text:
@book{achinstein_concepts_1968,
	address = {Baltimore},
	title = {Concepts of {Science}. {A} {Philosphical} {Analysis}},
	publisher = {John Hopkins University Press},
	collaborator = {Achinstein, Peter},
	year = {1968}
}

@book{rosenberg_philosophy_2000,
	title = {The {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	isbn = {978-0-415-93927-0},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Psychology Press},
	author = {Rosenberg, Alexander},
	year = {2000},
	note = {Google-Books-ID: od68ge7aF6wC}
}

@incollection{magnani_tracing_1999,
	title = {Tracing the {Development} of {Models} in the {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	booktitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning} in {Scientific} {Discovery}},
	publisher = {Kluwer/Plenum},
	author = {Bailer-Jones, Daniela M.},
	editor = {Magnani, L. and Nersessian, N. J. and Thagard, P.},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {23--40}
}

@article{jones_daniela_m._bailer_models_2002,
	series = {Wiley {Online} {Books}},
	title = {Models, {Metaphors} and {Analogies}},
	issn = {9780470756614},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470756614.ch6},
	doi = {10.1002/9780470756614.ch6},
	abstract = {Summary This chapter contains sections titled: Models Analogy Metaphor Metaphorical Models Current Issues},
	urldate = {2018-04-15},
	journal = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {{Jones Daniela M. Bailer}},
	year = {2002},
	keywords = {analogies, mathematical formalism, metaphors, models, scientific reasoning},
	file = {Snapshot:files/8/9780470756614.html:text/html}
}

@book{magnani_model-based_nodate,
	title = {in {Model}-{Based} {Reasoning}: {Science}, {Technology}, {Values},},
	shorttitle = {in {Model}-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	abstract = {This paper examines several analogies employed in computational data  analysis techniques: the analogy to the brain for artificial neural networks, the  analogy to statistical mechanics for simulated annealing and the analogy to  evolution for genetic algorithms. After exploring these analogies, we compare  them to analogies in scientific models and highlight that scientific models  address specific empirical phenomena, whereas data analysis models are  application-neutral: they can be used whenever a set of data meets certain  formal requirements, regardless of what phenomenon these data pertain to.},
	author = {{Magnani} and {Nersessian} and Bailer-jones, Daniela M. and Bailer-jones, Coryn A. L.},
	file = {Citeseer - Full Text PDF:files/11/Magnani et al. - in Model-Based Reasoning Science, Technology, Val.pdf:application/pdf;Citeseer - Snapshot:files/10/summary.html:text/html}
}

@book{barr_handbook_1981,
	title = {The {Handbook} of artificial intelligence, volume 1},
	url = {http://archive.org/details/handbookofartific01barr},
	abstract = {Bibliographie; Index},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2018-04-15},
	publisher = {Stanford, Calif.: HeurisTech Press ; Los Altos, Calif. : William Kaufmann},
	author = {Barr, Avron and Feigenbaum, Edward A.},
	collaborator = {{Internet Archive}},
	year = {1981},
	keywords = {Intelligence artificielle}
}

@article{smith_bateson_2016,
	title = {Bateson - {Consciousness}, {Mind} and {Nature}},
	abstract = {What is consciousness? That seems to be the fundamental question. As mind and self are intrinsically related to each other, and to the larger construct of consciousness, it is difficult to abstract them from one another in the attempt to answer this question. Damasio's views of consciousness are explicated. An exploration of Bateson's conceptions of mind, ecology, knowledge, difference, evolution, and their interrelationships and interconnectedness are undertaken. In addition, his concept of " high civilization " is explored.},
	author = {Smith, James},
	month = jun,
	year = {2016},
	file = {Full Text PDF:files/14/Smith - 2016 - Bateson - Consciousness, Mind and Nature.pdf:application/pdf}
}

@article{beacham_pompey_2003,
	title = {The {Pompey} {Project}: {Digital} {Research} and {Virtual} {Reconstruction} of {Rome}'s {First} {Theatre}},
	volume = {37},
	issn = {0010-4817},
	shorttitle = {The {Pompey} {Project}},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30204885},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-04-15},
	journal = {Computers and the Humanities},
	author = {Beacham, Richard and Denard, Hugh},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {129--139}
}

@article{black_black_1979,
	title = {Black, {Max} (1979). {More} {About} {Metaphor}. {In} {Metaphor} and {Thought}, ed. {Andrew} {Ortony} (pp. 19–39). {Cambridge}: {Cambridge} {University} {Press}.},
	journal = {Metaphor and Thought},
	author = {Black, Max},
	year = {1979}
}

@article{black_max_more_2007,
	title = {More about metaphor},
	volume = {31},
	issn = {0012-2017},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1977.tb01296.x},
	doi = {10.1111/j.1746-8361.1977.tb01296.x},
	abstract = {Summary An elaboration and defense of the ?interaction view of metaphor? introduced in the author's earlier study, ?Metaphor? (1962). Special attention is paid to the explication of the metaphors used in the earlier account. The topics discussed include: selection of the ?targets? of the theory; classification of metaphors; how metaphorical statements work; relations between metaphors and similes; metaphorical thought; criteria of recognition; the ?creative? aspects of metaphors; the ontological status of metaphors. Metaphors are found to be more closely connected with background models than has previously been recognized.},
	number = {3‐4},
	urldate = {2018-04-15},
	journal = {Dialectica},
	author = {{BLACK Max}},
	month = may,
	year = {2007},
	pages = {431--457},
	file = {Snapshot:files/19/j.1746-8361.1977.tb01296.html:text/html}
}

@misc{noauthor_notitle_nodate,
	url = {https://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar.bib?q=info:fC-0EuL3Rf4J:scholar.google.com/&output=citation&scisig=AAGBfm0AAAAAWtO7YUg8j6eKy5Tn5CAO2UVCNUYTBVAM&scisf=4&ct=citation&cd=-1&hl=de},
	urldate = {2018-04-15},
	file = {:files/21/scholar.html:text/html}
}

@article{black_more_1979,
	title = {More about {Metaphor}},
	volume = {2},
	journal = {Metaphor and Thought},
	author = {Black, Max},
	year = {1979},
	pages = {19--41}
}

@book{brooks_elsevier_1987,
	title = {Elsevier {Intelligence} without representation*},
	abstract = {Artificial intelligence research has foundered on the issue of representation. When intellig-ence is approached in an incremental manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures. The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and parallel activity producers which all interface directly to the world through perception and action, rather than interface to each other particularly much. The notions of central and peripheral systems evaporate--everything is both central and peripheral. Based on these principles we have built a very successful series of mobile robots which operate without supervision as Creatures in standard office environments. I.},
	author = {Brooks, Rodney A.},
	year = {1987},
	file = {Citeseer - Full Text PDF:files/25/Brooks - 1987 - Elsevier Intelligence without representation.pdf:application/pdf;Citeseer - Snapshot:files/24/summary.html:text/html}
}

