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+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00000", "text": ", 1995, by the Community, the City, and the Resolution Trust Corporation (in its capacity as the Receiver for the Sun State Savings and Loan Association, F.S.A.); and (B) includes the Development Agreement, the Use Agreement, and all other associated ancillary agreements and exhibits. (12) Use agreement.--The term ``Use Agreement'' means the agreement between the City and the Community, executed on September 11, 1995, that sets forth conditions and restrictions that-- (A) are supplemental to the Settlement, Release and Property Conveyance Agreement referred to in paragraph (11)(A); and (B) apply to the future use and development of the Mountain Property. SEC. 4. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT. The Settlement Agreement is approved and ratified and will be fully enforceable in accordance with its terms and the provisions of this Act. SEC. 5. TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES. (a) In General.--Upon satisfaction of all conditions to closing set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Resolution Trust Corporation will transfer, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement-- (1) to the Secretary, the Mountain Property and the Development Property purchased by the Community from the Resolution Trust Corporation; and (2) to the City, the Preservation Property and the Dedication Property purchased by the City from the Resolution Trust Corporation. (b) Trust Status.--The Mountain Property and the Development Property transferred under subsection (a)(1) will, subject to sections 6 and 7-- (1) be held in trust by the United States for the Community; and (2) become part of the Reservation. (c) Limitation on Liability.--despite any other provision of law, the United States will not incur any liability for conditions, existing prior to the transfer, on the parcels of land referred to in subsection (b) to be transferred to the United States in trust for the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. (d) Records.--Upon the satisfaction of all of the conditions of closing set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Secretary will file a plat of survey depicting the Saddleback Property (that includes a depiction of the Dedication Property, the Development Property, the Mountain Property, and the Preservation Property) with-- (1) the office of the Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona; and (2) the Titles and Records Center of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00970", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00001", "text": "be carried out on non-originating materials in order that the product manufactured can obtain originating status Heading No Description of product Working or processing carried out on non-originating materials that confers originating status (1) (2) (3) ex Chapter 28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes; except for heading Nos ex 2811, ex 2833 and ex 2840 for which the rules are set out below Manufacture in which all the materials used are classified within a heading other than that of the product. However, materials classified within the same heading may be used provided their value does not exceed 20 % of the ex-works price of the product ex 2840 Sodium perborate Manufacture from disodium tetraborate pentahydrate DECISION No 3/88 OF THE EEC-ICELAND JOINT COMMITTEE of 16 December 1988 supplementing and amending Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of ´originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation THE EEC-ICELAND JOINT COMMITTEE, Having regard to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, signed at Brussels on 22 July 1972, Having regard to Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of ´originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation, from now on referred to as ´Protocol 3', and in particular Article 28 of it, because, in the light of experience, the origin rules applying to used tyres collected in the Community or in Iceland to be sent for retreading to the other contracting party should be specified to eliminate certain practical problems arising for industry and customs administrations; because to this end the text of Article 4 (h) of Protocol 3 should be supplemented and a new explanatory note to that provision should be incorporated, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 Protocol 3 is amended as follows: 1. Article 4 (h) will be replaced by the following: (h) used articles collected there, fit only for the recovery of raw materials, subject to Note 5a on used tyres contained in Annex I to this Protocol;'. 2. In Annex I (´Explanatory Notes') the following will be inserted: ´Note 5a - Article 4 (h) In the case of used tyres, the term ´", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00813", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00002", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1379/2006 of 18 September 2006 prohibiting fishing for greater forkbeard in ICES zones VIII and IX (Community waters and international waters) by vessels flying the flag of Portugal THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (1), and in particular Article 26(4) of it, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy (2), and in particular Article 21(3) of it, because: (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2270/2004 of 22 December 2004 fixing for 2005 and 2006 the fishing opportunities for Community fishing vessels for certain deep-sea fish stocks (3) lays down quotas for 2005 and 2006. (2) According to the information received by the Commission, catches of the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to there have exhausted the quota allocated for 2006. (3) It is therefore necessary to prohibit fishing for that stock and its retention on board, transhipment and landing, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Quota exhaustion The fishing quota allocated to the Member State referred to in the Annex to this Regulation for the stock referred to there will be deemed to be exhausted from the date set out in that Annex. Article 2 Prohibitions Fishing for the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to there will be prohibited from the date set out in that Annex. It will be prohibited to retain on board, tranship or land such stock caught by those vessels after that date. Article 3 Entry into force This Regulation will enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 18 September 2006.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 481, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00524", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00003", "text": "the disposition. (2) Executive department.--The term ``executive department'' means an Executive department listed in section 101 of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 3. PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENT PILOT PROGRAM. (a) Plan for Entering Into Public-Private Agreements.-- (1) In general.--The head of a covered agency will develop and carry out a plan to enter into one or more agreements with a nongovernmental person, for the purposes described in paragraph (2). (2) Purposes.--The purposes of any agreement entered into under paragraph (1) will be-- (A) to lease Federal real properties that are underutilized or excess, under the terms of subsection (c); and (B) to develop, rehabilitate, or renovate facilities on such leased properties for the benefit of the covered agency. (3) Number of properties.--A total of at least 5, and not more than 10, Federal real properties will be leased under agreements entered into under paragraph (1). (b) Agreement Terms.-- (1) In general.--Each agreement entered into under this section-- (A) will have as its primary purpose the enhancement of the functional and economic efficiency of Federal real property; (B) will be negotiated under such procedures as the head of the covered agency concerned considers necessary to promote competition and protect the public interest; (C) will provide a lease option to the United States to occupy space in the facilities acquired, constructed, or rehabilitated under the agreement, but will not guarantee occupancy by the United States; (D) will describe the consideration, duties, and responsibilities for which the United States and the nongovernmental person are responsible and may provide for the alteration, repair, or improvement of the real property as part or all of the consideration of the nongovernmental person, despite any provision of law, including section 1302 of title 40, United States Code; (E) will provide-- (i) that the United States will not be liable for any actions, debts, or liability of the nongovernmental person; and (ii) that no person is authorized by the agreement to execute any instrument or document creating or evidencing any indebtedness unless such instrument or document specifically disclaims any liability of the United States under the instrument or document; and (F) will provide that the leasehold interests of the United States are senior to that of any lender", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00926", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00004", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 218/2008 of 11 March 2008 amending the representative prices and additional duties for the import of certain products in the sugar sector fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1109/2007 for the 2007/08 marketing year THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2006 of 30 June 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 as regards trade with third countries in the sugar sector (2), and in particular of the Article 36, because: (1) The representative prices and additional duties applicable to imports of white sugar, raw sugar and certain syrups for the 2007/08 marketing year are fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1109/2007 (3). These prices and duties have been last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 211/2008 (4). (2) The data currently available to the Commission indicate that the said amounts should be changed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The representative prices and additional duties on imports of the products referred to in Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, as fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1109/2007 for the 2007/08 marketing year are amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 12 March 2008. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 11 March 2008.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 413, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00643", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00005", "text": "River and Harbor Act of August 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1028, 1038, as recommended in House Rivers and Harbors Committee Document No. 50, 74th Congress. License issued to St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co., August 31, 1951, Project No. 2056, to use water from United States navigation dam at St. Anthony Falls, Minnesota, authorized in the River and Harbor Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 844, 848, as recommended in House Rivers and Harbors Committee Document No. 34, 75th Congress. Two licenses issued in 1934 and 1936 to Kanawha Valley Power Co., Projects Nos. 1175 and 1290, for three power plants at navigation dams on Kanawha River, West Virginia, authorized in River and Harbor Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 918, 928, as recommended in H.R. Doc. No. 190, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 'Mr. Angell. Is the Federal Government at the present time planning to develop any of those dams on the lower part of the river which are devoted exclusively to power production? 'Colonel Gee. No, sir. They have the same status in this basin plan as the eight remaining projects. They are part of the approved plan. Their being in that plan certainly is no bar to a private utility company coming in and seeking to develop one of these projects. 'Mr. Angell. And that is what is being done now. 'Colonel Gee. That is being done now at Roanoke Rapids, sir.' Hearings before the Committee on Public Works, H.R. 5472, Tit. II, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 144. 1 Section 10 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 reads in pertinent part as follows: 'That the following works of improvement for the benefit of navigation and the control of destructive flood waters and other purposes are adopted and authorized in the interest of the national security and with a view toward providing an adequate reservoir of useful and worthy public works for the post-war construction program, to be prosecuted under the direction of the Secretary of War and supervision of the Chief of Engineers in accordance with the plans in the respective reports from now on designated and subject to the conditions set forth there", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00487", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00006", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1294/2002 of 16 July 2002 fixing the minimum selling prices for beef put up for sale under the first invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1197/2002 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2345/2001(2), and in particular Article 28(2) of it, because: (1) Tenders have been invited for certain quantities of beef fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1197/2002(3). (2) under Article 9 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2173/79(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2417/95(5), the minimum selling prices for meat put up for sale by tender should be fixed, taking into account tenders submitted. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The minimum selling prices for beef for the first invitation to tender held in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1197/2002 for which the time limit for the submission of tenders was 8 July 2002 are as set out in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 17 July 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 July 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 372, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00616", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00007", "text": "except for permits not to exceed 1 year, and will not be identified for any disposition by or for any agency, and no mineral production or harvest of forest products will be permitted, except that nothing in this subsection will preclude forest management practices on such lands, including the harvest of timber in the event of fire, disease, or insect infestation; and (5) once the Pueblo has acquired title to the former National Forest System lands, these lands may be conveyed by the Pueblo to the Secretary of the Interior who will accept and hold such lands in the name of the United States in trust for the benefit of the Pueblo. SEC. 6. AFFIRMATION OF ACCURATE BOUNDARIES OF SANTO DOMINGO PUEBLO GRANT. (a) In General.--The boundaries of the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant, as determined by the 1907 Hall-Joy Survey, confirmed in the Report of the Pueblo Lands Board, dated December 28, 1927, are declared to be the current boundaries of the Grant and any lands currently owned by or on behalf of the Pueblo within such boundaries, or any lands from now on acquired by the Pueblo within the Grant in fee simple absolute, will be considered to be Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18, United States Code. (b) Limitation.--Any lands or interests in lands within the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant, that are not owned or acquired by the Pueblo, will not be treated as Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18, United States Code. (c) Acquisition of Federal Lands.--Any Federal lands acquired by the Pueblo under section 5(c)(1) will be held in trust by the Secretary for the benefit of the Pueblo, and will be treated as Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18, United States Code. (d) Land Subject to Provisions.--Any lands acquired by the Pueblo under section 5(c), or with funds subject to section 5(b), will be subject to the provisions of section 17 of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 641; commonly referred to as the Pueblo Lands Act). (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or in the Settlement Agreement will be construed to-- (1) cloud title to federally administered", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01017", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00008", "text": "order on a presumptive or imputed experience even though the Court is obliged to discredit such experience in the very same opinion? Is fictitious experience to be conclusive in matters of law and particularly in the interpretation of statutes, as the Court's opinion now intimates, or just in fact finding which has been the function which the Court has previously sustained upon the argument of administrative experience? 51 I suggest that administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point—it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law. And what action is, and what is not within the law must be determined by courts, when authorized to review, no matter how much deference is due to the agency's fact finding. Surely an administrative agency is not a law unto itself, but the Court does not really face up to the fact that this is the justification it is offering for sustaining the Commission action. 52 Even if the Commission had, as the Court says, utilized this case to announce a new legal standard of conduct, there would be hurdles to be cleared, but we need not dwell on them now. Because to promulgate a general rule of law, either by regulation or by case law, is something the Commission expressly declined to do. It did not previously promulgate, and it does not by this order profess to promulgate, any rule or regulation to prohibit such purchases absolutely or under stated conditions. On the other hand, its position is that no such rule or standard would be fair and equitable in all cases.3 IV. 53 Whether, as matter of policy, corporate managers during reorganization should be prohibited from buying or selling its stock, is not a question for us to decide. But it is for us to decide whether, so long as no law or regulation prohibits them from buying, their purchases may be forfeited, or not, in the discretion of the Commission. If such a power exists in words of the statute or in their implication, it would be possible to point it out and thus end the case. Instead, the Court admits that there was no law prohibiting these purchases when they were made, or at any time thereafter. And, except for this decision, there is none now. 54 The truth is that in this decision the Court approves the Commission's assertion of power to govern the matter without law, power to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00107", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00009", "text": "August 6, 1946. The judgment so rendered by this Court was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the case was remanded to this Court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court, 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746. 47 Following the remand, the plaintiff, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moved for summary judgment in its favor upon the pleadings and all of the proceedings which theretofore had been had in the case, or, in the alternative, for such further proceedings as this Court might direct, and defendants, by direction of the Court, filed proffers of proof. 48 Argument by counsel for the respective parties upon the motion of plaintiff was heard by the Court, and after due consideration of such argument and of defendants' proffers of proof, Garrett, J. and Jackson, J., constituting a majority of the Court, announced a ruling to the effect that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment would be granted, and Stephens, J., who presided during the trial, announced his dissent from such ruling. 49 Thereafter counsel for plaintiff and counsel for certain of the defendants submitted forms of final decrees for the consideration of the Court and also suggested findings of fact, the latter to be considered in the event the Court should deem it necessary to make any findings of fact additional to those originally found by it and to those stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court. 50 In due course, the Court heard arguments respecting the proposed decrees and the suggested findings of fact, and full consideration has been given thereto and to all prior proceedings all being considered in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court which, as understood by the majority of this Court, held that the defendants acted in concert to restrain trade and commerce in the gypsum board industry and monopolized said trade and commerce among the several states in that section from now on referred to as the eastern territory of the United States, which section embraces all the states of the United States westward from the eastern coast of it to the Rocky Mountains and including New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and the eastern half of Montana. 1 '45. Said combination has been formed, has been carried out, and is being carried out by each of the defendant companies (acting, in part, through those of their officers and directors made defendants", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00380", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00010", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2123/2003 of 2 December 2003 amending the import duties in the cereals sector THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1104/2003(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 as regards import duties in the cereals sector(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1110/2003(4), and in particular Article 2(1) of it, because: (1) The import duties in the cereals sector are fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2107/2003(5). (2) Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 provides that if during the period of application, the average import duty calculated differs by EUR 5 per tonne from the duty fixed, a corresponding adjustment is to be made. Such a difference has arisen. It is therefore necessary to adjust the import duties fixed in Regulation (EC) No 2107/2003, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes I and II to the amended Regulation (EC) No 2107/2003 are replaced by Annexes I and II to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 3 December 2003. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 2 December 2003.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 389, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00800", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00011", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1378/2005 of 22 August 2005 amending for the 52nd time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (1), and in particular Article 7(1), first indent, of it, because: (1) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 lists the persons, groups and entities covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation. (2) On 17 August 2005, the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council decided to amend the list of persons, groups and entities to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Annex I should therefore be amended accordingly. (3) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, this Regulation must enter into force immediately, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 22 August 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 419, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00718", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00012", "text": "504, 601 of the Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1172, 1174, 8 U.S.C. §§ 904, 906, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 904, 906. 20 It is apparent that Congress did not intend to leave a gap in the statutory coverage of acts of expatriation. 'Sec. 347. (a) Nothing contained in * * * chapter V (including § 504 which expressly repealed § 2 of the Act of 1907) of this Act, unless otherwise provided there, will be construed to affect the validity of any declaration of intention, petition for naturalization, certificate of naturalization or of citizenship, or other document or proceeding which will be valid at the time this Act will take effect; or to affect any prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings, civil or criminal, brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing, at the time this Act will take effect; but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts things, or matters, the statutes or parts of statutes repealed by this Act, are continued in force and effect.' 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 747(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 747(a). Section 504 also included the following clause: 'The repeal herein provided will not terminate nationality previously lawfully acquired, nor restore nationality previously lost under any law of the United States or any treaty to which the United States may have been a party.' 54 Stat. 1174, 8 U.S.C. § 904, 8 U.S.C.A. § 904. 21 Section 403(a) of the Act of 1940 (see note 2, supra) may apply to antecedent naturalizations and oaths of allegiance, as well as to future ones. 'A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.' Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S.Ct. 154, 157, 67 L.Ed. 332. See also, Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 54 S.Ct. 800, 78 L.Ed. 1353; United States v.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 493, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00335", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00013", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 24 November 1997 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the river Danube (97/825/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 130s (1) in conjunction with Article 228 (2), first sentence, and (3), first paragraph of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2), Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3), because the Commission participated, on behalf of the Community, in the negotiations within an ad hoc working party to prepare a Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the river Danube; because this Convention was signed on behalf of the Community in Sofia (Bulgaria) on 29 June 1994; because this Convention sets out to establish a framework for bilateral or multilateral cooperation to protect the marine environment, to prevent and control pollution in the river Danube and to ensure sustainable use of the water resources of countries through which the river Danube flows; because the Community has adopted measures in the field covered by the Convention; because it is for the Community to make an international commitment in this area; because, in accordance with Article 130r, Community policy on the environment helps to pursue the objectives of preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, protection of human health, prudent and rational utilization of natural resources, with a view to sustainable development, and promotion at international level of measures to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems; because the Community's environmental policy as a whole aims at a high level of protection; because it is based on the principles of precautionary and preventive action, on the principle of rectifying, as a priority at source, environmental damage and on the polluter should pay principle; because as part of their respective competences the Community and the Member States cooperate with the respective third countries and international organizations; because the conclusion of the Convention by the Community will help to achieve the objectives set out in Article 130r of the Treaty, and because it should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the river Danube is approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Convention is attached to this Decision. Article", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00762", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00014", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 25 February 1987 amending Decision 85/15/EEC authorizing Ireland to continue to apply certain protective measures under Article 108 (3) of the EEC Treaty (Only the English text is authentic) (87/150/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 108 (3) of it, because by Decision 85/15/EEC (1), the Commission authorized Ireland to continue to apply certain protective measures to capital movements liberalized in accordance with the Council Directive of 11 May 1960 (2), as amended by the Directive of 18 December 1962 (3); because Council Directive 86/566/EEC (4) widened the obligations of Member States in respect of the liberalization of capital movements; because Ireland has requested the Commission to extend the scope of the previously authorized protective measures to newly liberalized operations of the same type as those covered by Decision 85/15/EEC or presenting an equivalent threat to the balance of payments; because the authorization to apply the protective measures should be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Annex to Decision 85/15/EEC is replaced by the following: 'ANNEX 1.2 // // // Type of operation // Restrictions authorized by way of derogation from Community obligations // // // Operations in securities // Acquisition by residents of foreign securities, or of domestic securities issued on a foreign market, may be prohibited or made subject to authorization. The restriction will not apply to: // // - the acquisition by residents of foreign securities when such acquisition is financed from the proceeds of the sale of other foreign securities belonging to the resident or from borrowing abroad, // // - the acquisition of securities issued by the Communities or by the European Investment Bank 26. 11. 1986, p. 22. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to Ireland. Done at Brussels, 25 February 1987.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 425, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00806", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00015", "text": "identity of the purchasers of books and literature because 'under the Bill of Rights, that is beyond the power of your committee to investigate.' Id., p. 8. The books involved were The Road Ahead by John T. Flynn, The Constitution of the United States by Thomas J. Norton, Compulsory Medical Care by Melchior Palyi, and Why the Taft-Hartley Law by Irving B. McCann. Most of the purchasers (about 90 percent) had the books shipped to themselves; the rest told CCG the individuals the send them to or the type of person (e.g., 'farm leaders') who should receive them. One person had CCG send Compulsory Medical Care by Melchior Palyi to 15,550 libraries.3 The Select Committee stated in its report: 22 'Our study of this organization indicates very clearly that its most important function is the distribution of books and pamphlets in order to influence legislation directly and indirectly. It attempts to influence legislation directly by sending copies of books, pamphlets, and other printed materials to Members of Congress. It attempts to influence legislation indirectly by distributing hundreds of thousands of copies of these printed materials to people throughout the United States. 23 'Of particular significance is the fact that Edward A. Rumely and the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc., in recent years have devised a scheme for raising enormous funds without filing true reports under the provisions of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. This scheme has the color of legality but in fact is a method of circumventing the law. It utilizes the system outlined above whereby contributions to the Committee for Constitutional Government are designated as payments for the purchase of books, which are transmitted to others at the direction of the purchaser, with both the contributor of the money and the recipients of the books totally unaware of the subterfuge in most cases.' H.R.Rep. No. 3024, supra, p. 2. 24 The Select Committee insisted that the information demanded of respondent was relevant to its investigation of 'lobbying activities' within the meaning of the Resolution. It said: 25 'Because of the refusal of the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc., to produce pertinent financial records, this committee was unable to determine whether or not the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc., is evading or violating the letter or the spirit of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act by the establishment of a class of contributions called 'Receipt", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00479", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00016", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Property Low Hanging Fruit Act''. SEC. 2. UNIFORM AUTHORITY FOR EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS TO USE FUNDS FROM DISPOSAL OF FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY. (a) Authority To Convey.--The head of each executive department may-- (1) convey, by sale, lease, exchange, or otherwise, including through leaseback arrangements, real and related property, or interests there, under their ownership and control; and (2) retain the net proceeds of such dispositions in an account within the general fund of the United States Treasury established for purposes of this section, to be used in accordance with subsection (b). (b) Use of Funds.--For purposes of subsection (a), the net proceeds of such dispositions retained in the account of an executive department under that subsection will be available to the head of the executive department, until expended and without further appropriation and in compliance with other applicable provisions of law, to pay any necessary and incidental costs incurred by such head in connection with Federal property management activities of the executive department, including acquisition, improvements, maintenance, reconstruction, or construction needs. In conducting these activities, an executive department may enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for assistance. (c) Regulations.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services and the Secretary of Defense, will promulgate regulations to carry out this section. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Net proceeds.--The term ``net proceeds'', with respect to a disposition of property or interests under this section, means the rental, sales, and other sums received less the costs of the disposition. (2) Executive department.--The term ``executive department'' means an Executive department listed in section 101 of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 3. PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENT PILOT PROGRAM. (a) Plan for Entering Into Public-Private Agreements.-- (1) In general.--The head of a covered agency will develop and carry out a plan to enter into one or more agreements with a nongovernmental person, for the purposes described in paragraph (2). (2) Purposes.--The purposes of any agreement entered into under paragraph (1) will be-- (A) to lease Federal real properties that are underutilized or excess, under the terms of subsection (c);", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00925", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00017", "text": ". 1245, 'there is ample support for a legislative determination that the peculiar character of this traffic involves a special type of use of the highways,' with enhanced wear, tear and hazards laying heavier burdens on the state for maintenance and policing than other types of traffic create. It is to compensate for these burdens that the taxes are imposed and appellant has not sustained its burden. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., supra, 306 U.S. at page 599, 59 S.Ct. at page 753, 83 L.Ed. 1001, and authorities cited, of showing that the levies have no reasonable relation to that end.19 18 It is of no consequence that the state has seen fit to lay two exactions, substantially identical, rather than combine them into one, or that appellant pays other taxes which in fact are devoted to highway maintenance. For the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by imposing more than one form of tax. Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, supra; Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, supra. And, as we have said, the aggregate amount of both taxes combined is less than that of taxes previously sustained. In view of these facts there is not even semblance of substance to appellant's contention that the taxes are excessive. 19 Neither is there merit in its other arguments, which we have considered, including those urging due process and equal protection grounds for invalidating the levies. 20 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is affirmed. 21 Affirmed. 1 The section was enacted originally as Mont.Laws, 1931, c. 184, § 16. Textually it is as follows: '(a) In addition to all of the licenses, fees or taxes imposed upon motor vehicles in this state, and in consideration of the use of the public highways of this state, every motor carrier, as defined in this act, will, at the time of the issuance of a certificate and annually thereafter, on or between the first day of July and the fifteenth day of July, of each calendar year, pay to the board of railroad commissioners of the state of Montana the sum of ten dollars ($10.00), for every motor vehicle operated by the carrier over or upon the public highways of this state. * * *' In further relation to issuance of the permit, see note 5. 2 This section originally was Mont.Laws,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00121", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00018", "text": "28 of Directive 2002/98/EC, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Derogations to certain eligibility criteria for donors 1. Member States confronted with a serious risk of shortage or an actual shortage in the supply of blood and blood components directly due to the A(H1N1) Influenza pandemic, may, on a temporary basis: (a) by way of derogation from point 1.2 of Annex III to Directive 2004/33/EC, reduce the minimum haemoglobin levels in donors blood to no less than 120 g/l for females and 130 g/l for males; and/or (b) by way of derogation from point 2.2.1 of Annex III to Directive 2004/33/EC, apply a deferral period of no less than 7 days after cessation of symptoms of a flu-like illness. 2. The implementation of the derogations referred to in paragraph 1 will be subject to the following conditions: (a) the Member State concerned will inform the Commission without delay of the measures it intends to take or has taken under paragraph 1; (b) the Member State will communicate to the Commission justifications as to the necessity of those measures, notably as to the extent of the risk of shortage, or of the actual shortage, of blood and blood components, including a description of the criteria and methodology used to assess that necessity; (c) as soon as, according to the same criteria and methodology referred to in point (b), the supply of blood and blood components comes back to a sufficient level, the Member State concerned will terminate the implementation of the temporary derogations referred to in paragraph 1 and inform the Commission of it. Article 2 Transposition 1. Member States will bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2009 at the latest. They will immediately communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive. When Member States adopt those provisions, they will contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States will determine how such reference is to be made. 2. Member States will communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. Article 3 Entry into force This Directive will", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00808", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00019", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 551/2002 of 27 March 2002 establishing unit values for the determination of the customs value of certain perishable goods THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 993/2001(4), and in particular Article 173(1) of it, because: (1) Articles 173 to 177 of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 provide that the Commission will periodically establish unit values for the products referred to in the classification in Annex 26 to that Regulation. (2) The result of applying the rules and criteria laid down in the abovementioned Articles to the elements communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 173(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 is that unit values set out in the Annex to this Regulation should be established in regard to the products in question, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The unit values provided for in Article 173(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 are established as set out in the table in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 29 March 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 27 March 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 401, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00613", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00020", "text": "202. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR COMMERCIALIZATION. (a) In General.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary will delegate to directors of the National Laboratories signature authority with respect to any agreement described in subsection (b) the total cost of which (including the National Laboratory contributions and project recipient cost share) is less than $1,000,000. (b) Agreements.--Subsection (a) applies to-- (1) a cooperative research and development agreement; (2) a non-Federal work-for-others agreement; and (3) any other agreement determined to be appropriate by the Secretary, in collaboration with the directors of the National Laboratories. (c) Administration.-- (1) Accountability.--The director of the affected National Laboratory and the affected contractor will carry out an agreement under this section in accordance with applicable policies of the Department, including by ensuring that the agreement does not compromise any national security, economic, or environmental interest of the United States. (2) Certification.--The director of the affected National Laboratory and the affected contractor will certify that each activity carried out under a project for which an agreement is entered into under this section does not present, or minimizes, any apparent conflict of interest, and avoids or neutralizes any actual conflict of interest, as a result of the agreement under this section. (3) Availability of records.--On entering an agreement under this section, the director of a National Laboratory will submit to the Secretary for monitoring and review all records of the National Laboratory relating to the agreement. (4) Rates.--The director of a National Laboratory may charge higher rates for services performed under a partnership agreement entered into under this section, regardless of the full cost of recovery. (d) Conforming Amendment.--Section 12 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3710a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and indenting the subparagraphs appropriately; (B) by striking ``Each Federal agency'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), each Federal agency''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Exception.--despite paragraph (1), in accordance with section 202(a)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00848", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00021", "text": "on a single rate per year, corresponding to the rates applied annually to budget appropriations on the basis of the mechanism for the technical adjustment of the financial perspectives; because Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4254/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Regional Development Fund (3), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2083/93 (4), defines the measures for which the ERDF may provide financial support; because Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4255/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Social Fund (5), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2084/93 (6), defines the measures for which the ESF may provide financial support; because the Single Programming Document has been established in agreement with the Member State concerned through the partnership defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88; because the Single Programming Document satisfies the conditions and includes the information required by Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because the present assistance satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, and so should be implemented by means of an integrated approach involving finance from more than one Fund; because Article 1 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (7), as last amended by Regulation (ECSC, EC, Euratom) No 2730/94 (8), states that the legal commitments entered into for measures extending over more than one financial year must contain a time limit for implementation which must be specified to the recipient in due form when the aid is granted; because all the other conditions laid down for the grant of aid from the ERDF and the ESF have been complied with, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Single Programming Document for Community structural assistance in the region of East London and the Lee Valley concerned by Objective 2 in the United Kingdom, covering the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1996, is approved. Article 2 The Single Programming Document includes the following essential elements: (a) a statement of the main priorities for joint", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00655", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00022", "text": "apply, the notifier may withdraw his support of the inclusion of the active substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC within two months from receipt of the draft assessment report referred to in Article 11(2). Article 11f Active substance for which there are clear indications of harmful effects If there are clear indications that it may be expected that the active substance has harmful effects on human or animal health or on groundwater as set out in Annex VI, the Commission will take a Decision on the non-inclusion of the active substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC, in accordance with Article 12(1)(a) and (2)(b) of this Regulation. Article 12 Presentation of a draft directive or draft decision 1. The Commission will submit to the Committee a draft review report at the latest six months after: (a) receipt of the draft assessment report where Article 11b or Article 11f applies; (b) receipt of the conclusion established by the EFSA where Article 11c applies; (c) receipt of a written withdrawal of the notifier’s support where Article 11e applies. 2. Together with the draft review report the Commission will submit to the Committee: (a) a draft directive including the active substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC, setting out where appropriate the conditions, including the time limit, for such inclusion; or (b) a draft decision addressed to the Member States requiring them to withdraw, within six months, the authorisations of plant protection products containing the active substance, under the fourth subparagraph of Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414/EEC, whereby that active substance is not included in Annex I to that Directive, mentioning the reasons for the non-inclusion. The Directive or Decision will be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 19(2) of Directive 91/414/EEC. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2(b), the latest date for Member States to withdraw authorisations will be 31 December 2010 in the case referred to in paragraph 1(c) unless the Commission has concluded that the substance meets the criteria of Annex VI, if appropriate after having consulted the EFSA. Article 12a View by the EFSA Where an active substance is included in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC under Article 11b of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00588", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00023", "text": "that petitioner had prior knowledge of the Donner incident which forms the basis, at least in part, of the due process allegation now being made. The record in the first proceeding shows that petitioner's own lawyer elicited the information from Donner that he had talked with the prosecuting lawyers during the interlude between the allegedly conflicting statements. And petitioner made reference to that information during the course of the first habeas corpus proceeding in the manner previously described. Petitioner now utilizes that same information in alleging that the prosecution made a knowing use of false testimony. 42 In the first place, however, we cannot assume that petitioner has acquired no new or additional information since the time of the trial or the first habeas corpus proceeding that might indicate fraudulent conduct on the part of the prosecuting attorneys. As Judge Denman stated in his dissenting opinion below, 161 F.2d at pages 708, 709: 'The gravamen of the misconduct charged is not the fact that the witness changed his testimony but that the prosecuting attorney knowingly caused the witness to give the false testimony. All the accused and his attorney knew at the trial was that the single prosecuting witness changed his testimony. Obviously this in itself does not warrant a charge of fraud. That it was fraudulently done by persuasion of the prosecuting attorney could only have been learned after conviction and after the convicted man was in the penitentiary.' 43 Whether petitioner does or does not have any new information is a matter unrevealed by anything before us or before the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is a matter which should be determined in the first instance by the District Court. And it is one on which petitioner is entitled to be heard either at a hearing or through an amendment or elaboration of his pleadings. Appellate courts cannot make factual determinations which may be decisive of vital rights where the crucial facts have not been developed. Cf. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 68 S.Ct. 1031. 44 In the second place, even if it is found that petitioner did have prior knowledge of all the facts concerning the allegation in question, it does not necessarily follow that the fourth petition should be dismissed without further opportunity to amend the pleadings or without holding a hearing. If called upon, petitioner may be able to present adequate reasons for not making the allegation earlier, reasons which make it fair and just for the trial court to overlook the delay. The", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00171", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00024", "text": "ended as a procedure which would avoid hardships that a strike imposes on employees and was considered 'a better weapon than a strike.' 5 The employer did not resort to any private disciplinary measures such as discharge of the employees; instead, it sought a much less drastic remedy by plea to the appropriate public authority under Wisconsin law7 to investigate and adjudge the Union's conduct under the law of the State. After the prescribed procedures, the Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from '(a) engaging in any concerted efforts to interfere with production by arbitrarily calling union meetings and inducing work stoppages during regularly scheduled working hours; or engaging in any other concerted effort to interfere with production of the complainant except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.'8 6 Two court proceedings resulted from the Board's order: one by the Board to obtain enforcement and the other by the Union to obtain review. They are here considered, as they were below, together. 7 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained the Board's order but significantly limited the effect of its otherwise general prohibitions. It held that what the order does, and all that it does, is to forbid individual defendants and members of the Union from engaging in concerted effort to interfere with production by doing the acts instantly involved. As we have previously pointed out, the construction placed upon such an order by the State Supreme Court is conclusive on us. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154. Our only question is, therefore, whether it is beyond the power of the State to prohibit the particular course of conduct described.9 8 The Union contends that the statute as thus applied violates the Thirteenth Amendment in that it imposes a form of compulsory service or involuntary servitude. However, nothing in the statute or the order makes it a crime to abandon work individually, compare Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 64 S.Ct. 792, 88 L.Ed. 1095, or collectively. Nor does either undertake to rohibit or restrict any employee from leaving the service of the employer, either for reason or without reason, either with or without notice. The facts afford no foundation for the contention that any action of the State has the purpose or", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00241", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00025", "text": "the higher the rental fee the prior-run exhibitor will pay. 'On the other hand, the distributor's revenue from subsequent-run exhibition is also important to him; this income may mean the difference between black or red ink on his ledgers. But the longer the clearance period, the smaller will be these returns—not only because more customers will have attended the prior showing rather than wait for subsequent exhibition, but also because the effects of the advertising and exploitation efforts made when the picture was released will have been vitiated over this time. In general, the greater the total box-office return earned by a film in all showings, the greater will be the distributor's revenue. 'The relation between run, clearance and zoning, admission price, seating capacity, and rental fees is indeed a complex one. The range covered by these factors is indicated by this fact: a license fee amounting to many thousands of dollars may be paid for the first showing of a film in a large metropolitan theater, and within a year the same film may be exhibited in some small theater in the same city for a fee of less than $20.' 11 See note 10, supra. 12 This part of the decree provides: 'Each of the defendants is enjoined and restrained: '1. From monopolizing the supply of major first run films in any situation where there is a competing theatre suitable for first run exhibition of it and from monopolizing the supply of second run film in any situation where there is a suitable theatre for second run exhibition of it. '2. From demanding or receiving clearance over theatres operated by others which unreasonably restricts their ability to compete with a theatre owned or operated by a defendant corporation controlled by it and from attempting to control the admission prices charged by others by agreement with distributors, demands made upon distributors, or by any means whatsoever. '3. From conditioning the licensing of films in any competitive situation outside of Buffalo, New York, upon the licensing of films in any other situation and from entering into any film franchise. '5. From enforcing any existing agreements previously entered into (1) not to compete or (2) to restrict the use of any real estate to non-theatrical purposes. '6. From using any threats or deception as a means whereby a competitor is induced to sell. '7 From continuing any contract, conspiracy or combination with each other or with any other person which has the purpose or effect of maintaining the exhibition or theatre monopolies of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00164", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00026", "text": "Yet now we hold that no matter the extremes to which a legislative committee may go it is not answerable to an injured party under the civil rights legislation. That result is the necessary consequence of our ruling since the test of the statute, so far as material here, is whether a constitutional right has been impaired, not whether the domain of the committee was traditional. It is one thing to give great leeway to the legislative right of speech, debate, and investigation. But when a committee perverts its power, brings down on an individual the whole weight of government for an illegal or corrupt purpose, the reason for the immunity ends. It was indeed the purpose of this civil rights legislation to secure federal rights against invasion by officers and agents of the states. I see no reason why any officer of government should be higher than the Constitution from which all rights and privileges of an office obtain. 1 R.S. § 1980 (pt. 3), 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3): 'If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, and person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice-President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged there do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00401", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00027", "text": "by the Community, the City, and the Resolution Trust Corporation (in its capacity as the Receiver for the Sun State Savings and Loan Association, F.S.A.); and (B) includes the Development Agreement, the Use Agreement, and all other associated ancillary agreements and exhibits. (12) Use agreement.--The term ``Use Agreement'' means the agreement between the City and the Community, executed on September 11, 1995, that sets forth conditions and restrictions that-- (A) are supplemental to the Settlement, Release and Property Conveyance Agreement referred to in paragraph (11)(A); and (B) apply to the future use and development of the Mountain Property. SEC. 4. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT. The Settlement Agreement is approved and ratified and will be fully enforceable in accordance with its terms and the provisions of this Act. SEC. 5. TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES. (a) In General.--Upon satisfaction of all conditions to closing set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Resolution Trust Corporation will transfer, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement-- (1) to the Secretary, the Mountain Property and the Development Property purchased by the Community from the Resolution Trust Corporation; and (2) to the City, the Preservation Property and the Dedication Property purchased by the City from the Resolution Trust Corporation. (b) Trust Status.--The Mountain Property and the Development Property transferred under subsection (a)(1) will, subject to sections 6 and 7-- (1) be held in trust by the United States for the Community; and (2) become part of the Reservation. (c) Records.--Upon the satisfaction of all of the conditions of closing set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Secretary will file a plat of survey depicting the Saddleback Property (that includes a depiction of the Dedication Property, the Development Property, the Mountain Property, and the Preservation Property) with-- (1) the office of the Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona; and (2) the Titles and Records Center of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON USE AND DEVELOPMENT. Upon the satisfaction of all of the conditions of closing set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the properties transferred under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5(a) will be subject to the following limitations and conditions on use and development: (1) Preservation property.-- (", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01076", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00028", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 15 September 1981 authorizing the Italian Republic to exempt from application of Regulation (EEC) No 1463/70 on the introduction of recording equipment in road transport the vehicles referred to in Article 14a (3) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 (Only the Italian text is authentic) (81/790/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1463/70 of 20 July 1970 on the introduction of recording equipment in road transport (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2828/77 (2), and in particular Article 3 (3) of it, because the Italian Government has asked the Commission to authorize exemption from Regulation (EEC) No 1463/70 of the vehicles referred to in Article 14a (3) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (3); because this measure can have no repercussions on the situation as regards competition in the carriage of goods by road ; because, it can, moreover, in no way hinder the achievement of the aims of the social regulations applying to road transport; because the vehicles referred to above, which are in any case very small in number, are all intended for own-account operations having a negligible economic impact ; because they furthermore are normally used over very short distances and in consequence the drivers' hours are limited; because the transport operations in question are not intended to benefit from exemptions from Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 and will therefore continue to be governed by its provisions, and in particular that concerning the use of individual drivers' control books; because this measure will relate solely to the movement of the vehicles concerned on national territory and will not extend to their use in international transport operations, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Italian Republic is authorized to exempt from the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 1463/70 the vehicles referred to in Article 14a (3) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 543/69. Article 2 The Italian Republic will inform the Commission of the measures taken in order to implement this Decision. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Italian", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00633", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00029", "text": "zero. The basis of this determination was the alleged invalidity of Alma's patent, which the United States claims that the Act permits it to assert.5 8 In the meantime, Alma had taken an appeal from Paragraph 5 of the judgment of the District Court, which held that the T—79 transfer cases were outside the patent. Timken did not appeal. After the Order was promulgated, Timken moved to dismiss the appeal and remand to the District Court with directions to vacate its judgment. The motion was predicated on an affidavit that Timken had manufactured transfer cases for the United States alone, together with the argument that the operation of the Act and Order transferred jurisdiction of the subject matter of the entire case to the Court of Claims. Alma countered with an attack on the constitutionality of the Act and Order, primarily as working a deprivation of property in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. 9 The United States had at this time already submitted an amicus brief, in which it argued that the Order had made the appeal moot; and when Alma's constitutional attack was filed, the United States intervened in support of the Act and Order. 10 In its opinion6 the Circuit Court of Appeals considered that the question of the applicability of the Act and Order in this case was simply a question of their constitutional validity. It proceeded to consider this latter question, and decided that both the Act and the Order were entirely valid. Accordingly, it entered the following order: 11 '* * * it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that Paragraph 5 of the judgment of the said District Court in this case be, and the same is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to proceed no further there unless and until it will appear to the Court that a justiciable controversy again7 exists between the parties arising out of the facts set forth in the complaint, except that the Court may, if it deems such action to be appropriate, vacate all or any part of the remainder of the judgment and dismiss the complaint as moot.' 12 The War Department notice was issued after the District Court's judgment, but before appeal was filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. It appears that at no time did any party urge on the Circuit Court of Appeals or did that court pass on the question whether the T—79 transfer cases were covered by Alma's pat nt and license. Indeed, it was not until after we had", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00004", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00030", "text": "2.1. General considerations (178) Under Article 15(2) of Council Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose upon undertakings or associations of undertakings fines from one thousand to one million euro, or a sum in excess of it not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings and associations of undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. (179) In fixing the amount of any fine the Commission must have regard to all relevant circumstances and particularly the gravity and duration of the infringement, which are the two criteria explicitly referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17. (180) The Commission follows the methodology explained in its guidelines of 14 January 1998 on the method of setting fines imposed under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 (from now on called \"guidelines on fines\")(74). (181) The role played by each undertaking party to the infringement will be assessed on an individual basis. In particular, the Commission will reflect in the fine imposed any aggravating or attenuating circumstances and will apply, where appropriate, the notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (from now on called \"leniency notice\")(75). 2.2. Basic amount of the fines (182) In order to determine the amount of the fines, the Commission calculates a basic amount that will be increased to take account of aggravating circumstances, or reduced to take account of attenuating circumstances. The basic amount is determined according to the gravity and duration of the infringement. 2.2.1. Gravity (183) In its assessment of the gravity of the infringement, the Commission takes account of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic market. (184) In this case the agreement had the object of fixing (a) the way of charging for the exchange of in-currency banknotes (i.e. a percentage commission) and (b) the level of charges in the form of a target price (to achieve 90 % exchange margin income recovery) for the exchange of in-currency banknotes. Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty expressly prohibits both direct and indirect fixing of prices or other trading conditions. By its nature,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00581", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00031", "text": "policy to the state could subsequently pay a second time to a claimant and acquire the rights of the claimant against the comptroller. 2 '§ 700. Unclaimed life insurance corporation moneys. '1. The following unclaimed property held or owing by life insurance corporations will be deemed abandoned property: '(a) Any moneys held or owing by any life insurance corporation which will have remained unclaimed for seven years by the person or persons appearing to be entitled thereto under matured life insurance policies on the endowment plan issued on the lives of residents of this state. '(b) Any moneys held or owing by any life insurance corporation which are payable under other kinds of life insurance policies issued on the lives of residents of this state where the insured, if living, would, prior to the thirty-first day of December next preceding the report required by section seven hundred one, have attained the limiting age under the mortality table on which the reserves are based, exclusive of '(i) any policy which has within seven years been assigned, readjusted, kept in force by payment of premium, reinstated or subjected to loan, or '(ii) any policy with respect to which such corporation has on file written evidence received within seven years that the person or persons apparently entitled to claim thereunder have knowledge of it. '(c) Any moneys held or owing by any life insurance corporation due to beneficiaries under policies issued on the lives ofr esidents of this state who have died, which moneys will have remained unclaimed by the person or persons entitled thereto for seven years. '2. Any such abandoned property held or owing by a life insurance corporation to which the right to receive the same is established to the satisfaction of such corporation will cease to be deemed abandoned.' 3 187 Misc. 1004, 65 N.Y.S.2d 143; Id., 271 App.Div. 1002, 69 N.Y.S.2d 323; Id., 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24. 4 Abandoned Property Law, Art. XIV, § 1404: '1. The care and custody, subject only to the duty of conversion prescribed in section fourteen hundred two of this chapter, of all abandoned property previously paid to the state, except '(i) abandoned property in individual amounts of less than one dollar so paid under chapter one hundred", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00148", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00032", "text": ", facility or privilege extended by the Manufacturer under such practice, procedure or plan if such service, facility or privilege or a service, facility or privilege corresponding thereto, is not made available upon its written request to any other finance company upon substantially similar terms and conditions; and '(ii) so long as the Manufacturer will continue to afford any service, facility or privilege not otherwise specifically referred to in this decree to Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies, it will not refuse to afford similar or corresponding services, facilities or privileges upon substantially similar terms and conditions and upon written request to any other finance company for the purpose of giving Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies a competitive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers; provided that it will not be a violation of this decree for the Manufacturer to afford such service, facility or privilege only to registered finance companies as defined in sub-paragraph (j) of this paragraph 6 or only to a finance company designated in writing to the Manufacturer by the dealer or prospective dealer; 'the written request will specify in each instance the particular service, facility or privilege desired; '(6.) (i) The Manufacturer will not, except in each instance upon written request of the dealer or prospective dealer, arrange or agree with Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company that an agent of the Manufacturer and an agent of the finance company will together be present with any dealer or prospective dealer for the purpose of influencing the dealer to patronize Respondent Finance Company or such other finance company; provided, however, that it will not be a violation of this decree for the Manufacturer to assist any dealer or prospective dealer, because of said dealer's or prospective dealer's financial situation or requirements, by joint conference with him and a representative of a particular finance company, to obtain special facilities or services (such term not including only the financing of the shipment or delivery of automobiles to such dealer or prospective dealer and/or only the purchase or acquisition of retail time sales paper from him in the regular course of business) from the particular finance company and, in part consideration of such special facilities or services, for such dealer or prospective dealer to arrange to do business with such finance company on an exclusive basis for a reasonable period of time as may be agreed between them; '(6.) (k) The Manufacturer will not recommend, endorse or advertise the Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to any dealer or to the public; provided, however, that nothing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00212", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00033", "text": "Securities Act of 1933, transactions involving the initial disposition by an approved seller of pooled certificates that are acquired by that seller from the Corporation upon the initial issuance of the pooled certificates will be deemed to be transactions by a person other than as an issuer, underwriter, or dealer within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection: ``(A) Approved seller.--The term `approved seller' means an institution approved by the Corporation to sell mortgage loans to the Corporation in exchange for pooled certificates. ``(B) Pooled certificates.--The term `pooled certificates' means single class mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Corporation that have been issued by the Corporation directly to the approved seller in exchange for the mortgage loans underlying such mortgage-backed securities.''. (c) Regulations.--The Securities and Exchange Commission may issue any regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section and the amendments made by this section. (d) Effective Date.--The amendments under this section will be made upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, but will apply only with respect to fiscal years of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation that begin after the expiration of such 180- day period. SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON REGISTRATION FEES. (a) In General.--Section 6(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``despite any other provision of this title, no applicant, or group of affiliated applicants that do not include any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, filing a registration statement subject to a fee will be required in any fiscal year with respect to all registration statements filed by such applicant in such fiscal year to pay an aggregate amount in fees to the Commission under subsection (b) in excess of five percent of the target offsetting collection amount for such fiscal year. Fees paid in connection with registration statements relating to business combinations will not be included in calculating the total fees paid by any applicant.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment under subsection (a) will be made and will apply upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 489, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00916", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00034", "text": "ial purposes of the Act. We do not think that Congress intended to vest in the Board a virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures, and thus to prescribe penalties or fines which the Board may think would effectuate the policies of the Act. We have said that 'this authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an order'. We have said that the power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 235, 236, 59 S.Ct. 206, 219, 83 L.Ed. 126. see, also, National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267, 268, 58 S.Ct. 571, 574, 575, 82 L.Ed. 831. We adhere to that construction.' 311 U.S. 7, 11—12, 61 S.Ct. 79. 25 As we understand the decisions of this Court up to now, they have all held that the power of the Board to effectuate the policies of the Act is remedial and is for the purpose of making the employee whole and not of punishing the employer. It is conceded and cannot be denied that the rule previously applied by the Board in calculating back pay does not fail to make the employee whole. 26 The rule undoubtedly derives from the common-law rule of damages for the breach by the employer of a contract of employment. The measure of damages is what an employee would have earned if he had not been wrongfully discharged, less what he did earn during the period of the breach. American Trading Co. v. Steele, 9 Cir., 274 F. 774, 782; 5 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1937), § 1358; McCormick on Damages (1935) §§ 158, 160. 27 By the quarterly calculation approved by the Court in the instant case, not only may a wrongfully discharged employee often receive as back pay a greater amount than he would have received had he worked at his regular job, but the employer", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00474", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00035", "text": "as defined in section 102 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 3101 et seq.). ``(2) Acquired lands. ``(3) Lands immediately surrounding any building, permanent structure, or other development owned or controlled by the United States, another unit of government, or any person, including Native owned cabins or campsites on public lands or without the permission of the public land owner. ``(4) Lands withdrawn or reserved for national defense purposes. ``(5) Lands within the National Petroleum Reserve, Alaska. ``(6) Lands within the Tongass and Chugach National Forests. ``(e) Right of First Refusal.--The 13th Regional Corporation will not transfer all or any portion of lands or interests there that it acquires under this section to a third party without first making a written offer to sell that same land or interest there to the Regional Corporation for the geographical region within which the land or interest there is located at the amount (or its cash equivalent) offered by the third party who desires to acquire the land or interest there. The following terms will govern such transfers and offers: ``(1) The offer will be made to the Regional Corporation not less than 30 days before any proposed transfer of such land and will state the price and terms of the proposed transfer, and the name and address of both the offerer and offeree. ``(2) Not later than 20 days after the receipt of the offer, the Regional Corporation may exercise an option to purchase all, but not less than all, of the land or interest there that is to be transferred on the terms in the offer or their cash equivalent. ``(3) If the Regional Corporation does not purchase all of the land or interest there to be transferred within the required time, then the 13th Regional Corporation may transfer all of the land or interest there offered (but not a lesser or greater amount) to the third party specified in the offer, but not for a price less or on terms different from those originally made by the third party. Any land or interest there not transferred by the 13th Regional Corporation to the specified third party not later than 60 days after making the offer to the Regional Corporation will again become subject to the restrictions of this subsection as though it had never been offered. ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, `transfer' means the sale, transfer, or exchange of land or interests there in gravel, oil and gas, minerals, water", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01082", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00036", "text": "the president for each Federal reserve bank which is made in accordance with the amendment made by subsection (a) will take place upon the earlier of-- (A) the expiration of the term of the president of the bank who is serving in such office on the date of the enactment of this Act; or (B) the occurrence of the first vacancy in the office of president of the bank after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) 1st vice president.--despite any provision of the Federal Reserve Act, the term of the first vice president of any Federal reserve bank who was appointed to such position before the date of the enactment of this Act will end as of the date on which the president of the bank is first appointed in accordance with the amendment made by subsection (a) and a first vice president will be appointed in the manner provided by such amendment. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The subdivision designated ``Fifth.'' of the 4th undesignated paragraph of section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 341) is amended-- (1) in the 1st sentence, by striking ``a president, vice presidents, and''; and (2) by striking the 2d, 3d, and 4th sentences and inserting the following new sentence: ``All executive officers and all employees of the bank will be directly responsible to the president of the bank.''. SEC. 3. GAO AUDITS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS REQUIRED; ITEMIZED BUDGETS. (a) Removal of Limitation on GAO Audits.--Section 714(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking the 2d sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``In the case of any audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any Federal reserve bank under the preceding sentence, the audit may not include transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign country, or nonprivate international financing organization or any part of any discussion or communication among or between members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or officers or employees of such Board which is related to any such transaction.''. (b) Itemized Budgets.--The Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 221 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 11A the following new section: ``SEC", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01060", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00037", "text": "canines for agencies with certified bomb technicians); (G) tactical or armored vehicles; (H) law enforcement surveillance equipment; (I) long range hailing and warning devices; or (J) tactical entry equipment; or (2) to be used for, or to deploy or obtain training in the use or deployment of-- (A) robots and remotely piloted vehicles; (B) canines (other than bomb-sniffing canines for agencies with certified bomb technicians); (C) explosive entry equipment; (D) law enforcement surveillance equipment; or (E) tactical operations. (c) Review of Prior Receipt of Property Before Award.--In making an award under a preparedness grant program, the Agency will-- (1) determine whether the awardee has already received, and still retains, property from the Department of Defense under section 2576a of title 10, United States Code, including through review of the website maintained by the Defense Logistics Agency under subsection (h) of such section (as added by section 2(a)(1) of this Act); and (2) require that the award may not be used by the awardee to procure or obtain property determined to be retained by the awardee under paragraph (1). (d) Use of Grant Program Funds for Required Return of Property to DoD.--despite any other provision of law, the use of funds by a State or local agency to return to the Department of Defense property transferred to such State or local agency under section 2676a of title 10, United States Code, as such return is required by section 2(b) of this Act, will be an allowable use of preparedness grant program funds by such agency. SEC. 4. USE OF EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT FUNDS. (a) Limitation.--Section 501(d) of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3751(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(3) The purchase, maintenance, alteration, or operation of-- ``(A) lethal weapons; or ``(B) less-lethal weapons.''. (b) Use of Grant Funds for Required Return of Property to DoD.-- despite any other provision of law, the use of funds by a State agency or unit of local government to return to the Department", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00846", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00038", "text": "D. M. Heller and dated December 12, 1999. (b) Property Description.--The map referred to in subsection (a) is the primary description of the lands to which the map refers. In the event of a conflict between the map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The map will be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service until the lands are disposed of under this section. (c) Revocations.--despite any other provision of law, on conveyance of land by the Secretary under this section, any public order withdrawing the land from any form of appropriation under the public land laws is revoked. SEC. 6. DISPOSITION OF FUNDS. (a) Deposit in Sisk Act Fund.--The Secretary of Agriculture will deposit in the fund established under Public Law 90-171 (16 U.S.C. 484a; commonly known as the Sisk Act)-- (1) the proceeds of a sale or exchange under section 2; and (2) the consideration received under sections 3(b) and 4(b). (b) Use of Proceeds.--Subject to subsection (c), funds deposited under subsection (a) will be available to the Secretary, without further appropriation, for-- (1) the acquisition, construction, or improvement of administrative facilities and sites for the Allegheny National Forest; or (2) the acquisition of land and interests in land in the Allegheny National Forest. (c) Condition on Land Acquisition.--The acquisition of lands in the Allegheny National Forest using funds deposited under subsection (a) is subject to the condition that the market value of the acquired lands may not exceed 125 percent of the market value of the lands disposed of under this Act. SEC. 7. ADMINISTRATION OF LAND ACQUIRED BY UNITED STATES. Lands acquired by the Secretary of Agriculture under section 6(b) or by exchange under section 2 will be managed by the Secretary in accordance with the Act of March 1, 1911 (commonly known as the Weeks Act; 16 U.S.C. 480 et seq.) and other laws and regulations pertaining to National Forest System lands. For the purposes of section 7 of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00967", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00039", "text": "for advance payment; because suitable control provisions with regard to the refined sugar, including a definition of the term'refining', should be laid down; because, for conversion into escudos of the aid amounts, the conversion rate applicable to the transport aid and to the advance of that aid should be the agricultural conversion rate in force on the day when the bill of lading is made out for the sugar transported, all of which will be transported by sea, and, in so far as the refining aid is concerned, the conversion rate should be the agricultural conversion rate in force on the day when the sugar in question is refined; because Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2146/87 (7) determined the quantities of raw sugar obtained from beet harvested in the Community intended, for the 1987/88 marketing year, for the Portuguese refineries and entitled to benefit from the same aids as those granted for the raw sugar produced in the French overseas departments; because it was not possible for all of those quantities to be refined in good time but, in being considered as working stock, those quantities are eligible for the refining aid; because it is appropriate to provide that the refining aid should be applied to those quantities by attributing them to the quantities fixed in Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 2146/87 for the 1987/88 marketing year; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 1988/89 marketing year, flat-rate Community aids will be granted, as an intervention measure, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Regulation, for the transport to and refining in Portugal of raw sugar obtained from beet harvested in the Community, up to a limit equivalent to 20 000 tonnes of white sugar. Article 2 1. There will be granted for the sugar referred to in Article 1 delivered to Portuguese refineries and within the prescribed limit: (a) a flat-rate aid for transport equal to the total aid granted during the 1988/89 marketing year under Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 2225/86 for the transport of raw sugar produced in the French overseas departments; and (b) an aid for refining in Portuguese refineries made up of: (aa) an amount per 100 kilograms of raw sugar of standard quality equal to the difference between the storage", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00793", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00040", "text": ". 33 I join in the Court's judgment. But I strongly dissent from the reasons assigned to support it in the opinion of Mr. Justice JACKSON. 34 While giving lip service to the venerable decision in Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed. 332, and purporting to distinguish it, that opinion ignores nearly a century and a half of subsequent consistent construction.1 In all practical consequence, it would overrule that decision with its laer reaffirmations. Pertinently it may be asked, how and where are those decisions to operate, if not just in the situation presented by this case? And, if there is no other, would they not be effectively overruled? 35 What is far worse and more important, the manner in which this reversal would be made, if adhered to by a majority of the Court, would entangle every district court of the United States for the first time in all of the contradictions, complexities and subtleties which have surrounded the courts of the District of Columbia in the maze woven by the 'legislative court—constitutional court' controversy running through this Court's decisions concerning them.2 36 In my opinion it would be better to continue following what I conceive to be the original error of the Hepburn decision and its progeny than thus to ensnarl the general system of federal courts. Jurisdictional and doctrinal troubles enough we have concerning them without adding others by ruling now that they have the origin and jurisdiction of 'legislative' courts in addition to that of 'constitutional' courts created under Article III, with which alone they previously have been held endowed. 37 Moreover, however this case may be decided, there is no real escape from deciding what the word 'State' as used in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution means. For if it is a limitation on Congress' power as to courts created under that Article, it is hard to see how it becomes no limitation when Congress decides to cast it off under some other Article, even one relating to its authority over the District of Columbia. If this may be done in the name of practical convenience and dual authority, or because Congress might find some other constitutional way to make citizens of the District suable elsewhere or to bring here for suit citizens from any part of the country, then what is a limitation imposed on the federal courts generally is none", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00304", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00041", "text": "the victims of their offenses. SEC. 205. CONSUMER AND ANTI-FRAUD ACTIVITIES. The Attorney General will designate 50 existing full-time equivalent positions for attorneys and sufficient support staff to be assigned to the prosecution of consumer fraud and for law enforcement and consumer fraud education programs. SEC. 206. FORFEITURES. (a) Civil Forfeiture.--Section 981 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (D) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``Any'' and redesignating clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) as subclauses (I), (II), (III), (IV), (V), and (VI), respectively; (B) by striking ``(E) With respect to an offense listed in subsection (a)(1)(D)'' and inserting ``(ii) With respect to an offense described in clause (i)''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) Any property, real or personal, that constitutes, represents, is derived from, or is traceable to the proceeds of a violation of section 1029, 1341, or 1343 of this title if such violation relates to crimes against individuals 65 years of age or older. despite the provisions of section 524 of title 28, United States Code, up to 25 percent of the amounts forfeited under this subparagraph for an offense may be used to provide restitution to any victim of the offense.''. (b) Criminal Forfeiture.--Section 982(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end of it the following: ``(5) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, section 1029, 1341 or 1343 of this title, affecting an individual 65 years of age or older, will order that the person forfeit to the United States any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation. despite the provisions of section 524 of title 28, United States Code, up to 25 percent of the amounts forfeited under this paragraph for an offense may be used to provide restitution to any victim of the offense", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01127", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00042", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1225/2008 of 9 December 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 fixing the import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 December 2008 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 in respect of import duties in the cereals sector (2), and in particular Article 2(1) of it, because: (1) The import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 December 2008 were fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 (3). (2) As the average of the import duties calculated differs by more than EUR 5/tonne from that fixed, a corresponding adjustment must be made to the import duties fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008. (3) Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes I and II to Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 are replaced by the text in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will apply from 10 December 2008. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 December 2008.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 396, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00595", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00043", "text": "must be fixed in the light of the impact which the consumption aid has on part only of the production; because the intervention price must be fixed in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 8 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC; because, under Article 5 (1) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, the maximum quantity that may be eligible for the unitary production aid fixed for each of the marketing years in question is to be fixed; because, under the criteria referred to in the said paragraph, the maximum quantity for each of the 1991/92, 1992/93 and 1993/94 marketing years should be kept as set out below; because, as a result of the application of Articles 68 and 236 of the Act of Accession, the intervention price for olive oil in Spain and Portugal differs from the common prices; because, after the adjustment of the 'acquis communautaire' with relation to vegetable oils and fats, the detailed rules for the alignment of intervention prices for olive oil applicable in Spain and Portugal are those set out in the second indents of Articles 92 (2) and 290 (2) of the Act of Accession; because Articles 95 and 293 of the Act of Accession provide for the granting of Community aid for the production of olive oil in Spain and in Portugal; because, under Articles 79 and 246 of that Act, the amounts of the Community aid in Spain and Portugal should be aligned on the common aid at the beginning of the marketing year; because the rules on this alignment result in the Spanish and Portuguese aid rates shown below; because the production target price and the intervention price are fixed for a specific standard quality; because the reasons which led to the determination of the standard quality for the 1981/82 marketing year are still valid; because that standard quality should therefore remain unchanged; because, under Article 5 (4) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, a percentage of the production earmarked for producers may be allocated to the financing of regional measures to improve the quality of olive oil production; because such measures are necessary in certain production regions; because some of the said aid should therefore be allocated to the financing of such measures; because, in accordance with Article 20 (d) (1) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, the percentage of the production aid which may be withheld", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00502", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00044", "text": "guard officers will be in command at all times, they will not supplant the civilian guard officers, and unless expediency demands otherwise will exercise their authority through the chain of command established by the plant management.'9 The regulations also provided that the military drill of the guard forces should not exceed one hour per week 'except with the approval of the plant management.'10 22 As to the employer's relations with the guard force, the regulations were explicit in recognizing that those relations remained essentially the same as if there were no militarization. According to Circular No. 15: 'Basically, the militarization of plant guard forces does not change the existing systems of hiring, compensation, and dismissal; all remain primarily a matter between the guards and the plant managements. Guards in the employ of a private employer may, as previously, he dismissed by that employer.'11 A veto power over employment and dismissal, of course, was retained by the military. It was further provided: 'The status of the employer in respect to the employee benefits for the guard force is not changed. For example, social security, workmen's compensation, and employer's liability provisions remain unaffected.'12 And the employer was expected to train the guard forces in their ordinary protective duties and was required to furnish them with uniforms and weapons.13 23 The right of the plant guards to bargain collectively was recognized by Circular No. 15, paragraph 6h(2) of which provided: 'Auxiliary Military Police are permitted to bargain collectively, but no such activity will be tolerated which will interfere with their obligations as members of the Auxiliary Military Police. In view of recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (see In re Lord Mfg. Co. & United Rubber Workers of America, CIO, Case No. R—4826, February 1943) (Lord Manufacturing Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 1032), the Auxiliary Military Police should be represented in collective bargaining with the management by a bargaining unit other than that composed of the production and maintenance workers, although both bargaining units may be affiliated with the same labor organization. Where the guards are not now included in the same bargaining unit, this is mandatory; where the guards are included in such unit, serious consideration will be given to effect a change to conform to the foregoing policies.' Provision was also made that collective bargaining agreements covering plant guards who were civilian auxiliaries should include a clause recognizing that nothing in the collective bargaining relationship", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00081", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00045", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 55/88 of 7 January 1988 on the supply of common wheat flour to the Republic of Bolivia as food aid THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3972/86 of 22 December 1986 on food-aid policy and food-aid management (1), and in particular Article 6 (1) (c) of it, because Council Regulation (EEC) No 1420/87 of 21 May 1987 laying down implementing rules for Regulation (EEC) No 3972/86 on food-aid policy and food-aid management (2) lays down the list of countries and organizations eligible for food-aid operations and specifies the general criteria on the transport of food aid beyond the fob stage; because, by its Decision of 30 Junw 1987 on the supply of food aid to Bolivia, the Commission allocated to the latter country 12 720 tonnes of cereals; because it is necessary to provide for the carrying-out of this measure in accordance with the rules laid down by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2200/87 of 8 July 1987 laying down general rules for the mobilization in the Community of products to be supplied as Community food aid (3); because it is necessary to specify the time limits and conditions of supply and the procedure to be followed to determine the resultant costs, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 A tendering procedure is initiated for the award of a contract for the supply of cereals to Bolivia in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 2200/87 and with the conditions laid down in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 7 January 1988.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 426, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00705", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00046", "text": "SECTION 1. FINDINGS. Congress finds that: (1) Adak Island is an isolated island located 1,200 miles southwest of Anchorage, Alaska, between the Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea. The Island, with its unique physical and biological features, including a deep water harbor and abundant marine-associated wildlife, was recognized early for both its natural and military values. In 1913, Adak Island was reserved and set aside as a Preserve because of its value to seabirds, marine mammals, and fisheries. Withdrawals of portions of Adak Island for various military purposes date back to 1901 and culminated in the 1959 withdrawal of approximately half of the Island for use by the Department of the Navy for military purposes. (2) By 1990, military development on Adak Island supported a community of 6,000 residents. Outside of the Adak Naval Complex, there is no independent community on Adak Island. (3) As a result of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 1808), as amended, the Adak Naval Complex has been closed by the Department of Defense. (4) The Aleut Corporation is an Alaskan Native Regional Corporation incorporated in the State of Alaska under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), as amended (43 U.S.C. 1601, et seq.). The Aleut Corporation represents the indigenous people of the Aleutian Islands who prior to the Russian exploration and settlement of the Aleutian Islands were found throughout the Aleutian Islands which includes Adak Island. (5) None of Adak Island was available for selection by The Aleut Corporation under section 14(h)(8) of ANCSA (43 U.S.C. 1613(h)(8)) because it was part of a National Wildlife Refuge and because the portion comprising the Adak Naval Complex was withdrawn for use by the United States Navy for military purposes prior to the passage of ANCSA in December 1971. (6) The Aleut Corporation is interested in establishing a community on Adak and has offered to exchange ANCSA land selections for conveyance of certain lands and interests there on a portion of Adak formerly occupied by the Navy. (7) Removal of a portion of Adak Island land from refuge status will be offset by the acquisition of high quality wildlife habitat in other Aleut Corporation selections within the Alaska Maritime National", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01044", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00047", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 499/2002 of 20 March 2002 determining the world market price for unginned cotton THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Protocol 4 on cotton, annexed to the Act of Accession of Greece, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1050/2001(1), Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001 of 22 May 2001 on production aid for cotton(2), and in particular Article 4 of it, because: (1) In accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001, a world market price for unginned cotton is to be determined periodically from the price for ginned cotton recorded on the world market and by reference to the historical relationship between the price recorded for ginned cotton and that calculated for unginned cotton. That historical relationship has been established in Article 2(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1591/2001 of 2 August 2001(3). Where the world market price cannot be determined in this way, it is to be based on the most recent price determined. (2) In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001, the world market price for unginned cotton is to be determined in respect of a product of specific characteristics and by reference to the most favourable offers and quotations on the world market among those considered representative of the real market trend. To that end, an average is to be calculated of offers and quotations recorded on one or more European exchanges for a product delivered cif to a port in the Community and coming from the various supplier countries considered the most representative in terms of international trade. However, there is provision for adjusting the criteria for determining the world market price for ginned cotton to reflect differences justified by the quality of the product delivered and the offers and quotations concerned. Those adjustments are specified in Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1591/2001. (3) The application of the above criteria gives the world market price for unginned cotton determined from now on, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The world price for unginned cotton as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001 is determined as equ", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00659", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00048", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1589/1999 of 20 July 1999 fixing the minimum selling prices for beef put up for sale under the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1437/1999 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1633/98(2), and in particular Article 7(3) of it, (1) because tenders have been invited for certain quantities of beef fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1437/1999(3); (2) because, under Article 9 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2173/79(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2417/95(5), the minimum selling prices for meat put up for sale by tender should be fixed, taking into account tenders submitted; (3) because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The minimum selling prices for beef for the invitation to tender held in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1437/1999 for which the time limit for the submission of tenders was 12 July 1999 are as set out in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 21 July 1999. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 20 July 1999.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 371, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00717", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00049", "text": "Council Decision of 17 December 2001 on the conclusion of an Additional Protocol laying down the trade arrangements for certain fish and fishery products to the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part (2002/57/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because: (1) It is desirable to complete by means of an Additional Protocol the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part(1), so as to provide for preferential conditions for the importation into the Community of certain fish and fishery products originating in the Republic of Estonia, and into the Republic of Estonia of certain fish and fishery products originating in the Community. (2) To that end a new Protocol laying down the trade arrangements for certain fish and fishery products should be added to the said Europe Agreement. (3) The Protocol should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Additional Protocol laying down the trade arrangements for certain fish and fishery products to the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part, is approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Protocol is attached to this Decision. Article 2 From the date of entry into force of this Protocol, Annexes I and V of Council Regulation (EC) No 2178/95 of 8 August 1995 opening and providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas and ceilings for certain industrial and fishery products originating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and establishing the detailed provisions for adapting these quotas and ceilings(2) will cease to apply. Article 3 The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person empowered to sign the Protocol in order to bind the Community. Done at Brussels, 17 December 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 459, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00508", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00050", "text": "and in the sole discretion of the Bureau, to have a history of violence; (E) has not escaped, or attempted to escape, from a Bureau of Prisons facility; and (F) has not been determined by the Director, under the disciplinary system of the Bureau of Prisons, to have committed an infraction involving an act of violence. (5) Home detention.--The term ``home detention'' has the same meaning given the term in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and includes detention in a nursing home or other residential long-term care facility. (6) Pilot program.--The term ``pilot program'' means the pilot program carried out in accordance with this section. (7) Term of imprisonment.--The term ``term of imprisonment'' includes multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently, which will be treated as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment for purposes of this section. (b) Program Established.-- (1) In general.--despite section 3624 of title 18, United States Code, or any other provision of law, the Director will carry out a pilot program at 1 or more designated facilities, under which the Director will, in accordance with paragraph (2), place each prisoner who is determined to be an eligible prisoner on home detention until the date on which the term of imprisonment to which the eligible prisoner was sentenced expires. (2) Timing of release.--In carrying out the pilot program, the Director will place an eligible prisoner on home detention under paragraph (1)-- (A) with respect to a prisoner who is determined to be an eligible prisoner on or before the date that is 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and (B) with respect to a prisoner who is determined to be an eligible prisoner after the date that is 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act and before the date that is 3 years and 91 days after such date of enactment, not later than 90 days after the date of such determination. (3) Violation of terms of home detention.--A violation of the terms of the home detention, including the commission of another Federal, State, or local crime, will result in the return of an eligible prisoner to the form of custody of that prisoner prior to being placed on home detention. (c) Program Evaluation.-- (1) In general.--The Director will contract with an", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01145", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00052", "text": "337 U.S. 541 69 S.Ct. 1221 93 L.Ed. 1528 COHEN et al.v.BENEFICIAL INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATION. BENEFICIAL INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATION v. SMITH et a. Nos. 442, 512. Argued April 18, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Messrs. Philip B. Kurland, New York City, Charles Hershenstein, Jersey City, N.J., for Hannah Cohen, Ex'x and another. [Argument of Counsel from page 542 intentionally omitted] Mr. John M. Harlan, New York City, for Beneficial Industrial Loan corporation. Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The ultimate question here is whether a federal court, having jurisdiction of a stockholder's derivative action only because the parties are of diverse citizenship, must apply a statute of the forum state which makes the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for all expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense and requires security for their payment as a condition of prosecuting the action. 2 Petitioners' decedent as plaintiff, brought in the United States District Court for New Jersey an action in the right of the Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, a Delaware corporation doing business in New Jersey. The defendants were the corporation and certain of its managers and directors. The complaint alleged generally that since 1929 the individual defendants engaged in a continuing and successful conspiracy to enrich themselves at the expense of the corporation. Specific charges of mismanagement and fraud extended over a period of eighteen years and the assets allegedly wasted or diverted thereby were said to exceed $100,000,000. The stockholder had demanded that the corporation institute proceedings for its recovery but, by their control of the corporation, the individual defendants prevented it from doing so. This stockholder, therefore, sought to assert the right of the corporation. One of 16,000 stockholders, he owned 100 of its more than two million shares, so that his holdings, together with 150 shares held by the intervenor, approximated 0.0125% of the outstanding stock and had a market value that had never exceeded $9,000. 3 The action was brought in 1943, and various proceedings had been taken there when, in 1945, New Jersey enacted the statute which is here involved.1 Its general", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00300", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00053", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 1439/91 of 30 May 1991 fixing for the 1991/92 marketing year the Community offer prices for lemons applicable with regard to Spain and Portugal THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, Having regard to Council Regulations (EEC) No 3709/89 (1) and (EEC) No 3648/90 (2) laying down general rules for implementing the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal as regards the compensation mechanism on imports of fruit and vegetables originating respectively in Spain and Portugal, and in particular Article 4 (1) of it, because, Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3820/90 (3), lays down detailed rules for the application of the compensation mechanism to imports of fruit and vegetables from Spain; because, under Articles 152 and 318 of the Act of Accession, a compensation mechanism is to be introduced on imports into the Community as constituted at 31 December 1985, from now on referred to as the 'Community of Ten', of fruit and vegetables from Spain and Portugal for which a reference price is fixed with regard to third countries; because, Community offer prices for lemons coming from Spain and Portugal should be fixed only during the period where reference prices are fixed with regard to third countries, this means from 1 June up to and including 31 May of the following year; because, in accordance with Articles 152 (2) (a) and 318 (1) (a) of the Act of Accession, a Community offer price is to be calculated annually on the basis of the arithmetic mean of the producer prices in each Member State of the Community of Ten, plus transport and packaging costs incurred by the products from the production regions to the representative consumption centres of the Community and bearing in mind developments in the costs of production in the fruit and vegetable sector; because the abovementioned producer prices correspond to the average prices recorded during the three years preceding the date of fixing of the Community offer price; because, however, the annual Community offer price cannot exceed the reference price applied for third countries; because, in order to take account of seasonal variations in prices, the marketing year should be divided into one or more periods and a Community offer price should be fixed for each of them; because, in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00640", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00054", "text": "frequency exposure limits established by the Commission and compliance with applicable laws and regulations governing the effects of the proposed facility on the health, safety, and welfare of local residents in the community; and ``(B) documentation of the compliance of such facilities with applicable Federal, State, and local aviation safety standards or aviation obstruction standards regarding objects effecting navigable airspace; or ``(2) refusing to grant authority to such person to locate such facilities within the jurisdiction of such government if such person fails to produce any studies, reports, or documentation required under paragraph (1). ``(c) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit or otherwise limit the authority of a State or local government to ensure compliance with or otherwise enforce any statements, assertions, or representations filed or submitted by or on behalf of an applicant with the State or local government for authority to place, construct, or modify telecommunications facilities or broadcast transmission facilities within the jurisdiction of the State or local government.''. SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH ON EFFECTS OF RADIO FREQUENCY EMISSIONS ON HUMAN HEALTH. (a) Assessment.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services will carry out an independent assessment on the effects of radio frequency emission on human health. The Secretary will carry out the independent assessment through grants to appropriate public and private entities selected by the Secretary for purposes of the independent assessment. (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for the Secretary of Health and Human Services for fiscal year 2000, $10,000,000 for purposes of grants for the independent assessment required by subsection (a). Amounts appropriated under the authorization of appropriation in the preceding sentence will remain available until expended. (c) The Secretary of Health and Human Services will produce a report on existing research evaluating the biological effects to human health of short term, high-level, as well as long-term, low-level exposures to radio frequency emissions to Congress no later than January 1, 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 398, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00901", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00055", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1680/1999 of 19 July 1999 fixing the basic price, and the seasonal adjustments to the basic price, for sheepmeat for the 2000 marketing year THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2467/98 of 3 November 1998 on the common organisation of the market in sheepmeat and goatmeat(1) and in particular Article 3(1) and (2) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(2), Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(3), Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(4), because: (1) the basic price should be fixed in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2467/98; (2) when the basic price for sheep carcases is fixed, account should be taken of the objectives of the common agricultural policy; the main objectives of the common agricultural policy are, in particular, to guarantee a fair standard of living for the farming community and to ensure that supplies are available and that they reach consumers at reasonable prices; these factors result in the price for the 2000 marketing year being fixed at the level laid down in this Regulation; (3) the weekly seasonally adjusted amounts applicable to the basic price should be fixed in the light of experience gained during the 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 marketing years concerning private storage, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 2000 marketing year, the basic price for sheepmeat is fixed at EUR 504,07/100 kg carcase weight. Article 2 The basic price referred to in Article 1 is seasonally adjusted in accordance with the table set out in the Annex. Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply from the beginning of the 2000 marketing year. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 19 July 1999.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 486, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00752", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00056", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 310/2010 of 9 April 2010 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (1), and in particular Article 9(1)(a) of it, because: (1) In order to ensure uniform application of the Combined Nomenclature annexed to Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, it is necessary to adopt measures concerning the classification of the goods referred to in the Annex to this Regulation. (2) Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 has laid down the general rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature. Those rules apply also to any other nomenclature which is wholly or partly based on it or which adds any additional subdivision to it and which is established by specific provisions of the Union, with a view to the application of tariff and other measures relating to trade in goods. (3) under those general rules, the goods described in column (1) of the table set out in the Annex should be classified under the CN code indicated in column (2), by virtue of the reasons set out in column (3) of that table. (4) It is appropriate to provide that binding tariff information which has been issued by the customs authorities of Member States in respect of the classification of goods in the Combined Nomenclature but which is not in accordance with this Regulation can, for a period of 3 months, continue to be invoked by the holder, under Article 12(6) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (2). (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Customs Code Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The goods described in column (1) of the table set out in the Annex will be classified within the Combined Nomenclature under the CN code indicated in column (2) of that table. Article 2 Binding tariff information issued by the customs authorities of Member States, which is not in accordance with this Regulation, can continue to be invoked for", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00754", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00057", "text": "SECTION 1. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS OF THE WYANDOTTE NATION. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) The Wyandotte Nation has a valid interest in certain lands located in the Fairfax Business District in Wyandotte County, Kansas, that are located within the Nation's reservation established under an agreement between the Wyandotte Nation and the Delaware Nation dated December 14, 1843, which agreement was ratified by the Senate on July 25, 1848. (2) The Wyandotte Nation filed a lawsuit, Wyandotte Nation v. Unified Government of Kansas City and Wyandotte County, Kansas, U.S. D.C. Kan., Case No. 012303-CM, against certain landowners within the Fairfax Business District to ascertain and adjudicate ownership of lands that were once owned and held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation but were not conveyed to the United States by the Wyandotte Nation under the Treaty of January 31, 1855. (3) The Lawsuit also contends that certain major roads in Kansas City encroach upon a certain parcel of land, known as the Huron Cemetery, which was reserved for the Wyandotte Nation in the Treaty of January 31, 1855. (4) The pendency of this Lawsuit has resulted in severe economic hardships for the residents of the Fairfax Business District of Wyandotte County, Kansas, by clouding title to much of the land within that District. (5) Congress shares with the residents of the Fairfax Business District of Wyandotte County, Kansas, a desire to remove all clouds on title resulting from the Lawsuit without additional cost or expense to either the United States, the State of Kansas, the Unified Government of Kansas City and Wyandotte County, Kansas, and all other landowners within the Fairfax Business District of Wyandotte County, Kansas. (6) The Wyandotte Nation and the Unified Government of Kansas City and Wyandotte County have reached an agreement settling the Lawsuit which requires implementing legislation by Congress. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows: -- (1) To settle the Lawsuit. (2) To direct the Secretary to take into trust for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation the Settlement Lands in settlement of the Wyandotte Nation's Lawsuit and the land claims asserted there", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00904", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00058", "text": "354, 361, 61 S.Ct. 979, 982, 85 L.Ed. 1115. 8 Nor do we think there is merit in the contention that the First War Powers Act gave the President authority to transfer functions only from agencies in existence when that Act became law. It is true that § 1 authorizes the President 'to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and powers hitherto by law conferred upon' any agency. But the latter clause is only an illustration of the authority granted, not a limitation on it. It makes clear that the authority extends to existing agencies as well as to others. That construction is supported by § 5 of the Act which states that upon its termination all executive and administrative agencies'will exercise the same functions, duties, and powers as previously or as hereafter by law may be provided, any authorization of the President under this title to the contrary despite.' As stated by the Emergency Court of Appeals, unless § 1 authorizes the President to redistribute functions of agencies created after the passage of the Act, the reference in § 5 to functions 'hereafter' provided by law is 'wholly meaningless.' California Lima Bean Growers Ass'n v. Bowles, Em.App., 150 F.2d 964, 967. Nor is that result affected by the subsequent enactment of the Emergency Price Control Act which in § 201(b) authorized the President to transfer any of the powers and functions of the Office of Price Administration 'with respect to a particular commodity or commodities' to any government agency having other functions relating to such commodities. Whatever effect that provision may have, it does not purport to deal with general enforcement functions and so restricts in no way the authority of the President under the First War Powers Act to transfer them. Yet enforcement functions are all that are involved in the present cases. 9 We need not decide whether under the First War Powers Act the President had authority to transfer functions of an officer who need be confirmed by the Senate to one appointed by the President without Senate confirmation. For § 2 of that Act provides: 10 '(That) in carrying out the purposes of this title the President is authorized to utilize, coordinate, or consolidate any executive or administrative commissions, bureaus, agencies, governmental corporations, offices, or officers now existing by law, to transfer any duties or powers from one existing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00066", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00059", "text": "the laws of Florida) lacks the characteristics of a specific perfected lien which alone bars the priority of the United States' was not intended to settle the problem and may be taken to have been made with reference to the early mortgage lien cases discussed and distinguished in United States v. State of Texas, 314 U.S. at pages 484, 485, 62 S.Ct. 350, 352, 86 L.Ed. 356, and People of State of New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. at pages 293, 294, 53 S.Ct. at page 324, 77 L.Ed. 754. 11 'A lien is created in favor of the Director upon all the personal property or rights thereto owned or thereafter acquired by any employer and used by him in connection with his trade, occupation, profession or business, from whom contributions, interest, or penalties are or may hereafter become due. Such lien will be for a sum equal to the amount at any time due from such employer to the Districtor on account of contributions, interest and penalties thereon. Such lien will attach to such property at the time such contributions, interest or penalties became, or will hereafter become, due. In all cases where a report setting forth the amount of such contributions has been filed with the Districtor, no action to enforce such lien will be brought after three years from the date of the filing of such report and in all other cases no action to enforce such lien will be brought after three years from the date that the determination and assessment of the Director made under the provisions of this Act became final.' Jones Ill.Stat.Ann. (1944) § 45.154(a), Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 243(a). (Emphasis added.) See also note 2. 12 'Such lien will be invalid only as to any innocent purchaser for value of stock in trade of any employer in the usual course of such employer's business, and will be invalid as to any innocent purchaser for value of any of the other assets to which such lien has attached, unless notice of it has been filed by the Director in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the county within which the property subject to the lien is situated. * * *.' Jones Ill.Stat.Ann. (1944) § 45.154(b)(1), Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00012", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00060", "text": "Director, 2 Cir., 169 F.2d 747, 752.' 187 F.2d 804. 11 II. The Issues.—Petitioners in No. 35, the Carlson case, and respondent in No. 136, the Zydok case, seek respectively reversal or affirmance principally on the same grounds. It is urged that the denial of bail to each was arbitrary and capricious, a violation of the Fifth Amendment; that where there is no evidence to justify a fear of unavailability for the hearings or for the carrying out of a possible judgment of deportation, denial of bail under the circumstances of these cases is an abuse of discretion and violates a claimed right to reasonable bail secured by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Zydok urges, also, that there was an abuse of discretion in rearresting him, when there was no change of circumstances, after his previous release under bond on the same warrant. There are other minor contentions as to irregularities in the proceedings that appear to us immaterial to our consideration of these cases. 12 The basis for the deportation of presently undesirable aliens resident in the United States is not questioned and requires no reexamination. When legally admitted, they have come at the Nation's invitation, as visitors or permanent residents, to share with us the opportunities and satisfactions of our land. As such visitors and foreign nationals they are entitled in their persons and effects to the protection of our laws. So long, however, as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens will be permitted to remain within our borders.18 13 Changes in world politics and in our internal economy bring legislative adjustments affecting the rights of various classes of aliens to admission and deportation.19 The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 marked such a change of attitude toward alien members of the Communist Party of the United States. Theretofore there was a provision for the deportation of alien anarchists and other aliens, who are or were members of organizations devoted to the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States, but the Internal Security Act made Communist membership alone of aliens a sufficient ground for deportation.20 The reasons for the exercise of power are summarized in Title I of the Internal Security Act. It is sufficient here to print § 2(15), 50 U", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00439", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00061", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2170/2001 of 8 November 2001 amending the import duties in the cereals sector THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1666/2000(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 as regards import duties in the cereals sector(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2104/2001(4), and in particular Article 2(1) of it, because: (1) The import duties in the cereals sector are laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2144/2001(5). (2) In addition, Regulation (EC) No 2104/2001 abolishes the difference of EUR 10 in the case of importation overland or by river, or by sea on vessels from ports on the Mediterranean, Black Sea or Baltic Sea referred to in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1249/96. As a result, Annex I relating to import duties in the cereals sector should be amended. Under certain conditions, that Regulation also authorises reference to other quotation exchanges in the case of barley. Annex II relating to the basic data for calculation should therefore be adapted, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes I and II to Regulation (EC) No 2144/2001 are replaced by Annexes I and II to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 9 November 2001. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 8 November 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 431, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00676", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00062", "text": "will cover in particular the development priorities, the forms of assistance, the indicative financing plan, with details of the amount of assistance and its source, and the duration of the assistance; because Title III, Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) N° 2052/88 (3) sets out the conditions for the preparation and implementation of the Community support framework; because, in accordance with Article 11 (3) of Regulation (EEC) N° 2052/88, the Spanish Government submitted to the Commission on 27 October 1989 the rural development plans for Spain, 1989 to 1993; because the plan submitted by the Spanish Government includes a description of the main development priorities selected and of the corresponding measures, and an indication of the use to be made of assistance under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the other financial instruments of the Community in implementing the plans; because the Community support framework has been established in agreement with the Member State concerned through the partnership as defined in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88; because this Decision is in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Agricultural Structures and Rural Development; because the Committee provided for in Article 124 of the Treaty has been consulted; because in accordance with Article 10 (2) of Regulation (EEC) N° 4253/88 this Decision is to be sent as a declaration of intent to the Member State; because in accordance with Article 20 (1) and (2) of Regulation (EEC) N° 4253/88 the budgetary commitments relating to the contribution from the Structural Funds to the financing of the operations covered by the Community support framework will be made on the basis of subsequent Commission decisions approving the operations concerned, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Community support framework for Community structural assistance in the rural areas of Aragon, Baleares, Cantabria, Cataluña, Madrid, Navara, La Rioja and Pais Vasco concerned by Objective 5 (b), covering the period 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1993 is approved. The Commission", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00829", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00063", "text": "aspect of the bankruptcy law, though neither the terms of thelegislatio n, nor its context, nor its legislative history, nor considerations of policy previously suggested, call for such construction, while the history and structure of the legislation, its judicial interpretation, regard for congruity in finding meaning, and the larger claims of the federal judicial system, support a different reading of the statute. The large assumptions of the decision are that by indirection and without manifested design Congress reversed its prevailing policy of limiting federal jurisdiction and preserving a proper balance between federal and State courts; that Congress deviated from a principle of our federalism especially respected in recent times, according to which claims arising under State law will be tried under local trial procedure in the local courts; that Congress has departed from a settled policy of fifty years uniformly applicable in bankruptcy proceedings and which now continues as to all other proceedings in bankruptcy, although this established policy of leaving local claims to the State courts does not at all interfere with those aims for effective reorganization through use of the bankruptcy power which gave rise to Chapter X. 26 1. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The Central States Electric Corporation filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. With the consent of the reorganization court, respondents, as trustees, brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of the Corporation for an accounting and damages against its officers and directors for alleged fraud and mismanagement. The District Court found want of jurisdiction, but was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 159 F.2d 67. This Court now affirms the Circuit Court of Appeals and holds that a Chapter X trustee may bring this plenary suit in personam in a federal district court not the reorganization court, although neither diversity of citizenship nor other ground of federal jurisdiction exists. 27 No doubt Congress could authorize such a suit. See Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374, 55 S.Ct. 230, 233, 79 L.Ed. 433. Nor is there any doubt that Congress has not conferred upon the district courts the power to entertain such a suit by an ordinary bankruptcy trustee. Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act specifically limits plenary jurisdiction to a few enumerated cases (of which this is not one), or where", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00087", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00064", "text": "case of Texas. The Court concedes that prior to the Resolution of Annexation, the United States recognized Texas ownership of the three-league area claimed by Texas.1 34 The Court holds immaterial the fact of Texas' original ownership of this marginal sea area, because Texas was admitted on an 'equal footing' with the other states by the Resolution of Annexation. 5 Stat. 797. The scope of the 'equal footing' doctrine, however, has been thought to embrace only political rights or those rights considered necessary attributes of state sovereignty. Thus this Court has held in a consistent line of decisions that since the original states, as an incident of sovereignty, had ownership and dominion over lands under navigable waters within their jurisdiction, states subsequently admitted must be accorded equivalent ownership. E.g., Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565; Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L.Ed. 997. But it was an articulated premise of the California decision that the thirteen original states neither had asserted ownership nor had held dominion over the three-mile zone as an incident of sovereignty. 35 'Equal footing' has previously brought to a state the ownership of river beds, but never before has that phrase been interpreted to take away from a newly admitted state property that it had theretofore owned. I see no constitutional requirement that this should be done and I think the Resolution of Annexation left the marginal sea area in Texas. The Resolution expressly consented that Texas should retain all 'the vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits.' An agreement of this kind is in accord with the holding of this Court that ordinarily lands may be the subject of compact between a state and the Nation. Stearns v. State of Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245, 21 S.Ct. 73, 81, 45 L.Ed. 162. The Court, however, does not decide whether or not 'the vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits' (at the time of annexation) includes the land under the marginal sea. I think that it does include those lands. Cf. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 110, 69 S.Ct. 968, 982, 93 L.Ed.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00364", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00065", "text": "Council Decision of 2 October 2003 appointing three Dutch members and three Dutch alternate members of the Committee of the Regions (2003/719/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 263 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Netherlands Government, because: (1) On 22 January 2002 the Council adopted a Decision appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions(1). (2) Three seats of members of the Committee of the Regions have fallen vacant following the expiry of the mandates of Ms JACOBS, Mr VAN KLAVEREN and Mr VERBURG, and three seats of alternate members have fallen vacant following the expiry of the mandates of Mr BOERTJENS, Ms KALLEN-MORREN and Mr VAN NISTELROOIJ, of which the Council was notified on 10 September 2003, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Sole Article (a) The following are appointed members of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the term of office, which ends on 25 January 2006: 1. Mr G.J. JANSEN, Commissaris van de Koningin in de provincie Overijssel, to replace Ms JACOBS; 2. Mr P.A. BIJMAN, gedeputeerde van de provincie Fryslân, to replace Mr VAN KLAVEREN; 3. Mr J.P.J. LOKKER, gedeputeerde van de provincie Utrecht, to replace Mr VERBURG. (b) The following are appointed alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the term of office, which ends on 25 January 2006: 1. Mr H. BLEKER, gedeputeerde van de provincie Groningen, to replace Mr BOERTJENS; 2. Mr M.J.A. EURLINGS, gedeputeerde van de provincie Limburg, to replace Ms KALLEN-MORREN; 3. Mr O. HOES, gedeputeerde van de provincie Noord-Brabant, to replace Mr VAN NISTELROOIJ for the remainder of the term of office, which ends on 25 January 2006. Done at Brussels, 2 October 2003", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00699", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00066", "text": "Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.). (B) Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-- (i) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by unfair pay disparities; (ii) substantially reducing the number of working women earning unfairly low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance; and (iii) promoting stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair rate of pay; (iv) remedying the effects of past discrimination on the basis of sex and ensuring that in the future workers are afforded equal protection on the basis of sex; and (v) in the private sector, ensuring equal protection under Congress' power to enforce the fifth and 14th amendments. (5) With increased information about the provisions added by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and generalized wage data, along with more effective remedies, women will be better able to recognize and enforce their rights to equal pay for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions. (6) Certain employers have already made great strides in eradicating unfair pay disparities in the workplace and their achievements should be recognized. SEC. 3. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL PAY REQUIREMENTS. (a) Nonretaliation Provision.--Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``or has'' each place it appears and inserting ``has''; and (2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, or has inquired about, discussed, or otherwise disclosed the wages of the employee or another employee''. (b) Enhanced Penalties.--Section 16(b) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 216(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting after the first sentence the following: ``Any employer who violates section 6(d) will additionally be liable for such compensatory or punitive damages as may be appropriate, except that the United States will not be liable for punitive damages''; (2) in the sentence beginning ``An action to'', by striking ``either of the preceding sentences'' and inserting ``any of the preceding sentences of this subsection''; (3) in the sentence beginning ``No employees will'', by striking ``No employees'' and inserting ``Except with respect to class actions brought", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00886", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00067", "text": "'in the sense of the patent' manganese could be included as an alkaline earth metal (R. 297). Much of this testimony was corroborated by reference to recognized texts on inorganic chemistry (R. 332). Particularly important, in addition, were the disclosures of the prior art, also contained in the record. The Miller patent, No. 1,754,566, which preceded the patent in suit, taught the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes (R. 969, 971). Manganese was similarly disclosed in the Armor patent, No. 1,467,825, which also described a welding composition (R. 1346). And the record contains no evidence of any kind to show that Lincolnweld was developed as the result of independent research or experiments. 11 It is not for this Court to even essay an independent evaluation of this evidence. This is the function of the trial court. And, as we have previously observed, 'To no type of case is this * * * more appropriately applicable than to the one before us, where the evidence is largely the testimony of experts as to which a trial court may be enlightened by scientific demonstrations. This trial occupied some three weeks, during which, as the record shows, the trial judge visited laboratories with counsel and experts to observe actual demonstrations of welding as taught by the patent and of the welding accused of infringing it, and of various stages of the prior art. He viewed motion pictures of various welding operations and tests and heard many experts and other witnesses.' 336 U.S. 271, 274—275, 69 S.Ct. 535, 537, 93 L.Ed. 672. 12 The trial judge found on the evidence before him that the Lincolnweld flux and the composition of the patent in suit are substantially identical in operation and in result. He found also that Lincolnweld is in all respects equivalent to Unionmelt for welding purposes. And he concluded that 'for all practical purposes, manganese silicate can be efficiently and effectively substituted for calcium and magnesium silicates as the major constituent of the welding composition.' These conclusions are adequately supported by the record; certainly they are not clearly erroneous.2 13 It is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents. The disclosures of the prior art made clear that manganese silicate was a useful ingredient in welding compositions. Specialists familiar with the problems of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00363", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00068", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1897/2004 of 29 October 2004 supplementing the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2400/96 as regards the entry of a name in the ‘Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications’ (Cartoceto) (PDO) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 6(3) and (4) of it, because: (1) In accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, the application submitted by Italy for registration of the name ‘Cartoceto’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). (2) Since no statement of objection within the meaning of Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 has been sent to the Commission, the name should be entered in the ‘Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications’, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The name listed in the Annex to this Regulation is added to the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2400/96. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 29 October 2004.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 348, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00536", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00069", "text": "including any like obligation issued by a government or political subdivision of it), with interest coupons or in registered form, but does not include any such obligation which constitutes stock in trade of the taxpayer or any such obligation of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or any such obligation held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.' 4 See statement of Roy C. Osgood, 2 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1728—29 (1942). 5 H.R.Rep.No.2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1942). Precisely the same language appears in S.Rep.No.1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1942). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.125—5, is of identical tenor. 6 Int.Rev.Code § 113(b)(1) provides that 'Proper adjustment in respect of the property will in all cases be made * * * (H) in the case of any bond (as defined in section 125) the interest on which is wholly exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter, to the extent of the amortizable bond premium disallowable as a deduction under section 125(a)(2), and in the case of any other bond (as defined in such section) to the extent of the deductions allowable under section 125(a)(1) with respect thereto.' See note 3, ante, 339 U.S. 621, 70 S.Ct. 906, for the text of § 125. 7 Of this amount, 25.5 billion was wholly, and 33.0 billion partially tax-exempt. Statistical Abstract of the United States 372 (1948). 8 In this case, the record does not disclose how petitioner disposed of the bonds. If for some reason he had sold them after six months at a price above 138, his capital gain would have exceeded the deduction he took on the bond premium. This possibility is not merely theoretical, for the bonds in fact stood above 138 for over a year, starting in August, 1945. 9 Petitioner", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00370", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00070", "text": "310. '(b) The station license required * * *, the frequencies authorized to be used by the licensee, and the rights there granted will not be transferred, assigned, or in any manner either voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of, or indirectly by transfer of control of any corporation holding such license, to any person, unless the Commission will, after securing full information, decide that said transfer is in the public interest, and will give its consent in writing.' § 312. '(a) Any station license may be revoked for false statements either in the application or in the statement of fact which may be required by section 308 of this title, or because of conditions revealed by such statements of fact as may be required from time to time which would warrant the Commission in refusing to grant a license on an original application, or for failure to operate substantially as set forth in the license, or for violation of or failure to observe any of the restrictions and conditions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission authorized by this chapter or by a treaty ratified by the United States: * * *.' § 405. 'After a decision, order, or requirement has been made by the Commission in any proceeding, any party thereto may at any time make application for rehearing of the same, or any matter determined there, and it will be lawful for the Commission in its discretion to grant such a rehearing if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear: * * *.' 9 10 F.C.C. 110, 120; 11 F.C.C. 71, 76. 10 11 F.C.C. 71 at 75; see § 308(b), note 8. See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475, 642, 60 S.Ct. 693, 697, 84 L.Ed. 869, 1037. 11 11 F.C.C. 71, 76. 12 The Georgia court similarly conceived the issue: 'The Federal Communications Commission is an administrative agency of the Federal Government, empowered to enforce the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and has the power and authority to grant or refuse licenses to radio broadcasting stations, with a view to subserving the public interest so that the people will have the best possible radio service; but nothing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00345", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00071", "text": "ITATING STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING OZONE STANDARDS. (a) Designations.-- (1) Designation submission.--despite the deadline specified in paragraph (1)(A) of section 107(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7407(d)), not later than October 26, 2024, the Governor of each State will designate in accordance with that section all areas (or portions of areas) of the State as attainment, nonattainment, or unclassifiable with respect to the 2015 ozone standards. (2) Designation promulgation.--despite the deadline specified in paragraph (1)(B) of section 107(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7407(d)), not later than October 26, 2025, the Administrator will promulgate a final designation under that section for all areas in all States with respect to the 2015 ozone standards, including any modifications to the designations submitted under paragraph (1). (3) State implementation plans.--despite the deadline specified in section 110(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1)), not later than October 26, 2026, each State will submit to the Administrator an implementation plan under that section with respect to the 2015 ozone standards. (b) Certain Preconstruction Permits.-- (1) In general.--The 2015 ozone standards will not apply to the review and disposition of a preconstruction permit application if-- (A) the Administrator or the State, local, or tribal permitting authority, as applicable, determines the application to be complete on or before the date of promulgation of final designations under subsection (a)(2); or (B) the Administrator or the State, local, or tribal permitting authority, as applicable, publishes a public notice of a preliminary determination or draft permit for the application before the date that is 60 days after the date of promulgation of the final designation of the relevant area under subsection (a)(2). (2) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this section-- (A) eliminates the obligation of a preconstruction permit applicant to install best available control technology and lowest achievable emission rate technology, as applicable; or (B) limits the authority of a State, local, or tribal permitting authority to impose more stringent emissions requirements under State, local, or", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00947", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00072", "text": "344 U.S. 1 73 S.Ct. 1 97 L.Ed. 3 BROWN et al.v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, KAN., et al. BRIGGS et al. v. ELLIOTT et al. DAVIS et al. v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VA., et al. Nos. 8, 101, 191. Decided Oct. 8, 1952. Page 2 PER CURIAM. 1 In two appeals now pending, No. 8, Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., and No. 101, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., the appellants challenge, respectively, the constitutionality of a statute of Kansas, and a statute and the constitution of South Carolina, which provide for segregation in the schools of these states. D.C., 98 F.Supp. 797, D.C., 103 F.Supp. 920. Appellants allege that segregation is, per se, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Argument in these cases has previously been set for the week of October 13, 1952. 2 In No. 191, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County et al., the appellants have filed a Statement of Jurisdiction raising the same issue in respect to a statute and the constitution of Virginia. D.C., 103 F.Supp. 337. Appellees in the Davis case have called attention to the similarity between it and the Briggs and Brown cases; by motion they have asked the Court to take necessary action to have all three cases argued together. 3 This Court takes judicial notice of a fourth case, which is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Bolling et al. v. Sharpe et al., No. 11,018 on that court's docket. In that case, the appellants challenge the appellees' refusal to admit certain Negro appellants to a segregated white school, in the District of Columbia; they allege that appellees have taken such action under certain Acts of Congress; they allege that such action is a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 4 The Court is of the opinion that the nature of the issue posed", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00461", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00073", "text": "Commission Decision of 20 October 2003 amending Decision 88/234/EEC authorising methods for grading pig carcases in the United Kingdom (notified under document number C(2003) 3798) (Only the English text is authentic) (2003/750/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3220/84 of 13 November 1984 determining the Community scale for grading pig carcases(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3513/93(2), and in particular Article 5(2) of it, because: (1) Commission Decision 88/234/EEC(3), as last amended by Decision 94/567/EC(4), has introduced several grading methods for use in the United Kingdom. (2) The United Kingdom has requested the Commission to authorise the use of a new method for grading pig carcases in Great Britain and has submitted the details required in Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2967/85 of 24 October 1985 laying down detailed rules for the application of the Community scale for grading pig carcases(5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3127/94(6). An examination of this request has revealed that the conditions for authorising the new grading method are fulfilled. (3) At the same occasion, the United Kingdom has asked the Commission to remove the Ultra-Fom apparatus from Decision 88/234/EEC because this device is no longer used in Great Britain. (4) Decision 88/234/EEC should be amended accordingly. (5) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Pigmeat, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Decision 88/234/EEC is amended as follows: 1. Article 1 is amended as follows: (a) in the first paragraph, the fifth indent is replaced by the following: \"- the apparatus termed 'Fully automatic ultrasonic carcass grading' (Autofom) and assessment methods related thereto, details of which are given in part 5 of the Annex\"; (b) the third paragraph is deleted. 2. In Annex I, part 5 is replaced by the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00577", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00074", "text": "the eastern territory of the United States * * *.' As previously explained, that conclusion followed from our decision, if no evidence that controverted our ruling was offered. It is therefore necessary to examine briefly the offer of evidence. 13 The offer contained sixty-two paragraphs of proposed evidence. A full exposition is impracticable. Stress was laid on the available evidence to rebut our finding of an industry plan to stabilize prices.6 Evidence was offered to show the licenses were for settlement of alleged infringements, and individual in character and were not used as a subterfuge to gain price control. Such evidence would not affect our determination, set out above, that price-fixing licenses made in knowing concert by standardized price requirements violated the Sherman Act by their very existence. 14 Defendants offered to prove that royalties based on unpatented gypsum board were compensation for patent licenses and installment payment for prior infringement damages. Such proof would not affect the fact that such a royalty added to the cost of producing unpatented board. 15 Proof was offered that covenants against transfer of licenses, for price maintenance and for equality of license terms, and bulletin orders against rebates by selling other products at a cheaper price when patented articles were sold, were to protect the licensor's monopoly under its letters patent. It was offered to prove that the activities of the Board Survey Company, considered in our former opinion, 333 U.S. 364, 400, 68 S.Ct. 525, 544, 92 L.Ed. 746, were to secure compliance with the licenses; that there was no agreement to eliminate jobbers but only a purpose to maintain patent prices by discontinuing the jobber's discount. Such proof, in view of our holding as to the Sherman Act, would not make legal concerted action under patents to stabilize prices. We pass over other offers of proof as clearly immaterial on the issue of liability for Sherman Act violation. Good intentions, proceeding under plans designed solely for the purpose of exploiting patents, are no defense against a charge of violation by admitted concerted action to fix prices for a producer's products, whether or not those products are validly patented devices. We do not think that, accepting the offers of fact as true, there is enough in the proffered evidence to change the actions of the defendants from the illegal to the permissible. A finding that the manufacturers did not violate the Sherman Act under the evidence introduced by the Government and that proffer", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00379", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00075", "text": "/106/EEC; because it is necessary therefore to specify clearly the methods by which the two procedures must be implemented, by reference to Annex III, for each product or family of products, since Annex III gives preference to certain systems; because the procedure referred to in Article 13(3)(a) corresponds to the systems set out in the first possibility, without continuous surveillance, and the second and third possibilities of point (ii) of section 2 of Annex III, and the procedure referred to in Article 13(3)(b) corresponds to the systems set out in point (i) of section 2 of Annex III, and in the first possibility, with continuous surveillance, of point (ii) of section 2 of Annex III; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Construction, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The products and families of products set out in Annex I will have their conformity attested by a procedure whereby the manufacturer has under its sole responsibility a factory production control system ensuring that the product is in conformity with the relevant technical specifications. Article 2 The products set out in Annex II will have their conformity attested by a procedure whereby, in addition to a factory production control system operated by the manufacturer, an approved certification body is involved in assessment and surveillance of the production control or of the product itself. Article 3 The procedure for attesting conformity as set out in Annex III will be indicated in mandates for European technical specifications. Article 4 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 March 1998.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 333, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00764", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00076", "text": "not include a municipality or a governmental body? 'Commissioner Seavey: I think that municipalities are particularly excluded, and it is my belief that any other Federal agency, any other governmental agency, would be excluded under the terms of the bill. 'Mr. Pettingill: Now then, suppose that a municipality acquires by purchase, and of the common stock of a corporation, privately organized, so that the municipality is actually the owner of the power plant, although it was organized privately, as a private corporation. After that was done, could the private power plant competing in the same locality be required to carry the electric energy generated by the plant owned by the municipality, or State, or the nation? 'Commissioner Seavey: If it was controlled by the municipality and was subject wholly to municipal operations, I would say no, there it not be. (sic)' Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 397—398. See § 201(f). 24 California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 206; State of Wisconsin v. Federal Power Commission, D.C.Cir., 201 F.2d 183, and Wisconsin-Michigan Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 472. 25 Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 1 E.P.C. 536; Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134; Los Angeles v. Nevada-California Electric Corp., 2 F.P.C. 104; Connecticut Light & Power Co., 3 F.P.C. 132; Baum, The Federal Power Commission, 61—62. See the criticism of the § 201(a) phrase as meaninglessly ambiguous, Hartford Electric Light Co., 2 F.P.C. 359, and Northwestern Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 327. The Company has cited a brief by the Commission in another case with some force, as indicating that previously it has claimed that the United States is excluded from the Act by virtue of not being a 'person.' Respondent's brief, United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 4 Cir., 191 F.2d 796. We note, though, that the contention there", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00491", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00077", "text": "coins.--The Secretary may mint and issue such number of quarter dollars of each design selected under paragraph (4) in uncirculated and proof qualities as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. ``(B) Silver coins.--despite subsection (b), the Secretary may mint and issue such number of quarter dollars of each design selected under paragraph (4) as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, with a content of 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper. ``(C) Timing and order of issuance.--Coins minted under this subsection honoring the District of Columbia and each of the territories will be issued in equal sequential intervals during 2009 in the following order: the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(6) Other provisions.-- ``(A) Application in event of admission as a state.--If the District of Columbia or any territory becomes a State before the end of the 10-year period referred to in subsection (l)(1), subsection (l)(7) will apply, and this subsection will not apply, with respect to such State. ``(B) Application in event of independence.--If any territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a territory or possession of the United States before quarter dollars bearing designs which are emblematic of such territory are minted under this subsection, this subsection will cease to apply with respect to such territory. ``(7) Territory defined.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `territory' means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''. Passed the House of Representatives January 23, 2007. Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, Clerk.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 364, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00944", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00078", "text": "341 U.S. 716 71 S.Ct. 909 95 L.Ed. 1317 GARNER et al.v.BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. No. 453. Argued April 25, 1951. Decided June 4, 1951. Messrs. Charles J. Katz, Los Angeles, Cal., Samuel Rosenwein, New York City, for petitioners. Mr. Alan G. Campbell, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents. Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 In 1941 the California Legislature amended the Charter of the City of Los Angeles to provide in part as follows: 2 '* * * no person will hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department of it, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective (April 28, 1941), advise, advocate or teach, or who is now or has been within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches, or has, within said period of five (5) years, advised, advocated or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United States of America or of the State of California. 3 'In so far as this section may be held by any court of competent jurisdiction not to be self-executing, the City Council is given power and authority to adopt appropriate legislation for the purpose of effectuating the objects hereof.' Cal.Stat.1941, c. 67, p. 3409, § 432. 4 under the authority thus conferred the City of Los Angeles in 1948 passed ordinance No. 94,004 requiring every person who held an office or position in the service of the city to take an oath prior to January 6, 1949. In relevant part the oath was as follows: 'I further swear (or affirm) that I do not advise, advocate or teach, and have not within the period beginning five (5) years prior to the effective date", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00406", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00079", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION 2008/783/CFSP of 15 September 2008 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 24 of it, Having regard to the recommendation from the Presidency, because: (1) On 15 October 2007, the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (1) (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA). (2) Article 10(3) of that Joint Action provides that detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States are to be the subject of an agreement, in accordance with Article 24 of the Treaty. (3) Following authorisation by the Council on 13 September 2004, the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, negotiated an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA (the Agreement). (4) The Agreement should be approved on behalf of the European Union, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic is approved on behalf of the European Union. The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to sign the Agreement in order to bind the European Union. Article 3 This Decision will take effect on the day of its adoption. Article 4 This Decision will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 15 September 2008.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 440, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00695", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00080", "text": "United States to lands, interest in lands, compensation, or reimbursement on account of lands or interest in lands which have been granted, claimed to have been granted, or which it is claimed should have been granted to such carrier or any such predecessor in interest under any grant to such carrier or such predecessor in interest as aforesaid. Such release must be filed within one y ar from (the date of the enactment of this Act). Nothing in this section will be construed as requiring any such carrier to reconvey to the United States lands which have been previously patented or certified to it, or to prevent the issuance of patents confirming the title to such lands as the Secretary of the Interior will find to have been previously sold by any such carrier to an innocent purchaser for value or as preventing the issuance of patents to lands listed or selected by such carrier, which listing or selection has previously been fully and finally approved by the Secretary of the Interior to the extent that the issuance of such patents may be authorized by law.' 9 'Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation organized and existing by virtue of an Act of Congress approved March 3, 1897 (29 Stat. 622), with office and principal place of business at New York, in the State of New York, , in accordance with section 321 of Part II of Title III of the Transportation Act of 1940, and the rules and regulations issued thereunder by the Secretary of the Interior, relinquishes, remises and quitclaims to the United States of America any and all claims of whatever description to lands, interests there, compensation or reimbursement therefor on account of lands or interests granted, claimed to have been granted, or claimed should have been granted by any act of the Congress to Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company or to any predecessor in interest in aid of the construction of any portion of its railroad. 'This release does not embrace the rights of way or station grounds of this company, lands sold by the company to innocent purchasers for value prior to September 18, 1940, lands embraced in selections made by the company and approved by the Secretary of the Interior prior to September 18, 1940, or lands which have been patented or certified to the company or any predecessor in interest in aid of the construction of its railroad.' 10 Cf. note 4, supra. 11 See United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Co., 311", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 490, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00017", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00081", "text": "classification and in aid of legislation, is modified to the extent necessary to permit the designation as an Indian reservation of the following-described area: 'Beginning at the end of a point of land on the shore of Shelikof Strait on Kodiak Island, said point being about one and one-quarter miles east of Rocky Point and in approximate latitude 57 39 40'N., longitude 154 12 20'W.; 'Thence south approximately eight miles to latitude 57 32 30 N.; 'Thence west approximately twelve and one-half miles to the confluence of the north shore of Sturgeon River with the east shore of Shelikof Strait; Thence northeasterly following the easterly shore of Shelikof Strait to the place of beginning, containing approximately 35,200 acres. '2. The area described above and the waters adjacent thereto extending 3,000 feet from the shore line at mean low tide, are designated as an Indian reservation for the use and benefit of the native inhabitants of the native village of Karluk, Alaska, and vicinity: Provided, That such designation will be effective only upon its approval by the vote of the Indian and Eskimo residents of the area involved in accordance with section 2 of the act of May 1, 1936, supra: And provided further, That nothing herein contained will affect any valid existing claim or right nder the laws of the United States within the purview of that Section.' 2 The first section reads as follows, 36 Stat. 847, 43 U.S.C.A. § 141: 'That the President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States, including the District of Alaska, and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or reservations will remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress.' There is a second section designed to keep the reservations free for mineral exploration and utilization. 43 U.S.C.A. § 142. 3 There is an amendment, immaterial here, see 44 Stat. 752. 4 Under Reorganization Plan No. II the authority of the Department of Commerce over the administration of the White Act was transferred to the Department of the Interior, effective July 1", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00280", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00082", "text": "of the first appeal precluded review here at that time of the ruling adverse to petitioner, Urie did not waive that question by amending his complaint, in conformity with the court's mandate, to state his claim more specifically in terms of the Boiler Inspection Act or by proceeding with trial on that theory. As the case then stood, this was his only remaining chance for success unless he was to waive it, ask for final judgment to be entered against him on the general negligence issue, and rely solely upon securing review of that judgment and reversal by this Court. 16 Whatever the effect of the state supreme court's ruling for further proceedings in the state courts,11 it could not impose such an alternative upon petitioner. Local rules of practice cannot bar this Court's independent consideration of all substantial federal questions actually determined in earlier stages of the litigation by the court whose final adjudication is brought here for review. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 225 U.S. 445, 454, 32 S.Ct. 728, 732, 56 L.Ed. 1156; Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152. Even so, we think sound practice would see to it that such questions were expressly preserved in the later stages of review. But, as this Court has had occasion previously to observe, its power to probe issues disposed of on appeals prior to the one under review is, in the last analysis, a 'necessary correlative' of the rule which limits it to the examination of final judgments. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana 226 U.S. 99, 102, 33 S.Ct. 78, 80, 57 L.Ed. 138.12 17 Accordingly, even if it should be held that petitioner has stated no claim under the Boiler Inspection Act, the judgment now in review cannot stand unless the Missouri Supreme Court rightly concluded, on the first appeal, that petitioner's original complaint stated no cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, considered apart from any effect of the Boiler Inspection Act. That question is properly presented and to it we now turn. II. 18 Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides: 19 'Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce * * * will be liable", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00269", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00083", "text": "Commission in due course; (6) because, under the provisions of Directive 92/61/EEC, the components and characteristics covered by this Directive may not be placed on the market and sold in the Member States unless they comply with the provisions of this Directive;because the Member States must take all the necessary measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations resulting from this Directive. (7) because Member States should be enabled, by granting tax incentives, to promote the marketing of vehicles which, in advance, meet the requirements adopted at Community level concerning measures to counter pollutant and noise emissions; (8) because the methods of measuring the immunity of vehicles and separate technical units to electromagnetic radiation in order to check compliance with the provisions concerning electromagnetic compatibility (Chapter 8) require complex and costly installations; because, in order to enable Member States to provide such installations, provision should be made for deferring application of these measuring methods by three years from the entry into force of this Directive; (9) because, given the scale and impact of the action proposed in the sector in question, the Community measures which are the subject of this Directive are necessary, or even indispensable, to attain the objectives set, namely Community vehicle type approval; because these objectives cannot be adequately achieved by the Member States individually; (10) because technical progress requires rapid adaptation of the technical requirements set out in the Annex to this Directive; because, with the exception of the limit values for pollutants and sound level, this task should be assigned to the Commission in order to simplify and speed up the procedure; because, in all cases where the European Parliament and the Council confer upon the Commission authority to implement rules laid down in the two or three-wheel motor vehicle sector, it is appropriate to provide for a procedure for prior consultation between the Commission and Member States within a committee; (11) because safety or environmental requirements call for restrictions on tampering with certain types of two or three-wheel vehicle; because, if they are not to prove an obstacle to owner servicing and maintenance, such restrictions must be strictly limited to tampering which significantly modifies the vehicle's performance and pollutant and noise emissions; (12) because, a long as vehicles conform to the requirements of this Directive, no Member State may refuse registration or use of them; because the object of the requirements of this Directive should not be to oblige those Member States which do not allow two or three-wheel motor vehicles in their territory to tow a trailer to amend their rules,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00693", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00084", "text": ". 227, 239, 22 L.Ed. 80. 'If such prohibition is intended to reach the government in the use of known rights and remedies, the language must be clear and specific to that effect.' United States v. Stevenson, 1909, 215 U.S. 190, 197, 30 S.Ct. 35, 36, 54 L.Ed. 153. In both these cases the question, as in the present case, was whether the United States was divested of a certain remedy by a statute or a rule of law which, without express reference to the United States, made that remedy generally unavailable. 24 'Sec. 2. In the interpretation of this Act and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the United States is declared as follows: 'because under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he will be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.' 25 United States v. Cooper Corporation, 1941, 312 U.S. 600, 604, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743, 85 L.Ed. 1071; United States v. Fox, 1876, 94 U.S. 315, 321, 24 L.Ed. 192. 26 75 Cong.Rec. 5473. An amendment by Representative Beck, designed to save to the United States the right to intervene by injunction in private labor disputes, was defeated. 75 Cong.Rec. 5503,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00049", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00085", "text": "the `Plan'). The Plan will be deemed to satisfy the requirement for a comprehensive management plan under section 3(d) of this Act. ``(B) Management committee.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, there will be established a Farmington River Coordinating Committee to assist in the long-term protection of the segment and the implementation of this paragraph and the Plan. The membership, functions, responsibilities, and administrative procedures of the Committee will be as set forth in the Plan. The Committee will not be a Federal advisory committee, and will not be subject to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). ``(C) Federal role.--(i) The Director of the National Park Service (referred to in this paragraph as the `Director') will represent the Secretary in the implementation of the Plan and the provisions of this Act with respect to the segment designated by this paragraph, including the review of proposed federally assisted water resources projects that could have a direct and adverse effect on the values for which the segment was established, as authorized under section 7(a) of this Act. ``(ii) under sections 10(e) and 11(b)(1) of this Act, the Director may enter into cooperative agreements with the State of Connecticut, the towns of Colebrook, Hartland, Barkhamsted, New Hartford, and Canton, Connecticut, and the Committee. Such cooperative agreements will be consistent with the Plan and may include provisions for financial or other assistance from the United States to facilitate the long-term protection, conservation, and enhancement of the segment. ``(iii) The Director may provide technical assistance, staff support, and funding to assist in the implementation of the Plan. ``(iv) despite section 10(c) of this Act, no portion of the segment designated by this paragraph will become a part of the National Park System nor will it be subject to regulations that govern the National Park System. ``(D) Water resources projects.--(i) In determining whether a proposed water resources project would have a direct and adverse effect on the values for which the segment designated by this paragraph was included in the national wild and scenic rivers system, the Secretary will specifically consider the extent to which the project is consistent with the Plan. ``(ii) Congress finds that the existing operation of the Colebrook Dam and Goodwin Dam hydroelectric facilities, together with associated transmission lines and other existing project works, under licenses or exemptions granted", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01112", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00086", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 792/91 of 25 March 1991 extending the provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community (1), and in particular Article 11 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, by Regulation (EEC) No 3421/90 (2), the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America; because the examination of the facts has not yet been completed and the Commission has informed the exporters concerned in Japan and the United States of America of its intention to propose an extension of the period of validity of the provisional duty for a further period not exceeding two months; because none of the exporters involved has objected, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America is extended for a period not exceeding two months as from 30 March 1991. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 25 March 1991.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 335, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00782", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00087", "text": "18 (1) The reversal of the dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus is founded on the Court's premise that the report of the reviewing board of medical officers'shows that the appellate board based its conclusion on two considerations: (1) the initial certificate of the two public health doctors; (2) testimony given by Dr. Carlton Simon (a psychiatrist chosen by the alien).' The Court then concludes that 'the appellate board could not rest its finding that petitioner was a mental defective on the original certificate without denying petitioner the independent review and re-examination which Congress and the Surgeon General had prescribed.' That is to say, the report, as the Court phrases it,'makes clear that the appeal board made no such medical examination as was required by the regulations.'1 My reading of the opinion is that the Court thinks the record affirmatively shows a failure to comply with the statute and regulation § 34.13(g) and (h) as to findings and examination.2 19 There is a suggestion that a medical appeal board must certify that the alien had been examined.3 I assume, however, that if the Court intended to require specific certification by the medical board of the steps leading to its findings and conclusions it would have made such a holding definitive. 20 I disagree with the Court's interpretation of the report. A strong presumption exists that public officials perform their duty. If the report had added the phrase, 'in accordance with the regulations,' after the word 'considered,' there could be no doubt as to the sufficiency of the report. The presumption of regularity until rebutted requires courts to adopt such an interpretation.4 The statement of the board of medical officers that it 'has considered the appeal' means to me that the board has proceeded conformably to the statute and regulations. 