| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020263)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020263" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 3316 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| 111 |
| With three notable exceptions, the flights to them had stopovers in a country that was an ally of |
| the US, and which could seize Snowden. The three exceptions were China, North Korea (via |
| China) and Russia. |
| The only one of these three countries, or any other country, that Snowden is known to have |
| dealt with directly during his 33 day stay in Hong Kong, was Russia. As previously discussed, he |
| had dealings with Russian "diplomatic representatives", as Putin called them. Putin did not |
| provide the date of these contacts but he provided an intriguing clue. Snowden was identified to |
| him, according to Putin, not by name but merely as an "agent of special services." Putin's |
| description suggests the meeting had taken place before Snowden became a household name on |
| June 9, 2013. |
| For his part, Snowden was evasive when discussing his contacts with Russia while still in |
| Hong Kong. When Lana Lam asked Snowden on June 12, 2013 whether he had already |
| requested asylum from the Russia government, he deferred, saying: "My only comment is that I |
| am glad there are governments that refuse to be intimidated by great power." As it turned out, |
| Snowden was correct. The Russian government was not intimidated by the threats of reprisals by |
| the United States, as the Obama Administration would learn after his arrival in Russia on June 23, |
| 2013. But the only way that Snowden could not have known that fact on June 12" was by being |
| in contact with Russian officials prior to his interview with Lam. Of course, he may have had |
| multiple contacts on different dates with these officials. The Russian pro-government |
| newspaper Kommersant reported that Snowden had visited the Russian consulate on more than |
| one occasion and had been given a birthday celebration there on June 21, 2013. |
| What we do know about Snowden's interactions with the Russians in Hong Kong comes partly |
| from Putin's own description of them. Putin said, it will be recalled, that his decision to facilitate |
| Snowden's escape to Russia had been kicked all the way up the Russian chain of command for |
| him to personally decide Snowden's fate. Presumably, this decision-making process began earlier |
| than June 21, 2013, when he reportedly came to the consulate. The question is: how much |
| earlier? Since Snowden had arrived in Hong Kong on May 20*h, |
| ", 2013, his contacts with Russian |
| officials could have occurred as long as a month earlier. That would fit in with Snowden telling |
| Gellman on May 24" that he needed his help in dealing with the diplomatic mission of an unnamed |
| country. In any case, Putin tells us he learned an American "agent of the special services" had |
| contacted Russian diplomats because he wanted assistance. And Snowden did need assistance to |
| escape from Hong Kong. As he had no visas, he would require the sort of assistance that could |
| only be provided by a government willing to defy the United States. The assistance came from |
| Russia. |
| Nine days before Snowden boarded Aeroflot flight SU213 to Moscow on June 23rd |
| , the US had |
| filed a criminal complaint against him. It had also alerted Hong Kong authorities and Interpol |
| when it unsealed the complaint on June 21, 2013. And on June 21st it had invalidated his U.S. |
| passport (although he still had it in his possession at the Hong Kong Airport.) Since by this time |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020263 |
| |
