MEMY-1805 marker2-fixhub court-maxwell-v-estate (pepper 16-core): 136/136

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02821966/EFTA02821966.md

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+### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TIME VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: sitx.-61-156
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN. DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC. a New York Limited Liability Company.
+
+Defendants.
+
+Ann a01114c1I1S
+
+## COMPLAINT
+
+Plaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL ("Maxwell), through her undersigned attorneys. by %%a) of her Complaint against Defendants LSTA I L OF JLI FREY l.. L.PS ItIN (the -Estate"). DARREN K. INDYKE. in his capacity as Executor of the [STATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN (-Indy ke-). RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacit) as Executor of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPS (-Kahn"), and NES. LLC, a No% York Limited Liabilii% Company (- NES, LLCM alleges as tbllows:
+
+### NATURE OF THIS ACTION
+
+I. This is an action for indemnification for and advancement of the attorneys' fees. security costs, costs to find safe accommodation. and all other expenses Maxwell has reasonably incurred and will incur by reason of her prior employment relationship with Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Epstein") and his affiliated businesses in connection with any threatened, pending, or completed suit, proceeding, or investigation relating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.
+
+#### PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
+
+- 2. Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell is an adult citizen of the United States.
+- 3. Jeffrey E. Epstein was a resident of the Virgin Islands. The Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein was created following Epstein's death and is domiciled in the Virgin Islands.
+  - 4. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is an Executor of the Estate.
+  - 5. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is an Executor of the Estate.
+- 6. Defendant NES. LLC. is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of New York on or about August 13. 1998.
+  - 7. This Court has jurisdiction oy er this matter pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 76.
+- 8. Pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 78, venue properly lies in the United States Virgin Islands. and in the Division of St. and St. John.
+
+### FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
+
+- 9. From approximately 1999 through at least 2006. Maxwell was employed by Epstein individually. and by several of his affiliated businesses. including. but not limited to. the C.O.U.Q. I oundation. NES LLC. Neyy York Strategy Group. JEGE LLC. JEGE Inc.. and LSJ.I.LC.
+- 10. While under Epstein's employ. Maxwell Yyas responsible for managing Epstein's properties. including properties located in New York. Paris. Florida. New Mexico. and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
+- II. During the course of their relationship. including while Maxwell was in Epstein's employ, Epstein promised Maxwell that he would support her financially.
+
+12. Epstein made these promises to Maxwell repeatedly, both in writing and in conversation.
+
+13. Epstein restated these promises when Maxwell was in the process of leaving Epstein's employ to start a new business of her own.
+
+14. Epstein assured Maxwell that even if her business ventures failed he would support her financially.
+
+IS. In approximately 2001. Maxwell began transitioning to a more limited employment role for Epstein and his affiliated businesses. In approximately 2004, Maxwell received a typewritten letter from Epstein with a handwritten note asking Maxwell to remain in Epstein's employ and promising that no matter what Maxwell chose to do, Epstein would always support Maxwell financially.
+
+16. Sometime thereafter. Epstein pleaded guilty in a Florida stale proceeding to felony Charge of solicit:lion apromitta ion involvirw a minor.
+
+17. Since the time of Epstein's Florida state proceeding to the present. Maxwell has incurred legal fees and expenses in connection with various suits, proceedings. and investigation-, relating to Epstein. his affiliated businesses. and his alleged victims.
+
+18. Consistent with his repeated promises, Epstein indemnified Maxwell and advanced legal and settlement costs when they were incurred in connection with a lawsuit filed by against Epstein in 2017 (Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein. et rd.. 17-cv-00616-JGK).
+
+19. Consistent with his repeated promises, Epstein also paid Maxwell's legal bills incurred in connection with a civil suit filed by against Epstein in 2009.
+
+20. Epstein's promise is further evidenced by the fact that Epstein indemnified and advanced legal fees and expenses for a number of other employees in other various lawsuits relating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.
+
+21. Indyke, in his capacity as an Executor of the Estate, also made assurances to Maxwell that Maxwell's legal fees and obligations would be reimbursed by Epstein and the Estate, and that Maxwell's legal fees and expenses would be paid going forward.
+
+22. Indyke told Maxwell that her legal fees would be paid because she would not have incurred any legal expenses but for Epstein's alleged misconduct, and that Epstein's promises would be honored.
+
+23. Epstein was rotund dead on August 10. 2019 in New York.
+
+24. On August 15. 2019. Indyke and Kahn filed apetition for probate of Epstein's last will and testament with the Probate Div ision of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. Division of St. and St. John.
+
+25. Maxwell has incurred and will continue to incur significant legal ices. personal security costs. and other costs in connection with legal suits. proceedings. and investigations relating to Epstein. his affiliated businesses. and his alleged s ictims.
+
+26. Maxwell receives regular threats to her life and safety. which have required her to hire personal security services and find safe accommodation.
+
+27. Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement of expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with Epstein and his affiliated businesses. including attorneys' fees, as well as security costs and costs of finding safe accommodation, all of which are ongoing, extensive, and directly related to the pending suits, proceedings. and investigations concerning Epstein's alleged misconduct. These expenses will be ongoing due to the extensive global coverage and interest in these events and proceedings.
+
+28. By letter dated November 22, 2019. Maxwell submitted a claim to the Estate, addressed to Indyke and Kahn, requesting that the Estate honor its obligation to provide indemnification as requested in this action.
+
+29. The Estate has not honored or even formally responded to Maxwell's claim.
+
+30. Maxwell was compelled to file this Complaint because the Estate has not honored her claim for indemnification as requested in this action.
+
+31. Given that Maxwell was forced to seek judicial intervention to vindicate her right to indemnification by the Lstate, she is entitled to recover the reasonable Ices incurred in this action to vindicate that right.
+
+# CAUSES OF ACTION
+
+## COUNT ON1. Indemnification (Promissory Estonuel / Contractual)
+
+32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations of this Complaint as though full• set forth herein.
+
+33. On more than one occasion. Epstein made a clear and unambiguous promise to Maxwell that he would indemnify Maxwell and advance an) expenses incurred by reason of her prior employment relationship with him and his affiliated businesses.
+
+34. Maxwell reasonably and justifiably relied on Epstein's promises and put her trust in Epstein that he would fulfill his promises.
+
+35. As such, Maxwell elected to leave Epstein's employ to pursue her own business ventures because she trusted that Epstein would continue to support her financially.
+
+36. The Estate has failed to uphold Epstein's promise to indemnify and advance expenses incurred by reason of Maxwell's employment relationship with Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+37. Maxwell's reliance on the Estate's promises was a substantial factor in causing Maxwell harm as alleged herein.
+
+38. For the foregoing reasons, Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement from the Estate of expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+### COUNT TWO Indemnification (Common Lawl
+
+39. Plaintiff repeats and reallegcs the foregoing allegations of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
+
+40 The employment relationship between Maxwell and Epstein formed a legal and special relationship that gives rise to a duty on the part of the Estate to indemnify Maxwell for any expenses incurred by reason of Maxwell's employment relationship kith Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+41. Maxwell had no imolvement in or knowledge of Epstein's alleged misconduct, but nonetheless has been required to pay significant legal fees. personal security costs. and other expenses because the alleged events occurred while she was employed by Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+42. The suits, proceedings, and/or investigations for which Maxwell seeks indemnification were instituted against Maxwell solely because she was an employee of Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+43. Maxwell incurred these legal fees and expenses as a direct result of Epstein's acts and/or omissions.
+
+44. For the foregoing reasons, Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement from the Estate of expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+### COIN f 71IREE Indemnification (NLS, LLC and Other F-ntities1
+
+45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
+
+46. Maxwell was employed as a manager by NES. I .LC.
+
+47. Upon information and belief. the corporate organizational documents for NES. LLC entitle Maxwell to mandator) indemnification and advancement of legal fees. personal security costs, and other expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with NILS. Ike, including expenses incurred in connection with the pending suits. proceedings. and investigations concerning Epstein's alleged misconduct.
+
+48. Maxwell has incurred significant legal personal security costs, and other expenses by reason of her employment relationship with NES. LI.C.
+
+49. Upon infommtion and belief. as of September 2006, Defendant Kahn was the Comptroller of NES, LLC.
+
+50. By letter dated November 22, 2019, Maxwell requested indemnification from NES, LLC for the legal fees, personal security costs, and other expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with NES, LLC, among other entities, and never received a response.
+
+{sup}`51`. By the same letter dated November 22, 2019, Maxwell requested copies of documents setting forth applicable indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies, including any operating agreements for NES. LLC, and never received a response.
+
+52. Maxwell was also employed by several of Epstein's other entities, including. but not limited to. the C.O.U.Q. Foundation, New York Strategy Group, JEGE LLC, JEGE Inc., and LSJ. LLC.
+
+53. Upon information and belief, the corporate organizational documents of these other entities likely provide a right of indemnity to Maxwell for expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship ith those entities.
+
+54. Maxt'ell has incurred significant legal fees, personal security costs. and other expenses by reason of her employ mein relationship with these other entities.
+
+55. Maxwell requested indemnification from the Estate for such tees, costs. and expenses by reason of her prior employment relationship with these other entities. and was refused.
+
+56. For the foregoing reasons. Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement from Nrs. LLC and/or the Estate of expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with NES. LLC. Epstein, and/or any of his other entities with whom Maxwell was affiliated or employed.
+
+## PRAYER FOR RELIEF
+
+WHEREFORE, Maxwell respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in her favor and against the Estate and grant her the following relief:
+
+A. an Order declaring that Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement from the Estate and/or NES, ',LC the reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses she has incurred by reason of her employment relationship with Epstein, NES. LLC, and his other affiliated businesses, including attorneys' fees incurred in connection with any threatened. pending. or completed suit, proceeding. or investigation relating thereto, security costs and costs of finding safe accommodation incurred as a result thereof. and all other expenses Maxwell has reasonably incurred and will incur in the future by reason of her prior employment relationship with Epstein. NES, D.C. and his other affiliated businesses:
+
+13. an Order declaring that Maxwell is entitled to prejudgment interest on the reasonable attorney's' lees and other expenses for which the Estate and/or NI:S. 1.1 C has failed to nth ance or indemnify Maxwell:
+
+C. an Order declaring that Maxwell is entitled ti recover from the Estate and/or NES. 1.1.0 the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this action:
+
+D. post-judgment interest: and
+
+E. all such other and further relief to which Plaintiff is entitled at law and in equity or as this Court may deem just and proper.
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.:
+
+
+
+Dated: March 12. , 2020
+
+Qt INTAIROS, PRIF.1O, & BOYER, P.A.
+
+Attorneys for Plaintiff
+
+9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 41h Floor
+
+Miami. FL 33156
+
+T: (340) 693-0230
+
+F: (340) 693.0300
+
+Kyle R. Waldner. Esq.
+
+kwaldner(gonwhlm'.C9111
+
+V.I. Bar No.: 1038

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02821976/EFTA02821976.md

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+March 24, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES  
+CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DIVISION OF [[Location]]**
+
+**OFFICE OF THE CLERK**
+
+Date: March 24, 2020
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,  
+Plaintiff
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN et al,  
+Defendant.
+
+Name: **GHISLAINE  
+MAXWELL**  
+Address:
+
+**DOCKETING LETTER AND NOTICE OF JUDGE ASSIGNMENT**
+
+Dear **KYLE R. WALDNER, ESQ.:**
+
+The Court is in receipt of your **Debt** petition, which was docketed on **March 24, 2020**  
+and assigned Case Number **ST-2020-CV-00155.**
+
+The Honorable **Hon. Michael C. Dunston** has been assigned to your case.
+
+If there is a fee associated with your filing, such fee must be filed along with your  
+petition/complaint, or within five (5) days thereafter. Failure to pay the required fee  
+may result in your petition / complaint being dismissed for failure to prosecute.
+
+If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact the Office of the Clerk of the  
+Court at (340) 778-9750 (St. Croix) or 774-6680 (St. [REDACTED] - St. John).
+
+Sincerely,
+
+**TAMARA CHARLES**  
+Clerk of the Court
+
+BY: **Donna Donovan**
+
+cc: Defendant  
+Case File

