| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011733)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011733" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 2858 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| "single territorial unit" under Oslo. In essence, and very probably in name, this |
| meant a Palestinian state. I wasn't opposed to that in principle, if it was in return |
| for a full and final peace. But the Oslo process meant that we would be handing |
| back land, and control over security, in an ever-larger portion of territory before |
| we'd reached any so-called permanent-status agreement. In fact, before we even |
| knew whether that would prove possible. It wasn't "land for peace." It was land |
| for the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem |
| Yitzhak had faced over the Americans' misuse of our "pocket deposit" on the |
| Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the |
| government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord. |
| But he did say he thought the points I'd raised were important, which I took as |
| meaning he was comfortable with my raising it with the cabinet. |
| I spoke near the end of the four-hour cabinet meeting to ratify the Gaza- |
| Jericho plan. The ministers seemed attentive as I ran through the security |
| concerns I'd raised with Rabin, even nodding when I compared the agreement's |
| security provisions to "a piece of Swiss cheese, only with more holes." But then |
| I said that I wanted to say a few words which I recognized were beyond my |
| responsibility as chief of staff. "I'm speaking just as an Israeli citizen," I told |
| the cabinet, "and as a former head of military intelligence." Referring to specific |
| provisions in Oslo, and in the Camp David framework agreed by Begin and |
| Sadat 15 years earlier, I said it was important for ministers to realize that, even |
| though permanent-status issues were yet to be resolved, "you will be taking us |
| nearly the whole way toward creating a Palestinian state, based on the |
| internationally accepted reading of Camp David." The reaction to my comments |
| was a mix of defensiveness and hostility. In the latter camp were ministers from |
| Rabin's left-wing coalition partners, Meretz, who seemed especially angry |
| when I quoted from Camp David. The Prime Minister motioned them for calm. |
| "Ehud had a responsibility to talk about security questions, and we had a |
| responsibility to listen. As for his additional remarks, they are not a surprise to |
| me," he said. "He made these points to me, and I said he could repeat them here. |
| It is right that he should raise them." He said there was no need for ministers to |
| agree with me, but that it was proper that the points I'd raised should be heard. |
| Many clearly didn't agree with me, or simply believed the Gaza-Jericho |
| agreement still had to be ratified, which it was. But my remarks did lay the |
| groundwork for my objection to the next, more far-reaching stage in the Oslo |
| process barely a year later. By then, I was no longer chief of staff. I was a |
| member of Rabin's cabinet. |
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| _OVERSIGHT_011733 |
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