| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020572)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020572" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 3270 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| 113 |
| its fungibility, ultimately renders any distinction between domestic and foreign sources |
| meaningless. Corporations should also provide greater clarity on their financial and supply |
| chain exposure to China and disclose the presence of CCP members in joint- or wholly |
| owned ventures. In certain instances, new limitations on corporate activity that is harmful |
| to the national interest may be required. |
| American business leaders should become better versed in the evolving nature of China's |
| global ambitions, especially in the use of United Front tactics for influencing almost all |
| aspects of China's interaction with the United States. American corporations should raise |
| their voices through chambers of commerce or other collective commercial entities that can |
| collectively represent their interests when a company confronts pressures or coercion. To more |
| effectively resist growing Chinese pressures, American corporations will most certainly need |
| to find new ways to cooperate more closely with each other, and at times even in coordination |
| with the US government. Like think tanks, universities, other civil society organizations, |
| and media outlets, American companies will be most vulnerable to Chinese pressure when |
| they are atomized and isolated. In this sense, the challenges with which US corporations are |
| confronted by a rising authoritarian China with a far more ambitious global agenda are not so |
| dissimilar to those confronted by those other sectors of American society highlighted in this |
| report. Each confronts an un-level playing field that lacks reciprocity. |
| To help rectify these imbalances, in certain instances, the US government should be the |
| one to coordinate collective action, as it recently sought to do with the US airline industry. |
| It may also need to be more prepared to impose reciprocal penalties on Chinese companies |
| or even compensate American companies for losses when they stand up to punitive action |
| from China as an additional incentive to maintain resolve. |
| Most important, corporate executives, their boards, and their shareholders must double |
| their efforts to exercise the kind of principled leadership and restraint that will help them |
| resist the loss of corporate control in pursuit of short-term profit. This includes not only |
| individual companies but also their representative organizations, notably the US Chamber |
| of Commerce, the US-China Business Council and other specific trade associations. These |
| bodies not only need to promote American business interests by pushing back against |
| Chinese restrictions where necessary but they also need to adopt a heightened awareness of |
| the role that corporations must play in protecting both their own interests and the national |
| economic security of the United States itself. |
| In the corporate sector, China is not just taking advantage of the openness of American |
| markets, which are rightfully a point of pride for the United States and a pillar of our |
| economic vitality, but it is also exploiting American capitalism's short-termism. This latter |
| predilection could end up being as much of a threat to the ability of American corporations |
| to maintain healthy economic relations with China as Beijing's very strategic and targeted |
| United Front tactics. |
| Section 7 |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020572 |
|
|