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02821977/EFTA02821977.md

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+## FILED
+
+May 01, 2020
+
+#### TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS CLERK OF THE COURT DISTRICT OF ST. & ST. JOHN
+
+\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
+
+GH1SLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+
+v. )
+
+) ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN )
+
+K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF )
+
+THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, )
+
+RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as )
+
+EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY )
+
+E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York )
+
+Limited Liability Company, )
+
+
+Defendants. ) ) CIVIL NO. ST-20-CV-155
+
+#### MOTION TO DISMISS
+
+#### & INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
+
+COME NOW, DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and though their undersigned counsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), and on behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC ("NES"), an entity administered in probate by the Co-Executors as part of the Estate, and hereby move for an order pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. I2(bX6) dismissing the Complaint in this action filed by Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell").
+
+#### I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+In her Complaint, Maxwell asserts an absolute right to indemnification and advancement of expenses — unqualified in scope, unlimited in duration, and incalculable as to amount — based on a purported promise "to support her financially" that she alleges was made by her former employer at least fourteen (14) years ago. (Complili 1, 9-11, 14, 15.) Setting aside the dubious bona fides of Maxwell's claims, her action against the Co-Executors is barred
+
+by the mandatory claims processing rules set forth in 15 V.I.C. 606, which prohibit commencement of any action prior to one (I) year after issuance of letters testamentary. And Maxwell's claims against NES, which she bases entirely on her "belief' that its corporate organizational documents entitle her to "mandatory indemnification and advancement" of expenses (Comp1.1 47), are defeated by the undisputed fact that those documents provide her no such right.
+
+For these reasons, the Court must dismiss Maxwell's Complaint.
+
+### II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+#### A. The Probate Proceedings
+
+On August 10, 2019, Jeffrey E. Epstein, a domiciliary of the U.S. Virgin Islands, died testate in New York. On August 15, 2019, a Petition for Probate and for Letters Testamentary was filed with the Probate Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Probate No. ST-19-PB-0000080. On September 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell issued Letters Testamentary to Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn. See Exhibit A. Since that time, Messrs. Indyke and Kahn have served as Co-Executors of the Estate.
+
+### B. Nature of the Action
+
+In her three (3) count Complaint against the Co-Executors and NES, Maxwell seeks common law and contractual "indemnification for and advancement of the attorneys' fees, security costs, costs to find safe accommodation, and all other expenses Maxwell has reasonably incurred and will incur by reason of her prior employment relationship with [Mr. Epstein] and his affiliated businesses in connection with any threatened, pending, or
+
+{sup}`1.` Maxwell names the Estate itself as a defendant. However, that is improper: under Virgin Islands law, an estate does not have a separate identity and may not be sued as a party. See. e.g.. 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 1141 (2016) ("Since estates are not natural or artificial persons, and they lack legal capacity to sue or be sued, an action against an estate must be brought against an administrator or executor as the representative of the estate.").
+
+completed suit, proceeding, or investigation relating to Epstein, his affiliated business, and his alleged victims." (Compl. ¶ 1.)
+
+Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to indemnification and advancement of her expenses because Mr. Epstein allegedly promised to "support her financially" and paid certain litigation expenses for her when he was alive. (See Compl. ¶¶ 11-15, 18-19.) Maxwell further alleges that, following Mr. Epstein's death, Mr. Indyke acting in his capacity as a Co-Executor of the Estate "made assurances" to her that her past legal fees and obligations would be reimbursed by the Estate and paid going forward. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)
+
+Specifically, Maxwell alleges that she was employed by Mr. Epstein and his affiliated businesses, including NES, from "approximately 1999 through at least 2006." (Compl. ¶ 9.) During their relationship, Mr. Epstein purportedly "promised Maxwell that he would support her financially." (Compl. ¶ 11.) Maxwell claims that Mr. Epstein made this promise to her on several occasions, both orally and in writing. (Compl. ¶ 12-14.) She further contends that, when she was leaving Mr. Epstein's employ in "approximately 2001" to start her own business, he stated in writing that he would "always support [her] financially." (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.)2
+
+Maxwell does not allege that any lawsuits for which she seeks indemnification are related to her performance of legitimate, employment-related duties for Mr. Epstein or his affiliated businesses. To the contrary, the claims asserted against Maxwell to date relate to her own misconduct including that she sexually abused young women and, in one case, threatened a potential witness' life.'
+
+{sup}`2.` Maxwell's written demand to the Estate for indemnification, dated November 22, 2019 and expressly referenced in her Complaint (at paragraph 28), does not mention any written promises by Mr. Epstein to indemnify her. Rather, it refers only to his alleged "oral promises" to do so. (See Exhibit B at 2.)
+
+November 1, inter alia that Maxwell "committed sexual assault and battery upon Plaintiff 3. See, e.g., v. lndyke and Kahn. et al, Case No. 1 :19-cv-10475-LGS (S.D.N.Y.; Complaint filed when she was 16 years old," "ex sed Plaintiff's] breasts and groped her," and "threatened [Plaintiff's sister) in order to keep her quiet"); v. Estate ofJeffrey Edward Epstein. et at, Index No. 950010/19 (New York State; First Amended 'omp aint filed October 10, 2019, alleging inter alia that Maxwell
+
+#### HI. ARGUMENT
+
+#### A. Plaintiff's Claim is Premature, in Violation of 15 V.I.0 § 606(a).
+
+Whatever the purported merits of Plaintiff's claims, her lawsuit is premature. Maxwell may not file a Complaint against the Co-Executors until twelve (12) months have elapsed after the Probate Court issued Letters Testamentary. See 15 V.I.0 § 606(a). Here, that twelve (12) month period will not expire until September 6, 2020.
+
+Chapter 23 of Title 15 of the Virgin Islands Code outlines the exclusive procedure for pursuing a claim against executors of an estate. Section 606, entitled "Commencement of Action against Executor or Administrator," sets forth mandatory claims-processing rules; Section 606(a) specifically provides:
+
+"(a) An action may be commenced against an executor or administrator at any time after the expiration of twelve months from the granting of letters testamentary or of administration and until the final settlement of the estate and discharge of such executor or administrator from the trust, and not otherwise." (emphasis supplied)
+
+Section 606(a), which authorizes a plaintiff to commence an action against an estate's executor "mandates that at the time of commencement ... the estate have been open for a minimum of twelve months... ." Otdey v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.I. 480, 491492 (V.I. 2014) (emphasis added) (citing 15 V.I.C. § 606(a)). "[S]ection 606 is an inflexible claims-processing rule that cannot be waived." Id. at 492.4
+
+The Virgin Islands Legislature's twelve (12) month statutory waiting period is no fluke. Rather, the requirement ensures that a claimant cannot bypass the probate process and relieves
+
+{sup}`&`quot;conspired with Jeffrey Epstein to commit repeated acts of sexual assault and harmful or offensive touching against Plaintiff"); Jane Doe v. Indyke and Kahn. et at, Case No. I :20-cv-00484-JGK (S.D.N.Y.; Complaint filed January 22, 2020, alleging inter alia that Maxwell abused Plaintiff "for years as a young girl" and "regularly facilitated Epstein's abuse of [Plaintiff] and was frequently present when it occurred.").
+
+{sup}`4. 15` V.I.C. § 606(b) further prohibits commencement of any action against the Co-Executors until after Maxwell has presented them with her claim, and they have determined to disallow it:
+
+{sup}`&`quot;(b) An action against an executor or administrator shall not be commenced until the claim of the plaintiff has been duly presented to such executor or administrator and by him disallowed..." (emphasis supplied)
+
+the Co-Executors from simultaneously defending the Estate in civil actions and probate proceedings. Weil. 61 V.I. at 495. This rule further ensures that a claimant cannot seek to gain priority over the Estate's assets by filing suit to the detriment of those claimants who adhere to the probate rules. Id. at 495-96.
+
+"The Legislature has outlined in detail the duties of an executor or administrator in administering an estate and the process by which a creditor should seek to satisfy his claim, all under the guidance and review of the Superior Court. See 15 V.I.C. § 394; 15 V.I.C. § 240(c). Therefore, when looking at section 606 in the context of the entire probate scheme, it appears the Legislature intended section 606 'to regulate the process of obtaining review' by providing strict guidance for probate proceedings ... ."
+
+Ottley, 61 V.I. at 493.
+
+The Legislature designed these mandatory rules to ensure the orderly and efficient distribution of decedents' property. See id. at 490. Section 606 reflects the Legislature's intent to provide executors with a sufficient period of time in which to marshal an estate's assets, pay taxes, analyze any claims filed against the estate and, depending on whether the executors determine them to be meritorious, allow or reject them. Section 606 then provides a claimant with prompt summary review of her claim if the executors have rejected it. Id. at 494.
+
+Here, Maxwell violated the express strictures of Section 606(a): she did not wait twelve months to commence her action, thereby precluding the Co-Executors from proper consideration of her claims. As noted above, the Probate Court issued Letters Testamentary on September 6, 2019. See Exhibit A. Pursuant to Section 606(a), Maxwell is not permitted to file suit against the Co-Executors until September 6, 2020 at the earliest, and only then if they have disallowed her claim. Here, her failure to abide by the statutory rules "requires the court to dismiss [the Complaint] for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Ottley, 61 V.I., at 495 (citation omitted). The Court cannot allow Maxwell to jump the line, in violation of the mandatory claims-processing rules enacted by the Legislature.5
+
+#### B. Plaintiff's Claim Against NES is Meritless as a Matter of Law.
+
+Maxwell's claim against NES is defeated by the very documents on which she relies. As noted above, Maxwell asserts her "belief" that her employment relationship with NES entitles her to mandatory indemnification for and advancement of her fees and expenses pursuant to NES' corporate organizational documents:
+
+"Upon information and belief, the corporate organizational documents for NES, LLC entitle Maxwell to mandatory indemnification and advancement of legal fees, personal security costs, and other expenses incurred by reason of the employment relationship with NES, LLC, including expenses incurred in connection with the pending suits, proceedings, and investigations concerning Epstein's alleged misconduct."
+
+(Compl. 1 47; emphasis supplied.)
+
+Unfortunately for Maxwell, the truth is otherwise. As set forth in the Operating Agreement of NES, LLC dated January 1, 2014 (the "NES Operating Agreement", a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C), NES has no obligation to indemnify Maxwell for or advance her fees and expenses.' Rather, the NES Operating Agreement allows NES to decline
+
+{sup}`5.` To the extent that Maxwell relies on common-law indemnification, her claims are premature for another, independent reason: under Virgin Islands law, a party may not assert a common-law claim for indemnification in a separate action before a judgment has been rendered against her. See Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.1.23, 108, 2017 V.I. LEXIS 37,'132 (V.1. Super. Feb. 28, 2017).
+
+{sup}`6.` Because Maxwell expressly incorporates by reference NES's corporate organizational documents in her Complaint, the Court may properly consider those documents in deciding this motion to dismiss. See Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Fluor Daniel, Case No. SX-05-165, 2020 WL 1819622 (V.1. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2020Xapplying the "incorporation-by-reference" doctrine in declining to convert a pre-answer motion under V.I. R. Civ. P. I 2(bX6) to a motion for summary judgment, despite the defendants' submission of documents referenced in the complaint but not attached to it). As the Court in Hess observed:
+
+{sup}`&`quot;Ordinarily, when ruling on a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true ... `and draw all fair inferences from such allegations.' "Stanley, 2020 VI Super 47 at 1 12 (citation omitted)). But the incorporation-by-reference doctrine permits a court to review the actual document referenced in the complaint "to ensure that the plaintiff has not misrepresented its contents and that any inference the plaintiff seeks to have drawn is a reasonable one." Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 797 (Del. Ch. 2016), overruled in part on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933, 939 (Del. 2019). The doctrine further "limits the ability of the plaintiff to take language out of context, because the defendants can point the court to the entire document... [and) enables courts to
+
+Maxwell's claims for indemnification and advancement of fees and expenses, in its sole discretion:
+
+"...[T]he Company ... may indemnify, defend and hold harmless any employee or agent, who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, from and against any expense, loss, damage or liability incurred or connected with, or any claim, suit, demand, loss, judgment, liability, cost or expense ... arising from or related to, the Company ... or such employee or agent on behalf of the Company ... provided that such amounts were not the result of fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional misconduct on the part of ... such employee or agent against whom a claim is asserted. The Company may advance to ... any such employee or agent ... the costs of defending any claim, suit or action against such person if such person undertakes to repay the funds advanced, with interest, if the person is not entitled to indemnification under this Section."
+
+(Exhibit Cat Section VI.B. I, at pp. 5-6; emphasis supplied.)
+
+The NES Operating Agreement thus provides NES with discretion to indemnify its employees arising from performance of their job duties, provided that the employees did not engage in "fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional misconduct."' The Court should reject Maxwell's claim that, notwithstanding the explicit language in the Operating Agreement, NES is required to indemnify her for her own alleged misconduct. "Ordinarily, when the terms of a contract are unambiguous, the Superior Court treats the issue of the meaning of those terms as a question of law... ." United Corp. v. Tutu Park, Ltd., 55 V.I. 702, 707, (V.I. 2011); see also Bluewater Construction, Inc. v. CBI Acquisitions, LLC, 70 V.I. 586, 608 (V.I. Super. May 20, 2010) (interpretation of forum selection clause was a matter of law under Florida law). Here, the Operating Agreement cannot be construed to entitle Maxwell to
+
+dispose of meritless complaints at the pleading stage." td. "'Without the ability to consider the document at issue in its entirety, complaints that quoted only selected and misleading portions of such documents could not be dismissed under Rule 12(bX6) even though they would be doomed to failure." Id. (quoting In re: Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., 897 A.2d I62, 169 (Del. 2006))."
+
+{sup}`2020` WL 1819622 '8-9. See also Fenster v. Dechabert, 65 V.1.20, 22, 2016 V.I. LEXIS 214, \*I, 2016 WL 8943821 (V.1. Super. Aug. 8, 2016) ("The court may consider items of unquestioned authenticity that arc referred to in the challenged pleading and are integral to the pleader's claim for relief").
+
+{sup}`7.` See Exhibit Cat Section VI.B. I, at pp. 5.6.
+
+mandatory indemnification, as pleaded. Accordingly, it renders Maxwell's claim for contractual indemnification meritless as a matter of law.
+
+Nor does Maxwell fit the criterion under the NES Operating Agreement for mandatory indemnification of its employees or agents under the limited circumstance where that employee or agent has been successful in her defense of an action or proceeding. SeeExhibit C at Section VI.B.2, at p. 6. Here, Maxwell has not succeeded in defense of any action or proceeding against her. Because NES is not required to indemnify Maxwell for or advance any of her expenses, the Court should dismiss her claim against it.'
+
+WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff in this action.
+
+Respectfully,
+
+Dated: May I, 2020 uNin KROBLIN, ESQ. ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ. WILLIAM L. BLUM, ESQ. SHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ. MARJORIE WHALEN, ESQ. V.I. Bar Nos. 966, 266, 136, 1221 & R2019 KELLERHALS KROBIAN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. =, V.I. 00802 Telephone: (340) 779-2564 Facsimile: (888) 316-9269 Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com aheymann@solblum.com wblum@solblum.com sdandrade@kellfer.com mwhalen@kellfer.com
+
+{sup}`8.` Maxwell styles Count Three of the Complaint as one for contractual indemnification again NES "and Other Entities" (Compl. p. 7), but she names as defendants in this action no entities other than NES and the Co-Executors. And as to the other Epstein-affiliated entities Maxwell describes — the C.O.U.Q. Foundation, New York Strategy Group, JEGE LLC, JEGE Inc. and LSJ, LLC (Compl. r 52)— she alleges only her "belief' that their corporate organizational documents "likely provide a right to indemnity." (1d. r 53; emphasis supplied.) That is too thin a to satisfy the requirement that Plaintiff allege facts supporting all of the elements of her claim.
+
+#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this In day of May 2020, I caused a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss & Incorporated Memorandum of Law to be served via electronic mail upon:
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Quintairos, Prieto, & Boyer, P.A. 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor Miami, FL 33156 kwaldner®qpwblaw.com Kroblin
+
+IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DIVISION OF ST. [REDACTED] AND ST. JOHN
+
+IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF )  
+JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,  
+Deceased )  
+\_\_\_\_\_
+
+LETTERS TESTAMENTARY
+
+TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:
+
+KNOW YE, that the Last Will and Testament of JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN dated the 8{sup}`th` day of August 2019, which is hereto annexed, has been duly proven in this Court, and that DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, who have been nominated as Co-Executors therein have been duly appointed Co-Executors of the estate of JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN.
+
+This, therefore, authorizes DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN to administer the Estate of JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, deceased, according to law.
+
+DATED: September 6{sup}`th`, 2019
+
+ATTEST:  
+ESTRELLA H. [REDACTED]  
+Clerk of the Court  
+By: Edotcia Thomas Hodge  
+EDOTCIA [REDACTED] - HODGE  
+Court Clerk Supervisor 9/6/2019
+
+**Exhibit A**
+
+IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DIVISION OF ST. [REDACTED] AND ST. JOHN
+
+IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF )  
+ JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,  
+ Deceased )  
+
+PROBATE NO. ST-19-PB-80
+
+ORDER FOR PROBATE
+
+Upon consideration of the Petition filed herein, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that **JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN** died, testate, in Manhattan, New York, on August 10, 2019, and the adult heirs-at-law and next of kin of the deceased have been served with process or have consented to said Petition, and the Last Will and Testament of **JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN** dated the 8{sup}`th` day of August 2019 having been duly proved in this Court, and there being no valid objection to the probate of the said Will, it is
+
+**ORDERED** that the Will is admitted to probate and recorded as the Last will and Testament of **JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN** valid to pass real and personal property, and that Letters Testamentary be issued to **DARREN K. INDYKE** and **RICHARD D. KAHN**, the Co-Executors named therein, who may qualify hereunder without bond, conditioned on the faithful performance of trust.
+
+IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF I have hereunto subscribed my name and caused the Seal of the Court to be affixed this 6{sup}`th` day of September 2019.
+
+ATTEST:  
+**ESTRELLA H.** [REDACTED]  
+ Clerk of the Court
+
+By: Edotcia Thomas Hodge  
+**EDOTCIA** [REDACTED] - HODGE  
+ Court Clerk Supervisor 9/16/2019
+
+A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY  
+ DATE September 16, 2019  
+ ESTRELLA H. GEORGE  
+ CLERK OF THE COURT  
+ BY Joseph Marsh  
+ COURT CLERK II
+
+![](_page_11_Picture_0.jpeg)
+
+HADDON
+
+Novermber 22, 2019
+
+#### VIA EMAIL
+
+Darren K. Indyke Richard D. Kahn do William L. Blum, Esq. Kellerhals MKroblin PLLC 9053 Estate Suite 101 St. M, V.I. 00802 wblum@solblum.com
+
+RE: Demand for Indemnification
+
+Haddon. and r c Jeffrey S. Pagliuca
+
+150 East 10th Avenue Denver. Colcrado 80203 Pi 303.831.7364 N 303.832.2628 www.hrnfiaw.com jpaglluca@hmtlow.com
+
+Dear Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn:
+
+Our firm and & Gresser LLP represent Ghislaine Maxwell in connection with legal proceedings related to events that occurred while she was employed by Jeffrey Epstein and his affiliated businesses. On behalf of Ms. Maxwell, we write to respectfully request that the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein indemnify and advance expenses to Ms. Maxwell for attorneys' fees, security costs, and all other expenses reasonably incurred by reason of her prior employment relationship with Mr. Epstein and his affiliated businesses in connection with any threatened, pending, or completed suit, proceeding, or investigation relating to Mr. Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.
+
+From approximately 1999 through 2009, Ms. Maxwell was employed by Mr. Epstein individually, and by several of his affiliated businesses, including, but not limited to, NES LLC, New York Strategy Group, JEGE LLC, JEGE Inc., and LSJ LLC. Pursuant to the relevant corporate organizational documents, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to mandatory indemnification and advancement of expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship with Mr. Epstein and his affiliated businesses, including attorneys' fees (both from our firm and Gresser), as well as relocation and security costs, all of which are ongoing, extensive, and directly related to the pending suits, proceedings, and investigations concerning Mr. Epstein's alleged misconduct.
+
+Accordingly, we request that you provide copies of any documents in your possession setting forth applicable indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies, including, among other things, Ms. Maxwell's employment records, and any corporate documents, such as articles of incorporation, operating agreements, and bylaws for all entities that employed
+
+![](_page_11_Picture_12.jpeg)
+
+Darren K. Indyke  
+Richard D. Kahn  
+November 22, 2019  
+Page 2
+
+Maxwell. In addition, we request that you provide copies of any other documents, including any applicable insurance policies, that provide for indemnification and/or advancement for former employees of Mr. Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+In addition, please note that Ms. Maxwell is entitled to indemnification and advancement given that Mr. Epstein, on more than one occasion, promised that he would indemnify Ms. Maxwell and advance any expenses incurred by reason of her prior employment relationship with him and his affiliated businesses. Mr. Epstein's oral promise is evidenced by the fact that, among other things: (1) Mr. Epstein indemnified Ms. Maxwell and advanced legal fees and settlement costs when they were incurred in connection with the lawsuit filed by [REDACTED] (*Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein et al*, 17-cv-00616-JGK); and (2) Mr. Epstein indemnified and advanced legal fees and expenses for a number of other employees in other various lawsuits, including [REDACTED], Leslie Groff, and [REDACTED]. Mr. Epstein's oral promises to Ms. Maxwell are enforceable as a matter of law. *See, e.g., Barclays Bank of New York v. [REDACTED]*, 517 F. Supp. 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); *Hyatt Legal Servs. v. Ruppitz*, 620 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
+
+Ms. Maxwell is further entitled to indemnification under common law. Common law indemnity is an equitable concept that works to shift liability when failure to do so would result in "the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another." *Mas v. Two [REDACTED] Assocs.*, 75 N.Y.2d 680, 689-91 (1990). All of the jurisdictions in which Ms. Maxwell carried out her relevant employment duties—New York, Florida, New Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—recognize a common law right to indemnification, which allows for the shifting of liability to avoid the unfairness of holding one party liable solely on account of the wrongdoing of another. *See [REDACTED] v. Shared Equities, Co.*, 281 A.D.2d 174, 175, 721 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (1st Dep't 2001) (recognizing common law indemnification under New York law); *K-Mart Corp. v. Chairs, Inc.*, 506 So.2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA), *review denied*, 513 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1987) ("The right to indemnity may arise out of a contract or it may be based on liability imposed by law."); *Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing & Drain SSS*, 368 P.3d 389, 398-99 (N.M. 2016) (recognizing common law indemnification under New Mexico law); *Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp.*, No. SX-06-CV-202, 2017 WL 772808, at \*30 (V.I. Super. Feb. 28, 2017) ("This Court believes that the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands is to continue recognizing claims for common law indemnification.").
+
+Here, Ms. Maxwell had no involvement in or knowledge of Mr. Epstein's alleged misconduct, but nonetheless has been forced to pay significant legal fees, personal security costs, and other expenses merely because the alleged events occurred while she was employed by Mr. Epstein and his affiliated businesses. Accordingly, Mr. Epstein's estate must indemnify Ms. Maxwell for those expenses.
+
+Ms. Maxwell's Affidavit, attached as Exhibit 1, affirms the facts forming the basis for this Demand. Ms. Maxwell has attached the relevant invoices as Exhibits A, B, and C to her affidavit. These invoices represent some of Ms. Maxwell's considerable expenses. The bills reflect legal fees and costs paid by Ms. Maxwell to Haddon, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], P.C., in the
+
+Darren K. Indyke Richard D. Kahn November 22, 2019 Page 3
+
+amount of \$101,527.67 (Affidavit Exhibit A); legal fees and costs paid to & Gresser, LLP, in the amount of \$318,093.04 (Affidavit Exhibit B) and security/relocation costs paid to The Next Step (Veterans Transition) Ltd in the amount of £154,345.46 (Affidavit Exhibit C).
+
+In light of the serious and time-sensitive nature these issues, we appreciate your prompt response to this demand.
+
+Bess egards,
+
+Je y S. Pagliuca
+
+Cc: Kroblin (ckroblin@kellfer.com) Shari N. D'Andrade (sdandrade@kellfer.com) Marjorie Whalen (mwhalen@kellfer.com)
+
+Mark S. (mcohen®cohengresser.com) Christian R. Everdell (ceverdell@cohengresser.com)
+
+### AFFIDAVIT OF GHISLANE MAXWELL
+
+I, Ghislane Maxwell, of legal age and sound mind and body deposes and states:
+
+1. I have personal knowledge of the statements I make in this Affidavit and am authorized to make them.
+
+2. I have reviewed the letter by my lawyer, Jeffrey Pagliuca, requesting that the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein defend and indemnify mc. This affidavit is attached as Exhibit 1 to that letter and I affirm and verify that the factual statements contained in the letter are true.
+
+3. From approximately 1999 through 2009, I was employed by Mr. Epstein individually, and by several of his affiliated businesses, including, but not limited to, NES LLC, New York Strategy Group, JEGE LLC, JEGE Inc., and LSJ LLC.
+
+4. Mr. Epstein, on more than one occasion, promised that he would indemnify, defend, and advance any expenses incurred by reason of my prior employment relationship with him and his affiliated businesses.
+
+5. I have incurred substantial expenses defending myself against false accusations and investigations arising out of my employment relationship with Mr. Epstein and his companies. The invoices attached to this affidavit as Fxhibits A, B, and C are true and accurate (redacted) copies of bills that I have paid and am responsible for paying. These expenses are ongoing.
+
+6. My legal expenses were and are reasonable and necessary and directly related to my prior employment with Mr. Epstein and his companies.
+
+7. As a result of the enormous publicity surrounding the criminal and civil lawsuits against Mr. Epstein and the false portrayal of me as an accomplice to Mr. Epstein I continue to receive death threats on a regular basis. Because of the death threats and the media frenzy I have needed to hire security guards and relocate to an undisclosed location for an unknown amount of time.
+
+I certify that, under the penalty of perjury that the above written statements herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
+
+Signature: Ghi Maxwell
+
+15 Half Moon Street, London W1J 7DZ, United Kingdom
+
+Sworn to and subscribed this 22{sup}`nd` day of November, 2019. Witness my hand.
+
+Solicitor:
+
+Solicitor of the Supreme Court, WA  
+England & Wales
+
+
+
+#### OPERATING AGREEMENT OF NES, LLC A New York Limited Liability Company
+
+THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") of NES, LLC, a New York limited liability company (the "Company"), organized under the Limited Liability Company Law of the State of New York (this "LLC Law") is adopted as of January 1, 2014 by the Company's sole member, Jeffrey E. EpsteirSreinafter referred to as "Sole Member"), with an address at 6100 Red Hook Quarter, B3, St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802, who has determined that the Company's activities and the rights and responsibilities of its members shall be governed by the following terms and conditions:
+
+#### SECTION I ORGANIZATION & FORMATION
+
+A. Formation. The Company has been organized as a New York limited liability company under and pursuant to the LLC Law by the filing of Articles of Organization ("Articles") with the Secretary of State of the State of New York on August 13, 1998, as required by the LLC Law.
+
+B. Name. The name of the Company shall be "NES, LLC". The Company upon proper notice and filing with the Secretary of State of the State of New York may conduct its operations under one or more assumed names.
+
+C. Purposes. The purpose of the Company is to engage in any lawful activity, operate any lawful enterprise or to have any other lawful purpose permitted by the LLC Law and the other applicable laws of the State of New York. The Company shall have all the powers necessary or convenient to affect any purpose for which it is formed, including all powers granted by the LLC Law.
+
+D. Duration. The Company shall continue in existence perpetually, beginning on the date of filing of the Articles, unless terminated by law or dissolved and terminated.
+
+E. Service Address and Place of Business. The Secretary of State of the State of New York is designated as the agent of the Company upon whom process against the Company may be served. The post office address within or without the State of New York to which process so served may be sent is 9 East 71' Street, New York, New York 10021. The Company's principal place of business shall be located in the City, State and County of New York, or such other place or places as the Sole Member may hereafter determine.
+
+# Exhibit C
+
+#### SECTION II CAPITAL STRUCTURE: MEMBERSHIP UNITS AND CONTRIBUTIONS/TRANSFER OF MEMBERSHIP UNITS
+
+A. Capital Contribution by the Sole Member: Initial Issuance. The Sole Member's ownership rights in the Company shall be reflected as a 100% membership interest as recorded in the Company's records. The Sole Member may make additional capital contributions from time to time and at any time and in any amounts that he may desire.
+
+B. Transfer of Membership Interest. Subject to the provisions of this Section, a Member may transfer and assign all or a portion of his interest as a member in the Company ("Membership Interest") to any one or more persons or entities, at any time and from time to time. The transfer and assignment of all or a portion of a Membership Interest does not, in and of itself, entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the Company or to become a member. Such assignee is only entitled to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions the assigning Member would otherwise be entitled to, and such assignee shall only become an assignee of all or a portion of a Membership Interest and not a substitute Member. An assignee of all or a portion of a Membership Interest shall be admitted as a substitute Member and shall be entitled to all the rights and powers of the assignor only if all the Members consent. If admitted, the substitute Member, has to the extent assigned, all of the rights and powers, and is subject to all of the restrictions and liabilities, of a Member of the Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, without the consent of any other Member, the Sole Member may, by a duly executed agreement with the assignee, assign any or all of the Membership Interest then held by the Sole Member, together with the Sole Member's management and voting rights in the Company with respect to the portion of the Membership Interest so assigned, and, upon the consummation of such assignment, the assignee thereof shall be automatically admitted as a substitute member, with all of the rights and powers held by, and subject to all of the restrictions and liabilities imposed upon, the Sole Member immediately prior to such assignment, to the full extent of the portion of the Membership Interest so assigned.
+
+C. No Interest; No Return of Capital. Capital contributions to the Company shall not earn interest, except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Agreement. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, a Member shall not be entitled to withdraw, or to receive a return of, a capital contribution or any portion thereof; provided, however, that, subject to the provisions of Section IV hereof, the Sole Member shall from time to time and at any time, in the Sole Member's discretion, be entitled to withdraw, and receive a return of, all or any part of the Sole Member's capital contribution.
+
+#### SECTION III CAPITAL ACCOUNT
+
+A. Capital Account. A capital account ("Capital Account") shall be maintained for the Sole Member, and each additional Member, if any, in accordance with the provision of this Article.
+
+1. Increases in Capital Account. The Capital Account of each Member shall be increased by:
+
+- (a) The fair market value of the Member's initial capital contribution and any additional capital contributions by the Member to the Company. If any property, other than cash, is contributed to or distributed by the Company, the adjustments to Capital Accounts required by Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(bX2Xiv)(d), (e), (0 and (g) and Section 1.704-1(bX4)(1) shall be made.
+- (b) The Member's share of the increase in the tax basis of Company property, if any, arising out of the recapture of any tax credit.
+- (c) Allocations to the Member of Profit.
+- (d) Company income or gain (including income and gain exempt from income taxation) as provided under this Agreement, or otherwise by Regulation Section 1.704-1(bX2 Xiv).
+- (e) The amount of Company liabilities that are assumed by the Member.
+
+2. Decreases in Capital Account. The Capital Account of each Member shall be decreased by:
+
+- (a) The amount of money distributed to the Member by the Company pursuant to any provision of this Agreement.
+- (b) The fair market value of property distributed to the Member by the Company (net of liabilities secured by such distributed property that Member is considered to assume or take subject to under Code Section 752).
+- (c) Allocations to the Member of Losses.
+- (d) Allocations to the Member of deductions, expenses, Nonrecourse Deductions and net losses allocated to him pursuant to this Agreement, and the Member's share of Company expenditures which are neither deductible nor properly chargeable to Capital Accounts under Code Section 705(aX2)(8) or are treated as such expenditures under Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(bX2)(ivXj). "Nonrecourse Deductions" shall have the meaning set forth in Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2.
+- (e) The amount of any liabilities of the Member that are assumed by the Company.
+
+#### SECTION IV ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
+
+A. Allocations. For purposes of maintaining each Member's Capital Account, all of the Company's net profits, net losses, expenses and other items of income, gain, loss, and credit shall be allocated to the Member in proportion to the percentage Membership Interest of such Member. All items of Company taxable income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit recognized or allowable for Federal income tax purposes shall be similarly allocated and credited or charged to each Member in proportion to the percentage Membership Interest held by such Member.
+
+B. Distributions. Net cash flow shall be distributed at such times and in such amounts as may be determined from time to time and at any time by the Sole Member of the Company in the following priority:
+
+- 1. First, to the Members in repayment of any advance of funds to the Company as a lender, to the extent of and in proportion to such advances, including interest thereon, if any;
+- 2. Additional distributions, if any will be made to the Members in proportion to the percentage Membership Interests held by them, respectively, in such amounts and at such times as may be determined by the Sole Member of the Company.
+
+#### C. Distribution upon Liquidation of the Company.
+
+- 1. At the termination of the Company and after the Company has satisfied or provided for the satisfaction of all the Company's debts and other obligations, the Company's assets will be distributed in cash to the Members first, in discharge of their respective capital interests; and then, in proportion to the percentage Membership Interests held by them, respectively.
+- 2. If the Company lacks sufficient assets to make the distributions described in the foregoing paragraph, the Company will make distributions in proportion to the respective Membership Interests of the Members.
+
+#### SECTION V MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS
+
+A. In General. The Company shall be member-managed. The Members of the Company shall manage the business and affairs of the Company and shall have full and complete authority, power and discretion to do all things necessary or convenient to manage, control and cany out the business, affairs and properties of the Company, to make all decisions regarding those matters and to perform any and all other acts or activities customary or incident to the management of the Company's business. All decisions and actions of the Company in connection therewith shall be determined by the affirmative vote or the written consent of Members holding a majority percentage of the Membership Interests of the Company.
+
+B. Limitation of Manager's Authority. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary provided in the foregoing, the written consent of the Sole Member shall be required to:
+
+- 1. Sell, transfer, assign, convey, or otherwise dispose of any part of the Company's assets;
+- 2. Cause the Company to incur any debt in excess of \$5,000, whether or not in the ordinary course of business;
+- 3. Cause the Company to incur any debt less than \$5,000 other than in the ordinary course of business;
+- 4. Cause the Company to encumber any assets in connection with any debt referred to in clause 2 or 3 above;
+- 5. Issue or sell, or approve the transfer, assignment, conveyance or other disposition of all or any portion of any Membership Interest in the Company;
+- 6. Adopt, amend or repeal the Operating Agreement of the Company;
+- 7. Approve a plan of merger of the Company with any other entity;
+- 8. Incur any single expense or combination of related expenses in excess of \$5,000;
+- 9. Cause the Company to make any distributions to its Members.
+
+C. Voting of Membership Interests. A Membership Interest is entitled to be voted only if it is owned by a Member, and the relative weight of the vote of each such Membership Interest shall be proportionate to such Member's percentage Membership Interest. Neither an assignee nor a transferee may vote a Membership Interest unless such assignee or transferee is admitted as a Member.
+
+#### SECTION VI EXCULPATION OF LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION
+
+A. Exculpation of Liability. Unless otherwise provided by law or expressly assumed pursuant to a written instrument signed by such person, neither the Sole Member nor any other subsequent Member of the Company shall be personally liable for the acts, debts or liabilities of the Company.
+
+#### B. Indemnification.
+
+1. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, the Company, its receiver or its trustee shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Sole Member, each other subsequent Member and their respective heirs, personal representatives, and successors, and may indemnify, defend and hold harmless any employee or agent, who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, from and against any expense, loss, damage or liability incurred or connected with, or any claim, suit, demand, loss, judgment, liability, cost or expense, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, arising from or related to, the Company or any act or omission of the Sole Member, such subsequent Member or such employee or agent on behalf of the Company, and amounts paid in settlement of any of the above, provided that such amounts were not the result of fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional misconduct on the part of the Sole Member, such subsequent Member or such employee or agent against whom a claim is asserted. The Company may advance to the Sole
+
+Member, such subsequent Member or any such employee or agent and their respective heirs, personal representatives, and successors the costs of defending any claim, suit or action against such person if such person undertakes to repay the fluids advanced, with interest, if the person is not entitled to indemnification under this Section.
+
+2. To the extent that the Sole Member, such subsequent Member, or any such employee or agent of the Company has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of an action, suit or proceeding or in defense of any claim, issue or other matter in the action, suit or proceeding, such person shall be indemnified against actual and reasonable expenses, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit or proceeding and any action, suit or proceeding brought to enforce the mandatory indemnification provided herein.
+
+3. Any indemnification permitted under this Section, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by the Company only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that the indemnification is proper under the circumstances because the person to be indemnified has met the applicable standard of conduct and upon an evaluation of the reasonableness of expenses and amounts paid in settlement. This determination and evaluation shall be made by the vote of the majority of the percentage Membership Interests. Notwithstanding the foregoing to the contrary, no indemnification shall be provided to any Member, employee or agent of the Company for or in connection with the receipt of a financial benefit to which such person is not entitled, voting for or assenting to a distribution to the Members in violation of this Agreement or the LLC Law, or a knowing violation of other law.
+
+#### SECTION VII LIOUIDATION
+
+The Company shall be dissolved, and shall terminate and wind up its affairs, upon the determination of the Sole Member to do so.
+
+#### SECTION VIII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
+
+A. Section Headings. The Section headings and numbers contained in this Agreement have been inserted only as a matter of convenience and for reference, and in no way shall be construed to define, limit or describe the scope or intent of any provision of this Agreement.
+
+B. Severability. The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and this Agreement shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provisions were omitted.
+
+C. Amendment. This Agreement may be amended or revoked at any time, in writing, with the consent of the Sole Member. No change or modification to this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the Sole Member.
+
+D. finding Effect. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement relating to transferability, this Agreement will be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties, and their respective distributees, heirs, successors and assigns.
+
+E. Governing Law. The rights and obligations of the Sole Member, and any claims and disputes relating thereto, shall be subject to and governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, including without limitation, the LLC Law, as well as all New York Laws applicable to contracts executed and to be fully performed within the State of New York, without application of New York's laws relating to conflicts of law.
+
+IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sole Member makes and executes this Operating Agreement on the day and year first written above. \_
+
+SOLE MEMIJEFa---------
+
+Jeffity E. Epstein