21 (2) There is a graver error in the Court's holding, however, which may interfere with sound administrative procedure. Although petitioner was represented by counsel, no objection to the form of the report was made during the administrative process. This case previously has centered around the issue of finality disposed of by the Court. Even in the several hearings of her effort to get relief by habeas corpus, petitioner has never asserted, in this or any other court, that she was not examined by the physicians of the medical review board. This is made plain by the Court's statement of the generalized objections on other grounds to the report of the medical review board, see", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00262", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00088", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 847/97 of 12 May 1997 amending Annexes II and III to Regulation (EC) No 519/94 on common rules for imports from certain third countries THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 113 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because Regulation (EC) No 519/94 (1), introduced, in respect of the People's Republic of China, the quotas listed in Annex II to that Regulation and surveillance measures listed in Annex III thereto; because the Council's objective in establishing the quotas was to strike a balance between an appropriate level of protection for the Community industries concerned and maintenance of an acceptable level of trade with China, taking into account the various interests in play; because analysis of the main economic indicators, in particular the volume and market share of Chinese imports, leads to the conclusion that the quota on glass tableware falling within HS/CN code 7013 should be abolished as from 1 January 1998 and that such abolition would be neither inconsistent with the above objective nor liable to disrupt the Community market; because the products in respect of which the quota is abolished by this Regulation should, however, be subject to prior Community surveillance, in order to ensure adequate monitoring of the volume and prices of the imports of the products concerned; because the quota on toys falling within HS/CN codes 9503 41, 9503 49 and 9503 90 includes parts and accessories of toys; because, in light of the experience of the Community producers, the effects of this inclusion go beyond what is necessary for the appropriate protection of the Community industry concerned; because parts and accessories of toys should therefore be excluded from the quota; because it is no longer considered necessary to maintain surveillance measures on a range of products of which the imports in 1995 were negligible or lower than in 1994; because they should be removed from the list of products subject to surveillance measures; because the quantitative quotas and the surveillance measures introduced under Regulation (EC) No 519/94 should therefore be amended, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes II and III to Regulation (EC) No 519/94 will be replaced by the Annexes which appear in Annexes I and II to this Regulation respectively, until 31 December 1997. Article", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00637", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00089", "text": "and medical devices under this Act; and ``(ii) includes exhibiting, negotiating, marketing, surveying the market, and delivering and servicing agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices under this Act. ``(B) United states person defined.--In subparagraph (A), the term `United States person'-- ``(i) means the Federal Government, any State or local government, or any private person or entity of the United States; and ``(ii) includes a full-time employee, executive, sales agent or consultant of a producer, manufacturer, distributor, shipper, United States air or seaport, or a carrier of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices authorized for sale under this Act, as well as an exhibitor, representative, or member of a national or State trade organization that promotes the interests of a producer, manufacturer, or distributor of such products.''. SEC. 4. ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO CONDUCT ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. (a) Issuance of Visas.--despite any other provision of law, in the case of a Cuban national whose itinerary documents an intent to conduct activities, including phytosanitary inspections, related to purchasing United States agricultural goods under the provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, a consular officer (as defined in section 101(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(9))) may issue a nonimmigrant visa under section 101(a)(15)(B) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(B)) to the national, if the national is not inadmissible to the United States under section 212 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1182). (b) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act and every 3 months thereafter the Secretary of State will submit to the Committees on Finance, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Agriculture, Ways and Means, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the issuance of visas described in subsection (a). (2) Content of reports.--Each report will contain a full description of each application received from a Cuban national to", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00875", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00090", "text": "339 U.S. 846 70 S.Ct. 901 94 L.Ed. 1328 OSMANv.DOUDS, Individually and as Regional Director of the National Labor RelationsBoard. No. 12. On Jurisdictional Statement Distributed Nov. 26, 1948. Decided June 5, 1950. Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1950. See 71 S.Ct. 12. Samuel A. Newberger, New York City, for appellants. No appearance for appellee. PER CURIAM. 1 This case was previously held for, and presents the same issues involved in, American Communications Association, C.I.O., et al. v. Douds, and United Steel-workers of America, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674. In these cases the Court upheld the constitutionality of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U.S.C.Supp. III, §§ 141, 159(h), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141, 159(h), which provides: 2 'No investigation will be made by the (National Labor Relations) Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under subsection (e)(1) of this section will be entertained, and no complaint will be issued under a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.' 3 With regard to that part of the section which is concerned with membership in, or affiliation with, the Communist Party, the Court holds the requirement to be constitutional. Mr.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00371", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00091", "text": "the Case of Certain Dispositions.-- ``(1) In general.--In the event that a taxpayer-- ``(A) disposes of the principal residence with respect to which a credit was allowed under subsection (a), or ``(B) fails to occupy such residence as the taxpayer's principal residence, at any time within 60 months after the date on which the taxpayer purchased such residence, then the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year during which such disposition occurred or in which the taxpayer failed to occupy the residence as a principal residence will be increased by the amount of such credit. ``(2) Exceptions.-- ``(A) Death of taxpayer.--Paragraph (1) will not apply to any taxable year ending after the date of the taxpayer's death. ``(B) Involuntary conversion.--Paragraph (1) will not apply in the case of a residence which is compulsorily or involuntarily converted (within the meaning of section 1033(a)) if the taxpayer acquires a new principal residence within the 2-year period beginning on the date of the disposition or cessation referred to in such paragraph. Paragraph (1) will apply to such new principal residence during the remainder of the 60-month period described in such paragraph as if such new principal residence were the converted residence. ``(C) Transfers between spouses or incident to divorce.--In the case of a transfer of a residence to which section 1041(a) applies-- ``(i) paragraph (1) will not apply to such transfer, and ``(ii) in the case of taxable years ending after such transfer, paragraph (1) will apply to the transferee in the same manner as if such transferee were the transferor (and will not apply to the transferor). ``(D) Relocation of members of the armed forces.-- Paragraph (1) will not apply in the case of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty who moves under a military order and incident to a permanent change of station. ``(3) Joint returns.--In the case of a credit allowed under subsection (a) with respect to a joint return, half of such credit will be treated as having been allowed to each individual filing such return for purposes of this subsection. ``(4) Return requirement.--If the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year is increased under this subsection, the taxpayer will, despite section 6012, be required to file a return with respect to the taxes imposed under this subtitle. ``(d", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00839", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00092", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1200/2008 of 2 December 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 fixing the import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 December 2008 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 in respect of import duties in the cereals sector (2), and in particular Article 2(1) of it, because: (1) The import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 December 2008 were fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 (3). (2) As the average of the import duties calculated differs by more than EUR 5/tonne from that fixed, a corresponding adjustment must be made to the import duties fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008. (3) Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes I and II to Regulation (EC) No 1186/2008 are replaced by the text in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will apply from 3 December 2008. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 2 December 2008.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 396, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00639", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00093", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Saving Family Homes Act of 2008''. SEC. 2. RIGHT TO RENT HOME SUBJECT TO FORECLOSURE. (a) Exercise of Right.--If, at any time after notice under subsection (b) for an eligible mortgage is provided to the eligible mortgagor and before the commencement of the 7-day period that ends on the first date that the foreclosing creditor may first commence or execute such foreclosure under such notice, the eligible mortgagor under the eligible mortgage that is subject to such foreclosure provides notice in accordance with section 3, despite such foreclosure or any other interests in the property, the eligible mortgagor may, at the sole option of the eligible mortgagor, continue to occupy the foreclosed property during the 20-year period that begins upon the commencement of such occupancy, subject to the requirements of subsection (c). (b) Limitation on Timing of Foreclosure; Notice of Default and Right To Rent.--despite any other provision of law or any contract, a foreclosure of an eligible mortgage may not be commenced or executed before the expiration of the 28-day period beginning upon the receipt, by the eligible mortgagor, of written notice provided by the foreclosing creditor for the mortgage that-- (1) clearly states that-- (A) the eligible mortgagor is in default on the mortgage; and (B) foreclosure on the mortgage may or will be commenced on account of such default; (2) clearly states that the eligible mortgagor has the right, despite foreclosure, to continue to occupy the foreclosed property in accordance with this Act, and sets forth the terms of such occupancy under subsections (a) and (c); and (3) identifies the first date, under this section and any other provisions of law and contract, that such foreclosure may be commenced. (c) Terms of Periodic Tenancy.--Occupancy, by an eligible mortgagor, of a foreclosed property under subsection (a) will be under a periodic month-to-month tenancy under which the owner of the property may terminate the tenancy for material breach but will have no authority, at will, to terminate the tenancy during the occupancy under subsection (a) if the mortgagor-- (1) timely pays to the owner of the foreclosed property rent on a monthly basis in the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01084", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00094", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 3168/94 of 21 December 1994 establishing in the field of application of Council Regulation (EC) No 517/94 on common rules for imports of textile products from third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements or by other specific Community import rules a Community import licence and amending certain provisions of the Regulation THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 113 of it, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 517/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports of textile products from third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements or by other specific Community import rules (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2798/94 (2), and in particular Article 21 of it, because, as a result of the establishment of the internal market, it is appropriate that the different forms, so far used by the competent authorities of the Member States in the textile and clothing sector for authorizing the import into the Community of products subject to quantitative limits, under Regulation (EC) No 517/94, be replaced by a single document that may be used throughout the customs territory of the Community, regardless of the Member State of issue, or the nationality or domicile of the operator concerned; because to this end it is necessary to create a Community import licence to be drawn up by the competent authorities of the Member States on a common form meeting uniform criteria, to specify which information such document, and the application for such document, will contain and to amend or complete certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 517/94; because to facilitate the introduction of such a Community import licence in all Member States, it seems appropriate to authorize the competent authorities of the Member States, during a transitional period which will end no later than 31 December 1995, to continue to issue the national forms that were in use before the date of entry into force of this Regulation for issuing import authorizations and surveillance documents, unless the applicant, at the time of this application, has requested the issue of a Community import licence; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Textile Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 517/94 is amended as follows: 1. the following", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00575", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00096", "text": "of conservation, had delegated broad and elaborate power to their regulatory bodies over all aspects of producing gas.17 The Natural Gas Act was designed to supplement state power and to produce a harmonious and comprehensive regulation of the industry.18 Neither state nor federal regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other.19 Congress enacted this Act after full consideration of the problems of production and distribution. It considered the state interests as well as the national interest. It had both producers and consumers in mind. Legislative adjustments were made to reconcile the conflicting views. 31 The District Court found as a fact, and the finding is undisputed by the Commission, that, 'It has been the practice in the natural gas industry for companies to trade freely in gas leases, and the Commission has never previously asserted the right to regulate transfers of such leases.' Thus for over ten years the Commission has never claimed the right to regulate dealings in gas acreage. Failure to use such an important power for so long a time indicates to us that the Commission did not believe the power existed.20 In the light of that history we should not by an extravagant, even if abstractly possible, mode of interpretation push powers granted over transportation and rates so as to include production. If possible all sections of the Act must be reconciled so as to produce a symmetrical whole.21 We cannot attribute to Congress the intent to grant such far-reaching powers as implicit in the Act when that body has endeavored to be precise and explict in defining the limits to the exercise of federal power.22 32 The Commission sought by injunction to enforce its order halting the transaction between Panhandle and Hugoton pending the outcome of its investigation. The Commission argues that at any rate the transfer should be enjoined until it can determine its own power and the necessity of using it. Injunctive aid was requested under § 20(a)23 of the Act and the general equiry power of the district court. To be entitled to judicial assistance, however, the order issued by the Commission must be valid and based on a statutory grant of power to the Commission. As we have held above that the transfer of undeveloped gas leases is an activity related to the production and gathering of natural gas and beyond the coverage of the Act, the authority of the Commission cannot reach the sales. A proposed transfer cannot be stopped by the Commission. It should not be permitted to delay what it cannot prevent.24 If the Commission is of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00299", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00097", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 22 May 1992 approving measures to set up pilot projects for the control of rabies with a view to its eradication or prevention presented by France (Only the French text is authentic) (92/304/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Decision 89/455//EEC of 24 July 1989 introducing Community measures to set up pilot projects for the control of rabies with a view to its eradication or prevention (1), and in particular Article 4 of it, because, conforming to Article 1 of Decision 89/455/EEC France will set up large-scale pilot projects in accordance with Article 3 for the eradication or prevention of rabies in the wild life of the Community using vaccines for the oral immunization of foxes; because the pilot projects as presented by France include the adjacent border areas of Switzerland, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium; because the pilot project is part of a cross-border cooperation with Switzerland, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium; because by letter dated 7 January 1992 France notified the Commission of pilot projects for the control of rabies with a view to its eradication or prevention; because, after examination the pilot project was found to comply with Decision 89/455/EEC; because the conditions for financial participation by the Community are therefore met; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The pilot projects in April and May 1992 for the eradication and prevention of rabies, presented by France are approved. Article 2 France will bring into force by 1 April 1992 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions for implementing the pilot projects referred to in Article 1. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the French Republic. Done at Brussels, 22 May 1992.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 411, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00537", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00098", "text": "and further determines that the resulting sanctions imposed under such resolution 1718 would again come into full effect following a missile test or launch. (9) Congress has further determined that a return by North Korea to the Six-Party diplomatic process following any missile test or launch by Pyongyang must include a firm and transparent commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear programs, including those derived both from plutonium as well as highly enriched uranium. (10) Japanese press reports have indicated that a delegation of approximately fifteen Iranian missile experts have arrived in North Korea in March 2009 ``to help Pyongyang prepare for a rocket launch'', including senior officials with the Iranian rocket and satellite producer Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, and that they brought with them a letter from their President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il stressing the importance of cooperating on space technology. SEC. 3. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH KOREA. despite the decision by the Secretary of State on October 11, 2008, to rescind the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, restrictions against the Government of North Korea that were imposed by reason of a determination of the Secretary of State that the Government of North Korea, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, will remain in effect, and will not be lifted under such provisions of law, unless the President certifies to Congress that the Government of North Korea-- (1) is no longer engaged in the illegal transfer of missile or nuclear technology, particularly to the governments of Iran, Syria, or any other country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for international acts of terrorism; (2) is no longer engaged in training in combat operations or", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01072", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00099", "text": "1937 (42 U.S.C. 1347j(c)) is amended-- (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``Optional'' before ``Community Service''; (B) in paragraph (1), by striking the matter that precedes subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) and despite any other provision of law, a public housing agency may, at the option of the agency, require that each adult resident of a public housing project--''; (C) in paragraph (2), by striking the matter that precedes subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(2) Exemptions.--The Secretary will require each public housing agency that establishes a community service requirement under paragraph (1) to provide an exemption from the applicability of the requirements authorized by paragraph (1) for any individual who--''; (D) in paragraph (3)-- (i) in subparagraph (A)-- (I) by striking ``the requirement under paragraph (1), the public housing agency'' and inserting ``a requirement established under paragraph (1) by a public housing agency, the agency''; and (II) by striking ``the requirement under paragraph (1) of this subsection'' and inserting ``such requirement''; and (ii) in subparagraph (C)-- (I) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``the requirement under paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``a requirement established under paragraph (1) by the agency''; (II) in clause (i)(III) by striking ``the resident's lease will not be renewed'' and inserting the following ``the agency may, in accordance with policies established by the agency at the option of the agency, refuse to renew the resident's lease''; and (III) in clause (ii)-- (aa) by striking ``not'' and inserting ``, in accordance with policies established by the agency at the option of the agency, refuse to''; (bb) by striking ``will'' and inserting ``may, in accordance with such policies,''; and (cc) by striking ``under paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``established under paragraph (1)''; (E) in paragraph (4)-- (i) by striking ``not'' and inserting ``, in accordance with policies established by the agency at the option of the agency, refuse to''; and (ii) by striking ``the requirement under", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01102", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00100", "text": "243 and 244 of the state constitution set forth the prerequisites for qualified electors. Among other things these provisions require that each elector will pay an annual poll tax, produce satisfactory proof of such payment, and be able to read any section of the state constitution, or to understand the same when read to him, or to give a reasonable interpretation of it. The evidence showed that a very small number of Negro male citizens (the court estimated about 25) as compared with white male citizens, had met the requirements for qualified electors, and thereby become eligible to be considered under additional tests for jury service. On this subject the State Supreme Court said (29 So.2d 96, 98): 6 'Of the 25 qualified negro male electors there would be left, therefore, as those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male negro electors as compared with 5,500 to 6,000 male white electors as to whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a proportion of 5,000 nonexempt white jurors to 12 or 13 nonexempt negro jurors, or about one-fourth of one per cent negro jurors, 400 to 1. * * * For the reasons already previously stated there was only a chance of 1 in 400 that a negro would appear on such a venire and as this venire was of 100 jurors, the sheriff, had he brought in a negro, would have had to discriminate against white jurors, not against negroes,—he could not be expected to bring in one-fourth of one negro.'8 7 The above statement of the Mississippi Supreme Court illustrates the unwisdom of attempting to disprove systematic racial discrimination in the selection of jurors by percentage calculations applied to the composition of a single venire.9 8 The petitioner here points out certain legislative record evidence10 of which it is claimed we can take judicial notice, and which it is asserted establishes that the reason why there are so few qualified Negro electors in Mississippi is because of discrimination against them in making up the registration lists. But we need not consider that question in this case. For it is clear from the evidence in the record that there were some Negroes in Lauderdale County on the registration list. In fact, in 1945, the circuit clerk of the county, who is himself charged with duties in administering the jury system, sent the names of eight", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00117", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00101", "text": "not be paid during this suspension, which may not exceed three months. 2. The Secretary-General/High Representative may bring to the attention of national authorities any violation by a military staff member on secondment of the rules set out or referred to in this Decision. 3. A military staff member on secondment will continue to be subject to his national disciplinary rules. Article 34 Working hours The second sentence of Article 10(2) will not apply to seconded military staff. Article 35 Special leave By way of derogation from Article 12(4), unpaid additional special leave may be granted by the GSC for training by the employer subject to a duly reasoned request by the employer. Article 36 Allowances By way of derogation from Article 15(1) and Article 16, the Exchange of Letters referred to in Article 1(5) may stipulate that allowances provided for there will not be paid. Article 37 Place of residence 1. The seconded military staff member is considered as having his place of residence in the capital of the Member State of which he is a national, when, under Article 17(1), (2) and (3)(a), his place of residence is situated at 150 km or less from the place of secondment. 2. The seconded military staff member is considered as having his place of residence in the capital of the Member State of which he is a national when the place of principal residence of the spouse or of the child (children) referred to in Article 17(3)(b) is situated in a Member State other than that of secondment. CHAPTER V FINAL PROVISIONS Article 38 Repeals The following Decisions will be repealed: - Council Decision of 25 June 1997 on the rules applicable to national experts on detachment to the General Secretariat of the Council (Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs) in the context of implementation of the plan to step up the fight against organised crime, - Council Decision of 22 March 1999 on the rules applicable to national experts on detachment to the General Secretariat of the Council (Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs) in the context of the collective evaluation of the enactment, application and effective implementation by the applicant countries of the acquis of the European Union in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, - Council Decision 2001/41/EC of 22 December 2000 on the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00786", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00102", "text": "will be retained * * * and no disposition of it made, except as will have been previously or specifically hereafter will be provided by law.' 42 Stat. 105, 106. By the Treaty of Versailles, art. 297(d), 'all the exceptional war measures, or measures of transfer * * * will be considered as final and binding upon all persons.' In art. 297(i), Germany undertook 'to compensate her nationals in respect of the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in Allied or Associated States.' The Treaty of Berlin, 42 Stat. 1939, 1940, incorporated these provisions of the Versailles Treaty, together with appendices defining 'exceptional war measures' and cutting off the right of suit by German nationals against American officials on account of wartime action. An agreement of August 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 2200, established a Mixed Claims Commission to adjudicate claims of American nationals against Germany. Provisions for the return of vested property were made by successive amendments to § 9. Finally, in the Settlement of War Claims Act, 45 Stat. 254, 270, Congress provided for the return of 80% of their vested property to German enemies who would waive their claims to the remaining 20%. Germany in a debt funding agreement of Junt 23, 1930, deposited bonds with the United States, payments on which were to be applied to the settlement of awards of the Mixed Claims Commission. When Germany defaulted on these payments, Congress, by Public Resolution No. 53 of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 1267, suspended all deliveries of property under the Settlement of War Claims Act to German nationals until Germany should clear up the arrears. 7 As it passed the House, the bill contained a provision suspending the payment out of vested assets of debts owed by enemies to citizens. In the Senate hearings, Representative Beckworth, who had sponsored that provision, urged the Senate to go further and suspend the payment of so-called 'title claims' as well. He presented a draft amendment for the Senate committee's consideration which provided that 'no property * * * will be returned to former owners * * * except as directed by a court under § 9(a) of the act.' This was to be an addition to the provision which became § 39. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00431", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00103", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 30 June 1997 amending Decision 97/296/EC drawing up the list of third countries from which the import of fishery products is authorized for human consumption (Text with EEA relevance) (97/429/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Decision 95/408/EC of 22 June 1995 on the conditions for drawing up, for an interim period, provisional lists of third country establishments from which Member States are authorized to import certain products of animal origin, fishery products or live bivalve molluscs (1), as last amended by Decision 97/34/EC (2), and in particular Article 2 (2) of it, because Commission Decision 97/296/EC (3) established the list of third countries from which the import of fishery products is authorized for human consumption; because Commission Decision 97/426/EC (4) laid down special conditions for the import of fishery and aquaculture products originating in Australia; because, therefore, Australia should be added to the list of third countries from which the import of fishery products is authorized; because Article 3 (4) (b) of Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 laying down the health conditions for the production and the placing on the market of fishery products (5), as last amended by Directive 96/23/EC (6), lays down that processed bivalve molluscs must, before processing, satisfy the requirements laid down in Directive 91/492/EEC; because, therefore, the list of third countries satisfying the conditions laid down in Directive 91/492/EEC also applies to imports of processed bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Annex to Decision 97/296/EC is replaced by the Annex to this. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 30 June 1997.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 469, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00783", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00104", "text": "of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment * * *.' Section 652.11(a) of the Regulations imposes the duty on persons classified IV—E to comply with the order to report for work of national importance; and by § 653.12 assignees are required to report to the camp to which they are assigned and to remain there until released or transferred elsewhere by proper authority, except when on authorized missions or leave. 3 8 Cir., 149 F.2d 751; 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 637. 4 Apparently in both cases the important changes in the applicable regulations made after the Falbo decision were not called to the attention of the trial courts or the Circuit Courts of Appeals. 5 The exemption is provided by § 5(d) of the Act, 54 Stat. 885, 888, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 305(d), as follows: 'Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, and students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more than one year prior to the date of enactment of this Act, will be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this Act.' 6 under § 5(g) of the Act, which provides that persons so classified will be assigned to noncombatant service or, if conscientiously opposed to this, then to 'work of national importance under civilian direction.' 7 See text Part II infra at note 19; also note 13. 8 At that time § 653.11(c) of the Selective Service Regulations provided: 'If the assignee indicates that his physical condition has changed since his final type physical examination for registrants in Class IV—E, the camp physician will examine him with reference thereto. If the assignee is not accepted for work of national importance, the Camp Director will indicate the reason therefor, and the assignee, pending instructions from the Director of Selective Service will be retained in the camp or hospitalized when necessary.' Cf. note 10. This provision, effective by Amendment No. 40 on March 16, 1942 (7 F.R. 2093), was eliminated entirely by Amendment No. 210 (9 F.R. 1416), effective February 2, 1944, a little more than two months prior to the date", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00011", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00105", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 99/94 of 19 January 1994 ending the charges against the tariff ceilings opened for 1993 in the framework of generalized tariff preferences, by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3832/90 in respect of certain textile products originating in Sri Lanka, Brazil, Iran, India and Philippines THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3832/90 of 20 December 1990 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1991 in respect of textile products originating in developing countries (1), extended for 1993 by Regulation (EEC) No 3917/92 (2), and in particular the third paragraph of Article 12 of it, because, under Articles 1 and 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 3832/90 suspension of customs duties in the context of preferential tariff ceilings is granted within the limits of the individual ceilings set out in column 8 of Annex I to that Regulation in respect of each of the categories of product under consideration; because as provided for in the third paragraph of Article 12 of the said Regulation, the Commission may, after 31 December 1993, take measures to stop quantities being charged against any particular preferential tariff limit if these limits were exceeded particularly as a result of regularizations of imports actually made during the preferential tariff period; because, in respect of the products of the order Nos, categories and origins indicated in the table below, the relevant ceilings were fixed at the levels indicated in that table: \"\" ID=\"1\">40.0010> ID=\"2\">1> ID=\"3\">Sri Lanka> ID=\"4\">2 261\"> ID=\"1\">40.0180> ID=\"2\">18> ID=\"3\">Brazil> ID=\"4\">112\"> ID=\"1\">40.0381> ID=\"2\">38 A> ID=\"3\">Iran> ID=\"4\">22\"> ID=\"1\">40.0650> ID=\"2\">65> ID=\"3\">India> ID=\"4\">166\"> ID=\"1\">40.0680> ID=\"2\">68> ID=\"3\">Philippines> ID=\"4\">91\"> because on 1 January 1994, the sum of the quantities charged during the 1993 preferential period has exceeded", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00513", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00106", "text": "the rule.30 49 In the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft, submitted May 3, 1943, to this Court, there was included a § 5(b) which purported to codify the McNabb rule.31 In response to widespread opposition to such a codification,32 this section of Rule 5 was omitted from the final draft. These rules were drawn by a representative committee of the bench and bar with wide participation beyond the membership by interested parties from both groups. They were transmitted on December 26, 1944, by this Court to the Attorney General to be reported to Congress, more than a year after the McNabb case and after the hearings on the House bill to nullify the McNabb rule. Neither this Court nor the Congress restored the rejected proposal. 50 Instead of and extension of the McNabb rule, I feel that it should be left, as I think it originally was, a rule that barred a confession extracted under psychological pressure of the degree used in the McNabb case. 51 Such condemnation of even the restricted McNabb rule by those immediately responsible for the enactment and administration of our criminal laws should make this Court, so far removed from the actualities of crime prevention, hesitate long before pushing farther by judicial legislation its conception of the proprieties in criminal investigation. It takes this step in the belief that thereby it strengthens criminal administration by protecting a prisoner. A prisoner should have protection but it is well to remember that law and order is an essential prerequisite to the protection of the security of all. Today's decision puts another weapon in the hand of the criminal world. Apparently the Court intends to make the rule of commitment 'without unnecessary delay'33 an iron rule without flexibility to meet the emergencies of conspiracies, search for confederates, or examining into the ramifications of criminality. The Court does this by failing to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary delay in commitment. It uses words like 'immediately' and 'promptly' and thus destroys the leeway given by the Rule to police investigations. All, I think, without any need for such action since every coerced confession has been inadmissible for generations. The position stated in this dissent does not envisage a surrender to evils in the handling of criminals. If there is a prevalent abuse of the right to question prisoners, the sounder remedy lies in police discipline, in statutory punishment of offending officials, in vigorous judicial protection against unconstitutional pressures for confessions, and", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00214", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00107", "text": "the number of rights thus granted is less than the potential rights the difference may be returned to the national reserve. 2. Producers who obtained premiums in 1991 without applying for them in respect of 1992 owing to exceptional circumstances but who have nevertheless continued to produce may, where applicable, receive premium rights from the national reserve. 3. A producer who during the 1991 marketing year participated in a programme of extensification of production under Council Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 (1) may, at his request, be granted at the end of his participation and additional number of premium rights equal to the difference between the number of premiums granted for the 1991 marketing year and the number of premiums granted for the marketing year preceding the marketing year during the course of which the producer commenced his participation in the said programme. In that case: (a) the producer will not be authorized to transfer or temporarily lease his rights during the following three marketing years; (b) if the producer does not use all his rights during the three following marketing years the Member State will withdraw and return to the national reserve the average of the rights not used during the said three marketing years. 4. despite Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 3007/84 and Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2814/90 (2) and with regard to the 1993 marketing year, the Member States may lay down a specific period for the submission of premium applications for: - the producers referred to in Article 5b (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3013/89, - producers to which the limits referred to in Article 2 (1) hereof where notified after the deadline set by the Member State for the submission of applications where the limit is higher than the application initially submitted. The specific period, however, must not go beyond 30 June 1993. 5. Producers in the Canary Islands applying for premiums for the first time in respect of the 92 marketing year will be granted premium rights under the following conditions: (a) a regional ceiling will be set in line with the statistics concerning the number of ewes and goats present in 1991 in that territory; however, that ceiling will not exceed a total of 178 000 head; (b) within that regional celling, an individual limit per producer will be set taking account of the number", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00657", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00108", "text": "izing the holder of such certificate or permit to provide such transportation. 105 'Sec. 3. Section 654.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read: 106 '654.2. The provisions of Section 654.1 of the Penal Code will not apply to the selling, furnishing or providing of transportation of any person or persons 107 '(1) When no compensation is paid or to be paid, either directly or indirectly, for such transportation; 108 '(2) To the furnishing or providing of transportation to or from work, of employees engaged in farm work on any farm of the State of California; 109 '(3) To the furnishing or providing of transportation to and from work of employees of any nonprofit coopera ive association, organized under any law of the State of California; 110 '(4) To the transportation of persons wholly or substantially within the limits of a single municipality or of contiguous municipalities; 111 '(5) To transportation of persons over a route wholly or partly within a national park or state park where such transportation is sold in conjunction with or as part of a rail trip or trip over a regularly operated motor bus transportation system or line; '(6) To the transportation of passengers by a person who is driving his own vehicle and the transportation of persons other than himself and members of his family when transporting such persons to or from their place of employment and when the owner of such vehicle is driving to or from his place of employment; provided that arrangements for any such transportation provided under the provisions of this subsection will be made directly between the owner of such vehicle and the person who uses or intends to use such transportation. 112 'Sec. 4. Section 654.3 is added to the Penal Code, to read: 113 '654.3. Violation of Section 654.1 will be a misdemeanor, and upon first conviction the punishment will be a fine of not over two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or imprisonment in jail for not over 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment will be second conviction the punishment will be imprisonment in jail for not less than 30 days and not more than 180 days. Upon a third or subsequent conviction the punishment will be confinement in jail for not less than 90 days and not more than one year, and a person suffering three or more convictions will not be eligible to probation, the provisions of any law to the contrary despite.' 1947 Cal.Stat", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00258", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00109", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 29 January 1988 authorizing the Italian Republic to apply intra-Community surveillance to imports of bananas originating in certain third countries and put into free circulation in the other Member States (Only the Italian text is authentic) (88/75/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular the first paragraph of Article 115 of it, Having regard to Commission Decision 87/433/EEC (1), on surveillance and protective measures which Member States may be authorized to take under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty, and in particular Articles 1, 2 and 5 of it, because on 18 January 1988, the Italian Government applied for authorization to apply intra-Community surveillance to imports of bananas falling within subheading 0803 00 10 of the combined nomenclature, originating in certain third countries other than the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States (2) and put into free circulation in the other member States; because by its Decision C (88) 215 (3) of 29 January 1988, the Commission authorized the Italian Republic, under Article 115 of the Treaty, to apply until 30 June 1988 certain protective measures in respect of bananas originating in the third countries listed below; because under this Decision applications to import such bananas put into free circulation in the other Member States are subject to the lodging of a security; because the Italian Government has stated that the circumstances which led the Commission to adopt intra-Community surveillance measures in the past still prevail, namely the need to ensure the effectiveness of the commercial policy measures which Italy applies in respect of direct imports of fresh bananas originating in certain third countries other than the ACP States in order to attain the objective laid down in Protocol 4 to the Lomé Convention; because, without prejudice to a later examination of the situation, it is therefore necessary to authorize the Italian Republic to apply intra-Community surveillance until 30 June 1988 to imports of the products in question; because acceptance of import applications submitted under the surveillance system must be made subject to the conditions laid down in Article 1 of the Commission Decision of 29 January 1988 referred to above, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 1. The Italian Republic is authorized to apply intra-Community surveillance in accordance with Decision 87/", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00832", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00110", "text": "be amended to read as follows: 42 \"Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or which foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who will make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, will be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction of it, will be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Nothing herein contained will render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices or other conditions for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when such contracts or agreements are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or agreements will not be an unfair method of competition under section 5, as amended and supplemented, of the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes', approved September 26, 1914 (U.S.Code, title 15, sec. 45).\" General Statement 43 The sole objective of this proposed legislation is to permit the public policy of States having 'fair trade acts' to operate with respect to interstate contracts for the resale of goods within those States. The fairtrade acts referred to legalize the maintenance, by contract, of resale prices of branded or trade-marked goods which are in free competition with other goods of the same general class. 44 To accomplish this end, the reported bill amends section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act which declares every contract in restraint of trade illegal. The amendment adds a sentence to the section, in the nature of a limitation, to the effect, in substance, that nothing there contained will render illegal contracts prescribing minimum prices or other conditions for resale of branded or trade-marked goods when such contracts are lawful as to intrastate transactions under the State law of the State in which the resale is to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00397", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00111", "text": "25 June 1992 no longer served any purpose. It decided at the same time to initiate fresh proceedings under Article 93 (2) in respect of draft Law No 1536. consequently, this Decision does not cover the provisions of the Law on the Mezzogiorno relating to the reduction in social security contributions. No other Member State or interested party submitted comments within the period allowed. (3) The measure provided for in Article 6 of the Decree-Law, relating to the overall refinancing of the aid measures envisaged in the Law on the Mezzogiorno, was reproduced in several decree-laws without being converted into law by the Italian Parliament. By letter of 30 July 1992 the Italian authorities asked the Commission to allow them to delay submission of their comments under Article 93 (2) so that they could include there the amendments made to the text of the Decree-Law which was to be submitted to Parliament for conversion and on which the Commission could have adopted its final decision under Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty. The text in question was adopted by the Italian Government on 22 October 1992 as Decree-Law No 415 (Official Gazette of the Italian Republic No 249/3, 22 October 1992), and the Italian authorities submitted their comments to the Commission on 27 November 1992. No other Member State or interested party took the opportunity to submit comments. II (4) The refinancing under scrutiny amounts to Lit 24 000 billion (ECU 14 350 million) earmarked for aid to enterprises. In its decision of 25 June 1992 the Commission noted that Italy had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10 of Commission Decision 88/318/EEC (OJ No L 143, 10. 6. 1988, p. 37), which established the conditions under which the Law on the Mezzogiorno was declared compatible with the common market. under that Article, the Italian authorities should have informed the Commission each year of, inter alia, the total amount of tax aid granted, broken down by region and by economic sector. The information provided was not broken down in that way. The Commission took the view in its decision of 25 June 1992 that the compatibility of the overall refinancing of aid on the scale envisaged by the Law on the Mezz", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 493, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00767", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00112", "text": "157 F.2d 257; 31 Stat. 1358, D.C.Code § 14 306. Another example is afforded by the fact that the statute just cited also provided that one spouse could testify in favor of the other in cases in the District when the 'federal rule' was still to the contrary. Compare Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 41 S.Ct. 98, 65 L.Ed. 214; Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 31 S.Ct. 193, 55 L.Ed. 102, both overruled in Funk v. United States, supra. 12 The problem of the admissibility of the evidence set forth in the motion for a new trial is serious and its wise solution full of difficulty. The problem was apparently not explored below, and at the bar of this Court counsel did not give it the consideration appropriate for determination of a federal issue of general importance. It was not even argued in their briefs. Under such circumstances it is not for us to announce a rule for the District of Columbia. Nothing that has been said concerning the various possible choices is intended as an expression of preference among the competing rules about the admissibility of uncommunicated threats, nor as the slightest restriction upon the freedom of the Court of Appeals to make its own choice. We purposely withhold any expression of opinion on the merits of any of the permissible views on admissibility of this evidence. Certainly nothing in our decisions forecloses the Court of Appeals from selecting an one in the range of choices open to it, each one having some rational basis. That court has previously been recognized as the appellate tribunal for determining the local rules of evidence; it also is a court that has active experience with the just and practical considerations governing trials for murder, plainly outside the preoccupation of this Court. 13 It is precisely for such reasons that for a decade the Court has declined to review all convictions for first-degree murder in the District of Columbia, with a single exception, and in every one of these cases some local rule of evidence was at least in part involved. The Appendix gives a summary of the legal issues involved in the fourteen cases in which we denied a petition for certiorari. This course of disposition manifests uniformity of respect by this Court for District rulings on evidence.5 Reference to this course of disposition", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00256", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00113", "text": "under the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.; commonly referred to as the ``Indian Reorganization Act''), to form a government on behalf of the Band. Again, in spite of the Band's eligibility, the Bureau of Indian Affairs failed to act. (7) The United States Government, the government of the State of Michigan, and local governments have had continuous dealings with the recognized political leaders of the Band from 1836 to the present. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this Act the following definitions apply: (1) Band.--The term ``Band'' means the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. (2) Member.--The term ``member'' means those individuals enrolled in the Band under section 7. (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior. SEC. 4. FEDERAL RECOGNITION. (a) Federal Recognition.--Federal recognition of the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians is reaffirmed. All laws and regulations of the United States of general application to Indians or nations, tribes, or bands of Indians, including the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., commonly referred to as the ``Indian Reorganization Act''), which are inconsistent with any specific provision of this Act will not be applicable to the Band and its members. (b) Federal Services and Benefits.-- (1) In general.--The Band and its members will be eligible for all services and benefits provided by the Federal Government to Indians because of their status as federally recognized Indians, and despite any other provision of law, such services and benefits will be provided after the date of the enactment of this Act to the Band and its members without regard to the existence of a reservation or the location of the residence of any member on or near any Indian reservation. (2) Service areas.--For purposes of the delivery of Federal services to the enrolled members of the Band, the area of the State of Michigan within 70 miles of the boundaries of the reservation for the Burt Lake Band as set out in article I, paragraph ``seventh'' of the Treaty of 1855 (11 Stat. 621), will be deemed to be within or near a reservation, despite the establishment of a reservation for the tribe after the date of the enactment of this Act", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00894", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00114", "text": "239,429 67 Nov. 29, 1929.. Dec. 1, 1929. 310,000 259,576 241,529 68 Feb. 28, 1930.. Mar. 1, 1930. 260,000 259,576 242,072 69 May 31, 1930... June 1, 1930. 275,000 259,576 242,212 70 Nov. 29, 1930.. Dec. 1, 1930. 300,000 259,576 243,360 71 Feb. 25, 1931. Feb. 28, 1931. 75,000 259,576 243,510 72 May 27, 1931... June 1, 1931. 200,000 259,576 244,387 73 Aug. 29, 1931. Aug. 31, 1931. 250,000 259,576 244,527 74 Nov. 27, 1931. Nov. 30, 1931-. 300,000 259,576 244,527 75 Dec. 1, 1931. ------------- Reference is made in this respect to the relationship which MOP bears to the various companies in the Gulf Coast Lines system (from now on called GCL). In 1924, MOP acquired a controlling interest in NOTM and thereby inherited complete control of the GCL system, the rail lines of which are interlaced with others in the MOP system. NOTM at all times has been primarily a holding company owning all the stocks and bonds of the fourteen subsidiary companies constituting the GCL group, NOTM itself operating only about 11% of the total GCL mileage. Of the GCL operating companies, the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railway Co. (from now on called Brownsville) is the most important, operating about one-third of the GCL mileage and group's income during the period in question. NOTM is the only one of the GCL contributing from 61% to 84% of the group which has securities outstanding in the hands of the public. 76 According to the District Court fini ngs, MOP's policy in advancing the $2,795,000 to NOTM was to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00193", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00115", "text": "the Milwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for collective-bargaining purposes.2 For many years, the transit workers entered into collective-bargaining agreements with the transit company without resorting to strike. In 1948, however, the collective agreement was terminated when the parties were unable to agree on wages, hours and working conditions and the transit workers' union called a strike to enforce union demands. The respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board secured immediately an ex parte order from a State Circuit Court restraining the strike and, in compliance with that order, the union postponed its strike. Thereafter, the same Circuit Court entered a judgment under which petitioners are 'perpetually restrained and enjoined from calling a strike * * * which would cause an interruption of the passenger service of the (transit company).' The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, 1950, 257 Wis. 43, 42 N.W.2d 471, and we granted certiorari, 1950, 340 U.S. 874, 71 S.Ct. 124, to review the important questions decided below. 3 Petitioners in No. 438 are the union and its officers who represent employees of the Milwaukee Gas Light Company and its subsidiary, the Milwaukee Solvay Coke Company, both of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, under a certification of the National Labor Relations Board.3 In 1949, the collective agreement between petitioners and the gas company was terminated and, upon failure of further bargaining and conciliation to resolve the dispute, a strike was called and the gas workers left their jobs. Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board obtained immediately an ex parte restraining order from a State Circuit Court requiring that petitioners 'absolutely desist and refrain from calling strike (or) going out on strike * * * which would cause an interruption of the service of the (gas company)' and ordering petitioners to 'take immediate steps to notify all employes called out on strike to resume service immediately.' Although the strike was settled soon thereafter, the Circuit Court found that petitioners had not obeyed the restraining order and entered a judgment of contempt, imposing fines of $250 upon each petitioner. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, 1950, Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 258 Wis. 1, 44 N.W.2d 547, and we granted certiorari, 1950, 340 U", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00390", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00116", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1309/2000 of 20 June 2000 establishing unit values for the determination of the customs value of certain perishable goods THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 955/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1662/1999(4), and in particular Article 173 (1) of it, because: (1) Articles 173 to 177 of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 provide that the Commission will periodically establish unit values for the products referred to in the classification in Annex 26 to that Regulation. (2) The result of applying the rules and criteria laid down in the abovementioned Articles to the elements communicated to the Commission in accordance with Article 173 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 is that unit values set out in the Annex to this Regulation should be established in regard to the products in question, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The unit values provided for in Article 173 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 are established as set out in the table in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 23 June 2000. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 20 June 2000.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 402, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00755", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00117", "text": "under this Act will not result in any net cost to the United States Government. (b) Payment for Coins.--A coin will not be issued under this Act unless the Secretary has received-- (1) full payment for the coin; (2) security satisfactory to the Secretary to indemnify the United States for full payment; or (3) a guarantee of full payment satisfactory to the Secretary from a depository institution whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration Board. SEC. 10. CONDITIONS ON PAYMENT OF SURCHARGES. (a) Payment of Surcharges.--despite any other provision of law, no amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act will be paid to the Foundation unless-- (1) all numismatic operation and program costs allocable to the program under which such coins are produced and sold have been recovered; and (2) the Foundation submits an audited financial statement which demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that, with respect to all projects or purposes for which the proceeds of such surcharge may be used, the Foundation has raised funds from private sources for such projects and purposes in an amount which is equal to or greater than the maximum amount the Foundation may receive from the proceeds of such surcharge. (b) Annual Audits.-- (1) Annual audits of recipients required.--The Foundation will provide, as a condition for receiving any amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act, for an annual audit, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards by an independent public accountant selected by the Foundation, of all such payments to the Foundation beginning in the first fiscal year of the Foundation in which any such amount is received and continuing until all such amounts received by the Foundation with respect to such surcharges are fully expended or placed in trust. (2) Minimum requirements for annual audits.--At a minimum, each audit of the Foundation under paragraph (1) will report-- (A) the amount of payments received by the Foundation during the fiscal year of the Foundation for which the audit is conducted which are derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act; (B) the amount expended by the Foundation from the proceeds of such surcharges during the fiscal year of the Foundation for which the audit is conducted; and (C) whether all expenditures by the Foundation from", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01003", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00118", "text": "this title or the Securities Act of 1933, transactions involving the initial disposition by an approved seller of pooled certificates that are acquired by that seller from the Corporation upon the initial issuance of the pooled certificates will be deemed to be transactions by a person other than as an issuer, underwriter, or dealer within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection: ``(A) Approved seller.--The term `approved seller' means an institution approved by the Corporation to sell mortgage loans to the Corporation in exchange for pooled certificates. ``(B) Pooled certificates.--The term `pooled certificates' means single class mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Corporation that have been issued by the Corporation directly to the approved seller in exchange for the mortgage loans underlying such mortgage-backed securities.''. (c) Regulations.--The Securities and Exchange Commission may issue any regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section and the amendments made by this section. (d) Effective Date.--The amendments under this section will be made upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, but will apply only with respect to fiscal years of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation that begin after the expiration of such 180- day period. SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON REGISTRATION FEES. (a) In General.--Section 6(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``despite any other provision of this title, no applicant, or group of affiliated applicants that do not include any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, filing a registration statement subject to a fee will be required in any fiscal year with respect to all registration statements filed by such applicant in such fiscal year to pay an aggregate amount in fees to the Commission under subsection (b) in excess of five percent of the target offsetting collection amount for such fiscal year. Fees paid in connection with registration statements relating to business combinations will not be included in calculating the total fees paid by any applicant.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment under subsection (a) will be made and will apply upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 492, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00861", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00119", "text": "the same People of the State of Illinois.'3 5 The material portions of the records in these cases are identical, except for the names and ages of the children. They contain all that was before the Supreme Court of Illinois or that is before this Court. The following appears in each: 6 'Arraignment and plea of guilty—June 20, 1938 7 'Now on this day come the said People by Taylor E. Wilhelm, State's Attorney, and the said defendant in his own proper person also comes; Whereupon the said defendant is furnished with a copy of the indictment, a list of witnesses and jurors herein. 8 'And the said defendant being now arraigned before the bar of this Court moves the Court for leave to enter his plea of Guilty of the crime of taking indecent liberties with children in manner and form as charged in the first count of the indictment herein; and the Court having admonished and explained to the said defendant the consequences and penalties, which will result from said plea, and the said defendant still persisting in his desire to enter his plea of guilty to the crime oft aking indecent liberties with children, in manner and form as charged in the first count of the indictment herein, the court grants such leave. 9 'Thereupon the said defendant enters his plea of guilty of the crime of taking indecent liberties with children, in manner and form as charged in the first count of the indictment herein. 10 'Thereupon the Court finds the age of the said defendant to be fifty-seven (57) years. 11 'Judgment 12 'Now again on this day come the said People by Taylor E. Wilhelm, State's Attorney, and the said defendant Roy Bute, in his own proper person also comes, and the said defendant, Roy Bute, not saying anything further why the judgment of the Court should not now be pronounced against him on his plea of guilty of the crime of taking indecent liberties with children in manner and form as charged in the first count of the indictment herein, previously entered herein. 13 'Whereupon it is Ordered by the Court that the said defendant, Roy Bute, be and he is sentenced on said plea of guilty as aforesaid to confinement in the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet for a period of not less than one (1) year, nor more than twenty (20) years.' 14", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00157", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00120", "text": "the district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction. ``(2) Any order issued under this subsection will state with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation. Any penalty assessed in the order will not exceed $25,000 per day of noncompliance for each violation. In assessing such a penalty, the Administrator will take into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements. ``(d) Public Hearing.--Any order issued under this section will become final unless, not later than 30 days after the order is served, the person or persons named there request a public hearing. Upon such request the Administrator will promptly conduct a public hearing. In connection with any proceeding under this section the Administrator may issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books, and documents, and may promulgate rules for discovery procedures. ``(e) Violation of Compliance Orders.--If a violator fails to take corrective action within the time specified in a compliance order, the Administrator may assess a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance with the order. ``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: ``(1) Agreement.--The term `Agreement' means-- ``(A) the Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste between the United States and Canada, signed at Ottawa on October 28, 1986 (TIAS 11099) and amended on November 25, 1992; and ``(B) any regulations promulgated and orders issued to implement and enforce that Agreement. ``(2) Foreign municipal solid waste.--The term `foreign municipal solid waste' means municipal solid waste generated outside of the United States. ``(3) Municipal solid waste.-- ``(A) Waste included.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term `municipal solid waste' means-- ``(i) all waste materials discarded for disposal by households, including single and multifamily residences, and hotels and motels; and ``(ii) all waste materials discarded for disposal that were generated by commercial, institutional, municipal, and industrial sources, to the extent such materials-- ``(I) are essentially the same as materials described in clause (i); and ``(II) were collected and disposed of with other municipal solid waste described in clause (i) or subclause (I) of this clause as part of normal municipal solid waste collection services", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01067", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00121", "text": "the public streets in the Garment Center where the plaintiff's (respondents) brought the packages by hand or by hand truck. The part which the plaintiffs (respondents) took in such loading consisted of the lifting of the packages on to the tailboards of the trucks, and very often when the weights or size of the packages so required they would stand inside the truck bodies and, together with the downtown employee, stack and pile the freight in the vehicle. 'Item 5. As to all the plaintiffs (respondents) other than Shapiro they generally walked between stopping points but occasionally rode upon the trucks when the trucks moved from one place to another in the Garment Center, thereby avoiding loss of time by walking. As to the plaintiff Shapiro, he regularly and as a matter of fixed duty, between August 1939 and September 1, 1941, rode on the truck between four and five hours daily. On the truck at the same time was the driver and a helper from the downtown terminal. In addition thereto the plaintiff Shapiro devoted three and a half hours each day to inside office work at the 38th Street sub-terminal.' (Italics supplied.) 6 The order of dismissal appearing in the record was as follows: 'Ordered that the complaint be and the same is dismissed and that judgment be entered abating and dismissing said action, without prejudice to the rights of plaintiffs (respondents), or any one of them, to bring other actions or proceedings for the establishment of their respective claims, either administratively or at an appropriate time, by action in this court or other proper tribunal.' 7 See also, Walling v. Comet Carriers, D.C., 57 F.Supp. 1018; 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 107, 109, certiorari granted, 326 U.S. 716, 66 S.Ct. 338, writ of certiorari dismissed on motion of counsel for petitioner Comet Carriers, 328 U.S. 819, 66 S.Ct. 1007. That case, also in the Second Circuit, related to 'four motor truck drivers, four drivers' helpers and two hand truckers or pushers' employed by Comet Carriers in the transportation of goods between manufacturers and contractors mostly on intrastate trips within or near the New York City Garment Center. As to the hand truckers or pushers, the District Court said: 'they are", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00056", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00122", "text": "non-Federal party or parties who own, operate, and maintain the non-Federal water diversion and storage project, and any associated lands, involved. The operation, maintenance, and replacement of such facilities will be the sole responsibility of such party or parties and will not be a project cost assignable to any Federal reclamation project. SEC. 4. OTHER REQUIREMENTS. (a) Permits.--The Secretary may assist a non-Federal party who owns, operates, or maintains a non-Federal water diversion or storage project, and any associated lands, to obtain and comply with any required State, local, or tribal permits. (b) Federal Law.--In carrying out this Act, the Secretary will be subject to all Federal laws applicable to activities associated with the construction of a fish passage and screening facility or habitat improvements. (c) State Water Law.-- (1) In carrying out this Act, the Secretary will comply with any applicable State water laws. (2) Nothing in this Act affects any water or water-related right of a State, an Indian tribe, or any other entity or person. (d) Required Coordination.--The Secretary will coordinate with the Northwest Power and Conservation Council; appropriate agencies of the States of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington; and appropriate federally recognized Indian tribes in carrying out the program authorized by this Act. SEC. 5. INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL RECLAMATION LAW. (a) In General.--The Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and Acts amendatory of it and supplementary thereto, will not apply to the non-Federal water projects at which the fish passage and screening facilities authorized by this Act are located, nor to the lands which such projects irrigate. (b) Nonreimbursable and Nonreturnable Expenditures.-- despite any provision of law to the contrary, the expenditures made by the Secretary under this Act will not be a project cost assignable to any Federal reclamation project (either as a construction cost or as an operation and maintenance cost) and will be non- reimbursable and non-returnable to the United States Treasury. SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as are necessary for the purposes of this Act. Passed the Senate July 26, 2005. Attest: EMILY J. REYNOLDS, Secretary.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 491, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00933", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00123", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 13 April 1984 concerning the French Republic under Article 13 (2) of Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 2892/77 concerning own resources accruing from value added tax (Only the French text is authentic) (84/276/Euratom, ECSC, EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community; Having regard to Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources (1), Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 2892/77 of 19 December 1977 implementing in respect of own resources accruing from value added tax the Decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources (2), as last amended by Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 3625/83 (3), and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 9 (3), the second subparagraph of Article 11 (1) and Article 13 (2) of it, because the Commission, under Article 13 (2) of Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 2892/77, adopted, for 1979, Decision 80/821/EEC, Euratom, ECSC (4), for 1980, Decision 81/1017/Euratom, ECSC, EEC (5), for 1981, Decision 82/759/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (6) and, for 1982, Decision 83/142/EEC, Euratom, ECSC (7); because the French Republic has requested the extension of Decision 83/142/EEC, Euratom, ECSC, adopted for 1982; because, for the early years of implementation of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (8), authorizations were", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00801", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00124", "text": "; Atchison, T. & F.R.R. v. United States, 15 Ct.Cl. 126, 148; Cf. 18 Stat. 72, 74; 18 Stat. 452, 453, 454; 20 Stat. 377, 390; 27 Stat. 174, 180. 5 See Committee of Three: Report of March 24, 1938, H.Doc.No. 583, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 32; Committee of Six: Report of December 23, 1938, in Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., II, 260. 6 H.R. 10620, 75th Cong.; S. 3876, 75th Cong.; S. 1915 and S. 1990, 76th Cong. 7 54 Stat. 954, 49 U.S.C. § 65, 49 U.S.C.A. § 65. 8 Section 321 (b) provides that 'If any carrier by railroad * * * or any predecessor in interest, will have received a grant of lands from the United States to aid in the construction of any part of the railroad operated by it, the provisions of law with respect to (reduced rate) compensation for such transportation will continue to apply to such transportation as though subsection (a) of this section had not been enacted until such carrier will file with the Secretary of the Interior, in the form and manner prescribed by him, a release of any claim it may have against the United States to lands, interest in lands, compensation, or reimbursement on account of lands or interest in lands which have been granted, claimed to have been granted, or which it is claimed should have been granted to such carrier or any such predecessor in interest under any grant to such carrier or such predecessor in interest as aforesaid. Such release must be filed within one y ar from (the date of the enactment of this Act). Nothing in this section will be construed as requiring any such carrier to reconvey to the United States lands which have been previously patented or certified to it, or to prevent the issuance of patents confirming the title to such lands as the Secretary of the Interior will find to have been previously sold by", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00016", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00125", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1480/2004 of 10 August 2004 laying down specific rules concerning goods arriving from the areas not under the effective control of the Government of Cyprus in the areas in which the Government exercises effective control THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 (1), and in particular Article 4(12) of it, After consultation of the Line Regulation Committee, because: (1) Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 provides a special regime for the treatment of goods arriving from the areas not under effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter called the Areas) to the areas in which the Government exercises effective control. (2) The implementation of the regime established by Regulation (EC) No 866/2004, as regards goods other than those that are both wholly obtained in the Areas and compliant with Annex II of that Regulation, is subject to the adoption of specific rules by the Commission under Article 4(12) of the Regulation. It is however clearly intended that these specific rules should apply to all goods within the remit of the Regulation. (3) It is necessary to provide detailed rules concerning the form and content of the document to be issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce or by another authorised body and concerning controls with regard to compliance with the applicable rules. (4) It is also necessary to provide detailed rules concerning obligations of communication for the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce or another authorised body, the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, and the authorities of the Eastern Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus with respect to the nature, the quantities, the destination and the value of the goods for which certificates are established and which cross the line, and also any sanctions applied or import duties levied. (5) Plant health, food safety and other safety requirements need to be guaranteed. The protection against the introduction into the Community and against the spread within the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products needs to be ensured and detailed rules concerning the issuing of documents related to the checks as referred to in Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 have to be established. Pending the establishment of the phytosanitary status of the Areas as regards", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00799", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00126", "text": "cannot be placed upon the exercise of the right of religious instruction, yet that under the correlative constitutional guaranty against 'an establishment' taxes may be levied and used to aid and promote religious instruction, if only the amounts so used are small. See notes 30 31 supra and text. Madison's objection to 'three pence' contributions and his stress upon 'denying the principle' without waiting until 'usurped power had * * * entangled the question in precedents,' note 29, were reinforced by his further characterization of the Assessment Bill: 'District as it may be, in its present form, from the Inquisition it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance.' Remonstrance, Par. 9; II Madison 183, 188. 42 If it is part of the state's function to supply to religious schools or their patrons the smaller items of educational expense, because the legislature may say they perform a public function, it is hard to see why the larger ones also may not be paid. Indeed, it would seem even more proper and necessary for the state to do this. For if one class of expenditures is justified on the ground that it supports the general cause of education or benefits the individual, or can be made to do so by legislative declaration, so even more certainly would be the other. To sustain payment for transportation to school, for textbooks, for other essential materials, or perhaps for school lunches, and not for what makes all these things effective for their intended end, would be to make a public function of the smaller items and their cumulative effect, but to make wholly private in character the larger things without which the smaller could have no meaning or use. 43 'because the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society; which cannot be effected without a competent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle previously adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of pre-eminence amongst the different societies of communities of Christians; * * *' Supplemental Appendix; Fo", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00034", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00127", "text": "of the nation's corporations (the smallest) declined 23 percent, because those employed by 5 percent of the corporations (the largest) increased 22 percent. A related study indicates that between January 1, 1941, and January 1, 1943, business firms employing fewer than 125 workers each experienced an increase in employment of 1 percent and an increase in the value of their product (attributable principally to price increases) of 16 percent; during the same period, however, the increase in employment by the large establishments employing more than 125 workers was 62 percent and the increase in the value of the product, 96 percent.' 2 See for example United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129. 3 See for example Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268, 88 L.Ed. 376. 4 See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S.Ct. 941, 92 L.Ed. 1236; Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947, 92 L.Ed. 1245; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 172, 68 S.Ct. 915, 936, 92 L.Ed. 1260. Those cases have largely expended the force of Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322—an indefensible decision whereby the Court allowed those who had built one of the tightest monopolies in American history largely to retain their illgotten gains and continue their hold on the economy. The philosophy of that decision can be summed up in the words Brandeis used to describe the decree effecting a so-called dissolution of the American Tobacco Co. He said that its defenders 'appear to have discovered in the Constitution a new implied prohibition: 'What man has illegally joined together, let no court put asunder.\" The Curse o Bigness (1935) p. 103. 5 See Schine Theatres v. United States, supra,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00287", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00128", "text": "of evidence in the hearing will apply in the same manner in which such rules would apply in a removal proceeding before a United States immigration judge under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (c) Hearings, Findings and Conclusions, and Order.-- (1) Findings and conclusions.--Within 60 days after the end of a hearing conducted under this section, the immigration judge will make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to whether the respondent has been a participant in Nazi persecution (within the meaning of section 2 of this Act). (2) Order.-- (A) Finding that respondent has been a participant in nazi persecution.--If the immigration judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent has been a participant in Nazi persecution (within the meaning of section 2 of this Act), the immigration judge will promptly issue an order declaring the respondent to be ineligible for any Federal public benefit, and prohibiting any person from providing such a benefit, directly or indirectly, to the respondent, and will transmit a copy of the order to any governmental entity or person known to be so providing such a benefit. (B) Finding that respondent has not been a participant in nazi persecution.--If the immigration judge finds that there is insufficient evidence for a finding under subparagraph (A) that a respondent has been a participant in Nazi persecution (within the meaning of section 2 of this Act), the immigration judge will issue an order dismissing the proceeding. (C) Effective date; limitation of liability.-- (i) Effective date.--An order issued under subparagraph (A) will be effective on the date of issuance. (ii) Limitation of liability.-- despite clause (i), a person or entity will not be found to have provided a benefit to an individual in violation of this Act until the person or entity has received actual notice of the issuance of an order under subparagraph (A) with respect to the individual and has had a reasonable opportunity to comply with the order. (d) Review by Attorney General; Service of Final Order.-- (1) Review by attorney general.--The Attorney General may, in her discretion, review any finding or conclusion made, or order issued, under subsection (c), and will complete the review not later than 30 days after the finding or conclusion is so made, or order is so issued. Otherwise, the finding, conclusion, or order will be final. (2) Service of final order.--The Attorney", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00870", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00129", "text": "ance Corporation, or (b) upon the performance by General Motors Corporation of such agreement, act or practice in combination with some other agreement, act or practice with which the respondents are not charged in the indictment previously filed against them by the Grand Jury on May 27, 1938, No. 1041; '(3) After the entry of a consent decree against General Motors Corporation, or after the entry of a litigated decree, not subject to further review, against General Motors Corporation by a court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, or after the entry of a judgment of conviction against General Motors Corporation in the proceeding hereinbefore referred to, or after January 1, 1940 (whichever date is earliest), the court upon application of any respondent from time to time will enter orders: '(i) suspending each of the restraints and requirements contained in sub-paragraphs (d) to (f) and (h) to (i), inclusive, of paragraph 6 of this decree to the extent that it is not then imposed, and until it will be imposed, in substantially identical terms, upon General Motors Corporation and its subsidiaries, and suspending each of the restraints and requirements contained in sub-paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) of paragraph 7 of this decree to the extent that it is not imposed and until it will be imposed in substantially identical terms, upon General Motors Acceptance Corporation and its subsidiaries, either (w) by consent decree, or (x) by final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction not subject to further review, or (y) by decree of such court which, although subject to further review, continues effective, or (z) by the equivalent of such a decree as defined in clause (2) of this paragraph; provided, however, that if the provisions of a consent or litigated decree against General Motors Corporation in its subsidiaries corresponding to subparagraphs (j) and (k) of paragraph 6 of this decree are different from said sub-paragraphs of this decree, then upon application of the respondents any provision or provisions of said sub-paragraphs will be modified so as to conform to the corresponding provisions of such General Motors Corporation decree; '(ii) suspending each of the restraints and requirements contained in the remaining sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (g) of paragraph 6 to the extent that it is not then imposed", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00210", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00130", "text": "They formed an advisory committee, including distinguished judges and members of the bar, and obtained the services of special consultants.22 Furthermore, an advisory committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference.23 And to assist with matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting of himself and Justices Frank-furter and Douglas.24 15 That these experts assisted in drafting the Code does not mean that Congress blindly approved what outsiders did. This is demonstrated, for example, by the statement of Representative Robsion, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, at the hearing conducted by his Subcommittee in 1947. 'We will do the same as we did last year * * * just read them line by line and have you and other expert codifiers and other persons go over the bill with us.'25 16 Petitioner almost seems to imply that this very careful Committee consideration vitiates the legislation. But the Committee system is integral in typical legislative procedure; Congress could not function without it.26 A canon f construction which would discount statutory words pro tanto, the greater the expertise or the more meticulous the Committee consideration devoted thereto, or the longer and more complex the legislation, would be absurd, not least because it would make mockery of the techniques of statutory interpretation which have previously been used by the courts. 17 The experts and the Committees did not attempt to conceal the proposed revisions. 'The committee on revision of the laws in the preparation of those preliminary drafts sought to give them the widest possible circulation. We made certain that every member of the legislature got one; we made certain that they were sent to every United States attorney; that they were sent to every member of the Federal judiciary; that they were sent to the appropriate committees of the leading State and local bar associations; that they were sent to every-one who ever evidenced any interest in the work at all.'27 Indicative of the success in publicizing the provisions of the Code is the fact that there was specific treatment of § 1404(a) and its applicability to Federal Employers' Liability Act suits in a number of legal periodicals.28 18 The initial appearance of § 1404(a) was in the Second Draft of the Code, adopted by the meeting of May, 1945. Its text has remained unchanged. It was accompanied by a reviser's note, which recited that 'Subsection (a) is new. It was drafted in accordance", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00266", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00131", "text": "this opinion. Apart from allegations going to constitutionality and coverage, including asserted defects in the renegotiation procedures followed,12 the complaint sought to establish jurisdiction in the District Court, equitable in character, by showing the inadequacy of all available legal or other remedies. These included the pending Tax Court proceedings, possible suit in the Court of Claims following completion of the Tax Court's determination, and actions at law against appellant's customers, contractors with the Government to recover the amounts said to be due under their varios contract s. 12 In particular it was alleged that, despite the pendency of the Tax Court proceedings, the Board and the Secretary, or his delegates, were taking steps to prevent Aircraft's customers from paying over to it moneys owing on contracts, aggregating $270,000, and claimed to be due the Government as excessive profits. The complaint alleged further that the Board and the Secretary were threatening to direct Aircraft's customers to pay these sums into the Treasury13 and that, unless they were restrained, such payment would be made, to appellant's irreparable injury.14 No direct relief was asked, by way of judgment or decree, for refund of the $204,000 collected by the Government from appellant's customers, under the First Renegotiation Act, as excessive profits realized in 1942. It was suggested, however, that if that Act should be found invalid and the Second Act sustained,15 the Government should be permitted to collect only the difference between $270,000, the amount determined to be excessive profits for 1943, and the $204,000 collected for 1942. The suggestion, of course, if formally made, would be substantially a claim against the Government by way of setoff of the latter amount. Cf. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, supra. 13 The Government has contested each of appellant's claims. But its primary contentions have been aimed at Aircraft's jurisdictional showing. It argues that the suit in substance and legal effect is one against the United States, to which there has been no governmental consent, cf. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, supra; that the suit is premature, because the Tax Court proceedings have not been completed and until this has been done Aircraft will not have exhausted its administrative remedy, cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corporation, supra; that the Tax Court has been given exclusive jurisdiction in renegotiation matters; and that,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00092", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00132", "text": "or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of emp oyers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as from now on defined) of 'persons participating or interested' there (as from now on defined). '(b) A person or association will be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest there, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation. '(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. '(d) The term 'court of the United States' means any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress, including the courts of the District of Columbia.' 20 Lewis, Trustee v. United States, 1875, 92 U.S. 618, 622, 23 L.Ed. 513; United States v. Herron, 1873, 20 Wall. 251, 263, 22 L.Ed. 275; see Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 1912, 224 U.S. 152, 155, 32 S.Ct. 457, 458, 56 L.Ed. 706. 21 United States v. California, 1936, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567; Green v. United States, 1869, 9 Wall. 655, 658,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00048", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00133", "text": ". ``(6) Enhanced access.--The Secretary will provide access to the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (from now on in this subsection referred to as the `SEVIS'), or other equivalent or successor program or system, to appropriate employees of an institution or exchange visitor program sponsor participating in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program if-- ``(A) at least two authorized users are identified at each participating institution or exchange visitor sponsor; ``(B) at least one additional authorized user is identified at each such institution or sponsor for every 200 covered students or exchange visitors enrolled at the institution or sponsor; and ``(C) each authorized user is certified by the Secretary as having completed an appropriate training course provided by the Department for the program or system. ``(7) Program support.--The Secretary will provide appropriate technical support options to facilitate use of the program or system described in paragraph (4) by authorized users. ``(8) Upgrades to sevis or equivalent data.--The Secretary will update the program or system described in paragraph (4) to incorporate new data fields that include-- ``(A) verification that a covered student's performance meets the minimum academic standards of the institution in which such student is enrolled; and ``(B) timely entry of any information required by paragraph (5) regarding covered students and exchange visitors enrolled at institutions or exchange program sponsors. ``(9) Savings clause.--Nothing in this section will prohibit the Secretary or any institution or exchange program sponsor participating in the Student Exchange Visitor Program from requiring more frequent observations of covered students or exchange visitors.''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: ``(1) The term `covered student' means a student who is a nonimmigrant under subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)). ``(2) The term `observed' means positively identified by physical or electronic means. ``(3) The term `authorized user' means an individual nominated by an institution participating in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program and confirmed by the Secretary as not appearing on any terrorist watch list.''. (b) Comptroller General Review.--The Comptroller General will conduct a review of the fees for the Student and Exchange Visitor Program of the Department of Homeland Security. The Comptroller General will include in such review data from fiscal years 2007 through", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00935", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00134", "text": "preparations applied by spraying, retail products in powder form, smoking accessories, catalytic heaters, paints and varnishes; because improved monitoring of the marketing and use of dangerous asbestos fibres is necessary to protect human heath, especially as there are for certain uses substitute products regarded, on the basis of risk analysis, as less dangerous; because a very effective way of protecting human health and the environment is to prohibit the use of certain fibres, such as those of amphibole asbestos, which according to some scientific sources are particularly dangerous; because for practical reasons such a prohibition can not for the time being be extended to naturally-occuring materials such as ores and sand containing asbestos fibres as natural impurities; because a fibre fixity test to assess the dangers posed by particular asbestos-containing products is not yet widely available; because, despite this, products should be promoted which reduce the overall risk to man and the environment; because Council Directive 91/382/EEC (6) amends Directive 83/477/EEC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work (second individual Directive within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 80/1107/EEC); because the measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Adaption to Technical Progress of the Directives on the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade in Dangerous Substances and Preparations, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC is adapted to technical progress as set out in the Annex to this. Article 2 1. Member States will adopt and publish the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 January 1993 and will immediately inform the Commission of it. They will apply these provisions as from 1 July 1993. When Member States adopt these provisions, these will contain a reference to this Directive or will be accompanied by such reference at the time of their official publication. The procedure for such reference will be adopted by Member States. 2. Member States will communicate to the Commission no later than 18 months after the date of its adoption the text of the basic provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. Article 3 This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 3 December 1991.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 486, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00614", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00135", "text": "umber Company, will also refer to its successors. (i) Reports to Congress.--For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary will report annually to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, on the status of the negotiations with the company or its successors in interest to effect the land consolidation authorized by this section. SEC. 6. LAND CONSOLIDATION--GALLATIN AREA. (a) In General.--The Secretary will work diligently to assure all lands within what is generally known as the Gallatin Range owned by Big Sky Lumber Company, its assignee or successors in interest, not acquired, purchased or exchanged under sections 3 and 4 of this Act are acquired by the United States through exchange or purchase. (b) Direction.--The Secretary is directed to provide Congress, within three years, recommendations designed to acquire by purchase or exchange Gallatin Area lands owned by Big Sky Lumber Company: Provided, That such recommendations are agreed to by Big Sky Lumber Company: Provided further, That nothing in this section limits the Secretary's authority to acquire or purchase said lands. (c) Description of Lands.--The Secretary is authorized and directed to acquire by purchase or exchange the lands and interests there as depicted on a map entitled ``Gallatin Area'', dated September, 1992. (d) Land Acquisition Authorities.--Acquisitions under this section will be under existing authorities available to the Secretary: Provided, That despite any other law, exchanges authorized in this section will not be restricted within the same State. (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. Funds necessary for land acquisition are authorized to be appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. (f) Equal Value.--Any exchange of lands between Big Sky Lumber Company and the United States will be for equal value. (g) Quality of Title.--The quality of title to the properties referenced in this section in fact secured will meet applicable Forest Service standards with respect to surface and subsurface estates or will otherwise be acceptable to the Forest Service. (h) References.--The reference and authorities of this section referring to the Big Sky Lumber Company, will also refer to its successors. (i) Reports to Congress.--For a period of three years from the date of enactment of this Act, the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01023", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00137", "text": "96 to take account of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the Community and Turkey; because the aim of that amendment is to ensure that the amount to be deducted from the levy includes an amount equal to the special export charge levied by Turkey in the period 1 January 1994 to 31 January 1995 but not exceeding ECU 10,88 per 100 kilograms, plus an additional ECU 10,88 per 100 kilograms; because, from 1 February 1995, those amounts are replaced by ECU 13,14 per 100 kilograms in accordance with that amendment; because Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 should accordingly be amended with effect from the entry in force of the transitional arrangements, in order to take account of the additional ECU 14,60 and ECU 13,14 per 100 kilograms in reductions in the rates of duty on imports of unrefined olive oil originating in Morocco and Turkey respectively; because, with a view to full compliance with the Community's international undertakings, provision must be made for a procedure to reimburse traders for the difference between the duty actually paid and the duty payable in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95, as amended by this Regulation, on imports between 1 July 1995 and the entry into force of this Regulation and the difference between the levy actually paid and the levy payable for the period 1 January 1994 to 30 June 1995; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for oils and fats, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Article 2 (3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 are replaced by the following: '3. Where Algeria or Tunisia applies a special export charge to olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in paragraph 1, wholly obtained in Algeria or Tunisia and transported direct from those countries to the Community, the applicable rate of customs duty will be further reduced by an amount equal to the special charge but not exceeding ECU 14,60 per 100 kilograms. 4. Where Turkey applies a special export charge to olive oil covered by the CN codes mentioned in paragraph 1, wholly obtained in Turkey and transported direct from that country to the Community, the applicable rate of customs duty will be further reduced by", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00618", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00138", "text": ". In Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218, 53 S.Ct. 373, 77 L.Ed. 710, Ozark was relied upon to hold unconstitutional a state tax upon a corporation which was qualified to do intrastate business within the state but which in fact did only an interstate business. Cardozo, J., joined by Brandeis, J., and Stone, J., dissented on the ground that the tax could be supported as a tax laid upon the privilege to do intrastate business. Ozark was next before the Court in Virginia v. Imperial Coal Co., supra, a case involving a tax on tangible and intangible property situated and used within the state to carry on an exclusively interstate business. In that case it was distinguished on the ground that an ad valorem property tax, and not a privilege tax, was before the Court. In Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 298 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 887, 80 L.Ed. 1328, involving an excise tax on corporations doing business within Massachusetts, Ozark was again distinguished, this time on the ground that the Lumber Co. was engaged in local activities within the state and, therefore, that the burden imposed upon its interstate commerce was remote and incidental. Again, in Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 57 S.Ct. 696, 81 L.Ed. 970, Ozark was found to be inapposite because of factual differences. Southern Gas ruled upon the constitutionality of a tax assessed on the basis of the same tax that was before this Court in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, supra. The state tax was held constitutional by the Southern Gas case as a tax exacted for the privilege of doing an intrastate business by a company in fact engaging in intrastate business in Alabama. 14 Miss.Gen.Laws (1930), ch. 88, § 3: 'Every person desiring to engage in any business, or exercise any privilege from now on specified, will first, before commencing same, apply for, pay for, and procure from the proper officer a privilege license authorizing him to engage in the business, or exercise the privilege specified there; and the amount of tax shown in the following schedules is imposed for the privilege", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00200", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00139", "text": "the decisions construing it. On the contrary, this Court has often noted that prosecution under R.S. § 102 was intended'merely to supplement the power of contempt by providing for additional punishment.' Jurney v. MacCracken, supra, 294 U.S. at page 151, 55 S.Ct. at page 379. 29 The debates attending enactment of the statutes here in question and the decisions of this and other federal courts construing substantially identical statutes make plain the fact that Congress intended the immunity there provided to apply only to past criminal acts concerning which the witness should be called to testify.20 30 The offense of contempt of Congress, with which we are presently concerned, on the other hand, matures only when the witness is called to appear before the committee to answer questions or produce documents and wilfully fails to do so. Until that moment he has committed no crime. There is, in our jurisprudence, no doctrine of 'anticipatory contempt.' While the witness' testimony may show that he has elected to perjure himself or commit contempt, he does not thereby admit his guilt of some past crime about which he has been summoned for questioning but commits the criminal act then and there. 31 In Glickstein v. United States, supra, this Court considered the problem thereby presented. It was there held that perjury committed in the course of testimony given under statute falls outside the purview of § 7(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 25(10), 11 U.S.C.A. § 25(10), which, like R.S. § 859, provides that no testimony given by the witness (at a creditors' meeting) will be used against him in any criminal proceedings. In the Court's view, such an immunity'relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.' Id., 222 U.S. at page 142, 32 S.Ct. at page 73, 56 L.Ed. 128. The distinction is fully spelled out in a Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Edelstein v. United States, 8 Cir., 1906, 149 F. 636, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 236, which was cited with approval in the Glickstein case: 32 'To hold that the statute protects a", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00352", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00140", "text": "general phrase, 'It is declared to be the policy of Congress to * * * cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials of it and with any organization of motor carriers in the administration and enforcement of this part.' 49 Stat. 543. For full text, see Appendix B(1), infra. When this declaration was repealed in 1940 and largely incorporated in a statement of the 'National Transportation Policy,' preceding Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress added language emphasizing the federal rather than the state features of the policy. The material clauses then read: 'It is declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress * * * to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials of it; * * * all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Servi e, and of the national defense. * * *' 54 Stat. 899. For full text and comment, see Appendix B(1), infra. It was because the Commission, in 1942, found it necessary in order to carry out this National Transportation Policy that it withdraw the exemption in § 203(b)(9) which is now before us and which theretofore, to a large extent, had kept interstate travel bureaus and interstate share-the-expense operators exempt from the Interstate Commerce Act. 15 See Appendix B(1), infra. 16 § 211(a), 49 Stat. 547, 49 U.S.C. § 311(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 311(a). For text, see Appendix B(2), infra. 17 See Appendix B(1), infra. 18 See Appendix B(1), infra. 19 Orders directing investigations, 5 Fed.Reg. 1830, 1845. 20 Clause (9) of § 203(b) was amended to read as follows, the new language being italicized: '(9) the casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business, unless, in the case of transportation of passengers, such transportation is sold or offered for sale, or provided or procured or furnished or arranged for, by a broker", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00261", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00141", "text": "the lesser of the replacement cost for covered losses or the following amounts, as applicable: ``(i) Residential structures.--In the case of residential properties, which will include structures containing multiple dwelling units that are made available for occupancy by rental (despite any treatment or classification of such properties for purposes of section 1306(b))-- ``(I) for any single-family dwelling, $500,000; ``(II) for any structure containing more than one dwelling unit, $500,000 for each separate dwelling unit in the structure, which limit, in the case of such a structure containing multiple dwelling units that are made available for occupancy by rental, will be applied so as to enable any insured or applicant for insurance to receive coverage for the structure up to a total amount that is equal to the product of the total number of such rental dwelling units in such property and the maximum coverage limit per dwelling unit specified in this clause; and ``(III) $150,000 per dwelling unit for-- ``(aa) any contents related to such unit; and ``(bb) any necessary increases in living expenses incurred by the insured when losses from flooding or windstorm make the residence unfit to live in. ``(ii) Nonresidential properties.--In the case of nonresidential properties (including church properties)-- ``(I) $1,000,000 for any single structure; and ``(II) $750,000 for-- ``(aa) any contents related to such structure; and ``(bb) in the case of any nonresidential property that is a business property, any losses resulting from any partial or total interruption of the insured's business caused by damage to, or loss of, such property from flooding or windstorm, except that for purposes of such coverage, losses will be determined based on the profits the covered business would have earned, based on previous financial records, had the flood or windstorm not occurred. ``(B) Separate windstorm coverage.--The regulations issued under paragraph (6) will provide that windstorm coverage under paragraph (1)(B) for a property will not exceed the amount such that the aggregate liability under flood insurance coverage required to be maintained under paragraph (3)(B) for the property and such windstorm coverage for the property does not exceed the applicable coverage limit for the property set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. ``(8) Effective date.--This subsection will take effect on, and will apply beginning on, the expiration of the 6-month period that begins on", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01106", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00142", "text": "came to a climax Sunday when Browning Saturday night accepted without argument or citation of authority a motion by Dudley Tarlton Jackson's lawyer, for an instructed verdict * * *. The jury was kept Saturday night in the Court House. Sunday morning, following a threat by Browning to keep the jury together until they did sign, the juryman signed the verdict, appending a statement that they did so against the dictates of their conscience.' 42 Mr. Justice MURPHY (concurring). 43 While joining in the opinion of the Court, I believe that the importance of the problem raised by this case cannot be overemphasized. A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty. Any inroad made upon the constitutional protection of a free press tends to undermine the freedom of all men to print and to read the truth. 44 In my view, the Constitution forbids a judge from summarily punishing a newspaper editor for printing an unjust attack upon him or his method of dispensing justice. The only possible exception is in the rare instance where the attack might reasonably cause a real impediment to the administration of justice. Unscrupulous and vindictive criticism of the judiciary is regrettable. But judges must not retaliate by a summary suppression of such criticism for they are bound by the command of the First Amendment. Any summary suppression of unjust criticism carries with it an ominous threat of summary suppression of all criticism. It is to avoid that threat that the First Amendment, as I view it, outlaws the summary contempt methods of suppression. 45 Silence and a steady devotion to duty are the best answers to irresponsible criticism; and those judges who feel the need for giving a more visible demonstration of their feelings may take advantage of various laws passed for that purpose which do not impinge upon a free press. The liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, however, are too highly prized to be subjected to the hazards of summary contempt procedure. 46 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE concurs (dissenting). 47 Today's decision, in efect though not in terms, holds unconstitutional a power the possession of which by the States this Court has previously deemed axiomatic. 48 It cannot be repeated too often that the freedom of the press so indispensable to our democratic society presupposes an independent judiciary which will, when occasion demands, protect that freedom. To help achieve", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00080", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00143", "text": "will, in due course, pre ent problems for adjudication. We ought not to anticipate them when, being irrelevant, they are not before us. The Act ought not to be used even for illustrative purpose because illustrations depend on construction of the Act. 33 Apart from the foregoing, I agree with Mr. Justice REED'S opinion. * See United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell et al., 330 U.s. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556. 1 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 54 Stat. 767, 18 U.S.C.A. § 61l: 'Sec. 12. (a) No officer or employee of any State or local agency whose principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any Federal agency will * * * take any active part in political management or in political campaigns. * * * '(b) If any Federal agency charge with the duty of making any loan or grant of funds of the United States for use in any activity by any officer or employee to whom the provisions of subsection (a) are applicable has reason to believe that any such officer or employee has violated the provisions of such subsection, it will make a report with respect thereto to the United States Civil Service Commission (from now on referred to as the 'Commission'). Upon the receipt of any such report, or upon the receipt of any other information which seems to the Commission to warrant an investigation, the Commission will fix a time and place for a hearing, and will by registered mail send to the officer or employee charged with the violation and to the State or local agency employing such officer or employee a notice setting forth a summary of the alleged violation and the time and place of such hearing. At such hearing (which will be not earlier than ten days after the mailing of such notice) either the officer or employee or the State or local agency, or both, may appear with counsel and be heard. After such hearing, the Commission will determine whether any violation of such subsection has occurred and whether such violation, if any, warrants the removal of the officer or employee by whom it was committed from his office or employment, and will be registered mail notify such officer or employee and the appropriate State or local agency of such determination. If in any case the Commission finds that such officer or employee has not been removed from", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00022", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00144", "text": "subsection (a)(1) or any obligation of funds under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3), the President will notify the appropriate congressional committees (as defined in section 481(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)) in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2394). (c) Coordination With International Narcotics Control Assistance Program.--Assistance provided under this section will be coordinated with international narcotics control assistance under chapter 8 of part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.). SEC. 6. WAIVER OF RESTRICTIONS FOR NARCOTICS-RELATED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. For fiscal year 1995, narcotics-related assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may be provided despite any other provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries (other than section 490(e) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2291j(e)) if, at least 15 days before obligating funds for such assistance, the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees (as defined in section 481(e) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)) in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2394). SEC. 7. AUTHORITY FOR ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE. (a) Policy.--International criminal activities, including international narcotics trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and corruption, endanger political and economic stability and democratic development, and assistance for the prevention and suppression of international criminal activities should be a priority for the United States. (b) Authority.-- (1) In general.--For fiscal year 1995, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any country or international organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the prevention and suppression of international criminal activities. (2) Waiver of prohibition of police training.--Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420) will not apply with respect to assistance furnished under paragraph (1). SEC. 8. ASSISTANCE TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS. The President will take all reasonable steps provided by law to ensure that the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01073", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00145", "text": "ing error and that candid reversal of its position is commendable. We understand that the Army accepts and is governing itself by the Government's present interpretation of its duty toward those conscripted because of professional skills. To separate particular professional groups from the generality of the citizenship and render them liable to military service only because of their expert callings and, after induction, to divert them form the class of work for which they were conscripted would raise questions not only of bad faith but of unlawful discrimination. We agree that the statute should be interpreted to obligate the Army to classify specially inducted professional personnel for duty within the categories which rendered them liable to induction. It is not conceded, however, that particular duty orders within the general field are subject to judicial review by habeas corpus. 11 2. We cannot comply with the appellant's insistence that we order him to be commissioned or discharged. We assume that he is correct in stating that it has been a uniform practice to commission Army doctors; indeed, until 1950 Congress provided that the Army Medical Corps should consist of '* * * commissioned officers below the grade of brigadier general.' 10 U.S.C. § 91, 10 U.S.C.A. § 91. But in 1950 Congress repealed § 91 and substituted in its place the following language: '(The Medical Corps) * * * will consist of Regular Army officers appointed and commissioned there and such other members of the Army as may be assigned thereto by the Secretary of the Army * * *.' 10 U.S.C. § 81—1, 10 U.S.C.A. § 81—1. 10 U.S.C. § 94, 10 U.S.C.A. § 94, provides that medical officers of the Army may be assigned by the Secretary of the Army to such duties as the interests of the service demand. Thus, neither in the language of the Universal Military Training and Service Act nor of the Army Reorganization Act referred to above is there any implication that all personnel inducted under the Doctor's Draft Act and assigned to the Medical Corps be either commissioned or discharged. 12 Petitioner, by his concessions on the hearing to the effect that the question of a commission was not involved, may have avoided a full litigation of the facts which lie back of his noncommissioned status, but enough appears to make plain that there was cause for refusing him a commission. 13 It appears that just", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00480", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00146", "text": "in the case of producers who deliver to a fortifier of wine for distillation, - 31 August in the case of producers who make use of the possibility provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 12 (1) of this Regulation. Article 23 Expiry of the timelimits referred to in Article 12 (4) or, in the case of producers exercising the option provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 12 (1), of the time limits referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 12 (5) or of those fixed by the Member State under Article 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 2179/83 will have no bearing whatsoever on the accomplishment of the requirement that the quantities due from each producer be distilled. After expiry of the said time limits, the purchase price for the quantities delivered and the price of the alcohol which is produced from those quantities and which is delivered to the intervention agency will be reduced by an amount equal to the aid laid down for that distillation operation in respect of neutral spirits. No aid will be paid for distillation products which are not delivered to the intervention agency. Article 24 1. This Regulation will not be applicable: - in Spain during the 1985/86 wine year, - in Portugal during the 1985/86 to 1989/90 wine years. 2. despite the second indent of Article 12 (1) persons subject to the obligation specified in Article 41 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 may not during the 1985/86 wine year carry out the distillation in Spain or during the 1985/86 to 1989/90 wine years carry it out in Portugal. despite the first and second subparagraphs of Article 12 (2) delivery may not be made during the 1985/86 wine year by producers whose production was obtained in Spain or during the 1985/86 to 1989/90 wine years by producers whose production was obtained in Portugal. Article 25 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 24 March 1986.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 464, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00587", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00147", "text": "Quality of coins.--The Secretary may mint and issue such number of quarter dollars of each design selected under paragraph (4) in uncirculated and proof qualities as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. ``(B) Silver coins.--despite subsection (b), the Secretary may mint and issue such number of quarter dollars of each design selected under paragraph (4) as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, with a content of 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper. ``(C) Timing and order of issuance.--Coins minted under this subsection honoring the District of Columbia and each of the territories will be issued in equal sequential intervals during 2009 in the following order: the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(6) Other provisions.-- ``(A) Application in event of admission as a state.--If the District of Columbia or any territory becomes a State before the end of the 10-year period referred to in subsection (l)(1), subsection (l)(7) will apply, and this subsection will not apply, with respect to such State. ``(B) Application in event of independence.--If any territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a territory or possession of the United States before quarter dollars bearing designs which are emblematic of such territory are minted under this subsection, this subsection will cease to apply with respect to such territory. ``(7) Territory defined.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `territory' means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''. Passed the House of Representatives March 25, 2004. Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, Clerk.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 366, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00900", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00149", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Leave No Securities Behind Act''. SEC. 2. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES. (a) Fannie Mae.-- (1) Mortgage-backed securities.--Section 304(d) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1719(d)) is amended by striking the fourth sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Securities issued by the corporation under this subsection will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.'' (2) Subordinate obligations.--Section 304(e) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1719(e)) is amended by striking the fourth sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Obligations issued by the corporation under this subsection will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.'' (3) Securities.--Section 311 of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1723c) is amended-- (A) in the section header, by striking ``association''; (B) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' after ``Sec. 311.''; (C) in the second sentence, by inserting ``by the Association'' after ``issued''; and (D) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(b) Treatment of Corporation Securities.-- ``(1) In general.--Any stock, obligations, securities, participations, or other instruments issued or guaranteed by the corporation under this title will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(2) Exemption for approved sellers.--despite any other provision of this title or the Securities Act of 1933, transactions involving the initial disposition by an approved seller of pooled certificates that are acquired by that seller from the corporation upon the initial issuance of the pooled certificates will be deemed to be transactions by a person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection: ``(A) Approved seller.--The term `approved seller' means an institution approved by the corporation to sell mortgage loans to the corporation in exchange for pooled certificates. ``(B) Pooled certificates.--The term `pooled certificates' means single class mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the corporation that", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00915", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00150", "text": "or territory is admitted into the Union before the end of the 14-year period referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may issue $1 coins, in accordance with this subsection during any one year of such 14- year period, in addition to the four $1 coins issued during such year in accordance with clause (i). ``(iv) Application in the event of independence.--despite paragraph (3)(B)(i), if any State or territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a State or territory of the United States before $1 coins are minted under this subsection, the subsection will cease to apply with respect to such State or territory. ``(4) Selection of concept and design.-- ``(A) Concept.--With respect to each State, the District of Columbia, and territory to be honored with a coin under this subsection, the selection of the significant innovation, innovator or pioneer, or group of innovators or pioneers to be borne on the reverse of such coin will be made by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Governor or other chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or territory with respect to which a coin is to be issued under this subsection. ``(B) Design.--Each of the designs required under this subsection will be selected by the Secretary after-- ``(i) consultation with-- ``(I) the Governor or other chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or territory with respect to which a coin is to be issued under this subsection; and ``(II) the Commission of Fine Arts; and ``(ii) review by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Committee. ``(C) Selection and approval process.--Designs for $1 coins under this subsection may be submitted in accordance with the design selection and approval process developed by the Secretary in the sole discretion of the Secretary. ``(D) Standards.--Because it is important that the Nation's coinage and currency bear dignified designs of which the citizens of the United States can be proud, the Secretary will not select any frivolous or inappropriate design for any $1 coin minted under this subsection. ``(E) Prohibition on certain representations.--No head and shoulders portrait or bust of any person, living or dead, and no portrait of a living person may be included in the design of any coin issued under this subsection. ``(5) Treatment as numismatic items.--For purposes of sections 5134 and 5136, all $1 coins minted under this", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00999", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00151", "text": "the Department upon completion of solicitation for which they are issued or at the expiration of the period for which they are valid; '(Subsection (e) authorizes the board to recall and amend or correct the information cards on receiving additional information which, in its opinion, renders inaccurate any statement contained in it.) '(f) To waive all conditions of this Article upon application of person filing Notice of Intention, in respect to Inforation Card § and filing copies of written authorization when a campaign or drive for raising funds for any charitable purpose is given general publicity through the press or otherwise, and when more than twenty-five (25) persons serve as solicitors without compensation, if it will be proved to the satisfaction of the Board that the publicity concerning the solicitation fully informs the general public and the persons to be solicited as to the facts required to be set forth on the Information Card.' 17 In addition to 'the amount and kind of the contribution,' the receipt must show'substantially' the name of the association aided; a statement whether the contribution is to be applied to its 'general purposes' or to special ones and, if the latter, 'the nature of it * * * clearly stated'; that the information card was presented for perusal prior to the making of the contribution. But tender of the receipt is not required if the donation is made, in money, by placing it in a locked receptacle previously approved by the board. 18 The regulations governing promoters require a license from the Board distinct from or additional to the information card which solicitors must secure, § 44.19(1); the payment of an $25.00 license fee, § 44.19(4); the filing of a bond in the sum of $2000 conditioned as specified in § 44.19(3); and proof to satisfy the board that the applicant is 'of good character and reputation' and has'sufficient financial responsibility to carry out the obligations incident to any solicitation such applicant may make.' § 44.19(5). The ordinary solicitor, on the other hand, must secure only the information card, which is in effect a permit; pay the cost of the card; and generally, it would seem, comply with the other requirements previously outlined for securing the card. 19 Section 44.01 defines 'promoter' to mean 'any person who for pecuniary compensation or consideration received or to be received,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00084", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00152", "text": "no compensation for which had been contemplated by either the employer or employee at the time they were engaged in; (6) voluntary collective bargaining would be interefered with and industrial disputes between employees and employers and between employees and employees would be created; (7) the courts of the country would be burdened with excessive and needless litigation and champertous practices would be encouraged; (8) the Public Treasury would be deprived of large sums of revenues and public finances would be seriously deranged by claims against Public Treasury for refunds of taxes already paid; (9) the cost to the Government of goods and services previously and hereafter purchased by its various departments and agencies would be unreasonably increased and the Public Treasury would be seriously affected by consequent increased cost of war contracts; and (10) serious and adverse effects upon the revenues of Federal, State, and local governments would occur.' 2 See for example H.R.Rep.No.71, supra, p. 5: 'The Walsh-Healey Act also concerns itself in its field with minimum wages and overtime compensation. The Bacon-Davis Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 276a et seq., has provisions relating to minimum wages and other conditions of employment. These two acts are therefore affected by the Mount Clemens decision. The situation described herein as to the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to that existing under the Walsh-Healey Act and the Bacon-Davis Act. The same necessity exists there for remedial legislation.' 3 We do not reach the question whether employees have standing to sue under the Walsh-Healey Act. No provision, however, is made for their recovery of liquidated damages. The following provision relates to their rights: 'All sums withheld or recovered as deductions, rebates, refunds, or underpayments of wages shal be held in a special deposit account and will be paid, on order of the Secretary of Labor, directly to the employees who have been paid less than minimum rates of pay as set forth in such contracts and on whose account such sums were withheld or recovered: Provided, That no claims by employees for such payments will be entertained unless made within one year from the date of actual notice to the contractor of the withholding or recovery of such sums by the United States of America.' § 2. 4 Section 2 provides in pertinent part: 'Any sums of money due to the United States of America by reason of any violation of any of the representations", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00482", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00153", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1202/2001 of 19 June 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 174/1999 laying down special detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 as regards export licences and export refunds in the case of milk and milk products THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000(2), and in particular Articles 30(1) and 31(3) of it, because: (1) Article 20a of Commission Regulation (EC) No 174/1999(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 806/2001(4), lays down the provisions applicable to the management of the milk powder quota for export to the Dominican Republic under the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the European Community and the Dominican Republic and approved by Council Decision 98/486/EC(5). The scope of the provision on the period of validity of export licences issued under that quota should be clarified. (2) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Article 20a(13) of Regulation (EC) No 174/1999 is replaced by the following text: \"13. despite Article 6, export licences will be valid from their actual day of issue within the meaning of Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1291/2000 until 30 June of the quota year for which the licence application was made.\" Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply to licences issued from 1 June 2001. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 19 June 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 457, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00522", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00154", "text": "Forest Service in accordance with this Act. (d) Project Costs.--A participant in the pilot program will be responsible for all costs, as determined by the Secretary, incurred in participating in the pilot program, unless the Secretary determines that it is in the public interest for the Forest Service to contribute funds for a vegetation management project conducted under the pilot program. (e) Liability.-- (1) In general.--Participation in the pilot program does not affect any existing legal obligations or liability standards that-- (A) arise under the right-of-way for activities in the right-of-way; or (B) apply to fires resulting from causes other than activities conducted under an approved vegetation management project. (2) Project work.--A participant will not be liable to the United States for damage proximately caused by activities conducted under an approved vegetation management project unless-- (A) such activities were carried out in a manner that was grossly negligent or that violated criminal law; or (B) the damage was caused by the failure of the participant to comply with specific safety requirements expressly imposed by the Forest Service as a condition of participating in the pilot program. (f) Implementation.--The Secretary will utilize existing laws and regulations in the conduct of the pilot program and, in order to implement the pilot program in an efficient and expeditious manner, may waive or modify specific provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, including modifications to allow for formation of contracts or agreements on a noncompetitive basis. (g) Treatment of Proceeds.--despite any other provision of law, the Secretary may-- (1) retain any funds provided to the Forest Service by a participant in the pilot program; and (2) use such funds, in such amounts as may be appropriated, in the conduct of the pilot program. (h) Definitions.--In this section: (1) National forest system land.--The term ``National Forest System land'' means land within the National Forest System, as defined in section 11(a) of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1609(a)) exclusive of the National Grasslands and land utilization projects designated as National Grasslands administered under the Act of July 22, 1937 (7 U.S.C. 1010-1012). (2) Passing wildfire.--The term ``passing wildfire'' means a wildfire that originates outside the right-of-way. (3) Right-of-way.--The term ``", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00988", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00155", "text": ") Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (3)(A), (4)(A)(i), and (4)(B)(i)(I) of section 1400B(b) of such Code are each amended by striking ``January 1, 2004'' and inserting ``January 1, 2010''. (2) Subsections (e)(2) and (g) of section 1400B of such Code are each amended by striking ``2008'' each place it appears and inserting ``2014''. SEC. 4. FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MADE PERMANENT; OTHER MODIFICATIONS. (a) Credit Made Permanent.--Subsection (i) of section 1400C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to first-time homebuyer credit for District of Columbia) is amended by striking ``, and before January 1, 2004''. (b) Treatment of Purchases In Connection With Divorce.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 1400C of such Code is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) Purchases in connection with divorce.-- despite paragraphs (1) and (2), an individual will be treated as a first-time homebuyer with respect to the purchase of any residence if-- ``(A) the sale of the residence is under a divorce or separation instrument (as defined in section 71(b)(2)) relating to such individual and such individual's spouse or former spouse, and ``(B) such residence was the principal residence of such individual at the time of such sale or for any period ending not more than a reasonable period before such sale. The Secretary will prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the purposes of this paragraph.'' (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) will apply to purchases after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Credit Allowed Against Regular Tax and Alternative Minimum Tax.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (d) of section 1400C of such Code is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Limitation Based on Amount of Tax.-- ``(1) In general.--The credit allowed under subsection (a) for the taxable year will not exceed the excess of-- ``(A) the sum of the regular tax liability (as defined in section", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01071", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00156", "text": "Court of Appeals; they should control the decision here. The two lower courts found that while the practices now complained of by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor constituted violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, they were not on any fair consideration covered by the injunction, contempt of which is now charged. The injunction underlying this proceeding takes eight pages of a printed record and particularizes in great detail the violations which were enjoined. It also contains omnibus clauses prohibiting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On full consideration, the District Court treated the application for an adjudication of civil contempt 'as an amended complaint seeking a broadening of the injunctive orders previously entered in this case, and will enter an amended judgment enjoining defendants from violating the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as adjudicated in this Memorandum Opinion.' 69 F.Supp. 599, 608. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this view of the District Court (with a minor modification not here relevant). 167 F.2d 448. In short, both courts found no contempt. They did so because there was lacking that clearness of command in the court's order which warranted a finding of its disobedience, if due regard were paid to the proper construction of the injunction as the starting point of the contempt proceedings. At the least, such was a warrantable interpretation of the circumstances of this case, and we are disentitled to set our interpretation against theirs. 21 In reversing the conclusion of the two lower courts that there was no contempt because there was no disobedience of the injunction, the Court is rendering a decision of far-reaching import to the law of injunctions. Today's ruling happens to concern an injunction against an employer. Tomorrow it may be an injunction against employees, as it was yesterday and too often in the past. One of the grievances which led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., was the generality of the terms of labor injunctions. Ambiguity lurks in generality and may thus become an instrum nt of severity. Behind the vague inclusiveness of an injunction like the one before us is the hazard of retrospective interpretation as the basis of punishment through contempt proceedings. The two lower courts, in finding that generally to enjoin obedience to a law is too vague a foundation for proceedings in contempt, were avoiding the very evil with which labor injunctions", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00239", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00157", "text": "would invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation.7 These considerations have previously guided our construction of the Act. Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358, 60 S.Ct. 279, 84 L.Ed. 322; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 66 S.Ct. 637, 90 L.Ed. 718, 162 A.L.R. 1445. 11 Of course, this does not mean that all who render service to an industry are employees. Compare Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 520, 46 S.Ct. 172, 173, 70 L.Ed. 384. Obviously the private contractor who undertakes to build at a fixed price or on cost-plus a new plant on specifications is not an employee of the industry thus served nor are his employees. The distributor who undertakes to market at his own risk the product of another, or the producer who agrees so to manufacture for another ordinarily cannot be said to have the employer-employee relationship. Production and distribution are different segments of business. The purposes of the legislation are not frustrated because the Government collects employment taxes from the distributor instead of the producer or the other way around. 12 The problem of differentiating between employee and an independent contractor or between an agent and an independent contractor has given difficulty through the years before social legislation multiplied its importance. When the matter arose in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., we pointed out that the legal standards to fix responsibility for acts of servants, employees or agents had not been reduced to such certainty that it could be said there was'some simple, uniform and easily applicable test.' The word 'employee,' we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content in its context was a federal problem to be construed \"in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.\" We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, 'employees' included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality. The aim of the Act was to remedy the inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and working condiions. We r", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00089", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00158", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Energy Price Protection Act of 2006''. SEC. 2. GASOLINE PRICE GOUGING PROHIBITED. (a) Unlawful Conduct.-- (1) Unfair and deceptive act or practice.--It will be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for any person to sell crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, home heating oil, or any biofuel at a price that constitutes price gouging as defined by rule under subsection (b). (2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the term ``biofuel'' means any fuel containing any organic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis, including agricultural crops and trees, wood and wood wastes and residues, plants (including aquatic plants), grasses, residues, fibers, and animal wastes, municipal wastes, and other waste materials. (b) Price Gouging.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission will promulgate, in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, any rules necessary for the enforcement of this section. (2) Contents.--Such rules-- (A) will define ``price gouging'', ``retail sale'', and ``wholesale sale'' for purposes of this Act; and (B) will be consistent with the requirements for declaring unfair acts or practices in section 5(n) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(n)). (c) Enforcement.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (d), a violation of subsection (a) will be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). The Federal Trade Commission will enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. (2) Exclusive enforcement.--despite any other provision of law, no person, State, or political subdivision of a State, other than the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General of the United States to the extent provided for in section", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01026", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00159", "text": "341 U.S. 737 71 S.Ct. 987 95 L.Ed. 1331 LAND et al.v.DOLLAR et al. (two cases). In re KILLION (two cases). SAWYER et al. v. DOLLAR et al. Nos. 353, 697, 702, —- and —-. Decided June 4, 1951. PER CURIAM. 1 (1) Nos. 697 and 702 are before the Court of petitions for certiorari to review, first, an order of the District Court for the District of Columbia requiring that Charles Sawyer endorse certain stock certificates as 'United States Maritime Commission, by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce,' and, second, a Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoining named petitioners from: 2 'proposing, seeking or advocating any step in any proceeding, whether in said suit entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar et al., or in any other proceeding, inconsistent with strict compliance with and obedience to the orders previously entered by this Court in this cause. 3 'And it is further ordered that said persons are and each of them is enjoined and restrained until further order of this Court from complying with, taking advantage of, or utilizing, or seeking to comply with, utilize or take advantage of said temporary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in said cause entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar et al., or any order of similar tenor which may hereafter be entered by said court or any other court.' 4 The two orders are before the Court for the first time in Nos. 697 and 702. Certiorari is granted in these cases. 5 (2) Subsequent to the issuance of the above Restraining Order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found named petitioners to be in civil contempt of its prior decrees by reason of, inter alia, their activities in connection with obtaining the temporary injunction on behalf of the United States in its suit in the Northern District of California, referred to in the Restraining Order. The order of contempt has been stayed pending disposition of Nos. 697 and 702 as well as the forthcoming petitions for certiorari directed to the contempt order. Motion of respondents to vacate the stay is denied. 6", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00411", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00160", "text": "suit was brought to quiet title to one of the parcels of real estate. The Stylianos had sold this parcel to the plaintiffs of the suit, who paid the balance of the purchase price into court. The other three suits were to foreclose separate mortgages on the other three parcels. The Superior Court ordered the balance of the purchase price and any surplus remaining from the foreclosure sales after the mortgagees received payment in full to be applied first in payment of Morrison's judgment lien, and secondly in payment of any federal tax liens.3 4 The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District affirmed. Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal.App.2d 608, 209 P.2d 657. The Supreme Court of California declined to hear the case, and we granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 947, 70 S.Ct. 801.4 The four cases were consolidated below for purposes of appeal, and Morrison's claims of priority were treated as a single issue. They are treated here in the same manner. 5 Section 537 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff may have the property of the defendant attached at any time 'as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered'. Section 542a provides: 'The lien of the attachment on real property attaches and becomes effective upon the recording of a copy of the writ, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached with the county recorder of the county wherein said real property is situated * * *. The attachment whether previously levied or hereafter to be levied will be a lien upon all real property attached for a period of three years after the date of levy unless sooner released or discharged either as provided in this chapter, or by dismissal of the action, or by the recording with the recorder of an abstract of the judgment in the action.' 6 The effect of a lien in relation to a provision of federal law for the collection of debts owing the United States is always a federal question. Hence, although a state court's classification of a lien as specific and perfected is entitled to weight, it is subject to reexamination by this Court. On the other hand, if the state court itself describes the lien as inchoate, this classification is 'practically conclusive.' People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00377", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00161", "text": "1950, I proclaimed the existence of a national emergency which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made throughout the United Nations and otherwise to bring about a lasting peace; and 413 'because American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere overseas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; and 414 'because the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials; and 'because steel is likewise indispenable to the carrying out of programs of the Atomic Energy Comm ission of vital importance to our defense efforts; and 415 'because a continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel is also indispensable to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our military strength depends; and 416 'because a controversy has arisen between certain companies in the United States producing and fabricating steel and the elements of it and certain of their workers represented by the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, regarding terms and conditions of employment; and 417 'because the controversy has not been settled through the processes of collective bargaining or through the efforts of the Government, including those of the Wage Stabilization Board, to which the controversy was referred on December 22, 1951, under Executive Order No. 10233, and a strike has been called for 12:01 A.M., April 9, 1952; and 418 'because a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field; and 419 'because in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as from now on provided: 420 'Now,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 492, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00455", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00162", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 7 April 1993 amending the boundaries of the less-favoured areas in France within the meaning of Council Directive 75/268/EEC (Only the French text is authentic) (93/238/EEC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 75/268/EEC of 28 April 1975 on mountain and hill farming in certain less-favoured areas (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 (2), and in particular Article 2 (3) of it, because Council Directive 75/271/EEC of 28 April 1975 concerning the Community list of less-favoured farming areas within the meaning of Directive 75/268/EEC (3), as last amended by Directive No 89/587/EEC (4), specifies the regions of France included in the Community list of less-favoured areas within the meaning of Article 3 (3), (4) and (5) of Directive 75/268/EEC; because the French Government has requested, in accordance with Article 2 (1) of Directive 75/268/EEC, an amendment to the boundaries of the less-favoured areas listed in the Annex to Directive 75/271/EEC; because the transfer of certain areas included in the list of areas within the meaning of Article 3 (4) and (5) of Directive 75/268/EEC to the list of areas within the meaning of Article 3 (3) complies with the criteria and the figures, including the special criteria, applied under Council Directive 76/401/EEC (5), to determine mountain areas; because the series of amendments requested by the French Government under Article 2 (3) of Directive 75/268/EEC does not involve an increase in the total utilized agricultural area of the less-favoured areas and has therefore no effect on the limit fixed in that Article; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Agricultural Structures and Rural Development, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The list of less-favoured areas in France, given in the Annex to Directive 75/271/EEC, is amended in accordance", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00612", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00163", "text": "upon the aforesaid basic agreement) as they existed on March 31, 1943, and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, dated April 11, 1945.' 6 The letter also charged certain breaches of contract by the Government and asserted significant changes in Government wage policy. 7 Captain Collisson also specifically denied breaches of contract on the part of the Government. 8 Conferences were carried on without prejudice to the claims of either party in this respect. 9 Secretary Krug and defendant Lewis met privately on November 13 and again on November 14. 10 Secretary Krug had been advised by the Attorney General, whose opinion had been sought, that § 15 of the 1945 agreement was no longer in force. 11 Judicial Code, § 274d, 28 U.S.C. § 400, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400. 12 The pertinent part of the order was as follows: 'Now, Therefore, it is by the Court this 18th day of November, 1946, 'Ordered, that the defendants and each of them and their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concept or participation with them, be and they are restrained pending further order of this Court fr m permitting to continue in effect the notice previously given by the defendant, John L. Lewis, to the Secretary of Interior dated November 15, 1946; and from issuing or otherwise giving publicity to any notice that or to the effect that the Krug-Lewis Agreement has been, is, or will at some future date be terminated, or that said agreement is or will at some future date be nugatory or void at any, time during Government possession of the bituminous coal mines; and from breaching any of their obligations under said Krug-Lewis Agreement; and from coercing, instigating, inducing, or encouraging the mine workers at the bituminous coal mines in the Government's possession, or any of them, or any person, to interfere by strike, slow down, walkout, cessation of work, or otherwise, with the operation of said mines by continuing in effect the aforesaid notice or by issuing any notice of termination of agreement or through any other means or device; and from interfering with or obstructing the exercise by the Secretary of the Interior of his functions under Executive Order 9728; and from taking", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00046", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00164", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1234/94 of 30 May 1994 fixing the basic price and the buying-in price for cauliflowers, peaches, nectarines, lemons, tomatoes and apricots for June 1994 THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 of 18 May 1972 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables (1), and in particular Article 16 (1) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2), because, under Article 16 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72, a basic price and a buying-in price must be fixed for each marketing year for each of the products listed in Annex II to that Regulation; because the products harvested during a given crop year are marketed from January to December of each year in the case of tomatoes, from May to August of each year in the case of apricots, from May to October of each year in the case of peaches and nectarines, from May to April of the following year in the case of cauliflowers and from June to May of the following year in the case of lemons; because, however, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 16 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72, no basic price or buying-in price need be fixed for the slack marketing periods at the beginning and end of the marketing year; because, to ensure the continuity of cauliflower and lemon prices and the possibility of intervention in the case of peaches, nectarines and apricots from 1 June 1994 and in the case of tomatoes from 11 June 1994, the basic price and the buying-in price for these products must be fixed for the period 1 June to 30 June 1994, pending a decision for the 1994/95 marketing year, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the period 1 June to 30 June 1994, the basic price and the buying-in price for cauliflowers, peaches, nectarines, lemons, apricots and tomatoes expressed in ECU per 100 kilograms net, will", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00651", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00165", "text": "state power and to produce a harmonious and comprehensive regulation of the industry. Neither state nor federal regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other.' Federal Power Comm. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 513, 69 S.Ct. 1251, 1260. 27 What defines the point beyond which the provisions of the Act will not apply? The Court suggests that there is an inherent limitation on the affirmative grant of power which would render surplusage the clause in § 1(b) denying application of the Act to 'the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution'. Or it may be this exclusionary clause itself. At any rate, the Court finds the dividing line of jurisdiction to be drawn by physical characteristics of the transmission lines. It seizes upon the point where the high pressure at which gas is transmitted any sub-stantial distance is reduced to the low pressure at which it must be served to customers' burners through the community supply lines as the outer limit of the 'local' area reserved to the states. 28 Recognizing the purpose of the Federal Natural Gas Act of June 21, 1938, to regulate only that which was unregulated and unregulatable by the states, the Court assumes that decisions prior to its passage, 'not what we have since decided or would decide today,' fix the states' power for the purposes of measuring that of the Commission. The Court has previously followed the principle that Congress does not intend to freeze the impact of its legislation within current judicial decisions in the absence of evidence which makes such intention unmistakable. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440. But today it makes no effort to look for evidence of such an intention and had it searched it would not have found it. Cf. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184. 29 Today's anomalous result whereby the Commission is given regulatory power over the intrastate distribution facilities of a gas company over whose sales it admittedly has no jurisdiction", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00337", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00166", "text": "code and by country of origin, giving details of the packaging if that packaging is less than or equal to 5 kg. If no quantities have been released for free circulation during the period, a “nil” notification will be sent.’ 9. Article 10 is deleted. 10. Annex III is deleted. 11. In Annex IX, ‘tranches’ is replaced by ‘subperiods’. 12. Annex X is deleted. Article 3 Regulation (EC) No 955/2005 is amended as follows: 1. Article 1 is amended as follows: (a) in the first paragraph, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003’ is replaced by ‘in accordance with Articles 11, 11a, 11c and 11d of Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003’; (b) the second paragraph is deleted; (c) the following paragraph is added after the new second paragraph: ‘Commission Regulations (EC) Nos 1291/2000, 1342/2003 and 1301/2006 (17) will apply to the quota referred to in the first paragraph, save as otherwise provided for in this Regulation. (17) OJ L 238, 1.9.2006, p. 13.’\" 2. Article 2 is amended as follows: (a) paragraph 2 is deleted; (b) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: ‘3. despite Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1301/2006, applicants may submit more than one licence application per quota period. However, applicants may submit only one licence application per week for each eight-digit CN code.’ 3. Article 3 is amended as follows: (a) paragraph 2 is deleted; (b) in paragraph 3, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003’ is replaced by ‘in accordance with Articles 11, 11a, 11c and 11d of Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003’. 4. Article 4 is replaced by the following: ‘Article 4 1. Import licence applications will be lodged with the competent authorities of the Member States no later than each Monday at 13.00 (Brussels time). However", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00708", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00167", "text": "Commission Decision of 19 February 2004 amending Decision 2004/130/EC providing for the temporary marketing of certain seed of the species Vicia faba L., not satisfying the requirements of Council Directive 66/401/EEC (notified under document number C(2004) 492) (Text with EEA relevance) (2004/164/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 66/401/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of fodder plant seed(1), as last amended by Directive 2003/61/EC(2), and in particular Article 17, paragraph 1 of it, because: (1) under Commission Decision 2004/130/EC(3), the marketing in the Community of seed of spring field beans which does not satisfy the minimum germination requirements laid down in Directive 66/401/EEC was authorised in accordance with defined terms and subject to certain conditions for a period expiring on 15 February 2004. (2) The period left to market seed at the less stringent germination requirements, until 15 February 2004, will be insufficient. (3) Consequently, the authorisation should be extended and Decision 2004/130/EC should therefore be amended accordingly. (4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Seeds and Propagating Material for Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION Article 1 In Article 1 of Decision 2004/130/EC the date \"15 February 2004\" is replaced by the date \"31 March 2004\". Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 19 February 2004.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 391, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00709", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00168", "text": "it applies, and that no exclusive or several right of fishery will be granted there, nor will any citizen of the United States be denied the right to take, prepare, cure, or preserve fish or shellfish in any area of the waters of Alaska where fishing is permitted by the Secretary of Commerce. * * *' 48 U.S.C.A. § 222. 48 Respondents alleged that the exception for fishing by natives and their licensees made § 208.23(r) wholly illegal because it was inconsistent with the proviso of § 1 of the White Act as to exclusive or several right of fishery. The District and Circuit Courts agreed with this argument and the District Court said that the regulation must be viewed in its entirety, 67 F.Supp. 43, 49. We agree that it is not possible to separate the closing of the area from the exception and thus hold the closing applicable to everyone. A right to fish locally is too important to the natives in Alaska for us to conclude from this record that the Secretary would have promulgated the prohibition to fish for salmon in reservation waters without the exception in favor of the natives. We have no doubt, however, that the White Act authorizes the establishment of White Act preserves or closed areas in reservations created, as the Karluk Reservation, under § 2 of the Act extending the Wheeler-Howard Act to Alaska. No implications can be drawn from the broad and clear language of the White Act that reservation waters, however valuable for fishing or fish propagation, must be left unprotected from ruthless exploitation. 49 What we have said previously in this opinion as to the importance of fisheries and their conservation to Alaska natives with reference to the Karluk River area in particular need not be repeated. The quoted section of the White Act gives power to the Secretary so that he may '(c) make such regulations as to time, means, methods and extent of fishing as he may deem advisable.' Then follows the proviso that every such regulation will be of general application and that no exclusive or several right of fishing will be granted there. This section was enacted to correct alleged abuses that arose in the administration of the Act 'For the protection and regulation of the fisheries of Alaska,' approved June 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 478. By § 6 of the earlier act, streams or lakes could be set aside as permanent preserves but not coastal waters. Although the 1906 Act", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00277", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00169", "text": "and that the measures which are described in Annex V to this Decision are undertaken; because on 2 July 1993 Greece submitted an application for assistance from the cohesion financial instrument for the project 'Integration of Archaeological Sites of Athens'; because that application concerns a project which is eligible under the terms of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93; because the application for assistance contains all the information required by Article 8 (4) of the Regulation and satisfies the criteria set out in Article 8 (3) and (5) of the Regulation; because the project will help achieve the objectives of Article 130r of the Treaty concerning the environment; because Article 1 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (4), as last amended by Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No 610/90 (5), states that the legal commitments entered into for measures extending over more than one financial year will contain a time limit for implementation which must be specified to the recipient in due form when the aid is granted; because under Article 9 or Regulation EEC No 792/93, the Commission and the Member State will ensure that there is evaluation and systematic monitoring of the project; because the financial implementation provisions, monitoring and assessment are specified in Annexes III and IV to this Decision; because failure to comply with those provisions may result in suspension or reduction of the assistance granted under Article 9 (3) of that Regulation No 792/93; because all the other conditions laid down, have been complied with, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The project concerning the Integration of Archaeological Sites situated in Greece as described in Annex I to this is approved for the period from September 1993 to March 1994. Article 2 1. The maximum eligible expenditure to be taken as the basis for this Decision will be ECU 1 909 000. 2. The rate of Community assistance granted to the project will be fixed at 85 %. 3. The maximum amount of the contribution from the cohesion financial instrument will be fixed at ECU 1 622 650. 4. The contribution is committed from the 1993 budget. Article 3 1. Community assistance will be based on the financial plan for the project set out in Annex II. 2. Commitments and payments of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00711", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00170", "text": "4) Transfers prior to enactment.-- (A) In general.--In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, any transfer of land or natural resources, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, located anywhere within the United States from, by, or on behalf of the Pueblo, or any of the Pueblo's members, will be deemed to have been made in accordance with the Act of June 30, 1834 (4 Stat. 729; commonly referred to as the Trade and Intercourse Act), section 17 of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 641; commonly referred to as the Pueblo Lands Act), and any other provision of Federal law that specifically applies to transfers of land or natural resources from, by, or on behalf of an Indian tribe, and such transfers will be deemed to be ratified effective as of the date of the transfer. (B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in subparagraph (A) will be construed to affect or eliminate the personal claim of any individual Indian which is pursued under any law of general applicability that protects non-Indians as well as Indians. (5) Effective date.--The provisions of paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) will take effect upon the entry of a compromise final judgment, in a form and manner acceptable to the Attorney General, in the amount of $8,000,000 in the case of Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States (Indian Claims Commission docket No. 355). The judgment so entered will be paid from funds appropriated under section 1304 of title 31, United States Code. (b) Trust Funds; Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury a trust fund to be known as the ``Pueblo of Santo Domingo Land Claims Settlement Fund''. Funds deposited in the Fund will be subject to the following conditions: (A) The Fund will be maintained and invested by the Secretary of the Interior under the Act of June 24, 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a). (B) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3), monies deposited into the Fund may be expended by the Pueblo to acquire lands within the exterior boundaries of the exclusive aboriginal occupancy area of the Pueblo, as described in the Findings of Fact of the Indian Claims Commission, dated May 9, 1973, and for use for education", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01141", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00171", "text": "not accept my view of the reach of § 7(a), it would be useless to undertake an analysis of the other questions presented by the petition for certiorari. 1 Particularly invoked are § 5(c), 60 Stat. 237, 240, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1004(c), which provides in part: 'The same officers who preside at the reception of evidence under section 7 will make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 8 except where such officers become unavailable to the agency. Save to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, no such officer will consult any person or party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; nor will such officer be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency. No officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case will, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review under section 8 except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. * * *'; and § 11, 60 Stat. at page 244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1010, which provides in part: 'Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this Act, there will be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings under sections 7 and 8, who will be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and will perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners will be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (from now on called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and upon the record of it. Examiners will receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of section 7 of said Act, as amended, and the provisions of section 9 of said Act, as", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00348", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00172", "text": ", and in the final bill Congress provided that hearing examiners should be given independence and tenure within the existing Civil Service system.2 5 Congress intended to make hearing examiners 'a special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers'3 by vesting control of their compensation, promotion and tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much greater extent than in the case of other federal employees. Section 11 is as follows: 6 'Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this act, there will be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings under sections 7 and 8, who will be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and will perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners will be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (from now on called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and upon the record of it. Examiners will receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratins and in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of section 7 of said act, as amended, and the provisions of section 9 of said act, as amended, will not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners selected by the Commission from and with the consent of other agencies. For the purposes of this section, the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require reports by agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress, promulgate rates, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recommend legislation, subpena witnesses or records, and pay witness fees as established for the United States courts.' 7 An examination of § 11 shows that Congress retained the examiners as classified Civil Service employees but made inapplicable to them paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of § 7 of the Classification Act and § 9 of that Act. These sections had made the examiners dependent upon the agencies' ratings for their classification. Freed from this dependence upon the agencies, the examiners were specifically declared to be otherwise under the other provisions of the Classification Act of 1923, as amended (now the Classification Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00483", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00173", "text": ") No 1193/96 (6), and in particular Article 3 (1) of it, because Commission Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 of 8 September 1995 (7), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1235/96 (8), transitionally adjusts the special arrangements for imports of olive oil originating in Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey with a view to implementing the Agreement on agriculture concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations by derogating from the Council Regulations on imports of olive oil originating in those countries; because, under the abovementioned Regulation (EC) No 2146/95, the reductions in levies on unrefined oil applying before 1 July 1995 under the Council Regulations in force have become reductions in the rate of duty applicable under the same conditions; because Regulation (EEC) No 1521/76 was amended by Regulation (EC) No 2062/96 to take account of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the Community and Morocco; because the aim of that amendment is to ensure that the amount to be deducted from the levy includes an amount equal to the special export charge levied by Morocco in the period 1 January 1994 to 31 January 1995 but not exceeding ECU 12,09 per 100 kilograms, plus an additional ECU 12,09 per 100 kilograms; because, from 1 February 1995, those amounts are replaced by ECU 14,60 per 100 kilograms in accordance with that amendment; because Regulation (EEC) No 1180/77 was amended by Regulation (EC) No 2063/96 to take account of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the Community and Turkey; because the aim of that amendment is to ensure that the amount to be deducted from the levy includes an amount equal to the special export charge levied by Turkey in the period 1 January 1994 to 31 January 1995 but not exceeding ECU 10,88 per 100 kilograms, plus an additional ECU 10,88 per 100 kilograms; because, from 1 February 1995, those amounts are replaced by ECU 13,14 per 100 kilograms in accordance with that amendment; because Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 should accordingly be amended with effect from the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00617", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00175", "text": "-Saxon countries so as to offend what the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects. The issue was raised after verdict, and the Supreme Court of California might have disposed of the claim by ruling that it had not been made at the stage of the proceeding required by State law. That court, however, chose not to do so. It permitted the petitioner to invoke the Due Process Clause and thereby tendered a federal constitutional issue, as this Court recognizes, for our disposition. 1 Petitioner himself did not testify at the trial. 2 R. 287—288 (testimony of John D. Gray); see also R. 210 (testimony of Inspector J. A. Donahoe). 3 Three of these psychiatrists had been appointed by the trial court under Cal.Penal Code, 1951, § 1027. 4 36 Cal.2d at page 623, 226 P.2d at page 335. 5 36 Cal.2d at page 623, 226 P.2d at page 336. 6 Cal.Penal Code, 1951, §§ 1033, 1035. 7 See Grayson v. Harris, 1925, 267 U.S. 352, 358, 45 S.Ct. 317, 319, 69 L.Ed. 652; International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co., 1936, 297 U.S. 657, 665—666, 56 S.Ct. 619, 623, 80 L.Ed. 961; State of Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 1938, 303 U.S. 95. 98, 58 S.Ct. 443, 445, 82 L.Ed. 685; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 1948, 334 U.S. 410, 414, note 4, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1140, 92 L.Ed. 1478. 8 R. 361—362. 9 The trial court made this request as a result of certain conduct on the part of one of the deputy public defenders, set forth in the opinion below at 36 Cal.2d 628, 226 P.2d 338—339. 10 36 Cal.2d at", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00445", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00176", "text": "National Affordable Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 5306 note) is amended by striking ``Act will apply only with respect to fiscal years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994'' and inserting ``section will not apply to fiscal years after fiscal year 1995''. (b) CDBG Public Services Limitations.--Section 105(a)(8) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5305(a)(8)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' after ``under this paragraph,''; (2) by striking ``fiscal year 1994'' and inserting ``fiscal years 1994 and 1995''; and (3) by inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: ``, and except that of any amount of assistance under this title (including program income) to the Cities of Fairfield, Vallejo, Napa, and Vacaville, in California, such cities may use not more than 20 percent in fiscal year 1995 for activities under this paragraph''; (c) Use of Grant Amounts.-- (1) Pittsburgh, pennsylvania.--despite any other provision of law, the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, may retain any amounts provided under an urban development action grant for Project No. B-86-AA-42-0275 and use such funds for the Central Pittsburgh Plaza project, if such project is commenced not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Wilkes-barre, pennsylvania.--despite any other provision of law, the city of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, may retain any amounts provided under an urban development action grant for Project No. B-87-AA-42-1211 and use such funds for the Northeastern Pennsylvania Economic Development project, if such project is commenced not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act. (3) Richmond, virginia.