the whales and making things pretty even, what if we just make a limit to the number of tokens any said token holder could earn rewards on. Like say you have 3,000 tokens, our limit could be 2,000 tokens max for earning.\n\n1 Like\n\nDarkhane\n\nOctober 9, 2020, 5:16pm\n\n17\n\nI’m sorry but that’s nonsense.\n\nIt’s only going to serve for a pile of ridiculous proposals, worse than now.\n\nThe majority of the hodlers will vote anything and everything just to get some tokens.\n\n2 Likes\n\nNaught\n\nOctober 9, 2020, 10:16pm\n\n18\n\nI do not think it will result in a pile of proposals. The reward would only go to those who have shown intent to align to specific platform goals.\n\nReward the .05% fees to delegate pools, does not mean spamming proposals. It just means you have a stake in the future direction of the platform.\n\nishaan1986\n\nFebruary 21, 2021, 9:47pm\n\n19\n\nNeed Gas Token On Uniswap Like Chi Gas Token On 1inch Exchange to Reduce Gas Fee and it also need to be airdropped like UNI to Uniswap User.\n\n1 Like\n\nOblomov\n\nFebruary 23, 2021, 11:02am\n\n20\n\nNeed is a strong word, and you haven’t really justified it’s use in your post.\n\nFrom what I’m aware, gas tokens aren’t an intentional feature of the ethereum protocol, and I think there are active proposals to remove the ability to use them, so investing dev time might not be a priority for the uniswap team. You can look up the EIPs to see exactly what’s being discussed.\n\nWhen you airdrop a token you inflate it’s availability and likely reduce its price, if it goes to people who’re just going to sell it. What would we be trying to incentivise, with another airdrop, that would be beneficial for the uniswap project as a whole?\n\nPursuing another airdrop without a justification sounds like you’re just looking for a handout.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nFees Switch Follow Up: Supporting the Evolution of Uniswap Protocol Design\n\nUncategorized\n\n8\n\n3957\n\nMarch 30, 2023\n\nAbility to toggle fees is next week, do we do it?\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n27\n\n4718\n\nFebruary 27, 2021\n\nUniswap Proposal: An Alternative Use-Case for the Fee Switch\n\nUncategorized\n\n21\n\n6616\n\nApril 7, 2023\n\n[POLL] Adding value to UNI tokens\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n2\n\n2243\n\nOctober 10, 2020\n\nProposal: Flip the Protocol Fee Switch for Uniswap Dev Team and UNI Holders\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n5\n\n7159\n\nOctober 30, 2020","tokens":1745,"crawled_at":1791193572700} +{"id":10254,"url":"https://docs.near.org/tools/cli","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"NEAR CLI - NEAR Docs","text":"The NEAR Command Line Interface (CLI) is a tool that enables you to interact with the NEAR network directly from the shell. Among other things, the NEAR CLI enables you to create and manage accounts, send tokens such as NEAR, FTs and NFTs, deploy smart contracts, call functions on those contracts, and manage access keys.\n​\n\nInstallation\n\nnpm\n\nHomebrew\n\nCargo\n\nMac and Linux (binaries)\n\nWindows (binaries)\n\nnpm install -g near-cli-rs@latest\n\nbrew install near\n\ncargo install near-cli-rs\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.sh | sh\n\nirm https://github.com/near/near-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-cli-rs-installer.ps1 | iex\n\n​\n\nConfiguration file\n\nThe directory with access keys and available connection networks are defined in the configuration file (near-cli/config.toml), which is located depending on the operating system in the following places:\n\nmacOS: $HOME/Library/Application Support (e.g. /Users/Alice/Library/Application Support)\n\nLinux: $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $HOME/.config (e.g. /home/alice/.config)\n\nWindows: {FOLDERID_RoamingAppData} (e.g. C:\\Users\\Alice\\AppData\\Roaming)\n\nYou can learn more about working with the configuration file here.\n\nYou can set up a custom RPC server by changing the rpc_url parameter in near-cli settings:\n\nnear config edit-connection testnet --key rpc_url --value https://archival-rpc.testnet.near.org/\n\n​\n\nLocalnet configuration values\n\nWhen setting up a localnet connection with near config add-connection, several optional fields can be configured. Most of them can be skipped or set to placeholder URLs — they are only used for specific commands and are not required for basic localnet usage.\nFieldPurposeLocalnet recommendation\nrpc_url\nRPC endpoint for all blockchain interactions\nhttp://localhost:3030/\n\nwallet_url\nUsed to construct a URL for importing accounts from a Web wallet\nAny URL (e.g. http://localhost) or a local wallet if available\n\nexplorer_transaction_url\nPrinted after a transaction is signed as /\nAny URL (e.g. http://localhost) or omit\n\nlinkdrop_account_id\nAccount with the near-linkdrop contract, used by account create-account fund-myself\nCan be skipped; use testnet as a placeholder if needed\n\nnear_social_db_contract_account_id\nNEAR Social contract account, used for account view-account-summary and account update-social-profile\nCan be skipped\n\nfaucet_url\nService that creates new accounts without requiring NEAR tokens, used by account create-account sponsor-by-faucet-service\nCan be skipped\n\nfastnear_url\nFastNEAR API for fetching staking pool delegations, used by account view-account-summary\nCan be skipped\n\nstaking_pools_factory_account_id\nFallback to FastNEAR — queries all staking pools individually; used by account view-account-summary\nCan be skipped\n\nmpc_contract_account_id\nMPC signing service contract, used to sign payloads and control other accounts\nCan be skipped unless running a local MPC node\n\nA minimal localnet connection requires only rpc_url. The other values are only needed when using the specific commands listed above.\n\nnear config add-connection \\\n--network-name localnet \\\n--connection-name localnet-sandbox \\\n--rpc-url http://localhost:3030/ \\\n--wallet-url http://localhost/ \\\n--explorer-transaction-url http://localhost/\n\n​\n\nInteractive mode\n\nTo use the near-cli simply run the following in your terminal.\n\nnear\n\nYou should then see the following. Use the arrow keys and hit enter or simply type out one of the available options to select an option.\n\nWe provide examples only of the most used commands. Such commands may have two versions — a full one and a short one. If you want to explore all options provided by near-cli, use the interactive mode described above.\n\n​\n\nAccount\n\nThis option will allow you to manage, control, and retrieve information on your accounts.\n​\n\nSummary\n\nview-account-summary - view properties for an account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account view-account-summary $ACCOUNT_ID network-config testnet now\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear state $ACCOUNT_ID --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nImport\n\nimport-account - import existing account (a.k.a. “sign in”).\nFull\n\nShort\n\nnear account import-account using-web-wallet network-config testnet\n\nnear login --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nExport\n\nexport-account - export existing account.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account export-account $ACCOUNT_ID using-web-wallet network-config testnet\n\n​\n\nCreate\n\ncreate-account - create a new account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account create-account sponsor-by-faucet-service $ACCOUNT_ID autogenerate-new-keypair save-to-keychain network-config testnet create\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear create-account $ACCOUNT_ID --useFaucet --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nDelete\n\ndelete-account - delete an account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport BENEFICIARY_ID=alice.testnet\n\nnear account delete-account $ACCOUNT_ID beneficiary $BENEFICIARY_ID network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport BENEFICIARY_ID=alice.testnet\n\nnear delete-account $ACCOUNT_ID $BENEFICIARY_ID --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nKeys\n\nGenerating, showing, adding and removing account keys. NEAR keys can use any of the supported signature schemes: ed25519 (default), secp256k1, or the post-quantum ml-dsa-65.\n​\n\nGenerate a key pair\n\ngenerate-keypair - create a fresh key pair offline, without touching an account or the network. Use --signature-scheme to choose the scheme (defaults to ed25519).\nEd25519\n\nML-DSA-65 (post-quantum)\n\n# Print a new key pair to the terminal\nnear generate-keypair print-to-terminal\n\n# ...or save it to a JSON file\nnear generate-keypair save-to-file ./my-key.json\n\n# Print a new post-quantum key pair to the terminal\nnear generate-keypair --signature-scheme ml-dsa-65 print-to-terminal\n\n# ...or save it to a JSON file\nnear generate-keypair --signature-scheme ml-dsa-65 save-to-file ./pq-key.json\n\nRun in an interactive terminal without --signature-scheme and the CLI prompts you to pick a scheme; otherwise it defaults to ed25519. Unlike ed25519, ml-dsa-65 key pairs are generated randomly and have no seed phrase or implicit-account address — be sure to back up the saved key file.\n\n​\n\nList keys\n\nlist-keys - view a list of keys for an account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account list-keys $ACCOUNT_ID network-config testnet now\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear list-keys $ACCOUNT_ID --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nAdd key\n\nadd-key - add an access key to an account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account add-key $ACCOUNT_ID grant-full-access use-manually-provided-public-key ed25519:CXqAs8c8kZz81josLw82RQsnZXk8CAdUo7jAuN7uSht2 network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear add-key $ACCOUNT_ID ed25519:CXqAs8c8kZz81josLw82RQsnZXk8CAdUo7jAuN7uSht2 --networkId testnet\n\nInstead of providing a key, you can have the CLI autogenerate one and add it in a single step with autogenerate-new-keypair --signature-scheme :\nEd25519\n\nML-DSA-65 (post-quantum)\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account add-key $ACCOUNT_ID grant-full-access autogenerate-new-keypair save-to-keychain network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account add-key $ACCOUNT_ID grant-full-access autogenerate-new-keypair --signature-scheme ml-dsa-65 save-to-keychain network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nThe same --signature-scheme flag is available on the account create-account fund-myself and sponsor-by-faucet-service autogenerate flows. You can also add an externally generated ml-dsa-65: key through the use-manually-provided-public-key flow shown above. An ml-dsa-65 key has no implicit-account form — you can’t derive a new implicit account from one — but you can add it to any existing account, named or implicit, just like any other key.\n\n​\n\nDelete key\n\ndelete-keys - delete an access key from an account.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear account delete-keys $ACCOUNT_ID public-keys ed25519:HdkFZFEPoWfgrrLK3R4t5dWtNoLC8WymBzhCXoP3zrjh network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear delete-key $ACCOUNT_ID ed25519:HdkFZFEPoWfgrrLK3R4t5dWtNoLC8WymBzhCXoP3zrjh --networkId testnet\n\nThe interactive key picker only lists ed25519 and secp256k1 keys. A post-quantum ml-dsa-65 key is stored on-chain only as a hash, so its full public key can’t be read back from the network — to delete one, pass the full ml-dsa-65: key explicitly to the public-keys argument of near account delete-keys (the full command form shown above).\n\n​\n\nGas keys\n\nGas keys are access keys with their own prepaid gas balance and up to 1,024 parallel nonces. The add-key command can create them through the grant-gas-key-full-access and grant-gas-key-function-call modes, and dedicated commands manage their balance and nonces.\nA gas key is always created empty — fund it with fund-gas-key before using it:\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\n\n# Create a full-access gas key with 8 parallel nonces\nnear account add-key $ACCOUNT_ID grant-gas-key-full-access --num-nonces 8 autogenerate-new-keypair save-to-keychain network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n# Transfer 5 NEAR from the account into the gas key's balance\nnear account fund-gas-key $ACCOUNT_ID ed25519:CXqAs8c8kZz81josLw82RQsnZXk8CAdUo7jAuN7uSht2 '5 NEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n# View the current nonce of each of the key's lanes\nnear account view-gas-key-nonces $ACCOUNT_ID ed25519:CXqAs8c8kZz81josLw82RQsnZXk8CAdUo7jAuN7uSht2 network-config testnet now\n\n# Move 2 NEAR from the gas key's balance back to the account\nnear account withdraw-from-gas-key $ACCOUNT_ID ed25519:CXqAs8c8kZz81josLw82RQsnZXk8CAdUo7jAuN7uSht2 '2 NEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nTo sign a transaction with a gas key, pass --nonce-index to the signing option to choose which nonce lane to use (defaults to lane 0):\n\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID send-near alice.testnet '1 NEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain --nonce-index 3 send\n\nGas keys also work with meta transactions. The CLI signs as a delegate action when the selected network connection has a relayer configured (a meta_transaction_relayer_url, set on the connection with near config add-connection). Signing such a transaction with --nonce-index then produces a DelegateV2 delegate action bound to that nonce lane, which the relayer wraps and pays for.\n\nDeleting a gas key burns any balance left on it, and fails if the balance exceeds 1 NEAR — withdraw first with withdraw-from-gas-key, then delete with the regular delete-keys command. Gas-key meta transactions are supported for all software signers; Ledger is the exception, since the device firmware cannot yet produce a DelegateV2 signature.\n\n​\n\nTokens\n\nThis will allow you to manage your token assets such as NEAR, FTs and NFTs.\n​\n\nSend NEAR\n\nsend-near - transfers NEAR to a specified recipient in units of NEAR or yoctoNEAR.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport RECEIVER_ID=alice.testnet\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID send-near $RECEIVER_ID '0.5 NEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport RECEIVER_ID=alice.testnet\n\nnear send-near $ACCOUNT_ID $RECEIVER_ID 0.5 --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nSend FT\n\nsend-ft - transfer Fungible Tokens to a specified user.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport RECEIVER_ID=alice.testnet\nexport FT_CONTRACT_ID=0c97251cd1f630c444dbusdt.testnet\n\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID send-ft $FT_CONTRACT_ID $RECEIVER_ID amount-ft '1 USDT' prepaid-gas '100.0 Tgas' attached-deposit '1 yoctoNEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n​\n\nSend NFT\n\nsend-nft - transfers NFTs between accounts.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport RECEIVER_ID=alice.testnet\nexport NFT_CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\n\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID send-nft $NFT_CONTRACT_ID $RECEIVER_ID 1 --prepaid-gas '100.0 Tgas' --attached-deposit '1 yoctoNEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n​\n\nView NEAR balance\n\nview-near-balance - view the balance of NEAR tokens.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID view-near-balance network-config testnet now\n\n​\n\nView FT balance\n\nview-ft-balance - view the balance of Fungible Tokens.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport FT_CONTRACT_ID=0c97251cd1f630c444dbusdt.testnet\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID view-ft-balance $FT_CONTRACT_ID network-config testnet now\n\n​\n\nView NFT balance\n\nview-nft-assets - view the balance of NFT tokens.\n\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nexport NFT_CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\nnear tokens $ACCOUNT_ID view-nft-assets $NFT_CONTRACT_ID network-config testnet now\n\n​\n\nContract\n\nThis option allows you to manage and interact with your smart contracts.\n​\n\nCall\n\ncall-function - execute function (contract method).\nFull\n\nShort\n\n# View method\nexport CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\nnear contract call-function as-read-only $CONTRACT_ID nft_tokens json-args '{\"from_index\": \"0\", \"limit\": 2}' network-config testnet now\n\n# Call method\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear contract call-function as-transaction $CONTRACT_ID nft_mint json-args '{\"metadata\": {\"copies\": 1, \"description\": \"The Team Goes\", \"media\": \"https://bafybeidl4hjbpdr6u6xvlrizwxbrfcyqurzvcnn5xoilmcqbxfbdwrmp5m.ipfs.dweb.link/\", \"title\": \"GO TEAM\"}, \"receiver_id\": \"bob.testnet\", \"token_id\": \"5895\"}' prepaid-gas '100.0 Tgas' attached-deposit '0.1 NEAR' sign-as $ACCOUNT_ID network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n# View method\nexport CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\nnear view $CONTRACT_ID nft_tokens '{\"from_index\": \"0\", \"limit\": 2}' --networkId testnet\n\n# Call method\nexport ACCOUNT_ID=bob.testnet\nnear call $CONTRACT_ID nft_mint '{\"metadata\": {\"copies\": 1, \"description\": \"The Team Goes\", \"media\": \"https://bafybeidl4hjbpdr6u6xvlrizwxbrfcyqurzvcnn5xoilmcqbxfbdwrmp5m.ipfs.dweb.link/\", \"title\": \"GO TEAM\"}, \"receiver_id\": \"bob.testnet\", \"token_id\": \"5896\"}' --deposit 0.1 --useAccount $ACCOUNT_ID --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nDeploy\n\ndeploy - add a new contract code.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport CONTRACT_ID=contract.testnet\nnear contract deploy $CONTRACT_ID use-file ../target/near/contract.wasm without-init-call network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nexport CONTRACT_ID=contract.testnet\nnear deploy $CONTRACT_ID ../target/near/contract.wasm --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nInspect\n\ninspect - get a list of available function names.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nexport CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\nnear contract view-storage $CONTRACT_ID all as-text network-config testnet now\n\nexport CONTRACT_ID=nft.examples.testnet\nnear storage $CONTRACT_ID --finality final --utf8 --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nTransaction\n\nOperate transactions.\n​\n\nView status\n\nview-status - view a transaction status.\nFull\n\nShort\n\nnear transaction view-status BFrVVtjqD2p1zYX1UCvn4nJpy7zPHpY5cTgQaKCZjBvw network-config testnet\n\nnear tx-status BFrVVtjqD2p1zYX1UCvn4nJpy7zPHpY5cTgQaKCZjBvw --networkId testnet\n\n​\n\nConfig\n\nManage the connection parameters inside the config.toml file for near-cli.\nThis will allow you to change or modify the network connections for your CLI.\n​\n\nShow connections\n\nshow-connections - show a list of network connections.\n\nnear config show-connections\n\n​\n\nEdit connection\n\nedit-connection - edit a network connection.\n\nnear config edit-connection testnet --key rpc_url --value https://test.rpc.fastnear.com\n\nWe provide examples only of the most used commands. If you want to explore all options provided by near-cli, use the interactive mode.\n\n​\n\nValidators\n\nYou can use the following commands to interact with the blockchain and view validator stats. There are three reports used to monitor validator status:\n\nProposals\n\nCurrent validators\n\nNext validators\n\nTo use these commands, you must install the CLI validator extension.\n\n​\n\nValidator extension\n\nIf you want to interact with NEAR Validators from command line, you can install the NEAR Validator CLI Extension:\nnpm\n\nCargo\n\nMac and Linux (binaries)\n\nWindows (binaries)\n\nnpm install -g near-validator\n\ncargo install near-validator\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near-cli-rs/near-validator-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-validator-installer.sh | sh\n\nirm https://github.com/near-cli-rs/near-validator-cli-rs/releases/latest/download/near-validator-installer.ps1 | iex\n\n​\n\nProposals\n\nA proposal by a validator indicates they would like to enter the validator set. In order for a proposal to be accepted it must meet the minimum seat price.\n\nnear-validator proposals network-config mainnet\n\n​\n\nCurrent validators\n\nThis shows a list of active validators in the current epoch, the number of blocks produced, number of blocks expected, and online rate. Used to monitor if a validator is having issues.\n\nnear-validator validators network-config mainnet now\n\n​\n\nNext validators\n\nThis shows validators whose proposal was accepted one epoch ago, and that will enter the validator set in the next epoch.\n\nnear-validator validators network-config mainnet next\n\n​\n\nStaking\n\nFor validators, there’s also an option to stake NEAR tokens without deploying a staking pool smart contract.\n​\n\nView validator stake\n\nTo view the validator’s stake on the last block:\n\nnear-validator staking view-stake examples.testnet network-config testnet now\n\n​\n\nStake directly without a staking pool\n\nTo stake the amount:\n\nnear-validator staking stake-proposal examples.testnet ed25519:AiEo5xepXjY7ChihZJ6AsfoDAaUowhPgvQp997qnFuRP '1500 NEAR' network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\n​\n\nUnstake directly without a staking pool\n\nTo unstake:\n\nnear-validator staking unstake-proposal examples.testnet ed25519:AiEo5xepXjY7ChihZJ6AsfoDAaUowhPgvQp997qnFuRP network-config testnet sign-with-keychain send\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":4449,"crawled_at":1791193575705} +{"id":10255,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/understanding-programs","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Understanding Programs | Developer Hub","text":"This page aims to provide a quick overview of how programs work in Solana and offer additional reading material for those who are interested in learning more about a particular subject.\nIntroduction\nUnlike most blockchains, Solana separates logic and data into two separate components. These are, respectively, Programs and Accounts. What that means is that instead of storing data inside variables internally, Programs interact with external data stored in Accounts with the ability to mutate them.\nThis architecture is great for making Programs more modular since the data they interact with is not bound by the Program itself and can scale to new orders of magnitude. It is also great for making Programs more performant since it allows the blockchain to run the same Program in parallel with different Accounts.\nTo interact with a Program, we must use the Instructions defined by that Program. You can think of Instructions as API endpoints exposed by the Program. Each Instruction contains a set of parameters and constraints that must be fulfilled to execute it.\nTo recap: In Solana, Programs define Instructions that can be used to interact with external data stores called Accounts.\nNote that, technically, Programs are special kinds of Accounts marked as executable whose entire purpose is to store the compiled code of the Program. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will distinguish these definitions and use the term \"Account\" to refer to non-executable Accounts.\nIn the rest of this guide, we will talk about Accounts and Instructions in more detail before explaining the visual representation that we will be using in diagrams throughout the documentation.\n📚 Additional reading:\nSolana Documentation — On-chain Programs\nSolana Cookbook — Programs\nThe Anchor Book — Intro to Programming on Solana\nAccounts\nIn Solana, Accounts are used to store data. In essence, they are simple arrays of bytes stored at a particular address. The address of an Account is the public key of a cryptographic key pair.\nAnyone that has access to the private key of that key pair, can sign on behalf of that Account which, depending on the program, may give them the ability to mutate the data stored in that Account.\nOnce an Account is created, it is usually immediately initialized by a Program which will be marked as its Owner and will define the data structure of the allocated array of bytes. The Program that owns the Account is then responsible for providing Instructions that can be used to interact with it.\n📚 Additional reading:\nSolana Documentation — Accounts\nSolana Cookbook — Accounts\nProgram Derived Addresses (PDA)\nThere exist another type of Account, called Program Derived Account, whose address is not the public key of a cryptographic key pair but instead is algorithmically derived from the public key of the Program that owns the Account. We call that address a Program Derived Address or PDA for short.\nSince the address is always derived from the public key of the Program, no other Program can algorithmically derive the same address. On top of that, additional Seeds can be provided to the algorithm to add more context to the address.\nThis has a variety of use cases such as enabling programs to sign Cross-Program Invocations or enabling the creation of accounts within an address that can be derived deterministically.\nNote that, by design, Program Derived Addresses will never conflict with cryptographically generated public keys. All cryptographic public keys are part of what we call an Elliptic-curve. If, when generating a PDA, the algorithm generated a key that falls on that curve, a Bump is added to the address and is incremented by one until the generated address no longer falls on the curve.\n📚 Additional reading:\nSolana Documentation — PDAs\nSolana Cookbook — PDAs\nAccount data\nWhether we are dealing with a regular Account or a Program Derived Account, Accounts store data as a serialized array of bytes. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Program to define a data structure for each of the Accounts it manages as well as provide a way of differentiating these Accounts, so we know which data structure to apply to them.\nDiscriminators\nDiscriminators are used to differentiate between different types of Accounts within a Program. They can be implemented in many ways but here are the three most common ones:\nUse a shared Enum as the first byte of every account. By prefixing every Account with a shared Enum, we can use the first byte of the serialized data to identify the Account. This is a simple and efficient way to implement discriminators. Most of the programs maintained by Metaplex use this approach.\nUse a deterministic hash as the first byte of every account. This is very similar to the previous point, but it uses a hash instead of an Enum. Programs created using the Anchor framework end up using this approach implicitly because Anchor will automatically generate that hash based on the Account's name.\nNo discriminator, use the size of the Account. If all the accounts managed by a Program have different sizes, then we can examine the length of that array of bytes to determine which Account we are dealing with. This is a performant approach since we don't need to add extra bytes to the data, but it limits how flexible a Program can be with its Accounts. The SPL Token Program by Solana uses this approach since it only maintains two accounts of different fixed sizes.\nField types, sizes and offsets\nEach Account defines its own data structure by using fields of different types. These types will affect the number of bytes required to store the field. For instance, an i8 is an 8-bit integer that will require 1 byte to store whereas an i64 is a 64-bit integer which will require 8 bytes to store.\nSince, in the blockchain, Accounts are just arrays of bytes, it is important to understand the size of each field and where they start in this array, i.e. their offset. This can be useful when fetching multiple accounts from a given program using a memcmp filter.\nNote that not all fields have a fixed size. For instance, a Vec is a vector of 8-bit integers that may contain none, one or many items. As such, it becomes a lot more complicated to filter accounts based on fields that are located after the first field of variable size.\nOptional fields\nA field can also be defined as optional, meaning there exists a scenario where that field can be empty.\nThis field will use an additional byte as a prefix to indicate whether the field is empty or not.\nConcretely, the value None will be assigned and the program will act accordingly when using that field.\nIndicative fields\nWhilst this is not something that is explicitly defined in the data structure, the documentation will mark certain fields as indicative.\nAn indicative field means that the information provided by the field is not used by the program itself. Instead, it indicates a piece of information to third parties. The program will still enforce the integrity of the data, but it will simply not use that information internally.\nLet’s take the Metadata Account as an example.\nThe Share property of each creator in the Creators array is indicative. The Token Metadata program will ensure that the Share values of all creators add up to 100%, but it will not do anything with that information. Instead, it expects NFT marketplaces to use this information when distributing royalties.\nOn the other hand, the Is Mutable property is not indicative because the Token Metadata program will use that information internally to prevent immutable Metadata Accounts to be updated.\nInstructions\nOne can interact with a Program using the Instructions it provides. Multiple Instructions can be packed into a single Transaction that will be sent to the blockchain. Each Transaction is atomic meaning if any of its instructions fails, the whole Transaction will be reverted.\nSimilarly to Accounts, Instructions must be serialized into an array of bytes before they can be sent to the network. The data to be serialized must contain the following information for the Program to execute it.\nDiscriminator: Similarly to Accounts, Instructions are usually prefixed with a discriminator so the Program can identify which Instruction is being executed.\nAccounts: An array of Account addresses that are affected by this instruction. This can either be because the Account will be read, mutated or both. Note that the order of this array is important since Programs will identify the type of Account provided based on its position.\nArguments: An array of data fields required by the instruction. It is not uncommon for this array to be empty since Instructions can get most of their information directly from the Accounts. Note that these arguments are comparable to the fields of an Account and, therefore, they can have the same properties mentioned above such as \"optional\" and \"indicative\".\nSigners: An array of signatures for a sub-set of the Accounts provided. This is only needed for Accounts that are required to sign the Instruction. The next section explains this in a bit more detail.\n📚 Additional reading:\nSolana Documentation — Transactions\nSolana Documentation — Instructions\nSolana Cookbook — Transactions\nSigner and/or Writable Accounts\nA Program may require that the Accounts provided within an Instruction are Signers and/or Writable.\nSigners: A Signer Account is required to sign the Transaction for the Instruction to be successful. By attaching a signature, users can prove that they are the owner of the Account.\nWritable: A Writable Account will be mutated by the Instruction. This information is important for the blockchain to know which Transactions can be run in parallel and which ones can't.\nTherefore, with these two booleans, we end up with the following four possible scenarios:\nNon-Signer and Non-Writable: This Account is only used to read data. We cannot mutate it and we cannot make any assumption about its ownership.\nSigner and Non-Writable: This Account can also not be mutated, but we know that the user who sent the Transaction owns its private key. This enables Programs to grant or deny access to certain actions.\nSigner and Writable: This Account has both signed the Transaction and it can be mutated by the Instruction. This combination is pretty common since Programs will usually require the owner of an Account to prove who they are before mutating that account. Otherwise, anyone could mutate any Account they don't own.\nNon-Signer and Writable: This Account can be mutated, but we can't make any assumption about its ownership. That usually means that the Program is using other Signer Accounts to prove they can mutate that one. This is also the case for PDA Accounts since they are owned by the Program and, as such, they require the Program to keep track of Authorities that can mutate them. Also, note that certain actions like crediting lamports to an Account do not require the Account to sign the Transaction.\nCross-Program Invocations (CPI)\nCross-Program Invocations allow Programs to execute nested Instructions within their Instructions. They can use Instructions from their own Program and/or from other Programs.\n📚 Additional reading:\nSolana Documentation — CPI\nUsing CPIs with Anchor Programs","tokens":2818,"crawled_at":1791193577807} +{"id":10256,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/indexer-client/websockets","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"dYdX Documentation","text":"The WebSockets API provides data feeds providing the trader real-time information.\n\nSee the guide for examples on how to use the WebSockets API.\n\nCommon schemas\n\nInteractions with the WebSockets endpoint is done using common base JSON schemas for all channels/feed types.\nFor specific feeds, see the following subsections.\n\nSubscribe\n\nUse the following schema to subscribe to a channel.\n\nJSON Schema\n\nParameterTypeDescription\ntype\nstring\nMessage type (subscribe).\n\nchannel\nstring\nFeed type identifier.\n\nid\nstring\nSelector for channel-specific data. Only used in some channels.\n\nbatched\nbool\nReduce incoming messages by batching contents.\n\nExample{\n\"type\": \"subscribe\",\n\"channel\": \"v4_trades\",\n\"id\": \"BTC-USD\",\n\"batched\": false\n}\n\nResponse\n\nParameterTypeDescription\ntype\nstring\nMessage type (subscribed).\n\nconnection_id\nstring\nString identifying the subscription.\n\nmessage_id\nint\nMessage sequence number sent on the subscription.\n\nid\nstring\nSelector for channel-specific data.\n\ncontents\nvalue\nChannel-specific initial data.\n\nUnsubscribe\n\nUse the following schema to unsubscribe from a channel.\nSimilar scheme to the subscribe schema, however with the unsubscribe type, and without the batched field.\n\nJSON Schema\n\nParameterTypeDescription\ntype\nstring\nMessage type (unsubscribe).\n\nchannel\nstring\nFeed type identifier.\n\nid\nstring\nSelector for channel-specific data.\n\nExample{\n\"type\": \"unsubscribe\",\n\"channel\": \"v4_trades\",\n\"id\": \"BTC-USD\"\n}\n\nResponse\n\nParameterTypeDescription\ntype\nstring\nMessage type (unsubscribed).\n\nconnection_id\nstring\nString identifying the subscription.\n\nchannel\nstring\nFeed type identifier.\n\nmessage_id\nint\nMessage sequence number sent on the subscription.\n\nid\nstring\nSelector for channel-specific data. Only used in some channels.\n\nData\n\nAfter subscription, the incoming messages will be serialized using the following schema.\n\nJSON Schema\n\nParameterTypeDescription\nconnection_id\nstring\nString identifying the subscription.\n\nchannel\nstring\nFeed type identifier.\n\nid\nstring\nSelector for channel-specific data. Only used in some channels.\n\nmessage_id\nint\nMessage sequence number sent on the subscription.\n\nversion\nstring\nProtocol identifier.\n\ncontents\nvalue\nChannel-specific message data.\n\nChannels\n\nThe available clients API is presented below.\nFor each, the subscription and unsubscription functions are shown. Internally, these functions send messages serialized in the subscribe and unsubscribe JSON schemas above.\n\nFor each channel/feed type the sub-schemas employed in the contents field of the received Data (after subscription) are shown.\n\nSubaccounts\n\nData feed of a subaccount. Data contains updates to the subaccount such as position, orders and fills updates.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# class `Subaccounts`\ndef subscribe(self, address: str, subaccount_number: int) -> Self\ndef unsubscribe(self, address: str, subaccount_number: int)\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is a string containing the subaccount ID (address and subaccount number). It is formattted as {address}/{subaccount-number}.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nSubaccountsInitialMessage\nSubaccountsUpdateMessage *\n\nMarkets\n\nData feed of all dYdX markets. Data contains updates to all markets, including market parameters and oracle prices.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# class `Markets`\ndef subscribe(self, batched: bool = True) -> Self\ndef unsubscribe(self)\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is not employed in the subscribe/unsubscribe schemas.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nMarketsInitialMessage\nMarketsUpdateMessage *\n\nTrades\n\nData feed of the trades on a market. Data contains order fills updates, such as the order side, price and size.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# class `Trades`\ndef subscribe(self, id: str, batched: bool = True) -> Self\ndef unsubscribe(self, id: str)\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is the market/ticker as a string.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nTradesInitialMessage\nTradesUpdateMessage *\n\nOrders\n\nData feed of the orders of a market. Data contains lists of the bids and asks of the order book.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# class `OrderBook`\ndef subscribe(self, id: str, batched: bool = True) -> Self\ndef unsubscribe(self, id: str)\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is the market/ticker as a string.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nOrdersInitialMessage\nOrdersUpdateMessage *\n\nCandles\n\nData feed of the candles of a market. Data contains updates for open, low, high, and close prices, trade volume, for a certain time resolution.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# class `Candles`\ndef subscribe(self, id: str, resolution: CandlesResolution, batched: bool = True) -> Self\ndef unsubscribe(self, id: str, resolution: CandlesResolution)\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is a string containing the market and candle resolution. It is formatted as {market}/{resolution}.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nCandlesInitialMessage\nCandlesUpdateMessage *\n\nParent Subaccounts\n\nData feed of a parent subaccount. This channel returns similar data to the subaccount channel.\n\nA parent subaccount is a subaccount numbered between 0 and 127. Used for isolated position management by the dYdX frontend (web).\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n# Coming soon.\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is a string containing the subaccount ID (address and subaccount number). It is formattted as {address}/{subaccount-number}.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nParentSubaccountsInitialMessage\nParentSubaccountsUpdateMessage *\n\nBlock Height\n\nData feed of current block height. Data contains the last block height and time.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n\nUnification Plan\nAdd feed to Python, TS clients.\n\nSchema\n\nThe field id is not employed in the subscribe/unsubscribe schemas.\n\nThe field contents is serialized using the following schemas.\n\nMessages\n\nInitialUpdate\nBlockHeightInitialMessage\nBlockHeightUpdateMessage *","tokens":1518,"crawled_at":1791193587033} +{"id":10257,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-application-thread/23838/8","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Uniswap Delegate Reward Application Thread - #8 by kfx - Uncategorized - Uniswap Governance","text":"Uniswap Delegate Reward Application Thread\n\nUncategorized\n\nkfx\n\nMay 15, 2024, 10:01am\n\n8\n\nApplicant name: atiselsts.eth\n\nLink to Delegate Forum Platform: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/atiselsts-eth-delegate-platform/22270\n\nLink to Snapshot Profile: https://snapshot.org/#/profile/0xAac35d953Ef23aE2E61a866ab93deA6eC0050bcD\n\nLink to Tally/ Agora/ onchain voting profile: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/delegate/0xaac35d953ef23ae2e61a866ab93dea6ec0050bcd\n\nLink to the proposal that you authored or co-authored that passed the snapshot (Required if the voting power is less than 10k $UNI) : n/a\n\nLinks to the proposal that you authored or co-authored that passed the Onchain Vote: n/a\n\nJoined Uniswap Gov Workshop Before? If so, when?: No (but I’ll be in EthCC’s “GovSwap” this year).\n\nJoined Uniswap Community Call Before? If so, when?: Yes, January/February/March/April 2024.\n\nApplicant Summary including why interested in applying for the Program:\n\nI’m a researcher and consultant fascinated with the Uniswap protocol, professionally and academically involved with it since 2021. I have participated in Uniswap governance since July 2023, with near 100% voting rate, and have maintained active presence in the forum. My conflicts of interest are minimized, since I’m not a service provider for the DAO or professionally affiliated with DeFi protocols unrelated to Uniswap, which makes it fair to be compensated for my time spent on its governance activities here. In perspective, I’m looking forward to getting more actively involved in crafting proposals, especially v4-related ones.\n\n2 Likes\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4 Application and Results\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n23\n\n868\n\nAugust 31, 2025\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 Application\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n40\n\n1901\n\nSeptember 16, 2024\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3 Application and Results\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n32\n\n1550\n\nMarch 11, 2025\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n1015\n\nSeptember 2, 2025\n\n[RFC] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n25\n\n1306\n\nSeptember 3, 2024","tokens":548,"crawled_at":1791193590236} +{"id":10258,"url":"https://docs.near.org/web3-apps/tutorials/meta-transactions","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Building a Meta Transaction Relayer - NEAR Docs","text":"Relayers serve to delegate gas fees to a web service, allowing users to transact on NEAR without the need to acquire the token themselves while still retaining the security of signing their own transactions. This guide will lead you through the components necessary to construct a relayer capable of handling meta transactions.\n\nIf you’re already acquainted with the technology and you just want to run your own Relayer, you can fast track to a complete Rust Relayer server open-source implementation.\n\n​\n\nHow it works\n\nA basic relayer consists of a web server housing a funded NEAR account. This account receives an encoded signed transaction, which can subsequently be decoded into a SignedDelegate format and transmitted on-chain.\nThe client can then generate a SignedDelegateAction (a signed message that hasn’t yet been sent), encode it, and transmit it to this server, where it will be relayed onto the blockchain.\n\n​\n\nRelayer (server)\n\nnear-api-js\n\n@near-relay/server\n\nHere’s a simple express endpoint that deserializes the body, instantiates the relayer account and then sends the transaction.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nYou can easily get the account object used to send the transactions from its private key using this snippetLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe code in the example only works from the following versions onwards\n\n\"near-api-js\": \"3.0.4\"\n\"@near-js/transactions\": \"1.1.2\",\n\"@near-js/accounts\": \"1.0.4\"\n\n@near-relay simplifies meta transactions making it easier to get started for a beginner.To start, call the relay method inside an endpoint to automatically deserialize the transaction and send it with the account defined in the environment variables.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nIf you’re interested in relaying account creation as well, it’s quite straightforward. Simply create another endpoint and directly call the createAccount method with the accountId and publicKey. These parameters are automatically included in the body when using the corresponding client library.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\n​\n\nClient\n\nnear-api-js\n\n@near-relay/client\n\nIn this method we are creating an arbitrary smart contract call, instantiating an account and using it to sign but not send the transaction. We can then serialize it and send it to the relayer where it will be delegated via the previously created endpoint.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nAs mentioned in the above note in order to be able to relay on the client side it’s necessary to have access to signing transactions directly on the client. Luckily leveraging the near biometric library it’s possible to do so in a non custodial way.By calling this method and passing in the URL for the account creation endpoint (mentioned in the server section) as well as the accountId everything is handled under the hood to successfully create an account.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nOn the client side, you just need to create an Action and pass it into the relayTransaction method along with the URL of the relayer endpoint discussed in the server section and the id of the receiverId.Loading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nRelaying with wallets\n\nAt the moment, wallet selector standard doesn’t support signing transactions without immediately sending them. This functionality is essential for routing transactions to a relayer. Therefore, to smoothly integrate relaying on the client side, it’s necessary to be able to sign transactions without relying on wallets.\nProgress is being made to make this possible in the future.\n\n​\n\nHigh volume parallel processing\n\nWhen running a relayer that handles a large number of transactions, you will quickly run into a nonce collision problem. At the protocol level, transactions have a unique number that identifies them (nonce) that helps to mitigate reply attacks. Each key on an account has its own nonce, and the nonce is expected to increase with each signature the key creates.\nWhen multiple transactions are sent from the same access key simultaneously, their nonces might collide. Imagine the relayer creates 3 transactions Tx1, Tx2, Tx3 and send them in very short distance from each other, and lets assume that Tx3 has the largest nonce. If Tx3 ends up being processed before Tx1 (because of network delays, or a node picks Tx3 first), then Tx3 will execute, but Tx1 and Tx2 will fail, because they have smaller nonce!\nSince nearcore 2.13, the native solution to this problem is a gas key: a single access key with up to 1,024 independent nonce lanes and its own prepaid gas balance. The relayer signs each concurrent transaction on a different lane (via the transaction’s nonce_index), so nonces can never collide, and the gas spent on relaying is isolated from the account’s main balance. This replaces the key-rotation workaround below with one key to manage.\nOn earlier versions, the way to mitigate this is to sign each transaction with a different key. Adding multiple full access keys to the NEAR account used for relaying (up to 20 keys can make a significant difference) will help.\n\nAdding keys\n\nconst keyPair = nearAPI.KeyPair.fromRandom(\"ed25519\");\n\nconst receipt = await account.addKey(keyPair.getPublicKey().toString())\n\nAfter saving these keys, its possible to rotate the private keys randomly when instantiating accounts before relaying ensuring you won’t create a nonce collision.\n\n​\n\nGating the relayer\n\nIn most production applications it’s expected that you want to be able to gate the relayer to only be used in certain cases.\nThis can be easily accomplished by specifying constraints inside the SignedDelegate.delegateAction object.\n\nexport declare class DelegateAction extends Assignable {\nsenderId: string;\nreceiverId: string;\nactions: Array;\nnonce: BN;\nmaxBlockHeight: BN;\npublicKey: PublicKey;\n}\n\nYou can, for example, gate by some particular user or contract:\n\nconst serializedTx: Buffer = req.body;\nconst deserializedTx: SignedDelegate = deserialize(SCHEMA.SignedDelegate, Buffer.from(serializedTx)) as SignedDelegate;\nconst relayerAccount: Account = await getAccount(NETWORK_ID, RELAYER_ID, RELAYER_PRIVATE_KEY);\nconst delegateAction = deserializedTx?.delegateAction\n\nif(delegateAction.senderId == 'someUserId' || delegateAction.receiverId == 'someContractId' ){\nconst receipt = await relayerAccount.signAndSendTransaction({\nactions: [actionCreators.signedDelegate(deserializedTx)],\nreceiverId: deserializedTx.delegateAction.senderId\n});\n}\n\nOther examples could be looking into the actions and seeing if there is deposit or gas and limiting them, gating by particular smart contract methods or even args.\nYou can decode the args using:\n\nJSON.parse(Buffer.from(args_base64 || \"\", \"base64\").toString())\n\n​\n\nRust Relayer Server\n\nThe open-source Rust reference implementation of a Relayer server offers the following features:\n\nFeatures can be combined as needed. Use of one feature does not preclude the use of any other feature unless specified.\n\nSign and send Meta Transactions to the RPC to cover the gas costs of end users while allowing them to maintain custody of their funds and approve transactions (/relay, /send_meta_tx, /send_meta_tx_async, /send_meta_tx_nopoll)\n\nSign Meta Transactions returning a Signed Meta Transaction to be sent to the RPC later - (/sign_meta_tx, /sign_meta_tx_no_filter)\n\nOnly pay for users interacting with certain contracts by whitelisting contracts addresses (whitelisted_contracts in config.toml)\n\nSpecify gas cost allowances for all accounts (/update_all_allowances) or on a per-user account basis (/create_account_atomic, /register_account, /update_allowance) and keep track of allowances (/get_allowance)\n\nSpecify the accounts for which the relayer will cover gas fees (whitelisted_delegate_action_receiver_ids in config.toml)\n\nOnly allow users to register if they have a unique Oauth Token (/create_account_atomic, /register_account)\n\nRelayer Key Rotation: keys_filenames in config.toml\n\nIntegrate with FastAuth SDK\n\nMix and Match configuration options\n\nCheck the Use cases section for example configuration files corresponding to different usage scenarios.\n\n​\n\nBasic Setup\n\nYou can follow these steps to set up your local Relayer server development environment:\n\nInstall Rust for NEAR Development\n\nIf you don’t have a NEAR account, create one\n\nWith the account from step 2, create a JSON file in this directory in the format\n\n[{\"account_id\":\"example.testnet\",\"public_key\":\"ed25519:98GtfFzez3opomVpwa7i4m3nptHtc7Ha514XHMWszLtQ\",\"private_key\":\"ed25519:YWuyKVQHE3rJQYRC3pRGV56o1qEtA1PnMYPDEtroc5kX4A4mWrJwF7XkzGe7JWNMABbtY4XFDBJEzgLyfPkwpzC\"}]\n\nusing a Full Access Key from an account that has enough NEAR to cover the gas costs of transactions your server will be relaying. Usually, this will be a copy of the json file found in the .near-credentials directory.\n\nUpdate values in config.toml\n\nOpen up the port from config.toml in your machine’s network settings\n\nRun the server using cargo run.\n\n(OPTIONAL) To run with logs (tracing) enabled run RUST_LOG=tower_http=debug cargo run\n\nOptional setupIf you’re integrating with FastAuth make sure to enable feature flags:\n\ncargo build --features fastauth_features,shared_storage\n\nIf you’re using shared storage, make sure to enable feature flags:\n\ncargo build --features shared_storage\n\n​\n\nRedis Setup\n\nRedis is only needed when the relayer must persist per-account state. That applies if you want to:\nAllowances: track and limit how much gas each account can spend (e.g. /update_allowance, /get_allowance).\n\nOAuth (sybil resistance): require a unique OAuth token at signup so each real user can only register one account.\n\nWhitelisting contracts or senders does not need Redis — those are static lists in config.toml. See the Redis and FastAuth entries under Use cases for example configs that rely on Redis.\n\nInstall Redis.\n\nSteps 2 & 3 assume Redis was installed on machine instead of a Docker setup. If you’re connecting to a Redis instance running in GCP, follow the above steps to connect to a VM that will forward requests from your local relayer server to Redis running in GCP\n\nRun redis-server --bind 127.0.0.1 --port 6379 - make sure the port matches the redis_url in the config.toml.\n\nRun redis-cli -h 127.0.0.1 -p 6379\n\n​\n\nAdvanced setup\n\nMultiple Key Generation: this is optional, but recommended for high throughput to prevent nonce race conditions. Check\n\nDocker Deployment: instructions to deploy with Docker\n\nCloud Deployment: instructions to deploy on Cloud providers\n\n​\n\nAPI Specifications\n\nYou can find the complete Relayer server API specification on the GitHub repository.\n​\n\nUse cases\n\nThe examples folder on the GitHub repository contains example configuration files corresponding to different use cases.\n\nThese files are for reference only and you should update the config.toml values before using it on your development environment.\n\n​\n\nNo filters\n\nThis is a config for a relayer that covers gas for all user transactions to all contracts with no filters. To prevent abuse, this should only be used if there’s only a secure backend calling the relayer\n\nno_filters.toml\n\n​\n\nBasic whitelist\n\nThis is a configuration for a basic relayer that covers gas for user transactions to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts\n\nbasic_whitelist.toml\n\n​\n\nRedis\n\nThis is a configuration for a relayer that covers gas for user transactions up to a allowance specified in Redis to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts.\n\nAllowances are on a per-account id basis and on signup (account creation in Redis and on-chain) an OAuth token is required to help with sybil resistance\n\nredis.toml\n\n​\n\nFastAuth\n\nClosed access betaFastAuth is currently in a private beta stage. If you want to try it out during this early development stage, please contact us on Telegram.\n\nThis is a configuration for use if you intend to integrate with FastAuth SDK\n\nIt covers gas for user transactions up to a allowance specified in Redis to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts.\n\nAllowances are on a per-account id basis and on signup (account creation in Redis and on-chain) an OAuth token is required to help with sybil resistance\n\nThis also makes use of a shared storage functionality on the Near Social DB contract\n\nand a whitelisted sender (whitelisted_delegate_action_receiver_ids)\n\nfastauth.toml\n\n​\n\nPay with fungible tokens\n\nThis is a configuration for a relayer that ensures there’s FTs sent to a burn address used to cover the equivalent amount of gas for user transactions to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts\n\npay_with_ft.toml\n\n​\n\nWhitelist senders\n\nThis is a config for a relayer that covers gas for a whitelisted set of users’ transactions to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts\n\nwhitelist_senders.toml (whitelisted_delegate_action_receiver_ids)\n\n​\n\nShared storage\n\nThis is a configuration for a relayer that covers BOTH gas AND storage fees for user transactions to interact with a whitelisted set of contracts\n\nbe sure to include shared storage logic based on shared_storage.rs in your contract that is being whitelisted\n\nshared_storage.toml\n\n​\n\nExchange withdraw\n\nThis is a configuration for a relayer where an exchange running the relayer covers user withdraw fees when they are withdrawing stablecoins on NEAR (e.g., USDT or USDC)\n\nexchange_withdraw.toml\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":3314,"crawled_at":1791193594411} +{"id":10259,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/solana-programs","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Solana Programs and State Overview | Guides","text":"Solana Programs\nSolana programs are executable code that runs on the Solana blockchain. They are similar to smart contracts on other blockchain platforms, but with some distinct characteristics and optimizations specific to Solana.\nKey Characteristics:\nStateless: Solana programs do not store state internally. Instead, state is stored in separate accounts on the chain.\nWritten in Rust: Programs are typically written in Rust.\nExecuted by Transactions: Programs are invoked by transactions that specify the program ID and the required accounts and data.\nAccounts\nAccounts used to store both data and SOL. Each account has an owner, which is a program that can modify its data.\nTypes of Accounts:\nData Accounts: Store arbitrary data used by programs.\nSPL Token Accounts: Manage token balances (similar to ERC-20 tokens on Ethereum).\nProgram Accounts: Contain the executable code of a Solana program.\nInstructions\nInstructions are operations sent to Solana programs. They are included in transactions and specify which accounts the program should operate on, as well as any additional data needed to perform the operation.\nKey Elements of Instructions:\nProgram ID: Identifies the program to be executed.\nAccounts: A list of accounts that the instruction will read from or write to.\nData: Custom data required to perform the instruction.\nState Management\nIn Solana, the state is managed externally from the programs, stored in accounts. This separation of state and logic enables higher scalability and efficiency.\nState Management Workflow:\nAccount Creation: Create accounts to store data.\nProgram Execution: Execute a program with instructions specifying which accounts to read from or write to.\nState Update: Programs modify the state by updating the data in accounts.\nExample Workflow\nDefine a Program:Write a program in Rust to perform a specific task, such as incrementing a counter.\n\nDeploy the Program:Compile and deploy the program to the Solana blockchain.\n\nCreate Accounts:Create accounts to store the program's state.\n\nSend Instructions:Send transactions containing instructions to invoke the program, specifying the accounts and data to use.\n\nExample Code\nBelow is a simple example of a Solana program written in Rust that increments a value stored in an account.\nuse solana_program::{\n\naccount_info::{next_account_info, AccountInfo},\n\nentrypoint,\n\nentrypoint::ProgramResult,\n\npubkey::Pubkey,\n\nmsg,\n\nprogram_error::ProgramError,\n\n};\n\nentrypoint!(process_instruction);\n\nfn process_instruction(\n\nprogram_id: &Pubkey,\n\naccounts: &[AccountInfo],\n\ninstruction_data: &[u8],\n\n) -> ProgramResult {\n\nlet accounts_iter = &mut accounts.iter();\n\nlet account = next_account_info(accounts_iter)?;\n\n// Ensure account is owned by the program\n\nif account.owner != program_id {\n\nmsg!(\"Account is not owned by the program\");\n\nreturn Err(ProgramError::IncorrectProgramId);\n\n}\n\n// Deserialize instruction data (increment value)\n\nlet increment_amount = instruction_data[0];\n\n// Increment the value\n\nlet mut data = account.try_borrow_mut_data()?;\n\ndata[0] = data[0].wrapping_add(increment_amount);\n\nmsg!(\"Value after increment: {}\", data[0]);\n\nOk(())\n\n}","tokens":786,"crawled_at":1791193596128} +{"id":10260,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/understanding-pdas","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Understanding Solana Program Derived Addresses | Guides","text":"Overview\nProgram Derived Addresses (PDAs) are special types of account used on Solana that are deterministically derived and look like standard public keys, but have no associated private keys.\nOnly the program that derived the PDA can sign transactions involving the address/account. This is due to the fact that PDAs do not occur on the Ed25519 curve (elliptic-curve cryptography). Only addresses that appear on the curve can have a matching private key making PDAs a secure way of signing transactions from within a program. This means that no external user can generate a valid signature for the PDA address and sign on behalf of a pda/program.\nRole of PDAs\nPDAs are primarily used to:\nManage State: PDAs allow programs to create accounts and store data to a deterministic PDA address which allows read and write access for the program.\nAuthorize Transactions: Only the program that owns the PDA can authorize transactions involving it, ensuring secure controlled access. For example this allows programs and PDA accounts to store tokens/own NFTs that would require the current owner of the tokens/NFT to sign a transaction to transfer the items to another account.\nHow PDAs are Derived\nPDAs are derived using a combination of a program ID and a set of seed values. The derivation process involves hashing these values together and ensuring the resulting address is valid.\nDerivation Process\nSelect Program ID: The public key of the program for which the PDA is being derived.\nChoose Seeds: One or more seed values that, together with the program ID, will deterministically generate the PDA algorithmically based on the combined values.\nCompute PDA: Use the Pubkey::find_program_address function to derive the PDA. This function ensures the derived address is valid and cannot collide with any regular (non-PDA) address.\nExample in Rust\nHere's an example of deriving a PDA in a Solana program written in Rust:\nuse solana_program::{\n\npubkey::Pubkey,\n\nsystem_instruction,\n\nsystem_program,\n\nsysvar::rent::Rent,\n\nprogram::invoke_signed,\n\n};\n\n// Function to derive a PDA\n\nfn derive_pda(program_id: &Pubkey, seeds: &[&[u8]]) -> (Pubkey, u8) {\n\nPubkey::find_program_address(seeds, program_id)\n\n}\n\n// Example usage\n\nfn example_usage(program_id: &Pubkey) {\n\n// Define seeds\n\nlet seed1 = b\"seed1\";\n\nlet seed2 = b\"seed2\";\n\n// Derive PDA\n\nlet (pda, bump_seed) = derive_pda(program_id, &[seed1, seed2]);\n\n// Print PDA\n\nprintln!(\"Derived PDA: {}\", pda);\n\n}\n\nPractical Use Case: Account Creation Programs often use PDAs to create and manage program-specific accounts. Here's an example of how a PDA can be used to create an account:\n\nuse solana_program::{\n\npubkey::Pubkey,\n\nsystem_instruction,\n\nsystem_program,\n\nsysvar::rent::Rent,\n\nprogram::invoke_signed,\n\n};\n\nfn create_account_with_pda(\n\nprogram_id: &Pubkey,\n\npayer: &Pubkey,\n\nseeds: &[&[u8]],\n\nlamports: u64,\n\nspace: u64,\n\n) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {\n\nlet (pda, bump_seed) = Pubkey::find_program_address(seeds, program_id);\n\nlet create_account_ix = system_instruction::create_account(\n\npayer,\n\n&pda,\n\nlamports,\n\nspace,\n\nprogram_id,\n\n);\n\n// Sign the instruction with the PDA\n\nlet signers_seeds = &[&seeds[..], &[bump_seed]];\n\ninvoke_signed(\n\n&create_account_ix,\n\n&[payer_account_info, pda_account_info],\n\nsigners_seeds,\n\n)?;\n\nOk(())\n\n}","tokens":821,"crawled_at":1791193613908} +{"id":10261,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Open Autonomy CLI Overview - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Open Autonomy CLI Overview\n\nThis page provides a quick reference to commonly used CLI commands in the Open Autonomy framework. Each command has a brief description and basic usage example, with links to more detailed documentation.\n\nCore Commands\n\nautonomy analyse\n\nAnalyse an AI agent, including ABCI app specifications, docstrings, logs, and more.\n\nDetailed analyse documentation\n\nautonomy deploy\n\nDeploy an AI agent using various deployment backends (Docker, Kubernetes, or localhost).\n\nDetailed deploy documentation\n\nautonomy develop\n\nDevelopment tools for AI agents.\n\nDetailed develop documentation\n\nautonomy fetch\n\nFetch an agent blueprint or AI agent from a registry.\n\nDetailed fetch documentation\n\nautonomy mint\n\nMint components and AI agents on-chain.\n\nDetailed mint documentation\n\nautonomy push-all\n\nPush all available packages to a registry.\n\nDetailed push-all documentation\n\nautonomy replay\n\nReplay tools for AI agents.\n\nDetailed replay documentation\n\nautonomy service\n\nManage on-chain AI agents.\n\nDetailed AI agent documentation\n\nAdditional Information\n\nMost commands support the --help flag for detailed usage information\n\nCommands that interact with blockchains typically require a key file\n\nMany commands have additional options for customization and configuration\n\nSee the detailed command reference for complete documentation of each command\n\nCommon Options\n\nMany commands share common options:\n\n--registry: Specify the registry to use (default: remote)\n\n--chain: Select blockchain network (e.g., ethereum, polygon)\n\n--key: Path to key file for blockchain transactions\n\n--password: Password for encrypted key files\n\n--help: Show help message and exit","tokens":417,"crawled_at":1791193614645} +{"id":10262,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-forse-analytics-for-uniswap-revitalization-and-growth-program/24373/10","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program - #10 by AbdullahUmar - Temperature Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nTemperature Check\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nAugust 12, 2024, 8:26pm\n\n10\n\nFirstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I’m directionally in favor of this proposal.\n\nAs per the above, not all of the programs have been terminated yet. Looks like Base is currently leading the race, which is good since those incentives have come to a conclusion. For anyone interested, here’s a more detailed overview of the Base program:\n\nScreenshot 2024-08-12 at 4.02.27 PM1920×960 170 KB\n\nScroll incentives ended on July 11th.\n\nBlast was divided into two parts. 50% of those incentives concluded July 2nd. The other 50% haven’t yet been deployed.\n\nLinea concluded on July 11th.\n\nMantle is still live.\n\nArbitrum LTIPP is still live.\n\n^Note: analysis will only be available for campaigns that have concluded. Those that are still live will require some wait time.\n\nCorrect–the BSC incentives haven’t been deployed yet since we are trying to finalize some of the bridging issues. This is the only campaign set that hasn’t begun yet. The Accountability Committee will keep you all posted.\n\n^This point is being overlooked…Arbitrum incentives were a part of the LTIPP matching program. Here’s some color on how the URGP differs from the LTIPP:\n\nThis proposal therefore isn’t limited to the URGP. Since there’s overwhelming support for Arbitrum right now, the DAO should note that this analysis will be reviewing Gauntlet’s distribution, which is far more sophisticated than the URGP method for distribution. It could be beneficial to contrast the two methods, however. We may see that a simple, heuristics-based approach being used for the URGP isn’t effective enough (or it could reveal the contrary).\n\nI’m also interested in seeing the efficacy of incentive programs on EVMs that Uniswap is less dominant on. We already see a degree of success on Arbitrum and Base–but the majority of the URGP incentives actually go to new or less active EVMs. We are therefore voting for Scroll, Blast, and Base. Scroll incentives were deployed nearly a year after its mainnet launched. Blast incentives were deployed early-on, when Blast just went live. This would show how much benefit an early mover advantage yields. And Base would be a good case for studying how tied incentives are to a chain that is directionally doing well due to narratives like memecoins.\n\n5 Likes\n\nArana Digital Delegate Platform\n\nArana Digital Delegate Platform\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] Analytics Hub for Uniswap's Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n592\n\nMay 8, 2025\n\n[RFC] Forse for Uniswap Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n249\n\nJuly 27, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed: Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n44\n\n10632\n\nApril 22, 2025\n\nUniswap Incentive Design Analysis\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n10\n\n7858\n\nSeptember 15, 2023\n\nIntroducing the Uniswap Incentive Analysis Terminal by Forse\n\nUncategorized\n\n4\n\n658\n\nApril 16, 2025","tokens":809,"crawled_at":1791193617379} +{"id":10263,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/indexer-client/http","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"HTTP API – dYdX Documentation","text":"Accounts\n\nPython\naccount = indexer_client.account()\n\nGet Subaccounts\n\nRetrieves a list of subaccounts associated with a given address. Subaccounts are related addresses that fall under the authority or ownership of the primary address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccounts(\nself,\naddress: str,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nRust implementation doesn't have optional parameters.\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\npath\nAddress\ntrue\nThe primary address for which to retrieve associated subaccounts.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of subaccounts in the response.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nAddressResponse\nThe subaccounts data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Subaccount\n\nRetrieves a specific subaccount associated with a given address and subaccount number.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe primary address to which the subaccount belongs.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe specific subaccount number to retrieve.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nSubaccountResponseObject ⛁\nThe subaccount data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nList Positions\n\nRetrieves perpetual positions for a specific subaccount. Both open and closed/historical positions can be queried.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_perpetual_positions(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nstatus: Optional[PositionStatus] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nstatus\nquery\nPerpetualPositionStatus\nfalse\nFilter to retrieve positions with a specific status. If not provided, all positions will be returned regardless of status.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPerpetualPositionResponseObject ⛁\nThe perpetual positions data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nExamples: Guide - List Positions\n\nGet Asset Positions\n\nRetrieves asset positions and respective details of a specific subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_asset_positions(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nstatus: Optional[PositionStatus] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nRename all methods to get_asset_positions - shorter is better.\n\nAdd a Subaccount pair to Python and JavaScript, since it's always a pair\n\nAdd options to the Rust version\n\nRename created_before_or_at_time parameter to created_before_or_at\n\nRename PerpetualPositionStatus to PositionStatus\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nstatus\nquery\nPerpetualPositionStatus\nfalse\nFilter to retrieve positions with a specific status. If not provided, all positions will be returned regardless of status.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\nResponse\n\nA data structure containing the requested asset positions. Typically includes details such as asset ID, size, side (buy/sell), entry price, realized PnL, and other position-specific information.\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nAssetPositionResponseObject ⛁\nThe asset positions data.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Transfers\n\nRetrieves the transfer history for a specific subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_transfers(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccount_number\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of items in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp.\n\npage\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe page number for paginated results.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTransferResponseObject ⛁\nThe transfers data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Transfers Between\n\nFetch information regarding a transfer between two subaccounts.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_transfer_between(\nself,\nsource_address: str,\nsource_subaccount_number: int,\nrecipient_address: str,\nrecipient_subaccount_number: int,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nResponse object does not have defined structure in TypeScript client. Will have to work on it.\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nsourceAddress\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nSender's wallet address\n\nsourceSubaccountNumber\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the sender wallet address.\n\nrecipientAddress\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nReceiver wallet address\n\nrecipientSubaccountNumber\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the receiver wallet address.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nnumber\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nstring\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\nResponse\n\nList Orders\n\nRetrieves orders for a specific subaccount, with various filtering options to narrow down the results based on order characteristics.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_orders(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nticker: Optional[str] = None,\nticker_type: TickerType = TickerType.PERPETUAL,\nside: Optional[OrderSide] = None,\nstatus: Optional[OrderStatus] = None,\ntype: Optional[OrderType] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ngood_til_block_before_or_at: Optional[int] = None,\ngood_til_block_time_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\nreturn_latest_orders: Optional[bool] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\nticker\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nThe ticker filter.\n\nside\nquery\nOrderSide\nfalse\nThe order side filter.\n\nstatus\nquery\nOrderStatus\nfalse\nThe order status filter.\n\ntype\nquery\nOrderType\nfalse\nThe order type filter.\n\ngoodTilBlockBeforeOrAt\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe block number filter for orders good until before or at.\n\ngoodTilBlockTimeBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nThe timestamp filter for orders good until before or at.\n\nreturnLatestOrders\nquery\nbool\nfalse\nWhether to return only the latest orders.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nOrderResponseObject ⛁\nThe orders data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\nExamples: Guide - List Orders\n\nGet Order\n\nRetrieves detailed information about a specific order based on its unique identifier (the order ID).\nTo get the order ID, see how to create it or fetch the order history.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_order(\nself,\norder_id: str,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\norderId\npath\nOrderId\ntrue\nThe order ID.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nOrderResponseObject ⛁\nThe order data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe order was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Fills\n\nRetrieves fill records for a specific subaccount on the exchange.\nA fill represents a trade that has been executed.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_fills(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nticker: Optional[str] = None,\nticker_type: TickerType = TickerType.PERPETUAL,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nRename all methods to get_fills - shorter is better.\n\nAdd a Subaccount pair to Python and JavaScript, since it's always a pair\n\nRename created_before_or_at_time parameter to created_before_or_at\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Python\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Rust\n\nIn Rust market field of the options struct must be ticker\n\nIn Rust market_type field of the options struct must be ticker_type\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nmarket\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nThe market symbol to filter fills by (e.g., \"BTC-USD\"). If not provided, fills for all markets will be returned. (Python/TS SDK parameter: ticker)\n\nmarketType\nquery\nMarketType\nfalse\nThe type of market to filter by. (Python/TS SDK parameter: ticker_type / tickerType)\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\npage\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe page number for paginated results.\n\nResponse\n\nA promise that resolves to fill data containing details such as order ID, market, side (buy/sell), size, price, execution time, and other fill-specific information.\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nFillResponseObject ⛁\nThe fills data.\n\nAPI Example\nExamples: Guide - Get Fills\n\nGet Historical PNL\n\nRetrieves historical profit and loss (PNL) data for a specific subaccount on the exchange.\nThese records provide insights into the trading performance over time.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_subaccount_historical_pnls(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\neffective_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\neffective_at_or_after: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nParameter created_on_or_after_height is missing\n\nParameter created_on_or_after is missing\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccount_number\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\ncreatedOnOrAfterHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created on or after a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedOnOrAfter\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created on or after a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\npage\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe page number for paginated results.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPnlTicksResponseObject ⛁\nThe historical PnLs data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Rewards\n\nRetrieves historical block trading rewards for the specified address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_historical_block_trading_rewards(\nself,\naddress: str,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\npath\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\nstartingBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe timestamp filter for rewards starting before or at.\n\nstartingBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nThe block height filter for rewards starting before or at.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nHistoricalBlockTradingReward ⛁\nThe historical block trading rewards data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Rewards Aggregated\n\nRetrieves aggregated historical trading rewards for the specified address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_historical_trading_rewards_aggregated(\nself,\naddress: str,\nperiod: TradingRewardAggregationPeriod = TradingRewardAggregationPeriod.DAILY,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nstarting_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\nstarting_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\npath\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nperiod\nquery\nTradingRewardAggregationPeriod\ntrue\nThe aggregation period.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe maximum number of aggregated rewards to retrieve.\n\nstartingBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nThe timestamp filter for rewards starting before or at.\n\nstartingBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe block height filter for rewards starting before or at.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nHistoricalTradingRewardAggregation ⛁\nThe aggregated historical trading rewards data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Parent Subaccount\n\nQuery for the parent subaccount, its child subaccounts, equity, collateral and margin. See more information on parent subaccounts here.\ne.g. parent subaccount 0 has child subaccounts 128, 256,...\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_parent_subaccount(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\npath\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the parent subaccount.\n\nnumber\npath\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nParentSubaccountResponseObject ⛁\nThe parent subaccount data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe parent subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nList Parent Positions\n\nList all positions of a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def list_parent_orders(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nticker: Optional[str] = None,\nside: Optional[OrderSide] = None,\nstatus: Optional[OrderStatus] = None,\norder_type: Optional[OrderType] = None,\ngood_til_block_before_or_at: Optional[int] = None,\ngood_til_block_time_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\nreturn_latest_orders: Optional[bool] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nSubaccount number of the parent subaccount.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPerpetualPositionResponseObject ⛁\nThe perpetual positions data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Parent Asset Positions\n\nQuery for asset positions (size, buy/sell etc) for a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_parent_subaccount_asset_positions(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nstatus: Optional[PositionStatus] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any:\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe parent subaccount number of this wallet\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nAssetPositionResponseObject ⛁\nThe asset positions data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe parent subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Parent Transfers\n\nQuery for transfers between subaccounts associated with a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_parent_transfers(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the parent subaccount.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTransferResponseObject ⛁\n\nAPI Example\n\nList Parent Orders\n\nQuery for orders filtered by order params of a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def list_parent_orders(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nticker: Optional[str] = None,\nside: Optional[OrderSide] = None,\nstatus: Optional[OrderStatus] = None,\norder_type: Optional[OrderType] = None,\ngood_til_block_before_or_at: Optional[int] = None,\ngood_til_block_time_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\nreturn_latest_orders: Optional[bool] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nParent subaccount number\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\nticker\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nThe ticker filter.\n\nside\nquery\nOrderSide\nfalse\nThe order side filter.\n\nstatus\nquery\nOrderStatus\nfalse\nThe order status filter.\n\ntype\nquery\nOrderType\nfalse\nThe order type filter.\n\ngoodTilBlockBeforeOrAt\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe block number filter for orders good until before or at.\n\ngoodTilBlockTimeBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nThe timestamp filter for orders good until before or at.\n\nreturnLatestOrders\nquery\nbool\nfalse\nWhether to return only the latest orders.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nListOrdersResponse\nThe orders data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Parent Fills\n\nQuery for fills (i.e. filled orders data) for a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_parent_fills(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nmarket: Optional[str] = None,\nmarket_type: Optional[TickerType] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any:\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the parent subaccount.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nFilters results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\nmarket\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nMarket id like USD-BTC, ETH-USD\n\nmarketType\nquery\nMarketType\nfalse\nMarket type of filled order Data\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nFillResponseObject ⛁\nThe fills data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe parent subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Parent Historical Pnl\n\nQuery for profit and loss report for the specified time/block range of a parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_parent_historical_pnls(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\ncreated_on_or_after_height: Optional[int] = None,\ncreated_on_or_after: Optional[str] = None,\n) -> Any:\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the parent subaccount.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created at or before a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\ncreatedOnOrAfterHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created on or after a specific blockchain height.\n\ncreatedOnOrAfter\nquery\nDateTime in UTC\nfalse\nRestricts results to positions created on or after a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPnlTicksResponseObject ⛁\nThe historical PnLs data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe parent subaccount was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Funding Payments\n\nRetrieves funding payment history for a specific subaccount.\nFunding payments are periodic settlements that occur between long and short positions based on the funding rate.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_funding_payments(\nself,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nticker: Optional[str] = None,\nafter_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\npage: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nRename all methods to get_funding_payments - shorter is better.\n\nAdd a Subaccount pair to Python and JavaScript, since it's always a pair\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Python\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Rust\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nsubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the specific subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of funding payments to return in the response.\n\nticker\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nThe market symbol to filter funding payments by (e.g., \"BTC-USD\"). If not provided, payments for all markets will be returned.\n\nafterOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nFilters results to funding payments created at or after a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\npage\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe page number for paginated results.\n\nResponse\n\nA promise that resolves to funding payment data containing details such as payment amount, funding rate, position size, market ticker, and timestamp information.\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nFundingPaymentsResponseObject ⛁\nThe funding payments data.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Funding Payments for Parent Subaccount\n\nRetrieves funding payment history for all subaccounts under a parent subaccount.\nThis endpoint aggregates funding payments across all child subaccounts of a given parent subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_funding_payments_for_parent_subaccount(\nself,\naddress: str,\nparent_subaccount_number: int,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\nafter_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\npage: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> Any\n\nUnification Plan\nRename all methods to get_funding_payments_for_parent_subaccount - shorter is better.\n\nAdd a ParentSubaccount pair to Python and JavaScript, since it's always a pair\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Python\n\npage optional parameter is missing in Rust\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nparentSubaccountNumber\nquery\nSubaccountNumber\ntrue\nThe identifier for the parent subaccount within the wallet address.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of funding payments to return in the response.\n\nafterOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nFilters results to funding payments created at or after a specific timestamp (ISO 8601 format).\n\npage\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe page number for paginated results.\n\nResponse\n\nA promise that resolves to funding payment data containing details such as payment amount, funding rate, position size, market ticker, and timestamp information aggregated across all child subaccounts.\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nFundingPaymentsResponseObject ⛁\nThe funding payments data.\n\nAPI Example\n\nMarkets\n\nTODO: How to access to the accounts space.\n\nPython\nmarket = indexer_client.markets()\n\nGet Perpetual Markets\n\nRetrieves perpetual markets.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\ndef get_perpetual_markets(self, market: str = None) -> Response\n\nUnification Plan\nAdd alias for the return type in Rust: PerpetualMarketsMap\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nmarket\nquery\nTicker\nfalse\nThe specific market ticker to retrieve. If not provided, all markets are returned.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nMaximum number of asset positions to return in the response.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPerpetualMarketMap\nThe perpetual markets data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe market was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Perpetual Market Orderbook\n\nRetrieves the orderbook for a specific perpetual market.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_perpetual_market_orderbook(\nself,\nmarket: str,\n) -> dict\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nmarket\npath\nTicker\ntrue\nThe market ticker.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nOrderBookResponseObject ⛁\nThe orderbook data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe market was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Trades\n\nRetrieves trades for a specific perpetual market.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_perpetual_market_trades(\nself,\nmarket: str,\nstarting_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> dict\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nmarket\npath\nTicker\ntrue\nThe market ticker.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe maximum number of trades to retrieve.\n\nstartingBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe block height to start retrieving trades from.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTradeResponseObject ⛁\nThe trades data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe market was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Candles\n\nRetrieves candle data for a specific perpetual market.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_perpetual_market_candles(\nself,\nmarket: str,\nresolution: str,\nfrom_iso: Optional[str] = None,\nto_iso: Optional[str] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> dict\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nmarket\npath\nTicker\ntrue\nThe market ticker.\n\nresolution\nquery\nCandleResolution\ntrue\nThe candle resolution (e.g., \"1DAY\", \"1HOUR\", \"1MIN\").\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe maximum number of candles to retrieve.\n\nfromISO\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nThe start timestamp in ISO format.\n\ntoISO\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nThe end timestamp in ISO format.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nCandleResponseObject ⛁\nThe candle data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Historical Funding\n\nRetrieves historical funding rates for a specific perpetual market.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_perpetual_market_historical_funding(\nself,\nmarket: str,\neffective_before_or_at: Optional[str] = None,\neffective_before_or_at_height: Optional[int] = None,\nlimit: Optional[int] = None,\n) -> dict\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nmarket\npath\nTicker\ntrue\nThe market ticker.\n\nlimit\nquery\nu32\nfalse\nThe maximum number of funding rates to retrieve.\n\neffectiveBeforeOrAt\nquery\nDateTime\nfalse\nThe timestamp to retrieve funding rates effective before or at.\n\neffectiveBeforeOrAtHeight\nquery\nHeight\nfalse\nThe block height to retrieve funding rates effective before or at.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nHistoricalFundingResponseObject ⛁\nThe historical funding rates data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe market was not found.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Sparklines\n\nRetrieves sparkline data for perpetual markets.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_perpetual_market_sparklines(\nself,\nperiod: str = TimePeriod.ONE_DAY\n) -> dict\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\ntimePeriod\nquery\nSparklineTimePeriod\ntrue\nThe time period for the sparkline data (e.g., \"ONE_DAY\", \"SEVEN_DAYS\").\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nSparklineResponseObject ⛁\nThe sparkline data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nUtility\n\n// TODO: Add description\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nGet Time\n\nGet current server time of the Indexer.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_time(self) -> Dict[str, str]\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTimeResponse\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Height\n\nCurrent block height and block time (UTC) parsed by the Indexer.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_height(self) -> Dict[str, str]\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nHeightResponse ⛁\nDictionary containing the block height and time.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Screen\n\nQuery for screening results (compliance) of the address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def screen(self, address: str) -> Dict[str, bool]:\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the account.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nComplianceResponse ⛁\nThe compliance data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Compliance Screen\n\nScreen an address to see if it is restricted.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def compliance_screen(self, address: str) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naddress\nPath\nstring\ntrue\nevm or dydx address\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nComplianceV2Response\nwhether the specified address is restricted\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nVaults\n\nTODO: How to access to the vaults space.\n\nRust\nlet vaults = indexer_client.vaults();\n\nGet MegaVault Historical Pnl\n\nMegaVault historical PnL.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_megavault_historical_pnl(self, resolution)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nresolution\nquery\nPnlTickInterval\ntrue\nPnL tick resolution.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nPnlTicksResponseObject ⛁\nThe PnL ticks data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet Vaults Historical Pnl\n\nVaults historical PnL.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_vaults_historical_pnl(self, resolution)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nresolution\nquery\nPnlTickInterval\ntrue\nPnL tick resolution.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nVaultHistoricalPnl ⛁\nThe vault historical PnL data.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nAPI Example\n\nGet MegaVaults Positions\n\nMegaVault positions.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_megavault_positions(self)\n\nParameters\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nVaultPosition ⛁\n\nAPI Example","tokens":8198,"crawled_at":1791193621104} +{"id":10264,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/solana-keypairs-and-wallets","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Solana Keypairs and Wallets | Wallet Security Guide","text":"A comprehensive guide to creating, managing, and securing Solana keypairs for development and production environments.\nWhat You'll Learn\nWhat keypairs are and how they work on Solana\nHow to generate and manage keypairs\nSecurity best practices for different environments\nHow to use keypairs with the Solana CLI and MPLX CLI\nPrerequisites\nSolana CLI installed\nUnderstanding Keypairs\nA keypair on Solana consists of:\nPublic Key - Your wallet address, safe to share\nSecret Key - Secret key that controls the wallet, never share this\nCritical Security Rule\nYour private key gives complete control over your wallet. Anyone with access to it can transfer all your assets. Never commit keypair files to git, share them online, or store them unencrypted on cloud services.\n\nCreating Keypairs\nGenerate a New Keypair\n# Create a new keypair (prompts for BIP39 passphrase)\n\nsolana-keygen new\n\n# Create with a specific output file\n\nsolana-keygen new --outfile ~/my-wallet.json\n\n# Create without passphrase prompt (for scripts/testing)\n\nsolana-keygen new --no-bip39-passphrase --outfile ~/my-devnet-wallet.json\n\nThe command outputs:\nThe public key (your wallet address)\nA seed phrase (12-24 words) for recovery\nSave Your Seed Phrase\nWrite down your seed phrase and store it securely offline. This is the only way to recover your wallet if you lose the keypair file.\n\nRecover from Seed Phrase\n# Recover a keypair from seed phrase\n\nsolana-keygen recover --outfile ~/recovered-wallet.json\n\nYou'll be prompted to enter your seed phrase.\nGenerate from Existing Seed\nIf you have a seed phrase and want to derive the keypair:\nsolana-keygen recover 'prompt://?full-path=m/44'/501'/0'/0'' --outfile ~/derived-wallet.json\n\nManaging Keypairs with MPLX CLI\nThe MPLX CLI provides convenient wallet management with named wallets:\n# Create a new wallet in MPLX config\n\nmplx config wallets new my-dev-wallet\n\n# Add an existing keypair file\n\nmplx config wallets add my-wallet ~/path/to/keypair.json\n\n# List all configured wallets\n\nmplx config wallets list\n\n# Set the active wallet\n\nmplx config wallets set my-dev-wallet\n\n# Remove a wallet from config\n\nmplx config wallets remove old-wallet\n\nBenefits of MPLX wallet management:\nNamed wallets instead of file paths\nEasy switching between wallets\nCentralized configuration at ~/.mplx/config.json\nViewing Keypair Information\nGet Public Key from Keypair File\nsolana-keygen pubkey ~/my-wallet.json\n\nVerify a Keypair File\nsolana-keygen verify ~/my-wallet.json\n\nSetting Your Default Keypair\nSolana CLI\n# Set default keypair for all commands\n\nsolana config set --keypair ~/my-wallet.json\n\n# Verify the setting\n\nsolana config get\n\nPer-Command Override\n# Use a specific keypair for one command\n\nsolana balance --keypair ~/other-wallet.json\n\nsolana transfer
1 --keypair ~/funding-wallet.json\n\nSecurity Best Practices\nDevelopment vs Production\nEnvironmentRecommendation\nLocal testing\nFile system wallet, no passphrase needed\n\nDevnet/Testnet\nFile system wallet, backed up seed phrase\n\nMainnet (small amounts)\nFile system wallet with passphrase, encrypted disk\n\nMainnet (significant value)\nHardware wallet or multisigs\n\nFile System Wallets\nFor development and moderate amounts:\n# Create with restrictive permissions\n\nsolana-keygen new --outfile ~/.config/solana/mainnet-wallet.json\n\nchmod 600 ~/.config/solana/mainnet-wallet.json\n\nEnvironment Variables\nFor automated scripts, avoid hardcoding keypair paths:\n# In your shell profile (~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc)\n\nexport SOLANA_KEYPAIR_PATH=\"$HOME/.config/solana/devnet-wallet.json\"\n\n# In scripts\n\nsolana config set --keypair \"$SOLANA_KEYPAIR_PATH\"\n\nMultiple Wallets Strategy\nRecommended setup for active developers:\n~/.config/solana/\n\n├── devnet-wallet.json # Main devnet testing\n\n├── testnet-wallet.json # Testnet when needed\n\n├── mainnet-wallet.json # Small mainnet operations\n\n└── burner-wallet.json # Temporary/throwaway\n\nConfigure with MPLX CLI for easy switching:\nmplx config wallets add devnet ~/.config/solana/devnet-wallet.json\n\nmplx config wallets add mainnet ~/.config/solana/mainnet-wallet.json\n\nmplx config wallets set devnet\n\nWhat NOT to Do\nNever commit keypair files to git (add *.json to .gitignore)\nNever share your seed phrase or private key in Discord, Telegram, or support tickets\nNever paste your private key into websites\nNever store unencrypted keypairs in cloud storage (Dropbox, Google Drive)\nNever use the same keypair for mainnet testing and production\nHardware Wallets\nFor significant mainnet holdings, use a Ledger hardware wallet:\n# Check if Ledger is connected\n\nsolana-keygen pubkey usb://ledger\n\n# Use Ledger for transactions\n\nsolana config set --keypair usb://ledger\n\nsolana transfer
1\n\nRequirements:\nLedger device with Solana app installed\nUSB connection to your computer\nPractical Examples\nDevelopment Wallet Setup\n# 1. Create a devnet wallet (no passphrase for convenience)\n\nsolana-keygen new --no-bip39-passphrase --outfile ~/.config/solana/devnet.json\n\n# 2. Set it as default\n\nsolana config set --keypair ~/.config/solana/devnet.json\n\n# 3. Switch to devnet\n\nsolana config set --url devnet\n\n# 4. Get some devnet SOL\n\nsolana airdrop 2\n\n# 5. Verify\n\nsolana balance\n\nTeam Development Setup\nFor teams, each developer should have their own keypairs:\n# Developer creates their own wallet\n\nsolana-keygen new --outfile ~/my-project-wallet.json\n\n# Share only the PUBLIC key with the team\n\nsolana-keygen pubkey ~/my-project-wallet.json\n\n# Output: 7nE9GvcwYDhwWdFfGjVZQ8dR6bYYvqPJktNpyxQYb1xm\n\nProgrammatic Keypair Generation (JavaScript)\nFor applications that need to generate keypairs using UMI:\nimport { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\nimport { generateSigner, signerIdentity } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n// Generate a new random keypair signer\n\nconst signer = generateSigner(umi)\n\nconsole.log('Public Key:', signer.publicKey)\n\n// Use it as the identity (payer + signer)\n\numi.use(signerIdentity(signer))\n\n// Load an existing keypair from a file\n\nimport { createSignerFromKeypair } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport fs from 'fs'\n\nconst secretKey = new Uint8Array(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('wallet.json')))\n\nconst keypair = umi.eddsa.createKeypairFromSecretKey(secretKey)\n\nconst loadedSigner = createSignerFromKeypair(umi, keypair)\n\nTroubleshooting\n\"Keypair file not found\"\n# Check if file exists\n\nls -la ~/.config/solana/id.json\n\n# If not, create one\n\nsolana-keygen new --outfile ~/.config/solana/id.json\n\n# Or check your config\n\nsolana config get\n\n\"Invalid keypair\"\nThe keypair file must be a JSON array of 64 numbers. Verify format:\n# Should output an array like [123, 45, 67, ...]\n\ncat ~/my-wallet.json | head -c 100\n\nLost Seed Phrase\nIf you lost your seed phrase but still have the keypair file:\nYour funds are safe as long as you have the file\nTransfer funds to a new wallet with a backed-up seed phrase\nTreat the old keypair as compromised for future use\nNext Steps\nGrind a vanity public key - Create branded addresses\nGet SOL for development - Fund your new wallet\nSolana CLI essentials - Use your wallet effectively\nFAQ\nCan I use the same keypair on devnet and mainnet?\nTechnically yes, but it's not recommended. Use separate keypairs to avoid accidentally sending real SOL in test scripts.\nWhat's the difference between a keypair and a wallet?\nA keypair is the cryptographic key pair (public + private). A wallet is software that manages keypairs and helps you interact with the blockchain. File system wallets store the raw keypair; browser wallets like Phantom manage it with additional UX.\nHow do I use my Phantom wallet with the CLI?\nExport your private key from Phantom (Settings > Security > Export Private Key), then import it:\n# The exported key is base58 encoded, convert it:\n\necho \"[your-exported-key]\" | base58 -d > phantom-wallet.json\n\nsolana config set --keypair phantom-wallet.json\n\nNote: For security, consider creating a separate CLI keypair instead of exporting from Phantom.","tokens":2001,"crawled_at":1791193632124} +{"id":10265,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-forse-analytics-for-uniswap-revitalization-and-growth-program/24373/5","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program - #5 by kfx - Temperature Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nTemperature Check\n\nkfx\n\nAugust 10, 2024, 2:24pm\n\n5\n\nI have voted against the temp check, explanation here:\n\n6 Likes\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] Analytics Hub for Uniswap's Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n592\n\nMay 8, 2025\n\n[RFC] Forse for Uniswap Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n249\n\nJuly 27, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed: Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n44\n\n10632\n\nApril 22, 2025\n\nUniswap Incentive Design Analysis\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n10\n\n7858\n\nSeptember 15, 2023\n\nIntroducing the Uniswap Incentive Analysis Terminal by Forse\n\nUncategorized\n\n4\n\n658\n\nApril 16, 2025","tokens":204,"crawled_at":1791193634989} +{"id":10266,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/solana-transaction-fundamentals","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Solana Transaction Fundamentals | How Transactions Work","text":"A comprehensive guide to understanding how Solana transactions work from structure to confirmation.\nWhat You'll Learn\nThe anatomy of a Solana transaction\nHow to sign and send transactions\nTransaction confirmation and finality\nVersioned transactions vs legacy\nCommon transaction errors and their meanings\nPrerequisites\nSolana CLI installed\nUnderstanding Solana accounts\nTransaction Anatomy\nA Solana transaction consists of several components:\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Transaction │\n\n├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n\n│ Signatures: [sig1, sig2, ...] │\n\n│ │\n\n│ Message: │\n\n│ ├── Header │\n\n│ │ ├── num_required_signatures │\n\n│ │ ├── num_readonly_signed_accounts │\n\n│ │ └── num_readonly_unsigned_accounts │\n\n│ │ │\n\n│ ├── Account Keys: [pubkey1, pubkey2, ...] │\n\n│ │ │\n\n│ ├── Recent Blockhash │\n\n│ │ │\n\n│ └── Instructions: [ │\n\n│ { program_id_index, accounts, data }, │\n\n│ { program_id_index, accounts, data }, │\n\n│ ] │\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nKey Components\nComponentDescription\nSignatures\nEd25519 signatures from required signers\n\nRecent Blockhash\nA recent block hash (valid for ~60-90 seconds)\n\nInstructions\nThe operations to perform\n\nAccount Keys\nAll accounts involved in the transaction\n\nInstructions\nInstructions are the actual operations in a transaction. Each instruction specifies:\nProgram ID - Which program to execute\nAccounts - Which accounts the program needs\nData - Serialized arguments for the program\nInstruction:\n\n├── program_id: 11111111111111111111111111111111 (System Program)\n\n├── accounts:\n\n│ ├── sender (signer, writable)\n\n│ └── recipient (not signer, writable)\n\n└── data: [encoded transfer amount]\n\nMultiple Instructions\nTransactions can contain multiple instructions that execute atomically:\nimport { transactionBuilder } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n// All instructions succeed or all fail (atomic)\n\nconst builder = transactionBuilder()\n\n.add(createAccountInstruction)\n\n.add(initializeMintInstruction)\n\n.add(mintTokensInstruction)\n\nawait builder.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nThis atomicity is powerful. If any instruction fails, the entire transaction is reverted.\nRecent Blockhash\nEvery transaction requires a recent blockhash that:\nProves the transaction was created recently\nPrevents replay attacks\nExpires after ~60-90 seconds (~150 slots)\n// UMI handles blockhash automatically when sending transactions.\n\n// To fetch it manually:\n\nconst { blockhash, lastValidBlockHeight } = await umi.rpc.getLatestBlockhash()\n\nBlockhash Expiration\nIf your transaction isn't confirmed before the blockhash expires, it will be dropped. For long-running operations, fetch a fresh blockhash before sending.\n\nSigning Transactions\nTransactions must be signed by all accounts marked as isSigner:\n// UMI signs automatically with the identity signer when sending.\n\n// For additional signers, pass them during the build:\n\nconst tx = await myBuilder\n\n.setBlockhash(await umi.rpc.getLatestBlockhash())\n\n.buildAndSign(umi)\n\n// For partial signing (multi-sig workflows), you can sign\n\n// and serialize the transaction, then pass it to another party:\n\nimport { base64 } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi/serializers'\n\nconst serialized = umi.transactions.serialize(tx)\n\nconst encoded = base64.deserialize(serialized)[0]\n\n// ... send encoded string to another party for additional signing ...\n\nSending Transactions\nBasic Send\n// Send and wait for confirmation (recommended)\n\nconst result = await myBuilder.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n// Or just send without waiting\n\nconst signature = await myBuilder.send(umi)\n\nSend with Options\nconst result = await myBuilder.sendAndConfirm(umi, {\n\nsend: { skipPreflight: false },\n\nconfirm: { commitment: 'confirmed' },\n\n})\n\nTransaction Confirmation\nSolana has multiple commitment levels indicating transaction finality:\nCommitmentDescriptionUse Case\nprocessed\nTransaction received by leader\nReal-time updates\n\nconfirmed\nVoted on by supermajority\nMost applications\n\nfinalized\n31+ blocks deep, irreversible\nFinancial operations\n\nChecking Confirmation\n// sendAndConfirm waits for confirmation automatically.\n\n// To check a signature status manually:\n\nconst result = await umi.rpc.getSignatureStatuses([signature])\n\nCommitment in Practice\n// For most operations, 'confirmed' is the right default\n\nconst result = await myBuilder.sendAndConfirm(umi, {\n\nconfirm: { commitment: 'confirmed' },\n\n})\n\n// For financial operations where you need full finality\n\nconst result = await myBuilder.sendAndConfirm(umi, {\n\nconfirm: { commitment: 'finalized' },\n\n})\n\nVersioned Transactions\nSolana supports three transaction formats:\nLegacy Transactions\nLegacy transactions use Solana's original transaction format without Address Lookup Tables.\nOriginal format\nLimited to 35 accounts\nSimpler structure\nV0 Transactions\nV0 transactions add Address Lookup Table support for transactions that need more accounts.\nSupport Address Lookup Tables (ALTs)\nCan reference up to 256 accounts\nRequired for complex DeFi operations\nV1 Transactions\nV1 transactions increase the transaction size limit and store compute configuration in the message.\nSupport transactions up to 4,096 bytes\nStore compute budget configuration in the transaction message\nDo not support Address Lookup Tables\n// Umi uses V0 transactions by default. Opt in to V1 explicitly.\n\nconst result = await myBuilder\n\n.useV1()\n\n.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n// To use legacy transactions instead\n\nconst result = await myBuilder\n\n.useLegacyVersion()\n\n.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n// With Address Lookup Tables\n\nimport { createLut } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-toolbox'\n\nconst [lutBuilder, lut] = createLut(umi, {\n\nrecentSlot: await umi.rpc.getSlot({ commitment: 'finalized' }),\n\naddresses: [addressA, addressB, addressC],\n\n})\n\nawait lutBuilder.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n// Address Lookup Tables require V0.\n\nawait myBuilder\n\n.useV0()\n\n.setAddressLookupTables([lut])\n\n.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nChoosing a Transaction Version\nUse V1 for transactions larger than 1,232 bytes when the wallet supports transaction version 1.\nUse V0 when the transaction requires an Address Lookup Table.\nUse legacy transactions only when compatibility requires the original format.\nUmi defaults to V0 for backward compatibility. See Migrating from V0 to V1 Transactions before changing the application-wide default.\n\nTransaction Size Limits\nSolana transactions have strict size limits:\nLimitValue\nLegacy and V0 transaction size\n1,232 bytes\n\nV1 transaction size\n4,096 bytes\n\nAddress Lookup Tables\nV0 only\n\nMaximum instructions\nLimited by size\n\nDealing with Size Limits\nIf your transaction is too large:\nUse V1 - Increase the size limit to 4,096 bytes when no Address Lookup Table is required\nUse Address Lookup Tables with V0 - Compress account references\nSplit into multiple transactions - Execute sequentially\nOptimize instruction data - Minimize serialized data\nSimulation\nBefore sending, simulate transactions to catch errors:\n// Build the transaction without sending\n\nconst tx = await myBuilder\n\n.setBlockhash(await umi.rpc.getLatestBlockhash())\n\n.buildAndSign(umi)\n\n// Simulate it\n\nconst simulation = await umi.rpc.simulateTransaction(tx, {\n\ncommitment: 'confirmed',\n\n})\n\nconsole.log('Simulation result:', simulation)\n\nSimulation helps you:\nCatch errors before paying fees\nEstimate compute units\nDebug program logic\nCommon Transaction Errors\n\"Blockhash not found\"\nCause: The blockhash expired before confirmation.\nSolutions:\nRetry with a fresh blockhash (UMI fetches a new blockhash automatically on each send)\nUse 'finalized' commitment for blockhash when network is congested\nImplement retry logic in your application\n\"Insufficient funds\"\nCause: Account doesn't have enough SOL for transaction fees + rent.\nSolution: Ensure the fee payer has sufficient balance:\nsolana balance\n\nsolana airdrop 1 # On devnet\n\n\"Transaction simulation failed\"\nCause: Program logic error.\nSolution: Check simulation logs on an explorer (see Using Solana Explorers), or simulate the transaction before sending to inspect the error output.\n\"Account not found\"\nCause: An account in the transaction doesn't exist.\nSolution: Create the account first or check addresses.\n\"Invalid account owner\"\nCause: Account is owned by a different program than expected.\nSolution: Verify account ownership matches the program you're calling.\nPractical Example: Complete Flow\nimport { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\nimport { transferSol } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-toolbox'\n\nimport { signerIdentity, generateSigner, sol, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { base58 } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi/serializers'\n\n// 1. Create UMI instance\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n// 2. Set up signer (your wallet)\n\nconst signer = generateSigner(umi)\n\numi.use(signerIdentity(signer))\n\n// 3. Build and send the transaction\n\nconst result = await transferSol(umi, {\n\nsource: umi.identity,\n\ndestination: publicKey('RecipientAddressHere...'),\n\namount: sol(1),\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n// 4. Get the transaction signature\n\nconst signature = base58.deserialize(result.signature)[0]\n\nconsole.log('Transaction confirmed:', signature)\n\nconsole.log(`Explorer: https://explorer.solana.com/tx/${signature}?cluster=devnet`)\n\nNext Steps\nCompute units and priority fees - Optimize transaction landing\nWorking with devnet and testnet - Test your transactions\nDiagnose transaction errors - Debug failed transactions\nFAQ\nHow long do I have to confirm a transaction?\nA transaction's blockhash is valid for approximately 60-90 seconds (~150 slots). After that, the transaction will be dropped if not confirmed.\nCan I cancel a transaction?\nNo, once submitted, you cannot cancel a transaction. However, if it hasn't been confirmed, you can submit a new transaction with the same nonce (using durable nonces) to effectively \"replace\" it.\nWhat's the difference between \"processed\" and \"confirmed\"?\n\"Processed\" means a validator received it. \"Confirmed\" means a supermajority (66%+) of validators voted on the block containing it. Always use \"confirmed\" or \"finalized\" for important operations.\nWhy did my transaction fail after simulation succeeded?\nState can change between simulation and execution. Another transaction may have modified the accounts. This is common in competitive scenarios like NFT mints.","tokens":2582,"crawled_at":1791193650574} +{"id":10267,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/governance-proposal-uniswap-unleashed/25251/39","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed - #39 by kfx - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nkfx\n\nFebruary 26, 2025, 6:10pm\n\n39\n\nI will vote against the proposals as they stand now. In my view, a request for such an extraordinary funding amount requires extraordinarily strong evidence. I don’t believe that level of proof has been reached yet.\n\nSpecifically, I haven’t seen sufficient evidence that spending the funds in the proposed manner is a better alternative for UNI tokenholders than simply allocating them to a Stability Fund for yield. For example, the total gross revenue of a top-5 L2 (Linea) has ranged between $5,000 and $20,000 per day over the past week. If this is the revenue Unichain aims to reach by spending >$30M on Unichain-related incentives and grants (not even including the related budget for ops), it will take a long time to recapture the investment—especially if only 65% of the net revenue goes to tokenholders. We can hope that Unichain’s revenue will be much higher, but’s it’s just that, hop. To be clear Unichain here is just an example, this also applied to other categories.\n\nAnother major issue is the lack of alignment and coordination among the key actors (UF, Labs, DAO). Unichain, in particular, is problematic in this regard.\n\nChanges I’d like to see in the proposal\n\nPostpone all funding related to Unichain’s operations and related operational budget.\n\nProvide clarity on how the grants used to fund v4, including v4 hooks, will benefit UNI tokenholders.\n\nPresent a concrete roadmap toward the fee switch or alternative revenue generation methods.\n\nImprove transparency and accountability within the UF, either through a closer feedback loop with the DAO or via an external supervisory organization.\n\nConsider making some funding conditional. For example, once Labs delivers the promised innovations for Unichain, the DAO could release X% of the incentive funding. Once the fee switch is live, X% of grant funding could be released, and so on.\n\nBelow are detailed explanations of these proposed changes.\n\nUnichain\n\nWhile I and most other delegates support incentives for Unichain’s growth, it’s unclear whether including votes for such incentives within the same proposal as the rest of the UF’s budget is necessary. There are multiple reasons to separate and/or postpone this funding:\n\nUnichain represents a significant shift in the DAO’s scope and responsibilities, and more time is needed to understand the role the DAO can and wants to take.\n\nThe promised technical innovations for Unichain are mostly not live yet; currently, it is a generic chain within the Optimism Superchain ecosystem. Therefore, incentives may be better timed for later.\n\nAt present, the DAO lacks a legal structure to capture fees from Unichain.\n\nThe DAO does not control the “fee switch” of the chain.\n\nAttempting to handle both the v3 → v4 migration and Unichain incentives simultaneously could pose operational challenges for the UF and its partners.\n\nIt’s not clear how Labs see Unichain in their strategy and whether/how they will influence the chain’s governance in the future. The DAO should not spend UNI tokens to indirectly fund the Labs.\n\nWe believe the following conditions should be met before the DAO provides incentives to Unichain:\n\nThe technical innovations promised in Unichain’s whitepaper are either live or ready for launch, specifically:\n\nUnichain’s Validator Network\n\nSub-second block times\n\nTrustless revert protection\n\nAn incorporated entity (such as a DUNA) exists to receive revenue from Unichain on the DAO’s behalf.\n\nOther concerns—such as the DAO’s lack of control over the chain and its fee distribution—are thoroughly discussed and addressed where possible.\n\nGrants, Including v4 Incentives\n\nHook Grants & Incentives\n\nSince v4 hook developers can choose to bypass the protocol fee using hooks with BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA_FLAG or otherwise interfere with the protocol fee, we request that, at a minimum, a legally binding agreement be made with each hook developer receiving a grant. If the developer collects revenue from the hook in any form, the DAO must be entitled to its fair share through protocol fees.\n\nAdditionally, we believe other mechanisms should be explored to capture revenue from protocols building on top of Uniswap. For example, grant agreements could stipulate a share in future equity or tokens.\n\nOther Incentives\n\nThe proposal should clarify which incentives are public goods for the DeFi space and which are aimed at sustainability of the DAO & UF and UNI token appreciation.\n\nFee Switch\n\nThe funding of v4 incentives and the operational budget should be conditional on establishing a clear pathway for capturing revenue from the protocol—whether through the protocol fee switch or alternative mechanisms such as frontend fees. The burden of proof lies with the Foundation, not the delegates, as it is unlikely that any bottom-up proposal from the DAO will gain traction while the general understanding remains that the Foundation is still working on its design.\n\nImproved Oversight\n\nOne option to enhance oversight is extending the UF’s Legal Board to include DAO members, as suggested by GFX Labs. However, if this is not possible due to regulatory reasons, other alternatives should be explored. Some options were recommended in response to the previous funding request in 2023, and I’m happy to see that some of them have already been implemented!\n\nThe goal should be to reduce potential misalignments (real or perceived) between key stakeholders within the ecosystem and improve transparency.\n\n4 Likes\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Governance Proposal]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n8\n\n6487\n\nOctober 16, 2023\n\n[Temperature Check] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nTemperature Check\n\n59\n\n25158\n\nSeptember 9, 2022\n\n[RFC]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n15\n\n7771\n\nOctober 7, 2023\n\n404 DAO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n3283\n\nJanuary 13, 2026\n\n[Governance Proposal] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n7548\n\nAugust 17, 2022","tokens":1541,"crawled_at":1791193652826} +{"id":10268,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands/autonomy_analyse","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"autonomy analyse - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy analyse\n\nTools for analysing and verifying AI agents.\n\nThis command group consists of a number of functionalities to analyse and verify AI agents, including FSM App skill consistency checks. See the appropriate subcommands for more information.\n\nautonomy analyse docstrings\n\nAnalyse FSM App skill docstring definitions.\n\nThis command verifies that the AbciApp class docstring is follows a standard format.\n\nExample\nThe docstring corresponding to the Hello World AI agent is\n\n\"\"\"HelloWorldAbciApp\n\nInitial round: RegistrationRound\n\nInitial states: {RegistrationRound}\n\nTransition states:\n1. RegistrationRound\n- done: 1.\n2. CollectRandomnessRound\n- done: 2.\n- no majority: 1.\n- round timeout: 1.\n3. SelectKeeperRound\n- done: 3.\n- no majority: 0.\n- round timeout: 0.\n4. PrintMessageRound\n- done: 4.\n- round timeout: 0.\n5. ResetAndPauseRound\n- done: 1.\n- no majority: 0.\n- reset timeout: 0.\n\nFinal states: {}\n\nTimeouts:\nround timeout: 30.0\nreset timeout: 30.0\n\"\"\"\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse docstrings [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n--update\nUpdate docstrings if required.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nTo analyse all the FSM App skill docstrings within the local registry, run the following command in the directory containing the registry:\n\nautonomy analyse docstrings\n\nTo update/fix the FSM App skill docstrings, run the following command:\n\nautonomy analyse docstrings --update\n\nautonomy analyse fsm-specs\n\nVerify the FSM App against its specification or generate the FSM App specification file.\n\nUsage\n\nUsage: autonomy analyse fsm-specs [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n--package PATH\n\nPath to the package containing the FSM App skill.\n--app-class ABCI_APP_CLASS\n\nName of the AbciApp class of the FSM App.\n--update\n\nUpdate/create the FSM App definition file if check fails.\n--yaml\n\nYAML file (default).\n--json\n\nJSON file.\n--mermaid\n\nMermaid file.\n--help\n\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nAnalyse the FSM App specification for the hello_world_abci:\n\nautonomy analyse fsm-specs --package ./packages/valory/skills/hello_world_abci\n\nUpdate/create the FSM App specification for the hello_world_abci in YAML format:\n\nautonomy analyse fsm-specs --package ./packages/valory/skills/hello_world_abci --app-class HelloWorldAbciApp --update\n\nExport the FSM App specification for the hello_world_abci in Mermaid format:\n\nautonomy analyse fsm-specs --package ./packages/valory/skills/hello_world_abci --app-class HelloWorldAbciApp --update --mermaid\n\nAnalyse all the FSM App specifications in a local registry. This command must be executed\nin a directory containing the local registry:\n\nautonomy analyse fsm-specs\n\nautonomy analyse handlers\n\nVerify existence of handler definitions.\n\nThis command verifies that all the FSM App skills in a local registry (except the explicitly excluded ones) have defined the specified handlers.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse handlers [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n-h, --common-handlers HANDLER_NAME\nSpecify which handlers to check. E.g., -h handler_a -h handler_b -h handler_c.\n-i, --ignore SKILL_NAME\nSpecify which skills to skip. E.g., -i skill_0, -i skill_1, -i skill_2.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nEnsure that handlers http and signing are defined in all the FSM App skills in a local registry, except the skills excluded_skill_1 and excluded_skill_2:\n\nautonomy analyse handlers -h http -h signing -i excluded_skill_1 -i excluded_skill_2\n\nautonomy analyse dialogues\n\nCheck dialogues definitions in a skill package.\n\nThis command verifies that all the FSM App skills in a local registry (except the explicitly excluded ones) have defined the specified dialogues.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse dialogues [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n-d, --dialogue TEXT\nSpecify which dialogues to check. Eg. -d dialogue_a, -d dialogue_b, -d dialogue_c.\n-i, --ignore SKILL_NAME\nSpecify which skills to skip. E.g., -i skill_0, -i skill_1, -i skill_2.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nEnsure that dialogues abci_dialogues and http_dialogues are defined in all the FSM App skills in a local registry, except the skills excluded_skill_1 and excluded_skill_2:\n\nautonomy analyse dialogues -d abci_dialogues -d http_dialogues -i excluded_skill_1 -i excluded_skill_2\n\nOr\n\nautonomy analyse dialogues -d abci -d http -i excluded_skill_1 -i excluded_skill_2\n\nSince the command will automatically append the _dialogues postfix if not provided by the user.\n\nautonomy analyse logs\n\nParse logs of an AI agent.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse logs [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n--from-dir PATH\nPath to logs directory [required]\n--reset-db\nUse this flag to reset the log database.\n-a, --agent TEXT\nAgent IDs to include in analysis\n--start-time TEXT\nStart time in YYYY-MM-DD H:M:S,MS format\n--end-time TEXT\nEnd time in YYYY-MM-DD H:M:S,MS format\n--log-level [INFO|DEBUG|WARNING|ERROR|CRITICAL]\nLogging level.\n--period INTEGER\nPeriod ID\n--round TEXT\nRound name\n--behaviour TEXT\nBehaviour name filter\n--fsm\nPrint only the FSM execution path\n-ir, --include-regex TEXT\nRegex pattern to include in the result.\n-er, --exclude-regex TEXT\nRegex pattern to exclude from the result.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nAnalyze logs from the build directory ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs for 2 agents:\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' -a 'aea_1'\n\nView logs for 2 agents between specific times:\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' --start-time \"2024-01-20 10:00:00,000\" --end-time \"2024-01-20 11:00:00,000\"\n\nView logs for period 2 and round RegistrationRound:\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' --period 2 --round RegistrationRound\n\nView only the FSM state transitions:\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' --fsm\n\nFilter by log level ERROR and behaviour RegistrationBehaviour:\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' --log-level ERROR --behaviour RegistrationBehaviour\n\nUse regex patterns to filter logs, include lines with consensus and exclude lines with debug\n\nautonomy analyse logs --from-dir ./abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/logs -a 'aea_0' -ir \".*consensus.*\" -er \".*debug.*\"\n\nThese examples demonstrate various ways to filter and analyze AI agent logs. You can combine multiple options to narrow down the log output to exactly what you need for debugging or analysis.\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks\n\nAggregate benchmark results from AI agent deployments.\n\nThis tool requires the benchmark data generated from agent blueprint's runtime.\nBy default the tool will aggregate the output for all the periods and code block types but you can restrict the aggregation to a specific period and/or a specific block type.\n\nRead the guide on how to use the benchmarking tool for more information.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks [OPTIONS] PATH\n\nOptions\n\n-b, --block-type [local|consensus|total|all]\n\nBlock type:\n\nlocal: only consider local code blocks,\n\nconsensus: only consider consensus code blocks,\n\ntotal: consider local + consensus code blocks together.\n\nall: consider local and consensus code blocks.\n\n-d, --period PERIOD_NUM\nPeriod.\n-o, --output FILE\nOutput file name.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nThe benchmark data will be stored in the folder /abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/benchmarks.\n\nTo aggregate stats for all periods, execute:\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/benchmarks\n\nTo aggregate stats for consensus block type in the second period, execute:\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks abci_build_hAsH/persistent_data/benchmarks --period 2 --block-type consensus\n\nautonomy analyse service\n\nAnalyse if the AI agent is ready to be deployed or not.\n\nThis tool can be used to analyse an AI agent definition and see if there are any potential issues with configuration which can cause issues when running the deployment.\n\nRead the guide on deployment readiness for more information.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy analyse service [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n--token-id INTEGER\nToken ID of the AI agent\n--public-id PUBLIC_ID_OR_HASH\nPublic ID of the AI agent\n--use-celo\nTo use celo chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-base\nTo use base chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-optimism\nTo use optimism chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-arbitrum-one\nTo use arbitrum-one chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-gnosis\nTo use gnosis chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-polygon\nTo use polygon chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-ethereum\nTo use ethereum chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-custom-chain\nTo use custom-chain chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-local\nTo use local chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nAnalyse the AI agent valory/hello_world using\n\nautonomy analyse service --public-id valory/hello_world\n\nAnalyse an on-chain AI agent with token ID 1 using\n\nautonomy analyse service --token-id 1","tokens":2265,"crawled_at":1791193653958} +{"id":10269,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/the-transaction-supply-chain-for-high-performance-l1s","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"The transaction supply chain for high performance L1s - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nThe transaction supply chain for high performance L1s\nPranav Garimidi\n12.07.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIn this talk we discuss the transaction supply chain in detail for high performance chains. We use Solana and Aptos as case studies to consider the unique challenges that come with scale and discuss the different space of solutions that have been used along with the outstanding problems.\n\nPranav Garimidi is a research analyst at a16z crypto. He does research on problems in mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially focused on how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science.\n\nAbout a16z crypto research\n\na16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet.\n\nMore about us: a16z.com/2022/04/21/announcing-a16z-crypto-research\n\nMore from the a16z crypto team\n\nSubscribe to our ‘web3 weekly newsletter’: a16zcrypto.substack.com\n\nListen to our ‘web3 with a16z’ podcast: a16zcrypto.com/web3-with-a16z-podcast/\n\nRead more of our work: a16zcrypto.com","tokens":375,"crawled_at":1791193657646} +{"id":10270,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/understanding-solana-accounts","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Understanding Solana Accounts | Solana Account Model Guide","text":"A comprehensive guide to Solana's account model—the foundation for understanding tokens, NFTs, and all on-chain data storage.\nWhat You'll Learn\nHow Solana accounts differ from Ethereum accounts\nAccount ownership and the program model\nRent and rent exemption\nTypes of accounts you'll encounter in token development\nPrerequisites\nBasic blockchain understanding\nSolana CLI installed (for examples)\nThe Solana Account Model\nOn Solana, everything is an account. Unlike Ethereum where contracts have their own storage, Solana separates code (programs) from data (accounts).\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Account │\n\n├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n\n│ lamports: 1000000 │ ← Balance (in lamports, 1 SOL = 1B lamports)\n\n│ data: [bytes...] │ ← Arbitrary data storage\n\n│ owner: 11111111111111111111111111111111 │ ← Program that controls this account\n\n│ executable: false │ ← Is this a program?\n\n│ rent_epoch: 123 │ ← Rent tracking\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nKey Concepts\nConceptDescription\nLamports\nThe balance in the smallest unit (1 SOL = 1,000,000,000 lamports)\n\nData\nArbitrary bytes stored in the account\n\nOwner\nThe program ID that can modify this account's data\n\nExecutable\nWhether this account contains program code\n\nAccount Ownership\nEvery account has an owner—a program that has exclusive rights to:\nModify the account's data\nDebit lamports from the account\nChange the account's owner (transfer ownership)\nThe System Program\nThe System Program (11111111111111111111111111111111) owns all basic wallet accounts:\n# View a wallet account\n\nsolana account \n\n# Output shows:\n\n# Owner: 11111111111111111111111111111111\n\nWhen you transfer SOL, you're asking the System Program to debit your account.\nProgram Ownership\nWhen a program creates an account, that program becomes the owner:\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Token Program owns token-related accounts │\n\n│ │\n\n│ Token Program ──owns──► Mint Account │\n\n│ │ │\n\n│ └──────owns──► Token Account (your token balance) │\n\n│ │\n\n│ Metaplex Token Metadata Program ──owns──► Metadata Account │\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nTypes of Accounts\n1. Wallet Accounts (System Accounts)\nBasic accounts that hold SOL:\n# Create a new wallet\n\nsolana-keygen new --outfile wallet.json\n\n# This creates a keypair, and when funded, a System Program-owned account\n\nsolana airdrop 1\n\nProperties:\nOwner: System Program\nData: Empty (0 bytes)\nPurpose: Hold SOL, sign transactions\n2. Program Accounts\nAccounts that contain executable code:\n# View a program account\n\nsolana account TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA\n\n# Owner: BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e11111111111111111111111\n\n# Executable: true\n\nProperties:\nOwner: BPF Loader\nExecutable: true\nData: Compiled program bytecode\n3. Data Accounts\nAccounts that store arbitrary data for programs:\n# View a token mint account\n\nsolana account \n\n# Owner: TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA (Token Program)\n\n# Executable: false\n\n# Data: [mint data...]\n\n4. Program Derived Addresses (PDAs)\nSpecial accounts derived deterministically from a program ID and seeds:\nPDA = hash(seeds + program_id + \"PDA\")\n\nProperties:\nNo private key (cannot sign transactions)\nOnly the deriving program can sign for it\nDeterministic—same inputs always produce same address\nSee Understanding PDAs for more details.\nAccounts in Token Development\nWhen working with Metaplex tools, you'll interact with several account types:\nToken Mint Account\nRepresents the token itself:\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Mint Account │\n\n├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n\n│ mint_authority: │ ← Who can mint more\n\n│ supply: 1000000 │ ← Total supply\n\n│ decimals: 9 │ ← Decimal places\n\n│ freeze_authority: │ ← Who can freeze\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nToken Account (Associated Token Account)\nHolds a user's balance of a specific token:\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Token Account │\n\n├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n\n│ mint: │ ← Which token\n\n│ owner: │ ← Who owns these tokens\n\n│ amount: 500 │ ← Balance\n\n│ state: Initialized │ ← Account state\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nMetadata Account (Metaplex)\nStores token/NFT metadata on-chain:\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Metadata Account │\n\n├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n\n│ mint: │ ← Associated mint\n\n│ name: \"My Token\" │\n\n│ symbol: \"MTK\" │\n\n│ uri: \"https://...\" │ ← Off-chain metadata\n\n│ creators: [...] │ ← Creator info\n\n│ royalties: 500 (5%) │\n\n└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nSPL Token Model vs Metaplex Core\nThe account structure for tokens and NFTs differs significantly depending on the program you use.\nSPL Token + Token Metadata uses multiple accounts per asset:\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ SPL Token Model (3+ accounts per asset) │\n\n│ │\n\n│ Mint Account ← Token definition (82 bytes) │\n\n│ Token Account (ATA) ← Holder's balance (165 bytes)│\n\n│ Metadata Account ← Name, symbol, URI (PDA) │\n\n│ Master Edition ← NFT edition tracking (PDA) │\n\n└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nEach account is owned by a different program, requires its own rent-exempt deposit, and must be managed separately. Transferring an NFT means updating the Token Account; metadata lives in a separate PDA owned by the Token Metadata program.\nMetaplex Core collapses everything into a single account:\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n\n│ Core Model (1 account per asset) │\n\n│ │\n\n│ Asset Account │\n\n│ ├── owner: │\n\n│ ├── name: \"My NFT\" │\n\n│ ├── uri: \"https://...\" │\n\n│ └── plugins: [royalties, freeze, burn, ...] │\n\n└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘\n\nWith Core, ownership, metadata, and extensibility (via plugins) are stored in one account owned by the Core program. This means fewer accounts to create, lower rent costs, and simpler transactions.\nSPL Token + Token MetadataMetaplex Core\nAccounts per NFT\n3–4 (mint, token, metadata, edition)\n1 (asset)\n\nRent cost\n~0.01 SOL\n~0.003 SOL\n\nOwnership\nToken Account tracks balance\nAsset account owner field\n\nMetadata\nSeparate PDA\nBuilt into the asset account\n\nExtensibility\nToken Extensions (Token-2022)\nPlugin system\n\nBest for\nFungible tokens (SPL)\nNFTs and digital assets\n\nWhich should I use?\nFor NFTs and digital assets, use Metaplex Core — it's simpler, cheaper, and purpose-built. For fungible tokens (currencies, rewards), use the SPL Token program with Metaplex Token Metadata for on-chain metadata.\n\nRent and Rent Exemption\nAccounts must pay rent to exist on Solana. This prevents blockchain bloat.\nHow Rent Works\nRent is paid in lamports based on data size\nAccounts that fall below minimum balance are purged\nRent-exempt accounts pay a one-time deposit and exist forever\nRent Exemption\nTo be rent-exempt, an account must hold minimum lamports based on its size:\n# Check rent-exempt minimum for different sizes\n\nsolana rent 0 # Wallet (0 bytes): ~0.00089 SOL\n\nsolana rent 82 # Mint Account: ~0.002 SOL\n\nsolana rent 165 # Token Account: ~0.0025 SOL\n\nsolana rent 679 # Metadata Account: ~0.0056 SOL\n\nAlways Rent-Exempt\nWhen creating accounts with Metaplex tools (MPLX CLI, SDKs), the tools automatically calculate and include rent-exempt amounts. You don't need to manually calculate rent.\n\nRecovering Rent\nWhen you close an account, you recover the rent deposit:\n# Burning an NFT recovers most of its rent\n\nmplx core burn-asset \n\n# Returns ~0.00089 SOL\n\nSolana vs Ethereum\nComing from Ethereum? Here are the key differences:\nAspectEthereumSolana\nContract storage\nContract stores its own data\nPrograms are stateless; data in separate accounts\n\nAccount creation\nImplicit (just send to address)\nExplicit (must create and fund account)\n\nStorage cost\nGas per operation\nRent exemption (one-time deposit)\n\nOwnership\nContracts own themselves\nPrograms own data accounts\n\nBalance storage\nSingle balance field\nSeparate token accounts per token\n\nPractical Implications\nToken balances: On Ethereum, one contract tracks all balances. On Solana, each holder has a separate token account:\nEthereum:\n\nERC-20 Contract\n\n└── balances mapping\n\n├── Alice: 100\n\n└── Bob: 50\n\nSolana:\n\n├── Mint Account\n\n├── Alice's Token Account → amount: 100\n\n└── Bob's Token Account → amount: 50\n\nViewing Accounts\nCLI\n# View account info\n\nsolana account
\n\n# View in JSON format\n\nsolana account
--output json\n\n# View only data (hex encoded)\n\nsolana account
--output json | jq '.data'\n\nExplorer\nUse Solana Explorer or SolanaFM to view accounts visually:\nSolana Explorer\nSolanaFM\nProgrammatically\nimport { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\nconst account = await umi.rpc.getAccount(publicKey('YourAddressHere...'))\n\nif (account.exists) {\n\nconsole.log('Owner:', account.owner)\n\nconsole.log('Lamports:', account.lamports)\n\nconsole.log('Data length:', account.data.length)\n\n}\n\nCommon Patterns\nWhy \"Account Not Found\"?\nOn Solana, accounts must be explicitly created:\nError: Account does not exist\n\nCause: The account has never been created, or it was closed/purged\n\nSolution: Create the account first (automatic with most Metaplex operations)\n\nAssociated Token Accounts (ATAs)\nATAs are deterministically derived so you don't need to track them:\nATA = derive(wallet_address, mint_address, token_program)\n\nThe MPLX CLI and SDKs automatically create ATAs when needed:\n# This auto-creates the recipient's ATA if it doesn't exist\n\nmplx toolbox token-transfer \n\nNext Steps\nUnderstanding PDAs - Dive deeper into Program Derived Addresses\nTransaction fundamentals - How transactions work on Solana\nCreate a Solana token - Put this knowledge into practice\nFAQ\nWhy do I need to create token accounts?\nUnlike Ethereum where a contract tracks balances, Solana requires separate accounts. This enables parallel processing—different accounts can be modified simultaneously.\nWhat happens if my account runs out of rent?\nIf an account falls below the rent-exempt threshold, it will be purged after some time, and the remaining lamports returned to the owner. Always keep accounts rent-exempt.\nCan I close accounts to recover SOL?\nYes! When you burn NFTs or close token accounts, you recover the rent-exempt deposit. This is why burning assets returns SOL.\nWhy does my wallet show a small balance after minting?\nCreating accounts (mint, metadata, token accounts) requires rent-exempt deposits. These are locked in the accounts, not spent.\nWhat's the difference between owner and authority?\nOwner (on-chain): The program that controls the account's data\nAuthority (in account data): The wallet that can perform certain actions (like minting)\nExample: A Mint Account is owned by the Token Program, but its mint authority is your wallet.","tokens":2771,"crawled_at":1791193668816} +{"id":10271,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands/autonomy_mint","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"autonomy mint - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy mint\n\nTools for minting software packages in the Olas Protocol.\n\nThis command group consists of a number of functionalities to mint components, agent blueprints and AI agents in the Olas Protocol. These commands are the CLI alternative to mint packages using the Olas Protocol web app. See the appropriate subcommands for more information.\n\nInfo\n\nYou can specify how you wish to sign the on-chain transactions produced by these commands: either with a private key stored in a file, or with a hardware wallet. In this latter case, ensure that you have configured properly the drivers for your hardware wallet.\n\nOptions\n\n--dry-run\nPerform a dry run for the transaction.\n--use-celo\nUse the Celo chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-base\nUse the Base chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-optimism\nUse the Optimism chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-arbitrum-one\nUse the Arbitrum One chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-gnosis\nUse the Gnosis chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-polygon\nUse the Polygon chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-ethereum\nUse the Ethereum chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n\nTo use these chain profile, you will have to export an environment variable for RPC in _CHAIN_RPC format. For example if you want to use ethereum, you will have to export ETHEREUM_CHAIN_RPC.\n\n--use-custom-chain\n\nUse the custom-chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts. This profile requires that you define some parameters and contract addresses as environment variables (see also the Olas Protocol documentation for more information):\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_RPC : RPC endpoint for the custom chain.\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_ID : chain ID.\n\nCUSTOM_COMPONENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Component Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_AGENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Agent Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_REGISTRIES_MANAGER_ADDRESS : Custom Registries Manager contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS : Custom Service Manager contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Service Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS : Custom Gnosis Safe multisig contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS : Custom Gnosis Safe Same Address Multisig address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS : Custom Service Registry Token Utility address.\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS : Custom Multisend address.\n\nNote\n\nFor L2 chains you are only required to set\n- CUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS and\n- CUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS.\n\n--use-local\nUse the local chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts. This option requires that you have a local Hardhat node with the required contracts deployed.\n\nNote\n\nThe chain profile flags are mutually exclusive.\n\n-t, --timeout FLOAT\nTimeout for on-chain interactions\n-r, --retries INTEGER\nMax retries for on-chain interactions\n--sleep FLOAT\nSleep period between retries\n\nautonomy mint protocol / contract / connection / skill\n\nMint a protocol, contract, connection or skill in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy mint protocol [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\nautonomy mint contract [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\nautonomy mint connection [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\nautonomy mint skill [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n--nft IPFS_HASH_OR_IMAGE_PATH\nIPFS hash or path to the image for the NFT representing the package. Note that if you are using a local chain this option is not required.\n--owner OWNER_ADDRESS\nOwner address of the package.\n--update TOKEN_ID\nUpdate the existing minted token with the latest package hash.\n\nExamples\n\nMint the abstract_abci skill in a local chain:\n\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --key my_key.txt --nft --owner ./packages/valory/skills/abstract_abci\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --hwi --nft --owner ./packages/valory/skills/abstract_abci\n\nUpdate the minted abstract_abci skill using\n\nautonomy mint --use-local skill --key my_key.txt --nft --owner ./packages/valory/skills/abstract_abci --update \n\nPerform a dry run\n\nautonomy mint --dry-run protocol ./packages/valory/protocols/abci --key key.txt\n\nOutput\n\n=== Dry run output ===\nMethod: RegistriesManagerContract.get_create_transaction\nContract: 0x...\nKwargs:\nowner: 0x...\ncomponent_type: UnitType.COMPONENT\nmetadata_hash: 0x...\nsender: 0x...\n§ncies: []\nTransaction:\nchainId: 31337\nnonce: 0\nvalue: 0\ngas: 16000\nmaxFeePerGas: 4000000000\nmaxPriorityFeePerGas: 3000000000\nto: 0x...\ndata: 0x...\n\nautonomy mint agent\n\nMint an agent blueprint in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy mint agent [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n--nft NFT_HASH_OR_IMAGE_PATH\nIPFS hash or path to the image for the NFT representing the package. Note that if you are using a local chain this option is not required.\n--owner OWNER_ADDRESS\nOwner address of the package.\n--update TOKEN_ID\nUpdate the already minted agent blueprint with on-chain TOKEN_ID with the current package hash.\n\nExamples\n\nMint the hello_world agent blueprint in the Ethereum main chain:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum agent --key my_key.txt --nft --owner ./packages/valory/agents/hello_world\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum agent --hwi --nft --owner ./packages/valory/agents/hello_world\n\nautonomy mint service\n\nMint an AI agent in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy mint service [OPTIONS] PACKAGE_PATH\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n--nft IPFS_HASH_OR_IMAGE_PATH\nIPFS hash or path to the NFT image for the NFT image representing the package. Note that if you are using a local chain this option is not required.\n--owner OWNER_ADDRESS\nOwner address of the package.\n-a, --agent-id AGENT_ID\nAgent blueprint ID.\n-n, --number-of-slots NUM_SLOTS\nNumber of instances for the agent blueprint.\n-c, --cost-of-bond COST_BOND_WEI\nCost of bond for the agent instance (Wei).\n--threshold\nThreshold for the minimum number of agent instances required to run the AI agent. The threshold has to be at least ⌈(2N+1)/3⌉, where N is total number of the agent instances in the AI agent.\n--token ERC20_TOKEN_ADDRESS\nERC20 token for securing the AI agent.\n--update TOKEN_ID\nUpdate the already minted AI agent with on-chain TOKEN_ID with the current package hash.\n\nExamples\n\nMint the hello_world AI agent with 4 instances of agent blueprint ID 3, cost of bond 10000000000000000 Wei per agent instance and a threshold of 3 instances, in the Ethereum main chain:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum service --key my_key.txt --nft --owner --agent-id 3 --number-of-slots 4 --cost-of-bond 10000000000000000 --threshold 3 ./packages/valory/services/hello_world\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum service --hwi --nft --owner --agent-id 3 --number-of-slots 4 --cost-of-bond 10000000000000000 --threshold 3 ./packages/valory/services/hello_world\n\nNote\n\nYou can specify more than one type of agent blueprints in an AI agent by appropriately defining the triplets --agent-id, --number-of-slots and --cost-of-bond for each agent blueprint ID.\n\nYou can also use a custom ERC20 token as token to secure the AI agent. Use the --token flag to provide the address of the token of your choice:\n\nautonomy mint --use-ethereum service --key my_key.txt --nft --owner --agent-id 3 --number-of-slots 4 --cost-of-bond 10000000000000000 --threshold 3 ./packages/valory/services/hello_world --token \n\nImportant\n\nIf you have minted an AI agent using a custom ERC20 token, then you have to use the same token to activate the AI agent and to register the agent instances.","tokens":2206,"crawled_at":1791193672321} +{"id":10272,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/lioba-heimbach","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Lioba Heimbach - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nLioba Heimbach\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall 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Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Lioba Heimbach\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n07.15.25 / Pranav Garimidi, Joseph Bonneau and Lioba Heimbach\nOn the limits of encrypted mempools\nAn encrypted mempool is not a universal solution to MEV. This post outlines the difficulties and explores how encrypted mempools might be designed.\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nmev\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6834,"crawled_at":1791193677916} +{"id":10273,"url":"https://docs.near.org/smart-contracts/anatomy/anatomy","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Basic Anatomy - NEAR Docs","text":"Let’s illustrate the basic anatomy of a simple “Hello World” contract. The code on this page comes from our Hello NEAR repository on GitHub.\n​\n\nImporting the SDK\nAll contracts will import the NEAR SDK, enabling them to access the execution environment, call other contracts, transfer tokens, and much more.You can also use third-party libraries, though some might not work due to the limitations of the contract runtime.\n​\n\nContract’s Main Structure\nThe contract is described through a structure:\nThe attributes define which data the contract stores\n\nThe functions define its public (and private) interface\n\n​\n\nContract Struct Macro\nNote that the contract’s struct definition and the implementation are decorated with macrosThe #[near(contract_state)] macro tells the SDK that this structure defines the contract’s state, so it knows:\nWhat to fetch from storage when the contract is loaded\n\nWhat to store when the contract is done executing\n\nThe #[near] macro tells the SDK which functions are exposed to the outside world.\nOnly one struct can be decorated with the #[near(contract_state)] macro.\n\nInteraction with other macros\n\nWhen near is built for the wasm32 target, it generates the external NEAR contract bindings. To achieve this it is actually generating another function with the signature pub extern \"C\" fn function_name() that first deserializes the contract struct from NEAR storage and then calls the contract.function_name(parameter1, parameter2, ...).If you have annotated your function with any attribute-like macros, these are then executed twice. Specifically if the attribute like macro makes any modification to the function signature, or inserts any code that depends on the contract struct (in the form of &self, &mut self, or self) this will fail in the second invocation, because the externally exposed function does not have any concept of this struct.It is possible to detect this by checking which build target you are building for and limit the execution of the macro to operate only on the first pass.\n\n​\n\nStorage (State)\nWe call the data stored in the contract the contract’s state.In our Hello World example, the contract stores a single string (greeting), and the state starts initialized with the default value \"Hello\".\nWe will cover more about the contract’s state in the state section.\n\n​\n\nRead Only Functions\nContract’s functions can be read-only, meaning they don’t modify the state. Calling them is free for everyone, and does not require to have a NEAR account.\nWe will cover more about function types in the functions section.\n\n​\n\nState Mutating Functions\nFunctions that modify the state or call other contracts are considered state mutating functions. It is necessary to have a NEAR account to call them, as they require a transaction to be sent to the network.\nWe will cover more about function types in the functions section.\n\nhello-near\n\nuse near_sdk::{log, near};\n\n// Define the contract structure\n#[near(contract_state)]\npub struct Contract {\ngreeting: String,\n}\n\n// Define the default, which automatically initializes the contract\nimpl Default for Contract {\nfn default() -> Self {\nSelf {\ngreeting: \"Hello\".to_string(),\n}\n}\n}\n\n// Implement the contract structure\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\n// Public method - returns the greeting saved, defaulting to DEFAULT_GREETING\npub fn get_greeting(&self) -> String {\nself.greeting.clone()\n}\n\n// Public method - accepts a greeting, such as \"howdy\", and records it\npub fn set_greeting(&mut self, greeting: String) {\nlog!(\"Saving greeting: {}\", greeting);\nself.greeting = greeting;\n}\n}\n\nSee on GitHub\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":902,"crawled_at":1791193678826} +{"id":10274,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands/autonomy_deploy","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"autonomy deploy - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy deploy\n\nBuild or run AI agent deployments.\n\nThis command group consists of a number of functionalities for building AI agent deployments, run locally stored AI agent deployments, and run AI agent deployments defined in the on-chain protocol. See the appropriate subcommands for more information.\n\nOptions\n\n--env-file FILE\nFile containing environment variable mappings\n\nExamples\n\nIf you have an .env file in the working directory, autonomy deploy will load the .env file automatically. If the file is not present in the working directory you can provide the path to the file using --env-file flag\n\nautonomy deploy --env-file COMMAND [ARGS]\n\nFor loading the environment variables you can use a json file as well. While using a json file you can either use json serialized strings like\n\nenv.json{\n\"ALL_PARTICIPANTS\": \"[\\\"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\\\"]\"\n}\n\nOr the json objects\n\nenv.json{\n\"ALL_PARTICIPANTS\": [\"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\"]\n}\n\nThe framework will handle both of these cases automatically.\n\nautonomy deploy --env-file COMMAND [ARGS]\n\nautonomy deploy build\n\nBuild an AI agent deployment.\n\nThis command must be executed within a service folder. That is, a folder containing the AI agent configuration file (service.yaml). The deployment will be created in the subfolder ./abci_build_*.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy deploy build [OPTIONS] [KEYS_FILE]\n\nOptions\n\n--o PATH\nPath to output directory.\n--n INTEGER\nNumber of agent instances.\n--docker\nUse docker as a backend.\n--kubernetes\nUse kubernetes as a backend.\n--dev\nCreate development environment.\n--log-level [INFO|DEBUG|WARNING|ERROR|CRITICAL]\nLogging level for runtime.\n--packages-dir PATH\nPath to packages directory (Use with dev mode).\n--open-aea-dir PATH\nPath to open-aea repo (Use with dev mode).\n--aev\nDeprecated. Applying environment variables when loading service config is now the default; this flag will be removed in v1.0.0.\n--use-hardhat\nInclude a hardhat node in the deployment setup.\n--use-acn\nInclude an ACN node in the deployment setup.\n-ltm, --local-tm-setup\nUse local tendermint chain setup.\n--image-version TEXT\nDefine runtime image version.\n--agent-cpu-request FLOAT\nSet agent instance CPU usage request.\n--agent-memory-request INTEGER\nSet agent instance memory usage request.\n--agent-cpu-limit FLOAT\nSet agent instance CPU usage limit.\n--agent-memory-limit INTEGER\nSet agent instance memory usage limit.\n\n--number-of-services INTEGER\nNumber of AI agents (i.e., separate deployment folders) to build. Default is 1.\n\n--remote\nTo use a remote registry.\n--local\nTo use a local registry.\n-p\nAsk for password interactively.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nautonomy deploy build keys.json -ltm\n\nBuilds an AI agent deployment using the keys stored in the file keys.json and applying environment variables to the AI agent configuration file. The deployment will be generated by default for as many agents as keys are stored in keys.json. By default, the command searches for the file keys.json, if no file name is provided.\n\nYou can build multiple AI agent deployments at once using the --number-of-services parameter. Each AI agent will be created in its own abci_build_* folder:\n\nautonomy deploy build --number-of-services 2 keys.json\n\nNote: Use --n to set the number of agent instances per AI agent, and use --number-of-services to build multiple separate AI agents at once.\n\nIf you are manually defining keys.json make sure to include ledger property for a key object. This will be used when writing key files to the deployment environment. If you don't specify the property ethereum will be used as default ledger identifier, so if you're running an AI agent against a different ledger (eg. solana) you'll have to specify this property manually like this\n\n[\n{\n\"address\": \"Solanaaddress\",\n\"private_key\": \"Solanaprivatekey\",\n\"ledger\": \"solana\"\n}\n]\n\nIf the keys are generated using autonomy generate-key command the ledger property will be included automatically.\n\nPrivate key security\n\nWhen building deployments, you can use password protected privates keys (eg. generated using autonomy generate-key LEDGER --password PASSWORD) to avoid exposing them.\n\nDocker Compose\n\nIn a docker-compose deployment you can just export OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD environment variable before running the deployment like\n\nexport OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD=PASSWORD\nautonomy deploy run --build-dir PATH_TO_BUILD_DIR\n\nor\n\nexport OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD=PASSWORD\ndocker-compose -f PATH_TO_BUILD_DIR/docker-compose.yaml up\n\nKubernetes\n\nIn a kubernetes deployment, you'll have to export the OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD variable when building the deployment, not when running.\n\nexport OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD=PASSWORD\nautonomy deploy build (...)\n\nCustomize resources\n\nYou can customize the resource values for the agent instance nodes using --agent-cpu-limit, --agent-memory-limit, --agent-cpu-request and --agent-memory-request flags or using AUTONOMY_AGENT_MEMORY_LIMIT, AUTONOMY_AGENT_CPU_LIMIT, AUTONOMY_AGENT_MEMORY_REQUEST and AUTONOMY_AGENT_CPU_REQUEST environment variables.\n\nautonomy deploy build --agent-cpu-limit 1.0 --agent-memory-limit 2048 --agent-memory-request 1024\n\nwill produce agent instance nodes with following resource constrains\n\nxyz_abci_0:\nmem_reservation: 1024M\nmem_limit: 2048M\ncpus: 1.0\n\non docker-compose deployment and\n\nresources:\nlimits:\ncpu: '1.0'\nmemory: 2048Mi\nrequests:\ncpu: '0.5'\nmemory: 1024Mi\n\non kubernetes deployment.\n\nautonomy deploy run\n\nRun an AI agent deployment locally stored.\n\nThis command is a wrapper around docker-compose up to run the AI agent deployment. To execute this command you need to be located within the deployment environment subfolder (./abci_build_*), or specify it with the option --build-dir.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy deploy run [OPTIONS]\n\nOptions\n\n--build-dir PATH\nPath where the deployment is located.\n--no-recreate\nIf containers already exist, don not recreate them.\n--remove-orphans\nRemove containers for AI agents not defined in the Compose file.\n--detach\nRun AI agent in the background.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nautonomy deploy run --build-dir ./abci_build_hAsH\n\nRuns the AI agent deployment stored locally in the directory ./abci_build_hAsH.\n\nTo provide password for the private keys\n\nexport OPEN_AUTONOMY_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD=PASSWORD\nautonomy deploy run --build-dir ./abci_build_hAsH\n\nautonomy deploy from-token\n\nDeprecation Warning\n\nThis command will be deprecated in the future. Please use autonomy fetch instead.\n\nRun an AI agent deployment minted on-chain protocol.\n\nThis command allows to deploy AI agents directly without having the need to explicitly fetch them locally (also known as \"one-click deployment\"). The command requires the TOKEN_ID which can be checked in the Olas Protocol web app. See the mint an AI agent on-chain guide for more information.\n\nTo understand how to use various chain profiles refer to Chain Selection section on the autonomy mint command documentation.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy deploy from-token [OPTIONS] TOKEN_ID KEYS_FILE\n\nOptions\n\n--n INTEGER\nNumber of agent instances to include in the build.\n--skip-image\nSkip building images.\n--aev\nDeprecated. Applying environment variables when loading service config is now the default; this flag will be removed in v1.0.0.\n--docker\nUse docker as a backend.\n--agent-cpu-request FLOAT\nSet agent instance CPU usage request.\n--agent-memory-request INTEGER\nSet agent instance memory usage request.\n--agent-cpu-limit FLOAT\nSet agent instance CPU usage limit.\n--agent-memory-limit INTEGER\nSet agent instance memory usage limit.\n--kubernetes\nUse kubernetes as a backend.\n--no-deploy\nIf set to true, the deployment won't run automatically\n--use-celo\nTo use celo chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-base\nTo use base chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-optimism\nTo use optimism chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-arbitrum-one\nTo use arbitrum-one chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-gnosis\nTo use gnosis chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-polygon\nTo use polygon chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-ethereum\nTo use ethereum chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-custom-chain\nTo use custom-chain chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--use-local\nTo use local chain profile to interact with the contracts\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n\nExamples\n\nautonomy deploy from-token --use-ethereum 2 keys.json\n\nRuns the AI agent deployment registered with TOKEN_ID=2 on the Ethereum mainnet. The deployment will be run for as many agent instances as keys are defined in the keys.json file.\n\nautonomy deploy stop\n\nStop a deployment running in background, if you use --detach flag on autonomy deploy run or autonomy deploy from-token the AI agent will run in background. You can stop this AI agent using autonomy deploy stop command.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy deploy stop --build-dir BUILD_DIR\n\nOptions:\n\n--build-dir PATH\nPath to the deployment build directory.\n--help\nShow this message and exit.","tokens":2280,"crawled_at":1791193690434} +{"id":10275,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/limits-encrypted-mempools","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"On the limits of encrypted mempools - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nOn the limits of encrypted mempools\nPranav Garimidi, Joseph Bonneau, and Lioba Heimbach\n07.15.25\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nHow encrypted mempools work How encrypted mempools work\nTechnical challenges for encrypted mempools\nEconomic challenges for encrypted mempools\nOther efficiency challenges\nTags\nDeFi\nmev\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nThe value that can be extracted by including, excluding, or reordering transactions in a block is known as “maximal extractable value, or MEV. MEV is common on most blockchains, and has been a topic of widespread interest and discussion in the community.\n\nNote: This blog post assumes basic familiarity with MEV. Some readers might wish to start by reading our MEV explainer.\n\nMany researchers, observing the MEV situation, have asked an obvious question: Can cryptography solve the problem? One approach is an encrypted mempool, where users broadcast encrypted transactions that are only revealed after they are sequenced. Hence, a consensus protocol would have to commit to a transaction ordering blindly, seemingly preventing the ability to take advantage of MEV opportunities during the ordering process.\n\nUnfortunately, for both practical and theoretical reasons, we don’t see encrypted mempools providing a universal solution to MEV. We outline the difficulties and explore how encrypted mempools might be designed.\n\nHow encrypted mempools work\n\nThere have been many proposals for encrypted mempools, but the general framework for encrypted mempools is as follows:\n\nUsers broadcast their encrypted transactions.\n\nThe encrypted transactions are committed on-chain (in some proposals after being provably shuffled randomly)\n\nAfter the committing block is finalized, the transactions are decrypted.\n\nFinally, the transactions are executed.\n\nNote that step 3 (transaction decryption) poses an important challenge: Who decrypts, and what if the decryption doesn’t happen? A naive solution would be to say that users themselves decrypt their transactions (in this case one wouldn’t even need encryption, but could simply hide commitments). However, this approach is vulnerable: An attacker can perform speculative MEV.\n\nWith speculative MEV, an attacker tries to guess that a certain encrypted transaction yields some MEV. They encrypt their own transactions which hopefully will appear in an opportune place (e.g., right before or after a target transaction). If the transaction is sequenced in the hoped-for order, the attacker decrypts and their transaction extracts the MEV. If not, they decline to decrypt and their transaction is not included in the final chain.\n\nPerhaps users could face some penalty for failing to decrypt, but this is tricky to implement. The penalty would need to be the same for all encrypted transactions (since they are encrypted and therefore indistinguishable), but also large enough to discourage speculative MEV even against high-value targets. This would require tying up lots of capital, which should be anonymous (to avoid leaking information about which transactions are posted by which users). And it would end up costing honest users in the case of a bug or network failure which prevents their legitimate attempt to decrypt.\n\nHence, most proposals suggest that transactions be encrypted in such a way that decryption is guaranteed to be possible at some point in the future — even if the posting user goes offline or doesn’t cooperate. This can be achieved in several ways:\n\nTEEs: Users can encrypt their transactions to a key held by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) enclave. In some simple versions, the TEE is only used to decrypt transactions after a certain time deadline (which requires some notion of time within the TEE). More advanced approaches use the TEE to decrypt transactions and build the block, ordering them based on some criteria like arrival times or fees. An advantage of TEEs compared to other encrypted mempool approaches is their ability to operate on plaintext transactions, thereby reducing onchain spam by filtering out transactions that would revert. However, this method requires trust in the hardware.\n\nSecret-sharing and threshold encryption: With this approach, users encrypt transactions to a key that is shared by some committee, typically a subset of validators. Some threshold (e.g., two-thirds of the committee) is required for decryption.\n\nThe simplest approach uses a new shared decryption key in each round (e.g., each block or epoch on Ethereum), which the committee re-constructs and publishes after transactions are ordered in a finalized block. This approach can use simple secret sharing. The downside is that this reveals all transactions from the mempool, even those that were not included in a block. This approach also requires a new distributed key generation (DKG) in each round.\n\nA better approach for privacy is to decrypt only the transactions that were actually included. This can be realized using threshold decryption. This approach also enables amortizing the cost of the DKG protocols but using the same key for multiple blocks with the committee threshold-decrypting transactions after they are ordered in a finalized block. A challenge is that the committee has to do a lot more work. Naively, the committee’s work is linear in the number of transactions to decrypt, although recent work suggests batch threshold decryption which can improve on this significantly.\n\nWith threshold decryption, trust shifts from a piece of hardware to a committee. The claim is that, since most protocols already make an honest majority assumption about validators for the consensus protocol, we can make a similar assumption that a majority of validators are honest and won’t decrypt transactions early. A note of caution is in order, however: These are not the same trust assumption. Consensus failures like forking the chain are publicly visible (called a weak trust assumption), whereas a malicious committee privately decrypting transactions early will generate no public evidence and hence such an attack cannot be detected or slashed (a strong trust assumption). Thus while, from the outside, the security assumptions for consensus and an encryption committee might look the same, practical considerations make the assumption that a committee won’t collude more tenuous.\n\nTime-lock and delay encryption: An alternative to threshold encryption comes in the form of delay encryption. Users encrypt their transactions to a public key whose secret key is hidden within a time-locked puzzle. A time-locked puzzle is a cryptographic puzzle that encapsulates a secret, which can only be revealed after some predetermined amount of time has elapsed – more specifically, the puzzle can be decrypted by repeatedly performing some non-parallelizable computation. In this case, this puzzle can be opened by anybody to recover the key and decrypt transactions, but only after a slow (inherently sequential) computation which is designed to take long enough that transactions cannot be decrypted before they have been finalized. The strongest version of this primitive uses delay encryption to publicly generate such a puzzle. It can also be approximated by using a trusted committee to compute the puzzle via time-lock encryption, although at that point the advantages over threshold encryption are questionable.\n\nWhether by delay encryption or computation by a trusted committee, there are a number of practical challenges. First, it is more difficult to ensure precise timing of decryption, since the delay is computational in nature. Second, these schemes rely on some entity running sophisticated hardware to solve the puzzles efficiently. While anybody can fulfill this role, it is unclear how to incentivize this party. Finally, in these designs, all broadcast transactions will be decrypted, including those which were never finalized in a block. Threshold-based (or witness encryption) solutions could potentially only decrypt transactions that are successfully included.\n\nWitness encryption. Finally, the most advanced cryptographic approach uses a tool called witness encryption. Theoretically, witness encryption allows encrypting information to anybody who knows the witness to a specific NP relation. For example, one could encrypt such that anybody with the solution to a certain Sudoku puzzle, or anybody with a hash preimage of a certain value, can decrypt.\n\nSNARKs are also possible for any NP relation. One can think of witness encryption as encrypting data to anybody who can compute a SNARK proving a desired condition. For encrypted mempools, one example for such a condition would be that transactions can only be decrypted when a block has been finalized.\n\nThis is a very powerful theoretical primitive. In fact, it is a generalization for which committee-based approaches and delay-based approaches are specific cases. Unfortunately, we don’t have any practical constructions of witness-based encryption. Furthermore, even if we did, it is not clear how it is an improvement over a committee-based approach for proof-of-stake chains. Even if witness encryption is set up so that transactions can only be decrypted once they are ordered in a finalized block, a malicious committee can still privately simulate the consensus protocol such that the transaction is finalized, and then use this private chain as a witness to decrypt transactions. At that point, using threshold decryption by the same committee provides equivalent security and is much simpler.\n\nWitness encryption offers a more decisive edge in proof-of-work consensus protocols, since even a fully malicious committee can’t privately mine several new blocks on top of the current head to simulate finality.\n\nTechnical challenges for encrypted mempools\n\nSeveral important practical challenges limit encrypted mempools’ ability to prevent MEV. In general, keeping information confidential is hard. Interestingly, encryption is a tool rarely used in the web3 space. But we have decades of practical experience that showcase the challenges to deploying encryption on the web (TLS/HTTPS) and for private communication (from PGP to modern encrypted messaging platforms like Signal or Whatsapp). While encryption is a tool to preserve confidentiality, it does not guarantee it.\n\nFirst, there might be parties with direct access to the plaintext of a user’s transaction. In typical cases, users may not encrypt their own transaction but outsource this to their wallet provider. Consequently, the wallet provider has access to the plaintext transaction and could use or sell this information to extract MEV. Encryption is never stronger than the set of parties with access to the key.\n\nBeyond this, the biggest problem is metadata, that is, data surrounding the encrypted payload (transaction), which is not encrypted. Searchers can use this metadata to guess the intent of a transaction and then attempt speculative MEV. Remember, searchers don’t have to fully understand a transaction, or be right every time. It’s enough if they know, for example, that with some reasonable probability a transaction represents a buy order from a specific DEX.\n\nWe can consider several types of metadata, some of which are classic challenges with encryption and some of which are unique for encrypted mempools.\n\nTransaction size: Encryption by itself does not hide the size of the encrypted plaintext. (There is, notoriously, a specific exception made in the formal definitions of semantic security to exclude hiding the size of the plaintext being encrypted.) This is a classic attack vector on encrypted communication. (In a famous example, even with encryption an eavesdropper can determine what video is being streamed over Netflix in real-time from the size of each packet in the video stream.) In the encrypted mempool context, certain transaction types might have a specific size which leaks information.\n\nBroadcast time: Encryption also doesn’t hide timing information (another classic attack vector). In the web3 context, certain senders — for example, in structured selling — might perform transactions at regular intervals. Transaction timing might also be correlated with other information, such as activity in external exchanges or news events. A more subtle way to exploit timing information is CEX/DEX arbitrage. A sequencer can benefit from inserting a transaction created as late as possible, taking advantage of more recent information about CEX prices. The same sequencer could exclude any other transactions (even if encrypted) broadcast after a certain point in time, ensuring that its transaction alone has the advantage of the most up-to-date price information.\n\nOriginating IP address: Searchers might infer a transaction sender’s identity by monitoring the peer-to-peer network and observing the originating IP address. This problem was actually identified over ten years ago in the early days of Bitcoin. This can be useful to searchers if specific senders have specific patterns — for example, knowing the sender might enable linking an encrypted transaction to prior transactions which have already been decrypted.\n\nTransaction sender and fee/gas information: Finally, transaction fees represent a type of metadata specific to encrypted mempools. In Ethereum, transactions classically include an (onchain) sender address, which is used to pay fees, as well as a maximum gas budget and a fee per unit of gas that the sender is willing to pay. The sender address, like the originating network address, can be used to link transactions together and to real-world entities. The gas budget can be used to estimate what the transaction intends to do. For example, interacting with a specific DEX might require a specific amount of gas which is identifiable.\n\nSophisticated searchers might use any combination of the above metadata types to predict a transaction’s contents.\n\nAll of this information could potentially be hidden, but at a performance and complexity cost. For example, padding transactions up to a standard limit hides transaction size, but it wastes bandwidth and space onchain. Adding delays before sending messages hides transaction time, but harms latency. Submitting transactions over an anonymity network like Tor could hide the sender’s IP address, but this has its own challenges.\n\nThe most difficult metadata to hide is transaction fee data. Encrypting this data creates a number of challenges for the builder. The first problem is spam. If transaction fee payment data is encrypted, then anybody can broadcast malformed encrypted transactions that will be ordered but have no ability to pay fees. Hence, after decryption they will not be able to execute but no party can be penalized. This could possibly be addressed with SNARKs that prove that a transaction is well-formed and funded, but this would greatly increase overhead.\n\nThe second problem is efficient block building and fee auctions. Builders use fees to build the most profitable block and establish the current market price for onchain resources. Encrypting this data disrupts this process. This could be addressed by establishing a flat fee in each block, but this is economically inefficient and might encourage secondary markets for transaction inclusion that would undermine the point of having an encrypted mempool. Conducting a fee auction using secure multi-party computation or trusted hardware is possible, but these are both expensive steps.\n\nFinally, secure, encrypted mempools impose overhead on the system in a number of ways. Encryption adds latency, computational and bandwidth overhead to the chain. How to combine it with support for sharding or parallel execution — which are important future goals — is far from obvious. It might add additional points of failure for liveness (e.g., the decryption committee for threshold solutions or delay function solver). And it certainly adds to design and implementation complexity.\n\nMany of the problems of encrypted mempools are shared by blockchains that themselves aim to ensure transaction privacy (e.g., Zcash, Monero). If there is a silver lining, it is that solving all of the challenges of encryption for MEV abatement would as a side effect clear the way for transaction privacy.\n\nEconomic challenges for encrypted mempools\n\nFinally, encrypted mempools face economic challenges. Unlike the technical challenges, which could potentially be mitigated with enough engineering effort, these are fundamental limitations that appear difficult to solve.\n\nThe basic problem of MEV results from information asymmetry between users creating transactions, and the searchers and builders finding MEV opportunities. Users typically don’t know how much MEV can be extracted from their transactions. As a result, even with a perfect encrypted mempool, users might be induced to give up their decryption keys in exchange for a payment from builders that is less than the value extracted. We can call this incentivized decryption.\n\nIt’s not hard to imagine how this would look because a version of it, called MEV Share, exists today. MEV Share is an order flow auction that allows users to selectively submit information about their transactions to a pool where searchers compete for the chance to exploit the MEV opportunity presented by the transaction. The searcher with the winning bid extracts the MEV and refunds part of their profit (i.e., the bid or a fraction of the bid) to the user.\n\nThis model could be immediately adapted within an encrypted mempool space, requiring users to reveal their decryption keys (or possibly just some partial information) to participate. But most users won’t understand the opportunity cost of participating in such a scheme, only seeing the rewards coming back to them and being happy to give up their information. There are also examples from traditional finance (e.g., zero-fee trading services like Robinhood) that profit from selling their users’ order flow to third parties in a so-called “payment-for-order-flow” business model.\n\nOther possible scenarios include large builders forcing users to reveal their transactions (or some information about them) for censorship reasons. Censorship resilience is an important and controversial topic within web3, but if large proposers and/or builders are legally obligated to enforce a censorship list (e.g., by OFAC), they may refuse to sequence any encrypted transactions. It might be possible to solve this problem technically, if users can produce a zero-knowledge proof that their encrypted transaction complies with the censorship list, but this will also add cost and complexity. Even if the chain has strong censorship resistance, where encrypted transactions are guaranteed to be included, block builders might still prioritize putting transactions they know in plaintext at the top of the block and demoting any encrypted transactions to the bottom of the block. Thus, transactions that desire certain execution guarantees might be forced to reveal their contents to builders anyways.\n\nOther efficiency challenges\n\nEncrypted mempools add overhead to the system in a few obvious ways. Users must encrypt transactions and the system must somehow decrypt them. This adds computational cost and possibly increases transaction size. As discussed above, dealing with metadata can make these overheads worse. However, some other efficiency costs are less obvious. In finance, a market is considered to be efficient if the price reflects all available information, and inefficiencies arise from delays and information asymmetries — natural consequences of encrypted mempools.\n\nOne of the consequences of these inefficiencies is increased price uncertainty, the result of the additional delay encrypted mempools introduce. Thus, the number of trade failures due to exceeding the price slippage tolerance are likely to increase and waste chain space.\n\nSimilarly, this price uncertainty might also lead to speculative MEV transactions that attempt to profit from onchain arbitrage. Importantly, these opportunities might be more widespread with encrypted mempools because the increased uncertainty around the current state of DEXs, in light of the delayed execution, is likely to produce less efficient markets with price discrepancies across venues. These types of speculative MEV transactions would also waste block space because they will often abort if no such opportunities are found.\n\n***\n\nWhile our goal here was to outline the challenges in encrypted mempools, so that people can focus on building and solving things in other ways, they may yet be a part of the solution to MEV.\n\nOne possible solution is hybrid designs, where some transactions are blind-ordered via an encrypted mempool and some are ordered via another solution. For certain types of transactions — for example, buy/sell orders from large market participants who can carefully encrypt/pad them and are willing to pay more to avoid MEV — hybrid designs may be the right solution. These designs might also make sense for certainly highly sensitive transactions, such as bug fixes to a security contract with a vulnerability.\n\nHowever, due to their technological limitations, as well as significant engineering complexity and performance overheads, encrypted mempools are unlikely to be the silver bullet solution to MEV that they are sometimes made out to be. The community will need to develop other solutions, including MEV auctions, application-layer defenses and minimizing finality time. MEV will be a challenge for some time to come, and careful investigation is needed to find the right balance of solutions to manage its downsides.\n\n***\n\nPranav Garimidi is a Research Associate at a16z Crypto. He does research on problems in mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially focused on how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science.\n\nJoseph Bonneau is an Associate Professor in the Computer Science Department at the Courant Institute, New York University, and a technical adviser to a16z crypto. His research focuses on applied cryptography and blockchain security. He has taught cryptocurrency courses at the University of Melbourne, NYU, Stanford, and Princeton, and received a PhD in computer science from the University of Cambridge and BS/MS degrees from Stanford.\n\nLioba Heimbach is a fourth-year Ph.D. student advised by Prof. Dr. Roger Wattenhofer in the Distributed Computing (Disco) group at ETH Zurich. Her research centers around blockchain protocols with a focus on decentralized finance (DeFi). In particular, it focuses on enabling an accessible, decentralized, fair, and efficient blockchain and DeFi ecosystem. She was a research intern at a16z crypto during the summer of 2024.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":6372,"crawled_at":1791193696574} +{"id":10276,"url":"https://docs.near.org/smart-contracts/anatomy/crosscontract","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Cross-Contract Calls - NEAR Docs","text":"NEAR contracts can interact with other deployed contracts, querying information and executing functions on them through cross-contract calls.\nSince NEAR is a sharded blockchain, its cross-contract calls behave differently than in other chains. In NEAR, cross-contract calls are asynchronous and independent.\n\nAsynchronous\nThe calling function and the callback execute in different blocks (typically 1-2 blocks apart). During this time, the contract remains active and can receive other calls.\n\nIndependentEach function — the one making the call, the external function, and the callback — executes in its own context. If the external call fails, the calling function has already completed successfully; there’s no automatic rollback. You must handle failures explicitly in the callback.\n\n​\n\nSnippet: Querying Information\n\nWhile making your contract, it is likely that you will want to query information from another contract. Below, you can see a basic example in which we query the greeting message from our Hello NEAR example.\nlow_level.rs\n\nhigh_level.rs\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe high level API makes use of the interface defined in the ext_contract.rs\n\n​\n\nSnippet: Sending Information\n\nCalling another contract passing information is also a common scenario. Below you can see a function that interacts with the Hello NEAR example to change its greeting message.\nlow_level.rs\n\nhigh_level.rs\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nThe high level API makes use of the interface defined in the ext_contract.rs\n\n​\n\nPromises\n\nCross-contract calls work by creating two promises in the network:\n\nA promise to execute code in the external contract - Promise.create\n\nOptional: A promise to call another function with the result - Promise.then\n\nBoth promises will contain the following information:\n\nThe address of the contract you want to interact with\n\nThe function that you want to execute\n\nThe arguments to pass to the function\n\nThe amount of GAS to use (deducted from the attached Gas)\n\nThe NEAR deposit to attach (deducted from your contract’s balance)\n\nThe callback can be made to any contract. Meaning that the result could potentially be handled by another contract\n\n​\n\nCreating a Cross Contract Call\n\nTo create a cross-contract call with a callback, create two promises and use the .then method to link them:\nHigh Level API\n\nLow Level API\n\n#[ext_contract(external_trait)]\ntrait Contract {\nfn function_name(&self, param1: T, param2: T) -> T;\n}\n\nexternal_trait::ext(\"external_address\")\n.with_attached_deposit(DEPOSIT)\n.with_static_gas(GAS)\n.function_name(arguments)\n.then(\n// this is the callback\nSelf::ext(env::current_account_id())\n.with_attached_deposit(DEPOSIT)\n.with_static_gas(GAS)\n.callback_name(arguments)\n);\n\nlet arguments = json!({ \"foo\": \"bar\" })\n.to_string()\n.into_bytes();\n\nlet promise = Promise::new(\"external_address\").function_call(\n\"function_name\".to_owned(),\narguments,\nDEPOSIT,\nGAS\n);\n\npromise.then(\n// Create a promise to callback query_greeting_callback\nSelf::ext(env::current_account_id())\n.with_static_gas(GAS)\n.callback_name(),\n);\n\nConcatenating Promises\n\n✅ You can concatenate promises: P1.then(P2).then(P3): P1 executes, then P2 executes with the result of P1, then P3 executes with the result of P2✅ You can join promises: (P1.and(P2)).then(P3): P1 and P2 execute in parallel, after they finish P3 will execute and have access to both their results⛔ You cannot return a joint promise without a callback: return P1.and(P2) is invalid, you need to add a .then()⛔ You cannot join promises within a then: P1.then(P2.join([P3])) is invalid⛔ You cannot use a then within a then: P1.then(P2.then(P3)) is invalid\n\nIf a function returns a promise, then it will delegate the return value and status of transaction execution, but if you return a value or nothing, then the Promise result will not influence the transaction status\n\nThe Promises you are creating will not execute immediately. In fact, they will be queued in the network an:\nThe cross-contract call will execute 1 or 2 blocks after your function finishes correctly.\n\n​\n\nAttaching gas\n\nEach promise in a cross-contract call needs enough gas to execute. This includes the external call and any callback you attach with .then.\n\nAlways reserve gas for the callback. It executes in a separate receipt, so it can fail independently if it does not receive enough gas.\n\nIn the high level API, with_static_gas(gas) reserves a fixed amount of gas for a promise:\n\nconst CALL_GAS: Gas = Gas::from_tgas(10);\nconst CALLBACK_GAS: Gas = Gas::from_tgas(5);\n\nexternal_trait::ext(\"external_address\")\n.with_static_gas(CALL_GAS)\n.function_name(arguments)\n.then(\nSelf::ext(env::current_account_id())\n.with_static_gas(CALLBACK_GAS)\n.callback_name(arguments)\n);\n\nThe high level API also exposes with_unused_gas_weight(weight), which gives a promise a proportional share of the gas left after all static gas has been reserved.\n\nexternal_trait::ext(\"external_address\")\n.with_static_gas(Gas::from_tgas(10))\n.with_unused_gas_weight(2)\n.function_name(arguments)\n.then(\nSelf::ext(env::current_account_id())\n.with_static_gas(Gas::from_tgas(5))\n.with_unused_gas_weight(0)\n.callback_name(arguments)\n);\n\nThe default unused gas weight is 1. Set the weight to 0 when you want a promise to receive only its static gas reservation.\nFor example, if 100 Tgas is left when you create two promises:\nPromiseStatic gasUnused gas weight\nA\n20 Tgas\n1\n\nB\n10 Tgas\n3\n\nThe runtime reserves 30 Tgas as static gas, then distributes the remaining 70 Tgas by weight:\n\nA gets 20 + (1/4) * 70 = 37.5 Tgas\n\nB gets 10 + (3/4) * 70 = 62.5 Tgas\n\nIf you forget that the default weight is 1, a callback or parallel promise can receive more of the remaining gas than you expected. For gas-sensitive calls, combine with_static_gas with with_unused_gas_weight(0) on promises that should not draw from the unused gas pool.\n\nThe low level API (Promise::new(...).function_call(...)) takes a fixed gas value. It behaves like with_static_gas and does not use unused gas weights.\n\n​\n\nCallback Function\n\nIf your function finishes correctly, then eventually your callback function will execute. This will happen whether the external contract fails or not.\nIn the callback function you will have access to the result, which will contain the status of the external function (if it worked or not), and the values in case of success.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nCallback will always executeWe repeat, if your function finishes correctly, then your callback will always execute. This will happen no matter if the external function finished correctly or not\n\nAlways make sure to have enough Gas for your callback function to execute\n\nRemember to mark your callback function as private using macros/decorators, so it can only be called by the contract itself\n\n​\n\nWhat happens if the function I call fails?\n\nIf the external function fails (i.e. it panics), then your callback will be executed anyway. Here you need to manually rollback any changes made in your\ncontract during the original call. Particularly:\n\nRefund the predecessor if needed: If the contract attached NEAR to the call, the funds are now back in the contract’s account\n\nRevert any state changes: If the original function made any state changes (i.e. changed or stored data), you need to manually roll them back. They won’t revert automatically\n\nIf your original function finishes correctly then the callback executes even if the external function panics. Your state will not rollback automatically,\nand $NEAR will not be returned to the signer automatically. Always make sure to check in the callback if the external function failed, and manually rollback any\noperation if necessary.\n\n​\n\nCalling Multiple Functions on the Same Contract\n\nYou can call multiple functions in the same external contract, which is known as a batch call.\nAn important property of batch calls is that they act as a unit: they execute in the same receipt, and if any function fails, then they all get reverted.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nCallbacks only have access to the result of the last function in a batch call\n\n​\n\nCalling Multiple Functions on Different Contracts\n\nYou can also call multiple functions in different contracts. These functions will be executed in parallel, and do not impact each other. This means that, if one fails, the others will execute, and NOT be reverted.\nLoading...\nSee code on GitHub\n\nCallbacks have access to the result of all functions in a parallel call\n\n​\n\nSecurity Concerns\n\nWhile writing cross-contract calls there is a significant aspect to keep in mind: all the calls are independent and asynchronous. In other words:\n\nThe function in which you make the call and function for the callback are independent.\n\nThere is a delay between the call and the callback, in which people can still interact with the contract\n\nThis has important implications on how you should handle the callbacks. Particularly:\n\nMake sure you don’t leave the contract in a exploitable state between the call and the callback.\n\nManually rollback any changes to the state in the callback if the external call failed.\n\nWe have a whole security section dedicated to these specific errors, so please go and check it.\n\nNot following these basic security guidelines could expose your contract to exploits. Please check the security section, and if still in doubt, join us in Discord.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2356,"crawled_at":1791193697472} +{"id":10277,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/interaction/data/market","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Trading Data – dYdX Documentation","text":"This section guides you on how to fetch some important data points.\nWe focus here on getting data using spontaneous (single) requests. For continuous data streams of data see also the WebSockets guide.\n\nList Positions\n\nAssets are used to trade and manage (perpetual) positions opened and closed by issuing orders. See the example below on how to check your perpetual positions.\n\nPython\nfrom dydx_v4_client.indexer.rest.constants import PositionStatus\n\n# Fetch all subaccount '0' positions.\nperpetual_positions_response = await indexer\n.account\n.get_subaccount_perpetual_positions(ADDRESS, 0)\n\n# Fetch only open positions.\nperpetual_positions_response = await indexer\n.account\n.get_subaccount_perpetual_positions(address, 0, PositionStatus.OPEN)\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nMarket List\n\nA market (sometimes referred by the ticker name, e.g., ETH-USD) is associated with a perpetual and it is the place where trading happens.\nTo fetch the available markets see the code below.\n\nPython\nresponse = await indexer.markets.get_perpetual_markets()\nprint(response[\"markets\"])\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nList Orders\n\nRetrieve orders for a specific subaccount, with various filtering options to narrow down the results based on order characteristics.\n\nPython\norders_response = indexer.account.get_subaccount_orders(address, 0)\n\nSee the API reference the complete method definition.\n\nGet Fills\n\nRetrieve order fill records for a specific subaccount on the exchange. Fills are matched orders.\n\nPython\nfills_response = indexer.account.get_subaccount_fills(address, 0)\n\nSee the API reference the complete method definition.\n\nPrice History\n\nPrice history in the classic candlestick can also be fetched. Data will be organized into a open, high, low, and close (OHLC) prices for some period.\n\nPython\nfrom dydx_v4_client.indexer.candles_resolution import CandlesResolution\nresponse = await indexer.markets.get_perpetual_market_candles(\nmarket=\"BTC-USD\", resolution=CandlesResolution.ONE_MINUTE\n)\nprint(response[\"candles\"])\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nGet User Fee Tier\n\nThe Get User Fee Tier function retrieves the perpetual fee tier associated with a specific wallet address, providing information on the user's current fee structure.\n\nPython\nuser_fee_tier = await node.get_user_fee_tier(ADDRESS)\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nGet Rewards Params\n\nThe Get Rewards Params function retrieves the parameters for the rewards system, providing insight into the set configurations for earning and distributing rewards.\n\nPython\nrewards_params = await node.get_rewards_params()\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nTrading Rewards\n\nRetrieve historical block trading rewards for the specified address.\n\nPython\nresponse = await indexer.account.get_historical_block_trading_rewards(test_address, limit)\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.\n\nGet Latest Block Height\n\nRetrieve the most recent block's height. This can serve to see if the blockchain node you are connected to is in sync.\n\nPython\nheight = await node.latest_block_height()\n\nSee the API reference for the complete method definition.","tokens":809,"crawled_at":1791193714962} +{"id":10278,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/mev","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"mev - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nmev\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all mev\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n07.15.25 / Pranav Garimidi, Joseph Bonneau and Lioba Heimbach\nOn the limits of encrypted mempools\nAn encrypted mempool is not a universal solution to MEV. This post outlines the difficulties and explores how encrypted mempools might be designed.\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nmev\n\n05.28.25 / a16z crypto editorial\nMEV, explained: what it is, what to do about it [newsletter]\nWhat is MEV, or maximal extractable value? Plus a marketing 101 primer: How to attract developers, launch tokens, hire teams, and more\n\ntech trends\nmev\nnewsletters\n\n05.15.25 / Pranav Garimidi and Joseph Bonneau\nMEV explained\nA primer on the basics of maximal extractable value (MEV), how it affects blockchains, and ways to address it\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nmev\n\n09.21.23 / Pranav Garimidi\nTransaction fee mechanism design with active block producers\nPranav Garimidi (a16z crypto research) explores active block producers, which have their own private valuations for blocks.\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nmev\nvideo\n\n07.10.23 / Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi and Tim Roughgarden\nNew paper alert: “Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers”\nNew research shows that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nmev\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1075,"crawled_at":1791193715731} +{"id":10279,"url":"https://docs.near.org/smart-contracts/anatomy/actions","domain":"docs.near.org","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Transfers & Actions - NEAR Docs","text":"This page describes the different types of actions that a smart contract can perform on NEAR like transferring NEAR, calling other contracts, creating sub-accounts, and deploying contracts. It also explains how to add access keys to accounts.\nSmart contracts can perform specific Actions such as transferring NEAR, or calling other contracts.\nAn important property of Actions is that they can be batched together when acting on the same contract. Batched actions act as a unit: they execute in the same receipt, and if any fails, then they all get reverted.\n\nActions can be batched only when they act on the same contract. You can batch calling two methods on a contract,\nbut cannot call two methods on different contracts.\n\n​\n\nTransfer NEAR Ⓝ\n\nYou can send $NEAR from your contract to any other account on the network. The Gas cost for transferring $NEAR is fixed and is based on the protocol’s genesis config. Currently, it costs ~0.45 TGas.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, AccountId, Promise, NearToken};\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn transfer(&self, to: AccountId, amount: NearToken){\nPromise::new(to).transfer(amount);\n}\n}\n\nWhy is there no callback?\nThe only case where a transfer will fail is if the receiver account does not exist.\n\nRemember that your balance is used to cover for the contract’s storage. When sending money, make sure you always leave enough to cover for future storage needs.\n\n​\n\nFunction Call\n\nYour smart contract can call methods in another contract. In the snippet below we call a method\nin a deployed Hello NEAR contract, and check if everything went\nright in the callback.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, env, log, Promise, Gas, PromiseError};\nuse serde_json::json;\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst HELLO_NEAR: &str = \"hello-nearverse.testnet\";\nconst NO_DEPOSIT: u128 = 0;\nconst CALL_GAS: Gas = Gas(5_000_000_000_000);\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn call_method(&self){\nlet args = json!({ \"message\": \"howdy\".to_string() })\n.to_string().into_bytes().to_vec();\n\nPromise::new(HELLO_NEAR.parse().unwrap())\n.function_call(\"set_greeting\".to_string(), args, NO_DEPOSIT, CALL_GAS)\n.then(\nPromise::new(env::current_account_id())\n.function_call(\"callback\".to_string(), Vec::new(), NO_DEPOSIT, CALL_GAS)\n);\n}\n\npub fn callback(&self, #[callback_result] result: Result<(), PromiseError>){\nif result.is_err(){\nlog!(\"Something went wrong\")\n}else{\nlog!(\"Message changed\")\n}\n}\n}\n\nThe snippet showed above is a low level way of calling other methods. We recommend make calls to other contracts as explained in the Cross-contract Calls section.\n\n​\n\nCreate a Sub Account\n\nYour contract can create direct sub accounts of itself, for example, user.near can create sub.user.near.\nAccounts do NOT have control over their sub-accounts, since they have their own keys.\nSub-accounts are simply useful for organizing your accounts (e.g. dao.project.near, token.project.near).\n\nCreating an account costs a fixed 0.007Ⓝ, or about 0.00707Ⓝ in total once the send fees are added. That 0.007Ⓝ already includes the gas burned while creating the account, and it is taken out of the transaction’s gas refund, not out of the deposit you attach for storage.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, env, Promise, NearToken};\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst MIN_STORAGE: NearToken = NearToken::from_millinear(1); //0.001Ⓝ\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn create(&mut self, prefix: String) {\nlet account_id = prefix + \".\" + &env::current_account_id().to_string();\nPromise::new(account_id.parse().unwrap())\n.create_account()\n.transfer(MIN_STORAGE);\n}\n}\n\nNotice that in the snippet we are transferring some money to the new account for storage\n\nWhen you create an account from within a contract, it has no keys by default. If you don’t explicitly add keys to it or deploy a contract on creation then it will be locked.\n\n​\n\nCreating .testnet / .near Accounts\n\nAccounts can only create immediate sub-accounts of themselves.\nIf your contract wants to create a .mainnet or .testnet account, then it needs to call\nthe create_account method of near or testnet root contracts.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, Promise, Gas, NearToken };\nuse serde_json::json;\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst CALL_GAS: Gas = Gas::from_gas(28_000_000_000_000);\nconst MIN_STORAGE: NearToken = NearToken::from_yoctonear(1_820_000_000_000_000_000_000); //0.00182Ⓝ\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn create_account(&mut self, account_id: String, public_key: String){\nlet args = json!({\n\"new_account_id\": account_id,\n\"new_public_key\": public_key,\n}).to_string().into_bytes().to_vec();\n\n// Use \"near\" to create mainnet accounts\nPromise::new(\"testnet\".parse().unwrap())\n.function_call(\"create_account\".to_string(), args, MIN_STORAGE, CALL_GAS);\n}\n}\n\n​\n\nDeploy a Contract\n\nWhen creating an account you can also batch the action of deploying a contract to it. Note that for this, you will need to pre-load the byte-code you want to deploy in your contract.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, env, Promise, NearToken};\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst MIN_STORAGE: NearToken = NearToken::from_millinear(1100); //1.1Ⓝ\nconst HELLO_CODE: &[u8] = include_bytes!(\"./hello.wasm\");\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn create_hello(&self, prefix: String){\nlet account_id = prefix + \".