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Talk:Jesus/2nd Paragraph Debate/4

=Congratulations to one and all =

Dear Fellow editors:

While I wish we would have taken the current discussion to the talk:Jesus/2nd Paragraph Debate subpage, for it hath brought all other development unto an halt, I have to commend this discussion.

We have remained WP:CIVIL, assumed good faith, to the occaisonal deep breath, did not engage in personal attacks, etc. It's gotta be a record! If there was a cooperation barnstar for a group, I'd hang one here. So let me say: Good job! GOOD job! --CTSWyneken 21:54, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

=Cleanup scholar debate, moved= I have moved a lot of the recent conversation to the talk:Jesus/2nd Paragraph Debate page. --Andrew c 22:23, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

And I moved a live discussion back out. It was weird when the section disappeared just as I was trying to comment. The section was only about 90 minutes old! Please give it a day or two.Arch O. LaTalk TCF 22:35, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * My apologies. I figured that those interested would see my note and take the debate onto the subpage. But that is what I get for assuming and being TOO bold. Sorry for the confusion. --Andrew c 22:54, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * There is some discussion on the use and placement of Hebrew and Greek names that probably should be archived, though. Earlier discussion on that topic is in Archive 41. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 23:06, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

=Jesus-Myth, nonexistence hypothesis, and apocrypha= I think part of the controversy is that we're not making a clear distinction between the Jesus-Myth and the nonexistence hypothesis. I asked some time ago if they are one and the same; CTSWyneken and Paul B. explained the difference.

I've tried to point out that we Christians have our own version of the Jesus-Myth; we just call it apocrypha. Among academics, the Jesus-Myth refers to those who argue that some or all of the NT is also apocryphal. The non-existence hypothesis argues that the NT is entirely apocryphal, but there are others who accept some details of the Gospel account more readily than others. Obviously the miracles, virgin birth, and ressurection are considered mythical by non-Christians. Even liberal Christians will ask, for example, why Luke dates Jesus' birth to a Quinirian census that took place long after Herod the Great was dead.

This is why I think we should rephrase " A small minority question the historicity of Jesus" to something like "A small minority question the historical existence of Jesus." Strictly speaking, historicity is broader than existence. There are many who accept the historical existence of Jesus, but question the historicity of other details. The majority agree that "Jesus was a Jewish Galilean teacher and healer who was sentenced to death by crucifixion outside of Jerusalem on the orders of Roman Governor Pontius Pilate,[1] for claiming to be the "King of the Judeans," a crime of rebellion against Rome," but many among the majority question the historicity of other details. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 21:04, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I agree completely with you. Historicity should be clarified to say historical existence. Here is one proposal of mine.
 * Most scholars agree that Jesus was a Jewish Galilean teacher and healer who was sentenced to death by crucifixion outside of Jerusalem on the orders of Roman Governor Pontius Pilate,[2] for alleged rebellion against Rome.[3] A small minority of scholars question the historical existence of Jesus.[4] The main sources of information regarding Jesus' life and teachings are the four canonical Gospels of the New Testament, which are generally agreed to have been written in the decades after his death.
 * This proposal features the following: reordered sentences to make more sense; use of "scholars" across the board to simplify the critical bible scholars vs. historians vs. wahtever; historicity changed to historical existence; cut the reason clause behind the minority; generalized "claiming to be 'King of Judeans'" to "alleged rebellion". How does that work?--Andrew c 21:52, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * It works, but I still feel we should clarify which types of scholars are saying what. I don't think it's any different than when we say, in the next two paragraphs, that Christians say one thing and Muslims say another. We don't say "Some theologians says Jesus was the Son of God, and others say Jesus was a prophet"; we specify which religion says what.

 * However, I've finally realized that the original phrase "critical Bible scholars" was vague: it could mean either "scholars who are critical of the Bible," or "scholars in the field of Biblical criticism." The second is what we meant. As SOPHIA pointed out, "Biblical critics" would be more correct, just as "astrophysicist" is more correct than "critical astrophysical scholar."

 * I had a thought. Up until now, we've been limiting the minority to advocates of the nonexistence hypothesis, but it seems to me that we're excluding people who deny other parts of the majority opinion. For example, there are scholars who agree that there was a historical Jesus, but question whether he actually died on the cross (see swoon hypothesis). Such scholars would be in subset C of my Venn diagram, but are not included in out citations. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 22:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Actually, it seems that in some places, non-Christians might think the virgin birth happened :/. Remember that poll I found about what Americans seem to believe? Homestarmy 21:54, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * See what I said above about liberal Christians. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 22:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * The "question the historicity" quote wiki links straight through to the Historicity of Jesus article. If we've got the name wrong here then it's also wrong on the main article. We have a "Historicity" section in this article and there are explicit links to the historicity article - if we start calling it "existence" we are no longer in step with the rest of the terminology in the article.

 * The Jesus Myth lot don't always out right say Jesus didn't exist as that is impossible to prove. What they usually try to do is trace other older origins for key parts of the Jesus "story" to show that it was probably a rework of older mystery religions. However they still question the historicity in the sense that did a man named Jesus live at that time and actually do and say all the thing attributed to him.

 * As for the the sentence order in the second paragraph - all I was trying to do was stress the "Jesus" side rather than the sources aspect as this article is about him and there are plenty of others that stress the documents and are mainly concerned with them. IMO anyone coming to this article will want to know what we think we know about him before they want to know why we know it. But if I'm out numbered in that view then I'll happily go with whatever the majority feels is best. SophiaTalk TCF 22:47, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I'm trying to clarify the difference between "did a man named Jesus live at that time?" and "[did Jesus]] actually do and say all the things attributed to him?" We've been limiting the "small minority" to those who question the historical existence of Jesus. We might also include among the minority some of the people that question other elements of the majority concensus, but there are also people in the majority that question whether Jesus said and did eveything attributed to him (just not those things listed as the majority concensus).

 * As we have it now, some people are interpreting "historicity of Jesus" one way, some are interpreting it another way, and I think they're talking past each other. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 22:53, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * PS: I changed the wikilink to Historicity_of_Jesus, because that's what we're really talking about. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 22:56, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Just seen Arcola's "astrophysicist" quote. Interestingly in science we do things the other way round - you can have an astrophysicist or a theoretical astrophysicist (someone who doesn't get his hands dirty with astronomical observations and likes hard maths) but there is no such thing as a "critical astrophysicist" as all astrophysicists are assumed to work to the scientific method (they'd lose their tenure and have their papers rejected if they didn't). If someone is writing for the lay audience and is not active in peer reviewed research they are referred to as "populist" although this term would be more likely to apply to an astronomer as it's darn hard to be an astrophysicist if you're not active in a research field. So by those rules there would be "scholars" and "populist scholars". SophiaTalk TCF 22:59, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Good point. This is similar to Slrubenstein's comment about scholars and whether "critical" is the correct word. Actually, it is when we're referring to Biblical criticism, but when we refer to historians I believe that the situation is probably much the same as with astrophysicists. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 23:13, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

