| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 2020 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| 31 |
| know about their capabilities and the situation. They begin taking |
| concrete steps along the path that they think will get them to that end. |
| They learn far too slowly that what they initially thought they knew |
| was in fact wrong or no longer relevant. ... Things can get much |
| more convoluted by adding allies, different influential actors among |
| the polity, and multiple adversaries. This is why wars are easier to get |
| into than out of. 15 |
| Knowing when to end a war relates to war aims and measures of |
| success. A war's aims should be definitive enough so that success can |
| be measured in some clear way. This is easiest to do where the aims |
| concern discrete things such as the destruction of material targets. |
| Measuring success becomes harder as aims become more political |
| and psychological, such as weakening or toppling a regime, |
| encouraging opposition or deterring further action. Then, too, war |
| aims can expand as fighting escalates or broadens. In a situation in |
| which Iran has retaliated strongly and managed to inflict losses |
| (especially civilian losses) on the United States or its coalition |
| partners, we should expect to hear calls to inflict more damage, to |
| punish the regime and its forces, to bring a "decisive" end to the |
| conflict. |
| Short of inflicting a total defeat on Iran, an outcome that seems |
| scarcely conceivable, exiting the war could be challenging if Iran |
| chooses to fight on in some form of asymmetric conflict. We might |
| then have to compel Iran to quit, and that could potentially require |
| the application of force well beyond what was originally agreed upon |
| within the United States or with coalition partners. Even then, if the |
| Iranian regime survives at all, it is likely to declare victory, and many |
| of its supporters would believe it. How or when a war with Iran |
| would actually end is therefore no easy topic to nail down. Any attack |
| on Iran of sufficient scale to significantly damage its nuclear program |
| would have rolling consequences both in the short and long term. |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115 |
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|