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02821977/EFTA02821977.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822000/EFTA02822000.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+May 09, 202G
+
+TAMARA CHARLES
+
+## CLERK OF TOE COURT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
+
+DIVISION OF ST. & ST. JOHN
+
+GIIISLAINE MAXWELL, )
+
+) CASE NO. ST-20-CV-155 ) ) ) )
+
+Plaintiff, )
+
+VS. )
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al., )
+
+Defendants. )
+
+## ORDER
+
+Defendants Indykes and Kahn having filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about May 1, 2020; it is
+
+ORDERED that Plaintiff shall respond to the Motion by June I, 2020, and Defendants may reply by June 15, 2020; and it is
+
+ORDERED that copies of this Order shall be directed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated: May 9, 2020.
+
+ATTEST: Tamara Charles
+
+HON. N JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
+
+CI the Cou OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS by: Lori B nes-Tyson Court erk Supervisor

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822000/EFTA02822000.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822001/EFTA02822001.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+May 11, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES  
+CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS**  
+District of St. Thomas/St. John
+
+---
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,  
+Plaintiff
+
+Case Number: ST-2020-CV-00155  
+Action: Debt
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN et al,  
+Defendant.
+
+**NOTICE of ENTRY**  
+**of**  
+**ORDER**
+
+To: Kyle R. Waldner,Esq. [REDACTED] A. Kroblin,Esq.  
+
+Please take notice that on  
+ORDER  
+dated MAY 9, 2020 was/were entered  
+by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
+
+Dated: May 11, 2020
+
+Tamara Charles  
+Clerk of the Court
+
+By:
+
+Donna Donovan  
+Court Clerk Supervisor

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822001/EFTA02822001.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822002/EFTA02822002.md