--The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will cancel the indebtedness of the city of Richmond, Virginia, relating to the categorical program settlement grant provided to the city to settle four urban renewal programs (Project No. B-78-UR-51-0019). The city of Richmond, Virginia, is relieved of all liability to the Federal Government for such grant and any fees and charges payable in connection with such grant. (4) Lockport township,", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00854", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00177", "text": "1986 in the version given in Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 meets the conditions and objectives of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; because Title I of Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 1987 meets the conditions and objectives of Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; because that statement is based on the assumption that the measures provided for in Title I of the abovementioned Law are applied in accordance with the criteria and principles laid down in Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 as regards the granting of special aids to young farmers; because Title II of Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 1987 meets the conditions and objectives of Article 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; because the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund Committee has been consulted on the financial aspects; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Agricultural Structure, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Following Veneto Regional Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987, Veneto Regional Decision No 230 of 24 July 1986 and Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 1987, the latter subject to the provision that the measures provided for in Title I of it are applied in accordance with the criteria and principles laid down in Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 as regards the granting of special aids to young farmers, are deemed to satisfy the conditions for a financial contribution by the Community towards the common measure referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic. Done at Brussels, 29 October 1987.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 378, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00790", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00178", "text": "some instances dealers who contracted to purchase from Standard all their requirements of tires, tubes, and batteries, had also orally agreed to purchase of Standard their requirements of other automobile accessories. Of the written agreements, 2,712 were for varying specified terms; the rest were effective from year to year but terminable 'at the end of the first 6 months of any contract year, or at the end of any such year, by giving to the other at least 30 days prior thereto written notice. * * *' Before 1934 Standard's sales of petroleum products through independent service stations were made under agency agreements, but in that year Standard adopted the first of its several requirements-purchase contract forms, and by 1938 requirements contracts had wholly superseded the agency method of distribution. 4 Between 1936 and 1946 Standard's sales of gasoline through independent dealers remained at a practically constant proportion of the area's total sales; its sales of lubricating oil declined slightly during that period from 6.2% to 5% of the total. Its proportionate sales of tires and batteries for 1946 were slightly higher than they were in 1936, though somewhat lower than for some intervening years; they have never, as to either of these products, exceeded 2% of the total sales in the Western area. 5 Since § 3 of the Clayton Act was directed to prohibiting specific practices even though not covered by the broad terms of the Sherman Act,4 it is appropriate to consider first whether the enjoined contracts fall within the prohibition of the narrower Act. The relevant provisions of § 3 are: 6 'It will be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States * * * on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser of it will not use or deal in the goods * * * of a competitor or competitors of the * * * seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.' 7 Obviously the contracts here at issue would be proscribed if § 3 stopped short of the qualifying clause beginning,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00286", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00179", "text": "equipment produced in the flag Member State and equipment produced in other States. 3. Equipment covered by this Article will be given a certificate by the flag Member State which will at all times be carried with the equipment and which gives the flag Member State's permission for the equipment to be placed on board the ship and imposes any restrictions or lays down any provisions relating to the use of the equipment. 4. Where a Member State allows equipment covered by this Article to be placed on board a Community ship, that Member State will immediately communicate the particulars of it together with the reports of all relevant trials, assessments and conformity-assessment procedures to the Commission and the other Member States. 5. Equipment such as is referred to in paragraph 1 will be added to Annex A.2 in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 18. 6. Where a ship with equipment on board which is covered by paragraph 1 is transferred to another Member State, the receiving flag Member State may undertake the measures necessary, which may include tests and practical demonstrations, to ensure that the equipment is at least as effective as equipment which does comply with the conformity-assessment procedures. Article 15 1. despite Article 5, a flag State administration may permit equipment which does not comply with the conformity-assessment procedures or is not covered by Article 14 to be placed on board a Community ship for reasons of testing or evaluation, but only when the following conditions are complied with: (a) the equipment must be given a certificate by the flag Member State which must at all times be carried with the equipment and which gives the flag Member State permission for the equipment to be placed on board the Community ship and imposes any restrictions or lays down any provisions relating to the use of the equipment; (b) the permission must be limited to a short period of time; (c) the equipment must not be relied on in place of equipment which meets the requirements of this Directive and must not replace such equipment, which must remain on board the Community ship in working and ready for immediate use. 2. In the case of radiocommunications equipment, the flag State administration will require that such equipment does not unduly affect the requirements of the radio-frequency spectrum. Article 16 1. Where equipment needs to be replaced in a port outwith the Community and in exceptional circumstances which will be duly justified to the flag State administration where it is not practicable in terms of reasonable time, delay and cost to place", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00571", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00180", "text": ". The dividend was to be paid November 17, 1948, to Panhandle's stockholders of record on October 29, 1948. Nothing called to our attention indicates any control retained by Panhandle over the Hugoton stock. 6 On October 26, 1948, the Federal Power Commission (from now on called the Commission) ordered an investigation 'under the provisions of Section 14 of the Natural Gas Act, of the fa ts and circumstances involved in the formation and proposed operation of the Hugoton Production Company and the transfer to said company by Panhandle Eastern of the naturalgas reserves * * *.' By supplementary order of November 10, 1948, Hugoton was joined as a party, a date for a public hearing was fixed, and Hugoton and Panhandle ordered to show cause why they should not be directed to cancel the contract, and why Panhandle should not be prohibited from transferring the leases without the consent of the Commission and from distribution the Hugoton stock to its stockholders. Pending a final determination the Commission ordered that the status quo be maintained by Panhandle and Hugoton. 7 Upon the apparent refusal of Panhandle to company with this order the Commission on November 13, 1948, instituted the instant suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to compel Panhandle to proceed no further with the stock distribution and to maintain the status quo pending the final determination of the questions for which the hearing before the Commission had been set. The district court issued the temporary pestraining order which has been kept in effect by successive orders and which enjoined Panhandle from issuing to its stockholders the dividend of Hugoton stock. Panhandle was ordered to cause Hugoton to refrain from transferring any of the gas leases and from issuing or transferring any of it capital stock. After a hearing the district court refused to grant the preliminary injunction on the ground that there had not been shown any basis for the relief sought by the Commission. 8 On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on the ground that § 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act, excluding 'the production or gathering of natural gas' from the Commission's jurisdiction left the transfer of gas leases to state regulation and outside the scope of the Commission's regulatory powers. 172 F.2d 57.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00298", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00181", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 27 September 1990 approving the amendments to the plan for the eradication of classical swine fever presented by the Federal Republic of Germany (Only the German text is authentic) (90/483/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 80/1095/EEC of 11 November 1980 laying down conditions designed to render and keep the territory of the Community free from classical swine fever (1), as last amended by Directive 87/487/EEC (2), and in particular Article 3a of it, Having regard to Council Decision 80/1096/EEC of 11 November 1980, introducing Community financial measures for the eradication of classical swine fever (3), as last amended by Decision 87/488/EEC (4), and in particular Article 5 of it, because by Decision 88/614/EEC (5), the Commission approved the plan for the eradication of classical swine fever submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany; because, by letter of 7 September 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany has communicated to the Commission amendments to the plan for completing the eradication of classical swine fever; because the amended plan has been examined and found to comply with Council Directive 80/217/EEC of 22 January 1980 introducing Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (6), as last amended by Directive 87/486/EEC (7), and with Directive 80/1095/EEC and because the conditions for financial participation by the Community are therefore met; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The amendments to the plan for completing the eradication of classical swine fever presented by the Federal Republic of Germany are approved. Article 2 This Decision will take effect on 3 October 1990. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Brussels, 27 September 1990.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 453, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00805", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00182", "text": "of these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them. (...) 6. The Commission will, within six months of the notification approve or reject the national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction to trade between Member States and whether or not they will constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market In the absence of a Decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in paragraphs 4 (...) will be deemed to have been approved. When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a further period of up to six months.\" 2. Directive 2002/45/EC (3) Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations(2), as amended, establishes rules restricting the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations. According to Article 1(1), the Directive applies to the dangerous substances and preparations listed in Annex I. (4) Article 2 provides that Member States will take all necessary measures to ensure that the dangerous substances and preparations listed in Annex I may only be placed on the market or used subject to the conditions specified there. (5) Directive 76/769/EEC has been amended on several occasions, inter alia, to add new dangerous substances and preparations to Annex I thereto, thereby introducing the restrictions on their marketing or use that are necessary to protect human health or the environment. (6) Adopted on the legal basis of Article 95 of the Treaty, European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/45/EC has inserted in Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC a new point 42 concerning Alkanes, C10-C13, chloro (SCCPs), laying down rules on the marketing and use of these substances. (7) Recital 1 of the Directive states that \"limitations already adopted or planned by certain Member States on the use of short-chain chlorinated paraffins (SCCPs) following PARCOM (Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources) Decision 95/1 directly affect the completion and functioning of the internal market; it is therefore necessary to approximate", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00627", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00183", "text": "been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. * * *' 2 The controlling Pennsylvania statute then was Pa.Laws 1905, No. 198, 12 P.S. § 681. Like Rule 50(b) it provided for a timely motion for judgment despite the verdict. The binding duty to do this was explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as follows, in a case relied on by this Court in the Kennedy case: 'To secure the benefit of that act its terms must be complied with; that is, the refusal of the request for binding instructions must be followed by a proper motion made in due time. Pyle v. Finnessy, 275 Pa. 54, 5m, 118 A. 568. Here the record as duly certified discloses no such motion nor any evidence that one was made. True, the question of the absence of such motion was not raised in the lower court, but, being one of jurisdiction, it cannot be ignored. It follows that as the record stands the judgment cannot be sustained.' West v. Manatawny Mutual Fire & Storm Ins. Co., 277 Pa. 102, 104, 120 A. 763, 764. 3 The writer of this opinion and the Chief Justice are not convinced that the Court of Appeals attempted to direct a verdict for the railroad. What the court said was (194 F.2d 197): 'In our opinion the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Accordingly the judgment is reversed.' But holding that a directed verdict should have been given cannot be the equivalent of a court's entry of judgment for defendant despite a jury verdict for plaintiff. For after setting aside a verdict as authorized by Rule 50(b), a trial judge may 'either' enter a judgment contrary to the verdict 'or' order a new trial. The rule thereby requires the exercise of an informed judicial discretion as a condition precedent to a choice between these two alternatives. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., supra, 330 U.S. at page 215, 67 S.Ct. at page 754. And this discretion must be exercised by the court, not by its clerk. The Court was told during oral argument that it is the practice in the Second Circuit", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00464", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00184", "text": "§ 3(c); H.R.Rep. No. 740, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. 2 Sec. 1 provides: 'That a determination of the question of fact as to who are the heirs of any deceased citizen allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians who may die or may have previously died, leaving restricted heirs, by the probate court of the State of Oklahoma having jurisdiction to settle the estate of said deceased, conducted in the manner provided by the laws of said State for the determination of heirship in closing up the estates of deceased persons, will be conclusive of said question. * * *' Sec. 2 provides: 'That the lands of full-blood members of any of the Five Civilized Tribes are made subject to the laws of the State of Oklahoma, providing for the partition of real estate. Any land allotted in such proceedings to a full-blood Indian, or conveyed to him upon his election to take the same at the appraisement, will remain subject to all restrictions upon alienation and taxation obtaining prior to such partition. In case of a sale under any decree, or partition, the conveyance thereunder will operate to relieve the land described of all restrictions of every character.' 3 It isw ell-settled that Congress has authority to select state agencies to perform such functions. United States v. Hellard, supra, at page 365 of 322 U.S., at page 986 of 64 S.Ct. 4 The Act of April 12, 1926, provides in part: 'The death of any allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes will operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee's land: Provided, That hereafter no conveyance by any full-blood Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes of any interest in lands restricted by section 1 of this Act acquired by inheritance or devise from an allottee of such lands will be valid unless approved by the county court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of the deceased allottee or testator. * * *' See also Pub.L. No. 336, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 4, 1947, § 1, 61 Stat. 731. We do not have before us the question as to whether or not the United States is a necessary party to a", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00153", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00185", "text": "created a climate of commercial uncertainty that has inhibited agricultural sales to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. (6) There is nothing in either the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 itself or its legislative history to support the view that Congress intended payment to be made in advance of the shipment of goods from the United States to Cuba. It was and is the intent of Congress that a seller of a product authorized under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 receive payment only before a Cuban purchaser takes physical possession of that product. (7) At present it is the policy of the United States Government to prohibit direct payment between Cuban and United States financial institutions. As a result, Cuban purchasers of products authorized under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 must route their payments through third country banks that charge a fee for this service. Allowing direct payments between Cuban and United States financial institutions will permit the United States exporters to receive payment directly to their financial institutions within hours instead of days and will eliminate an unnecessary transactional fee, thereby allowing Cuban purchasers to purchase more United States origin agricultural products. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to restate the intent of Congress with respect to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, to remove impediments to present and future sales of United States agricultural products to Cuba under such Act, and to otherwise facilitate such sales. SEC. 3. TRAVEL TO CUBA IN CONNECTION WITH AUTHORIZED SALES ACTIVITIES UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. Section 910 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7209) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) General License Authority for Travel-Related Expenditures in Cuba by Persons Engaging in Sales and Marketing Activities and Transportation Activities.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury will authorize under a general license the travel-related transactions listed in subsection (c) of section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, for travel to, from, or within Cuba in connection with-- ``(A) sales and marketing activities of products under this Act, including the organization and participation in product exhibitions; and ``(B) transportation by sea or air of products under this", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01152", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00186", "text": ", the financial industry has not taken full advantage of these provisions and has contended that they are unduly burdensome. (6) The act of providing notice to the Secretary of the Treasury of designations of exemption-- (A) provides meaningful information to law enforcement officials on exempt customers and enables law enforcement to obtain account information through appropriate legal process; and (B) complements other sections of title 31, United States Code, whereby law enforcement can locate financial institutions with relevant records relating to a person of investigative interest, such as information requests made under regulations implementing section 314(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. (7) A designation of exemption has no effect on requirements for depository institutions to apply the full range of anti-money laundering controls required under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, and related provisions of law, including the requirement to apply the customer identification program under section 5326 of such title, and the requirement to identify, monitor, and, if appropriate, report suspicious activity in accordance with section 5318(g) of such title. (8) The Federal banking agencies and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network have recently provided guidance through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual on applying appropriate levels of due diligence and identifying suspicious activity by the types of cash-intensive businesses that generally will be subject to exemption. (b) Seasoned Customer Exemption.--Section 5313(e) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(e) Qualified Customer Exemption.-- ``(1) In general.--Before the end of the 270-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Seasoned Customer CTR Exemption Act of 2006, the Secretary of the Treasury will prescribe regulations that exempt any depository institution from filing a report under this section in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other monetary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes) with a qualified customer of the depository institution. ``(2) Qualified customer defined.--For purposes of this section, the term `qualified customer', with respect to a depository institution, has such meaning as the Secretary of the Treasury will prescribe, which will include any person that-- ``(A) is incorporated or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, including a sole proprietor", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00844", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00187", "text": "Member State; because in accordance with Article 20 (1) and (2) of Regulation (EEC) N° 4253/88 the budgetary commitments relating to the contribution from the Structural Funds to the financing of the operations covered by the Community support framework will be made on the basis of subsequent Commission decisions approving the operations concerned, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Community support framework for Community structural assistance in the rural areas of Aragon, Baleares, Cantabria, Cataluña, Madrid, Navara, La Rioja and Pais Vasco concerned by Objective 5 (b), covering the period 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1993 is approved. The Commission declares that it intends to contribute to the implementation of this Community support framework in accordance with the detailed provisions of it and in compliance with the rules and guidelines for the Structural Funds and other existing financial instruments. Article 2 The Community support framework includes the following essential information: (a) statement of specific priorities for joint action by the Community and the Member State: - improvement of structures and diversification of the agricultural sector, - conservation and improvement of rural areas, - diversification of economic activity and improvement of of associated basic infrastructure, - development of human resources; (b) an outline of the forms of assistance to be provided primarily in the form of operational programmes; (c) an indicative financing plan at 1989 constant prices, specifying for the whole period the total appropriations to provide budgetary assistance from the Community for both the implementation of new measures covered by the priorities in (a) and multiannual measures under way or decided, before the adoption of this Community support framework, broken down as follows: >TABLE> Article 3 This declaration of intent is addressed to the Kingdom of Spain. Done at Brussels, 6 June 1990.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 378, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00830", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00188", "text": "UTLEDGE dissent. 1 See note 3, infra, and 46 C.F.R.Cum. Supp. § 306.44. 2 See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 69 S.Ct. 1317, No. 351, 1948 Term. 3 'because, the United States of America (Herein called the 'United States') acting by and through the Administrator, War Shipping Administration, and Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc. (herein called the 'General Agent') entered into an Agreement (Contract WSA—4098) dated January 9, 1943 (herein called the 'Service Agreement') whereby the United States appointed the General Agent as its agent to manage and conduct the business of cargo vessels assigned to it by the United States; and 'because, it is desirable to have as far as practicable both cargo vessels and passenger vessels operated under the uniform provisions of one agreement. 'Now, Therefore: 'The United States and the General Agent agree that passenger vessels previously or hereafter allocated to the General Agent to conduct the business of the vessels as agent of the Unitd States will be governed by the provisions of the Service Agreement modified as follows: 'Section 1. Article 3A of the Service Agreement is amended by adding a provision following subsection (e) of it as follows: \"(f) will arrange for the transportation of passengers when so directed, and issue or cause to be issued to such passengers customary passenger tickets. After a uniform passenger ticket will have been adopted by the United States, such passenger ticket will be used in all cases as soon as practicable after receipt of it by the General Agent. Pending the issuance of such uniform passenger ticket, the General Agent may continue to use its customary form of passenger ticket.' 'Section 2. The vessels to which the Service Agreement will apply be operation of this Part II, are as listed on Exhibit B attached to this and made a part hereof, and such additional vessels as may from time to time be assigned to the General Agent by letter agreement. ' * * *.' 4 'Issued by 'Washington-Hampton Roads Line 'Operated by United States of America, War Shipping Administration 'One First Class Passage 'Norfolk, or Old Point Comfort Va. to Washington, D.C. 'Subject to the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 492, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00322", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00189", "text": "goal, today finds the substance of the Fourth Amendment 'to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, * * * valid as againt the states.' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288. 150 But I reject the Court's simultaneous conclusion that the mandate embodied in the Fourth Amendment, although binding on the states, does not carry with it the one sanction—exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Amendment's terms—failure to observe which means that 'the protection of the 4th Amendment * * * might as well be stricken from the Constitution.' Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A.1915B, 834, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1177. For I agree with my brother MURPHY'S demonstration that the Amendment without the sanction is a dead letter. Twenty-nine years ago this Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, refused to permit the Government to subpoena documentary evidence which it had stolen, copied and then returned, for the reason that such a procedure'reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.' Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426. But the version of the Fourth Amendment today held applicable to the states hardly rises to the dignity of a form of words; at best it is a pale and frayed carbon copy of the original, bearing little resemblance to the Amendment the fulfillment of whose command I had previously thought to be 'an indispensable need for a democratic society.' Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, dissenting opinion at page 161, 67 S.Ct. 1098, at page 1106, 91 L.Ed. 1399. 151 I also reject any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I had thought that issue settled by this Court's invalidation on dual grounds, in Boyd v", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00320", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00190", "text": "for a specific standard quality; because the reasons which led to the determination of the standard quality for the 1981/82 marketing year are still valid; because that standard quality should therefore remain unchanged; because, under Article 5 (4) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, a percentage of the production earmarked for producers may be allocated to the financing of regional measures to improve the quality of olive oil production; because such measures are necessary in certain production regions; because some of the said aid should therefore be allocated to the financing of such measures; because, in accordance with Article 20 (d) (1) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, the percentage of the production aid which may be withheld for recognized organizations of olive oil producers or associations of it should be so fixed that the resulting amount helps to finance the expenditure incurred in the work done under Articles 5 (3) and 20c of that Regulation; because that percentage should be set at a level which enables foreseeable expenditure in the 1991/92 marketing year to be covered, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 1991/92 marketing year, the production target price, the production aid and the intervention price for olive oil will be as follows: (a) production target price: ECU 322,01 per 100 kilograms; (b) production aid: - for Spain: ECU 45,85 per 100 kilograms, - for Portugal: ECU 42,53 per 100 kilograms, - for the Community of Ten: ECU 70,83 per 100 kilograms; (c) production aid for growers whose average production is less than 500 kilograms of olive oil per year: - for Spain: ECU 51,81 per 100 kilograms, - for Portugal: ECU 48, 49 per 100 kilograms, - for the Community of Ten: ECU 81,62 per 100 kilograms; (d) intervention price: - for Spain: ECU 185,31 per 100 kilograms, - for Portugal: ECU 209,65 per 100 kilograms, - for the Community of Ten: ECU 215,87 per 100 kilograms. Article 2 The prices referred to in Article 1 will relate to ordinary virgin olive oil with a free fatty acid content, expressed as oleic acid, of 3,3 grams per 100 grams", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00503", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00191", "text": "Id., 379—387; Pollock, The Law of Torts (13th ed.) 234—239; Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (8th ed.) 201—212. 17 Extension of the action per quod servitium amisit to domestic relations, upon a fictional basis, took place as early as 1653. Norton v. Jason, Style 398; see Winfield, Textbook of the Law of Tort (2d ed.) 257. 18 Analogies are drawn concerning the nature of the relation both on the basis of status, underlying the earlier forms of liability, and on that of its asserted contractual character, in the latter instance to the rather far-fetched extent of regarding the drafted soldier as having entered into a 'contract implied in law.' 19 E.g., in the fiction of loss of services involved in the father's action for a daughter's seduction and in the husband's action for loss of consortium. Compare Serjeant Manning's oft-quoted statement that 'the quasi fiction of servitium amisit affords protection to the rich man whose daughter occasionally makes his tea, but leaves without ledress the poor man whose child is sent unprotected to earn her bread amongst strangers.' Note to Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & Gr. at p. 1044. 20 That is, in the phase stressing that the question is not to be determined by applying state law, the emphasis is put upon the federal aspect of the case, but in that advancing the thesis of liability for acceptance as the federal rule, stress goes to the tort grounding of the argument. 21 The Government does not contend that the liability sought has existed previously. It frankly urges the creation of a new one. The only decision determining the matter, which has come to our attention, in addition to the cases cited above in note 2, is that of the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth v. Quince, 68 Comm.L.Rep. 227, aff'g, (1943) Q.S.R. 199, denying liability. See also Attorney General v. Valle-Jones (1935) 2 K.B. 209, reaching a contrary result, in which however the principal issue apparently went by concession. 22 See, e.g., 35 Stat. 1097, 18 U.S.C. § 94, 18 U.S", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00103", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00192", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1688/97 of 29 August 1997 amending for the 11th time Regulation (EC) No 413/97 adopting exceptional support measures for the market in pigmeat in the Netherlands THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2759/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organisation of the market in pigmeat (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 (2), and in particular Article 20 of it, because, because of the outbreak of classical swine fever in certain production regions in the Netherlands, exceptional support measures for the market in pigmeat in that Member State were adopted in Commission Regulation (EC) No 413/97 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1600/97 (4), because Article 4a of Regulation (EC) No 413/97 provides that eligible sows must be inseminated within four months of the lifting of the ban on insemination; because this provision is difficult to check and should be replaced by a requirement that sows be kept on the holding for the same period; because the application of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3887/92 laying down detailed rules for applying the integrated administration and control system for certain Community aid schemes (5), as last modified by Regulation (EC) No 2015/95 (6), would lead to unjustified payments in cases of force majeure and unjustified losses in cases where the natural circumstances clause applied; because in both these cases the payment of aid should be limited to the period in which the sows have been kept on the holding and have given rise to costs for the producer; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Pigmeat, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Article 4a of Regulation (EC) No 413/97 is amended as follows: 1. In paragraph 2 the second sentence is replaced by the following: 'It will be granted for eligible sows kept on the applicant's holding throughout the duration of the ban on insemination and for four months following the lifting of the ban.` 2. The following subparagraph is added to paragraph 3: 'However,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00694", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00193", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Full Disclosure Act''. SEC. 2. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES. (a) Fannie Mae.-- (1) Mortgage-backed securities.--Section 304(d) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1719(d)) is amended by striking the fourth sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Securities issued by the corporation under this subsection will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.'' (2) Subordinate obligations.--Section 304(e) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1719(e)) is amended by striking the fourth sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Obligations issued by the corporation under this subsection will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.'' (3) Securities.--Section 311 of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1723c) is amended-- (A) in the section header, by striking ``association''; (B) by inserting ``(a) in general.--'' after ``sec. 311.''; (C) in the second sentence, by inserting ``by the Association'' after ``issued''; and (D) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(b) Treatment of Corporation Securities.-- ``(1) In general.--Any stock, obligations, securities, participations, or other instruments issued or guaranteed by the corporation under this title will not be exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(2) Exemption for approved sellers.--despite any other provision of this title or the Securities Act of 1933, transactions involving the initial disposition by an approved seller of pooled certificates that are acquired by that seller from the corporation upon the initial issuance of the pooled certificates will be deemed to be transactions by a person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer within the meaning of the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection: ``(A) Approved seller.--The term `approved seller' means an institution approved by the corporation to sell mortgage loans to the corporation in exchange for pooled certificates. ``(B) Pooled certificates.--The term `pooled certificates' means single class mortgage-backed securities guaranteed", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00860", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00194", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 16 December 1994 on the approval of the Single Programming Document for Community structural assistance in the region of East London and the Lee Valley concerned by Objective 2 in the United Kingdom (Only the English text is authentic) (94/1021/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (1), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 (2), and in particular Article 10 (1) last subparagraph of it, After consultation of the Advisory Committee on the Development and Conversion of Regions and the Committee under Article 124 of the Treaty, because the programming procedure for structural assistance under Objective 2 is defined in Article 9 (8) to (10) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (3), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 (4); because, however, the last subparagraph of Article 5 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in order to simplify and to speed up programming procedures, Member States may submit in a Single Programming Document the information required for the regional and social conversion plan referred to in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and the information required at Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because Article 10 (1) last subparagraph of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in that case the Commission adopts a single decision in a Single Document covering the points referred to in Article 8 (3) and the assistance from the Funds referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 14 (3); because the Commission has established, by Decision 94/169/EC (5), an initial list of declining industrial areas concerned by", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00653", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00195", "text": "this Court has previously sustained. Cf. Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, supra; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, supra. The state builds the highways and owns them.16 Motor carriers for hire, and particularly truckers of heavy goods, like appellant, make especially arduous use of roadways, entailing wear and tear much beyond that resulting from general indiscriminate public use. Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 411, 56 S.Ct. at page 758, 80 L.Ed. 1245. Although the state may not discriminate against or exclude such interstate traffic generally in the use of its highways, this does not mean that the state is required to furnish those facilities to it free of charge or indeed on equal terms with other traffic not inflicting similar destructive effects. Cf. Clark v. Poor, supra; Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 411, 56 S.Ct. at page 758, 80 L.Ed. 1245. Interstate traffic equally with intrastate may be required to pay a fair share of the cost and maintenance reasonably related to the use made of the highways. 14 This does not mean, as appellant seems to assume, that the proceeds of all taxes levied for the privilege of using the highways must be allocated directly and exclusively to maintaining them. Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. at page 557, 47 S.Ct. at page 703, 71 L.Ed. 1199; Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 412, 56 S.Ct. at page 758, 80 L.Ed. 1245. That is true, although this Court has held invalid, as forbidden by the commerce clause, certain state taxes on interstate motor carriers because laid 'not as compensation for the use of the highways, but for the privilege of doing the interstate bus business.' Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186, 51 S.Ct. 380, 381, 75 L.Ed. 953; cf. McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 179, 60 S.Ct. 504, 506, 84 L.Ed. 683. Those cases did not hold that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00119", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00196", "text": "every measure which may be worthy of his (blessing, may re) dound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the prosperity, and the Happiness of the Commonwealth. II Madison, 183—191. 141 SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX. 142 A Bill Establishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion. 143 because the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society; which cannot be effected without a competent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle previously adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of pre-eminence amongst the different societies or communities of Christians; 144 Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, that for the support of Christian teachers,—per centum on the amount, or—in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is assessed, and will be paid by every person chargeable with the said tax at the time the same will become due; and the Sheriffs of the several Counties will have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner and under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be prescribed by the laws for raising the Revenues of this State. 145 And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Collector will give a receipt, expressing there to what socity of Christians the person from whom he may receive the same will direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account of it in his books. The Sheriff of every County, will, on or before the _ _ day of _ _ in every year, return to the Court, upon oath, two alphabetical lists of the payments to him made, distinguishing in columns opposite to the names of the persons who will have paid the same, the society to which the money so paid was by them appropriated; and one column for the names where no appropriation will be made. One of which lists, after being recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, will be filed by the Clerk in his office; the other will be the Sheriff be fixed up in the Court-house, there", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00031", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00197", "text": "or declare such sovereignty. If it means more than that, it implies that the Government has some proprietary interest. That has not been remotely established except by sliding from absence of ownership by California to ownership by the United States. 40 Let us assume, for the present, that ownership by California cannot be proven. On a fair analysis of all the evidence bearing on ownership, then, this area is, I believe, to be deemed unclaimed land, and the determination to claim it on the part of the United States is a political decision not for this Court. The Constitution places vast authority for the conduct of foreign relations in the independent hands of the President. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255. It is noteworthy that the Court does not treat the President's proclamation in regard to the disputed area as an assertion of ownership. See Exec.Proc. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 10 F.R. 12303. If California is found to have no title, and this area is regarded as unclaimed land, I have no doubt that the President and the Congress between them could make it part of the national domain and thereby bring it under Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution. The disposition of the area, the rights to be created in it, the rights previously claimed in it through usage that might be respected though it fall short of prescription, all raise appropriate questions of policy, questions of accommodation, for the determination of which Congress and not this Court is the appropriate agency. 41 Today this Court has decided that a new application even in the old field of torts should not be made by adjudication, where Congress has refrained from acting. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604. Considerations of judicial self-restraint would seem to me far more compelling where there are obviously at stake claims that involve so many farreaching, complicated, historic interests, the proper adjustments of which are not readily resolved by the materials and methods to which this Court is confined. 42 This is a summary statement of views which it would serve no purpose to elaborate. I think that the bill should be dismissed without prejudice. 1 The Government complaint claims an area extending three nautical miles from shore; the California boundary pur", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00112", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00198", "text": "of mind be taken as proved simply because the Government, feeling itself justified in resting on a purely legal defense, did not deny the existence of that state of mind. 71 To rule out the opportunity to establish the psychological implications of the complaint would be to make its denial a rule of law. It would not take much of the trial court's time to allow Klapprott to establish them if he can. The time would be well spent even if he should fail to do so; it would be more consonant with the safeguards which this Court has properly thrown around the withdrawal of citizenship than is the summary disposition that was made. But I would require Klapprott to satisfy the trial judge that what he impliedly alleges is true, and it is here that I part company with the majority. 72 April 4, 1949. 73 The motion of the respondent to modify the judgment of this Court in this case is granted. The judgment announced January 17, 1949, is amended to read: 'The judgment of the Court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to receive evidence on the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in petitioner's petition to vacate the default judgment entered in the denaturalization proceedings.' 74 Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice MURPHY, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE dissent from the modification of the order. 1 Amended Rule 60(b) provides: 'On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, of other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion will be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00231", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00199", "text": "the extension by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 of the anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93(4), and in particular Article 7 of it, After consulting the Advisory Committee, because: (1) After the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 88/97 a number of bicycle assemblers submitted requests under Article 3 of that Regulation for exemption of the anti-dumping duty as extended to imports of certain bicycle parts from the People's Republic of China by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 (the extended anti-dumping duty). The Commission published in the Official Journal of the European Communities a list of applicants(5) for which payment of the extended anti-dumping duty in respect of their imports of essential bicycle parts declared for free circulation was suspended under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97. (2) The Commission requested and received the necessary information from the parties listed in Annex I to this Decision and found their requests admissible under Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97. The information provided was examined and verified where necessary at the premises of the parties concerned. (3) The facts as finally ascertained by the Commission show that the assembly operations of the applicants concerned do not fall within the scope of Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96. It was found that for all the applicants' bicycle assembly operations, the value of the parts originating in the People's Republic of China which were used in their assembly operations was lower than 60 % of the total value of the parts used in these assembly operations. (4) For the above reasons, and in accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97, the parties listed in Annex I to this Decision should be exempted from the extended anti-dumping duty. The parties concerned were informed accordingly and given an opportunity to comment. (5) In accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 88/97, the exemption of the parties listed in Annex I to this Decision from the extended anti-dumping duty should take effect as from the date of receipt of their request and their customs debt in respect of the extended anti-dumping duty is to be considered void as from that date. (6) Other parties which had requested", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00686", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00200", "text": ".--Each report will contain a full description of each application received from a Cuban national to travel to the United States to engage in purchasing activities under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 and will describe the disposition of each such application. SEC. 5. CLARIFICATION OF PAYMENT TERMS UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. Section 908(b)(4) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7207(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) the term `payment of cash in advance' means, despite any other provision of law, the payment by the purchaser of an agricultural commodity or product and the receipt of such payment by the seller prior to-- ``(i) the transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and ``(ii) the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser.''. SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF DIRECT TRANSFERS BETWEEN CUBAN AND UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. despite any other provision of law, the President may not restrict direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a United States financial institution executed in payment for a product authorized for sale under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.).", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 353, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01153", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00201", "text": "of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture. (b) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the activities described in subsection (a) of this section $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. (2) Availability.--Amounts appropriated under the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) of this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE PROCESS. (a) Findings.--Congress -- (1) recognizes that-- (A) a single, viable internationally and regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and (B) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and on the Machakos Protocol in July 2002; and (2) commends the efforts of Special Presidential Envoy, Senator Danforth and his team in working to assist the parties to the conflict in Sudan in finding a just, permanent peace to the conflict in Sudan. (b) Measures of Certain Conditions Not Met.-- (1) Presidential determination.-- (A) The President will make a determination and certify in writing to the appropriate congressional committees within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and each 6 months thereafter, that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue. (B) If, under subparagraph (A) the President determines and certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Sudan has not engaged in good faith negotiations to achieve a permanent, just, and equitable peace agreement, or has unreasonably interfered with humanitarian efforts, then the President, after consultation with the Congress, will implement the measures set forth in paragraph (2). (C) If, under paragraph (A) the President determines and certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has not engaged in good faith negotiations to achieve a permanent, just, and equitable peace agreement, then paragraph (2) will not apply to the Government of Sudan. (D", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01099", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00202", "text": ") because, in order to facilitate access to markets in third countries, it appears necessary to establish equivalence between the requirements of Chapters 1 (tyres), 2 (lighting and light-signalling devices), 4 (rear-view mirrors) and 11 (safety belts) of the Annex to this Directive and those of United Nations ECE Regulations Nos 30, 54, 64 and 75 in respect of tyres, 3, 19, 20, 37, 38, 50, 56, 57, 72 and 82 in respect of lighting and light-signalling devices, 81 in respect of rear-view mirrors and 16 in respect of safety belts; (5) because, with regard to the aspects concerning the protection of the environment, namely atmospheric and noise pollution, it is necessary to pursue the aim of constantly improving the environment; because, for this purpose, limit values for pollutants and sound level must be laid down for the fastest possible application; because subsequent reductions in the limit values and changes in the testing procedure may be decided upon only on the basis of studies and research to be undertaken or pursued into the available or conceivable technological potential and into an analysis of their cost/benefit ratios in order to permit production, on an industrial scale, of vehicles which are able to meet these more stringent limits; because the decision on that subsequent reduction must be taken by the European Parliament and the Council at least three years before these limit values enter into force in order to enable the industry to take the necessary measures whereby their products may, by the intended date, comply with the new Community provisions; because the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council will be based on proposals to be submitted by the Commission in due course; (6) because, under the provisions of Directive 92/61/EEC, the components and characteristics covered by this Directive may not be placed on the market and sold in the Member States unless they comply with the provisions of this Directive;because the Member States must take all the necessary measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations resulting from this Directive. (7) because Member States should be enabled, by granting tax incentives, to promote the marketing of vehicles which, in advance, meet the requirements adopted at Community level concerning measures to counter pollutant and noise emissions; (8) because the methods of measuring the immunity of vehicles and separate technical units to electromagnetic radiation in order to check compliance with the provisions concerning electromagnetic", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00692", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00203", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 22 April 1993 amending the boundaries of the less-favoured areas in the Federal Republic of Germany within the meaning of Council Directive 75/268/EEC (Only the German text is authentic) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 75/268/EEC of 28 April 1975 on mountain and hill farming and farming in certain less-favoured areas (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 (2), and in particular Article 2 (3) of it, because Council Directive 86/465/EEC concerning the Community list of less-favoured farming areas within the meaning of Directive 75/268/EEC (3), as last amended by Directive 92/92/EEC (4), specifies the areas of the Federal Republic of Germany included in the Community list of less-favoured areas within the meaning of Article 3 (3), (4) and (5) of Directive 75/268/EEC; Wheras the German Government has requested, in accordance with Article 2 (1) of Directive 75/268/EEC, an amendment to the boundaries of the less-favoured areas listed in the Annex to Directive 92/92/EEC to take account of administrative changes which have taken place in the areas concerned; because the administrative transfer of certain areas already included in the list of areas within the meaning of Article 3 (4) and (5) of Directive 75/268/EEC does not change the boundaries of those homogeneous areas which have already been classified and which respect the criteria and figures, including the special criteria, laid down for the delimitation of those areas in Directive 86/465/EEC; because the series of amendments requested by the German Government under Article 2 (3) of Directive 75/268/EEC does not increase the total utilized agricultural area of the less-favoured areas and therefore does not affect the limit laid down in the said Article; because, to ensure clarity, it is desirable to publish a complete new list of the less-favoured agricultural areas as indicated in the Annex to Directive 92/92/EEC; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Agricultural Structures and", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00700", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00204", "text": "to that prevailing in the rest of the Community; because the method known as 'HPLC' should be retained as the common reference method in the Community for glucosinolate analysis; because for the 1991/92 marketing year the use of other methods of anaylsis should be permited by the Commission under conditions to be laid down; because provision should be made for the payment in advance of the bonus at the same time as the advance payment of the aid for rape seed is made; because, given that the final aid amounts will not be known until the month of November, provision should be made for the freeing of a significant part of the security covering the advance when the right to the aid has been recognized; because provision should be made to release the remaining part of the security only after the final aids have been published in order to ensure that any excess payment can be recovered; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Oils and Fats, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 2681/83 is amended as follows: 1. The first sentence of Article 18 (6) is replaced by the following: '6. The forms will be completed by typewriter, by printer or, failing that, by hand in block letters. Where the entries are compiled by computer they may be printed on the certificate or, failing that, on a separate sheet of paper provided that in either case they are endorsed by the issuing authority.' 2. Article 32 is replaced by the following: 'Article 32 1. The drawing of samples, their preparation as samples for analysis and the determination of the oil, impurities and moisture contents will be carried out using the common methods set out in Annexes I to V and VII to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1470/68 (*). 2. (a) The determination of the glucosinolate content of rape seed will be carried out using the method set out in Annex VIII to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1470/68. (b) The determination of the glucosinolate content of rape seed may also be carried out using the method known as X-ray fluorescence (XRF). Member States will approve the laboratories permitted to use XRF according to the Community protocol to be determined and provided that the XRF equipment has been calibrated according to the manufacture", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00623", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00205", "text": "of the concept of ´originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation, from now on referred to as ´Protocol 3', and in particular Article 28 of it, because the footnote contained in the List in Annex III to Protocol 3 derogating in respect of nuclear fuel elements from the origin rule applicable to Chapter 84 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) is valid only until 31 December 1988; because nuclear fuel elements of heading No 8401 manufactured from non-originating uranium enriched in the Community do not yet satisfy the basic requirements of the rules on origin applicable to Chapter 84 and will probably not do so in the foreseeable future; because it is therefore necessary to extend the derogation for a further period; because in the nuclear fuel industry contracts are concluded for long periods and well in advance of the date when supplies are commenced; because it is advisable to provide for legal certainty in this connection; because it is therefore necessary to extend the derogation at this time, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 In the List in Annex III to Protocol 3, the footnote relating to heading No 8401 is replaced by the following: ´For nuclear fuel elements of heading No 8401, the rule in column (3) does not apply until 31 December 1993. However, materials classified in heading No 8401 may be used provided their value does not exceed 5 % of the ex-works price of the product'. Article 2 This Decision will enter into force on 1 January 1989. Done at Brussels, 16 December 1988.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 333, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00815", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00206", "text": "by the laws of the United States, do make known and proclaim that the waters within three thousand feet from the shore lines at mean low tide of Annette Island, Ham Island, Walker Island, Lewis Island, Spire Island, Hemlock Island, and adjacent rocks and islets, located within the area segregated by the broken line upon the diagram to this attached and made a part of this proclamation; also the bays of said islands, rocks, and islets, are reserved for the benefit of the Metlakahtlans and such other Alaskan natives as have joined them or may join them in residence on these islands, to be used by them under the general fisheries laws and regulations of the United States as administered by the Secretary of Commerce. 'Warning is expressly given to all unauthorized persons not to fish in or use any of the waters herein described or mentioned.' A presidential proclamation had theretofore, 1892, set apart Afognak Island, Alaska, and its adjacent bays and territorial waters as a public reservation for fish culture without specific authority to reserve waters. 27 Stat. 1052. 39 Borax Consolidated, Ltd., v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 17, 22, 56 S.Ct. 23, 26, 29, 80 L.Ed. 9. This case turned on the power of the United States to convey tideland seaward of the line of mean high tide after California's admission to the Union. Public lands there could not include tidelands as they passed to California when she became a state. The cases cited in the Borax case to support the statement as to public lands are cases that have nothing to do with tidelands or coastal waters but depend upon whether the lands in question were subject to disposal as property of the United States, i.e., public lands. See Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763, 23 L.Ed. 769; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490, 21 S.Ct. 690, 693, 45 L.Ed. 963; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 388, 30 S.Ct. 138, 54 L.Ed. 246. 40 Act of May 14, 1898, c.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00282", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00207", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 151/91 of 21 January 1991 amending the list of least-developed countries contained in Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No 429/87 THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 428/87 of 9 February 1987 setting up a system of compensation for loss of export earnings for least-developed countries not signatory to the Third ACP-EEC Convention (1), and in particular Article 9 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because the Republic of Haiti has recently signed the fourth ACP-EEC Convention and will therefore be covered by the Stabex system set up by that Convention from the 1990 year of application onwards; because that country should therefore be withdrawn from the list of countries contained in Annex II to Council Regulation (EEC) No 429/87 of 9 February 1987 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EEC) No 428/87 (2), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The Republic of Haiti is withdrawn from the list of countries contained in Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No 429/87. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply from 1 January 1990. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 21 January 1991.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 341, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00738", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00208", "text": ".C. 179. 2 The complaints requested that the court convene a specially constituted court of three judges, as required by the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 220, 28 U.S.C. § 47, 28 U.S.C.A. § 47, to hear the motions 'for a temporary or interlocutory injunction and for final hearing in this proceeding.' Circuit Judge Evans and District Judge Igoe were then assigned to sit with District Judge Baltzell to hear and determine these applictions, and the cases were consolidated for all purposes. The applications for a temporary stay and an interlocutory injunction were assigned for hearing on January 3, 1946. But on that day, it appearing that the Commission had postponed the effective date of its order to April 8, 1946, the court ordered that 'the hearing upon the petitioners' application for an interlocutoryinjunction and temporary stay previously assigned and set for January 3, 1946, be and the same is, continued to the day of final hearing herein and that said final hearing will be had on March 25, 1946 * * *.' The Commission made a further postponement of the effective date of its order to July 8, 1946, in order that the carriers subject to the order might avoid the necessity of preparing and filing new tariffs prior to the termination of the court proceeding. It also appeared that the illness of Judge Baltzell made it impossible for the court to convene as scheduled on March 25. And so that court reassigned the case for trial on April 22, with Judge Baltzell being replaced by Circuit Judge Major. 3 Argument was held on April 22 before Circuit Judges Evans and Major and District Judge Igoe at the 'final hearing upon the plaintiffs' petitions for a permanent injunction.' On June 5, 1946, findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and entered under the signatures of Judges Major and Igoe; the Commission's order was sustained in all respects and a judgment was entered dismissing the complaints. The following natation was made in the margin of the findings of fact and conclusions of law: 'Judge Evan A. Evans became ill subsequent to the hearing of these causes and he is and has been unable to participate in a determination of it. The findings of fact, conclusions of law", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00068", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00209", "text": "4(a)(6);''. SEC. 5. STATE FRAUD AUTHORITY. Section 18(c)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77r(c)(1)) is amended by striking ``or dealer'' and inserting ``, dealer, or crowdfunding intermediaries''. SEC. 6. NOTICE FILINGS PERMITTED. Section 18(c)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77r(c)(2)) is amended by inserting after subsection (D) the following: ``(E) Fees not permitted on crowdfunded securities.--despite subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), no filing or fee may be required with respect to any security that is a covered security under subsection (b)(4)(C), or will be such a covered security upon completion of the transaction, except for the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of the State of the issuer's State of organization, or any State in which purchasers of 50 percent or greater of the aggregate amount of the issue are a residents.''. SEC. 7. BROKER AND DEALER EXEMPTIONS. (a) Brokers.--Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780c(a)(4)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(G) Exemption for crowdfunding intermediaries.-- ``(i) In general.--The term `broker' does not include any crowdfunding intermediary. ``(ii) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the term `crowdfunding intermediary' means any intermediary that-- ``(I) is open to and accessible by the general public; ``(II) provides public communication portals for investors and potential investors; ``(III) warns investors of the speculative nature generally applicable to investments in startups, emerging businesses, and small issuers, including risks in the secondary market related to illiquidity; ``(IV) warns investors that they are subject to a 1-year restriction on sales of securities issued; ``(V) takes reasonable measures to reduce the risk of fraud with respect to such transaction; ``(VI) prohibits its employees from investing in the offerings made through the crowdfunding intermediary, or to have any financial interest in the companies posting offerings through the crowdfunding intermediary; ``(VII) does not offer investment advice or recommendations; ``(VIII) provides to the Commission-- ``(aa)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00879", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00210", "text": "6; because, in the course of these consultations, the delegations agreed to recommend to their respective authorities that certain catch quotas for 1996 should be fixed for the vessels of the other Party; because the necessary measures should be taken to implement, for 1996, the results of the consultations held with Latvia; because it is for the Council to lay down the specific conditions under which catches by vessels flying the flag of Latvia must be taken; because the fishing activities covered by this Regulation are subject to the control measures provided for by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy (3); because Article 3 (2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1381/87 of 20 May 1987 establishing detailed rules concerning the marking and documentation of fishing vessels (4) provides that all vessels with chilled or refrigerated sea-water tanks are to keep on board a document certified by a competent authority and indicating the calibration of the tanks in cubic metres at 10-centimetre intervals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. From 1 January to 31 December 1996, vessels flying the flag of Latvia are authorized to fish for the species listed in Annex I, within the geographical and quantitative limits laid down there and in accordance with this Regulation, in the 200-nautical-mile fishing zone of the Member States in the Baltic Sea. 2. Fishing authorized under paragraph 1 will be limited to those parts of the 200-nautical-mile fishing zone lying seawards of 12-nautical-miles from the baselines from which the fishing zones of Member States are measured. 3. despite paragraph 1, unavoidable by-catches of a species for which no quota is established in a zone will be permitted within the limits fixed in the conservation measures in force in the zone concerned. 4. By-catches in a given zone of a species for which a quota is established in that zone will be counted against the quota concerned. Article 2 1. Vessels fishing within the quotas fixed in Article 1 will comply with the conservation and control measures and all other provisions governing fishing in the zones referred to in that Article, including the recommendations of the 21st session of the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission. 2. The vessels will keep a logbook in which the information set out in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00737", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00211", "text": "and dismissed by the Clerk of this Court upon producing a certificate from the Clerk of the Court wherein the judgment or decree was rendered, certifying that such appeal has been duly taken or allowed, and proof that four days' notice in writing has been served on the appellant or his attorney that application will be made to the Clerk of this Court for such dismissal. No action dismissed under this rule will be reinstated except in the discretion of the Court and upon a showing similar to that required under subdivision 2 hereof.' (Italics supplied.) 11 U.S.Sup.Ct.Rep.Digest, L.Ed., Supp. No. 4, p. 55. 11 The District Court, in its order of February 14, 1945, described the basis on which the case had been tried as follows: '* * * on the 3rd day of May, 1943, and the parties to this having duly appeared by their respective attorneys, and submitted to the Court, in lieu of the offering of proof, an agreed statement of facts setting forth the issues framed by the complaint, and the Court, upon the consent of the attorneys for the respective parties, having thereupon made and entered an order herein on the said 3rd day of May, 1943, wherein and whereby the said agreed statement of facts which were submitted by the attorneys for the respective parties, as aforesaid, was set forth as the issues framed by the complaint and answer, and the said action having been submitted to the Court for its determination upon the said agreed statement of facts and order hereinbefore mentioned and referred to, * * *.' 12 See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, note 2. 13 The findings of fact referred to by the Commission, insofar as they relate to loaders, are those quoted in the text of Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, at note 17.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 391, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00057", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00212", "text": "was reversed by this Court. One of the things those two cases establish is the principle that when a group of competitors enters into a series of separate but similar agreements with competitors or others, a strong inference arises that such agreements are the result of concerted action. That inference is strengthened when contemporaneous declarations indicate that supposedly separate actions are part of a common plan. 69 In so far as Finding 118 and the subsidiary findings were based by the District Court on its belief that the General Electric rule justified the arrangements or because of a misapplication of Masonite or Interstate Circuit, errors of law occurred. These we can, of course, correct, In so far as this finding and others to which we will refer are inferences drawn from documents or undisputed facts, previously described or set out, Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable. That rule prescribes that findings of fact in actions tried without a jury'will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.' It was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, to mae applicable the then prevailing equity practice.11 Since judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have the statutory or constitutional limitations of findings by administrative agencies12 or by a jury,13 this Court may reverse findings of fact by a trial court where 'clearly erroneous.' The practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure was that the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony where the candor and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged, had great weight with the appellate court. The findings were never conclusive, however.14 A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 70 The government relied very largely on documentary exhibits, and called as witnesses many of the authors of the documents. Both on direct and cross-examination counsel were permitted to phrase their questions in extremely leading form, so that the import of the witnesses' testimony was conflicting. On cross-examination most of the witnesses denied that they had acted in concert in securing patent licenses or that they had agreed to do the things which in fact were done. Where such testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous documents we can give it little weight, particularly when the crucial issues involve mixed", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00139", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00213", "text": "0 by Council Regulation (EC) No 2435/2000 of 17 October 2000 establishing certain concessions in the form of Community tariff quotas for certain agricultural products and providing for an adjustment, as an autonomous and transitional measure, of certain agricultural concessions provided for in the Europe Agreement with Romania(3). This second adjustment of the preferential arrangements has not yet been incorporated in the Europe Agreement in the form of an Additional Protocol. (5) Negotiations for further improvements to the preferential arrangements of the Europe Agreement with Romania were concluded on 18 June 2002. (6) The new Protocol to the Europe Agreement adjusting the trade aspects of the Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part (from now on referred to as the Protocol) should be approved with a view to consolidating all concessions in agricultural trade between the two sides, including the results of the negotiations concluded in 2000 and 2002. (7) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code(4) has codified the management rules for tariff quotas designed to be used following the chronological order of dates of customs declarations. Certain tariff quotas under this Decision should therefore be administered in accordance with those rules. (8) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Decision should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission(5). (9) As a result of the previously mentioned negotiations, Regulation (EC) No 2435/2000 has been superseded and should therefore be repealed, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Protocol adjusting the trade aspects of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part, to take account of the outcome of negotiations between the Parties on new mutual agricultural concessions, is approved on behalf of the European Community. Article 2 1. The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person empowered to sign the Protocol on behalf of the Community in order to bind the Community. 2. The President of the Council will, on behalf of the Community, make the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00645", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00214", "text": ".L.R.B. 75. There is neither explicit authorization nor explicit denial in the statute of the right of an employer to make such a challenge in enforcement proceedings. Nothing in the text or context of the statute or any consideration underlying its policy precludes the relevance of continued majority status to enforcement, especially where loss of majority may be due to employee dissatisfaction with alleged union intransigence. It appears to me arbitrary to deny to a Court of Appeals, in the fair exercise of its discretion under § 10(e), the right to ask the Board for light on this issue, if for no other reason than that the Board's views would be helpful in the judicial determination of the issue. 24 Fully mindful of the heavy load of cases before the Board, I venture to suggest that it could have speedily disposed of the matters that on the record appeared to trouble the Court of Appeals, could have reported back to the court, and could have secured a prompt disposition of its petitions for enforcement. Any adverse rulings by the court could then have been brought here by the Board, not with any ambiguity inherent in a discretionary ruling, but with the full clarity of an adjudication on the merits. Instead, the Board comes here to review the court's interim orders, petitions for certiorari resting on a special set of unique circumstances are granted, and the Court of Appeals is now reversed by attributing to it a disavowed disregard of an imporant principle in the administration of the Labor Management Relations Act. 25 In the light of the entire series of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, both before and after the orders in this case, it does not seem to me reasonable to interpret the orders now before us as demands on the Board for findings merely as to compliance with the orders sought to be enforced. That court's decisions preclude such intendment. Since the record permits, we ought to attribute to a Court of Appeals not a willful disregard of principle and, as such, an abuse of discretion, but an honest desire to get light on happenings after the Board's orders relevant to its duties as a court of equity. Courts of Appeals are also human institutions. By attributing to the Court of Appeals an abusive exercise of discretion when the record may fairly be otherwise interpreted, we not only needlessly rebuke that court; we take action calculated to chill other judges in exercising with utter freedom a discretion which we have previously pronounced they possess. 26", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00361", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00215", "text": "(1)Commission Decision of 11 December 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/E - 1/37.919 (ex 37.391) - Bank charges for exchanging euro-zone currencies - Germany) (notified under document number C(2001) 3693) (Only the German text is authentic) (2003/25/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty(2), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1216/1999(3), and in particular Articles 3 and 15(2) of it, Having regard to the Commission decision of 1 August 2000 to initiate proceedings in this case, Having given the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the objections raised by the Commission under Article 19(1) of Regulation No 17 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty(4), Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, Having regard to the final report of the Hearing Officer in this case, because: A. INTRODUCTION (1) This Decision concerning an infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty is addressed to the following undertakings: - Commerzbank AG, - Dresdner Bank AG, - Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, - Deutsche VerkehrsBank AG, - Vereins- und Westbank AG. (2) The banks participating in the meeting of 15 October 1997 at Deutsche Verkehrsbank AG in Frankfurt am Main agreed to a commission of about 3 % for the buying and selling of euro-zone banknotes during the three-year transitional period beginning on 1 January 1999. The purpose was to recover about 90 % of the \"exchange margin\" income after the abolition of the \"spread\" (i.e. buying and selling rates) on 1 January 1999. B. THE RELEVANT PRODUCT AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES 1. The relevant product market (3) On", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00580", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00216", "text": "could rest—that the proper method of computing the award is to determine the difference between the value of the business on the date of taking and its value on the date of return. It follows from our holding that the proper measure of compensation was an annual rental which came due only at the beginning of each renewal of the Army's occupancy, that interest should be payable on each installment of rental only from that date. 27 For proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, the case is reversed and remanded. 28 Reversed and remanded. 29 Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring. 30 As I understand the opinion of t e Court, its effect is simply to recognize that short-term takings of property entail considerations not present where complete title has been taken. Rules developed for the simple situation in which all the owner's interests in the property have been irrevocably severed should not be forced to fit the more complex consequences of a piecemeal taking of successive short-term interests. Such takings may involved compensable elements that in the nature of things are not present where the whole is taken. 31 With this much I agree. But having recognized the possible compensability of intangible interests, I would not subscribe to a formulation of theoretical rules defining their nature or prescribing their measurement. What seems theoretically sound may prove unworkable for judicial administration. But I do not understand the opinion of the Court to do more than indicate possible approaches to the compensation of such interests. Since remand of the case will permit the empirical testing of these approaches, I join in the Court's opinion. 32 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice REED concur, dissenting. 33 The United States took this plant in order to run a laundry for the Army, not for the public. The trade-routes were wholly useless to it. It never used them. Yet it is forced to pay for them under a new constitutional doctrine that is forged for this case. 34 previously it was settled that the owner could not receive compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the destruction of a business which resulted from the taking of his physical property, even though the business could not be reestablished elsewhere. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 45 S.Ct. 293, 69 L.Ed. 644; Bothwell v. United States,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00314", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00217", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Workforce Fairness and Tax Relief Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. AGREEMENTS WITH STATES HAVING QUALIFIED WORKER TRAINING PROGRAMS. (a) In General.--Any State, the State unemployment compensation law of which is approved by the Secretary of Labor (from now on in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') under section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, which desires to do so, may enter into and participate in an agreement with the Secretary under this Act, if such State law contains (as of the date such agreement is entered into) a requirement that special unemployment assistance be payable to individuals participating in a qualified worker training program, as described in subsection (b). Any State which is a party to an agreement under this Act may, upon providing 30 days' written notice to the Secretary, terminate such agreement. (b) Qualified Worker Training Program.--For purposes of this Act, the term ``qualified worker training program'' means a program-- (1) under which individuals who meet the requirements described in paragraph (3) are eligible to receive special unemployment assistance while participating in the program; (2) under which the assistance described in paragraph (1) is payable in the same amount, at the same interval, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions, as regular compensation under the State law, except that-- (A) State requirements relating to availability for work, active search for work, and refusal to accept work are not applicable to such individuals; (B) assistance will not be payable after the end of the 12-month period following the last day of the individual's benefit year; and (C) such individuals are considered to be unemployed for the purposes of Federal and State laws applicable to unemployment compensation, as long as such individuals meet the requirements applicable under this subsection; (3) under which individuals may receive the assistance described in paragraph (1) if such individuals-- (A)(i)(I) have exhausted all rights to regular compensation under the State law; (II) have exhausted all rights to extended compensation, or are not entitled thereto, because of the ending of their eligibility for extended compensation, in such State; (ii) have no rights to compensation (including both regular compensation and extended compensation) with respect to a week under such law or any other State unemployment compensation law or to compensation under any other", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00950", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00218", "text": "expires on 30 September 1997, it is appropriate, under Article 8 (1) of Regulation No 17, to fix the date of expiry of this Decision at 30 September 1997. (45) However, application of the agreement should not give rise to exchanges of information which could lead to concerted practices prohibited by Article 85 of the Treaty; it is therefore necessary to require the undertakings being parties to the agreement to refrain from divulging to the other parties individual data on each party's output and deliveries of bricks, either direct between themselves or between some of them, or through a fiduciary body or third party, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The provisions of Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty are, under Article 85 (3), declared inapplicable for the period from 10 September 1992 to 30 September 1997 to the agreement between Stichting Baksteen and the major Dutch brick producers listed in Article 3 below, notified on 10 September 1992. Article 2 The undertakings being parties to the agreement will refrain from divulging any data on individual outputs and deliveries of bricks, either direct between themselves or between some of them, or through a fiduciary body or third party. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the following undertakings: 1. Rodruza BV, St. Canisiussingel 20, NL-6511 TJ Nijmegen; 2. Teewen BV, Kaldenkerkerweg 33, NL-5932 CT Tegelen; 3. Boral Nedusa Baksteen BV, Spijksedijk 11, NL-6917 AB Spijk; 4. Koramic Baksteengroep BV, Kerkstraat 23, NL-5527 EE Hapert; 5. De Jong van Lekkerkerk Holding BV (Desimpel), Van Ginnekenweg 12, NL-5071 NJ Udenhout; 6. Steenfabriek Huissenswaard BV, Scherpekamp 1-7, NL-6687 ML Angeren; 7. Steenfabriek De Rijswaard BV, Rijswaard 2, NL-5308 LV Aalst (Gld); 8. L", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00690", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00219", "text": "67 L.Ed. 1078, at page 1085. The point has substance but we have nevertheless concluded to dispose of the appeal on its merits.' 1950, 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 880, 881—882. 3 Upon appeal to this Court, we considered appellants' jurisdictional statement but, instead of nothing probable jurisdiction, ordered that 'Further consideration of the question of the jurisdiction of this Court in this case and of the motion to dismiss or affirm is postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits.' On further study, the doubts thus indicated ripen into a conviction that we should dismiss the appeal without reaching the constitutional question. 4 The view of the facts taken by the court below, though it is entitled to respect, does not bind us and we may make an independent examination of the record. Doing so, we find nothing more substantial in support of jurisdiction than did the court below. Appellants, apparently seeking to bring themselves within Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 648, assert a challenge to the Act in two capacities—one as parent of a child subject to it, and both as taxpayers burdened because of its requirements. 5 In support of the parent-and-school-child relationship, the complaint alleged that appellant Klein was parent of a seventeen-year-old pupil in Hawthorne High School, where Bible reading was practiced under the Act. That is all. There is no assertion that she was injured or even offended thereby or that she was compelled to accept, approve or confess agreement with any dogma or creed or even to listen when the Scriptures were read. On the contrary, there was a pretrial stipulation that any student, at his own or his parents' request, could be excused during Bible reading and that in this case no such excuse was asked. However, it was agreed upon argument here that this child had graduated from the public schools before this appeal was taken to this Court. Obviously no decision we could render now would protect any rights she may once have had, and this Court does not sit to decide arguments after events have put them to rest. United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116, 40 S.Ct.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00438", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00220", "text": "and to produce 'all duplicate sales invoices, sales books, ledgers, inventory records, contracts ad records relating to the sale of all commodities from September 1st, 1944, to September 28, 1944.' In compliance with the subpoena, petitioner appeared and, after being sworn, was requested to turn over the subpoenaed records. Petitoner's counsel inquired whether petitioner was being granted immunity 'as to any and all matters for information obtained as a result of the investigation and examination of these records.' The presiding official stated that the 'witness is entitld to whatever immunity which flows as a matter of law from the production of these books and records which are required to be kept under M.P.R.'s 271 and 426.'3 Petitioner thereupon produced the records, but claimed constitutional privilege. 3 The plea in bar alleged that the name of the purchaser in the transactions involved in the information appeared in the subpoenaed sales invoices and other similar documents. And it was alleged that the Office of Price Administration had used the name and other unspecified leads obtained from these documents to search out evidence of the violations, which had occurred in the preceding year. 4 The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the records which petitioner was compelled to produce were records required to be kept by a valid regulation under the Price Control Act; that thereby they became public documents, as to which no constitutional privilege against self-incrimination attaches; that accordingly the immunity of § 202(g) did not extend to the production of these records and the plea in bar was properly overruled by the trial court. 2 Cir., 159 F.2d 890. 5 It should be observed at the outset that the decision in the instant case turns on the construction of a compulsory testimony-immunity provision which incorporates by reference the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893. This provision, in conjunction with broad record-keeping requirements, has been included not merely in a temporary wartime measure but also, in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal Government.4 6 It is contended that a broader construction of the scope of the immunity provision than that approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals would be more consistent with the congressional aim, in conferring investigatory powers upon the Administrator, to secure prompt disclosure of books and records of the private enterprises subjected to OPA regulations. In support of this contention, it is", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00202", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00221", "text": "the information required for the regional and social conversion plan referred to in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and the information required at Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because Article 10 (1) last subparagraph of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in that case the Commission adopts a single decision in a Single Document covering the points referred to in Article 8 (3) and the assistance from the Funds referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 14 (3); because the Commission has established, by Decision 94/169/EC (5), an initial list of declining industrial areas concerned by Objective 2 for the period 1994 to 1996; because the United Kingdom Government has submitted to the Commission on 18 April 1994 the Single Programming Document referred to in Article 5 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 for the region of East London and the Lee Valley; because this document contains the elements referred to in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and in Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because expenditure under this Single Programming Document is eligible under Article 33 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, from 1 January 1994; because the Single Programming Document submitted by this Member State includes a description of the conversion priorities selected and the applications for assistance from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) as well as an indication of the planned use of the assistance available from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the other financial instruments in implementing the Single Programming Document; because, in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, the Commission is charged with ensuring, within the framework of the partnership, coordination and consistency between assistance from the Funds and assistance provided by the EIB and the other financial instruments, including the ECSC and the other actions for structural purposes; because the EIB has been involved in the drawing up of the Single Programming Document in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, applicable by analogy in the establishment of the Single Programming Document;", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00654", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00222", "text": "the following new sections: ``Sec. 2. (a) Federal recognition is extended to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, as designated as petitioner number 65 by the Office of Federal Acknowledgement. All laws and regulations of the United States of general application to Indians and Indian tribes will apply to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina and its members. ``(b) despite the first section, any group of Indians in Robeson and adjoining counties, North Carolina, whose members are not enrolled in the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina as determined under section 3(c), may petition under part 83 of title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations for acknowledgement of tribal existence. ``Sec. 3. (a) The Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina and its members will be eligible for all services and benefits provided to Indians because of their status as members of a federally recognized tribe. For the purposes of the delivery of such services, those members of the Tribe residing in Robeson, Cumberland, Hoke, and Scotland counties in North Carolina will be deemed to be residing on or near an Indian reservation. ``(b) Upon verification by the Secretary of the Interior of a tribal roll under subsection (c), the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Health and Human Services will develop, in consultation with the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, a determination of needs to provide the services to which members of the Tribe are eligible. The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Health and Human Services will each submit a written statement of such needs to Congress after the tribal roll is verified. ``(c) For purposes of the delivery of Federal services, the tribal roll in effect on the date of the enactment of this section will, subject to verification by the Secretary of the Interior, define the service population of the Tribe. The Secretary's verification will be limited to confirming compliance with the membership criteria set out in the Tribe's constitution adopted on November 16, 2001, which verification will be completed within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this section. ``Sec. 4. (a) The Secretary may take land into trust for the Lumbee Tribe under this Act. An application to take land located within Robeson County, North Carolina, into trust under this section will be treated by the Secretary as an `on reservation' trust acquisition under part 151 of title 25, Code of Federal Regulation (or a successor regulation). ``(b) The tribe", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01150", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00223", "text": "and customs administrations; because to this end the text of Article 4 (h) of Protocol 3 should be supplemented and a new explanatory note to that provision should be incorporated, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 Protocol 3 is amended as follows: 1. Article 4 (h) will be replaced by the following: (h) used articles collected there, fit only for the recovery of raw materials, subject to Note 5a on used tyres contained in Annex I to this Protocol;'. 2. In Annex I (´Explanatory Notes') the following will be inserted: ´Note 5a - Article 4 (h) In the case of used tyres, the term ´´used articles collected there, fit only for the recovery of raw materials'' does not only cover used tyres fit only for the recovery of raw materials but also used tyres fit only for retreading or for use as waste.' Article 2 This Decision will enter into force on 1 January 1989. Done at Brussels, 16 December 1988. For the EEC-Iceland Joint Committee The Chairman P. BENAVIDES DECISION No 4/88 OF THE EEC-ICELAND JOINT COMMITTEE of 16 December 1988 amending, in relation to heading No 8401, the List in Annex III to Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of ´originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation THE EEC-ICELAND JOINT COMMITTEE, Having regard to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, signed at Brussels on 22 July 1972, Having regard to Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of ´originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation, from now on referred to as ´Protocol 3', and in particular Article 28 of it, because the footnote contained in the List in Annex III to Protocol 3 derogating in respect of nuclear fuel elements from the origin rule applicable to Chapter 84 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) is valid only until 31 December 1988; because nuclear fuel elements of heading No 8401 manufactured from non-originating uranium enriched in the Community do not yet satisfy the basic requirements of the rules on origin applicable to Chapter 84 and will probably not do so in the foreseeable future; because it is therefore necessary to extend the derogation for a further", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00814", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00224", "text": "necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. Funds necessary for land acquisition are authorized to be appropriated from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. (f) Equal Value.--Any exchange of lands between Big Sky Lumber Company and the United States will be for equal value. (g) Quality of Title.--The quality of title to the properties referenced in this section in fact secured will meet applicable Forest Service standards with respect to surface and subsurface estates or will otherwise be acceptable to the Forest Service. (h) References.--The reference and authorities of this section referring to the Big Sky Lumber Company, will also refer to its successors. (i) Reports to Congress.--For a period of three years from the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary will report annually to the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, on the status of the negotiations with the company or its successors in interest to effect the land consolidation authorized by this section. SEC. 8. SEVERED MINERALS EXCHANGE. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that-- (1) underlying certain areas in Montana described in subsection (b) are mineral rights owned by subsidiaries of Burlington Resources, Incorporated (from now on collectively referred to in this section as the ``company''); (2) there are federally owned minerals underlying privately owned lands lying outside those areas; (3) the company has agreed in principle with the Department of Agriculture to an exchange of mineral rights to consolidate Federal surface and subsurface ownerships and to avoid potential conflicts with the surface management of such areas; and (4) it is desirable that an exchange be completed within two years after the date of enactment of this Act. (b) Description of Mineral Interests.--(1) under an exchange agreement between the Secretary and the company, the Secretary may acquire mineral interests owned by the company underlying surface lands owned by the United States located in the areas depicted on the maps entitled ``Severed Minerals Exchange, Clearwater-Monture Area'', dated September 1988 and ``Severed Minerals Exchanges, Gallatin Area'', dated September 1988, or in fractional sections adjacent to those areas. (2) In exchange for the mineral interests conveyed to the Secretary under paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Interior will convey, subject to valid existing rights, such federally owned mineral interests as the Secretary and the company may agree upon. (c)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01024", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00225", "text": "329 U.S. 607 67 S.Ct. 583 91 L.Ed. 547 INSURANCE GROUP COMMITTEE et al.v.DENVER & R.G.W.R. CO. et al. No. 690. Argued Jan. 6, 1947. Decided Feb. 3, 1947. Rehearing Denied March 3, 1947. See 330 U.S. 854, 67 S.Ct. 860. [Syllabus from pages 607-609 intentionally omitted] Messrs. George D. Gibson, of Richmond, Va., and Kenneth F. Burgess, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioners. F. C. Nicodemus, Jr., of New York City, and William V. Hodges, of Denver, Colo., for respondents. 1 Mr. Jus ice REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 2 On November 29, 1944, the District Court for the District of Colorado confirmed a plan of reorganization for the debtor, the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 62 F.Supp. 384, despite the rejection of the plan by holders of the General Mortgage bonds under § 77, sub. e, Bankr. Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205, sub. e. Upon appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order of confirmation. 10 Cir., 150 F.2d 28. This Court granted certiorari, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & S.L.W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 699, 66 S.Ct. 50, 51, reversed the Circuit Court and affirmed the order of confirmation. 328 U.S. 495, 66 S.Ct. 1282. The debtor consistently opposed the plan throughout those proceedings. After the opinion of this Court was filed on June 10, 1946, the debtor petitioned for a rehearing which was denied October 28, 1946. At about the same time as that of filing its petition for rehearing, it moved in the District Court (September 17, 1946) for a re- examination of the plan in the light of circumstances which had changed since the Interstate Commerce Commission's hearings on the plan in May, 1941. 254 I.C.C. 6. The debtor specified three categories of changed conditions: '(a", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00018", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00226", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2402/2001 of 7 December 2001 on the issue of system B export licences in the fruit and vegetables sector THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1961/2001 of 8 October 2001 on detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards export refunds on fruit and vegetables(1), and in particular Article 6(6) of it, because: (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2102/2001(2) fixes the indicative quantities for system B export licences other than those sought in the context of food aid. (2) In the light of the information available to the Commission today, there is a risk that the indicative quantities laid down for the current export period for tomatoes will shortly be exceeded. This overrun will prejudice the proper working of the export refund scheme in the fruit and vegetables sector. (3) To avoid this situation, applications for system B licences for tomatoes exported after 8 December 2001 should be rejected until the end of the current export period, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Applications for system B export licences for tomatoes submitted under Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 2102/2001, export declarations for which are accepted after 8 December 2001 and before 15 January 2002, are rejected. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 8 December 2001. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 7 December 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 354, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00631", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00227", "text": ". The two positions, one that only power in the settlor at the time of death to cause the property to be transferred from him to another by will or by descent or to select beneficiaries through appointment brought the property formerly transferred within the reach of the words 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,' the Reinecke concept, and the other than, in addition, every possibility of reversion of the transferred interest to the settlor must be barred by the trust instrument, the dissenter's ground in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, were fully discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368.2 The latter position was accepted as the sound interpretation by us and I adhere to that view for the reasons stated in the Court's opinion in Helvering v. Hallock. Cf. Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 Tax Law Rev. 395. That interpretation has gained strength from the fact that Congress has not repudidated it as inconsistent with the legislative purpose and by other judgments by this Court applying the principles of the Hallock case in accordance with this statement. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227; Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324 U.S. 113, 6 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. 786, 159 A.L.R. 230. Possession or enjoyment of property as previously applied has meant from the standpoint of the taxability of the transferor's estate, at least, that the death of the transferor perfects the right of the transferee and cuts off any possibility of reverter to the transferor left by the instruments of transfer. If the transferor reacquired the property by inheritance or by purchase, other factors would enter. Before the Joint Resolution even the reservation of a life estate was insufficient to preserve possession or enjoyment in the transferor as nothing passed at his death. When words such as 'possession or enjoyment' used in a section of a revenue statute with their many", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00220", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00228", "text": "COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 19 December 1977 on a derogation accorded to the Kingdom of Denmark relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty applicable in international travel (77/800/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and in particular Articles 99 and 100 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, under Annex VII, Part V 1 (a) to Article 133 of the Act of Accession, the Kingdom of Denmark was granted a derogation regarding the application of certain provisions of Council Directive 69/169/EEC of 28 May 1969 on the harmonization of provisions laid down by law, regulation of administrative action relating to exemption from turnover tax and excise duty on imports in international travel (1), amended by Council Directive 72/230/EEC (2) ; because this derogation was extended by Directive 76/134/EEC (3) and Directive 77/82/EEC (4) adopted under the provisions of Annex VII, Part V 1 (c) of the Act of Accession ; because, under Article 9 (2) of the Act of Accession, the option to extend further this derogation on this basis expires on 31 December 1977; because the Danish Government has asked that it be granted a further period in which to apply the harmonized rules stemming from Directive 69/169/EEC; because progress in the attainment of economic and monetary union and, in particular, in fiscal harmonization does not yet allow the full application of such rules in Denmark without the risk of serious economic consequences; because, therefore, the Kingdom of Denmark should be authorized to maintain provisionally the exceptional arrangements which it has enjoyed hitherto ; because, however, in order to facilitate adaptation, provision should be made over a five-year period, for the gradual approximation of these arrangements to the harmonized Community rules, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 By way of derogation from Directive 69/169/EEC, the Kingdom of Denmark will have the right, in respect of exemption for imports of tobacco products, alcoholic beverages (distilled beverages and spirits of an alcoholic strength exceeding 22º) and beer (if the quantity exceeds two litres): (a) to maintain the rules currently in force", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00666", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00229", "text": ". Harp Tract 896, 1947''. (3) US Tract 1047 (formerly Tracts 551, 551a,b,c), original Marienville Ranger District Headquarters, consisting of 4.90 acres, as depicted on the map titled ``Marienville Ranger Station Compound Tract 1047, August 1998''. (4) US Tract 844, Marienville ranger residence, as depicted on the map titled ``Allegheny Unit, Peter B. DeSmet Tract 844, 1936'', except that portion of the tract identified as Lot 2, on the Survey Plat prepared by D. M. Heller and dated December 12, 1999, which is subject to conveyance under section 5. (b) Property Descriptions.--The maps referred to in subsection (a) are the primary descriptions of the lands to which the maps refer. In the event of a conflict between a map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The maps will be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service until the lands are disposed of under this section. (c) Consideration.-- (1) Authorized consideration.--As consideration for a conveyance of land under subsection (a), the recipient of the land, with the consent of the Secretary, may convey to the Secretary other land, existing improvements, or improvements constructed to the specifications of the Secretary. (2) Cash equalization.--despite any other provision of law, the Secretary may accept a cash equalization payment in excess of 25 percent of the value of any land and administrative site exchanged under subsection (a). (d) Applicable Law.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, any conveyance of land under subsection (a) will be subject to the laws and regulations applicable to the conveyance and acquisition of land for the National Forest System. (e) Solicitation of Offers.-- (1) Conveyance priority.--In the selection of the recipient of land under this section, the Secretary may give a preference to public entities that agree to use the land for public purposes. (2) Terms and conditions.--The Secretary may solicit offers for the conveyance of land under this section on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe. (3) Rejection of offers.--The Secretary", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00964", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00230", "text": "DECISION No 1776/2005/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 28 September 2005 amending Council Decision 2000/819/EC on a multiannual programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (2001 to 2005) (Text with EEA relevance) THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 157(3) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1), Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty (2), because: (1) It is essential to ensure the continuity of Community support for enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). (2) It is therefore appropriate to extend the period of validity of Decision 2000/819/EC (3) by another year until 31 December 2006 and increase the financial reference amount by EUR 88,5 million. (3) Decision 2000/819/EC should be amended accordingly. (4) The Committee of the Regions was consulted, but has not delivered an opinion, HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 Decision 2000/819/EC is amended as follows: 1. in Article 7(1), the financial reference amount of ‘EUR 450 million’ will be replaced by ‘EUR 538 500 000’; 2. in Article 8, the date of 31 December 2005 will be replaced by that of 31 December 2006. Article 2 This Decision will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Strasbourg, 28 September 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 411, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00792", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00231", "text": "shipping bills. It adds that muh to the r evenues of the Northeastern railroads with no showing or finding that it is needed to meet costs of furnishing railroad service. 255 The most important reason advanced for sustaining this order is the claim that this surcharge is to cure a discrimination in favor of the Northeastern territory against the South and West. Briefly and generally, the discrimination is said to consist in this: Mile for mile, a higher average charge is made for transportation under the present classifications in the more sparsely settled areas of the South and West than is more in the denser traffic regions of the Northeast. Why, then, should not the alleged discrimination be removed by lowering the high rates of the South and West? The answer is that they cannot be reduced further than the ten percent already ordered in this proceeding, because the railroads of the South and West, in view of their costs, could not bear further decrease. So the only other way of equalizing the rates and making it as costly to move goods there as anywhere in the United States, is to make the shippers in the Northeastern territory pay the railroads this additional 10% which they have not asked and do not need. 256 The Court's approval of this order is based on an entirely new theory of 'discrimination.' It has never before been thought to be an unlawful discrimination to charge more for a service which it cost more to render. Discrimination previously has been found to exist only when an unequal charge was exacted for a like service, or vice versa. But now it is held to be an unlawful discrimination if railroads of the Northeast do not make the same charge as other railroads in the South or West, for a different transportation under different cost conditions. The Government frankly advocates this new concept of discrimination as necessary to some redistribution of population in relation to resources that will reshape the nation's social, economic and perhaps its political life more nearly to its heart's desire. It says in its brief to us: 257 'There is no direct relation between the distribution of natural resources and the distribution of population in the United States. It happens that some of the areas richest in natural resources in the United States are sparsely populated. If the raw materials making up those natural resources are to be converted into finished products in that vicinity, allowing the area some economic benefit from their conversion, it will be necessary to transport considerable volumes of finished goods for long", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00073", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00232", "text": "OF DISPUTES AND CLAIMS. (a) Relinquishment, Extinguishment, and Compromise of Santo Domingo Claims.-- (1) Extinguishment.-- (A) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), in consideration of the benefits provided under this Act, and in accordance with the Settlement Agreement under which the Pueblo has agreed to relinquish and compromise certain claims, the Pueblo's land and trespass claims described in subparagraph (B) are extinguished, effective as of the date specified in paragraph (5). (B) Claims.--The claims described in this subparagraph are the following: (i) With respect to the Pueblo's claims against the United States, its agencies, officers, and instrumentalities, all claims to land, whether based on aboriginal or recognized title, and all claims for damages or other judicial relief or for administrative remedies pertaining in any way to the Pueblo's land, such as boundary, trespass, and mismanagement claims, including any claim related to-- (I) any federally administered lands, including National Forest System lands designated in the Settlement Agreement for possible sale or exchange to the Pueblo; (II) any lands owned or held for the benefit of any Indian tribe other than the Pueblo; and (III) all claims which were, or could have been brought against the United States in docket No. 355, pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims. (ii) With respect to the Pueblo's claims against persons, the State of New Mexico and its subdivisions, and Indian tribes other than the Pueblo, all claims to land, whether based on aboriginal or recognized title, and all claims for damages or other judicial relief or for administrative remedies pertaining in any way to the Pueblo's land, such as boundary and trespass claims. (iii) All claims listed on pages 13894-13895 of volume 48 of the Federal Register, published on March 31, 1983, except for claims numbered 002 and 004. (2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act (including paragraph (1)) will be construed-- (A) to in any way effectuate an extinguishment of or otherwise impair-- (i) the Pueblo's title to lands acquired by or for the benefit of the Pueblo since December 28, 1927, or in a tract of land of approximately 150.14 acres known as the ``sliver area''", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01140", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00233", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 27 October 1993 concerning the granting of assistance from the cohesion financial instrument to the following project 'Integration of Archaeological Sites of Athens' in Greece No CF: 93/09/61/001 - rev 5 (Only the Greek text is authentic) (94/126/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 of 30 March 1993 establishing a cohesion financial instrument (1), and in particular Article 8 (6) of it, because Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 establishes a cohesion financial instrument to provide Community support for projects in the fields of the environment and trans-European transport infrastructure networks; because under Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 certain provisions of Titles VI and VII of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 concerning the provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (2), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 (3), are to apply, mutatis mutandis; because Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 defines the types of measure for which the cohesion financial instrument may provide assistance; because Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 requires the Member States to ensure that adequate publicity is given to the operations of the financial instrument and that the measures which are described in Annex V to this Decision are undertaken; because on 2 July 1993 Greece submitted an application for assistance from the cohesion financial instrument for the project 'Integration of Archaeological Sites of Athens'; because that application concerns a project which is eligible under the terms of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93; because the application for assistance contains all the information required by Article 8 (4) of the Regulation and satisfies the criteria set out in Article 8 (3) and (5) of the Regulation; because the project will help achieve the objectives of Article 130r of the Treaty concerning the environment; because Article 1 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 197", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00710", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00234", "text": "0290) originating in Pakistan, the relevant ceiling amounts, respectively to 376 000 and 118 000 pieces; because that ceiling was reached on 19 March 1990 by charges of imports into the Community of the products in question originating in Pakistan, a country covered by preferential tariff arrangements, reached and were charged against that ceiling; because it is appropriate to reintroduce the levying of customs duties for the products in question with regard to Pakistan, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 6 April 1990 the levying of customs duties, suspended under Regulation (EEC) No 3897/89, will be reintroduced on imports into the Community of the following products, originating in Pakistan: 1.2.3.4 // // // // // Order No // Category (unit) // CN code // Description // // // // // // // // // 40.0260 // 26 (1 000 pieces) // 6104 41 00 6104 42 00 6104 43 00 6104 44 00 6204 41 00 6204 42 00 6204 43 00 6204 44 00 // Women's or girls dresses, of wool, of cotton or man-made fibres // 40.0290 // 29 (1 000 pieces) // 6204 11 00 6204 12 00 6204 13 00 6204 19 10 6204 21 00 6204 22 90 6204 23 90 6204 29 19 // Women's or girls' suits and ensembles other than knitted or crocheted, of wool, of cotton or man-made fibres, excluding // // // // Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 30 March 1990.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 433, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00599", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00235", "text": ", as compensation for their use, and bear only on the privilege of using them, not on the privilege of doing the interstate business. Moreover, the flat $10 fee laid by § 3847.16(a) is further identified as one on the privilege of use by the fact that 'unlike the general tax in Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 51 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed. 953, the levy of which was unrelated to the use of the highways, grant of the privilege of their use is by the present statute made conditional upon payment of the fee.' Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 410, 56 S.Ct. at page 757, 80 L.Ed. 1245. 17 The minimum so-called 'gross revenue' fee, on the other hand, is technically conditioned on the receipt of such revenue from the operations within Montana. But the flat minimum of $15 annually, which is all we have before us in the shape the case has taken for the purposes of decision here, has none of the alleged vices characteristic of gross income taxes previously held to vitiate such taxes laid by the states on interstate commerce. And appellant has advanced no tenable basis in rebuttal of the legislative declaration that this tax too is exacted in consideration of the use of the state's highways, i.e., for the privilege of using them, not for that of doing the interstate business. Here, as in Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 411, 56 S.Ct. 756, 758, 80 L.Ed. 1245, 'there is ample support for a legislative determination that the peculiar character of this traffic involves a special type of use of the highways,' with enhanced wear, tear and hazards laying heavier burdens on the state for maintenance and policing than other types of traffic create. It is to compensate for these burdens that the taxes are imposed and appellant has not sustained its burden. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., supra, 306 U.S. at page 599, 59 S.Ct. at page 753, 83 L.Ed. 1001, and authorities cited, of showing that the levies have no reasonable relation to that end.19 18 It is of no consequence that the state has seen fit to lay two ex", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00120", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00237", "text": "6 is a substantial right. It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sanction defeat of that right by the device at bar. 7 Reversed. 8 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice JACKSON concur in the result but upon the grounds stated by Chief Judge Hand in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 556, at page 560. 9 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. 2 The agreement also provided that the sums advanced would be deducted from whatever settlement or recovery petitioner finally achieved. As to this, the proviso in § 5 of the Liability Act specifies 'That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, such common carrier may set off there any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought.' Referring to this provision, and interpreting a contract similar to the one here involved, at least one federal court has held that 'The contract to waive the venue provisions is of no effect * * * because there was no consideration for it.' Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 168 F.2d 812, 815. 3 In accord with the decision below are: Roland v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., D.C.N.D.Ill.1946, 65 F.Supp. 630; Herrington v. Thompson, D.C.W.D.Mo.1945, 61 F.Supp. 903; Clark v. Lowden, D.C.D.Minn.1942, 48 F.Supp. 261; Detwiler v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., D.C.D.Minn.1936, 15 F.Supp. 541; Detwiler v. Lowden, 1936, 198 Minn", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00328", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00238", "text": "that the board has proceeded conformably to the statute and regulations. 21 (2) There is a graver error in the Court's holding, however, which may interfere with sound administrative procedure. Although petitioner was represented by counsel, no objection to the form of the report was made during the administrative process. This case previously has centered around the issue of finality disposed of by the Court. Even in the several hearings of her effort to get relief by habeas corpus, petitioner has never asserted, in this or any other court, that she was not examined by the physicians of the medical review board. This is made plain by the Court's statement of the generalized objections on other grounds to the report of the medical review board, see opinion at note 2, and from the affidavits and objections appearing in the record. The dissenting judge, 170 F.2d 1009, did not refer to the failure to examine petitioner. He spoke only of the failure of the Board of Special Inquiry and the medical board to req ire adequate and revealing certificates and reports. Even the petition for certiorari does not present the question. The brief does not discuss it. 22 The administrative remedy must be exhausted by fair effort to correct administrative errors before resort to habeas corpus or other judicial remedies.5 To permit occasional reversal of administrative orders on points not brought to the attention of the agency hampers administrative routine and, if adopted as a rule of law, would disorganize administrative procedure. Afterthought cannot take the place of required objection. This is not a case where rules of practice and procedure defeat the ends of justice.6 There is nothing in this record to indicate that disabilities of petitioner, or difficulties of procedure or practice, the emergence of a new rule of law or any other change of circumstance has affected the course of petitioner's pleas. She has had advantage of every method of relief known to the law but has not seen fit to bring forward the ground upon which this Court reverses. 23 It is obvious that had objection been made to the form of the report of the Board of Medical Officers at the hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry, April 6, 1948, a prompt elaboration of the report could have been obtained or, if no examination such as is required by the regulations had already been made, it could have been done promptly. Proper administrative procedure requires that objection to certificates be made at the earliest opportunity which in this case", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00263", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00239", "text": "previously. It frankly urges the creation of a new one. The only decision determining the matter, which has come to our attention, in addition to the cases cited above in note 2, is that of the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth v. Quince, 68 Comm.L.Rep. 227, aff'g, (1943) Q.S.R. 199, denying liability. See also Attorney General v. Valle-Jones (1935) 2 K.B. 209, reaching a contrary result, in which however the principal issue apparently went by concession. 22 See, e.g., 35 Stat. 1097, 18 U.S.C. § 94, 18 U.S.C.A. § 94, (enticing desertion from the military or naval service); 35 Stat. 1097, 18 U.S.C. § 95, 18 U.S.C.A. § 95, (enticing workmen from arsenals or armories); 35 Stat. 1097, 18 U.S.C. § 99, 18 U.S.C.A. § 99 (robbery of personal property belonging to the United States); 35 Stat. 1097, 18 U.S.C. § 100, 18 U.S.C.A. § 100 (embezzlement of property belonging to the United States). Of course it has not been necessary for Congress to pass statutes imposing civil liability in those situations where it has been understood since the days of the common law that the sovereign is protected from tortious interference. Thus, trespass on land belonging to the United States is a civil wrong to be remedied in the courts. Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 13 L.Ed. 675. 23 Necessarily such an element or effect often, if not always, exists whenever a new liability is created, as at common law, in the nature of responsibility for tort. This, however, could not be made an invariably controlling consideration in cases presenting common-law issues concerning such liabilities to tribunals whose business it is primarily to decide them, for to do this would forestall all growth in the law except by legislative action. The factor, however, is one generally to be taken into account and weighed against the social need dictating the new responsibility, in cases squarely presenting those issues and not complicated, as this case is", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00104", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00240", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1621/94 of 4 July 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2312/92 and (EEC) No 1148/93 laying down detailed rules for implementing the specific measures for supplying the French overseas departments with live bovine animals and breeding horses THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91 of 16 December 1991 introducing specific measures in respect of certain agricultural products for the benefit of the French overseas departments (1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3714/92 (2), and in particular Articles 4 (5) and 9 of it, because, for the purposes of Articles 4 and 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91, the number of bovine animals and pure-bred breeding horses originating in the Community eligible for aid with a view to developing the potential for production in the French overseas departments (FOD) and the number of male bovine animals eligible for exemption from duties on direct imports from third countries or for aid for deliveries originating in the rest of the Community for the 1994/95 marketing year should be determined; because the quantities of the forecast supply balances for those products were fixed by Regulation (EEC) No 2312/93 (3) and (EEC) No 1148/93 (4), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2789/93 (5); because, pending further information to be supplied by the competent authorities, and in order to guarantee continuity of the specific supply arrangements, the balance laid down in Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 1601/92 should be adopted for a period limited to three months on the basis of the quantities determined for the 1993/94 marketing year; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 2312/92 is replaced by Annex I to this Regulation. Article 2 Annex III to Regulation (EEC) No 2312/92 is replaced by Annex II to this Regulation. Article 3 The Annex to Regulation (EEC)", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00628", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00241", "text": "or not depends upon the same legal issues as does the question of identity previously discussed.'9 Ownership of a corporation and the control incident thereto can have no different tax consequences when clothed in the garb of agency than when worn as a removable corporate veil. 14 But it is necessary to go farther. The Tax Court did not, as petitioners seem to think, consider the argument that they were agents of Airco as different from or having any greater validity than the argument of identity of Airco and its subsidiaries. The court, in characterizing petitioners as Airco's agents, used that term exactly as it had been used in the Southern Pacific, Commonwealth Improvement Co., and Moline Properties cases. According to the Tax Court's opinion: 15 'The issue which (was decided) in this proceeding is: Whether, as the respondent has determined, the income from the operations of the three petitioners belonged not to Airco, the parent but to the petitioners and was taxable to them; or whether, as the three petitioners contend, the income from the operations of the petitioners in 1938, exclusive of the small amounts paid to petitioners under the contracts, belonged and was taxable to Airco, the parent company, both because the petitioners were in fact incorporated departments, divisions or branches of Airco's business and because the petitioners operated under express contract with Airco.'10 16 The theory upon which the Tax Court expunged the deficiencies apparently was that since the Southern Pacific Co. case was not expressly overruled by Moline Properties, the 'business purpose' rule laid down in the latter is not absolute, but that the corporate entity may be disregarded (or the corporation treated as an agent of its owner) for tax purposes when the facts of ownership and control of the corporation approximate those presented by the Southern Pacific case. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that under our decisions, when a corporation carries on business activity the fact that the owner retains direction of its affairs down to the minutest detail, provides all of its assets and takes all of its profits can make no difference tax-wise. The court concluded that 'Even though Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra, set up a different test, we regard it as pro tanto no longer controlling.'11 17 The result reached by the Court of Appeals is clearly required by our later decisions. Our reluctance to erase Southern Pacific from the books has been due not to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00246", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00242", "text": "to retire part of their indebtedness, at a discount, and to refund or extend the maturity date of the balance of their indebtedness, and it further appears desirable to discharge such railroads from bankruptcy proceedings without the necessity of drastic reorganizations under section 77; and 76 because the continued holding of roads that have become solvent in trustee or receiver operation as insolvent roads, and further efforts to reorganize, under section 77, railroads which no longer need such reorganization, are contrary to the general public interest and contrary to sound public policy; and 77 because the President of the United States has joined with Congress in going on record in favor of modifications of present reorganization legislati n and in favor of the principles proposed by the appropriate committees of the Senate and House of Representatives in 1946, and in favor of the principles enacted by Congress in 1946, and the President has further urged the strengthening of such proposals and the adoption of further provisions to carry out those general principles: Therefore be it 78 Resolved, That the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the Senate is authorized and directed either as a committee, or through a duly constituted subcommittee, to make an investigation of the conditions surrounding the operation and handling of said railroads by trustees and receivers through the period of receivership or trusteeship; to ascertain the extent to which there should be elimination or reduction of any of the exceptions previously proposed to legislation on this subject; to inquire into the causes for the failures, (a) to reduce the interest rates of railroads in receivership and bankruptcy proceedings; (b) to arrange for the reduction of the rates of interest payable by such railroads on their outstanding indebtedness; (c) to arrange for the refunding and extension of maturity dates of part or all of theindebtedness of such railroads while in the hands of the courts; (d) to call for the tender of bonds and the purchase of bonds of such railroads either at a discount or otherwise, by the receivers or trustees, out of funds in their hands; (e) to discharge such railroads from court proceedings without the necessity of being subjected to drastic reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (f) to return such railroads to their owners as promptly as possible; to investigate the fees paid trustees, receivers, counsel, bankers or bank syndicates, committees and experts, and any and all matters relating thereto,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00019", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00243", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 14 October 1980 on the conclusion of voluntary restraint Agreements with Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay in the sheepmeat and goatmeat sector (80/982/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 113 of it, Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission, because the Commission has opened negotiations with non-member countries which supply sheepmeat and goatmeat or live sheep and goats, with a view to reaching Agreements for voluntary restraint on their exports to the Community; because the Commission has reached agreement with Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay; because the said Agreements allow trade to be carried on in a manner compatible with the common organization of the markets in the sector in question, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 1. The Agreements drawn up in the form of exchanges of letters on trade in the sheepmeat and goatmeat sector with the countries listed hereafter are approved on behalf of the European Economic Community; - Argentina, - Australia, - New Zealand, - Uruguay. 2. The texts of the Agreements are annexed to this Decision. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorized to designate the person empowered to sign the Agreements referred to in Article 1, in order to bind the Community. Done at Luxembourg, 14 October 1980.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 307, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00791", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00244", "text": "an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office it is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution under this rule may be made when it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor in enforcing a law averred to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, will be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to object.' 3 An exception was a suit to enforce an obligation of the corporation or municipality to which the office was attached. See Thompson v. United States, 103 U.S. 480, 483, 26 L.Ed. 521, as explained in United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Butterworth, supra, 169 U.S. at page 603, 18 S.Ct. at page 442, 42 L.Ed. 873, and in Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 95, 101—102, 22 S.Ct. 776, 778 779, 46 L.Ed. 1070. 4 See note 5, infra. 5 Under the earlier Act the passage of the period within which substitution could be made resulted in the proceeding being 'at an end.' LeCrone v. McAdoo, supra, 253 U.S. at p. 219, 40 S.Ct. at page 511, 64 L.Ed. 869. The practice of this Court was therefore to dismiss the writ, leaving undisturbed the judgments below. LeCrone v. McAdoo, supra; United States ex rel. Wattis v. Lane, 255 U.S. 566, 41 S.Ct. 447, 65 L.Ed. 789; Payne v. Industrial Board, 258 U.S. 613, 42 S.Ct. 462, 66 L.Ed. 790; Payne v. Stevens, 260 U.S. 705, 43 S.Ct. 165, 67 L.Ed. 473. 6 In United", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00376", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00245", "text": ") A requirement that school buses manufactured after the effective date of the rule be equipped with a system that detects a trapped obstacle in the door of the vehicle and automatically applies the vehicle's brakes, or provides a warning to the driver, when such a object is detected. (b) Final Rule.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary will promulgate a final rule providing for any requirement or standard referred to in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) that the Secretary determines to be feasible and practicable. SEC. 7. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS. (a) Prohibition on Employment Pending Check.--despite any other provision of law and except as provided in subsection (b), a local educational agency, and any contractor providing school transportation services to such an agency, may not newly employ a person as a driver of a school bus of or on behalf of the agency before the completion of a background check of the person in the national criminal history background check system. The purpose of the check is to determine whether the person has been convicted of a crime which would warrant barring the person from duties as a driver of a school bus. (b) Exception.--A local educational agency or a contractor may newly employ a person as a driver of a school bus of or on behalf of the agency if a check of the person is not completed by the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date of the request for the check by the agency. The agency or contractor may commence such employment beginning at the end of such 21-day period. (c) Check Procedures.--Each State will establish procedures for conducting checks under this section. Such procedures will include the designation of an agency of the State to carry out the checks and will meet the guidelines set forth in section 3(b) of the National Child Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119a(b)). (d) Limitation on Liability.--A local educational agency or a contractor providing transportation services to such an agency will not be liable in an action for damages on the basis of a criminal conviction of a person employed by the agency or contractor as a school bus driver if-- (1) a check of the person was conducted under this section; and (2) the conviction was not disclosed to the agency or contractor under the check. (e)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01081", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00246", "text": "Commission Decision of 11 July 2001 on the State aid scheme applied by Spain to certain newly established firms in Navarre (Spain) (notified under document number C(2001) 1762) (Only the Spanish text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (2002/893/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 88(2) of it, Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) of it, Having, in accordance with the abovementioned Articles(1), called on interested parties to submit their comments, and having regard to those comments, because: I. PROCEDURE (1) As a result in particular of the information received in response to the procedures initiated following the complaints about the State aid granted to Daewoo Electronics Manufacturing España SA(2), Ramondín SA and Ramondín Cápsulas SA(3), the Commission learned of the existence of a scheme of non-notified investment aid in Spain, in Álava, consisting of tax incentives in the form of a reduction of taxable income for certain newly established firms. It also received unofficial information that similar measures existed in Navarre, since that territory enjoys the same autonomy in tax matters as Álava. (2) By letter dated 17 August 1999, SG(99)D/6865, the Commission informed Spain of its decision to initiate in respect of this aid the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the Treaty. (3) By letter from the Permanent Representation dated 26 August 1999, registered on 30 August 1999, the Spanish authorities requested more time in which to submit their comments. By letter from the Permanent Representation dated 24 January 2000, registered on 31 January 2000, the Spanish authorities submitted their comments under the abovementioned procedure. (4) The Commission's decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities(4). The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the aid within one month of the date of publication. (5) The Commission has received no comments from interested parties. (6) under Provincial Law 8/2001 of 10 April(5), the first section of Chapter II of Provincial Law 24", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00728", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00247", "text": "these material findings, see North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 65 S.Ct. 1260, 89 L.Ed. 1760, indicates to me the short cut which the Commission is taking to enlarge its jurisdiction to unprecedented limits. 1 '(4) Whenever in any such investigation (where rates made by authority of a state are in issue) the commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it will prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices will be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary despite.' (Italics supplied.) 41 Stat. 484, 49 U.S.C. § 13(4), 49 U.S.C.A. § 13(4). 2 § 13(2), 36 Stat. 550, as amended, 41 Stat 484, 49 U.S.C. § 13(2), 49 U.S.C.A. § 13(2); § 15a(2), 54 Stat. 912, 49 U.S.C. § 15a(2), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15a(2); § 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, inserting a preamble to the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. note preceding § 1, 49 U.S.C.A. note preceding section 1. 3 For earlier reports see Ex Parte No. 148, Increased Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 1942, 248 I.C.C. 545. The several proceedings under §§ 15a or", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00470", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00248", "text": "341 U.S. 246 71 S.Ct. 692 95 L.Ed. 912 MONTANA-DAKOTA UTILITIES CO.v.NORTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO. No. 77. Argued Nov. 27, 1950. Decided May 7, 1951. Mr. William D. Mitchell, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. Jacob M. Lashly, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent. Mr. Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Washington, D.C., for Federal Power Commission, amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 Petitioner and respondent are public electric utilities companies engaged in interstate commerce. Petitioner's predecessor and respondent were under the same management through interlocking directorships and joint officers. During that relationship the two interchanged electric energy, shared expenses, and made a number of intercompany contracts establishing rates and charges, which contracts were filed with and accepted by the Federal Power Commissoin. These contract rates and charges are at the root of this controversy. Petitioner charges that during the period 1935—1945, its predecessor paid respondent unreasonably high prices for what respondent furnished it, and that it received unreasonably low rates for what it provided respondent. That advantage, it is alleged, was fraudulent and unlawful and was due to the interlocking directorate, which prevented protest to the Commission to have reasonable rates and charges established under the provisions of the Federal Power Act.1 2 Petitioner sued in United States District Court and asserted jurisdiction on the ground that the case 'arises under the Constitution, or laws of the United States'2 and, more particularly, under a 'law regulating commerce,'3 specifically the Federal Power Act. 3 Petitioner was successful in the District Court, which found the contracts void for fraud and the rates and charges established there unreasonable. The court also determined what would have been reasonable rates and charges for the period in question and gave judgment for the difference between its conception of reasonable charges and the actual charges, amounting to over three-quarters of a million dollars.4 4 The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction.5 5 As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether the complaint states", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00396", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00249", "text": ", 12 Fed.Reg. 1. 8 Each of the following agencies was a new agency created by Executive Order to exercise powers formerly vested in other agencies or to perform new functions: National Housing Agency, Exec. Order No. 9070, 7 Fed.Reg.1529; War Food Administration, Exec. Order No. 9334, 8 Fed.Reg.5423; Office of War Mobilization, Exec. Order No. 9347, 8 Fed.Reg.7207; Office of Economic Warfare, Exec. Order No. 9361, 8 Fed.Reg.9861; Foreign Economic Administration, Exec. Order No. 9380, 8 Fed.Reg.13081; Surplus War Property Administration, Exec. Order No. 9425, 9 Fed.Reg. 2071. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 601 note. 9 December 4, 1941. See 87 Cong.Rec. 9413. 10 Pub.L. 20, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 14, under the heading 'Executive Office Of The President Office for Emergency Management,' the following: 'Office of Temporary Controls 'Salaries and expenses: For an additional amount, fiscal year 1947, for the Office of Price Administration transferred by Executive Order 9809 of December 12, 1946, to the Office of Temporary Controls, $7,051.752, to be available for the payment of terminal leave only: Provided, That it is the intent of the Congress that the funds previously and herein appropriated will include all expenses incident to the closing and liquidation of the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Temporary Controls by June 30, 1947.' 11 See § 1(b) supra, note 2. And for the general statute preventing the extinguishment of liability under a repealed statute, unless the repealing act expressly provides for it, see Rev.Stat. § 13, as amended, 58 Stat. 118, 1 U.S.C.Supp. V, § 29, 1 U.S.C.A. § 29. 12 Revised General Order 53, May 13, 1944, 9 Fed.Reg. 5191. 13 Section 202(b) provides in part: 'The Administrator may administer oaths and affirmations and may,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00067", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00250", "text": ". United States, 298 U.S. 38, 54, 56 S.Ct. 720, 727, 80 L.Ed. 1033, was drawn in question. Here, appellants can make no comparable claim. They attack an order which is valid even if its effect is to drive some operators out of business. As we have indicated, the rule-making power is rooted in and supplements Congress' regulatory scheme, which in turn derives from the commerce power. The fact that the value of some going concerns may be affected, therefore, does not support a claim under the Fifth Amendment, if the rules and the Act be related, as we have said they are, to evils in commerce which the federal power may reach.20 This being the case, appellants had no constitutional claim in support of which they are entitled to introduce evidence de novo, and the court did not err in sustaining the objection thereto. 34 Affirmed. 35 Appendix. 36 Rules prescribed governing the practices of authorized carriers of property by motor vehicle in Interstate or Foreign Commerce in (1) augmenting equipment, (2) interchanging of equipment, and (3) renting vehicles or equipment to private carriers or shippers. 37 s 207.3. Examptions.—Other than § 207.4(c) and (d), relative to inspection and identification of equipment, these rules will not apply— 38 (a) To equipment leased by one authorized carrier operating over regular routes to another authorized carrier operating over regular routes and operated between points and over routes which both lessor and lessee are authorized to serve, and to equipment leased by one authorized carrier operating over irregular routes to another such carrier and operated between points and within territory which both the lessor and lessee are authorized to serve; 39 (b) To equipment utilized wholly or in part in the transportation of railway express traffic, or in substituted motor-for-rail transportation of railroad freight moving between points that are railroad stations on railroad billing; 40 (c) To equipment utilized in transportation performed solely and exclusively within any municipality, contiguous municipalities, or commercial zone, as defined by the Commission; 41 (d) To equipment utilized by an authorized carrier in transportation performed under any plan of operation approved by the Commission in a proceeding arising under section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 42 s 207.4. Augmenting equipment.—Other than equipment exchanged between motor common carriers in interchange", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00472", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00251", "text": "a decree in an antitrust case, refer that case 'to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree there.' The Court could then adopt or reject such a report. 78 In the present proceeding the Commission has exhibited the familiarity with the competitive problems before it which Congress originally anticipated the Commission would achieve from its experience. The order it has prepared is we think clear and comprehensive. At the same time the prohibitions in the order forbid no activities except those which if continued would directly aid in perpetuating the same old unlawful practices. Nor do we find merit to the charges of surplusage in the order's terms. 79 Most of the objections to the order appear to rest on the premise that its terms will bar an individual cement producer from selling cement at delivered prices such that its net return from one customer will be less than from another, even if the particular sale be made in good faith to meet the lower price of a competitor. The Commission disclaims that the order can possibly be so understood. Nor do we so understand it. As we read the order, all of its separate prohibiting paragraphs and subparagraphs, which need not here be set out, are modified and limited by a preamble. This preamble directs that all of the respondents 'do immediately cease and desist from entering into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding or agreement, combination or conspiracy, between and among any two or more of said respondents, or between any one or more of said respondents and others not parties to this, to do or perform any of the following things. * * *' Then follow the prohibitory sentences. It is thus apparent that the order by its terms is directed solely at concerted, not individual activity on the part of the respondents. 80 Respondents have objected to the phrase 'planned common course of action' in the preamble. The objection is two-fold; first, that it adds nothing to the words that immediately follow it; and second, that if it does add anything, 'the Commission should be required to state what this novel phrase means in this order and what it adds to the four words.' It seems quite clear to us what the phrase means. It is merely an emphatic statement that the Commission is prohibiting concerted action—planned concerted action. The Commission chose a phrase perhaps more readily understood by businessmen than the accompanying legal words of like import. 81 Then there is", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00160", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00252", "text": "leg l effect is the same as if it had been filed in that name. Nothing in the language or policy of § 3466 justifies any other conclusion. It follows that the method of filing in this case cannot be questioned. The claim was filed in the name of the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration 'for and on behalf of the United States of America'—an explicit recognition of the legal realities involved. 8 The main contention, however, is that the purpose of the statutes under which the loans were made is inconsistent with § 3466, thereby rendering it inapplicable. The Acts of February 23, 1934, and June 19, 1934, authorized feed and crop loans to farmers in drought and storm-stricken areas of the nation. It is said that the prime purpose of these Acts was to restore the credit of the farmers and that to give effect to § 3466 would impair that credit. Reliance is placed upon United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra. This Court there held that § 3466 was inapplicable to the collection of loans made by the Government to railroad carriers to rehabilitate and maintain their credit status; it was felt that to give priority under such circumstances would defeat the purpose of the legislation by impairing the credit of the railroads. See also Cook County National Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445, 2 S.Ct. 561, 27 L.Ed. 537. 9 But it is manifest that the purpose of the Acts of February 23, 1934, and June 19, 1934, was to give emergency relief to distressed farmers rather than to restore their credit status. These were but two of a series of emergency seed and crop loan statutes3 enacted at various times from 1921 to 1938, a period when farmers were the victims of repeated crop failures and adverse economic conditions. Their credit was often impaired, but their most urgent need was for money to purchase feed and to plant crops; without such money, distress and unemployment might have been their lot. It was to meet that urgent need that Congress passed these statutes. 10 More specifically, the two Acts under consideration were designed to make loans available to those farmers who were unable to secure credit from the Production Credit Associations, organized under the Farm Credit Act of 1933.4 It was recognized that many farmers could not qualify for loans from those Associations", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00053", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00253", "text": "the statute apart from its general objectives. I doubt that upon any matter of construction the Court has previously so far presumed to override the plainly and incontrovertibly stated judgment of all participants in the legislative process with its own tortuously fashioned view. This is not construction under the doctrine of strict necessity. It is invasion of the legislative process by emasculation of the statute. The only justification for this is to avoid deciding the question of validity. II. 72 We are concerned in this case with the constitutionality of § 313 as amended only insofar as it may be applied in restriction or abridgment of the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly secured by the First Amendment.16 Other applications are not in question. There can be little doubt of Congress' power to regulate the making of political contributions and expenditures by labor unions, as well as by other organizations and individuals, in the interest of free and pure elections and the prevention of official corruption, by appropriate measures not trenching on those basic rights. But when regulation or prohibition touches them, this Court is duty bound to examine the restrictions and to decide in its own independent judgment whether they are abridged within the Amendment's meaning.17 That office cannot be surrendered to legislative judgment, however weighty, although such judgment is always entitled to respect. 73 As the Court has declared repeatedly, that judgment does not bear the same weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of validity, when the legislation on its face or in specific application restricts the rights of conscience, expression and assembly protected by the Amendment, as are given to other regulations having no such tendency.18 The presumption rather is against the legislative intrusion into these domains. For, while not absolute, the enforced suffender of those rights must be justified by the existence and immediate impendency of dangers to the public interest which clearly and not dubiously outweigh those involved in the restrictions upon the very foundation of democratic institutions, grounded as those institutions are in the freedoms of religion, conscience, expression and assembly. Hence doubtful intrusions cannot be allowed to stand consistently with the Amendment's command and purpose,19 nor therefore can the usual presumptions of constitutional validity, deriving from the weight of legislative opinion in other matters more largely within the legislative province and special competence, obtain. It is in the light and spirit of these principles that the validity of § 313 as claimed to be applicable here must be determined. 74 At the u tset the Government admits that §", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00195", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00254", "text": ", 63 L.Ed. 561—publication of twelve newspaper articles attacking the war; Debs v. United States, 1919, 249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252, 63 L.Ed. 566—one speech attacking United States' participation in the war; Abrams v. United States, 1920, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed. 1173—circulation of copies of two different socialist circulars attacking the war; Schaefer v. United States, 1920, 251 U.S. 466, 40 S.Ct. 259, 64 L.Ed. 360—publication of a Germanlanguage newspaper with allegedly false articles, critical of capitalism and the war; Pierce v. United States, 1920, 252 U.S. 239, 40 S.Ct. 205, 64 L.Ed. 542 circulation of copies of a four-page pamphlet written by a clergyman, attacking the purposes of the war and United States' participation there. Justice Holmes wrote the opinions for a unanimous Court in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs. He and Justice Brandeis dissented in Abrams, Schaefer and Pierce. The basis of these dissents was that, because of the protection which the First Amendment gives to speech, the evidence in each case was insufficient to show that the defendants had created the requisite danger under Schenck. But these dissents did not mark a change of principle. The dissenters doubted only the probable effectiveness of the puny efforts toward subversion. in Abrams, they wrote, 'I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about immediately certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.' 250 U.S. at page 627, 40 S.Ct. at page 21, 63 L.Ed. 1173. And in Schaefer the test was said to be 'one of degree', 251 U.S. at page 482, 40 S.Ct. at page 265, 64 L.Ed. 360, although it is not clear whether 'degree' refers to clear and present danger or evil. Perhaps both were meant", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00404", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00255", "text": "es conferred on the states jurisdiction over federal crimes and actions for penalties and forfeitures.5 5 Enforcement of federal laws by state courts did not go unchallenged. Violent public controversies existed throughout the first part of the Nineteenth Century until the 1860's concerning the extent of the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government. During that period there were instances in which this Court and state courts broadly questioned the power and duty of state courts to exercise their jurisdiction to enforce United States civil and penal statutes or the power of the Federal Government to require them to do so.6 But after the fundamental issues over the extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by war, this Court took occasion in 1876 to review the phase of the controversy concerning the relationship of state courts to the Federal Government. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833. The opinion of a unanimous court in that case was strongly buttressed by historic references and persuasive reasoning. It repudiated the assumption that federal laws can be considered by the states as though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its teaching is that the Constitution and the laws passed under it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, 'any-thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary despite.'7 It asserted that the obligation of states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they provide. And the Court stated that 'If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court.' Id. 93 U.S. at page 137, 23 L.Ed. 833. And see United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479, 56 S.Ct. 343, 348, 80 L.Ed. 331. 6 The Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments theretofore advanced against the power and duty of state courts to enforce federal penal laws. And since that decision, the remaining areas of doubt have been steadily narrowed.8 There have been statements in cases concerned with the obligation of states to give full faith", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00050", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00256", "text": "those schools is for a public purpose. If so, I do not understand why the state cannot go father or why this case approaches the verge of its power. 97 In truth this view contradicts the whole purpose and effect of the First Amendment as previously conceived. The 'public function'—'public welfare'—' social legislation' argument seeks in Madison's words, to 'employ Religion (that is, here, religious education) as an engine of Civil policy.' Remonstrance, Par. 5. It is of one piece with the Assessment Bill's preamble, although with the vital difference that it wholly ignores what that preamble explicitly states.43 98 Our constitutional policy is exactly the opposite. It does not deny the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures the r free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity, ad distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the twofold protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private. It cannot be made a public one by legislative act. This was the very heart of Madison's Remonstrance, as it is of the Amendment itself. 99 It is not because religious teaching does not promote the public or the individual's welfare, but because neither is furthered when the state promotes religious education, that the Constitution forbids it to do so. Both legislatures and courts are bound by that distinction. In failure to observe it lies the fallacy of the 'public function'—'social legislation' argument, a fallacy facilitated by easy transference of the argument's basing from due process unrelated to any religious aspect to the First Amendment. 100 By no declaration that a gift of public money to religious uses will promote the general or individual welfare, or the cause of education generally, can legislative bodies overcome the Amendment's bar. Nor may the courts sustain their attempts to do so by finding such consequences for appropriations which in fact give aid to or promote religious uses. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590, 55 S.Ct. 579, 580, 79 L.Ed. 1074; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00030", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00257", "text": "45 A.L.R. 895; Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust Co., 9 Cir., 10 F.2d 19; Sarthou v. Clark, D.C., 78 F.Supp. 139. 6 Guessefeldt has the further obstacle of § 39 to clear before he can succeed. Congress in 1948, so the Government's argument runs, adopted a 'policy of nonreturn,'5 and prohibited the restoration of vested property to a 'national' of Germany. A citizen is a national, and Guessefeldt is a German citizen. Thus, even though he may, before the enactment of § 39, have been entitled to bring suit as a nonenemy under § 9(a), that privilege has since been cut off. To which Guessefeldt counters that § 39 must be construed harmoniously with § 9(a); the term 'national' in the new section must accordingly be taken to mean only those German and Japanese citizens who could not theretofore have enforced the return of their property as of right. Section 39, in the context of its legislative history and in the light of the scheme and background of the statute, makes the Government's contention unpersuasive. 7 It is clear that the Custodian can lawfully vest under § 5 a good deal more than he can hold against a § 9(a) action. Central Union Trust Co. of New York v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 214, 65 L.Ed. 403; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 68 S.Ct. 174, 92 L.Ed. 880. Thus Congress had to make provision for the disposal of two classes of vested property. Nonenemy property, lawfully vested under § 5, was recoverable in a suit against the Custodian. § 9(a); see Becker Steel Co. of America v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 56 S.Ct. 15, 80 L.Ed. 54. The second class, property owned by 'enemies' and therefore not subject to recovery under § 9(a), was reserved for disposition '(a)fter the end of the war * * * as Congress will direct.' 40 Stat. 411", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00426", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00258", "text": "A) collect fees under regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to process background checks provided for by this Act; (B) despite the provisions of section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, retain and use such fees for salaries and other expenses incurred in providing such processing; and (C) establish such fees at a level to include an additional amount to remain available until expended to defray expenses for the automation of fingerprint identification and criminal justice information services and associated costs. (2) State costs.--Nothing in this Act will be construed as restricting the right of a State to assess a reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the costs to the State of administering this Act. (e) State Opt Out.--A State may decline to participate in the background check system authorized by this Act by enacting a law providing that the State is declining to participate under this subsection. (f) State Standards and Information Provided to Employer.-- (1) Absence of state standard.--If a State participates in the background check system authorized by this Act and has no State standard for qualification to be a private security officer, the State will notify an authorized employer whether or not an employee has been convicted of a felony, an offense involving dishonesty or false statement if the conviction occurred during the previous 10 years, or an offense involving the use or attempted use of physical force against the person of another if the conviction occurred during the previous 10 years. (2) State standard.--If a State participates in the background check system authorized by this Act and has State standards for qualification to be a private security officer, the State will use the information received under this Act in applying the State standard and will notify the employer of the results.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 347, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00838", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00259", "text": "i) In general.--The inscription of the year of minting or issuance of the coin, the mint mark, and the inscription `E Pluribus Unum' will be edge-incused into the coin. ``(ii) Preservation of distinctive edge.--The edge- incusing of the inscriptions under clause (i) on coins issued under this subsection will be done in a manner that preserves the distinctive edge of the coin so that the denomination of the coin is readily discernible, including by individuals who are blind or visually impaired. ``(3) Issuance of coins commemorating innovation or innovators.-- ``(A) Order of issuance.-- ``(i) In general.--The coins issued under this subsection commemorating either an innovation, an individual innovator, or a group of innovators, from each State, the District of Columbia, or a territory will be issued in the following order: ``(I) State.--With respect to each State, the coins will be issued in the order in which the States ratified the Constitution of the United States or were admitted into the Union, as the case may be. ``(II) District of columbia and territories.--After all coins are issued under subclause (I), the coins will be issued for the District of Columbia and the territories in the following order: the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(ii) Application in event of the admission of additional states.--despite clause (i), if any additional State is admitted into the Union before the end of the 14-year period referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a $1 coin with respect to the additional State in accordance with clause (i)(I). ``(iii) Application in the event of independence or adding of a territory.--despite clause (i)-- ``(I) if any territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a territory of the United States before $1 coins are minted under this subsection, the subsection will cease to apply with respect to such territory; and ``(II) if any new territory is added to the United States, $1 coins will be issued for such territories in the order in which the new the territories are added, beginning after the $1 coin is issued for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(B) Issuance of coins commemorating four innovations or innovators during each of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00955", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00260", "text": "296 U.S. 39, 46, 56 S.Ct. 74, 77, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239; Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398, 75 L.Ed. 996; and Shukert 26 v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 47 S.Ct. 461, 71 L.Ed. 764, 49 A.L.R. 855. II. THE SECOND PROPOSAL IS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CLIFFORD CASE. 27 To apply the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford, supra, to the case before us is, in effect, to substitute that doctrine for the doctrine of the Reinecke case. previously, this Court has made no application of the doctrine of the Clifford case to § 811(c) or to any of its predecessor Sections. That doctrine has been reserved largely for income tax cases. All the facts appropriate for a decision in this case under the doctrine of the Clifford case have not been presented. The absence of those facts from the record and the absence of this issue from the arguments made below emphasize the inappropriateness of a remand to introduce such facts at this late point in this proceeding. Nothing suggests that this trustee has practiced fraud, or tax evasion, or has violated his obligations as a trustee. The trust became irrevocable at its inception. It thus contrasts sharply with any testamentary instrument which the settlor might have executed. There is nothing in it to suggest that the settlor, even as a sole surviving trustee, would be free from strict accountability to the beneficiaries of the trust or from an obligation to use his discretion in their interest rather than in his own. There is no more of an express provision in this trust for the possobility of a reverter to the settlor than there was in the Reinecke case. The countless uncertainties which would arise in other cases from a retroactive application to this statute of the doctrine of the Clifford case might be nearly as gr at as those which would flow from a reversal of the Reinecke case. 28 Furthermore, there is a sharp contrast between § 22(a)3 and § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as a starting point for the application of the doctrine of the Clifford case", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00226", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00261", "text": "insurance against risks arising from hostilities or warlike operations by an involute and somewhat engimatic set of forms. A binder of insurance issued to Standard by the United States provided: '3. This binder will be subject to all the rules, regulations, conditions and policy forms as prescribed by the War Shipping Administration. * * *' Endorsement No. 1 to the binder also provided: '2. This insurance will be subject to all the rules, regulations, conditions and policy forms as prescribed by the War Shipping Administration in force at the time of issuance of the binder and will be subject to the terms of the requisition charter party relative to this vessel accepted by the assured and any modifications or amendments thereto.' The standard War Shipping Administration policy form referred to in the charter and binder included the following clauses: 'F.C. & S. Clause. despite anything to the contrary contained in the Policy, this insurance is warranted free from any claim for loss, damage, or expense caused by or resulting from capture, seizure, arrest, restraint, or detainment, or the consequences of it or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of the Vessel, by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of peace of war and whether lawful or otherwise; also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations (whether there be a declaration of war or not), piracy, civil war, revolution, rebellion, or insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom. 'If war risks are hereafter insured by endorsement on the Policy, such endorsement will supersede the above warranty only to the extent that their terms are inconsistent and only while such war risk endorsement remains in force.' An endorsement to the policy form further provided: 'It is agreed that this insurance covers only those risks which would be covered by the attached policy (including the Collision Clause) in the absence of the F.C. & S. warranty contained there but which are excluded by that warranty.' 2 In a letter to Standard counsel dated December 14, 1945, the Acting Chief Adjuster, Division of Maritime Insurance, stated that 'any claim or suit by the United States of America, as Owners of the ship Y.M.S.—12, in which we might prove to be concerned, would be waived.' See Interdepartmental Waiver promulgated by War Shipping Administration in Legal Bulletin W.S.A. No. 23, Part II, dated January 14, 1943: 'II", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00381", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00262", "text": "16 Cal.L.Rev. 169 and 257, and see Wiel, Europeanizing the State Constitution—The Water and Power Amendment, 12 Cal.L.Rev. 454; Note, I Stanford L.Rev. 172. 21 The Feasibility Report of Secretary Ickes, supra, n. 8, referring to Friant Dam, Friant-Kern Canal and Madera Canal, among others included, says, 'The next declaration required is that the cost of construction will probably be returned to the Federal Government. This is interpreted to mean that it will be returned within forty years from the time the Secretary issues public notice that water is available from the project works. The estimated cost of construction is $170,000,000 and the annual cost, including repayment of all other charges is $7,500,000. It is estimated that annual revenues from the sale of water and of electric power will be sufficient to cover these charges. The favorable conditions previously recited justify the belief that the project will return its cost.' 22 United States District Court, Southern District of California rendered a decision on April 12, 1950, in Rank v. Krug, 90 F.Supp. 773, consistent with the views we take of the issues here involved. 23 Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District Co. v. Superior Court in and for Colusa County, 196 Cal. 414, 432, 238 P. 687, 694. This is not a local court but a part of a system of state courts. It seems to fall within the rule of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109, as a court whose decrees are regarded as determination of state law rather than within the rule of King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153, 68 S.Ct. 488, 92 L.Ed. 608. 1 Section 7 provides: 'That where in carrying out the provisions of this Act it becomes necessary to acquire any rights or property, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire the same for the United States by purchase or by condemnation under judicial process, and to pay from the reclamation fund the sums which may be needed for that purpose, and it will be", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00368", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00263", "text": "property rests upon Art. 1, § 8 Clause 11 of the Constitution. Stoehr v. Wallace, supra, 255 U.S. (239), at page 242, 41 S.Ct. 293, 65 L.Ed. 404; United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11, 47 S.Ct. 1, (4), 71 L.Ed. 131. Whether it exists at international law may be doubted; but nobody contends that the war power of Congress includes the seizure of the property of friendly aliens. The amendment of § 5(b) must therefore rest upon some other power of Congress, not only for that reason, but because the amendment itself was expressly not limited to time of war (although it was in fact passed flagrante bello) but was to go into effect upon any 'national emergency declared.' It can rest upon Art. 1, § 8, Clause 1: i.e. upon the power 'to provide for the common Defence and general Welfare'; indeed, so far as we can see, the debtor does not challenge the power itself, but its exercise. It complains that the amendment delegates an unrestricted discretion to the President, and does not provide 'just compensation' for seizures.' 156 F.2d 793, 796. 5 40 Stat. 418, § 7(e): 'No person will be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in pursuance of any order, rule, or regulation made by the President under the authority of this Act.' 55 Stat. 840, § 5(b)(2): 'Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest there, made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, under this subdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder will to the extent of it be a full acquitance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person will be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.' 6 40 Stat. 418, 419, § 8(a):", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00115", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00264", "text": "nn. tit. 82, § 861—881 (1938). The power of eminent domain is granted to the petitioner by § 2(f) of the original Act. 'Section 2. Powers, Rights and Privileges.— '(f) To acquire by condemnation any and all property of any Kind, real, personal, or mixed, or any interest there within or without the boundaries of the District necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers, rights, privileges and functions conferred upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by general law with respect to condemnation;' Okla.Sess.L.1935, c. 70, Art. 4. 