@incollection{brown_thought_2017,
	edition = {Summer 2017},
	title = {Thought {Experiments}},
	url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entrieshought-experiment/},
	abstract = {Thought experiments are devices of the imagination used to investigatethe nature of things. They are used for diverse reasons in a varietyof areas, including economics, history, mathematics, philosophy, andthe sciences, especially physics. Most often thought experiments arecommunicated in narrative form, frequently with diagrams. Thoughtexperiments should be distinguished from thinking about experiments,from merely imagining any experiments to be conducted outside theimagination, and from psychological experiments with thoughts. Theyshould also be distinguished from counterfactual reasoning in general,as they seem to require an experimental element, which seems toexplain the impression that something is experienced in a thoughtexperiment. In other words, though many call any counter-factual orhypothetical situation a thought experiment, this seems tooencompassing.  It seems right to demand that they also be visualized(or perhaps smelled, tasted, heard, touched); there should besomething experimental about a thought experiment. , The primary philosophical challenge of thought experiments is simple:How can we learn about reality (if we can at all), just by thinking?More precisely, are there thought experiments that enable us toacquire new knowledge about the intended realm of investigationwithout new empirical data? If so, where does the new information come from ifnot from contact with the realm of investigation underconsideration? Finally, how can we distinguish good from bad instancesof thought experiments? These questions seem urgent with respectto scientific thought experiments, because most philosophers andhistorians of science “recognize them as an occasionally potenttool for increasing our understanding of nature. […]Historically their role is very close to the double one played byactual laboratory experiments and observations. First, thoughtexperiments can disclose nature's failure to conform to a previouslyheld set of expectations. Second, they can suggest particularways in which both expectation and theory must henceforth berevised.” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 241 and 261) The questions are urgentregarding philosophical thought experiments, because they play animportant role in philosophical discourse. Philosophy without thoughtexperiments seems almost hopeless.,  There is widespread agreement that thought experiments play acentral role both in philosophy and in the natural sciences. Generalacceptance of the importance of some of the well-known thoughtexperiments in the natural sciences, like Maxwell's demon, Einstein'selevator or Schrödinger's cat. Probably more often than not,these, and many other thought experiments have led the carefulanalysis of their epistemic powers to the conclusion that we shouldnot portray science as an exclusively empirical activity (seeWinchester, 1990, p. 79).,  The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners inGalileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz. And in our own time, thecreation of quantum mechanics and relativity are almost unthinkablewithout the crucial role played by thought experiments. Much ofethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind is based on theresults of thought experiments as well, including Searle's Chineseroom, Putnam's twin earth, and Jackson's Mary the colourscientist. Philosophy, even more than the sciences, would be severelyimpoverished without thought experiments, which suggests that aunified theory of thought experiments is desirable to account for themin both the sciences and the humanities (see Boniolo, 1997; Cooper,2005, pp. 329–330; Gähde, 2000). That is to say: since thesciences, especially physics, and philosophy both make use of thoughtexperiments, then, other things being equal, a unified account seemsdesirable.,  There have been attempts to define “thoughtexperiment”, but likely it will be better to leave the termloosely characterized, so as not to prejudice the ongoinginvestigation. Of course, we need to have some idea as to what thoughtexperiments are to guide a proper philosophical analysis (seeHaggqvist, 2009), but this does not mean we need to begin with atechnical definition, specifying necessary and sufficientconditions. In fact, many of the most important concepts we deal withremain rather loosely defined when philosophical inquiry begins, e.g.,religion or democracy. Luckily, there are plenty of examples to referto in order to circumscribe our subject matter well enough. As well asthose already mentioned, there are Newton's bucket, Heisenberg'sgamma-ray microscope, Einstein's elevator, Leibniz's mill, Parfit'speople who split like amoebas, and Thomson's violinist. Everyone isprobably familiar with some of these. Less familiar thoughtexperiments include “the dome”, a relatively new thoughtexperiment and probably the simplest example of indeterminism inNewtonian physics. Imagine a mass sitting on a radially symmetricsurface in a gravitational field. Guided by Newton's laws of motionone comes to realize that the mass can either remain at rest for alltimes, or spontaneously move in an arbitrary direction (see Norton,2008). This thought experiment triggers a number of very interestingquestions concerning the nature of Newtonian theory, the meaning of“physical”, and the role of idealizations in physics. And,of course, does it show what it claims? , In the following we will first highlight some of the most commonfeatures of thought experiments. A proposal follows for classifyingthought experiments, before reviewing the state of the debate onthought experimenting, preceded by some remarks about the history ofphilosophical inquiry into thought experiments. We conclude byhighlighting some of the recent developments surrounding the so-calledlaboratory of the mind.},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},
	publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
	author = {Brown, James Robert and Fehige, Yiftach},
	editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Descartes, René, Galileo Galilei, intuition, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Mach, Ernst, moral psychology: empirical approaches, Platonism: in metaphysics, rationalism vs. empiricism}
}

@book{burch_model-based_2018,
	series = {Demographic {Research} {Monographs}},
	title = {Model-{Based} {Demography}: {Essays} on {Integrating} {Data}, {Technique} and {Theory}},
	isbn = {978-3-319-65432-4},
	shorttitle = {Model-{Based} {Demography}},
	url = {//www.springer.com/de/book/9783319654324},
	abstract = {Late in a career of more than sixty years, Thomas Burch, an internationally known social demographer, undertook a wide-ranging methodological critique of demography. This open access volume contains a selection of resulting papers, some previously unpublished, some published but not readily accessible [from past meetings of The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and its research committees, or from other small conferences and seminars]. Rejecting the idea that demography is simply a branch of applied statistics, his work views it as an autonomous and complete scientific discipline. When viewed from the perspective of modern philosophy of science, specifically the semantic or model-based school, demography is a balanced discipline, with a rich body of techniques and data, but also with more and better theories than generally recognized. As demonstrated in this book, some demographic techniques can also be seen as theoretical models, and some substantive/behavioral models, commonly rejected as theory because of inconsistent observations, are now seen as valuable theoretical models, for example demographic transition theory. This book shows how demography can build a strong theoretical edifice on its broad and deep empirical foundation by adoption of the model-based approach to science. But the full-fruits of this approach will require demographers to make greater use of computer modeling [both macro- and micro-simulation], in the statement and manipulation of theoretical ideas, as well as for numerical computation. This book is open access under a CC BY license.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Burch, Thomas K.},
	year = {2018},
	file = {Snapshot:files/28/9783319654324.html:text/html}
}

@incollection{burch_computer_2002,
	series = {Methodos {Series}},
	title = {Computer {Modelling} of {Theory}: {Explanation} for the 21{\textless}{Superscript}{\textgreater}st{\textless}/{Superscript}{\textgreater} {Century}},
	isbn = {978-90-481-6122-5 978-1-4020-4676-6},
	shorttitle = {Computer {Modelling} of {Theory}},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-4676-6_12},
	abstract = {The words theory, model, and explanation are used in different ways by different writers. Complete agreement on their meanings among natural scientists, social scientists, philosophers of science, engineers and others seems unlikely, since meaning depends partly on context and on discipline-specific conventions. Accepted meanings of these words often depend on subject matter, and on the purposes of research. In practice, a theory, model, or explanation—or a good theory, model, or explanation—for a physicist or chemist may differ in some respects from a theory, model, or explanation for a biologist, a meteorologist, or a demographer. These differences may appear all the greater if one looks at the use of models and theories in practical decision making, as in engineering or policy formation.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {The {Explanatory} {Power} of {Models}},
	publisher = {Springer, Dordrecht},
	author = {Burch, Thomas K.},
	year = {2002},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-4020-4676-6_12},
	pages = {245--265},
	file = {Snapshot:files/30/978-1-4020-4676-6_12.html:text/html}
}

@misc{noauthor_how_1983,
	title = {How the {Laws} of {Physics} {Lie} - {Oxford} {Scholarship}},
	url = {http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198247044.001.0001/acprof-9780198247043},
	abstract = {Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality. Instead, fundamental laws describe highly idealized objects in models. Thus, the correct account of explanation in science is not the traditional covering law view, but the ‘simulacrum’ account. On this view, explanation is a matter of constructing a model that may employ, but need not be consistent with, a theoretical framework, in which phenomenological laws that are true of the empirical case in question can be derived. Anti‐realism about theoretical laws does not, however, commit one to anti‐realism about theoretical entities. Belief in theoretical entities can be grounded in well‐tested localized causal claims about concrete physical processes, sometimes now called ‘entity realism’. Such causal claims provide the basis for partial realism and they are ineliminable from the practice of explanation and intervention in nature.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	month = jun,
	year = {1983},
	file = {Snapshot:files/32/acprof-9780198247043.html:text/html}
}

@book{cartwright_how_1983,
	address = {Oxford},
	title = {How the {Laws} of {Physics} {Lie}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-824704-3},
	abstract = {Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Cartwright, Nancy},
	year = {1983},
	note = {OCLC: 611130590}
}

@book{clarke_models_1972,
	address = {London},
	title = {Models and {Paradigms} in {Contemporary} {Archaeology}. {In}: {Models} {In} {Archaeology}},
	shorttitle = {Models and {Paradigms} in {Contemporary} {Archaeology}. {In}},
	abstract = {This resource is a citation record only, the Center for Digital Antiquity does not have a copy of this document.  The information in this record has been migrated into tDAR from the National Archaeological Database Reports Module (NADB-R) and updated. Most NADB-R records consist of a document citation and other metadata but do not have the documents themselves uploaded.