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# FILED
+
+Cune 01, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-I55
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+### JOINT MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
+
+Plaintiff GH1SLAINE MAXWELL ("Plaintiff'), and Defendants DARREN K. INDYKE ("lndyke") and RICHARD D. KAHN ("Kahn"), by and though their undersigned counsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), and on behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC, an entity administered in probate by the Co-Executors as part of the Estate (collectively, the "Defendants"), through their respective undersigned attorneys, hereby file this Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings until September 7, 2020, and state as follows:
+
+I. "The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." v. Treasure Bay V.I. Corp., 2016 WL 9503682, at \*3 (V.1. Super. Oct. 6, 2016) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)). Generally, the party seeking a stay "must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
+
+forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. To that end, in determining whether to grant a motion to stay, courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether a stay will simplify issues and promote judicial economy; (2) the balance of hann to the parties; and (3) the length of the requested stay. See 2016 WL 9503682. at \*3; Cheyney State Coll. Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55).
+
+2. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on May I, 2020, citing, in part, 15 V.I.C. § 606(a), which provides that "(a)n action may be commenced against an executor or administrator at any time after the expiration of twelve months from the granting of letters testamentary or of administration and until the final settlement of the estate and discharge of such executor or administrator from the trust, and not otherwise." Here, Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Ilennon-Percell issued Letters Testamentary to Indyke and Kahn on September 6, 2019.
+
+3. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy and preserving assets of the Estate, it is requested that the Court stay the instant proceeding until September 7, 2020, a definite period of 98 days from the date of this Motion. The parties further stipulate that Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion to dismiss shall be due on or by September 7, 2020.
+
+WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order staying this proceeding until September 7, 2020, and for any such other and fiirther relief that this Court deems just and proper.
+
+Dated: June 1, 2020
+
+QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, [REDACTED] & BOYER, P.A.  
+*Attorneys for Plaintiff*  
+9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4{sup}`th` Floor  
+Miami, FL 33156  
+T: (340) 693-0230  
+F: (340) 693-0300
+
+By: /s/ Kyle R. Waldner
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Esq.  
+kwaldner@qpwblaw.com  
+V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+KELLERHALS [REDACTED] KROBLIN PLLC  
+*Attorneys for Defendants*
+
+[REDACTED] Palms Professional Building  
+9053 Estate [REDACTED], Suite 101  
+St. [REDACTED], V.I. 00802  
+T: (340) 779-2564  
+F: (888) 316-9269
+
+By: /s/ [REDACTED] Kroblin
+
+[REDACTED] Kroblin, Esq.  
+ckroblin@kellfer.com  
+V.I. Bar No.: 966
+
+# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via email and U.S. Mail this 14 day of June, 2020 to:
+
+Kroblin, Esq. KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. V.I. 00802 ckrotaliMet kellfer.com
+
+/s/ Kvle R. Waldner
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Esq.
+
+kwaldner6/ aowblaw.com
+
+V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+# ORDER
+
+THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Joint Motion To Stay Proceedings between the parties hereto. The premises having been duly considered, it is hereby:
+
+ORDERED that the Joint Motion To Stay Proceedings is GRANTED; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to dismiss shall be due on or by September 7, 2020; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that a certified copy of this Order shall be directed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated: 2020
+
+ATTEST: TAMARA CHARLES Clerk of the Court
+
+By: Deputy Clerk JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822002/EFTA02822002.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822007/EFTA02822007.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822116/EFTA02822116.md

