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@Article{burgess_abstract,
  Title                    = {The Generalized {N\&K} Value: An Axiomatic Mechanism for Electricity Trading},
  Author                   = {Mark Alexander Burgess and Archie C. Chapman and Paul Scott},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS`18)},
  Year                     = {2018},

  Month                    = {Jul},
  Pages                    = {1883--1885},
  Volume                   = {17}
}

@inproceedings{AzuatalamCV_PowerTech2019,
title = {Shapley value analysis of distribution network cost-causality pricing},
author ={D. Azuatalam and A. C. Chapman and G. Verbi\v{c}},
year = {2019},
booktitle = {IEEE PowerTech},
place = {Milan, Italy}
}

@Article{electronics8010048,
AUTHOR = {Khalid, Adia and Javaid, Nadeem and Mateen, Abdul and Ilahi, Manzoor and Saba, Tanzila and Rehman, Amjad},
TITLE = {Enhanced Time-of-Use Electricity Price Rate Using Game Theory},
JOURNAL = {Electronics},
VOLUME = {8},
YEAR = {2019},
NUMBER = {1},
ARTICLE-NUMBER = {48},
ISSN = {2079-9292}
}

@article{DutangSurvey,
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  Year = {2013}
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@article{fischer2014,
  Title                    = {Generalized nash equilibrium problems - Recent advances and challenges},
  Author                   = {Fischer, Andreas AND Herrich, Markus AND Sch\"onefeld, Klaus},
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  Year                     = {2014},

  Month                    = {12},
  Pages                    = {521--558},
  Volume                   = {34},

  ISSN                     = {0101-7438},
  Language                 = {en},
  Publisher                = {scielo}
}

@article{aumann1961core,
  title={The core of a cooperative game without side payments},
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@ARTICLE{8054716,
author={P. {Scott} and S. {Thiébaux}},
journal={IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
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year={2019},
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number={1},
pages={1046-1057},
ISSN={1949-3053},
month={Jan},}

@Book{Clarke1991,
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  Title                = {Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology: From Adam Smith to Max Weber},
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title="A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information",
journal="International Journal of Game Theory",
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month="May",
day="27",
issn="1432-1270"
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@ARTICLE{6520960,
author={E. {Baeyens} and E. Y. {Bitar} and P. P. {Khargonekar} and K. {Poolla}},
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@Article{Parag2016,
author={Parag, Yael
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title={Electricity market design for the prosumer era},
journal={Nature Energy},
year={2016},
month={Mar},
day={21},
publisher={Macmillan Publishers Limited SN  -},
volume={1},
pages={16032 EP  -},
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@article{SHARMA201733,
title = "Loss allocation of radial distribution system using Shapley value: A sequential approach",
journal = "International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems",
volume = "88",
pages = "33 - 41",
year = "2017",
issn = "0142-0615",
author = "Satish Sharma and A.R. Abhyankar"
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@ARTICLE{6840296,
author={W. {Lee} and L. {Xiang} and R. {Schober} and V. W. S. {Wong}},
journal={IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications},
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year={2014},
volume={32},
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pages={1398-1411},
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month={July},}

@article{WANG201972,
title = "Ensuring profitability of retailers via Shapley Value based demand response",
journal = {International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems},
volume = "108",
pages = "72 - 85",
year = "2019",
issn = "0142-0615",
author = "Jun Wang and Qi Huang and Weihao Hu and Jian Li and Zhenyuan Zhang and Dongsheng Cai and Xiaoyuan Zhang and Nanbo Liu"
}

@article{WU2017384,
title = "Benefit allocation for distributed energy network participants applying game theory based solutions",
journal = "Energy",
volume = "119",
pages = "384 - 391",
year = "2017",
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author = "Qiong Wu and Hongbo Ren and Weijun Gao and Jianxing Ren"
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author="Bremer, J{\"o}rg
and Sonnenschein, Michael",
editor="Klusch, Matthias
and Thimm, Matthias
and Paprzycki, Marcin",
title="Estimating Shapley Values for Fair Profit Distribution in Power Planning Smart Grid Coalitions",
booktitle="Multiagent System Technologies",
year="2013",
publisher="Springer Berlin Heidelberg",
address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
pages="208--221",
isbn="978-3-642-40776-5"
}

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author={A. {Chiş} and V. {Koivunen}},
journal={IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
title={Coalitional Game-Based Cost Optimization of Energy Portfolio in Smart Grid Communities},
year={2019},
volume={10},
number={2},
pages={1960-1970},
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@inproceedings{Perez-Diaz:2018:CEV:3237383.3237484,
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 series = {AAMAS '18},
 year = {2018},
 location = {Stockholm, Sweden},
 pages = {676--684},
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 publisher = {International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
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}

@ARTICLE{ip-gtd_20020005,
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@InProceedings{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-1903-10965,
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  title     = {Improving the Scalability of a Prosumer Cooperative Game with K-Means Clustering},
  Booktitle                = {13th IEEE PES PowerTech Conference (Accepted)},
  Year                     = {2019},
  Month                    = {June}
}

@article{Aziz:2016:SPS:3013589.3013605,
 author = {Aziz, Haris and Cahan, Casey and Gretton, Charles and Kilby, Philip and Mattei, Nicholas and Walsh, Toby},
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}

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@Article{markov5,
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  Month                    = {Jul},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
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@Article{markov2,
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@Article{markov4,
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  Title                    = {the core of a cooperative game without side payments},
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  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.07.18}
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@InCollection{Ausubel2006,
  Title                    = {The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction},
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  Interhash                = {6b14ea67538352f8e93fb753f86039a4},
  Intrahash                = {1279337df80d8917dfc734dec3be2b6c},
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@Article{sfe2,
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@Article{tasp1,
  Title                    = {Learning in games with unstable equilibria},
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  Volume                   = {144}
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@InBook{Borgers,
  Title                    = {An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design},
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@TechReport{bozbay,
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  Year                     = {2012},
  Type                     = {Post-Print},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
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@Article{markov9,
  Title                    = {State-Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games},
  Author                   = {Ilaria Brunetti and Yezekael Hayel and Eitan Altman},
  Journal                  = {Dynamic Games and Applications},
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  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.03.04}
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@Article{markov8,
  Title                    = {State Policy Couple Dynamics in Evolutionary Games},
  Author                   = {Ilaria Brunetti and Yezekael Hayel and Eitan Altman},
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  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.02.16}
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  Title                    = {Values for strategic games in which players cooperate},
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  Institution              = {University of Oregon Economics Department},
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  Type                     = {University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers}
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  Keywords                 = {C71; C72; D62; Core; Strategic games; Nash equilibrium; Coalition formation},
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  Timestamp                = {2017.07.18}
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@Article{rebidding1,
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  Month                    = {Oct},
  Pages                    = {730-746},
  Series                   = {ANZIAM J.},
  Volume                   = {51},

  Subjclass                = {90-04; 90-06}
}

@Article{crampton1,
  Title                    = {Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly},
  Author                   = {Peter Cramton},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences},
  Year                     = {2003},

  Month                    = {Jan},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{replicator1,
  Title                    = {The replicator equation and other game dynamics},
  Author                   = {Ross Cressman and Yi Tao},
  Journal                  = {Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA},
  Year                     = {2014},

