| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_016542)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_016542" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 5668 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| Page 33 of 42 |
| 103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *908 |
| rationale that oversight of prosecutors lies in the political process rather than judicial enforcement of legal parameters for |
| charging. |
| 218 Third, popular and political pressure has succeeded in redressing some underenforcement practices by |
| prosecutors (and police) when victim groups, or issues tied to specific offenses, achieve political potency. Intoxicated driving is |
| perhaps the best example of harmful wrongdoing about which many enforcement agencies have successfully revised their |
| policies to increase enforcement. 219 Domestic violence and sexual assaults are other examples where enforcement shifts have |
| been more limited but still significant. |
| 220 |
| Responses by local agencies to this type of pressure have taken three basic forms. First, chief prosecutors adopted internal |
| office policies that mandate - or set a strong presumption for - [*909] prosecution of specific crimes when evidence is |
| sufficient. 221 Second, prosecutors get specialized training on how to address the particular challenges posed by specific kinds |
| of cases such as domestic violence or sexual assault. 222 Finally, many offices have established dedicated, in-house units of |
| prosecutors who specialize in these same kinds of crimes. 223 States legislatures have encouraged these reforms, |
| virtually everywhere, the adoption, content, and enforcement of policies is left to local chief prosecutors. No legislation sets |
| specific charging criteria, authorized judicial review, or gives enforceable rights to victims. |
| 225 |
| These responses to underenforcement are meaningful, but their form is more political than legal. They are the kinds of |
| responses produced by a system of electorally accountable prosecutors and legislatures. 226 Often they are in large part |
| attributable to successful political efforts by advocacy groups. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for example, |
| successfully urged reforms of laws and enforcement practices against intoxicated driving. 227 Feminist groups and women's |
| advocates play important, ongoing roles in reforming police and prosecution policies, substantive criminal laws, and evidence |
| rules for domestic [*910] violence and sexual assault offenses. |
| 228 These efforts have succeeded in changing attitudes, |
| professional cultures, and enforcement practices in police and prosecution agencies that had contributed to underenforcement in |
| these areas. |
| 229 Prosecution units specializing in offenses such as domestic violence, for example, strengthen professional |
| culture committed to enforcement by attracting lawyers who share that commitment and who develop expertise to act on it. |
| 230 |
| https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract_id= 3095741. Without grounds for federal jurisdiction - such as conduct involving |
| interstate travel or occurring on federal property - sexual assaults and other violent offenses are the exclusive province of state officials. Kim, |
| supra, at 277. For examples of the limits built into federal offenses, see18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2016) (knowingly recruiting or enticing |
| minors to engage in commercial sex acts); 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2016) (prohibiting travel in interstate commerce for purpose of engaging in |
| illicit sexual conduct with minor females). |
| 150 The scholarly literature on public corruption is considerable. For a short overview of the debate and the federal law, see David Mills & |
| Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar Crime, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1377-94 (2008). For longer treatments, |
| see generally Political Corruption: A Handbook (Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989) (compiling comparative scholarly work on |
| political corruption); Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption: A Handbook (Paul M. Heywood ed., 2015) (focusing on international and |
| comparative corruption issues). |
| 151 See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (describing quid pro quo requirement for federal bribery offense, 18 |
| U.S.C. § 201, in relation to extortion and honest-services fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. S$1951(a) & 1346, used to prosecute corruption by state |
| officials); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407-09 (2010) (clarifying quid pro quo requirements for bribery and kickback conduct in |
| honest-services fraud prosecutions). |
| 152 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (criminalizing bribes and gratuities); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing theft or bribery related to |
| federally funded programs); 18 U.S.C.S$1341, 1343, 1346 (2016) (criminalizing mail, wire, and "honest services" fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 |
| (2012) (criminalizing extortion "under color of official right"). |
| 153 See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Only Three States Score Higher Than D+ in State Integrity Investigation; 11 Flunk, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, |
| https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18693/only-three-states-score-higher-d-state -integrity-investigation-11-flunk (last updated Nov. |
| 23, 2015) (scoring states and explaining methodology; all but three states scored a "D+" or below on A-to-F scale); see also Corruption |
| https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption |
| perceptions _index_2016#table (ranking 174 countries by corruption scores; the United States ranked eighteenth). On the challenges facing |
| corruption measures, see generally Staffan Andersson, Beyond Unidimensional Measurement of Corruption, 19 Pub. Integrity 58 (2017) |
| (analyzing the challenges posed by treating corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon); Adriana S. Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring |
| Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence From Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions, 18 Pub. Integrity 127 (2016) |
| DAVID SCHOEN |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_016542 |
| |