4 Okla.Rev.L.1910, c. 40; Okla.Sess.L.1927, c. 70, House Bill No. 62; Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 82, §§ 451—510 (1938). 5 This lower court proceeding is thus described in Grand Hydro v. Grand River Dam Authority, 192 Okl. 693, 697, 698, 139 P.2d 798, 803, 804. 6 See note 3, supra. 7 'Sec. 23. * * * '(b) * * * Any person, association, corporation, State, or municipality intending to construct a dam or other project works across, along, over, or in any stream or part of it, other than those defined herein as navigable waters, and over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States will before such construction file declaration of such intention with the Commission, whereupon the Commission will cause immediate investigation of such proposed construction to be made, and if upon investigation it will find that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would be affected by such proposed construction, such person, association, corporation, State, or municipality will not construct, maintain, or operate such dam or other project works until it will have applied for and will have received a license under the provisions of this Act. If the Commission will not so find, and if no public lands or reservations are affected, permission is granted to construct such dam or other project works in such stream upon compliance with State laws.' 49 Stat. 846, 16 U.S.C. § 817, 16 U.S.C.A. § 817. 8 See Enterprise Irrigation", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00213", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00266", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2732/92 of 21 September 1992 adopting for 1993 the measures to improve the quality of olive-oil production THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Regulation No 136/66/EEC of the Council of 22 September 1966 on the establishment of a common organization of the market in oils and fats (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2046/92 (2), and in particular Article 5 (5) of it, because, under Article 5 (4) of Regulation No 136/66/EEC, a percentage of the production aid earmarked for olive oil producers may be allocated to financing action at regional level to improve the quality of olive-oil production; because, under Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1721/91 (3), 2 % of the production aid earmarked for olive-oil producers in the relevant Member States has been allocated to financing action to improve the quality of olive oil in those countries; because rules for the execution of the operations in question should be laid down; because the tasks that may be assigned to producers' organizations should also be defined; because provision should be made for a larger number of measures so as to broaden the selection on the basis of the requirements and opportunities existing in each Member State; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Oils and Fats, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. This Regulation specifies the action to be taken during the period 1 January to 31 December 1993 to improve the quality of olive-oil production. 2. Action will be taken in the following areas: (a) control of the olive fly (Dacus oleae) and, where appropriate, other harmful organisms; (b) improvement of the treatment of olive trees, of the cropping, storage and processing of olives and of the storage of the oils produced; (c) technical assistance during the year to olive growers and to mills with a view to improving the quality of the production and processing of olives into oil; (d) the installation and/or the management of tasting rooms to assess the organoleptic characteristics of virgin olive oils; (e) the installation and/or", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00647", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00268", "text": "ical procedural nullification of constitutional rights in a case involving the liberty of the individual. The original order of January 15 and the so-called amended order are in reality the same order. Moreover, prior to this case there was no 'well-settled Illinois law' to apprise petitioner that his appeal to the intermediate court would constitute a waiver of his rights in circumstances such as these, where he had already sought review of his federal questions in the state supreme court. And finally, even if the contrary had been true, I would not consider this appellate practice reasonable within the doctrine of the Central Union case. 15 Petitioner filed the'scurrilous affidavits' which led to the contempt order on two different occasions. The first was on January 4 in response to the motion to produce them for inspection. The second was on January 15 as part of his answer to Shamberg's motion for a rule to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt for filing documents which he was only required to produce for inspection. On this second occasion the documents were included in the pleadings because relevant to his defense that the statements made there were true.4 The court adjudged petitioner in contempt for both filings.5 16 In the original contempt order of January 15 the court specifically referred to the fact that the documents had been filed twice before, identified them carefully and stated that they'should be by reference incorporated in this order and made a part hereof for greater certainty.' At a a ter point in the order the documents were again listed and adjudged to be ' incorporated by reference in this order and made a part hereof with the same force and effect as if set forth herein.' Thus the documents which gave rise to the contempt order were twice made a matter of public record and twice incorporated in the original contempt order. 17 The so-called amended order of January 23 is absolutely identical with the original order with the immaterial exception that the documents in addition to being incorporated in the order by reference were also'made a part hereof and marked Exhibits 'A' and 'B' respectively.' The reason for the change is probably explained by Illinois cases such as People v. Hogan, 256 Ill. 496, 100 N.E. 177, holding that the record on review of a contempt order is limited to the order itself. But respondent has not called our attention to any Illinois cases holding that incorporation of matter of public record", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00155", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00269", "text": "331 U.S. 432 67 S.Ct. 1283 91 L.Ed. 1585 UNITED STATESv.WALSH. No. 718. Argued April 29, 1947. Decided May 19, 1947. On appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California. Mr. Robert S. Erdahl, of Washington, D.C., for appellant. Mr. Eugene W. Miller, of San Diego, Cal., for appellee. Mr. Justice MURPHY, delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This appeal brings before us § 301(h) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, 1042, 21 U.S.C. § 331(h), 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(h), which prohibits the giving of a false guaranty that any food, drug, device or cosmetic is not adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of the Act. 2 Appellee does business in San Diego, California, under the name of Kelp Laboratories. An information has been filed, charging appellee with having given a false guaranty in violation of § 301(h). The following facts have been alleged: In February, 1943, appellee gave a continuing guaranty to Richard Harrison Products, of Hollywood, California, stating that no products thereafter shipped to the latter would be adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of the Act. On February 24, 1945, while the guaranty was in full force and effect, appellee consigned to Richard Harrison Products, at Holywood, a shipment of vitamin products which were allegedly adulterated and misbranded—thereby making the guaranty false in respect of that shipment. Prior and subsequent to the date of the shipment, Richard Harrison Products was engaged in the business of introducing and delivering for introduction into interstate commerce quantities of the vitamin product supplied by appellee. 3 Appellee moved to dismiss the information on the ground that it did not state an offense. The argument was that § 301(h) applies only to a guaranty that is false relative to an interstate shipment, because the alleged shipment here was to a consignee within California, the state of origin, and there was no allegation that the consignee purchased", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00076", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00270", "text": "may be awarded. If the quantities covered by licence applications submitted exceed the quantities available, the Commission will fix a single allocation coefficient applicable to the quantities applied for per quota. If the overall quantity applied for is less than the quantity available, the Commission will determine the quantity remaining, which will be added to that available in the following period of the same calendar year. 8. As soon as possible after the Commission has taken its decision, licences will be issued to applicants whose applications have been notified in accordance with paragraph 6. Article 5 under Article 21(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3719/88, import licences will be valid for 150 days from the date of actual issue. However, licences will not be valid after 31 December of the year for which they are issued. Import licences issued under this Regulation will not be transferable. CHAPTER II Reduction in customs duty Article 6 Licences for products listed in Part B of Annex I to this and imported under Articles 6(1) and 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1706/98 will be applied for and issued in accordance with this chapter. Article 7 Licence applications and licences will show: (a) in box 8, the country of origin; licences will carry with them an obligation to import from the country shown; (b) in box 15, a detailed description of the product; (c) in box 16, the CN code for the product; (d) under the heading \"'notes'\" and in box 24 respectively, one of the following entries: - Reducción del derecho de aduana en un 16 %, Producto ACP - Reglamento (CE) n° 704/1999, - Nedsættelse af importafgiften med 16 %, AVS-varer - forordning (EF) nr. 704/1999, - Zollermäßigung um 16 %, AKP-Erzeugnis - Verordnung (EG) Nr. 704/1999, - Μειωμένη εισφορά κατά 16 %, προϊόν ΑΚΕ - κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 704/1999, - Duty rate reduced by 16 %, ACP-Product - Regulation (EC) No 704/1999, - Réduction du taux de droit de douane de 16 %, produit ACP règlement (", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00742", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00271", "text": "stration, as estimated by the Office of Management and Budget. If the reduction in spending under paragraphs (1) and (2) for a fiscal year is greater than the estimated aggregate amount designated under section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for that fiscal year, then there will be no sequestration under this section. ``(b) Applicability.-- ``(1) In general.--despite sections 255 and 256, and except as provided by paragraph (2), each account of the United States will be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by multiplying the level of budgetary resources in that account at that time by the uniform percentage necessary to carry out subsection (a). All obligational authority reduced under this section will be done in a manner that makes such reductions permanent. ``(2) Exempt accounts.--No order issued under this section may-- ``(A) reduce benefits payable to the old-age and survivors insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act; ``(B) reduce retired or retainer pay payable to a member or former member of the uniformed services; or ``(C) reduce payments for net interest (all of major functional category 900).''. (b) Reports.--Section 254 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end of the table the following new item: ``October 1.................... Department of the Treasury report to Congress estimating amount of income tax designated under section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, and sequestration to reduce the public debt,'' after ``sequestration''; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) Reports on sequestration to reduce the public debt.-- The preview reports will set forth for the budget year estimates for each of the following: ``(A) The aggregate amount designated under section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for the last taxable year ending before the budget year. ``(B) The amount of reductions required under section 253A and the deficit remaining after those reductions have been made. ``(C) The sequestration percentage necessary to achieve the required reduction in accounts under section 253A(b).'';", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00862", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00272", "text": "cannot be said to constitute double jeopardy as we have previously considered it. Petitioner contends, however, that these cases are inapplicable here because correction of this sentence so as to make it lawful increases his punishment. Cf. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 309, 51 S.Ct. 113, 114, 75 L.Ed. 354. If this inadvertent error cannot be corrected in the manner used here by the trial court, no valid and enforceable sentence can be imposed at all. Cf. Jordan v. United States, 4 Cir., 60 F.2d 4, 6 with Barrow v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 128, 295 F. 949. This Court has rejected the 'doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether because the court committed an error in passing the sentence.' In re Bonner, supra, 151 U.S. at page 260, 14 S.Ct. at page 327, 38 L.Ed. 149. The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner. See King v. United States, 69 App.D.C. 10, 98 F.2d 291, 296. In this case the court 'only set aside what it had no authority to do, and substitute(d) directions required by the law to be done upon the conviction of the offender.' In re Bonner, supra, 151 U.S. at page 260, 14 S.Ct. at page 327, 38 L.Ed. 149. It did not twice put petitioner in jeopardy for the same offense.2 The sentence as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense. 9 Other contentions here do not merit our discussion. The judgment as to count one is affirmed. The judgment is reversed as to counts two and three. 10 It is so ordered. 11 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 12 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice MURPHY, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE dissenting as to the affirmance of the judgment on count one. 13 We are of the view that to convict one as an aider and abetter in engaging in or", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00037", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00273", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2066/2005 of 16 December 2005 fixing the minimum selling price for skimmed-milk powder for the 31st individual invitation to tender issued under the standing invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 214/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (1), and in particular Article 10(c) of it, because: (1) under Article 21 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 214/2001 of 12 January 2001 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards intervention on the market in skimmed milk (2), intervention agencies have put up for sale by standing invitation to tender certain quantities of skimmed-milk powder held by them. (2) In the light of the tenders received in response to each individual invitation to tender a minimum selling price will be fixed or a decision will be taken to make no award, in accordance with Article 24a of Regulation (EC) No 214/2001. (3) In the light of the tenders received, a minimum selling price should be fixed. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 31st individual invitation to tender under Regulation (EC) No 214/2001, in respect of which the time limit for the submission of tenders expired on 13 December 2005, the minimum selling price for skimmed milk is fixed at 185,50 EUR/100 kg. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 17 December 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 December 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 437, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00568", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00274", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``American Innovation $1 Coin Act''. SEC. 2. AMERICAN INNOVATION $1 COIN PROGRAM. Section 5112 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after subsection (v) the following new subsection: ``(w) Redesign and Issuance of $1 Coins Honoring Innovation, Innovators, and Pioneers From Each State, the District of Columbia, and Each Territory.-- ``(1) Redesign beginning in 2017.-- ``(A) In general.--despite subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2) and in accordance with the provisions of this subsection, during the 14-year period beginning on January 1, 2017 (or such later date as provided under subparagraph (B)(ii)), the Secretary of the Treasury will mint and issue $1 coins to be known as `American Innovation $1 coins', that-- ``(i) have designs on the obverse selected in accordance with paragraph (2)(A); and ``(ii) have a design on the reverse selected in accordance with paragraph (2)(B). ``(B) Continuity provisions.-- ``(i) In general.--despite subparagraph (A), the Secretary will continue to mint and issue $1 coins honoring Native Americans and their contributions in accordance with subsection (r). ``(ii) First year.--despite subparagraph (A), if the Secretary finds that it is not feasible and cost-effective to mint and issue American Innovation $1 coins beginning in 2017, the Secretary may mint and issue $1 coins bearing the designs of such Presidential $1 coins issued under subsection (n) that the Secretary determines to be appropriate. If any such Presidential $1 coin design bore the inscription `In God We Trust' incused on the edge, the Secretary will modify the design to place that inscription on the coin's obverse only, and such modification may be done without review by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Committee nor consultation with the Commission of Fine Arts. ``(C) Definition of territory.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `territory' means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. ``(2) Design requirements.--despite subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2), the $1 coins issued in accordance with paragraph (1)(A)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00997", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00275", "text": "50, 28 S.Ct. 690, 52 L.Ed. 954. The Court distinguished sharply between appropriations from public funds for the support of religious education and appropriations from funds held in trust by the Government essentially as trustee for private individuals, Indian wards, as beneficial owners. The ruling was that the latter could be disbursed to private, religious schools at the designation of those patrons for paying the cost of their education. But it was stated also that such a use of public moneys would violate both the First Amendment and the specific statutory declaration involved, namely, that 'it is declared to be the settled policy of the government to hereafter make no appropriation whatever for education in any sectarian school.' 210 U.S. at page 79, 28 S.Ct. at page 697, 52 L.Ed. 954. Cf. Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 322, 28 S.Ct. 737, 747, 52 L.Ed. 1068. And see Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168, an instance of highly artificial grounding to support a decision sustaining an appropriation for the care of indigent patients under a contract with a private hospital. Cf. also the authorities cited in note 9. 36 See text at note 1. 37 '* * * but o religious Test will ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.' Const. Art. VI, cl. 3. See also the two forms prescribed for the President's Oath or Affirmation. Const. Art. II, § 1. Cf. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356; Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073. 38 In the words of the Virginia statute, following the portion of the preamble quoted at the beginning of this opinion: '* * * even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00033", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00276", "text": "of the other actual competitors remains limited (206) Apart from Mobil, there are two other actual competitors, Statoil and Entrade. Statoil has indicated that \"its policy in the Dutch (and German) gas wholesale distribution markets can in short be characterised as a 'wait and see' approach.\" [...]*. (207) The \"direct sales\" by Statoil to the Eems plant is the only sales contract ever done directly by Statoil so that, on the basis of the above, the Commission considers that, overall, Statoil cannot be considered as a competitor that will remain active on the market. [...]*. (208) The other actual competitor is Entrade. Entrade has contracted [...]*. Entrade's sales potential along its pipeline seems to be more or less exhausted. The potential to increase further the sales via TPA with Gasunie seems to be limited [...]*. (209) Mobil has annual gas sales of [...]* under contract. Around [...]* is of British origin, the remainder from Mobil's north Friesland concession (Anjum). One of these contracts is a [...]*. Mobil has indicated that it has no more uncommitted high swing of own production. Potential competition (210) [...]* (211) The parties refer to the proximity of the existing Zeebrugge LNG terminal with spare capacity and connecting pipelines that make immediate entry of LNG possible into the Netherlands and indicate, in their reply, that Sonatrach, the Algerian gas company, could thereby enter the Dutch market. The parties did not provide data concerning the existing spare capacity in the Zeebrugge terminal and connecting pipelines. However, new LNG gas supplies are much more expensive (cost of 16 to 19 ct (HFL)/m3) than pipeline supplies and there is no indication of vertical integration by Sonatrach in any other European gas market. Therefore, potential entry of Sonatrach in the Netherlands is not considered to be very likely. (212) The parties also indicate that the recent TPA agreement that Gazprom secured with Ruhrgas facilitates the possible entry of Gazprom into the Dutch market. because this agreement might facilitate the possible entry, it does not make such an entry more likely. [...]*. In the reply, the parties have indicated that the potential relief from the parallel sales agreement is only for direct marketing by Gazprom to an existing Gasunie customer. However, all customers except", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00670", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00277", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 296/2002 of 15 February 2002 fixing the maximum export refund on wholly milled round grain, medium grain and long grain A rice to be exported to certain third countries in connection with the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 2009/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 of 22 December 1995 on the common organisation of the market in rice(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1987/2001(2), and in particular Article 13(3) of it, because: (1) An invitation to tender for the export refund on rice was issued under Commission Regulation (EC) No 2009/2001(3). (2) Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 584/75(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 299/95(5), allows the Commission to fix, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 and on the basis of the tenders submitted, a maximum export refund. In fixing this maximum, the criteria provided for in Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 must be taken into account. A contract is awarded to any tenderer whose tender is equal to or less than the maximum export refund. (3) The application of the abovementioned criteria to the current market situation for the rice in question results in the maximum export refund being fixed at the amount specified in Article 1. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The maximum export refund on wholly milled grain, medium grain and long grain A rice to be exported to certain third countries under the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 2009/2001 is fixed on the basis of the tenders submitted from 8 to 14 February 2002 at 205,00 EUR/t. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 16 February 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 February", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00559", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00278", "text": "COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 18 December 1986 converning the Community list of less-favoured farming areas within the meaning of Directive 75/268/EEC (France) (86/655/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 75/268/EEC of 28 April 1975 on mountain and hill farming and farming in certain less-favoured areas (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) N° 797/85 (2), and in particular Article 2 (2) of it. Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (3), because Council Directive 75/271/EEC of 28 April 1975 concerning the Community list of less-favoured farming areas within the meaning of Directive 75/268/EEC (4), supplemented by Directives 76/401/EEC (5), 76/631/EEC (6) and 77/178/EEC (7), listed the areas of the French Republic designated as less-favoured within the meaning of Article 3, 4 and 5 of Directive 75/268/EEC; because the Government of the French Republic has, under Article 2 (1) of Directive 75/268/EEC, requested the Commission to extend the Community list of less-favoured farming areas within the meaning of Article 3 (4) of that Directive on the basis of the criteria set out in Directive 75/271/EEC; because the request concerns the classificaton of 474 421 hectares, of which 237 985 hectares fall under Article 3 (4), and 236 436 hectares under Article 3 (5), of Directive 75/268/EEC; because the two types of area notified to the Commission meet the conditions of Article 3 (4) and (5) of Directive 75/268/EEC; because the first concerns less-favoured areas in danger of depopulation, in which the conservation of the countryside is necessary and which are homogeneous from the point of view of natural production conditions, and the second concerns areas suffering specific handicaps and thus they both meet the required characteristics; because, according to the information supplied by the Member", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00615", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00279", "text": "rule, including an explanation of any changes that were made in response to those comments and the reasons that the Commission did not incorporate those industry group concerns related to the potential costs or benefits in the final rule. ``(4) Review of existing regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission will review its regulations to determine whether any such regulations are outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and will modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with such review. Whenever under this paragraph the Commission is engaged in a review, it will consider whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the protection of investors, and whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. In reviewing any regulation (including, despite paragraph (6), a regulation issued in accordance with formal rulemaking provisions) that subjects issuers with a public float of $250,000,000 or less to the attestation and reporting requirements of section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7262(b)), the Commission will specifically take into account the large burden of such regulation when compared to the benefit of such regulation. ``(5) Post-adoption impact assessment.-- ``(A) In general.--Whenever the Commission adopts or amends a regulation designated as a `major rule' within the meaning of section 804(2) of title 5, United States Code, it will state, in its adopting release, the following: ``(i) The purposes and intended consequences of the regulation. ``(ii) Appropriate post-implementation quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the economic impact of the regulation and to measure the extent to which the regulation has accomplished the stated purposes. ``(iii) The assessment plan that will be used, consistent with the requirements of subparagraph (B) and under the supervision of the Chief Economist of the Commission, to assess whether the regulation has achieved the stated purposes. ``(iv) Any unintended or negative consequences that the Commission foresees may result from the regulation. ``(B) Requirements of assessment plan and report.-- ``(i) Requirements of plan.--The assessment plan required under this paragraph will consider the costs, benefits, and intended and unintended consequences of the regulation. The plan will specify the data to be collected, the methods for collection and analysis of the data and a date for completion of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01046", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00280", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Maximize Offshore Resource Exploration Act of 2008'' or the ``MORE Act of 2008''. SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF PROHIBITIONS ON EXPENDITURES FOR, AND WITHDRAWALS FROM, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING. (a) Prohibitions on Expenditures.--All provisions of Federal law that prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds to conduct oil and natural gas leasing and preleasing activities for any area of the Outer Continental Shelf will have no force or effect with respect to such activities. (b) Revocation Withdrawals.--All withdrawals of Federal submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf from leasing, including withdrawals by the President under the authority of section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1341(a)), are revoked and are no longer in effect with respect to the leasing of areas for exploration for, and development and production of, oil and natural gas. SEC. 3. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND NATURAL GAS LEASING PROGRAM. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 9 the following: ``SEC. 10. STATE APPROVAL REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO OIL AND NATURAL GAS LEASING. ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may not issue any lease authorizing exploration for, or development of, oil and natural gas in any area of the outer Continental Shelf that is located within 25 miles of the coastline of a State unless the State has enacted a law approving of the issuance of such leases by the Secretary. ``(b) State Approval Permanent.--Repeal of such a law by a State will have no effect for purposes of subsection (a).''. SEC. 4. SHARING OF REVENUES. (a) In General.--Section 8(g) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337(g)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2) by striking ``despite'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (6), and despite''; (2) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs (7) and (8); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following: ``(6) Royalties under qualified", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01038", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00281", "text": "), a State may (in a uniform manner for such children) require the families of such children to pay monthly premiums set on a sliding scale based on family income. ``(2) A premium requirement imposed under paragraph (1) may only apply to the extent that-- ``(A) in the case of a disabled child described in that paragraph whose family income does not exceed 250 percent of the poverty line, the aggregate amount of such premium and any premium that the parent is required to pay for family coverage under section 1902(cc)(2)(A)(i) does not exceed 7.5 percent of the family's income; and ``(B) the requirement is imposed consistent with section 1902(cc)(2)(A)(ii)(I). ``(3) A State will not require prepayment of a premium imposed under paragraph (1) and will not terminate eligibility of a child under section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) for medical assistance under this title on the basis of failure to pay any such premium until such failure continues for a period of not less than 60 days from the date on which the premium became past due. The State may waive payment of any such premium in any case where the State determines that requiring such payment would create an undue hardship.''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1903(f)(4) (42 U.S.C. 1396b(f)(4)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ``1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX),'' after ``1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII),''. (d) Rule of Construction.--despite any other provision of law, nothing in the amendments made by this section will be construed as permitting the application of the enhanced FMAP (as defined in section 2105(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1397ee(b)) to expenditures that are attributable to disabled children provided medical assistance under section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX)) (as added by subsection (a) of this section). (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section will apply to medical assistance for items and services furnished on or after October 1, 2006. SEC. 3. T", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00968", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00282", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 23 November 1992 authorizing the Kingdom of the Netherlands to apply a measure derogating from Article 21 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (92/545/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value-added tax: uniform basis of assessment (1), and in particular Article 27 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, under Article 27 (1) of the said Directive, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, may authorize any Member State to introduce special measures for derogation from that Directive in order to simplify the procedure for charging the tax or to prevent certain types of tax evasion or avoidance; because the Kingdom of the Netherlands, by letter received by the Commission on 11 February 1992, requested authorization to introduce in the ready-to-wear clothing industry a special measure for derogation from Article 21 (1) (a) of the Sixth Directive; because the purpose of the measure is to combat fraud occurring in the relationship between ready-to-wear clothing firms working for large stores on the one hand, and small workshops (subcontractors) to which those firms have put the work out on the other; because this type of fraud, which consists in the subcontractor invoicing VAT to the contractor but not paying it over to the tax authorities, while the contractor deducts the tax, is difficult to combat under the present system of collecting VAT; because the scheme planned by the Kingdom of the Netherlands involves, in the ready-to-wear clothing industry, collecting from the contractor the VAT normally due from the subcontractor under Article 21 of Directive 77/388/EEC; because the derogation will not have a negative effect on the Community's own resources accruing from value-added tax; because the scheme will be temporary, which will permit an assessment of the effects of the derogation after a period of application; because the Commission will present a report to the Council before 31 December 1996 on the application of this authorization, accompanied, where appropriate, by a proposal", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00525", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00283", "text": "the 'Conservation Fund' and the 'Interstate Oil Compact Fund of Oklahoma.' 68 Id. 1220.3. 14 Although the Oklahoma statutes in their general application lay the taxes on gross production, including royalties, cf. notes 9 and 13, they provide, with respect to the gross production tax, that the producer, in his required monthly statement to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, state, 'where such royalty is claimed to be exempt from taxation by law, the facts on which such claim of exemption is based.' 68 Okla.Stat. § 821 (1941). This provision is made applicable to the petroleum excise tax by the first section of each of the several enactments establishing and continuing that exaction. See note 13 supra. Only the interests of the lessees were assessed in these cases. 15 The Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered separate, unreported opinions. The principal opinion, filed in the Texas Company case, - P.2d —-,* was followed in the later one filed iin the Magnolia Petroleum case, —- P.2d —-.* Rehearing was denied in both cases. * Motion to stay mandate pending at date of publication. The original judgment in the Texas Company case provided for reversal of the trial court' judgment, with directions to overrule the commission's demurrer 'and proceed consistent with the views here expressed.' On motion of counsel for the commission this was modified to provide that 'The trial court judgment * * * is reversed' and that 'final judgment is rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum sued for,' thus eliminating all question concerning the finality of the judgment. 16 See note 15 supra. 17 under former § 237(c) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 344(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(c), present 28 U.S.C. § 2103, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2103. 18 Thomson v. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall. 579, 19 L.Ed. 792; Union Pac. Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L.Ed. 787; Central Pacific R. Co. v. People of State of California, 162 U.S. 91, 16 S.Ct. 766, 40 L", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00245", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00284", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 6/2004 of 5 January 2004 fixing Community producer and import prices for carnations and roses with a view to the application of the arrangements governing imports of certain floricultural products originating in Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4088/87 of 21 December 1987 fixing conditions for the application of preferential customs duties on imports of certain flowers originating in Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1300/97(2), and in particular Article 5(2)(a) of it, because: under Article 2(2) and Article 3 of abovementioned Regulation (EEC) No 4088/87, Community import and producer prices are fixed each fortnight for uniflorous (bloom) carnations, multiflorous (spray) carnations, large-flowered roses and small-flowered roses and apply for two-weekly periods. under Article 1b of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 700/88 of 17 March 1988 laying down detailed rules for the application of the arrangements for the import into the Community of certain floricultural products originating in Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2062/97(4), those prices are determined for fortnightly periods on the basis of weighted prices provided by the Member States. Those prices should be fixed immediately so the customs duties applicable can be determined. To that end, provision should be made for this Regulation to enter into force immediately, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The Community producer and import prices for uniflorous (bloom) carnations, multiflorous (spray) carnations, large-flowered roses and small-flowered roses as referred to in Article 1b of Regulation (EEC) No 700/88 for a fortnightly period will be as set out in the Annex. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 6 January 2004. It will apply from 7 to 20 January 2004.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00701", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00285", "text": "ervicemen' whom Congress desired to assist by means of the Veterans' Preference Act. 18 One other matter remains. Respondents claim, and the Court of Appeals held, that they acquired vested preference rights under § 18 of the Act. In pertinent part, § 18 provides that 'this Act will not be construed to take away from any preference eligible any rights previously granted to, or possessed by, him under any existing law, Executive order, civil-service rule or regulation, of any department of the Government or officer of it.' It is said that the Civil Service Commission's ruling of April 4, 1944, extending preference rights under the then existing laws to those who had performed service with the Volunteer Port Security Force, gave respondents vested rights which were preserved by § 18 when the Veterans' Preference Act was subsequently enacted. 19 This contention is without substance. Veterans' preference rights by their very nature do not accrue until one has become a veteran through separation from the armed forces. On June 27, 1944, when the Veterans' Preference Ac became law, neither of the respondents had as yet disenrolled from the Volunteer Port Security Force. In fact, respondent Hubickey had not even enrolled by that date. Thus they could not be classed as veterans or ex-servicemen, whatever definition be given those terms, on June 27, 1944, and they could not have earned any veterans' preference rights prior to that date. The Commission's ruling of April 4, 1944, did no more than inform respondents that they would be entitled to veterans' preference upon disenrollment, provided such ruling was lawful and still in effect. It did not purport to give them preference rights as of April 4, 1944, or to cause those rights to accrue before disenrollment. Since they did not possess and had not been granted any such rights under prior law, respondents were completely unaffected by the provisions of § 18. That section was primarily designed to perpetuate preferences granted earlier to veterans who had served in the armed forces during peacetime and who were then in government employment or on civil-service registers.16 Respondents were obviously not veterans of that type. 20 Reversed. 21 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS dissents. 1 58 Stat. 387, 5 U.S.C. § 851, 5 U.S.C.A. § 851. 2", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00145", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00286", "text": "New York has extended to its citizens against their nonresident debtors. These, in appropriate circumstances, may take the form of receivership10 or attachment.11 While these two remedies differ in nature and incidents, they are alike in being available at the commencement or during the pendency of an action, are not independent but auxiliary in character, and are not designed finally to adjudge substantive rights but to secure such judgment as may be rendered. As employed in this case, attachment also was the sole basis of jurisdiction. 5 The attachment levy on bank balances is perfected by service of a certified copy of the warrant of attachment on the banking institution,12 which is required to certify to the sheriff making the levy the balance due to the defendant.13 The levy does not require the sheriff to take physical possession of any property, nor does it require any transfer of title. The effect is prescribed: 'Any such person so served with a certified copy of a warrant of attachment is forbidden to make or suffer, any transfer or other disposition of, or interfere with, any such property or interest there so levied upon, * * * or sell, assign or transfer any right so levied upon, to any person, or persons, other than the sheriff serving the said warrant until ninety days from the date of such service, except upon direction of the sheriff or under an order of the court.'14 The account attached must, on the sheriff's demand, be paid over to him within ninety days, unless, as here, the time has been extended by order of court, and the sheriff is authorized to institute an action within that time to recover amounts withheld.15 6 These creditors prosecuted their actions to judgments which could be satisfied only from attached property and by issuance of executions.16 An attachment merges in an execution when issued, but it is not annulled until the judgment is paid and remains in force to keep alive the lien on the property. Castriotis v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1920, 229 N.Y. 74, 79, 127 N.E. 900, 902. 7 Execution, if issued, would require a transfer of credit and of funds, but this step has not been taken and, it is admitted, cannot be taken in these cases without a federal license. While requirement of a federal license creates something of a contingency as to satisfaction of the judgments, as matter of New York law this does not deprive the judgment of its", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00402", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00287", "text": ", when a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is '* * * as bad a word as you can give to man or thing.'18 State courts of last resort, on whom fall the heaviest burden of interpreting criminal law in this country, have consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses.19 If any state has deviated, the exception has neither been called to our attention nor disclosed by our research. 25 Congress, therefore, omitted any express prescription of criminal intent from the enactment before us in the light of an unbroken course of judicial decision in all constituent states of the Union holding intent inherent in this class of offense, even when not expressed in a statute. Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except the Act. Because the offenses before this Court in the Balint and Behrman cases were of this latter class, we cannot accept them as authority for eliminating intent from offenses incorporated from the common law. Nor do exhaustive studies of state court cases disclose any well-considered decisions applying the doctrine of crime without intent to such enacted common-law offenses,20 although a few deviations are notable as illustrative of the danger inherent in the Government's contentions here.21 26 The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom previously allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative. 27 The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly22 admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute. And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00423", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00288", "text": ". 169, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109, as a court whose decrees are regarded as determination of state law rather than within the rule of King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153, 68 S.Ct. 488, 92 L.Ed. 608. 1 Section 7 provides: 'That where in carrying out the provisions of this Act it becomes necessary to acquire any rights or property, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire the same for the United States by purchase or by condemnation under judicial process, and to pay from the reclamation fund the sums which may be needed for that purpose, and it will be the duty of the Attorney-General of the United States upon every application of the Secretary of the Interior, under this Act, to cause proceedings to be commenced for condemnation within thirty days from the receipt of the application at the Department of Justice.' 43 U.S.C.A. § 421. 2 A United States District Court for the Southern District of California has recently held, however, that § 8 of the Act provides for the purchase of water rights taken in connection with the Central Valley Project. Rank et al. v. Krug, 90 F.Supp. 773. 3 The memorandum records the following data: Region 1 (Washington, Idaho, northern Oregon, western Montana) reported the filing of appropriations under state law in 12 projects involving navigable rivers. In Region 2 (northern California, Oregon), § 8 has been construed to include rights in navigable as well as nonnavigable waters, although the exact number of filings was not revealed. Although some filings for appropriation under state law have been made in Region 3 (southern California, Arizona, southern Nevada), the lower Colorado River projects are the single exception to the otherwise consistent administrative practice. In Region 4 (northern Nevada, Utah, western Wyoming, western Colorado), water rights on at least two navigable rivers have been acquired under state law. No occasion has yet arisen in Region 5 (Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, southern Colorado) making necessary the acquisition of water rights on navigable streams. In the only instance in Region 6 (eastern Montana, northern Wyoming, North and South Dakota) where a federal project interfered with private water rights on a navigable river, the rights were paid for by", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00369", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00289", "text": "N.E.2d 345. 19 '(d) Any transfer affected by the Order and/or this general ruling and involved in, or arising out of, any action or proceeding in any Court within the United States will, so far as affected by the Order and/or this general ruling, be valid and enforceable for the purpose of determining for the parties to the action or proceeding the rights and liabilities there litigated; Provided, however, That no attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process will confer or create a greater right, power, or privilege with respect to, or interest in, any property in a blocked account than the owner of such property could create or confer by voluntary act prior to the issuance of an appropriate license.' See also Public Circular No. 31, August 2, 1946, 11 F.R. 8351. 20 E.g., Decker v. Gardner, 124 N.Y. 334, 26 N.E. 814, 11 L.R.A. 480; see Keeney v. Home Insurance Co., 71 N.Y. 396, 401, 27 Am.Rep. 60. 21 E.g., Mutual Brewing Co. v. New York & C.P.F. Co., 16 App.Div. 149, 45 N.Y.S. 101; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Sanborn, 34 Misc. 531, 69 N.Y.S. 1009; see N.Y. General Corporation Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 23, §§ 162, 163, 168, and annotations thereto. Petitioner calls our attention to Nealis v. American Tube & Iron Co., 150 N.Y. 42, 45, 44 N.E. 944, a case not cited to the Court of Appeals. This case says that a temporary receiver under a different statute 'is vested with title, and represents the corporation and its creditors as fully as a permanent receiver after final judgment of dissolution.' Page 45 of 150 N.Y., page 945 of 44 N.E. This case, however, involved the right of a temporary receiver to sue and the opinion deals with that problem rather than the distinction between a right to obtain possession and title. See In re Warren E. Smith Co., 31 App.Div. 39,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00295", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00290", "text": "the satisfaction of such corporation will cease to be deemed abandoned.' 3 187 Misc. 1004, 65 N.Y.S.2d 143; Id., 271 App.Div. 1002, 69 N.Y.S.2d 323; Id., 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24. 4 Abandoned Property Law, Art. XIV, § 1404: '1. The care and custody, subject only to the duty of conversion prescribed in section fourteen hundred two of this chapter, of all abandoned property previously paid to the state, except '(i) abandoned property in individual amounts of less than one dollar so paid under chapter one hundred seven of the laws of nineteen hundred forty-two; and of all abandoned property paid to the state comptroller under this chapter, is assumed for the benefit of those entitled to receive the same, and the state will hold itself responsible for the payment of all claims established thereto under law, less any lawful deductions, which cannot be paid from the abandoned property fund.' See also §§ 702, 1402, 1406(1)(a) and(b), and Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra, at page 242 of 321 U.S., at page 604 of 64 S.Ct., 88 L.Ed. 692, 151 A.L.R. 824. 5 Compare State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358, 139 A.L.R. 1436; Northwest Airlines v. State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 293, 294, 64 S.Ct. 950, 951, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 153 A.L.R. 245. 6 Purdon's Penna.Stat., Title 27, §§ 434—437. 7 N.J.Rev.Stat. § 17:34—49—34—58, N.J.S.A. 8 Ch. 455, Mass.Acts and Resolves (1946). 9 See Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra; Security Sav. Bank v. People of State of California, supra; In re Rapoport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.W.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 493, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00149", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00291", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Clatsop-Nehalem Restoration Act''. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Interim council.--The term ``Interim Council'' means the council which is established under, and the members elected under, section 5. (2) Member.--The term ``member'', when used with respect to the tribe, means an individual enrolled on the membership roll of the tribe in accordance with section 7. (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary's designated representative. (4) Tribal governing body.--The term ``tribal governing body'' means the governing body that is established under, and the members elected under, the tribal constitution and bylaws adopted in accordance with section 6. (5) Tribe.--The term ``tribe'' means Clatsop-Nehalem Confederated Tribes of Oregon considered as one tribe in accordance with section 3. SEC. 3. CONSIDERATION OF THE CLATSOP-NEHALEM CONFEDERATED TRIBES AS ONE TRIBE. The Clatsop-Nehalem Confederated Tribes of Oregon will be considered as one tribal unit for purposes of Federal recognition and eligibility for Federal benefits under section 4, the establishment of tribal self-government under sections 5 and 6, and the compilation of a tribal membership roll under section 7. SEC. 4. RESTORATION OF FEDERAL RECOGNITION, RIGHTS, AND PRIVILEGES. (a) Federal Recognition.--despite any provision of the Act approved August 13, 1954 (25 U.S.C. 691 et seq.), or any other law, Federal recognition is extended to the Clatsop-Nehalem Confederated Tribes of Oregon. Nothing is this Act will affect or diminish the treaty rights previously determined for other federally recognized Indian tribes. (b) Restoration of Rights and Privileges.--Except as provided in subsection (d), all rights and privileges of the tribe and the members of the tribe under any Federal treaty, Executive order, agreement, statute, or other Federal authority, that may have been diminished or lost under the Act approved August 13, 1954 (25 U.S.C. 691 et seq.), are restored, and the provisions of such Act will be inapplicable to the tribe and to members of the tribe", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00957", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00292", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 3062/80 of 25 November 1980 on the conclusion of the Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic Community and the Government of Spain THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 43 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1), because, by its resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977, the Council agreed, on the one hand, that the fishing by fishing vessels of third countries of fishery resources in the said zone would be governed by agreements between the Community and the countries concerned and, on the other hand, that fishing rights for Community fishermen in the waters of third countries must be obtained and preserved by appropriate Community agreements; because the Agreement on fisheries between the Community and Spain should therefore be concluded, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The Agreement on fisheries between the Government of Spain and the European Economic Community is approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Agreement is annexed to this Regulation. Article 2 The President of the Council will, on behalf of the Community, give the notification provided for in Article 12 of the Agreement (2). Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 25 November 1980.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 346, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00512", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00293", "text": "ensure such safety and soundness. (10) An analysis of actions taken by the enterprise that had a beneficial or harmful effect on holders of enterprise- related securities, in particular, preferred stock issued prior to September 6, 2008. (11) Any other information that the covered officer considers relevant or important with respect to the enterprise, and the activities and condition of the enterprise. (c) Reporting Periods; Timing of Reports.-- (1) Initial period.--The first reporting period for each enterprise will be the period that began upon the commencement of the conservatorship period for the enterprise and that ends upon the date of the enactment of this Act. The reports required under this section for such period will be submitted not later than the expiration of the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Quarterly periods.--After the first reporting period, the reporting periods for each enterprise will be each calendar quarter that concludes after the date of the enactment of this Act. Each report for each such reporting period will be submitted not later than the expiration of the 60-day period beginning upon the conclusion of such reporting period. (3) Receivership.--despite paragraph (2), if at any time a receiver is appointed for an enterprise under section 1367 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (12 U.S.C. 4617), the reporting periods for the enterprise during such receivership will be each calendar month (or such shorter period as the covered officer considers appropriate). Each report for each such reporting period will be submitted not later than the expiration of the 30-day period beginning upon the conclusion of such reporting period. (4) Nationalization.--despite paragraph (2), if at any time the Federal Government or any agency or entity of the Federal Government obtains control of an enterprise under law or through ownership of voting stock of the enterprise, or the covered officer determines that the enterprise has otherwise been nationalized, the reporting periods for the enterprise after such nationalization occurs will be the consecutive 6- month periods (the first such period beginning upon such nationalization (or such shorter period as the covered officer considers appropriate). Each report for each such reporting period will be submitted not later than the expiration of the 60-day period beginning upon the conclusion of such reporting period. (d) Public Availability.--The covered officer will-- (1) make information regarding the activities of the covered officer, including each report submitted to", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01056", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00294", "text": "here this Court could not possibly sustain the trial court (which had been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals) without necessarily affirming the trial court's ruling on the issue of jurisdiction. This Court reversed the trial court on that issue and held that the district court had jurisdiction. It found, however, that the cause of action should have been dismissed but on the merits. Accordingly, this Court modified the decree so that the dismissal was on the merits and not for want of jurisdiction. This Court could not have reached the merits without first determining whether there ws jurisdiction to reach them. In short, in Hurn v. Oursler the precedent of the district court had to be set aside in order to decide the case. Here, the 'precedent' of the district court is upon an issue which is essentially irrelevant, and therefore we should not follow the error of the district court in pronouncing upon an issue which 'need not be decided to dispose of this case.' 89 Appendix. 90 License Agreement. 91 This agreement made this 18th day of October, A.D. 1929, by and between the United States Gypsum Company, an Illinois corporation, of Chicago, Illinois, from now on referred to as Licensor, and Ebsary Gypsum Co., Inc. a New York corporation, of Newark, New Jersey, from now on referred to as Licensee, Witnesseth, that 92 2. Licensor has agreed to and does give and grant unto Licensee an indivisible and non-exclusive right, license and privilege of using the process or processes and a king and using the machines and/or inventions set forth and claimed in any and all of said patents and/or applications for letters patent set forth in Exhibit A attached to this in the manufacture of gypsum plasterboard and/or gypsum wallboard at the plants or factories now owned and/or operated by Licensee, or at any other plant or factory hereafter owned and/or operated or controlled by it or any subsidiary, associated or affiliated company, and of manufacturing at any such place or places, selling and using in the United States of America and the territories and possessions of it gypsum plasterboard or gypsum wallboard manufactured at any such place or places and embodying the inventions and improvements set forth and claimed in said patents and/or applications for letters patent described in said Exhibit A, for the full term of said letters patent or of any letters patent which may be granted for or upon any of said applications, including any", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00140", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00295", "text": ") of this section, not later than the expiration of the 12-month period that begins on the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 3. MONTHLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS. (a) Authority.--Subsection (g) of section 1308 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4015(g)) is amended-- (1) by striking the subsection designation and all that follows through ``With respect'' and inserting the following: ``(g) Frequency of Premium Collection.-- ``(1) Options.--With respect''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Monthly installment payment of premiums.-- ``(A) Exemption from rulemaking.--Until such time as the Administrator promulgates regulations implementing paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator may adopt policies and procedures, despite any other provisions of law and in alignment and consistent with existing industry escrow and servicing standards, necessary to implement such paragraph without undergoing notice and comment rulemaking and without conducting regulatory analyses otherwise required by statute, regulation, or Executive order. ``(B) Pilot program.--The Administrator may initially implement paragraph (1) of this subsection as a pilot program that provides for a gradual phase-in of implementation. ``(C) Policyholder protection.--The Administrator may-- ``(i) during the 12-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this subparagraph, charge policyholders choosing to pay premiums in monthly installments a fee for the total cost of the monthly collection of premiums not to exceed $25 annually; and ``(ii) after the expiration of the 12-month period referred to in clause (i), adjust the fee charged annually to cover the total cost of the monthly collection of premiums as determined by the report submitted under subparagraph (D). ``(D) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General will submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, that sets forth all of the costs associated with the monthly payment of premiums, including any up- front costs associated with infrastructure development, the impact on all policyholders including those that exercise the option to pay monthly and those that do not, options for minimizing the costs, particularly the costs to policyholders, and the feasibility of adopting practices that serve to minimize costs to policyholders such as", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00871", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00296", "text": "and the inscription `E Pluribus Unum' will be edge- incused into the coin. ``(ii) Preservation of distinctive edge.-- The edge-incusing of the inscriptions under clause (i) on coins issued under this subsection will be done in a manner that preserves the distinctive edge of the coin so that the denomination of the coin is readily discernible, including by individuals who are blind or visually impaired. ``(3) Issuance of coins commemorating innovation, innovators, and pioneers.-- ``(A) Order of issuance.--The coins issued under this subsection commemorating either an innovation, an individual innovator or pioneer, or a group of innovators or pioneers, from each State, the District of Columbia, or a territory will be issued in alphabetic order of the State, the District, or territory represented, starting with Alabama. ``(B) Issuance of coins commemorating four innovations, innovators, and pioneers during each of 14 years.-- ``(i) In general.--Four $1 coin designs as described in this subsection will be issued during each year of the period referred to in paragraph (1) until one coin featuring one innovation, an individual innovator or pioneer, or a group of innovators or pioneers, from each of the States, the District of Columbia, and territories has been issued. ``(ii) Number of coin designs in each year.--The Secretary will prescribe, on the basis of such factors as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, the number of $1 coins that will be issued with each of the designs selected for each year of the period referred to in paragraph (1). ``(iii) Application in event of the admission of additional states.-- despite clause (i), if any additional State or territory is admitted into the Union before the end of the 14-year period referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may issue $1 coins, in accordance with this subsection during any one year of such 14- year period, in addition to the four $1 coins issued during such year in accordance with clause (i). ``(iv) Application in the event of independence.--despite paragraph (3)(B)(i), if any State or territory becomes independent or otherwise ceases to be a State or territory of the United States before $1 coins are minted under this subsection, the subsection will cease to apply with respect to such State or territory. ``(4) Selection of concept and design.-- ``(A) Concept", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00998", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00297", "text": "section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section. ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under this chapter for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother. ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-- ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or ``(ii) the accused intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child. ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person will, instead of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 880, 918, and 919(a) of this title (articles 80, 118, and 119(a)) for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being. ``(D) despite any other provision of law, the death penalty will not be imposed for an offense under this section. ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are sections 918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 928 of this title (articles 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 122, 124, 126, and 128). ``(c) Nothing in this section will be construed to permit the prosecution-- ``(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law; ``(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or ``(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child. ``(d) In this section, the term `unborn child' means a child in utero, and the term `child in utero' or `child, who is in utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such sub", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00975", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00298", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Energy Price Protection Act of 2007''. SEC. 2. GASOLINE PRICE GOUGING PROHIBITED. (a) Unlawful Conduct.-- (1) Unfair and deceptive act or practice.--It will be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for any person to sell crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, home heating oil, or any biofuel at a price that constitutes price gouging as defined by rule under subsection (b). (2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the term ``biofuel'' means any fuel containing any organic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis, including agricultural crops and trees, wood and wood wastes and residues, plants (including aquatic plants), grasses, residues, fibers, and animal wastes, municipal wastes, and other waste materials. (b) Price Gouging.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission will promulgate, in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, any rules necessary for the enforcement of this section. (2) Contents.--Such rules-- (A) will define ``price gouging'', ``retail sale'', and ``wholesale sale'' for purposes of this Act; and (B) will be consistent with the requirements for declaring unfair acts or practices in section 5(n) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(n)). (c) Enforcement.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (d), a violation of subsection (a) will be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). The Federal Trade Commission will enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. (2) Exclusive enforcement.--despite any other provision of law, no person, State, or political subdivision of a State, other than the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General of the United States to the extent provided for in section", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00938", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00299", "text": "necessary to set forth with some particularity the facts and controlling issues. I. 8 Appellant is in the business of manufacturing diesel fuel injection equipment and precision parts, and aircraft precision parts. Its manufacturing activities, insofar as material,8 were carried on under subcontracts with government contractors. The contractor in turn furnished the completed aircraft or engines t the Unite d States. 9 under the First Renegotiation Act, the Secretary of War, acting though his delegate the Under Secretary of War, determined on October 27, 1943, that during the fiscal year ended November 30, 1942, appellant had realized excessive profits (less tax credits) amounting to $204,000. On April 29, 1944, the Under Secretary directed appellant's customers to withhold this sum from appellant. Thereafter it filed a petition with the Tax Court9 for a redetermination of the alleged excessive profits. Nevertheless, on July 19, 1944, the Under Secretary further directed appellant's customers to pay the $204,000 into the Treasury of the United States, and this direction was obeyed.10 10 Following the fiscal year ended November 30, 1943, renegotiation proceedings were instituted under the Second Renegotiation Act. On January 11, 1945, the Under Secretary of War, as delegate of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, entered an order determining that appellant had realized excessive profits of $1,265,000. Deduction of tax credits reduced this amount to approximately $270,000. Appellant again filed a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court.11 Then followed this suit. 11 The amended complaint is too lengthy for detailed summarization in this opinion. Apart from allegations going to constitutionality and coverage, including asserted defects in the renegotiation procedures followed,12 the complaint sought to establish jurisdiction in the District Court, equitable in character, by showing the inadequacy of all available legal or other remedies. These included the pending Tax Court proceedings, possible suit in the Court of Claims following completion of the Tax Court's determination, and actions at law against appellant's customers, contractors with the Government to recover the amounts said to be due under their varios contract s. 12 In particular it was alleged that, despite the pendency of the Tax Court proceedings, the Board and the Secretary, or his delegates, were taking steps to prevent Aircraft's customers from paying over to it moneys owing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00091", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00300", "text": "of the first beneficiary is used by the regulation as the basis of an actuarial calculation under a formula whereby total payments under § 602(h)(2) approximate the face value of the policies, plus interest. The extent of the difference in result is indicated by the table, set forth in the margin,18 of comparative present values of the monthly installments under the regulation and under the view of the Circuit Court of Appeals, taking into account the beneficiary's life expectancy as shown by the American Experience Table of Mortality. 20 The Circuit Court thought it probable that Congress originally intended the higher rate of benefit payments to be restricted to the beneficiaries covered by § 602(h)(2) because that group of persons over 30 at the time of the serviceman's death would include parents, who would be at least middleaged, and 'young widows with small children whose ten years of monthly payments would end at the most needed time.'19 This would hardly serve to explain, however, why Congress would intentionally discriminate in so substantial a manner against a similarly deserving but slightly younger widow in the under-thirty category by failing to extend comparable benefits to the latter group. 21 The disparity in benefits available under the respondent's view, as contrasted with those available under the regulation, is reflected in a correspondingly large increase, under the former view, in the total liability for beneficial payments.20 This greatly enhanced liability could be met, theoretically, in either of two ways: by special congressional appropriations, or by greatly increased premium rates substantially above those which are now set by the Veterans' Administration on the assumption that the regulation is proper. 22 The Circuit Court of Appeals was of the opinion that Congress intended the Government to bear the burden of this extraordinary liability. By express provisions in the 1940 Act, Congress specified that the United States would bear the administrative costs of the insurance system,21 excess mortality and disability cost resulting from the extra hazards of war,22 and the cost of reimbursing the reserve fund for waiving recovery of benefit payments erroneously made where it would be inequitable to require repayment.23 Congress obviously contemplated that the reserve fund to meet the liabilities of National Service Life Insurance policies was to be self-supporting, sustained by the premiums paid and by the yield of premiums invested, in all respects aside from those exceptional situations where the statute specifically designated that the Government would bear the financial burden. Yet Congress nowhere specified that the United States would bear the huge cost of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00184", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00301", "text": "payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest there, made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, under this subdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder will to the extent of it be a full acquitance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person will be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.' 6 40 Stat. 418, 419, § 8(a): 'That any person not an enemy or ally of enemy holding a lawful mortgage, pledge, or lien, or other right in the nature of security in property of an enemy or ally of enemy which, by law or by the terms of the instrument creating such mortgage, pledge, or lien, or right, may be disposed of on notice or presentation or demand * * * may continue to hold said property, and, after default, may dispose of the property * * *. Provided further, That if, on any such disposition of property, a surplus will remain after the satisfaction of the mortgage, pledge, lien, or other right in the nature of security, notice of that fact will be given to the President under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, and such surplus will be held subject to his further order.' 7 The Circuit Court of Appeals said: 'Thus it can be argued with much force that, unless some provision can be found by which he may secure compensation, § 5(b) is unconstitutional; and, if so, it would at best be doubtful whether the protection given by subsection (2) would be valid.' 156 F.2d 793, 797.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 390, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00116", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00302", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1666/2002 of 19 September 2002 fixing the maximum export refund for white sugar for the seventh partial invitation to tender issued within the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1331/2002 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector(1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 680/2002(2), and in particular Article 27(5) of it, because: (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1331/2002 of 23 July 2002 on a standing invitation to tender to determine levies and/or refunds on exports of white sugar(3), for the 2002/2003 marketing year, requires partial invitations to tender to be issued for the export of this sugar. (2) under Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1331/2002 a maximum export refund will be fixed, as the case may be, account being taken in particular of the state and foreseeable development of the Community and world markets in sugar, for the partial invitation to tender in question. (3) Following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the seventh partial invitation to tender, the provisions set out in Article 1 should be adopted. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the seventh partial invitation to tender for white sugar issued under Regulation (EC) No 1331/2002 the maximum amount of the export refund is fixed at 48,770 EUR/100 kg. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 20 September 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 19 September 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 435, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00662", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00303", "text": "in 1962 to the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization of New York for that purpose. (3) To facilitate efforts by the United States to seek an agreement whereby nations with claims against gold held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold would contribute all, or a substantial portion, of that gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. SEC. 102. DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE TRIPARTITE GOLD COMMISSION. (a) Directions to the President.--The President will direct the commissioner representing the United States on the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, established under Part III of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, to seek and vote for a timely agreement under which all signatories to the Paris Agreement on Reparation, with claims against the monetary gold pool in the jurisdiction of such Commission, contribute all, or a substantial portion, of such gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. (b) Authority To Obligate the United States.-- (1) In general.--From funds otherwise unobligated in the Treasury of the United States, the President is authorized to obligate subject to paragraph (2) an amount not to exceed $30,000,000 for distribution in accordance with subsections (a) and (b). (2) Conformance with budget act requirement.--Any budget authority contained in paragraph (1) will be effective only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts. SEC. 103. FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, not to exceed a total of $25,000,000 for all such fiscal years, for distribution to organizations as may be specified in any agreement concluded under section 102. (b) Archival Research.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President $5,000,000 for archival research and translation services to assist in the restitution of assets looted or extorted from victims of the Holocaust and such other activities that would further Holocaust remembrance and education. TITLE II--WORKS OF ART SEC. 201. FINDINGS. Congress finds as follows: (1) Established pre-World War II principles of international law, as enunciated in Articles 47 and", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00943", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00304", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 399/2002 of 1 March 2002 fixing the minimum selling prices for butter and the maximum aid for cream, butter and concentrated butter for the 92nd individual invitation to tender under the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2571/97 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000(2), and in particular Article 10 of it, because: (1) The intervention agencies are, under Commission Regulation (EC) No 2571/97 of 15 December 1997 on the sale of butter at reduced prices and the granting of aid for cream, butter and concentrated butter for use in the manufacture of pastry products, ice-cream and other foodstuffs(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 635/2000(4), to sell by invitation to tender certain quantities of butter that they hold and to grant aid for cream, butter and concentrated butter. Article 18 of that Regulation stipulates that in the light of the tenders received in response to each individual invitation to tender a minimum selling price will be fixed for butter and maximum aid will be fixed for cream, butter and concentrated butter. It is further stipulated that the price or aid may vary according to the intended use of the butter, its fat content and the incorporation procedure, and that a decision may also be taken to make no award in response to the tenders submitted. The amount(s) of the processing securities must be fixed accordingly. (2) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The minimum selling prices and the maximum aid and processing securities applying for the 92nd individual invitation to tender, under the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2571/97, will be fixed as indicated in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 2 March 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00632", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00305", "text": "30, 1945, he was disenrolled, having served on active duty on 32 days for a total service of 250 hours. 8 On April 4, 1944, before the passage of the Veterans' Preference Act, the Civil Service Commission had ruled that the duties performed by those enrolled in the Volunteer Port Security Force entitled them to veterans' preference in federal employment under the then existing preference laws.9 But on November 4, 1944, after the enactment of the statute in question and under a recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Commission changed this ruling and decided that such duties did not entitle one to veterans' preference under the terms of the statute.10 9 The two respondents were denied veterans' preference in their government employment in accordance with the Commission's second ruling. Due to general reductions in force, respondent Cohen was discharged from the War Department and respondent Hubickey was notified that he would be discharged from the Navy Department. They then brought these actions to compel the members of the Commission to classify them as preference eligibles; they also asked the court to adjudge and declare them entitled to the status of preference eligibles under the provisions of the Veterans' Preference Act. The District Court granted summary judgments in their favor. 69 F.Supp. 54. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed, one justice dissenting. 160 F.2d 915. We brought the cases here on certiorari, the problem raised being one of importance in the administration of the Veterans' Preference Act. 10 The pertinent portion of the Veterans' Preference Act is to be found near the end of § 2. That establishes preference in government employment for 'those exservicemen and women who have served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States, during any war, * * * and have been separated therefrom under honorable conditions.' 11 Respondents claim that their service with the Volunteer Port Security Force brings them squarely within this statutory provision, hence entitling them to veterans' preference. It is undisputed, of course, that they did serve part-time on active dt y in a branch of the armed forces of the United States during World War II and that they were separated therefrom under honorable conditions. The crucial question is whether they thereby are 'ex-servicemen' within the meaning of this particular statute. On that score, respondents urge that this term must", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00144", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00306", "text": ") in subparagraph (U), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (V)(iii), by adding ``and'' at the end; and (C) by inserting after subparagraph (V) the following new subparagraph: ``(W) remote assessment of diabetic retinopathy (as defined in subsection (ww));''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``Remote Assessment of Diabetic Retinopathy ``(ww) The term `remote assessment of diabetic retinopathy' means a diagnostic examination of the retina for the purpose of early detection of diabetic retinopathy that-- ``(1) is provided not more frequently than on an annual basis to an individual who has been diagnosed with diabetes; ``(2) meets technical standards set forth by the Secretary (which will be determined in consultation with industry and practitioner groups with expertise in ophthalmic photography, telemedicine, or related fields); and ``(3) is furnished via a telecommunications system by a physician (as defined in subsection (r)), a practitioner (described in section 1842(b)(18)(C) of this title), or a non- physician technician deemed to be qualified by the Secretary under the regulations promulgated under this Act, to an eligible patient enrolled under this part, despite that the individual physician or practitioner providing the service is not at the same location as the beneficiary.''. (b) Payment despite Limitation on Store and Forward Technology.--despite any limitations to the contrary that are set forth in section 1834(m)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395m(m)(1)), the amendments made by subsection (a) will be applicable to remote assessments of diabetic retinopathy that are furnished through the use of store-and-forward technologies that provide for the asynchronous transmission of health care information in single or multimedia formats. (c) Interim Payment Pending Publication of Final Rule.--For the period beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date the Secretary of Health and Human Services publishes a final regulation to carry out section 1861(s)(1)(W) of the Social Security Act, as added by subsection (a), the Secretary will provide for payment of retinopathy assessments furnished under such section during such period, and assign such temporary HCPCS code as is necessary to provide for such payment. (d) Study on Reimbursement for Remote Assessments of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00906", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00307", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1650/98 of 27 July 1998 amending for the 14th time Regulation (EC) No 913/97 adopting exceptional support measures for the pigmeat market in Spain THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organisation of the market in pigmeat (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 (2), and in particular Article 20 of it, because, because of the outbreak of classical swine fever in certain production regions in Spain, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 913/97 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1489/98 (4), to introduce exceptional support measures for the pigmeat market in that Member State; because, because the veterinary and trade restrictions continue to apply, the number of animals which may be delivered to the competent authorities should be increased so that the exceptional measures can continue from 15 July 1998 and the list of eligible areas laid down in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 913/97 should be adjusted in line with the current veterinary and health situation; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Pigmeat, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 913/97 is amended as follows: 1. Annex I is replaced by Annex I to this; 2. Annex II is replaced by Annex II to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply with effect from 15 July 1998. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 27 July 1998.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 413, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00751", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00308", "text": "whether it must be applied by federal courts in that State to suits brought there on diversity grounds. 30 Applicability in Federal Court. 31 The Rules of Decision Act, in effect since the First Congress of the United States and now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652, provides: 'The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the Un ted States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, will be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.' This Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, held that judicial decisions are laws of the states within its meaning. But Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny have wrought a more far-reaching change in the relation of state and federal courts and the application of state law in the latter whereby in diversity cases the federal court administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own conduct of business. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231. The only substantial argument that this New Jersey statute is not applicable here is that its provisions are mere rules of procedure rather than rules of substantive law. 32 Even if we were to agree that the New Jersey statute is procedural, it would not determine that it is not applicable. Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not merely a regulation of procedure. With it or without it the main action takes the same course. However, it creates a new liability where none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative action liable for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other defendants, if he does not make good his claims. Such liability is not usual and it goes beyond payment of what we know as 'costs.' If all the Act did was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But this new liability would be without meaning and value in many cases if it resulted in nothing but a judgment", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00301", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00309", "text": ".2d 662, 137 A.L.R. 1102, and S. & W. Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union, Local No. 353, 11 Wash.2d 262, 118 P.2d 962, had treated any peaceful picketing as lawful. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855, was held to be controlling in both cases. But in the instant case, both the O'Neil and S. & W. cases were characterized as wrong in principle and were expressly overruled. The court quoted from Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash.2d 193, 206, 177 P.2d 873, 880, 170 A.L.R. 1082, where it was said that peaceful picketing is an exercise of the right of free speech which loses the protection of constitutional guaranty where 'it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion.' 3 'In the interpretation of this act and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the State of Washington, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the State of Washington is declared as follows: 'because, Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he will be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the State of Washington are enacted.' Rem.Rev.Stat., Supp. 1940, § 7612—2.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 484, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00355", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00310", "text": "91 L.Ed. 1492; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 359, 56 S.Ct. 797, 803, 80 L.Ed. 1209; Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 132, 52 S.Ct. 74, 76, 76 L.Ed. 201; Charges for Protective Service to Perishable Freight, 241 I.C.C. 503, 510—511; Proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal, 235 I.C.C. 753, 761; Lighterage Cases, 203 I.C.C. 481, 510; West Coast Lumbermen's Assn. v. Akron, C. & Y.R. Co., 183 I.C.C. 191, 198—199; Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 159 I.C.C. 691, 696—697. 5 'It is declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials of it; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions;—all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act will be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.' 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. (1946 ed.), p. 5443, 49 U.S.C.A. note preceding section 1. 1 'In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates, fares, and charges of common carriers by water, and classifications, regulations, and practices relating thereto, the Commission will give", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00384", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00311", "text": "by the Robbins Survey and established by Executive Order in 1876. (7) On November 19, 1915, the Secretary of the Interior reversed the decision of the General Land Office to accept the Harrington Resurvey, and upon his recommendation on November 22, 1915, President Wilson issued Executive Order No. 2273 ``... to correct the error in location said southern boundary line...''-- and thus effectively excluded the La Paz lands from the Reservation. (8) Historical evidence compiled by the Department of the Interior supports the conclusion that the reason given by the Secretary in recommending that the President issue the 1915 Executive Order--``to correct an error in locating the southern boundary''--was itself in error and that the La Paz lands should not have been excluded from the Reservation. (9) The La Paz lands continue to hold cultural and historical significance, as well as economic development potential, for the Colorado River Indian tribes, who have consistently sought to have such lands restored to their Reservation. (c) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are: (1) To correct the south boundary of the Reservation by reestablishing such boundary as it was delineated by the Robbins Survey and affirmed by the Harrington Resurvey. (2) To restore the La Paz lands to the Reservation, subject to valid existing rights under Federal law and to provide for continued reasonable public access for recreational purposes. (3) To provide for the Secretary of the Interior to review and ensure that the corrected Reservation boundary is resurveyed and marked in conformance with the public system of surveys extended over such lands. SEC. 2. BOUNDARY CORRECTION, RESTORATION, DESCRIPTION. (a) Boundary.--The boundaries of the Colorado River Indian Reservation are declared to include those boundaries as were delineated by the Robbins Survey, affirmed by the Harrington Survey, and described as follows: The approximately 15,375 acres of Federal land described as ``Lands Identified for Transfer to Colorado River Indian Tribes'' on the map prepared by the Bureau of Land Management entitled ``Colorado River Indian Reservation Boundary Correction Act, and dated January 4, 2005'', (from now on referred to as the ``Map''). (b) Map.--The Map will be available for review at the Bureau of Land Management. (c) Restoration.--Subject to valid existing rights under Federal law, all right, title, and interest of the United States", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01129", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00312", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 28 February 2000 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning certain amendments to Annexes 2, 3, 4 and 6 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (2000/205/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133(3) of it in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 300(2), Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because: (1) In view of the time which has elapsed and the changes that have taken place since the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, on 26 February 1996, a number of minor amendments need to be made to some of the Annexes to the Agreement. (2) The effect of the amendments is to liberalise the tariff arrangements applied by Morocco to imports of industrial products originating in the European Community. (3) The Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters negotiated to that end between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning certain amendments to Annexes 2, 3, 4 and 6 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part is approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person empowered to sign the Agreement in order to bind the Community. Done at Brussels, 28 February 2000.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 436, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00607", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00313", "text": "of 1986. ``(2) Appropriation of additional amounts.--To the extent that, at any time, amounts contained in the special account described in paragraph (1) are inadequate to make payments required under subsection (a), there are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for such purpose. ``(c) Period of Applicability.--The requirement to make payments under subsection (a) will apply during the period beginning as prescribed in subsection (a)(2) or (b) of section 6 of the Border Tax Equity Act of 2009, as the case may be, and ending on the date on which the United States Trade Representative certifies to Congress that each of the United States trade negotiating goals regarding border tax treatment have been met. ``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. ``(e) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Indirect tax system and imposes or applies indirect taxes on imports of goods or services at the border.--A foreign country employs an indirect tax system and imposes or applies indirect taxes on imports of goods or services at the border if such country imposes indirect taxes (including sales taxes and value-added taxes (VAT)) on goods or services, and imposes or applies such indirect taxes on imports of goods or services at the border. ``(2) Value-added taxes (vat).--The term `value-added taxes' means an indirect general consumption tax that is levied by the exporting country on the value added to goods and services in that country at multiple stages of the production and supply chain. This type of tax is also referred to as a goods and services tax (GST).''. SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATES. (a) General Effective Date.--If, under subsection (a) of section 3 of this Act, the United States Trade Representative fails to certify to Congress by the applicable date specified in such subsection that each of the United States trade negotiating objectives regarding border tax treatment described in subsection (b) of such section has been met as a result of WTO negotiations, then-- (1) section 4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 4 of this Act, will take effect 90 days after such date; and (2) subject to subsection (b), section 314 of the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01096", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00314", "text": "1936, 49 Stat. 1250. This act was passed to extend to Alaska the benefits of the Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C.A. § 461 et seq., and to provide for the designation of Indian reservations in Alaska. As § 2 is important in our discussion, the pertinent provisions are set out in full: 2 'Sec. 2. That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to designate as an Indian reservation any area of land which has been reserved for the use and occupancy of Indians or Eskimos by section 8 of the Act of May 17, 1884 (23 Stat. 26), or by section 14 or section 15 of the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1101), or which has been previously reserved under any executive order and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior or any bureau of it, together with additional public lands adjacent thereto, within the Territory of Alaska, or any other public lands which are actually occupied by Indians or Eskimos within said Territory: Provided, That the designation by the Secretary of the Interior of any such area of land as a reservation will be effective only upon its approval by the vote, by secret ballot, of a majority of the Indian or Eskimo residents of it who vote at a special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior upon thirty days' notice: * * *' 3 The Native Village of Karluk held a meeting on May 23, 1944, and accepted 'the proposed Indian Reservation for this village. The adoption of said Reservation passed by a vote of 46 for and 0 against. 11 of the eligible voters were absent.' See note 26, infra. Under § 19 of the Wheeler-Howard Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 479, the Alaskan aborigines are classified as Indians. 4 On March 22 and August 27, 1946, the Secretary of the Interior amended the Alaska Fisheries General Regulations, 50 C.F.R., 1946 Supp., § 208.23, that related to the commercial fishing for salmon in the Kodiak Area Fisheries by the addition of a subsection (r), reading as follows: 5 '(r) All waters within 3,000 feet of the shores of Karluk Reservation", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00274", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00315", "text": "prior to verdict. Holding that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, the Court of Appeals reversed. 194 F.2d 194. Both parties agree that this reversal requires the District Court to enter judgment for the railroad despite the verdict, thereby depriving petitioner of another trial. Whether the Court of Appeals could direct such a judgment consistently with Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.,1 is the single question we granted certiorari to review. 343 U.S. 975, 72 S.Ct. 1073. 3 On several recent occasions we have considered Rule 50(b). We have said that in the absence of a motion for judgment despite the verdict made in the trial court within ten days after reception of a verdict the rule forbids the trial judge or an appellate court to enter such a judgment. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849. We repeated that construction of the rule in Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct. 246, 92 L.Ed. 177, and reemphasized it in Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 69 S.Ct. 754, 93 L.Ed. 971. 4 Although this respondent made several motions it did not as the rule requires move within ten days after verdict 'to have judgment entered in accordance with his (its) motion for a directed verdict'. We are told, however, in respondent's brief that its motion to set aside the verdict 'was intended to be a motion for judgment in its favor or for a new trial' and that '(o)bviously respondent did not merely want the verdict to be set aside but wanted the relief that invariably follows such a setting aside on the grounds urged: a judgment in its favor or a new trial.' The defect in this argument is that respondent's motions cannot be measured by its unexpressed intention or wants. Neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeals appears to have treated the motion to set aside the verdict as asking for anything but that. And surely petitioner is not to have her opportunity to remedy any shortcomings in her case jeopardized by a failure to fathom the unspoken hopes of respondent's counsel. Respondent's motion should", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00463", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00316", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 28 November 1995 modifying for the second time Decision No 95/33/EC approving parts of the Finnish programme for the implementation of Articles 138 to 140 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden (Only the Finnish text is authentic) (95/529/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 138 of it, because on 26 October 1994 Finland notified the Commission under Article 143 of the abovementioned Act, the Finnish programme for the implementation of its Article 138, 139 and 140 aids for a number of products and activities for the period 1995 to 1999 inclusive; because parts of this programme, as modified by letter dated 16 December 1994 were approved by Commission Decision No 95/33/EC (1); because that Decision was modified by Commission Decision No 95/330/EC (2); because on 13 September 1995 Finland notified the Commission under Article 143 of the abovementioned Act a request for Commission authorization to modify that programme to include certain fruits and fungi, not included in Decision No 95/33/EC; because that Decision in its Article (3) (3) refers to possible further decisions for products not covered by it; because the request for aid for certain fruits and fungi is in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Accession and in particular Article 138 of it; because the form of aid, though in relation to quantities produced, can, as already provided for other products, be authorized given that it is only applied for one year, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The following is added to the section 'Production-related aid - All regions` in Annex I of Commission Decision 95/33/EC: >TABLE> Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Finland. Done at Brussels, 28 November 1995.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 432, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00795", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00317", "text": "States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189, 65 S.Ct. 254, 262, 89 L.Ed. 160. Devices or instrumentalities which may be used for legitimate ends may nevertheless be outlawed entirely where they have been employed to build then monopoly or to create the restraint of trade. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, 323 U.S. at pages 187, 188, 65 S.Ct. at page 261, 89 L.Ed. 160. For the aim of the decree is not only to prevent a repetition of the unlawful practice but to undo what was done, to neutralize power unlawfully acquired, to prevent the defendants from acquiring any of the fruits of the condemned project. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78, 31 S.Ct. 502, 523, 55 L.Ed. 619, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734. 106 If that is to be done here, I think we must do more than forbid further expansion of the existing monopolistic situation. The defendants have unlawfully acquired control and domination over this industry to the exclusion of competitors. This control was obtained in part through the unlawful acquisition and use of patents. As stated by the District Court, 'These patents, through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domination of an entire industry. The net effect is that a business, originally founded upon patents which have long since expired, is today less accessible to free enterprise than when it was first launched.' 63 F.Supp. 513, 532. If defendants are allowed royalties on those patents, they do, indeed, reap dividends from their unlawful activities. As stated in a dissent in the Hartford-Empire case, 'Every dollar hereafter, as well as previously, secured from licenses on the patents illegally aggregated in he combina tion's hands is money to which the participants are not entitled by virtue of the patent laws or others. It is the immediate product of the conspiracy.' 323 U.S. at page 443, 65 S.Ct. at page 400, 89 L.Ed. 322. 107 But beyond that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00098", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00318", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1679/98 of 29 July 1998 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/98 and providing for the partial reimbursement of import duties levied on a quota of barley for malting THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/98 of 25 May 1998 opening a Community tariff quota for barley for malting falling within CN code 1003 00 (1), and in particular Article 2 of it, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (2), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 923/96 (3), and in particular Article 10(4) of it, because the provisions governing the way imports of cereals into the Community are treated were laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 on rules of application (cereal sector import duties) for Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 (4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2092/97 (5); because Article 2(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 provides, under certain conditions, for a flat-rate reduction in the import duty of ECU 8 per tonne in particular on barley for malting; because, under Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1099/98, a tariff quota has been opened for 1997 and 1998 for 50 000 tonnes of high-grade barley falling within CN code 1003 00 for the production of malt to be used in the manufacture of a type of beer aged in vats containing beechwood; because the rate of duty applicable to such imports is 50 % of the full rate of duty in force on the day of import, without the flat-rate reductions of ECU 8/tonne in the import duty provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1249/96; because, as a consequence, the duties applied under Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 for up to 50 000 tonnes of barley for malting covered by import licence applications submitted from", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00719", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00319", "text": "at a reasonable discount. (c) Prepaid Orders.--The Secretary will accept prepaid orders received before the issuance of the coins minted under section 202(a). The sale prices with respect to such prepaid orders will be at a reasonable discount. (d) Gold Coins.--despite section 204(c)(2), the Secretary will issue a 50 dollar coin minted under section 202(a)(1) for presentation free of charge to the next of kin or personal representative of each individual identified under section 202(b). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate will make appropriate arrangements for the presentation, on behalf of the Congress, of such gold coins. SEC. 206. SURCHARGES ON SALE OF COINS. (a) Assessment.--Any sale by the Secretary of a coin minted under this title will include a surcharge of an amount determined by the Secretary to be sufficient to cover the cost of the gold coins minted under section 202(a)(1) (including labor, materials, dies, use of machinery, overhead expenses, and shipping) for presentment in accordance with section 205(d), which charge may not be less than-- (1) $100 per coin for the 50 dollar gold coins; (2) $10 per coin for the 1 dollar coin; and (3) $5 per coin for the half dollar coin. (b) Distribution of Excess Proceeds.--Any proceeds from the surcharges received by the Secretary from the sale of coins issued under this title in excess of the cost of producing all coins issued under this title (including coins issued for individuals identified under section 202(b)(2)) will be-- (1) used to cover the costs incurred in the production of gold medals under title I that have not been recovered from the sale of duplicate bronze medals under such title; and (2) with respect to any amount remaining after the costs described in paragraph (1) are covered, transferred to any fund for victims of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General jointly determine to be appropriate.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 437, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01100", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00320", "text": ".--There is established in the Treasury a trust fund to be known as the ``Pueblo of Santo Domingo Land Claims Settlement Fund''. Funds deposited in the Fund will be subject to the following conditions: (A) The Fund will be maintained and invested by the Secretary of the Interior under the Act of June 24, 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a). (B) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3), monies deposited into the Fund may be expended by the Pueblo to acquire lands within the exterior boundaries of the exclusive aboriginal occupancy area of the Pueblo, as described in the Findings of Fact of the Indian Claims Commission, dated May 9, 1973, and for use for education, economic development, youth and elderly programs, or for other tribal purposes in accordance with plans and budgets developed and approved by the Tribal Council of the Pueblo and approved by the Secretary. (C) If the Pueblo withdraws monies from the Fund, neither the Secretary nor the Secretary of the Treasury will retain any oversight over or liability for the accounting, disbursement, or investment of such withdrawn monies. (D) No portion of the monies described in subparagraph (C) may be paid to Pueblo members on a per capita basis. (E) The acquisition of lands with monies from the Fund will be on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, and no eminent domain authority may be exercised for purposes of acquiring lands for the benefit of the Pueblo under this Act. (F) The provisions of Public Law 93-134, governing the distribution of Indian claims judgment funds, and the plan approval requirements of section 203 of Public Law 103-412 will not be applicable to the Fund. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for deposit into the Fund, in accordance with the following schedule: (A) $5,000,000 to be deposited in the fiscal year which commences on October 1, 2001. (B) $5,000,000 to be deposited in the next fiscal year. (C) The balance of the funds to be deposited in the third consecutive fiscal year. (3) Limitation on disbursal.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Fund under paragraph (2) will not be disbursed until the following conditions are met: (A) The case of Pueblo of Santo", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01016", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00321", "text": "/EEC allowing Member States to retain or adopt provisions with a view to ensuring more extensive protection for consumers, persons carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the general public, should not apply to comparative advertising, given that the objective of amending the said Directive is to establish conditions under which comparative advertising is permitted; (19) because a comparison which presents goods or services as an imitation or a replica of goods or services bearing a protected trade mark or trade name will not be considered to fulfil the conditions to be met by permitted comparative advertising; (20) because this Directive in no way affects Community provisions on advertising for specific products and/or services or restrictions or prohibitions on advertising in particular media; (21) because, if a Member State, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, prohibits advertising regarding certain goods or services, this ban may, whether it is imposed directly or by a body or organization responsible under the law of that Member State for regulating the exercise of a commercial, industrial, craft or professional activity, be extended to comparative advertising; (22) because Member States will not be obliged to permit comparative advertising for goods or services on which they, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, maintain or introduce bans, including bans as regards marketing methods or advertising which targets vulnerable consumer groups; because Member States may, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, maintain or introduce bans or limitations on the use of comparisons in the advertising of professional services, whether imposed directly or by a body or organization responsible under the law of the Member States for regulating the exercise of a professional activity; (23) because regulating comparative advertising is, under the conditions set out in this Directive, necessary for the smooth running of the internal market and because action at Community level is therefore required; because the adoption of a Directive is the appropriate instrument because it lays down uniform general principles while allowing the Member States to choose the form and appropriate method by which to attain these objectives; because it is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Directive 94/450/EEC is amended as follows: (1) The title will be replaced by the following: 'Council Directive of 10 September 1984 concerning misleading and comparative advertising`; (2) Article 1 will be replaced by the following: 'Article 1 The purpose of this Directive is to protect consumers, persons carrying on a trade or business or practising a craft", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00642", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00322", "text": "in documents within his possession that are relevant to a judicial proceeding are matters not here for adjudication. Therefore, not one of these questions is impliedly affected by the very narrow ruling on which the present decision rests. Specifically, the decision and opinion in this case cannot afford a basis for a future suggestion that the Attorney General can forbid every subordinate who is capable of being served by process from producing relevant documents and later contest a requirement upon him to produce on the ground that procedurally he cannot be reached. In joining the Court's opinion I assume the contrary—that the Attorney General can be reached by legal process. 25 Though he may be so reached, what disclosures he may be compelled to make is another matter. It will of course be open to him to raise those issues of privilege from testimonial compulsion which the Court rightly holds are not before us now. But unless the Attorney General's amenability to process is impliedly recognized we should candidly face the issue of the immunity pertaining to the information which is here sought. To hold now that the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his subordinates, though within a court's jurisdiction, to produce documents and to hold later that the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be procedurally reached would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice that ought to make Bentham's skeleton rattle. 1 Department of Justice Order No. 3229, filed May 2, 1946, 11 Fed.Reg. 4920, reads: 'under anthority vested in me by R.S. 161, U.S.Code, Title 5, Section 22, It is ordered: 'All official files, documents, records and information in the offices of the Department of Justice, including the several offices of United States Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals, and Federal penal and correctional institutions, or in the custody or control of any officer or employee of the Department of Justice, are to be regarded as confidential. No officer or employee may permit the disclosure or use of the same for any purpose other than for the performance of his official duties, except in the discretion of the Attorney General, The Assistant to the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General acting for him. 'Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any of such files, documents, records or information, the officer or employee on whom such subpoena is served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney General", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00387", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00323", "text": ". 2. 1 Rule 2, par. 5, reads: 'Where it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been disbarred from practice in any State, Territory, District, or Insular Possession, or has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of this court, he will be immediately suspended from practice before this court, and unless, upon notice mailed to him at the address shown in the clerk's records and to the clerk of the highest court of the State, Territory, District or Insular Possession, to which he belongs, he shows good cause to the contrary within forty days he will be disbarred.' 2 In re Isserman, 140 A. 253, 6 N.J.Misc. 146. 3 In the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, the Supreme Court of Judicature for the Province of New-York disbarred two of his defense counsel for 'having presumed (despite they were forewarned by the Court of their displeasure if they should do it) to sign' and file a document questioning legality of the Judges' Commissions, which was adjudged to be a contempt for which they were peremptorily excluded from further practice and their names struck from the roll of attorneys. Rutherford, John Peter Zenger, 50; 17 How.St.Tr. 683—684. 4 Jessup, Elihu Root, 80—93. 5 Rogers, American Bar Leaders, 50.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 320, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00494", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00324", "text": "the Commission to gain an overall view of compliance with compulsory distillation obligations, the Member States concerned must keep it regularly informed, on the basis of notifications from distillers, of the progress and results of distillation operations; because the production structures and administrative difficulties peculiar to Greece justify the introduction, in that Member State in wine years 1985/86 and 1986/87, of compulsory distillation arrangements which, while enabling a result to be obtained which approaches, in terms of quantity that deriving from the application of the general arrangements, limit the measure to producers who have an adequate quantity of table wine available, and authorize the Greek Government itself to fix the percentages of table wine production to be delivered for distillation by the producers concerned; because the percentages thus fixed must ensure equal treatment for the parties concerned and must be based on the criteria provided for in Article 41 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79; because Greek producers who are not subject to the compulsory distillation obligation may qualify for the measures provided for in Title I of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79; because, under Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79, the reference period for exclusion from intervention measures for producers subject to the obligation who have not made delivery should be determined; because the application of that Article is without prejudice to the obligation on Member States to apply national penalties necessary to ensure in accordance with Article 64 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79, the strict non-discriminatory application of compulsory distillation; because it should be made clear that this Regulation is not applicable in Spain during the 1985/86 wine year or in Portugal before the end of the 1989/1990 wine year; because persons for whom distillation is compulsory should be prohibited from carrying out the distillation or having it carried out in either Spain or Portugal; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the purposes of (a) and (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 41 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 the following definitions will apply: (a) availabilities recorded at the beginning of the wine year: the quantity equal to the sum of the beginning-of-year stocks and production of table wine and wine suitable for yielding table wine, minus: - the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00585", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00325", "text": "66/402/EEC and 69/208/EEC; because in its Decision 85/356/EEC (9), as last amended by Commission Decision 89/357/EEC, the Council determined that seed of certain species produced in certain third countries was equivalent to corresponding seed produced in the Community; because it has since been established that in Uruguay also there are rules on seed control for a range of plant species, which include provision for official field inspections to be carried out during the period of seed production; because an examination of the said rules and of the manner in which they are applied in Uruguay has shown that for certain species, the prescribed field inspections satisfied the conditions laid down in Annex I to Directive 66/401/EEC, 66/402/EEC or 69/208/EEC, as the case may be, and the conditions governing seed harvested and controlled there afforded, as regards the seed's characteristics, namely identity, examination, marking and control, the same assurances as do the conditions applicable to such seed harvested and controlled within the Community; because Uruguay should therefore be granted equivalence in respect of certain species, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Annex to Decision 85/355/EEC is amended as follows: 1. In Part I (1), point 1.1, the entry 'U = Uruguay' is inserted after the entry 'TR = Turkey'. 2. In the table in Part I (2) the following item is inserted after the item relating to Turkey: 1.2.3.4 // // // // // 1 // 2 // 3 // 4 // // // // // 'U // Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca, Dirección Granos (DIGRA), Unidad Ejucurora de Semillas, Montevideo // - 66/401 Festuca arundinacea Lolium multiflorum Phalaris aquatica Lotus corniculatus Trifolium pratense Trifolium repens // // // // - 66/402 Sorghum bicolor // (b) // // // Zea mays // // // // - 69/208 Helianthus annuus' // // // // // Article 2 The Annex to Decision 85/356/EEC is amended as follows: 1. In Part I (1", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00515", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00326", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1836/2001 of 18 September 2001 amending representative prices and additional duties for the import of certain products in the sugar sector THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector(1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1423/95 of 23 June 1995 laying down detailed implementing rules for the import of products in the sugar sector other than molasses(2), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 624/98(3), and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 1(2), and Article 3(1) of it, because: (1) The amounts of the representative prices and additional duties applicable to the import of white sugar, raw sugar and certain syrups are fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1309/2001(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1807/2001(5). (2) It follows from applying the general and detailed fixing rules contained in Regulation (EC) No 1423/95 to the information known to the Commission that the representative prices and additional duties at present in force should be altered to the amounts set out in the Annex to this, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The representative prices and additional duties on imports of the products referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1423/95 will be as set out in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 19 September 2001. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 18 September 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 392, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00739", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00327", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Montgomery GI Bill Second Chance Act of 2007''. SEC. 2. OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL TO WITHDRAW AN ELECTION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MONTGOMERY GI BILL EDUCATION PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Chapter 30 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3018C the following new section: ``Sec. 3018D. Opportunity for certain active-duty personnel to enroll ``(a) Opportunity To Enroll.--(1) despite any other provision of this chapter, during the month of October in any year, beginning with 2007, (from now on in this section referred to as the `open season') a qualified individual (described in subsection (b)) may make an irrevocable election under this section to become entitled to basic educational assistance under this chapter. ``(2) The Secretary of each military department will provide for procedures for a qualified individual to make an irrevocable election under this section in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of carrying out this section or which the Secretary of Homeland Security will provide for such purpose with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy. ``(b) Qualified Individual.--A qualified individual referred to in subsection (a) is an individual who meets each of the following requirements: ``(1) The individual first became a member of the Armed Forces or first entered on active duty as a member of the Armed Forces before, on, or after July 1, 1985. ``(2) The individual has served on active duty without a break in service since the date the individual first became such a member or first entered on active duty as such a member. ``(3) The individual is serving on active duty during the open season of the year involved. ``(4) The individual, before applying for benefits under this section, has completed the requirements of a secondary school diploma (or equivalency certificate) or has successfully completed (or otherwise received academic credit for) the equivalent of 12 semester hours in a program of education leading to a standard college degree. ``(5) The individual, when discharged or released from active duty, is discharged or released therefrom with an honorable discharge. ``(c) Enrollment Fee.--(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, with", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01042", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00328", "text": "of opinion that there 'is reason to believe' a defendant is insane. 10 The Nobles case does stand for the proposition that a condemned defendant has no 'absolute right' to a hearing on the question of his sanity on his mere'suggestion.' Such an absolute right, this Court thought, would make the punishment of a defendant 'depend solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed by trial upon trial.' 168 U.S. at page 406, 18 S.Ct. at page 90, 42 L.Ed. 515. For this reason, the Court in the Nobles opinion cited and quoted from legal commentators and from judicial opinions which emphasized, as the opinion in the Nobles case itself emphasized, the importance of leaving to the 'discretion of a judge' the most appropriate procedure for determining the sanity of a defendant already sentenced to death. It was in this connection that the Court made the statemen in the Nobles case upon which the California Supreme Court particularly relied, that 'the manner in which such question should be determined was purely a matter of legislative regulation.' 11 Reading this statement in its context and in relation to the Georgia procedure, we do not understand that the Court in the Nobles case passed upon the question here urged: whether a state which bars the execution of insane persons can submit to a single individual this question, crucial to life, to be decided by that individual ex parte, with or without notice and hearings as the individual may choose, and without any judicial supervision, control or review whatever. The Nobles case we do understand to be an authority for the principle that a condemned defendant cannot automatically block execution by suggestions of insanity, and that a state tribunal, particularly a judge, must be left free to exercise a reasonable discretion in determining whether the facts warrant a full inquiry and hearing upon the sanity of a person sentenced to death.7 12 What has been said previously indicates the gravity of the questions here raised under the due process clause as previously construed by this Court, both the contention that execution of an insane man is offensive to the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, d amson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1677, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223; Carter", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00176", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00329", "text": "level of ``heirless'' assets to be transferred. (5) In June of 1997, a representative of the Secretary of State, in testimony before the Congress, urged the reconsideration of the limited $500,000 settlement. (6) While a precisely accurate accounting of ``heirless'' assets may be impossible, good conscience warrants the recognition that the victims of the Holocaust have a compelling moral claim to the unrestituted portion of assets referred to in paragraph (3). (7) Furthermore, leadership by the United States in meeting obligations to Holocaust victims would strengthen-- (A) the efforts of the United States to press for the speedy distribution of the remaining nearly 6 metric tons of gold still held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (the body established by France, Great Britain, and the United States at the end of World War II to return gold looted by Nazi Germany to the central banks of countries occupied by Germany during the war); and (B) the appeals by the United States to the 15 nations claiming a portion of such gold to contribute a substantial portion of any such distribution to Holocaust survivors in recognition of the recently documented fact that the gold held by the Commission includes gold stolen from individual victims of the Holocaust. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows: (1) To provide a measure of justice to survivors of the Holocaust all around the world while they are still alive. (2) To authorize the appropriation of an amount which is at least equal to the present value of the difference between the amount which was authorized to be transferred to successor organizations to compensate for assets in the United States of heirless victims of the Holocaust and the amount actually paid in 1962 to the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization of New York for that purpose. (3) To facilitate efforts by the United States to seek an agreement whereby nations with claims against gold held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold would contribute all, or a substantial portion, of that gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. SEC. 102. DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE TRIPARTITE GOLD COMMISSION. (a) Directions to the President.--The President will direct the commissioner representing the United States on the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, established under Part III of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, to seek and vote for a timely agreement under which all sign", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00942", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00330", "text": "members will have no financial interests in any of the businesses for which reasonable profits are determined by the Board. (e) Pay and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Pay.--despite section 7 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), members of the Board will be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members will receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with section 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code. (f) Director of Staff.-- (1) Qualifications.--The Board will appoint a Director who has no financial interests in any of the businesses for which reasonable profits are determined by the Board. (2) Pay.--despite section 7 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), the Director will be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. (g) Staff.-- (1) Additional personnel.--The Director, with the approval of the Board, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel. (2) Appointments.--The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates. (3) Detailees.--Upon the request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Board to assist the Board in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Board. (4) Assistance.--The Comptroller General of the United States may provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Board in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Board. (h) Other Authority.-- (1) Experts and consultants.--The Board may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United States", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01011", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00331", "text": "men; (B) women often receive fewer diagnostic tests and intervention procedures than men; and (C) strokes present treatment issues unique to women. SEC. 3. REPORTING OF GENDER DATA IN APPLICATIONS FOR DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND DEVICES. (a) New Drug Applications.--Section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(5)(A) despite any other provision of this Act, the applicant will include in any submission to the Secretary under this subsection, to the extent appropriate, information stratified by gender, race and ethnicity, including any differences in safety and effectiveness. ``(B) The Secretary will withhold approval of an application if the applicant fails to submit the required information described in subparagraph (A). ``(C) The Secretary will develop standards to ensure that submissions to the Secretary under this subsection are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under subparagraph (A). ``(D) Upon the approval under this subsection of an application for a drug, the Secretary will report to the scientific community and make available to the public, in a timely manner, data regarding such drug stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity.''. (b) Investigational New Drug Applications.--Section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(i)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and paragraph (5)'' after ``Subject to paragraph (3)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(5)(A) despite any other provision of this Act, the manufacturer or sponsor of an investigation of a new drug will include in any submission to the Secretary under this subsection on the clinical investigation of the new drug and to the extent appropriate, information stratified by gender, race, and ethnicity, including any differences in safety and effectiveness. ``(B) The Secretary will place a clinical hold (as described in paragraph (3)) on an investigation if the manufacturer or sponsor of the investigation fails to submit the required information described in subparagraph (A). ``(C) The Secretary will develop standards that ensure that submissions to the Secretary under this subsection on clinical investigations of new drugs are adequately reviewed to determine whether such submissions include the information required under this paragraph.''. (c) Abbreviated New Drug", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00918", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00332", "text": ") to the Federal Trade Commission and provide the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case in which such prior notice is not feasible, in which case the State will serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission will have the right-- (i) to intervene in the action; (ii) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising there; and (iii) to file petitions for appeal. (B) Limitation on state action while federal action is pending.--If the Commission has instituted a civil action for violation of this Act, no attorney general of a State may bring an action under this subsection during the pendency of that action against any defendant named in the complaint of the Commission for any violation of this Act alleged in the complaint. (3) Construction with respect to powers conferred by state law.--For purposes of bringing any civil action under paragraph (1), nothing in this Act will be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of that State. (e) Civil Penalty.-- (1) In general.--despite any civil penalty that otherwise applies to a violation of a rule referred to in subsection (c)(1), any person who violates subsection (a) will be liable for a civil penalty under this subsection. (2) Amount.--The amount of a civil penalty under this subsection will be an amount equal to-- (A) in the case of a wholesale sale in violation of subsection (a), the sum of-- (i) 3 times the difference between-- (I) the total amount charged in the wholesale sale; and (II) the total amount that would be charged in such a wholesale sale made at the wholesale fair market price; plus (ii) an amount not to exceed $3,000,000 per day of a continuing violation; or (B) in the case of a retail sale in violation of subsection (a), 3 times the difference between-- (i) the total amount charged in the sale; and (ii) the total amount that would be charged in such a sale at the fair market price for such a sale. (3) Deposit.--Of the amount of any civil penalty imposed under this section with respect to any sale in violation of subsection (a) to a person that resides in a State, the portion of such amount that is determined under subparagraph (A)(i) or (B) (or both) of paragraph", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01028", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00333", "text": "to a court of equity for its remedies once a legal right is fairly in controversy.1 3 Respondent, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company (herein called Panhandle), a Delaware corporation, transports and markets natural gas in interstate commerce by means of its pipe-line system which runs from Texas into Michigan. In addition it owns or controls gas-producing properties in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. 4 In September, 1948, Panhandle organized Hugoton Production Company (from now on called Hugoton), also a Delaware corporation. On October 11, 1948, under a written agreement between the two companies, Panhandle transferred to Hugoton gas leases on approximately 97,000 acres of land in Kansas and $675,000 in cash. In return Panhandle received all the outstanding capital stock of Hugoton and the option to purchase on or after January 1, 1965, all or part of the gas produced from this land, which is at present undeveloped and not connected with any pipe-line system. The gas reserves under this acreage are estimated at approximately 700 billion cubic feet. Hugoton thereafter contracted to sell to the Kansas Power and Light Company for a period of fifteen years from November 1, 1949, to November 1, 1964, the gas produced from these leases, which, according to the contract, was to be consumed wholly within the State of Kansas. 5 On the same date as the transaction between Panhandle and Hugoton, Panhandle declared a dividend of the Hugoton stock to the holders of its common stock at the rate of one-half share of Hugoton stock for each share of common stock of Panhandle. The dividend was to be paid November 17, 1948, to Panhandle's stockholders of record on October 29, 1948. Nothing called to our attention indicates any control retained by Panhandle over the Hugoton stock. 6 On October 26, 1948, the Federal Power Commission (from now on called the Commission) ordered an investigation 'under the provisions of Section 14 of the Natural Gas Act, of the fa ts and circumstances involved in the formation and proposed operation of the Hugoton Production Company and the transfer to said company by Panhandle Eastern of the naturalgas reserves * * *.' By supplementary order of November 10, 1948, Hugoton was joined", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00297", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00334", "text": "ueblo under section 5(c)(1) will be held in trust by the Secretary for the benefit of the Pueblo, and will be treated as Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18, United States Code. (d) Land Subject to Provisions.--Any lands acquired by the Pueblo under section 5(c), or with funds subject to section 5(b), will be subject to the provisions of section 17 of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 641; commonly referred to as the Pueblo Lands Act). (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or in the Settlement Agreement will be construed to-- (1) cloud title to federally administered lands or non- Indian or other Indian lands, with regard to claims of title which are extinguished under section 5; or (2) affect actions taken prior to the date of enactment of this Act to manage federally administered lands within the boundaries of the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant. SEC. 7. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. (a) Authorization for Acquisition of State Trust Lands.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary will acquire by exchange the State trust lands in township 15 north, range 4 east, section 2, and all interests there, including improvements, mineral rights, and water rights. In exercising the authority to acquire such lands by exchange, the Secretary is authorized to use unappropriated public lands within the State of New Mexico. The properties so exchanged will be of approximately equal value and the Secretary may credit or debit the ledger account established in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bureau of Land Management, the New Mexico State Land Office, and the New Mexico Commissioner of Public Lands, in order to equalize the values of the properties exchanged. Once such lands are acquired, the Secretary will convey such lands to the Pueblo by sale, exchange, or otherwise, and the Pueblo will have the exclusive right to acquire these lands. Once the Pueblo has acquired title to the former State trust lands, these lands may be conveyed by the Pueblo to the Secretary who will accept and hold such lands in the name of the United States in trust for the benefit of the Pueblo. (b) Authorization for Exchange of Restricted Lands.--Authorization is given for the exchange of restricted land of the Pueblo for lands private title to which was", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01018", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00335", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 318/2002 of 20 February 2002 fixing the export refunds on eggs THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2771/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the market in eggs(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1516/96(2), and in particular Article 8(3) of it, because: (1) Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 2771/75 provides that the difference between prices on the world market for the products listed in Article 1(1) of that Regulation and prices for those products within the Community may be covered by an export refund. (2) The present market situation in certain third countries and that regarding competition on particular third country markets make it necessary to fix a refund differentiated by destination for certain products in the egg sector. (3) It follows from applying these rules and criteria to the present situation on the market in eggs that the refund should be fixed at an amount which would permit Community participation in world trade and would also take account of the nature of these exports and their importance at the present time. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Poultrymeat and Eggs, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The list of codes of products for which, when they are exported, the export refund referred to in Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 2771/75 is granted, and the amount of that refund will be as shown in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 21 February 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 20 February 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 402, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00729", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00336", "text": "and year after year Ford consented to the extension. On December 31, 1945, the Government again moved to have the prohibition against affiliation extended, this time to January 1, 1947. Ford now resisted the motion, and on May 4, 1946, both Ford and CIT filed motions of their own. They asked the District Court to suspend sub-paragraph (i) and (k) of paragraph 6 and sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 7 and to modify sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 6 on the ground that the practices enjoined by these provisions of the decree were not 'held by the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of guilty.' Ford also moved that 'an order be entered under paragraph 12 * * * that nothing there will preclude the Manufacturer from acquiring and retaining ownership of and/or control over or interest in any finance company * * *.' The District Court denied the motions by Ford and CIT and granted the Government's motion for extension of the prohibition against affiliation to January 1, 1947. The present appeals followed. Although the particular extension of paragraph 12 appealed from has expired, the equity suit against General Motors has not yet been set down for trial and the Government's motion for a further extension has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of these appeals. It is not a moot question therefore whether the District Court properly granted the extension to January 1, 1947. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 433, 452, 31 S.Ct. 288, 294, 55 L.Ed. 283; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 514 516, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310. 8 The restraints imposed against Ford by sub-paragraphs 6(e), 6(i), 6(k) and 7(d) must survive the outcome of the conviction against General Motors if the language of the trial judge's charge to the jury in the criminal prosecution of General Motors can fairly be equated with the language of those sub-paragraphs. If, on the other hand, the judge's charge falls short of holding illegal what those sub-paragraphs proscribed, appellants", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00207", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00337", "text": "the policy recognizing such sales as lawful sales conditioned upon payment to the Government of the charges here being considered. Financial burdens which may be postponed without the payment of interest are much less burdensome than those that are not postponable or that are subject to the accrual of interest during their postponement. The omission of the usual interest charge on postponed marketing penalties therefore decreases the force of the Act as a deterring factor and runs counter to the special purpose of the Act. 16 For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming that of the District Court allowing interest from the date of default, should have been affirmed. 17 Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE joins in this dissent. 1 Section 348 of the 1938 Act reads as follows: 'Any farmer who, while farm marketing quotas are in effect, markets cotton in excess of the farm marketing quota for the marketing year for the farm on which such cotton was produced, will be subject to the following penalties with respect to the excess so marketed: 2 cents per pound if marketed during the first marketing year when farm marketing quotas are in effect; and 3 cents per pound if marketed during any subsequent year, except that the penalty will be 2 cents per pound if cotton of the crop subject to penalty in the first year is marketed subject to penalty in any subsequent year.' 52 Stat. 59, 7 U.S.C. § 1348, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1348. The 1941 amendment required computation of the penalty on the following basis: 'despite the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended (from now on referred to as the Act)— '(9) The marketing penalty for cotton and rice produced in the calendar year in which any marketing year begins (if beginning with or after the 1941—1942 marketing year) will be at a rate equal to 50 per centum of the basic rate of the loan for cooperators for such marketing year under section 302 of the Act and this resolution.' 55 Stat. 203, 205, 7 U.S.C., Supp. V, § 1330(9), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1330(9). 2 28 U.S.C. § 811, 28 U.S.C.A. § 811, does allow interest on district court judgments in all civil cases where interest would be", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00113", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00338", "text": "of an integrated approach involving finance from more than one Fund; because Article 1 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (12), as last amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom, ECSC) No 2335/95 (13), states that the legal commitments entered into for measures extending over more than one financial year must contain a time limit for implementation which must be specified to the recipient in due form when the aid is granted; because Article 20 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 provides, subject to available funding, for a single commitment where the Community assistance granted is less than ECU 40 million for the whole programmation period; because all the other conditions laid down for the grant of aid from the ERDF and the ESF have been complied with, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The single programming document for Community structural assistance in Lolland concerned by Objective 2 in Denmark, covering the period 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1999, is approved. Article 2 The single programming document includes the following essential elements: (a) a statement of the main priorities for joint action, their specific quantified objectives, an appraisal of their expected impact and their consistency with economic, social and regional policies in Denmark; the sole priority is: development of companies; (b) the assistance from the Structural Funds as referred to in Article 4; (c) the detailed provisions for implementing the single programming document comprising: - the procedures for monitoring and evaluation, - the provisions on financial implementation and eligibility, - the rules for compliance with Community policies; (d) the procedures for verifying additionality and an initial evaluation of the latter; (e) the arrangements for associating the environmental authorities with the implementation of the single programming document; (f) the means available for technical assistance necessary for the preparation, implementation or adaptation of the measures concerned. Article 3 1. For the purpose of indexation, the annual breakdown of the global maximal allocation foreseen for the assistance from the Structural Funds is as follows: >TABLE> 2. To this global maximum allocation is added an amount of ECU 2 693 000 not subject to indexation, resulting from unused appropriations of the corresponding single programming document covering the period 1994 to 1996. Article 4 The assistance from the Structural Funds granted to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00604", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00339", "text": "level of ``heirless'' assets to be transferred. (5) In June of 1997, a current representative of the Secretary of State, in testimony before the Congress, urged the reconsideration of the limited $500,000 settlement. (6) While a precisely accurate accounting of ``heirless'' assets may be impossible, good conscience warrants the recognition that the victims of the Holocaust have a compelling moral claim to the unrestituted portion of assets referred to in paragraph (3). (7) Furthermore, leadership by the United States in meeting obligations to Holocaust victims would strengthen-- (A) the efforts of the United States to press for the speedy distribution of the remaining nearly 6 metric tons of gold still held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (the body established by France, Great Britain, and the United States at the end of World War II to return gold looted by Nazi Germany to the central banks of countries occupied during the war by Germany); and (B) the appeals by the United States to the 15 nations claiming a portion of such gold to contribute a substantial portion of any such distribution to Holocaust survivors in recognition of the recently documented fact that the gold held by the commission includes gold stolen from individual victims of the Holocaust. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows: (1) To provide a measure of justice to survivors of the Holocaust all around the world while they are still alive. (2) To authorize the appropriation of an amount which is at least equal to the present value of the difference between the amount which was authorized to be transferred to successor organizations to compensate for assets in the United States of heirless victims of the Holocaust and the amount actually paid in 1962 to the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization of New York for that purpose. (3) To facilitate efforts by the United States to seek an agreement whereby nations with claims against gold held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold would contribute all, or a substantial portion, of that gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. SEC. 102. DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE TRIPARTITE GOLD COMMISSION. (a) Directions to Secretary of State.--The Secretary of State will direct the commissioner representing the United States on the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, established under Part III of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, to seek and vote for a timely agreement", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00977", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00340", "text": "***** COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 6 May 1982 amending Council Directive 68/193/EEC on the marketing of material for the vegetative propagation of the vine (82/331/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 68/193/EEC of 9 April 1968 on the marketing of material for the vegetative propagation of the vine (1), as last amended by Directive 78/692/EEC (2), and in particular Article 17a of it, because the abovementioned Directive lays down conditions concerning the packaging of propagating material; because the appearance on the market of new types of packaging permits a relaxation of the said conditions while at the same time maintaining the requisite guarantees of identity; because the conditions in question should therefore be adapted to the new situation; because the measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Seeds and Propagating Material for Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Directive 68/193/EEC is amended as follows: 1. In point 1 of the table at Annex III, the following words will be added: 'or, where plastic bags of equivalent packages are used, 50 or 100, it being understood that the provisions of Article 10 (1a) do not apply thereto'. 2. In point 2 of the table at Annex III, the following words will be added: 'or, where plastic bags of equivalent packages are used, 100, it being understood that the provisions of Article 10 (1a) do not apply thereto'. Article 2 Member States will bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive on 1 July 1982. They will immediately inform the Commission of it. Article 3 This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 6 May 1982.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 424, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00787", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00341", "text": "activities and/or programs. (4) The results of the market analysis, new fees, increases or decreases in established fees, will be published in the Federal Register and any change in the amount of fees will not take place until at least 12 months after the date the notice is published in the Federal Register. (d) Additional Authorities.--Beginning in fiscal year 2003 and thereafter, the Secretary is authorized to-- (1) enter into agreements, including contracts, which provide for reasonable commissions or reimbursements, with any public or private entity to provide visitor reservation services, fee collection and/or processing services; (2) use National Park Service volunteers, as appropriate to collect fees charged under Section 2(C); (3) in establishing fees under this Act, the Secretary may provide discounted or free admission days or use as deemed appropriate by the Secretary; (4) the Secretary may modify the National Park Passport, established under Public Law 105-391; and (5) the Secretary will take such steps as may be necessary to provide information to the visitor concerning the various fees programs available to them and the costs and benefits of those programs. (e) State Agency Admission and Special Use Passes.--Beginning in fiscal year 2003 and thereafter-- (1) despite the Federal Grants Cooperative Agreements Act, the Secretary is authorized to enter into revenue sharing agreements with State agencies to accept their annual passes and convey the same privileges, terms and conditions as offered under the auspices of the National Park Passport, established under Public Law 105-391 (from now on referred to as the ``National Park Passport''), or as Public Law 105-391 may be amended. (2) State agency annual passes will only be accepted for all of the units of the National Park System within the boundaries of the State in which the specific revenue sharing agreement is entered into. (3) The Secretary may enter into revenue sharing agreements with other Federal agencies and/or Tribal governments to establish, charge and collect fees at areas, sites or projects located on other areas under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture and/or the specific Tribal government in which the agreement is made. SEC. 3. DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS. (a) In General.-- (1) The Secretary of the Treasury will establish a special account in the Treasury for the Agency. (2) Amounts collected by the Agency under section 2 will be deposited in its special account in the Treasury and will", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01031", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00342", "text": "with respect to the actual carriers whose service they utilize.' 88 Cong.Rec. 4065. See also, to the same effect, J. R. Kelly Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I.C.C. 315, 321. And see Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201, 297—304. 17 That the relation between express companies and underlying carriers is much different than the relations between forwarders and such carriers is clearly indicated in a letter from the Interstate Commerce Commission to Chairman Lea of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which appears at p. 42 of the Hearings before that committee on H.R. 2764, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. The Commission there said: 'There is a vast distinction between the relations of forwarders and the Express Agency to the underlying carriers. The Express Agency has an identical contract with each rail oad, which would not be true of the forwarder. The profits, if any, accrue to the railroads, because under the forwarder arrangement the profits would accrue, as they do now under the joint rates, to the forwarders. The routing of express shipments, although in the control of the Express Agency, must of necessity depend primarily upon available train service rather than upon solicitation by, or concessions from, the transporting carrier, because concessions in the amount of compensation to the carrier would be the most important factor in the case of the forwarder. Thus, the considerations which led to the adoption of laws prohibiting unjust discrimination and undue prejudice and preference as between large and influential shippers on the one hand, and smaller shippers on the other, are practically absent in express service, but are highly prominent in forwarder service.' 18 87 Cong.Rec. 8218. 19 Under § 1009, forwarders were permitted to continue operation under joint rates previously established with motor carriers for eighteen months from the date of enactment of Part IV. This provision was thought necessary 'in order to provide a reasonable period of adjustment within which rates and charges may be established under the provisions of section (1008).' Section 1009 was amended by the Act of February 20, 1946, 60 Stat. 21, to permit the filing of joint rates between forwarders and motor carriers under certain circumstances. 20 See e.g., Twin City Shippers Association Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I.C.C", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00251", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00343", "text": "emergency care provided to a child or adult with a special need in order to provide temporary relief to the family caregiver of that child or adult. ``(6) Lifespan respite care.--The term `lifespan respite care' means a coordinated system of accessible, community-based respite care services for family caregivers of children or adults with special needs. ``SEC. 2903. LIFESPAN RESPITE CARE GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. ``(a) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are-- ``(1) to expand and enhance respite care services to family caregivers; ``(2) to improve the statewide dissemination and coordination of respite care; and ``(3) to provide, supplement, or improve access and quality of respite care services to family caregivers, thereby reducing family caregiver strain. ``(b) Authorization.--Subject to subsection (f), the Secretary is authorized to award grants or cooperative agreements to eligible recipients who submit an application under subsection (d). ``(c) Federal Lifespan Approach.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary will work in cooperation with the National Family Caregiver Support Program Officer of the Administration on Aging, and respite care program officers in the Administration for Children and Families, the Administration on Developmental Disabilities, the Maternal and Child Health Bureau of the Health Resources and Services Administration, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, to ensure coordination of respite care services for family caregivers of children and adults with special needs. ``(d) Application.-- ``(1) Submission.--Each eligible recipient desiring to receive a grant or cooperative agreement under this section will submit an application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Secretary will require. ``(2) Contents.--Each application submitted under this section will include-- ``(A) a description of the applicant's-- ``(i) understanding of respite care and family caregiver issues; ``(ii) capacity to ensure meaningful involvement of family members, family caregivers, and care recipients; and ``(iii) collaboration with other State and community-based public, nonprofit, or private agencies; ``(B) with respect to the population of family caregivers to whom respite care information or services will be provided or for whom respite care workers and volunteers will be recruited and trained, a description of-- ``(i) the population of family caregivers; ``(ii) the extent and nature of the respite care needs of that population; ``(iii) existing", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01036", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00344", "text": "apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2004. SEC. 103. PROGRAM ALLOCATION. The following amounts will be deposited in the Centennial Fund from amounts designated under section 102 (and from the General Fund of the Treasury to the extent the amounts so designated are less than the total amounts specified in this section for the fiscal year concerned). Such amounts will, without further appropriation, be available to the Secretary of the Interior until expended: (1) Fiscal year 2005: $100,000,000. (2) Fiscal year 2006: $125,000,000. (3) Fiscal year 2007: $150,000,000. (4) Fiscal year 2008: $175,000,000. (5) Such sums as may be necessary through fiscal year 2016. SEC. 104. DISTRIBUTION OF FUND. There are created within the Centennial Fund 3 accounts, designated for the following purposes: (1) National Park Backlog Elimination Fund (60 percent). (2) Natural Resource Challenge Fund (20 percent). (3) Cultural Resource Challenge Fund (20 percent). SEC. 105. PATRIOTS FOR PARKS PROMOTION. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior such sums as necessary for a public awareness campaign about the existence of the National Park Centennial Fund created in section 101 and the ability of taxpayers to contribute to it through the tax checkoff created in section 6097 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. TITLE II--ELIMINATING THE NATIONAL PARK MAINTENANCE BACKLOG SEC. 201. BACKLOG ELIMINATION. (a) In General.--Sixty percent of the funds deposited into the Centennial Fund will be used to eliminate the backlog of unmet needs in the National Parks, as identified in the Facility Condition Index (from now on in this Act referred to as the ``FCI'') of the National Park Service. (b) Priorities.--(1) The Secretary of the Interior will prepare, as part of the annual budget proposal, a priority list for projects to be funded under this section. Moneys will be made available from the fund, without further appropriation, effective October 15 of each calendar year, for the projects identified on the priority list, unless prior to such date, legislation is enacted establishing a different priority list. (2) In preparing the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00962", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00345", "text": "point marks the beginning and end of what is termed 'line-haul' transportation, and is the extent of the service which may be performed under the line-haul rate. The Commission's authority to determine the point where transportation duty ends and industry convenience begins was upheld by this Court in United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U.S. 402, 57 S.Ct. 804, 81 L.Ed. 1186. We have repeatedly sustained the Commission in its application of Ex parte 104 principles to particular plants where it has prohibited the performance of services beyond the point fixed under a line-haul rate.2 In issuing cease and desist orders in these cases the Commission has acted under its duty to enforce § 6(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which section prohibits departure from filed tariffs and the rendering of preferential services.3 5 As stated, the purpose of these proceedings before the Commission was to determine the beinning and end of line-haul service at appellee-smelters' plants. The next question was whether the service rendered by the carriers conformed to the services delimited by the Commission. Thus the Commission, it its proceedings after remand, was not concerned with the question of whether reasonable rates were in force, as it explained in its second report in the American Smelting Company case: 6 'The question of the reasonableness of published rates or of charges that are or may be fixed for performing industrial services can be decided only in a proceeding brought, or investigation instituted, under different provisions of the act. It is our purpose to make it entirely clear here that our order herein is based solely upon our findings herein, which in turn are based solely upon the principles and authority established with the approval of the Supreme Court in our original and supplemental reports in Ex Parte No. 104, Part II, and that said order is not based in whole or in part upon any conclusions or findings in connection with tariff provisions or testimony as to whether the published rates are reasonable and do or do not include compensation for switching within the plant areas. We repudiate any reference or conclusion to the contrary conveyed by our discussion or evidence relative to such questions and the conclusions based thereon in our prior supplemental report herein.' 270 I.C.C. 362. 7 With that clear and distinct statement of what it was doing and what it was not doing, the Commission made its findings of fact which appear", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00349", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00346", "text": "11, supra. 20 See Pyramid Motor Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 67 S.Ct. 954, 91 L.Ed. 1184; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 931, 91 L.Ed. 1158; Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 917, 87 L.Ed. 1244; Overnight Motor Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682; United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345. 21 See note 18, supra. 22 'Section 1. (a) The Congress finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to stand, * * * (9) the cost to the Government of goods and services previously and hereafter purchased by its various departments and agencies would be unreasonably increased and the Public Treasury would be seriously affected by consequent increased cost of war contracts; * * * 'The Congress further finds and declares that all of the results which have arisen or may arise under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, as aforesaid, may (except as to liability for liquidated damages) arise with respect to the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts and that it is, therefore, in the national public interest and for the general welfare, essential to national defense, and necessary to aid, protect, and foster commerce, that this Act will apply to the Walsh-Healey Act and the Bacon-Davis Act.' (Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 84—85, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 251(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 251(a). 23 The", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00354", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00347", "text": "the Treasury of the United States the Public Safety Communications Trust Fund. ``(2) Deposits.--The Fund will consist of-- ``(A) the amounts appropriated under subsection (f); and ``(B) 50 percent of the proceeds of any auction conducted under section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 for any bands of frequencies other than those described in paragraph (3), except that such percentage may be reduced in accordance with paragraph (4). ``(3) Excepted frequencies.--The bands of frequencies described in this paragraph are the following: ``(A) the 216-220 megahertz band, the 1432-1435 megahertz band, the 1710-1755 megahertz band, and the 2385-2390 megahertz band of frequencies; and ``(B) any other band of frequencies reallocated from Federal use to non-Federal use after January 1, 2003, that is assigned by competitive bidding under section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)), except for bands of frequencies previously identified by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the Spectrum Reallocation Final Report, NTIA Special Publication 95-32 (1995). ``(4) Reduction of percentage.--If the board of directors submits to the Congress a statement that-- ``(A) projects that the future needs for grants under subsection (c) has been reduced to the extent that the percentage specified in paragraph (2) is likely to yield a surplus in the fund beyond the amounts needed to meet such needs, and ``(B) specifies a lower percentage that the board estimates to be sufficient to meet such needs (without yielding a surplus), paragraph (2) will be applied to any auction subject to such paragraph that is conducted after the date of submission of such statement by substituting such lower percentage for 50 percent. ``(5) Fund availability.-- ``(A) Appropriation.--There are appropriated from the Fund such sums as are authorized by the board to be disbursed for grants under this section. ``(B) Reversion of unused funds.--Any grant proceeds that remain unexpended at the end of the grant period as determined under subsection (c)(3) will revert to and be deposited in the Fund. ``(b) Board of Directors.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The Fund will be administered by the Administrator of the NTIA, in consultation with a board of directors", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00842", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00348", "text": "be deemed compatible with the common market only where it qualifies for one of the exemptions provided for there. Although these measures were deemed by the Commission Decision of 2 March 1988 to qualify for exemption on account of their regional development objectives, the lack of information on their actual application, particularly in the case of operating aid and tax aid, prevents the Commission from assessing the distorting effects of refinancing a system that has become opaque and consequently declaring such refinancing compatible with the common market. (8) The situation could be different, however, if the aid scheme provided for by Law No 64 of 1 March 1986 were to be applied in a radically different manner from in the past, in particular so as to facilitate the transition to a more fundamental reform of aid to the Mezzogiorno, to be carried out on expiry of the Law in line with the principles underlying the abovementioned amendments. (9) The Commission is, however, unable to comment here on the compatibility with the common market of any extension of the operation to areas other than those specified in the Law on the Mezzogiorno until such time as those areas have been precisely identified. under Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty, the Italian Government must therefore notify its detailed extension plans in good time to allow the Commission to comment on the planned measures before they are put into effect. V (10) In view of the foregoing and subject to the abovementioned reservation concerning the extension of the geographical coverage, the Commission takes the view that the guidelines emerging from Decree-Law No 415 of 22 October 1992 and the comments submitted by the Italian Government are such as to make the scheme compatible with the common market, despite the lack of transparency regarding past operations, provided that those guidelines are translated into practice in a significant and verifiable manner. Adoption of the law converting the Decree and any other legislative measures, as well as decisions of CIPI and CIPE, are appropriate means of translating the guidelines into practice. In this context, aid should clearly be granted only to firms in the provinces that can still qualify for application of the Law on the Mezzogiorno, with due regard to the time limits laid down in this connection in Commission Decision 88/318/EEC. It should be noted that the aid referred to in Article 3 of that Decision may be granted until 31 December 1992 and that, in the provinces referred to in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00768", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00349", "text": "the president for each Federal reserve bank which is made in accordance with the amendment made by subsection (a) will take place upon the earlier of-- (A) the expiration of the term of the president of the bank who is serving in such office on the date of the enactment of this Act; or (B) the occurrence of the first vacancy in the office of president of the bank after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) 1st vice president.--despite any provision of the Federal Reserve Act, the term of the first vice president of any Federal reserve bank who was appointed to such position before the date of the enactment of this Act will end as of the date on which the president of the bank is first appointed in accordance with the amendment made by subsection (a) and a first vice president will be appointed in the manner provided by such amendment. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The subdivision designated ``Fifth.'' of the 4th undesignated paragraph of section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 341) is amended-- (1) in the 1st sentence, by striking ``a president, vice presidents, and''; and (2) by striking the 2d, 3d, and 4th sentences and inserting the following new sentence: ``All executive officers and all employees of the bank will be directly responsible to the president of the bank.''. SEC. 3. GAO AUDITS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS REQUIRED; ITEMIZED BUDGETS. (a) Removal of Limitation on GAO Audits.--Section 714(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking the 2d sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``In the case of any audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any Federal reserve bank under the preceding sentence, the audit may not include transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign country, or nonprivate international financing organization or any part of any discussion or communication among or between members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or officers or employees of such Board which is related to any such transaction.''. (b) GAO Audit of Cash Vaults.--Section 714 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Audit of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00986", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00350", "text": "cases of civil and criminal contempt. This commingling of the various forms of relief, like that of the proceedings themselves, deprives these contemnors of any possibility for having the scope of the relief given against them measured according to law. 199 That is no insubstantial deprivation. When hybrid proceedings can produce hybrid penalties, concealing what is for punishment and what remedial, what criminal and what civil, and in the process can discard constitutional procedural protections against just such consequences, as convenience or other wholly discretionary impulse may command, then indeed to the extent we allow this will we have adopted the continental tradition of the civilians and rejected our own. No case in this Court previously has ever sustained such conglomerate proceedings and penalties.57 200 That the Government is complainant here, both as 'employer' seeking remedial relief and in sovereign capacity58 seeking to vindicate the court's authority by criminal penalty, does not nullify all these long established limitations or put the courts wholly at large, limited by nothing except their unconfined discretion as to the scope and character of the relief allowable. Power there is to take adequate measures when violation is clearly shown and adequate proof is made to sustain them. For proven violation, criminal penalty within the Eighth Amendment's limits as we would measure similar impositions placed by Congress, at the most; for damages proven and found, civil award commensurate with the finding; and for coercion, civil relief by way of imprisonment or 'fine,' but in either case contingent only, not final, giving opportunity for compurgation and for termination, on its being made, of further penalty for the future. 201 These are the limitations the law has prescribed. They apply equally when the Government is complainant, and whether in one capacity or the other, or both, as when others are.59 They cannot be dispensed with, separately or by conglomerating all into a single indiscriminate lump, at the suit of the Government or another, in this case or for others. To permit this would be to throw overboard the limitations prescribed by law and make the courts purely discretionary arbitrators of controversies. That cannot be done in our system. 202 The Court seemingly recognizes this, in part, in the revision it makes of the District Court's penalties. Lewis' fine is affirmed in amount but wholly changed in character. Instead of composite relief as the District Court made it, the Court makes that fine wholly a criminal penalty, thus", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00043", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00351", "text": "332 U.S. 234 67 S.Ct. 1599 91 L.Ed. 2022 UNITED STATESv.MUNSEY TRUST CO. OF WASHINGTON, D.C. No. 847. Argued May 6, 1947. Decided June 23, 1947. [Syllabus from pages 234-236 intentionally omitted] Mr. Philip Elman, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Messrs. W. B. Dew, of Hartford, Conn., and Alexander M. Heron, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This case presents a problem arising out of contracts for public building construction and repair. The rights inter sese of contractor, surety, assignees and government have been productive of much litigation, but we have not previously had to decide whether percentages retained under contract by the United States may be subjected to its set-off claims despite the claims of a surety who has paid laborers and materialmen. 2 In May and July, 1940, six contracts were made between the United States and the Federal Contracting Corporation, in which the corporate contractor agreed to paint and repair certain federal buildings. Each contract conformed to the requirements of statute, 49 Stat. 793, 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., 40 U.S.C.A. § 270a et seq., by providing for two surety bonds, one conditioned on the completion of the work within the contract period, and the other on the payment of those furnishing labor and material to the contractor. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company signed those bonds, each of which assigned to it the contractor's claims against the government for sums due on the contracts whenever the surety should be compelled by default of the contractor to fulfill its obligations.1 The work was completed by the contractor apparently in 1940, and accepted by the government. The surety therefore was not called upon to make good the promise of the performance bonds. But the contractor did not pay $13,065.93 owed to persons who had supplied labor and material for performance of five of the six contracts. This indebtedness the surety paid between April and September, 1941 as the payment bonds obliged it to do. 3 Under the customary terms of its contracts, the government had retained percentages of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00097", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00352", "text": "uting 'fighting words.' That emphasizes, however, the importance of the rule of the Stromberg case. Petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed. For all anyone knows he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest. We cannot avoid that issue by saying that all Illinois did was to measure petitioner's conduct, not the ordinance, against the Constitution. Petitioner raised both points that his speech was protected by the consTitution; that the inclusion of his speech within the ordinance was a violation of the Constitution. We would, therefore, strain at technicalities to conclude that the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to petitioner was not before the Illinois courts. The record makes clear that petitioner at all times challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to him. 13 Reversed. 