  Month                    = {Jul},
  Number                   = {111},
  Pages                    = {10810–10817},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.12.21}
}

@Article{bidding3,
  Title                    = {Strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets: a literature survey},
  Author                   = {A.K. David and Fushuan Wen},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting},
  Year                     = {2000},

  Month                    = {July},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{Debreu01101952,
  Title                    = {A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem},
  Author                   = {Debreu, Gerard},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  Year                     = {1952},
  Number                   = {10},
  Pages                    = {886-893},
  Volume                   = {38}
}

@Article{Esmaili,
  Title                    = {Observability-Enhanced PMU Placement Considering Conventional Measurements and Contingencies},
  Author                   = {Esmaili, M. and Shayanfar, H. A. and Gharani, K.},
  Journal                  = {Iranian Journal of Electrical \& Electronic Engineering},
  Year                     = {2014},
  Volume                   = {10},
}

@TechReport{alter_bargaining1,
  Title                    = {Endogenous bargaining power},
  Author                   = {Esteban, Joan and Sákovics, József},
  Institution              = {Barcelona Graduate School of Economics},
  Year                     = {2003},
  Number                   = {13},
  Type                     = {Working Papers}
}

@Article{comparrison2,
  Title                    = {Designing Electricity Auctions},
  Author                   = {Natalia Fabra and Nils-Henrik von der Fehr and David Harbord},
  Journal                  = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  Year                     = {2006},

  Month                    = {March},
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {23-46},
  Volume                   = {37},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{comparrison3,
  Title                    = {Modeling Electricity Auctions},
  Author                   = {Natalia Fabra and Nils-Henrik von der Fehr and David Harbord},
  Journal                  = {The Electricity Journal},
  Year                     = {2002},

  Month                    = {Aug},
  Number                   = {7},
  Pages                    = {72-81},
  Volume                   = {15},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{Facchinei2007,
  Title                    = {Generalized Nash equilibrium problems},
  Author                   = {Facchinei, Francisco
and Kanzow, Christian},
  Journal                  = {4OR},
  Year                     = {2007},

  Month                    = {Sep},
  Number                   = {3},
  Pages                    = {173--210},
  Volume                   = {5},
  Day                      = {01},
  ISSN                     = {1614-2411}
}

@Article{game_stuff,
  Title                    = {A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches in Smart Grid},
  Author                   = {Zubair Md. Fadlullah and Yousuke Nozaki and Akira Takeuchi and Nei Kato},
  Journal                  = {International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing (WSCP)},
  Year                     = {2011},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.14}
}

@Conference{Faltings2004b,
  Title                    = {{A} {B}udget-balanced, {I}ncentive-compatible {S}cheme for {S}ocial {C}hoice},
  Author                   = {Faltings, Boi},
  Booktitle                = {Agent-mediated E-commerce (AMEC) VI},
  Year                     = {2004},
  Editor                   = {Peyman Faratin and Juan-Antonio Rodriguez},
  Publisher                = {Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.06}
}

@InBook{non-vcg2,
  Title                    = {Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3435},
  Author                   = {Boi Faltings},
  Chapter                  = {A Budget-Balanced, Incentive-Compatible Scheme for Social Choice},
  Editor                   = {Peyman Faratin and Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar},
  Publisher                = {Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg},
  Year                     = {2006},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{Figueredo:2009dg,
  Title                    = {Assortative pairing and life history strategy - a cross-cultural study.},
  Author                   = {Figueredo, A.~J. and Wolf, P. S.~A.},
  Journal                  = {Human Nature},
  Year                     = {2009},
  Pages                    = {317-330},
  Volume                   = {20},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{battery2,
  Title                    = {Optimal Power Flow With Large-Scale Storage Integration},
  Author                   = {Dennice Gayme and Ufuk Topcu},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
  Year                     = {2013},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {709-717},
  Volume                   = {28},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{bidding2,
  Title                    = {Bidding Strategies for Electricity Producers in a Competitive Electricity Marketplace},
  Author                   = {Vasileios P. Gountis and Anastasios G. Bakirtzis},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
  Year                     = {2004},

  Month                    = {March},
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {356-365},
  Volume                   = {19},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{pools,
  Title                    = {Failing electricity markets: should we shoot the pools?},
  Author                   = {Richard Green},
  Journal                  = {Utilities Policy},
  Year                     = {2003},
  Pages                    = {155-167},
  Volume                   = {11},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{battery1,
  Title                    = {Optimal Management Strategy of a Battery-Based Storage System to Improve Renewable Energy Integration in Distribution Networks},
  Author                   = {Samuele Grillo and Mattia Marinelli and Stefano Massucco and Federico Silvestro},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
  Year                     = {2012},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {950-958},
  Volume                   = {3},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{Wang1,
author="Wang, Guanglei
and Hijazi, Hassan",
title="Mathematical programming methods for microgrid design and operations: a survey on deterministic and stochastic approaches",
journal="Computational Optimization and Applications",
year="2018",
month="Nov",
day="01",
volume="71",
number="2",
pages="553--608",
abstract="Planning and operating a power grid is a nontrivial exercise due to conflicting objectives, nonlinear constraints and uncertainties at multiple decision levels. Considerable research work has been dedicated to independently solve different aspects of the overall problem. This survey provides a detailed review of state-of-the-art techniques in mathematical optimization trying to address challenges in this area. We also provide a set of open problems and research perspectives.",
issn="1573-2894"
}

@Article{non-vcg1,
  Title                    = {Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized
Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond},
  Author                   = {M Guo and Victor Naroditskiy and V Conitzer and Amy Greenwald and Nicholas R Jennings},
  Journal                  = {Proc. of the 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics},
  Year                     = {2011},
  Month                    = {December}
}

@Article{orchid15,
  Title                    = {Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond},
  Author                   = {Mingyu Guo and Victor Naroditskiy and Vincent Conitzer and Amy Greenwald and Nicholas R Jennings},
  Journal                  = {Proc. of the 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics},
  Year                     = {2011},
  Month                    = {December},
}

@Article{RePEc:aen:journl:2006v27-02-a09,
  Title                    = {Electricity Price Volatility and the Marginal Cost of Congestion: An Empirical Study of Peak Hours on the NYISO Market, 2001-2004},
  Author                   = {Hadsell, Lester and Shawky, Hany A.},
  Journal                  = {The Energy Journal},
  Year                     = {2006},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {157-180},
  Volume                   = {27},
}

@Article{values3,
  Title                    = {A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game},
  Author                   = {John Harsanyi},
  Journal                  = {International Economic Review},
  Year                     = {1963},
  Pages                    = {194-220},
  Volume                   = {4},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@InProceedings{replicator_1,
  Title                    = {State-coupled replicator dynamics},
  Author                   = {Daniel Hennes and
 Karl Tuyls and
 Matthias Rauterberg},
  Booktitle                = {8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
 Systems (AAMAS), Budapest, Hungary},
  Year                     = {2009},
  Month                    = {May},
  Pages                    = {789--796},
  Volume                   = {2},
  Doi                      = {10.1145/1558109.1558120}
}

@Article{ess1,
  Title                    = {Evolutionary Stable Strategies: A review of basic theory},
  Author                   = {W.G.S. Hines},
  Journal                  = {Theoretical Population Biology},
  Year                     = {1987},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {195-272},
  Volume                   = {31},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.09.02}
}