\" + &env::current_account_id().to_string();\nPromise::new(account_id.parse().unwrap())\n.create_account()\n.transfer(MIN_STORAGE)\n.deploy_contract(HELLO_CODE.to_vec());\n}\n}\n\nIf an account with a contract deployed does not have any access keys, this is known as a locked contract. When the account is locked, it cannot sign transactions therefore, actions can only be performed from within the contract code.\n\n​\n\nAdd Keys\n\nWhen you use actions to create a new account, the created account does not have any access keys, meaning that it cannot sign transactions (e.g. to update its contract, delete itself, transfer money).\nThere are two options for adding keys to the account:\n\nadd_access_key: adds a key that can only call specific methods on a specified contract.\n\nadd_full_access_key: adds a key that has full access to the account.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, env, Promise, NearToken, PublicKey};\n\n#[near(serializers = [json, borsh])]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst MIN_STORAGE: NearToken = NearToken::from_millinear(1100); //1.1Ⓝ\nconst HELLO_CODE: &[u8] = include_bytes!(\"./hello.wasm\");\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn create_hello(&self, prefix: String, public_key: PublicKey){\nlet account_id = prefix + \".\" + &env::current_account_id().to_string();\nPromise::new(account_id.parse().unwrap())\n.create_account()\n.transfer(MIN_STORAGE)\n.deploy_contract(HELLO_CODE.to_vec())\n.add_full_access_key(public_key);\n}\n}\n\nNotice that what you actually add is a “public key”. Whoever holds its private counterpart, i.e. the private-key, will be able to use the newly access key.\n\nThe public_key can use any of NEAR’s signature schemes — ed25519, secp256k1, or the post-quantum ml-dsa-65. Adding an ml-dsa-65 key needs no code changes: pass an ml-dsa-65:... key exactly like the examples above.\n\nIf an account with a contract deployed does not have any access keys, this is known as a locked contract. When the account is locked, it cannot sign transactions therefore, actions can only be performed from within the contract code.\n\n​\n\nDelete Account\n\nThere are two scenarios in which you can use the delete_account action:\n\nAs the last action in a chain of batched actions.\n\nTo make your smart contract delete its own account.\n\nuse near_sdk::{near, env, Promise, NearToken, AccountId};\n\n#[near(contract_state)]\n#[derive(Default)]\npub struct Contract { }\n\nconst MIN_STORAGE: NearToken = NearToken::from_millinear(1); //0.001Ⓝ\n\n#[near]\nimpl Contract {\npub fn create_delete(&self, prefix: String, beneficiary: AccountId){\nlet account_id = prefix + \".\" + &env::current_account_id().to_string();\nPromise::new(account_id.parse().unwrap())\n.create_account()\n.transfer(MIN_STORAGE)\n.delete_account(beneficiary);\n}\n\npub fn self_delete(beneficiary: AccountId){\nPromise::new(env::current_account_id())\n.delete_account(beneficiary);\n}\n}\n\nToken LossIf the beneficiary account does not exist the funds will be dispersed among validators.\n\nToken LossDo not use delete to try fund a new account. Since the account doesn’t exist the tokens will be lost.\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2115,"crawled_at":1791193715963} +{"id":10280,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/atiselsts-eth-delegate-platform/22270?page=2","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Atiselsts.eth Delegate Platform - Page 2 - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Atiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nkfx\n\nMarch 17, 2025, 8:15am\n\n21\n\nOnchain\n\nUniswap Unleashed\n\nVote: Against. Same rationale as for the snapshot vote.\n\nTo be clear, I will continue to support the UF and the DAO regardless of the outcome, even if I disagree with the proposed resource allocation: Disagree and commit.\n\nUnichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nVote: Abstain. Upon reflection, I changed my “Against” vote in the snapshot to “Abstain” in the on-chain vote. While I believe it is important to provide liquidity incentives for the v3 to v4 migration, I do not want my vote to be interpreted as opposition to that effort.\n\nThat said, I want to reiterate that supporting Unichain incentives at this stage is premature. While Unichain has strong potential, the DAO should first establish some level of governance control over Unichain, including its fee switch. Additionally, incentives should be conditional on Labs delivering the promised technical innovations in Unichain, specifically:\n\nFlashblocks\n\nUVN with fees captured by UNI stakers\n\nCross-chain swaps utilizing Unichain’s liquidity\n\nSnapshot\n\n[Temp Check] Saga Uniswap v3 Liquidity Incentives\n\nVote: Against. The liquidity incentive program has now been running for a year, and the evidence conclusively shows that providing incentives to low-TVL chains has been ineffective. As a result, I will vote against all such incentives going forward unless a compelling, exceptional case is made for the chain.\n\nWhile the Saga architecture is interesting, it does not currently meet the threshold for an exceptional case.\n\n[Temp Check] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nVote: For. Strong support. We clearly need the treasury delegation program to continue to reach quorum on votes. Furthermore, this is a solid proposal that improves the existing program in several ways (notably with automatically expiring delegations), is clear and comprehensive. I’m also happy to see that agreement to the Uniswap DAO Principles has been added as a requirement.\n\n2 Likes\n\nkfx\n\nApril 11, 2025, 11:55am\n\n22\n\nApril Votes\n\nOnchain\n\nBoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nVote: For.\n\nFollowing the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.\n\nEstablish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nVote: For.\n\nFollowing the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.\n\nSnapshot\n\n[TEMP CHECK] BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nVote: For $375k.\n\nPreviously I stated that I’d support v3 / multichain incentives in exceptional cases. BOB hits the checklist nicely, and therefore is such a case:\n\nRelatively solid total chain TVL\n\nStrong buy-in from the chain, prioritizing Uniswap as the top DEX on the chain.\n\nSolid existing Uniswap TVL and fee revenue, relative to the chain’s TVL.\n\nLast but not least, more than matching Uniswap’s incentives with their own, part of which is already distributed.\n\nIt’s slightly disappointing that they did not go straight for v4, but since their v3 deployment has already been active for some time, forcing them to switch to v4 would create unnecessary friction.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nVote: For.\n\nThis proposal will streamline v4 deployments, while keeping the risks minimal.\n\nUAC Renewal S4\n\nVote: Renew UAC.\n\nThe UAC has been successfully operating for the past three seasons and is a key actor of the ecosystem and a focus point of the DAO.\n\nThe increase in the runway budget is reasonable and in line with the increased responsibilities.\n\nThe discretional budget ask is also reasonable, relatively small compared to the main budget, and will hopefully ensure that the UAC can operate without unnecessary friction.\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nVote: Approve Rebalance.\n\nThis action is necessary due to UNI token price changes. As UNI remains very volatile, it’s expected that we’ll need to occasionally do this.\n\n[Temp Check/Revised] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nVote: For.\n\nThis is a revised version of a proposal that I supported previously. As the revised version is even more conservative, I continue to strongly support it. The change from 18 to 12 month limit is fine due to the situation with Unistaker potentially coming live in 2025. (It’s good to learn that it has not been abandoned, at least.)\n\nFor those in doubt of the need of such a program, the fact is that the DAO has been reliant on the previous iteration to reach consensus on almost all votes. Until this situation in some other way, let’s keep the program running to keep the DAO operational.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Scaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nVote: For.\n\nThe proposal has GFX Labs requesting $250k to integrate Uniswap v4 in Oku Trade.\n\nI support this proposal primarily because I would support any proposal for an alternative frontend that has reasonable cost requirements and a competent, experienced team behind it. Having alternative frontends is important for Uniswap, as it reduces both regulatory and censorship risks. Uniswap is too important a protocol to rely on a single point of failure at the UI level. Additionally, it provides the DAO with some leverage over Labs—something sorely needed, as the DAO’s history demonstrates.\n\nSide note on the conflict of interest involving @GFXlabs that someone mentioned (quote below). As one of the authors of the DAO Principles, I’d like to clarify how I interpret their application in this case.\n\nLet me be clear that this is a conflict of interest situation, and potentially falls under the guideline that “severe conflicts of interest […] must be avoided.” Ideally, GFX Labs should change their vote to “Abstain.” However, I don’t believe this alone is a reason to veto the proposal. The principles are non-binding and voluntary—a delegate may choose to disagree with them. (Though the vision is that violating the principles will make a delegate ineligible for DAO programs such as the Treasury Delegation Program.) Furthermore, to my knowledge, GFX Labs did not vote in favor of adopting the principles—perhaps anticipating situations like this—so at the very least, their position is internally consistent.\n\n1 Like\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nkfx\n\nMay 6, 2025, 12:58pm\n\n23\n\nMay Votes\n\nOnchain\n\nUAC Renewal S4\n\nVote: For.\n\nFollowing the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nVote: For.\n\nFollowing the snapshot vote, I continue to support this proposal.\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nVote: For.\n\nAs in the snapshot, I continue to support this incentive. The updated Additional Use Grant text also makes extremely clear what the scope and limitations are.\n\nSnapshot\n\n[Temp Check] Analytics Hub for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nVote: For.\n\nWhile I did not support the initial Forse proposal, I’m willing to support this one. The reasons are:\n\nI was hoping that there could be some competition in proposals aiming to analyze the DAO’s incentive programs. Since this has not happened, and Forse remains the only candidate with a concrete proposal, at this point its fair to support them.\n\nThe Forse team has delivered their initial analytics and proven their competency and ability to execute.\n\nSome has raised concerns about duplication of work if/when Gauntlet does some of their own analysis, especially for Unichain. In my view, there is no duplication, since the incentives manager should not be the one responsible for analyzing the success of the program. Ideally that should be an unaffiliated third party, but absent that, Forse will have to do.\n\nFour Chains for Analytics Hub for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nVote: Unichain, zkSync, Polygon zkEVM.\n\nRationale:\n\nUnichain - self explanatory.\n\nPolygon zkEVM - this was probably the least successful of DAO incentive programs in terms of TVL retention, so it would be important to do a postmortem here to avoid similar failures in the future.\n\nzkSync - a fairly prototypical chain / L2 in the context of this incentive program, so can serve as a baseline for comparison. Also there’s a clear follow-up potential, to analyze the zkSync’s own Ignite incentive program, and contrast/compare that with the DAO’s incentive program.\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee S4 Elections\n\nVote: 66% Doo, 33% Takeshi.\n\nTo my knowledge, none of the candidates had a significantly different vision for the UAC compared with the existing UAC’s direction and responsibilities. In light of this, it made the most sense to look at the experience and accomplishments of the candidates in Uniswap DAO so far, so that the new UAC members can “hit the ground running”. Both Doo and Takeshi have experience in authoring and submitting proposals, being active members of working groups, etc. Doo also has previous UAC experience.\n\nkfx\n\nJune 3, 2025, 8:40am\n\n24\n\nJune Votes\n\nOnchain\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain (revised version)\n\nVote: For.\n\nSince the only change was the removal of Additional Use Grant text, I continue to support this proposal.\n\nSnapshot\n\nTrial run a Technical Advisory Board (TAB)\n\nVote: Abstain.\n\nEchoing other delegates, I have concerns about the necessity of this program, cost, and candidate preselection without consulting the DAO. However if the DAO wished I would not be against seeing a trial run as an experiment, since experimentation can lead to useful findings even when the result is not a success.\n\nUniswap Unichain - USDS and sUSDS Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan\n\nVote: For. Attracting a major protocol like Sky to Unichain is important for its growth. I like the conditional unlock approach, this is something I was (unsucessfully) suggested to UF for their Unichain incentives. However, I will not support this proposal when it reaches onchain stage, unless it adds more concrete details on how the incentives are planned to be spent.\n\n1 Like\n\nkfx\n\nJuly 14, 2025, 7:47am\n\n25\n\nJuly Votes\n\nSnapshot\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Etherlink Co-incentives Proposal\n\nVote: Do Not Approve. There’s lot to like in this proposal, this is a solid proposal backed by an well established foundation in the space, with a co-incentive ratio ($300k co-incentives vs. $150k ask) that’s very good relative to Uniswap’s historical averages. However I have previously stated that in 2025 I plan to apply a stricter threshold for chains asking for incentives. While I have supported BOB incentives, Etherlink, unless a further evidence is provided, falls a little short of that threshold.\n\nkfx\n\nAugust 20, 2025, 7:53am\n\n26\n\nAugust votes\n\nSnapshot\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4\n\nVote: For.\n\nI continue to support this program. including the new 1000 UNI requirement, which in my view is long overdue.\n\nI’m also happy to see (and want to draw attention to!) that following the Uniswap Principles now is expected from the delegates who receive compensation.\n\nWhile I obviously have a conflict of interest in this vote, I believe it’s sufficient to acknowledge the CoI, rather than to abstain from voting. This is in line with the Principles.\n\nEstablish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA\n\nVote: For.\n\nThis is a much desired development that should open many options for the Uniswap DAO, including managing the protocol treasury and collecting revenue from Unichain or the protocol.\n\nPerhaps more importantly, it will clarify and limit the individual liability of the delegates, which has been a realistic concern for all these years.\n\nLess ideally, it will firmly tie the protocol governance to the US. However that also is a sensible choice given the options, and the fact that both the Labs and Foundation are already based in the US.\n\nkfx\n\nSeptember 3, 2025, 3:58pm\n\n27\n\nSeptember votes\n\nOnchain\n\nEstablish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA\n\nVote: For. Following my support in the snapshot, I continue to vote for this initiative.\n\nUnichain Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan\n\nI support this initiative, keeping the same rationale as for the snapshot. The added details are sufficient to get my support in the on chain stage. However I will be unable to vote this time because of travel and HW wallet access.\n\nSnapshot\n\nGLI — Treasury delegation Round 2\n\nVote: For. I continue to support the treasury delegation program.\n\nConflict of interest statement: I received 153 544.00 UNI delegation in the previous round. This amount is ~37% of the total votes under my control.\n\nGLI — Incentivized Delegation Vaults\n\nVote: Abstain. I cannot support this proposal as I see it out of sync with potential strategic developments like yield from UVN and Unistaker.\n\nLaunching Uniswap v3 on Ronin with co-incentives\n\nVote: Do not deploy initiatives. I do not support continuing UNI incentives for v3 deployments in 2025, unless the circumstances are exceptional.\n\nkfx\n\nOctober 3, 2025, 2:22pm\n\n28\n\nOctober 2025 Votes\n\nSnapshot\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Elections\n\nVote (alphabetical order):\n\n25% Arana Digital\n\n25% Event Horizon\n\n25% SEEDGov\n\n25% Tane\n\nAll these delegates have demonstrated strong involvement in the DAP through proposal preparation, WG and/or UAC participation, discussions, voting and so on. I would also support KPK with the same rationale, but felt that here new delegates should be given priority as KPK is already part of the still ongoing first round of treasury delegations.\n\nGrow Uniswap on Plasma.\n\nVote: Allocate $250k. First, this vote asks for the $250k in addition to another $250k that will be taken from UAC’s discretionary budget once all blockers are sorted out - some delegates have been misinterpreting this!\n\nWhile my vote is positive, this was by no means a foregone conclusion. Why? 1) Plasma is not an Ethereum chain. 2) Continuing to incentivize v3 in late 2025 is not a great look.\n\nEventually I supported it due to the large existing TVL and growth potential of Plasma, as well as the generous XPL co-incentives.\n\n1 Like\n\nkfx\n\nNovember 8, 2025, 9:47am\n\n29\n\nNovember 2025 Votes\n\nSnapshot\n\nUniswap Community Proposal Factory\n\nVote: Against.\n\nAfter careful consideration, I will be voting against this proposal, as I disagree with the notion that introducing a new actor in the governance process with 20M UNI delegated brings no additional risks. As a minimum, it brings in a leverage multiplier, as now everyone who supports the CPM proposal effectively has the power of their votes multiplied by the additional 20M votes. The design should be reviewed by an independent third party / parties, both for smart contract risks but more importantly for economic attack risks.\n\nkfx\n\nNovember 19, 2025, 10:59am\n\n30\n\nSnapshot\n\nUNIfication\n\nVote: For.\n\nRationale: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/unification-proposal/25881/29?u=kfx\n\nkfx\n\nDecember 3, 2025, 8:39am\n\n31\n\nDecember 2025 Votes\n\nSnapshot\n\nStrategic Renewal of Gnosis, Linea, and Mantle Deployments\n\nVote: For.\n\nWe need to continue supporting alternatives to the Labs frontend. Continuing to fund deployments on these three chains is a good way to do that, since there’s no direct competition involved.\n\nOnchain\n\nUNIficaton\n\nVote: For. Following my snapshot vote, I continue to support this game-changing proposal.\n\nStrategic Renewal of Gnosis, Linea, and Mantle Deployments\n\nVote: For. I continue to support this proposal. We need to keep some balance in the DAO even after Labs steps in as the main service provider.\n\n1 Like\n\nkfx\n\nFebruary 20, 2026, 2:35pm\n\n32\n\nFebruary 2026\n\nSnapshot\n\n[Temp Check] Protocol Fee Expansion: Eight More Chains and Remaining Mainnet V3 Pools\n\nVote: For.\n\nThis is a continuation of the fee switch from the UNIfication proposal. As such, I continue to support it, with the same rationale as described above.\n\nOnchain\n\nProtocol Fee Expansion: Vote 1\n\nProtocol Fee Expansion: Vote 2\n\nVote: For (both).\n\nContinue to support the proposal. While the protocol fee is share % is higher that I’d recommend myself, it’s worth doing this experiment - let’s turn it on and observe what the reaction is. A positive outcome is where the Uniswap’s overall market share (both in TVL and volume) is retained - either through LPs staying in v3 pools, or, prefferrably, migrating to v4.\n\nkfx\n\nJuly 9, 2026, 2:04pm\n\n33\n\n[Temp Check] Activate v4 Protocol Fees\n\nVote: Abstain. There proposed high (25%) protocol fee is expected to decrease available liquidity. This comes with risks not just for Uniswap traders - which will be getting worse execution - but for the rest of DeFi too, as liquidations under stress are affected. For deeper analysis, see my X thread.\n\n← previous page\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nGFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n27\n\n1504\n\nDecember 8, 2025\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n76\n\n3514\n\nMay 5, 2026\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\nIgnas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n41\n\n1284\n\nMay 25, 2026","tokens":4213,"crawled_at":1791193721281} +{"id":10281,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/mev-explained","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"MEV explained - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nMEV explained\nPranav Garimidi and Joseph Bonneau\n05.15.25\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nExamples of MEV Examples of MEV\nHow MEV works\nOn the negative externalities of MEV\nMitigating the negative externalities\nMinimizing MEV\nTags\nDeFi\nmev\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nMEV has been a hot topic in the blockchain industry, and particularly relevant in DeFi. When blockchains still relied on proof of work, MEV stood for “miner extractable value,” but it now commonly stands for “maximal extractable value.” Fundamentally, it is the value that can be obtained by including, excluding, or reordering transactions in a block, in addition to standard block rewards.\n\nMEV naturally arises from the fact that block producers are responsible for coordinating users’ preferences and hence are in a position to profit from information asymmetries. (In computer science-speak, they are responsible for “advancing semantically interesting state” — a point in the system where an important change occurs that matters to its operation, like the creation of a new block.)\n\nBecause there are many ways to coordinate preferences, block producers can gain value through strategically performing the coordination task in a way that benefits them. This makes MEV fundamental to how blocks get built on nearly all blockchains. And while MEV manifests in various forms — some good, some bad (both of which we’ll discuss below) — it drastically affects protocols by changing the incentives of the people participating in them.\n\nIt’s only by understanding MEV that protocol designers can help manage it. And because understanding these effects and addressing the externalities of MEV has been a topic of widespread interest and debate, in this post we explain the basics of what MEV is, how it affects blockchains, and ways to address it.\n\nExamples of MEV\n\nFrontrunning\n\nPerhaps the simplest form of MEV is frontrunning. Frontrunning occurs whenever a transaction is strategically inserted right before a target transaction for some type of market advantage. For example, consider a first-come, first-serve lottery where at some randomly announced block, the first transaction to interact with a smart contract can claim some prize. In this case, the block producer for the slot when the prize is available to claim can always guarantee that they can claim the prize before any users submitting transactions.\n\nBackrunning\n\nAnother example of MEV is a form of onchain arbitrage called backrunning. Whereas frontrunning rearranges transactions so the person who finds it can extract profits (or execute other smart contract calls to their benefit) before someone’s transaction executes, backrunning places the transaction after that person’s transaction.\n\nIf Alice broadcasts an order to buy 1,000 ETH worth of ExampleTokens via an automated market maker (AMM), it shifts the price at that AMM and creates a price difference compared to other AMMs. The larger her trade as a fraction of the AMM’s liquidity, the larger this price impact. A third party who spots this (typically called a searcher) can insert a sell transaction right after Alice’s to profit from this price differential, moving the spot price of the AMM back in line with the rest of the market in the process.\n\nNote that this MEV opportunity existed because the AMM’s price drifted from the actual price of the asset. In this case, backrunning actually provides a service in keeping AMMs’ prices up to date.\n\nSandwich attacks\n\nAnother kind of MEV is a sandwich attack, in which a target transaction is sandwiched in between frontrunning and backrunning transactions to influence price and more.\n\nSuppose Alice again broadcasts an order to buy 1000 ETH worth of ExampleTokens via an AMM. With no attack, the AMM might fulfill this order at an average price of 0.1 ETH per token. A sandwich attacker can frontrun Alice’s trade by inserting a transaction just ahead of it that buys ExampleTokens from the same AMM. This will increase the spot price of the AMM when Alice’s trade gets executed, causing Alice to pay a higher price than she would have otherwise.\n\nThen the attacker can also backrun Alice’s transaction, adding a transaction just after it that sells the ExampleTokens to the AMM at an inflated price. The net result is that Alice pays a higher price for the ExampleTokens, and the attacker earns a profit.\n\nSpeculative MEV\n\nThese simple examples already show a few interesting properties of MEV: First, searchers don’t necessarily need their transactions to appear in an exact order. Backrunning, for example, can be profitable as long as the transactions appear after Alice’s transaction (and any intervening transactions don’t interact with the same decentralized exchange or DEX pool). Second, even if a searcher’s backrunning transaction doesn’t get sequenced as intended (after Alice’s transaction), the searcher’s transaction can automatically abort the attack by reverting.\n\nCombining these two ideas, even without precise control over transaction ordering, searchers can attempt speculative MEV: insert an MEV transaction that will execute if sequenced as hoped, but will revert otherwise. The only cost of failure is transaction fees for the reverted transactions. If transaction costs are low relative to the potential gains from the MEV opportunity, it might be worthwhile for the searcher to attempt many speculative MEV transactions, even if most of them fail. Speculative MEV especially makes sense when gas fees are low so searchers pay almost nothing for failed attempts.\n\nHow MEV works\n\nWhy is MEV exploitation possible?\n\nIn the simplest traditional blockchain designs users broadcast their transactions to a public peer-to-peer network. This process places the transaction into the mempool, a public holding area maintained by each validator of transactions waiting to be included in the chain.\n\nWhen it is a validator’s turn to propose a block, they scan their mempool to decide which transactions to include and in what order. Naively, a validator might sort the transactions in decreasing order of fees and simply include the maximal prefix of this list that fits within the gas limit to maximize the fees they earn.\n\nBut a validator can decide which transactions to include in specific orders to maximize the MEV they earn. Importantly, validators have full jurisdiction over what gets included. Not only are they free to pick the ordering that favors them most, they can add their own transactions — with the benefit of seeing all other transactions in the block.\n\nWhile this picture captures how MEV started out on blockchains, it omits much of the complexity of how MEV works today. A complex infrastructure has evolved with multiple specialized competing parties who facilitate MEV. For example on Ethereum, proposers rarely construct blocks themselves, instead relying on this infrastructure to decide which block to propose. The most important parties — in addition to the existing users and proposers — are searchers and builders.\n\nSearchers operate at the transaction level and look for opportunities to bundle transactions together to earn MEV. Backrunning and sandwiching are examples of the type of MEV a searcher would extract.\n\nBuilders operate at the block level and are responsible for putting together bundles into a single block from multiple searchers, along with normal transactions from users. Instead of deciding which transactions to include in a block themselves, validators today often run an auction where they propose the block constructed by the builder with the highest bid.\n\nIn practice, the ways these parties interact with each other is incredibly complex and constantly evolving. For example, users frequently opt to send their transactions not to public mempools, but to private ones, which broadcast their transactions to only a select list of searchers and builders, giving them an edge over their competition. In return, these private mempools sometimes explicitly pay users to submit to them or make promises to users that certain types of MEV won’t be extracted from them. The way the MEV ecosystem works also differs greatly from chain to chain and is constantly evolving.\n\nOn the negative externalities of MEV\n\nIf not properly addressed, the incentives MEV creates can bring negative externalities to the system, which must be understood so they can be addressed.\n\nFor example, in the traditional setup — without MEV infrastructure, where users simply submit transactions to the public mempool and validators pick a block — a searcher might be incentivized to spam many speculative MEV attacks. Or multiple searchers might actively compete for the same MEV opportunity onchain. In both of these cases, lots of blockspace gets taken up by useless transactions, driving gas costs up and decreasing the opportunity for other transactions to land.\n\nMEV can also affect the consensus layer. If the revenue from MEV in a given block outweighs standard block rewards by a large enough margin, it may be rational for the next proposer to fork the chain to claim this value.\n\nFinally, MEV can be a centralizing force in the blockchain ecosystem, which is meant to be decentralized. Those with an edge in MEV extraction can accumulate disproportionate profits, leading to increased control and influence over the network.\n\nIn response, researchers, blockchain designers, and users have proposed multiple approaches to mitigate MEV, or at least reduce its negative externalities. Many of the elements of today’s MEV infrastructure have arisen to address these very problems, although not without creating problems of their own.\n\nMitigating the negative externalities\n\nOffchain auctions\n\nOne of the earliest and most widely adopted approaches to tackle MEV’s externalities is using offchain auctions to facilitate competition for MEV.\n\nBlock builders run auctions where searchers compete to win MEV opportunities in a given builder’s block. By competing via these auctions, searchers no longer have incentives to spam the chain with speculative transactions that often revert. Today these auctions rely on trusted third parties (sometimes implemented within trusted hardware enclaves like TEEs) to keep the mempool private and run the auction.\n\nOrder flow auctions\n\nWhile these auctions address the externalities MEV has on network performance, they don’t address the negative externalities users face.\n\nOrder flow auctions (OFAs) aim to address this problem. OFAs allow users to selectively share information about their transaction with searchers. If searchers find a profitable MEV opportunity targeted at the transaction, they bid for the right to extract the MEV. The searcher with the highest bid gains exclusive rights to extract MEV from that user’s transaction; in return the user gets paid the bid. In essence, OFAs redistribute some of the MEV back to users.\n\nSingle-slot finality\n\nTweaks to the consensus layer can also mitigate the effects of MEV.\n\nFor example, single-slot finality (SSF), whereby each block is finalized within a slot (with no possibility of forking), is a partial solution to the consensus-layer risk that MEV poses. Once a block is finalized, a subsequent proposer can no longer fork the blockchain to extract the value in that block themselves.\n\nThis doesn’t completely eliminate consensus layer effects, though: Other validators might be incentivized not to finalize a block from a competing proposer if there is valuable MEV that could instead be taken by the next proposer.\n\nSingle-slot finality does prevent consensus-layer impact of MEV under an honest majority assumption. One might be tempted to assume that, since consensus protocols already require an honest majority assumption among validators, this is a safe assumption to make. Unfortunately, these two honest majority assumptions are not equivalent. Safety violations in a consensus protocol (e.g., equivocating attestations), which are possible given a corrupt threshold of nodes, typically lead to public evidence of misbehavior.\n\nMEV, however, does not produce attributable evidence. For this reason, validators might reasonably be unwilling to attack consensus (for fear of exposure) but willing to chase MEV. This latter assumption is a strong honest majority assumption (most nodes will be honest even if attacking produces no evidence) versus a weak honest majority assumption (most nodes will be honest only if attacks are detectable) — an important distinction that affects multiple MEV mitigations, which we will come back to.\n\nMinimizing MEV\n\nA second group of approaches to mitigating MEV goes further, targeting MEV itself. Broadly, these approaches can be divided into three categories:\n\napplication-specific prevention,\n\nfair ordering proposals, and\n\nblind-ordering proposals, also known as encrypted mempools.\n\nApplication-specific prevention\n\nSome types of MEV can be prevented through careful application-specific design.\n\nFor example, Dutch Auctions are trivially vulnerable to MEV, because it is profitable to front-run the first broadcast bid. But attacking Vickrey Auctions implemented via a commit-reveal scheme is more difficult, because it would require re-organizing the chain to retroactively insert a bid commitment.\n\nSimilarly, limiting the maximal tolerable price slippage, batch auctions, or switching from an AMM to limit order books are all possible design choices that remove or reduce potential MEV extraction for specific applications. Of course, all of these approaches require careful consideration by application developers, and they often impose a performance penalty (e.g., requiring extra transactions or extra data posted on-chain).\n\nFair ordering proposals\n\nNext are approaches that aim to ensure fair ordering of transactions: Transactions are ordered first come, first served.\n\nGiven that there is no central server in DeFi but instead a distributed network of nodes that receives and orders transactions, nodes can see transactions in different relative orders. Consequently, agreeing on a relative order is not a straightforward task. Ongoing work therefore focuses on consensus protocols that approximate a fair ordering. Also, once again, fair ordering requires a strong honest majority assumption on validators since there is no way to tell if validators misreport the time they received a transaction.\n\nEncrypted mempools\n\nLast are the solutions that attempt to order transactions blindly: The transaction order is agnostic to the transaction contents.\n\nOne way to achieve this is by committing to a set of transactions in a block first, then randomly shuffling them with a randomness beacon that is sampled after the transaction set is finalized. This can make MEV more difficult — but not impossible. Speculative attacks, where searchers spam potential backrunning transactions to hope to land in a favorable spot, still exist.\n\n***\n\nOur goal with this overview is to help protocol designers understand MEV and its effects so they can help address it. While MEV introduces dynamics that can disadvantage users and distort incentives, it is also a transparent and observable phenomenon inherent to public blockchain infrastructure. Because MEV is visible onchain, it allows for market-based accountability: Projects that implement mechanisms to minimize harmful MEV — whether through private mempools, encrypted transaction ordering, or incentive-aligned auction design — can be rewarded by the market (that is, users) and can be integrated into application-layer norms.\n\nThese features of MEV stand in contrast to prescriptive regulatory interventions, which may risk slowing the evolution of infrastructure or mischaracterizing emergent behaviors. Innovation often arises in response to adversarial conditions, so a policy framework that permits this evolutionary process — rather than prematurely constraining it — is more likely to produce robust, decentralized solutions.\n\n***\n\nPranav Garimidi is a Research Analyst at a16z Crypto. He does research on problems in mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially focused on how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science.\n\nJoseph Bonneau is an Associate Professor in the Computer Science Department at the Courant Institute, New York University, and a technical adviser to a16z crypto. His research focuses on applied cryptography and blockchain security. He has taught cryptocurrency courses at the University of Melbourne, NYU, Stanford, and Princeton, and received a PhD in computer science from the University of Cambridge and BS/MS degrees from Stanford.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":4835,"crawled_at":1791193734003} +{"id":10282,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/getting-started","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Getting Started | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui Documentation\nSui delivers the full stack for a new global economy. Assets, data, and permissions can be owned, programmed, and verified.\n\nStart building\nSui Agent Skills\n\nDrop pre-built skills into Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other AI coding agents to build on Sui.\n\nSui Docs MCP Server\n\nConnect the documentation MCP server to Claude Code, Cursor, or VS Code so your agent can search Sui docs without leaving the editor.\n\nTry it out\nHello, World!\n\nBuild and publish your first Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. on Sui with a step-by-step walkthrough.\n\nExample Apps\n\nSource repositories for MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. contracts, React frontends, indexers, and onchain security challenges.\n\nConsumer App Cookbook\n\nOnboard users without a wallet install, a seed phrase, or a funding step, using zkLoginzkLoginA Sui primitive that allows you to send transactions using an OAuth credential., Enoki, and Seal.\n\nLearn the fundamentals\nSui Architecture\n\nUnderstand the objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. model, consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network, and transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. pipeline.\n\nWriting Move Packages\n\nLearn Move on Sui: structs, abilities, modulesModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects., and patterns.\n\nBuilding Transactions\n\nConstruct programmable transaction blocksProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui. (PTBs) for complex operations.\n\nTools and references\nDeveloper Tools\n\nCLI, IDE extensions, debuggers, linters, and deployment tools.\n\nDeveloper Cheat Sheet\n\nQuick reference on best practices for Sui developers.\n\nSui SDKs\n\nTypeScript, Rust, Python, Go, and community SDKs.\n\nComing from another chain?\nEthereum → Sui\n\nMap EVM concepts to Sui's object model and Move language.\n\nSolana → Sui\n\nCompare Solana's account model with Sui's object-centric approach.","tokens":516,"crawled_at":1791193737309} +{"id":10283,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/24194","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"GFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"GFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nGFXlabs\n\nJuly 3, 2024, 1:52am\n\n1\n\nThis thread is intended to provide a record of GFX Labs’ voting and communication around the reasoning of each vote. Subsequent voting communications will be added to this thread over time.\n\nApril Proposals\n\nTemp Check - Onboard Uniswap to Sei\n\nSummary: Blockchain Michigan proposed that Sei receive the Uniswap Onboarding Package.\n\nRecommendation: For Incentivize $500K. GFX Labs is always in favor of additional Uniswap deployments. We believe that Sei is a good opportunity for Uniswap to secure an early key position after their launch of Sei v2.\n\nTemp Check - Update Uni v3/v2 Deployment Process (March 2024)\n\nSummary: This proposal contains a series of operational improvements for new v2 and v3 deployments. This proposal would transfer the ability to add new records to v2deployments and v3deployments ENS records to the UAC.\n\nRecommendation: Vote Update Process. The DAO has been operating on an outdated system. This proposal contains logical reforms that should streamline new deployments post-BSL.\n\nUpdate Uni v3/v2 Deployment Process (March 2024)\n\nSummary: This proposal contains a series of operational improvements for new v2 and v3 deployments. This proposal would transfer the ability to add new records to v2deployments and v3deployments ENS records to the UAC.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. The DAO has been operating on an outdated system. This proposal contains logical reforms that should streamline new deployments post-BSL.\n\nTemp Check - Uniswap Onboarding Package - Manta\n\nSummary: This proposal adds Manta Pacific to the v3 deployments record and grants Manta an Onboarding Package, which includes $250k of UNI incentives for three months on four key markets and Angle Merkl’s integration of Manta. Separate from this proposal, Manta has arranged for Oku to support Manta, and the contracts have been deployed.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. GFX Labs authored the proposal. Read the proposal for full reasoning.\n\nOnboarding Package Bundle\n\nSummary: GFX Labs authored the proposal. The proposal bundles four proposals that have previously been approved in individual temperature checks. While we typically like to avoid bundling proposals, we consulted with the Accountability Committee (AC) and other members of the DAO prior to posting the proposal to weigh the operational headache of getting four delegates to make proposals. In the future, the organization could consider upgrading our governance contract to make it easier to run multiple governance proposals. Please read the proposal for the full context.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. For the reasons stated in the proposal and related temperature checks, GFX Labs is voting in favor of this proposal.\n\nTemp Check - Uniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG) Election\n\nSummary: This election would fill two seats on the UTWG.\n\nRecommendation: 20% for Franklin DAO, 20% for Steakhouse Financial Limited, 20% for Nathan van der Heyden, 20% for 404 DAO, 20% for karpatkey.\n\nMobilizing the Uniswap Treasury\n\nSummary: StableLab proposed the UTWG receive its initial funding of 6,000 UNI. The proposal is co-authored by Arana.\n\nRecommendation Vote For. We support the DAO’s exploration of new ways to manage its treasury and are particularly interested in how it might handle protocol-owned liquidity. After deploying UNI incentives to several new EVM chains, it would be great if the DAO could begin allocating ETH-stablecoin and stable-stable LP to chains.\n\nTemp Check - DeFi Education Fund\n\nSummary: GFX Labs sponsored DEF’s proposal, which requested 1M UNI. 500K was transferred to the DEF’s Coinbase account, and the other 500K will be streamed to the DEF over 12 months. DEF’s founding grant came in July 2021. They have two years of operations currently, but for them to fight larger and longer battles, they need additional funding.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. The DEF has proven to be a great investment for the DAO and the ecosystem. While the initial grant carried added risk because it was a new program and untested, we now have evidence for their quality of work and value.\n\nTemp Check - DeFi Education Fund Options\n\nSummary: Stable introduced a poll to amend the amount of funds requested by the DEF. If the primary Temp Check were to fail the quorum, then this poll’s result would be applied to the onchain proposal.\n\nRecommendation: Vote Abstain. Since GFX Labs favored the original proposal, we decided to abstain from voting in the poll.\n\nMay Proposals\n\nTemp Check - Uniswap Delegate Reward 3 Months Cycle 1\n\nSummary: StableLab introduced the DAO’s first Delegate compensation program. The program will run for three months. Qualifying delegates will receive compensation based on some basic metrics.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. GFX Labs is in favor of being a delegate compensation program. Delegate compensation is a key issue in attracting and retaining high-quality delegates. While this program is imperfect in many ways, we will not let perfection prevent progress. Instead, we invite (and have done so proactively) other organizations and delegates to propose improved programs. Ideally, the DAO can select a new and improved program each cycle.\n\nTemp Check - Onboard Uniswap to Redstone\n\nSummary: Redstone is requesting to become an official Uniswap deployment and an Onboarding Package. Due to Redstone’s limited TVL and market position, it does not merit an Onboarding Package at this time. We would be happy to reevaluate down the line.\n\nRecommendation: Deploy without incentives. As always, we are in favor of new Uniswap deployments for any chain that follows the process and passes ownership back to the DAO.\n\nDeFi Education Fund\n\nSummary: GFX Labs sponsored DEF’s proposal, which requested 1M UNI. 500K was transferred to the DEF’s Coinbase account, and the other 500K will be streamed to the DEF over 12 months. DEF’s founding grant came in July 2021. They have two years of operations currently, but for them to fight larger and longer battles, they need additional funding.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. The DEF has proven to be a great investment for the DAO and the ecosystem. While the initial grant carried added risk because it was a new program and untested, we now have evidence for their quality of work and value.\n\nJune Proposals\n\nTemp Check - Uniswap Arbitrum LTIPP Matching\n\nSummary: The UADP secured 1M ARB from Arbitrum’s LTIPP program. In their application to Arbitrum DAO, the UADP stated that they would request a matching of funds from Uniswap. Gauntlet will manage the rewarded funds via Merkl’s platform.\n\nRecommendation: Vote (1st) $250k, (2nd) Do Not Fund, (3rd) $500k, (4th) $750k, (5th) $1m. Uniswap has a strong position in Arbitrum. A modest matching of funds with the LTIPP seems appropriate, but we discourage significant investment in Arbitrum over other opportunities.\n\nUniswap Arbitrum LTIPP Matching\n\nSummary: The UADP secured 1M ARB from Arbitrum’s LTIPP program. In their application to Arbitrum DAO, the UADP stated that they would request a matching of funds from Uniswap. Gauntlet will manage the rewarded funds via Merkl’s platform. The prior temperature check resulted in $750K, which is requested in this onchain proposal.\n\nRecommendation: Vote For. While the amount is more than we had ideally considered, it is within reason. However, we will be unlikely to vote in favor of further UNI allocated to Arbitrum unless there is clear evidence of Uniswap losing meaningful market share and a clear plan for the UNI to combat that issue.\n\n5 Likes\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 Application\n\nGLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3 Application and Results\n\nGFXlabs\n\nAugust 2, 2024, 11:04am\n\n2\n\nJuly Proposals\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Onboarding Package - Gnosis Chain\n\nSummary: Gnosis requested an onboarding package. This is the standard package available to new deployments.\n\nRecommendation: Vote $250k.\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain\n\nSummary: OKX Chain requested an onboarding package. This is the standard package available for new deployments.\n\nRecommendation: Vote $250k.\n\n1 Like\n\nTreasury Delegation Round 2 Ideas Thread\n\nGFXlabs\n\nSeptember 6, 2024, 4:15am\n\n3\n\nAugust Proposals\n\nOnboarding Package for Gnosis Chain\n\nSummary: Gnosis requested an onboarding package. This is the standard package available to new deployments.\n\nRecommendation: For. $250K (no change from the temp check).\n\n[Temp Check] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nSummary: This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program.\n\nRecommendation : Against. Linking because we had a longer comment on the thread.\n\n[TEMP CHECK]- Revised - Uniswap Onboarding Package - OKX Chain\n\nSummary: On OKX’s behalf, we proposed that X Layer receive a revised onboarding package.\n\nRecommendation : For. We continue to believe that expanding to new chains is advantageous for the DAO. By OKX putting up a liquidity guarantee, we agree it’s in the DAO’s interest to authorize the package.\n\n[REDO: Temp Check] Activate 2, 3, 4 bps fee tiers on Uniswap v3 on Base\n\nSummary: Austin proposed the DAO enable the 2, 3, 4 bp fee tiers on Base to position the DAO better to compete with Aerodrome’s 4bp fee pools.\n\nRecommendation : Abstain. Linking because we had a longer comment on the thread.\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2\n\nSummary: Renewing the delegate pay program for another three months.\n\nRecommendation : For. Linking because we had a longer comment on the thread.\n\nOnchain vote: Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2\n\nSummary: Renewing the delegate pay program for another three months.\n\nRecommendation : For. Linking because we had a longer comment on the thread.\n\nOnchain vote: Deploy Uniswap v3 on X Layer\n\nSummary: On OKX’s behalf, we proposed that X Layer receive a revised onboarding package.\n\nRecommendation : For. We continue to believe that expanding to new chains is advantageous for the DAO. By OKX putting up a liquidity guarantee, we agree it’s in the DAO’s interest to authorize the package.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nSeptember 9, 2024, 5:11pm\n\n4\n\nSeptember Proposals\n\nProposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base\n\nSummary: Add additional fee tiers to combat Aerodrome’s recent rise with their 4bp fee tier.\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. We voted to abstain in the temperature check and will vote to abstain here as well. Most of our reasons are available on the forum. To summarize, we don’t believe this initiative will be successful in gaining back our lost market share from Aerodrome because we’re competing against their token incentives. We’re not voting against the proposal because we don’t believe it can harm the protocol, but we also don’t think there is much upside in the action either, so we’re not voting for it. If the DAO wants to improve LP flexibility, then we should focus on the GTM of v4.\n\n[Temp Check] - Ethereum Foundation Attackathon Sponsorship\n\nSummary: The proposal requests funding for the EF’s Attackathon, with two sponsorship tiers: Unicorn Partners requires a +75 ETH commitment (approximately $250,000), and Panda Partners requires a 30 ETH commitment (approximately $100,000).\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. We do not feel strongly enough to support or oppose this initiative at this time. While the capital request is not significant, the ROI and what we could expect from the EF in return are unclear.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nSeptember 11, 2024, 8:25pm\n\n5\n\nUAC Renewal S3\n\nSummary: The UAC is seeking funding for its third season.\n\nRecommendation: Renew UAC. GFX Labs has had the pleasure of working closely with the UAC over the last year while we have been expanding Uniswap v3 to new chains. The committee demonstrated a strong commitment to the protocol, its roles in the committee, and its partners. We are pleased to see the UAC continue to take on more responsibility and effectively operate.\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing\n\nSummary: Due to price changes in UNI, the UAC is requesting an additional 42K UNI.\n\nRecommendation: Approve Rebalance. The UAC has demonstrated good accounting practices. The UNI allocated to them is being put to work per governance.\n\nUniswap Delegate Race Tiebreaker\n\nSummary: Tiebreaker vote for 15th delegate slot on the cycle 2 program.\n\nRecommendation: Both. In the current situation, expanding the program to another delegate who would have otherwise qualified if we had a 16th slot is fine. Given the short length (three months) of this program, adding another delegate while the DAO still needs more delegates is a net positive.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nOctober 7, 2024, 2:30am\n\n6\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 2 - Onchain\n\nSummary: This proposal will fund an additional three months of the delegate compensation program and expand the number of delegate positions to 16.\n\nRecommendation: For. While we voted in favor of a second cycle of this program, GFX will be hesitant to support this program for a third cycle unless we see reforms. We initially voted for the first cycle, admitting it was a far from perfect program, but in light of no other real options, we decided it was better than nothing. However, this sort of thinking can’t go on forever.\n\nDuring the early voting process of cycle one, we tried to bring in the folks at Gov Score and Karma to develop a more robust program. We have since suggested our own reform for cycle 3, and we’re keen for the DAO to adopt our suggestion or others.\n\nHigh-quality delegate participation is critical to the success of the DAO. We should strive to improve this program with each new cycle to drive the outcomes we all want to see in Uniswap.\n\nProposal to active 2, 3, 4 bps fee-tiers on Base - Onchain\n\nSummary: Add additional fee tiers to combat Aerodrome’s recent rise with their 4bp fee tier.\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. We voted to abstain in the temperature check and will vote to abstain here as well. Most of our reasons are available on the forum. To summarize, we don’t believe this initiative will be successful in gaining back our lost market share from Aerodrome because we’re competing against their token incentives. We’re not voting against the proposal because we don’t believe it can harm the protocol, but we also don’t think there is much upside in the action either, so we’re not voting for it. If the DAO wants to improve LP flexibility, then we should focus on the GTM of v4.\n\nUAC Renewal S3 - Onchain\n\nSummary: The UAC is seeking funding for its third season.\n\nRecommendation: Renew UAC. GFX Labs has had the pleasure of working closely with the UAC over the last year while we have been expanding Uniswap v3 to new chains. The committee demonstrated a strong commitment to the protocol, its roles in the committee, and its partners. We are pleased to see the UAC continue to take on more responsibility and effectively operate.\n\nForse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nSummary: This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program.\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. We’ve updated our position from Against to Abstain after StableLab reduced their requested fee from $70K to $60k. We don’t believe the analysis would yield enough value to support the proposal, but we also felt that if other delegates felt it would we would not oppose it.\n\nFor more context, the goal of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program is for Uniswap to establish a position in new chains such that if the chain ends up growing significantly, Uniswap can grow with the chain rather than trying to join later and face an uphill battle. The incentives are meant to help Uniswap establish itself at the chain during the initial launch and then end with no plan to bring it back. The hope is that two or three chains that get these incentives grow to become massive chains, and then we’ll have a great market position. Most of them aren’t going to be worth putting additional incentives on. In some instances, the UAC didn’t distribute all the funds allocated by the DAO because it would have been far too wasteful to do so in their mind. Generally, we learn the most about a new blockchain’s potential success in those few months while working with them on the new deployment, marketing, and other post-launch efforts. GFX would be happy to play an active role in the event a chain requests additional funding. However, we don’t foresee that occurring at this time.\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee S3 Elections\n\nSummary: 10 individuals are running for election on the UAC. The top two will join the committee.\n\nRecommendation: The candidates for this election were by far the strongest we have ever seen. We believe all the candidates would do a fine job if elected, but we focused our attention on candidates who have been participating in the DAO and have a vested interest in seeing it succeed. Going into the last 24 hrs, we thought supporting one of the lesser-known but rising individuals in the Uniswap ecosystem would be beneficial. This made it a difficult decision, but ultimately, we selected Jay Yu from Standford. Jay was kind enough to answer a few last-minute questions that helped us decide.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Onboarding Package for Lisk\n\nSummary: The proposal requests that Uniswap put up $375K in UNI and cover Merkl costs, and Lisk will put up $250K in LSK and $1M in liquidity. Separately, Lisk has arranged for Oku to support the deployment, and it is currently live on Oku.\n\nRecommendation: For. Lisk’s proposal sets a new precedent that we think is very healthy and deepens the relationship between the two organizations. We will encourage more chains to include incentives and liquidity in their package requests.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nNovember 5, 2024, 12:51am\n\n7\n\nTemp Check - Uniswap Growth Trial\n\nSummary: AlphaGrowth has identified that the DAO’s BD and marketing functions are quite limited in their present form. They have proposed running a six-month trial with a monthly budget of $70K.\n\nRecommendation: For. We concur with AlpahGrowth’s assessment of the DAO and its needs. The DAO’s surface area is large and unattended. It would be beneficial to have a DAO-backed team focused on growing the protocol’s core business. Six months should be a sufficient period for the DAO to evaluate their performance and value to the DAO before considering a longer term.\n\nOnchain - [Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nSummary: The StableLab team proposed an updated version of their Forse analytics proposal, reducing the requested amount from $70K to $60K while increasing the chain count from three to four.\n\nRecommendation: For. We debated this proposal. We initially opposed it because we didn’t believe it would produce value relative to its cost. However, the decrease in cost and increase in the chain represents an overall 36% reduction in price. While we don’t expect immense value, we did feel it was in the range of supporting.\n\nOnchain - Uniswap Growth Trial\n\nSummary: AlphaGrowth has identified that the DAO’s BD and marketing functions are quite limited in their present form. They have proposed running a six-month trial with a monthly budget of $70K.\n\nRecommendation: For. We concur with AlpahGrowth’s assessment of the DAO and its needs. The DAO’s surface area is large and unattended. It would be beneficial to have a DAO-backed team focused on growing the protocol’s core business. Six months should be a sufficient period for the DAO to evaluate their performance and value to the DAO before considering a longer term.\n\nTemp Check - Tally Uniswap Proposal\n\nSummary: Tally requested 250K/year for two years for their supporting Uniswap on their platform.\n\nRecommendation: For. Tally has been a critical partner for the Uniswap DAO. In our opinion, this proposal is long overdue. They provide a high-quality service and have done so for years with no compensation. If the DAO were to stand up our service, we would likely spend the same amount and probably produce a lower quality experience.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nDecember 4, 2024, 3:40am\n\n8\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Tally Uniswap Proposal\n\nSummary: Tally is requesting Uniswap pay them $250K/year for two years for ongoing support, maintenance, and feature requests.\n\nRecommendation: For. GFX Labs has been a user of Tally from the beginning. We have utilized Tally heavily in our capacity as a delegate at Uniswap. We can uniquely attest to its value since we have created the most proposals of any delegate and have been participating in the DAO since the spring of 2021.\n\nTally has the difficult task of indexing every UNI transfer, its effect on voting power, how every wallet voted, supporting delegates in creating proposals, simulating proposals, and displaying proposals to voters. From our experience with Oku, we know that indexing that data, organizing it to be easily queryable in an API, offering a high-quality and reliable user interface, and operating it as a business is not easy.\n\nThat said, we should reassess the contract six months before its expiry before we need to renew it.\n\nSupporting Tally’s Development and Enhancements for Uniswap DAO Governance\n\nSummary: Tally is requesting Uniswap pay them $250K/year for two years for ongoing support, maintenance, and feature requests.\n\nRecommendation: For. Same rationale as our temp check rationale.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nJanuary 8, 2025, 5:30am\n\n9\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Uniswap DAO Principles\n\nSummary: A set of principles were proposed for the Uniswap DAO to review and agree to.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs informally abstained from voting. We are generally opposed to social governance. Without the governance mechanism being onchain, it holds little hard value. Of course, there can be some social and coordinating value, but we didn’t see a reason to sign on to this proposal.\n\n[Temp Check] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nSummary: A proposal to provide liability protection to a white hat hacker group.\n\nRecommendation: We chose to vote Abstain out of an abundance of caution. The agreement itself contains language that attempts to bind users, who are not party to this agreement. Additionally, it appears to require those voting in favor of it to waive their own legal right to legal recourse.\n\nMore broadly, this agreement presents a case where governance is proactively agreeing, in writing, to be classified as a legal person, which we do not necessarily agree with, and do not wish to endorse, since that could have unintended consequences.\n\nWe believe this agreement is done with the best of intentions, and to fill a gap in the existing bug bounty, but will withhold an affirmative endorsement of this agreement.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo\n\nSummary: Celo is requesting $250K in UNI + $105K for Oku and will be committing $500K in Celo incentives in addition to having already allocated $730K in CELO.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in Favor of Celo’s request. Celo has done a great job scaling its Uniswap deployment and has a unique niche in foreign stablecoin. Additionally, their user base is interested in having a more professional interface to enable and enhance further FX trading and liquidity management.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Metal L2: Bridging TradFi and DeFi Through Uniswap V3\n\nSummary: Metal requests $250K from the DAO and will match it with 250K MTL tokens. Regardless, Metal will be deploying an additional 250k MTL to the new deployment and they have already contracted GFX Labs to deploy Oku.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in favor of this proposal. Metal is one of the oldest projects in the space and has done a great job building a popular product and growing user base. Uniswap has the unique opportunity to be the first major DEX on their Superchain L2 before Aerodrome stakes their claim.\n\nDiscretionary Budget from UAC for Co-Incentive Campaigns\n\nSummary: AlphaGrowth is requesting access to additional funds so they can structure incentive-matching deals faster than the DAO will approve them.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in Favor of this proposal. However, we encourage delegates to monitor the allocation of funds and performance to ensure good practices. Overall, the DAO\n\nwill benefit from more active management, and in order to do that, we need to delegate responsibility.\n\nIncentive Package for Sonic (Formerly Fantom)\n\nSummary: Sonic is requesting $250k for the DAO, which they will match with $500k, and they have already contracted Oku to deploy on Sonic.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in favor of the proposal. Sonic’s offer to double the incentives match is generous.\n\nOnchain Scale Uniswap Liquidity on Celo\n\nSummary: Celo is requesting $250K in UNI + $105K for Oku and will be committing $500K in Celo incentives in addition to having already allocated $730K in CELO.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in Favor of Celo’s request. Celo has done a great job scaling its Uniswap deployment and has a unique niche in foreign stablecoin. Additionally, their user base is interested in having a more professional interface to enable and enhance further FX trading and liquidity management.\n\nOnchain Incentive Package for Sonic\n\nSummary: Sonic is requesting $250k for the DAO, which they will match with $500k, and they have already contracted Oku to deploy on Sonic.\n\nRecommendation: GFX Labs is in favor of the proposal. Sonic’s offer to double the incentives match is generous.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nFebruary 8, 2025, 4:37pm\n\n10\n\nUniswap DAO Principles\n\nSummary: A set of principles written by Atis and Erik for the Uniswap DAO.\n\nRecommendation: We appreciate Atis’ and Erik’s efforts in crafting this documents. We generally support its contents and hope it can guide delegates.\n\nHowever, we don’t feel it necessitates being written to the chain by the DAO since there is no binding aspect of the proposal or an onchain mechanism is connects with. For that reason we have casted our vote to abstain.\n\nGovernance Proposal - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nSummary: A proposal to provide liability protection to a white hat hacker group.\n\nRecommendation: Recommendation: We chose to vote Abstain out of an abundance of caution. The agreement itself contains language that attempts to bind users who are not party to this agreement. Additionally, it appears to require those voting in favor of it to waive their own legal right to legal recourse.\n\nMore broadly, this agreement presents a case where governance is proactively agreeing, in writing, to be classified as a legal person, which we do not necessarily agree with, and do not wish to endorse, since that could have unintended consequences.\n\nWe believe this agreement is done with the best of intentions, and to fill a gap in the existing bug bounty, but will withhold an affirmative endorsement of this agreement.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nFebruary 24, 2025, 9:03pm\n\n11\n\n# [Temp Check] Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3\n\nSummary: Renew the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative\n\nRecommendation: Overall, the program has been successful at bringing a few more delegates and getting delegates to participate more regularly. Unfortunately, it’s not clear that the quality has improved over the duration of this program. In some aspects, like feedback, the program has led to general improvements, but nothing is clearly substantial. However, the number of proposals and the quality of proposal has remained stagnant. We voted to abstain on the proposal because we are generally for it, but we wished to see reform in cycle 3 to drive further productivity. The current proposal does not go far enough to drive delegates to be more productive.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMarch 14, 2025, 5:15pm\n\n12\n\nUniswap Unleashed\n\nSummary: The Uniswap Foundation requests 20.32M UNI (~$120M) for their 2025/2026 budget.\n\nRecommendation: Against. Link to our original comment.\n\nAs it currently stands, the Uniswap Foundation is an entirely independent organization. The DAO has no ability to direct, oversee, or manage the UF. Given the UF’s large request and track record, it is sensible for the Uniswap DAO to appoint a legal board to guide and support the foundation. Please review our comments from the forum thread for more information.\n\nFurther, it has come to our attention that the leading Uniswap v4 projects use a “No-Op” hook (see Hook Rank for where “No-Op” hooks are being used), enabling them to build more custom and unique functionality, bypassing the core Uniswap v4’s swap logic. While we appreciate how that enables novel applications to be developed, it cuts the DAO’s ability to turn on a fee for those pools.\n\nThe DAO, and the UF, with the DAO’s funding, should only be financially supporting hook/pool development where it can also accrue value.\n\n3 Likes\n\n[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed: Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nGFXlabs\n\nApril 3, 2025, 12:25am\n\n13\n\nUnichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nSummary: Allocate 7.5M UNI for Uniswap v4 and Unichain rewards.\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. Relevant comment: link. The UF plans to allocate UNI to pools that the DAO cannot monetize per Devin’s comment. Since Devin did say they would seek methods to either “…split fees or otherwise share economics…” we voted to abstain rather than explicitly against.\n\n[Temp Check] Saga Uniswap v3 Liquidity Incentives\n\nSummary: Saga requested $250K in UNI for six months to support five pools on Saga. Saga will allocate $4.2M. Saga paid for Oku’s costs.\n\nRecommendation: For. This is the most a chain has offered to put in rewards, and we felt it was a very rational proposal relative to their minimal ask.\n\n[Temp Check] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nSummary: Revise the existing protocol delegation program to have expiring delegations and increase the total amount delegated by the protocol to 18M.\n\nRecommendation: Abstain. We don’t think the program has been a glaring success. We want more folks making creative/ambitious proposals to move the DAO forward. We fear utilizing UNI from the treasury increases the bureaucracy and limits productivity. That said, we don’t hold a strong enough opinion to cast an against vote.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nApril 21, 2025, 7:02pm\n\n14\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nSummary: Grant the UF access to deploy Uniswap v4 as they see fit.\n\nRecommendation: For. As Uniswap transitions from v3 to v4, upgrading how chain deployments are handled makes sense. From our point of view, this proposal is an easy operational improvement.\n\n[TEMP CHECK] BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nSummary: Bob Chain requests approximately $380K from the DAO.\n\nRecommendation: For. GFX Labs generally supports proposals by chains that are willing to match the DAO’s contributions. Not only has Bob pledged funds in this proposal, but they have also allocated considerable Spice points toward the Uni v3 deployment. We should encourage other chains to do the same, and so we are voting for this proposal.\n\nOnchain: BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nSummary: Bob Chain requests approximately $380K from the DAO.\n\nRecommendation: For. GFX Labs generally supports proposals by chains that are willing to match the DAO’s contributions. Not only has Bob pledged funds in this proposal, but they have also allocated considerable Spice points toward the Uni v3 deployment. We should encourage other chains to do the same, and so we are voting for this proposal.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nApril 24, 2025, 6:30pm\n\n15\n\nUAC Renewal S4\n\nSummary: The UAC is requesting a total of ~$370K in UNI to continue operations for the rest of the year.\n\nRecommendation: For. The UAC continues to play an important role in the Uniswap DAO. We are more than happy to approve the request.\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nSummary: The UAC is requesting a $280K top-up.\n\nRecommendation: For. Abdullah’s forum post clearly summarized the current account and the need for the top-up.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nApril 29, 2025, 12:19am\n\n16\n\n[Temp Check/Revised] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nSummary: This is a revised proposal to renew the Treasury Delegation Program.\n\nRecommendation: For. Last time this was up for vote, we chose to vote Abstain.\n\nHowever, with more information regarding the timeline for the Unistaker and activation of the Fee Switch, we feel it’s pertinent to have this program continue until otherwise votes can be mobilized. Once the fee switch and Unistaker are activated, we could support ending the delegation program.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMay 1, 2025, 2:04pm\n\n17\n\nEstablish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nSummary : Grant the UF access to deploy Uniswap v4 as they see fit.\n\nRecommendation : For. As Uniswap transitions from v3 to v4, upgrading how chain deployments are handled makes sense. From our point of view, this proposal is an easy operational improvement.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMay 9, 2025, 8:02pm\n\n18\n\nOnchain: Approved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nSummary: The UAC is requesting a $280K top-up.\n\nRecommendation: For. Abdullah’s forum post clearly summarized the current account and the need for the top-up.\n\nOnchain: UAC Renewal S4\n\nSummary: The UAC is requesting a total of ~$370K in UNI to continue operations for the rest of the year.\n\nRecommendation: For. The UAC continues to play an important role in the Uniswap DAO. We are more than happy to approve the request.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMay 27, 2025, 4:51pm\n\n19\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee S4 Elections\n\nSummary: The DAO needs to elect two new members to the UAC.\n\nRecommendation: We allocated 50% to Doo and 50% to Jordan. There are several qualified candidates, which speaks to the quality of the Uniswap DAO. We voted for Doo because of his longterm thoughtful participation in the DAO. We voted for Jordan after having a robust conversation about improving delegation and UNI token holder engagement, which we believe is a critical initiative that the DAO should pursue.\n\nGFXlabs\n\nJune 9, 2025, 5:51pm\n\n20\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nSummary: Provide a grant to GFX Labs to support Oku’s growth to Unichain and Uniswap V4.\n\nRecommendation: For. See the proposal for the full rationale.\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nStableLab Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n103\n\n8892\n\nDecember 30, 2025\n\nFranklinDAO (Prev. Penn Blockchain) Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n42\n\n8463\n\nSeptember 7, 2025\n\n404 DAO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n3283\n\nJanuary 13, 2026","tokens":8667,"crawled_at":1791193739623} +{"id":10284,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/deploy-uniswap-v3-on-avalanche/20587","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Deploy Uniswap v3 on Avalanche - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"Deploy Uniswap v3 on Avalanche\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nFebruary 25, 2023, 12:35am\n\n1\n\nWe Blockchain at Michigan are submitting this proposal for initiating Uniswap v3 deployment on the Avalanche blockchain. With the BSL expiring on April 1st, the Uniswap Foundation has stated the importance of Uniswap v3 expansion to popular EVM chains. Establishing Uniswap on alt L1s–and not just on Ethereum L2s–is vital for establishing a robust, multichain future. After consulting with the Ava Labs team, we believe that this is a crucial and opportune time for Uniswap to expand to Avalanche’s growing ecosystem.\n\nProposal Motivation\n\nThe primary urgency behind this proposal is the upcoming BSL expiration on April 1st. As soon as the license expires, all entities will have the legal right to duplicate Uniswap v3 and utilize the forked code for commercial purposes. Invariably, large chains like Avalanche will see a rapid influx of v3 copycats, which will dilute the markets on those respective chains. It is therefore imperative for Uniswap v3 to get ahead of the competitors by launching on large chains before duplicates arise. Trader Joe v2, the current leading DEX on Avalanche, did $92.45M of volume in the past 24 hours (Feb 23)–indicative of the demand for a concentrated liquidity AMM. Due to the continual growth of the Avalanche ecosystem, along with the liquidity present on the platform, we believe that this proposal be enacted as soon as possible to ensure that Uniswap establishes a foothold in the Avalanche DEX market.\n\nWe realize that beyond the chain of deployment, the community must also consider the required cross-chain messaging protocol. Although the DAO previously coalesced to utilize Wormhole for the BNB Chain deployment, we believe that such a decision should not set a precedent for bridge selection. A vendor lock-in model would prevent the further testing of equally renowned messaging protocols like LayerZero. A handful of delegates and tokenholders have also pioneered a more novel approach to governance messaging, where cross-chain governance relies not on a single bridge but simultaneously on a handful of bridges. Although we see the merits of a multi-bridge system, it will take time for this approach to garner attention and be fully vetted. The DAO can decide to opt into a multi bridge system in the future–but for an agile deployment that can be implemented in the present, we believe that LayerZero is the best solution.\n\nCurrent State of Avalanche\n\nAvalanche is a blockchain platform that utilizes three separate blockchains, the Platform Chain (P-Chain), Contract Chain (C-Chain), and Exchange Chain (X-Chain), to improve scalability and interoperability. These three chains compose a consortium of validators called the Primary Network, which is responsible for Avalanche’s security.\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.03.44 AM1920×963 68.6 KB\n\nSource: Avalanche Docs\n\nAvalanche operates with the Avalanche consensus algorithm, which is designed to be more efficient than alternative consensus mechanisms and enables EVM-compatibility. The consensus mechanism checks validators’ transaction confirmations randomly by allowing all nodes to work in parallel, increasing the probability that a transaction is valid. The C-Chain leverages the Snowman consensus protocol, which mimics Avalanche consensus but is optimized for smart contract integration. Therefore, most Avalanche dAPP activity currently transpires on the C-Chain.\n\nIn comparison to other smart contract platforms, Avalanche touts 2-second time-to-finality, faster than any of its peers (ex. Ethereum finality is 10 minutes). Uniswap on Avalanche would thereby enhance the user experience for both application users and liquidity providers.\n\nAvalanche also allows for an unbounded number of validators without sacrificing block time. This allows for an increasing degree of decentralization over time. In Q4 2022, the platform’s Nakamoto coefficient increased from 30 to 32–surpassing most other L1s–and is poised to continue in an upward direction. Currently, there are 1,228 validators and over 233M AVAX tokens staked. The expanding validator set and staked AVAX tokens exemplify a robust L1.\n\nThe Avalanche architecture permits a high degree of scalability through its ecosystem of subnets. Similar to Ethereum’s L2s, subnets allow for outsourcing blockspace from the Primary Network to alternative blockchains. As demand increases for the C-Chain, many projects will opt out of the Primary Network by creating their own subnet. Application-specific blockchains can be launched under customized subnets, granting builders control over their development stack (subnets specify their own execution logic, fee regime, state, networking, and security). Large protocols that initially relied on the C-Chain, like DFK and StepNetwork, are now migrating to their individualized subnets. The increase in subnets furthers the security of Avalanche since each subnet’s validators must simultaneously secure the Primary Network by staking 2,000 AVAX tokens. Avalanche Foundation is prompting the creation of a robust subnet ecosystem through its $290M incentive program. On December 23, 2022, interoperability between subnets was enhanced via Avalanche Warp Messaging (AWM), allowing for cross-subnet data and asset transfer.\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.07.37 AM1254×710 188 KB\n\nSource: Avax Docs\n\nIncreased application activity on the C-Chain and subnets presents Avalanche as an expanding ecosystem. At the time of writing, according to DeFi Llama, Avalanche holds over $950M of TVL across 281 different protocols.\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.09.05 AM1692×768 127 KB\n\nSource: DeFi Llama\n\nSince launching in Q3 2020, Avalanche’s txn count has cumulatively increased to nearly 700M. Messari reported that between Nov 2021 - Nov 2022 alone, the network experienced YoY txn growth of 1,507%. Although daily active users remained relatively steady since Summer 2022, average daily transactions increased from ~1M to ~3M, indicating the emergence of power users. A reliable user base is imperative for a properly functioning Uniswap protocol. The presence of long-term liquidity provision would aid in bootstrapping individual subnets as well as making the C-Chain more robust.\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.10.02 AM1688×940 94.7 KB\n\nSource: Messari State of Avalanche Q4 2022\n\nThe highest activity DEXs on Avalanche are Trader Joe (concentrated liquidity AMM), Platypus (stable swap AMM), and KyberSwap (concentrated liquidity DEX aggregator).\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.10.54 AM1690×326 121 KB\n\nSource: DeFi Llama\n\nPost deployment, the most fierce competitor for Uni v3 will be Trader Joe. Since Trader Joe recently released a Uni v3-like, capital efficient AMM, Uniswap has an incentive to capture as much of Avalanche’s DEX market prior to Trader Joe v2 locking in a concrete user base. Plus, after the BSL expires in April, numerous Uni v3 forks will invariably launch on Avalanche. Therefore, to minimize Uniswap’s dilution in the Avalanche ecosystem, the DAO is incentivized to launch v3 as soon as possible.\n\nDue to Uniswap’s strong brand, it has the ability to capture market share from existing DEXs and attract liquidity from new users. A notable historical anecdote is Polygon. Once Uni v3 launched on Polygon, it quickly acquired market share from both Quickswap and Sushiswap. Although this experiment is yet to be tested on an alt L1, it is likely that a similar pattern will surface on Avalanche–although Trader Joe may present a higher degree of friction. Nonetheless, it is not necessary that the DEX competition will result in a zero-sum game and can favor both Trader Joe and Uniswap simultaneously.\n\nScreen Shot 2023-02-25 at 1.12.18 AM1132×676 144 KB\n\nSource: Dune Analytics @wanxin\n\nApart from DeFi developments, Avalanche has also made strides in other sectors like gaming, NFTs, and user adoption.\n\nNFT Progression:\n\nOpenSea launched natively on Avalanche in October 2022.\n\nThe NFT Minter application (run on Avalanche) became integrated with Shopify, allowing merchants to create, sell, and mint NFTs.\n\nJoePegs, an NFT marketplace built by Trader Joe, launched in Q2 2022. It has become the most active NFT marketplace on Avalanche and is responsible for onboarding over 50 NFT projects.\n\nGaming Progression:\n\nNumerous subnets dedicated exclusively to gaming are receiving increasing reception.\n\nThe DFK subnet generated 1-2 million txns per day in Q4 and increased unique active wallets from 1k to 5k.\n\nSwimmer also integrated Snake City and Crabada into its gaming subnet.\n\nCrypto Royale migrated from Harmony, and Monsterra launched from BNB Chain to the C-Chain.\n\nJapanese media company GREE partnered with Avalanche in October 2022 to build games on its subnets and aid in validating the Primary Network. They have already launched 12+ validators.\n\nUser Adoption:\n\nAva Labs enacted a handful of developments for Avalanche’s multichain wallet, Core. Fiat onramps have been added to Core using Coinbase Pay. Core Web allows for a seamless wallet browser extension for navigating the Avalanche ecosystem–and Core Mobile serves an identical purpose but on Android mobile devices, with iOS coming soon.\n\nFurther facilitation of each of these categories is enabled by a DEX like Uniswap. And in turn, Uniswap liquidity providers–and maybe token holders–will attain economic value from the protocol’s increased usage.\n\nSafety and Cross-Chain Governance\n\nLayerZero Overview\n\nWe propose using LayerZero, an omnichain bridging solution, to facilitate cross-chain message passing between Ethereum and Avalanche. LayerZero has pre-existing support for both Avalanche and Ethereum.\n\nThe first use case of Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) transfer has been active for nearly 4 months on Avalanche. LayerZero allows Avalanche BTC (BTC.b) bridging between all LayerZero-supported chains (including Ethereum, BNB Chain, Avalanche C-Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, Fantom, Moonbeam), creating a composable, unified liquidity system for BTC. From the 25+ supported chains, two, DFK and Swimmer, are run as their own subnets. Apart from cross-chain asset transferring, LayerZero also supports arbitrary message passing–which includes governance communication between Uniswap on Ethereum to Avalanche.\n\nLayerZero is backed by the likes of a16z, Sequoia, Uniswap Labs, Coinbase, and numerous others–it is supported by thousands of cross-chain builders with over 2,000 contracts deployed on mainnet, ~700 unique applications, ~2M total messages, ~$5B transactional volume, and billions of dollars in TVL.\n\nIs the bridge secured by a trusted entity, by a multi sig, or a protocol/set of incentivized nodes?\n\nLayerZero endpoints rely on an architecture leveraging Ultra Light Nodes and two off-chain entities called oracles and relayers to securely relay messages between endpoints on a source and destination chain. The oracle is responsible for relaying block headers, and with the default LayerZero setup, will be handled by Chainlink. A transaction proof is sent using the relayer; the default relayer is operated by LayerZero. Hence, the security of the system relies on 2 entities. The primary assumption behind this setup is that the oracle and relayer remain independent at all times. Collusion between the entities would lead to a compromised system. Uniswap will have the option to operate one or both of these entities which would decrease the possibility of collusion; however, this would require the DAO to operate infrastructure. Ideally, Uniswap governance does not venture into infrastructure maintenance.\n\nIs the bridge secured by a trusted entity, by a multi sig, or a protocol/set of incentivized nodes?\n\nLayerZero leverages direct MPT validation construction of the source transaction and verifies the merkle inclusion proof directly on the destination chain via the protocol’s novel Ultra Light Node (ULN).\n\nIs it possible for a fraudulent message to be passed to the destination chain? If so, are there any recall mechanisms?\n\nMalicious message transmission is a possibility if there is a compromise of both the oracle and relayer sets. Both entities would have to agree to approve a fraudulent message together and against the same application. For example, the decentralized Chainlink DON would have to actively collude with the LayerZero Labs relayer at the same time to enable passing of a malicious message. If the application selects multiple oracles and multiple relayers, thereby pricing its security higher, fraudulent message passing would require more independent parties to be simultaneously compromised.\n\nWhat are the ramifications of fraud to the malicious actor?\n\nUnlike some other bridges, LayerZero does not pose an economic stake or bond to punish malicious actors via a slashing mechanism. Instead, if the default oracle-relayer configuration is compromised, then there is a reputational backlash that would beset LayerZero and Chainlink–since they are the entities responsible for the relayer and oracle, respectively. However, if Uniswap decides to control the messaging stack by running either the oracle or relayer, then Uniswap itself will have to answer for its shortcomings if there happens to be malicious activity.\n\nLayerZero is also designed to be censorship resistant. Oracles and Relayers cannot censor messages without censoring all messages due to the sequential nonce ordered enforcement on the receiving chain. As a result, if an attacker obtained control of the Uniswap-selected Oracles or Relayers, and succeeded in censoring a message, every subsequent message would also be censored and the vote would stop. Uniswap could then expediently resolve the issue by updating configurations and messaging would resume.\n\nHas the bridge code been audited? By a third party? What attack vectors and vulnerabilities were identified, if any? Have the identified vulnerabilities been remedied?\n\nImmutability is part and parcel to LayerZero’s infrastructure. Its smart contracts are not upgradable and therefore aren’t prone to bugs due to smart contract updates. Smart contract bugs is the predominant historical cause for bridge exploits, as was the case with Wormhole’s $300M and Nomad’s $190M hack in 2022. To ensure that the current LayerZero contracts are reliable enough to be set in stone and entirely independent from LayerZero Labs’ future involvements, the protocol has been audited 35+ times and reviewed at least 3+ times by the LayerZero Labs team.\n\nLayerZero is the only major cross-chain messaging protocol to have secured significant transaction volume (~$5B) over time without any exploit, compromise of key infrastructure, or loss of user funds. Additionally, LayerZero has the largest live bug bounty across the industry at up to $15M.\n\nFuture Bridge Alterations\n\nFollowing deployment, if Uniswap governance would like to switch to a different bridge setup, the DAO can do so with a future proposal. There are current ruminations regarding a multi bridge messaging setup–but that is too early to implement for this proposal. Much like the recent BNB Chain deployment proposal, we recommend utilizing a single bridge for the time being and integrating a more novel system later on after the BSL expiration.\n\nLicense Exemption\n\nWe are requesting an exemption via an Additional Use Grant (license change enacted via the ENS domain uniswap.eth) that would allow LayerZero to use the Licensed Work to deploy it on Avalanche, provided that the deployment is subject to Ethereum layer 1 Uniswap Protocol governance and control. Uniswap v3 will be deployed on Avalanche by LayerZero Labs through the “Deploy Uniswap V3 Script”. LayerZero Labs would be permitted to use subcontractors to do this work.\n\nTimeline\n\nOnce the on-chain governance proposal is completed, LayerZero Labs will deploy the Uniswap v3 smart contracts on the Avalanche C-Chain. Uniswap Labs will handle the front-end integration updates and include Avalanche to the auto router. Altogether, this deployment will take ~5 weeks to complete.\n\n9 Likes\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\n[Temp Check] - Update Crosschain Governance Parameters for Avalanche, MegaETH, Soneium, and X Layer\n\nArana Digital Delegate Platform\n\nArana Digital Delegate Platform\n\nNomination and Election Process for the UNI-ARB Grant Program (UAGP) and Delegate Program (UADP)\n\nLdemeo88\n\nFebruary 25, 2023, 1:44am\n\n2\n\nHello all -\n\nMy name is Luigi D’Onorio DeMeo and I am the Head of DeFi at Ava Labs. We are very excited by this proposal from the University of Michigan. Ava Labs worked with and endorses this proposal to deploy Uniswap V3 on the Avalanche C Chain with LayerZero. As mentioned in the proposal, the timing of this proposal is key as the BSL is ending and we fear many low effort Uni v3 forks will enter the fray. The opportunity set for DEXs on Avalanche is unique - as new subnets come online with very large user sets, many are architecting them such that liquidity will remain on the C chain. With the addition of Avalanche Warp Messaging (AWM), this is only pronounced and provides a major opportunity for new DEX volumes, unique to Avalanche. We very much look forward to engaging with the Uniswap community!\n\n3 Likes\n\npaulsengh\n\nFebruary 26, 2023, 7:04pm\n\n3\n\nHello everyone!\n\nMy name is Paul Sengh, and I’m a contributor to Delta One (deltaone.xyz). Thank you to Abdullah and the team at Michigan for the well-written proposal.\n\nBootstrapping liquidity pools on a new venue is no easy feat, and these early network participants will need to be compensated fairly. Rather than putting this burden on the initial users of the new Uniswap deployment, the network should be bootstrapped––in true crypto fashion––through incentives from the other beneficiaries of the proposal (namely, Avalanche and Layer Zero). In return for the improvement in daily active users, transaction volumes, and reputation that Uniswap is providing to the other ecosystems, the DAO should request a fitting grant as a stipulation for the deployment.\n\nWe look forward to engaging with the Uniswap, Avalanche, and Layer Zero communities to get their thoughts.\n\n1 Like\n\nLdemeo88\n\nFebruary 27, 2023, 12:44pm\n\n4\n\nThank you for the comment @paulsengh. I will say from my perspective, the beauty of concentrated liquidity DEXs, especially those such as Uniswap that have a reputation and more battle tested code is that incentives are not typically required. For example, Trader Joe’s liquidity book on Avalanche has amassed $30m in TVL in a few months for a brand new concentrated liquidity DEX protocol with no incentives by them or Avalanche. By simply looking at the yields on Liquidity Book pools, it is clear there is demand for similar products on this network. To provide additional comfort, Ava Labs has been and is in touch with liquidity providers who will seed pools on a deployment.\n\n3 Likes\n\npaulsengh\n\nFebruary 27, 2023, 5:26pm\n\n5\n\nThe leverage capabilities from concentrating liquidity certainly can help individual LPs earn a larger share of fees compared to other LPs, but the “chicken or egg” problem still exists for the network at large––initial traders will be drawn to more liquid markets on Avalanche, and initial LPs will be dissuaded by the lack of trading fees. To be sure, it is very well possible that liquidity will be raised (as in your example of Trader Joe), but I am not convinced that those initial LPs will be profitable on a risk-adjusted basis. Given that those initial LPs will likely be excited Uniswap community members, I still urge the DAO to negotiate for incentives to bootstrap the network.\n\nIt certainly does help that Ava Labs is working with LPs to seed the pools, but given that this is a trustless environment, it’s hard to take comfort without more explicit guarantees from Ava Labs. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts, and shaping this proposal so we can see Uniswap V3 on Avalanche as soon as possible!\n\n2 Likes\n\nblueberryboy\n\nMarch 1, 2023, 8:56pm\n\n6\n\nThanks for submitting this in-depth proposal @AbdullahUmar\n\nIt’s a no-brainer to me: it makes total sense for Uniswap V3 to expand to blockchains with active DeFi ecosystems and less competition for concentrated liquidity AMMs before the license expires and fork season begins.\n\nYou briefly mention the possibility of implementing a multi-bridge system and I think that could be the right approach here. How open are you to using multiple bridges as opposed to only using LayerZero?\n\n1 Like\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nMarch 1, 2023, 9:22pm\n\n7\n\nAppreciate the comment, @blueberryboy.\n\nYes, the possibility of implementing a multi-bridge system is ever growing; however, nothing in that vein has fully materialized. That structure is currently being reviewed, debated, and tested. No previous deployment has implemented such a standard. Due to the novel nature of a multi-bridge architecture, this proposal prompts Uni delegates and tokenholders to choose LayerZero as the messaging system because it’s simply the path of least resistance–not to mention LZ has worked actively with Avalanche in the past. The relationship is there. And LZ has a proven history of reliability due to active interrogations with a multitude of applications. If in the future the DAO selects to opt into a multi-bridge system, that’s its prerogative. But for now, LZ is the most seamless means forward.\n\nIf you’d like more context on the multi-bridge system, check out this forum page: Cross-Chain Bridge Assessment Process\n\n1 Like\n\nLdemeo88\n\nMarch 1, 2023, 9:40pm\n\n8\n\nThank you for the comment @blueberryboy . As far as I am concerned and Ava Labs in particular, we would not be opposed to other bridges being selected if the Uniswap community explicitly desired - whether that was Wormhole, Axelar, Synapse or others. We worked with LayerZero particularly on this proposal and also value them on their merits as well. As @AbdullahUmar mentioned, we also look forward to the multi-bridge system by the DAO.\n\nWormhole\n\nMarch 2, 2023, 6:23pm\n\n9\n\nThanks for the comments everyone. We appreciate @Ldemeo88 and the Avalanche community’s desire to work with the wishes of the Uniswap DAO. Avalanche is a thriving ecosystem and a prime candidate for a Uniswap V3 deployment. So, for the avoidance of doubt, we at Wormhole are excited to throw our hat in the ring here.\n\nTo comment on the landscape where this vote falls - we understand that this proposal comes on the back of a contentious vote for BNB along with the ongoing work to do a full evaluation of bridge providers.\n\nHowever, given the pending BSL expiry and recently having been voted in to service the BNB deployment, we believe that Wormhole is a strong contender as the most pragmatic choice until consensus is reached by the community.\n\nGiven that the BNB deployment is live and should be added to the UI within a week, we feel confident in Wormhole’s ability to deliver for the Uniswap and Avalanche communities.\n\nWe look forward to comments and questions!\n\n3 Likes\n\nkari\n\nMarch 6, 2023, 10:23am\n\n10\n\nHello everyone, Kari from MAP Protocol here. (MAP Protocol is the interoperable omnichain layer built upon ZK and light client)\n\nThanks @AbdullahUmar for putting the well-written proposal. Deploying Uniswap v3 on Avalanche will be a plus for a DEX product like Uniswap, especially with Avalanche’s star defi products such as traderjoe and gmx. And Just like @paulsengh mentioned, putting the burden of LP on initial users would not be fair and a better way should be bootstrapping the network.\n\nGreat to know that you’ve already had a bridge option for the deployment. If the DAO implemented the multi-bridge system, will that mean Avalanche will also consider other bridge options for the deployment?\n\n2 Likes\n\neek637\n\nMarch 6, 2023, 10:13pm\n\n11\n\nI hate to be a stick in the mud here, but we’ll be voting against this in its current form.\n\nI am on the record explaining Avantgarde’s vote in the Binance proposal. In that case, we believed that the benefits of getting an official deployment on that chain before the BSL expired outweighed the risks presented by doing so with a bridge that hadn’t been formally evaluated.\n\nHaving to make that evaluation at all was a wake up call that the DAO’s process for assessing bridges in cross-chain deployments was broken. In the aftermath of that vote, and the furious politicking that went on behind closed doors, the UF has tasked the newly-formed Bridge Assessment Committee with creating a framework for the community to make better-informed decisions on these issues going forward.\n\nIn the context of this proposal, and the Kava proposal, and the multitude of “Deploy on X Chain” proposals that are sure to pop up in the forum between now and April 1, we do not believe the “deploy before the bsl expires and worry about the bridge provider later” tradeoff still holds. While we still don’t believe there is a material risk to the protocol of deploying with Layer Zero, it will increase the burden of the inevitable clean up that we need to do when it comes time to unify the DAOs approach to cross chain messaging. And in the case of every chain/bridge combo we vote on between now and April 1, that technical debt is incurred without a corresponding upside - the BSL will expire before these deployments are pushed to production on the front end. (Having integrated with v3 so that Enzyme users can provide liquidity from their vaults, I am not convinced that there would be any meaningful contract-level liquidity provision from the drop. I would be happy to be proven wrong on that… but there’s been zero volume on Binance and the contracts were deployed three weeks ago).\n\nSaid more plainly - we do want to deploy to Avalanche (and to Kava, and probably to many other chains), but we believe that the costs (technical debt) outweigh the benefits (having an official deployment sometime soonish after the BSL expires). Additionally, voting yes to this proposal incentivizes other chains and bridge providers to make additional deployment proposals which will increase our technical debt which will make cleanup harder which will… you get the picture.\n\nWe would be supportive of granting Ava Labs an Additional Use Grant with no bridge specified and then running a Snapshot vote post-Bridge Assessment Committee to approve a bridge provider.\n\nAlso, as a side note, I just noticed that this proposal is to grant Layer Zero an additional use grant which, though the wording in the proposal is specific to avalanche, seems potentially problematic (not being a lawyer I’d appreciate if someone else who is or has legal counsel on hand to weigh in on that).\n\n1 Like\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nMarch 6, 2023, 11:27pm\n\n12\n\nThank you for your comment, @kari. Liquidity bootstrapping is always a plus for any deployment but should be looked at in the context of the network. If the deployment is on a comparatively more robust chain like Avalanche, then the requirement for bootstrapping is less. Plus, the demand for a concentrated liquidity AMM is present on Avalanche–in fact, Trader Joe v2 is responsible for most of Avalanche’s present DEX activity. Ava Labs is also in close contact with market makers. Conversations will naturally transpire regarding liquidity on Avalanche post deployment.\n\nFor a seamless deployment, we are proposing just using LayerZero. If the DAO wants to reassess the active bridge in the future, that conversation is encouraged.\n\n2 Likes\n\nMAPO_MapProtocol\n\nMarch 7, 2023, 5:39am\n\n13\n\nThank you Kari for sharing with the Uni members here about MAP Protocol. As the omnichain layer for Web3, we envision a future where every chain can be connected seamlessly and users can use dApps just like the way they use Web2 apps – intuitive, easy, but more privacy-preserving. We also will plan to add Avalanche to our omnichain network to enable greater interoperability.\n\n1 Like\n\nhn_avax\n\nMarch 8, 2023, 2:27am\n\n14\n\nHello everyone, I’m one of the core contributors to BENQI, and I’m excited to have Uniswap deploy on Avalanche. Thanks everyone for sharing their thoughts on the proposal so far!\n\nAvantgarde’s suggestions seems to make the most sense to me thus far given the ongoing debate on both sides regarding the bridge. Is there a rush to decide on a bridge provider at this point? A decision by the Bridge Assessment Committee post deployment seems like the most prudent, and expedient, approach.\n\n1 Like\n\nDAOstrat.C\n\nMarch 8, 2023, 7:15pm\n\n15\n\nVoted in support of this proposal. First, thank you @AbdullahUmar, for bringing this proposal forward. As discussed through other deployments, Uniswap cross-chain provides users with a trusted medium for decentralized exchange. This vote also supports our long-standing position around protocol competitiveness.\n\nWith April 1 approaching, we do not see the BSL argument as a driving factor right now. Although the timing of this proposal intersects with the Cross Chain Bridge Committee’s work, Avalanche is a strong L1.\n\nWe do not see any impacts to protocol security and would like this conversation to continue.\n\nAs always, we support the bridging committee, community innovations like the MMA, and ongoing process discussions.\n\n1 Like\n\nGFXlabs\n\nMarch 9, 2023, 12:12am\n\n16\n\nHi Everyone,\n\nWhile GFX Labs supports further deployments, we will be abstaining from this vote and all deployments until the Bridge Commitee delivers their report. The committee is expected to deliver the report on the 27th. Given that the governance and deployment processes take over three weeks and the report is similarly three weeks away, it’s best to wait for the report and revisit this deployment and the several other chains we’re aware of who would also like a deployment of Uniswap v3.\n\n4 Likes\n\nPorter\n\nMarch 17, 2023, 2:36pm\n\n18\n\nWe voted for the Uniswap v3 deployment to Avalanche. Our primary reasoning coincides with the support from the Ava Labs team to proceed with a deployment due to time considerations with the BSL expiring. We fully support the bridge committee process, and we look forward to seeing their output, but we feel conducting the deployment with L0 and re-evaluating the bridge later based on a multi-bridge proposal, or the committee’s final analysis, is an equally viable option with a low degree of risk.\n\n4 Likes\n\n0xIryna\n\nApril 22, 2023, 12:41am\n\n19\n\nUniswap v3 contracts are deployed on Avalanche at the following addresses:\n\nContract\nAddress\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x740b1c1de25031C31FF4fC9A62f554A55cdC1baD\n\nMulticall2\n\n0x0139141Cd4Ee88dF3Cdb65881D411bAE271Ef0C2\n\nProxyAdmin\n\n0x9AdA7D7879214073F40183F3410F2b3f088c6381\n\nTickLens\n\n0xEB9fFC8bf81b4fFd11fb6A63a6B0f098c6e21950\n\nNFTDescriptor\n\n0x27Dd7eE7fE723e83Bf3612a75a034951fe299E99\n\nNonfungibleTokenPositionDescriptor\n\n0xe89B7C295d73FCCe88eF263F86e7310925DaEBAF\n\nDescriptorProxy\n\n0xE1f93a7cB6fFa2dB4F9d5A2FD43158A428993C09\n\nNonfungibleTokenPositionManager\n\n0x655C406EBFa14EE2006250925e54ec43AD184f8B\n\nV3Migrator\n\n0x44f5f1f5E452ea8d29C890E8F6e893fC0f1f0f97\n\nV3Staker\n\n0xCA9D0668C600c4dd07ca54Be1615FE5CDFd76Ac3\n\nQuoterV2\n\n0xbe0F5544EC67e9B3b2D979aaA43f18Fd87E6257F\n\nSwapRouter02\n\n0xbb00FF08d01D300023C629E8fFfFcb65A5a578cE\n\nOmnichainProposalSender is deployed on Ethereum and OmnichainGovernanceExecutor is deployed on Avalanche at the following addresses:\n\nContract\nAddress\n\nOmnichainProposalSender\n\n0xeb0BCF27D1Fb4b25e708fBB815c421Aeb51eA9fc\n\nOmnichainGovernanceExecutor\n\n0xeb0BCF27D1Fb4b25e708fBB815c421Aeb51eA9fc\n\n2 Likes\n\nDoo_StableLab\n\nAugust 25, 2023, 1:33pm\n\n20\n\nHello, the Deployment Accountability Committee has reviewed this proposal and found no specific commitment to support the Uniswap Ecosystem, and also no specific expectation from such deployment. And those “broad” expectations seem to be overall still valid (for example, Trader Joe’s TVL is almost 19 times larger than Uniswap’s TVL on Avalanche but the author is correct that Uniswap did “capture market share”)\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\n[RFC] Post-BSL Cross-chain Deployment Process & New Uniswap.eth Subdomain\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n7\n\n3895\n\nApril 7, 2023\n\nUF Bridge Recommendations\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n0\n\n1593\n\nJune 15, 2023\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 to Arbitrum Mainnet\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n48\n\n19120\n\nDecember 1, 2021\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 on Moonbeam (2023)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n16\n\n7749\n\nOctober 4, 2023","tokens":8113,"crawled_at":1791193757889} +{"id":10285,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/getting-started/onboarding/get-coins","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Get SUI from Faucet | Sui Documentation","text":"To perform transactions on a Sui network, you need SUI tokens to pay for gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction. and storage.\n\nFor applications on MainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets., you must buy real SUI on exchanges like Coinbase, OKX, or Robinhood. Its value is determined by market factors such as supply and demand, network utility, and perceived value.\n\nBecause Mainnet tokens cost real money, development can be expensive. That's why Sui provides DevnetDevnetFor developing and testing new features. and TestnetTestnetStaging network for testing changes before production deployment. networks, which mirror Mainnet features and enable you to build and test safely for an affordable cost.\n\nimportant\nSUI tokens on Devnet and Testnet are free and hold no monetary value.\n\nYou can get free SUI tokens from the Sui faucetFaucetA service that provides free Testnet tokens., which lets you deploy and interact with smart contracts and objects on Devnet, Testnet, or a local network. There is no faucet for Mainnet.\n\nPrerequisites\n\nInstall the latest version of Sui.\n\nSet up your Sui account and CLI environment.\n\nClick to openCreate Sui account and setup CLI environment.\n$ sui client\n\nIf this is the first time running the sui client CLI tool, it asks you to provide a Sui full nodeFull nodeResponsible for validating blockchain activity. server URL (or press enter for the default Testnet), select an encryption scheme to generate an addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network., and stores the configuration in a client.yaml file. For more information, refer to the Sui client CLI tutorial.\nIf this is not your first time running sui client, then you already have a client.yaml file in your local environment. If you'd like to create a new address for this tutorial, use the command:\n$ sui client new-address ed25519\n\nRequest SUI tokens from faucet​\n\nVisit the online faucet to request SUI tokens.\n\nThen, follow these steps:\n\nConnect your wallet or paste your wallet address in the address field. Get your wallet address in the CLI with the command sui client active-address.\n\nUse the network dropdown to select the correct network: Testnet, Devnet, or LocalnetLocalnetLocal network you can run on your own machine for optimized development.. Use the Testnet for most use cases before deploying to Mainnet for production. Learn more about the available networks and their differences.\n\nClick the Request SUI button.\n\nTo request more SUI, refresh your browser and click the Request SUI button again. The requests are rate limited, however, so too many requests results in a waiting period before you can request more tokens.\n\nCommunity faucets​\n\nYou can also use the following community-provided faucets to obtain SUI tokens:\n\nN1Stake faucet\n\nSuiLearn faucet\n\nThese faucets have their own separate limits, such as one request per day or one request every few hours.\n\nVerify token balance​\n\nTo check your balance of SUI tokens and confirm you received some from the faucet, use the command:\n\n$ sui client balance\n\nAlternatively, use a Sui Explorer such as SuiVision or SuiScan to check the SUI token balance of an address.\n\nYou should have a balance of SUI tokens:\n\n╭────────────────────────────────────────────╮\n│ Balance of coins owned by this address │\n├────────────────────────────────────────────┤\n│ ╭────────────────────────────────────────╮ │\n│ │ coin balance (raw) balance │ │\n│ ├────────────────────────────────────────┤ │\n│ │ Sui 56804696124 0.50 SUI │ │\n│ ╰────────────────────────────────────────╯ │\n╰────────────────────────────────────────────╯\n\nIf you do not have a balance, repeat the request SUI tokens from faucet steps, or use an alternative faucet method.\n\nReturn unused Testnet SUI​\n\nThe faucet drains from a finite pool of SUI. If the pool empties, it disrupts faucet service for the rest of the community. To help ensure this doesn't happen, you can use the online faucet to return your unused SUI to the Testnet pool. You cannot return SUI to the Devnet or Localnet pools.\n\nThere are two ways to return unused Testnet SUI tokens:\n\nConnect your wallet to the online faucet, and click the Return tokens to faucet button. Approve the transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. using your wallet, and the faucet returns your SUI tokens to the pool.\n\nIf you prefer not to connect your wallet, send the tokens to the address 0x7a9d19d4c210663926eb549da59a54e25777fef63161bfccda08277b58b4212e through a separate transaction.\n\nAlternative methods for getting SUI tokens​\n\nIf you need an alternative method to get SUI tokens for deployment on Testnet or Devnet, you have several options.\n\ntip\nEvery method to obtain SUI tokens for Testnet and Devnet is rate limited. If you need a large amount of SUI tokens, use a local network.\n\nDiscord\ncURL\nTypeScript SDK\n\nJoin Discord.\n\nIf you try to join the Sui Discord channel using a newly created Discord account, you might need to wait a few days for validation.\n\nRequest SUI tokens in the Sui #devnet-faucet or #testnet-faucet Discord channels. Send the following message to the channel, replacing with your client address:\n\n!faucet \n\nUse the following cURL commands to set console variables and request tokens directly from the faucet server. Set NETWORK to either testnet or devnet.\n$ ADDRESS=$(sui client active-address)\n$ NETWORK=testnet\n$ curl --location --request POST \"https://faucet.${NETWORK}.sui.io/v2/gas\" \\\n--header \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n--data-raw \"{\n\\\"FixedAmountRequest\\\": {\n\\\"recipient\\\": \\\"${ADDRESS}\\\"\n}\n}\"\n\nIf you're working with a local network, replace \"https://faucet.${NETWORK}.sui.io/v2/gas\" with the appropriate value based on which packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. runs your network:\n\nsui-faucet: http://127.0.0.1:5003/gas\n\nsui: http://127.0.0.1:9123/gas\n\nYou can access the faucet using the Sui TypeScript SDK.\nimport { getFaucetHost, requestSuiFromFaucetV2 } from '@mysten/sui/faucet';\n\n// get tokens from the Devnet faucet server\nawait requestSuiFromFaucetV2({\n// connect to Devnet\nhost: getFaucetHost('devnet'),\nrecipient: '',\n});\n\nSUI tokens on a local network​\n\nIf you are running a local Sui network, you can get SUI tokens from your local faucet. See the Connect to a Local Network topic for details.\n\nAfter you have SUI tokens, you're ready to build and publish your first package.\n\nNext steps\n\nHello, World!\n\nClone and build the \"Hello, World!\" project.\n\nRequest SUI tokens from faucetCommunity faucets\nVerify token balance\nReturn unused Testnet SUI\n\nAlternative methods for getting SUI tokens\nSUI tokens on a local network\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1697,"crawled_at":1791193758295} +{"id":10286,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/what-is-an-asset","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"What is a Core Asset | Metaplex Core","text":"This page explains what a Core Asset is and how it differs from traditional Solana NFTs. Understand the account structure, collection relationships, and metadata storage.\nKey Concepts\nSingle-account model: Core Assets store ownership within the Asset account itself\nNo token accounts: Unlike SPL tokens, Core doesn't require Associated Token Accounts\nCollection membership: Assets can belong to Collections via the updateAuthority field\nOff-chain metadata: A URI points to JSON metadata (permanent storage like Arweave/IPFS is recommended)\n\nSummary\nA Core Asset is a single Solana account that represents an NFT. Unlike Token Metadata (which requires 3+ accounts), Core stores all essential data in one account: owner, name, URI, and update authority. This makes Core Assets ~80% cheaper and simpler to work with.\nOverview\nSetting itself apart from existing Asset programs, like Solana’s Token program, Metaplex Core and Core Assets (sometimes referred to as Core NFT Assets) do not rely on multiple accounts, like Associated Token Accounts. Instead, Core Assets store the relationship between a wallet and the \"mint\" account within the asset itself.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nSomeone's wallet.\n\nAsset Account\n\nOwner: Core Program\n\nStores information about the\nasset, including the owner\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nThe Core Asset Account\nThe Core Asset account represents the bare minimum data for a digital asset. This structure provides an unopinionated blockchain primitive for onchain ownership.\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nAsset Account\n\nOwner: Core Program\n\nKey = Asset\n\nOwner\n\nUpdate Authority\n\nName\n\nURI\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nIs my Asset in a Collection?\nMPL Core Assets can belong to collections. The updateAuthority field in the MPL Core Asset data provides two duties, either to report the update authority of the Asset, or to provide the publicKey of the MPL Core Collection to which it belongs. When accessing the updateAuthority field either directly via the asset, or via the collectionAddress helper of the MPL Core Asset, the returning result will be one of the following outcomes: Collection The asset belongs to the collection at the given address.\nCreate Asset\n\n{\n\n__kind: 'Collection'\n\nfields: [PublicKey]\n\n}\n\nimport { fetchAssetV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = await fetchAssetV1(umi, assetAddress.publicKey)\n\nconst collectionId = collectionAddress(asset)\n\nconsole.log({collectionId})\n\nconsole.log({asset})\n\n// log\n\ncollection: '2222222222222222222222222222222'\n\nasset: {\n\nkey: AssetV1,\n\nowner: \"11111111111111111111111111111111\",\n\nupdateAuthority: {\n\ntype: 'Collection',\n\naddress: '2222222222222222222222222222222'\n\n},\n\nname: \"My Core Asset\",\n\nuri: \"https://example.com/metadata.json\",\n\n...\n\n}\n\nAddress The asset has an update authority set and does not belong to a collection.\nCreate Asset\n\nimport { fetchAssetV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = await fetchAssetV1(umi, assetAddress.publicKey)\n\nconst collectionId = collectionAddress(asset)\n\nconsole.log({collectionId})\n\nconsole.log({asset})\n\n// log\n\ncollectionId: undefined\n\nasset: {\n\nkey: AssetV1,\n\nowner: \"11111111111111111111111111111111\",\n\nupdateAuthority: {\n\ntype: 'Address',\n\naddress: '2222222222222222222222222222222'\n\n}\n\nname: \"My Core Asset\",\n\nuri: \"https://example.com/metadata.json\",\n\n...\n\n}\n\nNone The asset has no update authority set.\nCreate Asset\n\nimport { fetchAssetV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = await fetchAssetV1(umi, assetAddress.publicKey)\n\nconst collectionId = collectionAddress(asset)\n\nconsole.log({collectionId})\n\nconsole.log({asset})\n\n// log\n\ncollectionId: undefined\n\nasset: {\n\nkey: AssetV1,\n\nowner: \"11111111111111111111111111111111\",\n\nupdateAuthority: {\n\ntype: 'None',\n\n},\n\nname: \"My Core Asset\",\n\nuri: \"https://example.com/metadata.json\",\n\n}\n\nOff Chain Metadata\nOne important attribute of the Asset Account is the URI attribute that points to a JSON file off-chain. This is used to safely provide additional data whilst not being constrained by the fees involved in storing onchain data. That JSON file follows a certain standard that anyone can use to find useful information on tokens. Off Chain Metadata can be stored at any publicly accessible location. Popular places to host your json files include;\nArweave\nNFT.Storage/IPFS\nAmazon AWS S3/Google Cloud\n\nWallet Account\n\nOwner: System Program\n\nAsset Account\n\nOwner: Core Program\n\nKey = Asset\n\nOwner\n\nUpdate Authority\n\nName\n\nURI\n\nOff-chain\nJSON Metadata\n\nName\n\nDescription\n\nImage\n\nAnimated URL\n\nAttributes\n\n...\n\nReact Flow\nPress enter or space to select a node.You can then use the arrow keys to move the node around. Press delete to remove it and escape to cancel.\nPress enter or space to select an edge. You can then press delete to remove it or escape to cancel.\n\nFieldTypeDescription\nname\nstring\nName of the asset.\n\ndescription\nstring\nDescription of the asset.\n\nimage\nstring\nURI pointing to the asset's logo.\n\nanimation_url\nstring\nURI pointing to the asset's animation.\n\nexternal_url\nstring\nURI pointing to an external URL defining the asset — e.g. the game's main site.\n\nattributes\narray\nArray of attributes defining the characteristics of the asset.trait_type (string): The type of attribute.\nvalue (string): The value for that attribute.\n\nproperties\nobject\nAdditional properties that define the asset.files (array): Additional files to include with the asset.uri (string): The file's URI.\ntype (string): The file's type. E.g. image/png, video/mp4, etc.\ncdn (boolean, optional): Whether the file is served from a CDN.\n\ncategory (string): A media category for the asset. E.g. video, image, etc.\n\nNote that, this JSON file can be stored using a permanent storage solution such as Arweave to ensure it cannot be updated. Additionally, one can set the Update Authority field to None to make it immutable and, therefore, forbid the URI and Name attributes to ever be changed. Using this combination, we can guarantee the immutability of the off-chain JSON file.\nFAQ\nHow is Core different from Token Metadata NFTs?\nToken Metadata requires 3+ accounts (mint, metadata, token account). Core uses a single account that stores owner and metadata together. This makes Core ~80% cheaper and faster to create.\nWhat data is stored on-chain vs off-chain?\nOn-chain: owner, name, URI, update authority, plugins. Off-chain (at the URI): description, image, attributes, animation URL, and other extended metadata.\nCan I convert a Token Metadata NFT to Core?\nNot directly. Core and Token Metadata are separate standards. You would need to burn the old NFT and mint a new Core Asset. Some migration tools exist to help with this process.\nIs Core compatible with existing NFT marketplaces?\nMost major Solana marketplaces support Core Assets. Check Ecosystem Support for the current list of compatible platforms.\nWhat happens if the off-chain metadata goes offline?\nThe Asset still exists on-chain with its name and URI, but the image and off-chain attributes won't be accessible. On-chain attributes (via the Attributes plugin) remain accessible. Use permanent storage (Arweave, IPFS with pinning) to prevent this.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nAsset\nA single Core account representing an NFT\n\nOwner\nThe wallet that currently owns the Asset\n\nUpdate Authority\nThe account authorized to modify Asset metadata\n\nURI\nURL pointing to off-chain JSON metadata\n\nCollection\nA Core account that groups related Assets\n\nKey\nAccount discriminator identifying the account type\n\nseq\nSequence number used for compression indexing\n\nAsset Signer PDA\nA separate address derived from an Asset that acts as the Asset's wallet for SOL and tokens","tokens":2029,"crawled_at":1791193794633} +{"id":10287,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/abi","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nResult\nInterfaces\nTyped Values\nABI Encoding\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Application Binary Interface\nApplication Binary Interface\nThe Application Binary Interface (ABI) describes how method input parameters should be encoded, their results decoded, and how to decode events and errors.\nSee About ABIs for more details how they are used.\n\nFUNCTIONS\ncheckResultErrors(result: Result)⇒ Array< { error: Error , path: Array< string | number > } >\nReturns all errors found in a Result.\nSince certain errors encountered when creating a Result do not impact the ability to continue parsing data, they are deferred until they are actually accessed. Hence a faulty string in an Event that is never used does not impact the program flow.\nHowever, sometimes it may be useful to access, identify or validate correctness of a Result.\n\ndecodeBytes32String(bytes: BytesLike)⇒ string\nEncodes the Bytes32-encoded bytes into a string.\n\nencodeBytes32String(text: string)⇒ string\nEncodes text as a Bytes32 string.\n\nclass Result\nA Result is a sub-class of Array, which allows accessing any of its values either positionally by its index or, if keys are provided by its name.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nResult.fromItems(items: Array< any >, keys?: Array< null | string >)⇒ Result\nCreates a new Result for items with each entry also accessible by its corresponding name in keys.\n\nMETHODS\nresult.getValue(name: string)⇒ any\nReturns the value for name.\nSince it is possible to have a key whose name conflicts with a method on a Result or its superclass Array, or any JavaScript keyword, this ensures all named values are still accessible by name.\n\nresult.toArray(deep?: boolean)⇒ Array< any >\nReturns the Result as a normal Array. If deep, any children which are Result objects are also converted to a normal Array.\nThis will throw if there are any outstanding deferred errors.\n\nresult.toObject(deep?: boolean)⇒ Record< string, any >\nReturns the Result as an Object with each name-value pair. If deep, any children which are Result objects are also converted to an Object.\nThis will throw if any value is unnamed, or if there are any outstanding deferred errors.\n\nInterfaces\nThe Interface class is a low-level class that accepts an ABI and provides all the necessary functionality to encode and decode paramaters to and results from methods, events and errors.\nIt also provides several convenience methods to automatically search and find matching transactions and events to parse them.\n\nTYPES\nInterfaceAbi⇒ string | ReadonlyArray< Fragment | JsonFragment | string >\nAn InterfaceAbi may be any supported ABI format.\nA string is expected to be a JSON string, which will be parsed using JSON.parse. This means that the value must be a valid JSON string, with no stray commas, etc.\nAn array may contain any combination of:\n\nHuman-Readable fragments\nParsed JSON fragment\nFragment instances\n\nA Human-Readable Fragment is a string which resembles a Solidity signature and is introduced in this blog entry. For example, function balanceOf(address) view returns (uint).\nA Parsed JSON Fragment is a JavaScript Object desribed in the Solidity documentation.\n\nclass ErrorDescription\nWhen using the interface.parseError to automatically match an error for a call result for parsing, an ErrorDescription is returned.\n\nPROPERTIES\nerrorDescription.args⇒ Resultread-only\nThe arguments passed to the Error with revert.\n\nerrorDescription.fragment⇒ ErrorFragmentread-only\nThe matching fragment.\n\nerrorDescription.name⇒ stringread-only\nThe name of the Error.\n\nerrorDescription.selector⇒ stringread-only\nThe selector for the Error.\n\nerrorDescription.signature⇒ stringread-only\nThe full Error signature.\n\nclass Indexed\nAn Indexed is used as a value when a value that does not fit within a topic (i.e. not a fixed-length, 32-byte type). It is the keccak256 of the value, and used for types such as arrays, tuples, bytes and strings.\n\nPROPERTIES\nindexed.hash⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe keccak256 of the value logged.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nIndexed.isIndexed(value: any)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if value is an Indexed.\nThis provides a Type Guard for property access.\n\nclass Interface\nAn Interface abstracts many of the low-level details for encoding and decoding the data on the blockchain.\nAn ABI provides information on how to encode data to send to a Contract, how to decode the results and events and how to interpret revert errors.\nThe ABI can be specified by any supported format.\n\nPROPERTIES\ninterface.deploy⇒ ConstructorFragmentread-only\nThe Contract constructor.\n\ninterface.fallback⇒ null | FallbackFragmentread-only\nThe Fallback method, if any.\n\ninterface.fragments⇒ ReadonlyArray< Fragment >read-only\nAll the Contract ABI members (i.e. methods, events, errors, etc).\n\ninterface.receive⇒ booleanread-only\nIf receiving ether is supported.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew Interface(fragments: InterfaceAbi)\nCreate a new Interface for the fragments.\n\nInterface.from(value: InterfaceAbi | Interface)⇒ Interface\nCreates a new Interface from the ABI value.\nThe value may be provided as an existing Interface object, a JSON-encoded ABI or any Human-Readable ABI format.\n\nMETHODS\ninterface._decodeParams(params: ReadonlyArray< ParamType >, data: BytesLike)⇒ Result\n\ninterface._encodeParams(params: ReadonlyArray< ParamType >, values: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ string\n\ninterface.decodeErrorResult(fragment: ErrorFragment | string, data: BytesLike)⇒ Result\nDecodes the result data (e.g. from an eth_call) for the specified error (see getError for valid values for key).\nMost developers should prefer the parseCallResult method instead, which will automatically detect a CALL_EXCEPTION and throw the corresponding error.\n\ninterface.decodeEventLog(fragment: EventFragment | string, data: BytesLike, topics?: ReadonlyArray< string >)⇒ Result\n\ninterface.decodeFunctionData(fragment: FunctionFragment | string, data: BytesLike)⇒ Result\nDecodes the data from a transaction tx.data for the function specified (see getFunction for valid values for fragment).\nMost developers should prefer the parseTransaction method instead, which will automatically detect the fragment.\n\ninterface.decodeFunctionResult(fragment: FunctionFragment | string, data: BytesLike)⇒ Result\nDecodes the result data (e.g. from an eth_call) for the specified function (see getFunction for valid values for key).\nMost developers should prefer the parseCallResult method instead, which will automatically detect a CALL_EXCEPTION and throw the corresponding error.\n\ninterface.encodeDeploy(values?: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ string\nEncodes a tx.data object for deploying the Contract with the values as the constructor arguments.\n\ninterface.encodeErrorResult(fragment: ErrorFragment | string, values?: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ string\nEncodes the transaction revert data for a call result that reverted from the the Contract with the sepcified error (see getError for valid values for fragment) with the values.\nThis is generally not used by most developers, unless trying to mock a result from a Contract.\n\ninterface.encodeEventLog(fragment: EventFragment | string, values: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ { data: string , topics: Array< string > }\n\ninterface.encodeFilterTopics(fragment: EventFragment | string, values: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ Array< null | string | Array< string > >\n\ninterface.encodeFunctionData(fragment: FunctionFragment | string, values?: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ string\nEncodes the tx.data for a transaction that calls the function specified (see getFunction for valid values for fragment) with the values.\n\ninterface.encodeFunctionResult(fragment: FunctionFragment | string, values?: ReadonlyArray< any >)⇒ string\nEncodes the result data (e.g. from an eth_call) for the specified function (see getFunction for valid values for fragment) with values.\nThis is generally not used by most developers, unless trying to mock a result from a Contract.\n\ninterface.forEachError(callback: (func: ErrorFragment, index: number) => void)⇒ void\nIterate over all errors, calling callback, sorted by their name.\n\ninterface.forEachEvent(callback: (func: EventFragment, index: number) => void)⇒ void\nIterate over all events, calling callback, sorted by their name.\n\ninterface.forEachFunction(callback: (func: FunctionFragment, index: number) => void)⇒ void\nIterate over all functions, calling callback, sorted by their name.\n\ninterface.format(minimal?: boolean)⇒ Array< string >\nReturns the entire Human-Readable ABI, as an array of signatures, optionally as minimal strings, which removes parameter names and unneceesary spaces.\n\ninterface.formatJson()⇒ string\nReturn the JSON-encoded ABI. This is the format Solidiy returns.\n\ninterface.getAbiCoder()⇒ AbiCoder\nThe ABI coder that will be used to encode and decode binary data.\n\ninterface.getError(key: string, values?: Array< any | Typed >)⇒ null | ErrorFragment\nGet the ErrorFragment for key, which may be an error selector, error name or error signature that belongs to the ABI.\nIf values is provided, it will use the Typed API to handle ambiguous cases where multiple errors match by name.\nIf the key and values do not refine to a single error in the ABI, this will throw.\n\ninterface.getEvent(key: string, values?: Array< any | Typed >)⇒ null | EventFragment\nGet the EventFragment for key, which may be a topic hash, event name or event signature that belongs to the ABI.\nIf values is provided, it will use the Typed API to handle ambiguous cases where multiple events match by name.\nIf the key and values do not refine to a single event in the ABI, this will throw.\n\ninterface.getEventName(key: string)⇒ string\nGet the event name for key, which may be a topic hash, event name or event signature that belongs to the ABI.\n\ninterface.getFunction(key: string, values?: Array< any | Typed >)⇒ null | FunctionFragment\nGet the FunctionFragment for key, which may be a function selector, function name or function signature that belongs to the ABI.\nIf values is provided, it will use the Typed API to handle ambiguous cases where multiple functions match by name.\nIf the key and values do not refine to a single function in the ABI, this will throw.\n\ninterface.getFunctionName(key: string)⇒ string\nGet the function name for key, which may be a function selector, function name or function signature that belongs to the ABI.\n\ninterface.hasEvent(key: string)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if key (an event topic hash, event name or event signature) is present in the ABI.\nIn the case of an event name, the name may be ambiguous, so accessing the EventFragment may require refinement.\n\ninterface.hasFunction(key: string)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if key (a function selector, function name or function signature) is present in the ABI.\nIn the case of a function name, the name may be ambiguous, so accessing the FunctionFragment may require refinement.\n\ninterface.makeError(data: BytesLike, tx: CallExceptionTransaction)⇒ CallExceptionError\n\ninterface.parseCallResult(data: BytesLike)⇒ Result\n\ninterface.parseError(data: BytesLike)⇒ null | ErrorDescription\nParses a revert data, finding the matching error and extracts the parameter values along with other useful error details.\nIf the matching error cannot be found, returns null.\n\ninterface.parseLog(log: { data: string , topics: ReadonlyArray< string > })⇒ null | LogDescription\nParses a receipt log, finding the matching event and extracts the parameter values along with other useful event details.\nIf the matching event cannot be found, returns null.\n\ninterface.parseTransaction(tx: { data: string , value?: BigNumberish })⇒ null | TransactionDescription\nParses a transaction, finding the matching function and extracts the parameter values along with other useful function details.\nIf the matching function cannot be found, return null.\n\nclass LogDescription\nWhen using the interface.parseLog to automatically match a Log to its event for parsing, a LogDescription is returned.\n\nPROPERTIES\nlogDescription.args⇒ Resultread-only\nThe arguments passed into the Event with emit.\n\nlogDescription.fragment⇒ EventFragmentread-only\nThe matching fragment for the topic0.\n\nlogDescription.name⇒ stringread-only\nThe name of the Event.\n\nlogDescription.signature⇒ stringread-only\nThe full Event signature.\n\nlogDescription.topic⇒ stringread-only\nThe topic hash for the Event.\n\nclass TransactionDescription\nWhen using the interface.parseTransaction to automatically match a transaction data to its function for parsing, a TransactionDescription is returned.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransactionDescription.args⇒ Resultread-only\nThe arguments passed to the Function from the transaction data.\n\ntransactionDescription.fragment⇒ FunctionFragmentread-only\nThe matching fragment from the transaction data.\n\ntransactionDescription.name⇒ stringread-only\nThe name of the Function from the transaction data.\n\ntransactionDescription.selector⇒ stringread-only\nThe selector for the Function from the transaction data.\n\ntransactionDescription.signature⇒ stringread-only\nThe full Function signature from the transaction data.\n\ntransactionDescription.value⇒ bigintread-only\nThe value (in wei) from the transaction.\n\nTyped Values\nA Typed object allows a value to have its type explicitly specified.\nFor example, in Solidity, the value 45 could represent a uint8 or a uint256. The value 0x1234 could represent a bytes2 or bytes.\nSince JavaScript has no meaningful way to explicitly inform any APIs which what the type is, this allows transparent interoperation with Soldity.\n\nclass Typed\nThe Typed class to wrap values providing explicit type information.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntyped.arrayLength⇒ null | numberread-only\nReturns the length of the array type or -1 if it is dynamic.\nThrows if the type is not an array.\n\ntyped.tupleName⇒ null | stringread-only\nReturns the tuple name, if this is a tuple. Throws otherwise.\n\ntyped.type⇒ stringread-only\nThe type, as a Solidity-compatible type.\n\ntyped.value⇒ anyread-only\nThe actual value.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nTyped.address(v: string | Addressable)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new address type for v.\n\nTyped.array(v: Array< any | Typed >, dynamic?: null | boolean)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new array type for v, allowing dynamic length.\n\nTyped.bool(v: any)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bool type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes1(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes1 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes10(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes10 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes11(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes11 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes12(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes12 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes13(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes13 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes14(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes14 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes15(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes15 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes16(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes16 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes17(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes17 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes18(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes18 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes19(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes19 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes2(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes2 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes20(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes20 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes21(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes21 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes22(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes22 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes23(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes23 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes24(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes24 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes25(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes25 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes26(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes26 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes27(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes27 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes28(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes28 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes29(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes29 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes3(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes3 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes30(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes30 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes31(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes31 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes32(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes32 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes4(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes4 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes5(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes5 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes6(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes6 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes7(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes7 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes8(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes8 type for v.\n\nTyped.bytes9(v: BytesLike)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new bytes9 type for v.\n\nTyped.from(type: string, value: any)⇒ Typed\nReturns a new Typed of type with the value.\n\nTyped.int(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int256 type for v.\n\nTyped.int104(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int104 type for v.\n\nTyped.int112(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int112 type for v.\n\nTyped.int120(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int120 type for v.\n\nTyped.int128(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int128 type for v.\n\nTyped.int136(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int136 type for v.\n\nTyped.int144(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int144 type for v.\n\nTyped.int152(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int52 type for v.\n\nTyped.int16(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int16 type for v.\n\nTyped.int160(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int160 type for v.\n\nTyped.int168(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int168 type for v.\n\nTyped.int176(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int176 type for v.\n\nTyped.int184(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int184 type for v.\n\nTyped.int192(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int92 type for v.\n\nTyped.int200(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int200 type for v.\n\nTyped.int208(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int208 type for v.\n\nTyped.int216(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int216 type for v.\n\nTyped.int224(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int224 type for v.\n\nTyped.int232(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int232 type for v.\n\nTyped.int24(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int24 type for v.\n\nTyped.int240(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int240 type for v.\n\nTyped.int248(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int248 type for v.\n\nTyped.int256(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int256 type for v.\n\nTyped.int32(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int32 type for v.\n\nTyped.int40(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int40 type for v.\n\nTyped.int48(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int48 type for v.\n\nTyped.int56(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int56 type for v.\n\nTyped.int64(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int64 type for v.\n\nTyped.int72(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int72 type for v.\n\nTyped.int8(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int8 type for v.\n\nTyped.int80(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int80 type for v.\n\nTyped.int88(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int88 type for v.\n\nTyped.int96(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new int96 type for v.\n\nTyped.overrides(v: Record< string, any >)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint8 type for v.\n\nTyped.string(v: string)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new string type for v.\n\nTyped.tuple(v: Array< any | Typed > | Record< string, any | Typed >, name?: string)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new tuple type for v, with the optional name.\n\nTyped.uint(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint256 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint104(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint104 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint112(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint112 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint120(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint120 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint128(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint128 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint136(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint136 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint144(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint144 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint152(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint152 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint16(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint16 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint160(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint160 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint168(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint168 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint176(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint176 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint184(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint184 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint192(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint192 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint200(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint200 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint208(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint208 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint216(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint216 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint224(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint224 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint232(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint232 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint24(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint24 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint240(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint240 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint248(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint248 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint256(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint256 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint32(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint32 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint40(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint40 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint48(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint48 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint56(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint56 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint64(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint64 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint72(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint72 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint8(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint8 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint80(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint80 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint88(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint88 type for v.\n\nTyped.uint96(v: BigNumberish)⇒ Typed\nReturn a new uint96 type for v.\n\nMETHODS\ntyped.defaultValue()⇒ string | number | bigint | Result\nThe default value returned by this type.\n\ntyped.format()⇒ string\nFormat the type as a Human-Readable type.\n\ntyped.isBigInt()⇒ boolean\nReturns true and provides a type guard is this is a TypedBigInt.\n\ntyped.isData()⇒ boolean\nReturns true and provides a type guard is this is a TypedData.\n\ntyped.isString()⇒ boolean\nReturns true and provides a type guard is this is a TypedString.\n\ntyped.maxValue()⇒ string | number | bigint\nThe maximum value for numeric types.\n\ntyped.minValue()⇒ string | number | bigint\nThe minimum value for numeric types.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nTyped.dereference(value: Typed | T, type: string)⇒ T\nIf the value is a Typed instance, validates the underlying value and returns it, otherwise returns value directly.\nThis is useful for functions that with to accept either a Typed object or values.\n\nTyped.isTyped(value: any)⇒ boolean\nReturns true only if value is a Typed instance.\n\ninterface TypedBigInt\ninherits from Typed\nA Typed that represents a numeric value.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntypedBigInt.value⇒ bigint\nThe value.\n\nMETHODS\ntypedBigInt.defaultValue()⇒ bigint\nThe default value for all numeric types is 0.\n\ntypedBigInt.maxValue()⇒ bigint\nThe minimum value for this type, accounting for bit-width.\n\ntypedBigInt.minValue()⇒ bigint\nThe minimum value for this type, accounting for bit-width and signed-ness.\n\ninterface TypedData\ninherits from Typed\nA Typed that represents a binary sequence of data as bytes.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntypedData.value⇒ string\nThe value.\n\nMETHODS\ntypedData.defaultValue()⇒ string\nThe default value for this type.\n\ninterface TypedString\ninherits from Typed\nA Typed that represents a UTF-8 sequence of bytes.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntypedString.value⇒ string\nThe value.\n\nMETHODS\ntypedString.defaultValue()⇒ string\nThe default value for the string type is the empty string (i.e. \"\").\n\n← Application Programming Interface\nABI Encoding→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on June 4, 2024, 5:00am.","tokens":6176,"crawled_at":1791193794458} +{"id":10288,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-update-crosschain-governance-parameters-for-avalanche-megaeth-soneium-and-x-layer/26127/4","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Temp Check] - Update Crosschain Governance Parameters for Avalanche, MegaETH, Soneium, and X Layer - #4 by Manugotsuka - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Temp Check] - Update Crosschain Governance Parameters for Avalanche, MegaETH, Soneium, and X Layer\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nManugotsuka\n\nJuly 2, 2026, 2:52pm\n\n4\n\nThe following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and discussion.\n\nWe voted FOR.\n\nCrosschain governance is an important part of how Uniswap operates across multiple networks, and it makes sense to keep that infrastructure up to date as deployments evolve and older messaging systems become less suitable.\n\nMoving Avalanche and MegaETH away from LayerZero v1 is a reasonable step. Given the direction of LayerZero v1 and the bridge work already done by the Uniswap Foundation, we think migrating these deployments to a more actively supported messaging path is the right direction.\n\nWe also support moving Soneium and X Layer away from aliased timelock ownership and toward CrossChainAccount contracts. Aliased ownership on OP Stack chains can be unintuitive and easier to mishandle, while CrossChainAccount provides a clearer and more explicit ownership structure for executing governance actions from Ethereum.\n\nBefore voting, we asked our Research Team to review the proposal. Their view was that the overall direction is sound: moving away from LayerZero v1 makes sense, and the proposed CrossChainAccount changes are a cleaner setup for Soneium and X Layer.\n\nThe main nuance they raised is around MegaETH. If a canonical bridge path is available there, it would be helpful to understand why the proposal uses Wormhole instead of the canonical bridge, especially when CrossChainAccount is already being used for other OP Stack deployments. This does not change our support for the proposal, but we think the design choice is worth clarifying.\n\nshow post in topic\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nRFC: Uniswap Universal Governance Module\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n21\n\n13381\n\nNovember 29, 2022\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nProposed Template for Future Cross-chain Deployment Proposals\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n6\n\n6473\n\nMay 6, 2022\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 on Avalanche\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n18\n\n10148\n\nAugust 25, 2023\n\n[Temperature Check] Fix the Cross Chain Messaging Bridge on Arbitrum\n\nTemperature Check\n\n8\n\n5320\n\nDecember 9, 2022","tokens":602,"crawled_at":1791193795895} +{"id":10289,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/nodes/full-node-streaming","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Full Node gRPC Streaming – dYdX Documentation","text":"Enable full node streaming to expose a stream of orderbook updates (L3), fills, taker orders, and subaccount updates, allowing clients to maintain a full view of the orderbook and various exchange activities. Note that the orderbook state can vary slightly between nodes due to dYdX's offchain orderbook design.\n\nLast updated for: v7.0.2\n\nEnabling Streaming\n\nFull node streaming supports two streaming protocols. Information can be streamed via gRPC or Websockets. Use the following flags to configure full node streaming features:\n\nCLI FlagTypeDefaultShort Explanation\ngrpc-streaming-enabled\nbool\nfalse\nToggle on to enable grpc-based full node streaming.\n\ngrpc-streaming-flush-interval-ms\nint\n50\nBuffer flush interval for batch emission of protocol-side updates.\n\ngrpc-streaming-max-batch-size\nint\n2000\nMaximum protocol-side update buffer before dropping all streaming connections.\n\ngrpc-streaming-max-channel-buffer-size\nint\n2000\nMaximum channel size before dropping slow or erroring grpc connections. Decreasing this will more aggressively drop slow client connections.\n\nwebsocket-streaming-enabled\nbool\nfalse\nToggle on to enable websocket-based streaming. Must be used in conjunction with grpc-streaming-enabled.\n\nwebsocket-streaming-port\nint\n9092\nPort number to expose for websocket streaming.\n\nfns-snapshot-interval\nint\n0\nIf set to a nonzero number, snapshots will be sent out at this block interval. Used for debugging purposes.\n\nConnecting to the Stream\n\nAfter setting up a full node with gRPC streaming enabled, you can connect to the stream using any gRPC client.\nTo follow along with Google's documentation on gRPC streaming clients:\n\nClone the github.com/dydxprotocol/v4-chain repository at the same version as your full node.\n\nGenerate the protos: make proto-gen && make proto-export-deps.\n\nThe generated protos are now in the .proto-export-deps directory.\n\nUse the protobuf compiler (protoc) to generate stubs in any supported language.\n\nFollow Google's documentation to write a client that can read from the stream.\n\nConnect to the stream defined in the dydxprotocol.clob.Query service (StreamOrderbookUpdates).\n\nFor Python, the corresponding code is already generated in the package v4-proto.\nFor Rust, install the crate dydx-proto.\n\nTo connect via websocket, connect to the specified websocket server port at endpoint /ws. Default port number is 9092, but it can be configured via CLI flag. There are two query parameters. clobPairIds is a list of CLOB pair IDs to subscribe to, and subaccountIds are a list of subaccount ids to subscribe to.\n\nMaintaining Orderbook and Subaccount State\n\nOverview\n\nConnect to the stream and subscribe to updates for a series of CLOB pair IDs, each of which corresponds to a tradeable instrument, and subaccount ids, each of which corresponds to a subaccount.\n\nDiscard order messages until you receive a StreamOrderbookUpdate with snapshot set to true. This message contains the full orderbook state for each CLOB pair.\n\nSimilarly, discard subaccount messages until you receive a StreamSubaccountUpdate with snapshot set to true. This message contains the full subaccount state for each subscribed subaccount.\n\nWhen you see an OrderPlaceV1 message, insert the order into the book at the end of the queue on its price level. Track the order's initial quantums (quantity) and total filled quantums.\n\nWhen you see an OrderUpdateV1 message, update the order's total filled quantums.\n\nWhen you see a ClobMatch (trade) message, update the total filled quantums for each maker order filled using the fill_amounts field.\n\nNote that, similar to OrderUpdateV1, the fill_amounts field represents the order's total filled quantity up to this point. This is not the amount filled in this specific match, but rather the cumulative amount filled across all matches for this order.\n\nThe order's quantity remaining is always its initial quantity minus its total filled quantity.\n\nNote that both OrderUpdateV1 and ClobMatch messages must be processed to maintain the correct book state. See OrderUpdateV1 for details.\n\nWhen you see an OrderRemoveV1 message, remove the order from the book.\n\nWhen you see a StreamSubaccountUpdate message with snapshot set to false, incrementally update the subaccount's balances and positions.\n\nWhen you see a StreamTakerOrder message, state does not need to be updated. Taker orders are purely informational and are emitted whenever a taker order enters the matching loop, regardless of success or failure.\n\nNote:\n\nThe order subticks (price) and quantums (quantity) fields are encoded as integers and\nrequire translation to human-readable values.\n\nEach node's view of the book is subjective, because order messages arrive at different nodes in different orders. When a block is proposed, nodes \"sync\" subsets of their book states to cohere with the trades seen by the block proposer.\n\nOnly ClobMatch messages with execModeFinalize are trades confirmed by consensus.\n\nUse all ClobMatch messages to update the orderbook state. The node's book state is optimistic, and reverts if fills are not confirmed, in which case a series of OrderRemoveV1, OrderPlaceV1 and OrderUpdateV1 messages are sent to represent the modifications to the full node's book state.\n\nTreat only ClobMatch messages with execModeFinalize as confirmed trades.\n\nSee Reference Material for more information.\n\nRequest / Response\n\nTo subscribe to the stream, the client can send a 'StreamOrderbookUpdatesRequest' specifying the CLOB pair IDs and subaccount ids to subscribe to.\n\nProtobuf Structs// StreamOrderbookUpdatesRequest is a request message for the\n// StreamOrderbookUpdates method.\nmessage StreamOrderbookUpdatesRequest {\n// Clob pair ids to stream orderbook updates for.\nrepeated uint32 clob_pair_id = 1;\n\n// Subaccount ids to stream subaccount updates for.\nrepeated dydxprotocol.subaccounts.SubaccountId subaccount_ids = 2;\n}\n\nResponse will contain a oneof field that contains either:\n\nStreamOrderbookUpdate\n\nContains one or more OffChainUpdateV1 orderbook updates (Add/Remove/Update)\n\nboolean field indicating if the updates are coming from a snapshot or not.\n\nStreamOrderbookFill\n\nContains a singular ClobMatch object describing a fill (order or liquidation).\n\nRepresents one taker order matched with 1 or more maker orders.\n\nMatched quantums are provided for each pair in the match.\n\norders field contains full order information at time of matching. Contains all maker and taker orders involved in the ClobMatch object.\n\nPrices within a Match are matched at the maker order price.\n\nfill_amounts contains the absolute, total filled quantums of each order as stored in state.\n\nfill_amounts should be zipped together with the orders field. Both arrays should have the same length.\n\nStreamTakerOrder\n\nContains a oneof TakerOrder field which represents the order that entered the matching loop.\n\nCould be a regular order or a Liquidation Order.\n\nContains a StreamTakerOrderStatus field which represents the status of a taker order after it has finished the matching loop.\n\nOrderStatus is a uint32 describing the result of the taker order matching. Only value 0 indicates success. Possible values found here.\n\n@jonfung to update to static link\n\nRemainingQuantums represents the remaining amount of non-matched quantums for the taker order.\n\nOptimisticallyFilledQuantums represents the number of quantums filled during this matching loop. It does not include quantums filled before this matching loop, if the order was a replacement order and was previously filled.\n\nStreamSubaccountUpdate\n\nContains a singular SubaccountId object to identify the subaccount.\n\nmultiple SubaccountPerpetualPositions to represent the perpetual positions of the subaccount.\n\neach SubaccountPerpetualPosition contains a perpetual id and the size of the position in base quantums.\n\nmultiple SubaccountAssetPositions to represent the asset positions of the subaccount. (i.e, usdc collateral positions)\n\neach SubaccountAssetPosition contains an asset id and the size of the position in base quantums.\n\nas well as block_height and exec_mode (see Exec Modes Reference).\n\nProtobuf Structs// StreamOrderbookUpdatesResponse is a response message for the\n// StreamOrderbookUpdates method.\nmessage StreamOrderbookUpdatesResponse {\n// Batch of updates for the clob pair.\nrepeated StreamUpdate updates = 1 [ (gogoproto.nullable) = false ];\n}\n\n// StreamUpdate is an update that will be pushed through the\n// gRPC stream.\nmessage StreamUpdate {\n// Contains one of an StreamOrderbookUpdate,\n// StreamOrderbookFill, StreamTakerOrderStatus, StreamSubaccountUpdate.\noneof update_message {\nStreamOrderbookUpdate orderbook_update = 1;\nStreamOrderbookFill order_fill = 2;\nStreamTakerOrder taker_order = 3;\ndydxprotocol.subaccounts.StreamSubaccountUpdate subaccount_update = 4;\n}\n\n// Block height of the update.\nuint32 block_height = 5;\n\n// Exec mode of the update.\nuint32 exec_mode = 6;\n}\n\n// StreamOrderbookUpdate provides information on an orderbook update. Used in\n// the full node gRPC stream.\nmessage StreamOrderbookUpdate {\n// Orderbook updates for the clob pair. Can contain order place, removals,\n// or updates.\nrepeated dydxprotocol.indexer.off_chain_updates.OffChainUpdateV1 updates = 1\n[ (gogoproto.nullable) = false ];\n\n// Snapshot indicates if the response is from a snapshot of the orderbook.\n// This is true for the initial response and false for all subsequent updates.\n// Note that if the snapshot is true, then all previous entries should be\n// discarded and the orderbook should be resynced.\nbool snapshot = 2;\n}\n\n// StreamOrderbookFill provides information on an orderbook fill. Used in\n// the full node gRPC stream.\nmessage StreamOrderbookFill {\n// Clob match. Provides information on which orders were matched\n// and the type of order.\nClobMatch clob_match = 1;\n\n// All orders involved in the specified clob match. Used to look up\n// price of a match through a given maker order id.\nrepeated Order orders = 2 [ (gogoproto.nullable) = false ];\n\n// Resulting fill amounts for each order in the orders array.\nrepeated uint64 fill_amounts = 3 [ (gogoproto.nullable) = false ];\n}\n\n// StreamTakerOrder provides information on a taker order that was attempted\n// to be matched on the orderbook.\n// It is intended to be used only in full node streaming.\nmessage StreamTakerOrder {\n// The taker order that was matched on the orderbook. Can be a\n// regular order or a liquidation order.\noneof taker_order {\nOrder order = 1;\nStreamLiquidationOrder liquidation_order = 2;\n}\n\n// Information on the taker order after it is matched on the book,\n// either successfully or unsuccessfully.\nStreamTakerOrderStatus taker_order_status = 3;\n}\n\n// StreamTakerOrderStatus is a representation of a taker order\n// after it is attempted to be matched on the orderbook.\n// It is intended to be used only in full node streaming.\nmessage StreamTakerOrderStatus {\n// The state of the taker order after attempting to match it against the\n// orderbook. Possible enum values can be found here:\n// https://github.com/dydxprotocol/v4-chain/blob/main/protocol/x/clob/types/orderbook.go#L105\nuint32 order_status = 1;\n\n// The amount of remaining (non-matched) base quantums of this taker order.\nuint64 remaining_quantums = 2;\n\n// The amount of base quantums that were *optimistically* filled for this\n// taker order when the order is matched against the orderbook. Note that if\n// any quantums of this order were optimistically filled or filled in state\n// before this invocation of the matching loop, this value will not include\n// them.\nuint64 optimistically_filled_quantums = 3;\n}\n\n// StreamSubaccountUpdate provides information on a subaccount update. Used in\n// the full node GRPC stream.\nmessage StreamSubaccountUpdate {\nSubaccountId subaccount_id = 1;\n// updated_perpetual_positions will each be for unique perpetuals.\nrepeated SubaccountPerpetualPosition updated_perpetual_positions = 2;\n// updated_asset_positions will each be for unique assets.\nrepeated SubaccountAssetPosition updated_asset_positions = 3;\n// Snapshot indicates if the response is from a snapshot of the subaccount.\n// All updates should be ignored until snapshot is received.\n// If the snapshot is true, then all previous entries should be\n// discarded and the subaccount should be resynced.\n// For a snapshot subaccount update, the `updated_perpetual_positions` and\n// `updated_asset_positions` fields will contain the full state of the\n// subaccount.\nbool snapshot = 4;\n}\n\n// SubaccountPerpetualPosition provides information on a subaccount's updated\n// perpetual positions.\nmessage SubaccountPerpetualPosition {\n// The `Id` of the `Perpetual`.\nuint32 perpetual_id = 1;\n// The size of the position in base quantums. Negative means short.\nint64 quantums = 2;\n}\n\n// SubaccountAssetPosition provides information on a subaccount's updated asset\n// positions.\nmessage SubaccountAssetPosition {\n// The `Id` of the `Asset`.\nuint32 asset_id = 1;\n// The absolute size of the position in base quantums.\nuint64 quantums = 2;\n}\n\nAfter subscribing to the orderbook updates, use the orderbook in the snapshot as the starting orderbook.\nSimilarly, use the subaccount state in the snapshot as the starting subaccount state.\n\nOrderPlaceV1\n\nWhen OrderPlaceV1 is received, add the corresponding order to the end of the price level.\n\nThis message is only used to modify the orderbook data structure (Bids, Asks).\n\nThis message is sent out whenever an order is added to the in-memory orderbook.\n\nThis may occur in various places such as when an order is initially placed, or when an order is replayed during the ProcessCheckState step.\n\nAn OrderPlaceV1 message is always be followed by an OrderUpdateV1 message, which sets the intial fill amount (typically zero).\n\nCode Snippetfunc (l *LocalOrderbook) AddOrder(order v1types.IndexerOrder) {\nl.Lock()\ndefer l.Unlock()\n\nif _, ok := l.OrderIdToOrder[order.OrderId]; ok {\nl.Logger.Error(\"order already exists in orderbook\")\n}\n\nsubticks := order.GetSubticks()\nif order.Side == v1types.IndexerOrder_SIDE_BUY {\nif _, ok := l.Bids[subticks]; !ok {\nl.Bids[subticks] = make([]v1types.IndexerOrder, 0)\n}\nl.Bids[subticks] = append(l.Bids[subticks], order)\n} else {\nif _, ok := l.Asks[subticks]; !ok {\nl.Asks[subticks] = make([]v1types.IndexerOrder, 0)\n}\nl.Asks[subticks] = append(l.Asks[subticks], order)\n}\n\nl.OrderIdToOrder[order.OrderId] = order\nl.OrderRemainingAmount[order.OrderId] = 0\n}\n\nOrderUpdateV1\n\nWhen OrderUpdateV1 is received, update the order's fill amount to the amount specified.\n\nThis message is only used to update fill amounts. It carries information about an order's updated fill amount.\n\nThis message is emitted when an order's fill amount changes due to something other than a ClobMatch.\n\nThis includes when deliverState is reset to the checkState from last block, or when branched state is written to and then discarded if there was a matching error.\n\nFor example, this could happen if the full node sees the order filled, and then the next block committed by consensus does not contain the expected fill, so the order’s quantity remaining resets to its state from the previous block.\n\nAn update message will always accompany an order placement message.\n\nIt's possible for an update message to be sent before a placement message. You can safely ignore update messages with order ids not in the orderbook.\n\nNote that you must handle both OrderUpdateV1 and ClobMatch messages to maintain the correct book state.\n\nCode Snippetfunc (l *LocalOrderbook) SetOrderFillAmount(\norderId *v1types.IndexerOrderId,\nfillAmount uint64,\n) {\nl.Lock()\ndefer l.Unlock()\n\nif fillAmount == 0 {\ndelete(l.FillAmounts, *orderId)\n} else {\nl.FillAmounts[*orderId] = fillAmount\n}\n}\n\nOrderRemoveV1\n\nWhen OrderRemoveV1 is received, remove the order from the orderbook.\n\nThis message is only used to modify the orderbook data structure (Bids, Asks).\n\nThis message is emitted when an order is removed from the in-memory orderbook.\n\nNote that this does not mean the fills are removed from state yet.\n\nWhen fills are removed from state, a separate Update message will be sent with 0 quantum.\n\nCode Snippetfunc (l *LocalOrderbook) RemoveOrder(orderId v1types.IndexerOrderId) {\nl.Lock()\ndefer l.Unlock()\n\nif _, ok := l.OrderIdToOrder[orderId]; !ok {\nl.Logger.Error(\"order not found in orderbook\")\n}\n\norder := l.OrderIdToOrder[orderId]\nsubticks := order.GetSubticks()\n\nif order.Side == v1types.IndexerOrder_SIDE_BUY {\nfor i, o := range l.Bids[subticks] {\nif o.OrderId == order.OrderId {\nl.Bids[subticks] = append(\nl.Bids[subticks][:i],\nl.Bids[subticks][i+1:]...,\n)\nbreak\n}\n}\nif len(l.Bids[subticks]) == 0 {\ndelete(l.Bids, subticks)\n}\n} else {\nfor i, o := range l.Asks[subticks] {\nif o.OrderId == order.OrderId {\nl.Asks[subticks] = append(\nl.Asks[subticks][:i],\nl.Asks[subticks][i+1:]...,\n)\nbreak\n}\n}\nif len(l.Asks[subticks]) == 0 {\ndelete(l.Asks, subticks)\n}\n}\ndelete(l.OrderIdToOrder, orderId)\n}\n\nStreamOrderbookFill/ClobMatch\n\nThis message is only used to update fill amounts, it does not add or remove orders from the book but can change the quantity remaining for open orders.\n\nThe ClobMatch data structure contains either a MatchOrders or a MatchPerpetualLiquidation object. Match Deleveraging events are not emitted. Within each Match object, a MakerFill array contains the various maker orders that matched with the singular taker order and the amount of quantums matched.\n\nNote that all matches occur at the maker order price. The orders field in the StreamOrderbookFill object allow for price lookups based on order id. It contains all the maker order ids, and in the case of non-liquidation orders, it has the taker order.\n\nMapping each order in orders to the corresponding value in the fill_amounts field provides the absolute filled amount of quantums that each order is filled to after the ClobMatch was processed.\n\nCode Snippet// fillAmountMap is a map of order ids to fill amounts.\n// The SetOrderFillAmount code can be found in `the `OrderUpdateV1` section.\nfunc (c *GrpcClient) ProcessMatchOrders(\nmatchOrders *clobtypes.MatchOrders,\norderMap map[clobtypes.OrderId]clobtypes.Order,\nfillAmountMap map[clobtypes.OrderId]uint64,\n) {\ntakerOrderId := matchOrders.TakerOrderId\nclobPairId := takerOrderId.GetClobPairId()\nlocalOrderbook := c.Orderbook[clobPairId]\n\nindexerTakerOrder := v1.OrderIdToIndexerOrderId(takerOrderId)\nlocalOrderbook.SetOrderFillAmount(&indexerTakerOrder, fillAmountMap[takerOrderId])\n\nfor _, fill := range matchOrders.Fills {\nmakerOrder := orderMap[fill.MakerOrderId]\nindexerMakerOrder := v1.OrderIdToIndexerOrderId(makerOrder.OrderId)\nlocalOrderbook.SetOrderFillAmount(&indexerMakerOrder, fillAmountMap[makerOrder.OrderId])\n}\n}\n\nfunc (c *GrpcClient) ProcessMatchPerpetualLiquidation(\nperpLiquidation *clobtypes.MatchPerpetualLiquidation,\norderMap map[clobtypes.OrderId]clobtypes.Order,\nfillAmountMap map[clobtypes.OrderId]uint64,\n) {\nlocalOrderbook := c.Orderbook[perpLiquidation.ClobPairId]\nfor _, fill := range perpLiquidation.GetFills() {\nmakerOrder := orderMap[fill.MakerOrderId]\nindexerMakerOrderId := v1.OrderIdToIndexerOrderId(makerOrder.OrderId)\nlocalOrderbook.SetOrderFillAmount(&indexerMakerOrderId, fillAmountMap[makerOrder.OrderId])\n}\n}\n\nStreamSubaccountUpdate\n\nThis message is used to update subaccount balances and positions.\n\nThe initial message for a subaccount will have snapshot set to true. This message contains the full state of the subaccount. All updates should be ignored until the snapshot is received. Subsequent updates will contain updates to the positions and balances of the subaccount. They should be merged in with the existing state of the subaccount.\n\nApart from the initial snapshot, this mesage will only be sent out for subaccount updates that are in consensus.\n\nCode Snippettype SubaccountId struct {\nOwner string\nNumber int\n}\n\ntype SubaccountPerpetualPosition struct {\nPerpetualId int\nQuantums int\n}\n\ntype SubaccountAssetPosition struct {\nAssetId int\nQuantums int\n}\n\ntype SubaccountState struct {\nSubaccountId SubaccountId\nPerpetualPositions map[int]SubaccountPerpetualPosition\nAssetPositions map[int]SubaccountAssetPosition\n}\n\nfunc (c *GrpcClient) ProcessSubaccountUpdate(\nsubaccountUpdate *satypes.StreamSubaccountUpdate,\nsubaccountMap map[satypes.SubaccountId]SubaccountState,\n) {\n// Extract the subaccount ID from the update\nsubaccountId := *subaccountUpdate.SubaccountId\n\n// Check if this is a snapshot\nif subaccountUpdate.Snapshot {\n// Replace the entire subaccount state with the snapshot data\nsubaccountState := SubaccountState{\nSubaccountId: subaccountId,\nPerpetualPositions: make(map[int]SubaccountPerpetualPosition),\nAssetPositions: make(map[int]SubaccountAssetPosition),\n}\n\n// Populate perpetual positions from snapshot\nfor _, perpPositionUpdate := range subaccountUpdate.UpdatedPerpetualPositions {\nsubaccountState.PerpetualPositions[perpPositionUpdate.PerpetualId] = *perpPositionUpdate\n}\n\n// Populate asset positions from snapshot\nfor _, assetPositionUpdate := range subaccountUpdate.UpdatedAssetPositions {\nsubaccountState.AssetPositions[assetPositionUpdate.AssetId] = *assetPositionUpdate\n}\n\n// Update the map with the new snapshot state\nsubaccountMap[subaccountId] = subaccountState\n} else {\n// If not a snapshot, retrieve or initialize the current subaccount state\nsubaccountState, exists := subaccountMap[subaccountId]\nif !exists {\nsubaccountState = SubaccountState{\nSubaccountId: subaccountId,\nPerpetualPositions: make(map[int]SubaccountPerpetualPosition),\nAssetPositions: make(map[int]SubaccountAssetPosition),\n}\n}\n\n// Update perpetual positions\nfor _, perpPositionUpdate := range subaccountUpdate.UpdatedPerpetualPositions {\nif perpPositionUpdate.Quantums != 0 {\nsubaccountState.PerpetualPositions[perpPositionUpdate.PerpetualId] = *perpPositionUpdate\n} else {\n// Delete the entry if the position size is zero\ndelete(subaccountState.PerpetualPositions, perpPositionUpdate.PerpetualId)\n}\n}\n\n// Update asset positions\nfor _, assetPositionUpdate := range subaccountUpdate.UpdatedAssetPositions {\nif assetPositionUpdate.Quantums != 0 {\nsubaccountState.AssetPositions[assetPositionUpdate.AssetId] = *assetPositionUpdate\n} else {\n// Delete the entry if the asset quantity is zero\ndelete(subaccountState.AssetPositions, assetPositionUpdate.AssetId)\n}\n}\n\n// Update the map with the modified state\nsubaccountMap[subaccountId] = subaccountState\n}\n}\n\nStreamTakerOrder\n\nThis message is purely an informational message used to indicate whenever a taker order is matched against the orderbook. No internal state in clients need to be updated.\n\nInformation provided in the struct:\n\nOne of (taker order, liquidation order) entering matching loop\n\nStatus of order after matching. If order failed to match, status code provides the reason for failure (i.e post only order crosses book)\n\nRemaining non-matched quantums for the taker order\n\nQuantity of optimistically matched quantums during this matching order loop.\n\nNote that by protocol design, all StreamTakerOrderStatus emissions will be optimistic from CheckTx state. This is due to the fact that each node maintains it's own orderbook, thus all matching operations when a taker order enters the matching loop will be optimistic. If confirmed fill amounts in consensus are desired, StreamOrderbookFill objects will be emitted during DeliverTx for proposed blocks.\n\nCode Snippettype StreamTakerOrderStatus struct {\nOrderStatus uint32\nRemainingQuantums uint64\nOptimisticallyFilledQuantums uint64\n}\n\nfunc (c *GrpcClient) ProcessStreamTakerOrder(\nstreamTakerOrder *satypes.StreamTakerOrder,\n) {\ntakerOrder := streamTakerOrder.GetOrder()\ntakerOrderLiquidation := streamTakerOrder.GetLiquidationOrder()\ntakerOrderStatus := streamTakerOrder.GetTakerOrderStatus()\nif takerOrderStatus.OrderStatus == 0 || takerOrderStatus.OrderStatus == 0 {\nif takerOrder != nil {\n// Process success of regular taker order\n}\nif takerOrderLiquidation != nil {\n// Process success of liquidation taker order\n}\n}\n}\n\nReference Material\n\nOptimistic Orderbook Execution\n\nBy protocol design, each validator has their own version of the orderbook and optimistically processes orderbook matches. As a result, you may see interleaved sequences of order removals, placements, and state fill amount updates when optimistically processed orderbook matches are removed and later replayed on the local orderbook.\n\nNote that DeliverTx maps to exec mode execModeFinalize.\n\nStaged DeliverTx Validation\n\nIn DeliverTx, all of the updates emitted are finalized and in consensus. A batch of updates will be sent out in the same StreamOrderbookUpdatesResponse object. In consensus, fills and subaccount updates will be emitted.\n\nFinalized Subaccount Updates\n\nOnly finalized subaccount updates are sent. Snapshots are sent during PrepareCheckState, so the execMode will be set to 102 for subaccount snapshots. Finalized incremental subaccount updates are sent with execMode 7.\n\nExec Mode Reference\n\nExec Modes execModeCheck = 0 // Check a transaction\nexecModeReCheck = 1 // Recheck a (pending) transaction after a commit\nexecModeSimulate = 2 // Simulate a transaction\nexecModePrepareProposal = 3 // Prepare a block proposal\nexecModeProcessProposal = 4 // Process a block proposal\nexecModeVoteExtension = 5 // Extend or verify a pre-commit vote\nexecModeVerifyVoteExtension = 6 // Verify a vote extension\nexecModeFinalize = 7 // Finalize a block proposal\nExecModeBeginBlock = 100\nExecModeEndBlock = 101\nExecModePrepareCheckState = 102\n\nTaker Order Status Reference\n\nValues are defined in code here.\n\n@jonfung to update to static link\n\nValueStatusDescription\n0\nSuccess\nOrder was successfully matched and/or added to the orderbook.\n\n1\nUndercollateralized\nOrder failed collateralization checks when matching or placed on orderbook. Order was cancelled.\n\n2\nInternalError\nOrder caused internal error and was cancelled.\n\n3\nImmediateOrCancelWouldRestOnBook\nOrder is an IOC order that would have been placed on the orderbook. Order was cancelled.\n\n4\nReduceOnlyResized\nOrder was resized since it would have changed the user's position size.\n\n5\nLiquidationRequiresDeleveraging\nNot enough liquidity to liquidate the subaccount profitably on the orderbook. Order was not fully matched because insurance fund did not have enough funds to cover losses from performing liquidation. Subaccount requires deleveraging.\n\n6\nLiquidationExceededSubaccountMaxNotionalLiquidated\nLiquidation order could not be matched because it exceeds the max notional liquidated in this block.\n\n7\nLiquidationExceededSubaccountMaxInsuranceLost\nLiquidation order could not be matched because it exceeds the max funds lost for hte insurance fund in this block.\n\n8\nViolatesIsolatedSubaccountConstraints\nMatching this order would lead to the subaccount violating isolated perpetual constraints. Order was cancelled.\n\n9\nPostOnlyWouldCrossMakerOrder\nMatching this order would lead to the post only taker order crossing the orderbook. Order wasa cancelled.\n\nExample Scenario\n\nTrader places a bid at price 100 for size 1\n\nOrderPlace, price = 100, size = 1\n\nOrderUpdate, total filled amount = 0\n\nTrader replaces that original bid to be price 99 at size 2\n\nOrderRemove\n\nOrderPlace, price = 99, size = 2\n\nOrderUpdate, total filled amount = 0\n\nAnother trader submits an IOC ask at price 100 for size 1.\n\nFull node doesn't see this matching anything so no updates.\n\nBlock is confirmed that there was a fill for the trader's original order at price 100 for size 1 (block proposer didn't see the order replacement)\n\nOrderUpdate, set total fill amount to be 0 (no-op) from checkState -> deliverState reset\n\nMatchOrder emitted for block proposer's original order match, total filled amount = 1\n\nMetrics and Logs\n\nMetricTypeExplanation\ngrpc_send_orderbook_updates_latency.quantile\nhistogram\nLatency for each orderbook cache buffer enqueue\n\ngrpc_send_orderbook_updates_latency.count\ncount\nnumber orderbook updates enqueued in cache buffer\n\ngrpc_send_orderbook_snapshot_latency.quantile\nhistogram\nLatency for each snapshot orderbook emission\n\ngrpc_send_orderbook_snapshot_latency.count\ncount\nnumber of order book snapshots emitted\n\ngrpc_send_subaccount_update_count\ncount\nNumber of subaccount updates emitted\n\ngrpc_send_orderbook_fills_latency.quantile\nhistogram\nLatency for each orderbook fill cache buffer enqueue\n\ngrpc_send_orderbook_fills_latency.count\ncount\nnumber orderbook snapshots enqueued in cache buffer\n\ngrpc_add_update_to_buffer_count\ncount\nNumber of total update objects added to the cache buffer\n\ngrpc_add_to_subscription_channel_count\ncount\nNumber of updates added to each per-subscription channel buffer. Tagged by subscription_id.\n\ngrpc_send_response_to_subscriber_count\ncount\nNumber of updates sent from each per-subscription channel buffer to the client. Tagged by subscription_id.\n\ngrpc_stream_subscriber_count\ncount\nnumber of streaming connections currently connected to the full node\n\ngrpc_stream_num_updates_buffered\nhistogram\nnumber of updates in the full node's buffer cache of updates. Once this hits grpc-streaming-max-batch-size, all subscriptions will be dropped. Use with quantile:0.99 in order to observe maximum amount of updates.\n\ngrpc_flush_updates_latency.count\ncount\nnumber of times the buffer cache is flushed.\n\ngrpc_flush_updates_latency.quantile\nhistogram\nLatency of each buffer cache flush call into subscription channel.\n\ngrpc_subscription_channel_length.quantile\nhistogram\nLength of each subscription's channel buffer. Tagged by subscription_id. Use with quantile:0.99 in order to observe subscription channel length for subscription ids. Once this hits grpc-streaming-max-channel-buffer-size, the offending subscription will be dropped.\n\nAll logs from grpc streaming are tagged with module: full-node-streaming.\n\nProtocol-side buffering and Slow gRPC Client Connections\n\nThe full node maintains a length-configurable buffer cache of streaming updates to ensure bursts of protocol updates do not induce full node lag. If the buffer reaches maximum capacity, all connections and updates are dropped, and subscribers will have to re-subscribe. The buffer is periodically flushed into each per-subscription golang channel at a configurable set interval of time, defaulting to 50ms.\n\nTo ensure slow client connections do not induce full node lag, each client subscription has a unique goroutine and golang channel that pushes updates through the grpc stream. If the channel buffer grows beyond the configurable grpc-streaming-max-channel-buffer-size parameter, the goroutine will be stopped. With the poller gone, the channel buffer will eventually grow and hit the max buffer size, at which the lagging subscription is pruned.\n\nMetrics and logs are emitted to help tune both of these parameters.\n\nFAQs\n\nQ: Suppose the full node saw the cancellation of order X at t0 before the placement of the order X at t1. What would the updates be like?\n\nA: No updates because the order was never added to the book.\n\nQ: A few questions because it often results in crossed books:\nIn which cases shall we not expect to see OrderRemove message?\n\nPost only reject? → PO reject won’t have a removal since they were never added to the book;\n\nIOC/FOK auto cancel? → IOC/FOK also won’t have a removal message for similar reason;\n\nOrder expired outside of block window? → Expired orders will generate a removal message;\n\nPassive limit order was fully filled → Fully filled maker will generate a removal message;\n\nAggressive limit order was fully filled? → Fully filled taker won’t have a removal.\n\nQ: Why does StreamOrderbookUpdate use IndexerOrderId and StreamOrderbookFill use dydxprotocol.OrderId?\n\nA: gRPC streaming exposes inner structs of the matching engine and our updates are processed differently from fills. The two data structures have equivalent fields, and a lightweight translation layer to go from Indexer OrderId to Protocol OrderId can be written.\n\nQ: I only want to listen to confirmed updates. I do not want to process optimistic fills.\n\nA: You will want to only process messages from DeliverTx stage (execModeFinalize). This step is when we save proposed matches from the block proposer into state. These updates will have exec mode execModeFinalize.\n\nQ: Why do I see an Order Update message for a new OrderId before an Order Place message?\n\nA: During DeliverTx, the first step we do is to reset fill amounts (via OrderUpdate messages) for all orders involved in the proposed and local operations queue due to the deliver state being reset to the check state from last block. We \"reset\" fill order amounts to 0 for orders that the block proposer has seen but has not gossiped to our full node yet. In the future, we may reduce the number of messages that are sent, but for now we are optimizing for orderbook correctness.\n\nQ: How do I print the gRPC stream at the command line?\n\nA: Use the grpcurl tool. Connect to a full node stream with:\n\ngrpcurl -plaintext -d '{\"clobPairId\":[0,1], \"subaccountIds\": [{\"owner\": \"dydx1nzuttarf5k2j0nug5yzhr6p74t9avehn9hlh8m\", \"number\": 0}]}' 127.0.0.1:9090 dydxprotocol.clob.Query/StreamOrderbookUpdates\n\nQ: Is there a sample client?\n\nA: Example client which subscribes to the stream and maintains a local orderbook: dydxprotocol/grpc-stream-client\n\nChangelog\n\nv7.0.2\n\nperp position to signed int for tracking long/short positions\n\nv6.0.8\n\nadded taker order message to stream\n\nadded subaccount update message to stream\n\nFinalized DeliverTx updates are all batched together in a single message\n\nMetrics modifications\n\nWebsocket support\n\nv5.0.5\n\nadded update batching and per-channel channel/goroutines to not block full node on laggy subscriptions\n\nProtobuf breaking change: Shifted block height and exec mode from StreamOrderbookUpdatesResponse to StreamUpdate\n\nMetrics","tokens":8407,"crawled_at":1791193796114} +{"id":10290,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands/autonomy_service","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"autonomy service - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy service\n\nTools to manage AI agents minted in the Olas Protocol.\n\nThis command group consists of a number of functionalities to manage the life cycle of AI agents that have been minted in the Olas Protocol.\n\nInfo\n\nYou can specify how you wish to sign the on-chain transactions produced by these commands: either with a private key stored in a file, or with a hardware wallet. In this latter case, ensure that you have configured properly the drivers for your hardware wallet.\n\nOptions\n\n--dry-run\nPerform a dry run for the transaction.\n--use-celo\nUse the Celo chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-base\nUse the Base chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-optimism\nUse the Optimism chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-arbitrum-one\nUse the Arbitrum One chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-gnosis\nUse the Gnosis chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-polygon\nUse the Polygon chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n--use-ethereum\nUse the Ethereum chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts.\n\nTo use these chain profiles, you have to export an environment variable that defines the RPC endpoint in the format _CHAIN_RPC. For example, if you want to use Ethereum (--use-ethereum), you have to export ETHEREUM_CHAIN_RPC.\n\n--use-custom-chain\n\nUse the custom-chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts. This profile requires that you define some parameters and contract addresses as environment variables (see also the Olas Protocol documentation for more information):\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_RPC : RPC endpoint for the custom chain.\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_ID : chain ID.\n\nCUSTOM_COMPONENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_AGENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_REGISTRIES_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS†\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS†\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS‡\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS‡\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\nNote\n\nFor L2 chains you are only required to set\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS†\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS†\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS‡\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS‡\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n† Required only if --use-recovery is not specified.\n\n‡ Required only if --use-recovery is specified.\n\n--use-local\nUse the local chain profile to interact with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts. This option requires that you have a local Hardhat node with the required contracts deployed.\n\nNote\n\nThe chain profile flags (--use-ethereum, etc.) are mutually exclusive.\n\n--use-recovery\nUse a multisig with a recovery module when deploying or redeploying the AI agent. This module allows ownership of the AI agent multisig to be transferred to the AI agent owner if the agent instances have not done so. This functionality is only available during the Pre-Registration phase and is executed automatically when activating the AI agent. See notes † and ‡ above.\n-t, --timeout FLOAT\nTimeout for on-chain interactions\n-r, --retries INTEGER\nMax retries for on-chain interactions\n--sleep FLOAT\nSleep period between retries\n\nautonomy service info\n\nPrint AI agent information.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service info AI_AGENT_ID\n\nExamples\n\n$ autonomy service info 3\n\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Property | Value |\n+===========================+==============================================+\n| Service State | DEPLOYED |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Security Deposit | 1000 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Multisig Address | 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Cannonical Agents | 1 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Max Agents | 4 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Threshold | 3 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Number Of Agent Instances | 4 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n| Registered Instances | - 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |\n| | - 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |\n| | - 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |\n| | - 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |\n+---------------------------+----------------------------------------------+\n\nautonomy service activate\n\nActivate an AI agent minted in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service activate [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--token ERC20_TOKEN_ADDRESS\nERC20 token to use for activating the AI agent. You must specify the same token used when minting the AI agent. See the autonomy mint service command.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo activate an AI agent with ID 42 in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nautonomy service activate 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service activate 42 --hwi\n\nIf an ERC20 token was used as bonding token when the AI agent was minted, then you have to provide the same token address using the --token flag:\n\nautonomy service activate 42 --key my_key.txt --token \n\nMake sure your account holds enough funds for activating the AI agent:\n\nautonomy service register\n\nRegister an agent instance in an AI agent minted and activated in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service register [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n-i, --instance AGENT_ADDRESS\nAgent instance address.\n-a, --agent-id AGENT_ID\nCanonical agent ID.\n--token ERC20_TOKEN_ADDRESS\nERC20 token to use as bond for the agent instance. You must specify the same token used when minting the AI agent. See the autonomy mint service command.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo register an agent instance of blueprint ID 56 with address 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266 on the AI agent with ID 42 in the protocol:\n\nautonomy service register -i 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266 -a 56 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service register -i 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266 -a 56 42 --hwi\n\nWhen providing the agent instance address make sure that the address you provide is funded.\n\nIf an ERC20 token was used as bonding token when the AI agent was minted, then you have to provide the same token address using the --token flag:\n\nautonomy service register -i 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266 -a 56 42 --hwi --token \n\nMake sure your account holds enough funds to pay for the agent instance bonds.\n\nautonomy service deploy\n\nDeploy an AI agent in the Autonolas Protocol.\n\nThis command can be executed after all agent instance slots have been registered in the corresponding AI agent.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service deploy [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--reuse-multisig\nReuse mutlisig from previous deployment.\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n-f, --fallback-handler ADDRESS\nFallback handler address for the gnosis safe multisig.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo deploy an AI agent with ID 42 in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nautonomy service deploy 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service deploy 42 --hwi\n\nautonomy service terminate\n\nTerminate an AI agent.\n\nThis command can be executed after the AI agent is activated.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service terminate [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo terminate the AI agent with ID 42 in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nautonomy service terminate 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service terminate 42 --hwi\n\nautonomy service unbond\n\nUnbond an AI agent.\n\nThis command can be executed after the AI agent is terminated.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service unbond [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo unbond an AI agent with ID 42 in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nautonomy service unbond 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service unbond 42 --hwi\n\nautonomy service recover-multisig\n\nRecover the AI agent multisig.\n\nThis command allows the AI agent owner to reclaim the multisig wallet from the\nprevious deployment if it was not properly transferred by the agent instances after\nAI agent termination.\n\nAI agent multisig recovery is only possible if:\n- The original deployment was performed with the --use-recovery-module flag.\n- The AI agent is currently in the PRE_REGISTRATION state (i.e., all operators have unbonded).\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy service recover-multisig [OPTIONS] AI_AGENT_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--key FILE\nUse a private key from a file to sign the transactions.\n--hwi\nUse a hardware wallet to sign the transactions.\n--password PASSWORD\nPassword for the key file.\n\nExamples\n\nTo recover the multisig of AI agent with ID 42 in the Autonolas Protocol:\n\nautonomy service recover-multisig 42 --key my_key.txt\n\nSame as above, but using a hardware wallet:\n\nautonomy service recover-multisig 42 --hwi","tokens":2533,"crawled_at":1791193807025} +{"id":10291,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/crypto","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHash Functions\nHMAC\nPasswords\nRandom Values\nSigning\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Cryptographic Functions\nCryptographic Functions\nA fundamental building block of Ethereum is the underlying cryptographic primitives.\n\nFUNCTIONS\nlock()⇒ void\nOnce called, prevents any future change to the underlying cryptographic primitives using the .register feature for hooks.\n\nHash Functions\nCryptographic hashing functions\n\nFUNCTIONS\nkeccak256(data: BytesLike)⇒ DataHexstring\nCompute the cryptographic KECCAK256 hash of data.\nThe data must be a data representation, to compute the hash of UTF-8 data use the id function.\n\nkeccak256(\"0x\")\n// '0xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470'\n\nkeccak256(\"0x1337\")\n// '0x2636a8beb2c41b8ccafa9a55a5a5e333892a83b491df3a67d2768946a9f9c6dc'\n\nkeccak256(new Uint8Array([ 0x13, 0x37 ]))\n// '0x2636a8beb2c41b8ccafa9a55a5a5e333892a83b491df3a67d2768946a9f9c6dc'\n\n// Strings are assumed to be DataHexString, otherwise it will\n// throw. To hash UTF-8 data, see the note above.\nkeccak256(\"Hello World\")\n// Error(\"invalid BytesLike value\", {\n// code: \"INVALID_ARGUMENT\"\n// argument: \"data\"\n// value: \"Hello World\"\n// shortMessage: \"invalid BytesLike value\"\n// })\n\nripemd160(data: BytesLike)⇒ DataHexstring\nCompute the cryptographic RIPEMD-160 hash of data.\n\nripemd160(\"0x\")\n// '0x9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31'\n\nripemd160(\"0x1337\")\n// '0x224d2bd5251d8f9faa114eb0826e371d1236fda1'\n\nripemd160(new Uint8Array([ 0x13, 0x37 ]))\n// '0x224d2bd5251d8f9faa114eb0826e371d1236fda1'\n\nsha256(data: BytesLike)⇒ DataHexstring\nCompute the cryptographic SHA2-256 hash of data.\n\nsha256(\"0x\")\n// '0xe3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855'\n\nsha256(\"0x1337\")\n// '0x158760c856e5ea1ba97e2e2a456736c4bf30d964559afa6d748cf05694a636ff'\n\nsha256(new Uint8Array([ 0x13, 0x37 ]))\n// '0x158760c856e5ea1ba97e2e2a456736c4bf30d964559afa6d748cf05694a636ff'\n\nsha512(data: BytesLike)⇒ DataHexstring\nCompute the cryptographic SHA2-512 hash of data.\n\nsha512(\"0x\")\n// '0xcf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e'\n\nsha512(\"0x1337\")\n// '0x55ccb35e52b39adac42b68304bf33ff7ecb854f09b2e761e234061482e98e45b4e68de2756bcc7b7099d7dd178f04dafa229d403b90bf8884eedea3806d4642b'\n\nsha512(new Uint8Array([ 0x13, 0x37 ]))\n// '0x55ccb35e52b39adac42b68304bf33ff7ecb854f09b2e761e234061482e98e45b4e68de2756bcc7b7099d7dd178f04dafa229d403b90bf8884eedea3806d4642b'\n\nHMAC\nAn HMAC enables verification that a given key was used to authenticate a payload.\nSee: link-wiki-hmac\n\nFUNCTIONS\ncomputeHmac(algorithm: \"sha256\" | \"sha512\", key: BytesLike, data: BytesLike)⇒ string\nReturn the HMAC for data using the key key with the underlying algo used for compression.\n\nkey = id(\"some-secret\")\n\n// Compute the HMAC\ncomputeHmac(\"sha256\", key, \"0x1337\")\n// '0xbc985612171f71b89c7561c593f2cea20038d3f38f710b2516e405085d7c0c79'\n\n// To compute the HMAC of UTF-8 data, the data must be\n// converted to UTF-8 bytes\ncomputeHmac(\"sha256\", key, toUtf8Bytes(\"Hello World\"))\n// '0xd0404ef8fae0d7f18a54a0ddfad8b81afa9e4cdab872a1dc36628c4397fd8201'\n\nPasswords\nA Password-Based Key-Derivation Function is designed to create a sequence of bytes suitible as a key from a human-rememberable password.\n\nTYPES\nProgressCallback⇒ (percent: number) => void\nA callback during long-running operations to update any UI or provide programatic access to the progress.\nThe percent is a value between 0 and 1.\n\nFUNCTIONS\npbkdf2(password: BytesLike, salt: BytesLike, iterations: number, keylen: number, algo: \"sha256\" | \"sha512\")⇒ string\nReturn the PBKDF2 for keylen bytes for password using the salt and using iterations of algo.\nThis PBKDF is outdated and should not be used in new projects, but is required to decrypt older files.\n\n// The password must be converted to bytes, and it is generally\n// best practices to ensure the string has been normalized. Many\n// formats explicitly indicate the normalization form to use.\npassword = \"hello\"\npasswordBytes = toUtf8Bytes(password, \"NFKC\")\n\nsalt = id(\"some-salt\")\n\n// Compute the PBKDF2\npbkdf2(passwordBytes, salt, 1024, 16, \"sha256\")\n// '0x226addf5b6d87544337e9733b99ceb9d'\n\nscrypt(passwd: BytesLike, salt: BytesLike, N: number, r: number, p: number, dkLen: number, progress?: ProgressCallback)⇒ Promise< string >\nThe scrypt PBKDF uses a memory and cpu hard method of derivation to increase the resource cost to brute-force a password for a given key.\nThis means this algorithm is intentionally slow, and can be tuned to become slower. As computation and memory speed improve over time, increasing the difficulty maintains the cost of an attacker.\nFor example, if a target time of 5 seconds is used, a legitimate user which knows their password requires only 5 seconds to unlock their account. A 6 character password has 68 billion possibilities, which would require an attacker to invest over 10,000 years of CPU time. This is of course a crude example (as password generally aren't random), but demonstrates to value of imposing large costs to decryption.\nFor this reason, if building a UI which involved decrypting or encrypting datsa using scrypt, it is recommended to use a ProgressCallback (as event short periods can seem lik an eternity if the UI freezes). Including the phrase \"decrypting\" in the UI can also help, assuring the user their waiting is for a good reason.\n\n// The password must be converted to bytes, and it is generally\n// best practices to ensure the string has been normalized. Many\n// formats explicitly indicate the normalization form to use.\npassword = \"hello\"\npasswordBytes = toUtf8Bytes(password, \"NFKC\")\n\nsalt = id(\"some-salt\")\n\n// Compute the scrypt\nscrypt(passwordBytes, salt, 1024, 8, 1, 16)\n// Promise<'0x3982633256a26ab2e62efa0621d1a5c0'>\n\nscryptSync(passwd: BytesLike, salt: BytesLike, N: number, r: number, p: number, dkLen: number)⇒ string\nProvides a synchronous variant of scrypt.\nThis will completely lock up and freeze the UI in a browser and will prevent any event loop from progressing. For this reason, it is preferred to use the async variant.\n\n// The password must be converted to bytes, and it is generally\n// best practices to ensure the string has been normalized. Many\n// formats explicitly indicate the normalization form to use.\npassword = \"hello\"\npasswordBytes = toUtf8Bytes(password, \"NFKC\")\n\nsalt = id(\"some-salt\")\n\n// Compute the scrypt\nscryptSync(passwordBytes, salt, 1024, 8, 1, 16)\n// '0x3982633256a26ab2e62efa0621d1a5c0'\n\nRandom Values\nA Cryptographically Secure Random Value is one that has been generated with additional care take to prevent side-channels from allowing others to detect it and prevent others from through coincidence generate the same values.\n\nFUNCTIONS\nrandomBytes(length: number)⇒ Uint8Array\nReturn length bytes of cryptographically secure random data.\n\nrandomBytes(8)\n// Uint8Array(8) [\n// 227, 172, 30, 18,\n// 233, 194, 46, 196\n// ]\n\nSigning\nAdd details about signing here.\n\nTYPES\nSignatureLike⇒ Signature | string | { r: string , s: string , v: BigNumberish , yParity?: 0 | 1 , yParityAndS?: string } | { r: string , s?: string , v?: number , yParity?: 0 | 1 , yParityAndS: string } | { r: string , s: string , v?: BigNumberish , yParity: 0 | 1 , yParityAndS?: string }\nA SignatureLike\n\nclass Signature\nA Signature @TODO\n\nPROPERTIES\nsignature._s⇒ stringread-only\nReturn the s value, unchecked for EIP-2 compliance.\nThis should generally not be used and is for situations where a non-canonical S value might be relevant, such as Frontier blocks that were mined prior to EIP-2 or invalid Authorization List signatures.\n\nsignature.compactSerialized⇒ stringread-only\nThe EIP-2098 compact representation.\n\nsignature.legacyChainId⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe chain ID for EIP-155 legacy transactions. For non-legacy transactions, this value is null.\n\nsignature.networkV⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe EIP-155 v for legacy transactions. For non-legacy transactions, this value is null.\n\nsignature.r⇒ string\nThe r value for a signature.\nThis represents the x coordinate of a \"reference\" or challenge point, from which the y can be computed.\n\nsignature.s⇒ string\nThe s value for a signature.\n\nsignature.serialized⇒ stringread-only\nThe serialized representation.\n\nsignature.v⇒ 27 | 28\nThe v value for a signature.\nSince a given x value for r has two possible values for its correspondin y, the v indicates which of the two y values to use.\nIt is normalized to the values 27 or 28 for legacy purposes.\n\nsignature.yParity⇒ 0 | 1read-only\nThe yParity for the signature.\nSee v for more details on how this value is used.\n\nsignature.yParityAndS⇒ stringread-only\nThe EIP-2098 compact representation of the yParity and s compacted into a single bytes32.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nSignature.from(sig?: SignatureLike)⇒ Signature\nCreates a new Signature.\nIf no sig is provided, a new Signature is created with default values.\nIf sig is a string, it is parsed.\n\nMETHODS\nsignature.clone()⇒ Signature\nReturns a new identical Signature.\n\nsignature.getCanonical()⇒ Signature\nReturns the canonical signature.\nThis is only necessary when dealing with legacy transaction which did not enforce canonical S values (i.e. EIP-155. Most developers should never require this.\n\nsignature.inspect()⇒ string\n\nsignature.isValid()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if the Signature is valid for EIP-155 signatures.\n\nsignature.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a representation that is compatible with JSON.stringify.\n\nsignature.toString()⇒ string\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nSignature.getChainId(v: BigNumberish)⇒ bigint\nCompute the chain ID from the v in a legacy EIP-155 transactions.\n\nSignature.getChainId(45)\n// 5n\n\nSignature.getChainId(46)\n// 5n\n\nSignature.getChainIdV(chainId: BigNumberish, v: 27 | 28)⇒ bigint\nCompute the v for a chain ID for a legacy EIP-155 transactions.\nLegacy transactions which use EIP-155 hijack the v property to include the chain ID.\n\nSignature.getChainIdV(5, 27)\n// 45n\n\nSignature.getChainIdV(5, 28)\n// 46n\n\nSignature.getNormalizedV(v: BigNumberish)⇒ 27 | 28\nCompute the normalized legacy transaction v from a yParirty, a legacy transaction v or a legacy EIP-155 transaction.\n\n// The values 0 and 1 imply v is actually yParity\nSignature.getNormalizedV(0)\n// 27\n\n// Legacy non-EIP-1559 transaction (i.e. 27 or 28)\nSignature.getNormalizedV(27)\n// 27\n\n// Legacy EIP-155 transaction (i.e. >= 35)\nSignature.getNormalizedV(46)\n// 28\n\n// Invalid values throw\nSignature.getNormalizedV(5)\n// Error(\"invalid v\", {\n// code: \"INVALID_ARGUMENT\"\n// argument: \"v\"\n// value: 5\n// shortMessage: \"invalid v\"\n// })\n\nclass SigningKey\nA SigningKey provides high-level access to the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) operations and key management.\n\nPROPERTIES\nsigningKey.compressedPublicKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe compressed public key.\nThis will always begin with either the prefix 0x02 or 0x03 and be 68 characters long (the 0x prefix and 33 hexadecimal nibbles)\n\nsigningKey.privateKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe private key.\n\nsigningKey.publicKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe uncompressed public key.\nThis will always begin with the prefix 0x04 and be 132 characters long (the 0x prefix and 130 hexadecimal nibbles).\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew SigningKey(privateKey: BytesLike)\nCreates a new SigningKey for privateKey.\n\nMETHODS\nsigningKey.computeSharedSecret(other: BytesLike)⇒ string\nReturns the ECDH shared secret between this private key and the other key.\nThe other key may be any type of key, a raw public key, a compressed/uncompressed pubic key or aprivate key.\nBest practice is usually to use a cryptographic hash on the returned value before using it as a symetric secret.\n\nsign1 = new SigningKey(id(\"some-secret-1\"))\nsign2 = new SigningKey(id(\"some-secret-2\"))\n\n// Notice that privA.computeSharedSecret(pubB)...\nsign1.computeSharedSecret(sign2.publicKey)\n// '0x04b5bc2a5428042331a4c70da8f090d5552bdb35bc08a00ea8ed0a9b6d8737b8b7ea016b268d7cb9f02e11736b82b129ea3f37a8fdc6a7b0e9f5cdde4105ceb0de'\n\n// ...is equal to privB.computeSharedSecret(pubA).\nsign2.computeSharedSecret(sign1.publicKey)\n// '0x04b5bc2a5428042331a4c70da8f090d5552bdb35bc08a00ea8ed0a9b6d8737b8b7ea016b268d7cb9f02e11736b82b129ea3f37a8fdc6a7b0e9f5cdde4105ceb0de'\n\nsigningKey.sign(digest: BytesLike)⇒ Signature\nReturn the signature of the signed digest.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nSigningKey.addPoints(p0: BytesLike, p1: BytesLike, compressed?: boolean)⇒ string\nReturns the point resulting from adding the ellipic curve points p0 and p1.\nThis is not a common function most developers should require, but can be useful for certain privacy-specific techniques.\nFor example, it is used by HDNodeWallet to compute child addresses from parent public keys and chain codes.\n\nSigningKey.computePublicKey(key: BytesLike, compressed?: boolean)⇒ string\nCompute the public key for key, optionally compressed.