14 Mr. Chief Justice VINSON, dissen ing. 15 I dissent. The Court today reverses the Supreme Court of Illinois because it discovers in the record one sentence in the trial court's instructions which permitted the jury to convict on an unconstitutional basis. The offending sentence had previously gone completely undetected. It apparently was not even noticed, much less excepted to, by the petitioner's counsel at the trial. No objection was made to it in the two Illinois appellate tribunals which reviewed the case. Nor was it mentioned in the petition for certiorari or the briefs in this Court. In short, the offending sentence in the charge to the jury was no part of the case until this Court's independent research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat confused record. I think it too plain for argument that a reversal on such a basis does not accord with any principle governing review of state court decisions previously announced by this Court. Certainly, Stromberg v. California, 1931, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484, as Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER demonstrates, offers no precedent for today's action. 16 It will not do to say that, because the Illinois appellate courts affirmed the petitioner's conviction in the face of a constitutional attack, they necessarily must have approved the interpretation of the Chicago ordinance contained in the unnoticed instruction.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00264", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00353", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1730/2003 of 30 September 2003 altering the export refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in the natural state THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector(1), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 680/2002(2), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 27(5) of it, because: (1) The refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in the natural state were fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1684/2003(3). (2) It follows from applying the detailed rules contained in Regulation (EC) No 1684/2003 to the information known to the Commission that the export refunds at present in force should be altered to the amounts set out in the Annex to this, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds on the products listed in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, undenatured and exported in the natural state, as fixed in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1684/2003 are altered to the amounts shown in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 1 October 2003. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 30 September 2003.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 338, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00736", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00354", "text": "of appealable decisions, and distinctions from common-law practice which supported our conclusions in the Enelow and Ettelson cases supply no analogy competent to make an injunction of what in any ordinary understanding of the word is not one. 8 Trial by jury is a vital and cherished right, integral in our judicial system. It is argued that the importance of an interlocutory order denying or granting jury trial is such that it should be appealable. Many interlocutory orders are equally important, and may determine the outcome of the litigation, but they are not for that reason converted into injunctions. The Constitution guarantees to litigants in the federal courts the right to have their case tried by a jury, and Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly implements that guarantee. Denial of the right in a case where the demanding party is entitled to it is of course error. The rulings of the district courts granting or denying jury trial are subject to the most exacting scrutiny on appeal. 9 But piecemeal appeals have never been encouraged. The growth of the law of procedure in the United States during the last half-century has been steadily in the direction of simplicity and directness in the administration of justice. To that end, and with careful regard for the constitutional rights of the parties, this Court, under specific authorization by Congress, adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure, abolishing procedural distinctions between law and equity and establishing a single unified practice. We would ill serve the stated purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure were we to perpetuate by analogy distinctions which the rules expressly disavow. The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeal and its judgment is affirmed. 10 With the case disposed of in this manner, we do not reach the second question presented: whether petitioner is entitled to a jury on the issue of mutual mistake. 11 Affirmed. 12 Mr. Justice BURTON concurs in the judgment of the Court. 13 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring. 14 On occasion a problem arises which calls for a more discriminating analysis than is conveyed by the phrase 'law and equity are now fused' to indicate the procedural development whereby an action at law and a suit in equity in relation to it may be disposed of in a single litigation. In this case, the deeply rooted historical distinction between an action at law and a suit in equity becomes decisive. Since I would not reverse or impair the ruling in Enelow v", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00284", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00355", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 55/91 of 9 January 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1001/90 continuing market research measures within and outside the Community in respect of milk and milk products THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1079/77 of 17 May 1977 on a co-responsibility levy and on measures for expanding the markets in milk and milk products (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3660/90 (2), and in particular Article 4 of it, because Article 5 (3) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1001/90 (3) states that the competent authorities are to conclude contracts with the parties concerned before 1 January 1991; because due to the large number of contracts to be concluded this time limit should be extended; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 In Article 5 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1001/90, '1 January 1991' is replaced by '1 February 1991'. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 January 1991.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 329, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00681", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00356", "text": "of certain fishery products (3), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3165/84 (4), establish within the framework of the withdrawal price system the conditions for the use of the margin of tolerance provided for in Article 13 (1) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81; that in order to respect the parallelism between the two systems the use of the margin of tolerance within the framework of the sale price system provided for in Article 14a (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 should be subject to the same conditions; because, under the first subparagraph of Article 14a (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81, only 20 % of the annual quantity offered for sale may qualify for the premium; because, accordingly, the factors that are taken into account in calculating this percentage should be specified; because, to help ensure product quality and to facilitate the disposal of products on the market, the minimum requirements to be satisfied by operations qualifying for the premium should be laid down, together with requirements for the storage and return to the market of the products concerned; because, in order to prevent fraudulent operations, in particular in the event of preservation in tanks or cages, appropriate storage and marking arrangements must be introduced; because the terms 'technical costs' and 'financial costs' involved in calculating the premium should be defined; because the producers' organizations must share the financial burden associated with the application of the storage premium system for frozen products; because the amount of the premium must be fixed on the basis, in particular, of the costs of the stabilization and storage operations; because, therefore, the premium should be graduated on the basis of the period of storage; because, for the same reasons, the period of storage in respect of which a premium is provided for may not exceed six months; because, to increase the efficiency of checks, the recipients of the premium must keep stock records; because these records must contain at least the particulars necessary for the purposes of the said check; because the procedure whereby interested parties may submit applications for the premium should be laid down; because the procedure should also be laid down for the grant of advance payments and the amount of the relevant security should be specified; because the procedure must also be laid down for the lodging, release and forfeiture of the said security; because, in the case of minor infringements of the rules concerning the storage premium", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00528", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00357", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Heart Disease Education, Analysis, and Research, and Treatment for Women Act'' or the ``HEART for Women Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Heart disease, stroke, and other cardiovascular diseases are the leading cause of death among women. (2) Despite being the number 1 killer, only 13 percent of women are aware that cardiovascular diseases, including heart disease and stroke, are their greatest health risk. (3) Many minority women, including African American, Hispanic, and Native American women, are at a higher risk of death from heart disease, stroke, and other cardiovascular diseases, but they are less likely to know of this risk. (4) There is a pervasive lack of awareness among health care providers that cardiovascular disease is the leading killer of women. (5) Women are less likely than men to receive certain treatments for cardiovascular diseases, perhaps due to lack of awareness and the presence of different symptoms in women than in men. (6) Women tend to experience later onset of heart disease than men, and therefore more often suffer from multiple conditions that mask symptoms of heart disease and complicate treatment. (7) Certain diagnostic tests for cardiovascular disease may be less accurate in women than men. (8) Drug effectiveness and metabolism differ in women and men, impacting successful treatment of cardiovascular disease. (9) In addition, stroke kills 2.3 times as many females as does breast cancer. Nearly 61 percent of stroke-related deaths occur in females. Studies have found gender differences in the effects, diagnosis, and treatment of stroke. For instance-- (A) stroke severity is greater in women than in men; (B) women often receive fewer diagnostic tests and intervention procedures than men; and (C) strokes present treatment issues unique to women. SEC. 3. REPORTING OF GENDER DATA IN APPLICATIONS FOR DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND DEVICES. (a) New Drug Applications.--Section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(5)(A) despite any other provision of this Act, the applicant will include in any submission to the Secretary under this subsection, to the extent appropriate, information stratified by gender, race and ethnicity, including any differences in safety and effectiveness.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00917", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00358", "text": "Madagascar and Suriname, noted in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92 (5), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 3304/94 (6); because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. An invitation to tender is opened, for the refund on export of wholly milled round grain rice referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1418/76, for Zones I to VI and Zone VIII excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, as specified in the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92. 2. The invitation to tender will be open until 26 June 1997. During that period weekly invitations to tender will be issued and the date for submission of tenders will be determined in the notice of invitation to tender. 3. The invitation to tender will take place in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 and with the following provisions. Article 2 A tender will be valid only if it covers a quantity for export of at least 50 tonnes but not more than 5 000 tonnes. Article 3 The security referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 will be ECU 20 per tonne. Article 4 1. despite the provisions of Article 21 (1) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3719/88 (7), export licences issued within this invitation to tender will, for the purposes of determining their period of validity, be considered as having been issued on the day the tender was submitted. 2. The licences will be valid from their date of issue, within the meaning of paragraph 1, until the end of the third month following. Article 5 Tenders submitted must reach the Commission through the Member States not later than one and a half hours after expiry of the time limit for weekly submission of tenders as laid down in the notice of invitation to tender. They must be transmitted in accordance with the table given in the Annex. If no tenders are submitted, the Member States will inform the Commission accordingly within the same time limit as that given in the above subparagraph. Article 6 The time set for submitting tenders will be Belgian time. Article 7", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00511", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00359", "text": "held invalid as applied to interstate commerce. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050, 90 L.Ed. 1317, 165 A.L.R. 574. previously the Court steadily has held that the failure of Congress to enact a law on this specific subject does not operate to expose interstate commerce to the burden of local rules, no matter what policy in this highly controversial matter a state sought to advance. It would seem to me that the constitutional principles which have been so apparent to the Court that it would not permit local policies to burden national commerce, are even more obvious in relation to foreign commerce. 35 Certainly if any state can enforce regulations concerning embarkation and landing, it can in effect control much that pertains to the foreign journey. To determine what persons and commodities will be taken abroad is to control what persons and commodities may become the subject of foreign commerce, and that is to control the lifeblood of the commerce itself. These are identical with matters in which this commerce is subject to control by federal and foreign governments. The Federal Government takes active control of the inbound movement of goods by virtue of its customs service and of the movement of persons by virtue of its immigration service across these boundaries. The Canadian government does the same on the outbound crossing of the international line. It does so in this case, and it does so even if the bulk of the travelers do not go very far or stay very long and are merely amusement bent. 36 The wholesome and amiable situation detailed in the Court's opinion is made possible only by international relations wholly controlled by the Federal Government. It alone can effectively protect or foster this kind of commerce, and it alone should be allowed to burden it. If we are to concede this power over foreign commerce to one state, it would seem that it could logically be claimed by every state which has a port, border, or landing field used by foreign commerce. 37 The Court admits that the commerce involved in this case is foreign commerce, but subjects it to the state police power on the ground that it is not very foreign. It fails to lay down any standard by which we can judge when foreign commerce is foreign enough to become free of local regulation. The commerce involved here is not distinguishable from a great deal of the traffic across our Canadian and Mexican borders, except perhaps in volume. Communities have sprung up on either side, whose social and economic relations are interdependent,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00132", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00360", "text": "the resulting operating cost (i.e. seat-mile cost) these two types of regional jets serve distinct mission profiles and are not substitutable with one another. For an airline to fly 80 passengers from point A to point B there is no economically meaningful alternative between the use of two small or one large regional jet. Equally, to fly 45 passengers the use of a large regional jet is an uneconomical option. From a historical point of view, the first regional jets developed and put in the market were small regional aircraft, generally with less than 50 seats. However, the prospect of growing regional traffic coupled with technological advances enabled airframe and engine manufacturers to build longer airframes and more powerful engines, thereby responding to the current demand of airlines for larger rather than for small regional jets. In fact, large regional jets constituted 14 % of the overall European fleet in 1992 and 33 % in 1998. (21) Embraer, Fairchild Dornier, Bombardier and BAe Systems are the manufacturers of large regional jets, and GE, Honeywell, RR and P& W are the manufacturers of engines that can power regional jets. GE, RR, P& W, but not Honeywell, are active on the market for small regional jet engines, because GE and Honeywell are the only engine manufacturers for large regional jets. The proposed concentration creates a horizontal overlap only in relation to large regional jet aircraft. Honeywell is the engine supplier to the first large regional jet put on the market, namely BAe Systems' Avro and BAe 146 jet. GE is the engine supplier to the three most recent and only available alternative large regional jets that Embraer, Fairchild Dornier, and Bombardier have recently developed. Table 2 indicates these types of aircraft and their corresponding engines. Table 2 Large Regional Jet Aircraft and Engines >TABLE> (22) As Table 2 indicates, the merged entity will be the only available engine supplier to the large regional jet market. Until a new large regional jet platform is launched, competing engine manufacturers will not have the possibility to compete in this market. (23) The Parties have raised two objections to the above considerations. Firstly, they contested the existence of a horizontal overlap in large regional jets, arguing that the BAe System type of aircraft is not a full-fledged competitor in this market. Secondly, they argued that such a market should also include the small Airbus and Boeing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00714", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00361", "text": "that the Georgia Supreme Court has failed to give proper effect to the venue provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 8 Section 6 of that Act establishes petitioner's right to sue in Alabama. It provides that the employee may bring his suit wherever the carrier'will be doing business', and admittedly respondent does business in Jefferson County, Alabama. Congress has deliberately chosen to give petitioner a transitory cause of action; and we have held before, in a case indistinguishable from this one, that § 6 displaces the traditional 'power of a state court to enjoin its citizens, on the ground of oppressiveness * * * from suing * * * in the * * * courts of another state * * *.' Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra, 315 U.S. at page 699, 62 S.Ct. at page 828. Respondent admits that the Miles case dealt with precisely the issue before us, but respondent tells us that Miles is now no longer the law because Congress overruled it, by implication, with the passage of § 1404(a) of the Judicial Code in 1948.8 Section 1404(a) provides: 9 'For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.' 10 We have previously held that § 1404(a) makes the doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable to Federal Employers' Liability Act cases brought in federal courts and provides for the transfer of such actions to a more convenience forum. Ex parte Collett, 1949, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207. Respondent would have us extend that decision, to hold that s 1404(a) also provides for the power asserted by the Georgia court in this case. We do not agree; we do not think the language of the statute suggests any such implied grant of broad power to the state courts. 11 Section 1404(a), by its very terms, speaks to federal courts; it addresses itself only to that federal forum in which a lawsuit has been initiated; its function is to vest such a federal forum with the power to transfer a transitory cause of action to a more convenient federal court. It does not speak to state courts, and it says", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00495", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00362", "text": "574/72 (E 210 and E 211) because: (1) The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 requires the forms in the E 200 series to be amended. (2) The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement) of 2 May 1992, supplemented by the Protocol of 17 March 1993, Annex VI, implements Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 and (EEC) No 574/72 within the European Economic Area. (3) The European Community and its Member States, and the Swiss Confederation have concluded an Agreement on the free movement of persons (Swiss Agreement) which entered into force on 1 June 2002. Annex II to the Agreement refers to Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 and (EEC) No 574/72. (4) For practical reasons, the forms used in the European Union and under the EEA and Swiss Agreements should be identical, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 1. The model documents E 202 with additional pages 1 to 9, E 203 with additional pages 1 to 13, E 204 with additional pages 1 to 9, E 205(BE), (CZ), (DK), (DE), (EE), (GR), (ES), (FR), (IE), (IT), (CY), (LV), (LT), (LU), (HU), (MT), (NL), (AT), (PL), (PT), (SI), (SK), (FI), (SE), (UK), (IS), (LI), (NO), (CH), E 207, E 210, E 211, E 213 with additional pages 1 to 5, and E 215 with an additional page are adopted in accordance with the forms attached to this decision. 2. The competent authorities of the Member States will make available to the parties concerned the forms according to the models appended to this. These forms will be available in the official languages of the Community and laid out in such manner that the different versions are perfectly superposable, thereby making it possible for all addressees to receive the form printed in their own language. 3. This Decision, which replaces Decisions No 184 and No 188, will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. It", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00591", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00363", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 9 March 1998 on the procedure for attesting the conformity of construction products under Article 20(2) of Council Directive 89/106/EEC as regards internal partition kits (Text with EEA relevance) (98/213/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to construction products (1), as amended by Directive 93/68/EEC (2), and in particular Article 13(4) of it, because the Commission is required to select, as between the two procedures under Article 13(3) of Directive 89/106/EEC for attesting for conformity of a product, the 'least onerous possible procedure consistent with safety`; because this means that it is necessary to decide whether, for a given product or family of products, the existence of a factory production control system under the responsibility of the manufacturer is a necessary and sufficient condition for an attestation of conformity, or whether, for reasons related to compliance with the criteria mentioned in Article 13(4), the intervention of an approved certification body is therefore required; because Article 13(4) requires that the procedure thus determined must be indicated in the mandates and in the technical specifications; because, therefore, it is desirable to define the concept of products or family of products as used in the mandates and in the technical specifications; because the two procedures provided for in Article 13(3) are described in detail in Annex III to Directive 89/106/EEC; because it is necessary therefore to specify clearly the methods by which the two procedures must be implemented, by reference to Annex III, for each product or family of products, since Annex III gives preference to certain systems; because the procedure referred to in Article 13(3)(a) corresponds to the systems set out in the first possibility, without continuous surveillance, and the second and third possibilities of point (ii) of section 2 of Annex III, and the procedure referred to in Article 13(3)(b) corresponds to the systems set out in point (i) of section 2 of Annex III, and in the first possibility, with continuous surveillance, of point (ii) of section 2 of Annex", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00763", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00364", "text": "to review the allocation during a given year on the basis of the data available after the first six months; because a reserve should be established so as to avoid any interruption in trade with a supplier country when the overall quantity has not been exhausted; because the European Agreements with Bulgaria (5), Poland (6) and Romania (7) grant those countries preferential access to the Community market for specific quantities; because detailed arrangements should be laid down to ensure that the quantities in excess of the tariff quotas are subjected to the levying of the additional amount; because those arrangements must involve the issuing of licences at the end of a period in which the quantities are checked and the necessary notifications are made by the Member States; because these provisions are either supplementary to or derogate from the provisions of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2405/89 of 1 August 1989 laying down special detailed rules for the application of the system of import licences and advance fixing certificates for products processed from fruit and vegetables (8), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 556/94 (9), and by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3719/88 of 16 November 1988 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of import and export licences and advance fixing certificates for agricultural products (10), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2746/94 (11); because, under Regulation (EEC) No 1707/90, a new importer was not obliged to satisfy certain conditions in order to qualify as such; because experience shows that if proper management of the quota is to be ensured the share allocated to this category of trader must be reduced and certain criteria relating to the status of the applicants and the use of the licences allocated must be laid down; because it is more appropriate to establish henceforth an allocation between traditional importers on the basis of the quantities imported and not on the basis of the licences issued; because, for administrative reasons, provision should nevertheless be made for a transitional period; Wheras, to ensure the correct use of the quotas, provision must be made for regular notification by the Member States of the quantities for which the licences have not been used; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The entry into free circulation within the Community of mushrooms of the species Ag", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00715", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00365", "text": "located in the City of Edwardsville, Wyandotte County, Kansas and more particularly described in Quit Claim Deed filed for record as Parcel I.D. 944806, Book 3190 at Page 198 and Book 4408 at Page 789 in the Wyandotte County, Kansas, Register of Deeds Office. (5) Unified government.--The term ``Unified Government'' means the Unified Government of Kansas City and Wyandotte County, Kansas. (6) Wyandotte nation.--The term ``Wyandotte Nation'' means the Wyandotte Nation, a federally-recognized Indian tribe. (d) Extinguishment of Land Claims.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this section and as part of the settlement of the Lawsuit and the Wyandotte Nation's land claims asserted there, the Secretary will take and hold title to the Settlement Lands in trust for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation under and within the scope and meaning of section 20(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(B)(i)). Any and all claims which the Wyandotte Nation has or could have asserted in the Lawsuit will be extinguished upon-- (1) the Secretary accepting title to the Settlement Lands in trust for the Wyandotte Nation; and (2) publication in the Federal Register of a notice of approval of tribal-State compact between the Wyandotte Nation and the State of Kansas under section 11(d)(3)(B) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(B)). (e) Shriner Property.--Congress confirms that the United States acquired title to the Shriner's Property in trust for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation effective July 15, 1996. despite the trust status of the Shriner's Property, the Wyandotte Nation will have no rights to conduct gaming on the Shriner's Property upon- (1) the Secretary accepting title to the Settlement Lands in trust for the Wyandotte Nation; and (2) publication in the Federal Register of a notice approval of a tribal-State compact between the Wyandotte Nation and the State of Kansas under section 11(d)(3)(B) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(B)).", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 493, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00905", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00366", "text": "prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. 24 Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case (153 F.2d 212, 223) as the 'Work product of the lawyer.' Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, previously inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 25 We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essentia to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And production might be justified where the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00014", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00367", "text": "making determinations of whether the payment amount for a new test should be established on the basis described in paragraph (10)(A) or the basis described in paragraph (10)(B); ``(ii) make available to the public the data (other than proprietary data) considered in making such determinations; and ``(iii) provide for a mechanism under which-- ``(I) an interested party may request an administrative review of an adverse determination; ``(II) upon the request of an interested party, an administrative review is conducted with respect to an adverse determination; and ``(III) such determination is revised, as necessary, to reflect the results of such review. ``(D) For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (10)-- ``(i) the term `HCPCS' refers to the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System; and ``(ii) a code will be considered to be `substantially revised' if there is a substantive change to the definition of the test or procedure to which the code applies (such as a new analyte or a new methodology for measuring an existing analyte-specific test). ``(10)(A) despite paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), if a new test is clinically similar to a test for which a fee schedule amount has been established under paragraph (5), the Secretary will pay the same fee schedule amount for the new test. In determining whether tests are clinically similar for purposes of this paragraph, the Secretary may not take into account economic factors. ``(B)(i) despite paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5), if a new test is not clinically similar to a test for which a fee schedule has been established under paragraph (5), payment under this subsection for such test will be made on the basis of the lesser of-- ``(I) the actual charge for the test; or ``(II) an amount equal to 60 percent (or in the case of a test performed by a qualified hospital (as defined in paragraph (1)(D)) for outpatients of such hospital, 62 percent) of the prevailing charge level determined under the third and fourth sentences of section 1842(b)(3) for the test for a locality or area for the year (determined without regard to the year referred to in paragraph (2)(A)(i), or any national limitation amount under paragraph (4)(B), and adjusted annually by the percentage increase or decrease under paragraph (2)(A)(i)); until the beginning of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00891", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00368", "text": "§ 20 creates an exception, which the language of Attleboro did not reach, for hydroelectric energy transmitted across state lines under the aegis of coordinated state regulation. In short, it is alleged that § 20 'conferred jurisdiction' on the states. 10 We do not agree. Attleboro declared state regulation of interstate transmission of power for resale forbidden as a direct burden on commerce. The states may act as to such a subject only when Congress has specifically granted permission for the exercise of this state power over articles moving interstate which would otherwise be immune. In Re Rahner, 140 U.S. 545, 560—562, 11 S.Ct. 865, 868—869, 35 L.Ed. 572.8 Section 20 cannot bear this interpretation; it did not establish the source of the energy as a significant factor determining whether state or federal authority applied. It is quite different from those few unique federal statutes this Court has previously considered,'subjecting interstate commerce * * * to present and future state prohibitions,' or regulation, James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 326, 37 S.Ct. 180, 185, 61 L.Ed. 326, in the exercise of the constitutional commerce power. Its language indicates no consideration or desire to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause; it merely states that the federal power will not be invoked unless certain conditions of state inability to regulate obtain.9 Section 20 quite obviously is not based on any recognition of the constitutional barrier, but rather assumes what Attleboro held did not exist—state authority to reach interstate sales of energy for resale; its sole concern is the application of federal regulation on the possible failure of the states to empower their regulatory agencies or their inability to agree. 11 Nor can it soundly be said that Congress in § 20 of Part I charged the States with responsibility of regulating rates of interstate sales of electricity through the use of the federal power over government property. U.S.Const., Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. As indicated in our discussion of the commerce power, there was in 1920 when § 20 was enacted no full appreciation of the limits of state power over sales of electricity for export or import for resale. So that language of § 20 required reasonable rates to consumers of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00489", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00369", "text": "Evidence Act (1872). 32 And Fitzjames Stephen, who acted on this experience in drawing the Indian Evidence Act, was no softie, either before be became a judge or on the bench. 33 Accordingly I adhere to the views expressed in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136, 62 S.Ct. 993, 996, 86 L.Ed. 1322, that the Olmstead case should be overruled for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinions in that case. These views have been strongly underlined by the steady increase of lawlessness on the part of law officers, even after Congress has forbidden what the dissenters in Olmstead found the Constitution to forbid. 34 Even on the basis of the prior decisions of this Court, however, I feel bound to dissent. The Court seems not content with calling a halt at the place it had reached on what I deem to be the wrong road. As my brother BURTON shows, the Court now pushes beyond the lines of legality previously drawn. Such encouragement to lazy, immora conduct by the police does not bode well for effective law en forcement. Nor will crime be checked by such means. 35 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting. 36 The Court held in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, over powerful dissents by Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Butler, and Chief Justice Stone that wire tapping by federal officials was not a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Since that time the issue has been constantly stirred by those dissents and by an increasing use of wire tapping by the police. Fourteen years later in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322, the issue was again presented to the Court. I joined in an opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice Roberts, which adhered to the Olmstead case, refusing to overrule it. Since that time various aspects of the problem have appeared again and again in the cases coming before us. I now more fully appreciate the vice of the practices spawned by Olmstead and Goldman. Reflection on them has brought new insight to me. I now", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00458", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00370", "text": "Standard ANSI/UL 2034-2005). The standard will take effect 180 days after it is published. ``(2) Compliance with standard.--After the standard takes effect, it will be unlawful for any manufacturer or distributor to import into or distribute in commerce in the United States any new assembled or unassembled residential carbon monoxide detector unless it complies with the standard. ``(3) Violation.--The failure to comply with paragraph (2) will be deemed to be a failure to comply with a consumer product safety standard under this Act and subject to all of the penalties and remedies available under this Act. ``(4) Other types of carbon monoxide detectors.--Paragraph (2) does not apply to any carbon monoxide detector not covered by the standard as provided in section 1.4 of the standard. ``(b) Labeling.--Beginning 1 year after the date of enactment of the Residential Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Prevention Act, a manufacturer selling or offering for sale in the United States a residential carbon monoxide detector manufactured more than 1 year after the date of enactment of that Act, will clearly identify on any container of the detector and on the detector its conformance with the requirements of the consumer product safety standard promulgated under subsection (a). ``(c) Modification of Standard.-- ``(1) ANSI revisions.--If the American National Standard ANSI/UL 34-2005 is revised through the applicable consensus standards development process after the date on which the product safety standard for residential carbon monoxide detectors is published in the Federal Register, the American National Standards Institute will notify the Commission of the revision. ``(2) Commission action.--Within 120 days after it receives notice of such a revision by the American National Standards Institute, the Commission will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to amend the product safety standard for residential carbon monoxide detectors to include any such revision that the Commission determines is reasonably related to the performance of such detectors, and notify the Institute of any revision it has determined not to be so related. The Commission will promulgate an amendment to the standard for such detectors within 180 days after the date on which the notice of proposed rulemaking for the amendment is published in the Federal Register. ``(3) Additional safety requirements.--despite any other provision of this Act, the Commission may, under sections 7 and 9 of this Act, amend the product safety standard for residential", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01053", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00371", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 21 December 1999 approving the plan presented by Portugal for the surveillance of African swine fever (notified under document number C(1999) 4783) (Only the Portuguese text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (2000/62/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), as last amended by Council Directive 92/118/EEC(2), and, in particular, Article 10(4) of it, because: (1) By Commission Decision 1999/789/EC(3), Portugal was requested to submit the Commission a plan for the surveillance of African swine fever in the regions Alentejo and Algarve. (2) The plan submitted by Portugal provides for additional suitable measures to prevent the spread of African swine fever. (3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The plan submitted by Portugal for the surveillance of African swine fever is approved. Article 2 Portugal will bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions for implementing the plan referred to in Article 1. Article 3 This Decision is addressed to the Portuguese Republic. Done at Brussels, 21 December 1999.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 333, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00796", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00372", "text": "given leverages which the scheme of § 77 explicitly 1 With respect to South Western's property, the plan reads as follows: 'Prior to or upon consummation of the plan the debtor will also acquire, if they can be acquired on the terms from now on set forth, properties at present leased to the debtor by the South Western Railroad Company. * * * If any of these properties will not be acquired as a result of the acceptance of the plan by he leased-line security holders, then and in that event the lease or leases of any line or lines not so acquired will be disaffirmed as of such time at or prior to the consummation of the plan as the court may direct. The method of acquisition, whether through purchase, merger, or consolidation, will, subject to the approval of the Commission and the court, be determined by the trustee or by the reorganization managers when they begin to function. 'If the leased lines are acquired, the railroads of each of the three and the personal property appurtenant thereto and all of the real estate owned by each lessor will be conveyed to the reorganized company; each of said lessors will waive any damages to which it has become or will become entitled on account of any breach of the lease; and the South Western Railroad Company will waive all claims in respect to equipment. Such conveyances and waivers will in each instance be the sole consideration of the delivery to each of the respective lessors of the securities proposed to be allocated to it, as from now on specified.' 261 I.C.C.Rep. 515. 2 261 I.C.C.Rep. 309. 3 333 U.S. 853, 68 S.Ct. 736. 4 261 I.C.C.Rep. 515. 5 In its report approving the plan, the Commission said (261 I.C.C. Rep. at p. 308): 'The lessor (South Western) insists that it has the right to severance if it cares to exercise it, and such a right will be recognized in the approved plan.' The district court, in approving the plan, commented that 'If the lessors do not accept the proposal to acquire their lines they are, on disaffirmance, at liberty to take their properties back,' while counsel for the Trustee stated at a meeting of South Western's stockholders, 'The plan makes you an offer, gentlemen; that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00237", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00373", "text": "on file and available for public inspection in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service. (c) Abolishment of Current Pinnacles National Monument.-- (1) In general.--In light of the establishment of Pinnacles National Park, Pinnacles National Monument is abolished and the lands and interests there are incorporated within and made part of Pinnacles National Park. Any funds available for purposes of the monument will be available for purposes of the park. (2) References.--Any references in law (other than in this Act), regulation, document, record, map or other paper of the United States to Pinnacles National Monument will be considered a reference to Pinnacles National Park. (d) Administration.--The Secretary of the Interior will administer Pinnacles National Park in accordance with this Act and laws generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including the National Park Service Organic Act (16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4). (e) Land Acquisition.--The Secretary of the Interior may acquire land or interests in land within the boundaries of Pinnacles National Park by purchase from a willing seller with donated or appropriated funds, donation, or exchange. SEC. 4. REDESIGNATION OF PINNACLES WILDERNESS AS HAIN WILDERNESS AND EXPANSION OF WILDERNESS. (a) Redesignation.--Subsection (i) of the first section of Public Law 94-567 (90 Stat. 2693; 16 U.S.C. 1132 note) is amended by striking ``Pinnacles Wilderness'' and inserting ``Hain Wilderness''. Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Pinnacles Wilderness will be deemed to be a reference to the Hain Wilderness. (b) Expansion.--Certain lands comprising approximately 2,905 acres, as generally depicted on a map entitled ``Proposed Wilderness Additions to the Proposed Pinnacles National Park'' and dated April 16, 2008, are designated as wilderness and, therefore, as a component of the National Wilderness Preservation System and are incorporated in and will be deemed to be a part of the Hain Wilderness, as redesignated by subsection (a). SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01078", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00374", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1432/2001 of 13 July 2001 suspending the buying-in of butter in certain Member States THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000(2), and in particular Article 10 of it, because: (1) Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2771/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards intervention on the market in butter and cream(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 213/2001(4), lays down the criteria for opening or suspending the buying-in of butter by invitation to tender in the Member States. (2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1180/2001(5) suspending the buying-in of butter in certain Member States establishes the list of Member States in which intervention is suspended. As a result of the market prices communicated by Spain, intervention must be suspended in this country and the list of Member States established by Regulation (EC) No 1180/2001 adjusted accordingly. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Buying-in of butter by invitation to tender as provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 is suspended in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 1180/2001 is repealed. Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on 14 July 2001. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 13 July 2001.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 461, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00606", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00375", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 3047/83 of 28 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2213/76 on the sale of skimmed-milk powder from public storage THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in milk and milk products (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1600/83 (2), and in particular Article 7 (5) of it, because Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2213/76 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2836/83 (4), limited the quantity of skimmed-milk powder put up for sale by the Member States' intervention agencies to that taken into storage before 1 June 1983; because, having regard to the market situation and the amounts in storage, that date should be replaced by 1 August 1983; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 In Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 2213/76, '1 June 1983' is replaced by '1 August 1983'. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 28 October 1983.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 352, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00531", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00376", "text": ", Lewis could have been imprisoned for a year.60 204 In my opinion, when Congress prescribes a maximum penalty for criminal violation of a statute, that penalty fixes the maximum which can be imposed whether the conviction is in a criminal proceeding as such for its violation or is for contempt for violating an order of court to observe it temporarily. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 612, 34 S.Ct. 693, 696, 58 L.Ed. 1115. If the fine or other penalty in such a case can be multiplied twice or any other number of times, merely by bringing a civil suit, securing a temporary restraining order and then convicting the person who violates it of criminal contempt, regardless of the order's validity and of any of the usual restraints of criminal procedure, the way will have been found to dispense with substantially all of those protections relating not only to the course of the proceedings but to the penalty itself. 205 But it is in relation to the flat criminal fine of $700,000 against the union that the Court's disregard of the constitutional and other standards is most apparent. By what measuring rod this sum has been arrived at as the appropriate and lawful amount, I am unable to say, unless indeed it is simply by a rough estimate of what the union should be forced to pay on all counts. Never has a criminal fine of such magnitude been previously laid and sustained, so far as I am able to discover. And only for treason, with one other possible exception,61 has Congress authorized one so large. Moreover, the Court's enumeration of factors to be taken into account indicates expressly, as I read the opinion, that one is the coercive effect of the imposition for the future, though it is thoroughly settled that in contempt criminal punishment is to be l id only for past conduct.62 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co., supra, and authorities cited. 206 Thus, the Court in effect imposes double coercive penalties, in view of the additional contingent award of $2,800,000 for that specific and sole purpose. I think the criminal fine of $700,000 not only constitutionally excessive, far beyond any previously sustained for violation of any statute or order of court. It is also an unlawful commingling of civil coercive and criminal penalties, without the essential contingent feature in the coercive phase, under", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00044", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00377", "text": "was present or saw Haley during or after this examint ion testified in detail, and with positiveness, that Haley was not abused or roughly handled in any degree and that his person and clothes presented a normal appearance after the examination. Immediately after Haley had been shown alleged confessions by Parks and Lowder and had read at least that by Parks, Haley made an oral statement evidently similar to that made by Parks. Thereupon, Haley was taken to a front room where a sergeant of detectives typed Haley's confession in question and answer form during a period which consumed from one hour to an hour and a half. Before taking this confession the sergeant testified that he typed and read to Haley, clearly and distinctly, the preliminary statement, a part of which is quoted in this Court's opinion as being at the beginning of the written confession. The sergeant testified that Haley, after hearing this introduction, said that he still desired to make a statement and tell the truth. When completed, the statement, so prepared, was signed by Haley in the presence not only of some of the police officers who had questioned him but also of two civilian witnesses called in for that purpose from outside of police headquarters. The Acting Chief of Police, who himself was a member of the Bar of Ohio, requested Haley to read the entire confession. When this had been done, the Acting Chief of Police, in the capacity of a notary public, administered the oath signed by Haley at the end of the confession, stating that the facts contained there were true and correct as Haley verily believed. A newspaper photographer then took a picture of Haley in company with Parks and Lowder. Either then or on the following Monday, the date being disputed, Haley was taken back to his home where the police found the trunk described by him as that from which he had taken the pistol. After his confession he was placed in the city jail and, on the following Tuesday, October 23, he was removed to the county jail. On that day, a complaint was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Department, by a sergeant of police, charging Haley with being a delinquent child. 34 On October 29, 1945, under a motion of the prosecuting attorney, the judge assigned to the above-mentioned Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas appointed a doctor to make a physical and mental examination of the accused. 35 On November 1,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00125", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00378", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1831/2005 of 10 November 2005 on the issue of import licences for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 936/97 of 27 May 1997 opening and providing for the administration of tariff quotas for high-quality fresh, chilled and frozen beef and for frozen buffalo meat (2), because: (1) Regulation (EC) No 936/97 provides in Articles 4 and 5 the conditions for applications and for the issue of import licences for meat referred to in Article 2(f). (2) Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 fixes the amount of high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal meeting the definition laid down there which may be imported on special terms for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 at 11 500 t. (3) It should be recalled that licences issued under this Regulation will, throughout the period of validity, be open for use only in so far as provisions on health protection in force permit, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. All applications for import licences from 1 to 5 November 2005 for high-quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal as referred to in Article 2(f) of Regulation (EC) No 936/97 will be granted in full. 2. Applications for licences may be submitted, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 936/97, during the first five days of December 2005 for 5 132,33 t. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 11 November 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 10 November 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 451, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00750", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00379", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001''. SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN. (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 90 the following: ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN ``Sec. ``1841. Protection of unborn children. ``Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children ``(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section. ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother. ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-- ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child. ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person will instead of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being. ``(D) despite any other provision of law, the death penalty will not be imposed for an offense under this section. ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), (f), (h)(1), and (i), 924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1153(a), 120", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01059", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00380", "text": "history in this light, it lends support to the view that § 39 was conceived as dealing with property not otherwise subject to return. Senate hearings opened with detailed testimony analyzing the value of assets which would be left after payments for administration and liquidation, returns under § 32, and disbursements in satisfaction of judgments in suits brought under § 9(a). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4044, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12—21. See also id., at 44, and Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 873, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 264. It seems clear that the legislation looks to the disposition of this fund, and the conclusion is reinforced by the provision of the section that 'The net proceeds remaining upon the completion of administration, liquidation, and disposition under the provisions of this Act of any such property or interest there will be covered into the Treasury at the earliest practicable date.' 10 The tenor of the hearings demonstrates no purpose to change the existing scope of § 9(a). The only reason a proviso to that effect was not included in § 39 as passed seems to be an assumption—unwarranted in the light of other evidence before the committees discussed below—that a national of any enemy nation had no rights under § 9(a) in any case.7 Indeed, the terms 'enemy,' enemy alien,' 'enemy national,' and 'German or Japanese national' are used interchangeably in the hearings, not only by committee members but by witnesses from the Office of Alien Property, without regard to precise shades of meaning in the context of the Trading with the Enemy Act. 11 By § 39 Congress was manifesting its 'firm resolve not to permit the recurrence of events which after the close of World War I led to the return of enemy property to their former owners.' H.R.Rep. No. 976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. Those events, as we have seen, culminated in the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 permitting enemies as defined in § 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act to recover 80% of their vested assets. The major controversy on § 39 was whether this reversal of post-World War I policy was justifiable as a matter of international", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00428", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00381", "text": "it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it will be the duty of the President immediately to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President will immediately demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President will use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto will as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.' 15 Stat. 224, 8 U.S.C. § 903b, 8 U.S.C.A. § 903b. 5 See Delaney, The Alien Enemy and the Draft, 12 Brooklyn L.Rev. 91. 6 '* * * In 1798, the 5th Congress passed three acts in rapid succession, 'An Act concerning Aliens', approved June 25, 1798 (1 Stat. 570), 'An Act respecting Alien Enemies', approved July 6, 1798 (1 Stat. 577, 50 U.S.C.A. § 21 et seq.), and 'An Act in addition to the act, entitled 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States\", approved July 14, 1798. (1 Stat. 596.) The first and last were the Alien and Sedition Acts, vigorously attacked in Congress and by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as unconstitutional. But the members of Congress who vigorously fought the Alien Act saw no objection to the Alien Enemy Act. (8 Annals of Cong. 2035 (5th Cong., 1798).) In fact, Albert Gallatin, who led that opposition, was emphatic in distinguishing between the two bills and in affirming the constitutional power of Congress over alien enemies as part of the power to declare war. (Id. at 1980.) James Madison was the author of the Virginia Resolutions, and in his report to the Virginia House of Delegates the ensuing year after the deluge of controversy, he carefully and with some tartness asserted a distinction between alien members of a hostile nation and alien members of a friendly nation, disavowed any", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00374", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00382", "text": "interest that was meant. Hallock did not say or imply, as I read it, that the May v. Heiner doctrine, which is supported by Reinecke and Shukert v. Allen, as to when 'possession or enjoyment' passes from a donor was changed by the Resolution. These cases had held that something must pass from the settlor. The only difference wrought by Hallock on this concept of possession and enjoyment was to apply the Klein rule that the enlargement of the remainder estate did effect a transmission from the dead to the living. 43 Assuming that Congress might have legislated so that the added words would apply to the estates of all who died after the passage of the Joint Resolution, Congress definitely manifested an intention that the amendments were not to apply to trusts created prior to the Resolution though the settlor might die subsequently thereto. This whole matter is discussed thoroughly and, I think, unanswerably in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, and I can add nothing to the argument. Attention, however, should be called to the statements on the floor of the House by members of the Committee on Ways and Means at the time of the passage of the Joint Resolution.10 Mr. Hawley, Chairman of the Committee, answering a question as to the nature of the Resolution said, 'It provides that hereafter no such method will be used to evade the tax.' Mr. Garner of the same Committee stated: 44 'The Committee on Ways and Means this afternoon had a meeting and unanimously reported the resolution just passed. We did not make it retroactive for the reason that we were afraid that the Senate would not agree to it. But I do hope that when this matter is considered in the Seventy second Congress we may be able to pass a bill that will make it retroactive.' 45 And in answer to a question, he reiterated, 'I have strong hopes that the next Congress will make it retroactive.' Congress never took any subsequent action and this Court § interpretation of the meaning of 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment' remained the same. The addition to the section made by the Joint Resolution made certain future gifts inter vivos, which would theretofore have beer free of estate tax, subject to such a tax. 46 C. As a corollary to the foregoing section B, it is clear to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00223", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00383", "text": "Congress. Thus, this Court's first review of such seizures occurs under circumstances which leave Presidential power most vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible constitutional postures. 346 I did not suppose, and I am not persuaded, that history leaves it open to question, at least in the courts, that the executive branch, like the Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated powers. The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand. However, because the President does not enjoy unmentioned powers does not mean that the mentioned ones should be narrowed by a niggardly construction. Some clauses could be made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of interpretation for changing times. I have previously, and do now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism. 347 The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in three clauses of the Executive Article, the first reading, 'The executive Power will be vested in a President of the United States of America.' Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: 'In our view, this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable.' If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some trifling ones.9 348 The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his image. Continental European examples were no more appealing. And if we seek instruction from our own times, we can match it only from the executive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe as totalitarian. I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated. 349 The clause on which the Government next relies is that 'The President will be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States * * *.' These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history. Of course, they imply something more than an empty title", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00454", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00384", "text": "1941, 118 F.2d 855. Compare Forshay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1930, 20 B.T.A. 537. It cannot now escape the tax consequences of that choice, no matter how bona fide its motives or longstanding its arrangements. When we referred to the 'usual incidents of an agency relationship' in the Moline Properties case, we meant just that—not the identity of ownership and control disclo ed by the facts of this case. 24 We have considered the other arguments made by petitioners and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 25 Affirmed. 1 The substance of a typical subsidiaryparent contract is as follows: 'Airco employs Sales as its agent to manage and operate, during the term of this contract, all plants for the production of oxygen, acetylene and other gases and for the manufacture of apparatus and containers for the utilization and transportation of such gases * * *; and likewise employs Sales as its agent to market and sell, during the term of this contract, the output of all such plants. * * * Airco agrees (1) to give Sales the use of all cylinders, containers, motor trucks, equipment, and shipping facilities, which it now owns or may hereafter acquire; (2) to supply such working capital as Sales may need; (3) to provide such executive management (but not accounting, bookkeeping and clerical service), and office accommodation and facilities as may be necessary for the proper conduct of Sales business. * * * Sales agrees (1) to manage and operate * * * all of said plants; (2) to maintain the same in first class condition, charging necessary repairs and replacements to operating expense and setting aside and charging to operating expense proper reserves for depreciation * * * (3) to distribute, market and sell, the product manufactured in said plants as efficiently as possible * * * (4) to pay all expenses of such operation, maintenance and selling, and to discharge all expenses and liabilities incurred there or thereby and to collect all accounts receivable or other proceeds resulting therefrom; (5) to credit monthly on its books to Airco all profits accruing to it from the operation of its entire business over and above an amount equal to six per cent. (6%) per annum on its outstanding capital stock, which said amount it is authorized to deduct and retain, and it", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00247", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00385", "text": ". 17 Thereafter two officers of the Indian Service were appointed special agents for the Fish and Wildlife Service to assist in the enforcement of the fishing regulations issued by the Interior Department. They arrived at Karluk June 24, 1946. These two deputies were armed and maintained a boat patrol in the waters of the reservation. They checked the names of boats fishing in the waters of the reservation against the permits issued by the village of Karluk. No boats were allowed inside the area which had been restricted for beach seining by vote of the Indian meeting of May 23, 1944,11 and which was marked off by buoys. 18 If respondents show that they are without an adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury unless the enforcement of the alleged invalid regulation is restrained, a civil court will enjoin.12 While ordinarily criminal prosecutions will not be restrained even under an invalid statute,13 a civil action will lie in exceptional circumstances that make an injunction necessary to effectually protect property rights.14 19 The facts previously detailed as to the investments of respondents in canneries and fishing equipment and their establish activities in the waters of the reservation make clear the serious effect on them of exclusion from the reservation. It is not a threat of a single prosecution, as in the Spielman case, but an ousting of respondents and their employees from the fishing grounds unless each individual person takes a fishing license. Under the findings the respondents could not operate profitably if prohibited from fishing in the reservation area. Many fishermen may stay away from the grounds for fear of punishment. In the pursuit of their otherwise lawful business respondents are threatened with criminal prosecution should they fish in the waters of the Karluk Reservation without a permit from the native village. For the violation of the applicable regulation under the White Act, severe penalties are imposed including fine, imprisonment, the summary seizure of boats, haul, gear, equipment, and their forfeiture to the United States.15 These sanctions deny to respondents an adequate remedy at law for to challenge the regulation in an ordinary criminal proceeding is to hazard a loss against the payment of a license fee and compliance with the fishing rules of the natives. Yet to stay out of the reservation prevents the profitable operation of the canneries. In such a situation a majority of the Court thinks that the 'danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate' and properly calls forth the jurisdiction of the court of equity.16 II. 20 Respondents", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00275", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00386", "text": "the district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction. ``(2) Any order issued under this subsection will state with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation. Any penalty assessed in the order will not exceed $25,000 per day of noncompliance for each violation. In assessing such a penalty, the Administrator will take into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements. ``(d) Public Hearing.--Any order issued under this section will become final unless, not later than 30 days after the order is served, the person or persons named there request a public hearing. Upon such request, the Administrator will promptly conduct a public hearing. In connection with any proceeding under this section, the Administrator may issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books, and documents, and may promulgate rules for discovery procedures. ``(e) Violation of Compliance Orders.--If a violator fails to take corrective action within the time specified in a compliance order, the Administrator may assess a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance with the order. ``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: ``(1) Agreement.--The term `Agreement' means-- ``(A) the Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste between the United States and Canada, signed at Ottawa on October 28, 1986 (TIAS 11099) and amended on November 25, 1992; and ``(B) any regulations promulgated and orders issued to implement and enforce that Agreement. ``(2) Foreign municipal solid waste.--The term `foreign municipal solid waste' means municipal solid waste generated outside of the United States. ``(3) Municipal solid waste.-- ``(A) Waste included.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term `municipal solid waste' means-- ``(i) all waste materials discarded for disposal by households, including single and multifamily residences, and hotels and motels; and ``(ii) all waste materials discarded for disposal that were generated by commercial, institutional, municipal, and industrial sources, to the extent such materials-- ``(I) are essentially the same as materials described in clause (i); and ``(II) were collected and disposed of with other municipal solid waste described in clause (i) or subclause (I) of this clause as part of normal municipal solid waste", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00996", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00387", "text": "Electric cases indicates a widespread understanding that, if such interpretation is to be changed, the remedy calls for congressional action. The resistance to such a change which has been shown by Congress is impressive.30 It indicates no dissatisfaction with the interpretation of existing law as expressed in the Bement and General Electric cases. 126 There appears, therefore, to be neither adequate reason nor authority for overruling the Bement and General Electric cases or for distinguishing this case fromt hem. 1 26 Stat. 209, as amended by 36 Stat. 1167, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 4: 'Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal * * *.' 'Sec. 4. The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it will be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. * * *' 2 The names of appellees and the abbreviations from now on used as well as the percentage of production of the dropout fuse devices manufactured under the patents are listed below: Appellee Abbreviated title Percent General Electric General Electric 29.2 Line material Co. Line 25.4 James R. Kearney Corp. Kearney 18.9 Southern States Equipment Corp Southern 7.9 Westinghouse Electric Corp. Westinghouse 5.3 Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc. Schweitzer & Conrad 5.1 Railway & Industrial Engineering Co. Railway 3.8 W. N. Matthews Corp. Matthews 2.0 Porcelain Products Co. Porcelain 1.5 Royal Electric Mfg. Co. Royal.5 Pacific Electric Mfg. Co. Pacific.2 T. F. Johnson Johnson.2 100.0 All are corporations of various states except T. F. Johnson, doing business as Johnson Manufacturing Company, Atlanta, Georgia. 3 The case was argued April 29, 1947, and at our request reargued November 12—13, 1947. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00138", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00388", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 1493/77 of 4 July 1977 amending Regulation (EEC) No 497/70 on rules for the application of export refunds on fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 of 18 May 1972 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1034/77 (2), and in particular Article 30 (4) of it, because Council Regulation (EEC) No 2511/69 of 9 December 1969 laying down special measures for improving the production and marketing of Community citrus fruit (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1034/77, provided for the granting of a financial compensation for lemons until 31 May 1978; because Article 1 (2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 497/70 of 17 March 1970 on rules for the application of export refunds on fruit and vegetables (4), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2520/75 (5) should continue to be applied to lemons in order to avoid any possibility that those products which have benefited from the financial compensation referred to in Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 2511/69 should also benefit from the granting of an export refund; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Article 1 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 497/70 is amended to read as follows: \"2. Payment of the refund on exports leaving a Member State, other than the producer Member State, of products which could benefit from financial compensation under Regulation (EEC) No 2511/69 will, moreover, be subject to the production of proof that the products for which the refund is requested have not benefited from the said compensation.\" Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 4 July 1977.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00725", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00389", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999''. SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN. (a) In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 90 the following: ``CHAPTER 90A--PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN ``Sec. ``1841. Causing death of or bodily injury to unborn child. ``Sec. 1841. Causing death of or bodily injury to unborn child ``(a)(1) Any person who engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section. ``(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided for that conduct under Federal law had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother. ``(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-- ``(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or ``(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child. ``(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person will be punished as provided under section 1111, 1112, or 1113 of this title, as applicable, for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being, instead of the penalties that would otherwise apply under subparagraph (A). ``(D) despite any other provision of law, the death penalty will not be imposed for an offense under this section. ``(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are the following: ``(1) Sections 36, 37, 43, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 229, 242, 245, 247, 248, 351, 831, 844(d), 844(f), 844(h)(1), 844(i), 924(j), 930, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114,", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00872", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00390", "text": "1925 excuses the Government's prior failure to perfect a valid appeal from a final judgment against one of its officers. In short, the Court places on an appellee the burden of correcting his adversary's error. From this result I dissent. 1 Rule 19(4) of the Rules of this Court, 28 U.S.C.A., provides that in such cases 'the matter of abatement and substitution is covered by section 11 of the Act of February 13, 1925. Under that section a substitution of the successor in office may be effected only where a satisfactory showing is made within six months after the death or separation from office.' 2 This section was repealed as of September 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 992, 1000. It is argued that, since that date was the date on which the 6 months statutory period for substitution in this case expired and since the repealing Act preserved any rights or liabilities existing under any of the repealed laws (id., 992 § 39, 28 U.S.C.A. note preceding section 1), § 11 governs this case. We need not reach the effect of the repealing Act. For the Court of Appeals during the period material to our problem had in force its Rule 28(b) which provided that abatement and substitution were governed by § 11 of the 1925 Act. Rule 25(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. now provides: 'When an officer of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, the Canal Zone, a territory, an insular possession, a state, county, city, or other governmental agency, is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office it is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution under this rule may be made when it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor in enforcing a law averred to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, will be given reasonable notice of the application therefor", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00375", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00391", "text": "contingencies would be running against him—for instance, the uncertainty of the damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire claim—the overflow due to rises in the level of the river—is not a single event; it is continuous. And as there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit until the situation becomes stabilized. An owner of land flooded by the Government would not unnaturally postpone bringing a suit against the Government for the flooding until the consequences of inundation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck. 7 When dealing with a problem which arises under such diverse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided. All that we are here holding is that when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to asertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken.' Accordingly, we find that the taking which was the basis of these suits was not complete six years prior to April 1, 1943, nor at a time preceding Dickinson's ownership. In this conclusion we are fortified by the fact that the two lower courts reached the same conclusion on what is after all a practical matter and not a technical rule of law. 8 Nothing previously ruled by the Court runs counter to what we have said. The Government finds comfort in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. 135, 67 L.Ed. 287. But in that case the problem was whether by putting a gun battery into permanent position with a view to converting an area, for all practical purposes, into an artillery range, the Government inevitably took an easement in the land over which the guns were to be fired. The issue was not when a suit must be brought on a claim in respect to land taken by the United States, which is the issue before us, but whether there had been a taking at all. 9 Second. The Government challenges the compensation awarded for damage to the land due to erosion. It regards this damage as consequential, to be borne without any right to compensation. Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530, 539, 34 S.Ct.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00090", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00392", "text": "INATE RATES OF DUTY under CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS. (a) Limitation.--despite any other provision of the law, the President may not agree to a modification of any existing duty that would reduce or eliminate the bound or applied rate of such duty on any product in order to carry out any trade agreement entered into between the United States and a foreign country on or after the date of the enactment of this Act until the President transmits to Congress a certification described in subsection (b). (b) Certification.--A certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification of the President that-- (1) the United States has obtained the reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of the government of the foreign country described in subsection (a) with respect to United States exports of any product identified by United States domestic producers that has the same physical characteristics and uses as the product for which a modification of any existing duty is sought by the President to carry out the trade agreement described in subsection (a); and (2) a violation of any provision of the trade agreement described in subsection (a) relating to the matters described in paragraph (1) is immediately enforceable in accordance with the provisions of section 4. SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS. (a) Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions.--If the United States Trade Representative determines under subsection (c) that any tariff or nontariff barrier or policy or practice of the government of a foreign country described in section 3(a) has not been reduced or eliminated, or that a tariff or nontariff barrier or policy or practice of such government has been imposed or discovered, with respect to United States exports of any product identified by United States domestic producers that has the same physical characteristics and uses as the product for which a modification of any existing duty has been sought by the President to carry out the trade agreement described in section 3(a), then, despite any other provision of law, the modification of the existing duty will be withdrawn until such time as the United States Trade Representative submits to Congress a certification that the United States has obtained the reduction or elimination of the tariff or nontariff barrier or policy or practice of such government. (b) Investigation.-- (1) In general.--An investigation will be initiated by the United States Trade Representative whenever an interested party files a petition with the United States Trade Representative", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00866", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00393", "text": "property of the Department of Defense from one Federal or State agency to another such agency. ``(4)(A) The Secretary may waive the applicability of paragraph (1) to a vehicle described in subparagraph (B) of such paragraph (other than a mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle), if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is necessary for disaster or rescue purposes or for another purpose where life and public safety are at risk, as demonstrated by the proposed recipient of the vehicle. ``(B) If the Secretary issues a waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary will-- ``(i) submit to Congress notice of the waiver, and post such notice on a public Internet website of the Department, by not later than 30 days after the date on which the waiver is issued; and ``(ii) require, as a condition of the waiver, that the recipient of the vehicle for which the waiver is issued provides public notice of the waiver and the transfer, including the type of vehicle and the purpose for which it is transferred, in the jurisdiction where the recipient is located by not later than 30 days after the date on which the waiver is issued. ``(5) The Secretary may provide for an exemption to the limitation under subparagraph (D) of paragraph (1) in the case of parts for aircraft described in such subparagraph that are transferred as part of regular maintenance of aircraft in an existing fleet. ``(6) The Secretary will require, as a condition of any transfer of property under this section, that the Federal or State agency that receives the property will return the property to the Secretary if the agency-- ``(A) is investigated by the Department of Justice for any violation of civil liberties; or ``(B) is otherwise found to have engaged in widespread abuses of civil liberties. ``(g) Conditions for Extension of Program.--despite any other provision of law, amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year may not be obligated or expended to carry out this section unless the Secretary submits to Congress certification that for the preceding fiscal year that-- ``(1) each Federal or State agency that has received controlled property transferred under this section has-- ``(A) demonstrated 100 percent accountability for all such property, in accordance with paragraph (2) or (3), as applicable; or ``(B) been suspended from the program under paragraph (4); ``(2) with respect to each non-Federal agency that has received controlled property under this section, the State coordinator responsible for each such agency has verified that", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01004", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00394", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 520/2007 of 7 May 2007 laying down technical measures for the conservation of certain stocks of highly migratory species and repealing Regulation (EC) No 973/2001 THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 37 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, because: (1) The Community has by Decision 98/392/EC (1) approved the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which contains principles and rules relating to the conservation and management of the living resources of the sea. In the framework of its wider international obligations, the Community participates in efforts made in international waters to conserve fish stocks. (2) under Decision 86/238/EEC (2) the Community has been a Contracting Party to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, from now on ‘the ICCAT Convention’, since 14 November 1997. (3) The ICCAT Convention provides a framework for regional cooperation on the conservation and management of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjoining seas through the setting up of an International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, from now on the ‘ICCAT’, and the adoption of recommendations on conservation and management in the Convention area which become binding on the Contracting Parties. (4) ICCAT has recommended a number of technical measures for certain stocks of highly migratory species in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, specifying inter alia authorised sizes and weights of fish, and restrictions on fishing within certain areas and time periods, with certain gears, and on capacity. These recommendations are binding on the Community and should therefore be implemented. (5) The Community has by Decision 95/399/EC (3) approved the Agreement for the establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. The Agreement provides an appropriate framework for closer international cooperation and the rational use of tunas and related species in the Indian Ocean by setting up the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, from now on the ‘IOTC’, and adopting recommendations on conservation and management in the IOTC area which become binding on the Contracting Parties. (6) The IOTC has adopted a recommendation laying down technical measures for certain stocks of highly migratory species in the Indian Ocean and in particular the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00721", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00395", "text": "paid in 1962 to the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization of New York for that purpose. (3) To facilitate efforts by the United States to seek an agreement whereby nations with claims against gold held by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold would contribute all, or a substantial portion, of that gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. SEC. 102. DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE TRIPARTITE GOLD COMMISSION. (a) Directions to Secretary of State.--The Secretary of State will direct the commissioner representing the United States on the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, established under Part III of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, to seek and vote for a timely agreement under which all signatories to the Paris Agreement on Reparation, with claims against the monetary gold pool in the jurisdiction of such Commission, contribute all, or a substantial portion, of such gold to charitable organizations to assist survivors of the Holocaust. (b) Authority To Obligate the United States.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of State may commit the United States to pay an amount not to exceed $25,000,000 for distribution under an agreement described in subsection (a). (2) Conformance with budget act requirement.--Any budget authority contained in paragraph (1) will be effective only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts. SEC. 103. FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Subject to subsection (b), there are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, not to exceed a total of $25,000,000 for all such fiscal years, for distribution to organizations as may be specified in any agreement concluded under section 102, only if they meet the needs of Holocaust survivors in the United States. (b) Reservation.--The Secretary of State will reserve a portion of the amount appropriated under subsection (a) for the United States Holocaust Museum, for archival research to assist in the restitution of assets looted or extorted from victims of the Holocaust and such other activities that would further Holocaust remembrance and education. TITLE II--WORKS OF ART SEC. 201. FINDINGS. Congress finds as follows: (1) Established pre-World War II principles of international law, as en", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00978", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00396", "text": ". 1569, 91 L.Ed. 1968, undermined the foundations of Hust. See the dissent there, 332 U.S. at pp. 161—163, 67 S.Ct. at pages 1572, 1573. Caldarola held that the general agents under the standard form contract were not in possession and control of the vessel so as to make them liable under New York law to an invitee for injuries arising from negligence in its maintenance, 332 U.S. at pp. 158—159, 67 S.Ct. at pages 1570, 1571. Our ruling was based on 'the interpretation of that contract' as 'a matter of federal concern.' We do not think it consistent to hold that the general agent has enough 'possession and control' to be an employer under the Jones Act but not enough to be responsible for maintenance under New York law. It is true, as respondent argues, that Caldarola dealt only with the general agent's liability to a stevedore, as opposed to a crew member, under the law of New York. We think, however, that vicarious liability to anyone must be predicated on the relation which exists under the standard form agreement and the shipping articles between the general agent on the one hand and the master and crew of the vessel on the other. Caldarola held that this relation was not one which involved that proximity necessary to a finding of liability in the general agent for the torts of the master and crew. We perceive no reason why the rationale of this holding does not apply with equal force to a suit under the Jones Act. Under common-law principles of agency such a conclusion is required. We think it equally compelled even if we are to adopt, as the Court in Hust suggested, the perhaps less technical and more substantial tests propounded in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170. 13 Hust was decided June 10, 1946; Caldarola June 23, 1947. Certainly from the latter date, the danger of relying on Hust was apparent to the world though it must be admitted there was enough uncertainty in the aw properly to give concern to Congress.14 despite there may be some undesirable results in overruling Hust, such as loss of rights under the Suits in Admiralty Act by", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00325", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00397", "text": "ched in language identical in every significant respect to that used in the original § 602(h)(2).36 Accordingly, when Congress enacted the 1946 bill, it in effect incorporated the old provision of § 602(h)(2), which was the basis for Regulation 3450, and in our view thereby accepted the construction embodied in that regulation, which had been so clearly brought to its attention on this and prior occasions. 34 Further evidence, were any needed, that Congress accepted as its own this interpretation of the language used in § 602(h)(2) is supplied by the significant distinction maintained in this reenactment between the mode of payment originally provided by § 602(h)(2) and the refund life income plan, viewed in the light of the House Committee Report on the bill. It is hardly conceivable and if conceivable, hardly explicable—that Congress meant one thing by the language it used in § 602(h)(2) when enacting the original measure in 1940, and another, quite different thing, when it reenacted that language in 1946. 35 In the light of the foregoing considerations the validity of Regulation 3450 is sustained and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. 36 Reversed. 1 6 Fed.Reg. 1162, 1166, 38 C.F.R. 1941 Supp. § 10.3450. 2 Part I, Title VI of the Second Revenue Act of 1940, Act of Oct. 8, 1940, c. 757, 54 Stat. 974, 1008, 38 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802(h)(2), 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 801, 802(h)(2). 3 under § 617 of the Act, 38 U.S.C. § 817, 38 U.S.C.A. § 817. 4 § 602(g), 38 U.S.C. § 802(g), 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(g). 5 Sec. 608, 38 U.S.C. § 808, 38 U.S.C.A. § 808: 'The Administrator, subject to the general direction of the President, will administer, execute, and enforce the provisions of this chapter, will have power to make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00185", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00398", "text": "L.Ed. 786, 159 A.L.R. 230. Possession or enjoyment of property as previously applied has meant from the standpoint of the taxability of the transferor's estate, at least, that the death of the transferor perfects the right of the transferee and cuts off any possibility of reverter to the transferor left by the instruments of transfer. If the transferor reacquired the property by inheritance or by purchase, other factors would enter. Before the Joint Resolution even the reservation of a life estate was insufficient to preserve possession or enjoyment in the transferor as nothing passed at his death. When words such as 'possession or enjoyment' used in a section of a revenue statute with their many possible shades and ambiguities of meaning have been given definition through the course of legislation and litigation, a change by courts should be avoided.3 By the Resolution such a reservation or that of power of appointment was also made the source of an estate tax. 38 Prior cases have involved trust instruments where the settlor specifically reserved remainders, reverters or contingent powers of appointment. In these cases the value at death of the entire corpus of the trusts was taxed. This was because in each case there was a contingency through which completed gifts of the entire corpus to the beneficiaries might fail before the death of the settlor with the result that the settlor would again control the transfer of the corpus.4 In such circumstances, I take it as settled that the property is taxable on the event of the settlor's death under §§ 810 and 811(c). Cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. at page 111, 65 S.Ct. at page 510, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227. 39 The trust instruments in the present cases of the Spiegel and Church estates do not specifically provide for such possibility of reverter or for regaining control of the devolution of the property. The issue raised by these cases is whether a like possibility of reverter springing not from the instrument but by operation of law through the failure of all beneficiaries named in the trust instrument will have the same effect. All named beneficiaries in these two trusts might die before the settlors without surviving issue. Thus, depending upon the controlling state law, the settlors might repossess the estates.5 40 To lay bare the heart", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00221", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00399", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Lumbee Recognition Act''. SEC. 2. PREAMBLE. The preamble to the Act of June 7, 1956 (70 Stat. 254), is amended as follows: (1) By striking ``and'' at the end of each clause. (2) By striking ``: Now, therefore,'' at the end of the last clause and inserting a semicolon. (3) By adding at the end the following new clauses: ``because the Lumbee Indians of Robeson and adjoining counties in North Carolina are descendants of coastal North Carolina Indian tribes, principally Cheraw, and have remained a distinct Indian community since the time of contact with white settlers; ``because since 1885 the State of North Carolina has recognized the Lumbee Indians as an Indian tribe; ``because in 1956 the Congress of the United States acknowledged the Lumbee Indians as an Indian tribe, but withheld from the Lumbee Tribe the benefits, privileges and immunities to which the Tribe and its members otherwise would have been entitled by virtue of the Tribe's status as a federally recognized tribe; and ``because the Congress finds that the Lumbee Indians should now be entitled to full Federal recognition of their status as an Indian tribe and that the benefits, privileges and immunities that accompany such status should be accorded to the Lumbee Tribe: Now, therefore,''. SEC. 3. FEDERAL RECOGNITION. The Act of June 7, 1956 (70 Stat. 254), is amended as follows: (1) By striking the last sentence of the first section. (2) By striking section 2 and inserting the following new sections: ``Sec. 2. (a) Federal recognition is extended to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, as designated as petitioner number 65 by the Office of Federal Acknowledgement. All laws and regulations of the United States of general application to Indians and Indian tribes will apply to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina and its members. ``(b) despite the first section, any group of Indians in Robeson and adjoining counties, North Carolina, whose members are not enrolled in the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina as determined under section 3(c), may petition under part 83 of title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations for acknowledgement of tribal existence. ``Sec. 3. (a) The", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01149", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00400", "text": "for each fiscal year under paragraph (1) may not exceed the amount equal to the charges for tuition for all Native American Indian students of that college who were not residents of the State in which the college is located and who were enrolled in the college for academic year 2012-2013. ``(b) Treatment of Payment.--Any amounts received by an eligible college under this section will be treated as a reimbursement from the State in which the college is located, and will be considered as provided in fulfillment of any Federal mandate upon the State to admit Native American Indian students free of charge of tuition. ``(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section will be construed to relieve any State from any mandate the State may have under Federal law to reimburse a college for each academic year-- ``(1) with respect to Native American Indian students enrolled in the college who are not residents of the State in which the college is located, any amount of charges for tuition for such students for such academic year that exceeds the amount received under this section for such academic year; and ``(2) with respect to Native American Indian students enrolled in the college who are residents of the State in which the college is located, an amount equal to the charges for tuition for such students for such academic year. ``(d) Definition of Native American Indian Students.--In this section, the term `Native American Indian students' includes reference to the term `Indian pupils' as that term has been utilized in Federal statutes imposing a mandate upon any college or State to provide tuition-free education to Native American Indian students in fulfillment of a condition under which the college or State received its original grant of land and facilities from the United States.''. SEC. 4. OFFSET. (a) In General.--despite any other provision of law, $15,000,000 in appropriated discretionary funds are rescinded, on a pro rata basis, by account, from all available unobligated funds. (b) Implementation.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will determine and identify from which appropriation accounts the rescission under subsection (a) will apply and the amount of such rescission that will apply to each such account. Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget will submit a report to the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress of the accounts and amounts determined and identified for rescission under the preceding sentence. (c) Exception.--This section will not", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01051", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00401", "text": "ality of the Right to Work Statute and interpreting its meaning, but we do not find it inconsistent with the result below. See also, Edwards v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916; Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872; American Federation of Labor v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 260, 93 L.Ed. 222; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212. 6 In the Rountree case, 194 Va. at 154, 72 S.E.2d at 405, the highest court of Virginia holds that the Statute does not prohibit peaceful picketing 'unless * * * for an unlawful purpose.' It adds that 'a purpose to compel the complainants to discharge the non-union painters or to compel the painters to join the union as a condition of their continued employment' would be an unlawful purpose, but it fails to find the existence of such a purpose. On the other hand, in the instant case, the same court states that the injunctive decrees of the trial court 'are plainly right.' It thereby sustains the trial court's finding that 'the picketing complained of was * * * carried on by the defendants * * * for aims, purposes and objectives in conflict with the provisions of the Right To Work laws of the State of Virginia * * *.' The Rountree case thus reflects an instance of picketing so conducted as not to be in violation of the Right to Work Statute, because the facts in the instant case reflect conduct that is in conflict with the provisions of that Statute. However innocent the picketing appeared while in progress, the Virginia courts found that it was combined with conduct and circumstances occurring before and during the picketing that demonstrated a purpose on the part of petitioners that was in conflict with the Right to Work Statute. 7 In a case of this kind, we are justified in searching the record to determine whether the crucial finding by the state courts had a reasonable basis in the evidence.4 The record consists of the depositions of nine witnesses taken six to nine months after the events described. There is some conflict in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00485", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00402", "text": "documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, knowing that a counterfeit mark has been applied thereto, the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive,''. (2) Subsection (b) is amended to read as follows: ``(b)(1) The following property will be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right will exist in such property: ``(A) Any article bearing or consisting of a counterfeit mark used in committing a violation of subsection (a). ``(B) Any property used, in any manner or part, to commit or to facilitate the commission of a violation of subsection (a). ``(2) The provisions of chapter 46 of this title relating to civil forfeitures, including section 983 of this title, will extend to any seizure or civil forfeiture under this section. At the conclusion of the forfeiture proceedings, the court, unless otherwise requested by an agency of the United States, will order that any forfeited article bearing or consisting of a counterfeit mark be destroyed or otherwise disposed of according to law. ``(3)(A) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense under this section, will order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States-- ``(i) any property constituting or derived from any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of the offense; ``(ii) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, facilitate, aid, or abet the commission of the offense; and ``(iii) any article that bears or consists of a counterfeit mark used in committing the offense. ``(B) The forfeiture of property under subparagraph (A), including any seizure and disposition of the property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, will be governed by the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section. despite section 413(h) of that Act, at the conclusion of the forfeiture proceedings, the court will order that any forfeited article or component of an article bearing or consisting of a counterfeit mark be destroyed. ``(4) When a person is convicted of an offense under this section, the court, under sections 3556, 3663A, and 3664, will order the person to", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00953", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00403", "text": "the necessity of having their shrimp unloaded and packed in South Carolina ports rather than at their home bases in Georgia where they maintain their own docking, warehousing, refrigeration and packing facilities. In addition, an inevitable concomitant of a statute requiring that work be done in South Carolina, even though that be economically disadvantageous to the fishermen, is to divert to South Carolina employment and business which unight otherwise go to Georgia; the necessary tendency of the statute is to impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of the industry. 39 Appellees do not contest the fact that the statute thereby burdens, to some extent at least interstate commerce in shrimp caught in waters off the South Carolina coast. Again, however, they rely on the fact that the commerce affected is in fish rather than some other commodity. They urge that South Carolina, because of its ownership of the shrimp, could constitutionally prohibit all shipments to other States. It follows, they imply, that the State could impose lesser restrictions, such as those here at issue, on out-of-state shipments. 40 There is considerable authority, starting with Geer v. Connecticut, 1896, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793, to support the contention that a State may confine the consumption of its fish and game wholly within the State's limits. We need not pause to consider whether this power extends to free-swimming fish in the three-mile belt, for even as applied to fish taken in inland waters it has been held that where a State did not exercise its full power, but on the contrary permitted shipments to other States, it could not at the same time condition such shipments so as to burden interstate commerce. In Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 1928, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147, the Court held it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to enter an order temporarily enjoining, as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, enforcement of a Louisiana statute which permitted the shipment of shrimp from Louisiana to other States only if the heads and hulls had previously been removed. In distinguishing the Geer case, the following comment was made: 41 'As the representative of its people, the state might have retained the shrimp for consumption and use there. * * * But by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00174", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00404", "text": ", neither the answers nor the motion for summary judgment are before us, and we have considered the case on the petitioner's allegations in his complaint. 3 In No. 28, the court said: 'This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the intervening defendants to dismiss the cause on the ground that the question presented has become moot, because more than one year has elapsed since the date of the plaintiff's restoration to employment with the defendant, L. & N. Railroad Company, and the Court being advised, it is ordered and adjudged that said motion be, and the same is , sustained, and this action is now dismissed as moot, without cost to either the plaintiff, or the defendant, or the intervening defendants.' In No. 29, the entry was the same except for the name of the defendant railway. 4 'Sec. 8. * * * '(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) will be considered as having been on Furlough or leave of absence during his period of (training and service in the land or naval forces), will be so restored without loss of seniority, will be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer under established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was (inducted) into such (forces), and will not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.' 54 Stat. 890, as reenacted, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U.S.C.App. § 308(c), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 308(c).", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 362, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00331", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00405", "text": "is added to the Penal Code, to read: 113 '654.3. Violation of Section 654.1 will be a misdemeanor, and upon first conviction the punishment will be a fine of not over two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or imprisonment in jail for not over 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment will be second conviction the punishment will be imprisonment in jail for not less than 30 days and not more than 180 days. Upon a third or subsequent conviction the punishment will be confinement in jail for not less than 90 days and not more than one year, and a person suffering three or more convictions will not be eligible to probation, the provisions of any law to the contrary despite.' 1947 Cal.Stat., c. 1215, pp. 2723—2725. 114 Appendix B. 115 (1) National Transportation Policy. 116 'It is declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials of it; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions;—all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act will be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.' Inserted before Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C., note preceding § 1, 49 U.S.C.A. note preceding § 1. 117 The foregoing 'National Transportation Policy' has, for many purposes, superseded the declaration of the policy of Congress enunciated in the original § 202 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, to which a cross reference was made expressly in § 203(b), 49 Stat. 545. This cross reference prescribed that, in order to make", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00259", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00406", "text": "locations caused by a decrease in such limitation, the extent of the median home price decline, and the causes for such reduction in median home price.''. (b) Fannie Mae.-- (1) Conforming loan limit increase.--Paragraph (2) of section 302(b) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1717(b)(2)) is amended-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (B) in the second sentence, by redesignating clauses (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively; (C) in the third sentence, by striking ``clause (A)'' and inserting ``clause (i)''; (D) in the seventh sentence by striking ``January 1 of each year beginning after the effective date of the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008'' and inserting ``January 1, 2010, and January 1 of each year thereafter''; and (E) in the last sentence-- (i) by striking ``115 percent'' each place it appears and inserting ``125 percent''; and (ii) by striking ``150 percent'' and inserting ``175 percent''. (2) Discretionary authority.--Paragraph (2) of section 302(b) of the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. 1717(b)(2)), as amended by paragraph (1), is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(B) despite subparagraph (A) and subject to subparagraph (C), the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may-- ``(i) increase the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage that may be purchased by the corporation that is otherwise in effect under the seventh sentence of subparagraph (A) with respect to any particular size or sizes of residences located in any particular area or areas by not more than $100,000; or ``(ii) increase, for any geographic area that is smaller than an area for which a dollar amount limitation on the principal obligation of a mortgage is established under this paragraph, the limitation otherwise in effect for such size or sizes of residences for such sub-area or sub-areas, but in no case to an amount that exceeds the maximum nationwide amount otherwise permitted under this subparagraph. ``(C) The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency may increase the limitation on the maximum original principal obligation of a mortgage for", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00913", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00407", "text": "1994, among the National Park Service, the Nunamiut Corporation, the City of Anaktuvuk Pass, and the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation. Full effectuation of this agreement, as amended, requires ratification by the Congress. SEC. 3. RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENT. (a) Ratification.-- (1) In general.--The terms, conditions, procedures, covenants, reservations and other provisions set forth in the document entitled ``Donation, Exchange of Lands and Interests in Lands and Wilderness Redesignation Agreement Among Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Nunamiut Corporation, City of Anaktuvuk Pass and the United States of America'' (from now on referred to in this Act as ``the Agreement''), executed by the parties on December 17, 1992, as amended, are incorporated in this Act, are ratified and confirmed, and set forth the obligations and commitments of the United States, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Nunamiut Corporation and the City of Anaktuvuk Pass, as a matter of Federal law. (2) Land acquisition.--Lands acquired by the United States under the Agreement will be administered by the Secretary of the Interior (from now on referred to as the ``Secretary'') as part of the Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve, subject to the laws and regulations applicable thereto. (b) Maps.--The maps set forth as Exhibits C1, C2, and D through I to the Agreement depict the lands subject to the conveyances, retention of surface access rights, access easements and all-terrain vehicle easements. These lands are depicted in greater detail on a map entitled ``Land Exchange Actions, Proposed Anaktuvuk Pass Land Exchange and Wilderness Redesignation, Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve'', Map No. 185/80,039, dated April 1994, and on file at the Alaska Regional Office of the National Park Service and the offices of Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve in Fairbanks, Alaska. Written legal descriptions of these lands will be prepared and made available in the above offices. In case of any discrepancies, Map No. 185/80,039, will be controlling. SEC. 4. NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM WILDERNESS. (a) Redesignation.--Section 701(2) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (94 Stat. 2371, 2417)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01133", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00408", "text": "found that 75 percent of the wage differential between white and non-white workers was unexplained and may be a result of discrimination. (6) Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibits discrimination in compensation for ``equal work'' on the basis of sex. (7) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in compensation because of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. The United States Supreme Court, in its decision in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), held that title VII's prohibition against discrimination in compensation also applies to jobs which do not constitute ``equal work'' as defined in section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Decisions of lower courts, however, have demonstrated that further clarification of existing legislation is necessary in order effectively to carry out the intent of Congress to implement the Supreme Court's holding in its Gunther decision. (8) Artificial barriers to the elimination of discrimination in compensation based upon sex, race, and national origin continue to exist more than 3 decades after the passage of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-- (A) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by discriminating wage differentials; (B) substantially reducing the number of working women and people of color earning low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance; and (C) promoting stable families by enabling working family members to earn a fair rate of pay. SEC. 3. EQUAL PAY FOR EQUIVALENT JOBS. (a) Amendment.--Section 6 (29 U.S.C. 206) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(g)(1)(A) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section will discriminate between its employees on the basis of sex, race, or national origin by paying wages to employees or groups of employees at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to employees or groups of employees of the opposite sex or different race or national origin for work in equivalent jobs, except where such payment is made under a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. ``(B) An employer who is paying a wage rate differential in", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01008", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00409", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2081/86 of 2 July 1986 re-establishing the levying of customs duties on twine, cordage, rapes and cables, of synthetic textile fibres, plaited or not, products of category 90 (code 40.0900), originating in South Korea, to which the preferential tariff arrangements set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3600/85 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3600/85 of 17 December 1985 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1986 in respect of textile products originating in developing countries (1), and in particular Article 4 of it, because Article 2 of that Regulation provides that preferential tariff treatment will be accorded, for each category of products subjected to individual ceilings not allocated among the Member States, within the limits of the quantities specified in column 7 of Annex I or II thereto, in respect of certain or each of the countries or territories of origin referred to in column 5 of those Annexes; because Article 3 of that Regulation provides that the levying of customs duties may be re-established at any time in respect of imports of the products in question once the relevant individual ceilings have been reached at Community level; because, in respect of twine, cordage, ropes and cables, of synthetic textile fibres, plaited or not, products of category 90 (code 40.0900), the relevant ceiling amounts to 12,5 tonnes; because, on 27 June 1986, imports of the products in question into the Community, originating in South Korea, a country covered by preferential tariff arrangements, reached and were charged against that ceiling; because it is appropriate to re-establish the levying of customs duties for the products in question with regard to South Korea, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 6 July 1986, the levying of customs duties suspended under Council Regulation (EEC) No 3600/85 will be re-established in respect of the following products, imported into the Community and originating in South Korea: 1.2.3.4.5 // // // // // // Code // Category // CCT heading No // NIMEXE code // Description //", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00504", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00410", "text": "of cancellation 'for the convenience of the Government' the contractor would be paid 'for all costs, including a proper allocation of overhead expenses to the contract, incurred up to the time of termination, plus an allowance of 6% or 7% profit on all such costs except purchases of materials and unfinished goods, for which the contractor was reimbursed at cost.'4 38 'Standard termination clauses for fixed price contracts were developed late in 1941, and in general form and substance have been inserted in most contracts entered into since that time except for ship-construction contracts, which constitute a separate problem. The Department has not undertaken to modify outstanding contracts by the insertion of such clauses. It is difficult to estimate the time which would be required to incorporate such a clause by amendment in all contracts. However, it is doubted that such action would be administratively feasible except upon the initiative of the contractor.' 39 And see letter of the Acting Secretary, Oct. 10, 1943, id., 270—271. 40 That policy of the Navy, revealed as it was in official communications to Congress, is a matter of which we can take judicial notice. We have previously amplified findings of facts by reports of the Secretary of War. Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 130, 39 S.Ct. 56, 59, 63 L.Ed. 162. The official communications which disclose the policy of the Navy in this case, like reports, rules and regulations of agencies5 or other communications to Congress,6 are equally reliable and authoritative and need no further proof. 41 Respondent, however, has not carried the burden of showing that it would have been saved from the application of that policy. It has not shown that its contract falls in an exempt class. It has not shown that what was usual or customary for other contracts of this type would not be written into the formalized agreement to which its contract with the Government was to be reduced. It has not shown how it could escape application of the Navy's general policy and be granted the favor of a contract without a termination clause. 42 Yet unless it can make that showing, it has not established by 'clear and direct proof,' as United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 344, 4 S.Ct. 81, 83, 28 L.Ed. 168, requires, that it", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00272", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00411", "text": "rate of pay. Because of this defect, the concentration of work brought about by the contract has no effect in the determination of the regular rate of pay. As we indicated at the beginning of this subdivision (1) a major purpose of the statute was to compensate an employee by extra pay for work done in excess of the statutory maximum hours. Thus the burdens of overly long hours are balanced by the pay of time and a half for the excess hours. 29 We therefore hold that overtime premium, deductible from extra pay to find the regular rate of pay, is any additional sum received by an employee for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours in the workweek or workday whether the hours are specified by contract or statute.29 30 (2) Since under Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, § 69, the Administrator refers to regular working hours as important in calculating the regular rate of pay under s 7(a) of the Act, a word must be said as to regular working hours in this case.30 'Regular working hours' apparently has not been defined by the Administrator. He could hardly have intended in § 69 to employ the statutory maximum hours as synonymous with regular working hours as there is no prohibition on regular working hours that are longer than the statutory maximum. His illustrations, numbers 2 and 3, show that overtime premiums may be earned within the first 40 hours of a workweek. The statutory maximum hours are significant only as requiring overtime premium pay. An employer may increase pay or decrease hours free as to those steps from statutory regulation. See article in Monthly Labor Review, supra. The trial court pointed out that 'The identifying mark of the case at bar is the absence of any norm, any regularity. Both parties have emphasized the casual, irregular character of the employment.' 69 F.Supp. 959, 960. The trial court, as we have previously stated, 334 U.S. 455, 68 S.Ct. 1192, also found that the 'basic working day,' defined by § 2(a) of the agreement set forth in note 5, supra, was not the day normally, regularly or usually worked by respondents. Indeed the contract, § 1, required these round-the-clock irregular hours from some individuals. We call attention to the problem only to lay it aside as inapplicable in this case. 31 However, the government contends in this case that regular", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00177", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00412", "text": "forth in the application for the grant. ``SEC. 407. WITHHOLDING OF BLOCK GRANT. ``despite any other provision of this part, beginning 4 years after the effective date of this part, the Secretary may suspend or withhold for any period part or all of a grant to a State for a fiscal year under this part if, after reviewing the State reports submitted under section 406, the Secretary determines that the State program of assistance to families with dependent children during the immediately preceding fiscal year has not adequately met the needs of the families.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) will take effect on October 1, 1993. (c) References in Other Laws.--Any reference in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to part A of title IV of the Social Security Act, or to a provision of law contained in such part, will, unless the context otherwise requires, be considered to be a reference to such part, or such provision, as in effect immediately before October 1, 1993. SEC. 3. REDUCTION OF FEDERAL AFDC ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. (a) Cost-Reduction Requirement.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services will, using any authorities otherwise available, take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that, for each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1994, the total administrative costs of the program described in part A of title IV of the Social Security Act will not exceed 50 percent of the total administrative costs of that program (as then in effect) for fiscal year 1992. (b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services will submit a written report to Congress describing-- (1) the actions which have been or will be taken in order to achieve timely compliance with subsection (a); (2) the procedures and criteria used in determining what actions to take, including the reasons why each such action was chosen; (3) the savings anticipated from each action described under paragraph (1); and (4) the methodologies and assumptions used in connection with any computations under this section.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 459, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00981", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00413", "text": "that the free play of competition between products of different manufacturers of the same general class will prevent such a result. 60 However, in the opinion of the committee, those arguments are more properly addressed to the State legislatures considering the enactment of fair trade acts. It is the legislature's responsibility to fix the public policy of the State. This legislation merely seeks to help effectuate a public policy so fixed in a State. It has no application to any State which does not see fit to enact a fair trade act. 61 In this connection the committee invites attention to the following paragraph of the opinion of the Supreme Court, previously referred to, upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois act, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland: 62 'There is a great body of fact and opinion tending to show that price cutting by retail dealers is not only injurious to the good will and business of the producer and distributor of identified goods, but injurious to the general public as well. The evidence to that effect is voluminous; but it would serve no useful purpose to review the evidence or to enlarge further upon the subject. True, there is evidence, opinion, and argument to the contrary; but it does not concern us to determine where the weight lies. We need say no more than that the question may be regarded as fairly open to differences of opinion. The legislation here in question proceeds upon the former and not the latter view; and the legislative determination in that respect, in the circumstances here disclosed, is conclusive so far as this court is concerned. Where the question of what the facts establish is a fairly debatable one we accept and carry into effect the opinion of the legislature. Radice v. (People of State of) New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294, 44 S.Ct. 325, 326, 68 L.Ed. 690; Zahn v. Board of Public Works (of City of Los Angeles), 274 U.S. 325, 328, 47 S.Ct. 594, 595, 71 L.Ed. 1074, and cases cited'. (299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 145.) Effectuation of State Public Policy 63 Your committee respectfully submit that sound public policy on the part of the Federal Government lies in the direction of lending assistance to the States to effectuate their own public policy with regard to their internal affairs. It", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00400", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00414", "text": "Cong.Rec., Pt. 8, 8447—8454 (1941). 9 The nature of the need was reflected in the original statement of the purpose of the Act. '* * * to enable the President, in the interest of public health, comfort, morals, safety, and welfare, to provide for the discontinuance of the use as dwellings of buildings situated in alleys and to eliminate the hidden communities in inhabited alleys of the District of Columbia, and to carry out the policy declared in the Act approved May 16, 1918, as amended, of caring for the alley population of the District of Columbia, The President is authorized and empowered, * * *— '(a) To purchase, or acquire by condemnation or gift, and land, buildings, or structures, or any interest there, situated in or adjacent to any inhabited alley in the District of Columbia, * * *; '(b) * * * to demolish, move, or alter any buildings or structures situated thereon and erect such buildings or structures thereon as deemed advisable: * * *; '(c) To lease, rent, maintain, equip, manage, exchange, sell, or convey any such lands, buildings, or structures upon such terms and conditions as he may determine: * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) 48 Stat. 930—931. See also, 52 Stat. 1186, D.C.Code 1940, § 5—103. 10 Executive Order No. 6868, October 9, 1934 (published in Report of the National Capital Housing Authority for the Ten-Year Period 1934—1944, p. 3), and see Executive Order No. 8033, Jan. 11, 1939, 3 C.F.R. Cum.Supp. 443. This was under the authorization contained in 48 Stat. 931, D.C.Code 1940, § 5—104. 11 Executive Order No. 7784-A, Jan. 5, 1938, 3 Fed.Reg. 51 (1938). 12 Executive Order No. 9344, May 21, 1943, 3 C.F.R. Cum.Supp. 1279. 13 For this and the other factual material relating to this Authority, see Report of the National Capital Housing Authority for the Ten-Year Period 193", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00289", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00415", "text": "relationship between any such increases and either (A) increases in the amounts requested to be appropriated for Commission activities in connection with such applicants, licensees, or units subject to payment of fees, or (B) additional activities to be performed with respect to such applicants, licensees, or units. ``(3) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `amount requested by the President's budget' will include any adjustments to such requests that are made by May 1 of such calendar year. If any such adjustment is made after May 1, the Commission will provide such Committees with updated schedules and statements containing the information required by this subsection within 10 days after the date of any such adjustment.''. SEC. 5. INSPECTION OF SHIP RADIO STATIONS. (a) Contracting Out Inspections.--Section 4(f)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 154(f)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``despite the preceding provisions of this paragraph, the Commission may designate an entity to make the inspections referred to in this paragraph instead of using engineers in charge, radio engineers, or other field employees.''. (b) Annual Inspection Required.--Section 362(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 360(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``as may'' in the third sentence and inserting ``as the Commission determines to'', and (2) by striking ``thereby'' in the fourth sentence and all that follows and inserting the following: ``thereby-- ``(1) waive the annual inspection required under this section for a period of up to 90 days for the sole purpose of enabling a vessel to complete its voyage and proceed to a port in the United States where an inspection can be held, or ``(2) waive the annual inspection required under this section for a vessel that is in compliance with the radio provisions of the Safety Convention and that is operating solely in waters beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, but the inspection will be performed within 30 days after the vessel's return to the United States.''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 385 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 385) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``or an entity designated by the Commission'' after ``Commission'', and (2) by striking out ``as may'' and inserting ``as", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01040", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00416", "text": "date as the Secretary reasonably concludes that the manufacturer has no further information to provide to the Secretary as part of the demonstration or that the manufacturer is not in substantial compliance with the order under paragraph (1). ``(4) Review by secretary.--Once a demonstration under paragraph (1) by a manufacturer is completed, the Secretary will review all relevant information received by the Secretary under the demonstration or otherwise available to the Secretary and make a determination of whether the Secretary considers the dietary supplement involved to be adulterated under section 402(f)(1). Such determination will be made not later than 180 days after the completion of the demonstration. ``(5) Requirements regarding demonstrations.--The Secretary may, by order or by regulation, establish requirements for demonstrations under paragraph (1). ``(6) Relation to other procedures.--In the case of a dietary supplement with respect to which the Secretary has not issued an order under paragraph (1), this subsection may not be construed as preventing the Secretary from acting under section 402(f)(1) to the same extent and in the same manner as would apply in the absence of this subsection. In the case of a dietary supplement with respect to which the Secretary has issued an order under paragraph (1), a determination under paragraph (4) that the supplement is not adulterated under section 402(f)(1) does not prevent the Secretary from making a determination, on the basis of additional information obtained by the Secretary, that the supplement is so adulterated. ``(f) Sales to Minors; Significant Risk.-- ``(1) Criteria.--Not later than the expiration of the two- year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Dietary Supplement Access and Awareness Act, the Secretary will by regulation establish criteria for making a determination that a dietary supplement may pose a significant risk to individuals who are under the age of 18 (referred to in this section individually as a `minor'). ``(2) Product determination; prohibited act.--The Secretary may, by order or by regulation, make a determination described in paragraph (1) with respect to a dietary supplement. Effective upon the expiration of a period designated by the Secretary in publishing such determination in the Federal Register, the act of selling the dietary supplement to a minor will be deemed to be an act which results in such supplement being misbranded while held for sale. During the two-year period referred to in paragraph (1), an order making such a determination may be issued despite that criteria have not yet been established in", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01154", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00417", "text": "to be calculated annually on the basis of the arithmetic mean of the producer prices in each Member State of the Community of Ten, plus transport and packaging costs incurred by the products from the production regions to the representative consumption centres of the Community and bearing in mind developments in the costs of production in the fruit and vegetable sector; because the abovementioned producer prices correspond to the average prices recorded during the three years preceding the date of fixing of the Community offer price; because, however, the annual Community offer price cannot exceed the reference price applied for third countries; because, in order to take account of seasonal variations in prices, the marketing year should be divided into one or more periods and a Community offer price should be fixed for each of them; because, in accordance with Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 3709/89 and (EEC) No 3648/90, the producer prices to be used for the determination of the Community offer price are to be those of a domestic product defined by its commercial characteristics recorded on the representative market or markets located in the production areas where prices are lowest for products or varieties representing a considerable proportion of production marketed throughout the year or during a part of the latter and which meet Quality Class I requirements and conditions laid down as regards packaging; because the average price for each representative market must be established after disregarding prices which may be considered excessively high or excessively low compared with the normal fluctuations recorded on the market; because, moreover, if the average price for a Member State shows excessive variations with respect of normal price fluctuations, it will not be taken into account; because the application of the abovementioned criteria results in Community offer prices being fixed for lemons for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1992 at the levels set out from now on; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 1991/92 marketing year, the Community offer prices for lemons (CN code 0805 30 10) applicable with regard to Spain and Portugal, expressed in ecus per 100 kilograms net of packed products of class I, of all sizes, will be as follows: - June: 40,82 - July and August: 50,65 - September: 56,23 - October: 48,55 - November to April: 38", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00641", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00418", "text": "countries and new regulatory decisions and policies that may affect regulatory outcomes; and (9) conducting joint training on subjects that affect and strengthen seafood inspection effectiveness by Federal authorities. SEC. 3. CERTIFIED LABORATORIES. Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will increase the number of laboratories certified to the standards of the Food and Drug Administration in the United States and in countries that export seafood to the United States for the purpose of analyzing seafood and ensuring that it complies with Federal law. Such laboratories may include Federal, State, and private facilities. The Secretary of commerce will publish in the Federal Register a list of certified laboratories, and will update the list, and publish the updated list, no less frequently than annually. SEC. 4. NOAA LABORATORIES. In any fiscal year beginning after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce will increase the number and capacity of laboratories operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration involved in carrying out testing and other activities under this Act to the extent the Secretary determines that increased laboratory capacity is necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as provided for in appropriations Acts. SEC. 5. CONTAMINATED SEAFOOD. (a) Refusal of Entry.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services will issue an order refusing admission into the United States of all imports of seafood or seafood products originating from a country or exporter if the Secretary determines, on the basis of reliable evidence, that shipments of such seafood or seafood products is not likely to meet the requirements of Federal law. (b) Increased Testing.--If the Secretary determines, on the basis of reliable evidence that seafood imports originating from a country may not meet the requirements of Federal law, and determines that there is a lack of adequate certified laboratories to provide for the entry of shipments under section 3, then the Secretary will order an increase in the percentage of shipments tested of seafood originating from such country to improve detection of potential violations of such requirements. (c) Allowance of Individual Shipments From Exporting Country or Exporter.--despite an order under subsection (a) with respect to seafood originating from a country or exporter, the Secretary may permit individual shipments of seafood originating in that country or from that exporter to be admitted into the United States if-- (1) the exporter presents evidence from a laboratory certified by the Secretary that a shipment of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00972", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00419", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act''. SEC. 2. AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT. (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 1028, the following: ``Sec. 1028A. Aggravated identity theft ``(a) Offenses.-- ``(1) In general.--Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person will, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. ``(2) Terrorism offense.--Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a false identification document will, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years. ``(b) Consecutive Sentence.--despite any other provision of law-- ``(1) a court will not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this section; ``(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this section will run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony during which the means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used; ``(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for the felony during which the means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used, a court will not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section; and ``(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a violation of this section may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on that person for an additional violation of this section, provided that such discretion will be exercised in accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28. ``(c", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01101", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00420", "text": ". ``(C) Whoever willfully violates section 931(d), will be-- ``(i) fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both; and ``(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, such person will be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. ``(D) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (e) or (f) of section 931 will be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. ``(E) In addition to any other penalties imposed under this paragraph, the Secretary may, with respect to any person who knowingly violates any provision of section 931-- ``(i) if the person is registered under section 931(a), after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend for not more than 6 months or revoke the registration of that person under section 931(a); and ``(ii) impose a civil fine in an amount equal to not more than $10,000.''. (3) Technical and conforming amendments.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in the chapter analysis, by adding at the end the following: ``931. Regulation of firearms transfers at gun shows.''; and (B) in the first sentence of section 923(j), by striking ``a gun show or event'' and inserting ``an event''; and (c) Inspection Authority.--Section 923(g)(1) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(E) despite subparagraph (B), the Secretary may enter during business hours the place of business of any gun show promoter and any place where a gun show is held for the purposes of examining the records required by sections 923 and 931 and the inventory of licensees conducting business at the gun show. Such entry and examination will be conducted for the purposes of determining compliance with this chapter by gun show promoters and licensees conducting business at the gun show and will not require a showing of reasonable cause or a warrant.''. (d) Increased Penalties for Serious Recordkeeping Violations by Licensees.--Section 924(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01087", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00421", "text": "from the historic requirements of fairness merely because he acts, however conscientiously, in the name of security. Nor does he obtain immunity on the ground that designation is not an 'adjudication' or a'regulation' in the conventional use of those terms. Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have previously been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness. Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to past instances. 82 Therefore the petitioners did set forth causes of action which the District Court should have entertained. 83 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. 84 While I join in the opinion of Mr. Justice BURTON, which would dispose of the cases on procedural grounds, the Court has decided them on the Constitution. And so I turn to that aspect of the cases. 85 The resolution of the constitutional question presents one of the gravest issues of this generation. There is no doubt in my mind of the need for the Chief Executive and the Congress to take strong measures against any Fifth Column worming its way into government—a Fifth Column that has access to vital information and the purpose to paralyze and confuse. The problems of security are real. So are the problems of freedom. The paramount issue of the age is to reconcile the two. 86 In days of great tension when feelings run high, it is a temptation to take shortcuts by borrowing from the totalitarian techniques of our opponents. But when we do, we set in motion a subversive influence of our own design that destroys us from within. The present cases, together with No. 49, Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669, affirmed today by an equally divided Court, are simple illustrations of that trend. 87 I disagree with Mr. Justice JACKSON that an organization whether it be these petitioners, the American Red Cross, the Catholic Church, the Masonic Order, or the Boy Scouts—has no standing to object to being labeled'subversive' in these ex parte proceedings. The opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER disposes of that argument. This is not an instance of name calling by public officials. This is a determination of status—a proceeding to ascertain whether the organization", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00395", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00422", "text": "1946, at which the executive board voted to instruct Dr. Barsky not to produce the records before the Committee, as he had been ordered to do. While respondent did not participate in either of these actions, her knowledge of the Committee's efforts to obtain the records and the board's previous actions with respect thereto was shown by evidence of her attendance of a board meeting in March, 1946, when Dr. Barsky reported concerning his appearance before the Committee on February 13, and the association's attorney was present and talked to the board about its legal position in the matter. 4 The subpoena served on Mrs. Fleischman read as follows: 'Copy, By Authority of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America, 'To the Sergeant-at-Arms, or His Special Messenger: 'You are commanded to summon Mrs. Ernestina G. Fleischman, 'Voice of Fighting Spain,' 1 Columbus Avenue, New York City, a member of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, to be and appear before the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, of which the Honorable John S. Wood is chairman, and to bring with you all books, ledgers, records, and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or subcommittee of it, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries. The said books, papers and records demanded herein are for the period from January 1, 1945 up to and including the date of this subpoena, in their chamber in the city of Washington, on April 4, 1946, at the hour of 10 a.m., then and there to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said Committee; and (she) is not to depart without leave of said committee. 'Herein fail not, and make return of this summons. * * *' It is now suggested that this subpoena is defective because addressed not to the association by name but to respondent as a member of the executive board of the association, and Wilson v. United States, 1911, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771, Ann.Cas.1912D, 558 and Commissioners v. Sellew, 187", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00356", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00423", "text": "furnish all the necessary information within the time limits provided for; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The programme for the eradication of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia presented by Italy is approved for the period from 1 July 1994 to 31 December 1994. Article 2 Italy will bring into force by 1 July 1994 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions for implementing the programme referred to in Article 1. Article 3 1. Financial participation by the Community will be at the rate of 50 % of the costs of testing and those incurred in Italy by way of compensation for owners for the slaughter of animals up to a maximum of ECU 1 340 000. 2. The financial contribution of the Community will be granted subject to: - forwarding a report to the Commission every three months on the progress of the programme and the costs incurred, - forwarding a final report on the technical execution of the programme accompanied by justifying evidence as to the costs incurred by 1 July 1995 at the latest. 3. The financial contribution of the Community will be paid in ecus at the rate applying on the first working day of the month when the request of payment is made as published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Article 4 This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Italy. Done at Brussels, 27 July 1994.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 310, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00761", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00424", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 22 February 1995 concerning the dates to be fixed by Member States for the submission of 'area' aid applications under the integrated administration and control system for certain Community aid schemes (the 'integrated system') (Only the German, Greek, Finnish and Swedish texts are authentic) (95/48/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 of 27 November 1992 establishing an integrated administration and control system for certain Community aid schemes (1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 165/94 (2), and in particular Article 6 (2), of it, because Article 6 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 provided that the Commission may authorize Member States to fix a final date for the submission of an 'area' aid application between 1 April and the dates referred to in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92 (3); because Member States must justify their choice of date, in particular by providing the Commission with a detailed working plan which demonstrates that the proposed date allows the time required for all relevant data to be made available for the proper administrative and financial management of the aid and for the necessary checks to be carried out; because certain Member States have submitted to the Commission applications for the authorization of dates after 31 March accompanied by the relevant working plans; because the Commission has studied these applications; because this measure is in accordance with the opinion of the EAGGF Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Commission authorizes the Member States listed in the Annex to this to fix the final dates mentioned there for the submission of the 'area' aid application in 1995. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden. Done at Brussels, 22 February 1995.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 428, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00579", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00425", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 26/2009 of 15 January 2009 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 of 21 December 2007 laying down implementing rules for Council Regulations (EC) No 2200/96, (EC) No 2201/96 and (EC) No 1182/2007 in the fruit and vegetable sector (2), and in particular Article 138(1) of it, because: Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 lays down, under the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XV, Part A thereto, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The standard import values referred to in Article 138 of Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 are fixed in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 16 January 2009. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 January 2009.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 330, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00648", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00426", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 1657/87 of 12 June 1987 re-establishing the levying of customs duties applicable to other footwear, falling within subheading 64.02 B, originating in the Philippines and Thailand, to which the preferential tariff arrangements set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86 apply THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86 of 16 December 1986 applying generalized tariff preferences for 1987 in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing countries (1), and in particular Article 15 of it, because, under Articles 1 and 12 of that Regulation, suspension of customs duties will be accorded to each of the countries or territories listed in Annex III other than those listed in column 4 of Annex I, within the framework of the preferential tariff ceiling fixed in column 9 of Annex I; because, as provided for in Article 13 of that Regulation, as soon as the individual ceilings in question are reached at Community level, the levying of customs duties on imports of the products in question originating in each of the countries and territories concerned may at any time be re-established; because, in the case of other footwear, falling within subheading 64.02 B, the individual ceiling was fixed at 2 400 000 ECU; because, on 27 May 1987, imports of these products into the Community originating in the Philippines and Thailand reached the ceiling in question after being charged thereagainst; because it is appropriate to re-establish the levying of customs duties in respect of the products in question against the Philippines and Thailand, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 As from 16 June 1987, the levying of customs duties suspended under Regulation (EEC) No 3924/86 will be re-established on imports into the Community of the following products originating in the Philippines and Thailand: 1.2 // // // CCT heading No // Description // // // 64.02 (NIMEXE code 64.02-60, 61, 69, 99) // Footwear with outer soles of leather or composition leather, footwear (other than footweat footwear within heading No 64.01) with outer soles of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00776", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00427", "text": "***** COMMISSION DECISION of 29 October 1987 on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures in Italy (Veneto) under Council Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 (Only the Italian text is authentic) (87/539/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 of 12 March 1985 on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1760/87 (2), and in particular Article 25 of it, because the Italian Government has notified, under Article 24 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85: - Veneto Regional Decision No 230 of 24 July 1986 on provisions for the application of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85, - Veneto Regional Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 on provisions for applying Titles I, II and III of Decision No 230 of 24 July 1986, - Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 1987 on provisions for the installation of young farmers and for relief services in farming; because, under Article 25 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85, the Commission must decide whether, having regard to the compatibility of the aforesaid provisions with the abovementioned Regulation, the latter's objectives, and the need for a proper connection between the various measures, the conditions for a financial contribution by the Community are satisfied; because Veneto Regional Decision No 230 of 24 July 1986 in the version given in Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 meets the conditions and objectives of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; because Title I of Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 1987 meets the conditions and objectives of Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; because that statement is based on the assumption that the measures provided for in Title I of the abovementioned Law are applied in accordance with the criteria and principles laid down in Decision No 1381 of 2 April 1987 as regards the granting of special aids to young farmers; because Title II of Veneto Regional Law No 14 of 5 March 198", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00789", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00428", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1629/96 of 13 August 1996 on an invitation to tender for the refund on export of wholly milled round grain rice to certain third countries THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1418/76 of 21 June 1976 on the common organization of the market in rice (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 (2), and in particular Article 14 of it, because examination of the balance sheet shows that exportable amounts of rice are currently held by producers; because this situation could affect the normal development of producer prices during the 1996/97 marketing year; because, in order to remedy this situation, it is appropriate to make use of export refunds to zones which may be supplied by the Community; because the special situation of the rice market makes it necessary to limit the quantities of rice benefiting from the refunds, and therefore to apply Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1418/76 enabling the amount of refund to be fixed by tendering procedure; because it should be stated that the provisions of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 of 6 March 1975 laying down detailed rules for the application of the system of tendering for export refunds on rice (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 299/95 (4), apply to this invitation to tender; because, in order to avoid disturbances on the markets of the producing countries, the markets of destination should be limited to Zones I to VI and Zone VIII, excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, noted in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92 (5), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 3304/94 (6); because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. An invitation to tender is opened, for the refund on export of wholly milled round grain rice referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1418/76, for Zones I to VI and Zone VIII excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, as specified in the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 2145", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00510", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00429", "text": "and Government representatives in which the Indian agent at White River, all the agency's male employees, and a U.S. military detachment were killed in the so-called 'Meeker massacre.' Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 5, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. (1879) 16—19, 82—97. There have been charges and counter-charges as to who was responsible for inciting these hostilities. Whoever was responsible, it is clear that Congress, aroused by the massacre, took steps to punish the Indians who participated in it, to dispossess the Utes of their reservation, and to remove them from Colorado. Congressional action to accomplish this was provided by the Act of June 15, 1880, 21 Stat. 199, which ratified and embodied an agreement reached earlier that year between the Government and the leaders of the Utes who had promised 'to use their best endeavors with their people to procure their consent to cede to the United States all the territory of the present Ute Reservation * * *.' This Act authorized specific allotments to individual Indians from the lands so ceded. But § 3 provided that 'all the lands not * * * allotted, the title to which is, by the said agreement of * * * the Ute Indians, and this acceptance by the United States, released and conveyed to the United States * * *' would be restored to the public domain for sale as public lands. The proceeds of the sale of the land so conveyed by the Utes to the United States were, upon satisfaction of indemnity conditions imposed because of the massacre, to be distributed to the Indians. Thereafter, in 1882, an Executive Order declared that the lands withdrawn from the public domain by the Executive Order of 1875 and'set apart for the use of the * * * Ute Indians * * * is, restored to the public domain.' 1 Kappler, supra, pp. 834, 834. 5 under an Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 781, petitioners recovered a judgment for the proceeds of certain lands sold by the Government, as well as the value of certain lands appropriated by the Government to its own use, all of which were part of the 1868 treaty lands. The Ute Indians v. United States, 45 Ct.Cl. 440; 46 Ct.Cl", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00038", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00430", "text": "American Zirconium Corporation or Virginia Chemical Corporation, their successors or assigns, may at their option, if exercised within six months from the date of this decree, apply for licenses from DP under the provisions of paragraph 7. In the event American Zirconium Corporation. Virginia Chemical Corporation or their respective successors or assigns exercise the foregoing option, DP is enjoined from collecting royalties under any existing license agreement relating to titanium pigments between it and the person exercising the option in respect of any period subsequent to such exercise. Defendants NL, Tinc and DP are enjoined from bringing, or threatening to bring, any action against any person or corporation for the alleged infringement prior to the date of this decree of any patent as herein defined. '10. The Attorney General of the United States or his proper representative will, for the purpose of securing compliance with this decree, be permitted (1) access, during the office hours of the defendants, to all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of the defendants, relating to any matters contained in this decree, (2) subject to any legally recognized privilege, without restraint or interference from the defendants, to interview officers or employees of the defendants, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters; provided, however, that information obtained by the means permitted in this paragraph will not be divulged by any representative of the Department of Justice to any person other than a duly authorized representative of the Department of Justice except in the course of legal proceedings for the purpose of securing compliance with this decree in which the United States is a party or as otherwise required by law. '11. Judgment is entered against the defendants for all costs to be taxed in this proceeding. '12. The cancellation, injunctions and all executory action provided for under this decree will not become effective or operative until ninety days from the date of this decree. '13. Jurisdiction of this cause, and of the parties to this, is retained by the Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this decree, or any other person or corporation that may hereafter become bound, in whole or in part, thereby to apply to the Court at any time for such further orders, modifications, vacations or directions as may be necessary or appropriate. '(1) for the construction or carrying out of this decree, and '(2) for the enforcement of compliance therewith and the punishment of violations of it.'", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00101", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00431", "text": "rates.--Multiperil coverage under paragraph (1)(A) and windstorm coverage under paragraph (1)(B) will be made available for purchase for a property only at chargeable risk premium rates that, based on consideration of the risks involved and accepted actuarial principles, and including operating costs and allowance and administrative expenses, are required in order to make such coverage available on an actuarial basis for the type and class of properties covered. ``(6) Terms of coverage.--The Director will, after consultation with persons and entities referred to in section 1306(a), provide by regulation for the general terms and conditions of insurability applicable to properties eligible for multiperil coverage under paragraph (1)(A) and such terms and conditions applicable to properties eligible for windstorm coverage under paragraph (1)(B), subject to the provisions of this subsection, including-- ``(A) the types, classes, and locations of any such properties which will be eligible for such coverages, which will include residential and nonresidential properties; ``(B) subject to paragraph (7), the nature and limits of loss or damage in any areas (or subdivisions of it) which may be covered by such coverages; ``(C) the classification, limitation, and rejection of any risks which may be advisable; ``(D) appropriate minimum premiums; ``(E) appropriate loss deductibles; and ``(F) any other terms and conditions relating to insurance coverage or exclusion that may be necessary to carry out this subsection. ``(7) Limitations on amount of coverage.-- ``(A) Multiperil coverage.--The regulations issued under paragraph (6) will provide that the aggregate liability under multiperil coverage made available under this subsection will not exceed the lesser of the replacement cost for covered losses or the following amounts, as applicable: ``(i) Residential structures.--In the case of residential properties, which will include structures containing multiple dwelling units that are made available for occupancy by rental (despite any treatment or classification of such properties for purposes of section 1306(b))-- ``(I) for any single-family dwelling, $500,000; ``(II) for any structure containing more than one dwelling unit, $500,000 for each separate dwelling unit in the structure, which limit, in the case of such a structure containing multiple dwelling units that are made available for occupancy by rental, will be applied so as to enable any insured or applicant for insurance to receive coverage for the structure up to", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01105", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00432", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2619/87 of 28 August 1987 fixing for the 1987/88 marketing year the estimated production of and the reduction in the aid for cotton THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to the Act of Accession of Greece, and in particular Protocol 4 on cotton, as amended by the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Protocol 14 annexed thereto, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2169/81 laying down the general rules for the system of aid for cotton (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2276/87 (2), and in particular Article 11, because Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 2169/81 stipulates that production of cotton is to be estimated at the beginning of each marketing year; because on the basis of available figures the estimate for the 1987/88 marketing year should be fixed at the figure given below; because since this figure is higher than the maximum guaranteed quantity set for the marketing year by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1966/87 fixing, for the 1987/88 marketing year, the guide price for unginned cotton and the quantity of cotton for which aid may be granted in full (3), the reduction to be made in the aid should be fixed, the provision of Article 7 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2169/81 applying; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committeee for Flax and Hemp, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 1987/88 marketing year, the estimated production of cotton referred to in Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 2169/81 will be fixed at: 828 850 tonnes. Article 2 For the 1987/88 marketing year, the reduction to be made in the aid for cotton as referred to in Articel 7 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2169/81, will be fixed at 5,761 ECU per 100 kilogramms. Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00605", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00433", "text": "in notes 5 and 17. 10 The Executive Proclamation under which the Attorney General was acting provides that all alien enemies 'who will be deemed by the Attorney General to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States because they have adhered to the aforesaid enemy governments or to the principles of government of it will be subject upon the order of the Attorney General to removal from the United States and may be required to depart therefrom in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe.' Proclamation 2655, 10 Fed.Reg. 8947. This proclamation was issued under the authority conferred by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 577. 11 Furthermore, as the Solicitor General points out in his brief, there is 'no reason why the United States cannot waive this particular objection since it has the effect merely of permitting suit against one Government officer rather than another.' 12 See Fed.Rules Civil Procedure, rule 4(f), 28 U.S.C. following § 723c, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. 13 Upon the facts the situation is one in which the Government quite properly desires a speedy determination upon the merits, in order to avoid the further delay necessarily incident to reaching them by further proceedings. Whether from the viewpoint of establishing the Government's power to remove the petitioners or of terminating the restraint upon their liberties, expedition of the determination is highly desirable. 14 The 1925 amendment to the statute providing that 'the order of the circuit judge will be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had' does not limit jurisdiction to grant the writ. See Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307, 65 S.Ct. 208, 220, note 26, 89 L.Ed. 243. The provision is a mere recording requirement applicable in terms only to circuit judges acting individually. Appropriately it does not apply to courts as distinguished from judges because court orders would be recorded by routine procedure, because an order issued by a judge in vacation would require special treatment. Since the application in this case was made to a court in session, the requirement does not apply here. But even if it did apply, and even if a recording provision enacted in 1925 could be taken to relate back to the amendment of 1867 to give meaning to the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00192", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00434", "text": "or ``(ii) 60 days before the closing of the case; and ``(B) such fee, cost, or charge-- ``(i) is lawful under applicable nonbankruptcy law, reasonable, and provided for in the applicable security agreement; and ``(ii) is secured by property the value of which is greater than the amount of such claim, including such fee, cost, or charge; ``(4) the failure of a party to give notice described in paragraph (3) will be deemed a waiver of any claim for fees, costs, or charges described in paragraph (3) for all purposes, and any attempt to collect such fees, costs, or charges will constitute a violation of section 524(a)(2) or, if the violation occurs before the date of discharge, of section 362(a); and ``(5) a plan may provide for the waiver of any prepayment penalty on a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence.''. SEC. 5. CONFIRMATION OF PLAN. Section 1325(a) of title 11, the United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (8) by striking ``and'' at the end, (2) in paragraph (9) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon, and (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following: ``(10) despite subclause (I) of paragraph (5)(B)(i), the plan provides that the holder of a claim whose rights are modified under section 1322(b)(11) retain the lien until the later of-- ``(A) the payment of such claim as reduced and modified; or ``(B) discharge under section 1328; and ``(11) the plan modifies a claim in accordance with section 1322(b)(11), and the court finds that such modification is in good faith.''. SEC. 6. DISCHARGE. Section 1328 of title 11, the United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``(other than payments to holders of claims whose rights are modified under section 1322(b)(11)'' after ``paid'' the 1st place it appears, and (B) in paragraph (1) by inserting ``or, to the extent of the unpaid portion of the claim as reduced, provided for in section 1322(b)(11)'' after ``1322(b)(5)'',", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00982", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00435", "text": "337 U.S. 472 69 S.Ct. 1333 93 L.Ed. 1480 PROPPERv.CLARK, Attorney General. No. 390. Argued March 28, 29, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1949. See 70 S.Ct. 33. [Syllabus from pages 472-474 intentionally omitted] Messrs. A. Walter Socolow and Joseph M. Cohen, New York City, for petitioner. Mr. David Schwartz, New York City, for respondent. Mr. Louis D. Frohlich, New York City, for A.S.C.A.P. Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 The Alien Property Custodian1 on April 22, 1946, began this action under § 17 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 17, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to obtain the payment, and a declaration of title in him as against the petitioner as receiver, of certain royalties owed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to Staatlich Genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten and Musikverleger (AKM), an Austrian association, under the provisions of vesting order No. 2097, Office of Alien Property Custodian, September 4, 1943, 8 F.R. 16463, whereby the Custodian had vested in himself title to certain property of AKM, specifically claims for royalties under copyrights for the performance of musical compositions. By contract ASCAP had been authorized by AKM to license on royalty the use in this country of musical copyrights belonging to AKM. ASCAP and the petitioner, who is the state-appointed receiver of the royalties involved, were made defendants. The District Court, on motions for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, entered a judgment declaring that the petitioner had no right, title or interest in the claim in question, Markham v. Taylor, 70 F.Supp. 202, and later, a second judgment directing ASCAP to pay the debt to the Custodian. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on appeal by the petitioner,2 affirmed. Clark v. Propper, 169 F.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00294", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00436", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 23 April 1998 amending Decision 83/471/EEC relating to the Community Inspection Committee on the application of the classification scale for carcases of adult bovine animals (98/296/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 of 28 April 1981 determining the Community scale for the classification of carcases of adult bovine animals (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1026/91 (2), and in particular the fourth paragraph of Article 5 of it, because, in the light of experience gained, the detailed rules covering the membership of the inspection committee provided for in Article 5 of the abovementioned Regulation, the intervals at which on-the-spot inspections are to be carried out and the deadline for the forwarding of inspection reports should be adapted; because Commission Decision 83/471/EEC (3), as last amended by Decision 95/201/EC (4), should be adapted accordingly; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Decision 83/471/EEC is amended as follows: 1. Article 2(2) is replaced by the following: '2. On-the-spot inspections will be carried out in a given Member State by a delegation of the committee comprising at most: - three Commission experts, one of whom will act as chairman of the Committee, - one expert from the Member State concerned, - eight experts from other Member States.`; 2. the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) is replaced by the following: '2. On-the-spot inspections will be carried out at regular intervals in each Member State and may, where necessary, be followed by additional visits. In such cases, the membership of the Committee may be reduced.`; 3. Article 4(2) is replaced by the following: '2. The Committee chairman will draw up a report on the inspections conducted and containing the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1. The report will be sent at the earliest possibility to the Member State inspected and to the other Member States subsequently.` Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 23", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00624", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00437", "text": "-units with the name 'cent`; because the definition of the name 'cent` does not prevent the use of variants of this term in common usage in the Member States; because the European Council furthermore considered that the name of the single currency must be the same in all the official languages of the European Union, taking into account the existence of different alphabets; (3) because the Council when acting in accordance with the third sentence of Article 109l(4) of the Treaty will take the measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the euro other than the adoption of the conversion rates; (4) because whenever under Article 109k(2) of the Treaty a Member State becomes a participating Member State, the Council will according to Article 109l(5) of the Treaty take the other measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the euro as the single currency of this Member State; (5) because according to the first sentence of Article 109l(4) of the Treaty the Council will at the starting date of the third stage adopt the conversion rates at which the currencies of the participating Member States will be irrevocably fixed and at which irrevocably fixed rate the euro will be substituted for these currencies; (6) because given the absence of exchange rate risk either between the euro unit and the national currency units or between these national currency units, legislative provisions should be interpreted accordingly; (7) because the term 'contract` used for the definition of legal instruments is meant to include all types of contracts, irrespective of the way in which they are concluded; (8) because in order to prepare a smooth changeover to the euro a transitional period is needed between the substitution of the euro for the currencies of the participating Member States and the introduction of euro banknotes and coins; because during this period the national currency units will be defined as sub-divisions of the euro; because thereby a legal equivalence is established between the euro unit and the national currency units; (9) because in accordance with Article 109g of the Treaty and with Regulation (EC) No 1103/97, the euro will replace the ECU as from 1 January 1999 as the unit of account of the institutions of the European Communities; because the euro should also be the unit of account of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the central banks of the participating Member States; because, in line with the Madrid conclusions, monetary policy operations will be carried out", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00507", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00438", "text": "337 U.S. 498 69 S.Ct. 1251 93 L.Ed. 1499 FEDERAL POWER COMMISSIONv.PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO. et al. No. 558. Argued April 22, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Mr. Bradford Ross, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Messrs. Robert P. Patterson, New York City, and Jeff A. Robertson, Topeka, Kan., for respondents. Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 Stated broadly this certiorari brings before us for review a problem involving the scope of the power over the gas reserves of a natural-gas company given to the Federal Power Commission by the Natural Gas Act. 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 56 Stat. 83, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq. Specifically the question to be decided is whether a natural-gas company, subject to the Act, may sell the leases covering an estimated twelve per cent of its total gas reserves without the approval and contrary to an order of the Commission. 2 The issue is made very sharply because the District Court and the Court of Appeals have refused an injunction, sought by the Commission, to hold the consummation of the sale in abeyance until the Commission, through an admittedly permissible investigation, can determine whether the disposal of these reserves will impair the ability of Panhandle to supply its present and prospective customers in the area which it has undertaken to serve as a public utility. The Commission may find that public interest will best be served by requiring Panhandle to retain these reserves. The public interest has strong appeal to a court of equity for its remedies once a legal right is fairly in controversy.1 3 Respondent, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company (herein called Panhandle), a Delaware corporation, transports and markets natural gas in interstate commerce by means of its pipe-line system which runs from Texas into Michigan. In addition it owns or controls gas-producing properties in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. 4 In September, 1948, Panhandle organized Hugoton Production Company (from now on called Hugoton), also a Delaware corporation. On October 11, 1948, under a written agreement between the two companies, Panhandle transferred to Hugoton gas leases on approximately 97,000 acres of land in Kansas and", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00296", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00439", "text": "roles and responsibilities of employees assigned under paragraph (1) specifically with regard to the duties prescribed by this paragraph.''. SEC. 3. STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Section 442 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 252) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (10); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) Student and exchange visitor program.