@Article{psr1,
  Title                    = {Deterministic Evolutionary Game Dynamics},
  Author                   = {Josef Hofbauer},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics},
  Year                     = {2011},
  Pages                    = {61-79},
  Volume                   = {69},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.01.04}
}

@Article{zonal,
  Title                    = {Congestion Management in Electricity Networks: Nodal, Zonal and Discriminatory Pricing},
  Author                   = {Par Holmberg and Ewa Lazarczyk},
  Journal                  = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
  Year                     = {2012},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{aemo1,
  Title                    = {Empirical observations of bidding patterns in Australia's National Electricity Market},
  Author                   = {Xinmin Hu and George Grozev and David Batten},
  Journal                  = {Energy Policy},
  Year                     = {2005},

  Month                    = {Nov},
  Number                   = {16},
  Pages                    = {2075-2086},
  Volume                   = {33},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@InBook{Unbehauen.20032007,
  Title                    = {Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS): Mechanism Theory},
  Author                   = {Matthew O. Jackson},
  Chapter                  = {Individual Rationality or Voluntary Participation},
  Publisher                = {EOLSS Publishers},
  Year                     = {2003},

  Address                  = {Oxford},
  Keywords                 = {imported},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2010-06-25T10:38:42.000+0200}
}

@Article{deregulation,
  Title                    = {Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization},
  Author                   = {Paul Joskow},
  Journal                  = {The Energy Journal},
  Year                     = {2008},
  Number                   = {Special Issue 2},
  Pages                    = {9-42},
  Volume                   = {29},

  Abstract                 = {This paper discusses the lessons learned from electricity sector liberalization over the last 20 years. The attributes of reform models that have exhibited good performance attributes are identified, drawing on empirical analysis of market structure, behavior and performance in many countries. Wholesale and retail market competition and network regulation performance evidence are discussed. Technical, economic, and political challenges to improving the efficiency of what continue to be partial liberalization programs in many countries are considered.}
}

@Article{california1,
  Title                    = {Pricing in the California power exchange electricity market: Should California switch from uniform pricing to pay-as-bid pricing?},
  Author                   = {Alfred E. Kahn and Peter C. Cramton and Robert H. Porter and Richard D. Tabors},
  Journal                  = {Blue Ribbon Panel Report, A study commissioned by the California Power Exchange},
  Year                     = {2001},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{kalai1,
  Title                    = {Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited},
  Author                   = {Kalai, Adam and Kalai, Ehud},
  Journal                  = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  Year                     = {2013},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {917-966},
  Volume                   = {128},

  Abstract                 = { For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution. Specifically, it presents: (1) a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components, (2) an intuitive and computable closed-form formula for the solution, (3) an axiomatic justification of the solution, and (4) a generalization of the solution to games with private signals, along with an arbitration scheme that implements it. The objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications. JEL Codes: C71, C72, C78. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@TechReport{Kalai2010,
  Title                    = {A cooperative value for Bayesian games},
  Author                   = {Adam Kalai and Ehud Kalai},
  Institution              = {Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University},
  Year                     = {2010},

  Address                  = {Evanston},
  Number                   = {1512},
  Type                     = {Discussion Paper},

  Abstract                 = {Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient outcome among the many individually rational possibilities in a strategic game, and (2) establishing a play protocol under which strategic players may achieve this outcome. The paper presents a general solution for two-person Bayesian games with monetary payoffs, under a strong revealed-payoff assumption. The proposed solution builds upon earlier concepts in game theory. It coincides with the von Neumann minmax value on the class of zero sum games and with the major solution concepts to the Nash Bargaining Problem. Moreover, the solution is based on a simple decomposition of every game into cooperative and competitive components, which is easy to compute.},
  Keywords                 = {C70; C71; C72; C78; 330; cooperative game theory; non- cooperative game theory; bargaining; min-max value},
  Language                 = {eng},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Publisher                = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{smorodinsky,
  Title                    = {Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem},
  Author                   = {Kalai, Ehud and Smorodinsky, Meir},
  Journal                  = {Econometrica},
  Year                     = {1975},
  Number                   = {3},
  Pages                    = {513-18},
  Volume                   = {43},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{tale1,
  Title                    = {A Tale of Two Bargaining Solutions},
  Author                   = {Karagözoğlu, Emin and Keskin, Kerim},
  Journal                  = {Games},
  Year                     = {2015},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {1-14},
  Volume                   = {6},

  Abstract                 = {We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the tempered aspirations solution, in terms of Pareto efficiency in a strategic framework. Our main result shows that the weights solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a reference point. In particular, the introduction of a reference point brings one more degree of freedom to the model which requires also the difference in the weights placed on the reference point to be considered in reaching an efficiency ranking.},
  Keywords                 = {aspiration points; bargaining problem; endogenous disagreement points; reference points},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{marl2,
  Title                    = {Multiagent Learning in Large Anonymous Games},
  Author                   = {Ian A. Kash and Eric J. Friedman and Joseph Y. Halpern},
  Journal                  = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
  Year                     = {2011},
  Pages                    = {571-598},
  Volume                   = {40},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@TechReport{value2,
  Title                    = {Cooperative Strategic Games},
  Author                   = {Kohlberg, Elon and Neyman, Abraham},
  Institution              = {Harvard Business School},
  Year                     = {2017},
  Type                     = {Working Paper 17-075}
}

@TechReport{value1,
  Title                    = {The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games},
  Author                   = {Kohlberg, Elon and Neyman, Abraham},
  Institution              = {The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem},
  Year                     = {2015},
  Type                     = {Discussion Paper Series},

  Abstract                 = { Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case. Our main result is an extension of the definition and the existence and uniqueness theorems to stochastic games - discounted or undiscounted.},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@InBook{Kwon2012,
  Title                    = {Handbook of Networks in Power Systems I},
  Author                   = {Kwon, Roy H.
and Frances, Daniel},
  Chapter                  = {Optimization-Based Bidding in Day-Ahead Electricity Auction Markets: A Review of Models for Power Producers},
  Editor                   = {Sorokin, Alexey
and Rebennack, Steffen
and Pardalos, Panos M.
and Iliadis, Niko A.
and Pereira, Mario V. F.},
  Pages                    = {41-59},
  Publisher                = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  Year                     = {2011},

  Address                  = {Berlin, Heidelberg},

  Booktitle                = {Handbook of Networks in Power Systems I},
  ISBN                     = {978-3-642-23193-3}
}

@Article{game5,
  Title                    = {An Agent-based Market Platform for Smart Grids},
  Author                   = {Steffen Lamparter and Silvio Becher and Jan-gregor Fischer},
  Journal                  = {Proc. of 9th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010)},
  Year                     = {2010},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@TechReport{MaherFischerGallyetal.2017,
  Title                    = {The SCIP Optimization Suite 4.0},
  Author                   = {Stephen J. Maher and Tobias Fischer and Tristan Gally and Gerald Gamrath and Ambros Gleixner and Robert Lion Gottwald and Gregor Hendel and Thorsten Koch and Marco E. L{\"u}bbecke and Matthias Miltenberger and Benjamin M{\"u}ller and Marc E. Pfetsch and Christian Puchert and Daniel Rehfeldt and Sebastian Schenker and Robert Schwarz and Felipe Serrano and Yuji Shinano and Dieter Weninger and Jonas T. Witt and Jakob Witzig},
  Institution              = {ZIB},
  Year                     = {2017},