OK first of all, I don't like "biblical critics". It sounds like someone who reviews the bible, and doesn't connote someone who uses critical methods of research as much as the word, well, "critical" does. Next, I think there is an issue with the scholar debate. (Going back to the venn diagram which I unforutunately moved to another page). It isn't that only biblical and historical scholars think the majority position. Its that they DON'T think the minority position. When you qualify what sort of scholars are in the majority, it makes you think that the other scholars not named are all in the minority, when I'd say that clearly isn't the case. The issue is that no one that fits your critera for having 'proper' credentials to study Jesus thinks he didn't exist. While there is a minority of scholars from a number of OTHER disciplines that do question his existence. I do not think the current wording conveys this. My proposed changed (everything to scholar) skirts this issue, but by saying the position is in a small minority, still conveys the idea that it isn't widely accepted.--Andrew c 23:07, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * My revision actually uses the phrase "scholars of either Biblical criticism or history." This gives the proper names of the fields of study cited without (I hope) including the connotation that you describe. You do have a point that there are those in other fields who agree with the majority, but AFAIK we haven't cited them. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 23:13, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I also find "Biblical Criticism" not helpful since the set of scholars quoted include non-Critical Biblical scholars. Why can't we go with Biblical scholars and historians" I still don't get what's wrong with that formula. --CTSWyneken 02:13, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * It implies that people who are not Biblical scholars are not scholars. That is what Drogo and others have been objecting to. Andrew's proposal to refer to everyone as "scholars" is accurate but, IMHO, imprecise. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 02:51, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * To be honest, I don't see how. I take it to mean that some Biblical scholars are not historians and the reverse. I think that is correct. Isn't it? --CTSWyneken 12:39, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * It is correct. This is exactly the point I made with my Venn diagram. A is for Biblical Scholars, B is for Historians, C is for other scholars, the large square is for all scholars (the superset of A, B and C). A and B intersect but are not identical, therefore some Biblical scholars are not historians (the yellow subset) and the reverse is also true (the red subset). The orange subset are those who are both Biblical scholars and historians. Here's the Venn diagram again:
 * [[Image:JesusVenn.png]]
 * By "imprecise" I mean that Andrew's suggestion doesn't clarify which scholars are saying what. I think it's important to clarify their credentials and let the readers make up their own minds as to who is more credible. Myself, I find the historians to be more credible than the philosophers, but I also think it's more NPOV to attribute the writings of historians to historians, and the writings of philosophers to philosophers. Andrew's suggestion erases this distinction.
 * Notice that I didn't say that I agreed with the implication that scholars who are not Biblical scholars are not scholars. I'm not asserting that fallacy, I'm trying to answer it. I'm just thinking of the readers who will make that implication, and editors who have raised this objection.
 * As for "Bible scholars" vs. "Biblical criticism," I fear that "Bible scholars" loses the distinction that Slrubenstein has made between those scholars that base their argument on religion, and those scholars that bracket their religious beliefs. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 16:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree. When we call someone an "astronomer" rather than a "sholar of astronomy" we are not suggesting that the astronomer is not a scholar. Archola, it sounds like you are being very literal-minded concerning these terms, without understanding how people actually use them. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 12:46, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I have in the past been accused of being too literal, but I don't think I'm being as literal as those who object that using the phrase "Biblical scholars" implies that other scholars are not scholars. Of course the other scholars are also scholars, be they historians or philosophers or astrophysicists or whatever. See my Venn diagram. Yet some people (not me) object. I'm just saying that we need to consider their objections.
 * The objection comes from the phrasing. "Bible scholars, historians and philosphers" is exactly parallel to "Texan Americans, Iowans and Californians." Of course the others are also scholars/Americans, but the (false) implication can be made that they are not.Arch O. LaTalk TCF 16:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * My only proviso is that you can have undisputed scientists such as Steven Hawking who write "populist" works such as A Brief History of Time - in that case it would be the work that was referred to as "populist" not the author. SophiaTalk TCF 13:15, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Good book, but I think Hawking dumbed it down too much when he wrote ''The Universe in a Nutshell." Arch O. LaTalk TCF 16:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

These sounds reasonable - but I think what matters is not so much whether the book is aimed for a scholarly or general audience, but whether the author has established scholarly expertise in the field. In other words, I am less concerned about the difference between a Brief History of Time and "Occurence of Singularities in Open Universes" than the difference between A Brief History of Time and a book that he might write about Jesus or Christianity. In the former, the book - however populist - is still written by an acknowledged expert in the topic; in the latter, the book - however well-written and interesting - is written by someone who, however, smart, is writing as a non-expert. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 14:00, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I agree completely, but to refer to everyone as "scholars" and only as "scholars" as Andrew suggests, is to erase this distinction. Hence my objection. That's why I qualify it as "scholars of either Biblical criticism or history." As per CTSWyneken, we may also say, "scholars of either the Bible or of history." Either way, I think we need to say that these people are not only scholars, but also experts in the relevant fields of scholarship. Arch O. LaTalk TCF  16:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I sort of agree. I agree that we need to be more specific than scholars. I think "Bible scholars" is fine. I think the problem with "historians" is that it does not specify NT and Hellenic Judaism historians. I do not agree (if I understand you correctly) that we need to say "scholars of history" because, at least in America and the UK, such people are called "historians" and never "scholars of history." If you are concerned that without putting "scholarly" people might think that we are referring to popular historians, I suggest that the solution is not to add "scholarly" but specifiy that they are historians of early Christianity or Hellenic Judaism. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 16:46, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Clarifying "historians" is a good idea. I just think that saying "Bible scholars," while also mentioning other scholars, will to some be like saying "Texan Americans" while also mentioning natives of other American states. It is correct, but leaves some readers open to a false implication. We did originally say "critical Bible scholars" to refer to scholarship in Biblical criticism, and "Biblical criticism" avoids the "Texan American" problem. However, it doesn't work if we include noncritical Bible scholars as CTSWyneken has suggested. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 17:10, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * PS: I just got your message. It may be an inaccurate, illogical implication, but it is an implication that has been made by others on this talk page based, I think, on something similar to the analogy I made. There has to be some way to phrase this that doesn't leave the phrase open to this implication, however illogical or inaccurate the implication may be. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 17:20, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

= Was Jesus a healer? =

"Most scholars of either Biblical criticism or history agree that Jesus was a Jewish Galilean teacher and healer ... ."

Is this correct? If Jesus was a healer, then he was a miracle worker. Do most scholars (of all faiths) agree that Jesus could work miracles? Rick Norwood 23:24, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

 * We've already discussed this. By "healer" we mean "someone who heals or claims to heal." This does not neccesarily imply miracles. The link to healer explains further, and prior discussion can be found on this page at and at /2nd Paragraph Debate. Arch O. LaTalk TCF  23:35, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the reference, and I understand the difficulty of maintaining NPOV and the necessity of compromise. As long as everybody realizes that this is a compromise, and is willing to put up with Wikipedia being quoted as evidence that most scholars agree that Jesus had the power to heal the sick, because, all equivocations aside, that is what the passage says. Rick Norwood 00:37, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I think what we're actually saying is: most scholars agree that Jesus' contemporaries believed he had the power to heal the sick. As has been said, some thought his power came from God, and others felt that his power came from Satan. Of course, many modern skeptics doubt whether Jesus actually had the power to heal, and other skeptics maintain that his healings were psychosomatic. By including "claims to heal" in the definition of "healer," we leave the term open to all these POV interpretations. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 01:51, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I understand Arch's point, but one way to compromise even more would be to say "Jesus was a Jewish Galilean who was seen as a teacher and healer by his peers/contemporaries..."--Andrew c 01:52, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * This is true, but it complicates the paragraph. It's a double citation: scholars say that Jesus' contemporaries said... There are some who believe his healing was hearsay, and others who believe he actually healed (this includes those skeptics who explain it as the placebo effect). Arch O. LaTalk TCF 01:57, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I wasn't aware leprosy (Or whatever skin disease the greek referred to, it could technically mean many different skin diseases as I understand it) could be cured via placebo. Homestarmy 01:58, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Of course, all these interpetations have been challenged. The word "healer" is meant to cover all such interpretations. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 02:03, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * The statement is accurate as it stands. Every one of the scholars listed in the footnote says that Jesus went from town to town to heal the sick. This was not unusual, since many of his contemporaries did the same. No judgment is made about the effectiveness of such activity -- either Jesus' or those healers of his time. You are welcome to check the references. --CTSWyneken 02:10, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Which is pretty much what I meant by "someone who heals or claims to heal"; including the "or" means that no judgement of effectiveness is applied. I have to wonder, though, how many people are going to raise the same objection? There have now been two in less than a week. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 02:47, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

There is a reason this comes up over & over again - and that is, despite what the healer article says & what the scholars say, it is just too ambiguous to flatly state that scholars agree he WAS a healer. The fact that the issue is repeatedly raised indicates that the wording needs some modification. Those who question this wording are not all failing to understand the "real meaning" of the word. The word is used in an artificially stipulative sense in the healer article --JimWae 02:54, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Well because of the GA collaboration, the article is probably going to be nominated for FA status near the 18th whether we argue over "healer" over and over again or not, don't we have better things to do right now? Homestarmy 02:56, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Let's remember we're here to represent what the scholars say. We're never going to avoid challenges to the language we put here because so many people are so invested in the subject of Jesus. Leave it in, we'll be challenged. Take out, the oppose side will challenge. Qualify it, and yet others will challenge. The same thing with every phrase here. So, let's get on with summarizing the state of scholarship. --CTSWyneken 03:01, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

