diff --git "a/data/corpora/legal_formality/test_pos.jsonl" "b/data/corpora/legal_formality/test_pos.jsonl"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/data/corpora/legal_formality/test_pos.jsonl"
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00000", "text": "'5: In the event of the death, refusal, inability, or failure for any reason to act of both said Trustees at any time during the continuance of this trust, then The Chicago Title & Trust Company shall become the successor, Trustee, with the same rights, powers, duties and obligations as are herein vested in and imposed upon the Trustees, and the survivor thereof, hereinbefore named. 82 '6: None of the beneficiaries of the trust estate shall at any time be permitted to anticipate the payments to which any of them may be entitled hereunder by any order, assignment or otherwise. 83 'In Witness Whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal, at Chicago, Illinois, as of the 2nd day of January, 1920. 84 'Sidney M. Spiegel. (Seal) 85 'We hereby accept the above-named shares of stock and agree to hold the same subject to the terms above-mentioned, as of the 2nd day of January, 1920. 86 'Modie J. Spiegel. (Seal) 87 'Sidney M. Spiegel. (Seal)' 88 Appendix II. 89 The Northern Trust Company trust instrument No. 4477, which is one of the 'five trusts' considered in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397, is as follows (italics supplied): 90 'This indenture, made this first day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen (A.D. 1919), by and between Adolphus C. Bartlett, of the city of Chicago, county of Cook, and State of Illinois, the party of the first part, and the Northern Company (hereinafter termed the 'trustee'), of Chicago, a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Illinois, the party of the second part, witnesseth: 91 'Article First. 92 'That the party of the first part, being desirous of establishing and creating the trust hereinafter mentioned, for the purposes and upon the terms set forth, in consideration of the premises and influenced by love and affection for the beneficiaries hereinafter named, does hereby sell, assign, transfer, and", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00227", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00001", "text": ", lockouts or other cessation of work or interference therewith shall be ordered or sanctioned by any party hereto during the terms hereof except as against a party failing to comply with a decision, award, or order of the Adjustment Board.' If this be considered ambiguous in meaning, respondent offered, as evidence of its intent and meaning, to prove that during the negotiations one of the demands made by the union was a clause in the contract with reference to work stoppages which would have said 'No man shall be required to cross a picket line,' that this clause was rejected by respondent and the union acquiesced in the rejection and consented to the no-strike clause as above recited. The trial examiner said: 'All right. Let the offer of proof appear in the record.' From this it is not clear whether it was accepted or rejected. But the arbitrators' interpretation of the contract was in harmony with the offer. They said, 'In addition, the contract between the parties does not specifically permit the refusal by the employee to comply with such an order although other contracts in the industry do contain such a provision.' 19 In the section by which the Labor Management Relations Act prescribes certain practices of labor organizations which shall be deemed unfair, there is a proviso that nothing therein'shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this act * * *.'7 This clearly enables contracting parties to embody in their contract a provision against requiring an employee to cross a picket line if they so agree. And nothing in the Act prevents their agreeing upon contrary provisions if they consider them appropriate to the particular kind of business involved. An employee's breach of such an agreement may be amde grounds for his discharge without violating § 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157. National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 334, 59 S.Ct. 508, 510, 83 L.Ed. 682. In some instances he may not, even with an employer's assent, supplement the collective agreement with individual preferences over others employed under it. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relatios Board, 321 U.S.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00481", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00002", "text": "``, or from any other person, subject to such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors''. SEC. 11. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AMENDMENTS. Section 61(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a- 60(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following: ``(1)(A) The asset coverage requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 18(a)(1) applicable to business development companies shall be 200 percent. ``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) of this section or subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 18(a)(2), a business development company may have an asset coverage of not less than 110 percent, if, immediately before the issuance or sale of senior securities, the business development company has-- ``(i) total interest and dividend income for the 12 months preceding such issuance or sale that exceeds 120 percent of the sum of its total expenses (including taxes and interest expenses accrued) and dividends declared on senior securities for that 12-month period; and ``(ii) either-- ``(I) an average of not less than 50 percent of its assets invested in securities described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 55(a) throughout the preceding 12-month period; or ``(II) not less than 50 percent of its assets invested in securities described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 55(a) throughout 10 months of the preceding 12-month period. ``(C) It shall be unlawful for any business development company to issue any class of senior security representing indebtedness, or to sell any such security pursuant to subparagraph (B), unless provision is made to prohibit the declaration of any dividend (except a dividend payable in stock of the issuer), or the declaration of any other distribution upon any class of the capital stock of such business development company, or the purchase of any such capital stock, unless, in every such case-- ``(i) the class of senior securities has, at the time of the declaration of any such dividend or distribution or at the time of any such purchase, an asset coverage of not less than 110 percent after deducting the amount of such dividend, distribution, or purchase price, as the case may be; and ``(ii) the business development company", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01032", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00003", "text": "Act, has forbidden the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the Federal Act. In addition, it is not difficult to visualize situations in which application of the Wisconsin Act would work at cross-purposes with other policies of the National Act. But we content ourselves with citation of examples of direct conflict found in the records before us. In the case of the transit workers, the union agreed to continue collective bargaining after the strike became imminent, whereas the company insisted upon invocation of the compulsory arbitration features of the Wisconsin Act. That act requires that collective bargaining continue until an 'impasse' is reached, Wis.Stat. 1949, § 111.52, whereas the Federal Act requires that both employer and employees continue to bargain collectively,26 even though a strike may actually be in progress. National Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 1938, 304 U.S. 333, 345, 58 S.Ct. 904, 910, 82 L.Ed. 1381. Further, the transit company was able to avoid entirely any determination of certain union demands when the arbitrators, in accordance with Wis.Stat. 1949, § 111.58, ruled that the matter of assigning of workers to certain shifts 'infringe(s) upon the right of the employer to manage his business'. Yet similar problems of work scheduling and shift assignment have been held to be appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under the Federal Act as administered by the National Labor Relations Board. See Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42, 54—55 (1940); American National Ins. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 185 (1950), and cases cited therein. 19 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, passed by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause, are the supreme law of the land under Art. VI of the Constitution. Having found that the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law conflicts with that federal legislation, the judgments enforcing the Wisconsin Act cannot stand. 20 Reversed. 21 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice BURTON and Mr. Justice MINTON join, dissenting. 22 Wisdonsin has provided that labor disputes in public utilities shall be resolved by conciliation or compulsory arbitration if: 23 (1) after exerting 'every reasonable effort", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00391", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00004", "text": "the trial court gave its instructions and the District Attorney argued the case in accordance with the constitutional and statutory provisions just referred to, we have for decision the question of their constitutionality in these circumstances under the limitations of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 2 The appellant was charged in the information with former convictions for burglary, larceny and robbery and pursuant to § 1025, California Penal Code, answered that he had suffered the previous convictions. This answer barred allusion to these charges of convictions on the trial.5 Under California's interpretation of § 1025 of the Penal Code and § 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, if the defendant, after answering affirmatively charges alleging prior convictions, takes the witness stand to deny or explain away other evidence that has been introduced 'the commission of these crimes could have been revealed to the jury on cross-examination to impeach his testimony.' People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 494, 165 P.2d 3, 11; People v. Braun, 14 Cal.2d 1, 6, 92 P.2d 402. This forces an accused who is a repeated offender to choose between the risk of having his prior offenses disclosed to the jury or of having it draw harmful inferences from uncontradicted evidence that can only be denied or explained by the defendant. 3 In the first place, appellant urges that the provision of the Fifth Amendment that no person'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' is a fundamental national privilege or immunity protected against state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment or a privilege or immunity secured, through the Fourteenth Amendment, against deprivation by state action because it is a personal right, enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights. 4 Secondly, appellant relies upon the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate the provisions of the California law, set out in note 3 supra, and as applied (a) because comment on failure to testify is permitted, (b) because appellant was forced to forego testimony in person because of danger of disclosure of his past convictions through cross-examnation and (c) because the presumption of innocence was infringed by the shifting of the burden of proof to appellant in permitting comment on his failure to testify. 5 We shall assume, but without any intention thereby of ruling upon the issue,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00110", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00005", "text": "21st centuries; or ``(bb) the years 1999 and 2000; or ``(II) with regard to leap year calculations. ``(B) Establishment of program.--The Administration shall-- ``(i) establish a loan guarantee program, under which the Administration may, during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this paragraph and ending on December 31, 2000, guarantee loans made by eligible lenders to small business concerns in accordance with this paragraph; and ``(ii) notify each eligible lender of the establishment of the program under this paragraph, and otherwise take such actions as may be necessary to aggressively market the program under this paragraph. ``(C) Use of funds.--A small business concern that receives a loan guaranteed under this paragraph shall only use the proceeds of the loan to-- ``(i) address the Year 2000 computer problems of that small business concern, including the repair and acquisition of information technology systems, the purchase and repair of software, the purchase of consulting and other third party services, and related expenses; and ``(ii) provide relief for a substantial economic injury incurred by the small business concern as a direct result of the Year 2000 computer problems of the small business concern or of any other entity (including any service provider or supplier of the small business concern), if such economic injury has not been compensated for by insurance or otherwise. ``(D) Loan amounts.-- ``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding paragraph (3)(A) and subject to clause (ii) of this subparagraph, a loan may be made to a borrower under this paragraph even if the total amount outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business loan and investment fund, the business guaranty loan financing account, and the business direct loan financing account would thereby exceed $750,000. ``(ii) Exception.--A loan may not be made to a borrower under this paragraph if the total amount outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business loan and investment fund, the business guaranty loan financing account, and the business direct loan financing account would thereby exceed $1,000,000. ``(E) Administration participation.-- Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A), in an agreement to participate in a loan under this paragraph, participation by the Administration shall not exceed-- ``(i) 85 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan, if the balance exceeds $100,000; ``(ii)", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01114", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00006", "text": "Navy, Jan. 11, 1944, Sen. Hearings on Sen. 1268, Sen. 1280, and Sen.J.Res. 80, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 551, 553, where it is said: 4 See record p. 177 in Pownall v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694, and record p. 227 in Alexander Wool Combing Co. v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694. And see H.R. Hearings on H.R. 3022, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 27. At the time Title II of the First War Powers Act, § 201, 55 Stat. 839, 50 U.S.C.App. § 611, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 611, was in effect empowering the President to authorize any department or agency exercising functions in connection with the prosecution of the war effort under regulations prescribed by him 'to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made * * * without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendm nt, or modification of contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate the prosecution of the war * * *.' By Executive Order 9001, dated Dec. 27, 1941, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 611 note, 6 Fed.Reg. 6787, 3 C.F.R. 1941, Supp. 330, the President delegated this authority to various agencies including the Navy Department. He also authorized the Navy 'by agreement' to modify or amend or settle 'claims' under contracts and provided that the amendments and modifications'may be with or without consideration and may be utilized to accomplish the same things as any original contract could have accomplished hereunder, irrespective of the time or circumstances of the making of or the form of the contract amended or modified, or of the amending or modifying contract, and irrespective of rights which may have accrued under the contract, or the amendments or modifications thereof.' 5 See Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U.S.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00273", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00007", "text": "foreign commerce. ``(b) Certification Requirement.--No prosecution of any offense described in this subsection may be undertaken by the United States, except under the certification in writing of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General that-- ``(1) such certifying individual has reasonable cause to believe that the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person was a motivating factor underlying the alleged conduct of the defendant; and ``(2) such certifying individual has consulted with State or local law enforcement officials regarding the prosecution and determined that-- ``(A) the State does not have jurisdiction or does not intend to exercise jurisdiction; ``(B) the State has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdiction; ``(C) the State does not object to the Federal Government assuming jurisdiction; or ``(D) the verdict or sentence obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence. ``(c) Definitions.--In this section-- ``(1) the term `explosive or incendiary device' has the meaning given such term in section 232 of this title; ``(2) the term `firearm' has the meaning given such term in section 921(a) of this title; and ``(3) the term `gender identity' for the purposes of this chapter means actual or perceived gender-related characteristics. ``(d) Rule of Evidence.--In a prosecution for an offense under this section, evidence of expression or associations of the defendant may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial, unless the evidence specifically relates to that offense. However, nothing in this section affects the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``249. Hate crime acts.''. SEC. 7. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this Act", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00922", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00008", "text": "in recital 202 is hereby confirmed. I. DEFINITIVE COURSE OF ACTION (121) In view of the conclusions reached regarding dumping, injury, causation and Community interest, it is considered that definitive anti-dumping measures should be taken in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Community by dumped imports originating in the concerned countries. 1. Injury elimination level (122) In the absence of any new information, the methodology used for establishing the injury margin as described in recital 206 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. 2. Form and level of the duties (123) In the absence of any new information, the methodology used for establishing the anti-dumping duty rates in conjunction with the relevant countervailing duty rates established in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation, as described in recitals 209 to 213 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. (124) In order to avoid that fluctuations in PET prices caused by fluctuations in crude oil prices should result in higher duties being collected, it is considered appropriate that duties in the form of a specific amount per tonne should be imposed. These amounts result from the application of the anti-dumping duty rate to the cif export prices used for the calculation of the injury elimination level during the IP. (125) The proposed anti-dumping duties are the following: India >TABLE> (126) Elque Polyesters Limited and Futura Polymer Limited participated in the parallel anti-subsidy proceeding but noting the present anti-dumping investigation since they did not export to the Community. They are therefore entitled to ask for a newcomer review when they have actually exported to the Community, or when they can demonstrate that they have entered into irrevocable contractual obligations to export significant quantities to the Community. Indonesia >TABLE> Korea >TABLE> Malaysia >TABLE> Taiwan >TABLE> Tailand >TABLE> (127) Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission(5) forthwith with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with e.g. that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. The Commission, if appropriate, will, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, amend the Regulation accordingly by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00825", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00009", "text": "When the season closed, he helped take the boats out of the water and block them up for the winter. His employment terminated December 19, 1947. 3 Desper was re-employed March 15, 1948. There was testimony that he was then engaged for the season and was to resume his operator's duties when the boats were back in the water. For the time being, however, he was put to cleaning, painting, and waterproofing the boats, preparing them for navigation. On the date of the accident, April 26th, the boats were still blocked up on land. Several men, Desper among them, were on board a moored barge, maintained by respondent as a machine shop, warehouse, waiting room and ticket office, engaged in painting life preservers for use on the boats. One man was working on a fire extinguisher. It exploded, killing him and Desper. 4 The Jones Act confers a cause of action on 'any seaman.'4 In opposition to petitioner's suit under the Act, respondent contended that Desper, at the time of his death, was not a'seaman' within the meaning of the Act. Whether he was such a'seaman' is the critical issue in the case which reached this Court. 5 Petitioner contends that the 1939 Amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act5 extended the scope of the word'seaman,' as used in the Jones Act, to include those whose work'substantially affects' navigation. The Amendment provides that: 'Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall * * * be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.' 6 Petitioner reads with that Amendment the provision of the Jones Act that statutes'modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees' shall apply in a seaman's action. We agree with the court below that the Amendment has no effect on the 'right or remedy' of railway employees but merely redefines for the purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act the scope of the word 'employee' to include certain persons not theretofore covered, because they were not directly engaged in", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00421", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00010", "text": "ators, but we find that they do not affect the result.20 20 The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is therefore affirmed. 21 Affirmed. 22 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 23 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice JACKSON join, dissenting. 24 In light of the attitude with which the doom of deportation has heretofore been viewed by this Court, in the case of those whose lives have been intimately tied to this country, I deem it my duty not to squeeze the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 157, 8 U.S.C.A. § 157, so as to yield every possible hardship of which its words are susceptible. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284—285, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391, 68 S.Ct. 10, 12, 92 L.Ed. 17; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 376, 92 L.Ed. 433; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 1449, 89 L.Ed. 2103; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, note 8, 67 S.Ct. 224, 230, 91 L.Ed. 196; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612, 69 S.Ct. 384, 389, modified, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 384. Because we have been mindful of the fact that such deportation may result 'in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living', this Court concluded that due process of law requires judicial determination when a claim of citizenship is made in a deportation proceeding, while upon entry or reentry the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00340", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00011", "text": "* * *.'13 Moreover, a 1946 amendment to § 608, designed to eliminate the finality of the decisions of the Administrator on insurance matters,14 amended the last sentence of § 608 to add the words set out in italics: 15 'Except in the event of suit as provided in section 617 hereof, or other appropriate court proceedings, all decisions rendered by the Administrator under the provisions of this Act, or regulations properly issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact, and no other official of the United States, except a judge or judges of United States courts, shall have jurisdiction to review any such decisions.' 16 The extension of procedures available to secure judicial review, the interpolation of the word 'properly,' and the addition, presumably out of an abundance of caution, of the tautological phrase 'except a judge or judges of United States courts' are indicative of congressional concern that the regulations of the Veterans' Administration be subject to more than casual judicial scrutiny when they are based upon a controverted construction of the statute. 17 Accordingly, § 602(h)(2) must be read in the full context of related sections of the statute and other indicia of legislative intent before we can adequately determine whether the regulation is 'not inconsistent' with the provisions of the Act and whether it is 'necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes.' We turn therefore from narrow, semantic considerations to a broader context in which the intent of Congress can be more readily comprehended. 18 The proper meaning of § 602(h)(2) becomes apparent when the respective assumptions and consequences of each of the two alternative interpretations before us are tested against the legislative history and the statute viewed in its entirety. The construction adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals would result in conferring a far greater return to beneficiaries in the group covered by § 602(h)(2), i.e., over thirty at the time of the insured's death, than the return to which first beneficiaries covered by § 602(h)(1), i.e., under thirty at the insured's death, are entitled. It is unquestioned that the latter group, under the original statutory provisions,15 were entitled only to 240 monthly installments (i.e., over a 20-year period) which in the aggregate equal the face value plus interest, with no further installments payable thereafter, whether or not the payee survived that limited period. But,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00183", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00012", "text": "330 U.S. 75 67 S.Ct. 556 91 L.Ed. 754 UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS OF AMERICA (C.I.O.) et al.v.MITCHELL et al. No. 20. Reargued Oct. 17, 1946. Decided Feb. 10, 1947. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. [Syllabus from pages 75-77 intentionally omitted] Mr. Lee Pressman, of Washington, D.C., for appellants. Mr. Ralph F. Fuchs, of Washington, D.C., for appellees. Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The Hatch Act,* enacted in 1940, declares unlawful certain specified political activities of federal employees.1 Section 9 forbids officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking 'any active part in political management or in political campaigns.'2 Section 15 declares that the activities theretofore determined by the United States Civil Service Commission to be prohibited to employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the civil service rules shall be deemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered by the Hatch Act.3 These sections of the Act cover all federal officers and employees whether in the classified civil service or not and a penalty of dismissal from employment is imposed for violation. There is no designation of a single governmental agency for its enforcement. 2 For many years before the Hatch Act the Congress had authorized the exclusion of federal employees in the competitive classified service from active participation in political management and political campaigns.4 In June, 1938, the Congressional authorization for exclusion had been made more effective by a Civil Service Commission disciplinary rule.5 That power to discipline members of the competitive classified civil service continues in the Commission under the Hatch Act by virtue of the present applicability of the Executive Order No. 8705, March 5, 1941. The applicable Civil Service Commission rules are printed in the margin.6 The only change in the Civil Service Rules relating to political activity, caused by the Hatch Act legislation, that is of significance in this case is the elimination on March 5, 1941, of the word 'privately' from the phrase 'to express privately their opinions.' This limitation to private expression had regulated classified personnel since 1907.7 3 The present appellants sought an injunction before a", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00025", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00013", "text": "way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall * * * be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.' 6 Petitioner reads with that Amendment the provision of the Jones Act that statutes'modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees' shall apply in a seaman's action. We agree with the court below that the Amendment has no effect on the 'right or remedy' of railway employees but merely redefines for the purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act the scope of the word 'employee' to include certain persons not theretofore covered, because they were not directly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. It does not extend the meaning of'seaman' in the Jones Act to include one who was not a'seaman' before. Seamen were given the rights of railway employees by the Jones Act, but the definition of'seaman' was never made dependent on the meaning of 'employee' as used in legislation applicable to railroads. 7 The next question is whether, without reference to this 1939 Amendment, decedent was a'seaman' at the time of his death. The many cases turning upon the question whether an individual was a'seaman' demonstrate that the matter depends largely on the facts of the particular case and the activity in which he was engaged at the time of injury. The facts in this case are unique. The work in which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death quite clearly was not that usually done by a'seaman.' The boats were not afloat and had neither captain nor crew. They were undergoing seasonal repairs, the work being of the kind that, in the case of larger vessels, would customarily be done by exclusively shore-based personnel. For a number of reasons the ships might not be launched, or he might not operate one. To be sure, he was a probable navigator in the near future, but the law does not cover probable or expectant seamen but seamen in being. It is our conclusion that while engaged in such seasonal repair work Desper was not a'seaman' within the purview of the Jones Act. The distinct nature of the work is emphasized by the fact that there was no vessel engaged in navigation at the time of the decedent's death. All had been 'laid", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00422", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00014", "text": "of the Court held that the arrest in question was an invalid one. Obviously, a search and seizure may not be held valid on the sole ground that it was an incident to an invalid arrest. Such is not the situation here. 42 In Carroll v. United States, supra, at page 149 of 267 U.S., at page 284 of 45 S.Ct., this Court observed: 'The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.' We believe that the result reached today is not consistent with judicial authority as it existed before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment nor as it has developed since that time. Nor do we feel that the decision commends itself as adapted to conserve vital public and individual interests. Heretofore it has been thought that where ofenforcement of the law have lawfully enficers charged with the responsibility of tered premises and executed a valid arrest, a reasonable accommodation of the interests of society and the individual permits such officials to seize instrumentalities of the crime and contraband materials in open view of the arresting officer. The Court would now condition this right of seizure after a valid arrest upon an ex post facto judicial judgment of whether the arresting officers might have obtained a search warrant. At best, the operation of the rule which the Court today enunciates for the first time may be expected to confound confusion in a field already replete with complexities. 1 Subsequently, petitioners moved the District Court to order the return of the property seized and to suppress its use as evidence. 1947, 70 F.Supp. 764. The motion was denied. The order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam statement. 1947, 3 Cir., 163 F.2d 828. 2 See §§ 2803, 2810, 2812, 2814, 2831, 2833 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, §§ 2803, 2810, 2812, 2814, 2831, 2833. 3 Boyd v. United States, 1886, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 624, 6 S.Ct. 524, 528,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00181", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00015", "text": "the laws, deprived of property without due process of law, and have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. We pass to a consideration of those issues. I. 14 Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider. Only two cases have been decided by this Court which in any way have involved the enforcement of such agreements. The first of these was the case of Corrigan v. Buckley, 1926, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969. There, suit was brought in the courts of the District of Columbia to enjoin a threatened violation of certain restrictive covenants relating to lands situated in the city of Washington. Relief was granted, and the case was brought here on appeal. It is apparent that that case, which had originated in the federal courts and involved the enforcement of covenants on land located in the District of Columbia, could present no issues under the Fourteenth Amendment; for that Amendment by its terms applies only to the States. Nor was the question of the validity of court enforcement of the restrictive covenants under the Fifth Amendment properly before the Court, as the opinion of this Court specifically recognizes.5 The only constitutional issue which the appellants had raised in the lower courts, and hence the only constitutional issue before this Court on appeal, was the validity of the covenant agreements as such. This Court concluded that since the inhibitions of the constitutional provisions invoked, apply only to governmental action, as contrasted to action of private individuals, there was no showing that the covenants, which were simply agreements between private property owners, were invalid. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial question. Nothing in the opinion of this Court, therefore, may properly be regarded as an adjudication on the merits of the constitutional issues presented by these cases, which raise the question of the validity, not of the private agreements as such, but of the judicial enforcement of those agreements. 15 The second of the cases involving racial restrictive covenants was Hansberry v. Lee, 1940, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741. In that", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00166", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00016", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Increasing Homeownership Opportunities Act''. SEC. 2. PERMANENT CONFORMING LOAN LIMIT INCREASE FOR FREDDIE MAC AND FANNIE MAE. (a) Freddie Mac.-- (1) Conforming loan limit increase.--Paragraph (2) of section 305(a) of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act (12 U.S.C. 1454(a)(2)) is amended-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (B) in the first sentence, by redesignating clauses (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively; (C) in the second sentence, by striking ``clause (A)'' and inserting ``clause (i)''; (D) in the sixth sentence by striking ``January 1 of each year beginning after the effective date of the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008'' and inserting ``January 1, 2010, and January 1 of each year thereafter''; and (E) in the last sentence-- (i) by striking ``115 percent'' each place it appears and inserting ``125 percent''; and (ii) by striking ``150 percent'' and inserting ``175 percent''. (2) Discretionary authority.--Paragraph (2) of section 305(a) of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act (12 U.S.C. 1454(a)(2)), as amended by paragraph (1), is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) and subject to subparagraph (C), the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may-- ``(i) increase the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage that may be purchased by the Corporation that is otherwise in effect pursuant to the sixth sentence of subparagraph (A) with respect to any particular size or sizes of residences located in any particular area or areas by not more than $100,000; or ``(ii) increase, for any geographic area that is smaller than an area for which a dollar amount limitation on the principal obligation of a mortgage is established pursuant to this paragraph, the limitation otherwise in effect for such size or sizes of residences for such sub-area or sub-areas, but in no case to an amount that exceeds the maximum nationwide amount otherwise permitted under this subparagraph. ``(C) The Director of the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00911", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00017", "text": "authorization shall cooperate with the Federal coordinator. (b) Federal Refinery Authorizations.-- (1) Meeting participants.--Not later than 30 days after receiving a notification from an applicant that the applicant is seeking a Federal refinery authorization pursuant to Federal law, the Federal coordinator appointed under subsection (a) shall convene a meeting of representatives from all Federal and State agencies responsible for a Federal refinery authorization with respect to the refinery. The governor of a State shall identify each agency of that State that is responsible for a Federal refinery authorization with respect to that refinery. (2) Memorandum of agreement.--(A) Not later than 90 days after receipt of a notification described in paragraph (1), the Federal coordinator and the other participants at a meeting convened under paragraph (1) shall establish a memorandum of agreement setting forth the most expeditious coordinated schedule possible for completion of all Federal refinery authorizations with respect to the refinery, consistent with the full substantive and procedural review required by Federal law. If a Federal or State agency responsible for a Federal refinery authorization with respect to the refinery is not represented at such meeting, the Federal coordinator shall ensure that the schedule accommodates those Federal refinery authorizations, consistent with Federal law. In the event of conflict among Federal refinery authorization scheduling requirements, the requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency shall be given priority. (B) Not later than 15 days after completing the memorandum of agreement, the Federal coordinator shall publish the memorandum of agreement in the Federal Register. (C) The Federal coordinator shall ensure that all parties to the memorandum of agreement are working in good faith to carry out the memorandum of agreement, and shall facilitate the maintenance of the schedule established therein. (c) Consolidated Record.--The Federal coordinator shall, with the cooperation of Federal and State administrative agencies and officials, maintain a complete consolidated record of all decisions made or actions taken by the Federal coordinator or by a Federal administrative agency or officer (or State administrative agency or officer acting under delegated Federal authority) with respect to any Federal refinery authorization. Such record shall be the record for judicial review under subsection (d) of decisions made or actions taken by Federal and State administrative agencies and officials, except that, if the Court determines that the record does not contain sufficient information, the Court may remand the proceeding to the Federal coordinator for further development of the consolidated record. (d) Remedies.-- (1) In general.--The United States District Court for the district in which the proposed refinery is located shall have exclusive jurisdiction", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00896", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00018", "text": "line with consumer requirements and facilitate trade based on fair competition, thereby helping to improve profitability. (4) The standards are applicable at all marketing stages. Long-distance transport, storage over a certain period and the various processes the products undergo may cause some degree of deterioration owing to the biological development of the products or their perishable nature. Account should be taken of such deterioration when applying the standard at the marketing stages following dispatch. As products in the \"Extra\" Class have to be particularly carefully sorted and packaged, only lack of freshness and turgidity is to be taken into account in their case. (5) Sufficient maturity should be one of the minimum requirements for strawberries. Existing scientific and technical data do not permit reliable and objective criteria for assessing this requirement to be defined. (6) The marketing without calyx of strawberries of certain varieties that easily lose their calyx at harvest is traditional in the region of production in Finland and in Denmark. These two Member States have, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, requested that strawberries produced and consumed in those regions should not have to comply with the standards. This Regulation should therefore include a derogation to that effect. (7) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The marketing standard for strawberries falling within CN code 0810 10 00 shall be as set out in the Annex. The standard shall apply at all marketing stages under the conditions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 2200/96. However, at stages following dispatch, products may show in relation to the requirements of the standard: (a) a slight lack of freshness and turgidity; (b) for products graded in classes other than the \"Extra\" Class, slight deteriorations due to their development and their tendency to perish. Article 2 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Regulation, strawberries of varieties that easily lose their calyx at harvest may be sold without calyx in the region of production in Finland and in Denmark. 2. For the application of paragraph 1, each package or lot shall bear, in addition to the other indication required, the following indication: - in Finnish: \"myydään ainoastaan... (region of production)\", - in Danish: \"må kun sælges i... (region of production)\", - in Swedish", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00635", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00019", "text": "Navajo Nation and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe outlining the long-term management of the Center, including but not limited to-- (i) the acceptance and use of funds derived from public and private sources to minimize the use of appropriated or borrowed funds; (ii) the payment of the operating costs of the Center through the assessment of fees or other income generated by the Center; (iii) a strategy for achieving financial self-sufficiency with respect to the Center by not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act; and (iv) defining appropriate vendor standards and business activities at the Four Corners Monument Tribal Park. SEC. 6. SELECTION OF GRANT RECIPIENT. The Secretary is authorized to award a grant in accordance with the provisions of this act. The Four Corners Heritage Council may make recommendations to the Secretary on grant proposals regarding the design of facilities at the Four Corners Monument Tribal Park. SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. In General.-- (1) Authorizations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this act-- (A) $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and (B) $50,000 for each of fiscal years 2000-2004 for maintenance and operation of the center, program development, or staffing in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 5(b). (2) Carryover.--Any funds made available under this section that are unexpended at the end of the fiscal year for which those funds are appropriated may be used by the Secretary through fiscal year 2001 for the purposes for which those funds were made available. (3) Reservation of funds.--The Secretary may reserve funds appropriated pursuant to this act until a proposal meeting the requirements of this act is submitted, but no later than September 30, 2000. SEC. 8. DONATIONS. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of the planning, construction, and operation of the Center, the Secretary may accept, retain, and expand donations of funds, and use property or services donated from private persons and entities or from public entities. SEC. 9. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this Act is intended to abrogate, modify, or impair any right or claim of the Navajo Nation or the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, that is based on any law (including any treaty, Executive order, agreement, or Act", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01007", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00020", "text": "fixed for the 1992/93 marketing year is processed; whereas this is an undesirable side effect of the switchover from one system to another; Whereas, given that a policy to control production has been applied to these products for several years, this situation appears to be clearly at variance with the objective of that policy, which is familiar to operators, to bring production into line with possibilities of disposal; whereas, since the quota system has lapsed, the provisions in force should accordingly be adapted to maintain some discipline and thereby prevent serious imbalance on the market, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 is hereby amended as follows: 1. In Article 1: (a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: '1. The quantity of processed tomato products corresponding to 6 596 787 tonnes of fresh tomatoes is hereby fixed as the guarantee threshold for the 1992/93 marketing year. This tonnage shall be divided as follows: - 4 317 339 tonnes for the manufacture of tomato concentrate, - 1 543 228 tonnes for the manufacture of whole peeled tomatoes, - 736 220 tonnes for the manufacture of other processed tomato products.'; (b) paragraph 2 is deleted. 2. Article 2 is replaced by the following: 'Article 2 1. Where the guarantee threshold for the processed tomato products referred to in Article 1 (1) is exceeded, the aid for the current marketing year shall be reduced in line with the overrun in the threshold and in proportion to the amount by which each of the quantities fixed in that paragraph has been exceeded. 2. The overrun referred to in paragraph 1 shall be calculated on the basis of the quantities covered by production aid application during the 1992/93 marketing year.' Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Luxembourg, 30 June 1992.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 428, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00573", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00021", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Senior Citizen Protection Act of 1993''. TITLE I--VIOLENT CRIMES SEC. 101. MANDATORY PRISON TERMS. (a) In General.--Chapter 227 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 3581. Mandatory sentence for felony against individual of age sixty-five or over ``(a) Upon conviction of any Federal felony crime of violence, if any victim of such crime is an individual who had attained the age of 65 years on or before the date that the offense was committed, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment-- ``(1) for a term of not less than three fourths of the maximum term of imprisonment provided for such crime, in the case of a first offense to which this section is applicable; and ``(2) for a term of not less than the maximum term of imprisonment provided for such crime, in the case of a second or subsequent offense to which this section is applicable. ``(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to a sentence imposed under subsection (a) of this section-- ``(1) the court shall not suspend such sentence; ``(2) the court shall not give the defendant a probationary sentence; ``(3) such sentence shall be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed for a Federal offense; and ``(4) the court shall reject any plea agreement which would result in the imposition of a term of imprisonment less than that which would have been imposed under subsection (a) of this section in connection with any charged offense.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 227 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``3581. Mandatory sentence for felony against individual of age sixty- five or over.''. (c) Conforming Amendments to Rules of Procedure.-- (1) Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended-- (A) by adding at the end of the first paragraph in paragraph (1) the following new sentence: ``Neither the defendant nor the court may waive a presentence investigation and report unless there is in the record information sufficient for the court to determine whether a mandatory sentence must be imposed pursuant to title 18, United States Code, section 3581.''; and (B) in", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01126", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00022", "text": ", 90 L.Ed. 1099; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1208, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 1157. The question in this case therefore is not one necessarily governed by the same considerations as applied in the cases of seamen covered by the Hust decision. 16 But, as the Court recognizes, it is one of maritime tort, although longshoremen rather than seamen are involved; and is moreover'suable in the State courts by virtue of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which saves 'to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.\" Notwithstanding the characterization as maritime tort, the Court skirts the question whether the source of the right is New York law or, on the contrary, is federal law for which New York, pursuant to § 9, merely supplies a means for enforcement. For in either event, it says, '(New York's) determination is decisive that there is no remedy in its courts for such a business invitee against one who has no control and possession of (the) premises.' From this conclusion I disagree. For, if the liability here is founded in federal law, as creating the maritime tort, then New York law has nothing to do with creating or nullifying the substantive right. Its sole function is to supply the remedy commanded by § 9 of the Judiciary Act. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810. And in my judgment the liability here, since it arises from a maritime tort, is a creature of federal law in its entirety, not of state law.6 I therefore do not agree that any substantive issues in the case 'exclusively concern New York law' or that in any respect that state's Court of Appeals 'had the final say in holding that one in the relation of the respondents to the petitioner is not liable for the tort of which the latter complains.' I do not understand how the Court can leave open the question whether New York law has a hand in creating the right sued on or one only in supplying a forum and remedy, and at the same time can rely on New York law as having any part in creating the right or nullifying it, as it seems to", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00105", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00023", "text": "the sugar or the cereals sector; whereas the import levy on sugars added to certain preserved fruit is calculated on prices established in the sugar sector; whereas Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3020/85 (5) provides that the agricultural conversion rates for such amounts should be those applicable in the agricultural sectors covering the relevant basic products; Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 has extended the range of sugars attracting export refunds; whereas the existing rules should be amended to cover this situation; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. The agricultural conversion rate to be applied for converting: (a) the import levy provided for in Article 10 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 for the products listed in Annex III to that Regulation; (b) the export refund on sugars provided for in Article 11 (1), first, third an fourth indents, of the same Regulation; into national currencies shall be that applicable in the common organization of the market in the sugar sector. 2. The agricultural conversion rate to be applied for converting the amount of export refund on glucose and glucose syrup, falling within subheadings 17.02 B I and B II of the Common Customs Tariff, provided for in the second indent of Article 11 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86, shall be that applicable to maize under the common organization of the market in cereals. Article 2 Regulation (EEC) No 3020/85 is hereby repealed. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 18 April 1986.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 396, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00682", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00024", "text": "Finance Agency may-- ``(i) increase the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage that may be purchased by the Corporation that is otherwise in effect pursuant to the sixth sentence of subparagraph (A) with respect to any particular size or sizes of residences located in any particular area or areas by not more than $100,000; or ``(ii) increase, for any geographic area that is smaller than an area for which a dollar amount limitation on the principal obligation of a mortgage is established pursuant to this paragraph, the limitation otherwise in effect for such size or sizes of residences for such sub-area or sub-areas, but in no case to an amount that exceeds the maximum nationwide amount otherwise permitted under this subparagraph. ``(C) The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may increase the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage for any area or sub-area pursuant to subparagraph (B) only if the Director makes a determination that-- ``(i) such increase is warranted by higher median home prices in such area or sub-area; and ``(ii) such increase will have a significant impact on the cost or availability of mortgages having principal obligation amounts in the range of such increased limit. ``(D) Notwithstanding the calculation of the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage that may be purchased by the Corporation for an area pursuant to the last sentence of subparagraph (A), if any recalculation of the local median home price for any area would otherwise result in a decrease in the maximum original principal limitation for any size residence in any such area, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may prevent or limit a decrease in such limitation from taking place for any such area. In taking such action, the Director shall consider such factors as market dislocations caused by a decrease in such limitation, the extent of the median home price decline, and the causes for such reduction in median home price.''. (b) Fannie Mae.-- (1) Conforming loan limit increase.--Paragraph (2) of section 302(b) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1717(b)(2)) is amended-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (B) in the second sentence, by redesignating clauses (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively; (C) in the third sentence, by striking ``clause (A)'' and inserting ``clause (i)'';", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00912", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00025", "text": "89/310/EEC (4) unilaterally and without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations establishing provisional limits for 1989 in respect of imports into France of the products in question originating in New Zealand; Whereas there are disparities in the measures applied in different Member States to imports of the products in question originating in New Zealand; whereas such disparities may give rise to deflection of trade; Whereas information received by the Commission indicates that there has been a significant increase since the second half of 1988 in French imports of sheepmeat and goatmeat originating in New Zealand and put into free circulation in other Member States, and that there is a real risk of these imports, because of their volume and low price, causing material injury to French producers and disrupting the market; Whereas in the circumstances it is desirable to establish the likely trend of these imports; Whereas the information given by the French authorities has been examined closely by the Commission in accordance with the criteria laid down by Decision 87/433/EEC; Whereas this examination has shown that the conditions for the application of surveillance measures in respect of the products in question do exist; Whereas the French Republic should therefore be authorized to make the imports concerned subject to prior intra-Community surveillance, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The French Republic is hereby authorized to apply intra-Community surveillance in accordance with Decision 87/433/EEC until 31 December 1989 to imports of meat of sheep and goats, fresh, chilled or frozen, falling within CN code 0204, originating in New Zealand. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the French Republic. Done at Brussels, 10 May 1989.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 343, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00698", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00026", "text": "a junior lien has failed to resubordinate its lien, thereby preventing the refinancing of the eligible mortgage through the Program into a new mortgage, the enterprise shall charge the junior lien holder and recoup the fine described in paragraph (1), as applicable, and shall apply the payment to the balance of the borrower's first mortgage. (4) Limitations on liabilities.--A junior lien holder shall not be liable to the enterprise or to anyone else for the fine described in paragraph (1) if, within 30 days of the enterprise's written determination that a junior lien holder has failed to resubordinate its lien for any reason other than those specified in paragraph (1), that lien holder agrees to resubordinate its lien in compliance with this section. (g) Carryover of Mortgage Insurance.-- (1) In general.--If a mortgage insurer backing an eligible mortgage fails to transfer coverage to a new mortgage refinanced through the Program or places additional underwriting criteria or fees beyond those required by the Program as a condition of transfer approval, thereby preventing the refinancing of the eligible mortgage through the Program, that mortgage insurer shall be liable for an amount equal to 5.0 percent of the first mortgage balance, unless the new mortgage-- (A) would increase the first mortgage payment; (B) would increase the loan balance by more than 3 percent or $3,000, whichever is greater; (C) is an adjustable rate mortgage or has a term exceeding 30 years; or (D) the borrower has violated the due-on-sale clause at any time. (2) Actions by enterprises.--Upon submission to an enterprise of documentation by a qualified lender or eligible borrower that the mortgage insurer has prevented the refinance of an eligible mortgage through the Program into a new mortgage, the enterprise shall charge the mortgage insurer and recoup the fine described in paragraph (1), as applicable, and shall apply the payment to the balance of the borrower's first mortgage. (3) Limitation on liability.--A mortgage insurer shall not be liable to the enterprise or to anyone else for the fine described in paragraph (1) if, within 30 days of the enterprise's written determination that a mortgage insurer has prevented the refinancing of an eligible mortgage for any reason other than those specified in paragraph (1), that mortgage insurer agrees to transfer coverage in compliance with this section. (h) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the enterprises shall not be prevented from purchasing or guaranteeing", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00897", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00027", "text": ". Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919, 10 P. 674. Haggin organized an irrigation company and claimed the right to appropriate the entire flow of the Kern River for irrigation and to destroy any benefits for riparian owners downstream. The court held that the doctrine of riparian rights still prevailed in California, that such right attached to riparian land as soon as it became private property and, while subject to appropriations made prior to that time, it is free from all hostile appropriations thereafter. Thus California set itself apart by its effort to reconcile the system of riparian rights with the system of appropriation, whereas other arid states rejected the doctrine of riparian rights forthrightly and completely. 41 The Twentieth Century inducted new parties into the old struggle. Gigantic electric power and irrigation projects succeeded smaller operations, and municipalities sought to by-pass intervening agricultural lands and go into the mountains to appropriate the streams for city supply. Increasing dependence of all branches of the State's economy, both rural and urban, upon water centered attention upon its conservation and maximum utilization. 42 This objective seemed frustrated by the riparian-rights doctrine, when, in 1926, the Supreme Court decided Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607, and this Court, after argument, dismissed certiorari for want of a federal question. 1927, 275 U.S. 486, 48 S.Ct. 27, 72 L.Ed. 387. That case involved just such questions as we have here. Southern California Edison projected a large storage of San Joaquin waters in the mountains primarily for power generation. Plaintiffs' ranch, like lands of claimants, had always been naturally irrigated by overflow and thus naturally was productive property. Appropriation by the power company threatened to impair this overflow and destroy the value of the ranch. The company was unwilling to compensate the damage. The court held that common law of riparian rights must prevail against the proposed utilization and, notwithstanding the economic waste involved in plaintiffs' benefit, enjoined the power project. 43 This ruling precipitated a movement for amendment of the State Constitution and thus brought to a focus a contest that had grown in bitterness and intensity throughout the arid regions as both populations and property values mounted. The doctrine of riparian rights was characterized as socialistic. Weil, Theories of Water Law,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00366", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00028", "text": "submit to the White House Coordinator for International Cultural Property Protection information on efforts of the Department of Defense to protect international cultural property, including activities undertaken pursuant to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, other cultural protection statutes, and international agreements, including-- (1) directives, policies, and regulations the Department has instituted to protect international cultural property at risk of destruction due to political instability, armed conflict, or natural or other disasters; and (2) actions the Department has taken to protect international cultural property, including actions to avoid damage to cultural property through construction activities abroad. (d) Information on Activities of the Department of Justice To Protect International Cultural Property.--The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the White House Coordinator for International Cultural Property Protection information on efforts of the Department of Justice to protect both international cultural property and international cultural property located in, or attempted to be imported into, the United States, including activities undertaken pursuant to statutes and international agreements. Such information shall include the-- (1) statutes and regulations the Department has employed in criminal, civil, and civil forfeiture actions to prevent and interdict trafficking in stolen and smuggled cultural property, including investigations into transnational organized crime; and (2) actions the Department has taken in order to ensure the consistent and effective application of law in cases relating to both international cultural property and international cultural property located in, or attempted to be imported into, the United States. SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ENGAGE IN INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION ACTIVITIES WITH THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Interior, the National Archives, the National Science Foundation, and any other agency that is involved in international cultural property protection activities are authorized to enter into agreements or memoranda of understanding with the Smithsonian Institution to temporarily engage personnel from the Smithsonian Institution for the purposes of furthering such international cultural property protection activities. (b) Salaries and Expenses.--The Federal agencies or departments specified in subsection (a) are authorized to pay the salaries and expenses of personnel from the Smithsonian Institution to assist such agencies or departments in their international cultural property protection activities, including in support of military or diplomatic missions and law enforcement efforts. SEC", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00836", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00029", "text": "state at war with the United States. 1 Kent, Comm. p. 55; 2 Halleck, Int.L. (Rev.1908) p. 1; Hall, Int.Law (7th Ed.) p. 403, § 126; Baty & Morgan, 'War: Its Conduct and Legal Results,' p. 247; 1 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 310; Sylvester's Case, 7 Mod. 150; The Roumanian, 1915, Prob.Div. 26; affd., 1916, 1 A.C. 124; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns., N.Y., 438, 448; White v. Burnley, 20 How. 235, 249 (61 U.S. 235), 15 L.Ed. 886; The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568, 571, 20 S.Ct. 489, 44 L.Ed. 592; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 97 Am.Dec. 124, 1 Am.Rep. 142; so all the lexicographers, as, e.g., Webster, Murray, Abbott, Black, Bouvier. * * *' Cardozo, J., in Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 229, 128 N.E. 185, 186, 11 A.L.R. 166. 3 For cases in lower courts, see Note, 18 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 410. 4 'Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.'", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00373", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00030", "text": "ED concur, dissenting. 33 The United States took this plant in order to run a laundry for the Army, not for the public. The trade-routes were wholly useless to it. It never used them. Yet it is forced to pay for them under a new constitutional doctrine that is forged for this case. 34 Heretofore it was settled that the owner could not receive compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the destruction of a business which resulted from the taking of his physical property, even though the business could not be reestablished elsewhere. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 45 S.Ct. 293, 69 L.Ed. 644; Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231, 41 S.Ct. 74, 65 L.Ed. 238. That result followed from the rule that consequential damages resulting from the taking were not compensable. See United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281—283, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 1055—1056, 87 L.Ed. 1390; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377—378, 66 S.Ct. 596, 599, 90 L.Ed. 729. 35 And so in this case if the United States had taken this plant for a permanent laundry to run for the Army and not for the public1 it need not pay for the trade-routes. As Justice Brandeis said in Mitchell v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at page 345, 45 S.Ct. at page 294, 69 L.Ed. 644, 'If the business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of land.' As much seems to be conceded by the Court in the present case. That concession is necessary if precedent is to control. For in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383, 65 S.Ct. 357, 361, 89 L.Ed. 311, 156 A.L.R. 390, we said that a temporary taking and a permanent taking were to be treated alike in that respect. In that case the cost of moving out and preparing the space for the new occupancy was allowed insofar as", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00315", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00031", "text": ", as I understand, that purely coercive relief can be no greater than is necessary to secure obedience. But in its view there was no necessity here for allocation of specific amounts in order to comply with these distinct standards. Rather punishment and damages may be lumped with a third undefined amount for civil coercion; and the whole mass sustained, without reference to the constituent elements or any of the established standards for measuring them, other than by overall application of the Eighth Amendment's limitation to the mass. And in this view it maintains neither 'fine' is excessive. 196 Obviously, however, when all these distinct types and functions of relief are lumped together, in a single so-called 'fine,' none of the long established bases for measurement can be applied, for there is nothing to which they can apply. We can only speculate upon what portion of each 'fine' may have been laid to compensate for damages, what for punishment, and what, if any,54 for civil coercion. Moreover, the District Court made no findings whatever concerning the amount of civil damages sustained, even if it could be assumed that there was evidence to sustain such findings.55 And on the record none of the 'fine' was made contingent, affording an opportunity for compurgation, as is required for coercive penalties.56 197 It follows that we have no basis except our own speculative imagination by which to determine whether the so-called 'fines,' or either of them, are excessive as damages, or indeed as coercive relief looking to the future, or as penalty for past crime. 198 In this state of things, it is utterly impossible to perform our function of review in the manner heretofore required, even within the broad limits prescribed for cases of civil and criminal contempt. This commingling of the various forms of relief, like that of the proceedings themselves, deprives these contemnors of any possibility for having the scope of the relief given against them measured according to law. 199 That is no insubstantial deprivation. When hybrid proceedings can produce hybrid penalties, concealing what is for punishment and what remedial, what criminal and what civil, and in the process can discard constitutional procedural protections against just such consequences, as convenience or other wholly discretionary impulse may command, then indeed to the extent we allow this will we have adopted the continental tradition of the civilians and rejected our own. No case in this Court heretofore has ever sustained such conglomerate proceedings and penalties", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00042", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00032", "text": "bill shall be reported not later than the seventh legislative day of the Senate after it receives the bill. A committee failing to report the bill within such period shall be automatically discharged from consideration of the bill, and the bill shall be placed upon the appropriate calendar. ``(B)(i) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member of the Senate may move to strike any proposed rescission or rescissions of budget authority or any proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 14 other Members. ``(ii) It shall not be in order for a Member of the House or Senate to move to strike any proposed rescission under clause (i) unless the amendment reduces the appropriate Deficit Reduction Account (pursuant to section 314) if the program, project, or account to which the proposed rescission applies was identified in the Deficit Reduction Account in the special message under subsection (b). ``(4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a bill under this section shall be privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to. ``(B) Debate in the Senate on a bill under this section, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, (including debate pursuant to subparagraph (C)), shall not exceed 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. ``(C) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this section shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal. ``(D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a bill under this section is not debatable. A motion to recommit a bill under this section is not in order. ``(d) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as otherwise provided by this section, no amendment", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01061", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00033", "text": ") In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section shall apply to net operating losses arising in taxable years ending after December 31, 2007. (2) Alternative tax net operating loss deduction.--The amendment made by subsection (b) shall apply to taxable years ending after 1997. (3) Loss from operations of life insurance companies.--The amendment made by subsection (d) shall apply to losses from operations arising in taxable years ending after December 31, 2007. (4) Transitional rule.--In the case of a net operating loss (or, in the case of a life insurance company, a loss from operations) for a taxable year ending before the date of the enactment of this Act-- (A) any election made under section 172(b)(3) or 810(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to such loss may (notwithstanding such section) be revoked before the applicable date, (B) any election made under section 172(b)(1)(H) or 810(b)(4) of such Code with respect to such loss shall (notwithstanding such section) be treated as timely made if made before the applicable date, and (C) any application under section 6411(a) of such Code with respect to such loss shall be treated as timely filed if filed before the applicable date. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``applicable date'' means the date which is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Exception for TARP Recipients.--The amendments made by this section shall not apply to-- (1) any taxpayer if-- (A) the Federal Government acquires, at any time, an equity interest in the taxpayer pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or (B) the Federal Government acquires, at any time, any warrant (or other right) to acquire any equity interest with respect to the taxpayer pursuant to such Act, (2) the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and (3) any taxpayer which at any time in 2008 or 2009 is a member of the same affiliated group (as defined in section 1504 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, determined without regard to subsection (b) thereof) as a taxpayer described in paragraph (1) or (2).", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01136", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00034", "text": ". This gives added reasons why interpretations of the Act and regulations under it should not be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary to the will of Congress. See Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corporation, 288 U.S. 406, 415, 53 S.Ct. 428, 430, 77 L.Ed. 861. 11 The installment basis of reporting was enacted, as shown by its history, to relieve taxpayers who adopted it from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale based on the full amount of anticipated profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small portion of the sales price. Another reason was the difficult and time-consuming effort of appraising the uncertain market value of installment obligations.14 There is no indication in any of the congressional history, however, that by passage of this law Congress contemplated that those taxpayers, who elected to adopt this accounting method for their own advantage could by this means obtain a further tax advantage denied all other taxpayers, whereby they could, as to the same taxb le transaction, report in part on a cash receipts basis and in part on an accrual basis. 12 We find nothing unreasonable in the regulations here. See Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 65 S.Ct. 799, 89 L.Ed. 1166. 13 It is argued that notwithstanding what has been said, Congress by enacting § 501 of the 1940 Second Revenue Act, 54 Stat. 974, 1004, 26 U.S.C. § 115(l) 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Code, § 115(l), had provided a definition of 'earnings and profits' which includes these unpaid installment obligations and that the regulation here conflicts with § 115(l),15 which is applicable alike to both the income and the excess profits taxes. There are at least two reasons why we cannot accept this argument. In the first place, neither § 115(l) nor any other purports to alter the Commission's power to promulgate reasonable regulations which require taxpayers who adopt the installment basis of accounting to use an accounting method that reflects true income. The hybrid method here urged would not accomplish that result. 14 In the second place, we cannot accept the respondent's interpretation of § 115(l). He argues that 'earnings and profits' derived from a sale of property are defined in", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00151", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00035", "text": "within the time limit set in the notice of initiation. 2. Sampling (4) In view of the large number of Community producers, importers in the Community not related to an exporting producer in one of the countries concerned and of exporting producers in the countries concerned, it was considered appropriate, in conformity with Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (the basic Regulation), to examine whether sampling should be used. In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would indeed be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all the above parties were requested, pursuant to Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, to make themselves known within two weeks of the initiation of the proceeding and to provide the Commission with the information requested in the notice of initiation, for the period from 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2002 (the investigation period or IP). (5) All 14 Community producers on behalf of which the complaint had been lodged agreed to be included in the sample and provided the requested information within the deadline. Amongst them, eight companies(4) were selected for the sample. These were found to be representative of the overall complaining Community producers in terms of volume of production and sales of the product concerned in the Community, as well as in terms of geographic coverage. (6) Twelve unrelated importers also agreed to be included in the sample and provided the requested basic information within the deadline. In view of this situation, the Commission services decided not to apply sampling in the case of the unrelated importers, but to send questionnaires to all the 12 aforementioned importers. (7) As far as exporting producers are concerned, only one exporting producer in Russia made itself known within the relevant deadline, and therefore sampling was not applied for Russia. In the case of Turkey however, 19 exporting producers agreed to be included in the sample and provided the requested information within the deadline. From those producers, only 16 actually sold the product concerned in the Community during the investigation period. The choice of the sample was made in consultation with the representatives of the companies and the Turkish authorities. An agreement was reached on a sample of five companies covering around 80 % of the total exports of the product concerned to the Community during the IP. In addition to the above, among the companies which had sales to the Community, six companies not selected in the sample have requested an individual examination. In view of the large number of requests which", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00565", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00036", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2036/2003 of 19 November 2003 derogating from Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 as regards the fixing of adjustment coefficients to be applied to the reference quantity for each traditional operator under the tariff quotas for banana imports for 2004 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2587/2001(2), and in particular Article 20 thereof, Whereas: (1) Article 4(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 of 7 May 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1439/2003(4), lays down the method for calculating the reference quantity for traditional operators A/B and C for 2004 and 2005 on the basis of the use of import licences for those operators during a reference year. (2) According to the reports from the Member States pursuant to Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 896/2001, the sum of the reference quantities thus determined for 2004 is 2197147,342 tonnes for all traditional operators A/B and 630713,105 tonnes for all traditional operators C. As these amounts are below the quantities available under the tariff quotas, applying Article 5(3) of the said Regulation would entail the fixing of an adjustment coefficient which would increase the reference quantities for traditional operators. (3) Traditional operators could be allocated an exceptionally small quantity owing to the extreme hardship affecting their activity during the reference year. In accordance with Article 5(5) of Regulation (EC) No 896/2001, the Commission may take appropriate measures which are justified for tackling specific situations within the limits of tariff quotas A/B and C. Furthermore, the notification by certain Member States of the sum of the reference quantities established for traditional operators in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 could be adjusted on completion of the legal proceedings now in hand. (4) Until those", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00596", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00037", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 692/2004 of 15 April 2004 on the issue of system B export licences in the fruit and vegetables sector (tomatoes) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables(1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1961/2001 of 8 October 2001 on detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards export refunds on fruit and vegetables(2), and in particular Article 6(6) thereof, Whereas: (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2214/2003(3) fixes the indicative quantities for which system B export licences may be issued. (2) In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for tomatoes will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector. (3) To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for tomatoes after 15 April 2004 should be rejected until the end of the current export period, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Applications for system B export licences for tomatoes submitted pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 2214/2003, export declarations for which are accepted after 15 and before 30 April 2004, are hereby rejected. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 16 April 2004. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 April 2004.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 382, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00797", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00038", "text": "been called to my attention that there are certain mandatory fines and penalties which I omitted to impose. For the record now minimum mandatory fines and penalties will be imposed.' Thus a one hundred dollar fine was fixed as required by law, along with the imprisonment sentence. Petitioner charges that this action constituted double jeopardy forbidden by the Federal Constitution. 8 It is well established that a sentence which does not comply with the letter of the criminal statute which authorizes it is so erroneous that it may be set aside on appeal, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168, 169, 8 Otto 145, 168, 169, 25 L.Ed. 244; Murphy v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 157, 20 S.Ct. 639, 640, 44 L.Ed. 711, or in habeas corpus proceedings. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S.Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149. But in those cases it was recognized that an excessive sentence should be corrected, even though the prisoner had already served part of his term, not by absolute discharge of the prisoner, but by an appropriate amendment of the invalid sentence by the court of original jurisdiction, at least during the term of court in which the invalid sentence was imposed.1 Cf. De Benque v. United States, 66 App.D.C. 36, 85 F.2d 202, 106 A.L.R. 839. In the light of these cases, the fact that petitioner has been twice before the judge for sentencing and in a federal place of detention during the five hour interim cannot be said to constitute double jeopardy as we have heretofore considered it. Petitioner contends, however, that these cases are inapplicable here because correction of this sentence so as to make it lawful increases his punishment. Cf. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 309, 51 S.Ct. 113, 114, 75 L.Ed. 354. If this inadvertent error cannot be corrected in the manner used here by the trial court, no valid and enforceable sentence can be imposed at all. Cf. Jordan v. United States, 4 Cir., 60 F.2d 4, 6 with Barrow v. United States, 54 App.D.C", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00036", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00039", "text": "should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their financial interests (hereinafter the Agreement) and the accompanying Final Act are hereby approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Agreement and the Final Act are attached to this Decision (2). Article 2 In respect of matters falling within its competence, the Community shall be represented on the Joint Committee set up under Article 39 of the Agreement by the Commission. The position to be taken by the Community in the course of the implementation of the Agreement as regards decisions or recommendations of the Joint Committee shall be laid down by the Council, acting by qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission. The Council shall act unanimously when the position covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. Article 3 The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the European Community, give the notification provided for in Article 44(2) of the Agreement (3). The President of the Council shall notify a declaration of the European Community according to which, until the entry into force of the Agreement, the Community shall consider itself bound by the Agreement, within the limits of its competence, in its relations with any other Contracting Party having made the same declaration, in accordance with Article 44(3) of the Agreement (4). Article 4 This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 18 December 2008.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 338, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00558", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00040", "text": "to or an interest in lands allotted to a citizen of the Five Civilized Tribes or the proceeds, issues, rents, and profits derived from the same, may serve written notice of the pendency of such suit upon the Superintendent for the Five Civilized Tribes, and the United States may appear in said cause within twenty days thereafter, or within such extended time as the trial court in its discretion may permit, and after such appearance or the expiration of said twenty days or any extension thereof the proceedings and judgment in said cause shall bind the United States and the parties thereto to the same extent as though no Indian land or question were involved. * * * Provided, That within twenty days after the service of such notice on the Superintendent for the Five Civilized Tribes or within such extended time as the trial court in its discretion may permit the United States may be, and hereby is, given the right to remove any such suit pending in a State court to the United States district court by filing in such suit in the State court a petition for the removal of such suit into the said United States district court, to be held in the district where such suit is pending, together with the certified copy of the pleadings in such suit served on the Superintendent for the Five Civilized Tribes as hereinbefore provided. It shall then be the duty of the State court to accept such petition and proceed no further in said suit. * * *' See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 66 S.Ct. 835, 90 L.Ed. 982; Cf. Pub.L. No. 336, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1947) § 3(c); H.R.Rep. No. 740, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. 2 Sec. 1 provides: 'That a determination of the question of fact as to who are the heirs of any deceased citizen allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians who may die or may have heretofore died, leaving restricted heirs, by the probate court of the State of Oklahoma having jurisdiction to settle the estate of said deceased, conducted in the manner provided by the laws of said State for the determination of heirship in closing up the estates of deceased persons, shall be conclusive of said question. * * *' Sec. 2 provides: 'That", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00152", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00041", "text": "ature is one such proposal, since information providers generally regard the classification of products as difficult. (5) It is important to simplify the combined nomenclature to be used on a uniform basis in both intra-Community and external trade, so as to make it easier to apply the system - in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises; in this context the results of the ongoing discussions conducted by the Commission with Member States and European trade and industry organisations in the SLIM framework should be taken into account, preserving the principle of one single nomenclature. (6) The use of simplification thresholds is an efficient tool to reduce the burdens of declaration on businesses, in particular the SMEs, HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 In Article 28(5) of Regulation (EEC) No 3330/91 the first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: \"5. Simplification thresholds shall exempt parties required to provide information from the full provisions of Article 23; these parties need only report in the declarations referred to in Article 13(1) a maximum of ten of the finest relevant subheadings of the combined nomenclature that are the most important in terms of value and shall regroup the other products in residual subheadings according to detailed arrangements to be determined by the Commission pursuant to Article 30. For each of the aforementioned subheadings, in addition to the code number referred to in the second indent of Article 21, the Member State of consignment or destination and the value of the goods need to be stated.\" Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It shall apply from 1 January 2001. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 10 July 2000.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 381, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00707", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00042", "text": "the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Cap on overall rate of return.--The target rate of return for all the companies combined for the 2013 and subsequent reinsurance years shall be 12 percent of retained premium.''. SEC. 4. CAP ON REIMBURSEMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATING EXPENSES OF CROP INSURANCE PROVIDERS. Section 508(k)(4) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. 1508(k)(4)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(G) Additional cap on reimbursements.-- Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) through (F), total reimbursements for administrative and operating costs for the 2013 insurance year for all types of policies and plans of insurance shall not exceed $900,000,000. For each subsequent insurance year, the dollar amount in effect pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be increased by the same inflation factor as established for the administrative and operating costs cap in the 2011 Standard Reinsurance Agreement.''. SEC. 5. BUDGET LIMITATIONS ON RENEGOTIATION OF STANDARD REINSURANCE AGREEMENT. Section 508(k)(8) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938 (7 U.S.C. 1508(k)(8)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(F) Reduction in corporation obligations.--The Board shall ensure that any Standard Reinsurance Agreement negotiated under subparagraph (A)(ii), when compared to the immediately preceding Standard Reinsurance Agreement, shall reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the obligations of the Corporation under subsections (e)(2) or (k)(4) or section 523.''. SEC. 6. CROP INSURANCE PREMIUM SUBSIDIES DISCLOSURE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. Section 502(c)(2) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. 1502(c)(2)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (C) and (D) respectively; and (2) by inserting before subparagraph (C) (as so redesignated) the following: ``(A) Disclosure in the public interest.-- Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of law, except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall on an annual basis make available to the public-- ``(i)(", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00910", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00043", "text": "on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2005.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all adjustments made pursuant to section 110(a)(2) of title 23, United States Code, to sums authorized to be appropriated from the Highway Trust Fund (other than the Mass Transit Account) to carry out each of the Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction programs (other than emergency relief) in fiscal year 2005 shall be deemed to be zero. (e) Sense of Congress on Adjustment to Align Highway Spending With Revenues.--It is the sense of Congress that, in any multiyear reauthorization of the Federal-aid highway program, the alignment of highway spending with revenues under section 251(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 should be restructured to minimize year-to-year fluctuations in highway spending levels and to ensure the uniform enforcement of such levels. (f) Sense of Congress on Fully Guaranteed Funding.--It is the sense of Congress-- (1) in any multiyear law reauthorizing of the Federal-aid highway program enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, the level of obligation limitations for fiscal year 2005 under the highway category and the mass transit category in section 8103 of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (2 U.S.C. 901 note), as amended and extended, should equal the obligation limitations for such categories authorized in such multiyear law; (2) the highway account category obligation limitation level for fiscal year 2005 should be equal to the sum of the Federal Highway Administration, National Highway Safety Administration, and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration obligation limitations for fiscal year 2005 in such multiyear law; and (3) the mass transit category obligation limitation level for fiscal year 2005 should be equal to the sum of budget authority and obligation limitation authorizations for Federal Transit Administration programs for fiscal year 2005 in such multiyear reauthorization. SEC. 11. LEVEL OF OBLIGATION LIMITATIONS. (a) Highway Category.--Section 8103(a) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (2 U.S.C. 901 note; 112 Stat. 492; 117 Stat. 1128) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5); (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting ``", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01092", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00044", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1840/2005 of 10 November 2005 concerning tenders notified in response to the invitation to tender for the export of barley issued in Regulation (EC) No 1058/2005 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), and in particular Article 13(3) thereof, Whereas: (1) An invitation to tender for the refund for the export of barley to certain third countries was opened pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1058/2005 (2). (2) Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 of 29 June 1995 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 on the granting of export refunds on cereals and the measures to be taken in the event of disturbance on the market for cereals (3), and in particular Article 13(3) thereof, (3) On the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1501/95, a maximum refund should not be fixed. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 No action shall be taken on the tenders notified from 4 to 10 November 2005 in response to the invitation to tender for the refund for the export of barley issued in Regulation (EC) No 1058/2005. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 11 November 2005. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 10 November 2005.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 409, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00811", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00045", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1440/2001 of 16 July 2001 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1498/98(2), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto. (2) In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The standard import values referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 shall be fixed as indicated in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 17 July 2001. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 July 2001.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 300, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00574", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00046", "text": "of his stock without a hearing that included evidence and a judicial determination based on it. 7 In these circumstances we hold that it was error to enter an order forcing Hughes to sell his stock. 8 Reversed. 9 Mr. Justice JACKSON and Mr. Justice CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 'V. Howard R. Hughes represents that he now owns approximately 24 percent of the common stock of Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation. Within a period of one year from the date hereof, Howard R. Hughes shall either: 'A. Dispose of his holdings of the stock of (1) the New Picture Company, or (2) the New Theater Company, as he may elect, to a purchaser or purchasers who is or are not a defendant herein or owned or controlled by or affiliated with a defendant in this cause; or 'B. Deposit with a trustee designated by the court all of his shares of the New Picture Company or the New Theater Company, as he may elect, under a voting trust agreement whereby the trustee shall possess and be entitled to exercise all the voting rights of such shares, including the right to execute proxies and consents with respect thereto. Such voting trust agreement shall thereafter remain in force until Howard R. Hughes shall have sold his holdings of stock of the New Picture Company or the New Theater Company to a purchaser or purchasers who is or are not a defendant herein or owned or controlled by or affiliated with a defendant herein, and upon such sale and transfer such voting trust agreement shall automatically terminate. Such trust shall be upon such other terms or conditions, including compensation to the trustee, as shall be prescribed by the Court. During the period of such voting trust, Howard R. Hughes shall be entitled to receive all dividends and other distributions made on account of the trusteed shares, and proceeds from the sale thereof. 'For the purpose of evidencing his consent to be bound by the terms of section V of this decree, Howard R. Hughes individually has consented to its entry and it shall be binding upon his agents and employees.'", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 426, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00437", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00047", "text": "as a cooperating non-contracting party to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, hereinafter the ‘IATTC’, has decided to apply the technical measures adopted by the IATTC. These measures should therefore be incorporated in Community law. (10) Pursuant to Decision 2005/75/EC (6) and with effect from 25 January 2005 the Community is a Contracting Party to the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, hereinafter the ‘WCPFC Convention’. (11) The WCPFC Convention provides a framework for regional cooperation with a view to ensuring the long-term conservation and sustainable exploitation of highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean through the setting up of a Fisheries Commission for the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC). (12) The Community should therefore apply the provisions laid down in the Convention and the technical measures adopted by the WCPFC. (13) The technical measures adopted by these regional fisheries organisations have been incorporated into Council Regulation (EC) No 973/2001 of 14 May 2001 laying down technical measures for the conservation of certain stocks of highly migratory species (7). (14) The adoption of new technical measures by these organisations and the updating of those in force since the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 973/2001 require the repeal of that Regulation and its replacement by this Regulation. (15) The limits on capacity must be determined in accordance with Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (8). (16) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (9), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: TITLE I INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS Article 1 Object This Regulation lays down technical conservation measures applicable to the capture and landing of certain stocks of highly migratory species as referred to in Annex I and to the capture of by-catches. Article 2 Scope Without prejudice to Article 9, this Regulation shall apply to vessels flying the flag of a Member State and registered in the Community, hereinafter ‘Community fishing vessels’.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00722", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00048", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1251/2003 of 14 July 2003 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hollow sections originating in Turkey THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002(2), and in particular Article 7 thereof, After consulting the Advisory Committee, Whereas: A. PROCEDURE 1. Initiation (1) On 16 October 2002, the Commission announced, by notice published in the Official Journal of the European Communities(3), the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding with regard to imports into the Community of hollow sections originating in Russia and Turkey (the countries concerned) and commenced an investigation. (2) The proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged, in September 2002, by the Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry (the complainant) on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, around 80 %, of the total Community production of hollow sections. The complaint contained evidence of dumping of the product concerned and of material injury resulting therefrom, which was considered sufficient to justify the initiation of a proceeding. (3) The Commission officially advised the complaining Community producers, the other known Community producers, importers and users' associations known to be concerned as well as the known exporting producers and the representatives of Russia and Turkey of the initiation of the proceeding. Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set in the notice of initiation. 2. Sampling (4) In view of the large number of Community producers, importers in the Community not related to an exporting producer in one of the countries concerned and of exporting producers in the countries concerned, it was considered appropriate, in conformity with Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (the basic Regulation), to examine whether sampling should be used. In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would indeed be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all the above parties were requested, pursuant to Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, to make themselves known within two weeks of the initiation of the proceeding and to provide the Commission", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00564", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00049", "text": "75, 91 L.Ed. 590, (waiver issue not raised on appeal). 4 '(3) The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, establish through routes, joint classifications, and joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of passengers or property by carriers subject to this part, * * *.' 54 Stat. 911, 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(3), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(3). '(4) In establishing any such through route the Commission shall not (except as provided in section 3, and except where one of the carriers is a water line) require any carrier by railroad, without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route,(a) unless such inclusion of lines would make the through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established, or (b) unless the Commission finds that the through route proposed to be established is needed in order to provide adequate, and more efficient or more economic, transportation: Provided, however, That in prescribing through routes the Commission shall, so far as it consistent with the public interest, and subject to the foregoing limitations in clauses (a) and (b), give reasonable preference to the carrier by railroad which originates the traffic. No through route and joint rates applicable thereto shall be established by the Commission for the purpose of assisting any carrier that would participate therein to meet its financial needs. In time of shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency declared by the Commission, it may (either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, if it so orders, without answer or other formal pleadings by the interested carrier or carriers, and with or without notice, hearing, or the making or filing of a report, according as the Commission may determine) establish temporarily such through routes as in its opinion are necessary or desirable in the public interest.' 54 Stat. 911—912, 49 U.S.C. § 15(4), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(4). '(6) Whenever, after full hearing", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00452", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00050", "text": "contract providing in part: 9 'This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except those of the Caucasian race. 10 'It is further agreed that this restriction shall not be effective unless at least eighty percent of the property fronting on both sides of the street in the block where our land is located is subjected to this or a similar restriction.' 11 The agreement provided that the restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. The contract was subsequently recorded; and similar agreements were executed with respect to eighty percent of the lots in the block in which the property in question is situated. 12 By deed dated November 30, 1944, petitioners, who were found by the trial court to be Negroes, acquired title to the property and thereupon entered into its occupancy. On January 30, 1945, respondents, as owners of property subject to the terms of the restrictive agreement, brought suit against petitioners in the Circuit Court of Wayne County. After a hearing, the court entered a decree directing petitioners to move from the property within ninety days. Petitioners were further enjoined and restrained from using or occupying the premises in the future. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, deciding adversely to petitioners' contentions that they had been denied rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 13 Petitioners have placed primary reliance on their contentions, first raised in the state courts, that judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases has violated rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Acts of Congress passed pursuant to that Amendment.4 Specifically, petitioners urge that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, deprived of property without due process of law, and have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. We pass to a consideration of those issues. I. 14 Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider. Only two cases have been decided by this Court which in any way have involved the enforcement of such agreements. The first of these was the case of Corrigan v. Buckley, 1926, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969. There", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00165", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00051", "text": "20 '1. Cease and desist from: 21 '(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, as the exclusive representative of the respondent's production and maintenance employees at the Griffin plant, including watchmen, but excluding office, clerical, technical, and laboratory employees, section men in the spinning room, head loom fixers in the weave room, head fixers in the card room, all supervisory employees of the grade of second hand and above, and all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, by taking action, without prior consultation with said organization, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. 22 '(b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, to bargain collectively with it as the representative of its employees in the appropriate unit described above. 23 '2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: 24 '(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit described above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment; 25 '(b) Post at its plant at Griffin, Georgia, copies of the notice attached hereto, marked 'Appendix A.' Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; 26 '(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith.' 70 N.L.R.B. at pages 208-209. 'Appendix A. 27 'Notice to All Employees. 28 'Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00268", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00052", "text": "COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2005/6/EC of 26 January 2005 amending Directive 71/250/EEC as regards reporting and interpretation of analytical results required under Directive 2002/32/EC (Text with EEA relevance) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to the Council Directive 70/373/EEC of 20 July 1970 on the introduction of Community methods of sampling and analysis for the official control of feeding-stuffs (1), and in particular Article 2 thereof, Whereas: (1) Commission Directive 71/250/EEC of 15 June 1971 establishing Community methods of analysis for the official control of feeding-stuffs (2) includes provisions concerning the expression of results. (2) To ensure a harmonised implementation approach to Directive 2002/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2002 on undesirable substances in animal feed (3) in all Member States, it is of major importance that analytical results are reported and interpreted in a uniform way. (3) Directive 71/250/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly. (4) The measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Directive 71/250/EEC is amended as follows: 1. In Article 1 the following paragraph is added after the second paragraph: ‘As regards undesirable substances within the meaning of Directive 2002/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) including dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs, point C(3) of Part 1 of the Annex to this Directive shall apply.’ 2. The Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Directive. Article 2 1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive twelve months after the entry into force. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive. When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 2. Member States shall", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00652", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00053", "text": "United States, 297. S. 124, 128, 56 S.Ct. 395, 397, 80 L.Ed. 522; United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242, 30 S.Ct. 81, 84, 54 L.Ed. 173. 17 To accept the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals would lead to bizarre results. The congressional purpose would be frustrated, in part at least, in every situation where an escape is effected or attempted during the prisoner's service of any but the last of two or more consecutive sentences, possibly even in that instance, Barring intervention of executive clemency, it would be completely nullified in all cases where the consecutive sentences which the prisoner has not yet begun to serve aggregate five years or more. In the latter situation the prisoner could attempt any number of jail breaks with impunity. A court would be powerless to impose added confinement for violation of the Escape Act. 18 The holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals thus places it beyond the power of the judge to superimpose additional imprisonment for escape in those instances where such punishment is most glaringly needed as a deterrent.10 There is also this further striking incongruity. The judge is completely interdicted for imposing an additional sentence for escape or attempt to escape, the one type of offense which Congress unmistakably intended to be subject to separate and added punishment, although he may direct that a sentence for any other federal offense shall begin at the expiration of consecutive sentences theretofore imposed. 19 No rule of construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences. And the absence of any significant legislative history, other than has been related, may be indicative that Congress considered that there was no such problem as is now sought to be injected in the statutory wording or that by the 1935 amendment it had cured the previously existing one. The liberty of the individual must be scrupulously protected. But the safeguards of cherished rights are not to be found in the doctrinaire application of the tenet of strict construction. Neither an ordered system of liberty nor the proper administration of justice would be served by blind nullification of the congressional intent clearly reflected in the Federal Escape Act. 20 The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. 21 Reversed. 22 Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS dissent. 1 The Act is as follows", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00133", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00054", "text": ", 37, 63 S.Ct. 912, 914, 87 L.Ed. 1194. 33 Congress will have to use more explicit language than any yet cited before I will agree that it has authorized an administrative officer to break up the family of an American citizen or force him to keep his wife by becoming an exile. Likewise, it will have to be much more explicit before I can agree that it authorized a finding of serious misconduct against the wife of an American citizen without notice of charges, evidence of guilt and a chance to meet it. 34 I should direct the Attorney General either to produce his evidence justifying exclusion or to admit Mrs. Knauff to the country. 1 'When the United States is at war or during the existence of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941, or as to aliens whenever there exists a state of war between, or among, two or more states, and the President shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this Act be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or Congress, be unlawful— 2 '(3) After the effective date of the rules and regulations hereinafter authorized, no alien shall enter or attempt to enter the United States unless he is in possession of a valid unexpired permit to enter issued by the Secretary of State, or by an appropriate officer designated by the Secretary of State, or is exempted from obtaining a permit to enter in accordance with the rules and regulations which the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to prescribe in execution of these rules, regulations, and orders. 'No alien shall be permitted to enter the United States if it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States as provided in the rules and regulations hereinbefore authorized to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General.' 3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp., 271. 3 'In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice on the ground that he is, or may be excludable under one or more of the categories set forth in § 175.53, no hearing by a", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00341", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00055", "text": ". 39 There are ample grounds for distinguishing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, from this case. For example, in the Thiel case, the Court acted in the absence of actual notice that the objectionable practice had been discontinued,2 whereas, here, we have notice that the practice objected to was changed more than two years ago to conform, at least substantially, to the approved practice. Also, in the Thiel case, the procedure complained of consisted of the exclusion of an economic group, thereby detracting from the representative character of the jury list, in a manner contrary to the tradition and purpose of the jury system. Here the exclusion of women, as such, from jury service not only was in accordance with the traditional practice, but is in accordance with the congressionally approved future practice in the federal and state courts of about 40% of the states. This shows that the only objectionable practice here was that, after the State h d established a directory system of eligibility of women for state jury service, the federal court did not at once enlarge that policy into a mandatory requirement that all qualified women be placed upon all federal jury lists. 40 For these reasons, I am unable to concur in the judgment setting aside the indictment and verdict. The convictions in this case should be affirmed, and I concur in the statement by Mr. Chief Justice Stone: 'Certainly none of respondents' constitutional rights are violated if they are prosecuted for the fraudulent procurement of money by false representations as to their beliefs, religious or otherwise.' United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 90, 64 S.Ct. 882, 888, 88 L.Ed. 1148. 41 The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER join in this dissent. Mr. Justice JACKSON joins in it except in so far as the final paragraph relates to an affirmance of the convictions. 1 Women have been members of both grand and petit juries in that district since the beginning of the February Term, 1944. See United States v. Chaplin, D.C., 54 F.Supp. 682. 2 Thus Judicial Code § 276, 28 U.S.C. § 412, 28 U.S.C.A. § 412, provides for the drawing of 'All such jurors, grand and petit", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00003", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00056", "text": "is the coercive effect of the imposition for the future, though it is thoroughly settled that in contempt criminal punishment is to be l id only for past conduct.62 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co., supra, and authorities cited. 206 Thus, the Court in effect imposes double coercive penalties, in view of the additional contingent award of $2,800,000 for that specific and sole purpose. I think the criminal fine of $700,000 not only constitutionally excessive, far beyond any heretofore sustained for violation of any statute or order of court. It is also an unlawful commingling of civil coercive and criminal penalties, without the essential contingent feature in the coercive phase, under our prior decisions. 207 Moreover, it is the District Court's function, not ours, in the first instance to fix the amounts of criminal fines. In equity proceedings for coercive relief, appellate courts including this one have power to revise and fix awards for such purposes, and if damages also are sought to review amounts awarded for this purpose for consistency with the proof. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co., supra. But in a criminal proceeding which is at law even in contempt, ibid., our function is not in the first instance to fix the fines ourselves. That function is the District Court's. Ibid. We can only determine whether those imposed by it are excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 208 In its revision of the penalties therefore the Court in my opinion not only fails to unscramble the coercive and criminal elements, as the prior decisions here require to be done.63 It imposes grossly excessive criminal penalties, determined in amount by wholly arbitrary estimate related to no previously established standard legislatively or judicially fixed. And in doing so, it usurps the District Court's function. All this flows in part at least from its basic error, which is its failure to follow the rule of the Gompers and other cases that not only civil and criminal penalties, but also civil and criminal proceedings are altogether different and separate things, and under the Constitution must be kept so. 209 Much more is involved in this controversy than the issues which have been discussed. The issues in the main suit have not been determined and it would be beyond our function to intimate opinion concerning them now. But beyond this controversy as a whole lie still graver questions. They involve opposing claims concerning the right to strike", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00045", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00057", "text": "each succeeding fiscal year through fiscal year 2016, an amount equal to 15 percent above the amount deposited the prior fiscal year. Such amounts shall, without further appropriation, be available to the Secretary of the Interior until expended. (b) Sunset.--Effective October 1, 2016, titles II, III, and V of this Act shall expire, after which time receipts generated from section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be used to supplement annual appropriations for base operations of the individual national parks. SEC. 104. PATRIOTS FOR NATIONAL PARKS. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior such sums as necessary for a public awareness campaign about the existence of the Centennial Fund and the ability of taxpayers to contribute to it through the tax checkoff created in section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. TITLE II--ELIMINATING THE NATIONAL PARK MAINTENANCE BACKLOG SEC. 201. BACKLOG ELIMINATION. (a) In General.--Sixty percent of the funds deposited into the Centennial Fund shall be used to eliminate the backlog of unmet needs in the national parks, as identified in the Facility Condition Index (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ``FCI'') of the National Park Service. (b) Priorities.--(1) The Secretary of the Interior shall prepare, as part of the annual budget proposal, a priority list of projects to be funded under this section. Moneys shall be made available from the Centennial Fund, without further appropriation, effective October 15 of each calendar year, for the projects identified on the priority list. (2) In preparing the list of projects to be funded under this section, the Secretary of the Interior shall give priority to projects that-- (A) are identified in the general management plan of a national park; (B) are listed in the FCI; (C) are identified by the Secretary of the Interior as necessary to prevent immediate damage to the natural, cultural, or historic resources with a national park, with priority given to projects with the most significant benefit to conservation of resources or visitor education; and (D) are identified as necessary to promote public health and safety. (c) Overhead.--National parks undertaking projects under this section may allocate not more than 8 percent of the funds for such projects for oversight of such projects and other associated overhead responsibilities. TITLE III", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01070", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00058", "text": "''; (iv) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``funds received under this title'' and inserting ``Federal educational assistance''; and (v) in subparagraph (F)-- (I) in clause (iii), by striking ``under this title'' and inserting ``of Federal educational assistance''; and (II) in clause (iv), by striking ``under this title'' and inserting ``of Federal educational assistance''; (C) in paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(A) Ineligibility.-- ``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a proprietary institution of higher education receiving funds provided under this title that fails to meet a requirement of subsection (a)(24) for two consecutive institutional fiscal years shall be ineligible to participate in or receive funds under any program of Federal educational assistance for a period of not less than two institutional fiscal years. ``(ii) Regaining eligibility.--To regain eligibility to participate in or receive funds under any program of Federal educational assistance after being ineligible pursuant to clause (i), a proprietary institution of higher education shall demonstrate compliance with all eligibility and certification requirements for the program for a minimum of two consecutive institutional fiscal years after the institutional fiscal year in which the institution became ineligible. In order to regain eligibility to participate in any program of Federal educational assistance under this title, such compliance shall include meeting the requirements of section 498 for such 2-year period. ``(iii) Notification of ineligibility.--The Secretary of Education shall determine when a proprietary institution of higher education that receives funds under this title is ineligible under clause (i) and shall notify all other administering Secretaries of the determination. ``(iv) Enforcement.--Each administering Secretary for a program of Federal educational assistance shall enforce the requirements of this subparagraph for the program concerned upon receiving notification under clause (iii) of a proprietary institution of higher education's ineligibility.''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B)-- (I) in the matter preceding clause (i)-- (aa) by striking ``In addition'' and all that follows through ``education fails'' and inserting ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to such other means of enforcing the requirements of a program of Federal educational assistance as may be available to the administering Secretary, if a proprietary institution of higher education that receives funds provided under this title fails''; and (bb) by striking ``the programs authorized by this title'' and inserting ``all programs", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01074", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00059", "text": "Italian Republic No 16/3, 21 January 1992), which contains the following provisions: - Article 1 provides for the refinancing of the reduction in social security contributions provided for by the Law on the Mezzogiorno, - Article 2 provides for the State defrayal of social security contributions, involving a further reduction in social security contributions for firms in the Mezzogiorno, - Article 6 provides for the overall refinancing of the aid measures envisaged in the Law on the Mezzogiorno. (2) By letter of 25 June 1992 (2) the Commission informed the Italian Government that it had decided to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of the three abovementioned provisions, which it deemed incompatible with the common market within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty and ineligible for any of the derogations provided for therein. The Italian Government was invited to submit its comments within one month of notification of the letter, while the other Member States and interested third parties were also invited, by means of a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, to submit their comments. By letter dated 8 October 1992 the Italian authorities informed the Commission that Articles 1 and 2 of the Decree-Law had retroactively become ineffective because they had not been converted into law within the time limit imposed by the Italian Constitution. Since their substance was reproduced in draft Law No 1536 of 8 September 1992, notified pursuant to Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission took the view, in so far as those two provisions were concerned, that the proceedings initiated by its decision of 25 June 1992 no longer served any purpose. It decided at the same time to initiate fresh proceedings pursuant to Article 93 (2) in respect of draft Law No 1536. consequently, this Decision does not cover the provisions of the Law on the Mezzogiorno relating to the reduction in social security contributions. No other Member State or interested party submitted comments within the period allowed. (3) The measure provided for in Article 6 of the Decree-Law, relating to the overall refinancing of the aid measures envisaged in the Law on the Mezzogiorno, was reproduced in several decree-laws without being converted into law by the Italian Parliament. By letter of 30 July 1992 the Italian authorities", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00766", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00060", "text": "earlier petition and before filing of the later one, appellant had sought redetermination, pursuant to § 403(e)(1) of the Second Renegotiation Act, by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. The Board denied review and adopted the Under Secretary's redetermination as its own. 12 For example, in addition to contentions that the Renegotiation Acts as a matter of substantive law violate Article I, § 1, of the Constitution in that they constitute unlawful delegations of legislative power as well as contravene the due process and just compensation provisions of the Fifth Amendment, the jury trial provision of the Seventh Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment, it is said that the order under the Second Renegotiation Act was based in part at least on information said to have been obtained from 'governmental and other reliable sources' which the appellant has had no opportunity to examine or rebut. 13 Section 403(c)(2) of the Second Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1191(c) (2), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1191(c)(2), provides: 'Upon the making of an agreement, or the entry of an order, under paragraph (1) by the Board, or the entry of an order under subsection (e) by The Tax Court of the United States, determining excessive profits, the Board shall forthwith authorize and direct the Secretaries or any of them to eliminate such excessive profits (A) by reductions in the amounts otherwise payable to the contractor under contracts with the Departments, or by other revision of their terms; or (B) by withholding from amounts otherwise due to the contractor any amount of such excessive profits; or (C) by directing a contractor to withhold for the account of the United States, from amounts otherwise due to a subcontractor, any amount of such excessive profits of such subcontractor; or (D) by recovery from the contractor, through repayment, credit, or suit any amount of such excessive profits actually paid to him; or (E) by any combination of these methods, as in deemed desirable. * * *' 14 The allegations included the following: 'Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has filed its petition for redetermination in The Tax Court of the United States whereby it seeks an orderly determination of the amount, if any, it may owe to the United States of America, as excessive profits for its fiscal year ending November 30,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00094", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00061", "text": "1920.' 2 This conclusion is reinforced by the Report of the Senate Committee that 'The chief purpose of this bill is to grant private owners of vessels and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or goods have been damaged as the result of a collision with any Government-owned vessel'. S.Rep.No.941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. The Court's opinion finds overriding significance in a letter by the Attorney General commenting on the Bill, in which he stated that it 'intends to give the same relief against the Government for damages caused * * * by its public vessels' as was given by the Suits in Admiralty Act. That Act did afford the right to sue for personal injuries. To prefer the Attorney General's view to that expressed by those in charge of a measure would in itself be not the normal choice. And this letter of the Attorney General antedated the Report of the Committee and the statement of Representative Underhill. Compare United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U.S. 68, 71, 59 S.Ct. 456, 457, 458, 83 L.Ed. 492, where the Committee Report'stated that the purpose of the bill was set out in a letter from the Attorney General which it quoted.' To reject the subsequent authoritative statements of the Congressional proponents of the legislation and to accept the view of the Attorney General to which the Government now does not even refer, is to discard in favor of dim remote light what heretofore has been deemed controlling illumination.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 323, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00052", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00062", "text": "1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447. 56 This brings us to the final question of statutory interpretation. Did Congress impliedly consent to this attempted sharing of its established jurisdiction within the narrow limits of § 203(b)(9)? II. 57 The conviction under the California Code was invalid because Congress had taken exclusive jurisdiction over that offense and had not consented to share its jurisdiction with California. 58 It is a contradiction in terms to say that a state, without the consent of Congress, may duplicate or share in the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. If the jurisdiction of Congress has become exclusive, the state's jurisdiction must, by hypothesis, be derived thereafter from Congress or cease to exist. In this case there was no express consent by Congress to share with the states the federally protected exclusive jurisdiction over this type of transaction in interstate commerce. The question remains, however, whether, under all the circumstances, Congress shall be held to have impliedly consented to share its exclusive jurisdiction with California. The text of the legislation and the course of events, which led the Federal Government to take jurisdiction, not only disclose an absence of any basis for a claim that Congress impliedly consented to the California legislation but present overwhelming evidence of a deliberate, careful and unconditional assumption by Congress of federal jurisdiction, consciously exclusive of the inadequate state regulation theretofore found to exist. See the reference, supra, to original § 202(b) and (c) of the Act dealing with the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the states. For full text, see § 202(a) and (b) in Appendix B(2), infra. In addition, we shall now consider in detail the action taken under the informed guidance of the Interstate Commerce Commission in accordance with the express terms of § 203(b). 59 The precise fundamental issue is not the identity, similarity, diversity, or even repugnance, of the two statutes. The fundamental issue is that of the presence or absence of congressional consent to the sharing of its exclusive jurisdiction. The degree of immediate or potential conflict between the statutes has a material relation to the issue of congressional consent. Clear conflict between the statutes would be practically conclusive against the state. The less the conflict, the less obvious is the basis for the objection of Congress to sharing its jurisdiction with the state. However, even a complete absence of conflict, resulting in a mere duplication of offenses, would not remove all basis for objection and would not necessarily establish", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00257", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00063", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1574/2006 of 19 October 2006 on the issue of licences for the import of garlic in the quarter from 1 December 2006 to 28 February 2007 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1870/2005 of 16 November 2005 opening and providing for the administration of tariff quotas and introducing a system of import licences and certificates of origin for garlic imported from third countries (2), and in particular Article 10(2) thereof, Whereas: (1) The quantities for which licence applications have been lodged by traditonal importers and by new importers during the first five working days of October 2006, pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1870/2005 exceed the quantities available for products originating in China, Argentina and all third countries other than China and Argentina. (2) It is now necessary to establish the extent to which the licence applications sent to the Commission by 16 October 2006 can be met and to fix, for each category of importer and product origin, the dates until which the issue of certificates should be suspended, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Applications for import licences lodged pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1870/2005, during the first five working days of October 2006 and sent to the Commission by 16 October 2006, shall be met at a percentage rate of the quantities applied for as set out in Annex I to this Regulation. Article 2 For each category of importer and the origin involved, applications for import licences pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1870/2005 relating to the quarter from 1 December 2006 to 28 February 2007 and lodged after the first five working days of October 2006 but before the date in Annex II to this Regulation, shall be rejected. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on 20 October 2006. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00500", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00064", "text": "Agency. 2. By 26 January 2013, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and the Council a general report on experience acquired as a result of the application of this Regulation. This shall include in particular a detailed inventory of all medicinal products authorised for paediatric use since its entry into force. 3. By 26 January 2017, the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the experience acquired as a result of the application of Articles 36, 37 and 38. The report shall include an analysis of the economic impact of the rewards and incentives, together with an analysis of the estimated consequences for public health of this Regulation, with a view to proposing any necessary amendments. 4. Provided that there are sufficient data available to allow robust analyses to be made, the provisions of paragraph 3 shall be fulfilled at the same time as the provisions of paragraph 2. Section 2 Standing committee Article 51 1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use set up by Article 121 of Directive 2001/83/EC, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Committee’. 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 5 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof. The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at three months. 3. The Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure. CHAPTER 2 Amendments Article 52 Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 is hereby amended as follows: 1) in Article 1, the following definition shall be added: ‘(e) “Application for an extension of the duration” means an application for an extension of the duration of the certificate pursuant to Article 13(3) of this Regulation and of Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use (10). 2) in Article 7, the following paragraphs shall be added: ‘3. The application for an extension of the duration may be made when lodging the application for a certificate or when the application for the certificate is pending and the appropriate requirements of Articles 8(1)(d) or 8(1a", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00517", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00065", "text": "2145/92 (4), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 3304/94 (5); Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. An invitation to tender is hereby opened, for the refund on export of wholly milled long grain rice falling within CN code 1006 30 67 referred to in Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95, for Zones I to VI and Zone VIII excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, as specified in the Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92. 2. The invitation to tender shall be open until 26 June 1997. During that period weekly invitations to tender shall be issued and the date for submission of tenders shall be determined in the notice of invitation to tender. 3. The invitation to tender shall take place in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 and with the following provisions. Article 2 A tender shall be valid only if it covers a quantity for export of at least 50 tonnes but not more than 3 000 tonnes. Article 3 The security referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 shall be ECU 20 per tonne. Article 4 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21 (1) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3719/88 (6), export licences issued within this invitation to tender shall, for the purposes of determining their period of validity, be considered as having been issued on the day the tender was submitted. 2. The licences shall be valid from their date of issue, within the meaning of paragraph 1, until the end of the third month following. Article 5 Tenders submitted must reach the Commission through the Member States not later than one and a half hours after expiry of the time limit for weekly submission of tenders as laid down in the notice of invitation to tender. They must be transmitted in accordance with the table given in the Annex. If no tenders are submitted, the Member States shall inform the Commission accordingly within the same time limit as that given in the above subparagraph. Article 6 The time set for submitting tenders shall be Belgian time. Article 7 1. On the basis of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00780", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00066", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1031/2006 of 4 July 2006 implementing Regulation (EC) No 808/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning Community statistics on the information society (Text with EEA relevance) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 808/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 concerning Community statistics on the information society (1), and in particular Articles 8 thereof, Whereas: (1) Regulation (EC) No 808/2004 established a common framework for the systematic production of Community statistics on the information society. (2) Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 808/2004 implementing measures are necessary to determine the data to be supplied for preparation of the statistics defined in Articles 3 and 4 of that Regulation and the deadlines for their transmission. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Statistical Programme Committee, established by Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom (2), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The data to be transmitted for the production of Community statistics on the information society as laid down in Articles 3(2) and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 808/2004 shall be as specified in Annexes I and II to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 4 July 2006.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 368, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00649", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00067", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2357/91 of 29 July 1991 amending for the fifth time Regulation (EEC) No 3309/85 laying down general rules for the description and presentation of sparkling wines and aerated sparkling wines THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 of 16 March 1987 on the common organization of the market in wine (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1734/91 (2), and in particular Article 72 (1) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Whereas the general rules for the description and presentation of sparkling wines and aerated sparkling wines are drawn up in Regulation (EEC) No 3309/85 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2045/89 (4), Whereas the use of capsules or foils containing lead to cover the closing devices of containers in which sparkling wines are marketed should be banned, firstly in order to avoid any risk of contamination in particular by accidental contact with those products, and secondly to avoid any risk of environmental pollution from waste containing ing lead from the aforementioned capsules; whereas, however, to allow the manufacturers and users of these capsules a period to adjust, this ban should be applied only from 1 January 1993, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The following shall be inserted in Article 10 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3309/85 as a second subparagraph: 'The closing device referred to in the first and second indents of point (a) of the first subparagraph may not be covered by a capsule or foil containing lead.' Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It shall apply as from 1 January 1993. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 29 July 1991.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 444, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00703", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00068", "text": "will be the spontaneous generosity of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. It may be that monopoly in automobile loans is a good thing, but the anti-trust laws assume that competition is better. 27 I would affirm this judgment. 28 Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE concurs in this dissent. 29 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins in this opinion insofar as it protests against lifting the ban on Ford's acquisition of or affiliation with a finance company. 1 '12. The Respondent Finance Company shall not pay to any automobile manufacturing company and the Manufacturer shall not obtain from any finance company any money or other thing of value as a bonus or commission on account of retail time sales paper acquired by the finance company from dealers of the Manufacturer. The Manufacturer shall not make any loan to or purchase the securities of Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company, and if it shall pay any money to Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company with the purpose or effect of inducing or enabling such finance company to offer to the dealers of the Manufacturer a lower finance charge than it would offer in the absence of such payment, it shall offer in writing to make, and if such offer is accepted it shall make, payment upon substantially similar bases, terms and conditions to every other finance company offering such lower finance charge; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph contained shall be construed to prohibit the Manufacturer from acquiring notes, bonds, commercial paper, or other evidence of indebtedness of Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company in the open market. 'It is an express condition of this decree that notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this paragraph 12 and of any other provisions of this decree, if an effective final order or decree not subject to further review shall not have been entered on or before January 1, 1941, requiring General Motors Corporation permanently to divest itself of all ownership and control of General Motors Acceptance Corporation and of all interest therein, then and in that event, nothing in this decree shall preclude the Manufacturer from acquiring and retaining ownership of and/or control over or interest in any finance company, or from dealing with such finance company and with the dealers in the manner provided in this decree or in any order of modification or suspension thereof entered pursuant to paragraph 12a. The court, upon application of the respondents or any of them, will enter an order or decree to that effect at the foot of this decree, and the right of any respondent", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00208", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00069", "text": "339 U.S. 323 70 S.Ct. 724 94 L.Ed. 884 UNITED STATESv.BRYAN. No. 99. Argued Dec. 15, 1949. Decided May 8, 1950. Rehearing Denied June 5, 1950. See 339 U.S. 991, 70 S.Ct. 1018. Mr. Philip B. Perlman, Sol. Gen., Washington, D.C., for the United states. Messrs. O. John Rogge, Washington, D.C., and Benedict Wolf, New York City, for respondent. Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 Respondent is the executive secretary of an organization known as the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (hereinafter referred to as the association) and as such has custody of its records. Prior to April 4, 1946, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, which was conducting an investigation into the activities of the association, had attempted without success to procure these records from respondent and from the chairman of the association's executive board, Dr. Edward K. Barsky. On March 29, 1946, the Committee issued subpoenas to each of the known members of the executive board summoning them to appear in the Committee's room on April 4, 1946, at 10 a.m., to testify and produce certain specified records of the association, and an identical subpoena directed to the association by name was served upon respondent Bryan in her official capacity. 2 Bryan and the members of the executive board appeared before the Committee at the date and time set out in the subpoenas and in response thereto. Each person so summoned failed to produce any of the records specified in the subpoenas. The members of the executive board made identical statements in which each declared that he or she did not have possession, custody or control of the records; that Miss Bryan, the executive secretary, did. Respondent admitted that the records were in her possession but refused to comply with the subpoena because 'after consulting with counsel (she) came to the conclusion that the subpoena was not valid' because the Committee had no constitutional right to demand the books and records. Asked whether the executive board supported her action, she refused to answer because she did not think the question pertinent. 3 The Committee on Un-American Activities then submitted its report and resolution", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00351", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00070", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 28 February 2005 establishing guidance notes supplementing part B of Annex II to Council Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (notified under document number C(2005) 413) (Text with EEA relevance) (2005/174/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (1), and in particular the introductory paragraph of part B of Annex II thereto, After consulting the European Food Safety Authority (2), Whereas: (1) The criteria listed in part B of Annex II to Directive 90/219/EEC must be met in order to establish the safety of a genetically modified micro-organism (GMM) for human health and the environment and its suitability for inclusion in part C of Annex II to that Directive. (2) The application of those criteria should be facilitated through the provision of guidance notes for Member States, as an aid to ensuring that the national competent authorities carry out their preliminary assessment in an appropriate manner and provide appropriate information to users as to the content of dossiers to be submitted. (3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established under Article 21 of Directive 90/219/EEC, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The guidance notes set out in the Annex to this Decision shall be used to supplement part B of Annex II to Directive 90/219/EEC. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 28 February 2005.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 372, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00734", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00071", "text": "and effectua e, upon common-law principles, what is the present rule upon a given subject in the light of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to what has previously been declared and practiced.' 3 Of the cases cited, only United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430, 10 L.Ed. 527, and Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed. 369, 93 A.L.R. 1136, involve a change by this Court of a rule of evidence which had become firmly entrenched in our federal jurisprudence. The other cases involve a choice between conflicting rules or the establishment of a rule where none had theretofore existed. 4 318 U.S. at pages 338, 339, 63 S.Ct. at page 612, 87 L.Ed. 819: 'Relying upon the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment that no person'shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law', the petitioners contend that the Constitution itself forbade the use of this evidence against them. The Government counters by urging that the Constitution proscribes only 'involuntary' confessions, and that judged by appropriate criteria of 'voluntariness' the petitioners' admissions were voluntary and hence admissible.' 'The Court was establishing what it thought were 'civilized standards of procedure and evidence.' 318 U.S. at page 340, 63 S.Ct. at page 613. 5 As no question was raised by the defendants in the McNabb case because of prolonged police detention before commitment, the record did not show when they were committed. Dissent McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at page 349, 63 S.Ct. at page 617. The Court assumed that detention without commitment lasted for Freeman and Raymond McNabb from between one and two o'clock Thursday morning, when they were arrested twelve miles from Chattanooga, until the completion of the questioning about two o'clock Saturday morning; forty-eight hours later. One cannot tell from the opinion when Freeman and Raymond confessed or to what. A third McNabb, Benjamin, was not taken into custody until between eight and nine o'clock Friday morning. He confessed after five or six hours. The Court assumed that he had not been", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00215", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00072", "text": "2 (3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 are hereby replaced by the following: '3. Where Algeria or Tunisia applies a special export charge to olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in paragraph 1, wholly obtained in Algeria or Tunisia and transported direct from those countries to the Community, the applicable rate of customs duty shall be further reduced by an amount equal to the special charge but not exceeding ECU 14,60 per 100 kilograms. 4. Where Turkey applies a special export charge to olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in paragraph 1, wholly obtained in Turkey and transported direct from that country to the Community, the applicable rate of customs duty shall be further reduced by an amount equal to the special charge but not exceeding ECU 26,28 per 100 kilograms. 5. Where Morroco applies a special export charge to olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in paragraph 1, wholly obtained in Morroco and transported direct from that country to the Community, the applicable rate of customs duty shall be further reduced by an amount equal to the special charge but not exceeding ECU 29,20 per 100 kilograms.` Article 2 1. The difference between the import duty, reduced pursuant to Article 2 (3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95, as amended by this Regulation, and actually paid, and the duty payable pursuant to Article 2 (4) and (5) of that Regulation shall be reimbursed in respect of imports into the Community between 1 July 1995 and the date of entry into force of this Regulation of olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in Article 2 (1) of that Regulation and wholly obtained in Morocco or Turkey. 2. The difference between the levy, reduced pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1521/76 and Article 9 (1) of Regulation (EEC) 1180/77, and actually paid, and the levy payable shall be reimbursed in respect of imports into the Community between 1 January 1994 and 30 June 1995 of olive oil meeting the conditions laid down in those Articles and wholly obtained in Morocco or Turkey. 3. Operators effecting imports as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 may apply for reimbursement of the amounts specified therein in accordance with Article 236 of Council Regulation", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00619", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00073", "text": ", 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322—an indefensible decision whereby the Court allowed those who had built one of the tightest monopolies in American history largely to retain their illgotten gains and continue their hold on the economy. The philosophy of that decision can be summed up in the words Brandeis used to describe the decree effecting a so-called dissolution of the American Tobacco Co. He said that its defenders 'appear to have discovered in the Constitution a new implied prohibition: 'What man has illegally joined together, let no court put asunder.\" The Curse o Bigness (1935) p. 103. 5 See Schine Theatres v. United States, supra, 334 U.S. at pages 129—130, 68 S.Ct. at pages 957—958, 92 L.Ed. 1245. 6 It should be noted in this connection that a majority of the Court could not be obtained for holding illegal per se the vertical integration in the motion picture industry. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, supra, 334 U.S. at pages 173—174, 68 S.Ct. at pages 936, 937, 92 L.Ed. 1260. 7 Other People's Money (1933) p. 110. 8 For the plight of the independent service station operator see Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies (TNEC Monograph No. 39, 1941) pp. 46, 47, 52. See also Review and Criticism on Behalf of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Sun Oil Co. of Monograph No. 39 with Rejoinder by Monograph Author (TNEC Monograph 39—A, 1941). 1 The Government can derive no comfort for this sort of thing from International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20. There the defendant started with a patent monopoly of the machine for utilization of its product. The customers, canners, were in effect the ultimate consumers of salt as such. But they could get the advantages of the invention only if they tied themselves to use no other salt therein.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 476, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00288", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00074", "text": "District Court, on the expiration of thirty days, shall enter a decree enjoining the defendant Hynes and all acting in concert with him substantially as ordered in the permanent injunction entered November 6, 1946.60 If timely steps are taken, the District Court will, of course, be free to enter such orders as it may deem proper and not inconsistent with the present decision. Pending the entry of further orders by the District Court, the preliminary injunction entered July 18, 1946, shall apply to protect the rights of the respondents. 57 It is so ordered. 58 Decrees vacated and proceedings remanded. 59 Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice MURPHY agree, dissenting in part. I. 60 Jurisdictional questions aside, I am in full agreement with the Court's conclusion that Public Land Order 128, 8 F.R. 8557,1 is valid and was effective, according to its terms, to include in the reservation for the Karluk Indians the tidelands and coastal waters therein described. This action was taken pursuant to the statutory authorizations recited in the order and particularly the Act of May 1, 1936, 49 Stat. 1250, 48 U.S.C. § 358a, 48 U.S.C.A. § 358a. When approved by the Indians in accordance with the proviso of the latter Act, Order 128 withdrew the area covered from any general or public right of access for fishing or other purposes inconsistent with those of the reservation and set aside that area for the exclusive benefit of the Indian occupants and inhabitants. Cf. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed. 138. The necessary effect was to forbid others to enter the area for purposes inconsistent with the reservation's objects, thus making persons so entering trespassers and subject to such remedies as the law may afford to prevent or redress their wrongful entry. 61 By his 1946 amendments to the Alaska Fisheries General Regulations, 50 C.F.R. 1946 Supp., § 208.23(r), the Secretary of the Interior reinforced his prior action in setting aside the Karluk Reservation, prohibiting fishing within the coastal waters included in Public Land Order 128, except 'by natives in possession of said reservation' and '", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00278", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00075", "text": "'that a corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district * * * if in fact, in the ordinary and usual sense, it 'transacts business' therein of any substantial character.' Id. 273 U.S. at page 373, 47 S.Ct. at page 403. (Emphasis added.) 22 In other words, for venue purposes, the Court sloughed off the highly technical distinctions theretofore glossed upon 'found' for filling that term with particularized meaning, or emptying it, under the trn slation of 'carrying on business.' In their stead it substituted the practical and broader business conception of engaging in any substantial business operations. Cf. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S. App.D.C. 129, 134 F.2d 511, 146 A.L.R. 926; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra. Refinements such as previously were made under the'mere solicitation' and'solicitation plus' criteria, cf. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., supra, and like those drawn, e.g., between the People's Tobacco and International Harvester cases, supra, were no longer determinative. The practical, everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying on business 'of any substantial character' became the test of venue. 23 Applying it, the Court stated that'manifestly' the Eastman Company was not 'present' in the Georgia district under the earlier tests of § 7 of the Sherman Act, either for the purpose of venue or as being amenable to service of process. 273 U.S. at page 371, 47 S.Ct. at page 402. It thus aligned the case under those tests with the People's Tobacco decision rather than the International Harvester one. But, under the broader room given by § 12, venue was held to have been established.18 24 Thus, by substituting practical, business conceptions for the previous hairsplitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the 'found'-'present'-' carrying-on-business' sequence, the Court yielded to and made effective Congress' remedial purpose. Thereby it relieved persons injured through corporate violations of the antitrust laws from the 'often insuperable obstacle' of resorting to distant forums for redress of wrongs done in the places of their business or residence. A foreign corporation no", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00159", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00076", "text": "of turnover, which the Community industry achieved in 1999, could be regarded as an appropriate level which the Community industry could be expected to obtain in the absence of injurious dumping. The necessary price increase was then determined on the basis of a comparison, at the same level of trade, of the weighted average import price, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the non-injurious price of products sold by the Community industry on the Community market. The non-injurious price has been obtained by adjusting the sales price of each company composing the Community industry to a break-even point and by adding the abovementioned profit margin. Any difference resulting from this comparison was then expressed as a percentage of the total cif import value. (138) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this document were established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to \"all other companies\") are thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the companies and thus by the specific legal entities mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to \"all other companies\". (139) Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission forthwith with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. The Commission, if appropriate, will, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, amend the Regulation accordingly by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates. 2. Proposed provisional measures (140) In the light of the foregoing, it is considered that, in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, a provisional anti-dumping duty should be imposed in respect of imports originating in Turkey at the level of the dumping margins found, as these were found to be lower than the injury margins. 3. Undertakings (141) Pursuant to Article 46 of Decision No", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00566", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00077", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 27 July 1994 approving the programme for the eradication and surveillance of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia presented by Italy and fixing the level of the Community's financial contribution (Only the Italian text is authentic) (94/512/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to the Council Decision 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field (1) as last amended by Decision 94/370/EC (2) and in particular Article 24, thereof, Whereas Council Decision 90/424/EEC provides for the possibility of financial participation by the Community in the eradication and surveillance of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia; Whereas by letter dated 8 June 1994, Italy has submitted a programme for the eradication of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia; Whereas after examination of the programme it was found to comply with all Community criteria relating to the eradication of the disease in conformity with Council Decision 90/638/EEC on laying down Community criteria for the eradication and monitoring of certain animal diseases (3), as last amended by Council Directive 92/65/EEC (4); Whereas in the light of the importance of the programme for the achievement of Community objectives in the field of animal health, it is appropriate to fix the financial participation of the Community at 50 % of the costs incurred by Italy up to a maximum of ECU 1 340 000; Whereas a financial contribution from the Community shall be granted in so far as the actions provided for are carried out and provided that the authorities furnish all the necessary information within the time limits provided for; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The programme for the eradication of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia presented by Italy is hereby approved for the period from 1 July 1994 to 31 December 1994. Article 2 Italy shall bring into force by 1 July 1994 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions for implementing the programme referred to in Article 1. Article 3 1. Financial participation by the Community shall be at the rate of 50 % of the costs of testing and those incurred in Italy by way of compensation", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00760", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00078", "text": "All of these cases, however, involve the problem of corporate or association entity. They are not pertinent upon the question of contracts to shift tax liability from one taxpayer to another wholly distinct and disconnected corporation or individual. We do not think that such a contractual shift authorizes the Commissioner to collect taxes from one not covered by the taxing statute. The interpretive rulings on the Regulations, referred to in this paragraph do not have the force and effect of Treasury Decisions.4 We are of the opinion that such administrative action goes beyond routine and exceeds the statutory power of the Commissioner. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369, 370, 66 S.Ct. 637, 643, 90 L.Ed. 718, 162 A.L.R. 1445. 8 This brings us then to a determination of whether the members of a 'name band' under the circumstances heretofore detailed are employees of the operator of the dance hall or of the leader. If the operator is the employer, the leader is also his employee. 9 We are of the opinion that the elements of employment mark the band leader as the employer in these cases. The leader organizes an trains th e band. He selects the members. It is his musical skill and showmanship that determines the success or failure of the organization. The relations between him and the other members are permanent; those between the band and the operator are transient. Maintenance costs are a charge against the price received for the performance. He bears the loss or gains the profit after payment of the members' wages and the other band expenses. 10 The judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed and those of the District Court are affirmed. 11 Reversed. 12 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice MURPHY concur, dissenting. 13 As the opinion of the Court points out, the Form B contract involved in the present case was adopted, with the approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after it had been held under an earlier form of contract that members of the orchestra were employees of the band leader. On the face of the present contract the dance hall proprietor is the employer even under traditional concepts of master and servant. For he has all of the conventional earmarks of the entrepreneur ownership, profit, loss, and control—if the provisions of the contract alone are considered. Then the requirements of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00109", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00079", "text": "a violation of subsection (a) shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). The Federal Trade Commission shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. (2) Exclusive enforcement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person, State, or political subdivision of a State, other than the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General of the United States to the extent provided for in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or the attorney general of a State as provided by subsection (d), shall have any authority to enforce this Act or any rule prescribed pursuant to this Act. (d) Enforcement by State Attorneys General.-- (1) Civil action.--In any case in which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates subsection (a), the attorney general, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the State in a district court of the United States of appropriate jurisdiction-- (A) to enjoin further violation of such section by the defendant; (B) to compel compliance with such section; or (C) to impose a civil penalty under subsection (e). (2) Intervention by the ftc.-- (A) Notice and intervention.--The State shall provide prior written notice of any action under paragraph (1) to the Federal Trade Commission and provide the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case in which such prior notice is not feasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission shall have the right-- (i) to intervene in the action; (ii) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein; and (iii) to file petitions for appeal. (B) Limitation on state action while federal action is pending.--If the Commission has instituted a civil action for violation of this Act, no attorney general of a State may bring an action under this subsection during the pendency of that action against any defendant named in the complaint of the Commission for any violation of", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01027", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00080", "text": "817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, has no application. What constitutes negligence for the statute's purposes is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law formulating and applying the concept governs.13 Hence the Missouri Supreme Court's decision on the first appeal, that the complaint did not state a cause of action for negligence, is subject to our independent review and is not to be taken as governed conclusively by the state court decisions which alone were cited in support of the determination. 21 Of course if silicosis caused by the employment is not an 'injury' within the statutes' intended coverage, no cause of action could be stated for that injury under the statute, even though the allegations of fault and causation were wholly sufficient. The Missouri Supreme Court's first decision, however, assumed that silicosis fell within the statute's broad term 'injury,' and held that it would not 'be reasonable to hold, under the facts admitted by the demurrer, that defendant should have anticipated plaintiff's injury * * *.' 352 Mo. at page 219, 176 S.W.2d at page 475. Accordingly, the court ruled that no cause of action for negligence under the Act had been stated. 22 Upon the assumption that silicosis when caused by the employment is a compensable employee 'injury,' the adequacy of petitioner's claim turns solely on whether his original complaint alleged facts raising a triable issue of negligence. We think that under the standards heretofore set and followed by this Court,14 the facts alleged in the complaint and taken as admitted by the demurrer clearly stated a cause of action for negligence. 23 Those facts have been briefly, though only partially, summarized above. They charged that respondent used in the locomotives' sanders a sand material containing a very high percentage of silica or silicon dioxide; that often the material would come to the rails from the sanders in excessive and unnecessary quantities and would there be ground to dust; that the dust containing'such usual and unusual quantity of silican dioxide would come' into the engine cabs and, 'frequently of unusual quantity,' would be breathed by petitioner; and that respondent 'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,' that the sand contained the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00270", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00081", "text": "or field. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473, 62 L.Ed. 968. Within the limits of the patentee's rights under his patent, monopoly of the process or product by him is authorized by the patent statutes. It is stipulated by the United States that the validity of the patents is not in issue. With these points laid aside, we proceed to the issues presented by this record. III. The Determination of the Issue. 20 Under the above-mentioned assumption as to General Electric, the ultimate question for our decision on this appeal may be stated, succinctly and abstractly, to be as to whether in the light of the prohibition of § 1 of the Sherman Act, note 1, supra, two or more patentees in the same patent field may legally combine their valid patent monopolies to secure mutual benefits for themselves through contractual agreements between themselves and other licensees, for control of the sale price of the patented devices. 21 The appellees urge that the findings of the District Court, quoted in note 13 supra, stand as barriers to a conclusion here that § 1 of the Sherman Act has been violated by the licenses. Since there was material evidence to support the District Court's finding of the evidentiary facts and the Court necessarily weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of their testimony to establish appellees' contentions, appellees insist that the inferences or conclusions as to violations of the Sherman Act, drawn by the District Court, must be accepted by us.19 As to the evidentiary facts heretofore stated, there is no dispute. From them the District Court made findings of fact Nos. 32 to 36, inclusive, hereinbefore set out in note 13. Even though we accept, as we do, these findings on preliminary facts as correct, the last sentence in findings 32 and 34 crumbles their asserted bar to an examination by us as to whether the agreements are violative of the Sherman Act. Those sentences are to the effect that there was an agreement to fix prices between all parties in the language of the contracts as set out in notes 8 and 9 supra. If the patent rights do not empower the patentees to fix sale prices for others, the agreements do violate the Act. The previous summary in this opinion of the agreements which compose these arrangements", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00137", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00082", "text": "active effect was not necessarily fatal to its validity.' (Par. 17.) 'But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles.' (Par. 17.) Of course, if what these parties did really was condemned by'statutory design' or 'legal and equitable principles,' it could be stopped without resort to a new rule and there would be no retroactivity to condone. But if it had been the Court's view that some law already prohibited the purchases, it would hardly have been necessary three sentences earlier to hold that the Commission was not prohibited 'from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct.' (Par. 17.) (Emphasis supplied.) 48 I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it.' III. 49 But one does not need to comprehend the processes by which other minds reach a given result in order to estimate the practical consequences of their pronouncement upon judicial review of administrative orders. 50 If it is of no consequence that no rule of law be existent to support an administrative order, and the Court of Appeals is obliged to defer to administrative experience and to sustain a Commission's power merely because it has been asserted and exercised, of what use is it to print a record or briefs in the case, or to hear argument? Administrative experience always is present, at least to the degree that it is here, and would always dictate a like deference by this Court to an assertion of administrative power. Must the reviewing court, as this Court does in this opinion, support the order on a presumptive or imputed experience even though the Court is obliged to discredit such experience in the very same opinion? Is fictitious experience to be conclusive in matters of law and particularly in the interpretation of statutes, as the Court's opinion now intimates, or just in fact finding which has been the function which the Court has heretofore sustained upon the argument of administrative experience? 51 I suggest that administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point—it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law. And what action is, and what is not within the law must be determined by courts,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00106", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00083", "text": ") No 2408/97 (8), sets the latest time of entry into storage for butter sold pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3143/85 and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 570/88 (9), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 531/96 (10); whereas that Regulation has been amended several times to change that time of entry; whereas it has been found that, in the last two amendments made by Commission Regulations (EC) No 2224/97 (11) and (EC) No 2408/97, the first paragraph of Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1609/88 was amended in error instead of the second paragraph; whereas, therefore, the correct form of Article l should be re-established; Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 570/88 was repealed and replaced by Regulation (EC) No 2571/97; whereas the references should be adjusted accordingly; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 1609/88 is hereby amended as follows: 1. in the title, '(EEC) No 570/88` is replaced by '(EC) No 2571/97`; 2. in Article 1, the first and second paragraphs are replaced by the following: 'The butter referred to in Article 1(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3143/85 must have been taken into storage before 1 January 1993. The butter referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2571/97 must have been taken into storage before 1 July 1997.` Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 30 September 1998.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 428, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00679", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00084", "text": "for another.' United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67—68, 53 S.Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.Ed. 619; and see Gully v. First National Bank, supra, 299 U.S. at page 117, 57 S.Ct. at pages 99, 100, 81 L.Ed. 70. Similarly, as students of federal jurisdiction have taken pains to point out, the'substantial identity of the words' in the constitutional and statutory grants of federal-question jurisdiction, 'does not, of course, require, on that score alone, an identical interpretation.' Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393, 405, n. 47 (1936). Confusion of the two is a natural, but not an insurmountable, hazard. The Gully and Puerto Rico cases were concerned with the general statutory grant to district courts of jurisdiction over federal questions; they were not concerned with the constitutional grant of jurisdiction, nor with the specific statutory grant of jurisdiction found in the Bankruptcy Act and approved in Schumacher v. Beeler, supra. 58 It has never heretofore been doubted that the constitutional grant of power is broader than the general federal-question jurisdiction which Congress has from time to time thought to confer on district courts by statute. In one of the federal land-grant cases relied on in Mr. Justice JACKSON'S opinion, this Court had occasion to make this distinction clear: 59 'By the Constitution (art. 3, § 2) the judicial power of the United States extends to 'all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States' and to controversies 'between citizens of different states.' By article 4, § 3, cl. 2, Congress is given 'power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' Under these clauses Congress might doubtless provide that any controversy of a judicial nature arising in or growing out of the disposal of the public lands should be litigated only in the courts of the Unit d States. The question, therefore, is not one of the power of Congress, but of its intent. It has so constructed the judicial system of the United States that the great", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00306", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00085", "text": "the correct amount. ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `social security surplus' means, for any fiscal year, the excess, if any, of-- ``(i) the sum of-- ``(I) the taxes imposed for such fiscal year by chapter 21 (other than sections 3101(b) and 3111(b)) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to wages (as defined in section 3121 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegates pursuant to subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rates of tax under such chapter 21 (other than sections 3101(b) and 3111(b)) to such wages, less the amounts specified in clause (1) of subsection (b) of this section for such fiscal year, ``(II) the taxes imposed by chapter 2 (other than section 1401(b)) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to self-employment income (as defined in section 1402 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury on tax returns under subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rate of tax under such chapter (other than section 1401(b)) to such self-employment income, less the amounts specified in clause (2) of subsection (b) of this section for such fiscal year, and ``(III) the amount equivalent to the aggregate increase in tax liabilities under chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 which is attributable to the application of sections 86 and 871(a)(3) of such Code to payments from the Trust Fund, over ``(ii) the sum of-- ``(I) benefits paid from the Trust Fund during the fiscal year, and ``(II) amounts authorized to be made available from the Trust Fund under subsection (g) of this section which are paid from the Trust Fund during such fiscal year. ``(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the balance in the Account shall not be available for investment by the Managing Trustee. ``(D)(i) The preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not apply with respect to fiscal years commencing with or after the first fiscal year, after fiscal year 2018, for which a provision of Federal law takes effect and authorizes, for amounts in the Trust Fund, an investment vehicle other than obligations of the United States. ``(", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00979", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00086", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1927/2001 of 28 September 2001 fixing the maximum purchase price for beef under the 11th partial invitation to tender pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1512/2001(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 of 3 April 2001 on special market support measures in the beef sector(3), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1648/2001(4), and in particular Article 3(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) In application of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 690/2001, Commission Regulation (EC) No 713/2001 of 10 April 2001 on the purchase of beef under Regulation (EC) No 690/2001(5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1764/2001(6), establishes the list of Member States in which the tendering is open for the 11th partial invitation to tender on 24 September 2001. (2) In accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 690/2001, where appropriate, a maximum purchase price for the reference class shall be fixed in the light of the tenders received, taking into account the provisions of Article 3(2) of that Regulation. (3) Because of the need to support the market for beef in a reasonable way a maximum purchase price should be fixed in the Member States concerned. In the light of the different level of market prices in those Member States, different maximum purchase prices should be fixed. (4) Due to the urgency of the support measures, this Regulation should enter into force immediately. (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Under the 11th partial invitation to tender on 24 September 2001 opened under Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 the following", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00683", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00087", "text": "we are not called upon to decide what powers inhere in a court of equity, exercising due judicial discretion, even in a suit such as was here brought by the United States for the enforcement of an order under § 8a. We say this because it appears that at a stage in the proceedings in the district court a motion for a stay, pending disposition of the petition by the Ruzickas before the Secretary of Agriculture, was made by the respondents. With the court's leave, this motion was subsequently withdrawn. The power of the district court to have acted on it is therefore not before us. Compare Scripps Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Com'n, 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754. 12 Judgment reversed. 13 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result. 1 '8a(6) The several district courts of the United States are hereby vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating any order, regulation, or agreement, heretofore or hereafter made or issued pursuant to this title, in any proceeding now pending or hereafter brought in said courts.' '8c(15)(A) Any handler subject to an order may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law.' '8c(15)(B) The District Courts of the United States (including the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia) in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00008", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00088", "text": "18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: ``(5) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, section 1029, 1341 or 1343 of this title, affecting an individual 65 years of age or older, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 524 of title 28, United States Code, up to 25 percent of the amounts forfeited pursuant to this paragraph for an offense may be used to provide restitution to any victim of the offense.''. (c) Criminal Contempt Authority.--Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 56(a)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A) by striking ``civil'' the first place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ``Federal court''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``The Commission may bring a criminal contempt action for violations of orders obtained in cases brought under section 13(b) of this Act in the same manner as civil penalty and other Federal court actions to which this subsection applies. Such cases may be initiated by the Commission on its own complaint, or pursuant to its acceptance of an appointment by a court to assist it in enforcing such orders pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.''. SEC. 207. UNIFORM LAWS GOVERNING LICENSING OF HOME REPAIR CONTRACTORS, MORTGAGE COMPANIES, AND PRIZE GIVEAWAY COMPANIES. The Attorney General, in consultation with the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, or other interested persons, shall prepare model State law on each of the following subjects: (1) Licensing of home repair contractors. (2) Licensing of mortgage companies. (3) Licensing of prize giveaway companies. SEC. 208. MAIL FRAUD. (a) Offense.--Section 1341 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``or places in any private courier service office or authorized depository for receipt of matter to be delivered by private courier service,'' after ``mail matter,''; (2) by inserting ``or by", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01128", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00089", "text": "SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act-- (1) ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Commissioner of Reclamation; (2) ``Reclamation'' means the Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of the Interior; (3) ``Fish passage and screening facilities'' means ladders, collection devices, and all other kinds of facilities which enable fish to pass through, over, or around water diversion structures; facilities and other constructed works which modify, consolidate, or replace water diversion structures in order to achieve fish passage; screens and other devices which reduce or prevent entrainment and impingement of fish in a water diversion, delivery, or distribution system; and any other facilities, projects, or constructed works or strategies which are designed to provide for or improve fish passage while maintaining water deliveries and to reduce or prevent entrainment and impingement of fish in a water storage, diversion, delivery, or distribution system of a water project; (4) ``Federal reclamation project'' means a water resources development project constructed, operated, and maintained pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto; (5) ``Non-Federal party'' means any non-Federal party, including federally recognized Indian tribes, non-Federal governmental and quasi-governmental entities, private entities (both profit and non-profit organizations), and private individuals; (6) ``Snake River Basin'' means the entire drainage area of the Snake River, including all tributaries, from the headwaters to the confluence of the Snake River with the Columbia River; (7) ``Columbia River Basin'' means the entire drainage area of the Columbia River located in the United States, including all tributaries, from the headwaters to the Columbia River estuary; and (8) ``Habitat improvements'' means work to improve habitat for aquatic plants and animals within a currently existing stream channel below the ordinary high water mark, including stream reconfiguration to rehabilitate and protect the natural function of streambeds, and riverine wetland construction and protection. SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION. (a) In General.--Subject to the requirements of this Act, the Secretary is authorized to plan, design, and construct, or provide financial assistance to non-Federal parties to plan, design, and construct, fish passage and screening facilities or habitat improvements at any non-Federal water diversion or", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00932", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00090", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2513/98 of 20 November 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 on the granting of export refunds on cereals and the measures to be taken in the event of disturbance on the market for cereals THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 923/96 (2), and in particular Article 13(11) thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2094/98 (4), in order to calculate the export refunds on processed products, the processing coefficients applicable must be known; whereas those coefficients are in fact the figures set out in Annex I to that Regulation; whereas, in view of technical progress in the sector, the figures laid down for unroasted and roasted malt need to be adjusted; whereas Regulation (EC) No 2094/98 updates those coefficients; Whereas the new coefficients are applicable from 1 September 1998; whereas, however, for export licences for malt used in September the coefficients valid before the change provided for in that Regulation continue to apply for the purpose of calculating the monthly increase; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 '1 300` and '1 520` in the last column of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 for malt, not roasted, covered by CN codes 1107 10 19 and 1107 10 99 and malt, roasted, covered by CN code 1107 20 00 are replaced by '1 270` and '1 490` respectively. Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2094/98 is repealed. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It shall apply with effect from 1 September 1998.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00626", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00091", "text": "they may do so. We should not do it for them through the guise of interpretation. 1 Pertinent parts of the Ohio law read as follows: 'Sec. 5328-1: * * * Property of the kinds and classes mentioned in section 5328-2 of the General Code, used in and arising our of business transacted in this state by, for or on behalf of a non-resident person * * * shall be subject to taxation; and all such property of persons residing in this state used in and arising out of business transacted outside of this state by, for or on behalf of such persons * * * shall not be subject to taxation * * *. 'Sec. 5328-2: Property of the kinds and classes herein mentioned, when used in business, shall be considered to arise out of business transacted in a state other than that in which the owner thereof resides in the cases and under the circumstances following: 'In the case of accounts receivable, when resulting from the sale of property sold by an agent having an office in such other state or from a stock of goods maintained therein, or from services performed by an officer, agent or employe connected with, sent from, or reporting to any officer or at any office located in such other state. 'The provisions of this section shall be reciprocally applied, to the end that all property of the kinds and classes mentioned in this section having a business situs in this state shall be taxed herein and no property of such kinds and classes belonging to a person residing in this state and having a business situs outside of this state shall be taxed. It is hereby declared that the assignment of a business situs outside of this state to property of a person residing in this state in any case and under any circumstances mentioned in this section is inseparable from the assignment of such situs in this state to property of a person residing outside o this state in a like case and under similar circumstances. * * * Sec. 5-1: * * * Moneys, deposits, investments, accounts receivable and prepaid items, and other taxable intangibles shall be considered to be 'used' when they or the avails thereof are being applied, or are intended to be applied in the conduct of the business, whether in this state or elsewhere. * * * 'Sec. 5638: Annual taxes are hereby levied on the kinds and classes of intangible property, here", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00309", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00092", "text": "1997 and 1998 for 50 000 tonnes of high-grade barley falling within CN code 1003 00 for the production of malt to be used in the manufacture of a type of beer aged in vats containing beechwood; whereas the rate of duty applicable to such imports is 50 % of the full rate of duty in force on the day of import, without the flat-rate reductions of ECU 8/tonne in the import duty provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1249/96; whereas, as a consequence, the duties applied pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 for up to 50 000 tonnes of barley for malting covered by import licence applications submitted from 1 January to 31 December 1997 and for an unspecified quantity covered by import licence applications submitted between 1 January 1998 and the date of entry into force of this Regulation, should be adjusted by reducing the rate of duty in force on the day of release for free circulation of the imported product by 50 %, the amount thereby obtained being increased by ECU 8/tonne to take account of the flat-rate reduction in the import duty which may have been applied on release for free circulation; whereas the import duty on quantities covered by import licence applications submitted between the date of entry into force of this Regulation and 31 December 1998, within the limit of the remaining balance of the annual quota of 50 000 tonnes, must be reduced by 50 %; Whereas the tariff quota opened by Regulation (EC) No 1099/98 covers the periods 1 January to 31 December 1997 and 1 January to 31 December 1998; whereas notwithstanding Article 2 of that Regulation, no provisions applying retroactively can be laid down to guarantee the type of barley already imported or to recognise documents guaranteeing that that type of barley has been imported; Whereas the implementation of this international commitment should be ensured by providing that operators who have imported barley of a particular quality for malting during the period concerned may qualify, on application, for the reduction in the import duty, less any flat-rate reductions; whereas the Member States must accordingly be authorised to reimburse duties levied in excess to operators who can prove that the import duties they paid were reduced by ECU 8 per tonne as laid down for barley of brewery quality for the production of malt from 1 January to 31 December 1997", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00720", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00093", "text": "of the first phase; Whereas expenditure on the measures constituting the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP is estimated at 256 900 000 ECU for the period from 6 February 1986 to 31 December 1988; Whereas the Community contribution from the special budget heading referred to in Article 11 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2088/85 is estimated at 28 340 000 ECU for that period, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Languedoc-Roussillon IMP, in the version submitted to the Commission on 6 February 1986, as subsequently modified after examination by the Commission and following consultation of the Advisory Committee for Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, is hereby approved. The estimates of total expenditure and the estimated contributions from each Community budgetary source are shown in the financial plan of the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP. In so far as the measures are carried out in accordance with the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP, within the limits of the overall expenditure estimates and in compliance with the rules and procedures relating to each source of Community financing, the Commission shall pay the Community contributions specified in the financial plan for the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP. Article 2 The contribution from the special heading referred to in Article 11 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2088/85 shall not exceed 28 340 000 ECU in respect of the expenditure to be incurred in the period from 6 February 1986 to 31 December 1988 on measures to be financed in the context of the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP, estimated at 256 900 000 ECU. Article 3 Pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2088/85, a first instalment from the special budget heading referred to in Article 11 (2) of that Regulation amounting to 3 940 000 ECU is hereby committed, in accordance with the financial plan of the Languedoc-Roussillon IMP. Article 4 Where a measure is financed partly out of appropriations from a structural Fund and partly out of the special budget heading, an advance may be paid from each of those sources, according to the rules applicable to each source. Article 5 This Decision is addressed to the French Republic. Done at Brussels,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00556", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00094", "text": "5. COSTS NONREIMBURSABLE. Amounts expended pursuant to this Act shall be considered nonreimbursable for purposes of the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388; 43 U.S.C. 371 et seq.), and Acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. SEC. 6. AGREEMENTS. Funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be made available to the District or a local agency only if the District or local agency, as applicable, has entered into a binding agreement with the Secretary-- (1) under which the District or the local agency is required to pay the non-Federal share of the costs of construction required by section 4(a); and (2) governing the funding of planning, design, and compliance activities costs under section 4(b). SEC. 7. REIMBURSEMENT. For project work (including work associated with studies, planning, design, and construction) carried out by the District or by a local agency acting pursuant to the State statute in section 2 before the date amounts are provided for the project under this Act, the Secretary shall, subject to amounts being made available in advance in appropriations Acts, reimburse the District or the local agency, without interest, an amount equal to the estimated Federal share of the cost of such work under section 4. SEC. 8. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. (a) In General.--The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements and contracts with the District to assist the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this Act. (b) Subcontracting.--Under such cooperative agreements and contracts, the Secretary may authorize the District to manage and let contracts and receive reimbursements, subject to amounts being made available in advance in appropriations Acts, for work carried out under such contracts or subcontracts. SEC. 9. RELATIONSHIP TO RECLAMATION REFORM ACT OF 1982. Activities carried out, and financial assistance provided, under this Act shall not be considered a supplemental or additional benefit for purposes of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 1263; 43 U.S.C. 390aa et seq.). SEC. 10. APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED. Within existing budgetary authority and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary is authorized to expend up to $25,000,000, plus such additional amount, if any, as may be required by reason", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00990", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00095", "text": "of the third sentence of section 8(d)(2)(A) of the United States Housing Act of 1937. (3) Eligibility of public housing for demolition.--Section 415 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development-- Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1988 (Public Law 100- 202; 101 Stat. 1329-213), is amended by striking ``George Loving Place, at 3320 Rupert Street, Edgar Ward Place, at 3901 Holystone, Elmer Scott Place, at 2600 Morris, in Dallas, Texas, or''. (4) Section 23 conversion.-- (A) Authorization.--Notwithstanding contracts entered into pursuant to section 14(b) of the United States Housing Act of 1937, the Secretary is authorized to enter into obligations for the conversion of the Pine Tower Apartments in Bay City, Michigan, from a leased housing contract under section 23 of such Act to a project-based rental assistance contract under section 8 of such Act. (B) Repayment required.--The authorization made in subparagraph (A) is conditioned on the repayment to the Secretary of all amounts received by the public housing agency under the comprehensive improvement assistance program under section 14 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 for the Pine Tower Apartment project and the amounts, as determined by the Secretary, received by the public housing agency under the formula in section 14(k) of such Act by reason of the project. SEC. 3. RURAL HOUSING. (a) Underserved Areas Set-Aside.--Section 509(f)(4)(A) of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1479(f)(4)(A)) is amended-- (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``fiscal years 1993 and 1994'' and inserting ``fiscal year 1995''; and (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``each''. (b) Rural Multifamily Rental Housing.--Section 515(b) of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1485(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraphs: ``(2) such a loan may be made for a period of up to 50", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00852", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00096", "text": "337 U.S. 369 69 S.Ct. 1120 93 L.Ed. 1419 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEv.WODEHOUSE. No. 84. Argued Dec. 10-13, 1948. Decided June 13, 1949. Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1949. See 70 S.Ct. 31. Miss Melva M. Graney, Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Mr. Watson Washburn, New York City, for respondent. [Argument of Counsel from page 370 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The question before us is whether certain sums received in 1938 and 1941, by the respondent, as a nonresident alien author not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein, were required by the Revenue Acts of the United States to be included in his gross income for federal tax purposes. Each of these sums had been paid to him in advance and respectively for an exclusive serial or book right throughout the United States in relation to a specified original story written by him and ready to be copyrighted. The answer turns upon the meaning of 'gross income from sources within the United States' as that term was used, limited and defined in §§ 212(a), 211 and 119 of the Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1940 and 1941.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that these sums each came within those kinds of gross income from sources within the United States that w re referred to in those Acts as'rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States, * * * copyrights, * * * and other like property,'2 and that, accordingly, each of these seems was taxable under one or the other of those Acts. 2 The respondent, Pelham G. Wodehouse, at the times material to this case, was a British subject residing in France. He was a nonresident alien of the United States not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein during either the taxable year 1938 or 1941. He was a writer of serials, plays, short stories and other literary works published in the United States in", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00291", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00097", "text": "any evidence that they might have as to why all or any one of them should be found not to have violated the Sherman Act. Our reference at 333 U.S. 402, footnote 20, 68 S.Ct. 545, 92 L.Ed. 746, to Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 2 Cir., 147 F.2d 173, shows that. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mason, 3 Cir., 115 F.2d 548, 552; Bowles v. Biberman Bros., 3 Cir., 152 F.2d 700, 705. Furthermore, even though defendants had no substantial evidence to overcome the prima facie conclusion of Sherman Act violation, they had the right to lay facts before the court that were pertinent to the court's decision on the terms of the decree; for example, the purpose of the concerted action, or the reason for making new patents available to the licensees, or willingness to license all applicants for the patent privilege. Such rights, however, did not require the trial court to admit evidence that would not affect the outcome of the proceedings. They did not affect the power of the trial court to direct the progress of the case in such a way as to avoid a waste of time. 12 A summary judgment, under Rule 56, was a permissible on remand. It was allowed, as the last paragraph of the preliminary statement of the decree shows, on the court's understanding that our opinion 'held that the defendants acted in concert to restrain trade and commerce in the gypsum board industry and monopolized said trade and commerce among the several states in that section hereinafter referred to as the eastern territory of the United States * * *.' As heretofore explained, that conclusion followed from our decision, if no evidence that controverted our ruling was offered. It is therefore necessary to examine briefly the offer of evidence. 13 The offer contained sixty-two paragraphs of proposed evidence. A full exposition is impracticable. Stress was laid on the available evidence to rebut our finding of an industry plan to stabilize prices.6 Evidence was offered to show the licenses were for settlement of alleged infringements, and individual in character and were not used as a subterfuge to gain price control. Such evidence would not affect our determination, set out above, that price-fixing licenses made in knowing concert by standardized price requirements violated the Sherman", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00378", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00098", "text": "issued a summary of the Convention containing the following on this subject: 'The shipowner is required to furnish medical care and maintenance, including board and lodging, until the disabled person has been cured or the disability has been declared permanent.' Robinson, Admiralty, p. 300. 18 Representatives of the organized seamen have recognized and advised Congress of this traditional limitation on maintenance and cure. When Congress has had under consideration substitution of a system of workmen's compensation on the principles of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901—950, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901—950, organized seamen, as we have heretofore noted, have steadfastly opposed the change. Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 715, 66 S.Ct. 1218, 1222, 90 L.Ed. 1534. In doing so the legal representative of one maritime union advised the Committee on Merchant Marine of the House of Representatives that maintenance extended during '(a) the period that a seaman receives treatment at a hospital, either as an inpatient or an out-patient; and (b) during a period of convalescence, and until the maximum cure is obtained.'1 Another representative, after defining it to include hospitalization, said, 'In addition, a seaman is entitled to recover maintenance while outside of the hospital until his physical condition becomes fixed.'2 19 That the duty of the ship to maintain and care for the seaman after the end of the voyage only until he was so far cured as possible, seems to have seen the doctrine of the American admiralty courts prior to the adoption of the Convention by Congress,3 despite occasional ambiguity of language or reservation as to possible situations not before the court. It has been the rule of admiralty courts since the Convention.4 20 Maintenance and cure is not the only recourse of the injured seaman. In an appropriate case he may obtain indemnity or compensation for injury due to negligence or unseaworthiness and may recover, by trial before court and jury, damages for partial or total disability. But maintenance and cure is more certain if more limited in its benefits. It does not hold a ship to permanent liability for a pension, neither does it give a lump-sum payment to offset disability based on", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00250", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00099", "text": "and management of the National Laboratories. TITLE II--CROSS-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND GRANT COMPETITIVENESS SEC. 201. AGREEMENTS FOR COMMERCIALIZING TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAM. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall carry out the Agreements for Commercializing Technology pilot program of the Department, as announced by the Secretary on December 8, 2011, in accordance with this section. (b) Terms.--Each agreement entered into pursuant to the pilot program referred to in subsection (a) shall provide to the contractor of the applicable National Laboratory, to the maximum extent determined to be appropriate by the Secretary, increased authority to negotiate contract terms, such as intellectual property rights, indemnification, payment structures, performance guarantees, and multiparty collaborations. (c) Eligibility.-- (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including regulations), any National Laboratory may enter into an agreement pursuant to the pilot program referred to in subsection (a). (2) Agreements with non-federal entities.--To carry out paragraph (1) and subject to paragraph (3), the Secretary shall permit the directors of the National Laboratories to execute agreements with non-Federal entities, including non-Federal entities already receiving Federal funding that will be used to support activities under agreements executed pursuant to paragraph (1). (3) Restriction.--The requirements of chapter 18 of title 35, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Bayh-Dole Act'') shall apply if-- (A) the agreement is a funding agreement (as that term is defined in section 201 of that title); and (B) at least 1 of the parties to the funding agreement is eligible to receive rights under that chapter. (d) Submission to Secretary.--Each affected director of a National Laboratory shall submit to the Secretary, with respect to each agreement entered into under this section-- (1) a summary of information relating to the relevant project; (2) the total estimated costs of the project; (3) estimated commencement and completion dates of the project; and (4) other documentation determined to be appropriate by the Secretary. (e) Certification.--The Secretary shall require the contractor of the affected National Laboratory to certify that each activity carried out under a project for which an agreement is entered into under this section-- (1) is not in direct competition with the private sector; and (2) does not present, or minim", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00847", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00100", "text": "tax on what is exclusively the carrying on ot interstate commerce. Giving the State court's judgment every indulgence for supporting its validity, one cannot find any fair relationship between the tax and actual road use or the privilege of such use. The value of a vehicle is not a practical function of what the State affords. It has at best a most tenuous relationship to the privilege of using the roads, since differences in value are due to a vehicle's appointments or its age or to other factors which have no bearing on highway use. Differences in the cost of vehicles based on such factors, reflecting in large measure the financial condition of owners or their investment policies, can hardly furnish a standard by which a return for road use may be measured. 24 This irrelevance in the basis of the tax is reinforced by the irrelevance of its incidence. For the tax is exacted not only on the original purchase of the vehicle but upon its subsequent transfer to a new owner. If the tax be treated as one on the vehicle, then it is attributable not to the privilege of road use but to a shift in its ownership. If the tax is deemed to be upon the owner, then it depends not upon the privilege of road use but upon the frequency of turnover of his equipment. Unlike all the comparable taxes heretofore sustained, the Maryland tax is measured by considerations extraneous to the State's right to impose it. 25 The Court in effect concedes this, but proceeds on the theory that the basis of such a road tax need not be intrinsically reasonable. Validity is treated as a question of dollars and cents; only the amount of the tax may be questioned. It should occasion no surprise that such a test breaks wholly new ground. Amount has of course played a part in the total context of prior decisions and it raises issues to which I shall shortly advert. But a test of amount has never been regarded as in itself a substitute for a reasonable tax classification. While novelty of doctrine does not prove unconstitutionality, neither does it establish constitutionality. If no prior decision gives any warrant for determining the validity of a State tax on commerce going through it merely by the size of the financial burden which such a tax entails, the reason is obvious enough. It would cast what is surely not a judicial function upon this Court to decide how big an amount, abstractly considered, can economically be absorbed by a carrier engaged exclusively in interstate commerce as an exaction by each State through which the carrier", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00357", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00101", "text": "to the additional State in accordance with clause (i)(I). ``(iii) Application in the event of independence or adding of a territory.--Notwithstanding clause (i)-- ``(I) if any territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a territory of the United States before $1 coins are minted pursuant to this subsection, the subsection shall cease to apply with respect to such territory; and ``(II) if any new territory is added to the United States, $1 coins shall be issued for such territories in the order in which the new the territories are added, beginning after the $1 coin is issued for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(B) Issuance of coins commemorating four innovations or innovators during each of 14 years.-- ``(i) In general.--Four $1 coin designs as described in this subsection shall be issued during each year of the period referred to in paragraph (1) until 1 coin featuring 1 innovation, an individual innovator, or a group of innovators, from each of the States, the District of Columbia, and territories has been issued. ``(ii) Number of coins of each design.--The Secretary shall prescribe, on the basis of such factors as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, the number of $1 coins that shall be issued with each of the designs selected for each year of the period referred to in paragraph (1). ``(4) Selection of concept and design.-- ``(A) Concept.--With respect to each State, the District of Columbia, and each territory to be honored with a coin under this subsection, the selection of the significant innovation, innovator, or group of innovators to be borne on the reverse of such coin shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Governor or other chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or territory with respect to which a coin is to be issued under this subsection. ``(B) Design.--Each of the designs required under this subsection shall be selected by the Secretary after-- ``(i) consultation with-- ``(I) the Governor or other chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or territory with respect to which a coin is to be issued under this subsection; and ``(II) the Commission of Fine Arts; and ``(ii) review by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Committee. ``(C) Selection and approval process.--Proposals for designs for $1 coins under this subsection may be submitted in accordance with the design selection", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00956", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00102", "text": "States.--Subject to valid existing rights, the Secretary is authorized to convey all right, title, and interest, without warranties, of the United States in and to all Project Irrigation Works to the district. In the event a significant cultural resource or hazardous waste site is identified, the Secretary is authorized to defer or delay transfer of title to any parcel until required Federal action is completed. (b) Retention of Title to Wildlife Mitigation Facilities.--The Secretary will retain title to the Wildlife Mitigation Facilities. The District shall remain obligated to deliver water to and provide for the operations and maintenance of the Wildlife Mitigation Facilities at its own expense in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (c) Reservation.--The transfer of rights and interests pursuant to subsection (a) shall reserve to the United States all oil, gas, and other mineral deposits and a perpetual right to existing public access open to public fishing, hunting and other outdoor recreation purposes, and such other existing public uses. SEC. 8. REPAYMENT CONTRACT. Upon conveyance of title to the Project Irrigation Works notwithstanding any parcels delayed in accordance with section 7(a), the 1964 Basic Contract, and the 1979 Repayment Contract between the District and Reclamation, shall be terminated and of no further force or effect. SEC. 9. INDIAN TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES. The district shall remain obligated to deliver water under appropriate water service contracts to Indian Trust Lands upon request from the owners or lessees of such land. SEC. 10. LIABILITY. Upon completion of the conveyance of Project Irrigation Works under this Act, the District shall-- (1) be liable for all acts or omissions relating to the operation and use of the Project Irrigation Works that occur before or after the conveyance except for the Grillo Claim, government contractor construction claims accruing at any time, and any other suits or claims filed as of the date of the Settlement Agreement; (2) absolve the United States and its officers and agents of responsibility and liability for the design and construction including latent defects associated with the project; and (3) assume responsibility to indemnify and defend the United States against all claims whether now known or unknown and including those of third party claims associated with, arising from, or in any way related to, the project except for the Grillo Claim, government contractor construction claims accruing at any time, and any other suits or claims filed as of the date of the Settlement Agreement.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01088", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00103", "text": ", the following definition shall be added: ‘(e) “Application for an extension of the duration” means an application for an extension of the duration of the certificate pursuant to Article 13(3) of this Regulation and of Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use (10). 2) in Article 7, the following paragraphs shall be added: ‘3. The application for an extension of the duration may be made when lodging the application for a certificate or when the application for the certificate is pending and the appropriate requirements of Articles 8(1)(d) or 8(1a), respectively, are fulfilled. 4. The application for an extension of the duration of a certificate already granted shall be lodged not later than two years before the expiry of the certificate. 5. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, for five years following the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006, the application for an extension of the duration of a certificate already granted shall be lodged not later than six months before the expiry of the certificate.’; 3) Article 8 shall be amended as follows: (a) in paragraph 1, the following point shall be added: ‘(d) where the application for a certificate includes a request for an extension of the duration: (i) a copy of the statement indicating compliance with an agreed completed paediatric investigation plan as referred to in Article 36(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006; (ii) where necessary, in addition to the copy of the authorisations to place the product on the market as referred to in point (b), proof that it has authorisations to place the product on the market of all other Member States, as referred to in Article 36(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006.’; (b) the following paragraphs shall be inserted: ‘1a. Where an application for a certificate is pending, an application for an extended duration in accordance with Article 7(3) shall include the particulars referred to in paragraph 1(d) and a reference to the application for a certificate already filed. 1b. The application for an extension of the duration of a certificate already granted shall contain the particulars referred to in paragraph 1(d) and a", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00518", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00104", "text": "the Commission, and upon rehearing, the decision in each claim shall be final, and not subject to further review by any court or agency. (8) Certifications for payment.--After a decision approving a claim becomes final, the chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission shall certify it to the Secretary of the Treasury for authorization of a payment under section 3. (9) Treatment of affidavits.--For purposes of section 3 and subject to paragraph (2), the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission shall treat a claim that is accompanied by an affidavit of an individual that attests to all of the material facts required for establishing eligibility of such individual for payment under such section as establishing a prima facie case of the individual's eligibility for such payment without the need for further documentation, except as the Commission may otherwise require. Such material facts shall include, with respect to a claim under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 3(a), a detailed description of the injury or other circumstance supporting the claim involved, including the level of payment sought. (10) Release of related claims.--Acceptance of payment under section 3 by an individual for a claim related to a compensable Guam decedent or a compensable Guam victim shall be in full satisfaction of all claims related to such decedent or victim, respectively, arising under the Guam Meritorious Claims Act of 1945 (Public Law 79-224), the implementing regulations issued by the United States Navy pursuant thereto, or this Act. (11) Penalty for false claims.--The provisions of section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code (relating to criminal penalties for false statements) apply to claims submitted under this subsection. SEC. 5. GRANTS PROGRAM TO MEMORIALIZE THE OCCUPATION OF GUAM DURING WORLD WAR II. (a) Establishment.--Subject to subsection (c) and in accordance with this section, the Secretary of the Interior shall establish a grants program under which the Secretary shall award grants for research, educational, and media activities that memorialize the events surrounding the occupation of Guam during World War II, honor the loyalty of the people of Guam during such occupation, or both, for purposes of appropriately illuminating and interpreting the causes and circumstances of such occupation and other similar occupations during a war. (b) Eligibility.--The Secretary of the Interior may not award to a person a grant under subsection (a) unless such person submits an application to", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01050", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00105", "text": "be allowed to lapse. However, there is no statutory time limit to the period of operation of anti-dumping measures other than the five-year period mentioned in Article 15 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88. As that Article itself makes clear, a review held at the end of this time limit can, where warranted, lead to the confirmation, as in this case, of the existing measures for a new period. Also, while the existing anti-dumping measures have been in force for eight years, this review has shown that their effectiveness in protecting the Community industry has been limited by the fact that due to the behaviour of the Japanese exporters the effect of dumping on the Community market, manifested by price depression and undercutting, remains substantial. 5. Residual duty (105) The verification visits to cooperating exporters covered the near totality of PPC exports from Japan to the Community during the investigation period. It was considered appropriate that for those companies which did not cooperate in this review, the residual duty be set at the highest of the individual duty rates for the exporters investigated, i.e. at 20 %, in the absence of any information justifying a higher or lower level. The same rate should apply for those companies which did not export to the Community during the investigation period. However, for the latter companies, this is subject to the possibility of a newcomer review pursuant to Article 11 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 3283/94. 6. Undertakings (106) It was considered that the undertaking of Kyocera Corporation, Kyoto, under which it was committed to giving the Commission sufficient advance notice if it were to recommence exports to the Community, should be allowed to lapse. (107) As regards the undertakings given pursuant to Article 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, the Commission has received regular information enabling it to verify the undertakings given. The weighted average value of parts and materials of Japanese origin used in the assembly or production of PPCs in the Community has remained at less than 60 % of the total value of all parts and materials. The undertakings will lapse at the end of the investigation, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of plain paper photocopiers falling within CN codes ex 9009 12 00 (Taric", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00550", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00106", "text": "of a discoverer of a hitherto unknown islet. 30 Whether we distinguish between Crown and Government lands however seems immaterial. No record appears of any conveyance from King or Minister to any land on Palmyra. We assume the law required a public record for any such conveyance from either from the time possession was taken for Hawaii. It is clear that both the King and the Minister of the Interior with the authority of the King in the Cabinet Council had power to convey the lands to private citizens. Civil Code, 1859, §§ 39-48; Act of January 3, 1865, Rev.Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1226, § 3. We assume further that the formal claim to Palmyra for the Hawaiian Kingdom made by Bent, pursuant to his commission, gave Hawaii not only sovereignty over Palmyra but also the power to grant the lands of the newly annexed islets as part of its public lands to private ownes. 31 In the circumstances heretofore described, were the district and circuit courts justified in quieting title to Palmyra in respondents on the theory of a lost grant? We take judicial notice of the laws of Hawaii prior to its annexation as a part of our domestic laws.11 The rules under which the Hawaiian people lived under the monarchy or republic define, for the sovereign of today, the rights acquired during those periods. While in matters of local law the federal courts defer to the decisions of the territorial courts,12 we are dealing here with a problem of federal law—the United States seeks to quiet its title to land now claimed by virtue of Hawaiian cession. The federal rights are partly dependent upon the Hawaiian law prior to annexation. Therefore while the Hawaiian law, as it existed before the annexation of the Territory, is controlling on rights in land that are claimed to have had their beginnings then the federal courts construe that law for themselves. The federal courts cannot be foreclosed by determinations of the Hawaiian law by the Hawaiian courts. They will lean heavily upon the Hawaiian decisions as to the Hawaiian law but they are not bound to follow those decisions where a claimed title to public lands of the United States is involved.13 The roots of respondents' claim spring from Hawaiian law. As their claim to Palmyra continued after the United States acquired in 1898 whatever rights Hawaii then had, the validity of respondents' claim must be judged, also,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00075", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00107", "text": "); H.R. 16,828, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); H.R. 23,417, as amended, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); H.R. 1700, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913); H.R. 14,865, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); S. 2783, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928): S. 2491, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). 11 Provisions for reciprocal licensing have been incorporated in consent decrees. See United States v. General Elec. Co., CCH Trade Reg.Serv. 52.777 (D.C.N.J.1942); United States v. American Bosch Corp., CCH Trade Reg.Serv. 52,888 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1942). 12 \"5. The following agreements are hereaby adjudged to be unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and each of them i hereby ca ncelled and the defendants and each of them and all persons acting or claiming to act through, for or under them and all successors and subsidiaries of any of the defendants are hereby enjoined and restrained from the further performance of any of the provisions of said agreements and of any agreements amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto: (followed by a list of the canceled agreements) \"6. Each of the defendants and each of their directors, officers, agents, employees, successors and subsidiaries and all persons acting, or claiming to act under, through or for them or any of them are hereby enjoined and restrained (a) from entering into, adhering to, maintaining or furthering, directly or indirectly, or claiming any rights under any contract, agreement, understanding, plan or program amony themselves, the co-conspirators, or with any other person, partnership or corporation, which has as its purpose or effect the continuing or renewing of any of the agreements listed in paragraph 5 hereof; (b) from entering into, adhering to, maintaining or furthering, directly or indirectly, any contract, agreement, undertaking, plan or program with any other producer or dealer relating to titanium pigments which has as its purpose or effect (1) to divide sales", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00102", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00108", "text": "; Whereas to facilitate the introduction of such a Community import licence in all Member States, it seems appropriate to authorize the competent authorities of the Member States, during a transitional period which shall end no later than 31 December 1995, to continue to issue the national forms that were in use before the date of entry into force of this Regulation for issuing import authorizations and surveillance documents, unless the applicant, at the time of this application, has requested the issue of a Community import licence; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Textile Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 517/94 is hereby amended as follows: 1. the following subparagraph is added to Article 18 (1): 'The authorization application must contain: (a) the name of the applicant and full address (including, if any, telephone and fax numbers, and identification number registered with the competent national authorities), and VAT registration number, if it is a VAT payer; (b) name and full address of declarant; (c) name and full address of probable exporter; (d) the country of origin of the products and the country of consignment; (e) a description of the products including: - their commercial designation, - description of the products and combined nomenclature (CN) code; (f) the appropriate category and the quantity in the appropriate unit as indicated in Annexes III B and IV for the products in question; (g) the value of the products; (h) any internal code used for administrative purposes, such as the Taric code; (i) date and signature of applicant.'; 2. Article 19 (1) is replaced by the following text: '1. The competent authorities of the Member States shall issue import authorizations within five working days of notification of the Commission decision or with the time limit set by the Commission. The issue of the import authorizations and extracts thereof shall be made in accordance with the conditions and detailed rules laid down in Annex VIII.'; 3. the Annex to the present Regulation is added as Annex VIII to Regulation (EC) No 517/94. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 21 December 1994.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00576", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00109", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 872/88 of 30 March 1988 re-establishing the levying of customs duties on mixed alkybenzenes and mixed alkylnaphthalenes falling within CN code 3817, originating in South Korea, to which the preferential tariff arrangements set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3635/87 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3635/87 of 17 November 1987 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1988 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries (1), and in particular Article 16 thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Articles 1 and 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 3635/87, suspension of customs duties shall be accorded to each of the countries or territories listed in Annex III other than those listed in column 4 of Annex I within the framework of the preferential tariff ceiling fixed in column 9 of Annex I; Whereas, as provided for in Article 14 of that Regulation, as soon as the individual ceilings in question are reached at Community level, the levying of customs duties on imports of the products in question originating in each of the countries and territories concerned may at any time be re-established; Whereas, in the case of mixed alkylbenzenes and mixed alkylnaphthalenes falling within CN code 3817 the individual ceiling was fixed at 850 000 ECU; whereas, on 23 March 1988 imports of these products into the Community originating in South Korea reached the ceiling in question after being charged thereagainst; whereas, it is appropriate to re-establish the levying of customs duties in respect of the products in question against South Korea, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 3 April 1988, the levying of customs duties, suspended pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3635/87 shall be re-established on imports into the Community of the following products originating in South Korea: Order No CN code Description 10.0450 3817 Mixed alkylbenzenes and mixed alkylnaphthalenes, other than those of code 2707 or 2902 Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00636", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00110", "text": "IC RETINOPATHY. (a) Coverage.--Section 1861 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x) is amended: (1) in subsection (s)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (Y), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (Z), by adding ``and'' at the end; and (C) by inserting after subparagraph (Z) the following new subparagraph: ``(AA) remote assessment of diabetic retinopathy (as defined in subsection (bbb));''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``Remote Assessment of Diabetic Retinopathy ``(bbb) The term `remote assessment of diabetic retinopathy' means a diagnostic examination of the retina for the purpose of early detection of diabetic retinopathy that-- ``(1) is provided not more frequently than on an annual basis to an individual who has been diagnosed with diabetes; ``(2) meets technical standards set forth by the Secretary (which shall be determined in consultation with industry and practitioner groups with expertise in ophthalmology, ophthalmic imaging, telemedicine, or related fields); ``(3) is furnished via a telecommunications system by a physician (as defined in subsection (r)), a practitioner (described in section 1842(b)(18)(C) of this title), or a non- physician technician deemed to be qualified by the Secretary under the regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act, to an eligible patient enrolled under this part, notwithstanding that the individual physician or practitioner providing the service is not at the same location as the beneficiary; and ``(4) is conducted under the supervision of a board- certified ophthalmologist with retinal fellowship training.''. (b) Payment Notwithstanding Limitation on Store and Forward Technology.--Notwithstanding any limitations to the contrary that are set forth in section 1834(m)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395m(m)(1)), the amendments made by subsection (a) shall be applicable to remote assessments of diabetic retinopathy that are furnished through the use of store-and-forward technologies that provide for the asynchronous transmission of health care information in single or multimedia formats. (c) Interim Payment Pending Publication of Final Rule.--For the period beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date the Secretary of Health and Human Services publishes a final regulation to carry out", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01091", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00111", "text": "be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law.' '8c(15)(B) The District Courts of the United States (including the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia) in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 8a(6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 8a(6) of this title (except where brought by way of counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)) shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15).' 2 Section 8a(8) is also invoked by petitioner. But that section adds to the Government's remedies. It implies no judicial review in favor of handlers. 