@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
+## FILED
+
+CHARLES CLERK OF THE CO,RT
+
+## EXHIBIT B
+
+**UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
+\*\*\*\*\*CICO SUBPOENA\*\*\*\*\*  
+DUCES TECUM**
+
+**SUBPOENA FOR: RECORDS                      CASE**
+
+**IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS**
+
+**TO: Ghislaine Maxwell  
+c/o Quintairos, Prieto, [REDACTED] & Boyer, P.A.  
+4{sup}`th` Floor  
+Miami, FL 33156**
+
+**ATTN: Kyle R. Waldner, Esq.**
+
+Title 14 V.I.C. § 612(a) provides that "[w]henever any person is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, or to be engaging in, or about to engage in any conduct constituting a violation of any of the provisions of section 605r the Attorney General may, in his discretion, conduct an investigation of the conduct. The Attorney General is authorized before the commencement of and during any civil or criminal proceeding or action under this chapter to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, examine them under oath, or to require the production of any books, documents, records, writings, recordings or tangible things (hereinafter referred to as "documentary material") relevant or material to the investigation, for inspection, reproducing, and/or copying.
+
+Pursuant to Title 14 V.I.C. Section 612(a), **YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED** to produce forthwith copies of the documents listed in *Exhibit A*:
+
+Pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 612(c), the documents requested is in reference to an ongoing investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice of the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 133 and 1624, as well as other Virgin Islands statutes.
+
+Personal appearance is not required to satisfy this subpoena; instead, please provide the requested information to **Special Agent Tarique Turnbull, Department of Justice.**
+
+**PLACE:** United States Virgin Islands  
+Department of Justice  
+3438 Kronprindsens Gate  
+G.E.R.S. Complex, 2{sup}`nd` Floor  
+St. [REDACTED], VI 00802-5712
+
+**DATE:** April 17, 2020
+
+**TIME:** 3:00 p.m.
+
+**NOTE:** This subpoena places you on notice of an investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice. You must maintain, and may not destroy, any documents, electronic records, or other material relating to Jeffrey Epstein and the entities described in the subpoena.
+
+Failure to produce the documents requested may cause the Attorney General to petition the Superior Court to
+
+compel you to produce the documents requested and to the issuance of a warrant for your arrest, under 'Fide 14 V.I.C. 612(k).
+
+tb, Esquire
+
+Chief of the Civil Division
+
+V.I. Department of Justice
+
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+3438 KronprincLsens Gade
+
+G.E.R.S. Complex, 2nd Floor
+
+St. VI 00802
+
+(340) 774-5666 Ext. 10303
+
+DATED this M day of March, 2020.
+
+#### RETURN OF SERVICE
+
+Received by Server on: Place:
+
+Served on (Name): Date: At:
+
+Served by: Title:
+
+#### DECLARATION OF SERVER
+
+I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF TIIE United States of America and the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Services Statement is true and correct.
+
+Executed on: By:
+
+## Exhibit A
+
+Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
+
+RECORDS DELIVERY ONLY. NO ORAL TESTIMONY WILL BE TAKEN.
+
+IF RECORDS ARE DELIVERED PRIOR TO April 17, 2020, YOU NEED NOT APPEAR.
+
+If more than thirty (30) days is needed to respond to this subpoena, please contact the Civil Division Chief, Attorney Ariel M, at the Virgin Islands Department of Justice.
+
+### I. Definitions
+
+Unless otherwise specified, the documents specified below are required to be produced for the time period commencing January 1, 1998 and continuing through the present. Where production of account data is provided in electronic format or media the preferred software format to incorporate the data into is Microsoft Excel.
+
+As used herein, the following terms are defined as indicated:
+
+- 1. As used herein, the term "Account Holder" shall mean any person or entity in whose name an account is held or where the person or entity has held any ownership or other interest or has had signatory authority.
+- 2. "All/Each." The term "all" and "each" shall be construed as all and each.
+- 3. "And/Or." The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed either disjunctively or conjunctively as nenscary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.
+- 4. "Communication" means the transmittal of information (in the form of facts, ideas, inquiries or otherwise).
+- 5. "Concerning" means relating to, referring to, describing, evidencing or constituting.
+- 6. The terms "Document" or "Documents" are defined to be synonymous and equal in scope to the usage of these terms in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), including, without limitation, any written, drawn, printed, typed, photographed or other graphic or electronically or computerized recorded data or compilations of any kind or nature prepared or received by, or in the possession, custody or control of the answering party, its agents, servants, employees or other representatives. Originals, drafts and all nonidentical copies are separate documents within the meaning of this term.
+
+- 7. The term "identify" when used with reference to a person, means to give, to the extent known, the person's full name, present or last known address, and when referring to a natural person, additionally, the present or last known place of employment. Once a person has been identified in accordance with this subparagraph, only the name of that person need to be listed in response to subsequent discovery requesting the identification of that person.
+- 8. The term "identify" when used with reference to documents, means to give, to the extent known, the (i) type of document; (ii) general subject matter; (iii) date of the document; and (iv) author(s), addressee(s) and recipient(s).
+- 9. The term "identify" when used with reference to an oral communication, discussion, conversation or any other oral statement, shall mean to describe in detail the substance of each such communication, discussion, conversation or statement, state the date of such communication, discussion, conversation or statement, the place where such communication, discussion, conversation or statement was held and identify each person present for such communication, discussion, conversation or statement.
+- 10. "Person" means any natural person or any business, legal or governmental entity or association.
+- 11. "Referring to", "relating to", "reflecting", "regarding" or "with respect to" mean, without limitation the concepts: pertain to, deal with, concern, reflect, record, report, constitute, contain, mention, describe, discuss, analyze, evaluate, estimate, study, survey, project, assess, support, modify, contradict, criticize, summarize, comment, or otherwise involve, in whole or in part.
+- 12. "You means You, along with any organization or entity in which You have management or controlling interests, together with all present and former directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives or any other persons acting, or purporting to act, on Your behalf.
+
+#### Instructions
+
+- 1. When providing Your responses, indicate the Request to which each Document or answer responds in the metadata field, Request No.
+- 2. Documents produced pursuant to these Requests shall be produced as they are kept in the ordinary course of business.
+- 3. For each Document that You produce, produce the current version together with all earlier editions or predecessor Documents during the relevant time period, even though the title of earlier Documents may differ from current versions. Format for Documents produced electronically:
+  - a. Data shall be produced in single page TIFFs at a 300 DPI resolution which are named for the Number of the page. There shall be no more than 1000 images per folder. numbers, confidentiality designations, and redactions shall be burned into the TIFF image file so as not to unreasonably obstruct any information on the page.
+  - b. Document Unitization. Each page of a Document shall be electronically converted into an image as described above. If a Document is more than one page, the unitization of the Document and any attachments and/or affixed notes shall be maintained as it existed in the original when creating the image file and appropriately designated in the load files. The corresponding parent/attachment relationships, to the extent possible, shall be provided in the load files furnished with each production.
+  - c. Include Document level text files containing optical character recognition ("OCR") or extracted text named with the Number of the first page of the Document.
+  - d. Include data load files containing all of the metadata (both system and application — see list below) from the original Native Documents with extension.dat for Concordance.
+  - e. Include the database field name in the first ►ine **of the metadata file, in such a manner that it is clear how the metadata is organized in the file.**
+  - **f. Include an image load file for Concordance such as .opt.**
+  - **g. All hidden text (e.g., track changes, hidden columns, comments, notes, etc.) shall be expanded, extracted, and rendered in the .TIFF file.**
+
+- h. Documents created in Excel (spreadsheets), .CSV files, Access (databases), and audio and video media files shall be produced in Native format. The extractable metadata and text shall be produced in the same manner as other Documents that originated in electronic form (as described herein) to the extent that metadata exists or is reasonably accessible.
+- i. Email attachments and embedded files or links shall be mapped to their parent.
+- j. Produce all attachments to responsive Documents attached to the responsive Documents.
+- k. De-duplicate prior to production. To the extent that exact duplicate Documents (based on MD5 or SHA-I hash values at the Document level) reside within a party's data set, each party is only required to produce a single copy of a responsive Document, so long as there is a data field that identifies each custodian who had a copy. In addition, Documents may be de-duplicated in such a way as to eliminate earlier or incomplete chains of emails, and produce only the most complete iteration of an email chain so long as there is a data field that identifies each custodian who had a copy.
+
+### REOUIRED METADATAM:
+
+| BEGDOC | ENDDOC |
+| ----------- | ----------- |
+| BEGATTACH | ENDATTACH |
+| ATTCOUNT | ATTACH |
+| CUSTODIAN | AUTHOR |
+| FROM | TO |
+| CC | BCC |
+| FILESIZE | PGCOUNT |
+| DATERECD | TIMERECD |
+| DATESENT | TIMESENT |
+| CRTDATE | CRTTIME |
+
+| LASTMODDATE | LASTMODTIME |
+| ------------------------- | ---------------------- |
+| LASTACCDATE | LASTACCTIME |
+| TITLE | SUBJECT |
+| EMAILSUBJECT | FILENAME |
+| FILEEXT | MD5HASH |
+| ORGANIZATION | FULLPATH |
+| RECORD_TYPE | VERSION |
+| VOLUME | COMMENT |
+| PRINTEDDATE | ENTRYID |
+| ATTLST | ITEMTYPE |
+| PSTINSIDEPATH | ITEMCREATIONTIME |
+| REQATTANDEES | REMINDERTIME |
+| REPLYTIME | APPOINTMENTSTARTDATE |
+| APPOINTMENTDURATIONTIME | APPOINTMENTCONTACT |
+| CATEGORY | KEYWORDS |
+| MANAGER | LASTAUTHOR |
+| ENCRYPTED | FAMILYDATE |
+| NATIVELINK | TEXTPATH |
+
+## 4. Format for hard copies of Documents produced in response to this Request:
+
+- a. Re-type the question or request to which the Documents respond and firmly attach the Documents to the re-typed request;
+
+- b. Number all Documents consecutively, consistently with the numbers used for the Documents produced electronically.
+- 5. Unless otherwise indicated, the relevant time period for this Request for Production of Documents is January 1, 1998 to the present.
+- 6. If no Documents responsive to a particular request exist, so state.
+- 7. As to any Document which no longer exists but which You are aware existed at one time, identify such Document with as much particularity as possible, and in addition, identify the last known location of the Document, the reason the Document is no longer in existence, and the person responsible for the Document's disposition.
+- 8. For information that You withhold on the basis of privilege, provide a descriptive list of each Document stating the grounds for Your refusal and providing the following information: the name or title of the Document; a description of the nature and subject matter of the Document sufficient to enable a meaningful challenge to the assertion of privilege; the date, author(s), sender(s), and recipient(s) of the Document, including whether the person is an attorney and/or was an employee of Banco Popular de Puerto Rico. at the time the Document was authored, sent or received; and the nature of the privilege.
+- 9. These requests shall be deemed continuing in character so as to require prompt supplemental responses if additional Documents called for herein are obtained, discovered, or become known to You between the time of responding to the Requests and the final disposition of this action.
+- 10. Social Security numbers may be redacted from documents to the extent required by applicable law.
+
+#### Requests for the Production of Documents
+
+Please produce the following:
+
+- 1. All Documents and discovery obtained or provided in other litigation concerning or concerning allegations that You or Jeffrey Epstein engaged in sexual abuse, human trafficking, commercial sex, or pornography, including in the Virgin Islands.
+- 2. Transcripts and video recordinf of all taken of You in v. Maxwell (No. 15 CV 07433-RWS) and v. Epstein, Maxwell et al (No. 17 Civ. 0616 JGK).
+
+- 3. All Documents You reference or rely on in the complaint in Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey
+  - E. Epstein Civil Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+- 4. All Documents reflecting or concerning travel to or from the Virgin Islands for You, Jeffrey Epstein, or other individuals.
+- 5. All Documents reflecting or concerning communications between You, or Your agent or representative, and Darren IndyIce, or Richard Kahn.
+- 6. All Documents reflecting or concerning communications between You, or Your agent or representative, and Jeffrey Epstein. For this Request, provide documents from 1991 to present.
+- 7. All Documents reflecting or concerning Your allegation that Jeffrey Epstein agreed to indemnify you, pay Your legal fees, or otherwise provide financial support to You including, but not limited to, the notes referenced in Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein Civil Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+- 8. All Documents reflecting or concerning your employment for the companies and entities You described in Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein Civil Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+- 9. All Documents reflecting or concerning massages or other services You arranged or compensated for Jeffrey Epstein.
+- 10. All Documents reflecting or concerning a list of masseuses kept for any of the properties owned or controlled by Jeffrey Epstein.
+- 11. All photographs of Jeffrey Epstein, including, but not limited to, all photographs of You and Jeffrey Epstein.
+- 12. All photographs or videos taken of any of the women or girls who ever provided a massage for Jeffrey Epstein, regardless of location, or any visitor at Great St. James or Little St. James.
+- 13. All Documents reflecting or concerning a list of names, numbers, and addresses kept at any of the properties owned or controlled by Jeffrey Epstein.
+- 14. All Documents reflecting or concerning lists of names, numbers, and addresses You created or kept in the course of Your employment, as You described in Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein Civil Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+
+- 15. All Documents reflecting or concerning the purchase, maintenance, construction, permits, or other services provided to or obtained in connection with Great St. James or Little St. James.
+- 16. All Documents reflecting or concerning tax incentives obtained by Epstein or any Epstein Entity from the Government of the Virgin Islands or any agency or entity associated with the Government.
+- 17. All Documents reflecting or concerning communications between You, Jeffrey Epstein, or any Epstein Entity with or about the Government of the Virgin Islands, or any agency or entity associated with the Government.
+- 18. All Documents reflecting or concerning visitors to or houseguests of Great St. James or Little St. James.
+- 19. Documents sufficient to identify all email addresses, telephone numbers, and social media accounts used by You and Jeffrey Epstein. (You may answer this question, rather than provide responsive documents.)
+- 20. MI Documents reflecting or concerning communications between You and/or Jeffrey Epstein and any Person who visited or was a houseguest at Great St. James or Little St. James regarding the Person's visit or other visitors to the Island.
+- 21. All Documents reflecting or concerning travel on any airplane, helicopter, or boat owned or used by You or Jeffrey Epstein, including, but not limited to, Air Ghislaine.
+- 22. All Documents reflecting or concerning transfers or payment of money or other assets between You, Jeffrey Epstein, any Epstein Entity or agent, any entity of which you are an owner, officer, shareholder, or employee.
+- 23. All Documents reflecting or concerning bank accounts, securities or other investments, property, or other assets held by or transferred to or from Jeffrey Epstein or any Epstein Entity or agent.
+- 24. All Documents reflecting or concerning visas or other travel arrangements for models or other women or girls transported to the United States, including the Virgin Islands.
+- 25. All photographs, videos, audio messages, and/or any other visual media or audio recording reflecting You, Jeffrey Epstein, and/or any visitor to Little St. James or Great St. James.
+
+- 26. All Documents reflecting or concerning the presence of any Person on Little St. James or Great St. James for any purpose, including, but not limited to, any contractors or employees of Epstein or any Epstein Entity.
+- 27. All Documents reflecting to any offer of employment or contract of employment, agreement, or non-disclosure agreement for any employee of Jeffrey Epstein or any Epstein Entity, including, but not limited to, temporary, part-time, or kill-time employees, in any capacity, at Little St. James or Great St. James.
+- 28. Your telephone and credit card statements.
+- 29. All Documents reflecting or concerning payments You received from any Epstein Entity.
+- 30. All Documents reflecting or concerning Your role as Director and Treasurer of Financial Trust Company, including, but not limited to, payroll records, client lists, vendor lists, correspondence, bank statements or account documents, and business plans.
+- 31. All Documents reflecting or concerning identification documents (such as passports or driver licenses) for visitors to Little St. James or Great St. James.
+
+## EXHIBIT B
+
+Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Ghislaine Maxwell
+
+RECORDS DELIVERY ONLY. NO ORAL TESTIMONY WILL BE TAKEN. IF RECORDS ARE DELIVERED PRIOR TO April 17, 2020, YOU NEED NOT APPEAR. If more than thirty (30) days is needed to respond to this subpoena, please contact the Civil Division Chief, Attorney Ariel at the Virgin Islands Department of Justice.
+
+#### Individuals and Entities For Which Information To Be Provided
+
+- 1. Jeffrey E. Epstein
+- 2. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein
+- 3. The 1953 Trust
+- 4. Plan D, LW
+- 5. Great St. Jim, LLC
+- 6. Nautilus, Inc.
+- 7. Hyperion Air, LW
+- 8. Poplar Inc.
+- 9. C.O.U.Q. Foundation
+- 10. Epstein Foundation, Inc.
+- 11. Epstein Interests
+- 12. Gratitude America LTD
+- 13. J. Epstein Foundation, Inc.
+- 14. Southern Trust Co.
+- 15. Financial Trust Co. Inc.
+- 16. IGY-AYH St. Holdings, LW.
+- 17. Maple, Inc.
+- 18. Cypress, Inc.
+- 19. Laurel, Inc.
+- 20. JEGE, LW.
+- 21. Southern Country International
+
+# EXHIBIT C
+
+#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant.
+
+SEALED INDICTMENT
+
+20 Cr.
+
+20 Cr. 330
+
+COUNT ONE (Conspiracy to Entice Minors to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts)
+
+The Grand Jury charges:
+
+#### OVERVIEW
+
+1. The charges set forth herein stem from the role of GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, in the sexual exploitation and abuse of multiple minor girls by Jeffrey Epstein. In particular, from at least in or about 1994, up to and including at least in or about 1997, MAXWELL assisted, facilitated, and contributed to Jeffrey Epstein's abuse of minor girls by, among other things, helping Epstein to recruit, groom, and ultimately abuse victims known to MAXWELL and Epstein to be under the age of 18. The victims were as young as 14 years old when they were groomed and abused by MAXWELL and Epstein, both of whom knew that certain victims were in fact under the age of 18.
+
+2. As a part and in furtherance of their scheme to abuse minor victims, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, and Jeffrey Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to
+
+Epstein's residences in different states, which MAXWELL knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse. Moreover, in an effort to conceal her crimes, MAXWELL repeatedly lied when questioned about her conduct, including in relation to some of the minor victims described herein, when providing testimony under oath in 2016.
+
+#### FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+3. During the time periods charged in this Indictment, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, had a personal and professional relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and was among his closest associates. In particular, between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, MAXWELL was in an intimate relationship with Epstein and also was paid by Epstein to manage his various properties. Over the course of their relationship, MAXWELL and Epstein were photographed together on multiple occasions, including in the below image:
+
+![](_page_15_Picture_3.jpeg)
+
+4. Beginning in at least 1994, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, enticed and groomed multiple minor girls to engage in sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, through a variety of means and methods, including but not limited to the following:
+
+a. MAXWELL first attempted to befriend some of Epstein's minor victims prior to their abuse, including by asking the victims about their lives, their schools, and their families. MAXWELL and Epstein would spend time building friendships with minor victims by, for example, taking minor victims to the movies or shopping. Some of these outings would involve MAXWELL and Epstein spending time together with a minor victim, while some would involve MAXWELL or Epstein spending time alone with a minor victim.
+
+b. Having developed a rapport with a victim, MAXWELL would try to normalize sexual abuse for a minor victim by, among other things, discussing sexual topics, undressing in front of the victim, being present when a minor victim was undressed, and/or being present for sex acts involving the minor victim and Epstein.
+
+c. MAXWELL'S presence during minor victims' interactions with Epstein, including interactions where the minor victim was undressed or that involved sex acts with Epstein, helped put the victims at ease because an adult woman was present. For example, in some instances, MAXWELL would
+
+massage Epstein in front of a minor victim. In other instances, MAXWELL encouraged minor victims to provide massages to Epstein, including sexualized massages during which a minor victim would be fully or partially nude. Many of those massages resulted in Epstein sexually abusing the minor victims.
+
+d. In addition, Epstein offered to help some minor victims by paying for travel and/or educational opportunities, and MAXWELL encouraged certain victims to accept Epstein's assistance. As a result, victims were made to feel indebted and believed that MAXWELL and Epstein were trying to help them.
+
+e. Through this process, MAXWELL and Epstein enticed victims to engage in sexual activity with Epstein. In some instances, MAXWELL was present for and participated in the sexual abuse of minor victims. Some such incidents occurred in the context of massages, which developed into sexual encounters.
+
+5. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated Jeffrey Epstein's access to minor victims knowing that he had a sexual preference for underage girls and that he intended to engage in sexual activity with those victims. Epstein's resulting abuse of minor victims included, among other things, touching a victim's breast, touching a victim's genitals, placing a sex toy such as a vibrator on a victim's genitals,
+
+directing a victim to touch Epstein while he masturbated, and directing a victim to touch Epstein's genitals.
+
+#### MAXWELL AND EPSTEIN'S VICTIMS
+
+6. Between approximately in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated Jeffrey Epstein's access to minor victims by, among other things, inducing and enticing, and aiding and abetting the inducement and enticement of, multiple minor victims. Victims were groomed and/or abused at multiple locations, including the following:
+
+a. A a multi-story private residence on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York owned by Epstein (the "New York Residence"), which is depicted in the following photograph:
+
+![](_page_18_Picture_4.jpeg)
+
+b. An estate in Palm Beach, Florida owned by Epstein (the "Palm Beach Residence"), which is depicted in the following photograph:
+
+![](_page_19_Picture_1.jpeg)
+
+c. A ranch in Santa Fe, New Mexico owned by Epstein (the "New Mexico Residence"), which is depicted in the following photograph:
+
+![](_page_19_Picture_3.jpeg)
+
+d. MAXWELL's personal residence in London, England.
+
+7. Among the victims induced or enticed by GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, were minor victims identified herein as Minor Victim-1, Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3. In particular, and during time periods relevant to this Indictment, MAXWELL engaged in the following acts, among others, with respect to minor victims:
+
+a. MAXWELL met Minor Victim-1 when Minor Victim-1 was approximately 14 years old. MAXWELL subsequently interacted with Minor Victim-1 on multiple occasions at Epstein's residences, knowing that Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18 at the time. During these interactions, which took place between approximately 1994 and 1997, MAXWELL groomed Minor Victim-1 to engage in sexual acts with Epstein through multiple means. First, MAXWELL and Epstein attempted to befriend Minor Victim-1, taking her to the movies and on shopping trips. MAXWELL also asked Minor Victim-1 about school, her classes, her family, and other aspects of her life. MAXWELL then sought to normalize inappropriate and abusive conduct by, among other things, undressing in front of Minor Victim-1 and being present when Minor Victim-1 undressed in front of Epstein. Within the first year after MAXWELL and Epstein met Minor Victim-1, Epstein began sexually abusing Minor Victim-1. MAXWELL was present for
+
+and involved in some of this abuse. In particular, MAXWELL involved Minor Victim-1 in group sexualized massages of Epstein. During those group sexualized massages, MAXWELL and/or Minor Victim-1 would engage in sex acts with Epstein. Epstein and MAXWELL both encouraged Minor Victim-1 to travel to Epstein's residences in both New York and Florida. As a result, Minor Victim-1 was sexually abused by Epstein in both New York and Florida. Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel across state lines for the purpose of sexual encounters with Epstein, and MAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with Minor Victim-1 after Minor-Victim-1 traveled to Epstein's properties, including in the context of a sexualized massage.
+
+b. MAXWELL interacted with Minor Victim-2 on at least one occasion in or about 1996 at Epstein's residence in New Mexico when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18. Minor Victim-2 had flown into New Mexico from out of state at Epstein's invitation for the purpose of being groomed for and/or subjected to acts of sexual abuse. MAXWELL knew that Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18 at the time. While in New Mexico, MAXWELL and Epstein took Minor Victim-2 to a movie and MAXWELL took Minor Victim-2 shopping. MAXWELL also discussed Minor Victim-2's school, classes, and family with Minor Victim-2. In New Mexico, MAXWELL began her efforts to groom Minor Victim-2 for abuse by Epstein by, among other things, providing
+
+an unsolicited massage to Minor Victim-2, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. MAXWELL also encouraged Minor Victim-2 to massage Epstein.
+
+0. MAXWELL groomed and befriended Minor Victim-3 in London, England between approximately 1994 and 1995, including during a period of time in which MAXWELL knew that Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18. Among other things, MAXWELL discussed Minor Victim-3's life and family with Minor Victim-3. MAXWELL introduced Minor Victim-3 to Epstein and arranged for multiple interactions between Minor Victim-3 and Epstein. During those interactions, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to massage Epstein, knowing that Epstein would engage in sex acts with Minor Victim-3 during those massages. Minor Victim-3 provided Epstein with the requested massages, and during those massages, Epstein sexually abused Minor Victim-3. MAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with Minor Victim-3 on multiple occasions, including at times when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, including in the context of a sexualized massage.
+
+#### MAXWELL'S EFFORTS TO CONCEAL HER CONDUCT
+
+8. In or around 2016, in the context of a deposition as part of civil litigation, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, repeatedly provided false and perjurious statements, under oath, regarding, among other subjects, her role in facilitating the
+
+abuse of minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein, including some of the specific events and acts of abuse detailed above.
+
+#### STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
+
+9. Prom at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GNISDAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, enticement, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422.
+
+10. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that GMISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, would and did knowingly persuade, induce, entice, and coerce one and more individuals to travel in interstate and foreign commerce, to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422.
+
+#### Overt Acts
+
+11. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
+
+a. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL participated in multiple group sexual encounters with Epstein and Minor Victim-1 in New York and Florida.
+
+b. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel from Florida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the New York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+c. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an unsolicited massage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless.
+
+d. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in London, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse Minor Victim-3 during those massages.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
+
+#### COUNT TWO
+
+(Enticement of a Minor to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acta)
+
+
+12. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+13. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAIN7 MAXWELL, the defendant, knowingly did persuade, induce, entice, and coerce an individual to travel in interstate and foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, and attempted to do the same, and aided and abetted the same, to wit, MAXWELL persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced Minor Victim-1 to travel from Florida to New York, New York on multiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422 and 2.)
+
+#### COUNT THREE (Conspiracy to Transport Minors with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity)
+
+
+14. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+15. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to
+
+wit, transportation of minors, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a).
+
+16. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that OHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, would and did, knowingly transport an individual who had not attained the age of 18 in interstate and foreign commerce, with intent that the individual engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a).
+
+#### Overt Acts
+
+17. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
+
+a. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL participated in multiple group sexual encounters with EPSTEIN and Minor Victim-1 in New York and Florida.
+
+b. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel from Florida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the New York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+c. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an unsolicited nassage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless.
+
+d. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in London, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse Minor Victim-3 during those massages..
+
+through 18. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
+
+#### COUNT FOUR (Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity)
+
+
+including 19. From at least in or about 1994, up to and in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, transport an individual who had not attained the interstate and foreign commerce, with the intent knowingly did age of 18 in that the individual engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, and attempted to do so, and
+
