| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011899)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011899" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 2728 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| / BARAK / 142 |
| US. No matter how we might explain our attack, with the joint exercises soon to |
| begin, it would come over as a deliberate attempt to implicate our most important |
| ally in a potential conflict with Iran, against the explicit wishes of President |
| Obama. I felt this even more strongly when, a few weeks later, I was contacted by |
| one of Bibi's close political allies. He sounded me out on the possibility of |
| launching our strike against Iran after the joint exercise: barely two weeks before |
| the 2012 US election. Politically, he argued, Obama would then feel compelled to |
| support Israel's action, or at the very least to refrain from criticizing it. In other |
| words, we would be setting a political trap for the President of the United States. I |
| couldn't quite believe he was suggesting it. But my reply to this last-gasp |
| suggestion of a way for us to attack the Iranian sites required no hesitation, and |
| only two words: "No way." |
| Bibi would have known I would oppose such a ploy. But as with so much else |
| in the years I spent in his government, I think it was the politics of the scheme, |
| more than the substance, that enticed him. Almost everything he did seemed |
| increasingly about creating a kind of grand narrative to secure his position on the |
| right, solidifying a base which he figured would sustain him in office. At its core, |
| the narrative presented a picture of vulnerability and victimhood: a kind of |
| "fortress Israel" threatened by terror, missiles on its northern and southern borders, |
| and now potential nuclear annihilation from Iran, while our main ally, the United |
| States, was under the sway of a President who neither understood nor |
| fundamentally supported us. In day-to-day policy terms, this allowed Bibi to insist |
| we couldn't risk serious engagement with the Palestinians. On domestic issues as |
| well, like the widening gap between those at the top of our high-tech economy and |
| a painfully squeezed middle class, the sense of crisis he encouraged gave him |
| license to hunker down, warn of impending doom, and do virtually nothing. |
| Effective though the narrative was for him politically, it bore no resemblance to |
| reality. Yes, President Obama disagreed with us on issues of policy, both the peace |
| process and on how to deal with Iran. But he was unquestionably committed to |
| America's alliance with Israel. I had dealt face-to-face with four US presidents: |
| both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli |
| security, none had proved as consistently supportive and helpful as Obama. And |
| yes, Israel did face an array of security challenges. A nuclear-armed Iran would |
| undeniably make things worse. But far from being under existential threat, we |
| 428 |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011899 |
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|
