| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011719)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011719" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 2684 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| perfectly. No missiles would actually be shot. This stage was for the telemetry. |
| Once that was done, the soldier-actors would be replaced with wooden targets |
| and the real munitions would be tested. |
| The young soldiers stated chatting to one another, and milling about, |
| simulating as best we could the circumstances in which we expected to target |
| Saddam if the operation got final approval. In theory, within a minute, two |
| minutes at most, we would get word that the preliminary mock-firing sequence |
| had gone perfectly - at which point the artillery-range targets would be brought |
| in for the live test. But suddenly, there was an explosion. A split second of |
| silence. Then pandemonium. There was no need to know, and no time to |
| wonder, what exactly had gone wrong, or how it had been allowed to happen. It |
| was obvious to all of us that the live missiles had been fired. We sprinted |
| forward. When we got to the group of soldiers, we could see that four of the |
| young men were dead. Another was fighting for his life. Several others were |
| also wounded. |
| A sayeret medic and several senior officers were trying to save the most |
| badly injured man, but I knew I needed to get military doctors and medical |
| evacuation helicopters in immediately if we were to save the lives of the injured |
| soldiers. I had a mobile phone, but couldn't get a signal. I ran toward a slightly |
| higher area a few dozen yards away and managed to get through to the kirya. I |
| issued orders for the nearby training base in Tze'elim and an air force near |
| Beersheva to dispatch helicopters to treat and evacuate the wounded |
| We heard the first chopper about 25 minutes later, but it seemed initially |
| unable to see us, because it flew on before returning and landing two minutes |
| later. By that time, a medical team from the base in Tze'elim had arrived. Ten |
| minutes later, two other medevac choppers landed. But the soldier who had |
| been worst wounded could not be saved. After the doctors had been there about |
| 20 minutes, I again retreated to the area where I could get a mobile signal, and |
| phoned Rabin to tell him what had happened. We agreed I should come back to |
| brief him in detail. It was now about 50 minutes since the missiles had hit. The |
| wounded were all being treated. One of the helicopters had taken off for |
| Beersheva Hospital. Another two, including a heavier Sikorsky transport |
| helicopter, were preparing to leave. I arranged for Amnon, military intelligence |
| chief Shmuel Arad and me to return to the kirya. I told Amiram to stay until he |
| had confirmed all the injured had been evacuated, and talk to everyone involved |
| to get a preliminary idea of why and how the tragedy had happened. |
| 248 |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011719 |
|
|