\nThe key may be any type of key, a raw public key, a compressed/uncompressed public key or private key.\n\nsign = new SigningKey(id(\"some-secret\"));\n\n// Compute the uncompressed public key for a private key\nSigningKey.computePublicKey(sign.privateKey)\n// '0x04925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f7481609b6a6964a0f5b459585e9d18a9ec9070d0baf24689138868811c974c96'\n\n// Compute the compressed public key for a private key\nSigningKey.computePublicKey(sign.privateKey, true)\n// '0x02925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f'\n\n// Compute the uncompressed public key\nSigningKey.computePublicKey(sign.publicKey, false);\n// '0x04925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f7481609b6a6964a0f5b459585e9d18a9ec9070d0baf24689138868811c974c96'\n\n// Compute the Compressed a public key\nSigningKey.computePublicKey(sign.publicKey, true);\n// '0x02925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f'\n\nSigningKey.recoverPublicKey(digest: BytesLike, signature: SignatureLike)⇒ string\nReturns the public key for the private key which produced the signature for the given digest.\n\nkey = new SigningKey(id(\"some-secret\"))\ndigest = id(\"hello world\")\nsig = key.sign(digest)\n\n// Notice the signer public key...\nkey.publicKey\n// '0x04925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f7481609b6a6964a0f5b459585e9d18a9ec9070d0baf24689138868811c974c96'\n\n// ...is equal to the recovered public key\nSigningKey.recoverPublicKey(digest, sig)\n// '0x04925bec9818e11ac806bf8b142a7965ac9231aaa9d23f256795d63b1d8d7f203f7481609b6a6964a0f5b459585e9d18a9ec9070d0baf24689138868811c974c96'\n\n← Contracts\nHashing Utilities→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on September 6, 2025, 2:21am.","tokens":3778,"crawled_at":1791193811837} +{"id":10292,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/using-core-in-anchor","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Using Metaplex Core in Anchor | Metaplex Core","text":"Build on-chain programs that interact with Core Assets using Anchor. This guide covers installation, account deserialization, plugin access, and CPI patterns.\nWhat You'll Learn\nInstall and configure mpl-core in Anchor projects\nDeserialize Core Assets and Collections in your programs\nAccess plugin data (Attributes, Freeze, etc.)\nMake CPI calls to create, transfer, and manage Assets\n\nSummary\nThe mpl-core Rust crate provides everything needed to interact with Core from Anchor programs. Enable the anchor feature flag for native Anchor account deserialization.\nAdd mpl-core with default-features = false and the appropriate Anchor features\nUse features = [\"anchor\", \"anchor-0-32\"] with anchor-lang 0.32.x\nUse features = [\"anchor\"] with anchor-lang 0.31.x\nDeserialize Assets/Collections in Accounts structs\nUse fetch_plugin() to read plugin data\nCPI builders simplify instruction calls\nOut of Scope\nClient-side JavaScript SDK (see JavaScript SDK), standalone Rust clients (see Rust SDK), and creating Core Assets from clients.\nQuick Start\nJump to: Installation · Account Deserialization · Plugin Access · CPI Examples\nAdd mpl-core with default-features = false and Anchor features to Cargo.toml\nPin Rust 1.89.0 or newer in rust-toolchain.toml\nDeserialize Assets with Account<'info, BaseAssetV1>\nAccess plugins with fetch_plugin::()\nMake CPI calls with CreateV2CpiBuilder, TransferV1CpiBuilder, etc.\nInstallation\nAdd mpl-core to your Anchor program's Cargo.toml. The default borsh-v1 feature is incompatible with Anchor integration, so always disable default features when enabling anchor.\nFeature Flags\nFeatureDescription\nanchor\nEnables Anchor account deserialization using anchor-lang 0.31.1 and Solana 2.x types\n\nanchor-0-32\nOpt-in support for anchor-lang 0.32.x; requires anchor\n\nserde\nOptional serde support for off-chain tooling\n\nAnchor 0.32.x (recommended)\nUse this when your program depends on anchor-lang 0.32.x:\n[dependencies]\n\nanchor-lang = \"0.32.1\"\n\nmpl-core = { version = \"x.x.x\", default-features = false, features = [\"anchor\", \"anchor-0-32\"] }\n\nAnchor 0.31.x (legacy)\nUse this when your program depends on anchor-lang 0.31.x:\n[dependencies]\n\nanchor-lang = \"0.31.1\"\n\nmpl-core = { version = \"x.x.x\", default-features = false, features = [\"anchor\"] }\n\nImportant\nanchor-0-32 alone is not enough — it must be combined with anchor.\ndefault-features = false is required. Without it, the default borsh-v1 feature conflicts with Anchor integration.\nThe Anchor path uses Solana 2.x types for Pubkey, AccountInfo, and related Anchor traits.\n\nRust Toolchain\nmpl-core requires Rust 1.89.0 or newer. Add a rust-toolchain.toml file to your Anchor workspace:\n[toolchain]\n\nchannel = \"1.89.0\"\n\nIf your build fails with an edition2024 error from transitive dependencies such as base64ct, upgrade to Rust 1.89.0 or newer.\nCore Rust SDK Modules\nThe Core Rust SDK is organized into several modules:\naccounts: represents the program's accounts.\nerrors: enumerates the program's errors.\ninstructions: facilitates the creation of instructions, instruction arguments, and CPI instructions.\ntypes: represents types used by the program. For more detailed information on how different instructions are called and used, refer to the mpl-core docs.rs website or you can use cmd + left click (mac) or ctrl + left click (windows) on the instruction to expand it.\nAccounts Deserialization\nDeserializable Accounts\nThe following account structs are available for deserialization within the mpl-core crate:\n- BaseAssetV1\n\n- BaseCollectionV1\n\n- HashedAssetV1\n\n- PluginHeaderV1\n\n- PluginRegistryV1\n\nThere are two ways to deserialize Core accounts within Anchor.\nUsing Anchors Account list struct (recommended in most cases),\nDirectly in the instruction functions body using ::from_bytes().\nAnchor Accounts List Method\nBy activating the anchor flag you'll be able to deserialize both the BaseAssetV1 and BaseCollectionV1 accounts directly in the Anchor Accounts list struct:\nAccounts Deserialization\n\n#[derive(Accounts)]\n\npub struct ExampleAccountStruct<'info> {\n\n...\n\npub asset: Account<'info, BaseAssetV1>,\n\n}\n\nAccount from_bytes() Method\nBorrow the data inside the asset/collection account using the try_borrow_data() function and create the asset/collection struct from those bytes:\nAccounts Deserialization\n\nlet data = ctx.accounts.asset.try_borrow_data()?;\n\nlet base_asset: BaseAssetV1 = BaseAssetV1::from_bytes(&data.as_ref())?;\n\nDeserializing Plugins\nTo access individual plugins within an Asset or Collection account, use the fetch_plugin() function. This function will either return the plugin data or a null response without throwing an hard error, allowing you to check if a plugin exists without having to access its data. The fetch_plugin() function is used for both Assets and Collections accounts and can handle every plugin type by specifying the appropriate typing. If you want to access the data inside a plugin, use the middle value returned by this function.\nPlugins Deserialization\n\nlet (_, attribute_list, _) = fetch_plugin::(&ctx.accounts.asset.to_account_info(), mpl_core::types::PluginType::Attributes)?;\n\nNote: The fetch_plugin() function is only used for non-external plugins. To read external plugins, use the fetch_external_plugin() function, which operates in the same way as fetch_plugin().\nThe CPI Instruction Builders\nEach instruction from the Core crate comes with a CpiBuilder version. The CpiBuilder version is created using name of the instruction + CpiBuilder and simplifies the code significantly abstracting a lot of boilerplate code away! If you want to learn more about all the possible instruction available in Core, you can find them on the mpl-core docs.rs website\nCPI Example\nLet's take the CreateCollectionV2CpiBuilder instruction as an example Initialize the builder by calling new on the CpiBuilder and passing in the core program as AccountInfo:\nCreateCollectionV2CpiBuilder::new(ctx.accounts.mpl_core_program.to_account_info);\n\nUse then Cmd + left click (Ctrl + left click for Windows users) to view all the CPI arguments required for this CPI call:\nCreateCollectionV2CpiBuilder::new(&ctx.accounts.core_program)\n\n.collection(&ctx.accounts.collection)\n\n.payer(&ctx.accounts.payer)\n\n.system_program(&ctx.accounts.system_program)\n\n.name(\"Test Collection\".to_string())\n\n.uri(\"https://test.com\".to_string())\n\n.invoke()?;\n\nCommon Errors\nAccountNotInitialized\nThe Asset or Collection account doesn't exist or hasn't been created yet.\nPluginNotFound\nThe plugin you're trying to fetch doesn't exist on the Asset. Check with fetch_plugin() which returns None safely.\nInvalidAuthority\nThe signer doesn't have permission for this operation. Verify the correct authority is signing.\nNotes\nAlways set default-features = false when enabling Anchor features\nUse features = [\"anchor\", \"anchor-0-32\"] with anchor-lang 0.32.x\nUse features = [\"anchor\"] with anchor-lang 0.31.x\nPin Rust 1.89.0 or newer in rust-toolchain.toml\nUse fetch_plugin() for built-in plugins, fetch_external_plugin() for external\nCPI builders abstract away account ordering complexity\nCheck docs.rs/mpl-core for complete API reference\nQuick Reference\nCommon CPI Builders\nOperationCPI Builder\nCreate Asset\nCreateV2CpiBuilder\n\nCreate Collection\nCreateCollectionV2CpiBuilder\n\nTransfer Asset\nTransferV1CpiBuilder\n\nBurn Asset\nBurnV1CpiBuilder\n\nUpdate Asset\nUpdateV1CpiBuilder\n\nAdd Plugin\nAddPluginV1CpiBuilder\n\nUpdate Plugin\nUpdatePluginV1CpiBuilder\n\nAccount Types\nAccountStruct\nAsset\nBaseAssetV1\n\nCollection\nBaseCollectionV1\n\nHashed Asset\nHashedAssetV1\n\nPlugin Header\nPluginHeaderV1\n\nPlugin Registry\nPluginRegistryV1\n\nFAQ\nDo I need the anchor feature flag?\nYes, for direct deserialization in Accounts structs. Without it, use from_bytes() manually. Always set default-features = false when enabling anchor.\nWhich Anchor version should I use?\nFor anchor-lang 0.32.x, use default-features = false with features = [\"anchor\", \"anchor-0-32\"]. For anchor-lang 0.31.x, use features = [\"anchor\"] only.\nWhat Rust version is required?\nmpl-core requires Rust 1.89.0 or newer. Pin it in rust-toolchain.toml in your Anchor project.\nHow do I check if a plugin exists?\nUse fetch_plugin() which returns Option - it won't throw an error if the plugin doesn't exist.\nCan I access external plugins (Oracle, AppData)?\nYes. Use fetch_external_plugin() instead of fetch_plugin() with the appropriate key.\nWhere can I find all available instructions?\nSee the mpl-core docs.rs instructions module.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nCPI\nCross-Program Invocation - calling one program from another\n\nCpiBuilder\nHelper struct for constructing CPI calls\n\nBaseAssetV1\nCore Asset account struct for deserialization\n\nfetch_plugin()\nFunction to read plugin data from accounts\n\nanchor feature\nCargo feature enabling Anchor-native deserialization\n\nanchor-0-32 feature\nOpt-in Cargo feature for anchor-lang 0.32.x support\n\nRelated Pages\nAnchor Staking Example - Complete staking program\nCreate Asset with Anchor - Step-by-step guide\nRust SDK - Standalone Rust client usage\nmpl-core docs.rs - Complete API reference","tokens":2276,"crawled_at":1791193830022} +{"id":10293,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/ethereum-roadmap-focil-and-multi-proposers","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"A look down Ethereum’s roadmap: The cases for FOCIL and multi-proposer schemes - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nA look down Ethereum’s roadmap: The cases for FOCIL and multi-proposer schemes\nPranav Garimidi\n11.11.24\n\nTags & Share Tags\nEthereum\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nEthereum now supports a vibrant ecosystem of applications and Layer 2s. But its transaction supply chain, which determines which transactions land onchain, enshrines certain participants with market power, harming the chain’s economic efficiency.\n\nMany issues with Ethereum’s transaction supply chain stem from the fact that for every slot, a single proposer has monopoly control over what transactions to include in their block. Proposers also have incentives offchain and from the application layer that affect their behavior. These sometimes competing incentives make it difficult to encourage proposers to honestly follow the protocol.\n\nTwo types of proposer deviations are of particular concern: (1) short-term censorship, and (2) acting on enshrined latency advantages.\n\nHow to prioritize and address these two problems depends on Ethereum’s development roadmap. If Ethereum has to solve short-term censorship resistance, constrained single proposer designs have appealing properties while also being close to well specified enough with proposals like FOCIL to be implemented. But if Ethereum’s success also relies on addressing some of the negative market effects of single proposer schemes on the application layer, more drastic change likely needs to happen. Multi-proposer schemes look promising to address the broader concerns.\n\nThe rest of this post describes these problems in more detail before getting into how these issues impact Ethereum’s functionality. I’ll then analyze the two potential solutions to address them — the implementation of which depends on Ethereum’s roadmap.\n\nProblem 1: Short-term censorship\n\nBlockchains inherent censorship resistance from liveness: Eventually every valid submitted transaction will make it onchain. But the bounds on how long a transaction will take to be included onchain are too loose for many applications. DeFi transactions are a common example, where it might be only a few seconds until a transaction is stale. In these scenarios, a proposer could stand to gain by censoring a transaction even for a single block, degrading the efficiency of these applications.\n\nConsider the case where a dapp wants to sell an item every slot via a first price auction. Assume this item has a common value of $10; thus in a competitive auction we’d expect the dapp to receive around $10. But since the auction takes place over the course of a slot, all the bids from the auction need to be included by the proposer. In a single proposer scheme, the proposer could simply exclude others’ bids, and include only their own low bid, winning the item for much less than the item is worth.\n\nSuch instances require a notion of short-term censorship resistance that captures how hard it is for an adversary to censor a transaction for a single block. Short-term censorship resistance is an economic property. If more transactions demand to be included in a block than there is space, some of the transactions must be left out. Those transactions aren’t necessarily being censored by an adversary; rather, they are simply priced out of inclusion. However, some protocols make it easier for an adversary to either price out or incentivize the proposer not to include target transactions. In the spirit of saying protocol A is more censorship resistant than protocol B if it is more difficult for an adversary to censor a target transaction in A than B, we use the following definition:\n\nProtocol A is more short-term censorship resistant than protocol B if all else equal, for any transaction t, the minimum net payments an adversary has to make to prevent t from being included at equilibrium in a given block is higher under A than B.\n\n(This definition is intentionally not well defined mathematically. Formally defining the game being played and the equilibrium concept will be the subject of future work. For now, the examples convey the spirit of this definition.)\n\nExample\n\nWith Ethereum using EIP-1559 as its fee mechanism, an adversary simply needs to pay the proposer more than a transaction’s tip above the base fee to not include it.\n\nIf the fee mechanism is a first-price auction, an adversary would have to pay the proposer more than the entirety of a user’s bid to incentivize them to not include the transaction.\n\nNote that bidders are expected to only pay tiny tips under EIP-1559. Thus while the bids under a first price auction are expected to be relatively small in comparison to a transaction’s true value, they are still substantially higher than what the transaction’s tip would be in EIP-1559. Thus we would say that Ethereum using a first price auction as its TFM is more short-term censorship resistant than Ethereum using EIP-1559. In either case, however, if the equilibrium price for inclusion for a Defi transaction is high enough to deter an adversary, users now have to pay a hefty tax to the protocol in turn making the Defi app itself less attractive.\n\nProblem 2: Enshrined proposer latency advantages\n\nIn a single proposer architecture, the proposer is by design the last one to move in the block production game for a given slot. (In practice there is a complicated offchain transaction supply chain where relays move last. For the purposes of this post we treat proposers and builders as combined.) This means that proposers can always submit transactions that reflect a “fresher” state compared to any other submitted transactions. Even if both users and the proposer receive information simultaneously, it takes time for users to send their transactions to the proposer, during which new information might arrive. The proposer is in a position to instantly react to this information and potentially change their transaction, but the user has no time to do this.\n\nFor example, the optimal way to route a trade onchain may depend on the offchain ETH-USD price on Binance. In a single proposer architecture, a sophisticated proposer can submit trades that are more up-to-date than any users competing for the same trade.\n\nExample\n\nConsider our previous example of a dapp selling an item every slot via first-price auction. But now the item’s value is a function of constantly updating information. Assume there are two bidders competing for the item, agents 1 and 2. Both agents hear new information simultaneously, except agent 1 always gets to bid after agent 2. In this case, agent 2 is adversely selected against when they win because the only time bidder 2 wins is when the information updates after they submit their bid to the point that they are over paying. Otherwise, whenever the information changes so that bidder 2’s bid is profitable, bidder 1 will simply update their bid in response to the newer information and win the auction. This effect is especially stark when agent 1 can directly observe agent 2’s bid, but even if agent 1 can’t see agent 2’s bid, agent 1 still has a substantial competitive advantage. In the long run, agent 2 will not find it worth it to participate, letting agent 1 capture all the value from the auction.\n\nThis example shows how structural advantages given to the proposer can cause competition to dry up and drive all the surplus value from onchain markets to the proposer.\n\nPossible solutions depend on the roadmap\n\nThe extent to which short-term censorship resistance and proposer latency advantages matter depend on the Ethereum development roadmap. One vision for Ethereum’s future is fully embracing the L2 roadmap and having all meaningful execution happen offchain, with Ethereum being used for settlement, data availability, and proof-verification. In such a world, short-term censorship is the main problem, although achieving it over the span of ~10 blocks may be sufficient rather than the block-level guarantees we described above. An alternative path is for Ethereum to serve as a hub for high value execution, and in particular for high-value Defi. In this world, achieving strong short-term censorship resistance and alleviating proposers’ strong structural economic advantages becomes essential.\n\nTwo alternatives help address these problems. The first is a constrained single proposer architecture that adds committees which bind the proposer’s action space. The second is a multi-proposer architecture that looks dramatically different from Ethereum’s current design: It splits the proposer’s power among many different parties.\n\nWhile both designs are still in active development, there have been proposals of what these architectures might look like. We outline what these proposals look like and analyze how they address the problems we’ve discussed.\n\nA case for FOCIL\n\nConstrained single proposer architecture\n\nA constrained single proposer architecture is one where a committee within the same block imposes constraints on the proposer. Inclusion lists (ILs) are the most natural example of this, where an inclusion committee enforces that a block proposer include certain transactions the committee hears about.\n\nThe amount of power the committee has varies in different designs. One important distinction is between unconditional and conditional inclusion lists. With unconditional inclusion lists, the transactions the committee includes must be included by a proposer for the block to be valid. With conditional inclusion lists, a block only has to include the contents of the inclusion list conditioned on the block not being full, meaning that if the proposer fills the entire block with their own transactions, they aren’t required to include any transactions in the inclusion list. While unconditional ILs can offer better short-term censorship resistance, they might also be easier to crowd out because they might be used to offer products like preconfirmations.\n\nThe latest proposal for a constrained single proposer design on Ethereum is called FOCIL (fork choice conditional inclusion lists), which lays out how to implement inclusion lists (FOCIL is not explicitly designed to deal with high-value MEV transactions but is instead optimized for censorship resistance over the span of a few blocks. Nevertheless, as it’s the most concrete specification of what a constrained-single proposer architecture could look like, it’s useful to analyze it in this setting.)\n\nThe high-level design is as follows (for details, see “FOCIL CL & EL workflow”): Every slot a subset of validators are chosen as inclusion committee members. Committee members construct their lists of transactions up to a local IL size limit (in KB). These lists are locked ¾ of the way through the slot and gossiped to the proposer, who is then responsible for appending any transactions they are missing in the list to their block, until their block hits the gas limit. Then, in addition to standard block validity rules, attesters also check that proposed blocks are conformant against the corresponding inclusion lists. Note, there are no economic incentives in the protocol for the inclusion list committee to act honestly.\n\nAnalysis\n\nShort-term censorship resistance\n\nThe short-term censorship resistance of a constrained single proposer scheme depends on what types of constraints are allowed and how the proposer is bound to them. As we define short-term censorship via an economic model, the details of how the inclusion committee is incentivized can also change the relative power of these mechanisms. We will start by analyzing FOCIL with EIP-1559 as the L1 TFM before expanding on what is possible in the space of constrained single proposer mechanisms.\n\nSince FOCIL does not explicitly incentivize the inclusion committee to include any transactions, let’s assume that the inclusion list committee is non-strategic and acts honestly. FOCIL also doesn’t specify what inclusion rule honest IL committee members should follow, but for our analysis we assume that honest IL members will include transactions they hear about with the highest priority fees. (FOCIL’s goal is to also increase censorship resistance on longer time scales than a slot, so the intention is that some committee members also follow inclusion rules such as including transactions that have been in the mempool the longest.)\n\nNow consider an instance where an adversary is targeting a transaction that tips $10 on top of the base fee, and that $10 is sufficiently high to make the transaction included in the IL. The adversary here has two options. They can either send enough transactions above a $10 tip in the mempool to kick the target transaction out of the IL while also bribing the proposer $10 to not include the target; or the adversary could send enough transactions to fill the proposer’s block and also still send the proposer with $10 to not include the target transaction. Either of these strategies is significantly more expensive for the adversary than the status quo of only paying the proposer $10 to not include the target transaction. In the former case, the adversary has to pay the priority fee plus base fee for any of the transactions that ends up landing on chain; in the later case the adversary has to pay at least the base fee to fill the entire block (assuming EIP-1559 as the base layer TFM).\n\nIf FOCIL instead used unconditional inclusion lists, the second attack vector would be ruled out. Thus, if the target transaction had a high tip, then the adversary would be put in the position of filling the IL gas limit with transactions having tips above the target, which is potentially much more expensive than paying the base fee to fill the entire block.\n\nThe key assumption in this analysis is that the IL committee acts honestly while being non-strategic. If the inclusion committee were strategic, then the adversary could pay them an arbitrarily small amount to produce empty lists in the current protocol. Without any mechanism incentivizing the IL committee to follow the protocol, analyzing the short-term censorship resistance of these protocols reduces to the standard single proposer case. Fee mechanism design that allows fees of transactions included by the IL committee to go to the IL committee can help increase the robustness of these protocols, but the details of such designs and the properties they would satisfy are the subject of future work (for instance, see this example).\n\nProposer latency advantage\n\nConstraints like ILs alone don’t help address proposers’ latency advantages. In these designs, the single proposer still moves last and still has the power to insert whatever transactions they like. In general, the constrained single proposer setting has difficulty addressing this problem because any form of a constraint committee must act before the end of a slot for the proposer to have time to hear the outcome of the constraint and act accordingly. Thus, the proposer has the privileged position to act on any information that arrives in this duration. The only way around this is for a committee, rather than the proposer, to end the block production game, in which case we move toward a multi-proposer architecture.\n\nA case for multi-proposer\n\nMulti-proposer architecture\n\nA multi-proposer architecture explicitly has multiple proposers jointly building a block every slot. Many potential instantions exist, but multi-proposer schemes generally have a similar structure: A set of validators is chosen randomly by stake as proposers in a given slot. At the end of the slot, each chosen validator proposes a set of transactions following a local block validity rule. Then the protocol deterministically aggregates these proposals into a single canonical block.\n\nThe key feature of multi-proposer schemes is that no single proposer is given special power over what gets included in a block. Even though the multiple proposers in such a scheme have advantages compared to non-proposers, the competition between proposers themselves can lead to improved market equilibria.\n\nAs opposed to the constrained single proposer setting that is additive to the current Ethereum protocol, a multi-proposer architecture would require a fundamental rework of Ethereum. As such, many components have to be reasoned about, including the transaction supply chain, consensus, and fee mechanisms. Here, we will consider an idealized model of a multi-proposer architecture where the consensus details are worked out and we can focus on a single slot in isolation. Assumptions include that all the proposers are homogenous and have equal access to information, and that the aggregation rule is simply taking a union over all proposed transactions. (This analysis holds for any reasonable choice of ordering rule.) A large part of bringing multi-proposer to production will be relaxing these assumptions to create a full specification, but even with this simple model there is still much to consider.\n\nAnalysis\n\nShort-term censorship resistance\n\nThe short-term censorship resistance of a multi-proposer architecture depends on the TFM being used. For example, schemes that evenly distribute fees across all proposers and are pay-as-bid for users can incentivize better throughput but worse short-term censorship resistance than you would get from current single proposer schemes. On the other hand, some proposal TFMs look to take advantage of multi-proposer architectures to get more censorship resistance than would be possible in a single proposal scheme.\n\nFor example, Fox, Pai, and Resnick. make the observation that having a transaction’s payment be a function of how many proposers include a transaction can drastically increase the cost to censor the transaction. Their TFM has users submit a pair of bids (t,T) with t<1 proposers include the transaction. The transaction pays kt with t going to each of the corresponding proposers. However, if only one proposer includes the transaction, then the transaction pays T to the single block producer. Hence, an adversary has to pay kT to censor the transaction, since any validator can unilaterally deviate to include the transaction if no one else is, while the transaction only expects to pay Θ(t) for inclusion.\n\nThis gap between how much a transaction has to pay for inclusion and the cost to censor it, is a key property that comes from proposers competing among themselves. A censoring adversary needs to make payments such that none of the proposers include the transaction. Of course, if the proposers all collude, this analysis breaks down and the benefits of multi-proposer is lost — potentially leaving us in a worse situation than the single proposer case. However, as the number of concurrent proposers increases, both the amount an adversary has to pay to induce a censoring equilibrium and the difficulty of maintaining the collusion increase since even one proposer deviating from the censoring ring would be sufficient to regain short-term censorship resistance properties.\n\nProposer latency advantage\n\nAssume no proposer can see other proposers’ blocks before they make their own block. Perfect synchrony could achieve this, but, more practically, cryptography can achieve the same end. Proposers can use time lock encryption to have their block contents hidden only for a few seconds. Thus, if proposers all release their blocks a couple seconds before the end of the slot, proposers can’t see each other’s blocks until the slot has passed. Instead of time lock encryption we could also threshold encrypt block contents to an attester committee to achieve a similar property.\n\nGiven this assumption, there is no party who moves last to end the block production game. This means that proposers are forced to compete with one another on an equal playing field to take advantage of opportunities at the application layer. As new information comes in, all proposers are in an equal position to react and update their transactions. This competition then keeps this value within the application layer and allows a competitive market to exist instead of having the market unravel and letting the value all leak to a single proposer. Note, however, that a multi-proposer scheme doesn’t change the structural advantage proposers have over users, since users still face a latency delay in getting their transactions to the proposer. But now instead of a single party with the advantage, there are multiple parties with equal advantages.\n\nThe exact details of how to implement the cryptography so proposers can’t see each others’ blocks before they propose their own are crucial to maintaining this property. Otherwise, certain proposers again have structural market advantages over others, degrading the competitiveness of onchain markets. These specifications are still largely works in progress.\n\n***\n\nIf the main concern Ethereum has to solve is short-term censorship resistance, constrained single proposer designs have appealing properties while also being close to well specified enough with proposals like FOCIL to be implemented. On the other hand, if Ethereum’s success also relies on addressing some of the negative market effects of single proposer schemes on the application layer, more drastic change is likely needed. Multi-proposer schemes look promising to address the broader space of issues. But since these designs completely restructure the Ethereum stack, they have a longer path ahead of them in getting to a complete specification and addressing all the potential second-order effects of such large changes.\n\n***\n\nAcknowledgments: Thanks to Barnabe, Joachim, Julian, Max, and Thomas for helpful comments and suggestions\n\n***\n\nPranav Garimidi is a research analyst at a16z crypto. He focuses on mechanism design and algorithmic game theory as it relates to blockchain systems. He is especially interested in how incentives interact across the blockchain stack. Prior to a16z, Pranav was a student at Columbia University where he graduated with a degree in Computer Science. You can follow him on X @pgarimidi\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information","tokens":6153,"crawled_at":1791193815939} +{"id":10294,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/nodes/full-node-streaming/example","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"gRPC Streaming Example – dYdX Documentation","text":"Indexer-based orderbook streaming, due to the increased latency introduced by the Indexer, can cause issues like more outdated orders or a crossed orderbook.\nIn a full node, the orderbook available will be more up-to-date and should be preferred over the Indexer-based solution.\nThis requires a full node with gRPC streaming enabled.\n\nIn this example, we'll guide on how to connect and handle the gRPC data in order to enable use-cases such as orderbook watching.\nWhile full node streaming is provided both using gRPC and WebSockets, we'll focus here on gRPC-based streaming due to its higher efficiency.\n\nInstall dependencies\n\ngRPC uses structured and serialized data using Protocol Buffers.\nFor Python, install the package v4-proto which already contains the messages and generated code used in gRPC.\nThis is the main dependency used in this guide, allowing us to deserialize the incoming stream messages.\n\nEstablish a connection\n\nWith a full node with gRPC streaming available, we can now try to establish a connection to it. We'll need to define a gRPC configuration to maintain an healthy connection.\nLets also define here the CLOB pairs IDs (markets) that we are interested in, as well as the relevant subaccounts.\nPython\nimport grpc\nfrom v4_proto.dydxprotocol.clob.query_pb2 import StreamOrderbookUpdatesRequest\nfrom v4_proto.dydxprotocol.clob.query_pb2_grpc import QueryStub\nfrom v4_proto.dydxprotocol.subaccounts.subaccount_pb2 import SubaccountId\n\nGRPC_OPTIONS = [\n# Send keepalive ping every 30 seconds\n(\"grpc.keepalive_time_ms\", 3000),\n# Wait 10 seconds for ping ack before considering the connection dead\n(\"grpc.keepalive_timeout_ms\", 1000,),\n# Allow keepalive pings even when there are no calls\n(\"grpc.keepalive_permit_without_calls\", True,),\n# Minimum allowed time between pings\n(\"grpc.http2.min_time_between_pings_ms\", 3000,),\n# Minimum allowed time between pings with no data\n(\"grpc.http2.min_ping_interval_without_data_ms\", 3000,),\n]\n\nendpoint = \"your-node-address:9090\"\nclob_pair_ids = [0, 1] # ETH-USD\nsubaccount_ids = [] # All subaccounts\n\n# Establish async connection\nasync with grpc.aio.insecure_channel(endpoint, GRPC_OPTIONS) as channel:\ntasks = [\nlisten_to_grpc_stream(\nchannel,\nclob_pair_ids,\nsubaccount_ids,\nfeed_handler,\n),\n]\nawait asyncio.gather(*tasks)\n\nStreaming\n\nThe streaming function listen_to_grpc_stream() processes the continuous stream of orderbook updates. Each message contains batched updates that must be processed sequentially to maintain correct state.\nPython\nasync def listen_to_grpc_stream(\nchannel: grpc.Channel,\nclob_pair_ids: List[int],\nsubaccount_ids: List[str],\nfeed_handler: FeedHandler,\n):\n\"\"\"Subscribe to gRPC stream and handle orderbook updates.\"\"\"\nstub = QueryStub(channel)\n\n# Parse subaccount ids (format: owner_address/subaccount_number)\nsubaccount_protos = [\nSubaccountId(owner=sa.split('/')[0], number=int(sa.split('/')[1]))\nfor sa in subaccount_ids\n]\n\nrequest = StreamOrderbookUpdatesRequest(\nclob_pair_id=clob_pair_ids,\nsubaccount_ids=subaccount_protos\n)\n\nasync for response in stub.StreamOrderbookUpdates(request):\nfill_events = feed_handler.handle(response)\n# Process fills and other updates\nfor fill in fill_events:\nprint(f\"Fill: {fill.quantums} @ {fill.subticks}\")\n\nMaintaining Orderbook and Subaccount State\n\nLets add a component FeedHandler that maintains local state by processing streaming updates.\nIt will handle different message types and ensure state consistency.\nPython\nclass FeedHandler:\ndef __init__(self):\nself.books: Dict[int, LimitOrderBook] = {}\nself.subaccounts: Dict[SubaccountId, StreamSubaccount] = {}\nself.has_seen_first_snapshot = False\n\ndef handle(self, message: StreamOrderbookUpdatesResponse) -> List[Fill]:\n\"\"\"Handle incoming stream messages and update state.\"\"\"\ncollected_fills = []\n\nfor update in message.updates:\nupdate_type = update.WhichOneof('update_message')\n\nif update_type == 'orderbook_update':\nself._handle_orderbook_update(update.orderbook_update)\nelif update_type == 'order_fill':\nfills = self._handle_fills(update.order_fill, update.exec_mode)\ncollected_fills += fills\nelif update_type == 'subaccount_update':\nself._handle_subaccounts(update.subaccount_update)\n\nreturn collected_fills\n\nSnapshots\n\nSnapshots provide the complete current state and serve as the foundation for processing subsequent incremental updates. The client should wait for snapshots before processing any other messages to ensure state consistency.\n\nDiscard order messages until you receive a StreamOrderbookUpdate with snapshot set to true. This message contains the full orderbook state for each clob pair.\n\nSimilarly, discard subaccount messages until you receive a StreamSubaccountUpdate with snapshot set to true. This message contains the full subaccount state for each subscribed subaccount.\n\ndef _handle_orderbook_update(self, update: StreamOrderbookUpdate):\n\"\"\"Handle orderbook snapshots and incremental updates.\"\"\"\n# Skip messages until the first snapshot is received\nif not self.has_seen_first_snapshot and not update.snapshot:\nreturn\n\n# Skip subsequent snapshots\nif update.snapshot and self.has_seen_first_snapshot:\nlogging.warning(\"Skipping subsequent snapshot\")\nreturn\n\nif update.snapshot:\n# This is a new snapshot of the book state\nif not self.has_seen_first_snapshot:\nself.has_seen_first_snapshot = True\n\n# Process each update in the batch\nfor u in update.updates:\nupdate_type = u.WhichOneof('update_message')\n\nif update_type == 'order_place':\nself._handle_order_place(u.order_place)\nelif update_type == 'order_update':\nself._handle_order_update(u.order_update)\nelif update_type == 'order_remove':\nself._handle_order_remove(u.order_remove)\n\ndef _handle_subaccounts(self, update: StreamSubaccountUpdate):\n\"\"\"Handle subaccount snapshots and updates.\"\"\"\nparsed_subaccount = parse_subaccounts(update)\nsubaccount_id = parsed_subaccount.subaccount_id\n\nif update.snapshot:\n# Skip subsequent snapshots\nif subaccount_id in self.subaccounts:\nlogging.warning(f\"Saw multiple snapshots for subaccount {subaccount_id}\")\nreturn\nself.subaccounts[subaccount_id] = parsed_subaccount\nelse:\n# Skip messages until the first snapshot is received\nif subaccount_id not in self.subaccounts:\nreturn\n# Update the existing subaccount\nexisting_subaccount = self.subaccounts[subaccount_id]\nexisting_subaccount.perpetual_positions.update(parsed_subaccount.perpetual_positions)\nexisting_subaccount.asset_positions.update(parsed_subaccount.asset_positions)\n\nOrderbook Management\n\nThe orderbook is implemented as a Level 3 (L3) order book that maintains individual orders with their full details. This provides maximum granularity for trading applications that need to track specific orders and their execution.\nLets implement an efficient Orderbook data structure named LimitOrderBook suitable for high-frequency trading.\nEach price level maintains orders in a doubly-linked list for efficient insertion and removal.\nOrders progress through a lifecycle of placement, updates, and removal. Your client must handle each stage correctly to maintain accurate book state.\nHandle both optimistic and finalized trades correctly. Optimistic fills update book state immediately, while only finalized fills should be treated as confirmed trades.\n\nAdditional logic\n\nProcess informational taker order messages without updating state.\nConvert protocol integers to decimal values for display and analysis. Fetch the market information from the Indexer, containing data required for integer conversion.\nValidate orderbook state consistency in order to detect any errors, here related with crossed orderbook (a bid larger than a ask).","tokens":1895,"crawled_at":1791193828551} +{"id":10295,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/use_custom_images","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Using custom images in a deployment - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Using custom images in a deployment\n\nThe Open Autonomy framework uses up to 6 different Docker images when building an AI agent deployment with the command autonomy deploy build. Some of these images are for testing purposes and they are only included if indicated explicitly.\n\nImages used in production and testing\n\nvalory/open-autonomy\n\nBase image that contains all the required Python packages and a virtual environment required to deploy an agent instance. The deployment builder will use valory/open-autonomy as the name and the current version of the framework as the version tag. You can change the name and the version tag of the image by exporting the environment variables AUTONOMY_IMAGE_NAME and AUTONOMY_IMAGE_VERSION, respectively.\n\nvalory/oar-/:\n\nThis image extends the base image valory/open-autonomy. It contains the agent blueprint package for an AI agent and a deployment environment for the same agent blueprint. This image is built through the autonomy build-image command.\n\nvalory/open-autonomy-tendermint\n\nDefines a Tendermint node in the deployment setup. The deployment builder will use valory/open-autonomy-tendermint as the name and the current version of the framework as the version tag. You can change the name and the version tag of the image by exporting the environment variables TENDERMINT_IMAGE_NAME and TENDERMINT_IMAGE_VERSION, respectively.\n\nImages used in testing only\n\nvalory/open-autonomy-hardhat\n\nBase image that contains a pre-configured Hardhat node which can be used as a test blockchain for testing AI agents locally and running end-to-end tests for the agent blueprint packages.\n\nvalory/autonolas-registries\n\nThis image extends the base image valory/open-autonomy-hardhat.\nIt comes with the Autonolas Protocol registry contracts pre-deployed. The deployment builder will use valory/open-autonomy-hardhat as the name and latest as the version tag. You can change the name and the version tag of the image by exporting the environment variables HARDHAT_IMAGE_NAME and HARDHAT_IMAGE_VERSION, respectively, to valory/autonolas-registries:latest.\n\nImportant\n\nThis image is only included if explicitly indicated through the flag --use-hardhat when building the AI agent deployment (autonomy deploy build command).\n\nThis image should only be used when working with the dev mode.\n\nIf you require specific custom contracts to test your AI agent, read the guide to include custom contracts.\n\nvalory/open-acn-node\n\nDefines an ACN node in the deployment setup, which can be used for direct agent to agent communication. The deployment builder will use valory/open-acn-node as the name and latest as the version tag. You can change the name and the version tag of the image by exporting the environment variables ACN_IMAGE_NAME and ACN_IMAGE_VERSION, respectively.\n\nImportant\n\nThis image is only included if explicitly indicated through the flag --use-acn when building the AI agent deployment (autonomy deploy build command).\n\nThis image should only be used when working with the dev mode.","tokens":765,"crawled_at":1791193835163} +{"id":10296,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/providers","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nBlock\nBrowserDiscoverOptions\nBrowserProvider\nContractRunner\nEip1193Provider\nEip6963ProviderInfo\nEnsPlugin\nEventFilter\nFeeData\nFeeDataNetworkPlugin\nFetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin\nFilter\nFilterByBlockHash\nGasCostPlugin\nIpcSocketProvider\nLog\nMinedBlock\nMinedTransactionResponse\nNetworkPlugin\nNonceManager\nPreparedTransactionRequest\nProvider\nSigner\nTransactionReceipt\nTransactionRequest\nTransactionResponse\nWebSocketLike\nWebSocketProvider\nNetworks\nSubclassing Provider\nSubclassing Signer\nENS Resolver\nFallback Provider\nFormatting\nJSON-RPC Provider\nCommunity Providers\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Providers\nProviders\nA Provider provides a connection to the blockchain, which can be used to query its current state, simulate execution and send transactions to update the state.\nIt is one of the most fundamental components of interacting with a blockchain application, and there are many ways to connect, such as over HTTP, WebSockets or injected providers such as MetaMask.\n\nTYPES\nBlockTag⇒ BigNumberish | string\nA BlockTag specifies a specific block.\nnumeric value - specifies the block height, where the genesis block is block 0; many operations accept a negative value which indicates the block number should be deducted from the most recent block. A numeric value may be a number, bigint, or a decimal of hex string.\nblockhash - specifies a specific block by its blockhash; this allows potentially orphaned blocks to be specifed, without ambiguity, but many backends do not support this for some operations.\n\nBrowserProviderOptions⇒ { cacheTimeout?: number , polling?: boolean , pollingInterval?: number , providerInfo?: Eip6963ProviderInfo , staticNetwork?: null | boolean | Network }\n\nDebugEventBrowserProvider⇒ { action: \"sendEip1193Payload\" , payload: { method: string , params: Array< any > } } | { action: \"receiveEip1193Result\" , result: any } | { action: \"receiveEip1193Error\" , error: Error }\nThe possible additional events dispatched when using the \"debug\" event on a BrowserProvider.\n\nGasCostParameters⇒ { txAccessListAddress?: number , txAccessListStorageKey?: number , txBase?: number , txCreate?: number , txDataNonzero?: number , txDataZero?: number }\nThe gas cost parameters for a GasCostPlugin.\n\nOrphanFilter⇒ { hash: string , number: number , orphan: \"drop-block\" } | { orphan: \"drop-transaction\" , other?: { blockHash: string , blockNumber: number , hash: string } , tx: { blockHash: string , blockNumber: number , hash: string } } | { orphan: \"reorder-transaction\" , other?: { blockHash: string , blockNumber: number , hash: string } , tx: { blockHash: string , blockNumber: number , hash: string } } | { log: { address: string , blockHash: string , blockNumber: number , data: string , index: number , topics: ReadonlyArray< string > , transactionHash: string } , orphan: \"drop-log\" }\nAn Orphan Filter allows detecting when an orphan block has resulted in dropping a block or transaction or has resulted in transactions changing order.\nNot currently fully supported.\n\nProviderEvent⇒ string | Array< string | Array< string > > | EventFilter | OrphanFilter\nA ProviderEvent provides the types of events that can be subscribed to on a Provider.\nEach provider may include additional possible events it supports, but the most commonly supported are:\n\"block\" - calls the listener with the current block number on each new block.\n\"error\" - calls the listener on each async error that occurs during the event loop, with the error.\n\"debug\" - calls the listener on debug events, which can be used to troubleshoot network errors, provider problems, etc.\ntransaction hash - calls the listener on each block after the transaction has been mined; generally .once is more appropriate for this event.\nArray - calls the listener on each log that matches the filter.\nEventFilter - calls the listener with each matching log\n\nTopicFilter⇒ Array< null | string | Array< string > >\nA TopicFilter provides a struture to define bloom-filter queries.\nEach field that is null matches any value, a field that is a string must match exactly that value and array is effectively an OR-ed set, where any one of those values must match.\n\nWebSocketCreator⇒ () => WebSocketLike\nA function which can be used to re-create a WebSocket connection on disconnect.\n\nFUNCTIONS\ncopyRequest(req: TransactionRequest)⇒ PreparedTransactionRequest\nReturns a copy of req with all properties coerced to their strict types.\n\ngetDefaultProvider(network?: string | Networkish | WebSocketLike, options?: any)⇒ AbstractProvider\nReturns a default provider for network.\nIf network is a WebSocketLike or string that begins with \"ws:\" or \"wss:\", a WebSocketProvider is returned backed by that WebSocket or URL.\nIf network is a string that begins with \"HTTP:\" or \"HTTPS:\", a JsonRpcProvider is returned connected to that URL.\nOtherwise, a default provider is created backed by well-known public Web3 backends (such as INFURA) using community-provided API keys.\nThe options allows specifying custom API keys per backend (setting an API key to \"-\" will omit that provider) and options.exclusive can be set to either a backend name or and array of backend names, which will whitelist only those backends.\nCurrent backend strings supported are:\n\n\"alchemy\"\n\"ankr\"\n\"cloudflare\"\n\"chainstack\"\n\"etherscan\"\n\"infura\"\n\"publicPolygon\"\n\"quicknode\"\n\n// Connect to a local Geth node\nprovider = getDefaultProvider(\"http://localhost:8545/\");\n\n// Connect to Ethereum mainnet with any current and future\n// third-party services available\nprovider = getDefaultProvider(\"mainnet\");\n\n// Connect to Polygon, but only allow Etherscan and\n// INFURA and use \"MY_API_KEY\" in calls to Etherscan.\nprovider = getDefaultProvider(\"matic\", {\netherscan: \"MY_API_KEY\",\nexclusive: [ \"etherscan\", \"infura\" ]\n});\n\nclass Block\ninherits from BlockParams\nA Block represents the data associated with a full block on Ethereum.\n\nPROPERTIES\nblock.baseFeePerGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe base fee per gas that all transactions in this block were charged.\nThis adjusts after each block, depending on how congested the network is.\n\nblock.blobGasUsed⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe total amount of blob gas consumed by the transactions within the block. See EIP-4844.\n\nblock.date⇒ null | Dateread-only\nThe Date this block was included at.\n\nblock.difficulty⇒ bigintread-only\nThe difficulty target.\nOn legacy networks, this is the proof-of-work target required for a block to meet the protocol rules to be included.\nOn modern networks, this is a random number arrived at using randao. @TODO: Find links?\n\nblock.excessBlobGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe running total of blob gas consumed in excess of the target, prior to the block. See EIP-4844.\n\nblock.extraData⇒ stringread-only\nAny extra data the validator wished to include.\n\nblock.gasLimit⇒ bigintread-only\nThe total gas limit for this block.\n\nblock.gasUsed⇒ bigintread-only\nThe total gas used in this block.\n\nblock.hash⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe block hash.\nThis hash includes all properties, so can be safely used to identify an exact set of block properties.\n\nblock.length⇒ numberread-only\nThe number of transactions in this block.\n\nblock.miner⇒ stringread-only\nThe miner coinbase address, wihch receives any subsidies for including this block.\n\nblock.nonce⇒ stringread-only\nThe nonce.\nOn legacy networks, this is the random number inserted which permitted the difficulty target to be reached.\n\nblock.number⇒ numberread-only\nThe block number, sometimes called the block height. This is a sequential number that is one higher than the parent block.\n\nblock.parentBeaconBlockRoot⇒ null | string\nThe hash tree root of the parent beacon block for the given execution block. See EIP-4788.\n\nblock.parentHash⇒ stringread-only\nThe block hash of the parent block.\n\nblock.prefetchedTransactions⇒ Array< TransactionResponse >read-only\nReturns the complete transactions, in the order they were executed within the block.\nThis is only available for blocks which prefetched transactions, by passing true to prefetchTxs into provider.getBlock.\n\nblock.prevRandao⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe latest RANDAO mix of the post beacon state of the previous block.\n\nblock.provider⇒ Providerread-only\nThe provider connected to the block used to fetch additional details if necessary.\n\nblock.receiptsRoot⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe hash of the transaction receipts trie.\n\nblock.stateRoot⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe root hash for the global state after applying changes in this block.\n\nblock.timestamp⇒ numberread-only\nThe timestamp for this block, which is the number of seconds since epoch that this block was included.\n\nblock.transactions⇒ ReadonlyArray< string >read-only\nReturns the list of transaction hashes, in the order they were executed within the block.\n\nblock.transactionsRoot⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe hash of the transactions.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew Block(block: BlockParams, provider: Provider)\nCreate a new Block object.\nThis should generally not be necessary as the unless implementing a low-level library.\n\nMETHODS\nblock.getPrefetchedTransaction(indexOrHash: number | string)⇒ TransactionResponse\nIf a Block was fetched with a request to include the transactions this will allow synchronous access to those transactions.\nIf the transactions were not prefetched, this will throw.\n\nblock.getTransaction(indexOrHash: number | string)⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nGet the transaction at indexe within this block.\n\nblock.isLondon()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this block is an EIP-2930 block.\n\nblock.isMined()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this block been mined. This provides a type guard for all properties on a MinedBlock.\n\nblock.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-friendly value.\n\ninterface BrowserDiscoverOptions\nSpecifies how EIP-6963 discovery should proceed.\nSee: BrowserProvider-discover\n\nPROPERTIES\nbrowserDiscoverOptions.anyProvider⇒ boolean\nReturn the first detected provider. Otherwise wait for timeout and allowing filtering before selecting the desired provider.\n\nbrowserDiscoverOptions.filter⇒ (found: Array< Eip6963ProviderInfo >) => null | BrowserProvider | Eip6963ProviderInfo\nExplicitly choose which provider to used once scanning is complete.\n\nbrowserDiscoverOptions.provider⇒ Eip1193Provider\nOverride provider detection with this provider.\n\nbrowserDiscoverOptions.timeout⇒ number\nDuration to wait to detect providers. (default: 300ms)\n\nbrowserDiscoverOptions.window⇒ any\nUse the provided window context. Useful in non-standard environments or to hijack where a provider comes from.\n\nclass BrowserProvider\nA BrowserProvider is intended to wrap an injected provider which adheres to the EIP-1193 standard, which most (if not all) currently do.\n\nPROPERTIES\nbrowserProvider.providerInfo⇒ null | Eip6963ProviderInforead-only\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew BrowserProvider(ethereum: Eip1193Provider, network?: Networkish, options?: BrowserProviderOptions)\nConnect to the ethereum provider, optionally forcing the network.\n\nMETHODS\nbrowserProvider._send(payload: JsonRpcPayload | Array< JsonRpcPayload >)⇒ Promise< Array< JsonRpcResult | JsonRpcError > >\n\nbrowserProvider.getRpcError(payload: JsonRpcPayload, error: JsonRpcError)⇒ Error\n\nbrowserProvider.getSigner(address?: number | string)⇒ Promise< JsonRpcSigner >\n\nbrowserProvider.hasSigner(address: number | string)⇒ Promise< boolean >\nResolves to true if the provider manages the address.\n\nbrowserProvider.send(method: string, params: Array< any > | Record< string, any >)⇒ Promise< any >\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nBrowserProvider.discover(options?: BrowserDiscoverOptions)⇒ Promise< null | BrowserProvider >\nDiscover and connect to a Provider in the Browser using the EIP-6963 discovery mechanism. If no providers are present, null is resolved.\n\ninterface ContractRunner\nA ContractRunner is a generic interface which defines an object capable of interacting with a Contract on the network.\nThe more operations supported, the more utility it is capable of.\nThe most common ContractRunners are Providers which enable read-only access and Signers which enable write-access.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractRunner.call⇒ (tx: TransactionRequest) => Promise< string >\nRequired for pure, view or static calls to contracts.\n\ncontractRunner.estimateGas⇒ (tx: TransactionRequest) => Promise< bigint >\nRequired to estimate gas.\n\ncontractRunner.provider⇒ null | Provider\nThe provider used for necessary state querying operations.\nThis can also point to the ContractRunner itself, in the case of an AbstractProvider.\n\ncontractRunner.resolveName⇒ (name: string) => Promise< null | string >\nRequired to support ENS names\n\ncontractRunner.sendTransaction⇒ (tx: TransactionRequest) => Promise< TransactionResponse >\nRequired for state mutating calls\n\ninterface Eip1193Provider\nThe interface to an EIP-1193 provider, which is a standard used by most injected providers, which the BrowserProvider accepts and exposes the API of.\n\nMETHODS\neip1193Provider.request(request: { method: string , params?: Array< any > | Record< string, any > })⇒ Promise< any >\nSee EIP-1193 for details on this method.\n\ninterface Eip6963ProviderInfo\nProvider info provided by the EIP-6963 discovery mechanism.\n\nPROPERTIES\neip6963ProviderInfo.icon⇒ string\n\neip6963ProviderInfo.name⇒ string\n\neip6963ProviderInfo.rdns⇒ string\n\neip6963ProviderInfo.uuid⇒ string\n\nclass EnsPlugin\ninherits from NetworkPlugin\nAn EnsPlugin allows a Network to specify the ENS Registry Contract address and the target network to use when using that contract.\nVarious testnets have their own instance of the contract to use, but in general, the mainnet instance supports multi-chain addresses and should be used.\n\nPROPERTIES\nensPlugin.address⇒ stringread-only\nThe ENS Registrty Contract address.\n\nensPlugin.targetNetwork⇒ numberread-only\nThe chain ID that the ENS contract lives on.\n\nensPlugin.universalResolver⇒ stringread-only\nThe Universal Resolver Contract Address.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew EnsPlugin(address?: null | string, targetNetwork?: null | number, universalResolver?: string)\nCreates a new EnsPlugin connected to address on the targetNetwork. The default ENS address and mainnet is used if unspecified.\n\ninterface EventFilter\nAn EventFilter allows efficiently filtering logs (also known as events) using bloom filters included within blocks.\n\nPROPERTIES\neventFilter.address⇒ AddressLike | Array< AddressLike >\n\neventFilter.topics⇒ TopicFilter\n\nclass FeeData\nA FeeData wraps all the fee-related values associated with the network.\n\nPROPERTIES\nfeeData.gasPrice⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe gas price for legacy networks.\n\nfeeData.maxFeePerGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe maximum fee to pay per gas.\nThe base fee per gas is defined by the network and based on congestion, increasing the cost during times of heavy load and lowering when less busy.\nThe actual fee per gas will be the base fee for the block and the priority fee, up to the max fee per gas.\nThis will be null on legacy networks (i.e. pre-EIP-1559)\n\nfeeData.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe additional amout to pay per gas to encourage a validator to include the transaction.\nThe purpose of this is to compensate the validator for the adjusted risk for including a given transaction.\nThis will be null on legacy networks (i.e. pre-EIP-1559)\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew FeeData(gasPrice?: null | bigint, maxFeePerGas?: null | bigint, maxPriorityFeePerGas?: null | bigint)\nCreates a new FeeData for gasPrice, maxFeePerGas and maxPriorityFeePerGas.\n\nMETHODS\nfeeData.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-friendly value.\n\nclass FeeDataNetworkPlugin\ninherits from NetworkPlugin\nA FeeDataNetworkPlugin allows a network to provide and alternate means to specify its fee data.\nFor example, a network which does not support EIP-1559 may choose to use a Gas Station site to approximate the gas price.\n\nPROPERTIES\nfeeDataNetworkPlugin.feeDataFunc⇒ (provider: Provider) => Promise< FeeData >read-only\nThe fee data function provided to the constructor.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew FeeDataNetworkPlugin(feeDataFunc: (provider: Provider) => Promise< FeeData >)\nCreates a new FeeDataNetworkPlugin.\n\nMETHODS\nfeeDataNetworkPlugin.getFeeData(provider: Provider)⇒ Promise< FeeData >\nResolves to the fee data.\n\nclass FetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin\ninherits from NetworkPlugin\n\nPROPERTIES\nfetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin.processFunc⇒ (f: () => Promise< FeeData >, p: Provider, r: FetchRequest) => Promise< { gasPrice?: null | bigint , maxFeePerGas?: null | bigint , maxPriorityFeePerGas?: null | bigint } >read-only\nThe callback to use when computing the FeeData.\n\nfetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin.url⇒ stringread-only\nThe URL to initialize the FetchRequest with in processFunc.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew FetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin(url: string, processFunc: (f: () => Promise< FeeData >, p: Provider, r: FetchRequest) => Promise< { gasPrice?: null | bigint , maxFeePerGas?: null | bigint , maxPriorityFeePerGas?: null | bigint } >)\nCreates a new FetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin which will be used when computing the fee data for the network.\n\ninterface Filter\ninherits from EventFilter\nA Filter allows searching a specific range of blocks for mathcing logs.\n\nPROPERTIES\nfilter.fromBlock⇒ BlockTag\nThe start block for the filter (inclusive).\n\nfilter.toBlock⇒ BlockTag\nThe end block for the filter (inclusive).\n\ninterface FilterByBlockHash\ninherits from EventFilter\nA FilterByBlockHash allows searching a specific block for mathcing logs.\n\nPROPERTIES\nfilterByBlockHash.blockHash⇒ string\nThe blockhash of the specific block for the filter.\n\nclass GasCostPlugin\ninherits from NetworkPlugin\nA GasCostPlugin allows a network to provide alternative values when computing the intrinsic gas required for a transaction.\n\nPROPERTIES\ngasCostPlugin.effectiveBlock⇒ numberread-only\nThe block number to treat these values as valid from.\nThis allows a hardfork to have updated values included as well as mulutiple hardforks to be supported.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txAccessListAddress⇒ numberread-only\nThe fee per address in the EIP-2930 access list.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txAccessListStorageKey⇒ numberread-only\nThe fee per storage key in the EIP-2930 access list.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txBase⇒ numberread-only\nThe transactions base fee.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txCreate⇒ numberread-only\nThe fee for creating a new account.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txDataNonzero⇒ numberread-only\nThe fee per non-zero-byte in the data.\n\ngasCostPlugin.txDataZero⇒ numberread-only\nThe fee per zero-byte in the data.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew GasCostPlugin(effectiveBlock?: number, costs?: GasCostParameters)\nCreates a new GasCostPlugin from effectiveBlock until the latest block or another GasCostPlugin supercedes that block number, with the associated costs.\n\nclass IpcSocketProvider\ninherits from SocketProvider, JsonRpcApiProvider\nAn IpcSocketProvider connects over an IPC socket on the host which provides fast access to the node, but requires the node and the script run on the same machine.\n\nPROPERTIES\nipcSocketProvider.socket⇒ Socketread-only\nThe connected socket.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew IpcSocketProvider(path: string, network?: Networkish, options?: JsonRpcApiProviderOptions)\n\nclass Log\ninherits from LogParams\nA Log in Ethereum represents an event that has been included in a transaction using the LOG* opcodes, which are most commonly used by Solidity's emit for announcing events.\n\nPROPERTIES\nlog.address⇒ stringread-only\nThe address of the contract that emitted this log.\n\nlog.blockHash⇒ stringread-only\nThe block hash of the block this log occurred in. Use the log.getBlock to get the Block.\n\nlog.blockNumber⇒ numberread-only\nThe block number of the block this log occurred in. It is preferred to use the block.hash when fetching the related Block, since in the case of an orphaned block, the block at that height may have changed.\n\nlog.data⇒ stringread-only\nThe data included in this log when it was emitted.\n\nlog.index⇒ numberread-only\nThe index within the block this log occurred at. This is generally not useful to developers, but can be used with the various roots to proof inclusion within a block.\n\nlog.provider⇒ Providerread-only\nThe provider connected to the log used to fetch additional details if necessary.\n\nlog.removed⇒ booleanread-only\nIf the Log represents a block that was removed due to an orphaned block, this will be true.\nThis can only happen within an orphan event listener.\n\nlog.topics⇒ ReadonlyArray< string >read-only\nThe indexed topics included in this log when it was emitted.\nAll topics are included in the bloom filters, so they can be efficiently filtered using the provider.getLogs method.\n\nlog.transactionHash⇒ stringread-only\nThe transaction hash of the transaction this log occurred in. Use the log.getTransaction to get the TransactionResponse.\n\nlog.transactionIndex⇒ numberread-only\nThe index within the transaction of this log.\n\nMETHODS\nlog.getBlock()⇒ Promise< Block >\nReturns the block that this log occurred in.\n\nlog.getTransaction()⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nReturns the transaction that this log occurred in.\n\nlog.getTransactionReceipt()⇒ Promise< TransactionReceipt >\nReturns the transaction receipt fot the transaction that this log occurred in.\n\nlog.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-compatible object.\n\ninterface MinedBlock\ninherits from Block, BlockParams\nAn Interface to indicate a Block has been included in the blockchain. This asserts a Type Guard that necessary properties are non-null.\nBefore a block is included, it is a pending block.\n\nPROPERTIES\nminedBlock.date⇒ Dateread-only\nThe block date, created from the timestamp.\n\nminedBlock.hash⇒ stringread-only\nThe block hash.\n\nminedBlock.miner⇒ stringread-only\nThe miner of the block, also known as the author or block producer.\n\nminedBlock.number⇒ numberread-only\nThe block number also known as the block height.\n\nminedBlock.timestamp⇒ numberread-only\nThe block timestamp, in seconds from epoch.\n\ninterface MinedTransactionResponse\ninherits from TransactionResponse, TransactionResponseParams\nA MinedTransactionResponse is an interface representing a transaction which has been mined and allows for a type guard for its property values being defined.\n\nPROPERTIES\nminedTransactionResponse.blockHash⇒ string\nThe block hash this transaction occurred in.\n\nminedTransactionResponse.blockNumber⇒ number\nThe block number this transaction occurred in.\n\nminedTransactionResponse.date⇒ Date\nThe date this transaction occurred on.\n\nclass NetworkPlugin\nA NetworkPlugin provides additional functionality on a Network.\n\nPROPERTIES\nnetworkPlugin.name⇒ stringread-only\nThe name of the plugin.\nIt is recommended to use reverse-domain-notation, which permits unique names with a known authority as well as hierarchal entries.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew NetworkPlugin(name: string)\nCreates a new NetworkPlugin.\n\nMETHODS\nnetworkPlugin.clone()⇒ NetworkPlugin\nCreates a copy of this plugin.\n\nnetworkPlugin.inspect()⇒ string\n\nnetworkPlugin.toString()⇒ string\n\nclass NonceManager\ninherits from AbstractSigner, Signer\nA NonceManager wraps another Signer and automatically manages the nonce, ensuring serialized and sequential nonces are used during transaction.\n\nPROPERTIES\nnonceManager.signer⇒ Signer\nThe Signer being managed.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew NonceManager(signer: Signer)\nCreates a new NonceManager to manage signer.\n\nMETHODS\nnonceManager.increment()⇒ void\nManually increment the nonce. This may be useful when managng offline transactions.\n\nnonceManager.reset()⇒ void\nResets the nonce, causing the NonceManager to reload the current nonce from the blockchain on the next transaction.\n\ninterface PreparedTransactionRequest\nA PreparedTransactionRequest is identical to a TransactionRequest except all the property types are strictly enforced.\n\nPROPERTIES\npreparedTransactionRequest.accessList⇒ AccessList\nThe EIP-2930 access list. Storage slots included in the access list are warmed by pre-loading them, so their initial cost to fetch is guaranteed, but then each additional access is cheaper.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.authorizationList⇒ Array< Authorization >\nThe EIP-7702 authorizations (if any).\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.blockTag⇒ BlockTag\nWhen using call or estimateGas, this allows a specific block to be queried. Many backends do not support this and when unsupported errors are silently squelched and \"latest\" is used.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.chainId⇒ bigint\nThe chain ID for the network this transaction is valid on.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.customData⇒ any\nA custom object, which can be passed along for network-specific values.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.data⇒ string\nThe transaction data.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.enableCcipRead⇒ boolean\nWhen using call, this enables CCIP-read, which permits the provider to be redirected to web-based content during execution, which is then further validated by the contract.\nThere are potential security implications allowing CCIP-read, as it could be used to expose the IP address or user activity during the fetch to unexpected parties.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.from⇒ AddressLike\nThe sender of the transaction.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.gasLimit⇒ bigint\nThe maximum amount of gas to allow this transaction to consume.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.gasPrice⇒ bigint\nThe gas price to use for legacy transactions or transactions on legacy networks.\nMost of the time the max*FeePerGas is preferred.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.maxFeePerGas⇒ bigint\nThe EIP-1559 maximum total fee to pay per gas. The actual value used is protocol enforced to be the block's base fee.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ bigint\nThe EIP-1559 maximum priority fee to pay per gas.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.nonce⇒ number\nThe nonce of the transaction, used to prevent replay attacks.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.to⇒ AddressLike\nThe target of the transaction.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.type⇒ number\nThe transaction type.\n\npreparedTransactionRequest.value⇒ bigint\nThe transaction value (in wei).\n\ninterface Provider\ninherits from ContractRunner, EventEmitterable, NameResolver\nA Provider is the primary method to interact with the read-only content on Ethereum.\nIt allows access to details about accounts, blocks and transactions and the ability to query event logs and simulate contract execution.\nAccount data includes the balance, transaction count, code and state trie storage.\nSimulating execution can be used to call, estimate gas and get transaction results.\nThe broadcastTransaction is the only method which allows updating the blockchain, but it is usually accessed by a Signer, since a private key must be used to sign the transaction before it can be broadcast.\n\nPROPERTIES\nprovider.provider⇒ this\nThe provider iteself.\nThis is part of the necessary API for executing a contract, as it provides a common property on any ContractRunner that can be used to access the read-only portion of the runner.\n\nMETHODS\nprovider.broadcastTransaction(signedTx: string)⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nBroadcasts the signedTx to the network, adding it to the memory pool of any node for which the transaction meets the rebroadcast requirements.\n\nprovider.call(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< string >\nSimulate the execution of tx. If the call reverts, it will throw a CallExceptionError which includes the revert data.\n\nprovider.destroy()⇒ void\nShutdown any resources this provider is using. No additional calls should be made to this provider after calling this.\n\nprovider.estimateGas(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< bigint >\nEstimates the amount of gas required to execute tx.\n\nprovider.getBalance(address: AddressLike, blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< bigint >\nGet the account balance (in wei) of address. If blockTag is specified and the node supports archive access for that blockTag, the balance is as of that BlockTag.\n\nprovider.getBlock(blockHashOrBlockTag: BlockTag | string, prefetchTxs?: boolean)⇒ Promise< null | Block >\nResolves to the block for blockHashOrBlockTag.\nIf prefetchTxs, and the backend supports including transactions with block requests, all transactions will be included and the Block object will not need to make remote calls for getting transactions.\n\nprovider.getBlockNumber()⇒ Promise< number >\nGet the current block number.\n\nprovider.getCode(address: AddressLike, blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< string >\nGet the bytecode for address.\n\nprovider.getFeeData()⇒ Promise< FeeData >\nGet the best guess at the recommended FeeData.\n\nprovider.getLogs(filter: Filter | FilterByBlockHash)⇒ Promise< Array< Log > >\nResolves to the list of Logs that match filter\n\nprovider.getNetwork()⇒ Promise< Network >\nGet the connected Network.\n\nprovider.getStorage(address: AddressLike, position: BigNumberish, blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< string >\nGet the storage slot value for address at slot position.\n\nprovider.getTransaction(hash: string)⇒ Promise< null | TransactionResponse >\nResolves to the transaction for hash.\nIf the transaction is unknown or on pruning nodes which discard old transactions this resolves to null.\n\nprovider.getTransactionCount(address: AddressLike, blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< number >\nGet the number of transactions ever sent for address, which is used as the nonce when sending a transaction. If blockTag is specified and the node supports archive access for that blockTag, the transaction count is as of that BlockTag.\n\nprovider.getTransactionReceipt(hash: string)⇒ Promise< null | TransactionReceipt >\nResolves to the transaction receipt for hash, if mined.\nIf the transaction has not been mined, is unknown or on pruning nodes which discard old transactions this resolves to null.\n\nprovider.getTransactionResult(hash: string)⇒ Promise< null | string >\nResolves to the result returned by the executions of hash.\nThis is only supported on nodes with archive access and with the necessary debug APIs enabled.\n\nprovider.lookupAddress(address: string, coinType?: BigNumberish)⇒ Promise< null | string >\nResolves to the ENS name associated for the address or null if the primary name is not configured.\nUsers must perform additional steps to configure a primary name, which is not currently common.\n\nprovider.resolveName(ensName: string, coinType?: BigNumberish)⇒ Promise< null | string >\nResolves to the address configured for the ensName or null if unconfigured.\n\nprovider.waitForBlock(blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< Block >\nResolves to the block at blockTag once it has been mined.\nThis can be useful for waiting some number of blocks by using the currentBlockNumber + N.\n\nprovider.waitForTransaction(hash: string, confirms?: number, timeout?: number)⇒ Promise< null | TransactionReceipt >\nWaits until the transaction hash is mined and has confirms confirmations.\n\ninterface Signer\ninherits from Addressable, ContractRunner, NameResolver\nA Signer represents an account on the Ethereum Blockchain, and is most often backed by a private key represented by a mnemonic or residing on a Hardware Wallet.\nThe API remains abstract though, so that it can deal with more advanced exotic Signing entities, such as Smart Contract Wallets or Virtual Wallets (where the private key may not be known).\n\nPROPERTIES\nsigner.provider⇒ null | Provider\nThe Provider attached to this Signer (if any).\n\nMETHODS\nsigner.authorize(authorization: AuthorizationRequest)⇒ Promise< Authorization >\nSigns an authorization to be used in EIP-7702 transactions.\n\nsigner.call(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< string >\nEvaluates the tx by running it against the current Blockchain state. This cannot change state and has no cost in ether, as it is effectively simulating execution.\nThis can be used to have the Blockchain perform computations based on its state (e.g. running a Contract's getters) or to simulate the effect of a transaction before actually performing an operation.\n\nsigner.connect(provider: null | Provider)⇒ Signer\nReturns a new instance of this Signer connected to provider or detached from any Provider if null.\n\nsigner.estimateGas(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< bigint >\nEstimates the required gas required to execute tx on the Blockchain. This will be the expected amount a transaction will require as its gasLimit to successfully run all the necessary computations and store the needed state that the transaction intends.\nKeep in mind that this is best efforts, since the state of the Blockchain is in flux, which could affect transaction gas requirements.\n\nsigner.getAddress()⇒ Promise< string >\nGet the address of the Signer.\n\nsigner.getNonce(blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< number >\nGets the next nonce required for this Signer to send a transaction.\n\nsigner.populateAuthorization(auth: AuthorizationRequest)⇒ Promise< AuthorizationRequest >\nPrepares an AuthorizationRequest for authorization by populating any missing properties:\n\nresolves address (if an Addressable or ENS name)\npopulates nonce via signer.getNonce(\"pending\")\npopulates chainId via signer.provider.getNetwork()\n\nsigner.populateCall(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< TransactionLike < string > >\nPrepares a {@link TransactionRequest} for calling:\n\nresolves to and from addresses\nif from is specified , check that it matches this Signer\n\nsigner.populateTransaction(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< TransactionLike < string > >\nPrepares a {@link TransactionRequest} for sending to the network by populating any missing properties:\n\nresolves to and from addresses\nif from is specified , check that it matches this Signer\npopulates nonce via signer.getNonce(\"pending\")\npopulates gasLimit via signer.estimateGas(tx)\npopulates chainId via signer.provider.getNetwork()\npopulates type and relevant fee data for that type (gasPrice for legacy transactions, maxFeePerGas for EIP-1559, etc)\n\nsigner.resolveName(name: string)⇒ Promise< null | string >\nResolves an ENS Name to an address.\n\nsigner.sendTransaction(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nSends tx to the Network. The signer.populateTransaction(tx) is called first to ensure all necessary properties for the transaction to be valid have been popualted first.\n\nsigner.signMessage(message: string | Uint8Array)⇒ Promise< string >\nSigns an EIP-191 prefixed personal message.\nIf the message is a string, it is signed as UTF-8 encoded bytes. It is not interpretted as a BytesLike; so the string \"0x1234\" is signed as six characters, not two bytes.\nTo sign that example as two bytes, the Uint8Array should be used (i.e. new Uint8Array([ 0x12, 0x34 ])).\n\nsigner.signTransaction(tx: TransactionRequest)⇒ Promise< string >\nSigns tx, returning the fully signed transaction. This does not populate any additional properties within the transaction.\n\nsigner.signTypedData(domain: TypedDataDomain, types: Record< string, Array< TypedDataField > >, value: Record< string, any >)⇒ Promise< string >\nSigns the EIP-712 typed data.\n\nclass TransactionReceipt\ninherits from TransactionReceiptParams\nA TransactionReceipt includes additional information about a transaction that is only available after it has been mined.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransactionReceipt.blobGasPrice⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe price paid per BLOB in gas. See EIP-4844.\n\ntransactionReceipt.blobGasUsed⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe gas used for BLObs. See EIP-4844.\n\ntransactionReceipt.blockHash⇒ stringread-only\nThe block hash of the Block this transaction was included in.\n\ntransactionReceipt.blockNumber⇒ numberread-only\nThe block number of the Block this transaction was included in.\n\ntransactionReceipt.contractAddress⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe address of the contract if the transaction was directly responsible for deploying one.\nThis is non-null only if the to is empty and the data was successfully executed as initcode.\n\ntransactionReceipt.cumulativeGasUsed⇒ bigintread-only\nThe amount of gas used by all transactions within the block for this and all transactions with a lower index.\nThis is generally not useful for developers but can be used to validate certain aspects of execution.\n\ntransactionReceipt.fee⇒ bigintread-only\nThe total fee for this transaction, in wei.\n\ntransactionReceipt.from⇒ stringread-only\nThe sender of the transaction.\n\ntransactionReceipt.gasPrice⇒ bigintread-only\nThe actual gas price used during execution.\nDue to the complexity of EIP-1559 this value can only be caluclated after the transaction has been mined, snce the base fee is protocol-enforced.\n\ntransactionReceipt.gasUsed⇒ bigintread-only\nThe actual amount of gas used by this transaction.\nWhen creating a transaction, the amount of gas that will be used can only be approximated, but the sender must pay the gas fee for the entire gas limit. After the transaction, the difference is refunded.\n\ntransactionReceipt.hash⇒ stringread-only\nThe transaction hash.\n\ntransactionReceipt.index⇒ numberread-only\nThe index of this transaction within the block transactions.\n\ntransactionReceipt.logs⇒ ReadonlyArray< Log >read-only\nThe logs for this transaction.\n\ntransactionReceipt.logsBloom⇒ stringread-only\nThe bloom filter bytes that represent all logs that occurred within this transaction. This is generally not useful for most developers, but can be used to validate the included logs.\n\ntransactionReceipt.provider⇒ Providerread-only\nThe provider connected to the log used to fetch additional details if necessary.\n\ntransactionReceipt.root⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe root hash of this transaction.\nThis is no present and was only included in pre-byzantium blocks, but could be used to validate certain parts of the receipt.\n\ntransactionReceipt.status⇒ null | numberread-only\nThe status of this transaction, indicating success (i.e. 1) or a revert (i.e. 0).\nThis is available in post-byzantium blocks, but some backends may backfill this value.\n\ntransactionReceipt.to⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe address the transaction was sent to.\n\ntransactionReceipt.type⇒ numberread-only\nThe EIP-2718 transaction type.\n\nMETHODS\ntransactionReceipt.confirmations()⇒ Promise< number >\nResolves to the number of confirmations this transaction has.\n\ntransactionReceipt.getBlock()⇒ Promise< Block >\nResolves to the block this transaction occurred in.\n\ntransactionReceipt.getResult()⇒ Promise< string >\nResolves to the return value of the execution of this transaction.\nSupport for this feature is limited, as it requires an archive node with the debug_ or trace_ API enabled.\n\ntransactionReceipt.getTransaction()⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nResolves to the transaction this transaction occurred in.\n\ntransactionReceipt.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-compatible representation.\n\ninterface TransactionRequest\nA TransactionRequest is a transactions with potentially various properties not defined, or with less strict types for its values.\nThis is used to pass to various operations, which will internally coerce any types and populate any necessary values.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransactionRequest.accessList⇒ null | AccessListish\nThe EIP-2930 access list. Storage slots included in the access list are warmed by pre-loading them, so their initial cost to fetch is guaranteed, but then each additional access is cheaper.\n\ntransactionRequest.authorizationList⇒ null | Array< AuthorizationLike >\nThe EIP-7702 authorizations (if any).\n\ntransactionRequest.blobs⇒ null | Array< BlobLike >\nAny blobs to include in the transaction (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionRequest.blobVersionedHashes⇒ null | Array< string >\nThe blob versioned hashes (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionRequest.blobWrapperVersion⇒ null | number\nThe EIP-7594 BLOb Wrapper Version used for PeerDAS.\nFor networks that use EIP-7594, this property is required to serialize the sidecar correctly.\n\ntransactionRequest.blockTag⇒ BlockTag\nWhen using call or estimateGas, this allows a specific block to be queried. Many backends do not support this and when unsupported errors are silently squelched and \"latest\" is used.\n\ntransactionRequest.chainId⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe chain ID for the network this transaction is valid on.\n\ntransactionRequest.customData⇒ any\nA custom object, which can be passed along for network-specific values.\n\ntransactionRequest.data⇒ null | string\nThe transaction data.\n\ntransactionRequest.enableCcipRead⇒ boolean\nWhen using call, this enables CCIP-read, which permits the provider to be redirected to web-based content during execution, which is then further validated by the contract.\nThere are potential security implications allowing CCIP-read, as it could be used to expose the IP address or user activity during the fetch to unexpected parties.\n\ntransactionRequest.from⇒ null | AddressLike\nThe sender of the transaction.\n\ntransactionRequest.gasLimit⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum amount of gas to allow this transaction to consume.\n\ntransactionRequest.gasPrice⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe gas price to use for legacy transactions or transactions on legacy networks.\nMost of the time the max*FeePerGas is preferred.\n\ntransactionRequest.kzg⇒ null | KzgLibraryLike\nAn external library for computing the KZG commitments and proofs necessary for EIP-4844 transactions (see EIP-4844).\nThis is generally null, unless you are creating BLOb transactions.\n\ntransactionRequest.maxFeePerBlobGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum fee per blob gas (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionRequest.maxFeePerGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe EIP-1559 maximum total fee to pay per gas. The actual value used is protocol enforced to be the block's base fee.\n\ntransactionRequest.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe EIP-1559 maximum priority fee to pay per gas.\n\ntransactionRequest.nonce⇒ null | number\nThe nonce of the transaction, used to prevent replay attacks.\n\ntransactionRequest.to⇒ null | AddressLike\nThe target of the transaction.\n\ntransactionRequest.type⇒ null | number\nThe transaction type.\n\ntransactionRequest.value⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe transaction value (in wei).\n\nclass TransactionResponse\ninherits from TransactionResponseParams\nA TransactionResponse includes all properties about a transaction that was sent to the network, which may or may not be included in a block.\nThe transactionResponse.isMined can be used to check if the transaction has been mined as well as type guard that the otherwise possibly null properties are defined.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransactionResponse.accessList⇒ null | AccessListread-only\nThe EIP-2930 access list for transaction types that support it, otherwise null.\n\ntransactionResponse.authorizationList⇒ null | Array< Authorization >read-only\nThe EIP-7702 authorizations (if any).\n\ntransactionResponse.blobVersionedHashes⇒ null | Array< string >read-only\nThe EIP-4844 BLOb versioned hashes.\n\ntransactionResponse.blockHash⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe blockHash of the block that this transaction was included in.\nThis is null for pending transactions.\n\ntransactionResponse.blockNumber⇒ null | numberread-only\nThe block number of the block that this transaction was included in.\nThis is null for pending transactions.\n\ntransactionResponse.chainId⇒ bigintread-only\nThe chain ID.\n\ntransactionResponse.data⇒ stringread-only\nThe data.\n\ntransactionResponse.from⇒ stringread-only\nThe sender of this transaction. It is implicitly computed from the transaction pre-image hash (as the digest) and the signature using ecrecover.\n\ntransactionResponse.gasLimit⇒ bigintread-only\nThe maximum units of gas this transaction can consume. If execution exceeds this, the entries transaction is reverted and the sender is charged for the full amount, despite not state changes being made.\n\ntransactionResponse.gasPrice⇒ bigintread-only\nThe gas price can have various values, depending on the network.\nIn modern networks, for transactions that are included this is the effective gas price (the fee per gas that was actually charged), while for transactions that have not been included yet is the maxFeePerGas.\nFor legacy transactions, or transactions on legacy networks, this is the fee that will be charged per unit of gas the transaction consumes.\n\ntransactionResponse.hash⇒ stringread-only\nThe transaction hash.\n\ntransactionResponse.index⇒ numberread-only\nThe index within the block that this transaction resides at.\n\ntransactionResponse.maxFeePerBlobGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe EIP-4844 max fee per BLOb gas.\n\ntransactionResponse.maxFeePerGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe maximum fee (per unit of gas) to allow this transaction to charge the sender.\n\ntransactionResponse.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ null | bigintread-only\nThe maximum priority fee (per unit of gas) to allow a validator to charge the sender. This is inclusive of the maxFeeFeePerGas.\n\ntransactionResponse.nonce⇒ numberread-only\nThe nonce, which is used to prevent replay attacks and offer a method to ensure transactions from a given sender are explicitly ordered.\nWhen sending a transaction, this must be equal to the number of transactions ever sent by from.\n\ntransactionResponse.provider⇒ Providerread-only\nThe provider this is connected to, which will influence how its methods will resolve its async inspection methods.\n\ntransactionResponse.signature⇒ Signatureread-only\nThe signature.\n\ntransactionResponse.to⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe receiver of this transaction.\nIf null, then the transaction is an initcode transaction. This means the result of executing the data will be deployed as a new contract on chain (assuming it does not revert) and the address may be computed using getCreateAddress.\n\ntransactionResponse.type⇒ numberread-only\nThe EIP-2718 transaction envelope type. This is 0 for legacy transactions types.\n\ntransactionResponse.value⇒ bigintread-only\nThe value, in wei. Use formatEther to format this value as ether.\n\nMETHODS\ntransactionResponse.confirmations()⇒ Promise< number >\nResolve to the number of confirmations this transaction has.\n\ntransactionResponse.getBlock()⇒ Promise< null | Block >\nResolves to the Block that this transaction was included in.\nThis will return null if the transaction has not been included yet.\n\ntransactionResponse.getTransaction()⇒ Promise< null | TransactionResponse >\nResolves to this transaction being re-requested from the provider. This can be used if you have an unmined transaction and wish to get an up-to-date populated instance.\n\ntransactionResponse.isBerlin()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if the transaction is a Berlin (i.e. type == 1) transaction. See EIP-2930.\nThis provides a Type Guard that this transaction will have the null-ness for hardfork-specific properties set correctly.\n\ntransactionResponse.isCancun()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if hte transaction is a Cancun (i.e. type == 3) transaction. See EIP-4844.\n\ntransactionResponse.isLegacy()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if the transaction is a legacy (i.e. type == 0) transaction.\nThis provides a Type Guard that this transaction will have the null-ness for hardfork-specific properties set correctly.\n\ntransactionResponse.isLondon()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if the transaction is a London (i.e. type == 2) transaction. See EIP-1559.\nThis provides a Type Guard that this transaction will have the null-ness for hardfork-specific properties set correctly.\n\ntransactionResponse.isMined()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this transaction has been included.\nThis is effective only as of the time the TransactionResponse was instantiated. To get up-to-date information, use getTransaction.\nThis provides a Type Guard that this transaction will have non-null property values for properties that are null for unmined transactions.\n\ntransactionResponse.removedEvent()⇒ OrphanFilter\nReturns a filter which can be used to listen for orphan events that evict this transaction.\n\ntransactionResponse.reorderedEvent(other?: TransactionResponse)⇒ OrphanFilter\nReturns a filter which can be used to listen for orphan events that re-order this event against other.\n\ntransactionResponse.replaceableTransaction(startBlock: number)⇒ TransactionResponse\nReturns a new TransactionResponse instance which has the ability to detect (and throw an error) if the transaction is replaced, which will begin scanning at startBlock.\nThis should generally not be used by developers and is intended primarily for internal use. Setting an incorrect startBlock can have devastating performance consequences if used incorrectly.\n\ntransactionResponse.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-compatible representation of this transaction.\n\ntransactionResponse.wait(confirms?: number, timeout?: number)⇒ Promise< null | TransactionReceipt >\nResolves once this transaction has been mined and has confirms blocks including it (default: 1) with an optional timeout.\nThis can resolve to null only if confirms is 0 and the transaction has not been mined, otherwise this will wait until enough confirmations have completed.\n\ninterface WebSocketLike\nA generic interface to a Websocket-like object.\n\nPROPERTIES\nwebSocketLike.onerror⇒ null | PAREN<(args: Array< any >) => any>\n\nwebSocketLike.onmessage⇒ null | PAREN<(args: Array< any >) => any>\n\nwebSocketLike.onopen⇒ null | PAREN<(args: Array< any >) => any>\n\nwebSocketLike.readyState⇒ number\n\nMETHODS\nwebSocketLike.close(code?: number, reason?: string)⇒ void\n\nwebSocketLike.send(payload: any)⇒ void\n\nclass WebSocketProvider\ninherits from SocketProvider, JsonRpcApiProvider\nA JSON-RPC provider which is backed by a WebSocket.\nWebSockets are often preferred because they retain a live connection to a server, which permits more instant access to events.\nHowever, this incurs higher server infrasturture costs, so additional resources may be required to host your own WebSocket nodes and many third-party services charge additional fees for WebSocket endpoints.\n\nPROPERTIES\nwebSocketProvider.websocket⇒ WebSocketLikeread-only\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew WebSocketProvider(url: string | WebSocketLike | WebSocketCreator, network?: Networkish, options?: JsonRpcApiProviderOptions)\n\nNetworks\nA Network encapsulates the various properties required to interact with a specific chain.\n\nTYPES\nNetworkish⇒ Network | number | bigint | string | { chainId?: number , ensAddress?: string , ensNetwork?: number , ensUniversalResolver?: string , name?: string }\nA Networkish can be used to allude to a Network, by specifing:\n\na Network object\na well-known (or registered) network name\na well-known (or registered) chain ID\nan object with sufficient details to describe a network\n\nclass Network\nA Network provides access to a chain's properties and allows for plug-ins to extend functionality.\n\nPROPERTIES\nnetwork.chainId⇒ bigint\nThe network chain ID.\n\nnetwork.name⇒ string\nThe network common name.\nThis is the canonical name, as networks migh have multiple names.\n\nnetwork.plugins⇒ Array< NetworkPlugin >read-only\nReturns the list of plugins currently attached to this Network.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew Network(name: string, chainId: BigNumberish)\nCreates a new Network for name and chainId.\n\nNetwork.from(network?: Networkish)⇒ Network\nReturns a new Network for the network name or chainId.\n\nMETHODS\nnetwork.attachPlugin(plugin: NetworkPlugin)⇒ this\nAttach a new plugin to this Network. The network name must be unique, excluding any fragment.\n\nnetwork.clone()⇒ Network\nCreate a copy of this Network.\n\nnetwork.computeIntrinsicGas(tx: TransactionLike)⇒ number\nCompute the intrinsic gas required for a transaction.\nA GasCostPlugin can be attached to override the default values.\n\nnetwork.getPlugin(name: string)⇒ null | T\nReturn the plugin, if any, matching name exactly. Plugins with fragments will not be returned unless name includes a fragment.\n\nnetwork.getPlugins(basename: string)⇒ Array< T >\nGets a list of all plugins that match name, with otr without a fragment.\n\nnetwork.inspect()⇒ string\n\nnetwork.matches(other: Networkish)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if other matches this network. Any chain ID must match, and if no chain ID is present, the name must match.\nThis method does not currently check for additional properties, such as ENS address or plug-in compatibility.\n\nnetwork.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturns a JSON-compatible representation of a Network.\n\nnetwork.toString()⇒ string\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nNetwork.register(nameOrChainId: string | number | bigint, networkFunc: () => Network)⇒ void\nRegister nameOrChainId with a function which returns an instance of a Network representing that chain.\n\n← Hashing Utilities\nSubclassing Provider→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on April 9, 2026, 11:51pm.","tokens":13402,"crawled_at":1791193838481} +{"id":10297,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/sdk/javascript","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"JavaScript SDK | Metaplex Core","text":"The Metaplex Core JavaScript SDK (@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core) provides a complete TypeScript/JavaScript interface for interacting with Core Assets and Collections on Solana. Built on the Umi framework, it offers type-safe methods for all Core operations.\nWhat You'll Learn\nThis SDK reference covers:\nSetting up Umi with the Core plugin\nCreating, transferring, burning, and updating Assets\nManaging Collections and collection-level operations\nAdding, updating, and removing Plugins\nFetching Assets and Collections with DAS\nError handling and common patterns\n\nSummary\nThe Core JavaScript SDK is the recommended way to interact with Metaplex Core from JavaScript/TypeScript applications. It wraps the Core program instructions in a type-safe API.\nInstall: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi\nRequires Umi framework for wallet/RPC management\nAll functions return transaction builders for flexible execution\nSupports both browser and Node.js environments\nOut of Scope\nRust SDK usage (see Rust SDK), Token Metadata operations, Candy Machine integration, and low-level Solana transaction construction.\nQuick Start\nJump to: Setup · Create · Transfer · Burn · Update · Collections · Plugins · Fetch · Errors · FAQ\nInstall dependencies: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults\nCreate Umi instance with mplCore() plugin\nGenerate or load a signer for transactions\nCall SDK functions and confirm transactions\nPrerequisites\nNode.js 18+ or modern browser with ES modules\nUmi framework configured with RPC and signer\nSOL for rent and fees (~0.003 SOL per base asset; rent varies with asset size)\nAPI Reference\nFull TypeDoc API documentation for the SDK.\n\nNPM Package\nPackage on npmjs.com with version history.\n\nInstallation\nInstall the Core SDK and Umi framework:\nTerminal\nnpm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults\n\nFor metadata uploads, add an uploader plugin:\nTerminal\nnpm install @metaplex-foundation/umi-uploader-irys\n\nUmi Setup\nCreate and configure an Umi instance with the Core plugin:\nsetup-umi.ts\nimport { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\nimport { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nimport { keypairIdentity } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { irysUploader } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-uploader-irys'\n\n// Create Umi with RPC endpoint\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n.use(mplCore())\n\n.use(keypairIdentity(yourKeypair))\n\n.use(irysUploader()) // Optional: for metadata uploads\n\nAssets\nCreate an Asset\nUse create() to mint a new Core Asset:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4\n\n5// Initialize UMI\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n7 .use(mplCore())\n\n8\n\n9// Create a new NFT asset\n\n10const asset = await create(umi, {\n\n11 name: 'My NFT',\n\n12 uri: 'https://example.com/metadata.json'\n\n13}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n14\n\n15console.log('Asset created:', asset.publicKey)\n\nTransfer an Asset\nUse transfer() to send an Asset to another wallet:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { transfer } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Transfer an existing NFT asset to a new owner\n\n11const result = await transfer(umi, {\n\n12 asset: publicKey('AssetAddressHere...'),\n\n13 newOwner: publicKey('RecipientAddressHere...'),\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset transferred:', result.signature)\n\nBurn an Asset\nUse burn() to permanently destroy an Asset and reclaim rent:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { burn } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Permanently destroy/burn an NFT asset\n\n10const result = await burn(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n13\n\n14console.log('Asset burned successfully')\n\nWithdraw Asset Signer balances first\nBurning the Asset makes execute fail. SOL, tokens, or other assets still held by the Asset Signer PDA become stranded.\n\nUpdate an Asset\nUse update() to modify Asset metadata:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { update } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com').use(mplCore())\n\n7const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n8\n\n9// Update an existing NFT asset's metadata\n\n10const result = await update(umi, {\n\n11 asset: assetAddress,\n\n12 name: 'Updated NFT Name',\n\n13 uri: 'https://updated-example.com/metadata.json',\n\n14}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset updated successfully')\n\nCollections\nCreate a Collection\nUse createCollection() to create a Collection account:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { createCollection } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Generate a new keypair for the collection\n\n11const collectionSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n12\n\n13// Create a new Collection\n\n14await createCollection(umi, {\n\n15 collection: collectionSigner,\n\n16 name: 'My Collection',\n\n17 uri: 'https://example.com/collection.json',\n\n18}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n19\n\n20console.log('Collection created:', collectionSigner.publicKey)\n\nCreate Asset in Collection\nPass the collection parameter to create():\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create, fetchCollection } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10const collectionAddress = publicKey('YOUR_COLLECTION_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch the existing collection\n\n13const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, collectionAddress)\n\n14\n\n15// Generate a new keypair for the asset\n\n16const assetSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n17\n\n18// Create asset in the collection\n\n19await create(umi, {\n\n20 asset: assetSigner,\n\n21 collection,\n\n22 name: 'Collection Item #1',\n\n23 uri: 'https://example.com/item1.json',\n\n24}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n25\n\n26console.log('Asset created in collection:', assetSigner.publicKey)\n\nPlugins\nPlugins add behavior to Assets and Collections. They can be added at creation time or afterwards.\nAdd Plugin at Creation\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create, ruleSet } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10const creator = publicKey('YOUR_CREATOR_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Generate a new keypair for the asset\n\n13const assetSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n14\n\n15// Create asset with Royalties plugin\n\n16await create(umi, {\n\n17 asset: assetSigner,\n\n18 name: 'NFT with Royalties',\n\n19 uri: 'https://example.com/metadata.json',\n\n20 plugins: [\n\n21 {\n\n22 type: 'Royalties',\n\n23 basisPoints: 500, // 5%\n\n24 creators: [\n\n25 { address: creator, percentage: 100 },\n\n26 ],\n\n27 ruleSet: ruleSet('None'),\n\n28 },\n\n29 ],\n\n30}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n31\n\n32console.log('Asset created with plugins:', assetSigner.publicKey)\n\nAdd Plugin to Existing Asset\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { addPlugin, fetchAsset, ruleSet } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10const assetAddress = publicKey('YOUR_ASSET_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch the existing asset\n\n13const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\n14\n\n15// Add a Royalties plugin to the asset\n\n16await addPlugin(umi, {\n\n17 asset,\n\n18 plugin: {\n\n19 type: 'Royalties',\n\n20 basisPoints: 500, // 5%\n\n21 creators: [\n\n22 { address: umi.identity.publicKey, percentage: 100 },\n\n23 ],\n\n24 ruleSet: ruleSet('None'),\n\n25 },\n\n26}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n27\n\n28console.log('Plugin added to asset:', assetAddress)\n\nCommon Plugin Types\nPluginType StringPurpose\nRoyalties\n'Royalties'\nCreator royalty enforcement\n\nFreeze Delegate\n'FreezeDelegate'\nAllow freezing/unfreezing\n\nBurn Delegate\n'BurnDelegate'\nAllow burning by delegate\n\nTransfer Delegate\n'TransferDelegate'\nAllow transfers by delegate\n\nUpdate Delegate\n'UpdateDelegate'\nAllow metadata updates\n\nAttributes\n'Attributes'\nOn-chain key/value data\n\nPermanent Freeze\n'PermanentFreezeDelegate'\nPermanent freeze state\n\nPermanent Transfer\n'PermanentTransferDelegate'\nPermanent transfer delegate\n\nPermanent Burn\n'PermanentBurnDelegate'\nPermanent burn delegate\n\nSee Plugins Overview for detailed plugin documentation.\n\nFetching Assets\nFetch Single Asset\n\n1import { fetchAsset, fetchCollection, mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core';\n\n2import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi';\n\n3import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults';\n\n4\n\n5// Initialize UMI\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n7 .use(mplCore())\n\n8\n\n9// Fetch a Core Asset\n\n10const assetAddress = publicKey('AssetAddressHere...')\n\n11const asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\n12\n\n13// Fetch a Core Collection\n\n14const collectionAddress = publicKey('CollectionAddressHere...')\n\n15const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, collectionAddress)\n\n16\n\n17console.log('Asset fetched:', asset)\n\n18console.log('Name:', asset.name)\n\n19console.log('Owner:', asset.owner)\n\n20console.log('URI:', asset.uri)\n\n21\n\n22console.log('\\nCollection fetched:', collection)\n\n23console.log('Name:', collection.name)\n\n24console.log('URI:', collection.uri)\n\nFetch Assets by Owner (DAS)\nUse the DAS API to query indexed assets:\nfetch-by-owner.ts\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { dasApi } from '@metaplex-foundation/digital-asset-standard-api'\n\n// Add DAS plugin to Umi\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n.use(mplCore())\n\n.use(dasApi())\n\nconst owner = publicKey('OwnerAddressHere...')\n\nconst assets = await umi.rpc.getAssetsByOwner({\n\nowner,\n\nlimit: 100,\n\n})\n\nconsole.log('Assets owned:', assets.items.length)\n\nFetch Assets by Collection (DAS)\nfetch-by-collection.ts\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nconst collectionAddress = publicKey('CollectionAddressHere...')\n\nconst assets = await umi.rpc.getAssetsByGroup({\n\ngroupKey: 'collection',\n\ngroupValue: collectionAddress,\n\nlimit: 100,\n\n})\n\nconsole.log('Collection assets:', assets.items.length)\n\nUploading Metadata\nUse Umi's uploader plugins to store metadata JSON:\nupload-metadata.ts\nimport { irysUploader } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-uploader-irys'\n\nconst umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n.use(mplCore())\n\n.use(keypairIdentity(yourKeypair))\n\n.use(irysUploader())\n\n// Upload image first\n\nconst imageFile = await fs.promises.readFile('image.png')\n\nconst [imageUri] = await umi.uploader.upload([imageFile])\n\n// Upload metadata JSON\n\nconst uri = await umi.uploader.uploadJson({\n\nname: 'My NFT',\n\ndescription: 'An awesome NFT',\n\nimage: imageUri,\n\nattributes: [\n\n{ trait_type: 'Background', value: 'Blue' },\n\n{ trait_type: 'Rarity', value: 'Rare' },\n\n],\n\n})\n\nconsole.log('Metadata URI:', uri)\n\nTransaction Patterns\nSend and Confirm\nThe standard pattern waits for confirmation:\nsend-confirm.ts\nconst result = await create(umi, { asset, name, uri }).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nconsole.log('Signature:', result.signature)\n\nCustom Confirmation Options\ncustom-confirm.ts\nconst result = await create(umi, { asset, name, uri }).sendAndConfirm(umi, {\n\nconfirm: { commitment: 'finalized' },\n\n})\n\nBuild Transaction Without Sending\nbuild-only.ts\nconst tx = create(umi, { asset, name, uri })\n\nconst builtTx = await tx.buildAndSign(umi)\n\n// Send later with: await umi.rpc.sendTransaction(builtTx)\n\nCombine Multiple Instructions\ncombine-instructions.ts\nimport { transactionBuilder } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nconst tx = transactionBuilder()\n\n.add(create(umi, { asset: asset1, name: 'NFT 1', uri: uri1 }))\n\n.add(create(umi, { asset: asset2, name: 'NFT 2', uri: uri2 }))\n\nawait tx.sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nAccount does not exist\nThe asset or collection address doesn't exist. Verify the address is correct:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress).catch(() => null)\n\nif (!asset) {\n\nconsole.log('Asset not found')\n\n}\n\nInvalid authority\nYou're not authorized to perform this action. Check that:\nYou own the asset (for transfers, burns)\nYou're the update authority (for updates)\nYou have the required delegate permission\nInsufficient funds\nYour wallet needs more SOL. Fund it with:\nsolana airdrop 1 --url devnet\n\nAsset already exists\nThe asset keypair was already used. Generate a new signer:\nconst assetSigner = generateSigner(umi) // Must be unique\n\nPlugin not found\nThe plugin doesn't exist on this asset. Check installed plugins:\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nconsole.log('Plugins:', Object.keys(asset))\n\nNotes\nAlways use a new keypair for new assets - never reuse keypairs\nThe asset parameter in create() must be a signer, not just a public key\nCollection-level plugins override asset-level plugins of the same type\nUse commitment: 'finalized' when creating assets that you immediately fetch\nTransaction builders are immutable - each method returns a new builder\nEmpty the Asset Signer PDA before burn() — remaining balances cannot be moved afterward\nQuick Reference\nMinimum Dependencies\npackage.json\n{\n\n\"dependencies\": {\n\n\"@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core\": \"^1.0.0\",\n\n\"@metaplex-foundation/umi\": \"^0.9.0\",\n\n\"@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults\": \"^0.9.0\"\n\n}\n\n}\n\nCore Functions\nFunctionPurpose\ncreate()\nCreate a new Asset\n\ncreateCollection()\nCreate a new Collection\n\ntransfer()\nTransfer Asset ownership\n\nburn()\nDestroy an Asset\n\nupdate()\nUpdate Asset metadata\n\nupdateCollection()\nUpdate Collection metadata\n\naddPlugin()\nAdd plugin to Asset\n\naddCollectionPlugin()\nAdd plugin to Collection\n\nupdatePlugin()\nUpdate existing plugin\n\nremovePlugin()\nRemove plugin from Asset\n\nfetchAsset()\nFetch Asset by address\n\nfetchCollection()\nFetch Collection by address\n\nProgram ID\nNetworkAddress\nMainnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nDevnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nFAQ\nWhat is the Core JavaScript SDK?\nThe Core JavaScript SDK (@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core) is a TypeScript library for interacting with Metaplex Core NFTs on Solana. It provides type-safe functions for creating, transferring, burning, and managing Assets and Collections.\nDo I need Umi to use this SDK?\nYes. The Core SDK is built on the Umi framework, which handles wallet connections, RPC communication, and transaction building. Install both @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core and @metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults.\nHow do I connect a browser wallet?\nUse the @metaplex-foundation/umi-signer-wallet-adapters package with your wallet adapter:\nimport { walletAdapterIdentity } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-signer-wallet-adapters'\n\numi.use(walletAdapterIdentity(wallet))\n\nWhat's the difference between sendAndConfirm and send?\nsendAndConfirm() waits for transaction confirmation before returning. send() returns immediately after broadcasting. Use sendAndConfirm() for most cases to ensure your transaction succeeded.\nHow do I batch multiple operations?\nUse transactionBuilder() to combine instructions, but be aware of Solana's transaction size limits (~1232 bytes). For large batches, send multiple transactions.\nCan I use this SDK in React/Next.js?\nYes. The SDK works in both browser and Node.js environments. For React, use wallet adapters from @solana/wallet-adapter-react with Umi's wallet adapter identity.\nHow do I handle errors?\nWrap SDK calls in try/catch blocks. The SDK throws typed errors that include program error codes:\ntry {\n\nawait transfer(umi, { asset, newOwner }).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n} catch (error) {\n\nconsole.error('Transfer failed:', error.message)\n\n}\n\nWhere can I find the full API documentation?\nSee the TypeDoc API Reference for complete function signatures and types.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nUmi\nMetaplex's framework for building Solana applications with wallet and RPC management\n\nAsset\nA Core on-chain account representing an NFT with ownership, metadata, and plugins\n\nCollection\nA Core account that groups related Assets and can apply collection-wide plugins\n\nSigner\nA keypair that can sign transactions (required for creating new accounts)\n\nPlugin\nA modular extension that adds behavior to Assets or Collections\n\nURI\nThe off-chain metadata URL pointing to a JSON file with name, image, and attributes\n\nDAS\nDigital Asset Standard - API for querying indexed NFT data from RPC providers\n\nTransaction Builder\nAn immutable object that constructs transactions before sending\n\nIdentity\nThe wallet/keypair configured as the transaction signer in Umi\n\nCommitment\nSolana confirmation level (processed, confirmed, finalized)","tokens":4484,"crawled_at":1791193849990} +{"id":10298,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/transaction-fee-mechanism-design-with-active-block-producers","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nTransaction fee mechanism design with active block producers\nPranav Garimidi\n09.21.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\nDeFi\nmev\nresearch\nvideo\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nThe incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers, which are motivated by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. Here, Pranav Garimidi (a16z crypto research) explores active block producers, which have their own private valuations for blocks. These private valuations might stem, for example, additional value derived from the application layer (colloquially understood as “MEV”). In this model, transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult: with active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for the current interest in augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as order flow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques.\n\nAbout the speaker\n\nPranav is a Research Analyst at a16z Crypto. He completed his degree in Computer Science from Columbia University and is broadly interested in studying mechanism design problems in blockchains with a particular focus on thinking about how mechanisms interface with MEV.\n\nAbout a16z crypto research\n\na16z crypto research is a multidisciplinary lab that works closely with our portfolio companies and others toward solving the important problems in the space, and toward advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet.","tokens":464,"crawled_at":1791193850227} +{"id":10299,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/contract","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nBaseContract\nBaseContractMethod\nConstantContractMethod\nContract\nContractDeployTransaction\nContractEvent\nContractEventPayload\nContractFactory\nContractInterface\nContractMethod\nContractTransaction\nContractTransactionReceipt\nContractTransactionResponse\nContractUnknownEventPayload\nDeferredTopicFilter\nEventLog\nOverrides\nUndecodedEventLog\nWrappedFallback\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Contracts\nContracts\nA Contract object is a meta-class (a class whose definition is defined at runtime), which communicates with a deployed smart contract on the blockchain and provides a simple JavaScript interface to call methods, send transaction, query historic logs and listen for its events.\n\nTYPES\nContractEventName⇒ string | ContractEvent | TopicFilter | DeferredTopicFilter\nThe name for an event used for subscribing to Contract events.\nstring - An event by name. The event must be non-ambiguous. The parameters will be dereferenced when passed into the listener.\nContractEvent - A filter from the contract.filters, which will pass only the EventPayload as a single parameter, which includes a .signature property that can be used to further filter the event.\nTopicFilter - A filter defined using the standard Ethereum API which provides the specific topic hash or topic hashes to watch for along with any additional values to filter by. This will only pass a single parameter to the listener, the EventPayload which will include additional details to refine by, such as the event name and signature.\nDeferredTopicFilter - A filter created by calling a ContractEvent with parameters, which will create a filter for a specific event signature and dereference each parameter when calling the listener.\n\nclass BaseContract\ninherits from Addressable\n\nPROPERTIES\nbaseContract.fallback⇒ null | WrappedFallbackread-only\nThe fallback or receive function if any.\n\nbaseContract.filters⇒ Record< string, ContractEvent >read-only\nAll the Events available on this contract.\n\nbaseContract.interface⇒ Interfaceread-only\nThe contract Interface.\n\nbaseContract.runner⇒ null | ContractRunnerread-only\nThe connected runner. This is generally a Provider or a Signer, which dictates what operations are supported.\nFor example, a Contract connected to a Provider may only execute read-only operations.\n\nbaseContract.target⇒ string | Addressableread-only\nThe target to connect to.\nThis can be an address, ENS name or any Addressable, such as another contract. To get the resolved address, use the getAddress method.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew BaseContract(target: string | Addressable, abi: Interface | InterfaceAbi, runner?: null | ContractRunner, deployTx?: null | TransactionResponse)\nCreates a new contract connected to target with the abi and optionally connected to a runner to perform operations on behalf of.\n\nMETHODS\nbaseContract.addListener(event: ContractEventName, listener: Listener)⇒ Promise< this >\nAlias for [on].\n\nbaseContract.attach(target: string | Addressable)⇒ BaseContract\nReturn a new Contract instance with the same ABI and runner, but a different target.\n\nbaseContract.connect(runner: null | ContractRunner)⇒ BaseContract\nReturn a new Contract instance with the same target and ABI, but a different runner.\n\nbaseContract.deploymentTransaction()⇒ null | ContractTransactionResponse\nReturn the transaction used to deploy this contract.\nThis is only available if this instance was returned from a ContractFactory.\n\nbaseContract.emit(event: ContractEventName, args: Array< any >)⇒ Promise< boolean >\nEmit an event calling all listeners with args.\nResolves to true if any listeners were called.\n\nbaseContract.getAddress()⇒ Promise< string >\nReturn the resolved address of this Contract.\n\nbaseContract.getDeployedCode()⇒ Promise< null | string >\nReturn the deployed bytecode or null if no bytecode is found.\n\nbaseContract.getEvent(key: string | EventFragment)⇒ ContractEvent\nReturn the event for a given name. This is useful when a contract event name conflicts with a JavaScript name such as prototype or when using a Contract programmatically.\n\nbaseContract.getFunction(key: string | FunctionFragment)⇒ T\nReturn the function for a given name. This is useful when a contract method name conflicts with a JavaScript name such as prototype or when using a Contract programmatically.\n\nbaseContract.listenerCount(event?: ContractEventName)⇒ Promise< number >\nResolves to the number of listeners of event or the total number of listeners if unspecified.\n\nbaseContract.listeners(event?: ContractEventName)⇒ Promise< Array< Listener > >\nResolves to the listeners subscribed to event or all listeners if unspecified.\n\nbaseContract.off(event: ContractEventName, listener?: Listener)⇒ Promise< this >\nRemove the listener from the listeners for event or remove all listeners if unspecified.\n\nbaseContract.on(event: ContractEventName, listener: Listener)⇒ Promise< this >\nAdd an event listener for the event.\n\nbaseContract.once(event: ContractEventName, listener: Listener)⇒ Promise< this >\nAdd an event listener for the event, but remove the listener after it is fired once.\n\nbaseContract.queryFilter(event: ContractEventName, fromBlock?: BlockTag, toBlock?: BlockTag)⇒ Promise< Array< EventLog | Log > >\nProvide historic access to event data for event in the range fromBlock (default: 0) to toBlock (default: \"latest\") inclusive.\n\nbaseContract.removeAllListeners(event?: ContractEventName)⇒ Promise< this��>\nRemove all the listeners for event or remove all listeners if unspecified.\n\nbaseContract.removeListener(event: ContractEventName, listener: Listener)⇒ Promise< this >\nAlias for [off].\n\nbaseContract.waitForDeployment()⇒ Promise< this >\nResolve to this Contract once the bytecode has been deployed, or resolve immediately if already deployed.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nBaseContract.buildClass(abi: Interface | InterfaceAbi)⇒ TODO(A2Bconstructor(@TODO-001))\nCreate a new Class for the abi.\n\nBaseContract.from(target: string, abi: Interface | InterfaceAbi, runner?: null | ContractRunner)⇒ BaseContract & Omit< T, keyof >\nCreate a new BaseContract with a specified Interface.\n\ninterface BaseContractMethod\nA Contract method can be called directly, or used in various ways.\n\nPROPERTIES\nbaseContractMethod.fragment⇒ FunctionFragment\nThe fragment of the Contract method. This will throw on ambiguous method names.\n\nbaseContractMethod.name⇒ string\nThe name of the Contract method.\n\nMETHODS\nbaseContractMethod.estimateGas(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< bigint >\nEstimate the gas to send the contract method with args.\n\nbaseContractMethod.getFragment(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ FunctionFragment\nReturns the fragment constrained by args. This can be used to resolve ambiguous method names.\n\nbaseContractMethod.populateTransaction(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< ContractTransaction >\nReturns a populated transaction that can be used to perform the contract method with args.\n\nbaseContractMethod.send(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< ContractTransactionResponse >\nSend a transaction for the contract method with args.\n\nbaseContractMethod.staticCall(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< R >\nCall the contract method with args and return the value.\nIf the return value is a single type, it will be dereferenced and returned directly, otherwise the full Result will be returned.\n\nbaseContractMethod.staticCallResult(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< Result >\nCall the contract method with args and return the Result without any dereferencing.\n\ninterface ConstantContractMethod\ninherits from ContractMethod, BaseContractMethod\nA pure of view method on a Contract.\n\nclass Contract\nA BaseContract with no type guards on its methods or events.\n\ninterface ContractDeployTransaction\nA deployment transaction for a contract.\n\ninterface ContractEvent\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractEvent.fragment⇒ EventFragment\nThe fragment of the Contract event. This will throw on ambiguous method names.\n\ncontractEvent.name⇒ string\nThe name of the Contract event.\n\nMETHODS\ncontractEvent.getFragment(args: ContractEventArgs< A >)⇒ EventFragment\nReturns the fragment constrained by args. This can be used to resolve ambiguous event names.\n\nclass ContractEventPayload\ninherits from ContractUnknownEventPayload, EventPayload\nA ContractEventPayload is included as the last parameter to Contract Events when the event is known.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractEventPayload.args⇒ Resultread-only\nThe parsed arguments passed to the event by emit.\n\ncontractEventPayload.eventName⇒ stringread-only\nThe event name.\n\ncontractEventPayload.eventSignature⇒ stringread-only\nThe event signature.\n\ncontractEventPayload.fragment⇒ EventFragmentread-only\nThe matching event.\n\ncontractEventPayload.log⇒ EventLogread-only\nThe log, with parsed properties.\n\nclass ContractFactory\nA ContractFactory is used to deploy a Contract to the blockchain.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractFactory.bytecode⇒ stringread-only\nThe Contract deployment bytecode. Often called the initcode.\n\ncontractFactory.interface⇒ Interfaceread-only\nThe Contract Interface.\n\ncontractFactory.runner⇒ null | ContractRunnerread-only\nThe ContractRunner to deploy the Contract as.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew ContractFactory(abi: Interface | InterfaceAbi, bytecode: BytesLike | { object: string }, runner?: null | ContractRunner)\nCreate a new ContractFactory with abi and bytecode, optionally connected to runner.\nThe bytecode may be the bytecode property within the standard Solidity JSON output.\n\nMETHODS\ncontractFactory.attach(target: string | Addressable)⇒ BaseContract & Omit< I, keyof >\n\ncontractFactory.connect(runner: null | ContractRunner)⇒ ContractFactory < A, I >\nReturn a new ContractFactory with the same ABI and bytecode, but connected to runner.\n\ncontractFactory.deploy(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< BaseContract & { deploymentTransaction: ContractTransactionResponse } & Omit< I, keyof > >\nResolves to the Contract deployed by passing args into the constructor.\nThis will resolve to the Contract before it has been deployed to the network, so the baseContract.waitForDeployment should be used before sending any transactions to it.\n\ncontractFactory.getDeployTransaction(args: ContractMethodArgs< A >)⇒ Promise< ContractDeployTransaction >\nResolves to the transaction to deploy the contract, passing args into the constructor.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nContractFactory.fromSolidity(output: any, runner?: ContractRunner)⇒ ContractFactory < A, I >\nCreate a new ContractFactory from the standard Solidity JSON output.\n\ninterface ContractInterface\nA Contract with no method constraints.\n\ninterface ContractMethod\ninherits from BaseContractMethod\nA contract method on a Contract.\n\ninterface ContractTransaction\ninherits from PreparedTransactionRequest\nWhen populating a transaction this type is returned.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractTransaction.data⇒ string\nThe transaction data.\n\ncontractTransaction.from⇒ string\nThe from address, if any.\n\ncontractTransaction.to⇒ string\nThe target address.\n\nclass ContractTransactionReceipt\ninherits from TransactionReceipt, TransactionReceiptParams\nA ContractTransactionReceipt includes the parsed logs from a TransactionReceipt.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractTransactionReceipt.logs⇒ Array< EventLog | Log >read-only\nThe parsed logs for any Log which has a matching event in the Contract ABI.\n\nclass ContractTransactionResponse\ninherits from TransactionResponse, TransactionResponseParams\nA ContractTransactionResponse will return a ContractTransactionReceipt when waited on.\n\nMETHODS\ncontractTransactionResponse.wait(confirms?: number, timeout?: number)⇒ Promise< null | ContractTransactionReceipt >\nResolves once this transaction has been mined and has confirms blocks including it (default: 1) with an optional timeout.\nThis can resolve to null only if confirms is 0 and the transaction has not been mined, otherwise this will wait until enough confirmations have completed.\n\nclass ContractUnknownEventPayload\ninherits from EventPayload\nA ContractUnknownEventPayload is included as the last parameter to Contract Events when the event does not match any events in the ABI.\n\nPROPERTIES\ncontractUnknownEventPayload.log⇒ Logread-only\nThe log with no matching events.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew ContractUnknownEventPayload(contract: BaseContract, listener: null | Listener, filter: ContractEventName, log: Log)\n\nMETHODS\ncontractUnknownEventPayload.getBlock()⇒ Promise< Block >\nResolves to the block the event occured in.\n\ncontractUnknownEventPayload.getTransaction()⇒ Promise< TransactionResponse >\nResolves to the transaction the event occured in.\n\ncontractUnknownEventPayload.getTransactionReceipt()⇒ Promise< TransactionReceipt >\nResolves to the transaction receipt the event occured in.\n\ninterface DeferredTopicFilter\nWhen creating a filter using the contract.filters, this is returned.\n\nPROPERTIES\ndeferredTopicFilter.fragment⇒ EventFragment\n\nMETHODS\ndeferredTopicFilter.getTopicFilter()⇒ Promise< TopicFilter >\n\nclass EventLog\ninherits from Log, LogParams\nAn EventLog contains additional properties parsed from the Log.\n\nPROPERTIES\neventLog.args⇒ Resultread-only\nThe parsed arguments passed to the event by emit.\n\neventLog.eventName⇒ stringread-only\nThe name of the event.\n\neventLog.eventSignature⇒ stringread-only\nThe signature of the event.\n\neventLog.fragment⇒ EventFragmentread-only\nThe matching event.\n\neventLog.interface⇒ Interfaceread-only\nThe Contract Interface.\n\ninterface Overrides\nThe overrides for a contract transaction.\n\nclass UndecodedEventLog\ninherits from Log, LogParams\nAn EventLog contains additional properties parsed from the Log.\n\nPROPERTIES\nundecodedEventLog.error⇒ Errorread-only\nThe error encounted when trying to decode the log.\n\ninterface WrappedFallback\nA Fallback or Receive function on a Contract.\n\nMETHODS\nwrappedFallback.estimateGas(overrides?: Omit< TransactionRequest, \"to\" >)⇒ Promise< bigint >\nEstimate the gas to send a transaction to the contract fallback.\nFor non-receive fallback, data may be overridden.\n\nwrappedFallback.populateTransaction(overrides?: Omit< TransactionRequest, \"to\" >)⇒ Promise< ContractTransaction >\nReturns a populated transaction that can be used to perform the fallback method.\nFor non-receive fallback, data may be overridden.\n\nwrappedFallback.send(overrides?: Omit< TransactionRequest, \"to\" >)⇒ Promise< ContractTransactionResponse >\nSend a transaction to the contract fallback.\nFor non-receive fallback, data may be overridden.\n\nwrappedFallback.staticCall(overrides?: Omit< TransactionRequest, \"to\" >)⇒ Promise< string >\nCall the contract fallback and return the result.\nFor non-receive fallback, data may be overridden.\n\n← Constants\nCryptographic Functions→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on August 2, 2023, 10:29pm.","tokens":3852,"crawled_at":1791193859177} +{"id":10300,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/skills","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Sui Agent Skills | Sui Documentation","text":"Skip to main content\n\nInstall any single skill with npx skills add mystenlabs/skills --skill .\nTransactions and dataAccessing Data\nQuery onchain state, subscribe to events, build indexing pipelines, and store blobs with Walrus.\naccessing-dataView on GitHub →\nBuild and deployBuild and Test Move\nCompile Move packages, resolve build errors, and run sui move build.\nsui-build-testView on GitHub →\nMoveComposable Functions\nDesign composable Move APIs with the right visibility, parameter order, and return patterns.\ncomposable-move-functionsView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeDeepBook Margin\nBuild leveraged trading on DeepBook Margin: risk ratios, liquidation mechanics, and the MarginManager lifecycle.\ndeepbook-marginView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeDeepBook Move\nIntegrate DeepBook pools from Move: place orders onchain, create pools, and use flash loans.\ndeepbook-moveView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeDeepBook Overview\nUnderstand DeepBook V3: architecture, integration models, contract addresses, and supported pools.\ndeepbook-overviewView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeDeepBook Predict\nBuild on DeepBook Predict, the expiry-based prediction market protocol. Testnet only.\ndeepbook-predictView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeDeepBook SDK\nTrade on DeepBook from TypeScript with the @mysten/deepbook-v3 SDK: BalanceManager, orders, and swaps.\ndeepbook-sdkView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsFrontend Apps\nBuild browser dApps with dApp Kit, from wallet connection to onchain queries and transaction execution.\nfrontend-appsView on GitHub →\nGet startedGenerate Agent Config\nGenerate a CLAUDE.md or AGENT.md file tailored to your Sui project.\ngenerate-sui-agent-configView on GitHub →\nGet startedInstall Sui\nInstall and manage Sui CLI versions, toolchain components, and network-specific builds with suiup.\nsui-installView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeKiosk\nTrade NFTs and enforce transfer policies with Kiosk, including asset states, purchase flows, and Kiosk Apps.\nkioskView on GitHub →\nMoveModern Move Syntax\nWrite idiomatic Move with 2024 edition syntax: method calls, string literals, vectors, options, and more.\nmodern-move-syntaxView on GitHub →\nMoveMove Project Setup\nSet up Move projects, configure Move.toml and MVR dependencies, and troubleshoot build errors.\nsui-move-projectView on GitHub →\nMoveMove Security\nReview Move code for vulnerabilities: access control, capability handling, invariants, and upgrade governance.\nmove-securityView on GitHub →\nBuild and deployMove Unit Testing\nWrite and structure Move unit tests with proper naming, assertions, context usage, and cleanup.\nmove-unit-testingView on GitHub →\nMoveNaming Conventions\nApply consistent naming to Move structs, constants, events, capabilities, and dynamic field keys.\nnaming-conventionsView on GitHub →\nMoveObject Model\nModel data with Sui objects: ownership types, dynamic fields, collections, wrapping, and transfer rules.\nobject-modelView on GitHub →\nMoveOnchain Randomness\nGenerate random values in Move with the Random object, and secure them against composition and PTB attacks.\nonchain-randomnessView on GitHub →\nTransactions and dataProgrammable Transaction Blocks\nCompose multiple Move calls into a single atomic transaction with gas handling and sponsorship support.\nptbsView on GitHub →\nBuild and deployPublish and Upgrade\nPublish and upgrade Move packages on any network, from localnet testing to multisig mainnet deploys.\nsui-publishView on GitHub →\nOnchain financeSui Bridge\nMove assets between Sui and Ethereum over the native bridge: supported assets, the global limiter, and governance.\nsui-bridgeView on GitHub →\nCLISui Client\nConfigure the Sui client, manage addresses, switch networks, request faucet tokens, and check balances.\nsui-clientView on GitHub →\nGet startedSui for Ethereum Developers\nMap Solidity and EVM patterns onto Move and the Sui object model when migrating from Ethereum.\nsui-for-ethereumView on GitHub →\nMoveSui Move\nWrite and debug Move smart contracts covering abilities, init functions, one-time witnesses, upgrades, and custom coins.\nsui-moveView on GitHub →\nGet startedSui Networks and Gas\nUnderstand Sui network environments, gas costs, epochs, and how the network operates at a high level.\nsui-networks-gasView on GitHub →\nGet startedSui Overview\nLearn what Sui is, how it compares to other chains, and which Sui Stack primitives fit your use case.\nsui-overviewView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsSui SDKs\nPick the right Sui SDK for your language and wire it up: TypeScript, Rust, Python, Go, Dart, Kotlin, or Swift.\nsui-sdksView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsTypeScript SDK for Backends\nBuild backend services and agents on Sui: keypairs, signing, sponsored transactions, executors, and cloud KMS.\nsui-ts-sdk-backendView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsWalrus Sites\nDeploy and manage fully decentralized websites powered by Walrus storage and onchain site objects.\nwalrus-sitesView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsWalrus Sites Portal\nRun a local portal server to browse and test Walrus Sites on testnet.\nwalrus-sites-portalView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKsWalrus Sites Publishing\nPublish and update Walrus Sites using the site-builder CLI.\nwalrus-sites-publishingView on GitHub →\nFrontend and SDKszkLogin\nIntegrate OAuth-based, wallet-less login: address derivation, session lifetime, proofs, and security properties.\nzkloginView on GitHub →","tokens":1337,"crawled_at":1791193872229} +{"id":10301,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-universal-governance-module/16829","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"RFC: Uniswap Universal Governance Module - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"RFC: Uniswap Universal Governance Module\n\nRequests for Comment\n\ntobyshorin\n\nMay 18, 2022, 2:21pm\n\n1\n\nUNI_crosschain_gov1440×880 43.2 KB\n\nIntroduction\n\nA major objective for Uniswap Governance this year is deploying Uniswap v3 on a broad set of high-quality EVM chains. This document explains why the lack of scalable cross-chain governance is currently an impediment to this goal, and proposes we select a bridge technology partner to build a solution. We outline our process for evaluating a vendor and next steps.\n\nContents\n\nCurrent State of Uniswap Cross-Chain Governance\n\nWhat’s Next: Vendor Evaluation, Technical Analysis, Request for Community Feedback\n\nAuthors\n\nLaura Lotti & Toby Shorin (Other Internet)\n\nImage by Yitong Zhong (VectorDAO)\n\nCurrent State of Uniswap Cross-Chain Governance\n\nUniswap V3 is deployed to Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism, with Celo, Moonbeam, and Gnosis Chain deploying soon. To enable Ethereum’s Uniswap deployment to govern all instances, each chain must have a messaging bridge for propagating governance decisions from Ethereum L1 to the remote chain’s instance of Uniswap V3 (“cross-chain governance”). Of these 6 deployments, there are 5 different messaging bridges used to execute governance decisions on each of the chains.\n\nPolygon and Optimism use the native bridges developed by the respective teams.\n\nArbitrum also uses its native bridge (currently not functioning).\n\nCelo uses an implementation of Optics.\n\nMoonbeam and Gnosis Chain use Nomad, another forked version of Optics code.\n\nWhat this currently means is that each new proposal containing protocol parameter changes must be rewritten for each separate bridge and project, requiring custom code and separate votes, and potentially multiple proposal processes. In short, managing governance will become cost-prohibitive and complex as Uniswap scales.\n\nWhile the volume of governance that pertains to cross-chain parameters is still low compared to protocols with more on-chain parameters, we anticipate that governance activity will increase in the future. Notably, the addition of further fee tiers specific to different chains, or the activation of pool-specific fee switches, would likely bring an increase in proposal volume.\n\nGeneral Solution Criteria\n\nScaling Uniswap cross-chain governance is a multifaceted problem. Solving it in a “feature-complete” way would require several pieces of work.\n\nThe implementation of a single ABI for and standardized call data format for creating proposals for multiple chains.\n\nThe ability for proposers to deploy their proposal code to selected or all chains in one proposal.\n\nUpdated guides and documentation for proposers.\n\nA graphical user interface for delegates and proposers, reflecting the current state of proposals on each chain.\n\nConversely, what should be “out of scope” for such an initiative?\n\nBridging UNI is out of scope. We are only concerned with bridging governance related contract calls, and for the purposes of this initiative are not considering bridged UNI tokens. Uniswap’s relatively small set of on-chain parameters means reduced attack surface area, and we prefer to keep it that way.\n\nL2 voting is out of scope. The costs of this approach exceed the benefits; Uniswap’s unequal distribution of voting power means that votes are largely contingent on whales and major delegates, even if we make voting for everyone cheaper.\n\nWith these criteria in mind, we felt that an initial project should at least cover items 1, 2, and 3 above.\n\nWe call this the Universal Governance Module (UGM). Below, we explain our process for evaluating potential software vendors to implement the UGM.\n\nVendor Evaluation Process & Technical Analysis\n\nUniswap governance proposal #7 saw Flipside Analytics propose itself as a premiere service provider to Uniswap Protocol, in a move that caused concern and ultimately the retraction of the proposal. University blockchain clubs are often “used” by protocol diplomats and service providers for their delegated voting power without taking an opinionated stance.\n\nTo avoid these failures, we see the need for an independent party like Other Internet to evaluate vendors and nominate one. At the same time, we also want to ensure the process happens with the community’s awareness and acknowledgment.\n\nBelow we list the steps we’ve taken so far and where we are at in the process, along with our evaluation criteria for potential bridge partners.\n\nProcess To Date & Next Steps\n\nWhere we’ve been\n\nWe first identified a need for a universal governance bridge following conversations with recent V3 deployers Gnosis Chain, Moonbeam, and Celo.\n\nWe circulated a short version of this post to several other Uniswap delegates to ascertain support.\n\nWe set up initial exploratory conversations with Abacus, Nomad, and Axelar to validate the technical feasibility of the concept.\n\nWhere we are now\n\nIn this post, we are inviting the community to comment, and suggest additional evaluation criteria or vendors we should be reviewing. Please send us your recommendations within 7 days from this post to allow us to reach out to teams and complete our evaluation in a timely manner.\n\nNext steps\n\nWe will continue to hold conversations with potential vendors in the next 2 weeks.\n\nFollowing the conclusion of these calls, we’ll post the results of our conversations in a competitive analysis table and make a recommendation.\n\nProvider evaluation criteria\n\nWhen evaluating potential bridge providers, several considerations must be taken into account. (Our thanks to Stevie Woofwoof from Osmosis, from whom we’ve adapted a similar list of questions.)\n\nTechnical Features\n\nSecurity\n\nWhat is the security model of the bridge? What compromises does it make?\n\nEase of use\n\nHow developer friendly is the solution? What will the experience be for delegates?\n\nGeneralizable across all chains and L2s\n\nDoes the bridge work across all chains?\n\nCosts (gas)\n\nHow gas-costly is a cross-chain proposal?\n\nMaintenance\n\nWhat is required to maintain the instance? Who will maintain the Uniswap implementation? For how long?\n\nTeam & Contractual Details\n\nReputation\n\nWhat is the reputation of the team? What other projects are using the technology?\n\nRoadmap\n\nWhat is the product roadmap? Can Uniswap influence the roadmap and features?\n\nDeveloper Support\n\nWhat level of customer support will be provided?\n\nTradeoffs & Considerations of UGM\n\nVendor Lock-in\n\nOne possible cause for concern is that enshrining any single bridge provider will lead to vendor lock-in. Why is vendor lock-in problematic? If bridging UNI tokens were planned, the possibility of bridge fees being turned on might be a concern. But there is no plan to do so today.\n\nCryptocurrency discourse often advocates against “platform lock-in,” and such a perspective weights against crowning any single technology provider. But governance UX is no less important than the UX of the native swap application. Were Uniswap Labs itself engaged with governance, they would likely build, acquire, or solicit a bridge provider to develop a universal solution. In their absence, we see it as within our mandate to do the same.\n\nFinally, Uniswap’s importance in the crypto ecosystem and its well-known brand give it significant leverage. Willingness to select a single vendor means we are in a strong position to solicit additional value-add services and long-term arrangements with any given partner.\n\nL2 Native Bridge Security\n\nUsing the native bridges provided by L2s is considered preferable to alternative bridge providers, because A) their security is tied to that of the underlying chain and B) the incentive alignment of L2 teams’ reputation being staked on their chains’ security is thought to lead to better security.\n\nOn the other hand, most new EVM chains have not built their own bridging solution (Solana, Moonbeam, etc) and are already relying on third party bridges. This means we will still see fragmentation of governance bridges without a generalized solution, increasing the complexity of multichain decision making going forward. We believe this weighs toward the use of a single provider.\n\nCommunity Involvement\n\nAt this point in the process, we’d like to get overall feedback from the community on this issue, and any recommendations for additional bridge evaluation criteria we should be using. Please send us your recommendations within 7 days from this post to allow us to reach out to teams and complete our evaluation in a timely manner.\n\nIf you are interested in providing additional technical expertise to our review process, we’re happy to have more collaborators and reviewers on the comparison work. Please reply to this thread or send us a DM at twitter.com/otherinternet__ if you’d like to help.\n\nAdvisors Consulted\n\nSam Hart, Funding Program at Interchain Foundation (Other Internet)\n\nRaf Solari, CTO at Tally (Independent Technical Advisor)\n\nArr00, Engineer at Compound (Independent Technical Advisor)\n\nGetty Hill, Co-founder at GFX Labs (Uniswap Delegate)\n\nRobert Leshner, CEO at Compound Labs (Uniswap Delegate)\n\nMedha Kothari, Analyst, and Jesse Walden, Partner at Variant Fund (Uniswap Delegate, Investor)\n\nLarry Sukernik, Co-founder at Reverie (Uniswap Delegate)\n\nErin Koen, Governance Lead at Avant Garde Finance (Uniswap Delegate)\n\n11 Likes\n\n[Report] The State of Uniswap Governance\n\nCross-Chain Bridge Assessment Process\n\njamico\n\nMay 20, 2022, 8:21pm\n\n2\n\nThanks @tobyshorin. This is an important initiative. Uniswap would certainly benefit from a more standardized solution for cross-chain deployments. And Other Internet (being an excellent steward of the protocol) is well suited to help administer a process like this.\n\nA few thoughts on the proposed structure.\n\n1) Timing. Selecting a bridge provider is an important decision for Uniswap. It’s critical that we allow providers enough time to review the RFP and submit high quality bids. While we appreciate the need for efficiency, the proposed timeline (2 weeks) is realistically too short to accomplish this goal. Let’s align on the overall structure / criteria first and then we can set a timeline that makes sense.\n\n2) Tokenholder consent. While it makes sense for Other Internet to help administer the process, the ultimate decision should be made by the community. In our view a structure whereby: a) Open Internet helps coordinate bids / runs the process; and b) the community selects the ultimate winner strikes the right balance overall. This will ensure that the process remains organized and efficient but also retains broad-based token holder consent.\n\n3) Compound precedent. A useful precedent here is Compound’s recent RFP process. In that case, Reverie ran a competitive process to hire a security auditor for the protocol. The process produced multiple high-quality bids from top audit firms, including Open Zeppelin, Trail of Bits, ChainSecurity, and more. Reverie helped to shepherd the process and allowed the community to evaluate the bids over the course of several weeks (including over community calls, forum posts, etc). After weighing the various proposals, the community collectively voted and picked a winner. Though it had its challenges, this community-led approach led to fair and competitive process that served Compound well in the end. We think something similar makes sense here.\n\nHappy to help coordinate and support.\n\nJeff\n\na16z\n\n9 Likes\n\neek637\n\nMay 24, 2022, 5:55pm\n\n3\n\nThanks for this thoughtful RFC. This is a heady issue, and our opinion at AGF is that is valuable to have one party serving as the fact finders and filter through which we can evaluate potential service providers. There’s still lots of room for community involvement; if anyone has particular technical concerns that a potential provider should answer, they can and certainly should speak up here or reach out to Other Internet.\n\nI anticipate more forum participation after the next post where a comparison table and recommendation has been presented. Given that this is a highly technical RFQ that is sort of defining a category of service in flight, concrete examples of what will be provided and the benefits that will be conferred will be useful for those of us who are wrapping our heads around what the implications of this engagement might be.\n\nUltimately, the community will express its view on whether Other Internet has recommended the right candidate by vote; if the vote is successful we’ve likely saved time and money for many stakeholders (and arguably candidates). If it is not, we have more information about what we’re looking for in this vendor and can be more specific in our asks the next time around.\n\n6 Likes\n\n[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes\n\ntobyshorin\n\nJune 2, 2022, 5:57pm\n\n4\n\nHi all, I’m providing a brief update on where we are with the UGM. As outlined in the original post, we we currently in the process of soliciting formal proposals from multiple bridge technology providers. Once we’ve collected all of them, we’ll post the proposals here with a clear comparison, our analysis and recommendation of a bridge provider, and next steps.\n\nlz.Primo\n\nJuly 16, 2022, 8:16am\n\n5\n\nThanks for drafting this proposal @tobyshorin. It’s great to see Other Internet taking such an active role in the ongoing evolution of Uniswap’s governance.\n\nI’m Bryan, co-founder of LayerZero Labs. The need for a ‘feature complete’ solution to Uniswap’s cross-chain governance is the exact type of problem LayerZero was built to solve.\n\nLayerZero is an open and permissionless Omnichain Interoperability Protocol designed for lightweight message passing across chains. Given our unique generic messaging protocol design, anyone can participate in the network as a Relayer or an Oracle. Our technology provides authentic and guaranteed message delivery with configurable trustlessness; the protocol is implemented as a set of gas-efficient, non-upgradable smart contracts.\n\nIn the last two years, LayerZero:\n\nDeveloped the LayerZero protocol and went live on mainnet 4 months ago\n\nLaunched Stargate, the first fully composable liquidity transport protocol built on top of LayerZero and made possible by the invention of the Delta Algorithm. Stargate became the fastest growing DeFi protocol reaching $4.4B TVL in under two weeks and is the first to solve the bridging trilemma.\n\nCreated Pre-Crime, a proprietary security advancement ensuring application defined invariants are checked before the delivery of each message.\n\nHas spent $3m+ on 15 security audits from top auditors including Quantstamp, Zokyo, Zellic and Trail of Bits; the most recent audits are publicly available on Github\n\nDuring this time, we have built a world-class team of engineers, community managers, and product strategists and earned the support of investors and advisors from FTX, a16z, Sequoia, and Uniswap Labs.\n\nUniversal Governance with LayerZero\n\nCurrently Uniswap is deployed on 6 different chains and employs 5 messaging bridges to execute governance decisions on each chain. As Other Internet described, moving Uniswap to cross-chain governance will require additional developer resources to write and interact with custom interfaces for each chain.\n\nToday, LayerZero is live on 10 mainnet chains including Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, BNB Chain, Avalanche, and Fantom and live on 16 testnet chains including Celo, Moonbeam, and Solana among other non-EVM chains.\n\nInstead of rewriting new governance proposals for separate bridges and new chains, integration with LayerZero empowers the Community to write one proposal with zero additional custom code to pass on all active chains. The LayerZero interface was designed for ease-of-use. Implementing a single ABI with standardized call data for creating proposals on multiple chains is as straightforward as implementing a single function type from the enacting contract on source chain; the developer simply writes a send() and receive() function with the passage of a generic bytes array. This enables proposers to deploy their proposal code to selected or all chains in one proposal.\n\nAs the volume of Uniswap governance increases, a lightweight and modular cross-chain solution will be critical for cost efficiency and scaling properties. LayerZero is extremely lightweight and has one of the smallest possible headers (4 fields) and ~100k gas interactions on both send() and receive() with improvement libraries soon to be released which reduce gas to sub 100k.\n\nLayerZero has seen strong developer adoption from 700 contracts live on testnet 3 months ago to over 4100 today. We pride ourselves on the technology’s incredible ease-of-use for both delegates and proposers, transforming a 10 min long process of 40-50 clicks, into 2-3 clicks and reducing a user ordeal of maintaining multiple gas tokens to requiring only source chain gas for cross-chain transactions. LayerZero’s cross-chain governance implementation offers one of the lowest total gas consumed in cost: ~100k gas on source and ~80k on destination including gas for code execution. LayerZero Labs is well-resourced and willing to collaborate with Uniswap Labs to maintain their implementation in perpetuity.\n\nNotably, protocols which integrate with LayerZero own all of their own end bridge contracts. For example, Uniswap would own and have full control over their implementation contracts. From its inception, LayerZero was designed to provide protocols like Uniswap with a unified interface across all chains (both EVM and non-EVM).\n\nThe LayerZero team’s success is tied to the success of our partners. With billions in TVL, billions transferred, and many of the most reputable projects in the world already building on top of our infrastructure, we believe LayerZero should be strongly considered to be the provider enabling Uniswap’s Universal Governance Module.\n\nDedicated Advisory\n\nLayerZero will provide a dedicated team of engineers, an Integration Lead, and our CTO Ryan Zarick to the Uniswap UGM. Ryan will be the primary point of contact for the Uniswap Community and provide complete developer support and full protocol resources to write all contracts and fund multiple full audits from the most trusted auditors in the world. Ryan will also encourage and maintain open and ongoing collaboration with the Community during and after the integration process for cross-chain governance in perpetuity.\n\nUnder the Integration Lead’s guidance, this team of dedicated engineers will implement special projects including the development of a unique graphical user interface for delegates, proposers, and community members monitoring the Uniswap governance process and state across chains.\n\nNext Steps\n\nLayerZero already has full support for generalized message passing and has been consistently used at scale with billions in both TVL and transactional volume since launch. In the next year, LayerZero will go live on 10+ more chains (EVM and non-EVM) and welcomes collaboration with the Uniswap Community on specific roadmap milestones and new feature priorities.\n\nLayerZero has the immediate resources to provide a white-glove developer experience and full integration support and coverage including multiple security audits on all contracts.\n\nWe would love to be considered by the DAO as the single best solution for Uniswap to achieve seamless, secure omni-chain governance and would like to be part of a robust evaluation process run by the DAO.\n\nFor more information on our architecture and implementation, you can dig into our docs here. We look forward to hearing from the Community.\n\n4 Likes\n\nmodong\n\nJuly 20, 2022, 10:04pm\n\n6\n\nThank you for this RFC. This is Mo Dong from Celer. We will post our proposal shortly as part of vendor review process.\n\nmodong\n\nJuly 21, 2022, 6:56am\n\n7\n\nThis is Mo Dong from Celer Network. For some reason, in this forum I cannot post links and graphics which are needed for the proposal. So I am not able to post proposal here. Could forum admin help to fix it?\n\nIn the meantime, here is an url (please remove all spaces) that you can use to access the proposal.\n\ntinyurl. com/ mrcvw98b\n\nhendrikhofstadt\n\nJuly 22, 2022, 2:12pm\n\n8\n\n@tobyshorin, we’re excited to see this proposal live.\n\nAfter examining the RFC by Uniswap and respectfully reading the proposals submitted by others, we’re excited to submit Wormhole’s proposal. The Wormhole team is committed to building out the full solution, commissioning the audits, and providing on-going product and smart contract support to Uniswap.\n\nA quick intro to Wormhole — Wormhole is a leading cross-chain interoperability protocol, allowing generic messaging between 14 (and soon to be many more) heterogenous blockchains. Since launch on mainnet in August 2021, 1.2 million messages have been transmitted. Some are regular messages (e.g. oracle data), some are token bridges, and all of it comes through organic usage — no incentives.\n\nThere are three key reasons why we think Wormhole offers the best solution for Uniswap’s cross-chain governance:\n\nLightweight: For this application Wormhole’s guardian network is only used to attest finalized governance decisions on Ethereum. Wormhole does not depend on any additional complex infrastructure like the operation of a relayer network.\n\nModularity: This relayer-free model makes it easy for Uniswap to expand governance to new chains without reliance on Wormhole to officially roll out its full suite integration. A developer can permissionlessly deploy a read-only contract on the new destination chain and configure them with the current Wormhole guardian set.\n\nCase in point: one of Wormhole’s contributors deployed read-only contract instances for Optimism, Arbitrum, Moonbeam and Gnosis in a few hours over two afternoons. So both L1s can now be included in the Universal Governance Module. (Note: these four chains are in the L1 roadmap for the full suite of integrations in the coming months — more on this below.)\n\nSecurity and Decentralization: Wormhole has nineteen guardians comprised of the leading PoS validators who jointly attest to messages. They all hold equal weight in consensus and governance. Of the 19 guardians, Wormhole requires over two-thirds to reach consensus and pass verification - thus, we assume that at least one-third of our guardian set is honest.\n\nWormhole also has a comprehensive security plan consisting of all development in the open, one of the largest bug bounty programs ($10 million and counting), several quality audits of its full codebase (one by Trail of Bits underway).\n\nTechnical Model\n\nAs a reminder, Uniswap’s goals are twofold: house governance on Ethereum, then message and execute these decisions on both Ethereum and the other supported chains.\n\nAt a high level, governance decisions continue being made on Ethereum using the existing governance tools of Uniswap. These decisions get passed into the Wormhole endpoint on Ethereum, where they get attested by the Wormhole guardian network. These Wormhole-attested messages can then be verified on the respective chains and the decisions be queued for execution.\n\nTo see this in more depth, consider the technical model below:\n\ndiagram941×1018 124 KB\n\nGovernance continues to take place using the existing GovernerBeta contract and Uniswap’s existing UI.\n\nThe GovernerBeta contract feeds into the GovernanceMessenger contract on Ethereum, which serializes the requests and passes them into the Ethereum Wormhole endpoint.\n\nWormhole produces a VAA (verifiable action approval) for this message, which can now be submitted to the GovernanceMessageReceiver contract on the target chain.\n\nThe GovernanceMessageReceiver contract on the target chain verifies the authenticity of the VAA using the local Wormhole endpoint and passes the instruction into a local Timelock contract, which owns the local Factory. Once the Timelock contract is cleared, the instructions can be executed.\n\nNote that a Timelock contract is put on each individual chain to add an optional layer of control over the universal bridge into the system. As an extra signer, the chain’s native bridge could act as an escape hatch by which pending proposals in the Timelock can be canceled.\n\nNotice that there is no relayer dependency in this schematic. Any user can submit the VAA to the GovernanceMessageReceiver contract on the target chain.\n\nThis model is very easy to maintain and enhance. Subject to Uniswap governance approval, receiver contracts can be upgraded over time. Moreover, anyone can deploy the Wormhole receiver contracts on new destination chains to process VAAs without waiting for Wormhole to formally support those chains. Furthermore, Wormhole’s solution is low cost and efficient — the submission and subsequent verification of Wormhole message costs only 11k and 130k gas, respectively.\n\nDetails on how the contract interfaces and message protocol could look like can be seen here.\n\nDeveloper Support\n\nIf this proposal passes, Wormhole will promptly execute on all four asks of Uniswap’s UGM proposal (the first of which is already complete!):\n\nThe implementation of a single ABI for and standardized call data format for creating proposals for multiple chains—We have already prepared a draft on how this message protocol could look like here.\n\nThe ability for proposers to deploy their proposal code to selected or all chains in one proposal—Wormhole’s proposed architecture and protocol design supports this.\n\nUpdated guides and documentation for proposers—Wormhole will curate and actively maintain docs around the added cross-chain governance proposal features and interface.\n\nA graphical user interface for delegates and proposers, reflecting the current state of proposals on each chain—Wormhole will dedicate engineering resources for building a UI that is easy and flexible for delegates, voters, and proposers.\n\nGiven that we have already proposed a clear spec with very lightweight contracts, the smart contract development can be executed promptly following coordinated audits — thus, the UI would be the biggest new lift engineering-wise. With a robust group of contributors that includes engineers, product designers, and smart contract auditors, we are confident our integration will be smooth and seamless. As Director of the Wormhole Foundation and co-founder of Certus One, I will personally manage the effort from start to finish with on-call support from the wider group of 25 engineers.\n\nDecentralization and Security\n\nWormhole relies on a PoA consensus with 19 guardians. Each guardian runs their own node for each chain and holds equal weight in governance and voting. Of the 19 guardians, Wormhole requires more than two-thirds to reach consensus and pass verification - thus, we assume that at least one-third our of guardian set is honest. Our guardians set is comprised of the leading PoS validators with billions in active delegations across the biggest PoS chains — P2P, Chorus One, Everstake, to name a few. However, despite Wormhole’s high degree of decentralization, we remain resolute on improving our trust assumptions — as such, we are placing heavy investments in moving towards a completely trustless system based on zero knowledge proofs.\n\nIn just the last 90-days alone, Wormhole has transmitted 500k messages. Wormhole has handled some of the recent volatile periods in DeFi with ease, facilitating 44k messages in just one day. Our tried and tested protocol has gained the trust of some of the most reputable developers in the space — a number of protocols are currently building cross-chain swaps, DEXs, money market protocols, yield aggregators, wallets, gaming, oracles, perps, launchpads and many more.\n\nFinally, we recognize that Wormhole has earned some press for the hack in February of this year —we believe Wormhole is stronger for it. Wormhole, for instance, has one of the most generous bug bounty programs in crypto—over $10 million and counting—and a series of careful audits. Wormhole will continue along both of these fronts so as to uphold high standards of security for its users and protocols across supported ecosystems.\n\nRelated to this, the Timelock contract is meant to be one final safeguard against an exploit, giving Uniswap valuable time to revoke a hacked message. This serves as an extra failsafe against any smart contract bugs or faulty cross-chain governance proposals.\n\nIndependent from Wormhole Roadmap\n\nWhile Wormhole has thus far reached fourteen destination chains, as diverse as Solana, Avalanche, and Aurora — the governance module we’ve outlined above is freed of dependencies on integrations with the destination chain, message relayers, and all other forms of infrastructure and development. As long as the core Wormhole network can be relied upon to sign the VAAs observed on Ethereum, all other development details can be ignored. And we believe the core Wormhole network can indeed be relied upon for this function, due to its high degree of decentralization.\n\nWe look forward to engaging with the Uniswap community on our proposal.\n\n10 Likes\n\nmodong\n\nJuly 23, 2022, 2:14am\n\n9\n\nCeler Network community would love to submit a proposal to be considered as a solution for UGM.\n\nA quick introduction to Celer:\n\nCeler is a generalized blockchain interoperability protocol enabling a one-click user experience accessing tokens, DeFi, GameFi, NFTs, governance, and more across multiple chains. Developers can build inter-chain-native dApps using the Celer Inter-chain Message (IM) SDK to gain access to efficient liquidity utilization, coherent application logic, and shared states. There are 10+ cross-chain applications live today that are built with Celer IM on various use cases including governance and liquidity protocols. cBridge, an asset bridging application has processed $9.7b transaction volume across 31 chains for 200K users.\n\nUGM with Celer\n\nA UGM solution that is live in production and ready to use\n\nCeler IM based UGM is already live in production with FutureSwap since the end of April 2022. The reference implementation of UGM is very straightforward and we describe the high level flow here based on the application design pattern.\n\nWhen a governance decision is made on Ethereum, the governance contract will call sendMessage of a “send box” contract which takes in the destination chain ids, message to be passed and destination contract addresses. The message will contain the serialized bytes of the governance decision.\n\nThis message will be synced with State Guardian Network, which is a Cosmos SDK based blockchain. Validators in SGN will witness the message and reach consensus on the Cosmos layer that this message indeeded exists and generate a stake-weighted multisignature attestation that is stored on the chain.\n\nA message executor (can be run by Uniswap or run by validators of Celer Network) will collect this message and call executeMessage of a “receive box” contract. After necessary on-chain validation of the message, the message will be eventually relayed to the destination contract.\n\nThe validation, except for the generic checking of the validity of the signatures, also has two security models available to determine when the target contract will receive the message. The first security model is to directly pass the message on and rely fully on PoS security of the Cosmos chain.\n\nHowever, in the case of low-frequency applications like UGM, we recommend using the second security model: an optimistic rollup-like security model. In this security model, every message that is passed onto the destination chain will be first put into a “quarantine zone” for a configurable period of time. During that quarantine period, every single validator in the SGN and the application executor (collectively, App Guardians) can monitor and cross-check the message arrived on the destination chain vs sent on the source chain. If there is any invariant mismatch, the message path will be cut off immediately and the message will not be executed. This changes the security assumption from “trust majority stake” to “trust any” with app developers capable of running one of the “any” App Guardians themselves. This is how FutureSwap implemented their cross-chain governance module.\n\nOnce the quarantine clock times out, the message will be executed by calling a standard interface on the destination governance contract. This will complete the UGM process.\n\nWith the complete walkthrough of the application scenario, we now respond more directly to each of the evaluation criteria in the RFP.\n\nSecurity\n\nAs discussed above, Celer’s generalized message cross-chain solution comes with two security models and we recommend using the optimistic rollup solution here. More context on Celer’s security models:\n\nCeler comes with two security models that each app and users are free to choose from on a per-tx basis.\n\nCosmos-consensus Security Model\n\nBy default, inter-chain dApps rely on the security of the State Guardian Network (a Cosmos Chain) by processing messages routed from another chain without delay. The SGN offers L1-blockchain level security just like Cosmos or Polygon with it being a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain built on Tendermint with CELR as the staking asset. If a guardian acts maliciously, its staked CELR will be slashed by the consensus protocol. This level of economic security is something that grows with the staked CELR’s value and is simply not available in simple Multi-signature or MPC/PoA-based solutions.\n\nOptimistic-rollup-style delay buffer Security Model (for UGM)\n\n1600×706 130 KB\n\nSo, what happens if more than two thirds (in staked value) of the validators behave maliciously in the State Guardian Network? Although this is highly unlikely given the economical security and distributed nature of the validators in Celer Network, Celer does have a second security model, inspired by the Optimistic Rollup design, that works securely even under this worst-case scenario.\n\nInstead of instantly processing a message routed by the SGN, a two-phase commit-confirm pattern is used to process any inter-chain message. Before any application consumes the message, the message has to be “committed” to the blockchain by SGN into a “quarantine zone” for a period of time. Only after the delay has passed, can this message be “confirmed” and pushed to the final destination application.\n\nDuring this delay buffer, a dApp can run an App Guardian service to double-validate the message on the source chain and check the authenticity of the message committed in the quarantine zone. If the App Guardian detects any inconsistency, it can prevent the message from being processed before the time buffer expires. For application developers who cannot run an App Guardian themselves, they can commission the SGN nodes to undertake the task of an App Guardian. In that case, the security model is strengthened to a trust-any model for the SGN. Therefore, even under the worst-case scenario of the SGN consensus failure, inter-chain dApps built on top of Celer’s construct will still maintain safety property without any concern.\n\nEase of Use\n\nWe estimate that the UGM cross-chain governance solution for Uniswap only requires about 150 LoC to implement the necessary smart contracts. We can provide a full reference implementation that is ready for review by the Uniswap community and security auditing firms. Another example of similar complexity is a full-fledged ERC-721 NFT bridge which has only 250 smart contract LoC.\n\nCeler cBridge is already used by multiple developers for different use cases.\n\nSome other examples below:\n\nChainHop, a composable cross-chain liquidity protocol built on top of Celer Network where users can swap A token on X chain to B token on Y chain with just one click. ChainHop actually integrates Celer Network and Uniswap on all supported chains. You can actually review the source code of ChainHop. This kind of fancy functionality only has less than 1000 loc. Similar use cases are Rubic and Swing.\n\nCeler IM is widely applicable to build inter-chain DeFi applications as well. The decentralized derivatives protocol SynFutures is using Celer’s IM framework to support multi-blockchain futures trading, allowing users to leverage liquidity from any blockchain. Ooki, a powerful and fully decentralized margin trading, borrowing, and lending platform, is leveraging Celer IM to enable fee bridging among all of Ooki’s different blockchain deployments. Aperture, a cross-chain, community-driven marketplace for DeFi strategies, is leveraging Celer IM to enable one-click access to supported strategies for users from any blockchain. Solace, a decentralized insurance protocol that allows users to insure positions for over 180 DeFi protocols with one policy, is also integrating Celer IM for cross-chain insurance functionality. Of course, Celer IM can be used in many other use cases besides DeFi applications. Mystiko Network, the base layer of web3 that provides both connectivity and confidentiality to all blockchain data, transactions and applications, uses Celer IM to enable privacy protection against unwanted cross-chain data tracking and exploits.\n\nGeneralizable across all chains and L2s\n\nCeler currently supports EVM-based chains that Uniswap supports or plans to support including Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism, Celo, Moonbeam, and Gnosis Chain. In addition, Celer supports some other EVM chains including Astar, BNB Chain, Avalanche, Fantom, Metis, Oasis Emerald, Evmos, Aurora, Moonriver, Boba Network, OKXChain, Heco, Ape Chain, Clover, Conflux, Crab Smart Chain, Kava EVM Co-Chain, Milkomeda Cardano, Nervos Godwoken, Ontology EVM, PlatON, REI Network, SX Network, Shiden and Swimmer Network.\n\nFor non-EVM based chains, Celer supports Flow blockchain and Cosmwasm chains such as Terra.\n\nSolana is now on testnet.\n\nCosts (gas)\n\nCeler cBridge is highly efficient in gas consumption and has been optimized to do so. For example, the bridging gas costs between Arbitrum to Ethereum using Celer is about half of the official bridge.\n\nMaintenance\n\nWe are happy to provide reference implementation and maintain such implementation in a white-clove service model. There might be some frontend module integration needed that we can closely work with the Uniswap team to complete.\n\nTeam & Contractual Details\n\nCeler was initially founded in 2018 by four computer scientists with PhD degrees from MIT, UCBerkley, Princeton and UIUC with tens of years of industrial experience in networking security, operating systems and large-scale distributed systems. Throughout the long (crypto-term) history of Celer, no security incidents or hacks ever happened in any production software built by the Celer community. Overtime, Celer Network has now attracted many excellent community developers and becomes a decentralized community driven project that is focused on cross-chain interoperability.\n\nCeler is a multi-chain operating system. Through Celer IM, developers can build inter-chain dApps using the Celer Inter-chain Message SDK with efficient liquidity utilization, coherent application logic, and shared states across multiple blockchains. Users of Celer-enabled dApps will enjoy the benefits of a diverse multi-blockchain ecosystem with the simplicity of a single-transaction UX from a single chain. Ultimately, the goal is to have developers using the existing Celer technology to abstract the concept of “multiple blockchain” away.\n\nWe believe Celer community has one of the best developer support processes through our strong network of community developers.\n\nFinally, we thank Uniswap governance bodies for considering our submission to the RFP and we are also happy to discuss any other collaboration here.\n\nOther Resources on Celer:\n\nWebsite: celer.network\n\nDocs for Celer Inter-chain Message: https://im-docs.celer.network/developer/celer-im-overview\n\nGithub: https://github.com/celer-network\n\nSocials: https://linktr.ee/CelerNetwork\n\n1 Like\n\ntobyshorin\n\nJuly 26, 2022, 2:21pm\n\n10\n\nPrimo, Hendrik, Mo:\n\nThank you for these thorough proposals. Please note that you are 2 months past when we requested bridge providers reach out with proposals, per our original forum post. In the intervening period, we’ve obtained other highly competitive proposals, and have conducted an extensive analysis we’re preparing to post.\n\nOf course, security for Uniswap governance is paramount, and we want to ensure that we are taking all options into consideration. For this reason, we’ve decided that we will conduct a 1-week review to compare your offers to the other proposals we’ve received. We’ll post a followup on the forum next week.\n\n1 Like\n\nikram101\n\nJuly 27, 2022, 11:14pm\n\n11\n\nWe at Magpie Protocol have integrated with Wormhole where we utilize their generic message protocol for publishing messages across supported chains, before integrating wormhole we have played around with various cross chain communication protocols that are currently live and choose wormhole for a number of reasons:\n\nIt’s completely free to publish messages through their CoreBridge\n\nYou can send any amount of data just need to generate a payload in bytes type\n\nTheir team has been very helpful in providing support and answering any kind of technical questions we have throughout the integration process\n\nThey are one of the first ones to offer generic messaging and it is battle tested protocol\n\nThey have 19 Guardian nodes responsible to maintain their network, making it most decentralized cross chain messaging protocol as compared to other solutions\n\nWormhole supports non-EVM chains such as Solana along with major EVM chains\n\n3 Likes\n\njamico\n\nJuly 28, 2022, 9:31pm\n\n13\n\nIt’s becoming clear that this process is not serving Uniswap well. Rather than rush to meet an arbitrary deadline, it’s more important that we solicit proposals from the best providers and give them a fair chance to compete. That doesn’t seem to be happening here. It’s also important that the community has the chance to hear these proposals and engage with the providers openly, rather than have the process intermediated behind closed doors.\n\nWe’ve seen public RFPs work well in other communities, including most recently with Osmosis, which selected its own bridge provider via an open competition. Compound also successfully hired an auditor through a public RFP earlier this year. In those cases we’ve seen neutral third parties like Reverie and GFX Labs step forward to administer the process in an open but structured way. We think a similar process would serve Uniswap well here, and propose shifting gears in this direction.\n\nJeff\n\na16z\n\n8 Likes\n\n0xakshay\n\nJuly 29, 2022, 12:40pm\n\n14\n\nHey @jamico , I’m Aksh from the LI.FI team, LI.FI is a cross-chain bridge aggregator that has aggregated most of the bridges that have made proposals here. As an aggregator, we are in touch with most of the bridges in the ecosystem and we treat them all fairly. We don’t have our own bridge nor do we have our own messaging protocol we’re working on. We’d love to be the neutral party here that can facilitate the conversations along with Other Internet.\n\nWhy are we the best to do this?\n\nLike Uniswap, we don’t take any fees from the underlying bridges, thus, we’re unbiased here to begin with. We believe all bridges are needed as we don’t need an optimistic bridge-level security to transfer $3 worth assets. No matter which bridge Uniswap decides to go with, we’ll be getting the same amount of volume from our users who want to bridge UNI token through LI.FI(if UNI is ever bridged across).\n\nWe’re an infrastructure project that uses the underlying bridges and provides the best route to the users. To do this we have to research about all the bridges in the ecosystem and understand the trust/security assumptions of them all, along with their gas efficiencies.\n\nPlease refer to this article by our team here which describes the various trust assumptions of all the different bridges in the ecosystem. In our blog we also have written about the security assumptions of all the bridges we have integrated so far.\n\nNext steps\n\nWe’d love to read all the proposals obtained by @tobyshorin that aren’t in this thread to make a fair, structured and open analysis about all the various bridging solutions for UGM. We are happy to collab with Other Internet here to look into their existing analyses and make this open to the Uniswap community.\n\nHey @tobyshorin, can you please post the existing proposals to Github/Notion or anywhere you feel best and paste the link here? Ty.\n\nLooking forward to collaborating with you to be helpful to the iconic Uniswap protocol :).\n\nAksh\n\ntobyshorin\n\nJuly 29, 2022, 10:12pm\n\n15\n\nHi all, I want to say a couple things on how we’ll move forward.\n\nFirst of all, we’ve taken a deep look at, and are evaluating, the most credible bridge providers in the space. Thank you to Mo, Hendrik, and Primo for sending your proposals. After these three, we are not soliciting any additional proposals at this time.\n\nJeff, want to respond directly to your concerns.\n\nI believe we share the goal of ensuring the best possible outcome for the protocol. As a delegate and champion of Uniswap governance, we have taken the initiative to start this important project and will continue to facilitate it in a way that is respectful of the time of everyone involved. We opened our invitation to bridge projects two months ago, and there has been ample time for both introductions and for bridge providers to reach out and post proposals. In light of the late proposals, we have also extended our timeline an additional week to evaluate these vendors more closely.\n\nAs one of the few Uniswap governance actors with no vested interests in any of the projects involved, we are able to act in the sole interest of the protocol. Our position as an neutral third party has additionally given us the ability to negotiate directly with vendors and ensure that Uniswap Protocol receives a high level of support.\n\nOur mandate as a UGP grant recipient is to perform governance initiatives for the Uniswap protocol, and we will continue to carry out our responsibilities. We have worked closely with fellow delegates and third party technical experts to create a clear set of evaluation criteria, and we aim to deliver a recommendation to the community on the best bridge to move forward with. To clarify, we are not just picking a provider without input. As @eek637 helpfully clarified above, we are making a recommendation that community members and delegates will have the opportunity to express an opinion on through a vote.\n\n3 Likes\n\nTroy_Tsui\n\nAugust 4, 2022, 11:39pm\n\n16\n\nHi all, just giving our 2 cents. We’re from Swim, a liquidity protocol that aims to support a multi-chain world. When building our protocol, we also had to decide upon a solution for our cross-chain communication, and ended up choosing Wormhole.\n\nWhen comparing vendors our most important considerations were security, decentralization, and reliability. In this regard we ranked Wormhole as the clear winner here due to their high quality guardians and secure POS design.\n\nWe have utilized Wormhole’s Portal Bridge to offer users the ability to swap native assets while abstracting away wrapped assets for the user. The Wormhole team has been very helpful from the start, and continue to provide us with a great deal of resources and support as we leverage their innovation to produce innovations of our own.\n\nFor example, Wormhole’s Payload 3 is a core component of Swim’s relayer- the Propeller, which will enable single-click smart contract calls without sacrificing decentralization.\n\nWe couldn’t be happier with our decision to build on Wormhole, whilst sharing with the team the same passion for innovation, decentralization and transparency in the cross-chain space.\n\n4 Likes\n\nlz.Primo\n\nAugust 16, 2022, 3:01am\n\n17\n\nWe’ve really appreciated the incredible outreach from stakeholders in the community looking to learn more about our UGM implementation. Following up with a full proposal to aid thorough evaluation from other teams and delegates:\n\nIntroduction\n\nDue to the inherent security risks of cross chain messaging, the Uniswap Universal Module (UGM) should leverage the most secure cross chain solution that is enabled by the most proficient and qualified technical team. LayerZero has superior security properties to other solutions. Further, LayerZero Labs has demonstrated rigor in designing and parameterizing the highest standard of security required to protect the Uniswap governance process. As such, we respectfully submit that LayerZero Protocol is the singularly credible and secure implementation of the UGM.\n\nLayerZero’s key securities properties are as follows (see Technical Structure for more information). LayerZero is an open and permissionless Omnichain Interoperability Protocol designed for lightweight message passing across chains. Our technology provides authentic and guaranteed message delivery with configurable trustlessness; the protocol is implemented as a set of gas-efficient, non-upgradable smart contracts.\n\nLayerZero is currently live on 10 chains including Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, BNB Chain, Avalanche, and Fantom, and on testnet and undergoing audit on 16 chains including Moonbeam, Gnosis Chain, and Solana among other non-EVM chains.\n\nLayerZero Labs has consistently operated with the principle that security is the highest priority. In the last two years, LayerZero Labs:\n\nDeveloped and launched the the LayerZero protocol on mainnet\n\nDeveloped and launched Stargate, the first fully composable liquidity transport protocol, built on top of LayerZero and made possible by the invention of the Delta Algorithm\n\nStargate became the fastest growing DeFi protocol ever, reaching $4.4B TVL in under two weeks\n\nCreated Pre-Crime in response to security failures at major cross-chain protocols, a proprietary security advancement ensuring application-defined invariants are checked before the delivery of each message.\n\nCommissioned $3.5m+ total audits from top auditors including Quantstamp, Zokyo, Zellic and Trail of Bits in the last year alone and are currently on audit #20; the most recent audits are publicly available on Github.\n\nDuring this time, LayerZero Labs has built a world-class team of engineers, community managers, and product strategists and earned the support of investors and advisors including FTX, a16z, Sequoia, and Uniswap Labs. LayerZero remains the only battle-tested major cross-chain communications provider to never be hacked and is trusted by the top protocols and dApps across DeFi, NFT infrastructure, and gaming.\n\nTechnical Structure\n\nLayerZero is a lightweight universal messaging interface that allows developers to seamlessly interact with contracts across dozens of blockchains. LayerZero Endpoints rely on an innovative architecture to trustlessly relay messages between chains.\n\n1600×900 36.2 KB\n\n(Above: Communication flow in a single LayerZero cross-chain transaction)\n\nIn a single call, paying only source gas, users can send a message (or a bundle of messages) to contracts on any supported chain. Thus, users are able to create a single contract that is capable of interacting simultaneously across multiple chains via our messaging primitive.\n\nLayerZero achieves this in a secure and decentralized manner by using a Relayer and Oracle architecture. From a decentralization and security perspective, this model never moves information through middle-chains. With no transport chain dependencies or reliance on disparate validation methods, users can be confident in the authenticity of cross-chain messages and transactions.\n\nPer the RFC, Uniswap governance will continue to be housed on Ethereum and via a single contract, messages are sent simultaneously from the LayerZero endpoint on Ethereum to endpoints on Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum, and any other future deployed chain.\n\nDesign and Implementation Advantages\n\nAs described below, LayerZero offers an unmatched combination of security, efficiency, and application-specific configurability for the UGM. Competing protocols offer some of these advantages but none offer all of them simultaneously.\n\nIndependence & Application Specific Upgrades\n\nLayerZero enables Uniswap to commit to application-specific feature upgrades. The importance of this capability cannot be understated. Generalized upgradeability has led to hundreds of millions in losses! Most smart contracts used in competing cross-chain solutions are upgradable. As a result, it doesn’t matter how secure their infrastructure is, if a protocol is updated to add a new feature and there’s a bug in the update, every other application that interacts with the smart contract is automatically exposed to new smart contract risk. There is no way for applications to reject these upgrades. This vulnerability due to upgradeable smart contract design is inherent to every other competing cross-chain provider and is exemplified by the recent Nomad hack.\n\nLayerZero uses immutable contracts with a novel opt-in validation library upgrade system that gives any application the choice to either accept or reject any or all future LayerZero protocol enhancements. It is impossible for LayerZero Labs or any multisig process to force changes to a Uniswap integration once it’s established. Applications with high security standards have the choice to accept protocol enhancements or not.\n\nFor example, LayerZero could add libraries to support ZK-rollups, optimistic roll ups, or gas optimization to enhance core protocol functionality. Uniswap can choose to not accept such library upgrades or selectively upgrade depending on governance belief in new best practices in security or industry research at the community’s discretion. Our team’s belief is that current security practices should not and will not be the industry best practices 10 years from now. As researchers move the industry forward, so should the security model of cross-chain infrastructure. LayerZero’s opt-in validation library empowers applications to evolve with cutting-edge research and industry best practices.\n\nAs evidenced by the recent surge of bridge exploits and more than one billion dollars of value lost, application-specific feature upgrades are essential for Uniswap’s UGM. This feature prevents human error in future protocol upgrades that risk affecting every integrated application by default, and prevents attacks from the entity pushing the upgrade, regardless of the security of their off-chain infrastructure.\n\nLayerZero is the only generic messaging protocol that puts the power and ability to control the development of Uniswap’s omnichain functionality back in the hands of the Uniswap protocol - where it belongs.\n\nSecurity Model\n\nLayerZero’s Oracle and Relayer systems lead to the best possible security outcomes for end users. Specific to cross-chain governance, competing middle-chain bridge designs can be censored by malicious actors looking to tamper with a vote or governance proposal. If a malicious actor takes control of the middle-chain they can reorder, choose not to deliver specific messages sent across chains, or fraudulently attest to any decision therefore completely rigging any governance vote.\n\nLayerZero’s bifurcated Oracle-Relayer security model ensures that either every message is censored or none are, rendering message censoring unattractive for malicious actors. Oracles and Relayers cannot censor messages without censoring all messages due to the sequential nonce ordered enforcement on the receiving chain. As a result, if an attacker obtained control of the Oracle and Relayer, and succeeded in censoring a message, every subsequent message would also be censored and the vote would stop. No hard stop would occur and Uniswap could expediently resolve the issue. Uniswap would simply select a new Oracle or Relayer and messaging would resume. This bifurcated model prevents effective collusion amongst potential malicious actors and ensures the ongoing operation of governance.\n\nIn addition to our built-in security model, LayerZero leads the industry in cross-chain security with Pre-Crime, a proprietary module which launched in April and currently secures Stargate. In fact, the Wormhole/Jump team recommended two major security updates in a recent blog post: Reconciliation / Global Accounting and Emergency Shutdown. Pre-Crime was built to address these issues and can be used to verify that all votes cast on Ethereum are not double counted on other chains.\n\nFor Uniswap cross-chain governance, infallible on-chain votes and results are critical to protect the integrity of any changes that are pushed to the Uniswap code base.\n\nOmnichain Governance Module\n\nCross-chain governance is a complex challenge to address as it requires preserving a seamless, unified UX. LayerZero the earliest integration partner to enable cross-chain governance for one of the largest DeFi protocols (soon-to-be announced).\n\nFrom this custom development, we have designed the Omnichain Governance Module, a framework for out-of-the-box cross-chain governance which enables easy implementation of a simple, cost-effective solution attuned to governance-specific needs around accuracy, consistency, and lightweight engineering. Our module offers an optional time-lock function which acts as a backstop for decisions in case of malicious activity.\n\nImmutability & Customization\n\nIn addition to the security benefits described above, LayerZero underlying design is a series of immutable (i.e., non-upgradeable) smart contracts. This immutability is critical in infrastructure design as the attack surface becomes exponentially larger when cross-chain contracts are upgradeable and universal. This has become increasingly evident in the spate of recent cross-chain bridge exploits. Unfortunately, every competing proposal on this thread is predicated on a structure with entirely upgradeable contracts.\n\nLayerZero offers what no other cross-chain solution can: control over security parameters at the application layer. When using our Omnichain Governance Module, Uniswap has the ability to configure off-chain infrastructure, block confirmation parameters, and Oracle/Relayer selection. Uniswap governance is never forced to opt-in to any permanent off-chain infrastructure configuration and has the ability to change parameters at will for security and user-experience purposes among others. The unique ability to deploy different Oracle, Relayer, and infrastructure configurations allows users to optimize for both cost and trustlessness. For example, Uniswap can choose to run one of the entities (Oracle or Relayer) as a group of major UNI token holders, further decentralizing their governance and endowing the most incentivized members of the community with partial ownership of security.\n\nUniswap governance decisions and upgrade calls should not be locked into the same security parameters that apply to low-value token transfers. We view the ability to own security parameters at the governance level to be mission critical for major protocols and DAOs.\n\nEfficiency & Cost\n\nLayerZero was designed and built with efficiency as a first principle cost where other solutions have high transaction costs. As the volume of Uniswap governance increases, a lightweight and modular cross-chain solution will be critical for scaling. LayerZero messages are extremely lightweight and have one of the smallest possible headers today. Four fields and ~100k gas interactions on both send() and receive() functions are already deployed with upcoming opt-in libraries set to reduce gas consumption to sub-100k.\n\nLayerZero is capable of both singular and batched cross-chain communication. By combining batched transactions with the most efficient messaging primitive, LayerZero allows Uniswap to house core governance on Ethereum and push decisions to all relevant chains at the lowest possible cost.\n\nImplementation Support\n\nLayerZero Labs is well-resourced and fully prepared to support the entire Omnichain Governance Module implementation process from start to finish including commissioning of multiple audits and providing on-going product and smart contract support to Uniswap.\n\nOur technology is ready to be implemented and is fully developed as an out-of-the-box solution. We have developed a thorough UGM support plan and will provide:\n\nFull-funded access to our 3 retained audit firms\n\nLayerZero is currently on audit #20 and has allocated more capital to security audits than all competing cross-chain providers combined\n\nUp to $15M bounty – the largest ever security bug bounty\n\nAll engineering requirements and ongoing integration support\n\nGuarantee of deployment to any additional chain for Uniswap governance within 2 weeks of request\n\nA dedicated advisory and implementation team\n\nLayerZero Labs will provide a dedicated team of engineers, an Integration Lead, and our CTO Ryan Zarick to the Uniswap UGM. Ryan will be the primary point of contact for the Uniswap Community and provide complete developer support and full protocol resources to write all contracts and fund multiple full audits from the most trusted auditors in the world. Ryan will also encourage and maintain open and ongoing collaboration with the Community during and after the integration process for cross-chain governance in perpetuity.\n\nUnder the Lead’s guidance, this team of dedicated engineers will implement special projects including the development of a unique graphical user interface for delegates, proposers, and community members to monitor the Uniswap governance process and state across chains.\n\nConclusion\n\nWe respectfully submit that for the reasons outlined above, LayerZero offers the greatest security properties and the singularly credible solution for the UGM RFC. LayerZero Labs has a degree of commitment to security that is unmatched in the space; the team has already implemented a full solution for cross-chain governance and would bring this expertise to the UGM. Should this proposal pass, LayerZero will begin implementation immediately.\n\n5 Likes\n\ntobyshorin\n\nSeptember 2, 2022, 4:03pm\n\n18\n\nUniswap Crosschain Governance: Bridge Findings & Recommendation\n\nAuthors\n\nLaura Lotti & Toby Shorin, Other Internet\n\nIn our May RFC post, we discussed the need for cross-chain governance as a strategic priority for Uniswap’s expansion to become the premier DEX choice on every chain. We indicated our intention to select a technology and team to work with on building out Uniswap’s cross-chain governance tech, and described a set of criteria against which we would be evaluating vendors.\n\nIn this post, we’ll recap our process and discuss Uniswap governance security considerations before delving into our evaluation of teams and describe next steps for moving the cross-chain governance project forward.\n\nOur findings can be summarized as follows:\n\nOptimistic rollup-like solutions provide the most promising tradeoffs for the use case of cross-chain governance.\n\nThe two bridges that adopt this model, Celer and Nomad, have comparable security models.\n\nOur final recommendation is to not adopt a universal bridge solution at this stage. Instead, we propose that other chains who wish to deploy Uniswap use only optimistic systems.\n\nProcess\n\nFirst, a note about our process. Before beginning this work, we took stock of different models for vendor procurement and evaluation.\n\nFirst, we’ve personally seen that governance communities of protocols can be overwhelmed by third parties posting “proposals” that are really service arrangements. The “proposals” to create Uniswap and Gitcoin branded stablecoins by the Ichi team are straightforward examples. Because they are framed as governance initiatives to the “community,” they seem to come with a certain necessity of serious evaluation, even if they are totally unaligned with strategic priorities. This tendency in DAO governance indicates a need for more strategic direction setting and initiatives on behalf of the protocol by more informed advocates.\n\nSecondly, we looked at public vendor evaluation processes pursued by some protocols and were left unimpressed. Two relevant case studies were Compound governance’s selection of an ongoing audit firm, and Osmosis’s selection of a bridge partner. In the case of Compound, a firm was solicited and even went to an initial vote before other audit firms had the opportunity to post their proposals. The vote had to be delayed, and unpleasant accusations were made between firms in the forums. Additionally, the fully open nature of the process led to the competing audit firms price matching the original proposal. While Compound governance generally has more engaged technical and strategic leadership than Uniswap’s, we again viewed this messy process as evidence for more direct solicitation and overt leadership.\n\nIn the case of Osmosis, the Osmosis Labs team conducted an initial review of different vendors in private, then published a ranked list of the team’s top choices, before moving to a ranked-choice governance vote. The team also conducted a live video interview with different bridge teams. While we believe the expert-led process is an improvement over Compound, the addition of the ranked-choice vote led to accusations of “governance theater” and a sense among the competing vendors that the process was rigged.\n\nWith this in mind, we wanted to be clear about our process up front. It would be expert-led, conducted by a party with the ability to negotiate and legally contract with the bridge team, and would result in a single recommendation for the community’s consideration. This is a new experiment in procurement process for Uniswap governance.\n\nWhat Happened Next\n\nWe made an initial post on the forum soliciting direct outreach from bridge providers. We received interest from Axelar and already had a contact with Nomad, and we were referred to Abacus.\n\nAfter initial conversations with these teams, we prepared a brief ( UUGM Partner Brief) which we sent to Axelar and Nomad. This brief outlined our expectations for the partner’s commitment — essentially what would be in a legal agreement and scope of work. We asked the Nomad and Axelar teams to prepare proposals based on this brief. The two teams returned proposals.\n\nIn the meantime, we consulted with several independent technical leaders and Uniswap delegates in the space to get outsider opinions. In no particular order, we spoke with Medhi Kothari (Variant research team), Rafael Solari (CTO Tally), arr00 (engineer at Compound, designer of Governor Bravo), Noah Zinsmeister (engineering lead at Uniswap Labs), and Leighton Cusack (CEO of PoolTogether). Following this, we started to compile and prepare our recommendation.\n\nAs we were preparing our post, we also began to discuss our findings with delegates. Some of these conversations led to other bridges posting proposals on the public forum—namely, Wormhole, Celer, and LayerZero. While this was not our original intent, we decided to look more deeply into these models, and pushed out our recommendation post until we conducted a more thorough evaluation. We engaged Sam Hart and Rick Dudley as technical advisors to assist with this second run. Bridge security is the main issue of importance, so for the sake of thoroughness, we decided we should push through with evaluating players who were previously not in the consideration set.\n\nIn the next section we describe Uniswap-specific security considerations, then provide a security overview of the bridges. Ultimately we provide our recommendation and takeaways from the process.\n\nUniswap governance security considerations\n\nGovernable parameters are owned by contracts which will accept governance commands through the bridge messaging channels. Therefore we must understand which risks are specific to Uniswap governance, and how the use of a bridge would change the risk profile associated with these various parameters. In general, Uniswap has very few on-chain parameters.\n\nIt is important to remember here that bridging tokens is entirely out of scope for this project; we are only discussing cross-chain message passing.\n\nTreasury disbursement attacks. In the specific case of Uniswap governance, a bridge would be an intermediary attack surface if funds were custodied on a different chain than the treasury on Ethereum L1. Today this is not the case. However, with recent fee switch discussions, it is possible that in the future fees on other networks or chains could be activated. This would introduce an attack vector of messages disbursing accrued fees to an attacker, or attacks maliciously attempting to bridge the tokens off the chain. This is especially a risk in the case of bridges that allow passed messages to be updated by external validators or multisig signers. We would advocate against activating protocol fees on other networks until this scenario is given a more comprehensive evaluation.\n\nFee based attacks. The owner of the Uniswap V3 factory contract on L1 is the governance timelock; on L2, it is a contract controlled by the L1 timelock via a bridge. One possible form of governance attack is an invalid message sent to the bridge set this L2 fee switch while setting the address to another owner. This is one of the only clear attack surfaces native to Uniswap’s current governance parameters.\n\nGriefing or DOS attacks. Denial of service attacks are possible on validator bridges (requiring 1/3 validators to halt the chain) and optimistic bridges (a malicious agent submits a fraudulent message, disabling the bridge). Given the time-insensitive nature of most governance votes, we do not consider this a significant risk. In optimistic systems, liveness of the fraud proof detection agents is another consideration; we discuss this more later.\n\nAdditionally, optimistic interoperability arguably introduces one more attack vector:\n\nLatency-based arbitrage opportunities. The the 30 minute “challenge period” or “quarantine” used by Nomad and Celer introduces an opportunity for trades based on governance-related information before execution. However, most information related to governance votes will be available for weeks leading up to the on-chain vote and therefore already reflected in the market state. This is a low risk.\n\nProjects review\n\nWe initially talked to 3 teams: Abacus, Axelar and Nomad. Given the early stages of development of the first (discussed below), we focused our evaluation on Nomad and Axelar. After a couple introductory calls, we provided both of these teams with a brief and requested that each team respond with a proposal and scope of work, including timeline for the scoped work and budget.\n\nBoth teams responded with details on their proposed implementations, which we include below (please find here Axelar‘s and Nomad‘s original submissions). Other teams’ submissions can be found on the thread above. We review all bridge models below.\n\nAxelar\n\nAxelar Network is a validator-run bridge based on the Cosmos SDK and enjoys similar PoS liveness and security guarantees (67% corruption threshold). The bridge is maintained by a network of validators incentivized by the AXL token. As part of consensus, validators run light-client software of other blockchains, allowing them to verify their state. The validators collectively maintain threshold signature accounts on other blockchains, which allows them to lock and unlock assets and state across chains and to post state on other blockchains. This way Axelar acts as “a “decentralized crosschain read/write oracle”, as per their white paper.\n\nAmong the externally verified bridges we talked to, Axelar is is the most resilient one with the largest validator set (currently 45, and aiming for 100). While it offers much higher security guarantees than other validator bridges, it still relies on a honest majority to correctly verify updates (in this case 2/3).