  Address                  = {Takustr.7, 14195 Berlin},
  Number                   = {17-12},

  Language                 = {eng},
  Urn                      = {urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-62170}
}

@Article{marzat:hal-01183567,
  Title                    = {{A new expected-improvement algorithm for continuous minimax optimization}},
  Author                   = {Marzat, Julien and Walter, Eric and Piet-Lahanier, H{\'e}l{\`e}ne},
  Journal                  = {{Journal of Global Optimization}},
  Year                     = {2016},

  Month                    = Apr,
  Number                   = {4},
  Pages                    = {785-802},
  Volume                   = {64},

  Doi                      = {10.1007/s10898-015-0344-x},
  Hal_id                   = {hal-01183567},
  Hal_version              = {v1},
  Publisher                = {{Springer Verlag}}
}

@Book{auctions1,
  Title                    = {Electricity Auctions: An Overview of Efficient Practices},
  Author                   = {Luiz T. A. Maurer and Luiz A. Barroso},
  Publisher                = {World Bank Publications (World Bank Studies)},
  Year                     = {2011},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Book{cooperative_book,
  Title                    = {A Course on Cooperative Game Theory},
  Author                   = {Manipushpak Mitra and Palash Sarkar and Satya R. Chakravarty},
  Publisher                = {Cambridge University Press},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.07.18}
}

@Article{nash2,
  Title                    = {Two-Person Cooperative Games},
  Author                   = {Nash, John},
  Journal                  = {Econometrica},
  Year                     = {1953},

  Month                    = {April},
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {128-140},
  Volume                   = {21},

  Abstract                 = {No abstract is available for this item.},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{nash1,
  Title                    = {The Bargaining Problem},
  Author                   = {Nash, John},
  Journal                  = {Econometrica},
  Year                     = {1950},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {155-162},
  Volume                   = {18},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{myerson1,
  Title                    = {A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information, discussion paper 433},
  Author                   = {Roger B. Myerson},
  Journal                  = {J.L Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
  Year                     = {1980},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2019.02.05},
  Url                      = {https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/433.pdf}
}

@Article{burgess2,
  Title                    = {Stratied Finite Empirical Bernstein Sampling},
  Author                   = {Mark Alexander Burgess and Archie C. Chapman},
  Journal                  = {Preprints.org},
  Year                     = {2019},
  Number                   = {2019010202},

  Owner                    = {bur471}
}

@conference{2013arXiv1306.4265M,
       author = {{Maleki}, Sasan and {Tran-Thanh}, Long and {Hines}, Greg and {Rahwan},
        Talal and {Rogers}, Alex},
        title = "{Bounding the Estimation Error of Sampling-based Shapley Value Approximation}",
      journal = {arXiv e-prints},
     keywords = {Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory},
         year = 2013,
        month = Jun,
          eid = {arXiv:1306.4265},
        pages = {arXiv:1306.4265},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
       eprint = {1306.4265},
 primaryClass = {cs.GT}
}

@Article{DBLP:journals/cor/CastroGT09,
  Title                    = {Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling},
  Author                   = {Javier Castro and
 Daniel G{\'{o}}mez and
 Juan Tejada},
  Journal                  = {Computers {\&} {OR}},
  Year                     = {2009},
  Number                   = {5},
  Pages                    = {1726--1730},
  Volume                   = {36},
  Timestamp                = {Wed, 14 Nov 2018 10:45:08 +0100}
}

@Article{hines1,
  Title                    = {The Topological and Electrical Structure of Power Grids},
  Author                   = {P. Hines and S. Blumsack and E. Cotilla Sanchez and C. Barrows},
  Journal                  = {43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences},
  Year                     = {2010},

  Month                    = {Jan},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2019.02.06}
}

@Article{bardenet2015,
  Title                    = {Concentration inequalities for sampling without replacement},
  Author                   = {Bardenet, R{\'e}mi and Maillard, Odalric-Ambrym},
  Journal                  = {Bernoulli},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Month                    = {08},
  Number                   = {3},
  Pages                    = {1361--1385},
  Volume                   = {21},

  Doi                      = {10.3150/14-BEJ605},
  Fjournal                 = {Bernoulli},
  Publisher                = {Bernoulli Society for Mathematical Statistics and Probability}
}

@article{Bialas:1984:TLP:2784019.2784026,
 author = {Bialas, Wayne F. and Karwan, Mark H.},
 title = {Two-Level Linear Programming},
 journal = {Management Science},
 issue_date = {August 1984},
 volume = {30},
 number = {8},
 month = aug,
 year = {1984},
 issn = {0025-1909},
 pages = {1004--1020},
 numpages = {17},
 acmid = {2784026},
 publisher = {INFORMS},
 address = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Linthicum, Maryland, USA},
 keywords = {programming: linear, algorithms},
}

@Article{1938.10503378,
  Title                    = {Contribution to the Theory of Sampling Human Populations},
  Author                   = {J. Neyman},
  Journal                  = {Journal of the American Statistical Association},
  Year                     = {1938},
  Number                   = {201},
  Pages                    = {101-116},
  Volume                   = {33},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Publisher                = {Taylor \& Francis},
  Timestamp                = {2018.10.08}
}

@Article{CASTRO2017180,
  Title                    = {Improving polynomial estimation of the Shapley value by stratified random sampling with optimum allocation},
  Author                   = {Javier Castro and Daniel Gómez and Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada},
  Journal                  = {Computers \& Operations Research},
  Year                     = {2017},
  Pages                    = {180 - 188},
  Volume                   = {82},

  ISSN                     = {0305-0548},
  Keywords                 = {Computer science, Game theory, Operations research, Shapley value, Stratified sampling algorithm},
  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2018.10.08}
}

@Article{nash3,
  Title                    = {Equilibrium points in $n$-person games},
  Author                   = {John F. Nash},
  Journal                  = {Proc. of the National Academy of Sciences},
  Year                     = {1950},
  Pages                    = {48-49},
  Volume                   = {36},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{ACUNA2018161,
  Title                    = {Cooperation model in the electricity energy market using bi-level optimization and Shapley value},
  Author                   = {Luceny Guzm{\'a}n Acu{\~n}a and Diana Ram{\'i}rez R{\'i}os and Carlos Paternina Arboleda and Esneyder Gonz{\'a}lez Ponz{\'o}n},
  Journal                  = {Operations Research Perspectives},
  Year                     = {2018},
  Pages                    = {161--168},
  Volume                   = {5},
  ISSN                     = {2214-7160},
  Keywords                 = {Cooperation models, Energy market, Bi-level optimization, Shapley value}
}

@Inproceedings{archie_paper1,
  Title                    = {Cooperative game theory for non-linear pricing of load-side distribution network support},
  Author                   = {Archie C. Chapman and Sleiman Mhanna and Gregor Verbi\v{c}},
  Booktitle                  = {Proc.~10th Bulk Power Systems Dynamics and Control Symposium (IREP`17)},
  Year                     = {2017}
}

@Article{DBLP:journals/tsg/OBrienGR15,
  Title                    = {Shapley Value Estimation for Compensation of Participants in Demand
 Response Programs},
  Author                   = {Geaorid O'Brien and Abbas El Gamal and Ram Rajagopal},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
  Year                     = {2015},
  Number                   = {6},
  Pages                    = {2837--2844},
  Volume                   = {6},

