MEMY-1805 marker2-fixhub court-redacted-v-indyke-10479 (pepper 16-core): 106/106

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731941/EFTA02731941.md

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+### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff, CASE NO:
+
+v.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+# COMPLAINT
+
+Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
+
+Plaintiff by her attorneys Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, for her Complaint against Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein ("Epstein"), avers upon personal knowledge as to her own acts and status and upon information and belief and to all other matters as follows:
+
+#### NATURE OF THE ACTION
+
+- I. This suit arises out of Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of Plaintiff beginning when Plaintiff was 20 years old that lasted years and included trafficking Plaintiff to each of his homes in the United States and Paris.
+- 2. Plaintiff was a young girl living in with hopes of becoming a model when she was approached by one of Epstein's recruiters about a prospective modeling opportunity in the United States and invited to a restaurant to meet Epstein, who was dining with a former high U.S. Government official, a famous actor, and a well-known comedian. What appeared on the outside as a legitimate opportunity to break into the modeling business in the United States turned into years of horrific abuse and manipulation at the hands of Jeffrey Epstein.
+- 3. Epstein's trafficking scheme involved recruiting young females by making false promises and using his wealth, power and threats to intimidate the females into submission to his demands. This same pattern was repeated numerous times with numerous young women.
+- 4. As United States District Judge Kenneth Marra found, "From between about 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls . . . at his mansion in Palm Beach Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. . . . In addition to his own sexual abuse of the victims, Epstein directed other persons to abuse the girls sexually. Epstein used paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain
+
+minors not only for his own sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others." Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
+
+5. Epstein organized this sex trafficking network to obtain hundreds of young females for himself for sex, and also lent these females out to other powerful and wealthy individuals to be sexually abused.
+
+6. Epstein conspired with others and hired staff to maintain and keep secret this network of sexual abuse for years, which sprawled throughout Epstein's residences in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Paris. Epstein's preference was to have three different young females a day for his sexual pleasure.
+
+7. Despite his significant criminal activity, in 2008 Epstein received a shockingly minimal charge, pleading guilty to a single Florida state law charge of procuring a minor for prostitution and a non-prosecution agreement (a "NPA") with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Unknown to the public and the victims at the time, Epstein's lawyers were pressuring the Government to commit to the NPA without informing the victims. Epstein's multiple victims were kept in the dark and told to be "patient" while Epstein's lawyers worked to protect him and other potential co-conspirators from prosecution. Epstein served one year in jail, but was afforded the privilege of being able to leave the jail to go to work for twelve hours per day, six days per week.
+
+8. The NPA allowed Epstein to escape proportionate punishment for his actions and to continue operating his sex trafficking enterprise with liberty.
+
+9. A few years later, Epstein flippantly referred to his sexual abuse of multiple minors, and the slap on the wrist he had received for it, in a 2011 interview with the New York Post: "Billionaire pervert Jeffrey Epstein is back in New York City — and making wisecracks about his just-ended jail stint for having sex with an underage girl. 'I am not a sexual predator, I'm an offender,' the financier told The Post yesterday. 'It's the difference between a murderer and a person who steals a bagel,' said Epstein." Amber Sutherland, Billionaire Jefrey Epstein: I'm a Sex Offender Not a Predator, N.Y. Post (Feb. 25, 2011),
+
+https://nypost.com/20I I/02/25/billionaire-jeffrey-epstein-im-a-sex-offender-not-a-predator/.
+
+10. In August 2018, just one year before his death, Epstein told a New York Times reporter "that criminalizing sex with teenage girls was a cultural aberration and that at times in history it was perfectly acceptable." James B. Stewart, The Day Jeffrey Epstein Told Me He Had Dirt on Powerful People, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2019),
+
+https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/business/jeffrey-epstein-interview.html.
+
+II. When Plaintiff was 20 years old, Epstein added her to his long list of victims by committing sexual assault and battery against her. As such, Epstein is responsible for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to New York common law. The damage to Plaintiff has been severe and lasting.
+
+12. This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides that a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on August 29, 2019.
+
+13. This action has also been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-C, which provides that a plaintiff shall have 20 years to file civil claims "for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute rape in the
+
+first degree as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law." Epstein raped Plaintiff within 20 years of filing this Complaint.
+
+14. Any statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims, if any, is tolled due to the continuous and active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that Epstein and his co-conspirators used to silence his many victims, including Plaintiff. Epstein's actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit before his death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that Epstein and his co-conspirators would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward.
+
+15. Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Allowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. Epstein and his co-conspirators intimidated each of his victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods. They therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before his death. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, Epstein was able to escape punishment for his intolerable and brutal crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life.
+
+### PARTIES
+
+16. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of
+
+17. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein.
+
+18. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein.
+
+## JURISDICTION AND VENUE
+
+19. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands at the time of his death. Jeffrey Epstein maintained a residence in the Southern District of New
+
+York. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands.
+
+20. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000.00 excluding interests and costs and is between citizens of different states. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
+
+21. Venue is proper in this Court as Epstein's sexual abuse of Plaintiff began in New York, New York, where he recruited her at the age of 20 and began grooming her for sex in his organized sex trafficking ring.
+
+22. Many of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, where a substantial amount of Epstein's property is located. Thus, venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
+
+## FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
+
+## A. Epstein's Sex Trafficking Enterprise
+
+23. Jeffrey Epstein was widely renowned as a billionaire who used his vast connections to powerful individuals, and seemingly unlimited wealth and resources, to create a web of transcontinental sex trafficking that served himself, his co-conspirators, and some of the most powerful people in the world.
+
+24. Epstein owned multiple residences and frequently travelled between them, including at 9 East 71' Street, New York, New York 10021, and at 49 Z,orro Ranch Road, Stanley, New Mexico 87056, where the illegal sexual crimes against Plaintiff occurred. Epstein conservatively valued his New York townhome at \$55,931,000.00. Epstein conservatively valued his New Mexico ranch at \$17,246,208.00. In addition, Epstein owned residences in the Virgin Islands, Florida, and France, and even on his own island, Great St. James Island, where his
+
+transcontinental sex trafficking of hundreds of young females servicing him, his co-conspirators, and wealthy and powerful individuals around the world occurred.
+
+25. The allegations herein concern Epstein's tortious acts against Plaintiff while at Epstein's mansion in New York, his home in Florida, his home in the Virgin Islands, his apartment in Paris, and his New Mexico ranch.
+
+26. At all times material to this cause of action, Jeffrey Epstein utilized his seemingly unlimited power, wealth, and resources, as well as his deep connections to powerful and politically connected individuals to intimidate and manipulate his victims of sexual abuse.
+
+27. Epstein and his co-conspirators had perfected a scheme for manipulation and abuse of young females. As part of the scheme, a female "recruiter" would approach a young female and strike up a conversation in an effort to quickly learn about the young female's background and any vulnerabilities they could expose. The recruiter would then manipulate the young female into coming back to one of Epstein's residences by offering the young female something she needed. At times the recruiter's lure would be a modeling opportunity, money for education, help for the young female's family, and a whole host of other related offers depending on their target's situation. Once in the residence, the recruiter and Epstein would work in concert to impress and intimidate the young female with displays of vast wealth, including having employees that were butlers and maids formally dressed around the house. They would also strategically place photographs of very powerful political and social figures amongst photographs and art displaying nude females in an effort to normalize the sexual abuse. They would also normalize the sexual abuse by placing a massage table and spa related products around the massage area in an effort to legitimize the area where the abuse was set to occur. Once abused, Epstein and his co-conspirators continued to manipulate the victims, using their
+
+financial power, promises, and threats to ensure that the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands.
+
+#### B. The Arrest, Prosecution, and Death of Epstein
+
+28. The sexual trafficking ring described herein started at least as early as 1995 and continued up until at least July 2, 2019, when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") charged Epstein with sex trafficking conspiracy and sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. He was arrested on July 8, 2019, pursuant to the SDNY's Sealed Two Count Indictment, which is attached as Exhibit A.
+
+29. The Indictment described Epstein's conduct and his abuse and trafficking of females in the same trafficking operation he used to abuse and traffic Plaintiff.
+
+30. Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was executed on August 8, 2019, at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The witnesses were Mariel Colon Mire and Gulnom Tali. The Will included affidavits from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in which they swear an "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and Appointment of Local Counsel."
+
+31. Epstein was found dead in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019.
+
+32. Epstein's last will and testament was filed on August 15, 2019, in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.
+
+33. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn filed a Certificate of Trust in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for Epstein's 1953 Trust on August 26, 2019. See Certificate of Trust, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Aug. 26, 2019).
+
+34. Epstein's will was entered into probate on September 6, 2019, and the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands accordingly authorized Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn to administer Epstein's estate. See Order for Probate, In the Matter of the Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-19-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019); Letters Testamentary, In the Matter of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No. ST-I9-PB-80 (Super. Ct. V.I. Sept. 6, 2019).
+
+35. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs that "after the payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "give[s] all of my property, real and personal, wherever situated ... to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust."
+
+36. Following Epstein's death, SDNY submitted a proposed nolle prosequi order in the criminal matter against him because it was required by law to do so after Epstein was deceased. On August 29, 2019, U.S. District Judge Richard Berman formally dismissed SDNY's indictment against Epstein, terminating the criminal action against him. Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).
+
+C.
+
+• was born on in
+
+38. In 2002, was 20 years old and an aspiring model. In Cape Town, ME, an American model, approached in an attempt to befriend her. asked if she would like to meet Epstein, who she called the "King of America." described Epstein as a well-connected billionaire who could help her with her modeling career and explained that he was visiting Africa with a former high U.S. Government official, a famous actor, and a well- known comedian.
+
+39. considered meeting Epstein an amazing opportunity because modeling in New York City had always been one of her biggest dreams. • brought to a restaurant to meet Epstein, who at the time was dining with the former high U.S. Government official, the famous actor, and the well-known comedian. had never met a celebrity before. She was invited to attend a speech the former high U.S. Government official was giving in Cape Town the next day, and was escorted to the speech by police cars with individuals associated with the former official.
+
+40. Later, Epstein asked to bring her modeling portfolio to his hotel for "casting." Epstein told that he owned a modeling agency and would get her an agent in New York. He also mentioned that his good friend, Les Wexner, owned Victoria's Secret, a lingerie conglomerate.
+
+41. Within a few days, Leslie Groff began calling . Groff told that Epstein wanted to bring her to New York City to model. Groff, who was in New York at the time, helped get a visa, passport, and airline tickets. It was first time traveling overseas, so she was nervous. Epstein called mother from New York to assure her that would be safe with him in New York.
+
+42. Within two weeks, arrived in New York. A car picked her up from the airport and brought her to an apartment building on 66th Street, where Epstein housed some of the other models who he was abusing. But was not there for long. Shortly after arriving at the apartment, ==, another one of Epstein's co-conspirators, called and told that was going to the Caribbean. did not understand why she was traveling to the Caribbean so soon after arriving in New York City, but hoped it was for a modeling job.
+
+| 29 | B-727-311 | N COATSE | LFPB | EGGW | 146 | SAME AS ABOVE LESS SE |  | 1/1 |
+| ----- | ----------- | ---------- | ------------- | ------ | ----- | ------------------------------------- | -- | --------------- |
+| 6CS | " | " | EGGW | LFPB | 147 | GM, NECK & GDWENNA SAMMUMBS |  |  |
+| 2 | " | " | LFPB | JFK | 148 | JE/GM, [REDACTED] |  |  |
+| 3 | " | " | JFK | PBL | 149 | JE/SE, CHARGE, TESTIMPOE |  | NECK SAMMUMBS |
+| 6 | G-11549 | N COATSE | PBL | TEB | 150 | JE/SK, [REDACTED], RETA P, 1 FEMALE |  |  |
+| 11 | " | " | TEB | PBD | 151 | JE/GM, [REDACTED], RETA P, GEARY |  |  |
+| 14 | " | " | PBL-OFF-PBL |  | 152 | MARK POTTER-PPC |  | 1/1 |
+| 15 | " | " | PBL | TEB | 160 | JE/GM, RETA P, DENNIS |  | 1/1 |
+| 17 | " | " | TGO | TEST | 161 | JE, [REDACTED] |  |  |
+| 21 | " | " | TEST | PBL | 162 | JE, [REDACTED] |  | 1/1 |
+
+43. [REDACTED] was taken on Epstein's private plane. During the flight, Epstein began sexually touching [REDACTED] leg. She felt trapped and terrified, and feared that she would be killed.
+
+44. They arrived at Epstein's home in the Virgin Islands. Epstein's abuse of [REDACTED] there began when [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] to Epstein's room to massage him. For the rest of the trip, Epstein repeatedly raped [REDACTED] by forcible compulsion. [REDACTED] repeatedly sent [REDACTED] to Epstein's room, where he would touch her, use massage devices on her, force her to perform oral sex on him, and sexually force himself on her. [REDACTED] also witnessed another young girl performing oral sex on Epstein in front of [REDACTED] while they were watching a movie. [REDACTED] was terrified of Epstein and his power. No one knew where she was and she believed that if anything happened to her, no one would ever know.
+
+45. Instead of fulfilling her dreams of becoming a model in New York City, [REDACTED] was subject to extreme and repeated sexual abuse. Epstein's sexual abuse of [REDACTED] was humiliating and degrading, and caused [REDACTED] to cry herself to sleep each night. She felt trapped and alone on Epstein's private island. [REDACTED] learned very quickly that Epstein was incredibly powerful and that she should not disobey his demands.
+
+46. Epstein's abuse of [REDACTED] lasted for years. Epstein forced her to travel to the United States many times to see Epstein and be subjected to repeated sexual abuse for one to two weeks
+
+at a time, sometimes staying in his New York apartment. Epstein never introduced to a modeling agent, and she was never hired for a modeling job.
+
+47. For those years, felt like a prisoner and was afraid of betraying Epstein because of his money and power. She was afraid he would hurt her or her family. In fact, the very first time Epstein brought to the United States, in order to scare her, he told her that when another woman had accused him of rape, he planted drugs in the woman's apartment and had her sent to prison.
+
+48. Epstein made very clear to that he was incredibly wealthy, powerful, and regularly in contact with world leaders. In fact, in his New York mansion he had photographs displayed of significant political figures to ensure that any young female entering the home would know that he had extensive government connections. Epstein was not to be disobeyed and he made clear by his words and actions that there would be consequences if did not comply with his demands.
+
+49. was also forced to travel to Epstein's home in Paris where she had to stay with Ghislaine Maxwell, one of Epstein's main recruiters of young females, and where forced her to be photographed nude for Epstein. During that trip, witnessed that young females were on call to sexually pleasure Epstein.
+
+50. final trip to the United States was in 2004. She flew to see Epstein at his New Mexico ranch, called "Zorro Ranch." Epstein abused at Zorro Ranch. During that trip, Epstein took with him to meet another important government official. complied and went with Epstein. At the meeting, believed that Epstein had brought her there so that the official could look her over. felt very uncomfortable and she and Epstein began to fight because he claimed she was not being obedient. Epstein then informed that he
+
+wanted her to travel with him on his plane to California and serve drinks to some of his scientist friends who were going to be flying with him to California. But before the flight, after an argument with Epstein, flew home to This was the last time visited Epstein.
+
+51. Epstein attempted to keep in contact with through e-mail over the years. For example, in 2016, Epstein e-mailed to ask if she knew another woman who was a victim of Epstein's sex trafficking scheme. In June 2019, only two months before his death, Epstein sent an e-mail asking her to send him nude photographs.
+
+52. was deeply affected by her harrowing experiences at the hands of Epstein. She developed eating disorders that affected her for years afterwards. She also suffered from substance abuse, debilitating panic attacks, and severe anxiety.
+
+53. Epstein's sexual assault and battery of continues to cause her significant distress and harm.
+
+## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
+
+### (Battery)
+
+54. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs 1-53 as if fully set forth herein.
+
+55. Epstein intentionally committed battery by sexually assaulting Plaintiff on numerous occasions at his homes in New York, New Mexico, Florida, France, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As described above, on multiple occasions over a years-long period, Epstein raped Plaintiff and intentionally touched intimate parts of her body in an offensive and sexual manner without her consent.
+
+56. Epstein's actions constitute sexual offenses as defined in New York Penal Law Article 130, including but not limited to rape in the first degree as defined in Article 130.35, inasmuch as Epstein engaged in sexual intercourse with Plaintiff by forcible compulsion. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-C.
+
+57. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiffs first cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).
+
+58. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's conduct, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, anxiety, panic attacks, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy.
+
+### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
+
+## (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
+
+59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations stated above in paragraphs I 53 as if fully set forth herein.
+
+60. As a direct result of these allegations as stated, Epstein committed intentional infliction of emotional distress against Plaintiff.
+
+61. Epstein's actions, described above, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. Epstein's plan to recruit, entice, rape, and assault Plaintiff on multiple occasions goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community.
+
+62. Epstein knew or disregarded the substantial likelihood that these actions would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.
+
+63. A criminal action against Epstein with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's second cause of action arises was terminated on August 29, 2019, less than one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).
+
+64. As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's conduct, Plaintiff has in the past and will in the future continue to suffer extreme emotional distress, humiliation, fear, anxiety, panic attacks, psychological trauma, loss of dignity and self-esteem, and invasion of her privacy.
+
+## PRAYER FOR RELIEF
+
+WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants, awarding compensatory, consequential, exemplary, and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; costs of suit; attorneys' fees; and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
+
+### JURY DEMAND
+
+Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all causes of action asserted within this pleading.
+
+Dated: November 14, 2019.
+
+/s/ Joshua I. Schiller
+
+David Boies Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504
+
+Joshua I. Schiller Bows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001
+
+Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice Pending) Bows SCIIILLER FL EXNER LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731941/EFTA02731941.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731957/EFTA02731957.md