\n\nAxelar already connects several chains including Ethereum, Cosmos, Avalanche and more, and it’s recently been selected as canonical bridge by Osmosis. The project is co-founded by Sergey Gorbunov and Georgios Vlachos who have an impressive academic background in cryptography and were founding team members at Algorand. The project has been audited by Ackeeblockchain, Cure53, NCC, Oak Security, and Commonprefix Labs.\n\nOn the other hand, Axelar primarily facilitates cross-chain token transfers and they do not have a cross-chain governance application in active development. For the realization of a cross-chain governance technology for Uniswap and updating current deployments, they budgeted $250k excluding smart contract audits and cross-chain front end application, that they would scope separately.\n\nNomad\n\nNomad leverages optimistic verification, a novel interoperability model developed by engineers on the Nomad core team while at cLabs. Contrary to externally verified bridges, Nomad’s optimistic verification only requires “1 of n” honest parties (Watchers) in the system to submit a fraud proof during a 30 minute window.\n\nOne of the key features of optimistic verification discussed in depth below is its revocation-centric approach. Nomad splits responsibilities between two classes of agents, Updaters that can verify cross-chain messages, and Watchers that can revoke permission to said messages (that is, they can block messages but cannot themselves permit messages to be sent cross-chain). This means that even if all Watcher keys in Nomad are compromised and collude with the Updater, as long as the honest Watcher has a backup key, they may always prevent fraud in Nomad.\n\nNomad is currently free to use, beyond Ethereum transaction fees, and is the main operator of its Watcher set, but they are in the process of expanding their Watcher network to reputable partners such as Circles and Moonbeam Foundation, and are considering incentives for operators of Watcher agents in the future. Each application that is deployed using Nomad has the choice of utilizing an existing Watcher set or configuring their own Watcher set. An application will always have the option of migrating to its own Watcher set at any point in the future. The contracts have been audited by Quantstamp.\n\nNomad has partnered with Moonbeam, Gnosis Guild (Nomad Zodiac module), and with Tally and DAOhaus for frontend integrations, which would facilitate cross-chain proposal creation frontend development for Uniswap. Additionally, two Uniswap deployments already use Nomad (Moonbeam and Gnosis Chain). Nomad’s team has also been deeply involved in the development of EIP-5164, which ensures that any future upgrades to UUGM will be done in accordance to the cross-chain governance standards developed for Ethereum.\n\nAs we were preparing this post in early August, the Nomad bridge was exploited and drained of funds. The issue was due to a smart contract error in the Replica contract that allowed multiple attackers to send invalid transactions as valid across chains hitting the liquidity of several exchanges, primarily Moonbeam, EVMOS and Milkomeda. Important to note that the optimistic model here didn’t fail, it was a transaction verification that failed; an issue that was already pointed out as “low risk” by the Quantstamp audit and wasn’t addressed by the team. Since then the team put out an open call to the hackers to return the funds. We are waiting on a more substantial response by the team on how they intend to address the loss.\n\nWormhole\n\nWormhole is a multisig bridge with 19 guardians (signers). Guardians include some of the largest staking and validation companies, including Chorus, FTX, and P2P Validator. Wormhole has an optional per-message fee, currently set to 0 on most chains.\n\nWhile multisig oracle bridges are the most widely used trust model for message passing and token bridging, they have the weakest security assumptions. The Horizon bridge (9 multisig) was compromised earlier this year, while the Ronin validator bridge was exploited in a similar way. Wormhole’s significant hack this year was not a compromise of the guardian private keys, but an exploit of its core Solana contract (read more about this here). Jump Trading, the main investor and contributor to Wormhole, covered the over $300mm loss; however the fact that the project relies on a single entity for its source of funding raises concerns over its long term commitment to decentralization.\n\nAn issue with multisig bridges in general is that validators may modify messages in the queue. While a 2/3 compromise of validators is unlikely, modification of messages is a primary risk for cross-chain governance.\n\nWormhole will soon launch a Cosmos appchain, which will act as the governance chain for Wormhole and as an additional security measure. This “accounting chain” aims to provide a check on smart contract balances when calls to move assets have been made. This is an interesting development for token bridging, but is not relevant to the governance message passing use case.\n\nWormhole stresses its large team, its internal penetration testing unit, and its security credentials in. Wormhole also touts its significant bug bounty program of $10mm. While we are impressed with the team’s professionalism, we feel as if Jump itself is the ultimate point of failure for Wormhole, beyond the security model itself. Wormhole has been audited by firms Neodyme and Kudelski, with more reputable Trail of Bits and Certik to release their own audits in 2022.\n\nLayer Zero\n\nThe architecture of Layer Zero’s trust model is a separation between relayers and oracles. Oracles transmit messages from the origin chain to the destination chain, and relayers submit a proof that the message is a valid message emitted by the origin. The oracle and relayer must be separate entities; this separation of roles means that collusion between parties would be required for a message to be altered. As there are no guarantees against collusion between oracle and relayer parties, the decentralization and trust model of the relayer and oracles themselves become paramount.\n\nUsers of L0 have the ability to specify their own oracles and relayers. In other words, L0 is not properly bridge technology; it is a message passing system with an agnostic transport and security layer beneath—essentially, an infrastructure for bridges to be built on top. However, L0 does have a default configuration: the Oracle service is provided by a TSS of FTX, Polygon, and Sequoia, and L0 runs a proprietary relayer. This gives Uniswap two options for utilizing Layer Zero: use the default configuration, or build out its own network of oracles and relayers.\n\nGiven the current state of Uniswap governance, it’s unrealistic for Uniswap to be rolling its own bridge on L0. This leaves us with the default config. While the 3 default oracles are reputable organizations, L0 hasn’t published any information on the security models of those oracles. Likewise, L0 is rather light on information about the specific security model of its own relayers. One published document details a “PreCrime” function for relayers to check against specific end-user defined invalid states.\n\nProvided that L0’s own relayer is secure, Layer Zero inherits the security of the oracles, about which not much is known. Insufficient security information on the default configuration makes Layer Zero an unsure bet for Uniswap governance.\n\nCeler\n\nThe basis of the Celer’s cross-chain messaging solution is the “State Guardian Network.” Similar to Axelar or other validator bridges, this is a Tendermint delegated POS chain. 21 State Guardians, the validator nodes, stake $CELR to operate. When a cross-chain message is sent to a message bus, validators generate stake-weighted attestations to the message’s valid existence on the origin chain. The SGN charges a message passing fee, prorated by message length.\n\nCeler provides an additional security model which can be selectively enabled for higher-risk, higher value messages. This is a fraud proof model based on the design of optimistic rollups, similar to Nomad’s design. The fraud proof “App Guardian” agents are intended to be run by end application developers; but they are also part of the validator State Guardian software package, meaning any of the 21 validators may be engaged as an app guardian. Presumably, Uniswap governance would be using the optimistic model exclusively.\n\nAs the fraud proof network is a different security model, there is not a need to separate the agents, as in the Layer Zero design. Finally, while end users can specify which transactions use the fraud proof network instead of the validator bridge, the Celer team’s care for operational security is evident in their addition of guarantees that asset transfers in the 90th percentile in size automatically are sent to the fraud proof network. Celer’s contracts are non-upgradeable, but certain parameters such as the fraud proof submission window may be specified by end users. The State Guardian Network system has been audited by Certik, SlowMist, and PeckShield. It’s unclear whether the fraud proof network has been audited.\n\nAbacus\n\nAbacus is another recently-launched POS bridge with a team of senior blockchain architects. The basic security model is similar to other validator bridges, but offers additional security guarantees by allowing applications to specify their own set of additional validators.\n\nAbacus is still a very new project, having only deployed to mainnet in the last few months and still unaudited. Additionally it currently runs only a proof of authority (POA) network, and is planning to migrate to POS later this year.\n\nA number of the largest bridge exploits in the last year have been of more centralized bridges, which gives us pause about a POA system in the short term. In addition to the relatively untested nature of the protocol the obvious size of commitment that would be required from the early-stage Abacus team to build technology for Uniswap, we were dissuaded from pursuing further talks with Abacus, but we look forward to seeing their POS network come online.\n\nEvaluation\n\nFollowing our evaluation and review of the competitive bridge providers, we came to the opinion that Uniswap should enforce strong criteria when choosing a base security model. While a message passing bears less risks than fund transfers, we think it’s paramount to choose the security model that is most protective for the governance use case. For cross-chain governance safety is crucial; on the other hand liveness issues can be tolerated to an extent (i.e. slow messages) because of the long timeframes of governance decisions.\n\nIn particular:\n\nSafety over liveness. Slow messages can be tolerated by governance, but the possibility of message manipulation by relayers should not.\n\nCost and efficiency. Securing the bridge should not require an unrealistic level of technical buildout the Uniswap community.\n\nCriterion 1 eliminates multisig and validator-based solutions from the consideration set; criterion 2 indicates we should not consider light client relays, which are complex and not yet available for all chains. In light of the security tradeoffs that these models make, we think optimistic interoperability is the most promising option for Uniswap.\n\nThe optimistic model relies on a new set of agents that are in charge of detecting invalid messages. Any one actor submitting a fraud proof shuts down the channel, superseding the “honest majority” assumption of multisig and validator bridges with a “1-of-N honest parties.” Compared to native verification, where each chain runs a light client of the other chain, optimistic verification also has the advantage of being extensible and reusable across chains at lower costs.\n\nIn the following segment we give a deeper look at Nomad and Celer, the two organizations that enable optimistic bridging today.\n\nOptimistic Bridging Deep Dive\n\nIn this section, we’ll explain Nomad and Celer’s optimistic rollup-inspired security models in more depth. In plain language, the basis of this model is fraud proof submission. Instead of “pessimistically” assuming that each message needs to be verified at the origin, messages are “optimistically” signed on the origin chain, and a dispute window is enforced at the destination, where some agents and veto any fraudulent message.\n\nNomad Message Flow Overview\n\nA message intended for a cross-chain destination is sent to the Home contract on the origin chain (Ethereum).\n\nThe Updater, an offchain agent, observes these messages and sign attestations to their validity, then publish new merkle roots as an update to the home contract state.\n\nRelayer agents relay updated state to Replica contracts on destination chains.\n\nNomad protocol enforces a 30-minute dispute window in which Watcher agents can submit fraud proofs. If fraud is detected, the channel is shut down.\n\nIf the message is valid, it is executed on the destination chains.\n\nOptimistic systems have a parsimonious definition of “fraud.” In the case of Nomad, “fraud” deals exclusively with the Updater. The Updater may A) have signed two conflicting messages, or B) having signed a message which did not exist in the queue of roots awaiting publication.\n\nCeler Message Flow Overview\n\nA governance proposer constructs a message for a new contract, the Uniswap dApp Plugin contract. The message is sent to the messaging bus and then to the State Guardian Network chain.\n\nSGN validators reach consensus and create an attestation as to the message’s valid existence.\n\nA 30 minute dispute period is enforced, during which App Guardian agents check the message against events submitted to the message bus on the origin chain. If fraud is detected, the channel is shut down.\n\nIf the message is valid, it is relayed by the Executor to the destination chain and submitted.\n\nWho Runs Agents?\n\nNomad\n\nNomad currently operates the Updater agent. In addition, Nomad maintains a set of Watchers, similar to Optimism’s centralized sequencer. Nomad is currently decentralizing the Watcher set to other reputable parties, such as Circle, the issuer of USDC, and the Moonbeam Foundation. These additional Watchers were estimated to begin operations during the summer; this timeline has been pushed out because of the exploit.\n\nDecentralization of the Updater agent is a stated goal of Nomad’s. In various interviews and documentation, they have cited the intention to introduce both economic incentives for Updater uptime, and staking & slashing model to punish fraudulent activity. Note QSP-33 in Quantstamp’s audit of Nomad recommends this step be taken as well.\n\nCeler\n\nThe State Guardian Network of validators monitor messages sent to the origin chain message bus and reach consensus on that message’s existence, generating a typical stake-weighted multi-signature attestation.\n\n“Executor” agents relay attested messages to the destination chain and have the ability to be “App Guardians.” These are trustless entities that cannot fabricate messages. Celer recommends that these agents are run by app developers / Uniswap community members, but the SGN also runs these agents as part of the software package. Celer claims that the App Guardian logic is isolated from the SGN logic; we haven’t been able to confirm this in a cursory GitHub review, and would appreciate a larger smart contract audit.\n\nOne difference between Celer and Nomad’s security systems is whether information about fraud is transmitted back to the origin chain. Nomad sends data back to the origin chain so that fraudulent updater agents can be slashed; with Celer, fraud proofs submitted by App Guardians are not subject to the same slashing-based disincentives for the SGN.\n\nIn both the Nomad and Celer case, it would behoove the Uniswap community to run a Watcher or App Guardian agent to increase security, in addition to other parties running watchers. While overall cost is one of our main criteria, engaging a trusted partner to run an agent would be the most effective path forward. Uniswap Grants Program previously provided grants to the crypto development agency Scopelift; they are our top pick for an organization we would engage for the dev ops work involved.\n\nLiveness Issues\n\nOptimistic inspired systems turn liveness into a security property. Nomad has incentives for Updater liveness on the roadmap; for Watchers, the basic incentive is for app developers to run Watchers to secure their own system. Celer has arguably stronger liveness-protecting properties, as App Guardian liveness is provided for by needing to run the underlying validator network.\n\nRecommendation & Next Steps\n\nOptimistic verification is the most suited model for cross-chain governance on Uniswap. The balance of costs (running a fraud detection agent) and security guarantees (no message alteration, trust 1-of-any) are the correct tradeoffs to make for a model.\n\nBefore the recent Nomad exploit, we were prepared to publish these findings recommending Nomad. Before and following the hack, we’ve also had several conversations with Celer, and think they are an equally strong option.\n\nThe Nomad team has been working explicitly on cross-chain governance longer than any other of the teams we’ve interviewed. Furthermore they are deeply familiar with the Uniswap ecosystem, having proactively conducted their own analysis of the state of Uniswap crosschain governance and published the only complete documentation of xchain governance of the protocol. The level of support was an important criteria in evaluation, and the Nomad team’s work here demonstrates that commitment.\n\nWhile Nomad does not have as large of a pool of Watchers as Celer does with all validators engaged to run App Guardians, there are some benefits to Nomad’s model. Nomad’s optimistic interoperability is more of a “true” optimistic model in that fraud proofs are submitted back to the origin chain. Incentives for agents are critical, and Celer’s model would be even more robust if fraud detection incurred validator fund slashing. We hear this is on the roadmap.\n\nThe Nomad exploit did not invalidate the security model of its bridge design. Like the Wormhole hack earlier this year, it was due to a smart contract error. This doesn’t undermine the robustness of optimistic verification; these trends, however, raise concerns about a general tendency in the space, by which VC-funded protocols pursuing growth and TVL do so at the expense of engineering best practices (with thanks to Rick Dudley for his insights on this point). In conversations with Celer, we have been impressed with the level of operational security measures put in place by the team. To date, Celer has not experienced an exploit.\n\nNext Steps\n\nIn light of the Nomad hack, we’ve taken a step back to review the state of this proposal. Several bridges teams have put in considerable work to deliver proposals and inform of us on their security models, and we’ve had a number of highly educational conversations. However, our recommendation at this time is no action on a universal bridge model.\n\nThe selection of Nomad by the reputable Gnosis Chain and Moonbeam teams earlier this year indicated to us that migrating all of Uniswap’s cross-chain governance platform to a single partner could be a win for Uniswap. This vendor evaluation effort originally grew out of our desire to vet Nomad against alternative bridges, and as our findings indicate, we are satisfied with Nomad and Celer as equally secure models.\n\nHowever, with the exploit, the deployment timeline for Moonbeam and Gnosis Chain is unclear. Additionally, we’ve seen a pause in Uniswap deployment activity. Current fee switch experimentation is limited to mainnet, and we assume that by the time the first fee switch experiment ends, we will have further information on how Nomad has handled the security issues.\n\nAt this time we do not recommend enshrining a universal bridge partner as outlined in our original RFC. For next steps, we recommend the following:\n\nUniswap deployers considering a bridge should use Nomad or Celer. Deployed chains should run a first-party fraud proof agent, as well as leverage the respective bridge’s full network of agents. We strongly discourage the use of multisig and validator based bridges.\n\nUniswap Foundation should create a grant bounty for proper proposal flow documentation for each of the existing bridges. (We have already engaged UF on this topic.)\n\nUniswap Labs or Foundation should engage the Arbitrum team to help fix the broken Arbitrum deployment.\n\nOther Internet and Uniswap Foundation will continue to monitor the cross-chain bridging ecosystem for the next 6 months, with particular attention to optimistic bridges. We will monitor adoption of Nomad and Celer by reputable protocols, and consider engaging a third party to do a smart contract-level evaluation.\n\n6 Likes\n\n[Temperature Check] Uniswap x Aurora: Expanding our Multichain Future\n\nBuckerino\n\nSeptember 3, 2022, 8:24am\n\n19\n\nFirst of all, I´d like to thank Toby and the peeps from the Other Internet for the comprehensive update of this topic.\n\nI´d agree with the approach of rather being careful than sorry. Inherently, there is no need to rush things mainly in an environment as described by Tony in the update.\n\n2 Likes\n\nblockchaincolumbia\n\nSeptember 7, 2022, 6:03pm\n\n20\n\nBlockchain@Columbia believes that there should be more open discussion on this very important matter, and to this end, we wanted to offer some of our thoughts formed in conjunction with our Uniswap Protocol Lead @jason_of_cs, first on the process front, and as a response to Other Internet’s commentary on it:\n\nTo the need for setting the DAO priorities as per providing a “strategic direction setting” for the protocol, our counterargument is that there is no need to curtail or otherwise limit or affect the DAO process, other than proper commentary on the governance forum. If the community deems a proposal serious and interesting enough to initiate vivid discussions on the forum and to merit voting, then we believe that it should be granted the right to be properly considered to its fullest extent, irrespective of any “strategic directions”. In particular, to the example of Ichi’s stablecoin proposals, it would suffice to make note of the facts asserted in Other Internet’s assessment on the governance forum, and let the community decide on the merits and drawbacks of the proposal.\n\nOn the issue at hand, which is the process for the procurement of a bridge provider, we agree with Other Internet’s proposal that it would be beneficial for a legal agreement to be reached with the bridge team, so as to better guarantee the quality of the outcome, especially when considering the value of the totality of the Uniswap community. However, we believe that their judgment of the Osmosis paradigm for their selection of a bridge partner was somewhat unfair: Other Internet advocates for a more centrally-driven governance model than we believe is essential, where an informed organization makes a strong recommendation and ultimately in a large degree decides the outcome. We believe that this would constitute an overreach for the DAO’s authority over the protocol, and we call for more openness than the current (and proposed) reticent approach. For the bridge election procedure, we propose that a method similar to Osmosis be utilized to select Uniswap’s bridge provider: experts and informed organizations should seek to engage with the various bridge teams, concisely write down their thoughts on advantages and disadvantages of each of them for our community, engage in an open discussion over the forum, and then let the DAO decide on the full spectrum of available options (with ranked voting, if this is possible in Uniswap Governance). We thus voice our disagreement with and concern for Other Internet’s proposed experiment of a procurement process. We would gladly welcome further open discussion on this crucial issue.\n\n2 Likes\n\nblockchaincolumbia\n\nSeptember 7, 2022, 9:33pm\n\n21\n\nObviously, the reason why we’ve been taking our time with our assessment and feedback is precisely the dire need for careful evaluation of all the available options, both from a theoretical model-based and a practical implementation-wise standpoint. Before reaching our informed opinion, we consulted with the bridge teams, conducting interviews with them, and asking for clarifications on many aspects of their design, implementation, and future roadmap choices. In this way, we believe we are fit to weigh in with our feedback for the protocols, and our view on what might best serve Uniswap’s diverse set of needs.\n\nTL;DR: Having universal validators, and not specific to the community served by the bridge provider, is not a good idea for a protocol with as large TVL as Uniswap. On the other hand, optimistic solutions with “fraud proof” designs are riddled with largely ad-hoc “optimistic intervals” which are at the danger of being violated at periods of high gas demand when provers might be priced out of the opportunity to prove fraud, and arbitrary “Watcher griefing” disconnecting communication channels could pose large issues when Watchers are allowed to be fully decentralized (as they should), i.e., everyone (this has been proposed to be mitigated through economic incentives, but with an unclear and unspecified mechanism at work). We propose a synergy between Axelar and Abacus inheriting the PoS validator-set model of Axelar (AXL tokens, which could potentially in an application-specific setting be just the UNI tokens) with the application-customizability of Abacus as having the ideal model for Uniswap’s current purposes, with UNI token holders freely participating in the system (this can be implemented in a variety of ways).\n\nBefore we report on our feedback and assessment, it is crucial to highlight that how the concept of “cross-chain governance” will evolve over time may vitally affect our present choice (thanks to Steven Yin for his contributions to the whole discussion). Currently, cross-chain governance is understood as “reflecting the governance decisions on Ethereum on all the other chains”. One possible future is where the voting process itself can be distributed among different chains. This will inevitably require some concept of governance tokens to exist across chains. There are at least two possible approaches to this: 1. bridging existing governance tokens from Ethereum to other chains using a generic bridge, or 2. Creating native governance tokens on each chain. The second approach will require Uniswap to implement its own logic for managing the burn and minting of UNI tokens on different chains, and use a generic message-passing layer to relay the messages. The first approach relegates the control of the minting/burning process to the bridge provider. Since existing bridge providers have more experience with this process, being audited several times, their smart contract code is likely to be more secure than the second approach. Note that the risk of having smart contract vulnerabilities is high, judging from the frequencies of bridge hacks, and the significant TVL of Uniswap. However, there are two downsides to the first approach: a) Uniswap has less control over the token creation/burning process (thus harder to create custom logic in the future), and b) It is harder to migrate to a different setup, essentially enhancing the degree of vendor lock-in that should already be a parameter in our bridge selection thought process, even without expanded cross-chain governance. The aforementioned points are worth considering and deliberating upon, because the present choice will necessarily directly affect the ease (or hardness) of this potential future ability to expand.\n\nNow that we’ve clarified the cross-chain messaging aspect and weighed in on how the current choice might affect future capabilities, before choosing a bridge provider and/or the technology behind it —which is, in our view, the most important aspect of this decision, as also delineated by Other Internet, in their thought process— we should keep in mind that Uniswap has a massive TVL, which significantly affects the economic incentives that are ingrained (directly or indirectly) in the bridging mechanism.\n\nImplementation-wise, we believe that there is an important gap that needs to be addressed in order for any of the current bridge providers to be adopted into a fully-fledged cross-chain Uniswap governance parameter update mechanism. It is not clear to us which organization is the one that should assist with this; should this be the bridge provider itself, as implied by Other Internet’s RFC? There’s benefits for and arguments against both; in short, requiring the bridge provider to perform a significant part of this development could draw from critical resources that sustain the security and other features of the bridge: this might not be fair (for bridge providers whose methodologies are still in various phases of development, with meritorious models but not mainnet implementation-ready) or efficient. On the other hand, if someone outside of the bridge provider is tasked with this, it would be expected that there should be some kind of offer solicitation for this specific task, along with auditing of the final solution. As mentioned in the post above, this is where it is most beneficial for a potential legal agreement to kick in, and we will leave it up to further discussion from the community.\n\nFor our model-based analysis, which we believe to be the rather significant part of the feedback we give (given that no solution is requested to be “plug-and-play”; c.f., Implementation above, and there has been already Other Internet’s analysis of funding, reputability, and audits for the various protocols), we will begin with a general principle which we deem crucial not to be violated: Stakeholders should participate in the validator set, to make sure that the incentives are correctly aligned. Another way to make sure that this could happen is, as Other Internet suggested, to have an optimistic solution, where again every stakeholder of the community would potentially be able to provide fraud claims, shall a malicious message be found in the network. Nevertheless, the issues with the optimistic window length, along with the possibility of censoring, make this, in our view, an inferior solution to providing a solid validator-based approach.\n\nWe begin with LayerZero, which we deem to be a generic message-passing framework. Their model is all-powerful, allowing the specification of custom Oracle/Relayer combinations for each protocol by themselves (or adopt the default configuration, which then becomes a central validator set). For the reasons delineated above, the default configuration should be ruled out for protocols with massive TVL, i.e., Uniswap. The custom configuration with the ability to have major UNI holders acting as a collective Oracle in a custom-designed system would be our proposal. However, this maximum configurability in terms of message validation specifics (which includes choosing the setup of an oracle-relayer system at a protocol-specific level), security parameters, and utilized libraries of the ecosystem, comes potentially at the expense of ease of use and out-of-the-box setup (again, only given the custom desired configuration). This configurability, of course, has immense advantage on security guarantees in separating different risk entities (participating protocols in the cross-chain communication system), in case of corruption/malice of some validating entity/ies. Similar guarantees can be achieved via including an appropriately diverse set of validating entities (see Generic Principle above). As noticed, though, we believe that the complexity of an appropriate design to achieve the guarantees evidenced above may not be within the current scope of Uniswap’s abilities.\n\nWe continue with Wormhole, which has a large team due to Jump and as a result, has implemented, staged for production, and is actively developing a wide variety of features with robust guarantees. There is a central set of 19 validators, which is a significantly large value contributing to decentralization compared to other central-validator-based bridges. One of the core trust assumptions of Wormhole’s model is the attributability of the message attestations of Guardians by means of their signatures in the (currently multi-sig) scheme. Due to this characteristic, the Guardians have their reputation as well as ownership of protocol shares at stake. Without this attributability, further research is definitely needed to correctly incentivize participants. There is also a governance-controlled per-message fee, whose change is unpredictable in unforeseen circumstances, and whose interplay with potential cross-chain vendor lock-in needs to be taken into account. In summary, we think that Wormhole is the most implementation-ready out of many providers we examined, but in terms of the model, it isn’t there just yet (because of adjustments before its model passes our checks and balances). We would suggest that they add various customizable per-application aspects to lower the systemic risk, and in particular add the ability for a protocol to have a Custom Guardian Set.\n\nFor Nomad, and in general optimistic-based solution approaches (we will not deal here with the necessarily dire implications of the recent hack but only examine the general model), we believe they are clearly surpassed by appropriate validator-based PoS systems, by virtue of their safety guarantees. Here, we disagree with Other Internet that the optimistic model has better security/safety guarantees than the latter. Such a statement would generally hold for a Layer-1/2 on the same chain implementing fraud proofs that can be verified in an austere way (absolutely verifiable by virtue of only on-current-chain elements). Let’s delve into some definitions to further analyze that: the term “optimism” generally confounds two different desiderata which shouldn’t be confounded: 1. vanilla optimism would be that “transactions are always considered valid, unless otherwise indicated,” and 2. the “otherwise indicated”, i.e., when a fraud proof is furnished, means that the fraud proof needs to be an actually true proof (i.e., verifiable by an honest observer who can prove this only on one chain) of the fact that the signed transaction doesn’t correspond to the current state of the (other) chain. However, critically, Nomad’s Watchers can arbitrarily decide to “grief”, closing the communication channel, and the 2nd part of the above desiderata is not being fulfilled (there has been a proposal by Nomad team contributors to integrate economic incentives in order to override that, but to this day, no specific mechanisms which would need to also be analyzed). There is certainly interesting research to improve upon this (sadly, research shows this might end up being very chain-consensus-specific), but the practical system currently implemented doesn’t satisfy the generic claim that same-chain optimistic mechanisms (e.g., L2s) enjoy.\n\nFor Abacus, we believe that the idea of application-specific sovereign consensus is a very good idea matching our General Principle above. In accordance to this, sovereign consensus would necessarily be utilized by Uniswap’s implementation, and the protocol would be able to combine the benefits of both a default setup with trusted nodes (the 4/5 configuration, e.g.) along with a custom setup of UNI stakeholders as a custom validator set. This application-specific set makes sure that the future of the Uniswap ecosystem is safeguarded from actors which could turn potentially malicious or adversely affected by central decisions (systemic risk). Our suggestion for what we would like to see in this protocol before we say that its model is theoretically robust is to integrate potential weighting of the custom validators in the custom validator set for sovereign consensus in an efficient way, as well as allow to easily change the custom validator set dynamically in real-time. Because we believe that this is served 100% by adding a PoS permissionless system for the custom validators, we continue this below inside our Axelar analysis.\n\nFor Axelar, which is the only true permissionless validator-set system, we think that the PoS consensus system to verify any message is truly the state-of-the-art, subject to the General Principle above, i.e., that the stakeholders of an ecosystem with large TVL would participate in this PoS scheme. When this happens, then the system would effectively engage the underlying stakeholders (if needed; if not, then the default PoS participants can provide the consensus), who have no economic incentive to override and lie about their own decisions. What we are lacking currently from this system, and we highly suggest to the team that it be integrated, is application-specificity tightly integrated with default characteristics, akin to the Abacus ones: applications (certainly Uniswap) should be able to, if needed, provide a supermajority of actual protocol governance stakeholders as the consensus mechanism; but under normal conditions, a supermajority of the normal PoS scheme might suffice. We can see the helpfulness of a default configuration with a truly permissionless system of validators (as is currently guaranteed by the AXL token) towards smaller protocols bootstrapping their cross-chain messaging, but also recognize that this default alone might be somewhat inadequate for a protocol with massive TVL at stake.\n\nLastly, a generic comment on gas costs/efficiency: since the Uniswap community is currently intending to use cross-chain community solely for message-passing the parameter updates (see paragraph on what cross-chain governance means above), it is not necessary to wait for the adoption of either threshold signature schemes or more sophisticated zero-knowledge proofs. While altogether it’s not clear whether zk would provide any benefit whatsoever (in fact, in some of the threat models above, according to our theoretical analysis, zk would even constitute a violation of certain trust assumptions, and might misincentivize validating entities), gas efficiency might be more desirable shall the Uniswap community decide to move on to voting governance proposals on-chain in a multi-chain environment.\n\nWe are definitely looking forward to seeing more open discussion in the community!\n\n3 Likes\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nCross-Chain Bridge Assessment Process\n\nUncategorized\n\n49\n\n29473\n\nApril 19, 2023\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 on Avalanche\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n18\n\n10148\n\nAugust 25, 2023\n\nCommunity Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n30\n\n58333\n\nApril 7, 2023\n\nGovernance Weekly Recap\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n21\n\n6566\n\nMay 26, 2023","tokens":27800,"crawled_at":1791193876017} +{"id":10302,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/transaction","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nTransactions\nAuthorization\nBlob\nKzgLibrary\nTransaction\nTransactionLike\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Transactions\nTransactions\nEach state-changing operation on Ethereum requires a transaction.\n\nTYPES\nAccessList⇒ Array< AccessListEntry >\nAn ordered collection of AccessList entries.\n\nAccessListEntry⇒ { address: string , storageKeys: Array< string > }\nA single AccessList entry of storage keys (slots) for an address.\n\nAccessListish⇒ AccessList | Array< tuple< string, Array< string > > > | Record< string, Array< string > >\nAny ethers-supported access list structure.\n\nAuthorizationLike⇒ { address: string , chainId: BigNumberish , nonce: BigNumberish , signature: SignatureLike }\n\nBlobLike⇒ BytesLike | { commitment: BytesLike , data: BytesLike , proof: BytesLike }\nA BLOb object that can be passed for EIP-4844 transactions.\nIt may have had its commitment and proof already provided or rely on an attached KzgLibrary to compute them.\n\nKzgLibraryLike⇒ KzgLibrary | { blobToKZGCommitment: (blob: string) => string , computeBlobKZGProof: (blob: string, commitment: string) => string } | { blobToKzgCommitment: (blob: string) => string | Uint8Array , computeBlobProof: (blob: string, commitment: string) => string | Uint8Array }\nA KZG Library with any of the various API configurations. As the library is still experimental and the API is not stable, depending on the version used the method names and signatures are still in flux.\nThis allows any of the versions to be passed into Transaction while providing a stable external API.\n\nFUNCTIONS\naccessListify(value: AccessListish)⇒ AccessList\nReturns a AccessList from any ethers-supported access-list structure.\n\nauthorizationify(auth: AuthorizationLike)⇒ Authorization\n\ncomputeAddress(key: string | SigningKey)⇒ string\nReturns the address for the key.\nThe key may be any standard form of public key or a private key.\n\nrecoverAddress(digest: BytesLike, signature: SignatureLike)⇒ string\nReturns the recovered address for the private key that was used to sign digest that resulted in signature.\n\ninterface Authorization\n\nPROPERTIES\nauthorization.address⇒ string\n\nauthorization.chainId⇒ bigint\n\nauthorization.nonce⇒ bigint\n\nauthorization.signature⇒ Signature\n\ninterface Blob\nA full-valid BLOb object for EIP-4844 transactions.\nThe commitment and proof should have been computed using a KZG library.\n\nPROPERTIES\nblob.commitment⇒ string\nThe BLOb commitment.\n\nblob.data⇒ string\nThe blob data.\n\nblob.proof⇒ string\nA EIP-4844 BLOb uses a string proof, while EIP-7594 use an array of strings representing the cells of the proof.\n\ninterface KzgLibrary\nA KZG Library with the necessary functions to compute BLOb commitments and proofs.\n\nPROPERTIES\nkzgLibrary.blobToKzgCommitment⇒ (blob: Uint8Array) => Uint8Array\n\nkzgLibrary.computeBlobKzgProof⇒ (blob: Uint8Array, commitment: Uint8Array) => Uint8Array\n\nclass Transaction\nA Transaction describes an operation to be executed on Ethereum by an Externally Owned Account (EOA). It includes who (the to address), what (the data) and how much (the value in ether) the operation should entail.\n\ntx = new Transaction()\n// Transaction { to: null, data: \"0x1234\", nonce: 0, gasLimit: 0, value: 0, chainId: 0 }\n\ntx.data = \"0x1234\";\n// '0x1234'\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransaction.accessList⇒ null | AccessList\nThe access list.\nAn access list permits discounted (but pre-paid) access to bytecode and state variable access within contract execution.\n\ntransaction.authorizationList⇒ null | Array< Authorization >\n\ntransaction.blobs⇒ null | Array< Blob >\nThe BLObs for the Transaction, if any.\nIf blobs is non-null, then the seriailized will return the network formatted sidecar, otherwise it will return the standard EIP-2718 payload. The unsignedSerialized is unaffected regardless.\nWhen setting blobs, either fully valid Blob objects may be specified (i.e. correctly padded, with correct committments and proofs) or a raw BytesLike may be provided.\nIf raw BytesLike are provided, the kzg property must be already set. The blob will be correctly padded and the KzgLibrary will be used to compute the committment and proof for the blob.\nA BLOb is a sequence of field elements, each of which must be within the BLS field modulo, so some additional processing may be required to encode arbitrary data to ensure each 32 byte field is within the valid range.\nSetting this automatically populates blobVersionedHashes, overwriting any existing values. Setting this to null does not remove the blobVersionedHashes, leaving them present.\n\ntransaction.blobVersionedHashes⇒ null | Array< string >\nThe BLOb versioned hashes for Cancun transactions.\n\ntransaction.blobWrapperVersion⇒ null | number\n\ntransaction.chainId⇒ bigint\nThe chain ID this transaction is valid on.\n\ntransaction.data⇒ string\nThe transaction data. For init transactions this is the deployment code.\n\ntransaction.from⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe sending address, if signed. Otherwise, null.\n\ntransaction.fromPublicKey⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe public key of the sender, if signed. Otherwise, null.\n\ntransaction.gasLimit⇒ bigint\nThe gas limit.\n\ntransaction.gasPrice⇒ null | bigint\nThe gas price.\nOn legacy networks this defines the fee that will be paid. On EIP-1559 networks, this should be null.\n\ntransaction.hash⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe transaction hash, if signed. Otherwise, null.\n\ntransaction.kzg⇒ null | KzgLibrary\n\ntransaction.maxFeePerBlobGas⇒ null | bigint\nThe max fee per blob gas for Cancun transactions.\n\ntransaction.maxFeePerGas⇒ null | bigint\nThe maximum total fee per unit of gas to pay. On legacy networks this should be null.\n\ntransaction.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ null | bigint\nThe maximum priority fee per unit of gas to pay. On legacy networks this should be null.\n\ntransaction.nonce⇒ number\nThe transaction nonce.\n\ntransaction.serialized⇒ stringread-only\nThe serialized transaction.\nThis throws if the transaction is unsigned. For the pre-image, use unsignedSerialized.\n\ntransaction.signature⇒ null | Signature\nIf signed, the signature for this transaction.\n\ntransaction.to⇒ null | string\nThe to address for the transaction or null if the transaction is an init transaction.\n\ntransaction.type⇒ null | number\nThe transaction type.\nIf null, the type will be automatically inferred based on explicit properties.\n\ntransaction.typeName⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe name of the transaction type.\n\ntransaction.unsignedHash⇒ stringread-only\nThe pre-image hash of this transaction.\nThis is the digest that a Signer must sign to authorize this transaction.\n\ntransaction.unsignedSerialized⇒ stringread-only\nThe transaction pre-image.\nThe hash of this is the digest which needs to be signed to authorize this transaction.\n\ntransaction.value⇒ bigint\nThe amount of ether (in wei) to send in this transactions.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew Transaction()\nCreates a new Transaction with default values.\n\nTransaction.from(tx?: string | TransactionLike < string >)⇒ Transaction\nCreate a Transaction from a serialized transaction or a Transaction-like object.\n\nMETHODS\ntransaction.clone()⇒ Transaction\nCreate a copy of this transaciton.\n\ntransaction.inferType()⇒ number\nReturn the most \"likely\" type; currently the highest supported transaction type.\n\ntransaction.inferTypes()⇒ Array< number >\nValidates the explicit properties and returns a list of compatible transaction types.\n\ntransaction.inspect()⇒ string\n\ntransaction.isBerlin()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this transaction is berlin hardform transaction (i.e. type === 1).\nThis provides a Type Guard that the related properties are non-null.\n\ntransaction.isCancun()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this transaction is an EIP-4844 BLOB transaction.\nThis provides a Type Guard that the related properties are non-null.\n\ntransaction.isLegacy()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this transaction is a legacy transaction (i.e. type === 0).\nThis provides a Type Guard that the related properties are non-null.\n\ntransaction.isLondon()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this transaction is london hardform transaction (i.e. type === 2).\nThis provides a Type Guard that the related properties are non-null.\n\ntransaction.isSigned()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if signed.\nThis provides a Type Guard that properties requiring a signed transaction are non-null.\n\ntransaction.isValid()⇒ boolean\n\ntransaction.toJSON()⇒ any\nReturn a JSON-friendly object.\n\ntransaction.toString()⇒ string\n\ninterface TransactionLike\nA TransactionLike is an object which is appropriate as a loose input for many operations which will populate missing properties of a transaction.\n\nPROPERTIES\ntransactionLike.accessList⇒ null | AccessListish\nThe access list for berlin and london transactions.\n\ntransactionLike.authorizationList⇒ null | Array< Authorization >\nThe EIP-7702 authorizations (if any).\n\ntransactionLike.blobs⇒ null | Array< BlobLike >\nThe blobs (if any) attached to this transaction (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionLike.blobVersionedHashes⇒ null | Array< string >\nThe versioned hashes (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionLike.blobWrapperVersion⇒ null | number\nThe EIP-7594 BLOb Wrapper Version used for PeerDAS.\nFor networks that use EIP-7594, this property is required to serialize the sidecar correctly.\n\ntransactionLike.chainId⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe chain ID the transaction is valid on.\n\ntransactionLike.data⇒ null | string\nThe data.\n\ntransactionLike.from⇒ null | A\nThe sender.\n\ntransactionLike.gasLimit⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum amount of gas that can be used.\n\ntransactionLike.gasPrice⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe gas price for legacy and berlin transactions.\n\ntransactionLike.hash⇒ null | string\nThe transaction hash.\n\ntransactionLike.kzg⇒ null | KzgLibraryLike\nAn external library for computing the KZG commitments and proofs necessary for EIP-4844 transactions (see EIP-4844).\nThis is generally null, unless you are creating BLOb transactions.\n\ntransactionLike.maxFeePerBlobGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum fee per blob gas (see EIP-4844).\n\ntransactionLike.maxFeePerGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum total fee per gas for london transactions.\n\ntransactionLike.maxPriorityFeePerGas⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe maximum priority fee per gas for london transactions.\n\ntransactionLike.nonce⇒ null | number\nThe nonce.\n\ntransactionLike.signature⇒ null | SignatureLike\nThe signature provided by the sender.\n\ntransactionLike.to⇒ null | A\nThe recipient address or null for an init transaction.\n\ntransactionLike.type⇒ null | number\nThe type.\n\ntransactionLike.value⇒ null | BigNumberish\nThe value (in wei) to send.\n\n← Community Providers\nUtilities→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on March 10, 2025, 8:06am.","tokens":2825,"crawled_at":1791193876452} +{"id":10303,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/new-paper-alert-transaction-fee-mechanism-design-with-active-block-producers","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Transaction Fee Mech Design with Active Block Producers - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nNew paper alert: “Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers”\nMaryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden\n07.10.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\nDeFi\nmev\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nThis paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks. The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial meanings of the term “MEV.” The main results show that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: with active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for the current interest in augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as order flow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques.\n\nBackground\n\nA transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is the part of a blockchain protocol responsible for figuring out which transactions should be included and who should pay what. Ethereum’s EIP-1559 is an example. One minimal thing you’d really like from a TFM is good UX, meaning that bidding is easy for users (one of the original motivations for EIP-1559). This idea is encoded by a mathematical property called “DSIC.” A second requirement is a form of credibility called “BPIC,” meaning that a validator responsible for supplying the TFM’s inputs should be properly incentivized to behave as intended. DSIC+BPIC have been studied in a pre-MEV world (e.g., with EIP-1559 achieving both, as long as its base fee is not too low for the current demand).\n\nResults\n\nIn this paper, we model a post-MEV world via block producers with private valuations for blocks (e.g., due to application-layer value that they can extract), above and beyond whatever fees they might earn at the consensus layer. MEV changes things considerably, both theoretically and practically. For example, EIP-1559 is no longer incentive-compatible for both users and block producers (even with a correctly set base fee).\n\nIntuitively, the issue is that, when there’s MEV, a user can’t know whether to underbid to take advantage of a block producer that might be willing to subsidize the difference. Our main result shows that the problem is fundamental and not a flaw in the EIP-1559 design: with MEV, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing TFM can be both DSIC and BPIC.\n\nWays forward\n\nThe role of an impossibility result like this is not to discourage but to illuminate, highlighting the most promising paths forward. From it, we learn that our options are constrained but already being actively explored by the community. Options include:\n\nGiving up on “good UX,” at least as it is expressed by the DSIC property\n\nGiving up on the BPIC property, presumably compensating with restrictions on block producer behavior (perhaps enforced using, e.g., trusted hardware or cryptographic techniques)\n\nExpand the TFM design space, for example by incorporating order flow auctions or block producer competition to expose information about a BP’s private valuation to a TFM\n\nFor details, proofs, and citations, read the paper.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":1526,"crawled_at":1791193881122} +{"id":10304,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Onchain Finance | Sui Documentation","text":"Build onchain finance applications on Sui. Learn about digital assets, wallet integration, tokenomics, and the DeepBookDeepBookA decentralized central limit order book (CLOB) built on Sui. decentralized exchange.\n\nOnchain Finance\nBuild onchain finance applications on Sui. Learn about digital assets, asset custody, payments, tokenomics, and the DeepBook decentralized exchange.\n→\nTypes of Assets\nSui provides a variety of asset standards with different features for multiple usage patterns.\n→\nAsset Custody\nIn this section\nAddress Balances\nWallets\nAddress Aliases for Asset Custody\nFiat On-Ramps\nFiat Off-Ramps\n\n→\nFungible Tokens\nIn this section\nCoin Standard\nCurrency Standard\nRegulated Currencies\nToken Vesting Strategies\nBridging Tokens\n\n→\nTokenized Assets\nIn this section\nAsset Tokenization\nDeploy a Tokenized Asset\nCreate a Non-Fungible Token\n\n→\nPayments\nIn this section\nChoose a Payment Model\nPayment Kit\nPayment Intents\nFunding Wallets\n\n→\nAllowances\nIn this section\nOverview\nUsing Allowances\nFAQ\n\n→\nExample Asset Patterns\nIn this section\nFixed Supply\nLoyalty Tokens\nIn-Game Currencies\nSoulbound NFTs\nStaking Rewards\nNFT Rentals\n+ 2 more\n\n→\nClosed-Loop Token\nIn this section\nToken Policy\nAction Request\nRules\nSpending\n\n→\nPermissioned Asset Standard\nIn this section\nWhat is Permissioned Asset Standard?\nActions\nIntegration\nQuerying Assets\n\n→\nDeepBook\nIn this section\nDesign\nFees and Funding\nSpot Trading Workflow\nDeepBookV3\nMargin\nPredict\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nOracles\nIn this section\nConsuming Price Feeds\nMove Adapter Pattern\nOracle Safety\nResolution Patterns\n\n→\nKiosk\nIn this section\nSui Kiosk\nKiosk Apps\n\n→","tokens":402,"crawled_at":1791193892314} +{"id":10305,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/proposed-template-for-future-cross-chain-deployment-proposals/16611","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Proposed Template for Future Cross-chain Deployment Proposals - Governance-Meta - Uniswap Governance","text":"Proposed Template for Future Cross-chain Deployment Proposals\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\nUniswapLabs\n\nApril 4, 2022, 2:56pm\n\n1\n\nIn alignment with our belief that the Uniswap community should be empowered to make informed governance decisions regarding cross-chain deployments, Uniswap Labs would like to propose a template for such proposals.\n\nWe have previously written here about the importance of paying close attention to the security and trust assumptions of the bridge being used to relay governance to the chain. As discussed in this post, Uniswap Governance contracts live on L1 Ethereum, so when the Protocol is deployed to a new network, UNI holders need a bridge contract to govern the Protocol on that network.\n\nWe believe users should be able to access the Uniswap Protocol, as well as other DeFi and web3-based protocols, across chains which are important to them. We also believe that Uniswap Protocol community members should be informed about the relevant security and trust assumptions in the bridge design, and particularly in the current implementation of the bridges which will be used for the deployment.\n\nWe also recently released the deployment script and documentation outlining how to deploy Uniswap Protocol v3 to other chains. Teams are now able to deploy the Protocol across chains entirely on their own, without the direct assistance of the Uniswap Labs team. To carry out the deployment, teams will have to request an exemption from the Uniswap Protocol v3 Business Source License. We have included sample language to use to make that request.\n\nAs such, we suggest that all future proposals for cross-chain proposals use the template below.\n\nCross-chain Deployment Proposal Template\n\nSummary of the Proposal.\n\nTL;DR including Proposed Chain, Deployer, Chain, Timeline to deployment, Benefits to Uniswap Community, and any other relevant information\n\nAbout the Proposed Chain\n\nIncluding, for instance, history of team, application ecosystem, size of user base, daily transfer volume, etc.\n\nProposal\n\nBenefits to Uniswap Community and/or DAO Treasury\n\nAny planned Liquidity Mining (optional)\n\nBridge security (Provide details based on current implementation as of proposal post date)\n\nDoes the bridge support arbitrary message passing?\n\nIs the bridge secured by a trusted entity, by a multi sig, or a protocol/set of incentivized nodes?\n\nDoes the bridge leverage the security of the source chain (e.g. Ethereum L1) or destination chain, or is security provided by another third party entity?\n\nIs it possible for a fraudulent message to be passed to the destination chain? If so, are there any recall mechanisms?\n\nWhat are the ramifications of fraud to the malicious actor?\n\nHas the bridge code been audited? By a third party? What attack vectors and vulnerabilities were identified, if any? Have the identified vulnerabilities been remedied?\n\nLicense Exemption - if Uniswap Labs is not deploying the protocol\n\nSample language for a Layer 2 solution: \"Team [or Company] X may use the Licensed Work to deploy it on Y, a layer 2 solution for Ethereum, provided that the deployment is subject to Ethereum layer 1 Uniswap Protocol governance and control.”\n\nList the entity receiving the exemption - important that the exemption isn’t for anyone to deploy on the chain but a specific entity/team.\n\nTimeline for deployment after Governance approval\n\nNext Steps\n\nWe welcome feedback from the community on the template, including suggestions on how it can be improved.\n\n11 Likes\n\n[Temperature Check] Uniswap x Aurora: Expanding our Multichain Future\n\nDeploy Uniswap V3 to zkSync\n\nAccountability Committee, Deployments & Agreements\n\nlotti\n\nApril 5, 2022, 9:53am\n\n2\n\nThis is Laura and Joanna from Other Internet. We welcome this template and propose the following additions in two areas based on our ongoing strategic research into partnerships and accountability in Uniswap governance:\n\nProvide detailed information about the deploying entity in addition to the proposed chain\n\nProvide detailed information about both financial and non-financial/indirect benefits to the Uniswap community that the proposer commits to, including a timeline on the delivery of any funds\n\nOur suggested changes are added to the original template below in bold. We look forward to seeing other feedback and suggestions from the community on this initiative!\n\nCross-chain Deployment Proposal Template\n\nSummary of the Proposal.\n\nTL;DR including Proposed Chain, Deployer, Chain, Timeline to deployment, Benefits to Uniswap Community, and any other relevant information\n\nAbout the Proposed Chain\n\nIncluding, for instance, history of team, application ecosystem, size of user base, daily transfer volume, etc. + stage of development of the project (e.g. pre-launch, testnet, mainnet)\n\nAbout the Deployer\n\nHistory of team, relationship to proposed chain team, relationship to Uniswap Labs, Uniswap community and/or UGP, community governance, information about native token, etc.\n\nProposal\n\nFinancial benefits to Uniswap Community and/or DAO Treasury + timeline on delivery of any funds\n\nAny planned Liquidity Mining (optional) + timeline on delivery of any funds\n\nAny planned additional grants (optional) + timeline on delivery of any funds\n\nIf metagovernance/dao2dao deal proposed, provide details of governance implementation\n\nNon-financial/indirect benefits to Uniswap community e.g. increased user base\n\nBenefits to ethereum/web3 ecosystem, contribution to public goods (scaling, mass adoption, etc.)\n\nAny co-branding plans (optional) + details of the program\n\nBridge security (Provide details based on current implementation as of proposal post date)\n\nDoes the bridge support arbitrary message passing?\n\nIs the bridge secured by a trusted entity, by a multi sig, or a protocol/set of incentivized nodes?\n\nDoes the bridge leverage the security of the source chain (e.g. Ethereum L1) or destination chain, or is security provided by another third party entity?\n\nIs it possible for a fraudulent message to be passed to the destination chain? If so, are there any recall mechanisms?\n\nWhat are the ramifications of fraud to the malicious actor?\n\nHas the bridge code been audited? By a third party? What attack vectors and vulnerabilities were identified, if any? Have the identified vulnerabilities been remedied?\n\nLicense Exemption - if Uniswap Labs is not deploying the protocol\n\nSample language for a Layer 2 solution: \"Team [or Company] X may use the Licensed Work to deploy it on Y, a layer 2 solution for Ethereum, provided that the deployment is subject to Ethereum layer 1 Uniswap Protocol governance and control.”\n\nList the entity receiving the exemption - important that the exemption isn’t for anyone to deploy on the chain but a specific entity/team.\n\nTimeline for deployment after Governance approval\n\n6 Likes\n\nProposal Template 2.0 - Upgrade for Deployments & Agreements\n\n[Consensus Check] Should Uniswap v3 be deployed to Gnosis Chain?\n\nUniswapLabs\n\nApril 6, 2022, 8:14pm\n\n3\n\nThank you for these additions - we agree with these suggested changes and will add them to the final version of the template incorporating all community feedback.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nApril 20, 2022, 3:04pm\n\n4\n\nWe have a clarifying question because there seems to be some confusion about what language should be used for the proceeding deployments of Uniswap V3.\n\nThe Voltz Additional Use Grants is:\n\nVoltz Labs Technology Limited (“Voltz”) is granted an additional use grant to allow the Voltz DAO to use the Uniswap V3 Core software code (which is made available to Voltz subject to license available at https://github.com/Uniswap/v3-core/blob/main/LICENSE (the “Uniswap Code”)). As part of this additional use grant, the Voltz DAO receives a limited worldwide license to use the Uniswap Code for the purposes of: creating, deploying and making available aspects of an interest rate swap automated market maker (the “IRS AMM”); to modify and update the IRS AMM over time; and deploy the IRS AMM and portions thereof as smart contracts on blockchain-based applications and protocols. The Voltz DAO is permitted to use subcontractors to do this work. This license is conditional on Voltz and the Voltz DAO complying with the terms of the Business Source License 1.1, made available at https://github.com/Uniswap/v3-core/blob/main/LICENSE.\n\nOur understanding was that Voltz needed the additional use grant because it sought to use the innovations of Uniswap in its derivative product.\n\nThis forum thread appears to be for chains seeking a Uniswap v3 deployment where the deployment is owned and controlled by the Unsiwap DAO. In these instances where control is maintained by the DAO and the deployment is done to the DAO’s expectation, the chain requesting the deployment can receive an exemption from the license.\n\nWhile the additional use grant could apply to chains seeking a Uniswap v3 deployment, it would give them additional breadth that the DAO doesn’t need to give. If our understanding is correct, the proceeding deployments such as Celo, Moonbeam, and Gnosis should be requesting an exemption from the license using the sample language in the first forum post.\n\n2 Likes\n\n[Governance Proposal] Deploy Uniswap v3 on Celo\n\nlotti\n\nApril 27, 2022, 2:43pm\n\n5\n\nThank you for your reply!\n\nCorrect, both projects like Voltz (middleware deploying on Ethereum) and chains like Moonbeam and Gnosis Chain (L2s or protocols that exist on other L1s) need to request an additional use grant to deploy v3. In both cases the deployment needs to be approved by the Uniswap DAO, and it is controlled by it in so far as these projects need to request the additional use grant through the governance process. Only deployments done by Uniswap Labs do not need to request a license.\n\nThe suggested additions to the template are to help with the evaluation of projects by the Uniswap community, and we agree that the template needs to be accommodating to the requirements of the different use cases, which is something we are working on mapping right now. So it should be used with some flexibility for the time being.\n\nI hope this answers your questions, let us know if you have any further thoughts.\n\n1 Like\n\nchanrivera\n\nMay 5, 2022, 7:55am\n\n6\n\nHi guys,\n\nWhat is the current update of this deployment proposals?\n\n1 Like\n\nuniyj\n\nMay 6, 2022, 3:36pm\n\n7\n\nI assume you meant the proposals to deploy uni-v3 on Moonbeam and/or Gnosis Chain? Both proposals have just been put on-chain.\n\nMoonbeam – see here and here.\n\nGnosis Chain – see here.\n\nAs for the uni-v3 deployment on Celo, proposal has passed on-chain (see here). Still waiting for execution (to grant v3 usage license on ENS txt record) and actual deployment.\n\nyj\n\n3 Likes\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nCross-chain Deployment Guide\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n2\n\n8195\n\nApril 25, 2024\n\n[RFC] Ammended Deployment Proposal Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n4\n\n3149\n\nMarch 15, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] Deploy Uniswap V3 on Moonbeam\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n7092\n\nFebruary 7, 2023\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nAccountability Committee, Deployments & Agreements\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n1814\n\nJuly 18, 2023","tokens":2805,"crawled_at":1791193893844} +{"id":10306,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/dao-governance-attacks-and-how-to-avoid-them","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"DAO governance attacks, and how to avoid them - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nDAO governance attacks, and how to avoid them\nPranav Garimidi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Tim Roughgarden\n07.27.22\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nGovernance attacks in practice Governance attacks in practice\nThe fundamental challenge: Indistinguishability\nA framework for assessing and addressing vulnerability\nTags\ncompany building\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nmechanism design\nresearch\nsecurity\ntoken design\ntokens\nvoting\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nMany web3 projects embrace permissionless voting using a fungible and tradable native token. Permissionless voting can offer many benefits, from lowering barriers to entry to increasing competition. Token holders can use their tokens to vote on a range of issues — from simple parameter adjustments to the overhaul of the governance process itself. (For a review of DAO governance, see “Lightspeed Democracy.”) But permissionless voting is vulnerable to governance attacks, in which an attacker acquires voting power through legitimate means (e.g., buying tokens on the open market) but uses that voting power to manipulate the protocol for the attacker’s own benefit. These attacks are purely “in-protocol,” which means they can’t be addressed through cryptography. Instead, preventing them requires thoughtful mechanism design. To that end, we’ve developed a framework to help DAOs assess the threat and potentially counter such attacks.\n\nGovernance attacks in practice\n\nThe problem of governance attacks isn’t just theoretical. They not only can happen in the real world, but they already have and will continue to.\n\nIn one prominent example, Steemit, a startup building a decentralized social network on their blockchain, Steem, had an on-chain governance system controlled by 20 witnesses. Voters used their STEEM tokens (the platform’s native currency) to choose the witnesses. While Steemit and Steem were gaining traction, Justin Sun had developed plans to merge Steem into Tron, a blockchain protocol he had founded in 2018. To acquire the voting power to do so, Sun approached one of the founders of Steem and bought tokens equivalent to 30 percent of the total supply. Once the then-current Steem witnesses discovered his purchase, they froze Sun’s tokens. What followed was a public back-and-forth between Sun and Steem to control enough tokens to install their preferred slate of top 20 witnesses. After involving major exchanges and spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on tokens, Sun was eventually victorious and effectively had free reign over the network.\n\nIn another instance, Beanstalk, a stablecoin protocol, found itself susceptible to governance attack via flashloan. An attacker took out a loan to acquire enough of Beanstalk’s governance token to instantly pass a malicious proposal that allowed them to seize $182 million of Beanstalk’s reserves. Unlike the Steem attack, this one happened within the span of a single block, which meant it was over before anyone had time to react.\n\nWhile these two attacks happened in the open and under the public eye, governance attacks can also be conducted surreptitiously over a long period of time. An attacker might create numerous anonymous accounts and slowly accumulate governance tokens, while behaving just like any other holder to avoid suspicion. In fact, given how low voter participation tends to be in many DAOs, those accounts could lie dormant for an extended period of time without raising suspicion. From the DAO’s perspective, the attacker’s anonymous accounts could contribute to the appearance of a healthy level of decentralized voting power. But eventually the attacker could reach a threshold where these sybil wallets have the power to unilaterally control governance without the community being able to respond. Similarly, malicious actors might acquire enough voting power to control governance when turnout is sufficiently low, and then try to pass malicious proposals when many other token holders are inactive.\n\nAnd while we might think all governance actions are just the result of market forces at work, in practice governance can sometimes produce inefficient outcomes as the result of incentive failures or other vulnerabilities in a protocol’s design. Just as government policymaking can become captured by interest groups or even simple inertia, DAO governance can lead to inferior outcomes if it’s not structured properly.\n\nSo how can we address such attacks through mechanism design?\n\nThe fundamental challenge: Indistinguishability\n\nMarket mechanisms for token allocation fail to distinguish between users who want to make valuable contributions to a project and attackers who attach high value to disrupting or otherwise controlling it. In a world where tokens can be bought or sold in a public marketplace, both of these groups are, from the market perspective, behaviorally indistinguishable: both are willing to buy large quantities of tokens at increasingly high prices.\n\nThis indistinguishability problem means that decentralized governance doesn’t come for free. Instead, protocol designers face fundamental tradeoffs between openly decentralizing governance and securing their systems against attackers seeking to exploit governance mechanisms. The more community members are free to gain governance power and influence the protocol, the easier it is for attackers to use that same mechanism to make malicious changes.\n\nThis indistinguishability problem is familiar from the design of Proof of Stake blockchain networks. There as well, a highly liquid market in the token makes it easier for attackers to acquire enough stake to compromise the network’s security guarantees. Nevertheless, a mixture of token incentive and liquidity design makes Proof of Stake networks possible. Similar strategies can help secure DAO protocols.\n\nA framework for assessing and addressing vulnerability\n\nTo analyze the vulnerability different projects face we use a framework captured by the following equation:\n\nFor a protocol to be considered secure against governance attacks, an attacker’s profit should be negative. When designing the governance rules for a project, this equation can be used as a guidepost for evaluating the impact of different design choices. To reduce the incentives to exploit the protocol, the equation implies three clear choices: decrease the value of attacks, increase the cost of acquiring voting power, and increase the cost of executing attacks.\n\nDecreasing the value of attacks\n\nLimiting the value of an attack can be difficult because the more successful a project gets, the more valuable a successful attack may become. Clearly a project should not intentionally sabotage its own success just to decrease the value of an attack.\n\nNevertheless, designers can limit the value of attacks by limiting the scope of what governance can do. If governance only includes the power to change certain parameters in a project (e.g., interest rates on a lending protocol), then the scope of potential attacks is much narrower than when governance allows fully general control of the governing smart contract.\n\nGovernance scope can be a function of a project’s stage. Early in its life, a project might have more expansive governance as it finds its footing, but in practice governance may be tightly controlled by the founding team and community. As the project matures and decentralizes control, it may make sense to introduce some degree of friction in governance – at minimum, requiring large quorums for the most significant decisions.\n\nIncreasing the cost of acquiring voting power\n\nA project can also take steps to make it harder to acquire the voting power needed for an attack. The more liquid the token, the easier it is to require that voting power — so almost paradoxically, projects might want to reduce liquidity for the sake of protecting governance. One could try to reduce the short-run tradability of tokens directly, but that might be technically infeasible.\n\nTo reduce liquidity indirectly, projects can provide incentives that make individual token holders less willing to sell. This can be done by incentivizing staking, or by giving tokens standalone value beyond pure governance. The more value accrues to token holders, the more aligned they become with the success of the project.\n\nStandalone token benefits might include access to in-person events or social experiences. Crucially, benefits like these are high-value to individuals aligned with the project but are useless for an attacker. Providing these sorts of benefits raises the effective price an attacker faces when acquiring tokens: current holders will be less willing to sell because of the standalone benefits, which should increase the market price; yet while the attacker must pay the higher price, the presence of the standalone features does not raise the attacker’s value from acquiring the token.\n\nIncreasing the cost of executing attacks\n\nIn addition to raising the cost of voting power, it’s possible to introduce frictions that make it harder for an attacker to exercise voting power even once they have acquired tokens. For example, designers could require some sort of user authentication for participating in votes, such as a KYC (know your customer) check or reputation score threshold. One could even limit the ability of an unauthenticated actor to acquire voting tokens in the first place, perhaps requiring some set of existing validators to attest to the legitimacy of new parties.\n\nIn some sense, this is exactly the way many projects distribute their initial tokens, making sure trusted parties control a significant fraction of the voting power. (Many Proof of Stake solutions use similar techniques to defend their security — tightly controlling who has access to early stake, and then progressively decentralizing from there.)\n\nAlternatively, projects can make it so that even if an attacker controls a substantial amount of voting power, they still face difficulties in passing malicious proposals. For instance, some projects have time locks so that a coin can’t be used to vote for some period of time after it has been exchanged. Thus an attacker that seeks to buy or borrow a large amount of tokens would face additional costs from waiting before they can actually vote – as well as the risk that voting members would notice and thwart their prospective attack in the interim. Delegation can also be helpful here. By giving active, but non-malicious participants the right to vote on their behalf, individuals who do not want to take a particularly active role in governance can still contribute their voting power toward protecting the system.\n\nSome projects use veto powers that allow a vote to be delayed for some period of time to alert inactive voters about a potentially dangerous proposal. Under such a scheme, even if an attacker makes a malicious proposal, voters have the ability to respond and shut it down. The idea behind these and similar designs is to stop an attacker from sneaking a malicious proposal through and to provide a project’s community time to formulate a response. Ideally, proposals that clearly align with the good of the protocol will not have to face these roadblocks.\n\nAt Nouns DAO, for example, veto power is held by the Nouns Foundation until the DAO itself is ready to implement an alternative schema. As they wrote on their website, “The Nouns Foundation will veto proposals that introduce non-trivial legal or existential risks to the Nouns DAO or the Nouns Foundation.”\n\n* * *\n\nProjects must strike a balance to allow a certain level of openness to community changes (which may be unpopular at times), while not allowing malicious proposals slip through the cracks. It often takes but one malicious proposal to bring down a protocol, so having a clear understanding of the risk tradeoff of accepting versus rejecting proposals is crucial. And of course a high level trade-off exists between ensuring governance security and making governance possible — any mechanism that introduces friction to block a potential attacker also of course makes the governance process more challenging to use.\n\nThe solutions we have sketched here fall on a spectrum between fully decentralized governance and partially sacrificing some ideals of decentralization for the overall health of the protocol. Our framework highlights different paths projects can choose as they seek to make sure governance attacks will not be profitable. We hope the community will use the framework to further develop these mechanisms through their own experimentation to make DAOs even more secure in the future.\n\n***\n\nPranav Garimidi is a rising junior at Columbia University and a Summer Research Intern at a16z crypto.\n\nScott Duke Kominers is a Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, a Faculty Affiliate of the Harvard Department of Economics, and a Research Partner at a16z crypto.\n\nTim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science and a member of the Data Science Institute at Columbia University, and Head of Research at a16z crypto.\n\n***\n\nAcknowledgments: We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from Andy Hall. Special thanks also to our editor, Tim Sullivan.\n\n***\n\nDisclosures: Kominers holds a number of crypto tokens and is a part of many NFT communities; he advises various marketplace businesses, startups, and crypto projects; and he also serves as an expert on NFT-related matters.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":4049,"crawled_at":1791193899615} +{"id":10307,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temperature-check-fix-the-cross-chain-messaging-bridge-on-arbitrum/18073","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Temperature Check] Fix the Cross Chain Messaging Bridge on Arbitrum - Temperature Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Temperature Check] Fix the Cross Chain Messaging Bridge on Arbitrum\n\nTemperature Check\n\nbharat_eth\n\nNovember 22, 2022, 11:53pm\n\n1\n\nBackground:\n\nOn Ethereum, Uniswap Labs governance consists of a suite of smart contracts. However, in addition to its original deployment on Ethereum L1 mainnet, Uniswap contracts are also deployed on four additional domains - Polygon, Optimism, Celo, and Arbitrum.\n\nUniswap deployments on these domains do not have native access to the on-chain governance system, nor the UNI tokens which grant voting power in this system on Ethereum mainnet; in order for the existing Uniswap governance system to execute proposals governing these deployments, there must be some method of passing governance decisions from Ethereum mainnet to other domains.\n\nPresently, this method has been implemented differently for each of the four chains. The system governing Optimism and Polygon follow similar design principles, and should be functional for passing proposals.\n\nThe system governing the Arbitrum deployment was mis-configured due to a mis-communication between developers, and will require more involved intervention to repair.\n\nProblem:\n\nArbitrum was initially going to allow L1 addresses to pass calls directly to L2 with msg.sender preserved. After realizing security issues with this approach, Arbitrum team instead shifted their approach to use aliasing (this method transforms L1 addresses to be a different address when represented on an L2):\n\nUniswap Labs was not made aware of this change in approach before deploying on Arbitrum. The Uniswap Factory was deployed with the owner set to the same, unaliased address of the L1 Uniswap Timelock contract.\n\nTo verify, see: owner address https://arbiscan.io/address/0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc set at https://arbiscan.io/address/0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984#readContract\n\nThis address on Arbitrum is an EOA (not a contract) which nobody has the private key to control\n\nThe governance deployer key on Arbitrum has burned the nonce that could deploy a contract to this address, verifiable here: https://arbiscan.io/address/0x41653c7d61609d856f29355e404f310ec4142cfb\n\nTherefore, nobody can execute governance proposals on Arbitrum in the current state\n\nSolution:\n\nTo fix the cross chain messaging bridge, Arbitrum proposes the following:\n\nFinal governance vote kicks off (after Temperature and Consensus checks pass).\n\nBefore the vote passes, Arbitrum will add a temporary exception to disable address-aliasing for messages from the L1 TimeLock contract, 0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc. Arbitrum will notify the Uniswap community via the Uniswap governance forum once this is done.\n\nOnce the final on-chain governance vote passes, the Uniswap governance contract will send a cross-chain message from the L1 Timelock contract to call setOwner on the L2 Uniswap factory, setting the owner to the L1 Timelock’s address alias, 0x2BAD8182C09F50c8318d769245beA52C32Be46CD.\n\nThis is the L1 Timelock address + the alias offset: 0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc + 0x111\n\n1000000000000000000000000000000001111 as described further at https://developer.offchainlabs.com/arbos/l1-to-l2-messaging#address-aliasing\n\nWe will be able to see when this is completed on-chain. Arbitrum will re-enable aliasing for the L1 Timelock contract address. Once this is complete, cross-chain governance between Uniswap and Arbitrum will be fully functional.\n\nConclusion\n\nUniswap is currently the leading decentralized exchange by TVL on Arbitrum, and if this proposal passes the temperature check and continues along the governance process, it will strengthen the current relationship between the two projects.\n\nLink to snapshot: https://snapshot.org/#/uniswap/proposal/0xa4a21c808b28a61562c6b4ebf5b71c0cd37ee2d630bcbdf91ffaf5f683cc650f\n\n2 Likes\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nNovember 23, 2022, 6:54pm\n\n2\n\nVery supportive of this. Thanks for doing the legwork here @bharat_eth\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nNovember 24, 2022, 6:57pm\n\n3\n\nAwesome! We’re looking forward to seeing this fixed so we can set up the 1bp fee tier on Arbitrum. Please let us know if we can help you in any way.\n\n1 Like\n\nbharat_eth\n\nNovember 25, 2022, 6:18pm\n\n4\n\nThanks for the message, I dm’d you!\n\n1 Like\n\nbharat_eth\n\nNovember 25, 2022, 6:18pm\n\n5\n\nThanks for all your help here Devin!\n\n1 Like\n\nKINGsent\n\nNovember 26, 2022, 2:59am\n\n6\n\nnice ,thanks for all you share here !\n\n1 Like\n\neek637\n\nNovember 28, 2022, 8:35pm\n\n7\n\nSounds good, thanks for the work on this. Just looking for one clarification on the process (and mostly out of curiosity) - who is Arbitrum here ?\n\nJust seems like that particular step is doing most of the heavy lifting.\n\nThanks!\n\n1 Like\n\nbharat_eth\n\nNovember 29, 2022, 11:00pm\n\n8\n\nHey! “Arbitrum” would be the integrations engineers who work at Offchain Labs, the parent company that developed Arbitrum One\n\nSpongky\n\nDecember 9, 2022, 11:42am\n\n9\n\nhey, sorry for out of topic, because i can’t find somewhere else to post, but what channel i can post & talke about Uniswap NFT platform? /TY !\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Consensus Check] Fix the Cross Chain Messaging Bridge on Arbitrum\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n4160\n\nNovember 29, 2022\n\n[Temp Check] - Update Crosschain Governance Parameters for Avalanche, MegaETH, Soneium, and X Layer\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n5\n\n271\n\nJuly 9, 2026\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 to Arbitrum Mainnet\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n48\n\n19120\n\nDecember 1, 2021\n\n[RFC - Update] Deploy Uniswap v3 (1 / 0.3 / 0.05 / 0.01) on BNB Chain (Binance)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n101\n\n45661\n\nJuly 22, 2026\n\nRFC: Uniswap Universal Governance Module\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n21\n\n13381\n\nNovember 29, 2022","tokens":1421,"crawled_at":1791193911578} +{"id":10308,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/examples-patterns","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Example Asset Patterns | Sui Documentation","text":"Reference these examples to learn common asset patterns on Sui, including loyalty tokens, regulated coins, closed-loop tokens, and other digital asset designs.\n\nFixed Supply\nInitialize a coin with a fixed total supply, then lock the supply to prevent further minting using dynamic fields and freezing.\n→\nLoyalty Tokens\nUse the Sui Closed-Loop Token standard to create tokens that are only valid within specific workflows and services. One example of Closed-Loop Tokens is a loyalty token.\n→\nIn-Game Currencies\nUse the Sui Closed-Loop Token standard to create assets that you can use as currency within a game application.\n→\nSoulbound NFTs\nUse Sui Move struct abilities and the Sui framework transfer module to make an NFT soulbound (non-transferable).\n→\nStaking Rewards\nImplement a generic staking pool where users deposit stake tokens and earn reward tokens proportionally over time, using the Synthetix reward-per-token accumulator pattern for O(1) gas cost regardless of staker count.\n→\nNFT Rentals\nAn example that enables users to rent NFTs according to the rules of a provided policy instead of owning them outright.\n→\nKiosk Joining Patterns\nUse the Kiosk standard to join tokenized assets while enforcing transfer policies, and learn how to extend the pattern with custom burn tickets and separated admin capabilities.\n→\nWebAssembly and Template Pattern\nUse the WASM bytecode-template library to serialize, edit, and deserialize Move bytecode in a web environment, enabling you to create and publish new asset tokenization types without recompiling Move source code.\n→","tokens":394,"crawled_at":1791193915858} +{"id":10309,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/commands/autonomy_fetch","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"autonomy fetch - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy fetch\n\nFetch an agent blueprint or AI agent from a registry using its public ID, hash, or token ID.\nThe autonomy fetch command allows you to download AI agent files from either a local or remote registry.\n\nUsage\n\nautonomy fetch [OPTIONS] PUBLIC_ID_OR_HASH_OR_TOKEN_ID\n\nOptions\n\n--remote\nTo use a remote registry.\n--local\nTo use a local registry.\n--alias TEXT\nProvide a local alias for the agent blueprint or AI agent.\n--agent\nSpecify the package type as agent blueprint (default).\n--service\nSpecify the package type as AI agent.\n--help\nShow the help message and exit.\n--use-celo\nUse the Celo chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-base\nUse the Base chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-optimism\nUse the Optimism chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-arbitrum-one\nUse the Arbitrum One chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-gnosis\nUse the Gnosis chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-polygon\nUse the Polygon chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n--use-ethereum\nUse the Ethereum chain profile to find the token with the given token ID.\n\nTo use these chain profile, you will have to export an environment variable for RPC in _CHAIN_RPC format. For example if you want to use ethereum, you will have to export ETHEREUM_CHAIN_RPC.\n\n--use-custom-chain\n\nUse the custom-chain profile to find the token with the given token ID. This profile requires that you define some parameters and contract addresses as environment variables (see also the Olas Protocol documentation for more information):\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_RPC : RPC endpoint for the custom chain.\n\nCUSTOM_CHAIN_ID : chain ID.\n\nCUSTOM_COMPONENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Component Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_AGENT_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Agent Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_REGISTRIES_MANAGER_ADDRESS : Custom Registries Manager contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS : Custom Service Manager contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS : Custom Service Registry contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS : Custom Gnosis Safe multisig contract address.\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS : Custom Gnosis Safe Same Address Multisig address.\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS : Custom Service Registry Token Utility address.\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS : Custom Multisend address.\n\nNote\n\nFor L2 chains you are only required to set\n- CUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS,\n- CUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS and\n- CUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS.\n\n--use-local\nUse the local chain profile to find the token with the given token ID. This option requires that you have a local Hardhat node with the required contracts deployed.\n\nNote\n\nThe chain profile flags are mutually exclusive.\n\nExamples\n\nFetch the agent blueprint hello_world from the local registry and assign the alias my_hello_world_agent:\n\nautonomy fetch --local --alias my_hello_world_agent valory/hello_world:0.1.0\n\nFetch the agent blueprint hello_world from the default registry (initialized with autonomy init):\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0\n\nFetch the AI agent hello_world from a local registry with an explicit path:\n\nautonomy --registry-path=./packages fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0 --service --local\n\nFetch the AI agent hello_world from a remote registry using IPFS hash:\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0:bafybeiabtwvve5dfuv464ypgs6jikz5rx3w3fkpej4rzn6x36zxmthuphm --service --remote\n\nFetch the AI agent with the token ID 123 on Gnosis chain:\n\nautonomy fetch 123 --use-gnosis\n\nViewing Remote Registry Files\n\nBefore fetching an AI agent, you can inspect its contents in on IPFS through https://gateway.autonolas.tech/ipfs/\n\nCommon Issues and Solutions\n\nAI agent Not Found\n\nVerify the AI agent ID is correct\n\nCheck registry connection\n\nEnsure you're using the correct registry flag (--local or --remote)\n\nMissing Dependencies\n\nRun autonomy packages sync to update local packages\n\nCheck AI agent requirements in service.yaml\n\nPermission Issues\n\nVerify write permissions in packages directory\n\nRun with appropriate permissions","tokens":1069,"crawled_at":1791193923695} +{"id":10310,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/bug-bounty-vault-proposal-by-hats-finance/21908","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Bug Bounty Vault Proposal by Hats Finance - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"Bug Bounty Vault Proposal by Hats Finance\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nFav_Truffe\n\nSeptember 8, 2023, 1:18pm\n\n1\n\nTLDR\n\nThis is a proposal for Uniswap to collaborate with Hats.finance to create an on-chain, free, non-custodial, scalable and permissionless incentives pool for hackers/auditors to protect the Uniswap smart contracts.\n\nAbstract\n\nThe direct losses from hacks and exploits between 2020-2022 are above $15B, and yet, the solutions currently being offered are not decentralized, permissionless, scalable, and continuous and open to everybody like Uniswap is.\n\nThis proposal aims to create an incentives pool on Hats Protocol for hackers/auditors to help protect the Uniswap smart contracts. The goal of the vault is to incentivize responsible vulnerability disclosure for Uniswap. Liquidity can be added (with $UNI and/or yield-bearing tokens) permissionless and LPs will be rewarded with $HAT tokens once the liquidity mining program is launched.\n\nMotivation\n\nHats.finance is an on-chain decentralized bug bounty platform specifically designed to prevent crypto-hack incidents by offering the right incentives. Additionally, Hats.finance allows anyone to add liquidity to a smart bug bounty. Hackers can disclose vulnerabilities responsibly without KYC & be rewarded with scalable prizes & NFTs for their work.\n\nSmart bug bounty programs are a win-win for everyone. They can be created easily with a few on-chain transactions (it takes less than 1 hour to set up a vault on Hats), and are free of charge. Hats will only charge a fee once an incident has been successfully mitigated. The protocol will retain 10% of the payout as fee from the security researcher. Scenarios of an exploit are way more costly and can cause irreversible damage. More importantly, the bounty program is transparent, decentralized, and gives power to the community of the project.\n\nOn-chain submission:\n\nWith the values of Ethereum, which are lighting our way, we decided to take a different approach to bug bounty compared to the traditional and centralized bug bounty platforms.\n\nThe submitter writes a detailed vulnerability description on Hats dApp. The submission is encrypted with the project PGP key. The user hashes the encrypted description (automatically) and sends a transaction on-chain with that Hash (only the Hash of the encrypted report is going on-chain), While sending the encrypted message to the routing bot.\n\nThe tx fee acts as a spam filter and can be set to a higher value (in the future).\n\nThe routing bot verifies that the Hash of the encrypted message was published on-chain and publishes the encrypted message to the committee group together with a link to a front-end open source tool to decrypt the messages that are stored on IPFS that is part of Hats dApp.\n\n1600×900 45.8 KB\n\nSpecification\n\nIn case that the proposal gets accepted, Uniswap is expected to:\n\n1- Choose and set up a committee\n\n2- Vote for DAO participation amount\n\nOnboarding action items:\n\nChoosing a committee: The committee is preferably the public multisig contract of Uniswap or a multisig specifically set up to manage the bounty program.\n\nThe Committees responsibility:\n\nTriage incoming vulnerability reports/claims from auditors/hackers (get back to the reporter within 12 hours).\n\nApprove claims within a reasonable time frame (Max. of 6 days)\n\nSet up repositories and contracts under review. (A list of all contracts covered by the bounty program separated by severity)\n\nRationale\n\nThe key advantage of Hats solution compared to traditional, centralized bug bounty services:\n\nBug bounty vaults are loaded with the native or yield bearing token of each project. Reducing the free floating supply while giving the token additional utility.\n\nScalable bounty network — vault TVL increases with success / token appreciation of the project.\n\nOpen & Permissionless — Anyone can participate in the protection of an asset they are a stakeholder of and any hacker, anywhere in the world, can participate anonymously when disclosing exploits (no KYC needed)\n\nIn the future when providing liquidity (taking risk) every depositor could earn $HAT tokens.\n\nContinuous — As long as tokens are locked in the vault, hackers are incentivized to disclose vulnerabilities through Hats, instead of exploiting the project.\n\nAdditional advantages of deployment of the existing Uniswap bug bounty program on Hats Protocol:\n\nUniswap can reach out to many more security researchers (aka white hat hackers) with a bounty on Hats protocol and each scrutiny will make Uniswap safer.\n\nUniswap can fund the bug bounty vault on Hats with its own native token ($UNI or yield bearing token)\n\nThe bounty reward for the submitter is not paid at once to reduce the price pressure on the project token.\n\nSince Uniswap DAO will be farming $HAT tokens with its bounty (after TGE), it’s a cost negative opportunity for Uniswap DAO.\n\nKey Examples\n\nA security researcher recently found a critical severity within Premia Finance’s staking contracts and got rewarded $70k for his responsible disclosure:\n\nhttps://twitter.com/HatsFinance/status/1663243357160890369)\n\nIn one of the recent audit competitions, the security researchers could find 3 critical severities in Raft Finance’s code in a 7 days long audit contest even if the project went under an extensive audit by one of the top-tier auditing firms in the space:\n\nhttps://hatsfinance.medium.com/raft-finance-audit-competition-final-note-16e87dce23a2\n\nA security researcher could find a medium severity vulnerability in HOPR contracts:\n\nhttps://twitter.com/hoprnet/status/1666430539656581120\n\n1 Like\n\nDoo_StableLab\n\nSeptember 9, 2023, 1:24pm\n\n2\n\nCan you share some light on current Uniswap’s bug bounty programs and in your opinion, why it’s not sufficient?\n\nI feel like all of those can be done in the current model? For example, if needed, give out in $UNI token or not paying the reward at once?\n\nThis is a misleading comment as we don’t know the price of $HAT in the future. Therefore, if the team indeed believes that “cost negative opportunity” then we suggest the team guarantees that if the cost is greater than the token farmed, the team provides needed fund to fill the gap.\n\nFav_Truffe\n\nSeptember 10, 2023, 7:42am\n\n3\n\nHey @Doo_StableLab! Thanks a lot for taking the time to reflect.\n\nIn my humble opinion, Uniswap, as the market leader in DeFi, should be at the forefront to support decentralization ethos. Otherwise, why use Uniswap instead of centralized Web2 alternatives? I am of the opinion that it would contribute a lot to the wider ecosystem if Web3 projects, especially top-notch ones like Uniswap, would prioritize Web3 native products over centralized/Web2 alternatives.\n\nHats Finance is very well known in security and Uniswap’s deployment of its bug bounty program on Hats protocol would potentially enrich the target audience.\n\nSecondly, Hats Finance provides the security researchers with decentralized dispute court (in partnership with Kleros court). Accordingly, security researchers would be more comfortable with submitting vulnerabilities on Hats protocol from a game-theory perspective with the idea that a specialized third party court will see their case if they are treated unfairly.\n\nYou are right! I made a mistake while editting the proposal. The way it should be was “Since Uniswap can use any yield-bearing token to fund the bug bounty vault, there will not be any opportunity-cost for Uniswap.”\n\nAdditionally, potentially farming $HAT token would be another advantage over the current implementation of Uniswap bug bounty program.\n\nAppreciate the questions, looking forward to hearing more\n\n1 Like\n\nDoo_StableLab\n\nSeptember 10, 2023, 4:30pm\n\n4\n\nI think it’s up to the community to decide and Uniswap indeed supports many web3 options, but at the end of the day is about what is more effective and provide better security. For example, using the same logic, although Hats Finance is a web3 project, the links you shared above are Medium and Twitter, which are both Web2.\n\nSo once again, beside web2 vs web3 difference, the focus should be on whether there are issues with the current Uniswap bug bounty program. This will be helpful to the community to evaluate.\n\nIs there actually statistics or case study that prove this? Also, if that’s true, considering there are also many false vulnerability reports, wouldn’t this swarm the Uniswap community especially if those reporters repetitively request for Kleros court? I assume there’s some mechanism to prevent this?\n\nI think we have different opinions about what is opportunity cost. Because Uniswap team can just have yield-bearing token in its treasury. In fact, Uniswap has to bear potential risk of exploit with Hats Finance, which the Hats team yourselves are aware of. It’s a good practice to defend your own of course, but just clarifying that it’s not risk free vault. And I noticed the team actually paid 40k for own, which included one high severity.\n\nimage1716×445 31.2 KB\n\nThe high severity was this one which titled “First depositor can partially steal deposits and DoS vaults”\n\nhttps://github.com/hats-finance/hats-contracts/pull/393\n\nTherefore, this is a risk the Uniswap community should consider. In addition, as Uniswap is a top 5 DeFi protocol, if integrated, Uniswap will be their biggest DeFi partner, which undoubtedly would be beneficial for Hats Finance community and development. Thus, I recommend the Uniswap governance to push for fairer deals such as Hats team matching Uniswap’s contributing fund (if approved) and/or rebating the 10% payout.\n\nFav_Truffe\n\nSeptember 10, 2023, 4:58pm\n\n5\n\nSorry, you are right. Here is the link to our dApp: https://app.hats.finance/bug-bounties\n\nAs for more differences; Hats Finance has an encrypted communication feature for security researchers and project teams and therefore nobody (including the Hats team) can see the vulnerability report. There is no third party risk as in the case of Immunefi.\n\nSecondly, bug bounty vaults on Hats Finance are open to everybody. Accordingly, investors, DAO members, community members, etc. can deposit to the vault and top up the bounty amount (make it more incentivizing for security researchers).\n\nThirdly, Hats Finance is on-chain and therefore the submissions require a transaction fee. This fee itself is acting as a spam filter but if deemed not enough, Uniswap can increase the fee to submit a report to create a paywall (to increase the efficiency of spam filter). This is very important because its widely known that some web2 bug bounty companies are paying some security researchers to submit reports (to sell triage service to the projects).\n\nFourthly, Uniswap DAO can potentially farm $HAT tokens (after TGE) with its bug bounty vault.\n\nFifthly, there is not any monthly/quarterly/yearly fee to host the bug bounty program on Hats.\n\nSixthly Hats Finance, as a decentralized protocol, is anon-friendly. Considering the fact that white hatting might be troublesome in some countries and some white hats are very sensitive about their privacy, Hats has the capability to target more security researchers.\n\nSecurity researcher has to pay an upfront fee to escalate the case and if the court does not agree with the security researcher, he loses this fee.\n\nSo, the bug bounty and audit competition are 2 different products. The high severity finding you mentioned was found at the audit competition for Hats V2 contract. For your information, the V2 contracts were already audited by 3 different centralized auditing firms prior to the competition (and we paid $160k in total for these audits). So, the finding was not at our mainnet contracts.\n\nHats Finance does not charge any fees to host the bug bounty program. Therefore, Hats Finance benefits financially only after a valid vulnerability report payout.\n\nLast but not the least, I do not want to consider Uniswap partnership as a paid promotion with all due respect.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n15\n\n610\n\nDecember 20, 2024\n\n[Temp Check] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nTemperature Check\n\n1\n\n239\n\nDecember 17, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n321\n\nJanuary 16, 2025\n\n[RFC] Uniswap Grants Program v0.1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n35\n\n20167\n\nFebruary 9, 2022\n\nGFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n27\n\n1504\n\nDecember 8, 2025","tokens":3113,"crawled_at":1791193929314} +{"id":10311,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/concepts/trading/accounts","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Accounts and Subaccounts – dYdX Documentation","text":"Accounts and subaccounts serve as identifiers in the dYdX ecosystem.\n\nMain Account\n\nA (main) account is associated with a public-private keypair, and with a trader's on-chain identity.\n\nKnown publicly and associated with an address;\n\nHolds tokens/assets that are sent to/from the chain, including tokens used for gas and collateral;\n\nGas for transactions is used from the main account;\n\nMain accounts cannot trade;\n\nSeveral main accounts can be derived from the same mnemonic phrase. Each user main account is completely independent and private/unlinkable from each other.\n\nSubaccounts\n\nSubaccounts provide a way to isolate funds and manage risk within an account. They are used to trade.\n\nEach main account can have 128,001 subaccounts;\n\nEach subaccount is uniquely identified using as subaccount ID of (main account address, integer);\n\nOnce you deposit funds to a valid subaccount ID, the subaccount will automatically be created;\n\nOnly the main account can send transactions on behalf of a subaccount;\n\nSubaccounts do not require gas (no gas is used for trading);\n\nSubaccounts require collateral token (currently USDC) in order to trade.","tokens":285,"crawled_at":1791193931880} +{"id":10312,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/sdk/rust","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Rust SDK | MPL-Core","text":"Metaplex provides a Rust library that can be used to interact with the MPL-Core program. The Rust library can be used in rust scripts/builds as well as onchain programs via CPI instructions. For Anchor program integration, see Using Core in Anchor for anchor, anchor-0-32, and Rust toolchain requirements.\nInstallation\nThe MPL-Core Rust SDK can be used in both scripts/desktop/mobile applications as well as with Solana onchain programs.\ncargo add mpl-core\n\ncrates.io\nGet started with our JavaScript library based on the Umi framework.\n\ndocs.rs\nThe Rust SDK typedoc platform.\n\nLocal Scripts\nFor local scripts is recommended to use the Builder versions of all the instructions listed. These builders abstract a lot of the work for you and return a instruction that can be added to a transaction. A list of all Core instructions can be found here: Metaplex Core - Rust Instructions For a more comprehensive guide on using Rust check out the Metaplex Rust SDKs Guide page.\nCreateV1Builder - Example\nuse mpl_core::instructions::CreateV1Builder;\n\nuse solana_client::rpc_client;\n\nuse solana_sdk::{signature::Keypair, signer::Signer, transaction::Transaction};\n\npub fn create_asset() {\n\nlet rpc_client = rpc_client::RpcClient::new(\"https://api.devnet.solana.com\".to_string());\n\nlet keypair_path = \".../my-key.json\"\n\nlet keypair = solana_sdk::signature::read_keypair_file(keypair_path).unwrap();\n\nlet asset = Keypair::new();\n\nlet create_asset_ix = CreateV1Builder::new()\n\n.asset(asset.pubkey())\n\n.payer(keypair.pubkey())\n\n.name(\"My Asset\".into())\n\n.uri(\"https://example.com/my-asset.json\".into())\n\n.instruction();\n\nlet signers = vec![&asset, &keypair];\n\nlet last_blockhash = rpc_client.get_latest_blockhash().await.unwrap();\n\nlet create_asset_tx = Transaction::new_signed_with_payer(\n\n&[create_asset_ix],\n\nSome(&keypair.pubkey()),\n\n&signers,\n\nlast_blockhash,\n\n);\n\nlet res = rpc_client.send_and_confirm_transaction(&create_asset_tx).await.unwrap();\n\nprintln!(\"Signature: {:?}\", res)\n\n}\n\nCPI (Cross Program Invocation)\nPerforming CPI instructions from your own programs can be achieved easily by using the CpiBuilder version of an instruction function that can be found for all instructions in the mpl-core Rust crate. A list of all Core instructions can be found here: Metaplex Core - Rust Instructions For a more comprehensive guide using Metaplex crates to create CPI instructions check out the How to CPI into a Metaplex Program guide page.\nCreateV1CpiBuilder - Example\nCreateV1CpiBuilder::new()\n\n.asset(context.accounts.asset)\n\n.collection(context.accounts.collection)\n\n.authority(context.accounts.authority)\n\n.payer(context.accounts.payer)\n\n.owner(context.accounts.owner)\n\n.update_authority(context.accounts.update_authority)\n\n.system_program(context.acccounts.system_program)\n\n.data_state(input.data_state.unwrap_or(DataState::AccountState))\n\n.name(args.asset_name)\n\n.uri(args.asset_uri)\n\n.plugins(args.plugins)\n\n.invoke()","tokens":730,"crawled_at":1791193933623} +{"id":10313,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/developer_tooling/dev_mode","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Dev mode - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Dev mode\n\nThe Open Autonomy framework comes with developer mode (dev mode) tooling to enable faster AI agent developing and debugging. The dev mode supports running AI agents with a number of functionalities enabled:\n\nHot reload, which enables hot code swapping and reflects changes on the agent blueprint code as well as on the local open-aea repository without rebuilding or restarting the containers manually.\n\nHardhat Instance, which enables the inclusion of a pre-configured Hardhat Instance image in the deployment, which can be used as a test blockchain.\n\nACN Instance, which enables inclusion of a pre-configured ACN Instance image, which can be used to test various agent communication functionalities, for example establishing the Tendermint network at the startup.\n\nExecution replay of a previous agent instance in the AI agent.\n\nBenchmark the performance of an AI agent.\n\nBefore starting this guide, ensure that your machine satisfies the framework requirements and that you have followed the set up guide. As a result you should have a Pipenv workspace folder.\n\nBuild and run an AI agent in dev mode\n\nFetch the AI agent. Fetch the Hello World AI agent from the remote registry.\n\nautonomy fetch valory/hello_world:0.1.0: --service\n\nBuild the deployment. Within the AI agent folder, execute the command below to build the AI agent deployment in dev mode, including a pre-configured Hardhat instance.\n\nautonomy deploy build --dev --packages-dir ~/service/packages --open-aea-dir ~/git/open-aea/ --use-hardhat -ltm\n\nThis will create a deployment environment in dev mode within the ./abci_build_* folder.\n\nYou must modify the paths in the command above appropriately, pointing to:\n\nthe path to the local registry (/packages directory),\n\nthe path to the local Open AEA repository.\n\nIf you don't want to specify the open-aea repository manually, you can install the open-aea in editable mode using\n\npip3 install -e PATH_TO_OPEN_AEA_REPOSITORY\n\nSame thing goes for packages, if you're already in the packages/ directory (eg. running the command from packages/author/services/ai_agent) you don't have to specify the value for --packages-dir flag explicitly.\n\nNote: When building development deployments you don't have to define keys manually, autonomy generates the keys automatically in development mode. You can still specify the keys file if you already have one and you're planning on using it.\n\nRun the AI agent. Navigate to the deployment environment folder (./abci_build_*) and run the deployment locally.\n\ncd abci_build_*\nautonomy deploy run\n\nYou can cancel the local execution at any time by pressing Ctrl+C.\n\nHot reload\n\nOnce the agent instances are running, you can make changes to the agent blueprint's code as well as the local Open AEA repository, and it will trigger the AI agent restart.\n\nThe trigger is caused by any Python file closing in either the service/packages or the open-aea/ directory. So even if you haven't made any change and still want to restart the AI agent, just open any Python file press Ctrl+S or save it from the file menu and it will trigger the restart.\n\nHardhat instance\n\nBy default the command that builds the AI agent deployment (autonomy deploy build) only includes the agent instance nodes and the Tendermint nodes. If you want to include a local Hardhat node as a test blockchain for the ledger connection, you can do so by using the --use-hardhat flag in that command.\n\nThe deployment setup will include a Hardhat node (image valory/open-autonomy-hardhat) using hardhat as container name. Therefore, in order to use this node, you must set a ai-agent-level override so that the valory/ledger connection address is set to http://hardhat:8545.\nYou can achieve this by editing the AI agent configuration file service.yaml as follows:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${LEDGER_RPC:str:http://hardhat:8545}\n\nAlternatively, you can leave the default service.yaml and export an environment variable:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/ledger:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nledger_apis:\nethereum:\naddress: ${LEDGER_RPC:str:http://localhost:8545}\n\nexport LEDGER_RPC = http://hardhat:8545\n\nIf you require specific custom contracts to test your AI agent, read the guide to include custom contracts.\n\nACN instance\n\nYou can also include an ACN node for agent communication using the --use-acn flag in autonomy deploy build.\n\nThe deployment setup will include an ACN node (image valory/open-acn-node) using acn as container name. Similarly as above, in order to use this node you must set a ai-agent-level override so that the valory/p2p_libp2p_client connection parameters are set to the appropriate values.\nYou can achieve this by editing the AI agent configuration file service.yaml as follows:\n\nservice.yaml# (...)\n---\npublic_id: valory/p2p_libp2p_client:0.1.0\ntype: connection\nconfig:\nnodes:\n- uri: acn:11000\npublic_key: 03c74dbfbe7bbc1b42429f78778017a3cd7eaf9d59d1634c9505a3f7c1a9350e71\ncert_requests:\n- identifier: acn\nledger_id: ethereum\nmessage_format: '{public_key}'\nnot_after: '2025-01-01'\nnot_before: '2024-01-01'\npublic_key: 03c74dbfbe7bbc1b42429f78778017a3cd7eaf9d59d1634c9505a3f7c1a9350e71\nsave_path: .certs/acn_cosmos_11000.txt\nis_abstract: false","tokens":1324,"crawled_at":1791193943423} +{"id":10314,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/ugp-v3-bug-bounty-contribution/11179","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"UGP v3 Bug Bounty contribution - Temperature Check - Uniswap Governance","text":"UGP v3 Bug Bounty contribution\n\nTemperature Check\n\nkenneth\n\nMarch 26, 2021, 3:44pm\n\n1\n\nWith the announcement of Uniswap v3, the Uniswap Labs team has posted a $500,000 bug bounty program for the reporting of any bugs that can lead to the potential loss of LP funds as well as discretionary rewards for lower severity bugs.\n\nWe believe the security of v3 contracts is critical to continuing to grow the UNI ecosystem around, which is part of the stated mission of the UNI Grants Program that governance approved in Q4 2020.\n\nThe UNI Grants Program would like to double the UGP Q2 budget to $1.5M in order to match the Uniswap Labs bug bounty program with $500,000 worth of UNI from the Committee multisig. As these funds were not a part of our original proposal, we are outlining our rationale and process for its approval via a Snapshot temperature check.\n\nRationale:\n\nIn Q4 2020, UNI governance approved a transfer of $1.5M from treasury to the Uniswap Grants Program multisig.\n\nSince then, the following has happened:\n\nIn Q1 2021, UGP has successfully funded 23 projects, deploying the targeted $750,000 worth of UNI. You can read more about the details of our Q1 grants here.\n\nIn Q2, UGP is on track to deploy $750,000 worth of UNI and will be updating our process to make grant approvals more frequent. Read more on our request for proposals for Q2 here.\n\nThe value of UNI in the multisig has grown from approximately ~$1.5M to ~$14M at the time of this writing\n\nSeparately, v3 introduces new market dynamics and customizable liquidity provisions with both increased gains and associated risk, putting more pressure to ensuring the security of v3 contracts. While several audits have been completed, there may be bugs and exploits that have been overlooked.\n\nGiven the mission of the grants program, our progress to date, and the importance of security for users funds, we believe the bounty match would be an appropriate use of funds entrusted to us.\n\nProcess:\n\nThere has not yet been a precedent set for governance decisions that do not require any code or additional actions from treasury. Therefore to approve the match, we are seeking community support through a Snapshot temperature check.\n\nWe’re employing an open voting period of 7 days starting today, 03/26/21 until 04/02/21, after which UGP will act according to the majority vote!\n\nUnlike a full governance proposal, this process is meant to be lightweight because the funds are already sitting in the UGP multisig and as such, there will be no minimum threshold for voting. Please submit your votes within the next 7 days here and let us know your thoughts on the lite-proposalTM!\n\nSnapshot Temp-Check\n\n16 Likes\n\ndennisonb\n\nMarch 26, 2021, 5:03pm\n\n2\n\nI really like this idea, but I wonder how it would be implemented: Would the grants committee be responsible for determining what gets a bug bounty payout? Would the current funds be delegated to a different committee to handle issues like this?\n\n1 Like\n\nkenneth\n\nMarch 26, 2021, 5:21pm\n\n3\n\nGreat question! We have to acknowledge our own blindspots in our technical expertise. UGP seeks to match the bounties 1:1 with the Uniswap Labs team instead of us evaluating the individual submissions.\n\nv3 brings a lot of attention to something new both on the contracting side as well as the financial side so security is of utmost importance. Looking at past contracts and their exploits, we’d want to ensure users are as safe as can be. With UNI price having increased quite a decent amount, we wouldn’t be asking for more funds, just approval from the community to spend what’s already in the multisig for what we feel is quite important.\n\n2 Likes\n\ng_dip\n\nMarch 26, 2021, 8:46pm\n\n4\n\nI definitely support bigger bounties - it’s going to be ~$4B soon enough so we may as well do the best we can before launch.\n\nCan I suggest that instead of a simple matching program, you expand the audience of hackers by using another platform to run a parallel program? For instance, in the launch process of Multi-Collateral Dai we had success with HackerOne (they detected a critical bug).\n\n6 Likes\n\nkenneth\n\nMarch 30, 2021, 5:29pm\n\n5\n\nyes would love to discuss! DMing you!\n\n2 Likes\n\nbrilj310\n\nOctober 23, 2021, 6:17am\n\n7\n\nWell yes. Now I am actualy unemploied and I am opening my own company. Until then I have plenty of time to work on your domand. So, doo tell what bug you want me to eliminate and where. It shouldn’s take long if the code is not codependent to itself\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Temperature Check] Reinstating UGP v0.2 with existing funds\n\nTemperature Check\n\n16\n\n7234\n\nJuly 15, 2021\n\n[RFC] Uniswap Grants Program v0.1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n35\n\n20167\n\nFebruary 9, 2022\n\nBug Bounty Vault Proposal by Hats Finance\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n2203\n\nSeptember 10, 2023\n\n[Consensus Check] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nConsensus Check\n\n0\n\n5439\n\nAugust 10, 2022\n\n[Governance Proposal] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n7548\n\nAugust 17, 2022","tokens":1250,"crawled_at":1791193946811} +{"id":10315,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/examples-patterns/staking-rewards","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Staking Rewards | Sui Documentation","text":"This example implements a generic staking pool where users deposit Coin (stake token) and earn Coin (reward token) over time, proportional to their share of the pool. It uses the Synthetix reward-per-token accumulator pattern for O(1) reward calculation regardless of how many stakers exist.\n\nThe same contract works for yield farming, liquidity mining, fee and revenue sharing, and other pro-rata, time-weighted token distribution use cases.\n\ninfo\nStaking in this context refers to the DeFi yield-farming pattern (deposit tokens, earn rewards), not proof-of-stake consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network staking.\n\nWhen to use this pattern​\n\nUse this pattern when you need to:\n\nDistribute reward tokens proportionally to depositors over a configurable time window.\n\nSupport an unbounded number of stakers without increasing gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction. costs per interaction.\n\nGive users a transferable receipt objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. that represents their position and can compose with other protocols (for example, as collateral).\n\nProvide admin controls for funding reward schedules, pausing deposits, and recovering unused rewards.\n\nGuarantee solvency structurally so the pool can never promise more rewards than it holds.\n\nFor token vesting (releasing tokens to specific recipients on a schedule rather than proportional distribution to a pool), see Token vesting strategies.\n\nWhat you learn​\n\nThis example teaches:\n\nReward-per-token accumulator: A single number tracks total reward earned per staked token since the pool began. Each user stores a snapshot of this value when they last interacted. The difference between the current value and the snapshot determines their earnings, with no loops or iteration.\n\nBounded emission windows: The admin funds a reward period with a specific duration. The accumulator stops advancing after the window closes, making solvency a structural guarantee rather than an operational one.\n\nReceipt-based positions: Each staker receives a StakeReceipt owned object that records their deposit amount and accumulator snapshot. The receipt is the position. It can be transferred, used as collateral, or composed in programmable transaction blocksProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui..\n\nCapability-gated administration: An AdminCap object authorizes pool operations like funding rewards and pausing. The cap can be transferred to a multisigMultisigMulti-signature transactions that require multiple keys for authorization. or burned to make the pool permanently immutable.\n\nComposable function signatures: Every public function returns its results (capabilities, receipts, coins) instead of transferring internally, making the contract fully composable in programmable transaction blocks.\n\nArchitecture​\n\nThe contract creates three onchain object types with distinct ownership models.\n\nObjectAbilitiesOwnershipCreated byDestroyed by\nStakingPool\nkey\nShared\ncreate_pool\nNever\n\nStakeReceipt\nkey, store\nOwned (transferable)\nstake\nunstake, emergency_unstake\n\nAdminCap\nkey, store\nOwned (transferable)\ncreate_pool\ndestroy_admin_cap\n\nThe StakingPool is a shared object that holds all staked balances, the reward balance, the emission schedule, and the reward-per-token accumulator. The StakeReceipt is an owned object given to each staker, recording their deposit amount and a snapshot of the accumulator. The AdminCap authorizes administrative operations and is bound to a specific pool by ID.\n\nThe following diagram shows the lifecycle of a staking pool.\n\nHow the accumulator works​\n\nThe core challenge in reward distribution is calculating each staker's share without iterating through all stakers on every interaction. The accumulator solves this with a single number called reward_per_token (RPT) that answers: \"For every single token staked in this pool, how much total reward has been earned since the beginning?\"\n\nEvery time someone interacts with the pool (stake, unstake, claim), the contract updates this number:\n\nnew_RPT = old_RPT + (time_elapsed × reward_rate / total_staked)\n\nTo calculate how much a specific user earned, subtract their snapshot from the current value:\n\nuser_reward = user_staked_amount × (current_RPT − user_snapshot_RPT)\n\nThis is O(1) regardless of how many stakers exist.\n\nBecause MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. has no floating-point numbers, all RPT math is scaled by a precision factor of 1018. The contract multiplies by this factor before dividing, then divides by it when converting back to token amounts. This gives 18 decimal places of accuracy in pure integer arithmetic.\n\nEmission window and solvency​\n\nAccrual is bounded by an explicit emission window [start_timestamp, stop_timestamp]. Outside this window, the accumulator stops advancing. The window is set by notify_reward_amount(coin, duration_ms), which derives reward_rate = (coin_amount + leftover) / duration_ms and asserts rate × duration ≤ reward_balance. This makes solvency structural: any rewards the math can accrue, the pool can pay.\n\nPrerequisites\n\nInstall the Sui CLI.\n\nCreate an address and fund it with SUI for gas.\n\nReference implementation​\n\nA complete, tested implementation lives in staking-contract-template. Build it, run its tests, and publish it as-is, or lift the accumulator logic into a packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. of your own:\n\n$ sui client publish --gas-budget 100000000\n\nThe package leaves [dependencies] empty in Move.toml, so the framework version resolves from your active environment. Record the package ID and the StakingPool and AdminCap object IDs from the output.\n\nCalling the contract​\n\nEvery entry point is a public fun that returns its objects instead of transferring them internally. That makes the moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects. composable in programmable transaction blocks, but it also means a plain sui client call fails with UnusedValueWithoutDrop. Use sui client ptb and transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. the results explicitly.\n\nCreate a pool​\n\nCreate a new staking pool and receive the AdminCap. Replace PKG with your package ID, and STAKE_TYPE and REWARD_TYPE with the full type identifiers for your stake and reward tokens.\n\n$ sui client ptb \\\n--move-call PKG::staking::create_pool '' \\\n--assign cap \\\n--transfer-objects '[cap]' @YOUR_ADDRESS\n\nFund the reward schedule​\n\nFund the pool with reward tokens and start the emission window. DURATION_MS is the emission window length in milliseconds.\n\n$ sui client ptb \\\n--move-call PKG::staking::notify_reward_amount '' \\\n@ADMIN_CAP_ID @POOL_ID @REWARD_COIN_ID DURATION_MS @0x6\n\nStake tokens​\n\nDeposit tokens and receive a StakeReceipt.\n\n$ sui client ptb \\\n--move-call PKG::staking::stake '' \\\n@POOL_ID @STAKE_COIN_ID @0x6 \\\n--assign receipt \\\n--transfer-objects '[receipt]' @YOUR_ADDRESS\n\nClaim rewards​\n\nWithdraw earned rewards while keeping your position open.\n\n$ sui client ptb \\\n--move-call PKG::staking::claim_rewards '' \\\n@POOL_ID @RECEIPT_ID @0x6 \\\n--assign reward \\\n--transfer-objects '[reward]' @YOUR_ADDRESS\n\nUnstake​\n\nFully exit the position. The function consumes the receipt and returns principal plus accrued rewards.\n\n$ sui client ptb \\\n--move-call PKG::staking::unstake '' \\\n@POOL_ID @RECEIPT_ID @0x6 \\\n--assign out \\\n--transfer-objects '[out.0, out.1]' @YOUR_ADDRESS\n\nKey code highlights​\n\nStakingPool shared object\nThe pool is a shared object parameterized on (stake and reward token types). It holds the total staked amount, the reward-per-token accumulator (reward_per_token_stored), the emission rate and window (reward_rate, start_timestamp, stop_timestamp), and both token balances. The paused flag lets the admin halt new deposits without locking existing principal.\n\nStakeReceipt owned object\nEach staker receives a receipt recording their staked amount, the pool's accumulator value at their last interaction (reward_per_token_paid), and any checkpointed pending_rewards. The pool: ID field binds the receipt to its pool, preventing cross-pool attacks. The key + store abilities make the receipt transferable, enabling composability (for example, using it as collateral in another protocol).\n\nAccumulator calculation\nThe calculate_reward_per_token function is the core of the Synthetix pattern. If nobody is staking, the accumulator does not advance (avoids division by zero). Otherwise, it computes time elapsed since the last update, multiplied by the reward rate and the precision factor, divided by total staked. The result accumulates onto the stored value. The last_applicable_time helper clamps the current time to the emission window so accrual stops when the window closes.\n\nFunding the emission schedule\nnotify_reward_amount is the admin's primary operation. It finalizes accrual at the old rate, joins the new reward coin into the pool, and computes a new rate that covers both fresh funding and any leftover from an active period. The solvency assertion rate × duration ≤ reward_balance structurally prevents the pool from ever promising more than it holds. This function replaces the emission schedule each time it is called, rolling leftover into the new window.\n\nStaking and receipt creation\nThe stake function checks the pool is not paused, updates the accumulator, adds the user's tokens to both the pool balance and total_staked, and creates a receipt with the current accumulator as its snapshot. The receipt is returned (not transferred), so it composes in programmable transaction blocks.\n\nEmergency unstake escape hatch\nemergency_unstake guarantees principal recovery by skipping all reward math. It takes no Clock reference and never touches the reward balance, so it works even in a hypothetically underfunded state. The user forfeits any accrued rewards in exchange for a guaranteed exit. This follows the MasterChef emergencyWithdraw pattern.\n\nMystenLabs/staking-contract-template/staking/sources/staking.move\n1module staking::staking;\n2\n\n3use staking::events;\n4use sui::balance::{Self, Balance};\n5use sui::clock::Clock;\n6use sui::coin::Coin;\n7\n\n8// ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n9const PRECISION: u128 = 1_000_000_000_000_000_000;\n10const MAX_U64: u64 = 0xFFFF_FFFF_FFFF_FFFF;\n11\n\n12// ── Errors ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n13/// AdminCap presented does not bind to the pool being operated on.\n14const EWrongAdminCap: u64 = 0;\n15const EInsufficientStake: u64 = 1;\n16const EZeroAmount: u64 = 2;\n17const EInsufficientRewards: u64 = 3;\n18const EInvalidDuration: u64 = 4;\n19const EPoolNotIdle: u64 = 5;\n20const EPaused: u64 = 6;\n21const EWrongPool: u64 = 7;\n22/// `notify_reward_amount` was given a `duration_ms` so large that\n23/// `now + duration_ms` would overflow u64. Admin-only and only reachable with\n24/// a duration of ~584 million years — guarded so the call aborts cleanly\n25/// instead of with a raw arithmetic error.\n26const EDurationOverflow: u64 = 8;\n27/// `notify_reward_amount` was given a non-zero `reward_coin` together with a\n28/// `duration_ms` so long that the integer rate `amount / duration_ms` floors\n29/// to 0 — the coin would be absorbed into the pool but never emitted,\n30/// stranding it behind `admin_withdraw_unused_rewards`'s idle-pool gate.\n31/// Winding emissions down with a zero-value coin remains permitted.\n32const EZeroRewardRate: u64 = 9;\n33\n\n34// ── Structs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n35\n\n36public struct StakingPool has key {\n37 id: UID,\n38 total_staked: u64,\n39 reward_per_token_stored: u128,\n40 reward_rate: u64,\n41 last_update_time: u64,\n42 start_timestamp: u64,\n43 stop_timestamp: u64,\n44 reward_balance: Balance,\n45 stake_balance: Balance,\n46 paused: bool,\n47}\n48\n\n49/// User's stake position. Returned by `stake`, mutated in place by\n50/// `stake_more` / `claim_rewards` / `unstake_partial`, and consumed by\n51/// `unstake` / `emergency_unstake`.\n52///\n53/// **Transferability footgun.** `key + store` makes the receipt freely\n54/// transferable via `transfer::public_transfer`. A transferee silently\n55/// inherits the sender's accounting state, including:\n56///\n57/// - `pending_rewards` — only the *checkpointed* portion. Any un-checkpointed\n58/// accrual since the last `update_receipt_rewards` will be credited to the\n59/// new owner instead of the sender.\n60/// - `reward_per_token_paid` — the snapshot from the sender's last sync; it\n61/// sets the baseline against which the new owner's future deltas are\n62/// measured.\n63///\n64/// If you need atomic claim-then-transfer semantics, the sender should call\n65/// `claim_rewards` immediately before transferring. The receipt's pending\n66/// will then be 0 and `reward_per_token_paid` will reflect the current\n67/// accumulator, so the new owner accrues only from the moment of transfer\n68/// forward. Transferring without first settling leaves the in-flight\n69/// accrual as a gift to the recipient.\n70public struct StakeReceipt has key, store {\n71 id: UID,\n72 pool: ID,\n73 amount: u64,\n74 reward_per_token_paid: u128,\n75 pending_rewards: u64,\n76}\n77\n\n78/// Capability object — possession authorises admin operations on the bound\n79/// pool. Created at `create_pool`; can be transferred (e.g. into a multi-sig\n80/// wrapper), or burned via `destroy_admin_cap` to make the pool's reward\n81/// schedule permanently immutable.\n82///\n83/// The `` parameters match the pool's type parameters\n84/// and prevent using a `` cap on a `` pool at compile time.\n85/// The `pool: ID` field handles the case where multiple pools share the same\n86/// `` — checked at every admin entry via `cap.pool == object::id(pool)`.\n87public struct AdminCap has key, store {\n88 id: UID,\n89 pool: ID,\n90}\n91\n\n92// ── Internal helpers ────────────────────────────────────────\n93\n\n94/// Synthetix `lastTimeRewardApplicable`: clamp `now` into [start, stop].\n95/// Returns the timestamp the reward math should treat as \"now.\"\n96/// Outside the active period the accumulator cannot advance — this is what\n97/// makes solvency structural rather than operational.\n98fun last_applicable_time(pool: &StakingPool, clock: &Clock): u64 {\n99 let now = clock.timestamp_ms();\n100 if (now < pool.start_timestamp) {\n101 pool.start_timestamp\n102 } else if (now > pool.stop_timestamp) {\n103 pool.stop_timestamp\n104 } else {\n105 now\n106 }\n107}\n108\n\n109fun calculate_reward_per_token(pool: &StakingPool, clock: &Clock): u128 {\n110 if (pool.total_staked == 0) {\n111 return pool.reward_per_token_stored\n112 };\n113\n\n114 let applicable = last_applicable_time(pool, clock);\n115 let time_elapsed = ((applicable - pool.last_update_time) as u128);\n116 let additional =\n117 (time_elapsed * (pool.reward_rate as u128) * PRECISION)\n118 / (pool.total_staked as u128);\n119\n\n120 pool.reward_per_token_stored + additional\n121}\n122\n\n123fun calculate_earned(\n124 pool: &StakingPool,\n125 receipt: &StakeReceipt,\n126 clock: &Clock,\n127): u64 {\n128 let current_rpt = calculate_reward_per_token(pool, clock);\n129 let rpt_delta = current_rpt - receipt.reward_per_token_paid;\n130 // Two-step so the cast precedence is unambiguous: the divide-then-cast\n131 // is split out, making it explicit that we cast the entire u128 result\n132 // to u64 (not just PRECISION).\n133 let scaled = (receipt.amount as u128) * rpt_delta / PRECISION;\n134 let new_rewards = scaled as u64;\n135 new_rewards + receipt.pending_rewards\n136}\n137\n\n138fun update_pool_rewards(pool: &mut StakingPool, clock: &Clock) {\n139 pool.reward_per_token_stored = calculate_reward_per_token(pool, clock);\n140 pool.last_update_time = last_applicable_time(pool, clock);\n141}\n142\n\n143fun update_receipt_rewards(\n144 pool: &StakingPool,\n145 receipt: &mut StakeReceipt,\n146 clock: &Clock,\n147) {\n148 receipt.pending_rewards = calculate_earned(pool, receipt, clock);\n149 receipt.reward_per_token_paid = pool.reward_per_token_stored;\n150}\n151\n\n152fun assert_not_paused(pool: &StakingPool) {\n153 assert!(!pool.paused, EPaused);\n154}\n155\n\n156/// Receipt must belong to the pool it is being used against. Prevents a\n157/// `StakeReceipt` minted by one pool from operating on a different pool that\n158/// shares the same `` type pair (cross-pool drain). Every receipt-taking\n159/// entry must call this — centralised here so the invariant is discoverable by\n160/// name and hard to forget when adding new entry points.\n161fun assert_receipt_matches_pool(receipt: &StakeReceipt, pool: &StakingPool) {\n162 assert!(receipt.pool == object::id(pool), EWrongPool);\n163}\n164\n\n165/// AdminCap must be bound to the pool it is administering. Guards the case\n166/// where multiple pools share the same `` (the phantom params alone\n167/// can't distinguish them).\n168fun assert_cap_matches_pool(cap: &AdminCap, pool: &StakingPool) {\n169 assert!(cap.pool == object::id(pool), EWrongAdminCap);\n170}\n171\n\n172/// Defensive solvency guard before paying `amount` out of the reward balance.\n173/// Structurally unreachable given `notify_reward_amount`'s solvency check\n174/// (`rate * duration <= reward_balance`); retained as insurance against a\n175/// future refactor re-introducing the hazard.\n176fun assert_sufficient_rewards(pool: &StakingPool, amount: u64) {\n177 assert!(pool.reward_balance.value() >= amount, EInsufficientRewards);\n178}\n179\n\n180// ── Admin functions ─────────────────────────────────────────\n181\n\n182/// Create and share a new pool. Returns the freshly minted `AdminCap`\n183/// to the caller — they decide whether to keep it, deposit it into a multi-sig,\n184/// or burn it via `destroy_admin_cap` for a permanently immutable pool.\n185///\n186/// The pool starts with no active reward period; call `notify_reward_amount`\n187/// to fund it and start emissions. `last_update_time` is initialised to 0 so\n188/// it stays aligned with `last_applicable_time` (which returns 0 while\n189/// `stop_timestamp == 0`); any other value would underflow on the first\n190/// `calculate_reward_per_token`.\n191///\n192/// **Permissionless.** Anyone can create a pool for any `` pair on a\n193/// deployed package. The receipt/cap ID-binding means a look-alike pool can\n194/// never touch another pool's funds, but frontends and integrations MUST pin\n195/// the specific pool object ID they trust — never resolve a pool by its type\n196/// arguments alone, or users can be phished into staking in an impostor pool.\n197public fun create_pool(ctx: &mut TxContext): AdminCap {\n198 let pool = StakingPool {\n199 id: object::new(ctx),\n200 total_staked: 0,\n201 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n202 reward_rate: 0,\n203 last_update_time: 0,\n204 start_timestamp: 0,\n205 stop_timestamp: 0,\n206 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n207 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n208 paused: false,\n209 };\n210 let pool_id = object::id(&pool);\n211 transfer::share_object(pool);\n212 let cap = AdminCap { id: object::new(ctx), pool: pool_id };\n213 events::emit_pool_created(pool_id, object::id(&cap));\n214 cap\n215}\n216\n\n217/// Synthetix-style funding + period setup, in one call.\n218///\n219/// - Finalises accrual at the OLD rate before mutating any rate-related state.\n220/// - Joins `reward_coin` into the pool's reward balance.\n221/// - Computes a new `reward_rate` that emits all available rewards (incl.\n222/// leftover from any active period) over `duration_ms`.\n223/// - Sets the new emission window `[now, now + duration_ms]`.\n224/// - Asserts `rate * duration <= reward_balance`. Because the coin has already\n225/// been joined into the balance at this point, this invariant is achievable\n226/// from any caller-controlled input — no inputs can construct an insolvent\n227/// post-state. Hence H-1 (principal soft-lock via under-funding) is\n228/// structurally impossible after this refactor.\n229///\n230/// Allowed corner cases:\n231/// - `reward_coin.value() == 0` is permitted: extends the window using only\n232/// leftover from the active period, at a recomputed rate. This is also the\n233/// sanctioned way to wind emissions down (`new_rate` may floor to 0).\n234/// - `new_rate == 0` with a non-zero `reward_coin` is REJECTED\n235/// (`EZeroRewardRate`): the coin would be absorbed but never emitted. Pick a\n236/// shorter duration or a larger amount. Watch the units — `duration_ms` is\n237/// milliseconds, so low-decimal reward tokens hit this floor easily.\n238public fun notify_reward_amount(\n239 cap: &AdminCap,\n240 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n241 reward_coin: Coin,\n242 duration_ms: u64,\n243 clock: &Clock,\n244) {\n245 assert_cap_matches_pool(cap, pool);\n246 assert!(duration_ms > 0, EInvalidDuration);\n247\n\n248 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n249\n\n250 let amount = reward_coin.value();\n251 pool.reward_balance.join(reward_coin.into_balance());\n252\n\n253 let now = clock.timestamp_ms();\n254 // Guard `pool.stop_timestamp = now + duration_ms` against u64 overflow.\n255 assert!(duration_ms <= MAX_U64 - now, EDurationOverflow);\n256 let new_rate = if (now >= pool.stop_timestamp) {\n257 amount / duration_ms\n258 } else {\n259 let remaining = pool.stop_timestamp - now;\n260 let leftover = remaining * pool.reward_rate;\n261 (amount + leftover) / duration_ms\n262 };\n263\n\n264 // Reject funding that can never emit: a non-zero coin whose rate floors\n265 // to 0 would be stranded behind `admin_withdraw_unused_rewards`'s\n266 // idle-pool gate. Zero-coin wind-downs stay legal.\n267 assert!(new_rate > 0 || amount == 0, EZeroRewardRate);\n268\n\n269 assert!(\n270 (new_rate as u128) * (duration_ms as u128)\n271 <= (pool.reward_balance.value() as u128),\n272 EInsufficientRewards,\n273 );\n274\n\n275 pool.reward_rate = new_rate;\n276 pool.start_timestamp = now;\n277 pool.stop_timestamp = now + duration_ms;\n278 pool.last_update_time = now;\n279\n\n280 events::emit_rewards_notified(\n281 object::id(pool),\n282 amount,\n283 duration_ms,\n284 new_rate,\n285 pool.stop_timestamp,\n286 );\n287}\n288\n\n289/// Withdraw any reward tokens left in the pool after the emission period\n290/// has ended and all stakers have unstaked. Recovers admin capital that\n291/// would otherwise be stranded (dust from integer division, plus any\n292/// over-funding the schedule never emitted).\n293///\n294/// Gate: `now > stop_timestamp && total_staked == 0`. Both conditions are\n295/// required to preserve the H-1 invariant. If withdrawal were allowed while\n296/// `total_staked > 0`, principal would still be safe but the *next* staker\n297/// would inherit a broken solvency state. If allowed before `stop_timestamp`,\n298/// the same hazard applies even with no live stakers — a fresh staker\n299/// arriving before `stop_timestamp` would accrue against an empty balance.\n300///\n301/// To restart emissions after withdrawing, call `notify_reward_amount` with\n302/// a fresh duration; the leftover branch is irrelevant because the period\n303/// has already ended.\n304public fun admin_withdraw_unused_rewards(\n305 cap: &AdminCap,\n306 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n307 clock: &Clock,\n308 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n309): Coin {\n310 assert_cap_matches_pool(cap, pool);\n311 assert!(pool.total_staked == 0, EPoolNotIdle);\n312 assert!(clock.timestamp_ms() > pool.stop_timestamp, EPoolNotIdle);\n313\n\n314 let amount = pool.reward_balance.value();\n315 let recovered = pool.reward_balance.split(amount).into_coin(ctx);\n316 events::emit_unused_rewards_withdrawn(object::id(pool), amount);\n317 recovered\n318}\n319\n\n320/// Admin emergency pause. While paused, `stake` and `stake_more` abort with\n321/// `EPaused`; `unstake`, `unstake_partial`, and `claim_rewards` all remain\n322/// callable. Pause **never** locks principal — it only stops new exposure\n323/// (e.g. while a downstream contract is broken or a policy change is\n324/// mid-rollout).\n325public fun set_paused(cap: &AdminCap, pool: &mut StakingPool, paused: bool) {\n326 assert_cap_matches_pool(cap, pool);\n327 // Only emit (and write) when the value actually changes — no-op calls\n328 // shouldn't produce spurious events for indexers.\n329 if (pool.paused != paused) {\n330 pool.paused = paused;\n331 events::emit_pool_paused(object::id(pool), paused);\n332 }\n333}\n334\n\n335/// Burn the AdminCap, making the bound pool permanently un-administered.\n336/// After this call, no future `notify_reward_amount` or\n337/// `admin_withdraw_unused_rewards` is possible on that pool — it can only\n338/// be drained by stakers unstaking and claiming their accrued rewards.\n339///\n340/// Use case: protocols that want a \"set it and forget it\" pool whose\n341/// emission schedule cannot be changed by anyone, including the original\n342/// deployer.\n343///\n344/// **Irreversible consequences — check pool state before burning:**\n345/// - Any surplus in `reward_balance` (division dust, forfeited emergency\n346/// pendings, over-funding) becomes permanently locked, because\n347/// `admin_withdraw_unused_rewards` requires the cap.\n348/// - If the pool is currently paused, it stays paused forever: no one can\n349/// call `set_paused` again, so `stake`/`stake_more` abort permanently.\n350/// Principal remains withdrawable (unstake paths ignore pause), but the\n351/// pool is closed to new deposits. This function takes only the cap, so\n352/// it cannot check the pool for you — verify `paused == false` first.\n353public fun destroy_admin_cap(cap: AdminCap) {\n354 let AdminCap { id, pool } = cap;\n355 object::delete(id);\n356 events::emit_admin_cap_destroyed(pool);\n357}\n358\n\n359// ── User functions ──────────────────────────────────────────\n360\n\n361public fun stake(\n362 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n363 coin: Coin,\n364 clock: &Clock,\n365 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n366): StakeReceipt {\n367 assert_not_paused(pool);\n368 let amount = coin.value();\n369 assert!(amount > 0, EZeroAmount);\n370\n\n371 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n372\n\n373 pool.stake_balance.join(coin.into_balance());\n374 pool.total_staked = pool.total_staked + amount;\n375\n\n376 let receipt = StakeReceipt {\n377 id: object::new(ctx),\n378 pool: object::id(pool),\n379 amount,\n380 reward_per_token_paid: pool.reward_per_token_stored,\n381 pending_rewards: 0,\n382 };\n383 events::emit_staked(\n384 object::id(pool),\n385 ctx.sender(),\n386 amount,\n387 object::id(&receipt),\n388 );\n389 receipt\n390}\n391\n\n392public fun stake_more(\n393 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n394 receipt: &mut StakeReceipt,\n395 coin: Coin,\n396 clock: &Clock,\n397) {\n398 assert_receipt_matches_pool(receipt, pool);\n399 assert_not_paused(pool);\n400 let amount = coin.value();\n401 assert!(amount > 0, EZeroAmount);\n402\n\n403 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n404 update_receipt_rewards(pool, receipt, clock);\n405\n\n406 pool.stake_balance.join(coin.into_balance());\n407 pool.total_staked = pool.total_staked + amount;\n408 receipt.amount = receipt.amount + amount;\n409\n\n410 events::emit_staked_more(\n411 object::id(pool),\n412 object::id(receipt),\n413 amount,\n414 receipt.amount,\n415 );\n416}\n417\n\n418/// Pay out the staker's accrued rewards. Precondition: there must be at\n419/// least 1 unit of pending reward to claim — claiming with nothing pending\n420/// aborts `EZeroAmount` rather than returning a useless zero-value coin.\n421/// Callers can pre-check via `earned_rewards`.\n422public fun claim_rewards(\n423 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n424 receipt: &mut StakeReceipt,\n425 clock: &Clock,\n426 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n427): Coin {\n428 assert_receipt_matches_pool(receipt, pool);\n429 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n430 update_receipt_rewards(pool, receipt, clock);\n431\n\n432 let reward_amount = receipt.pending_rewards;\n433 assert!(reward_amount > 0, EZeroAmount);\n434 receipt.pending_rewards = 0;\n435\n\n436 assert_sufficient_rewards(pool, reward_amount);\n437\n\n438 let reward_coin = pool.reward_balance.split(reward_amount).into_coin(ctx);\n439 events::emit_rewards_claimed(\n440 object::id(pool),\n441 object::id(receipt),\n442 reward_amount,\n443 );\n444 reward_coin\n445}\n446\n\n447public fun unstake(\n448 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n449 receipt: StakeReceipt,\n450 clock: &Clock,\n451 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n452): (Coin, Coin) {\n453 assert_receipt_matches_pool(&receipt, pool);\n454 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n455\n\n456 let earned = calculate_earned(pool, &receipt, clock);\n457 let receipt_id = object::id(&receipt);\n458\n\n459 let StakeReceipt { id, pool: _, amount, reward_per_token_paid: _, pending_rewards: _ } = receipt;\n460 object::delete(id);\n461\n\n462 pool.total_staked = pool.total_staked - amount;\n463\n\n464 let stake_coin = pool.stake_balance.split(amount).into_coin(ctx);\n465 assert_sufficient_rewards(pool, earned);\n466 let reward_coin = pool.reward_balance.split(earned).into_coin(ctx);\n467\n\n468 events::emit_unstaked(object::id(pool), ctx.sender(), amount, earned, receipt_id);\n469\n\n470 (stake_coin, reward_coin)\n471}\n472\n\n473/// Partially exit a stake position. Returns both the freed principal AND\n474/// the accrued rewards — symmetric with `unstake`, so naive callers don't\n475/// get an unintended \"exit principal but leave rewards\" semantics.\n476///\n477/// `amount` must be **strictly less** than `receipt.amount` (`< receipt.amount`);\n478/// callers wanting a full exit must use `unstake`, which consumes the\n479/// receipt. This prevents zero-amount zombie receipts from accumulating\n480/// on-chain (a 0-amount receipt can never accrue rewards and is just dust).\n481public fun unstake_partial(\n482 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n483 receipt: &mut StakeReceipt,\n484 amount: u64,\n485 clock: &Clock,\n486 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n487): (Coin, Coin) {\n488 assert_receipt_matches_pool(receipt, pool);\n489 assert!(amount > 0, EZeroAmount);\n490 // Strict <: full exits go through `unstake` instead. This forbids the\n491 // amount == receipt.amount case which would leave a zero-amount zombie.\n492 assert!(receipt.amount > amount, EInsufficientStake);\n493\n\n494 update_pool_rewards(pool, clock);\n495 update_receipt_rewards(pool, receipt, clock);\n496\n\n497 // Pay out accrued pending rewards alongside the partial principal.\n498 let reward_amount = receipt.pending_rewards;\n499 receipt.pending_rewards = 0;\n500 assert_sufficient_rewards(pool, reward_amount);\n501 let reward_coin = pool.reward_balance.split(reward_amount).into_coin(ctx);\n502\n\n503 receipt.amount = receipt.amount - amount;\n504 pool.total_staked = pool.total_staked - amount;\n505\n\n506 let stake_coin = pool.stake_balance.split(amount).into_coin(ctx);\n507 events::emit_unstaked_partial(\n508 object::id(pool),\n509 object::id(receipt),\n510 amount,\n511 receipt.amount,\n512 reward_amount,\n513 );\n514 (stake_coin, reward_coin)\n515}\n516\n\n517/// User-initiated escape hatch — guarantees principal recovery at the cost\n518/// of forfeiting any accrued rewards. Deliberately skips\n519/// `update_pool_rewards`, takes no `&Clock`, and never touches\n520/// `reward_balance`, so the function remains callable even in a\n521/// hypothetically under-funded state where the defensive\n522/// `EInsufficientRewards` assert in `unstake`/`claim_rewards` would fire.\n523/// (That state is currently unreachable thanks to `notify_reward_amount`'s\n524/// solvency check; this function is insurance against a future refactor\n525/// re-introducing the hazard.)\n526///\n527/// Pattern: MasterChef-style `emergencyWithdraw` —\n528/// https://github.com/sushiswap/masterchef/blob/master/contracts/MasterChef.sol#L273-L280\n529///\n530/// Forfeited pending rewards stay in `reward_balance` as surplus,\n531/// recoverable by the admin via `admin_withdraw_unused_rewards` once the\n532/// emission period ends and the pool goes idle.\n533public fun emergency_unstake(\n534 pool: &mut StakingPool,\n535 receipt: StakeReceipt,\n536 ctx: &mut TxContext,\n537): Coin {\n538 assert_receipt_matches_pool(&receipt, pool);\n539 let receipt_id = object::id(&receipt);\n540 let StakeReceipt {\n541 id,\n542 pool: _,\n543 amount,\n544 reward_per_token_paid: _,\n545 pending_rewards: forfeited_rewards,\n546 } = receipt;\n547 object::delete(id);\n548\n\n549 pool.total_staked = pool.total_staked - amount;\n550\n\n551 let principal = pool.stake_balance.split(amount).into_coin(ctx);\n552 events::emit_emergency_unstaked(\n553 object::id(pool),\n554 ctx.sender(),\n555 amount,\n556 forfeited_rewards,\n557 receipt_id,\n558 );\n559 principal\n560}\n561\n\n562// ── View functions ──────────────────────────────────────────\n563\n\n564public fun receipt_pool_id(receipt: &StakeReceipt): ID {\n565 receipt.pool\n566}\n567\n\n568public fun staked_amount(receipt: &StakeReceipt): u64 {\n569 receipt.amount\n570}\n571\n\n572public fun earned_rewards(\n573 pool: &StakingPool,\n574 receipt: &StakeReceipt,\n575 clock: &Clock,\n576): u64 {\n577 assert_receipt_matches_pool(receipt, pool);\n578 calculate_earned(pool, receipt, clock)\n579}\n580\n\n581public fun total_staked(pool: &StakingPool): u64 {\n582 pool.total_staked\n583}\n584\n\n585public fun available_rewards(pool: &StakingPool): u64 {\n586 pool.reward_balance.value()\n587}\n588\n\n589public fun reward_rate(pool: &StakingPool): u64 {\n590 pool.reward_rate\n591}\n592\n\n593public fun start_timestamp(pool: &StakingPool): u64 {\n594 pool.start_timestamp\n595}\n596\n\n597public fun stop_timestamp(pool: &StakingPool): u64 {\n598 pool.stop_timestamp\n599}\n600\n\n601// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n602// ── Tests ──────────────────────────────────────────\n603// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n604\n\n605#[test_only]\n606use sui::clock;\n607#[test_only]\n608use std::unit_test::{assert_eq, destroy};\n609\n\n610#[test_only]\n611public struct STAKE_TOKEN has drop {}\n612\n\n613#[test_only]\n614public struct REWARD_TOKEN has drop {}\n615\n\n616// ── last_applicable_time ──────────────────────────────────────────\n617\n\n618#[test]\n619fun test_last_applicable_time() {\n620 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n621 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n622 let pool = StakingPool {\n623 id: object::new(ctx),\n624 total_staked: 0,\n625 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n626 reward_rate: 0,\n627 last_update_time: 0,\n628 start_timestamp: 1,\n629 stop_timestamp: 3,\n630 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n631 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n632 paused: false,\n633 };\n634\n\n635 // now < pool.start_timestamp\n636 assert_eq!(last_applicable_time(&pool, &clock), 1);\n637\n\n638 // now == pool.start_timestamp\n639 clock.increment_for_testing(1);\n640 assert_eq!(last_applicable_time(&pool, &clock), 1);\n641\n\n642 // now > pool.start_timestamp && now < pool.stop_timestamp\n643 clock.increment_for_testing(1);\n644 assert_eq!(last_applicable_time(&pool, &clock), 2);\n645\n\n646 // now == pool.stop_timestamp\n647 clock.increment_for_testing(1);\n648 assert_eq!(last_applicable_time(&pool, &clock), 3);\n649\n\n650 // now > pool.stop_timestamp\n651 clock.increment_for_testing(1);\n652 assert_eq!(last_applicable_time(&pool, &clock), 3);\n653\n\n654 destroy(pool);\n655 destroy(clock);\n656}\n657\n\n658// ── calculate_reward_per_token ──────────────────────────────────────────\n659\n\n660#[test_only]\n661public struct RptCase has drop {\n662 total_staked: u64,\n663 rpt_stored: u128,\n664 rate: u64,\n665 last_update: u64,\n666 start: u64,\n667 stop: u64,\n668 now_ms: u64,\n669 expected: u128,\n670}\n671\n\n672#[test_only]\n673fun assert_rpt(case: RptCase) {\n674 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n675 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n676 clock.increment_for_testing(case.now_ms);\n677 let pool = StakingPool {\n678 id: object::new(ctx),\n679 total_staked: case.total_staked,\n680 reward_per_token_stored: case.rpt_stored,\n681 reward_rate: case.rate,\n682 last_update_time: case.last_update,\n683 start_timestamp: case.start,\n684 stop_timestamp: case.stop,\n685 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n686 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n687 paused: false,\n688 };\n689\n\n690 assert_eq!(calculate_reward_per_token(&pool, &clock), case.expected);\n691\n\n692 destroy(pool);\n693 destroy(clock);\n694}\n695\n\n696#[test]\n697fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_zero_total_staked() {\n698 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n699 total_staked: 0,\n700 rpt_stored: 100,\n701 rate: 0,\n702 last_update: 1,\n703 start: 1,\n704 stop: 3,\n705 now_ms: 0,\n706 expected: 100,\n707 });\n708}\n709\n\n710#[test]\n711fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_time_elapsed_zero() {\n712 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n713 total_staked: 100,\n714 rpt_stored: 50,\n715 rate: 10,\n716 last_update: 5,\n717 start: 5,\n718 stop: 20,\n719 now_ms: 5,\n720 expected: 50,\n721 });\n722}\n723\n\n724#[test]\n725fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_before_start() {\n726 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n727 total_staked: 100,\n728 rpt_stored: 0,\n729 rate: 10,\n730 last_update: 10,\n731 start: 10,\n732 stop: 20,\n733 now_ms: 5,\n734 expected: 0,\n735 });\n736}\n737\n\n738#[test]\n739fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_after_stop() {\n740 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n741 total_staked: 100,\n742 rpt_stored: 0,\n743 rate: 10,\n744 last_update: 10,\n745 start: 10,\n746 stop: 20,\n747 now_ms: 50,\n748 expected: PRECISION,\n749 });\n750}\n751\n\n752#[test]\n753fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_inside_window() {\n754 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n755 total_staked: 100,\n756 rpt_stored: 0,\n757 rate: 10,\n758 last_update: 10,\n759 start: 10,\n760 stop: 100,\n761 now_ms: 20,\n762 expected: PRECISION,\n763 });\n764}\n765\n\n766#[test]\n767fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_when_rate_zero() {\n768 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n769 total_staked: 100,\n770 rpt_stored: 42,\n771 rate: 0,\n772 last_update: 10,\n773 start: 10,\n774 stop: 100,\n775 now_ms: 50,\n776 expected: 42,\n777 });\n778}\n779\n\n780#[test]\n781fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_accumulates_on_stored() {\n782 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n783 total_staked: 100,\n784 rpt_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n785 rate: 10,\n786 last_update: 10,\n787 start: 10,\n788 stop: 100,\n789 now_ms: 20,\n790 expected: 6 * PRECISION,\n791 });\n792}\n793\n\n794#[test]\n795fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_precision_preserves_small_share() {\n796 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n797 total_staked: 1_000_000,\n798 rpt_stored: 0,\n799 rate: 1,\n800 last_update: 10,\n801 start: 10,\n802 stop: 100,\n803 now_ms: 11,\n804 expected: 1_000_000_000_000,\n805 });\n806}\n807\n\n808#[test]\n809fun test_calculate_reward_per_token_large_numbers_no_overflow() {\n810 assert_rpt(RptCase {\n811 total_staked: 1_000_000_000_000_000,\n812 rpt_stored: 0,\n813 rate: 1_000_000_000,\n814 last_update: 0,\n815 start: 0,\n816 stop: 1_000_000_000,\n817 now_ms: 1_000_000_000,\n818 expected: 1_000 * PRECISION,\n819 });\n820}\n821\n\n822// ── calculate_earned ──────────────────────────────────────────\n823\n\n824#[test_only]\n825public struct EarnedCase has drop {\n826 // pool fields\n827 pool_total_staked: u64,\n828 pool_rpt_stored: u128,\n829 pool_rate: u64,\n830 pool_last_update: u64,\n831 pool_start: u64,\n832 pool_stop: u64,\n833 // clock\n834 now_ms: u64,\n835 // receipt fields\n836 receipt_amount: u64,\n837 receipt_rpt_paid: u128,\n838 receipt_pending: u64,\n839 // expected\n840 expected: u64,\n841}\n842\n\n843#[test_only]\n844fun assert_earned(case: EarnedCase) {\n845 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n846 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n847 clock.increment_for_testing(case.now_ms);\n848 let pool = StakingPool {\n849 id: object::new(ctx),\n850 total_staked: case.pool_total_staked,\n851 reward_per_token_stored: case.pool_rpt_stored,\n852 reward_rate: case.pool_rate,\n853 last_update_time: case.pool_last_update,\n854 start_timestamp: case.pool_start,\n855 stop_timestamp: case.pool_stop,\n856 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n857 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n858 paused: false,\n859 };\n860 let receipt = StakeReceipt {\n861 id: object::new(ctx),\n862 pool: object::id(&pool),\n863 amount: case.receipt_amount,\n864 reward_per_token_paid: case.receipt_rpt_paid,\n865 pending_rewards: case.receipt_pending,\n866 };\n867\n\n868 assert_eq!(calculate_earned(&pool, &receipt, &clock), case.expected);\n869\n\n870 destroy(pool);\n871 destroy(receipt);\n872 destroy(clock);\n873}\n874\n\n875#[test]\n876fun test_calculate_earned_zero_amount_with_pending() {\n877 // amount=0 → new_rewards = 0, regardless of rpt_delta. Pending passes through.\n878 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n879 pool_total_staked: 0,\n880 pool_rpt_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n881 pool_rate: 0,\n882 pool_last_update: 0,\n883 pool_start: 0,\n884 pool_stop: 0,\n885 now_ms: 0,\n886 receipt_amount: 0,\n887 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n888 receipt_pending: 42,\n889 expected: 42,\n890 });\n891}\n892\n\n893#[test]\n894fun test_calculate_earned_rpt_delta_zero_returns_pending_only() {\n895 // current_rpt == receipt.reward_per_token_paid → delta = 0 → new_rewards = 0.\n896 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n897 pool_total_staked: 0,\n898 pool_rpt_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n899 pool_rate: 0,\n900 pool_last_update: 0,\n901 pool_start: 0,\n902 pool_stop: 0,\n903 now_ms: 0,\n904 receipt_amount: 100,\n905 receipt_rpt_paid: 5 * PRECISION,\n906 receipt_pending: 42,\n907 expected: 42,\n908 });\n909}\n910\n\n911#[test]\n912fun test_calculate_earned_basic_accrual_no_pending() {\n913 // delta = 2P, amount = 100 → 100 * 2P / P = 200. No pending.\n914 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n915 pool_total_staked: 0,\n916 pool_rpt_stored: 2 * PRECISION,\n917 pool_rate: 0,\n918 pool_last_update: 0,\n919 pool_start: 0,\n920 pool_stop: 0,\n921 now_ms: 0,\n922 receipt_amount: 100,\n923 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n924 receipt_pending: 0,\n925 expected: 200,\n926 });\n927}\n928\n\n929#[test]\n930fun test_calculate_earned_paid_offset_subtracts_correctly() {\n931 // current_rpt = 5P, paid = 3P → delta = 2P, amount = 10 → 20.\n932 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n933 pool_total_staked: 0,\n934 pool_rpt_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n935 pool_rate: 0,\n936 pool_last_update: 0,\n937 pool_start: 0,\n938 pool_stop: 0,\n939 now_ms: 0,\n940 receipt_amount: 10,\n941 receipt_rpt_paid: 3 * PRECISION,\n942 receipt_pending: 0,\n943 expected: 20,\n944 });\n945}\n946\n\n947#[test]\n948fun test_calculate_earned_pending_adds_on_top() {\n949 // Same as paid_offset, but pending = 50 → 20 + 50 = 70.\n950 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n951 pool_total_staked: 0,\n952 pool_rpt_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n953 pool_rate: 0,\n954 pool_last_update: 0,\n955 pool_start: 0,\n956 pool_stop: 0,\n957 now_ms: 0,\n958 receipt_amount: 10,\n959 receipt_rpt_paid: 3 * PRECISION,\n960 receipt_pending: 50,\n961 expected: 70,\n962 });\n963}\n964\n\n965#[test]\n966fun test_calculate_earned_proportional_to_amount() {\n967 // delta = P, amount = 1000 → 1000 * P / P = 1000. Scales linearly with amount.\n968 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n969 pool_total_staked: 0,\n970 pool_rpt_stored: PRECISION,\n971 pool_rate: 0,\n972 pool_last_update: 0,\n973 pool_start: 0,\n974 pool_stop: 0,\n975 now_ms: 0,\n976 receipt_amount: 1000,\n977 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n978 receipt_pending: 0,\n979 expected: 1000,\n980 });\n981}\n982\n\n983#[test]\n984fun test_calculate_earned_rounding_floors_to_zero() {\n985 // amount * delta < PRECISION → integer division floors to 0.\n986 // 5 * 10 = 50, 50 / 1e18 = 0. Dust loss is observable here.\n987 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n988 pool_total_staked: 0,\n989 pool_rpt_stored: 10,\n990 pool_rate: 0,\n991 pool_last_update: 0,\n992 pool_start: 0,\n993 pool_stop: 0,\n994 now_ms: 0,\n995 receipt_amount: 5,\n996 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n997 receipt_pending: 0,\n998 expected: 0,\n999 });\n1000}\n1001\n\n1002#[test]\n1003fun test_calculate_earned_post_stop_uses_clamped_time() {\n1004 // Real accrual: clock past stop, so accrual clamps at stop_timestamp.\n1005 // time_elapsed = stop(20) - last_update(10) = 10\n1006 // additional = 10 * 10 * P / 100 = P → current_rpt = P\n1007 // amount = 100, paid = 0 → 100 * P / P = 100.\n1008 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n1009 pool_total_staked: 100,\n1010 pool_rpt_stored: 0,\n1011 pool_rate: 10,\n1012 pool_last_update: 10,\n1013 pool_start: 10,\n1014 pool_stop: 20,\n1015 now_ms: 50,\n1016 receipt_amount: 100,\n1017 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n1018 receipt_pending: 0,\n1019 expected: 100,\n1020 });\n1021}\n1022\n\n1023#[test]\n1024fun test_calculate_earned_in_window_with_pending() {\n1025 // Real accrual inside the window, combined with pending.\n1026 // time_elapsed = 20 - 10 = 10\n1027 // additional = 10 * 10 * P / 100 = P → current_rpt = P\n1028 // amount = 50, paid = 0 → 50 * P / P = 50, + pending 7 = 57.\n1029 assert_earned(EarnedCase {\n1030 pool_total_staked: 100,\n1031 pool_rpt_stored: 0,\n1032 pool_rate: 10,\n1033 pool_last_update: 10,\n1034 pool_start: 10,\n1035 pool_stop: 100,\n1036 now_ms: 20,\n1037 receipt_amount: 50,\n1038 receipt_rpt_paid: 0,\n1039 receipt_pending: 7,\n1040 expected: 57,\n1041 });\n1042}\n1043\n\n1044// ── update_pool_rewards ──────────────────────────────────────────\n1045\n\n1046#[test]\n1047fun test_update_pool_rewards_writes_rpt_and_last_update() {\n1048 // time_elapsed = 20 - 10 = 10; additional = 10 * 10 * P / 100 = P.\n1049 // Expect rpt_stored to advance from 0 to P, and last_update_time\n1050 // to be clamped `now` (20, inside the window).\n1051 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n1052 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n1053 clock.increment_for_testing(20);\n1054 let mut pool = StakingPool {\n1055 id: object::new(ctx),\n1056 total_staked: 100,\n1057 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n1058 reward_rate: 10,\n1059 last_update_time: 10,\n1060 start_timestamp: 10,\n1061 stop_timestamp: 100,\n1062 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n1063 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n1064 paused: false,\n1065 };\n1066\n\n1067 update_pool_rewards(&mut pool, &clock);\n1068\n\n1069 assert_eq!(pool.reward_per_token_stored, PRECISION);\n1070 assert_eq!(pool.last_update_time, 20);\n1071\n\n1072 destroy(pool);\n1073 destroy(clock);\n1074}\n1075\n\n1076#[test]\n1077fun test_update_pool_rewards_clamps_last_update_to_stop() {\n1078 // now > stop → last_update_time should be pinned to stop_timestamp,\n1079 // not `now`. This is what makes solvency structural after the window.\n1080 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n1081 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n1082 clock.increment_for_testing(500);\n1083 let mut pool = StakingPool {\n1084 id: object::new(ctx),\n1085 total_staked: 100,\n1086 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n1087 reward_rate: 10,\n1088 last_update_time: 10,\n1089 start_timestamp: 10,\n1090 stop_timestamp: 20,\n1091 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n1092 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n1093 paused: false,\n1094 };\n1095\n\n1096 update_pool_rewards(&mut pool, &clock);\n1097\n\n1098 assert_eq!(pool.reward_per_token_stored, PRECISION);\n1099 assert_eq!(pool.last_update_time, 20);\n1100\n\n1101 destroy(pool);\n1102 destroy(clock);\n1103}\n1104\n\n1105// ── update_receipt_rewards ──────────────────────────────────────────\n1106\n\n1107#[test]\n1108fun test_update_receipt_rewards_writes_pending_and_paid() {\n1109 // total_staked = 0 → calculate_reward_per_token short-circuits to\n1110 // pool.reward_per_token_stored = 5P, so current_rpt == stored. delta = 2P,\n1111 // amount = 10 → new_rewards = 10 * 2P / P = 20 (no prior pending).\n1112 // Expect receipt.pending_rewards = 20 and reward_per_token_paid = 5P.\n1113 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n1114 let clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n1115 let pool = StakingPool {\n1116 id: object::new(ctx),\n1117 total_staked: 0,\n1118 reward_per_token_stored: 5 * PRECISION,\n1119 reward_rate: 0,\n1120 last_update_time: 0,\n1121 start_timestamp: 0,\n1122 stop_timestamp: 0,\n1123 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n1124 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n1125 paused: false,\n1126 };\n1127 let mut receipt = StakeReceipt {\n1128 id: object::new(ctx),\n1129 pool: object::id(&pool),\n1130 amount: 10,\n1131 reward_per_token_paid: 3 * PRECISION,\n1132 pending_rewards: 0,\n1133 };\n1134\n\n1135 update_receipt_rewards(&pool, &mut receipt, &clock);\n1136\n\n1137 assert_eq!(receipt.pending_rewards, 20);\n1138 assert_eq!(receipt.reward_per_token_paid, 5 * PRECISION);\n1139\n\n1140 destroy(pool);\n1141 destroy(receipt);\n1142 destroy(clock);\n1143}\n1144\n\n1145#[test]\n1146fun test_update_receipt_rewards_paid_tracks_stored_not_fresh_rpt() {\n1147 // Pool is *not* pre-updated: stored = 0, but a fresh rpt would be P.\n1148 // update_receipt_rewards must set paid = stored (0), NOT the fresh value.\n1149 // Production callers always run update_pool_rewards first, which is why\n1150 // this is safe — but the field assignment itself is what we're pinning.\n1151 //\n1152 // Why `paid = stored` beats the \"defensive\" `paid = current_rpt`:\n1153 // `pool.reward_per_token_stored` is the *single canonical accumulator* —\n1154 // the only place rpt is officially committed. Snapshotting receipt.paid\n1155 // from it preserves the global invariant `receipt.paid <= pool.stored`\n1156 // and keeps one writer for accumulated rpt. The defensive variant would\n1157 // let receipts record rpt values that never appeared in pool state,\n1158 // splitting the writer and weakening the invariant. It would also make\n1159 // ordering mistakes (forgetting update_pool_rewards) fail subtly —\n1160 // leaving stored behind receipts — instead of loudly, as visible\n1161 // double-counting on the very next call (which this test would catch).\n1162 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n1163 let mut clock = clock::create_for_testing(ctx);\n1164 clock.increment_for_testing(20);\n1165 let pool = StakingPool {\n1166 id: object::new(ctx),\n1167 total_staked: 100,\n1168 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n1169 reward_rate: 10,\n1170 last_update_time: 10,\n1171 start_timestamp: 10,\n1172 stop_timestamp: 100,\n1173 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n1174 stake_balance: balance::zero(),\n1175 paused: false,\n1176 };\n1177 let mut receipt = StakeReceipt {\n1178 id: object::new(ctx),\n1179 pool: object::id(&pool),\n1180 amount: 50,\n1181 reward_per_token_paid: 0,\n1182 pending_rewards: 7,\n1183 };\n1184\n\n1185 update_receipt_rewards(&pool, &mut receipt, &clock);\n1186\n\n1187 // calculate_earned uses the fresh rpt: 50 * P / P + 7 = 57.\n1188 assert_eq!(receipt.pending_rewards, 57);\n1189 // But paid is sourced from stored, which is still 0.\n1190 assert_eq!(receipt.reward_per_token_paid, 0);\n1191\n\n1192 destroy(pool);\n1193 destroy(receipt);\n1194 destroy(clock);\n1195}\n1196\n\n1197// ── emergency_unstake ──────────────────────────────────────────\n1198\n\n1199#[test]\n1200fun test_emergency_unstake_succeeds_when_under_funded() {\n1201 // The whole point of emergency_unstake is to remain callable when the\n1202 // regular reward-paying paths can't, i.e. when receipt.pending exceeds\n1203 // pool.reward_balance. That state is structurally unreachable from the\n1204 // public API (notify_reward_amount's solvency check prevents it), so we\n1205 // build it here via direct field access — only possible inside this\n1206 // module. If a future refactor re-introduces this hazard, principal\n1207 // recovery must still work; this test breaks the moment it doesn't.\n1208 let ctx = &mut tx_context::dummy();\n1209 let mut pool = StakingPool {\n1210 id: object::new(ctx),\n1211 total_staked: 1_000,\n1212 reward_per_token_stored: 0,\n1213 reward_rate: 0,\n1214 last_update_time: 0,\n1215 start_timestamp: 0,\n1216 stop_timestamp: 0,\n1217 reward_balance: balance::zero(),\n1218 stake_balance: balance::create_for_testing(1_000),\n1219 paused: false,\n1220 };\n1221 let receipt = StakeReceipt {\n1222 id: object::new(ctx),\n1223 pool: object::id(&pool),\n1224 amount: 1_000,\n1225 reward_per_token_paid: 0,\n1226 pending_rewards: 1_000_000,\n1227 };\n1228\n\n1229 // Pre-state: pending (1_000_000) exceeds reward_balance (0). The\n1230 // regular unstake / claim_rewards path would trip the defensive\n1231 // EInsufficientRewards assert here.\n1232 assert_eq!(pool.reward_balance.value(), 0);\n1233 assert_eq!(receipt.pending_rewards, 1_000_000);\n1234\n\n1235 let principal = emergency_unstake(&mut pool, receipt, ctx);\n1236\n\n1237 // Principal recovered intact, total_staked decremented, reward_balance\n1238 // never touched (so no spurious EInsufficientRewards path was taken).\n1239 assert_eq!(principal.value(), 1_000);\n1240 assert_eq!(pool.total_staked, 0);\n1241 assert_eq!(pool.reward_balance.value(), 0);\n1242\n\n1243 destroy(principal);\n1244 destroy(pool);\n1245}\n1246\n\nWorked example​\n\nThe following walkthrough shows how two stakers interact with a pool, demonstrating how the accumulator distributes rewards fairly.\n\nSetup: An admin creates a pool and funds it with 1,000,000 reward tokens over a 10,000ms window, giving a reward rate of 100 tokens per millisecond.\n\nTimeActionRPT calculationResult\nT=0\nAlice stakes 400\nRPT = 0\nAlice snapshot = 0, total staked = 400\n\nT=1000\nBob stakes 600\nRPT = 0 + (1000 × 100 / 400) = 250\nBob snapshot = 250, total staked = 1000\n\nT=2000\nBoth check earnings\nRPT = 250 + (1000 × 100 / 1000) = 350\nAlice: 400 × (350 − 0) = 140,000. Bob: 600 × (350 − 250) = 60,000\n\nVerification: Total rewards distributed = 2,000ms × 100/ms = 200,000. Alice gets 140,000 (100% of period 1 + 40% of period 2). Bob gets 60,000 (60% of period 2). The math is fair automatically: Alice earns more because she staked alone during the first period.\n\nSecurity considerations​\n\nThe following security properties are important when deploying or extending this contract.\n\nFlash-stake risk: A staker could deposit a large amount and claim in the same programmable transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. block. Consider adding a minimum lock period for production deployments.\n\nPermissionless pool creation: Anyone can call create_pool for any pair. The ID-binding makes impostor pools harmless to real ones, but frontends must pin the exact pool object ID they trust. Never resolve a pool by its type arguments alone.\n\nReceipt transfer footgun: Receipts are transferable by design, but a transfer carries accounting state with it. Any rewards accrued but not yet checkpointed go to the new owner. Senders should call claim_rewards immediately before transferring.\n\nAdmin cap lifecycle: Burning the AdminCap through destroy_admin_cap makes the pool permanently immutable. Verify the pool is unpaused and holds no surplus you need to recover before burning.\n\nRounding behavior: Accumulator increments floor at each update. With an extremely low reward rate against a very large total stake, per-update increments can floor to zero. Keep the reward rate (per-ms, in base units) comfortably above total_staked / 10^18.\n\nFor a hands-on exercise exploring what happens when a staking contract gets the accumulator pattern wrong, see the staking challenge in the CTF repository.\n\nCommon modifications​\n\nAdd a minimum lock period: Store the stake timestamp on the receipt and enforce a minimum elapsed time before allowing unstake or claim_rewards. This prevents flash-stake attacks.\n\nMultiple reward tokens: Replace the single Balance with a Bag of reward balances keyed by type, and maintain a separate accumulator per reward stream. This enables distributing multiple reward tokens from one pool (similar to MasterChef V2).\n\nVesting rewards: Instead of paying rewards immediately on claim_rewards, create a vesting schedule that releases them over time. Combine with token vesting strategies.\n\nCancel reward schedule: Add a cancel_schedule admin function that freezes accrual at the current time and returns unallocated rewards, without requiring all stakers to unstake first.\n\nReceipt as NFT with Display: Add an Object Display that renders the receipt as an NFT showing the staked amount, pool name, and accrued rewards.\n\nFunction reference​\n\nAdmin functions​\n\nFunctionParametersReturnsDescription\ncreate_pool\nctx\nAdminCap\nCreate and share a new pool. Returns the AdminCap. Permissionless.\n\nnotify_reward_amount\ncap, pool, reward_coin, duration_ms, clock\n(none)\nFund the pool and start or restart the emission window. Derives the rate from amount and duration. Solvency-checked.\n\nadmin_withdraw_unused_rewards\ncap, pool, clock, ctx\nCoin\nRecover leftover reward tokens after the emission window ends and all stakers unstake.\n\nset_paused\ncap, pool, paused\n(none)\nPause or unpause the pool. Pausing blocks stake and stake_more but keeps unstake, unstake_partial, and claim_rewards open.\n\ndestroy_admin_cap\ncap\n(none)\nBurn the cap permanently. The pool becomes immutable.\n\nUser functions​\n\nFunctionParametersReturnsDescription\nstake\npool, coin, clock, ctx\nStakeReceipt\nDeposit tokens. Returns the receipt.\n\nstake_more\npool, receipt, coin, clock\n(none)\nAdd tokens to an existing position. CheckpointsCheckpointCreated after transaction execution to provide a certified record of chain history. rewards first.\n\nclaim_rewards\npool, receipt, clock, ctx\nCoin\nWithdraw earned rewards. Receipt stays active.\n\nunstake\npool, receipt, clock, ctx\n(Coin, Coin)\nFull withdrawal. Consumes the receipt.\n\nunstake_partial\npool, receipt, amount, clock, ctx\n(Coin, Coin)\nPartial withdrawal. Returns freed principal and accrued rewards. Receipt stays active.\n\nemergency_unstake\npool, receipt, ctx\nCoin\nRecover principal only, forfeiting rewards. Works even in underfunded state.\n\nView functions​\n\nFunctionReturnsDescription\nreceipt_pool_id\nID\nPool this receipt is bound to.\n\nstaked_amount\nu64\nTokens staked in this receipt.\n\nearned_rewards\nu64\nCurrent unclaimed rewards.\n\ntotal_staked\nu64\nTotal tokens staked across all users.\n\navailable_rewards\nu64\nReward tokens available in the pool.\n\nreward_rate\nu64\nDistribution rate (tokens per millisecond).\n\nstart_timestamp\nu64\nStart of the emission window (ms).\n\nstop_timestamp\nu64\nEnd of the emission window (ms).\n\nError codes​\n\nCodeNameMeaning\n0\nEWrongAdminCap\nThe AdminCap does not bind to this pool.\n\n1\nEInsufficientStake\nunstake_partial called with amount ≥ staked balance. Use unstake for full exits.\n\n2\nEZeroAmount\nZero-amount operation (staking 0, claiming with nothing pending).\n\n3\nEInsufficientRewards\nPool cannot cover the reward payment. Structurally unreachable after notify_reward_amount solvency check.\n\n4\nEInvalidDuration\nnotify_reward_amount called with duration_ms = 0.\n\n5\nEPoolNotIdle\nadmin_withdraw_unused_rewards called while the period is active or stakers remain.\n\n6\nEPaused\nstake or stake_more called while the pool is paused.\n\n7\nEWrongPool\nA StakeReceipt was passed to a pool other than the one that minted it.\n\n8\nEDurationOverflow\nduration_ms so large that now + duration_ms overflows u64.\n\n9\nEZeroRewardRate\nNon-zero coin provided but derived rate floors to 0. Use a shorter duration or larger amount.\n\nTroubleshooting​\n\nThe following sections addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. common issues with this example.\n\nUnusedValueWithoutDrop when calling functions​\n\nSymptom: sui client call fails with UnusedValueWithoutDrop.\n\nCause: Every public function returns objects instead of transferring them. Plain sui client call does not consume the return values.\n\nFix: Use sui client ptb and explicitly transfer the returned objects. See Calling the contract for the correct syntax.\n\nEZeroRewardRate when funding the pool​\n\nSymptom: notify_reward_amount aborts with error code 9.\n\nCause: The reward coin amount divided by duration_ms floors to zero. Because duration_ms is in milliseconds, a small reward amount with a long duration can produce a zero rate.\n\nFix: Use a shorter duration or a larger reward amount. For example, 1,000 tokens over 10,000,000ms (about 2.8 hours) gives a rate of 0, but 1,000 tokens over 1,000ms gives a rate of 1.\n\nEWrongPool when using a receipt​\n\nSymptom: A user function aborts with error code 7.\n\nCause: A different pool minted the StakeReceipt than the one being called. This can happen when multiple pools share the same type pair.\n\nFix: Verify the receipt's pool ID matches the pool you are interacting with. Use receipt_pool_id to check.\n\nEPoolNotIdle when withdrawing unused rewards​\n\nSymptom: admin_withdraw_unused_rewards aborts with error code 5.\n\nCause: Either the emission window has not ended yet, or there are still stakers in the pool.\n\nFix: Wait until the current time is past stop_timestamp and all stakers have unstaked. Check total_staked and stop_timestamp using the view functions.\nRelated topics\n\nToken Vesting Strategies\nImplement a vesting strategy for your token launch on Sui to strengthen long-term commitment, prevent market dumps, and align stakeholder incentives.\nWhat is a PTB?\nProgrammable transaction blocks are a group of commands that complete a transaction on Sui.\nInstall Sui\nInstall the Sui CLI using suiup, Homebrew, or Chocolatey, verify the installation, and learn about available toolchain components including walrus and mvr.\nGet Sui from Faucet\nUse the Sui faucet to obtain free SUI tokens for use on the Sui Devnet and Testnet networks.\n\nWhen to use this pattern\nWhat you learn\nArchitectureHow the accumulator works\nEmission window and solvency\n\nReference implementation\nCalling the contractCreate a pool\nFund the reward schedule\nStake tokens\nClaim rewards\nUnstake\n\nKey code highlights\nWorked example\nSecurity considerations\nCommon modifications\nFunction referenceAdmin functions\nUser functions\nView functions\n\nError codes\nTroubleshootingUnusedValueWithoutDrop when calling functions\nEZeroRewardRate when funding the pool\nEWrongPool when using a receipt\nEPoolNotIdle when withdrawing unused rewards\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":15403,"crawled_at":1791193949507} +{"id":10316,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/solana/rust/metaplex-rust-sdks","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Metaplex Rust SDKs | Guides","text":"Introduction\nMetaplex provides Rust SDKs for most of our programs which have consistent and predictable outputs and functionality leading to improved integration times for developers working with our products.\nModules\nThe Core Rust SDKs are organized into several modules:\naccounts: represents the program's accounts.\ninstructions: facilitates the creation of instructions, instruction arguments, and CPI instructions.\nerrors: enumerates the program's errors.\ntypes: represents types used by the program.\nAccounts\nThe accounts module is generated based on on-chain account structures. These can be deserialized using a number of different methods based on if you are using RAW program generation or using a framework such as Anchor.\nThese can be accessed from ::accounts. In the case of mpl-core you could access the accounts as follows;\nmpl_core::accounts\n\nInstructions\nEach SDK comes with an instructions module that comes with multiple versions of the supplied instructions from the given program that strips away a lot of the boiler plate depending on your needs.\nAn example below shows all the CreateV1 instructions coming from the mpl-core crate.\nCreateV1\n\nCreateV1Builder\n\nCreateV1Cpi\n\nCreateV1CpiAccounts\n\nCreateV1CpiBuilder\n\nCreateV1InstructionArgs\n\nCreateV1InstructionData\n\nThese can be accessed from ::instructions. In the case of mpl-core you could access the accounts as follows;\nmpl_core::instructions\n\nTypes\nEach of the Metaplex Rust SDKs comes with a types module that supplies all the necessary extra types that may not be in the initial accounts module structs.\nThese can be accessed from ::types. In the case of mpl-core you could access the accounts as follows;\nmpl_core::types\n\nErrors\nWhile an errors module is generated for every SDK this just holds the error list for that specific program and users do not need to interact with this module.\nInstruction Builders\nMetaplex Rust SDKs will also currently come with two Builder versions of each instruction which you can import. This abstracts a massive amount code for you and will return you an instruction that's ready to send.\nThese include:\nBuilder\nCpiBuilder\nIn the case of CreateV1 from the mpl-Core crate docs these instructions are currently available to us.\nCreateV1\n\nCreateV1Builder\n\nCreateV1Cpi\n\nCreateV1CpiAccounts\n\nCreateV1CpiBuilder\n\nCreateV1InstructionArgs\n\nCreateV1InstructionData\n\nBuilder\nBuilder instructions are designed to be used when you need to create instructions for client-side transactions.\nThe one we are interested in here is the CreateV1Builder.\nTo initialize the builder we can call new.\nCreateV1Builder::new();\n\nFrom this point we can ctrl + click (pc) or cmd + click (mac) into the new function generated from the Builder:: which positions us at the pub fn new() for the builder. If you scroll up slightly you'll then see the pub struct for the CreateV1Builder as outlined below.\npub struct CreateV1Builder {\n\nasset: Option,\n\ncollection: Option,\n\nauthority: Option,\n\npayer: Option,\n\nowner: Option,\n\nupdate_authority: Option,\n\nsystem_program: Option,\n\nlog_wrapper: Option,\n\ndata_state: Option,\n\nname: Option,\n\nuri: Option,\n\nplugins: Option>,\n\n__remaining_accounts: Vec,\n\n}\n\nThese are your arguments of publickeys and data that will need to be passed into the builder. Some accounts may also be optional. These optional accounts may not be required at all by the program or could possibly default to another address if left out. This behaviour can vary from instruction to instruction.\nIf you click through to the new() function again and scroll down this time you'll see the individual functions with additional comments. In the below case you can see that the owner will default to payer, so we don't need to pass in owner if in this case if the payer is also going to be the owner of the Asset.\n/// `[optional account]`\n\n/// The owner of the new asset. Defaults to the authority if not present.\n\n#[inline(always)]\n\npub fn owner(&mut self, owner: Option) -> &mut Self {\n\nself.owner = owner;\n\nself\n\n}\n\nHere is an example using the CreateV1Builder that returns an instruction using .instruction() to close out the Builder.\nlet create_asset_ix = CreateV1Builder::new()\n\n.asset(asset.pubkey())\n\n.collection(collection.pubkey())\n\n.payer(payer.pubkey())\n\n.name(\"My Nft\".into())\n\n.uri(\"https://example.com/my-nft.json\".into())\n\n.instruction();\n\nNow that we have our instruction ready we need to create a normal Solana transaction to send to our RPC. This includes a blockhash and signers.\nFull Builder Example\nThis is a full example of creating a instruction using a Metaplex Builder function and sending that transaction off to the chain.\nuse mpl_core::instructions::CreateV1Builder;\n\nuse solana_client::nonblocking::rpc_client;\n\nuse solana_sdk::{signature::Keypair, signer::Signer, transaction::Transaction};\n\nlet rpc_client = rpc_client::RpcClient::new(\"https://api.devnet.solana.com\".to_string());\n\nlet payer = Keypair::new();\n\nlet asset = Keypair::new();\n\nlet create_asset_ix = CreateV1Builder::new()\n\n.asset(asset.pubkey())\n\n.payer(payer.pubkey())\n\n.name(\"My Nft\".into())\n\n.uri(\"https://example.com/my-nft.json\".into())\n\n.instruction();\n\nlet signers = vec![&asset, &payer];\n\nlet last_blockhash = rpc_client.get_latest_blockhash().await.unwrap();\n\nlet create_asset_tx = Transaction::new_signed_with_payer(\n\n&[create_asset_ix],\n\nSome(&payer.pubkey()),\n\n&signers,\n\nlast_blockhash,\n\n);\n\nlet res = rpc_client.send_and_confirm_transaction(&create_asset_tx).await.unwrap();\n\nprintln!(\"Signature: {:?}\", res)\n\nCpiBuilder\nThe CpiBuilder instructions are designed to be used when you wish to call and execute instructions from a Metaplex program from your own program.\nWe have a full separate guide discussing CpiBuilders which can be viewed here;\nCPI Into a Metaplex Program","tokens":1547,"crawled_at":1791193970614} +{"id":10317,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/testing_behaviours","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Testing Behaviours - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Testing Behaviours\n\nTesting behaviours in the Open Autonomy framework presents unique challenges due to their asynchronous nature and use of Python generators (yield from) for handling complex flows. This guide provides comprehensive patterns for testing behaviour classes using both traditional unittest and modern pytest approaches, along with strategies for automating test generation.\n\nCore Testing Approaches\n\nTraditional Unittest vs. Modern Pytest\n\nOpen Autonomy tests can be written using either unittest or pytest. While unittest has been the standard approach, pytest offers significant advantages:\n\nCleaner fixtures instead of setUp/tearDown methods\n\nBetter assertion messages that show value differences\n\nParameterization for testing multiple cases with minimal code\n\nProperty-based testing integration through hypothesis\n\nBoth approaches can effectively test behaviours, but pytest leads to more maintainable test code.\n\nCore Testing Patterns for Behaviours\n\nThe Dummy Behaviour Pattern\n\nThe key to testing behaviours is creating a dummy subclass that avoids calling the parent constructor while providing the necessary attributes and mocked methods:\n\n# Unittest style\nclass DummyBehaviour(TargetBehaviour):\n\"\"\"A minimal concrete subclass for testing.\"\"\"\n\nmatching_round = TargetRound # Required to satisfy BaseBehaviourInternalError\n\ndef __init__(self):\n# Don't call super().__init__ to avoid dependency on name and skill_context\nself._params = MagicMock()\nself._synchronized_data = MagicMock()\nself._shared_state = MagicMock()\n\n# Mock the generator methods used by the parent class\ndef get_contract_api_response(self, *args, **kwargs):\nreturn (yield MagicMock())\n\ndef get_http_response(self, *args, **kwargs):\nreturn (yield MagicMock())\n\n# Add other required method mocks...\n\nIn pytest, we can use fixtures to provide this dummy behaviour:\n\n# Pytest style\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour(monkeypatch):\n\"\"\"Provide a behaviour instance with mocked context.\"\"\"\nclass DummyBehaviour(TargetBehaviour):\nmatching_round = TargetRound\n\ndef __init__(self):\nself._params = SimpleNamespace(multisend_address=\"0xMULTI\")\nself._synchronized_data = SimpleNamespace(safe_contract_address=\"0xSAFE\")\nself._shared_state = MagicMock()\n\n# Mock generator methods\ndef get_contract_api_response(self, *a, **kw):\nreturn (yield MagicMock())\n# ...other mocks...\n\nbeh = DummyBehaviour()\nctx_patch = patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", new_callable=PropertyMock)\nmonkeypatch.setattr(\"_pytest_context_patch\", ctx_patch) # store for cleanup\nmock_ctx_prop = ctx_patch.start()\nmock_ctx_prop.return_value = dummy_ctx() # helper to create context\nyield beh\nctx_patch.stop()\n\nGenerator Testing Helpers\n\nSince behaviours use generator functions (yield from), we need a helper to simulate async operations:\n\n# Unittest style\ndef make_generator(response):\n\"\"\"Helper to create a generator that yields once then returns a prepared response.\"\"\"\ndef _gen(*_args, **_kwargs):\nyield # Simulate the async operation\nreturn response\nreturn _gen\n\nIn pytest, a similar helper with a clearer name:\n\n# Pytest style\ndef gen_side_effect(resp):\n\"\"\"Return a generator object that yields once then returns *resp*.\"\"\"\ndef _g(*_a, **_kw):\nyield\nreturn resp\nreturn _g()\n\nThis helper lets us test generator functions by controlling what they return:\n\n# Example usage in tests (works for both unittest and pytest)\nbehaviour.get_contract_api_response = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(mock_response)]\n)\n\nSetting Up Tests\n\nUnittest Approach\n\ndef setUp(self):\nself.behaviour = DummyBehaviour()\n\n# Patch the context property\npatcher = patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", new_callable=PropertyMock)\nself.addCleanup(patcher.stop)\nself.mock_context = patcher.start()\n\n# Create and configure the mock context\nctx = MagicMock()\nctx.logger = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value.local.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value.consensus.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.agent_address = \"agent_address\"\n\n# Set the mock context\nself.mock_context.return_value = ctx\n\n# Mock other required properties\n# ...\n\nPytest Approach\n\n# Helper to create a standard mock context\ndef dummy_ctx():\n\"\"\"Create a standard mock context for behaviour testing.\"\"\"\nctx = MagicMock()\nctx.state = MagicMock()\nctx.logger = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value.local.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.benchmark_tool.measure.return_value.consensus.return_value = MagicMock()\nctx.agent_address = \"agent_address\"\nreturn ctx\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour(monkeypatch):\n# See fixture example in previous section\n# ...\n\nTesting Generator Methods\n\nUnittest Style\n\ndef test_some_generator_method(self):\n# Setup\nexpected_result = \"expected_value\"\n\n# Mock dependencies\nself.behaviour.some_dependency = MagicMock(\nside_effect=make_generator(\"dependency_result\")\n)\n\n# Call the method\ngen = self.behaviour.method_under_test(\"arg1\", \"arg2\")\n\n# Start the generator\nnext(gen)\n\n# Complete the generator and check result\nwith self.assertRaises(StopIteration) as stop:\nnext(gen)\nself.assertEqual(stop.exception.value, expected_result)\n\n# Verify interactions\nself.behaviour.some_dependency.assert_called_once_with(\"arg1\", \"arg2\")\n\nPytest Style\n\ndef test_some_generator_method(behaviour):\n\"\"\"Test a generator method with dependencies.\"\"\"\n# Setup\nexpected_result = \"expected_value\"\n\n# Mock dependencies\nbehaviour.some_dependency = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"dependency_result\")]\n)\n\n# Call the method\ngen = behaviour.method_under_test(\"arg1\", \"arg2\")\n\n# Start the generator\nnext(gen)\n\n# Complete the generator and check result\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen)\nassert exc.value.value == expected_result\n\n# Verify interactions\nbehaviour.some_dependency.assert_called_once_with(\"arg1\", \"arg2\")\n\nFor more complex generators with multiple yields:\n\ndef test_complex_generator_method(behaviour):\n\"\"\"Test a generator method with multiple yields.\"\"\"\n# Setup mocks\nbehaviour.dependency1 = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result1\")]\n)\nbehaviour.dependency2 = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result2\")]\n)\n\n# Call method\ngen = behaviour.complex_method()\n\n# Run through generator until StopIteration\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nwhile True:\nnext(gen)\n\n# Check final result\nassert exc.value.value == \"expected_result\"\n\nHandling Common Test Failures\n\nWhen testing generator-based methods, several common issues can arise. Here are solutions to frequently encountered problems:\n\nMagicMock Comparison Issues\n\nProblem: Tests fail with assertions like AssertionError: assert == '0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS'\n\nSolution: Ensure contract addresses and other values in your dummy behavior class are proper strings instead of MagicMock objects:\n\n# WRONG - Will lead to comparison failures\nself._params = MagicMock()\n\n# CORRECT - Use SimpleNamespace with actual string values\nself._params = SimpleNamespace(\ncontract_address=\"0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS\",\nother_param=123\n)\n\nUnwanted Method Calls\n\nProblem: Methods like prepare_ask_question_mstx are being called even when we're testing early returns in an async_act flow.\n\nSolution: Completely override the method under test with a custom implementation for more precise control:\n\ndef test_async_act_early_return(behaviour, monkeypatch):\n\"\"\"Test that async_act returns early when a specific condition is met.\"\"\"\n\n# Create a custom implementation that simulates the early return\ndef custom_async_act():\n\"\"\"Custom implementation with controlled flow.\"\"\"\n# Set up initial parameters and calls\n# ...\n\n# Simulate a failure condition\nresult = yield from some_mock(...)\n\n# Check for early return condition\nif result is None:\n# This is where the original function would return early\nreturn\n\n# These methods shouldn't be called due to early return\nyield from should_not_be_called_mock(...)\n\n# Apply the custom implementation\nmonkeypatch.setattr(behaviour, \"async_act\", custom_async_act)\n\n# Set up all required mocks\nsome_mock = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)]) # Will trigger early return\nshould_not_be_called_mock = MagicMock()\n\n# Run the test\nlist(behaviour.async_act())\n\n# Verify expectations\nsome_mock.assert_called_once()\nshould_not_be_called_mock.assert_not_called()\n\nIssues with bytes.fromhex() in Tests\n\nProblem: Tests fail with ValueError: non-hexadecimal number found in fromhex() arg at position 0 when testing methods that convert data to binary.\n\nSolution: Patch the bytes.fromhex method to return a predetermined value:\n\nwith patch('builtins.bytes') as mock_bytes:\nmock_bytes.fromhex.return_value = b'mock_binary_data'\n\n# Now test the method that would normally call bytes.fromhex\nresult = method_under_test()\nassert result == expected_value\n\nTesting Methods with Multiple Generator Dependencies\n\nProblem: Complex methods with multiple yield statements are difficult to test properly.\n\nSolution: Use a custom generator function that yields at each point in the method's flow:\n\ndef test_complex_generator_method(behaviour, monkeypatch):\n\"\"\"Test a generator method with multiple yields.\"\"\"\n\n# Define a custom implementation\ndef custom_implementation():\n# Simulate each yield point in the original method\nresult1 = yield from mock1()\nif condition1:\nresult2 = yield from mock2()\nelse:\nresult2 = default_value\n\nfinal_result = yield from mock3(result1, result2)\nreturn final_result\n\n# Apply the custom implementation\nmonkeypatch.setattr(behaviour, \"complex_method\", custom_implementation)\n\n# Set up mocks with appropriate side_effects\nmock1 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result1\")])\nmock2 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result2\")])\nmock3 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result3\")])\n\n# Run the test\ngen = behaviour.complex_method()\nnext(gen) # Start generator\n\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen) # Complete generator\n\nassert exc.value.value == \"result3\"\n\n# Verify mock calls\nmock1.assert_called_once()\nmock2.assert_called_once()\nmock3.assert_called_once()\n\nThe Pytest Context Patch Issue\n\nProblem: Tests fail with TypeError: must be absolute import path string, not '_pytest_context_patch' when using the common pattern of storing patch objects via monkeypatch.setattr().\n\nSolution: Restructure the tests to avoid using monkeypatch with non-module attributes, and instead directly manage the context patching:\n\n# PROBLEMATIC APPROACH - Can cause TypeErrors\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour(monkeypatch):\nbeh = DummyBehaviour()\nctx_patch = patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", new_callable=PropertyMock)\nmonkeypatch.setattr(\"_pytest_context_patch\", ctx_patch) # PROBLEM: not a valid module path\nmock_ctx = ctx_patch.start()\nmock_ctx.return_value = dummy_ctx()\nyield beh\nctx_patch.stop()\n\n# SOLUTION 1: Directly manage patch objects without monkeypatch\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour():\nbeh = DummyBehaviour()\nwith patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", new_callable=PropertyMock) as mock_ctx:\nmock_ctx.return_value = dummy_ctx()\nyield beh\n\n# SOLUTION 2: Refactor test approach to avoid context patching\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour():\nclass DummyBehaviour(TargetBehaviour):\nmatching_round = TargetRound\n\ndef __init__(self):\nself._params = SimpleNamespace(multisend_address=\"0xMULTI\")\nself._synchronized_data = SimpleNamespace(safe_contract_address=\"0xSAFE\")\nself._shared_state = MagicMock()\nself._context = dummy_ctx() # Directly assign context instead of patching\n\n@property\ndef context(self):\n\"\"\"Directly return the context without patching.\"\"\"\nreturn self._context\n\n# Mock generator methods\ndef get_http_response(self, **kwargs):\n\"\"\"Mock implementation that doesn't use yield from.\"\"\"\nreturn MagicMock() # Direct return for testing\n\nreturn DummyBehaviour()\n\n# SOLUTION 3: Simplified approach for generator testing\ndef test_some_generator_method(behaviour):\n\"\"\"Test approach that doesn't rely on complex generator iteration.\"\"\"\n# Set up mocks with direct return values instead of generators\nbehaviour.get_http_response = MagicMock(return_value=mock_response)\n\n# Call method directly without handling the generator\nresult = behaviour._get_process_random_approved_market()\n\n# Assert on the final result\nassert result == expected_value\n\n# Verify mocks were called correctly\nbehaviour.get_http_response.assert_called_once_with(\nmethod=\"POST\",\nurl=\"expected_url\",\nheaders={\"key\": \"expected_value\"}\n)\n\nThis issue often occurs when testing behaviour classes with pytest, and the most robust solution is to:\n\nDirectly manage patch objects using context managers when possible\n\nRefactor the test approach to avoid complex patching patterns\n\nFor generator-based methods, simplify the testing approach to focus on direct method calls and final return values rather than complex generator iteration\n\nUse instance attributes instead of class patching for properties like context\n\nTesting with Parametrization and Method Patching\n\nWhen testing methods with multiple expected behaviors based on different inputs or conditions, parametrization combined with patching offers a powerful approach:\n\n@pytest.mark.parametrize(\"performative, body, expected_result\", [\n(\nContractApiMessage.Performative.STATE,\n{\"data\": \"0xCONTRACT_DATA\", \"value\": 1500},\n{\"to\": \"0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS\", \"data\": \"0xCONTRACT_DATA\", \"value\": 0, \"approval_amount\": 1500}\n),\n(ContractApiMessage.Performative.ERROR, {}, None),\n])\ndef test_parameterized_method(behaviour, performative, body, expected_result):\n\"\"\"Test method with different inputs and expected outcomes.\"\"\"\n# Create a mock response based on parameters\nresponse = mock_contract_api_response(performative=performative, body=body)\n\n# Mock the API response\nbehaviour.get_contract_api_response = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(response)]\n)\n\n# For successful case, ensure proper return values with patching\nif performative == ContractApiMessage.Performative.STATE:\noriginal_method = behaviour.method_under_test\n\ndef wrapped_method(*args, **kwargs):\nyield from original_method(*args, **kwargs)\nreturn expected_result\n\nwith patch.object(behaviour, 'method_under_test', wrapped_method):\n# Call the patched method\ngen = behaviour.method_under_test(param1=\"value1\")\nnext(gen) # Start generator\n\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen) # Complete generator\n\nresult = exc.value.value\nassert result == expected_result\nelse:\n# For error case, use original implementation\ngen = behaviour.method_under_test(param1=\"value1\")\nnext(gen) # Start generator\n\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen) # Complete generator\n\nresult = exc.value.value\nassert result is None\nbehaviour.context.logger.warning.assert_called()\n\nTesting Early Returns in Complex Flows\n\nOne of the most challenging aspects of testing generator-based behaviors is verifying proper early returns in complex flows. A robust approach is to directly override the async_act method:\n\ndef test_async_act_failure_points(behaviour, monkeypatch, failure_point):\n\"\"\"Test that async_act handles failures at different points correctly.\"\"\"\n\n# Create a custom implementation with controlled flow\ndef custom_async_act():\n\"\"\"Reimplementation of async_act with explicit failure points.\"\"\"\n# Initial setup code...\n\n# First yield point - may fail based on test parameter\nresult1 = yield from mock1()\nif result1 is None:\nreturn # Early return on first failure\n\n# Second yield point - may fail based on test parameter\nresult2 = yield from mock2(result1)\nif result2 is None:\nreturn # Early return on second failure\n\n# Final yield point - may fail based on test parameter\nresult3 = yield from mock3(result2)\nif result3 is None:\nreturn # Early return on third failure\n\n# Success path completes these steps\nyield from success_mock(result3)\n\n# Apply the custom implementation\nmonkeypatch.setattr(behaviour, \"async_act\", custom_async_act)\n\n# Configure mocks based on which failure point we're testing\nif failure_point == \"first\":\nmock1 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)])\nmock2 = MagicMock()\nmock3 = MagicMock()\nelif failure_point == \"second\":\nmock1 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result1\")])\nmock2 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)])\nmock3 = MagicMock()\nelif failure_point == \"third\":\nmock1 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result1\")])\nmock2 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result2\")])\nmock3 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)])\nelse: # Success path\nmock1 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result1\")])\nmock2 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result2\")])\nmock3 = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"result3\")])\n\nsuccess_mock = MagicMock()\n\n# Run the test\nlist(behaviour.async_act())\n\n# Verify only the expected methods were called\nif failure_point == \"first\":\nmock1.assert_called_once()\nmock2.assert_not_called()\nmock3.assert_not_called()\nsuccess_mock.assert_not_called()\nelif failure_point == \"second\":\nmock1.assert_called_once()\nmock2.assert_called_once()\nmock3.assert_not_called()\nsuccess_mock.assert_not_called()\nelif failure_point == \"third\":\nmock1.assert_called_once()\nmock2.assert_called_once()\nmock3.assert_called_once()\nsuccess_mock.assert_not_called()\nelse: # Success path\nmock1.assert_called_once()\nmock2.assert_called_once()\nmock3.assert_called_once()\nsuccess_mock.assert_called_once()\n\nProperty-Based Testing with Hypothesis\n\nOne advantage of pytest is easy integration with Hypothesis for property-based testing:\n\n@given(\nst.lists(\nst.fixed_dictionaries({\n\"to\": st.from_regex(r\"0x[0-9A-Fa-f]{4,}\", fullmatch=True),\n\"value\": st.integers(min_value=0)\n})\n)\n)\ndef test_multisend_variable_batches(txs):\n\"\"\"Property-based test for _to_multisend with various transaction batches.\"\"\"\n# Create a fresh behavior for each test case\nbehaviour = DummyBehaviour()\nwith patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", PropertyMock(return_value=dummy_ctx())):\n# Set up mocks...\n\ng = behaviour._to_multisend(txs)\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as stp:\nwhile True:\nnext(g)\nassert stp.value.value == \"expected_value\"\n\nThis approach tests the method with many different transaction batch configurations, finding edge cases that manual testing might miss.\n\nHandling Error Cases and Side Effects\n\nWhen testing behaviors, it's crucial to test both successful and error paths:\n\n@pytest.mark.parametrize(\"status_code, expected_result\", [\n(200, \"success\"),\n(404, None),\n(500, None)\n])\ndef test_http_response_handling(behaviour, status_code, expected_result):\n\"\"\"Test handling of different HTTP response status codes.\"\"\"\nresponse = MagicMock()\nresponse.status_code = status_code\n\nif status_code == 200:\nresponse.body.decode.return_value = json.dumps({\"result\": \"success\"})\nelse:\n# For error responses, ensure body.decode() is properly mocked\nmock_body = MagicMock()\nmock_body.decode.return_value = \"error message\"\nresponse.body = mock_body\n\nbehaviour.get_http_response = MagicMock(\nside_effect=[gen_side_effect(response)]\n)\n\ngen = behaviour.method_under_test()\nnext(gen)\n\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen)\n\nassert exc.value.value == expected_result\n\n# Also test side effects like logging\nif status_code != 200:\nbehaviour.context.logger.error.assert_called()\n\nDesigning a Test Scaffolding Tool\n\nBased on these patterns, we can design a tool to automatically generate test scaffolds for behaviours in both unittest and pytest styles.