+aided and abetted the same, to wit, MAXWELL arranged for Minor Victim-1 to be transported from Florida to New York, New York on multiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2423(a) and 2.)
+
+#### COUNT GIVE (Perjury)
+
+
+20. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+21. On or about April 22, 2016, in the Southern District of New York, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having taken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in connection with a case then pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under docket number 15 Civ. 7344, knowingly made false material declarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined false testimony:
+
+> Q. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages? If you know.
+
+A. I don't know what you're talking about.
+
+• • •
+
+- Q. List all the people under the age of 18 that you interacted with at any of Jeffrey's properties?
+- A. I'm not aware of anybody that I interacted with, other than obviously (the plaintiff] who was 17 at this point.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.)
+
+#### COUNT SIX (Perjury)
+
+
+22. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+23. On or about July 22, 2016, in the Southern District of New York, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having taken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in connection with a case then pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under docket number 15 Civ. 7344, knowingly made false material declarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined false testimony:
+
+> Q: Were you aware of the presence of sex toys or devices used in sexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach house?
+
+A: No, not that I recall. . . .
+
+- O. Do you know whether Mr. Epstein possessed sex toys or devices used in sexual activities?
+
+- A. No.
+
+- Q. Other than yourself and the blond and brunette that you have identified as having been involved in three-way sexual activities, with whom did Mr. Epstein have sexual activities?
+
+- A. I wasn't aware that he was having sexual activities with anyone when I was with him other than myself.
+
+- Q. I want to be sure that I'm clear. Is it your testimony that in the 1990s and 2000s, you were not aware that Mr. Epstein was having sexual activities with anyone other than yourself and the blond and brunette on those few occasions when they were involved with you?
+
+- A. That is my testimony, that is correct.
+
+• • •
+
+- Q. Is it your testimony that you've never given anybody a massage?
+
+- A. I have not given anyone a massage.
+
+- Q. You never gave Mr. Epstein a massage, is that your testimony?
+
+- A. That is my testimony.
+
+- Q. You never gave (Minor Victim-2] a massage is your testimony?
+
+- A. I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage.
+
+(Title 18, united States Code, Section 1623.)
+
+F/REPERSON--
+
+Shazilvi--- AUDREY USS Acting nited States Attorney Form No. USA-33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58)
+
+#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+V.
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Defendant.
+
+#### INDICTMENT
+
+(18 U.S.C. §8 371, 1623, 2422, 2423(a), and 2)
+
+AUDREY STRAUSS
+
+Acting United States Attorney
+
+Foreperson
+
+# EXHIBIT D
+
+UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
+
+---
+
+In re: Subpoena for Records for Ghislaine Maxwell
+
+Case No.: N/A
+
+---
+
+AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
+
+I, Rafael [REDACTED], a Private Process Server, being duly sworn, depose and say:
+
+That I have been duly authorized to make service of the Subpoena Duces Tecum with Exhibits in the above entitled case.
+
+That I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to or otherwise interested in this action.
+
+That on 3/20/2020 at 12:10 PM, I served Ghislaine Maxwell c/o Quintairos, Prieto, [REDACTED] & Boyer, P.A. with the Subpoena Duces Tecum with Exhibits at 9300 South Dadeland Boulevard, 4th Floor, Miami, Florida 33156 by serving Eric Boyer, Designated Agent, who stated that he/she is authorized to accept service on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell c/o Quintairos, Prieto, [REDACTED] & Boyer, P.A..
+
+Eric Boyer is described herein as:
+
+Gender: Male    Race/Skin: [REDACTED]    Age: 40's    Weight: 180    Height: 5'6"    Hair: [REDACTED]    Glasses: No
+
+I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true and correct.
+
+Sworn to before me on 3/24/2020
+
+![](_page_33_Picture_98.jpeg)
+
+![](_page_33_Picture_99.jpeg)
+
+Client Ref Number:N/A  
+Job #: 1576402
+
+UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
+\*\*\*\*\*CICO SUBPOENA\*\*\*\*\*  
+DUCES TECUM
+
+RD  
+#10017  
+3/20/20  
+12:10P  
+Eric Boyer
+
+SUBPOENA FOR: RECORDS CASE
+
+IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
+
+TO: Ghislaine Maxwell  
+c/o Quintairos, Prieto, [REDACTED] & Boyer, P.A.  
+4{sup}`th` Floor  
+Miami, FL 33156
+
+ATTN: Kyle R. Waldner, Esq.
+
+Title 14 V.I.C. § 612(a) provides that "[w]henever any person is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, or to be engaging in, or about to engage in any conduct constituting a violation of any of the provisions of section 605r the Attorney General may, in his discretion, conduct an investigation of the conduct. The Attorney General is authorized before the commencement of and during any civil or criminal proceeding or action under this chapter to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, examine them under oath, or to require the production of any books, documents, records, writings, recordings or tangible things (hereinafter referred to as "documentary material") relevant or material to the investigation, for inspection, reproducing, and/or copying.
+
+Pursuant to Title 14 V.I.C. Section 612(a), YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to produce forthwith copies of the documents listed in *Exhibit A*:
+
+Pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 612(c), the documents requested is in reference to an ongoing investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice of the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 133 and 1624, as well as other Virgin Islands statutes.
+
+Personal appearance is not required to satisfy this subpoena; instead, please provide the requested information to Special Agent Tarique Turnbull, Department of Justice.
+
+PLACE: United States Virgin Islands  
+Department of Justice  
+3438 Kronprindsens Gade  
+G.E.R.S. Complex, 2{sup}`nd` Floor  
+St. [REDACTED] VI 00802-5712
+
+DATE: April 17, 2020
+
+TIME: 3:00 p.m.
+
+NOTE: This subpoena places you on notice of an investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice. You must maintain, and may not destroy, any documents, electronic records, or other material relating to Jeffrey Epstein and the entities described in the subpoena.
+
+Failure to produce the documents requested may cause the Attorney General to petition the Superior Court to
+
+compel you to produce the documents requested and to the issuance of a warrant for your arrest, under Titkl4 6I2(k).
+
+Arlel h4. Sjnith, Esquire
+
+Clic( of t ie Civil Division V.I. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 3438 Kronprindsens Gade G.E.R.S. Complex, 2nd Floor St. VI 00802 (340) 774-5666 Ext. 10303
+
+DATED this /9 day of March, 2020.
+
+#### RETURN OF SERVICE
+
+Received by Server on Place:
+
+Served on (Name): Date: At:
+
+Served by: Title:
+
+#### DECLARATION OF SERVER
+
+I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF TICE United States of America and the 'ferritory of the United States Virgin Islands that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Services Statement is true and correct.
+
+Executed on: By:
+
+# EXHIBIT E
+
+From: david.cattie@cattie-law.com <david.cattie@cattie-law.com>
+
+Sent: Wednesda , April 15, 2020 12:43 PM
+
+To: Ariel Dave
+
+Subject: [EXTERNAL MAILjGhislaine Maxwell
+
+Good day Attorney
+
+Please note that I have been retained by Ghislaine Maxwell In regard to two subpoenas from your office which were delivered to Quintairos, Prieto, & Boyer in Miami Florida. I am not sure about your work schedule in light of the COVID-19 issues, but I would like to meet or set up a conference call with you to discuss these matters. Unfortunately, I am having emergency surgery tomorrow so I will likely not be in a position to meet/conference with you until the middle of next week. Please let me know if/when you would be able to meet and your preferred method to conduct a meeting. Thank you and I hope you are staying safe.
+
+David J. Cattic, Esq. The Cattle Law Firm, P.C. t7to sal er's Gade St. , Virgin Islands 00802 T. 34o.775.i200/F. 800.878.5237 www.eattie-law.eom
+
+# EXHIBIT F
+
+From: =. Linda <Isinger@motlevrice.com>
+
+Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 9:42 AM
+
+To: David Cattie <david.cattie@cattie-law.com>
+
+Cc: Ariel >; Scott, Carmen <cscott@motlevrice.com >
+
+Subject: f/u on our conversation this week
+
+Attorney Cattle:
+
+I hope that you are well.
+
+When we spoke on Monday, you indicated that you expected to have a response from your client by the end of this week. Can you let us know where things stand?
+
+I would be happy to set up a call for this afternoon if you would prefer to speak by phone.
+
+Best,
+
+Linda
+
+Linda I Attorney at Law I Motley Rice LLC
+
+401 9th St. NW, Suite 1001 I Washington, DC 20004
+
+o. 202.386.9626 x5626 j f. 202.386.9622 I IsincierOmotlevrice.com
+
+# EXHIBIT G
+
+From: david.cattle@cattle-law.com <dayid.cattie@cattle-law.com>
+
+Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:52 PM
+
+To: Linda lsin er motle rice.coml
+
+Cc: 'Ariel >; Scott, Carmen <cscott@motleyrice.com>: 'Carol
+
+Subject: RE: EXTERNAL-RE: f/u on our conversation this week
+
+Good day counsels:
+
+I thank you for your consideration in this matter. I cannot waive the issue of service of the subpoenas, nor can I disclose my client's location to anyone at this time. In the interest of resolving this issue, however, I am willing to collect and provide the documents/items on the attached list. As you know, there are rather broad protective orders in the non-VI litigation which preclude even me from accessing most of the information in those cases. I have determined that I can provide the items on the attached list without running afoul of those protective orders. If you are amenable to resolving the subpoenas in this manner please confirm that in writing (perhaps we should draft a short agreement to that effect) and I will tolled and produce this information to you in short order.
+
+If you would like to discuss this matter further, please let me know.
+
+Dave
+
+![](_page_41_Picture_9.jpeg)
+
+David J. Cattie, Esq. I Attorney & Counselor at Law
+
+I The Cattie Law Firm, P.C.
+
+tel: 340.775.1200/ fax.: 800.878.5237
+
+I e-mail: david.cattiePcattie-law.com
+
+I web: www.cattie-law.com
+
+I address: 1710 Kongens Gade, St. - V.1. 00802
+
+# EXHIBIT H
+
+From: Linda Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 4:01 PM To: david.cattie@cattie-law.com Cc: 'Ariel= 1; Scott, Carmen; 'Carol= Subject: RE: EXTERNAL-RE: f/u on our conversation this week
+
+David:
+
+Apologies for the slow response, and thank you for reaching out.
+
+First, my reading of the protective order, as with most protective orders, is that Ms. Maxwell can share any document that she produced or other discovery material that she designated confidential.
+
+Second, also per the protective order, Ms. Maxwell could seek the consent of opposing counsel to produce the materials produced by the opposing party.
+
+I suspect that would cover at least substantially all of the documents in that litigation. Please let me know if you disagree with my interpretation.
+
+In part, we focused on these litigation materials because we believe that they would not be burdensome to collect and produce. However, we also would be happy to discuss emails or other records that are relevant to the Government's investigation in Ms. Maxwell's custody and control that could be produced outside of the protective order.
+
+Please let me know if you would like to discuss.
+
+Best, Linda
+
+Linda= I Attorney at Law I Motley Rice LLC 401 9th St. NW, Suite 1001 1 Washington, DC 20004 o. 202.386.9626 x5626 I f. 202.386.9622 I Isinger@motleyrice.com
+
+# EXHIBIT I
+
+UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \*\*\*\*\*GIGO SUBPOENA\*\*\*\*\* DUCES TECUM
+
+SUBPOENA FOR: RECORDS CASE ST-20-CV-014
+
+#### IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
+
+TO: Ghislaine Maxwell do David J. Cattle, Esq. I710a:ens Cade St. V.I., 00802
+
+# ATTN: David J. Cattie, Esq. other Virgin Islands statutes.
+
+Title 14 V.I.C. § 612(a) provides that "[wihenever any person is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, or to be engaging in, or about to engage in any conduct constituting a violation of any of the provisions of section 605r the Attorney General may, in his discretion, conduct an investigation of the conduct. The Attorney General is authorized before the commencement of and during any civil or criminal proceeding or action under this chapter to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, examine them under oath, or to require the production of any books, documents, records, writings, recordings or tangible things (hereinafter referred to as "documentary material") relevant or material to the investigation, for inspection, reproducing, and/or copying.
+
+Pursuant to Title 14 V.I.C. Section 612(a), YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to produce forthwith copies of the documents listed below in Exhibit A:
+
+Pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 012(c), the documents requested is in reference to an ongoing investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice of the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking Of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 133 et seq., as well as
+
+Personal appearance is not required to deliver the documents required by this subpoena; instead, please provide them to Special Agent Tarique Turnbull, Department ofJustice.
+
+PLACE: United States Virgin Islands DATE: July 2, 2020 Department of Justice 3438 Kronprindsens Gade G.E.R.S. Complex, 2i° Floor TIME: 3:00 p.m. St. , Vi 00802-57 12
+
+NOTE: This subpoena places you on notice of an investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice. You must maintain, and may not destroy, any documents, electronic records, video or other material relating to Jeffrey Epstein.
+
+Failure to produce the documents requested may cause the Attorney General to petition the Superior Court to compel you to produce the documents requested and to the issuance of a **warrant for your arrest**, under Title 14 V.I.C. § 612(k).
+
+DATED this 11{sup}`th` day of June, 2020.
+
+Ariel [REDACTED], Esquire  
+Chief of the Civil Division  
+V.I. Department of Justice  
+Office of the Attorney General  
+3438 Kronprindsens Gade  
+G.E.R.S. Complex, 2nd Floor  
+St. [REDACTED], VI 00802  
+(340) 774-5666 Ext. 10155
+
+**RETURN OF SERVICE**
+
+Received by Server on: \_\_\_\_\_ Place: \_\_\_\_\_
+
+Served on (Name): \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ At: \_\_\_\_\_
+
+Served by: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_
+
+**DECLARATION OF SERVER**
+
+I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE United States of America and the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Services Statement is true and correct.
+
+Executed on: \_\_\_\_\_ By: \_\_\_\_\_
+
+# EXHIBIT J
+
+From: david.cattie@cattie-law.com Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 2:00 PM To: Linda Cc: 'Ariel I; Scott, Carmen; 'Carol Subject: RE: EXTERNAL-RE: f/u on our conversation this week Attachments: 2020 06 11 Subpoena Duces Tecum to Ghislaine Maxwell.pdf
+
+Good day:
+
+Please note that I have previously advised you that I am not authorized to accept service on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. Today (while I was actually on a Zoom call with Attorney-), the Attorney General's Office attempted to complete service of a CICO Subpoena (attached) through me. I advised the office that I was not authorized to accept service on her behalf. Also, please note that while the subpoena demands documents attached as Exhibit "A", there is no such exhibit attached thereto.
+
+David Cattie
+
+![](_page_48_Picture_4.jpeg)
+
+David J. Cattie, Esq. I Attorney & Counselor at Law
+
+I The Cattie Law Firm, P.C.
+
+I tel: 340.775.1200/ fax.: 800.878.5237
+
+I e-mail: david.cattieRcattie-law.com
+
+I web: www.cattie-law.com
+
+I address: tyto Kongens Gade, St. V.I. oo8oz
+
+# EXHIBIT K
+
+#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+JANE DOE 43
+
+Plaintiff No. 17 Civ. 00616 (JGK)
+
+v.
+
+JEFFREY EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, LESLEY GROFF and NATALYA
+
+Defendants.
+
+#### PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION TO APPROVE ALTERNATE SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(e)(1)
+
+Plaintiff, , by and through her undersigned counsel and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) and the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 308(5) files this Renewed Motion to Approve Alternative Service and for grounds thereof states:
+
+As this Court is aware, Defendant Maxwell is also a defendant in another action in the Southern District of New York, v. Maxwell, Case No. 15-cv-07433 RWS. In that action, Maxwell is represented by counsel who appeared before that Court on her behalf as recently as November 8, 2017. Despite that fact, Maxwell will apparently not authorize her counsel to accept service of the complaint in this case. Indeed, Maxwell's counsel has gone so far as to hire their own separate legal counsel to argue to this Court that they should not have to accept service in this case. Yet in this very case, Maxwell has already actively participated, including having counsel make a request for additional time to serve her answer and attempting to impose
+
+{sup}`&#`x27; Plaintiff has decided to reveal her identity in connection with this matter and has filed a Notice to Change Case Caption.
+
+restrictions on the case of discovery materials. See DE 69 and November 23, 2017 Letter to Judge Koeltl, Exhibit D.
+
+While this Court originally granted Plaintiff Motion for Alternate Service (DE 57), Maxwell's counsel sought reconsideration of that Order on October 30, 2017. This Court held a hearing on November 28, 2017 and issued an Order on November 30, 2017 instructing to again attempt service on Defendant Maxwell on or before January 5, 2018: "By that date, the plaintiff will file either proof of service or a renewed application to the alternate service." DE 90. As directed, has made the following attempts to effectuate service on Maxwell:
+
+- provided Maxwell's counsel of record in the v. Maxwell case a copy of the summons and complaint;
+- emailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the following email address which is publicly associated with Maxwell. panax@ellmax.com. See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit I, December 4, 2017 E-mail;
+- retained, at significant expense, a private investigation firm to attempt to effectuate service at locations associated with Maxwell in New York and New Jersey, including the following addresses:
+  - I. 116 E. 65th Street, New York, NY 10065;
+  - 2. 457 Madison Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10022; and
+  - 3. 55 Monterey Avenue, Teaneck, NJ 07666.
+
+As detailed in the affidavit of Investigator Douglas Mercer (See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 2), at one location, it was clear that individuals were present in the home but were refusing to answer the door and accept service;
+
+- conducted a public record search of the London Townhome that was identified in Epstein's Phone Directory as being associated with Defendant Maxwell: 44 Kinnerton Street, London. The UK government record demonstrates that title to the property was changed on March 17, 2016 to Square Properties Limited and is no longer owned by Defendant Maxwell rendering attempts at service in London futile. See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 3, Summary of Title NGL948023; and
+
+- Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is also identified as the founder of the TerraMar Project on its websitc. The organization has a New York address for its headquarters at 326 E. 65111Street #326, New York, New York 10065. The email address identified with the organization is hellogtheterramarproject.org. On January 4, 2018, we served a copy of the summons and complaint to the following potential email addresses:
+
+- I. gmaxwell(a.theterramaroroject.org;
+- 2. maxwellggtheterramarproject.org;
+- 3. ghislaine(rr)theterramaroroiect.org;
+- 4. gmax(t4theterramarproject.org;
+- 5. maxwell(a),theterramaroroioct.org; and
+- 6. ghislaine.maxwell@theterramarproiect.org.
+
+See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 4. The only email address which received a delivery failure message was maxwell@theterramarproiect.org.
+
+Accordingly, having made renewed — and unsuccessful efforts — to serve Maxwell through conventional means, now renews her request for alternative service as such means as the Court respectfully suggests that, as the Court allowed in its previous order, that service of the complaints on current legal counsel representing her in a related matter before this Court and other publicly identified email accounts be permitted as a means of alternative service.
+
+#### MEMORANDUM OF LAW
+
+Service of a Complaint should not be a game of cat and mouse particularly where the defendant is represented by counsel in a matter pending in the same district. See Carillo v. Hagerty, No. 3:05CV1417 (MRK), 2006 WL 2165679, at \*1 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006) (court
+
+finding defendant should not benefit from service gamesmanship reasoning that: "service of process is not intended to be a game of hide and seek or cat and mouse.").
+
+Based on the exhaustion of the other methods of service delineated above, moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), for an order permitting service by an alternative method. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) provides that service upon a party may be effected by "following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made." Accordingly, Defendant Maxwell may be served pursuant to CPLR § 308, which provides several methods by which service upon a natural person may be effectuated, including personal service; service by "delivering the summons ... to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served" and then mailing the summons to the individual's "last know residence;" or service by "affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be served" and then "mailing the summons to such person at his or her last known residence" or to his or her place of business - so called "nail and mail" service. CPLR §§ 308(1), (2) & (4).
+
+If service under CPLR §§ 308(1), (2) & (4) is impracticable, CPLR § 308(5) permits service "in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs." The determination of whether service is impracticable "depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case." Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. HGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3866 (DLC), 1999 WL 1021087, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999). Although the plaintiff must show impracticability of service, there is no requirement of "proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute." Id. "When usual methods of service prove impracticable, service
+
+that is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested party of the pendency of the action will suffice."D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026 (PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004).
+
+New York Courts consistently affirm their right to direct or approve alternative methods of service where regular service has been deemed "impracticable." For example, in Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 498, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 168 (1968), the New York Court of Appeals held that where a plaintiff could not follow the prescribed methods of service as set forth in § 308, Courts are "given the discretion to fashion other means adapted to the particular facts of the case before it" pursuant to § 308(5) (referred to in Dobkin as § 308(4), the predecessor to § 308(5)). Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that a Court's discretion to fashion such methods of service "must be broad" if the statute is to be "meaningful." Id. at 499, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
+
+There is no doubt that Defendant Maxwell has had actual notice and knowledge of the claims asserted in this Complaint. has tried multiple alternative avenues to serve Maxwell, including (1) sending the documents to her current counsel in another matter, (2) investigating and attempting service at multiple locations known to be associated with Defendant Maxwell, and (3) emailing the documents to Defendant Maxwell's publicly available email address. As a result, this Court should deem the service methods attempted to be sufficient and grant the Motion for Alternate Service. See Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7311 (LTS), 2003 WL21073951, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003) (authorizing alternative service under § 308(5) when Plaintiff was unable to determine Defendant's residence or place of business after "extensive Internet searches" and inquires with Defendant's former clients); Javier H. v. -Botello, 217 F.R.D. 308, 309 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (service by publication authorized when individual Defendant was a fugitive from the criminal justice system; was likely aware of
+
+the pending civil action through his relatives, who were co-Defendants; and when the Court determined that Defendant would likely read a newspaper that was circulated in the region of his last known residence); see also Inc., 1999 WL 1021087, at \*1 (service by publication in USA Today authorized when Defendant's whereabouts were unknown, efforts to locate his home or business address by searching computer databases failed, and there existed no record that he designated an agent for service); D.R.L. Inc., 2004 WL 1237511, at •2 (after Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendant through a process server and searched databases for his address, Court authorized service by sending process by certified mail to Defendant's last known address; by publishing the action in a local newspaper; and by emailing it to Plaintiffs last known email address).
+
+WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for this Court to enter an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternative Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)( I) and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 308(5) upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and finding that the service efforts made by Plaintiff's counsel herein are sufficient. Dated: January 5, 2018
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
+
+Is/ Sigrid McCawley
+
+Sigrid S. McCawley (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
+
+Meredith (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
+
+Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
+
+401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
+
+Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
+
+Tel: (954) 356-0011
+
+J. , Esq.
+
+Stanley Pottinger, Esq.
+
+425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
+
+Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
+
+Tel: (954) 524-2820 Fax: (954) 524-2822
+
+Paul G. Cassell (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) S.J. Quinney College of Law University of Utah 383 University St. Salt Lake City, UT 84112 (801) 585-52022
+
+{sup}`2` This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation.
+
+#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via transmission of the Electronic Court Filing System generated by CM/ECF.
+
+Kimo S. Peluso Sher Tremonte, LLP 90Broad Street, 23rd Floor New York, NY 10004 knelusoashertremonte.com Counsel for Haddon, P.C.
+
+ct
+
+Laura A. Menninger, Esq. Jeffrey Pagliuca. Es . HADDON, & P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 Email: ImenninecrAlunflaw.com inagliuczahmflaw.com
+
+John E. Stephenson, Jr. Jonathan D. Parente ALSTON & BIRD LLP 1201 West Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30309 John.stenhensortab.alston.com Jonathan.parente@alston.com Alexander S. Lorenzo ALSTON & BIRD LLP 90 Park Avenue Ncw York, NY 10016 alexander.Iorenzo rialston.com Counsel for Defendant
+
+Michael Justin Michael A. Keotirm STEPTOE & LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 mmillerabstepkg•com ichue.stentoe.com Counsel for Defendants, Jeffrey Epstein and Lesley Groff
+
+> Is Sigrid McCawlev Sigrid McCawley
+
+# EXHIBIT L
+
+2018 WL 637421
+
+Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. New York.
+
+, Plaintiff,
+
+Jeffrey EPSTEIN, et al., Defendants.
+
+17-cv-616 (JGK)
+
+Signed 01/30/2018
+
+#### Attorneys and Law Firms
+
+Justin Y.K. Michael Campion , Steptoc & LLR Alexander Seton Lorenzo. Alston & Bird, I.I.P, New York, NY, Laura A. Menninger, I laddon. and P.C.. Denver, CO. John E. Stephenson. Jr.. Alston & Bird 1.1.P, Atlanta, GA. for Defendants.
+
+#### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
+
+John (1 Koeltl, United States District Judge
+
+\*1 The plaintiff, I , has moved the Court to approve alternative service on the defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and to find that service has been effected. The plaintiff asserts that, despite diligent measures. she has been unable to serve Maxwell personally. The plaintiff argues, however, that she has taken reasonable measures to provide Maxwell with notice of the pending lawsuit and requests that this service should be deemed sufficient. Non-party Haddon & M. P.C. ("Haddon M"), Maxwell's counsel in another litigation pending in this Court. has refused to accept service on behalf of Maxwell and has objected to becoming a general agent of process for Maxwell, but has taken no position on the plaintiff's application to deem service effected through the email efforts that the plaintiff has already made. Neither Maxwell nor any representative of Maxwell has otherwise opposed the current motion.
+
+Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(eg 1) permits a plaintiff to serve a defendant by following the procedures set forth by state law in the state where the district court is located. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 308 sets forth available methods of service. Where service under §§ 308(1), (2). or (4)—which generally provide variants of personal service—is impracticable, § 308(5) provides that
+
+the Court may approve alternative service methods. Sc.e e.g,. Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Sec.. Inc., No. 02 cv-73 I I (LTSXAJP), 2003 WI. 21073951. at • I (S.D.N.Y. May 9. 2003). Service under § 308(5) requires a showing of impracticability of the other methods of service, but does not require a showing of due diligence. Isia
+
+The plaintiff has taken various steps in an effort to serve Maxwell personally—all to no avail. The plaintiff retained a private investigation firm to attempt to determine where Maxwell resides, and that firm attempted service at three physical addresses potentially associated with Maxwell. The plaintiff also emailed the summons and complaint to several email addresses that are publicly associated with Maxwell. only one of which has been returned as undelivered. The plaintiff has also provided a copy of the summons and complaint to I laddon who currently represents Maxwell in another litigation pending in this district.
+
+Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has demonstrated impracticability, because she has made numerous efforts to obtain information about the defendant's current residence and general contact infonnation to effectuate personal service but has been unable to locate Maxwell. Sec, es,. S.E.C. v. Nnebc. No. 01-cv-5247 (KMW), 2003 WL 402377. at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff has demonstrated that service on Maxwell is impracticable and thus grants the motion for alternative service.
+
+\*2 Further, the steps already taken by the plaintiff to serve Maxwell are "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances. to apprise [her] of the pendency of the action and afford [her] an opportunity to present [heir objections." and the Court therefore deems service of the summons and complaint to be complete as to defendant Maxwell. See. e.g . Doria v. Love. No. 15-CV-3271 (LGS). 2015 WL 4039849, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. July I, 2015) (holding that service upon the defendant's counsel in an unrelated matter was sufficient); Rampersad, 2003 WL 21073951, at • 1.
+
+Finally, Haddon objection to becoming a general agent of process for Maxwell is unfounded. The Court's ruling that service by email and personal delivery to Haddon has been reasonably calculated to provide Maxwell with notice of this lawsuit and an opportunity to respond does not turn Haddon into a general agent for Maxwell. Indeed. this order does not even require Haddon to accept service on behalf of Maxwell. but rather finds that service on Haddon is likely to provide notice of the lawsuit to Maxwell, given that Haddon is presumably in contact with Maxwell with regards to their representation of her in the other pending matter. Sec Bozza. 2015 WL 4039849, at •2.
+
+Accordingly. the motion for alternative service is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion pending at Docket Number 97. Defendant Maxwell's time to move
+
+or answer is twenty-one days from the date of this order. If Maxwell chooses not to appear, the plaintiff may pursue whatever remedies are available, including the entry• of a default judgment.
+
+SO ORDERED.
+
+All Citations
+
+Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2018 WL 637421
+
+#### Footnotes
+
+1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the case caption to name No. 96. as the plaintiff. See Docket
+
+End of Docuniont
+
+tgr 2020 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822177/EFTA02822177.md