--In administering the program under paragraph (4), the Secretary will, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of the Student Visa Security Improvement Act-- ``(A) prescribe regulations to require an institution or exchange visitor program sponsor participating in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program to ensure that each covered student or exchange visitor enrolled at the institution or attending the exchange visitor program-- ``(i) is an active participant in the program for which the covered student or exchange visitor was issued a visa to enter the United States; ``(ii) is not unobserved for any period-- ``(I) exceeding 30 days during any academic term or program in which the covered student or exchange visitor is enrolled; or ``(II) exceeding 60 days during any period not described in subclause (I); and ``(iii) is reported to the Department if within 10 days-- ``(I) transferring to another institution or program; ``(II) changing academic majors; or ``(III) any other changes to information required to be maintained in the system described in paragraph (4); and ``(B) despite subparagraph (A), require each covered student or exchange visitor to be observed at least once every 60 days. ``(6) Enhanced access.--The Secretary will provide access to the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (from now on in this subsection referred to as the `SEVIS'), or other equivalent or successor program or system, to appropriate employees of an institution or exchange visitor program sponsor participating in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program if-- ``(A) at least two authorized users are identified at each participating institution or exchange visitor sponsor; ``(B) at least one additional authorized user is identified at each such institution or sponsor for every 200 covered students or exchange visitors enrolled at the institution or sponsor; and ``(C) each authorized user is certified by the Secretary as having completed an appropriate training course provided by the Department for the program or system. ``(7) Program", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00934", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00440", "text": "(1) arranging or attempting to arrange consumer credit; (2) offering to find for any individual consumer credit; or (3) advising any individual as to how to obtain consumer credit. (b) Prohibition on False or Misleading Representations.--No loan broker may-- (1) make or use any false or misleading representations or omit any material fact in the offer or sale of the service of a loan broker; or (2) engage, directly or indirectly, in any act that operates or would operate as fraud or deception upon any person in connection with the offer or sale of the services of a loan broker, despite the absence of reliance by the person to whom the loan broker's services are offered or sold. SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT BY THE FTC. Any violation of section 3 of this Act will-- (1) be treated as a violation of a rule of the Federal Trade Commission issued under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and (2) be subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission under the enforcement and penalty provisions applicable to violations of such rules. SEC. 5. CRIMINAL PENALTY. (a) In General.--Whoever knowingly violates section 3 will be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. (b) Civil Forfeiture.--Section 981(a)(1)(C) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``title or a violation'' and inserting ``title, a violation''; and (2) by inserting ``, or a violation of section 5(a) of the Advance Fee Loan Scam Prevention Act of 1993'' before the period. (c) Nonmailable Matter.--For purposes of section 3005(a) of title 39, United States Code, a violation of section 3 by any person will constitute prima facie evidence that such person is engaged in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money or property through the mail by means of false representations.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 427, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01123", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00441", "text": "is proposed to be acquired by the Secretary of Agriculture, as depicted in Exhibit A to the Option Agreement. (4) Eastside national forests.--The term ``Eastside National Forests'' means national forests east of the Continental Divide in the State of Montana, including the Beaverhead National Forest, Deerlodge National Forest, Helena National Forest, Custer National Forest, and Lewis and Clark National Forest. (5) National forest system land.--The term ``National Forest System land'' means approximately 29,000 acres of land (including all appurtenances to the land) owned by the United States in the Gallatin National Forest, Flathead National Forest, Deerlodge National Forest, Helena National Forest, Lolo National Forest, and Lewis and Clark National Forest that is proposed to be acquired by BSL, as depicted in Exhibit B to the Option Agreement. (6) Option agreement.--The term ``Option Agreement'' means-- (A) the document signed by BSL, dated July 29, 1998 and entitled ``Option Agreement for the Acquisition of Big Sky Lumber Co. Lands under the Gallatin Range Consolidation and Protection Act of 1993''; (B) the exhibits and maps attached to the document described in subparagraph (A); and (C) an exchange agreement to be entered into between the Secretary and BSL and made part of the document described in subparagraph (A). (7) Secretary.--The ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Agriculture. SEC. 4. GALLATIN LAND CONSOLIDATION COMPLETION. (a) In General.--despite any other provision of law, and subject to the terms and conditions of the Option Agreement-- (1) if BSL offers title acceptable to the Secretary to the BSL land-- (A) the Secretary will accept a warranty deed to the BSL land and a quit claim deed to agreed to mineral interests in the BSL land; (B) the Secretary will convey to BSL, subject to valid existing rights and to other terms, conditions, reservations, and exceptions as may be agreed to by the Secretary and BSL, fee title to the National Forest System land; and (C) the Secretary of the Interior will convey to BSL, by patent or otherwise, subject to valid existing rights and other terms, conditions, reservations, and exceptions as may be agreed to by the Secretary of the Interior and BSL, fee title to the BLM land;", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00834", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00442", "text": "have been used in the course of the opinions, this Court has consistently upheld the finality of the department head's decision unless it was founded on fraud, alleged and proved. So fraud is in essence the exception. By fraud we mean conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest. The decision of the department head, absent fraudulent conduct, must stand under the plain meaning of the contract. 4 If the decision of the department head under Article 15 is to be set aside for fraud, fraud should be alleged and proved, as it is never presumed. United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219, 226, 32 S.Ct. 617, 620, 56 L.Ed. 1063. In the case at bar, there was no allegation of fraud. There was no finding of fraud nor request for such a finding. The finding of the Court of Claims was that the decision of the department head was 'arbitrary,' 'capricious,' and 'grossly erroneous.' But these words are not the equivalent of fraud, the exception which this Court has previously laid down and to which it now adheres without qualification. 5 Respondents were not compelled or coerced into making the contract. It was a voluntary undertaking on their part. As competent parties they have contracted for the settlement of disputes in an arbitral manner. This, we have said in Moorman, Congress has left them free to do. United States v. Moorman, supra, 338 U.S. at page 462, 70 S.Ct. 291. The limitation upon this arbitral process is fraud, placed there by this Court. If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for Congress. 6 Since there was no pleading of fraud, and no finding of fraud, and no request for such a finding, we are not disposed to remand the case for any further findings, as respondents urge. We assume that if the evidence had been sufficient to constitute fraud, the Court of Claims would have so found. In the absence of such finding, the decision of the department head must stand as conclusive, and the judgment is reversed. 7 Reversed. 8 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice REED concurs, dissenting. 9 Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00419", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00443", "text": "eny Unit, Leo S. Laura A. Guth Tract 905, July 1948''. (b) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance under subsection (a), Ridgeway Township will pay to the Secretary an amount equal to the fair market value of the conveyed lands, as determined by an appraisal acceptable to the Secretary and Ridgeway Township. (c) Property Description.--The maps referred to in subsection (a) is the primary description of the lands to which the maps refer. In the event of a conflict between a map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The maps will be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service until the lands are disposed of under this section. (d) Revocations.--despite any other provision of law, on conveyance of land by the Secretary under this section, any public order withdrawing the land from any form of appropriation under the public land laws is revoked. SEC. 5. CONVEYANCE OF MARIENVILLE RANGER RESIDENCE, FOREST COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA. (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of Agriculture may convey, without consideration, to the Marienville Volunteer Fire Department of Forest County, Pennsylvania, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to that portion of US Tract 844, Marienville ranger residence, as depicted on the map titled ``Allegheny Unit, Peter B. DeSmet Tract 844, 1936'', which is identified as Lot 2 on the Survey Plat prepared by D. M. Heller and dated December 12, 1999. (b) Property Description.--The map referred to in subsection (a) is the primary description of the lands to which the map refers. In the event of a conflict between the map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The map will be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service until the lands are disposed of under this section. (c) Revocations.--despite any other provision of law, on conveyance of land by the Secretary under this section, any public order withdrawing the land from any", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00966", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00444", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Milk Import Tariff Equity Act''. SEC. 2. IMPOSITION OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS ON CERTAIN CASEIN AND MILK CONCENTRATES. (a) Casein and Casein Products.-- (1) In general.--The Additional U.S. notes to chapter 35 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States are amended-- (A) by striking ``Additional U.S. Note'' and inserting ``Additional U.S. Notes''; (B) in note 1, by striking ``subheading 3501.10.10'' and inserting ``subheadings 3501.10.05, 3501.10.15, and 3501.10.20''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new note: ``2. The aggregate quantity of casein, caseinates, milk protein concentrate, and other casein derivatives entered under subheadings 3501.10.15, 3501.10.65, and 3501.90.65 in any calendar year will not exceed 110 percent of the average quantity of such articles imported into the United States during the preceding 3 calendar years, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Articles originating in a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement in force will not be permitted or included under this quantitative limitation and no such article will be classifiable there.''. (2) Rates for certain caseins, caseinates, and other derivatives and glues.--Chapter 35 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by striking subheadings 3501.10 through 3501.90.60 and inserting the following new subheadings, with the article descriptions for subheadings 3501.10 and 3501.90 having the same degree of indentation as the article description for subheading 3502.20.00: ``3501.10 Casein:............................ Milk protein concentrate:............................ 3501.10.05 Described in general note 15 to 0.37 cent Free (A*, CA, CL, E, IL, J, 12 cents/ the tariff schedule and entered s/kg JO, MX, SG) 0.2 kg under its provisions..... cents/kg (AU) 3501.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01161", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00445", "text": ". 74 I do not think the claimants are entitled to interest. When the Government assumes a liability by statute, interest is not allowable unless specific provision is made for it. United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 207, 61 S.Ct. 487, 490, 85 L.Ed. 776; United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588, 67 S.Ct. 398, 399, 91 L.Ed. 521. A different rule obtains when the United States takes property protected by the Fifth Amendment. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664. The present water rights, though not protected by the Fifth Amendment, are ones which the United States has agreed to pay for under §§ 7 and 8 of the Reclamation Act. Sections 7 and 8 contain no provision for the payment of interest. The Act refers to state law to determine whether a water right exists not to ascertain the measure of damages for the taking. 1 Claimants' rights are subject to certain prior appropriative and other rights which do not affect the issues before us. 2 '(T)he entire Central Valley Project, California, previously authorized and established under the provisions of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 115) and the First Deficiency Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1936 (49 Stat. 1622) is reauthorized * * *.' The latter reference is to a $6,900,000 appropriation primarily for 'Friant Reservoir and irrigation facilities therefrom', as a reclamation project'reimbursable under the Reclamation Law.' 49 Stat. 1597, 1622. Development of the water resources of Central Valley was initiated by the State of California. Cal.Stat.1933, p. 2643. Studies were made of the feasibility of federal participation, and although there was no accompanying appropriation, the first congressional authorization in connection with the project was contained in the Act of Aug. 30, 1935, 49 Stat. 1028, 1038. In this Act, on the representation of the Chief of Engineers that, as to the Fri", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00367", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00446", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Alaska Native Veterans Land Allotment Equity Act''. SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION REGARDING OCCUPANCY OF NATIVE ALLOTMENTS IN NATIONAL FORESTS. Section 18(a) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1617(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) No Native'' and inserting the following: ``(a) Revocation.-- ``(1) In general.--No Native''; (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``Further, the'' and inserting the following: ``(2) Repeal.--The''; (3) in the third sentence, by striking ``despite the foregoing provisions of this section, any'' and inserting the following: ``(3) Applications for allotment.-- ``(A) In general.--despite paragraphs (1) and (2), any''; and (4) in paragraph (3) (as designated by paragraph (3)), by adding at the end the following: ``(B) Certain applications approved.--Any allotment application pending before the Department of the Interior on December 18, 1971, that was closed by the Department under the civil action styled `Shields v. United States' (698 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied (104 S. Ct. 73 (1983))) will be reopened and considered to be approved under this paragraph.''. SEC. 3. OPEN SEASON FOR CERTAIN ALASKA NATIVE VETERANS FOR ALLOTMENTS. Section 41 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``In General'' and inserting ``Alaska Native Veteran Allotments''; (B) by striking paragraphs (1) through (4) and inserting the following: ``(1) Allotments.-- ``(A) Eligible recipients.--Any person described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b) will be eligible to receive an allotment under the Act of May 17, 1906 (34 Stat. 197, chapter 2469) (as in effect before December 18, 1971), of not more than 2 parcels of Federal land, the total area", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00991", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00447", "text": "fixed by the Commission in its decision approving the plan referred to in Article 1. 2. The estimated assistance to be charged to the Community budget under the chapter covering expenditure relating to agriculture will be ECU 9 million for the duration of the period provided for in paragraph 1. Article 6 1. On condition that all the measures laid down are applied and are in compliance with the plan approved by the Commission under Article 3, the expenditure incurred by Italy - under Article 2 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f), and (2), - under Article 2 (3) and (4), will qualify for Community financial aid within the limits laid down in Article 5. 2. The Community will refund 50 % of the expenditure referred to in the first indent of paragraph 1 and 30 % of the expenditure referred to in the second indent of paragraph 1. 3. Detailed rules for the application of this Article will be adopted, as required, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 9. Article 7 1. Applications for payment will relate to expenditure incurred by Italy during the calendar year and will be submitted to the Commission before 1 July of the following year. 2. The Commission will decide on the aid provided for under this Decision after consulting the committee referred to in Article 9. 3. Detailed rules for the application of this Article will be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 9. Article 8 Articles 8 and 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2048/88 (2), will apply mutatis mutandis. Article 9 1. Where the procedure laid down in this Article is to be followed, matters will without delay be referred by the chairman, either on his own initiative or at the request of the representative of a Member State, to the Standing Veterinary Committee (from now on called 'the committee') set up by Decision 68/361/EEC (3). 2. Within the committee, the votes of the Member States will be weighted as provided for in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty. The chairman will not vote. 3. The representative of the Commission will submit to the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00794", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00448", "text": "of a person residing in this state in any case and under any circumstances mentioned in this section is inseparable from the assignment of such situs in this state to property of a person residing outside o this state in a like case and under similar circumstances. * * * Sec. 5-1: * * * Moneys, deposits, investments, accounts receivable and prepaid items, and other taxable intangibles will be considered to be 'used' when they or the avails of it are being applied, or are intended to be applied in the conduct of the business, whether in this state or elsewhere. * * * 'Sec. 5638: Annual taxes are levied on the kinds and classes of intangible property, from now on enumerated, on the classified tax list in the offices of the county auditors and duplicates of it in the offices of the county treasurers at the following rates, to wit: '* * * moneys, credits and all other taxable intangibles so listed, three mills on the dollar. * * * 'Sec. 5327: The term 'credits' as so used, means the excess of the sum of all current accounts receivable and prepaid items (used) in business when added together estimating every such account and item at its true value in money, over and above the sum of current accounts payable of business, other than taxes and assessments. * * *' Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (1945). 2 150 Ohio St. 229, 80 N.E.2d 863. 3 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2). 1 The Constitutional Position of Property in America, 64 Independent 834, 836 (1908). He went on to say that the Dartmouth College case, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629, and the construction given the Fourteenth Amendment in the Santa Clara case 'have had the effect of placing the modern industrial corporation in an almost impregnable constitutional position.' Id., p. 836. As to whether the framers of the Amendment may have had such an undisclosed purpose see Graham, The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Yale L.J. 371. 2 Cf. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 853,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00310", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00449", "text": "in the sum of $2000 conditioned as specified in § 44.19(3); and proof to satisfy the board that the applicant is 'of good character and reputation' and has'sufficient financial responsibility to carry out the obligations incident to any solicitation such applicant may make.' § 44.19(5). The ordinary solicitor, on the other hand, must secure only the information card, which is in effect a permit; pay the cost of the card; and generally, it would seem, comply with the other requirements previously outlined for securing the card. 19 Section 44.01 defines 'promoter' to mean 'any person who for pecuniary compensation or consideration received or to be received, solicits or is engaged in the business of or holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of soliciting contributions for or on behalf of any other person or any charitable association, corporation, or institution, or conducts, manages or carries on or agrees to conduct, manage or carry on or is engaged in the business of or holds himself out as engaged in the business of conducting, managing or carryig on any d rive or campaign for any such purpose. * * *' (Emphasis added.) Section 44.01, entitled 'Definitions,' contains no definition of'solicitor,' but defines'solicitation' broadly, as we have indicated in note 11 supra. The meaning of'solicitor' apparently is left therefore to be gathered definitively from the definition of'solicitation' and the use of'solicit' or'solicitor' in the special context of other sections as they become pertinent. It should be noted that the definition of 'promoter' in § 44.01, by including the word'solicits,' italicized above, would seem literally broad enough to include any paid solicitor of contributions 'for or on behalf of any other person' or charitable organization, and thus to include all solicitors except wholly voluntary ones. This seems to have been Justice Carter's view as expressed in his dissent in the Gospel Army case, 27 Cal.2d 232, 266, 163 P.2d 704. However, other sections indicate that solicitors may be paid as well as voluntary without becoming promoters. See § 44.19(9). And see note 20. Murdock apparently receives compensation for his services as an officer", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 489, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00085", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00450", "text": "3) of this subsection; and (3) a provision requiring the contractor to insert in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000 made by him under such contract (A) a provision for the renegotiation by such Secretary and the subcontractor of the contract price of the subcontract at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the Secretary, the profits cn be determined with reasonable certainty, (B) a provision for the retention by the United States or the repayment to the United States of any amount of the contract price of the subcontract which is found as a result of such renegotiation, to represent excessive profits, and (C) a provision for relieving the contractor from any liability to the subcontractor on account of any amount so retained by or repaid to the United States. 86 '(c) The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed, whenever in his opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are likely to be realized, from any contract with such Department or from any subcontract thereunder, (1) to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price, (2) to withhold from the contractor or subcontractor any amount of the contract price which is found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits, and (3) in case any amount of the contract price found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits will have been paid to the contractor or subcontractor, to recover such amount from such contractor or subcontractor. Such contractor of subcontractor will be deemed to be indebted to the United States for any amount which such Secretary is authorized to recover from such contractor or subcontractor under this subsection, and such Secretary may bring actions in the appropriate courts of the United States to recover such amount on behalf of the United States. All amounts recovered under this subsection will be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. This subsection will be applicable to all contracts and subcontracts hereafter made and to all contracts and subcontracts previously made, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain a renegotiation or recapture clause, provided that final payment under such contract or subcontract has not been made prior to the date of enactment of this Act. 87 '(d) In renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive profits for the purposes of this section, the Secretaries of the respective Departments will not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses, or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees in excess of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00188", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00451", "text": "the Commission will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to amend the product safety standard for residential carbon monoxide detectors to include any such revision that the Commission determines is reasonably related to the performance of such detectors, and notify the Institute of any revision it has determined not to be so related. The Commission will promulgate an amendment to the standard for such detectors within 180 days after the date on which the notice of proposed rulemaking for the amendment is published in the Federal Register. ``(3) Additional safety requirements.--despite any other provision of this Act, the Commission may, under sections 7 and 9 of this Act, amend the product safety standard for residential carbon monoxide detectors to include any additional provision that the Commission determines is reasonably necessary to ensure their safe and effective operation. ``(4) Certain provisions not applicable.--Sections 7 and 9 of this Act will not apply to promulgation of any amendment of the product safety standard under paragraph (2). Judicial review of any amendment of the standard under paragraph (2) will be in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents of the Consumer Product Safety Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 42 the following: ``Sec. 43. Residential carbon monoxide detectors.''. SEC. 4. REDUCING DEATHS AND INJURIES FROM CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING. (a) Safety Standard: Requiring Equipment of Portable Generators with Carbon Monoxide Interlock Safety Devices.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product Safety Commission will promulgate consumer product safety rules, under section 7 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2056), requiring, at a minimum, that every portable generator sold to the public for purposes other than resale will be equipped with an interlock safety device that-- (1) detects the level of carbon monoxide in the areas surrounding such portable generator; and (2) automatically turns off the portable generator before the level of carbon monoxide reaches a level that would cause serious bodily injury or death to people. (b) Labeling and Instruction Requirements.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product Safety Commission will promulgate consumer product", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01054", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00452", "text": "(4) Transfers prior to enactment.-- (A) In general.--In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, any transfer of land or natural resources, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, located anywhere within the United States from, by, or on behalf of the Pueblo, or any of the Pueblo's members, will be deemed to have been made in accordance with the Act of June 30, 1834 (4 Stat. 729; commonly referred to as the Trade and Intercourse Act), section 17 of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 641; commonly referred to as the Pueblo Lands Act), and any other provision of Federal law that specifically applies to transfers of land or natural resources from, by, or on behalf of an Indian tribe, and such transfers will be deemed to be ratified effective as of the date of the transfer. (B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in subparagraph (A) will be construed to affect or eliminate the personal claim of any individual Indian which is pursued under any law of general applicability that protects non-Indians as well as Indians. (5) Effective date.--The provisions of paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) will take effect upon the entry of a compromise final judgment, in a form and manner acceptable to the Attorney General, in the amount of $8,000,000 in the case of Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States (Indian Claims Commission docket No. 355). The judgment so entered will be paid from funds appropriated under section 1304 of title 31, United States Code. (b) Trust Funds; Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury a trust fund to be known as the ``Pueblo of Santo Domingo Land Claims Settlement Fund''. Funds deposited in the Fund will be subject to the following conditions: (A) The Fund will be maintained and invested by the Secretary of the Interior under the Act of June 24, 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a). (B) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3), monies deposited into the Fund may be expended by the Pueblo to acquire lands within the exterior boundaries of the exclusive aboriginal occupancy area of the Pueblo, as described in the Findings of Fact of the Indian Claims Commission, dated May 9, 1973, and for use for", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01015", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00453", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1968/2005 of 1 December 2005 fixing the maximum reduction in the duty on maize imported in connection with the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 1809/2005 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), and in particular Article 12(1) of it, because: (1) An invitation to tender for the maximum reduction in the duty on maize imported into Portugal from third countries was opened under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1809/2005 (2). (2) under Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 (3), the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003, may decide to fix maximum reduction in the import duty. In fixing this maximum the criteria provided for in Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1839/95 must be taken into account. A contract is awarded to any tenderer whose tender is equal to or less than the maximum reduction in the duty. (3) The application of the abovementioned criteria to the current market situation for the cereal in question results in the maximum reduction in the import duty being fixed at the amount specified in Article 1. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For tenders notified from 25 November to 1st December 2005, under the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 1809/2005, the maximum reduction in the duty on maize imported will be 22,95 EUR/t and be valid for a total maximum quantity of 47 800 t. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 2 December 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 1 December 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 466, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00697", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00454", "text": "kind of judicial tyranny. 19 In such a case as this, only after an administrative order has been formulated and a court has adjudicated that the order is within the administrator's statutory authority does the command of a court come into existence, disobedience of which may be punished as contempt. For violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act as such, one may be made to suffer civil penalties or imprisonment, but the latter only after conviction by a jury. For violation of the command of an injunction issued under the Act, however, he may not only be exposed to more severe civil penalties than the Act by its own terms imposes, but made to suffer imprisonment without benefit of jury trial. It is for such reasons that this Court has indicated again and again that a statute cannot properly be made the basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its broad terms into a court order. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, 25 S.Ct. 276, 279, 49 L.Ed. 518; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 200 U.S. 361, 404, 26 S.Ct. 272, 282, 50 L.Ed. 515; National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 435, 61 S.Ct. 693, 699, 85 L.Ed. 930. These considerations become increasingly important as there is increasing use of injunctions for the enforcement of administrative orders and statutory duties. 20 These are general principles but their application governed the decisions of the District Court and of the Circuit Court of Appeals; they should control the decision here. The two lower courts found that while the practices now complained of by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor constituted violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, they were not on any fair consideration covered by the injunction, contempt of which is now charged. The injunction underlying this proceeding takes eight pages of a printed record and particularizes in great detail the violations which were enjoined. It also contains omnibus clauses prohibiting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On full consideration, the District Court treated the application for an adjudication of civil contempt 'as an amended complaint seeking a broadening of the injunctive orders previously entered in this case, and will enter an", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00238", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00455", "text": "BP/Mobil fuel business. As a consequence, the parties claim that the combined entity Exxon/Mobil and BP/Mobil will both have every incentive to continue to compete vigorously with each other in this sector. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to aggregate BP/Mobil's shares with those of Exxon for the purpose of assessing the competitive implications of the transaction. (448) In essence, the parties' arguments are tantamount to saying that despite the fact that Mobil has joint control over BP/Mobil joint venture, the combined entity Exxon/Mobil and BP/Mobil joint venture should be treated as two independent undertakings competing against each other, at least with respect to the downstream fuel business. In other words, according to the parties the existence of a control relation does not influence the incentives to compete of the undertakings concerned by this link. (449) This argument is to be rejected on the basis of a number of considerations. under the Merger Regulation an acquisition of joint control or a creation of a full-function joint venture constitute concentrations and as such they are subject to the dominance test laid down in Article 2 of the Merger Regulation. In order to ascertain the existence of a dominant position, the relations between the JV and the parents are considered on the basis of the generally correct assumption that they achieve some form of integration and that the parent company is in a position to control the commercial policy of its JV, so that from a competition point of view they are to be viewed as being not in competition with each other. (450) With regard to this case, it should be recalled that BP/Mobil JV was notified to the Commission in accordance with the Merger Regulation and was treated as a concentrative joint venture. Both BP and Mobil were regarded as holding joint control of the overall joint venture, irrespective of the fact that each partner had a special operational responsibility over a specific business (BP over fuels and Mobil over lubricants). This conclusion was notably based on the fact that the two parents jointly exerted decisive influence on the joint venture's policy through a supervisory committee whose tasks included decisions in the following areas: business plans, major acquisitions, closures, disposals, investment and certain other strategic decisions. Mobil was one of the notifying parties of that transaction and at that time never contested those findings. (451) The argument put forward by the parties that Mobil is not in a position to interfere in the day-to-day management of the fuel business run by BP is not convincing: on", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00672", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00456", "text": "Commission Decision of 15 February 2001 approving the single programming document for Community structural assistance under Objective 2 in the Balearic Islands (notified under document number C(2001) 229) (Only the Spanish text is authentic) (2002/426/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds(1), and in particular Article 15(5) of it, After consulting the Committee on the Development and Conversion of Regions and the Committee under Article 147 of the Treaty, because: (1) Articles 13 et seq. of Title II of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 lay down the procedure for preparing and implementing single programming documents. (2) Article 15(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 provides that, after consultation with the partners referred to in Article 8 of the Regulation, the Member State may submit to the Commission a development plan which is treated as a draft single programming document, and which contains the information referred to in Article 16 of the Regulation. (3) Under Article 15(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, on the basis of the regional development plan submitted by the Member State and within the partnership established in accordance with Article 8 of that Regulation, the Commission is to take a decision on the single programming document, in agreement with the Member State concerned and in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles 48 to 51. (4) The Spanish Government submitted to the Commission on 28 April 2000 an acceptable draft single programming document for the areas of the Balearic Islands fulfilling the conditions for Objective 2 under Article 4(1) and Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. The draft contains the information listed in Article 16 of the Regulation, and in particular a description of the priorities selected and an indication of the financial contribution from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). (5) Under Article 52(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, as an acceptable plan was submitted between 1 January", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00509", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00457", "text": "States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437e(j)(2)(G)(i)) is amended by striking ``fiscal years 1993 and 1994'' and inserting ``fiscal year 1995''. (h) National Homeownership Fund.--Section 172 of the bill, H.R. 3838 (103d Congress), as passed by the House of Representatives on July 22, 1994, is enacted into law. (i) Treatment of Certain Projects.-- (1) Conversion of section 23 project.--From amounts available for the conversion of the Tamaqua Highrise project in the Borough of Tamaqua, Pennsylvania, from a leased housing contract under section 23 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 to tenant-based assistance under section 8 of such Act, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will, to the extent such amounts are made available in appropriation Acts, enter into an obligation for the conversion of the project to a project-based rental assistance contract under section 8 of such Act, despite the requirement for rehabilitation or the percentage limitations under section 8(d)(2) of such Act. (2) Compliance with rehabilitation requirement.-- Rehabilitation activities undertaken by E.T.C. Enterprises in connection with 16 scattered-site dwelling units that were rehabilitated to provide housing for low-income families and are located in Perth Amboy, New Jersey, and rehabilitation activities undertaken by Pennrose Properties in connection with 40 dwelling units for senior citizens in the Providence Square development located in New Brunswick, New Jersey, are deemed to have been conducted under the approval of and an agreement with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under clauses (i) and (ii) of the third sentence of section 8(d)(2)(A) of the United States Housing Act of 1937. (3) Eligibility of public housing for demolition.--Section 415 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development-- Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1988 (Public Law 100- 202; 101 Stat. 1329-213), is amended by striking ``George Loving Place, at 3320 Rupert Street, Edgar Ward Place, at 3901 Holystone, Elmer Scott Place, at 2600 Morris, in Dallas, Texas, or''. (4) Section 23 conversion.-- (A) Authorization.--despite contracts entered into under section 14(b) of the United States", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00851", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00458", "text": "the Attorney General, is authorized to prescribe in execution of these rules, regulations, and orders. 'No alien will be permitted to enter the United States if it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States as provided in the rules and regulations hereinbefore authorized to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General.' 3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp., 271. 3 'In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice on the ground that he is, or may be excludable under one or more of the categories set forth in § 175.53, no hearing by a board of special inquiry will be held until after the case is reported to the Attorney General and such a hearing is directed by the Attorney General or his representative. In any special case the alien may be denied a hearing before a board of special inquiry and an appeal from the decision of that board if the Attorney General determines that he is excludable under one of the categories set forth in § 175.53 on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.' 8 CFR, 1945 Supp., § 175.57(b). 4 See note 3, supra. 5 See note 1, supra. 6 And at certain other times not material here. 7 Proclamation 2714 of December 31, 1946, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 601 note, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77. 8 'That despite any of the several clauses of section 3 of the Act of February 5, 1917, excluding physically and mentally defective aliens, and despite the documentary requirements of any of the immigration laws or regulations, Executive orders, or Presidential proclamations issued thereunder, alien spouses or alien children of United States citizens serving in, or having an honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United States during the Second World War will, if otherwise admissible under the immigration laws and if application for admission is made within three years of the effective date of this Act, be admitted to the United States * * *. 'Sec. 2. Regardless of section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1924, any alien admitted under section 1 of this", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00342", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00459", "text": "to avoid disturbances on the Community market. (3) Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1518/95 (3) on the import and export system for products processed from cereals and from rice defines the specific criteria to be taken into account when the refund on these products is being calculated. (4) The refund to be granted in respect of certain processed products should be graduated on the basis of the ash, crude fibre, tegument, protein, fat and starch content of the individual product concerned, this content being a particularly good indicator of the quantity of basic product actually incorporated in the processed product. (5) There is no need at present to fix an export refund for manioc, other tropical roots and tubers or flours obtained therefrom, given the economic aspect of potential exports and in particular the nature and origin of these products. For certain products processed from cereals, the insignificance of Community participation in world trade makes it unnecessary to fix an export refund at the present time. (6) The world market situation or the specific requirements of certain markets may make it necessary to vary the refund for certain products according to destination. (7) The refund must be fixed once a month. It may be altered in the intervening period. (8) Certain processed maize products may undergo a heat treatment following which a refund might be granted that does not correspond to the quality of the product; because it should therefore be specified that on these products, containing pregelatinised starch, no export refund is to be granted. (9) The Management Committee for Cereals has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its chairman, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds on the products listed in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1518/95 are fixed as shown in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 30 September 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 29 September 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 423, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00716", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00460", "text": "person to * * * do or omit to do any act, in violation of any regulation or order under section 2, * * * or to offer, solicit, attempt, or agree to do any of the foregoing.' Section 205(a). 'Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order will be granted without bond.' Rent Regulation for Housing, 8 F.R. 7322, 10 F.R. 11666; 11 F.R. 5824, 8106: 'Section 6. 'Removal of tenant—(a) Restrictions on removal of tenant. So long as the tenant continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled, no tenant will be removed from any housing accommodations, by action to evict or to recover possession, by exclusion from possession, or otherwise, nor will any person attempt such removal or exclusion from possession, despite that such tenant has no lease or that his lease or other rental agreement has expired or otherwise terminated, and regardless of any contract, lease, agreement or obligation previously or hereafter entered into which provides for entry of judgment upon the tenant's confession for breach of the covenants of it or which otherwise provides contrary to this, * * *' 9 Pike & Fischer, OPA Service, Rent, Interpretations of the Rent Regulation for Housing, § 6—VI, issued July 25, 1946: '(a) Interpretation 6—VI. Evictions Pending On July 25, 1946. 'The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, on July 25, 1946, was extended by striking out 'June 30, 1946' and substituting 'June 30, 1947,' as the expiration date of the Act. Section 18 provides that the provisions of the Act will take ffect as of June 30, 1946. In this section a savings clause was inserted for the protection of persons who had acted contrary", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00064", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00461", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Public Safety Interoperability Implementation Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the need for interoperable communications for public safety became even more apparent, and critical to address. (2) The inability of many firefighters and police to communicate with each other in the World Trade Centers led to some loss of lives that perhaps could have been prevented. (3) As demonstrated by a hearing by the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, on June 11, 2003, interoperability problems and spectrum and equipment shortages continue to plague our nation's first responders, and without additional funding these problems will continue. (4) Action is critical to address these shortages not only to ensure readiness in the event of another terrorist attack, but also to address daily communications needs that are essential. (5) Each day this Nation's public safety officers put their lives on the line to serve this country and immediate increases in funding are essential. (6) According to the report by the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States is drastically underfunding local emergency responders, and remains dangerously unprepared to handle a catastrophic attack on American soil. SEC. 3. PUBLIC SAFETY TRUST FUND. Part A of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``SEC. 106. PUBLIC SAFETY TRUST FUND. ``(a) Establishment.-- ``(1) Fund established.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States the Public Safety Communications Trust Fund. ``(2) Deposits.--The Fund will consist of-- ``(A) the amounts appropriated under subsection (f); and ``(B) 50 percent of the proceeds of any auction conducted under section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 for any bands of frequencies other than those described in paragraph (3), except that such percentage may be reduced in accordance with paragraph (4). ``(3) Excepted frequencies.--The bands of frequencies described in this paragraph are the following: ``(A) the 216-220 megahertz band, the 1432-1435 megahertz band, the 1710-1755 megahertz band,", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00841", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00462", "text": "for violating § 301(a) does not carry over the interstate limitation of § 301(a) to § 301(h). Section 301(a) prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of illicit articles,3 and § 303(c)(2) relieves one from the liabilities of such introduction if one has a guaranty or undertaking as there described. Section 301(h)has adopted that description for the entirely different purpose of informing persons what kind of a guaranty or undertaking may not be given falsely. In other words, s 301(a) is directed to illegal interstate shipments, while § 301(h) is directed to the giving of false guaranties. Guaranties as described in § 303(c)(2) may be used by interstate dealers in connection with either interstate or intrastate shipments and those guaranties that are false are outlawed by § 301(h). 7 It is true, of course, that the guaranty referred to in § 303(c)(2) is one given for the purpose of protecting the dealer 'in case of an alleged violation of section 301(a),' thereby relieving him of liability if he reships adulterated or misbranded goods in interstate commerce. But where such a guaranty, as in this case, is given to a dealer regularly engaged in making interstate shipments and who may therefore have need of the guaranty, § 301(h) imposes liability on the guarantor if that guaranty turns out to be false. And that liability attaches even where the particular shipment which renders the guaranty false is not alleged to have been an interstate one. 8 It is significant that § 301(h) had no counterpart in the predecessor statute, the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768, 21 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. Under § 9 of that Act, a dealer could not be prosecuted for shipping adulterated or misbranded articles in interstate commerce if he had a guaranty of a type similar to that referred to in the present statute. If there were such a guaranty, the guarantor was subject to the penalties which would otherwise attach to the dealer. The result was that the guarantor was not liable on account of a false guaranty unless the dealer had shipped the prohibited article in interstate commerce. Steinhardt Bros. & Co. v.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00078", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00463", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Social Security Surplus Preservation and Debt Reduction Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds that-- (1) The $69,246,000,000 unified budget surplus achieved in fiscal year 1998 was entirely due to surpluses generated by the social security trust funds and the cumulative unified budget surpluses projected for subsequent fiscal years are primarily due to surpluses generated by the social security trust funds; (2) Congress and the President should balance the budget excluding the surpluses generated by the social security trust funds; (3) according to the Congressional Budget Office, balancing the budget excluding the surpluses generated by the social security trust funds will reduce the debt held by the public by a total of $1,859,500,000,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009; (4) social security surpluses should be used for social security reform or to reduce the debt held by the public and should not be spent on other programs; and (5) if Social Security surpluses are not raided to pay for non-Social Security spending, they will, under current law, be used to reduce the debt held by the public and thereby improve the future viability of the Social Security system. SEC. 3. PROTECTION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS. (a) Protection by Congress.-- (1) Reaffirmation of support.--Congress reaffirms its support for the provisions of section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 that provides that the receipts and disbursements of the social security trust funds will not be counted for the purposes of the budget submitted by the President, the congressional budget, or the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. (2) Protection of social security benefits.--If there are sufficient balances in the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, the Secretary of Treasury will give priority to the payment of social security benefits required to be paid by law. (b) Points of Order.--Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Social Security Point of Order.--It will not be in order in the Senate to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget, an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon that violates section 13301 of the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01137", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00464", "text": "We do not find it necessary to consider the conflicting contentions in this respect, or therefore to scrutinize the regulations with a view to locating such a point. More fundamental considerations are controlling. 26 We have said that the Government's argument is founded entirely upon analogy, because no case has ruled that one who becomes subject to the 'jurisdiction' of a work camp under the Selective Service procedure thereby forfeits his right to defend against a charge of desertion or other breach of duty, on the ground that his classification was invalid. Nor has it been held that his only recourse for release from the camp is by way of habeas corpus. Furthermore, we think there are compelling reasons why the analogy does not hold true. 27 In the first place, there are obvious and important differences between the two situations which it is sought to connect by the claimed resemblance. Not the least is that in the one instance the person concerned crosses the vast gulf between civil and military jurisdiction, with all the attendant consequences for change in status and rights, because in the other no such chasm is traversed. The alleged transfer of 'jurisdiction' is only from one civilian agency to another, both branches of the Selective Service System, and there is none at all from the authority of the civilian courts as agencies for the enforcement of obligations imposed by the law. There is in fact no change in 'jurisdiction' whatsoever, except in the sense that from the time he becomes a camp member the registrant's duties are different and his orders come through different channels of the same agency. 28 Unlike the man 'actually inducted,' the person classified IV E remains a civilian; his duties are not military in character; he is not subject to military discipline or authority; and for violation of duties or orders he cannot be tried by court martial or military tribunal. On the contrary the Selective Service Act expressly provides the same civil penalties and mode of trial for violating duties arising when he enters the camp as for those arising before that time.32 29 There is therefore no such profound change in rights, duties and status as occurs when one crosses the line between civil and military jurisdiction by being 'actually inducted' under the rule of Billings v. Truesdell, supra. It was this change and the consequences it entailed together with the statute's command that no one should be tried by military or naval court martial in any case arising under the Act until he had been actually inducted,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00010", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00465", "text": "Act of 2006 (42 U.S.C. 16918(c)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon in paragraph (3); (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: ``(4) any information about a sex offender for whom the offense giving rise to the duty to register was an offense for which the offender was adjudicated delinquent; and''. SEC. 6. PROTECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM STATE NONCOMPLIANCE PENALTY UNDER SORNA. Section 125 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (42 U.S.C. 16925(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``jurisdiction'' each place it appears and inserting ``State''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``subpart 1 of part E'' and inserting ``section 505(c)''; and (B) by striking ``(42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.)'' and inserting ``(42 U.S.C. 3755(c))''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(e) Calculation of Allocation to Units of Local Government.-- despite the formula under section 505(c) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3755(c)), a State which is subject to a reduction in funding under subsection (a) will-- ``(1) calculate the amount to be made available to units of local government by the State under the formula under section 505(c) using the amount that would otherwise be allocated to that State for that fiscal year under section 505(c) of that Act, and make such amount available to such units of local government; and ``(2) retain for the purposes described in section 501 any amount remaining after the allocation required by paragraph (1).''. SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS. Section 635 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (42 U.S.C. 16991) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Not later than July 1 of each year'' and inserting ``On January 1 of each year,''; (2) in paragraph (3),", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00963", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00466", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1723/2002 of 27 September 2002 determining the extent to which applications lodged in September 2002 for import licences for certain pigmeat sector products under the regime provided for by Council Regulation (EC) No 774/94 opening and providing for the administration of certain Community tariff quotas for pigmeat and certain other agricultural products can be accepted THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1432/94 of 22 June 1994 laying down detailed rules for the application in the pigmeat sector of the import arrangements provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 774/94 opening and providing for the administration of certain Community tariff quotas for pigmeat and certain other agricultural products(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1006/2001(2), and in particular Article 4(4) of it, because: (1) The applications for import licences lodged for the last quarter of 2002 are for quantities less than the quantities available and can therefore be met in full. (2) It is appropriate to draw the attention of operators to the fact that licences may only be used for products which comply with all veterinary rules currently in force in the Community, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. Applications for import licences for the period 1 October to 31 December 2002 submitted under Regulation (EC) No 1432/94 will be met as referred to in the Annex. 2. Licences may only be used for products which comply with all veterinary rules currently in force in the Community. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 1 October 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 27 September 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 399, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00807", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00467", "text": "* Illegality is illegality, and officers of the law should deem themselves special guardians of the law. But in any event, the illegality of Mitchell's detention does not retroactively change the circumstances under which he made the disclosures. These, we have seen, were not elicited through illegality. Their admission, therefore, would not be use by the Government of the fruits of wrongdoing by its officers. Being relevant, they could be excluded only as a punitive measure against unrelated wrongdoing by the police. Our duty in shaping rules of evidence relates to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used as an indie ct mode of disciplining misconduct.' United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70, 71, 64 S.Ct. 896, 898, 88 L.Ed. 1140. 3 The trial court included in its final instructions to the jury the following: 'You will recall that I have previously said to you that, in general, the judge determines the admissibility of evidence. But, you will recall I think that on Monday just before certain alleged statements or declarations claimed by the State to have been made by the defendant, in part oral and in part consisting of an alleged written or typed statement or declaration, identified as State's Exhibit D, were by the judge permitted to be introduced with the instruction that you the jury would in the end and finally, determine first, whether the defendant made said statements and declarations, and if he did make it, whether they were made by the defendant voluntarily and of his own free will; and further in the event you should find he did mae them and made them voluntarily and of his free will, just what weight, if any, should be accorded them. 'I now again direct your attention to that evidence. The State claims the defendant made said statements and declarations and that he made them voluntarily and of his own free will. The defendant denies the State's said claims and asserts they were not made voluntarily and of free will. You will decide these questions from all the evidence in the case. Should you find from all the evidence that the defendant did not make them, or if he made them that he did not make them voluntarily and of his free will, you will in that event disregard them entirely and not consider them further. On the other hand, should you find defendant did make them and that he made them voluntarily and of his", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00126", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00468", "text": "committee or a majority of the members of the minority party or majority party of the committee, will, prior to the filing of the report, prepare and submit to the committee a statement assessing the extent to which the provisions of the bill, joint resolution, or conference report reduce protection of the environment. (b) Assistance to Committees and Studies.--At the request of any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Comptroller General will, to the extent practicable, consult with and assist such committee in assessing the extent to which the provisions of a bill, joint resolution, or conference report reduce the protection of the environment. SEC. 6. DUTIES OF OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT OF BUDGET. (a) In General.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will ensure that each department or agency of the United States-- (1) collects and catalogs available information that would assist in assessing whether any provision in a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report before Congress would reduce protection of the environment; (2) coordinates, organizes and facilitates the availability of such information for use by Congress; and (3) ensures that such information is readily available to the Comptroller General for purposes of fulfilling duties under section 5 of this Act or for other purposes. (b) Public Availability.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will ensure that each department or agency of the United States makes information collected and cataloged under subsection (a) readily available to the public. SEC. 7. LEGISLATION SUBJECT TO POINT OF ORDER. (a) In General.--It will not be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution, or conference report that is reported by a committee unless the committee has complied with section 4. (b) Procedure in the House of Representatives.--It will not be in order in the House of Representatives to consider a rule or order that waives the application of subsection (a). SEC. 8. DEBATE ON PROVISIONS REDUCING PROTECTION. (a) Amendment of House Rules.--Rule XVI of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(11) despite the adoption of any rule or motion to limit or close debate it will always be in order, as question of high privilege, to move to strike from any bill, joint resolution, or amendment any provision that reduces protection of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00899", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00469", "text": "States), the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure, will be in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); and the same provisions for counterclaim and set-off, for interest upon judgments, and for payment of judgments, will be applicable as in cases brought in the United States district courts under the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505) (Tucker Act).' 60 Stat. 844, 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 932. The above references to the specific instances in which the Tucker Act procedure is to control under the Federal Tort Claims Act emphasize the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under all other circumstances. In the revision of Title 28, effective September 1, 1948, this section was omitted as unnecessary because 'the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court will apply to all civil actions.' S.Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, as to Amendment No. 61. 10 'Rule 14. Third-Party Practice. '(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served, from now on called the third-party defendant, will make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 * * *. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. * * *' (The amendments which became effective March 19, 1948, and are included here, made no changes that are material in the instant cases.) Rule 20 similarly provides for the permissive joinder of parties. 11 See Englehardt v. United States, D.C. Md., 69 F.Supp. 451; Newsum v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00386", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00470", "text": "receipt of a certification under subsection (a)(1), if the Senate has adjourned or recessed for more than 2 days, the majority leader of the Senate, after consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, will notify the Members of the Senate that, under this section, the Senate will convene not later than the second calendar day after receipt of such message. ``(2) Placement on calendar.--Upon introduction in the Senate, a joint resolution will be immediately placed on the calendar. ``(3) Floor consideration.-- ``(A) In general.--despite rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time during the period beginning on the day after the date on which Congress receives a certification under subsection (a)(1) and ending on the sixth day after the date of introduction of a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to will not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution will remain the unfinished business until disposed of. ``(B) Consideration.--Consideration of the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, will be limited to not more than 10 hours, which will be divided equally between the majority and minority leaders or their designees. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order. ``(C) Vote on passage.--If the Senate has voted to proceed to a joint resolution, the vote on passage of the joint resolution will occur immediately following the conclusion of consideration of the joint resolution, and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate. ``(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution will be", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00873", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00471", "text": "will be determined based on the profits the covered business would have earned, based on previous financial records, had the flood or windstorm not occurred. ``(B) Separate windstorm coverage.--The regulations issued under paragraph (6) will provide that windstorm coverage under paragraph (1)(B) for a property will not exceed the amount such that the aggregate liability under flood insurance coverage required to be maintained under paragraph (3)(B) for the property and such windstorm coverage for the property does not exceed the applicable coverage limit for the property set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. ``(8) Effective date.--This subsection will take effect on, and will apply beginning on, the expiration of the 6-month period that begins on the date of the enactment of the Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2009.''. SEC. 3. PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICATIVE COVERAGE. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is amended by inserting after section 1313 (42 U.S.C. 4020) the following new section: ``prohibition against duplicative coverage ``Sec. 1314. Flood insurance under this title may not be provided with respect to any structure (or the personal property related thereto) for any period during which such structure is covered, at any time, by multiperil insurance coverage made available under section 1304(c)(1)(A).''. SEC. 4. COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND LOCAL LAW. Section 1316 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4023) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a) Flood Protection Measures.--'' before ``No new''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(b) Windstorm Protection Measures.--No new multiperil coverage will be provided under section 1304(c) for any property that the Director finds has been declared by a duly constituted State or local zoning authority, or other authorized public body to be in violation of State or local laws, regulations, or ordinances, which are intended to reduce damage caused by windstorms.''. SEC. 5. CRITERIA FOR LAND MANAGEMENT AND USE. Section 1361 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4102) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Windstorms.-- ``(1)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01107", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00472", "text": "who have reached the age of 19 years on the date of the distribution provided for under paragraph (4), will be paid directly to them. (B) The per capita shares of deceased individuals will be distributed to their heirs and legatees in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary. (C) The shares of legally incompetent individuals will be administered under regulations and procedures established by the Secretary under section 3(b)(3) of Public Law 93-134 (25 U.S.C. 1403(b)(3)). (D) The shares of minors and individuals who are under the age of 19 years on the date of the distribution provided for under paragraph (4) will be held by the Secretary in supervised individual Indian money accounts. The funds from such accounts will be disbursed over a period of 4 years in payments equaling 25 percent of the principal, plus the interest earned on that portion of the per capita share. The first payment will be disbursed to individuals who have reached the age of 18 years if such individuals are deemed legally competent. Subsequent payments will be disbursed within 90 days of the individual's following 3 birthdays. (6) despite section 7 of the Indian Tribal Judgment Funds Use or Distribution Act (25 U.S.C. 1407), the per capita shares (or the availability of those shares) will not-- (A) be subject to Federal or State income taxation; (B) be considered to be income or resources; or (C) be used as a basis for denying or reducing financial assistance or any other benefit to which a household or member would otherwise be entitled under-- (i) the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.); or (ii) any other Federal or federally- assisted program. (7) All per capita shares belonging to living competent adults certified as eligible to share in the judgment fund distribution under this section, and the interest earned on those shares, that remain unpaid for a period of 6-years will be added to the principal funds that are held and invested in accordance with section 3, except that in the case of a minor, such 6-year period will not begin to run until the minor reaches the age of majority. (8) Any other residual principal and interest funds remaining after the distribution under paragraph (4) is complete will be added to the principal funds that are held and invested in accordance with section 3. SEC.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01041", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00473", "text": "without which the smaller could have no meaning or use. 43 'because the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society; which cannot be effected without a competent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle previously adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of pre-eminence amongst the different societies of communities of Christians; * * *' Supplemental Appendix; Foote, Sketches of Virginia (1850) 340. 44 'Because the Establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself; for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world. * * * Because the establishment in question is not necessary for the support of Civil Government. * * * What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? * * * in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the l berties of the people.' II Madison 183, 187, 188. 45 'Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.' II Madison 183, 187. 46 'At least let warning be taken at the first fruit of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of the Bill has transformed that 'Christian forbearance, love and charity,' which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which may not soon be appeased.' II Madison 183, 189. 47 In this case briefs amici curiae have been filed on behalf of various organizations representing three religious sects, one labor union, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the states of Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan and New York. All these states have laws similar to New Jersey's and all of them, with one religious sect, support the constitutionality of New Jersey's action. The others oppose it. Maryland and Mississippi have sustained similar legislation. Note 49 infra. No state without legislation of this sort has filed an opposing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00035", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00474", "text": "338 U.S. 440 70 S.Ct. 225 94 L.Ed. 244 HUBSCHv.UNITED STATES. SCHWEITZER v. UNITED STATES. Nos. 379, 380. On Application for Approval of Settlement Nov. 25, 1949. Decided Dec. 19, 1949. PER CURIAM. 1 We granted writs of certiorari in these cases, 338 U.S. 814, 70 S.Ct. 44, to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 174 F.2d 7, affirming judgments of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in favor of the United States on claims arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Before argument, petitioners and the Solicitor General submitted a joint application for approval of proposed settlements of the claims, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2677, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2677, which reads as follows: 2 'The Attorney General, with the approval of the court, may arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title (suits under the Tort Claims Act), after commencement of an action thereon.' We construe § 2677 as imposing on the District Court the authority and responsibility for passing on proposed compromises, despite the judgments of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgments of the District Court previously entered herein. The application and stipulations are therefore referred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida with authority to consider and dispose of the same. It is so ordered. 3 Remanded. 4 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 369, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00332", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00475", "text": "or issued by a bank or other person referred to in section 408(a)(2) of such Code. ``(2) Treatment of accounts.-- ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B)-- ``(i) any KidSave Account described in paragraph (1)(A) will be treated in the same manner as an account in the Thrift Savings Fund under subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, and ``(ii) any KidSave Account described in paragraph (1)(B) will be treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan (as so defined). ``(B) Exceptions.-- ``(i) Contribution limit.--The aggregate amount of contributions for any taxable year to all KidSave Accounts of an individual will not exceed the contribution made under section 251(b) for such year on behalf of such individual. ``(ii) Rollover contributions.--No rollover contribution may be made to a KidSave Account unless it is from another KidSave Account. A rollover described in the preceding sentence will not be taken into account for purposes of clause (i). ``(iii) Distributions.--despite any other provision of law, distributions may only be made from a KidSave Account of an individual on or after the earlier of-- ``(I) the date on which the individual begins receiving benefits under this title, or ``(II) the date of the individual's death. ``kidsave investment fund ``Sec. 253. (a) Establishment.--There is established and maintained in the Treasury of the United States a KidSave Investment Fund in the same manner as the Thrift Savings Fund under sections 8437, 8438, and 8439 of title 5, United States Code. ``(b) KidSave Investment Fund Board.-- ``(1) In general.--There is established and operated in the Social Security Administration a Kidsave Investment Fund Board in the same manner as the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board under subchapter VII of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) Specific investment duties.--The Kidsave Investment Fund will be managed by the Kidsave Investment Fund Board in the same manner as the Thrift Savings Fund is managed under subchapter VIII of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code. ``appropriations to the federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund ``Sec. 254. Out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, there are appropriated", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01030", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00476", "text": "consider this agreement as though there was a paragraph which read to the effect that the straight time rate is the regular rate of pay. We should also consider that the contract provided that the contract overtime rates were intended to provide any statutory excess compensation, when men worked more than forty hours except in those situations where the entire time, including the excess, was in the straight time hours.33 This of course does not mean that respondents here were familiar with these purposes of the agreement. So far as the record shows, they worked for the pay promised under the words of the contract. It shows nothing more on this point. 34 Under the contract we are examining, the respondents' work in overtime hours was performed without any relation as to whether they had or had not worked before. Under our view of § 7(a)'s requirements their high pay was not because they had previously worked but because of the disagreeable hours they were called to labor or because the contracting parties wished to compress the regular working days into the straight time hours as much as possible. As previously pointed out, we need not determine what were the regular working hours of these respondents. If it were important, the trial court determined that their regular working hours were not the straight time hours. They worked at irregular times. Finding 45, 162 F.2d at page 672. The record shows that all respondents worked 5,201 straightt ime hours and 20,771 overtime hours. Four of the twenty respondents worked no straight time hours. Five others worked less than 100 straight time hours. Three worked more straight time than overtime. The record does not show the hours these respondents worked for other employers. That fact is immaterial in this case as respondents seek recovery only from petitioner employers. These round-the-clock hours were in strict accordance with the contract which allowed the Longshoremens Association to furnish all men needed and called for the men to 'work any night of the week, or on Sundays, holidays or Saturday afternoons when required.' §§ 1 and 2; see note 5. Men who worked contract overtime hours were entitled to contract overtime pay. They were given no overtime premium pay because of long hours. It is immaterial that his regular rate may greatly exceed the statutory minimum rate. This contract overtime rate, therefore, did not meet the excess pay requirements of § 7. 35 In finding the statutory excess compensation due respondents, the trial court must determine the method of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00179", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00477", "text": "without qualifying the necessity for speedy perfection of an appeal in cases involving constitutionality, so that the validity of acts of Congress may not remain in doubt through protracted litigation. This was a deep concern of Congress and its reason for imposing the sixty-day limitation for perfecting appeals in this class of cases. 41 But under compulsion of the Court's assumption of jurisdiction, I reach the merits and join in Mr. Justice REED'S opinion. 42 Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting. 43 The sentence in § 9 of the statute, here upheld, makes it unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with minor numerical exceptions,1 to 'take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.' The punishment provided is immediate discharge and a permanent ban against reemployment in the same position.2 The number of federal employees thus barred from political action is approximately three million. Section 12 of the same Act affects the participation in political campaigns of many thousands of state employees.3 No one of all these millions of citizens can, without violating this law, 'take any active part' in any campaign for a cause or for a candidate if the cause or candidate is'specifically identified with any National or State political party.' Since under our common political practices most causes and candidates are espoused by political parties, the result is that, because they are paid out of the public treasury, all these citizens who engage in public work can take no really effective part in campaigns that may bring about changes in their lives, their fortunes, and their happiness.4 44 We are not left in doubt as to how numerous and varied are the 'activities' prohibited. For § 15 sweepingly describes them as 'the same activities * * * as the United States Civil Service Commission has previously determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States * * *.' Along with the vague and uncertain prior prohibitions of the Commission, are these things which the Commission had clearly prohibited: serving as an election officer; publicly expressing political views at a party caucus or political gathering for or against any candidate or cause identified with a party; soliciting votes for a party or candidate; participating in a political parade; writing for publication or publishing any letter or article, signed or unsigned, in favor of or against any political party, candidate, or faction; initiating, or canvassing for signatures on,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00026", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00478", "text": "the Karluk River spawning waters and those within 100 yards of its mouth.45 Later the Secretary of the Interior, still acting solely under § 1 of the White Act, added the waters of the Karluk Reservation to the prohibited areas.46 An exception was made in the regulation to the prohibition against fishing in the reservation waters. The precise language of the entire subsection (r) of the regulation, § 208.23, is on page 4 of this opinion. (337 U.S. 92, 69 S.Ct. 972). We repeat here the exception: 45 'The foregoing prohibition will not apply to fishing by natives in possession of said reservation, nor to fishing by other persons under authority granted by said natives. 49 Stat. 1250; 48 U.S.C. 358a, 48 U.S.C.A. § 358a. Such authority will be granted only by or under ordinance of the Native Village of Karluk, approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly authorized representative.' The citation to 49 Stat. 1250 is to the Act of May 1, 1936, authorizing the creation of the reservation. Perhaps it was thought that the creation of the reservation justified this exception in the White Act regulation but we do not understand that any support from that Act is claimed for the establishment of the White Act preserve. 46 The validity of the exception permitting fishing by natives in possession of the reservation and their licensees is challenged by respondents because of a proviso in § 1 of the White Act, reading: 47 'Provided, That every such regulation made by the Secretary of Commerce will be of general application within the particular area to which it applies, and that no exclusive or several right of fishery will be granted there, nor will any citizen of the United States be denied the right to take, prepare, cure, or preserve fish or shellfish in any area of the waters of Alaska where fishing is permitted by the Secretary of Commerce. * * *' 48 U.S.C.A. § 222. 48 Respondents alleged that the exception for fishing by natives and their licensees made § 208.23(r) wholly illegal because it was inconsistent with the proviso of § 1 of the White Act as to exclusive or several right of fishery. The District and Circuit Courts agreed with this argument and the District Court said that the regulation must be viewed in its", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00276", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00479", "text": "to file typewritten records and briefs. The motions refute any such knowledge on the part of these petitioners and I am satisfied that no such knowledge would be established if the District Court were permitted to try these cases. 29 The result of the Court's illiberal construction of 60(b) is that these foreign-born people, dependent on our laws for their safety and protection, are denied the right to appeal to the very court that held (on the Government's admission) that the judgment against their co-defendant was unsupported by adequate evidence. It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b) if, after they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's resort to ancient common-law concepts. I would reverse. 1 'Relief From Judgment or Order. '(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion will be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118, Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 1655", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00383", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00480", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1748/2006 of 27 November 2006 amending the representative prices and additional duties for the import of certain products in the sugar sector fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1002/2006 for the 2006/2007 marketing year THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2006 of 30 June 2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 as regards trade with third countries in the sugar sector (2), and in particular of the Article 36, because: (1) The representative prices and additional duties applicable to imports of white sugar, raw sugar and certain syrups for the 2006/2007 marketing year are fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1002/2006 (3). These prices and duties have been last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1710/2006 (4). (2) The data currently available to the Commission indicate that the said amounts should be changed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The representative prices and additional duties on imports of the products referred to in Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 951/2006, as fixed by Regulation (EC) No 1002/2006 for the 2006/2007 marketing year are amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 28 November 2006. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 27 November 2006.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 418, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00744", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00481", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 889/90 of 6 April 1990 reimposing the levying of customs duties applicable to third countries on certain products originating in Yugoslavia THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1), and in particular Protocol No 1 thereto; Having regard to Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3606/89 of 20 November 1989 establishing ceilings and Community supervision for imports of certain products originating in Yugoslavia (2); because the abovementioned Protocol No 1 and Article 15 of the Cooperation Agreement provide that the products listed in the Annex are imported exempt of Customs duty into the Community, subject to the ceiling shown, above which the Customs duties applicable to Third Countries may be re-established; because imports into the Community of those products, originating in Yugoslavia, have reached that ceiling; because the situation on the Community market requires that customs duties applicable to third countries on the products in question be reimposed, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 From 10 April to 31 December 1990, the levying of customs duties applicable to third countries will be reimposed on imports into the Community of the products listed in the Annex, originating in Yugoslavia. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 6 April 1990.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 339, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00554", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00482", "text": "it was not so circumscribing of proof in establishing the issue toward which the evidence was directed as to call for correction. But it is urged that while the Company was so restricted on proof of this issue the Board allowed evidence further back calculated to show a continuous state of mind toward influencing employee association by the Company. By way of rebuttal to the employees' testimony that the plant union of 1937 was a spontaneous effort of the employees wholly uninfluenced by the Company, the Board admitted evidence to show that the Company fostered a company union in 1935. It does not follow that the limitation of time on admissible evidence is the same regardless of the issue for which the evidence is tendered. Certainly we cannot say that it was not admissible to allow this evidence of company coercion in 1935 as bearing on the independence of the new plant union in 1937. And so we cannot find a solid enough ground to establish discriminatory treatment by the Board because on this issue it went back to 1935 because on the issue of the influence of International's violence in the formation of the 1937 plant union, it drew the line at events six months prior thereto. 19 (3) While we think that the Board properly construed the scope of the remand not to require a retrial of issues canvassed at the first hearing, time does not stop still even for the administrative process. Change in circumstances may make relevant at the second hearing what was irrelevant at the first hearing. The Circuit Court of Appeals found such a change in circumstances in a decision of this Court rendered after the first review below. In its decision of November 6, 1941, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the exclusion by the Board of testimony to prove misdeeds by International. The tenor of its reasoning was that an inquiry into charges of unfair labor practices by the Company did not make relevant charges of misconduct against International, the complainant. The Board issued the order now challenged on June 9, 1943. In the meantime, on January 18, 1943, this Court decided National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 63 S.Ct. 394, 399, 87 L.Ed. 579. That case, so the court below thought, required the admission at the second hearing of the offer of proof regarding International's acts of violence. 20 We regard this as a mis", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00041", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00483", "text": "9(b)(12), (13), (14), (16), 9(m), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 9(b)(12—14, 16), (m), Congress provided for the return to admittedly enemy owners of 80% of their vested property. See Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115, 57 S.Ct. 359, 81 L.Ed. 545.6 Section 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 60 Stat. 50, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. (Supp. IV, 1946) § 32, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 32, enacted after World War II, provided for administrative returns of property to certain classes of 'technical' enemies who were ineligible to bring suit under § 9(a). Thus, if § 39 is treated as dealing only with property not otherwise subject to recovery, the consistency of the pattern of enactment is preserved. On the other hand, if the significant language of the section is regarded as requiring the retention of property which would otherwise be recoverable in a suit under § 9(a), it would mark the first departure from what appears to be a previously consistent Congressional policy. 9 Section 39 was passed as part of a measure establishing a commission on the problem of compensating American prisoners of war, internees and others who suffered personal injury or property damage at the hands of World War II enemies. Congressional attention was focused on the nature and extent of these claims and methods of adjudicating them. The issues involved in § 39 were of peripheral concern. Reading the legislative history in this light, it lends support to the view that § 39 was conceived as dealing with property not otherwise subject to return. Senate hearings opened with detailed testimony analyzing the value of assets which would be left after payments for administration and liquidation, returns under § 32, and disbursements in satisfaction of judgments in suits brought under § 9(a). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4044, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12—21. See also id., at 44, and Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 873, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 264.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00427", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00484", "text": "S.Ct. 236, 240, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435; and see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854, 70 A.L.R. 263, and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357. There must be both the capacity to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible. If the choice is beclouded, whether by duress or by misleading advice, however honestly offered by a member of the prosecution, a plea of guilty accepted without more than what this record discloses can hardly be called a refusal to put the inner feeling of innocence to the fair test of the law with intelligent awareness of consequences. Therefore, if the F.B.I. agent had admitted that the petitioner accurately stated his advice to her, or if the District Court upon a conflict of testimony had found that memory or truth lay with the petitioner, I could not escape the conclusion that the circumstances under which the petitioner's plea of guilty was accepted did not measure up to the safeguards previously enunciated by this Court for accepting a plea of guilty, especially where a sentence of death was at hazard. 39 On the record as we have it, however, I cannot tell whether the advice which, if given, would have colored the plea of guilty was actually given. If the unrevealing words of the cold record spoke to me with the clarity which they convey to four of my brethren, I should agree that the petitioner must be discharged. Conversely, if the District Court's opinion conveyd to me the findings which it radiates to my other brethren, I too would conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. 40 Unfortunately, the record does not give me a firm basis for judgment regarding the crucial issue of the F.B.I. agent's advice to the petitioner. It is not disputed that the agent, who was also a lawyer, did talk with her and did discuss legal issues with her. But he neither admitted nor denied whether, in the course of his discussions with her, he expounded the law so as hardly to leave her escape, however innocent under correct view of the law she may", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00129", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00485", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 15 April 1992 establishing a list of semen collection centres approved for the export to the Community of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species from certain third countries (92/255/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 88/407/EEC of 14 June 1988 laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), as last amended by Directive 90/425/EEC (2), and in particular Article 9 of it, because the competent veterinary services of the third countries to which the Annex to this decision refer have forwarded a list of semen collection centres officially approved for export of bovine semen to the Community; because Commission Decision 90/14/EEC (3), as last amended by Decision 91/276/EEC (4), establishes a list of third countries from which Member States authorize the importation of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species; because Community on-the-spot visits have been undertaken or will be undertaken to ensure the uniform application of Directive 88/407/EEC, particularly in relation to the veterinary supervision of semen production systems, the powers of the veterinary services and the supervision to which semen collection centres are subject; because, therefore, the Commission is satisfied that the centres approved by the third countries to which this decision refers meet the terms of Directive 88/407/EEC and can, in the circumstances, be included in a list of centres approved for the export of bovine semen to the Community; because it will be necessary to re-examine and, if necessary, to amend this Decision in the light of new information from time to time; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The semen collection centres listed in the Annex are approved for the export to the Community of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 April 1992.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 470, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00625", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00486", "text": "i). ``(D) Fees collected under this paragraph will be deposited in the Treasury in accordance with section 286(t).''. (2) Establishment of account; use of fees.--Section 286 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1356) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(t) High-Tech Education Fund Account.-- ``(1) In general.--There is established in the general fund of the Treasury a separate account, which will be known as the `High-Tech Education Fund Account'. despite any other provision of law, there will be deposited as offsetting receipts into the account all fees collected under section 214(c)(10) and all civil money penalties collected under section 214(n)(7)(C). ``(2) Use of fees for k-12 mathematics, science, and computer science education.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), amounts deposited into the High-Tech Education Fund Account will remain available to the Director of the National Science Foundation until expended to make merit-reviewed grants, under section 3(a)(1) of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (43 U.S.C. 1862(a)(1)), for programs that provide opportunities for enrollment in academic enrichment courses in mathematics, science, and computer science for elementary and secondary school students. ``(3) Use of fees for duties relating to petitions.--3 percent of the amounts deposited into the High-Tech Education Fund Account will remain available to the Attorney General until expended to carry out duties under subsections (c)(10) and (n) of section 214.''. (d) Effective Date; Sunset.-- (1) Effective date.--The amendments made by this section will take effect beginning with fiscal year 2000. (2) Sunset.--The amendments made by subsections (a), (b), and (c)(1) will cease to be effective on September 30, 2004, except with respect to any alien having nonimmigrant status under such amendments before such date. In the case of such an alien, the amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) will remain in effect until the date on which such nonimmigrant status otherwise would expire (disregarding any potential extension of status).", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 459, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01075", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00487", "text": "76 L.Ed. 1167. All three concern the problem of reasonable classification and in no wise bear on the issue now before us. The difference in the issues between the Smith case and the Junz case is strikingly manifested by the fact that the conviction of Smith was affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeals of New York, because in the present case the conviction was affirmed by the narrowest division in that court. It must also be borne in mind that the Smith case was disposed of in 1934, before the series of decisions beginning with Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, allowing much less scope to local officials in the control of public utterances than had theretofore been taken for granted. Compare the language of Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731, 42 L.Ed. 71, as well as the atmosphere which it generated. So far as the special circumstances relating to the City of New York are concerned, it is pertinent to note that all three dissenting judges below are residents of New York City, because not one of the four constituting the majority is a denizen of that City. The three New York City dissenting judges are presumably as alive to the need for securing peace among the various racial and religious groups in New York, and to the opportunity of achieving it within the constitutional limits, as one who has only a visitor's acquaintance with the tolerant and genial communal life of New York City.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 327, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00385", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00488", "text": "owner or beneficiary of an entity that is a partnership, an S corporation (as defined in section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), a limited liability company (classified as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes), a trust, an estate, or any other similar entity, if the entity has a physical presence in the State in which the tax is imposed. (3) Preservation of authority.--This section will not be construed to modify, affect, or supersede the authority of a State to enact a law and bring an enforcement action under such law or existing law against a person or persons or an entity or entities, including but not limited to related persons or entities, that is or are engaged in an illegal activity, a sham transaction, or an actual abuse in its or their business activities in order to ensure a proper reflection of its or their tax liabilities, nor will it supersede the authority of a State to require combined reporting. SEC. 4. GROUP RETURNS. If, in computing the net income tax or other business activity tax liability of a person for a taxable year, the net income or other economic results of affiliated persons is taken into account, the portion of such combined or consolidated net income or other economic results that may be subject to tax by the State will be computed using the methodology that is generally applicable to businesses conducting similar business activities and, if that generally applicable methodology employs an apportionment formula, the denominator or denominators of that formula will include the aggregate factors of all persons whose net income or other economic results are included in such combined or consolidated net income or other economic results and the numerator or numerators will include the factors attributable to the state of only those persons that are themselves subject to taxation by the State under the provisions of this Act and subject to all other legal constraints on State taxation of interstate or foreign commerce. SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE. (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this Act: (1) Net income tax.--The term ``net income tax'' has the meaning given that term for the purposes of the Act entitled ``An Act relating to the power of the States to impose net income taxes on income derived from interstate commerce, and authorizing studies by congressional committees of matters pertaining thereto'', approved September 14, 1959 (15 U.S.C. 381 et seq.). (2) Other business activity tax.-- (A) In general.--The term ``other business activity tax''", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01118", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00489", "text": ", or both. ``(D) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (c) or (f) of section 931 will be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. ``(E) In addition to any other penalties imposed under this paragraph, the Secretary may, with respect to any person who knowingly violates any provision of section 931-- ``(i) if the person is registered under section 931(a), after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend for not more than 6 months or revoke the registration of that person under section 931(a); and ``(ii) impose a civil fine in an amount equal to not more than $10,000.''. (3) Technical and conforming amendments.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in the chapter analysis, by adding at the end the following: ``931. Regulation of firearms transfers at gun shows.''; and (B) in the first sentence of section 923(j), by striking ``a gun show or event'' and inserting ``an event''. (d) Inspection Authority.--Section 923(g)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(E) despite subparagraph (B), the Secretary may enter during business hours the place of business of any gun show promoter and any place where a gun show is held for the purposes of examining the records required by sections 923 and 931 and the inventory of licensees conducting business at the gun show. Such entry and examination will be conducted for the purposes of determining compliance with this chapter by gun show promoters and licensees conducting business at the gun show and will not require a showing of reasonable cause or a warrant.''. (e) Increased Penalties for Serious Recordkeeping Violations by Licensees.--Section 924(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter, or violates section 922(m) will be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. ``(B) If the violation described in subparagraph (A) is in relation to an offense-- ``(i)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00850", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00490", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 18 December 2008 concerning the signature, on behalf of the European Community, of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their financial interests (2009/127/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 280 in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 300(3) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1), because: (1) On 14 December 2000, the Council authorised the Commission to negotiate with the Swiss Confederation an Agreement to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of the financial interests of the Community and its Member States, including value added tax and excise duties. (2) In accordance with the Council Decision of 26 October 2004 concerning the signature, on behalf of the European Community, of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their financial interests, and subject to its conclusion at a later date, the Agreement was signed on behalf of the European Community on 26 October 2004. (3) The Agreement establishes a Joint Committee with decision-making powers in certain areas and it is thus necessary to specify who represents the Community within this Committee. (4) The Agreement should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their financial interests (from now on the Agreement) and the accompanying Final Act are approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Agreement and the Final Act are attached to this Decision (2). Article 2 In respect of matters falling within its competence, the Community will be represented on the Joint Committee set up under Article 39 of the Agreement by the Commission. The position to be taken by the Community in the course of the implementation of the Agreement as", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00557", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00491", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1619/2003 of 15 September 2003 prohibiting fishing for Norway lobster by vessels flying the flag of Belgium THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 806/2003(2), and in particular Article 21(3) of it, because: (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2341/2002 of 20 December 2002 fixing for 2003 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community vessels, in waters where limitations in catch are required(3), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1407/2003(4), lays down quotas for Norway lobster for 2003. (2) In order to ensure compliance with the provisions relating to the quantity limits on catches of stocks subject to quotas, the Commission must fix the date by which catches made by vessels flying the flag of a Member State are deemed to have exhausted the quota allocated. (3) According to the information received by the Commission, catches of Norway lobster in the waters of ICES zone VIIIa, b, d, e, by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium have exhausted the quota allocated for 2003. Belgium has prohibited fishing for this stock from 1 September 2003. This date should be adopted in this Regulation also, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Catches of Norway lobster in the waters of ICES zone VIIIa, b, d, e, by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium are deemed to have exhausted the quota allocated to Belgium for 2003. Fishing for Norway lobster in the waters of ICES zone VIIIa, b, d, e, by vessels flying the flag of Belgium or registered in Belgium is prohibited, as are the retention on board, transhipment and landing of this stock caught by the above vessels after the date of application of this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will apply from 1 September 2003", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00684", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00492", "text": "show cause, previously issued, discharged.' 8 The Government's brief in the Circuit Court of Appeals again was devoted solely to a quotation of the District Court's opinion denying the third petition. See footnote 7, supra. It concluded with the following statement: 'Appellee is in accord with the reasoning of Judge St. Sure and the authorities cited in his memorandum and order denying appellant's thrid application for a writ of habeas corpus, and adopts them in toto as his argument on this appeal to sustain the Court below in its decision denying appellant's fourth application for a writ of habeas corpus in our case at bar.' 9 Blackstone describes the following common law versions of the habeas corpus writ: (1) Habeas corpus ad respondendum. Issued 'when a man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court; in order to remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in the court above.' (2) Habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum. Issued 'when a prisoner hath had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with process of execution.' (3) Habeas corpus ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum, etc. Issued 'when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prosecute or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed.' (4) Habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum. This 'issues out of any of the courts of Westminster hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the superior court; commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his caption and detainer, 'whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas corpus cum causa,) to do and receive whatsoever the king's court will consider in that behalf.' (5) Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The 'great and efficacious writ,' which is 'directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, ad faciendum, subjiciendum, et recipiendum, to do, submit to, ad receive whatsoever the judge or court", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00172", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00493", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 192/2005 of 3 February 2005 fixing the maximum export refund for white sugar to certain third countries for the 18th partial invitation to tender issued within the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1) and in particular the second indent of Article 27(5) of it, because: (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 of 19 July 2004 on a standing invitation to tender to determine levies and/or refunds on exports of white sugar (2), for the 2004/2005 marketing year, requires partial invitations to tender to be issued for the export of this sugar to certain third countries. (2) under Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 a maximum export refund will be fixed, as the case may be, account being taken in particular of the state and foreseeable development of the Community and world markets in sugar, for the partial invitation to tender in question. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For the 18th partial invitation to tender for white sugar issued under Regulation (EC) No 1327/2004 the maximum amount of the export refund will be 40,889 EUR/100 kg. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 4 February 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 3 February 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 401, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00560", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00494", "text": ", or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, of other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion will be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C. Title 28, § 118, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment will be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.' 2 In 1948 Criminal Code, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1015, 1421 et seq. 1 Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 112, and concurring opinion page 165, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1355, 87 L.Ed. 1796; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, dissenting opinion page 675, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 1314, 90 L.Ed. 1500. 2 See Schneiderman", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00232", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00495", "text": "332 U.S. 258 67 S.Ct. 1558 91 L.Ed. 2041 Ex parte FAHEY et al. No. 133, Misc. Argued on Return to Rule to Show Cause April 30, 1947. Decided June 23, 1947. Mr. Oscar H. Davis, of Washington, D.C., for petitioners on support of the motion for leave to file. Messrs. Welburn Mayock, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Charles K. Chapman, of Long Beach, Cal., for respondent Peirson M. Hall, Judge, in opposition thereto. Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This petition by John H. Fahey, individually and as Federal Home Loan Bank Commissioner, and A. V. Amman, individually and as Conservator for the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association, invokes the original jurisdiction of this Court. They ask leave to file petition fr a writ o f'mandamus and/or prohibition and/or injunction' against Judge Peirson M. Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, to prohibit any further allowance there, and to enjoin any payments previously allowed. 2 While an appeal in the principal case was pending in this Court, application was made by various counsel for the plaintiffs and associated interests there for allowance of fees aggregating some $125,000. The District Court allowed counsel for plaintiffs $50,000 as a partial payment on account of services, but withheld action on other applications. Certain costs and expenses of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,295.13 were also ordered reimbursed. 3 The petition involves serious questions of law and of fact. Whether, because of the pendency of the appeal and the stay order granted there, the District Court had power to entertain the application, whether before the final outcome of the case could be known an allowance was premature, whether the source of the fund on deposit with the court was so related to the services as to be subject to disbursement for their compensation, and whether one judge can make allowances in a case before a three-judge court, are, with other questions, much contested. We do not decide any question as to the merits.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00108", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00496", "text": "3 These include cutting off the beet tops, trimming the crowns in a specified way, and removing all foreign substances likely to interfere with factory work. 4 Net returns from sugar sales were measured by gross sales price less selling expenses directly applicable to sugar. Monthly settlements were made for beets delivered during the preceding month on the estimated net returns of the refiner. But final settlement had to be deferred until the end of the season when net returns could be accurately determined. 5 At this point the words 'in sugar and sugar beets' appeared in the original complaint. They were stricken from the amended complaint by petitioner's counsel prior to dismissal of that complaint. Cf. note 1. This change however did not affect numerous other allegations remaining in the amended complaint concerning the combination's restrictive and monopolistic effects upon interstate trade in sugar. See note 6 and text; also note 24 and text Part IV infra. 6 Paragraph XIX of the amended complaint summarized petitioners' conclusions as follows: 'By reason of the foregoing acts of the defendant and its said conspirators, interstate commerce in sugar was illegally restrained, competition there was not only substantially lessened but was destroyed, the price of sugar beets was illegally fixed, and an illegal monopoly was established, all in violation of the anti-trust laws of the United States to the damage of plaintiffs as aforesaid.' (Emphasis added.) Cf. notes 5 and 24. 7 It is not clear whether damages were to be measured by the difference between the prices actually paid and those that would have been paid if based on respondent's separate returns, or by the difference between the prices paid and the prices set by the Secretary of Agriculture, under the Sugar Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 910, 7 U.S.C. § 1131(d), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1131(d); see 5 Fed.Reg. 5231. But that is an issue that need not concern us now. Petitioner Mandeville Island Farms prayed judgment for $315,043.80; petitioner Zuckerman for $112,192.14. 8 It has been previously noted here that the Court applied these labels as a heritage from prior decisions under the commerce clause, dealing not as the Knight case with an act or acts of Congress, but with the validity of state statutes, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00167", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00497", "text": "and (ii) compensation in a form acceptable to the Secretary to be provided by the City of Santa Clarita. (3) Acceptance of offer.-- (A) In general.--The contract holder will have 60 days from the later of the date on which the Secretary makes the offer under paragraph (1) or an agreement is negotiated under paragraph (2)(D) to accept the offer or agreement. (B) Failure to accept offer.--If the contract holder does not accept the offer under paragraph (1) or if an agreement is not negotiated under paragraph (2)(D) within the time period described in subparagraph (A), the contracts will remain in effect and no further actions will taken be taken under this Act. SEC. 4. SALE OF LAND NEAR VICTORVILLE, CALIFORNIA. (a) In General.--despite sections 202 and 203 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1712, 1713) and subject to subsections (b) through (f), not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary will place on the market and offer for sale by competitive bidding and in a manner designed to obtain the highest price possible, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the Victorville disposal area. (b) Availability of Map.--The Secretary will keep the Map on file and available for public inspection in-- (1) the office of the Director of the Bureau of Land Management; and (2) the district office of the Bureau of Land Management located in Barstow, California. (c) Right of Local Land Use Authority To Purchase Certain Land.-- (1) In general.--Before a sale of land under subsection (a), the Secretary will provide to the applicable local land use authority an exclusive preemptive right, as determined under State law, to purchase any right, title, or interest of the United States in and to any portion of the parcels of land identified as ``Area A'' and ``Area B'' on the Map that is located within the jurisdiction of the local land use authority. (2) Timing.--A preemptive right under paragraph (1) will be in effect for a period of 30 days before the land is sold under subsection (a). (3) Authority.--During the period described in paragraph (2), the local land use authority may purchase some or all", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00931", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00498", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002''. SEC. 2. AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT. (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 1028, the following: ``Sec. 1028A. Aggravated identity theft ``(a) Offenses.-- ``(1) In general.--Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person will, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. ``(2) Terrorism offense.--Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person will, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years. ``(b) Consecutive Sentence.--despite any other provision of law-- ``(1) a court will not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this section; ``(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this section will run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony during which the means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used; ``(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for the felony during which the means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used, a court will not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section; and ``(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a violation of this section may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on that person for an additional violation of this section, provided that such discretion will be exercised in accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28. ``(c)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00863", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00499", "text": "in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and the information required at Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because the last subparagraph of Article 10 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 foresees that in that case the Commission adopts a single decision in a single document covering the points referred to in Article 8 (3) and the assistance from the Funds referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 14 (3); because the Commission has established, by Decision 96/472/EC (4), the list of declining industrial areas concerned by Objective 2 for the programming period from 1997 to 1999; because the global maximum allocation foreseen for the assistance of the Structural Funds for the present single programming document is composed of resources coming from the indicative allocation of Structural Fund commitment appropriations for the period 1997 to 1999 under Objective 2 resulting from Commission Decision 96/468/EC (5) and from unused appropriations of ECU 2 693 000 of the corresponding single programming document covering the period 1994 to 1996, under Commission Decision C (96) 4195 of 18 December 1996; because the Danish Government has submitted to the Commission on 8 August 1996 the single programming document as referred to in Article 5 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 for the region of Lolland; because this document contains the elements referred to in Article 9 (8) of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and in Article 14 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88; because expenditure under this single programming document is eligible as from that date; because the single programming document submitted by this Member State includes a description of the conversion priorities selected and the applications for assistance from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) as well as an indication of the planned use of the assistance available from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the other financial instruments in implementing the single programming document; because, in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, the Commission is charged with ensuring, within the framework of the partnership, coordination and consistency between assistance from the Funds and assistance provided by the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00603", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00500", "text": "Code of 1986 that have been damaged as a result of acts of arson or terrorism, as certified under procedures to be established by the Secretary. Any loan guarantee program established under this authorization will be administered by the Federal Housing Administration. (b) Transfer of Balances.--Amounts for guarantees may be derived from the transfer of unobligated balances in the account (including recaptures of previously obligated amounts despite section 8(bb) of the United States Housing Act of 1937). (c) Treatment of Costs.--The costs of guaranteed loans, including the cost of modifying loans, will be as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. (d) Limit on Loan Principal.--Funds made available by this section will be available to subsidize total loan principal, any part of which is to be guaranteed, not to exceed $10,000,000. (e) Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary will-- (1) establish such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate to provide guarantees under this section; and (2) include in the terms and conditions a requirement that the decision to provide a guarantee to a financial institution and the amount of the guarantee does not in any way depend on the purpose, function, or identity of the organization to which the financial institution has made, or intends to make, a loan. SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO ASSIST STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, including the Community Relations Service, in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 such sums as are necessary to increase the number of personnel, investigators, and technical support personnel to investigate, prevent, and respond to potential violations of sections 247 and 844 of title 18, United States Code, and section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 directed toward religious real property. These additional investigators, technical support personnel, and other personnel will primarily participate in the investigation, response to, and prevention of possible violations of the Federal laws referred to in the preceding sentence and train and empower State and local law enforcement in the investigation and prevention of suspicious fires. SEC. 6. REAUTHORIZATION OF HATE CRIMES STATISTICS ACT. The first section of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b),", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01117", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00501", "text": "subject to the above remarks, the provisions laid down in Abruzzi Regional Law No 37 of 31 July 1986 satisfy the conditions and objectives of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 in so far as they relate to measures governed by that Regulation; because the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Committee has been consulted on the financial aspects; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Agricultural Structure, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Abruzzi Regional Law No 37 of 31 July 1986 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 satisfies the conditions governing a Community financial contribution to the common measure provided for in Article 1 of that Regulation, subject to the following conditions: (a) under Article 2 of the Law, the Region will ensure that aids to investments are granted only to farmers practising farming as their main occupation within the meaning of Article 2 (5) of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; (b) the amount of investments provided for in Article 7 that may be carried out by cooperatives will be limited to 360 000 ECU until such time as the Commission decides otherwise under Article 6 (5) of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85; (c) the EAGGF contribution to the aids provided for in Article 9 of the Law in favour of young farmers will be limited to the aids granted to young farmers - who have the vocational training provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 12 of Law No 153 of 9 May 1975, or who have followed a training course as laid down in the third indent of the first subparagraph of Article 21 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 797/85, - who take over for the first time the legal and financial responsibility or co-responsibility for the management of the holding. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic. Done at Brussels, 12 June 1987.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 429, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00547", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00502", "text": "can. 311 Mr. Sacher: Your Honor, I am certainly aware of the fact that if I bear false witness against your Honor in anything I have said that I am subject to disciplinary measures and I am not inviting disciplinary measures by making false statements. 312 The Court: You mean that I will take disciplinary measures against you because you said I scratched my head? Don't be absurd, Mr. Sacher. Don't be absurd. 313 Mr. Sacher: The point I am making is that in every available means your Honor is conveying to the jury your lack of sympathy if not hostility to the defendants, their counsel's presentation of the case, and in these circumstances I want certainly to note on behalf of my clients a vigorous objection to your Honor's conduct and I wish to join Mr. Gladstein in the motion to declare a mistrial by the withdrawal of a juror. 314 The Court: Motion denied. (Pp. 3316—3317.) 315 Mr. Gladstein: * * * There is nothing unusual about that request and we make it, and we ask the Court to really give some consideration to it. 316 The Court: You know, that word'really,' there, that is the way you do. You put that little sly insinuation in, as much as to say that previously I haven't really given the matter any consideration. (P. 3332.) Mr. Gladstein: I move that the remarks you have just made concerning the enjoyment— 317 The Court: I see them smiling, sneering and snickering there. The jury undoubtedly sees it as well. 318 Mr. Gladstein: Just a minute. If your Honor please, I assign those remarks as prejudicial misconduct on the part of the Court. I assign as misconduct your refusal to permit me to make an objection. 319 The Court: When did I refuse? 320 Mr. Gladstein: By your interrutpion at the present time and by pyramiding the misconduct which I am assigning. I ask the Court to instruct the jury— 321 The Court: You are now told that you may go ahead and make your remarks in extenso. (P. 3769.) 322 (Conduct involved in Specification XIII—pp. 3942—3943; April 4, 1949.) 323 Mr. Gladstein: Your Honor, I am allowed", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00443", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00503", "text": "has provided to the Secretary documentation accounting for all property the Secretary has previously transferred to such recipient under this section; and ``(B) has complied with paragraphs (5) and (6) of subsection (b) with respect to the property so transferred during such fiscal year. ``(2) If the Secretary cannot provide a certification under paragraph (1) for a recipient, the Secretary may not transfer additional property to such recipient under this section, effective as of the date on which the Secretary would otherwise make the certification under this subsection, and such recipient will be suspended or terminated from further receipt of property under this section. ``(g) Conditions for Extension of Program.--despite any other provision of law, amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year may not be obligated or expended to carry out this section unless the Secretary submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a certification that for the preceding fiscal year that-- ``(1) each recipient agency that has received property under this section has-- ``(A) demonstrated 100 percent accountability for all such property, in accordance with paragraph (2) or (3), as applicable; or ``(B) been suspended or terminated from the program under paragraph (4); ``(2) with respect to each non-Federal agency that has received property under this section, the State Coordinator responsible for each such agency has verified that the State Coordinator or an agent of the State Coordinator has conducted an in-person inventory of the property transferred to the agency and that 100 percent of such property was accounted for during the inventory or that the agency has been suspended or terminated from the program under paragraph (4); ``(3) with respect to each Federal agency that has received property under this section, the Secretary of Defense or an agent of the Secretary has conducted an in-person inventory of the property transferred to the agency and that 100 percent of such property was accounted for during the inventory or that the agency has been suspended or terminated from the program under paragraph (4); ``(4) the eligibility of any agency that has received property under this section for which 100 percent of the equipment was not accounted for during an inventory described in paragraph (2) or (3), as applicable, to receive property transferred under this section has been suspended or terminated; and ``(5) each State Coordinator has certified, for each non- Federal agency located in the State for which the State Coordinator is responsible that-- ``(A) the agency has complied with all requirements under this section; or ``(", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00845", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00504", "text": "State which asked for the sample to be taken. Such costs will be calculated according to the rates applicable in the Member State in the territory of which the operations were carried out. 2. The costs incurred in sending the samples referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2348/91 to the JCR or to another laboratory designated by the JCR for analysis by nuclear magnetic resonance will be borne by the Community. When the JCR requests the taking of other samples, in addition to the samples referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2348/91, - half the costs incurred in taking the sample of fresh grapes and its treatment will be borne by the member State concerned and the other half by the Community and - the costs incurred in sending the samples to the JCR or to another laboratory designated by the JCR for analysis by nuclear magnetic resonance will be borne by the Community. For Member States which do not have a laboratory equipped for wine analysis by nuclear magnetic resonance, the costs incurred in sending to the JCR all the samples to be taken under Article 2 (1) will be borne by the Community. Article 5 Subsistence and travelling expenses The subsistence and travelling expenses incurred as a result of engaging an official appointed by a competent body will be calcultated according to the rates applicable in the Member State where the official normally works. These expenses will be borne by the competent bodies which asked for the official to be engaged. Article 6 Regulation (EEC) No 1714/81 is repealed. Article 7 This Regulation will enter into force on 1 September 1991. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 29 July 1991.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 363, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00544", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00505", "text": "which is relevant for the monitoring of residues (marker residue); (4) because, for the control of residues, as provided for in appropriate Community legislation, maximum residue limits should usually be established for the target tissues of liver or kidney; because, however, the liver and kidney are frequently removed from carcasses moving in international trade, and maximum residue limits should therefore also always be established for muscle or fat tissues; (5) because, in the case of veterinary medicinal products intended for use in laying birds, lactating animals or honey bees, maximum residue limits must also be established for eggs, milk or honey; (6) because parconazole should be inserted into Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90; (7) because, in order to allow for the completion of scientific studies, imidocarb, carazolol, pirlimycin, danofloxacin, josamycin and bacitracin should be inserted into Annex III to Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90; (8) because a period of 60 days should be allowed before the entry into force of this Regulation in order to allow Member States to make any adjustment which may be necessary to the authorisations to place the veterinary medicinal products concerned on the market which have been granted in accordance with Council Directive 81/851/EEC(3), as last amended by Directive 93/40/EEC(4) to take account of the provisions of this Regulation; (9) because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Veterinary Medicinal Products, HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING REGULATION Article 1 Annexes II and III of Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90 are amended as set out in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the 60th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 5 May 1999.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 426, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00622", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00506", "text": "the last five years, and other areas; because, however, it is appropriate to provide that areas having a yield lower than a threshold differentiated for the varieties concerned will not be considered as specialized areas for the application of the aid arrangements; because, therefore, aid will not be granted for the cultivation of such areas; because it is necessary to determine the aid to be granted to producers who replant their vineyards in order to combat phylloxera under the conditions laid down in Article 6 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86; because verification of the areas used for growing these grapes has revealed no overrun of the maximum guaranteed area fixed in Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2911/90 of 9 October 1990 laying down detailed rules of application for aid for the production of certain varieties of grapes for drying (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2475/94 (4); because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. For the 1995/96 marketing year, the per hectare aid for the cultivation of sultanas, currants and muscatels intended for processing under Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 will be ECU 2 785 per hectare of specialized area harvested. For each variety the amount of aid will be adjusted by the coefficient listed in the Annex. 2. For the application of Article 6 (6) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 areas having a yield per hectare less than: - 1 300 kilograms of dried grapes for sultanas, - 2 500 kilograms of dried grapes for other sultanas affected by phylloxera or replanted within the last five years, - 1 500 kilograms of dried grapes for currants, - 400 kilograms of dried grapes for muscatels, will not be considered as specialized areas. The aid will not be paid for the cultivation of the abovementioned products on these areas. 3. Member States will take all necessary measures for checking this minimum yield. Article 2 under Article 6 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 426/86, the per hectare aid to be granted to producers", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00731", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00507", "text": "There is established in the Treasury a trust fund to be known as the ``Pueblo of Santo Domingo Land Claims Settlement Fund''. Funds deposited in the Fund will be subject to the following conditions: (A) The Fund will be maintained and invested by the Secretary of the Interior under the Act of June 24, 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a). (B) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3), monies deposited into the Fund may be expended by the Pueblo to acquire lands within the exterior boundaries of the exclusive aboriginal occupancy area of the Pueblo, as described in the Findings of Fact of the Indian Claims Commission, dated May 9, 1973, and for use for education, economic development, youth and elderly programs, or for other tribal purposes in accordance with plans and budgets developed and approved by the Tribal Council of the Pueblo and approved by the Secretary. (C) If the Pueblo withdraws monies from the Fund, neither the Secretary nor the Secretary of the Treasury will retain any oversight over or liability for the accounting, disbursement, or investment of such withdrawn monies. (D) No portion of the monies described in subparagraph (C) may be paid to Pueblo members on a per capita basis. (E) The acquisition of lands with monies from the Fund will be on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, and no eminent domain authority may be exercised for purposes of acquiring lands for the benefit of the Pueblo under this Act. (F) The provisions of Public Law 93-134, governing the distribution of Indian claims judgment funds, and the plan approval requirements of section 203 of Public Law 103-412 will not be applicable to the Fund. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for deposit into the Fund, in accordance with the following schedule: (A) $5,000,000 to be deposited in the fiscal year which commences on October 1, 2001. (B) $5,000,000 to be deposited in the next fiscal year. (C) The balance of the funds to be deposited in the third consecutive fiscal year. (3) Limitation on disbursal.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Fund under paragraph (2) will not be disbursed until the following conditions are met: (A) The case of Pueblo of Santo Doming", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01142", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00508", "text": "***** COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2368/89 of 28 July 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3951/88 fixing catch possibilities for 1989 for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks in the Regulatory Area as defined in the NAFO Convention THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources (1), as amended by the 1985 Act of Accession, and in particular Article 11 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 170/83, it is incumbent upon the Council to establish the total allowable catches (TACs) by stock or group of stocks, the share available for the Community and also the specific conditions under which the catches must be made; because, in accordance with Article 4 of the said Regulation, the share available for the Community is to be allocated between the Member States; because Regulation (EEC) No 3951/88 (1) fixed catch possibilities for 1989 for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks in the Regulatory Area as defined in the NAFO Convention; because the scientific information now available on the cod stocks in NAFO divisions 2 J + 3 KL indicates a deterioration in the status of the stocks; because, in the framework of its wider international obligations, the Community participates in efforts to conserve fish stocks arising in international waters; because it is necessary consequently to reduce the fishing possibilities of the Community on the stocks in the current year, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The figures relating to cod in NAFO divisions 2 J + 3 KL set out in Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 3951/88 are replaced by those set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 28 July 1989.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 479, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00680", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00509", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Eastern Band of Cherokee Historic Lands Reacquisition Act''. SEC. 2. LAND TAKEN INTO TRUST FOR THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS. (a) Lands Into Trust.--Subject to such rights of record as may be vested in third parties to rights-of-way or other easements or rights- of-record for roads, utilities, or other purposes, the following Federal lands managed by the Tennessee Valley Authority and located on or above the 820-foot (MSL) contour elevation in Monroe County, Tennessee, on the shores of Tellico Reservoir, are declared to be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians: (1) Sequoyah museum property.--Approximately 46.0 acres of land generally depicted as ``Sequoyah Museum'', ``Parcel 1'', and ``Parcel 2'' on the map titled ``Eastern Band of Cherokee Historic Lands Reacquisition Map 1'' and dated April 30, 2015. (2) Support property.--Approximately 11.9 acres of land generally depicted as ``Support Parcel'' on the map titled ``Eastern Band of Cherokee Historic Lands Reacquisition Map 2'' and dated April 30, 2015. (3) Chota memorial property and tanasi memorial property.-- Approximately 18.2 acres of land generally depicted as ``Chota Memorial 1'' and ``Tanasi Memorial'' on the map titled ``Eastern Band of Cherokee Historic Lands Reacquisition Map 3'' and dated April 30, 2015, and including the Chota Memorial and all land within a circle with a radius of 86 feet measured from the center of the Chota Memorial without regard to the elevation of the land within the circle. (b) Property on Lands.--In addition to the land taken into trust by subsection (a), the improvements on and appurtenances thereto, including memorials, are and will remain the property of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. (c) Revised Maps.--Not later than 1 year after the date of a land transaction made under this section, the Tennessee Valley Authority, after consultation with the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the Secretary of the Interior, will submit revised maps that depict the land taken into trust under this section, including any corrections made to the maps described", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01033", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00510", "text": "applicant will eventually assume responsibility for all of the costs for such officers;''; and (2) by striking subsection (d). (c) Renewal of Grants.--Section 1703 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-2) is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 1703. RENEWAL OF GRANTS. ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), a grant made under this part may be renewed, without limitations on the duration of such renewal, to provide additional funds if the Attorney General determines that the funds made available to the recipient were used in a manner required under an approved application and if the recipient can demonstrate significant progress in achieving the objectives of the initial application. ``(b) Grants for Hiring.--Grants made under this part for hiring or rehiring additional career law enforcement officers may be renewed for up to 5 years, except that the Attorney General may waive such 5-year limitation for good cause. ``(c) No Cost Extensions.--despite subsections (a) and (b), the Attorney General may extend a grant period, without limitations as to the duration of such extension, to provide additional time to complete the objectives of the initial grant award.''. (d) Limitation on Use of Funds.--Section 1704 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-3) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``that would, in the absence of Federal funds received under this part, be made available from State or local sources'' and inserting ``that the Attorney General determines would, in the absence of Federal funds received under this part, be made available for the purpose of the grant under this part from State or local sources''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The preceding sentence will not apply with respect to funds made available under this part by a grant made under subsection (a) for the purposes described in subsection (b)(4).''; and (2) by striking subsection (c). (e) Study of Program Effectiveness.--Section 1705 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-4) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00867", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00511", "text": "from effective interference over any rights or title secured by the attachment stands unimpaired. In such a situation it does not seem to me that there can be any difference between a title acquired by receiver, subject to the control of the Custodian as licensor, and the lien acquired by the attaching creditor, subject to the same license limitation. The Court's distinction between Propper v. Clark and this case should have no effect on the result here. 52 I disagree, too, with the Court's interpretation of the brief filed by the Government in Polish Relief Commission v. Banca Nationala a Rumaniei, 288 N.Y. 332, 43 N.E.2d 345. The case holds only that the attachment is good between the debtor and creditor. It does not hold it good against the Government nor did the Government beirf, as I read it, so concede. The brief merely approved suits between litigants to settle those litigants' personal rights, not to get gransfers of or liens on frozen assets effective against the Custodian. That is litigation under General Ruling No. 12(d), note 2, supra. This is clear from the brief, excerpts from which appear below.3 53 As the Court does not agree with me on the propriety of making a determination at the present time as above suggested and has left open for future litigation 'all federal questions as to recognition by the custodian of the state law lien, or priority of payment,' I forbear from expressing my views at length until this issue is presented. 54 As indicated above, I think we should modify the judgment entered below by some such insertion as I have previously suggested on pages 467—468 of 341 U.S., page 844 of 71 S.Ct., and as so modified affirm that decree. 1 As provided for in N.Y. Civil Practice Act, § 922. 2 3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp. 948, 6 Fed.Reg., 2897, 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a note. 3 3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp. 645, 5 Fed.Reg. 1400, 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a note. 4 40 Stat. 411, 415, as amended by Joint Resolution of May 7, 1940, 54", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00403", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00512", "text": "the same activities * * * as the United States Civil Service Commission has previously determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States * * *.' Along with the vague and uncertain prior prohibitions of the Commission, are these things which the Commission had clearly prohibited: serving as an election officer; publicly expressing political views at a party caucus or political gathering for or against any candidate or cause identified with a party; soliciting votes for a party or candidate; participating in a political parade; writing for publication or publishing any letter or article, signed or unsigned, in favor of or against any political party, candidate, or faction; initiating, or canvassing for signatures on, community petitions or petitions to Congress. 45 In view of these prohibitions, it is little consolation to employees that the Act contradictorily says that they may 'express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates.' For this permission to 'express their opinions,' is, the Commission has rightly said,'subject to the prohibition that employees may not take any active part in * * * political campaigns.' The hopeless contradiction between this privilege of an employee to talk and the prohibition against his talking stands out in the Commission's further warning to all employees that they can express their opinio § publicly, but 'Public expression of opinion in such way as to constitute taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns is accordingly prohibited.' Thus, whatever opinions employees may dare to express, even secretly, must be at their peril. They cannot know what particular expressions may be reported to the Commission and held by it to be a sufficient political activity to cost them their jobs. Their peril is all the greater because of another warning by the Commission that 'Employees are * * * accountable for political activity by persons other than themselves, including wives or husbands, if, in fact, the employees are thus accomplishing by collusion and indirection what they may not lawfully do directly and openly.' Thus are the families of public employees stripped of their freedom of political action. The result is that the sum of political privilege left to government and state employees, and their families, to take part in political campaigns seems to be this: They may vote in silence; they may carefully and quietly express a political view at their peril; and they may become'spectators' (this is the Commission's word) at campaign gatherings, though it may be highly dangerous for them to'second", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00027", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00513", "text": "Council Decision of 24 November 2003 on the conclusion of bilateral Agreements between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Republic of Hungary laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on information society services (2004/299/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2), Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because the bilateral Agreements between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Republic of Hungary laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on information society services have been negotiated and should be approved, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The bilateral Agreements between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Republic of Hungary laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on information society services are approved on behalf of the European Community. The text of the Agreements and the Annexes of it are attached to this Decision. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to sign the Agreements in order to bind the Community and to transmit, on behalf of the Community, the note provided for in Article 16 of the Agreements(1). Done at Brussels, 24 November 2003.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 316, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00759", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00514", "text": "thereafter for the transfers referred to in section 402(h) of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1232(h)), as amended by this Act, in the same manner as are other amounts available for such transfers. (2) despite any other provision of law, interest credited to the fund established by section 401 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 1231) that is not transferred to the Combined Benefit Fund referred to in section 402(h) of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1232(h)), as amended by this Act, prior to the date of enactment of this Act will be available in fiscal year 2004 and thereafter for the transfers referred to in section 402(h) of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1232(h)), as amended by this Act, in the same manner as are other amounts available for such transfers. (b) Inventory.--Within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior will complete a review of all additions made, under amendments offered by States and Indian tribes after December 31, 1998, to the inventory referred to in section 403(c) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 1233(c)) to ensure that such additions reflect eligible lands and waters under section 404 of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1234) that meet the priorities set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 403(a) of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1233(a)(1) and (2)), and are correctly identified under such priorities. Any lands or waters that were included in the inventory under the general welfare standard set forth in section 403(a) of such Act (30 U.S.C. 1233(a)) before the date of enactment of this Act that are determined in the review to no longer meet the criteria set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 403(a) of such Act, as amended by this Act, will be removed from the inventory.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 440, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00937", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00515", "text": "Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives. Such map and legal description will have the same force and effect as if included in this Act, except that the Secretary, as appropriate, may correct clerical and typographical errors in such legal description and map. Such map and legal description for the Wilderness Area will be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the Director and California State Director, Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior. (b) United States-Mexico Border.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary will ensure that the southern boundary of the Wilderness Area is 100 feet north of the trail depicted on the map referred to in subsection (a) and is at least 100 feet from the United States-Mexico international border. SEC. 5. WILDERNESS REVIEW. The Congress finds and directs that all the public lands not designated wilderness within the boundaries of the Southern Otay Mountain Wilderness Study Area (CA-060-029) and the Western Otay Mountain Wilderness Study Area (CA-060-028) managed by the Bureau of Land Management and reported to the Congress in 1991, have been adequately studied for wilderness designation under section 603 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1782), and are no longer subject to the requirements contained in section 603(c) of that Act pertaining to the management of wilderness study areas in a manner that does not impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness. SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATION OF WILDERNESS AREA. (a) In General.--Subject to valid existing rights and to subsection (b), the Wilderness Area will be administered by the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.), except that-- (1) any reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act is deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act; and (2) any reference in such provisions to the Secretary of Agriculture is deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of the Interior. (b) Border Enforcement, Drug Interdiction, and Wildland Fire Protection.--Because of the proximity of the Wilderness Area to the United States-Mexico international border, drug interdiction, border operations, and wildland fire management operations are common management actions throughout the area encompassing the Wilderness Area.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01068", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00516", "text": "884, 71 S.Ct. 198. Later, we refused to reconsider our refusal. 340 U.S. 948, 71 S.Ct. 530. 19 2. The upshot of the litigation at this point was that the Dollars had obtained a final judgment that the members of the United States Maritime Commission were unlawfully withholding the stock of the corporation, and that, as against the Commissioners, the Dollars were entitled to it. To carry out the judgment the District Court entered an order on mandate on December 11, 1950. That order stated in part that 'title to the shares in question is in the plaintiffs (Dollars), since they were never legally divested of the same, and the asserted title of all others arising out of the same transaction to the contrary (is) null and void * * *.' 97 F.Supp. 59. 20 3. The members of the Maritime Commission took an appeal from this order. They urged that it was too broad, in that it purported to bind, not only the individual members of the Commission, but also the United States. The Court of Appeals remanded the cause with instructions to enter a narrower order, the terms of which it prescribed. The substance of those terms is as follows: '(P) laintiffs (Dollars) are entitled to possession of the shares as against defendants, and the defendants are ordered and directed to deliver immediately to the plaintiffs the said shares. The possession to which plaintiffs are entitled is an effective possession of the shares. In so far as such right requires action on the part of defendants in addition to physical delivery of the certificates, such action is directed to be taken. Plaintiffs are entitled under this judgment to all rights belonging to possessors of the shares.' 188 F.2d 629, 631. 21 In further explanation of its order the Court stated: 'The District Court is directed to enforce obedience to its order, as herein modified, whether effective process is against the present named defendants or is against another official, or other officials, against whom the order might be lawfully enforced if he or they were a party or parties to the suit. 22 'If the Secretary of Commerce now has custody or possession of the shares, he obviously acquired such custody or possession since the beginning of this action, indeed since the order of June 11, 1947 (prohibiting transfer of the stock", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00414", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00517", "text": "of the questions on which, No. 11c, asked: 'Does applicant have absolute control of station, both as to physical operation and programs broadcast?' 3 I.e., the sales of broadcasting time less commissions or disbursements to others. 4 'Resolved, by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia that the ruling of the Federal Communications Commission having made the contract with the stockholders of Southern Broadcasting Stations, Inc. legally impossible of performance, the board approves the action of its WGST Radio Committee in directing that said contract be not further complied with. This action is taken without prejudice to a fair adjustment or settlement of whatever rights the said stockholders may have, subject to the approval or consent of the Federal Communications Commission.' 5 'The agreement effective April 15, 1943, was cancelled by the Regents of the University System of Georgia by resolution adopted at a meeting of the Board of Regents held on October 11, 1945. A true and correct copy of the resolution is to this attached as Exhibit J. The other parties to the agreement have been notified orally of the cancellation of the agreement and no payments under the agreement have been made since the issuance of the proposed decision of the Commission in Docket No. 6534 on September 20, 1945. The Board of Regents will not undertake to negotiate any adjustment or settlement with the other parties to the agreement unless and until said parties first obtain the approval or consent of the Federal Communications Commission to negotiate a settlement of whatever rights said parties may have under the agreement.' 6 There are further allegations of defense in the answer that may be summarized as a statement that respondents had actual knowledge of the filing of the renewal application that resulted in issuance of the license; that respondents had actual knowledge of the hearings, of the proposed decision and of the final order of the Commission. The petitioner further alleged that respondents knew the operation of the station depended upon the grant of a license. We consider these allegations as to notice only as they bear upon the effect of the Board order on petitioner's responsibility under the contract. Petitioner did not plead them as an estoppel to recovery. Neither of the Georgia courts treated the allegations as a basis of estoppel under the law of Georgia. This would be a matter of state law. 7 78 Ga.App. 292, 50 S.E.2d 808, certiorari by the Sup.Ct. of Georgia denied, 78 Ga", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00344", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00518", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1446/2005 of 5 September 2005 adopting derogations from the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2150/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on waste statistics as regards the United Kingdom and Austria (Text with EEA relevance) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2150/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2002 on waste statistics (1), and in particular Article 4(1) of it, Having regard to the request made by the United Kingdom on 20 December 2004, Having regard to the request made by Austria on 16 November 2004, because: (1) In accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2150/2002, derogations from certain provisions of Annexes to that Regulation may be granted by the Commission during a transitional period. (2) Such derogations should be granted, at their request, to the United Kingdom and Austria. (3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Statistical Programme Committee established by Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom (2), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. The following derogations from the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2150/2002 are granted: (a) The United Kingdom is granted derogations for the production of results relating to Section 8(1.1), Items 1 (agriculture, hunting and forestry), 2 (fisheries) and 16 (services activities) of Annex I and those relating to Section 8(2) of Annex II. (b) Austria is granted derogations for the production of results relating to Section 8(1.1), Items 2 (fisheries) and 16 (services activities) of Annex I and those relating to Section 8(2) of Annex II. 2. The derogations provided for in paragraph 1 are granted only in respect of data for the first reference year, namely 2004. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the 20th day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00534", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00519", "text": "or private, which is not religious in character. 94 These things are beside the real question. They have no possible materiality except to obscure the all-pervading inescapable issue. Cf. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, supra. Stripped of its religious phase, the case presents no substantial federal question. Id. The public function argument, by casting the issue in terms of promoting the general cause of education and the welfare of the individual, ignores the religious factor and its essential connection with the transportation, thereby leaving out the only vital element in the case. So of course do the 'public welfare' and'social legislation' ideas, for they come to the same thing. 95 We have here then one substantial issue, not two. To say that New Jersey's appropriation and her use of the power of taxation for raising the funds appropriated are not for public purposes but are for private ends, is to say that they are for the support of religion and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for religious ones. 96 This is precisely for the reason that education which includes religious training and teaching, and its support, have been made matters of private right and function not public, by the very terms of the First Amendment. That is the effect not only in its guaranty of religion's free exercise, but also in the prohibition of establishments. It was on this basis of the private character of the function of religious education that this Court held parents entitled to send their children to private, religious schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. Now it declares in effect that the appropriation of public funds to defray part of the cost of attending those schools is for a public purpose. If so, I do not understand why the state cannot go father or why this case approaches the verge of its power. 97 In truth this view contradicts the whole purpose and effect of the First Amendment as previously conceived. The 'public function'—'public welfare'—' social legislation' argument seeks in Madison's words, to 'employ Religion (that is, here, religious education) as an engine of Civil policy.' Remonstrance, Par. 5. It is of one piece with the Assessment Bill's preamble, although with the vital difference that it wholly ignores what that preamble explicitly states.43 98 Our constitutional policy is exactly the opposite. It does not deny", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00029", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00520", "text": "made on the basis of the lesser of-- ``(I) the actual charge for the test; or ``(II) an amount equal to 60 percent (or in the case of a test performed by a qualified hospital (as defined in paragraph (1)(D)) for outpatients of such hospital, 62 percent) of the prevailing charge level determined under the third and fourth sentences of section 1842(b)(3) for the test for a locality or area for the year (determined without regard to the year referred to in paragraph (2)(A)(i), or any national limitation amount under paragraph (4)(B), and adjusted annually by the percentage increase or decrease under paragraph (2)(A)(i)); until the beginning of the third full calendar year that begins on or after the date on which an HCPCS code is first assigned with respect to such test, or, if later, the beginning of the first calendar year that begins on or after the date on which the Secretary determines that there are sufficient claims data to establish a fee schedule amount under clause (ii). ``(ii) despite paragraphs (2) and (4), and (5), the fee schedule amount for a clinical diagnostic laboratory test described in clause (i) that is performed-- ``(I) during the first calendar year after clause (i) ceases to apply to such test, will be an amount equal to the national limitation amount that the Secretary determines (consistent with clause (iii)) would have applied to such test under paragraph (4)(B)(viii) during the preceding calendar year, adjusted by the percentage increase or decrease determined under paragraph (2)(A)(i) for such first calendar year; and ``(II) during a subsequent year, is the fee schedule amount determined under this clause for the preceding year, adjusted by the percentage increase or decrease that applies under paragraph (5)(A) for such year. ``(iii) For purposes of clause (ii)(I), the national limitation amount for a test will be set at 100 percent of the median of the payment amounts determined under clause (ii)(I) for all payment localities or areas for the last calendar year for which payment for such test was determined under clause (i). ``(iv) Nothing in clause (ii) will be construed as prohibiting the Secretary from applying (or authorizing the application of) the comparability provisions of the first sentence of such section 1842(b)(3) with respect to amounts", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00892", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00521", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 297/2002 of 15 February 2002 fixing the maximum export refund on wholly milled long grain rice in connection with the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 2010/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 of 22 December 1995 on the common organisation of the market in rice(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1987/2001(2), and in particular Article 13(3) of it, because: (1) An invitation to tender for the export refund on rice was issued under Commission Regulation (EC) No 2010/2001(3). (2) Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 584/75(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 299/95(5), allows the Commission to fix, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 and on the basis of the tenders submitted, a maximum export refund. In fixing this maximum, the criteria provided for in Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 must be taken into account. A contract is awarded to any tenderer whose tender is equal to or less than the maximum export refund. (3) The application of the abovementioned criteria to the current market situation for the rice in question results in the maximum export refund being fixed at the amount specified in Article 1. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The maximum export refund on wholly milled long grain rice to be exported to certain third countries under the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 2010/2001 is fixed on the basis of the tenders submitted from 8 to 14 February 2002 at 297,50 EUR/t. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 16 February 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 February 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 482, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00658", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00522", "text": "right to enter the reservation and fish, but solely as trespassers having no right of entry, but seeking only to avert the incidence of possible remedies for threatened wrongful entry. In effect the Court's decision is that respondents, although they have not put forward their case in this light, are entitled to have it so determined and to have equitable relief which prevents possible application of White Act sanctions against them. I cannot agree that persons so situated have standing to invoke the assistance of a court of equity. Accordingly I think the judgment should be reversed and the cause should be remanded with instructions to dismiss it. 82 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins in Part I of this opinion. 1 8 Fed.Reg. 8557: 'Alaska 'Modification of Executive Order Designating Lands as Indian Reservation 'By virtue of the authority contained in the act of June 25, 1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847, as amended by the act of August 24, 1912, c. 369, 37 Stat. 497, U.S.C., Title 43, secs. 141—143 (43 U.S.C.A. §§ 141—143), and the act of May 1, 1936, c. 254, 49 Stat. 1250, U.S.C. Title 48, sec. 358a (48 U.S.C.A. § 358a), and under Executive Order No. 9146 of April 24, 1942: It is ordered, As follows: '1. Executive Order No. 8344 of February 10, 1940, withdrawing Kodiak and other islands, Alaska, for classification and in aid of legislation, is modified to the extent necessary to permit the designation as an Indian reservation of the following-described area: 'Beginning at the end of a point of land on the shore of Shelikof Strait on Kodiak Island, said point being about one and one-quarter miles east of Rocky Point and in approximate latitude 57 39 40'N., longitude 154 12 20'W.; 'Thence south approximately eight miles to latitude 57 32 30 N.; 'Thence west approximately twelve and one-half miles to the confluence of the north shore of Sturgeon River with the east shore of Shelikof Strait; Thence northeasterly following the easterly shore of Shel", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00279", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00523", "text": "that the purchase price for the wine was paid to the producer within the time limit specified in Article 13 (2), the security being released in proportion to the quantities in respect of which such evidence is produced. If the evidence referred to in the first subparagraph is provided after the date specified in the first subparagraph but before 1 June, the amount to be released will be equal to 80 % of the security. If it is found that the fortifier has not paid the producer the purchase price the intervention agency will, before 1 July, pay the producer an amount equal to the aid, if necessary through the intervention agency of his Member State. Article 19 1. Member States will send the Commission, by the 20th day of each month in respect of the previous month, a statement of: - the quantities of table wine and fortified wine distilled under the distillation operation referred to in Article 41 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79, broken down by colour, - the quantities of alcohol delivered to intervention agencies, - the quantities of wine spirits produced and their alcoholic strength, - the quantities of other products of at least 52 % vol alcoholic strength for which aid has been requested. 2. Member States will notify the Commission, by 31 March, of cases where distillers or fortifiers of wine for distillation have not fulfilled their obligations and of the action being taken in consequence. Article 20 Conversion into national currencies of amounts to be fixed under this Regulation will be at the representative rates applying for the wine sector on the date of the entry into force of the Regulation whereby the distillation measure referred to in Article 41 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 becomes applicable. Article 21 For the 1985/86 and 1986/87 wine years the following provisions will apply in Greece under the first subparagraph of Article 41 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79: (a) The persons subject to the distillation requirement referred to in this Regulation will be those producers, including wine cooperatives and producers' associations, who have obtained in the course of the wine year a quantity of table wine to be fixed by the Greek authorities before 10 March of the year in question; (b) The Greek Government will set, before 10 March and in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 41 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00586", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00524", "text": "within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Article XV. 'Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote will not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 'Section 2. The Congress will have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.' 8 U.S.C. § 31, 8 U.S.C.A. § 31: 'All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, will be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary despite.' 3 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §§ 1331, 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 2201. Petitioners abandoned a claim to money damages, apparently grounded on 8 U.S.C. §§ 43, 47, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 47. 4 D.C.S.D.Tex.1950, 90 F.Supp. 595. The District Judge supported his conclusions by reference to Art. 3163, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes: 'Art. 3163. Parties without State organization 'Any political party without a State organization desiring to nominate candidates for county and precinct offices only may nominate such candidates therefor under the provisions of this title by primary elections or by a county convention held on the legal primary election day, which convention will be composed of delegates from various election precincts in said county, elected there at primary conventions held in such precincts between the hours of eight a.m. and ten p.m. of the preceding Saturday. All nominations made by any such parties will be certified to the county clerk by the chairman of the county committee of such party, and, after taking the same course as nominations of other parties so certified, will be printed on the official ballot in a separate column, headed by the name of the party; provided, a written application for such printing will have been made to the county judge, signed", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00499", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00525", "text": "of subsistence, in accordance with section 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code. (f) Director of Staff.-- (1) Qualifications.--The Board will appoint a Director who has no financial interests in any of the businesses for which reasonable profits are determined by the Board. (2) Pay.--despite section 7 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), the Director will be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. (g) Staff.-- (1) Additional personnel.--The Director, with the approval of the Board, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel. (2) Appointments.--The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates. (3) Detailees.--Upon the request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Board to assist the Board in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Board. (4) Assistance.--The Comptroller General of the United States may provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Board in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Board. (h) Other Authority.-- (1) Experts and consultants.--The Board may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Leasing.--The Board may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent that funds are available. (i) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such funds as are necessary to carry out this section. SEC. 6. LOWER GASOLINE PRICES THROUGH TECHNOLOGY ACCESS. Section 308 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7608) is amended by striking ``or 202'' and inserting ``202, or 211''.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 458, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00976", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00526", "text": "Coins.--A coin will not be issued under this Act unless the Secretary has received-- (1) full payment for the coin; (2) security satisfactory to the Secretary to indemnify the United States for full payment; or (3) a guarantee of full payment satisfactory to the Secretary from a depository institution whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration Board. SEC. 10. CONDITIONS ON PAYMENT OF SURCHARGES. (a) Payment of Surcharges.--despite any other provision of law, no amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act will be paid to the Foundation unless-- (1) all numismatic operation and program costs allocable to the program under which such coins are produced and sold have been recovered; and (2) the Foundation submits an audited financial statement which demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that, with respect to all projects or purposes for which the proceeds of such surcharge may be used, the Foundation has raised funds from private sources for such projects and purposes in an amount which is equal to or greater than the maximum amount the Foundation may receive from the proceeds of such surcharge. (b) Annual Audits.-- (1) Annual audits of recipients required.--The Foundation will provide, as a condition for receiving any amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act, for an annual audit, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards by an independent public accountant selected by the Foundation, of all such payments to the Foundation beginning in the first fiscal year of the Foundation in which any such amount is received and continuing until all such amounts received by the Foundation with respect to such surcharges are fully expended or placed in trust. (2) Minimum requirements for annual audits.--At a minimum, each audit of the Foundation under paragraph (1) will report-- (A) the amount of payments received by the Foundation during the fiscal year of the Foundation for which the audit is conducted which are derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of coins issued under this Act; (B) the amount expended by the Foundation from the proceeds of such surcharges during the fiscal year of the Foundation for which the audit is conducted; and (C) whether all expenditures by the Foundation from the proceeds of such surcharges during the fiscal year of the Foundation for which the audit is conducted were for authorized purposes.