3 'During the period while any such petition is pending before the Secretary and until notice of the Secretary's ruling is given to the petitioner, the penalties imposed by the act for violation of an order cannot be imposed upon the petitioner if the court finds that the petition was filed in good faith and not for delay. The Secretary may, nevertheless, during this period proceed to obtain an injunction against the petitioner pursuant to section 8a(6) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. * * * It is believed that these provisions establish an equitable and expeditious procedure for testing the validity of orders, without hampering the Government", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00009", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00112", "text": "of the island of Palmyra, situated in longitude 161 53 West and in latitude 6 4 North as described by you in said memorial; for the purpose of increasing the trade and Commerce of this Kingdom, as well as offering protection to the interests of its subjects—' The trial court, United States v. Fullard-Leo, D.C., 66 F.Supp. 774, 782, ended its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the first trial in these words: 19 'My controlling finding is, that the sovereignty of the United States was extended over Palmyra Island by Annexation, but the Republic of Hawaii did not in fact or in form assert fee simple title to this land at the time of annexation, or at any other time, and it is sufficient to say, only, as a 20 'Conclusion 21 'I am decidedly of opinion that petitioner (The United States) does not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the United States and, therefore, is not entitled to any relief prayed for.' 22 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 9 Cir., 133 F.2d 743. It concluded that the commission to Bent, heretofore referred to,'makes it abundantly clear that Bent was merely acting as agent of the King. Under the principles of international law, the taking of possession by Bent perfected the title of the King. 1 Hyde, International Law, 167 § 100; 1 Oppenheim, International Law, 276—278, §§ 221-224; Martin v. Waddell ('s Lessee,) 16 Pet. 367, 409, 41 U.S. 367, 409, 10 L.Ed. 997. Nothing in the resolution or the letter referred to is contrary to that view.' 133 F.2d at page 747. It said there was no proof of subsequent alienation by any sovereign and that the evidence would not support a finding of a lost grant. 23 On remand of this case on the first appeal, the trial court entered further findings of fact and conclusions of law. It held 66 F.Supp. 786: 24 'I believe and so hold that the evidence in this case is not only entirely consistent with but can reasonably and logically be accounted for only upon the presumption that", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00074", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00113", "text": "of which the administrative examination and approval procedure has been completed or, in the absence of such a procedure, those whose implementation is highly advanced and which can thus be expected to produce their beneficial effects on development of the region within a short period. The Commission therefore considers that it can deem compatible with the common market the fact that some of the Lit 24 000 billion refinancing is earmarked for granting aid, pursuant to the rules implementing the Law on the Mezzogiorno which were approved by Decision 88/318/EEC, to certain firms whose applications were pending on the date when Decree-Law No 363 of 14 August 1992 entered into force. That proportion of the refinancing should not exceed Lit 10 000 billion and should be channelled as a matter of priority towards aid for programme contracts and projects for which the administrative examination and approval procedure has been completed or whose implementation is at a more advanced stage, in which case they must be not less than 30 % implemented. The Commission reserves the right to re-examine the appropriateness of this amount in the light of a report on its allocation to be submitted by the Italian authorities, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Lit 24 000 billion refinancing of the aid measures provided for by Law No 64 of 1 March 1986 on aid to the Mezzogiorno, as envisaged in Decree-Law No 14 of 21 January 1992 and in the recapitulating and amending decree-laws, is hereby approved subject to the conditions laid down in the following Articles. The aid may be granted only in so far as the various provinces still qualify for aid under Law No 64 of 1 March 1986, with due regard to the deadlines laid down in the Commission Decision of 2 March 1988 on the compatibility of that Law. The refinancing shall not cover the reductions in social security contributions provided for in Article 1 of Decree-Law No 14 of 21 January 1992. Article 2 The intensity of aid for productive investment by firms, expressed in net grant equivalent, shall not exceed the following ceilings: (a) in zone A as defined in the Commission Decision of 2 March 1988 on aid to the Mezzogiorno: - 65 % for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as defined in the Community guidelines on State aid for SME", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00769", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00114", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 575/2003 of 28 March 2003 fixing the maximum subsidy on exports of husked long grain rice B to Réunion pursuant to the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1895/2002 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 of 22 December 1995 on the common organisation of the market in rice(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 411/2002(2), and in particular Article 10(1) thereof, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 of 6 September 1989 laying down detailed rules for exports of rice to Réunion(3) as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1453/1999(4), and in particular Article 9(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1895/2002(5) opens an invitation to tender for the subsidy on rice exported to Réunion. (2) Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 allows the Commission to fix, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 and on the basis of the tenders submitted, a maximum subsidy. (3) The criteria laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 should be taken into account when fixing this maximum subsidy. Successful tenderers shall be those whose bids are at or below the level of the maximum subsidy. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 A maximum subsidy on exports to Réunion of husked long grain rice B falling within CN code 1006 20 98 is hereby set on the basis of the tenders lodged from 24 to 27 March 2003 at 302,00 EUR/t pursuant to the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1895/2002. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 29 March 2003. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00828", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00115", "text": "344 U.S. 199 73 S.Ct. 232 97 L.Ed. 231 SCHWARTZv.STATE OF TEXAS. No. 41. Argued Nov. 12, 1952. Decided Dec. 15, 1952. Mr. Maury Hughes, Dallas, Tex., for petitioner. Messrs. Henry Wade, Dallas, Tex., Calvin B. Garwood, Jr., Houston, Tex., pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, for respondent. Mr. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The petitioner, Schwartz, a pawnbroker, entered into a conspiracy with Jarrett and Bennett whereby the latter two were to rob places to be designated by Schwartz and bring the loot to him to dispose of and divide the proceeds with them. Pursuant to the plan, Jarrett and Bennett robbed a woman in Dallas, Texas, of her valuable jewels and brought the loot to the petitioner. After the petitioner repeatedly delayed settlement with the robbers, the thieves finally fell not, which proved very helpful to the police. The petitioner tipped off the police where they could find Jarrett. After Jarrett had been in jail about two weeks, he consented to telephone the petitioner from the sheriff's office. With the knowledge and consent of Jarrett, a professional operator set up an induction coil connected to a recorder amplifier which enabled the operator to overhear and simultaneously to record the telephone conversations between Jarrett and the petitioner. These records were used as evidence before the jury that tried and convicted the petitioner as an accomplice to the crime of robbery. The records, admitted only after Jarrett and the petitioner had testified, corroborated Jarrett and discredited the petitioner. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas upheld the conviction, Tex.Cr.App., 246 S.W.2d 174, rehearing denied, Tex.Cr.App., 246 S.W.2d 179. We granted certiorari, 343 U.S. 975, 72 S.Ct. 1073. 2 Petitioner contends that § 605 of the Federal Communications Act1 makes inadmissible in evidence the records of intercepted telephone conversations without the petitioner's consent. The pertinent provision of the statute reads as follows: 3 '* * * no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00468", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00116", "text": ". 405, 65 L.Ed. 816; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra, reliance upon that case to support the Act now under consideration is incompatible with the position that constitutional courts may only decide 'cases' and 'controversies' of a judicial nature. The second is that the rationale of the O'Donoghue case is, by its terms, limited to courts of the District. For the Court said, 289 U.S. at page 546, 53 S.Ct. at page 748, 77 L.Ed. 1356: 'If, in creating and defining the jurisdiction of the courts of the District, Congress were limited to article 3, as it is in dealing with other federal courts, the administrative and other jurisdiction spoken of could not be conferred upon the former.' 106 In view of this express limitation, the O'Donoghue case lends no support to the Act now in question. To extend its applicability beyond the courts of the District is warranted neither by the language nor the reasoning of that case. The Court in no way diminished the authority of American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1828, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242, which had held that the courts of Florida Territory were legislative courts not created pursuant to Art. III and incapable of receiving the judicial power set out therein. Since territorial courts cannot be invested with Art. III power, the strict dichotomy between legislative and constitutional courts still exists—except in the District of Columbia. It is not enough to refer to the breadth of congressional power over the District; that such power is national in character rather than merely local. The power of Congress over the territories is equally broad, yet territorial courts cannot be invested with Art. III power under the O'Donoghue case. And some of the very statements now relied upon as indicating the scope of Congress' power over the District18 were quoted in the O'Donoghue case, but the rationale of that case was expressly limited to courts of the District, as noted above. The District of Columbia courts were there regarded as unique—different in powers and makeup from either territorial courts or other constitutional courts. Extension of the O'Donoghue case to all constitutional courts is clearly unwarranted under these circumstances, especially in the face of the uncontradicted constitutional history previously outlined. 107 Except in the District of Columbia, therefore,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00307", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00117", "text": "basis of the average Eurostat import price for the PRC during the IP. (35) For all non-cooperating companies, a countrywide dumping margin was calculated by comparing the normal value in the complaint with the export price calculated on the basis of the average Eurostat import price (see recital 34). 2.7. Provisional dumping margins for PRC (36) The provisional dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cif Community frontier price duty unpaid are: >TABLE> D. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY (37) Sodium cyclamate is manufactured in the Community by a sole company, the complainant, Productos aditivos SA. It is deemed to constitute the \"Community industry\" within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation and will hereinafter be referred to as such. E. INJURY 1. Community consumption (38) Community consumption was based on the combined volume of imports of the product concerned into the Community based on Eurostat statistics and the total verified sales of the Community industry on the Community market. (39) Community consumption of sodium cyclamate was approximately 7640 tonnes during the IP. This figure is some 50 % higher than at the start of the period considered. The increase between 2000 and 2001 was 12,7 % and 27,4 % between 2001 and the IP. Community consumption >TABLE> 2. Imports of sodium cyclamate into the Community (a) Cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports concerned (40) The Commission examined whether imports from all countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively pursuant to Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. According to that Article the effects of imports: \"shall be cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in Article 9(3) and that the volume of imports from each country is not negligible; and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in the light of the conditions of competition between imported products and the conditions between the imported products and the like Community product\". (41) Taking into account the conditions laid down in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, the Commission recalls that the dumping margins found ranged from 5,7 % to 29,5 % for the PRC and was", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00660", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00118", "text": "Authorities.--Beginning on January 1, 2006, the Secretary may enter into agreements, including contracts to provide reasonable commissions or reimbursements with any public or private entity for visitor reservation services, fee collection and/or processing services. (e) Administration.--The Secretary may provide discounted or free admission days or use, may modify the National Park Passport, established pursuant to Public Law 105-391, and shall provide information to the public about the various fee programs and the costs and benefits of each program. (f) State Agency Admission and Special Use Passes.--Effective January 1, 2006, and notwithstanding the Federal Grants Cooperative Agreements Act, the Secretary may enter into revenue sharing agreements with State agencies to accept their annual passes and convey the same privileges, terms and conditions as offered under the auspices of the National Park Passport, to State agency annual passes and shall only be accepted for all of the units of the National Park System within the boundaries of the State in which the specific revenue sharing agreement is entered into except where the Secretary has established a fee that includes a unit or units located in more than one State. SEC. 3. DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS. Without further appropriation, all receipts collected pursuant to the Act or from sales of the National Park Passport shall be retained by the Secretary and may be expended as follows: (1) 80 percent of amounts collected at a specific area, site, or project as determined by the Secretary, shall remain available for use at the specific area, site or project, except for those units of the National Park System that participate in an active revenue sharing agreement with a State under Section 2(f) of this Act, not less than 90 percent of amounts collected at a specific area, site, or project shall remain available for use. (2) The balance of the amounts collected shall remain available for use by the Service on a Service-wide basis as determined by the Secretary. (3) Monies generated as a result of revenue sharing agreements established pursuant to Section 2(f) may provide for a fee-sharing arrangement. The Service shares of fees shall be distributed equally to all units of the National Park System in the specific States that are parties to the revenue sharing agreement. (4) Not less than 50 percent of the amounts collected from the sale of the National Park Passport shall remain available for use at the specific area, site, or project at which the fees were collected and the balance of the receipts shall be distributed in", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00993", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00119", "text": "and in effect with respect thereto on June 30, 1947.' Controlled Housing Rent Regulation, 12 Fed.Reg. 4331, contains similar provisions. §§ 2(a), 4(a). Provisions of this statute and regulation, not here material, allow adjustment of maximum rentals when necessary to correct inequities and permit a 15% increase if negotiated between landlord and tenant and incorporated in a lease of a designated term. 2 Section 206(a) makes it unlawful 'to offer, solicit, demand, accept, or receive any rent for the use or occupancy of any controlled housing accommodations in excess of the maximum rent prescribed under section 204.' Section 206(b) authorized the Housing Expediter to apply to any federal, state, or territorial court of competent jurisdiction for an order enjoining 'any act or practice which constitutes or will constitute a violation of subsection (a) of this section.' 3 Proclamation 2714, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 601 note, 12 Fed.Reg. 1. That proclamation recognized that 'a state of war still exists.' On July 25, 1947, on approving S.J.Res. 123 terminating certain war statutes, the President is ued a statement in which he declared that 'The emergencies declared by the President on September 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941, and the state of war continue to exist, however, and it is not possible at this time to provide for terminating all war and emergency powers.' 4 Section 204(c) provides: 'The Housing Expediter is hereby authorized and directed to remove any or all maximum rents before this title ceases to be in effect, in any defense-rental area, if in his judgment the need for continuing maximum rents in such area no longer exists due to sufficient construction of new housing accommodations or when the demand for rental housing accommodations has been otherwise reasonably met.' 5 See Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57, 43 S.Ct. 486, 488, 67 L.Ed. 858. 6 See H.R.Rep.No.317, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1, 2, 3, 10 11. The Report states, p. 2: 'There are several factors, in addition to the normal", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00134", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00120", "text": "588.' And \"The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.\" He summed up: 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals. * * *'13 15 It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to those two classes of rights. The latter question was long ago decided adversely to the plaintiffs. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 763, 32 L.Ed. 766. Before we embark upon such a constitutional inquiry, it is necessary to satisfy ourselves that the attempt to allege a cause of action within the purview of the statute has been successful. 16 The section under which this action is brought falls into two divisions. The forepart defines conspiracies that may become the basis of liability, and the latter portion defines overt acts necessary to consummate the conspiracy as an actionable wrong. While a mere unlawful agreement or conspiracy may be made a federal crime, as it was at common law,14 this statute does not make the mere agreement or understanding for concerted action which constitutes the forbidden conspiracy an actionable wrong unless it matures into some action that inflicts injury. That, we think, is the significance of the second division of the section. 17 The provision with reference to the overt act will bear repeating, with emphasis supplied: '* * * (I)n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages * * *.' 18 In the light of the dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00405", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00121", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013''. SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION TO REQUIRE COLLECTION OF SALES AND USE TAXES. (a) Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.--Each Member State under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement is authorized to require all sellers not qualifying for the small seller exception described in subsection (c) to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to remote sales sourced to that Member State pursuant to the provisions of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, but only if the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement includes the minimum simplification requirements in subsection (b)(2). A State may exercise authority under this Act beginning 90 days after the State publishes notice of the State's intent to exercise the authority under this Act, but no earlier than the first day of the calendar quarter that is at least 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Alternative.--A State that is not a Member State under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement is authorized notwithstanding any other provision of law to require all sellers not qualifying for the small seller exception described in subsection (c) to collect and remit sales and use taxes with respect to remote sales sourced to that State, but only if the State adopts and implements the minimum simplification requirements in paragraph (2). Such authority shall commence beginning no earlier than the first day of the calendar quarter that is at least 6 months after the date that the State-- (1) enacts legislation to exercise the authority granted by this Act-- (A) specifying the tax or taxes to which such authority and the minimum simplification requirements in paragraph (2) shall apply; and (B) specifying the products and services otherwise subject to the tax or taxes identified by the State under subparagraph (A) to which the authority of this Act shall not apply; and (2) implements each of the following minimum simplification requirements: (A) Provide-- (i) a single entity within the State responsible for all State and local sales and use tax administration, return processing, and audits for remote sales sourced to the State; (ii) a single audit of a remote seller for all State and local taxing jurisdictions within that State; and (iii) a single sales and use tax return to be used by remote sellers to be filed with the single entity responsible for tax administration. A State may not require a remote", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00907", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00122", "text": "7 Fed.Reg. 237. That the two roles are quite distinct is illustrated by the policy of the War Labor Board of the First World War which outlawed 'yellow-dog' contracts for the duration of that war, thereby in effect nullifying this Court's then recent decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260, L.R.A. 1918C, 497, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 461. See Smith & Wesson Co., War Lab.Bd. Docket No. 273; Gregg, The National War Labor Board, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 39, 54. The difference in roles is again emphasized by the ruling of the War Labor Policies Board of 1918 that all Government cont acts should contain a clause prohibiting the use of child labor, although Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 724, invalidating such a child-labor provision, was decided within a few weeks after that Board was established. See 6th Ann.Rep. of the Secretary of Labor 114 (1918); 7th Ann.Rep. of the Secretary of Labor 126 (1919); Report on International Labor Standards 43 (prepared in 1918 by the War Labor Policies Board, undated). 4 'Sec. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.' 1", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00244", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00123", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Saint Helena Island National Scenic Area Act''. SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF SAINT HELENA ISLAND NATIONAL SCENIC AREA. (a) Purpose.--The purposes of this Act are-- (1) to preserve and protect for present and future generations the outstanding resources and values of Saint Helena Island in Lake Michigan, Michigan, and (2) to provide for the conservation, protection, and enhancement of primitive recreation opportunities, fish and wildlife habitat, vegetation, and historical and cultural resources of such island. (b) Establishment.--For the purposes described in subsection (a), there shall be established the Saint Helena Island National Scenic Area (hereinafter referred to in this Act as the ``scenic area''). (c) Effective Upon Conveyance.--Subsection (b) shall be effective upon conveyance of satisfactory title to the United States of the whole of Saint Helena Island, except that portion to be conveyed to the Great Lakes Lighthouse Keepers Association pursuant to section 1001 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3948). SEC. 3. BOUNDARIES. (a) Saint Helena Island.--The scenic area shall comprise all of Saint Helena Island, in Lake Michigan, Michigan, and all associated rocks, pinnacles, islands, and islets within one-eighth mile of the shore of Saint Helena Island. (b) Boundaries of Hiawatha National Forest Extended.--Upon establishment of the scenic area, the boundaries of the Hiawatha National Forest shall be extended to include all of the lands within the scenic area. All such extended boundaries shall be deemed boundaries in existence as of January 1, 1965, for the purposes of section 8 of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l-9). (c) Payments to Local Governments.--Solely for purposes of payments to local governments pursuant to section 6902 of title 31, United States Code, lands acquired by the United States under this Act shall be treated as entitlement lands. SEC. 4. ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT. (a) Administration.--Subject to valid existing rights, the Secretary of Agriculture (hereafter in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') shall administer the scenic area in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the National", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01146", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00124", "text": "24(4)(b) and Article 25(4) of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 37(4)(b) and Article 38(4) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the Commission may take immediate measures as provided for in Articles 24 and 25 of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Articles 37 and 38 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. If the Commission receives a request from a Member State, it shall take a Decision thereon within five working days of receipt of the request. 2. The Commission shall notify the Council of its Decision. 3. Any Member State may refer the Commission's Decision to the Council within 10 working days of receiving notification of the Decision. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may take a different Decision within two months. Article 7c Safeguard clause for agricultural and fisheries products Notwithstanding the procedures set out in Articles 7a and 7b, necessary measures concerning agricultural and fisheries products on the basis of Articles 17 or 24 of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Articles 30 or 37 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement or on the basis of provisions in the Annexes covering these products as well as of Protocol 3, can be taken according to procedures provided for by the relevant rules establishing the common organisation of the agricultural markets or markets in fishery and aquaculture products, or in specific provisions adopted pursuant to Article 308 of the Treaty and applicable to products resulting from the processing of agricultural and fisheries products, provided that the conditions established pursuant to Article 17 of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 30 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement or Article 24(3), (4) and (5) of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 37(3), (4) and (5) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement are met. Article 7d Dumping In the case of a practice which is liable to warrant application by the Community of the measures provided for in Article 23(1) of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 36(1) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the introduction of anti-dumping measures shall be decided upon in accordance with the provisions laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped import from countries not members of the European Community(6)", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00733", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00125", "text": "eligible lender pursuant to delegation of authority under subsection (h) was not originated in accordance with the requirements under this section and the Secretary pays a claim under the guarantee for the loan, the Secretary may require the eligible lender authorized under subsection (h) to issue the guarantee certificate for the loan-- ``(A) to indemnify the Secretary for the loss, if the payment under the guarantee was made within a reasonable period specified by the Secretary; or ``(B) to indemnify the Secretary for the loss regardless of when payment under the guarantee was made, if the Secretary determines that fraud or misrepresentation was involved in connection with the origination of the loan. ``(2) Termination of authority to issue guarantees.--The Secretary may cancel a delegation of authority under subsection (h) to an eligible lender if the Secretary determines that the lender has violated the requirements and procedures for guaranteed loans under this section or for other good cause. Any such cancellation shall be made by giving notice to the eligible lender and shall take effect upon receipt of the notice by the mortgagee or at a later date, as the Secretary may provide. A decision by the Secretary to cancel a delegation shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review. ``(k) Refinancing.--Any loan guaranteed under this section may be refinanced and extended in accordance with terms and conditions that the Secretary shall prescribe, but in no event for an additional amount or term that exceeds the limitations under subsection (f). ``(l) Nonassumption.--The borrower under a loan that is guaranteed under this section and under which any portion of the principal obligation or interest remains outstanding may not be relieved of liability with respect to the loan, notwithstanding the transfer of property for which the loan was made. ``(m) Geographical Targeting.-- ``(1) Study.--The Secretary shall provide for an independent entity to conduct a study to determine the extent to which borrowers in the United States will utilize loan guarantees under this section, the rural areas in the United States in which borrowers can best utilize and most need loans guaranteed under this section, and the rural areas in the United States in which housing of the type eligible for a loan guarantee under this section is most needed by low- and moderate-income families. The Secretary shall require the independent entity conducting the study to submit a report to the Secretary and to the Congress describing the results of the study not later than the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Rural Multifamily Rental", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00960", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00126", "text": "uvuk Pass Land Exchange and Wilderness Redesignation, Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve'', Map No. 185/80,039, dated April 1994, and on file at the Alaska Regional Office of the National Park Service and the offices of Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve in Fairbanks, Alaska. Written legal descriptions of these lands shall be prepared and made available in the above offices. In case of any discrepancies, Map No. 185/80,039, shall be controlling. SEC. 4. NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM WILDERNESS. (a) Redesignation.--Section 701(2) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (94 Stat. 2371, 2417) establishing the Gates of the Arctic Wilderness is hereby amended with the addition of approximately fifty-six thousand eight hundred and twenty-five acres as wilderness and the rescission of approximately seventy-three thousand nine hundred and ninety-three acres as wilderness, thus revising the Gates of the Arctic Wilderness to approximately seven million thirty- four thousand eight hundred and thirty-two acres. (b) Maps.--The lands redesignated in subsection (a) are depicted on a map entitled ``Wilderness Actions, Proposed Anaktuvuk Pass Land Exchange and Wilderness Redesignation, Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve'', Map No. 185/80,040, dated April 1994 and on file at the Alaska Regional Office of the National Park Service and the office of Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve in Fairbanks, Alaska. SEC. 5. CONFORMANCE WITH OTHER LAW. (a) Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.--All of the lands, or interests therein, conveyed to and received by Arctic Slope Regional Corporation or Nunamiut Corporation pursuant to the Agreement shall be deemed conveyed and received pursuant to exchanges under section 22(f) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended (43 U.S.C. 1601, 1621(f)). All of the lands or interests in lands conveyed pursuant to the Agreement shall be conveyed subject to valid existing rights. (b) Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.--Nothing in this Act or in the Agreement shall be construed to enlarge or diminish the rights, privileges or obligations of any person, except to the extent specifically set forth in this Act or the Agreement, including specifically the preference for subsistence uses and access to subsistence resources provided under title VIII of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, as amended", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01134", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00127", "text": "It reads: 'Under these circumstances, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respondent, by its action with respect to the wage increase, failed to perform its statutory duty to bargain collectively with the Union and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in the Act.' (Emphasis supplied.) 70 N.L.R.B. at page 207. 11 Accordingly, there appears no reason for enlarging the scope of the enforcement decree beyond that feature, and little, if any, need for orders requiring either specific affirmative action to be taken by the employer or the posting of any notices by it.8 12 For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for action consistent with this opinion. 13 It is so ordered. 14 Reversed and remanded. 15 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE join in Part I of this opinion, but think the Board's order should be enforced without modification. 16 Appendix A. 17 Order of National Labor Relations Board In the Mat er of Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., and Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, Case No. 10—C1812.—Decided August 21, 1946. 18 'Order. 19 'Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., Griffin, Georgia, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 20 '1. Cease and desist from: 21 '(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, as the exclusive representative of the respondent's production and maintenance employees at the Griffin plant, including watchmen, but excluding office, clerical, technical, and laboratory employees, section men in the spinning room, head loom fixers in the weave room, head fixers in the card room, all supervisory employees of the grade of second hand and above, and all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, by taking action, without prior consultation with said organization, with respect", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00267", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00128", "text": "Land Management. (c) Management of Wilderness.--Subject to valid existing rights, the wilderness area designated by this Act shall be managed by the Secretary in accordance with the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.) and this Act, except that, with respect to the wilderness area designated by this Act, any reference in the Wilderness Act to the effective date of the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the date of enactment of this Act. (d) Management of Newly Acquired Land.--If acquired by the United States, the following land shall become part of the wilderness area designated by this Act and shall be managed in accordance with this Act and other applicable law: (1) Section 12 of township 15 north, range 01 west, New Mexico Principal Meridian. (2) Any land within the boundaries of the wilderness area designated by this Act. (e) Management of Lands to Be Added.--The lands generally depicted on the map as ``Lands to be Added'' shall become part of the wilderness area designated by this Act if the United States acquires, or alternative adequate access is available to, section 12 of township 15 north, range 01 west, New Mexico Principal Meridian. (f) Release.--The Congress hereby finds and directs that the lands generally depicted on the map as ``Lands to be Released'' have been adequately studied for wilderness designation pursuant to section 603 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1782) and no longer are subject to the requirement of section 603(c) of such Act (43 U.S.C. 1782(c)) pertaining to the management of wilderness study areas in a manner that does not impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness. (g) Grazing.--Grazing of livestock in the wilderness area designated by this Act, where established before the date of enactment of this Act, shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of section 4(d)(4) of the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1133(d)(4)) and the guidelines set forth in Appendix A of the Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to accompany H.R. 2570 of the One Hundred First Congress (H. Rept. 101-405). (h) Fish and Wildlife.--As provided in section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01049", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00129", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 3191/87 of 26 October 1987 re-establishing the levying of customs duties on other new motor vehicles for the transportation of goods falling within subheading 87.02 B II a) 2 ex bb), originating in South Korea, to which the preferential tariff arrangements set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86 of 16 December 1986 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1987 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries (1), and in particular Article 15 thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Articles 1 and 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86, suspension of customs duties shall be accorded to each of the countries or territories listed in Annex III other than those listed in column 4 of Annex I, within the framework of the preferential tariff ceiling fixed in column 9 of Annex I; Whereas, as provided for in Article 13 of that Regulation, as soon as the individual ceilings in question are reached at Community level, the levying of customs duties on imports of the products in question originating in each of the countries and territories concerned may at any time be re-established; Whereas, in the case of other new motor vehicles for the transportation of goods falling within subheading 87.02 B II a) 2 ex bb), originating in South Korea, the individual ceiling was fixed at 4 000 000 ECU; whereas, on 20 October 1987, imports of these products into the Community originating in South Korea reached the ceiling in question after being charged thereagainst; whereas it is appropriate to re-establish the leying of customs duties in respect of the products in question against South Korea, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 30 October 1987, the levying of customs duties, suspended pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86, shall be re-establish on imports into the Community of the following products originating in South Korea: 1.2.3 // // // // Order No // CCT heading No and NIMEXE-code // Description // // // // 10.1125 // 87.02 B II a)", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00535", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00130", "text": "5/95 of 7 September 1995 laying down detailed rules of application for the grant of export refunds in the sugar sector(2). The refund thus calculated for sugar containing added flavouring or colouring matter must apply to their sucrose content and, accordingly, be fixed per 1 % of the said content. (4) The world market situation or the specific requirements of certain markets may make it necessary to vary the refund for sugar according to destination. (5) In special cases, the amount of the refund may be fixed by other legal instruments. (6) The refund must be fixed every two weeks. It may be altered in the intervening period. (7) It follows from applying the rules set out above to the present situation on the market in sugar and in particular to quotations or prices for sugar within the Community and on the world market that the refund should be as set out in the Annex hereto. (8) Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 does not make provision to continue the compensation system for storage costs from 1 July 2001. This should accordingly be taken into account when fixing the refunds granted when the export occurs after 30 September 2001. (9) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds on the products listed in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, undenatured and exported in the natural state, are hereby fixed to the amounts shown in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 16 November 2001. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 November 2001.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 376, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00578", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00131", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1075/98 of 26 May 1998 establishing unit values for the determination of the customs value of certain perishable goods THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 82/97 (2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 75/98 (4), and in particular Article 173 (1) thereof, Whereas Articles 173 to 177 of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 provide that the Commission shall periodically establish unit values for the products referred to in the classification in Annex 26 to that Regulation; Whereas the result of applying the rules and criteria laid down in the abovementioned Articles to the elements communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 173 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 is that unit values set out in the Annex to this Regulation should be established in regard to the products in question, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The unit values provided for in Article 173 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 are hereby established as set out in the table in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 29 May 1998. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 26 May 1998.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 386, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00597", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00132", "text": "/EC (5), the Commission approved the single programming documents for Community structural measures in Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion respectively, with regard to Objective 1 in France; Whereas those single programming documents provide for a measure for the implementation of joint action in respect of Objective 5 (a) to improve the processing and marketing conditions for agricultural products under Regulation (EEC) No 866/90; Whereas on 14 April 1995 and 6 September 1996, the French authorities submitted an application to the Commission for a derogation from the second indent of Article 13 of Regulation (EEC) No 866/90 and an application for derogations from the Annex to Decision 94/173/EC relating, in the latter case, to cereals for investment in storage and animal feed, in the case of oilseeds and protein plants, for investments in animal feed and, in the case of eggs and poultry, for investments in the market preparation of eggs and the slaughter of chickens; Whereas the ad hoc derogations from the second indent of Article 13 of Regulation (EEC) No 866/90 and from the selection criteria adopted by abovementioned Decision 94/173/EC, as requested by the French authorities, are warranted having regard to the specific requirements of the overseas departments and the recognized need, under measures pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91, to develop the agricultural product processing and marketing industry; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Agricultural Structures and Rural Development, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The applications for derogations from Regulation (EEC) No 866/90 and from the selection criteria laid down in Decision 94/173/EC which have been submitted under the single programming documents for the implementation of Community structural measures in Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion, as listed in the Annex hereto, are hereby accepted. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the French Republic. Done at Brussels, 18 December 1996.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 438, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00673", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00133", "text": ") Prohibition against duplicative coverage.-- Multiperil coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) may not be provided with respect to any structure (or the personal property related thereto) for any period during which such structure is covered, at any time, by flood insurance coverage made available under this title. ``(B) Requirement to maintain flood insurance coverage.--Windstorm coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) may be provided only with respect to a structure (and the personal property related thereto) that is covered by flood insurance coverage made available under this title and only during the period that such structure (and personal property) are so covered. ``(4) Nature of coverage.-- ``(A) Multiperil coverage.--Multiperil coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall-- ``(i) cover losses only from physical damage resulting from flooding or windstorm; and ``(ii) provide for approval and payment of claims under such coverage upon proof that such loss must have resulted from either windstorm or flooding, but shall not require for approval and payment of a claim that the specific cause of the loss, whether windstorm or flooding, be distinguished or identified. ``(B) Separate windstorm coverage.--Windstorm coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall-- ``(i) cover losses only from physical damage resulting from windstorm; and ``(ii) provide for approval and payment of claims under such coverage or under the flood insurance coverage required to be maintained under paragraph (3)(B) upon a determination that such loss from windstorm or flooding, respectively, but shall not require for approval and payment of a claim that the insured distinguish or identify the specific cause of the loss, whether windstorm or flooding. ``(5) Actuarial rates.--Multiperil coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) and windstorm coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall be made available for purchase for a property only at chargeable risk premium rates that, based on consideration of the risks involved and accepted actuarial principles, and including operating costs and allowance and administrative expenses, are required in order to make such coverage available on an actuarial basis for the type and class of properties covered. ``(6) Terms of coverage.--The Director shall, after consultation with persons and entities referred to in section 1306(a), provide by regulation for the general terms and conditions of insurability applicable to properties eligible for multiperil coverage pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) and such", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01104", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00134", "text": "as a commercial traveler, city salesman, wholesale house salesman, sales manager or merchandise broker, selling goods at wholesale or selling office, store, factory, railroad, mill or municipal equipment, for a manufacturer or wholesale dealer, or one who has had at least six months experience in either of the occupations named herein, and is thus engaged at the date of filing the application, and who is in good mental and physical condition may become a member of this Order if found acceptable.' Art. II, constitution of the society, 1922. 169655, then issued to him, and which is the primary basis for the respondent's claim, is as follows: 'Incorporated Under the General Laws of the State of Ohio (Continued on p. 594) Class A Insurance Certificate The Order of United Commercial Travelers of America Columbus, Ohio 'An Association incorporated under the laws of the state of Ohio, hereby certifies that Ford Shane, a member of The Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, in consideration of the statements contained in his application for insurance and the application fee paid by him, is hereby accepted as an Insured Member of said Order under 'Class A,' beginning at twelve (12) o'clock, noon, Standard time, on the day this certificate is dated, and is entitled to all the rights and benefits which may be provided for such 'Class A' Insured Members in and by the Constitution of said Order in force and effect at the time any accident occurs subsequent to said time and date. 'This Certificate, the Constitution, By-Laws and Articles of Incorporation of said Order, together with the application for insurance signed by said Insured Member, shall constitute the contract between said Order and said Insured Member and shall govern the payment of benefits, and any changes, additions or amendments to said Constitution, By-Laws or Articles of Incorporation, hereafter duly made, shall bind said Order and said Insured Member and his beneficiary or beneficiaries, and shall govern and control the contract in all respects. 'In Witness Whereof, we have affixed our signatures and the seal of the Supreme Council, at Columbus, Ohio, this 21st day of December A.D. 1922. 'This certificate supersedes all insurance certificates issued of a prior date bearing this number.'s/ Frank J. Rosser 'Supreme Counselor.'s/ Walter D. Murphy 'Supreme Secretary.' Seal 14 The certificate,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00083", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00135", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 4 April 2007 concerning the publication of the reference of the standard EN 71-1:2005 ‘Safety of Toys - Part 1: mechanical and physical properties’ regarding the technical requirements on projectiles with suction cups as an impact area in accordance with Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the safety of toys (notified under document number C(2007) 1460) (Text with EEA relevance) (2007/224/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 88/378/EEC of 3 May 1988 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the safety of toys (1), and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) thereof, Having regard to the opinion of the Standing Committee established by Article 5 of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and on Information Society Services (2), as amended by Directive 98/48/EC (3) (Committee on standards and technical regulations), Whereas: (1) Article 2 of Directive 88/378/EEC provides that toys must be placed on the market only if they do not jeopardise the safety and/or health of users or third parties when they are used as intended or in a foreseeable way, bearing in mind the normal behaviour of children. (2) Pursuant to the Article 5(1) second subparagraph of Directive 88/378/EEC, toys are presumed to comply with the essential safety requirements referred to in Article 3 of the Directive if they conform to the national standards applicable to them transposing the harmonised standards the reference numbers of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. (3) According to the Article 5(1) second subparagraph of Directive 88/378/EEC, Member States are required to publish the reference numbers of national standards transposing harmonised standards, the reference numbers of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. (4) The European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), under mandate from the Commission, drew up and adopted the harmonised standard EN 71-1:1998 ‘Safety of toys -", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00634", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00136", "text": "it should have considered unless an examination of the whole record puts its acceptance beyond reason. Since this matter is crucial, it is appropriate to quote fully the Board's decision on the point: 16 'In remanding the case to the Board for further hearing, the Circuit Court directed that the respondent (the Company) and the D.G.W.U. (the plant union) be permitted to adduce the previously proffered testimony of respondent's (the Company's) employees to show, in substance, that they formed and joined the D.G.W.U. of their own free will and that they were not influenced, interfered with, or coerced by the respondent in choosing that organization as their bargai ing representative. In compliance with the Court's mandate and pursuant to the respective offers of proof submitted by the respondent and the D.G.W.U. at the original hearing, the Board permitted the introduction of such testimony. We have carefully considered all such evidence adduced by the respondent and the D.G.W.U. We find, however, that the testimony in question does not overcome more positive evidence in the record that the respondent committed acts of interference and assistance in the formation and administration of the D.G.W.U. which subjected that organization to the respondent's domination and which removed from the employees' selection of the D.G.W.U. the complete freedom of choice which the Act contemplates. Since we find the testimony here adduced totally unpersuasive that the employees voluntarily designated the D.G.W.U., we are moreover impelled to adhere to the opinion, derived from our experience in administration of the Act, that conclusionary evidence of this nature is immaterial to issue such as those presented in this case. A consideration of all the evidence convinces us, and we find, that the respondent dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the D.G.W.U. and contributed support thereto; and that the respondent thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced it employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.' 50 N.L.R.B. 241. 17 We cannot read this otherwise than as an assurance by the Board that it did not merely go through the motions of allowing the testimony of these witnesses to get into the record as an empty formality, but that it duly heeded the order of the Court and reflected upon the testimony. The Board judged of its worth, as it had a right to, in light of the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00040", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00137", "text": "***** COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 489/85 of 26 February 1985 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1322/83 on the transfer of 550 000 tonnes of common wheat of bread-making quality by French and German intervention agencies THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2727/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the market in cereals (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1018/84 (2), and in particular Article 8 (3) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 1322/83 (3), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2153/84 (4), provided in particular for the transfer to Italy of 450 000 tonnes of common wheat of bread-making quality held by the French intervention agency for disposal by the Italian intervention agency in animal feedingstuffs before 1 August 1984; whereas, since the said quantity could not be disposed of in its entirety before the said date, the deadline for the disposal of the remaining quantity of 32 420 tonnes, held in storage in Sicily, was extended to 31 October 1984; whereas it was stipulated that as from 1 November 1984 quantities not disposed of would be put up for sale again in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 1836/82 (5); Whereas the new deadline has proved inadequate; whereas recourse to Regulation (EEC) No 1836/82 appears inappropriate; whereas therefore, for the sake of efficient management, provision should be made for the disposal of the remaining quantity of 21 680 tonnes before 1 August 1985; whereas Regulation (EEC) No 1322/83 should be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The first subparagraph of Article 1 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1322/83 is hereby amended as follows: 1. the second sentence is replaced by the following: 'They shall ensure that it is disposed of in animal feed before 1 August 1985.'; 2. the third sentence is deleted. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00608", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00138", "text": "the business direct loan financing account would thereby exceed $750,000. ``(ii) Exception.--A loan may not be made to a borrower under this paragraph if the total amount outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business loan and investment fund, the business guaranty loan financing account, and the business direct loan financing account would thereby exceed $1,000,000. ``(E) Administration participation.-- Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A), in an agreement to participate in a loan under this paragraph, participation by the Administration shall not exceed-- ``(i) 85 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan, if the balance exceeds $100,000; ``(ii) 90 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan, if the balance is less than or equal to $100,000; and ``(iii) notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), in any case in which the subject loan is processed in accordance with the requirements applicable to the SBAExpress Pilot Program, 50 percent of the balance outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan. ``(F) Periodic reviews.--The Inspector General of the Administration shall periodically review a representative sample of loans guaranteed under this paragraph to mitigate the risk of fraud and ensure the safety and soundness of the loan program. ``(G) Annual report.--The Administration shall annually submit to the Committees on Small Business of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the results of the program carried out under this paragraph during the preceding 12-month period, which shall include information relating to-- ``(i) the total number of loans guaranteed under this paragraph; ``(ii) with respect to each loan guaranteed under this paragraph-- ``(I) the amount of the loan; ``(II) the geographic location of the borrower; and ``(III) whether the loan was made to repair or replace information technology and other automated systems or to remedy an economic injury; and ``(iii) the total number of eligible lenders participating in the program.''. (b) Guidelines.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall issue guidelines to carry out the program under section 7(a)(27) of the Small Business Act, as added by this section. (2) Requirements.--Except to the extent that it would be inconsistent with this section or", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01115", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00139", "text": "at 89, 155 A.L.R. 845. 3 The statute dissolving Defense Supplies Corporation, footnote 6, infra, is an example. 4 Mumma v. Potomac Co., supra; Peora Coal Co. v. Ashcraft, 123 W.Va. 586, 595, 17 S.E.2d 444. 5 The problem is distinct from that of survival of causes of action. Fix v. Philadelphia Barge Co., 290 U.S. 530, 54 S.Ct. 270, 78 L.Ed. 481. 6 'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, all functions, powers, duties, and authority of the corporations hereinafter designated, are hereby transferred, together with all their documents, books of account, records, assets, and liabilities of every kind and nature, to Reconstruction Finance Corporation and shall be performed, exercised, and administered by that Corporation in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as if originally vested in Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the designated corporations are hereby dissolved: Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve Company, and Defense Supplies Corporation, created by Reconstruction Finance Corporation pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1940 (54 Stat. 572), and Disaster Loan Corporation, created by the Act of February 11, 1937 (50 Stat. 19), are hereby designated as the corporations to which this joint resolution applies. 'Sec. 2. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall assume and be subject to all liabilities, whether arising out of contract or otherwise, of the corporations dissolved by this joint resolution. No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against any of such corporations shall abate by reason of the enactment of this joint resolution, but the court, on motion or supplemental petition filled at any time within twelve months after the date of such enactment, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain a determination of the questions involved, may allow the same to be maintained by or against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 'Sec. 3. This joint resolution shall take effect on July 1, 1945.' 59 Stat. 310. 7 'Be it enacted * * * That no suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00252", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00140", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2506/91 of 20 August 1991 re-establishing the levying of customs duties on the products falling within CN code 2827 32 00, originating in India, to which the preferential tariff arrangements of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3831/90 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3831/90 of 20 December 1990 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1991 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries (1), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3835/90 (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 3831/90, customs duties on certain products originating in each of the countries or territories listed in Annex III are totally suspended, and the products as such are, as a general rule, subject to statistical surveillance every three months on the reference base referred to in Article 8; Whereas, as provided for in Article 8 of that Regulation, where the increase of preferential imports of these products, originating in one or more beneficiary countries, threatens to cause economic difficulties in a region of the Community, the levying of customs duties may be reintroduced, once the Commission has had an appropriate exchange of information with the Member States; whereas for this purpose the reference base to be considered is equal as a general rule, to 6,3 % of the total importations into the Community, originating from third countries in 1988; Whereas, in the case of the products falling within CN code 2827 32 00, originating in India, the reference base is fixed at ECU 240 000; whereas that reference base was reached on 21 March 1991 by charges of imports into the Community of the products in question originating in India; whereas the exchange of information organized by the Commission has demonstrated that continuance of the preference threatens to cause economic difficulties in a region of the Community; whereas, therefore, customs duties for the products in question must be reintroduced with regard to India, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 25 August 1991, the levying of customs duties, suspended in pursuance of Council Regulation (EEC) No", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00583", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00141", "text": "332 U.S. 507 68 S.Ct. 190 92 L.Ed. 128 PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO.v.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF INDIANA et al. No. 69. Argued Nov. 14—17, 1947. Decided Dec. 15, 1947. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. Mr. John S. L. Yost, of New York City, for appellant. Mr. Karl J. Stipher, of Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee, Public Service Commission of Indiana. Mr. William P. Evans, of Indianapolis, Ind., for appellees, Indiana Gas & Water Co. et al. Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 Broadly the question is whether Indiana has power to regulate sales of natural gas made by an interstate pipe-line carrier direct to industrial consumers in Indiana. More narrowly we are asked to decide whether the commerce clause, Const. Art. I, § 8, by its own force forbids the appellee, Public Service Commission, to require appellant to file tariffs, rules and regulations, annual reports, etc., as steps in a comprehensive plan of regulation preliminary to possible exercise of jurisdiction over rates and service in such sales.1 2 Panhandle Eastern transports natural gas from Texas and Kansas fields into and across intervening states, including Indiana, to Ohio and Michigan. In Indiana it furnishes gas to local public utility distributing companies and municipalities. These in turn supply the needs of over 112,000 residential, commercial and industrial consumers. 3 Since 1942 appellant also has sold gas in large amounts direct to Anchor-Hocking Glass Corporation for industrial consumption.2 Shortly before beginning this service appellant had informed a number of its customers, local distributing companies in Indiana, that it intended to render service directly to large industrial consumers wherever possible.3 Pursuant to that policy, since these proceedings began direct service has been extended to another big industrial user.4 4 In 1944 the Commission initiated hearings relative to direct service by Panhandle Eastern to Indiana consumers. It concluded that 'the distribution in Indiana by Panhandle of natural gas direct to consumers is subject to regulation by this Commission under the laws of this state,' notwithstanding any alleged contrary effect of the commerce clause upon appellant's direct sales to industrial sers. Accordingly it issued its order of November 21, 1945,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00122", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00142", "text": "us, but also in the cases to come to us from the order of civil contempt in which petitions for certiorari are to be filed. 9 There is a further consideration militating against premature disposition of the issues presented. There is now pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California an action brought by the United States for adjudication of its claim of title in the same shares of stock as those involved in the instant cases. We have heretofore held that judgments entered in the instant cases would not be res judicata against the United States. Land v. Dollar, 1947, 330 U.S. 731, 736, 737, 739, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1011, 1012, 1013, 91 L.Ed. 1209. Appeals have been taken from the temporary injunction issued in that suit on behalf of the United States and with which much of the present phase of this litigation is concerned. We are advised that on May 31, 1951, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard argument on a motion to stay the temporary injunction pending appeal from the order granting the temporary injunction and has taken that motion under advisement. On June 1, 1951, the District Court for the Northern District of California began its hearing on defendants' (respondents in this Court) motion to dismiss the complaint and for summary judgment. 10 For the foregoing reasons, we do not accept the suggestion that hearing argument in a matter of weeks is compatible with the orderly administration of justice. 11 Certiorari granted, motion to vacate stay denied, motion for leave to file continued, and suggestion that ending of term be delayed rejected. 12 Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications. 13 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER does not join in this opinion. LAND 14 v. DOLLAR 15 No. 697. 16 Separate memorandum of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER. 17 It is not practicable, as a rule, for reasons indicated in my memorandum in State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, to set forth the considerations that move the Court in granting or denying a petition for certiorari. And since an unexplained announcement of an individual vote", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00413", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00143", "text": "other organization had ever been allowed to use the hall. The interference to oust the Union was enough without a discrimination, which could hardly occur unless some other union had been allowed to use the hall. Consequently, I think the Board could require the employer to notify the Patriotic Sons that it has been unfair in the objections heretofore made and that it will make no objections in the future, and that the Patriotic Sons are free to allow such temporary use if they see fit. 24 But the Board's order goes beyond this. It has ordered that the employers take affirmative action to place the hall of the Patriotic Sons at the disposal of the Union. It is one thing to forbid the employers to bring pressure on the custodian of the hall to shut out the Union; it is another thing to order them to bring pressure on the custodian to admit the Union, or to order the employers to repossess the hall and turn it over to the Union. If the employers were controlling the hall directly, I would have serious doubts whether denial of union use of the hall could be an unfair labor practice, and equally serious doubts whether it would not be an unfair labor practice under § 8(2) of the Act to allow it. Neither the complaining Union nor any other has yet been chosen as bargaining agent for these employees. For the employers to provide this Union a hall, by direct permission or by indirect pressure on the Patriotic Sons, may readily convey to employees an impression of favoring the Union thus indulged. As the court below pointed out, the policy of the Act as heretofore applied is one of preventing the employer from extending financial aid or support to any union. I think in the longrun interpretation of the Act to require a complete hands-off attitude on the part of employers will better effectuate the purposes of the Act than an occasional departure from it to require some kind of aid to a union as an expedient for correcting or punishing an unfair labor practice. 25 If the Act permitted imposing such a penalty upon the employers, it would perhaps be appropriate to compel them to provide a meeting hall in lieu of those it kept the Union from obtaining. However, it is well established by decisions of this Court that § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c), is remedial, not punitive. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00240", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00144", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1906/2001 of 28 September 2001 setting the amounts of aid for the supply of rice products from the Community to the Azores and Madeira THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1600/92 of 15 June 1992 introducing specific measures in respect of certain agricultural products for the benefit of the Azores and Madeira(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1449/2001(2), and in particular Article 10 thereof, Whereas: (1) Pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 1600/92, the requirements of the Azores and Madeira for rice are to be covered in terms of quantity, price and quality by the mobilization, on disposal terms equivalent to exemption from the levy, of Community rice, which involves the grant of an aid for supplies of Community origin. This aid is to be fixed with particular reference to the costs of the various sources of supply and in particular is to be based on the prices applied to exports to third countries. (2) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/92(3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2596/93(4), lays down common detailed rules for implementation of the specific arrangements for the supply of certain agricultural products, including rice, to the Azores and Madeira. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/92 of 16 July 1992 laying down detailed rules for implementation of the specific arrangements for the supply of rice products to the Azores and Madeira and establishing the forecast supply balance for these products(5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1683/94(6), lays down detailed rules which complement or derogate from the provisions of the aforementioned Regulation. (3) As a result of the application of these detailed rules to the current market situation in the rice sector, and in particular to the rates of prices for these products in the European part of the Community and on the world market the aid for supply to the Azores and Madeira should be set at the amounts given in the Annex. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REG", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00691", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00145", "text": "time conduct an evaluation of the fellowships under this Act. SEC. 4. TERMS OF FELLOWSHIPS. (a) Period of Fellowship.--An applicant selected under subsection (b) shall be awarded a fellowship for a period not to exceed 12 months. (b) Selection of Fellows.-- (1) In general.--A fellowship shall be awarded pursuant to a nationwide competition established by the Executive Director with the approval of a majority of the Board. The Executive Director shall establish the procedure for the competition process. (2) Qualification.--A successful applicant shall be an individual who has demonstrated-- (A) a desire to pursue a career in humanitarian service; and (B) outstanding potential for such a career. (3) Amount of award.--The Board shall determine the amount of an educational award and living allowance that a successful applicant will receive under a fellowship. (4) Recognition of fellowship receipt.-- (A) A recipient of a fellowship from the Bill Emerson Hunger Fellowship shall be known as an ``Emerson Fellow''. (B) A recipient of a fellowship from the Mickey Leland Hunger Fellowship shall be known as a ``Leland Fellow''. SEC. 5. TRUST FUND. (a) Establishment.--There is established the Congressional Hunger Fellows Trust Fund (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ``Fund'') in the Treasury of the United States, consisting of amounts appropriated to the Fund under section 8(a), amounts credited to it under subsection (c), and amounts received under section 7(c)(2). (b) Investment of Funds.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the full amount of the Fund. Each investment shall be made in an interest bearing obligation of the United States or an obligation guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States that, as determined by the Secretary in consultation with the Board, has a maturity suitable for the Fund. (c) Return on Investment.--Except as provided in section 6(a), the Secretary of the Treasury shall credit to the Fund the interest on, and the proceeds from sale or redemption of, obligations held in the Fund. SEC. 6. EXPENDITURES; AUDIT. (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer to the Program from the amounts described in section 5(c) and section 7(c)(2) such sums as the Board determines are necessary to enable the Program to carry out the provisions of this Act. (b", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01012", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00146", "text": "authorities to compare import prices with the entry price given in the Common Customs Tariff, in order to be able to determine the duties to be levied; whereas, pursuant to Article 3 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 3290/94, for the purposes of this Regulation, they may not apply beyond 30 June 1996; Whereas the import price on the basis of which the imported products are classified in the Common Customs Tariff must be equal to the fob price of the products concerned plus the cost of insurance and transport up to the border of the customs territory of the Community; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 This Regulation lays down detailed rules for the transitional application of the entry price system for the products listed in Annex I, Part 3, Section I, Annex 2 to the Customs Tariff of the European Communities, for the period ending on 30 June 1996. Article 2 Each declaration of release for free circulation shall cover goods of one origin only and covered by one code only in the combined nomenclature. Article 3 1. The import price on the basis of which the products referred to in Article 1 are classified in the customs tariff of the European Communities must be equal to the fob price of the product in question in the country of origin, plus the cost of insurance and transport up to the place of entry into the customs territory of the Community. 2. Where the import price cannot be determined by reference to paragraph 1 of this Article, the products referred to in Article 1 shall be classified in the customs tariff of the European Communities on the basis of the customs value determined in accordance with Articles 30 and 31 of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (4). Article 4 This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 September 1995. It shall apply until 30 June 1996. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 August 1995.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 442, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00609", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00147", "text": ", if said acquisition or option to acquire has been consummated by a qualified section 501(c)(3) conservation entity, said entity shall have notified the Secretary that the quality of title in fact secured meets applicable Forest Service standards with respect to surface and subsurface estates or is otherwise acceptable to the Forest Service''. (c) Description of Lands.--The Secretary is authorized and directed to acquire by purchase or exchange the lands and interests therein as depicted on a map entitled ``Porcupine Area'', dated September, 1992. (d) Land Acquisition Authorities.--Acquisitions pursuant to this section shall be under existing authorities available to the Secretary. (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. Funds necessary for land acquisition are authorized to be appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. (f) Equal Value.--Any exchange of lands between Big Sky Lumber Company and the United States shall be for equal value. (g) References.--The reference and authorities of this section referring to the Big Sky Lumber Company, shall also refer to its successors. SEC. 5. LAND CONSOLIDATION--TAYLOR FORK AREA. (a) In General.--The exchange described in section 3 of this Act shall not be consummated by the Secretary until the conditions of this section are met. (b) Conditions.--The Secretary or a qualified section 501(c)(3) conservation entity, acting on its behalf for later disposition to the United States, shall have acquired, by purchase or option to acquire, or exchange, all of the Taylor Fork property for its fair market value, determined at the time of acquisition in accordance with appraisal standards acceptable to the Secretary by an appraiser acceptable to the Secretary and owner. Any appraisal for exchange purposes shall be conducted by the same parties, utilizing the same standards noted above; and further that, if said acquisition or option to acquire has been consummated by a qualified section 501(c)(3) conservation entity, said entity shall have notified the Secretary that the quality of title in fact secured meets applicable Forest Service standards with respect to surface and subsurface estates or is otherwise acceptable to the Forest Service. (c) Direction.--The Secretary is directed to provide Congress, within two years, recommendations designed to acquire by purchase or exchange Taylor Fork Area lands owned by Big Sky Timber Company: Provided, That such recommendations are agreed to by Big Sky L", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01021", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00148", "text": "of the United States under the provisions of and within the time limit prescribed in subsection (e)(1), such order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review or redetermination by any court or other agency. The Board shall exercise its powers with respect to the aggregate of the amounts received or accrued during the fiscal year (or such other period as may be fixed by mutual agreement) by a contractor or subcontractor under contracts with the Departments and subcontracts, and not separately with respect to amounts received or accrued under separate contracts with the Departments or subcontracts, except that the Board may exercise such powers separately with respect to amounts received or accrued by the contractor or subcontractor under any one or more separate contracts with the Departments or subcontracts at the request of the contractor or subcontractor. Whenever the Board makes a determination with respect to the amount of excessive profits, whether such determination is made by order or is embodied in an agreement with the contractor of subcontractor, it shall, at the request of the contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be, prepare and furnish such contractor or subcontractor with a statement of such determination, of the facts used as a basis therefor, and of its reasons for such determination. Such statement shall not be used in The Tax Court of the United States as proof of the facts or conclusions stated therein. 126 '(d) (1) There is hereby created a War Contracts Price Adjustment Board (in this section called the 'Board'), which shall consist of six members. 