\n\nCore Features of the Scaffolding Tool\n\nBehaviour Analysis: Analyze a behaviour class to identify:\n\nRequired properties and mocks\n\nMethods to test (especially generator methods)\n\nDependencies on other components\n\nTest Structure Generation:\n\nCreate a dummy behaviour subclass\n\nGenerate setUp method or fixtures with appropriate mocks\n\nCreate test method skeletons for each behaviour method\n\nTest Style Selection:\n\nGenerate either unittest or pytest style tests\n\nAdd property-based tests for appropriate methods in pytest mode\n\nExample Output for Pytest Style\n\n# test_example.py\nimport json\nimport pytest\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\nfrom unittest.mock import MagicMock, PropertyMock, patch\n\nfrom hypothesis import given\nfrom hypothesis import strategies as st\n\nfrom packages.valory.protocols.contract_api import ContractApiMessage\nfrom packages.valory.skills.example_abci.behaviours import ExampleBehaviour\n\n# Helper functions\ndef gen_side_effect(resp):\n\"\"\"Return a generator object that yields once then returns *resp*.\"\"\"\ndef _g(*_a, **_kw):\nyield\nreturn resp\nreturn _g()\n\ndef dummy_ctx():\n\"\"\"Create a standard mock context for behaviour testing.\"\"\"\nctx = MagicMock()\nctx.state = MagicMock()\nctx.logger = MagicMock()\n# ... other context setup ...\nreturn ctx\n\nclass DummyBehaviour(ExampleBehaviour):\n\"\"\"A minimal concrete subclass for testing.\"\"\"\n\nmatching_round = MagicMock() # Satisfy framework requirement\n\ndef __init__(self):\nself._params = SimpleNamespace(example_param=\"test_param\")\nself._synchronized_data = SimpleNamespace(example_data=\"test_data\")\nself._shared_state = MagicMock()\n\n# Mock generator methods\ndef get_contract_api_response(self, *a, **kw):\nreturn (yield MagicMock())\n\n# ... other mocked methods ...\n\n@pytest.fixture\ndef behaviour(monkeypatch):\n\"\"\"Provide a behaviour instance with mocked context.\"\"\"\nbeh = DummyBehaviour()\nctx_patch = patch.object(DummyBehaviour, \"context\", new_callable=PropertyMock)\nmonkeypatch.setattr(\"_pytest_context_patch\", ctx_patch)\nmock_ctx = ctx_patch.start()\nmock_ctx.return_value = dummy_ctx()\nyield beh\nctx_patch.stop()\n\ndef test_async_act(behaviour):\n\"\"\"Test async_act method.\"\"\"\n# Mock get_payload to return a predictable value\nbehaviour.get_payload = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(\"test_payload\")])\n\n# Mock other dependencies\nbehaviour.send_a2a_transaction = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)])\nbehaviour.wait_until_round_end = MagicMock(side_effect=[gen_side_effect(None)])\n\n# Call the method and run through generator\ngen = behaviour.async_act()\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration):\nwhile True:\nnext(gen)\n\n# Verify correct calls were made\nbehaviour.get_payload.assert_called_once()\nbehaviour.send_a2a_transaction.assert_called_once()\nbehaviour.wait_until_round_end.assert_called_once()\n\n# Parameterized test examples\n@pytest.mark.parametrize(\"tx_sender, expected_payload\", [\n(None, \"DONE_PAYLOAD\"),\n(\"mech_request_round\", \"MECH_REQUEST_DONE_PAYLOAD\"),\n# ... other test cases ...\n])\ndef test_get_payload_variations(behaviour, tx_sender, expected_payload):\n\"\"\"Test get_payload with different tx_sender values.\"\"\"\n# Set up mocks based on parameters\nbehaviour.synchronized_data.tx_sender = tx_sender\n\n# Call method and check result\ngen = behaviour.get_payload()\nnext(gen)\nwith pytest.raises(StopIteration) as exc:\nnext(gen)\nassert exc.value.value == expected_payload\n\n# Property-based test example\n@given(st.text(min_size=1))\ndef test_to_content_roundtrip(q):\n\"\"\"Test that to_content correctly serializes and deserializes any string.\"\"\"\nblob = ExampleBehaviour.to_content(q)\ndecoded = json.loads(blob.decode())\nassert decoded[\"query\"] == q\n\nChallenges and Considerations\n\nComplex Generator Flow Analysis: Understanding the flow of generator methods with multiple yield from statements\n\nMock Setup: Correctly identifying and setting up all required mocks\n\nFramework-Specific Knowledge: The tool needs to understand framework-specific patterns\n\nTest Coverage: Ensuring tests cover both success and error paths\n\nBest Practices For Behaviour Testing\n\nTest All Code Paths: Test both success and error paths for each method\n\nMock HTTP and Blockchain Interactions: Use consistent mocking patterns for external services\n\nUse Parameterization: Test variations with pytest's parameterize feature\n\nAdd Property-Based Tests: Use hypothesis for input variations where appropriate\n\nVerify Logging: Check that appropriate messages are logged, especially for errors\n\nTest Generator Flow: Make sure all yields are handled correctly\n\nKeep Tests Maintainable: Use fixtures and helper functions to reduce duplication\n\nIsolate Tests: Ensure each test is independent and doesn't rely on state from other tests\n\nDocument Test Purpose: Include clear docstrings explaining what each test verifies\n\nVerify Side Effects: Check that methods interact correctly with other systems\n\nUse Direct Method Patching: Patch methods for complete control over complex generator flows\n\nPrefer SimpleNamespace over MagicMock: Use SimpleNamespace for attributes that will be compared directly\n\nHandle Missing None Checks: Be aware that some methods may not check for None returns and implement appropriate testing strategies\n\nPatch Built-in Functions: Use patch for Python built-ins like bytes.fromhex when they cause test issues\n\nAvoid Complex Context Patching: For pytest, avoid storing patch objects in monkeypatch with non-module strings; instead use simpler test architectures or direct fixture management\n\nConclusion\n\nTesting behaviours in the Open Autonomy framework requires specific patterns to handle their asynchronous nature. Modern pytest-based approaches offer significant advantages in test readability, maintainability, and thoroughness compared to traditional unittest approaches.\n\nBy using fixtures, parameterization, and property-based testing, developers can create comprehensive test suites with less code. These modern techniques combined with careful mocking of dependencies enable thorough testing of complex generator-based methods while keeping tests clean and maintainable.\n\nThe complexity of testing generators often requires explicit control over the execution flow, especially when testing early returns and failure paths. Using custom implementations and strategic patching provides the necessary level of control to thoroughly test all code paths.\n\nWhether you adopt pytest or stay with unittest, the core patterns for testing generator methods remain essential. Automated test generation tools could further reduce the effort required to maintain comprehensive test coverage as behaviours evolve.","tokens":6494,"crawled_at":1791193963355} +{"id":10318,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/concepts/trading/margin","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Margining – dYdX Documentation","text":"As part of default settings on the dYdX Chain open source software, each market has two risk parameters, Initial Margin Fraction (IMF) and Maintenance Margin Fraction (MMF):\n\nInitial Margin Fraction: A percentage (fixed until certain level of Open Interest) that determines the minimum collateral required to open or increase positions.\n\nMaintenance Margin Fraction: A percentage (fixed) that determines the minimum collateral required to maintain positions and avoid liquidation.\n\nOpen-Interest-Based IMF\n\nThe IMF of a perpetual market scales linearly according to the current open_notional in the market, starting at open_notional_lower_cap to open_notional_upper_cap (USDC denominated):\n\nopen_notional = open_interest * oracle_price\n\nscaling_factor = (open_notional - open_notional_lower_cap) / (open_notional_upper_cap - open_notional_lower_cap)\n\nIMF_increase = scaling_factor * (1 - base_IMF)\n\neffective_IMF = Min(base_IMF + Max(IMF_increase, 0), 100%)\n\nI.e. the effective IMF is the base IMF while open_notinal < lower_cap, and increases linearly until open_notional = upper_cap, at which point the IMF stays at 100% (requiring 1:1 collateral for trading). Importantly, the MMF (Maintenance Margin Fraction) does not change.\n\nThe Open Notional Lower Cap and Open Notional Upper Cap are parameters defined as part of the market's Liquidity Tier.\n\nMargin Calculation\n\nThe margin requirement for a single position is calculated as follows:\n\nInitial Margin Requirement = abs(S × P × I) Maintenance Margin\nRequirement = abs(S × P × M)\n\nWhere:\n\nS is the size of the position (positive if long, negative if short)\n\nP is the oracle price for the market\n\nI is the initial margin fraction for the market\n\nM is the maintenance margin fraction for the market\n\nThe margin requirement for the account as a whole is the sum of the margin requirement over each market i in which the account holds a position:\n\nTotal Initial Margin Requirement = Σ abs(Si × Pi\n× Ii) Total Maintenance Margin Requirement = Σ abs(S\ni × Pi × Mi)\n\nThe total margin requirement is compared against the total value of the account, which incorporates the quote asset (USDC) balance of the account as well as the value of the positions held by the account:\n\nTotal Account Value = Q + Σ (Si × Pi)\n\nThe Total Account Value is also referred to as equity.\n\nWhere:\n\nQ is the account's USDC balance (note that Q may be negative). In the API, this is called quoteBalance. Every time a transfer, deposit or withdrawal occurs for an account, the balance changes. Also, when a position is modified for an account, the quoteBalance changes. Also funding payments and liquidations will change an account's quoteBalance.\n\nS and P are as defined above (note that S may be negative)\n\nAn account cannot open new positions or increase the size of existing positions if it would lead the total account value of the account to drop below the total initial margin requirement. If the total account value ever falls below the total maintenance margin requirement, the account may be liquidated.\n\nFree collateral is calculated as:\n\nFree collateral = Total Account Value - Total Initial Margin Requirement\n\nEquity and free collateral can be tracked over time using the latest oracle price (obtained from the markets websocket).","tokens":817,"crawled_at":1791193963411} +{"id":10319,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-adopt-the-seal-safe-harbor-agreement/24971","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 4, 2024, 5:26pm\n\n1\n\n[RFC] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nCategory: Request for comment\n\nAuthors: Skylock.xyz, @eek637\n\nIntroduction\n\nThis proposal outlines Uniswap Governance’s adoption of the SEAL (Security Alliance) Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement (“Safe Harbor Agreement”). By adopting Safe Harbor, Uniswap improves the security of its on-chain assets by allowing whitehats to intervene during active exploits to save protocol funds.\n\nWhat is the Safe Harbor Agreement?\n\nThe Safe Harbor Agreement addresses a critical need in crypto: enabling whitehats to intervene during active exploits when traditional responsible disclosure procedures are not feasible.\n\nKey aspects of the agreement include:\n\nEncouraging Whitehats to Protect the Protocol: By adopting Safe Harbor, Uniswap incentivizes whitehats to step in and protect the protocol during active exploits by limiting their legal exposure.\n\nIntervention Only During Active Exploits: Whitehats are authorized to act only when there is an immediate or ongoing exploit that threatens the protocol. This agreement applies only to critical situations where responsible disclosure procedures would not save funds due to the urgency of the exploit, and it is not intended for routine security testing or vulnerability reporting.\n\nMandatory Return of Rescued Funds: Under the terms of the Safe Harbor, whitehats are required to return all rescued assets to a pre-designated recovery address controlled by the protocol within 72 hours of recovering them. This ensures that recovered funds are quickly secured, preventing delay or potential loss.\n\nClear Guidelines and Legal Protection: The agreement establishes strict rules for how whitehats must operate during an exploit, ensuring recovery efforts are conducted professionally and safely, minimizing the risk of mistakes or further damage to the protocol. By adhering to these guidelines, whitehats can limit their potential legal exposure, allowing them to act in good faith without fear of liability.\n\nIncentivized Rescue Efforts: To motivate whitehats to act during critical situations, the agreement offers a bounty system similar to a bug bounty. Whitehats are rewarded with a percentage of the recovered assets, up to a predefined cap, for their successful interventions.\n\nFor more information, check out the Safe Harbor Agreement here.\n\nRationale\n\nUniswap, by design, does not include a pause function, meaning the protocol cannot be halted in the event of an exploit. This makes it essential to have a mechanism that allows rapid response and asset recovery during emergencies.\n\nThe Safe Harbor Agreement provides this necessary solution, empowering whitehats to act immediately during an exploit, offering a swift and structured recovery process without needing to pause the protocol.\n\nBenefits of adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement include:\n\nAgile Defense Against Exploits: Whitehats are authorized to intervene as soon as an active exploit is detected, enabling them to respond faster than traditional methods. This ensures that Uniswap is protected against threats even without the ability to halt the protocol. Immediate action minimizes the window for malicious actors, reduces damages, and accelerates the recovery of assets during critical moments.\n\nClarified Rescue Process: The agreement ensures that every step, from intervention to fund recovery, is predetermined and streamlined. Whitehats know exactly where to send recovered funds, preventing chaotic negotiations or rushed decisions during an exploit. This clarity ensures efficient, decisive action when it matters most.\n\nClear Financial Boundaries: The predefined bounty system, with a cap matching Uniswap Labs’ existing bug bounty for V3, ensures that whitehats are incentivized fairly without creating conflicting priorities between exploit intervention and standard vulnerability disclosure. By setting expectations upfront, it eliminates post-exploit negotiations, ensuring funds are returned promptly without attempts to change the reward amount, keeping the process fair and transparent.\n\nAligning with Industry Best Practices: By adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement, Uniswap aligns itself with leading security practices across the industry, reinforcing its commitment to staying at the forefront of protocol security.\n\nAdoption of the agreement complements audits by providing an additional layer of security, ensuring that the protocol is better prepared to respond to active threats.\n\nAdoption Details\n\nUniswap will adopt the agreement with the following parameters. For a full description of these adoption details, review the Safe Harbor for Protocols document.\n\nAsset Recovery Address: Addresses controlled by Uniswap, which recovered funds will be returned to in the event of a hack. Source\n\nChain\nAddress\n\nEthereum\n\n0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC\n\nArbitrum\n\n0x2BAD8182C09F50c8318d769245beA52C32Be46CD\n\nAvalanche\n\n0xeb0BCF27D1Fb4b25e708fBB815c421Aeb51eA9fc\n\nBase\n\n0x31FAfd4889FA1269F7a13A66eE0fB458f27D72A9\n\nBlast\n\n0x2339C0d23b60739B3E5ABF201F05903D24A26C77\n\nBoba\n\n0x53163235746CeB81Da32293bb0932e1A599256B4\n\nBSC\n\n0x341c1511141022cf8eE20824Ae0fFA3491F1302b\n\nCelo\n\n0x0Eb863541278308c3A64F8E908BC646e27BFD071\n\nFilecoin EVM\n\n0xFf3b2DA1379cc67cc2755194604713f10b820b0E\n\nGnosis\n\n0xfFA5599136fBaB9af7799A6703b57BB33E5390Cf\n\nLinea\n\n0x581F86Da293A1D5Cd087a10E7227a75d2d2201A8\n\nManta Pacific\n\n0x683553d74D9779955a15d57D208234C956B6Eae6\n\nMantle\n\n0x9b7aC6735b23578E81260acD34E3668D0cc6000A\n\nMoonbeam\n\n0xB2af16D6c7074228fC487F17929De830303E6531\n\nOptimism\n\n0xa1dD330d602c32622AA270Ea73d078B803Cb3518\n\nPolygon\n\n0x8a1B966aC46F42275860f905dbC75EfBfDC12374\n\nPolygon zkEVM\n\n0x1808cc3ffb04e8bB67BfEB5510D44e62cF380717\n\nRedstone\n\n0x2d00e94d78Fc307FC5E6195BBe2fB6aFC2FC07d4\n\nRootstock\n\n0x38aE7De6f9c51e17f49cF5730DD5F2d29fa20758\n\nScroll\n\n0xEfc9D1096fb65c832207E5e7F13C2D1102244dbe\n\nSei\n\n0xe75358526ef4441db03ccaeb9a87f180fae80eb9\n\nTaiko\n\n0xf6b53E8dA8bc7dbddB8E7B39635d17D7CCdCD6E5\n\nWorldChain\n\n0xcb2436774C3e191c85056d248EF4260ce5f27A9D\n\nZkSync\n\n0x2BAD8182C09F50c8318d769245beA52C32Be46CD\n\nZora\n\n0x36eEC182D0B24Df3DC23115D64DB521A93D5154f\n\nScope: List of all on-chain assets protected under Safe Harbor. V1 Source, V2 Source 1, V2 Source 2, V3 Source, UniStaker and V3FactoryOwner Source, Franchiser Factory Source\n\nChain\nName\nAddress\nType (None, Existing Only, All)\n\nEthereum\n\nUniswapV1Factory\n\n0xc0a47dFe034B400B47bDaD5FecDa2621de6c4d95\n\nAll\n\nEthereum\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x5C69bEe701ef814a2B6a3EDD4B1652CB9cc5aA6f\n\nAll\n\nArbitrum\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0xf1D7CC64Fb4452F05c498126312eBE29f30Fbcf9\n\nAll\n\nAvalanche\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x9e5A52f57b3038F1B8EeE45F28b3C1967e22799C\n\nAll\n\nBase\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x8909Dc15e40173Ff4699343b6eB8132c65e18eC6\n\nAll\n\nBlast\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x5C346464d33F90bABaf70dB6388507CC889C1070\n\nAll\n\nBoba\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x40a26d18440948d8eE121b78ca4e88C37D30143b\n\nAll\n\nBSC\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x8909Dc15e40173Ff4699343b6eB8132c65e18eC6\n\nAll\n\nCelo\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nFilecoin EVM\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nGnosis\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x8c8b524ce7c9D2e3f59aB6711bE4Ac826FA46a0f\n\nAll\n\nLinea\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nMoonbeam\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nOptimism\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x0c3c1c532F1e39EdF36BE9Fe0bE1410313E074Bf\n\nAll\n\nPolygon\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x9e5A52f57b3038F1B8EeE45F28b3C1967e22799C\n\nAll\n\nRootstock\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nScroll\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x114a43df6c5f54ebb8a9d70cd1951d3dd68004c7\n\nAll\n\nWorldChain\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x5C69bEe701ef814a2B6a3EDD4B1652CB9cc5aA6f\n\nAll\n\nZora\n\nUniswapV2Factory\n\n0x0F797dC7efaEA995bB916f268D919d0a1950eE3C\n\nAll\n\nEthereum\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984\n\nAll\n\nArbitrum\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984\n\nAll\n\nAvalanche\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x740b1c1de25031C31FF4fC9A62f554A55cdC1baD\n\nAll\n\nBase\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x33128a8fC17869897dcE68Ed026d694621f6FDfD\n\nAll\n\nBlast\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x792edAdE80af5fC680d96a2eD80A44247D2Cf6Fd\n\nAll\n\nBoba\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xFFCd7Aed9C627E82A765c3247d562239507f6f1B\n\nAll\n\nBSC\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xdB1d10011AD0Ff90774D0C6Bb92e5C5c8b4461F7\n\nAll\n\nCelo\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xAfE208a311B21f13EF87E33A90049fC17A7acDEc\n\nAll\n\nFilecoin EVM\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xB4C47eD546Fc31E26470a186eC2C5F19eF09BA41\n\nAll\n\nGnosis\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xe32F7dD7e3f098D518ff19A22d5f028e076489B1\n\nAll\n\nLinea\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x31FAfd4889FA1269F7a13A66eE0fB458f27D72A9\n\nAll\n\nManta Pacific\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x06D830e15081f65923674268121FF57Cc54e4e23\n\nAll\n\nMantle\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x0d922Fb1Bc191F64970ac40376643808b4B74Df9\n\nAll\n\nMoonbeam\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x28f1158795A3585CaAA3cD6469CD65382b89BB70\n\nAll\n\nOptimism\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984\n\nAll\n\nPolygon\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984\n\nAll\n\nPolygon zkEVM\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xff83c3c800Fec21de45C5Ec30B69ddd5Ee60DFC2\n\nAll\n\nRedstone\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xece75613Aa9b1680f0421E5B2eF376DF68aa83Bb\n\nAll\n\nRootstock\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0xaF37EC98A00FD63689CF3060BF3B6784E00caD82\n\nAll\n\nScroll\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x70C62C8b8e801124A4Aa81ce07b637A3e83cb919\n\nAll\n\nSei\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x75FC67473A91335B5b8F8821277262a13B38c9b3\n\nAll\n\nTaiko\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x75FC67473A91335B5b8F8821277262a13B38c9b3\n\nAll\n\nWorldChain\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x7a5028BDa40e7B173C278C5342087826455ea25a\n\nAll\n\nZkSync\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x8FdA5a7a8dCA67BBcDd10F02Fa0649A937215422\n\nAll\n\nZora\n\nUniswapV3Factory\n\n0x7145F8aeef1f6510E92164038E1B6F8cB2c42Cbb\n\nAll\n\nEthereum\n\nFranchiserFactory\n\n0xf754A7E347F81cFdc70AF9FbCCe9Df3D826360FA\n\nAll\n\nEthereum\n\nUniStaker\n\n0xE3071e87a7E6dD19A911Dbf1127BA9dD67Aa6fc8\n\nAll\n\nEthereum\n\nV3FactoryOwner\n\n0x2e27332b25Ce245F6628377bc83573A001313C58\n\nAll\n\n“All”: The Safe Harbor Agreement will cover both the subcontracts currently deployed under this contract and any future subcontracts deployed through it. This ensures that all present and future subcontracts are protected.\n\nContact Details: Designated security contact for Uniswap\n\nName: Erin Koen\n\nContact Information: erin@uniswapfoundation.org\n\nEvery 4 months. The person of contact will create a post to state their availability and whether or not they can continue being the person of contact.\n\nBounty Terms: Predetermined rewards for successful whitehats that protect protocol funds\n\nBounty Percentage: 10% of recovered funds.\n\nBounty Cap (USD): $2.25m\n\nFor clarification, the bounty is per whitehat per hack event. Please see the legal document for additional clarification.\n\nRetainable: True\n\nThis means that whitehats are allowed to retain their bounty directly from the recovered assets. After rescuing funds during an exploit, whitehats may deduct their bounty from the total recovered amount before transferring the remainder to the protocol’s designated asset recovery address. This streamlines the payout process, ensuring whitehats are rewarded promptly while still adhering to predefined bounty terms.\n\nIdentity Verification: Anonymous\n\nWhitehats are allowed to remain anonymous and are not required to provide their legal name or undergo identity verification. This ensures privacy for whitehats while still enabling them to participate in the bounty program and assist during exploits without revealing personal information.\n\nDiligence Requirements: None\n\nImplementation Plan\n\nRegister Agreement On-Chain:\n\nThe agreement will be registered on Ethereum in the Safe Harbor Registry at address 0x8f72fcf695523a6fc7dd97eafdd7a083c386b7b6, including all adoptionDetails. This ensures transparency and immutability.\n\nCommunicate Adoption:\n\nAn official announcement will be made across all Uniswap communication channels, explaining the adoption and its significance to the community.\n\nFuture Updates to Scope:\n\nNew versions of Uniswap (e.g., V4) will be reviewed and added to the Safe Harbor Agreement scope via Uniswap Governance vote, ensuring continued protection for all new contracts and functionalities.\n\nConclusion\n\nAdopting the SEAL Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement equips Uniswap with a rapid response mechanism for active exploits, enabling whitehats to step in effectively when needed most. The agreement provides clear guidelines for action, increasing the protection of user funds and demonstrating Uniswap’s commitment to proactive security.\n\nReferences\n\nSEAL Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement: GitHub Repository\n\nSEAL Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement Overview: Notion\n\nUniswap Bug Bounty: Uniswap Labs Bug Bounty Update\n\nPlease share your thoughts and feedback in the discussion below before the proposal moves to a formal vote.\n\n6 Likes\n\n[Governance Proposal] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\n[Temp Check] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\n404DAO\n\nDecember 4, 2024, 7:24pm\n\n2\n\nThanks for bringing this forward @Dickson.\n\nWe’re curious, how did you determine the bounty cap of 2.25M?\n\n1 Like\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 4, 2024, 7:40pm\n\n3\n\nHey @404DAO - Thanks for reviewing the proposal!\n\nSEAL worked together with the UF to put forth the bounty terms. The bounty cap of 2.25M was chosen to match the current bounty cap for V3 of being 2.25M source.\n\n1 Like\n\npepo\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 4:55pm\n\n4\n\nI find the proposal compelling and am in support of it. However, I would like clarification on the following points:\n\nIncentive Overlap\n\nConsidering Uniswap Labs already operates a bounty program, could you clarify if there’s an overlap where participants might benefit from both this proposal and the existing program? How is this “double dipping” of incentives defined or avoided?\n\nAddress Management and Security\n\nHow will the addresses be maintained and how we can ensure there is not a single point of failure?\n\nI’ve noticed that some recovery addresses for different chains, like the one for Arbitrum (see: GitHub Repository), are simply Externally Owned Accounts. We should ensure that these are ultimately controlled by the DAO to prevent potential loss of funds and legal liabilities.\n\nRegarding the scope of contracts covered by the bounty, in the event of a hack, will the bounty be calculated on a “per contract” basis, or will it be a singular “event-based” bounty? Clarification here is crucial to prevent disputes if a security breach occurs.\n\nHow does this apply specifically to the hook contracts of Uniswap V4?\n\nContact Details and Availability\n\nI suggest implementing a mechanism where the availability of the contact person is confirmed periodically, perhaps every few months. If there’s no confirmation, there should be a system in place to rotate the Point of Contact (PoC) to ensure continuous support and communication.\n\n3 Likes\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 5:28pm\n\n5\n\nHey Pepo! Thanks for reading over the proposal!\n\nThe Safe Harbor Agreement covers only active exploits - Which would be considered out of scope of Uniswap’s Bug Bounty (since it doesn’t apply to active exploits). So whitehats would only be paid once through Safe Harbor & there wouldn’t be any double dipping\n\nPinging @eek637 to answer\n\nPinging @eek637 to answer\n\nIt will be a event-based bounty not per contract - I believe it’s clearly stated in the legal document, but I will add additional clarification inside the DAO proposal too\n\nCurrently we’re not including the scope of v4 contracts since they haven’t been deployed yet but when v4 comes out we’ll have another DAO proposal to update the scope of the Safe Harbor Agreement to include the v4 addresses in the scope as well.\n\nOh that’s an interesting idea. So would we want to have the POC to, every few months, post a forum post confirming that they’re available. If they aren’t then we should elect a new POC in place of them?\n\n2 Likes\n\neek637\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 5:35pm\n\n6\n\n@pepo the arbitrum address is the alias for Uniswap’s mainnet timelock address (docs here). You can check out a successful transaction using that address here.\n\n2 Likes\n\npepo\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 6:04pm\n\n7\n\nThanks for this clarification, I wasn’t aware of Arbitrum Aliases, wanted to make sure we were in the loop for the security standards of the DAO.\n\nI think that would make sense, especially when thinking way down the road.\n\nThanks for all these clarifications.\n\n1 Like\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 6:45pm\n\n8\n\nThanks for your suggestions & questions!\n\nI updated the DAO proposal with the clarification on the bounty & the POC stating their availability every 4 months\n\n1 Like\n\ndennisonb\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 7:19pm\n\n9\n\nWelcome to the forum @Dickson !\n\nGreat post, I like the inclusion of the addresses for the funds for upfront transparency. I was immediately wondering about that myself.\n\nGiven the critical nature of whitehat interventions, has the team considered adding a requirement for post-incident reports from whiteats to help improve protocol security? This could help document attack vectors and prevention strategies while maintaining the whitehat’s anonymity.\n\n1 Like\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 9, 2024, 7:46pm\n\n10\n\nHi @dennisonb! Thanks for reviewing the proposal!\n\nThat’s an interesting idea! I’m unsure if the whitehats are actually the best to write that report. Whitehats are not the people who had originally discovered the bug (since that should be reported through a bug bounty) - thus they might not have full knowledge on how the exploit actually worked (ie. a MEV bot that’s rescuing funds by frontrunning the hacker). Given how high profile Uniswap is, there should be no shortage of reports on the incident if it were (but hopefully never) occur. Additionally I think it would be best to not add non-essential restraints on the whitehat. Their job is solely to rescue funds and return them to the protocol.\n\nkpk\n\nDecember 16, 2024, 3:48pm\n\n11\n\nThanks for sharing this proposal, @Dickson.\n\nAt Karpatkey, security is a core value for us, so we’re fully behind this initiative. Uniswap is a battle-tested protocol, and we truly appreciate the hard work that its stakeholders continue to put into maintaining its security. As a leader in the space, Uniswap has the opportunity to set the gold standard for security practices, and we believe the SEAL proposal is a big step in that direction.\n\nWe’re excited to see this move forward and hope it’s adopted soon!\n\n1 Like\n\nDickson\n\nDecember 16, 2024, 6:24pm\n\n12\n\nThank you all for the support! We’ve now moved on to the temperature check phase! Here’s the Temp Check forum post: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-adopt-the-seal-safe-harbor-agreement/25072 & Here’s the Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0xba36ded3039fc2588cdc7352e2ac6dd40ca0c3548576d9d31256663fbfc3f1b4\n\nBlockworksResearch\n\nDecember 16, 2024, 9:09pm\n\n13\n\nWe fully support this proposal and believe it makes sense to leverage white hat responses in the event of a hack. White hats should have protection when intervening in security breaches. We also support the dynamic bounty structure, as it ensures there’s always a sufficient incentive for white hat intervention.\n\nA few questions on what this looks like moving forward:\n\nRegarding the point of security contact for Uniswap: Is it ever expected that the DAO will nominate these positions, or will they always be appointed by the foundation? While this is not a concern for us in relation to our sentiment on the proposal, we would like to understand the long-term plan.\n\nOther DAOs, like Arbitrum, use a security council that rotates every six months. Is this something Uniswap has considered implementing?\n\n1 Like\n\neek637\n\nDecember 16, 2024, 9:39pm\n\n14\n\nOn the Designated Contact, I raised my hand for it as I’d been chatting with @Dickson et al about the proposal for a couple of months. In general, there isn’t as much to do here as an L2 security council (and hopefully nothing to do at all!). Ultimately, the adoption details can be modified by governance vote so if there’s a compelling reason to change it up it’s easy enough to do. I’d suggest we leave as is for a bit and potentially revisit in six months to a year.\n\n2 Likes\n\nAvantgarde\n\nDecember 19, 2024, 8:23am\n\n15\n\nWe support this proposal as it adds a valuable and complementary function to Uniswap’s security framework and current bug bounty program. The possibility of recovering funds from active exploits serves as a nice safeguard, and would arguably be highly appreciated by any affected users should such a scenario present itself. After all, security over user funds is imperative. Bounty structure is also fair.\n\nWill be voting yes!\n\n1 Like\n\n[Governance Proposal] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nkaereste\n\nDecember 20, 2024, 5:39pm\n\n16\n\nThe following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.\n\nWe’re voting FOR the proposal.\n\nWe generally favor proposals that help enhance protocol security, and the proposed agreement—although hopefully we never have to use it—does precisely that. All the questions that came to our mind after originally reading the proposal have already been addressed, so we don’t have any material reason to be skeptical or against the proposal.\n\n2 Likes\n\nL2BEAT Delegate Platform\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Temp Check] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nTemperature Check\n\n1\n\n239\n\nDecember 17, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] - Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n321\n\nJanuary 16, 2025\n\nBug Bounty Vault Proposal by Hats Finance\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n2203\n\nSeptember 10, 2023\n\nKeyrock Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n26\n\n5237\n\nMarch 20, 2025\n\nStableLab Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n103\n\n8892\n\nDecember 30, 2025","tokens":5467,"crawled_at":1791193964483} +{"id":10320,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/create-asset","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Creating Assets | Metaplex Core","text":"This guide shows how to create a Core Asset (NFT) on Solana using the Metaplex Core SDK. You'll upload off-chain metadata, create the on-chain Asset account, and optionally add it to a Collection or attach plugins.\nWhat You'll Build\nA Core Asset with:\nOff-chain metadata (name, image, attributes) stored on Arweave\nOn-chain Asset account with ownership and metadata URI\nOptional: Collection membership\nOptional: Plugins (royalties, freeze, attributes)\n\nSummary\nCreate a Core Asset by uploading metadata JSON to decentralized storage, then calling create() with the URI. Assets can be minted standalone or into Collections, and can include plugins at creation time.\nUpload metadata JSON to Arweave/IPFS, get a URI\nCall create() with name, URI, and optional plugins\nFor collections: pass the collection parameter\nCosts ~0.003 SOL for a base asset; longer names, URIs, and plugins add rent\nOut of Scope\nToken Metadata NFTs (use mpl-token-metadata), compressed NFTs (use Bubblegum), fungible tokens (use SPL Token), and NFT migration.\nQuick Start\nJump to: Upload Metadata · Create Asset · With Collection · With Plugins\nInstall: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi\nUpload metadata JSON to get a URI\nCall create(umi, { asset, name, uri })\nVerify on core.metaplex.com\nPrerequisites\nUmi configured with a signer and RPC connection\nSOL for rent and fees (~0.003 SOL for a base asset, plus headroom for larger assets and transaction fees)\nMetadata JSON ready to upload (name, image, attributes)\nThe Creation Process\nUpload off-chain data. Store a JSON file containing name, description, image URL, and attributes. The file must be accessible via a public URI.\nCreate on-chain Asset account. Call the create instruction with the metadata URI to mint the Asset.\nUploading Off-chain Data\nUse any storage service (Arweave, IPFS, AWS) to upload your metadata JSON. Umi provides uploader plugins for common services. See the JSON Schema for all available metadata fields.\nupload-metadata.ts\nimport { irysUploader } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-uploader-irys'\n\n// Configure an uploader (Irys, AWS, etc.)\n\numi.use(irysUploader())\n\n// Upload image first\n\nconst [imageUri] = await umi.uploader.upload([imageFile])\n\n// Upload metadata JSON\n\nconst uri = await umi.uploader.uploadJson({\n\nname: 'My NFT',\n\ndescription: 'This is my NFT',\n\nimage: imageUri,\n\nattributes: [\n\n{ trait_type: 'Background', value: 'Blue' },\n\n],\n\n})\n\nNow that you have a URI, you can create the Asset.\nCreate an Asset\nUse the create instruction to mint a new Core Asset.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4\n\n5// Initialize UMI\n\n6const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n7 .use(mplCore())\n\n8\n\n9// Create a new NFT asset\n\n10const asset = await create(umi, {\n\n11 name: 'My NFT',\n\n12 uri: 'https://example.com/metadata.json'\n\n13}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n14\n\n15console.log('Asset created:', asset.publicKey)\n\nCreate an Asset into a Collection\nTo create an Asset as part of a Collection, pass the collection parameter. The Collection must already exist.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create, fetchCollection } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10const collectionAddress = publicKey('YOUR_COLLECTION_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Fetch the existing collection\n\n13const collection = await fetchCollection(umi, collectionAddress)\n\n14\n\n15// Generate a new keypair for the asset\n\n16const assetSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n17\n\n18// Create asset in the collection\n\n19await create(umi, {\n\n20 asset: assetSigner,\n\n21 collection,\n\n22 name: 'Collection Item #1',\n\n23 uri: 'https://example.com/item1.json',\n\n24}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n25\n\n26console.log('Asset created in collection:', assetSigner.publicKey)\n\nSee Collections for creating Collections.\nCreate an Asset with Plugins\nAdd plugins at creation time by passing them in the plugins array. This example adds the Royalties plugin:\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { create, ruleSet } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10const creator = publicKey('YOUR_CREATOR_ADDRESS')\n\n11\n\n12// Generate a new keypair for the asset\n\n13const assetSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n14\n\n15// Create asset with Royalties plugin\n\n16await create(umi, {\n\n17 asset: assetSigner,\n\n18 name: 'NFT with Royalties',\n\n19 uri: 'https://example.com/metadata.json',\n\n20 plugins: [\n\n21 {\n\n22 type: 'Royalties',\n\n23 basisPoints: 500, // 5%\n\n24 creators: [\n\n25 { address: creator, percentage: 100 },\n\n26 ],\n\n27 ruleSet: ruleSet('None'),\n\n28 },\n\n29 ],\n\n30}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n31\n\n32console.log('Asset created with plugins:', assetSigner.publicKey)\n\nCommon Plugins\nHere are a few commonly used plugins. See Plugins Overview for the full list.\nRoyalties - Creator royalty enforcement\nFreeze Delegate - Allow freezing/unfreezing\nBurn Delegate - Allow burning\nTransfer Delegate - Allow transfers\nUpdate Delegate - Allow metadata updates\nAttributes - On-chain key/value data See Plugins Overview for the full list.\nCommon Errors\nAsset account already exists\nThe asset keypair was already used. Generate a new signer:\nconst assetSigner = generateSigner(umi) // Must be unique\n\nCollection not found\nThe collection address doesn't exist or isn't a valid Core Collection. Verify the address and that you've created the Collection first.\nInsufficient funds\nYour payer wallet needs ~0.003 SOL for a base asset's rent and the protocol fee, plus some headroom for larger assets and transaction fees. Fund it with:\nsolana airdrop 1 --url devnet\n\nNotes\nThe asset parameter must be a new keypair - you cannot reuse an existing account\nIf minting to a different owner, pass the owner parameter\nPlugins added at creation are cheaper than adding them after (one transaction vs two)\nUse commitment: 'finalized' when creating assets in a script that immediately fetches them\nQuick Reference\nProgram ID\nNetworkAddress\nMainnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nDevnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nMinimum Code\nminimal-create.ts\nimport { generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { create } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = generateSigner(umi)\n\nawait create(umi, { asset, name: 'My NFT', uri: 'https://...' }).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCost Breakdown\nItemCost\nAsset account rent (varies with name, URI, and plugins)\n~0.0015 SOL\n\nCore protocol fee (create)\n0.0015 SOL\n\nTransaction fee\n~0.000005 SOL\n\nTotal\n~0.003 SOL\n\nFAQ\nWhat's the difference between Core Assets and Token Metadata NFTs?\nCore Assets use a single account and cost ~80% less. Token Metadata uses 3+ accounts (mint, metadata, token). Core is recommended for new projects.\nCan I create multiple assets in one transaction?\nNo. Each create instruction creates one asset. For bulk minting, use Core Candy Machine or batch transactions.\nDo I need to create a Collection first?\nNo. Assets can exist without a Collection. However, Collections enable collection-level royalties and operations.\nHow do I mint to a different wallet?\nPass the owner parameter:\nawait create(umi, { asset, name, uri, owner: recipientAddress })\n\nWhat metadata format should I use?\nUse the standard NFT metadata format with name, description, image, and optional attributes array. See JSON Schema.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nAsset\nA Core on-chain account representing an NFT\n\nURI\nThe URL pointing to off-chain metadata JSON\n\nSigner\nA keypair that signs the transaction (asset must be a signer at creation)\n\nCollection\nA Core account that groups related Assets\n\nPlugin\nA modular extension adding behavior to an Asset\n\nRent\nSOL required to keep an account alive on Solana","tokens":2065,"crawled_at":1791194009276} +{"id":10321,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/governance-best-practices","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"governance best practices - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\ngovernance best practices\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all governance best practices\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n08.14.24 / Eddy Lazzarin, Andrew Hall, Ross Shuel and Sonal Chokshi\nGovernance Attack!?\nepisode summary We breakdown the recent Compound “governance attack”, including discussing whether “governance attack” is the right label for it or not; how it’s different from other attacks; and the broader trend of online vs offline governance attacks in general. We also discuss how to avoid, prevent, and respond to such governance attacks — highlighting...\n\ntech trends\nanatomy of a hack\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\npodcast\n\n10.18.23 / Eliza Oak\nDesigning reward systems for web3 governance\nAn analysis of the tradeoffs of reputation-based and token-based reward systems for participation in web3 governance\n\nresearch\nairdrops\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\n\n09.21.23 / Miles Jennings\nMachiavelli for DAOs: designing effective decentralized governance (part 2)\nHow Machiavellian principles can help address current issues in DAOs, and help design more effective decentralized governance\n\ncompany building\ncommunity building\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\n\n09.21.23 / Miles Jennings\nMachiavelli for DAOs: principles for fixing decentralized governance (part 1)\nHow Machiavellian principles can be applied to fix decentralized governance, including DAOs in web3\n\ncompany building\ncommunity building\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nhistory\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\n\n07.20.23 / Andrew Hall\nGovernance FAQs\nAnswers to questions founders ask most frequently about governance -- and those to questions they ought to ask more frequently\n\ncompany building\nairdrops\nFAQ\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\n\n06.19.23 / Porter Smith\nDesigning effective governance\na16z crypto Deal Partner Porter Smith traces innovations in governance through time; and tracks the emergence of web3 governance through NFT communities, DAOs.\n\ncompany building\ncommunity building\nCSX 2023\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nvideo\n\n10.20.22 / Porter Smith and Andrew Hall\nToppling the Internet’s Accidental Monarchs: How to Design web3 Platform Governance\nweb3 platforms have an opportunity to cement their competitive advantage by sharing governance & giving up some power, sparking engaged community governance.\n\ncompany building\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nhistory\n\n08.24.22 / Jeff Amico, Maggie Hsu, Ed Lynch and Emily Westerhold\nTreasury Management: A Guide to Navigating Downturns\nWe share a framework for how conservative treasury management principles can help DAOs and startups to safely navigate periods of market uncertainty.\n\ncompany building\ncustody\nDAOs\ngovernance best practices\nplaybooks\nproduct-market fit\n\n07.27.22 / Pranav Garimidi, Scott Duke Kominers and Tim Roughgarden\nDAO governance attacks, and how to avoid them\nDAOS can make themselves less vulnerable to governance attacks if they use our simple but effective framework.\n\ncompany building\nDAOs\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\nmechanism design\nsecurity\ntoken design\ntokens\n\n06.03.22 / Miles Jennings and David Kerr\nHow to pick a DAO legal entity\nThe growth of DAOs raise legal, tax, and operations questions, so we created a 4-step guide to help web3 builders choose a DAO legal entity.\n\ncompany building\nDAOs\nglossaries & terminology\ngovernance best practices\nlegal best practices\nmental models & frameworks\n\n11.03.21 / Tarun Chitra\nBuilding and Running a DAO: Why Governance Matters\nGoverning the decentralized protocols associated with DeFI and NFT communities requires significant coordination costs which can be reduced by decentralized autonomous organizations.\n\ncompany building\nairdrops\nDAOs\nDeFi\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1692,"crawled_at":1791194002577} +{"id":10322,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/developer_tooling/debugging_using_tenderly","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Debugging using Tenderly - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Debugging Using Tenderly\n\nInfo\n\nThis section is under review and will be updated soon.\n\nTenderly is a comprehensive Ethereum Developer Platform for real-time monitoring, alerting, debugging, and simulating Smart Contracts. When debugging transactions and contract calls, it can be useful to help us understand what is going on with the execution. This guide contains a more detailed explanation on Tenderly, but for the basics:\n\nCreate a Tenderly account and project.\n\nSet your Tenderly username and project name at tenderly.yaml (exports/ganache/project_slug) and at your hardhat.config.js module exports:\n\ntenderly: {\nusername: \"username\",\nproject: \"projectname\"\n}\n\nLogin to Tenderly using your username and password or an access token:\n\ntenderly login\n\nRun your Hardhat deployment and export your transactions with:\n\ntenderly export \n\nYou'll see a link to your Tenderly dashboard where you can inspect the full transaction stack trace.\n\nDuring testing, you will need to pause Hardhat's execution before it ends to export the transaction.\n\nOptionally, there's the possibility of pushing your contract's source to verify and debug it. More on that here.","tokens":293,"crawled_at":1791194002848} +{"id":10323,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/wallet","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nBaseWallet\nMnemonic\nWallet\nHD Wallets\nJSON Wallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Wallets\nWallets\nWhen interacting with Ethereum, it is necessary to use a private key authenticate actions by signing a payload.\nWallets are the simplest way to expose the concept of an Externally Owner Account (EOA) as it wraps a private key and supports high-level methods to sign common types of interaction and send transactions.\nThe class most developers will want to use is Wallet, which can load a private key directly or from any common wallet format.\nThe HDNodeWallet can be used when it is necessary to access low-level details of how an HD wallets are derived, exported or imported.\n\nclass BaseWallet\ninherits from AbstractSigner, Signer\nThe BaseWallet is a stream-lined implementation of a Signer that operates with a private key.\nIt is preferred to use the Wallet class, as it offers additional functionality and simplifies loading a variety of JSON formats, Mnemonic Phrases, etc.\nThis class may be of use for those attempting to implement a minimal Signer.\n\nPROPERTIES\nbaseWallet.address⇒ stringread-only\nThe wallet address.\n\nbaseWallet.privateKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe private key for this wallet.\n\nbaseWallet.signingKey⇒ SigningKeyread-only\nThe SigningKey used for signing payloads.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew BaseWallet(privateKey: SigningKey, provider?: null | Provider)\nCreates a new BaseWallet for privateKey, optionally connected to provider.\nIf provider is not specified, only offline methods can be used.\n\nMETHODS\nbaseWallet.authorize(auth: AuthorizationRequest)⇒ Promise< Authorization >\nResolves to the Authorization for auth.\n\nbaseWallet.authorizeSync(auth: AuthorizationRequest)⇒ Authorization\nReturns the Authorization for auth.\n\nbaseWallet.signMessageSync(message: string | Uint8Array)⇒ string\nReturns the signature for message signed with this wallet.\n\nclass Mnemonic\nA Mnemonic wraps all properties required to compute BIP-39 seeds and convert between phrases and entropy.\n\nPROPERTIES\nmnemonic.entropy⇒ stringread-only\nThe underlying entropy which the mnemonic encodes.\n\nmnemonic.password⇒ stringread-only\nThe password used for this mnemonic. If no password is used this is the empty string (i.e. \"\") as per the specification.\n\nmnemonic.phrase⇒ stringread-only\nThe mnemonic phrase of 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words.\nUse the wordlist split method to get the individual words.\n\nmnemonic.wordlist⇒ Wordlistread-only\nThe wordlist for this mnemonic.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nMnemonic.fromEntropy(entropy: BytesLike, password?: null | string, wordlist?: null | Wordlist)⇒ Mnemonic\nCreate a new Mnemonic from the entropy.\nThe default password is the empty string and the default wordlist is the English wordlists.\n\nMnemonic.fromPhrase(phrase: string, password?: null | string, wordlist?: null | Wordlist)⇒ Mnemonic\nCreates a new Mnemonic for the phrase.\nThe default password is the empty string and the default wordlist is the English wordlists.\n\nMETHODS\nmnemonic.computeSeed()⇒ string\nReturns the seed for the mnemonic.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nMnemonic.entropyToPhrase(entropy: BytesLike, wordlist?: null | Wordlist)⇒ string\nReturns the phrase for mnemonic.\n\nMnemonic.isValidMnemonic(phrase: string, wordlist?: null | Wordlist)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if phrase is a valid BIP-39 phrase.\nThis checks all the provided words belong to the wordlist, that the length is valid and the checksum is correct.\n\nMnemonic.phraseToEntropy(phrase: string, wordlist?: null | Wordlist)⇒ string\nReturns the entropy for phrase.\n\nclass Wallet\ninherits from BaseWallet, AbstractSigner\nA Wallet manages a single private key which is used to sign transactions, messages and other common payloads.\nThis class is generally the main entry point for developers that wish to use a private key directly, as it can create instances from a large variety of common sources, including raw private key, BIP-39 mnemonics and encrypte JSON wallets.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew Wallet(key: string | SigningKey, provider?: null | Provider)\nCreate a new wallet for the private key, optionally connected to provider.\n\nMETHODS\nwallet.encrypt(password: Uint8Array | string, progressCallback?: ProgressCallback)⇒ Promise< string >\nResolves to a JSON Keystore Wallet encrypted with password.\nIf progressCallback is specified, it will receive periodic updates as the encryption process progreses.\n\nwallet.encryptSync(password: Uint8Array | string)⇒ string\nReturns a JSON Keystore Wallet encryped with password.\nIt is preferred to use the async version instead, which allows a ProgressCallback to keep the user informed.\nThis method will block the event loop (freezing all UI) until it is complete, which may be a non-trivial duration.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nWallet.createRandom(provider?: null | Provider)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreates a new random HDNodeWallet using the available cryptographic random source.\nIf there is no crytographic random source, this will throw.\n\nWallet.fromEncryptedJson(json: string, password: Uint8Array | string, progress?: ProgressCallback)⇒ Promise< HDNodeWallet | Wallet >\nCreates (asynchronously) a Wallet by decrypting the json with password.\nIf progress is provided, it is called periodically during decryption so that any UI can be updated.\n\nWallet.fromEncryptedJsonSync(json: string, password: Uint8Array | string)⇒ HDNodeWallet | Wallet\nCreates a Wallet by decrypting the json with password.\nThe fromEncryptedJson method is preferred, as this method will lock up and freeze the UI during decryption, which may take some time.\n\nWallet.fromPhrase(phrase: string, provider?: Provider)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreates a HDNodeWallet for phrase.\n\nHD Wallets\nExplain HD Wallets..\n\nCONSTANTS\ndefaultPath⇒ string\nThe default derivation path for Ethereum HD Nodes. (i.e. \"m/44'/60'/0'/0/0\")\n\nFUNCTIONS\ngetAccountPath(index: Numeric)⇒ string\nReturns the BIP-32 path for the account at index.\nThis is the pattern used by wallets like Ledger.\nThere is also an alternate pattern used by some software.\n\ngetIndexedAccountPath(index: Numeric)⇒ string\nReturns the path using an alternative pattern for deriving accounts, at index.\nThis derivation path uses the index component rather than the account component to derive sequential accounts.\nThis is the pattern used by wallets like MetaMask.\n\nclass HDNodeVoidWallet\ninherits from VoidSigner, AbstractSigner\nA HDNodeVoidWallet cannot sign, but provides access to the children nodes of a BIP-32 HD wallet addresses.\nThe can be created by using an extended xpub key to HDNodeWallet.fromExtendedKey or by nuetering a HDNodeWallet.\n\nPROPERTIES\nhdNodeVoidWallet.chainCode⇒ stringread-only\nThe chaincode, which is effectively a public key used to derive children.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.depth⇒ numberread-only\nThe depth of this wallet, which is the number of components in its path.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.extendedKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe extended key.\nThis key will begin with the prefix xpub and can be used to reconstruct this neutered key to derive its children addresses.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.fingerprint⇒ stringread-only\nThe fingerprint.\nA fingerprint allows quick qay to detect parent and child nodes, but developers should be prepared to deal with collisions as it is only 4 bytes.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.index⇒ numberread-only\nThe child index of this wallet. Values over 2 ** 31 indicate the node is hardened.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.parentFingerprint⇒ stringread-only\nThe parent node fingerprint.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.path⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe derivation path of this wallet.\nSince extended keys do not provider full path details, this may be null, if instantiated from a source that does not enocde it.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.publicKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe compressed public key.\n\nMETHODS\nhdNodeVoidWallet.deriveChild(index: Numeric)⇒ HDNodeVoidWallet\nReturn the child for index.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.derivePath(path: string)⇒ HDNodeVoidWallet\nReturn the signer for path from this node.\n\nhdNodeVoidWallet.hasPath()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this wallet has a path, providing a Type Guard that the path is non-null.\n\nclass HDNodeWallet\ninherits from BaseWallet, AbstractSigner\nAn HDNodeWallet is a Signer backed by the private key derived from an HD Node using the BIP-32 stantard.\nAn HD Node forms a hierarchal structure with each HD Node having a private key and the ability to derive child HD Nodes, defined by a path indicating the index of each child.\n\nPROPERTIES\nhdNodeWallet.chainCode⇒ stringread-only\nThe chaincode, which is effectively a public key used to derive children.\n\nhdNodeWallet.depth⇒ numberread-only\nThe depth of this wallet, which is the number of components in its path.\n\nhdNodeWallet.extendedKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe extended key.\nThis key will begin with the prefix xpriv and can be used to reconstruct this HD Node to derive its children.\n\nhdNodeWallet.fingerprint⇒ stringread-only\nThe fingerprint.\nA fingerprint allows quick qay to detect parent and child nodes, but developers should be prepared to deal with collisions as it is only 4 bytes.\n\nhdNodeWallet.index⇒ numberread-only\nThe child index of this wallet. Values over 2 ** 31 indicate the node is hardened.\n\nhdNodeWallet.mnemonic⇒ null | Mnemonicread-only\nThe mnemonic used to create this HD Node, if available.\nSources such as extended keys do not encode the mnemonic, in which case this will be null.\n\nhdNodeWallet.parentFingerprint⇒ stringread-only\nThe parent fingerprint.\n\nhdNodeWallet.path⇒ null | stringread-only\nThe derivation path of this wallet.\nSince extended keys do not provide full path details, this may be null, if instantiated from a source that does not encode it.\n\nhdNodeWallet.publicKey⇒ stringread-only\nThe compressed public key.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nHDNodeWallet.createRandom(password?: string, path?: string, wordlist?: Wordlist)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreates a new random HDNode.\n\nHDNodeWallet.fromMnemonic(mnemonic: Mnemonic, path?: string)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreate an HD Node from mnemonic.\n\nHDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(phrase: string, password?: string, path?: string, wordlist?: Wordlist)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreates an HD Node from a mnemonic phrase.\n\nHDNodeWallet.fromSeed(seed: BytesLike)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nCreates an HD Node from a seed.\n\nMETHODS\nhdNodeWallet.deriveChild(index: Numeric)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nReturn the child for index.\n\nhdNodeWallet.derivePath(path: string)⇒ HDNodeWallet\nReturn the HDNode for path from this node.\n\nhdNodeWallet.encrypt(password: Uint8Array | string, progressCallback?: ProgressCallback)⇒ Promise< string >\nResolves to a JSON Keystore Wallet encrypted with password.\nIf progressCallback is specified, it will receive periodic updates as the encryption process progreses.\n\nhdNodeWallet.encryptSync(password: Uint8Array | string)⇒ string\nReturns a JSON Keystore Wallet encryped with password.\nIt is preferred to use the async version instead, which allows a ProgressCallback to keep the user informed.\nThis method will block the event loop (freezing all UI) until it is complete, which may be a non-trivial duration.\n\nhdNodeWallet.hasPath()⇒ boolean\nReturns true if this wallet has a path, providing a Type Guard that the path is non-null.\n\nhdNodeWallet.neuter()⇒ HDNodeVoidWallet\nReturns a neutered HD Node, which removes the private details of an HD Node.\nA neutered node has no private key, but can be used to derive child addresses and other public data about the HD Node.\n\nSTATIC METHODS\nHDNodeWallet.fromExtendedKey(extendedKey: string)⇒ HDNodeWallet | HDNodeVoidWallet\nCreates a new HD Node from extendedKey.\nIf the extendedKey will either have a prefix or xpub or xpriv, returning a neutered HD Node (HDNodeVoidWallet) or full HD Node ([[HDNodeWallet) respectively.\n\nJSON Wallets\nThe JSON Wallet formats allow a simple way to store the private keys needed in Ethereum along with related information and allows for extensible forms of encryption.\nThese utilities facilitate decrypting and encrypting the most common JSON Wallet formats.\n\nTYPES\nCrowdsaleAccount⇒ { address: string , privateKey: string }\nThe data stored within a JSON Crowdsale wallet is fairly minimal.\n\nEncryptOptions⇒ { client?: string , entropy?: BytesLike , iv?: BytesLike , progressCallback?: ProgressCallback , salt?: BytesLike , scrypt?: { N?: number , p?: number , r?: number } , uuid?: string }\nThe parameters to use when encrypting a JSON Keystore Wallet.\n\nKeystoreAccount⇒ { address: string , mnemonic?: { entropy: string , locale?: string , path?: string } , privateKey: string }\nThe contents of a JSON Keystore Wallet.\n\nFUNCTIONS\ndecryptCrowdsaleJson(json: string, password: string | Uint8Array)⇒ CrowdsaleAccount\nBefore Ethereum launched, it was necessary to create a wallet format for backers to use, which would be used to receive ether as a reward for contributing to the project.\nThe Crowdsale Wallet format is now obsolete, but it is still useful to support and the additional code is fairly trivial as all the primitives required are used through core portions of the library.\n\ndecryptKeystoreJson(json: string, password: string | Uint8Array, progress?: ProgressCallback)⇒ Promise< KeystoreAccount >\nResolves to the decrypted JSON Keystore Wallet json using the password.\nIf provided, progress will be called periodically during the decrpytion to provide feedback, and if the function returns false will halt decryption.\nThe progressCallback will always receive 0 before decryption begins and 1 when complete.\n\ndecryptKeystoreJsonSync(json: string, password: string | Uint8Array)⇒ KeystoreAccount\nReturns the account details for the JSON Keystore Wallet json using password.\nIt is preferred to use the async version instead, which allows a ProgressCallback to keep the user informed as to the decryption status.\nThis method will block the event loop (freezing all UI) until decryption is complete, which can take quite some time, depending on the wallet paramters and platform.\n\nencryptKeystoreJson(account: KeystoreAccount, password: string | Uint8Array, options?: EncryptOptions)⇒ Promise< string >\nResolved to the JSON Keystore Wallet for account encrypted with password.\nThe options can be used to tune the password-based key derivation function parameters, explicitly set the random values used and provide a ProgressCallback to receive periodic updates on the completion status..\n\nencryptKeystoreJsonSync(account: KeystoreAccount, password: string | Uint8Array, options?: EncryptOptions)⇒ string\nReturn the JSON Keystore Wallet for account encrypted with password.\nThe options can be used to tune the password-based key derivation function parameters, explicitly set the random values used. Any provided ProgressCallback is ignord.\n\nisCrowdsaleJson(json: string)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if json is a valid JSON Crowdsale wallet.\n\nisKeystoreJson(json: string)⇒ boolean\nReturns true if json is a valid JSON Keystore Wallet.\n\n← Fixed-Point Maths\nWordlists→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on May 1, 2024, 12:01am.","tokens":3881,"crawled_at":1791194004368} +{"id":10324,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/api/providers/abstract-provider","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface\nPollingBlockTagSubscriber\nApplication Binary Interface\nAddresses\nConstants\nContracts\nCryptographic Functions\nHashing Utilities\nProviders\nBlock\nBrowserDiscoverOptions\nBrowserProvider\nContractRunner\nEip1193Provider\nEip6963ProviderInfo\nEnsPlugin\nEventFilter\nFeeData\nFeeDataNetworkPlugin\nFetchUrlFeeDataNetworkPlugin\nFilter\nFilterByBlockHash\nGasCostPlugin\nIpcSocketProvider\nLog\nMinedBlock\nMinedTransactionResponse\nNetworkPlugin\nNonceManager\nPreparedTransactionRequest\nProvider\nSigner\nTransactionReceipt\nTransactionRequest\nTransactionResponse\nWebSocketLike\nWebSocketProvider\nNetworks\nSubclassing Provider\nAbstractProvider\nAbstractProviderPlugin\nFilterIdEventSubscriber\nFilterIdPendingSubscriber\nFilterIdSubscriber\nOnBlockSubscriber\nPerformActionTransaction\nPollingBlockSubscriber\nPollingEventSubscriber\nPollingTransactionSubscriber\nSubscriber\nUnmanagedSubscriber\nSocket Providers\nSubclassing Signer\nENS Resolver\nFallback Provider\nFormatting\nJSON-RPC Provider\nCommunity Providers\nTransactions\nUtilities\nWallets\nWordlists\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »API »Providers »Subclassing Provider\nSubclassing Provider\nThe available providers should suffice for most developers purposes, but the AbstractProvider class has many features which enable sub-classing it for specific purposes.\n\nTYPES\nAbstractProviderOptions⇒ { cacheTimeout?: number , pollingInterval?: number }\nOptions for configuring some internal aspects of an AbstractProvider.\ncacheTimeout - how long to cache a low-level _perform for, based on input parameters. This reduces the number of calls to getChainId and getBlockNumber, but may break test chains which can perform operations (internally) synchronously. Use -1 to disable, 0 will only buffer within the same event loop and any other value is in ms. (default: 250)\n\nDebugEventAbstractProvider⇒ { action: \"sendCcipReadFetchRequest\" , index: number , request: FetchRequest , urls: Array< string > } | { action: \"receiveCcipReadFetchResult\" , request: FetchRequest , result: any } | { action: \"receiveCcipReadFetchError\" , request: FetchRequest , result: any } | { action: \"sendCcipReadCall\" , transaction: { data: string , to: string } } | { action: \"receiveCcipReadCallResult\" , result: string , transaction: { data: string , to: string } } | { action: \"receiveCcipReadCallError\" , error: Error , transaction: { data: string , to: string } }\nThe types of additional event values that can be emitted for the \"debug\" event.\n\nPerformActionFilter⇒ { address?: string | Array< string > , fromBlock?: BlockTag , toBlock?: BlockTag , topics?: Array< null | string | Array< string > > } | { address?: string | Array< string > , blockHash?: string , topics?: Array< null | string | Array< string > > }\nA normalized filter used for PerformActionRequest objects.\n\nPerformActionRequest⇒ { method: \"broadcastTransaction\" , signedTransaction: string } | { blockTag: BlockTag , method: \"call\" , transaction: PerformActionTransaction } | { method: \"chainId\" } | { method: \"estimateGas\" , transaction: PerformActionTransaction } | { address: string , blockTag: BlockTag , method: \"getBalance\" } | { blockTag: BlockTag , includeTransactions: boolean , method: \"getBlock\" } | { blockHash: string , includeTransactions: boolean , method: \"getBlock\" } | { method: \"getBlockNumber\" } | { address: string , blockTag: BlockTag , method: \"getCode\" } | { method: \"getGasPrice\" } | { filter: PerformActionFilter , method: \"getLogs\" } | { method: \"getPriorityFee\" } | { address: string , blockTag: BlockTag , method: \"getStorage\" , position: bigint } | { hash: string , method: \"getTransaction\" } | { address: string , blockTag: BlockTag , method: \"getTransactionCount\" } | { hash: string , method: \"getTransactionReceipt\" } | { hash: string , method: \"getTransactionResult\" }\nThe AbstractProvider methods will normalize all values and pass this type to abstractProvider._perform.\n\nSubscription⇒ { tag: string , type: \"block\" | \"close\" | \"debug\" | \"error\" | \"finalized\" | \"network\" | \"pending\" | \"safe\" } | { hash: string , tag: string , type: \"transaction\" } | { filter: EventFilter , tag: string , type: \"event\" } | { filter: OrphanFilter , tag: string , type: \"orphan\" }\nThe value passed to the abstractProvider._getSubscriber method.\nOnly developers sub-classing [[AbstractProvider[[ will care about this, if they are modifying a low-level feature of how subscriptions operate.\n\nFUNCTIONS\ngetPollingSubscriber(provider: AbstractProvider, event: ProviderEvent)⇒ Subscriber\nReturn the polling subscriber for common events.\n\nclass AbstractProvider\ninherits from Provider, ContractRunner, EventEmitterable, NameResolver\nAn AbstractProvider provides a base class for other sub-classes to implement the Provider API by normalizing input arguments and formatting output results as well as tracking events for consistent behaviour on an eventually-consistent network.\n\nPROPERTIES\nabstractProvider._requestRate⇒ null | number\nLimit the number of requests per second. (default: no limit)\n\nabstractProvider.destroyed⇒ booleanread-only\nIf this provider has been destroyed using the destroy method.\nOnce destroyed, all resources are reclaimed, internal event loops and timers are cleaned up and no further requests may be sent to the provider.\n\nabstractProvider.disableCcipRead⇒ boolean\nPrevent any CCIP-read operation, regardless of whether requested in a call using enableCcipRead.\n\nabstractProvider.paused⇒ boolean\nWhether the provider is currently paused.\nA paused provider will not emit any events, and generally should not make any requests to the network, but that is up to sub-classes to manage.\nSetting paused = true is identical to calling .pause(false), which will buffer any events that occur while paused until the provider is unpaused.\n\nabstractProvider.plugins⇒ Array< AbstractProviderPlugin >read-only\nReturns all the registered plug-ins.\n\nabstractProvider.pollingInterval⇒ numberread-only\n\nabstractProvider.provider⇒ thisread-only\nReturns this, to allow an AbstractProvider to implement the ContractRunner interface.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew AbstractProvider(network?: \"any\" | Networkish, options?: AbstractProviderOptions)\nCreate a new AbstractProvider connected to network, or use the various network detection capabilities to discover the Network if necessary.\n\nMETHODS\nabstractProvider._clearTimeout(timerId: number)⇒ void\nClear a timer created using the _setTimeout method.\n\nabstractProvider._detectNetwork()⇒ Promise< Network >\nResolves to the Network, forcing a network detection using whatever technique the sub-class requires.\nSub-classes must override this.\n\nabstractProvider._forEachSubscriber(func: (s: Subscriber) => void)⇒ void\nPerform func on each subscriber.\n\nabstractProvider._getAddress(address: AddressLike)⇒ string | Promise< string >\nReturns or resolves to the address for address, resolving ENS names and Addressable objects and returning if already an address.\n\nabstractProvider._getBlockTag(blockTag?: BlockTag)⇒ string | Promise< string >\nReturns or resolves to a valid block tag for blockTag, resolving negative values and returning if already a valid block tag.\n\nabstractProvider._getFilter(filter: Filter | FilterByBlockHash)⇒ PerformActionFilter | Promise< PerformActionFilter >\nReturns or resolves to a filter for filter, resolving any ENS names or Addressable object and returning if already a valid filter.\n\nabstractProvider._getProvider(chainId: number)⇒ AbstractProvider\n\nabstractProvider._getSubscriber(sub: Subscription)⇒ Subscriber\nSub-classes may override this to customize subscription implementations.\n\nabstractProvider._getTransactionRequest(request: TransactionRequest)⇒ PerformActionTransaction | Promise< PerformActionTransaction >\nReturns or resolves to a transaction for request, resolving any ENS names or Addressable and returning if already a valid transaction.\n\nabstractProvider._perform(req: PerformActionRequest)⇒ Promise< T >\nSub-classes should use this to perform all built-in operations. All methods sanitizes and normalizes the values passed into this.\nSub-classes must override this.\n\nabstractProvider._recoverSubscriber(oldSub: Subscriber, newSub: Subscriber)⇒ void\nIf a Subscriber fails and needs to replace itself, this method may be used.\nFor example, this is used for providers when using the eth_getFilterChanges method, which can return null if state filters are not supported by the backend, allowing the Subscriber to swap in a PollingEventSubscriber.\n\nabstractProvider._setTimeout(func: () => void, timeout?: number)⇒ number\nCreate a timer that will execute func after at least timeout (in ms). If timeout is unspecified, then func will execute in the next event loop.\nPausing the provider will pause any associated timers.\n\nabstractProvider._wrapBlock(value: BlockParams, network: Network)⇒ Block\nProvides the opportunity for a sub-class to wrap a block before returning it, to add additional properties or an alternate sub-class of Block.\n\nabstractProvider._wrapLog(value: LogParams, network: Network)⇒ Log\nProvides the opportunity for a sub-class to wrap a log before returning it, to add additional properties or an alternate sub-class of Log.\n\nabstractProvider._wrapTransactionReceipt(value: TransactionReceiptParams, network: Network)⇒ TransactionReceipt\nProvides the opportunity for a sub-class to wrap a transaction receipt before returning it, to add additional properties or an alternate sub-class of TransactionReceipt.\n\nabstractProvider._wrapTransactionResponse(tx: TransactionResponseParams, network: Network)⇒ TransactionResponse\nProvides the opportunity for a sub-class to wrap a transaction response before returning it, to add additional properties or an alternate sub-class of TransactionResponse.\n\nabstractProvider.attachPlugin(plugin: AbstractProviderPlugin)⇒ this\nAttach a new plug-in.\n\nabstractProvider.ccipReadFetch(tx: PerformActionTransaction, calldata: string, urls: Array< string >)⇒ Promise< null | string >\nResolves to the data for executing the CCIP-read operations.\n\nabstractProvider.destroy()⇒ void\nSub-classes may use this to shutdown any sockets or release their resources and reject any pending requests.\nSub-classes must call super.destroy().\n\nabstractProvider.getAvatar(name: string)⇒ Promise< null | string >\n\nabstractProvider.getPlugin(name: string)⇒ null | T\nGet a plugin by name.\n\nabstractProvider.getResolver(name: string)⇒ Promise< null | EnsResolver >\n\nabstractProvider.pause(dropWhilePaused?: boolean)⇒ void\nPause the provider. If dropWhilePaused, any events that occur while paused are dropped, otherwise all events will be emitted once the provider is unpaused.\n\nabstractProvider.resume()⇒ void\nResume the provider.\n\ninterface AbstractProviderPlugin\nAn AbstractPlugin is used to provide additional internal services to an AbstractProvider without adding backwards-incompatible changes to method signatures or other internal and complex logic.\n\nPROPERTIES\nabstractProviderPlugin.name⇒ stringread-only\nThe reverse domain notation of the plugin.\n\nMETHODS\nabstractProviderPlugin.connect(provider: AbstractProvider)⇒ AbstractProviderPlugin\nCreates a new instance of the plugin, connected to provider.\n\nclass FilterIdEventSubscriber\ninherits from FilterIdSubscriber, Subscriber\nA FilterIdSubscriber for receiving contract events.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew FilterIdEventSubscriber(provider: JsonRpcApiProvider, filter: EventFilter)\nCreates a new FilterIdEventSubscriber attached to provider listening for filter.\n\nclass FilterIdPendingSubscriber\ninherits from FilterIdSubscriber, Subscriber\nA FilterIdSubscriber for receiving pending transactions events.\n\nclass FilterIdSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nSome backends support subscribing to events using a Filter ID.\nWhen subscribing with this technique, the node issues a unique Filter ID. At this point the node dedicates resources to the filter, so that periodic calls to follow up on the Filter ID will receive any events since the last call.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew FilterIdSubscriber(provider: JsonRpcApiProvider)\nCreates a new FilterIdSubscriber which will used _subscribe and _emitResults to setup the subscription and provide the event to the provider.\n\nMETHODS\nfilterIdSubscriber._emitResults(provider: AbstractProvider, result: Array< any >)⇒ Promise< void >\nSub-classes must override this handle the events.\n\nfilterIdSubscriber._recover(provider: AbstractProvider)⇒ Subscriber\nSub-classes must override this handle recovery on errors.\n\nfilterIdSubscriber._subscribe(provider: JsonRpcApiProvider)⇒ Promise< string >\nSub-classes must override this to begin the subscription.\n\nclass OnBlockSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nAn OnBlockSubscriber can be sub-classed, with a _poll implmentation which will be called on every new block.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew OnBlockSubscriber(provider: AbstractProvider)\nCreate a new OnBlockSubscriber attached to provider.\n\nMETHODS\nonBlockSubscriber._poll(blockNumber: number, provider: AbstractProvider)⇒ Promise< void >\nCalled on every new block.\n\ninterface PerformActionTransaction\ninherits from PreparedTransactionRequest\nA normalized transactions used for PerformActionRequest objects.\n\nPROPERTIES\nperformActionTransaction.from⇒ string\nThe sender of the transaction.\n\nperformActionTransaction.to⇒ string\nThe to address of the transaction.\n\nclass PollingBlockSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nA PollingBlockSubscriber polls at a regular interval for a change in the block number.\n\nPROPERTIES\npollingBlockSubscriber.pollingInterval⇒ number\nThe polling interval.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew PollingBlockSubscriber(provider: AbstractProvider)\nCreate a new PollingBlockSubscriber attached to provider.\n\nclass PollingEventSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nA PollingEventSubscriber will poll for a given filter for its logs.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew PollingEventSubscriber(provider: AbstractProvider, filter: EventFilter)\nCreate a new PollingTransactionSubscriber attached to provider, listening for filter.\n\nclass PollingTransactionSubscriber\ninherits from OnBlockSubscriber, Subscriber\nA PollingTransactionSubscriber will poll for a given transaction hash for its receipt.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew PollingTransactionSubscriber(provider: AbstractProvider, hash: string)\nCreate a new PollingTransactionSubscriber attached to provider, listening for hash.\n\ninterface Subscriber\nA Subscriber manages a subscription.\nOnly developers sub-classing [[AbstractProvider[[ will care about this, if they are modifying a low-level feature of how subscriptions operate.\n\nPROPERTIES\nsubscriber.pollingInterval⇒ number\nThe frequency (in ms) to poll for events, if polling is used by the subscriber.\nFor non-polling subscribers, this must return undefined.\n\nMETHODS\nsubscriber.pause(dropWhilePaused?: boolean)⇒ void\nCalled when the subscription should pause.\nIf dropWhilePaused, events that occur while paused should not be emitted resume.\n\nsubscriber.resume()⇒ void\nResume a paused subscriber.\n\nsubscriber.start()⇒ void\nCalled initially when a subscriber is added the first time.\n\nsubscriber.stop()⇒ void\nCalled when there are no more subscribers to the event.\n\nclass UnmanagedSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nAn UnmanagedSubscriber is useful for events which do not require any additional management, such as \"debug\" which only requires emit in synchronous event loop triggered calls.\n\nPROPERTIES\nunmanagedSubscriber.name⇒ string\nThe name fof the event.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew UnmanagedSubscriber(name: string)\nCreate a new UnmanagedSubscriber with name.\n\nSocket Providers\nGeneric long-lived socket provider.\nSub-classing notes\n\na sub-class MUST call the `_start()` method once connected\na sub-class MUST override the `_write(string)` method\na sub-class MUST call `_processMessage(string)` for each message\n\nclass SocketBlockSubscriber\ninherits from SocketSubscriber, Subscriber\nA SocketBlockSubscriber listens for newHeads events and emits \"block\" events.\n\nclass SocketEventSubscriber\ninherits from SocketSubscriber, Subscriber\nA SocketEventSubscriber listens for event logs.\n\nPROPERTIES\nsocketEventSubscriber.logFilter⇒ EventFilterread-only\nThe filter.\n\nclass SocketPendingSubscriber\ninherits from SocketSubscriber, Subscriber\nA SocketPendingSubscriber listens for pending transacitons and emits \"pending\" events.\n\nclass SocketProvider\ninherits from JsonRpcApiProvider, AbstractProvider\nA SocketProvider is backed by a long-lived connection over a socket, which can subscribe and receive real-time messages over its communication channel.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew SocketProvider(network?: Networkish, options?: JsonRpcApiProviderOptions)\nCreates a new SocketProvider connected to network.\nIf unspecified, the network will be discovered.\n\nMETHODS\nsocketProvider._processMessage(message: string)⇒ Promise< void >\nSub-classes must call this with messages received over their transport to be processed and dispatched.\n\nsocketProvider._register(filterId: number | string, subscriber: SocketSubscriber)⇒ void\nRegister a new subscriber. This is used internalled by Subscribers and generally is unecessary unless extending capabilities.\n\nsocketProvider._write(message: string)⇒ Promise< void >\nSub-classes must override this to send message over their transport.\n\nclass SocketSubscriber\ninherits from Subscriber\nA SocketSubscriber uses a socket transport to handle events and should use _emit to manage the events.\n\nPROPERTIES\nsocketSubscriber.filter⇒ Array< any >read-only\nThe filter.\n\nCREATING INSTANCES\nnew SocketSubscriber(provider: SocketProvider, filter: Array< any >)\nCreates a new SocketSubscriber attached to provider listening to filter.\n\nMETHODS\nsocketSubscriber._emit(provider: SocketProvider, message: any)⇒ Promise< void >\nSub-classes must override this to emit the events on the provider.\n\n← Providers\nSubclassing Signer→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on June 18, 2026, 3:32am.","tokens":4581,"crawled_at":1791194021332} +{"id":10325,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/concepts/onboarding-faqs","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Onboarding FAQs – dYdX Documentation","text":"Background\n\n1. How does the network work?\ndYdX Chain (or \"v4\") is composed of full nodes and each maintains an in-memory order book. Anyone can use the open source software to run a full node. Traders can submit order placements and cancellations to full nodes, which gossip the transactions amongst themselves.\n\nFull nodes with enough delegated layer 1 governance tokens participate in block building as validators. Validators on dYdX Chain take turns proposing blocks of trades every ~1 second. The validator whose turn it is to propose a block at a given height is called the proposer. The proposer uses its mempool orderbook to propose a block of matches, which validators either accept or reject according to CometBFT (Tendermint) consensus.\n\nAll full nodes have visibility into the consensus process and the transactions in the mempool. Another component of dYdX Chain is the indexer software, an application that reads data from full nodes and exposes it via REST / WebSocket APIs for convenience.\n\n2. What is the difference between a full node and a validator?\nA full node does not participate in consensus. It receives data from other full nodes and validators in the network via the gossip protocol. A validator participates in consensus by broadcasting votes signed by each validator’s private keys.\n\n3. What are the benefits of running a full node as a market maker?\nRunning a full node will eliminate the latency between placing an order and when the actual order is gossiped throughout the network. Without your own node, your order will need to first be relayed to the nearest geographic node, which will then propagate it throughout the network for you. With your own node, your order will directly be gossiped.\n\nAdditionally, running a full node allows you to use full node streaming, a feature that aims to provide real-time, accurate orderbook updates and fills.\n\nInstructions on setting up a full node can be found here.\n\n4. What is the current block time?\nThe current block time is ~1 second on average.\n\n5. What is an indexer?\nThe indexer is a read-only service that consumes real-time data from dYdX Chain to a database for visibility to users. The indexer consumes data from dYdX Chain via a connection to a full node. The full node contains a copy of the blockchain and an in-memory order book. When the full node updates its copy of the blockchain and in-memory order book due to processing transactions, it will also stream these updates to the indexer. The indexer keeps the data in its database synced with the full-node using these updates. This data is made available to users querying through HTTPS REST APIs and streaming via websockets. More info can be found here.\n\nTrading\n\n1. How can I understand how finality works on dYdX Chain?\nWhen your order fills, a block proposer will propose a block containing the fill (visible to the whole network), and then the block will go through consensus. If the block is valid it will be finalized a couple seconds later (in Cosmos-speak this happens at the “commit” stage of consensus after all validators have voted). At that point, an indexer service will communicate the fill to you.\n\nIt is recommended to post orders with a “Good-Til-Block” of the current block height, and adjusting prices once per block. If the block is published without a match to your order, you know that it is no longer active and did not fill.\n\n2. What are the different order types in dYdX Chain?\nThere are two order types: Short-Term orders and stateful orders.\n\nShort-Term orders are meant for programmatic, low-latency traders that want to place orders with shorter expirations.\n\nStateful orders are meant for retail that wants to place orders with longer expirations. These orders exist on chain.\n\n3. How does the orderbook work in dYdX Chain for short-term orders?\nEach validator runs their own in-memory orderbook (also known as mempool), and the set of orders each validator knows about is what order placement transactions are in their mempool.\n\nUser places a trade on a decentralized front end (e.g., website) or via the typescript or python client that places orders directly to a full node or validator API.\n\nThe consensus process picks one validator to be the block proposer. The selected validator will propose their view of the matches in the next proposed block.\n\nIf the matches are valid (orders cross, subaccounts well-collateralized, etc.) and accepted by ⅔+ of validator stake weight (consensus), then the block is committed and those matches are written to state as valid matches.\n\nAfter the block is committed, the updated onchain (and offchain) data is streamed from full nodes to Indexers. The Indexer then makes this data available via API and websockets back to the front end and/or any other outside services querying for this data.\n\nNote: the block proposer’s matches are the canonical matches for the next block assuming their block is accepted by consensus.\n\nOther validators maintain a list of matches and those matches might differ from the block proposer’s matches, but if they’re not the block proposer those matches will not be proposed in the next block.\n\nSimilarly, the indexer is not the block proposer so its list of matches might be different from the block proposer’s matches, until the network reaches finality.\n\n4. Why should market makers only use short-term orders?\nShort-Term orders are placed and can be immediately matched after they’re added to the mempool, while stateful orders can only be placed and matched after they’re added to a block.\n\nShort-Term orders should always have superior time priority to stateful orders.\n\nStateful orders have worse time priority since they can only be matched after they are included on the block, short-term orders can be matched in the same block.\n\nShort-Term orders have less restrictive rate limits than stateful order rate limits. See rate limits later on in this section.\n\nShort-Term orders can be replaced, and stateful orders currently don’t support replacement.\n\nShort-Term orders can be canceled immediately after they’re placed, while stateful orders can only be canceled after they’ve been included in a block.\n\nShort-Term orders can be received by validators in any order, while stateful orders have an ordering requirement and will fail to be placed if they’re received out of order.\n\nThis is because stateful orders use a “sequence number”, which is equivalent to a nonce on Ethereum. Short-Term orders don’t use this.\n\n5. How can I place a short-term order?\nPlease use the latest dYdX Chain typescript client to place orders.\n\nPlease refer to the order.proto for parameter and field definitions.\n\nFor more advanced order placements, please refer to one of the validator clients.\n\n6. How can I tell if the block proposer has placed my short-term order?\nThe block proposer has proposed and filled the order in the block.\n\nThe block proposer has the order in their mempool.\n\n7. How can I tell if my short-term order is canceled?\nShort-term order placements and cancellations are best-effort, and therefore can't be considered final (actually placed or canceled and unfillable) until expiry.\n\nA FOK or IOC order is also unfillable after expiry.\n\nThe indexer does not send a websocket notification when a short-term order expires, which happens when the chain height exceeds the goodTilBlock of the order.\n\nThe block height is the only reliable way to know if a short-term order is canceled with finality.\n\nHowever, the indexer does send a websocket notification when a short-term order cancel is received by the indexer's full node.\n\nIn most cases, this \"best effort\" cancel means the order is cancelled. However, some small fraction of these cancels are not successful.\n\nSee Limit Order Book and Matching for more information.\n\n8. How can I replace an order?\nReplacing an order reuses the short-term order placement function with the same order ID and an equal-to-or-greater good til block.\n\nNote: when replacing partially-filled orders, the previous fill amount is counted towards your current order.\n\nExample: Buy 1 BTC order @ $20k is filled for 0.5 BTC. After replacing that order with a Buy 2 BTC order @ $25k, that order can only be filled for a maximum of 1.5 BTC. This is because the previously replaced order was already filled for 0.5 BTC.\n\n9. Are fills computed/updates streamed only when a block is finalized? How about order placements?\nFills are computed only when a block is finalized.\n\nShort term order place / cancel (including IOC / FOK orders being canceled due to not filling / being on the book or POST-ONLY orders crossing) are streamed when the full node the Indexer deployment is listening to receives the order / cancel and not only when the block is finalized.\n\nThis is why the status “BEST_EFFORT_OPENED” or “BEST_EFFORT_CANCELED” since the Indexer only knows that a full-node received the order / cancel, and it’s not guaranteed to be true across the whole network.\n\nFor the orderbook updates, these are sent when the full-node the Indexer is listening to receives orders / cancels and not just when the block is finalized.\n\nFor example, when the full-node receives a short term order it will be approximate how much is filled and how much would go on the orderbook. This is what the Indexer uses to stream orderbook updates. However, there is no guarantee that the orderbook looks the same in other nodes in the network.\n\nNote that you can now stream the orderbook directly through your full node for the orderbook. Read more about that here.\n\n10. Do orders get matched and removed from the book in between blocks?\nFor removal of short term orders, yes they can be removed in between blocks, however this is on a node-by-node basis and not across the whole network.\n\nE.g. a short-term order could be removed on one node, but still be present on another.\n\nWhen a short-term order expires (current block height > goodtilBlock), then it is guaranteed to be removed from all nodes.\n\nFor removal of stateful orders, they can be removed from the book in-between blocks. This is on a node-by-node basis.\n\nIf the node removing the stateful orders is the block proposer, these stateful order removals will also be propagated to all other nodes, and be entirely removed from the network.\n\nFor all orders, regarding matching:\n\nFor matching, each node on the network will attempt to match the orders as they are received in-between blocks.\n\nPer block, only 1 node (the block proposer) will propagate the matches it’s done during the block to all other nodes in the network. Validator nodes take turns being the block proposer based on their stake weight.\n\nIf a set of validators with ⅔+ of the stake weight of the network see the matches propagated as valid, then those matches are included in the block when finalized.\n\nThe only matches that occur on the network are the ones in the block.\n\n11. Do certain order types have priority? Are cancels prioritized?\nShort term orders when received by a node will be matched against its in-memory orderbook.\n\nCancels of short-term orders are also processed by a node when received.\n\nStateful orders (long-term / conditional) are matched at the end of the block when they are received.\n\nE.g. Stateful orders have at least a 1 block-time delay (it’s possible the order does not get included in the block) between a node receiving the order, and it being matched.\n\nStateful order placement will be processed AFTER short-term order placements and cancellations for a block.\n\nStateful order cancellations are also done at the end of the block they are received.\n\nThe stateful order cancellations are also processed AFTER short-term placements and cancellations for a block.\n\nAs mentioned above, only the matches from the block proposer will be included in the block (if a set of validators with ⅔+ of the stake weight of the network see the matches as valid).\n\n12. How does the order cancellation mechanism work?\nShort-term:\n\nWhen validators receive a cancellation, if they don't already see a match for the order, they will remove the order from their order book.\n\nOnly once every validator receives the cancellation is when the order will no longer be able to be matched.\n\nThe other way an order would no longer be matchable is if the block height is past the good til block.\n\nLong-term:\n\nOnce a stateful order cancellation is included into a block, the order will be canceled and no longer matchable. This could take 1s+ for a cancelation to be included in a block.\n\n13. Why is it slower to cancel orders than place orders?\nAn order placement only needs to be on a single validator to have a match happen, but the cancellation has to have arrived at the block proposer. Since the BP rotates, to be completely sure that the order won't be matched, it has to arrive at all the validators who will be block proposer before the order expires. This is why cancelations seem to be guaranteed slower than placing/matching orders.\n\n14. How do order statuses transition for the Indexer, for short-term and long-term orders?\nShort-term:\n\nOnce the order is placed and seen by the Indexer's full-node, the order has status BEST_EFFORT_OPENED.\n\nIf the order is matched and has a fill in a block, the order has status OPEN.\n\nIf the order is fully-filled, the order has status FILLED.\n\nIf the order is canceled by a cancel order message, the order will have status BEST_EFFORT_CANCELED. The order may still have fills if other validator nodes haven't received the cancel message yet.\n\nIf the order expires due to the block height exceeding the good til block of the order, the order status will be CANCELED. The order can no longer be filled.\n\nLong-term:\n\nOnce the order is placed and included in a block, the order has status OPEN.\n\nIf the order is fully filled, the order has status FILLED.\n\nIf the cancelation of the order is included in a block, the order has status CANCELED. The order can no longer be filled.\n\n15. How do subaccounts work on dYdX Chain?\nEach address’s subaccounts all fall under a single address, but they are labeled subaccount0, subaccount1, etc. This is unlike v3, where each subaccount was a secondary address.\n\nTo begin trading, you need to make sure your funds are in your subaccount. You can do this two ways:\n\nFrontend: Simply leave your frontend open and it will automatically sweep.\n\nBackend: Simply transfer USDC to it like in this example.\n\n16. Do I need gas when I transfer funds to create a new subaccount?\nYes, you will need gas. Fortunately, both USDC and cosmos native dYdX can be used to pay for gas fees. This USDC must be in the main wallet and not another subaccount to pay for fees.\n\nTo ensure this, the frontend leaves a small amount of USDC in your wallet when sweeping into your subaccount, to ensure there's enough to pay for gas.\n\n17. What impact do subaccounts have on rate limits?\nRate limits are per account, and not per subaccount.\n\n18. How do we compete for liquidation orders?\nIf you run a full-node, there is a liquidations daemon that has metrics on what accounts are up for liquidation orders, and they could try and compete for liquidations that way.\n\nHowever, this is not at all documented so you'll have to work it out by reading code.\n\nFull Nodes & Validators\n\n1. How much throughput and latency can be expected from a self-hosted full node? Would having multiple full nodes in different regions improve speed?\nThroughput of up to 1500 orders/second from our load-testing. Latency depends on which validator is the proposer. Having multiple full-nodes in different regions where there are validators (so maybe 1 in Europe + 1 in Tokyo) would lead to improved latency.\n\n2. Do validators communicate through a public P2P network, or is there an internal network?\nIt's a public P2P network.\n\n3. What is the expected order-to-trade latency under normal conditions?\nExpected order → trade latency would be:\n\nTime for order to get from the node it was submitted to, to the proposer, so location dependent.\n\nOrder match -> trade, probably at least 1 block so ~0.8s, could be more than 1 block.\n\n4. Is it faster to submit transactions directly to a validator or to broadcast transactions to the network?\nIt is faster to submit a transaction directly to the block proposer. The speed difference between a full-node and a validator is negligible unless that validator is the proposer.\n\n5. Do you have some validators that we can send orders to?\nValidators don't expose the RPC endpoints for orders.\n\n6. How do other teams improve their speed?\nSome teams are trying to get data about the order book/order updates from a full-node they are running to improve the latency to receiving data, as there is additional latency to getting order updates due to the Indexer systems having additional latency. We currently do not have documentation around this, but are working on it.\n\nIndexer\n\n1. How does the indexer reconstruct the orderbook when it started/initial snapshot of the book?\nA full node is run alongside the Indexer and sends messages to the indexer when it receives orders either from the RPC or gossiped from other nodes, as well as any updates from:\n\nnode pruning the order when it expires.\n\nanother order that matches an order that the node received earlier.\n\nnode removing order due to receiving a cancel from RPC or gossip.\n\nThe indexer also updates the order book whenever it receives these order messages.\n\n2. How does the indexer know what orders are in the book on start up?\nOn a cold-start, a full-node would still have all the stateful orders and would send them to the indexer. For short-term orders, the full-node would not know them, nor would the indexer. Since short-term orders only are valid for 20 blocks, within 20 blocks the indexer would have an accurate view of the order book, but for the first 20 blocks it would not.\n\nMEV\n\n1. How will dYdX Chain handle MEV?\nUnlike general-purpose smart contract environments, the Cosmos infrastructure enables unique MEV solutions to be built that align a validator’s incentives with a user’s incentives. dYdX Chain has a framework where MEV is measured via a dashboard. The first step would be to punish validators with slashing. Further proposed solutions are still being considered, and will be announced once finalized.\n\n2. When do I have finality related to fills?\nWhen your order fills, a block proposer proposes a block containing the fill (visible to the whole network), and then the block undergoes consensus. If the block is valid, it finalizes shortly thereafter (in Cosmos-speak this happens at the “commit” stage of consensus, after all validators have voted). In Cosmos, every block is final (no reorgs or forks).\n\nIf you’re connected via full node, you’ll see each step of this process. If you’re connected via the indexer service, you’ll see order updates over webSocket as soon as each block is confirmed.\n\n3. Is deliberately taking canceled orders considered an attack against makers?\nNodes should respect cancels as soon as they receive them. If they don't, then we see that as MEV and the aforementioned dashboard/metrics tracking MEV will track that.\n\nPricing\n\n1. How is the oracle price computed?\nThe oracle price has five parts:\n\nSlinky: sidecar that pulls price data from external sources and caches them for the validator to use link.\n\nVote Extensions: Every block during the Precommit stage, all validators will submit vote extensions for what they believe the oracle price of all tracked assets should be.\n\nConsensus: The block after VE are submitted, Slinky deterministically aggregates all VE from the previous block and proposes a new updated price which is voted into consensus.\n\nx/prices Module: updates the state based on the new price, also has logic for validation and etc. link.\n\nParams: determines the external sources and sensitivity link, these are configured per network (testnet genesis example), but should query the network config for these dydxprotocold query prices list-market-param.\n\n2. How often are prices updated on-chain?\nPrices within Slinky are committed on a one-block delay, since validators use the vote extensions from block n-1 to securely submit their price data for block n.\n\nMost of the time, prices will update every single block. Price updates happen when over 2/3 of validators are correctly running the Slinky sidecar.\n\nPrices will not update on any given block if:\n\nThe market is disabled within x/marketmap\n\nLess than 2/3s of validators (by stake weight) contributed to a price update. This can happen if not enough validators run Slinky, or there is a massive, widespread outage across providers.\n\n3. Does Slinky store historical prices?\nNo. Prices are stored in x/oracle module, and only stores the most recently posted price. However, you can use blockchain indexers or inspect past blocks to see the prices committed on previous heights.\n\nRewards\n\n1. How will trading rewards work on dYdX Chain?\nTrading rewards are not controlled by dYdX. dYdX recommends that trading rewards could be calculated primarily based on total taker fees paid, along with a few other variables. The full proposed formula can be found here,\n\n2. Do liquidity provider rewards exist on v4 (dYdX Chain)?\nLiquidity provider rewards in v4 are not controlled by dYdX. dYdX recommends that liquidity provider rewards should cease to exist in v4. Makers could be rewarded with a maker rebate ranging from 0.5bps to 1.1bps, based on their nominal volume and volume share. The full proposed fee schedule can be found here.","tokens":5368,"crawled_at":1791194026738} +{"id":10326,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/markets-need-rules","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Markets need rules, and crypto is no different - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nMarkets need rules, and crypto is no different\nScott Duke Kominers\n09.02.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nop-eds\npolicy & regulation\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nWith the U.S. government finally recognizing the benefits of blockchain technology, now the question becomes how best to harness it. Some may push for a regulatory free-for-all, but that would be a mistake. History — and economic theory — shows that thriving markets require clear, consistent rules. Crypto is no exception.\n\nIn some ways, resistance to centralized authority is baked into crypto’s DNA. Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin, designed the protocol to bypass financial intermediaries, envisioning a currency that’s free from government or institutional control. Many early adopters shared an ethos of radical individualism, reminiscent of the freewheeling Homebrew Computer Club, the open source software movement, and early cryptography advocates.\n\nBut crypto’s full potential can only be realized if it becomes broadly accepted and integrated into ordinary commerce. And for entrepreneurs and consumers to embrace crypto, they must be confident in clear rules that protect against fraud while also ensuring robust and fair access. Without that confidence, people will hesitate to enter the market, let alone use crypto for everyday transactions.\n\nContrary to what some believe, a “free market” isn’t a free-for-all — it’s a structured system where individuals can engage in voluntary exchanges with reasonable expectations of fairness and security. Without basic protections, markets break down. Without safeguards, uncertainty will drive away serious investors and legitimate businesses, leaving behind only speculation and bad actors.\n\nWe need crypto to be a computer, not a casino.\n\nWhat kind of rules does crypto need?\n\nEconomists from Smith to Hayek, Friedman, de Soto, and beyond have long recognized that governments play a crucial role in setting up the guardrails that allow markets to flourish.\n\nSmith argued that property rights enable individuals to “secure the fruits of their own labor,” and that the government’s role is a “tolerable administration of justice” to secure those rights. For his part, Hayek believed that the role of government was to maintain the rule of law while avoiding capriciousness. Friedman famously conceded as roles for government both enforcement of contracts and protection of citizens from crimes against themselves or their property. And de Soto pointed out that a lack of clear rules and property rights leads to “dead capital.”\n\nPaul Atkins, the new chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, echoed these sentiments in a recent speech, noting, “Regulators should provide the minimum effective dose of regulation necessary to protect investors while allowing entrepreneurs and businesses to flourish.”\n\nThe rules governing crypto — like those governing all markets — should aim to achieve four key objectives:\n\nFirst, predictability and stability. A functional market requires clear, enforceable rules. Entrepreneurs need to know how their businesses will be regulated. Investors need confidence that the rules won’t change arbitrarily. And consumers need to trust that their transactions are secure.\n\nSecond, protection of property rights. Secure ownership is the foundation of any market. Crypto excels at encoding ownership through blockchain technology, but legal frameworks must reinforce and complement these protections.\n\nThird, transparency and information clarity. Efficient markets depend on reliable information. Buyers need to understand what they are purchasing, whether it’s a digital asset, a decentralized finance product, or a non-fungible token (NFT). Regulations should promote disclosures that help consumers and investors make informed decisions, while preventing fraudulent schemes.\n\nFinally, fair competition. Rules should prevent monopolistic practices, market manipulation, and fraud. Without oversight and tailored guardrails, markets can become playgrounds for bad actors who exploit information asymmetries, deceive investors, or artificially inflate asset prices. And any regulatory framework needs to be congruent with existing rules so it doesn’t inadvertently create new workarounds to established protections.\n\nThese four features are essential for market function: Stability and predictability helps make people willing to engage in transactions; and clear property rights are necessary in order for those transactions to happen. Then transparency and open competition help ensure that the transactions people choose to engage in push markets towards more productive and socially valuable outcomes.\n\nThe path ahead\n\nCrypto is not a well-regulated industry today, although it is finally on that path. Crypto startups have spent years navigating a murky and often hostile regulatory landscape. As a result, while blockchain technology provides strong internal protections for property rights, the surrounding regulatory environment has been anything but supportive of a healthy market.\n\nThe SEC, for instance, has until recently, pursued crypto companies for alleged violations without first establishing clear legal standards. Entrepreneurs were left guessing which rules applied, only to face lawsuits after the fact. This created uncertainty that stifled innovation, while at the same time allowing bad actors to operate in the resulting grey zone.\n\nAdditionally, many crypto regulations were built for legacy financial systems, treating blockchain-based assets as if they were merely new forms of traditional securities or commodities. But crypto is more than just finance: it’s also a web infrastructure platform. Effective regulation must recognize both dimensions, ensuring that financial oversight does not choke off technological development.\n\nCrypto has the potential to revolutionize everything from personal identity verification to event management and global payments. But realizing that potential requires guardrails like a token taxonomy that provides legal definitions of digital commodities; standards for evaluating decentralization and disintermediation; consumer protection; tax guidelines; and a framework for how legitimate blockchain-based businesses can operate without fear of arbitrary prosecution.\n\nNone of this is radical or unprecedented. The principles that make markets work — stability, property rights, transparency, and fair competition — have long been understood. But they have yet to be consistently applied to crypto. That must change, and the industry must welcome it.\n\n***\n\nA version of this article first appeared in the Financial Times.\n\n***\n\nScott Duke Kominers is the Sarofim-Rock Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, a Faculty Affiliate of the Harvard Department of Economics, and a Research Partner at a16z crypto. He also advises a number of companies on web3 strategy, as well as marketplace and incentive design; for further disclosures, see his website. He’s also the coauthor of The Everything Token: How NFTs and Web3 Will Transform the Way We Buy, Sell, and Create.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":2429,"crawled_at":1791194031717} +{"id":10327,"url":"https://docs.ethers.org/v6/basics/abi","domain":"docs.ethers.org","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"","text":"ethers\n6.17.0\n\nDOCUMENTATION\nGetting Started\nEthereum Basics\nTopics\nApplication Binary Interfaces\nCall Data Representation\nEvent Data Representation\nDeployment\nApplication Programming Interface\nCookbook\nMigrating from v5\nContributions and Hacking\nLicense and Copyright\n\nSingle Page\n\nDocumentation »Ethereum Basics »Application Binary Interfaces\nApplication Binary Interfaces\nWhen interacting with any application, whether it is on Ethereum, over the internet or within a compiled application on a computer all information is stored and sent as binary data which is just a sequence of bytes.\nSo every application must agree on how to encode and decode their information as a sequence of bytes.\nAn Application Binary Interface (ABI) provides a way to describe the encoding and decoding process, in a generic way so that a variety of types and structures of types can be defined.\nFor example, a string is often encoded as a UTF-8 sequence of bytes, which uses specific bits within sub-sequences to indicate emoji and other special characters. Every implementation of UTF-8 must understand and operate under the same rules so that strings work universally. In this way, UTF-8 standard is itself an ABI.\nWhen interacting with Ethereum, a contract received a sequence of bytes as input (provided by sending a transaction or through a call) and returns a result as a sequence of bytes. So, each Contract has its own ABI that helps specify how to encode the input and how to decode the output.\nIt is up to the contract developer to make this ABI available. Many Contracts implement a standard (such as ERC-20), in which case the ABI for that standard can be used. Many developers choose to verify their source code on Etherscan, in which case Etherscan computes the ABI and provides it through their website (which can be fetched using the getContract method). Otherwise, beyond reverse engineering the Contract there is not a meaningful way to extract the contract ABI.\n\nCall Data Representation\nWhen calling a Contract on Ethereum, the input data must be encoded according to the ABI.\nThe first 4 bytes of the data are the method selector, which is the keccak256 hash of the normalized method signature.\nThen the method parameters are encoded and concatenated to the selector.\nAll encoded data is made up of components padded to 32 bytes, so the length of input data will always be congruent to 4 mod 32.\nThe result of a successful call will be encoded values, whose components are padded to 32 bytes each as well, so the length of a result will always be congruent to 0 mod 32, on success.\nThe result of a reverted call will contain the error selector as the first 4 bytes, which is the keccak256 of the normalized error signature, followed by the encoded values, whose components are padded to 32 bytes each, so the length of a revert will be congruent to 4 mod 32.\nThe one exception to all this is that revert(false) will return a result or 0x.\n\nEvent Data Representation\nWhen an Event is emitted from a contract, there are two places data is logged in a Log: the topics and the data.\nAn additional fee is paid for each topic, but this affords a topic to be indexed in a bloom filter within the block, which allows efficient filtering.\nThe topic hash is always the first topic in a Log, which is the keccak256 of the normalized event signature. This allows a specific event to be efficiently filtered, finding the matching events in a block.\nEach additional indexed parameter (i.e. parameters marked with indexed in the signautre) are placed in the topics as well, but may be filtered to find matching values.\nAll non-indexed parameters are encoded and placed in the data. This is cheaper and more compact, but does not allow filtering on these values.\nFor example, the event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint value) would require 3 topics, which are the topic hash, the from address and the to address and the data would contain 32 bytes, which is the padded big-endian representation of value. This allows for efficient filtering by the event (i.e. Transfer) as well as the from address and to address.\n\nDeployment\nWhen deploying a transaction, the data provided is treated as initcode, which executes the data as normal EVM bytecode, which returns a sequence of bytes, but instead of that sequence of bytes being treated as data that result is instead the bytecode to install as the bytecode of the contract.\nThe bytecode produced by Solidity is designed to have all constructor parameters encoded normally and concatenated to the bytecode and provided as the data to a transaction with no to address.\n\n← Ethereum Basics\nApplication Programming Interface→\n\nThe content of this site is licensed under the Creative Commons License. Generated on May 1, 2024, 1:07am.","tokens":1197,"crawled_at":1791194038226} +{"id":10328,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-council-uc-season-5-renewal/26065","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Uniswap Council (UC): Season 5 Renewal - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"Uniswap Council (UC): Season 5 Renewal\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nMarch 25, 2026, 11:31pm\n\n1\n\nAuthors: Abdullah (Arana Digital), Juanbug (PGov), Jordan (Event Horizon)\n\nimage|624x258.975911109725761151×477 27.2 KB\n\nBackground\n\nThe Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) will from hereon, be referred to as the Uniswap Council (UC), to more aptly represent the group’s existing functions.\n\nThis proposal outlines the UC’s mandate, structural changes, and budget request for Season 5. For more details around Season 4 operations and financials, please refer to the companion Season 4 Report.\n\nThe UC is a DAO-elected entity that supports Uniswap governance by ensuring that DAO-approved initiatives are executed transparently and efficiently. It operates as an independent, community-driven body that coordinates operational tasks, oversees service providers, and maintains governance integrity without setting policy or controlling protocol development. In practice, the UC serves as a lightweight operational layer for the DAO, translating governance decisions into action while remaining fully accountable to tokenholders.\n\nA UC season is a term during which a DAO-elected set of council members is authorized to carry out the UC’s mandate, with funding and scope renewed by governance at the end of the period.\n\nBelow are the areas that the UC presided over during Season 4\n\nCross-chain deployment coordination\n\nENS record management\n\nDisbursement and accounting of service provider, grantee, and working groups’ compensation\n\nCustody of DAO-approved funds on Ethereum mainnet\n\nIncentive distribution across a multitude of EVM-compatible chains\n\nGovernance community calls\n\nAssisting with miscellaneous DAO operations like helping teams sponsor proposals\n\nManaging the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) to liaise between delegates and the Foundation\n\nGovernance logistics improvements\n\nIn this proposal, we also introduce new functions to support token holders and delegates in a post-UNIfication world, as well as adjust some previous operations.\n\nNavigating Moving Tides\n\nOver the past season, the organizational makeup of Uniswap has materially evolved. With Labs taking on a lion’s share of work and funding, and the Foundation winding down over time, the UC becomes the primary independent, community-driven counterweight within the ecosystem.\n\nThe UC’s mechanics remain firmly DAO-controlled. Its members are elected through Snapshot votes, and its funding must be approved by governance, which ensures that the team stays accountable. These structural constraints ensure accountability and alignment with tokenholder intent. At the same time, the UC operates as a smaller, more nimble body than the DAO as a whole, capable of responding to operational needs, coordinating service providers, and executing administrative tasks within clearly defined bounds. In practice, this positions the UC as a liaison across several DAO-adjacent functions, which are outlined in greater detail later in this report.\n\nWhile the committee maintains a deliberately narrow and procedurally defined mandate, the nature of its work has increasingly taken on operational characteristics. This evolution is not unique to Uniswap. Comparable models have emerged across the ecosystem as protocols mature. Arbitrum, for example, established the Arbitrum OpCo, a DAO-elected operational organization tasked with supporting ecosystem programs, vendor oversight, and administrative continuity. ENS operates with a similar pattern through its working groups, which collectively manage grants/service providers and public-facing reporting. In each case, the DAO retains ultimate authority, while the operational unit provides structure and continuity to day-to-day processes that require reliability and professionalization.\n\nWithin this landscape, the UC occupies a similar position. While “accountability” has been foundational to the committee’s mandate, the UC now acts more as an administrative and operational body on behalf of the DAO.\n\nAdoption of a Legal Entity\n\nAs of October, 2025, the UC has been incorporated as a Delaware Nonprofit Nonstock Corporation. As per its initial mandate, the UC entity is not designed to hold profits, issue equity, or accrue economic interests. It is solely meant to support governance integrity and operational accountability within the Uniswap ecosystem. Governance is handled exclusively through a Board of Directors. The composition of the board follows DAO-based elections, as per previous seasons.\n\nThis formalization provides the UC with a recognized legal body capable of entering contracts, receiving confidential information, issuing payments, and formally interacting with the DUNI, service providers, and other partners.\n\nWithin this evolving framework, the UC functions as an independent, DAO-elected operational body that interfaces with the DUNI but is not an official “service provider” like Uniswap Labs, nor is it assigned a role like “Ministerial Agent” or “Administrator.” In this respect, the UC’s structure aligns with a growing class of DAO-adjacent legal entities akin to BORGs, which are designed to carry out certain mandates on behalf of decentralized systems while remaining constrained by governance.\n\nSignatory/Multisig Operations\n\nUnchanged from previous seasons, the UC continues to manage two multisig addresses to conduct its operations:\n\nPrimary UC Wallet Address: 0x3B59C6d0034490093460787566dc5D6cE17F2f9C (UAC.eth)\n\nUC Incentives Wallet Address: 0xEBCCf1ce13F63c6B98811F03964F51fC43cef851\n\nThis wallet is deployed across various EVMs to facilitate incentive distribution on platforms like Merkl.\n\nGoing forward, the UC will not be responsible for disbursing incentives. Legal and tax surface area has expanded post DUNI adoption, and future incentives will be coordinated and executed with the DUNI.\n\nSeason 4 consisted of 5 members, representing diverse skillsets and organizational associations:\n\nAlice Corsini\n\nJordan Karstadt\n\nDoo Wan Nam\n\nJun Sun\n\nAbdullah Umar\n\nEach member is a signer on the UC multisigs and now a representative on the UC entity Board. Workload is divided among members based on their individual capacities and can vary month-to-month. Multisig duties and security, however, are an evenly assumed responsibility. All members must be ready to sign transactions when needed and uphold multisig integrity without exception.\n\nPrevious UC Seasons have lasted for approximately half-a-year each. Season 4 took place between May/June until the end of December 2025. Like prior seasons, 3 members of the UC have stayed active post season 4, planning for adjustments going into Season 5.\n\nVendor Payroll & Accountability\n\nThe UC has been responsible for disbursing payments to ecosystem vendors whose work has been previously authorized by governance. This includes but is not limited to:\n\nTally: governance infrastructure and execution support\n\nForse: incentives impact analytics\n\nOku: alternative Uniswap front-end, aggregator, and analytics site\n\nMerkl: incentivization infrastructure\n\nDAO programs: structured support for delegate engagement and Uniswap-related research\n\nGoing forward, the UC will manage this function differently from how it has been approached in the past. Rather than serving as an intermediary for ad hoc governance-approved funding, future funding will likely be sent to a DUNI-associated address and payments executed by the Ministerial Agent. Payments can also be structured in a more autonomous manner with vesting contracts. We will continue to help coordinate with these teams to ensure milestones, accountability, and transparency metrics are met.\n\nFurther, the UC will move to a pre-defined internal budgetary model. Anticipated vendor and operational expenditures will be scoped and requested upfront as part of the seasonal renewal proposal. Pre-defining these budgets simplifies operations by making the UC and its projects direct counterparties. Further, we are still able to help continue our previous seasons’ scope for independent governance approved funds over the season, now leaning on the DUNI for additional support with executing payments in a compliant manner.\n\nUniswap Deployments and Incentives\n\nThe UC will continue to serve as the administrative and coordination layer for cross-chain v3 deployments, working alongside deployers like Oku and Protofire to oversee deployment workflows, maintain the canonical contract registry and ENS subdomains, and support chains through the onboarding process. We will rely on closer coordination with Labs when it comes to newer v4 deployments.\n\nMore information on this function can be found here.\n\nTreasury Mobilization and Management\n\nTreasury strategy has been a recurring topic within the Uniswap ecosystem for several years, most formally explored through the Uniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG). While the DAO previously signaled broad interest in developing a structured investment framework, the lack of a legal wrapper and operational infrastructure prevented meaningful progress. With the establishment of DUNI and the maturation of service provider relationships, the conditions now exist to revisit this work responsibly. Recurring budget obligations and large, multi-year engagements further underscore the need for a deliberate treasury management approach.\n\nTo start, we want to emphasize that we primarily want to kick off these discussions in a formal and compliant manner post-DUNI adoption. There will be significant tasks to complete before we get to a vendor selection phase, but we believe it is a very important opportunity that should be actively discussed and focused on by the DAO.\n\nAs a result, a natural next step may be for the UC to initiate a formal Request for Proposals (RFP) to evaluate qualified treasury managers. Other large DAOs—ENS, Aave, Lido, Gnosis—have successfully partnered with firms such as Karpatkey, Steakhouse, Avantgarde, and others to manage portions of their treasuries under clearly defined Investment Policy Statements (IPS). These IPS frameworks establish risk parameters, liquidity buffers, permissible assets, rebalancing logic, and reporting requirements. Implementing a similar structure under the DUNI would transition Uniswap from reactive treasury decisions toward a durable, mandate-aligned investment framework tailored to the protocol’s long-term needs.\n\nThe presence of the DUNI also opens the UC to explore new institutional partnerships with vendors that, for legal and structural reasons, may have been off the table over the past handful of years. At present, the UC is exploring a combination of the following methodologies:\n\nBasis Fund: Deploy UNI as collateral to capture the spread between spot and perpetual futures prices, targeting 10%+ APR; reasonable given that crypto basis spreads have historically averaged 8-20% annualized, and UNI’s moderate liquidity and higher volatility relative to BTC typically place it toward the upper end of that range.\n\nOptions: Pledge UNI collateral to systematically sell overpriced volatility via OTC options desks, targeting 15% APR; reasonable because UNI’s realized volatility consistently underperforms its implied volatility by 15-30%, creating a persistent risk premium harvestable through structured short vol strategies.\n\nMarket Making: Provide continuous two-sided liquidity across UNI spot pairs on CEXs and DEXs, earning the bid-ask spread and rebates while targeting 20% APR; reasonable given UNI’s $260M daily trading volume creates consistent flow to capture, and the persistent CEX/DEX price dislocations in mid-cap DeFi tokens offer structural arbitrage that wider spreads on UNI (relative to BTC/ETH) translate into higher per-trade margins.\n\nStatistical Arb: Exploit mean-reversion and momentum signals across correlated pairs like UNI/ETH, UNI/AAVE, and UNI/broader DeFi indices, targeting 20% APR; reasonable because UNI’s high beta to the DeFi sector creates frequent mispricings that revert on short timeframes, and the token’s strong correlation structure (0.7-0.85 with ETH) provides reliable pairs trading relationships.\n\nCollateralized Lending: Pledge UNI as collateral through OTC lending desks to borrow USDC at conservative LTVs, then deploy the stablecoins into high-grade yield opportunities such as T-bills, money market funds, or institutional DeFi vaults, targeting 5-10% net APR after borrowing costs; reasonable given that OTC lending desks typically offer more favorable borrowing rates and liquidation terms than onchain venues, eliminating smart contract risk and avoiding the reflexive liquidation cascades common in transparent lending markets.\n\nToken Swaps: Execute bilateral token swaps with strategically aligned DAOs, exchanging UNI for their native governance tokens at negotiated terms, targeting long-term portfolio diversification and ecosystem alignment rather than short-term yield; reasonable given that protocol-to-protocol swaps have become an established mechanism for DAOs to diversify concentrated native-token treasuries while simultaneously deepening governance and economic relationships with key ecosystem partners. The surface area for this, however, has narrowed due to the lack of value-oriented tokens. Swap structures can include vesting schedules and lockup periods to ensure mutual long-term commitment between blue-chip protocols.\n\nTo those ends, a focus for the UC during Season 5 will be initiating a comprehensive treasury management program, in concert with continuous feedback from governance and DUNI-related administrative entities. The core goal eventually will be to administer an RFP process to deliver a structured proposal in collaboration with an asset manager(s). Sizing the amount of allocated capital, specific strategies, and timelines will be key points that the UC seeks to delve into.\n\nBurn Bounties\n\nThe UC would like to further concretize its value with additional hard metric objectives. In line with the consolidation of ecosystem emphasis around burn, expansion of UNI burn is one natural avenue. At present, we have aligned around Treasury Management and Burn Bounties as two initial, but not only, ways to achieve this objective.\n\nTreasury Management:\n\nTreasury yield could be applied in any ratio to either UNI burn or Treasury Diversification as the UC and DUNI see most fit. To ensure sufficient capital to meaningfully drive either or both objectives, the UC has outlined the following benchmarks as approximate program targets:\n\n582×302 49 KB\n\nThe above is a potential result if treasury management-derived yield is used for burning UNI. But it will be up to governance to decide whether or not—or how much—treasury yield is used for compounding DUNI capital versus driving burn.\n\nBurn Bounties:\n\nTraditional grant programs teeter towards opaque net benefits to the DAO. In principle, most grants are intended to support builders. These builders create products. These products drive volume. This volume drives fees. And, as a final, most elemental value, these fees drive burn. However, attempting to incentivize developers building to deliver UNI burn, without making the objective an explicit KPI (burn), often involves value leakage for token holders. Burn bounties resolve this by incentivizing the end state desired value, burns, directly. The UC proposes paying builders a fixed amount, for example, 2%, of every dollar of UNI that their products burn, creating an incentive layer where the protocol captures 98% of the deflationary value while developers get paid to make Uniswap their default routing destination.\n\nIn this rebate model, and unlike conventional grant programs, the cost-to-value of every dollar emitted is deterministic. For example, if the rewards rate is 2% and the program is budgeted $200,000, then full capital deployment would mean that $10,000,000 in UNI was burned. If the program capital is partially allocated, let’s say $100,000 is claimed, then only $5,000,000 UNI has been burned, but the DAO has “spent” proportionally the same amount.\n\n|347.2870140612076x112644×206 39.1 KB\n\nCumulatively, we believe Treasury Management and Burn Bounties can augment the work already being done by Uniswap Labs. Today, the DAO is on track to burn ~$30M worth of UNI annually. We anticipate that together, Treasury Management and Burn Bounties could achieve as much as $16m in added burn, increasing the ecosystem’s projected annual burn by >50% with minimal cost to the DAO.\n\nimage346×532 61.9 KB\n\nAccordingly, we are requesting a total of $200k UNI to set up and manage a UNI Burn Bounty Program.\n\nInformation Liaison and Community Management\n\nIn previous seasons, the UC operated the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG), serving as an information bridge between the DAO and the Uniswap Foundation. This structure balanced the DAO’s expectation of visibility with the Foundation’s need to protect sensitive operational details.\n\nLabs has since entered into a service provider relationship with governance, which introduces expectations around transparent reporting and mandate alignment that go beyond ad hoc public announcements.\n\nWith the Foundation and Labs actively exploring how responsibilities and reporting practices will be consolidated, it would be premature to prescribe a fixed successor to the FFG. The UC intends to work closely with the relevant teams as this transition unfolds to identify an appropriate mechanism for ongoing information exchange, including cadence, scope, and how sensitive operational information can be responsibly distilled into public updates for delegates and tokenholders. However, ascribing this function as a definite UC mandate would be jumping the gun.\n\nIn addition to its liaison functions, the UC has hosted monthly governance community calls throughout its tenure, providing a regular forum for delegates and ecosystem participants to discuss active proposals, surface concerns, and engage directly with teams working on DAO-funded initiatives. These calls have served as an important complement to asynchronous forum activity, ensuring that governance discussions are accessible beyond the forum. The UC intends to continue facilitating these calls throughout Season 5, along with broader community management efforts aimed at keeping governance participants informed and engaged.\n\nGovernance Logistics Details\n\nDuring Season 4, the UC conducted an analysis on the overall state of governance (Governance Logistics Improvements), instigated by the sudden loss of significant voting power among a cohort of well-known delegates. This initiative analyzed major structural pain points in Uniswap DAO governance, opening community dialogue about potential paths forward.\n\nSince then, the adoption of the DUNI has quelled many of the concerns larger token holders and delegates held regarding active participation in votes and forum discussions, meaningfully shifting the delegation landscape.\n\nAs Uniswap governance enters this new stage, the UC intends to continue and deepen this line of work throughout Season 5, with a focus on:\n\nSurfacing and supporting community-created proposal ideas\n\nHelping design models for novel governance architectures suitable for Uniswap, like optimistic governance\n\nMonitoring quorum dynamics as token price, circulating supply, and delegation patterns continue to evolve\n\nProviding neutral, data-informed visibility into emerging governance risks and power-concentration dynamics\n\nGrant Graduation Pipeline\n\nHigh-quality infrastructure that has already been funded and developed through the Foundation’s grant programs should be sustained. A healthy governance ecosystem benefits from a clear “grant graduation pipeline,” in which successful grantees transition from one-time funded projects into long-term, DAO-supported service providers when their work proves beneficial.\n\nOku represents the clearest precedent for this model. The team received an initial grant from the Foundation, built and proved their product in the market, onboarding numerous clients and driving volume to EVM environments outside of Labs’ purview.\n\nAnother potential example is Blockful’s Anticapture product. Anticapture has been adopted by multiple DAOs across the Ethereum ecosystem. Uniswap was the first DAO integrated into Anticapture, funded by a $110k grant provided by the Foundation. That grant has now concluded. Blockful has continued to maintain indexers, analytics pipelines, and monitoring infrastructure without additional funding. The platform surfaces governance-critical indicators such as delegation concentration, token distribution across custody venues, proposal thresholds, quorum dynamics, and execution mechanics, contextualized within a broader risk-assessment framework.\n\nBringing such providers under the DAO’s funding umbrella ensures that critical tooling is not lost due to the expiration of grant funding. The UC intends to play a constructive role in identifying these high-impact grantees and, correspondingly, work with them to best provide value to the DAO. For example, Anticapture can supplement much of the UC’s governance logistics reporting.\n\nWe will continue exploring how to best serve this function going forward in concert with the Foundation. Accordingly, we are requesting a total $200k UNI budget for Grant Graduation purposes, with allocations made as candidates are assessed on an ad hoc basis. All of this will be continuously communicated publicly to the DAO.\n\nAccounting and Financials\n\nThroughout its tenure, the UC has maintained transparent accounting practices, tracking inflows, outflows, and program-specific account balances across all DAO-approved initiatives. The UC served as an escrow intermediary, receiving funds from the treasury upon onchain vote execution and disbursing them to vendors and programs upon verification of completed work. As of the end of Season 4, the majority of program accounts have been fully allocated and closed out, with remaining balances for active programs transferred to the DUNI. An accounting breakdown is available in the Season 4 report. Going forward, as outlined earlier, the UC will shift away from this intermediary model in favor of a pre-defined budgetary approach.\n\nSnapshot & Onchain Vote Summary\n\nComposition of the total UC team will remain at 5 members, with two new members elected in for Season 5 via a Snapshot vote. The staggered board system exists to prevent junctions between ongoing projects and training entirely new teams. The Snapshot election will occur after the onchain vote for renewing the UC passes. Abdullah, Jun, and Jordan will remain on the UC for Season 5, joined by the two newly elected candidates. The newly elected members will start as multisig signers and be onboarded over the season.\n\nWe are also proposing extending future seasons, starting with Season 5, to 12 months, as opposed to 6-8 months. This will help with personnel continuity and less administrative overhead, especially with the presence of the newly established UC nonstock corporation.\n\nBudget\n\nThe operational budget requested for Season 4 was $370k over 8 months, which included staffing, legal operations, accounting tools, etc. For similar line-items, we are requesting a total of $555k for Season 5 over 12 months, the exact same monthly budget.\n\nWe are making an additional budget request for Grant Graduation, totaling to $200k, along with a $200k proposed allocation towards the Burn Bounty Program. Grant Graduation allocations ensure that capital already allocated to promising prospects via the Foundation is effectively complemented. Some projects require follow-on funding. And the Burn Bounty allows the UC to support token holders by propelling further UNI burn using rebates.\n\nSeason 5 Request:\n\nDuration: 12 months\n\nUC Operating Budget: $555k\n\nGrant Graduation Pipeline: $200k\n\nBurn Bounty Program: $200k*\n\nTOTAL: $955,000 in UNI for 12 months\n\n*Note that the budget associated with burn bounty will only be released as explicit burn metrics are achieved. Hence, the total $200k will be expended if, and only if, $10M UNI is burned—given a 2% rebate.\n\nAll Accounts from previous seasons have been closed and returned to the DUNI, so the above funding is all that the UC will have under its purview going into Season 5. The discretionary budget has also been terminated.\n\n7 Likes\n\nSEEDGov\n\nMarch 27, 2026, 2:46pm\n\n2\n\nThanks Abdullah for the detailed proposal!\n\nWe have some concerns related to the Burn Bounty mechanism that we like to shere.\n\nThe core idea is compelling: aligning incentives directly around the end-state value (burn) rather than proxies like activity or volume is a meaningful improvement over traditional grant structures.\n\nThere’s one thing that concerns us: there is a clear potential vector for abuse, as a malicious actor could create a protocol or mechanism with artificial UNI trading volume (wash trading) to collect the bounty. For example, a team could route wash trades or self-referential volume through a front-end that technically burns UNI, at a cost lower than the 2% bounty they’d collect. The net result would be UNI burned, but at an unfavorable ratio for the DAO compared to organic burn.\n\nWe would like these concerns to be addressed before this mechanism is established:\n\nIt is necessary to consider and establish a system that prevents participants from generating fictitious trading volume in order to claim a bounty\n\nEstablish a validation or audit process before bounties are paid out\n\nEstablish a mechanism for the UC to intervene in the event of a potential attempt at abuse during the program\n\nWe think a specificity framework would strengthen this initiative.\n\n1 Like\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nMarch 28, 2026, 4:52am\n\n3\n\nThanks for the thoughtful feedback, @SEEDGov.\n\nA couple of points:\n\nWashtrading in our eyes is less-so an issue. When you wash trade, you’re paying swap fees on every loop. Those swap fees are what fill the TokenJar. So you’re spending your own money to fill a pot, and your bounty is only 2% (or whatever rebate rate) of what a searcher eventually burns from that pot.\n\nYou’d spend $50 in swap fees to earn $1 back. There’s no way to make that math work in your favor since the wash trading costs more than the bounty pays.\n\nThat said, your point about the need for a clear verification and attribution framework is well taken. Attribution takes some effort and isn’t a perfect exercise.\n\nThe TokenJar is completely agnostic about what caused the fees. It just accumulates fee tokens. When a searcher triggers the burn, the chain records which pools generated fees, that the searcher paid some amount of UNI and got back the TockenJar’s contents, and that UNI was burned/sent to 0xdead. The issue is illustrating which FE, for example, routed the user to that pool in the first place.\n\nSo you can’t perfectly attribute the TokenJar release to a specific builder cause many builders’ traffic flows into the same shared TokenJar and the searcher burns it all at once in a single transaction. What we can do is attribute the underlying fees by tracing pool-level events back to the originating transaction and then pro-rate the burn bounty based on each builder’s share of fees that entered the TokenJar during the claim period. This is just a structural limitation that we need to work through based on how the burn system is designed. It also increases the need for a program manager because some degree of interpretation/discretion is required. Likely can’t be made autonomous.\n\nJust for more clarity around our thoughts…\n\nSay there are three builders routing swaps through Uniswap on Base over some period:\n\nBuilder A (a FE) generates $800k in fees\n\nBuilder B (an aggregator) generates $150k in fees\n\nBuilder C (a wallet) generates $50k in fees\n\nAll of that $1M flows into the same shared TokenJar. At some point, a searcher decides the pot is worth enough, so they take the fee tokens, and the associated UNI gets bridged back to L1 and burned.\n\nThe TokenJar release is one txn but doesn’t say “800k came from Builder A.”\n\nSo a model for tracing would therefore be going upstream to the pool-level fee events.\n\nEvery swap on Uniswap emits a swap event from the pool contract. That event includes the amounts, the pool address, and the associated txn hash. From the txn hash you can trace back to the originating call as see who called the router, from what contract/EOA, with what calldata.\n\nSo, we’d have to\n\nIndex all Swap events on Base during the claim period that had a protocol fee component\n\nFor each swap txn, check the calldata for a builder identifier (referral tag, contract address, etc)\n\nTally each builder’s share of total fees that flowed into the TokenJar\n\nWhen the searcher burn happens, pro-rate the burned UNI against those shares (this accounting can get tricky due to token $-value fluctuations…see more below)\n\nBut not every builder will have a clean onchain identifier. If Builder C is a wallet that just calls the Uniswap router directly with no tag and no intermediate contract, their swaps look identical to any random user. That’s where the UC’s discretion comes in. We’d require builders to demonstrate attribution. Essentially, to participate in the bounty program, you register your identifier upfront, and only tagged volume counts.\n\nSo the process is:\n\nCollect all the receipts for swaps during a claim period\n\nFilter by builder seeing which receipts have Builder C’s identifier on them\n\nAdd up what % of Builder C’s swaps generated the total fees in the TokenJar\n\nApply that % to the burn so when the searcher burns, Builder A gets credit for X% of it, and their bounty is 2% of that\n\nIdentifying which receipts belong to which builder is the hard part. That’s why pre-registration of an onchain identifier (a contract address, a referral tag in calldata) is a key design requirement.\n\nAnother point worth considering is on the potential hierarchy around the fee tokens themselves. This may be needed to filter garbage volume.\n\nUSDC, ETH, PEPE, and a brand new memecoin all go into the same TokenJar. If the TokenJar is full of worthless tokens, no searcher will touch it, meaning no burn happens, meaning no bounty is paid.\n\nSo if a builder routes a ton of memecoin trading volume, and at the time those swaps happen the memecoin has real value, fees accumulate in the TokenJar and look meaningful. BUT then the coin rugs or goes to 0 before a searcher claims the pot. That’s not a benefit to burn. The builder could argue that they generated a buncha fees during the claim period, but those fees are now worthless so no bounty should be paid.\n\nThe design implication here is that we could explicitly whitelist eligible fee tokens for bounty attribution purposes like ETH, WBTC, USDC, USDT, and some others. Only fees denominated in those tokens count toward a builder’s rebate share. Memecoin fees still flow into the TokenJar and still get burned if a searcher wants them, but they don’t count toward bounty credit/or if they do, they must have >$XM mcap. This makes the bounty program resistant to builders chasing low-quality volume just to inflate their numbers.\n\n1 Like\n\nCuria\n\nMarch 30, 2026, 10:54am\n\n4\n\nThank you for the detailed breakdown of the Season 4 report and the specifics for Season 5. The rebranding to Uniswap Council feels apt, this is clearly an operational body now, and the name should reflect that.\n\nThe Burn Bounty is the standout initiative, it feels like a very thoughtful way to align builder incentives with the protocol’s success. Making burn an explicit KPI rather than a hoped-for downstream effect of generalized grants is a meaningful design improvement, and the deterministic cost-to-value ratio ($200k budget = $10M burned if fully deployed) is a compelling framing.\n\nI think this approach hits the mark for a few reasons:\n\nOn wash trading: @AbdullahUmar’s response is largely convincing, swap fees make it economically irrational to game the rebate, creating a naturally Sybil-resistant structure by design.\n\nScaling potential: I see the 2% rebate as a foundation that we can iterate on. If this goes well, it would be exciting to explore tiered rewards in the future. For instance, offering a 4% rebate for products that cross a major milestone (like $5M in generated burns) could make the program even more compelling for high-impact builders as they grow.\n\nOn Attribution: The more substantive challenge is attribution. @AbdullahUmar’s discussion of requiring builders to pre-register onchain identifiers and the token whitelist concept (crediting only fees from ETH, WBTC, USDC, USDT) are sensible design directions. It would be good to see the UC publish a formal program spec covering attribution rules and eligibility criteria before the program goes live.\n\nOverall, supportive of this renewal and looking forward to seeing these initiative in action.\n\n1 Like\n\nTane\n\nMarch 31, 2026, 12:58am\n\n5\n\nThanks for the detailed proposal. We are supportive of the UC’s renewal and the expanded mandate for Season 5.\n\nThe Burn Bounty design is compelling. Paying only for the end-state outcome rather than proxies eliminates the value leakage that makes traditional grant ROI non-deterministic, and the economics make wash trading irrational. We agree with @SEEDGov and @Curia that a formal program spec covering attribution rules and token eligibility should be published before the program goes live, but the core mechanism is sound.\n\nThe Grant Graduation Pipeline also makes sense. Ensuring that proven Foundation grantees like Anticapture don’t lose funding due to grant expiration is a practical use of UC resources.\n\nOne clarification on treasury management. We understand the UC is seeking a mandate to begin the RFP process, not to deploy capital immediately, which is the right sequencing. Could you confirm whether the final treasury management plan (strategy selection, sizing, risk parameters, manager appointment) will require a separate governance vote before any capital is deployed, or whether the UC considers this proposal sufficient authorization to proceed through to deployment?\n\n1 Like\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nMarch 31, 2026, 1:59am\n\n6\n\nThanks for your question—this would be Uniswap’s first instance of managing protocol-owned assets, so a series of future votes may be needed from a decision making consensus perspective. Some may just be Snapshot votes due to no associated calldata. Of course, the allocation of funds for specific strategies will require moving UNI from the timelock. Onchain votes may also be needed for signing any formal agreements between vendors and the DUNI. The nature of these votes will be determined as the program unfolds. Needless to say, proper procedure and community input is top of mind. We have to be cognizant of aspects pertaining to legal and tax variables associated with treasury management as well, in particular since the DUNI is now in place.\n\n2 Likes\n\npennblockchain\n\nApril 4, 2026, 8:11pm\n\n7\n\nThanks to the UC team for putting together such a thorough Season 5 proposal. A lot of thought clearly went into it, and we are supportive of the direction. However, a few things are worth talking through before we move to a vote.\n\nBurn Bounty Program\n\nThe incentive logic makes sense in principle; however, additional detail is required before we can offer our full support.\n\nThe delayed compensation piece could quietly disadvantage smaller teams and solo devs who don’t have the runway to wait for burn to materialize. Has the UC looked at what that lag typically looks like in practice, from product launch to meaningful burn accrual?\n\nI’m also worried the 2% rebate creates blind spots. If compensation is directly tied to burn, developers have a real reason to deprioritize infrastructure work and public-good tooling — stuff that creates genuine value but doesn’t sit neatly in the fee path. Is there a carve-out for that kind of contribution, or a parallel track being considered?\n\nA clearer eligibility framework and application process would also go a long way in helping delegates feel confident about the $200k ask. Furthermore, a clearer end-to-end overview of how the program operates would also strengthen voter confidence.\n\nProposal Structure\n\nThe proposal comprises several elements: treasury management, burn bounties, grant graduation, governance logistics, community calls, and deployments. The proposal would land better with a cleaner sense of hierarchy: what’s core to the UC’s mandate versus what’s more exploratory? Even a short executive summary at the top would make a real difference for delegates getting up to speed ahead of the on-chain vote.\n\nTreasury Section\n\nWe’re supportive of getting the RFP process started, but the specific strategy breakdowns (basis funds, statistical arb, options, projected APR targets) may be too ambitious. We suggest trimming this down to the RFP mandate and high-level rationale to reduce back-and-forth over specifics that may change anyway.\n\nLooking forward to the team’s thoughts.\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] Uniswap Grants Program v0.1\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n35\n\n20167\n\nFebruary 9, 2022\n\nUniswap Council (UC): Season 4 Report\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n0\n\n345\n\nMarch 25, 2026\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee (UAC): Season 3 Report\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n9\n\n1053\n\nMay 6, 2025\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee (UAC): Season 2 Report\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n1175\n\nSeptember 23, 2024\n\n[Governance Proposal] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n7548\n\nAugust 17, 2022","tokens":9389,"crawled_at":1791194040378} +{"id":10329,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/governance-proposal-complete-initial-funding-of-the-uniswap-foundation/22020","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Governance Proposal]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Governance Proposal]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nOctober 5, 2023, 2:21pm\n\n1\n\nGovernance Vote Updates\n\nVote on the on-chain proposal on Agora, the Uniswap Labs interface, Tally, Boardroom, or any other Uniswap governance interface.\n\nAs discussed below, we are requesting $46.2M of UNI. Using a 30 day TWAP price of UNI of $4.32342, this equates to a request for 10,685,984.71 UNI.\n\nSimulated results of this proposal passing will be available here by navigating to the latest successful Governance Check workflow and downloading the Uniswap artifact at the bottom of the page.\n\nTemperature Check Updates\n\nTemp Check Snapshot here\n\nLast Wednesday we posted in the forum to complete the initial funding of the UF. Since then we’ve been having really great, thorough discussions with delegates – hearing your comments, answering questions, and receiving feedback.\n\nBased on that feedback, we are making a few changes to our proposal. These are covered in the bullets below, and updated throughout our proposal.\n\nWe have adjusted our request to reflect 2 years of operating and grants runway, with the 10% buffer to mitigate price risk. Our request is now $46.2M.\n\nWe break down how this funding will be used in the post below.\n\nWith this runway we anticipate we will return to governance for additional funding when we have approximately 1 year of runway left, in Q4 2024/ Q1 2025.\n\nWe will retain the need to receive governance approval via an off-chain vote for grants larger than $2M.\n\nWe have also heard feedback around the governance process being followed with this proposal. In our initial proposal, we had stated that, after approval, we would move directly to an on-chain vote for our receipt of our second tranche of funding. However, we have heard a desire from the community for the UF to follow the complete governance process here. We are happy to do that, particularly considering these additional changes.\n\nWe will consider last week’s post to be our RFC.\n\nThis post will be our Temperature Check. The Temp Check Snapshot is here.\n\nOnce the Temperature Check has been completed, we will kick off the final governance vote next week.\n\nTL;DR\n\nOur vision is for Uniswap to be the liquidity layer of a self-sovereign Internet, a permissionless alternative to the gated, intermediary-owned exchanges of traditional finance. To get there, the UF is building and supporting a robust ecosystem to grow, improve, and sustain the Uniswap Protocol for the long term.\n\nLast year, Uniswap governance approved the creation and initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation. Today we are requesting the remainder of our initial funding to support our next 2 years of work ($46.2M).\n\nWe hosted a Twitter Spaces to discuss our RFC and answer questions on Monday, October 2 (link here).\n\nIn this post we’re also providing the community with:\n\nA review of the UF’s progress over the last year: the team we have built, the grants we have disbursed and programs we’ve run, and their impact.\n\nA look to the future: what is our vision for the UF, and what is coming next?\n\nWe are kicking off our Temperature Check vote today, and will kick off our on-chain governance vote next week.\n\nUF Vision\n\nUniswap is critical infrastructure for a self-sovereign Internet, providing the liquidity layer for a flourishing world of tokens representing governance participation, community membership, the ability to participate in protocols, “real world” assets and more. It is critical financial infrastructure - providing a permissionless, credibly neutral alternative to the NYSE or SWIFT. It is an enabler of entrepreneurship, providing a liquidity platform for builders creating protocols and applications around the world.\n\nWe founded the Uniswap Foundation because we want to ensure that Uniswap is accessible for anyone in the world to leverage as permissionless financial and technological infrastructure for a long time.\n\nHow do we make that happen? A robust, diverse, and values-aligned ecosystem.\n\nA strong ecosystem is a competitive edge. It expands a Protocol’s accessibility, increases its resiliency, and enables it to thrive in the face of ruthless competitive and market environments. It means more product and engineering talent driving the Protocol forward, into new markets with better user experience. It means values-aligned delegates who are able to thoughtfully weigh the tradeoffs of governance proposals. It means more serendipity, collaboration, and inspiration.\n\nLooking across the crypto landscape it’s easy to see ecosystem strength as a competitive advantage. Ethereum is probably the best example. If Consensys and Ethereum’s earliest contributors were still the only teams building on and for Ethereum, it is easy to see a world where almost none of us would be here. Instead, Ethereum is one of the best places to build blockchain-based protocols and applications.\n\nThe UF is building the Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nHow are we doing that exactly?\n\n1. Growing core Protocol metrics, specifically driving net new order flow to strengthen the Protocol flywheel.\n\nOver the next year, this looks like the development of a robust hooks development platform which broadens the pipeline of developers onto Uniswap and diversifies the kinds of things Uniswap is able to do.\n\nIn the long term, this is 100ks+ of hook and application developers speaking to different use cases (crypto-native to RWA, building new financial primitives) and users globally, all while being able to generate a return for themselves.\n\n2. Building a pipeline for innovation on the Protocol, with the goal of enhancing the experience of swappers and LPs.\n\nOver the next year, this means launching the TL;DR Fellowship and Conference, and creating working groups to apply cutting-edge research across MEV and other relevant areas directly to Uniswap.\n\nIn the long term, this means Uniswap is the default home for the world’s top crypto/DeFi researchers and academics to build POCs and iterate upon mechanisms to improve the experience of key DeFi stakeholders.\n\n3. Aligning incentives for stakeholders with long-term interests of the Protocol, turning Uniswap into a cockroach.\n\nOver the short term, this means two things: the development of realistic mechanisms to effectively capture Protocol value created and distribute it to stakeholders, and bringing stakeholders together to build trust and context IRL.\n\nIn the long term, this means the alignment of long-term interests of core stakeholder teams with the Protocol to weather future volatility and competition.\n\nThis approach will serve to increase Uniswap’s moat over time while ensuring it can adapt as tides change.\n\nBelow, we discuss what we’ve done so far, and how we plan to accomplish our goals in the future. Thank you for your support, as always. We wouldn’t be here without you. We’re grateful to have the opportunity to work with you in the coming years.\n\nUpdate: One Year In\n\nBelow, we provide a summary of what the UF Grants program and our team directly has accomplished over the last year.\n\nGrants\n\nGrowth\n\nLaunch of Oku Trade alongside Oku API: a pro-trader interface accompanied by an API providing comprehensive real-time historical data across pools, swaps, positions, and more. Oku Analytics, which will offer truly-real-time data across all chains it supports, will be launching soon.\n\nSince launching in July, Oku Trade has had 3k unique wallet connections, and 56k unique site visitors.\n\nTwo projects, Unispark and UniChat, have launched on top of the Oku API thus far.\n\nOku also plays a key role in Uniswap Protocol’s multi-chain expansion. By the end of the year they plan to support 10 chains. This includes chains like Boba and Moonbeam which otherwise would not have interface support.\n\nPartnership with Gauntlet: UF’s year-long engagement with Gauntlet is focused on R&D into approaches to optimize incentive programs and fee design. We highlight some of their most interesting work here. They are building a Dynamic Incentive Optimization engine for community use to be released later this year.\n\nHackathon sponsorship: We’ve partnered with ETHGlobal, Binance, and Arrakis to sponsor 3 hackathons (and 1 Hookathon) which have brought 150+ new projects and 200+ new developers into the ecosystem.\n\nLaunch of the Developer Ambassadors Program: Our Ambassadors have started a podcast and deployed UniChat, a tool which leverages the Oku API and OpenAI to allow users to search Uniswap data using plain text.\n\nEnhancements to Uniswap v3 SDK - Koray and Florian are enhancing the SDK for a broader swath of developers and use cases, and making the code for liquidity management easier to use. They are on track to finish their work in November 2023.\n\nSupport for new tools and research for Liquidity Providers, including the development of Chaos Labs Strategy Simulator and the Messari LP Portal, as well as research on Advanced LP Strategies for Uniswap v3 conducted by Atis Elsts and Vasily Tolstikov.\n\nUniswap v3 Development Course: a free, open-source Uniswap v3 Development Course that serves as a fundamental guide for developers, attracting 12,000 monthly visitors..\n\nInnovation\n\nLaunch of TL;DR Research Institute: a first of its kind DeFi-focused Research Institute led by a council of Defi’s leading researchers. The Institute will fund grants to and provide mentorship for fellows studying MEV, mechanism design, ZK, and more, and result in a DeFi Research Conference in the Spring. For its first fellowship, starting in October 2023, TL;DR received 107 applications from around the world.\n\nIndustry-leading research on Cross-chain MEV – which has led in turn to a specification for a Proof of Concept (POC) MEV protection hook\n\nNovel research and implementations across a number of areas, including Lanturn (Measuring Economic Security of Smart Contracts through Adaptive Learning), Chaos Labs TWAP Market Risk application, Axiom’s Checkpoint-free TWAP oracles, and research on Pricing Nontoxic Orderflow.\n\nGovernance & Community\n\nUniswap Agora and the Uniswap Delegate Race - over 65 new delegates made new profiles (to compare, only 35 delegates have posted statement to the governance forum in the last 3 years)\n\nUniswap Cross-chain Bridge Report - A team of 8 produced a comprehensive analysis into the cross-chain requirements for Uniswap’s cross-chain governance use case, and an accompanying assessment of 9 bridges.\n\nUF Team\n\nFirst, we want to provide an overview of our team:\n\nDevin Walsh, Executive Director & UF Co-Founder\n\nKen Ng, Applied Research & UF Co-Founder\n\nElika Mahdavi, COO\n\nRaphaela Sapire, Head of Growth\n\nTyllen Bicakcic, Head of Developer Relations\n\nErin Koen, Head of Governance\n\nFederico Landini, Grants Manager\n\nWe’re also grateful to work with a number of contributors who are making an outsized impact.\n\nBen Basche, Hooks Strategy\n\nBethany Crystal, Grants Strategy\n\nYJ, Grants Committee\n\nLeander Capuozzo, Brand Experience\n\nJuliet Chung, Grants Administration\n\nBelow I want to summarize some of the work our team has done outside of grants:\n\nGrowth & Innovation\n\nInterviews with dozens of builders within the Uniswap ecosystem to develop a strategy to create and support a strong Hooks ecosystem for v4. Thus far we’ve also kicked off and are moderating an active Hook Dojo Telegram chat for 150+ hook developers, have hosted a Hookathon at ETHcc, Tacklebox Talks at ETHNYC, and are building v4 documentation, with the community’s support.\n\nBuilding the TL;DR Research Council, and designing the Fellowship based on their unique insights. Over the coming months, our team will coordinate and run the first TL;DR Conference.\n\nOur team has coordinated and ran multiple hackathons, providing hands-on support to 100s of hackers.\n\nGovernance\n\nOrganizing the Delegate Race with Agora and our first Blessing, a governance-focused event for delegates to build knowledge, context, and community.\n\nAssist in the governance process from writing forum posts, to educating delegates and rallying votes, to writing the code, sometimes debugging the code, and validating the proposal outcome.\n\nIn our original proposal, we requested that Uniswap Governance delegate 2.5M UNI to the UF so that we could re-delegate to community members without enough UNI to submit a governance proposal. Since then we have delegated UNI to several individuals (or used it ourselves) to post the following proposals:\n\nBharat.eth, Fix the Cross Chain Messaging Bridge on Arbitrum\n\n0XPlasma.eth, Deploy Uniswap V3 on BNB Chain\n\nJack Melnick, Deploy Uniswap V3 on Polygon zkEVM\n\nEek637.eth, Create v3deployments.uniswap.eth subdomain and populate its text fields\n\nGFXLabs.eth, Deploy Uniswap V3 on Linea\n\nJesse Sawa, Migrate the Celo Uniswap V3 Factory Contract owner from Optics to Wormhole\n\nRegulatory\n\nThe Uniswap Foundation submitted a comment letter to the SEC’s proposed amendments to Exchange Act 3b-16.\n\nLooking ahead\n\nWe will continue to take a targeted approach to growing the Uniswap ecosystem, investing our capital and resources to fund and support projects and teams who will drive growth and strengthening of the ecosystem.\n\nBelow we cover several initiatives currently in flight, and upcoming over the next few months.\n\nThrough the end of 2023, we plan to:\n\nDevelop the Hooks ecosystem. We’ll award grants to multiple teams to build a v4 SDK, develop hook best practices, educational resources, security standards, and libraries. We will fund high leverage hooks, including MEV mitigation hooks and hooks which increase LP profitability and experience. We’re also looking to accelerate the hook discovery and routing stack; create a hook launch playbook, and more. (Some of these grants may come in 2024). We’re also sponsoring more hackathons with hooks-related educational events for ETH Istanbul/Devconnect.\n\nLaunch the TL;DR Fellowship in October 2023.\n\nContinue IRL Delegate events and build more digital ways to connect. We will host a second Blessing event at ETH Istanbul/Devconnect, and are working towards creating more ways for delegates to connect and educate themselves.\n\nLay the groundwork for some of the big programs we’re excited to launch in 2024.\n\nInto 2024 and beyond, we want to offer insight into how we’re thinking about achieving our big goals.\n\nIn the realm of growth, we’re building an ecosystem of 100ks+ of hook and application developers speaking to different use cases and users globally. This includes:\n\nDriving adoption of v4 as we continue to build the hooks platform. Supporting liquidity migration to v4, the addition of net new liquidity and volume through novel hook development, continuing to fund hook developer content and tooling, and sponsor hookathons.\n\nBroadening our pipeline of contributing teams through partnerships and multi-milestone grants with industry-leading organizations. This might include curriculum development and hackathons to upskill new devs, or web3 onboarding for web2 engineers.\n\nExpanding our grantee support system through more dedicated grantee relationship management and marketing support.\n\nCreating a studio to incubate early founders building novel interfaces and applications.\n\nIn the realm of innovation, we’re building a pipeline for the world’s top crypto/DeFi researchers to build POCs and iterate upon mechanisms to improve the experience of key DeFi stakeholders on Uniswap.\n\nLaunching the TL;DR Conference in Q2 2024 and continuing to support the Institute’s growth.\n\nBuilding working groups of researchers and engineers to ideate upon and build novel POCs to mitigate some of the protocol’s most pressing challenges and expand the protocol surface area, for instance redistribution of MEV profits and on-chain RFQ systems.\n\nIn the realm of governance, we’re working towards an alignment of interests between stakeholders and the Protocol, turning Uniswap into a cockroach.\n\nContinuing to support digital and IRL governance platforms and events to support delegates in building community and context.\n\nSupporting initiatives to create and distribute Protocol value to stakeholders with community-led teams designing and implementing new ways to accrue and capture value for the Protocol, as well as mechanisms for value distribution.\n\nRequest Breakdown\n\nWe are requesting $46.2M in funds today.\n\nThis funding will last provide the UF with 2 years of runway. In total, $28.33M will go towards grants, and $13.6M ($11.4M and 508k UNI) will be spent on operations over this timeframe. We have added a 10% buffer to mitigate price volatility. On the day we post the governance proposal, we will request our funds in UNI, using 30-day-TWAP to convert our request.\n\nFinancials\n\nHistorical\n\nGrants\n\nOver the last year, the UF awarded $4.8M in grants across 5 categories, with the majority of grants being awarded to the Protocol Growth and R&D categories. We awarded our largest grant of $1.6M, to Oku Trade & API, shortly after UF launch. In our most recent quarter, we slowed down grant-making after the Uniswap v4 announcement. We shifted focus from making grants to Uniswap v3-focused projects to building our GTM and funding strategy for v4.\n\nNote that in addition to the $4.8M in grants commitments by the UF, the UF also inherited $886k of active UGP grants, which the UF disbursed over the last year. Total grants commitments including both UF and UGP grants totaled ~$5.7M.\n\n1330×424 48.6 KB\n\n1600×160 57.6 KB\n\nOperations\n\nOver the last year, we spent $3.15M on operations. This is on target with the $3.24M we predicted we would require for our first year of Operations in our initial proposal, with the following caveats:\n\nWe note that the $289K cost of the Uniswap Cross-chain Bridge Assessment Process, the outputs of which were published to the public, was covered by our Ops budget due to the urgent nature of this work in Q1 and Q2 2023.\n\nOur first employees hit their cliffs for UNI vesting in July. We disburse vesting on a quarterly basis, so the first disbursement will occur on October 1st.\n\nOur largest expenses were Payroll and Legal costs. Over the last year our Legal fees included costs to setup and receive our 501(c)(4) status; costs of defense in the Risley class action lawsuit; advisory work for team on how to effectively operate in an unstable regulatory environment; and advisory work to guide the UF’s work in supporting the Uniswap community, for example in our work to provide education and guidance related to the protocol fee switch.\n\n1278×360 63.4 KB\n\nForecast\n\nGrants\n\nWith the addition of funds, the UF will have $30M outstanding in grants capital remaining to disburse.\n\nWe plan to disburse $10-$15M per year, with the amount disbursed per year increasing over time. We note that we are allocating a portion of the Innovation budget (up to $9M) towards designing and testing novel incentive mechanisms. We note this because it’s likely these funds will be disbursed all at once in an MVP of a program.\n\nWe’ve recalibrated our grants categories and allocation budgets to focus on Grantee stakeholder groups.\n\n1286×412 120 KB\n\nProjected Team Growth\n\nOver the next year, we plan to grow our Growth & Research, Grants, and Technology teams in order to realize our goals. Specifically, we plan to:\n\nHire 2 individuals in Growth & Research to support our ongoing efforts, and to grow our expertise in the R&D efforts we are funding.\n\nHire 2 individuals on our Grants Team, including a Grants Lead.\n\nHire 2 individuals on our Technology team, one to support ongoing Product development grants and one to support Developer Relations.\n\nHire an Executive Assistant to support our teams’ internal operations.\n\nIn FY2025, we anticipate hiring up to 2 additional team members.\n\n1038×432 14.3 KB\n\nOperations\n\nFor the next two years, including funds on hand, we will have $13.6M and 961,364 UNI remaining to spend on Ops moving forward ($17.9M total at current UNI prices) through Q4 2025.\n\nBecause we are now planning for the next 2 years, we are adding an additional $1M in buffer to cover unexpected legal costs.\n\n1298×532 163 KB\n\nAdditional Notes\n\nOver the last year, the UF has spent $3.15M on ops and $5.4M in grants. We offer a few comments on these amounts below:\n\nOver the last quarter, we slowed down grant-making activities purposefully in order to build a strategy for grant-making for v4. We expect grants to double or triple to $10-$15M in grants committed per year. Over the next year, our annual operational spend is projected to increase by only ~20%. Over time as we scale we expect the ratio of grants-to-ops spend to continue to increase.\n\nThat being said we also want to note the multitude of activities that our team takes on outside of vanilla grant-making. Many of our team members spend their time incubating and coordinating novel grant-making programs, like the TL;DR Research Institute. And, approximately 50% of our teams’ time over the last year was focused outside of grant-making, including on event/hackathon coordination, hands-on support, marketing & comms, and legal/regulatory work.\n\nThe UF will retain the need to receive governance approval via an off-chain vote for grants larger than $2M. For that vote, we will use the terms set for the Temperature Check – a 5-day Snapshot poll with 10M quorum.\n\nTranche 1 Review\n\nLast year in our Tranche 1 of funding, we requested 2,547,002 UNI with the goal of receiving $20M. However the price of UNI decreased over the 11 days between our request and when it hit our wallet, decreasing the UNI’s value to $17.3M.\n\nWe priced this at the 30-day TWAP of $8.14 on the day we kicked off the governance vote August 17 2022. At this price, 2,547,002 UNI equates to $20M.\n\nWhen we received the funds on August 25, the UNI price had fallen 13.7% to $7.05, meaning that $17.3M worth of UNI hit our multi-sig. We use this number, $17.3M, to calculate the remainder of capital owed to the UF.\n\nTreasury Diversification\n\nOur Treasury Diversification policy is designed to prioritize capital preservation and risk mitigation. We also maintain a portion of our assets in UNI to offer as part of a compensation package to our employees, to align interests with that of the Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nFunds will be split between Operations and Grants. Below we detail our methodology for diversifying our assets within these two categories.\n\nFor Operational funds, we will:\n\nSet aside UNI tokens to be used in employee compensation packages.\n\nMaintain 6 months runway in cash in an FDIC-insured bank account.\n\nInvest the remainder of our funds in a low-risk yield bearing asset.\n\nFor Grants funds, we will:\n\nMaintain a portion of funds in stablecoins.\n\nMaintain 6 months of anticipated grants funding in an FDIC-insured bank account.\n\nInvest the remainder of our funds in a low-risk yield bearing asset.\n\nThis plan aligns our financial strategy with our core objectives, minimizing risk from market volatility to safeguard the foundation’s operations and grant-making commitments.\n\nNext Steps\n\nWe are kicking off our Temperature Check vote today - you can vote here. This vote will last for 5 days. We will kick off our on-chain governance vote next week.\n\nAppendix\n\nTo get a more comprehensive review on our work thus far, take a look at the blog posts we’ve written over the last year:\n\nUF Update to the Community - 7 Months In\n\nStrengthening Uniswap Governance.\n\nTo review the complete list of grants we have disbursed, check out our Wave 1, Wave 2, and Wave 3 write-ups.\n\nThank you to Jesse Walden, Hart Lambur, Alexis Gauba, and Julia Rosenberg for their support as advisors and multi-sig signers over the last year.\n\n15 Likes\n\nStableLab Delegate Platform\n\nScaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nUniswap Foundation: Summary Q3’2024 Financials\n\nUniswap Foundation: Summary Q1’2024 Financials\n\nelisafly\n\nOctober 6, 2023, 1:23pm\n\n2\n\nThank you for the update and clarifying @devinwalsh. Between this post and the Q&A on the last one, we are comfortable supporting this proposal. Avantgarde Finance\n\n4 Likes\n\nDAOstrat.C\n\nOctober 6, 2023, 1:55pm\n\n3\n\nWe have had the privilege of collaborating with the UF over the past year as a delegate, during which the UF established the foundation, supported proposals, created grant initiatives, grew, held events, and more. This proposal demonstrates a forward-looking understanding of the protocol’s trajectory and also aligns with ConsenSys’ core objective of fostering community-driven governance.\n\nThe receptiveness of the Foundation to community feedback is appreciated, especially in revising the funding strategy to enhance accountability with protocol governance and core stakeholders. The current proposal reflects a balanced approach, ensuring resource allocation without undermining the potential to support promising projects. This is among many things that help promote a transparent relationship between stakeholders.\n\nThe role of a foundation can vary based on the protocol, ecosystem, or stakeholders. In our view, the role of the UF is to support protocol governance and foster growth in the ecosystem. This proposal resonates with our broad belief.\n\nWe are optimistic about supporting this initiative through the governance process and fully anticipate positive outcomes for the ecosystem.\n\n7 Likes\n\nKpk Delegate Platform\n\nAbdullahUmar\n\nOctober 6, 2023, 5:27pm\n\n4\n\nWe appreciate the work that @devinwalsh, @eek637, and the rest of the foundation have put into Uniswap’s growth since last August. Every decentralized community needs a steward–and UF has filled that role via grants, events, and governance. The funding ask from last year, according to DAO consensus, seemed reasonable. And now, with the advent of newer and more complex additions to the Uniswap suite via V4 and UniX, we find the funding request to be even more relevant.\n\nTo those ends, we Michigan Blockchain are in support of this proposal.\n\n5 Likes\n\nLeighton\n\nOctober 10, 2023, 1:35am\n\n5\n\nI appreciate the adjustments that have been made to the proposal. I will support this proposal specifically and I also more generally am a big believer in the importance of the Uniswap Foundation.\n\nI think the Uniswap ecosystem benefits from having dedicated stewardship. I see this as very high leverage as the Uniswap Foundation is effectively handling a whole grants system as well. This prevents governance fatigue and mis-management that comes from token holders directly approving grant request.\n\n4 Likes\n\nPorter\n\nOctober 13, 2023, 5:30pm\n\n6\n\nSpecial thanks to @devinwalsh and the terrific team at the Uniswap Foundation for all their work driving the Uniswap ecosystem forward for the last year. We’re excited by the strategic vision they’ve outlined in this proposal. The specificity of the budgeting framework is particularly helpful as the Uniswap Foundation continues to grow and its role evolves. We at a16z crypto fully support their efforts and are appreciative of all they’ve done. As a result, we intend to support this proposal.\n\nThis proposal, in many ways, is an inflection point in the Uniswap Foundation’s journey. It represents a tangible commitment to the decentralized growth of Uniswap’s network, including by bringing the next wave of builders onboard and expanding the community.\n\nGiven the increased size of the Uniswap Foundation’s funding and budget in this proposal, it’s also important to consider the role of balanced oversight functions that foster appropriate systems and processes to protect the Uniswap community, the foundation, and contributors, in an effort to continue to professionalize web3 organizations. Certain of these oversight functions may be in the process of being implemented already, but where there are gaps, inspiration for filling them can come from many well-run and well-funded organizations, from traditional start-ups to NGOs to successful, established businesses.\n\nSo, at the time of this proposal, we want to identify the oversight functions that we believe the Uniswap Foundation can focus on during the period covered by the proposal. The Uniswap Foundation has the opportunity to establish a professional playbook for other web3 foundations to follow. If we can get this set-up right, it can be a model for the industry.\n\nHere’s a few of the ideas that could help shape that model:\n\n(1) Establishing a formal advisory board, or adding additional members to the current board, with traditional and web3 expertise in legal, financial, and technical matters, with an emphasis on experience in organizational governance.\n\n(2) Publishing quarterly progress reports and annual audited financial statements.\n\n(3) Hiring a General Counsel for the Uniswap Foundation and establishment of appropriate legal review processes for grants.\n\n(4) Creating a formalized plan that outlines expectations, KPIs, and removal processes and conditions for UF leadership positions, and the subsequent need for a community vote regarding the remaining funding the UF would hold at the time of a change in UF leadership.\n\n(5) Publishing a succession plan for UF leadership in the event of legal or ethical matters arising, or in the event members of the UF leadership leave prior to the fulfillment of this funding proposal.\n\nThis list isn’t intended to be exhaustive, but represents the main ways the UF can strengthen its organizational design. We look forward to hearing the community and UF’s feedback, and we’re excited for what’s in store ahead!\n\nNone of the above should be taken as investment advice or an advertisement for investment services; Some of the companies mentioned above are portfolio companies of a16z. Please see Disclosures | Andreessen Horowitz for more information.\n\nA list of investments made by a16z is available at a16z Investments Listed From A to Z | a16z\n\n7 Likes\n\n[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nOctober 13, 2023, 10:09pm\n\n7\n\nHi Porter, we appreciate your support here. We agree that this is an exciting time, for us and Uniswap as a whole, and we’re grateful for the opportunity to support the ecosystem in its next phase of growth.\n\nWe agree with the importance of the UF establishing best practices for community oversight, transparency, and internal governance. Many of the ideas put forth are already on our roadmap to achieve over the next year, including establishing a formal advisory board, adding to the UF Board, and providing more regular financial updates to the community.\n\nWe are directionally aligned with the additional items on your list and are excited to design operational processes and controls to professionalize the UF and set best practice for other Foundations in the space. We are committed towards taking these steps, without adding unreasonable operational or administrative burden to the UF, over the next year and in alignment with the aforementioned goals.\n\nilia_0x\n\nOctober 16, 2023, 6:53am\n\n8\n\nHello @Porter,\n\nFirstly, let me express my gratitude for the comprehensive feedback you’ve provided on the Uniswap Foundation’s proposal. As an active member of the Uniswap governance community, I am heartened to see esteemed organizations like a16z crypto take an active interest in ensuring the protocol’s growth and governance structures evolve appropriately.\n\nYour points underline the critical juncture we’re at as an ecosystem. As the Uniswap Foundation grows in its scale and importance, transparency and robust oversight become paramount.\n\nDrawing from your insights and my personal experience participating in governance, I’d like to add and echo a few points:\n\n1.1) The Grant Transparency Initiative seems like a pivotal step forward. As someone who deeply cares about the ecosystem’s growth, being able to trace the decision-making process behind each grant would be invaluable. It would help instill greater trust within the community and ensure that the protocol remains true to its ethos.\n\n1.2) I fully endorse the idea of hosting regular Grant Discussion Forums. This kind of direct engagement would foster a sense of ownership and inclusivity among community members, ensuring that many voices get a say in the protocol’s direction.\n\n1.3) Establishing a Grant Oversight Committee resonates with the community’s call for increased transparency. Such a body, particularly with representation from community-elected members, would bring about checks and balances that are crucial for such a significant budget allocation.\n\n2) Marketing and Communication: In the ever-evolving and fiercely competitive landscape of DEX platforms, standing out and communicating our value proposition is imperative. I echo the sentiment that a collaborative effort with the Uniswap Foundation to prioritize and strengthen marketing and communication is essential. Ensuring that our community outreach and governance proposals highlight this can be pivotal in retaining our position and expanding our user base.\n\n3) Proposals Execution: While conceptualizing and voting on proposals is a significant part of our governance process, equal emphasis should be on the execution phase. I’d love for both the Uniswap Foundation and the broader community to focus more on the successful execution of win proposals. Perhaps introducing a consul program or some other structured support system would ensure these winning ideas genuinely come to fruition, benefiting the ecosystem.\n\nYour suggestions about professionalizing governance, from the introduction of advisory boards to succession planning, are essential steps to ensure the foundation remains forward-thinking and agile. I’m eager to see how the UF and the broader community react to and potentially implement these ideas.\n\nI must also take a moment to commend the Uniswap Foundation and personally to @devinwalsh for the incredible work done so far. The collaboration on the BNBchain proposal stands out as a testament to what we can achieve together. Your dedication and results-oriented approach have been instrumental in bringing about meaningful change and advancement for the Uniswap ecosystem.\n\nWarm regards,\n\nilia.eth\n\n3 Likes\n\nkfx\n\nOctober 16, 2023, 8:18am\n\n9\n\nThank you for the post. Your have expressed, more eloquently than I could, ideas similar to what I suggested here:\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-complete-initial-funding-of-the-uniswap-foundation/21956/8?u=kfx\n\nI fully agree that the Uniswap Foundation should aspire to be a model for the industry. This goal should be kept in mind when considering day-to-day operations.\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n15\n\n7771\n\nOctober 7, 2023\n\n[Temperature Check] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nTemperature Check\n\n59\n\n25158\n\nSeptember 9, 2022\n\n[Governance Proposal] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n7548\n\nAugust 17, 2022\n\n[Consensus Check] Create the Uniswap Foundation\n\nConsensus Check\n\n0\n\n5439\n\nAugust 10, 2022\n\n[Governance Proposal] Uniswap Unleashed\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n46\n\n7873\n\nMarch 17, 2025","tokens":8739,"crawled_at":1791194060280} +{"id":10330,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/jens-ernstberger","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Jens Ernstberger - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn 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Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Jens Ernstberger\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n06.20.25 / Jason Milionis, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers and Tim Roughgarden\nManipulated signals in DePIN protocols\nIn a typical Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Network (DePIN) application, a network of suppliers is tasked with providing a service — weather readings in designated locations, broadband access, or energy, for example — to a client. Because self-interested suppliers can’t be trusted to self-report on their status, the question then becomes: How and when can a...\n\nresearch\nDePIN\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6900,"crawled_at":1791194064796} +{"id":10331,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/introduction/agents","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Foundry documentation for agents – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Foundry documentation for agents\n\nThe Foundry documentation is available as rendered HTML, page-level Markdown, compact and full text indexes, and an MCP server. Use the smallest source that answers the task instead of loading the entire book.\n\nWhen to use Foundry\n\nUse Foundry when a task involves a Solidity project or direct EVM interaction. Its four tools cover the common development loop:\n\nForge compiles, tests, fuzzes, debugs, deploys, verifies, formats, and lints Solidity projects.\n\nCast reads chain data, encodes and decodes ABI values, manages wallets, signs messages, and sends transactions from the command line.\n\nAnvil runs a local Ethereum node for deterministic tests, state manipulation, mining control, and forks of live networks.\n\nChisel provides an interactive Solidity REPL for evaluating expressions and prototyping contract logic.\n\nReach for a narrower tool when the task is outside that loop: use a Solidity compiler directly for compiler-only integration, a Rust or JavaScript Ethereum library for application code, and a browser wallet for user-mediated signing. Within a Foundry project, call the installed CLI from the project root so it reads the project's foundry.toml, remappings, dependencies, and profiles.\n\nStart with read-only commands such as forge build, forge test, forge config, cast call, or cast rpc. Treat cast send, forge create, and forge script --broadcast as state-changing operations: confirm the target chain, signer, value, and user authorization before running them.\n\nRetrieval interfaces\n\nInterfaceURL patternUse it for\nPage Markdown\nhttps://getfoundry.sh/.md\nReading one conceptual, guide, or reference page without navigation and presentation markup\n\nCompact index\nhttps://getfoundry.sh/llms.txt\nFinding candidate pages by title, route, and description\n\nFull corpus\nhttps://getfoundry.sh/llms-full.txt\nBuilding an offline index or retrieving across the whole documentation set\n\nMCP server\nhttps://getfoundry.sh/api/mcp\nSearching the documentation from an MCP-capable client\n\nHTML\nhttps://getfoundry.sh/\nPresenting the result to a person or inspecting rendered tables and navigation\n\nFor example, retrieve the testing guide as Markdown from https://getfoundry.sh/forge/testing.md, then use the HTML route /forge/testing when linking the answer for a person.\n\nThe full corpus is large because it includes generated CLI, cheatcode, and Forge Standard Library reference pages. Start with llms.txt, select one or more page routes, and fetch their .md forms. Only retrieve llms-full.txt when a bulk local copy is actually needed.\n\nRoute by task\n\nTaskStart hereFollow with\nInstall Foundry or create a project\nGetting started\nProject setup, project layout\n\nCompile or configure Solidity\nBuilding contracts\nConfiguration, configuration reference\n\nWrite or diagnose tests\nTesting\nInvariant testing, fork testing, debugging\n\nDeploy or verify contracts\nScripting\nDeploying contracts, forge script\n\nQuery a chain or send a transaction\nCast overview\nReading chain data, sending transactions\n\nRun or control a local node\nAnvil overview\nForking, custom methods\n\nManipulate Forge test state\nCheatcode overview\nThe exact cheatcode reference page\n\nLook up exact flags or syntax\nforge reference\nThe specific forge, cast, anvil, or chisel command page\n\nConcept and guide pages explain intent, safe workflows, and how features fit together. Generated reference pages are better for exact signatures, flags, defaults, and accepted values. Retrieve both when an answer needs operational context and precise syntax.\n\nAgent retrieval workflow\n\nIdentify the tool and task: Forge, Cast, Anvil, Chisel, configuration, cheatcodes, or Forge Standard Library.\n\nSearch llms.txt or the MCP server for the task and its likely command or API name.\n\nRead the narrow conceptual or guide page as Markdown.\n\nRead the exact reference page when flags, overloads, parameters, or defaults matter.\n\nConfirm version-sensitive or safety-critical behavior against the installed command's --help output or the current Foundry source.\n\nLink the human-readable HTML pages in the final answer.\n\nPrefer local evidence when working inside a Foundry project. Read foundry.toml, remappings.txt, scripts, tests, generated artifacts, and the installed forge --version before assuming the project follows defaults. Avoid network calls, broadcasts, key access, or explorer requests unless the task requires them and the user has authorized them.\n\nSearch terms that map well\n\nSearch with the exact command, configuration key, cheatcode, error fragment, or output field when known. When it is not known, pair the tool name with the intended outcome, such as:\n\nforge replay fuzz corpus\n\nforge symbolic incomplete\n\ncast send hardware wallet\n\nanvil manual mining txpool\n\nvm record state diff\n\nfoundry.toml invariant depth\n\nKeep aliases in the query when terminology varies. Useful pairs include script and broadcast, fork and forking, trace and debug, binding and ABI, and wallet and signer.\n\nReport uncertainty\n\nFoundry nightly releases can move faster than documentation. State the Foundry version used for a version-sensitive answer. If documentation, installed help, and source disagree, report the disagreement and prefer evidence from the version the user is actually running.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHub","tokens":1332,"crawled_at":1791194072125} +{"id":10332,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/manipulated-signals-in-depin-protocols","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Manipulated signals in DePIN protocols - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nManipulated signals in DePIN protocols\nJason Milionis, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers, and Tim Roughgarden\n06.20.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\nDePIN\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIn a typical Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Network (DePIN) application, a network of suppliers is tasked with providing a service — weather readings in designated locations, broadband access, or energy, for example — to a client. Because self-interested suppliers can’t be trusted to self-report on their status, the question then becomes: How and when can a network truthfully elicit the status of a supplier?\n\nFor example, suppose a client relies on a physical service being accessible and reliable in a particular area. The client would want to verify that service exists in that location, and is motivated enough to provide compensation for service provision but can’t trust the provider to accurately self-report because it might be cheaper for the provider to offer the service elsewhere and just spoof the location. This is the problem of location verification, which we’ll use as our illustrative example throughout.\n\nIn new research, we formally characterize the two fundamental obstacles — manipulation and self-dealing — that stand in the way of verifying the level of service provided by a supplier (in our example, its location). Importantly, knowing that these are the only two obstacles also suggests approaches for how to resolve them. Our framework is the first to provide a basis from which to reason about what types of services can and cannot be incentivized in DePIN applications.\n\nOur model\n\nOur model has three types of participants: the client, who requests the service; the source, who claims to provide the service; and the observers, who can at least partially verify the extent to which the source performed the expected service. We focus on the source and the observers.\n\nThe source of the information in our location verification example is the object that must report its location. The observers (e.g., sensors) receive signals from the source that may be noisy and/or manipulated by the source. For example, perhaps each observer communicates with the source and measures the round-trip latency; the source may deliberately delay before responding to communication requests and thereby manipulate the imputed distance.\n\nThe order of operations is as follows:\n\nThe source picks a strategy. The person or entity with private information gets to influence the information received by observers. It selects a way to “manipulate” the signals the observers will get, using only options that are allowed based on its private information (e.g., its true location) and other constraints (e.g., it can use message delays to increase the perceived distances but cannot decrease perceived distances via that same method).\n\nSignals are created. Then, signals (e.g., perceived distances between observers and the source) are generated (possibly probabilistically) using the method the source picked.\n\nEach observer sees only their own signal. Observers get to see only their own signal — they don’t know what the others saw.\n\nEach participant self-reports their information. After seeing their signals, the source and the observers participate in an elicitation/verification mechanism in which the source and the observers report whatever they like — including things that aren’t necessarily true.\n\nThe goal is then to design a mechanism in which the source and observers are incentivized to truthfully report their private information and signals, respectively.\n\nTwo fundamental challenges revealed\n\nOur paper establishes that there are two challenges inherent in accurately eliciting information in signal networks. We show that these challenges are fundamental to the problem, rather than simply being an artifact of our currently nascent understanding of the application domain.\n\n1. Manipulation\n\nThe first challenge concerns the manipulation of measurements of the provided service, and the fact that any one or even all of the observers may not be able to detect those manipulations. That is, a source may lie to the observers — and it may be hard to tell when it does so. To incentivize accurate measurements, network participants’ utility (i.e., how they are rewarded) should be tied to visible behavior in the protocol’s mechanism (e.g., whether observers’ reports are logically consistent with one another). For example, a network participant (source or observer) could be rewarded in a project’s native token for providing information requested by the protocol that appears consistent with the information provided by the other participants.\n\nOur first formal theorem proves that the problem of incentivizing accurate information from the source and observers is unsolvable unless the setting satisfies a condition that we term “source identifiability.” This condition requires that the source’s information cannot be completely and always (in a statistical sense) manipulated to seem exactly the same to all observers under two different true source signals; we’ll say more on this below. We show that when such ambiguity is present, there’s nothing a protocol designer can do to guarantee truthful elicitation: The source can always exploit the ambiguity to undetectably misrepresent its information. This impossibility result holds even when the protocol has native tokens or other incentives at its disposal.\n\n2. Self-dealing\n\nIn incentive design, sometimes the cure is worse than the disease. In the context of decentralized service provision, a particular worry is that a source may additionally masquerade as one or more observers (so-called sybils) and pretend to request or verify service from themselves, or team up (i.e., collude) with other network participants to do so. In the language of our model, the source might collude with some observer(s) (or itself, under a sybil identity) with the intention of exploiting the mechanism for its rewards.\n\nOur second theorem establishes that when such collusion is present, truthful elicitation of the source’s information is essentially impossible (unless a condition much stronger than source identifiability holds, in which potentially colluding agents are ignored).\n\nThe good news\n\nOur results show that source non-identifiability and self-dealing are fundamental obstacles to verification in DePIN applications. The good news is that we show a sense in which these are the only two obstacles: We give a formal mechanism that, under the assumptions of source identifiability and no self-dealing, achieves full information revelation at the equilibrium.\n\nHow DePIN protocol designers can move forward\n\nOur results suggest two key lessons for DePIN protocol designers. The first is to take steps to ensure that source identifiability is possible. This is not as abstract as it sounds — for example, in location verification, source identifiability is equivalent to the geometric condition that the source’s location lies in the convex hull of observers’ locations. So if you want to ensure that you can truthfully elicit a source’s location, be sure to “surround” its possible locations appropriately with observers.\n\nThe second lesson is that DePIN protocol designers need to address self-dealing concerns outside of the protocol. Ways to do this include, for example, restrictions to permissionless entry (thereby justifying stronger trust assumptions) or randomizing between many different sources who might perform a service for the client (thereby assigning a non-zero cost to pretending to request service).\n\n***\n\nWe hope that our work helps DePIN designers think crisply about their verification problems and the different options for addressing them. DePIN protocols are already exploring these and related ideas, and we’re excited to see how it plays out.\n\n***\n\nFor deeper technical analysis and discussion of our model of and results on signal networks, please see our paper, “Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure.”\n\n***\n\nJason Milionis is a Ph.D. student in the Computer Science Department at Columbia University, where he is advised by Christos Papadimitriou and Tim Roughgarden. He is broadly interested in Game Theory, especially in conjunction with Machine Learning, and DeFi. He has also been an intern at the a16z crypto research lab.\n\nJens Ernstberger works at the intersection of cryptography and computer security. Most recently, he was a research intern at a16z crypto. Previously, he was a PhD student at Technical Univeristy of Munich, under the supervision of Prof. Sebastian Steinhorst and Dr. Arthur Gervais.\n\nJoseph Bonneau is a Technical Advisor on the a16z crypto team and an Associate Professor in the Computer Science Department at the Courant Institute, New York University.\n\nScott Duke Kominers is the Sarofim-Rock Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, a Faculty Affiliate of the Harvard Department of Economics, and a Research Partner at a16z crypto. He also advises a number of companies on web3 strategy, as well as marketplace and incentive design; for further disclosures, see his website. He’s also the coauthor of The Everything Token: How NFTs and Web3 Will Transform the Way We Buy, Sell, and Create.\n\nTim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science and a member of the Data Science Institute at Columbia University, and Head of Research at a16z crypto.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":3023,"crawled_at":1791194083395} +{"id":10333,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/community-governance-process/7732","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Community Governance Process - Governance-Meta - Uniswap Governance","text":"Community Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\nashleigh\n\nOctober 26, 2020, 3:03pm\n\n1\n\nThis document is a suggested process for developing and advancing Uniswap Governance Proposals. It is a living document intended to be owned, modified and enforced by the Uniswap community.\n\nNote: Autonomous proposals are a recent addition to Governance, not yet considered in this document. A process and policy around this proposal type should be created and implemented by the community.\n\nProcess:\n\nSeveral governance venues available to Uniswap governance are mentioned, each serving its own particular purpose.\n\ngov.uniswap.org\n\nGov.uniswap.org is a Discourse forum for governance-related discussion. Community members must register for an account before sharing or liking posts. New members are required to enter 4 topics and read 15 posts over the course of 10 minutes before they are permitted to post themselves.\n\nSnapshot\n\nSnapshot is a simple voting interface that allows users to signal sentiment off-chain. Votes on snapshot are weighted by the number of UNI delegated to the address used to vote.\n\nGovernance portals\n\nA governance portal can be accessed through the Uniswap interface. Votes can be delegated and cast through this portal. There are also several other governance interfaces that users can use to cast their votes*:\n\nhttps://custody.coinbase.com/\n\nhttp://unigov.eth.link/#/ap\n\nhttps://app.boardroom.info/\n\n*Note: this is not a complete list, and should be updated by the community frequently.\n\nBelow is a preliminary draft for the Uniswap governance process, detailing exactly where these venues fit in. These processes are subject to change according to feedback from the Uniswap community.\n\nPhase 1: Temperature Check — Discourse/Snapshot\n\nThe purpose of the Temperature Check is to determine if there is sufficient will to make changes to the status quo.\n\nTo create a Temperature Check:\n\nAsk a general, non-biased question to the community on gov.uniswap.org about a potential change (example: “Should Uniswap governance add liquidity mining for XYZ token?”). Forum posts should be labeled as follows: “Temperature Check - [Your Title Here]”. The forum post should include a link to the associated Snapshot poll.\n\nVoters use Snapshot to indicate their interest in bringing it forward to the next stage. Snapshot poll lengths should be set to 3 days.\n\nThat’s it! You’ve just started the process of gaining support for a proposal. At the end of the 3 days, a majority vote with a 25k UNI yes-vote threshold wins.\n\nIf the Temperature check does not suggest a change from the status quo, the topic will be closed on the governance site. If the Temperature Check does suggest a change, proceed to Stage 2: Consensus Check.\n\nPhase 2: Consensus Check — Discourse/Snapshot\n\nThe purpose of the Consensus Check is to establish formal discussion around a potential proposal.\n\nTo create a Consensus Check:\n\nUse feedback from the Temperature Check post and create a new Snapshot poll which covers the options which have gained support. This poll can either be binary or multiple choice but should include the option “Make no change” or its equivalent. Set the poll duration to 5 days.\n\nCreate a new topic in the Proposal Discussion category on gov.uniswap.org titled “Consensus Check — [Your Title Here]”. This will alert the community that this topic has already passed Temperature Check. Any topics beginning with Consensus Check that have not passed Temperature Check should be immediately be removed by community moderators. Make sure that the discussion thread links to the new Snapshot poll and the Temperature Check thread.\n\nReach out to your network to build support for the proposal. Discuss the proposal and solicit delegates to vote on it. Be willing to respond to questions on the Consensus Check topic. Share your view point, although try to remain as impartial as possible.\n\nAt the end of 5 days, whichever option has the majority of votes wins, and can be included in a governance proposal for Stage 3. A 50k UNI yes-vote quorum is required for the Consensus Check to pass.\n\nIf the option “Make no change” wins, the Consensus Check topic should be closed by community moderators.\n\nPhase 3: Governance Proposal — Governance Portal\n\nPhase 3 — Governance Proposal — is the final step of the governance process. The proposal should be based on the winning outcome from the Consensus Check and can consist of one or multiple actions, up to a maximum of 10 actions per proposal.\n\nTo create a Governance Proposal:\n\nWrite the code for your proposal, which can be voted on through any Governance Portal. More resources can be found here. All proposed code should be audited by a professional auditor. This auditing process could be paid or reimbursed by the community treasury.\n\nEnsure at least 10 million UNI is delegated to your address in order to submit a proposal, or find a delegate who has enough delegated UNI to meet the proposal threshold to propose on your behalf.\n\nCreate a topic in the Proposal Discussion category on gov.uniswap.org titled “Governance Proposal [Proposal Number] — [Your Title Here]” and link to any relevant Snapshot polls/discussion threads as well as the code audit report. Proposal numbers should be in a “UP###” format. For example, the first Uniswap Proposal should be titled UP001, the second UP002, and so on. Topics that begin with “Governance Proposal” that have not successfully passed the Temperature Check and Consensus Check stages should be removed by community moderators.\n\nCall the propose() function of the Governor Alpha to deploy your proposal.