So will the article's being nominated AGAIN lead to the degeneration of the article? --JimWae 03:03, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Jim, the word "extant" is also used in an artificially stipulative sense, but I had to abandon my arguments and accept the concensus definition. To many, "extant" is the opposite of "extinct," but in this article we limit "extant" to those things that we know to exist. To many, "healer" implies supernaturalism, but in this article we limit "healer" to those who purport to heal (by any method, and regardless of effectiveness). Arch O. LaTalk TCF 03:07, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Even conservative, "fundie" Christians call people of other religions "faith healers," even when they believe that such people have no supernatural power, or are just scamming people, and so on. Atheists sometimes call televangelists "faith healers," though they don't believe such people have any supernatural power. Yogis and New Age gurus are called "healers," though they explicitly claim that they are doing nothing but teaching you to realize your own natural potential. Homeopathic / Holistic health advisors are called "healers." Encarta gives only one definition: "somebody who cures or treats illnesses or injuries." Now with such a wide spectrum of usage that does not (necessarily) imply anything supernaturalistic, I don't see what the objection is. "Healer" is a descriptive title, like "Preacher," it describes what you do (or claim to do), not what you are in terms of qualities of powers -- granted that Christians (and people of other religions) may believe that the method by which Jesus healed was supernatural, but that is not a denotation or connotation of the word itself. --MonkeeSage 05:38, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Jesus was a faith healer! Although noone will agree to that term, it actually describes things pretty well (click on the link). It seems to me that there are two competing definitions of "healer" in this discussion: 1, someone who heals, and 2, someone who treats illness. The second definition is uncontroversial in describing Jesus, while the first is not. Anyone have another term that means the second but not the first of these two definitions? ntennis 05:49, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I think "someone who heals" and "someone who treats illness" are synonyms, aren't they? Most forms physical defects, diseases, and psychoses are called "illness," and treating/curing them is called "healing." The term "healer" in itself doesn't imply any given means of healing (be it naturalistic or supernaturalistic): a psychiatrist is a "healer," and so is a yogi, and so is a chi gung sifu, and so is a shaman, and so is a medical doctor, and so forth. But they all use very different methods -- some claiming to be supernatural, some claiming to be natural. But "healer" covers all of them because the term in itself is only a title describing what you do (or claim to do), which is "heal" -- not how you do it, or the mechanics behind it. --MonkeeSage 06:30, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * They are not quite synonyms; the difference in the slash you placed between "treating" and "curing". ntennis 07:00, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * IMHO Jesus and his disciples and the OT prophets were the only legitimate faith healers, though of course those who aren't Christian will question their legitimacy. The problem with "faith healer" is that, while technically correct, it lumps Jesus in with all those recent faith healers who have been proven to be scam artists. Very bad connotation; many Christians will object. Frankly, I'm not sure how to further clarify the term "healer" without offending one faction or another. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 06:38, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Anyone can claim to be a healer, and anybody can "treat" illnesses, but when somebody else calls them a healer there is a strong presumption that the one calling them a healer is claiming they are successful at it - even a stronger presumption when an encylopedia says so --JimWae 06:33, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Not necessarily, but I understand that the connotation is there. However, MonkeySage is correct about the denotation. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 06:38, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Hmmm...if we need to qualify the difference between the claim to be a healer and the effectivness of the healing, then don't we need to distinguish between the claim to be a teacher and the effectivness of the teaching and so on? I think that functional/descriptive titles should be taken neutrally, as neither implying the effectivness or ineffectivness of the person given the title, and generally are taken that way until further information is provided. --MonkeeSage 07:12, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I agree. There are effective healers and ineffective healers, just as there effective teachers and ineffective teachers. To claim that Jesus was either effective or ineffective would be POV. Simply using the terms "healer" and "teacher," without making a claim about Jesus' effectiveness, is NPOV.
 * Of course, it's also a philosophical question whether an ineffective teacher is really a teacher. Ditto healer. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 07:17, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * For someone to be a teacher they do not need to teach effectively - all they need is to be able to get students to talk to (even if just body-language). Bakers need to actually be able to produce food from dough, astronauts need to actually go into space. Some (but not all) "job titles" imply success at something. "Healer" either implies someone who actually heals, or else is too ambiguous to be descriptive. I have to wonder if the scholars cited qualify their description of "healer" in any way. MOST of the dictionaries at http://www.onelook.com/?w=healer&ls=a use the word as an ability or skill, with "faith healer" as an "also see". Only 2 or so add "or claims to". People who find this confusing are not failing to understand the "real meaning" of the word. If the article is going to use the word, it should be in the context of a claim to be a healer or some such. --JimWae 07:30, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * It's definitely a claim made by Jesus' contemporaries in the Gospel accounts. To judge whether the claim is accurate or not would start a POV war. By analogy, was Mohammed "really" a prophet? Muslims say yes, and just about everybody else says no. Yet, Mohammed is often described as the Islamic prophet even by non-Muslims. In the same way, this article describes Jesus as a "Jewish Galilean...healer." This is "Jewish" in the sense of Judaism as it existed during the time of Herod's Temple, and not in the sense of modern Rabbinic Judaism. Jesus was a first-century Jewish healer in the same sense that Mohammed was the Islamic prophet. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 07:50, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * The difference is that most people agree there ARE people with some skills to heal people, whereas most people are aware that many would deny there are ANY prophets at all -- AND that all claims to be a prophet are strongly influenced by POV --JimWae 07:58, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Is there any objection to "spiritual healer"? How about "religious healer"? I don't think those two terms have the same nasty connotations as "faith healer." Arch O. LaTalk TCF 08:03, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Nearly any qualification will do. To state he WAS a healerr without qualifying that term in any way is at least misleading and subject to POV objections. I find it hard to believe that all the scholars mentioned used the term without some qualification --JimWae 08:22, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * "Most scholars of either Biblical criticism or history agree that Jesus was a Jewish Galilean teacher who was believed to be healer, and who was sentenced to death . . ." ? The "was" in past tense indicates that the belief was contemporaneous with the other events mentioned, avoids a double-cite, and is (hopefully) more NPOV compliant. What say ye? --MonkeeSage 08:58, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * It's better to leave out the "healer" alltogether than to (again) indulge in grammatical contraptions in order to avoid a (perceived) POV. Str1977 (smile back) 09:18, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

No, it is not. This discussion is largely misdirected. Wikipedia editors do not put their own views in articles. Therefore, it simply does not matter whether an editor believes that Jesus was a healer, or was not a healer. Nor does it matter whether an editor can provide compelling evidence and a strong argument to support or contradict this claim. What we can say is that X believes that Jesus was a healer. To answer Robsteadman's original question: all of the critical scholars I have read (primarily Sanders, Fredriksen, and Vermes, who are the ones most frequently cited in the academic literature) identify Jesus as a healer. My understanding is that they are identifying him with a known social role at that time in that place. Neither Sanders, Fredriksen, nor Vermes claim that Jesus "really" could heal people, or "really" worked miracles. They consider this to be a meaningless question for an academic historian. I think they identify "healer" the same way they identify "high priest." High priests offered sacrifices to God and on Yom Kippor spoke God's name in the Holy of Holies. Does this mean that when I say Caiafas was the high priest, I am asserting that there (1) is a god (2) who has a name (3) and who accepts sacrifices? I don't think so. And when a historian says Caiphas was the high priest, I feel pretty confident that they are making no claims whatsoever as to the "truthfulness" or "reality" of what a high priest did. In the same way, when historians describe Honi the Circle-Maker as a miracle worker, they are not saying that miracles really occur, or that Honi really was able to work miracles. When historians describe Elijah as a prophet, they are not caliming that God really spoke to Elijah and carried him up to heaven. When historians say that Ahab was king, they are not saying that they believe that humans should be ruled by monarchs. They are identifying Honi, Elija, and Ahab with social roles or positions that were meaningful to people at that time. This is no different from an anthropologist who identifies someone as a shaman - it does not mean that the anthropologist really believes in "shamanism," e.g. that someone can kill or cure using powers that science cannot detect, it means that this particular person occupies a particular role in that society. My reading of Sanders, Vermes, and Fredricksen is that when they identify Jesus as a healer they are doing just what anthropologists are doing when they identify someone as a shaman. Certainly, when they or anyone else analyzes what it meant to be a "healer" at that time, they never claim that illness is caused by demons which must be exorcised. Rather, they examine this belief in its social and cultural context, to understand why this belief was meaningful at the time.