127 '(4) The Board may delegate in whole or in part any power, function, or duty to the Secretary of a Department, and any power, function, or duty so delegated may be delegated in whole or in part by the Secretary to such officers or agencies of the United States as he may designate, and he may authorize successive redelegations of such powers, functions, and duties. 128 '(e) (1) Any contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by an order of the Board determining the amount of excessive profits received or accrued by such contractor or subcontractor may, within ninety days (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day) after the mailing of the notice of such order under subsection (c)(1), file a petition with The Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination thereof. Upon such filing such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, to finally determine the amount, if any, of such", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00190", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00149", "text": "of the motion grounds and, in addition, the denial of the motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed with a per curiam opinion declaring that it could perceive no substantial error in the proceedings. United States v. Memolo, 3 Cir., 152 F.2d 759. Petition for certiorari was denied by this Court, Memolo v. United States, 327 U.S. 800, 66 S.t. 902, 90 L.Ed. 1025. Therefore, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate of affirmance and in the conventional form commanded that'such execution and further proceeding be had in said cause, as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding.' Memolo was then taken into custody and on April 8, 1946, imprisoned in a federal penitentiary. 4 The following day the Clerk of the District Court received from Judge Smith an order dated April 8th 'that judgment heretofore entered be vacated and that the verdict heretofore returned be set aside, and that a new trial be granted the defendant.' It was accompanied by a'memorandum' reciting the history of the case and that 'This Court, while the appeal was pending, reconsidered the grounds urged by the defendant in support of his motion for a new trial. It is our opinion upon this reconsideration that in the interest of justice a new trial should be granted the defendant.' It assigned no more particular ground for the order. Memolo was thereupon released from the penitentiary on bail. 5 On the Government's petition to the Court of Appeals for writs directing that the order be vacated, Memolo was allowed to intervene. Judge Smith also answered asserting that his order 'was in accordance with the mandate of this Court and was authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1946, effective March 21, 1946, particularly Rule 33 thereof.' He referred to his memorandum but did not further elucidate his reasons for granting a new trial. On consideration, the court below sitting en banc denied the petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. 3 Cir., 156 F.2d 642. Two of the five judges dissented. 6 The mandate which the appellate court returned to the District Court was in the conventional and long-used form", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00082", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00150", "text": "sugar during its period of application. (2) In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1325/2001, two applications were submitted to the national authorities before 16 July 2001 for import licences covering a total quantity exceeding the total available quantity of 4848 tonnes. (3) Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1325/2001, in conjunction with Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2553/97, provides that where licence applications cover annual quantities in excess of 4848 tonnes of sugar, the Commission is to adopt a regulation fixing a single reducing coefficient to be applied to the applications submitted and suspend the submission of further applications during the period of application of Regulation (EC) No 1325/2001. (4) The Commission must accordingly fix a reducing coefficient for the purposes of issuing the import licences and suspend the submission of further licence applications pursuant to Regulation No 1325/2001, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The import licences applied for under the second indent of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1325/2001 on 2 July 2001 for 4848 tonnes and on 11 July 2001 for 2172 tonnes of sugar covered by CN code 1701 99 10 shall be issued for 69,1 % of the quantity applied for in both cases. Article 2 The submission of further applications during the period of application of Regulation (EC) No 1325/2001 is hereby suspended. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 21 August 2001.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 379, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00520", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00151", "text": "and meridian, as generally depicted on the map entitled ``Faraway Ranch, Tracts 39 and 40'' and dated June 30, 2002. (b) Time for Conveyance.--The Secretary shall make the conveyance under subsection (a) not later than 120 days after the date on which the recipient deposits sufficient funds with the Bureau of Land Management, California State Office, Branch of Geographic Services, to cover survey work costs and with the Forest Service, Mendocino National Forest, to cover Forest Service direct transaction costs described in subsection (e). (c) Corrections.--With the agreement of the recipient, the Secretary may make minor corrections to the legal descriptions and map of the lands to be conveyed pursuant to this section. (d) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance under subsection (a), the recipient shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to the fair market value of the National Forest System lands conveyed under such subsection. The fair market value of such lands shall be determined by an appraisal that is acceptable to the Secretary and conforms with the Federal appraisal standards, as defined in the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions developed by the Interagency Land Acquisition Conference. (e) Payment of Costs.--All direct transaction costs associated with the conveyance under section (a), including the costs of appraisal, title, and survey work, shall be paid by the recipient. (f) Use of Proceeds.-- (1) Deposit.--The Secretary shall deposit the amounts received by the Secretary as consideration under subsection (d) in the fund established by Public Law 90-171 (commonly known as the Sisk Act; 16 U.S.C. 484a). (2) Use.--Funds deposited under paragraph (1) shall be available to the Secretary until expended, without further appropriation-- (A) for the acquisition of land and interests in land for National Forest System purposes in the State of California; and (B) for reimbursement of costs incurred by the Forest Service in making the conveyance under subsection (a). (3) Status of acquired land.--Notwithstanding Public Law 85-862 (16 U.S.C. 521a), any lands acquired under paragraph (2)(A) shall be managed as lands acquired under the March 1, 1911 (commonly known as the Weeks Act; 16 U.S.C. 480, 500, 515 et seq.), regardless of whether any of the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00858", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00152", "text": "(h)(8) of ANCSA (43 U.S.C. 1613(h)(8)) because it was part of a National Wildlife Refuge and because the portion comprising the Adak Naval Complex was withdrawn for use by the United States Navy for military purposes prior to the passage of ANCSA in December 1971. (6) The Aleut Corporation is interested in establishing a community on Adak and has offered to exchange ANCSA land selections for conveyance of certain lands and interests therein on a portion of Adak formerly occupied by the Navy. (7) Removal of a portion of Adak Island land from refuge status will be offset by the acquisition of high quality wildlife habitat in other Aleut Corporation selections within the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, maintaining a resident human population on Adak to control caribou, and making possible a continued U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service presence in that remote location to protect the natural resources of the Aleutian Islands Unit of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge. (8) It is in the public interest to promote reuse of the Adak Island lands by exchanging certain lands for lands selected by The Aleut Corporation elsewhere in the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge. Experience with environmental problems associated with formerly used defense sites in the State of Alaska suggests that the most effective and efficient way to avoid future environmental problems on Adak is to support and encourage active reuse of Adak. SEC. 2. RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENT. The document entitled the ``Agreement Concerning Transfer of Lands at Adak Naval Complex'' (hereinafter ``the Agreement''), and dated __________, executed by The Aleut Corporation, the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy, is hereby ratified, confirmed, and approved and the terms, conditions, procedures, covenants, reservations, and other provisions set forth in the Agreement are declared to be obligations and commitments of the United States as a matter of Federal law. SEC. 3. REMOVAL OF LANDS FROM REFUGE. Effective on the date of conveyance to The Aleut Corporation of the Adak Exchange Lands as described in the Agreement, all such lands shall be removed from the National Wildlife Refuge System and shall neither be considered as part of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge nor subject to any laws pertaining to lands within the boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge. The conveyance restrictions imposed by section 22(g) of the ANCSA, 43 U.S", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01045", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00153", "text": "with the exception of non-ferrous metals, in the case of taxable entities with an annual turnover of less than NLG 2,5 million and, secondly, for exemption of the supply and intra-Community acquisition of non-ferrous metals; Whereas the taxable persons whose transactions are covered by the above exemptions may, subject to the conditions laid down by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, be authorised not to apply that measure to their transactions; Whereas the measure both simplifies matters and helps to combat fraud since a category of taxable persons where checks and efforts at collection would be disproportionate to the revenue generated can be excluded from the VAT system; Whereas, consequently, the special measure satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 27 of Directive 77/388/EEC; Whereas the Commission adopted on 10 July 1996 a work programme, together with a timetable, for the phased introduction of a common system of VAT for the internal market; Whereas authorisation is being granted until 31 December 1999 so that an assessment can then be made of the compatibility of the derogation measure with the overall approach adopted for the new common system of VAT; Whereas this derogation will not have an adverse impact on the Community's own resources accruing from VAT, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Kingdom of the Netherlands is hereby authorised until 31 December 1999 to apply a special measure for the taxation of used and waste materials that contains provisions derogating from Directive 77/388/EEC. The provisions in question are laid down in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of this Decision. Article 2 By way of derogation from Article 2 of Directive 77/388/EEC, the following shall be exempt from VAT: - the supply of used and waste materials by firms with an annual turnover of less than NGL 2,5 million. For the purposes of that threshold, turnover in non-ferrous metals may be disregarded, - the supply of non-ferrous metals. Article 3 By way of derogation from Article 28a(1)(a) of Directive 77/388/EEC, the following shall be exempt from VAT: - the intra-Community acquisition of used and waste materials by firms with an annual turnover of less than NGL 2,5 million. For the purposes of that threshold, turnover in non-ferrous metals may be disregarded, - the intra-", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00543", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00154", "text": "to a protected computer'' after ``cause damage to a protected computer''. SEC. 6. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CYBER-CRIMES. Section 1030(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or conspires'' after ``attempts''. SEC. 7. PENALTIES FOR SECTION 1030 VIOLATIONS. Subsection (c) of section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(c) The court, in imposing sentence for an offense under subsection (a) or (b), shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, order that the person forfeit to the United States-- ``(1) the person's interest in any personal property that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation; and ``(2) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.''. SEC. 8. DIRECTIVE TO SENTENCING COMMISSION. (a) Directive.--Pursuant to its authority under section 994(p) of title 28, United States Code, and in accordance with this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall forthwith review its guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of offenses under sections 1028, 1028A, 1030, 1030A, 2511 and 2701 of title 18, United States Code and any other relevant provisions of law, in order to reflect the intent of Congress that such penalties be increased in comparison to those currently provided by such guidelines and policy statements. (b) Requirements.--In determining its guidelines and policy statements on the appropriate sentence for the crimes enumerated in paragraph (a), the Commission shall consider the extent to which the guidelines and policy statements may or may not account for the following factors in order to create an effective deterrent to computer crime and the theft or misuse of personally identifiable data-- (1) the level of sophistication and planning involved in such offense; (2) whether such offense was committed for purpose of commercial advantage or private financial benefit; (3) the potential and actual loss resulting from the offense; (4) whether the defendant acted with intent to cause either physical or property harm in committing the offense; (5) the extent to which the offense violated the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01057", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00155", "text": ".Ct. 755, 761—765, 94 L.Ed. 1017, firmly established that commerce includes the transportation of public property, while the irrelevance of the fact that this electricity is transmitted across the state boundary over lines owned by the Navy and by the County, as purchasers, may be seen from Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61, 69, 71, 63 S.Ct. 953, 957, 958, 87 L.Ed. 1258, and Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 62 S.Ct. 384, 86 L.Ed. 371. 4 The most serious contentions pressed in opposition to application of Part II, arise from the self-limiting statement therein that the Act is 'to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.'4 So respondents contend that Power Commission jurisdiction only begins where the local regulatory power ends, and point to Part I, § 20, as supporting their contention that the limitation applies to the facts of this case. Section 20 provides that when power from projects licensed under Part I, which that energy sold to the Navy and the County includes, 5'shall enter into interstate or foreign commerce the rates * * * and the service * * * by any * * * licensee * * * or by any person, corporation, or association purchasing power from such licensee for sale and distribution or use in public service shall be reasonable * * * to the customer * * *; and whenever any of the States directly concerned has not provided a commission or other authority to enforce the requirements of this section within such State * * * or such States are unable to agree through their properly constituted authorities on the services * * * or on the rates * * * jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the commission * * * to regulate * * * so much of the services * * * and of the rates * * * therefor as constitute interstate or foreign commerce.' 6 Both Nevada and California have regulatory agencies with certain rate powers. And we may assume, though the Government asserts otherwise, that both agencies can enforce reasonable rate orders and have not disagreed.5 Respondents point to this as satisfying § 20, and thus ousting any Part II regulation. In short, they contend—what at first blush may appear anomalous—that federal", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00488", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00156", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 843/90 of 30 March 1990 reintroducing the levying of the customs duties on women's or girls' dresses, products of category No 16 (order No 40.0260) and women's or girls' suits and ensembles products of category No 29 (order No 40.0290) originating in Pakistan, to which the preferential tariff arrangements set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3897/89 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3897/89 of 18 December 1989 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1990 in respect of textile products originating in developing countries (1), and in particular Article 12 thereof, Whereas pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 3897/89, preferential tariff treatment shall be accorded for each category of products subjected in Annexes I and II to individual ceilings within the limits of the quantities specified in column 8 of its Annex I and column 7 of its Annex II, in respect of certain or each of the same Annexes; whereas Article 11 of that Regulation provides that the levying of customs duties may be reintroduced at any time in respect of imports of the products in question as soon as the relevant individual ceilings are reached at Community level; Whereas, in respect of women's or girls' dresses, products of category No 29 (order No 40.0260) and women's or girls' suits and ensembles, products of category No 29 (order No 40.0290) originating in Pakistan, the relevant ceiling amounts, respectively to 376 000 and 118 000 pieces; whereas that ceiling was reached on 19 March 1990 by charges of imports into the Community of the products in question originating in Pakistan, a country covered by preferential tariff arrangements, reached and were charged against that ceiling; whereas it is appropriate to reintroduce the levying of customs duties for the products in question with regard to Pakistan, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 6 April 1990 the levying of customs duties, suspended pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 3897/89, shall be reintroduced on imports into the Community of the following products, originating", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00598", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00157", "text": "of property under subparagraph (A), including any seizure and disposition of the property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section. Notwithstanding section 413(h) of that Act, at the conclusion of the forfeiture proceedings, the court shall order that any forfeited article or component of an article bearing or consisting of a counterfeit mark be destroyed. ``(4) When a person is convicted of an offense under this section, the court, pursuant to sections 3556, 3663A, and 3664, shall order the person to pay restitution to the owner of the mark and any other victim of the offense as an offense against property referred to in section 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). ``(5) The term `victim', as used in paragraph (4), has the meaning given that term in section 3663A(a)(2).''. (3) Subsection (e)(1) is amended-- (A) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(A) a spurious mark-- ``(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in any goods, services, labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature; ``(ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; ``(iii) that is applied to or used in connection with the goods or services for which the mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or is applied to or consists of a label, patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion, charm, box, container, can, case, hangtag, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature that is designed, marketed, or otherwise intended to be used on or in connection with the goods or services for which the mark is registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office; and ``(iv) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; or''; and (B)", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00954", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00158", "text": "State of New York, and do not ship any material proportion of their product outside the State, 59 3. Service trades (such as laundries), 4. Office and residential buildings, 60 5. Small and clearly local public utilities (this includes local traction companies, as well as gas and electric light corporations), 61 6. Storage warehouses, 62 7. Construction operations, 63 8. Other obviously local businesses. 64 A copy of the letter of July 12, 1937, is attached to this memorandum. 65 At the time of the preparation of the letter of July 12 and the conference which preceded it and upon which it is based, their was relatively little case law as to the jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the National Board under the National Act. Since that time there has been a large number of decisions in the federal circuit courts of appeals and several in the Supreme Court which have substantially extended the Board's jurisdiction beyond that which was understood to exist in July 1937. To take only one pertinent example: In July 1937 the Board had not asserted jurisdiction over retail establishments. Since 1937 the Board has accepted a considerable number of cases involving retail establishments such as department stores and the Board's power in this respect has been sustained by the courts. Notwithstanding this extension of jurisdiction under the National Act, the National and State Boards, respectively, have, in general, followed the understanding reflected by the letter of July 12, 1937. Thus, in New York State the National Board has not asserted jurisdiction over retail establishments. The representatives at the conference of April 20 expressed the view that, by and large, the understanding had worked out well as applied to the types of businesses there dealt with. The position was repeatedly expressed by the representatives of both National and State Boards that as a working matter the jurisdiction between the two Boards must be allotted on the basis of the type of industry or business involved (rather, for example, than on the basis of which Board a petition or charge is initially filed with), and that when one Board, pursuant to common understanding, has asserted jurisdiction in the past over a particular employer, the other Board should thereafter refer any matters coming to it to the Board which had entertained the earlier case or cases.1 66 Following reference to the letter of July 12, there was detailed discussion of the eight categories there listed, which are quoted above. The gist of this", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00058", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00159", "text": "and as a common carrier was under the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of the passengers including the selection of personnel. It was upon the basis of respondent's liability as common carrier that petitioners developed their causes of action, and upon that theory the jury under the instructions discussed above returned a verdict in their favor. At the conclusion of the trial judge's charge, counsel for petitioners stated, 'If your Honor please, we have no exceptions.' Under these circumstances, error cannot be urged as to this point. See Rule 8(1), Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A.; Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555. 11 By the decision below, the trial court was directed to enter a judgment for respondent, which had filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As there were suggestions in the complaint and evidence of alleged liability of respondent to petitioners for respondent's own negligence while acting as general agent, this direction should not have been given. See Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 63 S.Ct. 425, 87 L.Ed. 471.7 The decision is modified so as to eliminate the direction to enter judgment.8 12 We express no opinion as to what circumstances might fix liability upon the respondent for its own actions as general agent. 13 Affirmed as modified. 14 Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice MURPHY, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE dissent. 1 See note 3, infra, and 46 C.F.R.Cum. Supp. § 306.44. 2 See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 69 S.Ct. 1317, No. 351, 1948 Term. 3 'Whereas, the United States of America (Herein called the 'United States') acting by and through the Administrator, War Shipping Administration, and Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc. (herein called the 'General Agent') entered into an Agreement (Contract WSA—4098) dated January 9, 1943 (herein called the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00321", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00160", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004'' or ``Laci and Conner's Law''. SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN. (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 90 the following: ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN ``Sec. ``1841. Protection of unborn children. ``Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children ``(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section. ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother. ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-- ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child. ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall instead of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being. ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section. ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), (f), (h)(1),and (i), 924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120,", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01037", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00161", "text": "and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.). (B) Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-- (i) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by unfair pay disparities; (ii) substantially reducing the number of working women earning unfairly low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance; and (iii) promoting stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair rate of pay; (iv) remedying the effects of past discrimination on the basis of sex and ensuring that in the future workers are afforded equal protection on the basis of sex; and (v) ensuring equal protection pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the 5th and 14th amendments. (5) With increased information about the provisions added by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and wage data, along with more effective remedies, women will be better able to recognize and enforce their rights to equal pay for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions. (6) Certain employers have already made great strides in eradicating unfair pay disparities in the workplace and their achievements should be recognized. SEC. 3. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL PAY REQUIREMENTS. (a) Required Demonstration for Affirmative Defense.--Section 6(d)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``(iv) a differential'' and all that follows through the period and inserting the following: ``(iv) a differential based on a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience, except that this clause shall apply only if-- ``(I) the employer demonstrates that-- ``(aa) such factor-- ``(AA) is job-related with respect to the position in question; or ``(BB) furthers a legitimate business purpose, except that this item shall not apply where the employee demonstrates that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing such differential and that the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice; and ``(bb) such factor was actually applied and used reasonably in light of the asserted justification; and ``(II) upon the employer succeeding under subclause I, the employee fails to demonstrate that the differential produced by the reliance of the employer on such factor is itself the result of discrimination on the basis of sex by the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01048", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00162", "text": "Council Decision of 12 March 2001 authorising the French Republic to apply a differentiated rate of excise duty to certain mineral oils, when used for specific purposes, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81/EEC (2001/227/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 92/81/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils(1), and in particular Article 8(4) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Whereas: (1) Pursuant to Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81/EEC, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission may authorise any Member State to introduce exemptions or reductions in the excise duty charged on mineral oils for specific policy considerations. (2) As public transport is more environmentally friendly than transport in private vehicles, the French authorities have informed the Commission that they wish to introduce a differentiated rate of duty on diesel fuel used in local public passenger transport vehicles by refunding a proportion of future annual rises in duty on diesel fuel. (3) The other Member States have been informed thereof. (4) The Commission and all the Member States accept that the application of differentiated rate of excise duty on diesel fuel used in local public passenger transport vehicles will not give rise to distortions of competition or hinder the operation of the internal market. (5) This Decision does not prejudice the outcome of any future State aid procedures that may be undertaken in accordance with Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty, nor does it override the requirement for Member States to notify instances of potential State aid to the Commission under Article 88 of the Treaty. (6) The Commission regularly reviews reductions and exemptions to check that they do not distort competition or the operation of the internal market or are incompatible with Community policy on protection of the environment. (7) The French Republic has requested authorisation to introduce the differentiated rate of duty on diesel fuel used in local public passenger transport vehicles from 1 January 2001. (8) The Council will review this Decision on the basis of a proposal from the Commission no later than 31 December 2005 when the authorisation granted by this Decision expires, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00555", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00163", "text": "Commission Decision of 13 May 2003 on the State aid which Belgium plans to grant to Volvo Cars NV in Gent (notified under document number C(2003) 1485) (Only the French and Dutch texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (2003/665/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 88(2) thereof, Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof, Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions cited above(1), Whereas: PROCEDURE (1) The planned aid was notified to the Commission by letter dated 15 May 2002. The Commission requested further information by letters dated 25 June 2002 and 20 August 2002, to which Belgium replied on 23 July 2002 and 18 September 2002. (2) The Commission decided on 27 November 2002 to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 88(2) of the Treaty (decision to open the formal investigation procedure), as it had doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the common market. Belgium submitted its comments in response to the opening of proceedings by letter dated 28 January 2003. (3) The Commission decision to initiate proceedings was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities(2), with an invitation to interested parties to submit their comments on the aid. However, no comments from interested parties were received. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE AID (4) The beneficiary of the aid would be Volvo Cars NV, which is located in Gent and is owned by Ford Motor Company. The Volvo Gent plant currently assembles the Volvo S60 and S 70 models. As of 2003, Volvo intends to produce the new Volvo V40 and S40 models in the plant. Volvo intends to spend around EUR 27,58 million on training existing and 1400 newly-employed staff in the period 2002 to 2004. (5) The eligible training cost, taking into account that the trainees' personnel costs may not exceed the total of the other eligible costs, amounts to EUR 15180393. According to Belgium, the eligible investment includes elements of specific training amounting to EUR 4294532. The general training cost amounts to EUR", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00753", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00164", "text": "equivalent treatment for industrial products means including the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme all products currently excluded from it but exempt from customs duties under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention; Whereas agricultural products subject under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention to a tariff reduction but not to a tariff quota should be included in the scheme for the benefit of least-developed countries by applying one of the preferential rates of duty provided for in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1256/96, in line with the reduction accorded by the Fourth ACP-EC Convention, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Access to the arrangements provided for in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 3281/94 is hereby extended to the products listed in Annex I to this Regulation. Article 2 The arrangements laid down in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1256/96 shall be supplemented by applying to the products listed in Annex II to this Regulation one of the preferential rates of duty specified in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1256/96, according to product sensitivity. Article 3 The list of least-developed countries in Annex IV to Regulations (EC) Nos 3281/94 and 1256/96 is hereby amended as follows: - in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 3281/94, ‘330 Angola’ shall be inserted after ‘328 Burundi’ and ‘391 Botswana’ and ‘817 Tonga’ shall be deleted, - in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 1256/96, ‘391 Botswana’ and ‘817 Tonga’ shall be deleted. Article 4 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It shall apply from 1 January 1998. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 March 1998.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 414, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00593", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00165", "text": "Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S.Ct. 246, 249, 85 L.Ed. 267, 130 A.L.R. 1229. If what was here involved were merely an occasional and transient storage of coal moving from Pennsylvania to New York, New Jersey could not levy a property tax on the coal nor a license tax for the storing of it. The controlling consideration here is that there was storage of the coal precisely like the holding of the cattle in the Blasius case. In both cases there was a sufficiently distinct and permanent break in the process of transportation between the States so as to give rise to interests in the State of storage to justify the exertion of its non-discriminatory taxing power. For me this case is controlled by Susquehanna Coal Co. v. City of South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 33 S.Ct. 712, 714, 57 L.Ed. 1015. Here, as in that case, there was something more 'than an incidental interruption of the continuity' of the coal's 'journey through the state.' There was 'a business purpose and advantage in the delay which was availed of, and while it was availed of, the products secured the protection of the state.' 228 U.S. at pages 668 and 669, 33 S.Ct. at page 714, 57 L.Ed. 1015. Thereby the State's power to tax arose. 50 The fact that for railroad-rate purposes this storage was treated as part of a transit privilege does not affect the relation of the storage to the taxing powers of the State. Assuming that such a storage may properly be treated as a stop-over privilege under the Interstate Commerce Act, it does not follow that the break in the process of interstate transportation is not of such significance in its relation to a State as to allow that State to tax the protection given to the property during the break as well as the opportunity afforded in conducting the business for such separable and enduring storage in the State. 51 Mr. Justice JACKSON, with whom Mr. Chief Justice VINSON joins, dissenting. 52 The Erie Railroad Company is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. By a specific tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act it and severa other rail carriers have long published a joint and proportional through-tar", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00059", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00166", "text": ". at page 510, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227. 39 The trust instruments in the present cases of the Spiegel and Church estates do not specifically provide for such possibility of reverter or for regaining control of the devolution of the property. The issue raised by these cases is whether a like possibility of reverter springing not from the instrument but by operation of law through the failure of all beneficiaries named in the trust instrument shall have the same effect. All named beneficiaries in these two trusts might die before the settlors without surviving issue. Thus, depending upon the controlling state law, the settlors might repossess the estates.5 40 To lay bare the heart of the problem, it seems helpful to put aside certain phases of possible congressional intention and possible statutory meaning, as not involved or heretofore decided for sound reasons. 41 A. It was not the purpose of Congress at any time in dealing with the inclusion of transfers of property in trust to have the whole value, at the donor's death, of the total of all gifts made during life, included in the settlor's estate for estate tax purposes.6 The words of the statute show this. See note 1, supra. Gifts in trust are taxable only where an interest remains in the donor. Therefore a gift by A to a trust company to hold in trust for B during B's life and at B's death to C, his heirs, devisees or assigns is not taxable under § 811(c). Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra, 278 U.S. at pages 347, 348, 49 S.Ct. at pages 125, 126, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397. Before the amendment of 19317 the retention of an estate for life in the settlor did not subject the trust to estate tax where the remainder was taken by beneficiaries without regard to future action by the settlor.8 42 B. The Joint Resolution of 1931 made no change in the language of the subsection of the estate tax relating to the inclusion in estates of interests in trusts intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. Neither the resolution nor the discussion on the floor of either house suggested a change in the words of the section to define what is meant by an interest intended to take effect after death. Congress aimed at", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00222", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00167", "text": "To assume that an order of the Commission for which reviewing power is not conferred, is presumably reviewable by the courts is to start with the answer of the problem to be solved. Unless Congress has chosen to give the courts oversight of a determination by the Commission, the courts have not the power of oversight where, as here, the Constitution does not require it. If Congress has made no grant of power to courts to review the Commission's order denying a claim for reparation, and, in fact, has explicitly withheld resort to the courts after such denial by the Commission, it is wholly immaterial that as to other types of orders the right to review has been given to the courts, or that a determination by the Commission closely related to reparations, but not in fact a claim for damages, does not bar access to the courts. 43 When dealing with the Interstate Commerce Act we are dealing not with an episodic bit of legislation to which the general jurisdiction of the federal courts presumably applies. We are dealing with the oldest regulatory scheme which, by successive amendments and enlargements, established a comprehensive, self-contained regime both of administration and adjudication. The scheme as a whole ought not to be dislocated to meet the exigencies of a particular situation. 44 First. Judicial review of an order by the Commission dismissing a complaint for reparations has heretofore been urged exclusively on the basis of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. The jurisdiction of the district court in this case was invoked under that Act. This is the sole basis of jurisdiction urged by the Government here in its comprehensive brief and argument, and the Court rejects it. It rightly rejects it. But the compelling considerations for this rejection demand a further analysis of the structure and details of the jurisdictional provisions relating to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Such analysis is essential to lay bare the equally compelling considerations against jurisdiction under the general equity powers of the district courts. 45 Section 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act created a civil liability of carriers for damages caused by violation of the new obligations imposed by that Act. In the absence of specific remedies, it would be fair to assume that these new rights were enforceable in the district courts under their general jurisdiction over suits 'arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce.' 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948 ed.), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337. But the Interstate Commerce Act did not stop with a mere declaration of liability. It", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00303", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00168", "text": "by adding at the end the following: ``(10)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a person shall include in any submission to the Secretary pursuant to this subsection appropriate drug information stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity, including any differences in safety and effectiveness. ``(B) The Secretary shall develop standards that ensure that submissions to the Secretary pursuant to this subsection are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under this paragraph. ``(11) Upon the approval under this subsection of an application for a drug, the Secretary shall report to the scientific community and make available to the public, in a timely manner, data regarding such drug stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity.''. (d) Premarket Approvals.--Section 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360e) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end; (ii) in subparagraph (G), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(H) information regarding the device, to the extent appropriate, stratified by gender, race and ethnicity, including differences in safety and effectiveness.''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(5) The Secretary shall develop standards that ensure that submissions to the Secretary pursuant to this subsection are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under paragraph (1)(H).''; and (2) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end; (ii) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (E), the following: ``(F) the application does not contain, as appropriate, the information required in subsection (c)(1)(H).''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(7) Upon the approval of an application under this section, the Secretary shall report to the scientific community and make available to the public, in a timely manner, data regarding such device stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity.''. (e) Investigational Device Exemptions.--Section 520(g)(2) of the Federal Food, Drug,", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00920", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00169", "text": "enacted the Clayton Act, including § 12. The following year the Eastman case, supra, was begun in the Northern District of Georgia. Process issued and was served under § 12 on the defendant, a New York corporation, at its principal place of business in Rochester. In 1927 this Court sustained both the venue and the service, as against objections that § 12 had not broadened § 7 of the Sherman Act, but merely made explicit what had been decided under it.15 20 The argument was certainly plausible, but for the fact that it made the addition of 'or transacts business' to 'inhabitant' and 'found' in § 12 redundant and meaningless. The Court refused to accept the argument, because doing so would have defeated the plain remedial purpose of § 12.16 That section was enacted, it held, to enlarge the jurisdiction given by § 7 of the Sherman Act over corporations by adding those words,'so as to establish the venue of such a suit not only, as theretofore, in a district in which the corporation resides or is 'found,' but also in any district in which it 'transacts business'—although neither residing nor 'found' therein—in which case the process may be issued to and served in a district in which the corporation either resides or is 'found.\" 273 U.S. at page 372, 47 S.Ct. at page 403.17 21 This construction gave the words 'transacts business' a much broader meaning for establishing venue than the concept of 'carrying on business' denoted by 'found' under the preexisting statute and decisions. The scope of the addition was indicated by the statement 'that a corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district * * * if in fact, in the ordinary and usual sense, it 'transacts business' therein of any substantial character.' Id. 273 U.S. at page 373, 47 S.Ct. at page 403. (Emphasis added.) 22 In other words, for venue purposes, the Court sloughed off the highly technical distinctions theretofore glossed upon 'found' for filling that term with particularized meaning, or emptying it, under the trn slation of 'carrying on business.' In their stead it substituted the practical and broader business conception of engaging in any substantial business operations. Cf. Frene v. Louisville Cement", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00158", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00170", "text": ". 563. Other cases have reemphasized the Fifteenth Amendment's specific grant of this new constitutional right.2 Not content to rest congressional power to protect this new constitutional right on the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, the Fifteenth Amendment's framers added § 2, reading: 23 'The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.' 24 And Mr. Justice Miller speaking for this Court declared that the Amendment's granted right to be free from racial discrimination '* * * should be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary.' Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665, 4 S.Ct. 152, 159, 28 L.Ed. 274. See also United States v. Reese, supra, 92 U.S. at page 218, 23 L.Ed. 563. And see Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion on circuit in United States v. Cruikshank, Fed.Cas.No.14,897, 1 Woods 308, 314—316, 320 323. Acting pursuant to the power granted by the second section of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress in 1870 provided as follows: 25 'All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.' 8 U.S.C. § 31, 8 U.S.C.A. § 31. 26 The Amendment, the congressional enactment and the cases make explicit the rule against racial discrimination in the conduct of elections. Together they show the meaning of 'elections.' Clearly the Amendment includes any election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected.3 Just as clearly the Amendment excludes social or business clubs. And the statute shows the congressional mandate against discrimination whether the voting on public issues and officials is conducted in community, state or nation. Size is not a standard. 27 It is significant that precisely the same qualifications as those prescribed by Texas entitling electors to vote at county-operated primaries are", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00498", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00171", "text": ") Boundary.--The boundaries of the Colorado River Indian Reservation are hereby declared to include those boundaries as were delineated by the Robbins Survey, affirmed by the Harrington Survey, and described as follows: The approximately 15,375 acres of Federal land described as ``Lands Identified for Transfer to Colorado River Indian Tribes'' on the map prepared by the Bureau of Land Management entitled ``Colorado River Indian Reservation Boundary Correction Act, and dated January 4, 2005'', (hereinafter referred to as the ``Map''). (b) Map.--The Map shall be available for review at the Bureau of Land Management. (c) Restoration.--Subject to valid existing rights under Federal law, all right, title, and interest of the United States to those lands within the boundaries declared in subsection (a) that were excluded from the Colorado River Indian Reservation pursuant to Executive Order No. 2273 (November 22, 1915) are hereby restored to the Reservation and shall be held in trust by the United States on behalf of the Colorado River Indian Tribes. (d) Exclusion.--Excluded from the lands restored to trust status on behalf of the Colorado River Indian Tribes that are described in subsection (a) are 2 parcels of Arizona State Lands identified on the Map as ``State Lands'' and totaling 320 acres and 520 acres. SEC. 3. RESURVEY AND MARKING. The Secretary of the Interior shall ensure that the boundary for the restored lands described in section 2(a) is surveyed and clearly marked in conformance with the public system of surveys extended over such lands. SEC. 4. WATER RIGHTS. The restored lands described in section 2(a) and shown on the Map shall have no Federal reserve water rights to surface water or ground water from any source. SEC. 5. PUBLIC ACCESS. Continued access to the restored lands described in section (2)(a) for hunting and other existing recreational purposes shall remain available to the public under reasonable rules and regulations promulgated by the Colorado River Indian Tribes. SEC. 6. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. (a) In General.--The restored lands described in section (2)(a) shall be subject to all rights-of-way, easements, leases, and mining claims existing on the date of the enactment of this Act. The United States reserves the right to continue all Reclamation projects, including the right to access and remove mineral materials for Colorado River maintenance", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01130", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00172", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1481/2002 of 16 August 2002 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1498/98(2), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto. (2) In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The standard import values referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 shall be fixed as indicated in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 17 August 2002. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 August 2002.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 300, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00677", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00173", "text": "valid warrant based on probable cause.''. (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 3 of this Act, is further amended by striking the items relating to title VII and section 701 and inserting the following new items: ``TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ``701. Warrant requirement.''. SEC. 7. ENCRYPTION AND PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND SOFTWARE. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government shall not mandate that the manufacturer of an electronic device or software for an electronic device build into such device or software a mechanism that allows the Federal Government to bypass the encryption or privacy technology of such device or software. SEC. 8. GAO COMPLIANCE EVALUATIONS. (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall annually evaluate compliance by the Federal Government with the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (b) Report.--The Comptroller General shall annually submit to Congress a report containing the results of the evaluation conducted under subsection (a). SEC. 9. WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS. (a) Authorization To Report Complaints or Information.--An employee of or contractor to an element of the intelligence community that has knowledge of the programs and activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) may submit a covered complaint-- (1) to the Comptroller General of the United States; (2) to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (3) to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; or (4) in accordance with the process established under section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)). (b) Investigations and Reports to Congress.--The Comptroller General shall investigate a covered complaint submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) and shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of the investigation. (c) Covered Complaint Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered complaint'' means a complaint or information concerning programs and activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01110", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00174", "text": "position.--The Corporation may dispose of used construction equipment by means of a public auction conducted by a private entity that is independent of the Corporation. ``(C) Debt reduction.--The Corporation shall apply all proceeds of a disposition of used construction equipment under subparagraph (B) to the reduction of debt of the Corporation.''. SEC. 10. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT TO PROVIDE COMPETITIVE EQUALITY. (a) Section 15d(a) the first paragraph of the TVA Act (16 U.S.C. 831n-4), is hereby repealed and replaced as follows: ``Bonds for Financing Power Program ``(a) Authorization; Amount, Use of Proceeds; Restriction on Contracts for Sale or Delivery of Power; Exchange Power Arrangements; Payment of Principal and Interest; Bond Contracts.--The Corporation is authorized to issue and sell bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness (hereinafter collectively referred to as ``bonds'') in an amount not exceeding $27,000,000,000 outstanding as of January 1, 2001, to assist in financing its power program and to refund such bonds: Provided, That such authorization shall be reduced in annual increments of $1,000,000,000, such that TVA shall be authorized to issue and sell bonds, in an amount up to and not exceeding $17,000,000,000 on and after January 1, 2011: Provided further, That the Corporation shall certify to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure by January 1 of each year that the Corporation's cumulative indebtedness is less than the bond authorization designated herein. The Corporation may, in performing functions authorized by this chapter, use the proceeds of such bonds for the operation and maintenance of any plant or other facility used or to be used for the generation or transmission of electric power; as may be required in connection with the lease, lease-purchase, or any contract for the power output of any such plant or other facility. Unless otherwise specifically authorized by Act of Congress the Corporation shall make no contracts for the sale or delivery of power which would have the effect of making the Corporation or its distributors, directly or indirectly, a source of power supply outside the area for which the Corporation or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957, and such additional area extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00881", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00175", "text": "a) of Annex I to Directive 64/433/EEC, the first indent is hereby supplemented by:'- ESP - P,'. Article 3 In the first indent of point 33 (a) of Chapter VII of Annex A to Directive 77/99/EEC, 'ESP - P' shall be inserted after 'E'. Article 4 Article 2 of Directive 77/504/EEC shall be supplemented by the following paragraph: 'However, Portugal is hereby authorized to maintain, until 31 December 1990 at the latest, import restrictions for bovine animals, as described in the first indent of the previous paragraph, where the breeds concerned do not appear on the list of breeds authorized in Portugal. Portugal shall notify the Commission and the Member States of the list of authorized breeds.' Article 5 The list of national swine fever laboratories in Annex II to Directive 80/217/EEC is hereby supplemented by the following: 'Spain: Laboratorio de Sanidad y Producción Animal de BarcelonaPortugal: Laboratório Nacional de Investigação Veterinária - Lisboa'. Article 6 Directive 80/1095/EEC is hereby amended as follows:1. The following subparagraph shall be added to Article 3 (2): 'The status of Portugal and Spain will be defined in accordance with the same procedure before 1 July 1986 with a view to specifying such control measures as may prove appropriate.'2.Article 12 (2) shall be supplemented by the following: 'and, in the case of Portugal and Spain, before 1 July 1992.' Article 7 Subject to the entry into force of the Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal, Member States shall bring into force not later than 1 January 1986, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. Article 8 This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 20 December 1985.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 409, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00748", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00176", "text": ", a framework is required for the purpose of regular consultations with those bodies, with the managers of projects supported by the European Commission in the fields of research and public health action and with other relevant stakeholders acting in the field. (6) This need for a framework was reflected in the Communication COM(2008) 679 final on rare diseases. Point 7 of the Communication recommended that the Commission be assisted by a European Union Advisory Committee on Rare Diseases. (7) The Committee shall not act as a Committee within the meaning of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (5), HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Commission hereby establishes a Committee of Experts on Rare Diseases, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Committee’. Article 2 1. The Committee acting in the public interest shall assist the Commission in formulating and implementing the Community's activities in the field of rare diseases, and shall foster exchanges of relevant experience, policies and practices between the Member States and the various parties involved. 2. The tasks of the Committee shall not comprise issues covered by Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (6) and issues that fall under the tasks of the Committee of Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP), set up by Article 4 of that Regulation, nor issues that fall under the tasks of the Pharmaceutical Committee, set up by Council Decision 75/320/EEC (7). 3. To achieve the aims referred to in paragraph 1, the Committee shall: (a) assist the Commission in the monitoring, evaluating and disseminating the results of measures taken at Community and national level in the field of rare diseases; (b) contribute to the implementation of Community actions in the field, in particular by analysing the results and suggesting improvements to the measures taken; (c) contribute to the preparation of Commission reports on the implementation of the Commission Communication and the Council Recommendation; (d) deliver opinions, recommendations or submit reports to the Commission either at the latter's request or on its own initiative; (e) assist the Commission in international cooperation on matters relating to rare diseases; (f) assist the Commission in drawing up guidelines, recommendations and any other action defined in the Commission Communication and in the Council Recommendation; (g", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00713", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00177", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act''. SEC. 2. WAIVER OF REQUIREMENT FOR FINGERPRINTS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any regulation, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall use the fingerprints provided by an individual at the time the individual enlists in the Armed Forces to satisfy any requirement for fingerprints as part of an application for naturalization if the individual-- (1) may be naturalized pursuant to section 328 or 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1439 or 1440); (2) was fingerprinted in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Defense at the time the individual enlisted in the Armed Forces; and (3) submits an application for naturalization not later than 12 months after the date the individual enlisted in the Armed Forces. SEC. 3. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON NATURALIZATION TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. (a) Citizenship Advocate.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish the position of Citizenship Advocate at each Military Entry Processing Station to provide information and assistance related to the naturalization process to members of the Armed Forces. An individual serving as a Citizenship Advocate may be a civilian. (b) Written Materials.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that written information describing the naturalization process for members of the Armed Forces is provided to each individual who is not a citizen of the United States at the time that the individual enlists in the Armed Forces. (c) Telephone Hot Line.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- (1) establish a dedicated toll free telephone service available only to members of the Armed Forces and the families of such members to provide information related to naturalization pursuant to section 328 or 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1439 or 1440), including the status of an application for such naturalization; (2) ensure that the telephone service required by paragraph (1) is operated by employees of the Department of Homeland Security who-- (A) have received specialized training on the naturalization process for members of the Armed Forces and the families of such members; and (B) are physically located in the same unit as the military processing unit that adjudicates applications for naturalization pursuant to such section 328 or 329; and (3) implement a quality control program to monitor", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01080", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00178", "text": "with respect to Cuba. Any regulations in effect on the day before such effective date pursuant to the exercise of such authorities, shall cease to be effective on such date. (c) Exercise of Authorities Under Other Provisions of Law.-- (1) Removal of prohibitions.--Any prohibition on exports to Cuba that is in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act under the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall cease to be effective on such effective date. (2) Authority for new restrictions.--The President may, on and after the effective date of this Act-- (A) impose export controls with respect to Cuba under section 5, 6(j), 6(l), or 6(m) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, and (B) exercise the authorities he has under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act with respect to Cuba pursuant to a declaration of national emergency required by that Act that is made on account of an unusual and extraordinary threat, that did not exist before the enactment of this Act, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. (d) Cuban Democracy Act.--The Cuban Democracy Act (title XVII of Public Law 102-484) is repealed. (e) Termination of Denial of Foreign Tax Credit With Respect to Cuba.--Subparagraph (A) of section 901(j)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to denial of foreign tax credit, etc., with respect to certain foreign countries) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new flush sentence: ``Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, this subsection shall not apply to Cuba after the date which is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this sentence.''. SEC. 4. TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES. Any common carrier within the meaning of section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153) is authorized to install, maintain, and repair telecommunications equipment and facilities in Cuba, and otherwise provide telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba. The authority of this section includes the authority to upgrade facilities and equipment. SEC. 5. TRAVEL. (a) In General.--Travel to and from Cuba by individuals who are citizens or residents of the United States, and any transactions ordinarily incident to such travel, may not be regulated or prohibited if such travel would be lawful in the United States. (b) Transactions Incident", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01079", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00179", "text": "a directed verdict should have been given cannot be the equivalent of a court's entry of judgment for defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict for plaintiff. For after setting aside a verdict as authorized by Rule 50(b), a trial judge may 'either' enter a judgment contrary to the verdict 'or' order a new trial. The rule thereby requires the exercise of an informed judicial discretion as a condition precedent to a choice between these two alternatives. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., supra, 330 U.S. at page 215, 67 S.Ct. at page 754. And this discretion must be exercised by the court, not by its clerk. The Court was told during oral argument that it is the practice in the Second Circuit for the clerk to include in his mandate a direction to the district court to have a judgment entered in favor of a party notwithstanding the verdict where the court reverses a district court's refusal to direct a verdict. A rule of practice of this kind under which a court clerk's mandate would automatically direct entry of a judgment for defendant after court reversal of a plaintiff's judgment could not possibly be the result of the kind of judicial discretion directed by Rule 50(b). We are not willing to attribute such a practice to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit's Rules of Practice do not prescribe a practice of that kind. See F.C.A.Rules c. 5, pp. 96—103, 16 S.Ct.Dig. 143—169, U.S.Dig., Court Rules (L.Ed.), pp. 573—589. Nor do the rules of any other circuit. See F.C.A.Rules cc. 4—13, pp. 84—194, 16 S.Ct.Dig. 107—523, U.S.Dig., Court Rules (L.Ed.), pp. 545—827. No case has been found that indicates such a practice by the Second of any other Circuit. Since adoption of Rule 50(b) in 1938, courts of appeals wishing to enter or direct judgment have said so in clear, simple and mandatory language. As to the Second Circuit, see e.g., Venides v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 168 F.2d 681; Brennan v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 115 F.2d 555; Williams v. New Jersey-New York Transit Co., 113 F.2d 649; Conway v.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00465", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00180", "text": "preconstruction permitting.--If the Administrator fails to publish the final regulations and guidance referred to in paragraph (2) that include information relating to submission and consideration of a preconstruction permit application under a new or revised national ambient air quality standard concurrently with the national ambient air quality standard, the new or revised national ambient air quality standard shall not apply to the review and disposition of a preconstruction permit application until the date on which the Administrator publishes the final regulations and guidance. ``(4) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this subsection-- ``(A) precludes the Administrator from issuing regulations and guidance to assist States, permitting authorities, and permit applicants in implementing a national ambient air quality standard after the publication of final regulations and guidance for the national ambient air quality standard under paragraph (2); ``(B) eliminates the obligation of a preconstruction permit applicant to install best available control technology and lowest achievable emission rate technology, as applicable; or ``(C) limits the authority of a State, local, or tribal permitting authority to impose more stringent emissions requirements pursuant to State, local, or tribal law than the Federal national ambient air quality standards established by the Administrator.''. (e) Contingency Measures for Extreme Ozone Nonattainment Areas.-- Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(9)) is amended-- (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Such'' and inserting the following: ``(A) Specific measures.--A nonattainment''; (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``Such measures'' and inserting the following: ``(B) Contingency measures.--The specific measures referred to in subparagraph (A)''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) Extreme areas.--Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B) and any other provision of this Act, the specific measures referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall not be required for any nonattainment area for ozone classified as an Extreme Area.''. (f) Plan Submissions and Requirements for Ozone Nonattainment Areas.--Section 182 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7511a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii)(III), by inserting ``and economic feasibility'' after ``technological achievability''; (2) in subsection (c)(2)(B)(ii), by inserting ``and", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00949", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00181", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 446/2008 of 22 May 2008 adapting certain bluefin tuna quotas in 2008 pursuant to Article 21(4) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy (1), and in particular Article 21(4) thereof, Whereas: (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2007 (2), fixed the amount of bluefin tuna which could be fished in 2007 in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 45° W, and the Mediterranean sea by Community fishing vessels. (2) France and Italy overfished their bluefin tuna quotas in 2007. (3) On the basis of the exhaustion of the Community share, fishing for bluefin tuna by vessels flying the flag of or registered in Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Malta or Portugal was prohibited by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1073/2007 (3). (4) Regulation (EC) No 1073/2007 entered into force before Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Malta and Portugal had exhausted their quotas. The quotas which could not be used by those Member States in 2007 amounted to 438,6 tonnes. (5) Council Regulation (EC) No 40/2008 (4), fixes the amount of bluefin tuna which may be fished in 2008 in the areas concerned. (6) It is appropriate to make deductions from the 2008 bluefin tuna quotas of France and Italy and to allocate the amounts deducted, as appropriate, to the Member States whose fishing activities were halted before their quotas were exhausted. (7) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) quotas allocated to France and Italy for the year 2008 shall be reduced and the amounts deducted shall be allocated to Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta and Portugal for 2008 as shown in the Annex. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00802", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00182", "text": "Fund under this Act. (2) Funding.--Not later than the first day of the 11th fiscal year that begins after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall deposit in the Fund, from the general fund of the Treasury, $92,500,000. (3) Investment of trust fund.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest such portion of the Fund as is not, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, required to meet current withdrawals. (B) Eligible obligations.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the amounts deposited under paragraph (2) and the interest earned on those amounts only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States issued directly to the Fund. (C) Interest.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall deposit interest resulting from such investments into the Fund. (4) Payment of interest to tribe.-- (A) Withdrawal of interest.--On October 1st of each year, the Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer the aggregate amount of interest deposited into the Fund for the fiscal year to the Secretary for use in accordance with subparagraph (C). (B) Availability.--Each amount transferred under subparagraph (A) shall be available without fiscal year limitation. (C) Payments to tribe.-- (i) In general.--The Secretary shall use the amounts transferred under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of making payments to the Tribe, as such payments are requested by the Tribe pursuant to tribal resolution. (ii) Limitation.--Payments may be made by the Secretary under clause (i) only after the Tribe has adopted a plan under paragraph (6). (iii) Use of payments by tribe.--The Tribe shall use the payments made under this subparagraph only for carrying out projects and programs under the plan prepared under paragraph (6). (5) Limitation on transfers and withdrawals.--Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4)(A), the Secretary of the Treasury shall not transfer or withdraw any amount deposited into the Fund under paragraph (2). (6) Development plan.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Tribal Council shall prepare a plan for the use of the payments to the Tribe under paragraph (4). (B) Contents.--The plan shall provide for the manner in which the Tribe shall expend payments to the Tribe under paragraph (4) to promote-- (i) economic", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01009", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00183", "text": "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.' 56 The following States, the committee is advised, have adopted fair trade acts: California, Washington, Oregon, Montana, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. 57 The committee is advised that in addition one house of each of the following States have passed a fair trade bill: South Carolina, North Carolina, Idaho, Colorado, and Oklahoma. 58 The committee is further advised that bills are pending in the Legislatures of Nevada, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas, Mississippi, Delaware, Missouri, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine; and that only one State, Vermont, has definitely rejected legislation of this character. Economic Aspects 59 The anticipated economic effects of the legislation here proposed were presented both by proponents and opponents of the bill in the hearings held by the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary in charge of the bill. On the one hand it is urged that predatory price cutting is a weapon of monopolistic large distributors to crush small businessmen. On the other hand, it is contended that price-maintenance legislation tends unduly to enhance the price of goods to the consumer. To this argument it is answered that the free play of competition between products of different manufacturers of the same general class will prevent such a result. 60 However, in the opinion of the committee, those arguments are more properly addressed to the State legislatures considering the enactment of fair trade acts. It is the legislature's responsibility to fix the public policy of the State. This legislation merely seeks to help effectuate a public policy so fixed in a State. It has no application to any State which does not see fit to enact a fair trade act. 61 In this connection the committee invites attention to the following paragraph of the opinion of the Supreme Court, heretofore referred to, upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois act, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00399", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00184", "text": "105, 107. The California courts thus have treated men and women as equally qualified and have assumed that litigants will have an adequate impartial jury, regardless of the sex of the jurors, provided the jurors otherwise are qualified to serve. Cf. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 374, 32 S.Ct. 793, 804, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614; Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 44, 17 S.Ct. 235, 238, 41 L.Ed. 624. While such a state practice is not binding upon the federal courts as a matter of law, yet it is persuasive as indicating that litigants need not be treated as having been prejudiced when a Federal District Court has conformed its practice to that of the state. For the state rule see People v. Parman supra; In re Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 P. 986, L.R.A.1918E, 771; People v. Manuel, 41 Cal.App. 153, 182 P. 306. 38 The error in the federal practice cannot be the exclusion of women, as such, because such exclusion not only is permitted but is required by federal statute in states where they are not eligible for state jury duty. The error, if any, must consist of the failure to require the listing of women, as well as men, for all federal jury service in a state which permits such listing for state jury service, even though the state regards such listing as directory to and not mandatory upon the state courts. 39 There are ample grounds for distinguishing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, from this case. For example, in the Thiel case, the Court acted in the absence of actual notice that the objectionable practice had been discontinued,2 whereas, here, we have notice that the practice objected to was changed more than two years ago to conform, at least substantially, to the approved practice. Also, in the Thiel case, the procedure complained of consisted of the exclusion of an economic group, thereby detracting from the representative character of the jury list, in a manner contrary to the tradition and purpose of the jury system. Here the exclusion of women, as", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00002", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00185", "text": "340 U.S. 573 71 S.Ct. 428 95 L.Ed. 547 MOOREv.CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. No. 318. Argued Jan. 4, 1951. Reargued Jan. 10, 1951. Decided Feb. 26, 1951. Mr. George E. Allen, Richmond, Va., for petitioner. Messrs. Meade T. Spicer, Jr., and Strother Hynes, Richmond, Va., for respondent. Mr. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This action, brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act1 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of a surviving widow and children, charged negligence against respondent railroad in the death of petitioner's decedent, who was acting in the course of his employment as a brakeman for respondent at the time of his death. The case was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence, respondent moved for a directed verdict on the ground, among others, that respondent was not shown to have been negligent. The District Court reserved decision, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for petitioner. Respondent then renewed its contention by motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was sustained, and the action was dismissed on the merits. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 184 F.2d 176, and we granted certiorari to determine whether the province of the jury had been invaded by the action of the District Court. 340 U.S. 874, 71 S.Ct. 123. 