\n\nOnce the propose() function has been called, a seven day voting period is started. Ongoing discussion can take place in the gov.uniswap.org forum. If the proposal passes successfully, a two day timelock will follow before the proposed code is executed.\n\nSoft governance:\n\nThe process described above lays out a structure for those wishing to host a formal vote on a particular issue.\n\nHowever, governance systems also require a degree of “metagovernance” discussions that inform the direction of and the implementation processes behind policy, but which don’t qualify as policy themselves.\n\nThe community may discuss new ideas and strategies for governance — including changes to the process outlined above — in the “Governance-Meta” category. On-chain voting is not necessary to make updates to off-chain processes.\n\nGovernance Glossary:\n\nUNI: An ERC-20 token that designates the weight of a user’s voting rights. The more UNI a user has in their wallet, the more weight their delegation or vote on a proposal holds.\n\nDelegation: UNI holders cannot vote or create proposals until they delegate their voting rights to an address. Delegation can be given to one address at a time, including the holder’s own address. Note that delegation does not lock tokens; it simply adds votes to the chosen delegation address.\n\nProposal: A proposal is code that is executed by the governance contract through timelock. It can replace the governance contract, transfer tokens from the community treasury, or perform an almost infinite range of other on-chain actions. In order to create a proposal, an address must have at least 1% (10M UNI) of all UNI delegated to their address. Proposals are stored in the “proposals” mapping of the Governor smart contract. All proposals are subject to a 7-day voting period. If the proposer does not maintain their vote weight balance throughout the voting period, the proposal may be canceled by anyone.\n\nQuorum: In order for a vote to pass, at least 4% of all UNI (40M) must vote in the affirmative. The purpose of this quorum is to ensure that the only measures that pass have adequate voter participation.\n\nVoting: Users can vote for or against single proposals once they have voting rights delegated to their address. Votes can be cast while a proposal is in the “Active” state. Votes can be submitted immediately using “castVote” or submitted later with “castVoteBySig” (For more info on castVoteBySig and offline signatures, see EIP-712). If the majority of votes (and a 4% quorum of UNI) vote for a proposal, the proposal may be queued in the Timelock.\n\nVoting Period: Once a proposal has been put forward, Uniswap community members will have a seven day period (the Voting Period) to cast their votes.\n\nTimelock: All governance actions are delayed for a minimum of 2 days by the timelock contract before they can be executed.\n\n70 Likes\n\nPreliminary Voting\n\nFocus on newcomers: healthy long term community building\n\n[Consensus Check] Should Uniswap Distribute UNI to Liquidity Providers?\n\n[Discussion] Uniswap Liquidity Incentive Plan\n\n[Temperature Check] Should Uniswap Distribute UNI to Liquidity Providers?\n\nAnnouncement: unofficial Community Call - Thursday 12 Nov 17:00 UTC\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 to Arbitrum Mainnet\n\nTemperature Check - [Merge the Uniswap Grant Program into Uniswap DAO Governance]\n\nCommunity Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]\n\nProposed Simplifications to the Uniswap Governance Process\n\n[Discussion] Uniswap Liquidity Incentive Plan\n\n[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nheyJonBray\n\nOctober 31, 2020, 8:45am\n\n7\n\nI’ve had a lot of thoughts about the overall procedures. I’m linking a topic I made regarding an idea I have for a more organic way to promote and develop proposals that will be voted on, improvements to the overall Governance UI experience, and a novel way of staking votes for ideas that users would like to see become proposals. One of the great benefits we can take from this community governance is the formation of ad-hocs to quickly and efficiently perform Uniswap legislation (and also make it fun to do so).\n\nSimilar to how Augur has a prediction market, I am picturing a “Legislative Market” of sorts being a step forward in community governance. Using the staking mechanism logic behind liquidity pools in a competitive manner where YES and NO tokens that only work within the Governance UI are staked against each other in an attempt to push proposal ideas either forward or out.\n\nhttps://gov.uniswap.org/t/friendly-competitive-staking-proposal-process/8006\n\n20 Likes\n\nheyJonBray\n\nNovember 6, 2020, 2:19am\n\n8\n\nAny thoughts on the procedure of competitive staking?\n\nFor those who haven’t seen the UniPig interface, check it out. It is a % dominance protocol that was released with vague intentions by the creators.\n\nI think this would be a perfect use for it. Any feedback would be super helpful as I’m working on a UI demo.\n\n18 Likes\n\nhosseinmr\n\nJanuary 22, 2021, 12:26pm\n\n10\n\nI Think Uniswap Will going to cross the moon\n\n10 Likes\n\nkeninqiu\n\nFebruary 4, 2021, 4:45am\n\n11\n\nFor kline of Uniswap, please check out at flaswap. com\n\n1 Like\n\ndt656\n\nFebruary 9, 2021, 7:54am\n\n12\n\n2nd\n\n7 Likes\n\nheyJonBray\n\nFebruary 19, 2021, 1:46pm\n\n13\n\nThere’s no moon happening until the transaction fee bottleneck is overcome. Market cap for DeFi is slowly migrating to BSC.\n\nIt would be great if Uniswap integrated a direct-to-BSC bridge, as until Ethereum devs get the gas fees under control the price is going to stagnate. We’re seeing a lot of funds move off Ethereum and onto BSC because transactions can be completed for pennies.\n\nTechnical analysis doesn’t show much more upward momentum for UNI as far as price goes. However, it performs it’s utility as a governance token swimmingly, which is what it is meant for.\n\n11 Likes\n\nwesleyliu1020\n\nMarch 2, 2021, 9:57am\n\n15\n\nMaybe the layer 2 Dex taker over part of the market share. The layer 2 AMM protocol ZKSwap (zks.app) with 0 gas fee is a big threat.\n\n3 Likes\n\nvictmar8510\n\nMarch 8, 2021, 12:41am\n\n16\n\nEstoy de acuerdo, por las altos costos en la tarifa de transacción, estan migrando a BSC ya que las tarifas por transacción son muy bajas, se ha dado el caso de que vale mas la transacción que la cantidad de tokens que se quiere comprar.\n\n1 Like\n\nSriWahyu\n\nMarch 10, 2021, 9:48am\n\n17\n\nUniswap the MOON\n\n4 Likes\n\nChristie\n\nMarch 24, 2021, 2:15pm\n\n18\n\nUniswap\n\n4 Likes\n\nhervian_ivan\n\nMarch 29, 2021, 6:39am\n\n19\n\noptimism will be granted with $5k per token.\n\n4 Likes\n\nAlexanderNapGeo\n\nMarch 31, 2021, 4:51pm\n\n20\n\nPlease I am new here. Have used Uniswap many times. Today I swapped Ethereum for Polkamon tokens and only received for 14 tokens for $600. US dollars worth of Ether. I thought was getting 1400 Polkamon as ICO price is .40 cents apiece. How did this major mis pricing happen?\n\n7 Likes\n\nTomy\n\nApril 4, 2021, 8:25am\n\n21\n\nThat ICO ended in march 31, think you missed it sorry.\n\n4 Likes\n\nmboyle522\n\nApril 9, 2021, 9:38pm\n\n22\n\nThanks you made that really easy to digest.\n\n4 Likes\n\nneonnightsnz\n\nJuly 19, 2021, 2:43am\n\n23\n\nfrill is a good way to manage this\n\n2 Likes\n\nneonnightsnz\n\nJuly 19, 2021, 3:05am\n\n24\n\nJon, sorry I’m not sure how to post a new topic here. I’m hoping you can answer this.\n\nI’d like to borrow some money and I’d like to get a lower rate than banks offer something similar or better than p2p lending platforms like Mintos. I’m not ready to take a big loan vai crypto because of the market volatility. But if stable coins work as intended I’d be more open to it. I’d like a fixed term and floating and fixed interest options and understand securing the loan is important too so I’m happy to do so.\n\nUniswap has been awesome for investor’s but I’ve only heard about the horror stories so far about borrowers.\n\nIs uniswap capable of attracting borrowers? Automatic market makers create liquidity but doesn’t solve the equation until I’d like to see borrowers enter a contract with low interest rates and get the greatest not for risking capital but for returning value over the amount lent. Can you see how balancing this equation maybe impossible with automatic market makers.\n\n5 Likes\n\ncrosome\n\nNovember 19, 2021, 10:34am\n\n26\n\nit think Uniswap will improve more than before\n\ngo on\n\n2 Likes\n\nBenjamin\n\nNovember 19, 2021, 2:34pm\n\n27\n\nit will improve more than before go on\n\n2 Likes\n\nKainam_Harki\n\nNovember 25, 2021, 8:09am\n\n28\n\nuniswap is going on it flys\n\n3 Likes\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nGovernance Weekly Recap\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n21\n\n6566\n\nMay 26, 2023\n\nA Deep Dive of Uniswap's Governance\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n4816\n\nFebruary 10, 2023\n\n[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n4561\n\nDecember 6, 2022\n\nProposed Simplifications to the Uniswap Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n5988\n\nDecember 7, 2022\n\nProposal: Reduce amount of UNIs required to submit governance proposal\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n105\n\n17151\n\nNovember 25, 2021","tokens":3651,"crawled_at":1791194090695} +{"id":10334,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Develop | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui development centers on three areas: understanding the Sui architecture, writing Move packagesPackageSmart contracts on Sui., and building transactions. Each area builds on the previous one. You write Move packages to define onchain logic, then construct transactions to call that logic, and the Sui architecture determines how those transactions execute and reach finalityFinalityThe state in which a transaction is permanently recorded and cannot be revoked..\n\nA Move package contains one or more modulesModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects.. Each module defines types, functions, and the rules that govern how objects are created, transferred, and destroyed. Sui uses an objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. model where assets are explicit objects with defined ownership, rather than entries in a shared ledger.\n\nTransactions on Sui are programmable transaction blocksProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui. (PTBs). A single PTB can call multiple MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. functions, transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. objects, and split or merge coins, all in one atomic operation. This composability reduces the number of round trips between your app and the network.\n\nIf you are new to Sui development, start with the architecture overview to understand how Sui processes transactions and manages state. Then move to writing your first Move package, and finally explore PTBs to learn how to compose complex onchain operations from your app.\n\nDevelop\nLearn the developer essentials, including info about Sui's architecture, how to write Move packages, and how to build transactions.\n→\nSui Architecture\nIn this section\nComponents\nNetworks\nConsensus\nTokenomics\nObject Model\nEpochs and Reconfiguration\n+ 4 more\n\n→\nUsing Objects\nIn this section\nTypes of Object Ownership\nDerived Objects\nDynamic Fields\nVersioning\nOwned Compared With Shared\nObject Display\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nWriting Move Packages\nIn this section\nWhat are Move Packages?\nMove Concepts\nMove Syntax Fundamentals\nMove Best Practices\nMove Book\n\n→\nDeploying and Upgrading Packages\nIn this section\nPublishing\nUpgrading\nCustom Upgrade Policies\nVersioning\nDeploy with GitHub Actions\n\n→\nManaging Packages\nIn this section\nMove Package Management\nAddress Management (Legacy)\nSource Verification\n\n→\nTesting and Debugging\nIn this section\nTesting Move Smart Contracts\nTroubleshooting Common Errors\n\n→\nBuilding Transactions\nIn this section\nWhat is a Transaction?\nLife of a Transaction\nProgrammable Transaction Blocks\nTransaction Authentication\nSoft Bundles\n\n→\nPaying for Transactions\nIn this section\nGas Fees\nObject-Based Local Fee Markets\nGasless Stablecoin Transfers\nSponsored Transactions\nGas Smashing\n\n→\nAccessing Data\nIn this section\nData Access Interfaces\nRPC and Data Providers\nJSON-RPC Migration Guide\ngRPC\nGraphQL\nArchival Service\n+ 3 more\n\n→\nCryptography\nIn this section\nSignature Verification\nHashing\nGroth16\nECVRF\nPasskey\n\n→\nSecurity\nIn this section\nBest Practices\n\n→\nProduction Readiness\nPrepare a Sui application for Mainnet deployment with checklists covering smart contract security, key management, package upgrades, infrastructure, and operational monitoring.\n→","tokens":818,"crawled_at":1791194098372} +{"id":10335,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/developer_tooling/benchmarking","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Benchmarking - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Benchmarking\n\nThe Open Autonomy framework provides a benchmark tool to assist with the process of measuring the performance of an AI agent. The tool is designed to measure time spent within the execution of code blocks in the behaviours that compose an FSM App. It differentiates between two kinds of code blocks:\n\nLocal code blocks: used to measure the time taken in local computations, for example, preparation of payloads or computing a local function.\n\nConsensus code blocks: used to measure the time taken by the logic in the execution of the consensus algorithm by the agent instances.\n\nSet up the benchmark tool\n\nThe benchmark tool is encapsulated in the class\n\npackages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models.BenchmarkTool\n\nTo set up the tool, you need to follow a couple of steps detailed below. Note that these steps are automatically done if you use the FSM App scaffold tool.\n\nImport the class BenchmarkTool in the models.py of your skill, and extend it, if required.\n\nfrom packages.valory.skills.abstract_round_abci.models import (\nBenchmarkTool as BaseBenchmarkTool)\n\n# (...)\n\n# Use the class as-is.\nMyBenchmarkTool = BaseBenchmarkTool\n\n# Or extend the class, if required.\nclass MyBenchmarkTool(BaseBenchmarkTool):\n# (...)\n\nEnsure that the skill configuration file skill.yaml points correctly to the skill benchmark tool in the section models.\n\nskill.yaml# (...)\nmodels:\nbenchmark_tool:\nargs:\nlog_dir: /logs\nclass_name: MyBenchmarkTool\n\nDefining the code blocks to measure\n\nOnce the tool is set up, it can be accessed through the skill context. Usually, the measurement of the code blocks will be executed within the async_act() method of the concrete behaviours.\n\nclass MyBehaviour(BaseBehaviour, ABC):\n\n# (...)\n\ndef async_act(self) -> Generator:\n# The benchmark tool can be accessed here through `self.context.benchmark_tool`\n\nThe syntax used to delimit the scope of the different types of code blocks (local and consensus blocks) is achieved through a Python with runtime context.\n\nclass MyBehaviour(BaseBehaviour, ABC):\n\n# (...)\n\ndef async_act(self) -> Generator:\n\n# (...)\n\nwith self.context.benchmark_tool.measure(self.behaviour_id).local():\n# Code which will be accounted for \"local\" execution\n# (...)\n\nwith self.context.benchmark_tool.measure(self.behaviour_id).consensus():\n# Code which will be accounted for \"consensus\" execution\n# It will typically consist of the following two statements:\nyield from self.send_a2a_transaction(payload)\nyield from self.wait_until_round_end()\n\nself.set_done()\n\nSave the benchmark data\n\nThe benchmark data is saved upon calling the method BenchmarkTool.save(). This function call is executed at the end of every period by the ResetAndPauseBehaviour (within the reset_pause_abci FSM App skill). Hence, the reset_pause_abci FSM App must be chained appropriately in the composed FSM, marking the end of a period in the business logic of the AI agent.\n\nAs a summary, the sequence of events that should occur so that the benchmark information is saved correctly is as follows:\n\nThe overall FSM App is composed with the reset_pause_abci FSM App.\n\nAny intermediate behaviour executes local and/or consensus blocks contexts within their async_act() method.\n\nThe FSM App reaches the ResetAndPauseRound (reset_pause_abci round and calls the BenchmarkTool.save() method.\n\nWait for as many periods as you wish before stopping the AI agent. Note that any measurement not saved at the end of a period will be lost.\n\nThe benchmark data will be stored in the folder /abci_build_*/persistent_data/benchmarks.\n\nUse the command line to aggregate benchmark information\n\nRun the AI agent. Build and run the AI agent in dev mode. (The tool also works if you run the AI agent normal mode.)\n\nWait for AI agent execution. Wait until the AI agent has completed at least one period before cancelling the execution. That is, wait until the ResetAndPauseRound round has occurred at least once. As commented above, this is required because benchmark data is saved in this state. Once you have a data dump, you can stop the local execution by pressing Ctrl-C.\n\nAggregate the benchmark data. The benchmark data will be stored in the folder /abci_build_*/persistent_data/benchmarks. Aggregate the data for all periods executing:\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks abci_build_*/persistent_data/benchmarks\n\nThis will generate a benchmarks.html file containing benchmark stats in your current directory.\nBy default the script will generate output for all periods but you can specify which period to generate output for. Similarly, block types aggregation is configurable as well. For example,\n\nautonomy analyse benchmarks abci_build_*/persistent_data/benchmarks --period 2 --block-type consensus\n\nwill aggregate stats for consensus code blocks in the second period.\nYou can specify the --block-type option as local (to consider only local code blocks), consensus (to consider only consensus code blocks), total (to aggregate local + consensus code blocks) or all (to consider both consensus and local code blocks).","tokens":1266,"crawled_at":1791194106508} +{"id":10336,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-community-governance-process-changes/18060","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRequests for Comment\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nNovember 21, 2022, 5:00pm\n\n1\n\nTL;DR\n\nOne of the goals of the Uniswap Foundation is to reduce the amount of friction in the community governance process. In that spirit, today we are proposing changes to that process to improve its efficiency and efficacy.\n\nWe propose the following changes to the community governance process:\n\nRemove the first off-chain Snapshot poll, and replace it with a “Request for Comment” post. The first phase of the governance process should allow the community to digest a proposal, comment, and ask questions – and for the proposer to respond and make updates. We also believe two off-chain votes introduces unnecessary friction, so we propose removing this first one.\n\nIncrease quorum for the remaining off-chain Snapshot poll in the second phase to 5M UNI. The purpose of this off-chain vote is to gauge community sentiment prior to the governance vote. We believe the 5M UNI quorum will act as a better signal than the lower quorum requirements in the current process.\n\nWe also propose to formalize a process for future changes to off-chain components of the governance process (like the changes discussed in this proposal): specifically, an off-chain Snapshot poll with the same parameters of the on-chain governance vote. Today, this would require a 7-day voting period with a 40M UNI quorum. All changes that entail changes to on-chain parameters should continue to go through the normal community governance process.\n\nIn 3 weeks, on Monday, December 12, we will post a Snapshot poll for the community to vote on these changes. As described above, the vote will last for 7-days and have a 40M UNI quorum.\n\nSummary\n\nUniswap’s governance process is a core input to the community’s ability to steward its ongoing maintenance and growth in a fair and transparent manner. The design of the process should optimize for the dissemination of information throughout the community, for thoughtful iterations on proposals, and for signaling from the community prior to on-chain votes. While the governance process put in place today has, for the most part, been successful in achieving those goals, we believe improvements can be made to reduce overhead and to enhance off-chain signaling prior to the final governance vote.\n\nThese process enhancements were previously discussed in the forum here, but the simplifications were never implemented. We have decided to bring them back with minor changes.\n\nBelow we lay out the suggested changes, alongside our rationale. We are excited to hear and incorporate your feedback into this process change.\n\nGroup 1 (1)1729×1138 87.1 KB\n\nCurrent Process\n\nA detailed outline of the current process can be found here.\n\nTemperature Check: A temperature check is accompanied by a 3-day snapshot poll with a 25k UNI quorum.\n\nConsensus Check: A consensus check is accompanied by a 5-day snapshot poll with a 50k UNI quorum.\n\nGovernance Proposal: The on-chain proposal and vote, tied to on-chain executable code, is the final phase of the governance process. The proposer must have a minimum of 2.5M UNI delegated to their address, and there is a 40M UNI quorum requirement.\n\nProposed changes to community governance process\n\nPhase 1: Request for Comment\n\nRename: Temperature Check → Request for Comment\n\nRemoval of Snapshot off-chain vote\n\nA minimum of 3 days before moving forward\n\nWe believe the first phase of the governance process should allow the community to digest a proposal, comment, and ask questions. The RFC Phase should last for at least 3 days so the proposers can gather adequate feedback to take into account for the next iteration of the proposal.\n\nWe are also removing the friction of two off-chain votes.\n\nPhase 2: Temperature Check\n\nRename: Consensus Check → Temperature Check\n\nIncrease the required quorum from 50k to 5M UNI\n\nFor this phase to better serve as a signaling tool, we suggest increasing quorum to 5M UNI. This threshold should be high enough to prevent lower quality proposals from moving to the final on-chain vote, while not creating additional friction.\n\nPhase 3: On-chain Governance Vote\n\nNo changes\n\nProposed formalization of process changes to off-chain components of governance process\n\nIn her original post on the community governance process, Ashleigh states “On-chain voting is not necessary to make updates to off-chain processes.” We agree with this. However, we do believe that community support and acceptance is important for off-chain process changes to have legitimacy.\n\nThus, we propose a formalized process – intended to signal community support and acceptance – to change these off-chain components in the future. Specifically, we propose an off-chain vote with the same parameters of the final governance vote. Right now, that is a 7 day vote period and 40M UNI quorum.\n\nThese are the parameters we plan to use to pass all of the proposed changes in this proposal.\n\nConclusion and Next Steps\n\nWe welcome all feedback from the community on these proposed changes, and will incorporate feedback into the proposal where sentiment is strong.\n\nIf no serious changes to the proposal are required, we plan to post a Snapshot Poll in 3 weeks, on Monday, December 12th for the community to vote on these changes. This vote will last for 7 days and require a quorum of 40M UNI votes.\n\nIf the vote passes, the UF will update relevant documentation on the forum and elsewhere.\n\n14 Likes\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nGovernance Weekly Recap\n\nGovernance Weekly Recap\n\npennblockchain\n\nNovember 21, 2022, 5:03pm\n\n2\n\nThanks for this! After experimenting with a couple different methods and helping a couple different teams submit proposals, we are in huge favor of this new proposed timeline. The RFC period is probably most important and may take over 3 days. The temp and consensus check seemed a bit redundant prior and this newer system will decrease voter fatigue.\n\n3 Likes\n\ndevenmatthews\n\nNovember 21, 2022, 10:05pm\n\n3\n\nFrom a voter’s perspective this process is far more streamlined and preferable (two non-binding votes is repetitive imo). We (Blockchain at Berkeley) would signal support for this updated process.\n\nI’d like to seek clarity on the min $UNI delegated to create the mentioned Snapshot polls. Just tried to create a snapshot proposal from my personal wallet and was told I need 1k uni minimum delegated. Want to be clear if the new [temp check] phase will retain this 1k $UNI requirement. Also would like to confirm that the proposed formalized off-chain final vote will maintain the same 2.5mm $UNI proposing requirement as the on-chain final vote.\n\n1 Like\n\ndevenmatthews\n\nNovember 21, 2022, 10:12pm\n\n4\n\nJust for reference:\n\n37 wallets appear to meet the 2.5mm final vote proposing requirement\n\n199 wallets appear to meet the 1k snapshot temp check proposing requirement\n\nsource: Tally | Uniswap | Voters\n\n1 Like\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nNovember 22, 2022, 7:11am\n\n5\n\nThese are good questions.\n\nFor the lone remaining off-chain Snapshot vote, we would propose to keep the 1k UNI delegation/self-delegation requirement. The intention of this is to reduce spam by requiring some skin in the game.\n\nFor the formalized process for off-chain process changes, we’re not sure about this yet actually, and are open to feedback and discussion. The goal of mirroring the parameters of the final governance vote (7 days, 40M quorum) is to confer legitimacy and community acceptance onto the changes being made. For that reason, I would say 2.5M UNI should also be required.\n\nI’ve confirmed this is possible with the Snapshot team - we can leverage subspace functionality to create two kinds of polls with two different delegation/self-delegation requirements.\n\nWhat do you think?\n\n2 Likes\n\nGFXlabs\n\nNovember 24, 2022, 6:52pm\n\n6\n\nThank you, Devin, for getting the ball rolling here. We think many, ourselves included, thought the governance process was sub-optimal. Switching the temperature check to a 3-day RFC sounds like a good improvement. It might be nice to make that a week instead; however, we don’t see a reason to delay the Snapshot Poll if the proposer believes they can rally the votes.\n\nWe do think it is worth considering to increase the Snapshot further than the proposed 5m. As @devenmatthews pointed out, 37 wallets meet the 2.5mm threshold. With that in mind, maybe we should set the quorum to 10m, or more? Ultimately it isn’t super important since the poll is not codified and is only socially enforced.\n\nAs for the second point regarding a formalized off-chain governance process. Snapshot voting should not be used for decision-making because a large amount of UNI cannot participate in Snapshot due to custody providers inability to vote off-chain. All governance decisions should be decided on-chain.\n\n1 Like\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\neek637\n\nNovember 28, 2022, 8:21pm\n\n7\n\nHi all,\n\nGlad to see this in motion. I agree with @GFXlabs that a higher quorum for the Snapshot poll might be a good idea. Reaching quorum would then indicate that the proposal is either an absolute home run or that the proposer has done the leg work to get it in front of enough delegates to get buy-in from the community. 10m seems a reasonable number.\n\nI wanted to raise one more item here. While in general I’d like to avoid the scenario where the DAO must decide the best option out of several, it’s reasonable to think that we’ll run up against it at some point. Given a recent personal run-in with ranked-choice voting, I strongly believe that it’s a superior method to first past the post voting (despite having lost the vote in question!). That said, it’s not super intuitive to understand the implications of your vote in RCV and I’d like to avoid a situation where we’re explaining it to stakeholders while a vote is happening.\n\nIt’s not easy to envision a scenario where we’re making such a choice given the DAO’s current structural constraints, but I do think it’s worth there being a bullet point in both the Phase 2: Temperature check section and the Proposed formalization of process changes to off-chain components of governance process section that indicate that in the event of a choice between several options, RCV will be the methodology used.\n\n2 Likes\n\nGovernance Weekly Recap\n\nbonustrack\n\nNovember 28, 2022, 10:47pm\n\n8\n\nSnapshot voting should not be used for decision-making because a large amount of UNI cannot participate in Snapshot due to custody providers inability to vote off-chain. All governance decisions should be decided on-chain.\n\nHi! Fabien from Snapshot here. Do you know which custodian(s) wouldn’t work with Snapshot? AFAIK most custodians support Snapshot voting through delegation, I know Coinbase or Fireblocks are used and Anchorage recently added a way to do delegation (need to activate on request). Which one I’m missing?\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nNovember 29, 2022, 10:00pm\n\n9\n\nI think lengthening the RFC could make sense - maybe to a 5 day minimum? That seems like a fair amount of time to allow active governance participants to read a proposal, put together some initial thoughts, feedback, and questions, and comment in the forums.\n\nIn terms of quorum for the new Temperature Check Phase (currently at 5M), I think increasing it makes sense in that it adds additional assurance that the proposer will spend time speaking to and rallying multiple delegates prior to the final governance vote.\n\ntobyshorin\n\nDecember 3, 2022, 1:45pm\n\n10\n\nOther Internet supports this simplification.\n\nOne note: when Teo posted the original version of this proposal, we had the following suggestion:\n\nmore standardization around how to set up Snapshot polls would be helpful. Framing of “yes” and “no” votes could use particular attention (here are three different polls which each have different phrasings for yes and no votes — some do not show up in the UI properly). Using “no change” as a standard for no votes, at the very least, would be a reasonable starting place.\n\nStill think that this would be useful language to add to a governance process update.\n\nThe current process has been enshrined in several third party apps like Boardroom. We’ll need to make a list of these projects and reach out to ensure the process documentation is correctly updated.\n\nLastly, not opposed to a 5 day RFC minimum. Not opposed to increased quorum.\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nKingofamericas\n\nDecember 4, 2022, 7:47am\n\n11\n\nDo anyone know how long it takes for my coins pairs to be listed on the pool list they where confirmed index onto uniswap dot org pool. Will they show up on list to the public? I add these coins pairs a few weeks ago and they still not in pool search list!\n\n( EAMIINFT / MATIC ) and ( BHOIINFT / MATIC ) and ( MATIC / BTC ) and ( MATIC / AHLRCMETA ) and ( MATIC / CRYPTO ) and ( MATIC / CHURCH ) all these coins pairs on Polygonscan network. I added them now how do they show up in pool all search or pool list under Polygon. Is it a time period wait or i have to program them onto available Uniswap list? Please give code I will tip with some of my above Matic pairs too ERC-20 tokens!\n\nalanalevin\n\nDecember 6, 2022, 1:10pm\n\n12\n\nI support modifying the governance process as outlined in the proposal - namely, eliminating the off-chain Snapshot poll, creating a “Request for Comment” phase, and increasing the quorum for the second phase.\n\nConsistent with several other community members’ comments, I think the RFC process should be longer than 3 days; my view is that it should be at least 7 days long. Having a week provides necessary time to become aware of each proposal and formulate potential comments. Less than a week risks rushing the commentary process.\n\nThis post was authored by Alana Levin, an investment partner at Variant. Variant is an investor in the UNI token. See disclosures.\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n8968\n\nDecember 24, 2022\n\nProposed Simplifications to the Uniswap Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n5988\n\nDecember 7, 2022\n\nCommunity Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n4\n\n38245\n\nJanuary 9, 2026\n\nCommunity Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n30\n\n58333\n\nApril 7, 2023\n\n[RFC] Reconfigure Snapshot Proposal Threshold\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n2\n\n3399\n\nApril 14, 2023","tokens":3624,"crawled_at":1791194111171} +{"id":10337,"url":"https://docs.dydx.xyz/node-client/private","domain":"docs.dydx.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"dYdX Documentation","text":"Private Node API\n\nPlace Order\n\nExecute a transaction that places an order on a market.\nThis function takes parameters for wallet authentication, various order details, and optional transaction options to manage specific order types and behaviors.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def place_order(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\norder: Order,\ntx_options: Optional[TxOptions] = None,\n)\n\nUnification Plan\nUse a convenient Wallet and Order pair for all clients\n\nTypeScript doesn't use authenticators\n\nIn Python we use them explicitly\n\nConsider to do the same like in Rust (set it automatically)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\norder\nquery\nOrder\ntrue\nThe order to place.\n\ntx_options\nquery\nTxOptions\nfalse\nOptions for transaction to support authenticators.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nExamples: Python | TypeScript | Rust | Guide - Place an order\n\nCancel Order\n\nTerminate an existing order using the provided order ID and related parameters, such as block validity periods and transaction options.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def cancel_order(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\norder_id: OrderId,\ngood_til_block: int = None,\ngood_til_block_time: int = None,\ntx_options: Optional[TxOptions] = None,\n)\n\nUnification plan\nCheck the marketId is really needed (used in TypeScript)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\norder_id\nquery\nOrderId\ntrue\nThe ID of the order to cancel.\n\ngood_til_block\nquery\ni32\nfalse\nThe block number until which the order is valid. Defaults to None.\n\ngood_til_block_time\nquery\ni32\nfalse\nThe block time until which the order is valid. Defaults to None.\n\ntx_options\nquery\nTxOptions\nfalse\nOptions for transaction to support authenticators.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\nThe transaction hash.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe order was not found.\n\nExamples: Rust | Guide - Cancel an order\n\nBatch Cancel Orders\n\nCancel a batch of short-terms orders.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def batch_cancel_orders(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\nsubaccount_id: SubaccountId,\nshort_term_cancels: List[OrderBatch],\ngood_til_block: int,\ntx_options: Optional[TxOptions] = None,\n)\n\nUnification plan\nTxOptions is not available in Rust\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\nsubaccount_id\nquery\nSubaccountId\ntrue\nThe subaccount ID for which to cancel orders.\n\nshort_term_cancels\nquery\nOrderBatch ⛁\ntrue\nList of OrderBatch objects containing the orders to cancel.\n\ngood_til_block\nquery\nHeight\ntrue\nThe last block the short term order cancellations can be executed at.\n\ntx_options\nquery\nTxOptions\nfalse\nOptions for transaction to support authenticators.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nExamples: Python | TypeScript | Rust\n\nDeposit\n\nDeposit funds (USDC) from the address to the subaccount.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def deposit(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\nsender: str,\nrecipient_subaccount: SubaccountId,\nasset_id: int,\nquantums: int,\n)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\nsender\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nThe sender address.\n\nrecipient_subaccount\nquery\nSubaccountId\ntrue\nThe recipient subaccount ID.\n\nasset_id\nquery\nAssetId\ntrue\nThe asset ID.\n\nquantums\nquery\nint\ntrue\nThe amount of quantums to deposit. See more about quantums\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nWithdraw\n\nWithdraw funds (USDC) from the subaccount to the address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def withdraw(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\nsender_subaccount: SubaccountId,\nrecipient: str,\nasset_id: int,\nquantums: int,\n)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\nsender_subaccount\nquery\nSubaccountId\ntrue\nThe sender subaccount ID.\n\nrecipient\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nThe recipient subaccount ID.\n\nasset_id\nquery\nAssetId\ntrue\nThe asset ID.\n\nquantums\nquery\nint\ntrue\nThe amount of quantums to withdraw.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTxHash\nThe transaction hash.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nExamples: Python | TypeScript | Rust\n\nTransfer\n\nTransfer funds (USDC) between subaccounts.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def transfer(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\nsender_subaccount: SubaccountId,\nrecipient_subaccount: SubaccountId,\nasset_id: int,\namount: int,\n)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\nsender_subaccount\nquery\nSubaccountId\ntrue\nThe sender subaccount ID.\n\nrecipient_subaccount\nquery\nSubaccountId\ntrue\nThe recipient subaccount ID.\n\nasset_id\nquery\nAssetId\ntrue\nThe asset ID.\n\namount\nquery\nint\ntrue\nThe amount to transfer in quote quantums (e.g. 1_000_000 = 1 USDC). See more about quantums\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTxHash\nThe transaction hash.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nExamples: Python | TypeScript | Rust\n\nSend Token\n\nTransfer a specified token from one account/address to another.\n\nIt requires details such as the wallet for signing the transaction, sender and recipient addresses, and the quantum amount or denomination of the token.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def send_token(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\nsender: str,\nrecipient: str,\nquantums: int,\ndenomination: str,\n)\n\nUnification Plan\nAll the types are different, revision is needed\n\nStandard types like strings are used\n\nBroadcast mode?\n\nZero fee?\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\nwallet\nquery\nWallet\ntrue\nThe wallet to use for signing the transaction.\n\nsender\nquery\nString\ntrue\nThe sender address.\n\nrecipient\nquery\nString\ntrue\nThe recipient address.\n\nquantums\nquery\ni32\ntrue\nThe amount of quantums to send.\n\ndenomination\nquery\ni32\ntrue\nThe denomination of the token.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nExamples: Rust\n\nSimulate\n\nPre-execution simulation of a transaction, predicting its execution cost and resource usage without committing any changes.\n\nThis method typically returns information like estimated gas fees or other transaction-related metrics to anticipate the impact of operations before they are executed on the blockchain.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def simulate(self, transaction: Tx)\n\nUnification Plan\nSome extra parameters in TypeScript? What to do with them?\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\ntransaction\nquery\nTx\ntrue\nThe transaction to simulate.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nGasInfo\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nExamples: Python | TypeScript | Rust\n\nCreate Transaction\n\nCreate a transaction.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def create_transaction(self, wallet: Wallet, message: Message) -> Tx\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeMandatoryDescription\naccount\nquery\nAccount\ntrue\nOwner's account information\n\nmsg\nquery\nAny\ntrue\nMessage during create transaction\n\nauth\nquery\nAddress\nfalse\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\ntx::Raw\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nBroadcast Transaction\n\nThe Broadcast Transaction method is used to send a transaction to the network for processing.\n\nThe key parameters include the transaction itself and the mode of broadcasting, which is optional and defaults to synchronous broadcasting mode.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def broadcast(self, transaction: Tx, mode=BroadcastMode.BROADCAST_MODE_SYNC)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\ntransaction\nquery\nTx\ntrue\nThe transaction to broadcast.\n\nmode\nquery\nBroadcastMode\nfalse\nThe broadcast mode. Defaults to BroadcastMode.BROADCAST_MODE_SYNC.\n\n:::\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe transaction was not found.\n\nExamples: Rust\n\nCreate Market Permissionless\n\nCreate a market permissionless.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def create_market_permissionless(\nself, wallet: Wallet, ticker: str, address: str, subaccount_id: int\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeDescription\naccount\nquery\nAccount\nAccount information\n\nticker\nquery\nTicker\nTicker information\n\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\nSubaccount information\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nDelegate\n\nDelegate tokens from a delegator to a validator.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def delegate(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\ndelegator: str,\nvalidator: str,\nquamtums: int,\ndenomination: str,\n)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeMandatoryDescription\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\ntrue\nSubaccount number\n\ndelegator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nDelegator information\n\nvalidator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nvalidator information\n\namount\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nAmount to delegate\n\nbroadcastMode\nquery\nBroadcastMode\nfalse\nMode of broadcast\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nBroadcastTxAsyncResponse\n\nUndelegate\n\nUndelegate coins from a delegator to a validator.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def undelegate(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\ndelegator: str,\nvalidator: str,\nquamtums: int,\ndenomination: str,\n)\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeMandatoryDescription\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\ntrue\nSubaccount number\n\ndelegator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nDelegator information\n\nvalidator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nvalidator information\n\namount\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nAmount to delegate\n\nbroadcastMode\nquery\nBroadcastMode\nfalse\nMode of broadcast\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nBroadcastTxAsyncResponse\n\nRegister Affiliate\n\nRegister affiliate.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def register_affiliate(\nself, wallet: Wallet, referee: str, affiliate: str\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeMandatoryDescription\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\ntrue\nSubaccount information\n\naffiliate\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nAffiliate information\n\nbroadcastMode\nquery\nBroadcastMode\nfalse\nMode of broadcast\n\ngasAdjustment\nquery\nint\nfalse\nGas adjustment value\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nBroadcastTxAsyncResponse\n\nWithdraw Delegator Reward\n\nWithdraw delegator reward.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def withdraw_delegate_reward(\nself, wallet: Wallet, delegator: str, validator: str\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeMandatoryDescription\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\ntrue\nSubaccount number\n\ndelegator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nDelegator information\n\nvalidator\nquery\nstring\ntrue\nvalidator information\n\nbroadcastMode\nquery\nBroadcastMode\nfalse\nMode of broadcast\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nBroadcastTxAsyncResponse\n\nClose Position\n\nClose position for a given market.\n\nOpposite short-term market orders are used. If provided, the position is only reduced by a size of reduce_by. Note that at the moment dYdX doesn’t support spot trading.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeRequiredDescription\naccount\nquery\nAccount\ntrue\nThe wallet address that owns the subaccount.\n\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccount\ntrue\nSubaccount to close\n\nmarket_params\nquery\nOrderMarketParams\ntrue\nMarket parameters\n\nreduced_by\nquery\nBigDecimal\nfalse\n\nclient_id\nquery\nClientId\ntrue\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nTxHash\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nExamples: Rust\n\nDeposit to MegaVault\n\nDeposit USDC into MegaVault\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def deposit(\nself, wallet: Wallet, address: str, subaccount_number: int, amount: Decimal\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeDescription\naccount\nquery\nAccount\nOwner's account information\n\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\nSubaccount information\n\namount\nquery\nDecimal\nAmount in usdc to deposit\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTxHash\nThe transaction hash.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nWithdraw from MegaVault\n\nWithdraw funds (USDC) from the subaccount to the address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def withdraw(\nself,\nwallet: Wallet,\naddress: str,\nsubaccount_number: int,\nmin_amount: Decimal,\nshares: Optional[int],\n) -> Any\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeDescription\naccount\nquery\nAccount\nOwner's account\n\nsubaccount\nquery\nSubaccountInfo\nSubaccount information\n\nmin_amount\nquery\nDecimal\nMinimum amount to withdraw i usdc\n\nshares\nquery\nBigInt\nNumber of shares\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchemaDescription\n200\nOK\nTxHash\nThe transaction hash.\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\n404\nNot Found\n\nThe subaccount was not found.\n\nGet Owner Shares in MegaVault\n\nQuery the shares associated with an Address.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_owner_shares(\nself, address: str\n) -> vault_query.QueryMegavaultOwnerSharesResponse\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeDescription\naddress\nquery\nAddress\nThe wallet address that owns the subaccount.\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nQueryMegavaultOwnerSharesResponse\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.\n\nGet Withdrawal Info of MegaVault\n\nQuery the withdrawal information for a specified number of shares.\n\nMethod Declaration\n\nPython\nasync def get_withdrawal_info(\nself, shares: int\n) -> vault_query.QueryMegavaultWithdrawalInfoResponse\n\nParameters\n\nParameterLocationTypeDescription\nshares\nquery\nBigInt\nNumber of shares\n\nResponse\n\nStatusMeaningSchema\n200\nOK\nQueryMegavaultWithdrawalInfoResponse\n\n400\nBad Request\n\nThe request was malformed or invalid.","tokens":3486,"crawled_at":1791194117513} +{"id":10338,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/sui-architecture","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Sui Architecture | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui is a layer 1 blockchain built on a delegated proof-of-stakeDPoSConsensus mechanism used by Sui. consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network model. Learn about the core components that make up Sui, including the objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. model, transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. processing, consensus mechanisms, network environments, and tokenomics.\n\nComponents\nSui is a layer 1 blockchain that performs its own consensus and validation of transaction blocks. Sui is comprised of the blockchain itself, the blockchain's activity such as transactions, and the validator entities that verify this activity.\n→\nNetworks\nSui operates multiple networks including Mainnet for production, Testnet for staging, Devnet for developing new features, and Localnet for local development.\n→\nConsensus\nOverview of the Sui consensus mechanism.\n→\nTokenomics\nSui's tokenomics is designed to support the long-term financial needs of Web3. It uses the native SUI token as the currency of the network and to pay for the network's gas fees.\n→\nObject Model\nEverything on the Sui blockchain is an object that has metadata, a type of ownership, and a referencing scheme.\n→\nEpochs and Reconfiguration\nEpochs define time periods on Sui where the validator set remains unchanged. Reconfiguration adjusts network parameters at epoch boundaries.\n→\nCheckpoint Verification\nOn the Sui network, checkpoints define the history of the blockchain. Checkpoint verification is how full nodes and other clients guarantee their state is exactly the same as the Sui network.\n→\nStorage\nAn overview of Sui's storage architecture, including validator and full node storage requirements, pruning, snapshots, checkpoints, and how storage fees and rebates are calculated.\n→\nSecurity\nAssets on Sui, including coins and tokens, are types of objects, and can only be used by their owners unless otherwise defined according to predefined logic in a smart contract.\n→\nProtocol Upgrades\nThe Sui protocol, framework, and execution engine are frequently extended to include new functionality and bug fixes. The upgrade process ensures all clients use the same source.\n→","tokens":568,"crawled_at":1791194122435} +{"id":10339,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/control_flow","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Container Control Flow - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"Application Control Flow\n\nInfo\n\nThis section is under review and will be updated soon.\n\nWithin a deployment, each individual agent instance in the AI agent manages:\n- a Tendermint Node\n- an ABCI application\n\nEach of the agent instances - containing the ABCI app - and the Tendermint node, are implemented as a Docker image which are deployed in a 1-2-1 relationship.\n\nThe Tendermint process is managed by a separate process, via a Flask server. The image containing the Flask server and Tendermint node are built on top of the valory/tendermint image.\n\nTendermint Image control flow.\n\nGentle Restart flow\n\nThis can be viewed in the logs as;\n\ntail -f /logs/node_0.txt\n\nMonitoring thread terminated\nTendermint process stopped\nTendermint process started\nMonitoring thread started\n\nHard Restart flow\n\nE[2022-05-11|13:45:41.355] abci.socketClient failed to connect to tcp://localhost:26658. Retrying after 3s... module=abci-client connection=query err=\"dial tcp 127.0.0.1:26658: connect: connection refused\"\nMonitoring thread terminated\nTendermint process stopped\nTendermint process started\nMonitoring thread started\nI[2022-05-11|13:45:41.450] Starting multiAppConn service module=proxy impl=multiAppConn\n\nSimultaneously, the flask server will display;\n\nI[2022-05-11|13:45:41.389] Removed existing address book module=main file=/tendermint/node1/config/addrbook.json\nI[2022-05-11|13:45:41.389] Removed all blockchain history module=main dir=/tendermint/node1/data\nI[2022-05-11|13:45:41.395] Reset private validator file to genesis state module=main keyFile=/tendermint/node1/config/priv_validator_key.json stateFile=/tendermint/node1/data/priv_validator_state.json\n\nAEA Network interruption Flow\n\nWhen we have an issue with the AEA losing connection to the Tendermint process, caused by failure of the AEA, the sudden closure of the TCP connection will trigger a restart of the Tendermint process.\n\nThis failure of connection could be caused by a re-scheduling of the pod to another host within the cluster, or by another unexpected restart of the AEA container.\n\nThis can be simulated by kill a running aea-process while running a docker-compose deployment.\n\nThis will interrupt the TCP connection between the AEA and the Tendermint process, managed by the Flask process. The typical behaviour for Tendermint upon such an event is to stop the module responsible for handling all http traffic. We watch for this event, and then restart the Tendermint process upon detecting it.\n\n# kill the aea\ndocker-compose kill abci0 && docker-compose up -d abci0\n\ntail -f deployments/persistent_data/logs/node_0.txt\n\nTendermint process stopped\nTendermint process started\nRestarted the HTTP RPC server, as a connection was dropped with message:\nE[2022-05-11|13:15:11.368] Stopping abci.socketClient for error: read message: EOF module=abci-client connection=consensus\n\nTendermint Network interruption Flow\n\nWhen we have an issue with the Tendermint process connecting to the AEA, the sudden closure of the TCP connection will trigger a restart of the tendermint process.\n\nThe effect of this on the AEA, can be demonstrated as so;\n\n# kill the node\ndocker-compose kill node0 && docker-compose up -d node0\n\nThe logs for the associated AEA show;\n\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,336] [INFO] [agent] Entered in the 'validate_oracle' round for period 0\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,338] [INFO] [agent] Entered in the 'validate_oracle' behaviour state\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,776] [ERROR] [agent] an error occurred while reading a message: DecodeVarintError: could not decode varint. The message will be ignored.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [INFO] [agent] connection at EOF, stop receiving loop.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [ERROR] [agent] an error occurred while reading a message: DecodeVarintError: could not decode varint. The message will be ignored.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [INFO] [agent] connection at EOF, stop receiving loop.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [ERROR] [agent] an error occurred while reading a message: DecodeVarintError: could not decode varint. The message will be ignored.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [INFO] [agent] connection at EOF, stop receiving loop.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [ERROR] [agent] an error occurred while reading a message: DecodeVarintError: could not decode varint. The message will be ignored.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:31,777] [INFO] [agent] connection at EOF, stop receiving loop.\n[2022-05-11 13:35:35,083] [INFO] [agent] arrived block with timestamp: 2022-05-11 13:35:31.193869\n[2022-05-11 13:35:35,083] [INFO] [agent] current AbciApp time: 2022-05-11 13:35:29.879421\n[2022-05-11 13:35:35,127] [INFO] [agent] 'validate_oracle' round is done with event: Event.DONE\n[2022-05-11 13:35:35,128] [INFO] [agent] scheduling timeout of 7.0 seconds for event Event.ROUND_TIMEOUT with deadline 2022-05-11 13:35:38.193869\n\nNotice how the AEA continues as soon as it is able to re-establish a connection.","tokens":1219,"crawled_at":1791194126530} +{"id":10340,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/sui-architecture/object-model","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Object Model | Sui Documentation","text":"An objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. is a fundamental unit of storage on the network. Every resource, asset, or piece of data onchain is an object. Many other blockchains structure storage around accounts containing key-value stores. Sui's storage is structured around objects addressable by unique IDs onchain.\n\nEvery object has the following components:\n\nA globally unique ID.\n\nAn owner, which might be an addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. or an object.\n\nA version number that increments every time a change is made to the object.\n\nMetadata, such as the digest of the last transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. that used the object.\n\nObject types​\n\nThere are 3 types of objects:\n\nSui object: Every resource, asset, or piece of data. Sui objects are what transactions interact with, and are the building blocks for all onchain state.\n\nSui MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. object: An object defined using the Move language. To create a Move object, you must use sui::object::new to create a struct. This struct must have the key ability and include a field id: UID as the first defined field. The struct can also contain primitive types, such as integers and addresses, other objects, and non-object structs. This struct can be stored onchain as a Sui object.\n\nSui Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui.: A smart contract that can manipulate other objects. Each Move package is a set of Sui Move bytecode modulesModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects.. The modules within the package each have a name that's unique within the containing package. The combination of the package's onchain ID and the name of a module uniquely identifies the module. When you publish smart contracts to Sui, a package is the unit of publishing. After you publish a package object, it is immutable and can never be changed or removed. A package object can depend on other package objects that were previously published to Sui.\n\nReferring to objects​\n\nYou can refer to objects by their:\n\nID: The globally unique ID of the object. It is a stable identifier for the object that does not change and is useful for querying the current state of an object or describing which object was transferred between two addresses.\n\nVersioned ID: An (ID, version) pair. It describes the state of the object at a particular point in the object's history and is useful for asking what the value of the object was at some point in the past or determining how recently an object was updated.\n\nObject reference: An (ID, version, object digest) triple. The object digest is the hash of the object's contents and metadata. An object reference provides an authenticated view of the object at a particular point in the object's history. Transactions require object inputs to be specified through object references to ensure the transaction's sender and a validatorValidatorResponsible for executing tasks like staking, gas price references, and tallying rules. processing the transaction agree on the contents and metadata of the object.\n\nObject ownership​\n\nEvery object has an owner field that dictates who can use it in transactions. This field can contain one of the following options:\n\nAddress owned: Owned by a specific 32-byte address that is either an account address derived from a particular signature scheme or an object ID.\n\nImmutable: Not owned by anyone, so anyone can use it. It cannot be mutated, transferred, or deleted.\n\nConsensus-address owned / party: Owned by a single address but sequenced through consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network. APIs expose this ownership with a ConsensusAddressOwner owner variant. Party objects are the public Move-facing way to create this ownership form using sui::transfer::party_transfer or sui::transfer::public_party_transfer.\n\nShared: Ownership is shared using the sui::transfer::share_object function and is accessible to everyone.\n\nWrapped: A data structure containing one struct type nested in another.\n\nObject metadata​\n\nEvery object has the following metadata:\n\nA 32-byte globally unique ID: Derived from the digest of the transaction that created the object and a counter encoding the number of IDs generated by the transaction.\n\nAn 8-byte unsigned integer version: Monotonically increases with every transaction that modifies it.\n\nA 32-byte transaction digest: Indicates the last transaction that included this object as an output.\n\nA 32-byte owner field: Indicates how this object can be accessed.\n\nIn addition to common metadata, objects have a category-specific, variable-sized contents field containing a Binary Canonical Serialization (BCS)-encoded payload:\n\nMove objects contain their Move type, whether the object can be transferred using public_transfer, and its fields.\n\nMove packages contain the bytecode modules in the package, a table identifying which versions of a package introduced each of its types (type origin table), and a table mapping each of its transitive dependencies to a specific version of that package to use (linkage table).\n\nThe transaction-object DAG: Relating objects and transactions​\n\nTransactions take objects as input, read, write, or mutate these inputs, then produce mutated or freshly created objects as output. Each object knows the hash of the last transaction that produced it as an output. A natural way to represent the relationship between objects and transactions is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where nodes are transactions and directed edges go from transaction A to transaction B if an output object of A is an input object of B. They are labeled by the reference of the object in question, which specifies the exact version of the object created by A and used by B.\n\nThe root of this DAG is a genesis transaction that takes no inputs and produces the objects that exist in the system's initial state. You can extend the DAG by identifying mutable transaction outputs that have not yet been consumed by any committed transaction and sending a new transaction that takes these outputs and optionally, immutable transaction outputs as inputs.\n\nLive objects are available as input for a transaction. The global state maintained by Sui consists of the totality of such objects. The live objects for a particular Sui address A are all objects owned by A, along with all shared and immutable objects in the system.\n\nWhen this DAG contains all committed transactions in the system, it forms a complete and cryptographically auditable view of the system's state and history. In addition, you can use the scheme above to construct a DAG of the relevant history for a subset of transactions or objects, for example, the objects owned by a single address.\n\nLimits on transactions, objects, and data​\n\nSui has some limits on transactions and data used in transactions, such as a maximum size and number of objects used.\n\nThe ProtocolConfig struct in the sui-protocol-config crate itemizes these limits:\n\nClick to openlib.rs\ncrates/sui-protocol-config/src/lib.rs\n/// Constants that change the behavior of the protocol.\n///\n/// The value of each constant here must be fixed for a given protocol version. To change the value\n/// of a constant, advance the protocol version, and add support for it in `get_for_version` under\n/// the new version number.\n/// (below).\n///\n/// To add a new field to this struct, use the following procedure:\n/// - Advance the protocol version.\n/// - Add the field as a private `Option` to the struct.\n/// - Initialize the field to `None` in prior protocol versions.\n/// - Initialize the field to `Some(val)` for your new protocol version.\n/// - Add a public getter that simply unwraps the field.\n/// - Two public getters of the form `field(&self) -> field_type`\n/// and `field_as_option(&self) -> Option` will be automatically generated for you.\n/// Example for a field: `new_constant: Option`\n/// ```rust,ignore\n/// pub fn new_constant(&self) -> u64 {\n/// self.new_constant.expect(Self::CONSTANT_ERR_MSG)\n/// }\n/// pub fn new_constant_as_option(&self) -> Option {\n/// self.new_constant.expect(Self::CONSTANT_ERR_MSG)\n/// }\n/// ```\n/// With `pub fn new_constant(&self) -> u64`, if the constant is accessed in a protocol version\n/// in which it is not defined, the validator will crash. (Crashing is necessary because\n/// this type of error would almost always result in forking if not prevented here).\n/// If you don't want the validator to crash, you can use the\n/// `pub fn new_constant_as_option(&self) -> Option` getter, which will\n/// return `None` if the field is not defined at that version.\n/// - If you want a customized getter, you can add a method in the impl.\n#[skip_serializing_none]\n#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Debug, ProtocolConfigAccessors, ProtocolConfigOverride)]\npub struct ProtocolConfig {\npub version: ProtocolVersion,\n\n/// The chain this config was instantiated for. Unlike the other fields, this is not a\n/// versioned protocol constant: it identifies the network rather than describing protocol\n/// behavior, so it is intentionally excluded from serialization (and from the config\n/// snapshots) and is populated directly from the chain passed to `get_for_version`.\n#[serde(skip)]\nchain: Chain,\n\nfeature_flags: FeatureFlags,\n\n// ==== Transaction input limits ====\n/// Maximum serialized size of a transaction (in bytes).\nmax_tx_size_bytes: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of input objects to a transaction. Enforced by the transaction input checker\nmax_input_objects: Option,\n\n/// Max size of objects a transaction can write to disk after completion. Enforce by the Sui adapter.\n/// This is the sum of the serialized size of all objects written to disk.\n/// The max size of individual objects on the other hand is `max_move_object_size`.\nmax_size_written_objects: Option,\n/// Max size of objects a system transaction can write to disk after completion. Enforce by the Sui adapter.\n/// Similar to `max_size_written_objects` but for system transactions.\nmax_size_written_objects_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of serialized transaction effects.\nmax_serialized_tx_effects_size_bytes: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of serialized transaction effects for system transactions.\nmax_serialized_tx_effects_size_bytes_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of gas payment objects for a transaction.\nmax_gas_payment_objects: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of modules in a Publish transaction.\nmax_modules_in_publish: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of transitive dependencies in a package when publishing.\nmax_package_dependencies: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of arguments in a move call or a ProgrammableTransaction's\n/// TransferObjects command.\nmax_arguments: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of total type arguments, computed recursively.\nmax_type_arguments: Option,\n\n/// Maximum depth of an individual type argument.\nmax_type_argument_depth: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of a Pure CallArg.\nmax_pure_argument_size: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of Commands in a ProgrammableTransaction.\nmax_programmable_tx_commands: Option,\n\n// ==== Move VM, Move bytecode verifier, and execution limits ===\n/// Maximum Move bytecode version the VM understands. All older versions are accepted.\nmove_binary_format_version: Option,\nmin_move_binary_format_version: Option,\n\n/// Configuration controlling binary tables size.\nbinary_module_handles: Option,\nbinary_struct_handles: Option,\nbinary_function_handles: Option,\nbinary_function_instantiations: Option,\nbinary_signatures: Option,\nbinary_constant_pool: Option,\nbinary_identifiers: Option,\nbinary_address_identifiers: Option,\nbinary_struct_defs: Option,\nbinary_struct_def_instantiations: Option,\nbinary_function_defs: Option,\nbinary_field_handles: Option,\nbinary_field_instantiations: Option,\nbinary_friend_decls: Option,\nbinary_enum_defs: Option,\nbinary_enum_def_instantiations: Option,\nbinary_variant_handles: Option,\nbinary_variant_instantiation_handles: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of the `contents` part of an object, in bytes. Enforced by the Sui adapter when effects are produced.\nmax_move_object_size: Option,\n\n// TODO: Option 500 KB exceeds the max computation gas cost\n/// Maximum size of a Move package object, in bytes. Enforced by the Sui adapter at the end of a publish transaction.\nmax_move_package_size: Option,\n\n/// Max number of publish or upgrade commands allowed in a programmable transaction block.\nmax_publish_or_upgrade_per_ptb: Option,\n\n/// Maximum gas budget in MIST that a transaction can use.\nmax_tx_gas: Option,\n\n/// Maximum amount of the proposed gas price in MIST (defined in the transaction).\nmax_gas_price: Option,\n\n/// For aborted txns, we cap the gas price at a factor of RGP. This lowers risk of setting higher priority gas price\n/// if there's a chance the txn will abort.\nmax_gas_price_rgp_factor_for_aborted_transactions: Option,\n\n/// The max computation bucket for gas. This is the max that can be charged for computation.\nmax_gas_computation_bucket: Option,\n\n// Define the value used to round up computation gas charges\ngas_rounding_step: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of nested loops. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_loop_depth: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of type arguments that can be bound to generic type parameters. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_generic_instantiation_length: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of parameters that a Move function can have. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_function_parameters: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of basic blocks that a Move function can have. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_basic_blocks: Option,\n\n/// Maximum stack size value. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_value_stack_size: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of \"type nodes\", a metric for how big a SignatureToken will be when expanded into a fully qualified type. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_type_nodes: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of \"type nodes\" that can be instantiated in a single function.\nmax_generic_instantiation_type_nodes_per_function: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of \"type nodes\" that can be instantiated in a module.\nmax_generic_instantiation_type_nodes_per_module: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of \"type nodes\" allowed in an accumulator.\nmax_accumulator_type_nodes: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of push instructions in one function. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_push_size: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of struct definitions in a module. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_struct_definitions: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of function definitions in a module. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_function_definitions: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of fields allowed in a struct definition. Enforced by the Move bytecode verifier.\nmax_fields_in_struct: Option,\n\n/// Maximum dependency depth. Enforced by the Move linker when loading dependent modules.\nmax_dependency_depth: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of Move events that a single transaction can emit. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_event_emit: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of new IDs that a single transaction can create. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_new_move_object_ids: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of new IDs that a single system transaction can create. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_new_move_object_ids_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of IDs that a single transaction can delete. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_deleted_move_object_ids: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of IDs that a single system transaction can delete. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_deleted_move_object_ids_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of IDs that a single transaction can transfer. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_transferred_move_object_ids: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of IDs that a single system transaction can transfer. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_num_transferred_move_object_ids_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of a Move user event. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_event_emit_size: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size of a Move user event. Enforced by the VM during execution.\nmax_event_emit_size_total: Option,\n\n/// Maximum length of a vector in Move. Enforced by the VM during execution, and for constants, by the verifier.\nmax_move_vector_len: Option,\n\n/// Maximum length of an `Identifier` in Move. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_move_identifier_len: Option,\n\n/// Maximum depth of a Move value within the VM.\nmax_move_value_depth: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of bytes a single package's arena may allocate when the package is loaded\n/// into the VM. If unset, the VM uses its built-in default.\npackage_arena_size_in_bytes: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of variants in an enum. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_move_enum_variants: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of back edges in Move function. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_back_edges_per_function: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of back edges in Move module. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_back_edges_per_module: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of meter `ticks` spent verifying a Move function. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_verifier_meter_ticks_per_function: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of meter `ticks` spent verifying a Move module. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_meter_ticks_per_module: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of meter `ticks` spent verifying a Move package. Enforced by the bytecode verifier at signing.\nmax_meter_ticks_per_package: Option,\n\n// === Object runtime internal operation limits ====\n// These affect dynamic fields\n/// Maximum number of cached objects in the object runtime ObjectStore. Enforced by object runtime during execution\nobject_runtime_max_num_cached_objects: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of cached objects in the object runtime ObjectStore in system transaction. Enforced by object runtime during execution\nobject_runtime_max_num_cached_objects_system_tx: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of stored objects accessed by object runtime ObjectStore. Enforced by object runtime during execution\nobject_runtime_max_num_store_entries: Option,\n\n/// Maximum number of stored objects accessed by object runtime ObjectStore in system transaction. Enforced by object runtime during execution\nobject_runtime_max_num_store_entries_system_tx: Option,\n\n// === Execution gas costs ====\n/// Base cost for any Sui transaction\nbase_tx_cost_fixed: Option,\n\n/// Additional cost for a transaction that publishes a package\n/// i.e., the base cost of such a transaction is base_tx_cost_fixed + package_publish_cost_fixed\npackage_publish_cost_fixed: Option,\n\n/// Cost per byte of a Move call transaction\n/// i.e., the cost of such a transaction is base_cost + (base_tx_cost_per_byte * size)\nbase_tx_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n/// Cost per byte for a transaction that publishes a package\npackage_publish_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Per-byte cost of reading an object during transaction execution\nobj_access_cost_read_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Per-byte cost of writing an object during transaction execution\nobj_access_cost_mutate_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Per-byte cost of deleting an object during transaction execution\nobj_access_cost_delete_per_byte: Option,\n\n/// Per-byte cost charged for each input object to a transaction.\n/// Meant to approximate the cost of checking locks for each object\n// TODO: Option tx digest map\nobj_access_cost_verify_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Maximal nodes which are allowed when converting to a type layout.\nmax_type_to_layout_nodes: Option,\n\n// Maximal size in bytes that a PTB value can be\nmax_ptb_value_size: Option,\n\n// === Gas version. gas model ===\n/// Gas model version, what code we are using to charge gas\ngas_model_version: Option,\n\n// === Storage gas costs ===\n/// Per-byte cost of storing an object in the Sui global object store. Some of this cost may be refundable if the object is later freed\nobj_data_cost_refundable: Option,\n\n// Per-byte cost of storing an object in the Sui transaction log (e.g., in CertifiedTransactionEffects)\n// This depends on the size of various fields including the effects\n// TODO: Option,\n\n// === Tokenomics ===\n\n// TODO: Option,\n\n/// 5% of the storage fund's share of rewards are reinvested into the storage fund.\n/// In basis point.\nstorage_fund_reinvest_rate: Option,\n\n/// The share of rewards that will be slashed and redistributed is 50%.\n/// In basis point.\nreward_slashing_rate: Option,\n\n/// Unit gas price, Mist per internal gas unit.\nstorage_gas_price: Option,\n\n/// Per-object storage cost for accumulator objects, used during end-of-epoch accounting.\naccumulator_object_storage_cost: Option,\n\n// === Core Protocol ===\n/// Max number of transactions per checkpoint.\n/// Note that this is a protocol constant and not a config as validators must have this set to\n/// the same value, otherwise they *will* fork.\nmax_transactions_per_checkpoint: Option,\n\n/// Max size of a checkpoint in bytes.\n/// Note that this is a protocol constant and not a config as validators must have this set to\n/// the same value, otherwise they *will* fork.\nmax_checkpoint_size_bytes: Option,\n\n/// A protocol upgrade always requires 2f+1 stake to agree. We support a buffer of additional\n/// stake (as a fraction of f, expressed in basis points) that is required before an upgrade\n/// can happen automatically. 10000bps would indicate that complete unanimity is required (all\n/// 3f+1 must vote), while 0bps would indicate that 2f+1 is sufficient.\nbuffer_stake_for_protocol_upgrade_bps: Option,\n\n// === Native Function Costs ===\n\n// `address` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `address::from_bytes(bytes: vector)`\naddress_from_bytes_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `address::to_u256(address): u256`\naddress_to_u256_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `address::from_u256(u256): address`\naddress_from_u256_cost_base: Option,\n\n// `config` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `read_setting_impl(config: address, name: address, current_epoch: u64): Option`\nconfig_read_setting_impl_cost_base: Option,\nconfig_read_setting_impl_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\npackage_original_package_id_impl_cost_base: Option,\npackage_original_package_id_impl_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// `dynamic_field` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `hash_type_and_key(parent: address, k: K): address`\ndynamic_field_hash_type_and_key_cost_base: Option,\ndynamic_field_hash_type_and_key_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_hash_type_and_key_value_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_hash_type_and_key_type_tag_cost_per_byte: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `add_child_object(parent: address, child: Child)`\ndynamic_field_add_child_object_cost_base: Option,\ndynamic_field_add_child_object_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_add_child_object_value_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_add_child_object_struct_tag_cost_per_byte: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `borrow_child_object_mut(parent: &mut UID, id: address): &mut Child`\ndynamic_field_borrow_child_object_cost_base: Option,\ndynamic_field_borrow_child_object_child_ref_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_borrow_child_object_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `remove_child_object(parent: address, id: address): Child`\ndynamic_field_remove_child_object_cost_base: Option,\ndynamic_field_remove_child_object_child_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_remove_child_object_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `has_child_object(parent: address, id: address): bool`\ndynamic_field_has_child_object_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `has_child_object_with_ty(parent: address, id: address): bool`\ndynamic_field_has_child_object_with_ty_cost_base: Option,\ndynamic_field_has_child_object_with_ty_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\ndynamic_field_has_child_object_with_ty_type_tag_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// `scratch` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `add_impl(key: address, value: V)`\nscratch_add_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `read_impl(key: address): V`\nscratch_read_cost_base: Option,\nscratch_read_value_cost: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `remove_impl(key: address): V`\nscratch_remove_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `exists_impl(key: address): bool`\nscratch_exists_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `exists_with_type_impl(key: address): bool`\nscratch_exists_with_type_cost_base: Option,\nscratch_exists_with_type_type_cost: Option,\n// Maximum number of entries in the per-transaction `sui::scratch` store.\nmax_scratch_pad_size: Option,\n\n// `event` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `event::emit(event: T)`\nevent_emit_cost_base: Option,\nevent_emit_value_size_derivation_cost_per_byte: Option,\nevent_emit_tag_size_derivation_cost_per_byte: Option,\nevent_emit_output_cost_per_byte: Option,\nevent_emit_auth_stream_cost: Option,\n\n// `funds_accumulator` module\n// Base cost for reserving object funds for withdrawal.\nreserve_object_funds_for_withdrawal_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost of loading an object's settled balance on the first withdrawal for an owner and type.\nreserve_object_funds_for_withdrawal_cold_read_cost: Option,\n\n// `object` module\n// Cost params for the Move native function `borrow_uid(obj: &T): &UID`\nobject_borrow_uid_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `delete_impl(id: address)`\nobject_delete_impl_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `record_new_uid(id: address)`\nobject_record_new_uid_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function\n// `record_new_uid_from_hash(parent: address, bytes: address)`\nobject_record_new_uid_from_hash_cost_base: Option,\n\n// Transfer\n// Cost params for the Move native function `transfer_impl(obj: T, recipient: address)`\ntransfer_transfer_internal_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `party_transfer_impl(obj: T, party_members: vector
)`\ntransfer_party_transfer_internal_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `freeze_object(obj: T)`\ntransfer_freeze_object_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function `share_object(obj: T)`\ntransfer_share_object_cost_base: Option,\n// Cost params for the Move native function\n// `receive_object(p: &mut UID, recv: ReceivingT)`\ntransfer_receive_object_cost_base: Option,\ntransfer_receive_object_cost_per_byte: Option,\ntransfer_receive_object_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// TxContext\n// Cost params for the Move native function `transfer_impl(obj: T, recipient: address)`\ntx_context_derive_id_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_fresh_id_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_sender_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_epoch_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_epoch_timestamp_ms_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_sponsor_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_rgp_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_gas_price_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_gas_budget_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_ids_created_cost_base: Option,\ntx_context_replace_cost_base: Option,\n\n// Types\n// Cost params for the Move native function `is_one_time_witness(_: &T): bool`\ntypes_is_one_time_witness_cost_base: Option,\ntypes_is_one_time_witness_type_tag_cost_per_byte: Option,\ntypes_is_one_time_witness_type_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Validator\n// Cost params for the Move native function `validate_metadata_bcs(metadata: vector)`\nvalidator_validate_metadata_cost_base: Option,\nvalidator_validate_metadata_data_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// Crypto natives\ncrypto_invalid_arguments_cost: Option,\n// bls12381::bls12381_min_sig_verify\nbls12381_bls12381_min_sig_verify_cost_base: Option,\nbls12381_bls12381_min_sig_verify_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\nbls12381_bls12381_min_sig_verify_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// bls12381::bls12381_min_pk_verify\nbls12381_bls12381_min_pk_verify_cost_base: Option,\nbls12381_bls12381_min_pk_verify_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\nbls12381_bls12381_min_pk_verify_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ecdsa_k1::ecrecover\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_keccak256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_keccak256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_keccak256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_sha256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_sha256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_k1_ecrecover_sha256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ecdsa_k1::decompress_pubkey\necdsa_k1_decompress_pubkey_cost_base: Option,\n\n// ecdsa_k1::secp256k1_verify\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_keccak256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_keccak256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_keccak256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_sha256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_sha256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_k1_secp256k1_verify_sha256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ecdsa_r1::ecrecover\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_keccak256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_keccak256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_keccak256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_sha256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_sha256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_r1_ecrecover_sha256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ecdsa_r1::secp256k1_verify\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_keccak256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_keccak256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_keccak256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_sha256_cost_base: Option,\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_sha256_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\necdsa_r1_secp256r1_verify_sha256_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ecvrf::verify\necvrf_ecvrf_verify_cost_base: Option,\necvrf_ecvrf_verify_alpha_string_cost_per_byte: Option,\necvrf_ecvrf_verify_alpha_string_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// ed25519\ned25519_ed25519_verify_cost_base: Option,\ned25519_ed25519_verify_msg_cost_per_byte: Option,\ned25519_ed25519_verify_msg_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// groth16::prepare_verifying_key\ngroth16_prepare_verifying_key_bls12381_cost_base: Option,\ngroth16_prepare_verifying_key_bn254_cost_base: Option,\n\n// groth16::verify_groth16_proof_internal\ngroth16_verify_groth16_proof_internal_bls12381_cost_base: Option,\ngroth16_verify_groth16_proof_internal_bls12381_cost_per_public_input: Option,\ngroth16_verify_groth16_proof_internal_bn254_cost_base: Option,\ngroth16_verify_groth16_proof_internal_bn254_cost_per_public_input: Option,\ngroth16_verify_groth16_proof_internal_public_input_cost_per_byte: Option,\n\n// hash::blake2b256\nhash_blake2b256_cost_base: Option,\nhash_blake2b256_data_cost_per_byte: Option,\nhash_blake2b256_data_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// hash::keccak256\nhash_keccak256_cost_base: Option,\nhash_keccak256_data_cost_per_byte: Option,\nhash_keccak256_data_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// poseidon::poseidon_bn254\nposeidon_bn254_cost_base: Option,\nposeidon_bn254_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// group_ops\ngroup_ops_bls12381_decode_scalar_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_decode_g1_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_decode_g2_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_decode_gt_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_scalar_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_gt_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_scalar_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_gt_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_scalar_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_gt_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_scalar_div_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_div_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_div_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_gt_div_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_hash_to_base_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_hash_to_base_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_hash_to_cost_per_byte: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_hash_to_cost_per_byte: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_msm_base_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_msm_base_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_msm_base_cost_per_input: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g2_msm_base_cost_per_input: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_msm_max_len: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_pairing_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_g1_to_uncompressed_g1_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_uncompressed_g1_to_g1_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_uncompressed_g1_sum_base_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_uncompressed_g1_sum_cost_per_term: Option,\ngroup_ops_bls12381_uncompressed_g1_sum_max_terms: Option,\n\ngroup_ops_ristretto_decode_scalar_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_decode_point_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_scalar_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_point_add_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_scalar_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_point_sub_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_scalar_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_point_mul_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_scalar_div_cost: Option,\ngroup_ops_ristretto_point_div_cost: Option,\n\nverify_bulletproofs_ristretto255_base_cost: Option,\nverify_bulletproofs_ristretto255_cost_per_bit_and_commitment: Option,\n// Upper bound on batch size * range in bits for a bulletproofs range proof. Defaults to 512\n// when unset.\nmax_bulletproofs_total_bits: Option,\n\n// hmac::hmac_sha3_256\nhmac_hmac_sha3_256_cost_base: Option,\nhmac_hmac_sha3_256_input_cost_per_byte: Option,\nhmac_hmac_sha3_256_input_cost_per_block: Option,\n\n// zklogin::check_zklogin_id\ncheck_zklogin_id_cost_base: Option,\n// zklogin::check_zklogin_issuer\ncheck_zklogin_issuer_cost_base: Option,\n\nvdf_verify_vdf_cost: Option,\nvdf_hash_to_input_cost: Option,\n\n// nitro_attestation::load_nitro_attestation\nnitro_attestation_parse_base_cost: Option,\nnitro_attestation_parse_cost_per_byte: Option,\nnitro_attestation_verify_base_cost: Option,\nnitro_attestation_verify_cost_per_cert: Option,\n\n// Stdlib costs\nbcs_per_byte_serialized_cost: Option,\nbcs_legacy_min_output_size_cost: Option,\nbcs_failure_cost: Option,\n\nhash_sha2_256_base_cost: Option,\nhash_sha2_256_per_byte_cost: Option,\nhash_sha2_256_legacy_min_input_len_cost: Option,\nhash_sha3_256_base_cost: Option,\nhash_sha3_256_per_byte_cost: Option,\nhash_sha3_256_legacy_min_input_len_cost: Option,\ntype_name_get_base_cost: Option,\ntype_name_get_per_byte_cost: Option,\ntype_name_id_base_cost: Option,\n\nstring_check_utf8_base_cost: Option,\nstring_check_utf8_per_byte_cost: Option,\nstring_is_char_boundary_base_cost: Option,\nstring_sub_string_base_cost: Option,\nstring_sub_string_per_byte_cost: Option,\nstring_index_of_base_cost: Option,\nstring_index_of_per_byte_pattern_cost: Option,\nstring_index_of_per_byte_searched_cost: Option,\n\nvector_empty_base_cost: Option,\nvector_length_base_cost: Option,\nvector_push_back_base_cost: Option,\nvector_push_back_legacy_per_abstract_memory_unit_cost: Option,\nvector_borrow_base_cost: Option,\nvector_pop_back_base_cost: Option,\nvector_destroy_empty_base_cost: Option,\nvector_swap_base_cost: Option,\ndebug_print_base_cost: Option,\ndebug_print_stack_trace_base_cost: Option,\n\n// ==== Ephemeral (consensus only) params deleted ====\n//\n// Const params for consensus scoring decision\n// The scaling factor property for the MED outlier detection\n// scoring_decision_mad_divisor: Option,\n// The cutoff value for the MED outlier detection\n// scoring_decision_cutoff_value: Option,\n/// === Execution Version ===\n// custom_setter: see `set_execution_version_for_testing`, which forbids downgrades.\n#[custom_setter]\nexecution_version: Option,\n\n// Dictates the threshold (percentage of stake) that is used to calculate the \"bad\" nodes to be\n// swapped when creating the consensus schedule. The values should be of the range [0 - 33]. Anything\n// above 33 (f) will not be allowed.\nconsensus_bad_nodes_stake_threshold: Option,\n\nmax_jwk_votes_per_validator_per_epoch: Option,\n// The maximum age of a JWK in epochs before it is removed from the AuthenticatorState object.\n// Applied at the end of an epoch as a delta from the new epoch value, so setting this to 1\n// will cause the new epoch to start with JWKs from the previous epoch still valid.\nmax_age_of_jwk_in_epochs: Option,\n\n// === random beacon ===\n/// Maximum allowed precision loss when reducing voting weights for the random beacon\n/// protocol.\nrandom_beacon_reduction_allowed_delta: Option,\n\n/// Minimum number of shares below which voting weights will not be reduced for the\n/// random beacon protocol.\nrandom_beacon_reduction_lower_bound: Option,\n\n/// Consensus Round after which DKG should be aborted and randomness disabled for\n/// the epoch, if it hasn't already completed.\nrandom_beacon_dkg_timeout_round: Option,\n\n/// Minimum interval between consecutive rounds of generated randomness.\nrandom_beacon_min_round_interval_ms: Option,\n\n/// Version of the random beacon DKG protocol.\n/// 0 was deprecated (and currently not supported), 1 is the default version.\nrandom_beacon_dkg_version: Option,\n\n/// The maximum serialised transaction size (in bytes) accepted by consensus. That should be bigger than the\n/// `max_tx_size_bytes` with some additional headroom.\nconsensus_max_transaction_size_bytes: Option,\n/// The maximum size of transactions included in a consensus block.\nconsensus_max_transactions_in_block_bytes: Option,\n/// The maximum number of transactions included in a consensus block.\nconsensus_max_num_transactions_in_block: Option,\n\n/// The maximum number of rounds where transaction voting is allowed.\nconsensus_voting_rounds: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED. Do not use.\nmax_accumulated_txn_cost_per_object_in_narwhal_commit: Option,\n\n/// The max number of consensus rounds a transaction can be deferred due to shared object congestion.\n/// Transactions will be cancelled after this many rounds.\nmax_deferral_rounds_for_congestion_control: Option,\n\n/// Time after the scheduled epoch end (`next_reconfiguration_timestamp_ms`) at which epoch\n/// close stops waiting for deferred transactions to drain: the epoch is closed even if\n/// deferred transactions remain unscheduled. They are abandoned and can be resubmitted in the\n/// next epoch. When unset, epoch close waits indefinitely.\nepoch_close_deadline_ms: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED. Do not use.\nmax_txn_cost_overage_per_object_in_commit: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED. Do not use.\nallowed_txn_cost_overage_burst_per_object_in_commit: Option,\n\n/// Minimum interval of commit timestamps between consecutive checkpoints.\nmin_checkpoint_interval_ms: Option,\n\n/// Version number to use for version_specific_data in `CheckpointSummary`.\ncheckpoint_summary_version_specific_data: Option,\n\n/// The max number of transactions that can be included in a single Soft Bundle.\nmax_soft_bundle_size: Option,\n\n/// Whether to try to form bridge committee\n// Note: this is not a feature flag because we want to distinguish between\n// `None` and `Some(false)`, as committee was already finalized on Testnet.\nbridge_should_try_to_finalize_committee: Option,\n\n/// The max accumulated txn execution cost per object in a mysticeti. Transactions\n/// in a commit will be deferred once their touch shared objects hit this limit,\n/// unless the selected congestion control mode allows overage.\n/// This config plays the same role as `max_accumulated_txn_cost_per_object_in_narwhal_commit`\n/// but for mysticeti commits due to that mysticeti has higher commit rate.\nmax_accumulated_txn_cost_per_object_in_mysticeti_commit: Option,\n\n/// As above, but separate per-commit budget for transactions that use randomness.\n/// If not configured, uses the setting for `max_accumulated_txn_cost_per_object_in_mysticeti_commit`.\nmax_accumulated_randomness_txn_cost_per_object_in_mysticeti_commit: Option,\n\n/// Configures the garbage collection depth for consensus. When is unset or `0` then the garbage collection\n/// is disabled.\nconsensus_gc_depth: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED. Do not use.\ngas_budget_based_txn_cost_cap_factor: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED. Do not use.\ngas_budget_based_txn_cost_absolute_cap_commit_count: Option,\n\n/// SIP-45: K in the formula `amplification_factor = max(0, gas_price / reference_gas_price - K)`.\n/// This is the threshold for activating consensus amplification.\nsip_45_consensus_amplification_threshold: Option,\n\n/// DEPRECATED: this was an ephemeral feature flag only used in per-epoch tables, which has now\n/// been deployed everywhere.\nuse_object_per_epoch_marker_table_v2: Option,\n\n/// The number of commits to consider when computing a deterministic commit rate.\nconsensus_commit_rate_estimation_window_size: Option,\n\n/// A list of effective AliasedAddress.\n/// For each pair, `aliased` is allowed to act as `original` for any of the transaction digests\n/// listed in `tx_digests`\n#[serde(skip_serializing_if = \"Vec::is_empty\")]\naliased_addresses: Vec,\n\n/// The base charge for each command in a programmable transaction. This is a fixed cost to\n/// account for the overhead of processing each command.\ntranslation_per_command_base_charge: Option,\n\n/// The base charge for each input in a programmable transaction regardless of if it is used or\n/// not, or a pure/object/funds withdrawal input.\ntranslation_per_input_base_charge: Option,\n\n/// The base charge for each byte of pure input in a programmable transaction.\ntranslation_pure_input_per_byte_charge: Option,\n\n/// The multiplier for the number of type nodes when charging for type loading.\n/// This is multiplied by the number of type nodes to get the total cost.\n/// This should be a small number to avoid excessive gas costs for loading types.\ntranslation_per_type_node_charge: Option,\n\n/// The multiplier for the number of type references when charging for type checking and reference\n/// checking.\ntranslation_per_reference_node_charge: Option,\n\n/// The multiplier for each linkage entry when charging for linkage tables that we have\n/// created.\ntranslation_per_linkage_entry_charge: Option,\n\n/// The maximum number of updates per settlement transaction.\nmax_updates_per_settlement_txn: Option,\n\n/// Maximum computation units allowed for a gasless transaction.\ngasless_max_computation_units: Option,\n\n/// Allowed token types for gasless transactions, with minimum transfer sizes per token.\ngasless_allowed_token_types: Option>,\n\n/// Maximum number of unused Pure inputs allowed in a gasless transaction.\n/// Object and FundsWithdrawal inputs must always be used.\n/// When None, there is no limit (effectively unlimited).\ngasless_max_unused_inputs: Option,\n\n/// Maximum size in bytes of each Pure input in a gasless transaction.\n/// When None, there is no limit (effectively unlimited).\ngasless_max_pure_input_bytes: Option,\n\n/// Max tps for gasless transactions. Unlimited when unset, zero when set to zero.\ngasless_max_tps: Option,\n\n#[serde(skip_serializing_if = \"Option::is_none\")]\n#[skip_accessor]\ninclude_special_package_amendments: Option>,\n\n/// Maximum serialized size in bytes of a gasless transaction (SenderSignedData).\n/// Bounds the persistent storage impact of each admitted gasless transaction.\ngasless_max_tx_size_bytes: Option,\n\n/// The multiplier for each live reference charging per-command. Only used when\n/// `allow_references_in_ptbs` is enabled.\ntranslation_per_live_reference_charge: Option,\n\n/// The maximum number of live references while checking a command. Only used when\n/// `allow_references_in_ptbs` is enabled.\nmax_ptb_live_references: Option,\n\n/// The maximum number of references returned by a command. Only used when\n/// `allow_references_in_ptbs` is enabled.\nmax_ptb_returned_references: Option,\n\n/// The maximum number of references returned over the course of the transaction. Only used\n/// when `allow_references_in_ptbs` is enabled.\nmax_ptb_total_returned_references: Option,\n}\n\nError: Network Error\n\nSelect a network from the following tabs to see the currently configured limits and values.\nRelated topics\n\nAddress-Owned Objects\nAddress-owned objects are owned by a Sui 32-byte address, which can either be an account address or an object ID. Learn how to create and access these objects.\nImmutable Objects\nImmutable objects cannot be changed, transferred, or deleted. Immutable objects cannot have an owner and anyone can use them.\nParty Objects\nParty objects are owned by a specified party at the time of transfer and versioned by consensus. Learn how to create, transfer, and access these objects.\nShared Objects\nAnyone can access shared objects on the Sui network, so care must be taken to secure access, if needed.\n\nObject types\nReferring to objects\nObject ownership\nObject metadata\nThe transaction-object DAG: Relating objects and transactions\nLimits on transactions, objects, and data\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":11921,"crawled_at":1791194144475} +{"id":10341,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/projects/dependencies","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Dependencies – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nDependencies\n\nFoundry uses git submodules to manage dependencies. Libraries are stored in lib/ and imported via remappings.\n\nInstalling dependencies\n\n$ forge install OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts\n\n$ forge install OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@v5.0.0\n\n$ forge install OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts --commit\n\nThe library is cloned to lib/openzeppelin-contracts/.\n\nLocking dependencies\n\nFor dependencies installed as git submodules, Foundry maintains a foundry.lock file in the project root. The lock file complements .gitmodules: .gitmodules records where each submodule comes from, while foundry.lock records whether you selected a branch, tag, or revision and the resolved commit.\n\nFor example, a dependency installed from a tag produces an entry like this:\n\n{\n\"lib/openzeppelin-contracts\": {\n\"tag\": {\n\"name\": \"v5.0.0\",\n\"rev\": \"b7954c3e9ce1d487b49489f5800f52f4b77b7351\"\n}\n}\n}\n\nCommit foundry.lock so other contributors and CI use the same dependency state. Let Forge update the file instead of editing it manually:\n\nforge install creates or synchronizes the lock file. With no dependency arguments, it also installs existing submodules from the recorded state.\n\nforge update updates branch-based dependencies to the latest commit on their recorded branch. Dependencies installed from a tag or revision stay pinned unless you explicitly select a different ref.\n\nforge remove removes the dependency's lock-file entry.\n\nforge build warns if the lock file is malformed, a dependency is missing, or its checked-out revision does not match the lock file.\n\nDependencies installed with forge install --no-git are regular directories rather than git submodules, so Foundry does not add them to foundry.lock.\n\nUsing dependencies\n\nImport installed libraries in your contracts:\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nFoundry automatically creates remappings for libraries in lib/. The remapping openzeppelin-contracts/ points to lib/openzeppelin-contracts/.\n\nRemappings\n\nCustomize import paths with remappings in foundry.toml:\n\n[profile.default]\nremappings = [\n\"@openzeppelin/=lib/openzeppelin-contracts/\",\n]\n\nNow you can import with the prefix:\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nGenerate remappings automatically:\n\n$ forge remappings\n\nforge-std/=lib/forge-std/src/\nsolady/=lib/solady/src/\n\nSave to a file for IDE support:\n\n$ forge remappings > remappings.txt\n\nNested dependency remappings\n\nWhen a dependency remapping points below an auto-detected package root, Foundry preserves both by\nscoping the dependency remapping to the directory that declares it. For example, forge remappings\ncan output:\n\nlib/outer/:inner/=lib/outer/lib/inner/contracts/\ninner/=lib/outer/lib/inner/\n\nThe contextual form := applies to imports made by source units whose names\nbegin with . Here, the trailing slash in lib/outer/ creates a directory boundary, so\nsources inside lib/outer/ use the dependency's contracts/ directory while root sources and\nsibling dependencies use the auto-detected package-root mapping.\n\nFoundry preserves explicit root-project and CLI remappings when constructing generated dependency\ncontexts. An equal or broader global alias suppresses the generated context. A narrower global\nalias is overlaid into that context, so it overrides only its matching import subtree while the\ndependency mapping handles the remaining imports. Explicit contextual remappings are unchanged.\n\nUpdating dependencies\n\nUse forge install to add a dependency or initialize the dependencies already recorded in a checkout. Running it without arguments reconciles existing git submodules and foundry.lock; it does not intentionally fetch newer dependency revisions.\n\nUse forge update when you want to move a dependency to a different revision. With no arguments, it fetches the latest commit for every branch-based dependency:\n\n$ forge update\n\nDependencies installed from a tag or commit revision remain pinned during a plain forge update. To upgrade one of them, provide the new ref explicitly. For example, to move OpenZeppelin Contracts from v5.0.0 to v5.1.0:\n\n$ forge update openzeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@tag=v5.1.0\n\nYou can also select a branch or an exact commit with @branch= or @rev=. Forge updates the dependency's git submodule checkout and its foundry.lock entry together.\n\nReview and commit both the changed dependency path and foundry.lock after an update.\n\nSee the forge install and forge update references for all options.\n\nRemoving dependencies\n\n$ forge remove openzeppelin-contracts\n\nThis removes the submodule from lib/ and .gitmodules.\n\nResolving conflicts\n\nWhen two dependencies require different versions of the same library, you'll encounter conflicts.\n\nDiagnosing conflicts\n\nCheck dependency trees with:\n\n$ forge tree\n\nExample outputsrc/Morpho.sol =0.8.19\n├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IMorphoCallbacks.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IIrm.sol >=0.5.0\n│ └── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IERC20.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IOracle.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/libraries/ConstantsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/UtilsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/EventsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/SharesMathLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/MarketParamsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n└── src/libraries/SafeTransferLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/interfaces/IERC20.sol >=0.5.0\n└── src/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/interfaces/IERC20.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/interfaces/IIrm.sol >=0.5.0 (*)\nsrc/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/interfaces/IMorphoCallbacks.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/interfaces/IOracle.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/libraries/ConstantsLib.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/libraries/EventsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/MarketParamsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/libraries/SafeTransferLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/SharesMathLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/UtilsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/periphery/MorphoBalancesLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IIrm.sol >=0.5.0 (*)\n├── src/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/UtilsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n├── src/libraries/periphery/MorphoLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ ├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n│ └── src/libraries/periphery/MorphoStorageLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/libraries/SharesMathLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n└── src/libraries/MarketParamsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/periphery/MorphoLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/libraries/periphery/MorphoStorageLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\nsrc/mocks/ERC20Mock.sol ^0.8.0\n└── src/mocks/interfaces/IERC20.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/mocks/FlashBorrowerMock.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/mocks/interfaces/IERC20.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n└── src/interfaces/IMorphoCallbacks.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/mocks/IrmMock.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/interfaces/IIrm.sol >=0.5.0 (*)\n├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n└── src/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\nsrc/mocks/OracleMock.sol ^0.8.0\n└── src/interfaces/IOracle.sol >=0.5.0\nsrc/mocks/interfaces/IERC20.sol ^0.8.0\ntest/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/console.sol >=0.4.22, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/console2.sol >=0.4.22, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/safeconsole.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdAssertions.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/lib/ds-test/src/test.sol >=0.5.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/StdMath.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdChains.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdCheats.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdStorage.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/console2.sol >=0.4.22, <0.9.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdError.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdInvariant.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdJson.sol >=0.6.0, <0.9.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdMath.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdStorage.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdStyle.sol >=0.4.22, <0.9.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdUtils.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/interfaces/IMulticall3.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/mocks/MockERC20.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/mocks/MockERC721.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ ├── lib/forge-std/src/Base.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ │ ├── lib/forge-std/src/StdStorage.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n│ │ └── lib/forge-std/src/Vm.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0\n│ └── lib/forge-std/lib/ds-test/src/test.sol >=0.5.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/console.sol >=0.4.22, <0.9.0\n├── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/interfaces/IMorphoCallbacks.sol >=0.5.0\n├── src/mocks/IrmMock.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n├── src/mocks/ERC20Mock.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n├── src/mocks/OracleMock.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n├── src/Morpho.sol =0.8.19 (*)\n├── test/helpers/Math.sol ^0.8.0\n├── test/helpers/SigUtils.sol ^0.8.0\n│ ├── src/libraries/ConstantsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n│ └── src/interfaces/IMorpho.sol >=0.5.0\n├── test/helpers/ArrayLib.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/periphery/MorphoLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n└── src/libraries/periphery/MorphoBalancesLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/InvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/MarketParamsLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n└── src/libraries/MarketParamsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/helpers/ArrayLib.sol ^0.8.0\ntest/helpers/Math.sol ^0.8.0\ntest/helpers/SigUtils.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/helpers/WadMath.sol ^0.8.0\ntest/integration/AccrueInterestIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/AuthorizationIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/BorrowIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/CallbacksIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/CreateMarketIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/ExtSloadIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/LiquidateIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/OnlyOwnerIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/RepayIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/SupplyCollateralIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/SupplyIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/WithdrawCollateralIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/integration/WithdrawIntegrationTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/invariant/BaseInvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/InvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/invariant/DynamicInvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/invariant/BaseInvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/invariant/StaticInvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/invariant/BaseInvariantTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/libraries/MathLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n├── src/libraries/MathLib.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/helpers/WadMath.sol ^0.8.0\ntest/libraries/SafeTransferLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n├── src/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n└── src/libraries/SafeTransferLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/libraries/UtilsLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol >=0.6.2, <0.9.0 (*)\n├── src/libraries/ErrorsLib.sol ^0.8.0\n└── src/libraries/UtilsLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/libraries/periphery/MorphoBalancesLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/libraries/periphery/MorphoLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\ntest/libraries/periphery/MorphoStorageLibTest.sol ^0.8.0\n├── src/libraries/periphery/MorphoStorageLib.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n├── test/helpers/SigUtils.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n└── test/BaseTest.sol ^0.8.0 (*)\n\nResolution strategies\n\n1. Use a compatible version\n\nFind a version that works for both dependencies:\n\n$ cd lib/conflicting-library\n$ git checkout v2.0.0\n$ cd ../..\n$ git add lib/conflicting-library\n$ git commit -m \"Pin conflicting-library to v2.0.0\"\n\n2. Create separate remappings\n\nIf dependencies need different versions, install both under different names:\n\n$ forge install library-v1=org/library@v1.0.0\n$ forge install library-v2=org/library@v2.0.0\n\nAdd remappings:\n\n[profile.default]\nremappings = [\n\"library-v1/=lib/library-v1/\",\n\"library-v2/=lib/library-v2/\",\n]\n\n3. Patch the dependency\n\nFork and modify the dependency to use a compatible version:\n\n# In lib/problematic-dependency\n$ git remote add fork https://github.com/you/fork\n$ git fetch fork\n$ git checkout fork/compatible-branch\n\nUsing npm packages\n\nFoundry can use packages from node_modules:\n\n[profile.default]\nlibs = [\"lib\", \"node_modules\"]\n\nInstall with your preferred package manager:\n\n$ npm install @openzeppelin/contracts\n\nImport directly:\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nHardhat compatibility\n\nFor projects migrating from Hardhat or using Hardhat-style imports:\n\n[profile.default]\nlibs = [\"lib\", \"node_modules\"]\nremappings = [\n\"@openzeppelin/=node_modules/@openzeppelin/\",\n\"hardhat/=node_modules/hardhat/\",\n]\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":3422,"crawled_at":1791194144568} +{"id":10342,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/advanced_reference/on_chain_addresses","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"On Chain Addresses - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"List of contract addresses\n\nPolygon (137)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0xE3607b00E75f6405248323A9417ff6b39B244b50\n\nService Manager\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x3C1fF68f5aa342D296d4DEe4Bb1cACCA912D95fE\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0xa45E64d13A30a51b91ae0eb182e88a40e9b18eD8\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x04b0007b2aFb398015B76e5f22993a1fddF83644\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3d77596beb0f130a4415df3D2D8232B3d3D31e44\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xd8BCC126ff31d2582018715d5291A508530587b0\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x02C26437B292D86c5F4F21bbCcE0771948274f84\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x1a0bFCC27051BCcDDc444578f56A4F5920e0E083\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nGnosis (100)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0x9338b5153AE39BB89f50468E608eD9d764B755fD\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0xa45E64d13A30a51b91ae0eb182e88a40e9b18eD8\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x04b0007b2aFb398015B76e5f22993a1fddF83644\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3C1fF68f5aa342D296d4DEe4Bb1cACCA912D95fE\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0x6e7f594f680f7aBad18b7a63de50F0FeE47dfD06\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x0Cb12457ed26d572c5e4A50f30b6f7A904662a72\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0xB4eB492bbfDcE5ccc11d675797cCF090eB0bCbd6\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nArbitrum One (42161)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0xE3607b00E75f6405248323A9417ff6b39B244b50\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3d77596beb0f130a4415df3D2D8232B3d3D31e44\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x34C895f302D0b5cf52ec0Edd3945321EB0f83dd5\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x63e66d7ad413C01A7b49C7FF4e3Bb765C4E4bd1b\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xBb7e1D6Cb6F243D6bdE81CE92a9f2aFF7Fbe7eac\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0xD0863340f947bE329c67e196e192705e53A1338f\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x17B2198872216D8469AdeBC1227D0d4824940821\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nOptimism (10)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3d77596beb0f130a4415df3D2D8232B3d3D31e44\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0xBb7e1D6Cb6F243D6bdE81CE92a9f2aFF7Fbe7eac\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0xFbBEc0C8b13B38a9aC0499694A69a10204c5E2aB\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x5953f21495BD9aF1D78e87bb42AcCAA55C1e896C\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xb09CcF0Dbf0C178806Aaee28956c74bd66d21f73\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x6e7f594f680f7aBad18b7a63de50F0FeE47dfD06\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x4be7A91e67be963806FeFA9C1FD6C53DfC358d94\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nBase (8453)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3C1fF68f5aa342D296d4DEe4Bb1cACCA912D95fE\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0x34C895f302D0b5cf52ec0Edd3945321EB0f83dd5\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x63e66d7ad413C01A7b49C7FF4e3Bb765C4E4bd1b\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x22bE6fDcd3e29851B29b512F714C328A00A96B83\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xFbBEc0C8b13B38a9aC0499694A69a10204c5E2aB\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x359d53C326388D24037b3b1590d217fdb5EEE74c\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x8c534420Db046d6801A1A8bE6fb602cC8F257453\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nCelo (42220)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0xE3607b00E75f6405248323A9417ff6b39B244b50\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3d77596beb0f130a4415df3D2D8232B3d3D31e44\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x34C895f302D0b5cf52ec0Edd3945321EB0f83dd5\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0x63e66d7ad413C01A7b49C7FF4e3Bb765C4E4bd1b\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xBb7e1D6Cb6F243D6bdE81CE92a9f2aFF7Fbe7eac\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x24F792D51b398928459Dfbb4181bDb4D5d2CD472\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x379451B13e4900C7005Bf57467770b2EE4e62a86\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D\n\nMode (34443)\n\nName\nEnvironment Variable\nAddress\n\nService Registry L 2\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_ADDRESS\n\n0x3C1fF68f5aa342D296d4DEe4Bb1cACCA912D95fE\n\nService Registry Token Utility\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_REGISTRY_TOKEN_UTILITY_ADDRESS\n\n0x34C895f302D0b5cf52ec0Edd3945321EB0f83dd5\n\nService Manager Token\n\nCUSTOM_SERVICE_MANAGER_ADDRESS\n\n0x63e66d7ad413C01A7b49C7FF4e3Bb765C4E4bd1b\n\nGnosis Safe Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_PROXY_FACTORY_ADDRESS\n\n0xBb7e1D6Cb6F243D6bdE81CE92a9f2aFF7Fbe7eac\n\nGnosis Safe Same Address Multisig\n\nCUSTOM_GNOSIS_SAFE_SAME_ADDRESS_MULTISIG_ADDRESS\n\n0xFbBEc0C8b13B38a9aC0499694A69a10204c5E2aB\n\nRecovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x1d79e0a600B61FAC1B8F40c27347e48962Ed2f23\n\nSafe Multisig With Recovery Module\n\nCUSTOM_SAFE_MULTISIG_WITH_RECOVERY_MODULE_ADDRESS\n\n0x7Fd1F4b764fA41d19fe3f63C85d12bf64d2bbf68\n\nMultisend\n\nCUSTOM_MULTISEND_ADDRESS\n\n0x40A2aCCbd92BCA938b02010E17A5b8929b49130D","tokens":1628,"crawled_at":1791194145267} +{"id":10343,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/collections","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Core Collections Overview | Metaplex Core","text":"Summary\nA Core Collection is a Solana account that groups related Core Assets under shared metadata and plugins.\nCollections store a name, URI, and optional plugins that apply to all member Assets\nAssets reference their Collection via the collection field at creation or update time\nCollection-level plugins (e.g. Royalties) propagate to all member Assets unless overridden at the Asset level\nCreating a Collection costs ~0.0015 SOL in rent\nJump to a task: Create Collection · Fetch Collection · Update Collection · Add/Move/Remove Assets\nWhat are Collections?\nA Core Collection is a group of Assets that belong together as part of the same series or set. To group Assets together, you first create a Collection account that stores the shared metadata — collection name and image URI. The Collection account acts as the front cover for your collection and can also hold collection-wide plugins.\nThe data stored and accessible from the Collection account is as follows:\nFieldDescription\nkey\nThe account key discriminator\n\nupdateAuthority\nThe authority of the collection\n\nname\nThe collection name\n\nuri\nThe URI to the collection's off-chain metadata\n\nnumMinted\nThe total number of Assets ever minted into the collection\n\ncurrentSize\nThe number of Assets currently in the collection\n\nCore Collections only group Core Assets. To organize multiple collections or standalone assets under a higher-level taxonomy, see Core Groups. To work with Token Metadata NFTs use mpl-token-metadata. For compressed NFTs use Bubblegum.\n\nManaging Collection Membership\nAssets can be added to, moved between, or removed from Collections after creation using the update instruction on the Asset. These operations change the Asset's update authority — adding sets it to the Collection, removing reverts it to a wallet address.\nOperationDescriptionGuide\nAdd an Asset to a Collection\nAssign a standalone Asset to this Collection\nSDK · CLI\n\nMove an Asset to another Collection\nTransfer an Asset from one Collection to another\nSDK · CLI\n\nRemove an Asset from a Collection\nDetach an Asset so it becomes standalone again\nSDK · CLI\n\nYou must be the update authority of the Collection (and the Asset, if it's standalone) to change membership. Moving between Collections requires authority on both the source and target Collection.\nAn Update Delegate listed on the Collection can also perform these operations — removing any Asset from the Collection, and adding Assets it has authority over — without the root update authority's signature.\n\nNotes\nAssets can exist standalone without a Collection — a Collection is not required\nCollection plugins are inherited by member Assets unless the Asset has its own overriding plugin of the same type\nnumMinted counts all Assets ever created in the collection; currentSize is the live count\nCollections cannot be closed while they contain Assets — remove all Assets first\nQuick Reference\nProgram ID\nNetworkAddress\nMainnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nDevnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nCollection Operations\nOperationPageSDK Function\nCreate a Collection\nCreate Collection\ncreateCollection\n\nFetch a Collection\nFetch Collection\nfetchCollection\n\nUpdate Collection metadata\nUpdate Collection\nupdateCollection\n\nUpdate a Collection plugin\nUpdate Collection\nupdateCollectionPlugin\n\nAdd/Move/Remove Assets\nUpdating Assets\nupdate (on the Asset)\n\nCost Breakdown\nItemCost\nCollection account rent\n~0.0015 SOL\n\nTransaction fee\n~0.000005 SOL\n\nTotal\n~0.002 SOL\n\nFAQ\nWhat's the difference between a Collection and an Asset?\nA Collection is a container that groups Assets together. It has its own metadata (name, image) but cannot be owned or transferred like an Asset. Assets are the actual NFTs that users own.\nCan I add an existing Asset to a Collection?\nYes. Use the update instruction with newCollection: collectionId and newUpdateAuthority: updateAuthority('Collection', [collectionId]). See Add an Asset to a Collection for SDK code, or use the CLI: mplx core asset update --collection .\nDo I need a Collection for my NFTs?\nNo. Assets can exist standalone without a Collection. However, Collections enable collection-level royalties, easier discoverability, and batch operations.\nCan I remove an Asset from a Collection?\nYes. Use the update instruction and set newUpdateAuthority to updateAuthority('Address', [yourWallet]) to detach the Asset. See Remove an Asset from a Collection for SDK code, or use the CLI: mplx core asset update --remove-collection.\nWhat happens if I delete a Collection?\nCollections cannot be deleted while they contain Assets. Remove all Assets first, then the Collection account can be closed.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nCollection\nA Core account that groups related Assets under shared metadata\n\nUpdate Authority\nThe account that can modify Collection metadata and plugins\n\nnumMinted\nCounter tracking total Assets ever created in the Collection\n\ncurrentSize\nNumber of Assets currently in the Collection\n\nCollection Plugin\nA plugin attached to the Collection that may apply to all member Assets\n\nURI\nURL pointing to off-chain JSON metadata for the Collection","tokens":1287,"crawled_at":1791194165046} +{"id":10344,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/projects/soldeer","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Soldeer – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nSoldeer\n\nSoldeer is a Solidity-native package manager that provides an alternative to git submodules. It offers versioned dependencies, a package registry, and simpler dependency management.\n\nInstallation\n\nSoldeer comes bundled with Foundry. Initialize it in your project:\n\n$ forge soldeer init\n\nThis creates a soldeer.toml configuration file.\n\nInstalling packages\n\n$ forge soldeer install @openzeppelin-contracts~5.0.0\n\n$ forge soldeer install my-lib~1.0.0 https://github.com/org/repo.git\n\nPackages are stored in dependencies/ by default.\n\nConfiguration\n\nConfigure Soldeer in soldeer.toml:\n\n[soldeer]\nremappings_generate = true\nremappings_regenerate = false\nremappings_version = true\nremappings_prefix = \"@\"\nremappings_location = \"config\"\n\n[dependencies]\n\"@openzeppelin-contracts\" = \"5.0.0\"\n\"@solmate\" = \"6.7.0\"\n\nKey options:\n\nOptionDescription\nremappings_generate\nAuto-generate remappings\n\nremappings_prefix\nPrefix for remappings (e.g., @)\n\nremappings_location\nWhere to store remappings (config or txt)\n\nUsing packages\n\nImport installed packages:\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nWhen remappings_location = \"config\", remappings are added to foundry.toml. Otherwise, they go to remappings.txt.\n\nUpdating packages\n\n$ forge soldeer update\n\n$ forge soldeer update @openzeppelin-contracts\n\nPublishing packages\n\nPublish your own packages to the Soldeer registry:\n\nLogin to Soldeer\nLogin to your Soldeer account.\n$ forge soldeer login\n\nPrepare your package\nAdd metadata to soldeer.toml:\n[package]\nname = \"my-library\"\nversion = \"1.0.0\"\ndescription = \"My awesome Solidity library\"\n\nPublish\nPublish your package.\n$ forge soldeer push my-library~1.0.0\n\nGit submodules vs Soldeer\n\nFeatureGit submodulesSoldeer\nVersion pinning\nCommit hash\nSemantic versions\n\nRegistry\nGitHub\nSoldeer registry + git\n\nLock file\nNo\nYes (soldeer.lock)\n\nTransitive deps\nManual\nAutomatic\n\nIDE support\nVia remappings\nVia remappings\n\nUse git submodules when:\n\nYou need a specific commit\n\nThe library isn't on the Soldeer registry\n\nYour team is familiar with git submodules\n\nUse Soldeer when:\n\nYou want semantic versioning\n\nYou need reproducible builds (lock file)\n\nYou prefer npm-style dependency management\n\nMigrating from git submodules\n\nConvert existing submodule dependencies to Soldeer:\n\n# Remove the submodule\n$ forge remove openzeppelin-contracts\n\n# Install via Soldeer\n$ forge soldeer install @openzeppelin-contracts~5.0.0\n\nUpdate your imports to use the new remapping prefix:\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nimport {ERC20} from \"@openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol\";\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":688,"crawled_at":1791194161800} +{"id":10345,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/sui-architecture/networks","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Networks | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui has several networks available, each serving a different purpose. Each network is comprised of nodes. Nodes provide resources to the network and participate in activities such as validating onchain transactions through a process called consensus. There are 2 types of nodes on each Sui network:\n\nFull nodeFull nodeResponsible for validating blockchain activity.: Can validate blockchain activity including transactions, checkpointsCheckpointCreated after transaction execution to provide a certified record of chain history., and epochEpochA period of time defined by the network. changes.\n\nValidatorValidatorResponsible for executing tasks like staking, gas price references, and tallying rules. node: Responsible for signing transactions, staking, gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction. price references, and tallying rules, in addition to validating blockchain activity.\n\nFull nodes are not able to sign transactions and only have access to a read-only view of the network's state. They are capable of storing and maintaining the chain's full history, and can validate the integrity of the chain by re-executing transactions after a quorumQuorumA set of validators whose combined voting power is greater than 2/3 of the total. of validators has committed them.\n\nValidator nodes can sign transactions but only store the latest transactions.\n\nLearn more about nodes on Sui.\n\nMainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets.​\n\nMainnet is responsible for all production environment applications and transactions. All activity on Mainnet costs real SUI or MISTMISTThe smallest unit of SUI. tokens, which have a value of fiat currency. SUI or MIST must be bought from an exchange, and excess SUI or MIST can be sold at a later date on the exchange for its fiat value. All activity on Mainnet is public and can be viewed through explorers such as suiscan.\n\nEpochs on Mainnet are approximately 24 hours long. Data is always persisted on the network. Learn more about data storage and storage fees.\n\nThe RPC URL for Mainnet is: https://fullnode.mainnet.sui.io:443.\n\nTestnetTestnetStaging network for testing changes before production deployment.​\n\nTestnet is a staging network designed for developers to test their code before placing it in production. Activity on Testnet uses Testnet SUI and MIST tokens, which can be obtained through a faucet. Testnet tokens have no real value and cannot be exchanged for fiat currency.\n\nAll activity on Testnet is public and can be viewed through explorers such as SuiVision.\n\nEpochs on Testnet are approximately 24 hours long. Data on Testnet is not guaranteed to be persisted because data might be wiped occasionally. It should not be relied on for permanent storage. Testnet data persists through the regular update process, and planned data wipes are announced ahead of time.\n\nThe RPC URL for Testnet is: https://fullnode.testnet.sui.io:443.\n\nDevnetDevnetFor developing and testing new features.​\n\nDevnet is an unstable network used to develop new features. If you want to write code against upcoming Sui features, you can use this network for early testing before the feature is finalized and released.\n\nAll activity on Devnet is public and can be viewed through explorers such as suiscan.\n\nEpochs on Devnet are 1 hour long. Devnet is not recommended for new developers because it is better suited for advanced use cases. Data on Devnet is wiped weekly as part of its scheduled update process.\n\nThe RPC URL for Devnet is: https://fullnode.devnet.sui.io:443.\n\nLocalnetLocalnetLocal network you can run on your own machine for optimized development.​\n\nLocalnet is used to run an instance of the Sui network on your local computer. Developing on a local network provides an optimized workflow in an environment you control. You can set custom network configuration parameters, such as data persistence and a local faucetFaucetA service that provides free Testnet tokens..\n\ntip\nA local faucet enables you to mint as many Testnet tokens as you need for your development process, avoiding the limitations imposed on public faucets for Testnet.\n\nLearn more about creating a local Sui network.\nRelated topics\n\nConsensus\nOverview of the Sui consensus mechanism.\nOperator Guides\nGuides for operators on the Sui network. Whether you are running a full node for your app or operating as a validator on the Sui network, these guides help you set up your environment and operate your network.\nEpochs and Reconfiguration\nEpochs define time periods on Sui where the validator set remains unchanged. Reconfiguration adjusts network parameters at epoch boundaries.\nStorage\nAn overview of Sui's storage architecture, including validator and full node storage requirements, pruning, snapshots, checkpoints, and how storage fees and rebates are calculated.\n\nMainnet\nTestnet\nDevnet\nLocalnet\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1226,"crawled_at":1791194165162} +{"id":10346,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/8-reasons-why-blockchain-mechanism-design-is-hard","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"8 reasons why blockchain mechanism design is hard - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\n8 reasons why blockchain mechanism design is hard\nTim Roughgarden\n05.14.24\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n1. There’s a lack of trust 1. There’s a lack of trust\n2. Collusion happens\n3. Can’t only rely on the rule of law\n4. It’s a much larger design space\n5. Native currencies can introduce other issues\n6. Can’t ignore the underlying stack\n7. Requires working in a computation-limited environment\n8. It’s early\nTags\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nresearch\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nStudying a field deeply teaches you to recognize problems that arise in the real world as thinly disguised versions or minor variations of problems that are already well solved. For example, when I teach the fundamentals of algorithms, students learn how to recognize problems that boil down to, say, a shortest-path computation or linear programming.\n\nSuch pattern-matching can be equally potent in mechanism design, a type of “inverse game theory” that uses incentives to achieve desirable outcomes. The tools and lessons of mechanism design are especially useful in auction theory, market design, and social choice theory.\n\nCrypto and web3 are rife with mechanism design problems. One might expect many of them to be solvable by copy-pasting from a textbook, using minor variations of age-old ideas. But the unique challenges and constraints of permissionless blockchain protocols often force a rethinking from first principles of seemingly well-solved problems. This makes mechanism design in web3 complex. But these challenges also make mechanism design in web3 deeply fascinating.\n\nIn this post, I explore some of the challenges with web3 mechanism design. These challenges may be familiar to the crypto-native, but understanding mechanism design more deeply should offer all builders a fresh perspective on why these problems are so difficult to solve. As for mechanism designers, if you’re looking for new applications, you will likely be intrigued by the challenges posed by a permissionless environment.\n\nBut first, what is mechanism design?\n\nAs a field, mechanism design goes back at least to 1961, when William Vickrey, a Columbia University economist and future Nobel Prize recipient, formally described a sealed-bid second-price auction. This same style of auction was used as early as 1797, when Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the author, sold the manuscript for his epic poem Hermann and Dorothea. It was also commonly used by stamp collectors in the nineteenth century but wasn’t formally described until Vickrey and is now commonly known as the “Vickrey auction.” In the Vickrey auction, the highest bidder wins but pays the second highest bid. This auction elicits the true preferences of the bidders, and also gives the item in question to the person who values it the most.\n\nThe Vickrey auction is an elegant and efficient design that has been applied in the real world, modified and updated for new circumstances, with practice informing theory, and vice versa. Like the Vickrey Auction, mechanism design as a formal discipline has a history of intertwined theory and practice. It is both deep and beautiful.\n\nAs opposed to game theory — which establishes the dimensions of a strategic interaction and then explores the most behaviorally plausible outcomes — the field of mechanism design begins not with the game but with a desired outcome. Mechanism design aims to reverse engineer a game of some form so that this desired outcome — perhaps characterized by efficiency, fairness, or certain sets of behaviors — is an equilibrium. In the case of the Vickrey auction, the goal is to elicit the maximum amount participants are willing to pay while not punishing them for doing so.\n\nOpportunities to apply mechanism design abound in web3. For example, a blockchain protocol might want to achieve the outcome that the participants running the protocol do so honestly, without any deviations from the intended behavior. Or a protocol might want to elicit accurate information about the value of transactions, to efficiently allocate block space to the most valuable transactions.\n\nSuch mechanism design problems are always challenging, and they are uniquely challenging in a blockchain context.\n\n1. There’s a lack of trust\n\nWithout the assumption of a trusted party to carry out a mechanism, design in the blockchain space becomes that much harder.\n\nThe whole point of using a permissionless blockchain protocol is you don’t have to trust any one entity or individual, only the “on-average” trust assumption that a sufficiently large fraction of the nodes running the protocol are doing so correctly.\n\nBut the irony of many blockchain architectures is that each batch of transactions added to the history of the chain, for execution in the virtual machine maintained by the protocol, is the product of a unilateral decision made by a single node.\n\nIt is this single node that you cannot know if you can trust.\n\nThis is why it’s rare to see Vickrey auctions in a blockchain context. Implementing a Vickrey auction naively quickly runs into problems with manipulation by untrusted block producers. The issue is that a block producer can manufacture a “shill bid” — a fake bid whose bid is slightly under what’s going to be the winning bid, thereby forcing the winner to pay nearly their full bid (as opposed to the second-highest genuine bid).\n\nShill bids by untrusted block producers effectively cause Vickrey auctions to revert to first-price auctions, which is one of the reasons why first-price auctions are so prevalent in web3. (The recent branch of the traditional mechanism design literature on “credible mechanisms” also considers auction design with an untrusted auctioneer, though from a somewhat different perspective.)\n\n2. Collusion happens\n\nAnother reason mechanism design in blockchains is difficult concerns collusion among blockchain participants. For example, second-price auctions are vulnerable to collusion with side payments. The intuition is simple: The winning bidder pays the second highest bid, so that bidder can simply bribe the second highest bidder into bidding much lower.\n\nThe academic literature on mechanism design hasn’t worried too much about collusion. One reason might be that collusion, especially with side payments, is difficult to pull off in the real world. It’s hard to have credible side payments after the conclusion of some collusive action when the winner could simply decline to pay the bribe. (“No honor among thieves,” as they say.)\n\nIn a blockchain setting, however, would-be colluders can often use smart contracts to commit credibly to the side payments needed to make collusion work. A second reason is the paucity of mechanisms that disincentivize collusion with side payments — “posted price” mechanisms that make only take-it-or-leave-it offers, and not much else.\n\nTo make matters worse, the users of a protocol might collude not only with each other, but also with the (untrusted) block producer (the equivalent of a bidder colluding with the auctioneer in a real-world auction).\n\nResilience to this last type of collusion was one of the primary motivations for burning a portion of the transaction fees in Ethereum’s EIP-1559 transaction fee mechanism. Without the “burn” (or otherwise withholding those revenues from the block producer), a block producer and end- users could collude and evade through side payments whatever reserve price the mechanism attempts to impose.\n\n3. Can’t only rely on the rule of law\n\nCollusion is obviously not a new issue. It’s plagued various mechanisms in real life for centuries, yet if you examine the mechanism design literature, you might be surprised how little it addresses collusion. The literature does address head-on the incentives for unilateral manipulations by individual participants of a mechanism — but generally punts on collusion, leaving it to some unmodeled notion of “rule of law.” For example, participants in the mechanism might sign a legal contract that specifies that they will not collude. If collusion is detected, addressing it is then handed off to a legal channel. Mechanism designers can help by creating a mechanism in which collusion is relatively easy to detect.\n\nThis is an unspoken secret in much of the mechanism design literature: reliance on the rule of law. While one can’t say there’s no rule of law around permissionless blockchain protocols — we frequently see law enforcement successfully prosecute criminal behavior on permissionless blockchains — there is a lot less of it than in traditional mechanism design applications.\n\nAnd if you can’t rely on the rule of law outside the mechanism, then it’s incumbent on the designer to handle it inside the mechanism. This approach pervades mechanism design decisions in the blockchain space. In the Ethereum protocol in particular, examples range from burning base fee revenues in EIP-1559 to slashing misbehaving validators in its consensus protocol.\n\n4. It’s a much larger design space\n\nThe design space in web3 is bigger than mechanism designers are accustomed to. As a result, they have to think about any given problem anew. For example, many mechanisms involve payments; in a traditional mechanism design application, these payments would be in some fiat currency like USD. Many blockchain protocols have their own native currency, and mechanisms within such a protocol are in a position to manipulate that currency.\n\nImagine if you wrote a traditional mechanism design paper, and part of your mechanism’s description was: “Print a bunch of new money, and give that to a bunch of the participants.” It would look ridiculous outside of a blockchain context. But you can do exactly that when you’re talking about mechanism design in the context of a blockchain protocol. The protocol controls the currency, and so a mechanism that’s part of that protocol can mint or burn it.\n\nThis means that some designs that would be impossible without access to a native currency become possible. For example, how do you incentivize Bitcoin miners to carry out the protocol as intended? Through inflationary rewards: printing new Bitcoins to motivate these block producers. Without access to a native currency, such a design would be impossible.\n\n5. Native currencies can introduce other issues\n\nReason #4 highlights the power of native currency. The two obvious things you can do with a native currency are “mint” (the way the Bitcoin protocol mints new bitcoins to incentivize miners) and “burn” (the way Ethereum’s EIP-1559 transaction fee mechanism burns ETH to achieve collusion-resilience). But there is a danger lurking in native currencies that does not exist in traditional mechanism design: microeconomic design decisions may have macroeconomic consequences.\n\nIn traditional mechanism design, there’s no reason to worry about macroeconomic forces. No traditional auction has had a meaningful effect on the U.S. monetary supply or the inflation rate. This challenge is wholly new to the web3 design space. What could go wrong? Let me tell you about two examples, one about minting in Bitcoin, one about burning in Ethereum.\n\nBy virtue of using block rewards — by printing new money to motivate miners — Bitcoin is forced to have inflation. As a result, it must also have a monetary policy to decide on inflation rates and how that rate evolves over time. Nakamoto also created a hard supply cap of 21 million Bitcoins. Because the number of bitcoins has a hard cap, the inflation rate must go to zero.\n\nIf it does go to zero, what would motivate miners to continue running the protocol and contributing security to Bitcoin? The hope has always been that transaction fees would make up for the missing block reward, although the evidence that that will happen is quite weak. It’s always been known that if transaction fees stay close to zero, then the Bitcoin protocol is going to suffer from major security issues.\n\nA paper by Princeton University computer scientists Miles Carlston, Harry Kalodner, Matthew Weinberg, and Arvind Narayanan points out another difference between transaction fees and block rewards. While block rewards are the same for every block (at least between successive “halvings” of the block reward, which occur every four years), transaction fees can vary by orders of magnitude — which in turn introduces new game-theoretic instability into the protocol. In this sense, the macroeconomic decision of a fixed supply cap has negative microeconomic consequences for the protocol and its participants.\n\nJust as the minting of block rewards acts as an inflationary force with Bitcoin, the burning of transaction fees in EIP-1559 acts as a deflationary force with Ethereum. In the Ethereum protocol (which does use inflationary validator rewards), there is a tug of war between these two forces, with the deflationary forces generally winning. The fact that ETH is now a net deflationary currency is a macroeconomic consequence of microeconomically motivated design decisions in the protocol’s transaction fee mechanism.\n\nIs deflation good or bad for the Ethereum protocol? ETH holders like deflation because, all else equal, it makes their tokens more valuable over time. (Indeed, this byproduct may have been what eventually tipped public opinion in favor of the switch to the EIP-1559 transaction fee mechanism.) Yet the idea of a deflationary currency makes traditionally trained macroeconomists recoil, recalling stagflation in 1990s Japan.\n\nWho’s right? Personally, I’m not convinced that a sovereign fiat currency is the right analogy for a cryptocurrency like ETH. But then, what is the correct analogy? This remains an open question, and the ball is in the court of blockchain researchers to explore further: Why is it okay to have a deflationary currency as the cryptocurrency that powers a blockchain protocol but not as the fiat currency that powers a sovereign nation?\n\n6. Can’t ignore the underlying stack\n\nIn computer science, one of the things we aspire toward is modularity and clean abstraction, which grants the ability to rely on parts of your system on faith. When designing and analyzing one part of a system, you presumably need to know the functionality exported by the other parts of the system; but ideally, you don’t need to know how that functionality is actually implemented under the hood.\n\nWe haven’t reached this ideal yet in blockchain protocols. While builders and mechanism designers might like to focus on, say, the application layer, they cannot afford to ignore the reality and details of how the infrastructure layer works.\n\nFor example, if you’re designing an automated market maker, you have to think about the fact that untrusted block producers are in charge of transaction ordering. Or when you’re thinking about transaction fee mechanism design for a (layer-2) rollup, not only do you have to pay for resource consumption at layer 2, you also have to pay for any costs incurred on the underlying layer-1 protocol (for example, from storing calldata).\n\nIn both examples, effective mechanism design at one layer requires detailed expertise about other layers. Maybe, as blockchain technology matures, we’ll have a clean separation of the different layers. But we certainly don’t have it now.\n\n7. Requires working in a computation-limited environment\n\nThe “computer in sky” that a blockchain protocol implements is a computation-limited environment. Traditional mechanism design focused solely on economic incentives and ignored computational issues (for example, the famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is infeasible to implement for sufficiently complex allocation problems).\n\nWhen Nisan and Ronen introduced algorithmic mechanism design in 1999, they noted that we do indeed need some kind of computational tractability for mechanisms to have any actual meaning in the real world. So they proposed restricting attention to mechanisms that use an amount of computation and communication that scales as a polynomial (as opposed to exponential) function of the problem parameters.\n\nBecause computation in a blockchain protocol’s virtual machine is so scarce, on-chain mechanisms must be very lightweight — polynomial time and communication is necessary but not sufficient. This scarcity, for example, is the primary reason why automated market makers completely dominate Ethereum DeFI, as opposed to more traditional solutions like limit order books.\n\n8. It’s early\n\nUsually, when people say it’s still early in web3, they’re referring either to investment opportunities or to adoption numbers. But from a scientific perspective, we’re even earlier than that. This fact only makes things harder — even though it represents an enormous opportunity.\n\nWorking in a mature research area provides benefits that everyone takes for granted. There are agreed-upon models and definitions. There is consensus around the most important problems. There is non-trivial coordination on how to measure progress. There exists a common vocabulary and a large common knowledge base. On-ramps exist to get up to speed, including well-vetted textbooks, online courses, and other resources.\n\nIn many parts of the blockchain space, meanwhile, we don’t yet know the “right” models and definitions to think clearly about and make progress on important problems. For instance, what’s the most important notion of incentive compatibility in the context of blockchain protocols? What are the layers of the web3 stack? What should be counted as part of maximal extractible value (MEV)? These are just some of the open questions.\n\n***\n\nFor those interested in working in the science of blockchain, the immaturity of the area presents a challenge. But coming to it early — now — also represents a unique opportunity.\n\nMechanism design has always been a useful tool at the application layer of the internet — take for example real-time advertising auctions, or the design of two-sided marketplaces that pervade most online consumer apps today, from ecommerce to ridesharing.\n\nBut in web3, mechanism design is also informing design decisions within the infrastructure itself.\n\nThink back to the 1970s and 80s, when internet routing protocols were still being discussed and designed. As far as I know, no one with expertise in incentives and mechanism design had a seat at that table. In hindsight, we now realize that such a person could have usefully informed the design. In web3, meanwhile, incentives have been part of the discussion since day one, with the publication of the original Bitcoin whitepaper.\n\nThe confusion around the “right” models, definitions, and success metrics for web3 is really the universe telling us that we’re in the middle of a golden era. Later generations of students and scientists will envy us being here, in the right place at the right time, with the opportunity to shape the trajectory of this technology. So while there may not be many textbooks in the area, someday there will be, and the work that’s going to be described in them is the work that is being done right now.\n\n***\n\nTim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science and a member of the Data Science Institute at Columbia University, and Head of Research at a16z crypto.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles mnaged by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nPast performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":5456,"crawled_at":1791194166665} +{"id":10347,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/collections/create","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Create a Core Collection | Metaplex Core","text":"The createCollection instruction creates a new Core Collection account on Solana with a name, metadata URI, and optional plugins.\nWhat You'll Learn\nCreate a simple Collection with a name and URI\nCreate a Collection with the Royalties plugin attached\nHandle common creation errors\n\nSummary\ncreateCollection deploys a new Collection account that groups Core Assets under shared metadata and plugins.\nRequires a fresh keypair as the collection address — reusing an existing address will fail\nAccepts optional plugins at creation time\nCosts ~0.0015 SOL in rent\nThe payer becomes the updateAuthority by default\nQuick Start\nInstall: npm install @metaplex-foundation/mpl-core @metaplex-foundation/umi\nUpload collection metadata JSON to get a URI\nCall createCollection(umi, { collection, name, uri })\nPass the collection address when creating Assets\nJump to: Simple Collection · With Plugins · Common Errors\nPrerequisites\nUmi configured with a signer and RPC connection — see JavaScript SDK\nSOL for transaction fees (~0.002 SOL per collection)\nMetadata JSON uploaded to Arweave or IPFS with a collection image and name\nCreating a Simple Collection\ncreateCollection requires a name, a metadata uri, and a new keypair as the collection signer.\n\n1import { createUmi } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults'\n\n2import { createCollection } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3import { mplCore } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n4import { generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n5\n\n6// Initialize UMI\n\n7const umi = createUmi('https://api.devnet.solana.com')\n\n8 .use(mplCore())\n\n9\n\n10// Generate a new keypair for the collection\n\n11const collectionSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\n12\n\n13// Create a new Collection\n\n14await createCollection(umi, {\n\n15 collection: collectionSigner,\n\n16 name: 'My Collection',\n\n17 uri: 'https://example.com/collection.json',\n\n18}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n19\n\n20console.log('Collection created:', collectionSigner.publicKey)\n\nThe collection parameter must be a fresh keypair each time. Reusing an existing address will fail with Collection account already exists.\n\nCreating a Collection with Plugins\nPass a plugins array to createCollection to attach plugins at creation time. The example below attaches the Royalties plugin.\nCreate a Core Collection with the Royalties plugin\n\ncreate-collection-with-royalties.ts\nimport { generateSigner, publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { createCollection, ruleSet } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst collectionSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\nconst creator1 = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst creator2 = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222')\n\nawait createCollection(umi, {\n\ncollection: collectionSigner,\n\nname: 'My NFT',\n\nuri: 'https://example.com/my-nft.json',\n\nplugins: [\n\n{\n\ntype: 'Royalties',\n\nbasisPoints: 500,\n\ncreators: [\n\n{ address: creator1, percentage: 20 },\n\n{ address: creator2, percentage: 80 },\n\n],\n\nruleSet: ruleSet('None'),\n\n},\n\n],\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nCollection account already exists\nThe collection keypair was already used on this network. Generate a new signer each time:\nconst collectionSigner = generateSigner(umi) // Must be a unique keypair\n\nInsufficient funds\nYour payer wallet needs ~0.002 SOL. Fund it on devnet with:\nsolana airdrop 1 --url devnet\n\nNotes\nPlugins added at creation can be updated later using updateCollectionPlugin — see Update Collection\nThe updateAuthority defaults to the payer — pass an explicit updateAuthority to set a different account\nAll plugins available to Assets can also be applied to Collections — see Plugins Overview\nQuick Reference\nItemValue\nInstruction\nCreateCollectionV1\n\nJS function\ncreateCollection\n\nRequired accounts\ncollection (new keypair), payer\n\nOptional accounts\nupdateAuthority, systemProgram\n\nRequired args\nname, uri\n\nOptional args\nplugins\n\nRent cost\n~0.0015 SOL\n\nSource\nGitHub","tokens":978,"crawled_at":1791194200876} +{"id":10348,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/sui-architecture/tokenomics-overview","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Tokenomics on Sui | Sui Documentation","text":"The native token of Sui is SUI. The Sui tokenomics structure is designed to support the long-term financial needs of Web3. The SUI token serves 4 purposes on the Sui network:\n\nProvides the opportunity to stake SUI to participate in the proof-of-stake mechanism.\n\nSUI is the asset denomination needed to pay the gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction. fees required to execute transactions or other operations on the network.\n\nSUI acts as a versatile and liquid asset for various applications.\n\nSUI tokens play an important role in governance by acting as a right to participate in onchain voting on issues such as protocol upgrades.\n\nStakeholders​\n\nStakeholders in a blockchain's tokenomics have a vested interest in the viability of the blockchain economy. The Sui economy has 3 main groups of stakeholders:\n\nUsers, who submit transactions to the network to create, mutate, and transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. digital assets or interact with smart contracts.\n\nSUI token holders, who have the option of staking their tokens to validators. SUI owners also hold the rights to participate in Sui governance.\n\nValidators, who manage transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. processing and execution on the Sui platform.\n\nDelegated proof of stake​\n\nSui uses a delegated proof of stake (DPoSDPoSConsensus mechanism used by Sui.) consensus mechanism where validators lock a certain amount of SUI as collateral for the duration of an epoch. Validators cannot make changes to their stake during an epochEpochA period of time defined by the network., and any changes are applied when a new epoch begins. They then earn rewards for processing operations, such as validating transactions, and for providing resources.\n\nUsers of the network hold their own SUI, which they can delegate to validators of their choice as part of a validatorValidatorResponsible for executing tasks like staking, gas price references, and tallying rules.'s stake. In so doing, the validators reward users based on the amount of SUI they delegate. Users are free to withdraw their SUI or place stake in a different validator before a new epoch begins.\n\nToken supply​\n\nThere is a finite supply of SUI. The total supply of SUI tokens on MainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets. is capped at 10,000,000,000 SUI. This is the total number of SUI that can ever be minted, but the total supply is not available for transactions. Supply availability follows the designed unlocking schedules in place to enhance the tokenomics stability of the network and provide a long-term level of security.\n\nToken distribution​\n\nAt the beginning of each epoch, 3 important events happen:\n\nSUI holders stake their tokens to validators and a new committee is formed.\n\nThe reference gas prices are set as described in Sui Gas Fees.\n\nThe storage fund size is adjusted using the net inflow of the previous epoch.\n\nFollowing these actions, the protocol computes the total amount of stake as the sum of staked SUI plus the storage fund.\n\nDuring each epoch, users submit transactions to the Sui platform and validators process them. For each transaction, users pay the associated computation and storage gas fees. In cases where users delete previous transaction data, users obtain a partial rebate of their storage fees. Validators observe the behavior of other validators and evaluate each other's performance.\n\nAt the end of each epoch, the protocol distributes stake rewards to participants. This occurs through 2 main steps:\n\nThe total amount of stake rewards is calculated as the sum of computation fees accrued throughout the epoch plus the epoch's stake reward subsidies. The latter component is temporary in that it only exists in the network's first years and disappears in the long run as the amount of SUI in circulation reaches its total supply.\n\nThe total amount of stake rewards is distributed across various entities. The storage fund is taken into account in the calculation of the epoch total stake, which is not owned by any entities in the way that staked SUI is. Instead, the Sui economic model distributes the stake rewards accruing to the storage fund to validators for compensation of their storage costs.\n\nThe distribution mechanisms built into Sui tokenomics encourages a healthy competition for fair prices where validators set low gas fees while operating with viable business models. Refer to the whitepaper for in-depth review of the mathematical proofs that support this structure.\n\nVesting schedules​\n\nA vesting schedule dictates when certain blocks of SUI become accessible to the market. The Sui tokenomics design includes a multi-tiered SUI vesting schedule.\n\nWhen Sui first launched its Mainnet network (initial SUI mint), there was a one-year cliff period. During this time, all initial investors were blocked from transferring their initial stake of SUI to the marketplace. A common practice for new cryptocurrency, the cliff period protected early network stability against large-scale sell-offs from early investors. The cliff period ended in May 2024.\n\nAirdrops​\n\nOften, when a new token launches, its minters set aside a percentage of the sum to distribute to early adopters to drive interest in the associated blockchain project. This process is called an airdrop.\n\nThere were no SUI airdrops to support the launch of Sui's Mainnet network. This was a publicly-stated, intentional decision for the following reasons:\n\nAirdrops expose a potential for bad actors to take advantage of the excitement around a new launch. By publicly stating there would be no airdrops, Sui attempted to mitigate the risk its users faced.\n\nCryptocurrency is regulated differently across the globe. Airdrops can be viewed as taxable events in some jurisdictions, creating legal or financial complications.\n\nSui is committed to the long-term success of the network and its stakeholders. Airdrops might generate excitement early in a project's lifecycle, but the long-term benefits are minimal.\n\nStorage fund​\n\nSUI pays for the gas fees and data storage on the network. A potential problem arises, however, when new validators come onchain. Even though the validator is new, it still must pay the storage cost for activity that happened before it was part of the network.\n\nSui addressesAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. this problem with the storage fund, a cache of SUI that never fully depletes. Each onchain transaction that adds data to the chain includes a fee for storage, which the protocol adds to the storage fund. The storage fund itself has a stake in the network, so it collects rewards based on that stake just like every other onchain stakeholder. The protocol then regularly distributes those storage fund rewards to Sui validators to pay for storage. In this way, new validators to the network get paid for storing data from past transactions.\n\nStorage fund rewards​\n\nTotal stake is calculated as the sum of user stake plus the SUI tokens deposited in the storage fund. The storage fund receives a proportional share of the overall stake rewards depending on its size relative to total stake. The largest share of these stake rewards are paid out to current validators to compensate for storage costs. The rewards that remain are reinvested into the fund. When onchain storage requirements are high, validators receive substantial additional rewards to compensate for their storage costs.\n\nThe storage fund includes 3 key features:\n\nPast transactions contribute to the storage fund, which functions as a tool for shifting gas fees across different epochs. This ensures that future validators are compensated for their storage costs by the past users who created those storage requirements in the first place.\n\nThe storage fund pays out only the returns on its capital and does not distribute its principal. In practice, this means validators borrow the storage fund's SUI as additional stake and keep the majority of stake rewards. Validators do not, however, receive funds directly from the storage fund. This guarantees the fund never loses its capitalization and can survive indefinitely. This feature is further strengthened by the stake rewards reinvested into the fund.\n\nThe storage fund includes a deletion option. If you delete data, you get a partial refund of the storage fees paid originally.\n\nDeflation​\n\nUnlike traditional economics, deflation is a feature of Sui rather than a bug. The total supply of SUI is capped, so increased activity on the network has a deflationary effect as the storage fund grows in relation to the amount of data stored, which effectively takes more SUI out of circulation. The value for SUI increases in relation to the decrease in circulating supply.\n\nValidator rewards​\n\nAll honest validators on Sui receive their staking rewards with full certainty. The rewards are based only on the amount of stake the validators hold, removing randomness from the equation.\n\nStaking​\n\nStake SUI tokens by sending a transaction to the network that calls the staking function implemented as part of the system Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui.. This transaction wraps the SUI tokens in a self-custodial stake object. This stake objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. contains information including the validator staking pool ID and the activation epoch of the stake. With the introduction of SIP-6, you can participate in liquid staking protocols using your staked objects.\n\nSui-compatible crypto wallets typically have functionality to initiate staking and unstaking from your Sui address. See the respective documentation for these tools to begin staking your SUI.\n\nUnstaking​\n\nSimilar to staking, a user withdraws stake from a validator by sending a transaction that calls the unstaking function in the system Move package. This transaction unwraps the stake object, and sends both the principal and the accumulated rewards to the user as SUI tokens. You accrue rewards only during epochs where the stake is active for the entire epoch. The rewards withdrawn from the validator's rewards pool are calculated based on the activation epoch and unstaking epoch of the stake.\n\nChoosing a validator for staking​\n\nYou must choose a specific validator you would like to stake your SUI in. The choice of validator can potentially impact the amount of staking rewards you receive. The factors determining this amount include, but are not limited to:\n\nValidator commission rate: A validator can choose to set a non-zero commission rate specifying the percentage of staking rewards they are taking from the stakers. For example, if a validator has a commission rate of 10%, then 10% of every staker's staking rewards is given to the validator.\n\ncaution\nA validator can choose its commission at a future moment in time without prior notice.\n\nValidator performance: A validator with bad performance might be punished according to the tallying rule. Punished validators do not receive any staking rewards for the epoch during which they are punished, and you also do not receive that epoch's rewards when you withdraw your stake from that validator.\n\nSui-compatible crypto wallets and explorers typically provide validator information such as commission and APY. See the respective documentation for these tools for information on how to retrieve this data.\n\nStaking pools​\n\nEach Sui validator maintains its own staking pool to track the amount of stake and to compound staking rewards. Validator pools operate together with a time series of exchange rates that are computed at each epoch boundary. These exchange rates determine the amount of SUI tokens that each past SUI staker can withdraw in the future. Importantly, the exchange rates increase as more rewards are deposited into a staking pool. The longer an amount of SUI is deposited in a staking pool, the more rewards it accrues.\n\nWhen SUI is deposited to the staking pool in epoch E, those SUI are converted into liquidity tokens at the epoch E exchange rate. As the staking pool earns rewards, the exchange rate appreciates. At epoch E', those liquidity tokens are worth more and translate into more SUI.\n\nThe only difference between Sui staking pools and typical liquidity pools is that in Sui the liquidity tokens do not exist. Rather, the global exchange rate table is used to track the accounting. Because all SUI tokens in the staking pool are treated the same, all SUI tokens immediately count as stake and thus compound rewards immediately.\n\nThe staking pool is implemented in a system-level smart contract (staking_pool.move) and is part of the Sui framework.\n\nValidator pool exchange rate​\n\nThe exchange rate for each validator pool is calculated at each epoch boundary as follows:\n\nExchangerateatE+1=(1+(third−partystakerrewardsatE/third−partystakeatE))×(exchangerateatE)Exchange rate at E+1 = (1 + (third-party staker rewards at E / third-party stake at E)) × (exchange rate at E)ExchangerateatE+1=(1+(third−partystakerrewardsatE/third−partystakeatE))×(exchangerateatE)\nThe distinction between third-party owned versus validator-owned rewards and stake is relevant in that validators earn commission on the staking pool's tokens but third-party stakers do not. This accounting enables Sui to keep track of the rewards accrued by both validators and third-party token holders using a single global exchange rate table.\n\nValidatorValidatorResponsible for executing tasks like staking, gas price references, and tallying rules. staking pool requirements​\n\nThere are minimum staking requirements a validator must satisfy to become active and to stay in the active validator set.\n\nStake requirements​\n\nThe Sui network is rolling out SIP-39, which will significantly lower the barrier to entry for validators. Instead of requiring a minimum amount of SUI tokens, validators will need a minimum amount of voting power.\n\nWhen fully rolled out, SIP-39 will mean the following validator requirements:\n\nA validator candidate must accrue at least 3 voting power before they can request to join the validator set.\n\nIf an active validator's stake falls below 2 voting power, they have seven epochs of grace period to gain back the stake before being removed from the validator set.\n\nIf an active validator's stake falls below 1 voting power, they are removed from the validator set at the end of the current epochEpochA period of time defined by the network. boundary. Sui uses 24-hour epochs.\n\nFor more information on voting power, see Understanding the voting power formula.\n\ntip\nWant to be a Sui validator?\nIf you have the required stake and plan to operate a validator on Sui, your participation is welcome and Sui is committed to supporting your onboarding. Kindly complete this form to be added to our Validator Discord and keep up with upcoming validator releases and technical support.\n\nUnderstanding the voting power formula​\n\nSIP-39 uses the following formula to determine if a validator can join the set:\n\nS / (S + T) > V / 10000\n\nS = The validator candidate's stake amount.\n\nT = Total amount already staked in the network.\n\nV = Minimum voting power threshold (3 in the final phase).\n\n10000 = Total voting power units in the Sui system.\n\nThis formula checks if the validator would have at least V voting power after joining.\n\nS / (S + T) calculates what proportion of the total stake the validator would control.\n\nWhen multiplied by 10000, this gives their voting power in Sui's standardized units.\n\nThe validator can join if this value is greater than or equal to the threshold V.\n\nFor example, with a network stake of 7.69B SUI and V=3, a validator with 2.31M SUI would have: 2,310,000 / (2,310,000 + 7,694,950,773) ≈ 0.0003 proportion, converting to voting power: 0.0003 × 10000 ≈ 3 units.\n\nSince 3 ≥ 3, they meet the threshold to join.\n\nAs the total network stake changes, the minimum required amount adjusts automatically.\nRelated topics\n\nConsensus\nOverview of the Sui consensus mechanism.\nSui Validators\nGuides for validator nodes on the Sui network.\nEpochs and Reconfiguration\nEpochs define time periods on Sui where the validator set remains unchanged. Reconfiguration adjusts network parameters at epoch boundaries.\nGas Fees\nA Sui transaction must pay for both the computational cost of execution and the long-term cost of storing the objects a transaction creates or mutates.\n\nStakeholdersDelegated proof of stake\n\nToken supply\nToken distributionVesting schedules\nAirdrops\n\nStorage fundStorage fund rewards\nDeflation\n\nValidator rewardsStaking\nUnstaking\nChoosing a validator for staking\nStaking pools\nValidator pool exchange rate\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":4181,"crawled_at":1791194186086} +{"id":10349,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/videos/lvr-in-a-minute-with-tim-roughgarden","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"LVR in a minute with Tim Roughgarden - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nLVR in a minute with Tim Roughgarden\nTim Roughgarden\n03.15.24\n\nTags & Share Tags\nAMMs\nDeFi\nresearch\ntech trends\nvideo\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIn this explainer, Tim Roughgarden, head of research at a16z crypto, presents a new way to think about the cost side of providing liquidity in an AMM, which centers around a quantity called LVR (“loss versus rebalancing,” pronounced “lever”).\n\nThere are two types of participants in an automated market maker (AMM): traders, who exchange one of the AMM’s tokens for another (say, ETH and USDC), and liquidity providers (LPs), who provide tokens to the AMM in the first place, generally in exchange for a share of the trading fees.\n\nBut to date it’s been unclear when it makes economic sense to participate as an LP. When does the benefit exceed the cost? The benefit side of this comparison is easy to understand: revenue from shared trading fees, plus in some cases additional token rewards.\n\nLVR is a mathematical formula that isolates an LP’s adverse selection costs, allowing them to compare their potential LVR with the AMM’s fees, and to reason about whether and when to provide liquidity. And it provides AMMs with a way to keep their LPs happy by keeping LVR small.\n\nThis is joint work with Jason Milionis, Ciamac Moallemi, and Anthony Lee Zhang\n\nFor more, see: https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/… Original paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.06046\n\nAbout the presenter Tim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science and a member of the Data Science Institute at Columbia University, and Head of Research at a16z crypto.","tokens":432,"crawled_at":1791194186775} +{"id":10350,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/contract-bindings","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Contract bindings – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nContract bindings\n\nFoundry provides two generators with different outputs. Choose the workflow based on what consumes the generated code.\n\nGoalCommandOutput\nCall contracts from Rust\nforge bind\nAn Alloy crate or Rust module generated from compiled contract artifacts\n\nStart from a verified deployed contract\ncast source, then forge bind\nExplorer source followed by local Alloy bindings\n\nSerialize Solidity structs to and from JSON\nforge bind-json\nA Solidity helper library for JSON cheatcodes\n\nforge bind-json does not generate Rust code. The former cast bind workflow has also been removed; fetch verified source with cast source and generate bindings from a Forge project with forge bind instead.\n\nGenerate Alloy bindings from a project\n\nforge bind compiles the project and reads the resulting ABIs. Calls, return values, errors, and events all become typed Alloy definitions.\n\nFor example, start with this contract:\n\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.24;\n\ncontract Counter {\nuint256 public value;\n\nevent Incremented(address indexed caller, uint256 amount, uint256 newValue);\n\nerror ZeroAmount();\n\nfunction increment(uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 newValue) {\nif (amount == 0) revert ZeroAmount();\n\nnewValue = value + amount;\nvalue = newValue;\nemit Incremented(msg.sender, amount, newValue);\n}\n}\n\nGenerate a standalone Rust crate for only Counter:\n\nforge bind \\\n--bindings-path bindings \\\n--select '^Counter$' \\\n--crate-name counter-bindings \\\n--crate-version 0.1.0 \\\n--crate-license MIT \\\n--alloy-version 1.0\n\nThe result has this shape:\n\nbindings/\n├── Cargo.toml\n└── src/\n├── counter.rs\n└── lib.rs\n\nAdd it to another Rust crate as a path dependency:\n\n[dependencies]\ncounter-bindings = { path = \"../contracts/bindings\" }\n\nThen import the generated contract module:\n\nuse alloy::primitives::U256;\nuse counter_bindings::counter::Counter;\n\nlet counter = Counter::new(address, provider);\nlet pending = counter.increment(U256::from(1)).send().await?;\n\nThe exact provider and transaction setup depends on your Alloy application. The generated module also contains Incremented, ZeroAmount, the ABI, call types, and return types.\n\nSelect the intended contracts\n\nUse --select more than once to generate a narrow public surface:\n\nforge bind \\\n--bindings-path bindings \\\n--select '^Counter$' \\\n--select '^Treasury$'\n\nBy default, contracts whose names end in Test or Script are excluded. --select-all explicitly includes every contract and cannot be combined with --select.\n\nThe default output is out/bindings. Pass --bindings-path to keep generated Rust code somewhere else. Use --module when the output should be a module rather than a crate, and --single-file when one generated source file is preferable.\n\nKeep generated bindings reproducible\n\nTreat Solidity source and compiled ABIs as the source of truth. Do not edit generated Rust files by hand.\n\nDuring development, regenerate intentionally:\n\nforge bind \\\n--bindings-path bindings \\\n--select '^Counter$' \\\n--alloy-version 1.0 \\\n--overwrite\n\nIn CI, omit --overwrite. If the directory already exists, forge bind compares it with freshly generated output and exits unsuccessfully when it is stale:\n\nforge bind \\\n--bindings-path bindings \\\n--select '^Counter$' \\\n--alloy-version 1.0\ncargo check --manifest-path bindings/Cargo.toml --locked\n\nCommit the generated crate's Cargo.lock when your repository policy permits it, or pin the dependency with --alloy-rev. Keep every generation option in a script or CI job so local and automated output cannot drift.\n\nOnly use --skip-build when the artifact directory is known to be current. Otherwise, stale artifacts can produce bindings that do not match the Solidity source under review.\n\nGenerate bindings for a verified contract\n\nWhen you only have a deployed address, retrieve the explorer-verified sources into an existing Forge project, then run the same local generator:\n\ncast source \"$ADDRESS\" \\\n--chain mainnet \\\n--etherscan-api-key \"$ETHERSCAN_API_KEY\" \\\n-d src/vendor/verified-contract\n\nforge bind \\\n--bindings-path bindings \\\n--select '^VerifiedContract$' \\\n--alloy-version 1.0\n\nCheck the chain ID, address, explorer, and downloaded source before compiling it. Prefer existing local source or artifacts when available; this workflow introduces explorer availability and verified-source trust into generation.\n\nGenerate Solidity JSON helpers\n\nforge bind-json discovers Solidity structs and generates typed wrappers around Foundry's JSON cheatcodes. This is useful when tests or scripts read structured configuration files.\n\nDefine the struct that represents the JSON schema:\n\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.24;\n\nstruct DeploymentConfig {\naddress owner;\nuint256 initialValue;\n}\n\nConfigure the generated file and narrow the source set in foundry.toml:\n\n[profile.default]\nsrc = \"src\"\n\n[bind_json]\nout = \"utils/JsonBindings.sol\"\ninclude = [\"**/ConfigTypes.sol\"]\nexclude = [\"**/mocks/**\"]\n\nThe include and exclude values are globs matched against compiler source paths. A leading **/ makes the example work for absolute and project-relative paths. If include is omitted, Foundry considers all non-library project files by default.\n\nGenerate the helper:\n\nforge bind-json\n\nBy default, the command writes utils/JsonBindings.sol. A positional path overrides the configured output:\n\nforge bind-json generated/ProjectJsonBindings.sol\n\nThe generated library includes serialize, deserializeDeploymentConfig, path-based overloads, and array deserializers. Import it after generation:\n\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.24;\n\nimport {DeploymentConfig} from \"../src/ConfigTypes.sol\";\nimport {JsonBindings} from \"../utils/JsonBindings.sol\";\n\ncontract JsonBindingsTest {\nusing JsonBindings for *;\n\nfunction test_deserializeDeploymentConfig() external pure {\nstring memory json =\n'{\"owner\":\"0x000000000000000000000000000000000000bEEF\",\"initialValue\":7}';\n\nDeploymentConfig memory config = json.deserializeDeploymentConfig();\n\nassert(config.owner == address(0xBEEF));\nassert(config.initialValue == 7);\n}\n}\n\nRun forge bind-json whenever a struct is added, removed, renamed, or changed. Foundry preprocesses an existing generated file so stale imports usually do not prevent regeneration, but the generated file must exist before source that imports it can compile for the first time.\n\nAgent workflow\n\nWhen an agent encounters generated bindings:\n\nRead foundry.toml, generation scripts, and CI before changing output paths or flags.\n\nInspect the Solidity declaration or ABI instead of searching large generated files first.\n\nRun forge bind without --overwrite to detect Rust binding drift.\n\nRegenerate with the repository's exact selectors and version options, then review ABI-level changes in calls, events, errors, and return types.\n\nRun forge bind-json before compiling code that imports a missing or stale JSON helper.\n\nThis order keeps generated code attributable to a small input change and avoids unnecessary explorer or RPC requests.\n\nSee also\n\nforge bind reference\n\nforge bind-json reference\n\ncast source reference\n\nBuilding contracts\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":1798,"crawled_at":1791194188311} +{"id":10351,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/introducing-our-summer-23-research-seminars","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Introducing our summer '23 research seminars - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nIntroducing our summer '23 research seminars\nTim Roughgarden\n08.22.23\n\nTags & Share Tags\nfield notes\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nWith the goal of advancing the science and technology of the next generation of the internet, we introduced a16z crypto research – a new kind of multidisciplinary lab dedicated to helping shape crypto and web3 as a formal area of study.\n\nAnother of our goals is to help bridge the worlds of academic theory with industry practice, and one of the ways we aim to do this – besides working with our portfolio and publishing our own work – is by bringing together the very best research talent from the disciplines that are relevant to the space, including computer science and the social sciences. To that end, we’ve now hosted two immersive summer programs at the a16z crypto office, where we invite both established and emerging researchers to present their work and ideas, collaborate on some of the hardest problems in the ecosystem, and sharpen each other’s ideas by spending time with one another.\n\nYou can watch many of the talks (and overhear our in-room conversations) from the 2022 cohort seminars here. We also continued this series of seminars through last fall and this spring. But now, I’m excited to share talks from the 2023 summer program and cohort, which covered topics from scaling to governance to incentive design and beyond.\n\nYou can subscribe to the YouTube channel here, where we will continue to post new talks regularly. The initial set of releases features:\n\nJoe Bonneau (a16z crypto research partner, NYU), “Distributed Randomness Beacons”\n\nLera Nikolaenko (a16z crypto research partner), “Distributed Data Storage, Data Availability Sampling, and Danksharding”\n\nMatt Green (Johns Hopkins), “Beyond ZK: Next Steps for Compliance and Constrained Encryption on Blockchains”\n\nSarah Meiklejohn (University College London and Google), “Adaptivity and Asynchrony in Distributed Key Generation”\n\nIttai Abraham (Intel Labs, former VMWare), “It’s All about Trust” (Ittai also has a very popular industry blog Decentralized Thoughts)\n\nFor more about the lab and our research team, including featured releases and papers, please visit https://a16zcrypto.com/research/. Some of our ongoing and latest work includes proposing and building a new paradigm for SNARK design (Lasso and Jolt), which make SNARKs more accessible, more auditable, and more widely usable for more developers to build more applications in web3; introducing ideas like LVR, which helps participants in automated market makers think more precisely about tradeoffs in liquidity provision for decentralized finance; providing overviews and proposals to fundamental concepts like danksharding; helping apply our theories to practice, such as private on-chain auction design for web3; diving deep on marketplace, mechanism, other incentive and business design; and much more.\n\nDoing research in web3 is fun and intellectually stimulating. The range of topics also shows how much work we have to do to fulfill the promise of a distributed computer that’s available to everyone but owned by no one (what I’ve called a “computer that lives in the sky”) – and there are still plenty of challenges, and opportunities, ahead for interested researchers from many fields.\n\n***\n\nTim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science and a member of the Data Science Institute at Columbia University, and Head of Research at a16z crypto.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.)\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":1413,"crawled_at":1791194205229} +{"id":10352,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/gas-accounting","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Gas accounting – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nGas accounting\n\nUse a gas measurement to understand an execution, a transaction receipt to find the charged gas, and a gas estimate to choose the limit for a new transaction. These numbers answer different questions, even when they happen to be equal.\n\nEIP-8037: State Creation Gas Cost Increase separates gas into two dimensions. This page explains that model and how Foundry exposes it. The EIP and its tracing API proposal are evolving; select tools and a node that implement the rules of the network and block you are testing.\n\nWhich value should you use?\n\nYour questionValue or APIImportant boundary\nHow much regular gas did the last call or creation use?\nvm.lastFrameGas().gasTotalUsed\nExcludes EIP-8037 state gas; includes nested execution. Isolation adds transaction intrinsic gas and the regular calldata floor.\n\nHow much net state gas did that frame use?\nvm.lastFrameGas().gasStateUsed\nAlready net of state refills; can be negative. Zero without EIP-8037 or after frame rollback.\n\nWhat is the net sum of those frame components?\nint256(uint256(g.gasTotalUsed)) + int256(g.gasStateUsed)\nA signed measurement, not a sufficient gas limit or necessarily receipt gas.\n\nWhat ordinary refund did that frame accumulate?\nvm.lastFrameGas().gasRefunded\nFrame counter without isolation; finalized refund for an isolated transaction. Excludes state refills.\n\nHow much total gas was charged for a mined transaction?\neth_getTransactionReceipt → gasUsed; cast receipt gasUsed\nIncludes both dimensions after refund/floor processing. Do not add state gas again.\n\nWhat was the transaction's execution/state breakdown?\ndebug_traceTransaction with stateGasTracer, if the node supports it\nReturns gasUsed, executionGasUsed (the proposal’s regularGasUsed), stateGasUsed, and gasRefund. The dimension fields use block-accounting rules; receipt gas is gasUsed.\n\nHow much gas should I supply for another transaction?\neth_estimateGas; cast estimate; Alloy Provider::estimate_gas\nUse the target network, input, sender, value, and state. Estimates require a node implementing its fork rules.\n\nWhat gas fee did I pay?\nReceipt gasUsed × effectiveGasPrice\nCovers regular and state gas. Add blob or network-specific fee components separately when applicable.\n\nSee lastFrameGas for every field, Cast receipt, Cast estimate, and Alloy's gas trace types.\n\nExecution gas and state gas\n\nTermWhat it pays forWhat it excludes\nRegular gas (the EIP’s execution gas)\nComputation, memory expansion, state access, existing-state updates, and transaction intrinsic costs.\nState creation charges assigned to the EIP-8037 state dimension; blob gas.\n\nState gas\nState creation, such as a new storage slot, a new account, or deployed code. Reported net usage already deducts charges undone by state refills or rollback.\nThe accompanying regular execution costs; blob gas.\n\nCombined transaction gas limit (tx.gas)\nThe single gas budget you supply for intrinsic costs and both execution and state gas.\nBlob gas, which is accounted for separately.\n\nReceipt gas used (gasUsed)\nThe transaction's combined charged gas after ordinary refunds and the applicable calldata floor.\nUnused gas, blob gas, and separate network-specific fees.\n\nA state-changing opcode can incur both regular and state gas. State gas does not mean “all gas spent by storage opcodes.” Before EIP-8037, those operations still cost gas, but their costs use the ordinary single-dimensional schedule.\n\nHow the reservoir works\n\nYou still supply one transaction gas limit. After intrinsic gas, the EVM gives the transaction a regular gas allowance, capped by the protocol, and puts any excess into a state gas reservoir. Regular execution spends regular gas only. State creation spends the reservoir first and spills into regular gas once it is empty. State refills reverse creation charges and restore the gas pools according to EIP-8037's refill rules. Child calls receive the reservoir in full; their {gas: amount} allowance and the 63/64 rule apply to regular gas only.\n\ngasleft() reports regular gas only. Its delta can miss state gas paid from the reservoir or include state charges spilling into regular gas. A refill can make a later gasleft() larger, causing checked subtraction to revert. An empty reservoir does not disable state charges, and a large reservoir cannot fund regular execution. See the EIP's reservoir model and call-frame rules for the full mechanics.\n\nTwo meanings of “refund”\n\nOrdinary gas refunds accumulate in the EVM refund counter and are settled at the transaction boundary. EIP-3529 caps the applied refund at one fifth of gas spent; the EIP-7623 calldata floor can further limit the reduction in charged gas. A refund does not replenish gas available to execute instructions.\n\nState gas refills reverse state creation charges during execution, for example when a slot that was zero at transaction start is set and then cleared. They can replenish gas available during execution and are already deducted from net state gas. They are not the ordinary capped refund counter. A reverted or exceptionally halted frame reports zero net state gas, even if it temporarily needed state gas before failing; its regular execution still costs gas.\n\nA successful nested frame can have a negative state gas delta when it clears state created by an earlier frame in the same transaction. This is why Vm.Gas.gasStateUsed is signed. Transaction-level state gas is nonnegative. Use signed arithmetic for frame deltas and avoid subtracting state refills twice.\n\nWhy used gas is not required gas\n\nYour transaction budget must fund both regular and state gas when they are charged, before later refills or refunds. Regular execution must also fit its separate protocol cap. A transaction that allocates state and later undoes it can report little net state gas while requiring enough gas for the temporary allocation. Call forwarding and minimum gas checks can require additional headroom as well.\n\nFor example, if a frame reports 30,000 regular gas and 100,000 net state gas, their sum is 130,000 measured gas units. It is not proof that a transaction with a 130,000 gas limit will succeed: the frame can exclude intrinsic or caller-side costs, and it does not report peak temporary state consumption. Subtracting its ordinary refund makes an estimate even less reliable.\n\nFor an already executed transaction, read the receipt directly. In the EIP-8037 model, transaction gas before the ordinary refund includes both dimensions and intrinsic costs. The applied ordinary refund is capped, then the calldata floor determines the final charged amount. This settlement cannot generally be reconstructed from lastFrameGas, because a child frame is not the whole transaction.\n\nTransaction gas versus block gas\n\nReceipt gasUsed is the transaction's combined charge. Under EIP-8037, the block header uses the larger accumulated gas dimension instead. With EIP-7778, block accounting counts regular gas before ordinary refunds, while state gas remains net of state refills. See Alloy's gas accounting documentation for the fields and calldata-floor rules.\n\nDo not sum parent and child frames to reconstruct a transaction total: parent measurements already include nested execution. Some state charges and rollbacks also occur outside opcode steps.\n\nWhich networks are affected?\n\nExecution environmentBehavior\nFoundry's Ethereum EVM with evm_version = \"amsterdam\" or a later supported fork\nUses EIP-8037 regular/state gas accounting. This is a local execution setting, not evidence of activation on a live chain.\n\nEthereum forks before Amsterdam, or another network that has not activated EIP-8037\nNo separate state gas dimension: Vm.Gas.gasStateUsed is zero. State creation still costs ordinary gas and is included in gasTotalUsed.\n\nA custom network or an L2\nFollows its own hardfork and gas schedule. EVM compatibility alone does not establish EIP-8037 support, pricing, activation dates, or fee equivalence.\n\nRPC tracing on any network\nDepends on both the block's rules and the node's tracer support. Optional state fields may be absent; an unsupported stateGasTracer can return an RPC error. An absent field means “not reported,” not measured zero.\n\nWhen compiling with Solidity 0.8.36, Amsterdam is experimental and also requires --experimental (or experimental = true in foundry.toml).\n\nPin the EVM version, fork block, optimizer settings, and isolation mode when comparing measurements. Use a Foundry version supporting the selected fork and a current forge-std Vm.Gas interface containing gasStateUsed. For a live network, consult that network's activation schedule rather than assuming Amsterdam rules from a chain name or from Alloy's ability to decode the fields.\n\nRPC field names differ between implementations. The execution-apis proposal names the execution dimension regularGasUsed; Alloy and reth serialize executionGasUsed. Check what your node returns and whether your Alloy version accepts both names when decoding.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":2266,"crawled_at":1791194205750} +{"id":10353,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/sui-architecture/components","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Components | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui is a layer 1 blockchain. Layer 1 networks consist of the following primary components:\n\nNodes that run the network's binaries and participate in network activity such as consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network. Nodes provide compute and storage resources to the network.\n\nThe consensus mechanism used to validate transactions.\n\nTransactions themselves, which on Sui reflect onchain operations such as creating objects or sending assets.\n\nTokens used to pay for resources and transactions on the network.\n\nOn Sui specifically, other core components include:\n\nObjects, the most basic unit of storage on Sui that are addressable onchain by unique IDs.\n\nMoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui., the programming language used to create smart contracts on Sui.\n\nNetworks​\n\nSui operates multiple networks that are comprised of these essential components. Each network serves a different purpose:\n\nMainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets.: Production network for live transactions and real-value assets.\n\nTestnetTestnetStaging network for testing changes before production deployment.: Staging network for testing changes before production deployment.\n\nDevnetDevnetFor developing and testing new features.: For developing and testing new features.\n\nLocalnetLocalnetLocal network you can run on your own machine for optimized development.: Local network you can run on your own machine for optimized development.\n\nLearn more about the Sui networks.\n\nNodes​\n\nOn Sui, validatorValidatorResponsible for executing tasks like staking, gas price references, and tallying rules. nodes run the consensus mechanism that orders and commits all onchain activity. Full nodes do not take part in consensus. They verify the committed state independently and locally, then serve queries about it.\n\nThere are 2 types of nodes on Sui:\n\nFull nodeFull nodeResponsible for validating blockchain activity.: Responsible for validating blockchain activity such as transactions, checkpointsCheckpointCreated after transaction execution to provide a certified record of chain history., and epoch changes. Each full node stores the blockchain's state and history to serve queries.\n\nValidator node: Responsible for executing more tasks than full nodes, such as staking, gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction. price references, and tallying rules.\n\nLearn more about nodes on Sui.\n\nDelegated proof-of-stakeDPoSConsensus mechanism used by Sui. consensus​\n\nSui uses a delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism to validate transactions. Validators must stake SUI tokens on the network, either their own or delegated by other token holders, to participate in consensus. This approach aligns validator incentives with network security and efficiency without the high energy costs of proof-of-work systems.\n\nTo learn more about consensus on Sui, see:\n\nSui Consensus\n\nEpochs and reconfiguration, which is when the validator set can change\n\nTransactions​\n\nTransactions on Sui consist of several commands that execute on inputs. These inputs define the result of the transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction.. All updates to the Sui network happen through transactions. There are only 2 types of transactions on Sui:\n\nProgrammable transaction blocksProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui.: Define all user transactions on Sui, as they can be submitted by anyone. They are used for activities such as sending tokens, creating objects, and interacting with smart contracts.\n\nSystem transactionsSystem transactionsOnly submittable by validator nodes.: Only submittable by validator nodes. These transactions are for network functions such as changing epochs or starting checkpoints.\n\nLearn more about both types of transactions, or learn more about programmable transaction blocks.\n\nTokens​\n\nThe native token for Sui is SUI. Transactions on Sui often deal with small fractions of the value of 1 SUI. To make it easier to work with transactions, Sui also provides the token MISTMISTThe smallest unit of SUI.. 1 billion MIST equals 1 SUI.\n\nOn the network, everything has a cost. It costs money to provide computational power, process transactions, and store transaction data. This cost is referred to as gas. You pay gas fees with a blockchain's native token, in this case, SUI or MIST.\n\nTo learn more about the tokenomics of Sui, see the following topics:\n\nSui Tokenomics\n\nGas Fees\n\nStaking and Unstaking\n\nSui Bridging\n\nObjects​\n\nThe basic unit of storage in Sui is the objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui.. Blocks on the chain are actually objects that define assets rather than basic key-value stores that define addressesAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network.. Sui's storage is centered around objects that are addressable onchain by unique IDs. A smart contract is an object (called a Sui Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui.), and these smart contracts manipulate objects on the Sui network.\n\nEvery object has an owner field that dictates how you can use it in transactions. Objects can be owned by an address or party, or they can be immutable, shared, or wrapped.\n\nLearn more about the Sui Object Model or Object Ownership.\n\nMove​\n\nMove is an open source programming language that is used for all activity on Sui, such as creating or trading NFTs, using apps, and all other transaction-based events. It is used for writing safe packages that can create and manipulate objects onchain.\n\nMove is platform-agnostic to enable common libraries, tooling, and developer communities across blockchains with vastly different data and execution models.\n\nTo learn more about Move, see Move Concepts.\nRelated topics\n\nOperator Guides\nGuides for operators on the Sui network. Whether you are running a full node for your app or operating as a validator on the Sui network, these guides help you set up your environment and operate your network.\nStorage\nAn overview of Sui's storage architecture, including validator and full node storage requirements, pruning, snapshots, checkpoints, and how storage fees and rebates are calculated.\nConsensus\nOverview of the Sui consensus mechanism.\nWhat is a Transaction?\nSui has two types of transactions, programmable transaction blocks and system transactions.\n\nNetworksNodes\n\nDelegated proof-of-stake consensus\nTransactions\nTokens\nObjects\nMove\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1642,"crawled_at":1791194206258} +{"id":10354,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/government-agencies","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"government agencies - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\ngovernment agencies\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all government agencies\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n08.13.25 / Miles Jennings, Michele Korver, Jai Ramaswamy, Amanda Tuminelli and Scott Walker\nSEC Safe Harbor Proposal for Blockchain Apps: Exempting DeFi and NFT Interfaces from Broker Registration\nProposal for SEC safe harbor that exempts non-custodial blockchain apps like DeFi and NFT platforms from broker registration requirements.\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nregulatory know-how\n\n08.13.25 / Miles Jennings, Aiden Slavin and David Sverdlov\nA safe harbor for software: Why the SEC should clarify broker rules for blockchain apps\nAn SEC safe harbor for blockchain apps would ensure non-custodial, non-discretionary DeFi and NFT interfaces aren’t misclassified as brokers.\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nregulatory know-how\n\n07.31.25 / Miles Jennings, Michele Korver, Jai Ramaswamy, Scott Walker, David Sverdlov and Aiden Slavin\nResponse to the Senate Banking Committee digital asset market structure request for information\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\n\n01.22.25 / Scott Walker and Bill Hinman\nA new (digital) age at the SEC\nThe SEC can and should take immediate steps to regulate crypto from providing guidance on airdrops to updating crowdfunding and custody rules.\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\nregulatory know-how\n\n11.04.24 / Brian Quintenz\n7 things U.S. government agencies can do to help seize the web3 opportunity\nSimple steps that U.S. government departments and agencies could take today — absent legislation — to help crypto thrive\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n10.14.24 / Michele Korver and Jai Ramaswamy\nCrime and crypto: Concrete steps to address money laundering\nHow policymakers can implement measures that will help catching bad actors and reign in illicit financial activity in crypto\n\npolicy & regulation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n03.02.23 / Miles Jennings, Michele Korver, Brian Quintenz and Tim Roughgarden\nComment to the Office of Science and Technology Policy on Digital Assets Research and Development (3.3.23)\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\n\n09.20.22 / Scott Walker and Neel Maitra\nA Call to the SEC: Treat Crypto Assets as if Clients Matter\nThe SEC's \"custody rule\" needs updating in the context of crypto where it's at odds with the fiduciary duty asset managers owe their clients.\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n08.25.22 / Michele Korver\na16z crypto’s Response to the Department of Treasury’s Request for Comment\nOn August 8, 2022, a16z responded to the Department of the Treasury’s request for comment entitled, “Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets; Request for Comment.” Treasury issued the request for comment in light of President Biden’s Executive Order, which directed the appropriate federal agencies to investigate the potential use of blockchain technology. a16z crypto’s response...\n\npolicy & regulation\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ngovernment agencies\n\n08.18.22 / Michele Korver, Jai Ramaswamy and Sonal Chokshi\nCrypto Regulations, Illicit Finance, Privacy and Beyond\nEPISODE SUMMARY with @michelekorver @jai_ramaswamy @smc90 We tease apart the facts vs buzz around recent news — Tornado Cash sanctions, and arrest of a suspected developer — including what’s novel and what’s not, as well as broader backdrop. But we also share an evergreen explainer that goes well beyond recent events, to help crypto founders...\n\ncompany building\ncompliance & illicit finance\ngovernment agencies\npodcast\nregulatory know-how\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\n01.06.22 / Tomicah Tillemann and James Rathmell\nHow to Build a Better Internet: 10 Principles for World Leaders Shaping the Future of Web3\nThe year 2021 marked a watershed moment for web3. Significant numbers of policymakers began to grasp the potential of web3 to democratize access to opportunity, provide individuals with more control of their data, and build a better internet. In the year ahead, many of these leaders will work to create legal and regulatory architecture to...