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+The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet.
+
+**PLAINTIFFS**
+
+![](_page_0_Picture_812.jpeg)
+
+DEFENDANTS  
+DAKREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN
+
+ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER)  
+Joshua I. Schiller  
+Boies Schiller Flexner LLP  
+55 Hudson Yards, New York, NY 10001 (212) 446-2300
+
+ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)  
+Bennet J. Moskowitz  
+875 Third Avenue  
+New York, NY 10022
+
+CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE)  
+(DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY)
+
+28 U.S.C. § 1332; New York causes of action
+
+Has this action, case, or proceeding, or one essentially the same been previously filed in SDNY at any time? No  Yes  Judge Previously Assigned
+
+If yes, was this case Vol.  Invol.  Dismissed. No  Yes  If yes, give date \_\_\_\_\_ & Case No. \_\_\_\_\_
+
+IS THIS AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CASE? No  Yes 
+
+(PLACE AN [x] IN ONE BOX ONLY)
+
+**NATURE OF SUIT**
+
+| CONTRACT | PERSONAL INJURY | PERSONAL INJURY | FORFEITURE/PENALTY | BANKRUPTCY | OTHER STATUTES |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [ ] 110 INSURANCE MARINE | [ ] 310 AIRPLANE | [ ] 367 HEALTHCARE/ PHARMACEUTICAL PERSONAL INJURY/PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 625 DRUG RELATED SEIZURE OF PROPERTY | [ ] 422 APPEAL 28 USC 158 | [ ] 375 FALSE CLAIMS |
+| [ ] 120 ACT NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT | [ ] 315 AIRPLANE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 365 PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 630 OTHER | [ ] 423 WITHDRAWAL 28 USC 157 | [ ] 376 QUI TAM |
+| [ ] 140 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT & ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT | [ ] 320 ASSAULT, LIBEL & SLANDER | [ ] 368 ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 830 COPYRIGHTS | [ ] 442 APPEAL 28 USC 158 | [ ] 400 STATE REAPPORTIONMENT |
+| [ ] 150 STUDENT LOANS (EXCL VETERANS) RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT OF VETERANS BENEFITS STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 345 MARINE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 370 OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 830 PATENT | [ ] 430 BANKS & BANKING | [ ] 450 COMMERCE |
+| [ ] 151 DEFAULTED STUDENT LOANS (EXCL VETERANS) RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT OF VETERANS BENEFITS STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 355 MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 371 TRUTH IN LENDING | [ ] 840 TRADEMARK | [ ] 470 RACKETEER INFLUENCED & CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT (RICO) | [ ] 480 CONSUMER CREDIT |
+| [ ] 153 RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENT OF VETERANS BENEFITS STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 362 PERSONAL INJURY - MED MALPRACTICE | [ ] 380 OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGE | [ ] 851 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT | [ ] 480 CONSUMER CREDIT | [ ] 490 CABLE/SATELLITE TV |
+| [ ] 160 STOCKHOLDERS SUITS | [ ] 365 PROPERTY DAMAGE PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 380 OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGE | [ ] 720 LABOR/MGMT RELATIONS | [ ] 865 RSI (405(g)) | [ ] 850 SECURITIES/ COMMODITIES/ EXCHANGE |
+| [ ] 190 OTHER CONTRACT CONTRACT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 443 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 510 MOTIONS TO VACATE SENTENCE 28 USC 2255 | [ ] 750 RAILWAY LABOR ACT | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 26 USC 7609 | [ ] 890 OTHER STATUTORY ACTIONS |
+| [ ] 195 CONTRACT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 440 OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (Non-Prisoner) | [ ] 530 HABEAS CORPUS VACATE SENTENCE | [ ] 751 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) | [ ] 870 TAXES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 891 AGRICULTURAL ACTS |
+| [ ] 196 FRANCHISE | [ ] 442 EMPLOYMENT | [ ] 535 DEATH PENALTY | [ ] 791 EMPL RET INC SECURITY ACT (ERISA) | [ ] 872 TAXES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 893 ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS |
+| [ ] 210 LAND CONDEMNATION | [ ] 443 HOUSING/ ACCOMMODATIONS | [ ] 550 CIVIL RIGHTS | [ ] 462 NATURALIZATION APPLICATION | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 26 USC 7609 | [ ] 895 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT |
+| [ ] 220 FORECLOSURE RENT LEASE & EJECTMENT | [ ] 445 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES - EMPLOYMENT | [ ] 560 CIVIL DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT | [ ] 465 OTHER IMMIGRATION ACTIONS | [ ] 890 ARBITRATION | [ ] 896 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT/REVIEW OR APPEAL OF AGENCY DECISION |
+| [ ] 240 TORTS TO LAND TORT PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 446 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES - OTHER | [ ] 560 CIVIL DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT | [ ] 675 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) | [ ] 870 TAXES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | [ ] 895 ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS |
+| [ ] 290 ALL OTHER REAL PROPERTY | [ ] 448 EDUCATION | [ ] 550 CIVIL RIGHTS | [ ] 675 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) | [ ] 871 IRS-THIRD PARTY 26 USC 7609 | [ ] 950 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES |
+
+Check if demanded in complaint:
+
+ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23
+
+DO YOU CLAIM THIS CASE IS RELATED TO A CIVIL CASE NOW PENDING IN S.D.N.Y. AS DEFINED BY LOCAL RULE FOR DIVISION OF BUSINESS 13? IF SO, STATE:
+
+DEMAND \$ \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ JUDGE \_\_\_\_\_ DOCKET NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_
+
+Check YES only if demanded in complaint  
+JURY DEMAND:  YES  NO
+
+NOTE: You must also submit at the time of filing the Statement of Relatedness form (Form IH-32).
+
+ 1 Original Proceeding       2 Removed from State Court       3 Remanded from Appellate Court       4 Reinstated or Reopened       5 Transferred from (Specify District)       6 Multidistrict Litigation (Transferred)       7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judge
+
+ a. all parties represented       8 Multidistrict Litigation (Direct File)
+
+ b. At least one party is pro se.
+
+(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY)
+
+**BASIS OF JURISDICTION**
+
+ 1 U.S. PLAINTIFF       2 U.S. DEFENDANT       3 FEDERAL QUESTION       4 DIVERSITY  
+(U.S. NOT A PARTY)
+
+**IF DIVERSITY, INDICATE CITIZENSHIP BELOW.**
+
+**CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY)**
+
+(Place an [X] in one box for Plaintiff and one box for Defendant)
+
+| CITIZEN OF THIS STATE | PTF [ ] 1 [ ] 1 | DEF [ ] 1 | CITIZEN OR SUBJECT OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY | PTF DEF [x] 3 [ ] 3 | INCORPORATED and PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN ANOTHER STATE | PTF [ ] 5 [ ] 5 | DEF [ ] 5 |
+| -------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------- |
+| CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE | [ ] 2 [x] 2 |  | INCORPORATED or PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN THIS STATE | [ ] 4 [ ] 4 | FOREIGN NATION | [ ] 6 [ ] 6 |  |
+
+PLAINTIFF(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
+
+![](_page_1_Picture_43.jpeg)
+
+40 Victoria Road  
+Cape Town, South Africa
+
+DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES)
+
+Darren K. Indyke  
+Richard D. Kahn  
+U.S. Virgin Islands
+
+DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS UNKNOWN
+
+REPRESENTATION IS HEREBY MADE THAT, AT THIS TIME, I HAVE BEEN UNABLE, WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE, TO ASCERTAIN THE RESIDENCE ADDRESSES OF THE FOLLOWING DEFENDANTS:
+
+Defendants are sued as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. Per 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Defendants are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), decedent Epstein's domicile. Defendants' residential addresses are unknown to Plaintiff. Defendants' counsel is listed above.
+
+**COURTHOUSE ASSIGNMENT**
+
+I hereby certify that this case should be assigned to the courthouse indicated below pursuant to Local Rule for Division of Business 18, 20 or 21.
+
+Check one: THIS ACTION SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO:  [ ] PLAINS  MANHATTAN
+
+DATE 11/14/2019 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
+
+RECEIPT #
+
+ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN THIS DISTRICT
+
+[ ] NO  
+[x] YES (DATE ADMITTED Mo.08 Yr. 2009)  
+Attorney Bar Code # JS3315
+
+Magistrate Judge is to be designated by the Clerk of the Court.
+
+Magistrate Judge \_\_\_\_\_ is so Designated.
+
+Ruby J. Krajick, Clerk of Court by \_\_\_\_\_ Deputy Clerk, DATED \_\_\_\_\_.