If you have a digital copy of the document and would like to have it curated in tDAR, please contact us at comments@tdar.org.},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Methuen},
	author = {Clarke, David L.},
	year = {1972},
	keywords = {12998 (Fips Code), Archaeological Overview, Florida (State / Territory), North America (Continent), Theory, United States of America (Country)}
}

@incollection{craig_perceptual_2002,
	title = {Perceptual {Simulation} in {Analogical} {Problem} {Solving}},
	isbn = {978-1-4613-5154-2 978-1-4615-0605-8},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_10},
	abstract = {We argue that in some situations solutions to target problems can be generated based on perceptual simulations of analogous but superficially dissimilar source problems. Unlike processes associated with perceptually neutral representations, those associated with perceptual simulations should be highly sensitive to context, whether conveyed through textual, visual or physical mediums. Consistent with this claim, we found that when the context of a source problem was manipulated to accentuate kinesthetic structure, people were more likely to generate solutions to an analogous problem. We also found that subjects who drew diagrams of solutions to source problems were most likely to transform them into solutions to an analogous problem when the contextual properties of their diagrams afforded such transformations.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	publisher = {Springer, Boston, MA},
	author = {Craig, David L. and Nersessian, Nancy J. and Catrambone, Richard},
	year = {2002},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_10},
	pages = {167--189},
	file = {Snapshot:files/36/978-1-4615-0605-8_10.html:text/html}
}

@article{davis_what_1993,
	title = {What {Is} a {Knowledge} {Representation}?},
	volume = {14},
	copyright = {Copyright (c)},
	issn = {0738-4602},
	url = {https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/1029},
	language = {en-US},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {AI Magazine},
	author = {Davis, Randall and Shrobe, Howard and Szolovits, Peter},
	month = mar,
	year = {1993},
	pages = {17},
	file = {Full Text PDF:files/38/Davis et al. - 1993 - What Is a Knowledge Representation.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:files/39/947.html:text/html}
}

@misc{noauthor_hyle_nodate,
	title = {{HYLE} 6-1 (2000): {Models} and analogies in science},
	url = {http://www.hyle.org/journal/issues/6/delre.htm},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	file = {HYLE 6-1 (2000)\: Models and analogies in science:files/41/delre.html:text/html}
}

@book{noauthor_performances_nodate,
	title = {Performances},
	url = {http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo3633981.html},
	abstract = {With elegance and candor, Greg Dening offers a panoramic collection of rich and densely textured essays that demonstrate how we can only understand our present through our consciousness of the past and how in thinking about the past we mirror the time and place of our own living.For Dening, history saturates every moment of our cultural and personal existence. Yet he is keenly aware that the actual past remains fundamentally irreplicable. All histories are culturally crafted artifacts, commensurate with folk tales, stage plays, or films. Whether derived from logbooks and letters, or displayed on music hall stages and Hollywood back lots, history is in essence our making sense of what has and continues to happen, creating for us a sense of our cultural and individual selves.Through juxtapositions of actual events and creative reenactments of them—such as the mutiny on the Bounty in 1787 and the various Hollywood films that depict that event—Dening calls attention to the provocative moment of theatricality in history making where histories, cultures, and selves converge. Moving adeptly across varied terrains, from the frontiers of North America to the islands of the South Pacific, Dening marshals a striking array of diverse, often recalcitrant, sources to examine the tangled histories of cross-cultural clash and engagement. Refusing to portray conquest, colonization, and hegemony simply as abstract processes, Dening, in his own culturally reflexive performance, painstakingly evokes the flesh and form of past actors, both celebrated and unsung, whose foregone lives have become our history.},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	file = {Snapshot:files/43/bo3633981.html:text/html}
}

@book{dening_readings/writings_1998,
	address = {Carlton, Vic},
	title = {Readings/writings},
	isbn = {978-0-522-84841-0},
	abstract = {Reading is a dance on the beaches of the mind, writes Greg Dening. His reading-dances are about the pain of cross-cultural encounters, of loomings beyond the horizons of discipline, gender and race, of the pleasures of a hundred texts. In Readings/Writings his aim is to cultivate our imaginations so that we might see further, understand more deeply and hear more acutely. This book opens with Dening's extraordinary piece, 'Memorial', a deeply moving reading of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC. Dening's profound yet lucid reflections on the meanings contained in this stark, simple memorial set the tone for the book},
	publisher = {Melbourne University Press},
	author = {Dening, Greg},
	year = {1998},
	keywords = {Historiography, History, Philosophy},
	annote = {Memorial -- Ways of Seeing. Pego's Grave. Fetching Facts. Kingdoms Come. Writing What the Eye Sees. 'P905.A512 x 100': An Ethnographic Essay. Simpson's Donkey. The Randy and Imperial Eye -- Beaches of the Mind. Waves Are My Worry Beads. A Stone Axe and 'Collegium Tarturense'. Endeavour and Hokule'a. Something of a Cook's Tour. Turtles All the Way Down. Truganini's Spectre -- Theatre/Theory. Laughing into Empire. The Theatricalities of Derring-do. The Hill of Difficulty. The Mad Logic of Empire. The Trials of a Literary Man. The Tortoise Wins Again. Empowering Imaginations -- Memorial Memorial -- Ways of Seeing. Pego's Grave. Fetching Facts. Kingdoms Come. Writing What the Eye Sees. 'P905.A512 x 100': An Ethnographic Essay. Simpson's Donkey. The Randy and Imperial Eye --Beaches of the Mind. Waves Are My Worry Beads. A Stone Axe and 'Collegium Tarturense'. Endeavour and Hokule'a. Something of a Cook's Tour. Turtles All the Way Down. Truganini's Spectre -- Theatre/Theory. Laughing into Empire. The Theatricalities of Derring-do. The Hill of Difficulty. The Mad Logic of Empire. The Trials of a Literary Man. The Tortoise Wins Again. Empowering Imaginations -- Memorial}
}

@article{fetzer_role_1999,
	title = {The {Role} of {Models} in {Computer} {Science}},
	volume = {82},
	issn = {0026-9662},
	url = {https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/82/1/20/1122951},
	doi = {10.5840/monist19998211},
	abstract = {Taking Brian Cantwell Smith's study, “Limits of Correctness in Computers,” as its point of departure, this article explores the role of models in computer science. Smith identifies two kinds of models that play an important role, where specifications are models of problems and programs are models of possible solutions. Both presuppose the existence of conceptualizations as ways of conceiving the world “in certain delimited ways.” But high-level programming languages also function as models of virtual (or abstract) machines, while low-level programming languages function as models of causal (or physical) machines. The resulting account suggests that sets of models embedded within models are indispensable for computer programming.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {The Monist},
	author = {Fetzer, James H.},
	month = jan,
	year = {1999},
	pages = {20--36},
	file = {Snapshot:files/47/1122951.html:text/html}
}

@book{noauthor_paul_1993,
	edition = {3},
	title = {Paul {Feyerabend} - {Against} {Method}, {Three} {Dialogues} on {Knowledge}, other},
	url = {http://archive.org/details/PaulFeyerabend},
	abstract = {Paul Feyerabend - Against Method, Three Dialogues on Knowledge, other},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	year = {1993},
	keywords = {Paul Feyerabend}
}

@book{suchergebnisse_ancient_1986,
	address = {New York, N.Y., U.S.A},
	title = {Ancient {History}: {Evidence} and {Models}},
	isbn = {978-0-670-80970-7},
	shorttitle = {Ancient {History}},
	abstract = {Explains the limitations of the evidence available to classical historians, looks at how historians have used these sources, and suggests alternative procedures},
	language = {Englisch},
	publisher = {Viking Pr},
	author = {Suchergebnisse},
	month = feb,
	year = {1986}
}

@book{franck_explanatory_2002,
	address = {Boston, Massua},
	series = {Methodos series ; 1},
	title = {The explanatory power of models: bridging the gap between empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences},
	isbn = {978-1-4020-0867-2},
	shorttitle = {The explanatory power of models},
	abstract = {Enthalten: Literaturangaben},
	language = {eng},
	publisher = {Kluwer},
	author = {Franck, Robert},
	year = {2002},
	keywords = {Aufsatzsammlung, Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Social sciences, Social sciences ; Sozialwissenschaften ; Statistisches Modell ; Aufsatzsammlung, Social sciences Mathematical models, Social sciences Research, Social sciences Statistical methods, Sozialwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaften, Statistik, Statistisches Modell}
}