  Timestamp                = {Sat, 20 May 2017 00:23:25 +0200}
}

@Article{game1,
  Title                    = {Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Demand Response in Electricity Markets},
  Author                   = {Ehsan Nekouei and Tansu Alpcan and Deb Chattopadhyay},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Month                    = {Mar},
  Number                   = {2},
  Volume                   = {6},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Book{1944,
  Title                    = {The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior},
  Author                   = {John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern},
  Publisher                = {Princeton University Press},
  Year                     = {1944},

  Address                  = {Princeton, New Jersey, USA},
  Edition                  = {60th},

  Abstract                 = {The nature of the problems investigated and the techniques employed in this book necessitate a procedure which in many instances is thoroughly mathematical. The mathematical devices used are elementary in the sense that no advanced algebra, or calculus, etc., occurs. (With two, rather unimportant, exceptions: Part of the discussion of an example in 19.7. et sequ. and a remark in A.3.3. make use of some simple integrals.) Concepts originating in set theory, linear geometry and group theory play an important role, but they are invariably taken from the early chapters of those disciplines and are moreover analyzed and explained in special expository sections. Nevertheless the book is not truly elementary because the mathematical deductions are frequently intricate and the logical possibilities are extensively exploited. Thus no specific knowledge of any particular body of advanced mathematics is required. However, the reader who wants to acquaint himself more thoroughly with the subject expounded here, will have to familiarize himself with the mathematical way of reasoning definitely beyond its routine, primitive phases. The character of the procedures will be mostly that of mathematical logics, set theory and functional analysis. We have attempted to present the subject in such a form that a reader who is moderately versed in mathematics can acquire the necessary practice in the course of this study. We hope that we have not entirely failed in this endeavour. In accordance with this, the presentation is not what it would be in a strictly mathematical treatise. All definitions and deductions are considerably broader than they would be there. Besides, purely verbal discussions and analyses take up a considerable amount of space. We have in particular tried to give, whenever possible, a parallel verbal exposition for every major mathematical deduction. It is hoped that this procedure will elucidate in unmathematical language what the mathematical technique signifies-and will also show where it achieves more than can be done without it. ! In this, as well as in our methodological stand, we are trying to follow the best examples of theoretical physics. The reader who is not specifically interested in mathematics should at first omit those sections of the book which in his judgment are too mathematical. We prefer not to give a definite list of them, since this judgment must necessarily be subjective. However, those sections marked with an asterisk in the table of contents are most likely to occur to the average reader inthis connection. At any rate he will find that these omissions will little interfere with the comprehension of the early parts, although the logical chain may in the rigorous sense have suffered an interruption. As he proceeds the omissions will gradually assume a more serious character and the lacunae in the deduction will become more and more significant. The reader is then advised to start again from the beginning since the greater familiarity acquired is likely to facilitate a better understanding.},
  ISBN                     = {978-0-691-13061-3 },
  Keywords                 = {economic behavior, games, theory},
  Organization             = {Princeton University Press},
  Pages                    = {776}
}

@Book{nowak,
  Title                    = {Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life},
  Author                   = {Martin A Nowak},
  Publisher                = {Harvard University Press},
  Year                     = {2006},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.12.21}
}

@Article{okada1,
  Title                    = {The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games},
  Author                   = {Okada, Akira},
  Journal                  = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  Year                     = {2010},
  Number                   = {6},
  Pages                    = {2356-2379},
  Volume                   = {145},

  Abstract                 = {We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core.},
  Keywords                 = { Nash bargaining solution Noncooperative bargaining Coalition Externality Core n-Person cooperative games},
  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.07.18}
}

@Article{vcg_mechanism1,
  Title                    = {Integration of Day-ahead Energy Market Using VCG Type Mechanism under Equality and Inequality Constraints},
  Author                   = {Yusuke Okajima and Toshiyuki Murao and Kenji Hirata and Kenko Uchida},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Conference on Control Applications (CCA) Part of IEEE Multi-Conference on Systems and Control},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Month                    = {September},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Book{book1,
  Title                    = {Bargaining and markets},
  Author                   = {Osborne, {Martin J.} and Rubinstein, {Ariel}},
  Publisher                = {Acad. Press},
  Year                     = {1990},

  Address                  = {San Diego, Calif.[u.a.]},
  Series                   = {Economic theory, econometrics, and mathematical economics},

  Added-at                 = {2009-08-21T09:55:59.000+0200},
  Chapter                  = {2},
  Interhash                = {259538b1845c493654841df2dab5bcc7},
  Intrahash                = {f32df802b886b54b19d57736ea47de23},
  ISBN                     = {0125286317},
  Keywords                 = {Methoden_und_Techniken_der_Betriebswirtschaft Methoden_und_Techniken_der_Volkswirtschaft Spieltheorie Verhandlungstheorie},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Pagetotal                = {XI, 216},
  Ppn_gvk                  = {02583911X},
  Timestamp                = {2009-08-21T09:56:09.000+0200}
}

@Article{lmp4,
  Title                    = {Net-Zero Settlement in Distribution Markets},
  Author                   = {Sina Parhizi and
 Alireza Majzoobi and
 Amin Khodaei},
  Journal                  = {CoRR},
  Year                     = {2017},
  Volume                   = {abs/1702.07030}
}

@Article{comparrison1,
  Title                    = {Pay-as-Bid versus Marginal Pricing-Part I: Strategic Generator Offers},
  Author                   = {Yongjun Ren and Francisco D. Galiana},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
  Year                     = {2004},
  Number                   = {4},
  Pages                    = {1771-1776},
  Volume                   = {19},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{Rothkopf07,
  Title                    = {Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical.},
  Author                   = {Rothkopf, Michael H.},
  Journal                  = {Operations Research},
  Year                     = {2007},
  Number                   = {2},
  Pages                    = {191-197},
  Volume                   = {55},
  Date                     = {2009-09-07},
  Description              = {dblp},
  Ee                       = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0384},
  Interhash                = {66181b01ac6a1951b2778bb9ec70551a},
  Intrahash                = {933fd824b80ed8eba6cc1d0c337b156d},
  Keywords                 = {dblp},
  Timestamp                = {2009-09-08T11:34:44.000+0200}
}

@Article{sfe1,
  Title                    = {Supply function equilibrium: theory and applications},
  Author                   = {Aleksandr Rudkevich},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’03)},
  Year                     = {2002},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{sfe3,
  Title                    = {Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco},
  Author                   = {Rudkevich, Aleksandr and Duckworth, Max and Rosen, Richard},
  Journal                  = {The Energy Journal},
  Year                     = {1998},
  Number                   = {Number 3},
  Pages                    = {19-48},
  Volume                   = {Volume19},

  Abstract                 = {We calculate the electricity prices that would result from a pure "poolco" market with identical profit-maximizing generating firms. We advance theoretical concepts developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery (1992), and propose a new formula for the instantaneous market clearing price when generating firms adopt bidding strategies given by the Nash Equilibrium. Applying this formula to empirical electricity supply and demand data, we find that even in markets with a relatively high number of firms, the price of electricity is significantly higher than the short-run marginal cost of generation. We express the average annual price mark-up with a Price-Cost Margin Index, and show how it varies with market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). We conclude that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's use of the HHI in its merger guidelines could prove inadequate in addressing market power concerns in deregulated poolco markets.}
}