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731957/EFTA02731957.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731959/EFTA02731959.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+for the
+
+Southern District of New York
+
+make)
+
+V. Civil Action No.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN
+
+Defendant(
+
+## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
+
+To: (Defendant's name and address) Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn Go Bennet J. Moskowitz, attorney 875 Third Avenue New York. NY 10022
+
+A lawsuit has been filed against you.
+
+Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency. or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (aX2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney. whose name and address are: Joshua Schiller
+
+Boles Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212)446-2300 jischillenabsfIlp.com
+
+If you fail to respond. judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
+
+Date:
+
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+Signature ofClark or Deputy Clerk
+
+Civil Action No.
+
+## PROOF OF SERVICE
+
+(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Cir. P.4 (ID
+
+This summons for (name of indmdual and ask, if any) was received by me on (date)
+
+O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) : or
+
+O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there. on (date) . and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address: or
+
+O I served the summons on (name of Maurine!) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) : or
+
+Date: Server's signature
+
+O I returned the stunmons unexecuted because : or
+
+O Other (specify):
+
+My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
+
+Printed name and title
+
+Seer's address
+
+Additional information regarding attempted service. etc:

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731959/EFTA02731959.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731961/EFTA02731961.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+for the
+
+Southern District of New York
+
+Plainhjj(s)
+
+v. Civil Action No.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN
+
+DElendant(4(
+
+## SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
+
+To: (Defendant's name and address) Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn c/o Bennet J. Moskowitz. attorney 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022
+
+A lawsuit has been filed against you.
+
+Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency. or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (aX2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. whose name and address are: Joshua Schiller
+
+Boles Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 (212)446-2300 jischiller©bsflIp.com
+
+If you fail to respond. judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
+
+Date:
+
+CLERK OF COURT
+
+11/15/2019 /s/ P. Canales
+
+"\_s 0 sr/
+
+&gnature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
+
+Civil Action No.
+
+## PROOF OF SERVICE
+
+(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R Civ. P. 4 (1))
+
+This summons for (name of andmehtal and title, Vain) was received by me on (date)
+
+0 I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) : or
+
+0 I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there. on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address: or
+
+13 I served the summons on Owns of mdtsIdual) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of °manual:on) on (date) or
+
+Date: Server's signature
+
+CI I remitted the summons unexecuted because : or
+
+13 Other (specifil):
+
+My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
+
+Printed name and title
+
+Server's address
+
+Additional information regarding attempted service. etc:

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731961/EFTA02731961.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731963/EFTA02731963.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+vs.
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv- 10479 (ALC)
+
+## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, David Boies, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding.
+
+Dated: New York, New York November 20, 2019
+
+BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
+
+By: /s/ David Boies David Boies 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 Telephone: (914) 749-8200 Fax: (914) 749-8300 dboies@bsflIp.com
+
+Attorney for Plaintiff

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731963/EFTA02731963.receipt.json

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+  "text_format": "markdown"
+}

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731964/EFTA02731964.md

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+vs.
+
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv- 10479 (ALC)
+
+#### MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, I, Sigrid S. McCawley, hereby move this Court for an Order for Admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Plaintiff, in the above-captioned action.
+
+I am in good standing in the bar of the State of Florida and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3.
+
+Dated: November 21, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
+
+/s/ Site rid S. McCawlev
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Tel: (954) 356-0011 Fax: (954) 356 0022 Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com
+
+Counsel for Plaintiff
+
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+VS.
+
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+
+I, Sigrid S. McCawley, hereby declare as follows:
+
+- I I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court.
+- 3. There are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court.
+- 4. I am a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Florida.
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC)
+
+DECLARATION OF SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.
+
+Dated: November 21, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
+
+Is/ Sigrid S. McCawlev
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley
+
+Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP
+
+401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200
+
+Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
+
+Tel: (954) 356-0011
+
+Fax: (954) 356 0022
+
+Email: smccawley@bsfllp.com
+
+Counsel for Plaintiff
+
+# Supreme Court of Florida Certificate of Good Standing
+
+*I JOHN A. TOMASINO, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, do hereby certify that*
+
+**SIGRID [REDACTED] MCCAWLEY**
+
+*was admitted as an attorney and counselor entitled to practice law in all the Courts of the State of Florida on November 6, 1997, is presently in good standing, and that the private and professional character of the attorney appear to be good.*
+
+*WITNESS my hand and the Seal of the Supreme Court of Florida at Tallahassee, the Capital, this November 20, 2019.*
+
+![](_page_2_Picture_60.jpeg)
+
+*Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.*
+
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+vs.
+
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+
+Case No. I :19-cv- 10479 (ALC)
+
+### ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+The motion of Sigrid S. McCawley, for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted.
+
+Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Florida; and that her contact information is as follows:
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 356-0011 Fax: (954) 356-0022 smccawley@bsfllp.com
+
+Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff in the above entitled action;
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
+
+All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys.
+
+Dated:
+
+United States District Judge

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731964/EFTA02731964.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731969/EFTA02731969.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+AO 399 (01/09) Wawa of the Senice of Summons
+
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
+
+for the
+
+Southern District of New York
+
+Plaintiff
+
+v.
+
+Darren Indyke et al
+
+Defendant
+
+To: David Boles
+
+Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-10479-ALC
+
+## WAIVER OF TIIE SERVICE OF SUMMONS
+
+flame of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintift)
+
+I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver fonn, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.
+
+I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.
+
+I understand that I, or the entity I represent. will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.
+
+I also understand that I. or the entity I represent. must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from /75119 . the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.
+
+Date: /2 5/O
+
+Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn Printed name of pony waiving service of summons Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party
+
+Bennet Moskowitz Printed name
+
+Troutman Sanders LLP. 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022
+
+.Iddress
+
+Bennet.Moskowitz@troutman.com
+
+Equal! address
+
+(212) 704-6087
+
+I elephone ,,umber
+
+## Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Espenses of Sem ing a Summons
+
+Rule 4 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expensesof serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service. unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.
+
+-Good cause" does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.
+
+if the waiver is signed and returned. you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.
+
+Ifyou wake service, then you must. within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731970/EFTA02731970.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+![](_page_0_Picture_138.jpeg)
+
+**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
+SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**
+
+\_\_\_\_\_ X  
+ [Redacted],
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+-against-
+
+INDYKE, ET AL,
+
+Defendants.
+
+19-CV-10479 (ALC)
+
+**ORDER OF REFERENCE**
+
+\_\_\_\_\_ X  
+**ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., District Judge:**
+
+The above-captioned action is referred to Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman, for the following purpose[s]:
+
+| <u>X</u> | General Pretrial (includes scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement) | ___ | Consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all purposes (including trial) |
+| ---------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ___ | Specific Non-Dispositive Motion/Dispute | ___ | Consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for limited purpose (e.g., dispositive motion, preliminary injunction)<br>Purpose: _____ |
+| ___ | If referral is for discovery disputes when the District Judge is unavailable, the time period of the referral: _____ | ___ | Habeas Corpus |
+| ___ | Settlement | ___ | Social Security |
+| ___ | Inquest After Default/Damages Hearing | ___ | Dispositive Motion (i.e., motion requiring a Report and Recommendation)<br>Particular Motion: _____ |
+
+**SO ORDERED.**
+
+Dated: December 26, 2019  
+New York, New York
+
+\_\_\_\_\_  
+ HON. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR.  
+ United States District Judge

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731971/EFTA02731971.md

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+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW Y
+
+vs.
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg)
+
+Case No. 1:
+
+## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+The motion of Sigrid S. McCawley, for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted.
+
+Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Florida; and that her contact information is as follows:
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 356-0011 Fax: (954) 356-0022 smccawlev@bsflIn.com
+
+Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff in the above entitled action;
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
+
+All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys.
+
+Dated: 12/27/19
+
+DEBRA FREEMAN  
+UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
+SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731971/EFTA02731971.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731973/EFTA02731973.md