2 On September 25, 1948, petitioner's decedent was employed by respondent as a brakeman in respondent's switching yards at Richmond, Virginia. The day was fair. At about 3:50 p.m., the crew with which decedent was working undertook its first car movement of the day. An engine and tender were headed into Track 12 and the front end of the engine was coupled onto 33 loaded freight cars which were to be moved out initially upon the straight track referred to as the ladder track. The switch at the junction of Track 12 and the ladder track was properly aligned for the train to pass onto", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00388", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00186", "text": "count on its merits and, further, to make possible a speedy and inexpensive review by appeal if the Court held that the first count was insufficient; 'Now, Wherefore, the parties stipulate, without plaintiffs' waiving their rights under the second and third counts and without prejudice to any of plaintiffs' rights thereunder, as follows, to-wit: '1. Plaintiffs will file an amended complaint herein, attaching copies of the forms of contract in use in 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941, and omitting the second and third counts. '2. Said omission of the said second and third counts shall be without prejudice to any of the rights of the plaintiffs as to any cause or causes of action included or includible therein by amendment, and shall not be a retraxit or a dismissal with prejudice. '3. Defendant herein waives, for the period of time hereinafter set forth, any and all statutes of limitations now or hereafter applicable to the second or third causes of action or any matters therein set forth or includible therein by amendment, and waives the defense of laches as to the second and third causes of action or any matters therein set forth or includible therein by amendment. '4. Plaintiffs may, at any time prior to six months after the decision on appeal as to the sufficiency of the first count has become final, either amend the amended complaint herein by realleging said second and third counts or any portion of either, or, at any time during said period, file a separate action or actions setting forth said second and third counts or any portion of either, all with the same force and effect as if said second and third counts were continuously included herein as second and third counts from the date of the commencement of this action. '5. The waiver of the statute of limitations and of the defense of laches herein set forth, n d the stipulation permitting the amendment of the amended complaint or the filing of a separate action or actions hereinabove set forth, shall continue until six months after the determination on appeal as to the sufficiency of the first count has become final.'", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 438, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00168", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00187", "text": ") of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1274(d)). (d) Committee.--The Secretary of the Interior shall coordinate the management responsibilities of the Secretary with regard to the Eightmile River with the Eightmile River Coordinating Committee, as specified in the Eightmile River Watershed Management Plan. (e) Cooperative Agreements.--In order to provide for the long-term protection, preservation, and enhancement of the Eightmile River, the Secretary of the Interior may enter into cooperative agreements pursuant to sections 10(e) and 11(b)(1) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(e), 1282(b)(1)) with the State of Connecticut, the towns of Salem, Lyme, and East Haddam, Connecticut, and appropriate local planning and environmental organizations. All cooperative agreements authorized by this subsection shall be consistent with the Eightmile River Watershed Management Plan and may include provisions for financial or other assistance from the United States. (f) Relation to National Park System.--Notwithstanding section 10(c) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(c)), the Eightmile River shall not be administered as part of the National Park System or be subject to regulations which govern the National Park System. (g) Land Management.--The zoning ordinances adopted by the towns of Salem, East Haddam, and Lyme, Connecticut, in effect as of December 8, 2005, including provisions for conservation of floodplains, wetlands, and watercourses associated with the segments, are deemed to satisfy the standards and requirements of section 6(c) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1277 (c)). For the purpose of section 6(c) of that Act, such towns shall be deemed ``villages'' and the provisions of that section, which prohibit Federal acquisition of lands by condemnation, shall apply to the segments designated by subsection (b). The authority of the Secretary to acquire lands for the purposes of this Act shall be limited to acquisition by donation or acquisition with the consent of the owner thereof, and shall be subject to the additional criteria set forth in the Eightmile River Watershed Management Plan. (h) Watershed Approach.-- (1) In general.--In furtherance of the watershed approach to resource preservation and enhancement articulated in the Eightmile River Watershed Management Plan, the tribut", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00971", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00188", "text": "on Labor (1950), 367—460. 9 An appeal to the Court of Appeals in that proceeding was dismissed by the Board with that court's consent. 10 '(l) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b), the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district court of the United States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: * * *.' 61 Stat. 149, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 160(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l). 11 See, also, National Labor Relations Board v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 6 Cir., 181 F.2d 126, affirmed 341 U.S. 707, 71 S.Ct. 966; Denver Building Trades Council, 82 N.L.R.B. 93. 12 'Sec. 10(a) The Board is empowered * * * to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. * * *' 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 160(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a). 'Sec. 2. When used in this Act— '(6) The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States * * *. '(7) The term 'affecting commerce", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00410", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00189", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Paycheck Fairness Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) Women have entered the workforce in record numbers. (2) Even in the 1990s, women earn significantly lower pay than men for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions. These pay disparities exist in both the private and governmental sectors. In many instances, the pay disparities can only be due to continued intentional discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination. (3) The existence of such pay disparities-- (A) depresses the wages of working families who rely on the wages of all members of the family to make ends meet; (B) prevents the optimum utilization of available labor resources; (C) has been spread and perpetuated, through commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce, among the workers of the several States; (D) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (E) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (F) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (G) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce; and (H) in many instances, may deprive workers of equal protection on the basis of sex in violation of the fifth and 14th amendments. (4)(A) Artificial barriers to the elimination of discrimination in the payment of wages on the basis of sex continue to exist more than 3 decades after the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.). (B) Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-- (i) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by unfair pay disparities; (ii) substantially reducing the number of working women earning unfairly low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance; and (iii) promoting stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair rate of pay; (iv) remedying the effects of past discrimination on the basis of sex and ensuring that in the future workers are afforded equal protection on the basis of sex; and (v) in the private sector, ensuring equal protection pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the fifth and 14", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00885", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00190", "text": ", dissenting. 29 I think this patent meets the patent statute's every requirement. And confronted by this record an industry heretofore galled by futility and frust ation may well be amazed at the Court's dismissal of Jungersen's ingenious and successful efforts. 30 Of course, commercial success will not fill any void in an invalid patent. But it may fill the void in our understanding of what the invention has meant to those whose livelihood, unlike our own, depends upon their knowledge of the art. Concededly, in this high-pressure age sales volume may reflect only powerful promotion or marketing magic, and its significance as an index of novelty or utility may rightly be suspected. But Jungersen's success was grounded not in the gullibility of the public but in the hard-headed judgment of a highly competitive and critical if not hostile industry. Knowing well its need for and its failure to achieve improvements on available processes, that industry discarded them, adopted this outsider's invention, and made it a commercial success. 31 It would take a singular self-assurance on the part of one who knows as little of this art as I do, or as I can learn in the few hours that can be given to consideration of this case, to ignore the judgment of these competitors who grew up in the industry and say that they did not know something new and useful when they saw it. And if Benvenuto Cellini's age-old writings are so revealing to us laymen of the appellate Bench, it is hard to see why this practical-minded industry which the Court says was following Cellini failed through all the years to get his message. 32 It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have been granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office. But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on. 33 I agree with the opinion of Judge Learned Hand below. 1 In No. 7 we are asked to consider the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as to claims 5 and 6; in No. 8, the decision of that court as to claims 1 through 4; and in No. 48, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as to all", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00218", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00191", "text": "Co., 3 F.P.C. 132; Baum, The Federal Power Commission, 61—62. See the criticism of the § 201(a) phrase as meaninglessly ambiguous, Hartford Electric Light Co., 2 F.P.C. 359, and Northwestern Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 327. The Company has cited a brief by the Commission in another case with some force, as indicating that heretofore it has claimed that the United States is excluded from the Act by virtue of not being a 'person.' Respondent's brief, United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 4 Cir., 191 F.2d 796. We note, though, that the contention there was made in regard to the application of § 313(a), that 'No proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by any person unless such person' has applied to the Commission for a rehearing. The Court, however, chose to ignore the point, and rather held that the Secretary of Interior could not petition for review in that case since he was not a 'party aggrieved,' § 313(b). 191 F.2d at pages 799—800. On certiorari here, the Commission failed to press the 'person' argument again, relying solely on the argument that petitioner, as a representative of federal interests was not 'aggrieved' by the Commission's order in support of its contention of lack of standing. Br.F.P.C.Nos. 28 and 29, 1952 Term, pp. 95 128. We did not consider the matter in our opinion. United States ex rel. Champman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U.S. 153, 156, 73 S.Ct. 609. 26 See East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 51 S.Ct. 499, 75 L.Ed. 1171; Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 469, 70 S.Ct. 266, 269, 94 L.Ed. 268. 27 See California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 206, 209. 28 The Ninth Circuit, in California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00492", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00192", "text": "1) Majority vote for adoption.--In any election held pursuant to subsection (a), a vote of a majority of those actually voting shall be necessary and sufficient for the approval of the adoption of the tribal constitution and bylaws. (2) Procedure in event of failure to adopt proposed constitution.--If in any such election such majority does not approve the adoption of the proposed tribal constitution and bylaws, the Interim Council shall be responsible for preparing another tribal constitution and other bylaws in the same manner provided in this section for the first proposed constitution and bylaws. The new proposed constitution and bylaws shall be adopted by the Interim Council not later than 6 months after the date of the election in which the first proposed constitution and bylaws failed to be adopted. An election on the question of the adoption of the new proposal of the Interim Council shall be conducted in the same manner provided in subsection (a)(2) for the election on the first proposed constitution and bylaws. (d) Election of Tribal Governing Body.--Not later than 120 days after the tribe approves the adoption of the tribal constitution and bylaws and subject to the approval of the Secretary, the Interim Council shall conduct an election, by secret ballot, to elect the tribal governing body established under such constitution and bylaws. Notwithstanding any provision of the tribal constitution and bylaws, absentee and write-in balloting shall be permitted in an election under this subsection. SEC. 7. MEMBERSHIP ROLLS; VOTING RIGHTS OF MEMBER. (a) Membership Roll Established and Opened.--The membership roll of the tribe is established and open. (b) Criteria Governing Eligibility.-- (1) Membership prior to election.--Until the first election of the tribal governing body is held pursuant to section 6(d), the membership of the Clatsop-Nehalem Confederated Tribes shall consist as follows: (A) Any person who can document being a direct descent from a Clatsop or Nehalem (Naalem) Tillamook Indian (or both) on the tribal rolls compiled-- (i) in 1906 by Charles E. McChesney, Supervisor of Indian School. (B) Any person found eligible by the Portland, Oregon, Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs who would satisfy enrollment requirements under-- (i) the Act of August 24, 1912, (37 Stat. 518-535); (ii) the Act of", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00959", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00193", "text": "also referred to as a goods and services tax (GST).''. SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATES. (a) General Effective Date.--If, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 3 of this Act, the United States Trade Representative fails to certify to Congress by the applicable date specified in such subsection that each of the United States trade negotiating objectives regarding border tax treatment described in subsection (b) of such section has been met as a result of WTO negotiations, then-- (1) section 4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 4 of this Act, shall take effect 90 days after such date; and (2) subject to subsection (b), section 314 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by section 5 of this Act, shall take effect 120 days after such date. (b) Earlier Effective Date for Exports of Services.-- (1) In general.--If, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 3 of this Act, the United States Trade Representative fails to certify to Congress by January 1, 2010, that each of the United States trade negotiating objectives regarding border tax treatment described in subsection (b) of such section has been met as a result of WTO negotiations, then section 314 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by section 5 of this Act, shall take effect on January 1, 2010, with respect to exports of services from the United States as described in section 314 of the Tariff Act of 1930. (2) Appropriation of amounts.--There are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for making payments with respect to exports of services from the United States in accordance with section 314 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by section 5 of this Act, until such time as the special account authorized under subsection (e) of section 4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 4 of this Act, is established and amounts contained in the special account are adequate to make such payments.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 452, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01097", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00194", "text": ".Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302. 39 Likewise irrelevant to the instant proceeding is Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999. In that case, the petitioner set forth two grounds for discharge in his first petition. At the hearing, he offered no proof in support of the second ground. The petition was dismissed on the theory that the first ground was not good in law. A subsequent habeas corpus petition relied entirely on the second ground alleged in the first petition. This Court held that the petitioner had had full opportunity to offer proof as to the second point at the hearing on the first petition, proof which was accessible at all times. If he was intending to rely on that ground, good faith required that he produce his proof at the first hearing. 'To reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus. No reason for not presenting the proof at the outset is offered.' 265 U.S. at page 241, 44 S.Ct. at page 525, 68 L.Ed. 999. 40 The Wong Doo case thus involved a siu ation where one has properly raised an issue in an earlier petition, has received a full opportunity at a hearing to present evidence on the point, and has refused to avail oneself of that opportunity. The distinguishing features in the instant case are obvious. 41 There is one factor in this case that might be thought to justify the dismissal of the fourth petition as an abusive use of the habeas corpus writ. That factor is that petitioner had prior knowledge of the Donner incident which forms the basis, at least in part, of the due process allegation now being made. The record in the first proceeding shows that petitioner's own lawyer elicited the information from Donner that he had talked with the prosecuting lawyers during the interlude between the allegedly conflicting statements. And petitioner made reference to that information during the course of the first habeas corpus proceeding in the manner heretofore described. Petitioner now utilizes that same information in alleging that the prosecution made a knowing use of false testimony. 42 In the first place, however, we cannot assume that petitioner has acquired no new or additional information since the time of the trial or the first habeas corpus proceeding that might indicate fraudulent", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00170", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00195", "text": "the act, and to the extent that the Board in the past has accorded protection to such activities, the conference agreement makes such protection no longer possible. Furthermore, in section 10(c) of the amended act, as proposed in the conference agreement, it is specifically provided that no order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual or the payment to him of any back pay if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause, and this, of course, applies with qual force whether or not the acts constituting the cause for discharge were committed in connection with a concerted activity. Again, inasmuch as section 10(b) of the act, as proposed to be amended by the conference agreement, requires that the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts shall, so far as practicable, be followed and applied by the Board proof of acts of unlawful conduct cannot hereafter be limited to proof of confession or conviction thereof. 'The second change made by the House bill in section 7 of the act (which is carried into the conference agreement) also has an important bearing on the kinds of concerted activities which are protected by section 7. That provision, as heretofore stated, provides that employees are also to have the right to refrain from joining in concerted activities with their fellow employees if they choose to do so. Taken in conjunction with the provisions of section 8(b)(1) of the conference agreement (which will be hereafter discussed), wherein it is made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7, it is apparent that many forms and varieties of concerted activities which the Board, particularly in its early days, regarded as protected by the act will no longer be treated as having that protection, since obviously persons who engage in or support unfair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.' 16 61 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a). 17 To call these stoppages a strike we would have to ignore petitions' own conception of this activity. As we have shown, they adopted this technique precisely because it was believed to be 'better * * * than a strike.' See text 69 S.Ct. 519. 1 It was held in National Labor Relations Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 2 Cir", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00242", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00196", "text": "year 1998 pursuant to this Act shall be made available to the extent and in the manner which would be provided by the pertinent appropriation Act for fiscal year 1997, including all of the terms and conditions and the apportionment schedule imposed with respect to the appropriation made or funds made available for fiscal year 1997 or authority granted for the program, project, or activity under current law. (b) Appropriations made by this Act shall be available to the extent and in the manner which would be provided by the pertinent appropriation Act. (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the rate for operations for any continuing project or activity would result in a furlough or a reduction-in-force of Government employees, that rate for operations shall be increased to a level that would preclude a furlough or reduction-in-force. coverage Sec. 4. Appropriations and funds made available, and authority granted, for any program, project, or activity for fiscal year 1998 pursuant to this Act shall cover all obligations or expenditures incurred for that program, project, or activity during the portion of fiscal year 1998 for which this Act applies to that program, project, or activity. expenditures Sec. 5. Expenditures made for a program, project, or activity for fiscal year 1998 pursuant to this Act shall be charged to the applicable appropriation, fund, or authorization whenever a regular appropriation bill or a joint resolution making continuing appropriations until the end of fiscal year 1998 providing for that program, project, or activity for that period becomes law. initiating or resuming a program, project, or activity Sec. 6. No appropriation or funds made available or authority granted pursuant to this Act shall be used to initiate or resume any program, project, or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during fiscal year 1997. protection of other obligations Sec. 7. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect Government obligations mandated by other law, including obligations with respect to Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and veterans benefits. definition Sec. 8. In this Act, the term ``regular appropriation bill'' means any annual appropriation bill making appropriations, otherwise making funds available, or granting authority, for any of the following categories of programs, projects, and activities: (1) Agriculture, rural development, and related agencies programs. (2) The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the judiciary, and", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00869", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00197", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2293/82 of 19 August 1982 amending and supplementing Regulation (EEC) No 1603/79 laying down rules for payment of a premium to producers of potato starch THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2727/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the market in cereals (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1451/82 (2), Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2742/75 of 29 October 1975 on production refunds in the cereals and rice sectors (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1460/82 (4), and in particular Article 8 thereof, Whereas in Regulation (EEC) No 2125/82 (5), the most recent Regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No 1603/79 (6), the Annex to that Regulation was supplemented by more detailed scales based on a more precise determination of the starch content of potatoes; Whereas experience has shown that the starch content of potatoes cannot be determined so precisely employing one of the two methods used in the Community; whereas, therefore, the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 1603/79 should be amended and appropriate measures provided to prevent any disadvantages which might result for potato starch producers; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 1603/79 is hereby amended and supplemented as follows: 1. the Annex shall be replaced by the Annex hereto; 2. the following subparagraph shall be added to Article 3: 'Where the starch content of potatoes is calculated by Reimann's or Perow's weight and corresponds to a figure which appears on two or three lines in the second column of the Annex, the scales applicable shall be those corresponding to the second or to the third line.' Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 19 August 1982.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00771", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00198", "text": ") by directing a contractor to withhold for the account of the United States, from amounts otherwise due to a subcontractor, any amount of such excessive profits of such subcontractor; or (D) by recovery from the contractor, through repayment, credit, or suit any amount of such excessive profits actually paid to him; or (E) by any combination of these methods, as in deemed desirable. * * *' 14 The allegations included the following: 'Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has filed its petition for redetermination in The Tax Court of the United States whereby it seeks an orderly determination of the amount, if any, it may owe to the United States of America, as excessive profits for its fiscal year ending November 30, 1943, the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, purporting to act under the provisions of Section 403(c)(2) of the Renegotiation Act, purposes to direct the defendant Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, or his delegates, to direct contractors, customers of the plaintiff, to withhold moneys due to the plaintiff by such contractors for the account of the United States, in amounts determined by it, the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, to be due as excessive profits, and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, or his delegates purposes to follow such directions of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board and further to direct such contractors to pay such sms of mone y into the Treasury of the United States, in accordance with the procedure adopted by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, acting through his delegate, Robert P. Patterson, in respect of excessive profits found by him to be due for the fiscal year of the plaintiff ending November 30, 1942, as heretofore, recited in this complaint, before The Tax Court of the United States of America shall have made or shall have had opportunity to make any determination of the plaintiff's petition for a redetermination of its excessive profits, if any, for its fiscal year ending 1943.' See also note 42. 15 The omission from the First Act of various provisions contained in the Second, see, e.g., note 9 supra, is alleged to afford basis for invalidating the former even though the latter may be held constitutional. 16 See note 42 infra. 17 Although asserted by way of equitable setoff, the effect of allowing such a claim would be, as we said in the Mine Safety", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00095", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00199", "text": "329 U.S. 585 67 S.Ct. 398 91 L.Ed. 521 UNITED STATESv.THAYER-WEST POINT HOTEL CO. No. 106. Argued Dec. 20, 1946. Decided Jan. 20, 1947. Mr. Oscar H. Davis, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr.E. J. Ellenwood, of New York City, for respondent. Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The decision here turns upon the power of the Court of Claims, in light of § 177(a) of the Judicial Code,1 to include interest in its award of 'just compensation' to a lessee for the construction of a hotel and other buildings pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 30, 1920.2 2 The act of March 30, 1920, authorizes the Secretary of War to lease land on the United States Military Reservation at West Point, N.Y., to any person for a term not exceeding 50 years upon which to erect a hotel and other necessary buildings in connection therewith. The lease is to contain such conditions, terms, reservations and covenants as may be agreed upon and is to provide 'for just compensation to the lessees for the construction of said hotel, appurtenances, and equipments, to be paid to said lessees at the termination of said lease.' 3 On October 17, 1924, the Secretary of War duly made a lease under this Act to one Williams for a period of 50 years. The lease provided, among other things, that it might be cancelled at any time by the Secretary if the lessee should fail to observe all the covenants and conditions in the lease. One of the covenants was that the lessee was to 'keep the said hotel open for business every day during the continuance of this lease, except at such times as permission to close may be given in writing by the Superintendent, U.S.M.A.' Upon a cancellation of the lease, 'just compensation' was to be paid to the lessee for the construction of the hotel, appurtenances and equipment, and title thereto was to pass at once to the United States. Similar provisions were made in connection with the termination of the lease on the expiration of the 50-year term. The lease also set forth numerous restrictions and requirements", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00015", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00200", "text": "9304 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) State Agencies.--A State agency, including any financing authority established by any State, which meets the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a) may be treated as a surety corporation for purposes of this chapter. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, user fees collected by the Financial Management Services incident to sections 9304 through 9309 of this title shall be credited to the appropriation of that agency and may be retained without fiscal year limitation to carry out the provisions of such sections.''. (b) Clarification of Effective Date for Amendment Relating to Commercial Mortgage Related Securities.--Section 347(d) of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-325; 108 Stat. 2241) is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Effective Date.-- ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as of the date of the enactment of the Housing Programs Extension Act of 1994. ``(2) National and insured state banks.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to national banks or, in accordance with section 24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, insured State banks before the effective date of final regulations prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to subsection (c).''. Passed the House of Representatives October 7, 1994. Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON, Clerk.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 333, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00856", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00201", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1068/2009 of 6 November 2009 amending the representative prices and additional import duties for certain products in the sugar sector fixed by Regulation (EC) No 877/2009 for the 2009/10 marketing year THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (single CMO Regulation) (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2006 of 30 June 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 as regards trade with third countries in the sugar sector (2), and in particular Article 36(2), second subparagraph, second sentence thereof, Whereas: (1) The representative prices and additional duties applicable to imports of white sugar, raw sugar and certain syrups for the 2009/10 marketing year are fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 877/2009 (3). These prices and duties have been last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1043/2009 (4). (2) The data currently available to the Commission indicate that those amounts should be amended in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The representative prices and additional duties applicable to imports of the products referred to in Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, as fixed by Regulation (EC) No 877/2009 for the 2009/10, marketing year, are hereby amended as set out in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 7 November 2009. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 6 November 2009.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 430, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00553", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00202", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 162/94 of 24 January 1994 extending the provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community (1), and in particular Article 11 thereof, Having regard to the Commission proposal, Whereas Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 (2) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation; Whereas examination of the facts has not yet been completed and the Commission has informed the exporters known to be concerned of its intention to propose an extension of the validity of the provisional duty for an additional period of two months; Whereas the exporters have raised no objections, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The validity of the provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 is hereby extended for a period of two months. It shall cease to apply if, before the expiry of that period, the Council adopts definitive measures or the proceeding is terminated under Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 24 January 1994.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 353, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00667", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00203", "text": "3 (68 Fed. Reg. 68698) (related to achievement of students with significant cognitive disabilities) as if such amendments-- ``(i) permitted the proficient or advanced scores on alternate assessments of not more than 3.0 percent of all tested students to be considered as proficient or advanced, respectively, for the purposes of determining adequate yearly progress, except that-- ``(I) any assessment given to any such so considered student for the purposes of determining such adequate yearly progress shall be required by the individualized education program of such so considered student; ``(II) the individualized education program shall reflect the need for any such alternate assessment based on the evaluation of such so considered student and the services provided such so considered student under section 614 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; and ``(III) the individualized education program shall include written consent from the parent of such so considered student prior to such alternate assessment being administered; ``(ii) used the term `students requiring alternate assessments' in lieu of the term `students with the most significant cognitive disabilities'; and ``(iii) permitted the eligibility, of such so considered students to have the students' scores of proficient or advanced on alternate assessments counted as proficient or advanced for purposes of determining adequate yearly progress, to be determined by the State educational agency, except that such eligibility shall, at a minimum, include-- ``(I) such so considered students who are receiving services pursuant to a plan required under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; ``(II) the students described in subclause (I) who are assessed at a grade level below the grade level in which the students are enrolled (out of level assessments); and ``(III) the students described in subclause (I) who are considered students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, as defined by the State educational agency, on the day before the date of enactment of the Improving No Child Left Behind Act. ``(M) Other measures of adequate yearly progress.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, a State may establish in the State plan an alternative definition of adequate yearly progress, subject to approval by the Secretary under subsection (e). Such alternative definition may-- ``(i) include measures of student achievement over a period of time (such as a value added accountability system) or the progress of some or all of the groups of students described in subparagraph (C)(v) to the next higher level of achievement described in subparagraph (II) or (III) of paragraph (1)(", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01164", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00204", "text": "7) establish conditions that promote cooperation between local exchange carriers; and ``(8) ensure that all regulatory rights and obligations for and in connection with the business arrangements described in this section shall be determined exclusively in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to this section. ``(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to enact into law any economic support currently provided to telephone exchange service or enact into law any prohibition with regard to new economic support mechanisms for telephone exchange service or any service other than telephone exchange service. ``SEC. 230. SIGNALLING. ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any restriction or obligation imposed before the date of enactment of this section pursuant to the Modification of Final Judgment, no local exchange carrier shall be prohibited from transporting or processing signalling and information for another local exchange carrier in adjoining or reasonably proximate serving areas upon request of that local exchange carrier to the same extent that the providing local exchange carrier is permitted to engage in such activities for itself. ``SEC. 231. INTRASTATE COMMUNICATION. ``Except as provided in section 2, nothing in this Act shall be construed to alter, limit, or supersede the authority of any State with respect to the regulation of intrastate communication service.''. SEC. 4. ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS. (a) Inapplicability of Antitrust Laws.--Nothing contained in any Federal or State antitrust law shall render unlawful any individual or concerted action taken by a local exchange carrier, or its directors, officers, agents, employees, affiliates, subsidiaries, joint ventures, counsel or other persons purporting to act on behalf of such carrier, pursuant to sections 228, 229, and 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, including (but not limited to) lobbying before Congress or the Federal Communications Commission or communicating by any means with other local exchange carriers. (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined: (1) The term ``Federal antitrust laws'' means the Acts known as the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. 13 et seq.), the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.), all subsequent amendments of such Acts, and any and all other laws which have been or are", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00930", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00205", "text": "90.15, and 0404.90.20 having the same degree of indentation as the article description for subheading 0405.20.40: ``0404.90 Other:............................ Milk protein concentrates:............................ 0404.90.05 Described in general note 15 to 0.37 cent Free (A*, CA, CL, E, IL, J, 12 cents/ the tariff schedule and entered s/kg JO, MX, SG) 0.2 cents/kg kg pursuant to its provisions..... (AU) 0404.90.15 Described in additional U.S. 0.37 cent Free (A*, CA, CL, E, IL, J, 12 cents/ note 27 to this chapter and s/kg JO, SG) 0.2 kg entered pursuant to its cents/kg (AU) provisions..................... 0404.90.20 Other........................ $1.56/kg Free (MX) $2.02/kg ''. (c) Effective Date.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section apply to-- (A) goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the first day of the first month after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; or (B) if the President notifies Congress that the international obligations of the United States require the President to enter into negotiations pursuant to an existing trade agreement under section 3(a)(1), goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the first day of the first month after the date that is 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Transitional provisions.-- (A) Chapter 35.--Notwithstanding Additional U.S. note 2 to chapter 35 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (as added by subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section), in the case of any calendar year that includes the effective date described in paragraph (1), the aggregate amount of casein, caseinates, milk protein concentrate, and other casein derivatives entered under subheadings 3501.10.15, 3501.10.65, and 3501.90.65 shall not exceed an amount equal to-- (i) 110 percent of the average quantity of such articles imported into the United States during the preceding 3 calendar years,", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01163", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00206", "text": "15)(B)) to the national, if the national is not inadmissible to the United States under section 212 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1182). (b) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act and every 3 months thereafter the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committees on Finance, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Agriculture, Ways and Means, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the issuance of visas described in subsection (a). (2) Content of reports.--Each report shall contain a full description of each application received from a Cuban national to travel to the United States to engage in purchasing activities pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 and shall describe the disposition of each such application. SEC. 5. CLARIFICATION OF PAYMENT TERMS UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. Section 908(b)(4) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7207(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) the term `payment of cash in advance' means, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the payment by the purchaser of an agricultural commodity or product and the receipt of such payment by the seller prior to-- ``(i) the transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and ``(ii) the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser.''. SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF DIRECT TRANSFERS BETWEEN CUBAN AND UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not restrict direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a United States financial institution executed in payment for a product authorized for sale under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.).", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 488, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00876", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00207", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Free Speech About Science Act of 2010''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Federal regulators have forbidden-- (A) cherry growers and food producers to cite independent and respected scientific research on their produce that references health benefits; and (B) a variety of dietary supplement makers to cite independent scientific research on health benefits from supplements from respected, peer-reviewed scientific journals. (2) Americans want access and have a right to access legitimate scientific information about foods and dietary supplements to ensure informed decisions about diet and health care. While the American public is inundated daily with advertisements about prescription drugs for health conditions, many of which could be prevented through lifestyle changes, proper nutrition, and informed use of dietary supplements, Americans are denied access to the very information that assists in making informed lifestyle and health care decisions. (3) Providing access to scientific information promotes self-responsibility, thereby empowering Americans to exercise independent judgment in caring for themselves and ultimately reducing health care costs and improving quality of life. (4) The United States has a long commitment to the free dissemination of scientific research with the exception of limited extreme situations for national security. This commitment goes back to the First Amendment to the Constitution and has contributed vitally to the Nation's economic progress. SEC. 3. MISBRANDED FOOD AND DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS. Section 403(r) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 343(r)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (3)-- (A) by redesignating clause (D) as clause (E); (B) by inserting after clause (C) the following: ``(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (A)(i) and (B), a claim of the type described in subparagraph (1)(B) which is not authorized by the Secretary in a regulation promulgated in accordance with clause (B) shall be authorized and may be made with respect to a food if-- ``(i) the claim is based on legitimate scientific research; ``(ii) the claim and the food for which the claim is made are in compliance with clause (A)(ii) and are otherwise in compliance with paragraph (a) and section 201(n); ``(iii) the claim is stated in a manner so that the claim-- ``(I) is an accurate balanced summary of such research; and ``(", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00924", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00208", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 9 June 2009 appointing a Judge to the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (2009/474/EC, Euratom) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 225a thereof, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 140b thereof, Whereas: (1) The European Union Civil Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Service Tribunal) was established by Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom (1). To that end, that Decision added an Annex to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice). (2) By Decision 2005/150/EC, Euratom (2), the Council determined the conditions and arrangements governing the submission and processing of applications for appointment as a judge of the Civil Service Tribunal, as provided for in Article 3(2) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice. (3) By Decision 2005/49/EC, Euratom (3), the Council determined the operating rules of the committee provided for in Article 3(3) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). (4) Pursuant to the resignation of one of the Judges of the Civil Service Tribunal, a public call for applications for the appointment of a judge to the Civil Service Tribunal for the period from 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2015 was published on 6 March 2009 (4). (5) The Committee met on 26 March, on 7 May and on 25 and 26 May 2009. On completion of its discussions, it finalised the opinion and list provided for in Article 3(4) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice. (6) Under the fourth paragraph of Article 225a of the EC Treaty and the fourth paragraph of Article 140b of the EAEC Treaty, Judges of the Civil Service Tribunal are appointed by the Council. (7) Accordingly, it is appropriate to appoint one of the persons included on the list provided for in Article 3(4) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00827", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00209", "text": "steel is likewise indispensable to the carrying out of programs of the Atomic Energy Commission of vital importance to our defense efforts; and 24 Whereas a continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel is also indispensable to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our military strength depends; and 25 Whereas a controversy has arisen between certain companies in the United States producing and fabricating steel and the elements thereof and certain of their workers represented by the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, regarding terms and conditions of employment; and 26 Whereas the controversy has not been settled through the processes of collective bargaining or through the efforts of the Government, including those of the Wage Stabilization Board, to which the controversy was referred on December 22, 1951, pursuant to Executive Order No. 10233, and a strike has been called for 12:01 A.M., April 9, 1952; and 27 Whereas a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field; and 28 Whereas is order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as hereinafter provided: 29 Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 30 1. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies named in the list attached hereto (List of specific Steel Companies and Plants omitted), or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation. 31 2. In carrying out this order the Secretary of Commerce may act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate; and all Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce to the fullest extent possible in carrying out the purposes of this order. 32 3. The Secretary of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00453", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00210", "text": "Products, at Holywood, a shipment of vitamin products which were allegedly adulterated and misbranded—thereby making the guaranty false in respect of that shipment. Prior and subsequent to the date of the shipment, Richard Harrison Products was engaged in the business of introducing and delivering for introduction into interstate commerce quantities of the vitamin product supplied by appellee. 3 Appellee moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it did not state an offense. The argument was that § 301(h) applies only to a guaranty that is false relative to an interstate shipment, whereas the alleged shipment here was to a consignee within California, the state of origin, and there was no allegation that the consignee purchased the order for some one outside California or that it intended to sell the products in its interstate rather than its intrastate business. The District Court gave an oral opinion sustaining appellee's contention and granting the motion to dismiss. The case is here on direct appeal by the United States. 4 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act rests upon the constitutional power resident in Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Article 1, § 8, cl. 3. To the end that the public health and safety might be advanced, it seeks to keep interstate channels free from deleterious, adulterated and misbranded articles of the specified types. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48. It is in that interstate setting that the various sections of the Act must be viewed. 5 But § 301(h), with which we are concerned, does not speak specifically in interstate terms. It prohibits the 'giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in section 303(c)(2), which guaranty or undertaking is false,' the only exception being as to a false guaranty given by a person who, in turn, relied upon a similar guaranty given by the person from whom he received in good faith the adulterated or misbranded article.1 Nothing on the face of the section limits its application to guaranties relating to articles introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce. From all that appears, its proscription plainly extends to the giving of any false statutory guaranty, without regard to the interstate or intrastate character of the shipment in", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00077", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00211", "text": "ATIONS. Subsection (c) of section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(c)(1) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 30 years, or both. ``(2) The court, in imposing sentence for an offense under subsection (a) or (b), shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, order that the person forfeit to the United States-- ``(A) the person's interest in any personal property that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation; and ``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.''. SEC. 9. DIRECTIVE TO SENTENCING COMMISSION. (a) Directive.--Pursuant to its authority under section 994(p) of title 28, United States Code, and in accordance with this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall forthwith review its guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of offenses under sections 1028, 1028A, 1030, 1030A, 2511 and 2701 of title 18, United States Code and any other relevant provisions of law, in order to reflect the intent of Congress that such penalties be increased in comparison to those currently provided by such guidelines and policy statements. (b) Requirements.--In determining its guidelines and policy statements on the appropriate sentence for the crimes enumerated in paragraph (a), the Commission shall consider the extent to which the guidelines and policy statements may or may not account for the following factors in order to create an effective deterrent to computer crime and the theft or misuse of personally identifiable data-- (1) the level of sophistication and planning involved in such offense; (2) whether such offense was committed for purpose of commercial advantage or private financial benefit; (3) the potential and actual loss resulting from the offense; (4) whether the defendant acted with intent to cause either physical or property harm in committing the offense; (5) the extent to which the offense violated the privacy rights of individuals; (6) the effect of the offense upon the operations of a government agency of the United States, or of a State or local government; (7) whether the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00895", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00212", "text": "the Eightmile River, as a scenic river. ``(E) The 0.7-mile segment of Falls Brook from Tisdale Brook to the main stem of the Eightmile River at Hamburg Cove, as a scenic river.''. (d) Management.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary shall manage the Eightmile River in accordance with the Management Plan and such amendments to the Plan as the Secretary determines to be consistent with this section. (2) Management plan.--The Management Plan shall be considered to satisfy each requirement for a comprehensive management plan that is required by section 3(d) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1274(d)). (e) Committee.--The Secretary shall coordinate the management responsibilities of the Secretary relating to the Eightmile River with the Eightmile River Coordinating Committee, as described in the Management Plan. (f) Cooperative Agreements.-- (1) In general.--Pursuant to sections 10(e) and 11(b)(1) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(e), 1282(b)(1)), the Secretary may enter into a cooperative agreement with-- (A) the State of Connecticut; (B) the towns of-- (i) Salem, Connecticut; (ii) Lyme, Connecticut; and (iii) East Haddam, Connecticut; and (C) appropriate local planning and environmental organizations. (2) Consistency with management plan.--Each cooperative agreement authorized by this subsection-- (A) shall be consistent with the Management Plan; and (B) may include provisions for financial or other assistance from the United States. (g) Relation to National Park System.--Notwithstanding section 10(c) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(c)), the Eightmile River shall not-- (1) be administered as part of the National Park System; or (2) be subject to laws (including regulations) that govern the National Park System. (h) Land Management.-- (1) Zoning ordinances.--With respect to the Eightmile River, each zoning ordinance adopted by the towns of Salem, East Haddam, and Lyme, Connecticut, in effect as of December 8, 2005 (including provisions for conservation of floodplains, wetland and watercourses associated with the segments), shall be considered to satisfy each standard and requirement under section 6(c) of the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01124", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00213", "text": "within territory which both the lessor and lessee are authorized to serve; 39 (b) To equipment utilized wholly or in part in the transportation of railway express traffic, or in substituted motor-for-rail transportation of railroad freight moving between points that are railroad stations on railroad billing; 40 (c) To equipment utilized in transportation performed solely and exclusively within any municipality, contiguous municipalities, or commercial zone, as defined by the Commission; 41 (d) To equipment utilized by an authorized carrier in transportation performed pursuant to any plan of operation approved by the Commission in a proceeding arising under section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 42 s 207.4. Augmenting equipment.—Other than equipment exchanged between motor common carriers in interchange service as defined in § 207.5 of these rules, authorized carriers may perform authorized transportation in or with equipment which they do not own only under the following conditions; 43 (a) The contract, lease, or other arrangement for the use of such equipment— 44 (1) Shall be made between the authorized carrier and the owner of the equipment; 45 (2) Shall be in writing and signed by the parties thereto, or their regular employees or agents duly authorized to act for them in the execution of contracts, leases, or other arrangements; 46 (3) Shall specify the period for which it applies, which shall be not less than 30 days when the equipment is to be operated for the authorized carrier by the owner or employees of the owner; * * * 47 (4) Shall provide for the exclusive possession, control and use of the equipment, and for the complete assumption of responsibility in respect thereto, by the authorized carrier, * * * 48 (5) Shall specify the compensation to be paid by the lessee for the rental of the leased equipment; provided, however, that such compensation shall not be computed on the basis of any division or percentage of any applicable rate or rates on any commodify or commodities transported in said vehicle or on a division or percentage of any revenue earned by said vehicle during the period for which the lease is effective; (6) Shall specify the time and date or the circumstance on which the contract, lease, or other arrangement begins, and the time or the circumstance on which it ends. The duration of the contract, lease, or other arrangement shall coincide with the time for the giving of receipts for the equipment, as required by paragraph (b) of this", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00473", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00214", "text": "Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to eliminate the annual operating deficit and the maintenance backlog in the national parks by the centennial anniversary of the National Park System by enabling Congress to focus on overseeing and fully funding the core operations of the national parks in the annual appropriations process. TITLE I--CENTENNIAL FUND SEC. 101. CENTENNIAL FUND FOR PRESERVING AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS. (a) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund which shall be known as the ``National Park Centennial Fund'', hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ``Centennial Fund''. In each fiscal year beginning in fiscal year 2005, the Secretary of the Treasury shall deposit in the Centennial Fund amounts set forth in subsection (b) sufficient to fund the programs identified in titles II, III, and IV. (b) Appropriations.--There are hereby appropriated to the Centennial Fund in each fiscal year, the following amounts: (1) Amounts equivalent to the amounts designated in the fiscal year concerned under section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (2) Any additional amounts necessary to make the total amounts deposited to the Centennial Fund each fiscal year equal to the total amount listed in section 103. SEC. 102. DESIGNATION OF OVERPAYMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF UNITS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM. (a) In General.--Subchapter A of chapter 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new part: ``PART IX--DESIGNATION OF OVERPAYMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF UNITS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM ``Sec. 6097. Designation. ``SEC. 6097. DESIGNATION. ``(a) In General.--In the case of an individual, with respect to each taxpayer's return for the taxable year of the tax imposed by chapter 1, such taxpayer may designate that-- ``(1) a specified portion (but not less than $1) of any overpayment of tax for such taxable year, and ``(2) any cash contribution which the taxpayer includes with such return, shall be used for the benefit of units of the National Park System. ``(b) Manner and Time of Designation.--A designation under subsection (a) may be made with respect to any taxable year only at the time of filing the return of", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00961", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00215", "text": "February 25, 1944, by the Revenue Act of 1943 (the so-called Second Renegotiation Act) the Original Renegotiation Act, as theretofore amended, did not provide expressly for a review or redetermination of the initial determination of the excess profits authorized to be made by the respective Secretaries. The 1944 amendments added not merely an express statement of factors to be taken into consideration in determining excessive profits (§ 403(a)(4)(A),39 but also created a War Contracts Price Adjustment Board (§ 403(d)(1)40 to make such determinations in the future. Also, it providd expressly for petitions to be filed with the Tax Court to secure redeterminations of the orders of such Board. § 403(e)(1).41 71 It expressly stated that 'A proceeding before the Tax Court to finally determine the amount, if any, of excessive profits shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board, but shall be treated as a proceeding de novo.' § 403(e)(1). It provided also that 'In the absence of the filing of a petition with The Tax Court of the United States under the provisions of and within the time limit prescribed in subsection (e)(1), such order (of the Board) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review or redetermination by any court or other agency.' § 403(c)(1).42 All of the determinations in the case before us were made after February 25, 1944, and those in the Pownall case were made on behalf of the Board. The above procedure under § 403(e)(1) accordingly was open to the petitioners in the Pownall case but they did not file a petition with the Tax Court. 72 In addition to the above procedures affecting future determinations of excessive profits to be made by the Board, the Second Renegotiation Act also made express provisions, in § 403(e)(2),43 for a redetermination by the Tax Court of excessive profits determined to exist by the respective Secretaries. These provisions applied first to any determinations made by a Secretary prior to February 25, 1944, with respect to a fiscal year ending before July 1, 1943. In those instances a petition for redetermination by the Tax Court was permitted to be filed within 90 days after February 25, 1944. We", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00187", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00216", "text": "''; (iv) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``funds received under this title'' and inserting ``Federal educational assistance''; and (v) in subparagraph (F)-- (I) in clause (iii), by striking ``under this title'' and inserting ``of Federal educational assistance''; and (II) in clause (iv), by striking ``under this title'' and inserting ``of Federal educational assistance''; (C) in paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(A) Ineligibility.-- ``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a proprietary institution of higher education receiving funds provided under this title that fails to meet a requirement of subsection (a)(24) for two consecutive institutional fiscal years shall be ineligible to participate in or receive funds under any program of Federal educational assistance for a period of not less than two institutional fiscal years. ``(ii) Regaining eligibility.--To regain eligibility to participate in or receive funds under any program of Federal educational assistance after being ineligible pursuant to clause (i), a proprietary institution of higher education shall demonstrate compliance with all eligibility and certification requirements for the program for a minimum of two institutional fiscal years after the institutional fiscal year in which the institution became ineligible. In order to regain eligibility to participate in any program of Federal educational assistance under this title, such compliance shall include meeting the requirements of section 498 for such 2-year period. ``(iii) Notification of ineligibility.--The Secretary of Education shall determine when a proprietary institution of higher education that receives funds under this title is ineligible under clause (i) and shall notify all other administering Secretaries of the determination. ``(iv) Enforcement.--Each administering Secretary for a program of Federal educational assistance shall enforce the requirements of this subparagraph for the program concerned upon receiving notification under clause (iii) of a proprietary institution of higher education's ineligibility.''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B)-- (I) in the matter preceding clause (i)-- (aa) by striking ``In addition'' and all that follows through ``education fails'' and inserting ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to such other means of enforcing the requirements of a program of Federal educational assistance as may be available to the administering Secretary, if a proprietary institution of higher education that receives funds provided under this title fails''; and (bb) by striking ``the programs authorized by this title'' and inserting ``all programs of", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01085", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00217", "text": "they wore their uniforms, were subject to the usual Coast Guard discipline and were vested with the same authority as members of the regular Coast Guard of similar rank. 6 At all times the members of the Volunteer Port Security Force remained subject to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 301 et seq. They were required to register and were liable for induction into the regular armed forces. In fact, many of them did enlist or were drafted into those forces, thereby necessitating their disenrollment as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. If illness or disease occurred while on duty, they were accorded the same hospital treatment as members of the regular Coast Guard. But if they were injured or killed in the line of duty, they wr e entitled only to the benefits prescribed by law for civilian employees of the United States. Moreover, they were ineligible for the benefits of National Service Life Insurance. 7 Respondent Cohen enrolled on April 13, 1944, as a member of the Volunteer Port Security Force and was assigned to duty with the Captain of the Port, Washington, D.C. He performed his part-time duties without compensation and without interruption to his regular employment as a civilian economist in the War Department. He was disenrolled on September 5, 1945, having served on active duty on 58 days for a total service of 398 hours. Respondent Hubickey was enrolled in the Force on October 18, 1944, and was assigned to duty with the Captain of the Port, Philadelphia, Pa. He too performed his part-time duties without compensation and without interference with his regular work as a civilian naval architect in the Navy Department. On September 30, 1945, he was disenrolled, having served on active duty on 32 days for a total service of 250 hours. 8 On April 4, 1944, before the passage of the Veterans' Preference Act, the Civil Service Commission had ruled that the duties performed by those enrolled in the Volunteer Port Security Force entitled them to veterans' preference in federal employment under the then existing preference laws.9 But on November 4, 1944, after the enactment of the statute in question and pursuant to a recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Commission changed this ruling and decided that such duties did not entitle one to veterans' preference under the terms of the statute.10 9 The two respondents were", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00143", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00218", "text": "him above all deductions, without making allowance for any expenditures made by petitioner for the care or hositalization of Brandon. When petitioner refused to pay Johnson anything, he filed a libel and complaint in the United States District Court to recover the balance due on his earned wages, plus interest, transportation to Seattle (his port of signing on) and double wages for each day of unlawful delay in the payment of the sum due.1 Petitioner set up a counterclaim of $2,500, later reduced to $1,691.55, for expenses and losses caused it by Johnson's attack on Brandon.2 It contended also that the nature of this defense demonstrated the existence of sufficient statutory cause for its delay in making payment. 3 The District Court disallowed petitioner's counterclaim and entered judgment for respondent's earned wages and transportation allowance, plus interest and costs. It disallowed respondent's claim for double wages.3 91 F.Supp. 872. Petitioner appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed. 190 F.2d 991. We granted certiorari because the decision below presents an important question of maritime law not heretofore determined by this Court. 342 U.S. 940, 72 S.Ct. 562. 4 Petitioner cites several early lower court decisions which allowed a set-off against a seaman's suit for wages. These were largely rendered before the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872 or rendered later without discussion of that or subsequent legislation.4 We ar convinced, however, that the legislation passed by Congress f or the protection of seamen, beginning in 1872, has now covered this field. Petitioner's set-off is not prescribed, recognized or permitted by such legislation. So far as that legislation goes, such a set-off is not available as a defense against a seaman's claim for earned wages. R.S. § 4547, 30 Stat. 756, 46 U.S.C. § 604, 46 U.S.C.A. § 604. On the other hand, the absence of such authorization for the employer to set off such a counterclaim does not preclude it from seeking to collect the claim otherwise. 5 For the purposes of this case, we may assume that petitioner owed Brandon the legal duty to provide him with the medical care and hospitalization which it provided and also owed him the duty to divert its vessel from its course to secure his hospitalization at", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00459", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00219", "text": "Gevaert NV, Mortsel, Belgium. (8) The investigation of dumping covered the period 1 July 1991 to 30 June 1992 (investigation period). (9) Owing to the unusual complexity of a number of legal, technical and policy issues dealt with by the investigation, and the very large volume of data and submissions received from parties concerned, often requiring time limits to be extended, the investigation significantly exceeded the period of one year recommended for investigations in Article 7 (9) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88. For similar reasons, it had also already taken the Commission close to six months following the end of the five-year period of operation of the original measures, 24 February 1992, to initiate this review investigation. In accordance with Article 15 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, the original measures have remained in force during this entire period. (10) All parties concerned were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive measures. They were also granted a period within which to make representations subsequent to these disclosures. B. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE PRODUCT 1. Product concerned (11) In accordance with Article 7 (9) (b) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, the anti-dumping proceeding which was initiated on 2 August 1985 concerning imports of photocopying apparatus originating in Japan, continues as long as the measures have not expired or been repealed or terminated. There is therefore no change in the product concerned by the proceeding. The product was defined as 'photo-copying apparatus incorporating an optical system`, 'formed by four basic elements, i.e. image processing, photo-conducting or developing, transfer or fixing and paper transport system` (1), or in short as 'plain paper photocopiers (PPCs)` (2). (12) As the name indicates, such copiers use plain paper instead of coated paper to make copies. PPCs have now almost entirely replaced coated paper copiers for normal applications. Whereas coated paper copiers use a direct process to transfer the image of an original document onto a chemically treated sheet of paper, PPCs are based on an indirect process, whereby the optical system (comprising mainly a light source, a condenser, lenses, mirrors, prisms or an", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00549", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00220", "text": "action from the business of the taxpayer is precisely the same as though the tax had been levied upon the interstate business itself.5 But the choice of a local incident for the tax, without more, is not enough. There are always convenient local incidents in every interstate operation. Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra, 327 U.S. at 423, 66 S.Ct. 589, 90 L.Ed. 760. The incident selected should be one that does not lend itself to repeated exactions in other states. Otherwise intrastate commerce may be preferred over interstate commerce.6 Again, where there is a state exaction for some intrastate privilege that discriminates against interstate commerce, it is invalid even though it is sufficiently disconnected from the commerce to be taxable otherwise.7 10 The Mississippi tax under consideration is not discriminatory. It is levied, in addition to ad valorem taxes, on corporations created under Mississippi laws, those admitted to do business in Mississippi and those operating in the state without any authority from the state. See note 1, supra. Petitioner operated local compressor stations. We have heretofore held that the generation of electric energy for the operation of such stations was subject to state taxation withou violation of the Commerce Clause. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043. A glance at the activities, named above, listed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, shows that there is no possibility of multiple taxation through the same exactions by other states. The amount of the tax is reasonable.8 It is properly apportioned to the investment in Mississippi.9 11 However, a state tax upon a corporation doing only an interstate business may be invalid under our decisions because levied (1) upon the privilege of doing interstate business within the state,10 or (2) upon some local event so much a part of interstate business as to be in effect a tax upon the interstate business itself.11 Petitioner asserts that the Mississippi statute so offends. 12 First. This Court has drawn the distinction in the field of pipe line taxation between state statutes on the privilege of doing business where only interstate business was done and those upon appropriate local incidents. In Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 45 S.Ct. 184,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00196", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00221", "text": "483, 60 S.Ct. 628, 630, 84 L.Ed 876; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101. But in absence of uch a showing the federal court in the interest of dispatch should proceed to determine the questions, relying on such sources of local law as may be available, including information from state regulatory agencies. The federal court may in its discretion disburse the funds directly to either the local distributing companies or the ultimate consumers or work out an administrative scheme whereby the distribution is made pursuant to directives of state agencies. 9 In conclusion, the task of the federal court in distributing the fund accumulated by virtue of its stay order is to undo the wrong which its process caused. The basic problem, therefore, is not to fix rates but to determine who suffered a loss as a result of the court's action in granting the stay. What in fact would have happened as a consequence of federal or state law if the stay had not been issued, no one can know for a certainty. But the federal court must make its prognostication, whether an excursion into federal or state law questions is entailed. Distribution of the fund should not involve prolonged litigation. It is an administrative matter involving the exercise of an informed judgment by the federal court and should have the flexibility and dispatch which characterize the administrative process. 10 Reversed. 11 FRANKFURTER, Justice, concurring. 12 While agreeing in substance with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS's opinion, because of the conflict of views to which the case has given rise I deem it desirable to spell out with particularity what I regard as the controlling considerations. 13 1. The controversy concerns the proper disposition of a fund impounded in the Court of Appeals by virtue of the Court's suspension of a rate reduction order of the Federal Power Commission. Interstate paid into the registry of the court the sums collected by it in excess of the rates fixed by the Commission. After the order was finally sustained Interstate moved the court for distribution of the fund to the three companies which, as customers of Interstate, paid the unlawfully exacted amounts. The motion was supported by the three purchasers from Interstate; it was resisted by the Federal Power Commission which asked that distribution be made to the ultimate consumers; it was also resisted by the City of Jackson and by the regulatory commissions of Illinois and Missouri", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00254", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00222", "text": "rimination may be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state.'9 The Twining case likewise disposed of the contention that freedom from testimonial compulsion, being specifically granted by the Bill of Rights, is a federal privilege or immunity that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state invasion. This Court held that the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of this protction agai nst the power of the national government did not make the privilege a federal privilege or immunity secured to citizens by the Constitution against state action. Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 211 U.S. at pages, 98, 99, 29 S.Ct. at page 19, 53 L.Ed. 97; Palko v. Connecticut, supra, 302 U.S. at page 328, 58 S.Ct. at page 153, 82 L.Ed. 288. After declaring that state and national citizenship co-exist in the same person, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. As a matter of words, this leaves a state free to abridge, within the limits of the due process clause, the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship. This reading of the Federal Constitution has heretofore found favor with the majority of this Court as a natural and logical interpretation. It accords with the constitutional doctrine of federalism by leaving to the states the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of their citizens except those inherent in national citizenship.10 It is the construction placed upon the amendment by justices whose own experience had given them contemporaneous knowledge of the purposes that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. This construction has become embedded in our federal system as a functioning element in preserving the balance between national and state power. We reaffirm the conclusion of the Twining and Palko cases that protection against self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. 7 Appellant secondly contends that if the privilege against self-incrimination is not a right protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action, this privilege, to its full scope under the Fifth Amendment, inheres in the right to a fair trial. A right to a fair trial is a right admittedly protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Therefore, appellant argues, the due process clause", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00111", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00223", "text": "SECTION 1. GRANTING OF COPYRIGHT. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, copyright is hereby granted to Inna Hecker Grade and her successors and assigns in the works set forth in section 2 by Chaim Grade, including all editions in English and translations heretofore published or hereafter published by Inna Hecker Grade or her successors or assigns, for a term of 50 years from June 26, 1982 (the date of death of Chaim Grade). The copyright owner shall be entitled to all rights and remedies provided to copyright owners generally by law, except that no liability shall attach under this Act for lawful uses made or acts done before the date of enactment of this Act in connection with such works, or in respect to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business undertaking or enterprise lawfully undertaken before such date involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, or circulation of such works. SEC. 2. WORK SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT. The following works of Chaim Grade (including lectures and essays) are covered by section 1: (1) ``Yo'' (``Yes''); (2) ``Musarnikes'' (``Mussarists''); (3) ``Dojrois'' (``Generations''); (4) ``Oyf di Hurves'' (``On the Ruins''); (5) ``Pleitim'' (``Refugees''); (6) ``Farvoksene Vegn'' (``Overgrown Paths''); (7) ``Der Mames Tzavoe'' (``The Mother's Will''); (8) ``Shayn fun Farloshene Shtern'' (``Shine of the Extinguished Stars''); (9) ``Mayn Krig Mit Hersh Rassayner'' (``My Quarrel with Hersh Rassayner''); (10) ``Yerushalaim shel Maylah, Yerushalaim shel Matah'' (``The Heavenly Jerusalem and the Earthly Jerusalem''); (11) ``Hurbin''; (12) ``Vilna'', with 5 major parts entitled: (A) ``Vilna''; (B) ``Di Shank'' (``The Tavern''); (C) ``Der Ger-Tzadik'' (``The Convert''); (D) ``Di", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00882", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00224", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 525/2008 of 12 June 2008 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 of 21 December 2007 laying down implementing rules of Council Regulations (EC) No 2200/96, (EC) No 2201/96 and (EC) No 1182/2007 in the fruit and vegetable sector (1), and in particular Article 138(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto. (2) In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The standard import values referred to in Article 138 of Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 shall be fixed as indicated in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 13 June 2008. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 12 June 2008.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 316, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00819", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00225", "text": "4 or 5 requires to be conducted pursuant to this section— 38 '(a) Presiding Officers.—There shall preside at the taking of evidence (1) the agency, (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or (3) one or more examiners appointed as provided in this Act; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute. * * *' 60 Stat. 237, 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1006. 39 The Government argues that immigrant inspectors are'specially provided for by or designated pursuant to' § 16 of the Immigration Act, which, in pertinent part, reads: '* * * The inspection * * * of aliens, including those seeking admission or readmission to or the privilege of passing through or residing in the United States, and the examination of aliens arrested within the United States under this Act,33 shall be conducted by immigrant inspectors, except as hereinafter provided in regard to boards of special inquiry. * * * Said inspectors shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, and, where such action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence; * * *' 39 Stat. 874, 885, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 152, 8 U.S.C.A. § 152. 40 Certainly nothing here specifically provides that immigrant inspectors shall conduct deportation hearings or be designated to do so. This language does direct them to conduct border inspections of aliens seeking admission. They may administer oaths and take, record, and consider evidence. But these functions are indispensable to investigations which are concededly within their competence. And these functions are likewise necessary to enable the preparation of complaints for prosecutive purposes. But that Congress by grant of these powers has specially constituted them or provided for their designation as hearing officers in deportation proceedings does not appear. 41 Section 7(a) qualifies as presiding officers at hearings the agency and one or more of the members of the body comprising the agency, and it also leaves untouched any others whose responsibilities and duties as hearing officers are established by other", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00347", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00226", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1745/2001 of 31 August 2001 suspending the buying-in of butter in certain Member States THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2771/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards intervention on the market in butter and cream(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1614/2001(4), and in particular Article 2 thereof, Whereas: (1) Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2771/1999 lays down that buying-in by invitation to tender is to be opened or suspended by the Commission in a Member State, as appropriate, once it is observed that, for two weeks in succession, the market price in that Member State is below or equal to or above 92 % of the intervention price. (2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1432/2001 of 14 July 2001 suspending the buying-in of butter in certain Member States(5) establishes the most recent list of Member States in which intervention is suspended. This list must be adjusted as a result of the market prices communicated by Ireland under Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 2771/1999. In the interests of clarity, the list in question should be replaced and Regulation (EC) No 1432/2001 should be repealed, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Buying-in of butter by invitation to tender as provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 is hereby suspended in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 1432/2001 is hereby repealed. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 September 2001. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00745", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00227", "text": "for the first time in Nos. 697 and 702. Certiorari is granted in these cases. 5 (2) Subsequent to the issuance of the above Restraining Order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found named petitioners to be in civil contempt of its prior decrees by reason of, inter alia, their activities in connection with obtaining the temporary injunction on behalf of the United States in its suit in the Northern District of California, referred to in the Restraining Order. The order of contempt has been stayed pending disposition of Nos. 697 and 702 as well as the forthcoming petitions for certiorari directed to the contempt order. Motion of respondents to vacate the stay is denied. 6 (3) No action is taken at this time on petitioners' motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of our denial of certiorari in No. 353. 340 U.S. 884, 71 S.Ct. 198. The motion is continued on the docket so that there may be no question as to this Court's control over No. 353 for whatever action may be deemed appropriate. 7 (4) It has been suggested that this Court delay the normal ending of the October Term, 1950, and hear argument within a matter of weeks. No motion for advancement has been filed. 8 We agree that expeditious disposition of the important issues in this lengthy proceeding is highly desirable. But our desire for expedition must be weighed against the danger to orderly presentation of important issues inherent in hasty briefing and argument. And this is particularly so when it is suggested that we hear argument not only in Nos. 697 and 702 now before us, but also in the cases to come to us from the order of civil contempt in which petitions for certiorari are to be filed. 9 There is a further consideration militating against premature disposition of the issues presented. There is now pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California an action brought by the United States for adjudication of its claim of title in the same shares of stock as those involved in the instant cases. We have heretofore held that judgments entered in the instant cases would not be res judicata against the United States. Land v. Dollar, 1947, 330 U.S. 731, 736, 737, 739, 67 S.Ct. 100", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00412", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00228", "text": "appeal from the challenged order is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 349a, 28 U.S.C.A. § 349a. 4 The Court was also of the view that § 265 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 379, barred any injunction against the state officials. 5 The appellant sought njunctions against future eviction of these tenants through writs of restitution or other process by which eviction might be consummated. Sections 2(d), 4(a) and 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and Rent Regulation § 6(a), set out below.8 Such an injunction is in accord with the administrative Interpretations of the Rent Regulation.9 The properties involved in this litigation were defense-area housing accommodations. There is no suggestion that the heretofore referred to sections of the price control acts and § 6 of the Rent Regulations for Housing do not authorize these legal proceedings. The constitutionality of the price control acts, generally considered, is unquestioned. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892. The sole inquiry for us, at this point, is whether it was erroneous for the district court to refuse to allow the temporary injunction, because to do so would invade the constitutional right of the landlord appellees to retain the fruits of their'vested rights' in the valid judgments. 6 As the appellant is undertaking to enjoin future eviction of the tenants or lessees, our consideration is not affected by the proviso of § 18 of the Extension Act, set out in the margin.10 The retroactive provision of § 18, quoted above at note 2, is inapposite for the same reason. It is immaterial whether the state judgments were obtained before or after the effective date of the Extension Act. The effort of the appellant is to enjoin future proceedings for eviction after the acquisition by the landlord appellees through valid judgments of what the district court characterized as'vested rights.' Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through fore", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00062", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00229", "text": "Ltd. Laporte CIL Canadian Industries, Ltd. CTP Canadian Titanium Pigments, Ltd. Kokusan Kokusan Kogyo or KK Kabushiki Kaisha TK Titan Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Terres Rares Societe des Produits Chimiques des Terres Rares Thann Fabriques des Produits Chimiques de Thann et de Mulhouse Montecatini Societa Anonima Titanium Aussig Verein fur Chemische und Metallurgische Produktion '4. The term 'patents as herein defined' shall mean United States letters patent and applications as follows: (a) the letters patent and patent applications listed in Appendix A hereof; (b) all divisions, continuations or reissues of any of the foregoing patents and applications; (c) all patents issued upon such applications; (d) all patents which cover any titanium pigments or any process for the manufacture of titanium pigments issued to any of the defendants within five years from the date of this decree; and all such patents which any of the defendants acquires within such five years; and all such patents of which any of the defendants becomes the exclusive licensee within such five years with power to sublicense. '5. The following agreements are hereby adjudged to be unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and each of them is hereby cancelled and the defendants and each of them and all persons acting or claiming to act through, for or under them and all successors and subsidiaries of any of the defendants are hereby enjoined and restrained from the further performance of any of the provisions of said agreements and of any agreements amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto: 'Agreement dated July 30, 1920, between TP and TAS (Exhibit A); 'Agreement between TP and Krebs dated January 1, 1933, as amended January 1, 1941 (Exhibits E and E—3); 'Agreements dated July 30, 1920, between NL, TP, The Titanium Alloy Manufacturing Company and TAS (Exhibits A—1 and A—2); 'Agreement between TAS and SIT dated March 3, 1927 (Exhibit B); 'Agreement between TAS and IG dated October 3 and 20, 1927 (Exhibit C); 'Agreement between TAS and IG signed June 24 and October 20, 1927 (Exhibit C—1); 'Ag", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00100", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00230", "text": "those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to \"all other companies\". (107) Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting-up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission(5) forthwith with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with e.g. that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. The Commission, if appropriate, will, after consultation of the Advisory Committee, amend the Regulation accordingly by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates. I. FINAL PROVISION (108) In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which the interested parties which made themselves known within the time limit specified in the notice of initiation may make their views known in writing and request a hearing. Furthermore, it should be stated that the findings concerning the imposition of duties made for the purposes of this Regulation are provisional and may have to be reconsidered for the purpose of any definitive duty, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. A provisional anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of sodium cyclamate, currently classifiable within CN code ex 2929 90 00 (TARIC code 2929 90 00 10 ), originating in the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. 2. The rate of the provisional anti-dumping duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-frontier price for products manufactured by the companies listed below shall be as follows: >TABLE> 3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 4. The release for free circulation in the Community of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security, equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty. Article 2 Without prejudice to Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96, interested parties may request disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which this Regulation was adopted, make their views known in writing and apply to be heard orally by the Commission within 30 days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. Pursuant to Article 21(4) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96, the parties concerned may comment on", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00661", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00231", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 12 January 1989 approving a programme submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany for the livestock and meat sector in Hamburg pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 355/77 (Only the German text is authentic) (89/87/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 355/77 of 15 February 1977 on common measures to improve the conditions under which agricultural and fishery products are processed and marketed (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1760/87 (2), and in particular Article 5 thereof, Whereas the German Government forwarded a programme for the livestock and meat sector in Hamburg on 23 July 1985 and supplied additional information on 18 March and 16 September 1986 and 18 January 1987; Whereas the said programme relates to the rationalization and modernization of abattoirs, cutting and refrigerating facilities and cold stores and is intended to make the sector more competitive and increase the value of its products; whereas it therefore constitutes a programme within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 355/77; Whereas the programme contains sufficient information, as required by Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 355/77, to show that the objectives laid down in Article 1 of the said Regulation can be achieved in respect of the livestock and meat sector in Hamburg; whereas the time allowed for implementation of the programme does not exceed the limits referred to in Article 3 (1) (g) of the Regulation; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Agricultural Structure, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The programme for the livestock and meat sector in Hamburg forwarded by the German Government pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 355/77 on 23 July 1985, concerning which additional information was supplied on 18 March and 16 September 1986 and 18 January 1987, is hereby approved. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Brussels, 12 January 1989.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 469, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00669", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00232", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Northern Mariana Islands College Access Act of 2009''. SEC. 2. PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Act to establish a program that enables college-bound residents of the Northern Mariana Islands to have greater choices among institutions of higher education. SEC. 3. PUBLIC SCHOOL GRANTS. (a) Grants.-- (1) In general.--From amounts appropriated under subsection (i), the Governor shall award grants to eligible institutions that enroll eligible students to pay the difference between the tuition and fees charged for in-State students and the tuition and fees charged for out-of-State students on behalf of each eligible student enrolled in the eligible institution. (2) Maximum student amounts.--The amount paid on behalf of an eligible student under this section shall be-- (A) not more than $15,000 for any one award year (as defined in section 481 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088)); and (B) not more than $75,000 in the aggregate. (3) Proration.--The Governor shall prorate payments under this section for students who attend an eligible institution on less than a full-time basis. (b) Reduction for Insufficient Appropriations.-- (1) In general.--If the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (i) for any fiscal year are insufficient to award a grant in the amount determined under subsection (a) on behalf of each eligible student enrolled in an eligible institution, then the Governor, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, shall-- (A) first, ratably reduce the amount of the tuition and fee payment made on behalf of each eligible student who has not received funds under this section for a preceding year; and (B) after making reductions under subparagraph (A), ratably reduce the amount of the tuition and fee payments made on behalf of all other eligible students. (2) Adjustments.--The Governor, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, may adjust the amount of tuition and fee payments made under paragraph (1) based on-- (A) the financial need of the eligible students to avoid undue hardship to the eligible students; or (B) undue administrative burdens on the Governor. (3) Further adjustments.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Governor may prioritize the making or amount of tuition and fee payments under this subsection based on the income and need of eligible students.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01135", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00233", "text": "it to any extent, though the time thus spent is not five minutes daily or weekly. 'Substantial effect' in these instances has little if any relation, negatively speaking, to'substantial time.' Driving and the work of mechanical repair of trucks are obvious examples. Loading may be another, less obviously as the Court says, but depending upon the circumstances under which it is done.6 So with the work of helpers in these three functions. 70 Notwithstanding the Commission's contrary finding,7 this means that all employees who do any part of certain kinds of work, for however short a time, regularly or casually, fall within the Commission's power. It means, for instance, that a person who spends ten minutes a day or an hour a week in driving or in mechanically repairing trucks, and the remaining 39 hours of a 40-hour week in work having no effect upon safety falls within the Commission's authority. For, in such circumstances, it cannot be held that the comparatively minute amount of time spent in work affecting safety is trivial or inconsequential in its possible effects upon safety. And in the Court's view, as I understand it, the result is not only that the Commission has power to prescribe the qualifications of all such employees,8 but also that they are thereby exempted from the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 71 It is from the latter conclusion that I dissent. I cannot believe that Congress, when it incorporated § 13(b)(1) in the statute, intended to exclud from those provisions every employee who might spend ten minutes a day in work substantially affecting safety and seven hours and fifty minutes in work having no effect whatever upon it. An exactly literal application of § 13(b)(1), it is true, would lead to this result. But we are frequently told that rigidly literal application of a statute may be ruinous to achieving its purposes.9 It is especially so in this instance, in view of the nature and purposes of the Act we are construing, for a variety of reasons. 72 The legislative history shows, in my judgment, that Congress did not have in mind so expansive and destructive an exemption as literal application of § 13(b)(1) and the Court's ruling10 would produce. Congress clearly intended to exempt some employees who do not devote all their time to such work. But at the time it acted its primary concern and that of the Commission11 were with fulltime employees, principally drivers,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00055", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00234", "text": "GF and 40 % by the Guidance Section; whereas the said measures count as intervention within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 and constitute a common measure within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of that Regulation; whereas it is therefore necessary to include Guidance Section expenditure when clearing the accounts in respect of expenditure financed by the EAGGF;Whereas the present Decision does not prejudge the financial consequences which may be drawn in any subsequent clearance of accounts for national aids in accordance with Article 93 of the Treaty or infringement procedures under Article 169 of the Treaty currently in progress or concluded after the date of 31 March 1985 or as a result of infringements in 1981 or national aids incompatible with the Treaty paid in 1981 having affected the expenditure charged to the EAGGF in any financial year subsequent to that of 1981;Whereas the present Decision does not prejudge the financial consequences which may be drawn in any subsequent clearance of accounts relating to current investigations, financial losses resulting from irregularities in the meaning of Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) N° 729/70 or judgments by the Court of Justice on cases currently under consideration and concerning matters which are also the subject of this Decision,HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 1. The expenditure by Belgium recognized as chargeable to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee Section, in respect of the 1981 financial year amounts, in accordance with Annex I, to Bfrs 20 462 666 547.2. The expenditure recognized as chargeable to the EAGGF, pursuant to Regulation (EEC) N° 1078/77, amounts, in accordance with Annex II, to Bfrs 94 493 454.3. The amount of Bfrs 91 539 383 relating to expenditure declared in respect of premium for leaf tobacco is not the subject of the present Decision.Article 2The financial resources available at the end of 1981 amount, in accordance with Annex I, to Bfrs 1 462 903 966 and, in accordance with Annex II, to Bfrs 1 754. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Belgium. Done at Brussels, 28 August 1985.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 480, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00746", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00235", "text": "and supplemental thereto. SEC. 6. AGREEMENTS. Funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be made available to the District or a local agency only if the District or local agency, as applicable, has entered into a binding agreement with the Secretary-- (1) under which the District or the local agency is required to pay the non-Federal share of the costs of construction required by section 4(a); and (2) governing the funding of planning, design, and compliance activities costs under section 4(b). SEC. 7. REIMBURSEMENT. For project work (including work associated with studies, planning, design, and construction) carried out by the District or by a local agency acting pursuant to the State statute in section 2 before the date amounts are provided for the project under this Act, the Secretary shall, subject to amounts being made available in advance in appropriations Acts, reimburse the District or the local agency, without interest, an amount equal to the estimated Federal share of the cost of such work under section 4. SEC. 8. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. (a) In General.--The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements and contracts with the District to assist the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this Act. (b) Subcontracting.--Under such cooperative agreements and contracts, the Secretary may authorize the District to manage and let contracts and receive reimbursements, subject to amounts being made available in advance in appropriations Acts, for work carried out under such contracts or subcontracts. SEC. 9. RELATIONSHIP TO RECLAMATION REFORM ACT OF 1982. Activities carried out, and financial assistance provided, under this Act shall not be considered a supplemental or additional benefit for purposes of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 1263; 43 U.S.C. 390aa et seq.). SEC. 10. APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this Act $25,000,000, plus such additional amount, if any, as may be required by reason of changes in costs of services of the types involved in the District's projects as shown by engineering and other relevant indexes. Sums appropriated under this section shall remain available until expended.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 466, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00884", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00236", "text": "business of such licensee, any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or '(2) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value in lieu of giving, or on account of failure to give, employment to any person or persons, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or '(3) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee; or '(4) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value for services, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, which are not to be performed; * * *. '(c) The provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not be held to make unlawful the enforcement or attempted enforcement, by means lawfully employed, of any contract right heretofore or hereafter existing or of any legal obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred or assumed. '(d) Whoever willfully violates any provision of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. * * *' 60 Stat. 89, 90, 47 U.S.C. § 506(a, c, d), 47 U.S.C.A. § 506(a, c, d). 7 For a report of the subsequent trial and acquittal on the merits, see United States v. Petrillo, D.C., 75 F.Supp. 176. 8 In its report of December 31, 1948, the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, established under § 401 of the Taft-Hartley Act, later reviewed the litigation arising under § 8(b)(6), including the trial examiner's report in the instant case, and recommended 'a continuing study of cases arising under the present featherbedding provision, since there has not been sufficient experience upon which to base intelligent amendments at this time.' S.Rep.No.986, Pt. 3, 82th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, and see pp. 58—61. See", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00478", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00237", "text": "was the first time he was in the custody of Nebraska. There is not the slightest proof or suggestion by the defendant or his counsel that Nebraska officials abused, threatened, or unduly questioned him. On the contrary, he willingly told how he beat his paramour to death in a fit of jealousy. The only complaint against Nebraska is that it detained Gallegos an unduly long time before arraignment. Even if it did, the delay was after confession and therefore could not have been for any sinister purpose of coercing one, nor could the detention have been the cause of confession. There is not, from any state action by Nebraska, the slightest ground for inference that the confession to its officials was not given voluntarily. 28 Upon the trial, however, the prosecution proved not only the Nebraska confession but also an earlier one made in Texas. In connection with the latter, vague allegations are made against the Texas officials. Perhaps the prosecution would have been well advised not to have proved how the murder originally came to light. But the prosecution chose to lay the whole matter before the jury, and had it failed to do so it would no doubt have been charged with some sinister purpose in its suppression. 29 Even if we should assume that Texas officials coerced this confession, they were not acting at the request of Nebraska nor in any sense as her agent. Before we could reverse the conviction, we would have to decide a question not heretofore answered in any decision that I recall, namely, whether Nebraska merely by admitting a coerced foreign confession in evidence would deny due process. Insofar as the reason for exclusion is to prevent convictions on coerced confessions, which are shown by legal experience to be intrinsically unreliable, I should suppose that any defect in its origin would inhere in the confession wherever offered. Insofar, however, as the reason for exclusion is to deter states from attempting coercion in order to bring about convictions, the reason would hardly apply to a case where a state of confession sought no conviction and the state of conviction did not seek the confession. But here there is no need to resolve such difficult questions in affirming the conviction, for I find no coercion such as would require exclusion of this confession, even if Nebraska be held to answer for the conduct of every official involved. 30 Gallegos was taken into custody by the Texas authorities at the request of the United States immigration service. They had probable cause to believe he was illegally in the country, as", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00420", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00238", "text": "intersection of Hartford Road (State Route 85) and Round Hill Road to the East Branch of the Eightmile River, as a scenic river. ``(D) The 1.9-mile segment of Beaver Brook from Cedar Pond Brook to the main stem of the Eightmile River, as a scenic river. ``(E) The 0.7-mile segment of Falls Brook from Tisdale Brook to the main stem of the Eightmile River at Hamburg Cove, as a scenic river.''. (d) Management.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary shall manage the Eightmile River in accordance with the Management Plan and such amendments to the Plan as the Secretary determines to be consistent with this section. (2) Management plan.--The Management Plan shall be considered to satisfy each requirement for a comprehensive management plan that is required by section 3(d) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1274(d)). (e) Committee.--The Secretary shall coordinate the management responsibilities of the Secretary relating to the Eightmile River with the Eightmile River Coordinating Committee, as described in the Management Plan. (f) Cooperative Agreements.-- (1) In general.--Pursuant to sections 10(e) and 11(b)(1) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(e), 1282(b)(1)), the Secretary may enter into a cooperative agreement with-- (A) the State of Connecticut; (B) the towns of-- (i) Salem, Connecticut; (ii) Lyme, Connecticut; and (iii) East Haddam, Connecticut; and (C) appropriate local planning and environmental organizations. (2) Consistency with management plan.--Each cooperative agreement authorized by this subsection-- (A) shall be consistent with the Management Plan; and (B) may include provisions for financial or other assistance from the United States. (g) Relation to National Park System.--Notwithstanding section 10(c) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1281(c)), the Eightmile River shall not-- (1) be administered as part of the National Park System; or (2) be subject to regulations that govern the National Park System. (h) Land Management.-- (1) Zoning ordinances.--With respect to the Eightmile River, each zoning ordinance adopted by the towns of Salem, East Haddam, and Lyme, Connecticut, in", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01005", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00239", "text": "the Board for findings merely as to compliance with the orders sought to be enforced. That court's decisions preclude such intendment. Since the record permits, we ought to attribute to a Court of Appeals not a willful disregard of principle and, as such, an abuse of discretion, but an honest desire to get light on happenings after the Board's orders relevant to its duties as a court of equity. Courts of Appeals are also human institutions. By attributing to the Court of Appeals an abusive exercise of discretion when the record may fairly be otherwise interpreted, we not only needlessly rebuke that court; we take action calculated to chill other judges in exercising with utter freedom a discretion which we have heretofore pronounced they possess. 26 I would leave the action of the Court of Appeals to take the course which I believe wisely should have been taken when their orders were entered. To that end, I would dismiss these writs as improvidently granted. 1 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. 2 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 141 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. 3 146 of the 164 valid votes were cast in favor of the union, of the approximately 186 eligible voters. 4 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1938, 303 U.S. 261, 271, 58 S.Ct. 571, 576, 82 L.Ed. 831, 115 A.L.R. 307; Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 1938, 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126; National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 1949, 337 U.S. 217, 225, 69 S.Ct. 960, 963; National Labor Relations Board v. Draper Corp., 1 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 294, 297; National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 2 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 862, 869—870", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00362", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00240", "text": "applicant. 'Upon obtaining a permit as herein required the holder of such permit shall be entitled to an identification card of such design, and bearing such number as the sheriff may prescribe, upon payment of a fee of $1.00 annually, therefor, which shall be paid by the applicant to the tax collector and shall be due on the 1st day of June of each year. Such card shall be carried by the permittee during all business hours and shall not be transferable. 'Each applicant for a permit shall be examined by the sheriff as to his knowledge of the provisions of this ordinance, the Vehicle Code, traffic regulations and the geography of the county, and if the result of the examination is unsatisfactory he shall be refused a permit. The sheriff may deny the application or having issued the permit may revoke the same if the sheriff shall determine that the applicant or taxicab driver is of bad moral character or is guilty of violation of any of the provisions of this ordinance or of any lawful regulation promulgated pursuant thereto or has been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.' 1 'Section 9. (Amended by Ord. No. 609 (New Series) adopted 5—12—47; and again amended by Ord. 958 (New Series) adopted 4—10 50, to read as follows:) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or to be in actual physical control of any taxicab in the unincorporated area of the County of San Diego without first obtaining a permit in writing so to do from the sheriff of the County of San Diego. 'Applicants for such permits shall file applications therefor with the sheriff of the County of San Diego on a form furnished by the sheriff which, when completed, will contain full personal information concerning the applicant. 'Upon obtaining a permit as herein required the holder of such permit shall be entitled to an identification card of such design, and bearing such number as the sheriff may prescribe, upon payment of a fee of $1.00 annually, therefor, which shall be paid by the applicant to the tax collector and shall be due on the 1st day of June of each year. Such card shall be carried by the permittee during all business hours and shall not be transferable. 'Each applicant for a permit shall be examined by the sheriff as to his knowledge of the provisions of this ordinance, the Vehicle Code, traffic regulations and the geography of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00441", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00241", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1306/95 of 8 June 1995 amending Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 of 18 May 1972 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables (1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 997/95 (2), and in particular Article 23 (2) thereof, Whereas Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables (3), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 553/95 (4), introduces a mechanism for recording prices on the representative markets with a view to fixing a standard import value in order to determine the value of products imported on consignment so that they can be classified in the Common Customs Tariff; whereas, in the case of certain fresh products imported for processing, separate entry prices apply from 1 May and, for such products, which are not sold on consignment on the representative markets, a direct price recording mechanism may be used for their tariff classification; whereas the said mechanism may involve only the tariff classification of the products concerned on the basis either of the fob price of the products, plus the costs of insurance and freight up to the borders of the Community customs territory, or of the customs value referred to in Article 30 (2) (c) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (5), as amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden; Whereas, if the customs authorities consider that a security is required pursuant to Article 248 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (6), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3254/94 (7), they must require an amount equal to the maximum amount of duty applicable to the product in question to be lodged; whereas, if the importer chooses to classify his products on the basis of", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00674", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00242", "text": ", is today less accessible to free enterprise than when it was first launched.' 63 F.Supp. 513, 532. If defendants are allowed royalties on those patents, they do, indeed, reap dividends from their unlawful activities. As stated in a dissent in the Hartford-Empire case, 'Every dollar hereafter, as well as heretofore, secured from licenses on the patents illegally aggregated in he combina tion's hands is money to which the participants are not entitled by virtue of the patent laws or others. It is the immediate product of the conspiracy.' 323 U.S. at page 443, 65 S.Ct. at page 400, 89 L.Ed. 322. 107 But beyond that is the effect on the industry. Here defendants have been in a commanding and impregnable position. They have dominated the field and suppressed competition. If competition is to be restored strong measures must be adopted to provide the maximum opportunity for new ventures to compete with the established giants of the industry. It is here that the major vice of permitting royalties on the licensed patents becomes apparent. Each dollar of royalty adds a dollar to the costs of the new competitor and gives the established licensor another dollar with which to fight that competition. As stated by National Lead in its brief before this Court: 108 'National and du Pont not only compete with their licensees but dominate the titanium industry. A requirement of uniform, reasonable royalties in no way frees competition because, no matter what the royalty may be in this industry a licensee required to pay more than its licensor will be at a competitive disadvantage.' 109 'Compulsory licensing alone would not be enough to restore the industry to a healthy, competitive condition. If National and du Pont are permitted to receive royalties on their existing patents, they will still be in position to dominate the industry.' 110 If National Lead, the world's largest producer of titanium pigments, expects to find itself at a competitive disadvantage as a result of reasonable royalty licenses, what can be the probable fate of newcomers or existing independents of small statute?4 111 The decree approved by the Court stops short of granting effective relief. Divestiture is refused. Compulsory licensing is ordered, but only to those who are willing reciprocally to license use by the defendants of their patents. In this additional respect the decree will enable the large established companies to strengthen their dominant position. To get the benefits of the decree an independent must", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00099", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00243", "text": "), by adding at the end of the table the following new item: ``October 1.................... Department of Treasury report to Congress estimating amount of income tax designated pursuant to section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''; (2) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``, and sequestration to reduce the public debt,'' after ``sequestration''; (3) in subsection (c), by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6) and by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: ``(5) Reports on sequestration to reduce the public debt.-- The preview reports shall set forth for the budget year estimates for each of the following: ``(A) The aggregate amount designated under section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for the last taxable year ending before the budget year. ``(B) The amount of reductions required under section 253A and the deficit remaining after those reductions have been made. ``(C) The sequestration percentage necessary to achieve the required reduction in accounts under section 253A(b).''; and (4) in subsection (f), by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph: ``(4) Reports on sequestration to reduce the public debt.-- The final reports shall contain all of the information contained in the public debt taxation designation report required on October 1.''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in section 250(a) of the the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 253 the following new item: ``Sec. 253A. Sequestration to reduce the public debt.''. (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 275(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the expiration date set forth in that section shall not apply to the amendments made by this section. The amendments made by this section shall cease to have any effect after the first fiscal year during which there is no public debt.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 445, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01066", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00244", "text": ". 440, 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L.Ed. 736, 112 A.L.R. 1455; United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 60 S.Ct. 1034, 84 L.Ed. 1356; United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S.Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed. 726, this case is brought squarely within the prohibition of § 313. This is conclusively established by the excerpts from the legislative discussion quoted in the Court's opinion. Others to the same effect are added to this one as an appendix. 70 Moreover in his message vetoing the Labor Management Act of 1947 the President stated that § 313 'would prevent the ordinary union newspaper from commenting favorably or unfavorably upon candidates or issues in national elections.' H.R.Doc. No. 334, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9. In the debate preliminary to the overriding of the veto, none of the legislators in charge of the measure gave any indication that they differed with the Presidet's interpretation. Nor could they have differed, for the statement in the veto message gave effect to their clearly expressed views as to the section's coverage in the specific instance stated. 71 Thus, in the face of the legislative judgment, reiterated after veto, and of the Chief Executive's in making his veto, this Court sets aside the one clearly intended feature of the statute apart from its general objectives. I doubt that upon any matter of construction the Court has heretofore so far presumed to override the plainly and incontrovertibly stated judgment of all participants in the legislative process with its own tortuously fashioned view. This is not construction under the doctrine of strict necessity. It is invasion of the legislative process by emasculation of the statute. The only justification for this is to avoid deciding the question of validity. II. 72 We are concerned in this case with the constitutionality of § 313 as amended only insofar as it may be applied in restriction or abridgment of the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly secured by the First Amendment.16 Other applications are not in question.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00194", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00245", "text": "an ordinance of the City of Struthers, Ohio, forbidding the summoning of the occupants of a residence to the door, our less extreme cases had created comment. See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) 406.27 27 To the city council falls the duty of protecting its citizens against the practices deemed subversive of privacy and of quiet. A householder depends for protection on his city board rather than churlishly guarding his entrances with orders forbidding the entrance of solicitors. A sign would have to be a small billboard to make the differentiations between the welcome and unwelcome that can be written in an ordinance once cheaply for all homes. 28 'The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.'28 29 When there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power of Louisiana.29 Changing living conditions or variations in the experiences or habits of different communities may well call for different legislative regulations as to methods and manners of doing business. Powers of municipalities are subject to control by the states. Their judgment of local needs is made from a more intimate knowledge of local conditions than that of any other legislative body. We cannot say that this ordinance of Alexandria so burdens or impedes interstate commerce as to exceed the regulatory powers of that city. 30 First Amendment.—Finally we come to a point not heretofore urged in this Court as a ground for the invalidation of a Green River ordinance. This is that such an ordinance is an abridgment of freedom of speech and the press. Only the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this point. It was not open to the solicitors for gadgets or brushes. The point is not that the press is free of the ordinary restraints and regulations of the modern state, such as taxation or labor regulation, referred to above at note 24, but, as stated in appellant's brief, 'because the ordinance places an arbitrary, unreasonable and undue burden upon a well established and essential method of distribution and circulation of lawful magazines and periodicals and, in effect, is tantamount to a prohibition of the utilization of such method.' Regulation necessarily has elements of prohibition. Thus the argument", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00416", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00246", "text": "53728, falling within CN codes 3907 60 20 and ex 3907 60 80 (TARIC code 3907 60 80 10). 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 below, the rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Community-frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows for products originating in: >TABLE> 3. The above rates shall not apply to the products manufactured by the companies listed below, which shall be subject to the following anti-dumping duty rates: >TABLE> 4. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 145 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code(7), the amount of anti-dumping duty, calculated on the basis of the amounts set above, shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable. 5. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the definitive duty shall not apply to imports released for free circulation in accordance with the provisions of Article 2. 6. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. Article 2 1. Imports shall be exempt from the anti-dumping duties imposed by Article 1 provided that they are produced and directly exported (i.e. invoiced and shipped) to a company acting as an importer in the Community by the companies mentioned in paragraph 3, declared under the appropriate TARIC additional code and that the conditions set out in paragraph 2 are met. 2. When the request for release for free circulation is presented, exemption from the duties shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs service of the Member State concerned of a valid \"Undertaking Invoice\" issued by the exporting companies mentioned in paragraph 3, containing the essential elements listed in the Annex. Exemption from the duty shall further be conditional on the goods declared and presented to customs corresponding precisely to the description on the \"Undertaking Invoice\". 3. Imports accompanied by an \"Undertaking Invoice\" shall be declared under the following TARIC additional codes: >TABLE> Article 3 The amounts", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00826", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00247", "text": "of such renewal, to provide additional funds if the Attorney General determines that the funds made available to the recipient were used in a manner required under an approved application and if the recipient can demonstrate significant progress in achieving the objectives of the initial application. ``(b) Grants for Hiring.--Grants made under this part for hiring or rehiring additional career law enforcement officers may be renewed for up to 5 years, except that the Attorney General may waive such 5-year limitation for good cause. ``(c) No Cost Extensions.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the Attorney General may extend a grant period, without limitations as to the duration of such extension, to provide additional time to complete the objectives of the initial grant award.''. (d) Limitation on Use of Funds.--Section 1704 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-3) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``that would, in the absence of Federal funds received under this part, be made available from State or local sources'' and inserting ``that the Attorney General determines would, in the absence of Federal funds received under this part, be made available for the purpose of the grant under this part from State or local sources''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to funds made available under this part by a grant made pursuant to subsection (a) for the purposes described in subsection (b)(4).''; and (2) by striking subsection (c). (e) Study of Program Effectiveness.--Section 1705 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-4) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Study of Program Effectiveness.-- ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall provide for a scientific study of the effectiveness of the programs, projects, and activities funded under this part in reducing crime. ``(2) Study.--The Attorney General shall select one or more institutions of higher education, including historically Black colleges and universities, to conduct the study described in paragraph (1). ``(3) Reports.--Not later than 4 years after the date of the enactment of the COPS Improvements Act of 2007, the institution or institutions selected under paragraph (", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01002", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00248", "text": "until 30 June 1996, to facilitate the introduction of the arrangements applicable to imports of grape juice and must from Cyprus resulting from the agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations pending a long-term solution within the framework of the agreement creating an association between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus; Whereas the period for the adoption of transitional measures was extended until 30 June 1997 by Regulation (EC) No 1193/96 extending the period for the adoption of the transitional measures required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations; whereas, pending the adoption by the Council of definitive measures, the transitional measures provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1960/95 and (EC) No 2309/95 should be extended until 30 June 1997; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 1960/95 is hereby amended as follows: 1. In Article 1, the date '30 June 1996` is replaced by '30 June 1997`. 2. In Article 4, the date '30 June 1996` is replaced by '30 June 1997`. Article 2 In Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2309/95, the date '30 June 1996` is replaced by '30 June 1997`. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It shall apply from 1 July 1996. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 1 July 1996.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 376, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00803", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00249", "text": "their resistance the union adopted a plan which was designed to make it impossible for nonunion peddlers to buy ice to supply their retail customers in Kansas City., pursuant to the plan the union set about to obtain from all Kansas City wholesale ice distributors agreements that they would not sell ice to nonunion peddlers. Agreements were obtained from all distributors except the appellee, Empire Storage and Ice Company. Empire refused to agree. The union thereupon informed Empire that it would use other means at its disposal to force Empire to come around to the union view. Empire still refused to agree. Its place of business was promptly picketed by union members although the only complaint registered against Empire, as indicated by placards carried by the pickets, was its continued sale of ice to nonunion peddlers. 3 Thus the avowed immediate purpose of the picketing was to compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers. Missouri statutes, set out in note 1, make such an agreement a crime punishab e by a fine of not more than $5,000 and by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than five years. Furthermore, had Empire made the agreement, the ice peddlers could have brought actions for triple damages for any injuries they sustained as a result of the agreement under § 8308 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1939, Mo.R.S.A. 4 About 85% of the truck drivers working for Empire's customers were members of labor unions. These union truck drivers refused to deliver goods to or from Empire's place of business. Had any one of them crossed the picket line he would have been subject to fine or suspension by the union of which he was a member. 5 Because of the foregoing facts shown either by admissions, by undisputed evidence, or by unchallenged findings, the picketing had an instantaneous adverse effect on Empire's business. It was reduced 85%. In this dilemma, Empire was faced with three alternatives: It could continue to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, in which event it would be compelled to wage a fight for survival against overwhelming odds; it could stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers thereby relieving itself from further conflict with the union, in which event it would be subject to prosecution for crime and suits for triple damages; it could invoke the protection of the law. The last alternative was adopted. 6 Empire's complaint", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00248", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00250", "text": "of work, and similar reasons. 5 CFR, 1951 Supp., § 20.2(a). 22 Part of respondents' argument seems to direct itself to the point that it is the agency which makes the reduction in force. Rule 34.15 provides for the dropping of examiners with the lowest number of'retention credits' after the agency finds that it must reduce its force. These credits are based on length of service and are beyond the power of the agency to affect. As with promotions, the Commission will always need to consult with the agency to ascertain that there is occasion for a reduction. Just as the statute leaves with the agency the duty to see that there are an adequate number of the right type of examiners, it leaves with the agency the responsibility to declare that there are a lesser number of examiners necessary at this time. It must be assumed that the Commission will prevent any devious practice by an agency which would abuse this Rule. The Rule provides for examiner appeal to the Commission, so there is opportunity to bring abuses to the Commission's attention. Also challenged is the statement in the Retention Preference Regulations for Reduction in Force (5 CFR, 1951, § 20.2) allowing reduction in force 'for other reasons.' This is obviously to provide for legitimate reasons for reduction not now foreseen, and it must be assumed that the Commission will not permit an agency to misuse it. 23 We find no evidence that Congress intended to make hearing examiners a class with lifetime employment, whether there was work for them to do or not, as contended by the respondents. A reduction in force for the reasons heretofore provided by the Civil Service Commission and removal of an examiner in accordance therewith is 'good cause' within the meaning of § 11. 24 The rules conform to the statute and carry out the purpose and intent9 of Congress, and they are therefore valid. 25 The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. 26 Reversed and remanded with directions. 27 Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concur, dissenting. 28 I think these regulations should be held invalid and the judgment affirmed for substantially the reasons given in the opinion of Chief Judge Laws of the District Court for the District of Columbia. 104 F.Supp. 734", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00484", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00251", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 30 May 2006 amending Decision 2006/346/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Germany (notified under document number C(2006) 2058) (Text with EEA relevance) (2006/391/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market (1), and in particular Article 10(4) thereof, Having regard to Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (2) and in particular Article 11(1)(f) thereof, Having regard to Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption (3), and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) thereof, Whereas: (1) Following outbreaks of classical swine fever in Germany, protection and surveillance zones were immediately established around outbreak sites in Germany in accordance with Article 9(1) of Directive 2001/89/EC. (2) In addition, Commission Decision 2006/346/EC of 15 May 2006 concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Germany and repealing Decision 2006/274/EC (4) was adopted in order to maintain and extend the measures taken by Germany pursuant to Directive 2001/89/EC. (3) The provisions for the use of a health marking on fresh meat are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption (5). However, pursuant to Council Directive 2001/89/EC, that health mark may not be used for marking the fresh meat from pigs originating from a holding located in a surveillance zone. (4) Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Directive 2002/99/EC, Germany has submitted", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00590", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00252", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 520/2003 of 20 March 2003 prohibiting fishing for cod by vessels flying the flag of Belgium THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2846/98(2), and in particular Article 21(3) thereof, Whereas: (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2341/2002 of 20 December 2002 fixing for 2003 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required(3), lays down quotas for cod for 2003. (2) In order to ensure compliance with the provisions relating to the quantity limits on catches of stocks subject to quotas, the Commission must fix the date by which catches made by vessels flying the flag of a Member State are deemed to have exhausted the quota allocated. (3) According to the information received by the Commission, catches of cod in the waters of ICES divisions VIIb-k, VIII, IX, X and CECAF division 34.1.1 (Community waters) by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium have exhausted the quota allocated for 2003. Belgium has prohibited fishing for this stock from 1 March 2003. This date should be adopted in this Regulation also, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Catches of cod in the waters of ICES divisions VIIb-k, VIII, IX, X and CECAF division 34.1.1 (Community waters) by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium are hereby deemed to have exhausted the quota allocated to Belgium for 2003. Fishing for cod in the waters of ICES divisions VIIb-k, VIII, IX, X and CECAF division 34.1.1 (Community waters) by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium is hereby prohibited, as are the retention on board, transhipment and landing of this stock caught by the above vessels after the date of application of this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00584", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00253", "text": "academic year-- (1) with respect to Indian students enrolled in the college who are not residents of the State in which the college is located, any amount of charges for tuition for such students that exceeds the amount received under this section for such academic year; and (2) with respect to Indian students enrolled in the college who are residents of the State in which the college is located, an amount equal to the charges for tuition for such students for such academic year. (d) Definitions.--In this section, the term ``Indian students'' includes reference to the term ``Indian pupils'' as that term has been utilized in Federal statutes imposing a mandate upon any college or State to provide tuition-free education to Native American Indian students in fulfillment of a condition under which it received its original grant of land and facilities from the United States. (e) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. SEC. 5. OFFSET. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of all available unobligated funds, $15,000,000 in appropriated discretionary funds are hereby rescinded. (b) Implementation.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall determine and identify from which appropriation accounts the rescission under subsection (a) shall apply and the amount of such rescission that shall apply to each such account. Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit a report to the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress of the accounts and amounts determined and identified for rescission under the preceding sentence. (c) Exception.--This section shall not apply to the unobligated funds of-- (1) the Department of the Interior for the postsecondary education of Native American Indian students; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the Department of Veterans Affairs; or (4) the Department of Education.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 397, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00903", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00254", "text": "time conduct an evaluation of the fellowships under this Act. SEC. 4. TERMS OF FELLOWSHIPS. (a) Period of Fellowship.--An applicant selected under subsection (b) shall be awarded a fellowship for a period not to exceed 24 months. (b) Selection of Fellows.-- (1) In general.--A fellowship shall be awarded pursuant to a nationwide competition established by the Executive Director with the approval of a majority of the Board. The Executive Director shall establish the procedure for the competition process. (2) Qualification.--A successful applicant shall be an individual who has demonstrated-- (A) a desire to pursue a career in humanitarian service; and (B) outstanding potential for such a career. (3) Amount of award.--The Board shall determine the amount of an educational award and living allowance that a successful applicant will receive under a fellowship. (4) Recognition of fellowship receipt.-- (A) A recipient of a fellowship from the Bill Emerson Hunger Fellowship shall be known as an ``Emerson Fellow''. (B) A recipient of a fellowship from the Mickey Leland Hunger Fellowship shall be known as a ``Leland Fellow''. SEC. 5. TRUST FUND. (a) Establishment.--There is established the Congressional Hunger Fellows Trust Fund (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ``Fund'') in the Treasury of the United States, consisting of amounts appropriated to the Fund under section 9, amounts credited to it under subsection (c), and amounts received under section 7(c)(2). (b) Investment of Funds.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the full amount of the Fund. Each investment shall be made in an interest bearing obligation of the United States or an obligation guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States that, as determined by the Secretary in consultation with the Board, has a maturity suitable for the Fund. (c) Return on Investment.--Except as provided in section 6(a), the Secretary of the Treasury shall credit to the Fund the interest on, and the proceeds from sale or redemption of, obligations held in the Fund. SEC. 6. EXPENDITURES; AUDIT. (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer to the Program from the amounts described in section 5(c) and section 7(c)(2) such sums as the Board determines are necessary to enable the Program to carry out the provisions of this Act. (b)", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01120", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00255", "text": "the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act to any program, project, or activity in any area in any country described in subsection (d) in which local authorities are not complying with the provisions of Article IX and Annex 4, Article II of the Dayton Agreement relating to war crimes and the Tribunal, or with the provisions of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement relating to the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin. (d) Sanctioned Countries.--A country described in this section is a country the authorities of which fail to apprehend and transfer to the Tribunal all persons who have been indicted by the Tribunal and are in a territory that is under the effective control of those authorities. (e) Waiver.-- (1) Authority.--The President may waive the application of subsection (a) or subsection (b) with respect to a country if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress within six months after the date of enactment of this Act that a majority of the indicted persons who are within a territory that is under the effective control of the country have been arrested and transferred to the Tribunal. (2) Period of effectiveness.--Any waiver made pursuant to this subsection shall be effective for a period of six months. (f) Termination of Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed pursuant to subsection (a) or subsection (b) with respect to a country shall cease to apply only if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the authorities of that country have apprehended and transferred to the Tribunal all persons who have been indicted by the Tribunal and are in a territory that is under the effective control of those authorities. SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act: (1) Country.--The term ``country'' shall not include the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the provisions of this Act shall be applied separately to its constituent entities of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2) Dayton agreement.--The term ``Dayton Agreement'' means the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with annexes relating thereto, done at Dayton, November 10 through 16, 1995. (3) Democratization assistance.--The term ``democratization assistance'' includes electoral assistance and assistance used in establishing the institutions of a democratic and civil society. (4) Humanitarian assistance.--The term ``human", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01086", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00256", "text": "the value of the exchange of land authorized by this section. (h) Quality of Title.--Title to the properties referenced in this section to be offered to the United States by Big Sky Lumber Company, its assignees or successors in interest, shall be inclusive of the entire surface and subsurface estates without reservation or exception. The owner shall be required to reacquire any outstanding interest in mineral or mineral rights, timber or timber rights, water or water rights, or any other outstanding interest in the property, except reservations by the United States or the State of Montana by patent, in order to assure that title to the property is transferred as described in this section and sections 4, 5, and 6. Title standards for acquisition shall otherwise be in compliance with Forest Service policies and procedures. (i) References.--The reference and authorities of this section referring to Plum Creek Timber Company, L.P., shall also refer to its successors. SEC. 4. LAND CONSOLIDATION; PORCUPINE AREA. (a) In General.--The exchange described in section 3 of this Act shall not be consummated by the Secretary until the conditions of this section are met. (b) Conditions.--The Secretary or a qualified section 501(c)(3) conservation entity, acting on its behalf for later disposition to the United States, shall have acquired, by purchase or option to acquire, or exchange, all of the Porcupine property for its fair market value, determined at the time of acquisition in accordance with appraisal standards acceptable to the Secretary by an appraiser acceptable to the Secretary and the owner. Any appraisal for exchange purposes shall be conducted by the same parties, utilizing the same standards noted above; ``And further that, if said acquisition or option to acquire has been consummated by a qualified section 501(c)(3) conservation entity, said entity shall have notified the Secretary that the quality of title in fact secured meets applicable Forest Service standards with respect to surface and subsurface estates or is otherwise acceptable to the Forest Service''. (c) Description of Lands.--The Secretary is authorized and directed to acquire by purchase or exchange the lands and interests therein as depicted on a map entitled ``Porcupine Area'', dated September, 1992. (d) Land Acquisition Authorities.--Acquisitions pursuant to this section shall be under existing authorities available to the Secretary. (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01020", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00257", "text": "discount are required by § 22(a) to be included in his gross income. They recognize that the mere exclusion of 'gifts' under § 22(b)(3) is not enough to cover factual situations like those presented in § 22(b)(9) or in the other relief provisions above mentioned. Among these relief provisions are the following: Exclusion, from excess profits credit, of income derived from the retirement or discharge by the taxpayer of the taxpayer's own obligations if they have been outstanding more than 18 months. Internal Revenue Code, §§ 711(a)(1)(C), 711(a)(2)(E), and § 711(b)(1)(C), 26 U.S.C.A. § 711, added by the Second Revenue Act of 1940, c. 757, 54 Stat. 976—978, repealed by the Revenue Act of 1945, c. 453, 59 Stat. 568. Exclusion, from gross income, for income tax purposes, of the income of railroad corporations attributable to their discharge of their indebtedness to the extent realized from a modification or cancellation of indebtedness, pursuant to an order of court. Internal Revenue Code, § 22(b)(10), added by the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 812, applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939, but not applicable to any discharge in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1945; this latter date extended to December 31, 1946, 59 Stat. 574; December 31, 1947, 60 Stat. 749; and December 31, 1949, 61 Stat. 179. 15 See note 3, supra. 16 'Sec. 2. (a) That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00219", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00258", "text": "purchasing, financial, and contract transactions with private enterprise. The Constitution does not extend sovereign exemption from state taxation to corporations or individuals, contracting with the United States, merely because their activities are useful to the Government. We hold, therefore, that sovereign immunity does not prohibit this tax. 12 Appellants press a further point, that the Tennessee courts have discriminated against the Federal Government by the result in this case. They point to the fact that heretofore, specifically in Tennessee Oil Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn. 683, 157 S.W.2d 267, 162 S.W.2d 1081, a claim of immunity by a public body was sustained where the public body had leased the tanks from the private dealer. Apparently, appellants feel that the distinction between that case and this is so fine as to require similar results from any fair-minded court. We do not agree. Had the United States similarly rented the tanks from Esso, and thus stood firmly in its shoes as the organization exercising the privilege of storage, it would have fallen within the McCanless precedent. It did not do so, but instead paid Esso to receive, store, handle and load the fuel. The different results in the two cases thus accord with our conception of the operation of the Tennessee statute as a privilege tax. 13 Affirmed. 14 The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice JACKSON dissent. 15 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, not having heard the argument, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corporation, 308 U.S. 21, 60 S.Ct. 15, 84 L.Ed. 11; Carson v. Roane Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 72 S.Ct. 257, 96 L.Ed. 257; Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 73 S.Ct. 721. 2 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447, 63 S.Ct. 1137, 1140, 87 L.Ed. 1504; United States v. Allegheny County, supra.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 475, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00497", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00259", "text": "Commission Decision of 24 January 2001 exempting imports of certain bicycle parts originating in the People's Republic of China from the extension by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 of the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93, and maintained by Regulation (EC) No 1524/2000, and lifting the suspension of the payment of the anti-dumping duty extended to certain bicycle parts originating in the People's Republic of China granted to certain parties pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 88/97 (notified under document number C(2000) 4389) (Only the English, Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch and Portuguese texts are authentic) (2001/108/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000(2), Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97(3) extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93, and maintained by Regulation (EC) No 1524/2000, on bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of certain bicycle parts from the People's Republic of China, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 88/97 of 20 January 1997 on the authorisation of the exemption of imports of certain bicycle parts originating in the People's Republic of China from the extension by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 of the anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93(4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, After consulting the Advisory Committee, Whereas: (1) After the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 88/97 a number of bicycle assemblers submitted requests pursuant to Article 3 of that Regulation for exemption of the anti-dumping duty as extended to imports of certain bicycle parts from the People's Republic of China by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 (the extended anti-dumping duty). The Commission published in the Official Journal of the European Communities a list of applicants(5) for which payment", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00685", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00260", "text": "ers, farmers, and homesteaders. (5) Pinnacles National Monument is the only National Park System site within the ancestral home range of the California Condor. The reintroduction of the condor to its traditional range in California is important to the survival of the species, and as a result, the scientific community with centers at the Los Angeles Zoo and San Diego Zoo in California and Buenos Aires Zoo in and Argentina looks to Pinnacles National Monument as a leader in California Condor recovery, and as an international partner for condor recovery in South America. (6) The preservation, enhancement, economic and tourism potential and management of the central California coast and Pacific coast range's important natural and cultural resources requires cooperation and partnerships among local property owners, Federal, State, and local government entities and the private sector. SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PINNACLES NATIONAL PARK. (a) Establishment and Purpose.--There is hereby established Pinnacles National Park in the State of California for the purposes of-- (1) preserving and interpreting for the benefit of future generations the chaparral, grasslands, blue oak woodlands, and majestic valley oak savanna ecosystems of the area, the area's geomorphology, riparian watersheds, unique flora and fauna, and the ancestral and cultural history of native Americans, settlers and explorers; and (2) interpreting the recovery program for the California Condor and the international significance of the program. (b) Boundaries.--The boundaries of Pinnacles National Park are as generally depicted on the map entitled ``Pinnacles National Park Proposed Designation Change'', numbered 114/80,100, and dated April 2008. The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service. (c) Abolishment of Current Pinnacles National Monument.-- (1) In general.--In light of the establishment of Pinnacles National Park, Pinnacles National Monument is hereby abolished and the lands and interests therein are incorporated within and made part of Pinnacles National Park. Any funds available for purposes of the monument shall be available for purposes of the park. (2) References.--Any references in law (other than in this Act), regulation, document, record, map or other paper of the United States to Pinnacles National Monument shall be considered a reference to Pinnacles National Park. (d) Administration.--The Secretary of the", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01077", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00261", "text": "ess. 434 (1947). It makes some strikes unfair labor practices. 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b). But the strikes so condemned concededly do not include the kind we have in the present cases. The amendments to §§ 7 and 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 163, do not restrict the right as it previously existed. Moreover, the 1947 legislation comprehensively defines a strike, 29 U.S.C. § 142, 29 U.S.C.A. § 142, as 'any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees', which is broad enough to include the activity which Wisconsin has condemned here. 4 The Court heretofore has held that the measure of the right to strike in these interstate industries is a question of federa law. National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240, at pages 255—257, 59 S.Ct. 490, at pages 496, 497, 83 L.Ed. 627, 123 A.L.R. 599. Thus § 2(3) of the Wagner Act defined employee to 'include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute * * *.' 