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| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020460)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020460" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
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| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| Introduction |
| For three and a half decades following the end of the Maoist era, China adhered to |
| Deng Xiaoping's policies of "reform and opening to the outside world" and "peaceful |
| development." After Deng retired as paramount leader, these principles continued to |
| guide China's international behavior in the leadership eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. |
| Admonishing Chinese to "keep your heads down and bide your time," these Party leaders |
| sought to emphasize that China's rapid economic development and its accession to "great |
| power" status need not be threatening to either the existing global order or the interests |
| of its Asian neighbors. However, since Party general secretary Xi Jinping came to power in |
| 2012, the situation has changed. Under his leadership, China has significantly expanded |
| the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. These policies not |
| only seek to redefine China's place in the world as a global player, but they also have put |
| forward the notion of a "China option" (#E5*) that is claimed to be a more efficient |
| developmental model than liberal democracy. |
| While Americans are well acquainted with China's quest for influence through the projection |
| of diplomatic, economic, and military power, we are less aware of the myriad ways Beijing |
| has more recently been seeking cultural and informational influence, some of which could |
| undermine our democratic processes. These include efforts to penetrate and sway-through |
| various methods that former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull summarized as |
| "covert, coercive or corrupting" —a range of groups and institutions, including the Chinese |
| American community, Chinese students in the United States, and American civil society |
| organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, and media.' |
| Some of these efforts fall into the category of normal public diplomacy as pursued by many |
| other countries. But others involve the use of coercive or corrupting methods to pressure |
| individuals and groups and thereby interfere in the functioning of American civil and |
| political life. |
| It is important not to exaggerate the threat of these new Chinese initiatives. China has not |
| sought to interfere in a national election in the United States or to sow confusion or inflame |
| polarization in our democratic discourse the way Russia has done. For all the tensions in the |
| relationship, there are deep historical bonds of friendship, cultural exchange, and mutual |
| inspiration between the two societies, which we celebrate and wish to nurture. And it is |
| imperative that Chinese Americans-who feel the same pride in American citizenship as do |
| other American ethnic communities—not be subjected to the kind of generalized suspicion |
| or stigmatization that could lead to racial profiling or a new era of McCarthyism. However, |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020460 |
| |