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+January 10, 2020
+
+## VIA ECF
+
+The Honorable Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312
+
+> Re: v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate ofJeffity Edward Epstein, 19-10479 Jane Doe 1000 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate ofJetey Edward Epstein, 19-10577 Annie Farmer v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffiey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, 19- 10475 v. Darren K Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeji-ey Edward Epstein, 19-10476
+
+Dear Judge Freeman:
+
+Pursuant to the Court's request at the November 21, 2019, Case Management Conference, Plaintiffs and Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, jointly submit this letter to provide the Court with an update as to the progress of discussions regarding both discovery and settlement.
+
+The parties have thus far engaged in two productive conferences pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. During those conferences, the parties agreed to exchange initial disclosures by January 23, 2020, and to exchange discovery plans one week thereafter, on January 30, 2020.
+
+As the Court is aware, Defendants have arranged for a Victims' Compensation Program that will be available to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel has conferred with the Program's designers and administrators, the Program's administrators provided Plaintiffs with a proposed protocol for the Program, and Plaintiffs have provided some feedback to the administrators. The motion for the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands to approve the establishment of the Program will be heard on February 4, 2020.
+
+The parties request a conference with the Court on February 6 or 7, 2020, to resolve any potential disagreements as to how these matters should proceed. The parties will provide the Court with their proposed discovery plan(s) 48 hours before any such conference.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+/s/ Joshua I. Schiller
+
+David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
+
+/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. Troutman Sanders LLP
+
+cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731975/EFTA02731975.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+The Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York is directed to docket the within ORDER in each of the following actions:
+
+VE v. Nine East 71st Street et al., No. 1:19-cv-07625 (AJN) (DF)
+
+Katlyn Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07771 (PKC) (DF)
+
+Priscilla Doe v. Indyke et al, No. 1:19-cv-07772 (ALC) (DF)
+
+Lisa Doe v. Indyke et al., No. 1:19-cv-07773 (ER) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10577 (LGS) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe 15 v. Indyke et aL, No. I :19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DF)
+
+Mary Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-I 0758 (PAE) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et al, No. 1:19-cv-10788 (GHW) (DF)
+
+Anastasia Doe v. Indyke et al, No. 1:19-cv-11869 (MN) (DF)
+
+![](_page_0_Picture_15.jpeg)
+
+## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:
+
+The above-referenced cases — all brought by plaintiffs claiming that they were sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein and seeking damages from his estate — have been neither consolidated for any purpose, nor designated as "related" by the Court. Nonetheless, these cases (together with certain other, similar cases, not listed above) have been referred to the undersigned for general pretrial supervision, so that discovery — and potentially settlement — may be coordinated as reasonable. While, at the parties' request, discovery in the other Jeffrey Epstein cases referred to this Court has been stayed pending a further report on the parties' settlement efforts, the parties to each of the above-referenced cases have requested, by submissions dated January 10, 2020, that this Court set a discovery schedule. This Court's having reviewed the parties' submissions, it is hereby ORDERED that:
+
+1. In each of the above-referenced cases in which the parties have not yet submitted a jointly proposed discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are directed to submit a proposed discovery schedule for this Court's review no later
+
+than February 6, 2020. This submission should address all of the matters set out in Rule 26(f)(3), and should specifically include proposed deadlines for:
+
+- a service of initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1);
+- b. service of initial document requests and interrogatories;
+- c. any motion for joinder of other parties or amendment of the pleadings;
+- d. completion of fact discovery; and
+- e. expert disclosures and the completion of expert discovery, if any.
+
+2. As to each of the above-referenced cases, this Court will hold a pretrial conference pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on February 11, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 17A at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007. The parties should be aware, however, that the mere fact that this Court will be holding a single, joint case-management conference does not necessarily mean that this Court will set an identical discovery schedule in each case. At the conference, counsel should be prepared to address whether there are reasons why these cases should be treated differently for scheduling purposes.
+
+Dated: New York, New York January 14, 2019
+
+SO ORDERED
+
+Ahles A9-7 DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge
+
+Copies to:
+
+All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731977/EFTA02731977.md

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+Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com
+
+January 24, 2020
+
+ECF
+
+Hon. Andrew L. Carter Jr.
+
+Thurgood Marshall
+
+United States Courthouse
+
+40 Foley Square
+
+New York, NY 10007
+
+Re: v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+Dear Judge Carter:
+
+We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the to -Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Practice § 2(A) to set forth the bases for the Co-Executors' anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the time-barred claims and punitive damages demand in Plaintiff ("Plaintiff") Complaint (ECF No. 1).
+
+- 1. Plaintiff is a South African resident who alleges Decedent committed torts against her from 2002 to 2004 when she was an adult, in various jurisdictions.
+
+Plaintiff, who claims South African citizenship and residency, alleges that, from 2002 (when she was 20) to 2004, Mr. Epstein ("Decedent"), now deceased, committed various sexual offenses against her in the U.S. Virgin Islands ("USVI"), France, Florida, New Mexico and New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action -- battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress -- and demands punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 54-64, p. 15.)
+
+- 2. Plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred.
+
+CPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-N.Y. resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside N.Y., the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations ("SOL") of both N.Y. and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued.' Plaintiff's causes of action expired by: 2006 per the USVI's 2-year SOL (5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A)); 2008 per FL's 4-year SOL (Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)); 2007 per N.M.'s 3-year SOL (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); and 2005 or 2007 per N.Y.'s 1 or 3-year SOL (CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)).
+
+- 3. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statutes of limitations fail.
+
+Plaintiff erroneously alleges her claims are timely per CPLR § 213-c or § 215(8)(a), her claims were equitably tolled, and that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting an SOL defense (Compl. ¶y 12-15). Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.
+
+{sup}`&`quot;In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202." Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nat? Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).
+
+First, neither CPLR § 213-c nor § 215(8)(a) applies here. The 20 year SOL in CPLR § 213-c became effective as of September 18, 2019; the SOL was 5 years as of 2006 and 1 year before then. (L. 2006, ch 3, § 5(b).) However, the 20-year SOL does not apply retroactively except "where the applicable [SOL] in effect on the date of such act or omission has not yet expired." L. 2019, ch. 315, §4. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c cannot revive Plaintiff's claims arising from torts committed in N.Y.
+
+Separately, CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action" (emphasis added). Decedent's criminal indictment (the "Indictment") attached to Plaintiff's Complaint does not concern Plaintiff's allegations. Rather, the indictment charges Decedent sexually abused "minor girls" (Compl., Ex. A at ¶ 1), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking of "minors." (Id., Ex. A at ¶¶2 - 4, 6, 8, 11- 15, 18 - 20, 22.) Because Plaintiff alleges she was an adult when Decedent abused her, her action and the Indictment arise from different occurrences.
+
+New York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gaffina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action occurred on different dates): McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LOS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829, at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable to claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions). Plaintiff alleges a far more tenuous connection to the Indictment than the criminal-civil links unsuccessfully asserted in those cases.
+
+Second, even if CPLR § 213-c and § 215(8)(a) apply, which they do not, Plaintiff's claims for torts committed outside N.Y. are still untimely per the limitations periods of those jurisdictions and CPLR § 202. While Plaintiff alleges Decedent raped her within 20 years of filing her Complaint (Compl. ¶13), she does not allege that occurred in N.Y. Plaintiff's claims for torts outside N.Y. are untimely.
+
+Third, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is "prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising h[er) rights." Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at \*30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a court may, "under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "That the doctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances -- is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is justified." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A late-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with "reasonable
+
+diligence" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at \*32 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists but the defendant's conduct causes her to delay in bringing her lawsuit. Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at '5 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment. Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented her from timely commencing suit. Id. at '6 (citation omitted).
+
+Plaintiff's threadbare allegations of "deception," "threats" and the like (Compl. ¶14) do not establish "extraordinary" circumstances justifying tolling. Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) that Decedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) that Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment.
+
+## 4. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.2
+
+Plaintiff's punitive damages claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because none of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred permits punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at '6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) ("Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased."); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate"); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) ("an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury."); Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at \*5 n.13 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (Restat. §908(2) "reflects the common law of this jurisdiction").3 That is the law in most jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a (punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor).°
+
+{sup}`2` Courts in this District regularly dismiss punitive damages claims. See The Cookware Co. (USA), LW v. Austin, 15.5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing punitive damages claim without leave to replead); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 03-6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at '25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claims not statutorily available).
+
+{sup}`3` To determine common law, USVI courts consider: (1) whether USVI courts previously adopted a rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of other jurisdictions; and (3) which approach is the soundest for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. , No. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at '1 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014). These factors favor the Co-Executors: (1) pre-Banks, USVI courts expressed approval for Restat. § 908 (see v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) (considering the inverse issue)): (2) a majority of other jurisdictions preclude punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate (2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)); and (3) post-Banks, USVI courts have held § 908 is the soundest rule (Powell, supra.).
+
+{sup}`4` France does not recognize punitive damages. Punitive Damages, supra., at § 22.4 (citation omitted).
+
+Hon. Andrew L. Carter Jr. January 24, 2020 Page 4
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+![](_page_3_Picture_2.jpeg)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731981/EFTA02731981.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+January 29, 2020
+
+#### VIA ECF
+
+The Honorable Andrew L. Carter Jr. District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007
+
+Re: v. huh he el al., Case No. 19-cv-10479
+
+Dear Judge Carter,
+
+Pursuant to Individual Rule 2(A), Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendants' request for a pre-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt. 12. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion "to dismiss" Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is procedurally improper. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' anticipated motion in its entirety.
+
+## I. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York Law.
+
+Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiffshall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence the civil action." (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on August 29, 2019. Compl. ¶ 36. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later, the action is timely under CPLR § 215(8Xa). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 215(8)(a)'s application to these facts are meritless.
+
+First, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was not named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR § 215(8)(a) is "plain, clear and unambiguous" that it does not require that the plaintiff be "the victim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed." Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
+
+Second, Defendants' narrow construction of § 215(8)(a)'s "event or occurrence" language is improper, especially in light of the breadth of Epstein's indictment. The charges were not limited to crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex trafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, "including minor victims identified herein." Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y Indictment) ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added). As another example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking of "numerous individuals .. . including but not limited to Minor Victim-1." Id. ¶ 24. Nor did the
+
+# BSF
+
+Indictment describe the sex trafficking conspiracy as exclusively targeting minor victims—it explicitly acknowledged that some victims were not underage at the time of the sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 11 ("[Epstein] knew that many of his New York victims were underage."). The Indictment was targeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. See Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 56-57, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (guilty plea conceding "knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan" allowed victims of the atrocities in Sudan use 2 1 5(8Xa) because causes of action arose out of defendant's general conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions put in place to stop atrocities). Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common scheme, they fall within CPLR § 2 I 5(8Xa).
+
+The cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were much narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced only in connection with events on two dates); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at •3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment "charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates"). Epstein's Indictment was much broader, covering sexual abuse that occurred "over the course of many years" "from at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005." S.D.N.Y. Indictment ¶¶1-2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added). Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a) because the scheme the S.D.N.Y. Indictment targeted is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arise.
+
+Plaintiff's claims are also timely under CPLR § 213-c, which provides for a twenty year limitations period for "all civil claims or causes of action brought by any person for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute rape" or other enumerated sex crimes. The Complaint alleges that Epstein raped Plaintiff numerous times within the past twenty years. See Compl. ¶ 44 ("Epstein repeatedly raped Juliette by forcible compulsion."). Plaintiff's claims fall squarely within CPLR § 213-c's coverage. Defendants' assertion that CPLR § 213-c does not apply because "the 20-year SOL does not apply retroactively" is meritless. CPLR § 213-c's text contains no such limitation, and was revised last year (increasing the limitations period from 5 to 20 years) specifically to allow claims such as Plaintiff's to proceed. See June 17, 2019, New York Committee Report, 2019 NY S.B. 6574 (NS) (noting that "victims who have suffered in silence for decades have bravely spoken about their abuse, and have also laid bare the state's limited ability to prosecute their abusers due to the passage of time" and that "this bill would increase the time period in which the victim could bring a civil suit for these offenses to twenty years").
+
+Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202. This argument fails for two reasons. First, CPLR § 202 only applies to nonresidents who are injured outside of New York, and the controlling date for determining a plaintiff's residence is the date on which the cause of action accrued, not the date on which the action was commenced. See, e.g.. DeMartino v. 148 A.D.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Under the borrowing statute, the phrases "resident" and "domicile" are not synonymous. "Rather, the determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for purposes of CPLR § 202, turns on whether [she] has a significant connection with some locality in the State as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year." Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 473 N.E.2d 742, 746 (N.Y. 1984). The fact that Plaintiff currently lives in South Africa is therefore irrelevant. At the time of her repeated sexual assaults, Plaintiff was a resident of New York.
+
+Epstein's co-conspirators got Plaintiff a visa so that she could travel to New York often, and when she visited she stayed at Epstein's New York home for one to two weeks at a time. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 46. Because Plaintiff had a significant connection with New York at the time her cause of action accrued, she was a resident of New York, and CPLR § 202 does not apply.
+
+Second, even if New York's borrowing statute did apply and Plaintiff's claims were otherwise untimely, they would still not be barred because CPLR § 215(8Xa) provides for civil actions to commence within "one year from the termination of the criminal action . . . notwithstanding that the time in which to commence such action has already expired."
+
+### II. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling.
+
+Even if Plaintiff's claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of limitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Defendants assert that Plaintiff "fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel." Dkt. 12 at 2. But the Complaint alleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies "where it would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense," Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929 (N.Y. 2006), due to "deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct," Zoe G. v. Frederick F.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his co-conspirators manipulated victims using "financial power, promises, and threats;" that Plaintiff was "afraid of betraying Epstein because of his money and power" and was "afraid he would hurt her or her family;" that Epstein tried to scare her by telling her that he had one of his accusers sent to prison; and that Epstein tried to keep in contact with Plaintiff after the abuse ended. Compl. 27, 47, 51. The allegations concerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of his victims (and Plaintiff specifically) easily provide the requisite "extraordinary circumstances" for equitable tolling.
+
+Because equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants' attempt to resolve the issue at motion to dismiss is inappropriate, and any motion challenging whether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have conducted discovery. See, e.g., Carelock v. United States, 2015 WL 5000816, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015).
+
+## III. The Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery
+
+Federal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's clams (battery and intentional infliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be dealt with at a later stage of this litigation. See. e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying "motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive damages as procedurally premature").
+
+![](_page_3_Picture_1.jpeg)
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Is/Joshua I. Schiller
+
+David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller, Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq.
+
+cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731985/EFTA02731985.md