49 Stat. 450, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3). In accordance with this section the Court has held that participation in a strike did not remove workers from the protection of the Act and that they retained the status of employees. See National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345—347, 58 S.Ct. 904, 910, 911, 82 L.Ed. 1381. The question of what is a 'labor dispute' within the meaning of § 2(3) necessarily involves a consideration of whether the strike was or was not justified. See National Labor Relations Board v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 3 Cir., 105 F.2d 167, 176. Determination of the legality of strikes in interstate industries by federal law is necessary if", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00243", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00262", "text": "tax authorities, while the contractor deducts the tax, is difficult to combat under the present system of collecting VAT; Whereas the scheme planned by the Kingdom of the Netherlands involves, in the ready-to-wear clothing industry, collecting from the contractor the VAT normally due from the subcontractor under Article 21 of Directive 77/388/EEC; Whereas the derogation will not have a negative effect on the Community's own resources accruing from value-added tax; Whereas the scheme will be temporary, which will permit an assessment of the effects of the derogation after a period of application; Whereas the Commission will present a report to the Council before 31 December 1996 on the application of this authorization, accompanied, where appropriate, by a proposal for a Decision to extend the said authorization; Whereas the other Member States were informed of the request of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 10 March 1992, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 By way of derogation from Article 21 (1) (a) of Directive 77/388/EEC, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is hereby authorized to apply until 31 December 1996 in the ready-to-wear clothing industry a scheme for shifting the obligation to pay over VAT to the tax authorities from the subcontractor to the clothing firm (the contractor). Article 2 In the light of a report from the Commission on the application of the authorization referred to in Article 1, accompanied, where appropriate, by a proposal for a Decision, the Council, acting on the basis of that proposal, shall decide, by 31 December 1996, whether the said authorization is to be extended. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Done at Brussels, 23 November 1992.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 364, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00526", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00263", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999''. SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN. (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 90 the following: ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN ``Sec. ``1841. Protection of unborn children. ``Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children ``(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section. ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother. ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-- ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child. ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall instead of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being. ``(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section. ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), (f), (h)(1), and (i), 924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1153(a), 120", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00974", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00264", "text": "over high-pressure pipe lines such as those of East Ohio. However, this pressure factor is one which we found immaterial in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., supra, 331 U.S. at page 689, 67 S.Ct. at page 1486, 91 L.Ed. 1742, where, with rare unanimity, we put our emphasis upon the fact of sale for resale in interstate commerce. But today it is the difference between retail and wholesale operations which is termed immaterial, so long as the factor of high-pressure pipe lines is present. 33 This shift in emphasis rests upon inferences drawn from the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act which are wholly inconsistent with those drawn in our prior decisions examining the subject. Heretofore we have been careful consistently to observe that Congress did not attempt to occupy the entire field within the limits of its constitutional power, and until today we have insisted that in extending federal regulation Congress 'was meticulous to take in only territory which this Court had held the states could not reach.' Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Comm., 332 U.S. 507, 519, 68 S.Ct. 190, 196, 92 L.Ed. 128. We said only two years ago in that case that '(B)y 1938 the Court had delineated broadly between the area of permissible state control and that in which the states could not intrude. The former included interstate direct sales to local consumers, as exemplified in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U.S. 23, 40 S.Ct. 279, 64 L.Ed. 434; the latter, service interstate to local distributing companies for resale, as held in State of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 544, 68 L.Ed. 1027, reinforced by Public Utilities Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549.' And we went on to say that the purpose of the legislation was to make state regulation effective 'by adding the weight of federal regulation to supplement and reinforce it in the gap created by the prior decisions.' Id., 332 U.S. at pages 514, 517, 68 S.Ct. at page 195. And", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00338", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00265", "text": "2003 (68 Fed. Reg. 68698) (related to achievement of students with significant cognitive disabilities), as if such amendments-- ``(i) permitted the proficient or advanced scores on alternate assessments of not more than 3.0 percent of all tested students to be considered as proficient or advanced, respectively, for the purposes of determining adequate yearly progress, except that-- ``(I) any assessment given to any such so considered student for the purposes of determining such adequate yearly progress shall be required by the individualized education program of such so considered student; ``(II) the individualized education program shall reflect the need for any such alternate assessment based on the evaluation of such so considered student and the services provided such so considered student under section 614 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; and ``(III) the individualized education program shall include written consent from the parent of such so considered student prior to such alternate assessment being administered; ``(ii) used the term `students requiring alternate assessments' in lieu of the term `students with the most significant cognitive disabilities'; and ``(iii) permitted the eligibility, of such so considered students to have the students' scores of proficient or advanced on alternate assessments counted as proficient or advanced for purposes of determining adequate yearly progress, to be determined by the State educational agency, except that such eligibility shall, at a minimum, include-- ``(I) such so considered students who are receiving services pursuant to a plan required under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; ``(II) the students described in subclause (I) who are assessed at a grade level below the grade level in which the students are enrolled (out of level assessments); and ``(III) the students described in subclause (I) who are considered students with the most significant cognitive disabilities, as defined by the State educational agency, on the day before the date of enactment of the Enhancing Flexibility for Effective Schools Act. ``(M) Other measures of adequate yearly progress.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, a State may establish in the State plan an alternative definition of adequate yearly progress, subject to approval by the Secretary under subsection (e). Such alternative definition may-- ``(i) include measures of student achievement over a period of time (such as a growth model or value added accountability system) or the progress of some or all of the groups of students described in subparagraph (C)(v) to the next higher level of achievement described in subparagraph (II) or (III)", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00880", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00266", "text": "he considered most important of all, namely, to provide for common education at public expense. See V Jefferson, 153. However, he linked this with disestablishment as collorary prime parts in a system of basic freedoms. I Jefferson, 78. Jefferson and Madison by his sponsorship, sought to give the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom as nearly constitutional status as they could at the time. Acknowledging that one legislature could not'restrain the acts of succeeding Assemblies and that therefore to declare this act to be irrevocable would be of no effect in law,' the Bill's concluding provision as enacted nevertheless asserted: 'Yet we are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present or to narrow its operations, such act will be an infringement of natural right.' 1 Randall, 220. 16 See I Jefferson, 70—71; XII Jefferson, 447; Padover, 80. 17 Madison regarded this action as desertion. See his letter to Monroe of April 12, 1785; II Madison, 129, 131—132; James, cc. X, XI. But see Eckenrode, 91, suggesting it was surrender to the inevitable. The bill provided: 'That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the same shall direct the money to be paid. * * *' See also notes 19, 43 infra. A copy of the Assessment Bill is to be found among the Washington manuscripts in the Library of Congress. Papers of George Washington, Vol. 231. Because of its crucial role in the Virginia struggle and bearing upon the First Amendment's meaning, the text of the Bill is et forth in the Supplemental Appendix to this opinion. 18 Eckenrode, 99, 100. 19 Id., 100; II Madison, 113. The bill directed the sheriff to pay 'all funds which * * * may not be appropriated by the person paying the same * * * into the public Treasury, to be disposed of under the direction of the General Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning within the Counties whence such sums shall arise, and to no other use or purpose whatsoever.' Supplemental Appendix.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00032", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00267", "text": "and may provide for the alteration, repair, or improvement of the real property as part or all of the consideration of the nongovernmental person, notwithstanding any provision of law, including section 1302 of title 40, United States Code; (E) shall provide-- (i) that the United States shall not be liable for any actions, debts, or liability of the nongovernmental person; and (ii) that no person is authorized by the agreement to execute any instrument or document creating or evidencing any indebtedness unless such instrument or document specifically disclaims any liability of the United States under the instrument or document; and (F) shall provide that the leasehold interests of the United States are senior to that of any lender to the nongovernmental person. (2) Ability to pledge as collateral.--Subparagraph (F) shall not impair the ability of the nongovernmental person to pledge as collateral its leasehold interest under a lease with the United States entered into pursuant to the terms of subsection (c). (c) Lease of Real Property.-- (1) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including sections 582 and 583 of title 40, United States Code, the head of a covered agency may lease real property under an agreement under subsection (a) to the nongovernmental person that is party to the agreement. (2) Period of lease.--A lease under this subsection may be for such period as the head of the covered agency determines appropriate. (3) Relationship to homeless assistance act.--Real property leased under this subsection shall not be considered unutilized or underutilized for purposes of section 501 of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11411) and may be leased under this subsection without regard to any other provision of law. (d) Services.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of a covered agency, or his or her designee, may provide services under an agreement under subsection (a) to the nongovernmental person that is party to the agreement on such terms as the head considers appropriate. (e) Use and Deposit of Revenues.-- (1) Use of revenues.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of a covered agency may retain and use any revenues derived from agreements entered into under this section for Federal property management activities of the covered agency, including acquisition, improvements, maintenance, reconstruction, or", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00927", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00268", "text": "Commission, respondents applied to the United States District Court for an injunction against further State proceedings. What is before us is the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the District Court had erred in not granting the injunction. 41 This Court now orders the proceedings before the Illinois Commerce Commission to be enjoined, without knowledge on our part what it is that Illinois would exact of respondents. It has not yet been decided by the authoritative voice of Illinois law, the Supreme Court of Illinois, which of her regulatory requirements would survive respect by that Court for the controlling Federal Act. This Court has heretofore acted on the wise rule that it will not 'assume in advance that a State will so construe its law as to bring it into conflict with the federal Constitution or an act of Congress.' Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 746, 62 S.Ct. 820, 824, 86 L.Ed. 1154. The suit in the District Court was, in any event, premature. It should, on familiar principles, be ordered held in the District Court until the claim of Illinois may be authoritatively ascertained in the State courts, thereby perhaps avoiding a claim of conflict between State and federal legislation. Compare the series of cases from Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628, 84 L.Ed. 876, to Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101. 42 On the merits of the controversy our problem is to determine what freedom to regulate its grain warehouses has been left to Illinois, after Congress exercised its constitutional power over such warehouses by adopting a licensing system to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture under closely defined authority. Underlying the problem is the important fact that we are concerned with an economic enterprise which, while it has important radiations beyond State bounds, does not thereby lose special relations to the State in which it is conducted. And so we have once more the duty of judicially adjusting the interests of both the Nation and the State, where Congress has not clearly asserted its power of preemption so as to leave no doubt that the separate interests of the States are left wholly to national protection. 43 The general considerations to be taken into account in striking a balance, and not", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00069", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00269", "text": "market in the same manner as they apply to health insurance coverage offered by a health insurance issuer in connection with a group health plan in the small or large group market. ``(b) Notice.--A health insurance issuer under this part shall comply with the notice requirement under section 714(b) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 with respect to the requirements referred to in subsection (a) as if such section applied to such issuer and such issuer were a group health plan.''. (c) Effective Dates.-- (1) Group health plans and group health insurance coverage.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendments made by subsection (a) apply with respect to group health plans for plan years beginning more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Individual health insurance coverage.--The amendment made by subsection (b) applies with respect to health insurance coverage offered, sold, issued, renewed, in effect, or operated in the individual market on or after such date. (3) Collective bargaining exception.--In the case of a group health plan maintained pursuant to 1 or more collective bargaining agreements between employee representatives and 1 or more employers ratified before the date of enactment of this Act, the amendments made subsection (a) shall not apply to plan years beginning before the later of-- (A) the date on which the last collective bargaining agreements relating to the plan terminates (determined without regard to any extension thereof agreed to after the date of enactment of this Act), or (B) the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes of subparagraph (A), any plan amendment made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement relating to the plan which amends the plan solely to conform to any requirement added by subsection (a) shall not be treated as a termination of such collective bargaining agreement. (d) Coordination of Administration.--The Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure, through the execution of an interagency memorandum of understanding among such Secretaries, that-- (1) regulations, rulings, and interpretations issued by such Secretaries relating to the same matter over which two or more such Secretaries have responsibility under the provisions of this Act (and the amendments made thereby) are administered so as to have the same effect at all times; and (2) coordination of policies relating to enforcing the same requirements through such Secretaries in order to have a coordinated enforcement", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01055", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00270", "text": "could not be taken on a zero basis. As we have just decided that the correct basis of the property was not zero, but $262,042.50, we avoid this difficulty, and conclude that an adjustment should be made as the Commissioner determined. 17 Petitioner urges to the contrary that she was not entitled to depreciation deductions, whatever the basis of the property, because the law allows them only to one who actually bears the capital loss,32 and here the loss was not hers but the mortgagee's. We do not see, however, that she has established her factual premise. There was no finding of the Tax Court to that effect, nor to the effect that the value of the property was ever less than the amount of the lien. Nor was there evidence in the record, or any indication that petitioner could produce evidence, that this was so. The facts that the value of the property was only equal to the lien in 1932 and that during the next six and one-half years the physical condition of the building deteriorated and the amount of the lien increased, are entirely inconclusive, particularly in the light of the buyer's willingness in 1938 to take subject to the increased lien and pay a substantial amount of cash to boot. Whatever may be the rule as to allowing depreciation to a mortgagor on property in his possession which is subject to an unassumed mortgage and clearly worth less than the lien, we are not faced with that problem and see no reason to decid it now. 18 At last we come to the problem of determining the 'amount realized' on the 1938 sale. Section 111(b), it will be recalled, defines the 'amount realized' from 'the sale * * * of property' as 'the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received,' and § 111(a) defines the gain on 'the sale * * * of property' as the excess of the amount realized over the basis. Quite obviously, the word 'property', used here with reference to a sale, must mean 'property' in the same ordinary sense intended by the use of the word with reference to acquisition and depreciation in § 113, both for certain of the reasons stated heretofore in discussing its meaning in § 113, and also because the functional relation of the two sections requires that the word mean the same in one section that it does in the other. If the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00060", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00271", "text": "igation Works that occur before or after the conveyance except for the Grillo Claim, government contractor construction claims accruing at any time, and any other suits or claims filed as of the date of the Settlement Agreement; (2) absolve the United States and its officers and agents of responsibility and liability for the design and construction including latent defects associated with the project; and (3) assume responsibility to indemnify and defend the United States against all claims whether now known or unknown and including those of third party claims associated with, arising from, or in any way related to, the project except for the Grillo Claim, government contractor construction claims accruing at any time, and any other suits or claims filed as of the date of the Settlement Agreement. SEC. 11. CERTAIN ACTS NOT APPLICABLE AND TERMINATION OF MANDATES. (a) Reclamation Laws.--All mandates imposed by the Reclamation Act of 1902, and all Acts supplementary thereto or amendatory thereof, including the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, upon the Project Irrigation Works shall be terminated upon the completion of the transfers as provided by this Act and the Settlement Agreement. (b) Relationship to Other Laws.--The transfer of title authorized by this Act shall not-- (1) be subject to the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Administrative Procedures Act''); or (2) be considered a disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 471 et seq.) And the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1601 et seq.). (c) Deauthorization.--Effective upon the transfer of title to the district under this section, that portion of the Oroville-Tonasket Unit Extension, Okanogan-Similkameen Division, Chief Joseph Dam Project, Washington referred to in section 7(a) as the Project Irrigation Works is hereby deauthorized. After transfer of title, the district shall not be entitled to receive any further Reclamation benefits pursuant to the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, and Acts supplementary thereto or amendatory thereof.", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 457, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01089", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00272", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1957/2001 of 5 October 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1627/89 on the buying-in of beef by invitation to tender THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1512/2001(2), and in particular Article 47(8) thereof, Whereas: (1) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1627/89 of 9 June 1989 on the buying-in of beef by invitation to tender(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1853/2001(4), opened buying-in by invitation to tender in certain Member States or regions of a Member State for certain quality groups. (2) The application of Article 47(3), (4) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 and the need to limit intervention to buying-in the quantities necessary to ensure reasonable support for the market result, on the basis of the prices of which the Commission is aware, in an amendment, in accordance with the Annex hereto, to the list of Member States or regions of a Member State where buying-in is open by invitation to tender, and the list of the quality groups which may be bought in. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 1627/89 is hereby replaced by the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 6 October 2001. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 5 October 2001.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 424, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00724", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00273", "text": "an altered Notice of Classification Card. Petitioner was acquitted on the first count which charged theft of government property. Count 11, which charged alteration of a Notice of Classification card, and Count 13, which charged possession of an altered card, were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years on each of the sixteen counts indicated, the sentences to run concurrently. 2 54 Stat. 885, 894, 895, 50 U.S.C.App. § 311, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311. Section 623.61—2 of the Selective Service Regulations states that 'It shall be a violation of these regulations for any person to have in his possession' a Notice of Classification not regularly issued to him or to alter or forge any Notice of Classification. Section 11 of the Act makes criminal the failure to perform any duty required by the Regulations punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both. 3 35 Stat. 1098, 18 U.S.C. § 101, 18 U.S.C.A. § 101. Insofar as pertinent, the section provides: 'Whoever shall receive, conceal, or aid in concealing, or shall have or retain in his possession with intent to convert to his own use or gain, any * * * property of the United States, which has theretofore been embezzled, stolen, or purloined by any other person, knowing the same to have been so embezzled, stolen, or purloined, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; * * *'. 4 The Fourth Amendment provides: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 5 Insofar as pertinent, the Fifth Amendment provides: 'No person * * * shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself, * * *'. 6 35 Stat. 1130, 1131, 18 U.S.C. § 338, 18 U.S", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00072", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00274", "text": "the market but also the forwarding state could tax the sale 'to the fullest extent' upon the gross receipts. For this reason I concur in the result. 59 But in doing so I dissent from grounding the decision upon a foundation which not only will outlaw properly apportioned taxes, thus going beyond the Adams decision, unless the Court is merely to reiterate the rule forbidding 'direct' taxation of interstate sales only to recall it when a case involving a property apportioned tax shall arise; but also will require outlawing many other types of tax heretofore sustained, unless a similar retreat is made. 60 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice MURPHY concurs, dissenting. 61 I think the Court confuses a gross receipts tax on the Indiana broker with a gross receipts tax on his Indiana customer. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed. 272, would hold invalid a gross receipts tax, unapportioned, on the broker. In that case, the taxpayer was a marketing agent for fruit growers in the State of Washington. The agent made sales and deliveries of the fruit in other States and in foreign countries, collected the sales prices, and remitted the proceeds, less charges, to the customers. The Court held that the gross receipts tax, being unapportioned, was invalid. There are two reasons why that result followed. In the first place, as the Court stated 305 U.S. at page 437, 59 S.Ct. at page 327, 83 L.Ed. 272, 'The entire service for which the compensation is paid is in aid of the shipment and sale of merchandise' in interstate or foreign commerce. 'Such services are within the protection of the commerce clause'. In the second place, as the Court stated 305 U.S. at page 439, 59 S.Ct. at page 328, 83 L.Ed. 272, 'If Washington is free to exact such a tax, other states to which the commerce xtends may, with equal right, lay a tax similarly measured for the privilege of conducting within their respective territorial limits the activities there which contribute to the service. The present tax, though nominally local, thus in its practical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it imposes upon it, merely", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00007", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00275", "text": "other corporations, for the dissolution or liquidation of corporations, the creating or authorization of indebtedness, mortgages and other liens and for the organization or reorganization of corporations and to deposit securities with any reorganization committee or protection committee of any corporation. '(6) To apportion in their uncontrolled discretion as between income and principal as the trustees may deem proper, any losses or profits resulting from the i crease or decrease in the value of the securities or property which may at any time from a part of the trust estate, and also so to apportion the income of the trust estate, and any loss in said income and any proceeds received upon account of income, whether by way of interest, dividends, stock dividends or by way of the distribution of cash, bonds, debentures, stocks or other securities by corporations whose stocks or securities may at any time form a part of the principal of the trust estate or otherwise, and also similarly to apportion expenses incurred in the administration of said trust or in connection with the realization upon any of said securities or property; '(7) To employ counsel or attorneys at law in connection with the administration of the trust of in their discretion the Trustees deem it necessary or desirable and to pay them reasonable compensation for their services as an expense of the administration of said trust. 'In the event that any of the Trustees should resign or for any other reason cease to be a trustee such vacancy shall be filled by the appointment of a successor trustee in writing by the Settlor. 'In witness whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. 'Francois L. Church, Settlor. 'Francois L. Church, 'E. Dwight Church, 'Charles T. Church, Trustees.' 2 The respondent cites particularly Fulton Trust Co. v. Phillips, 218 N.Y. 573, 581, 113 N.E. 558, 559, L.R.A.1918E 1070; and Matter of Bowers' Estate, 195 App.Div. 548, 186 N.Y.S. 912, affirmed 231 N.Y. 613, 132 N.E. 910; and, as presenting analogous situations in testamentary trusts or dispositions, Matter of Elting's Will, 268 App.Div. 74, 48 N.Y.S.2d 892, affirmed 294 N.Y. 941,", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00225", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00276", "text": "new paragraph: ``(2)(A) There is established in the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund a Medicare Surplus Protection Account (in this paragraph referred to as the `Account'). As soon as practicable after the end of each fiscal year after fiscal year 2018, the Managing Trustee shall transfer to the Account, from amounts otherwise available in the Trust Fund, amounts equivalent to the Medicare part A surplus for such fiscal year. Such amounts shall be transferred from time to time to the Account, such amounts to be determined on the basis of estimates by the Managing Trustee, and proper adjustments shall be made in amounts subsequently transferred to the extent prior estimates were in excess of or were less than the correct amount. ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `Medicare part A surplus' means, for any fiscal year, the excess, if any, of-- ``(i) the sum of-- ``(I) the taxes imposed for such fiscal year by sections 3101(b) and 3111(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to wages (as defined in section 3121 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegates pursuant to subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rates of tax under such sections to such wages; and ``(II) the taxes imposed by section 1401(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to self- employment income (as defined in section 1402 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury on tax returns under subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rate of tax under such section 1401(b) to such self-employment income; over ``(ii) the sum of-- ``(I) benefits paid from the Trust Fund during the fiscal year; and ``(II) amounts authorized to be made available from the Trust Fund under subsection (f) of this section (or section 201(g)) which are paid from the Trust Fund during such fiscal year. ``(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the balance in the Account shall not be available for investment by the Managing Trustee. ``(D)(i) The preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not apply with respect to fiscal years commencing with or after the first fiscal year, after fiscal year 2018, for which a provision of Federal law takes effect and authorizes, for amounts", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00980", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00277", "text": "included. Nor have cases been included which though arising under the Act present issues other than those of negligence. Moreover, Wabash R. Co. v. Williamson, 196 S.W.2d 129, certiorari denied, 330 U.S. 824, 67 S.Ct. 860, 91 L.Ed. 1274, has been omitted since negligence was admitted by the employer, the case turning on the construction of a railroad rule. 1 The Supreme Court of Utah considered and rejected the opinion in Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 F.2d 333, in which it was said: 'Any detailed review of the evidence in a case of this character for the purpose of determining the propriety of the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict would be an idle and useless ceremony in the light of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. This is so regardless of what we might think of the sufficiency of the evidence in this respect. The fact is, so we think, that the Supreme Court has in effect converted this negli ence statute into a compensation law thereby making, for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees. See dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 358, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1066, 87 L.Ed. 1444. 'The Supreme Court, commencing with Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, in a succession of cases has reversed every court (with one exception hereinafter noted) which has held that a defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. In the Tiller case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 128 F.2d 420, which had affirmed the District Court in directing a verdict. The case, upon remand, was again tried in the court below, where a directed verdict was denied. For this denial the Court of Appeals reversed and again the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the District Court properly submitted the case to the jury. In Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00235", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00278", "text": "concerning the imposition of duties made for the purposes of this Regulation are provisional and may have to be reconsidered for the purpose of any definitive duty, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. A provisional anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of hollow sections which consist of welded pipes, tubes and hollow profiles of a square or rectangular cross-section of iron or steel with the exception of those made of stainless steel or of a perimeter greater than 600 mm, currently classifiable within CN codes ex 7306 60 31 (TARIC code 7306 60 31 90 ) and ex 7306 60 39 (TARIC code 7306 60 39 90 ), and originating in Turkey, and originating in Turkey. 2. The rate of the provisional duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-frontier price, before duty, for products produced by the following manufacturers shall be as follows: >TABLE> 3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 4. The release for free circulation in the Community of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security, equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty. Article 2 1. Without prejudice to Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96, interested parties requesting disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which this Regulation was adopted, shall present their views in writing and request a hearing from the Commission within one month of the date of entry into force of this regulation. 2. Pursuant to Article 21(4) of Regulation No 384/96, the parties concerned may comment on the application of this Regulation within one month of the date of its entry into force. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 1 of this Regulation shall apply for a period of six months. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 14 July 2003.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 439, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00567", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00279", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 22 April 1997 on the approval of the single programming document for Community structural assistance in Lolland concerned by Objective 2 in Denmark (Only the Danish text is authentic) (97/444/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3193/94 (2), and in particular Article 10 (1) last subparagraph thereof, After consultation of the Advisory Committee on the Development and Conversion of Regions and the Committee pursuant to Article 124 of the Treaty, Whereas the programming procedure for structural assistance under Objective 2 is defined in Article 9 (6) to 9 (10) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3193/94; whereas however the last subparagraph of Article 5 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in order to simplify and to speed up programming procedures, Member States may submit in a single programming document the information required for the regional and social conversion plan referred to in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and the information required at Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; whereas the last subparagraph of Article 10 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in that case the Commission adopts a single decision in a single document covering the points referred to in Article 8 (3) and the assistance from the Funds referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 14 (3); Whereas the Commission has established, by Decision 96/472/EC (4), the list of declining industrial areas concerned by Objective 2 for the programming period from 1997", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00602", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00280", "text": "., 61 F.Supp. 355, 357(5); 10 Cir., 153 F.2d 280, 283, the attack, on this issue, is limited to an examination into whether or not the Commission abused its discretion in the order of removal. As heretofore stated, the provisions for review underwent changes during the passage of the act.24 As finally adopted, however, the reviewing court is directed to remand when it determines that the action of the Commission 'is not in accordance with law.' § 12(c)25 The question of 'the removal of the officer or employee,' § 12(b), note 1, supra, we think is a matter of administrative discretion. Since under Rule I of the Civil Service Commission the taking of 'any active part in political management or political campaigns' had been determined by the Commission to include service on a political committee, see notes 37 and 38 of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 it is clear Mr. Paris' position violated § 15 of the Hatch Act. Note 1, supra. It could hardly be said that determination of the Commission in ordering his removal was an abuse of its discretion. See 61 F.Supp. at page 357(6) and (7); 153 F.2d at pages 283, 284. 27 Judgment affirmed. 28 Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 29 Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE dissent. 30 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring. 31 It is of course settled that this Court must consider whenever the question is raised or even though not raised by counsel, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts as well as the jurisdiction of this Court. Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462. But whether a State has standing to urge a claim of constitutionality under a Congressional grant-in-aid statute does not involve 'jurisdiction' in the sense of a court's power but only the capacity of the State to be a litigant to invoke that power. In this litigation the Government did not", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00021", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00281", "text": ".' The decree expressly was 'without prejudice to the right of the United States, as provided in Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, to prosecute suits to recover civil penalties for violations of the said modified order to cease and desist hereby affirmed, and without prejudice to the right of the Federal Trade Commission to initiate contempt proceedings for violations of this decree.' The reports of compliance were subsequently filed and accepted, and there the matter appears to have rested for a little upwards of four years. 3 On September 2, 1947, the Commission ordered additional and highly particularized reports to show continuing compliance with the decree. This was done without application to the court, was not authorized by any provision of its decree, and is not provided for in § 5 of the statute under which the Commission's original cease and desist order had issued. The new order recited that it was issued on the Commission's own motion pursuant to its published Rule of Practice No. XXVI2 and the authority granted by subsections (a) and (b) of § 6 of the Trade Commission Act. It ordered these and other parties restrained by the earlier decree to file within thirty days 'additional reports showing in detail the manner and form in which they have been, and are now, complying with said modified order to cease and desist and said decree.' It demanded of each producer a 'complete statement' of the 'prices, terms, and conditions of sale of salt, together with books or compilations of freight rates used in calculating delivered prices, price lists and price announcements distributed, published or employed in marketing salt from and after January 1, 1944.' From the Salt Producers Association it required information as to its activities and services. The Association and some of the producers reported satisfactorily. These two respondents did not. Instead, each informed the Commission in general terms that it had complied with the decree in the manner previously reported, but that it doubted the Commission's jurisdiction to require further reports and declined to supply the particulars demanded. Neither asked any hearing or made objection to the scope of the order. 4 The Commission next gave respondents notices asserting their default and calling attention to penalties provided in § 10 of the Act. Neither respondent asked any hearing on the notice of default. These suits were then commenced in the name of the United States in District Court under §§ 9 and 10 of the Trade Commission Act, asking mandatory injunctions commanding respondents to report as", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00346", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00282", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Property Low Hanging Fruit Act''. SEC. 2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENT PILOT PROGRAM. (a) Plan for Entering Into Public-Private Agreements.-- (1) In general.--The head of a covered agency shall develop and carry out a plan to enter into one or more agreements with an eligible entity, for the purposes described in paragraph (2). (2) Purposes.--The purposes of any agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall be-- (A) to lease Federal real properties that are underutilized or excess, under the terms of subsection (c); and (B) to develop, rehabilitate, or renovate facilities on such leased properties for the benefit of the covered agency, including monetary benefits such as lease revenues and non-monetary benefits such as avoided operations and maintenance costs. (3) Number of properties.--The head of each covered agency shall identify at least 5, and not more than 10, Federal real properties to be offered for lease under agreements entered into under paragraph (1). (b) Agreement Terms.-- (1) In general.--Each agreement entered into pursuant to this section-- (A) shall have as its primary purpose the enhancement of the functional and economic efficiency of Federal real property; (B) shall be negotiated pursuant to such procedures as the head of the covered agency concerned considers necessary to promote competition and protect the interests of the Federal Government; (C) shall provide a fair market value lease option to the United States to occupy space in the facilities acquired, constructed, or rehabilitated under the agreement, but shall not guarantee occupancy by the United States; (D) shall describe the consideration, duties, and responsibilities for which the United States and the eligible entity are responsible and may provide for the alteration, repair, or improvement of the real property as part or all of the consideration of the eligible entity, notwithstanding any provision of law, including section 1302 of title 40, United States Code; (E) shall provide-- (i) that the United States shall not be liable for any actions, debts, or liability of the eligible entity; and (ii) that no person is authorized by the agreement to execute any instrument or document creating or evidencing any indebtedness unless such instrument or document specifically disclaims any liability of the United States under the instrument or document; and (F) shall include terms for authorizing the Government to", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01090", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00283", "text": "Justice MURPHY agrees, concurring in the result. 39 To treat a denaturalization proceeding, whether procedurally or otherwise, as if it were nothing more than a suit for damages for breach of contract or one to recover overtime pay ignores, in my view, every con ideration of justice and of reality concerning the substance of the suit and what is at stake. 40 To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends those rights and almost all others.1 To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power. U.S.Const., Amend. VIII. Yet by the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights, this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held, can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment. 41 No such procedures could strip a naturalborn citizen of his birthright or lay him open to such a penalty. I have stated heretofore the reasons why I think the Constitution does not countenance either that deprivation or the ensuing liability to such a punishment for naturalized citizens. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, concurring opinion page 165, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1355, 87 L.Ed. 1796; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, dissenting opinion page 675, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 1315, 90 L.Ed. 1500. 42 Those views of the substantive rights of naturalized citizens have not prevailed here. But the Schneiderman decision and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525, required a burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization.2 This was in itself and to that extent recognition that ordinary civil procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other purely civil liabilities, do not suffice for den", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00230", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00284", "text": "the question of reasonableness of rates, it does so only for purposes of distributing the fund for whose creation it alone was responsible. It does not fix or prescribe rates for the past or the future. The reasonableness of rates charged by the companies who claim the fund is wholly ancillary to the problem of determining what claimants are equitably entitled to share in it. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 55 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed. 1451; United States v. Morgan, supra. 7 Second. The problem is somewhat more complicated if distribution of the fund is to be made to claimants other than the pipe-line companies. The latter sell gas to at least two types of customers—industrial users over whose rates the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction2 and over which state regulatory bodies may or may not, depending on local law; and numerous distributing companies selling to customers in eight states. If the pipe-line companies had passed the rate reductions on to the distributing companies those reductions may or may not have reached the ultimate consumers. We likewise do not know whether the reductions would have reached the industrial users either by terms of the contracts or by virtue of the assertion of regulatory authority. 8 If in this situation local law rpovides a standard for determining which of two or more claimants would have been entitled to the benefits of the rate reduction, the federal court should apply it. If clear and speedy state remedies are available, the federal court might hold the fund until those having the final say on the state law questions have spoken. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483, 60 S.Ct. 628, 630, 84 L.Ed 876; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101. But in absence of uch a showing the federal court in the interest of dispatch should proceed to determine the questions, relying on such sources of local law as may be available, including information from state regulatory agencies. The federal court may in its discretion disburse the funds directly to either the local distributing companies or the ultimate consumers or work out an administrative scheme whereby the distribution is made pursuant to directives of state agencies. 9 In conclusion, the task of the federal court in distributing the fund", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00253", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00285", "text": "Glass Corporation for industrial consumption.2 Shortly before beginning this service appellant had informed a number of its customers, local distributing companies in Indiana, that it intended to render service directly to large industrial consumers wherever possible.3 Pursuant to that policy, since these proceedings began direct service has been extended to another big industrial user.4 4 In 1944 the Commission initiated hearings relative to direct service by Panhandle Eastern to Indiana consumers. It concluded that 'the distribution in Indiana by Panhandle of natural gas direct to consumers is subject to regulation by this Commission under the laws of this state,' notwithstanding any alleged contrary effect of the commerce clause upon appellant's direct sales to industrial sers. Accordingly it issued its order of November 21, 1945, for the filing of tariffs, etc., as has been stated. 5 Early in 1946 Panhandle Eastern brought this suit in a state court to set aside and enjoin enforcement of the order. While the cause was pending the Commission issued a supplemental order declining appellant's offer to submit the specified tariffs, reports, etc., 'as information only,' and reasserting its full regulatory power as conferred by the Indiana statutes.5 63 P.U.R., N.S., 309. 6 The trial court vacated the orders and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. It accepted appellant's view of the effect of the commerce clause on its operations. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed that judgment and denied the relief appellant sought. 71 N.E.2d 117. It held first that the Commission's orders amounted to an unequivocal assertion of power to regulate rates and service on appellant's direct industrial sales and thus presented squarely the question of the Commission's jurisdiction over such sales as affected by the commerce clause. The court did not flatly hold that the sales are in interstate rather than intrastate commerce. But, taking them to be of the former kind, it held them nevertheless subject to the state's power of regulation under the doctrine of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996. The court further held that appellant, in making these sales, is a public utility within the meaning and application of the state's regulatory statutes, Burns Ind.Stat.Ann. § 54-105 and Ind. Acts 1945, c. 53, p. 110. It is this decision we have to review pursuant to § 237 of the Judicial", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00123", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00286", "text": "344 U.S. 48 73 S.Ct. 125 97 L.Ed. 77 JOHNSONv.NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO. No. 40. Argued Oct. 23, 24, 1952. Decided Nov. 17, 1952. Jacquin Frank, New York City, for petitioner. Mr. Robert M. Peet, New York City, for respondent. Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This case raises questions concerning the power of a Court of Appeals to render judgment for a defendant instead of merely ordering a new trial after it has set aside a jury verdict and trial court judgment for a plaintiff. 2 The petitioner sued the respondent railroad under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, for wrongful death of her husband. When the evidence was all in, the railroad moved to dismiss the complaint and also asked for a directed verdict in its favor on the grounds that no negligence had been proven and that the deceased had been responsible for his own death. The trial court reserved decision on the motion, submitted the case to the jury, a verdict of $20,000 was returned for petitioner, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Within ten days after reception of the verdict the railroad moved to have the verdict set aside on the ground that it was excessive, contrary to the law, to the evidence, to the weight of the evidence. More than two months later this motion was denied; in the same order denying that motion the court also denied the preverdict motions for dismissal and for a directed verdict on which action had been reserved prior to verdict. Holding that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, the Court of Appeals reversed. 194 F.2d 194. Both parties agree that this reversal requires the District Court to enter judgment for the railroad notwithstanding the verdict, thereby depriving petitioner of another trial. Whether the Court of Appeals could direct such a judgment consistently with Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.,1 is the single question we granted certiorari to review. 343 U.S. 975, 72 S.Ct. 1073. 3 On several recent occasions we have considered Rule 50(b). We have said that in the absence of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00462", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00287", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 26 February 2009 amending the Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU-related bodies (2009/167/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to Article 42(2), Article 10(4) and Article 18 of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) (1), Having regard to the Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external relations with third States and non-European Union related bodies (2), and in particular Article 2 of that Act, Having regard to the Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules concerning the receipt of information by Europol from third parties (3), and in particular Article 2 of that Act, Having regard to the Council Act of 12 March 1999 adopting the rules governing the transmission of personal data by Europol to third States and third bodies (4), and in particular Articles 2 and 3 of that Act, Whereas: (1) On 27 March 2000 the Council adopted the Decision authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU-related bodies (5). (2) There are operational interests that require that India be added to the list of third States with which the Director of Europol is authorised to start negotiations. (3) The Decision of 27 March 2000 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Decision of 27 March 2000 is hereby amended as follows: In Article 2(1), under the heading ‘Third States’, the following State shall be added to the alphabetical list: ‘- India’. Article 2 This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 3 This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its adoption. Done at Brussels, 26 February 2009.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 430, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00529", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00288", "text": "``or'' at the end; (ii) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (E), the following: ``(F) the application does not contain, as appropriate, the information required in subsection (c)(1)(H).''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(7) Upon the approval of an application under this section, the Secretary shall report to the scientific community and make available to the public, in a timely manner, data regarding such device stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity.''. (e) Investigational Device Exemptions.--Section 520(g)(2) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360j(g)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the following: ``(iv) A requirement that any application include information regarding the device, to the extent appropriate, stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity, including differences in safety and effectiveness.''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(d) The Secretary shall develop standards that ensure that submissions to the Secretary pursuant to this subsection are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under paragraph (B)(iv).''. (f) Biological Product Licenses.--Section 351(a)(2) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(D)(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the applicant shall include in any application to the Secretary pursuant to this section appropriate information regarding the subject biological product stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity, including differences in safety and effectiveness. ``(ii) The Secretary shall develop standards that ensure that submissions to the Secretary pursuant to this section are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under paragraph (D)(i). ``(iii) Upon the approval of an application under this subsection, the Secretary shall report to the scientific community and make available to the public, in a timely manner, data regarding such biological product stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity.''. (g) GAO Study.--Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Comptroller General of the United States shall study the drug approval processes of the Food and Drug Administration to ensure that the Food and Drug", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00921", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00289", "text": "the formation of Oregon Physicians' Service marking the entry of appellees into the prepaid medical care business. He ruled that what restraints were proved could be justified as reasonable to maintain proper standards of medical ethics. He found that supplying prepaid medical care within the State of Oregon by doctor-sponsored organizations does not constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act, but he declined to rule on the question whether supplying prepaid medical care by the private associations is interstate commerce. 11 The Government asks us to overrule each of these findings as contrary to the evidence, and to find that the business of providing prepaid medical care is interstate commerce. We are asked to review the facts and reverse and remand the case 'for entry of a decree granting appropriate relief.' We are asked in substance to try the case de novo on the record, make findings and determine the nature and form of relief. We have heretofore declined to give such scope to our review. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra. 12 While Congress has provided direct appeal to this Court, it also has provided that where an action is tried by a court without a jury 'findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.' Rule 5i(a), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. There is no case more appropriate for adherence to this rule than one in which the complaining party creates a vast record of cumulative evidence as to long-past transactions, motives, and purposes, the effect of which depends largely on credibility of witnesses. 13 The trial court rejected a grouping by the Government of its evidentiary facts into four periods, 1930—1936, the year 1936, 1936—1941, and 1941 to trial. That proposal projected the inquiry over an eighteen-year period before the action was instituted. The court accepted only the period since the organization of Oregon Physicians' Service as significant and rejected the earlier years as 'ancient history' of a time 'when the Doctors were trying to find themselves. * * * It was a period of groping for the correct position to take to accord with changing times.' 95 F.Supp. at page 105. Of course, present events have roots in the past, and it is quite proper to trace currently questioned conduct backwards to illuminate its connections and meanings.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00448", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00290", "text": "we consider these questions, however, we turn to a jurisdiction problem. 7 Federal Jurisdiction.—The Government properly presents for our consideration an issue of federal jurisdiction not heretofore raised. The quaere is whether this proceeding involves a justiciable question under Article III of the Constitution.6 It is said the Attorney General's suspension of deportation is merely a recommendation to Congress, and that federal courts cannot intervene because at this point a court order does not finally control the deportation of the alien.7 This argument is founded on § 19(c) of the Immigration Act which provides that, if deportation is suspended longer than six months, a detailed report must be made to Congress, and, if Congress fails to approve the suspension before the termination of the session next following the session in which the case is reported, the Attorney General must thereupon proceed with the deportation.8 8 While such a jurisdictional point may be raised at any time,9 we do not think there is basis for the objection here. The statute gives the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation for a minimum of six months and until Congress acts or the time for action elapses. The Attorney General's power is final for such deferment of deportation. That other forces may come into play later with authority to take other steps does not detract from that finality. The United States relies particularly on Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman, S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568. The congressional power here is quite distinct from the Presidential power concerning overseas licensing in the Chicago & Southern case. The license in question there was ineffective until the President acted. The delay here is effective despite subsequent congressional action. This litigation, whatever its ultimate effect, is aimed only at the delay. The judgment sought in this proceeding would be binding and conclusive on the parties if entered and the question is justiciable. 9 Declaratory Judgment.—The United States does not challenge finality for purpose of review.10 However, the Government does contend that the Immigration Act provision, § 19(a), making the Attorney General's decision on deportation 'final' precludes judicial review except by habeas corpus of his refusal to grant suspension of deportation. The procedural question as thus narrowed is whether an administrative decision against a requested suspension of deportation under § 19(c) of the Immigration Act can be challenged by an alien free from custody through", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00382", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00291", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 195/98 of 26 January 1998 supplementing the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2400/96 on the entry of certain names in the 'Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications` provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (Text with EEA relevance) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1068/97 (2), and in particular Article 6(3) and (4) thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, Member States have sent the Commission applications for registration of certain names as geographical indications or designations of origin; Whereas it has been found, pursuant to Article 6(1) of that Regulation, that an application meets all its requirements, in particular that all the information required pursuant to Article 4 has been given; Whereas following publication of the name in the Annex to this Regulation in the Official Journal of the European Communities (3) a statement of objection was made to the Commission pursuant to Article 7 of that Regulation but was deemed to be unfounded and therefore inadmissible; Whereas the name should therefore be entered in the 'Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications` and hence be protected throughout the Community as a designation of origin; Whereas the Annex to this Regulation supplements the Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 2400/96 (4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2396/97 (5), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The name in the Annex hereto is hereby added to the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2400/96 and, pursuant to Article 6(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, entered in the 'Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications` as a protected designation of origin (PDO). Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00665", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00292", "text": "operations. (4) For the above reasons, and in accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97, the parties listed in Annex I to this Decision should be exempted from the extended anti-dumping duty. The parties concerned were informed accordingly and given an opportunity to comment. (5) In accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97, the exemption of the parties listed in Annex I to this Decision from the extended anti-dumping duty should take effect as from the date of receipt of their request and their customs debt in respect of the extended anti-dumping duty is to be considered void as from that date. (6) Other parties which had requested an exemption from the extended anti-dumping duty did not submit the necessary information requested by the Commission. Those parties should not be exempted under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 88/97. The Commission informed the parties concerned that it intended to reject their request for exemption from the extended duty, on the grounds that they had failed to provide the information requested. The parties concerned are listed in Annex II to this Decision. (7) Since it is no longer justified for the parties listed in Annex II to benefit from a suspension of the payment of the extended anti-dumping duty, the suspension should be lifted and the extended anti-dumping duty should be collected as from the date of receipt of their request. (8) Following the adoption of this Decision, an updated list of parties exempted pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 88/97 and of parties whose requests pursuant to Article 3 of that Regulation are under examination should be published in the \"C\" series of the Official Journal of the European Communities in accordance with Article 16(2) of that Regulation, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The parties listed in Annex I to this Decision are hereby exempted from the extension by Regulation (EC) No 71/97 of the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93, and maintained by Regulation (EC) No 1524/2000, on bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of certain bicycle parts from the People's Republic of China. The exemptions shall take effect in relation to each party as from the relevant date shown in the column headed \"Date of effect\". Article 2 The requests", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00687", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00293", "text": ". Unlike the provisions of the Charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensation to named individual employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statute was held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial. 18 Nor are we impressed by the contention that the oath denies due process because its negation is not limited to affiliations with organizations known to the employee to be in the proscribed class. We have no reason to suppose that the oath is or will be construed by the City of Los Angeles or by California courts as affecting adversely those persons who during their affiliation with a proscribed organization were innocent of its purpose, or those who severed their relations with any such organization when its character became apparent, or those who were affiliated with organizations which at one time or another during the period covered by the ordinance were engaged in proscribed activity but not at the time of affiant's affiliation.1 We assume that scienter is implicit in each clause of the oath. As the city has done nothing to negative this interpretation, we take for granted that the ordinance will be so read to avoid raising difficult constitutional problems which any other application would present. Fox v. State of Washington, 1915, 236 U.S. 273, 277, 35 S.Ct. 383, 384, 59 L.Ed. 573. It appears from correspondence of record between the city and petitioners that although the city welcomed inquiry as to its construction of the oath, the interpretation upon which we have proceeded may not have been explicitly called to the attention of petitioners before their refusal. We assume that, if our interpretation of the oath is correct, the City of Los Angeles will give those petitioners who heretofore refused to take the oath an opportunity to take it as interpreted and resume their employment. 19 The judgment as to Pacifico and Schwartz is affirmed. The judgment as to the remaining petitioners is affirmed on the basis of the interpretation of the ordinance which we have felt justified in assuming. 20 Affirmed. 21 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 22 The Constitution does not guarantee public employment. City, State and Nation are not confined to making provisions appropriate for securing competent professional discharge of the functions pertaining to diverse governmental", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00408", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00294", "text": "1209. 72 When a pleading raises a substantial claim that the defendant is wrongfully withholding from the plaintiff property belonging to him, the defendant has not heretofore been permitted to shield himself behind the immunity of the sovereign. Only after the preliminary question of ownership is decided against the plaintiff does the claim of sovereign immunity come into play. Only then can it be said that the decree will affect property of the sovereign. 73 The Court tries to explain away Land v. Dollar, supra, by suggesting that it was a case where the officers acted in excess of their authority although the opinion in that case makes clear that even if the officers had authority there still remained the issue whether the shares of stock were sold or pledged to the United States. If the latter, to hold after satisfaction of the pledge would be tortious, and the stock could be recovered in the suit against the defendants. The Court seeks to avoid the decision in Ickes v. Fox, supra, by saying that the ground of decision is not made clear. But not even these most dubious arguments can explain away Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536, 46 S.Ct. 613, 70 L.Ed. 1074. Accordingly, the Court impliedly overrules that decision. No reason of policy is vouchsafed for overruling a decision that carries the authority that the Goltra case does. It was based on a long series of prior cases, it was decided by a unanimous Court and delivered by a Chief Justice who brought to the Court from his Presidential experience a partiality toward freedom for executive action, as evinced by his opinion in the contemporaneous case of Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160. The Goltra case has since been frequently, and always approvingly, cited, most recently in Land v. Dollar, supra, as an application of the Lee doctrine. See also Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 97, 57 S.Ct. 412, 417, 81 L.Ed. 525. The Goltra case is now thrown into the discard because it did not cite Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218, 34 S.Ct. 84, 58 L.Ed. 191. That earlier case is deemed in conflict with the later", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00319", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00295", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1868/95 of 26 July 1995 fixing for the 1995/96 marketing year the amount of the aid for the cultivation of certain varieties of grape intended for drying THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 of 24 February 1986 on the common organization of the market in products processed from fruit and vegetables (1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1032/95 (2), and in particular Article 6 (6) thereof, Whereas, pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86, new aid arrangements in respect of specialized areas for the cultivation of sultanas, currants and muscatels took effect as from the 1990/91 marketing year; whereas these arrangements have gradually replaced the system of production aid provided for in Article 6a; Whereas, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 6a (1) of the abovementioned Regulation, the Community aid per hectare should be set at the level laid down in this Regulation; Whereas the third subparagraph of Article 6 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 provides for the possibility to differentiate the amount of aid on the basis of the varieties of grapes and on other factors which may affect yield; whereas it is appropriate to provide such a differentiation by a coefficient derived from the ratio of average yield by variety to total average yield; whereas in the case of sultanas provision should be made for further differentiation between areas affected by phylloxera or replanted within the last five years, and other areas; Whereas, however, it is appropriate to provide that areas having a yield lower than a threshold differentiated for the varieties concerned shall not be considered as specialized areas for the application of the aid arrangements; whereas, therefore, aid shall not be granted for the cultivation of such areas; Whereas it is necessary to determine the aid to be granted to producers who replant their vineyards in order to combat phylloxera under the conditions laid down in Article 6 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86; Whereas verification of the areas used for growing these grapes has revealed no overrun of the maximum guaranteed area fixed in Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2911/", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00730", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00296", "text": "and applied by the Court in the Wilson case, then, it should be obvious that they neither stand for the proposition that the fact that private records are required to be kept by statute makes them public records by operation of law, nor did Mr. Justice Hughes misconstrue them in reaching the decision in the Wilson case. 109 Were there any doubt as to the point of the illustrations in the Wilson case, surely we could safely permit that doubt to be resolved by the Wilson opinion itself. After reviewing the illustrative cases, Mr. Justice Hughes observed: 'The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases is that where, by virtue of their character and the rules of law applc able to them, the books and papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.' 221 U.S. at pages 381, 382, 31 S.Ct. at page 545. 110 Evidently the dictum in the Wilson case and the authorities therein cited need to be bolstered for the use to which they are put in this case. We are told that 'Other state supreme court decisions, subsequent to the Wilson case, similarly treat as non-privileged, records required by statute to be kept.' These are the five instances cited: 111 (1) Paladini v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. 369, 173 P. 588, where it was held that the statutory procedure whereby the State Market Director could compel the production of the sales records of licensed fish dealers was valid. 112 Comment.—The court did not hold that the records were 'non-privileged,' but disposed of the contention that the statute violated the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that 'The proceeding before the state market director is not criminal in its nature, and the order compelling the petitioners to produce their books before the state market director was not in violation of the constitutional provision, which prohibits a court or officer from requiring a defendant in a criminal case to furnish evidence against himself.' 178 Col. at page 373, 173 P. at Page 590. The court did dispose of the contention that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution on the ground that the records were not private. But the records here were public records because, since it was conceded that the", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00205", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00297", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 736/89 of 16 March 1989 concerning the classification of certain goods in the combined nomenclature THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 20/89 (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof, Whereas in order to ensure uniform application of the combined nomenclature annexed to the said Regulation, it is necessary to adopt measures concerning the classification of the goods referred to in the Annex to this Regulation; Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 has set down the general rules for the interpretation of the combined nomenclature and these rules also apply to any other nomenclature which is wholly or partly based on it or which adds any additional subdivisions to it and which is established by specific Community provisions, with a view to the application of tariff or other measures relating to trade in goods; Whereas, pursuant to the said general rules, the goods described in column 1 of the table annexed to this Regulation must be classified within the appropriate CN codes indicated in column 2, by virtue of the reasons set out in column 3; Whereas the nomenclature committee has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its chairman, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The goods described in column 1 of the annexed table are now classified within the combined nomenclature within the appropriate CN codes indicated in column 2 of the said table. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the 21st day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 March 1989.", "label": 1, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 414, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00706", "split": "test"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_test_1_00298", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Taxpayer Oversight of Surplus Property Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds that-- (1) section 203(j) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 484(j)) established a system to ensure the fair and equitable allocation of Federal surplus personal property to eligible recipients including law enforcement agencies, school systems, medical institutions, libraries, homeless assistance providers, and units of local government; (2) the benefits of the Federal Personal Property Utilization and Donation Program is measured in terms of American taxpayer dollars not spent from budgets on new and expensive property; (3) Members of Congress and State and local officials all have an obligation to oversee the fair and equitable distribution of Government property, thereby ensuring accountability to the American taxpayers; (4) the owners of surplus Federal property are the American people and the Federal Government is merely its public custodian; (5) the efforts of the State agencies in distributing surplus property have enabled thousands of American taxpayers to acquire items such as office equipment, clothing, furniture, motor vehicles, forklifts, aircraft, boats and generators which have been declared surplus to the needs of the Federal Government; (6) the effectiveness of the current system for donation of surplus Federal personal property has been undermined by programs which mandate that property is made available on a priority basis to foreign entities before the safety, health, education, and training needs of American taxpayers are met; and (7) new legislation is needed to move the priority for property transfers through foreign assistance programs to a level below that for domestic use transfers of excess personal property to Federal agencies. SEC. 3. PRIORITY TO STATES AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE TRANSFER OF NONLETHAL EXCESS SUPPLIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Section 2547 of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``The Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``Subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense''; (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and (3) by inserting after subsection (c), the following: ``(d)(1) Nonlethal excess supplies of the Department of Defense shall be made available to a State or a local government of a State upon the request of the State or local government pursuant to authority provided in another", "label": 1, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01108", "split": "test"}