| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020529)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020529" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 2963 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| 70 |
| increasingly flood public events put on by US think tanks in Washington, using the |
| events as press conferences and to pose leading questions. While Western reporters are |
| not immune to this type of behavior, the Chinese media undertake such distortions |
| in a far more systematic manner, with a pointed political agenda that is usually |
| determined by the government's current political "line." |
| With this in mind, US think tank analysts have developed a varied set of approaches |
| to their interactions with the Chinese media. Some see the Chinese media as an |
| opportunity to get their views across to the Chinese public, even though, as one think |
| tanker acknowledges, he knows he may be censored in "inappropriate ways." Another |
| stated that despite the obvious biases, he still gives a lot of interviews—to CCTV, |
| CGTN, Xinhua, People's Daily, and the Shanghai Media Group, among them. At least |
| one claims that while he does frequent CGTN interviews, he has never been censored. |
| Several US think-tank scholars indicate that they keep track of their interviews, and if |
| they are misquoted, they stop speaking to that journalist. One notes that he refuses to |
| do interviews on sensitive political issues, such as party congresses. Another indicates |
| he will only do live television as a hedge against being censored, while another |
| indicates he will only be interviewed in written email form. Two analysts refuse to |
| give interviews to Chinese media at all, with the exception of those that occur in |
| the immediate aftermath of a public talk when an analyst is approached by Chinese |
| journalists. In one case, an analyst reported that Xinhua conducted an in-person |
| background interview after she refused to write an op-ed, but she was willing to share |
| her views (which were negative). Xinhua then drafted a full, positive-sounding op-ed |
| in her name, which they planned to publish without her approval. She successfully |
| blocked it, and her institute now has a blanket ban on interviews with the Chinese |
| press unless there is a special reason. This is intended to send a message that they do |
| not believe the Chinese media can be trusted. |
| The opportunity to earn money through interviews was mentioned by one scholar. She |
| noted that CGTN pays $150 per interview. The network warned her, however, that if |
| she was too critical of the Chinese government, she would not be invited back. CGTN |
| also indicated that she should be "more like" another think-tank analyst who had |
| become a regular on CGTN. |
| Writing and Publishing in China |
| The majority of the think-tank analysts who have been interviewed for this section |
| have refused to write op-eds for Chinese newspapers, with several stating that they |
| have had bad experiences in which content has been censored. One scholar reports |
| several instances of pieces being commissioned by Global Times, only to have his piece |
| spiked after submission because of its controversial content. Others, however, have |
| Think Tanks |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020529 |
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|