In short, I think that if there is any problem here, it is that some, perhaps many, readers do not understand what historians do, how they work. This wouldn't entirely surprise me, because in my experience most Americans (and now I am starting to suspect most people in England) do not really understand how anti-biotics work or how physicists or chemists work. Well, this is why we have links to physics or history, and hopefully those articles do a good job explaining to a general public how physicists and historians work. I know this can be challenging - the talk page for evolution often goes off on some long tangent because an editor really does not understand what scientists actually mean by the word "theory" - even though the article itself explains it! Anyway, all we can do in the introduction is summarize what historians believe. I think we need to put a detailed explanation of why they belive this and what they mean in a linked article that provides the space to explore this in depth. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 11:04, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * To clarify what I meant by "It's better to leave out the "healer" alltogether than to (again) indulge in grammatical contraptions in order to avoid a (perceived) POV."
 * I did not advocate leaving it out, I'd prefer it stays in.
 * I oppose however this tendency, lately increasing, to preface anything with a cluster of words like "scholars think that people belief that ..." We should keep readibility in mind.Str1977 (smile back) 15:34, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I agree with SL. As I said earlier: those scholars in the footnotes, representing nearly every conceivable viewpoint in Biblical studies and ancient history, state that Jesus was a healer and everything else we have in the paragraph. Does anyone challenge this?
 * While I haven't looked at everything written on the life of Jesus, I have yet to find any historian or Biblical scholar who challenges any of our statements. Does anyone know of one? If not, I suggest we leave things as are and move on. --CTSWyneken 11:25, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I have one (only one!) objection to the current phrasing. I do not think that we should privilege the views of historians who are not experts on this particular period in history. What is important is not what "lots of people" think, what is important is what scholars who have extensive training and have written recognized scholarly works on the period. I think we should delete the Will Durant footnote, for example - who cares what Will Durant thought? I strongly believe that adding Durant actually dilutes the significance of this paragraph. I would grant him some authority as a philosopher, but his historical work was all popular and based on secondary sources - why should we care about what he thought of 1st century Judea, any more than what anyone else thought? We should stick to recognized scholars of this period. By the way, as far as I know all or most of the people in footnote 2 believe Jesus was executed for sedition. Why not just delete footnote three, and move footnote two to the end of the sentence? Slrubenstein  |  Talk 11:30, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * The reason for footnote 3 is I have not had the time to go back and verify that it is indeed the case that the footnote 2 people have said that very thing in print. All the other statments I have seen with my own eyes (if they exist, since there are no extant, public documents that say I have eyers ;-)). It is essential that we do not claim more with citation than we have objective evidence for. Where would we be if I just "assumed" all these folk thought Jesus to be a healer? Because I have done the work, I can say this without a doubt and point people to the page numbers in the footnotes if they wish to verify my work. --CTSWyneken 12:36, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * re: Durant... I haven't had a chance to check Will Durant's qualifications. Do we have anything on him on the talk:Jesus/Cited Authors Bios page? I haven't had a chance to look because my duties are heavy at this moment. --CTSWyneken 12:42, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

You are welcome to check me, but I am pretty sure Sanders and fredriksen agree Jesus was most likely executed for sedition, and I think Vermes says the same thing. About Durant - he has a PhD. in philosophy. His fame as a historian is based on his nine volume history of civilization, which is most definitely a popularizing work - I mean, aimed at a popular audience. As a popular work it is indeed remarkable in the scope of the sources Durant draws on, and his fairly sophisticated way of synthesizing what was at the time main streams of thought among historians. Be that as it may, he really has no more credentials to speak about Jesus than most people do: his view is reasonably well-informed and thoughtful. But it is not the view of a critical (by which I mean only someone who brackets their personal views and applies the methods of modern scholarship with an open mind as to the result - if you can tell me another way to signal this, as opposed say to a Hassidic Rebbe who has the entire Hebrew Bible memorized word for word, and has read all the major commentaries by various rabbis over the the ages, i.e. someone who is most definitely a scholar but most definitely beginning with theological ssumptions and working towards theological ends - I would be very grateful) scholar. I really think that it is important to distinguish between what people who are professional experts on the NT and first century Jewish history think, versus what a range of well-informed and thoughtful people think. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 12:53, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I do not doubt you, my friend, but it is a matter of scholarly dilligence. If I say something is in a book on such-and-such a page, my reputation suffers if it is not there. As an publication editor and a librarian, accuracy is everything. I will change an author's footnote if there's a comma in the wrong place. If you have the Sanders, et al. books we cite and you can find the page numbers that support what we both know is there, then please feel free to provide them. I'll reference them in footnote three and we can keep going until all the books in two are cited in three. THEN we can take out footnote three entirely.

I appreciate it - but honestly, I didn't take your comment personally and didn't mean for you to think I did. What I should have said is, "I am pretty confident about this, but if you are willing to check that would be a good idea, in case my memory is wrong, because as you say scholarly dilligence has to be our priority here. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 14:02, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * On the Durant front, we can remove him, then. --CTSWyneken 13:41, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * We get away with "healer" because it describes Jesus and the definition we have does not rely on the supernatural - if we said "Jesus healed the sick" we would be POV as that cannot be sustantiated. SophiaTalk TCF 13:21, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I'm glad for the point, Sophia. Of course, what matters, though, is the scholars we cite say it. So it is literally and verifibly so that most ______ say "a healer." It is NPOV because that is what they say. If find a ______, who denies it, we have another kettle of Herring. --CTSWyneken 13:41, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Slrubenstein seems to have it spot on in my opinion, can we please do something more important now? Whether any of us like it or not, the sources we're using seem to say that Jesus was a healer, so that's just plain how it's got to be, I don't see the problem here. Homestarmy 13:43, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Most scholars compare Jesus's role as a healer with modern examples of faith healing, holistic medicine, shamanism, hypnotic therapy, and so on. It is remarkable that these ancient healing techniques still survive, even today, in our modern technological world. Difficult-to-explain spontaneous healings are rare, but they occur in all religious and cultural traditions. Today most medical scientists accept, patients who engage in some form of spiritual/psychosomatic therapy have statistically better healing rates and on rare occasions spontaneous healing. Some medical scientists ask questions such as, For which illnesses are spiritual therapies most effective? I met one medical researcher who studies spiritual healing within different American religions. She noted, for example, spiritual therapy diminishes certain kinds of cancer more effectively than other kinds of cancer. She also noted no particular religion has a therapeutic advantage. However what does matter is the level of "spiritual intensity", positive expectation, and communal meditations and celebrations, such as group prayer for the ill, enthusiastic singing and so on. Again, these are ancient healing techniques. Whose origins are probably in the Paleolithic Period. They seem to work to some degree. Also, it should be pointed out that many of the patients that Jesus treated by spiritual healing were "demoniacs", that is, people with mental illnesses. Obviously, spiritual traditions can have strong impact on certain kinds of mental illness. In the context of Jesus, scholars understand the term "healer" in the sense of a social role, without needing to verify the effectiveness of his therapies. Jesus seems to have had a popular reputation for being a healer, and even just this reputation and enthusiastic expectation no doubt increased the success rates of his healing techniques. --Haldrik 15:06, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Slrubenstein and CTSWyneken and now Haldrik have it exactly right: when our cited sources speak of Jesus as a healer, they are speaking of a social role in the context of first-century Judaism. They cannot comment on whether or not Jesus was effective without making an inappropriate judgement of this social role. This is exactly what we mean when we precede "teacher and healer" with "Jewish Galilean." I tried to explain this with my analogy to Mohammed—who outside of Islam is only accepted as a prophet when describing his social role within Islam&mdashbut JimWae rejected this analogy. Slrubenstein makes much the same analogy when he talks about Caiaphas as the high priest. There are, of course, atheists who desribe Caiaphas as the high priest of Judaism. Why? Because they are describing his social role within Judaism.

 * The thing is, this cultural-historical social role of "healer" is lost on some readers, and thus we have objections. There has to be some way of clarifying that when the cited authors speak of Jesus as a healer, they mean this as a social role within the context of Jesus' religion, and not any of the other meanings ascribed to the word "healer." If we don't make this clear, then we will have to contend with the same objection over and over again. I for one grow tired of going in circles. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 15:28, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * We are not quoting these scholars, we are summarizing what they say - and we are not summarizing it for other historians (and note there is an issue with whether they are historians or not). The scholars have a whole book to explain how they might use the term - or at least it is clearer that they are using it in a "historical context". We have one word without qualification and without pointing out that the term is being used in the context of those who lived at that time. It is not the job of an encyclopedia to use any specialized vocabulary of any one group of scholars - but rather to address the general reader in contemporary language. This issue will not just "go away". More later --JimWae 15:37, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Indeed. This is why I suggested either "spiritual healer" or "religious healer." I reject "faith healer" as being a loaded phrase. I am open to suggestions as to how to clarify the historical context. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 15:48, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * "Jewish Galilean" still has a contemporary meaning and does not make it clear that "healer" is being used in the "old" sense--JimWae 15:43, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Is that reason of Israel still known as Galilee? Of course, the contemporary definition of Judaism differs from the historical (prior to 70CE) definition. Which has also led to problems with the article Judaism's view of Jesus. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 15:48, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * You are welcome to check to see if these scholars use the exact word. I looked for the precise term and have listed at least one page in each work where it is used. In this case, the word itself is not summarized. It is the word they use.