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+#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+#### DISCOVERY PLAN
+
+v.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Pursuant to the Court's January 14, 2020, order (Dkt. 11), the parties submit the following report addressing the required topics under Rule 26(0(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
+
+- (A)The parties have already exchanged initial disclosures.
+- (B) Plaintiff seeks discovery as to Jeffrey Epstein's documents concerning
+  - a. The Plaintiffs;
+  - b. Mr. Epstein's sex-trafficking conspiracy;
+  - c. Visitors and/or passengers at any of Mr. Epstein's multiple residences or aircraft where the sex trafficking occurred;
+  - d. Communications between Mr. Epstein and his co-conspirators;
+  - e. Communications between Mr. Epstein and his employees;
+  - f. Communications between Mr. Epstein and any government official regardless of country;
+
+- g. Mr. Epstein's flight logs and helicopter logs;
+- h. Video tapes and photographs taken at Mr. Epstein's properties or on his planes;
+- i. Financial records;
+- j. Mr. Epstein's message pads and any phone call logs or phone/contact directories; and
+- k. Amazon.com account details, including order history.
+
+The Co-Executors preserve all of their discovery rights including the right to object to Plaintiff's discovery requests. The Co-Executors' position is that the general subjects of discovery in this action are: (1) Mr. Epstein's alleged abuse of Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff's alleged damages.
+
+There is no need to conduct discovery in phases, or otherwise limit discovery to particular issues.
+
+- (C) The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol for the exchange of documents including the production of electronically stored information, no later than April 13, 2020. (D)— (F) There are no further issues requiring the Court's attention at this time.
+
+A proposed scheduling order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Where the parties are in disagreement regarding a particular deadline, their respective positions are noted.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+Is/ Sigrid S. McCawley
+
+David Boies, Esq.
+
+Joshua I. Schiller, Esq.
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq.
+
+Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq.
+
+cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)
+
+# EXHIBIT A
+
+#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff, CASE NO: 19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+[PROPOSED] SCHEDULING ORDER
+
+v.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+### DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:
+
+It is hereby ORDERED that:
+
+- 1. Plaintiff's proposal: The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than March 12, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 30 days from the Court's entry of this Order.
+- 2. The Co-Executors' proposal: Plaintiffs shall provide HIPAA-compliant medical records release authorizations to the Defendants no later than 14 days from Defendants' request. Plaintiff's position: Any request for HIPAA releases shall be by motion if the parties are unable to reach agreement without Court intervention, after discovery requests are served.
+- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than March 27, 2020.
+- 4. The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol regarding the production of documents and electronically stored information no later than April 13, 2020.
+
+- 5. Plaintiff's proposal: All fact discovery shall be completed no later than June 10, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 160 days from the Court's entry of this Order.
+- 6. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule:
+  - a. Plaintiffs proposal: Each party bearing the affirmative burden of proof on a claim or defense shall serve its expert report(s) with respect to that claim or defense no later than May 27, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 190 days from the Court's entry of this Order (i.e., 30 days after the close of fact discovery).
+  - b. Rebuttal reports shall be served no later than June 26, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 220 days from the Court's entry of this Order (i.e., 60 days after the close of fact discovery).
+  - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than July 27, 2020. The Co-Executors' proposal: 240 days from the Court's entry of this Order.
+- 7. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court.
+
+Dated: New York, New York
+
+February 2020
+
+SO ORDERED
+
+DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge
+
+## Cordes to:
+
+All counsel (via ECF)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731990/EFTA02731990.md

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+The Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York is directed to docket the within ORDER in each of the following actions:
+
+USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED Doc #: DATE FILEIT41411Q2a. - VE v. Nine East 71st Street et aL, No. 1:19-cv-07625 (AJN) (DF)
+
+Katlyn Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07771 (PKC) (DF)
+
+Priscilla Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07772 (ALC) (DF)
+
+Lisa Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-07773 (ER) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10475 (LGS) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe 1000 v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10577 (LGS) (DF)
+
+Jane Doe 15 v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DF)
+
+Mary Doe v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DF)
+
+v. Indyke et at, No. 1:19-cv-10788 (O1-1W) (DF)
+
+Anastasia Doe v. Indyke et aL, No. 1:19-cv-11869 (MN) (DF)
+
+## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:
+
+The Court having held a case management conference on February 11, 2020, with counsel for all parties in the above-referenced cases, it is hereby ORDERED, as stated at the conference, that:
+
+- 1. To the extent not already made, the parties shall make initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no later than February 25, 2020.
+- 2. The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than March 10, 2020. In their initial interrogatories, the parties may, as reasonable, seek information outside the scope of Local Civil Rule 33.3(a).
+- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than April 30, 2020.
+  - 4. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than June 10, 2020.
+
+- 5. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule:
+  - a. Plaintiffs' expert reports shall be served no later than June 10, 2020.
+  - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than July 10, 2020.
+  - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than July 31, 2020.
+- 6. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court.
+- 7. The parties to the above-referenced cases shall submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions, no later than April 30,
+
+2020.
+
+Dated: New York, New York February 11, 2020
+
+SO ORDERED
+
+DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge
+
+## Copies to:
+
+All counsel in the above-referenced cases (via ECF)

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02731992/EFTA02731992.md

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+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+X Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, Defendants. X
+
+Index No. I :19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+### MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Mary "Molly" S. DiRago hereby moves this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-captioned action.
+
+I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state of Illinois and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule I .3.
+
+/s/ Mary "Molly" S. DiRago
+
+Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending)
+
+Troutman Sanders LLP
+
+One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905
+
+Chicago, 60606
+
+(312) 759-1926
+
+(312) 759-1939 (Fax)
+
+molly.dirago@troutman.com
+
+Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and
+
+Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of
+
+Jeffrey E. Epstein
+
+### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+v. Index No. 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD • EPSTEIN,
+
+•
+
+Defendants.
+
+
+# AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+I, Mary "Molly" S. DiRago, declare as follow:
+
+I. I am a member in good standing of the State Bar of Illinois and an associate with the law firm Troutman Sanders LLP, counsel for Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"). I submit this affidavit in support of my Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice before this Court.
+
+2. I have never been convicted of a felony.
+
+3. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred, or denied admission or readmission by any court.
+
+4. There are no disciplinary proceedings presently against me.
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
+
+Dated: February 13, 2020 Respectfully Submitted,
+
+/il Mary "Molly" S. DiRago
+
+Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending)
+
+Troutman Sanders LLP
+
+One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905
+
+Chicago, 60606
+
+(312) 759-1926
+
+(312) 759-1939 (Fax)
+
+molly.dirago@troutman.com
+
+Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and
+
+Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of
+
+Jeffrey E. Epstein
+
+# Certificate of Admission To the Bar of Illinois
+
+I, Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, do hereby certify that
+
+Mary Sharon DiRago
+
+has been duly licensed and admitted to practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law within this State; has duly taken the required oath to support the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES and of the STATE OF ILLINOIS, and also the oath of office prescribed by law, that said name was entered upon the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors in my office on 11/04/2004 and is in good standing, so far as the records of this office disclose.
+
+> IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the seal of said Court, this 31st day of January, 2020.
+
+> > Croy acitee
+
+Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois
+
+# CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING
+
+![](_page_5_Picture_2.jpeg)
+
+United States of America
+
+}ss. Mary S DiRago
+
+Northern District of Illinois
+
+G. Bruton , Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
+
+DO HEREBY CERTIFY That Mary S DiRago was duly admitted to practice in said Court on (12/08/2004) and is in good standing as a member of the bar of said court.
+
+Dated at Chicago, Illinois on (01/29/2020 )
+
+Mlle, Bruton , Clerk,
+
+By: Tina Lam Deputy Clerk
+
+### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+v.
+
+Index No. 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+
+## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted.
+
+Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows:
+
+Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-1939 (Fax) molly.dirago@troutman.com
+
+Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") in the above entitled action;
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys.
+
+Dated:
+
+United States District/Magistrate Judge

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732000/EFTA02732000.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, Defendants. X x
+
+USDC SDNY I )0CUMENT !:.LECTRONICALLY FILED TIOC #: DATE FILED: 42- I 202°
+
+Index No. 1:19-cv-I 0479-ALC-DCF
+
+## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
+
+The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted.
+
+Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows:
+
+Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-I 939 (Fax) molly.dirago©troutman.com
+
+Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above entitled action;
+
+IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys.
+
+Dated: 07-AV/A 2-OAziAi 1)-2
+
+United States District/Magistrate Judge
+
+DEBRA FREEMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732002/EFTA02732002.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+vs.
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv- 10479 (ALC)
+
+## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Andrew Villacastin, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding.
+
+Dated: New York, New York March 6, 2020
+
+BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
+
+By: /s/ Andrew Villacastin Andrew Villacastin 55 Hudson Yards Telephone: (212) 446-2300 Fax: (212) 446-2350 avillacastin@bsfllp.com
+
+Attorney for Plaint

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732003/EFTA02732003.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+vs.
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv- 10479 (ALC)
+
+## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Sabina Mariella, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding.
+
+Dated: New York, New York March 6, 2020
+
+BOLES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
+
+By: /s/ Sabina Mariella Sabina Mariella 55 Hudson Yards Telephone: (212) 446-2300 Fax: (212) 446-2350 smariella®bsfllp.com
+
+Attorney for PlaintiA

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732004/EFTA02732004.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Case No. 19-cv-10479-ALC
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+-against-
+
+Indyke, et al. Defendant.
+
+## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS
+
+TO ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES
+
+z I have cases pending I have no cases pending
+
+Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for:
+
+Sabina Mariella
+
+FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME
+
+My SDNY Bar Number is:2212\_92\_6\_\_\_\_\_ My State Bar Number is \_5530170\_\_\_
+
+I am,
+
+An attorney
+
+A Government Agency attorney
+
+A Pro Hac Vice attorney
+
+FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number):
+
+OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME:a& Cromwell. LLP
+
+FIRM ADDRESS:\_12a\_Broag\_Snet Nsw York. NY 10004
+
+FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (719)558-4000
+
+FIRM FAX NUMBER: (2121558-358g
+
+NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Boles Schiller Flexneth.. .P
+
+FIRM ADDRESS:)
+
+FIRM TELEPHONE
+
+FIRM FAX NUMBER:\_n\_4413-2350
+
+I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency.
+
+I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on \_\_\_\_\_\_ by Judge\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
+
+Datcd: March 9,2020
+
+ORNEY'S SIGNATURE