@incollection{franklin_experiment_2016,
	edition = {Winter 2016},
	title = {Experiment in {Physics}},
	url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/physics-experiment/},
	abstract = {Physics, and natural science in general, is a reasonable enterprisebased on valid experimental evidence, criticism, and rationaldiscussion. It provides us with knowledge of the physical world, and itis experiment that provides the evidence that grounds this knowledge.Experiment plays many roles in science. One of its important roles isto test theories and to provide the basis for scientific knowledge.[1] It can also call for a new theory, either byshowing that an accepted theory is incorrect, or by exhibiting a newphenomenon that is in need of explanation. Experiment can provide hintstoward the structure or mathematical form of a theory and it canprovide evidence for the existence of the entities involved in ourtheories. Finally, it may also have a life of its own, independent oftheory. Scientists may investigate a phenomenon just because it looksinteresting. Such experiments may provide evidence for a future theoryto explain. [Examples of these different roles will be presentedbelow.] As we shall see below, a single experiment may play several ofthese roles at once., If experiment is to play these important roles in science then wemust have good reasons to believe experimental results, for science isa fallible enterprise. Theoretical calculations, experimental results,or the comparison between experiment and theory may all be wrong.Science is more complex than “The scientist proposes, Nature disposes.”It may not always be clear what the scientist is proposing. Theoriesoften need to be articulated and clarified. It also may not be clearhow Nature is disposing. Experiments may not always give clear-cutresults, and may even disagree for a time., In what follows, the reader will find an epistemology of experiment,a set of strategies that provides reasonable belief in experimentalresults. Scientific knowledge can then be reasonably based on theseexperimental results.},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},
	publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
	author = {Franklin, Allan and Perovic, Slobodan},
	editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
	year = {2016},
	keywords = {confirmation, logic: inductive, rationalism vs. empiricism, scientific method, scientific realism},
	file = {SEP - Snapshot:files/53/physics-experiment.html:text/html}
}

@book{noauthor_how_nodate,
	title = {How {Experiments} {End}},
	url = {http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo5969426.html},
	abstract = {"Galison provides excellent histories of three experimental episodes: the measurement of the gyromagnetic ratio of the electron, the discovery of the mu meson, or muon, and the discovery of weak neutral currents. These studies of actual experiments will provide valuable material for both philosophers and historians of science and Galison's own thoughts on the nature of experiment are extremely important. . . . Galison has given both philosophers and historians much to think about. I strongly urge you to read this book."—Allan Franklin, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science"Anyone who is seriously concerned with understanding how research is done should read this. There have been many books on one or another part of its subject matter but few giving such insights into how the research is done and how the consensus of discovery is arrived at."—Frank Close, New Scientist"[Galison] is to be congratulated on producing a masterpiece in the field."—Michael Redhead, Synthese"How Experiments End is a major historical work on an exciting topic."—Andy Pickering, Isis},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	file = {Snapshot:files/55/bo5969426.html:text/html}
}

@article{galison_philosophy_1988,
	title = {Philosophy in the {Laboratory}},
	volume = {85},
	number = {10},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Galison, Peter},
	year = {1988},
	pages = {525--527}
}

@book{galison_image_1997,
	title = {Image and {Logic}: {A} {Material} {Culture} of {Microphysics}},
	shorttitle = {Image and {Logic}},
	publisher = {University of Chicago Press: Chicago},
	author = {Galison, Peter},
	year = {1997}
}

@article{gentner_analogy_2002,
	title = {Analogy in scientific discovery: {The} case of {Johannes} {Kepler}},
	shorttitle = {Analogy in scientific discovery},
	url = {https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/analogy-in-scientific-discovery-the-case-of-johannes-kepler},
	language = {English},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {Model-based reasoning: Science, technology, values},
	author = {Gentner, Dedre},
	year = {2002},
	file = {Snapshot:files/60/analogy-in-scientific-discovery-the-case-of-johannes-kepler.html:text/html}
}

@misc{noauthor_poetics_nodate,
	title = {Poetics mind figurative thought language and understanding {\textbar} {Cognition}},
	url = {http://www.cambridge.org/at/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/poetics-mind-figurative-thought-language-and-understanding},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {Cambridge University Press},
	file = {Snapshot:files/62/poetics-mind-figurative-thought-language-and-understanding.html:text/html}
}

@book{gibbs_poetics_1994,
	title = {The {Poetics} of {Mind}: {Figurative} {Thought}, {Language}, and {Understanding}},
	isbn = {978-0-521-42992-4},
	shorttitle = {The {Poetics} of {Mind}},
	abstract = {In this bold new work, Ray Gibbs demonstrates that human cognition is deeply poetic and that figurative imagination constitutes the way we understand ourselves and the world in which we live.},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Gibbs, Raymond W.},
	month = aug,
	year = {1994},
	note = {Google-Books-ID: 4kVJAMghNmUC},
	keywords = {Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / General, Philosophy / Mind \& Body, Psychology / Cognitive Psychology \& Cognition, Psychology / General}
}

@book{goodman_problems_1972,
	title = {Problems and {Projects}},
	publisher = {Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill},
	author = {Goodman, Nelson},
	year = {1972}
}

@book{results_languages_1976,
	address = {Indianapolis, Ind.},
	edition = {2 edition},
	title = {Languages of {Art}},
	isbn = {978-0-915144-34-1},
	abstract = {"Like Dewey, he has revolted against the empiricist dogma and the Kantian dualisms which have compartmentalized philosophical thought. . . . Unlike Dewey, he has provided detailed incisive argumentation, and has shown just where the dogmas and dualisms break down." --Richard Rorty, The Yale Review},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.},
	author = {results, search},
	month = jun,
	year = {1976}
}

@article{groenewold_model_1960,
	title = {The {Model} in {Physics}},
	volume = {12},
	number = {2-3},
	journal = {Synthese},
	author = {Groenewold, H. J.},
	year = {1960},
	pages = {222--227}
}

@incollection{guala_models_2002,
	title = {Models, {Simulations}, and {Experiments}},
	isbn = {978-1-4613-5154-2 978-1-4615-0605-8},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_4},
	abstract = {I discuss the difference between models, simulations, and experiments from an epistemological and an ontological perspective. I first distinguish between “static” models (like a map) and “dynamic” models endowed with the capacity to generate processes. Only the latter can be used to simulate. I then criticize the view according to which the difference between models/simulations and experiments is fundamentally epistemic in character. Following Herbert Simon, I argue that the difference is ontological. Simulations merely require the existence of an abstract correspondence between the simulating and the simulated system. In experiments, in contrast, the causal relations governing the experimental and the target systems are grounded in the same material. Simulations can produce new knowledge just as experiments do, but the prior knowledge needed to run a good simulation is not the same as that needed to run a good experiment. I conclude by discussing “hybrid” cases of “experimental simulations” or “simulating experiments”.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	publisher = {Springer, Boston, MA},
	author = {Guala, Francesco},
	year = {2002},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_4},
	pages = {59--74},
	file = {Snapshot:files/70/978-1-4615-0605-8_4.html:text/html}
}

@book{hacking_representing_1983,
	title = {Representing and {Intervening}: {Introductory} {Topics} in the {Philosophy} of {Natural} {Science}},
	isbn = {978-0-521-28246-8},
	shorttitle = {Representing and {Intervening}},
	abstract = {This 1983 book is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new direction to debates about realism. Hacking illustrates how experimentation often has a life independent of theory. He argues that although the philosophical problems of scientific realism can not be resolved when put in terms of theory alone, a sound philosophy of experiment provides compelling grounds for a realistic attitude. A great many scientific examples are described in both parts of the book, which also includes lucid expositions of recent high energy physics and a remarkable chapter on the microscope in cell biology.},
	language = {en},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Hacking, Ian},
	month = oct,
	year = {1983},
	keywords = {Philosophy / Political, Science / Philosophy \& Social Aspects}
}

