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| title: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12) (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290)" | |
| source: "House Oversight: Estate Documents (Nov 12)" | |
| sourceUrl: "https://www.justice.gov/epstein" | |
| date: "2026-01-01" | |
| category: "House Oversight" | |
| eftaNumber: "HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290" | |
| ocrPages: 1 | |
| ocrChars: 3198 | |
| ocrElapsed: 0.0 | |
| parseTier: "external-legacy" | |
| engine: "engine undisclosed (ep-nov-12.greg.technology mirror)" | |
| externalSource: "greg-ep-nov-12" | |
| externalLicense: "not granted" | |
| externalCredit: "ep-nov-12.greg.technology" | |
| externalUrl: "https://ep-nov-12.greg.technology" | |
| 138 | |
| After establishing some part of Snowden's "material" was still in his possession, Shevardnadze | |
| asked the next logical question: "Why did Russia get involved in this whole thing if it got nothing out of?" | |
| In response, Kucherena elliptically hinted that the unreleased material contained CIA secret files. | |
| "Snowden spent quite a few years working for the CIA." He said. "We haven't fully realized yet | |
| the importance of his revelations." (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of | |
| CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell | |
| confirmed.) | |
| Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, | |
| Kucherena was on the FSB's public oversight board. If he had kept Snowden's possessions of | |
| these documents secret from the FSB, he would not have divulged it in an interview on television. | |
| Kucherena's answer left little ambiguity to the critical question about the fate of the NSA's | |
| missing documents: Snowden had not destroyed the electronic files of NSA documents that he | |
| had not distributed to journalists. He still had them, when Kucherena had reviewed his files in | |
| Russia. Kucherena's disclosure that Snowden retained these crucial documents did not contradict | |
| Snowden's own story at the time of the Shevardnadze interview. Indeed, it was completely | |
| consistent with the statement Snowden made three weeks after arriving in Russia in his previously- | |
| mentioned email to Senator Humphrey. | |
| Snowden subsequently changed his story. In mid-October, Snowden electronically-informed | |
| journalists that he had destroyed all the NSA documents in his possession before flying to | |
| Moscow. So his new story radically contradicted what his own lawyer had said the previous | |
| month on television. | |
| To be sure, Kucherena who later confirmed the accuracy of the Shevardnadze interview to me in | |
| Moscow in 2015 may have meant to say that Snowden only had access to the NSA documents | |
| rather than having the physical files in his possession. It is certainly possible that Snowden | |
| transferred the NSA files from his own computers and thumb drives to storage on a remote server | |
| in the so-called "cloud" before coming to Russia. The "cloud" is actually not in the sky but a | |
| term used for remote storage servers, such as those provided by Drop Box, Microsoft, Google, | |
| Amazon and other Internet companies. Anyone who is connected to the Internet can store and | |
| retrieved files by entering a user name and a password. For Kucherena to be certain Snowden | |
| had access to this data, Snowden must have demonstrated his access either to him or the | |
| authorities. The Russians therefore also knew Snowden had the means to retrieve this data. Since | |
| the data concerned electronic espionage against Russia, the FSB had every reason to ask him to | |
| share his user name and password. If Snowden had encrypted these files, it would also ask for his | |
| encryption key. And the FSB is not known to take a no for an answer in issues involving | |
| espionage. | |
| Even if Snowden refused to furnish his key, it would not present an insurmountable barrier for | |
| the FSB. Snowden may have had confidence in the power of his encryption protocols but, | |
| HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290 | |