 * If you wish to continue to argue this, please produce a reference to a qualified scholar who challenges it.

 * I'd also like to conduct an experiment. Why don't we, without identifying up front why, ask people around us "if I say so-and-so is a healer, what do I mean?" --CTSWyneken 16:13, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

There are two issues before us. First, was Jesus "really" a healer. I think we have dispensed with this issue because Wikipedia articles never make such claims about anyone, and the passage is summarizing the view of historians (&c.) Second, should we say "healer?" I continue to believe, firmly, that the answer is yes. If I were pushing for the word "medical doctor" or "physician" people would have good grounds to challenge me and I con't see how I could defend that position. But we are not saying he was a medical doctor. We are saying he was a healer, which is by definition a much more inclusive term. There is no reason for people to think that if he was a healer he was a medical doctor, because if that is what he was, we would say so. Moreover, as Haldrik points out, there continue to be many different kinds of healers in the modern world. We should keep the intro simple (I think here Str197 and I are on the same page). Yes, the historical and cultural context needs to be included. But, as with many other elements of the introduction, that context should come in the body of the article. In other words, I do not see any reason to debate whether or not cultural and historical context belongs in the article. It does. On this we agree. The issue is, where do we put this context. My answer is, in the body of the article and in linked articles. I believe I am just being consistent. The word "messiah" is in my opinion more contentious than "healer." But I have not been demanding that messiah be removed from the introduction or that all of the context necessary to know what messiah meant has to be put in the introduction - and if anyone made such a demand I would say the same thing: yes, we need this context, but it belongs in the body of the article and in linked articles, not the introduction. People have widely variant understandings of the meaning of "crucifixion" - divergent meanings that get at metaphysical and historical issues (by which I only mean to say, the question of the meaning of crucifixion and the fact that it means different things to different people) is not trivial, certainly no less complex or important than "healer," but we do not go into the different views and context in the first paragraph nor should we. As a rule, context and details belong in the body, not the intro. Slrubenstein  |  Talk 16:26, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Not to pat myself on the back, but I pointed out earlier that "healer" covers a broad range of social roles, and is in iteself a relatively neutral word (not connoting or denoting any supernatualism, and not commenting on the effectiveness of the person given the title)...it appears I was right. All this tapestry-weaving has paid off! :) --MonkeeSage 16:52, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Yes, you are correct, Slrubenstein is correct, Haldrik is correct, and CTSWyneken is correct. And yet people continue to object to the word "healer." Just as "Biblical scholar" is correct, yet people objected that "Biblical scholars and historians" was redundant because historians are also scholars. Just as some might have issues with "messiah" and "crucifixion" because of varying historical and theological connotations. Myself, I just think need to stop eating shoots and leaves. I believe there should be a way to state the words and phrases under contention that don't lead others to the wrong conclusion. I just don't have a good idea as to how to do this. I'll stop making bad suggestions now. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 17:31, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I don't even believe Jesus existed but as the word "healer" was explained to me in non supernatural terms and more importantly as the link definition is non supernatural even I don't object to the word - so what's the problem? SophiaTalk TCF 17:48, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * The problem is that JimWae continues to object. Rick Norwood raised the same objection you did, but when I pointed him to healer and our previous discussion, Rick came to the same conclusion that you did. However, JimWae objects that "the word ["healer"] is used in an artificially stipulative sense in the healer article." As Slburstein has stated, we can clarify the context in the body of the Jesus article, and I think this would be best in the "historical reconstruction" section; however, we have yet to do so. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 18:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Will most people looking for information on Jesus even know what "artificially stipulative" means? Homestarmy 20:04, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * They may not know the words but they'll understand the concept. It basically means that the words we use are defined the way we define them, but not everyone accepts the way we define them. The deeper issue is that many people are more familiar with the New Testament than they are with historical methodology. The NT does describe Jesus as someone who has the supernatural power to heal, but you almost have to be a Christian to believe that. The critical scholars take this as a reflection of Jesus' social role, a social role based on his own religious beliefs and those of his followers. Thus we have two different takes on the word "healer." Arch O. LaTalk TCF 21:00, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

 * Steve, et al: the article does not say that scholars agree he was the Messiah - it DOES say (a mix of) scholars agree he WAS a healer. This is needlessly ambiguous regarding whether or not he was a successful healer - and being successful (having a skill) is ordinarily a requirement, in contemporary language, for being described (without further semantic qualification), as a healer (unlike being a teacher or a priest). We should not be trying to "get away" with this wording. It would be far less misleading/controversial if "healer" were qualified in some way (perhaps that he "took on the role of a healer"). As you agree, the context cannot fit in the intro - that does not mean we should be content to say (misleading/confusing) things out-of-context in the intro. Some people will read the intro, see that it says scholars agree he WAS a healer & decide they are about to encounter a POV article & just stop reading. This article is not being peer-reviewed by historians, nor is it an article strictly for them. It is being peer-reviewed by scholars from many fields - and some have commented that the apparent POV (re "healer", at least) bothers them. If we agree the present wording lacks clarity because of missing context, perhaps we can agree to start to search for an alternative wording. (BTW, We would not have the same issue if the article said that the NT depicted him as a healer - as it did long, long ago) --JimWae 05:24, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

 * I have attempted an alternative just as you say above on the subpage - is anyone looking at the Talk:Jesus/2nd Paragraph Debate subpage? I'm not happy about having the same conversation in two places at once - is it normal to have active subpages? SophiaTalk TCF  08:05, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

 * To be honest, I like your clarification of "healer," I just dispute a different part of your proposal. As for subpages, I think CTSWyneken started this practice because some discussions just got to be too bloody long. If you have 100k on one issue, other discussion tends to be drowned out. However, I for one don't see a problem with keeping the most recent discussion on the main talk page. Obviously some of us do read the subpages, and just as obviously some of us do not. Arch O. LaTalk TCF 20:06, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

 * A possible solution is to say "The parts of the NT portrayal of Jesus that nearly all scholars (including secular ones) agree on is , that he took the role of a Jewish teacher and healer (mostly in the region of Judea), that he was crucified .. " - problems arise with "King of Judeans vs King of the Jews, however & that might need to be dropped from the intro. --JimWae 20:23, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

title: Talk:Jesus/2nd Paragraph Debate/4


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Fox River Valley Conference

The result of the debate was delete. Mailer Diablo 01:18, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

Fox River Valley Conference
nn high school athletic league.Blnguyen | Have your say!!! 00:25, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete per nom. - the.crazy.russian   (T)   (C)   (E)  01:36, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete, clubcruft. Roy  boy cr ash  fan  [[Image:Flag_of_Texas.svg|30px]] 01:44, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete as non-notable athletic organization -- T B C [[Image:Confused-tpvgames.gif|18px|]] ???  ???   ??? 02:13, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete per above. --Khoikhoi 04:08, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete, nn. --Ter e nce Ong 13:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete per nom --Focoe 15:37, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
 * Delete per nom. Oliver Keenan 20:42, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

source: wikimedia

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
User:Vuara/Protothought

http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/~jim/berlin.paper.html

Protothought had no logical names

James R Hurford, Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, Linguistics Department, University of Edinburgh In New Essays on the Origin of Language edited by Jürgen Trabant. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin. pp.119-132. Note: This HTML version may differ slightly from the printed version; the printed version is the `authorized' version.)

1 Introduction

The evolutionary history of any complex system, such as human cognition, or the human language capacity, necessarily starts with something simpler1. It is accepted as a working hypothesis that a precursor of modern human capacity for complex syntactic language was a capacity for protolanguage (Bickerton, 1990), a kind of communication system with no syntax. In protolanguage, although words may have been uttered in short sequences, there were no rules defining wellformedness of strings, and therefore words in protolanguage could not be said to belong to separate syntactic classes, such as Noun or Verb.

A view commonly encountered about the emergence of true syntactic language is that, during the protolanguage period, there existed a somewhat complex system of mental representation, capable of representing the structure of events with their participant agents and patients. In this view, the move to syntactic language was in large part an externalization of this pre-existing system of representation. ``The mechanism [of syntax] was there all the time, but it was not being used for language.'' (Bickerton, 1998:350) Let us call such a system of mental representation `protothought'. It is often assumed that the structure of this protothought was something like Predicate Calculus (but possibly without quantifiers).