@article{hacking_stability_1988,
	title = {On the {Stability} of the {Laboratory} {Sciences}},
	volume = {85},
	number = {10},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Hacking, Ian},
	year = {1988},
	pages = {507--514}
}

@article{heelan_experiment_1988,
	title = {Experiment and {Theory}: {Constitution} and {Reality}},
	volume = {85},
	issn = {0022-362X},
	shorttitle = {Experiment and {Theory}},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026810},
	number = {10},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Heelan, Patrick A.},
	year = {1988},
	pages = {515--524}
}

@incollection{johnson_metaphor-based_2002,
	title = {Metaphor-{Based} {Values} in {Scientific} {Models}},
	isbn = {978-1-4613-5154-2 978-1-4615-0605-8},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_1},
	abstract = {Theories of attention in cognitive psychology are based on various metaphoric models that determine how the phenomena of attention are identified, how they are studied experimentally, and how they are explained theoretically. Three of the central models in contemporary research programs are the Attention-Spotlight metaphor, the Attention As Limited Resource metaphor, and the Biased-Competition metaphor. Each of these metaphoric models involves a specific ontology of entities and processes, and each one entails a specific set of values that guide research on attention. These values are largely incompatible across the three different models. I argue that metaphor-based value systems are characteristic of all science and that this is not a lamentable problem, but rather the source of the insight and experimental fruitfulness of scientific models.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	publisher = {Springer, Boston, MA},
	author = {Johnson, Mark},
	year = {2002},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_1},
	pages = {1--19},
	file = {Snapshot:files/77/978-1-4615-0605-8_1.html:text/html}
}

@book{kent_data_2000,
	address = {Bloomington, Ind},
	edition = {Rev..},
	title = {Data and reality},
	isbn = {978-1-58500-970-1},
	abstract = {Enthalten: Literaturverz. S. 231 - 239},
	language = {eng},
	publisher = {1st Books Library},
	author = {Kent, William},
	year = {2000},
	keywords = {ADV, Automatische Datenverarbeitung, Automatisierte Datenverarbeitung, Datenverarbeitung, EDV, Elektronische Datenverarbeitung}
}

@article{kirschenbaum_imagebased_2002,
	title = {Image–based {Humanities} {Computing}},
	volume = {36},
	issn = {0010-4817},
	url = {https://insights.ovid.com/computers-humanities/chum/2002/36/040/image-based-humanities-computing/7/00014862},
	language = {en},
	number = {4},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {Computers \& the Humanities},
	author = {Kirschenbaum, Matthew G.},
	month = nov,
	year = {2002},
	pages = {463--465},
	file = {Snapshot:files/80/00014862.html:text/html}
}

@book{korzybski_science_1933,
	title = {Science and sanity; an introduction to {Non}-{Aristotelian} systems and general semantics},
	url = {http://archive.org/details/sciencesanityint00korz},
	abstract = {"First edition."; Bibliography: p. 767-781},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	publisher = {Lancaster, Pa., New York City, The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, The Science Press Printing Company, distributors},
	author = {Korzybski, Alfred},
	collaborator = {{Internet Archive}},
	year = {1933},
	keywords = {General semantics}
}

@book{korzybski_science_1933-1,
	title = {Science and sanity; an introduction to {Non}-{Aristotelian} systems and general semantics},
	url = {http://archive.org/details/sciencesanityint00korz},
	abstract = {"First edition."; Bibliography: p. 767-781},
	language = {eng},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	publisher = {Lancaster, Pa., New York City, The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, The Science Press Printing Company, distributors},
	author = {Korzybski, Alfred},
	collaborator = {{Internet Archive}},
	year = {1933},
	keywords = {General semantics}
}

@article{irvine_review_1978,
	title = {Review of: “{THE} {ROLE} {OF} {ANALOGY}, {MODEL} {AND} {METAPHOR} {IN} {SCIENCE}”, by {W}. {H}. {Leather}-dale, {North}-{Holland}, {Amsterdam}, 1974. 276 pp.},
	volume = {4},
	issn = {0308-1079},
	shorttitle = {Review of},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/03081077808960675},
	doi = {10.1080/03081077808960675},
	number = {2},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {International Journal of General Systems},
	author = {IRVINE, WILLIAM S.},
	month = jan,
	year = {1978},
	pages = {132--134},
	file = {Snapshot:files/84/03081077808960675.html:text/html}
}

@book{stork_hals_1997,
	address = {Cambridge, Massua},
	title = {{HAL}'s legacy: 2001's computer as dream and reality},
	isbn = {978-0-262-19378-8},
	shorttitle = {{HAL}'s legacy},
	abstract = {Enthalten: Literaturangaben},
	language = {eng},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	author = {Stork, David G.},
	year = {1997},
	keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Aufsatzsammlung, Computer science, Computer science Automatisch aus GBV\_2011-10 2012-05-27, Computerunterstützte Intelligenz, KI, Künstliche Intelligenz, Maschinelle Intelligenz, Supercomputers ; Künstliche Intelligenz ; Aufsatzsammlung, Supercomputers Automatisch aus GBV\_2011-10 2012-05-27}
}

@article{lougee_would-be_1988,
	title = {{THE} {WOULD}-{BE} {GENTLEMAN}: {A} {Historical} {Simulation} of the {France} of {Louis} {XIV}},
	volume = {4},
	shorttitle = {{THE} {WOULD}-{BE} {GENTLEMAN}},
	url = {https://www.learntechlib.org/p/139430/},
	abstract = {Discusses a computer software package, available for the Apple Macintosh, which simulates the economic and social climate during the reign of Louis XIV of France, 1638-1715. Describes the benefits of using the program as a tool for teaching social history. Includes a course outcome and brief bibliography. (GEA)},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {History Microcomputer Review},
	author = {Lougee, Carolyn Chappell},
	year = {1988},
	pages = {7--14},
	file = {Snapshot:files/87/139430.html:text/html}
}

@article{mccarty_network_2002,
	title = {A {Network} with a thousand entrances: {Commentary} in an electronic age?},
	shorttitle = {A {Network} with a thousand entrances},
	url = {https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/a-network-with-a-thousand-entrances-commentary-in-an-electronic-age(0eb4f884-133d-4675-95e0-48eb9b333c5f)/export.html},
	language = {English},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	journal = {The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory},
	author = {McCarty, Willard},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {359--402},
	file = {Snapshot:files/89/export.html:text/html}
}

@book{machamer_blackwell_2002,
	address = {Malden, Mass},
	series = {Blackwell philosophy guides},
	title = {The {Blackwell} guide to the philosophy of science},
	isbn = {978-0-631-22107-4 978-0-631-22108-1},
	number = {7},
	publisher = {Blackwell},
	editor = {Machamer, Peter K. and Silberstein, Michael},
	year = {2002},
	keywords = {Philosophy, Science},
	file = {Machamer und Silberstein - 2002 - The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science.pdf:files/90/Machamer und Silberstein - 2002 - The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science.pdf:application/pdf}
}

@book{magnani_model-based_2002,
	title = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}: {Science}, {Technology}, {Values}},
	isbn = {978-0-306-47244-2},
	shorttitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	url = {//www.springer.com/de/book/9780306472442},
	abstract = {Model-Based Reasoning...},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	publisher = {Springer US},
	editor = {Magnani, L. and Nersessian, Nancy},
	year = {2002},
	file = {Snapshot:files/93/9780306472442.html:text/html}
}

@article{markman_arthur_2000,
	title = {Arthur {B}. {Markman} and {Eric} {Dietrich}},
	volume = {4},
	number = {12},
	journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
	author = {Markman, A B and of, Department},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {6},
	file = {Markman und of - 2000 - Arthur B. Markman and Eric Dietrich.pdf:files/94/Markman und of - 2000 - Arthur B. Markman and Eric Dietrich.pdf:application/pdf}
}

@unpublished{noauthor_1911_nodate,
	title = {1911 {Encyclopædia} {Britannica}},
	copyright = {Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply.  By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.},
	keywords = {1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, 1911 works, Encyclopædias Britannica, Incomplete texts},
	file = {Wikisource Snapshot:files/97/index.html:text/html}
}