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00833", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00527", "text": "project under the laws of the United States and the State of California. (b) Compatibility Requirement.--The Secretary will ensure that projects for which assistance is provided under this Act are not inconsistent with watershed protection and environmental restoration efforts being carried out under the authority of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (Public Law 102-575; 106 Stat. 4706 et seq.) or the CALFED Bay-Delta Program. SEC. 4. COST SHARING. (a) Non-Federal Share.--The Secretary will require that the District and cooperating non-Federal agencies or organizations pay-- (1) 25 percent of the costs associated with construction of any project carried out with assistance provided under this Act; and (2) 100 percent of any operation, maintenance, and replacement and rehabilitation costs with respect to such a project. (b) Planning, Design, and Compliance Assistance.--Funds appropriated under this Act may be made available to fund all costs incurred for planning, design, and environmental compliance activities by the District or by local agencies acting under the State statute, in accordance with agreements with the Secretary. (c) Treatment of Contributions.--For purposes of this section, the Secretary will treat the value of lands, interests in lands (including rights-of-way and other easements), and necessary relocations contributed by the District to a project as a payment by the District of the costs of the project. SEC. 5. COSTS NONREIMBURSABLE. Amounts expended under this Act will be considered nonreimbursable for purposes of the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388; 43 U.S.C. 371 et seq.), and Acts amendatory of it and supplemental thereto. SEC. 6. AGREEMENTS. Funds appropriated under this Act may be made available to the District or a local agency only if the District or local agency, as applicable, has entered into a binding agreement with the Secretary-- (1) under which the District or the local agency is required to pay the non-Federal share of the costs of construction required by section 4(a); and (2) governing the funding of planning, design, and compliance activities costs under section 4(b). SEC. 7. REIMBURSEMENT. For project work (including work associated with studies, planning, design, and construction) carried out by the District or by a local agency acting under the State statute", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00883", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00528", "text": "ing from Article I. The only express holding which conceivably could lend comfort to this doctrine of dual jurisdiction in this Court's conclusion in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356, that certain courts of the District of Columbia theretofore deemed legislative courts created under Article I,7 owe their jurisdiction to Article I and Article III. With the merits of the O'Donoghue decision in holding that Article III barred salary reductions for judges of the courts in question, we are not presently concerned. Suffice it to point out that the express language of the O'Donoghue decision negatives the view that federal courts in the several states share this hybrid heritage: 44 '* * * Congress derives from the District clause distinct powers in respect of the constitutional courts of the District which Congress does not possess in respect of such courts outside the District.'8 45 The limits of the O'Donoghue decision are only underscored by the dissenting view of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Van Devanter and Cardozo that all District of Columbia courts are solely the creatures of Article I: 46 'As the courts of the District do not rest for their creation on section 1 of Article 3, that creation is not subject to any of the limitations of that provision. Nor would those limitations, if considered to be applicable, be susceptible of division so that some might be deemed obligatory and others might be ignored.' 289 U.S. at page 552, 53 S.Ct. at page 751, 77 L.Ed. 1356. 47 Comfort is sought to be drawn, however, from this Court's rationale in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S.Ct. 751, 77 L.Ed. 1372, which, in sanctioning salary reductions for judges of the Court of Claims, held that that court did not derive its jurisdiction from Article III. That conclusion stemmed in part from the proposition that suits against the United States are not 'Controversies to which the United States will be a Party,' within the meaning of Article III, § 2. Hence, it is said, the permissible inference is that the long-established concurrent jurisdiction of district courts over claims against the United States is likewise not derived from Article III.9 We need not today determine the nature of district", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00305", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00529", "text": "Labor Relations Board is, of course, no defense to the Board's petition for judicial enforcement of its order. Therefore, a Court of Appeals would be abusing the authority conferred by § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,* if, upon such a petition for enforcement, it even temporarily withheld enforcement merely for the purpose of asking the Board to report to it whether the order had already been complied with. Even if it had, the Board is entitled to a formal decree as a safeguard against repetition of the unfair labor practice. If in the cases before us the Court of Appeals had, by seeking light from the Board on the issue of compliance, in effect ruled that compliance with an order of the Board was relevant to enforcement, it would be incumbent upon this Court, in the fair administration of law, to issue its discretionary writ of certiorari and reverse the orders of the Court of Appeals summarily. 15 But the action of the Court of Appeals in these two cases cannot fairly be interpreted as definance of the settled principle of law that compliance by an employer with the Board's order is not a defense to an application for its enforcement. In a series of decisions prior to its actions in these two cases the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in common with all other circuits, has enforced orders of the Board despite allegations of compliance. Nor are these two cases to be interpreted as departures from the principle which that court has previously recognized and obeyed. It has explictly advised us that the opinions and orders in these two cases 'were not intended to be, they were not, departures' from the established rule. National Labor Relations Board v. Cooper Co., 5 Cir., 179 F.2d 241. Whatever justification there may have been when we granted certiorari for attributing to the court below a volte-face on its own repeated application of a settled principle of law, there was none after its decision in the Cooper case ten days later. Yet it is only by attributing to the Court of Appeals a departure which that court has disavowed that it may be charged with an abuse of discretion which alone would have warranted our taking these cases for review. 16 The fact is that in both these cases representations were made to the Court of Appeals of circumstances arising subsequent to the orders issued by the Board which amount to more than a claim that the employer had complied with", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00360", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00530", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Paycheck Fairness Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Women have entered the workforce in record numbers. (2) Even in the 1990's, women earn significantly lower pay than men for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions. These pay disparities exist in both the private and governmental sectors. In many instances, the pay disparities can only be due to continued intentional discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination. (3) The existence of such pay disparities-- (A) depresses the wages of working families who rely on the wages of all members of the family to make ends meet; (B) prevents the optimum utilization of available labor resources; (C) has been spread and perpetuated, through commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce, among the workers of the several States; (D) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (E) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (F) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (G) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce; and (H) in many instances, may deprive workers of equal protection on the basis of sex in violation of the 5th and 14th amendments. (4)(A) Artificial barriers to the elimination of discrimination in the payment of wages on the basis of sex continue to exist more than 3 decades after the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.). (B) Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-- (i) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by unfair pay disparities; (ii) substantially reducing the number of working women earning unfairly low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance; and (iii) promoting stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair rate of pay; (iv) remedying the effects of past discrimination on the basis of sex and ensuring that in the future workers are afforded equal protection on the basis of sex; and (v) ensuring equal protection under Congress' power to enforce the 5th and 14", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01047", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00531", "text": "an urban development action grant for Project No. B-87-AA-42-1211 and use such funds for the Northeastern Pennsylvania Economic Development project, if such project is commenced not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act. (3) Richmond, virginia.--The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will cancel the indebtedness of the city of Richmond, Virginia, relating to the categorical program settlement grant provided to the city to settle four urban renewal programs (Project No. B-78-UR-51-0019). The city of Richmond, Virginia, is relieved of all liability to the Federal Government for such grant and any fees and charges payable in connection with such grant. (4) Lockport township, illinois.--The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will cancel the indebtedness of Lockport Township, Illinois, relating to the public facilities loan for Project No. ILL-11-PFL0112. Lockport Township, Illinois, is relieved of all liability to the Federal Government for the outstanding principal balance on such loan, the amount of accrued interest on such loan, and any other fees and charges payable in connection with such loan. (5) Budget compliance.--Paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection will be effective only to the extent, or in such amounts, as are provided in appropriation Acts. (d) New Towns Demonstration Program.-- (1) Insurance authority.--The first sentence of section 1104(d) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 5318 note) is amended to read as follows: ``To the extent provided in appropriation Acts, the Secretary will use any authority provided under section 531(b) of the National Housing Act to enter into commitments to insure loans and mortgages under this section in fiscal year 1995 with an aggregate principal amount not exceeding such sums as may be necessary to carry out the demonstration under this title.''. (2) Second mortgage assistance.--Section 1105(e) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 5318 note) is amended to read as follows: ``(5) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1995 such sums as may be necessary for providing assistance under this section.''. (3) Community development assistance.--Section 1106(h) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00855", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00532", "text": "in evidence of the entire record of the criminal case, but criticized the use of the indictment as an exhibit to the complaint, as well as certain references to the indictment in the opening statement and closing argument of petitioners' counsel to the jury. It held that serious error was committed when the indictment was sent to the jury as an exhibit and the trial court 'told the jury that it could look to it (the indictment) to ascertain the means and the acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy * * *.' The court observed that 'it was unnecessary for the Government to prove * * * any of the acts or means, except for the purpose of establishing venue, in order for the jury in the criminal proceeding to find defendants guilty,' and that'such acts and means are not to be considered as established by the finding of guilt.' It concluded that the use of the indictment as evidence was aggravated by the instruction of the trial judge last quoted and italicized in part, supra, 181 F.2d page 75. III. 21 The issue we must determine, as defined in our order granting review, is 'whether the Court of Appeals erred in construing § 5 of the Clayton Act * * * as not permitting: (a) the admission in the instant case of the indictment in the antecedent criminal case against respondents, nor (b) the judgment there to be used as evidence that the conspiracy of which respondents had been convicted occasioned Emich Motors' cancellation.' 22 In considering the application of § 5 in this case we are confronted with five differing interpretations. The broadest construction is urged by petitioners who contend that the criminal judgment is prima facie evidence that Emich Motors' franchises were cancelled under the unlawful conspiracy, and that the entire record in the criminal case should be admissible in this action. The view of the trial judge differs only in that he would not permit the record in the criminal case, beyond the indictment, verdict and judgment, to go to the jury. The United States as amicus curiae takes a more contracted position, urging in its brief that the judgment is prima facie evidence of the conspiracy and also of the performance of such acts in accomplishing it as the jury in the criminal case, in rendering a verdict of guilty, necessarily found to have occurred, the latter to be determined by the trial judge in the treble-damage suit from the entire record in the criminal case. In its view", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00389", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00533", "text": "Service Commission and have persisted there since 1907.22 25 Oklahoma also argues that the Civil Service Commission determination that the acts of Mr. Paris constitute such a violation of § 12(a) as to warrant his removal from his state office is not in accordance with law but arbitrary, unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The facts of Mr. Paris' activities and his connection with the Democratic State Central Committee during his tenure of office as a member of the Highway Commission of Oklahoma have been stated. The Circuit Court of Appeals said, 10 Cir., 153 F.2d at page 284, 'Manifestly, the Commission had solid footing in the Act for the conclusion that removal of Paris from office was warranted.' We agree.23 26 Finally, petitioner says that § 12(c), note 1, supra, authorizes a review of 'every minute detail of the case' to 'determine whether sufficient facts exist to support the order of the Commission, decide whether the statute has been reasonably and just y applied, and independently resolve the entire question as though the federal court had been the forum in the first instance.' The basis for this argument in so far as it differs from that referred to in the preceding paragraph, is drawn from the language of § 12(c) that 'The review by the court will be on the record entire, including all of the evidence taken on the hearing, and will extend to questions of fact and questions of law. * * * The court will affirm the Commission's determination or order, or its modified determination or order, if the court determines that the same is in accordance with law.' As the facts were stipulated and no objection has been taken to the findings of fact, D.C., 61 F.Supp. 355, 357(5); 10 Cir., 153 F.2d 280, 283, the attack, on this issue, is limited to an examination into whether or not the Commission abused its discretion in the order of removal. As previously stated, the provisions for review underwent changes during the passage of the act.24 As finally adopted, however, the reviewing court is directed to remand when it determines that the action of the Commission 'is not in accordance with law.' § 12(c)25 The question of 'the removal of the officer or employee,' § 12(b), note 1, supra, we think is a matter of administrative discretion. Since under", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00020", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00534", "text": "istillers Corporation, 1936, 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139, 81 L.Ed. 109, read as follows: 48's 1. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or content of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is in fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others will be deemed in violation of any law of the State of Illinois by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such contract: 49 '(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated by the vendor. 50 '(2) That the producer or vendee of a commodity require upon the sale of such commodity to another that such purchaser agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at the price stipulated by such producer or vendee. 51 'Such provisions in any contract will be deemed to contain or imply conditions that such commodity may be resold without reference to such agreement in the following cases: 52 '(1) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing delivery of any such commodity: Provided, however, That such stock is first offered to the manufacturer of such stock at the original invoice price, at least ten (10) days before such stock will be offered for sale to the public. 53 '(2) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and notice is given to the public of it. 54 '(3) By any officer acting under the orders of any court. 55's 2. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into under the provisions of section 1 of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.' 56 The following States, the committee is advised, have adopted fair trade acts: California, Washington, Oregon, Montana, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, New", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00398", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00535", "text": "COUNCIL DECISION of 1 December 2005 amending Decision 1999/70/EC concerning the external auditors of the national central banks, as regards the external auditors of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (2005/866/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular to Article 27.1 of it, Having regard to the Recommendation ECB/2005/10 of the European Central Bank of 26 October 2005 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (1), because: (1) The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national central banks of the Eurosystem are audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council of the European Union. (2) The mandate of the current external auditors of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland has expired and will not be renewed. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors from the financial year 2005. (3) The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland has selected Deloitte & Touche as its external auditors starting from the financial year 2005, and the ECB considers that they fulfil the necessary requirements for appointment. (4) The Governing Council of the ECB recommended that the mandate of the external auditors should be for three years and may be extended. (5) It is appropriate to follow the recommendation of the Governing Council of the ECB and to amend Council Decision 1999/70/EC (2) accordingly, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 Article 1(5) of Decision 1999/70/EC will be replaced by the following: ‘5. Deloitte & Touche are approved as the external auditors of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland from the financial year 2005 for a duration of three years, with the possibility of extension.’ Article 2 This Decision will be notified to the European Central Bank. Article 3 This Decision will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 1 December 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00809", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00536", "text": "Finance Company, in the event that the restraints of sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph 6 of this decree are suspended as to the Manufacturer. '(4) The right of the respondents or any of them to make any application for suspension of any provision of this decree in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and to obtain such relief is expressly granted. 'In the event that at any time prior to the date when General Motors Corporation had permanently divested itself of all ownership and control of and interest in General Motors Acceptance Corporation, General Motors Acceptance Corporation will make available to dealers of General Motors Corporation in any area a finance charge, on all or any class of automobiles sold by dealers of General Motors Corporation, less than the finance charge then generally available to dealers of the Manufacturer within such area, nothing in this decree will prevent the Manufacturer from making, and the Manufacturer may make, adjustments, allowances or payments to or with all of its dealers in such area who agree to reduce to an amount approved by the Manufacturer (but not less than that then made available by General Motors Acceptance Corporation) the finance charges which such dealers of the Manufacturer in such area receive from any class of retail purchasers of automobiles, provided that such adjustments, allowances or payments will not discriminate among such dealers in such area.' 2 Their full text is as follows: '(6.) (e) Except as provided by sub-paragraphs (j) and (k) of this paragraph 6. '(i) the Manufacturer will not establish any practice, procedure or plan for the retail or wholesale financing of automobiles for the purpose of enabling Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to enjoy a competitive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers through any service, facility or privilege extended by the Manufacturer under such practice, procedure or plan if such service, facility or privilege or a service, facility or privilege corresponding thereto, is not made available upon its written request to any other finance company upon substantially similar terms and conditions; and '(ii) so long as the Manufacturer will continue to afford any service, facility or privilege not otherwise specifically referred to in this decree to Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies, it will not refuse to afford similar or corresponding services, facilities or privileges upon substantially similar terms and conditions and upon written request to any other finance company for the purpose of giving Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies a competitive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers;", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00211", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00537", "text": "when, in private litigation, decision of the constitutional question may affect the public at large, may be in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of securing to them their common rights.' 7 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442, 52 S.Ct. 252, 256, 76 L.Ed. 375; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 558, 57 S.Ct. 592, 604, 81 L.Ed. 789; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513, 57 S.Ct. 868, 874, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327. 8 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 59 Stat. 306: Section 2(d). 'Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator such action is necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this Act, he may, * * * regulate or prohibit * * * renting or leasing practices (including practices relating to recovery of the possession) in connection with any defense-area housing accommodations, which in his judgment are equivalent to or are likely to result in * * * rent increases, * * * inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.' Section 4(a). 'It will be unlawful, regardless of any contract, agreement, lease, or other obligation previously or hereafter entered into, for any person to * * * do or omit to do any act, in violation of any regulation or order under section 2, * * * or to offer, solicit, attempt, or agree to do any of the foregoing.' Section 205(a). 'Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00063", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00538", "text": ", it adds the words steal or purloin. * * * Stealing, having no common law definition to restrict its meaning as an offense, is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that which rightfully belongs to another, and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, but may or may not involve the element of stealth usually attributed to the word purloin. * * * Thus, in any case involving larceny as defined by the common law, section 46 (18 U.S.C. § 99 (1940 ed.)) would apply. Where the offense is embezzlement, or its nature so doubtful as to fall between larceny and embezzlement, it may be prosecuted under section 47 (18 U.S.C. § 100 (1940 ed.)).' 99 F.2d at 564—565. The reference in Crabb v. Zerbst to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 99, the robbery and larceny statute then operative, suggests examination of its successor in today's code. For purpose of clarification, that section states that: 'Whoever will rob another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, or will feloniously take and carry away the same, will be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.' The Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 641, 18 U.S.C.A. § 641, makes no mention of it as a successor to that section. The present robbery statute is 18 U.S.C. § 2112, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2112, 'Personal property of United States', providing that: 'Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, will be imprisoned not more than fifteen years.' The Reviser's Note to that section recites that it is derived from § 99 of the 1940 Code, and 'That portion of said section 99 relating to felonious taking was omitted as covered by section 641 of this title', which makes it clear that, despite the absence of any reference to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 99 in the Note to 18 U.S.C. § 641, 18 U.S.C.A.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00425", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00539", "text": "175.41 to 175.62 'The term 'an alien who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States' means an alien who has been lawfully admitted into the continental United States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii for permanent residence there and who has since such admission maintained his domicile in the United States: * * *.' 3 For the nature and significance of such clearance, see Executive Order No. 10173, of October 18, 1950, U.S.Code Cong.Serv.1950, p. 1663, especially §§ 6.10—1 to 6.10—9, now published, as amended, in 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp. That order was issued under the Act of June 15, 1917, as amended by the Magnuson Act of August 9, 1950, 64 Stat. 427—428, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 191, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 191. It has now been implemented by regulations effective December 27, 1950, published, as amended, in 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp., §§ 121.01—125.37. See also, Parker v. Lester, D.C., 98 F.Supp. 300, Id., 9 Cir., 191 F.2d 1020. Section 6.10—1, as it existed at the date of petitioner's clearance, provided: 'Issuance of documents and employment of persons aboard vessels. No person will be issued a document required for employment on a merchant vessel of the United States nor will any licensed officer or certificated man be employed on a merchant vessel of the United States if the Commandant is satisfied that the character and habits of life of such person are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of the individual on board would be inimical to the security of the United States: * * *.' 15 Fed.Reg. 7007. Later regulations have published detailed security provisions as to who may be employed on merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward, whether engaged in foreign or other trade. 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp., §§ 121.13—121.16. 4 In this opinion 'exclusion", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00477", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00540", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1037/2004 of 27 May 2004 fixing the export refunds on syrups and certain other sugar products exported in the natural state THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 27(5) of it, because: (1) Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 provides that the difference between quotations or prices on the world market for the products listed in Article 1(1)(d) of that Regulation and prices for those products within the Community may be covered by an export refund. (2) Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2135/95 of 7 September 1995 laying down detailed rules of application for the grant of export refunds in the sugar sector (2), provides that the export refund on 100 kilograms of the products listed in Article 1(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 is equal to the basic amount multiplied by the sucrose content, including, where appropriate, other sugars expressed as sucrose; the sucrose content of the product in question is determined in accordance with Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2135/95. (3) Article 30(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 provides that the basic amount of the refund on sorbose exported in the natural state must be equal to the basic amount of the refund less one hundredth of the production refund applicable, under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1265/2001 of 27 June 2001 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 as regards granting the production refund on certain sugar products used in the chemical industry (3), to the products listed in the Annex to the last mentioned Regulation. (4) According to the terms of Article 30(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, the basic amount of the refund on the other products listed in Article 1(1)(d) of the said Regulation exported in the natural state must be equal to one-h", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00650", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00541", "text": "can be sustained under the Commerce Clause as mere regulation. 46 Congress is given the power 'To regulate commerce * * * among the several States.' U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The doctrine of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 1851, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996, permits a state to exercise its police powers in a manner impinging upon interstate commerce only where the subject of regulation is essentially local and then only when there is no discrimination against or undue burden on interstate commerce. This is an approach grounded in the practical, an approach which imposes upon this Court the 'duty to determine whether the statute (or ordinance) under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce.' Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 1940, 311 U.S. 454, 455—456, 61 S.Ct. 334, 335, 85 L.Ed. 275. That this ordinance, on its face, professes to protect the home does not relieve us of our duty to weigh the practical effect of the ordinance upon interstate commerce. Lack of discrimination on its face has not previously been regarded as sufficient to sustain an ordinance without inquiry into its practical effects upon interstate commerce. E.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 1951, 340 U.S. 349, 354, 71 S.Ct. 295, 297 (prohibition against sale of milk pasteurized more than five miles from city); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 1925, 268 U.S. 325, 336, 45 S.Ct. 525, 526, 69 L.Ed. 982, (requirement that solicitors file bond); Minnesota v. Barber, 1890, 136 U.S. 313, 10 S.Ct. 862, 34 L.Ed. 455 (statute requiring inspection of meat within state). 47 In passing upon other ordinances affecting solicitors, this Court has not hesitated in noting the economic fact that 'the'real competitors' of (solicitors) are, among others, the local retail merchants.' Nippert v. Richmond, supra, 327 U.S. at page 433, 66 S.Ct. at page 594, citing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00417", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00542", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1280/2009 of 22 December 2009 fixing the reference prices for certain fishery products for the 2010 fishing year THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products (1), and in particular Article 29(1) and (5) of it, because: (1) Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 provides that reference prices valid for the EU may be fixed each year, by product category, for products that are the subject of a tariff suspension under Article 28(1). The same holds for products which, by virtue of being either the subject of a binding tariff reduction under the WTO or some other preferential arrangements, must comply with a reference price. (2) under Article 29(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 104/2000, the reference price for the products listed in Annex I, Parts A and B to that Regulation, is to be the same as the withdrawal price fixed in accordance with Article 20(1) of that Regulation. (3) The EU withdrawal prices for the products concerned are fixed for the 2010 fishing year by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1277/2009 (2). (4) under Article 29(3)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 104/2000, the reference price for products other than those listed in Annexes I and II to that Regulation is to be established in particular on the basis of the weighted average of customs values recorded on the import markets or in the ports of import in the three years immediately preceding the date on which the reference price is fixed. (5) There is no need to fix reference prices for those products falling under the criteria laid down in Art. 29(1) of Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 which are imported from third countries in insignificant volumes. (6) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fishery Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The reference prices for the 2010 fishing year of fishery products, as referred to in Article 29 of Regulation (", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00831", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00543", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Theodore Roosevelt Commemorative Coin Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Theodore Roosevelt, one of America's greatest presidents, was born on October 27, 1858, in New York City, New York. (2) At the young age of 23, Theodore Roosevelt was elected to the first of 3 terms as a representative in the New York State Assembly (1882-1884). (3) From 1895-1897, Theodore Roosevelt served as Commissioner of the New York City Police Department. (4) While serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President William McKinley (1897-1898), Theodore Roosevelt organized the First United States Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, popularly known as the ``Rough Riders'', and then served as Colonel of this regiment during the Spanish-American War. (5) From 1898-1900, Theodore Roosevelt served as Governor of New York. (6) In 1900, with the election of President McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt was elected as the 25th Vice-President of the United States. (7) Becoming the 26th President of the United States the following year, Theodore Roosevelt took a very active role in foreign affairs, establishing the United States as a new world power, and instituted broad reforms, at home, particularly with respect to labor, monopolies, and conservation, until the end of his presidency in 1909. (8) On January 16, 2001, Theodore Roosevelt was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for leading a charge up the San Juan Heights in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, shortly before the war ended, thereby becoming the first President of the United States to be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. (9) 2006 will mark the 100th anniversary of Theodore Roosevelt receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the first citizen of the United States to receive such prize, for drawing up the 1905 peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. SEC. 3. COIN SPECIFICATIONS. (a) Denominations.--The Secretary of the Treasury (from now on in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') will mint and issue the following coins: (1) $5 gold coins.--Not more than 50,000 $5 coins, which will-- (A) weigh", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00983", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00544", "text": "the maximum extent practicable, the Board of Directors of the Haitian-American Enterprise Fund should adopt the best practices and procedures used by Enterprise Funds, including those for which funding has been made available under section 201 of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-179; 22 U.S.C. 5421). SEC. 7. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTERPRISE FUNDS. In implementing this Act, the President will ensure that the Articles of Incorporation of the Haitian-American Enterprise Fund (including provisions specifying the responsibilities of the Board of Directors of the Fund), the terms of United States Government grant agreements with the Fund, and United States Government oversight of the Fund are, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with the Articles of Incorporation of, the terms of grant agreements with, and the oversight of the Enterprise Funds established under section 201 of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5421) and comparable provisions of law. SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President $100,000,000, which will be used to provide funding for grants to the Haitian-American Enterprise Fund, which will be used for the purposes specified in section 3. (b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts appropriated under subsection (a) will remain available until expended. (c) Nonapplicability of Other Laws.--Amounts appropriated under subsection (a) may be used to carry out this Act despite any other provision of law.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 337, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01058", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00545", "text": "Jan. 26, 1943. The royalty agreement to manufacture and sell this device was dated June 20, 1939. The taxpayer remained the owner of the first three patents throughout the year 1941, and he remained the owner of the patent application on the fourth device throughout that year. 2 Six months' notice was provided in the agreement dated Jan. 10, 1928, covering the cylinder grinder. The other three agreements provided for one year's notice of cancellation. 3 On Jan. 8, 1929, the taxpayer assigned to his wife 'all my rights, title and interest in and to the Royalty Which will accrue hereafter to me' upon the royalty contract of Jan. 10, 1928, with respect to the cylinder grinder device. Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue raised some question as to the sufficiency and completeness of this assignment, the taxpayer executed a further assignment on Dec. 21, 1931. This second assignment confirmed the first one and stated further that his wife was assigned 'all of my right, title and interest in and to said royalty contract of January 10, 1928 * * * And I state that the royalties accruing under said royalty contract have previously been and are hereafter the sole and exclusive property of the said Cornelia Sunnen (his wife), and declare that said royalties will be paid to the said Cornelia Sunnen or to her order, and that she will have the sole right to collect, receive, receipt for, retain or sue for said royalties.' 'Assignments similar in form and substance to the assignment of Dec. 21, 1931, were made as to the other three royalty contracts. 4 In the Dodson case, Dodson owned 51% of the stock of a corporation and his wife owned the other 49%. He was the owner of a formula and trade mark. under a contract which he made with the corporation, the corporation was given the exclusive use of the formula and trade mark for 5 years, renewable for a like period. Dodson was to receive in return a royalty measured by a certain percentage of the net sales. He then assigned a one-half interest in the contract to his wife, retaining his full interest in the formula and trade mark. The Tax Court held that his dominant stock position permitted him to cancel or modify the contract at any time, thus rendering him taxable", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 493, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00156", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00546", "text": "340 U.S. 602 71 S.Ct. 508 95 L.Ed. 573 SPECTOR MOTOR SERVICE, Inc.,v.O'CONNOR. No. 132. Argued Nov. 29—30, 1950. Reargued Jan. 10, 1951. Decided March 26, 1951. Mr. Cyril Coleman, Hartford, Conn., for petitioner. Mr. Louis Weinstein, New Haven, Conn., for respondents. Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This proceeding attacks, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, the validity of a state tax imposed upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the State when (1) the business consists solely of interstate commerce, and (2) the tax is computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that part of the corporation's net income which is reasonably attributable to its business activities within the State. For the reasons from now on stated, we hold this application of the tax invalid. 2 Petitioner, Spector Motor Service, Inc., is a Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in interstate trucking. It instituted this action in 1942 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Tax Commissioner of that State. It sought to enjoin collection of assessments and penalties totaling $7,795.50, which had been levied against it, for various periods between June 1, 1935, and December 31, 1940, under the Connecticut Corporation Business Tax Act of 1935 and amendments thereto.1 It asked also for a declaratory judgment as to its liability, if any, under that Act. It claimed that the tax imposed by the Act did not apply to it and that, if it did, such application violated both the Connecticut Constitution and the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Amend. 14. Finally, it alleged that it had no plain, speedy and efficient remedy at law or in equity in the state courts2 and that the collection of the taxes and penalties by the means provided in the statute would cause it irreparable injury. The District Court took jurisdiction, held that the Act did not apply to petitioner and granted the injunction sought. Spector Motor Service v", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00392", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00547", "text": "318 U.S. 523, 549, 63 S.Ct. 727, 742, 87 L.Ed. 959. The Commission must then determine the result of the balloting and certify to the judge 'the results of such submission.' § 77, sub. e. The court then'will confirm' the plan if satisfied (1) that the requisite percentage of each class of creditors and stockholders has been obtained and (2) 'that such acceptances have not been made or procured by any means forbidden by law'. § 77, sub. e. (Italics added.) On confirmation of the plan by the court, the plan and order of confirmation'will, subject to the right of judicial review,' be binding upon the debtor and stockholders and 'all creditors secured or unsecured, whether or not adversely affected by the plan, and whether or not their claims will have been filed, and, if filed, whether or not approved, including creditors who have not, as well as those who have, accepted it.' § 77, sub. f. 30 Section 77, sub. f also provides that on confirmation of the plan the debtor or any other corporation organized to carry out the plan'will have full power and authority to, and will put into effect and carry out the plan and the orders of the judge relative thereto, under and subject to the supervision and the control of the judge, the laws of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary despite.' (Italics added.) And § 77, sub. j, with exceptions not material here, gives the court power to enjoin or stay the commencement of any suit against the debtor until after final decree.1 31 The control of the court over the acceptance of the plan and over its confirmation is one of the historic instances of the 'exclusive jurisdiction' vested in the court by § 77, sub. a. The exclusive jurisdiction of the reorganization court is one which previously we have zealously guarded against encroachments by state courts. See Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 66 S.Ct. 937, 90 L.Ed. 1132. That exclusive jurisdiction is not restricted to protection of the court's possession of the property and operation of the business. Section 77, sub. e gives the reorganization court the sole authority to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00236", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00549", "text": "-jury derived from the testimony of at least one other witness who had previously given evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when that witness testified and so far as appears was not even aware that he had testified. Based on its beliefs thus formed—that petitioner's story did not 'jell'—the judge-grand jury immediately charged him with contempt, immediately convicted him, and immediately sentenced him to sixty days in jail. Under these circumstances of haste and secrecy, petitioner, of course, had no chance to enjoy the benefits of counsel, no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity either to cross examine the other grand jury witness or to summon witnesses to refute the charge against him. 4 Three days later a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf in the Michigan Supreme Court the petition for habeas corpus now under consideration. It alleged among other things that the petitioner's attorney had not been allowed to confer with him and that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, the petitioner was not held in jail under any judgment, decree or execution, and was 'not confined by virtue of any legal commitment directed to the sheriff as required by law.' An order was then entered signed by the circuit judge that he had while'sitting as a One-Man Grand Jury' convicted the petitioner of contempt of court because petitioner had testified 'evasively' and had given 'contradictory answers' to questions. The order directed that petitioner 'be confined in the county jail * * * for a period of sixty days * * * or until such time as he * * * will appear and answer the questions previously propounded to him by this Court * * *.' 5 The Supreme Court of Michigan, on grounds detailed in the companion case of Petition of Dohany (In re Hartley), 317 Mich. 441, 27 N.W.2d 48,2 rejected petitioner's contention that the summary manner in which he had been sentenced to jail in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had depi ved him of his liberty without affording him the kind of notice, opportunity to defend himself, and trial which the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires.3 Petition of Dohany (Ex Parte Oliver), 318 Mich. 7, 27 N.W.2d 323. We granted certiorari, 332 U.S. 755, 68 S.Ct. 76, to consider these procedural due process", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00141", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00550", "text": "Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report-- (1) describing the extent of contamination by depleted uranium at each site studied by the Administrator under subsection (b); (2) providing site-specific recommendations for the mitigation and cleanup of each such site; and (3) providing general recommendations regarding the cleanup of sites where depleted uranium has been used on foreign lands. SEC. 9. ENVIRONMENTAL MITIGATION AND CLEANUP REQUIREMENTS. (a) Department of Defense Cleanup Plan.--Not later than one year after receiving the report under section 8(c), the Secretary of Defense will develop a plan for mitigation and cleanup at each site and a prioritized list for such cleanups. The Secretary will submit a copy of the plan to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate. (b) Report.--The Secretary will submit a report to those committees and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency each year before commencement of the mitigations and cleanups until those projects are complete. (c) Cleanup.--After filing of such plans, the Secretary will commence, or contract for, the mitigation and cleanup of each site for which the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has recommended such mitigation and cleanup and in the manner and scope that the Administrator's report specifies. (d) Applicability of NEPA.--despite any other provision of law, the cleanup and mitigation required by subsection (c) will be carried out in a manner consistent with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, without regard to any exemption to any of the provisions of that Act for the Department of Defense or any element of it.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 359, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00849", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00551", "text": "-kind contribution for non-federal share.--The Secretary may accept as part of the non-Federal cost share the contribution of such in-kind services by the District as the Secretary determines will contribute to the conduct and completion of the study. SEC. 4. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT. All planning, design, and construction of the Project authorized by this Act will be undertaken in accordance with a cooperative agreement between the Secretary and the District for the Project. Such cooperative agreement will set forth in a manner acceptable to the Secretary and the District the responsibilities of the District for participating in the study and related environmental review, including, but not limited to: (1) preparation of an assessment of the need for the project; (2) preparation of feasibility and reconnaissance studies; (3) environmental review; (4) engineering and design; (5) construction; and (6) the administration of contracts pertaining to any of the foregoing. SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE MADERA WATER SUPPLY AND ENHANCEMENT PROJECT. (a) Authorization of Construction.--Upon submission of feasibility report described in section 3 and a statement by the Secretary that the project is feasible, the Secretary, acting under the Federal reclamation laws (Act of June 17, 1902; 32 Stat. 388), and Acts amendatory of it or supplementary thereto, as far as those laws are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, is authorized to enter into a cooperative agreement through the Bureau with the District for the support of the design, and construction of the Project. (b) Cost Share.--The Federal share of the capital costs of the Project will not exceed 25 percent of the total cost. Capital costs incurred by the District prior to the date of the enactment of this Act will be considered a portion of the non-Federal cost share. (c) In-Kind Services.--In-kind services performed by the District will be considered a part of the local cost share to complete the Project authorized by subsection (a). (d) Credit for Non-Federal Work.--The District will receive credit toward the non-Federal share of the cost of the Project for-- (1) reasonable costs incurred by the District as a result of participation in the planning, design, and construction of the Project; and (2) for the fair market value of lands used or acquired by the District for the Project. (e) Limitation.--The Secretary will not provide funds for the operation or", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01063", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00552", "text": "B, Thyssengas and VNG are considered to have a dominant position in their own region. Oligopolistic dominance (246) Market growth is expected to remain steady at, at most, 2 to 3 % per year. because the parties have indicated that as a result of such a growth there might be a supply gap [...]* onwards, such market growth cannot but be considered moderate at most. (247) The price elasticity for gas demand is limited: it is rather price inelastic. There are numerous indications in the file that a \"price war\" would destroy the margin for everybody and that both producers and wholesale transmission companies (see the section on \"the old demarcation regions are still relevant in view of the fear for retaliation\" above) are aware of this and act accordingly. (248) In the light of the uncompetitive nature of the market as discussed above, the limited growth of the market and the limited sensitivity of demand to price movements, the Commission considers that there is already pre-merger an oligopolistic dominant position between at least Ruhrgas, BEB and Thyssengas on the German long-distance wholesale transmission market. (249) The best illustration of the existence of a collective dominant position is that BASF, probably the largest user of natural gas in Germany, considered it necessary to invest in an own pipeline network to have access to cheaper gas. It has used the leverage of its demand to help to create Wingas. Result of the merger Mobil - uniquely placed to be a protagonist in a more liberalised German gas market (250) Mobil currently holds a [0 to 10]* % market share. This is however a significant underestimate of its competitive potential in the German market. [...]*. (251) Mobil is in a somewhat atypical situation in Germany. Mobil produces a substantial part of the German gas ([...]* %) and thereby accounts for [...]* % of German gas consumption. Mobil also has an equity interest in Erdgas Münster and in Ruhrgas (Supervisory Board member). It is therefore a part of the German gas establishment. This is probably the reason why Mobil was able to import gas without having its own high-pressure pipeline network by means of TPA with especially BEB (their close partner in the German production). [...]*. (252) [...]* (253) The potential of Mobil bringing more competition into the German market thanks to liberalisation will completely disappear. Unlike Mobil", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00671", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00553", "text": "the marketing of seed and propagating material of certain varieties; because the Federal Republic of Germany has applied for such authorization for a certain number of varieties of different species, including some of the varieties officially accepted in Portugal referred to above; because the varieties Ellire (Italian ryegrass) and Aurora (perennial ryegrass) have been the subject of official trials in Germany; because, in respect of the variety Ellire, the results of the trials show that in the Federal Republic of Germany, when compared with the national rules governing the acceptance of varieties there, which apply within the framework of current Community provisions, it is not distinct from another variety accepted there (Article 15 (3) (a), first case, of Directive 70/457/EEC); because the examination of this case has led to some doubts concerning the appraisal of its distinctness in the Member State of acceptance, in the terms of Article 12a (1) of Directive 70/457/EEC; because these doubts need to be clarified; because the application in respect of the variety Aurora is now being carefully examined by the Commission; because it is impossible to complete the clarification and examination before the time limit specified in Article 15 (1) of Directive 70/457/EEC; because the time limit in question should therefore, where the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, be extended for an appropriate period in order to allow complete clarification and examination in respect of these two varieties (Article 15 (7) of Directive 70/457/EEC); because the variety of oats concerned is of the winter type; because the varieties of maize concerned have a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) maturity class index over 350; because it is well known that the varieties of winter oats and varieties of maize which have an FAO maturity class over 350 are at present unsuitable for cultivation in the Federal Republic of Germany (Article 15 (3) (c), second case, of Directive 70/457/EEC); because, therefore, the application of the Federal Republic of Germany in respect of these varieties should be granted in full; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Seed and Propagating Material for Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Federal Republic of Germany is authorized to prohibit the marketing in its territory of seed of the following varieties", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00774", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00554", "text": "be provided confidential access to information relating to the employee provided under this Act to the authorized employer. (3) Providing records.--Upon receipt of a background check request from an authorized employer, submitted through the State identification bureau or other entity authorized by the Attorney General, the Attorney General will-- (A) search the appropriate records of the Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (B) promptly provide any identification and criminal history records resulting from the background checks to the submitting State identification bureau or other entity authorized by the Attorney General. (4) Frequency of requests.--An employer may request a background check for an employee only once every 12 months of continuous employment by that employee unless the employer has good cause to submit additional requests. (b) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General will issue such final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to carry out this Act, including-- (1) measures relating to the security, confidentiality, accuracy, use, submission, dissemination, and destruction of information and audits, and recordkeeping; (2) standards for qualification as an authorized employer; and (3) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for conducting the background checks. (c) Criminal Penalty.--Whoever falsely certifies that he meets the applicable standards for an authorized employer or who knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained under this Act other than for the purpose of determining the suitability of an individual for employment as a private security officer will be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both. (d) User Fees.-- (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may-- (A) collect fees under regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to process background checks provided for by this Act; (B) despite the provisions of section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, retain and use such fees for salaries and other expenses incurred in providing such processing; and (C) establish such fees at a level to include an additional amount to remain available until expended to defray expenses for the automation of fingerprint identification and criminal justice information services and associated costs. (2) State costs.--Nothing in this Act will be construed as restricting the right of a State to assess a reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the costs to the State of administering this Act. (e) State Opt Out.--A State may", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00837", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00555", "text": ", the Commission will, by rule or regulation, establish disqualification provisions under which a person will not be eligible to utilize the exemption under subsection (a)(6), or to participate in the affairs of a crowdfunding intermediary facilitating the use of that exemption. Such provisions will be substantially similar to the disqualification provisions contained in the regulations adopted in accordance with section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (1512 U.S.C. 77d note). ``(3) Restricted securities.--Securities issued under a transaction described in subsection (a)(6) will be considered restricted securities, subject to a one-year holding period.''. SEC. 3. EXCLUSION OF CROWDFUNDING INVESTORS FROM SHAREHOLDER CAP. Section 12(g)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(5)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``For the purposes'' and inserting: ``(A) In general.--For the purposes''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) Exclusion for persons holding certain securities.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `held of record' will not include holders of securities issued under transactions described under section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933.''. SEC. 4. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW. Section 18(b)(4) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77r(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following: ``(C) section 4(a)(6);''. SEC. 5. STATE FRAUD AUTHORITY. Section 18(c)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77r(c)(1)) is amended by striking ``or dealer'' and inserting ``, dealer, or crowdfunding intermediaries''. SEC. 6. NOTICE FILINGS PERMITTED. Section 18(c)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77r(c)(2)) is amended by inserting after subsection (D) the following: ``(E) Fees not permitted on crowdfunded securities.--despite subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), no filing or fee may be required with respect", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00878", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00556", "text": "need supporting argument and citation of authorities.' 24 On May 28, 1945, an article said: 'Browning accepted Tarlton's one-page motion and, without permitting argument or citation of authorities to support the motion, ruled that it be granted. The effect of this ruling was that Browning took the matter from the jury.' 25 That article also included the following statement made by Mayes' attorney to the jury on May 27, 1945: 26 'However, I now advise you that under the law, Judge Browning has the right to compel you, even against the dictates of your conscience, to sign the verdict he has ordered. 27 'As a matter of fact, it is probable that he has the power to put you in jail until such time as you do sign it, and I rather imagine, from what has previously taken place in this trial, that unless you do sign the verdict, he will cause you to be put in jail. 28 'As I and my clients feel that you have done all in your power to register your protest and revulsion of feeling at the effect of this decision reached by Judge Browning; as you are helpless to do anything further; and as making you suffer by remaining locked up will not do us a bit of good, I suggest that you sign the verdict and return to your homes with a clear conscience of having done all that you could to protect the rights of a man whom I feel, and evidently you feel, has been done a gross injustice. 29 'While we have no appeal from the court's decision in this case, we do have the right again to appeal to his conscience by presenting a motion for new trial in this action—and which motion we will file and argue strenuously with the hope that in the meantime, he will see the error committed and will rectify the same. 30 'There cannot be any doubt but that the action of you men in registering your protest against this decision, as you have done, will affect him. At least I can only hope that it will. I sincerely thank you.' On May 30, 1945, an editorial stated: 31 'Browning's behavior and attitude has brought down the wrath of public opinion upon his head, properly so. Emotions have been aggravated. American people simply don't like the idea of such goings on, especially when a man in the service of his country seems to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00079", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00557", "text": "that the Union would not agree to such a clause so long as it covered matters subject to the duty to bargain collectively under the Labor Act. 4 Several further bargaining sessions were held without reaching agreement on the Union's proposal or respondent's counterproposal to unlimited arbitration. As a result, the management functions clause was 'by-passed' for bargaining on other terms of the Union's contract proposal. On January 17, 1949, respondent stated in writing its agreement with some of the terms proposed by the Union and, where there was disagreement, respondent offered counter-proposals, including a clause entitled 'Functions and Prerogatives of Management' along the lines suggested at the meeting of January 10th. The Union objected to the portion of the clause providing: 5 'The right to select and hire, to promote to a better position, to discharge, demote or discipline for cause, and to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees and to determine the schedules of work is recognized by both union and company as the proper responsibility and prerogative of management to be held and exercised by the company, and while it is agreed that an employee feeling himself to have been aggrieved by any decision of the company in respect to such matters, or the union in his behalf, will have the right to have such decision reviewed by top management officials of the company under the grievance machinery from now on set forth, it is further agreed that the final decision of the company made by such top management officials will not be further reviewable by arbitration.' 6 At this stage of the negotiations, the National Labor Relations Board filed a complaint against respondent based on the Union's charge that respondent had refused to bargain as required by the Labor Act and was thereby guilty of interfering with the rights of its employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and of unfair labor practices under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act.3 While the proceeding was pending, negotiations between the Union and respondent continued with the management functions clause remaining an obstacle to agreement. During the negotiations, respondent established new night shifts and introduced a new system of lunch hours without consulting the Union. 7 On May 19, 1949, a Union representative offered a second contract proposal which included a management functions clause containing much of the language found in respondent's second counterproposal, quoted above, with the vital difference that questions arising under the Union's proposed clause would be subject to arbitration as in the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00450", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00558", "text": "ion and sovereignty rested in the United States and over which Congress had complete legislative authority.' Compare also Borax Consolidated, Ltd., v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15, 56 S.Ct. 23, 25, 80 L.Ed. 9. 36 23 Stat. 27: 'Sec. 12. That the Secretary of the Interior will select two of the officers to be appointed under this act, who, together with the governor, will constitute a commission to examine into and report upon the condition of the Indians residing in said Territory, what lands, if any, should be reserved for their use, what provision will be made for their education what rights by occupation of settlers should be recognized, and all other facts that may be necessary to enable Congress to determine what limitations or conditions should be imposed when the land laws of the United States will be extended to said district; and to defray the expenses of said commission the sum of two thousand dollars is appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.' 37 'The General Land Laws of the United States should be extended over the Territory as early as possible. The natives claim only the land on which their houses are built and some garden patches near their villages; they ask or expect nothing more. A deed for their lots in severalty would be a very highly prized document by them. The fisheries occupied by them before the advent of the Whites should also be secured to them against encroachment. They ask only the same rights and protection given the white man.' 38 'Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by the laws of the United States, do make known and proclaim that the waters within three thousand feet from the shore lines at mean low tide of Annette Island, Ham Island, Walker Island, Lewis Island, Spire Island, Hemlock Island, and adjacent rocks and islets, located within the area segregated by the broken line upon the diagram to this attached and made a part of this proclamation; also the bays of said islands, rocks, and islets, are reserved for the benefit of the Metlakahtlans and such other Alaskan natives as have joined them or may join them in residence on these islands, to be used by them under the general fisheries laws and regulations of the United States as administered by the Secretary", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00281", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00559", "text": "market. (38) According to Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation an adjustment on the normal value can only be granted for import duties borne by the like product and by raw materials physically incorporated there, when intended for consumption in the exporting country and refunded (or not collected) in respect of the product exported to the Community. It should be noted that in this case, the exporter based its claim for duty drawback merely on the amount of import duties refunded upon exportation of PET. According to the Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme (\"DEPB scheme\") applicable to the company, a duty refund upon exportation was granted regardless of whether raw materials for the production of the like product were imported or not. Moreover, the actual amount of the relevant import charges paid on raw materials for the PET sold on the domestic market during the IP and refunded or not collected when exporting the product concerned to the Community was not provided by the company in its questionnaire response or during the on-the-spot verification visit. It follows that the company could not demonstrate that the import duties refunded were included in the domestic price. Consequently, it could not be established that price comparability was affected and the claim had to be rejected. (39) The same Indian exporting producer claimed finally that the provisional findings of the anti-dumping investigation were in contradiction with the provisional findings in the parallel anti-subsidy proceeding. It was argued that it would be incorrect to reject the company's claim for a duty drawback adjustment in the context of the anti-dumping investigation, when at the same time the DEPB scheme from which the company benefits had been considered as an export subsidy in the context of the anti-subsidy proceeding. (40) This argument cannot be accepted. Indeed, in the context of the parallel anti-subsidy investigation it was found that the scheme which gave right to a customs duty refund or a duty-free import, as the case may be, is a countervailable export subsidy, and not a bona fide duty drawback scheme for the purpose of Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community(4) (the \"basic Anti-subsidy Regulation\"). under Article 14(1) of the basic Regulation, this countervailing duty will be deducted from any anti-dumping duty. Thus, to make the requested adjustment here, on top of this deduction, would amount", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00822", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00560", "text": "So the value of the federal property was, in part, the measure of the tax. We held the substance of this procedure was 'to lay an ad valorem general property tax on property owned by the United States', Id., 322 U.S. at page 185, 64 S.Ct. at page 915, and therefore invalid. Our holding was not 'dependent upon the ultimate resting place of the economic burden of the tax.' Id., 322 U.S. at page 189, 64 S.Ct. at page 916. 10 This tax was imposed because Esso stored gasoline. It is not, as the Allegheny County tax was, based on the worth of the government property. Instead, the amount collected is graduated in accordance with the exercise of Esso's privilege to engage in such operations; so it is not 'on' the federal property as was Pennsylvania's. Federal ownership of the fuel will not immunize such a private contractor from the tax on storage. It may generally, as it did here, burden the United States financially. But since James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 151, 58 S.Ct. 208, 217, 82 L.Ed. 155, this has been no fatal flaw. We must look further, and find either a stated immunity created by Congress in the exercise of a constitutional power,1 or one arising by implication from our constitutional system of dual government.2 11 Neither condition applies to the kind of governmental operations here involved. There is no claim of a stated immunity. And we find none implied. The United States, today, is engaged in vast and complicated operations in business fields, and important purchasing, financial, and contract transactions with private enterprise. The Constitution does not extend sovereign exemption from state taxation to corporations or individuals, contracting with the United States, merely because their activities are useful to the Government. We hold, therefore, that sovereign immunity does not prohibit this tax. 12 Appellants press a further point, that the Tennessee courts have discriminated against the Federal Government by the result in this case. They point to the fact that previously, specifically in Tennessee Oil Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn. 683, 157 S.W.2d 267, 162 S.W.2d 1081, a claim of immunity by a public body was sustained where the public body had", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00496", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00561", "text": "Article 175(1), in conjunction with Article 300 of the Treaty, ruling that both Articles 133 and 175(1), in conjunction with the relevant provisions of Article 300, were the appropriate legal basis. (3) The Court's judgment does not affect the Community's status as Party to the Convention. In accordance with Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the deposit of a new instrument of ratification is therefore not required. A new Council Decision approving the Rotterdam Convention is however necessary together with an amended Declaration of competence to reflect the change in the legal base, in accordance with Article 25(3) of the Rotterdam Convention. (4) To ensure legal certainty and to avoid a legal void, it is appropriate for this Decision to take effect from the date at which Decision 2003/106/EC was adopted, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade signed in Rotterdam on 11 September 1998, (from now on referred to as ‘the Rotterdam Convention’), is approved on behalf of the Community. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to deposit, on behalf of the Community, the Declaration of competence set out in the Annex to this Decision, in accordance with Article 25(3) of the Rotterdam Convention. Article 3 This Decision will take effect from 19 December 2002. Done at Brussels, 25 September 2006.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 320, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00533", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00562", "text": "COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/42/EC of 27 July 1994 amending Directive 64/432/EEC on health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particualr Article 43 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2), Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3), because the Council has adopted Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market (4) and Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries (5); because it is necessary, in the light of this situation, to amend Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine (6), in particular concerning the period of presence in a Member State prior to movement and the rules for trade in animals under thirty days of age, HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Directive 64/432/EEC is amended as follows: 1. In Article 2, the following point will be inserted; 'collection centre: will mean any site, including holdings and markets, at which bovine animals or swine originating from different holdings are grouped together to form consignments of animals intended for trade, which has the equipment and facilities required for holding animals and which is placed under the care of the veterinary authority responsible. The latter will take all the measures needed to ensure that, for the animals passing through it, this collection centre constitutes an animal health unit of the level required by this Directive which is cleared of animals, eaned and disinfected after each sale and the admission of further animals. These collection centres must be approved for trading purposes'; 2. In Article 3, the following will be added to point 2 (i): 'However, where several destinations are involved, the animals must be regrouped in as many consignments as there are destiantions. Each consignment must", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00757", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00563", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act''. SEC. 2. FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER BIOMETRIC INFORMATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. (a) In General.--despite any other provision of law, including section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act of 1974''), the Secretary of Homeland Security will use the fingerprints provided by an individual at the time the individual enlisted in the United States Armed Forces, or at the time the individual filed an application for adjustment of status, to satisfy any requirement for background and security checks in connection with an application for naturalization if-- (1) the individual may be naturalized under section 328 or 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1439, 1440); (2) the individual was fingerprinted and provided other biometric information in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Defense at the time the individual enlisted in the United States Armed Forces; (3) the individual-- (A) submitted an application for naturalization not later than 24 months after the date on which the individual enlisted in the United States Armed Forces; or (B) provided the required biometric information to the Department of Homeland Security through a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Application Support Center at the time of the individual's application for adjustment of status if filed not later than 24 months after the date on which the individual enlisted in the United States Armed Forces; and (4) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the biometric information provided, including fingerprints, is sufficient to conduct the required background and security checks needed for the applicant's naturalization application. (b) More Timely and Effective Adjudication.--Nothing in this section precludes an individual described in subsection (a) from submitting a new set of biometric information, including fingerprints, to the Secretary of Homeland Security with an application for naturalization. If the Secretary determines that submitting a new set of biometric information, including fingerprints, would result in more timely and effective adjudication of the individual's naturalization application, the Secretary will-- (1) inform the individual of such determination; and (2) provide the individual with a description of how to submit such biometric information, including fingerprints. (c) Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00985", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00564", "text": "Picketing is largely immunized from control on the ground that it is free speech, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, and police may not regulate sound trucks and loud-speakers, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574, though the Court finds them an evil that may be prohibited altogether. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448. And one-third of the Court has gone further and declared that a position 'that the state may prevent any conduct which induces people to violate the law, or any advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. * * *' and it is only we who can decide when the limit is passed. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 102, 68 S.Ct. 397, 400, 92 L.Ed. 562. Whatever the merits of any one of these decisions in isolation, and there were sound reasons for some of them, it cannot be denied that their cumulative effect has been a sharp handicap on municipal control of the streets and a dramatic encouragement of those who would use them in a battle of ideologies. 91 I do not think we should carry this handicap further, as we do today, but should adhere to the principles previously announced to safeguard our liberties against abuse as well as against invasion. It should not be necessary to recall these elementary principles, but it has been a long time since some of them were even mentioned in this Court's writing on the subject and results indicate they may have been overlooked. 92 I begin with the oft-forgotten principle which this case demonstrates, that freedom of speech exists only under law and not independently of it. What would Terminiello's theoretical freedom of speech have amounted to had he not been given active aid by the officers of the law? He could reach the hall only with this help, could talk only because they restrained the mob, and could make his getaway only under their protection. We would do well to recall the words of Chief Justice Hughes in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00265", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00565", "text": "the occasion. 'I instruct you that in determining whether or not the defendant acted purposely and with premeditated and deliberated malice, it is your duty to take into consideration defendant's mental condition and all factors relating thereto, and that even though you may not find him legally insane, if, in fact, his mentality was impaired, that evidence bears upon these factors, and it is your duty to consider sider this evidence along with all the other evidence in the case.' R. 332. 9 R. 321, 324. 10 Or. Comp.Laws 1940, § 26—846 (requiring notice of purpose to show insanity as defense); id., § 26—955 (providing for verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and consequent commitment to asylum by judge). After defining legal insanity, the trial court instructed the jury: 'In this case, evidence has been introduced relating to the mental capacity and condition of the defendant... at the time (the girl) is alleged to have been killed, and if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed her in the manner alleged in the indictment, or within the lesser degrees included there, then you are to consider the mental capacity of the defendant at the time the homicide is alleged to have been committed.' R. 327 (emphasis supplied). 11 Deady's Gen.Laws of Or., 1845—1864, Code of Crim.Proc., § 204. 12 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (H.L., 1843). 13 Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (9th ed., Sturge, 1950), 6; cf. Sodeman v. The King, (1936) W.N. 190 (P.C.); see Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935) A.C. 462, 475. 14 Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933), 151—155. 'Clear proof' was sometimes interpreted to mean proof beyond a reasonable doubt, e.g., State v. De Rance, 1882, 34 La.Ann. 186, and sometimes to mean proof by a preponderance of the evidence, e.g., Hurst v. State, 1899, 40 Tex.Crim. 378,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00460", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00566", "text": "on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2004.--despite any other provision of law, all adjustments made under section 110(a)(2) of title 23, United States Code, to sums authorized to be appropriated from the Highway Trust Fund (other than the Mass Transit Account) to carry out each of the Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction programs (other than emergency relief) in fiscal year 2004 will be deemed to be zero. (e) Sense of Congress on Adjustment to Align Highway Spending With Revenues.--It is the sense of Congress that, in any multiyear reauthorization of the Federal-aid highway program, the alignment of highway spending with revenues under section 251(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 should be restructured to minimize year-to-year fluctuations in highway spending levels and to ensure the uniform enforcement of such levels. SEC. 11. LEVEL OF OBLIGATION LIMITATIONS. (a) Highway Category.--Section 8103(a) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (2 U.S.C. 901 note; 112 Stat. 492) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4); (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(6) for fiscal year 2004, $34,498,000,000.''. (b) Mass Transit Category.--Section 8103(b) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 901 note; 112 Stat. 492) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4); (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(6) for fiscal year 2004, $7,303,000,000.''. (c) Treatment of Funds.--despite any other provision of law, funds made available under this Act, including the amendments made by this Act, will be deemed to be zero for the purposes of section 110 of the title 23, United States Code. SEC. 12. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF TRUST FUNDS FOR OBLIGATIONS UNDER TEA 21.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01121", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00567", "text": "533 (this case below); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 156 F.2d 899; United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 152 F.2d 161. 4 'Sec. 5. (a) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful. 'The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, * * * from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. '(b) Whenever the Commission will have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, and if it will appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect of it would be to the interest of the public, it will issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place there fixed * * *. If upon such hearing the Commission will be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this Act, it will make a e port in writing in which it will state its findings as to the facts and will issue and cause to be served on such person, partnership, or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice. * * *' 52 Stat. 111, 112, 15 U.S.C. § 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45. 5 Sec. 2. (a) * * * It will be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, * * * where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing contained will prevent diferentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00162", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00568", "text": "1951, under Executive Order No. 10233, and a strike has been called for 12:01 A.M., April 9, 1952; and 418 'because a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field; and 419 'because in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as from now on provided: 420 'Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is ordered as follows: 421 '1. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies named in the list attached to this, or any part of it, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation of it and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation * * *.'22 422 The next morning, April 9, 1952, the President addressed the following Message to Congress: 423 'To the Congress of the United States: 424 'The Congress is undoubtedly aware of the recent events which have taken place in connection with the management-labor dispute in the steel industry. These events culminated in the action which was taken last night to provide for temporary operation of the steel mills by the Government. 425 'I took this action with the utmost reluctance. The idea of Government operation of the steel mills is thoroughly distasteful to me and I want to see it ended as soon as possible. However, in the situation which confronted me yesterday, I felt that I could make no other choice. The other alternatives appeared to be even worse—so much worse that I could not accept them. 426 'One alternative would have been to permit a shut-down in the steel industry. The effects of such a shut-down would have been so immediate and damaging with respect to our efforts to support our Armed Forces and to protect our national security that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00456", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00569", "text": "61(a), and ``(B) subsection (a)(1)(B) will not apply. ``(2) Making of election.--An election under this subsection will be made at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe. Such election will apply for the taxable year for which it is made and for all subsequent taxable years and may be revoked only with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury. ``(c) Effect on Qualified Rehabilitation Expenditures and Rehabilitation Credits.--For purposes of determining the rehabilitation credit allowable to a taxpayer under section 47, the transfer or allocation of State historic tax credits with respect to any property by a taxpayer will not affect or reduce the amount of qualified rehabilitation expenditures (as defined in section 47(c)(2)) incurred in connection with such property, nor will such transfer or disposition, nor any basis adjustments under subsection (a), be treated as an early disposition of investment credit property for purposes of the recapture provisions of section 50, despite any reduction in basis under paragraph (a)(2)(C). ``(d) State Historic Tax Credits Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term `State historic tax credit' means any credit against State or local tax liabilities which-- ``(1) is allowable under the laws of any State or political subdivision of it to a taxpayer with respect to expenditures made for the rehabilitation of property identified by such laws, and ``(2) can be allocated, disposed, or refunded under such laws.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for such part III is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 139E the following new item: ``Sec. 139F. Dispositions of State historic tax credits.''. (c) Effective Date.--This section will apply to transfers or dispositions made, or refunds received, after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 7. MODIFICATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN TAX-EXEMPT USE PROPERTY. (a) In General.--Section 47(c)(2)(B)(v)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax-exempt use property) is amended by inserting ``and subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of section 168(h)(1)(B)(ii) will not apply'' after ``of it''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section will apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01029", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00570", "text": "the obligations vested here were 'within the United States' and thus come within the presumably narrower terms of the Executive Order. 7 Section 9(n) was added in 1928 by the Settlement of War Claims Act, 45 Stat. 254, which provided in general for the return of 80% of all seized property. The purpose of § 9(n) was to authorize the President, where he had seized a stock or bond interest without seizing the instrument itself, to make such 80% return to the current holder of the instrument. See H.R.Rep. No. 17, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 21; S.Rep. No. 273, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 30. 8 See §§ 5(b)(2) and 7(e). 9 Such recovery will not be prevented by § 7(c) of the Act. That subsection provides in part: 'The sole relief and remedy of any person having any claim to any money or other property previously or hereafter conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian, or required so to be, or seized by him will be that provided by the terms of this Act * * *.' Petitioners, however, will not be claiming 'any money or other property * * * conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian, or required so to be, or seized by him * * *.' Rather they will be claiming just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for a taking of their property. Therefore the provision quoted above will not apply to them.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 343, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00436", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00571", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 43/2002 of 10 January 2002 fixing the maximum export refund on common wheat in connection with the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 943/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1666/2000(2), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 of 29 June 1995 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 on the granting of export refunds on cereals and the measures to be taken in the event of disturbance on the market for cereals(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 602/2001(4), and in particular Article 4 of it, because: (1) An invitation to tender for the refund on exportation of common wheat to all third countries with the exclusion of Poland was opened under Commission Regulation (EC) No 943/2001(5). (2) Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 provides that the Commission may, on the basis of the tenders notified, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 23 of Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92, decide to fix a maximum export refund taking account of the criteria referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1501/95. In that case a contract is awarded to any tenderer whose bid is equal to or lower than the maximum refund. (3) The application of the abovementioned criteria to the current market situation for the cereal in question results in the maximum export refund being fixed at the amount specified in Article 1. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For tenders notified from 4 to 10 January 2002, under the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 943/2001, the maximum refund on exportation of common wheat will be EUR 0,00/t. Article 2", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00516", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00572", "text": "SEIZED EXPLOSIVES THAT ARE UNSAFE. Section 844(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(c)''; and (2) by adding after and below the end the following: ``(2) despite paragraph (1), in the case of the seizure of any explosive materials for any offense for which the materials would be subject to forfeiture in which it would be impracticable or unsafe to remove the materials to a place of storage or would be unsafe to store them, the seizing officer may destroy the explosive materials immediately. Any destruction under this paragraph will be in the presence of at least 1 credible witness. The seizing officer will make a report of the seizure and take such samples as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe. ``(3) Within 60 days after any destruction of property under paragraph (2), the owner of (including any person having an interest in) the property may apply to the Secretary for reimbursement of an amount equal to the fair market value of the property. If the claimant establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the seizure was wrongful, the Secretary will make an allowance to the claimant not exceeding the fair market value of the property destroyed.''. SEC. 107. FORFEITURE OF INSTRUMENTALITIES OF EXPLOSIVES OFFENSES. (a) Civil Forfeiture.--Section 981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(G) Any property, real or personal, involved in a violation of chapter 40 (relating to importation, manufacture, distribution, and storage of explosive materials), or in a conspiracy to commit such a violation, and any other property traceable to such property.''. (b) Criminal Forfeiture.--Section 982(a) of such title is amended by inserting the following: ``(6) The court, in imposing a sentence on a person convicted of a violation of chapter 40 or of conspiring to commit such a violation, will order the person to forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in the violation or in the conspiracy, and any other property traceable to such property.''. TITLE II--PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS. Section 841 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00909", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00573", "text": "cause of action against one completely outside the broadest lines or definitions of employment or employer. We have no doubt that under the Jones Act only one person, firm, or corporation can be sued as employer. Either Cosmopolitan or the Government is that employer.12 The seaman's substantive rights are the same whoever is the employer. Under the Jones Act, his remedy permits him to demand a jury trial. If the Government is the employer, his remedy is in Admiralty without a jury. See the excerpt from the House Report, p. 8, infra. 9 It was said in Hust that the election of remedies granted seamen injured between October 1, 1941, and the effective date of the Clarification Act, March 24, 1943, indicated that a seaman had broader rights before the Clarification Act than he did after. 328 U.S. at page 725, 66 S.Ct. at page 1227, 91 L.Ed. 1968, Part III. The suggestion was that Congress could not have intended to restrict suits against general agents. This statement springs from the Court's then understanding of the Brady case, which we have previously considered. The reason for the election given by the Clarification Act was quite different. It was to give seamen employees of the United States through the War Shipping Administration on public vessels or foreign-flag vessels or otherwise an election to employ the means for redress theretofore possessed by them, such as those mentioned in § of the Clarification Act, note 8, supra, or to enjoy the same rights as similar employees on merchant vessels.13 Nothing has been presented to us from the Act or from its legislative history indicative of congressional purpose to do anything other than to extend existing rights of merchant seamen to all seamen employed through the War Shipping Administration. This was specifically declared in H.R. Rep. No. 107, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21: 10 'The various rights and remedies under statute and general maritime law with respect to death, injury, illness, and other casualty to seamen, have been rather fully set forth hereinabove. Under clause 2 of section 1(a) these substantive rights would be governed by existing law relating to privately employed seamen. The only modification of it arises from the remedial provision that they will be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Suits in Admir", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00324", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00574", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 1755/92 of 30 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 introducing a system of guarantee thresholds for certain processed fruit and vegetable products THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 426/86 of 24 February 1986 on the common organization of the market in products processed from fruit and vegetables (1), and in particular Article 2 (3) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (2), because Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 (3) introduces a system of guarantee thresholds for certain processed fruit and vegetable products and in particular for processed tomato products; because the threshold for the latter should be adjusted to take account of production in the new German Laender and the breakdown of the overall quantity into categories of finished products should be adjusted accordingly; because Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 provides that if the guarantee threshold for processed tomato products is exceeded in a marketing year, the production aid for the following marketing year is to be reduced; because in addition the overrun in the threshold is to be calculated on the basis of the average quantity produced in the three marketing years preceding the marketing year in respect of which the aid is to be fixed; because, under those provisions, on the one hand there should be no financial consequences in the 1992/93 marketing year whatever the quantity processed and on the other hand there should be such consequences in the 1993/94 marketing year only if a quantity approximately one million tonnes over the threshold fixed for the 1992/93 marketing year is processed; because this is an undesirable side effect of the switchover from one system to another; because, given that a policy to control production has been applied to these products for several years, this situation appears to be clearly at variance with the objective of that policy, which is familiar to operators, to bring production into line with possibilities of disposal; because, since the quota system has lapsed, the provisions in force should accordingly be adapted to maintain some discipline and thereby prevent serious imbalance on the market, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 is amended as follows: 1. In Article 1: (", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00572", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00575", "text": "A)) is amended-- (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``fiscal years 1993 and 1994'' and inserting ``fiscal year 1995''; and (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``each''. (b) Rural Multifamily Rental Housing.--Section 515(b) of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1485(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraphs: ``(2) such a loan may be made for a period of up to 50 years from the making of the loan; ``(3) the terms and conditions of such a loan will provide for periodic payments, during the term of the loan, based upon a schedule for complete amortization of the loan over a 50-year period and for payment of any outstanding amounts due under the loan not later than the expiration of the term of the loan;''. (c) Rural Rental Housing Funds for Nonprofit Entities.--The first sentence of section 515(w)(1) of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1485(w)(1)) is amended by striking ``fiscal years 1993 and 1994'' and inserting ``fiscal year 1995''. (d) Loan Guarantees for Rural Multifamily Rental Housing Loans.-- Section 517 of the bill, H.R. 3838 (103d Congress), as passed by the House of Representatives on July 22, 1994, is enacted into law. (e) Eligibility of Area for Rural Homeownership Loans.--Section 502 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1472) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(i) despite section 520, the Secretary may make loans under this section for properties in the Pine View West Subdivision, located in Gibsonville, North Carolina, in the same manner as provided under this section for properties in rural areas.''. (f) Definition of Rural Area.--The last sentence of section 520 of the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C. 1490) is amended by striking ``city of'' and inserting ``cities of South Tucson, Arizona, and''. SEC", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00853", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00576", "text": "D) Relocation of members of the armed forces.-- Paragraph (1) will not apply in the case of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty who moves under a military order and incident to a permanent change of station. ``(3) Joint returns.--In the case of a credit allowed under subsection (a) with respect to a joint return, half of such credit will be treated as having been allowed to each individual filing such return for purposes of this subsection. ``(4) Return requirement.--If the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year is increased under this subsection, the taxpayer will, despite section 6012, be required to file a return with respect to the taxes imposed under this subtitle. ``(d) Limitation Based on Amount of Tax.--In the case of a taxable year to which section 26(a)(2) does not apply, the credit allowed under subsection (a) for any taxable year will not exceed the excess of-- ``(1) the sum of the regular tax liability (as defined in section 26(b)) plus the tax imposed by section 55, over ``(2) the sum of the credits allowable under this subpart (other than this section) for the taxable year. ``(e) Definitions and Special Rules.--For purposes of this section-- ``(1) Principal residence.--The term `principal residence' has the same meaning as when used in section 121. ``(2) Purchase.--In defining the purchase of a principal residence, rules similar to the rules of paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1400C(e) (as in effect on the date of the enactment of this section) will apply. ``(3) Reporting requirement.--Rules similar to the rules of section 1400C(f) (as so in effect) will apply. ``(4) Denial of double benefit.-- ``(A) Coordination with other credits.--No credit will be allowed under this section for any purchase for which a credit is allowed under section 36 or section 1400C. ``(B) Basis adjustment.--For purposes of this subtitle, if a credit is allowed under this section with respect to the purchase of any residence, the basis of such residence will be reduced by the amount of the credit so allowed. ``(f) Application of Section.--This section will not apply to residences purchased during the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this subsection.''. (b) Conforming", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00840", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00577", "text": "them with the mass of other students, we will soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and morality.' 12 Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (Fed. ed., 1905) 272. 12 3 Randall, Life of Thomas Jefferson (1858) 471. 13 19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial edition, 1904) 449. 14 The texts of the Memorial and Remonstrance and the bill against which it was aimed, to wit, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion are set forth in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 28, 63—74, 67 S.Ct. 504, 517, 534—539. 15 See, generally, the dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge, 330 U.S. 1, 28, 67 S.Ct. 504, 517. 16 330 U.S. at pages 72, 73, 67 S.Ct. at page 539: 'Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That for the support of Christian teachers,—per centum on the amount, or—in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is assessed, and will be paid by every person chargeable with the said tax at the time the same will become due; and the Sheriffs of the several Counties will have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner and under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be prescribed by the laws for raising the Revenues of this State. 'And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Collector will give a receipt, expressing there to what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the same will direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account of it in his books. * * *' 17 60 Stat.ch. 281, §§ 4, 11(d)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1753, 1760(d)(3). 18 See Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366, 390, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349, L.R", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00136", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00578", "text": ", under the statutes for the government of it adopted at a general convention (sobor) held in the city of New York on or about or between October fifth to eighth, nineteen hundred thirty-seven, and any amendments thereto and any other statutes or rules previously or hereafter adopted by a general convention (sobor) of the Russian Church in America and will in all other respects conform to, maintain and follow the faith, doctrine, ritual, communion, discipline, canon law, traditions and usages of the Eastern Confession (Eastern Orthodox or Greek Catholic Church). '3. The trustees of every Russian Orthodox church will have the custody and control of all temporalities and property, real and personal, belonging to such church and of the revenues therefrom and will administer the same in accordance with the by-laws of such church, the normal statutes for parishes of the Russian Church in America approved at a general convention (sobor) of it held at Cleveland, Ohio, on or about or between November twentieth or twenty-third, nineteen hundred thirty-four, and any amendments thereto and all other rules, statutes, regulations and usages of the Russian Church in America.' 4 Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 317, 47 S.Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514, 68 S.Ct. 665, 669, 92 L.Ed. 840. The court expressed its conclusion in reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America v. Kedroff, 276 App.Div. 309, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453, which had affirmed the Trial Term. 192 Misc. 327, 77 N.Y.S.2d 333. The Court of Appeals held: 'The only construction which gives meaning to all the language in sections 105 and 107 is that the statute was intended to apply to those Russian Orthodox churches founded and established before 1924 for the purpose of adhering and being subject to the North American Mission or North American Diocese, and to those Russian Orthodox churches founded and established after 1924 for the purpose of adhering and being subject to the autonomous metropolitan district. The majority in the Appellate Division further intimated that to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00467", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00579", "text": ".3 But soon after the entry of the income tax into the federal scene in 1913, separate provision was made for the filing of claims for refund of income taxes 'paid in excess of those properly due.' Section 14(a) of the Revenue Act of 19164 was the first such provision and it made clear that § 3228 was inapplicable to claims of this nature. Section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1918,5 followed by § 252 of the 1921 Act,6 continued this scheme of separate treatment. These later provisions were written so as to include refund claims relating to war-profits and excess-profits taxes as well as those involving income taxes; and a limitation of five years from the date the return was due was placed on the filing of such claims. It was further specified that the procedure there detailed was to be followed 'despite the provisions' of § 3228. 7 Section 252, as it appeared in the 1921 Act, was then changed in 19237 so as to permit claims for refund of income and profits taxes 'paid in excess of that properly due' to be filed within two years after the tax was paid, in addition to the five-year period after the due date of the return. This change was made'so that the taxpayer who has, by agreement with the Treasury, permitted the time for the final assessment of the taxes due from him to be made after the expiration of the five-year period, will not be barred from making a claim for a refund when such assessment is made and the taxpayer alleges that the assessment is illegal.'8 Amending § 252 rather than § 3228 of the Revised Statutes to accomplish this purpose was significant. It was an unequivocal indication that § 252, in speaking of claims for refund of 'excess' payments of income and profits taxes, was designed by its framers to include not only those payments growing out of errors in the preparation of returns but also those payments resulting from illegal or erroneous assessments. See Graham v. Dupont, 262 U.S. 234, 258, 43 S.Ct. 567, 570, 67 L.Ed. 965. 8 The Revenue Act of 19249 transferred the substance of the former § 252 to a new § 281. A four-year period of limitations from the date of the payment of the tax was established, a period coinciding in length", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00124", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00580", "text": ". The Congress consents to the SMART Research and Development Compact if that compact is entered into by two or more of the following States: The State of Delaware, the State of Maryland, the State of New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The compact reads substantially as follows: ``SMART RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMPACT ``ARTICLE I. ``The purpose of this compact is to promote the contribution of the Mid-Atlantic region to the Nation's research and development in science and technology, and to create a multi-State organization that will be known as the SMART (Strengthening the Mid-Atlantic Region for Tomorrow) Organization (from now on in this compact referred to as the `Organization'). The purpose of the Organization is to oversee and help facilitate the acquisition of research and development funding, and to enhance the cooperation, formation of partnerships, and sharing of information among businesses, academic institutions, Federal and State governmental agencies, laboratories, federally owned and operated laboratories, and nonprofit entities, within Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. ``ARTICLE II. ``This compact takes effect upon ratification by two or more of the following States: The State of Delaware, the State of Maryland, the State of New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under the consent of Congress. ``ARTICLE III. ``The States, which are parties to this compact (from now on referred to as `party States'), do establish and create the Organization as a joint organization which will be known as the SMART Organization. ``The leadership of the Organization will consist of a Board of Directors that will include a representative from each party State, appointed as provided by the law of that State, and representatives from each technology class described in Article IV from the party States. Board Members may include any business, academic institution, nonprofit agency, Federal or State governmental agency, laboratory, and federally owned and operated laboratory within the party States. ``The leadership of the Organization will oversee and direct the projects, administration, and policies of the Organization. The Board of Directors may create and utilize the services of technology- designated Working Groups to identify goals and sources of funding, establish research and development projects, detect new technology advances for the region to pursue, and facilitate cooperation among regional entities. The Board of Directors and Working Groups in the Organization will serve without compensation and will hold regular quarterly meetings and such special meetings as their business may require. ``The Organization will adopt bylaws and any other such rules or procedures as may", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00973", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00581", "text": "with the parties concerned as soon as possible. Where, after such consultation, the Commission finds that: - the measures are justified, it will immediately so inform the Member State which took the initiative and the other Member States; where the decision referred to in paragraph 1 is attributed to shortcomings in the testing standards, the Commission will, after consulting the parties concerned, bring the matter before the Committee referred to in Article 18 within two months if the Member State which has taken the decision intends to maintain it and will initiate the procedure referred to in Article 18, - the measures are unjustified, it will immediately so inform the Member State which took the initiative and the manufacturer or his authorized representative established within the Community. 3. Where a non-complying piece of equipment bears the mark, the appropriate measures will be taken by the Member State which has authority over whomsoever affixed the mark; that Member State will inform the Commission and the other Member States of the measures it has taken. 4. The Commission will ensure that the Member States are kept informed of the progress and outcome of this procedure. Article 14 1. despite the provisions of Article 5, in exceptional circumstances of technical innovation, the flag State administration may permit equipment which does not comply with the conformity-assessment procedures to be placed on board a Community ship if it is established by trial or otherwise to the satisfaction of the flag State administration that such equipment is at least as effective as equipment which does comply with the conformity-assessment procedures. In the case of radiocommunications equipment, the flag State administration will require that such equipment does not unduly affect the requirements of the radio-frequency spectrum. 2. Such trial procedures will in no way discriminate between equipment produced in the flag Member State and equipment produced in other States. 3. Equipment covered by this Article will be given a certificate by the flag Member State which will at all times be carried with the equipment and which gives the flag Member State's permission for the equipment to be placed on board the ship and imposes any restrictions or lays down any provisions relating to the use of the equipment. 4. Where a Member State allows equipment covered by this Article to be placed on board a Community ship, that Member State will immediately communicate the particulars of it together with the reports of all relevant trials, assessments and conformity-assessment procedures to the Commission and the other Member States. 5. Equipment such as is referred to in paragraph 1 will be added", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00570", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00582", "text": "the lands to be exchanged adjusted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of section 103 or section 104(d), as appropriate. In order to save administrative costs to the United States, the costs of performing such work, including the appraisals required under this title, will be paid by MCJV or DPSHA for the relevant property, except for the costs of any such work (including appraisal reviews and approvals) that the Secretary is required or elects to have performed by employees of the Department of Agriculture. (c) Federal Land Reservations and Encumbrances.--The Secretary will convey the Federal land under this title subject to valid existing rights, including easements, rights-of-way, utility lines and any other valid encumbrances on the Federal land as of the date of the conveyance under this title. If applicable to the land conveyed, the Secretary will also retain any right of access as may be required by section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)) for remedial or corrective action relating to hazardous substances as may be necessary in the future. (d) Administration of Acquired Land.--The land acquired by the Secretary under this title will become part of the Tonto or Coconino National Forest, as appropriate, and be administered as such in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations generally applicable to the National Forest System. Such land may be made available for domestic livestock grazing if determined appropriate by the Secretary in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations applicable thereto on National Forest System land. (e) Transfer of Land to Park Service.--Upon their acquisition by the United States, the ``Montezuma Castle Contiguous Lands'' identified in section 103(d)(1) will be transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the National Park Service, and will thereafter be permanently incorporated in, and administered by the Secretary of the Interior as part of, the Montezuma Castle National Monument. TITLE II--MENDOCINO NATIONAL FOREST LAND CONVEYANCE SEC. 201. LAND CONVEYANCE, FARAWAY RANCH, MENDOCINO NATIONAL FOREST, CALIFORNIA. (a) Conveyance Required.--Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Agriculture will convey to the owner of the property known as the Faraway Ranch in Lake County, California (in this section referred to", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00857", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00583", "text": "just as it remained a part of the County of Jefferson and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A state may conform its municipal structures to its own plan, so long as the state does not interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction within the federal area by the United States. Kentucky's consent to this acquisition gave the United States power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within the area. A change of municipal boundaries did not interfere in the least with the jurisdiction of the United States within the area or with its use or disposition of the property. The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government. The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction, not fiction, to which we must give heed. 5 This question has been before other state courts, and the right to annex has been upheld. Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 52, 182 S.W.2d 695, 699, 154 A.L.R. 1434; County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1047, 45 S.E.2d 136, 142—143. We agree with these cases and hold that Louisville was free to annex the Ordnance Plant area. 6 Even though the Ordnance Plant is within the boundaries of the City of Louisville under the annexation, exclusive jurisdiction over the area still remains with the United States, except as modified by statute. U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091. Within this jurisdiction, the right to tax income paid to employees of the Government who worked at the Ordnance Plant was granted by 4 U.S.C. §§ 105—110, 4 U.S.C.A. §§ 105—110, known as the Buck Act. Section 106 of this Act reads as follows: 7's 106. Same; income tax 8 '(a) No person will be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority there,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00475", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00584", "text": "on the prices recorded on important third-country markets and on sales concluded in international trade of which the Commission is aware, either directly or through the Member States. Under Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 785/68, the Commission may for this purpose take an average of several prices as a basis, provided that this average is representative of actual market trends. (4) The information must be disregarded if the goods concerned are not of sound and fair marketable quality or if the price quoted in the offer relates only to a small quantity that is not representative of the market. Offer prices which can be regarded as not representative of actual market trends must also be disregarded. (5) If information on molasses of the standard quality is to be comparable, prices must, depending on the quality of the molasses offered, be increased or reduced in the light of the results achieved by applying Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 785/68. (6) A representative price may be left unchanged by way of exception for a limited period if the offer price which served as a basis for the previous calculation of the representative price is not available to the Commission and if the offer prices which are available and which appear not to be sufficiently representative of actual market trends would entail sudden and considerable changes in the representative price. (7) Where there is a difference between the trigger price for the product in question and the representative price, additional import duties should be fixed under the conditions set out in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1422/95. Should the import duties be suspended under Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1422/95, specific amounts for these duties should be fixed. (8) Application of these provisions will have the effect of fixing the representative prices and the additional import duties for the products in question as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. (9) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The representative prices and the additional duties applying to imports of the products referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1422/95 are fixed in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 5 March 2004. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 4 March 2004", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00530", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00585", "text": "5 Indeed, this Court has previously given specific recognition to the rule. Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 157, 45 S.Ct. 280, 286, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790.6 35 Thus, even though agents charged with enforcement of the laws of the United States made a lawful entry onto the farm and despite the fact that a valid arrest was made of a party who was in the act of committing a felony, the Court now holds that the arresting officer in the absence of a search warrant was powerless to make a valid seizure of contraband materials located in plain sight in the structure in which the arrest took place. And this despite the long line of decisions in this Court recognizing as consistent with the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment the power of law-enforcement officers to make reasonable searches and seizures as incidents to lawful arrests. 36 In Agnello v. United States, 1925, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 5, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409, this Court stated: 'The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime * * * as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted. * * * Such searches and seizures naturally and usually appertain to and attend such arrests.'7 And see Weeks v. United States, 1914, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A.1915B, 834, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1177; Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at page 158, 45 S.Ct. at page 287; United States v. Lee, 1927, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202; Marron v. United States, 1927, 275 U.S. 192, 198, 199, 48 S.Ct", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00180", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00586", "text": "years ending after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 3. PUBLIC DEBT REDUCTION TRUST FUND. (a) In General.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following section: ``SEC. 9511. PUBLIC DEBT REDUCTION TRUST FUND. ``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `Public Debt Reduction Trust Fund', consisting of any amount appropriated or credited to the Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). ``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are appropriated to the Public Debt Reduction Trust Fund amounts equivalent to the amounts designated under section 6097 (relating to designation for public debt reduction). ``(c) Expenditures.--Amounts in the Public Debt Reduction Trust Fund will be used by the Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of paying at maturity, or to redeem or buy before maturity, any obligation of the Federal Government included in the public debt (other than an obligation held by the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund, or the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund). Any obligation which is paid, redeemed, or bought with amounts from the Public Debt Reduction Trust Fund will be canceled and retired and may not be reissued.'' (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Sec. 9511. Public Debt Reduction Trust Fund.'' (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section will apply to amounts received after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 4. TAXPAYER-GENERATED SEQUESTRATION OF FEDERAL SPENDING TO REDUCE THE PUBLIC DEBT. (a) Sequestration To Reduce the Public Debt.--Part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended by inserting after section 253 the following new section: ``SEC. 253A. SEQUESTRATION TO REDUCE THE PUBLIC DEBT. ``(a) Sequestration.--despite sections 255 and 256, within 15 days after Congress adjourns to end a session, and on the same day as sequestration (if any", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01065", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00587", "text": "interest there to be transferred within the required time, then the 13th Regional Corporation may transfer all of the land or interest there offered (but not a lesser or greater amount) to the third party specified in the offer, but not for a price less or on terms different from those originally made by the third party. Any land or interest there not transferred by the 13th Regional Corporation to the specified third party not later than 60 days after making the offer to the Regional Corporation will again become subject to the restrictions of this subsection as though it had never been offered. ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, `transfer' means the sale, transfer, or exchange of land or interests there in gravel, oil and gas, minerals, water or timber that have been leased to a third party for consideration, including a lease or royalty payment but does not include an exchange for other land or an interest there within the state of Alaska under section 22(f) of this Act or section 1302(h) of the Alaska National Interest Lands and Conservation Act, mineral or other leasing on commercially reasonable terms, or the pledge, encumbrance or grant of a security interest on commercially reasonable terms.''. SEC. 4. REVENUE SHARING. Section (1)(A) of Section 7(i) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1606(i)) is amended to read as follows: (1)(A) Except as provided by subparagraph (B), 70 percent of all revenues received by each of the 12 Regional Corporations organized under subsection (a) from the timber and subsurface estate patented to it under this Act, and 15 percent of all revenues received by the 13th Regional Corporation organized under subsection (c) from the timber and subsurface estate patented to it under the 13th Regional Corporation Land Entitlement Act, will be divided annually by the Regional Corporation among the 12 Regional Corporations organized under subsection (a) according to the number of Natives enrolled in each region under section 5 of this Act. An additional, 10 percent of such revenues received by the 13th Regional Corporation, will be distributed to the Regional Corporation for the geographical region where the resources giving rise to such revenues are located. If the resources developed are on lands originally withdrawn for selection by a Village Corporation, then one-half of the 10 percent paid to the local Regional Corporation will be distributed", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01083", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00588", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be referred to as the ``Gallatin Range Consolidation and Protection Act of 1993''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds that: (1) It has been the clear policy of the Federal Government since 1925 to consolidate the checkerboard lands along the Gallatin Range north of Yellowstone National Park. (2) These lands north of Yellowstone possess outstanding natural characteristics and wildlife habitat which give them high value as lands added to the National Forest System. (3) Although these lands have remained pristine up till now failure to consolidate at this time will in the near future lead to fragmentation and development. (4) The Federal Government has already invested a great deal in keeping the lands along the Gallatin Range protected from excess development. SEC. 3. PLUM CREEK LAND EXCHANGE--GALLATIN AREA. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Agriculture, from now on called the Secretary, will, subject to the provisions of section 4(b) and section 5(b) and, despite any other law, acquire by exchange and cash equalization in the amount of $3,400,000, certain lands and interests in land of the Plum Creek Timber, L.P. (referred to in this section as the ``company'') in and adjacent to the Hyalite-Porcupine- Buffalo Horn Wilderness Study Area, the Scapegoat Wilderness Area, and other land in the Gallatin National Forest in accordance with this section. (b)(1) Description of Lands.--If the company offers to the United States the fee title, including mineral interests, to approximately 37,752 and \\15/100\\ acres of land owned by the company which is available for exchange to the United States as depicted on a map entitled ``Plum Creek Timber and Forest Service Proposed Gallatin Land Exchange'', dated May 20, 1988, the Secretary will accept a warranty deed to such land and, in exchange therefor, and subject to valid existing rights, recommend that the Secretary of the Interior convey, subject to valid existing rights, by patent the fee title to approximately 12,414 and \\6/100\\ acres of National Forest system lands available for exchange to the company as depicted on such map, subject to-- (A) the reservation of ditches and canals required by the Act entitled ``An Act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01019", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00589", "text": ". While these permitted taxes may in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause. 10 It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable. But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on commerce. Nor is there any warrant in the constitutional principles previously applied by this Court to support the notion that a State may be allowed one single tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of commerce. An exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not because of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a State with the freedom of interstate commerce. Such a tax by the seller State alone must be judged burdensome in the context of the circumstances in which the tax takes effect. Trade being a sensitive plant, a direct tax upon it to some extent at least deters trade even if its effect is not precisely calculable. Many States, for instance, impose taxe on the consumption of goods and such taxes have been sustained regardless of the extra-State origin of the goods, or whether a tax on their sale had been imposed by the seller State. Such potential taxation by consumer States is but one factor pointing to the deterrent effect on commerce by a superimposed gross receipts tax. 11 It has been urged that the force of the decision in the Adams case has been sapped by McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00005", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00590", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 924/2007 of 1 August 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 918/2007 fixing the import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 August 2007 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1249/96 of 28 June 1996 on rules of application (cereal sector import duties) for Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 (2), and in particular Article 2(1) of it, because: (1) The import duties in the cereals sector applicable from 1 August 2007 were fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 918/2007 (3). (2) As the average of the import duties calculated differs by more than EUR 5 a tonne from that fixed, a corresponding adjustment must be made to the import duties fixed by Regulation (EC) No 918/2007. (3) Regulation (EC) No 918/2007 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annexes I and II to Regulation (EC) No 918/2007 are replaced by the text in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 2 August 2007. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 1 August 2007.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 355, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00770", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00591", "text": "which he was a member. 5 Because of the foregoing facts shown either by admissions, by undisputed evidence, or by unchallenged findings, the picketing had an instantaneous adverse effect on Empire's business. It was reduced 85%. In this dilemma, Empire was faced with three alternatives: It could continue to sell ice to nonunion peddlers, in which event it would be compelled to wage a fight for survival against overwhelming odds; it could stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers thereby relieving itself from further conflict with the union, in which event it would be subject to prosecution for crime and suits for triple damages; it could invoke the protection of the law. The last alternative was adopted. 6 Empire's complaint charged that the concerted efforts of union members to restrain Empire from selling to nonunion members was a violation of the antitrade restraint statute and that an agreement by Empire to refuse to make such sales would violate the same statute. It prayed for an injunction against the picketing. In answering, appellants asserted a constitutional right to picket Empire's premises in order to force it to discontinue sale of ice to nonunion peddlers. They contended that their right to do so was 'guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments' because there was 'a labor dispute existing' between appellants and appellee, and because the picketers publicized only the truthful information that appellee was'selling ice to peddlers who are not members of the said defendant union.' 7 The trial court heard evidence, made findings and issued an injunction restraining the appellants from 'placing pickets or picketing around or about the buildings' of Empire. 8 The State Supreme Court affirmed. Mo.Sup., 210 S.W.2d 55. It agreed with the findings of the trial court that the conduct of appellants was under a local transportation combination used to compel Empire to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers and that the purpose of the picketing was to force Empire to become a party to such combination. It held that such activities were unlawful because in violation of § 8301 of the Missouri statutes and further held that the injunction to prevent picketing for such unlawful purpose did not contravene the appellants' right of free speech. 9 In this Court appellants do not raise problems similar to those discussed in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00249", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00592", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 14 December 1993 concerning the grant of assistance from the cohesion financial instrument to a project concerning the N III highway (Requena-Chiva section) in Spain No CF: 93/11/65/009 (Only the Spanish text is authentic) (94/409/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 of 30 March 1993 establishing a cohesion financial instrument (1), and in particular Article 8 (6) of it, because Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 establishes a cohesion financial instrument to provide Community support for projects in the fields of the environment and trans-European transport infrastructure networks; because under Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 certain provisions of Titles VI and VII of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 concerning the provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (2), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 (3), are to apply, mutatis mutandis; because Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 defines the types of measure for which the cohesion financial instrument may provide assistance; because Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 requires the Member States to ensure that adequate publicity is given to the operations of the financial instrument and that the measures which are described in Annex V to this Decision are undertaken; because on 13 May 1993 Spain submitted an application for assistance from the cohesion financial instrument for a project concerning the N III highway (Requena-Chiva section); because that application concerns a project which is eligible under the terms of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93; because the application for assistance contains all the information required by Article 8 (4) of the Regulation and satisfies the criteria set out in Article 8 (3) and (5) of the Regulation; because the project is a transport infrastructure project of common interest; because the project forms part of the master plan for a trans-European network concerning roads; because Article 1", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00723", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00593", "text": "***** COUNCIL DECISION of 26 March 1985 concerning the conclusion of an exchange of letters extending the arrangement relating to clause 2 of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Republic of Romania on trade in sheepmeat and goatmeat (85/211/EEC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 113 of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, in the voluntary restraint Agreement concluded with the Community in the sector of sheepmeat and goatmeat and of live sheep and goats, Romania undertook, by an exchange of letters, to limit its exports to certain Community markets regarded as sensitive areas; because, however, this undertaking did not extend beyond 31 March 1984; because the conditions which led to the designation of the said areas have not changed and the arrangement regarding the restriction of exports to these areas ought therefore to be extended; because the Commission has conducted negotiations to this end with Romania and these negotiations have resulted in agreement, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 The exchange of letters extending the arrangements relating to clause 2 of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Republic of Romania on trade in sheepmeat and goatmeat is approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the exchange of letters is attached to this Decision. Article 2 The President of the Council is authorized to designate the person empowered to sign the exchange of letters referred to in Article 1 in order to bind the Community. Done at Brussels, 26 March 1985.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 340, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00506", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00594", "text": "State under the provisions of this Act and subject to all other legal constraints on State taxation of interstate or foreign commerce. SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE. (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this Act: (1) Net income tax.--The term ``net income tax'' has the meaning given that term for the purposes of the Act entitled ``An Act relating to the power of the States to impose net income taxes on income derived from interstate commerce, and authorizing studies by congressional committees of matters pertaining thereto'', approved September 14, 1959 (15 U.S.C. 381 et seq.). (2) Other business activity tax.-- (A) In general.--The term ``other business activity tax'' means any tax in the nature of a net income tax or tax measured by the amount of, or economic results of, business or related activity conducted in the State. (B) Exclusion.--The term ``other business activity tax'' does not include a sales tax, a use tax, or a similar transaction tax, imposed on the sale or acquisition of goods or services, whether or not denominated a tax imposed on the privilege of doing business. (3) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given such term by section 1 of title 1 of the United States Code. Each corporation that is a member of a group of affiliated corporations, whether unitary or not, is itself a separate ``person.'' (4) State.--The term ``State'' means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing. (5) Tangible personal property.--For purposes of section 3(b)(1)(C), the leasing or owning of tangible personal property does not include the leasing or licensing of computer software. (b) Effective Date.--This Act will apply with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after January 1, 2012.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 403, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01119", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00595", "text": "be and is imposed, levied and assessed upon every corporation, association or joint stock company, as hereinbefore defined, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of some other state, territory or country, or organized and existing without any specific statutory authority, now, or hereafter doing business within this state, as hereinbefore defined, a franchise or excise tax equal to $1.50 of each $1,000.00 or fraction of it of the value of capital used, invested or employed within this state, except as from now on provided. It being the purpose of this section to require the payment of a tax by all organizations not organized under the laws of this state, measured by the amount of capital or its equivalent, for which such organization receives the benefit and protection of the government and laws of the state.' 2 Miss.Code § 9312 (1942). 3 Prudential Ins Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 1154, 90 L.Ed. 1342, 164 A.L.R. 476. 4 Such local incidents form a sound basis for taxation by a state of foreign corporations doing interstate business. For example, we have upheld state taxes on sales after completion of the interstate state transit, McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876; on production of electricity for interstate commerce, Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 52 S.Ct. 548, 76 L.Ed. 1038, compare Fisher's Blend Station, Inc., v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650, 655, 56 S.Ct. 608, 610, 80 L.Ed. 956; a privilege tax on the operation of machines for the production of electricity to drive gas in interstate commerce, Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043; a use tax on rails shipped interstate for immediate incorporation into an interstate transportation system, Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00199", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00596", "text": "active substance has harmful effects on human or animal health or on groundwater as set out in Annex VII the Commission will take a Decision on the non-inclusion of the active substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC, in accordance with Article 25(1)(a) and (2)(b) of this Regulation. Article 25 Presentation of a draft directive or draft decision 1. The Commission will submit to the Committee a draft review report at the latest six months after: (a) receipt of the draft assessment report where Article 24b or Article 24f applies; (b) receipt of the conclusion by the EFSA where Article 24c applies; (c) receipt of a written withdrawal of the notifier’s support where Article 24e applies. 2. Together with the draft review report the Commission will submit to the Committee: (a) a draft directive including the active substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC, setting out where appropriate the conditions, including the time limit, for such inclusion; or (b) a draft decision addressed to the Member States requiring them to withdraw, within six months, the authorisations of plant protection products containing the active substance, under the fourth subparagraph of Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414/EEC, whereby that active substance is not included in Annex I to that Directive, mentioning the reasons for the non-inclusion. The Directive or Decision will be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 19(2) of Directive 91/414/EEC. 3. By way of derogation from point (b) of paragraph 2, the latest date for Member States to withdraw authorisations will be 31 December 2010 in the case referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1 unless the Commission concluded that the substance meets the criteria of Annex VII, if appropriate after having consulted the EFSA. Article 25a View by the EFSA Where an active substance is included in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC under Article 24b of this Regulation, the Commission will request the EFSA to deliver its view on the draft review report by 31 December 2010 at the latest. Member States and notifiers will cooperate with the EFSA and the Commission. In order to facilitate the planning of the work, the Commission and the EFSA will agree on a schedule for the delivery", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00589", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00597", "text": "'s path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom previously allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative. 27 The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly22 admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute. And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. 28 We hold that mere omission from § 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced. II. 29 It is suggested, however, that the history and purposes of § 641 imply something more affirmative as to elimination of intent from at least one of the offenses charged under it in this case. The argument does not contest that criminal intent is retained in the offenses of embezzlement, stealing and purloining, as incorporated into this section. But it is urged that Congress joined with those, as a new, separate and distinct offense, knowingly to convert government property, under circumstances which imply that it is an offense in which the mental element of intent is not necessary. 30 Congress has been alert to what often is a decisive function of some mental element in crime. It has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as 'intentional,' 'wilful,' 'knowing,' 'fraudulent' or'malicious,' will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act,23 or increase the degree of the offense or its punishment.24 Also, it has at times required a specific intent or purpose which will require some specialized knowledge or design for some evil beyond the common-law intent to do injury.25 The law under some circumstances recognizes good faith or blameless intent as a defense, partial defense, or as an element to be considered in mitigation", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00424", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00598", "text": "in existence as of January 1, 1965, for the purposes of section 8 of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l-9). (c) Payments to Local Governments.--Solely for purposes of payments to local governments under section 6902 of title 31, United States Code, lands acquired by the United States under this Act will be treated as entitlement lands. SEC. 4. ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT. (a) Administration.--Subject to valid existing rights, the Secretary of Agriculture (hereafter in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') will administer the scenic area in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the National Forest System in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. (b) Special Management Requirements.--Within 3 years of the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary will develop a management plan for the scenic area as an amendment to the Land and Resources Management Plan for the Hiawatha National Forest. Such an amendment will conform to the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act will require the Secretary to revise the Land and Resource Management Plan for the Hiawatha National Forest under section 6 of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974. In developing a plan for management of the scenic area, the Secretary will address the following special management considerations: (1) Public access.--Alternative means for providing public access from the mainland to the scenic area will be considered, including any available existing services and facilities, concessionaires, special use permits, or other means of making public access available for the purposes of this Act. (2) Roads.--After the date of enactment of this Act, no new permanent roads will be constructed within the scenic area. (3) Vegetation management.--No timber harvest will be allowed within the scenic area, except as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, and diseases, and to provide for public safety and trail access. despite the foregoing, the Secretary may engage in vegetation manipulation practices for maintenance of wildlife habitat and visual quality. Trees cut for these purposes may be utilized, salvaged, or removed from the scenic area as authorized by the Secretary. (4) Motorized travel.--Motorized travel will not be permitted within the scenic area, except on the waters of Lake Michigan, and as necessary for administrative use in furtherance of the purposes of this Act.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01147", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00599", "text": "1(6), specifies the products for which a rate of refund should be fixed, to be applied where these products are exported in the form of goods listed in Annex B to Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 or in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 as appropriate. (3) In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1520/2000, the rate of the refund per 100 kilograms for each of the basic products in question must be fixed for each month. (4) The commitments entered into with regard to refunds which may be granted for the export of agricultural products contained in goods not covered by Annex I to the Treaty may be jeopardised by the fixing in advance of high refund rates. because it is therefore necessary to take precautionary measures in such situations without, however, preventing the conclusion of long-term contracts. because the fixing of a specific refund rate for the advance fixing of refunds is a measure which enables these various objectives to be met. (5) Now that a settlement has been reached between the European Community and the United States of America on Community exports of pasta products to the United States and has been approved by Council Decision 87/482/EEC(7), it is necessary to differentiate the refund on goods falling within CN codes 1902 11 00 and 1902 19 according to their destination. (6) under Article 4(3) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 1520/2000 provides that a reduced rate of export refund has to be fixed, taking account of the amount of the production refund applicable, under Council Regulation (EEC) No 1722/93(8), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1786/2001(9), for the basic product in question, used during the assumed period of manufacture of the goods. (7) Spirituous beverages are considered less sensitive to the price of the cereals used in their manufacture. However, Protocol 19 of the Act of Accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark stipulates that the necessary measures must be decided to facilitate the use of Community cereals in the manufacture of spirituous beverages obtained from cereals. Accordingly, it is necessary to adapt the refund rate applying to cereals exported in the form of spirituous beverages. (8) It is necessary to ensure continuity", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00812", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00600", "text": "of first offer regarding any reconveyance of the Federal land by the Sequoia Council of the Boy Scouts of America. (e) Disposition and Use of Cash Equalization Funds.--The Secretary will deposit the cash equalization payment received under subsection (a) in the fund established by Public Law 90-171 (commonly known as the Sisk Act; 16 U.S.C. 484a). The cash equalization payment will be available to the Secretary until expended, without further appropriation, for the acquisition of lands and interests in lands for the National Forest System in the State of California. (f) Cost Collection Funds.--The owner of the non-Federal land will be responsible for all direct costs associated with processing the land exchange under this section and will pay the Secretary the necessary funds, which will be deposited in a cost collection account. Funds so deposited will be available to the Secretary until expended, without further appropriation, for the cost associated with the land exchange. Any funds remaining after completion of the land exchange, which are not needed to cover expenses, will be refunded to the owner of the non-Federal land. SEC. 4. GRANT OF EASEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NO. 67. (a) Purpose.--A hydroelectric project, licensed under the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) as Project No. 67, is located on a majority of the Federal land authorized for exchange under section 3. To protect the ability of the owner of Project No. 67 to continue to operate and maintain that hydroelectric project under the current and all future licenses or authorizations issued under the Federal Power Act or any other applicable law, this section is necessary. (b) Easement Required.--Before conveying the Federal land under section 3, the Secretary will grant an easement, without consideration, to the owner of Project No. 67 for the right to enter, occupy, and use for hydroelectric power purposes the Federal land currently within the licensed boundary for Project No. 67. The Project No. 67 owner will hold harmless the Secretary for any claims against the owner due to the grant of easement. (c) Required Terms and Conditions.--The easement granted under this section will provide the following: ``The United States of America, from now on called `Grantor,' under a congressional authorization, grants, transfers, and con", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01013", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00601", "text": "Council Decision of 9 April 2001 laying down the new guidelines applicable to actions and measures to be taken under the multiannual programme to promote international cooperation in the energy sector (1998 to 2002) under the multiannual framework programme for actions in the energy sector and connected measures (2001/353/EC) THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Decision 1999/21/EC, Euratom of 14 December 1998 adopting a multiannual framework programme for actions in the energy sector (1998 to 2002) and connected measures(1), and in particular Article 4 of it, Having regard to Council Decision 1999/23/EC of 14 December 1998 adopting a multiannual programme to promote international cooperation in the energy sector (1998 to 2002)(2), (from now on referred to as the \"Synergy programme\"), Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because: (1) In order to enhance efficiency, the implementation of the Synergy programme needs to be adjusted, especially with regard to tasks relating to programme and project management. (2) The Synergy programme has resulted in a substantial number of small contracts spread over a large geographical area, as stated in the last evaluation report. (3) The Synergy programme is one of the programmes which have limited financial resources for a very broad field of activities. There is therefore a need to focus it more on certain priorities, to reduce the number of contracts dealt with under the programme and to increase their average amount so as to enable the targets for Commission reform to be met as regards programme management. (4) The Commission presented new guidelines for actions and measures to be undertaken in the framework of the Synergy programme, but they were not accepted by the Framework Programme Committee. (5) This Decision does not prejudge decisions on other programmes under the current framework programme on energy (1998 to 2002) nor on the forthcoming proposal for a multiannual framework programme. (6) The guidelines should not affect the action programme referred to in Article 5 of Decision 1999/23/EC or the indicative programme set out in the Annex thereto, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Sole Article The Council approves the new guidelines for the Synergy programme annexed to this Decision, which will prevail without prejudice to the action programme referred to", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00798", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00602", "text": "employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 3 of this Act; '(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of value; '(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State; '(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; '(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute; '(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts previously specified; '(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts previously specified; and '(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts previously specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 3 of this Act.' 'Sec. 13. When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act— '(a) A case will be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests there; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of emp oyers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as from now on defined) of 'persons participating or interested' there (as from now on defined). '(b) A person or association will be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 491, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00047", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00603", "text": "Sites situated in Greece as described in Annex I to this is approved for the period from September 1993 to March 1994. Article 2 1. The maximum eligible expenditure to be taken as the basis for this Decision will be ECU 1 909 000. 2. The rate of Community assistance granted to the project will be fixed at 85 %. 3. The maximum amount of the contribution from the cohesion financial instrument will be fixed at ECU 1 622 650. 4. The contribution is committed from the 1993 budget. Article 3 1. Community assistance will be based on the financial plan for the project set out in Annex II. 2. Commitments and payments of Community assistance granted to the project will be made in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 and as specified in Annex III. 3. The amount of the first advance payment will be fixed at ECU 833 333. Article 4 1. Community assistance will cover expenditure on the project for which legally binding arrangements have been made in Greece and for which the requisite finance has been specifically allocated to works to be completed not later than 31 March 1994. 2. Expenditure incurred before 1 January 1993 will not be eligible for assistance. 3. The closing date for the completion of national payments on the project is fixed not later than 12 months after the date mentioned in subparagraph 1. Article 5 1. The project will be carried out in accordance with Community policies, and in particular with Articles 7, 30, 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty, as well as with Community law, in particular with the Directives coordinating public procurement procedures. 2. This Decision will not prejudice the right of the Commission to commence infringement proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Article 6 Systematic monitoring and assessment of the project take place in accordance with the provisions set out in Annex IV to this. Article 7 The Member State concerned will ensure adequate publicity for the project as specified in Annex V. Article 8 Each Annex to this Decision will form an integral part of it. Article 9 Failure to comply with the provisions of this Decision or its Annexes may entail a reduction or suspension of assistance in accordance with the provisions set out in Annex VI. Article 10 This Decision is addressed to the Hellen", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00712", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00604", "text": "on its books at the end of 1942,4 and included this amount in 'invested capital.' It thus sought to deduct 8% of its theretofore designated 'unrealized profit' in computing its excess profits tax. The Commissioner redetermined the tax for 1943 after eliminating this item from 'invested capital.' The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's redetermination, 7 T.C. 669, relying on its opinion in Kimbrell's Home Furnishings, Inc., v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 339.5 The Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 Cir., 162 F.2d 866, with one justice dissenting, reversed on the authority of its decision in Commissioner v. Shenandoah Co., 5 Cir., 138 F.2d 792. The Government's petition for certiorari alleged that the result reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals was counter to the Commissioner's regulations and to longstanding tax practices recognized by statutes and judicial opinions, under which practices a taxpayer normally cannot report taxable income on one accounting basis and adjustments of that income on another. The questions thereby raised are of importance in tax administration and we granted certiorari to consider them. 6 A Treasury regulation, set out in part below,6 applicable to both the normal income tax and the excess profits tax,7 specifically prv ides that 'a corporation computing income on the installment basis as provided in section 44 will, with respect to the installment transactions, compute earnings and profits on such basis.'8 Since respondent computed its taxable income from installment sales on the installment or modified cash receipts basis, but computed its earnings and profits from these same sales on another basis, the accrual, it contends that the regulation is invalid because inconsistent with the governing code provisions. Validity of the regulation is therefore the crucial question. 7 This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons. See, e.g., Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378, 51 S.Ct. 144, 145, 75 L.Ed. 397. 8 This regulation is in harmony with the long-established congressional policy that a taxpayer generally cannot compute income taxes by reporting annual income", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00150", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00605", "text": "them. Business men are not guided by such abstractions. Obedience is not freely given to uncertain laws when they involve such sensitive matters as opening the books of business. And so, business men would have had a strong incentive to hold back their records, forcing the Administrator to compel production by judicial process. Apart from the use of opportunities for obstructive tactics that can hardly be circumvented when new legislation is tested, delays inevitable to litigation would dam up the flow of needed information. Congress sought to produce information, not litigation. See United States v. Monia, supra, 317 U.S. at page 428, 63 S.Ct. at page 411. 51 In the Monia case the Court considered that the statute, 'if interpreted as the Government now desires, may well be a trap for the witness.' Id., 317 U.S. at page 430, 63 S.Ct. at page 412. We need not speculate here as to potential entrapment. The record discloses that the petitioner asked, through his attorney, whether he was 'being granted immunity as to any and all matters for information obtained as the result of the investigation and examination of these records.' On behalf of the Price Administrator, the reply was 'The witness is entitled to whatever immunity which flows as a matter of law from the production of these books and records which are required to be kept under MPRs (Maximum Price Regulations) 271 and 426.' Petitioner, himself, thereupon specifically claimed immunity under the statute as well as under the Constitution, and stated that under 'these conditions' he produced the books and records that the subpoena sought. It seems clear that disclosure was here made, records were produced, on the petitioner's justifiable belief based upon the advice of counsel and acquiesced in by the presiding official—that he thereby secured statutory immunity and not constitutional litigation. 52 There is nothing to indicate that in 1942 Congress legislated with a view to litigating the scope of the limitation of the Fifth Amendment upon its powers. To ascertain what Congress meant by § 202(g) we would do well to begin by carefully attending to what Congress said: 'No person will be excused from complying with any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U.S.C.1934 edition, title", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00203", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00606", "text": "Spanish-American War, shortly before the war ended, thereby becoming the first President of the United States to be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. (9) 2006 will mark the 100th anniversary of Theodore Roosevelt receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the first citizen of the United States to receive such prize, for drawing up the 1905 peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. SEC. 3. COIN SPECIFICATIONS. (a) Denominations.--The Secretary of the Treasury (from now on in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') will mint and issue the following coins: (1) $5 gold coins.--Not more than 50,000 $5 coins, which will-- (A) weigh 8.359 grams; (B) have a diameter of 0.850 inches; and (C) contain 90 percent gold and 10 percent alloy. (2) $1 silver coins.--Not more than 500,000 $1 coins, each of which will-- (A) weigh 26.73 grams; (B) have a diameter of 1.500 inches; and (C) contain 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper. (b) Legal Tender.--The coins minted under this Act will be legal tender, as provided in section 5103 of title 31, United States Code. (c) Numismatic Items.--For purposes of section 5136 of title 31, United States Code, all coins minted under this Act will be considered to be numismatic items. (d) Use of the United States Mint at West Point, New York.--It is the sense of the Congress that the coins minted under this Act should be struck at the United States Mint at West Point, New York, to the greatest extent possible. SEC. 4. DESIGN OF COINS. (a) Design Requirements.-- (1) In general.--The design of the coins minted under this Act will-- (A) be emblematic of the life and legacy of President Theodore Roosevelt; and (B) use the designs of James Earle Fraser or Augustus Saint-Gaudens, 2 sculptors most closely associated with the revitalization of the United States coinage, commonly referred to as the ``Golden Age of American Coin Design'', that was initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt. (2) Obverse.--The obverse of the coins minted under this Act will bear the image", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00984", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00607", "text": "on the merits is wrong. And we have previously rejected the argument that official action is invalid if based on an incorrect decision as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so. Adams v. Nagle, 1938, 303 U.S. 532, 542, 58 S.Ct. 687, 692, 82 L.Ed. 999. We therefore reject the contention here. We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under the normal rules of agency. A Government officer is not thereby necessarily immunized from liability, if his action is such that a liability would be imposed by the general law of torts. But the action itself cannot be enjoined or directed, since it is also the action of the sovereign. 18 United States v. Lee, 1882, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171, is said to have established the rule for which the respondent contends. It did not. It represents, rather, a specific application of the constitutional exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The suit there was against federal officers to recover land held by them, within the scope of their authority, as a United States military station and cemetery. The question at issue was the validity of a tax sale under which the United States, at least in the view of the officers, had obtained title to the property. The plaintiff alleged that the sale was invalid and that title to the land was in him. The Court held that if he was right the defendants' possession of the land was illegal and a suit against them was not a suit against the sovereign. Prima facie, this holding woud appear to support the contention of the plaintiff. Examination of the Lee case, however, indicates that the basis of the decision was the assumed lack of the defendants' constitutional authority to hold the land against the plaintiff. The Court said (106 U.S. at page 219, 1 S.Ct. at page 260): 19 'It is not pretended, as the case now stands, that the president had any lawful authority to (take the land), or that the legislative body could give him any such authority except", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00317", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00608", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Seasoned Customer CTR Exemption Act of 2006''. SEC. 2. EXCEPTION FROM CURRENCY TRANSACTION REPORTS FOR SEASONED CUSTOMERS. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds as follows: (1) The completion of and filing of currency transaction reports under section 5313 of title 31, United States Code, poses a compliance burden on the financial industry. (2) Due to the nature of the transactions or the persons and entities conducting such transactions, some reports as currently filed may not be relevant to the detection, deterrence, or investigation of financial crimes, including money laundering and the financing of terrorism. (3) However, the data contained in such reports can provide valuable context for the analysis of other data derived under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, as well as investigative data, which provide invaluable and indispensable information supporting efforts to combat money laundering and other financial crimes. (4) An appropriate exemption process from the reporting requirements for certain currency transactions that are of little or no value to ongoing efforts of law enforcement agencies, financial regulatory agencies, and the financial services industry to investigate, detect, or deter financial crimes would continue to fulfill the compelling need to produce and provide meaningful information to policy-makers, financial regulators, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, while potentially lowering the compliance burden placed on financial institutions by the need to file such reports. (5) The Secretary of the Treasury has by regulation, and in accordance with section 5313 of title 31, United States Code, implemented a process by which institutions may seek exemptions from filing certain currency transaction reports based on appropriate circumstances; however, the financial industry has not taken full advantage of these provisions and has contended that they are unduly burdensome. (6) The act of providing notice to the Secretary of the Treasury of designations of exemption-- (A) provides meaningful information to law enforcement officials on exempt customers and enables law enforcement to obtain account information through appropriate legal process; and (B) complements other sections of title 31, United States Code, whereby law enforcement can locate financial institutions with relevant records relating to a person of investigative interest, such as information requests made under regulations implementing section 314(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. (7) A designation of exemption has no effect on requirements for depository institutions to apply the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00843", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00609", "text": "through the Program into a new mortgage, the enterprise will charge the mortgage insurer and recoup the fine described in paragraph (1), as applicable, and will apply the payment to the balance of the borrower's first mortgage. (3) Limitation on liability.--A mortgage insurer will not be liable to the enterprise or to anyone else for the fine described in paragraph (1) if, within 30 days of the enterprise's written determination that a mortgage insurer has prevented the refinancing of an eligible mortgage for any reason other than those specified in paragraph (1), that mortgage insurer agrees to transfer coverage in compliance with this section. (h) Limitation.--despite any other provision of law, the enterprises will not be prevented from purchasing or guaranteeing a mortgage resulting from the refinancing of an eligible mortgage under this section and subject to all other provisions of this section. (i) Guarantee Fees.-- (1) In general.-- (A) Average fee.--On each mortgage refinanced under the Program in accordance with this section, the enterprises will set the average fee required under this Act, as determined by the Director in an amount not less than the average fees imposed in 2012 for such guarantees. The Director will prohibit an enterprise from offsetting the cost of the fee to the mortgage originators, borrowers, and investors by decreasing other charges, fees, or premiums, or in any other manner. (B) Authority to limit offer of guarantee.--The Director will prohibit an enterprise from consummating any offer for a guarantee to a lender for mortgage- backed securities, if the guarantee is inconsistent with the requirements of this section. (2) Information collection and analysis.--The Director will require each enterprise to provide to the Director, as part of its annual report submitted to Congress, for loans refinanced under the Program-- (A) a description of changes made to up-front fees and annual fees as part of the guarantee fees negotiated with lenders; and (B) an assessment of how the changes in the guarantee fees described in subparagraph (A) met the requirements of paragraph (1). (j) Regulations.--Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director will issue any regulations or guidance necessary to carry out the changes to the Program established under this section, which regulations or guidance will be put into effect not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act. (k) Termination.--The requirements of this section will expire concurrent with", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00898", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00610", "text": ", they are not persuasive of a contrary result. 14 Two administrative rulings15 on the carry-back provision of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, are cited as opposed to this interpretation of the Code. We see no need to distinguish these regulations or decisions. Two rulings relating to a carry-back section of twenty-five years ago, not repeated in the intervening quarter-century, are not sufficient to force us to conclude that Congress intended to impart their construction of that section to the present provision. 15 We have considered the remainder of the points raised by the court below and respondent, but for the foregoing reasons are in accord that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the judgment of the District Court affirmed. 16 Reversed. 17 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 The payment in question included corporate income tax, defense tax and excess profits tax. No question is presented as to the correctness of the defense tax payment. 2 Int.Rev.Code, § 274(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 274(a): 'Upon the adjudication of bankruptcy of any taxpayer in any bankruptcy proceeding or the appointment of a receiver for any taxpayer in any receivership proceeding before any court of the United States or of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia, any deficiency (together with all interest, additional amounts, or additions to the tax provided for by law) determined by the Commissioner in respect of a tax imposed by this chapter upon such taxpayer will, despite the restrictions imposed by section 272(a) upon assessments be immediately assessed if such deficiency has not theretofore been assessed in accordance with law. In such cases the trustee in bankruptcy or receiver will give notice in writing to the Commissioner of the adjudication of bankruptcy or the appointment of the receiver, and the running of the statute of limitations on the making of assessments will be suspended for the period from the date of adjudication in bankruptcy or the appointment of the receiver to a date 30 days after the date upon which the notice from the trustee or receiver is received by the Commissioner; but the suspension under this sentence will in no case be for a period in excess of two years. Claims for the deficiency and such interest, additional amounts and additions to the tax may be presented, for adjudication in accordance with law, to the court before which the bankruptcy or receivership proceeding is pending, despite", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00343", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00611", "text": "***** COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 314/86 of 11 February 1986 laying down detailed rules for the grant of a storage premium for certain fishery products THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 of 29 December 1981 on the common organization of the market in fishery products (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Article 14a (5) of it, because, under Article 14a of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81, the Member States grant a storage premium to producers' organizations that offer for sale, stabilize and store Norway lobsters and edible crabs under certain conditions; because, therefore, these conditions should be specified; because only those categories of the said products that are suitable for disposal after storage or pre-reservation should qualify for this premium; because, accordingly, these categories should be fixed; because, in order to ensure the smooth running of the storage aid system and in particular to ensure that the Community selling price is observed, the detailed rules for application of this system should be specified; because Article 2 (2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2202/82 of 28 July 1982, laying down the general rules for the granting of financial compensation in respect of certain fishery products (2), and Articles 2 and 4 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3137/82 of 19 November 1982, laying down detailed rules for the granting of financial compensation in respect of certain fishery products (3), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3165/84 (4), establish within the framework of the withdrawal price system the conditions for the use of the margin of tolerance provided for in Article 13 (1) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81; that in order to respect the parallelism between the two systems the use of the margin of tolerance within the framework of the sale price system provided for in Article 14a (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 should be subject to the same conditions; because, under the first subparagraph of Article 14a (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 379", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00527", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00612", "text": "Executive Order No. 8033, Jan. 11, 1939, 3 C.F.R. Cum.Supp. 443. This was under the authorization contained in 48 Stat. 931, D.C.Code 1940, § 5—104. 11 Executive Order No. 7784-A, Jan. 5, 1938, 3 Fed.Reg. 51 (1938). 12 Executive Order No. 9344, May 21, 1943, 3 C.F.R. Cum.Supp. 1279. 13 For this and the other factual material relating to this Authority, see Report of the National Capital Housing Authority for the Ten-Year Period 1934—1944, submitted by it to the President December 28, 1944, and by him to Congress March 1, 1945, 91 Cong.Rec., Pt. 2, 1597 (1945). See also, the Annual Reports of this Authority to the President, all required by § 5(a) and (b) of the District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act, 48 Stat. 932, D.C.Code 1940, § 5—107(a) and (b). 14 'Sec. 2. When used in this Act— '(1) The term 'low-rent housing' means decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of families of low income, and developed and administered to promote serviceability, efficiency, economy, and stability, and embraces all necessary appurtenances thereto. The dwellings in low-rent housing as defined in this Act will be available solely for families whose net income at the time of admission does not exceed five times the rental (including the value or cost to them of heat, light, water, and cooking fuel) of the dwellings to be furnished such families, except that in the case of families with three or more minor dependents, such ratio will not exceed six to one.' (Emphasis supplied.) 50 Stat. 888, 42 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) § 1402(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1402(1). II. The District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act does not apply to Government-owned, defense housing in the District, such as the Bellevue Houses. 15 This contrasts with the language used by Congress", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00290", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00613", "text": "On the surface this appears to be merely a bankruptcy case raising technical questions of federal jurisdiction. But the answers to these questions have far-reaching import. They involve the distribution of judicial power as between United States and State courts, and thus concern federal-state relations generally. More immediately, inasmuch as the allowable scope of the business of the federal courts is in controversy, a proper disposition of the case bears upon the quality of the work of those courts and of this Court in particular. 24 The Court makes a shift in the distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts which has prevailed for half a century. Such a break with the past is not required by what Congress has written nor by any inference drawn from disclosed Congressional policies. On the contrary, I believe that the result reached is repelled by every consideration relevant to the proper construction of the statutory materials by which the jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be determined. 