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732005/EFTA02732005.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+x Plaintiff, -against-INDYKE, 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) Defendants. ORDER
+
+USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC#: DATE FILED: I • Ill - 20
+
+ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:
+
+On January 24, 2020, Defendant filed a letter motion requesting a pre-motion conference on an anticipated motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 121(6). On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed her response. Defendant's motion for a pre-motion conference is DENIED and the Court sets the following briefing schedule:
+
+Defendant's Motion to Dismiss:
+
+Plaintiff's Opposition:
+
+Defendant's Reply, if any:
+
+SO ORDERED.
+
+Dated: March 17, 2020
+
+New York, New York
+
+April 14, 2020
+
+May 12, 2020
+
+May 26, 2020
+
+7
+
+ANDREW L. CARTER, JR. United States District Judge

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732006/EFTA02732006.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+-against-DARREN I IN0VKE and RICHARD DAWN, ti Paw Gunwales a executors at Os ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, Defendant.
+
+## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS
+
+TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES
+
+I have cases pending I have no cases pending
+
+Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for:
+
+Mary "Molly' S. DiRago
+
+FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME
+
+My SDNY Bar Number is: My State Bar Number is 6282757
+
+lam.
+
+An attorney A Government Agency attorney A Pro Hac Vice attorney
+
+FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number):
+
+OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: TROUTMAN SANDERS UP FIRM ADDRESS:One North Wacker Drive. Suite 2905 Chicago. IL 60606 FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: ovarN-IIN FIRM FAX NUMBER: awn.
+
+NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME:mameueNeatul rause FIRM ADDRESS: 227 StreeLltole\_3900, Chicago, 4 60606 FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER:\_isipiss.isze FIRM FAX NUMBER: 1312)759-1939
+
+I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency.
+
+I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge
+
+Dated: 03/20/2020 /s/ Mary \*Molly\* S. DiRago ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732007/EFTA02732007.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+-against-
+
+DARREN . INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. I:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DCF)
+
+## NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
+
+PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying Memorandum of Law and all prior pleadings and proceedings in this action, Defendants will move this Court before the Hon. Andrew L. Carter, Jr., United States District Judge, at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007, at a time to be scheduled by this Court, for an Order pursuant to Rule 12(13(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing Plaintiff Complaint (ECF No. 1); and for such other and further relief as may be just and proper.
+
+Dated: New York, New York Respectfully submitted, April 14, 2020
+
+TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000
+
+By:/s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+Attorneys for Defendants