@book{suchergebnisse_analogy-making_1993,
	address = {Cambridge, Mass.},
	title = {Analogy-{Making} as {Perception}},
	isbn = {978-0-262-51544-3},
	abstract = {The psychologist William James observed that "a native talent for perceiving analogies is... the leading fact in genius of every order." The centrality and the ubiquity of analogy in creative thought have been noted again and again by scientists, artists, and writers, and understanding and modeling analogical thought have emerged as two of the most important challenges for cognitive science.Analogy-Making as Perception is based on the premise that analogy-making is fundamentally a high-level perceptual process in which the interaction of perception and concepts gives rise to "conceptual slippages" which allow analogies to be made. It describes Copycat - a computer model of analogymaking, developed by the author with Douglas Hofstadter, that models the complex, subconscious interaction between perception and concepts that underlies the creation of analogies.In Copycat, both concepts and high-level perception are emergent phenomena, arising from large numbers of low-level, parallel, non-deterministic activities. In the spectrum of cognitive modeling approaches, Copycat occupies a unique intermediate position between symbolic systems and connectionist systems a position that is at present the most useful one for understanding the fluidity of concepts and high-level perception.On one level the work described here is about analogy-making, but on another level it is about cognition in general. It explores such issues as the nature of concepts and perception and the emergence of highly flexible concepts from a lower-level "subcognitive" substrate.Melanie Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Michigan, is a Fellow of the Michigan Society of Fellows. She is also Director of the Adaptive Computation Program at the Santa Fe Institute.},
	language = {Englisch},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	author = {Suchergebnisse},
	month = may,
	year = {1993}
}

@book{noauthor_how_nodate-1,
	title = {How to {Lie} with {Maps}},
	url = {http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo3696845.html},
	abstract = {Originally published to wide acclaim, this lively, cleverly illustrated essay on the use and abuse of maps teaches us how to evaluate maps critically and promotes a healthy skepticism about these easy-to-manipulate models of reality. Monmonier shows that, despite their immense value, maps lie. In fact, they must.The second edition is updated with the addition of two new chapters, 10 color plates, and a new foreword by renowned geographer H. J. de Blij. One new chapter examines the role of national interest and cultural values in national mapping organizations, including the United States Geological Survey, while the other explores the new breed of multimedia, computer-based maps.To show how maps distort, Monmonier introduces basic principles of mapmaking, gives entertaining examples of the misuse of maps in situations from zoning disputes to census reports, and covers all the typical kinds of distortions from deliberate oversimplifications to the misleading use of color."Professor Monmonier himself knows how to gain our attention; it is not in fact the lies in maps but their truth, if always approximate and incomplete, that he wants us to admire and use, even to draw for ourselves on the facile screen. His is an artful and funny book, which like any good map, packs plenty in little space."—Scientific American"A useful guide to a subject most people probably take too much for granted. It shows how map makers translate abstract data into eye-catching cartograms, as they are called. It combats cartographic illiteracy. It fights cartophobia. It may even teach you to find your way. For that alone, it seems worthwhile."—Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, The New York Times". . . witty examination of how and why maps lie. [The book] conveys an important message about how statistics of any kind can be manipulated. But it also communicates much of the challenge, aesthetic appeal, and sheer fun of maps. Even those who hated geography in grammar school might well find a new enthusiasm for the subject after reading Monmonier's lively and surprising book."—Wilson Library Bulletin"A reading of this book will leave you much better defended against cheap atlases, shoddy journalism, unscrupulous advertisers, predatory special-interest groups, and others who may use or abuse maps at your expense."—John Van Pelt, Christian Science Monitor"Monmonier meets his goal admirably. . . . [His] book should be put on every map user's 'must read' list. It is informative and readable . . . a big step forward in helping us to understand how maps can mislead their readers."—Jeffrey S. Murray, Canadian Geographic},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	file = {Snapshot:files/102/bo3696845.html:text/html}
}

@book{noauthor_how_nodate-2,
	title = {How to {Lie} with {Maps}},
	url = {http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo3696845.html},
	abstract = {Originally published to wide acclaim, this lively, cleverly illustrated essay on the use and abuse of maps teaches us how to evaluate maps critically and promotes a healthy skepticism about these easy-to-manipulate models of reality. Monmonier shows that, despite their immense value, maps lie. In fact, they must.The second edition is updated with the addition of two new chapters, 10 color plates, and a new foreword by renowned geographer H. J. de Blij. One new chapter examines the role of national interest and cultural values in national mapping organizations, including the United States Geological Survey, while the other explores the new breed of multimedia, computer-based maps.To show how maps distort, Monmonier introduces basic principles of mapmaking, gives entertaining examples of the misuse of maps in situations from zoning disputes to census reports, and covers all the typical kinds of distortions from deliberate oversimplifications to the misleading use of color."Professor Monmonier himself knows how to gain our attention; it is not in fact the lies in maps but their truth, if always approximate and incomplete, that he wants us to admire and use, even to draw for ourselves on the facile screen. His is an artful and funny book, which like any good map, packs plenty in little space."—Scientific American"A useful guide to a subject most people probably take too much for granted. It shows how map makers translate abstract data into eye-catching cartograms, as they are called. It combats cartographic illiteracy. It fights cartophobia. It may even teach you to find your way. For that alone, it seems worthwhile."—Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, The New York Times". . . witty examination of how and why maps lie. [The book] conveys an important message about how statistics of any kind can be manipulated. But it also communicates much of the challenge, aesthetic appeal, and sheer fun of maps. Even those who hated geography in grammar school might well find a new enthusiasm for the subject after reading Monmonier's lively and surprising book."—Wilson Library Bulletin"A reading of this book will leave you much better defended against cheap atlases, shoddy journalism, unscrupulous advertisers, predatory special-interest groups, and others who may use or abuse maps at your expense."—John Van Pelt, Christian Science Monitor"Monmonier meets his goal admirably. . . . [His] book should be put on every map user's 'must read' list. It is informative and readable . . . a big step forward in helping us to understand how maps can mislead their readers."—Jeffrey S. Murray, Canadian Geographic},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	file = {Snapshot:files/103/bo3696845.html:text/html}
}

@incollection{morgan_model_2002,
	title = {Model {Experiments} and {Models} in {Experiments}},
	isbn = {978-1-4613-5154-2 978-1-4615-0605-8},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_3},
	abstract = {This paper explores how model-based reasoning might be characterized in terms of making experiments. I outline the characteristic steps of such model experiments or “experiments on models”, and apply the notions to a diagrammatic model in everyday use in economics. I compare these model experiments with two other kinds of experiments (using examples from the same economic domain): laboratory experiments and a hybrid form. This hybrid form involves simulations or “experiments with models”. The paper concludes with a comparison of the role that models play in each case.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	booktitle = {Model-{Based} {Reasoning}},
	publisher = {Springer, Boston, MA},
	author = {Morgan, Mary S.},
	year = {2002},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-4615-0605-8_3},
	pages = {41--58},
	file = {Snapshot:files/105/978-1-4615-0605-8_3.html:text/html}
}

@book{morgan_models_1999,
	address = {Cambridge ; New York},
	series = {Ideas in context},
	title = {Models as mediators: perspectives on natural and social sciences},
	isbn = {978-0-521-65097-7 978-0-521-65571-2},
	shorttitle = {Models as mediators},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	editor = {Morgan, Mary S. and Morrison, Margaret},
	year = {1999},
	keywords = {Science, Mathematical models, Physics},
	file = {Morgan und Morrison - 1999 - Models as mediators perspectives on natural and s.pdf:files/106/Morgan und Morrison - 1999 - Models as mediators perspectives on natural and s.pdf:application/pdf}
}

@book{netz_shaping_1999,
	address = {Cambridge},
	title = {The {Shaping} of {Deduction} in {Greek} {Mathematics}: {A} {Study} in {Cognitive} {History}},
	isbn = {978-0-511-54329-6},
	shorttitle = {The {Shaping} of {Deduction} in {Greek} {Mathematics}},
	url = {http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511543296},
	urldate = {2018-04-16},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Netz, Reviel},
	year = {1999},
	doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511543296},
	file = {Netz - 1999 - The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics A S.pdf:files/108/Netz - 1999 - The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics A S.pdf:application/pdf}
}