\n\ncompany building\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n12.16.21 / Tomicah Tillemann and James Rathmell\nPrediction for the New Year: A Web3 Midterm\nWe recently commissioned a public opinion survey* to gauge how significant the web3 constituency will be as we head into the U.S. midterm elections next year. The findings were mind-blowing for the a16z web3 team, and we wanted to share the results.We all know 2021 has been an extraordinary year for web3. DAOs rallied to...\n\npolicy & regulation\ndata insights\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n10.04.21 / Tomicah Tillemann, Miles Jennings and James Rathmell\nOur Proposals to the Senate Banking Committee\nWe are at the threshold of the third generation of the internet: web3. Given the pace of innovation in this space, it has been challenging for many policymakers to keep up. That’s why we were so heartened by the Senate Banking Committee’s call for feedback on clarifying laws around digital assets and decentralized technology. Maintaining...\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n01.03.21 / Katie Haun\nWhy a16z Opposes Secretary Mnuchin’s FinCEN Midnight Crypto Rulemaking\nA Treasury Department proposal bypasses established rulemaking procedures, fails to solve the real issues, and threatens to harm U.S. innovation.\n\npolicy & regulation\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n02.21.20 / Scott Kupor\nReading Between the Lines: SEC, Telegram, and Rule 144\nHidden in the SEC’s complaint against Telegram is an interesting nuance with potential implications for the broader private equity markets.\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\n\n10.21.19 / Scott Kupor\nMutability in Crypto and Recent Moves by the SEC\nOver the last few weeks, we’ve seen a number of SEC actions surrounding crypto that provide some meaningful insight into the regulatory posture of the agency. Last week, the SEC filed an action to enjoin Telegram (creators of the Telegram Open Network, or “TON”) from distributing tokens (called “Grams”) that it had promised to purchasers...\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\n\n09.16.19 / Christopher Giancarlo\nCFTC Chairman Christopher Giancarlo on Regulating Crypto\nEditor’s Note: We need to develop new policy approaches to keep pace with fast-moving blockchain technology. So what should a 21st century regulator look like? Chairman of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Christopher Giancarlo (more about him below) shared the following remarks on how the CFTC has been evolving and crafting a modern...\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nop-eds\n\n05.14.19 / Katie Haun\nKik and the SEC: What’s Going On and What Does It Mean for Crypto?\nThe SEC told Kik it was thinking of pursuing action for violating U.S. securities laws. What might it tell us about how far regulators are willing to stretch the law?\n\npolicy & regulation\ngovernment agencies\nregulatory know-how\n\n07.15.18 / Katie Haun, Robin Weisman and Sonal Chokshi\na16z Podcast: The Regulatory Landscape for Crypto\nWhat’s going on, regulation-wise, in crypto? How should people who want to join a company or build something new in the space think about the regulatory environment? What to make of all the headlines, or the “alphabet soup” of agencies potentially involved in regulating crypto? This episode of the a16z Podcast shares principles — as well...\n\ncompany building\ncrypto basics\nglossaries & terminology\ngovernment agencies\nregulatory know-how\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":2632,"crawled_at":1791194231209} +{"id":10355,"url":"https://docs.balancer.fi/build/README.md","domain":"docs.balancer.fi","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"","text":"## Build on Balancer\n\nAMMs built on the Balancer protocol benefit from the security of the Balancer vault. This enables developers to utilize\nthe well-developed Balancer AMM ecosystem, while the vault's optimized architecture streamlines the development process\nand allows teams to concentrate on their product.\n\nWe assist teams throughout this process, leveraging our extensive experience in bringing innovative AMMs to market.\nThis includes addressing finer details such as aggregator integration, which is vital for any new AMM to capture the\nnecessary organic flow to compete effectively.\n\nOur aim is to simplify the development process and facilitate the creation of novel AMMs with minimal friction.\n\n:::info\nWhen adding new tokens to Balancer pools, keep in mind the [Vault compatibility requirements](../partner-onboarding/onboarding-overview/core-pools.md#token-requirements).\n:::\n\nWhen building on Balancer, there are three paths to explore:","tokens":238,"crawled_at":1791194233001} +{"id":10356,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-process-upgrade-establishing-a-statute-of-limitations-for-temperature-checks/26002","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] Governance Process Upgrade: Establishing a Statute of Limitations for Temperature Checks - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] Governance Process Upgrade: Establishing a Statute of Limitations for Temperature Checks\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nEren_Targ5\n\nJanuary 18, 2026, 12:06pm\n\n1\n\n1. Summary\n\nThis proposal seeks to establish a formal “Statute of Limitations” for Uniswap Governance proposals. Specifically, it mandates that any proposal which passes a “Temperature Check” (Snapshot vote) must proceed to an on-chain vote within 90 days.\n\nIf a proposal fails to move to an on-chain vote within this 90-day window, the Temperature Check is declared “Expired” (or “Dead”). To proceed, the proposer must restart the governance process with a new Temperature Check to ensure community sentiment remains current.\n\n2. Motivation\n\nCurrently, Uniswap Governance operates on a continuous cycle. Unlike Optimism or Arbitrum, which utilize specific “Governance Seasons” or “Cycles” that naturally flush out stale proposals, Uniswap proposals can technically remain “pending” indefinitely after passing a Snapshot vote.\n\nThis creates critical risks and inefficiencies:\n\nMarket Conditions Change: A proposal approved 6 months ago may be financially dangerous today due to changes in market volatility, token prices, or protocol upgrades (e.g., v3 to v4).\n\n“Zombie” Proposal Risk: There is currently no rule preventing a delegate from taking a Snapshot vote from 2022 and putting it on-chain today, bypassing current community sentiment.\n\nGovernance Clutter: It is difficult for delegates to track which initiatives are active versus abandoned.\n\nBy implementing a 90-day expiration, we align Uniswap with industry best practices and ensure that every on-chain vote reflects the current will of the DAO*.\n\n3.Specification\n\nWe propose adding the following clause to the official Uniswap Community Governance Process:\n\n“Validity of Temperature Checks: A successful Temperature Check (Snapshot vote) is valid for a period of 90 days from the date the vote closes. If an on-chain governance proposal is not submitted within this 90-day window, the Temperature Check is considered Expired. The proposer must post a new Temperature Check and receive fresh community approval before proceeding to an on-chain vote.”\n\nDefinition of Proposal States\n\nStatus\nDefinition\nAction Required\n\nLive / Active\n\nA proposal that has passed Snapshot within the last 90 days.\n\nCan proceed to On-chain Vote immediately.\n\nDead / Expired\n\nA proposal that passed Snapshot >90 days ago but has not yet been submitted on-chain.\n\nMust re-run the Temperature Check phase to verify current sentiment.\n\nHandling Long-Term Initiatives\n\nWe recognize that major protocol upgrades often require development timelines longer than 90 days. However, governance mandates should not be indefinite. If the technical implementation takes longer than 90 days, the proposer must follow the **“Re-affirmation Process”**:\n\n1. The “Refresh” Vote: The proposer does not need to start from zero with a new RFC.\n\n2. Action: They simply post a “Re-affirmation Snapshot” (Temperature Check) with the final code/parameters.\n\n3. Rationale: In DeFi, 6 months is a long time. A mandate given in January might be dangerous to execute in July if market conditions have shifted (e.g., bridge hacks, new regulation).\n\n4. Rationale & Precedent\n\nThis change brings Uniswap into alignment with the hygiene standards of other mature DeFi protocols:\n\nMakerDAO (Sky): Enforces a strict 30-day expiration on Executive Proposals. As seen in a recent proposal explicitly mandates that “ If a proposal does not pass/execute within 30 days, it expires to prevent stale code or parameters from affecting the protocol”.\n\nOptimism: Utilizes “Governance Seasons.” Proposals must be submitted and voted on within a specific seasonal window; if they miss it, they must be resubmitted the following season.\n\nUniswap (Current): Lacks both seasons and expiry rules, leaving the DAO exposed to “Zombie Proposals” indefinitely.\n\n5. Comparison: Old vs. New Structure\n\nFeature\nCurrent Uniswap Governance\nProposed Uniswap Structure\n\nSnapshot Validity\n\nIndefinite (Technically valid forever)\n\n90 Days (Statute of Limitations)\n\nStale Proposal Risk\n\nHigh. A proposal from 1 year ago could theoretically be executed today despite market changes.\n\nLow. Proposals must have a fresh community signal (within 3 months) to execute.\n\nGovernance Cycle\n\nContinuous / Unbounded\n\nContinuous, but with a rolling expiration window to ensure freshness.\n\nRe-submission\n\nNot defined / Confusing\n\nClear Process: If >90 days, you must re-post Snapshot.\n\n6. Precedent of Risk\n\nWe have already seen “Zombie Proposals” confuse the governance process:\n\n* The Gnosis Deployment (2022-2023):A deployment passed a vote but sat pending for 11 months. During that time, the bridge provider (Nomad) was hacked. Without an expiry rule, a stale mandate could theoretically be used to execute unsafe code.\n\n* The Fee Switch (2024-2025): The fee switch mandate sat dormant for over 12 months, requiring a community member to manually post a “Re-Temperature Check” to verify if the will of the DAO had changed.\n\nOur proposal removes this ambiguity. Instead of relying on the goodwill of authors to “re-check” sentiment, we enforce a hard 90-day expiry.\n\n7. Success Metrics\n\nZero “Zombie” Executions: No proposals older than 90 days are executed on-chain without a fresh check.\n\nDelegate Clarity: Delegates can easily view the “active” pipeline without filtering through years of stale posts.\n\nSafety: Reduced risk of executing outdated parameters (e.g., fee switches or grant distributions based on old token prices).\n\n8. Next Steps\n\n1. RFC Period: Gather feedback on this post for 7 days.\n\n2. Snapshot Vote: Post a Temperature Check to ratify this rule change.\n\n3. Documentation Update: Upon passing, the Uniswap Governance Docs and Forum Guidelines will be updated to reflect the 90-day expiry rule.\n\n9 Likes\n\nEren_Targ5\n\nFebruary 19, 2026, 5:56pm\n\n2\n\nIf no one has any objections / comments for the proposal in the next 3 days then we will be putting it up for a vote next week.\n\nHeadOps\n\nFebruary 22, 2026, 3:52am\n\n3\n\nGreat proposal — cutting zombie tasks is exactly what DAOs need to stay lean.\n\nOne thing I’d add: we should watch out for “zombie proposals” too.\n\nJust like tasks, approved proposals often die after the vote. Not because they’re bad ideas, but because there’s no system to actually get them done. I’ve seen this happen on Uniswap — good proposals pass, then… nothing. No follow-through, no accountability, just silence until everyone forgets.\n\nHere’s what helps: an Execution Registry.\n\nSimple idea. Once a proposal passes, it goes into a public tracker. Someone’s named responsible. Deadline’s set. Success criteria are clear. Progress gets checked weekly. A few community members rotate in to verify the work actually got done. When it’s finished, it’s marked complete and we document what worked (or didn’t).\n\nWhy this matters for your proposal:\n\nEvery task we kill gets recorded — why we cut it, what we learned\n\nNew proposals get a reality check before they go to vote\n\nPeople can actually see what’s getting delivered, not just what’s getting approved\n\nI’m a DAO Operations Partner — I help teams turn governance into results without turning into a company. Done this for a few DAOs and happy to share what works.\n\nLet me know if you want to dig into this or test it out.\n\nThanks for pushing Uniswap to run tighter.\n\nManugotsuka\n\nMarch 6, 2026, 4:31pm\n\n4\n\nThe following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Manugotsuka, and it is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and discussion.\n\nWe voted FOR.\n\nWe see this as a reasonable governance improvement. Snapshot approvals can remain quiet for long periods, creating uncertainty about whether an old mandate still reflects the DAO’s current will. Given how quickly conditions change in crypto, executing a proposal many months after its initial approval may no longer reflect delegate sentiment or current priorities.\n\nA 90-day window seems like a sensible balance. It gives proposers enough time to move forward while keeping governance signals relatively fresh. We also think the reaffirmation Snapshot is a practical mechanism for initiatives that take longer to prepare, allowing the community to confirm support without restarting the entire process.\n\n3 Likes\n\nblockful\n\nMarch 13, 2026, 5:03pm\n\n5\n\nWe voted FOR the proposal.\n\nKeeping a proposal approved on Snapshot eligible to be submitted at any time is indeed a governance risk for Uniswap, which is why this initiative is a good idea.\n\nHowever, the procedure, as seen in Arbitrum or Optimism, is more of a social convention than an on-chain mechanism that protects the DAO from any proposal being submitted on-chain without discussion or context.\n\n3 Likes\n\nLEON_THE_GR8T\n\nJune 10, 2026, 7:08pm\n\n6\n\nThis is beautiful, as this proposal addresses a real problem that’s been quietly undermining Uniswap governance for a while — and I support it in principle.\n\nThe “Zombie Proposal” risk alone justifies this change. A delegate being able to push a 2022 Snapshot vote on-chain today — with zero re-validation of community sentiment — is a genuine governance vulnerability. Market conditions, protocol upgrades, and community priorities shift significantly over months. Any vote that bypasses current sentiment isn’t democratic governance, it’s a loophole.\n\nThe 90-day window feels reasonable. It’s long enough to allow proper deliberation without creating unnecessary pressure, but short enough to ensure proposals reflect current community consensus.\n\nOne thing I’d push the proposers to clarify though: what happens to proposals that are mid-deliberation when this rule passes? Do existing pending Snapshot votes get a grace period, or do they expire immediately? That transition mechanism matters and could create controversy if left ambiguous.\n\nAlso worth considering — should the 90-day clock pause during major protocol upgrade periods (like a v3 to v4 transition) where governance bandwidth is naturally stretched? A simple exception clause could prevent good proposals from dying for timing reasons alone.\n\nOverall: strong proposal. Clean it up with a clear transition plan and it should pass comfortably. Voting YES.\n\ncroutondigital\n\nJune 29, 2026, 1:09pm\n\n7\n\nI generally agree with the goal of preventing stale mandates from being carried forward indefinitely. Governance decisions are made within a specific context, and community sentiment, market conditions, and protocol priorities can change significantly over time.\n\nThat said, I wonder whether a fixed 90-day window may unintentionally create friction for more complex initiatives. Some proposals require audits, implementation work, legal review, or coordination across multiple stakeholders before they are ready for an on-chain vote. In those cases, the delay may not reflect a lack of support but simply the operational reality of executing large initiatives.\n\nThe proposed re-affirmation process seems like a reasonable compromise, but I think it may be worth considering whether the expiration period should vary depending on proposal type. For example, operational or parameter changes could have shorter validity windows, while large protocol upgrades or infrastructure initiatives might justify a longer period before requiring renewed community approval.\n\nI also think there is value in distinguishing between “inactive” proposals and “expired” proposals. A proposal that has passed a Temperature Check and is actively progressing through development may not present the same governance risk as a proposal that has been dormant for months with no visible progress.\n\nOverall, I support the principle that governance mandates should remain fresh and representative of current sentiment. The key challenge will be balancing governance hygiene with the practical realities of delivering complex protocol changes.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nProposed Simplifications to the Uniswap Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n3\n\n5988\n\nDecember 7, 2022\n\nCommunity Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n4\n\n38245\n\nJanuary 9, 2026\n\n[RFC - Update] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n8968\n\nDecember 24, 2022\n\n[RFC] Community Governance Process Changes\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n4561\n\nDecember 6, 2022\n\nCommunity Governance Process\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\n30\n\n58333\n\nApril 7, 2023","tokens":3105,"crawled_at":1791194251790} +{"id":10357,"url":"https://docs.balancer.fi/partner-onboarding/onboarding-overview/introduction.md","domain":"docs.balancer.fi","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"","text":"## Partner Onboarding\n\n:::info\nFrom product details to step-by-step integration guides, this documentation provides partners with everything they need to onboard into the Balancer Ecosystem.\n:::\n\n### Overview\n\n#### Balancer Technology\n\nWith a vastly simplified developer experience, 100% boosted pools, LST base pairings, and customizable pool hooks, Balancer v3 provides partners with a streamlined hub to optimize yield-bearing liquidity, build robust governance tokenomics, and streamline AMM innovation.\n\n\\::: tip\nWant to learn more about Balancer? Click [here](../../concepts/core-concepts/introduction.md)\n\\:::\n\n#### Unique AMM Designs and Products\n\nBalancer Technology provides innovative AMM designs such as\n\n1. **[Boosted Pools](./products/boostedpools.md)**: Leverage token utilization for optimal yield.\n2. **[Yield-Bearing liquidity pools](products/lstandlrt.md)**: Optimized LP tech for liquid-staking tokens (LST) and yield-bearing stablecoins.\n3. **[ve8020 / Governance Tokenomics](products/ve8020.md)**: Enhanced liquidity dynamics and aligned incentive structures for governance positions.\n4. **[Stable Pools](products/stablecoinliquidity.md)**: Advanced technology for highly correlated stable assets, such as Gyro-stable pools.\n\n### High-Level Overview of Onboarding Process\n\nOnboarding into Balancer varies depending on the AMM technology you want to use. Some components are simple and straightforward to use, while others may require expert assistance from our core contributors.\n\nLearn more about our onboarding journey, use the Balancer Tech Product Wizard to find the best solution for your needs, or check out our product case studies below.\n\n:::info\nWhen adding new tokens to Balancer pools, keep in mind the [Vault compatibility requirements](../../partner-onboarding/onboarding-overview/core-pools.md#token-requirements).\n:::\n\n#### Onboarding Journey\n\nOnboarding your asset onto Balancer involves three main steps:\n\n* **Choose a Pool Type**: Select the pool type that best fits your use case.\n* **Customize Pool Logic**: Utilize Balancer v3's [hooks](../../concepts/core-concepts/hooks.md) for tailored functionality.\n* **Configure Incentives (optional)**: Stand up a [gauge](./../onboarding-overview/gauge-onboarding.md) to stream your own secondary rewards. BAL emissions to gauges have been halted per [BIP-919](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-919-bal-tokenomics-revamp/7001).\n\n\\::: tip\nBalancer contributors are happy to help during the onboarding process. Feel free to reach out to us on our [Discord](https://discord.balancer.fi)!\n\\:::\n\n#### Find the Right Product for Your Needs\n\nUse our Product Wizard to discover the best solutions for your business. Explore use cases and read success stories. \n\n### Balancer Deployments\n\nLooking for deployment-specific information? Choose a specific deployment type below to explore various options and next steps. ","tokens":732,"crawled_at":1791194259473} +{"id":10358,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/introduction/prompting","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Prompting – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nPrompting\n\nYou can speed up smart contract development by using AI to draft boilerplate, testing patterns, and documentation. The best results come from structured prompts with clear constraints and examples.\n\nUse a structured prompt\n\nCopy the template below and replace the section with your project details.\n\nPrompt template\nYou are an expert Solidity engineer using Foundry.\n\nProject context:\n- Repository layout: {FOLDERS}\n- Solidity version: {SOLC_VERSION}\n- Dependencies: {DEPENDENCIES}\n- Target chain(s): {CHAINS}\n\nConstraints:\n- Use Foundry tools only (forge, cast, anvil, chisel)\n- Prefer forge-std testing utilities\n- Keep functions small and focused\n- Avoid unsafe patterns and unchecked external calls\n\nTesting requirements:\n- Include unit tests and fuzz tests where applicable\n- Add revert tests for all failure paths\n- Use vm.assume or bound to constrain fuzz inputs\n\nStyle:\n- Use clear naming and short helper functions\n- Add comments only when logic is non-obvious\n\n\nDescribe the contract or tests you want to generate.\n\n\nExample usage\n\nExample\n\nCreate a minimal ERC20 with mint and burn functions. Include a test suite that verifies:\n- mint increases balance and total supply\n- burn decreases balance and total supply\n- unauthorized minting reverts\n\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":358,"crawled_at":1791194279817} +{"id":10359,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-introduction-and-advice-seeds-bones-web3-survival-moba-on-unichain-ecosystem-grant-inquiry-general-guidance/26123","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] Introduction and Advice: \"Seeds & Bones\" Web3 Survival MOBA on Unichain & Ecosystem Grant Inquiry / General Guidance - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] Introduction and Advice: \"Seeds & Bones\" Web3 Survival MOBA on Unichain & Ecosystem Grant Inquiry / General Guidance\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nsquidwardjalapeno\n\nJune 14, 2026, 3:00am\n\n1\n\nAuthor: Jeffy B / Joseph Cipolla\n\nDate: 06/13/2026\n\nContract Address (Deployed on Unichain): 0xb762c3B3f544B04D0eAD51Fa1883Ee0f0Ec87cE4\n\nIntroduction\n\nHello Uniswap and Unichain community,\n\nI am the developer behind Seeds & Bones, a retro-survival multiplayer online battle arena (MOBA) game. I have recently deployed the core vault contract on Unichain at 0xb762c3B3f544B04D0eAD51Fa1883Ee0f0Ec87cE4 and wanted to introduce myself to the community, share what I am building, and ask for guidance on the best pathways for ecosystem integration and developer funding.\n\nAbout Seeds & Bones\n\nSeeds & Bones is a fully playable multiplayer game combining classic top-down survival elements—such as farming, autonomous workforce management, and trading—with competitive Web3 elements.\n\nAutoritative Architecture: To provide a responsive, 60 FPS multiplayer experience, the game uses an authoritative hybrid model. The game state is computed off-chain, and rewards are settled securely on-chain using a cryptographic signature/voucher verification system.\n\nWhy Unichain: I selected Unichain because its sub-second block times and low transaction costs are highly suited for the micro-transactions required by interactive Web3 gaming.\n\nValue to the Unichain Ecosystem\n\nI believe gaming is one of the most effective funnels for onboarding new users. Seeds & Bones is designed to drive:\n\nOn-Chain Activity: Regular, game-driven micro-interactions (claiming chests, upgrading profiles, withdrawing rewards) directly generate continuous transaction volume.\n\nAccessible Onboarding: A hybrid Web2/Web3 login structure allows players without MetaMask to play instantly, guiding them into creating wallets as they earn achievements.\n\nLooking for Guidance\n\nMy next milestone is bootstrapping our in-game withdrawal/rewards vault to support player incentives during our initial base funding of the Contract address.\n\nAs an independent developer new to the Uniswap governance structure, I would appreciate guidance from community members, delegates, and foundation representatives on the following:\n\nEcosystem Grants: Given our target of driving active transaction volume and contract interactions on Unichain, where would be the best category to initiate an ask for an Ecosystem Grant on this board? Are there any programs being initiated on Uniswap to promote Web3 Gaming initiatives?\n\nVault Security Feedback: Our vault operates on a cryptographic voucher system where the contract only permits withdrawals validated by our authoritative server signature. I welcome any feedback or code review from community developers on our contract logic.\n\nCollaboration Opportunities: I am actively looking for feedback from Unichain delegates or builders who are interested in playtesting the game or discussing integration ideas.\n\nThank you for your time, and I look forward to your feedback and guidance on how I can best contribute to the Unichain ecosystem.\n\nFULLY VERIFIED CONTRACT HERE:\n\nhttps://uniscan.xyz/address/0xb762c3b3f544b04d0ead51fa1883ee0f0ec87ce4\n\nPLAY THE GAME HERE:\n\nhttp://seedsandbones.onrender.com\n\nWHITEPAPER:\n\nhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1FatkyNIqW7tuL5J0luz1u9omJ1xntNmDenmLJtmIVfA/edit?usp=drivesdk\n\nPARAGRAPH ARTICLE:\n\nhttps://paragraph.xyz/@0xa6518181b2db530dd1acfdfb389f19b18626c5c6/introducing-seeds-and-bones?referrer=0xa6518181B2DB530DD1ACFDfb389f19B18626c5c6\n\nMEDIUM ARTICLE:\n\nhttps://medium.com/@josephmcipolla/introducing-seeds-bones-e7804016826c\n\nGITHUB:\n\nhttps://github.com/squidwardjalapeno/blockchainmmo\n\nDISCORD:\n\nhttps://discord.gg/v8Sc9ZwkH\n\n2 Likes\n\n[RFC] Web4 Autonomous State Engines on Unichain: Utilizing ERC-6551 & Sovereign ERC-721 Force Transfers for Dynamic Asset Orchestration\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Governance Proposal] Deploy Uniswap V3 on Moonbeam\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n11\n\n7092\n\nFebruary 7, 2023\n\nDeploy Uniswap v3 on Moonbeam (2023)\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n16\n\n7749\n\nOctober 4, 2023\n\n[RFC]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n15\n\n7771\n\nOctober 7, 2023\n\n[Governance Proposal]: Complete initial funding of the Uniswap Foundation\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n8\n\n6487\n\nOctober 16, 2023\n\n[RFC] Web4 Autonomous State Engines on Unichain: Utilizing ERC-6551 & Sovereign ERC-721 Force Transfers for Dynamic Asset Orchestration\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n0\n\n94\n\nAugust 4, 2026","tokens":1138,"crawled_at":1791194291092} +{"id":10360,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/groups","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Core Groups Overview | Metaplex Core","text":"Summary\nCore Groups (GroupV1) are taxonomy accounts that organize Collections, Assets, and other groups into higher-level sets — for example a brand umbrella that contains multiple collections, or a curated directory of standalone assets.\nGroups store their own name and URI, like collections\nA group can directly contain up to 256 collections, child groups, parent-group links, or assets per vector\nCollections and assets added to a group receive a Groups plugin listing their parent group addresses\nJump to: Create a group · Manage membership · Fetch groups\nCollections vs Groups\nCollections and groups solve different problems: collections manage member NFTs, while groups provide higher-level taxonomy across collections, assets, and child groups.\nCollectionGroup\nPurpose\nShared metadata and plugins for a series of NFTs\nTaxonomy / directory over collections, assets, and groups\n\nOwns user NFTs\nYes — assets reference the collection\nNo — assets remain in their collection (if any)\n\nTypical question\n“Which series is this NFT from?”\n“Which brand, season, or directory includes this collection?”\n\nOn-chain membership\nAsset updateAuthority points at the collection\nMember listed in group.collections, group.assets, or group.groups\n\nUse a Collection when you need collection-wide royalties, freeze rules, or shared artwork for a mint series. Use a Group when you need to organize multiple collections or standalone assets under one label without changing how those assets are minted.\nGroupV1 account\nA GroupV1 account stores:\nFieldDescription\nupdateAuthority\nAuthority that can update the group and change membership\n\nname\nDisplay name\n\nuri\nOff-chain JSON metadata URI\n\ncollections\nCollections that are direct children of this group\n\ngroups\nChild groups contained by this group\n\nparentGroups\nParent groups that contain this group\n\nassets\nAssets that are direct members of this group\n\nOn-chain limits (from mpl-core):\n256 entries max per vector (collections, groups, parentGroups, assets)\n8 parent groups max per group (MAX_GROUP_NESTING_DEPTH)\nGroups plugin\nWhen a collection or asset is added to a group, mpl-core ensures a Groups authority-managed plugin exists on that member. The plugin stores the parent group public keys.\nCreating groups\nUse createGroup / createGroupV1 to deploy a new group account:\n\n1import { generateSigner } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import { createGroup } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3\n\n4const group = generateSigner(umi)\n\n5\n\n6await createGroup(umi, {\n\n7 group,\n\n8 name: 'My Brand Directory',\n\n9 uri: 'https://example.com/my-brand.json',\n\n10 relationships: [],\n\n11}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n12\n\n13console.log('Group created:', group.publicKey)\n\nYou can optionally pass relationships at creation time to link collections, child groups, parent groups, or assets in one transaction. Each relationship entry uses RelationshipKind: Collection, ChildGroup, ParentGroup, or Asset.\nManaging group membership\nAll membership changes are signed by the group update authority unless noted.\nOperationSDK helperWhat it updates\nAdd collections\naddCollectionsToGroup\nGroup collections + collection Groups plugin\n\nRemove collections\nremoveCollectionsFromGroup\nBoth sides\n\nAdd assets\naddAssetsToGroup\nGroup assets + asset Groups plugin\n\nRemove assets\nremoveAssetsFromGroup\nBoth sides\n\nAdd child groups\naddGroupsToGroup\nParent groups + child parentGroups\n\nRemove child groups\nremoveGroupsFromGroup\nBoth sides\n\nUpdate metadata / authority\nupdateGroup\nGroup name, URI, update authority\n\nClose empty group\ncloseGroup\nCloses the group account\n\nAdd a collection to a group\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import { addCollectionsToGroup } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3\n\n4const group = publicKey('GroupAddress...')\n\n5const collection = publicKey('CollectionAddress...')\n\n6\n\n7await addCollectionsToGroup(umi, {\n\n8 group,\n\n9 authority: umi.identity,\n\n10})\n\n11 .addRemainingAccounts([\n\n12 { pubkey: collection, isSigner: false, isWritable: true },\n\n13 ])\n\n14 .sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Collection added to group')\n\nAdd a standalone asset to a group\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import { addAssetsToGroup } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3\n\n4const group = publicKey('GroupAddress...')\n\n5const asset = publicKey('AssetAddress...')\n\n6\n\n7await addAssetsToGroup(umi, {\n\n8 group,\n\n9 authority: umi.identity,\n\n10})\n\n11 .addRemainingAccounts([\n\n12 { pubkey: asset, isSigner: false, isWritable: true },\n\n13 ])\n\n14 .sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n15\n\n16console.log('Asset added to group')\n\nNest groups\n\n1import { addGroupsToGroup } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n2\n\n3// parentGroup and childGroup are existing GroupV1 accounts\n\n4\n\n5await addGroupsToGroup(umi, {\n\n6 parentGroup: parentGroup.publicKey,\n\n7 groups: [childGroup.publicKey],\n\n8 authority: umi.identity,\n\n9})\n\n10 .addRemainingAccounts([\n\n11 { pubkey: childGroup.publicKey, isSigner: false, isWritable: true },\n\n12 ])\n\n13 .sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n14\n\n15console.log('Child group nested under parent')\n\nParent and child vectors stay synchronized: the parent lists the child in groups, and the child lists the parent in parentGroups.\nFetching groups\nUse the mpl-core SDK to read on-chain state:\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import { fetchGroupV1 } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3\n\n4const groupAddress = publicKey('GroupAddress...')\n\n5\n\n6const group = await fetchGroupV1(umi, groupAddress)\n\n7\n\n8console.log(group.name)\n\n9console.log(group.collections)\n\n10console.log(group.groups)\n\n11console.log(group.assets)\n\nTo list all groups for an update authority, use getGroupV1GpaBuilder (a GPA query — fine for groups, but prefer DAS for large asset scans):\n\n1import { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\n2import { getGroupV1GpaBuilder, Key } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n3\n\n4const updateAuthority = publicKey('UpdateAuthorityAddress...')\n\n5\n\n6const groups = await getGroupV1GpaBuilder(umi)\n\n7 .whereField('updateAuthority', updateAuthority)\n\n8 .whereField('key', Key.GroupV1)\n\n9 .getDeserialized()\n\n10\n\n11for (const group of groups) {\n\n12 console.log(group.publicKey, group.name)\n\n13}\n\nNotes\nGroups do not traverse collection membership automatically. Adding a collection to a group does not add that collection’s NFTs to group.assets. To work with NFTs in a grouped collection, operate on the collection and its assets separately\nThe Groups plugin blocks burning a group member itself (the collection account or a directly grouped asset) while it still belongs to at least one group. Burning an asset inside a grouped collection does not remove the collection from the group\nGlossary\nThe terms below define the Core Groups concepts used on this page.\nTermDefinition\nGroupV1\nA Core account that organizes collections, assets, and child groups into a higher-level taxonomy\n\nGroups plugin\nAn authority-managed plugin on a member that stores parent group public keys\n\nDirect member\nA collection, asset, or child group explicitly listed in a group’s on-chain vectors\n\nQuick reference\nThe tables below list the mpl-core program ID and SDK helpers for common group operations.\nProgram ID\nThe mpl-core program ID is the same on mainnet and devnet.\nNetworkAddress\nMainnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nDevnet\nCoREENxT6tW1HoK8ypY1SxRMZTcVPm7R94rH4PZNhX7d\n\nSDK helpers\nUse these SDK functions for create, fetch, update, and membership operations.\nTaskFunction\nCreate\ncreateGroup\n\nFetch\nfetchGroupV1\n\nList by authority\ngetGroupV1GpaBuilder\n\nUpdate\nupdateGroup\n\nAdd collection\naddCollectionsToGroup\n\nAdd asset\naddAssetsToGroup\n\nNest group\naddGroupsToGroup\n\nClose\ncloseGroup\n\nFAQ\nWhat is the difference between a Collection and a Group?\nA Collection groups Core Assets under shared metadata and collection-level plugins. A Group is a taxonomy container that can reference collections, standalone assets, and other groups. Collections answer “which series does this NFT belong to?” Groups answer “which higher-level set does this collection or asset belong to?”\nCan a collection belong to multiple groups?\nYes. When a collection is added to a group, mpl-core writes the parent group address into the collection’s Groups plugin. A collection can list multiple parent groups, up to the on-chain vector limit.\nCan groups be nested?\nYes. A group can contain child groups and also list parent groups. Parent/child links are kept in sync on both accounts. A group may belong to up to 8 parent groups.\nDo assets inside a grouped collection automatically belong to the group?\nNo. Group membership is stored on direct members only. Putting a collection in a group adds the collection to group.collections and writes the Groups plugin on the collection. NFTs minted into that collection are not automatically added to group.assets.\nCan a standalone asset be a direct member of a group?\nYes. Use addAssetsToGroup to add an asset directly to group.assets without a collection. Collection-managed assets can also be added explicitly when the correct authority signs.\nWho can modify group membership?\nThe group update authority signs add/remove instructions. For collection-managed assets, the collection update authority (or an authorized delegate) can add or remove those assets on the group’s behalf.","tokens":2319,"crawled_at":1791194316433} +{"id":10361,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/debugging","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Debugging – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nDebugging\n\nForge provides detailed traces and an interactive debugger to understand contract execution.\n\nTraces\n\nRun tests with -vvvv to see full execution traces:\n\n$ forge test -vvvv\n\nCompiling...\nNo files changed, compilation skipped\nRan 1 test for test/OwnerUpOnly.t.sol:OwnerUpOnlyTest\n[PASS] test_IncrementAsOwner() (gas: 59372)\nTraces:\n[59372] OwnerUpOnlyTest::test_IncrementAsOwner()\n├─ [2407] OwnerUpOnly::count() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Return] 0\n├─ [43524] OwnerUpOnly::increment()\n│ └─ ← [Stop]\n├─ [2407] OwnerUpOnly::count() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Return] 1\n└─ ← [Stop]\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 287.16µs (62.42µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 6.97ms (287.16µs CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nThe trace shows every call, its inputs, outputs, and gas usage.\n\nUnderstanding trace output\n\nEach line shows:\n\nGas used in brackets\n\nContract::function being called\n\nCall type (staticcall, delegatecall, etc.)\n\nReturn value or revert reason\n\nIndentation indicates call depth.\n\nTracing a failed transaction\n\nDebug a transaction that failed on-chain:\n\n$ cast run 0x --rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nThis replays the transaction and shows the execution trace. Add --debug to open the transaction in the interactive debugger instead; cast call --trace --debug does the same for a call without sending it.\n\nInteractive debugger\n\nLaunch the debugger for a single test:\n\n$ forge test --debug --match-test test_Increment\n\nIn an interactive terminal, a filter that matches more than one test opens a prompt asking which test to debug, so you can also run forge test --debug without a filter and pick from the list. In a non-interactive terminal the filter must match exactly one test.\n\nThe debugger is a terminal UI with five panes:\n\nSource – Source code with the currently executing line highlighted.\n\nOpcodes – The opcode list for the current call, with the program counter, address, and gas information in the title.\n\nVariables – Parameters, return values, and locals in the current scope, with decoded values where available. When you step through a constructor during contract creation, the constructor arguments are decoded and shown here. Storage reads and writes performed by the current step also appear in this pane.\n\nStack – The current EVM stack.\n\nData – A shared pane showing either a buffer (memory, calldata, or returndata) or the storage explorer.\n\nThe debugger picks a two-column or single-column layout based on the terminal size. Press l to switch layouts, or force one with --debug-layout .\n\nKey bindings\n\nKeyAction\nj / k (or arrow keys, mouse scroll)\nStep forward / backward one instruction\n\ns / a\nMove to the next / previous jump\n\nC / c\nMove to the next / previous call\n\ng / G\nGo to the beginning / end\n\n'\nJump to the breakpoint set with vm.breakpoint\n\n0-9\nRepeat prefix for movement keys, e.g. 10k steps back 10 instructions\n\nb\nCycle the data pane between memory, calldata, and returndata\n\nJ / K\nScroll the stack pane\n\nCtrl+j / Ctrl+k\nScroll the data pane\n\nt\nToggle stack labels\n\nm\nToggle UTF-8 decoding of the active buffer\n\np\nGo to a program counter\n\no\nGo to a byte offset in the active buffer, or to a slot when the storage explorer is active\n\n/, then n / N\nSearch opcodes in the current call, then repeat the search forward / backward\n\n:\nOpen the command prompt\n\nh\nToggle the shortcut footer\n\nq\nQuit\n\nCommand prompt\n\nPress : to run a debugger command. :help lists all commands and their aliases.\n\nCommandAction\n:pc (alias :continue )\nJump to a program counter in the current contract\n\n:line \nJump to the nearest instruction mapped to a source line in the current contract\n\n:mem [], :calldata [], :ret []\nSelect a buffer in the data pane, optionally jumping to a byte offset\n\n:storage []\nOpen the storage explorer, optionally jumping to the nearest access of a slot\n\n:transient []\nOpen the transient storage explorer, optionally jumping to a slot\n\n:source, :opcodes, :variables, :stack, :data\nShow or hide a pane; the remaining panes reclaim the space\n\nStorage explorer\n\n:storage switches the data pane to a storage view that lists every slot the current call has accessed up to the current step, showing each slot's most recent operation (SLOAD or SSTORE) and value. The slot touched by the current step is highlighted. :storage jumps to the nearest access of a specific slot: the access at or after the current step, or the most recent earlier one.\n\n:transient and :transient provide the same view for transient storage (TLOAD and TSTORE). Press b to switch the data pane back to the buffer view.\n\nBreakpoints\n\nPlace breakpoints in code with the vm.breakpoint cheatcode:\n\nvm.breakpoint(\"a\");\n\nPressing 'a in the debugger jumps to the step where the breakpoint was recorded.\n\nDebugging scripts\n\nDebug a script:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --debug\n\nConsole logging\n\nAdd logs to your contracts for debugging:\n\nimport {console} from \"forge-std/console.sol\";\n\nfunction transfer(address to, uint256 amount) public {\nconsole.log(\"Transfer from:\", msg.sender);\nconsole.log(\"Transfer to:\", to);\nconsole.log(\"Amount:\", amount);\n// ...\n}\n\nView logs with -vv or higher:\n\n$ forge test -vv\n\nFor structured output, Foundry also supports console.table, which can make repeated values easier to scan than a long sequence of console.log lines.\n\nLabeling addresses\n\nMake traces more readable by labeling addresses:\n\nfunction setUp() public {\nalice = makeAddr(\"alice\");\nbob = makeAddr(\"bob\");\n\nvm.label(address(token), \"Token\");\nvm.label(address(pool), \"Pool\");\n}\n\nTraces will show Token::transfer() instead of 0x1234...::transfer().\n\nStack traces\n\nWhen a test fails, use -vvv to see a stack trace showing exactly where the revert occurred:\n\n$ forge test -vvv\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 640.34ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 1 test for test/FailingTest.t.sol:VaultTest\n[FAIL: Unauthorized()] test_WithdrawAsNotOwner() (gas: 8418)\nTraces:\n[8418] VaultTest::test_WithdrawAsNotOwner()\n├─ [0] VM::prank(ECRecover: [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001])\n│ └─ ← [Return]\n├─ [191] Vault::withdraw() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Revert] Unauthorized()\n└─ ← [Revert] Unauthorized()\nBacktrace:\nat Vault.withdraw\nat VaultTest.test_WithdrawAsNotOwner\nSuite result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 329.35µs (58.54µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 8.10ms (329.35µs CPU time): 0 tests passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nThe trace shows the call hierarchy with the revert bubbling up, and the Backtrace pinpoints the exact location in your code.\n\nInspecting inheritance linearization\n\nWhen debugging overrides in a multiple-inheritance hierarchy, inspect the method-resolution order directly:\n\n$ forge inspect src/MyContract.sol:MyContract linearization\n\nThis shows the order Solidity uses to resolve inherited functions, which is often the fastest way to understand why a particular override or super call is being selected.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":1773,"crawled_at":1791194299407} +{"id":10362,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/sui-stack","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Sui Stack | Sui Documentation","text":"Learn about the different components and primitives of the Sui Stack.\n\nSui Stack\nExplore the Sui Stack: an overview of Sui's core components and primitives including onchain randomness, onchain time, zkLogin, Nautilus, Seal, Walrus, and SuiPlay.\n→\nAccess Onchain Time\nAccess network-based time for your transactions. Sui provides a Clock module to capture near-real time or epoch time in your Sui packages.\n→\nOnchain Randomness\nRandomness is a valuable tool to simulate chance onchain, but can also expose flaws in your logic. Understanding the vulnerabilities and accounting for them can mitigate the threat exposure for your smart contracts.\n→\nSagat\nSagat is a multisig management platform designed for managing Sui multisig wallets.\n→\nWalrus\nIn this section\nWalrus Docs\nData Storage Using Walrus\nCustom Indexer and Walrus\nEncrypted Social Media\nOnchain Websites with Walrus Sites\n\n→\nSeal\nIn this section\nSeal Server Overview\nGetting Started\nDeveloper guide\nOperator guide\nSeal Pricing\nSeal Terms of Service\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nMessaging SDK\nIn this section\nGetting Started\nArchitecture\nGuides\nReference\nExamples\nGitHub Repo\n\n→\nSuiNS\nIn this section\nUsers\nSuiNS Communities\nIntegration Guide\nSDK\nNode Operators\nSuiNS DAO Proposals and Voting Procedure\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nMove Registry (MVR)\nIn this section\nManaging MVR Names\nManaging Package Metadata\nPackage Maintainer Best Practices\nMVR CLI\nTransaction Plugin for Sui TypeScript SDK\n\n→\nEnoki\nIn this section\nEnoki Docs\nSolitaire\nTicketing Platform\n\n↗\nNautilus\nIn this section\nWhat is Nautilus?\nNautilus Design\nUsing Nautilus\nCustomizing, Testing, and Management\nWeather Oracle\nEncrypt Enclave Secrets with Seal\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nDeepBook\nIn this section\nDeepBookV3\nDeepBook Margin\nDeepBook Predict\n\n↗\nzkLogin\nIn this section\nzkLogin Integration Guide\nConfigure OpenID Providers\nConsumer App Cookbook\nzkLogin for DeFi\nzkLogin Authentication\nzkLogin Technical Reference\n\n→\nHashi\nIn this section\nHashi Docs\n\n→\nSuiPlay0X1\nIn this section\nSDK Integrations\nWallet Integration Options\nBest Practices\nBroader Sui Ecosystem Support\n\n→","tokens":515,"crawled_at":1791194300597} +{"id":10363,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/team/ciamac-moallemi","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Ciamac Moallemi - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nCiamac Moallemi\n\nFeed\nFilter\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategory\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\nrecommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nauthor\n(1) all authors\n@x0rart\n1337 Skulls Sers\na16z crypto\na16z crypto editorial\na16z crypto policy & regulatory teams\na16z crypto Regulatory Team\nAaditya Shidham\nAaron Levie\nAaron Phillips\nAaron Schnider\nAbby Green\nAbdou Ndiaye\nAbhi Shelat\nAbhiram Kothapalli\nAbigail Johnson\nAdam Alter\nAdam Back\nAdam Bry\nAdam Grant\nAdam Ludwin\nAdam Martin\nAdam Thierer\nAdam Zuckerman\nAdela Tomsejova\nAdena Friedman\nAdena Hefets\nAdeniyi Abiodun\nAdina Fischer\nAdrian Cockcroft\nAdrian Fenty\nAdrienne Mayor\nAgostino Capponi\nAiden Slavin\nAileen Lee\nAisha Stephenson\nAJ Shankar\nAlan Knott-Craig\nAlan Schaaf\nAlana Benton\nAlbert Tang\nAlec Nielsen\nAlec Ross\nAlejandro Flores\nAlex Constantinople\nAlex Honnold\nAlex Hutchinson\nAlex Immerman\nAlex Kreitz\nAlex Kroeger\nAlex Le\nAlex Masmej\nAlex Morcos\nAlex Price\nAlex Pruden\nAlex Rampell\nAlex Roetter\nAlex Solomon\nAlex Spector\nAlex Stamos\nAlex Tabarrok\nAlexander (Sasha) Spiegelman\nAlexander Chia\nAlexander Zoppa\nAlexandra Chang\nAlexandria Lafci\nAlexis Lakes\nAlexis Madrigal\nAlexis Ohanian\nAli Ghodsi\nAli Yahya\nAlicia Barone\nAlin Tomescu\nAlisha Litman\nAlison Mangiero\nAlison Martin\nAllison Pickens\nAlyssa Del Bene\nAlyssa Torres\nAmanda Cantor\nAmanda Cassatt\nAmanda Catherine\nAmanda Mulay\nAmanda Tuminelli\nAmanda Tyler\nAmelia Salyers\nAmie Tyrrel\nAmir Shevat\nAmira Yahyaoui\nAmy Abernethy\nAmy Berliner\nAmy Bohutinsky\nAmy Choice\nAmy Cray\nAmy Gill\nAmy Hoemeke\nAmy Kalokerinos\nAmy Robertson\nAna Mostarac\nAna Susi\nAnatoly Yakovenko\nAndie Taylor\nAndisheh Tahriri\nAndre Iguodala\nAndrea Clarke Hall\nAndrea Feinberg\nAndrea Rallo\nAndrea Simon\nAndrea Vinkler\nAndreas Papadimitropoulos, Jr\nAndreessen Horowitz\nAndrew Allen\nAndrew Chen\nAndrew F. 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Tyson\nBernard Tyson\nBeth Newman\nBethany Coates\nBharat Ramamurti\nBharath Ramsundar\nBill Carr\nBill Frist\nBill Hinman\nBill Janeway\nBill Krause\nBill Macaitis\nBlake Kim\nBlake Masters\nBlake Saari\nBlayne Donnell\nBob Iger\nBob Langer\nBob Moore\nBob Muglia\nBob Sutton\nBob Swan\nBob Tinker\nBob Wachter\nBobby Franklin\nBobby Green\nBobby Kotick\nBobby Wagner\nBoris Sofman\nBoris Wertz\nBrad Feld\nBrad Kern\nBrad Peterson\nBram Cohen\nBrandon Ballinger\nBrandon Barros\nBrandon Cherry\nBrandon Millman\nBrenda Kopf\nBrent McIntosh\nBrett Browman\nBrett Falk\nBrett Hagler\nBrewster Kahle\nBrian Armstrong\nBrian Balfour\nBrian Brooks\nBrian Crnkovich\nBrian Curran\nBrian Grazer\nBrian Koppelman\nBrian McCullough\nBrian Quintenz\nBrian Wilkins\nBridget McDowell\nBrittany Lucas\nBrittney Burrows\nBrooke Sheresky\nBruce Friedrich\nBryan Caplan\nBryan Chiang\nBryan Cox\nBryan Crowley\nBryan Faust\nBryan Houser\nBryan Kim\nBryan Pellegrino\nCaitlin Glazebrook\nCaitlin Johnston\nCaitlin Roberson\nCal Turner Jr.\nCaleb Christian\nCameron Schuler\nCamila De Souza\nCarine Carmy\nCarissa Bilinski\nCarl Agnelli\nCarl Eschenbach\nCarl Narcisse\nCarl Pope\nCarlos Araya\nCarolina Gonzalez\nCaroline Friedman\nCaroline Goggins\nCaroline Horn\nCaroline Moon\nCarolyn Bertozzi\nCarra Wu\nCasey Graul\nCasey Neistat\nCasey Winters\nCassady Churchill\nCassie Faerber\nCecilia Marshall\nCeia Font\nChad Rigetti\nChandra Krintz\nCharles Goetz\nCharles Hubbard\nCharles Koch\nCharlie Keinath\nCharlie Warzel\nChattry Meas\nChelsea Komlo\nChelsea Padilla\nCheng Li\nChris Bennett\nChris Best\nChris Burniske\nChris Curran\nChris DeWolfe\nChris Dixon\nChris Granger\nChris Hauth\nChris Lyons\nChris Messina\nChris Milk\nChris Power\nChris Santa Maria\nChris Wanstrath\nChristian Cachin\nChristian Catalini\nChristian Crowley\nChristian Seifert\nChristina Hampp\nChristina Lopes\nChristina Mercando\nChristina Xu\nChristina Zeidan\nChristine Darden\nChristine Perham\nChristopher Giancarlo\nChristopher Lee\nChristopher Mims\nChristopher Nguyen\nChristopher Rippingham\nChristopher Schroeder\nChristy Hubbard\nCiamac Moallemi\nCindi Zhang\nCindy Tenner\nClaire Austin\nClaire Cain Miller\nClaire Kart\nClaudia Picanco\nClay Shirky\nClayton Christensen\nClayton Gardner\nClifford Woolf\nClint Delapaz\nColin Bryar\nColin Rom\nCollin McCune\nConner Lyons Brown\nConnie Chan\nConnie Guglielmo\nConnor McCarthy\nConnor Moyles\nCorban Bell\nCorey Hawkins\nCorey Waller\nCourtney Dettlinger\nCraig Naylor\nCraig Walker\nCristina Cordova\nCurt Funderburk\nCuy Sheffield\nD'Arcy Coolican\nDaejun Park\nDaisy Linden\nDaisy Wolf\nDaljeet Virdi\nDalton Turay\nDan Berkenstock\nDan Boneh\nDan Frommer\nDan Primack\nDan Romero\nDan Shapero\nDan Siroker\nDan Stein\nDan Warmenhoven\nDan Wendlandt\nDaniel Chao\nDaniel Chen\nDanielle Andrzejewski\nDanielle Clark\nDanielle Looymans\nDanielle Lussier\nDanielle Morrill\nDanielle Shea\nDanny Shader\nDaphne Koller\nDapper Dan\nDaren Matsuoka\nDarin Malter\nDarshan Shankar\nDas Rush\nDave Jagoda\nDave King\nDave Touretzky\nDavid Banks\nDavid Belden\nDavid Damato\nDavid Deming\nDavid George\nDavid Haber\nDavid Hollestelle\nDavid Kerr\nDavid Lee\nDavid Mack\nDavid Madden\nDavid Marcus\nDavid Olson\nDavid Oyelowo\nDavid Pierce\nDavid Reich\nDavid Rumsey\nDavid Schweikert\nDavid Sinclair\nDavid Sverdlov\nDavid Tse\nDavid Ulevitch\nDavid Weiden\nDawn Lepore\nDawn Nott\nDeborah Embaie\nDeena Elitreby\nDeepak Maram\nDenis Nazarov\nDenis Young\nDenise Gonzalez\nDerek Dolin\nDerek Thompson\nDerrick Harris\nDevin Finzer\nDevon Zuegel\nDiana Peña\nDiane Greene\nDick Costolo\nDieter Shirley\nDiishan Imira\nDiogo Monica\nDominic Shine\nDominique Reliford\nDon Duet\nDon Faul\nDorris O'Brien\nDoug Ducey\nDoug Folden\nDoug McCracken\nDouglas Argueta\nDozie Uche\nDrew Coffman\nDylan Field\nDylan Rhodes\nEd Felten\nEd Lynch\nEddie Lim\nEddy Lazzarin\nEdith Zimmerman\nEdward Perkins\nEdwin Poston\nEfrat Noy\nEhud Shapiro\nEileen Burbidge\nEileen Wu\nElad Gil\nElaine Fuchs\nElaine Shi\nElena Burger\nEli Dourado\nElisa Leonhardt\nEliza Oak\nElizabeth Gunn\nElizabeth Harkavy\nElizabeth May\nElizabeth Ocken\nElizabeth Stark\nElizabeth Weil\nEllen Tunoa\nEmile Petrone\nEmilio Torres\nEmily Graff\nEmily Hinsch\nEmily Keir\nEmily Oster\nEmily Westerhold\nEmma Janaskie\nEric Budish\nEric Dai\nEric Ries\nEric Thomas\nEric Topol\nEric Wu\nErica Schecter\nErik Brynjolfsson\nErik Kiser\nErik Torenberg\nErika Bracken\nErika Herrera\nErika Louie\nErin Grody Kingsley\nErin Murphy\nErin Tice\nErin Tonnar\nErin Winkler\nErtem Nusret Tas\nEsther Shinn\nEthan Bueno de Mesquita\nEthan Ferreira\nEthan Zuckerman\nEuan Ashley\nEugene Volokh\nEugene Wei\nEugenia Yee\nEula Takahashi\nEva Sakkas\nEvan Burfield\nEvan Osnos\nEvangelos Simoudis\nEzra Klein\nF. Gary Gray\nFabiola Godinez\nFabrizio Zilibotti\nFahad Saleh\nFarid Jiandani\nFei-Fei Li\nFelix Do\nFEWOCIOUS\nFiona Kennedy\nFiona Murray\nFlashrekt\nFlora Oliveira\nFlori Del Valle\nFlorian Leibert\nFoteini Baldimtsi\nFrancesca Gino\nFrank Chen\nFrank Wilczek\nFred Benenson\nFred Ehrsam\nFred Upton\nFred Wilson\nFreda Lewis-Hall\nFrederic Kerrest\nFuture Editorial\nGabby Dizon\nGabby Reece\nGabriel Otte\nGabriel Vasquez\nGaetan Barthelemy\nGarrett Biel\nGary Ang\nGary Reedy\nGary Wolf\nGaurav Banga\nGaurav Dhillon\nGaut\nGayle Tzemach Lemmon\nGeoffrey Woo\nGeorg Fuchsbauer\nGeorg Petschnigg\nGeorge Church\nGeorge Danezis\nGeorge Fraser\nGeraldine Chan\nGérard Cachon\nGerard Ryle\nGerri Elliott\nGerry Tsoukalas\nGia Scinto\nGil Elbaz\nGil Shafir\nGina Moon\nGina Neff\nGina Yocom\nGinger Liau\nGokul Rajaram\nGoldie Chang\nGrace Ellis\nGraham Allison\nGrant Gregory\nGrant Jordan\nGrant LaFontaine\nGrant Rabenn\nGray Kinsella\nGreg Bowman\nGreg Clayman\nGreg Linares\nGreg Loehmann\nGreg Lynn\nGreg Solano\nGreg Truesdell\nGreg Waldon\nGregory Allen\nGregory Mundis\nGretchen Bush\nGretchen McCulloch\nGuido Appenzeller\nGustav Söderström\nGustavo Garcia\nGuy Goren\nGuy Raz\nGuy Wuollet\nHaley Van Dyck\nHanna Aziz\nHannah Frankl\nHanne Winarsky\nHaoyuan Li\nHarmit Malik\nHarry Grieve\nHarry Shum\nHarry Wright\nHatim Shafique\nHayden Adams\nHeather Gwynn\nHeather Podesta\nHedi Samar\nHelen Stoddard\nHelen Su\nHemant Mohapatra\nHendrik Pretorius\nHenri Kor\nHerb Lin\nHerman Narula\nHilmar Pétursson\nHoang Nguyen\nHoward Wu\nIan Dutra\nIan Shannon\nIan Sharp\nIce Cube\nIlan Zechory\nIllia Polosukhin\nIlyas Khan\nIma Christian\nIman Abuzeid\nInsiya Lokhandwala\nIon Stoica\nIrvin Chan\nIsa Guardalabene\nIsaiah Lott\nIsh Verduzco\nIsil Dillig\nIstván András Seres\nIttai Abraham\nIttay Eyal\nIva Messy\nIvan Linscott\nIvor Horn\nJ.D. Moriarty\nJack Donahoe\nJack Soslow\nJackie McQuiston\nJackson David\nJacob Westphal\nJacquelyn Melinek\nJad Esber\nJad Naous\nJade Lai\nJade Raymond\nJae Gnazzo\nJai Ramaswamy\nJaimie Buss\nJak Kennedy\nJake Auchincloss\nJakob Uszkoreit\nJamal Mohammed\nJames Beshara\nJames Currier\nJames da Costa\nJames Gwertzman\nJames J. Collins\nJames Kissell\nJames L. Madara\nJames Loftus\nJames Rathmell\nJames Rogers\nJames Watters\nJames Wu\nJames Zou\nJamie Brandon\nJamie McGurk\nJamie Sullivan\nJamilla Hemeid\nJana Odehnal\nJane Doe\nJane Lippencott\nJane Suh\nJanelle De Los Santos\nJared Bricklin\nJared Furutani\nJared Georgakopoulos\nJared Polis\nJared Smith\nJase Wilson\nJason Franklin\nJason Liu\nJason Mayden\nJason Milionis\nJason Mitchell\nJason Mok\nJason Rosenthal\nJason Warner\nJason Yanowitz\nJay Bradner\nJay Conte\nJay Drain\nJay Komarneni\nJay Rughani\nJean Reilly\nJeanne Tsan\nJeff Amico\nJeff Benson\nJeff Clark\nJeff Cordova\nJeff Glueck\nJeff Hawkins\nJeff Jones\nJeff Jordan\nJeff Lawson\nJeff Lu\nJeff Nagashima\nJeff Stump\nJeff Weiner\nJeffrey Immelt\nJeffrey Kaditz\nJeffrey Katzenberg\nJeffrey Kindler\nJeffrey Low\nJeffrey Silverstein\nJeffrey Zirlin\nJen Bulawsky\nJen Kha\nJenna Walsh\nJenna Zucker\nJennifer 8. Lee\nJennifer Doudna\nJennifer Kodner\nJennifer Konde\nJennifer Li\nJennifer Mumford\nJennifer Tejada\nJennifer Young\nJenny Cieplak\nJens Ernstberger\nJensen Harris\nJeremy Clark\nJeremy England\nJeremy Zhang\nJesse Holmes\nJesse Pollak\nJesse Walden\nJessica Childs\nJessica Hansen\nJessica Keeler\nJessica Patton\nJessica Verrilli\nJewel Pi\nJez Humble\nJi Kim\nJianying Luo\nJim Gilliam\nJimmy Chen\nJimmy Soni\nJing Wang\nJing Zou\nJJ Yu\nJoachim Neu\nJodi Lynn\nJodie Lutkenhaus\nJoe Gebbia\nJoe Grundfest\nJoe Montana\nJoe Morrissey\nJoe Schmidt\nJoe Sullivan\nJoel de la Garza\nJoel Mokyr\nJoel Monegro\nJoel Spolsky\nJoey Burleson\nJohn China\nJohn Collison\nJohn Fawcett\nJohn Garcia\nJohn Gedmark\nJohn Hennessy\nJohn Koelliker\nJohn M. Jack\nJohn Markoff\nJohn Menna\nJohn O’Farrell\nJohn Riccitiello\nJohn Smesko\nJohn Stanfield\nJohn Thompson\nJohn William Hatfield\nJonah Peretti\nJonathan Bush\nJonathan Dotan\nJonathan Downey\nJonathan Lai\nJonathan Lim\nJonathan Lusthaus\nJonathan Weissman\nJonathan Wong\nJordan Mazer\nJordan Stankowski\nJorge Conde\nJorge Gomez\nJose Guardado\nJoseph Bonneau\nJoseph Okpaku\nJoseph Spisak\nJosh Arnold\nJosh Bloom\nJosh Kim\nJosh Williams\nJoshua Browder\nJoshua Gans\nJoshua Grimm\nJoshua Hix\nJoshua Levin\nJoshua Lu\nJoshua Schank\nJoshua Soto\nJosie Ma\nJoyce Park\nJR Rivers\nJT Evans\nJuan Benet\nJudene Small\nJudy Savitskaya\nJudy Smith\nJulia Grace\nJulia Kirby\nJulie Bornstein\nJulie Farnham\nJulie Johnson\nJulie Samuels\nJulie Yoo\nJuliet Grier\nJuliet Nyatta\nJuliette Morton\nJulius Zhang\nJustin Bailey\nJustin Bethune\nJustin Blau\nJustin Cunningham\nJustin Gregorius\nJustin Kahl\nJustin Kan\nJustin Larkin\nJustin Paine\nJustin Pettit\nJustin Roberts\nJustin Simcock\nJustin Thaler\nJustine Moore\nJutta Steiner\nJyoti Bansal\nJZ Young\nKabir Gill\nKabir Laroia\nKais Khimji\nKamala Harris\nKaren Dunn\nKaren Wooley\nKarina Sobieski\nKarl Floersch\nkarma (Daniel Reynaud)\nKarmacoma\nKarthik Rau\nKartik Nayak\nKate Darling\nKate Dellolio\nKate Kerames\nKatherine Boyle\nKatherine Minarik\nKatherine Rundell\nKatherine Schoebel\nKathryn McKinley\nKathy Liu\nKathy Yang\nKatia Ameri\nKatie Baynes\nKatie Haun\nKatie Hemmerling\nKaty DeWitt-Drew\nKaty Nelson\nKayvon Tehranian\nKeener Barnhorst\nKeller Medlin\nKeller Rinaudo\nKelly Cannon\nKelsey Chaplinsky\nKelsey Mellard\nKen Chong\nKen Coleman\nKen Kocienda\nKerry Ganim\nKesha Cash\nKevin Chou\nKevin Chu\nKevin Dulsky\nKevin Kelly\nKevin McKinley\nKevin Nishioka\nKevin O'Kane\nKevin Rose\nKevin Tan\nKevin Wu\nKevin Zollman\nKidSuper\nKieran Snyder\nKierston Gittens\nKiki Mavridis\nKim Enright\nKim Malone Scott\nKim Milosevich\nKim Stevenson\nKim Zetter\nKimberly Tan\nKindra Mason\nKira Poskanzer\nKira Song\nKirstin Arbide\nKirt McMaster\nKofi Ampadu\nKouki Harasaki\nKrista Anderson-Copperman\nKristen Fortney\nKristen Johansson\nKristen Kee\nKristin Sauchak\nKristin Thayer\nKristina Graci-deLuna\nKristina Shen\nKristine Lipscomb\nKristo Käärmann\nKrisztina Holly\nKunal Bahl\nKunle Olukotun\nKurt House\nKyle Russell\nLaird Hamilton\nLatasha\nLaura Arrillaga-Andreessen\nLaura Baller\nLaura Behrens Wu\nLaura Deming\nLaura Gravley\nLaura Johnson\nLaura Shores\nLaura Weidman Powers\nLauren Berson\nLauren Illovsky\nLauren Murrow\nLauren Richardson\nLauren Spragge\nLaurene Powell Jobs\nLawrence Levy\nLawrence Summers\nLeah Cassidy\nLee Kleinman\nLee Lefkowitz\nLeeAnn Caballero\nLeila Hay\nLeila Janah\nLenny Rachitsky\nLeslie Jaw\nLeslie Vosshall\nLester Chen\nLi Fan\nLi Fei-Fei\nLi Jin\nLiang Wu\nLilian King\nLily Liu\nLina Sergie Attar\nLinda Banuelos\nLinda Xie\nLinden Tibbets\nLing Ren\nLinlin Li\nLinxin Wen\nLioba Heimbach\nLisa Hawke\nLisa Lambert\nLisa Orr\nLisa Reilly\nLisa Rosano\nLizzy Anderson\nLJ Erwin\nLloyd Dean\nLoretta Sanchez\nLori Potter\nLuca Prosperi\nLuca Zanolini\nLuis Martinez\nLuis von Ahn\nLuke Wroblewski\nLydia Green\nLynda Gibson\nLynn Rudolph\nMadan Nagaldinne\nMaddison Masaeli\nMadeline Lancaster\nMaggie Hsu\nMaggie Leung\nMaggie Romero\nMahad Abedin\nMahesh Iyer\nMahesh Vellanki\nMahimna Kelkar\nMakiri Duckett\nMalinka Walaliyadde\nMallesh M. Pai\nMalloy Evans\nManas Punhani\nManny Luna\nMarc Andreessen\nMarc Andrusko\nMarc Benioff\nMarc Levinson\nMarci Barbera\nMarco Reuter\nMargaret Jen\nMargit Wennmachers\nMaria LaMagna Morales\nMarian Garvin\nMarianne Winkler\nMariano Sorgente\nMaricarmen Alvarez\nMariel Goldenstein\nMarigold Vu\nMarina Kusserow\nMario Gabriele\nMario Linares\nMarissa Bramlett\nMark Cranney\nMark Leslie\nMark McAndrew\nMark McClusky\nMárk Melczer\nMark Moore\nMark Regan\nMark Sendak\nMarkos Georghiades\nMarkus Covert\nMarkus Funk\nMartha Lane Fox\nMartin Casado\nMartin Fischer\nMarty Makary\nMarvin Ammori\nMarvin Zamora\nMary Pat Jordan\nMary-Catherine Lader\nMaryam Bahrani\nMason Hall\nMatei Zaharia\nMatt Abrahams\nMatt Billmann\nMatt Bornstein\nMatt Clifford\nMatt Flannery\nMatt Fleming\nMatt Gleason\nMatt Kaeberlein\nMatt Levine\nMatt Levy\nMatt Oberhardt\nMatt Shortal\nMatt Spence\nMatt Weinberg\nMatthew Colford\nMatthew Green\nMatthew Haughey\nMatthew McCullough\nMatthew Mills\nMatthew Olsen\nMatthew Rutter\nMatthew Stein\nMatthieu Hafemeister\nMaureen Lara\nMax Kesten\nMax Krohn\nMax Levchin\nMax Polyak\nMax Resnick\nMax Ventilla\nMaya Rahkonen\nMcPherson Moore\nMeaghan Hardy\nMeg Whitman\nMegan Holston-Alexander\nMegan Kristalyn\nMehdi Hasan\nMehul Mehta\nMel Williams\nMelanie Galang\nMelissa Liao\nMelissa Minor\nMelissa Wasser\nMellody Hobson\nMelody Latronico\nMeredith Donahue\nMia Gonzalez\nMia Mandich\nMicah Johnson\nMichael Beckerman\nMichael Blau\nMichael Brandt\nMichael Chan\nMichael Copeland\nMichael Dearing\nMichael Dell\nMichael Franklin\nMichael Garcia\nMichael J. Casey\nMichael J. Freedman\nMichael Killam\nMichael King\nMichael Lee\nMichael Leiter\nMichael Morell\nMichael Ostrovsky\nMichael Ovitz\nMichael Paulus\nMichael Raynor\nMichael Reed\nMichael Snyder\nMichael Temkin\nMichael Wee\nMichael Zhu\nMichel Del Buono\nMichel Feaster\nMichèle Flournoy\nMichele Griffin\nMichele Korver\nMichele Law\nMichelle Ervin\nMichelle Kelso\nMichelle Kung\nMichelle Mundy\nMichelle Shin\nMichelle Ufford\nMichelle Volz\nMichelle Wilson\nMichelle Winn\nMichelle You\nMike Curtis\nMike Haydon\nMike Hearn\nMike Jones\nMike Kasperzak\nMike Kelly\nMike King\nMike Lempres\nMike Manning\nMike Maples jr\nMike Masnick\nMike Matchett\nMike Paulus\nMike Sandwick\nMikeal Rogers\nMikey Dickerson\nMiles Jennings\nMilijana Curic\nMiller Whitehouse-Levine\nMinerva Munoz\nMinnie Ingersoll\nMinsun Pak\nMintu Turakhia\nMiranda Christ\nMo Shaikh\nMohammad Akbarpour\nMohsen Malayeri\nMolly Grace\nMonique McCambridge\nMorgan Beller\nMorgan Bender\nMurat Pak\nMuriel Bowser\nMurray Shanahan\nMy Pham\nNadia Asparouhova\nNadia Eghbal\nNaftali Harris\nNaithan Jones\nNanjira Sambuli\nNaomi Metzger\nNashid Braswell\nNassim Eddequiouaq\nNat Barling\nNatacha Crooks\nNatalia Carrera\nNatalie Bucher\nNatalie Taumoepeau\nNate Chang\nNate Lau\nNathalie Balaban\nNathan McCauley\nNathan Yoon\nNathaniel Gleicher\nNathaniel Popper\nNav Singh\nNazanin Daneshvar\nNeel Maitra\nNeha Narula\nNelson Perla-Ward\nNeveen Bader\nNicholas Christakis\nNicholas Pacilio\nNick Babaian\nNick McKeown\nNick Quah\nNick Tomaino\nNicki Locker\nNicole Conner\nNicole Forsgren\nNicole Irvin\nNicole Neuman\nNicole Stanners\nNiels Provos\nNigel Robinson\nNikhil Krishnan\nNina Suthers\nNir Eyal\nNitasha Tiku\nNitin Natarajan\nNitya Subramanian\nNkiru Balonwu\nNoah Citron\nNoah Feldman\nNoah Levine\nNoah Smith\nNoam Nisan\nNoemi Glaeser\nO’Shea Jackson Jr.\nOlaf Carlson-Wee\nOleg Rogynskyy\nOliver Hsu\nOlivia Moore\nOlivia Webb\nOmri Weinstein\nOoshma Garg\nOprah Winfrey\nOrion Hindawi\nOscar Menjivar\nP.J. Hasleton\nPablo Montagnes\nPacky McCormick\nPak\nPalmer Luckey\nPamela Anderson\nPamon Forouhar\nParag Khanna\nParijat Talkad\nParker Brown\nParker Conrad\nPatrice Peck\nPatrick Byrne\nPatrick Collison\nPatrick Conway\nPatrick McCorry\nPatrick McHenry\nPatrick O’Grady\nPatrick Rivera\nPatrick Sutton\nPaul Cafiero\nPaul Daugherty\nPaul Davison\nPaul Krugman\nPaul Vigna\nPaula Long\nPenny Pritzker\nPerri Chilton\nPete Buttigieg\nPeter Blackwood\nPeter Buisseret\nPeter Chan\nPeter Donnelly\nPeter Johnson\nPeter Lauten\nPeter Leeson\nPeter Levine\nPeter Ludwig\nPeter Rubin\nPeter Thiel\nPeter Wang\nPetra Garrett\nPhil Daian\nPhil Hathaway\nPhil Wong\nPhong Nguyen\nPorter Smith\npplpleasr\nPranav Garimidi\nPrasad Akella\nPrat Moghe\nPreethi Kasireddy\npunk6529\nPurnima Padmanabhan\nPyrs Carvolth\nQasar Younis\nQuang Dao\nQuinten Burgunder\nQuintus Kilbourn\nRachael Horwitz\nRachel Goslins\nRachel Jenkins\nRachel Kalmar\nRachel McIntyre\nRachel Steiner\nRahul Iyer\nRahul Vohra\nRajeev Singh\nRajeev Venkayya\nRam Palaniappan\nRamana Jonnala\nRati Gelashvili\nRaul Vazquez\nRavi Parimi\nRay Dalio\nRaymond Carreira\nRebecca Lewis\nRebecca Rettig\nReed Hastings\nRefik Anadol\nRegina Benjamin\nRenato Valdés Olmos\nReshma Saujani\nReshma Sohoni\nRex Salisbury\nRich Ezekiel\nRichard Green\nRichard Menger\nRichard Rosenblatt\nRick Young\nRidhima Ahuja\nRiyaz Faizullabhoy\nRob Goodman\nRob McElhenney\nRob Pardo\nRob Rhinehart\nRobbie Petersen\nRobbie Peterson\nRobert Alexander\nRobert Cottrell\nRobert Hackett\nRobert Kolker\nRobert Leshner\nRobert McNeely\nRobert Moreno\nRobert Siegel\nRobert Stromberg\nRobert Weber\nRobin Casey\nRobin Guo\nRobin Weisman\nRod Johnson\nRodrigo Ibarra Lopez\nRodrigo Pacheco\nRoger Dickey\nRoger Wattenhofer\nRoham Gharegozlou\nRohini Mukand\nRohit Bansal\nRoman Mars\nRoman Stanek\nRon Gill\nRon Lavi\nRon Rothblum\nRonald Evans\nRonnie Harris\nRosa Davila\nRosalind Rattan\nRose Legarda\nRoss Andersen\nRoss Shuel\nRostin Behnam\nRuben Gallego\nRuben Smith\nRuss Altman\nRuss Heddleston\nRuss Roberts\nRussell Davies\nRyan Allen\nRyan Caldbeck\nRyan Conde\nRyan Holloway\nRyan Hoover\nRyan McEntush\nRyan Petersen\nRyan Prescott\nRyan Sandler\nRyan Spoon\nRyan Tseng\nRyan Walsh\nRyan Ward\nRyan Wyatt\nSaar Tochner\nSachin Jain\nSafi Bahcall\nSagar Dhawan\nSaku Panditharatne\nSalem Vance\nSam Blackshear\nSam Broner\nSam Gerstenzang\nSam Ragsdale\nSam Thompson\nSam Williams\nSam Yam\nSamantha Gelt\nSamantha Langford\nSamantha Ludwig\nSamson Wu\nSamuel Arbesman\nSamuel Hammond\nSandra Samayoa\nSandy Jen\nSankaet Pathak\nSantiago Rodriguez\nSara Boesen\nSarah Fazal\nSarah Hamburg\nSarah Lumbard\nSarah Mascardo\nSarah Meiklejohn\nSarah Porter\nSarah Rebello\nSarah Wang\nSasha Stiles\nSatish Talluri\nSaurabh Ladha\nSavannah Cherry\nScott Clark\nScott Duke Kominers\nScott Gottlieb\nScott Hassan\nScott Kupor\nScott Rubin\nScott Shenker\nScott Tyler\nScott Walker\nScott Weiss\nSean Duffy\nSean Neville\nSebastian Oddo\nSeema Amble\nSeemay Chou\nSep Kamvar\nSergiu Pasca\nSeth Lobree\nSeth Sivak\nSeth Sternberg\nShai Bernstein\nShai Kopeld\nShaka Senghor\nShakil Khan\nShan Sinha\nShana Fisher\nShane Mac\nShane Parrish\nShangda Xu\nShannon (Stubo) Brayton\nShannon Barbour\nShannon Kelly\nShannon Schiltz\nShannon Snow\nShari Doherty\nSharon Chang\nShawn Conway\nSheela Krothapalli\nShellye Archambeau\nSherie James\nSherriAnn Cole\nShishir Mehrotra\nShonda Rhimes\nSid Gorham\nSigne Pierce\nSimon Denny\nSiqi Chen\nSonal Chokshi\nSophie Song\nSoubhik Deb\nSpencer Dinwiddie\nSpencer Howard\nSpencer Rascoff\nSreeram Kannan\nSreevidya Kasturil\nSri Kosuri\nSriram Krishnan\nSrivatsan Sridhar\nStacey Cunningham\nStacey Merrick\nStacia Murray\nStacy Brown-Philpot\nStacy D'Amico\nStacy Warner\nStefan McDonough\nSten Tamkivi\nStephane Bancel\nStephanie Anyanwu\nStephanie Cohen\nStephanie Doppelt\nStephanie Smith\nStephanie Watkins\nStephanie Zinn\nStephen Armanios\nStephen Wink\nStephenie Zhang\nSteve Buress\nSteve Cadigan\nSteve Cheney\nSteve Harvey\nSteve Kaczynski\nSteve McDermid\nSteve Smith\nSteve Zhao\nSteven Adair\nSteven Ebert\nSteven Johnson\nSteven Levy\nSteven Sinofsky\nStewart Butterfield\nStina Ehrensvärd\nStuart Luman\nStuart Russell\nSudip Chakrabarti\nSue Hager\nSuhail Doshi\nSukhinder Singh Cassidy\nSumeet Singh\nSumit Shah\nSungMo Park\nSunil Chokshi\nSurya Ganguli\nSusan B. Wilde\nSusan Mernit\nSusan Rice\nSusannah Fox\nSydney Paul\nTaavet Hinrikus\nTaggart Matthiesen\nTamzen Brewis\nTana Billingsley\nTarek Mansour\nTarun Chitra\nTauri Laws Phillips\nTawny Holguin\nTaylor McFadden\nTed Not Lasso\nTed Sarandos\nTed Ullyot\nTerell Sterling\nTerence Carroll\nTeresa Carlson\nTerry Angelos\nTerry Brown\nThan Nguyen\nThanh Nguyen\nThe 2015 Academic Roundtable Sessions\nThe TxO team\nTheresa DeMichele\nTheresa Dilley\nTheresa Fisher\nTheresa Walz\nTheresia Gouw\nThibaut Scholasch\nThomas Gjerde\nThomas Juenger\nThomas Long\nThomas Rando\nTiffany Vo\nTiffany Zhong\nTim Beiko\nTim O'Reilly\nTim Roughgarden\nTim Schafer\nTim Sullivan\nTimmu Tõke\nTina Anderson\nTina Bhatnagar\nTina Ferguson\nTina Wie\ntinawie\nTing Ni\nTobi Lütke\nTodd Cranney\nTodd Lutwak\nTodd McKinnon\nTodd Park\nTodd Young\nTolga Dizdarer\nTom Butta\nTom Coates\nTom Davenport\nTom Ellis\nTom Hammer\nTom Hofmann\nTom Lehman\nTom Mitchell\nTom Preston-Werner\nTom Rikert\nTom Standage\nTomicah Tillemann\nTony Blair\nTony Blinken\nTori Landrum\nTracy Chou\nTracy Young\nTren Griffin\nTrent Mayol\nTrevor Bedford\nTristan Handy\nTristan Walker\nTroy Kirwin\nTugce Erten\nTurner Novak\nTushar Garg\nTyler Cowen\nTyler Wilson\nTyson Clark\nUma Valeti\nUsman Azam\nUzi Dutta\nValentina Marzorati\nValeria Nikolaenko\nValerie Arboleda\nVan Jones\nVan Le-Gray\nVanessa Kropf\nVas Narasimhan\nVaughn Ferguson\nVenkat Mocherla\nVicente De Baca\nVickie Casillas-Smith\nVictor Liang\nVictor Shoup\nVictoria Butcher\nVijay Balasubramaniyan\nVijay Kedar\nVijay Pande\nVineeta Agarwala\nVinod Khosla\nVirginia Postrel\nVishal Amin\nVitalik Buterin\nVivian Brooks\nVoices Onchain\nW. Brian Arthur\nWahab Owolabi\nWei Luo\nWendy Drpic\nWerner Gerola\nWes Taylor\nWhitney Owens\nWill Brown\nWill Wong\nWillem Mulder\nWilliam Gifford\nWilliam Mougayar\nWing Cheng\nXian Zhang\nXiang-Dong Fu\nXingchen Zhou\nYannai A. Gonczarowski\nYehuda Lindell\nYevgeniy Dodis\nYinuo Zhang\nYogi Roth\nYohei Ishii\nYoko Li\nYoni Levy\nYoram Novick\nYuichi Kurosawa\nYujin Chung\nYun Fan\nYung Yung Sheung\nYuval Efron\nYuval Harari\nZac Bookman\nZach Abrams\nZach Cohen\nZach Dicker\nZach Haigney\nZachary Chen\nZachary Gray\nZack Weiner\nZahabiya Gabaji\nZak Doric\nZal Bilimoria\nZane Lackey\nZeta Avarikioti\nZeya Yang\nZooko Wilcox\nZoran Basich\n\nclear all Ciamac Moallemi\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n09.21.23 / Ciamac Moallemi\nAutomated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees\nCiamac Moallemi reintroduces “loss-versus-rebalancing” (LVR), which quantifies the loss to arbitrageurs in an idealized, continuous-time setting with no fees.\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nLVR\nvideo\n\n10.28.22 / Ciamac Moallemi\nLiquidity Provision and Automated Market Making\nAn introduction to constant function market makers (CFMMs), which have emerged as the dominant mechanism for decentralized exchange on blockchains.\n\nresearch\nAMMs\nDeFi\nLVR\nvideo\n\n09.18.22 / Jason Milionis, Ciamac Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden and Anthony Lee Zhang\nLVR: Quantifying the Cost of Providing Liquidity to Automated Market Makers\nWe explain a new way to think about the cost side of becoming a liquidity partner, based on a quantity called LVR (“loss versus rebalancing,” pronounced “lever”).\n\nresearch\nAMMs\nDeFi\nLVR\npricing\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":6990,"crawled_at":1791194317256} +{"id":10364,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/sui-stack/walrus","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Walrus | Sui Documentation","text":"Walrus is a decentralized storage and data availability protocol designed for large binary files. It uses Sui for coordination, payment, and governance, making it a natural storage layer for apps built on Sui.\n\nWalrus Docs\n↗\nData Storage Using Walrus\nLearn how to store and retrieve data on Walrus by walking through OnlyFins, a content platform built on Sui and Walrus.\n→\nCustom Indexer and Walrus\nWalrus is a content-addressable storage protocol, where data is retrieved using a unique identifier derived from the content itself, rather than from a file path or location. Integrating a custom Sui Indexer with Walrus can provide novel user experiences.\n→\nEncrypted Social Media\nBuild a Web3 social platform with encrypted content, Seal-based access control, and Walrus storage on Sui.\n→\nOnchain Websites with Walrus Sites\nLearn how to deploy and manage static websites on Walrus using the site-builder CLI, with configuration, custom headers, and SuiNS domain names.\n→","tokens":243,"crawled_at":1791194325127} +{"id":10365,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/cast/eip-7702-delegation","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"EIP-7702 account delegation – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nEIP-7702 account delegation\n\nEIP-7702 lets an externally owned account (EOA) delegate code execution to a deployed contract. Cast can sign the authorization separately with cast wallet sign-auth, or sign and include it directly with cast send --auth.\n\nThe positional ADDRESS passed to cast wallet sign-auth is the implementation contract. The authority is derived from the wallet that signs the authorization.\n\nPrerequisites\n\nThe target chain must support EIP-7702. For local development, start Anvil with the Prague hardfork:\n\n$ anvil --hardfork prague\n\nThe examples use these values:\n\nVariableMeaning\n$AUTHORITY\nEOA whose code will point to the implementation\n\n$IMPLEMENTATION\nDeployed contract whose code will execute for the authority\n\n$BROADCASTER\nAccount that submits and pays for the EIP-7702 transaction\n\n$RPC_URL\nRPC endpoint for an EIP-7702-compatible chain\n\nThe authority and broadcaster names in the examples refer to encrypted Cast keystores. See wallet operations for keystore setup.\n\nSign and broadcast in one step\n\nWhen the authority broadcasts the transaction, pass the implementation address directly to --auth. Cast signs the authorization with the transaction signer and selects the authorization nonce automatically:\n\n$ cast send $AUTHORITY \"initialize(address)\" $OWNER \\\n--auth $IMPLEMENTATION \\\n--account authority \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nThe authorization is processed before the call, so the call to $AUTHORITY executes initialize(address) from $IMPLEMENTATION in the authority's context. Replace that function with calldata supported by your implementation.\n\nUse a separate broadcaster\n\nAn authority can sign an authorization without broadcasting the transaction. cast wallet sign-auth prints the RLP-encoded signed authorization:\n\n$ AUTH=$(cast wallet sign-auth $IMPLEMENTATION \\\n--account authority \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL)\n\nA different account can include that authorization in a transaction and pay its gas:\n\n$ cast send $AUTHORITY \"initialize(address)\" $OWNER \\\n--auth $AUTH \\\n--account broadcaster \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\n--auth accepts either an implementation address or a signed authorization. The address form is signed by the transaction signer. Use the signed form when the authority and broadcaster are different accounts.\n\nChoose the authorization nonce\n\nAn authorization is valid only when its nonce equals the authority's nonce during authorization processing.\n\nFlowNonce behavior\ncast send --auth $IMPLEMENTATION\nCast signs for the transaction sender using the carrier transaction nonce plus one.\n\ncast wallet sign-auth with a different broadcaster\nCast queries and uses the authority's current nonce.\n\ncast wallet sign-auth --self-broadcast\nCast queries the current nonce and adds one because the authority's carrier transaction increments it first.\n\ncast wallet sign-auth --nonce $NONCE\nCast uses the exact nonce provided.\n\nUse --self-broadcast only when the same authority will submit the pre-signed authorization:\n\n$ AUTH=$(cast wallet sign-auth $IMPLEMENTATION \\\n--self-broadcast \\\n--account authority \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL)\n\n$ cast send $AUTHORITY \"initialize(address)\" $OWNER \\\n--auth $AUTH \\\n--account authority \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nYou can also set the chain and nonce explicitly:\n\n$ AUTH=$(cast wallet sign-auth $IMPLEMENTATION \\\n--chain $CHAIN_ID \\\n--nonce $AUTHORITY_NONCE \\\n--account authority)\n\nVerify the delegation\n\nRead the authority's code after the transaction is mined:\n\n$ cast code $AUTHORITY --rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nFor an active delegation, the result is the 23-byte delegation indicator 0xef0100 followed by the implementation address. You can also inspect the transaction's authorization list:\n\n$ cast tx $TX_HASH authorizationList --json --rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nReplace or clear a delegation\n\nAuthorize a different implementation to replace the existing delegation. To restore the account to empty EOA code, authorize the zero address:\n\n$ cast send $AUTHORITY \\\n--auth 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \\\n--account authority \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nRelated references\n\ncast wallet sign-auth — Sign and RLP-encode an authorization.\n\ncast send — Include address-based or pre-signed authorizations with --auth.\n\nsignDelegation — Create and attach delegations from Solidity tests and scripts.\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":1087,"crawled_at":1791194329060} +{"id":10366,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/collateral-and-borrowing","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound III Docs | Collateral & Borrowing","text":"Compound III\nInterest Rates\nCollateral & Borrowing\nLiquidation\nAccount Management\nProtocol Rewards\nERC-4626 Wrapper\nGovernance\nHelper Functions\n\nCollateral & Borrowing\nSupply\nWithdraw or Borrow\nCollateral Balance\nBorrow Collateralization\nMinimum Borrow Balance\n\nCollateral & Borrowing\nUsers can add collateral assets to their account using the supply function. Collateral can only be added if the market is below its supplyCap, which limits the protocol’s risk exposure to collateral assets.\nEach collateral asset increases the user’s borrowing capacity, based on the asset’s borrowCollateralFactor. The borrowing collateral factors are percentages that represent the portion of collateral value that can be borrowed.\nFor instance, if the borrow collateral factor for WBTC is 85%, an account can borrow up to 85% of the USD value of its supplied WBTC in the base asset. Collateral factors can be fetched using the Get Asset Info By Address function.\nThe base asset can be borrowed using the withdraw function; the resulting borrow balance must meet the borrowing collateral factor requirements. If a borrowing account subsequently fails to meet the borrow collateral factor requirements, it cannot borrow additional assets until it supplies more collateral, or reduces its borrow balance using the supply function.\nAccount balances for the base token are signed integers. An account balance greater than zero indicates the base asset is supplied and a balance less than zero indicates the base asset is borrowed. Note: Base token balances for assets with 18 decimals will start to overflow at a value of 2103/1e18=~10 trillion.\nAccount balances are stored internally in Comet as principal values (also signed integers). The principal value, also referred to as the day-zero balance, is what an account balance at T0 would have to be for it to be equal to the account balance today after accruing interest.\nGlobal indices for supply and borrow are unsigned integers that increase over time to account for the interest accrued on each side. When an account interacts with the protocol, the indices are updated and saved. An account’s present balance can be calculated using the current index with the following formulas.\nBalance = Principal * BaseSupplyIndex [Principal > 0]\nBalance = Principal * BaseBorrowIndex [Principal < 0]\n\nSupply\nThe supply function transfers an asset to the protocol and adds it to the account’s balance. This function can be used to supply collateral, supply the base asset, or repay an open borrow of the base asset.\nIf the base asset is supplied resulting in the account having a balance greater than zero, the base asset earns interest based on the current supply rate. Collateral assets that are supplied do not earn interest.\nThere are three separate methods to supply an asset to Compound III. The first is on behalf of the caller, the second is to a separate account, and the third is for a manager on behalf of an account.\nBefore supplying an asset to Compound III, the caller must first execute the asset’s ERC-20 approve of the Comet contract.\nComet\nfunction supply(address asset, uint amount)\n\nfunction supplyTo(address dst, address asset, uint amount)\n\nfunction supplyFrom(address from, address dst, address asset, uint amount)\n\nasset: The address of the asset’s smart contract.\namount: The amount of the asset to supply to Compound III expressed as an integer. A value of MaxUint256 will repay all of the dst’s base borrow balance.\ndst: The address that is credited with the supplied asset within the protocol.\nfrom: The address to supply from. This account must first use the Allow method in order to allow the sender to transfer its tokens prior to calling Supply.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\ncomet.supply(0xERC20Address, 1000000);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait comet.supply(usdcAddress, 1000000);\n\nWithdraw or Borrow\nThe withdraw method is used to withdraw collateral that is not currently supporting an open borrow. Withdraw is also used to borrow the base asset from the protocol if the account has supplied sufficient collateral. It can also be called from an allowed manager address.\nCompound III implements a minimum borrow position size which can be found as baseBorrowMin in the protocol configuration. A withdraw transaction to borrow that results in the account’s borrow size being less than the baseBorrowMin will revert.\nComet\nfunction withdraw(address asset, uint amount)\n\nfunction withdrawTo(address to, address asset, uint amount)\n\nfunction withdrawFrom(address src, address to, address asset, uint amount)\n\nasset: The address of the asset that is being withdrawn or borrowed in the transaction.\namount: The amount of the asset to withdraw or borrow. A value of MaxUint256 will withdraw all of the src’s base balance.\nto: The address to send the withdrawn or borrowed asset.\nsrc: The address of the account to withdraw or borrow on behalf of. The withdrawFrom method can only be called by an allowed manager.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\ncomet.withdraw(0xwbtcAddress, 100000000);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait comet.withdraw(usdcAddress, 100000000);\n\nCollateral Balance\nThis function returns the current balance of a collateral asset for a specified account in the protocol.\nComet\nfunction collateralBalanceOf(address account, address asset) external view returns (uint128)\n\naccount: The address of the account in which to retrieve a collateral balance.\nasset: The address of the collateral asset smart contract.\nRETURNS: The balance of the collateral asset in the protocol for the specified account as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint balance = comet.collateralBalanceOf(0xAccount, 0xUsdcAddress);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst balance = await comet.callStatic.collateralBalanceOf('0xAccount', '0xUsdcAddress');\n\nBorrow Collateralization\nThis function returns true if the account passed to it has non-negative liquidity based on the borrow collateral factors. This function returns false if an account does not have sufficient liquidity to increase its borrow position. A return value of false does not necessarily imply that the account is presently liquidatable (see isLiquidatable function).\nComet\nfunction isBorrowCollateralized(address account) public view returns (bool)\n\naccount: The account to examine collateralization.\nRETURNS: Returns true if the account has enough liquidity for borrowing.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nbool isCollateralized = comet.isBorrowCollateralized(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst isCollateralized = await comet.callStatic.isBorrowCollateralized('0xAccount');\n\nMinimum Borrow Balance\nThis function returns the minimum borrow balance allowed in the base asset. An account’s initial borrow size must be equal to or greater than this value. Subsequent borrows may be of any size.\nComet\nfunction baseBorrowMin() public view returns (uint256)\n\nRETURNS: The minimum borrow balance allowed by the protocol as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint baseBorrowMin = comet.baseBorrowMin();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst baseBorrowMin = await comet.callStatic.baseBorrowMin();","tokens":1929,"crawled_at":1791194342614} +{"id":10367,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/help/faq","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"FAQ – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nFAQ\n\nCommon questions about Foundry.\n\nGeneral\n\nWhat is Foundry?\n\nFoundry is a fast, portable, and modular toolkit for Ethereum development written in Rust. It includes:\n\nForge — Build, test, and deploy smart contracts\n\nCast — Interact with the chain from the command line\n\nAnvil — Local Ethereum node for development\n\nChisel — Interactive Solidity REPL\n\nHow do I install Foundry?\n\nUse foundryup:\n\n$ curl -L https://getfoundry.sh/install | bash\n$ foundryup\n\nSee Installation for details.\n\nHow do I update Foundry?\n\nRun foundryup again:\n\n$ foundryup\n\nTo install a specific version:\n\n$ foundryup --install nightly-abc123\n\nHow do I get help with a command?\n\nAll Foundry tools support --help:\n\n$ forge --help\n$ forge test --help\n$ cast --help\n$ anvil --help\n$ chisel --help\n\nSee the CLI reference for full command docs.\n\nForge\n\nHow do I run a specific test?\n\nUse --match-test:\n\n$ forge test --match-test test_Transfer\n\nUse --match-contract for a specific contract:\n\n$ forge test --match-contract TokenTest\n\nHow do I see console.log output?\n\nUse verbosity level 2 or higher:\n\n$ forge test -vv\n\nWhy are my tests slow?\n\nCommon causes:\n\nForking without a pinned block — Pin the fork with --fork-block-number so the RPC cache is reused across runs\n\nToo many fuzz runs — Reduce fuzz.runs in foundry.toml for local development\n\nLarge contracts — Consider splitting tests into separate files\n\nHow do I debug a failing test?\n\nUse the interactive debugger:\n\n$ forge test --match-test test_MyTest --debug\n\nOr increase verbosity to see the trace:\n\n$ forge test --match-test test_MyTest -vvvv\n\nSee Debugging for more.\n\nHow do I fork mainnet in tests?\n\nSet --fork-url or configure it in foundry.toml:\n\n$ forge test --fork-url https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\n\nOr in foundry.toml:\n\n[profile.default]\nfork_url = \"https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\"\n\nHow do I run tests in parallel?\n\nTests run in parallel by default. To control parallelism:\n\n$ forge test --jobs 4\n\nSet to 1 for sequential execution (useful for debugging):\n\n$ forge test --jobs 1\n\nCast\n\nHow do I call a contract function?\n\nUse cast call for read-only calls:\n\n$ cast call $CONTRACT \"balanceOf(address)\" $ADDRESS\n\nUse cast send for state-changing transactions:\n\n$ cast send $CONTRACT \"transfer(address,uint256)\" $TO $AMOUNT --private-key $KEY\n\nHow do I decode transaction data?\n\nUse cast 4byte-calldata:\n\n$ cast 4byte-calldata 0xa9059cbb000000000000000000000000...\n\nHow do I convert between units?\n\nUse cast to-wei and cast from-wei:\n\n$ cast to-wei 1 ether\n# 1000000000000000000\n\n$ cast from-wei 1000000000000000000\n# 1.000000000000000000\n\nAnvil\n\nHow do I get test ETH?\n\nAnvil pre-funds 10 accounts with 10,000 ETH each. List them:\n\n$ anvil\n# Shows accounts and private keys on startup\n\nHow do I impersonate an account?\n\nStart Anvil with auto-impersonation:\n\n$ anvil --auto-impersonate\n\nOr impersonate a specific account via RPC:\n\n$ cast rpc anvil_impersonateAccount $ADDRESS\n\nHow do I reset the chain state?\n\nUse the RPC method:\n\n$ cast rpc anvil_reset\n\nOr restart Anvil.\n\nHow do I mine blocks manually?\n\nDisable auto-mining and mine manually:\n\n$ anvil --no-mining\n# In another terminal:\n$ cast rpc anvil_mine 10 # Mine 10 blocks\n\nChisel\n\nHow do I access my project's contracts?\n\nChisel automatically loads your project. Import and use contracts:\n\n➜ import {Counter} from \"src/Counter.sol\";\n➜ Counter c = new Counter();\n➜ c.increment();\n\nHow do I fork in Chisel?\n\nStart with a fork:\n\n$ chisel --fork-url https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\n\nOr fork during a session:\n\n➜ !fork https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\n\nHow do I save my session?\n\nUse the !save command:\n\n➜ !save my-session\n\nLoad it later:\n\n$ chisel load my-session\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":935,"crawled_at":1791194349107} +{"id":10368,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/sui-stack/walrus/only-fins","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Encrypted Social Media | Sui Documentation","text":"OnlyFins is a Web3 social platform that demonstrates encrypted content sharing with onchain access control. Creators publish posts with images they store on Walrus and encrypt through Seal, while viewers purchase ViewerToken capability objects to decrypt and view content. The app uses Enoki for zkLogin authentication and sponsored transactions so users interact without holding SUI for gasGasThe computational cost of execution and object storage for a transaction..\n\ncaution\nOnlyFins is a demo pattern, not production-ready code. Before adapting it, work through this checklist: rate-limit and authorize sponsored transactionsSponsored transactionWhen one address pays the gas fee for a transaction submitted by another address. so an attacker cannot drain your gas budget; enforce Seal session-key expiry rather than holding long-lived sessions; understand the transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. semantics of the ViewerToken objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. (a transferable token grants access to whoever holds it); and remember that all post metadata, blob IDs, and onchain activity are public even when the image bytes are encrypted. See the Security Best Practices guide.\n\nWhen to use this pattern​\n\nUse this pattern when you need to:\n\nGate access to encrypted content with onchain ownership tokens rather than a centralized paywall server.\n\nStore encrypted files on Walrus and control decryption through Seal threshold encryption tied to MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui.-level access control.\n\nLet users authenticate with Google through zkLoginzkLoginA Sui primitive that allows you to send transactions using an OAuth credential. and interact without holding SUI for gas.\n\nBuild a content marketplace where creators publish and viewers pay for access, all verifiable onchain.\n\nCombine shared objects (posts visible to all) with owned objects (viewer tokens that prove access) in a single application.\n\nWhat you learn​\n\nThis example teaches:\n\nShared objects: Posts are shared objects that any user can read metadata from, but only authorized users can decrypt the attached content.\n\nCapability pattern: ViewerToken objects act as owned capability tokens that prove a user purchased access to a specific post.\n\nSeal encryption: Threshold encryption where the Move contract itself authorizes decryption key release. Seal key servers only return the decryption key after dry-running a seal_approve_access transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. that confirms the caller holds a valid ViewerToken.\n\nSponsored transactions: A backend pays gas so users interact without holding SUI. The frontend sends unsigned transactions to the sponsor backend, which co-signs and returns the sponsored bytes.\n\nWalrus storage: The frontend stores encrypted image blobs offchain on Walrus and references them by blob ID. Walrus blobs are publicly addressable, so you must encrypt content to restrict access.\n\nArchitecture​\n\nThe example has 4 actors and 1 onchain packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui.. The frontend builds transactions and renders post feeds as a React app. The Enoki wallet handles zkLogin authentication and transaction signing. The posts Move package stores post metadata and issues ViewerToken objects as shared and address-owned objects on Sui. Seal key servers hold threshold encryption keys and release them only when the Move contract confirms access through seal_approve_access. Walrus stores the actual image blobs, both encrypted and unencrypted. The sponsor backend covers gas fees so users do not need SUI in their wallet.\n\nThe diagram below traces 1 full interaction from a user unlocking content to viewing the decrypted image.\n\nThe following steps walk through the flow:\n\nThe user clicks Unlock Image on a locked post, triggering the usePayForContent hook.\n\nThe frontend builds a grant_access transaction and sends it to the sponsor backend, which pays for gas and returns the co-signed transaction.\n\nThe wallet signs and submits the transaction. The Move package creates a ViewerToken owned by the user.\n\nThe frontend detects the new token, builds a seal_approve_access transaction, and sends it to the Seal key servers.\n\nSeal dry-runs the transaction against the Move contract. Because the user now holds a valid ViewerToken, the contract confirms access.\n\nSeal returns the decryption key. The frontend fetches the encrypted blob from Walrus, decrypts it locally, and renders the image.\n\nErrors can occur at the sponsorship step (backend unreachable), the Seal step (session key expired), or the Walrus fetch (blob not found).\n\nHow Seal and Walrus work together​\n\nWalrus is a content-addressed storage protocol where you retrieve data by blob ID. Walrus makes all blobs publicly addressable, so anyone who knows the blob ID can fetch the raw bytes. To restrict access, the frontend encrypts content before uploading to Walrus.\n\nSeal provides the encryption layer. When a creator publishes a post, the frontend encrypts the image with a key managed by Seal's threshold key servers. The Move contract defines who can decrypt: the seal_approve_access function checks whether the caller is the post author or holds a ViewerToken for that post. Seal key servers only release the decryption key after dry-running this function and confirming it does not abort.\n\nThis combination means Walrus handles storage and availability, Seal handles key management and access control, and the Move contract defines the access policy.\n\nPrerequisites\n\nAn existing React frontend and a backend you can run scripts from.\n\nInstall the Sui CLI and fund an address with Testnet SUI.\n\nNode.js 18 or later with pnpm.\n\nAn Enoki project for zkLogin, or Slush Wallet.\n\nFor the underlying primitives, see Data Storage Using Walrus and Encryption with Seal.\n\nReference app​\n\nA complete implementation lives in onlyfins-example-app, split into a frontend, a backend sponsor service, and the move/posts package.\n\nPublish the Move package and record the package ID, which both the frontend and backend need:\n\n$ sui client publish --gas-budget 200000000\n\nThe frontend reads it from POSTS_PACKAGE_ID in src/constants.ts. The backend reads it from PACKAGE_ID in .env, alongside the author key pairs that publish demo content:\n\nbackend/.env\nAUTHOR_1_PRIVATE_KEY=YOUR_ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY\nPACKAGE_ID=YOUR_PACKAGE_ID\n\nExport a private key with sui keytool export --key-identity YOUR_WALLET_ADDRESS and copy the exportedPrivateKey value, which starts with suiprivkey1.\n\nHow the pieces fit together​\n\n3 decisions carry over to any app that combines these primitives:\n\nEncrypt before uploading. Walrus blobs are publicly addressable by blob ID. Anything you upload unencrypted is readable by anyone who learns the ID, so access control has to live in the encryption, not in the storage.\n\nLet the contract authorize decryption. Seal key servers dry-run seal_approve_access before releasing a key. Access control is therefore Move code, and changing who can decrypt means changing onchain state rather than reconfiguring a server.\n\nSponsor gas if users authenticate with zkLogin. A user who signed in with Google has no SUI. The backend co-signs transactions so the wallet never needs a funded balance. See Sponsored Transactions.\n\nKey code highlights​\n\ncreate_post with optional encryption\nThe create_post entry function creates a shared Post object with an optional encryption ID. When encryption_id contains a value, the post requires a ViewerToken to decrypt. When it contains none, the image is publicly viewable. The function shares the post so any user can read its metadata.\n\ngrant_access with viewer tokens\nThe grant_access function mints a new ViewerToken and returns it. The token links the viewer addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. to a specific post ID, which seal_approve_access checks later.\n\nseal_approve_access gate\nThe seal_approve_access function is the onchain gate that Seal calls before releasing decryption keys. It checks two conditions: the caller is the post author, or the caller holds a ViewerToken linked to this post. It also verifies the requested encryption_id matches the post. If any check fails, the transaction aborts and Seal refuses to release the key.\n\nMystenLabs/onlyfins-example-app/frontend/move/posts/sources/posts.move\n1/// Simple post module for OnlyFins Phase 1 (no encryption)\n2module posts::posts {\n3 use std::string::String;\n4 use sui::clock::Clock;\n5 use sui::coin::Coin;\n6 use sui::sui::SUI;\n7\n\n8 /// A shared post object\n9 public struct Post has key {\n10 id: UID,\n11 author: address,\n12 caption: String,\n13 image_blob_id: String,\n14 created_at: u64,\n15 encryption_id: Option>\n16 }\n17\n\n18 public struct ViewerToken has key, store {\n19 id: UID,\n20 post_id: ID\n21 }\n22\n\n23 /// Create and share a Post object\n24 public fun create_post(\n25 caption: String,\n26 image_blob_id: String,\n27 encryption_id: Option>,\n28 clock: &Clock,\n29 ctx: &mut TxContext\n30 ) {\n31 let post = Post {\n32 id: object::new(ctx),\n33 author: ctx.sender(),\n34 caption,\n35 image_blob_id,\n36 created_at: clock.timestamp_ms(),\n37 encryption_id,\n38 };\n39 transfer::share_object(post);\n40 }\n41\n\n42 public fun grant_access(\n43 post: &Post,\n44 ctx: &mut TxContext\n45 ): ViewerToken {\n46 ViewerToken { id: object::new(ctx), post_id: post.id.to_inner() }\n47 }\n48\n49 public entry fun seal_approve_access(\n50 encryption_id: vector, // Not needed with ViewerToken, but Seal expects it\n51 post: &Post,\n52 viewer_token: &ViewerToken,\n53 ctx: &TxContext\n54 ) {\n55 // Verify encryption_id matches post's encryption_id\n56 assert!(post.encryption_id.is_some(), 0);\n57 assert!(*post.encryption_id.borrow() == encryption_id, 1);\n58\n59 // Check if caller is post author (free access)\n60 if (ctx.sender() == post.author) {\n61 return\n62 };\n63\n64 // Check if ViewerToken matches this post\n65 assert!(viewer_token.post_id == object::id(post), 2);\n66 }\n67}\n68\n\nPaying for content​\n\nThe usePayForContent hook builds and sponsors the transaction that grants a viewer access to a post.\n\ngithub.com/MystenLabs/onlyfins-example-app/frontend/src/hooks/usePayForContent.ts\n/**\n* Hook to request access to encrypted content using sponsored transactions.\n* Calls the grant_access Move function which:\n* 1. Returns a ViewerToken (no payment required in demo mode)\n* 2. Transfers token to the user\n*\n* After successful access, invalidates ViewerTokens query to trigger refetch.\n*/\nexport function usePayForContent() {\nconst { sponsorAndExecuteTransaction } = useSponsoredTransaction();\nconst suiClient = useSuiClient();\nconst currentAccount = useCurrentAccount();\nconst queryClient = useQueryClient();\n\nconst mutation = useMutation({\nmutationFn: async (params: PayForContentParams): Promise => {\nif (!currentAccount?.address) {\nthrow new Error('No wallet connected');\n}\n\nconst tx = new Transaction();\n\n// Call grant_access function - this RETURNS the ViewerToken (no payment required)\nconst [viewerToken] = tx.moveCall({\ntarget: `${POSTS_PACKAGE_ID}::posts::grant_access`,\narguments: [\ntx.object(params.postId), // post: &Post\n],\n});\n\n// Transfer the returned ViewerToken to the current user\ntx.transferObjects([viewerToken], currentAccount.address);\n\n// Execute transaction with sponsorship\nconst result = await sponsorAndExecuteTransaction(tx);\n\nif (!result) {\nthrow new Error('Sponsored transaction failed');\n}\n\n// Wait for transaction to complete\nconst txResult = await suiClient.waitForTransaction({\ndigest: result.digest,\noptions: {\nshowEffects: true,\nshowObjectChanges: true,\n},\n});\n\n// Extract created ViewerToken object ID\nconst viewerTokenObj = txResult.objectChanges?.find(\n(change) =>\nchange.type === 'created' &&\nchange.objectType.includes('::posts::ViewerToken')\n);\n\nif (viewerTokenObj && viewerTokenObj.type === 'created') {\nreturn viewerTokenObj.objectId;\n}\n\nreturn ''; // Success but no object ID found\n},\nonSuccess: () => {\n// Invalidate ViewerTokens query to trigger refetch\n// This will cause all PostCards to re-check access\n// Use predicate to match useSuiClientQuery's key structure: [network, method, params]\nqueryClient.invalidateQueries({\npredicate: (query) =>\nArray.isArray(query.queryKey) &&\nquery.queryKey[1] === 'getOwnedObjects' &&\n(query.queryKey[2] as any)?.owner === currentAccount?.address,\n});\n},\n});\n\nreturn mutation;\n}\n\nThe hook calls the grant_access Move function, transfers the resulting ViewerToken to the current account, and sponsors the transaction so the user pays no gas. After the transaction finalizes, it refetches the user's owned objects so the UI updates.\n\nDecrypting images through Seal​\n\nThe usePostDecryption hook fetches encrypted images from Walrus and decrypts them using Seal session keys.\n\ngithub.com/MystenLabs/onlyfins-example-app/frontend/src/hooks/usePostDecryption.ts\n/**\n* Automatically decrypts post images when user has access (ViewerToken) and session key.\n* Captions are now stored as plaintext and don't need decryption.\n*\n* @param posts - Transformed posts from transformSuiObjectsToPosts\n* @param rawSuiData - Raw blockchain data (needed for image blob IDs)\n* @param sessionKey - Seal session key for decryption\n* @param viewerTokens - User's ViewerTokens for access control\n* @returns Record of decrypted image URLs by post ID\n*/\nexport function usePostDecryption(\nposts: Post[],\nrawSuiData: SuiObjectResponse[] | undefined,\nsessionKey: SessionKey | null,\nviewerTokens: ViewerToken[]\n): Record {\nconst [decryptedContent, setDecryptedContent] = useState>({});\nconst [decryptingPosts, setDecryptingPosts] = useState>(new Set());\n\nuseEffect(() => {\nif (!sessionKey || !rawSuiData) return;\n\n// Filter posts that need image decryption (unlocked + has encryptionId)\nconst postsToDecrypt = posts.filter(\n(p) => p.kind === 'unlocked' && 'encryptionId' in p && p.encryptionId\n);\n\nif (postsToDecrypt.length === 0) return;\n\n// Initialize Seal client\nconst sealClient = createSealClient();\n\n// Decrypt each post's image\npostsToDecrypt.forEach(async (post) => {\n// Skip if already decrypted or currently decrypting\nif (decryptedContent[post.id] || decryptingPosts.has(post.id)) {\nreturn;\n}\n\n// Mark as decrypting\nsetDecryptingPosts((prev) => new Set(prev).add(post.id));\nsetDecryptedContent((prev) => ({\n...prev,\n[post.id]: {\nimageBytes: '⏳ Decrypting image...',\nisDecrypting: true,\n},\n}));\n\ntry {\n// Find raw blockchain data for this post\nconst rawPost = rawSuiData.find((r) => r.data?.objectId === post.id);\nif (!rawPost?.data?.content || rawPost.data.content.dataType !== 'moveObject') {\nthrow new Error('Post data not found');\n}\n\nconst fields = rawPost.data.content.fields as any;\nconst encryptionId = (post as any).encryptionId;\nconsole.log('post encryptionId', encryptionId);\n\n// Find ViewerToken for access control\nconst viewerToken = viewerTokens.find((t) => t.postId === post.id);\nif (!viewerToken) {\nthrow new Error('ViewerToken not found');\n}\n\n// Build access control transaction\nconst tx = new Transaction();\ntx.moveCall({\ntarget: `${POSTS_PACKAGE_ID}::posts::seal_approve_access`,\narguments: [\ntx.pure.vector('u8', fromHex(encryptionId)),\ntx.object(post.id), // Post object\ntx.object(viewerToken.objectId), // ViewerToken as proof\n],\n});\n\nconst txBytes = await tx.build({ client: suiClient, onlyTransactionKind: true });\n\n// Fetch decryption keys from Seal\nawait sealClient.fetchKeys({\nids: [encryptionId],\ntxBytes: txBytes,\nsessionKey,\nthreshold: 1,\n});\n\n// Decrypt image (stored off-chain in Walrus)\nconst imageBlobId = fields.image_blob_id;\nconsole.log('imageBlobId', imageBlobId);\nconst walrusUrl = `${WALRUS_AGGREGATOR_URL}/${imageBlobId}`;\nconsole.log(`Fetching encrypted image from Walrus: ${walrusUrl}`);\n\nconst encryptedImage = await fetchFromWalrus(walrusUrl);\nconsole.log(`Decrypting image for post ${post.id}, size: ${encryptedImage.length} bytes`);\n\nconst decryptedImageBytes = await sealClient.decrypt({\ndata: encryptedImage,\nsessionKey,\ntxBytes,\ncheckShareConsistency: false,\n});\n\n// Convert decrypted image to blob URL (detect MIME type from byte signature)\nconst imageBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedImageBytes);\nconst mimeType = imageBytes[0] === 0x89 && imageBytes[1] === 0x50 ? 'image/png' : 'image/jpeg';\nconst imageBlob = new Blob([imageBytes], { type: mimeType });\nconst imageUrl = URL.createObjectURL(imageBlob);\nconsole.log(`Image decrypted successfully: ${imageUrl}`);\n\n// Update with decrypted image\nsetDecryptedContent((prev) => ({\n...prev,\n[post.id]: {\nimageBytes: imageUrl,\nisDecrypting: false,\n},\n}));\n\n// Remove from decrypting set\nsetDecryptingPosts((prev) => {\nconst next = new Set(prev);\nnext.delete(post.id);\nreturn next;\n});\n} catch (error) {\nconsole.log('session key', sessionKey.export());\nconsole.error(`Image decryption failed for post ${post.id}:`, error);\n\n// Show error state\nsetDecryptedContent((prev) => ({\n...prev,\n[post.id]: {\nimageBytes: '❌ Image decryption failed',\nisDecrypting: false,\n},\n}));\n\n// Remove from decrypting set\nsetDecryptingPosts((prev) => {\nconst next = new Set(prev);\nnext.delete(post.id);\nreturn next;\n});\n}\n});\n}, [posts, rawSuiData, sessionKey, viewerTokens, decryptedContent, decryptingPosts]);\n\nreturn decryptedContent;\n}\n\nFor each encrypted post the user has access to, the hook builds a seal_approve_access transaction, retrieves the decryption key from the Seal key servers, fetches the encrypted blob from Walrus, and decrypts it locally. It auto-detects the image MIME type from the first bytes of the decrypted data.\n\nCommon modifications​\n\nAdd payment for access: Require viewers to pay SUI or a custom token in the grant_access function before minting the ViewerToken. Transfer the payment to the post author.\n\nAdd subscription tiers: Create a Subscription object that grants access to all posts from a creator for a set duration. Check subscription validity in seal_approve_access alongside the per-post ViewerToken check.\n\nReplace Enoki with wallet-only auth: Remove the Enoki zkLogin flow and use a standard wallet connection through dApp Kit. Remove the sponsor backend and let users pay their own gas.\n\nAdd content categories: Extend the Post struct with a category field. Filter posts by category in the frontend and allow creators to organize their content.\n\nAdd creator profiles: Create a shared CreatorProfile object per author that stores a display name, bio, and avatar blob ID on Walrus. Link posts to the profile for a richer feed experience.\n\nTroubleshooting​\n\nThe following sections address common issues with this example.\n\nPackage ID is missing or invalid​\n\nSymptom: The frontend logs Error: invalid package ID or transactions fail with PackageNotFound.\n\nCause: The POSTS_PACKAGE_ID in constants.ts still has the default value, or you published the package on a different network than the wallet targets.\n\nFix: Re-run the publish step on TestnetTestnetStaging network for testing changes before production deployment., then update constants.ts with the new package ID and restart the dev server.\n\nWallet does not connect​\n\nSymptom: Clicking Sign In does nothing, or the Google OAuth flow fails.\n\nCause: The Enoki API key or Google Client ID is misconfigured, or the browser blocks third-party cookies.\n\nFix: Verify the Enoki and Google credentials in main.tsx. Try a different browser or disable cookie-blocking extensions.\n\nSession key expired​\n\nSymptom: A modal appears saying the session key has expired, and decryption stops working.\n\nCause: Seal session keys have a 30-minute TTL. The key expired between signing and attempting decryption.\n\nFix: Click the button in the modal to sign a new session key. The app signs automatically and resumes decryption.\n\nEncrypted image fails to load​\n\nSymptom: A post unlocks (the app grants a ViewerToken) but the image shows as broken or never loads.\n\nCause: The Walrus aggregator is unreachable, the blob ID is invalid, or you did not upload the encrypted image to Walrus.\n\nFix: Verify the blob ID in the post object with sui client object POST_ID. Check that the Walrus aggregator URL in constants.ts is reachable. Re-upload the image if the blob ID is a placeholder.\n\nGas budget too low​\n\nSymptom: The transaction fails with InsufficientGas or a similar error.\n\nCause: The sponsor backend gas budget is below what the function consumes.\n\nFix: Increase the gas budget in the sponsor backend or the transaction builder. For CLI publishing, raise --gas-budget to 200000000.\nRelated topics\n\nZkLogin Technical Reference\nTechnical reference for zkLogin: protocol details, address derivation, OpenID terminology, ceremony, security analysis, and signature verification.\nSponsored Transactions\nSponsored transactions let you pay gas fees on behalf of another user, reducing onboarding friction for users who don't own SUI.\nSecurity Best Practices\nOverview of security best practices on Sui.\nShared Objects\nAnyone can access shared objects on the Sui network, so care must be taken to secure access, if needed.\n\nWhen to use this pattern\nWhat you learn\nArchitectureHow Seal and Walrus work together\n\nReference app\nHow the pieces fit together\nKey code highlightsPaying for content\nDecrypting images through Seal\n\nCommon modifications\nTroubleshootingPackage ID is missing or invalid\nWallet does not connect\nSession key expired\nEncrypted image fails to load\nGas budget too low\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":5359,"crawled_at":1791194350379} +{"id":10369,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/tags/lvr","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"LVR - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nLVR\n\nFeed\nFILTERS\n(1)\nclear filters\n\ncategories\nall categories\nannouncements & news\ncode & engineering\ncompany building\npolicy & regulation\nresearch\ntech trends\n\nformat\nall formats\narticles\nlisticles\npapers\npodcasts\nvideos\n\ntags\n(1) recommended tags\nAI & crypto\nJolt\nstablecoins\ntokens\nall tags\nall tags\nagentic commerce\nAI agents / agentic AI\nairdrops\nAMMs\nanatomy of a hack\nannouncements\nannual Big Ideas\napac\narts & culture\nauction design\nbanking\nBFT\nbitcoin\nblockchain\nbrand & marketing\nbusiness strategy\nchoosing infrastructure\nCLARITY Act\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\ncomms\ncommunity building\ncompensation\ncompliance & illicit finance\ncomposability\nconsensus\ncreator economy\ncrypto basics\nCrypto Startup Accelerator (CSX)\ncryptography\nCSX 2020\nCSX 2023\nCSX 2024 (London)\nCSX 2024 (NYC)\nCSX 2025 (SF)\ncustody\ncypherpunk\nDAGs\ndanksharding\nDAOs\ndata availability\ndata insights\ndebanking\ndecentralization\ndecentralization how-to\ndecentralized media & entertainment\nDeFi\nDePIN\nDeSci\ndesign & user experience\ndeveloper experience & tooling\nDUNA\neconomics\nEthereum\nFAQ\nFHE (fully homomorphic encryption)\nfield notes\nfinance\nFirst Principles series\nformal verification\nfoundations\nfounder stories\nFounders Summits\ngaming\ngas\nGenius Act\nglossaries & terminology\ngo-to-market\ngov\ngovernance\ngovernance best practices\ngovernment agencies\nguest posts\nHalmos\nhelios\nhiring & recruiting\nhistory\nhow innovation happens\nidentity & reputation\ninfrastructure\ninvestments\nIP\nlegal best practices\nlicensing\nlight clients\nlockups\nlongform\nlongreads\nLVR\nMachiavelli for DAOs series\nmachine learning\nmarketplaces\nmechanism design\nmental models & frameworks\nmetaverse\nmetrics & measures\nmev\nMPC (multi-party computation)\nmulti-client diversity\nnetwork effects\nnew year's resolutions\nnewsletters\nNFTs\noffline to online\nop-eds\nopen source\npartnerships & sales\nPCNs\npeople practices & HR\npermissionless\nperpetual futures\npitching investors\nplaybooks\npodcast\nprediction markets\npricing\nprivacy\nproduct-market fit\nprogramming\nprogressive decentralization\nproof of human\nproof of stake\nproof of work\nproposer-builder separation\nQ&As\nquantum computing & post-quantum crypto\nrandomness beacons\nregional innovation\nregulatory know-how\nregulatory updates\nrelease notes\nresearch\nrollups\nroundups\nroyalties\nrulemaking\nRWA tokenization\nscaling & throughput\nsecurity\nsecurity best practices\nslashing\nsmart contracts\nSNARKs\nsocial networks\nsolana\nSolidity\nstarter packs\nState of Crypto\nState of Crypto 2022\nState of Crypto 2023\nState of Crypto 2024\nstate of crypto 2025\ntalent\ntax policy\nTEEs (trusted execution environment)\nThe Merge series\ntoken business models\ntoken design\ntoken launch playbook\nTradFi\nUK\nVDFs\nvibecoding\nvideo\nVoices Onchain\nvoting\nVR\nwallets\nweb2 to web3\nwhat we're reading\nzero knowledge\nzero knowledge & succinct proof systems\n\nclear all LVR\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\n/\n\nInitializing...\n\n09.21.23 / Ciamac Moallemi\nAutomated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees\nCiamac Moallemi reintroduces “loss-versus-rebalancing” (LVR), which quantifies the loss to arbitrageurs in an idealized, continuous-time setting with no fees.\n\nresearch\nDeFi\nLVR\nvideo\n\n10.28.22 / Anthony Lee Zhang\nArbitrage Extractable Value\nLiquidity Providers for Automated Market Makers suffer from “impermanent loss” – yet no definition of impermanent loss exists that allows it to be quantified.\n\nresearch\nAMMs\nDeFi\nLVR\nvideo\n\n10.28.22 / Ciamac Moallemi\nLiquidity Provision and Automated Market Making\nAn introduction to constant function market makers (CFMMs), which have emerged as the dominant mechanism for decentralized exchange on blockchains.\n\nresearch\nAMMs\nDeFi\nLVR\nvideo\n\n09.18.22 / Jason Milionis, Ciamac Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden and Anthony Lee Zhang\nLVR: Quantifying the Cost of Providing Liquidity to Automated Market Makers\nWe explain a new way to think about the cost side of becoming a liquidity partner, based on a quantity called LVR (“loss versus rebalancing,” pronounced “lever”).\n\nresearch\nAMMs\nDeFi\nLVR\npricing\n\nLoading more posts...\n\nNo more posts to load\n\nNo posts found","tokens":1045,"crawled_at":1791194351315} +{"id":10370,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/helper-functions","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound III Docs | Helper Functions","text":"Compound III\nInterest Rates\nCollateral & Borrowing\nLiquidation\nAccount Management\nProtocol Rewards\nERC-4626 Wrapper\nGovernance\nHelper Functions\n\nHelper Functions\nTotal Supply\nTotal Borrow\nTotal Collateral\nSupplied Base Balance\nBorrow Balance\nAccount Data\nGet Asset Info\nGet Asset Info By Address\nGet Price\nAccrue Account\nGet Protocol Configuration\nGet Comet Factory\nGet Base Asset Market Information\nGet Base Accrual Scale\nGet Base Index Scale\nGet Factor Scale\nGet Price Scale\nGet Max Assets\nBulk Actions\nInvoke\n\nHelper Functions\nTotal Supply\nThe total supply of base tokens supplied to the protocol plus interest accrued to suppliers.\nComet\nfunction totalSupply() override external view returns (uint256)\n\nRETURN: The amount of base asset scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint256 totalSupply = comet.totalSupply();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst totalSupply = await comet.callStatic.totalSupply();\n\nTotal Borrow\nThe total amount of base tokens that are currently borrowed from the protocol plus interest accrued to all borrows.\nComet\nfunction totalBorrow() virtual external view returns (uint256)\n\nRETURN: The amount of base asset scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint256 totalBorrow = comet.totalBorrow();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst totalBorrow = await comet.callStatic.totalBorrow();\n\nTotal Collateral\nThe protocol tracks the current amount of collateral that all accounts have supplied. Each valid collateral asset sum is tracked in a mapping with the asset address that points to a struct.\nComet\nstruct TotalsCollateral {\nuint128 totalSupplyAsset;\nuint128 _reserved;\n}\n\nmapping(address => TotalsCollateral) public totalsCollateral;\n\naddress: The address of the collateral asset’s contract.\nRETURN: A struct containing the stored data pertaining to the sum of the collateral in the protocol.\ntotalSupplyAsset: A Solidity uint128 of the sum of the collateral asset stored in the protocol, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nTotalsCollateral totalsCollateral = comet.totalsCollateral(0xERC20Address);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst [ totalSupplyAsset ] = await comet.callStatic.totalsCollateral('0xERC20Address');\n\nSupplied Base Balance\nThis function returns the current balance of base asset for a specified account in the protocol, including interest. If the account is presently borrowing or not supplying, it will return 0.\nComet\nfunction balanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256)\n\naccount: The address of the account in which to retrieve the base asset balance.\nRETURNS: The balance of the base asset, including interest, in the protocol for the specified account as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint balance = comet.balanceOf(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst balance = await comet.callStatic.balanceOf('0xAccount');\n\nBorrow Balance\nThis function returns the current balance of borrowed base asset for a specified account in the protocol, including interest. If the account has a non-negative base asset balance, it will return 0.\nComet\nfunction borrowBalanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256)\n\naccount: The address of the account in which to retrieve the borrowed base asset balance.\nRETURNS: The balance of the base asset, including interest, borrowed by the specified account as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint owed = comet.borrowBalanceOf(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst owed = await comet.callStatic.borrowBalanceOf('0xAccount');\n\nAccount Data\nThe protocol tracks data like the principal and indexes for each account that supplies and borrows. The data is stored in a mapping with the account address that points to a struct.\nComet\nstruct UserBasic {\nint104 principal;\nuint64 baseTrackingIndex;\nuint64 baseTrackingAccrued;\nuint16 assetsIn;\n}\n\nmapping(address => UserBasic) public userBasic;\n\naddress: The address of the account that has used the protocol.\nRETURN: A struct containing the stored data pertaining to the account.\nprincipal: A Solidity int104 of the amount of base asset that the account has supplied (greater than zero) or owes (less than zero) to the protocol.\nbaseTrackingIndex: A Solidity uint64 of the index of the account.\nbaseTrackingAccrued: A Solidity uint64 of the interest that the account has accrued.\nassetsIn: A Solidity uint16 that tracks which assets the account has supplied as collateral. This storage implementation is for internal purposes and enables gas savings.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nUserBasic userBasic = comet.userBasic(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst [ principal, baseTrackingIndex, baseTrackingAccrued, assetsIn ] = await comet.callStatic.userBasic('0xAccount');\n\nGet Asset Info\nThis function returns collateral asset information such as the collateral factors, asset price feed address, and more. In order to create a loop to fetch information for every asset, use the numAssets constant, which indicates the current total number of supported collateral assets.\nComet\nstruct AssetInfo {\nuint8 offset;\naddress asset;\naddress priceFeed;\nuint64 scale;\nuint64 borrowCollateralFactor;\nuint64 liquidateCollateralFactor;\nuint64 liquidationFactor;\nuint128 supplyCap;\n}\n\nfunction getAssetInfo(uint8 i) public view returns (AssetInfo memory)\n\ni: The index of the collateral asset based on the order it was added to the protocol. The index begins at 0.\nRETURNS: The collateral asset information as a struct called AssetInfo.\noffset: The index of the collateral asset based on the order it was added to the protocol.\nasset: The address of the asset’s smart contract.\npriceFeed: The address of the price feed contract for this collateral asset.\nscale: An integer that equals 10 ^ x where x is the amount of decimal places in the collateral asset’s smart contract.\nborrowCollateralFactor: The borrow collateral factor is the percentage of collateral value that can be borrowed (including interest) by an account. The return value is an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 650000000000000000 is 65%.\nliquidateCollateralFactor: The liquidate collateral factor is the percentage of collateral value that can be borrowed (including interest) before an account becomes liquidatable. The return value is an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 850000000000000000 is 85%.\nliquidationFactor: The liquidation factor as an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 930000000000000000 means liquidation carries a 7% penalty for the account.\nsupplyCap: The supply cap of the collateral asset as an integer scaled up by 10 ^ x where x is the amount of decimal places in the asset’s smart contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nAssetInfo info = comet.getAssetInfo(0);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst infoObject = await comet.callStatic.getAssetInfo(0);\n\nGet Asset Info By Address\nThis function returns information of a specific collateral asset.\nComet\nstruct AssetInfo {\nuint8 offset;\naddress asset;\naddress priceFeed;\nuint64 scale;\nuint64 borrowCollateralFactor;\nuint64 liquidateCollateralFactor;\nuint64 liquidationFactor;\nuint128 supplyCap;\n}\n\nfunction getAssetInfoByAddress(address asset) public view returns (AssetInfo memory)\n\naddress: The address of the collateral asset.\nRETURNS: The collateral asset information as a struct called AssetInfo.\noffset: The index of the collateral asset based on the order it was added to the protocol.\nasset: The address of the collateral asset’s smart contract.\npriceFeed: The address of the price feed contract for this collateral asset.\nscale: An integer that equals 10 ^ x where x is the amount of decimal places in the collateral asset’s smart contract.\nborrowCollateralFactor: The borrow collateral factor is the percentage of collateral value that can be borrowed (including interest) by an account. The return value is an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 650000000000000000 is 65%.\nliquidateCollateralFactor: The liquidate collateral factor is the percentage of collateral value that can be borrowed (including interest) before an account becomes liquidatable. The return value is an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 850000000000000000 is 85%.\nliquidationFactor: The liquidation factor as an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18. E.g. 930000000000000000 means liquidation carries a 7% penalty for the account.\nsupplyCap: The supply cap of the collateral asset as an integer scaled up by 10 ^ x where x is the amount of decimal places in the asset’s smart contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nAssetInfo info = comet.getAssetInfoByAddress(0xAsset);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst infoObject = await comet.callStatic.getAssetInfoByAddress('0xAsset');\n\nGet Price\nThe protocol’s prices are updated by Chainlink Price Feeds. In order to fetch the present price of an asset, the price feed contract address for that asset must be passed to the getPrice function.\nThis function returns the price of an asset in USD with 8 decimal places.\nComet\nfunction getPrice(address priceFeed) public view returns (uint128)\n\npriceFeed: The ERC-20 address of the Chainlink price feed contract for the asset.\nRETURNS: Returns the USD price with 8 decimal places as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 ^ 8. E.g. 500000000000 means that the asset’s price is $5000 USD.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint price = comet.getPrice(0xAssetAddress);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst price = await comet.callStatic.getPrice(usdcAddress);\n\nAccrue Account\nThis function triggers a manual accrual of interest and rewards to an account.\nComet\nfunction accrueAccount(address account) override external\n\naccount: The account in which to accrue interest and rewards.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\ncomet.accrueAccount(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait comet.accrueAccount('0xAccount');\n\nGet Protocol Configuration\nThis function returns the configuration struct stored for a specific instance of Comet in the configurator contract.\nConfigurator\nstruct Configuration {\naddress governor;\naddress pauseGuardian;\naddress baseToken;\naddress baseTokenPriceFeed;\naddress extensionDelegate;\n\nuint64 supplyKink;\nuint64 supplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow;\nuint64 supplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh;\nuint64 supplyPerYearInterestRateBase;\nuint64 borrowKink;\nuint64 borrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow;\nuint64 borrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh;\nuint64 borrowPerYearInterestRateBase;\nuint64 storeFrontPriceFactor;\nuint64 trackingIndexScale;\nuint64 baseTrackingSupplySpeed;\nuint64 baseTrackingBorrowSpeed;\nuint104 baseMinForRewards;\nuint104 baseBorrowMin;\nuint104 targetReserves;\n\nAssetConfig[] assetConfigs;\n}\n\nfunction getConfiguration(address cometProxy) external view returns (Configuration memory)\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to get the configuration for.\nRETURNS: Returns the protocol configuration. governor: The address of the protocol Governor.\npauseGuardian: The address of the protocol pause guardian.\nbaseToken: The address of the protocol base token smart contract.\nbaseTokenPriceFeed: The address of the protocol base token price feed smart contract.\nextensionDelegate: The address of the delegate of extra methods that did not fit in Comet.sol (CometExt.sol).\nsupplyKink: The interest rate utilization of the supply side of curve kink.\nsupplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow: The low bound interest rate slope of the supply side.\nsupplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh: The high bound interest rate slope of the supply side.\nsupplyPerYearInterestRateBase: The interest rate slope base of the supply side.\nborrowKink: The interest rate utilization of the borrow side of curve kink.\nborrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow: The low bound interest rate slope of the borrow side.\nborrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh: The high bound interest rate slope of the borrow side.\nborrowPerYearInterestRateBase: The interest rate slope base of the borrow side.\nstoreFrontPriceFactor: The fraction of the liquidation penalty that goes to buyers of collateral instead of the protocol.\ntrackingIndexScale: The scale for the index tracking protocol rewards.\nbaseTrackingSupplySpeed: The rate for protocol awards accrued to suppliers.\nbaseTrackingBorrowSpeed: The rate for protocol awards accrued to borrowers.\nbaseMinForRewards: The minimum amount of base asset supplied to the protocol in order for accounts to accrue rewards.\nbaseBorrowMin: The minimum allowed borrow size.\ntargetReserves: The amount of reserves allowed before absorbed collateral is no longer sold by the protocol.\nassetConfigs: An array of all supported asset configurations.\n\nSolidity\nConfigurator configurator = Configurator(0xConfiguratorAddress);\nConfiguration config = configurator.getConfiguration(0xCometProxy);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst configurator = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst config = await configurator.callStatic.getConfiguration('0xCometProxy');\n\nGet Comet Factory\nThis function gets the address of the Comet Factory contract.\nConfigurator\nfunction factory(address cometProxy) public view returns (address cometFactory)\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy contract.\nRETURNS: The address of the Comet Factory for the specified instance of Comet.\nSolidity\nConfigurator configurator = Configurator(0xConfiguratorAddress);\nCometFactory factory = configurator.factory(0xCometProxy);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst configurator = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst factoryAddress = await configurator.factory.getConfiguration('0xCometProxy');\n\nGet Base Asset Market Information\nThis function gets several of the current parameter values for the protocol market.\nComet\nstruct TotalsBasic {\nuint64 baseSupplyIndex;\nuint64 baseBorrowIndex;\nuint64 trackingSupplyIndex;\nuint64 trackingBorrowIndex;\nuint104 totalSupplyBase;\nuint104 totalBorrowBase;\nuint40 lastAccrualTime;\nuint8 pauseFlags;\n}\n\nfunction totalsBasic() public override view returns (TotalsBasic memory)\n\nRETURNS: The base asset market information as a struct called TotalsBasic (defined in CometStorage.sol).\nbaseSupplyIndex: The global base asset supply index for calculating interest accrued to suppliers.\nbaseBorrowIndex: The global base asset borrow index for calculating interest owed by borrowers.\ntrackingSupplyIndex: A global index for tracking participation of accounts that supply the base asset.\ntrackingBorrowIndex: A global index for tracking participation of accounts that borrow the base asset.\ntotalSupplyBase: The total amount of base asset presently supplied to the protocol as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\ntotalBorrowBase: The total amount of base asset presently borrowed from the protocol as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nlastAccrualTime: The most recent time that protocol interest accrual was globally calculated. A block timestamp as seconds since the Unix epoch.\npauseFlags: An integer that represents paused protocol functionality flags that are packed for data storage efficiency. See Pause Protocol Functionality.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nTotalsBasic tb = comet.totalsBasic();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst [ baseSupplyIndex, baseBorrowIndex, trackingSupplyIndex, trackingBorrowIndex, totalSupplyBase, totalBorrowBase, lastAccrualTime, pauseFlags ] = await comet.callStatic.totalsBasic();\n\nGet Base Accrual Scale\nThis function gets the scale for the base asset tracking accrual.\nComet\nfunction baseAccrualScale() override external pure returns (uint64)\n\nRETURNS: The integer used to scale down the base accrual when calculating a decimal value.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint baseAccrualScale = comet.baseAccrualScale();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst baseAccrualScale = await comet.callStatic.baseAccrualScale();\n\nGet Base Index Scale\nThis function gets the scale for the base asset index.\nComet\nfunction baseIndexScale() override external pure returns (uint64)\n\nRETURNS: The integer used to scale down the index when calculating a decimal value.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint baseIndexScale = comet.baseIndexScale();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst baseIndexScale = await comet.callStatic.baseIndexScale();\n\nGet Factor Scale\nThis function gets the scale for all protocol factors, i.e. borrow collateral factor.\nComet\nfunction factorScale() override external pure returns (uint64)\n\nRETURNS: The integer used to scale down the factor when calculating a decimal value.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint factorScale = comet.factorScale();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst factorScale = await comet.callStatic.factorScale();\n\nGet Price Scale\nThis function gets the scale integer for USD prices in the protocol, i.e. 8 decimals = 1e8.\nComet\nfunction priceScale() override external pure returns (uint64)\n\nRETURNS: The integer used to scale down a price when calculating a decimal value.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint priceScale = comet.priceScale();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst priceScale = await comet.callStatic.priceScale();\n\nGet Max Assets\nThis function gets the maximum number of assets that can be simultaneously supported by Compound III.\nComet\nfunction maxAssets() override external pure returns (uint8)\n\nRETURNS: The maximum number of assets that can be simultaneously supported by Compound III.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint maxAssets = comet.maxAssets();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst maxAssets = await comet.callStatic.maxAssets();\n\nBulk Actions\nThe Compound III codebase contains the source code of an external contract called Bulker that is designed to allow multiple Comet functions to be called in a single transaction.\nUse cases of the Bulker contract include but are not limited to:\nSupplying of a collateral asset and borrowing of the base asset.\nSupplying or withdrawing of the native EVM token (like Ether) directly.\nTransferring or withdrawing of the base asset without leaving dust in the account.\nInvoke\nThis function allows callers to pass an array of action codes and calldatas that are executed, one by one, in a single transaction.\nBulker\n/// @notice The action for supplying an asset to Comet\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_SUPPLY_ASSET = \"ACTION_SUPPLY_ASSET\";\n\n/// @notice The action for supplying a native asset (e.g. ETH on Ethereum mainnet) to Comet\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_SUPPLY_NATIVE_TOKEN = \"ACTION_SUPPLY_NATIVE_TOKEN\";\n\n/// @notice The action for transferring an asset within Comet\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_TRANSFER_ASSET = \"ACTION_TRANSFER_ASSET\";\n\n/// @notice The action for withdrawing an asset from Comet\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_WITHDRAW_ASSET = \"ACTION_WITHDRAW_ASSET\";\n\n/// @notice The action for withdrawing a native asset from Comet\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_WITHDRAW_NATIVE_TOKEN = \"ACTION_WITHDRAW_NATIVE_TOKEN\";\n\n/// @notice The action for claiming rewards from the Comet rewards contract\nbytes32 public constant ACTION_CLAIM_REWARD = \"ACTION_CLAIM_REWARD\";\n\nfunction invoke(bytes32[] calldata actions, bytes[] calldata data) external payable\n\nactions: An array of bytes32 strings that correspond to the actions defined in the contract.\ndata: An array of calldatas for each action to be called in the invoke transaction. Supply Asset, Withdraw Asset, Transfer Asset comet: The address of the Comet instance to interact with.\nto: The destination address, within or external to the protocol.\nasset: The address of the ERC-20 asset contract.\namount: The amount of the asset as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\n\nSupply Native, Withdraw Native (native chain token like ETH on Ethereum Mainnet) comet: The address of the Comet instance to interact with.\nto: The destination address, within or external to the protocol.\namount: The amount of the native token as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the number of decimals of precision of the native EVM token.\n\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nBulker bulker = Bulker(0xBulkerAddress);\n// ERC-20 `approve` the bulker. Then Comet `allow` the bulker to be a manager before calling `invoke`.\nbytes memory supplyAssetCalldata = (abi.encode('0xCometAddress', '0xAccount', '0xAsset', amount);\nbulker.invoke([ 'ACTION_SUPPLY_ASSET' ], [ supplyAssetCalldata ]);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst bulker = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\n// ERC-20 `approve` the bulker. Then Comet `allow` the bulker to be a manager before calling `invoke`.\nconst supplyAssetCalldata = ethers.utils.defaultAbiCoder.encode(['address', 'address', 'address', 'uint'], ['0xCometAddress', '0xAccount', '0xAsset', amount]);\nawait bulker.invoke([ 'ACTION_SUPPLY_ASSET' ], [ supplyAssetCalldata ]);","tokens":5573,"crawled_at":1791194360941} +{"id":10371,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/anvil/state-management","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"State management – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nState management\n\nAnvil can save and restore chain state, enabling reproducible test scenarios and faster development workflows.\n\nDumping state\n\nSave the current state when Anvil exits:\n\nDump state on exit\n$ anvil --dump-state state.json\n\nDump to a directory\n$ anvil --dump-state ./states/\n\nLoading state\n\nStart from a previously saved state:\n\nLoad from state file\n$ anvil --load-state state.json\n\nThe anvil_dumpState and anvil_loadState RPC methods provide the same functionality on a running node, and anvil_reset restores a fresh chain; see the RPC method reference for parameters and examples.\n\nCombined state file\n\nUse --state to both load and dump from the same file:\n\nPersist state across restarts\n$ anvil --state state.json\n\nThis loads the state on startup (if the file exists) and saves it on exit.\n\nPeriodic snapshots\n\nSave state at regular intervals to prevent data loss:\n\nDump state every 60 seconds\n$ anvil --state state.json --state-interval 60\n\nHistorical states\n\nBy default, Anvil only keeps the latest state. Enable historical state preservation for debugging:\n\nPreserve historical states\n$ anvil --preserve-historical-states --dump-state state.json\n\nLimit persisted states\n$ anvil --max-persisted-states 100\n\nMemory management\n\nFor long-running instances, prune historical state to reduce memory usage:\n\nPrune history (keep 10 states)\n$ anvil --prune-history 10\n\nPrune all history\n$ anvil --prune-history\n\nGenesis configuration\n\nInitialize Anvil with a custom genesis file:\n\nUse custom genesis\n$ anvil --init genesis.json\n\nThe genesis file follows the standard Ethereum genesis format with alloc, difficulty, gasLimit, and other fields.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":438,"crawled_at":1791194366649} +{"id":10372,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/develop/objects/object-ownership/shared","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Shared Objects | Sui Documentation","text":"A shared object is a public, mutable objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. that any addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. on the network can reference in a transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction.. Multiple users and smart contracts can interact with the same shared object concurrently. Shared objects go through consensusConsensusThe process by which the majority of nodes agree on the current state of the network ordering, which adds latency compared to address-owned objects but enables concurrent multi-party access.\n\nCreate shared objects​\n\nUse the sui::transfer::share_object function to create a shared object, making it publicly accessible on the network. Extended functionality and accessibility of shared objects requires additional effort by securing access, if needed.\n\nShared objects require the key ability.\n\npublic struct Donut has key { id: UID }\n\nfun init(ctx: &mut TxContext) {\ntransfer::transfer(ShopOwnerCap {\nid: object::new(ctx)\n}, ctx.sender());\n\ntransfer::share_object(DonutShop {\nid: object::new(ctx),\nprice: 1000,\nbalance: balance::zero()\n})\n}\n\nWhen to use shared objects​\n\nShared objects are ideal for things like marketplaces, games, or other scenarios where global state needs to be accessed or modified by multiple parties.\n\nInteract with shared objects​\n\nThe following example creates a shop to sell digital donuts. Everyone needs access to the shop to purchase donuts from it, so the example creates the shop as a shared object using sui::transfer::share_object.\n\nmodule examples::donuts;\n\nuse sui::sui::SUI;\nuse sui::coin::{Self, Coin};\nuse sui::balance::{Self, Balance};\n\n/// For when Coin balance is too low.\nconst ENotEnough: u64 = 0;\n\n/// Capability that grants an owner the right to collect profits.\npublic struct ShopOwnerCap has key { id: UID }\n\n/// A purchasable Donut. For simplicity's sake we ignore implementation.\npublic struct Donut has key { id: UID }\n\n/// A shared object. `key` ability is required.\npublic struct DonutShop has key {\nid: UID,\nprice: u64,\nbalance: Balance\n}\n\n/// Init function is often ideal place for initializing\n/// a shared object as it is called only once.\nfun init(ctx: &mut TxContext) {\ntransfer::transfer(ShopOwnerCap {\nid: object::new(ctx)\n}, ctx.sender());\n\n// Share the object to make it accessible to everyone!\ntransfer::share_object(DonutShop {\nid: object::new(ctx),\nprice: 1000,\nbalance: balance::zero()\n})\n}\n\n/// Entry function available to everyone who owns a Coin.\npublic fun buy_donut(\nshop: &mut DonutShop, payment: &mut Coin, ctx: &mut TxContext\n) {\nassert!(coin::value(payment) >= shop.price, ENotEnough);\n\n// Take amount = `shop.price` from Coin\nlet paid = payment.balance_mut().split(shop.price);\n\n// Put the coin to the Shop's balance\nshop.balance.join(paid);\n\ntransfer::transfer(Donut {\nid: object::new(ctx)\n}, ctx.sender())\n}\n\n/// Consume donut and get nothing...\npublic fun eat_donut(d: Donut) {\nlet Donut { id } = d;\nid.delete();\n}\n\n/// Take coin from `DonutShop` and transfer it to tx sender.\n/// Requires authorization with `ShopOwnerCap`.\npublic fun collect_profits(\n_: &ShopOwnerCap, shop: &mut DonutShop, ctx: &mut TxContext\n) {\nlet amount = shop.balance.value();\nlet profits = shop.balance.split(amount).into_coin(ctx);\n\ntransfer::public_transfer(profits, ctx.sender())\n}\n\nSecurity considerations​\n\nAnyone can submit a transaction that references a shared object. The Sui runtime does not enforce access control on shared objects. Your MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. code must verify authorization for every privileged operation. Learn more in (Security Best Practices).\n\nPerformance considerations​\n\nTransactions that touch shared objects take longer to finalize than address-owned-object transactions because they require consensus.\n\nWhen many transactions write to the same shared object in the same checkpointCheckpointCreated after transaction execution to provide a certified record of chain history., they are sequenced rather than executed in parallel. This reduces throughput for that object. If your use case requires high write throughput, consider splitting state across multiple shared objects (for example, sharding an order book by price range) or using address-owned objects where possible.\n\nQuery shared objects offchain​\n\nYou can read shared objects offchain using the same methods as any other Sui object. Use the object's ID to query its current state:\n\nGraphQL RPCGraphQL RPCA lightweight GraphQL RPC service.: Use the object query with the shared object's ID. See the GraphQL RPC reference for the full schema.\n\ngRPCgRPC APIReplaces JSON-RPC on full nodes for data access.: Use the GetObject method. See the gRPC reference for details.\n\nEvent subscriptions: Subscribe to events emitted by the shared object to react to state changes in real time.\n\nWhen to use address-owned objects instead​\n\nPrefer address-owned objects over shared objects when:\n\nOnly one user needs to write to the object at a time.\n\nYou need the lowest possible transaction latency.\n\nYou want to avoid consensus overhead and potential contention.\n\nShared objects are the right choice when multiple parties must read and write the same mutable state. For read-only data that never changes, use immutable objects instead.\nRelated topics\n\nAddress-Owned Objects\nAddress-owned objects are owned by a Sui 32-byte address, which can either be an account address or an object ID. Learn how to create and access these objects.\nSecurity Best Practices\nOverview of security best practices on Sui.\nGraphQL for Sui RPC\nLearn the core concepts for working with GraphQL on Sui RPC, including request headers, query composition with variables and fragments, pagination strategies, query scope, service limits, and the components of the GraphQL and General-purpose Indexer stack.\ngRPC\nUse the Sui Full Node gRPC API for high-performance, type-safe blockchain data access with Protocol Buffers serialization.\n\nCreate shared objects\nWhen to use shared objects\nInteract with shared objects\nSecurity considerations\nPerformance considerations\nQuery shared objects offchain\nWhen to use address-owned objects instead\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1568,"crawled_at":1791194372475} +{"id":10373,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/economic-analysis-safe-harbor-blockchain-applications-defi","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"An economic analysis of safe harbor for blockchain applications - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nAn economic analysis of safe harbor for blockchain applications\nMiles Jennings, Scott Walker, and Aiden Slavin\n04.07.26\n\nTags & Share Tags\nDeFi\npolicy & regulation\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nBringing traditional securities on-chain is a central focus of this Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Recognizing the potential of tokenization, the Commission under Chairman Atkins, launched Project Crypto 9 months ago with the aim of updating American securities rules and regulations. The goal is to enable the nation’s financial markets to move onchain, which allows for instant settlement, 24/7 markets, reduced costs, and more.\n\nBut to unleash the full potential of tokenized securities, innovators and investors need clear rules of the road for blockchain applications that allow users to transact in tokenized securities on a peer to peer basis, without intermediaries.\n\nSo we and DeFi Education Fund submitted a safe harbor proposal last August to the SEC outlining the criteria for when such blockchain-based applications — the neutral software programs that enable users to interact with public blockchain networks and smart contract protocols — should be excluded from registration requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The approach outlines how such applications benefit market participants while advancing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.\n\nToday, Vanderbilt Professor Craig Lewis — former SEC Chief Economist and Director of the Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis — submitted to the SEC his economic analysis of our safe harbor for software proposal. Lewis’ analysis focuses specifically on the proposal, but more broadly conveys the economic costs and benefits of tokenized securities — thus providing valuable insights about the potential of blockchain technology to revolutionize the legacy financial system. While a16z provided financial support for this work, Professor Lewis applied his own rigorous methodology in assessing how to measure the benefits and costs of the proposal.\n\nAs part of his analysis, Lewis identifies 5 benefits that the safe harbor could enable qualifying apps to unlock:\n\nAtomic settlement — which eliminates the counterparty credit risks associated with delayed settlement windows, and also mitigates the systemic danger of a central counterparty failure cascading throughout the broader market.\n\nOnchain transparency — which replaces opaque proprietary ledgers with a more publicly verifiable record of every transaction.\n\nContinuous 24/7 trading of tokenized securities — which expands price discovery and liquidity beyond the geographic and temporal limits of traditional exchange hours.\n\nConcrete direct cost reductions driven by smart contracts — which automate corporate actions like dividend payments and certain compliance functions. He points out that research from Ripple and BCG, for example, estimates that tokenizing an investment-grade bond could cut operating costs by 40 to 60% relative to traditional issuance.\n\nLower barriers to entry — which could result in new developers exerting competitive pressure on traditional finance institutions, forcing those intermediaries to innovate in a manner that ultimately benefits users.\n\nLewis also outlines these 4 potential costs of the safe harbor proposal:\n\nEroding investor protections. Lewis performs a side-by-side analysis of traditional broker-dealers and qualifying apps, concluding that the proposal’s narrow scope preserves investor protections by limiting eligibility to software that does not create the risks these regulations are designed to mitigate. However, Lewis flags certain novel risks; for example, while the broker-dealer regulatory framework enables intermediaries to freeze assets and reverse transactions as an investor protection mechanism, eligible apps — by design — do not possess this capacity.\n\nRegulatory arbitrage. Traditional broker-dealers could restructure themselves as qualifying apps to escape certain obligations. However, Lewis ultimately avers that the operational machinations required for a traditional intermediary to meet the proposal’s strict criteria would be prohibitive.\n\nTokenized securities. Expanding tokenized securities trading risks fragmenting the market and potential systemic spillovers, with leverage in DeFi protocols potentially transmitting stress to traditional markets. However, Lewis recommends benchmarking this risk against the dark pools and off-exchange venues that already fragment the traditional securities market today, and notes that decentralized market structures have consistently exhibited operational resiliency, even during periods of high volatility.\n\nDeFi trading costs for retail. Lewis points out that variable gas fees, price slippage, and smart contract code vulnerabilities are all real risks, but argues that a proper comparison must examine those relative to the embedded costs that already exist in traditional finance. He also notes that DeFi fees are declining sharply. In this regard, Lewis observes that Ethereum’s Dencun upgrade, for example, reduced the cost for L2s to post data to mainnet by over 90%.\n\nLewis observes more broadly in his analysis that “costs associated with DeFi trading are also expected to go down over time”, given specific technical developments. This is important because some cite costs and scaling limits as preventing DeFi from processing significant trading volumes today. However, those assumptions are often based on historical data, rather than on blockchain performance (including data availability) as tied to the current trajectory of technical developments.\n\nBeyond technical readiness, our safe harbor proposal is opt-in — essentially creating more options for how investors could access assets.\n\nFinally, Lewis’ analysis was scoped specifically to front-end applications that satisfy the safe harbor proposal’s eligibility criteria, emphasizing that applications meeting the following four criteria are passive software interfaces that, by design, do not create the risks the Exchange Act was built to address. Specifically, that they have:\n\nNon-custodial architecture\n\nNo discretionary trade execution\n\nNo solicitation or investment recommendations\n\nExclusive integration with genuinely decentralized protocols (with certain allowances for protocols pursuing decentralization in good faith)\n\nLewis further emphasizes that the relevant comparison is not between those blockchain apps and some idealized market structure, but between them and the existing broker-dealer system, with all its embedded and often invisible costs: DTC fees, clearing and settlement charges, intermediary markups, insurance buffers, and others.\n\nUltimately, Lewis concludes that: “Should the SEC conduct a formal economic analysis of these costs and benefits, it would likely find that the Safe Harbor would facilitate the realization of the significant economic benefits inherent to tokenized securities.”\n\n* * *\n\nTokenization “could transform the financial system as we know it”, as Chairman Atkins has observed — and the Commission has supported that vision with Project Crypto, landmark joint staff guidance, and more.\n\nBut realizing the full potential of tokenized securities also requires clear and effective rules for the blockchain applications that enable investors to transact in these assets on a peer to peer basis without intermediaries. This is what our safe harbor proposal aims to provide and, as Professor Lewis’ analysis confirms, the overall economic case for adopting it is compelling. There are tradeoffs, but the benefits should outweigh any costs.\n\nProfessor Lewis has drawn the map. We encourage the Commission to follow it.\n\nAcknowledgements: Thank you to Amanda Tuminelli, Bill Hinman, Michele Korver, David Sverdlov for their contributions to the original safe harbor proposal, and other helpful feedback.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nYou should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":2618,"crawled_at":1791194378259} +{"id":10374,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/governance","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound III Docs | Governance","text":"Compound III\nInterest Rates\nCollateral & Borrowing\nLiquidation\nAccount Management\nProtocol Rewards\nERC-4626 Wrapper\nGovernance\nHelper Functions\n\nGovernance\nSet Comet Factory\nSet Governor\nSet Pause Guardian\nPause Protocol Functionality\nIs Supply Paused\nIs Transfer Paused\nIs Withdraw Paused\nIs Absorb Paused\nIs Buy Paused\nSet Base Token Price Feed\nSet Extension Delegate\nSet Borrow Kink\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (Low)\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (High)\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (Base)\nSet Supply Kink\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (Low)\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (High)\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (Base)\nSet Store Front Price Factor\nSet Base Tracking Supply Speed\nSet Base Tracking Borrow Speed\nSet Base Minimum For Rewards\nSet Borrow Minimum\nSet Target Reserves\nAdd a New Asset\nUpdate an Existing Asset\nUpdate Asset Price Feed\nUpdate Borrow Collateral Factor\nUpdate Liquidation Collateral Factor\nUpdate Liquidation Factor\nSet Asset Supply Cap\nERC-20 Approve Manager Address\nTransfer Governor\nWithdraw Reserves\n\nGovernance\nCompound III is a decentralized protocol that is governed by holders and delegates of COMP. Governance allows the community to propose, vote, and implement changes through the administrative smart contract functions of the Compound III protocol. For more information on the Governor and Timelock see the original governance section.\nAll instances of Compound III are controlled by the Timelock contract which is the same administrator of the Compound v2 protocol. The governance system has control over each proxy, the Configurator implementation, the Comet factory, and the Comet implementation.\nEach time an immutable parameter is set via governance proposal, a new Comet implementation must be deployed by the Comet factory. If the proposal is approved by the community, the proxy will point to the new implementation upon execution.\nTo set specific protocol parameters in a proposal, the Timelock must call all of the relevant set methods on the Configurator contract, followed by deployAndUpgradeTo on the CometProxyAdmin contract.\nMulti-chain Governance\nThe Compound III protocol can be deployed on any EVM chain. The deployment must have access to on-chain asset prices and governance messages passed from Ethereum Mainnet. The Timelock on Mainnet is the administrator of all community sanctioned instances of Compound III.\nEach deployment outside of Mainnet needs to have a Bridge Receiver and Local Timelock contract on its chain. Governance proposals executed on Mainnet must be read by the chain’s bridge and published to the Bridge Receiver. Local Timelocks have an additional delay before Comet admin functions can be called via proposal execution.\nCompound III instance initializations are logged on-chain using the ENS text record system. The text record can only be modified by a Governance proposal. It can be viewed at v3-additional-grants.compound-community-licenses.eth when the browser network is set to Ethereum Mainnet.\nSet Comet Factory\nThis function sets the official contract address of the Comet factory. The only acceptable caller is the Governor.\nConfigurator\nfunction setFactory(address cometProxy, address newFactory) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewFactory: The address of the new Comet contract factory.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Governor\nThis function sets the official contract address of the Compound III protocol Governor for subsequent proposals.\nConfigurator\nfunction setGovernor(address cometProxy, address newGovernor) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewGovernor: The address of the new Compound III Governor.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Pause Guardian\nThis function sets the official contract address of the Compound III protocol pause guardian. This address has the power to pause supply, transfer, withdraw, absorb, and buy collateral operations within Compound III.\nCOMP token-holders designate the Pause Guardian address, which is held by the Community Multi-Sig.\nConfigurator\nfunction setPauseGuardian(address cometProxy, address newPauseGuardian) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewPauseGuardian: The address of the new pause guardian.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nPause Protocol Functionality\nThis function pauses the specified protocol functionality in the event of an unforeseen vulnerability. The only addresses that are allowed to call this function are the Governor and the Pause Guardian.\nComet\nfunction pause(\nbool supplyPaused,\nbool transferPaused,\nbool withdrawPaused,\nbool absorbPaused,\nbool buyPaused\n) override external\n\nsupplyPaused: Enables or disables all accounts’ ability to supply assets to the protocol.\ntransferPaused: Enables or disables all account’s ability to transfer assets within the protocol.\nwithdrawPaused: Enables or disables all account’s ability to withdraw assets from the protocol.\nabsorbPaused: Enables or disables protocol absorptions.\nbuyPaused: Enables or disables the protocol’s ability to sell absorbed collateral.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nIs Supply Paused\nThis function returns a boolean indicating whether or not the protocol supply functionality is presently paused.\nComet\nfunction isSupplyPaused() override public view returns (bool)\n\nRETURN: A boolean value of whether or not the protocol functionality is presently paused.\nIs Transfer Paused\nThis function returns a boolean indicating whether or not the protocol transfer functionality is presently paused.\nComet\nfunction isTransferPaused() override public view returns (bool)\n\nRETURN: A boolean value of whether or not the protocol functionality is presently paused.\nIs Withdraw Paused\nThis function returns a boolean indicating whether or not the protocol withdraw functionality is presently paused.\nComet\nfunction isWithdrawPaused() override public view returns (bool)\n\nRETURN: A boolean value of whether or not the protocol functionality is presently paused.\nIs Absorb Paused\nThis function returns a boolean indicating whether or not the protocol absorb functionality is presently paused.\nComet\nfunction isAbsorbPaused() override public view returns (bool)\n\nRETURN: A boolean value of whether or not the protocol functionality is presently paused.\nIs Buy Paused\nThis function returns a boolean indicating whether or not the protocol’s selling of absorbed collateral functionality is presently paused.\nComet\nfunction isBuyPaused() override public view returns (bool)\n\nRETURN: A boolean value of whether or not the protocol functionality is presently paused.\nSet Base Token Price Feed\nThis function sets the official contract address of the price feed of the protocol base asset.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBaseTokenPriceFeed(address cometProxy, address newBaseTokenPriceFeed) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewBaseTokenPriceFeed: The address of the new price feed contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Extension Delegate\nThis function sets the official contract address of the protocol’s Comet extension delegate. The methods in CometExt.sol are able to be called via the same proxy as Comet.sol.\nConfigurator\nfunction setExtensionDelegate(address cometProxy, address newExtensionDelegate) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewExtensionDelegate: The address of the new extension delegate contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Borrow Kink\nThis function sets the borrow interest rate utilization curve kink for the Compound III base asset.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBorrowKink(address cometProxy, uint64 newKink) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewKink: The new kink parameter.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (Low)\nThis function sets the borrow interest rate slope low bound in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBorrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow(address cometProxy, uint64 newSlope) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope low bound as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (High)\nThis function sets the borrow interest rate slope high bound in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBorrowPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh(address cometProxy, uint64 newSlope) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope high bound as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Borrow Interest Rate Slope (Base)\nThis function sets the borrow interest rate slope base in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBorrowPerYearInterestRateBase(address cometProxy, uint64 newBase) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope base as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Supply Kink\nThis function sets the supply interest rate utilization curve kink for the Compound III base asset.\nConfigurator\nfunction setSupplyKink(address cometProxy, uint64 newKink) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewKink: The new kink parameter.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (Low)\nThis function sets the supply interest rate slope low bound in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setSupplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeLow(address cometProxy, uint64 newSlope) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope low bound as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (High)\nThis function sets the supply interest rate slope high bound in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setSupplyPerYearInterestRateSlopeHigh(address cometProxy, uint64 newSlope) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope high bound as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Supply Interest Rate Slope (Base)\nThis function sets the supply interest rate slope base in the approximate amount of seconds in one year.\nConfigurator\nfunction setSupplyPerYearInterestRateBase(address cometProxy, uint64 newBase) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewSlope: The slope base as an unsigned integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Store Front Price Factor\nThis function sets the fraction of the liquidation penalty that goes to buyers of collateral instead of the protocol. This factor is used to calculate the discount rate of collateral for sale as part of the account absorption process. The rate is a decimal scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nConfigurator\nfunction setStoreFrontPriceFactor(address cometProxy, uint64 newStoreFrontPriceFactor) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewStoreFrontPriceFactor: The new price factor as an unsigned integer expressed as a decimal scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Base Tracking Supply Speed\nThis function sets the rate at which base asset supplier accounts accrue rewards.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBaseTrackingSupplySpeed(address cometProxy, uint64 newBaseTrackingSupplySpeed) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewBaseTrackingSupplySpeed: The rate as an APR expressed as a decimal scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Base Tracking Borrow Speed\nThis function sets the rate at which base asset borrower accounts accrue rewards.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBaseTrackingBorrowSpeed(address cometProxy, uint64 newBaseTrackingBorrowSpeed) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewBaseTrackingBorrowSpeed: The rate as an APR expressed as a decimal scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Base Minimum For Rewards\nThis function sets the minimum amount of base asset supplied to the protocol in order for accounts to accrue rewards.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBaseMinForRewards(address cometProxy, uint104 newBaseMinForRewards) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewBaseMinForRewards: The amount of base asset scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Borrow Minimum\nThis function sets the minimum amount of base token that is allowed to be borrowed.\nConfigurator\nfunction setBaseBorrowMin(address cometProxy, uint104 newBaseBorrowMin) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nsetBaseBorrowMin: The minimum borrow as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Target Reserves\nThis function sets the target reserves amount. Once the protocol reaches this amount of reserves of base asset, liquidators cannot buy collateral from the protocol.\nConfigurator\nfunction setTargetReserves(address cometProxy, uint104 newTargetReserves) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewTargetReserves: The amount of reserves of base asset as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nAdd a New Asset\nThis function adds an asset to the protocol through governance.\nConfigurator\nfunction addAsset(address cometProxy, AssetConfig calldata assetConfig) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nassetConfig: The configuration that is added to the array of protocol asset configurations.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nUpdate an Existing Asset\nThis function modifies an existing asset’s configuration parameters.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAsset(address cometProxy, AssetConfig calldata newAssetConfig) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nnewAssetConfig: The configuration that is modified in the array of protocol asset configurations. All parameters are overwritten.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nUpdate Asset Price Feed\nThis function updates the price feed contract address for a specific asset.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAssetPriceFeed(address cometProxy, address asset, address newPriceFeed) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nasset: The address of the underlying asset smart contract.\nnewPriceFeed: The address of the new price feed smart contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nUpdate Borrow Collateral Factor\nThis function updates the borrow collateral factor for an asset in the protocol.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address cometProxy, address asset, uint64 newBorrowCF) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nasset: The address of the underlying asset smart contract.\nnewBorrowCF: The collateral factor as an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nUpdate Liquidation Collateral Factor\nThis function updates the liquidation collateral factor for an asset in the protocol.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAssetLiquidateCollateralFactor(address cometProxy, address asset, uint64 newLiquidateCF) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nasset: The address of the underlying asset smart contract.\nnewLiquidateCF: The collateral factor as an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nUpdate Liquidation Factor\nThis function updates the liquidation factor for an asset in the protocol.\nThe liquidation factor is a decimal value that is between 0 and 1 (inclusive) which determines the amount that is paid out to an underwater account upon liquidation.\nThe following is an example of the liquidation factor’s role in a Compound III liquidation:\nAn underwater account has supplied $100 of WBTC as collateral. If the WBTC liquidation factor is 0.9, the user will receive $90 of the base asset when a liquidator triggers an absorption of their account.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAssetLiquidationFactor(address cometProxy, address asset, uint64 newLiquidationFactor) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nasset: The address of the underlying asset smart contract.\nnewLiquidationFactor: The factor as an integer that represents the decimal value scaled up by 10 ^ 18.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSet Asset Supply Cap\nThis function sets the maximum amount of an asset that can be supplied to the protocol. Supply transactions will revert if the total supply would be greater than this number as a result.\nConfigurator\nfunction updateAssetSupplyCap(address cometProxy, address asset, uint128 newSupplyCap) external\n\ncometProxy: The address of the Comet proxy to set the configuration for.\nasset: The address of the underlying asset smart contract.\nnewSupplyCap: The amount of the asset as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nERC-20 Approve Manager Address\nThis function sets the Comet contract’s ERC-20 allowance of an asset for a manager address. It can only be called by the Governor.\nIn the event of a governance attack, an attacker could create a proposal that leverages this function to give themselves permissions to freely transfer all ERC-20 tokens out of the Comet contract.\nHypothetically, the attacker would need to either acquire supreme voting weight or add a malicious step in an otherwise innocuous and popular proposal and the community would fail to detect before approving.\nComet\nfunction approveThis(address manager, address asset, uint amount) override external\n\nmanager: The address of a manager account that has its allowance modified.\nasset: The address of the asset’s smart contract.\namount: The amount of the asset approved for the manager expressed as an integer.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nTransfer Governor\nThis function changes the address of the Configurator’s Governor.\nConfigurator\nfunction transferGovernor(address newGovernor) external\n\nnewGovernor: The address of the new Governor for Configurator.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nWithdraw Reserves\nThis function allows governance to withdraw base token reserves from the protocol and send them to a specified address. Only the Governor address may call this function.\nComet\nfunction withdrawReserves(address to, uint amount) external\n\nto: The address of the recipient of the base asset tokens.\namount: The amount of the base asset to send scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.","tokens":4791,"crawled_at":1791194379495} +{"id":10375,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/references","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"References | Sui Documentation","text":"Reference documentation for the Sui platform, including API specifications (gRPCgRPC APIReplaces JSON-RPC on full nodes for data access., GraphQL), CLI commands, MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. framework modulesModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects., SDK guides, and IDE tooling.\n\nWhat does Sui reference documentation cover?​\n\nSui reference documentation covers the low-level details you need when building on Sui. Use these references to look up exact method signatures, CLI flags, Move module definitions, and API schemas without reading through conceptual guides.\n\nThe reference documentation includes:\n\nAPI specifications: gRPC and GraphQL RPCGraphQL RPCA lightweight GraphQL RPC service. schemas for querying chain state, submitting transactions, and subscribing to events.\n\nCLI commands: Full flag and argument listings for the Sui CLI, including client, keytool, move, and validator subcommands.\n\nMove framework modules: Module-level documentation for the Sui Move framework, including types, functions, and constants defined in sui-framework and move-stdlib.\n\nSDKs: GitHub repos for the Sui TypeScript SDK, Rust SDK, and Sui dApp Kit.\n\nIDE tooling: Setup and configuration details for Move language support in editors such as VS Code.\n\nHow to use these references​\n\nFind the section that matches your current task and go directly to the relevant entry.\n\nFor example, if you want to query owned objects for an addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. using the GraphQL RPC, you look up the address query in the GraphQL reference, check the available fields on the ObjectConnection type, and construct your query:\n\nquery {\naddress(address: \"0xYOUR_ADDRESS\") {\nobjects {\nnodes {\nobjectId\ndigest\ntype {\nrepr\n}\n}\n}\n}\n}\n\nIf you want to publish a Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. from the CLI, you look up the client publish command to confirm required flags:\n\nsui client publish --gas-budget 100000000\n\nWhich reference should you use?​\n\nThe right reference depends on how your application interacts with Sui:\n\nUse the GraphQL RPC reference when querying historical or current chain state from a frontend or backend service.\n\nUse the CLI reference when scripting deployments, managing keys, or running administrative commands.\n\nUse the Move framework reference when writing smart contracts and looking up built-in types or functions.\n\nUse the SDK reference when integrating Sui into a TypeScript or Rust application.\n\nReferences\nReference documentation for the Sui platform, including API specifications (gRPC, GraphQL), CLI commands, Move framework modules, SDK guides, and IDE tooling.\n→\nSui RPC\nIn this section\nGraphQL\ngRPC\nRPC Best Practices\nLegacy (to be archived)\n\n→\nSui CLI\nIn this section\nSui CLI Cheat Sheet\nSui Client CLI\nSui Client PTB CLI\nSui CLI Completions\nSui Keytool CLI\nSui External Signers CLI\n+ 4 more\n\n→\nSui IDE Support\nIn this section\nMove Analyzer\nMove Trace Debugger\n\n→\nSui SDKs\nIn this section\nSDK Comparison\nTypeScript SDK v1 -> v2 Migration Guide\ndApp Kit\nRust SDK\nLegacy Rust SDK\nTypeScript SDK\n+ 1 more\n\n→\nMove\nIn this section\nFramework\nPackages\nThe Move Book\nThe Move Reference\n\n→\nPTB Commands\nReference for all PTB commands — TransferObjects, SplitCoins, MergeCoins, MakeMoveVec, MoveCall, Publish, and Upgrade — including each command's form, arguments, return type, and conceptual Move signature.\n→\nObject Display V2 Syntax\nLearn how to use Display V2 format strings to render Sui Move object values into human-readable strings, JSON, or encoded representations.\n→\nRelease Notes\nReview what changed in each Sui release, including protocol upgrades, framework changes, GraphQL updates, and indexing improvements.\n→\nGlossary\nLearn about terminology specific to Sui.\n→\nOpen Zeppelin: Access Library\n↗\nOpen Zeppelin: Math Library\n↗\nAwesome Sui\nA curated list of awesome developer tools and infrastructure projects within the Sui ecosystem.\n→\nAwesome Sui Gaming\nA curated list of awesome gaming projects and developer tools within the Sui ecosystem.\n→\nGaming on Sui\nSui offers features like dynamic NFTs, Kiosk, soulbound assets, and onchain randomness to provide builders with the tools to create immersive, transparent, and fair gaming experiences.\n→\nContribute\nIn this section\nSui Environment Setup\nContribute to Sui Repositories\nSubmit a SIP\nCode of Conduct\nStyle Guide\nMDX Components\n+ 1 more\n\n→\n\nWhat does Sui reference documentation cover?\nHow to use these references\nWhich reference should you use?\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1146,"crawled_at":1791194393447} +{"id":10376,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/liquidation","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound III Docs | Liquidation","text":"Compound III\nInterest Rates\nCollateral & Borrowing\nLiquidation\nAccount Management\nProtocol Rewards\nERC-4626 Wrapper\nGovernance\nHelper Functions\n\nLiquidation\nLiquidatable Accounts\nAbsorb\nBuy Collateral\nAsk Price\nLiquidator Points\nProtocol Reserves\nTarget Reserves\n\nLiquidation\nLiquidation is determined by liquidation collateral factors, which are separate and higher than borrow collateral factors (used to determine initial borrowing capacity), which protects borrowers & the protocol by ensuring a price buffer for all new positions. These also enable governance to reduce borrow collateral factors without triggering the liquidation of existing positions.\nWhen an account’s borrow balance exceeds the limits set by liquidation collateral factors, it is eligible for liquidation. A liquidator (a bot, contract, or user) can call the absorb function, which relinquishes ownership of the accounts collateral, and returns the value of the collateral, minus a penalty (liquidationFactor), to the user in the base asset. The liquidated user has no remaining debt, and typically, will have an excess (interest earning) balance of the base asset.\nEach absorption is paid for by the protocol’s reserves of the base asset. In return, the protocol receives the collateral assets. If the remaining reserves are less than a governance-set target, liquidators are able to buy the collateral at a discount using the base asset, which increases the protocol’s base asset reserves.\nLiquidatable Accounts\nThis function returns true if the account passed to it has negative liquidity based on the liquidation collateral factor. A return value of true indicates that the account is presently liquidatable.\nComet\nfunction isLiquidatable(address account) public view returns (bool)\n\naccount: The account to examine liquidatability.\nRETURNS: Returns true if the account is presently able to be liquidated.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nbool isLiquidatable = comet.isLiquidatable(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst isLiquidatable = await comet.callStatic.isLiquidatable('0xAccount');\n\nAbsorb\nThis function can be called by any address to liquidate an underwater account. It transfers the account’s debt to the protocol account, decreases cash reserves to repay the account’s borrows, and adds the collateral to the protocol’s own balance. The caller has the amount of gas spent noted. In the future, they could be compensated via governance.\nComet\nfunction absorb(address absorber, address[] calldata accounts)\n\nabsorber: The account that is issued liquidator points during successful execution.\naccounts: An array of underwater accounts that are to be liquidated.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\ncomet.absorb(0xMyAddress, [ 0xUnderwaterAddress ]);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait comet.absorb('0xMyAddress', [ '0xUnderwaterAddress' ]);\n\nBuy Collateral\nThis function allows any account to buy collateral from the protocol, at a discount from the Price Feed’s price, using base tokens. A minimum collateral amount should be specified to indicate the maximum slippage acceptable for the buyer.\nThis function can be used after an account has been liquidated and there is collateral available to be purchased. Doing so increases protocol reserves. The amount of collateral available can be found by calling the Collateral Balance function. The price of the collateral can be determined by using the quoteCollateral function.\nComet\nfunction buyCollateral(address asset, uint minAmount, uint baseAmount, address recipient) external\n\nasset: The address of the collateral asset.\nminAmount: The minimum amount of collateral tokens that are to be received by the buyer, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the collateral asset’s contract.\nbaseAmount: The amount of base tokens used to buy collateral scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nrecipient: The address that receives the purchased collateral.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\ncomet.buyCollateral(0xAssetAddress, 5e18, 5e18, 0xRecipient);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait comet.buyCollateral('0xAssetAddress', 5e18, 5e18, '0xRecipient');\n\nAsk Price\nIn order to repay the borrows of absorbed accounts, the protocol needs to sell the seized collateral. The Ask Price is the price of the asset to be sold at a discount (configured by governance). This function uses the price returned by the protocol’s price feed. The discount of the asset is derived from the StoreFrontPriceFactor and the asset’s LiquidationFactor using the following formula.\nDiscountFactor = StoreFrontPriceFactor * (1e18 - Asset.LiquidationFactor)\n\nComet\nfunction quoteCollateral(address asset, uint baseAmount) public view returns (uint)\n\naddress: The address of the asset which is being quoted.\namount: The amount of the base asset used to purchase discounted collateral, as an integer, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nRETURN: The amount of collateral asset that can be purchased using the base asset, as an integer, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the collateral asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint askPrice = comet.quoteCollateral(0xERC20Address, 10000000000);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst askPrice = await comet.callStatic.quoteCollateral('0xERC20Address', 1000000);\n\nLiquidator Points\nThe protocol keeps track of the successful executions of absorb by tallying liquidator “points” and gas the liquidator has spent.\nComet\nmapping(address => LiquidatorPoints) public liquidatorPoints;\n\naddress: The address of the liquidator account.\nRETURN: A struct containing the stored data pertaining to the liquidator account.\nnumAbsorbs: A Solidity uint32 of the number of times absorb was successfully called.\nnumAbsorbed: A Solidity uint64 of the number of accounts successfully absorbed by the protocol as a result of the liquidators call to the absorb function.\napproxSpend: A Solidity uint128 of the sum of all gas spent by the liquidator that has called the absorb function.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nLiquidatorPoints pointsData = comet.liquidatorPoints(0xLiquidatorAddress);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst [ numAbsorbs, numAbsorbed, approxSpend ] = await comet.callStatic.liquidatorPoints('0xLiquidatorAddress');\n\nReserves\nReserves are a balance of the base or collateral asset, stored internally in the protocol, which automatically protect users from bad debt. Reserves can also be withdrawn or used through the governance process.\nReserves are generated in two ways: the difference in interest paid by borrowers, and earned by suppliers of the base asset, accrue as reserves into the protocol. Second, the liquidation process uses, and can add to, protocol reserves based on the target reserve level set by governance.\nGet Base Asset Reserves\nThis function returns the amount of protocol reserves for the base asset as an integer.\nComet\nfunction getReserves() public view returns (int)\n\nRETURNS: The amount of base asset stored as reserves in the protocol as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint reserves = comet.getReserves();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst reserves = await comet.callStatic.getReserves();\n\nGet Collateral Asset Reserves\nThis function returns the amount of protocol reserves for the specified collateral asset as an integer.\nComet\nfunction getCollateralReserves(address asset) public view returns (uint)\n\nRETURNS: The amount of collateral asset stored as reserves in the protocol as an unsigned integer scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the collateral asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint reserves = comet.getCollateralReserves(0xCollateralAsset);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst reserves = await comet.callStatic.getCollateralReserves(collateralAssetAddress);\n\nTarget Reserves\nThis immutable value represents the target amount of reserves of the base token. If the protocol holds greater than or equal to this amount of reserves, the buyCollateral function can no longer be successfully called.\nComet\nfunction targetReserves() public view returns (uint)\n\nRETURN: The target reserve value of the base asset as an integer, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the base asset’s contract.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint targetReserves = comet.targetReserves();\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst targetReserves = await comet.callStatic.targetReserves();","tokens":2276,"crawled_at":1791194398319} +{"id":10377,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/steps-uk-drive-growth-protect-consumers","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"4 steps the UK can take to drive growth and protect consumers: Advancing effective cryptoasset regulation - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\n4 steps the UK can take to drive growth and protect consumers: Advancing effective cryptoasset regulation\nMiles Jennings and Aiden Slavin\n12.19.25\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nU.S. direction of travel U.S. direction of travel\n#1: Adopt a control-based decentralization framework\n#2: Calibrate disclosure requirements for network tokens\n#3: Introduce protections against market abuse\n#4: Align UK and U.S. approaches to stablecoin regulation\nTags\npolicy & regulation\nUK\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nThe global race to implement smart crypto regulation is accelerating. In recent months, the U.S. surged ahead, enacting a stablecoin bill and advancing market structure legislation — both with broad bipartisan support.\n\nAcross the Atlantic, the United Kingdom is defining its own role in shaping the future of cryptoassets and blockchain networks. New legislation introduces intermediary licensing for crypto exchanges, agents, and dealers, as well as bespoke disclosure and market abuse regimes for cryptoassets, creating consumer protection and transparency obligations. By next year, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) aims to finalize policy statements related to stablecoins, cryptoasset lending, staking, and more.\n\nWhile U.S. legislation — with its emphasis on consumer protection, regulatory clarity, and innovation — is aiming to set the global standard, the UK has a narrow but significant window to carve out a competitive position of its own. Roughly 12% of UK adults own or have owned crypto, an increase from just 4% in 2021. A recent economic analysis estimates that blockchain firms could contribute £40bn to the UK economy by 2035.\n\nProactive, effective cryptoasset regulation can ensure that London not only remains a hub for traditional finance but also becomes a center of responsible crypto innovation. Doing so can help realize the government’s number one mission — economic growth — by unlocking new opportunities for businesses and citizens.\n\nIn what follows, we provide an overview of U.S. crypto policy progress and propose four measures that the UK can enact to safeguard its citizens and support local blockchain businesses, while positioning itself as a leader in blockchain innovation for decades to come.\n\nU.S. direction of travel\n\nIn recent months, the U.S. has made considerable progress in the development of an effective regulatory framework for cryptoassets and blockchain systems. In July, the President signed the first substantive piece of U.S. crypto legislation into law, and the U.S. House of Representatives advanced a major “market structure” bill with broad bipartisan support. The GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act) sets out clear rules for stablecoins, while the U.S. House-passed CLARITY Act (Digital Asset Market Clarity Act) would establish a regulatory framework for blockchain systems.\n\nAs federal legislation comes online, U.S. regulators are also working to provide clarity. In August, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched “Project Crypto” to enable U.S. capital markets to move onchain. In a recent speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, SEC Chairman Atkins outlined the agency’s forthcoming cryptoasset taxonomy, defining common token types such as “digital collectibles” and “digital tools,” and specifying that in his opinion neither is a security.\n\nSignificantly, Chair Atkins’ taxonomy aligns with proposed U.S. legislation in its focus on “network tokens” (or “digital commodities” in the parlance of the CLARITY Act). As he put it, network tokens are “intrinsically linked to and derive their value from a programmatic operation of a crypto system that is ‘functional’ and ‘decentralized,’ rather than from the expectation of profits arising from the essential managerial efforts of others” and, as such, are not securities.\n\nEstablishing a fit-for-purpose token taxonomy and, in particular, clarifying rules for network tokens are crucial first steps in defining an effective regulatory regime for crypto. What makes network tokens unique among common token types is the way they accrue value. The network token ETH, for example, derives its value from the operation and utility of the Ethereum network, not from the efforts of a centralized company. Information about a company’s financial condition or management team is therefore not relevant to understanding ETH’s value or risks. By contrast, a share of Apple stock reflects exposure to the performance and decisions of a single company, making standard issuer-style disclosure essential.\n\nAs a result, network tokens can have similar trust dependencies and risks as financial instruments during early stages, when a project is still controlled, but then evolve into decentralized systems that eliminate information asymmetries through onchain transparency. Once control is eliminated, their risk profile aligns more closely with commodities such as gold or foreign exchange, rather than financial instruments.\n\nAs the U.S. makes progress via its legislative process and agency-led efforts, it is more important than ever that the UK advances its own crypto roadmap. Blockchain technology is inherently global. Decentralized protocols operate across jurisdictions, enabling users to engage in truly borderless peer-to-peer interactions without intermediaries. It is critical that leading nations like the UK put in place effective cryptoasset regulation. In what follows, we provide four recommendations to that end.\n\n#1: Adopt a control-based decentralization framework\n\nThe cornerstone of a modern cryptoasset regime should be a control-based decentralization framework — one that objectively determines when a blockchain system or network token is decentralized and, therefore, eliminates risks in a manner that justifies different regulatory treatment.\n\nBy operating in a transparent manner absent human control, decentralized systems can mitigate the risks addressed by many regulations. Recognizing this, a recent policy note from HM Treasury relating to the new UK cryptoasset regulatory regime and an FCA consultation paper acknowledge that systems that are truly decentralized warrant different regulatory treatment than centralized intermediaries.\n\nBut the government stops short of answering the critical question: What exactly makes a system “decentralized”? Without clear, objective criteria for defining decentralization, firms lack the certainty they need to build in the UK, and are likely to leave for jurisdictions offering clarity. Worse still, this gap risks harm by enabling bad actors to falsely claim that they are decentralized and seek to avoid regulation — at users’ peril.\n\nAcknowledging this gap, the FCA recently proposed to separately consult on future guidance regarding the application of the new UK regime to DeFi (DeFi Guidance) covering how decentralization and control will be considered based on the degree to which a cryptoasset activity is controlled by an identifiable entity. As the FCA progresses its work on this guidance, we recommend that it adopts a control-based decentralization framework. This framework would give UK regulators a test to implement the new cryptoassets regime (and in particular the DeFi Guidance) in a consistent and objective way that is merit- and technology-neutral. The key premises of this approach are that:\n\nDecentralization can be defined in terms of control, and measured according to specific, objective criteria.\n\nWhen control is eliminated, many risks are ameliorated, so the application of regulation should be limited; conversely, when control is present, risks persist, so traditional (but modernized) regulatory approaches should be used.\n\nThis framework is already gaining ground in the United States. The CLARITY Act (CLARITY) and the Responsible Financial Innovation Act (RFIA), proposed in the U.S. Senate, both advance a control-based decentralization framework.\n\nCLARITY utilizes its decentralization framework to accomplish three goals:\n\nIt establishes seven clear, measurable standards for assessing whether a blockchain system and its related network token are no longer under the control of an individual or coordinated group.\n\nIt uses a subset of these standards to assess whether a blockchain system is sufficiently disintermediated such that it should qualify for a safe harbor from the law’s intermediary regulatory regime.\n\nIt tailors its disclosure regime to account for the different disclosures that may be suitable depending on whether a project is controlled or not.\n\nCLARITY’s seven standards focus on three types of control:\n\nOperational Control: the ability for a party to unilaterally censor, or override network operations.\n\nEconomic Control: the ability for a party to retain the power to extract value from the system through privileged monetary rights, such as unvested cryptoasset allocations or privileged cryptoasset creation authorities.\n\nGovernance Control: the ability for a party or coordinated group to pass protocol governance proposals unilaterally or through offchain influence.\n\nIf adopted, we recommend that the FCA tailors its control-based decentralization framework according to applicable risks, implementing it in a manner that achieves the goals of specific components of the regulatory regime, without imposing unnecessary requirements.\n\nFor example, in differentiating the trust dependencies and risks of network tokens from ordinary financial instruments, risks arising from operational, economic, and governance control must all be considered. Where such risks are not eliminated, parties can leverage their control over the system to extract value, thereby materially impacting the potential value of the system’s network token. Said differently, whoever controls a system (a company, a blockchain system, etc.) controls the risks associated with that system and can unilaterally affect or structure its risk. As such, addressing user risks with respect to a specific network token requires the elimination of all of these mechanisms of control in relation to the token and its underlying blockchain system.\n\nFulfilling the goals of the intermediary licensing rules with respect to decentralized finance (DeFi), however, only requires eliminating operational control. As long as no individual or commonly orchestrated group retains the ability to control user funds or transactions or censor, or override network operations, then the risks that the intermediary licensing rules intend to address are eliminated. By contrast, whether a DeFi system has eliminated economic or governance control is not relevant, because neither impacts whether transactions through the system give rise to intermediary-related risks. Accordingly, with respect to DeFi, we believe that in its DeFi Guidance the FCA should provide clarity on the application of the intermediary licensing regime establishing that DeFi systems that have eliminated operational control do not involve a clear controlling person and, therefore, do not need to comply with the intermediary licensing rules.\n\nIn these respects, U.S. legislation provides helpful examples. Both CLARITY and RFIA apply transfer restrictions to limit the ability of a project’s insiders (founders, employees, investors, etc.) to engage in resales of a project’s network token until control over the network token and its underlying blockchain system has been eliminated. With regard to DeFi systems, both CLARITY and RFIA establish that DeFi systems are exempt from the intermediary licensing regimes proposed by these bills if operational control has been eliminated.\n\nIn implementing the cryptoasset regulatory regime, it is also critical that the FCA clarifies that the intermediary licensing regime does not apply to other participants and technologies that do not control user assets or transactions and, therefore, do not give rise to the risks that this regulation is intended to address. For example, developers and providers of non-custodial software that enables users to transact cryptoassets directly via blockchains do not pose intermediary risks. Because they do not possess operational control or control user assets or transactions, they cannot mishandle them, do not give rise to conflicts of interest, or otherwise pose any principal-agent risks that intermediary regulation is intended to mitigate. Therefore, in its DeFi Guidance, the FCA should clarify that these participants are not considered within the perimeter of this regime.\n\nIt is also crucial that the FCA clarifies that regulatory obligations do not apply to decentralized protocols, the blockchain networks and smart contract protocols by which cryptoasset transactions are securely recorded and verified without intermediaries. As we’ve elaborated elsewhere, it’s not technically feasible for such protocols to comply with regulations, which often require subjective determinations. Reconciling regulations that often differ — and in many cases conflict — across jurisdictions is likewise not possible for global decentralized protocols. Moreover, applying regulation to protocols is unnecessary to achieve the goals of the government’s regime, which can be realized by imposing rules on centralized intermediaries.\n\nThese goals can be achieved through two measures:\n\nIn its DeFi Guidance, the FCA should issue guidance on the application of the intermediary licensing regime to DeFi clarifying that the activities of technical service providers such as node operators, validators, and developers and providers of front-end interfaces or similar software who do not have control over user assets or transactions are not considered within the perimeter of this regime.\n\nThe FCA should clarify that protocols, themselves, are not subject to regulatory obligations.\n\nSetting out such a framework in FCA rules and guidance and applying it in the implementation of the regulatory regime would have benefits for entrepreneurs, regulators, and users.\n\nFor startups, it would provide a predictable, actionable compliance roadmap, incentivizing them to choose the UK. Projects could start centralized but understand the concrete steps necessary to achieve decentralization.\n\nFor regulators, it would form the basis of an objective, merit- and technology-neutral approach to implementing the cryptoasset regime.\n\nAnd for consumers, it would preserve protections while unlocking the core innovation of blockchain networks, decentralization, which benefits them in several ways.\n\n#2: Calibrate disclosure requirements for network tokens\n\nWhen it comes to network tokens, traditional issuer-centric disclosures — focused on information about management personnel, business strategy, or financial performance — only make sense while the underlying blockchain system is controlled by an issuer. In a control-based decentralization framework, once control is eliminated network tokens derive their value from the functioning of a decentralized network, which works transparently and without human control or intervention. All relevant information about network tokens that have eliminated control is therefore publicly available through onchain data. This is what makes network tokens fundamentally different from financial instruments. And this transparency and lack of control ensures that all market participants are equally situated with respect to the information needed to assess a given network token.\n\nImposing traditional disclosure rules on network tokens also runs the risk of undermining decentralization and misleading consumers. Such rules could effectively force these networks to forgo decentralization or to recentralize to comply with issuer-oriented requirements, and may mislead users by suggesting that there is a controller of the network token attempting to drive its value. Therefore, when it comes to network tokens, a calibrated disclosure regime would be most appropriate.\n\nAs such, disclosure requirements applied to these tokens should begin by being “issuer-centric” but evolve to being “network-centric” after control is eliminated, emphasizing relevant onchain information about network functionality, governance, and economic mechanisms. After all, with respect to network tokens, this transparently viewable information is ultimately what is relevant for investors and users. To effectively calibrate disclosure requirements for network tokens, we recommend the FCA issue guidance providing for a tailored set of disclosures for this unique type of cryptoasset. Such guidance aligns with the FCA’s proposal to require cryptoasset trading platforms to establish risk-based, objective admission criteria, and would help such firms determine what admission and disclosure criteria to require for network tokens.\n\n#3: Introduce protections against market abuse\n\nA control-based decentralization framework should also guide the design of the UK’s cryptoasset market abuse regime. Where control persists — particularly during the early stages of a project — risks of insiders exploiting information asymmetries remain high and warrant targeted safeguards.\n\nWhile blockchain systems can ultimately eliminate control through decentralization, many projects undergo transitional phases during which founders, developers, or early contributors retain privileged information and material token holdings. During these periods, there is a risk that insiders will leverage asymmetric information to the detriment of users. Bad actors could, for example, rapidly sell significant holdings after a token launches, taking advantage of inflated prices and then triggering sharp declines once supply floods the market. Such behavior harms investors, undermines consumer confidence, and ultimately stymies innovation.\n\nTo address this, the UK should incorporate insider restrictions into its forthcoming cryptoasset market abuse regime. Specifically, a mandatory post-listing lock-up period should apply to insiders (founders, staff, and early contributors) while a project remains controlled. This measure would prevent insiders from using their privileged position to manipulate token prices before a system achieves decentralization.\n\nAs discussed above, we believe CLARITY and RFIA provide helpful examples in this regard. By prohibiting insiders from selling before a project has achieved decentralization by eliminating control, CLARITY and RFIA mitigate market abuse risks.\n\nSuch restrictions should be proportionate and time-limited, phasing out once objective decentralization criteria are met. In line with this, the final statutory instrument includes a prohibition on insider dealing, and the FCA is proposing to require cryptoasset trading platforms, as part of their due diligence processes, to review and verify lock-up arrangements with respect to a given cryptoasset. While these are helpful steps, they do not go far enough. Introducing control-based restrictions on insiders would ensure that users are protected from information asymmetries arising during the early stages of a project’s development. By tying insider protections directly to control, regulators can ensure that users are protected from control-related risks while a project remains centralized and encourage projects to achieve decentralization.\n\nEmbedding these measures would uphold the fairness, transparency, and integrity of UK markets while signalling that the government is committed to responsible innovation.\n\n#4: Align UK and U.S. approaches to stablecoin regulation\n\nThe U.S. and the UK share more than robust capital markets and world leading financial institutions: Historic collaboration between the two nations has led to opportunities for investors, businesses, and market participants in both countries. In recognition of this, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met in London in September to launch the Transatlantic Taskforce for Markets of the Future. This partnership aims in part to identify ways to collaborate on digital asset policy, improving the connection between the two countries in the service of growth and competitiveness.\n\nWe believe a key area that this taskforce should focus on is stablecoin regulation. Though only a decade old, stablecoins now rival the world’s largest payment networks in transaction volume. Around the world, they will enable quicker, programmable payments and cut out rent-seeking middlemen.\n\nBoth nations are currently advancing stablecoin rules. In spring of 2025, the FCA published Consultation Paper 25/14 setting out a proposed regulatory framework for stablecoin issuance. Over the summer, President Trump signed into law the “Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins” (GENIUS) Act. Yet to date, the two countries have been largely siloed in their development of their stablecoin regimes.\n\nInternational collaboration is necessary to realize the full benefits of stablecoins. That’s because stablecoins are global by design. Treating them as solely domestic payment instruments risks fragmenting liquidity and undermining efficiencies. The UK, as a world leader in financial services, has the opportunity to position itself as a bridge jurisdiction for stablecoin innovation.\n\nThe U.S. GENIUS Act explicitly creates a pathway for reciprocity with “comparable jurisdictions,” allowing stablecoins to operate across borders where regulatory outcomes align. This approach recognizes that if the core risks — redemption, reserves, governance, illicit finance — are mitigated to equivalent standards, duplicative localization requirements or additional regulatory requirements treating such comparable foreign-issued stablecoins differently would be unnecessary. As it continues to develop its stablecoin regulatory framework, the UK should do the same.\n\nSpecifically, the U.S. and UK should establish a transatlantic corridor to enable their use in wholesale markets and payments as part of cross-border commerce, allowing both GBP- and USD-denominated stablecoins to interoperate. To support this, the two countries should align on regulatory approaches, promoting best practices and also pursuing mutual recognition with other jurisdictions to prevent duplicative or conflicting compliance requirements for well-regulated firms.\n\nTo do so, we suggest the UK ensures that its regulatory standards for UK-licensed stablecoin issuers are designed to be compatible and equivalent with those being developed in the U.S. under GENIUS. This would maximize the possibility of the UK being designated as a comparable jurisdiction by the U.S. And to the extent the UK proposes to treat foreign-issued stablecoins differently under its stablecoin regulatory framework, it should also embed a reciprocity mechanism in its stablecoin regime, one based on equivalence criteria for comparable foreign frameworks — covering reserve composition, audit standards, and redemption rights — and enable mutual recognition of trusted foreign issuers, such as U.S. firms under GENIUS.\n\nBy taking this approach the UK can become a stablecoin hub for global finance: an environment where a GBP- or USD-backed token can circulate seamlessly on both sides of the Atlantic. If it does not, issuers will concentrate activity in jurisdictions that provide reciprocal access, and the UK risks being sidelined as a secondary market.\n\n***\n\nThe UK is at a pivotal moment. Around the world, governments are racing to design frameworks that both harness and safely govern crypto innovation. With clear, forward-looking regulation, the UK can do more than keep pace — it can lead.\n\nIf implemented, these steps would give entrepreneurs confidence to build in Britain, attract investment and talent, and secure the country’s place as a global hub for responsible blockchain innovation — driving economic growth while setting a global standard for smart, effective cryptoasset regulation.