| --- |
| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020502)" |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" |
| date: "2026-01-01" |
| category: "House Oversight" |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020502" |
| ocrPages: 1 |
| ocrChars: 3129 |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" |
| externalLicense: "not granted" |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" |
| --- |
| |
| 43 |
| CIs in the mainstream Chinese studies curricula on US campuses to date. (See below |
| for our recommendations concerning CIs.) |
| Chinese Students and Scholars Associations |
| Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) on American campuses maintain |
| regular contact with China's diplomatic missions in the US. Even when these contacts |
| are purely for cultural purposes, the CSSA provides a ready channel or entry point |
| for the political departments of China's embassy and consulates in the US to gather |
| information and coordinate action, which in some cases includes pressuring the |
| behavior of Chinese students. Sometimes pressure is even applied by China's security |
| services on the family members of those students it finds speaking out in unacceptable |
| ways back in China. What is more, Chinese scholars and diplomats have sought to |
| influence on-campus debates in China's favors and have even protested when American |
| universities have exercised their right to invite speakers whom China identifies as |
| unfriendly. Finally, some Chinese students and scholars have exploited the collaborative |
| research environment on US campuses to obtain sensitive American technologies. |
| Chinese Students and Scholars Associations now exist on approximately 150 US |
| campuses." A second type of on-campus association has also recently started up, |
| the China Development Student Think Tank (CDSTT), with chapters at Syracuse |
| University, Boston University, and George Washington University. As voluntary |
| associations of Chinese citizens on campus, these groups perform many appropriate |
| social functions, such as orienting new students to life in the United States and |
| arranging networking get-togethers. Nonetheless, their links with Chinese diplomatic |
| missions and some of their activities, because of their attempts to interfere with |
| other campus activities and broader political discourse and debate, present cause for |
| concern. CSSAs at Washington, DC, universities make no secret of their ties to the |
| Chinese embassy and receive small amounts of operating funds directly from it. CSSAs |
| elsewhere have similar ties to nearby Chinese consulates, which also provide them |
| with funding, other kinds of support, and surveillance. It has also been reported that |
| Chinese Communist Party cells have been established on several US campuses.20 |
| CSSAs often alert PRC diplomatic missions about events on campus that offend official |
| PRC political sensitivities, e.g., speeches or discussions on Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, human |
| rights, and Chinese elite politics. Once notified, the local PRC mission has sometimes |
| contacted university faculty or staff members to prevent such events from proceeding. |
| In some instances, it is difficult to know whether opposition to events originates with |
| a CSSA or the local PRC mission. In 2017, the CSSA at the University of California San |
| Diego mobilized opposition to the chancellor's invitation to the Dalai Lama to be the |
| commencement speaker, which at least some CSSA members ultimately coordinated with |
| the PRC consulate in Los Angeles. After the event finally took place anyway as planned, |
| Section 4 |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020502 |
|
|