@book{newton-smith_companion_2001,
	address = {Malden, Mass.},
	edition = {Revised ed.},
	title = {Companion to the {Philosophy} of {Science}},
	isbn = {978-0-631-23020-5},
	abstract = {Unmatched in the quality of its world-renowned contributors, this companion serves as both a course text and a reference book across the broad spectrum of issues of concern to the philosophy of science.},
	language = {Englisch},
	publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons},
	author = {Newton-Smith, Newton-Smith},
	month = sep,
	year = {2001}
}

@book{cartwright_how_1984,
	address = {Oxford; New York},
	title = {How the laws of physics lie},
	isbn = {0-19-824700-1 978-0-19-824700-5 0-19-824704-4 978-0-19-824704-3},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press},
	author = {Cartwright, Nancy.},
	year = {1984}
}

@book{geertz_interpretation_2017,
	title = {The interpretation of cultures},
	isbn = {0-465-09355-8 978-0-465-09355-7},
	language = {English},
	author = {Geertz, , Clifford},
	year = {2017}
}

@book{grenville_idea_2017,
	title = {The idea of perfection},
	isbn = {978-1-5098-2343-7 1-5098-2343-3},
	abstract = {Being adored was something she had come to mistrust. She felt adoration to be a small and lovely-looking bomb that could blow up in your face at any time. In the small and eccentric town of Karakarook, New South Wales, two outsiders meet for the first time. Douglas Cheeseman is an engineer, gawky, awkward and lonely, and Harley Savage, a woman altogether too big and abrupt for comfort. Harley is in town to work with the local Heritage Museum, and Douglas is there to tear down the town's beloved old Bent Bridge, so from day one they are on a collision course; but out of this unpromising union comes something unexpected, something even better than perfection.},
	language = {English},
	author = {Grenville, , Kate and Wyld, , Evie},
	year = {2017}
}

@book{morgan_models_1999-1,
	address = {New York},
	title = {Models as mediators},
	isbn = {0-521-65097-6 978-0-521-65097-7 0-521-65571-4 978-0-521-65571-2},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	author = {Morgan, Mary S. and Morrison, , Margaret},
	year = {1999}
}

@article{hacking_stability_1988-1,
	title = {On the {Stability} of the {Laboratory} {Sciences}},
	volume = {85},
	issn = {0022-362X},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026809},
	number = {10},
	urldate = {2018-04-09},
	journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {Hacking, Ian},
	year = {1988},
	pages = {507--514}
}

@book{clarke_models_2015,
	address = {London; New York},
	title = {Models in {Archaeology}},
	isbn = {978-1-317-60618-5 978-1-315-74847-4},
	url = {http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1826744},
	abstract = {This major study reflects the increasing significance of careful model formation and testing in those academic subjects that are struggling from intuitive and aesthetic obscurantism toward a more disciplined and integrated approach to their fields of study. The twenty-six original contributions represent the carefully selected work of progressive archaeologists around the world, covering the use of models on archaeological material of all kinds and from all periods from Palaeolithic to Medieval. Their common theme is archaeological generalisation by means of explicit model building, testing, m.},
	language = {English},
	urldate = {2018-04-09},
	publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
	author = {Clarke, David L},
	year = {2015},
	annote = {OCLC: 894171596}
}

@article{gooding_david_c._experiment_2017,
	series = {Wiley {Online} {Books}},
	title = {Experiment},
	issn = {9781405164481},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch18},
	doi = {10.1002/9781405164481.ch18},
	abstract = {Summary There have been many images of experiment. The contemplative narratives of Aristotle served to illustrate hypotheses and arguments. There was no expectation that they be performed. Even in Galileo's dialogues, the distinction between real experiments and imaginary ones is not sharp (see galileo). During the seventeenth century, performance and public description became essential to the probative power of experiment. These made its methods and procedures transparent, allowing any reader of the narrative to be a virtual witness of an active demonstration (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, pp. 22?79). Thus, by the end of the scientific revolution, illustrative narratives were distinguished from public accounts of experiment as the disciplined, systematic study of phenomena. Eventually this made the efficacy of thought experiments problematic (see Kuhn 1977, pp. 241?2, and thought experiments). As a source of experience of realms previously beyond the reach of the senses, real?world experiment contributed to the rise of objective scientific knowledge. Harvey, Galileo, Hooks, Boyle, Newton, and other proponents of experimental natural philosophy established an important new mode of argumentation.},
	urldate = {2018-04-09},
	journal = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Science},
	author = {{Gooding David C.}},
	month = sep,
	year = {2017}
}

@book{franck_explanatory_2011,
	address = {Dordrecht; London},
	title = {The explanatory power of models : bridging the gap between empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences},
	isbn = {978-90-481-6122-5 90-481-6122-3},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Springer},
	author = {Franck, Robert.},
	year = {2011}
}

@book{noauthor_rules_2013,
	address = {[Place of publication not identified]},
	title = {Rules of the game : cross-disciplinary essays on models in scholarly thought.},
	isbn = {0-415-86908-0 978-0-415-86908-9},
	abstract = {Tavistock Press was established as a co-operative venture between the Tavistock Institute and Routledge \& Kegan Paul (RKP) in the 1950s to produce a series of major contributions across the social sciences. This volume is part of a 2001 reissue of a selection of those important works which have since gone out of print, or are difficult to locate. Published by Routledge, 112 volumes in total are being brought together under the name The International Behavioural and Social Sciences Library: Classics from the Tavistock Press. Reproduced here in facsimile, this volume was originally published in 1972 and is available individually. The collection is also available in a number of themed mini-sets of between 5 and 13 volumes, or as a complete collection –},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	year = {2013}
}

@book{finley_ancient_2000,
	address = {London},
	title = {Ancient history : evidence and models},
	isbn = {0-7126-6673-7 978-0-7126-6673-2},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Pimlico},
	author = {Finley, M. I.},
	year = {2000}
}

@book{morley_theories_2004,
	address = {London; New York},
	title = {Theories, models, and concepts in ancient history},
	isbn = {0-415-24876-0 978-0-415-24876-1 0-415-24877-9 978-0-415-24877-8 978-0-203-50224-2 0-203-50224-8},
	abstract = {"The place of 'theory' in the study of the past is controversial. Some historians believe that the use of ideas and concepts from disciplines like economics and sociology produces anachronistic and distorted accounts. Others argue that all historians use generalisations about human nature and the workings of society - in other words, some sort of 'theory' - but that most are unconscious of the assumptions on which their accounts of the past depend, a position with its own set of problems." "Neville Morley's book offers a guide for students to how theories, models and concepts have been applied to ancient history. It shows readers how they can use theory to interpret historical evidence for themselves, as well as to evaluate the work of others." "The book concludes a survey of key ideas and theories on a wide range of ancient historical topics, including society and economy, the environment, gender and sexuality, myth and rationality. An annotated guide to further reading on all the topics covered is also provided."–Jacket.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	author = {Morley, Neville.},
	year = {2004}
}

@article{minsky_matter_1965,
	title = {Matter, {Mind} and {Models}},
	url = {http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/6119},
	abstract = {This paper attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between menal and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be (1) because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be (2) because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. My view is that many important questions about relation between mind and brain are of this latter kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on he problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. In this paper we suggest a theory of why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. The paper does not go very far toward finding technical solutions to the questions, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused.},
	language = {en\_US},
	urldate = {2018-04-09},
	author = {Minsky, Marvin},
	month = mar,
	year = {1965}
}