2 Predicate Logic, Semantics and Psychology

Assuming something like a modern Predicate Calculus form of mental representation for our pre-linguistic ancestors actually attributes to them at least a five-way distinction between types of atomic mental entities, as the following simple formulae illustrate.

CAME(john)      [translation: `John came']

x[TALL(x) & MAN(x) & CAME(x)] [translation: `A tall man came']

In such representations, one has to distinguish the following types of atomic element, each of which functions in the representations in a distinctive way and relates to external meanings in a distinctive way:

 * predicates (e.g. CAME, TALL),
 * individual constants (e.g. john),
 * individual variables (e.g. x),
 * connectives (e.g. &),
 * quantifiers (e.g. ).

The proposals which derive the basics of modern syntactic structure from such pre-linguistic mental representations are seldom fully explicit on points of detail, but typically seem to assume that individual constants are the evolutionary sources of Proper Nouns, and perhaps also of Common Nouns, while the predicate constants are the sources of Verbs. One account which is completely explicit on this point is found in the computer models of Kirby (2000a, 2000b), and here is it clear that individual constants are the evolutionary source of what emerge as Proper Nouns, and predicate constants the source of Verbs.

Such an apparatus for prelinguistic mental representation is implausibly rich. I will argue that a reduced apparatus is more plausible. Specifically, in the proposed less complex format for mental representations, there are only

predicates individual variables, but no individual constants, just one connective, namely conjunction, `&' just one quantifier, the existential, `', implicit in all representations. The implication of this proposal is that formulae such as the first given above, CAME(john), were not available as pre-linguistic mental representations, specifically because they contain individual constants. Why do I believe that individual constants cannot be justified as elements of mental representation pre-existing language? A brief look at the place of Predicate Logic in modern scholarship will help to set the scene.

The originators of modern logical calculi did not intend them to be taken as psychological entities in any way. Frege, for example, was averse to `psychologism', believing that the private concepts of individual people are beyond investigation. The central tradition stemming from Frege interprets logical formulae by a direct relationship with a presumed objectively given world, thus bypassing any psychological stage which might be located in the mind/brain of a user. In this view, meaning is a relation between (logical) language and the world; no mind intervenes or mediates in this relationship between language and the world. ``According to Montague, the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of natural languages are branches of mathematics, not of psychology.'' (Thomason, 1974:2) This approach to meaning has been characterized (and criticized) by Lakoff (1988:119-154) as `objectivist semantics'.

The designers of the Predicate Calculus assumed, surely correctly, that the world contains individual objects, such as the sun, the moon, particular people, dogs, cats, tables and chairs and so forth. These individual objects are the denotata of the individual constants in logical formulae, such as john. Since, in this tradition, no minds mediate the relation between language and the world, the function which assigns denotations to individual constants is merely stipulated; it is typically explained by the author of a text on logic with enough ordinary-language prose to make the idea of an inherent, or stipulated, link between the logical name and the object it denotes clear enough to the reader. Often, the author conjures up some fictitious little world, with fictional characters in it, and can be confident that a reader will get the idea. Textbooks2 and more advanced accounts of meaning in logic assume that giving a real semantics to sentences involves mapping them to an assumed objective world, without involving any psychological entities such as concepts, thoughts or ideas.

When linguists began to build generative models of languages including their semantics, it seemed appropriate to assume that the classical and simple languages of logic, such as Predicate Calculus, could be taken in their entirety and used as mental representations of meaning, much as standard IPA phonetic transcriptions can be used to represent pronunciation. Generative grammar, as indeed most modern schools of linguistics, aims to model linguistic competence, that is psychological representations of language in speakers' heads. But it cannot be safely assumed that a formalism, such as Predicate Logic, that was not designed to suit psychologistic purposes, will be appropriate for such purposes. A semanticist who accords psychological reality to semantic representations (e.g. logical formulae), faces not only the task of stating what in the world the components of these representations map onto, but also the task of accounting for how these mappings could come to be known by the language user.

Theorists of language evolution who assume something like Predicate Calculus representations pre-existing language in the minds of early hominids also face the problem of accounting for the mappings between the mental entities, such as predicates and individual constants, and parts of the world. An account of how mental predicates (e.g. LITTLE, GREEN, MAN) come to be mapped onto properties of the world is, I claim, relatively unproblematic, whereas an account of how mental individual constants (e.g. john, mary) come to be mapped onto particular individuals is, I will argue, impossibly problematic.

3 Perception and Cognition of Objects

It is crucial to distinguish between perception and cognition. Mental representations of events and their participants are involved differently in these two psychological processes. Let us start with perception, or more precisely `perception-as'.

3.1 Perception

3.1.1 Unfocussed perception

Some experiences come uninvited. A creature may notice a particular smell, or feel cold, or hear thunder. In prelinguistic hominids, these experiences would undoubtedly have caused different reactions, and can be regarded as separate mental predicates whose denotations are the classes of stimuli giving rise to them. In hearing thunder, or noticing a smell, the perceiver perceives only the smell or the thunder; no other object or person is perceived. Such perceptions can be represented schematically as isolated zero-place predicates, as in

SMELL31

COLD

THUNDER

These could be paraphrased in modern English as `There is a certain smell (around here)', `It's cold', and `Ah, thunder'. Note the lack of any contentful grammatical subjects in these paraphrases.

If the creature has no language, there is no question of these categories being connected with any words. I assume that non-linguistic creatures have representations which involve mental categories, and that they are able to judge whether or not perceived objects belong in these categories. Such mental categories are partitions of an innately given structured space of possible categories, acquired through experience. Activation of different categories, whether by immediate experience or by rumination, will stimulate different patterns of behaviour; this is what enables non-linguistic creatures to behave systematically in relation to the world. Our imagined creature carries such categories as SMELL31, COLD, and THUNDER in its mind somehow. Their existence in its mind has been distally triggered by its previous experiences. In the act of perception, these categories are reactivated.

3.1.2 Attending to perceived objects

We now bring particular objects into the discussion. For concreteness, let's say a creature looks, with some attentive deliberation, at a fresh green sycamore leaf. In this case, the focus of attention is the leaf itself, which is an object in the world. In attending to it, and judging it to be a green leaf, the creature applies certain mental categories to it, which we can relatively safely represent as the mental predicates GREEN and LEAF. Let us assume that this much is possible, the creature's species having evolved to be able to recognize greenness and the class of leaves.

Just as with thunder and coldness, the categories GREEN and LEAF are carried in the creature's mind somehow, having been planted there by its previous contacts with the world. In the act of perceiving a green leaf, these mental categories are brought to bear on an object of attention in the external world. It is natural, for illustrative purposes, to represent the principal elements in such an act of perception by a formula such as3:

GREEN(x) & LEAF(x)

where x denotes the real-world object attended to, and the predicates correspond to the mental categories which the creature judges to apply to this object. Such a formula, then, has a mixed, partly external objective, partly mental, semantics. This is appropriate, because an episode of `perception-as' is an encounter between mental categories and real-world objects. The x in the formula is essentially deictic (or `indexical'). It is not the constant name of any particular object. It only stands, in this convenient expository representation of an act of perception, for whatever object happens to be the object of perception. If, on yet another occasion, the creature sees a different green leaf, the same representation as before, `GREEN(x) & LEAF(x)', would be appropriate, as this is another act of perceiving an object as a green leaf. If I may call this x a variable, it is attention that associates the variable with a real perceived object in the world.

The same mental predicate can be either a zero-place predicate or a one-place predicate, depending on whether the stimulus comes from an object to which the perceiver is attending. Thus if the creature deliberately sniffed the leaf, its perception might also include SMELL31(x).

There is a fuzzy borderline between attention to a specific object and awareness of ambient impressions. Attention involves selection of one source of stimulation over others which have an equally good chance of being selected, or attended to. A creature might decide to have a good look at a hole in a tree, as opposed to the tree's bark, or an upper branch. A hole in a tree is something of a size that one can reasonably pay selective attention to. Compare this with a large cave, especially one in which the creature is sitting. As the cave is all around it, it is not clear whether to count a perceptual judgement about the cave as an unfocussed perception or the perception of an object attended to, that is whether this should be represented as4

DARK(x) & CAVE(x) & SMELLY(x)

or as

DARK & CAVE & SMELLY

It will pose no problem to the account proposed here if we allow that mental representations cannot be fully determined, or theorized about, in all cases. Either the creature represents its perceptions as simply ambient (the zero-place case) or more specifically about the place it is sitting in, as opposed to some other place it has chosen not to attend to (the one-place case).