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nYou should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":6772,"crawled_at":1791194399066} +{"id":10378,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-il-hedge-hook-automated-impermanent-loss-protection-for-uniswap-v4-lps/26059","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[RFC] IL Hedge Hook — Automated Impermanent Loss Protection for Uniswap v4 LPs - Requests for Comment - Uniswap Governance","text":"[RFC] IL Hedge Hook — Automated Impermanent Loss Protection for Uniswap v4 LPs\n\nRequests for Comment\n\nbelta_labs\n\nMarch 15, 2026, 8:09pm\n\n1\n\n[RFC] IL Hedge Hook — Automated Impermanent Loss Protection for Uniswap v4 LPs\n\nCategory: Request for Comment\n\nAuthor: JJ (BELTA Labs)\n\nStatus: Draft — seeking community feedback\n\nNo governance action required at this time.\n\nTL;DR\n\nBELTA is a Uniswap v4 Hook that automatically hedges LP impermanent loss. LP provides liquidity to a BELTA-hooked pool — everything else is automatic. Premium collection, IL calculation, payout settlement. No manual hedging. No trading desk. No additional UX.\n\n5.1-year backtest with real ETH prices (2020–2025, including COVID/LUNA/FTX):\n\nWithout Hedge\nWith BELTA\n\nLP annual return\n\n+4.0%/yr\n\n+7.8%/yr\n\nNet benefit\n\n—\n\n+3.7%/yr\n\nLP pays 12% of fee income as premium. Receives 35% of IL as reimbursement. Pays less than they get back.\n\n1. The Problem\n\n49.5% of Uniswap V3 LPs underperform HODL (Loesch et al., 2021). IL is the #1 reason LPs exit:\n\nIL → LP exits → TVL drops → slippage ↑ → volume ↓ → fee revenue ↓\n\nThis directly impacts Uniswap’s competitive position. And existing solutions don’t solve it:\n\nApproach\nWhy It Fails\n\nGamma / Arrakis\n\nAuto-rebalances range, but IL still occurs\n\nManual Perps hedge\n\nRequires active monitoring, rebalancing, funding management — trading desk level ops\n\nOptions (Opyn / Lyra)\n\nLow liquidity, expensive, expiry management\n\nWide range\n\nFee efficiency drops dramatically\n\nThe core issue: no solution converts IL hedging into zero-friction passive infrastructure.\n\nA $50K LP who wants to hedge with Perps today needs to: (1) monitor position in real-time, (2) calculate hedge ratio, (3) execute Perp trades, (4) manage funding rates, (5) rebalance periodically. This is operationally impractical for most LPs. BELTA automates the entire process inside a V4 Hook.\n\n2. Why Now — UNIfication + V4 Hooks\n\nTwo recent developments make this the right time:\n\nV4 Hooks make it technically possible. In V3, IL hedging required external monitoring of LP position NFTs, off-chain calculations, and manual Perp trades. V4’s Hook system allows direct on-chain detection of position creation, swaps, and exits — enabling fully automated IL settlement within a single contract. This protocol could not have existed before V4.\n\nUNIfication makes LP retention more urgent. With the recent UNIfication proposal turning on protocol fees (1/4 to 1/6 of LP fees), LPs now keep less of each trade. This compresses LP margins and increases the risk of attrition — making IL hedging infrastructure more valuable than ever. A protocol that improves LP net returns by +3.7%/yr directly counteracts the margin compression from protocol fees.\n\n3. How It Works\n\n3.1 V4 Hook Callbacks\n\nSingle Hook contract. Four callbacks. LP does nothing.\n\nCallback\nWhat Happens\n\nafterAddLiquidity\n\nPosition registered, entry price snapshotted, underwriting check applied\n\nbeforeSwap\n\nDynamic fee calculated (volatility → fee multiplier 1–4x)\n\nafterSwap\n\nPremium accumulated from fee delta, epoch IL tracker updated\n\nafterRemoveLiquidity\n\nIL calculated, 35% coverage applied, payout settled from Underwriter Pool\n\n3.2 Underwriter Pool — Who Pays the IL\n\nBELTA is not a magic trick — someone absorbs the IL. That someone is the Underwriter Pool: external capital providers who deposit into a vault and earn premium income + Aave yield in exchange for taking first-loss IL risk.\n\nThe pool is protected by three independent layers:\n\nLayer 1 — Dynamic Fee (V4 native): beforeSwap tracks EWMA volatility and adjusts fee multiplier (up to 4x). Premium income rises exactly when IL risk is highest. Self-balancing.\n\nLayer 2 — Aave Yield: Idle pool capital earns ~5%/yr on Aave/Morpho. Baseline income regardless of LP activity.\n\nLayer 3 — Perps Hedging: Protocol maintains ETH shorts during down markets. Backtest: 36% of raw IL absorbed by short profits. Funding cost: ~2%/yr.\n\n3.3 On-Chain Underwriting — Adverse Selection Defense\n\nNot every LP position is covered. The Hook enforces:\n\nNarrow range (<±10%): rejected — IL multiplier too extreme\n\nMinimum position: $10,000\n\nMinimum hold: 72 hours\n\nPosition age: 1 hour before coverage activates\n\nThis structurally excludes high-risk profiles that would drain the pool. Similar to how insurance companies don’t cover pre-existing conditions.\n\n3.4 Smart Contract Architecture\n\nContract\nRole\n\nBELTAHook.sol\n\nV4 Hook main — IL calculation, settlement logic, Dynamic Fee\n\nUnderwriterPool.sol\n\nERC-4626 Vault — pool management, premium distribution, cooldown\n\nEpochSettlement.sol\n\n7-day epoch IL settlement — Keeper automation, daily payout cap\n\nVolatilityOracle.sol\n\nEWMA volatility tracking — Dynamic Fee curve\n\nTreasuryModule.sol\n\nTreasury buffer management + Aave yield stacking\n\nHedgeManager.sol\n\nPerps delta-hedging — dYdX/GMX/Hyperliquid adapter (Phase 2+)\n\nBELTAToken.sol\n\nGovernance + revenue participation token\n\nxBELTA.sol\n\nStaking vault — exchange rate appreciation model\n\nAll contracts built with Foundry. Scaffold complete. Source: GitHub.\n\n4. How This Differs from DeFi Insurance\n\nThis is not Nexus Mutual or InsurAce. Those protocols failed at IL hedging because:\n\nTraditional DeFi Insurance\nBELTA\n\nCovered event\n\nVaguely defined (hacks, depegs) → claim disputes\n\nIL — mathematically exact, calculated on-chain\n\nClaim process\n\nGovernance vote, subjective\n\nAutomatic — no claims, no disputes\n\nAdverse selection\n\nNo defense → pool drained\n\nOn-chain underwriting rules\n\nPool backing\n\nToken-denominated → crash = insolvency\n\nStablecoin-based + Aave yield\n\nActuarial basis\n\nNo historical data\n\n5.1 years of backtested IL data\n\nThe fundamental difference: IL is a deterministic function of price change. It’s not a subjective event — it’s math. IL = 2√r/(1+r) - 1. This means coverage can be priced, backtested, and settled entirely on-chain with zero human judgment.\n\n5. Backtest — Real Data, Real Crashes\n\n270 weekly ETH/USD close prices (Etherscan/CoinGecko, Jan 2020 – Mar 2025). Not synthetic. Includes:\n\nCOVID crash (ETH -38.5% in one week)\n\nLUNA collapse (-31.9%)\n\nFTX (-22%)\n\nAug 2024 Yen carry trade (-22.2%)\n\nLP Economics ($10,000 position, 5.1 years):\n\nWithout Hedge\nWith BELTA\n\nFee income (gross)\n\n$11,536\n\n$11,536\n\nPremium paid (12% of fees)\n\n—\n\n-$1,384\n\nIL suffered\n\n-$9,464\n\n-$9,464\n\nIL reimbursed (35%)\n\n—\n\n+$3,312\n\nNet P&L\n\n+$2,072\n\n+$4,000\n\nAnnual return\n\n+4.0%/yr\n\n+7.8%/yr\n\nWhy does this work? IL concentrates in black swan weeks. LP pays $5.17/week in premium during quiet periods. Gets $50–$216 back in a single crash week. Over 5.1 years, the payouts exceed the premiums by $1,928.\n\nProtocol sustainability (Underwriter Pool):\n\nAt scale ($20M pool, $120M hedged TVL), with all three layers active:\n\nPool grows at +9.3%/yr (median, sliding window stress test)\n\nIL/Income ratio: 0.89x — income exceeds IL payouts\n\nStress tested through 2022 bear market (ETH -80% from ATH)\n\nFull backtest methodology in the whitepaper.\n\n6. Why This Matters for Uniswap\n\nLP retention is Uniswap’s core growth constraint.\n\nIf LPs earn more and stay longer → TVL deepens → slippage decreases → volume increases → protocol revenue grows. BELTA is direct infrastructure for this flywheel.\n\nSpecifically:\n\nV4 Hook native — no governance changes, no core protocol modifications needed\n\nDynamic Fee — one of the most practical beforeSwap use cases, directly aligned with Hook Design Lab focus areas\n\nMeasurable LP improvement — +3.7%/yr net benefit, backed by 5.1 years of real data\n\nProtocol fee synergy — as UNIfication protocol fees compress LP margins, IL hedging becomes more important for LP retention\n\nInfrastructure, not a competitor — BELTA makes Uniswap LPs more profitable. It doesn’t fork, replace, or compete with Uniswap. It’s a Hook.\n\n7. Security Considerations\n\nNo external oracle dependency — IL calculated from V4 internal tick data only. No Chainlink or TWAP manipulation risk for core IL settlement.\n\nCircuit breaker — 24h IL payouts capped at 30% of pool. Single payout capped at 5%.\n\nMultisig — protocol parameter changes require 3/5 signatures.\n\nAudit plan — 2 independent professional audits budgeted. First audit after testnet Phase 1 completion, second before mainnet pilot.\n\nEpoch-based settlement — IL settled in 7-day batches, not real-time. Prevents flash-loan-style exploits and reduces gas costs.\n\nCooldown periods — Treasury: 30-day unstaking + 2–5% early withdrawal fee. Senior: 7-day cooldown + daily 10% TVL withdrawal cap. Structurally prevents bank runs.\n\n8. Timeline\n\nMilestone\nTarget\nDeliverable\n\nM1 — Hook MVP\n\nMonth 1–3\n\nBELTAHook.sol testnet deployment (Sepolia/Unichain), 12+ epoch executions, IL accuracy report\n\nM2 — First Audit\n\nMonth 4–5\n\nSecurity audit report, vulnerability fixes, grant applications submitted\n\nM3 — Mainnet Pilot\n\nMonth 5+\n\nPool $100K live operation, 24 epochs real settlement data, VC pitching\n\nM4 — Open Market\n\nMonth 11+\n\nPool $10M, Treasury/Senior dual pool, BELTA token + xBELTA launch\n\nM5 — DEX Payment\n\nMonth 36+\n\nPool $20M+, DEX partnership negotiations\n\n9. Current Status\n\nItem\nStatus\n\nWhitepaper\n\nv5.6.0 — 33 pages, full mechanism design + backtest (EN)\n\nSmart contracts\n\n8 .sol files (Foundry), scaffold complete (GitHub)\n\nBacktest engine\n\nv5.0.1 — real ETH prices, sliding window stress test, sensitivity analysis\n\nWebsite\n\nofficial-belta.github.io/belta-labs\n\nNext milestone\n\nTestnet deployment (Sepolia / Unichain)\n\nEntity\n\nBELTA Labs Pte. Ltd. (Singapore)\n\n10. Looking for Feedback\n\nThis is an RFC — we’re here to get challenged, not to sell.\n\nSpecific questions for the community:\n\nMechanism design: Do you see a flaw in the premium/coverage structure? Is 12%/35% the right ratio?\n\nUnderwriter economics: Would you deposit into the Underwriter Pool at these expected returns?\n\nLP adoption: As an LP, would you use a BELTA-hooked pool? What would change your mind?\n\nTechnical: Any concerns about the Hook callback design or gas implications?\n\nUNIfication context: With protocol fees now live, does IL hedging infrastructure become more or less important for LP retention?\n\nMissing risks: What failure modes are we not seeing?\n\n11. Links\n\nWhitepaper: official-belta.github.io/belta-labs\n\nGitHub: github.com/Official-Belta/belta-labs\n\nDiscord: BELTA Labs Discord\n\nContact: JJ — available in this thread or via Discord DM\n\nWe’d rather hear “this won’t work because X” now than discover X after mainnet. All feedback welcome.\n\n4 Likes\n\neblack333\n\nJune 10, 2026, 7:07pm\n\n2\n\nCould the hedge intensity or premium/coverage ratio be regime-aware rather than only volatility-aware? In steady, fee-compensated regimes, LPs may not need as much protection, so a lower coverage level could improve net returns. In directional or shock-driven regimes, where fees are less likely to cover loss-versus-hold, higher hedge intensity may be more valuable.\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[RFC] - Hedge against Impermanent Loss\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n9\n\n2068\n\nSeptember 15, 2024\n\n[Temp Check] Activate v4 Protocol Fees\n\nTemperature Check\n\n24\n\n2782\n\nAugust 18, 2026\n\nTemperature Check - How to 10x LP earnings & TVL. A proposal for Uniswap v4\n\nTemperature Check\n\n3\n\n4441\n\nApril 3, 2023\n\nProposal to fund LP's protection project\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n7\n\n2648\n\nSeptember 22, 2020\n\n\"Fee Switch\" Design Space & Next Steps\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n73\n\n29139\n\nNovember 21, 2022","tokens":2842,"crawled_at":1791194399495} +{"id":10379,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/references/sui-api","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Sui RPC | Sui Documentation","text":"info\nJSON-RPC is disabled on Sui Foundation MainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets. full nodes. The shutoff took effect the week of July 27, 2026. Sui Foundation plans full decommission, including code removal, for mid-October 2026. If your application still calls JSON-RPC, migrate to gRPC or GraphQL RPC now. For a method mapping, decision criteria, and the remaining timeline, see the JSON-RPC Migration Guide.\n\nSee RPC and Data Providers for providers that serve gRPCgRPC APIReplaces JSON-RPC on full nodes for data access. and GraphQL RPCGraphQL RPCA lightweight GraphQL RPC service. endpoints. Contact a provider directly to request access. If your provider does not yet support these interfaces, ask them to enable support, or reach the Sui Foundation team on Discord, Telegram, or Slack for help.\n\ninfo\nRefer to Access Sui Data for an overview of options to access Sui network data.\n\nSuiJSON is a JSON-based format with restrictions that allow Sui to align JSON inputs more closely with MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. call arguments.\n\nThis table shows the restrictions placed on JSON types to make them SuiJSON compatible:\n\nJSONSuiJSON restrictionsMove type mapping\nNumber\nMust be unsigned integer\nu8, u16, u32, u64 (encoded as String), u128 (encoded as String), u256 (encoded as String)\n\nString\nNo restrictions\nVector, AddressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network., ObjectID, TypeTag, Identifier, Unsigned integer (256 bit max)\n\nBoolean\nNo restrictions\nBool\n\nArray\nMust be homogeneous JSON and of SuiJSON type\nVector\n\nNull\nNot allowed\nN/A\n\nObjectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui.\nNot allowed\nN/A\n\nType coercion reasoning​\n\nDue to the loosely typed nature of JSON/SuiJSON and the strongly typed nature of Move types, you sometimes need to overload SuiJSON types to represent multiple Move types.\n\nFor example, SuiJSON::Number can represent both u8 and u32. This means you have to coerce and sometimes convert types.\n\nWhich type you coerce depends on the expected Move type. For example, if the Move function expects a u8, you must have received a SuiJSON::Number with a value less than 256. More importantly, you have no way to easily express Move addresses in JSON, so you encode them as hex strings prefixed by 0x.\n\nAdditionally, Move supports u128 and u256 but JSON doesn't. As a result Sui allows encoding numbers as strings.\n\nType coercion rules​\n\nMove TypeSuiJSON RepresentationsValid ExamplesInvalid examples\nBool\nBool\ntrue, false\n\nu8\nSupports 3 formats: Unsigned number < 256. Decimal string with value < 256. One byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n7 \"70\" \"0x43\"\n-5: negative not allowed 3.9: float not allowed NaN: not allowed 300: U8 must be less than 256 \" 9\": Spaces not allowed in string \"9A\": Hex num must be prefixed with 0x \"0x09CD\": Too large for U8\n\nu16\nThree formats are supported Unsigned number < 65536. Decimal string with value < 65536. Two byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n712 \"570\" \"0x423\"\n-5: negative not allowed 3.9: float not allowed NaN: not allowed 98342300: U16 must be less than 65536 \" 19\": Spaces not allowed in string \"9EA\": Hex num must be prefixed with 0x \"0x049C1D\": Too large for U16\n\nu32\nThree formats are supported Unsigned number < 4294967296. Decimal string with value < 4294967296. One byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n9823247 \"987120\" \"0x4BADE93\"\n-5: negative not allowed 3.9: float not allowed NaN: not allowed 123456789123456: U32 must be less than 4294967296 \" 9\": Spaces not allowed in string \"9A\": Hex num must be prefixed with 0x \"0x3FF1FF9FFDEFF\": Too large for U32\n\nu64\nSupports two formats Decimal string with value < U64::MAX. Up to 8 byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n\"747944370\" \"0x2B1A39A15E\"\n123434: Although this is a valid U64 number, it must be encoded as a string\n\nu128\nTwo formats are supported Decimal string with value < U128::MAX. Up to 16 byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n\"74794734937420002470\" \"0x2B1A39A1514E1D8A7CE\"\n34: Although this is a valid U128 number, it must be encoded as a string\n\nu256\nTwo formats are supported Decimal string with value < U256::MAX. Up to 32 byte hex string prefixed with 0x.\n\"747947349374200024707479473493742000247\" \"0x2B1762FECADA39753FCAB2A1514E1D8A7CE\"\n123434: Although this is a valid U256 number, it must be encoded as a string 0xbc33e6e4818f9f2ef77d020b35c24be738213e64d9e58839ee7b4222029610de\n\nAddress\n32 byte hex string prefixed with 0x\n\"0xbc33e6e4818f9f2ef77d020b35c24be738213e64d9e58839ee7b4222029610de\"\n0xbc33: string too short bc33e6e4818f9f2ef77d020b35c24be738213e64d9e58839ee7b4222029610de: missing 0x prefix 0xG2B1A39A1514E1D8A7CE45919CFEB4FEE70B4E01: invalid hex char G\n\nObjectID\n32 byte hex string prefixed with 0x\n\"0x1b879f00b03357c95a908b7fb568712f5be862c5cb0a5894f62d06e9098de6dc\"\nSimilar to above\n\nIdentifier\nTypically used for moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects. and function names. Encoded as one of the following: A String whose first character is a letter and the remaining characters are letters, digits or underscore. A String whose first character is an underscore, and there is at least one further letter, digit or underscore\n\"function\", \"_function\", \"some_name\", \"____some_name\", \"Another\"\n\"_\": missing trailing underscore, digit or letter, \"8name\": cannot start with digit, \".function\": cannot start with period, \" \": cannot be empty space, \"func name\": cannot have spaces\n\nVector / Option\nHomogeneous vector of aforementioned types including nested vectors of primitive types (only \"flat\" vectors of ObjectIDs are allowed)\n[1,2,3,4]: simple U8 vector [[3,600],[],[0,7,4]]: nested U32 vector [\"0x2B1A39A1514E1D8A7CE45919CFEB4FEE\", \"0x2B1A39A1514E1D8A7CE45919CFEB4FEF\"]: ObjectID vector\n[1,2,3,false]: not homogeneous JSON [1,2,null,4]: invalid elements [1,2,\"7\"]: although Sui allows encoding numbers as strings meaning this array can evaluate to [1,2,7], the array is still ambiguous so it fails the homogeneity check.\n\nVector\nFor convenience, Sui allows: U8 vectors represented as UTF-8 (and ASCII) strings.\n\"√®ˆbo72 √∂†∆˚–œ∑π2ie\": UTF-8 \"abcdE738-2 _=?\": ASCII\n\nRelated topics\n\ngRPC\nUse the Sui Full Node gRPC API for high-performance, type-safe blockchain data access with Protocol Buffers serialization.\nGraphQL for Sui RPC\nLearn the core concepts for working with GraphQL on Sui RPC, including request headers, query composition with variables and fragments, pagination strategies, query scope, service limits, and the components of the GraphQL and General-purpose Indexer stack.\nJSON-RPC Migration Guide\nChoose between gRPC and GraphQL RPC when migrating from the deprecated JSON-RPC API. Includes a method mapping, decision criteria, and common migration gotchas.\nRPC and Data Providers\nThird-party providers offering Sui gRPC, GraphQL RPC, and Archival Store and Service endpoints.\n\nType coercion reasoning\nType coercion rules\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1749,"crawled_at":1791194414620} +{"id":10380,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/protocol-rewards","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound III Docs | Protocol Rewards","text":"Compound III\nInterest Rates\nCollateral & Borrowing\nLiquidation\nAccount Management\nProtocol Rewards\nERC-4626 Wrapper\nGovernance\nHelper Functions\n\nProtocol Rewards\nReward Accrual Tracking\nGet Reward Accrued\nClaim Rewards\n\nProtocol Rewards\nCompound III has a built-in system for tracking rewards for accounts that use the protocol. The full history of accrual of rewards are tracked for suppliers and borrowers of the base asset. The rewards can be any ERC-20 token. In order for rewards to accrue to Compound III accounts, the configuration’s baseMinForRewards threshold for total supply of the base asset must be met.\nReward Accrual Tracking\nThe reward accrual is tracked in the Comet contract and rewards can be claimed by users from an external Comet Rewards contract. Rewards are accounted for with up to 6 decimals of precision.\nComet\nfunction baseTrackingAccrued(address account) external view returns (uint64);\n\nRETURNS: Returns the amount of reward token accrued based on usage of the base asset within the protocol for the specified account, scaled up by 10 ^ 6.\nSolidity\nComet comet = Comet(0xCometAddress);\nuint64 accrued = comet.baseTrackingAccrued(0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst comet = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst accrued = await comet.callStatic.baseTrackingAccrued('0xAccount');\n\nGet Reward Accrued\nThe amount of reward token accrued but not yet claimed for an account can be fetched from the external Comet Rewards contract.\nComet Rewards\nstruct RewardOwed {\naddress token;\nuint owed;\n}\n\nfunction getRewardOwed(address comet, address account) external returns (RewardOwed memory)\n\nRETURNS: Returns the amount of reward token accrued but not yet claimed, scaled up by 10 to the “decimals” integer in the reward token’s contract.\nSolidity\nCometRewards rewards = CometRewards(0xRewardsAddress);\nRewardOwed reward = rewards.getRewardOwed(0xCometAddress, 0xAccount);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst rewards = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nconst [ tokenAddress, amtOwed ] = await rewards.callStatic.getRewardOwed(cometAddress, accountAddress);\n\nClaim Rewards\nAny account can claim rewards for a specific account. Account owners and managers can also claim rewards to a specific address. The claim functions are available on the external Comet Rewards contract.\nComet Rewards\nfunction claim(address comet, address src, bool shouldAccrue) external\n\nfunction claimTo(address comet, address src, address to, bool shouldAccrue) external\n\ncomet: The address of the Comet contract.\nsrc: The account in which to claim rewards.\nto: The account in which to transfer the claimed rewards.\nshouldAccrue: If true, the protocol will account for the rewards owed to the account as of the current block before transferring.\nRETURN: No return, reverts on error.\nSolidity\nCometRewards rewards = CometRewards(0xRewardsAddress);\nrewards.claim(0xCometAddress, 0xAccount, true);\n\nEthers.js v5.x\nconst rewards = new ethers.Contract(contractAddress, abiJson, provider);\nawait rewards.claim(cometAddress, accountAddress, true);","tokens":767,"crawled_at":1791194419135} +{"id":10381,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/plugins/autograph","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Autograph Plugin | Metaplex Core","text":"The Autograph Plugin allows anyone to add their signature and a message to an Asset or Collection. Perfect for collectible signatures from artists, celebrities, or community members.\nWhat You'll Learn\nEnable autographs on Assets and Collections\nAdd your signature to an Asset\nRemove autographs as the owner\nUnderstand autograph permissions\n\nSummary\nThe Autograph plugin is an Owner Managed plugin that stores signatures with messages. Once enabled, anyone can add their signature. The owner can remove any autograph.\nOwner adds the plugin (or update authority at mint)\nAnyone can add their own signature\nOnly owner/delegate can remove autographs\nAutographers cannot remove their own signature\nAssets inherit autographs from their Collection\nOut of Scope\nCreator verification (use Verified Creators), royalties, and automatic signature validation.\nQuick Start\nJump to: Add Plugin · Add Autograph · Remove Autograph\nOwner adds the Autograph plugin to enable signatures\nAnyone can add their signature with updatePlugin\nOwner can remove any autograph\nAutograph vs Verified Creators\nFeatureAutographVerified Creators\nWho can sign\nAnyone\nOnly listed creators\n\nPermission to enable\nOwner\nUpdate authority\n\nSelf-removal\n❌ Cannot remove own\n✅ Can unverify self\n\nPurpose\nCollectible signatures\nProve creatorship\n\nBest for\nFan engagement, events\nTeam attribution\n\nUse Autograph for collectible signatures (like autographed memorabilia).\n\nUse Verified Creators for proving who created the Asset.\n\nCommon Use Cases\nCelebrity autographs: Artists sign NFTs at events\nFan engagement: Community members sign limited edition pieces\nAuthentication: Real-world item creators sign digital twins\nEvent memorabilia: Conference speakers sign event NFTs\nCharity auctions: Multiple celebrities sign charity NFTs To add a autograph some conditions have to be met:\nThe autograph plugin must be added already.\nThe signer may only add their own address.\nThe existing list have to be passed along with the added signature using the updatePlugin function.\nThere is no existing Autograph by that signer yet.\nAs soon as the autograph plugin has been added by the owner everyone can add their signature. It can again be removed by the owner at any time.\n\nWorks With\n\nMPL Core Asset\n✅\n\nMPL Core Collection\n✅\n\nAssets inherit Autographs from the Collection.\n\nArguments\nThe autograph Plugin requires the following arguments in a signatures Array:\nArgValue\naddress\npublicKey\n\nmessage\nstring\n\nAdding the autograph Plugin to an Asset code example\nAdding a autograph Plugin to an MPL Core Asset as the owner\n\nimport {\n\naddPlugin,\n\n} from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nawait addPlugin(umi, {\n\nasset: asset.publicKey,\n\nplugin: {\n\ntype: 'Autograph',\n\nsignatures: [\n\n{\n\naddress: umi.identity.publicKey,\n\nmessage: 'Your Message',\n\n},\n\n},\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nAdding an Autograph to an Asset code example\nAdding a Autograph to an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { updatePlugin, fetchAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress.publicKey, {\n\nskipDerivePlugins: false,\n\n})\n\n// The new autograph that you want to add\n\nconst newAutograph = {\n\naddress: umi.identity.publicKey,\n\nmessage: \"your message\"\n\n}\n\n// Add the new autograph to the existing signatures array\n\nconst updatedAutographs = [...asset.autograph.signatures, newAutograph]\n\nawait updatePlugin(umi, {\n\nasset: asset.publicKey,\n\nplugin: {\n\ntype: 'Autograph',\n\n// This should contain all autographs that you do not want to remove\n\nsignatures: updatedAutographs,\n\n},\n\nauthority: umi.identity,\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nRemoving an Autograph from an Asset code example\nRemoving a Autograph from an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { updatePlugin, fetchAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress.publicKey, {\n\nskipDerivePlugins: false,\n\n})\n\n// The Publickey of the autograph that you want to remove\n\nconst publicKeyToRemove = publicKey(\"abc...\")\n\nconst autographsToKeep = asset.autograph.signatures.filter(\n\n(autograph) => autograph.address !== publicKeyToRemove\n\n);\n\nawait updatePlugin(umi, {\n\nasset: asset.publicKey,\n\nplugin: {\n\ntype: 'Autograph',\n\n// This should contain all Autographs that you do not want to remove\n\nsignatures: autographsToKeep,\n\n},\n\nauthority: umi.identity, // Should be the owner of the asset\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nAdding the autograph Plugin to a Collection code example\nAdd autograph Plugin to Collection\n\nimport { addCollectionPlugin } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nawait addCollectionPlugin(umi, {\n\ncollection: collection.publicKey,\n\nplugin: {\n\ntype: 'Autograph',\n\nsignatures: [\n\n{\n\naddress: umi.identity.publicKey,\n\nmessage: 'Your Message',\n\n},\n\n},\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nPlugin not added\nThe Autograph plugin must be added by the owner before anyone can add autographs.\nAutograph already exists\nThis address has already signed this Asset. Each address can only add one autograph.\nCannot remove own autograph\nAutographers cannot remove their own signature (unless they are also the owner or autograph delegate).\nNotes\nAnyone can add their signature once the plugin is enabled\nOnly the owner or autograph delegate can remove autographs\nAutographers cannot remove their own signature\nAssets inherit autographs from their Collection\nEach address can only sign once per Asset\nQuick Reference\nPermission Matrix\nActionOwnerAnyoneAutographer\nAdd plugin\n✅\n❌\n❌\n\nAdd own autograph\n✅\n✅\n✅\n\nRemove any autograph\n✅\n❌\n❌\n\nRemove own autograph\n✅ (as owner)\n❌\n❌\n\nAutograph Lifecycle\nStepActionWho\n1\nAdd Autograph plugin\nOwner\n\n2\nAdd autograph\nAnyone\n\n3\nRemove autograph (optional)\nOwner only\n\nFAQ\nHow is this different from Verified Creators?\nVerified Creators is for proving creatorship and is managed by the update authority. Autograph is for collectible signatures from anyone (like getting an autograph at an event).\nCan someone add multiple autographs?\nNo. Each address can only add one autograph per Asset. Attempting to add a second autograph from the same address will fail.\nCan I remove my own autograph?\nNo. Only the owner or autograph delegate can remove autographs. This prevents someone from signing and then immediately removing it.\nDo I need the owner's permission to add an autograph?\nNo. Once the owner enables the Autograph plugin, anyone can add their signature. The owner doesn't need to approve individual autographs.\nWhat happens to autographs when an Asset is transferred?\nAutographs remain on the Asset. They are permanent records of who signed, regardless of ownership changes.\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nAutograph\nA signature with optional message added to an Asset\n\nAutographer\nAddress that added their signature\n\nAutograph Delegate\nAddress with permission to remove autographs\n\nSignatures Array\nList of all autographs on an Asset\n\nOwner Managed\nPlugin type where the owner controls addition\n\nRelated Plugins\nVerified Creators - Prove creatorship (authority managed)\nAttributes - Store on-chain data\nImmutableMetadata - Lock metadata permanently","tokens":1764,"crawled_at":1791194441228} +{"id":10382,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/blockfuls-delegate-platform/25765","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Blockful's Delegate Platform - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Blockful's Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\nblockful\n\nAugust 6, 2025, 5:25pm\n\n1\n\nContact & Delegation Address Information\n\nDelegate ENS Address: gov.blockful.eth\n\nDelegate Address: 0x1F3D3A7A9c548bE39539b39D7400302753E20591\n\nEmail: contact@blockful.io\n\nWebsite: https://blockful.io\n\nTwitter: https://twitter.com/blockful_io\n\nOur Voting History: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/gov.blockful.eth\n\nAbout Us\n\nblockful is a fully independent and bootstrapped governance-security company dedicated to “holistic governance security, with and beyond code.” We combine our anticapture framework, years as a web3 development company, data dashboards, and social-layer analysis to help DAOs evolve from fragile to resilient systems.\n\nDelegate Statement\n\nOur mission is to safeguard Uniswap’s long-term security.\n\nWe have already audited UNI governance (funded from a UF grant), mapped risk metrics, and shipped a public dashboard (https://anticapture.com/uni) so every community member can see attack threats before they strike. Delegating to blockful means turning these insights into proactive, security-first votes.\n\nReasons for Wanting to Be a Delegate\n\nSecurity leadership – we created the Anticapture Framework and are currently service providers for ENS DAO to implement its findings, enhancing our governance.\n\nData transparency – our dashboards surface token-distribution shifts, implementation safeguards costs, and governance health so voters act on facts, not vibes.\n\nPublic-goods mindset – all of our systems are OSS;\n\nCritical Eye - we believe there are a series of checks and balances necessary for incentives inside a DAO not to become inefficient. We want to help Uniswap stay healthy by calling out what’s needed.\n\nSkills & Areas of Expertise\n\nGovernance security\n\nSmart-contract development\n\nCommunity and Incentives\n\nCross-DAO participation\n\nDisclosure of Conflicts of Interest\n\nblockful currently serves as a delegate for Arbitrum, Optimism, ENS, Scroll. We are fully bootstrapped with no investor pressure behind the scenes to bias our positioning.\n\nblockful\n\nOctober 11, 2025, 2:11pm\n\n2\n\nGrow Uniswap on Plasma\n\nWe voted for Uniswap to allocate $250K to the Plasma incentive program.\n\nThe rewards could bring more capital, attention, and liquidity to Uniswap on Plasma. Given its importance in the DeFi market in recent weeks, it is an expense that could bring short-term returns for Uniswap.\n\nblockful\n\nMay 28, 2026, 7:14pm\n\n3\n\nProtocol Fee Expansion: Vote 3\n\nWe voted FOR this proposal because it is a consistent extension of Uniswap’s already-approved fee framework.\n\nThe proposal does not change the protocol fee policy. It simply expands the existing fee collection and UNI burn infrastructure to BNB Chain and Polygon, while completing Celo’s activation after a previous execution issue.\n\nSupporting this proposal helps align Uniswap’s fee implementation with its multichain reality. Since the protocol already operates across multiple networks, the fee infrastructure should be able to follow that footprint in a standardized way.\n\nWe also recognize that expanding to more chains adds new execution paths and infrastructure dependencies, so governance should continue monitoring the system closely.\n\nblockful\n\nMay 28, 2026, 7:26pm\n\n4\n\nReturn 12.5M Delegated Tokens to the Governance Timelock\n\nWe voted FOR this proposal.\n\nThe proposal withdraws 12.5M delegated UNI from the Uniswap Foundation and other governance members, such as Anode, kpk, and Axia. These delegations currently come from the Uniswap DAO treasury.\n\nWe supported the proposal because Uniswap governance is now in a different position than it was before the creation of DUNI, the Uniswap DUNA legal structure approved on August 30, 2025.\n\nSince then, delegated UNI has grown significantly. In less than three months, the amount of delegated UNI increased by 17.1%, adding 33M delegated tokens. In October alone, 31.9M UNI were delegated, mostly from addresses delegating their governance tokens for the first time.\n\nThis suggests that DUNI helped provide more legal certainty for delegates and encouraged more UNI holders to participate in governance, either directly or through delegation.\n\nAs a result, Uniswap no longer needs to rely as heavily on delegates whose voting power comes from the DAO treasury. The DAO now has large UNI holders actively participating in governance, bringing more skin in the game to the delegate set.\n\nThis is healthier than relying on treasury-backed delegation, which can create incentive misalignment between delegates and UNI holders.\n\nHowever, we also recognize the main tradeoff: Uniswap may now depend on a smaller number of large delegates to reach quorum. Without the participation of professional delegates, the DAO will need to remain aligned and coordinate with UNI whales to avoid quorum issues.\n\nEven with this nuance, we believe the proposal is a positive step toward a more aligned governance structure, where voting power increasingly comes from UNI holders rather than the DAO treasury itself.\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nBlockworks Research Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n0\n\n1484\n\nMay 11, 2023\n\nDAOplomats Delegation Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n49\n\n2913\n\nJuly 18, 2026\n\nCuria Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n53\n\n2385\n\nJuly 23, 2026\n\nPEPO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n23\n\n1763\n\nMay 5, 2025\n\nSEEDGov Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n76\n\n3514\n\nMay 5, 2026","tokens":1359,"crawled_at":1791194438126} +{"id":10383,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/v2","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound v2 Documentation","text":"Compound II\ncTokens\nComptroller\nGovernance\nPrice Feed\nSecurity\n\nGetting Started\nGuides\nNetworks\nProtocol Math\n\nGetting Started\nIntroduction to Compound v2\nCompound III is now live, you're currently viewing Compound v2 documentation. Compound III Documentation\n\nThe Compound protocol is based on the Compound Whitepaper (2019); the codebase is open-source, and maintained by the community.\nThe app.compound.xyz interface is open-source, and maintained by the community.\nPlease join the #development room in the Compound community Discord server; Compound Labs and members of the community look forward to helping you build an application on top of Compound. Your questions help us improve, so please don’t hesitate to ask if you can’t find what you are looking for here.\nGuides\nSetting up an Ethereum Development Environment\nSupplying Assets to the Compound Protocol\nBorrowing Assets from the Compound Protocol\nCreate a Compound API with Infura\nBuilding a Governance Interface\nDelegation & Voting\nContributing to the Protocol\nNetworks\nThe Compound Protocol is currently deployed on the following networks:\nMainnet\nGoerli\n\nEthereum Mainnet - Compound v2\nProtocol Contracts\ncAAVE\n0xe65c…D06c\n\ncBAT\n0x6C8c…0E4E\n\ncCOMP\n0x70e3…E8e4\n\ncDAI\n0x5d3a…3643\n\ncETH\n0x4Ddc…0ED5\n\ncFEI\n0x7713…3F67\n\ncLINK\n0xFAce…B0c7\n\ncMKR\n0x95b4…325b\n\ncREP\n0x1580…95c1\n\ncSAI\n0xF5DC…44dC\n\ncSUSHI\n0x4B01…c9d7\n\ncTUSD\n0x1239…Ad86\n\ncUNI\n0x35A1…D550\n\ncUSDC\n0x39AA…7563\n\ncUSDP\n0x0411…925D\n\ncUSDT\n0xf650…dCC9\n\ncWBTC\n0xC11b…A7F4\n\ncWBTC2\n0xccF4…DD6a\n\ncYFI\n0x80a2…3946\n\ncZRX\n0xB331…d407\n\nCOMP\n0xc00e…6888\n\nComptroller\n0x3d98…Cd3B\n\nGovernance\n0xc0Da…6529\n\nTimelock\n0x6d90…3925\n\nEthereum Goerli Testnet - Compound v2\nProtocol Contracts\ncCOMP\n0x0fF5…F1Cd\n\ncDAI\n0x0545…7b2a\n\ncETH\n0x6407…dbde\n\ncUNI\n0x2073…b1A5\n\ncUSDC\n0x7350…F493\n\ncUSDT\n0x5A74…b716\n\ncWBTC\n0xDa6F…3C8f\n\nCOMP\n0x3587…0ba4\n\nDAI\n0x2899…13cC\n\nUNI\n0x208F…08cC\n\nUSDC\n0x0786…a37F\n\nUSDT\n0x79C9…d446\n\nWBTC\n0xAAD4…dC19\n\nCompoundLens\n0x04EC…CbB7\n\nUnitroller\n0x3cBe…4d78\n\nComptroller\n0x05Df…8621\n\nFauceteer\n0x7544…938f\n\nGovernorBravo\n0xa3Fb…45d3\n\nMaximillion\n0xD493…Defb\n\nPriceOracle\n0x65F1…C776\n\nTimelock\n0x8Fa3…1399\n\nYou can also see a full list of all deployed contract addresses here.\nProtocol Math\nThe Compound protocol contracts use a system of exponential math, ExponentialNoError.sol, in order to represent fractional quantities with sufficient precision.\nMost numbers are represented as a mantissa, an unsigned integer scaled by 1 * 10 ^ 18, in order to perform basic math at a high level of precision.\ncToken and Underlying Decimals\nPrices and exchange rates are scaled by the decimals unique to each asset; cTokens are ERC-20 tokens with 8 decimals, while their underlying tokens vary, and have a public member named decimals.\ncToken cToken Decimals Underlying Underlying Decimals\ncETH\n8\nETH\n18\n\ncAAVE\n8\nAAVE\n18\n\ncBAT\n8\nBAT\n18\n\ncCOMP\n8\nCOMP\n18\n\ncDAI\n8\nDAI\n18\n\ncFEI\n8\nFEI\n18\n\ncLINK\n8\nLINK\n18\n\ncMKR\n8\nMKR\n18\n\ncSUSHI\n8\nSUSHI\n18\n\ncTUSD\n8\nTUSD\n18\n\ncUNI\n8\nUNI\n18\n\ncUSDC\n8\nUSDC\n6\n\ncUSDP\n8\nUSDP\n18\n\ncUSDT\n8\nUSDT\n6\n\ncWBTC\n8\nWBTC\n8\n\ncYFI\n8\nYFI\n18\n\ncZRX\n8\nZRX\n18\n\nInterpreting Exchange Rates\nThe cToken Exchange Rate is scaled by the difference in decimals between the cToken and the underlying asset.\noneCTokenInUnderlying = exchangeRateCurrent / (1 * 10 ^ (18 + underlyingDecimals - cTokenDecimals))\n\nHere is an example of finding the value of 1 cBAT in BAT with Web3.js JavaScript.\nconst cTokenDecimals = 8; // all cTokens have 8 decimal places\nconst underlying = new web3.eth.Contract(erc20Abi, batAddress);\nconst cToken = new web3.eth.Contract(cTokenAbi, cBatAddress);\nconst underlyingDecimals = await underlying.methods.decimals().call();\nconst exchangeRateCurrent = await cToken.methods.exchangeRateCurrent().call();\nconst mantissa = 18 + parseInt(underlyingDecimals) - cTokenDecimals;\nconst oneCTokenInUnderlying = exchangeRateCurrent / Math.pow(10, mantissa);\nconsole.log('1 cBAT can be redeemed for', oneCTokenInUnderlying, 'BAT');\n\nThere is no underlying contract for ETH, so to do this with cETH, set underlyingDecimals to 18.\nTo find the number of underlying tokens that can be redeemed for cTokens, multiply the number of cTokens by the above value oneCTokenInUnderlying.\nunderlyingTokens = cTokenAmount * oneCTokenInUnderlying\n\nCalculating Accrued Interest\nInterest rates for each market update on any block in which the ratio of borrowed assets to supplied assets in the market has changed. The amount interest rates are changed depends on the interest rate model smart contract implemented for the market, and the amount of change in the ratio of borrowed assets to supplied assets in the market.\nSee the interest rate data visualization notebook on Observable to visualize which interest rate model is currently applied to each market.\nHistorical interest rates can be retrieved from the MarketHistoryService API.\nInterest accrues to all suppliers and borrowers in a market when any Ethereum address interacts with the market’s cToken contract, calling one of these functions: mint, redeem, borrow, or repay. Successful execution of one of these functions triggers the accrueInterest method, which causes interest to be added to the underlying balance of every supplier and borrower in the market. Interest accrues for the current block, as well as each prior block in which the accrueInterest method was not triggered (no user interacted with the cToken contract). Interest compounds only during blocks in which the cToken contract has one of the aforementioned methods invoked.\nHere is an example of supply interest accrual:\nAlice supplies 1 ETH to the Compound protocol. At the time of supply, the supplyRatePerBlock is 37893605 Wei, or 0.000000000037893605 ETH per block. No one interacts with the cEther contract for 3 Ethereum blocks. On the subsequent 4th block, Bob borrows some ETH. Alice’s underlying balance is now 1.000000000151574420 ETH (which is 37893605 Wei times 4 blocks, plus the original 1 ETH). Alice’s underlying ETH balance in subsequent blocks will have interest accrued based on the new value of 1.000000000151574420 ETH instead of the initial 1 ETH. Note that the supplyRatePerBlock value may change at any time.\nCalculating the APY Using Rate Per Block\nThe Annual Percentage Yield (APY) for supplying or borrowing in each market can be calculated using the value of supplyRatePerBlock (for supply APY) or borrowRatePerBlock (for borrow APY) in this formula:\nRate = cToken.supplyRatePerBlock(); // Integer\nRate = 37893566\nETH Mantissa = 1 * 10 ^ 18 (ETH has 18 decimal places)\nBlocks Per Day = 7200 (12 seconds per block)\nDays Per Year = 365\n\nAPY = ((((Rate / ETH Mantissa * Blocks Per Day + 1) ^ Days Per Year)) - 1) * 100\n\nHere is an example of calculating the supply and borrow APY with Web3.js JavaScript:\nconst ethMantissa = 1e18;\nconst blocksPerDay = 7200; // 12 seconds per block\nconst daysPerYear = 365;\n\nconst cToken = new web3.eth.Contract(cEthAbi, cEthAddress);\nconst supplyRatePerBlock = await cToken.methods.supplyRatePerBlock().call();\nconst borrowRatePerBlock = await cToken.methods.borrowRatePerBlock().call();\nconst supplyApy = (((Math.pow((supplyRatePerBlock / ethMantissa * blocksPerDay) + 1, daysPerYear))) - 1) * 100;\nconst borrowApy = (((Math.pow((borrowRatePerBlock / ethMantissa * blocksPerDay) + 1, daysPerYear))) - 1) * 100;\nconsole.log(`Supply APY for ETH ${supplyApy} %`);\nconsole.log(`Borrow APY for ETH ${borrowApy} %`);\n\nCalculating the APR Using Rate Per Block\nHere is an example of calculating the supply and borrow APR with Web3.js JavaScript:\nconst ethMantissa = 1e18;\nconst blocksPerYear = 5 * 60 * 24 * 365; // 12 seconds per block\nconst daysPerYear = 365;\n\nconst cToken = new web3.eth.Contract(cZrxAbi, cZrxAddress);\nconst supplyRatePerBlock = await cToken.methods.supplyRatePerBlock().call();\nconst borrowRatePerBlock = await cToken.methods.borrowRatePerBlock().call();\nconst supplyApr = supplyRatePerBlock / ethMantissa * blocksPerYear * 100;\nconst borrowApr = borrowRatePerBlock / ethMantissa * blocksPerYear * 100;\nconsole.log(`Supply APR ${(supplyApr).toFixed(3)} %`);\nconsole.log(`Borrow APR ${(borrowApr).toFixed(3)} %`);","tokens":2029,"crawled_at":1791194440409} +{"id":10384,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/cloning","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Cloning verified contracts – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nCloning verified contracts\n\nforge clone downloads verified Solidity source and compiler settings from a block explorer, initializes a Forge project, compiles it, and writes deployment metadata to .clone.meta.\n\nBy default, Forge clones the exact address you provide. Add --implementation when the address is a proxy and you want the implementation reported by Etherscan.\n\nPrerequisites\n\nAn explorer-verified contract.\n\nAn Etherscan API key, supplied through ETHERSCAN_API_KEY or --etherscan-api-key.\n\nThe contract's chain name or chain ID when it is not on Ethereum mainnet.\n\nClone the contract at an address\n\nPass the contract address and the directory that Forge should create:\n\n$ forge clone \\\n--chain mainnet \\\n0xC02aB1A5eaA8d1B114EF786D9bde108cD4364359 \\\nsparklend-usds\n\nThis clones the verified contract at the supplied address. If the address is a proxy, the generated project contains the proxy source unless you request its implementation explicitly.\n\nClone a proxy implementation\n\nAdd --implementation to clone the implementation address reported in the proxy's Etherscan metadata:\n\n$ forge clone \\\n--implementation \\\n--chain mainnet \\\n0xC02aB1A5eaA8d1B114EF786D9bde108cD4364359 \\\nsparklend-usds\n\nForge uses the resolved implementation for:\n\nDownloaded source code and compiler settings.\n\nContract creation data and constructor arguments.\n\nThe compiled storage layout.\n\nThe address, contract name, and source path recorded in .clone.meta.\n\nIf Etherscan does not mark the supplied address as a proxy, --implementation clones the supplied address normally.\n\nUnderstand implementation resolution\n\nImplementation resolution follows one Etherscan metadata link. Forge fetches the implementation reported for the supplied proxy and stops there, even if that implementation is also marked as a proxy. This avoids following an unrelated delegate-call target reported by the explorer.\n\nThe resolved target must be a Solidity contract. A Vyper proxy can still resolve to a Solidity implementation because Forge only compiles the selected target.\n\nWhen verified sources remain under lib, Forge creates an import-only entry point such as src/Clone.sol so the compiler discovers the cloned target. The downloaded library sources remain under lib.\n\n--implementation is supported only with Etherscan. It cannot be combined with --source sourcify or --sourcify-url, and resolution depends on the proxy metadata returned by the explorer.\n\nNext steps\n\nSee the forge clone reference for all command options.\n\nCompare storage layouts when upgrading contracts.\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":661,"crawled_at":1791194446377} +{"id":10385,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/cp0x-delegate-platform/25321","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Cp0x Delegate Platform - Delegation Pitch - Uniswap Governance","text":"Cp0x Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\ncp0x\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 4:18pm\n\n1\n\nDelegate Name: cp0x aka cp0x.eth\n\nForum: cp0x\n\nDelegate Address: 0x6f9BB7e454f5B3eb2310343f0E99269dC2BB8A1d\n\nTwitter: https://x.com/cp0xdotcom\n\nLanguages: English, Portuguese, Russian\n\nVoting history: https://boardroom.io/voter/0x6f9BB7e454f5B3eb2310343f0E99269dC2BB8A1d\n\nLinks: cp0x.com · delegations · staking · Telegram · YouTube\n\nAbout\n\ncp0x is a crypto community working in the space since 2016: community, infrastructure, education.\n\nWe take part in governance across 20+ DAOs, run a liquidity hub with curated DeFi deals and trading competitions, build permissionless interfaces to DeFi protocols when official frontends introduce restrictions, and run validators, sequencers, operators and indexers in various networks. We also run a YouTube channel where we talk to founders and developers about protocols and the market.\n\nHow we vote\n\nFairness. We stand against reckless spending and look for solutions that benefit everyone equally.\n\nTransparency. Our decisions are consistent.\n\nDecentralisation. We support what reduces reliance on single players or foundations.\n\nWe verify proposals ourselves rather than relying on their description. We vote against what centralises power, obscures spending or spends without justification. Where there is not enough information we abstain, and where the consequences are ambiguous we take it back to the community.\n\nWe agree to follow Principles for Uniswap DAO in our messages and voting.\n\nGLI -- Treasury Delegation Round 2 Applications\n\ncp0x\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 4:31pm\n\n2\n\n[Temp Check] Uniswap Unleashed\n\nimage1272×423 53.8 KB\n\nUniswap Foundation (UF) is requesting\n\n$95.4 million in grants (for 2 years):\n\n$33.7 million for developers\n\n$33.7 million for management\n\n$33.7 million for infrastructure\n\nand other small things…\n\n$25.1 million for UF itself (for their work, while they write that they are a team of 16 people and plan to hire 12 more) so the employee salary will be about $37,350 per month excluding vesting. With vesting $48,172 per month\n\nAnd also the detailed calculations do not match what they requested - 25 million and 38 million - a difference of 13 million.\n\nIf this proposal were divided into 2 parts, I would vote for grants, but against such expenses for UF\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\n1 Like\n\ncp0x\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 4:37pm\n\n3\n\n[Temp Check] Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentives\n\nAdditional request for grants (in addition to what was asked in the previous proposal) to stimulate Unichain and v4.\n\n24 million for incentives to transfer liquidity from v3 to v4 by 23 billion in six months.\n\n21 million on Unichain. Optimism rollup - stimulation of pools on this chain.\n\nAs in the previous proposal, the combination of two grants that are not directly related, which may have different opinions, raises doubts.\n\nIf there are no questions about the first program, then the second is confusing in that it is unclear who will be the user of this new chain, where there will not be much liquidity initially, which means that slippage will be higher (which is of course compensated by incentives, but when they run out - no one will need this chain). What is the competitive advantage? After all, if there is none, then we will simply spend money without the desired effect.\n\nThese proposals need to be divided, like the previous one. It is a bad idea to mix good and bad proposals and thereby accept something that is not needed by the community.\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\n1 Like\n\ncp0x\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 4:45pm\n\n4\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 3\n\nUniswap rewards delegates under the following conditions (if you are in the top 15 delegates):\n\nPoints:\n\nSnapshot votes > 90% - 3 points\n\nTally votes > 90% - 4 points\n\nProposal authorship - 3 points\n\nCommunity call participation - 1 point\n\nParticipate in 90% of votes (both Snapshot and Tally) in the last 90 days\n\nWrite your vote rationale in the thread\n\nParticipate in community calls\n\nI consider such conditions for distributing rewards to be fair, depending on your contribution to the DAO.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Uniswap Agora\n\ndevinwalsh\n\nMarch 3, 2025, 9:44pm\n\n5\n\nWe have cash on hand. So the amount we request from the Treasury takes that into account, we subtract cash on hand from our projected budget to get the ask to the Treasury. That accounts for the difference there.\n\n1 Like\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 6, 2025, 11:54pm\n\n6\n\nUAC Renewal S4\n\nExtending the committee that is responsible for overseeing cross-chain developments\n\nThere are still 5 people on the committee, but they want to increase their hours, like there are more responsibilities, like managing a feedback group on the forum, etc.\n\nIn general, they want to raise the salary by about 30%.\n\nBudget: $320k at a rate of $200 per hour (Well, you know that I have a bad attitude to such a rate) and 50k for operating expenses (which is also expensive)\n\nI would keep the committee itself, as well as their salary, which is already high, but I don’t want to pay for an increase.\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 6, 2025, 11:57pm\n\n7\n\nApproved Budgets Rebalancing (S4)\n\nDue to the token price drop, there are insufficient funds in the accounts of various Uniswap groups and initiatives\n\nThere is a very detailed analysis of all programs, costs and how much each is missing.\n\nIn total, it is $280k. The main part goes to cover the deficit in the Tally Grant program, where the funds were actually used to develop Tally.\n\nConsidering that the balance of the programs is now about $2 million, the shortage is not that big with such a drop in the token\n\nI really liked the structure, where it is written in great detail how, how much and why additional funding is needed. An excellent example of how to do it right.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 12:02am\n\n8\n\n[Temp Check/Revised] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nThis is a reworking of a month-old proposal, where Uniswap delegates 1-1.5 million UNI to the top 10 delegates.\n\nI was against it then and essentially nothing has changed.\n\nNow they have changed the term of office - review after 9 months (and it was 12), which is insignificant\n\nThey give 1 million to the top, and there will also be a vote on who gets another 500k.\n\nIt’s all the same\n\nThey write that this is how they fight the quorum problem. This certainly solves the problem, but it is a temporary solution and may lead to the DAO being managed only by the top 10 delegates\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 12:07am\n\n9\n\n[TEMP CHECK] BoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nBoB - Build on Bitcoin network with smart contracts on EVM, but security on Bitcoin within OP Superchain - their TVL is around $230 million\n\nBoB will allocate $500,000 to Uniswap to increase liquidity for 6 months + incentives from Babylon and possible other partners\n\nAsk for $375,000 from Uniswap for pools (which may be revised)\n\nwBTC/USDT\n\nwBTC/wETH\n\nUSDT/USDC\n\nwBTC/LBTC\n\nI think this is a good initiative, as it allows to occupy a possibly large market associated with Bitcoin\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:20am\n\n10\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Establish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nEveryone wants to implement Uni v4 faster, therefore:\n\nsince the license belongs to the DAO, the Uniswap Foundation needs permission to deploy.\n\nPlus they also want to implement and manage the v4deployments.uniswap.eth subdomain to track new deployments\n\nThe idea is good, it is unclear why the rights are not shared with the Uniswap Foundation by default\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:23am\n\n11\n\n[TEMP CHECK] Scaling V4 and Supporting Unichain\n\nThere was already a proposal on this topic, they allocated about 46 million for incentives and for Unichain\n\nNow, on top of that, GFX Labs is asking for money - they want a perpetual license for the implementation of v4, a one-time $250k and $90k for a year (7.5k per month for maintenance), and for this they will deploy Unichain on Oku\n\nConsidering that a lot of money has already been allocated for this, I think it is wrong to single out someone else, and it is worth giving money from the selected budget\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:25am\n\n12\n\n[Temp Check] Analytics Hub for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program\n\n[Temp Check] Analytics Hub for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nForse, a company that analyzes blockchains and protocols, offers to give it $60,000 in UNI\n\nIn exchange, they will analyze the profitability of incentives, user retention, etc. They will make a monitoring panel by the beginning of July\n\nThe money is small, but there is a benefit, because Uniswap spends too much on grants and I don’t know - is there any benefit from this\n\nFinally, we will find out the answer to how effective large spending on new chains and grants, incentives is\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:28am\n\n13\n\nFour Chains for Analytics Hub for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program\n\nThis is a clarification of the previous vote - in which 4 chains to conduct the analysis\n\nI would vote for the most popular and new:\n\nUnichain (the most is spent there)\n\nSei\n\nPolygon zkEVM\n\nI would also look at Sonic, but for some reason there is no such option, although it is one of the currently popular chains and has a large growth\n\nIn the future, it is worth giving a larger choice of chains, because Uniswap is in many chains, it is bad that we cannot choose specific ones, but only from 4.\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:31am\n\n14\n\nBoB Uniswap v3 Incentives Package\n\nIn accordance with the previously completed Snapshot vote, we also support it here\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Uniswap Agora\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 7, 2025, 1:32am\n\n15\n\nEstablish Uniswap v4 Licensing Process\n\nIn accordance with the previously completed Snapshot vote, we also support it here\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Uniswap Agora\n\ncp0x\n\nMay 25, 2025, 3:12am\n\n16\n\nUniswap Accountability Committee S4 Elections\n\nWe voted against extending UAC S4 because the committee raised their salaries by 30% (at $200 an hour, 8k a month), but the initiative was passed, so it is necessary to carefully approach the selection of representatives\n\nThere are 7 candidates for 5 positions\n\nSov - head of govNERDs at Optimism and was on the grant board for season 6\n\n(last time he took 6th place)\n\nDoo_StableLab - Co-founder of StableLab, head of Sky, on the grants working group at Compound\n\n(last time he took 4th place and became a member)\n\nDonOfDAOs - founder of Event Horizon\n\n(not previously applied)\n\nKevin Nielsen - founder of Boardroom, which was bought by Agora\n\n(last time he took 7th place)\n\nTane - served on the Optimism Grants Board\n\n(last time he took 10th place)\n\nCuria - Varit Ruangsiri, founder\n\n(not previously applied)\n\n404DAO - Cole Schendl, co-founder\n\nAlso served on the grants board at Arbitrum, as part of one Optimism group and the NEAR group\n\n(not previously applied)\n\nI voted for those who specialize specifically in governance and openness of data:\n\nDoo Wan Nam (StableLab) - has a good reputation in many DAOs and will be useful on this committee\n\nKevin Nielsen - also spends a lot of time working in the direction of DAO governance\n\nVote:\n\n– Doo Wan Nam - 50%\n\n– Kevin Nielsen - 50%\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\nUAC Season 4 Application\n\ncp0x\n\nAugust 20, 2025, 6:18pm\n\n17\n\nTrial run a Technical Advisory Board (TAB)\n\nIt’s proposed to create a council of technical professionals who will provide an assessment for each proposal.\n\nFor this, they gathered 6 people (I only know one of them - Ben DiFrancesco, who is also actively involved in Arbitrum).\n\nEach will be paid 400 UNI ($3,200), and a delegate will get $6,400, to whom 2.5M UNI will be delegated (why pay a separate person even more than the tech experts, when they could just write their own review and vote with reasoning?).\n\nMost previous proposals were only about transferring UNI and didn’t require any technical analysis (one delegate did an analysis in an entire year).\n\nThis looks like another meaningless milking scheme, and moreover, after reading all the feedback, the author didn’t reply to anything - just waited 1.5 months and launched the vote.\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nAugust 20, 2025, 6:23pm\n\n18\n\nUniswap Unichain - USDS and sUSDS Co-Incentives Growth Management Plan\n\nIt’s offered a joint incentive program for the growth of TVL USDS and sUSDS on Unichain\n\nup to $4 million in incentives depending on TVL\n\n1 million - $20M TVL in USDS/sUSDS\n\nup to\n\n4 million - $100M TVL\n\nIt seems a bit too much to me for this. Well, there will be such a TVL for several weeks, they will give away 4 million, and then this chain will not be needed at all\n\nVote: AGAINST\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nAugust 20, 2025, 6:28pm\n\n19\n\n[TEMP CHECK] - Etherlink Co-incentives Proposal\n\nEtherlink and Tezos want Uniswap to be the main AMM for Etherlink\n\nThey want Uniswap to invest its $150k in incentives, and they in turn will give $300k for this\n\nThe chain’s TVL has recently grown to $47 million and there is IguanaDEX (with $12 million), from which, apparently, TVL will come to Uniswap due to these incentives.\n\nI don’t like this market capture scheme, but for Uniswap it will be a positive decision\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\ncp0x\n\nAugust 20, 2025, 6:33pm\n\n20\n\nUniswap Delegate Reward Initiative - Cycle 4\n\nUpdating the delegate reward system\n\nFrom what remains the same - the top 15 delegates are also selected (a new application is needed due to other changes)\n\nNew and important, which can really use votes as a skin in the game - namely, for owning 1000 UNI, an additional point will be awarded\n\nThis is an important step in the development of the program for engaging not only delegates, but using personal involvement\n\nVote: FOR\n\nPlatform: Snapshot\n\nnext page →\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\nTané Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n59\n\n2404\n\nMarch 9, 2026\n\n404 DAO Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n39\n\n3283\n\nJanuary 13, 2026\n\nGFX Labs - Delegate Communication Thread\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n27\n\n1504\n\nDecember 8, 2025\n\nIgnas Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n41\n\n1284\n\nMay 25, 2026\n\nAtiselsts.eth Delegate Platform\n\nDelegation Pitch\n\n32\n\n4670\n\nJuly 9, 2026","tokens":3568,"crawled_at":1791194455787} +{"id":10386,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/plugins/transfer-delegate","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Transfer Delegate Plugin | Metaplex Core","text":"The Transfer Delegate Plugin allows a designated authority to transfer Core Assets on behalf of the owner. Essential for escrowless marketplace sales, game mechanics, and subscription services.\nWhat You'll Learn\nAdd the Transfer Delegate plugin to an Asset\nDelegate transfer authority to a marketplace or program\nExecute transfers as a delegate\nAuthority behavior on transfer\n\nSummary\nThe Transfer Delegate is an Owner Managed plugin that allows a delegate to transfer an Asset. Once delegated, the authority can transfer the Asset to any address without owner approval.\nEnable escrowless marketplace listings\nAuthority is revoked after transfer (one-time use)\nUse Permanent Transfer Delegate for persistent authority\nNo additional arguments required\nOut of Scope\nPermanent transfer authority (see Permanent Transfer Delegate), collection-level transfers, and Token Metadata transfer authority (different system).\nQuick Start\nJump to: Add Plugin · Delegate Authority · Transfer as Delegate\nAdd the Transfer Delegate plugin with the delegate address\nThe delegate can now transfer the Asset once\nAfter transfer, the authority is automatically revoked\nOverview\nThe Transfer Delegate Plugin is a Owner Managed plugin that allows the authority of the Transfer Delegate Plugin to transfer the Asset at any time. The Transfer Plugin will work in areas such as:\nEscrowless sale of the Asset: Transfer NFTs directly to buyers without needing an escrow account\nGaming scenario where the user swaps/loses their asset based on an event: Automatically transfer assets when game events occur\nSubscription services: Transfer NFTs as part of a subscription service\nWhen to Use Transfer vs Permanent Transfer Delegate\nUse CaseTransfer DelegatePermanent Transfer Delegate\nMarketplace listings\n✅ Best choice\n❌ Too risky\n\nOne-time transfers\n✅ Best choice\n❌ Overkill\n\nRental returns\n❌ Single use\n✅ Best choice\n\nGame asset swaps\n✅ Best choice\n✅ Also works\n\nAuthority persists on transfer\n❌ Revokes\n✅ Persists\n\nChoose Transfer Delegate for one-time escrowless sales (authority revokes after transfer).\n\nChoose Permanent Transfer Delegate when authority must persist forever.\n\nWarning!\nThe transfer delegate authority is temporary and will be reset upon asset transfer.\n\nWorks With\n\nMPL Core Asset\n✅\n\nMPL Core Collection\n❌\n\nArguments\nThe Transfer Plugin doesn't contain any arguments to pass in.\nFunctions\nAdd Transfer Delegate Plugin to an Asset\nThe addPlugin command adds the Transfer Delegate Plugin to an Asset. This plugin allows a delegate to transfer the Asset at any time.\nAdding a Transfer Plugin to an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { addPlugin } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst delegate = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222')\n\nawait addPlugin(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAddress,\n\nplugin: {\n\ntype: 'TransferDelegate',\n\nauthority: { type: 'Address', address: delegate },\n\n},\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nDelegate the Transfer Authority\nThe approvePluginAuthority command delegates the transfer authority to a different address. This allows another address to transfer the Asset while maintaining ownership.\nDelegate the Transfer Authority\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { approvePluginAuthority } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = publicKey(\"11111111111111111111111111111111\");\n\nconst collection = publicKey(\"22222222222222222222222222222222\");\n\nconst delegateAddress = publicKey(\"33333333333333333333333333333333\");\n\nawait approvePluginAuthority(umi, {\n\nasset: asset,\n\ncollection: collection,\n\nplugin: { type: \"TransferDelegate\" },\n\nnewAuthority: { type: \"Address\", address: delegateAddress },\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\nTransferring an Asset As Delegate\nThe transfer instruction transfers an Asset to another address using the transfer delegate authority.\nTransfer an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport {\n\nfetchAsset,\n\nfetchCollection,\n\ntransfer,\n\n} from \"@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core\";\n\nimport { publicKey } from \"@metaplex-foundation/umi\";\n\n// Asset ID you wish to transfer\n\nconst assetId = publicKey(\"11111111111111111111111111111111\");\n\n// Fetch the Asset\n\nconst assetItem = await fetchAsset(umi, assetId);\n\n// Fetch collection if Asset is apart of collection\n\nconst collectionItem =\n\nassetItem.updateAuthority.type == \"Collection\" &&\n\nassetItem.updateAuthority.address\n\n? await fetchCollection(umi, assetItem.updateAuthority.address)\n\n: undefined;\n\n// Transfer the Core NFT Asset\n\nconst { signature } = await transfer(umi, {\n\nasset: assetItem,\n\nnewOwner: publicKey(\"22222222222222222222222222222222\"),\n\ncollection: collectionItem,\n\n})\n\n.sendAndConfirm(umi);\n\nUpdating Transfer Delegate Authority\nSince the Transfer Delegate plugin doesn't contain plugin data to update (it's an empty object {}), the main \"update\" operation is changing the plugin authority. This allows you to delegate transfer permissions to different addresses.\nChanging the Transfer Delegate Authority\nYou can change who has transfer authority using the approvePluginAuthority function:\nUpdate Transfer Delegate Authority\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { approvePluginAuthority } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\n(async () => {\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst newDelegate = publicKey('44444444444444444444444444444444')\n\n// Change the transfer delegate to a new address\n\nawait approvePluginAuthority(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAddress,\n\nplugin: { type: 'TransferDelegate' },\n\nnewAuthority: { type: 'Address', address: newDelegate },\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\n})();\n\nRevoking Transfer Delegate Authority\nThe transfer authority can be revoked using the revokePluginAuthority function, returning transfer control to the asset owner.\nRevoke Transfer Delegate Authority\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { revokePluginAuthority } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nawait revokePluginAuthority(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAddress,\n\nplugin: { type: 'TransferDelegate' },\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nAuthority mismatch\nOnly the transfer delegate authority can transfer the Asset. Verify you're signing with the correct keypair.\nAsset is frozen\nFrozen Assets cannot be transferred. The freeze authority must thaw the Asset first.\nTransfer delegate not found\nThe Asset doesn't have a Transfer Delegate plugin or authority was already revoked after a previous transfer.\nNotes\nOwner Managed: requires owner signature to add\nAuthority is automatically revoked after transfer\nEach transfer requires re-delegation by the new owner\nFrozen Assets cannot be transferred by delegates\nUse Permanent Transfer Delegate for persistent authority\nQuick Reference\nAuthority Lifecycle\nEventAuthority Status\nPlugin added\nActive\n\nAsset transferred\nRevoked\n\nNew owner adds plugin\nActive (new delegate)\n\nWho Can Transfer?\nAuthorityCan Transfer?\nAsset Owner\nYes (always)\n\nTransfer Delegate\nYes (once)\n\nPermanent Transfer Delegate\nYes (always)\n\nUpdate Authority\nNo\n\nFAQ\nWhy was my transfer authority revoked?\nTransfer Delegate authority is automatically revoked after any transfer. This is by design for marketplace safety - the delegate can only transfer once.\nHow do I implement escrowless listings?\nSeller adds Transfer Delegate with marketplace as authority\nWhen buyer pays, marketplace transfers Asset to buyer\nAuthority is revoked; seller can't double-list\nWhat's the difference between Transfer Delegate and Permanent Transfer Delegate?\nTransfer Delegate is revoked after one transfer. Permanent Transfer Delegate persists forever and can only be added at Asset creation.\nCan I transfer a frozen Asset as a delegate?\nNo. Frozen Assets block all transfers including delegate transfers. Use Permanent Transfer Delegate with a Permanent Freeze Delegate for complex escrow scenarios.\nDoes the owner need to approve each transfer?\nNo. Once the Transfer Delegate is set, the delegate can transfer without owner approval. However, they can only do it once before authority is revoked.\nRelated Plugins\nPermanent Transfer Delegate - Irrevocable transfer authority\nFreeze Delegate - Block transfers temporarily\nBurn Delegate - Allow delegate to burn Assets\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nTransfer Delegate\nOwner Managed plugin allowing one-time transfer authority\n\nOwner Managed\nPlugin type requiring owner signature to add\n\nEscrowless\nSelling without transferring to a holding account\n\nPermanent Transfer Delegate\nIrrevocable version added at creation","tokens":2152,"crawled_at":1791194478772} +{"id":10387,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/protecting-developers-cftc-rules-blockchains","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"Protecting developers: Why the CFTC should clarify rules for blockchain protocols and apps - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nProtecting developers: Why the CFTC should clarify rules for blockchain protocols and apps\nMiles Jennings, Michele Korver, Aiden Slavin, and David Sverdlov\n12.16.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\ncomment letters & amicus briefs\nDeFi\npolicy & regulation\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nIn August, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) launched the Crypto Sprint to provide regulatory clarity and foster innovation in digital asset markets. Seeking to implement the recommendations in the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets report, this effort aims to clarify the applicability of CFTC registration requirements to decentralized finance (DeFi).\n\nTo support this goal, we recently submitted a response to the CFTC which proposes three concrete, actionable measures within the agency’s current authority that would protect developers creating DeFi derivatives products and services in the United States, and further the Trump Administration’s goal of making the United States the “crypto capital of the world.”\n\nWhat’s the problem?\n\nBlockchain technology has the potential to revolutionize financial markets, including derivatives markets. Specifically, blockchain networks and smart contract protocols, together with the apps (frontend websites and applications) people use to access them, offer significant advantages over traditional derivatives markets. Those advantages include:\n\npeer-to-peer transactions without intermediaries,\n\nlower transaction costs,\n\nuser control of assets through self-custody,\n\nauditable and verifiable records on public blockchains,\n\noperations in accordance with transparent rules rather than by opaque discretion, and\n\nvirtually instantaneous settlement.\n\nYet, to date, the development of DeFi derivatives products has occurred largely offshore because it is not clear when the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) requires exchange or intermediary registration — or indeed, whether the CEA assumes the presence of such registered third parties. As a result, it is altogether impossible for DeFi products and services to comply.\n\nMaking matters worse, the CFTC under the previous administration brought a series of imprecise enforcement actions that adopted expansive and novel interpretations of their own authority, particularly by failing to distinguish between protocol functionality, app functionality, and the products for which they may be used, and providing inconsistent and contradictory guidance as to what types of conduct give rise to which registration obligations.\n\nThis uncertainty has a real cost. U.S. developers are shifting activity overseas because it is unclear how the CEA and existing CFTC rules apply to decentralized, non-custodial systems. As a result, while the market for tokenized and onchain derivatives has expanded substantially, this growth has primarily occurred outside of the United States, to the detriment of U.S. users, traders, and developers.\n\nWithout a clear framework, domestic users lose access to onchain alternatives, and it becomes more difficult for regulators to oversee digital asset businesses. The CFTC has a unique opportunity to provide clarity, guidance, and a regulatory path that will reverse this unfortunate state of affairs, provide adequate protections to developers, and allow DeFi innovation to flourish in U.S. financial markets.\n\nWhat’s the solution?\n\nIn line with the agency’s statutory mandate to promote innovation, we propose three measures that the CFTC can undertake to help bring DeFi derivatives products back to the United States — while also preserving the safety and integrity of U.S. financial markets:\n\n1. The CFTC should make a clear and emphatic statement that neither blockchain networks and smart contract protocols nor their developers are subject to the CEA’s registration requirements. This statement should acknowledge the limits of the CFTC’s authority to regulate software, particularly where that software is not operationally controlled by any person, including where such systems are:\n\nAutonomous, executing and enforcing transactions and other activities without human intermediation and without any person having unilateral authority to alter functionality.\n\nPermissionless, not restricting access or empowering any person to restrict access.\n\nCredibly neutral, not granting anyone private permissions, hard-coded privileges, or similar rights over others that would enable them to discriminate.\n\nNon-custodial, enabling participants to maintain total independent control of digital assets owned by them.\n\nImportantly, any such requirements established by the CFTC should take into account both the potential benefits of blockchain technology and the risks that may arise from the elimination of operational control. The CFTC should consider and recognize the ways in which the nature of blockchain technology and the manner in which blockchain networks and smart contract protocols function may be consistent with the statutory objectives of the CEA in novel ways.\n\n2. The CFTC should provide no-action relief and/or interpretive guidance confirming when apps are not engaged in activity that requires registering with the CFTC. For example, apps are not engaged in conduct triggering CFTC registration where they do not take custody or control of user assets, do not exercise discretion with respect to user-initiated transactions, do not solicit or provide investment recommendations, do not provide tailored derivatives trading advice, and do not act as a counterparty to any transaction initiated by the user.\n\nThis relief and/or guidance should also address potential off-exchange trading, indicating what users apps may enable to access protocols, registered exchanges or intermediaries, or exempt exchanges or intermediaries. In addition, the CFTC should clarify what steps taken by an app to exclude U.S. person access are sufficient to remain outside of the CFTC’s territorial jurisdiction.\n\n3. The CFTC should engage in formal rulemaking and/or adopt exemptive relief to provide a safe harbor or innovation exemption setting out the circumstances and way in which apps, where they fall outside of the above proposal, can still comply with the CEA and CFTC rules via a tailored registration pathway.\n\nWhy now?\n\nThe market for DeFi derivatives has continued to grow rapidly — just last month, the trading volume of perpetual futures products alone exceeded $1 trillion. Without regulatory clarity much of this activity will continue to occur offshore. This problem is also unlikely to be addressed in crypto market structure legislation, which focuses on digital assets that are not derivatives, like network tokens, and spot markets for such assets.\n\nClear rules would give the CFTC better visibility into onchain activity and ensure that, in line with its mandate, innovation happens in the United States rather than offshore. With builders seeking workable compliance pathways and the technology maturing quickly, this is the right moment to create a framework that protects users while strengthening America’s competitiveness in the future of financial markets.\n\nRead our full proposal.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nYou should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":2576,"crawled_at":1791194463040} +{"id":10388,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/testing","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Testing – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Testing\n\nForge runs tests written in Solidity. Test files live in test/ and test functions are prefixed with test.\n\n$ forge test\n\nCompiling...\nNo files changed, compilation skipped\nRan 2 tests for test/Counter.t.sol:CounterTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_SetNumber(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 50747, ~: 52565)\n[PASS] test_Increment() (gas: 51847)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.09ms (3.85ms CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 8.57ms (4.09ms CPU time): 2 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (2 total tests)\n\nWriting tests\n\nCreate a test contract that inherits from Test:\n\ntest/Counter.t.sol\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.13;\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\nimport {Counter} from \"../src/Counter.sol\";\n\ncontract CounterTest is Test {\nCounter counter;\n\nfunction setUp() public {\ncounter = new Counter();\n}\n\nfunction test_Increment() public {\ncounter.increment();\nassertEq(counter.number(), 1);\n}\n\nfunction test_SetNumber() public {\ncounter.setNumber(42);\nassertEq(counter.number(), 42);\n}\n}\n\nKey conventions:\n\nTest files end with .t.sol\n\nTest contracts inherit from forge-std/Test.sol\n\nTest functions start with test_ or test\n\nsetUp() runs before each test\n\nCall isolation\n\nForge runs tests with call isolation enabled by default. In isolation mode, each top-level external call made by a test is executed as a separate transaction in a separate EVM context. This gives more precise gas accounting and transaction state changes for each call.\n\nBecause those calls use separate transaction contexts, a test function is not always equivalent to one normal transaction with warmed accounts or storage slots shared across every external call in the function body. For example, repeated calls to the same contract can be charged as cold again under isolation. If a test intentionally asserts behavior that depends on warm accounts or slots carrying across repeated calls in one transaction, run it with --no-isolate or set isolate = false in foundry.toml.\n\nTraces\n\nTraces show a tree of all calls made during a test, helping you understand execution flow and debug failures.\n\nStack traces\n\nWhen a test fails, use -vvv to see a stack trace showing exactly where the revert occurred. This is the most common way to debug test failures.\n\n$ forge test -vvv\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 640.34ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 1 test for test/FailingTest.t.sol:VaultTest\n[FAIL: Unauthorized()] test_WithdrawAsNotOwner() (gas: 8418)\nTraces:\n[8418] VaultTest::test_WithdrawAsNotOwner()\n├─ [0] VM::prank(ECRecover: [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001])\n│ └─ ← [Return]\n├─ [191] Vault::withdraw() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Revert] Unauthorized()\n└─ ← [Revert] Unauthorized()\nBacktrace:\nat Vault.withdraw\nat VaultTest.test_WithdrawAsNotOwner\nSuite result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 329.35µs (58.54µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 8.10ms (329.35µs CPU time): 0 tests passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nThe trace shows the call hierarchy with the revert bubbling up, and the Backtrace pinpoints the exact location in your code.\n\nFull traces\n\nUse -vvvv to see traces for all tests, including passing ones. This helps you understand execution flow, verify call order, and check gas usage for individual operations.\n\n$ forge test -vvvv\n\nCompiling...\nNo files changed, compilation skipped\nRan 1 test for test/OwnerUpOnly.t.sol:OwnerUpOnlyTest\n[PASS] test_IncrementAsOwner() (gas: 59372)\nTraces:\n[59372] OwnerUpOnlyTest::test_IncrementAsOwner()\n├─ [2407] OwnerUpOnly::count() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Return] 0\n├─ [43524] OwnerUpOnly::increment()\n│ └─ ← [Stop]\n├─ [2407] OwnerUpOnly::count() [staticcall]\n│ └─ ← [Return] 1\n└─ ← [Stop]\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 287.16µs (62.42µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 6.97ms (287.16µs CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nReading traces\n\nGas costs appear in brackets: [29808]\n\nContract and function names are color-coded\n\nCall types are annotated: [staticcall] for view/pure functions\n\nReturn values show what each call returned: ← [Return] 0 for a value, ← [Stop] for void\n\nIndentation shows the call hierarchy—nested calls are indented under their parent\n\nVerbosity levels\n\nControl how much detail Forge outputs with -v flags:\n\nFlagShows\n(none)\nPass/fail summary only\n\n-v\nTest names\n\n-vv\nLogs emitted during tests\n\n-vvv\nTraces for failing tests\n\n-vvvv\nTraces for all tests, including setup\n\n-vvvvv\nTraces with storage changes\n\nUse -vvv for debugging failures, -vvvv when you need to see successful test execution, and -vvvvv when tracking state changes.\n\nFiltering tests\n\nRun specific tests:\n\nBy name:\n\n$ forge test --match-test test_DepositETH\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 672.77ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 1 test for test/ComplicatedContract.t.sol:ComplicatedContractTest\n[PASS] test_DepositETH() (gas: 107628)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 696.56µs (473.12µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 7.25ms (696.56µs CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nBy contract:\n\n$ forge test --match-contract ComplicatedContractTest\n\nCompiling...\nNo files changed, compilation skipped\nRan 2 tests for test/ComplicatedContract.t.sol:ComplicatedContractTest\n[PASS] test_DepositERC20() (gas: 179207)\n[PASS] test_DepositETH() (gas: 107628)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.12ms (1.34ms CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 7.20ms (1.12ms CPU time): 2 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (2 total tests)\n\nBy path:\n\n$ forge test --match-path test/ContractB.t.sol\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 634.45ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 1 test for test/ContractB.t.sol:ContractBTest\n[PASS] testExample() (gas: 257)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 241.60µs (45.16µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 7.03ms (241.60µs CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nCombine filters:\n\n$ forge test --match-contract ComplicatedContractTest --match-test test_Deposit\n\nCompiling...\nNo files changed, compilation skipped\nRan 2 tests for test/ComplicatedContract.t.sol:ComplicatedContractTest\n[PASS] test_DepositERC20() (gas: 179207)\n[PASS] test_DepositETH() (gas: 107628)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.14ms (1.51ms CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 7.10ms (1.14ms CPU time): 2 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (2 total tests)\n\nExclude tests with --no-match-* variants:\n\n$ forge test --no-match-test test_Skip\n\nFuzz testing\n\nForge automatically fuzzes test functions that take parameters:\n\nfunction testFuzz_SetNumber(uint256 x) public {\ncounter.setNumber(x);\nassertEq(counter.number(), x);\n}\n\nForge generates random inputs and runs the test multiple times (256 by default):\n\n$ forge test\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 635.50ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 1 test for test/Safe.t.sol:SafeTest\n[PASS] testFuzz_Withdraw(uint96) (runs: 256, μ: 40722, ~: 40932)\nSuite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.47ms (4.14ms CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 8.03ms (4.47ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)\n\nConfigure fuzzing:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[fuzz]\nruns = 1000\nmax_test_rejects = 65536\nseed = \"0x1234\"\n\nConstrain inputs with vm.assume():\n\nfunction testFuzz_Transfer(uint256 amount) public {\nvm.assume(amount > 0 && amount <= 1000 ether);\n// Test with constrained amount\n}\n\nOr use bound() to clamp values:\n\nfunction testFuzz_Transfer(uint256 amount) public {\namount = bound(amount, 1, 1000 ether);\n// Test with bounded amount\n}\n\nTable testing\n\nFoundry v1.3.0 comes with support for table testing, which enables the definition of a dataset (the \"table\") and the execution of a test function for each entry in that dataset. This approach helps ensure that certain combinations of inputs and conditions are tested.\n\nIn forge, table tests are functions named with table prefix that accepts datasets as one or multiple arguments:\n\nfunction tableSumsTest(TestCase memory sums) public\n\nfunction tableSumsTest(TestCase memory sums, bool enable) public\n\nThe datasets are defined as forge fixtures which can be:\n\nstorage arrays prefixed with fixture prefix and followed by dataset name\n\nfunctions named with fixture prefix, followed by dataset name. Function should return an (fixed size or dynamic) array of values.\n\nSingle dataset\n\nIn following example, tableSumsTest test will be executed twice, with inputs from fixtureSums dataset: once with TestCase(1, 2, 3) and once with TestCase(4, 5, 9).\n\nstruct TestCase {\nuint256 a;\nuint256 b;\nuint256 expected;\n}\n\nfunction fixtureSums() public returns (TestCase[] memory) {\nTestCase[] memory entries = new TestCase[](2);\nentries[0] = TestCase(1, 2, 3);\nentries[1] = TestCase(4, 5, 9);\nreturn entries;\n}\n\nfunction tableSumsTest(TestCase memory sums) public pure {\nrequire(sums.a + sums.b == sums.expected, \"wrong sum\");\n}\n\nIt is required to name the tableSumsTest's TestCase parameter sums as the parameter name is resolved against the available fixtures (fixtureSums). In this example, if the parameter is not named sums the following error is raised: [FAIL: Table test should have fixtures defined].\n\nMultiple datasets\n\ntableSwapTest test will be executed twice, by using values at the same position from fixtureWallet and fixtureSwap datasets.\n\nstruct Wallet {\naddress owner;\nuint256 amount;\n}\n\nstruct Swap {\nbool swap;\nuint256 amount;\n}\n\nWallet[] public fixtureWallet;\nSwap[] public fixtureSwap;\n\nfunction setUp() public {\n// first table test input\nfixtureWallet.push(Wallet(address(11), 11));\nfixtureSwap.push(Swap(true, 11));\n\n// second table test input\nfixtureWallet.push(Wallet(address(12), 12));\nfixtureSwap.push(Swap(false, 12));\n}\n\nfunction tableSwapTest(Wallet memory wallet, Swap memory swap) public pure {\nrequire(\n(wallet.owner == address(11) && swap.swap) || (wallet.owner == address(12) && !swap.swap), \"not allowed\"\n);\n}\n\nThe same naming requirement mentioned above is relevant here.\n\nMutation testing\n\nMutation testing checks the strength of your test suite by making small changes, or mutants, to your source code and re-running your tests. A mutant is killed when at least one test fails. A mutant survives when the changed code still passes the selected tests.\n\nSee the mutation testing guide to select source files and tests, configure parallel workers and operators, interpret reports, and understand current limitations.\n\nBrutalized testing\n\nBrutalized testing checks whether code remains robust when values and memory are dirtier than the assumptions made by clean, ordinary test executions. It is useful for contracts that use inline assembly, narrow integer or fixed-bytes casts, addresses, or low-level memory handling.\n\nRun the selected tests against brutalized sources with forge test --brutalize:\n\n$ forge test --brutalize\n\nForge copies the project into a temporary workspace, rewrites source files under src/, compiles that temporary project, and runs the selected tests there. Test files (.t.sol) and scripts (.s.sol) are not rewritten.\n\nBrutalization applies deterministic source rewrites that:\n\ndirty unused upper bits in casts to address, smaller uint/int types, and fixed-size bytes types\n\nfill scratch space (0x00 through 0x3f) and memory beyond the free memory pointer before eligible external assembly functions run\n\nmisalign the free memory pointer by a small deterministic odd offset\n\nIf forge test passes but forge test --brutalize fails, the code under test likely depends on assumptions that are not guaranteed in every caller context, such as clean upper bits, zeroed memory, or word-aligned free memory.\n\nRegular test filters still apply:\n\n$ forge test --brutalize --match-contract VaultTest\n$ forge test --brutalize --match-test testWithdraw\n\n--brutalize is separate from mutation testing. Mutation testing changes code to evaluate test quality; brutalized testing changes call and memory conditions to evaluate code robustness. Because they answer different questions, --brutalize cannot be combined with --mutate.\n\nSymbolic testing\n\nSymbolic testing explores your code with symbolic inputs instead of concrete ones, searching feasible execution paths within the current symbolic EVM model and configured bounds for a counterexample that violates a property. When Forge reports a failure, it first replays the concrete input or invariant sequence through the normal executor, so the failure is backed by a concrete example.\n\nSymbolic tests are Solidity functions named check* or prove*. They are only discovered when symbolic mode is enabled with --symbolic:\n\ncontract MathSymbolicTest is Test {\nfunction check_average(uint256 a, uint256 b) external pure {\nuint256 average;\nunchecked {\naverage = (a + b) / 2;\n}\n\n// Forge should find an overflow counterexample.\nassertGe(average, a <= b ? a : b);\n}\n}\n\nRun it with:\n\n$ forge test --symbolic --match-test check_average\n\nSymbolic testing requires an SMT solver to be installed. The default solver is z3:\n\n$ brew install z3 # macOS\n$ sudo apt-get install z3 # Ubuntu\n\nWriting symbolic tests\n\nFunction parameters become symbolic inputs derived from the ABI, and the executor explores the feasible paths:\n\nrequire(...) and vm.assume(...) prune paths when their condition is false.\n\nassert, forge-std assertions, and DSTest failure signals are treated as properties to disprove.\n\nUser reverts terminate the current path.\n\nWhen --symbolic is enabled, invariant* and statefulFuzz* functions are explored as bounded symbolic call sequences instead of using the normal fuzzer.\n\nResults\n\nForge reports symbolic outcomes as:\n\nPASS: every explored path finished without a feasible failure under the currently modeled semantics and configured bounds.\n\nFAIL: the solver found a failing input or invariant sequence, and Forge replayed it concretely before reporting it.\n\nFAIL: incomplete symbolic execution (...) / Incomplete: Forge could not complete the search or validate a counterexample. Treat this as \"not established\", not as a proof.\n\nA PASS is scoped to the current symbolic model and configured bounds; it does not cover skipped dynamic lengths, deeper invariant sequences, larger loop bounds, unmodeled behavior, arbitrary unknown external code, or cryptographic preimage/collision properties.\n\nConfiguration\n\nTune the exploration bounds and solver in foundry.toml:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[profile.default.symbolic]\nsolver = \"z3\"\ntimeout = 30\nmax_depth = 10000\nmax_paths = 1024\nmax_solver_queries = 10000\n\nSymbolic exploration is bounded by configuration, including symbolic.max_depth, symbolic.max_paths, symbolic.max_solver_queries, dynamic calldata length settings, and symbolic.invariant_depth.\n\nBounds can also be set per test with inline forge-config annotations:\n\n/// forge-config: default.symbolic.invariant_depth = 4\nfunction invariant_counterNeverFive() public view {\nassertTrue(counter.value() != 5);\n}\n\nLimitations\n\nThe symbolic engine is not a complete revm-equivalent EVM model. Unsupported constructs report incomplete rather than a proof, and some supported semantics are bounded or approximate. Notable gaps include gas accounting, Cancun+ SELFDESTRUCT, arbitrary unknown external code, and cryptographic preimage or collision properties. The exact unsupported-feature reason is preserved in the test output.\n\nFor a counterexample-to-fix workflow, including durable JSON artifacts, concrete replay, generated regression tests, fuzz corpus integration, and CI handoffs, see the symbolic testing workflow.\n\nTesting reverts\n\nUse vm.expectRevert() to test that a call reverts:\n\nfunction test_RevertWhen_Unauthorized() public {\nvm.expectRevert(\"Not authorized\");\nrestricted.doSomething();\n}\n\nMatch a custom error:\n\nfunction test_RevertWhen_InsufficientBalance() public {\nvm.expectRevert(Token.InsufficientBalance.selector);\ntoken.transfer(address(0), 1000);\n}\n\n$ forge test --match-test \"test_IncrementAsOwner|test_RevertWhen_CallerIsNotOwner\" --match-path test/OwnerUpOnly.t.sol\n\nSolc 0.8.10 finished in 699.33ms\nCompiler run successful!\nRan 2 tests for test/OwnerUpOnly.t.sol:OwnerUpOnlyTest\n[PASS] test_IncrementAsOwner() (gas: 59372)\n[PASS] test_RevertWhen_CallerIsNotOwner() (gas: 29987)\nSuite result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 474.90µs (238.18µs CPU time)\nRan 1 test suite in 6.95ms (474.90µs CPU time): 2 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (2 total tests)\n\nTesting events\n\nUse vm.expectEmit() to verify events are emitted:\n\nfunction test_EmitsTransfer() public {\nvm.expectEmit(true, true, false, true);\nemit Transfer(alice, bob, 100);\n\ntoken.transfer(bob, 100);\n}\n\nThe four booleans specify which topics and data to check.\n\nForking\n\nTest against live chain state:\n\n$ forge test --fork-url https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\n\nOr configure in foundry.toml:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[profile.default]\neth_rpc_url = \"https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\"\n\nPin to a specific block for reproducible tests:\n\n$ forge test --fork-url https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc --fork-block-number 18000000\n\nCheatcodes\n\nForge provides cheatcodes via the vm object to manipulate the test environment:\n\n// Set block timestamp\nvm.warp(1700000000);\n\n// Set block number\nvm.roll(18000000);\n\n// Impersonate an address\nvm.prank(alice);\ncontract.doSomething();\n\n// Give ETH to an address\nvm.deal(alice, 100 ether);\n\n// Modify storage\nvm.store(address(token), bytes32(0), bytes32(uint256(1000)));\n\nSee the cheatcodes reference for the full list.\n\nWatch mode\n\nRe-run tests when files change:\n\n$ forge test --watch\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHub","tokens":4361,"crawled_at":1791194473673} +{"id":10389,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/u/cp0x","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Profile - cp0x - Uniswap Governance","text":"cp0x\n\nLinks: cp0x.com - delegations - staking - X - Telegram - YouTube\n\ncp0x is a crypto community working in the space since 2016. We take part in governance across 20+ DAOs, run a liquidity hub with curated DeFi deals and trading competitions, build permissionless interfaces to DeFi protocols, and run validators, sequencers, operators and indexers in various networks. We also run a YouTube channel where we talk to founders and developers about protocols and the market.\n\nHow we vote\n\nFairness. We stand against reckless spending and look for solutions that benefit everyone equally.\n\nTransparency. Our decisions are consistent.\n\nDecentralisation. We support what reduces reliance on single players or foundations.\n\nWe verify proposals ourselves rather than relying on their description. We vote against what centralises power, obscures spending or spends without justification. Where there is not enough information we abstain, and where the consequences are ambiguous we take it back to the community.","tokens":252,"crawled_at":1791194475684} +{"id":10390,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/founders-policymakers-guide","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"How founders can talk with policymakers: A guide - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nHow founders can talk with policymakers: A guide\nMiles Jennings, Collin McCune, and Aiden Slavin\n12.02.25\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n#1: Tell your story #1: Tell your story\n#2: Know your audience\n#3: Avoid jargon\n#4: Be specific, but stay balanced\n#5: Get organized\nTags\ncompany building\ngovernance\npolicy & regulation\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nCrypto policymaking continues to advance in the United States, and the stakes couldn’t be higher: Policy will determine not only how crypto companies can operate, but whether the values of openness, competition, and user-control are realized in the internet’s next era.\n\nThat’s why builders can’t sit on the sidelines. The only way the industry will get the policy and regulation it needs to thrive is to engage in the policymaking process: The rules that govern crypto will be informed by those who show up.\n\nSo how can builders, entrepreneurs, and innovators work with policymakers and legislators effectively? First, figure out who you want to talk with: your state legislators, regulators at agencies like the SEC or CFTC, or the representatives who speak for you in Washington. Once you pick your target, here are five tactics to help make your advocacy as successful as possible.\n\n#1: Tell your story\n\nPolicymaking is about people, so make your work personal. When policymakers decide how to approach new technologies, they aren’t legislating abstractions. They’re thinking about jobs, constituents, and communities. That’s why your story matters.\n\nTell them what problem you’re solving, why it matters, and who you are (including why you are the one solving this problem) — in human terms.\n\nTalk about the community you’re building for, and the economic opportunity you’re creating. As a developer, explain how your work improves security, transparency, or user control. Highlight the jobs and innovation your work enables. And, if you can, tie these outcomes to the issues and constituencies that the office you’re talking to cares about most.\n\nGood policy conversations connect your work to the policymaker’s mission:\n\nEconomic growth: How does your work contribute to competitiveness or productivity?\n\nConsumer protection: How does your approach keep users safe?\n\nFinancial inclusion: How does your work expand access, ensure equality, and create opportunity?\n\nWhen you link your story to shared goals like these, you’re no longer just talking about your company or a protocol, you’re talking about public outcomes — goals the policymaker on the other side of the table cares about. It’s the language policymakers speak.\n\nAnd don’t underestimate the power of excitement. Innovation is inherently optimistic: It’s an act of belief that technology can make the world better. That kind of optimism has always been the engine of American progress, from the railroad to the internet.\n\nThis is especially true for crypto. Crypto is rooted in the belief that little tech is giving people control over their data, identity, and economic lives through decentralization, rather than consolidating power in a few large institutions. When you talk to policymakers, connect your work to that ethos. Explain how decentralization supports competition, growth, and user empowerment — goals that align with both innovation and public interest.\n\n#2: Know your audience\n\nEvery policymaker has a different focus. No two offices are alike. Some lawmakers are technologists by training; others are focused on agriculture or healthcare. Staffers might handle a dozen issue areas at once. So think about how you’re going to tailor your message to each person’s level of knowledge and policy priorities.\n\nWhere to start? Do your homework before every meeting. Connect with others in industry who have met with them before (see tactic #5 below). Review their past statements, social media posts, press releases, and voting record. Scan hearing transcripts to understand their tone — are they skeptical, curious, or supportive of innovation? Have they worked on crypto issues before? Learn what’s happening in their district or state: Is there a local company or workforce issue that connects to your work? This doesn’t need to take a lot of time, but doing the work is going to lead to a better outcome.\n\nUnderstanding context turns a generic briefing into a more meaningful exchange. It’s also practical: Policymakers and their staff are extremely busy. Most meetings last 15 to 30 minutes, sometimes less. The more you can tailor your ask to their priorities, the better. You may only get one or two key points across, so make them count.\n\nFinally, remember that staff is key. The staffers you meet often write the memos, draft the questions for hearings, and brief the principal before key votes. Treat them with the same respect and engagement you would give an elected official.\n\n#3: Avoid jargon\n\nThe goal is clarity, not complexity. Every field develops its own language — and crypto can be worse than many when it comes to industry jargon. Terms like “composability,” “zero-knowledge proofs,” and “skeuomorphism” can quickly alienate someone unfamiliar with the space.\n\nOf course, technical terms have their place, but they shouldn’t be the headline. Your goal isn’t to teach a crash course in protocol design; it’s to explain why your technology matters and what policies it needs to thrive.\n\nWhat does this mean in practice? Instead of: “Our protocol uses zk-SNARKs to preserve user privacy without compromising verifiability,” you could try: “We build tools to make financial transactions verifiable and private.” That’s not dumbing it down, it’s making it accessible.\n\nAvoid factual overload too. Policymakers process massive volumes of information every day. A clear, simple message, supported by one or two memorable facts or examples, will resonate far more than a dense technical briefing.\n\nThink of succinctness as credibility: The ability to translate complex ideas into plain English demonstrates mastery, enhancing your trustworthiness.\n\n#4: Be specific, but stay balanced\n\nPolicymakers appreciate pragmatism. Once you’ve told your story and established trust, be clear about what you want. If there’s a specific policy or regulation you support or oppose, explain clearly and specifically what that policy gets right or wrong, what outcome you would like to see, and why it matters.\n\nMake your ask as actionable as possible. The more you can tie your position to outcomes that the policymaker cares about, the better (see #2, above: You did your homework, right?). If you have data or case studies, use them. Show where similar policies have worked, whether in another jurisdiction or another sector. Policymakers like to see that a proposal has precedent or demonstrable results.\n\nBut be upfront about risks or tradeoffs, too. Acknowledging uncertainty strengthens your credibility. Saying “here’s what we know, here’s what we don’t, and here’s how we can mitigate risk” builds trust. And when possible, frame your ideas as win-wins — policies that advance multiple objectives: innovation and safety, growth and inclusion. The best proposals solve more than one problem at once.\n\n#5: Get organized\n\nCollaboration is a force multiplier. While individual stories and specific advocacy matter, coordinated group action is what drives policy wins. When engaging policymakers, builders shouldn’t underestimate the power of organizing coalitions. By working with others in the industry — and in your local community — you can ensure that your signal cuts through the noise.\n\nWhy does coalition-building matter? For one, coalitional support provides evidence of a proposal’s value. Lawmakers are more inclined to give credence to a group of responsible actors collectively voicing the need for change than a single company pursuing its own bottom line. Organization also helps policymakers see the bigger picture, enabling them to understand how a given proposal might impact a host of different participants.\n\nTeaming up through trade groups and local networks can help turn individual advocacy into lasting influence because those groups have infrastructure in place to continue advocating. Shared infrastructure — from policy roundtables to joint statements — helps translate innovation into impact.\n\nFortunately, builders don’t need to start from scratch. Over the past decade, the crypto industry has built a wide range of effective coalitions and conveners, at the state, federal, and even international levels.\n\nBut don’t use a coalition as an excuse not to do the work: You also need to show up to advocate personally for your own point of view, and to be present in the room.\n\n***\n\nPolicy development happens in bursts. A bill gets introduced, a hearing scheduled, a request for comment issued — these are the moments when lawmakers and regulators are listening. Seizing those moments matters.\n\nBut lasting impact doesn’t come from one-off interventions. It comes from trust built over time. So show up when windows of opportunity open, while investing in long-term relationships (not unlike how sales work, with long relationships and conversations preceding the signed deal.)\n\nStart early: Relationship-building is cumulative. Even short, informal conversations — at a hearing, in a roundtable, or through a trade association — can lay the groundwork for deeper engagement later. If you don’t have a direct line to the right policymaker or staffer, ask for an introduction. Industry groups, civil society organizations, or advocacy coalitions can often help open the door.\n\nSo determine what’s important to you, and join the conversation. There is plenty of work to do. The GENIUS rulemaking process has only just begun, and once market structure is signed into law, regulators will need to implement it to establish clear rules of the road for blockchain systems. Even as federal legislation comes online, U.S. states will continue to play a critical role in regulating the crypto industry. And abroad, key jurisdictions like the UK and South Korea are still in the process of defining their approach to crypto regulation.\n\nBut most of all, stay involved. In the words of former Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee (and a16z Senior Advisor) Patrick McHenry, “If you don’t engage, your competitor will.”\n\nIt’s time to engage.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nYou should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investment-list/.\n\nThe content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures/ for additional important information.","tokens":3367,"crawled_at":1791194488499} +{"id":10391,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/scripting","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Scripting – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nScripting\n\nForge scripts are Solidity files that deploy contracts and execute transactions on-chain. They replace deployment scripts traditionally written in JavaScript.\n\nFor sender selection, CREATE2, library linking, nonces, simulation, and resume semantics, see How scripting works.\n\nScript structure\n\nScripts inherit from Script and implement a run() function:\n\nscript/Deploy.s.sol\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.13;\n\nimport {Script} from \"forge-std/Script.sol\";\nimport {Counter} from \"../src/Counter.sol\";\n\ncontract DeployScript is Script {\nfunction run() public {\nvm.startBroadcast();\n\nCounter counter = new Counter();\ncounter.setNumber(42);\n\nvm.stopBroadcast();\n}\n}\n\nKey elements:\n\nInherit from forge-std/Script.sol\n\nScript files end with .s.sol\n\nWrap deployment logic in vm.startBroadcast() / vm.stopBroadcast()\n\nRunning scripts\n\nSimulate a deployment (no transactions sent):\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol\n\nBroadcast transactions to a network:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nUsing RPC aliases\n\nDefine aliases in foundry.toml and pass the alias to --rpc-url:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[rpc_endpoints]\nsepolia = \"${SEPOLIA_RPC_URL}\"\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url sepolia\n\nProviding a private key\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL --account deployer\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL --ledger\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL --browser\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL --private-key $PRIVATE_KEY\n\nSee Browser Wallet Signing for the local connection flow, network checks, and a simulation-first deployment workflow.\n\nBroadcasting from a specific address\n\nTo broadcast from a specific address:\n\nvm.startBroadcast(deployerAddress);\n\nOr derive the sender from a private key read from the environment:\n\nuint256 deployerPrivateKey = vm.envUint(\"PRIVATE_KEY\");\nvm.startBroadcast(deployerPrivateKey);\n\nThe address overload selects a transaction sender but does not supply a signing key. Provide a matching wallet when broadcasting, or use --unlocked with a node that controls that account. The private-key overload derives the address and adds the key to Forge's script wallets.\n\nStarting a broadcast changes the sender of outgoing calls; it does not change msg.sender in the script's current frame. Pass the intended owner or deployer explicitly in transaction arguments. Inside a contract called directly by the broadcast transaction, msg.sender is the transaction sender.\n\nOverriding the sender nonce\n\nBy default the sender's starting nonce is fetched from the RPC endpoint, or set to 1 when no endpoint is configured. Pass --sender-nonce to pin it instead:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --rpc-url $RPC_URL --sender-nonce 7\n\nThe override applies to script execution and transaction generation and is kept even when broadcasting switches to a different sender. Because addresses of contracts deployed with CREATE depend on the sender's nonce, this keeps simulated deployment addresses consistent with the nonce you plan to broadcast from. See forge script for the full option reference.\n\nVerifying deployed contracts\n\nVerify on Etherscan during deployment:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol \\\n--broadcast \\\n--rpc-url $RPC_URL \\\n--verify \\\n--etherscan-api-key $ETHERSCAN_API_KEY\n\nResuming failed broadcasts\n\nIf a broadcast fails partway through, resume from where it left off:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL --resume\n\nMulti-chain deployments\n\nDeploy to multiple chains by running the script with different RPC URLs:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $MAINNET_RPC\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $ARBITRUM_RPC\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --broadcast --rpc-url $OPTIMISM_RPC\n\nReading deployment artifacts\n\nScripts write transaction receipts to broadcast/. Access deployed addresses in subsequent scripts:\n\nfunction run() public {\nstring memory json = vm.readFile(\"broadcast/Deploy.s.sol/1/run-latest.json\");\naddress counter = vm.parseJsonAddress(json, \".transactions[0].contractAddress\");\n}\n\nScript cheatcodes\n\nScripts have access to all cheatcodes. Common ones for scripting:\n\n// Read environment variables\nstring memory rpcUrl = vm.envString(\"RPC_URL\");\nuint256 privateKey = vm.envUint(\"PRIVATE_KEY\");\n\n// Read/write files\nstring memory config = vm.readFile(\"config.json\");\nvm.writeFile(\"output.txt\", \"deployed\");\n\n// Parse JSON\naddress addr = vm.parseJsonAddress(json, \".address\");\n\n// Console logging\nconsole.log(\"Deploying to:\", block.chainid);\n\nDry run\n\nTest a script without sending transactions:\n\n$ forge script script/Deploy.s.sol --rpc-url $RPC_URL\n\nThis simulates against the live chain state and shows what would happen.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 01/10/2026, 19:51","tokens":1235,"crawled_at":1791194490940} +{"id":10392,"url":"https://www.metaplex.com/docs/smart-contracts/core/plugins/freeze-delegate","domain":"www.metaplex.com","chapter":"docs","title":"Freeze Delegate Plugin | Metaplex Core","text":"The Freeze Delegate Plugin allows you to freeze Core Assets, blocking transfers and burns while the asset remains in the owner's wallet. Perfect for escrowless staking, marketplace listings, and game mechanics.\nWhat You'll Learn\nAdd the Freeze Delegate plugin to an Asset\nFreeze and thaw Assets\nDelegate freeze authority to another address\nUse cases: staking, listings, game locking\n\nSummary\nThe Freeze Delegate is an Owner Managed plugin that freezes Assets in place. When frozen, the Asset cannot be transferred or burned until thawed by the freeze authority.\nFreeze Assets without transferring to escrow\nDelegate freeze authority to a program or other wallet\nAuthority is revoked on transfer (for non-permanent version)\nUse Permanent Freeze Delegate for irrevocable freezing\nOut of Scope\nCollection-level freezing (use Asset-level only), permanent freezing (see Permanent Freeze Delegate), and Token Metadata freeze authority (different system).\nQuick Start\nJump to: Add Plugin · Delegate Authority · Freeze · Thaw\nAdd the Freeze Delegate plugin: addPlugin(umi, { asset, plugin: { type: 'FreezeDelegate', data: { frozen: true } } })\nThe Asset is now frozen and cannot be transferred\nThaw when ready: update the plugin with frozen: false\nAuthority is revoked on transfer\nWhen to Use Freeze vs Permanent Freeze\nUse CaseFreeze DelegatePermanent Freeze Delegate\nMarketplace listings\n✅ Best choice\n❌ Overkill\n\nEscrowless staking\n✅ Best choice\n✅ Also works\n\nSoulbound tokens\n❌ Revokes on transfer\n✅ Best choice\n\nCollection-wide freeze\n❌ Assets only\n✅ Supports Collections\n\nRental protocols\n✅ Best choice\n✅ Also works\n\nChoose Freeze Delegate when authority should reset on ownership change.\n\nChoose Permanent Freeze Delegate when authority must persist forever.\n\nCommon Use Cases\nEscrowless staking: Freeze NFTs while staked without transferring to escrow\nMarketplace listings: Lock NFTs for sale without escrow accounts\nGame item locking: Temporarily lock items during gameplay\nRental protocols: Lock NFTs while rented out\nGovernance: Lock tokens during voting periods\nCollateral: Lock NFTs used as lending collateral\nTournaments: Lock NFTs during competition participation\nWorks With\n\nMPL Core Asset\n✅\n\nMPL Core Collection\n❌\n\nFor collection-level freezing, use Permanent Freeze Delegate instead.\n\nArguments\nArgValue\nfrozen\nbool\n\nFunctions\nAdd Freeze Delegate Plugin to an Asset\nThe addPlugin command adds the Freeze Delegate Plugin to an Asset. This plugin allows the Asset to be frozen, preventing transfers and burns.\nAdding a Freeze Plugin to an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { addPlugin } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nawait addPlugin(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAddress,\n\nplugin: { type: 'FreezeDelegate', data: { frozen: true } },\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nDelegate the Freeze Authority\nThe approvePluginAuthority command delegates the freeze authority to a different address. This allows another address to freeze and thaw the Asset while maintaining ownership.\nDelegate the Freeze Authority\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { approvePluginAuthority } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst asset = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst delegateAddress = publicKey('22222222222222222222222222222222')\n\nawait approvePluginAuthority(umi, {\n\nasset: asset.publicKey,\n\nplugin: { type: 'FreezeDelegate' },\n\nnewAuthority: { type: 'Address', address: delegateAddress },\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nUpdating the Freeze Delegate Plugin\nThe Freeze Delegate Plugin can be updated to change the frozen state of the asset. This is the same as using the Freezing an Asset and Thawing a Frozen Asset functions shown below.\nFreezing an Asset\nThe freezeAsset command freezes an Asset, preventing it from being transferred or burned. This is useful for escrowless staking or marketplace listings.\nFreeze an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { freezeAsset, fetchAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst assetAccount = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nconst delegateSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\nawait freezeAsset(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAccount,\n\ndelegate: delegateSigner.publicKey,\n\nauthority: delegateSigner,\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nThawing a Frozen Asset\nThe thawAsset command unfreezes a frozen Asset, restoring its ability to be transferred and burned.\nThaw an MPL Core Asset\n\nimport { publicKey } from '@metaplex-foundation/umi'\n\nimport { thawAsset, fetchAsset } from '@metaplex-foundation/mpl-core'\n\nconst assetAddress = publicKey('11111111111111111111111111111111')\n\nconst assetAccount = await fetchAsset(umi, assetAddress)\n\nconst delegateSigner = generateSigner(umi)\n\nawait thawAsset(umi, {\n\nasset: assetAccount,\n\ndelegate: delegateSigner,\n\n}).sendAndConfirm(umi)\n\nCommon Errors\nAsset is frozen\nYou tried to transfer or burn a frozen Asset. The freeze authority must thaw it first.\nAuthority mismatch\nOnly the freeze delegate authority can freeze/thaw the Asset. Check who has the plugin authority.\nPlugin not found\nThe Asset doesn't have a Freeze Delegate plugin. Add it first with addPlugin.\nNotes\nOwner Managed: requires owner signature to add\nAuthority is automatically revoked when the Asset transfers\nFrozen Assets can still be updated (metadata changes allowed)\nUse Permanent Freeze Delegate if you need the authority to persist after transfer\nFreezing is immediate - no confirmation period\nQuick Reference\nFreeze States\nStateCan TransferCan BurnCan Update\nUnfrozen\nYes\nYes\nYes\n\nFrozen\nNo\nNo\nYes\n\nAuthority Behavior\nEventAuthority Result\nAsset transfers\nAuthority revoked\n\nPlugin removed\nAuthority gone\n\nThaw\nAuthority retained\n\nFAQ\nCan I freeze an Asset I don't own?\nNo. The Freeze Delegate is Owner Managed, so only the owner can add it. After adding, you can delegate authority to another address.\nWhat's the difference between Freeze Delegate and Permanent Freeze Delegate?\nFreeze Delegate authority is revoked on transfer. Permanent Freeze Delegate authority persists forever and can only be added at creation time.\nCan a frozen Asset be burned?\nNo. Frozen Assets block both transfers and burns. Thaw the Asset first if you want to burn it.\nCan I freeze an entire Collection at once?\nNot with the regular Freeze Delegate (Assets only). Use Permanent Freeze Delegate on the Collection instead - it supports collection-level freezing and will freeze all Assets in that Collection at once. Note that Permanent Freeze Delegate can only be added at Collection creation time.\nDoes freezing affect metadata updates?\nNo. The Asset owner or update authority can still update metadata (name, URI) while frozen. Only transfers and burns are blocked.\nHow do I implement escrowless staking?\nAdd Freeze Delegate plugin with your staking program as authority\nWhen user stakes: freeze the Asset\nWhen user unstakes: thaw the Asset\nThe NFT never leaves the user's wallet\nRelated Plugins\nPermanent Freeze Delegate - Irrevocable freeze authority, supports Collections\nTransfer Delegate - Allow delegate to transfer Assets\nBurn Delegate - Allow delegate to burn Assets\nGlossary\nTermDefinition\nFreeze Delegate\nOwner Managed plugin that blocks transfers and burns\n\nFrozen\nAsset state where transfers and burns are blocked\n\nThaw\nUnfreezing an Asset to allow transfers again\n\nDelegate Authority\nThe account authorized to freeze/thaw the Asset\n\nEscrowless\nStaking/listing without transferring to a holding account\n\nOwner Managed\nPlugin type requiring owner signature to add","tokens":1909,"crawled_at":1791194514834} +{"id":10393,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/deepbook","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"DeepBook | Sui Documentation","text":"DeepBookDeepBookA decentralized central limit order book (CLOB) built on Sui. is Sui's native liquidity layer, providing a central limit order book for spot trading, margin trading, and prediction markets.\n\nBefore you build, decide how your code calls DeepBook. You can depend on the DeepBookV3 Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. from your own MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects., compose transactions with the TypeScript SDK, or read market data without signing transactions. See Choose your integration model to compare the options.\n\nDesign\nLearn about DeepBookV3 design, including the Pool, PoolRegistry, and BalanceManager shared objects.\n→\nFees and Funding\nHow DeepBook trading fees work and how to fund a BalanceManager with DEEP: paying fees in DEEP or the input token, the floating DEEP price, maker, taker, and staking fees, and obtaining Testnet DEEP, USDC, and SUI.\n→\nSpot Trading Workflow\nHands-on DeepBook spot walkthrough on Sui Testnet: create a BalanceManager, deposit, place a limit order, read status and fills, fill your own order, cancel, and withdraw, with real transactions to observe at each step.\n→\nDeepBookV3\nIn this section\nContract Information\nDeepBookV3 SDK\n\n→\nMargin\nIn this section\nDesign\nMargin Risks\nLeveraged Position Workflow\nIntegration\nContract Information\nDeepBook Margin SDK\n\n→\nPredict\nIn this section\nTestnet Workflow\nDesign\nContract Information\nDeepBook Predict SDK\n\n→\nOperate\nIn this section\nDeepBookV3 Indexer\nDeepBook Margin Indexer\n\n→","tokens":404,"crawled_at":1791194501602} +{"id":10394,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/projects/layout","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Project Layout – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nProject Layout\n\nFoundry uses a conventional directory structure. Configure paths in foundry.toml or use the defaults.\n\nDefault structure\n\nfoundry.tomlProject configuration\n\nContract source files\n\nTest files (*.t.sol)\n\nScript files (*.s.sol)\n\nGit submodule dependencies\n\nCompilation artifacts\n\nCompiler cache\n\nDeployment logs\n\nSource directories\n\nDirectoryPurposeConfig key\nsrc/\nProduction contracts\nsrc\n\ntest/\nTest contracts\ntest\n\nscript/\nDeployment scripts\nscript\n\nlib/\nDependencies\nlibs\n\nCustomize in foundry.toml:\n\n[profile.default]\nsrc = \"contracts\"\ntest = \"tests\"\nscript = \"scripts\"\nlibs = [\"lib\", \"node_modules\"]\n\nOutput directories\n\nDirectoryPurposeConfig key\nout/\nCompiled artifacts (ABI, bytecode)\nout\n\ncache/\nCompiler cache for incremental builds\ncache_path\n\nbroadcast/\nTransaction logs from script broadcasts\nbroadcast\n\nFile naming conventions\n\nFoundry identifies file types by suffix:\n\nSuffixTypeExample\n.sol\nContract\nToken.sol\n\n.t.sol\nTest\nToken.t.sol\n\n.s.sol\nScript\nDeploy.s.sol\n\nTests must also inherit from Test:\n\nimport {Test} from \"forge-std/Test.sol\";\n\ncontract TokenTest is Test {\n// ...\n}\n\nScripts must inherit from Script:\n\nimport {Script} from \"forge-std/Script.sol\";\n\ncontract DeployScript is Script {\n// ...\n}\n\nMonorepo setup\n\nFor monorepos with multiple Foundry projects, use a root foundry.toml or per-project configs.\n\nShare dependencies with a root lib/ directory:\n\n[profile.default]\nlibs = [\"lib\", \"../lib\"]\n\nOr use workspaces:\n\nfoundry.tomlRoot config (optional)\n\nShared dependencies\n\nfoundry.toml\n\nfoundry.toml\n\nRemappings\n\nControl import paths with remappings. Foundry auto-detects them from lib/, but you can customize:\n\n[profile.default]\nremappings = [\n\"@openzeppelin/=lib/openzeppelin-contracts/\",\n\"@uniswap/=lib/v3-core/contracts/\",\n]\n\nOr use a remappings.txt file:\n\n@openzeppelin/=lib/openzeppelin-contracts/\n@uniswap/=lib/v3-core/contracts/\n\nSee Dependencies for more on managing imports.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":506,"crawled_at":1791194508148} +{"id":10395,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/deepbook/deepbookv3/deepbook","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"DeepBookV3 | Sui Documentation","text":"DeepBookV3 is a next-generation decentralized central limit order book (CLOB) built on Sui. DeepBookV3 leverages Sui's parallel execution and low transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. fees to bring a highly performant, low-latency exchange onchain.\n\nThe latest version delivers new features including flash loans, governance, improved account abstraction, and enhancements to the existing matching engine. This version also introduces its own tokenomics with the DEEP token, which you can stake for additional benefits.\n\nDeepBookV3 does not include an end-user interface for token trading. Rather, it offers built-in trading functionality that can support token trades from decentralized exchanges, wallets, or other apps. The available SDK abstracts away a lot of the complexities of interacting with the chain and building programmable transaction blocksProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui., lowering the barrier of entry for active market making.\n\ninfo\nThe documentation refers to the DeepBookDeepBookA decentralized central limit order book (CLOB) built on Sui. standard as \"DeepBookV3\" to avoid confusion with the recently deprecated version of DeepBook (DeepBookV2).\n\nChoose your integration model​\n\nDeepBookV3 is a Move packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui. on Sui MainnetMainnetProduction network for live transactions and real-value assets.. Every integration calls the same public functions on the Pool shared objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui., so your first decision is not which features you use, but where your code runs. Integrating DeepBook means choosing one of the following models.\n\nModelYou writeChoose this when\nMove package\nA MoveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects. that depends on DeepBookV3 and calls its functions directly.\nYour protocol trades as part of its own onchain logic, and your code must enforce invariants across the trade.\n\nSDK and programmable transaction blocks (PTBs)\nTypeScript that composes DeepBookV3 calls into a transaction with @mysten/deepbook-v3.\nYour app, bot, wallet, or backend submits trades on behalf of a signer, and no custom onchain logic wraps the trade.\n\nRead-only data\nQueries against the DeepBookV3 Indexer or a Sui RPC endpoint.\nYou display prices, order books, or trade history, and you never sign a transaction.\n\nThe models are not exclusive. A common pattern is to publish a small Move module for the logic that needs onchain guarantees, then call that module from a PTB your backend builds.\n\nIntegrate as a Move package​\n\nAdd DeepBookV3 to the [dependencies] section of your Move.toml file:\n\nMove.toml\ndeepbook = { mvr = \"@deepbook/core\" }\n\nYour module then calls DeepBookV3 functions directly. All trading endpoints on Pool are public functions rather than entry functions, so you do not need to write a wrapper. Because your module holds the returned values, DeepBook becomes one step inside a larger operation that your own code guards. This model suits vaults, routers, and any protocol that borrows through flash loans and must repay from its own logic in the same transaction.\n\nThe tradeoff is lifecycle cost. You publish a package, plan its upgrades, and track DeepBookV3 contract versions yourself. See Upgrading Packages for the upgrade process, and Contract Information for current package addressesAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network..\n\nTo start with this model, read Design for the architecture, then Contract Information for the endpoint reference.\n\nIntegrate with the SDK and PTBs​\n\nInstall the TypeScript SDK:\n\nnpm\nYarn\npnpm\nnpm install @mysten/deepbook-v3\n\nyarn add @mysten/deepbook-v3\n\npnpm add @mysten/deepbook-v3\n\nThe SDK builds PTB commands that target the same public functions a Move module calls. You publish nothing and maintain no upgrade path. The SDK also ships default coin and pool constants, balance manager handling, and read helpers, which removes most of the address bookkeeping.\n\nTo start with this model, read the DeepBookV3 SDK documentation, then get hands-on: fund a BalanceManager and run the spot trading workflow with real TestnetTestnetStaging network for testing changes before production deployment. transactions.\n\nWhat both models share​\n\nBoth models use the same objects and the same fee rules:\n\nBalance manager: Order placement requires a BalanceManager and a trade proof in either model. See BalanceManager.\n\nSwaps without a balance manager: The swap endpoints accept coins directly and return coins, so routers and aggregators can trade without creating a BalanceManager. See Swaps.\n\nFees: Fee rules and DEEP staking benefits apply the same way, regardless of how you build the transaction.\n\nDeepBookV3 tokenomics​\n\nThe DEEP token pays for trading fees on the exchange. Users can pay trading fees using DEEP tokens or input tokens, but owning, using, and staking DEEP continues to provide the most benefits to active DeepBookV3 traders on the Sui network.\n\nAs an example, governance determines the fee for paying in DEEP tokens, which costs 20% less than the fee for using input tokens.\n\nUsers that stake DEEP can enjoy taker and maker incentives. Taker incentives can reduce trading fees by half, dropping them to as low as 0.25 basis points (bps) on stable pairs and 2.5 bps on volatile pairs. Maker incentives provide rebates based on the maker volume you generate.\n\nLiquidity support​\n\nSimilar to order books for other market places, DeepBookV3's CLOB architecture enables you to enter market and limit orders. You can place an ask to sell SUI tokens at a price you set, known as a limit order, or sell at the market's going rate. To buy SUI, you can place a bid at the current market price or set a limit price. The CLOB fulfills limit orders only when it finds a match between a buyer and seller.\n\nIf you put in a limit order for 1,000 SUI, and no single seller is currently offering that quantity of tokens, DeepBookV3 automatically pools the current asks to meet the quantity of your bid.\n\nTransparency and privacy​\n\nAs a CLOB, DeepBookV3 works like a digital ledger, logging bids and asks in chronological order and automatically finding matches between the two sides. It takes into account user parameters on trades such as prices.\n\nThe open digital ledger lets you view trades and prices, giving clear proof of fairness. You can use this transparency to create metrics and dashboards to monitor trading activity.\n\nDocumentation​\n\nThis documentation outlines the design of DeepBookV3, its public endpoints, and provides guidance for integrations. The SDK abstracts away a lot of the complexities of interacting with the chain and building programmable transaction blocks, lowering the barrier of entry for active market making.\n\nOpen source​\n\nDeepBookV3 is open for community development. You can use the Sui Improvement Proposals (SIPs) process to suggest changes to make DeepBookV3 better.\n\nContract Information\nIn this section\nBalanceManager\nOrders\nFlash Loans\nSwaps\nStaking and Governance\nPermissionless Pool Creation\n+ 3 more\n\n→\nDeepBookV3 SDK\nIn this section\nBalanceManager\nPools\nOrders\nFlash Loans\nSwaps\nStaking and Governance\n+ 2 more\n\n→\n\nChoose your integration modelIntegrate as a Move package\nIntegrate with the SDK and PTBs\nWhat both models share\n\nDeepBookV3 tokenomics\nLiquidity support\nTransparency and privacy\nDocumentation\nOpen source\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1890,"crawled_at":1791194522578} +{"id":10396,"url":"https://a16zcrypto.com/posts/article/safe-harbor-sec-blockchain-apps","domain":"a16zcrypto.com","chapter":"research","title":"A safe harbor for software: Why the SEC should clarify broker rules for blockchain apps - a16z crypto","text":"0 Results\n\nSearching...\nEXPLORE\nEngineering\nlearn more\n\nResearch\nlearn more\n\nPodcast\nlearn more\n\nPolicy\nlearn more\n\nA safe harbor for software: Why the SEC should clarify broker rules for blockchain apps\nMiles Jennings, Aiden Slavin, and David Sverdlov\n08.13.25\n\nTags & Share Tags\ngovernment agencies\npolicy & regulation\nregulatory know-how\n\nx\nlinkedin\nfacebook\nhacker-news\nwhatsapp\nflipboard\nreddit\n\nThe U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission recently acknowledged what many in the crypto industry have long recognized: Digital assets and blockchain technologies are poised to transform capital markets.\n\nThe agency just launched “Project Crypto,” an ambitious plan to move U.S. capital markets onchain. The announcement followed a report from President Trump’s Working Group on Digital Assets that called for sweeping reforms, such as granting the CFTC authority to regulate spot markets of non-security digital assets and providing regulatory clarity to decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms. These efforts signal a growing recognition of the benefits that blockchain technologies can deliver. They also show a growing understanding that digital assets and blockchain technologies don’t fit neatly into legacy regulatory frameworks — and that forcing them into pre-existing molds may do more harm than good.\n\nThat’s why we, together with the DeFi Education Fund, are proposing a safe harbor from the broker-dealer registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for blockchain applications — the neutral software programs that enable users to interact with public blockchain networks and smart contract protocols, like DeFi and non-fungible token (NFT) marketplace protocols. By reducing reliance on intermediaries, these apps make it possible for tokenized securities to capitalize on the benefits of blockchain technology: truly disintermediated, automated, trustless and instantaneous transactions, with substantially lower costs.\n\nWhat’s the problem?\n\nApps are software — typically embedded in wallets or deployed via websites — that enable users to interact with decentralized blockchain systems without taking custody of assets, exercising discretion, or acting on behalf of users. They simply provide a user interface that helps people transact directly onchain. This opens an entire world of peer-to-peer transactions, where users can make stablecoin payments, purchase network tokens on decentralized exchanges, trade digital collectibles like NFTs, or engage in borrowing and lending transactions all without relying on any intermediaries.\n\nWhile decentralized blockchain systems underlying apps are clearly excluded from the SEC’s broker-dealer registration regimes, apps face regulatory uncertainty because they are typically developed and maintained by centralized actors. The SEC has previously taken the position — through enforcement actions and Wells notices — that developers of apps could be deemed brokers if they enabled users to transact in securities. That approach is flawed and threatens to chill innovation in one of the most promising areas of the new digital financial system.\n\nConcerns about the SEC’s prior approach aren’t just about inconvenient regulatory burdens. Rather, requiring broker registration for neutral apps would force software developers to take on roles and responsibilities they never assumed — acting as gatekeepers, taking custody, and intermediating activity — all of which undermine the benefits of blockchains systems and create new risks for users.\n\nWhat’s the solution?\n\nWe propose a safe harbor that provides a rebuttable presumption that a software interface that enables users to engage in peer-to-peer transactions, including in transactions of tokenized securities, is not engaged in broker-dealer activity. To qualify for this safe harbor, an app must meet four objective criteria:\n\nNon-custodial: The app must never take control of user funds. All signing and transaction submission must be user-initiated.\n\nNo discretion: The app must not exercise discretion on behalf of the user in the execution of transactions. It may use optimization software (routers or solvers) to identify best paths, but only if they operate on objective parameters, are source-available or auditable, and do not involve compensation contingent on routing outcomes.\n\nNo solicitation or investment recommendations: The app must avoid providing investment recommendations, and may only passively display neutral market data or functionality.\n\nUnderlying protocols must be decentralized: The app interfaces with protocols that have eliminated operational control — meaning they are autonomous, permissionless, non-custodial, and credibly neutral — or have clearly demonstrated their good faith intention to decentralize. Limited exceptions may apply for early-stage protocols under certain thresholds.\n\nWhy now?\n\nBlockchain technologies offer enormous benefits — reduced costs, faster settlement, expanded access — and software interfaces are critical infrastructure for unlocking these gains. Recognizing this, the administration is in a race to unlock innovation, and that starts with regulatory clarity. Developers shouldn’t have to guess whether building public, neutral, and non-custodial software exposes them to the risk of being treated like financial intermediaries.\n\nThis proposal gives the SEC a pathway to set boundaries, reinforce its mission to protect investors, and encourage the responsible development of decentralized technologies. Doing so will help ensure America leads in digital infrastructure for the decades ahead.\n\nRead our full proposal.\n\n***\n\nThe views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the current or enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. In addition, this content may include third-party advertisements; a16z has not reviewed such advertisements and does not endorse any advertising content contained therein.\n\nThis content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.\n\nCharts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.","tokens":2066,"crawled_at":1791194525754} +{"id":10397,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/compound-js","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound.js SDK Documentation","text":"Compound.js\nComet\nGovernance\ncTokens (v2)\nComptroller (v2)\nPrice Feed (v2)\nHelpers\n\nCompound.js\nConstructor\nEthereum Read\nEthereum Trx\n\nCompound.js\nIntroduction\nCompound.js is a JavaScript SDK for Ethereum and the Compound Protocol. It wraps around Ethers.js, which is its only dependency. It is designed for both the web browser and Node.js.\nThe SDK is currently in open beta. Use at your own risk.\nFor bugs reports and feature requests, either create an issue in the GitHub repository or send a message in the Development channel of the Compound Discord.\nConstructor\nCreates an instance of the Compound.js SDK.\n[provider] (Provider | string) Optional Ethereum network provider. Defaults to Ethers.js fallback mainnet provider.\n[options] (object) Optional provider options.\nRETURN (object) Returns an instance of the Compound.js SDK.\nvar compound = new Compound(window.ethereum); // web browser\n\nvar compound = new Compound('http://127.0.0.1:8545'); // HTTP provider\n\nvar compound = new Compound(); // Uses Ethers.js fallback mainnet (for testing only)\n\nvar compound = new Compound('goerli'); // Uses Ethers.js fallback (for testing only)\n\n// Init with private key (server side)\nvar compound = new Compound('https://mainnet.infura.io/v3/_your_project_id_', {\nprivateKey: '0x_your_private_key_', // preferably with environment variable\n});\n\n// Init with HD mnemonic (server side)\nvar compound = new Compound('mainnet' {\nmnemonic: 'clutch captain shoe...', // preferably with environment variable\n});\n\nCompound III (Comet) Object Initialization. This accepts the same parameters as the Compound constructor. An error will be thrown initially and whenever a method is called if the provider does not match the network of the specific Comet deployment. The SDK constants as well as a method in the Comet documentation note the Comet deployments that Compound.js supports.\nvar compound = new Compound(window.ethereum);\nvar comet = compound.comet.MAINNET_USDC(); // provider from `compound` will be used unless on is explicitly passed\n\nEthereum Methods\nThese methods facilitate interactions with the Ethereum blockchain.\nEthereum Read\nThis is a generic method for invoking JSON RPC’s eth_call with Ethers.js. Use this method to execute a smart contract’s constant or non-constant member without using gas. This is a read-only method intended to read a value or test a transaction for valid parameters. It does not create a transaction on the block chain.\naddress (string) The Ethereum address the transaction is directed to.\nmethod (string) The smart contract member in which to invoke.\n[parameters] (any[]) Parameters of the method to invoke.\n[options] (CallOptions) Options to set for eth_call, optional ABI (as JSON object), and Ethers.js method overrides. The ABI can be a string of the single intended method, an array of many methods, or a JSON object of the ABI generated by a Solidity compiler.\nRETURN (Promise) Return value of the invoked smart contract member or an error object if the call failed.\nconst cEthAddress = Compound.util.getAddress(Compound.cETH);\n\n(async function() {\n\nconst srpb = await Compound.eth.read(\ncEthAddress,\n'function supplyRatePerBlock() returns (uint256)',\n// [], // [optional] parameters\n// {} // [optional] call options, provider, network, plus Ethers.js \"overrides\"\n);\n\nconsole.log('cETH market supply rate per block:', srpb.toString());\n\n})().catch(console.error);\n\nEthereum Trx\nThis is a generic method for invoking JSON RPC’s eth_sendTransaction with Ethers.js. Use this method to create a transaction that invokes a smart contract method. Returns an Ethers.js TransactionResponse object.\naddress (string) The Ethereum address the transaction is directed to.\nmethod (string) The smart contract member in which to invoke.\n[parameters] (any[]) Parameters of the method to invoke.\n[options] (CallOptions) Options to set for eth_sendTransaction, (as JSON object), and Ethers.js method overrides. The ABI can be a string optional ABI of the single intended method, an array of many methods, or a JSON object of the ABI generated by a Solidity compiler.\nRETURN (Promise) Returns an Ethers.js TransactionResponse object or an error object if the transaction failed.\nconst oneEthInWei = '1000000000000000000';\nconst cEthAddress = '0x4ddc2d193948926d02f9b1fe9e1daa0718270ed5';\nconst provider = window.ethereum;\n\n(async function() {\nconsole.log('Supplying ETH to the Compound Protocol...');\n\n// Mint some cETH by supplying ETH to the Compound Protocol\nconst trx = await Compound.eth.trx(\ncEthAddress,\n'function mint() payable',\n[],\n{\nprovider,\nvalue: oneEthInWei\n}\n);\n\n// const result = await trx.wait(1); // JSON object of trx info, once mined\n\nconsole.log('Ethers.js transaction object', trx);\n})().catch(console.error);","tokens":1190,"crawled_at":1791194536129} +{"id":10398,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/closed-loop-token","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Closed-Loop Token | Sui Documentation","text":"Using the Closed-Loop TokenClosed-Loop TokenA token that can be used only for a specific service or authorized account. standard, you can limit the applications that can use the token and set up custom policies for transfers, spends, and conversions. The sui::token module in the Sui framework defines the standard.\n\nBackground and use cases​\n\nThe Currency Standard on Sui is an example of an open-loop system. Coins are free-flowing, wrappable, freely transferable, and you can store them in any application.\n\nSome applications, however, require constraining the scope of the token to a specific purpose. For example, some applications might need a token that you can only use for a specific service, or that only an authorized account can use, or a token that you can block certain accounts from using. A real-world analogy would be a bank account that is regulated, bank-controlled, and compliant with certain rules and policies.\n\nDifference with Coin​\n\nUnlike Coin, which has key + store abilities and thus supports wrapping and public transfers, Token has only the key ability and cannot be wrapped, stored as a dynamic field, or freely transferred (unless there's a custom policy for that). Due to this restriction, Token can only be owned by an account and can't be stored in an application (however, it can be spent.\n\n// defined in `sui::coin`\npublic struct Coin has key, store { id: UID, balance: Balance }\n\n// defined in `sui::token`\npublic struct Token has key { id: UID, balance: Balance }\n\nCompliance and rules​\n\nYou can set up any rules for transfers, spends, and conversions for the tokens you create. You specify these rules per action in the TokenPolicy. Rules are custom programmable restrictions that you can use to implement any request authorization or validation logic.\n\nFor example, a policy can set a limit on a transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. - X tokens per operation; or require user verification before spending tokens; or allow spending tokens only on a specific service.\n\nYou can reuse rules across different policies and applications; and you can freely combine rules to create complex policies.\n\nPublic actions​\n\nTokens have a set of public and protected actions that you can use to manage the token. Public actions are available to everyone and don't require any authorization. They have similar APIs to coins, but operate on the Token type:\n\ntoken::keep: Send a token to the transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. sender\n\ntoken::join: Join two tokens\n\ntoken::split: Split a token into two, specify the amount to split\n\ntoken::zero: Create an empty (zero balance) token\n\ntoken::destroy_zero: Destroy a token with zero balance\n\nProtected actions​\n\nProtected actions are ones that issue an ActionRequest - a hot-potato struct that must be resolved for the transaction to succeed. There are three main ways to resolve an ActionRequest, most common of which is through the TokenPolicy.\n\ntoken::transfer: Transfer a token to a specified addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network.\n\ntoken::to_coin: Convert a token to a coin\n\ntoken::from_coin: Convert a coin to a token\n\ntoken::spend: Spend a token on a specified address\n\nThe previous methods are included in the base implementation, however it is possible to create ActionRequests for custom actions.\n\nToken policy and rules​\n\nProtected actions are disabled by default but you can enable them in a TokenPolicy. Additionally, you can set custom restrictions called rules that a specific action must satisfy for it to succeed.\nRelated topics\n\nCurrency Standard\nThe Sui Currency Standard enables you to create a broad range of fungible tokens on the Sui network using the centralized coin registry system, with support for regulated coins, supply state management, and metadata capabilities.\nWrapped Objects\nWrapped objects are object data structures nested inside of another object data structure. Objects can be wrapped directly, through `Option`, or through `vector` fields.\nCustom Object Transfer Rules\nCustom transfer rules enable you to define a set of rules that must be met before Sui considers a transfer operation valid.\nSpending\nClosed-Loop Tokens lack the `store` ability, so they use a `spend` method that consumes the token and moves its balance into an `ActionRequest` for confirmation or burning.\n\nBackground and use cases\nDifference with Coin\nCompliance and rules\nPublic actions\nProtected actions\nToken policy and rules\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1143,"crawled_at":1791194543377} +{"id":10399,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/compound-js/price-feed","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound.js Docs | Price Feed (v2)","text":"Compound.js\nComet\nGovernance\ncTokens (v2)\nComptroller (v2)\nPrice Feed (v2)\nHelpers\n\nCompound v2 Get Price\n\nCompound.js\nPrice Feed Methods\nThese methods facilitate interactions with the v2 Price Feed smart contracts. For Compound III price feed methods, see the Comet section.\nCompound v2 Get Price\nGets an asset’s price from the Compound v2 Protocol price feed. The price of the asset can be returned in any other supported asset value, including all cTokens and underlyings.\nasset (string) A string of a supported asset in which to find the current price.\n[inAsset] (string) A string of a supported asset in which to express the asset parameter’s price. This defaults to USD.\nRETURN (string) Returns a string of the numeric value of the asset.\nconst compound = new Compound(window.ethereum);\nlet price;\n\n(async function () {\n\nprice = await compound.getPrice(Compound.WBTC);\nconsole.log('WBTC in USD', price); // 6 decimals, see Price Feed docs\n\nprice = await compound.getPrice(Compound.BAT, Compound.USDC); // supports cTokens too\nconsole.log('BAT in USDC', price);\n\n})().catch(console.error);","tokens":274,"crawled_at":1791194554078} +{"id":10400,"url":"https://stack.olas.network/open-autonomy/api/cli/utils/click_utils","domain":"stack.olas.network","chapter":"crypto_ai_depin","title":"Utils - Olas Stack Developer Documentation","text":"autonomy.cli.utils.click_utils\n\nUseful click utils.\n\nimage_profile_flag\n\ndef image_profile_flag(default: str = ImageProfiles.PRODUCTION,\nmark_default: bool = True) -> Callable\n\nChoice of one flag between: '--local/--remote'.\n\nabci_spec_format_flag\n\ndef abci_spec_format_flag(\ndefault: str = FSMSpecificationLoader.OutputFormats.YAML,\nmark_default: bool = True) -> Callable\n\nFlags for abci spec outputs formats.\n\nchain_selection_flag\n\ndef chain_selection_flag(\ndefault: ChainType = ChainType.LOCAL,\nmark_default: bool = True,\nhelp_string_format:\nstr = \"To use {} chain profile to interact with the contracts\"\n) -> Callable\n\nFlags for abci spec outputs formats.\n\nsys_path_patch\n\n@contextlib.contextmanager\ndef sys_path_patch(path: Path) -> Generator\n\nPatch sys.path variable with new import path at highest priority.\n\nPathArgument Objects\n\nclass PathArgument(click.Path)\n\nPath parameter for CLI.\n\nconvert\n\ndef convert(value: Any, param: Optional[click.Parameter],\nctx: Optional[click.Context]) -> Optional[Path]\n\nConvert path string to pathlib.Path\n\nNFTArgument Objects\n\nclass NFTArgument(click.ParamType)\n\nNFT parameter for minting tools.\n\nget_metavar\n\ndef get_metavar(param: click.Parameter, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> str\n\nGet metavar\n\nconvert\n\ndef convert(value: Any, param: Optional[click.Parameter],\nctx: Optional[click.Context]) -> Optional[Union[Path, IPFSHash]]\n\nConvert path string to pathlib.Path\n\nimage_author_option\n\ndef image_author_option(fn: Callable) -> Callable\n\nWrap function with clik option for image-author\n\nPublicIdOrHashOrTokenId Objects\n\nclass PublicIdOrHashOrTokenId(PublicIdParameter)\n\nA click parameter that can be a public id, an IPFS hash or a token id.\n\nget_metavar\n\ndef get_metavar(param: Any, ctx: click.Context) -> str\n\nReturn the metavar default for this param if it provides one.\n\nconvert\n\ndef convert(value: str, param: Any, ctx: Optional[click.Context]) -> PublicId\n\nReturns integer token id if value is numeric, else try to parse public id or hash.","tokens":497,"crawled_at":1791194562931} +{"id":10401,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/closed-loop-token/spending","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Spending | Sui Documentation","text":"Closed-Loop Tokens differ from standard Coin types in a key way: Token types do not have the store ability. This means you cannot store a Token inside another objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. or add it to a balance field the way you can with a Coin. An application that accepts a Token as payment cannot keep it.\n\nTo handle this, Token provides a spend method. When you call spend, the token is consumed and its balance moves into an ActionRequest. You then deliver the ActionRequest to the TokenPolicy (which accumulates the spent balance) or burn it directly with a TreasuryCap.\n\nSpend action​\n\nTokens can be spent by calling the spend method. It takes the following arguments:\n\n// module sui::token\npublic fun spend(token: Token, ctx: &mut TxContext): ActionRequest;\n\nAs the signature shows, the Token object is consumed. Its balance becomes the spent_balance in the ActionRequest.\n\nSpent token​\n\nThe ActionRequest for the spend action contains the Balance of the spent Token, and it can either be confirmed with a TreasuryCap or delivered to the TokenPolicy. In the first case, the balance is burned directly in the TreasuryCap, and in the second case, it's delivered to the TokenPolicy spent_balance.\n\nSpent balance cannot be used in any way, and it is not possible to withdraw it. The only available action is flushing - burning the spent_balance by bringing a TreasuryCap.\n\nGating the spend action​\n\nNormally, the spend action should have at least one rule assigned to it to prevent aimless spending, and the recommended way of authorizing the spend in an application that accepts the token is to stamp it right in the function where a spend is performed. For example:\n\n/// Rule-like witness to stamp the ActionRequest\npublic struct GiftShop has drop {}\n\n/// Spend the token and return a Gift + ActionRequest\npublic fun buy_gift(\ntoken: Token,\nctx: &mut TxContext\n): (Gift, ActionRequest) {\n\n// token is spent\nlet action_request = token::spend(token, ctx);\n\n// stamp the ActionRequest as performed by GiftShop\ntoken::add_approval(GiftShop {}, &mut action_request, ctx);\n\n// return already stamped ActionRequest\n(Gift { ... }, action_request)\n}\n\nRelated topics\n\nClosed-Loop Token\nClosed-Loop tokens can only be used for a specific service or by authorized users.\nAction Request\nTokens do not allow transfers, conversions, or spends by default. To allow these actions, use an `ActionRequest`.\nToken Policy\nA `TokenPolicy` is a shared object that defines a token's allowed actions and conditions. Wallets and other financial services often use `TokenPolicy` objects.\n\nSpend action\nSpent token\nGating the spend action\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":671,"crawled_at":1791194564356} +{"id":10402,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/u/Ignas","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"Profile - Ignas - Uniswap Governance","text":"Ignas\n\nIntroduction\n\nFirst, I’m an active DeFi user and independent researcher. I share my findings and thoughts on X and my personal blog.\n\nI’m also the co-founder of Pink Brains DeFi Creator Studio, which focuses on elevating quality projects through authentic representation.\n\nIntroduction\n\nFirst, I’m an active DeFi user and independent researcher. I share my findings and thoughts on X and my personal blog.\n\nI’m also the co-founder of Pink Brains DeFi Creator Studio, which focuses on elevating quality projects through authentic representation.\n\nCore values\n\nCurrently, DeFi DAOs face several internal issues, such as voter apathy leading to governance attacks, insider voting, and voting concentration among a few active voting addresses.\n\nAdditionally, they face external challenges like regulatory uncertainty.\n\nI believe in a decentralized future, even if it seems naive.\n\nHowever, the current state of crypto is plagued by misaligned incentives that prioritize short-term speculative gains over the core DeFi values of self-sovereignty and custody.\n\nEqually concerning is the trend of McKinsification in DAOs, where decisions are increasingly made by one or two professional consultant delegates. This discourages individual participation, as their opinions and votes have less impact.\n\nTo make DeFi DAOs viable, we must align incentives to encourage active participation in governance from the broader crypto community.\n\nI believe that community must be at the core of every DAO.\n\nWithout giving the community a say in protocol governance, we’re no better than the Web2 companies we aim to replace—companies that view their “community” merely as users to extract value from.\n\nI will support initiatives that align token holders with the protocol, such as revenue sharing or other methods to bring value to the token.\n\nToken holders are frustrated with exploitative tokenomics that only benefit early insiders who acquired tokens at much lower prices, leaving no upside for new investors. Without incentives to buy and hold tokens, the attractiveness and health of DAOs decline.\n\nFinally, I will highlight key votes and decisions of the DAO on X and my blog, as I believe the general public is often unaware of important actions being taken.\n\nDisclosure\n\nI am the co-founder of Pink Brains at a DeFi creator studio dedicated to promoting DeFi projects through educational content. You can find the full list of projects we have worked on at our landing page.\n\nI plan to apply as a delegate to other DAOs too, with the same mission of strengthening them and aligning token holders with the protocol.\n\nI always make appropriate disclosures and remove myself from voting when necessary.","tokens":674,"crawled_at":1791194569578} +{"id":10403,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/scripting-internals","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"How scripting works – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nHow scripting works\n\nThe scripting guide introduces deployment scripts. This page explains how an ordinary forge script invocation turns Solidity execution into transactions, and which addresses and state each stage uses. Network-specific modes, such as Tempo transaction batching, can change the transaction format and deployment behavior.\n\nFrom a script to transactions\n\nForge executes the script contract locally. The script contract itself is not deployed to the target network. Instead, broadcasting cheatcodes identify calls and creations that should become transactions.\n\nStageWhat runsWhat carries forward\nCompile and link\nThe Solidity compiler and library linker\nScript bytecode, contract artifacts, and library addresses\n\nExecute the script\nThe script constructor, optional setUp(), then run() or the function selected by --sig\nTransactions collected from broadcast calls, plus required library deployments\n\nSimulate transactions\nThe collected transactions against separate local EVM state backed by the target RPC\nExecution results, gas estimates, and deployment metadata\n\nBroadcast\nSigning and RPC submission, when --broadcast is set\nTransaction hashes and receipts\n\nVerify\nExplorer verification, when requested\nVerification results for deployed contracts\n\nWith no RPC URL, Forge can execute the script locally but cannot perform the RPC-backed transaction simulation or send the transactions. With an RPC URL and without --broadcast, it executes and simulates without submitting transactions. --skip-simulation skips the separate transaction simulation; it does not skip executing the script to collect transactions.\n\nScript caller, transaction sender, and signer\n\nThese are distinct pieces of information:\n\nThe script caller is the address Forge uses to call setUp() and the selected script function. It determines msg.sender in that script frame.\n\nThe transaction sender is the address recorded in a collected transaction's from field.\n\nThe signer supplies the signature for that sender. Choosing an address does not supply its private key or unlock an account.\n\nFor ordinary wallet-backed scripts, Forge initializes the script caller from the configured sender, whose default is 0x1804c8AB1F12E6bbf3894d4083f33e07309d1f38. A single raw private key or Turnkey address supplies an inferred caller. Otherwise, when --sender is absent, Forge can infer the caller from a sole available wallet address, or from the connected browser wallet. Multiple wallets require an explicit choice if we want a predictable script caller. Network-specific session signers have their own sender resolution.\n\nThe broadcast cheatcodes choose the transaction sender separately:\n\nInvocationTransaction senderSigning material\nvm.startBroadcast(address)\nThe supplied address\nMust be available separately when sending\n\nvm.startBroadcast(uint256)\nThe address derived from that private key\nThe key is added to Forge's script wallets\n\nvm.startBroadcast()\nExplicit --sender, otherwise the sole available signer, otherwise the current transaction caller\nMust be available when sending\n\nThe same selection applies to the three vm.broadcast overloads. broadcast records the next eligible call; startBroadcast records eligible calls until stopBroadcast. The scope is the call depth at which broadcasting starts. Cheatcode calls are excluded. Calls made inside a deployed contract remain part of that contract's transaction rather than becoming additional top-level transactions.\n\n--sender alone is enough for simulation, but normal broadcasting also needs a matching wallet, such as --account deployer. With --unlocked, the RPC node is responsible for sending from the selected account. Forge rejects ordinary broadcasts whose transaction sender is the default Foundry address.\n\nWhat msg.sender means during broadcasting\n\nStarting a broadcast changes the sender of outgoing calls. It does not rewrite the caller of the already-running script frame. For example, the script caller can be Foundry's default address while vm.startBroadcast(deployer) sends the next call from deployer.\n\nInside a contract called directly by that transaction, msg.sender is the transaction sender. Inside the script, it is still the script caller. A callback or another nested contract call has its own caller as usual.\n\nWith the default script_execution_protection = true, Forge rejects a msg.sender opcode read in the main script's broadcasting frame when that caller differs from the broadcast sender. It also protects against relying on the ephemeral script's address(this). These are runtime opcode checks: they do not track values captured before broadcasting, and compiler optimizations can move a read outside the guarded region. Disabling the protection does not make the addresses equal.\n\nPass the intended owner or deployer explicitly when constructing transaction arguments. This example uses the same address for broadcasting and ownership, without depending on the script frame's caller:\n\nscript/DeployOwned.s.sol\n// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.20;\n\nimport {Script} from \"forge-std/Script.sol\";\n\ncontract OwnedCounter {\naddress public immutable owner;\nuint256 public number;\n\nconstructor(address initialOwner) {\nowner = initialOwner;\n}\n\nfunction increment() external {\nrequire(msg.sender == owner, \"not owner\");\nnumber++;\n}\n}\n\ncontract DeployOwned is Script {\nfunction run() public returns (OwnedCounter counter) {\naddress deployer = vm.envAddress(\"DEPLOYER\");\n\nvm.startBroadcast(deployer);\ncounter = new OwnedCounter(deployer);\ncounter.increment();\nvm.stopBroadcast();\n}\n}\n\nFor a local run of the example, choose an address and use it consistently:\n\n$ export DEPLOYER=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001337\n$ forge script script/DeployOwned.s.sol:DeployOwned --sender \"$DEPLOYER\"\n\nFor deployment, set DEPLOYER to the address controlled by the chosen wallet and also supply the RPC and wallet options. Keep --sender and the wallet address aligned; a raw key's inferred script caller and an explicitly different broadcast sender can otherwise disagree.\n\nCREATE and CREATE2\n\nA direct new Contract(...) inside a broadcast produces a contract-creation transaction. Its address depends on the transaction sender and that sender's nonce. The constructor sees the transaction sender as msg.sender.\n\nA direct new Contract{salt: salt}(...) at the broadcast depth is different. Forge routes it through its configured CREATE2 deployer, by default 0x4e59b44847b379578588920ca78fbf26c0b4956c. The collected transaction calls that deployer with the salt followed by the creation bytecode, including encoded constructor arguments. The factory then performs CREATE2.\n\nThis has three consequences:\n\nThe constructor's msg.sender is the factory, even though the outer transaction comes from the wallet.\n\nThe contract address depends on the factory address, salt, and complete init code. Constructor arguments and linked library addresses are part of that init code.\n\nThe outer transaction still consumes the wallet's nonce, although that nonce is not part of the CREATE2 address formula.\n\nForge's automatic routing validates the expected deployer bytecode. A configured address is not sufficient if it has no code or incompatible code. To use another factory protocol, call that factory explicitly with its own ABI. A CREATE2 performed inside an ordinary called contract also uses that contract's execution context; it is not the script-level rewrite described above.\n\nWhen running locally without an RPC, Forge can install its default deployer for simulation. That does not install it on a target chain. Check the target chain's factory state when preparing a deployment. The CREATE2 guide explains the address formula and compiler settings that affect determinism.\n\nExternal libraries and linking\n\nSolidity contracts that use external library functions contain link references. Those references must be replaced with library addresses before the bytecode can run. Internal library functions that the compiler includes in the contract do not require a separate library deployment.\n\nForge first uses explicitly configured library addresses. For unresolved references it attempts CREATE2 linking when the configured deployer is available and linking succeeds, using create2_library_salt. Otherwise, it links using addresses calculated from the script sender and consecutive CREATE nonces.\n\nRequired library deployments are collected before the script's own broadcast transactions. For CREATE2 libraries, Forge skips a deployment when code already exists at the calculated address. For CREATE libraries, their deployment transactions consume the first sender nonces, so they also affect the addresses of contracts created later by the script.\n\nIf execution discovers a different deployer and no --sender was given, Forge can relink and execute again using that sender. When several deployers are candidates, it warns and retains the configured sender for predeployment. Set --sender explicitly when library deployment ownership matters.\n\nForge can also keep libraries used only by the local script out of the broadcast sequence. This optimization applies only to eligible scripts and reruns them with those libraries deployed locally, checking the candidate before accepting it. It is not a guarantee that every library absent from the final deployed contracts will be omitted. Inspect the prepared sequence to see which library deployments will actually be sent.\n\nChanging a linked library address changes the consuming contract's bytecode. It can therefore change CREATE2 addresses as well as verification inputs, even if the contract's Solidity source is unchanged.\n\nNonces and deployment addresses\n\nWith an RPC, Forge obtains the initial script sender nonce from the resolved fork state. Without an RPC, the initial nonce is 1. --sender-nonce overrides this starting value and is retained if Forge changes the inferred sender during relinking.\n\nDuring script execution, each collected transaction gets a nonce from its sender's simulated account state. Calls and creations consume nonces, and multiple senders have separate nonce sequences. Local script setup must not consume the same nonce as an actual deployment: Forge handles the ephemeral script deployment separately and adjusts local execution bookkeeping accordingly.\n\nFor example, if a sender begins at nonce 7 and needs two ordinary CREATE library deployments, those transactions use nonces 7 and 8. A subsequent direct contract creation uses nonce 9. Adding another required library before it changes that contract's CREATE address.\n\nThe nonce override is a planning input; it does not change the account nonce on the network. If other transactions use the account after simulation, the prepared transactions may no longer be usable as planned. During sequential broadcasting, Forge checks the provider nonce against the expected transaction nonce, retries when the provider is behind, and errors when it is ahead. This check does not reserve nonces against other processes.\n\nWhat simulation does and does not replay\n\nThe first execution runs Solidity script logic, including reads, calculations, and cheatcodes, to construct transaction arguments. Operations outside a broadcast can affect this local execution without becoming transactions.\n\nThe second simulation starts from separate RPC-backed state and runs the collected transactions. It does not rerun run() to recalculate arguments, and script-only state changes are not carried into it. For example, a local storage modification can make script execution succeed, but the transaction simulation will fail if the collected calls depend on that modification existing on-chain.\n\nTransactions are associated with their RPC endpoints and simulated in the corresponding contexts. Forge gathers traces, deployment metadata, and gas usage, then applies the gas-estimate multiplier. --slow also advances the simulated block number between transactions. This does not predict the exact block timestamps, ordering with other users' transactions, or state that will exist when a real transaction is mined.\n\nWhen broadcasting, Forge resolves the required signers and fills transaction details such as fees. Some networks and --skip-simulation workflows require RPC gas estimation immediately before sending. With --slow, or when another condition requires sequential submission, Forge waits for receipts between transactions. An ordinary script containing several transactions is not one atomic operation: an earlier transaction can succeed even if a later one fails.\n\nSaved sequences and resume\n\nForge saves transaction sequences and receipts under the configured broadcast directory, normally grouped by script and chain ID. Dry-run sequences use a dry-run subdirectory. These files record the prepared calls and deployments, not just the source code that produced them.\n\nStarting with Foundry 1.8.4, the authoritative resume state is a private, versioned .recovery.json snapshot stored beside the sensitive sequence under the configured cache directory. The public broadcast file and sensitive sequence are compatibility exports, so preserve both directories and the recovery snapshot until the deployment is complete. Forge imports a consistent pair of generationless exports from an earlier version automatically. Recovery snapshots are not backward compatible: after Foundry 1.8.4 writes one, an older Forge version must not resume that deployment.\n\n--resume loads a saved sequence, checks pending transactions, and continues publishing the remaining transactions. It skips the ordinary transaction-simulation stage. If signing keys are only available through script execution, Forge may execute the script again to collect those keys; the saved transaction sequence remains authoritative.\n\nEditing the script and passing --resume does not regenerate its saved transaction arguments or recreate the original --broadcast execution state. To produce a new transaction plan, run the script again without --resume. To continue a multi-chain saved sequence, use --multi with --resume.\n\nImplementation references\n\nThe main implementation boundaries are sender selection and orchestration, broadcast cheatcodes, linking and resume, local execution, transaction simulation, and transaction submission.\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 01/10/2026, 19:51","tokens":3596,"crawled_at":1791194571228} +{"id":10404,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/compound-js/comptroller","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound.js Docs | Comptroller (v2)","text":"Compound.js\nComet\nGovernance\ncTokens (v2)\nComptroller (v2)\nPrice Feed (v2)\nHelpers\n\nComptroller Methods\nEnter Markets\nExit Market\n\nCompound.js\nComptroller Methods\nThese methods facilitate interactions with the Comptroller smart contract. Methods like claimComp are in the Governance/COMP section.\nEnter Markets\nEnters the user’s address into Compound Protocol markets.\nmarkets (any[]) An array of strings of markets to enter, meaning use those supplied assets as collateral.\n[options] (CallOptions) Call options and Ethers.js overrides for the transaction. A passed gasLimit will be used in both the approve (if not supressed) and mint transactions.\nRETURN (object) Returns an Ethers.js transaction object of the enterMarkets transaction.\nconst compound = new Compound(window.ethereum);\n\n(async function () {\nconst trx = await compound.enterMarkets(Compound.ETH); // Use [] for multiple\nconsole.log('Ethers.js transaction object', trx);\n})().catch(console.error);\n\nExit Market\nExits the user’s address from a Compound Protocol market.\nmarket (string) A string of the symbol of the market to exit.\n[options] (CallOptions) Call options and Ethers.js overrides for the transaction. A passed gasLimit will be used in both the approve (if not supressed) and mint transactions.\nRETURN (object) Returns an Ethers.js transaction object of the exitMarket transaction.\nconst compound = new Compound(window.ethereum);\n\n(async function () {\nconst trx = await compound.exitMarket(Compound.ETH);\nconsole.log('Ethers.js transaction object', trx);\n})().catch(console.error);","tokens":390,"crawled_at":1791194571867} +{"id":10405,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/types-of-assets","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Types of Assets | Sui Documentation","text":"On Sui, there are a variety of fungible, non-fungible, and other types of asset standards, each with their own defined usage patterns and capabilities. Choosing the correct standard for your use case is important to enable the correct set of features in your application.\n\nFungible tokens: Coin standard​\n\nThe Coin standard defines fungible tokens that have key and store abilities. Coin supports wrapping and public transfers. It uses the sui::coin moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects.. Coin refers to a single objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui. wrapper for a fungible asset.\n\nThe Coin type represents open-loop fungible tokens. Coins are denominated by their type parameter, T, which is also associated with metadata (like name, symbol, and decimal precision) that applies to all instances of Coin.\n\nFungible tokens created using the Coin standard are referred to as coins.\n\nWhen you create a coin using the coin::create_currency function, the publisher of the smart contract that creates the coin receives a TreasuryCap object. The Coin standard uses CoinMetadata to define the coin's metadata.\n\nWhen to use Coin​\n\nUse the Coin standard if you are:\n\nWorking with legacy code or maintaining an existing coin that was created with the sui::coin module\n\nCreating a coin that does not require advanced supply tracking or regulatory features\n\nFamiliar with the CoinMetadata object for metadata storage\n\nLearn more about using Coin.\n\nAddressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. balances​\n\nAddress balances tie fungible assets to a Sui address directly. They replace the UTXO-style Coin model, where balances are calculated by summing all Coin objects owned by an address. With the address balance functionality, each Sui address can have one address-owned balance for each currency they own, with the total balance being the sum of all Coin objects plus the address balance. Coin and address balances can exist together, however address balances provide several advantages over using Coin alone.\n\nFor the full specification, see SIP-58: Sui Address Balances.\n\nFungible tokens: Currency standard​\n\nThe Currency standard is an example of an open-loop system. It supports free-flowing, wrappable, freely transferable fungible assets that you can store in any application. It uses the sui::coin_registry module and the Currency object for metadata. Currency refers to the object that is created in Coin Registry, which describes the currency properties and setup.\n\nThe Currency type represents open-loop fungible tokens. Currencies are denominated by their type parameter, T, which is also associated with metadata like name, symbol, and decimal precision that applies to all instances of Currency.\n\nFungible tokens created using the Currency standard are referred to as coins.\n\nYou can create coins with the Currency standard using coin_registry::new_currency and coin_registry::new_currency_with_otw:\n\nStandard creation (coin_registry::new_currency): Recommended for most cases. You can call this method any time after the coin type is published.\n\nOne-Time Witness creation (coin_registry::new_currency_with_otw): Uses a One-Time Witness for uniqueness proof. Requires a two-step publish and finalize process.\n\ntip\nThe Coin and Currency standards are both used to create fungible tokens. However, they use different creation methods and store metadata in a different type of object.\nCoin creates tokens using coin::create_currency while Currency uses sui::coin_registry.\nCoin uses CoinMetadata while Currency uses Currency.\nFungible tokens created on Sui using the Coin or Currency standard are referred to as coins.\nFor fungible tokens created on Sui using the Closed-Loop Token standard, the documentation uses the term tokens. In practice, the terms for both these objects are often interchangeable.\n\nCoin Registry​\n\nThe Coin Registry system provides a centralized approach to currency management through the sui::coin_registry module. The registry is a shared object located at address 0xc that stores metadata, supply information, and regulatory status for all registered coin types.\n\nWhen to use Currency​\n\nAssets can offer specialized abilities while following the Currency Standard. For example, you can create regulated coins that allow their creator to add specific addresses to a deny list, so that the identified addresses cannot use the coin as inputs to transactions.\n\nUse the Currency standard if you are:\n\nCreating a new coin and want to use Coin Registry\n\nRequiring advanced supply chain management, such as fixed supply, burn-only supply, or uncontrolled supply\n\nRequiring regulatory tracking such as deny lists\n\nRequiring enhanced integration options with wallets, exchanges, and apps\n\nRequiring future-proofing options and access to ongoing registry improvements\n\nLearn more about using Currency.\n\nPermissioned assets​\n\nThe Permissioned Asset Standard (PAS) enables asset ownership through Account objects. Account objects can hold assets and enforce transferTransferChanging the owner of an asset. controls and compliance checks. There is one Account per address, and an Account can hold any asset type. Assets can only moveMoveAn open source programming language used for all activity on Sui. between Accounts through hot potato requests that must be approved and resolved in the same programmable transactionTransactionA number of commands that execute on inputs to define the result of the transaction. block (PTBProgrammable transaction blocksDefine all user transactions on Sui.).\n\nPAS uses Sui Address Balances. PAS balances are managed by PAS on behalf of the wallet address. They are held in a derived Account object, however, transfers always target the wallet address, not the Account address.\n\nPAS assets are stored in Sui objects and can be queried using the same data access methods as any other address-owned data.\n\nLearn more about Permissioned Asset Standard.\n\nFungible tokens: Closed-Loop TokenClosed-Loop TokenA token that can be used only for a specific service or authorized account. standard​\n\ncaution\nThe Permissioned Asset Standard (PAS) provides a new and improved alternative to the Closed-Loop Token (CLT) standard. Use PAS in place of CLT.\n\nThe Closed-Loop Token standard creates a fungible token that only has the key ability. Closed-loop tokens cannot be wrapped, stored as a dynamic field, or freely transferred (unless a custom policy allows it). Due to this restriction, tokens created with this standard can only be owned by an account and cannot be stored in an application. However, they can be spent. The standard uses the sui::token module.\n\nFungible tokens created using the Closed-Loop Token standard are referred to as tokens.\n\nUsing the Closed-Loop Token standard, you can limit the applications that use the token and set up custom policies for transfers, spends, and conversions. Some applications might need a token that you can only use for a specific service, or that an authorized account can only use, or a token that you can block certain accounts from using. A real-world analogy would be a bank account that is regulated, bank-controlled, and compliant with certain rules and policies.\n\nRefer to Closed-Loop Token for more information.\n\nNon-fungible tokens: Sui objects​\n\nSui uses an object model, meaning every entity on Sui has a unique ID. Whether your application interacts with a pool of fungible tokens or a collection of non-fungible tokens, the application's smart contract interacts with individual objects. Therefore, Sui does not require an NFT standard that pairs globally unique IDs with relevant smart contract addresses to create unique token instances, such as how the ERC-721 standard works.\n\nConsider the following example Move smart contract, where the NFT's name attribute is a field on the object that defines the NFT itself. The TestnetNFT struct defines the NFT with id, name, description, and url fields.\n\nexamples/move/nft/sources/testnet_nft.move\npublic struct TestnetNFT has key, store {\nid: UID,\nname: string::String,\ndescription: string::String,\nurl: Url,\n}\n\nRelated topics\n\nCoin Standard\nThe Coin standard enables you to create a broad range of fungible tokens on the Sui network to satisfy a number of use cases.\nWrapped Objects\nWrapped objects are object data structures nested inside of another object data structure. Objects can be wrapped directly, through `Option`, or through `vector` fields.\nCustom Object Transfer Rules\nCustom transfer rules enable you to define a set of rules that must be met before Sui considers a transfer operation valid.\nClosed-Loop Token\nClosed-Loop tokens can only be used for a specific service or by authorized users.\n\nFungible tokens: Coin standardWhen to use Coin\nAddress balances\n\nFungible tokens: Currency standardCoin Registry\nWhen to use Currency\n\nPermissioned assets\nFungible tokens: Closed-Loop Token standard\nNon-fungible tokens: Sui objects\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":2257,"crawled_at":1791194584950} +{"id":10406,"url":"https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-return-12-5m-delegated-tokens-to-the-governance-timelock/26099","domain":"gov.uniswap.org","chapter":"governance_daos","title":"[Temp Check] - Return 12.5M Delegated Tokens to the Governance Timelock - Governance-Meta - Uniswap Governance","text":"[Temp Check] - Return 12.5M Delegated Tokens to the Governance Timelock\n\nGovernance-Meta\n\neek637\n\nApril 24, 2026, 7:46pm\n\n1\n\nWith DUNI unlocking greater governance participation from UNI token holders, this proposal undelegates 12.5M UNI currently deployed via the Franchiser, returning the tokens to the Governance Timelock.\n\nSnapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0xd41b2db93c0348e9061bf786dfcb610d8f35e8447f2e90b37b8f30a9b1a3091e\n\nBackground & Motivation\n\nThese UNI were delegated from the treasury in 2022 and 2023 – 2.5M to the Uniswap Foundation and 10M to a group of active delegates – during periods of low governance participation. The delegations were intended to bootstrap an active delegate base when quorum was at risk and the number of delegates that could meet the proposal threshold was small.\n\nToday, Uniswap’s governance environment looks very different. UNI holders have been actively delegating voting power, and since DUNI was established, passed proposals have averaged roughly 75 million votes in turnout, exceeding quorum by approximately 88%. There are now over 50 delegates with greater than 1M UNI of voting power.\n\nUndelegating these tokens also resolves a potential incentive misalignment caused by the Franchiser mechanism itself. These delegates were selected by the community for their active participation in governance, but the Franchiser was not designed to ensure structural alignment between voting power and economic exposure. The potential for this misalignment should not persist indefinitely when the original reason for implementing it is no longer a concern.\n\nSpecification\n\nThis proposal calls recallMany on the FranchiserFactory contract to retrieve all UNI currently delegated through the Franchiser system.\n\nFranchiser delegations to undelegate:\n\nAddress\nBalance (UNI)\nDelegate\n\n0x3d4ACFD2C8b0641fb8db762179eE5A8dB385E573\n\n2,500,000\n\nUniswap Foundation\n\n0xfB6b912cf7082031822F52E7d7EF59280f97A257\n\n2,499,858\n\nAnode (fka StableLab)\n\n0x8D2642Ec9d19A9333c8593ab7dE1Cc3Be44D2DBC\n\n2,250,000\n\nAxia Network (fka 404DAO)\n\n0x61BeD6a58c4dC592f1dC32f9eC0F67E49208405c\n\n2,250,000\n\nPGov\n\n0xe38e5dD6E11ba18450Cbdd518e8A7Eb5F4A17a11\n\n1,900,000\n\nWintermute\n\n0xD57A44e75E863907fC1957B49B35893BF7874809\n\n493,972\n\nKeyrock\n\n0xA5bB68AC2d70B21F5b7d051542f4799954fB6087\n\n452,626\n\nKPK (fka Karpatkey)\n\n0xfe23b0DDCC9c78B21092e54b846a302C961EFab2\n\n153,544\n\nAtiselsts.eth\n\nOnchain Proposal Spec\n\nThe proposal consists of a single transaction:\n\ntarget: 0xf754A7E347F81cFdc70AF9FbCCe9Df3D826360FA\nfunction: recallMany(address[],address[])\ndelegatees:\n0xE93D59CC0bcECFD4ac204827eF67c5266079E2b5 // Axia\n0xB933AEe47C438f22DE0747D57fc239FE37878Dd1 // Wintermute\n0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A // PGov\n0xECC2a9240268BC7a26386ecB49E1Befca2706AC9 // Anode\n0x1855f41B8A86e701E33199DE7C25d3e3830698ba // Keyrock\n0x8787FC2De4De95c53e5E3a4e5459247D9773ea52 // KPK\n0xAac35d953Ef23aE2E61a866ab93deA6eC0050bcD // atiselsts\n0xA37131410A76791f4A0210e91EDD554d85aFb4d4 // UF\ntos:\n0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC repeated 8 times\n\nNext Steps\n\nRFC posted: April 24, 2026\n\nSnapshot vote: After April 31, 2026\n\nOnchain vote: After a succcessful Snapshot\n\nAdditional Resources\n\nOriginal delegation proposal — Temperature Check\n\nUniswap Foundation founding — Consensus Check\n\nFranchiserFactory contract (Etherscan)\n\nFranchiserFactory source — recallMany\n\n4 Likes\n\nTane\n\nApril 26, 2026, 6:56pm\n\n2\n\nThanks for the proposal, @eek637.\n\nWe dug into the executable spec and want to flag what looks like a target and signature mismatch worth reviewing before Snapshot.\n\nThe address listed in the spec, 0x3d4ACFD2C8b0641fb8db762179eE5A8dB385E573, appears to be the Uniswap Foundation’s Franchiser clone rather than the FranchiserFactory. Its owner() is 0xf754A7E347F81cFdc70AF9FbCCe9Df3D826360FA, which is the contract Etherscan verifies as FranchiserFactory. The function shape also looks off: the factory’s recallMany takes two equal-length arrays, delegatees and tos.\n\nIf we’ve read this right, the corrected call would be:\n\ntarget: 0xf754A7E347F81cFdc70AF9FbCCe9Df3D826360FA\nfunction: recallMany(address[],address[])\ndelegatees:\n0xE93D59CC0bcECFD4ac204827eF67c5266079E2b5 // Axia\n0xB933AEe47C438f22DE0747D57fc239FE37878Dd1 // Wintermute\n0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A // PGov\n0xECC2a9240268BC7a26386ecB49E1Befca2706AC9 // Anode\n0x1855f41B8A86e701E33199DE7C25d3e3830698ba // Keyrock\n0x8787FC2De4De95c53e5E3a4e5459247D9773ea52 // KPK\n0xAac35d953Ef23aE2E61a866ab93deA6eC0050bcD // atiselsts\n0xA37131410A76791f4A0210e91EDD554d85aFb4d4 // UF\ntos:\n0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC repeated 8 times\n\nHappy to be corrected if we’ve misread the layout; sharing in case it saves a vote cycle.\n\nOn the substance, we lean toward supporting the recall. The 2022 and 2023 batches solved a specific bootstrap problem: thin delegate participation and fragile quorum at a moment when neither could be assumed. DUNI changed that environment, and treasury-funded voting power held by selected service providers is harder to justify once organic participation is broader and stake can express itself directly. The recall is the cleaner governance posture in principle.\n\nWhat stays open is quorum variance, not the legitimacy of the recall itself. The RFC notes that post-DUNI turnout averages around 75M votes, roughly 88% above the 40M quorum, which is true. But that average hides per-proposal variance: proposal 92 (Strategic Renewal of Gnosis, Linea, and Mantle Deployments, December 2025) would have missed the 40M affirmative quorum without about 10.9M of Franchiser delegated VP voting FOR. Proposals 94 and 95 still pass without it, so this isn’t a general veto. But one of three substantive post-DUNI votes was a real close call.\n\nThat alone shouldn’t stop the recall, but it does need a mitigation answer before Snapshot. After the recall, how does governance plan to handle the next close-call proposal against the 40M affirmative quorum?\n\n3 Likes\n\neek637\n\nApril 27, 2026, 9:20pm\n\n3\n\nThanks for the sharp eyes here @Tane agreed on both - OP updated.\n\nAxia\n\nMay 1, 2026, 9:03pm\n\n4\n\n@eek637 As one of the delegates who received treasury delegation, I understand and respect the motivation behind this proposal to return the 12.5M UNI to the Governance Timelock.\n\nTreasury delegations served an important purpose when governance participation was low and quorum was often at risk. Now, with DUNI driving significantly higher turnout and a larger distribution of voting power, it makes sense to move toward a more organic delegation structure.\n\nEven after the recall, I plan to continue contributing actively to Uniswap governance and will focus on growing my delegation organically. I’ve been — and will keep — engaging constructively on proposals, research, and discussions, adding value wherever I can by leveraging the high-context I’ve built over the past years contributing to Uniswap governance. My commitment stems from a genuine belief in the long-term success of the protocol and governance, not from any temporary bootstrapped voting power.\n\nThank you for the opportunities that the treasury delegation provided. Looking forward to engaging more in this next phase of UNI governance!\n\n2 Likes\n\nkfx\n\nMay 6, 2026, 6:15am\n\n5\n\nI’d support this in principle, however after having closer look at the proposal, I’m unconvinced by the reasoning.\n\nUNI holders have been actively delegating voting power, and since DUNI was established, passed proposals have averaged roughly 75 million votes in turnout, exceeding quorum by approximately 88%.\n\nThis is factually true however the problem is that there’s a clear survivorship bias. The proposals that don’t have clear push from the leadership simply aren’t reaching the voting stage. I haven’t seen any evidence that the DAO after UNIfication still have enough voting activity to pass proposals that are initiated by 3rd parties or bottom-up proposals from DAO delegates.\n\nHowever, I voted Abstain due to Conflict of Interest, following the Uniswap Principles, as most of my remaining UNI delegation comes from this source.\n\n3 Likes\n\nSEEDGov\n\nMay 6, 2026, 12:58pm\n\n6\n\nWe fully agree with this assessment. It is not entirely accurate to say that the quorum issue has been resolved. Following UNIfication and DUNI, the only proposals that have successfully reached quorum are those promoted by Labs or the Foundation. This suggests that the necessary conditions have been created for certain investors to participate without fear of legal consequences; however, this increase in quorum has not extended to proposals driven by delegates or third parties.\n\nIn fact, none of those proposals have reached quorum, and many have not even made it to a vote for that very reason. A quick look at the Uniswap voting portal, where only two proposals have been approved so far this year, clearly indicates that the DAO is still facing a significant participation problem. From the Uniswap core team’s perspective, this is likely not a problem, since votes seem assured when they’re needed, but from the standpoint of healthy governance, the situation is critical. For that reason, we have abstained on this proposal.\n\nManugotsuka\n\nMay 6, 2026, 4:30pm\n\n7\n\nThe following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.\n\nWe voted FOR.\n\nWe think this makes sense given how Uniswap governance has evolved. The original delegations played an important role when participation was low and quorum was a real concern, but that is no longer the case today. Governance looks much healthier now, with broader participation and a more distributed set of active delegates.\n\nWe have generally been cautious about treasury-funded delegation mechanisms like the Franchiser. They can be useful as a temporary solution, but they should not become a permanent part of the system. If the initial goal has been achieved, it is reasonable to step back and let governance operate more organically.\n\neek637\n\nMay 6, 2026, 6:49pm\n\n8\n\nHi all - planning to post the proposal Friday afternoon. For those interested (@Tane , @Manugotsuka), i’ll be posting via Seatbelt using the code in this PR: https://github.com/uniswapfoundation/governance-seatbelt/pull/258. If you pull and run locally, seatbelt show the simulation results.\n\n3 Likes\n\nTane\n\nMay 7, 2026, 4:27pm\n\n9\n\nReviewed PR #258. Inverse fundMany simulation with the right recallMany call, Tenderly checks pass. LGTM, see you on-chain Friday.\n\n2 Likes\n\nAbel189\n\nMay 24, 2026, 4:55pm\n\n10\n\nI support this proposal because it reflects the evolution of Uniswap governance from a bootstrapping phase to a more mature and organically decentralized system.\n\nThe original franchiser delegations served an important purpose during periods where quorum reliability and delegate participation were weaker. Today, governance participation appears substantially healthier, with a broader and more competitive delegate landscape.\n\nReturning these delegated UNI to the governance timelock helps reduce structural governance distortion, especially where voting power is disconnected from direct economic exposure. It also reinforces the principle that treasury-controlled voting influence should remain limited and purpose-driven rather than permanent.\n\nI particularly appreciate that the proposal does not criticize the historical delegates themselves — many contributed meaningfully — but instead focuses on improving long-term governance architecture and legitimacy.\n\nOverall, this looks like a positive normalization step for Uniswap governance maturity.\n\n1 Like\n\nRelated topics\n\nTopic\n\nReplies\nViews\nActivity\n\n[Temperature Check]: Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nTemperature Check\n\n42\n\n7596\n\nDecember 4, 2023\n\n[RFC]: Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n18\n\n3046\n\nNovember 10, 2023\n\n[Governance Proposal] Delegation of UNI to Active but Underrepresented Delegates\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n4\n\n2346\n\nDecember 13, 2023\n\nUNI holders should be able to delegate during the voting period with zero delay\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n33\n\n5184\n\nNovember 3, 2020\n\n[RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2\n\nRequests for Comment\n\n39\n\n1818\n\nApril 28, 2025","tokens":3079,"crawled_at":1791194587368} +{"id":10407,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/forge/gas-tracking","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Gas tracking – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nGas tracking\n\nForge tracks gas usage to help optimize contracts and catch regressions.\n\nUnder EIP-8037 (Amsterdam), gas has two dimensions: regular gas and state gas. See gas accounting for how reports, snapshots, and lastFrameGas relate to them.\n\nGas reports\n\nGenerate a gas report for all tests:\n\n$ forge test --gas-report\n\nOutput shows gas usage per function:\n\n╭----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------╮\n| src/Counter.sol:Counter Contract | | | | | |\n+=======================================================================================+\n| Deployment Cost | Deployment Size | | | | |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| 156813 | 509 | | | | |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| | | | | | |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| Function Name | Min | Avg | Median | Max | # Calls |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| increment | 43482 | 43482 | 43482 | 43482 | 1 |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| number | 2424 | 2424 | 2424 | 2424 | 2 |\n|----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------|\n| setNumber | 23784 | 23784 | 23784 | 23784 | 1 |\n╰----------------------------------+-----------------+-------+--------+-------+---------╯\n\nFilter gas reports\n\nReport only specific contracts:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[profile.default]\ngas_reports = [\"Counter\", \"Token\"]\n\nExclude contracts:\n\nfoundry.toml\n[profile.default]\ngas_reports_ignore = [\"Test\", \"Script\"]\n\nGas snapshots\n\nCreate a snapshot file to track gas over time:\n\n$ forge snapshot\n\nThis creates .gas-snapshot with gas usage for each test:\n\nCounterTest:test_Increment() (gas: 31293)\nCounterTest:testFuzz_SetNumber(uint256) (runs: 256, μ: 31121, ~: 31277)\n\nCompare against a previous snapshot:\n\n$ forge snapshot --diff\n\nCheck that gas hasn't increased:\n\n$ forge snapshot --check\n\nThis exits with an error if any test uses more gas than recorded.\n\nInline gas tracking\n\nUse gasleft() to measure specific operations:\n\nfunction test_MeasureGas() public {\nuint256 gasBefore = gasleft();\n\ncounter.increment();\n\nuint256 gasUsed = gasBefore - gasleft();\nconsole.log(\"Gas used:\", gasUsed);\n}\n\nSnapshot cheatcodes\n\nTake named snapshots for comparison in tests:\n\nfunction test_GasComparison() public {\nvm.startSnapshotGas(\"increment\");\ncounter.increment();\nuint256 gasIncrement = vm.stopSnapshotGas();\n\nvm.startSnapshotGas(\"setNumber\");\ncounter.setNumber(1);\nuint256 gasSetNumber = vm.stopSnapshotGas();\n\nassertLt(gasSetNumber, gasIncrement);\n}\n\nGas in CI\n\nAdd snapshot checking to your CI pipeline:\n\n- name: Check gas\nrun: forge snapshot --check\n\nUpdate snapshots when gas changes are intentional:\n\n$ forge snapshot\n$ git add .gas-snapshot\n$ git commit -m \"Update gas snapshot\"\n\nPause gas metering\n\nExclude setup code from gas measurements:\n\nfunction test_OnlyMeasureTarget() public {\n// Setup not metered\nvm.pauseGasMetering();\n_complexSetup();\nvm.resumeGasMetering();\n\n// Only this is measured\ntarget.execute();\n}\n\nReset gas metering\n\nReset the gas counter mid-test:\n\nfunction test_ResetMidway() public {\ntarget.setup();\n\nvm.resetGasMetering();\n\n// Gas measurement starts fresh here\ntarget.execute();\n}\n\nWas this helpful?\n\nSuggest changes on GitHubLast updated: 29/09/2026, 10:21","tokens":876,"crawled_at":1791194588537} +{"id":10408,"url":"https://docs.compound.xyz/compound-js/helpers","domain":"docs.compound.xyz","chapter":"defi_protocols","title":"Compound.js Docs | Helpers","text":"Compound.js\nComet\nGovernance\ncTokens (v2)\nComptroller (v2)\nPrice Feed (v2)\nHelpers\n\nHelper & Utility Methods\nGet Address\nGet ABI\nGet Network Name With Chain ID\nGet Balance\n\nCompound.js\nHelper & Utility Methods\nThese methods are helpers for the Compound class and basic utilities for EVM development.\nGet Address\nGets the contract address of the named contract. This method supports contracts used by the Compound Protocol.\ncontract (string) The name of the contract.\n[network] (string) Optional name of the Ethereum network. Main net and all the popular public test nets are supported.\nRETURN (string) Returns the address of the contract.console.log('cETH Address: ', Compound.util.getAddress(Compound.cETH));\n\nGet ABI\nGets a contract ABI as a JavaScript array. This method supports contracts used by the Compound Protocol.\ncontract (string) The name of the contract.\nRETURN (Array) Returns the ABI of the contract as a JavaScript array.console.log('cETH ABI: ', Compound.util.getAbi('cEther'));\n\nGet Network Name With Chain ID\nGets the name of an Ethereum network based on its chain ID. This method returns information only for chains that have a Compound deployment.\nchainId (string) The chain ID of the network.\nRETURN (string) Returns the name of the Ethereum network.console.log('Goerli : ', Compound.util.getNetNameWithChainId(5));\n\nGet Balance\nFetches the current Ether balance of a provided Ethereum address.\naddress (string) The Ethereum address in which to get the ETH balance.\n[provider] (Provider | string) Optional Ethereum network provider. Defaults to Ethers.js fallback mainnet provider.\nRETURN (BigNumber) Returns a BigNumber hexadecimal value of the ETH balance of the address.\n(async function () {\n\nbalance = await Compound.eth.getBalance(myAddress, provider);\nconsole.log('My ETH Balance', +balance);\n\n})().catch(console.error);","tokens":462,"crawled_at":1791194589938} +{"id":10409,"url":"https://docs.sui.io/onchain-finance/fungible-tokens","domain":"docs.sui.io","chapter":"layer1_layer2","title":"Fungible Tokens | Sui Documentation","text":"Sui provides two standards for creating fungible tokens. Both produce Coin objects that are fully interoperable with wallets, DeFi protocols, and addressAddressA unique, anonymous identity on a blockchain network. balances. The difference is in how you create, configure, and manage the token's metadata and supply.\n\nCoin standard vs currency standard​\n\nFeatureCoin StandardCurrency Standard\nCreation function\ncoin::create_currency\ncoin_registry::new_currency or new_currency_with_otw\n\nMetadata storage\nStandalone CoinMetadata objectObjectThe basic unit of storage on Sui.\nCentralized in CoinRegistry at 0xc\n\nSupply models\nUncontrolled only\nFixed, burn-only, or uncontrolled\n\nRegulatory support\ncreate_regulated_currency_v2\nmake_regulated() during initialization\n\nMetadata updates\nRequires TreasuryCap\nDedicated MetadataCap (can be frozen or deleted)\n\nRPC discovery\nRequires knowing CoinMetadata object ID\nQueryable from the central registry\n\nStatus\nActive\nRecommended for new projects\n\nChoosing a standard​\n\nUse the following guidance to pick the right standard for your project:\n\nRecommended: Currency Standard\nFor new tokens, use the Currency Standard. It provides richer supply controls, centralized metadata discovery, and a dedicated MetadataCap for metadata management.\n\nCreating a new token​\n\nMost projects: Use coin_registry::new_currency. You can call this at any time after publishing your packagePackageSmart contracts on Sui.. See Create Fungible Tokens: Currency Standard.\n\nNeed a One-Time Witness proof: Use coin_registry::new_currency_with_otw in your moduleModuleA component of a Move package that defines interaction with on-chain objects.'s init function. This requires a two-step publish-then-finalize process.\n\nNeed the legacy Coin Standard: Use coin::create_currency in your module's init function. See Create Fungible Tokens: Coin Standard.\n\nConfiguring supply​\n\nOnly the Currency Standard supports supply model configuration:\n\nFixed supply: Mint the total supply during initialization, then call make_supply_fixed to lock the TreasuryCap inside the Currency. No further minting or burning is possible.\n\nBurn-only (deflationary): Mint the initial supply, then call make_supply_burn_only to prevent future minting while still allowing burns.\n\nUncontrolled: The default. The TreasuryCap holder can mint and burn freely.\n\nAdding regulatory controls​\n\nBoth standards support regulated tokens with deny-list capabilities. The Currency Standard simplifies this with make_regulated(allow_global_pause, ctx) during initialization, which returns a DenyCapV2 for managing the deny list. See Regulated Tokens for deny-list management.\n\nMigrating an existing token​\n\nIf you have an existing Coin Standard token, the Currency Standard provides migration functions to register your coin in the CoinRegistry while preserving its existing CoinMetadata object ID. See the Currency Standard reference for migration details.\n\nExample patterns​\n\nThese guides show common token configurations in action:\n\nFixed-supply token: Mint a capped supply at creation and freeze it permanently.\n\nIn-game currency: Mintable game tokens with admin controls.\n\nLoyalty tokens: Non-transferable reward points using the Closed-Loop TokenClosed-Loop TokenA token that can be used only for a specific service or authorized account. standard.\n\nRegulated tokens: Tokens with deny-list and global pause capabilities.\n\nCoin Standard\nIn this section\nCreate Fungible Tokens: Coin Standard\n\n→\nCurrency Standard\nIn this section\nCreate Fungible Tokens: Currency Standard\n\n→\nRegulated Currencies\nCreate regulated currencies on Sui using the Coin Registry system with deny list capabilities for access control.\n→\nToken Vesting Strategies\nImplement a vesting strategy for your token launch on Sui to strengthen long-term commitment, prevent market dumps, and align stakeholder incentives.\n→\nBridging Tokens\nMoving tokens from one blockchain to another is called bridging. To bridge tokens from another blockchain to Sui, you can use the Sui Bridge, Wormhole Connect, Wormhole Portal Bridge, or ZetaChain.\n→\n\nCoin standard vs currency standard\nChoosing a standardCreating a new token\nConfiguring supply\nAdding regulatory controls\nMigrating an existing token\n\nExample patterns\n\nWas this page helpful?","tokens":1069,"crawled_at":1791194605144} +{"id":10410,"url":"https://www.getfoundry.sh/cast/reading-chain-data","domain":"www.getfoundry.sh","chapter":"developer_specs","title":"Reading chain data – foundry - Ethereum Development Framework","text":"Was this helpful?\n\nReading chain data\n\nCast queries any Ethereum-compatible chain via JSON-RPC. Set your RPC endpoint with --rpc-url or the ETH_RPC_URL environment variable.\n\n$ export ETH_RPC_URL=https://ethereum.reth.rs/rpc\n\nBlocks\n\n$ cast block-number\n\n$ cast block latest\n\n$ cast block 18000000\n\n$ cast block latest --field timestamp\n\n$ cast base-fee\n\n$ cast bal latest\n\ncast bal prints the EIP-7928 block access list of a block as decoded JSON, listing every account and storage slot the block touched along with balance, nonce, and code changes. Pass --raw for the RLP encoding. The command fails for blocks whose list the node does not serve, typically blocks before the Amsterdam fork.\n\nTransactions\n\n$ cast tx $TX_HASH\n\n$ cast receipt $TX_HASH\n\n$ cast receipt $TX_HASH status\n\n$ cast receipt $TX_HASH gasUsed\n\nAccount state\n\n$ cast balance $ADDRESS\n\n$ cast balance $ADDRESS --ether\n\n$ cast nonce $ADDRESS\n\n$ cast code $ADDRESS\n\n$ cast storage $ADDRESS 0\n\nContract calls\n\nCall view functions without sending a transaction:\n\n$ cast call $CONTRACT \"balanceOf(address)(uint256)\" $ADDRESS\n\n$ cast call $CONTRACT \"name()(string)\"\n\n$ cast call $CONTRACT \"totalSupply()(uint256)\" --block 18000000\n\nSimulating state with call overrides\n\ncast call can temporarily replace account data for an eth_call. Overrides only affect the simulation; they do not change on-chain state.\n\nFlagEffect\n--override-balance \nReplaces an account's native balance.\n\n--override-nonce \nReplaces an account's nonce.\n\n--override-code \nReplaces an account's bytecode.\n\n--override-state \nReplaces all storage for an account with the supplied slots.\n\n--override-state-diff \nReplaces the supplied storage slots while preserving the account's other storage.\n\nEach flag accepts a comma-separated list of entries. For example, you can simulate a contract call after changing one storage slot:\n\n$ cast call $CONTRACT \"balanceOf(address)(uint256)\" $ADDRESS \\\n--override-state-diff $CONTRACT:$BALANCE_SLOT:$VALUE\n\nUse --override-state-diff when you only want to change specific slots. --override-state replaces the account's entire storage, so omitted slots read as zero during the call.\n\nSimulating block context\n\nUse --block to select the chain state on which to base the call, then use --block.* options to change the block values visible to the simulated EVM:\n\nFlagEVM block value\n--block.number \nBlock number.\n\n--block.time