@TechReport{value4,
  Title                    = {On the Values for Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments},
  Author                   = {Salamanca Lugo, Andrés},
  Institution              = {HAL},
  Year                     = {2017},
  Type                     = {Working Papers},

  Abstract                 = {In this paper we study several value like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and sidepayments. In our model, sidepayments are required to be incentive compatible, thus utility is not fully transferable (as it would be in the complete information case). Restricting attention to games with orthogonal coalitions, which do not involve strategic externalities, we show that Myerson's (1984a) extension of the Shapley NTU value and Salamanca's (2016) extension of the Harsanyi NTU value coincide. Allowing for arbitrary informational and strategic externalities, we show that the ex-ante evaluation of Myerson's (1984a) value equals Kalai and Kalai's (2013) cooperative-competitive value in two-player games with verifiable types.},
  Keywords                 = {sidepayments; incomplete information; Cooperative games},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@TechReport{values2,
  Title                    = {On the Values for Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments},
  Author                   = {Salamanca Lugo, Andrés},
  Institution              = {HAL},
  Year                     = {2017},
  Type                     = {Working Papers},

  Abstract                 = {In this paper we study several value like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and sidepayments. In our model, sidepayments are required to be incentive compatible, thus utility is not fully transferable (as it would be in the complete information case). Restricting attention to games with orthogonal coalitions, which do not involve strategic externalities, we show that Myerson's (1984a) extension of the Shapley NTU value and Salamanca's (2016) extension of the Harsanyi NTU value coincide. Allowing for arbitrary informational and strategic externalities, we show that the ex-ante evaluation of Myerson's (1984a) value equals Kalai and Kalai's (2013) cooperative-competitive value in two-player games with verifiable types.},
  Keywords                 = {sidepayments; incomplete information; Cooperative games}
}

@Article{battery3,
  Title                    = {Energy efficient operation in smart grids: Optimal management of shiftable loads and storage systems},
  Author                   = {E. Riva Sanseverino and M. L. Di Silvestre and G. Zizzo and G. Graditi},
  Journal                  = {International Symposium on Power Electronics, Electrical Drives, Automation and Motion},
  Year                     = {2012},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{KOHLBERG2018139,
  Title                    = {Games of threats},
  Author                   = {Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman},
  Journal                  = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  Year                     = {2018},
  Note                     = {Special Issue in Honor of Lloyd Shapley: Seven Topics in Game Theory},
  Pages                    = {139 - 145},
  Volume                   = {108},

  Abstract                 = {A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S⊆N, such that d(S)=−d(N∖S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(∅)=0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of d(S) across all the coalitions that include the player. Games of threats arise naturally in value theory for strategic games, and may have applications in other branches of game theory.},
  ISSN                     = {0899-8256},
  Keywords                 = {Shapley value, Coalitional game}
}

@Article{lmp1,
  Title                    = {Distributed Multi-Period Optimal Power Flow for Demand Response in Microgrids},
  Author                   = {Paul Scott and Sylvie Thi\'ebaux},
  Journal                  = {ACM e-Energy},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Month                    = {July},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@InBook{marginalism1,
  Title                    = {An Outline of the History of Economic Thought},
  Author                   = {Ernesto Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni},
  Chapter                  = {The Triumph of Utilitarianism and the Marginalist Revolution},
  Publisher                = {Oxford University Press},
  Year                     = {1995},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.10.30}
}

@incollection{Shapley1953a,
author = {Lloyd S. Shapley},
title = {A Value for n-person Games},
booktitle = {Contributions to the Theory of Games},
year = {1953},
editor = {H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker },
titleaddon = {Annals of Mathematical Studies},
volume = {28},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
pages = {307-317}
}

@Article{shapley53,
  Title                    = {Stochastic Games},
  Author                   = {Shapley, L. S.},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
  Year                     = {1953},
  Number                   = {10},
  Pages                    = {1095--1100},
  Volume                   = {39},

  Citeulike-article-id     = {4516190},
  Doi                      = {10.2307/88799},
  ISSN                     = {00278424},
  Keywords                 = {game-theory},
  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Posted-at                = {2009-05-14 07:14:09},
  Priority                 = {0},
  Publisher                = {National Academy of Sciences},
  Timestamp                = {2017.05.10}
}

@Article{ShimizuA_IEEEAC80,
  Title                    = {{Necessary conditions for min-max problems and algorithms by a relaxation procedure}},
  Author                   = {Shimizu, K. and Aiyoshi, E.},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
  Year                     = {1980},

  Month                    = feb,
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {62--66},
  Volume                   = {25},

  Abstract                 = {{For decision making under uncertainty, a rational optimality criterion is min-max. Min-max problems such that the minimizer makes an optimal decision against the worst case that might be chosen by the maximizer are studied. This paper presents necessary conditions and computational methods for a min-max solution (not a saddle point solution). Those conditions are stated in a form like Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The computational methods are based on the relaxation procedure. A min-max problem such that the minimizer and the maximizer are subject to separate constraints is primarily studied. But it is shown that the obtained results can be applied for the unseparate constraint case by use of duality theory.}},
  Doi                      = {10.1109/tac.1980.1102226},
  ISSN                     = {0018-9286},
  Keywords                 = {minimax},
  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Posted-at                = {2012-06-22 12:31:00},
  Priority                 = {2},
  Timestamp                = {2017.08.18}
}

@Book{maynard2,
  Title                    = {Evolution and the Theory of Games},
  Author                   = {John Maynard Smith},
  Publisher                = {Cambridge University Press},
  Year                     = {1982},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.12.11}
}

@Article{maynard,
  Title                    = {The Logic of Animal Conflict},
  Author                   = {John Maynard Smith and Goerge R Price},
  Journal                  = {Nature},
  Year                     = {1973},
  Number                   = {5427},
  Pages                    = {15-18},
  Volume                   = {246},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.09.02}
}

@InProceedings{cocoq,
  Title                    = {Coco-Q: Learning in Stochastic Games with Side Payments.},
  Author                   = {Sodomka, Eric and Hilliard, Elizabeth and Littman, Michael L. and Greenwald, Amy},
  Booktitle                = {ICML (3)},
  Year                     = {2013},
  Pages                    = {1471-1479},
  Publisher                = {JMLR.org},
  Series                   = {JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings},
  Volume                   = {28},
  Keywords                 = {dblp},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2016-07-13T11:42:57.000+0200}
}

@Article{Solan2015,
  Title                    = {Stochastic games},
  Author                   = {Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille},
  Journal                  = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Month                    = {nov},
  Number                   = {45},
  Pages                    = {13743--13746},
  Volume                   = {112},

  Doi                      = {10.1073/pnas.1513508112},
  Owner                    = {mark},
  Publisher                = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.12}
}

@Article{qlearning1,
  Title                    = {Comparison of Different Auction Pricing Rules in the Electricity Market},
  Author                   = {Ly Fie Sugianto and Kevin Zhigang Liao},
  Journal                  = {Modern Applied Science},
  Year                     = {2014},
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {147-163},
  Volume                   = {8},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{spacial4,
  Title                    = {Evolutionary games on graphs},
  Author                   = {G. Szab\'{o} and G. F\'{a}th},
  Journal                  = {Physics Reports},
  Year                     = {2007},
  Number                   = {446},
  Pages                    = {97-216},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.12.20}
}