text:
@inproceedings{laorden_enhancing_2011,
 abstract = {Spam has become an important problem for computer security because it is a channel for the spreading of threats such as computer viruses, worms and phishing. Currently, more than 85% of received emails are spam. Historical approaches to combat these messages, including simple techniques such as sender blacklisting or the use of email signatures, are no longer completely reliable. Many solutions utilise machine-learning approaches trained using statistical representations of the terms that usually appear in the emails. However, these methods require a time-consuming training step with labelled data. Dealing with the situation where the availability of labelled training instances is limited slows down the progress of filtering systems and offers advantages to spammers. In a previous work, we presented the first spam filtering method based on anomaly detection that reduces the necessity of labelling spam messages and only employs the representation of legitimate emails. We showed that this method achieved high accuracy rates detecting spam while maintaining a low false positive rate and reducing the effort produced by labelling spam. In this paper, we enhance that system applying a data reduction algorithm to the labelled dataset, finding similarities among legitimate emails and grouping them to form consistent clusters that reduce the amount of needed comparisons. We show that this improvement reduces drastically the processing time, while maintaining detection and false positive rates stable.},
 address = {Perth, Australia},
 author = {Laorden, Carlos and Cantero, Xabier Ugarte and Santos, Igor and Sanz, Borja and Bringas, Pablo García},
 booktitle = {8th Annual Collaboration, Electronic messaging, Anti-Abuse and Spam Conference (CEAS)},
 copyright = {All rights reserved},
 doi = {10.1145/2030376.2030378},
 file = {Laorden et al_2011_Enhancing Scalability in Anomaly-based Email Spam Filtering.pdf:G\:\\Mi unidad\\04 - Investigación\\01 - Producción científica\_Zotero_Folder\Łaorden et al_2011_Enhancing Scalability in Anomaly-based Email Spam Filtering.pdf:application/pdf},
 keywords = {Anomaly detection, computer security, dataset clustering, email spam},
 month = {September},
 pages = {13--22},
 title = {Enhancing Scalability in Anomaly-based Email Spam Filtering},
 year = {2011}
}

license: MIT

repository: bosanz/academic-kickstart

license_type: permissive

repo_name: bosanz/academic-kickstart

branch_name: refs/heads/master

gha_license_id: MIT

extension: bib


text:
#
# MIT License
#
# Copyright (c) 2016 Thibault Martinez
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
# copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
# SOFTWARE.
#
#

TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -std=c++11)
TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wall)
TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wextra)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wctor-dtor-privacy)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wnon-virtual-dtor)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wreorder)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Weffc++)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wold-style-cast)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Woverloaded-virtual)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wdouble-promotion)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wfloat-equal)
#   TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wshadow)
TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -O3)
TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -g)

# Using Clang
IF (CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")

# Using GCC
ELSEIF (CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "GNU")

  TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wsuggest-attribute=pure)
  TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wsuggest-attribute=const)
  TARGET_COMPILE_OPTIONS(${CMAKE_PROJECT_NAME} PRIVATE -Wsuggest-attribute=noreturn)

endif()

repository: Rinoi/SOCEL

repo_name: Rinoi/SOCEL

extension: cmake


text:
DEPENDS = "enigma"
DESCRIPTION = "tuxbox plugins (enigma)"
MAINTAINER = "Felix Domke <tmbinc@elitdvb.net>"

SRC_URI = "cvs://anoncvs@cvs.tuxbox.org/cvs/tuxbox;module=apps/tuxbox/plugins;method=ext \
	   file://disable_nonworking.diff;patch=1;pnum=1 \
	   file://fix_config_path.diff;patch=1;pnum=1 \
	   file://fix_install_weather_pics.diff;patch=1;pnum=1"

SRCDATE = "20060112"
PV = "0.0+cvs${SRCDATE}"
PR = "r0"

CFLAGS_append = " -I${STAGING_INCDIR}/enigma -DHAVE_DREAMBOX_HARDWARE -DDREAMBOX"
CXXFLAGS_append = " -I${STAGING_INCDIR}/enigma -DHAVE_DREAMBOX_HARDWARE -DDREAMBOX"

PACKAGES = "enigma-plugin-dreamdata enigma-plugin-dbswitch \
	enigma-plugin-ngrabstart enigma-plugin-ngrabstop enigma-plugin-getset \
	enigma-plugin-movieplayer enigma-plugin-script enigma-plugin-rss \
	enigma-plugin-weather enigma-plugin-demo"

FILES_enigma-plugin-dreamdata = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/dreamdata.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/dreamdata.cfg \
	/etc/tuxbox/dreamdata.xml"
FILES_enigma-plugin-dbswitch = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/dbswitch.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/dbswitch.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-ngrabstart = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/ngrabstart.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/ngrabstart.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-ngrabstop = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/ngrabstop.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/ngrabstop.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-getset = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/enigma_getset.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/enigma_getset.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-movieplayer = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/movieplayer.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/movieplayer.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-script = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/script.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/script.cfg"
FILES_enigma-plugin-rss = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/rss.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/rss.cfg \
	/etc/tuxbox/feeds.xml"
FILES_enigma-plugin-weather = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/weather.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/weather.cfg \
	/etc/tuxbox/weather.xml /usr/share/tuxbox/weather/*.png"
FILES_enigma-plugin-demo = "/usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/enigma_demo.so /usr/lib/tuxbox/plugins/enigma_demo.cfg"

S = "${WORKDIR}/plugins"

inherit autotools pkgconfig

bindir = "/usr/bin"
sbindir = "/usr/sbin"

EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-target=native --with-boxtype=dm7020"

repository: demsey/openembedded

repo_name: demsey/openembedded

branch_name: HEAD

extension: bb


text:
SUMMARY = "Ampere Computing LLC Host Gpio Handling"
PR = "r1"
LICENSE = "Apache-2.0"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COMMON_LICENSE_DIR}/Apache-2.0;md5=89aea4e17d99a7cacdbeed46a0096b10"

inherit obmc-phosphor-systemd

DEPENDS += "virtual/obmc-gpio-monitor"
RDEPENDS:${PN} += "virtual/obmc-gpio-monitor"

OBMC_HOST_ACK_MONITOR_INSTANCES = "reboot_ack shutdown_ack"

SYSTEMD_ENVIRONMENT_FILE:${PN} +="obmc/gpio/reboot_ack \
                                  obmc/gpio/shutdown_ack \
                                 "

TMPL = "phosphor-gpio-monitor@.service"
INSTFMT = "phosphor-gpio-monitor@{0}.service"
TGT = "multi-user.target"
FMT = "../${TMPL}:${TGT}.requires/${INSTFMT}"

SYSTEMD_SERVICE:${PN} += "ampere-host-shutdown-ack@.service"
SYSTEMD_LINK:${PN} += "${@compose_list(d, 'FMT', 'OBMC_HOST_ACK_MONITOR_INSTANCES')}"

repository: Intel-BMC/openbmc

repo_name: Intel-BMC/openbmc

gha_license_id: NOASSERTION

gha_language: Python


text:
@article{Shafii-2019-Can,
    title = "Can Improved Flow Partitioning in Hydrologic Models Increase Biogeochemical Predictability?",
    author = "Shafii, Mahyar  and
      Craig, James R.  and
      Macrae, Merrin L.  and
      English, Michael C.  and
      Schiff, Sherry L.  and
      Van Cappellen, Philippe  and
      Basu, Nandita B.",
    journal = "Water Resources Research, Volume 55, Issue 4",
    volume = "55",
    number = "4",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "American Geophysical Union (AGU)",
    url = "https://aclanthology.org/G19-157001",
    doi = "10.1029/2018wr024487",
    pages = "2939--2960",
}
@article{Günther-2019-Uncertainties,
    title = "Uncertainties in Snowpack Simulations{---}Assessing the Impact of Model Structure, Parameter Choice, and Forcing Data Error on Point‐Scale Energy Balance Snow Model Performance",
    author = {G{\"u}nther, Daniel  and
      Marke, Thomas  and
      Essery, Richard  and
      Strasser, Ulrich},
    journal = "Water Resources Research, Volume 55, Issue 4",
    volume = "55",
    number = "4",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "American Geophysical Union (AGU)",
    url = "https://aclanthology.org/G19-5001",
    doi = "10.1029/2018wr023403",
    pages = "2779--2800",
}

repository: gwf-uwaterloo/gwf-publications

repo_name: gwf-uwaterloo/gwf-publications

branch_name: refs/heads/main


text:
@article{sireiter2012,
 author = {Yajuan Si and Jerome P Reiter},
 date-added = {2015-01-05 20:28:31 +0000},
 date-modified = {2015-01-05 20:29:13 +0000},
 journal = {Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics},
 number = {5},
 pages = {499--521},
 title = {Multiple imputation for incomplete categorical variables in large scale educational surveys},
 volume = {38},
 year = {2013}
}

repository: yajuansi-sophie/academic-kickstart

repo_name: yajuansi-sophie/academic-kickstart