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732008/EFTA02732008.md

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+-against-
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,
+
+Defendants.
+
+Case No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DCF)
+
+## DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
+
+TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Tel: 212-704-6000 Fax: 212-704-6288
+
+Attorneys for Defendants
+
+# TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+|  | Page |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ |
+| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | 1 |
+| STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 |
+| I. Plaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her From 2002-2004, |  |
+| When She Was An Adult | 2 |
+| ARGUMENT | 4 |
+| I. Plaintiff's Causes Of Action Expired In 2014 At The Latest | 4 |
+| II. Plaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations |  |
+| Exceptions Fail | 7 |
+| A. CPLR § 215(8Xa) is inapplicable because the Indictment arises out |  |
+| of the alleged sex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff | 7 |
+| B. CPLR § 213-c is inapplicable because it is not retroactive | 10 |
+| C. Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege "extraordinary" |  |
+| circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel | 12 |
+| III. Plaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Are Barred As A Matter Of Law | 16 |
+| A. Banks factor one: previously, USVI courts favorably cited the |  |
+| estates | 18 |
+| B. Banks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an |  |
+| decedent | 19 |
+| C. Banks factor three: Post-Banks, USV1 courts have favorably |  |
+| damages | 19 |
+| CONCLUSION | 21 |
+
+## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
+
+| Cases Abercrombie v. College, | Page(s) |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ |
+| 438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, | 15 |
+| 10, 2008) Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., | 17 |
+| 64 N.Y.2d 20, 484 N.Y.S.2d 514, 473 N.E.2d 742 (1984) Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., | 6 |
+| 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 201 I) Blissett v. Eisensmidt, | 18, 19, 20 |
+| 940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) Boos v. Runyon, | 17 |
+| 201 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2000) Booth v. Bowen, | 13 |
+| No. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008) Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., | 18 |
+| 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Tern Ct. 1989) Cerbone v. Intl Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, | 20 |
+| 768 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1985) Christodoulou v. Terdeman, | 13 |
+| 262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1999) Clemens v. Nealon, | 7, 8 |
+| 202 A.D.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nall Tr. Co., | 9 |
+| 234 F. Supp. 3d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) Conklin v. Maidenbaum, | 4 |
+| (Ramos, J.) | 14 |
+
+| Crabtree v. Estate of Crabtree, |  |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- |
+| 837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005) v. Christian, | 19 |
+| 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005) Dept of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., | 19 |
+| 747 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) | 15 |
+| Fairley v. =, |  |
+| S.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.) Gallina v. Thatcher, | 12 |
+| 23, 2018) Gleason v. Gleason, | 7, 8 |
+| 26 NY2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970) Gleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, | 11 |
+| 170 Misc. 2d 668, 649 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1996) Gov't of Virgin Islands v. | II, 12 |
+| No. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014). Graham v. | I8 |
+| 224 F.R.D. 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) v. Dowson Holding Co., | 17 |
+| 51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009) Hammerman v. Louis Watch Co., | 18 |
+| 7 A.D.2d 817, 181 N.Y.S.2d 65 (3rd Dept. 1958) Hammerman v Louis Watch Co., | 6 |
+| 7 AD2d 817 In re Higgins, | 6 |
+| 270 B.R. 147 (Bank.. S.D.N.Y. 2001) Isaac v. Crichlow, | 13 |
+| 63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., | 19 |
+| 117 N.M. 337 (N.M. 1994). | .17 |
+
+- v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1996) 13 Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) 10 Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) 20 Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988) 17 McElligott v. City of N. Y., No. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) 7 Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 15 Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, 69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) 19 Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, No. 18-14155-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) 17 Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) 20
+- v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) 21 Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 2020 NY Slip Op 02127 11 Siegfried v Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916 6 Simons v. Marriott Corp., 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993) 16 SIB v. N.Y.C. Dep 't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) 20
+  - v. N.Y.C. Dep't of COPT., No. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 13
+
+| St. House, Inc. v. Barrows, |  |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979) Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., | 70 |
+| No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, | 16 |
+| (Batts, J.) v. Rios, | 20 |
+| 780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D.V.I. 2011) In re U.S. Lines, Inc., | 20 |
+| 318 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 2003) Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., | 13 |
+| Oct. 5, 2012) Yesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, | 12, 13 |
+| Sept. 27, 2010) Statutes | 13 |
+| EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) | 16 |
+| Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3XO) | 1, 5 |
+| McKinney's Cons. Laws | 9, 11 |
+| N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8 | I, 5 |
+| New York Child Victim's Act | 12 |
+| New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law | 16 |
+| New York General Construction Law § 37-a Other Authorities | 17 |
+| Alec A. Beech, | Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be |
+| Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, | 49 Akron L. Rev. |
+| 553 (2016) | 19 |
+| CPLR § 202 | 4, 5 |
+| CPLR § 213-c | I, 2, 3, 10, II, 12 |
+
+| CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3) | I, 4 |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- |
+| CPLR § 214-g | 12 |
+| CPLR §215(8) | 8, 9 |
+| CPLR § 215(8Xa) | 1,2,3,7,8,9 |
+| Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) | 1, 12, 21 |
+| 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015) | 19 |
+| 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 22.4 (7th ed. 2015) | 18 |
+| Restatement (Second) of Torts | 18, 19, 20 |
+| Nonexistent Concept | 18 |
+| Defendants | 19 |
+
+Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. I) because it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is prohibited by statute.
+
+### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+This action is time-barred. Plaintiff, who claims South African citizenship and residency, alleges that, from 2002 (when she was 20 years old) to 2004, Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Decedent") now deceased, committed various sexual offenses against her in the U.S. Virgin Islands ("USVI"), France, Florida,' New Mexico, and New York. (Comp!. 11 16, 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action—battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress—and demands punitive damages. (Id. 11 54-64, p. 15.)
+
+However, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by: 2006 per the USVI's two-year statute of limitations (5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A)); 2005 or 2007 per New York's one- or three-year statute of limitations (CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)); 2007 per New Mexico's three-year statute of limitations (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); 2008 per Florida's four-year statute of limitations (Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)); and 2014 per France's ten-year statute of limitations (Art. 2226 (1) of the Civil Code). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are untimely and must be dismissed.
+
+In apparent recognition that her claims are time-barred, Plaintiff erroneously alleges that they are timely pursuant to CPLR § 215(8)(a)2 and CPLR § 213-c, they were equitably tolled, and
+
+I In two conclusory allegations, Plaintiff lists Florida as one of the locations where she was assaulted (Compl. 11 25, 55), but offers no factual allegations in support.
+
+{sup}`2` CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action" (emphasis added).
+
+that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. (Compl. 7J 12-15.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.
+
+CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here because Decedent's criminal indictment (the "Indictment"), which concerns alleged sexual abuse of minors, has nothing to do with Plaintiff, who alleges misconduct when she was an adult. Similarly, CPLR § 213-c fails because it does not apply retroactively, and Plaintiff's claims had already expired by the time it was enacted in September 18, 2019. Plaintiff also fails to meet her burden at the pleadings stage to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.
+
+Finally, Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages must also be dismissed as a matter of law. New York law, which applies here because New York has the greatest connection to this matter, expressly bars recovery of punitive damages in a personal injury action brought to recover damages from a decedent tortfeasor's estate—i.e., exactly what Plaintiff attempts to do here. However, even if Florida, New Mexico, USVI, or law applies (the only other locations where Plaintiff alleges she was harmed), Plaintiff's punitive damages claim would likewise be barred under the laws of those jurisdictions, which are in accord with New York and the majority of U.S. jurisdictions that prohibit recovery of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate.
+
+## STATEMENT OF FACTS
+
+## I. Plaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her From 2002-2004, When She Was An Adult
+
+Plaintiff claims she met Decedent in 2002, when she was twenty years old, in Cape Town, South Africa. (Compl. 1 38.) She alleges that an American woman approached her and asked if she wanted to meet Decedent. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she met Decedent and, on some later date, another woman helped Plaintiff get a visa, passport, and airline tickets so she could visit Decedent
+
+in New York. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) Plaintiff claims that, shortly after arriving in New York, she was flown to the Caribbean on Decedent's private plane. (Id. ¶¶ 4243.) Plaintiff alleges that Decedent first sexually assaulted her in the USVI. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.)
+
+Plaintiff further alleges that she was sexually abused multiple times thereafter, during a period of two years, when she was forced to travel and meet Decedent in New York, Paris, and New Mexico. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 49-50.) Plaintiff claims her final trip to the United States was in 2004, when she allegedly flew to see Decedent at his New Mexico ranch. (Id. ¶ 50.) During this trip, Decedent and Plaintiff allegedly had an argument because Plaintiff was "not being obedient." (Id.) Decedent also asked Plaintiff to serve drinks on a plane headed to California, but Plaintiff and Decedent allegedly had another argument and Plaintiff flew home to South Africa instead. (Id.) This trip—sixteen years ago—was the last time she alleges she saw Decedent. (Id.)
+
+Apparently recognizing that her claims are time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations, Plaintiff alleges generic legal conclusions that also appear in other time-bared complaints against the Co-Executors that Plaintiff's counsel filed in this District on behalf of other individuals. Thus, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion:
+
+- This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa), which provides that a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against [Decedent] with respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on August 29, 2019. (Id. ¶ 12.)
+- This action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-C, which provides that a plaintiff shall have 20 years to file civil claims "for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law." [Decedent] raped Plaintiff within 20 years of filing this Complaint. (Id. 1 13.)
+- Any statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims is tolled due to the continuous and active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that [Decedent] and his co-conspirators used to silence his victims, including Plaintiff. [Decedent]'s actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit before
+
+his death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that [Decedent] and his co-conspirators would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. (Id. ¶ 14.)
+
+- Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Allowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. [Decedent] and his co-conspirators intimidated each of his victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods, and therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before his death. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, [Decedent] was able to escape punishment for his crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life. (Id. ¶ 15.)
+
+None of these threadbare allegations rescues Plaintiff's claims from being time-barred.
+
+## ARGUMENT
+
+# I. Plaintiffs Causes Of Action Expired In 2014 At The Latest
+
+Plaintiff claims she was sexually assaulted between 2002 and 2004 in New York, the USVI, Florida, New Mexico, and France. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action based on these sexual assaults (battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress) and demands punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 54-64, p. 15.) CPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York, the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued.3 Here, Plaintiff's claims are not timely under New York law or any of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred and the Court must dismiss her claims.
+
+New York. New York law applies a one-year limitations period to actions for assault and battery and a three-year limitations period to actions for personal injury. CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3). Under either statute, Plaintiff's claims are untimely, as they expired in either 2005 or 2007.
+
+{sup}`3` "ln diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202." Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).
+
+USVj. Under USVI law, which is where Decedent's first sexual assault of Plaintiff allegedly occurred, the statute of limitations for battery actions is two years. 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A). Thus, under USVI law, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by 2006 at the latest.
+
+Florida. Although the Complaint does not allege any specific acts that occurred in Florida (nor even that Plaintiff was ever in Florida), even if it did, these claims would be time-barred. Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for actions "for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort" is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O). Accordingly, under Florida law, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by 2008 at the latest.
+
+New Mexico. Under New Mexico law, actions for "injury to a person" must be brought within three years. N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8. Thus, under New Mexico law, Plaintiff's claims expired in 2007 at the latest.
+
+France. Under law, the civil statute of limitations in the event of violence or sexual assault against an adult is 10 years. Art. 2226 (1) of the Civil Code. Therefore, under law, Plaintiff's claims expired in 2014 at the latest.
+
+To avoid these statutes of limitations, Plaintiff argues in her response to the Co-Executors' pm-motion letter that she was a resident of New York at the time of the alleged torts and, accordingly, CPLR § 202 is inapplicable. (ECF No. 13 at pp. 2-3.) This argument is unavailing for at least two reasons.
+
+First even if Plaintiff is correct—and, as explained below, she is not—her claims are still untimely under the laws of each jurisdiction that could conceivably apply to her claims.
+
+Second Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in her Complaint plausibly establishing she was ever a resident of New York. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a South African
+
+citizen and resident (Compl ¶ 16); refers to only one specific visit to New York and that Plaintiff was "not there for long" (id. ¶ 42); and asserts that Decedent "forced [Plaintiff] to travel to the United States many times to see [Decedent] and be subjected to repeated sexual abuse for one to two weeks at a time, sometimes staying in his New York apartment" (id. ¶ 46).
+
+As a matter of law, New York residency requires significantly more than an occasional visit there. Rather, Plaintiff must allege facts establishing that she intended to remain in New York with some degree of permanency.
+
+In Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 64 N.Y.2d 20, 30, 484 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518-19, 473 N.E.2d 742, 746-47 (1984), which Plaintiff cites in her pre-motion response letter, the court found that "[c]ases defining `resident' for purposes of venue under CPLR 503 are useful precedents (see, e.g., Siegfried v Siegfried, 92 AD2d 916; Hammerman v Louis Watch Co., 7 AD2d 817)." The courts in Siegfried and Hammerman found that, in order for a person to be deemed a resident of New York, "[s]he must stay there for some time and have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency." Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916, 916, 460 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (2nd Dept. 1983) (renting a room in Nassau County and party's statements regarding her intent to remain in Nassau County were insufficient to support a finding that she was a resident of Nassau County); Hammerman v. Louis Watch Co., 7 A.D.2d 817, 818, 181 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (3rd Dept. 1958) ("Residence requires more stability than occasional stopovers at a hotel... and the mere fact that the plaintiffs rent premises on a year round basis where they sleep while there on business, in our view, does not establish a residence.").
+
+Here, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to claim New York residency as a matter of law. Visiting New York "sometimes" over a two-year period hardly qualifies as evincing an intent to remain there with some degree of permanency. See Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d at 916.
+
+#### II. Plaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations Exceptions Fail
+
+### A. CPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable because the Indictment arises out of the alleged sex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff.
+
+Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: "Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action." (Emphasis added).
+
+Decedent's Indictment, which Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint, was not commenced with respect to Plaintiff. Rather, the Indictment alleges that Decedent sexually trafficked "minor girls" (Ex. A to Compl., ¶ 1 (emphasis added)), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking of "minors" (id. ¶¶ 24, 6, 8, 11-15, 18-20, 22). Because Plaintiff alleges she was between 20 and 22 years old when Decedent assaulted her (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 38, 50), this action and the Indictment necessarily arise from different events or occurrences.
+
+New York courts apply CPLR § 215(8Xa) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallant' v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of No. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829, at \*13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8Xa) inapplicable to claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions).
+
+GaUlna is especially instructive. In that case, an individual sued an attorney for battery and other claims based on the core allegation that, over the course of two years, the attorney committed various sexual misconduct against the plaintiff, including sexual assault. 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at \*1. Defendant had also been criminally charged with forceable touching for incidents that occurred with the plaintiff in 2017. Id. at \*3. The court dismissed as time-barred plaintiffs battery counts based on incidents alleged to have occurred in 2016. Id. at \*2-3.
+
+In doing so, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that CPLR § 215(8Xa) applied to the 2016 incidents, finding:
+
+> Plaintiff argues that the July and October 2016 incidents are part of the same ongoing course of events as the February, March and May 2017 incidents and should therefore be deemed timely commenced ... the case law does not support Plaintiffs interpretation of ... CPLR §215(8Xa). The criminal instruments ... demonstrate that Defendant was charged for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates ... Pursuant to CPLR §215(8Xa), tolling would apply only to claims based on these dates, "because it was only in connection with the events of these [three] days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against the defendant." Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 [2d Dept. 1999]. As criminal charges were not commenced with respect to the July 2016 and October 2016 events, the tolling provisions of CPLR §215(8) do not apply.
+
+Id. at •3-4. Here, Plaintiff asserts a much more tenuous connection between this action and the Indictment than the one unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiff in Galling (and the other cited cases). Therefore, the Court should reject Plaintiff's argument for the application of CPLR § 215(8)(a).
+
+In Plaintiff's response to the Co-Executors' pre-motion letter, Plaintiff asserts three arguments for application of CPLR § 215(8Xa). First Plaintiff argues that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not require the Indictment to expressly identify Plaintiff as one of Decedent's victims. This is a strawman argument: no one argues otherwise.
+
+Plaintiff cites Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), for this assertion, stating that CPLR § 215(8Xa) "does not require that the plaintiff be 'the victim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed.' (ECF No. 13 at p. 1, quoting Clemens, 202 A.D.2d at 749, emphasis in letter). This characterization of Clemens is misleading. In Clemens, defendants were charged with criminal mischief resulting to damage to two boats. Id. at 748. The six plaintiffs in Clemens were aboard the two boats and sued to recover damages for assault and battery, infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Id. Defendant asserted that CPLR § 215(8) did not apply because the victims of the crimes were the owners of the two damaged boats—not the plaintiffs who were on the boats. Id. at 749. The court disagreed, reading the plain language of CPLR § 215(8), expressly requiring that the action arise out of the same "event or occurrence." Id. Thus, Clemens does not alter the requirement that Plaintiff must show she was a victim of the same "event or occurrence" on which the Indictment is based; she has not and cannot. The Indictment could not be clearer: it concerns sex trafficking of minors. Plaintiff does not allege she was a minor when Decedent sexually assaulted her.
+
+Second, Plaintiff urges a broad construction of CPLR § 215(8Xa) that effectively rewrites it by rendering the limitation therein—"with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises"—meaningless. Plaintiff effectively argues that, unless the Indictment expressly rules out that it arises from the same event as this action, then Plaintiff is entitled to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). That argument is contrary to basic principles of statutory interpretation prohibiting a reading of a statute that would render its words meaningless (see McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92), the case law cited above, a plain reading of the Indictment, and common sense.
+
+Plaintiff cites Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), in support of her erroneous argument. However, Kashef is factually distinguishable. The civil and criminal actions in that case both arose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions. Id. at 63. Here, Plaintiff's allegations—that she traveled as an adult to visit Decedent in various places where he sexually assaulted her—do not comport with what is set forth repeatedly in the Indictment—namely, an alleged scheme to traffic minors.
+
+Acknowledging this critical defect, Plaintiff argues in her pre-motion response letter that the Indictment applies to trafficking of adults as well as minors, but deliberately misquotes the Indictment. According to Plaintiff:
+
+The charges were not limited to crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex trafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, "including minor victims identified herein."
+
+(ECF No. 13 at p. 1, citing Indictment (emphasis added).) However, this quote, and the argument relying on it, is disingenuous. The cited portion of the Indictment actually states:
+
+"In or about 2004, Jefferey Epstein, the defendant, enticed and recruited multiple minor victims, including minor victims identified herein...."
+
+(Ex. A to Compl. ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added).) In other words, Plaintiff removed the word "minor" from the first part of the sentence to make it appear as though the latter reference to "minor victims" identified merely a subset of the former "multiple victims." Plaintiff's alteration of the text and meaning of the Indictment indicates she is aware she has a losing argument. While Plaintiff may claim she, too, is a victim of Decedent, she is not a victim by reason of the events giving rise to the Indictment.
+
+# B. CPLR § 213-c is inapplicable because it is not retroactive.
+
+Plaintiff also attempts to plead around the applicable statutes of limitations by erroneously invoking CPLR § 213-c, which currently provides for a twenty-year limitation period for certain sexual offenses. However, the twenty-year limitation set forth in CPLR § 213-c became effective September 18, 2019, and is thus inapplicable here. (The statute of limitations was five years as of 2006 and one year before then. L. 2006, ch. 3, § 5(b)). The twenty-year statute of limitations does not apply retroactively except "where the applicable !statute of limitations] in effect on the date of such act or omission has not yet expired." L. 2019, ch. 315, § 4 (emphasis added). That is not the case here. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c cannot revive Plaintiff's claims arising from torts committed in New York.
+
+In her pre-motion letter, Plaintiff contends—without legal authority and in complete disregard of what the enacting bill for CPLR § 213-c states very clearly—that CPLR § 213-c applies retroactively because CPLR § 213-c itself does not expressly state otherwise. This is wrong. Plaintiff provides no reason to disregard what the law amending CPLR § 213-c actually states, as quoted above.
+
+Plaintiff also has it backwards. Under New York law, "[i]t takes a clear expression of the legislative purpose ... to justify a retroactive application of a statute which assures that [the legislative body] itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits." Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. N.Y. State Div. of Nous. & Cmty. Renewal, 2020 NY Slip Op 02127, ¶ 12 (citing Gleason v. Gleason, 26 NY2d 28, 36, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The rules for determining whether a statute is to be applied retroactively are contained in McKinney's Consolidated Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 51 et seq. See Gleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, 170 Misc. 2d 668, 649 N.Y.S.2d 647, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1996). McKinney's states:
+
+Generally, statutes are construed as prospective, unless the language of the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, requires that it be given a retroactive
+
+construction. ... Stated differently, a construction of a statute which will give it a retroactive operation is not favored by the courts, but on the contrary, the laws [sic] favors a prospective interpretation wherever possible. It is well settled also that a statute will not be given a retroactive construction unless an intention to make it retroactive is to be deduced from its wording, and a law will not receive a retroactive construction unless its language, either expressly or by necessary implication, requires that it be so construed. A clear expression of the legislative purpose is required to justify a retrospective application....
+
+Gleason, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 677-678.
+
+Here, there is no "clear expression" that the New York State legislature intended CPLR § 213-c to be applied retroactively. Rather, the legislature expressly stated the opposite. See L. 2019, ch. 315, § 4.
+
+By contrast, the recently-enacted New York Child Victim's Act, a revival statute that provides a one-year window in which to bring claims of sexual abuse of minors that had previously expired, expressly states it "revive[s]" claims that are "barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired." CPLR § 214-g. This confirms the New York State Legislature is quite capable of indicating when a limitations period should be applied retroactively. Because the Legislature did not do that for CPLR § 213-c—it did the opposite— Plaintiff's claim cannot succeed.
+
+## C. Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege "extraordinary" circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.
+
+Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel including on the pleadings. "Second Circuit cases discussing equitable tolling set a stringent standard for its application." Fairley v. No. 09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536, at •16 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.) (finding equitable tolling did not apply and granting defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaint on statute of limitations grounds). Equitable tolling only applies where a plaintiff is "prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising h[er] rights." Viti v. Guardian
+
+Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at •30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citing v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)).
+
+Under this doctrine, a court may, only "under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at \*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010); In re U.S. Lines. Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003)). "That the doctrine is to be employed only sparingly—in 'extraordinary' and 'compelling' circumstances is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is justified." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A latefiling party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with "reasonable diligence" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at \*32 (citation omitted).
+
+Equitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists, but the defendant's conduct caused her to delay bringing suit. See Yesh Diamonds, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at \*5 (citing Cerbone v. Intl Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1985)). "The rationale behind this equitable doctrine is to protect the person who brings their action after it would normally be barred because she was 'lulled' into believing that she should delay pursuing her cause of action." Id. (quoting In re Higgins, 270 B.R. 147, 158 (Bantu. S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: "(i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe that the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on that misrepresentation to h[er] detriment." Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit. See id. at \*6.
+
+Here, Plaintiff does not allege any particularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from exercising her rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Nor does Plaintiff allege that (i) Decedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment. Therefore, there is no "extraordinary" basis alleged sufficient to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute of limitations defense.
+
+Plaintiff asserts in her pre-motion response letter that "the Complaint alleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that [Decedent] and his co-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice." (ECF No. 13 at 3.) This is false. Rather, the complaint merely alleges—in two conclusory paragraphs identical to paragraphs included in other plaintiff's complaints represented by the same counsel—that Decedent threatened and intimidated "his many victims, including Plaintiff." (Comp!. ¶¶ 14-15.) The remaining claims, even as retold by Plaintiff in her letter, do not allege any conduct by Decedent beyond "tr[ying] to keep in contact with Plaintiff after the abuse ended." (ECF. No. 13 at p. 3, citing Compl. ¶ 51.) The allegations Plaintiff points to as demonstrating intimidation merely describe Plaintiff's unextraordinary state of mind: Plaintiff was "afraid of betraying [Decedent] because of his money and power" (id., citing ¶ 47); Plaintiff was "afraid [Decedent] would hurt her or her family" (id.). There are no allegations explaining that Decedent did anything to impede Plaintiff from bringing this lawsuit for some fifteen years.
+
+Plaintiff's assertion that such thin allegations are "extraordinary" is inconsistent with numerous court decisions in which far stronger allegations were deemed insufficient to justify equitable estoppel or tolling. See, e.g., Conklin v. Maidenbaum, No. 12-cv-3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975, at •27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (Ramos, J.) (finding equitable tolling inapplicable and dismissing complaint, notwithstanding that plaintiffs alleged they reasonably relied on defendants' representations over a period spanning more than ten months and dozens of telephone calls).
+
+Plaintiff alternatively argues in her pre-motion response letter that her entitlement to equitable estoppel and tolling are "fact-specific doctrines" and thus should be resolved after discovery. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) Plaintiff misunderstands New York law and understates the deficiencies in her own Complaint. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to allege facts that support invocation of an exception to the statute of limitations, there is no issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds:
+
+> If properly pled, allegations of equitable estoppel normally create questions of fact which cannot be determined at a motion to dismiss ... However, without adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore cannot defeat a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. See Dep't of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing cause of action because plaintiff made no allegation in complaint that "its failure to timely institute its third-party action was due to its justified reliance upon a misrepresentation" by opposing party); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of N. Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant caused them to delay in bringing suit on a known cause of action. On the contrary, plaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that they did not discover the alleged ... violations until long after the limitations period had expired. Equitable estoppel is therefore not appropriate in this case.").
+
+Abercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added).
+
+Here, as in Abercrombie, "Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support invocation of the equitable estoppel doctrine. First, Plaintiff does not identify the misrepresentations or other facts demonstrating fraudulent concealment that could serve as the basis for the claimed equitable estoppel. More particularly, Plaintiff has utterly failed to identify in the Complaint which statements led her to believe that she could delay bringing her lawsuit." Id. at 266. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts that would support invocation of equitable tolling. These are pleading deficiencies, not questions of fact.
+
+# III. Plaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Are Barred As A Matter Of Law
+
+Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law because it is barred by the law of each potentially applicable jurisdiction. When determining what law applies, courts look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Simons v. Marriott Corp., 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, the law of the state where a tort occurs generally applies to punitive damages. See Starr Indent. & Liab. Co. v. Ant. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) ("Because punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.' (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)).
+
+Here, Plaintiff alleges tortious conduct occurring in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the USVI, and France. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 55.) None of these jurisdictions permits recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. That is the law in most jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cat. a (punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor). Each of these jurisdictions is addressed below in turn.
+
+New York: New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provides: "No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury." NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (emphasis added). "Also,
+
+'there is a strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent."' Graham v. , 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).
+
+New York General Construction Law § 37-a defines "personal injury" as including "an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another." Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for her alleged personal injuries. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages from Decedent's estate based on alleged torts that occurred in New York.
+
+Florida: The result is the same under Florida law. "Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased." Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, No. 18-14155-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at •6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) (citing Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988) ("[A] decedent's innocent heirs should not be punished when the wrongdoer is unavailable because of death. In so holding, we join the majority of jurisdictions in this country that have considered this issue.")).
+
+New Mexico: Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has unequivocally held that "punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors." Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages under New Mexico law.
+
+France: Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate is barred under law because France prohibits punitive damages altogether. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, No. 02 MDL 1448 (RWS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109247, at •23-25 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) ("Unlike many jurisdictions in the United States, including New York, France prohibits punitive damages claims as they are known in the United States. ... Instead of employing
+
+punitive damages as a mechanism for punishing and deterring potentially harmful conduct, France has instead deemed liability for compensatory damages in conjunction with penal liability (where appropriate) to be a sufficient deterrent.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 22.4 (7th ed. 2015) (citing Rouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Europe: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept, 74 Def. Coun. J. 320 (2007)).
+
+USVI:USVI courts apply a "Banks analysis" to determine U.S.V.I. common law. Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011). The Banks analysis includes consideration of three factors: (1) whether any USVI courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which approach represents the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.=, No. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at •1 (V.I. Feb. 24,2014). Applying the Banks factors here demonstrates that USVI courts would adopt the rule in the Restatement (Second) of Torts which is also followed in the majority of United States jurisdictions, including New York—and hold that punitive damages are not available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. These factors are analyzed below.
+
+### A. Banks factor one: pre% iously, USVI courts favorably cited the Restatement section that precludes punitive damages against estates.
+
+USVI courts have favorably recited the Restatement's rule precluding punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See, e.g., v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV. 2006-217,2008 WL 220067, at •5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008). In these cases, the U.S. District Court for the Virgin Islands considered the inverse of the issue here, i.e., whether the personal representatives of an estate may obtain punitive damages in an action arising from the decedent's wrongful death. In determining that punitive damages were not available under such circumstances, the courts cited the Restatement, which provides that "[p]unitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor, ordinarily, in an action under a death statute." Restat. (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Banks factor favors the Co-Executors.
+
+### B. Banks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages based on the wrongful acts of a decedent.
+
+This Banks factor overwhelmingly supports the Co-Executors' position. The majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against the personal representatives of an estate based on the actions of the deceased tortfeasor. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. 2005) ("The majority view denies punitive damages."); 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015) ("[A] majority of jurisdictions will not award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate." (citing Alec A. Beech, Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev. 553 (2016))); Timothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead Or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 393, 398 (2010) ("The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is one authority stating that punitive damages should not follow the death of a wrongdoer, and the majority of courts considering the issue have provided rulings consistent with this position.").
+
+### C. Banks factor three: Post-Banks, USVI courts have favorably applied Restatement Section 908 to questions regarding punitive damages.
+
+The third Banks factor weighs strongly in favor of the Co-Executors as well. Post-Banks, USVI courts have found that Section 908 of the Restatement is "the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands with respect to the imposition of an award of punitive damages." Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing v. Christian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005), Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015), St House, Inc. v. Bat-rows, 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979), Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1989), and v. Rios, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011)); Powell v. Chi-Co 's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at \*5 n.13 (U.S.V.1. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) ("Applying a Banks analysis, the Court finds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction."). There is no reason to think the USVI courts would adhere to one portion of Section 908 and not another.
+
+Because every Banks factor favors the Co-Executors' position, to the extent USVI law applies to the alleged tortious conduct that occurred there, Plaintiff cannot recover an award of punitive damages against the Co-Executors. Therefore, even if any of Plaintiff's claims survive, regardless of which state's law applies here, the Court must dismiss her claim for punitive damages in its entirety.
+
+Finally, Plaintiff does not contend that her punitive damages claims are proper. Rather, in her pre-motion response letter, she asks the Court to delay ruling on the issue of punitive damages until after discovery. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) As there are no facts that would render Plaintiff's punitive damages claim proper, there is no reason to allow it to stand. Not surprisingly, courts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss claims for punitive damages. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SIB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at \*25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages claims because they were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages); v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp. 980, 981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages).
+
+Plaintiff merely seeks to delay the inevitable so she may use the prospect of punitive damages—despite the legal prohibition on their availability here—as (misplaced) leverage over the Co-Executors. This would serve no legitimate purpose. It would also impede productive settlement discussions. Like the punitive damages claims in the cases cited above, Plaintiff's punitive damages claim should be dismissed.
+
+## CONCLUSION
+
+For the foregoing reasons, the Co-Executors respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is prohibited by statute.
+
+Dated: New York, New York Respectfully submitted, April 14, 2020
+
+TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000
+
+By✓s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+Attorneys for Defendants