@Article{storage_strategy2,
  Title                    = {Dynamic Economic Dispatch Game: The Value of Storage},
  Author                   = {Wenyuan Tang and Rahul Jain},
  Journal                  = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
  Year                     = {2016},
  Number                   = {5},
  Pages                    = {2350-2358},
  Volume                   = {7},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{game3,
  Title                    = {Pricing Mechanisms for Economic Dispatch: A Game-Theoretic Perspective},
  Author                   = {W. Tang and R. Jain},
  Journal                  = {International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems},
  Year                     = {2015},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{storage_strategy1,
  Title                    = {Dynamic economic dispatch among strategic generators with storage systems},
  Author                   = {Wenyuan Tang and Rahul Jain},
  Journal                  = {52nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)},
  Year                     = {2014},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.13}
}

@Article{lmp2,
  Title                    = {Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Nodal Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Markets},
  Author                   = {Wenyuan Tang and Rahul Jain},
  Journal                  = {52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control},
  Year                     = {2013},

  Month                    = {December},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Article{markov3,
  Title                    = {Mean Field Asymptotic of Markov Decision Evolutionary Games and Teams},
  Author                   = {Hamidou Tembine and Jean-Yves Le Boudec and Rachid El-Azouzi and Eitan Altman},
  Journal                  = {Gamenets 2009, International Conference on Game Theory for Networks},
  Year                     = {2009},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.09.02}
}

@Article{marl3,
  Title                    = {What evolutionary game theory tells us about multiagent learning},
  Author                   = {Karl Tuyls and Simon Parsons},
  Journal                  = {Artificial Intelligence},
  Year                     = {2007},

  Month                    = {May},
  Number                   = {7},
  Pages                    = {406-416},
  Volume                   = {171},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.12}
}

@Book{mech_book1,
  Title                    = {Mechanism Design},
  Author                   = {Vohra, Rakesh V.},
  Publisher                = {Cambridge University Press},
  Year                     = {2011},

  Abstract                 = {Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.}
}

@InProceedings{storage_strategies3,
  Title                    = {Agent-based Micro-storage Management for the Smart Grid},
  Author                   = {Vytelingum, Perukrishnen and Voice, Thomas D. and Ramchurn, Sarvapali D. and Rogers, Alex and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
  Booktitle                = {Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Volume 1},
  Year                     = {2010},
  Pages                    = {39--46},
  Publisher                = {International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
  Series                   = {AAMAS '10},

  Acmid                    = {1838212},
  ISBN                     = {978-0-9826571-1-9},
  Keywords                 = {agent-based simulation, energy, micro-storage, smart grid},
  Location                 = {Toronto, Canada},
  Numpages                 = {8}
}

@Book{weibull,
  Title                    = {Evolutionary Game Theory},
  Author                   = {J\"orgen W. Weibull},
  Publisher                = {The MIT Press},
  Year                     = {1997},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2016.12.11}
}

@InProceedings{tasp3,
  Title                    = {Best-Response Multiagent Learning in Non-Stationary Environments.},
  Author                   = {Weinberg, Michael and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.},
  Booktitle                = {AAMAS},
  Year                     = {2004},
  Pages                    = {506-513},
  Publisher                = {IEEE Computer Society},
  ISBN                     = {1-58113-864-4},
  Keywords                 = {dblp},
}

@Article{bidding4,
  Title                    = {Optimal bidding strategies for competitive generators and large consumers},
  Author                   = {Fushuan Wen and A.K. David},
  Journal                  = {Electrical Power and Energy Systems},
  Year                     = {2001},

  Month                    = {Jan},
  Number                   = {1},
  Pages                    = {37-43},
  Volume                   = {23},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.12}
}

@Article{qlearning2,
  Title                    = {Multi-agent Based Experiments on Uniform Price and Pay-as-Bid Electricity Auction Markets},
  Author                   = {Gaofeng Xiong and Shigeru Okuma and Hideki Fujita},
  Journal                  = {IEEE International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies (DRPT2004)},
  Year                     = {2004},
  Pages                    = {72-76},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Electronic{bidding1,
  Title                    = {Bidding in energy-only wholesale electricity markets},

  Address                  = {http://www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/c196404a-e850-46bd-8ae2-41600f8454bb/Bidding-in-energy-only-wholesale-electricity-marke.aspx},
  Author                   = {Professor George Yarrow and Dr Chris Decker},
  Organization             = {Australian Energy Market Commission},
  Year                     = {2014},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.11}
}

@Article{pools3,
  Title                    = {Incentive compatible pool-based electricity market design and implementation: A Bayesian mechanism design approach},
  Author                   = {Zou, Peng and Chen, Qixin and Xia, Qing and He, Chang and Kang, Chongqing},
  Journal                  = {Applied Energy},
  Year                     = {2015},
  Number                   = {C},
  Pages                    = {508-518},
  Volume                   = {158},

  Abstract                 = {Under conditions of imperfect competition, the issue of asymmetric information, which has not been effectively managed and settled until now, has been one of the most significant problems of the pool-based electricity market, both in theory and practice. Electricity generation companies expect to maximize their profits and control the market price by strategically bidding and their offers will necessarily deviate from the true marginal costs. These practices would result in great losses of market efficiency and incur much more payments from the consumers than actually needed. Therefore, this paper uses the analytical paradigm of economic mechanism design theory to deduce and design a customized pool-based market mechanism, which simultaneously satisfies three major properties of mechanism design theory: incentive compatibility, individual rationality and payment cost minimization. Then, several issues associated with the operational principle and implementation of this innovative mechanism are discussed and examined in detail. Finally, the results of numerical examples and case study validate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism, which can encourage truthfulness and eliminate tacit collusion, even when there is a tight market or transmission congestion with pivotal suppliers.},
  Keywords                 = {Bayesian mechanism; Incentive compatibility; Individual rationality; Mechanism design; Payment cost minimization; Pool-based electricity market;}
}

@Article{vcg_mechanism2,
  Title                    = {Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare},
  Author                   = {Xiaoyan Zou},
  Journal                  = {Energy Policy},
  Year                     = {2009},
  Pages                    = {4231-4239},
  Volume                   = {37},

  Owner                    = {mark},
  Timestamp                = {2017.06.15}
}

@Electronic{ieee_archive,
  Title                    = {Power Systems Test Case Archive},
  Note                     = {Accessed 24/07/2017},
  Organization             = {University of Washington, Dept. of Electrical Engineering},
  Url                      = {https://www2.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/},
  Year                     = {1999},

  Owner                    = {bur471},
  Timestamp                = {2017.07.24}
}

extension: bib


text:
package token_test

import (
	"io/ioutil"
	"testing"

	"github.com/BenLubar/bit/token"
)

func BenchmarkHello(b *testing.B) {
	src, err := ioutil.ReadFile("../hello.bit")
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("could not read hello.bit: %v", err)
	}

	b.ResetTimer()

	b.RunParallel(func(pb *testing.PB) {
		for pb.Next() {
			var p token.Parser
			_, err := p.Write(src)
			if err == nil {
				err = p.Done()
			}
			if err != nil {
				b.Errorf("failed to tokenize hello.bit: %v", err)
			}
		}
	})
}

license: MIT

repository: BenLubar/bit

license_type: permissive

repo_name: BenLubar/bit

branch_name: refs/heads/master

extension: go


text:
package cmd

import (
	"fmt"