25 In 1867 Congress granted jurisdiction to the then lower federal courts over suits on claims owing to one whose estate was administered in bankruptcy, though the claims were based wholly on local law and were devoid of any federal aspect which would give a federal court jurisdiction were the creditor not in bankruptcy. This was another one of those enactments of the Reconstruction period when the influences toward expansion of federal jurisdiction were at flood-tide. As part of the recession from this Reconstruction tendency Congress, in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, withdrew from the federal courts suits what rested solely on local law even though they involved claims asserted on behalf of one whose estate was being administered in the bankruptcy court. By a tenuous process of implication the Court now concludes that Congress, through the Chandler Act of 1938, enlarged federal jurisdiction in one aspect of the bankruptcy law, though neither the terms of thelegislatio n, nor its context, nor its legislative history, nor considerations of policy previously suggested, call for such construction, while the history and structure of the legislation, its judicial interpretation, regard for congruity in finding meaning, and the larger claims of the federal judicial system, support a different reading of the statute. The large assumptions of the decision are that by indirection and without manifested design Congress reversed its prevailing policy of limiting federal jurisdiction and preserving a proper balance between federal and State courts; that Congress deviated from a principle of our federalism especially respected in recent times, according to which claims arising under State law will be tried under local trial procedure in the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00086", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00614", "text": "this provision as giving veterans an absolute preference,7 but also extended the preference to veterans in the field service8 and to positions not under civil service.9 23 Executive Order 4240 of June 4, 1925, as amended by Executive Order 5068 of March 2, 1929, provided, as does Subgroup A-1 here, an absolute retention preference for veterans over nonveterans where the veterans' efficiency ratings were 'good,' and a similar absolute preference over nonveterans whose ratings were less than good if the veterans' ratings were equal to those of the nonveterans. And at the time of passage of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, there were 1943 Civil Service Regulations outstanding10 which granted veterans with permanent tenure and with a rating of 'good' or higher, precisely the same absolute retention preference over nonveterans which is now afforded by Subgroup A-1, here attacked as invalid. Consequently, a holding that veterans with a rating of 'good' no longer have a retention preference over nonveterans with longer service, would mean that passage of the Veterans' Preference Act in 1944 narrowed the long-existing scope of veterans' preferences in case of reduction in force of government personnel. The purpose oft hat Act's sponsors and of Congress in passing it appears to have been precisely the opposite—to broaden rather than narrow the preference. 24 The Senate Civil Service Committee was told by the congressional sponsor of the measure that 'this bill takes away no existing veterans' preference, either by statute or Executive order, but it does strengthen, broaden and implement the veterans' preference policy previously in effect,' and that it would 'give legislative sanction to existing veterans' preference, to the rules and regulations in the executive branch of the Government. * * *.'11 A member of the Civil Service Commission in explaining the bill to the Senate Committee called the proviso here involved the 'heart of the section,'12 and stated that it 'was substantially the same' as the 1912 Act,13 which as before pointed out, provided for an absolute veterans' retention preference without regard to length of service.14 And in explaining the Bill on the floor of the House, the sponsor and active proponents of the measure explained it as strengthening and broadening veterans' preferences then embodied in statutes and executive orders.15 25 Not only did the friends of the Veterans' Preference Act explain to the Senate", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00173", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00615", "text": "date of promulgation of final designations under subsection (a)(2); or (B) the Administrator or the State, local, or tribal permitting authority, as applicable, publishes a public notice of a preliminary determination or draft permit for the application before the date that is 60 days after the date of promulgation of the final designation of the relevant area under subsection (a)(2). (2) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this section-- (A) eliminates the obligation of a preconstruction permit applicant to install best available control technology and lowest achievable emission rate technology, as applicable; or (B) limits the authority of a State, local, or tribal permitting authority to impose more stringent emissions requirements under State, local, or tribal law than the Federal national ambient air quality standards established by the Administrator. SEC. 4. FACILITATING STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS. (a) Consideration of Technological Feasibility.--Section 109(b) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7409(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(b)(1) National'' and inserting the following: ``(b) Requirements.-- ``(1) In general.-- ``(A) Public health.--National''; and (2) in paragraph (1)(A) (as so designated), in the second sentence, by striking ``Such'' and inserting the following: ``(B) Technological feasibility.--If the Administrator, in consultation with the independent scientific review committee appointed under subsection (d), finds that a range of levels of air quality for an air pollutant are requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, as described in subparagraph (A), the Administrator may consider, as a secondary consideration, likely technological feasibility in establishing and revising the national primary ambient air quality standard for the pollutant.''. (b) Timeline for Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards.-- (1) 10-year cycle for all criteria air pollutants.--Section 109(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7409(d)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``five-year intervals'' and inserting ``10-year intervals''; and (B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``five-year intervals'' and inserting ``10-year intervals''. (2) Cycle for next review of ozone criteria and standards.--despite section 109(d", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00948", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00616", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Recreational Fee Authority Act of 2004''. SEC. 2. RECREATION FEE AUTHORITY. (a) In General.--Beginning on January 1, 2006, the Secretary of the Interior (``Secretary'') may establish, modify, charge, and collect fees for admission to a unit of the National Park System and the use of National Park Service (``Service'') administered areas, lands, sites, facilities, and services (including reservations) by individuals and/or groups. Fees will be based on an analysis by the Secretary of-- (1) the benefits and services provided to the visitor; (2) the cumulative effect of fees; (3) the comparable fees charged elsewhere and by other public agencies and by nearby private sector operators; (4) the direct and indirect cost and benefit to the government; (5) public policy or management objectives served; (6) economic and administrative feasibility of fee collection; and (7) other factors or criteria determined by the Secretary. (b) Number of Fees.--The Secretary will establish the minimum number of fees and will avoid the collection of multiple or layered fees for a wide variety of uses, activities or programs. (c) Analysis.--The results of the analysis together with the Secretary's determination of appropriate fee levels will be transmitted to the Congress at least three months prior to publication of such fees in the Federal Register. New fees and any increases or decreases in established fees will be published in the Federal Register and no new fee or change in the amount of fees will take place until at least 12 months after the date the notice is published in the Federal Register. (d) Additional Authorities.--Beginning on January 1, 2006, the Secretary may enter into agreements, including contracts to provide reasonable commissions or reimbursements with any public or private entity for visitor reservation services, fee collection and/or processing services. (e) Administration.--The Secretary may provide discounted or free admission days or use, may modify the National Park Passport, established under Public Law 105-391, and will provide information to the public about the various fee programs and the costs and benefits of each program. (f) State Agency Admission and Special Use Passes.--Effective January 1, 2006, and despite the Federal Grants Cooperative Agreements Act, the Secretary may enter into revenue sharing agreements with State agencies to accept their annual passes and convey", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00992", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00617", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2955/80 of 14 November 1980 authorizing, in the Châteauneuf-du-Pape registered designation area, the additional acidification of certain products from the 1980 wine harvest THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 of 5 February 1979 on the common organization of the market in wine (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1990/80 (2), and in particular Article 34 (4) of it, because Article 34 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 provides that, in years when climatic conditions have been exceptional, additional acidification may be authorized up to a limit of 1 750 grams per litre expressed in tartaric acid, or 20 milliequivalents, for certain products originating in Zone C II; because exceptional climatic conditions were experienced in the Châteauneuf-du-Pape registered designation area, which have resulted in the total acidity being lower than normal; because Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 338/79 of 5 February 1979 laying down special provisions relating to quality wines produced in specified regions (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 459/80 (4), provides that the conditions and limits within which the acidification of certain products may take place and the procedure whereby authorization may be granted are those laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The additional acidification referred to in Article 34 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 is authorized for fresh grapes, grape must, partially fermented grape must and new wine still in fermentation produced in the Châteauneuf-du-Pape area of registered designation from the 1980 wine harvest. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 14 November 1980.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00804", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00618", "text": "(2) OJ No C 128, 9. 5. 1994, p. 322. RESOLUTION containing the comments which form part of the Decision giving discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the 1992 financial year THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - having regard to Article 206 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, - having regard to Article 89 of the Financial Regulation of 13 March 1990 (1) under which each Community institution is required to take all appropriate steps to take action on the comments appearing in the Decisions giving discharge, - because, under the same Article, the institutions are also required to report, at Parliament's request, on the measures taken in the light of these comments and, in particular, on the instructions given to those of their departments which are responsible for the implementation of the budget, - having regard to the Council recommendation of 21 March 1994 (C3-0147/94), noting however its incomplete nature, in so far as it reserves the position of Council on the very point presenting the greatest obstacle to discharge, - having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A4-0056/95), because the Commission bears the sole legal responsibility for the implementation of the budget under Article 205 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; Matters pertaining to the earlier postponement of discharge 1. Welcomes the fact that, in line with Parliament's demand, the Commission has decided to reverse its earlier Decision to apply new milk quotas retroactively for Italy in 1989, and Italy, Spain and Greece in 1990 and 1991, resulting in the recovery of about ECU 1 600 million as requested by Parliament; 2. Notes the Council's failure to make a clear recommendation in respect of the Commission's management of the milk quota system in the context of discharge; 3. Learns however that the original 1989 clearance of accounts Decision included a Decision retroactively to apply new milk quotas in Spain and that this Decision remains in force; believes that the principle of this case is identical to those corrected by the Commission and that the loss to the taxpayer caused by this omission amounts to about ECU 170 million; 4. Observes and deplores the fact that the Commission has operated a milk production buy-back scheme in Italy and Spain without a legal basis; notes that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00772", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00619", "text": "inclusion in the said list; because, bearing in mind the structural situation and the localization of the production and processing of common wheat, barley, maize and rice in Portugal, application of the STM to these products, limited to the periods which are sensitive as regards the marketing of Portuguese production, is likely to make it easier, when Council Regulation (EEC) N° 3653/90 introducing transitional provisions for the common organization of the market in cereals and rice in Portugal(1) is applied, to dispose of national production, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The supplementary trade mechanism provided for in Article 249 of the Act of Accession will apply from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 1995 to the products listed in the Annex to this and imported into Portugal, on the terms set out in Articles 250, 251 and 252 of the Act. However, with regard to common wheat, barley, maize and rice, the supplementary trade mechanism will apply only during those periods which are sensitive as regards the marketing of Portuguese production, as determined according to the procedure provided for in Article 26 of Regulation (EEC) 2727/75(2), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) N° 1340/90(3), or in Article 27 of Regulation (EEC) N° 1418/76(4), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) N° 1806/89(5). Article 2 As part of the annual report on the operation of the supplementary trade mechanism, the Commission will examine any amendments which, as a result of developments in trade, may be made to the list of the products listed in the Annex and will present, should this prove appropriate, the necessary proposals to the Council. Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following that its its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 11 December 1990 F", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 422, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00749", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00620", "text": ". ``(iv) despite section 10(c) of this Act, no portion of the segment designated by this paragraph will become a part of the National Park System nor will it be subject to regulations that govern the National Park System. ``(D) Water resources projects.--(i) In determining whether a proposed water resources project would have a direct and adverse effect on the values for which the segment designated by this paragraph was included in the national wild and scenic rivers system, the Secretary will specifically consider the extent to which the project is consistent with the Plan. ``(ii) Congress finds that the existing operation of the Colebrook Dam and Goodwin Dam hydroelectric facilities, together with associated transmission lines and other existing project works, under licenses or exemptions granted under the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) and in effect on the date of enactment of this paragraph, is not incompatible with the designation of the segment referred to in subparagraph (A) as a component of the national wild and scenic rivers system, and will not have a direct and adverse effect on, nor unreasonably diminish, the values for which the segment was established. despite any provision in this Act to the contrary, the designation of the river will not affect the ability of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to license or relicense (including exempting from licensing) the continued operation of the Colebrook Dam and Goodwin Dam hydroelectric projects, together with associated transmission lines and other project works if such operation is consistent with the Plan. ``(iii) despite any provision in this Act to the contrary, inclusion of the segment designated by this paragraph in the wild and scenic rivers system will not impair the continued operation of the Colebrook Dam and Reservoir by the United States Army Corps of Engineers for the purpose of flood control. ``(iv) The Plan, including the detailed analysis of instream flow needs incorporated in the Plan and such additional analysis as may be incorporated in the future, will serve as the primary source of information regarding the flows needed to maintain instream resources and the potential compatibility between resource protection and possible water supply withdrawals. ``(E) Land management.--(i) The zoning ordinances adopted by the towns of Hartland, Barkhamsted, New Hartford, and Canton, Connecticut, including the `river protection overlay districts' in effect on the date of enactment of this paragraph, satisfy the standards and requirements of section 6(c) of this Act. For the purpose of section 6(c),", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01113", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00621", "text": "al law, not to apply retroactively. It is true that the court there reviewed federal decisions to show that it would raise a serious question of constitutionality if the Act were construed otherwise. But Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed. 692, 151 A.L.R. 824, had intervened and in reference to it the Court of Appeals said, 'In the light of that fresh authority, we do not say that if invoked for prospective application, and in a manner consistent with the federal statutes, the Michigan statute would conflict with the national banking laws and constitute an unlawful interference with the liquidation of a national bank. Discussion of that problem is deemed inappropriate in view of our conclusion that the Act under consideration carries no retroactive effect in the present situation.' 143 F.2d at page 559. 4 In Starr v. Schram, 6 Cir., 1944, 143 F.2d 561, the Court of Appeals on the same day passed on the receiver's request for a declaration that the escheat laws were at no time validly applicable to the receivership and that he was entitled to recover back certain dormant deposit balances and the dividends thereon which already had been paid over to the State under the Act. The District Court had held that the state statute was invalid as an 'unlawful interference' with the federal liquidation. This holding the Court of Appeals affirmed but, on considerations of state immunity from suit, it refused to allow recovery of what had been paid over. 5 Now comes Black v. Delano—the present case, Roth being substituted for Black—6 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 966, which the Court of Appeals rests on the'settled doctrine' of these cases. 6 Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra, in substance, held that the Constitution of the United States does not prohibit a State from escheating deposits in a national bank located and actively doing business there, abandoned by their owners or belonging to missing persons. The State, after a reasonable lapse of time may lawfully administer such assets, holding them for the benefit of the disappeared claimant or the missing owner for a period and providing for eventual escheat. This it may do through appointment of a personal representative, or a public administrator, or by utilizing its own public officials", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00329", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00622", "text": "(C) the complete protocol of such treatment; and (D) the source from which such treatment or any part of it was obtained; and (4) include as part of the reporting under paragraph (3), an affidavit under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, confirming that all statements made in the report under such paragraph are accurate. (b) Secretary.--Upon confirmation that a medical treatment has proven dangerous to individuals, the Secretary will properly disseminate information with respect to the danger of the medical treatment and prohibit the further use of such treatment. SEC. 5. REPORTING OF A BENEFICIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT. If a health care practitioner, after administering a medical treatment that is not an approved drug or medical device for a life- threatening medical condition or conditions, discovers that such medical treatment has, in the opinion of the health care practitioner, positive effects on such condition or conditions that are significantly greater than the positive effects that are expected from an approved medical treatment for the same condition or conditions, the practitioner will-- (1) make a monthly reporting to the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine at the National Institutes of Health of-- (A) the nature of such medical treatment (which is not a conventional medical treatment); (B) the general results of such treatment administered in the month involved; and (C) the protocol of such treatment; and (2) provide an affidavit under section 746 of title 28, United States Code, confirming that all statements made in the monthly reporting under paragraph (1) are accurate and truthful. SEC. 6. TRANSPORTATION AND PRODUCTION OF FOOD, DRUGS, DEVICES, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. (a) In General.--despite any other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), an individual may-- (1) introduce or deliver into interstate commerce a food, drug, device, or any other equipment; and (2) produce, transport, receive and hold a food, drug, device, or any other equipment, solely for use in accordance with this Act if there have been no advertising claims by the manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the food, drug, device, or equipment involved. (b) Notification.--If an individual imports a shipment of a food, drug, device, or any other equipment, the individual will notify the Secretary of any such shipment. (c)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01006", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00623", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Madera Water Supply Enhancement Act''. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. (a) The term ``District'' means the Madera Irrigation District, Madera, California. (b) The term ``Project'' means the ``Madera Water Supply and Enhancement Project''. (c) The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior. SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT. (a) Study.-- under the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 388) and Acts amendatory of it and supplemental thereto, the Secretary, acting through the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, and in consultation and cooperation with the District, is authorized to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of constructing the Project. (b) Report.-- (1) Transmission.--Upon completion of the study authorized by subsection (a), the Secretary will transmit to the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report containing the results of the study, together with recommendations regarding any recommendation to construct the project. (2) Use of available materials.--In developing the report under this section, the Secretary will make use of reports and any other relevant information supplied by the District. (3) Deadline.--No later than December 30, 2006, the Secretary will complete the report and transmit the report to Congress under subsection (b)(2). (c) Cost Share.-- (1) Federal share.--The Federal share of the costs of the feasibility study authorized by this section will not exceed 50 percent of the total cost of the study. (2) In-kind contribution for non-federal share.--The Secretary may accept as part of the non-Federal cost share the contribution of such in-kind services by the District as the Secretary determines will contribute to the conduct and completion of the study. SEC. 4. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT. All planning, design, and construction of the Project authorized by this Act will be undertaken in accordance with a cooperative agreement between the Secretary and the District for the Project. Such cooperative agreement will set forth in a manner acceptable to the Secretary and the District the responsibilities of the District for participating in the study and related environmental review, including, but not limited to: (1) preparation of an assessment of the need for the project; (2) preparation of feasibility and reconnaissance", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01062", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00624", "text": "changes may be temporary. Furthermore, should the on-going anti-dumping investigation to be terminated without imposing measures, it is likely that dumped imports would rapidly regain market share. (98) On the basis of the above, it was concluded that developments occurring after the IP do not show that the injury caused by dumped imports has disappeared. As a result, the imposition of anti-dumping measures is not manifestly unsuitable. 6. Conclusion on injury (99) Given that no other arguments were received regarding the injury suffered by the Community industry, the conclusion that the Community industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the basic Regulation, as set out in recitals 125 to 128 of the provisional Regulation, is confirmed. G. CAUSATION (100) Several interested parties continued to argue that the Commission wrongly concluded that imports originating in the countries concerned were the cause of the injury suffered by the Community industry because, in their opinion, the situation of this industry and the level of prices on the Community market were due to a combination of other factors. In this context, they reiterated the points already raised at the provisional stage (including the price of raw materials, the situation of over capacity, the competition between PET producers). (101) Given that no other arguments were received regarding the cause of the injury suffered by the Community industry, the conclusion that imports of PET from the countries concerned had caused injury to the Community industry as stated in recital 148 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed. H. COMMUNITY INTEREST 1. Likely effect of the imposition of measures on downstream industries Further investigation (102) In view of the low level of cooperation from the users during the first stage of the investigation, the Commission decided to investigate further the likely effect of the imposition of measures on the downstream industries. Therefore, the Commission sent out 90 new, simplified questionnaires to users of PET, some of which had already been contacted but had not replied. 19 previously non-cooperating companies submitted meaningful responses within the time limits set. The new cooperating companies are: - three preform/bottle converters: Lux PET GmbH & Co. (Luxembourg) Puccetti SpA (Italy) EBP SA (Spain) - four producers of PET films and sheets using the product concerned: RPC Cobelplast Montonate Srl (Italy) Moplast SpA (Italy) Alusuisse Thermoplastic (UK) Klöckner Pentap", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00824", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00625", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1499/97 of 29 July 1997 amending for the second time Regulation (EC) No 913/97 adopting exceptional support measures for the pigmeat market in Spain THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75 of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the market in pigmeat (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 (2), and in particular Article 20 of it, because, because of the outbreak of classical swine fever in certain production regions in Spain, exceptional measures to support the pigmeat market were adopted for that Member State in Commission Regulation (EC) No 913/97 (3), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1301/97 (4); because, because of continuing veterinary and trade restrictions adopted by the Spanish authorities and their extension to new areas, the number of pigs for fattening which may be delivered to the competent authorities should be increased, thus allowing the continuation of the exceptional measures in the coming weeks; because the aid granted for the delivery of piglets should be adjusted to the current market situation, taking account of the fall in prices; because the rapid and efficient application of the exceptional market support measures is one of the best ways of combating the spread of classical swine fever; because the application of one of the provisions of this Regulation from 16 July 1997 is therefore justified; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Pigmeat, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 913/97 is amended as follows: 1. in Article 4 (4), 'ECU 69`, 'ECU 60` and 'ECU 50` are replaced by 'ECU 60`, 'ECU 52` and 'ECU 43` respectively; 2. Annex I is replaced by Annex I to this; 3. Annex II is replaced by Annex II to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. However, point 3 of Article 1 will apply with effect from 16 July 1997. This Regulation will", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00726", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00626", "text": "45 Stat. 826, 827, 47 Stat. 208, 209. In 1933 the Bureau made a contrary ruling which expressly revoked the one made in 1921. But the facts on which the Bureau took this action are important. 120 The taxpayer had received the income in question under contracts with a number of publishers and producers under which he had granted serial rights in books already written, reserving a \"stipulated royalty per copy sold.\" The Bureau characterized all but one of these contracts as requiring \"stipulated sums * * * to be paid him as royalties.\" Moreover, in some of these contracts yearly licenses were granted, renewable at the taxpayer's option, with stipulated royalties per copy. In one contract a company was granted first American and Canadian serial rights in the taxpayer's exclusive output of both long and short stories for which the company was to pay a stipulated sum of money, and in another contract the taxpayer granted motion-picture rights throughout the world, the consideration to be paid in installments. The Bureau ruled that these proceeds were within the phrase \"* * * royalties from * * * (or) for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States * * * copyrights * * *.\" 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(4), 26 U.S.C.A. § 119(a)(4). 121 The reasoning on which this conclusion was based deserves attention.9 This is the crux of it: 122 \"The taxpayer in these contracts granted the publishers and producers licenses to use in particular ways his literary property and his copyright there, and exacted from them certain payments for that use. These were not, and could not be, contracts of sales; they were in fact contracts of license, and the payments for such licenses constituted rentals or royalties subject to tax as such. * * * 123 \"* * * Since the grant by the taxpayer in each instance is so clearly the grant of a particular right in all the rights constituting the taxpayer's literary property and copyright, the conclusion is obvious that the grant is a license and not a sale. 124 \"In Office Decision 988, supra, a grant of all rights of serial publications in the United States in certain literary works was through error said to be a sale. Such a grant could only be a license. Office Decision 988 is accordingly revoked.\" I.T. 2735, XII-2, Cum.B", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00293", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00627", "text": "* * The Master, Officers, and all other members of the Crew are employees of the United States subject to the provisions of (the Clarification Act, 57 Stat. 45, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 1291, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1291), and are not employees of Agwilines, Inc.' Respondent Agwilines was the general agent for the ship under standard form contract GAA 4—4—42. The Gadsden departed from Philadelphia on a foreign voyage and stopped en route at Charleston where, while on authorized shore leave, petitioner was injured in a highway accident. Neither the ship, the general agent, nor the W.S.A. was directly involved in any way in the accident. 8 Petitioner sued respondent for wages and maintenance and cure, alleging that respondent 'possessed, owned, operated and controlled' the vessel. Agwilines denied these allegations, averred that it was merely the general agent under the standard form contract, that the ship was 'owned, operated and controlled by the United States,' and that petitioner had failed to comply with the Clarification Act, which required complaints of this sort to be brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act. 9 On the pleadings, an agreed statement of facts as summarized above, the shipping articles, the standard form agreement, and the delivery and redelivery certificates evidencing the allocation of the vessel to respondent by the W.S.A., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the action on the ground that petitioner's only remedy was a suit against the United States under the Clarification Act. 76 F.Supp. 617. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Gaynor v. Agwilines, Inc., 169 F.2d 612. We granted certiorari and assigned the case for argument along with Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, and Fink v. Shepard Steamship Co., supra. 10 Although this case involves the right to wages and maintenance and cure, because McAllister and Fink concern damages for negligent injury, the reasoning and decisions in those cases are dispositive here. This is so because the right to maintenance and cure is 'annexed to the employment,' Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S.Ct.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00311", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00628", "text": "Congress they are given a definite area as a place upon which to live. When Indians receive recognition of their right to occupy lands by act of Congress, they have a right of occupancy which cannot be taken from them without compensation.3 But by the other type of occupancy, it may be called Indian title, the Indians get no right to continue to occupy the lands; and any interference with their occupancy by the United States has not previously given rise to any right of compensation, legal or equitable.4 34 This distinction between rights from recognized occupancy and from Indian title springs from the theory under which the European nations took possession of the lands of the American aborigines. This theory was that discovery by the Christian nations gave them sovereignty over and title to the lands discovered. Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 572—586, 5 L.Ed. 681; 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (5th Ed.) § 152. While Indians were permitted to occupy these lands under their Indian title,5 the conquering nations asserted the right to extinguish that Indian title without legal responsibility to compensate the Indian for his loss.6 It is not for the courts of the conqueror to question the propriety or validity of such an assertion of power. Indians who continued to occupy their aboriginal homes, without definite recognition of their right to do so are like paleface squatters on public lands without compensable rights if they are evicted. Tenure for Indian tribes specifically recognized by Congress developed along different lines in the original states, the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican Session or the lands obtained by the Northwest Boundary Treaty. But there is no instance known to us where there has been intimation or holding that Congressional power to take Indian title to lands is limited. Whenever the lands to which the Indians had only Indian title were required for settlement or public use, the sovereign without legal obligation could extinguish that title by purchase or the sword.7 35 In Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 21 S.Ct. 690, 45 L.Ed. 963 Mission Indians claimed a right of permanent occupancy in former Mexican lands ceded to the United States by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. They made this claim against a right arising by virtue of a patent that was issued by the United States in confirmation of grants by the Mexican Government in derogation of the Indian title. This Court said", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00000", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00629", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 1013/2002 of 13 June 2002 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1498/98(2), and in particular Article 4(1) of it, because: (1) Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, under the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto. (2) In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The standard import values referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 will be fixed as indicated in the Annex to this. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 14 June 2002. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 13 June 2002.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 300, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00561", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00630", "text": "nullification of this Court's decisions and orders' in the case. It stated at the hearing on the order that it was not deciding 'whether the United States might seek ancillary injunctive relief in any other respect; that is, in any respect save only the defeat and nullification of a judgment already finally entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.' It ordered that the respondents, their agents, attorneys, and all persons in active concert with any of them 34 'be and they are enjoined and restrained until further order of this Court from proposing, seeking or advocating any step in any proceeding, whether in said suit entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar et al., or in any other proceeding, inconsistent with strict compliance with and obedience to the orders previously entered by this Court in this cause. 35 'And it is further ordered that said persons are and each of them is enjoined and restrained until further order of this Court from complying with, taking advantage of, or utilizing, or seeking to comply with, utilize or take advantage of said temporary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in said cause entitled United States v. R. Stanley Dollar, et al., or any order of similar tenor which may hereafter be entered by said court or any other court.' 36 We have before us for review on this petition (1) the order of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissing appeals from the orders entered by the District Court on March 16 directing that the stock be delivered to the Dollars; (2) the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on April 10. 37 Three other matters concerning this litigation are also now before the Court. They are referred to in a per curiam opinion. This memorandum does not address itself to them. 38 On Motion to Vacate Stay of Contempt Order. SAWYER 39 v. DOLLAR In re KILLION 40 Nos. —-, —-. 41 By Mr. Justice JACKSON. 42 Respondents ask the full Court to vacate a stay of proceedings granted by THE CHIEF JUSTICE. I regret that I cannot acquiesce in summary disposition of the motion, for I think the circumstances require the Court to set it down for prompt argument and act only after hearing both sides. 43 This Court examined the decision of the Court of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00415", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00631", "text": ", the sense seems to me to be with Mr. Justice Woods in Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, supra, Fed.Cas.No. 7,052, 1 Woods at page 88, where he said, 'The plain and evident meaning of the section is, that the persons to whom the equal protection of the law is secured are persons born or naturalized or endowed with life and liberty, and consequently natural and not artificial persons.' 54 History has gone the other way. Since 1886 the Court has repeatedly struck down state legislation as applied to corporations on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 Every one of our decisions upholding legislation as applied to corporations over the objection that it violated the Equal Protection Clause has assumed that they are entitled to the constitutional protection. But in those cases it was not necessary to meet the issue since the state law was not found to contain the elements of discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause condemns. But now that the question is squarely presented I can only conclude that the Santa Clara case was wrong and should be overruled. 55 One hesitates to overrule cases even in the constitutional field that are of an old vintage. But that has never been a deterrent heretofore4 and should not be now. 56 We are dealing with a question of vital concern to the people of the nation. It may be most desirable to give corporations this protection from the operation of the legislative process. But that question is not for us. It is for the people. If they want corporations to be treated as humans are treated, if they want to grant corporations this large degree of emancipation from state regulation,5 they should say so. The Constitution provides a method by which they may do so. We should not do it for them through the guise of interpretation. 1 Pertinent parts of the Ohio law read as follows: 'Sec. 5328-1: * * * Property of the kinds and classes mentioned in section 5328-2 of the General Code, used in and arising our of business transacted in this state by, for or on behalf of a non-resident person * * * will be subject to taxation; and all such property of persons residing in this state used in and arising out of business transacted outside of this state by, for or on behalf of such persons * * * will not be subject to taxation * * *. 'Sec. 5328-2: Property of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00308", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00632", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 3685/93 of 20 December 1993 allocating, for 1994, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Estonian waters THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture(1), and in particular Article 8 (4) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because, in accordance with the procedure provided for in the Agreement on fisheries relations between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Estonia(2), and in particular Articles 3 and 6 of it, the Community and Estonia have held consultations concerning their mutual fishing rights for 1994 and the management of common living resources; because, in the course of these consultations, the delegations agreed to recommend to their respective authorities that certain catch quotas for 1994 should be fixed for the vessels of the other Party; because the necessary measures should be taken to implement, for 1994, the results of the consultations held between the delegations of the Community and Estonia; because to ensure efficient management of the catch possibilities available in Latvian waters, they should be allocated among the Member States as quotas in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92; because the fishing activities covered by this Regulation are subject to the relevant control measures provided for by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy(3), HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 From 1 January to 31 December 1994 vessels flying the flag of a Member State are authorized to make catches within the quota limits set out in the Annex in waters falling within the fisheries jurisdiction of Estonia. Article 2 1. The financial contribution provided for in Article 7 of the Agreement will be set for the period referred to in Article 1 at ECU 343 614, payable to an account designated by Estonia. 2. The finanical contribution provided for in Article 8 of the Agreement will be set for the period referred to in Article 1 at ECU 35 000, payable to an account designated by Estonia. Article 3 This Regulation will", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00582", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00633", "text": "destination of products from intervention (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 775/83 (2), should apply where products drawn from intervention stocks are to be supplied as food aid in accordance with this Regulation ; because, consequently, the adoption of this Regulation entails amendments to the Annex to Regulation (EEC) No 1687/76; because, in the case of operations involving the supply of products which are not drawn from intervention stocks or goods, manufactured therefrom, proof of the destination of the goods until they left the geographical territory of the Community should continue to be furnished by the production of the control copy referred to in Article 10 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 223/77 (3); because the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products has not delivered on opinion within the time limit set by its chairman, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: TITLE I GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1 1. Where a decision is taken on Community action to supply skimmed-milk powder, butter or butteroil as food aid, the general rules for mobilization and supply laid down in this Regulation will apply, without prejudice to the special provisions laid down, where appropriate, for specific cases. 2. Unless there are any provisions to the contrary the general rules laid down in this Regulation will apply to operations to be carried out at the fob, cif or free-at-destination stage. 3. For the purposes of this Regulation, the countries of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union will be considered as a single Member State. 4. For the purposes of this Regulation, the recipient may appoint a representative. The Commission will publish in the \"C\" series of the Official Journal of the European Communities, a list of the recipients' representatives in the Community notified to it. Article 2 1. Supply will be effected by an undertaking approved by the competent body in the Member State where the registered office of the undertaking is established. The undertaking, from now on referred to as \"the successful tenderer\", will be selected in accordance with one of the procedures laid down in Article 9. 2. Approval will be granted, on request, to any undertaking: - which has its registered office in one of the Member States of the Community, - which is engaged in the manufacture or processing of or trade in milk products or the transport of foodstuffs. 3. Approval will be withdrawn temporarily or permanently where it is established", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00630", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00634", "text": "1(b)) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to wages (as defined in section 3121 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegates under subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rates of tax under such chapter 21 (other than sections 3101(b) and 3111(b)) to such wages, less the amounts specified in clause (1) of subsection (b) of this section for such fiscal year, ``(II) the taxes imposed by chapter 2 (other than section 1401(b)) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with respect to self-employment income (as defined in section 1402 of such Code) reported to the Secretary of the Treasury on tax returns under subtitle F of such Code, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the applicable rate of tax under such chapter (other than section 1401(b)) to such self-employment income, less the amounts specified in clause (2) of subsection (b) of this section for such fiscal year, and ``(III) the amount equivalent to the aggregate increase in tax liabilities under chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 which is attributable to the application of sections 86 and 871(a)(3) of such Code to payments from the Trust Fund, over ``(ii) the sum of-- ``(I) benefits paid from the Trust Fund during the fiscal year, and ``(II) amounts authorized to be made available from the Trust Fund under subsection (g) of this section which are paid from the Trust Fund during such fiscal year. ``(C) despite paragraph (1), the balance in the Account will not be available for investment by the Managing Trustee. ``(D)(i) The preceding provisions of this paragraph will not apply with respect to fiscal years commencing with or after the first fiscal year, after fiscal year 2013, for which a provision of Federal law takes effect and authorizes, for amounts in the Trust Fund, an investment vehicle other than obligations of the United States resulting in the transfer of Trust Fund assets to the general fund of the Treasury. ``(ii) A provision of Federal law will be deemed to meet the requirements of clause (i) if such provision includes the following: `This Act will be considered to be a provision of Federal law meeting the requirements of section 201(d)(2)(D)(i)", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01157", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00636", "text": "Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren, principal draftsman of the bill, testified that it had no application to Germans 'domiciled' in this country. Id., at 34. And the House Report speaks of enemy status as being determined 'not so much * * * by the nationality or allegiance of the individual, * * * as by his * * * commercial domicile or residence in enemy territory. The enemy domiciled or residing in the United States is not included * * *.' H.R.Rep.No.85, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. 4 The validity of this construction is additionally suggested by the explanation in the Senate report of the parallel term of § 2, 'doing business within such territory.' According to the report that meant 'having a branch or agency actively conducting business within that country.' S.Rep.No.111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. That is to say, not 'domiciled' in enemy territory by American corporation law standards, but having a substantial, not casual or transitory connection with it. See also Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on H.R.4960, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 136—137. 5 H.R.Rep.No.976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. 6 The resolution of July 2, 1921, terminating the state of war with Germany, provided that 'All property of the Imperial German Government * * * and of all German nationals which * * * has * * * come into the possession or under control of * * * the United States * * * will be retained * * * and no disposition of it made, except as will have been previously or specifically hereafter will be provided by law.' 42 Stat. 105, 106. By the Treaty of Versailles, art. 297(d), 'all the exceptional war measures, or measures of transfer * * * will be considered as final and binding upon all persons.' In art. 297(i), Germany undertook 'to compensate her nationals in respect of the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in Allied or Associated States.' The Treaty of Berlin, 42 Stat. 1939, 1940, incorporated these provisions of the Versailles Treaty, together with appendices defining 'exceptional war measures", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00430", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00637", "text": ", Integrated Resources Management Program for Flood Control in the Colusa Basin'', dated May 2000; and (2) carried out in accordance with that document and all environmental documentation requirements that apply to the project under the laws of the United States and the State of California. (b) Compatibility Requirement.--The Secretary will ensure that projects for which assistance is provided under this Act are not inconsistent with watershed protection and environmental restoration efforts being carried out under the authority of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (Public Law 102-575; 106 Stat. 4706 et seq.) or the CALFED Bay-Delta Program. SEC. 4. COST SHARING. (a) Non-Federal Share.--The Secretary will require that the District and cooperating non-Federal agencies or organizations pay-- (1) 25 percent of the costs associated with construction of any project carried out with assistance provided under this Act; (2) 100 percent of any operation, maintenance, and replacement and rehabilitation costs with respect to such a project; and (3) 35 percent of the costs associated with planning, design, and environmental compliance activities. (b) Planning, Design, and Compliance Assistance.--Funds appropriated under this Act may be made available to fund 65 percent of costs incurred for planning, design, and environmental compliance activities by the District or by local agencies acting under the State statute, in accordance with agreements with the Secretary. (c) Treatment of Contributions.--For purposes of this section, the Secretary will treat the value of lands, interests in lands (including rights-of-way and other easements), and necessary relocations contributed by the District to a project as a payment by the District of the costs of the project. SEC. 5. COSTS NONREIMBURSABLE. Amounts expended under this Act will be considered nonreimbursable for purposes of the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388; 43 U.S.C. 371 et seq.), and Acts amendatory of it and supplemental thereto. SEC. 6. AGREEMENTS. Funds appropriated under this Act may be made available to the District or a local agency only if the District or local agency, as applicable, has entered into a binding agreement with the Secretary-- (1) under which the District or the local agency is required to pay the non-Federal share of the costs of construction required by section 4(a); and (2", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00989", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00638", "text": "Agreements. (4) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission(3). (5) With regard to trade defence measures, it is appropriate to lay down specific provisions concerning the general rules provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community(4). (6) This Regulation should continue to apply after entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 In Regulation (EC) No 153/2002 the following Articles will be inserted: \"Article 7a General safeguard clause and shortage clause 1. Where a Member State requests the Commission to take measures as provided for in Articles 24 and 25 of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Articles 37 and 38 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, it will provide the Commission, in support of its request, with the information needed to justify it. 2. The Commission will be assisted by the Advisory Committee established by Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3285/94(5) (from now on referred to as 'the Committee'). 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 3 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC will apply. 4. The Committee will adopt its rules of procedure. 5. Where the Commission, at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, finds that the conditions laid down in Articles 24 and 25 of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Articles 37 and 38 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement are fulfilled, it will: - inform the Member States immediately if acting on its own initiative or, if it is responding to a Member State's request, within five working days of the date of receipt of that request, - consult the Committee on the proposed measures, - at the same time inform the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and will notify it of the opening of the consultations within the Cooperation Council, and thereafter the Stabilisation and Association Committee as provided for in Article 24(4) and Article 25(3) of the Interim Agreement, and thereafter Article 37(", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00732", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00639", "text": "3 May 1993 Portugal submitted an application for assistance from the cohesion financial instrument for a project concerning the widening of the Alverca/Vila Franca de Xira subsection; because that application concerns a project which is eligible under the terms of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 792/93; because the application for assistance contains all the information required by Article 8 (4) of the Regulation and satisfies the criteria set out in Article 8 (3) and (5) of the Regulation; because the project forms part of the master plan for a trans-European road network; because Article 1 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (3), as last amended by Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No 610/90 (4), states that the legal commitments entered into for measures extending over more than one financial year will contain a time limit for implementation which must be specified to the recipient in due form when the aid is granted; because under Article 9 or Regulation EEC No 792/93, the Commission and the Member State will ensure that there is evaluation and systematic monitoring of the project; because the financial implementation provisions, monitoring and assessment are specified in Annexes III and IV to this Decision; because failure to comply with those provisions may result in suspension or reduction of the assistance granted under Article 9 (3) of that Regulation No 792/93; because all the other conditions laid down, have been complied with, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 1. The stage of project situated in Portugal as described in Annex I to this is approved for the period from 1 January 1993 to December 1996. 2. References to 'project' in the following Articles and Annexes will be understood to mean also'stage of project'. Article 2 1. The maximum eligible expenditure to be taken as the basis for this Decision will be ECU 40 466 000. 2. The rate of Community assistance granted to the project will be fixed at 80 %. 3. The maximum amount of the contribution from the cohesion financial instrument will be fixed at ECU 32 372 800. 4. The contribution is committed from the 1993 budget. Article 3 1. Community assistance will be based on the financial plan for the project set out", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00785", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00640", "text": "as a substantive matter this would be for the states to control. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 3493—3506. 49 For myself I have no doubt of the validity of Rule 23 or of the power of Congress to enact such a rule, even though it has a substantive aspect. despite that aspect, the rule is too closely related to procedural and other matters affecting litigation in the federal courts for me to conceive of its invalidity. So also in the present cases I think the state regulations, though each may be regarded as having a substantive aspect, are too closely related to the modes and methods of conducting litigation in the federal courts to be capable of displacing Congress' power or regulation in those respects or the federal courts' power to hear and determine the respective controversies. 50 Accordingly I would reverse the judgments in the Cohen and Ragan cases and affirm that in the Woods case. 1 Chapter 131, New Jersey Laws of 1945, N.J.S.A. 14:3—15 to 17, provides in pertinent part as follows: '1. In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation having a total par value or stated capital value of less than five per centum (5%) of the aggregate par value or stated capital value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation's stock of every class * * * unless the shares or voting trust certificates held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), the corporation in whose right such action is brought will be entitled, at any stage of the proceeding before final judgment, to require the complainant or complainants to give security for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which it may become subject under law, its certificate of incorporation, its by-laws or under equitable principles, to which the corporation will have recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction will determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such security may thereafter, from time to time, be increased or ecreased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive. '2. In any action, suit", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00302", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00641", "text": "4) Special Masters.-- ``(A) The courts established under subsections (a) and (b) may appoint one or more Special Masters to advise the courts on technical issues raised during proceedings before the courts. ``(B) In this paragraph, the term `Special Master' means an individual who has technological expertise in the subject matter of a proceeding before a court established under subsection (a) or (b).''. SEC. 5. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF SPECIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT REGARD TO SPECIFIC DEVICE. Section 105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) that, upon the request of the applicant, any person or entity will furnish the applicant immediately all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing that target of electronic surveillance;''. SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR COLLECTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978. (a) In General.--Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 3 of this Act, is further amended to read as follows: ``TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ``SEC. 701. WARRANT REQUIREMENT. ``despite any other provision of this Act, no information relating to a United States person may be acquired under this Act without a valid warrant based on probable cause.''. (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 3 of this Act, is further amended by striking the items relating to title VII and section 701 and inserting the following new items: ``TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ``701. Warrant requirement.''. SEC. 7. ENCRYPTION AND PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND SOFTWARE. despite any other provision of law, the Federal Government will not mandate that the manufacturer of an electronic device or software for an electronic device build into such device or", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 495, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01109", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00642", "text": ", physical address, mailing address, and phone number; and (iii) containing a statement that the agent accepts the designation and acknowledges that the duties of the agent may not be assigned to another person or entity and the duties remain in effect until withdrawn or replaced by the foreign manufacturer or producer. (4) Applicability.-- (A) In general.--Paragraph (1) applies only with respect to a foreign manufacturer or producer that exceeds minimum requirements established by the head of the applicable agency under this section. (B) Factors.--In determining the minimum requirements for application of paragraph (1) to a foreign manufacturer or producer, the head of the applicable agency will, at a minimum, consider the following: (i) The value of all covered products imported from the manufacturer or producer in a calendar year. (ii) The quantity of all covered products imported from the manufacturer or producer in a calendar year. (iii) The frequency of importation from the manufacturer or producer in a calendar year. (b) Registry of Agents of Foreign Manufacturers and Certifications.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of Commerce will, in cooperation with each head of an applicable agency, establish and keep up to date a registry of agents registered under subsection (a), certifications submitted under section 2(5)(B), and certifications removed under subsection (e). (2) Availability.--The Secretary of Commerce will make the registry established under paragraph (1) available-- (A) to the public in a searchable format through the Internet website of the Department of Commerce; and (B) to the Commissioner responsible for U.S. Customs and Border Protection in a format prescribed by the Commissioner. (c) Consent to Jurisdiction.-- (1) In general.--A foreign manufacturer or producer of a covered product that registers an agent under this section thereby consents to the personal jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts of the State in which the registered agent is located for the purpose of any judicial proceeding related to such covered product. (2) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (1) will not apply to actions brought by foreign plaintiffs where the alleged injury or damage occurred outside the United States. (d) Regulations.-- (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, the Commissioner responsible for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and each head of an applicable agency will prescribe regulations to carry out this section. (2) Interagency cooperation.--The", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01125", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00643", "text": "isolable. Rather they are bound together by one sole purpose—to locate and seize the narcotics of respondent. The search and seizure are, therefore, incapable of being untied. To hold that this search and seizure were lawful as to the respondent would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to protect a fundamental right. The respondent unquestionably had standing to object to the seizure made without warrant or arrest unless the contraband nature of the narcotics seized precluded his assertion, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, of a property interest there. 8 It is urgently contended by the Government that no property rights within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment exist in the narcotics seized here, because they are contraband goods in which Congress has declared that 'no property rights will exist'3. The Government made the same contention in Trupiano v. United States, 1948, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663. See Brief for the United States, pp. 24 45. This Court disposed of the contention saying: 'It follows that it was error to refuse petitioners' motion to exclude and suppress the property which was improperly seized. But since this property was contrabrand, they have no right to have it returned to them.' 334 U.S. at 710, 68 S.Ct. 1235. 9 The same section declaring that 'no property rights will exist' in contraband goods provides for the issuance of search warrants 'for the seizure' of such property. The Government's view in Trupiano was that the latter provision applies 'when the entry must be made to seize'; but not 'where, after a lawful entry for another purpose, the contraband property is before the eyes of the enforcing officers.'4 This construction would make it necessary for the officers to have a search warrant here. We are of the opinion that Congress, in abrogating property rights in such goods, merely intended to aid in their forfeiture and thereby prevent the spread of the traffic in drugs rather than to abolish the exclusionary rule formulated by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See In re Fried, 2 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 453. 10 Since the evidence illegally seized was contraband the respondent was not entitled to have it returned to him. It", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00418", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00644", "text": "cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal.15 The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal. It does not mean, therefore, that the agent's action, because tortious, is, for that reason alone, ultra vires his authority. An argument to that effect was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate liability for torts, but was decisively rejected.16 17 There is, therefore, nothing in the law of agency which lends support to the contention that an officer's tortious action is ipso facto beyond his delegated powers. Nor, do we think, is there anything in the doctrine of sovereign immunity which requires us to adopt such a view as regards Government agencies. If, of course, it is assumed that the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the thesis that the king can do no wrong then it may be also assumed that if the king's agent does wrong that action cannot be the action of the king. It is on some such argument that the position of the respondent rests. It is argued that an officer given the power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions. If his decisions are not correct, then his action based on those decisions is beyond his authority and not the action of the sovereign. There is no warrant for such a contention in cases in which the decision made by the officer does not relate to the terms of his statutory authority. Certainly the jurisdiction of a court to decide a case does not disappear if its decision on the merits is wrong. And we have previously rejected the argument that official action is invalid if based on an incorrect decision as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so. Adams v. Nagle, 1938, 303 U.S. 532, 542, 58 S.Ct. 687, 692, 82 L.Ed. 999. We therefore reject the contention here. We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under the normal rules of", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00316", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00645", "text": "will be suspended where the Commission has to take a decision under Article 11(3) of that Regulation, without proceeding first by way of simple request for information, owing to circumstances for which one of the undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible. 3. The time limits referred to in Articles 9(4), Article 10(1) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 will be suspended: (a) in the cases referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, for the period between the expiry of the time limit set in the simple request for information, and the receipt of the complete and correct information required by decision; (b) in the cases referred to in point (c) of paragraph 1, for the period between the unsuccessful attempt to carry out the inspection and the completion of the inspection ordered by decision; (c) in the cases referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1, for the period between the occurrence of the change in the facts referred to there and the receipt of the complete and correct information. (d) in the cases referred to in paragraph 2 for the period between the expiry of the time limit set in the decision and the receipt of the complete and correct information required by decision. 4. The suspension of the time limit will begin on the working day following the date on which the event causing the suspension occurred. It will expire with the end of the day on which the reason for suspension is removed. Where such a day is not a working day, the suspension of the time-limit will expire with the end of the following working day. Article 10 Compliance with the time-limits 1. The time limits referred to in Article 4(4), fourth subparagraph, Article 9(4), Article 10(1) and (3), and Article 22(3) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 will be met where the Commission has taken the relevant decision before the end of the period. 2. The time limits referred to in Article 4(4), second subparagraph, Article 4(5), third subparagraph, Article 9(2), Article 22(1), second subparagraph, and 22(2), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 will be met by a Member State concerned where that Member State, before the end of the period,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00519", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00646", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 12 November 2008 on a temporary derogation from the rules of origin laid down in Annex II to Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 to take account of the special situation of Kenya with regard to tuna loins (notified under document number C(2008) 6644) (2008/886/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for products originating in certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements (1), and in particular Article 36(4) of Annex II thereto, because: (1) On 5 August 2008 Kenya requested, in accordance with Article 36 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007, a derogation from the rules of origin set out in that Annex for a period of one year. On 19 August 2008 Kenya submitted additional information relating to its request. The request covers a total quantity of 2 000 tonnes of tuna loins of HS heading 1604. The request is made because catches and supply of originating raw tuna have decreased in the Indian Ocean. (2) According to the information provided by Kenya catches of raw originating tuna are unusually low even compared to the normal seasonal variations and have led to a decrease in production of tuna loins. This abnormal situation makes it impossible for Kenya to comply with the rules of origin laid down in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 during a certain period. (3) In order to ensure that Kenya may continue its exports to the European Community, following the expiration of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (2), a new derogation should be granted. (4) To ensure smooth transition from the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement to the Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the East African Community partner States, on the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the other part (EAC-EU Interim Partnership Agreement), a new derogation should be granted with retroactive effect from 1 January 2008. (5) A temporary derogation from", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00816", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00647", "text": "is to derive from the Act, such differentiations are interpolations of construction. They are not expressions by Congress. 40 In the light of this approach to the problem of construction presented by this Act, I would affirm the judgment below. 41 Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justc e JACKSON join in this dissent. 1 'Sec. 301. The following acts and the causing of it are prohibited: '(k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being misbranded.' 52 Stat. 1042, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k), 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(k). 2 The following inscription appeared on the bottle labels as a compliance with § 502(f)(1) which requires directions as to use: 'Caution.—To be used only by or on the prescription of a physician.' This would appear to constitute adequate directions since it is required by regulation issued by the Administrator under authority of the Act. 21 C.F.R.Cum.Supp. § 2.106(b) (3). The following appeared on the label of the bottles as a compliance with § 502(f)(2) which requires warnings of danger: 'Warning.—In some individuals Sulfathiazole may cause severe toxic reactions. Daily blood counts for evidence of anemia or leukopenia and urine examinations for hematuria are recommended. 'Physicians should familiarize themselves with the use of this product before it is administered. A circular giving full directions and contraindications will be furnished upon request.' 3 H.Rep. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 3. 1 E.g., §§ 403(a), 502(a) and 602(a) are in identical language. 2 See S.Rep.No.361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19. 3 See H.R.Rep.No.2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8. 4 'The proviso of this paragraph likewise requires the establishment of regulations exempting packages of assorted foods", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00127", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00648", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 29 June 1993 amending Decision 92/452/EEC establishing lists of embryo collection teams approved in third countries for export of bovine embryos to the Community (93/433/EEC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and imports from third countries of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), as last amended by Directive 90/425/EEC (2), and in particular Article 8 of it, because Commission Decision 92/452/EEC (3), as last amended by Decision 93/212/EEC (4), established a list of embryo collection teams approved in third countries for the export of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species to the Community; because the competent authorities of Canada and the United States of America have forwarded amendments to the list of teams approved in their territories; because it is now necessary to amend the list of approved teams as regards Canada and the United States of America; because the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Annex to Decision 92/452/EEC is replaced by the Annex to this Decision. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to Member States. Done at Brussels, 29 June 1993.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 318, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00668", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00649", "text": "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 120/96 of 22 January 1996 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2390/89 laying down general rules for the import of wines, grape juice and grape must THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 of 16 March 1987 on the common organization of the market in wine (1), and in particular Article 70 (2) of it, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, because Articles 1 (2) and 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 2390/89 (2) provide for import facilities for wine products originating in third countries which offer specific guarantees through the provision of a certificate of origin and conformity and an analysis report; because Article 3 (2) of that Regulation limits those facilities to a trial period expiring on 31 December 1995; because, taking into account the time necessary to examine the implementation of future arrangements, that period should be extended until the end of 1996, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 In Article 3 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2390/89, the date 31 December 1995 is replaced by 31 December 1996. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will apply as from 1 January 1996. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 22 January 1996.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 349, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00638", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00650", "text": ".50 acres, as depicted on the map titled ``Allegheny Unit, Elk Tanning Company Tract 770, 1934''. (b) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance under subsection (a), the Warren County Development Association will make to the Secretary a lump sum payment of $100,000. (c) Property Description.--The map referred to in subsection (a) is the primary description of the lands to which the map refers. In the event of a conflict between the map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The map will be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service until the lands are disposed of under this section. (d) Revocations.--despite any other provision of law, on conveyance of land by the Secretary under this section, any public order withdrawing the land from any form of appropriation under the public land laws is revoked. SEC. 4. CONVEYANCE OF RIDGEWAY RANGER DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, ELK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA. (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of Agriculture may convey to Ridgeway Township, Pennsylvania, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to US Tract 904, consisting of 8.812 acres, and US Tract 905, consisting of 0.869 acres, Ridgeway Ranger District Headquarters, as depicted on the maps titled ``Allegheny Unit, Harry R. Eliza E. Larson Tract 904, 1959'' and ``Allegheny Unit, Leo S. Laura A. Guth Tract 905, July 1948''. (b) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance under subsection (a), Ridgeway Township will pay to the Secretary an amount equal to the fair market value of the conveyed lands, as determined by an appraisal acceptable to the Secretary and Ridgeway Township. (c) Property Description.--The maps referred to in subsection (a) is the primary description of the lands to which the maps refer. In the event of a conflict between a map description and the metes and bounds description of the lands, the map will be deemed to be the definitive description of the lands unless the map cannot be located. The maps will be on file and", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00965", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00651", "text": "COMMISSION DECISION of 21 December 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/32.948 - IV/34.590: Tretorn and others) (Only the English, French, German, Italian and Dutch texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (94/987/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Articles 3 and 15 (2) of it, Having regard to the Commission decision of 14 May 1993 to initiate proceedings in this case, Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the objections raised by the Commission, in accordance with Article 19 (1) of Regulation No 17 and with Commission Regulation No 99/63/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17 (2), After consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, because: A. THE FACTS I. THE PARTIES (1) Tretorn AB, (from now on referred to as 'Tretorn AB'), is a Swedish industrial company. It operates within the Community in the market in tennis balls, through its subsidiary Tretorn Sport Ltd, Ireland. For the year 1992, Tretorn AB's turnover was of about ECU 16,5 million. (2) Tretorn Sport Ltd, (from now on 'Tretorn'), is a subsidiary of Tretorn AB, manufacturing tennis balls. For the year 1992, Tretorn had a turnover of about ECU [...] (3). (3) Formula Sport International Ltd (from now on 'Formula') was Tretorn's exclusive distributor in the United Kingdom until 1989. (4) Fabra SPA, (from now on 'Fabra'), was Tretorn's exclusive distributor in Italy until mid-1993. (5) Tenimport SA (from now on 'Tenimport'), was Tretorn's exclusive distributor in Belgium. (6) Zuercher", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00818", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00652", "text": "a). (2) During certain proceedings.--despite any provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security will not order an alien to be removed from the United States if the alien is in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under any provision of such Act and has applied for adjustment of status under subsection (a), except where the Secretary of Homeland Security has made a final determination to deny the application. (3) Work authorization.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may authorize an alien who has applied for adjustment of status under subsection (a) to engage in employment in the United States during the pendency of such application and may provide the alien with an ``employment authorized'' endorsement or other appropriate document signifying authorization of employment. (B) Pending applications.--If an application under subsection (a) is pending for a period exceeding 180 days and has not been denied, the Secretary of Homeland Security will authorize such employment. (d) Record of Permanent Residence.--Upon approval of an alien's application for adjustment of status under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security will establish a record of the alien's admission for permanent record as of the date of the alien's arrival in the United States. (e) Availability of Administrative Review.--The Secretary of Homeland Security will provide to applicants for adjustment of status under subsection (a) the same right to, and procedures for, administrative review as are provided to-- (1) applicants for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255); or (2) aliens subject to removal proceedings under section 240 of such Act. (f) Limitation on Judicial Review.--A determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security as to whether the status of any alien should be adjusted under this section is final and will not be subject to review by any court. (g) No Offset in Number of Visas Available.--If an alien is granted the status of having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence under this section, the Secretary of State will not be required to reduce the number of immigrant visas authorized to be issued under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (h) Application of Immigration and Nationality Act Provisions.-- (1) Definitions.--Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the definitions contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act will apply in this section. (2) Savings provision.--Nothing in this Act will be construed", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00941", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00653", "text": ". They, with six others who were acquitted, were taken into custody by the United States Army after the Japanese surrender and were tried and convicted by a Military Commission constituted by our Commanding General at Nanking by delegation from the Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theatre, under authority specifically granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. The Commission sat in China, with express consent of the Chinese Government. The proceeding was conducted wholly under American auspices and involved no international participation. After conviction, the sentences were duly reviewed and, with immaterial modification, approved by military reviewing authority. 3 The prisoners were repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences. Their immediate custodian is Commandant of Landsberg Prison, an American Army officer under the Commending General, Third United States Army and the Commanding General, European Command. He could not be reached by process from the District Court. Respondents named in the petition are Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. 4 The petition alleges, and respondents denied, that the jailer is subject to their direction. The Court of Appeals assumed, and we do likewise, that, while prisoners are in immediate physical custody of an officer or officers not parties to the proceeding, respondents named in the petition have lawful authority to effect that release. 5 The petition prays an order that the prisoners be produced before the District Court, that it may inquire into their confinement and order them discharged from such offenses and confinement. It is claimed that their trial, conviction and imprisonment violate Articles I and III of the Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment thereto, and other provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States and provisions of the Geneva Convention governing treatment of prisoners of war. 6 A rule to show cause issued, to which the United States made return. Thereupon the petition was dismissed on authority of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898. 7 The Court of Appeals reversed and, reinstating the petition, remanded for further proceedings. 84 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 174 F.2d 961. It concluded that any person, including an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under any purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ if he can show that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00372", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00654", "text": "in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, supra. The state tax was held constitutional by the Southern Gas case as a tax exacted for the privilege of doing an intrastate business by a company in fact engaging in intrastate business in Alabama. 14 Miss.Gen.Laws (1930), ch. 88, § 3: 'Every person desiring to engage in any business, or exercise any privilege from now on specified, will first, before commencing same, apply for, pay for, and procure from the proper officer a privilege license authorizing him to engage in the business, or exercise the privilege specified there; and the amount of tax shown in the following schedules is imposed for the privilege of engaging and/or continuing in the businesses set out there.' Id., § 163: 'Upon each person engaging and/or continuing in this state in the business of operating a pipe line or transporting in or through this state oil, or natural, or artificial gas, through pipes, and/or conduits, a tax, as follows: (On each mile a varying tax that depended upon the diameter of the pipe).' 15 The same rationale has led this Court at times to declare invalid similar taxes on foreign corporations, admitted to do business in a state and doing only an interstate business through activities within the state. The leading decisions supporting this view (Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 38 S.Ct. 295, 62 L.Ed. 632, and Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 S.Ct. 477, 69 L.Ed. 916, 44 A.L.R. 1219) have been strictly limited. Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 298 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 887, 80 L.Ed. 1328; cf. Southern Gas Corporation v. Alabama, supra, 301 U.S. at page 156, 57 S.Ct. 699, 81 L.Ed. 970, and dissent in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218, 229, at 237, 53 S.Ct. 373, 376, 379, 77 L.Ed. 710. In the Cheney case an excise tax for the privilege of doing business", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00201", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00655", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2772/2000 of 18 December 2000 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1964/82 laying down the conditions for granting special export refunds on certain cuts of boned meat of bovine animals THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), and in particular Article 33(12) of it, because: (1) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1964/82(2), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1470/2000(3), lays down the conditions for granting special export refunds on certain cuts of boned meat of adult bovine animals. (2) The current rules require that all cuts produced by the boning of hindquarters, with the exception of fillet, must be exported. However, in line with the general trend on the market, the option of not exporting fillet should be extended to other cuts from hindquarters with a view to achieving better prices within the Community, without thereby jeopardising the goal of freeing the Community market. (3) Since the rate of the special refund corresponds to the average level of support for all cuts obtained from hindquarters, the decision not to export certain hindquarter cuts means that the refund needs to be adjusted, the amount of such adjustment being calculated by reference to the value of the cuts most affected. (4) Some points in the text need clarifying and other technical details need updating, in particular to replace the references to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 of 27 November 1987 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products(4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 604/98(5), by references to Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/1999(6), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1557/2000(7), which replaced it. (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 1964/82 is amended as follows: 1.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00551", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00656", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 996/2007 of 28 August 2007 amending for the 84th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (1), and in particular Article 7(1), first indent, of it, because: (1) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 lists the persons, groups and entities covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation. (2) On 1 and 13 August 2007, the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council decided to amend the list of persons, groups and entities to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Annex I should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 28 August 2007.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 397, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00532", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00657", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Dividend Taxation Elimination Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. EXEMPTION OF DIVIDEND INCOME FROM TAX. (a) In General.--Part III of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to amounts specifically excluded from gross income) is amended by inserting after section 115 the following new section: ``SEC. 116. EXCLUSION OF DIVIDENDS RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUALS. ``(a) Exclusion From Gross Income.--Gross income does not include dividends which are otherwise includible in gross income and which are received during the taxable year by an individual. ``(b) Limitation Before 2007.--In the case of a taxable year beginning before January 1, 2007, the aggregate amount excluded under subsection (a) for any taxable year will not exceed-- ``(1) $25,000 in the case of taxable years beginning during 2003, ``(2) $50,000 in the case of taxable years beginning during 2004, ``(3) $75,000 in the case of taxable years beginning during 2005, and ``(4) $100,000 in the case of taxable years beginning during 2006. In the case of a joint return, the preceding sentence will be applied by doubling each amount contained there. ``(c) Special Rules.--For purposes of this section-- ``(1) Exclusion not to apply to capital gain dividends from regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts.-- ``For treatment of capital gain dividends, see sections 854(a) and 857(c). ``(2) Certain nonresident aliens ineligible for exclusion.--In the case of a nonresident alien individual, subsection (a) will apply only in determining the taxes imposed for the taxable year under sections 871(b)(1) and 877(b). ``(3) Dividends from employee stock ownership plans.-- Subsection (a) will not apply to any dividend described in section 404(k). ``(4) Certain dividends excluded.--Subsection (a) will not apply to any dividend from a corporation which for the taxable year of the corporation in which the distribution is made is a corporation exempt from tax under section 521 (relating to farmers' cooperative associations).''. (b) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Subparagraph (A) of section", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01035", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00658", "text": "Insurance Trust Fund, the Secretary of Treasury will give priority to the payment of social security benefits required to be paid by law. (b) Points of Order.--Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Social Security Point of Order.--It will not be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget, an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon that violates section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. ``(k) Debt Held by the Public Point of Order.--It will not be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that would-- ``(1) increase the limit on the debt held by the public in section 253A(a) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985; or ``(2) provide additional borrowing authority that would result in the limit on the debt held by the public in section 253A(a) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 being exceeded. ``(l) Social Security Surplus Protection Point of Order.-- ``(1) In general.--It will not be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget, an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon that sets forth a deficit in any fiscal year. ``(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) will not apply if-- ``(A) the limit on the debt held by the public in section 253A(a) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is suspended; or ``(B) the deficit for a fiscal year results solely from the enactment of-- ``(i) retirement security reform legislation, as defined in section 253A(e)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985; or ``(ii) provisions of legislation that are designated as an emergency requirement under section 251(b)(2)(A) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.''. SEC. 4. DEDICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY SURPLUSES TO REDUCTION IN THE DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC. (a) Amendments to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.--The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended-- (", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00902", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00659", "text": "; because this objective can be met by fixing the maximum guaranteed quantity at 701 000 tonnes of cotton of the average quality of unginned cotton produced in the Community; because, with a view to avoiding excessive variations in the reduction of the aid, it is appropriate that this reduction be limited to 15 % of the norm price and the proportion in excess of this maximum together with any difference between actual and estimated production should be carried forward, without application of that limit, to the following marketing year; because experience may show the need to make other adjustments to the system provided for by the abovementioned Protocol; because, therefore, a procedure should be laid down whereby the Council may adjust the system, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 This Regulation provides for adjustments to the system of aid for the production of cotton provided for in paragraphs 3 and 8 of Protocol 4 annexed to the Act of Accession of Greece and adjusted by Regulation (EEC) No 1964/87. Article 2 Article 2 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1964/87 will be replaced by the following: '1. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, will determine the maximum guaranteed quantity for a fixed period. Such quantity will take into account a reference period and a foreseeable trend in demand. However, for each of the 1992/93 to 1995/96 marketing years, the maximum guaranteed quantity will be fixed at 701 000 tonnes of unginned cotton.' Article 3 The second and third subparagraphs of Article 2 (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1964/87 will be replaced by the following: 'However, without prejudice to the third subparagraph, if the reduction in the amount of aid exceeds 15 % of the guide price, this reduction will be limited, under the marketing year concerned, to 15 %. Any reduction which exceeds this limit will be carried forward to the guide price of the following marketing year up to a limit of 5 %. Moreover, the amount of the aid for the marketing year concerned will be adjusted upwards of a threshold of 3 % on the basis of the relation between, on the one hand, the gap between the estimated production and the actual production and, on the other hand, the maximum quantity guaranteed for the preceding marketing year. However for the 1992/93 marketing year, the reduction in the guide", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00756", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00660", "text": "; 136 (2) To the furnishing or providing of transportation to or from work, of employees engaged in farm work on any farm of the State of California; 137 (3) To the furnishing or providing of transportation to and from work of employees of any nonprofit cooperative association, organized under any law of the State of California; 138 (4) To the transportation of persons wholly or substantially within the limits of a single municipality or of contiguous municipalities; 139 (5) To transportation of persons over a route wholly or partly within a national park or state park where such transportation is sold in conjunction with or as part of a rail trip or trip over a regularly operated motor bus transportation system or line; 140 (6) To the transportation of passengers by a person who is driving his own vehicle and the transportation of persons other than himself and members of his family when transporting such persons to or from their place of employment and when the owner of such vehicle is driving to or from his place of employment; provided that arrangements for any such transportation provided under the provisions of this subsection will be made directly between the owner of such vehicle and the person who uses or intends to use such transportation. (c) Penalties. 141 654.3. Violation of Section 654.1 will be a misdemeanor, and upon first conviction the punishment will be a fine of not over two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or imprisonment in jail for not over 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment. Upon second conviction the punishment will be imprisonment in jail for not less than 30 days and not more than 180 days. Upon a third or subsequent conviction the punishment will be confinement in jail for not less than 90 days and not more than one year, and a person suffering three or more convictions will not be eligible to probation, the provisions of any law to the contrary despite. 142 (2) Emphasis expressly placed upon the mutual exclusiveness of the state and federal regulations assigning intrastate regulation to the states,and interstate regulation to the Interstate Commerce Commission upon its finding it necessary. 143 1933 California Act. 144 The state policy of regulation of motor carrier transportation agents and unlicensed share-the-expense motor carriers was to apply to interstate, as well as intrastate, transportation \"until such time as Congress of the United States will act, * * *.\" P.761, 69 S.Ct.857, supra. 145", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00260", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00661", "text": "short title Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``Government Shutdown Prevention Act''. continuing funding Sec. 2. (a) If any regular appropriation bill for fiscal year 1998 does not become law prior to the beginning of fiscal year 1998 or a joint resolution making continuing appropriations is not in effect, there is appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of applicable corporate or other revenues, receipts, and funds, such sums as may be necessary to continue any program, project, or activity for which funds were provided in fiscal year 1997. (b) Appropriations and funds made available, and authority granted, for a program, project, or activity for fiscal year 1998 under this Act will be at 100 per cent of the rate of operations that was provided for the program, project, or activity in fiscal year 1997 in the corresponding regular appropriation Act for fiscal year 1997. (c) Appropriations and funds made available, and authority granted, for fiscal year 1998 under this Act for a program, project, or activity will be available for the period beginning with the first day of a lapse in appropriations and ending with the earlier of-- (1) the date on which the applicable regular appropriation bill for fiscal year 1998 becomes law (whether or not that law provides for that program, project, or activity) or a continuing resolution making appropriations becomes law, as the case may be; or (2) the last day of fiscal year 1998. terms and conditions Sec. 3. (a) An appropriation of funds made available, or authority granted, for a program, project, or activity for fiscal year 1998 under this Act will be made available to the extent and in the manner which would be provided by the pertinent appropriation Act for fiscal year 1997, including all of the terms and conditions and the apportionment schedule imposed with respect to the appropriation made or funds made available for fiscal year 1997 or authority granted for the program, project, or activity under current law. (b) Appropriations made by this Act will be available to the extent and in the manner which would be provided by the pertinent appropriation Act. (c) despite any other provision of law, whenever the rate for operations for any continuing project or activity would result in a furlough or a reduction-in-force of Government employees, that rate for", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00868", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00662", "text": "Spanish-American War, shortly before the war ended, thereby becoming the first President of the United States to be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. (9) 2006 will mark the 100th anniversary of Theodore Roosevelt receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the first citizen of the United States to receive such prize, for drawing up the 1905 peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. SEC. 3. COIN SPECIFICATIONS. (a) Denominations.--The Secretary of the Treasury (from now on in this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') will mint and issue the following coins: (1) $1 silver coins with rough rider design on obverse.-- Not more than 500,000 $1 coins bearing the designs specified in section 4(a)(2), each of which will-- (A) weigh 26.73 grams; (B) have a diameter of 1.500 inches; and (C) contain 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper. (2) $1 silver coins with adventurer design on obverse.--Not more than 500,000 $1 coins bearing the designs specified in section 4(a)(3), each of which will-- (A) weigh 26.73 grams; (B) have a diameter of 1.500 inches; and (C) contain 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper. (b) Legal Tender.--The coins minted under this Act will be legal tender, as provided in section 5103 of title 31, United States Code. (c) Numismatic Items.--For purposes of section 5136 of title 31, United States Code, all coins minted under this Act will be considered to be numismatic items. (d) Use of the United States Mint at West Point, New York.--It is the sense of the Congress that the coins minted under this Act should be struck at the United States Mint at West Point, New York, to the greatest extent possible. SEC. 4. DESIGN OF COINS. (a) Design Requirements.-- (1) In general.--The design of the coins minted under this Act will-- (A) be emblematic of the life and legacy of President Theodore Roosevelt; and (B) use the designs of James Earle Fraser or Augustus Saint-Gaudens, 2 sculptors most closely associated with the revitalization of the United States coinage, commonly referred to as the", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00952", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00663", "text": "here. But it does place upon the Attorney General the burden of showing weighty reason for departing in this instance from a rule so deeply imbedded in history and in the demands of justice. Nothing in the Loyalty Order requires him to deny organizations opportunity to present their case. The Executive Order, defining his powers, directs only that designation will be made 'after appropriate investigation and determination.' This surely does not preclude an administrative procedure, however informal, which would incorporate the essentials of due process. Nothing has been presented to the Court to indicate that it will be impractical or prejudicial to a concrete public interest to disclose to organizations the nature of the case against them and to permit them to meet it if they can. Indeed, such a contention could hardly be made inasmuch as the Loyalty Order itself requires partial disclosure and hearing in proceedings against a Government employee who is a member of a proscribed organization. Whether such procedure sufficiently protects the rights of the employee is a different story. Such as it is, it affords evidence that the wholly summary process for the organizations is inadequate.20 And we have controlling proof that Congress did not think that the Attorney General's procedure was indispensable for the protection of the public interest. The McCarran Act, passed under circumstances certainly not more serene than when the Loyalty Order was issued, grants organizations a full administrative hearing, subject to judicial review, before they are required to register as 'Communist-action' or 'Communist-front.'21 81 We are not here dealing with the grant of Government largess. We have not before us the measured action of Congress, with the pause that is properly engendered when the validity of legislation is assailed. The Attorney General is certainly not immune from the historic requirements of fairness merely because he acts, however conscientiously, in the name of security. Nor does he obtain immunity on the ground that designation is not an 'adjudication' or a'regulation' in the conventional use of those terms. Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have previously been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness. Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to past instances. 82 Therefore the petitioners did set forth causes of action which the District Court should have entertained. 83", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00394", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00664", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2093/98 of 30 September 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1609/88 setting the latest time of entry into storage for butter sold under Regulations (EEC) No 3143/85 and (EEC) No 570/88 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1587/96 (2), and in particular Article 6(6) of it, because under Article l of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3143/85 of 11 November 1985 on the sale at reduced prices of intervention butter intended for direct consumption in the form of concentrated butter (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1802/95 (4), the butter put up for sale must have been taken into storage before a date to be determined; because the same procedure is followed for the sale of butter under the arrangements laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2571/97 of 15 December 1997 on the sale of butter at reduced prices and the granting of aid for cream, butter and concentrated butter for use in the manufacture of pastry products, icecream and other foodstuffs (5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1982/98 (6); because Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1609/88 (7), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2408/97 (8), sets the latest time of entry into storage for butter sold under Regulation (EEC) No 3143/85 and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 570/88 (9), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 531/96 (10); because that Regulation has been amended several times to change that time of entry; because it has been found that, in the last two amendments made by Commission Regulations (EC) No 2224/97 (11) and (EC) No 2408/97, the first paragraph of Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1609/88 was amended in error instead of the second paragraph; because,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00678", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00665", "text": "and (ii) at least 12 kilograms of fish meal, non-deodorised or with a strong smell, containing at least 30 % (m/m) of particles not exceeding 300 microns, and (iii) at least 2 kilograms of starch or puffed (pregelatinised) starch. The particle sizes which, according to BS standard 410-1976, are the closest to the maximum sizes laid down for the particles of the product concerned, without being smaller than them, will be regarded as equivalent thereto. 2. The substances added to the skimmed-milk powder must be uniformly distributed in the mixture. Skimmed-milk powder may not be put through any process, either before or after denaturing, that will weaken or neutralise the effects of the denaturing, in particular by using deodorising agents, changing the taste and smell by eliminating the components responsible for gustatory and/or olfactory perception, or adding ingredients giving a taste and smell that mask those of the fish meal. CHAPTER II AID FOR SKIMMED-MILK POWDER Section 1 Amount of aid and implementing conditions Article 7 1. Aid is fixed at: (a) EUR 5,80 per 100 kilograms of skimmed milk with a protein content of not less than 35,6 % of the non-fatty dry extract; (b) EUR 5,12 per 100 kilograms of skimmed milk with a protein content of not less than 31,4 % but less than 35,6 % of the non-fatty dry extract; (c) EUR 71,51 per 100 kilograms of skimmed-milk powder with a protein content of not less than 35,6 % of the non-fatty dry extract; (d) EUR 63,07 per 100 kilograms of skimmed-milk powder with a protein content of not less than 31,4 % but less than 35,6 % of the non-fatty dry extract. 2. In the case of skimmed-milk powder with a moisture content exceeding 5 %, the aid will be reduced by 1 % for each additional 0,2 % of moisture. Article 8 To qualify for aid, skimmed-milk powder must meet at least the following conditions: (a) it must be used in an undertaking approved in accordance with Article 9: (i) either unaltered or incorporated in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00523", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00666", "text": "Article 2 (1) of that Regulation and wholly obtained in Morocco or Turkey. 2. The difference between the levy, reduced under Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 1521/76 and Article 9 (1) of Regulation (EEC) 1180/77, and actually paid, and the levy payable will be reimbursed in respect of imports into the Community between 1 January 1994 and 30 June 1995 of olive oil meeting the conditions laid down in those Articles and wholly obtained in Morocco or Turkey. 3. Operators effecting imports as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 may apply for reimbursement of the amounts specified there in accordance with Article 236 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (9) and Articles 877 to 881 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 (10). Such applications must be accompanied by the certification from the authorities responsible for issuing import licences in accordance with Article 880 of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 and copies of the declarations of release for free circulation covering the imports concerned. In addition, applications covering imports as referred to in paragraph 1 must be accompanied by the proofs referred to in Article 4 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 2146/95 and those covering imports as referred to in paragraph 2 must be accompanied by the proofs referred to in Article 1 (3) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1588/76 (11) and Article 1 (3) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1401/77 (12) respectively. Article 3 This Regulation will enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Article 1 will apply from 1 July 1995. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 16 December 1996.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 405, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00620", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00667", "text": "the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus for petitioner's release from custody is affirmed. 27 Affirmed. 28 APPENDIX. 29 Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945—1950. 30 (Emphasis supplied throughout except in headings.) 31 1. June 5, 1945.—Allied Powers assumed'supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.' Declaration by Commanding Generals representing the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the French Provisional Government, THE AXIS IN DEFEAT—A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, published by the United States Department of State, p. 63. 32 2. July 14, 1945.—Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in Europe, established a Military Government under his authority in the United States Zone of Occupation—Military Government—United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 1, 12 Fed.Reg. 6997. 33 3. September 19, 1945.—Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, proclaimed: 34 'Article II. Except as previously abrogated, suspended or modified by Military Government or by the Control Council for Germany, the German law in force at the time of the occupation will be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation, until repealed by, or superseded by a new law enacted by the Control Council for Germany, or by Military Government or the states constituted or by other competent authority.' Military Government—United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 2, 12 Fed.Reg. 6997. 35 4. 1946.—Military Government Courts, as distinguished from courts-martial, were given jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory, including civilians subject to military law and over offenses under the laws of the occupied territory. 36 '* * * Article II; jurisdiction. (1) Military Government courts will have jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory except persons other than civilians who are subject to military, naval or air", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 496, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00446", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00668", "text": ", in the context of the parallel anti-subsidy investigation it was found that the scheme which gave right to a customs duty refund or a duty-free import, as the case may be, is a countervailable export subsidy, and not a bona fide duty drawback scheme for the purpose of Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community(4) (the \"basic Anti-subsidy Regulation\"). under Article 14(1) of the basic Regulation, this countervailing duty will be deducted from any anti-dumping duty. Thus, to make the requested adjustment here, on top of this deduction, would amount to a double adjustment which would negate the results of the anti-subsidy investigation. (41) Considering the above, the Commission's provisional findings are confirmed, i.e. the company's claim for an adjustment for differences in import charges and indirect taxes was not warranted and had consequently to be rejected. (42) One Korean company contested the method of calculation of the duty drawback adjustment made by the Commission, which, according to the company, did not reflect the actual amount of duty drawback received during the IP. (43) During the investigation the company did not provide any evidence concerning the link between the amount of duty drawback actually received and the raw materials physically incorporated in the product. In the absence of any new evidence which can support the claim of the exporting producer, the approach followed in recital 58 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed. (44) Another Korean company objected to the Commission's decision to reject the duty drawback adjustments in its entirety (see recital 58 of the provisional Regulation). (45) In the light of the explanations provided by the company after the publication of the provisional Regulation, and considering the information collected during the investigation, the Commission could re-calculate the amount of the allowance for duty drawback in order to reflect the duty paid for raw materials imported during the IP. The allowance was consequently granted but only to the extent that it could be verified. (46) One Indian exporting producer contested the fact that the Commission did not take sales taxes into account when establishing domestic sales prices. It was argued that although the company was exempted from sales taxes during the IP, the invoice price charged to the customers was an all inclusive price and that sales taxes were actually collected from customers and subsequently paid to the government. (47)", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00823", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00669", "text": "423.1 et seq. At the time of appellants' strike, the pertinent provisions of the law read as follows: 'Sec. 9. No strike or lockout will take place or be put into effect until and unless each of the steps have been taken and the requirements complied with as provided in this act. '1. In the event the parties thereto are unable to settle any dispute, the employees or their representative, in the case of impending strike, or the employer or his agent, in the case of an impending lockout, will serve notice upon the board of such dispute together with a statement of the issues involved. * * * not less han 10 days before the strike or lockout is to become effective, or in case of an industry affected with a public interest or a public utility or hospital, said notice will be so served not less than 30 days before the strike or lockout is to become effective. '2. Upon receipt of such notice it will be the duty of the board to exercise the powers herein granted to effect a settlement of such dispute by mediation between the parties. Prior to the calling of an election as provided from now on, it will be the duty of each of the parties to such dispute to actively and in good faith participate in the mediation of it. * * * 'Sec. 9a. In the event that it becomes apparent to the board that there is no reasonable probability of settlement of such dispute by mediation and that further efforts to that end would be without avail, there will be held in the case of any impending strike, an election upon such issue which election will be conducted and supervised by the board. In the event either party to said dispute notifies the board in writing * * * that in the opinion of such party, further efforts to settle such dispute by mediation would be without avail, it will be the duty of the board to cause an election to be held within 10 days of the receipt of such notice unless it is not practical to hold such election within said period, in which event said election will be held within 20 days of receipt of such notice. * * * Every employee in the bargaining unit will be entitled to vote in such election and in order to authorize a strike under the provisions of this act, a majority of all employees in such bargaining unit must vote in favor of such action.' 'In 1949, the last requirement was amended to read, 'a majority of all employees casting valid", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00353", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00670", "text": "embezzler, an extortioner or a robber as taxable earnings derived from a business, trade or a profession. I just do not think Congress intended to treat the plunder of such criminals as theirs. 19 It seems illusory to believe, as the majority apparently does, that the burden on honest American taxpayers will be lightened by a governmental policy of pursuing extortioners in futile efforts to collect income taxes. I venture the guess that this one trial has cost United States taxpayers more money than the Government will collect in taxes from extortioners in the next twenty-five years. If this statute is to be interpreted on the basis of what is financially best for honest taxpayers, it probably should be construed so as to save money by eliminating federal prosecutions of state crimes under the guise of punishing tax evaders. 20 Since it seems pretty clear that the Government can never collect substantial amounts of money from extortioners, there must be another reason for applying the tax law to money they extract from others. The Government's brief is suggestive of the only other reason that occurs to me—to give Washington more and more power to punish purely local crimes such as embezzlement and extortion. Today's decision illustrates an expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into fields of law enforcement previously wholly left to states and local communities. I doubt if this expansion is wise from the standpoint of the United States or the states. 21 Insofar as the United States is concerned, many think that taking over enforcement of local criminal laws lowers the prestige of the federal system of justice. It certainly tends to make the federal system top-heavy. Of supreme importance is the fact that the United States cannot perform the monumental tasks which lie beyond state power if the time, energy and funds of federal institutions are expended in the field of state criminal law enforcement.1 22 Federal encroachment upon local criminal jurisdiction can also be very injurious to the states. Extortion, robbery, embezzlement and offenses of that nature are traditionally matters of local concern.2 The precise elements of these offenses as well as the problems underlying them vary from state to state. Federal assumption of the job of enforcing these laws must of necessity tend to free the states from a sense of responsibility for their own local conditions.3 Even when states attempt to play their traditional role in the field of law enforcement, the overriding federal authority forces them to surrender control over the manner and policy of construing and applying their own laws. State courts not only lose control over", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00444", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00671", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 238/2006 of 9 February 2006 fixing the maximum export refund on common wheat in connection with the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 1059/2005 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals (1), and in particular Article 13(3) of it, because: (1) An invitation to tender for the refund for the export of common wheat to certain third countries was opened under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1059/2005 (2). (2) In accordance with Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1501/95 of 29 June 1995 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 on the granting of export refunds on cereals and the measures to be taken in the event of disturbance on the market for cereals (3), the Commission may, on the basis of the tenders notified, decide to fix a maximum export refund taking account of the criteria referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1501/95. In that case a contract is awarded to any tenderer whose bid is equal to or lower than the maximum refund. (3) The application of the abovementioned criteria to the current market situation for the cereal in question results in the maximum export refund being fixed. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 For tenders notified from 3 to 9 February 2006, under the invitation to tender issued in Regulation (EC) No 1059/2005, the maximum refund on exportation of common wheat will be 3,00 EUR/t. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 10 February 2006. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 9 February 2006.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 464, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00610", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00672", "text": "that provides for freedom of information or public disclosure of governmental information, in order to provide for Congressional consideration of the effects of the public disclosure required under clause (iii) of section 112(r)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act and for consideration of the reports under section 4 of this Act, no Off-site Consequence Analysis Submission will be disclosed, or made available, to the public or to any person or entity by the Administrator, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, a State, a local agency or an entity referred to in such clause (iii), or any authorized contractor. (2) One-year period.--The prohibition set forth in paragraph (1) will apply only for a period ending 1-year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (3) Permitted disclosure.--The prohibition set forth in paragraph (1) will not apply to disclosure of an Off-site Consequence Analysis Submission for official use only under clause (iii) of section 112(r)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act to the Administrator, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, a State, a local agency or an entity referred to in such clause (iii), or any authorized contractor. (b) Penalty.--The violation of the prohibition set forth in subsection (a) will be an infraction punishable under section 3571 of title 18 of the United States Code. In any case in which more than one Off-site Consequence Analysis Submission has been disclosed or made available in violation of subsection (a), the violation with respect to each such Submission will be considered a separate violation for purposes of such section 3571. The total of all penalties imposed on a single person or organization for violations of subsection (a) will not exceed $100,000. (c) Disclosure without Facility Identification.--despite the moratorium under subsection (a), after June 21, 1999, the Administrator will make information from risk management plans, including information from the Off-site Consequence Analysis Submissions, available to the public in accordance with section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii) of the Clean Air Act in a form which does not include any information concerning the identity or location of the covered stationary sources for which such plans were prepared. (d) Emergency Planning Meetings.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, each owner or operator of a covered stationary source will convene a meeting with community representatives, employees and contractors", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00923", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00673", "text": "Commission Regulation (EC) No 2374/2002 of 30 December 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 668/2001 increasing to 3499978 tonnes the quantity of barley held by the German intervention agency for which a standing invitation to tender for export has been opened THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1666/2000(2), and in particular Article 5 of it, because: (1) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2131/93(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1630/2000(4), lays down the procedures and conditions for the disposal of cereals held by the intervention agencies. (2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 668/2001(5), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1095/2001(6), opened a standing invitation to tender for the export of 3000055 tonnes of barley held by the German intervention agency. Germany informed the Commission of the intention of its intervention agency to increase by 499923 tonnes the quantity for which a standing invitation to tender for export has been opened. The total quantity of barley held by the German intervention agency for which a standing invitation to tender for export has been opened should be increased to 3499978 tonnes. (3) This increase in the quantity put out to tender makes it necessary to alter the list of regions and quantities in store. Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 668/2001 must therefore be amended. (4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 668/2001 is amended as follows: 1. Article 2 is replaced by the following: \"Article 2 1. The invitation to tender will cover a maximum of 3499978 tonnes of barley to be exported to all third countries with the exception of the United States, Canada and Mexico. 2. The regions in which the 3499978 tonnes of barley are stored are stated in Annex I to this Regulation", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00702", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00674", "text": "the Department of the Treasury has created a climate of commercial uncertainty that has inhibited agricultural sales to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. (6) There is nothing in either the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 itself or its legislative history to support the view that Congress intended payment to be made in advance of the shipment of goods from the United States to Cuba. It was and is the intent of Congress that a seller of a product authorized under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 receive payment only before a Cuban purchaser takes physical possession of that product. (7) At present it is the policy of the United States Government to prohibit direct payment between Cuban and United States financial institutions. As a result, Cuban purchasers of products authorized under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 must route their payments through third country banks that charge a fee for this service. Allowing direct payments between Cuban and United States financial institutions will permit the United States exporters to receive payment directly to their financial institutions within hours instead of days and will eliminate an unnecessary transactional fee, thereby allowing Cuban purchasers to purchase more United States origin agricultural products. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to restate the intent of Congress with respect to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, to remove impediments to present and future sales of United States agricultural products to Cuba under such Act, and to otherwise facilitate such sales. SEC. 3. TRAVEL TO CUBA IN CONNECTION WITH AUTHORIZED SALES ACTIVITIES UNDER THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2000. Section 910 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7209) is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: ``(a) Authorization of Travel Relating to Commercial Sale of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical Devices.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury will promulgate regulations under which, at a minimum, the travel- related transactions described in paragraph (2) may be authorized by specific license or general license for travel to, from, or within Cuba in connection with-- ``(A) commercial export sales and transportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices under this Act; and ``(B) sales and marketing activities of agricultural commodities,", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00874", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00675", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 957/2005 of 23 June 2005 altering the export refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in the natural state fixed by Regulation (EC) No 846/2005 THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector (1), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 27(5) of it, because: (1) The export refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in the natural state were fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 846/2005 (2). (2) Since the data currently available to the Commission are different to the data at the time Regulation (EC) No 846/2005 was adopted, those refunds should be adjusted, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds on the products listed in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001, undenatured and exported in the natural state, as fixed in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 846/2005 are altered to the amounts shown in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on 24 June 2005. This Regulation will be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 23 June 2005.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 320, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00594", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00676", "text": ". The Oklahoma Tax Commission rejected this contention and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, 199 Okl. —-, 193 P.2d 1017.DP It is essential at the outset to understand the history and nature of the arrangement whereby the United States holds in trust the properties involved in this case. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1945) 446—455. In 1866, the United States and the Cherokee Nation of Indians executed a comprehensive treaty covering their various relationships. 14 Stat. 799, 804. It was there agreed that the United States might settle friendly Indians in certain areas of Cherokee territory, including what is now Osage County, Oklahoma; these areas had previously been conveyed by the United States to the Cherokees. The treaty further provided that the areas in question were to be conveyed in fee simple to the tribes settled by the United States 'to be held in common or by their members in severalty as the United States may decide.' 10 The Osage Indians subsequently moved to the Indian Territory and settled in what is now Osage County. In 1883, under the 1866 treaty, the Cherokees conveyed this area to the United States 'in trust nevertheless and for the use and benefit of the said Osage and Kansas Indians.' It is significant that fee simple title to the land was not conveyed at this time to the Osages; instead, the United States received that title as trustee for the Osages. Nor was any distinction here made between the land and the minerals thereunder, legal title to both being transferred to the United States. 11 On June 28, 1906, the Osage Allotment Act, providing for the distribution of Osage lands and properties, became effective. 34 Stat. 539. See Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Coleman, 241 U.S. 432, 36 S.Ct. 644, 60 L.Ed. 1080. Provision was there made for the allotment to each tribal member of a 160-acre homestead, plus certain additional surplus lands. These allotted lands, said § 7, were to be set aside 'for the sole use and benefit of the individual members of the tribe entitled thereto, or to their heirs, as herein, provided.' The homestead was to be inalienable and nontaxable for 25 years or during the life of the", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00182", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00677", "text": "103 of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act to investigate each applicant for a license or permit under chapter 40 of title 18, United States Code. SEC. 104. REQUIREMENTS FOR PURCHASES OF BLACK POWDER AND SMOKELESS POWDER. (a) In General.--Section 845 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking ``and components of it''; (2) in subsection (a)(5), by striking ``commercially manufactured black powder in quantities not to exceed fifty pounds,''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Except in the case of section 842(f), and subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of section 844, this chapter will not apply to commercially manufactured black powder or smokeless powder in quantities not to exceed 5 pounds.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 926 of such title is amended by striking subsection (c). SEC. 105. ENHANCED PENALTIES. under its authority under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission will promulgate amendments to the sentencing guidelines to appropriately enhance the penalties for a violation of any provision of chapter 40 of title 18, United States Code, the penalties for which are not as severe as the penalties for a comparable violation of chapter 44 of such title 18, so that the penalties for the violation of the provision of such chapter 40 are the same as the penalties for a comparable violation of such chapter 44. SEC. 106. DESTRUCTION OF SEIZED EXPLOSIVES THAT ARE UNSAFE. Section 844(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(c)''; and (2) by adding after and below the end the following: ``(2) despite paragraph (1), in the case of the seizure of any explosive materials for any offense for which the materials would be subject to forfeiture in which it would be impracticable or unsafe to remove the materials to a place of storage or would be unsafe to store them, the seizing officer may destroy the explosive materials immediately. Any destruction under this paragraph will be in the presence of at least 1 credible witness. The seizing officer will make a report", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00908", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00678", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 530/97 of 21 March 1997 on an invitation to tender for the refund on export of wholly milled long grain rice to certain third countries THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 of 22 December 1995 on the common organization of the market in rice (1), and in particular Article 13 (3) of it, because examination of the balance sheet shows that exportable amounts of rice are currently held by producers; because this situation could affect the normal development of producer prices during the 1996/97 marketing year; because, in order to remedy this situation, it is appropriate to make use of export refunds to zones which may be supplied by the Community; because the special situation of the rice market makes it necessary to limit the quantities of rice benefiting from the refunds, and therefore to apply Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 enabling the amount of refund to be fixed by tendering procedure; because it should be stated that the provisions of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 584/75 of 6 March 1975 laying down detailed rules for the application of the system of tendering for export refunds on rice (2), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 299/95 (3), apply to this invitation to tender; because, in order to avoid disturbances on the markets of the producing countries, the markets of destination should be limited to Zones I to VI and Zone VIII, excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, noted in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92 (4), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 3304/94 (5); because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1. An invitation to tender is opened, for the refund on export of wholly milled long grain rice falling within CN code 1006 30 67 referred to in Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95, for Zones I to VI and Zone VIII excluding Guyana, Madagascar and Suriname, as specified in the Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 2145/92. 2.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00779", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00679", "text": "be used to pay the compensation of such person.' 53 Stat. 1147, 1148; 54 Stat. 767; 56 Stat. 181. 3 18 U.S.C. § 61o, 18 U.S.C.A. § 61o. 'The provisions of this subchapter which prohibit persons to whom such provisions apply from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns will be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has previously determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns.' 54 Stat. 767, 771. 4 See Civil Service Act (1883), § 2, 22 Stat. 403, 404, 5 U.S.C.A. § 633: 'Sec. 2. That it will be the duty of said commissioners: 'First. To aid the President, as he may request, in preparing suitable rules for carrying this act into effect, and when said rules will have been promulgated it will be the duty of all officers of the United States in the departments and offices to which any such rules may relate to aid, in all proper ways, in carrying said rules, and any modifications of it, into effect. 'Second. And, among other things, said rules will provide and declare, as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows: 'Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.' 5 U.S.C. § 631, 5 U.S.C.A. § 631: 'The President is authorized to * * * establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appointments in the civil service.' First Annual Report, Civil Service Commission, Ex. Doc. No. 105, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 45: 'In the exercise of the power vested in the President by the Constitution, and by virtue of the 1753d section of the Revised Statutes, and of the civil service act approved January 16, 1883, the following rules for the regulation and improvement of the executive civil", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00028", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00680", "text": "ators, it is likely that the change would have been made by express provision for it. We find nothing in its legislative history that suggests a congressional intent to distinguish between two such groups of undesirable criminals. 18 The Congressional Committee Reports demonstrate that, while this statute was framed in general language and has remained in effect for 30 years, its enactment originally was occasioned by a desire to deport some or all of about 500 aliens who were then interned as dangerous enemy aliens and who might be found, after hearings, to be undesirable residents, and also to deport some or all of about 150 other aliens who, during World War I, had been convicted of violations of the Espionage Act or other national security measures, and who might be found, after hearings, to be undesirable residents.18 It is hardly conceivable that, under those circumstances, Congress, without expressly saying so, intended to prevent the Secretary of Labor (or his successor, the Attorney General) from deporting alien offenders merely because they had received their respective convictions at times when they held certificates of naturalization, later canceled for fraud. To do so would permit the denaturalized aliens to set up a canceled fraudulent status as a defense, and successfully to claim benefits and advantages under it.19 Congress, in 1920, evidently wanted to provide a means by which to free the United States of residents who (1) had been or thereafter were convicted of certain offenses against the security of the United States, (2) had been or thereafter were found, after hearing, to be undesirable residents of the United States, and (3) being aliens were subject to deportation. Congress said just that. 19 We have given consideration to such other points as were raised by the relators, but we find that they do not affect the result.20 20 The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is therefore affirmed. 21 Affirmed. 22 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 23 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice JACKSON join, dissenting. 24 In light of the attitude with which the doom of deportation has previously been viewed by this Court, in the case of those whose lives have been intimately tied to this country, I deem it my duty not to squeeze the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00339", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00681", "text": "mittal. (c) Referral of Rescission Disapproval Bills.--Any rescission disapproval bill introduced with respect to a special message will be referred to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be. (d) Consideration in the Senate.-- (1) Any rescission disapproval bill received in the Senate from the House will be considered in the Senate under the provisions of this Act. (2) Debate in the Senate on any rescission disapproval bill and debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, will be limited to not more than ten hours. The time will be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. (3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motions or appeal in connection with such bill will be limited to one hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by the mover and the manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto will be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal. (4) A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. A motion to recommit (except a motion to recommit with instructions to report back within a specified number of days not to exceed one, not counting any day on which the Senate is not in session) is not in order. (e) Points of Order.-- (1) It will not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any rescission disapproval bill that relates to any matter other than the rescission budget authority transmitted by the President under this Act. (2) It will not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any amendment to a rescission disapproval bill. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) may be waived or suspended in the Senate only by a vote of three-fifths of the members duly chosen and sworn.", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 448, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01144", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00682", "text": "ers before their refusal. We assume that, if our interpretation of the oath is correct, the City of Los Angeles will give those petitioners who previously refused to take the oath an opportunity to take it as interpreted and resume their employment. 19 The judgment as to Pacifico and Schwartz is affirmed. The judgment as to the remaining petitioners is affirmed on the basis of the interpretation of the ordinance which we have felt justified in assuming. 20 Affirmed. 21 Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 22 The Constitution does not guarantee public employment. City, State and Nation are not confined to making provisions appropriate for securing competent professional discharge of the functions pertaining to diverse governmental jobs. They may also assure themselves of fidelity to the very presuppositions of our scheme of government on the part of those who seek to serve it. No unit of government can be denied the right to keep out of its employ those who seek to overthrow the government by force or violence, or are knowingly members of an organization engaged in such endeavor. See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565. 23 But it does not at all follow that because the Constitution does not guarantee a right to public employment, a city or a State may resort to any scheme for keeping people out of such employment. Law cannot reach every discrimination in practice. But doubtless unreasonable discriminations, if avowed in formal law, would not survive constitutional challenge. Surely, a government could not exclude from public employment members of a minority group merely because they are odious to the majority, nor restrict such employment, say, to nativeborn citizens. To describe public employment as a privilege does not meet the problem. 24 This line of reasoning gives the direction, I believe, for dealing with the issues before us. A municipality like Los Angeles ought to be allowed adequate scope in seeking to elicit information about its employees and from them. It would give to the Due Process Clause an unwarranted power of intrusion into local affairs to hold that a city may not require its employees to disclose whether they have been members of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. In the contex of our time, such membership is sufficiently relevant to effective and dependable government, and to the confidence of the electorate in its government. I think the precise Madison would have been surprised even to hear it suggested that", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00409", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00683", "text": "7. 2. Annual Action Programmes will specify the objectives pursued, the fields of intervention, the expected results, the management procedures and total amount of financing planned. They will contain a summary description of the operations to be financed, an indication of the amounts allocated for each operation and an indicative implementation timetable. Where relevant, they should include the results of any lessons learned from previous assistance. Objectives will be measurable. 3. Annual Action Programmes and any revision or extension of it will be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 22(2). Article 9 Special Measures 1. despite Articles 7 and 8, in the event of unforeseen needs or circumstances, the Commission may adopt Special Measures not provided for in the Multi-country and Thematic Strategy Papers and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes referred to in Article 7 or the Annual Action Programmes referred to in Article 8. 2. Special Measures will specify the objectives pursued, the areas of activity, the expected results, the management procedures used and the total amount of financing planned. They will contain a description of the operations to be financed, an indication of the amounts allocated for each operation and an indicative implementation timetable. 3. Special Measures costing more than EUR 5 000 000 will be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 22(2). 4. The Commission will inform the Committee set up under Article 22(1) within one month of adopting Special Measures costing up to EUR 5 000 000. TITLE III BENEFICIARIES AND FORMS OF FINANCING Article 10 Eligibility 1. (a) partner countries and regions and their institutions; (b) decentralised bodies in the partner countries, such as regions, departments, provinces and municipalities; (c) joint bodies set up by the partner countries and regions and the Community; (d) international organisations, including regional organisations, UN bodies, departments and missions, international financial institutions and development banks, and institutions of international jurisdiction, in so far as they contribute to the objectives of this Regulation; (e) European agencies; (f) the following entities and bodies of the Member States, partner countries and regions and any other third country in so far as they contribute to the objectives of this Regulation: (i) public and para-statal bodies, local authorities or administrations and consortia of it; (ii) companies, firms and other private organisations", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00521", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00684", "text": "), states that the legal commitments entered into for measures extending over more than one financial year must contain a time limit for implementation which must be specified to the recipient in due form when the aid is granted; because all the other conditions laid down for the grant of aid from the ERDF and the ESF have been complied with, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Single Programming Document for Community structural assistance in the region of East London and the Lee Valley concerned by Objective 2 in the United Kingdom, covering the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1996, is approved. Article 2 The Single Programming Document includes the following essential elements: (a) a statement of the main priorities for joint action, their specific quantified objectives, an appraisal of their expected impact and their consistency with economic, social and regional policies in the United Kingdom; the main priorities are: 1. business development support; 2. actions for knowledge based industries and advanced technological development; 3. targeted inward investment; 4. action to develop cultural industries and advanced producer services and industries; 5. targeted assistance to create and access employment for communities; (b) the assistance from the Structural Funds as referred to in Article 4; (c) the detailed provisions for implementing the Single Programming Document comprising: - the procedures for monitoring and evaluation, - the financial implementation provisions, - the rules for compliance with Community policies; (d) the procedures for verifying additionality and an initial evaluation of the latter; (e) the arrangements for associating the environmental authorities with the implementation of the Single Programming Document; (f) the means available for technical assistance necessary for the preparation, implementation or adaptation of the measures concerned. Article 3 For the purpose of indexation, the annual breakdown of the global maximal allocation foreseen for the assistance from the Structural Funds is as follows: >TABLE> Article 4 The assistance from the Structural Funds granted to the Single Programming Document amounts to a maximum of ECU 74,0 million. The procedure for granting the financial assistance, including the financial contribution from the Funds to the various priorities and measures, is set out in the financing plan and the detailed implementing provisions which form an integral part of the Single Programming Document. The national financial contribution envisaged, which is approximately ECU 91,43 million for the public sector and ECU 25,82 million for the private sector, may be met in part by Community", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00656", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00685", "text": ".3 The Board thereupon certified that Union as the exclusive representative of those production and maintenance employees who constituted the appropriate bargaining unit designated by the Board. In January 1947 the Union filed a charge with the Board complaining that respondent had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union, and was thus guilty of unfair labor practices within the meaning of §§ 8(1) and 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board issued its complaint under those charges in June 1947. Respondent, in answer, admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act, denied the charges contained in the complaint, and alleged, inter alia, that the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, though the number of employees who had withdrawn was unknown to respondent. A hearing was held before a trial examiner in August 1947. The Trial Examiner denied respondent's motions for a more definite statement of the complaint, and for an order permitting the inspection and copying of certain evidence. Respondent's counsel thereupon withdrew from the hearing and took no further part there. 3 In December 1947 the Trial Examiner issued his report. He concluded that 'From the evidence, it is apparent that, although the respondent conferred with the Union on possible contract provisions, it did not bargain in good faith and had no intention of doing so.' The failure to bargain was manifest from evidence of incidents taking place from the time of the certification of the Union until a month before its complaint was filed. Unilateral wage increases and respondent's efforts to shunt the Union representatives from one company official to another in search of the final authority in wage and contract negotiations—these and other findings led the Examiner to conclude that 'an unmistakable effort to escape genuine collective bargaining' and demonstated. Further, the Examiner determined, there was no merit in the respondent's contention that the Union did not retain the membership of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Respondent, having taken no part in the hearing, did not of course introduce any evidence to support its allegation. 4 The Examiner recommended, in substance, that respondent be ordered to cease and desist from its refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union. No exceptions to the report were filed within the time permitted by § 10(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and in July 1948 the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's findings and issued the recommended order,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00359", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00686", "text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1350/96 of 11 July 1996 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3478/92 laying down detailed rules for the application of the premium system for raw tobacco THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2075/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organization of the market in raw tobacco (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 415/96 (2), and in particular Article 7 of it, because, in accordance with Article 5 (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 2075/92, premiums are granted solely on leaf tobacco from specified production areas; because, under Article 1 (2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3478/92 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 259/96 (4), such production areas are to be reviewed each year and adapted, where necessary, to quantitative and qualitative developments on the market; because such production areas are recognized on the basis of traditional tobacco-producing areas; because the Member States concerned may, with a view to sound management of production of a particular group of varieties and within their guarantee thresholds, apply for such traditional production areas to be included on the list of recognized production areas; because, following an application from Germany and in view of the fact that the three areas concerned are traditional production areas, Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 3478/92 listing the recognized production areas should be amended; because, in the wake of Austria's accession, the production areas and the moisture content for dark air-cured tobacco produced in Austria should be determined; because Annexes I and III to Regulation (EEC) No 3478/92 should therefore be amended; because the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Tobacco, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Regulation (EEC) No 3478/92 is amended as follows: 1. Part III (Dark air-cured) of Annex I is replaced by the Annex to this. 2. Point III of Annex III is replaced by the following: >TABLE> Article 2 This Regulation will enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_eu", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00688", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00687", "text": ", houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, will not be violated * * *.' Our trouble arises because this sentence leaves debatable what particular searches are unreasonable ones. Those who think it their duty to make searches seldom agree on this point with those who find it in their interest to frustrate searches. 542 The Amendment, having thus roughly indicated the immunity of the citizen which must not be violated, goes on to recite how officers may be authorized, consistently with the right so declared, to make searches: '* * * and no Warrants will issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 543 Here endeth the command of the forefathers, apparently because they believed that by thus controlling search warrants they had controlled searches. The forefathers, however, were guilty of a serious oversight if they left open another way by which searches legally may be made without a search warrant and with none of the safeguards that would surround the issuance of one. 544 Of course, a warrant to take a person into custody is authority for taking into custody all that is found upon his person or in his hands. Some opinions have spoken in generalities of this right to search such property incidentally to arrest of the person as including whatever was in the arrested person's 'possession.' 545 Repeated efforts have been made to expand this search to include all premises and property in constructive possession by reason of tenancy or ownership. While the language of this Court sometimes has been ambiguous, I do not find that the Court previously has sustained this extension of the incidental search. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775. In this respect, it seems to me, the decision of today goes beyond any previous one and throws a home open to search on a warrant that does not in any respect comply with the constitutional requirements of a search warrant and does not even purport to authorize any search of an premises. 546 The decision certainly will be taken, in practice, as authority for a search of any home,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00071", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00688", "text": "and the causes for such reduction in median home price.''. SEC. 3. PERMANENT LOAN LIMIT INCREASE FOR FHA. (a) Loan Limit Increase.--Subparagraph (A) of section 203(b)(2) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1709(b)(2)(A)) is amended-- (1) in clause (i) by striking ``115 percent'' and inserting ``125 percent''; and (2) in clause (ii) by striking ``150 percent'' and inserting ``175 percent''. (b) Discretionary Authority.--Subparagraph (A) of section 203(b)(2) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1709(b)(2)(A) is amended by inserting after ``; and'' at the end the following: ``except that, if the Secretary determines an increase is warranted by higher median home prices in an area or sub-area and such an increase will have a significant impact on the cost or availability of mortgages having principal obligation amounts in the range of an increased limit, the Secretary may increase the maximum dollar amount limitation that is otherwise in effect under the preceding provisions of this subparagraph with respect to any particular size or sizes of residences, or with respect to residences located in any particular area or areas, by not more than $100,000, or increase, for any geographic area that is smaller than an area for which a dollar amount limitation is determined under the preceding provisions of this subparagraph, the limitation otherwise in effect for such size or sizes of residences for such sub-area or sub-areas, but in no case to an amount that exceeds the maximum nationwide amount otherwise permitted under this subparagraph; and except that despite the calculation of the maximum dollar amount limitation for any area under clause (i) of this subparagraph, if any recalculation of the local median home price for any area would otherwise result in a decrease in the maximum dollar amount limitation for any size residence in any such area, the Secretary, considering such factors as market dislocations caused by a decrease in such dollar amount limitation, the extent of the median home price decline, and the causes for such reduction in median home price, may prevent or limit a decrease in such dollar amount limitation from taking place for any such area; and''. SEC. 4. EXISTING LOAN LIMITS. This Act may not be construed to affect the loan limits for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00914", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00689", "text": "its interstate journey the instant it crosses the Ohio boundary or enters East Ohio's pipes, even though that Company operates completely within the state where the gas is finally consumed. Respondents do not and cannot claim that their gas is not in interstate commerce.7 As we held in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 331 U.S. 682, 688, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1486, 91 L.Ed. 1742, the meaning of 'interstate commerce' in this Act is no more restricted than that which theretofore had been given to it in the opinions of this Court. 9 Respondents contend, however, that the word 'transportation' in § 1(b) must be construed as applying only to companies engaged in the business of transporting gas in interstate commerce for hire or for sales to be followed by resales, because East Ohio does neither. The short answer is that the Act's language did not express any such limitation. Despite the unqualified language of § 1(b) making the Act apply to 'transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,' respondents ask us to qualify that language by applying it only to businesses which both transport and sell natural gas for resale. They rely on a sentence in the declaration of policy, § 1(a), referring to 'the business of transporting and selling natural gas'. But their contention that the word 'and' in the policy provision creates an unseverable bond is completely refuted by the clearly disjunctive phrasing of § 1(b) itself. As we pointed out in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm., 332 U.S. 507, 516, 68 S.Ct. 190, 195, 92 L.Ed. 128, § 1(b) made the Natural Gas Act applicable to three separate things: '(1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.' And throughout the Act 'transportation' and'sale' are viewed as separate subjects of regulation. They have independent and equally important places in the Act. Thus, to adopt respondents' construction would unduly restrict the Commission's power to carry out one of the major policies of the Act. Moreover, the initial interest of Congress in regulation of transportation facilities was reemphasized in", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 500, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00336", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00690", "text": "Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 64 S.Ct. 967, 88 L.Ed. 1227.20 Likewise a special privilege tax upon an interstate automobile transportation company for the use of the state roads has been approved. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 167. 17 The Mississippi excise has no more effect upon the commerce than any of the instances just recited. The events giving rise to this tax were no more essential to the interstate commerce than those just mentioned or ad valorem taxes. We think that the state is within its constitutional rights in exacting compensation under this statute for the protection it affords the activities within its borders. Of course, the interstate commerce could not be conducted without these local activities. But that fact is not conclusive. These r e events apart from the flow of commerce. This is tax on activities for which the state, not the United States, gives protection and the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate business. 18 Affirmed. 19 Mr. Justice BLACK, concurs in the judgment. 20 Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring. 21 In accordance with views which I have previously expressed,1 it is enough for me to sustain the tax imposed in this case that it is one clearly within the state's power to lay insofar as any limitation of due process or 'jurisdiction to tax' in that sense is concerned;2 it is nondiscriminatory, that is, places no greater burden upon interstate commerce than the state places upon competing intrastate commerce of like character;3 is duly apportioned, that is, does not undertake to tax any interstate activities carried on outside the state's borders;4 and cannot be repeated by any other state.5 22 In this view the tax is not different in any substantial respect, for purposes of the commerce clause's prohibitive application, from the apportioned tax upon grss receipts from interstate transportation levied by New York and sustained by the decision recently rendered in Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S.Ct. 1260.6 That tax is nonetheless one upon the commerce, although it is apportioned. The apportionment", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00197", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00691", "text": "OF DISPUTES AND CLAIMS. (a) Relinquishment, Extinguishment, and Compromise of Santo Domingo Claims.-- (1) Extinguishment.-- (A) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), in consideration of the benefits provided under this Act, and in accordance with the Settlement Agreement under which the Pueblo has agreed to relinquish and compromise certain claims, the Pueblo's land and trespass claims described in subparagraph (B) are extinguished, effective as of the date specified in paragraph (5). (B) Claims.--The claims described in this subparagraph are the following: (i) With respect to the Pueblo's claims against the United States, its agencies, officers, and instrumentalities, all claims to land, whether based on aboriginal or recognized title, and all claims for damages or other judicial relief or for administrative remedies pertaining in any way to the Pueblo's land, such as boundary, trespass, and mismanagement claims, including any claim related to-- (I) any federally administered lands, including National Forest System lands designated in the Settlement Agreement for possible sale or exchange to the Pueblo; (II) any lands owned or held for the benefit of any Indian tribe other than the Pueblo; and (III) all claims which were, or could have been brought against the United States in docket No. 355, pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims. (ii) With respect to the Pueblo's claims against persons, the State of New Mexico and its subdivisions, and Indian tribes other than the Pueblo, all claims to land, whether based on aboriginal or recognized title, and all claims for damages or other judicial relief or for administrative remedies pertaining in any way to the Pueblo's land, such as boundary and trespass claims. (iii) All claims listed on pages 13894- 13895 of volume 48 of the Federal Register, published on March 31, 1983, except for claims numbered 002 and 004. (2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act (including paragraph (1)) will be construed-- (A) to in any way effectuate an extinguishment of or otherwise impair-- (i) the Pueblo's title to lands acquired by or for the benefit of the Pueblo since December 28, 1927, or in a tract of land of approximately 150.14 acres known as the ``sliver area", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01014", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00692", "text": ", title 28, secs. 346 and 347). If any provision of this subsection is held to be invalid as applied to any party with respect to any determination or order of the Commission, such determination or order will thereupon become final and effective as to such party in the same manner as if such provision had not been enacted. 'Sec. 15. The provisions of this act which prohibit persons to whom such provisions apply from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns will be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has previously determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns.' 18 U.S.C.A. § 61o. 2 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597, 599, 67 L.Ed. 1078; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479, 58 S.Ct. 300, 303, 82 L.Ed. 374, are cited as authority, together with other cases. 3 A respondent can support his judgment on any ground that appears in the record. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421, 60 S.Ct. 313, 316, 84 L.Ed. 355; City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Co., 277 U.S. 54, 59, 48 S.Ct. 454, 456, 72 L.Ed. 781. 4 See note 1, supra, § 12(c). 5 See Federal Highway Act, 42 Stat. 212, as amended, 23 U.S.C. §§ 1—117, 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—117. 6 Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 1202, 86 L", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00024", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00693", "text": "SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``National Slave Memorial Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Millions of Africans and their descendants were enslaved in the United States and the 13 American colonies in the period 1619 through 1865. (2) The American Colonies determined that economic benefit would be derived from the import of slave labor and immediately became an active participant in the ``Middle Passage'' of African slaves to its shores. (3) Upon their arrival in North America, Africans were considered chattel and thereby denied the privileges granted to other immigrants. (4) The agricultural resources of any nation are the backbone of its subsistence and for over 250 years, millions of unnamed African and American-born Black men, women, and children provided the free labor that cultivated the fields from which Americans ate and were clothed, which allowed the dominant population to secure other interests. (5) Slavery was a grave injustice that caused African Americans to suffer enormous damages and losses, both material and intangible, including the loss of human dignity and liberty, the frustration of careers and professional lives, and the long-term loss of income and opportunity. (6) Slavery in the United States denied African Americans the fruits of their own labor and was an immoral and inhumane deprivation of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, citizenship rights, and cultural heritage. (7) Although the achievements of African Americans in overcoming the evils of slavery stand as a source of tremendous inspiration, the successes of slaves and their descendants do not overwrite the failure of the Nation to grant all Americans their birthright of equality and the civil rights that safeguard freedom. (8) Many African American slaves fought as valiant patriots in the wars that helped to preserve our national freedoms, knowing they would never be privileged to partake of the freedoms for which they fought. (9) African American art, history, and culture reflect experiences of slavery and freedom, and continued struggles for full recognition of citizenship and treatment with human dignity, and there is inadequate presentation, preservation, and recognition of the contributions of African Americans within American society. (10) There is a great need for building institutions and monuments to promote cultural understanding of African American heritage and further enhance racial harmony. (11) It is proper and timely for the Congress to recognize June 19, 1865, the historic day when the last group of slaves were informed of", "label": 0, "domain": "government", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_01052", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00694", "text": "party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment will be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.' 5 A subsequent section, 54 Stat. 1163, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(1) and (d), 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(a)(1), (d), specifically providing for the criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment for the utterance of a false oath such as this indicates an intention that proceedings under § 338 are not criminal. Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 1313, 90 L.Ed. 1500; Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27, 28, 34 S.Ct. 10, 15, 58 L.Ed. 101; Sourino v. United States, 5 Cir., 86 F.2d 309; United States v. Wezel, D.C., 49 F.Supp. 16, 17. 6 Cf. Wallace v. United States, 2 Cir., 142 F.2d 240, 244. 1 Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or Order. * * * '(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 497, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00233", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00695", "text": ". 27 The conclusion that liquidation compelled by governmental edict was not foreseen at the time Engineers' charter was drafted is reenforced by a statement appearing in the record, made by counsel for Engineers, one of the draftsmen of the charter, apparently in connection with another case, that a § 11 liquidation 'is an arbitrarily and forced statutory termination of the enterprise, and it has no relation whatsoever to any factors which the parties could have had in mind when they entered the enterprise.' 28 The common stockholders contend that the repeated references in the legislative history of the Holding Company Act to Continental Insurance Company v. United States, 259 U.S. 156, 42 S.Ct. 540, 66 L.Ed. 871 (S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 33; H.R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 49—50; 79 Cong.Rec. 4607, 8432) 'leave no doubt that at least when a genuine liquidation is compelled by the Act,' charter provisions were intended to control. But these congressional references to the Continental case were in support of propositions other than that charter liquidation provisions are applicable to liquidations compelled by the Act. The Otis opinion pointed out that the Continental case 'turned * * * on the charter rights of the preferred to share equally with the common in earnings which had be ome assets, * * * not on whether a right to share was matured or varied by governmental action.' 323 U.S. at page 639, 65 S.Ct. at page 491, 89 L.Ed. 511. The opinion proceeds to refute expressly the contentions made by the common stockholders here: 'We do not feel constrained by (the Continental case's) dealing with charter rights as in a normal liquidation to hold that where liquidation is adopted as a matter of administrative routine, the preferences are thereby matured.' Ibid. 29 The Otis case was described as follows: 'In construing the words 'fair and equitable' in a federal statute of very similar purposes, we have held that although the full priority rule applies in liquidation of a solvent holding company under a federal statute, the priority is satisfied by giving each class the full economic equivalent of what they presently hold, and that, as a matter", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00312", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00696", "text": "170, 48 S.Ct. at page 504, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45.5 32 That the Court has at all times been aware of this problem is demonstrated by its reiteration throughout the relevant decisions that the charge must be'reasonable in amount.' See especially Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 295 U.S. 285, 289, 55 S.Ct. 709, 711, 79 L.Ed. 1439: 'The fee is moderate in amount,' and Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 507, 68 S.Ct. 167, 173, 92 L.Ed. 99: '* * * the aggregate amount of both taxes combined is less than that of taxes previously sustained.' 33 The problem is inescapably one of determining how much is too much, in the total nature of the tax. Thus, it becomes important to see how the Maryland tax compares in amount with similar taxes in prior cases. This is done, not to test the tax as individually applied to appellants, but to determine whether general application of a tax of this magnitude may fairly be deemed to burden interstate commerce unduly. Examination of decided cases reveals that the largest flat tax previously sustained was $15 for six months or $30 per year, and the largest annual tax based upon size or weight was $75.6 See Appendix to this opinion, post, 337 U.S. p. 561, 70 S.Ct. 817. The Maryland taxes on the three appellants amounted to $372, $505 and $580, but since the Maryland tax is not annual, these amounts are not comparable to amounts previously sustained. In order to equate them, information is needed as to the number of years typical motor carriers are likely to operate such busses over Maryland roads. Even taking the assumption of the Maryland Court of Appeals, not based on any evidence in the record, that five years was a fair estimate,7 the amounts are in excess of any sustained by this Court. Therefore even if the Court were to accept the formula of the Maryland titling tax, the case should be remanded for a finding of the anticipated period of use in order to have some basis of appraising the validity of the amount. 34 III", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 494, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00358", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00697", "text": "the authorized type'. 320 U.S. at page 409, 64 S.Ct. at page 171. 26 VIII. Preservation of Agricultural Exemption.—As indicated above, the Act also exempts from Commission jurisdiction'motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products of it), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation'; § 203(b)(6),16 and appellants, and particularly the intervening Secretary of Agriculture, urge that the rules will drastically reduce the significance of this section in violation of Congress' intent. All admit, of course, that the rules do not directly apply to agricultural equipment; it is merely required that authorized carriers using such trucks comply with certain provisions. But it is contended that the preconditions to such use imposed on those within Commission jurisdiction will wipe out much of the traffic which the agricultural carriers have previously engaged in. It appears, for instance, that a substantial leasing is built on agricultural haulers who would otherwise return empty to their place of departure, having unloaded the farm produce carried; the authorized carriers have found them prepared to accept a one-trip engagement for the return route. The thirtyday lease provision will make such arrangements impossible. 27 We are unable, however, to conclude that the economic danger to the agricultural truckers from these rules constitutes a violation of § 203(b)(6). The mere fact that commercial carriers of agricultural products will hereafter be required to establish their charges on the basis of an empty return trip is not the same as bringing them within Commission jurisdiction generally. The exemption extends, by its own words, to carriage of agricultural products, and not to operations where the equipment is used to carry other property. Needless to say, the statute is not designed to allow farm truckers to compete with authorized and certificated motor carriers in the carriage of non-agricultural products or manufactured products for off-the-farm use, merely because they have exemption when carrying only agricultural products. We can therefore find nothing in it which implies protection of agricultural truckers' right to haul other property, even though from an economic standpoint that right is important to protect profit margins. Regulated truckers must also receive protection upon their restricted routes and limited carriage. A balance between these competing factors, carried out in accordance with congressional purpose,17 does not seem to us unreasonable or invalid. 28 IX.", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 498, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00471", "split": "train"}
+{"id": "legal_formality_train_0_00698", "text": ".Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453, and Harris v. United States, supra, with the 'well-stated' opinion in United States v. Mulligan, D.C., 268 F. 893; but see Trupiano v. United States, supra. This is not 'a parade of horribles.' If a man's records are 'public' so as to deprive him of his privilege against self-crimination, their publicness inheres in them for many other situations. 77 Indeed, if these records are public, I can see no reason why the public should not have the same right that the Government has to peruse, if not to use, them. For, public records are 'of a public character, kept for public purposes, and so immediately before the eyes of the community that inaccuracies, if they should exist, could hardly escape exposure.' Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 666, 25 L.Ed. 306. It would seem to follow, therefore, that these public records of persons engaged in what to the common understanding is deemed private enterprise should be generally available for examination and not barred by the plea that the enterprise would thereby cease to be private. 78 Congress was guilty, perhaps, of no more than curious inconsistency when it provided in § 202(h) of the Act for the confidential treatment of these 'public' records.16 But the seeming inconsistency generally applies to information obtained by the Government under record-keeping and reporting requirements. See H. Doc. No. 27, supra, at pp. 26 28; 56 Stat. 1078, 1079, 5 U.S.C.A. § 139 et seq.; H.R.Rep. No. 1651, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at pp. 4—5; ('We (the Bureau of the Census) do not even supply the Department of Justice or anybody else with that information') Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.R. 7590, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 63. 79 The fact of the matter, then, is that records required to be kept by law are not necessarily public in any except a wordplaying sense. To determine whether such records are truly public records, i.e.,", "label": 0, "domain": "legal_us", "token_count": 499, "matched_pair_id": "legal_00204", "split": "train"}