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marker2-fixhub/court-redacted-v-indyke-10479/EFTA02732036/EFTA02732036.md

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+Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022
+
+troutman.com
+
+Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com
+
+April 15, 2020
+
+Via ECF
+
+Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007
+
+![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg)
+
+Re: Jane Doe 1000, 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF; 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF; 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF
+
+Dear Judge Freeman:
+
+We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (to ether. the to -Executors"). in the above-referenced actions commenced by Jane Doe 1000, and (together "Plaintiffs", and with the Co-Executors, the "Parties"). In light of the ongoing pandemic and the various difficulties it has presented for all parties, we write with the consent of Plaintiffs to request that the Court extend the remaining deadlines in the above-referenced actions, as set by this Court's Order dated February 11, 2020, by thirty (30) days, as follows:
+
+- the deadline for Plaintiffs to file any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties be extended from April 30, 2020 to June 1, 2020;
+- the deadline for the Parties to submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions, be extended from April 30, 2020 to June 1, 2020;
+- the deadline for the completion of fact discovery be extended from June 10, 2020 to July 10, 2020;
+- the deadline for service of Plaintiffs' expert reports be extended from June 10, 2020 to July 10, 2020;
+- the deadline for service of the Defendants' rebuttal reports be extended from July 10, 2020 to August 10, 2020; and
+
+- the deadline for the completion of expert discovery be extended from July 31, 2020 to August 31, 2020.
+
+This is the first request for an extension of these deadlines.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+s/Bennet J Moskowitz
+
+Bennet J. Moskowitz
+
+cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)

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