	"github.com/hectorchu/gonano/wallet"
	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
)

var ledgerCmd = &cobra.Command{
	Use:   "ledger",
	Short: "Add a Ledger wallet",
	Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
		w, err := wallet.NewLedgerWallet()
		fatalIf(err)
		wi := &walletInfo{w: w, IsLedger: true}
		wallets = append(wallets, wi)
		wi.initAccounts()
		fmt.Println("Added wallet.")
	},
}

func init() {
	addCmd.AddCommand(ledgerCmd)
}


text:
package tinysrc

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"github.com/dmitrypro77/tinysrc-api-sdk/models"
	"io"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
)

// Client to send request to TinySRC API
type Client struct {
	httpClient *http.Client
	ApiKey     string
	baseURL    *url.URL
	ctx        context.Context
}

// Constructor of httpClient
func NewClient(ctx context.Context, apiKey string, httpClient *http.Client) (*Client, error) {
	if httpClient == nil {
		httpClient = http.DefaultClient
	}

	base, e := url.Parse(API_URL + fmt.Sprintf("/%s", VERSION))
	if e != nil {
		return nil, e
	}

	c := &Client{httpClient: httpClient, ApiKey: apiKey, baseURL: base, ctx: ctx}
	return c, nil
}

// Set required headers by TinySRC
func (client *Client) setRequestHeaders(req *http.Request) {
	req.Header.Add("Accept", "application/json")
	req.Header.Add("Content-Type", "application/json")
	req.Header.Add("x-api-key", client.ApiKey)
}

// Send Request To TinySRC API
func (client *Client) sendRequest(method string, pathURL string, body io.Reader) (*http.Response, error) {
	rel, e := url.Parse(client.baseURL.Path + pathURL)
	if e != nil {
		return nil, e
	}

	fullURL := client.baseURL.ResolveReference(rel)

	req, e := http.NewRequest(method, fullURL.String(), body)
	if e != nil {
		return nil, e
	}

	client.setRequestHeaders(req)

	resp, e := client.do(req)
	if e != nil {
		return nil, e
	}

	return resp, nil
}

func (client *Client) do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
	resp, e := client.httpClient.Do(req.WithContext(client.ctx))
	if e != nil {
		select {
		case <-client.ctx.Done():
			return nil, client.ctx.Err()
		default:
		}
		return nil, e
	}

	return resp, e
}

// Check If Response From Api Success
func (client *Client) isSuccess(statusCode int) bool {
	return statusCode >= 200 && statusCode <= 299
}

// Check If Response From Api Success
func (client *Client) isUnauthorized(statusCode int) bool {
	return statusCode == 401
}

// Parse Response From Api
func (client *Client) parseErrorResponse(resp *http.Response) *models.ErrorResponse {
	errorResponse := models.ErrorResponse{}
	errorResponse.Status = resp.StatusCode

	if client.isUnauthorized(errorResponse.Status) {
		errorResponse.Errors = append(errorResponse.Errors, "Unauthorized")
	}

	e := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResponse)

	if e != nil {
		errorResponse.Errors = append(errorResponse.Errors, e.Error())
		return &errorResponse
	}

	return &errorResponse
}


text:
@book{Allen2007,
    Title = {Bai Dialect Survey},
    Year = {2007},
    Publisher = {SIL International},
    Author = {Allen, B.}
}

repository: clics/pyclics

repo_name: clics/pyclics

gha_language: Python


text:
DESCRIPTION = "Task to install crypto dev packages in SDK"
LICENSE = "MIT"
PR = "r4"

inherit packagegroup

PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"

CRYPTO_API = ""
CRYPTO_API_ti33x = "cryptodev-module-dev"
CRYPTO_API_ti43x = "cryptodev-module-dev"
CRYPTO_API_dra7xx = "cryptodev-module-dev"
CRYPTO_API_keystone = "cryptodev-module-dev"

RDEPENDS_${PN} = "\
    openssl-dev \
    ${CRYPTO_API} \
"

repository: varigit/meta-arago-var

repo_name: varigit/meta-arago-var

extension: bb


text:
require octave.inc

PR = "${INC_PR}.0"

SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.octave.org/pub/octave/${PN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
           file://configure.patch"

PACKAGES =+ "libcruft liboctave liboctinterp octave-oct \
	     libcruft-dev liboctave-dev liboctinterp-dev \
             libcruft-dbg liboctave-dbg liboctinterp-dbg"

FILES_libcruft = "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/libcruft.so*"
FILES_libcruft-dbg += "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/.debug/libcruft*"

FILES_liboctave = "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/liboctave.so*"
FILES_liboctave-dbg += "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/.debug/liboctave*"

FILES_liboctinterp = "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/liboctinterp.so*"
FILES_liboctinterp-dbg += "${libdir}/${PN}-${PV}/.debug/liboctinterp*"

# octave-oct provides subroutines in .oct file format
FILES_${PN}-oct = "${libexecdir}/${PN}/${PV}/oct/${TARGET_SYS}/*.oct"

FILES_${PN}-dbg += "${libexecdir}/${PN}/${PV}/oct/${TARGET_SYS}/.debug"

SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6b11065c9dbd3c9743d234c2f785fb7b"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fb093e267e5b9656f767896a33d664e5ee921e28898a481542bdb4db31f7604e"

repository: overo/overo-oe-natty

repo_name: overo/overo-oe-natty

branch_name: HEAD


text:
package main

import (
	"github.com/Januadrym/seennit/internal/app/api"
	"github.com/Januadrym/seennit/internal/pkg/http/server"

	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)

func main() {
	router, err := api.NewRouter()
	if err != nil {
		logrus.Panic("Cannot initiate router! err: ", err)
	}

	serverConf := server.LoadConfigFromEnv()
	server.ListenAndServe(serverConf, router)
}

repository: Januadrym/seennit

repo_name: Januadrym/seennit


text:
package api

import (
	"net/http"

	"github.com/supabase/gotrue/internal/models"
	"github.com/supabase/gotrue/internal/storage"
)

// Logout is the endpoint for logging out a user and thereby revoking any refresh tokens
func (a *API) Logout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
	ctx := r.Context()
	db := a.db.WithContext(ctx)
	config := a.config

	a.clearCookieTokens(config, w)

	s := getSession(ctx)
	u := getUser(ctx)

	err := db.Transaction(func(tx *storage.Connection) error {
		if terr := models.NewAuditLogEntry(r, tx, u, models.LogoutAction, "", nil); terr != nil {
			return terr
		}
		if s != nil {
			return models.Logout(tx, u.ID)
		}
		return models.LogoutAllRefreshTokens(tx, u.ID)
	})
	if err != nil {
		return internalServerError("Error logging out user").WithInternalError(err)
	}

	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
	return nil
}

repository: Levet/gotrue

repo_name: Levet/gotrue

gha_license_id: MIT


text:
include nano.inc

SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c011c7f9e47cb1da27d4e7cc8b56ec6a"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "752170643039e2c95a433de357f0c70a8c4c4c561a90a7e7259a63e225b659b9"

repository: nedap/meta-openembedded

repo_name: nedap/meta-openembedded

gha_language: BitBake