3.2 Cognition: Representing previously perceived objects

We move now to cognition. The important aspect of cognition, for our purposes, is the memory, or store, of experiences which are no longer current. Consider how the non-linguistic creature, while not actually perceiving a green leaf, stores in memory the fact that it did once see a green leaf. When objects are no longer attended to, the association of an external object with an attention variable is lost, because it is the very act of attention which brings about this association. In the transition from perception to cognition (i.e. the process of putting into memory), then, the variable loses its former (extensional) meaning. The creature can remember that it once had a `GREEN(x) & LEAF(x)' experience, but there is now nothing pointing, as attention once did, to the object itself. The closest that Predicate Calculus can get to this is formulae with existential quantifiers, like:

For any x [GREEN(x) & LEAF(x)]

For any x [DARK(x) & DAMP(x) & SMELLY(x) & CAVE(x)]

The second formula here might be paraphrased as `(I remember) there was a dark damp smelly cave'. Memory of complex experiences (but not involving more than one object) is captured by conjunctions of such atomic proposition-predicates. Each conjunction, or bundle of features, is a separate entry in the mental database, a memory of a separate experienced event.

Implicit in this account, and the central plank of the whole argument, is the theme that in prelinguistic cognition there are no components of mental representation with the logical status of individual constants, i.e. elements that, as the philosophers say, allow their possessors to re-identify particulars with absolute reliability.

3.2.1 There are No Particulars in Animal Cognition

The individuals most important us are our near kin, mothers and babies. The following quotation demonstrates the prima facie attraction of the impression that animals distinguish such individuals, but simultaneously gives the game away.

“The speed with which recognition of individual parents can be acquired is illustrated by the `His Master's Voice' experiments performed by Stevenson et al. (1970) on young terns: these responded immediately to tape-recordings of their own parents (by cheeping a greeting, and walking towards the loudspeaker) but ignored other tern calls, even those recorded from other adult members of their own colony.” (Walker, 1983:215)

Obviously, the tern chicks in the experiment were not recognizing their individual parents --- they were being fooled into treating a loudspeaker as a parent tern. For the tern chick, anything which behaved sufficiently like its parent was `recognized' as its parent, even if it wasn't. The tern chicks were responding to very finely-grained properties of the auditory signal, and apparently neglecting even the most obvious of visual properties discernible in the situation. In tern life, there usually aren't human experimenters playing tricks with loudspeakers, and so terns have evolved to discriminate between auditory cues just to the extent that they can identify their own parents with a high degree of reliability. Even terns presumably sometimes get it wrong. “ ... animals respond in mechanical robot-like fashion to key stimuli. They can usually be `tricked' into responding to crude dummies that resemble the true, natural stimulus situation only partially, or in superficial respects.” (Krebs and Dawkins, 1984:384)

A creature can appear to recognize a particular individual reliably if it gets sensory impressions which are fine-grained enough to distinguish this individual from others with which it is likely to come into contact. To manage successfully in `recognizing its mother', a creature need not have a mental distinction between individual and property; all that is needed is the ability to distinguish just the set of properties which in practice differentiates its mother from other candidates.

English dictionaries often distinguish two senses of the word recognize, as below:

1 If you recognize someone or something, you know who someone is or what someone is when you see them or hear them, because you have seen them or heard them before. EG She didn't recognize me at first ... 2 If you recognize something ... you are able to identify it when you see it, for example because you have learned about it or had some previous exoerience of it. EG They are specially trained to recognize the symptoms of radiation sickness ... There was a field planted with what he recognized as maize. (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary) This lexicographic distinction rests on the ontological distinction between individuals (or particulars5 ) and universals. The central claim here is that prelinguistic creatures could not have had mental representations containing elements corresponding to particular individuals; they could only recognize things in sense 2 above, but not in sense 1.

3.2.2 Individual particulars, universal properties

Prelinguistic creatures could not have been able to reidentify particulars with absolute reliability, because, in fact, neither can we. Given what we know about the world, it is, in the limit, impossible. This is not to deny that much of the time we are quite successful at reidentifying particulars, especially where it matters. But situations where reidentification is impossible are also common. For instance, every morning I pick up a bottle of milk from my doorstep. If I have a backlog of undrunk milk from previous days, I add today's bottle to the two or three that are already in the fridge in a particular spatial sequence, so that I know which is which. If someone disturbs my milk filing system, then I no longer know which is which, because I cannot reidentify particulars6. Where it really matters to us to keep individuals apart, we either mark them somehow (as with my milk filing system), or we develop more refined perceptual categories, so that we can remember the difference between individuals in terms of their slightly different properties. This presumably why humans are so proficient at face-recognition. But it is both impossible and unnecessary to refine ones perceptual categories to the point where every individual object is distinguishable from all others. One paperclip is much the same as another, as are sheets of paper, grains of sand, freshman students, and so on.

The argument above has concentrated on the difficulty with logical individual constants as components of mental representations. The impression may have been given that logical predicates are not problematic in the same way. Philosophers have emphasized to me that, in the limit, predicates are also subject to similar problems. Putnam's Twin Earth argument (Putnam, 1975:223-247) establishes that there could be objectively (i.e. from a God's eye view) two different sorts of stuff that we label water. Our concept of water could fit both kinds of stuff, and the stuff that is chemically XYZ could, to all intents and purposes, serve exactly the same range of purposes as the stuff that is chemically H2O. We wouldn't know the difference. In Putnam's (1975:222) words, ``Extension is not determined by psychological state''.

There is, however, a great practical difference between an ability to reidentify particulars (such as the very lion who was stalking me yesterday) and an ability to reidentify universals (such as lions in general), and hence a great practical difference between individual constants and predicates.

Invariant factors in the environment in which humans have evolved have given rise to our perceptual space, and the discriminability of regions within it. The species has evolved to see just the colours it can see, hear just the sounds it can hear, smell just the sounds it can smell, and so forth. Despite some individual variation, the same inputs from the world trigger broadly similar perceptions in everyone, across a wide range of possible inputs. More importantly, there are relatively few cases in which objectively7 disjoint stimuli trigger the same perception. Putnam mentions such a case: ``Although the Chinese do not recognize a difference, the term `jade' applies to two minerals: jadeite and nephrite. Chemically, there is a marked difference. Jadeite is a combination of sodium and aluminum. Nephrite is made of calcium, magnesium, and iron. These two quite different microstructures produce the same unique textural qualities!'' (Putnam, 1975:241) Examples such as it jade pose no problem for a theory that prelinguistic creatures could have had mental predicates corresponding to various classes of stimuli. Their mental predicates would have had a perceptual and functional basis. If it looks like a duck, sounds like a duck, smells like a duck, feels like a duck and tastes like a duck, it is a duck.

Properties are procedurally prior to individuals. That is, we use an object's properties to try to determine which individual it is. We humans are often obsessed by this question of which individual is presenting itself to us. We can never be certain, but we get as close as we can by finer and finer subclassifications of the properties we are observing. In life's ongoing calculation of `what is happening', the fundamental empirical premises are the properties which the world presents to us. The conceptual identities of individuals appear only in our conclusions.

Central to the concept of an individual are the related ideas of uniqueness and spatiotemporal continuity. These are not part of the idea of a property. Many things are red, in different places at the same time. But an individual cannot be in two places at once. Consequently, the evidence needed to assign the same property (a mental predicate) on different occasions is weaker than the evidence needed to conclude that something is the very same individual. To assign a property, in many cases all we need is the evidence of our senses. ``No doubt about it, this is green.'' But without keeping a constant eye on an object, or insulating it somehow, we can never be sure that it hasn't been replaced by a twin, a different individual.

3.3 Language hints at knowable identity

Modern human languages contain devices which are interpreted as if the reidentification of particulars posed no problem. Proper names are the prime example. But in fact our ordinary usage with proper names is more rough and ready than the usage of logicians with individual constants. We all know many people called Jim, and usually the context of the speech situation clarifies which Jim we are talking about. Thus Jim is in fact only a shorthand for whichever of the people who have been regularly labelled `Jim' in the experience of the interlocutors is most salient in this context. Clearly, Jim in English does not pick out a single individual, though doubtless there are some rare names which do happen to pick out single individuals. But we would not wish to distinguish logically or grammatically between different proper names on the basis of their relative rarity of application. Markers of definiteness, like English the, are also basically shorthand for whichever of the things concerned is most salient in this context.

Individual objects are less enduring over time than properties. The objects to which proper names are most commonly attached, namely people, only live for a few generations. But almost all of the properties which we see in an individual person can be seen, in different combinations, in other people, long before and long after the brief span of the particular individual. Ars longa, vita brevis might be adapted to the case of properties and particulars, which is related to why, in philosophical discussion, properties are often called `universals'. The relative impermanence of particulars, as opposed to properties, undermines the utility of constant expressions for particulars in the continuing language of a community. Place-names are the most useful designators of enduring individual objects in modern languages, but our early ancestors would have had much less use for fixed place-names than we have. In any case, there is evidence that in modern languages, all place-names in fact derive historically from descriptions, that is from expressions involving property-terms, like the dark pool or the new castle. Probably, all person-names are ultimately so derived as well.

Linguistic devices suggest that humans are capable of mentally representing unique individuals, using the mental equivalent of logical individual constants. We might even grant, for the sake of this argument, that modern humans do have this capacity. But it is only language that pushes us toward this conclusion. Without an insight into our language, an outside observer of modern human behaviour could not tell that we are able to mentally represent particular individuals. We, in our turn, when we consider the minds of non-linguistic creatures, must adopt the simplest hypothesis compatible with the observed facts. There is no need to hypothesize mental individual constants in animal minds. When animals respond systematically to impressively finely graded stimuli, even to the extent of reliably recognizing what we human observers believe to be unique individuals, there is no need to postulate a special category of mental representation, individual constants. Finely graded predicates, or alternatively, conjunctions of less finely graded predicates, will do the job.

4 Social life without individual constants

We are considering the emergence of language with modern characteristics from pre-existing cognitive capacities in pre-linguistic creatures. I hope to have made the case that the cognitive representations available to pre-linguistic hominids for remembering the events of their lives are most unlikely to have contained the equivalent of logical individual constants. A more plausible form of pre-linguistic mental representation would have had only predicates, individual variables, a conjunctive connective and an implicit existential quantifier. The baby australopithecine or habiline would have had many stored memories of episodes involving its mother, many containing a form something like this:

SMELL31(x) & SQUAWK7(x) & WARM(x) & CUDDLY(x)

(Here and henceforth, the existential quantifier is omitted from such representations, as it can be taken as implicit. The variables, however, cannot be eliminated, as they are needed for representing memories of events involving several different objects.)

Our immediate prelinguistic ancestors certainly had complex social lives, as do modern chimpanzees. Expressing it in modern human terms, they remembered who were their friends and enemies, who was whose child, who had recently fought with whom, and who had groomed whom. But the whos in this last sentence tend to impose our modern logical analysis on the animals' behaviour. It is possible, with finely graded predicates, to represent as accurately as is necessary any of the information that australopithecines or habilines would have stored about members of their social group. That this is generally true is shown by a transformation that one can apply to any first-order logical formula containing individual constants, replacing the constants by corresponding (suitably fine-grained) predicates. For example,

CAME(john)

can be replaced by

CAME(x) & JOHN(x)

where JOHN is a predicate which is only satisfied by one individual. Of course, expressing it in terms of a predicate being ``only satisfied by one individual'' is again to express things from a modern, language-informed perspective. To a pre-linguistic hominid, as to a tern chick, it was only important that the mental predicate be specific enough to be reliable in all the circumstances in which it was likely to be used.

Two-place predications involving different individuals can be handled in this way, but with distinct variables. Thus Kanzi is Panbanisha's child could be represented as

KANZI(x) & PANBANISHA(y) & CHILD(x, y)

Clearly, representations without individual constants are sufficient to account for the Machiavellian intelligence of apes.

It is assumed here that our prelinguistic ancestors were capable of forming associations between different concepts, allowing inferences between thoughts involving different predicates. Thus

SMELL14(x) EDIBLE(x)

might have been a mental rule useful in foraging. Similarly, `portmanteau' predicates could have been created, abbreviating longer conjunctions of more basic predicates. Thus the baby australopithecine we mentioned earlier could have had a rule such as

[SMELL31(x) & SQUAWK7(x) & GAIT12(x)] MOTHER(x)

5 So what? How does this argument relate to other issues in the evolution of language?

The origin of syntax is a central problem. At the heart of syntactic structure is the Subject-Predicate dichotomy. So any claim about the origin of the Subject-Predicate dichotomy is central to theorizing about the origins of modern human language.

There are two tendencies in the search for explanations of features of language, whether these are evolutionary or otherwise. One tendency is to look in the direction of possibly innate, not necessarily communicatively functional, characteristics of the minds which gave rise to language. Bickerton, in particular, has stressed the representational function of language, as opposed to its communicative function. Accounts of the rise of Subject-Predicate structure from the `pre-existing representation' point of view assume a pre-existing dichotomy between two types of concepts, a predicate type, and a subject (or argument) type; individual constants are the principal instances of concepts of the subject/argument type. In this view, pre-existing propositional representations of Subject-Predicate form get rather straightforwardly translated into linguistic clauses with corresponding structure.

Such proposals push the question of the origin of Subject-Predicate structure back into pre-linguistic representations, and that is considered far enough to absolve the proposers from further explanation. But, as I claim to have shown, it is unnecessary to attribute such pre-existing mental structure to prelinguistic creatures; they could have got along fine without it, and so they probably did not have it.

The opposing tendency in linguistic explanation is to appeal to communicative function. Communicative function cannot be a consideration relevant to pre-linguistic (or pre-communicative) mental structure. Pressure from communicative function can only arise once mental representations are externalized in public conventionalized symbols. From this perspective, an alternative explanation for the origin of Subject-Predicate structure is communicatively functional Topic-Comment structure. It must be emphasized that Topic and Comment are not categories of classical (modern) logical systems. Topic and Comment are categories rooted in pragmatics, in the shared knowledge of speakers and hearers, and thus are not, and never have been, the concern of truth-conditionally oriented logicians.

The argument presented in this paper has been largely negative. I have argued that our prelinguistic ancestors could not have represented the world in terms of formulae involving individual constants, where these individual constants were destined to become the evolutionary antecedents of modern referring expressions by a process of externalization into public language.

This negative argument is a prelude to a positive argument, in which a mechanism will be shown whereby essentially communicative pressures gave rise to the emergence of modern Subject-Predicate structure, based on prior representations in which the only constants were predicates. In brief, some predicates became selected as prototypically serving a Topic function, while others became selected as prototypically serving a Comment function. And this happened concurrently with the emergence from protolanguage of longer, more coherent strings of words.

But, for now, that is another story.

Endnotes This is not to deny that evolution can sometimes simplify. But the dominant evolutionary trend is from simple to complex; and the original proto-systems were undoubtedly simple.

E.g. Cann, 1993; Guttenplan, 1997; McCawley, 1981.

To the best of my knowledge, the first use of such formulae, suggested as prelinguistic representations of meaning, is in Batali (2000).

For simplicity, I allow the connective & to conjoin more than two conjuncts; as we will not be dealing with disjunction, this will not affect the argument at all.

I use the terms interchangeably here.

My dairy does not datestamp its products.

Objectively, to the best of our current scientific knowledge, that is.

References

Batali, John 2000 The negotiation and acquisition of recursive grammars as a result of competition among exemplars. In Briscoe, E.J. (ed.) Linguistic Evolution through Language Acquisition: Formal and Computational Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bickerton, Derek 1990 Language and Species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bickerton, Derek 1998 Catastrophic evolution: the case for a single step from protolanguage to full human language. In Hurford, J.R., M.Studdert-Kennedy, and C.Knight (eds.), Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases, 341-358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kirby, Simon 2000a Learning, bottlenecks and the evolution of recursive syntax. In Briscoe, E.J. (ed) Linguistic Evolution through Language Acquisition: Formal and Computational Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirby, Simon 2000b Syntax without natural selection: how compositionality emerges from vocabulary in a population of learners. In Knight, C., M. Studdert-Kennedy and Hurford, J.R. (eds) The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social Function and the Origins of Linguistic Form, 302-323. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Stevenson, J., R.E.Hutchison, J.Hutchison, B.L.R.Bertram, and W.H.Thorpe 1970 Individual recognition by auditory cues in the Common Tern (Sterna hirundo), Nature, 226:562-563.

Thomason, Richard 1974 Introduction to Thomason, R. (ed.) Formal Philosophy: Selected papers of Richard Montague. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by grant [No.R000237551] from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, and by a Fellowship at the Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study. I have benefitted from helpful comments and advice from John Batali, Manfred Bierwisch, Peter Carruthers, Terry Deacon, Daniel Dor, Dan Nettle, Bruce MacLennan, Luc Steels, and Paul Taylor, but don't blame them for any faults in the paper.

title: User:Vuara/Protothought