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+# FILED
+
+July 12,
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+\*St\*\* \*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+
+PLAINTIFF,
+
+V.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+DEFENDANTS.
+
+## GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS' MOTION TO INTERVENE
+
+The Government of the United States Virgin Islands ("Government"), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby moves for an order permitting the Government to intervene in this action as of right pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or else by leave pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Government states in support of its motion as follows.
+
+## PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") filed this action seeking indemnification for and advancement of expenses incurred by reason of her prior employment relationship with decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein and his affiliated businesses "in connection with any threatened, pending, or completed suit, proceeding, or investigation relating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims." Complaint ¶ I. Since the filing of this action, Maxwell has been arrested by
+
+federal authorities on charges that she assisted, facilitated, and participated in Epstein's sexual abuse of underage girls.
+
+The Government has two distinct but closely related interests that support intervention in this action. First, the Government has a pending action in the Virgin Islands against Defendants herein—the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, and Richard D. Kahn—and others under the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (CICO), 14 V.I.C. §§ 601 et seq. See Ex. A (Gov't of the U.S. Virgin Islands v. Indyke et al., No. ST-20-CV-14 (First Amended Complaint, filed 2/5/20)) ("FAC"). The Government alleges that Defendants committed and conspired to commit criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse activity. The Government's primary interest for intervention is to ensure that the Epstein Estate's assets are not wrongfully dissipated by Maxwell's suspect claims for indemnification and "advancement" of legal expenses, and instead are preserved to satisfy the CICO judgment, which seeks forfeiture, divestiture, disgorgement, and payment of maximum civil penalties and damages by the Epstein Estate.
+
+Second, the Government also is investigating Maxwell's participation in Epstein's criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct pursuant to its authority under CICO, 14 V.I.C. § 612, to investigate reasonably suspected criminal activity. The Government has attempted to serve a CICO Subpoena Duces Tecum on Maxwell stating that:
+
+Pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 612(c), the documentation requested is in reference to an ongoing investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice of the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 133 and 1624, as well as other Virgin Islands statutes.
+
+Ex. B (Government's CICO Subpoena Duces Tecum to Ghislaine Maxwell, dated March 19, 2020) at 1. Maxwell resisted and evaded service of the subpoena during the three and a half
+
+months after its issuance. The Government's second intervention interest thus is to ensure that Maxwell is compelled to respond to its investigatory subpoena through this action in which she is a party and has consented to the Court's jurisdiction.
+
+The Government's need to intervene is further fueled by Maxwell's inappropriate use of the Virgin Islands courts to seek payment and reimbursement from the Epstein criminal enterprise, while she circumvents the service of process of Government subpoenas related to her involvement in that criminal enterprise.
+
+Based upon either or both of the Government's interests with respect to all parties in this action and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court should grant the Government intervention as of right under V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or else by leave under V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
+
+# STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO INTERVENTION
+
+## A. Maxwell's Arrest on Federal Criminal Sex-Trafficking Charges Related to Her Involvement with Epstein's Conduct.
+
+On July 2, 2020, federal authorities arrested Ms. Maxwell on six federal criminal charges related to her involvement with Epstein's alleged sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct. See Ex. C (Indictment, United States of America v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 20-CR-330 (S.D.N.Y.)).
+
+Maxwell is charged with Conspiracy to Entice Minors to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts (Count One), Enticement of a Minor to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts (Count Two), Conspiracy to Transport Minors with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity (Count Three), and Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity (Count Four). Id. All of these charges stem from Maxwell's role "in the sexual exploitation and abuse of multiple minor girls by Jeffrey Epstein." Id.,111; see &soli 2 ("GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, and Jeffrey Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to Epstein's
+
+residences in different states, which MAXWELL knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse.").
+
+Maxwell also is charged with two counts of Perjury for giving false testimony concealing the foregoing conduct of both Epstein and herself. See id, Counts Five and Six.
+
+## B. The Government's CICO Investigation of Maxwell's Participation in the Epstein Enterprise.
+
+The Government is and has been actively investigating Maxwell's participation in the criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct of the Epstein Enterprise. See Ex. B (Government's CICO Subpoena) (seeking documentation "in reference to an ongoing investigation by the Virgin Islands Department of Justice of the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 133 and 1624, as well as other Virgin Islands statutes").
+
+Prior to Maxwell's arrest, the Government made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to serve its CICO subpoena on her. On March 24, 2020, the Government served the subpoena on Maxwell's counsel in this action, Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. See Ex. D (Certificate of service).
+
+On April 15, 2020, David J. Cattie, Esq. notified the Government that Ms. Maxwell had retained him in regard to the Government's subpoenas. See Ex. E (Cattie to email, 4/15/20). The subpoena was clearly received by Maxwell, and Attorney Cattie contacted the Government on her behalf to negotiate a possible resolution of the subpoena. Given that Attorney Cattie nonetheless raised concerns about service on Maxwell, the Government asked that Maxwell authorize him to accept service of the subpoena or disclose her whereabouts, so that it could serve her personally. See Ex. F (email from L. to D. Cattie, May 1, 2020). On May 12, 2020, almost two months after the Government's initial attempts at service, Mr. Cattie responded that he "cannot waive the issue of service of the subpoenas, nor can I disclose my client's location to anyone at this time." Ex. G (email from D. Cattie to L. May 12, 2020) (emphasis added).
+
+After Mr. Cattie refused to accept or waive service, the Government -- in good faith - continued to negotiate for release of the requested documents in lieu of enforcing the CICO Subpoena. See Ex. H (Email from L. to D. Cattie, May 28, 2020). Those negotiations also failed, and the Government attempted service of a second CICO Subpoena on Ms. Maxwell's counsel on June 11, 2020. See Ex. I (second subpoena).' Mr. Cattie once more stated that he was not "authorized" to accept service on her behalf. Ex. J (Email from D. Cattie to L. June 17, 2020). And again, Mr. Cattie did not offer to provide Maxwell's location to allow the Government to effectuate service. Id. To date, Maxwell has not acknowledged or responded to either of the Government's CICO Subpoenas.
+
+After Epstein's most recent arrest on July 8, 2019 and his death in prison on August 10, 2019, see Complaint, ¶ 23, and before her own arrest on July 2, 2020, Maxwell was in hiding. Numerous media outlets reported on her unknown whereabouts, including The Sun, the Washington Examiner, Vanity Fair, BBC, CNN, CNBC, the Telegraph, The Guardian, and Page Six.2 At the same time, her counsel was actively litigating in other Courts to keep shielded from public view thousands of pages of court records that would expose her involvement and
+
+I The second CICO Subpoena, see Ex. I is identical to the fast one served on March 24, 2020.
+
+{sup}`2` See, e.g., hups://wynv.vanityfair.coin/news/2019/11/hunt-for-jeffrey-epstein-alleged-enabler-ghislaine-maxwell; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/18/ghislaine-maxwell-prince-andrew-friend-jeffrey-epsteincontroversy-hiding; hups://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/decil 2/she-was-so-dangerous-where-in-the-worldis-the-notorious-ghislaine-maxwell; httpsJ/www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50927651; hilps://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/08/uk/who-is-ghislaine-maxwell-jeffrey-epstein-intl-gbdindex.html; https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/14/ghislaine-maxwell-location-unknown-jeffrey-epstein-accusers-eye-her.html; ht s://www.washin tonexarniner.com/news/ibi-investi atin -'effre -e stein-facilitator- hislaine-maxwell;
+
+prosecutors-announced/; up-for-epstein-lawsuit/. https://pagesix.com/2020/01/11/ghislaine-maxwell-flies-under-the-radar-while-lawyering-
+
+participation in Epstein's heinous crimes. See, e.g., v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y.).
+
+Maxwell also was actively litigating this action with counsel appearing on her behalf. See, e.g., Joint Motion to Stay proceedings, filed June 2, 2020 in Maxwell v. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, et al Case No.: ST-20-CV-15, in the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands.
+
+Even before Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, locating and serving Maxwell was impracticable. In 2017, a victim suing Maxwell in yet another matter related to Maxwell's participation in Epstein's sex trafficking scheme, attempted to serve Maxwell in a number of ways, including by providing Maxwell's attorneys at Haddon a copy of the summons and complaint, emailing a copy of the summons and complaint to gmax@ellmax.com, and attempting to effectuate service at three locations associated with Maxwell in New York and New Jersey. See Ex. K (Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein. et al., 17 Civ. 00616-JGK (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 97) at 2-3.
+
+Despite those attempts, was unable to personally serve Maxwell and filed a motion asking the court to approve alternative service. Id. On January 30, 2018, the Honorable John G. Koeltl of the Southern District of New York held that had demonstrated that serving Maxwell was impracticable under New York law and that providing copies of the summons and complaint to her counsel, was reasonably calculated to provide Maxwell with notice of the lawsuit given that they were presumably in contact with Maxwell. See Ex. L v. Epstein, No. 17-CV-616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018)).
+
+Maxwell thus has engaged in repeated instances of avoiding service of the type that the Government has encountered in its CICO investigation of her alleged criminal sex-trafficking conduct that also is at issue in this coverage action filed by none other than Maxwell herself.
+
+## C. The Government's CICO Acton Against Defendants the Epstein Estate, Indyke, and Kahn, and Others.
+
+The Government alleges in its CICO action against Defendants herein—the Epstein Estate, Indyke, and Kahn—that Epstein was a resident of the Virgin Islands and maintained a residence on Little St. James Island, which he owned, from 1998 until his death in prison in 2019. Ex. A (FAC) ¶ 5. In 2016, Mr. Epstein purchased a second island—Great St. James. Id. By this time, he was a registered sex offender, having been convicted in Florida of procuring a minor for prostitution. Id., ¶ 6.
+
+The Government alleges that Epstein for decades conducted an enterprise (the "Epstein Enterprise") whereby he used his web of businesses in the Virgin Islands to transport female victims, many of them children, to his privately-owned Little St. James Island, where they were sexually abused, injured, and held captive. Id ,¶1 40-41. Flight logs show that between 2001 and 2019, Defendants transported girls and young women to the Virgin Islands and then helicoptered them to Little St. James. ld.,1 46. Air traffic controller reports state that some victims appeared to be as young as 11 years old. Id., ¶ 51. Epstein and his associates lured these girls and young women to his island with promises of modeling and other career opportunities. Id.,1149. Once they arrived, they were sexually abused, exploited, and held captive. Id.
+
+Epstein's privately-owned islands in the Virgin Islands were essential to the sextrafficking enterprise. Little St. James is a secluded, private island, nearly two miles off-shore from St. with no other residents. Id., ¶ 66. It is accessible only by private boat or helicopter, with no public or commercial transportation servicing the island. Id. When two of the victims, one age 15, attempted to escape from Little St. James, Epstein was able to organize search parties, locate them, return them to his house, and then confiscate the 15-year old girl's passport to hinder her ability to escape again. Id., ¶¶ 57-58.
+
+The Government alleges that Epstein and the CICO Defendants violated CICO by committing and conspiring to commit criminal human trafficking offenses based upon the foregoing conduct. See id., ¶¶ 115-170 (Counts 1-VIII). The Government further alleges that they violated CICO by committing and conspiring to commit various child-abuse, neglect, rape, unlawful-sexual-contact, prostitution, and sex-offender-registry-related offenses based upon the foregoing sexual-abuse conduct. See 171-258 (Counts IX-XIX). The Government also alleges that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to conceal the unlawful sexual abuse alleged. See id.,111281-287 (Count XXII).
+
+The Government is seeking civil penalties for each violation of law, treble damages, and compensatory and punitive damages for civil conspiracy. Id., Prayer for Relief ¶11J-L, O. The Government also seeks equitable relief, including but not limited to disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, as warranted pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 608(c)(4), to protect the rights of victims and innocent persons in the interest of justice and consistent with CICO's purposes. Id.. Prayer for Relief¶¶ N, P. The Government further seeks forfeiture and divestiture in favor of the Government as to all CIC Defendants' interests in any real and personal property in the Virgin Islands used to facilitate or further the goals of the criminal Epstein Enterprise, including but not limited to Little St. James and Great St. James Islands, and in any proceeds or funds obtained by them during the course of the criminal Epstein Enterprise. Id., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ D-F.
+
+# ARGUMENT
+
+## A. Legal Standards
+
+The Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a person to intervene as of right in a pending action as follows:
+
+On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
+
+(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
+
+V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
+
+The civil rules also provide for a person to intervene by permission of the court in a pending action as follows:
+
+On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
+
+(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.
+
+V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
+
+"The purpose of the rule governing intervention is to enable one not named as a party who has a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the litigation to protect himself from an action that might be detrimental to him." Hendricks v. Clyne, No. ST-16-cv-147, 2019 WL 918607, at "1 (V.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2019).
+
+## B. The Government Satisfies Rule 24(a)'s Requirements to Intervene of Riaht.
+
+A party seeking to intervene as of right must establish three elements: "(1) a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the pending litigation, (2) a substantial risk that the disposition of the litigation will impair the interest, and (3) the existing parties do not adequately protect that interest." Id. The Government satisfies all of these requirements.
+
+#### 1. The Government Has Sufficient Interests in the Subject Matter of this Action.
+
+The Government has two distinct but related interests in the subject matter of this action-- Maxwell's claim against the Epstein Estate for indemnification and "advancement" of legal
+
+expenses for any suit involving her relationship with Epstein and his affiliated businesses.
+
+Complaint ¶ 1; see also id., ¶¶ 17-19 (Epstein indemnified and advanced Maxwell's costs for suits and investigations "relating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims."). Either or both of the Government's interests is sufficient for its intervention as of right.
+
+First, the Government has an interest as a litigant against Defendants to ensure that the Epstein Estate's assets are preserved to satisfy the judgment it seeks on its CICO claims. The Government is seeking an order requiring forfeiture, divestiture, disgorgement, and payment of maximum civil penalties and damages. See Ex. B (CICO FAC), Prayer for Relief¶¶ D-P. Maxwell's claims in this action threaten the Government's litigation interests by seeking to wrongfully dissipate the Epstein Estate's assets on a joint tortfeasor's undocumented and otherwise suspect claim of entitlement to indemnification and "advancement" of legal expenses for criminal or civil actions addressing her involvement in Epstein's sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct.
+
+Numerous federal courts applying the identically worded Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) have held that a tort claimant has a sufficiently developed interest to intervene as of right in a coveragerelated action involving the tort defendant. In Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1991), the appeals court reversed denial of intervention as of right by class action plaintiffs in a separate declaratory judgment action by the insurer of the class action defendant seeking to disavow coverage. See id. at 260. The appeals court addressed the proposed intervenors' interest, which was contingent since they had not obtained a judgment at the time their intervention was denied, and, after weighing the relevant arguments, held that "the Teague Intervenors stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the district court judgment on [the insurer's] complaint" and that this "interest in the subject matter of this litigation is a significantly protectable interest."
+
+Id.; see also Security Ins. Co. v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995) (permitting tort claimant to intervene in insurer's declaratory judgment action against tort defendant).
+
+Based on the Fourth Circuit's Teague decision, a federal district court permitted sexabuse tort claimants to intervene in an action brought by the tort defendant seeking a declaration as to coverage by an insurer. See v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 11-1258, 2011 WL 3241452, at \*I (D. Md. July 28, 2011). Following Teague, the court held that the sex-abuse tort claimants had a sufficiently protected interest to intervene as of right." See id. at •2 ("Plainly, it is of great importance to the tort plaintiffs to persuade this Court that Fire[man]'s Fund is obligated to indemnify If this Court ultimately determines that Fireman's Fund is not required to indemnify , the Does will only be able to satisfy any judgment they obtain against from his assets, rather than from the resources of the insurer.").
+
+The only difference between the Government's position here and the tort claimant intervenors' positions in Teague and is that here the CICO Defendants are in the role of potential insurer. In Maxwell's suit against the Epstein estate, the Estate's assets are similar to those of an insurer, as both the Government and Maxwell are seeking recovery from the same Estate proceeds, which Maxwell is attempting to use as insurance. Thus, the Government's interest in ensuring the availability of hinds to satisfy its own judgment would be threatened here not by the denial of coverage (as in Teague), but by the provision of coverage using the Estate's assets to indemnify Maxwell. But this is a distinction without a difference, as the interest itself is the same—ensuring the availability of Estate funds to satisfy the Government's potential
+
+judgment against a possible co-conspirator in the CICO enterprise. This interest by itself supports intervention.3
+
+Second, the Government also has an interest as a potential litigant authorized by statute to investigate Maxwell's involvement in the same criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct that is the subject of the CICO action against the Epstein Estate, Indyke, and Kahn. Under CICO, "[w]henever any person is reasonably suspected to have engaged in . . . any conduct constituting a violation of any of the provisions of [14 V.I.C. § 605] the Attorney General may, in [her] discretion, conduct an investigation of the conduct." 14 V.I.C. § 6I2(a). The Attorney General is expressly authorized "before the commencement of and during any civil or criminal proceeding or action under this chapter to subpoena witnesses . . . or to require the production of any books, documents, records, writings, recordings or tangible things . . . relevant or material to the investigation . ..." Id.
+
+Pursuant to this express statutory authority, the Attorney General is and has been investigating Maxwell's involvement with Epstein's criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct in anticipation of a potential action against her. See Ex. B (CICO Subpoena) (describing investigation of "the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates"); see also 14 V.I.C. § 612(a) ("The Attorney General is authorized before the commencement of and during any civil or criminal proceeding or action under this chapter to subpoena witnesses . . . or to require the production of any ... documents . . . relevant or material to the investigation ...."). Thus, to the extent the
+
+{sup}`3` Although the Government at present has Criminal Activity Liens on certain Estate Assets pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610, limitations on the scope of pre-trial restraints mean that the Liens do not and cannot ensure the availability of sufficient funds to satisfy a judgment.
+
+Government may intervene as of right to assert its interest in its statutory enforcement action, it also may do so to assert its statutory investigative interest related to much the same conduct.
+
+In sum, the Government has both active litigation interests and statutorily authorized investigatory interests with respect to the parties on both sides of this action. Either or both of these interests in the conduct and outcome of this action is sufficient for the Government to intervene of right under Rule 24(a).
+
+# 2. The Government's Interests Will Be Impaired Absent Intervention.
+
+There is considerable risk bordering on near certainty that the disposition of this action will impair the Government's litigation and/or investigatory interests if the Court denies intervention. In Teague, supra, the Fourth Circuit held that the tort-claimant intervenors demonstrated impairment of their interest based upon the possibility of the tort defendant's loss of coverage. See 931 F.2d at 261 ("We also find that the Teague Intervenors' ability to protect their interest would be impaired or impeded by disposition of ERC's action" as they would have to satisfy their judgment from other assets of the insureds and the existence and amount of such assets are questionable.").
+
+Here, there is far greater likelihood that the Government's interests will be impaired if it is denied intervention. As to its litigation interest, if Maxwell succeeds on her undocumented and otherwise suspect claim against the Epstein Estate for indemnification and "advancement" of legal expenses, this will diminish the Estate's available funds to satisfy the judgment the Government seeks against it in the CICO action. This potential impairment due to a loss of funds available to the tort defendant is identical to that found by the U.S. Court of Appeals to support intervention as of right in Teague.
+
+As to its separate but related investigatory interest against Maxwell, the Government has demonstrated that she repeatedly and deliberately evaded service of its CICO subpoena prior to her arrest. See supra, Preliminary Statement and Factual Background § B. She also has resisted service in other civil actions brought by Epstein's and her victims. By virtue of her lawsuit, Maxwell has already subjected herself to the jurisdiction of this Court. It would be supremely inequitable to allow Maxwell to make use of the courts of the Virgin Islands to assert her affirmative claims for indemnification for her involvement in the Epstein criminal enterprise, and yet still avoid complying with a lawful subpoena authorized by the laws of the Virgin Islands as part of an investigation into this very criminal conduct. If the Government cannot intervene in this action that she initiated, Maxwell may refuse to comply with the Government's subpoena, yet still proceed in her separate action and leave the Government with little to no recourse. As a result, the Government's investigatory and enforcement interests will be irreparably impaired.
+
+For either or both of these reasons, the Court should find that the Government's interests will likely be impaired if intervention is denied, and for this reason too the Government may intervene of right under Rule 24(a).
+
+#### 3. The Epstein Estate Cannot Adequately Represent the Government's Interests.
+
+Finally, there is no serious question but that the Government's enforcement and investigatory interests under CICO are not adequately represented by the current parties to this case— Ghislaine Maxwell, the Epstein Estate, and its Co-Executors.
+
+The Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors are defendants in the Government's existing CICO action involving Epstein's and his associates' criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct, and show no inclination to be anything but adversarial to the Government's interests. They are refusing to comply with discovery, and even are seeking to prevent the Government
+
+from issuing subpoenas to key fact witnesses, such as the house managers for Little St. James, where Epstein (and likely Maxwell) sexually abused girls and women in the Virgin Islands. See Gov't of the U.S. Virgin Islands v. Indyke et al., No. ST-20-CV-I4, Co-Executors' Opp. to Government's Motions for Issuance of Letters Rogatory (filed 6/17/20).
+
+Although the Epstein Estate nominally has an interest in preserving its own funds as against Maxwell's claim for indemnification, Maxwell's evident involvement in Epstein's alleged criminal conduct makes her a critical fact witness with whom the Estate is very likely to try to cooperate. Cf. Teague, 931 F.2d at 262 ("[T]here is a significant chance that [the tort defendants] might be less vigorous than the Teague Intervenors in defending their claim to be insureds under the ERC policy."). That Maxwell and the Epstein Estate are not truly adversarial is demonstrated by the fact that they jointly moved to stay the Estate's pending motion to dismiss until a date when its primary grounds for dismissal (the one-year time bar from the granting of letters of administration under 15 V.I.C. § 606(a)) will no longer apply. See Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings (filed 6/1/20).
+
+Maxwell likewise has evaded and refused to accept service of the Government's CICO subpoena for months before she was arrested by federal authorities on charges identical to those under investigation. She therefore is demonstrably adverse to the Government with respect to both the availability of the Epstein Estate's funds and conduct of the Government's investigation.
+
+The Government therefore has no potential ally in this action between likely tortfeasors as to its interests in both uncovering and obtaining redress for the criminal conduct of Epstein, Maxwell, and/or their associates. The conduct of both parties—Maxwell and the Epstein Estate—demonstrates clearly that both have a far stronger interest in obstructing the Government's investigation and enforcement than they do in any claims as between themselves.
+
+For all of these reasons, the Court should grant the Government intervention as of right under Rule 24(a).
+
+## C. The Government Also Satisfies Rule 24(b)'s Requirements for Permissive Intervention.
+
+"Rule 24(b) applies a substantially more relaxed standard for permissive intervention, since the proposed intervenor need not demonstrate the sort of interest required for intervention as of right." Meyers v. No. ST-I2-cv-394, 2017 WL 10636962, at \*3 (V.I. Super. Ct. April 24, 2017). The proposed intervenor need only demonstrate that the proposed intervention is timely and that the intervenor's claim shares a common question of law or fact with the claims already in the case. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra, 2019 WL 918607, at \*1. The Government readily satisfies both of these requirements.
+
+First, the Government's motion to intervene is timely. The Court assesses timeliness based on the length of delay in seeking intervention, the prejudicial impact of delay on existing parties, prejudice to the would-be intervenor if intervention is denied, and other factors affecting fairness. Id. Here, all of these factors favor permitting the Government to intervene. Maxwell filed this action less than four months ago, on March 12, 2020. During this time, Defendants have not yet answered the Complaint. Instead, they filed a motion to dismiss and shortly thereafter, in lieu of Maxwell opposing the Estate's motion, the Estate and Maxwell moved jointly to stay the action until September 7, 2020. See Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings (filed 6/1/20). The Government's intervention thus will not disrupt or slow down active litigation.
+
+By contrast, denial of intervention would be highly prejudicial to the Government for the reasons discussed above. First, the Government's CICO claims against Defendants, its potential claims against Maxwell, and Maxwell's claims against the Defendants all present a common question of law or fact—Who is liable to pay a judgment on the Government's CICO claims
+
+against Defendants and/or Maxwell for their involvement in or connection to the rape, abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Epstein and his associates?
+
+In Security Ins. Co., supra, the Seventh Circuit addressed federal Rule 24(b)'s identical requirement that there be a "common question of law or fact," and found that it was "clearly met in this case" involving intervention by a tort claimant in the tort defendant's coverage action.
+
+See 69 F.3d 1381; cf. also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l REO Mgmt., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Thus, while the insurance contract may not be an issue in the underlying case in Superior Court, the factual similarities between the two cases are enough to establish a common question of fact. Specifically, both the present case and the underlying case arise from alleged carbon monoxide emissions from a furnace in the defendant's building that began on February 23, 1995. In addition, neither case can be decided without determining the source of the applicant's injuries. Accordingly, for purposes of Rule 24(b), the court finds a common question of fact in the present lawsuit and the underlying lawsuit in Superior Court.").
+
+Second, if Maxwell succeeds on her undocumented and suspect claims for indemnification by the Epstein Estate, that will threaten the availability of Estate funds to satisfy the Government's potential judgment in its CICO action. Second, since Maxwell has repeatedly and deliberately evaded service of the Government's investigatory subpoena during the past four months, as she has resisted service in other civil actions brought by Epstein's and her victims, this action is her only known connection to the Virgin Islands through which the Government can enforce its investigatory subpoena against her. Denial of intervention therefore would also harm the Government's investigatory and enforcement interests. For each of these reasons, the Court should hold that the Government's motion is timely filed.
+
+Since the Government's motion is timely and its actual and potential CICO claims concerning Epstein's sex-trafficking enterprise and Maxwell's involvement in it present common questions of law and/or fact to those presented in this action for coverage as to those claims, the Court should grant the Government's motion to intervene and deem its CICO subpoena attached as Exhibit B to be served on Maxwell. This will allow the Government both to ensure its interest in preventing the dissipation of the Epstein Estate's assets and to enforce its subpoena and pursue potential and as appropriate independent claims against Maxwell. For either or both of these reasons, the Government may intervene by leave pursuant to Rule 24(b).
+
+## CONCLUSION
+
+For all of the reasons set forth, the Government's Motion to Intervene in this action should be granted. Respectfully submitted,
+
+> DENISE N. ESQUIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+
+Dated: July 10, 2020 By: s/Ariel M ARIEL M. ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. U.S. Vir in Islands 00802 Email: (340) 774-5666 ext. 10155
+
+#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the foregoing Motion to Intervene complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R. Civ. P. 6-1(e) and a true and correct copy of the Motion was served via regular mail, postage prepaid, with a courtesy copy sent by email to counsel of record on July 10, 2020 to:
+
+KYLE R. WALDNER, ES QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 41b Floor Miami, FL 33156 E-mail: kwaldner@qpwblaw.com & BOYER, P.A.
+
+DAVID CATTIE, ESQ. THE CATTLE LAW FIRM, P.C. 171aiens Gade St. , V.I., 00802 e-mail: david.cattie@cattie-law.com
+
+KROBLIN, ESQ. ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ., WILLIAM BLUM, ESQ. SHARI D'ANDRADE ES . KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate , Suite 101 St. V.I. 00802-3602 Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com aheymann@solblum.com wblum@solblum.com sdandrade@kellfer.com mwhalen@kellfer.com
+
+ANDREW TOMBACK McLaughlin & Stem, LLP 260 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 United States Email: ATomback®mclaughlinstem.com
+
+DANIEL WEINER MARC A. WEINSTEIN HUGHES HUBBARD & REID, LLP One Battery Park Plaza
+
+New York, NY 10004-1482
+
+United States
+
+Email: daniel.weiner®hugheshubbard.com
+
+marc.weinsteinathuv..heshubbard.com
+
+By: s/Ariel M.
+
+ARIEL M. ESQUIRE
+
+Assistant Attorney General
+
+Virgin Islands Department of Justice
+
+Office of the Attorney General
+
+34-38 Kron rindsens Gade
+
+St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
+
+Email:
+
+(340) 774-5666 ext. 10155

marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822177/EFTA02822177.receipt.json

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822197/EFTA02822197.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+## FILED
+
+July 30, 2020
+
+## TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS CLERK OF THE COURT DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+## STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
+
+IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED TO, by and between Plaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL ("Plaintiff") and proposed Intervenor, the GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS (the "Government"), by and through their respective undersigned attorneys, that Plaintiff shall have up to and including Monday, August 17, 2020 to respond to the Government's Motion to Intervene in the above-captioned action.
+
+Dated: July 30, 2020
+
+QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, & BOYER, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4'b Floor Miami, FL 33156 T: (340) 693-0230 F: (340) 693-0300
+
+By: /s/ Kyle R. Waldner Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@oowblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+DENISE N. M, ESQ. ATTORNEY GENERAL VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Proposed Intervenor 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. M, U.S. Virgin Islands 00802 T: (340) 774-5666
+
+By: /s/ Ariel M. Ariel M. Esq. ariel @doj.vi.gov V.I. Bar No.:
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via email and U.S. Mail this tlt day of July, 2020 to:
+
+Kroblin, Esq. KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. , V.I. 00802 ckroblin@kellfer.com
+
+Ariel M. =, Esq. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of the Attorney General 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. . U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
+
+Is/ Kyle R. Waldner
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@qpwblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822200/EFTA02822200.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+**FILED**
+
+August 03, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES  
+CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+District of St. [REDACTED] / St. John
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,  
+Plaintiff
+
+Case Number: ST-2020-CV-00155  
+Action: Debt
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN et al,  
+Defendant.
+
+NOTICE of ENTRY  
+of  
+(2)ORDERS
+
+To: KYLE R. WALDNER, ESQ. DENISE [REDACTED] ESQ.  
+
+Please take notice that on  
+a(n) \_\_\_\_\_  
+dated AUGUST 3, 2020 was/were entered  
+by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
+
+Dated: August 03, 2020
+
+Tamara Charles  
+Clerk of the Court
+
+By:
+
+Donna Donovan  
+Court Clerk Supervisor

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822201/EFTA02822201.md

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+## FILED
+
+August 03, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINli MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN g INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+## ORDER
+
+THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Joint Motion To Stay Proceedings between the parties hereto. The premises having been duly considered, it is hereby:
+
+ORDERED that the Joint Motion To Stay Proceedings is GRANTED; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to dismiss shall be due on or by September 7, 2020; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that a certified copy of this Order shall be directed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated: 41. 3 , {sup}`2020`
+
+ATTEST: TAM RA CHAR
+
+Clerk our( By: De uty Clerk
+
+JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
+
+OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822202/EFTA02822202.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+August 03, 2020
+
+CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS  
+DIVISION OF ST. [REDACTED] AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,  
+DARREN [REDACTED]. INDYKE, in his capacity as  
+EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY  
+E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his  
+capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE  
+OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a  
+New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+**ORDER**
+
+THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Stipulation for Extension of Time between  
+Plaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL and proposed Intervenor, the GOVERNMENT OF THE  
+UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS. The premises having been duly considered, it is hereby:
+
+ORDERED that the Stipulation is APPROVED; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have up to and including Monday, August 17, 2020 to  
+respond to the Government's Motion to Intervene in the above-captioned action; and it is further
+
+ORDERED that a certified copy of this Order shall be directed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated: Aug. 3, 2020
+
+ATTEST:  
+Clerk of the Court  
+By:
+
+Deputy Clerk
+
+*Hanna Maxwell*  
+JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT  
+OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
+
+*[Signature]*  
+8/3/2020

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822203/EFTA02822203.md

@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+# FILED
+
+September 08, 2020
+
+#### TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS CLERK OF THE COURT DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+## PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE
+
+Plaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL ("Plaintiff), by counsel, pursuant to V.I.R.Civ.P. 24, hereby opposes the Motion to Intervene' (the "Motion to Intervene") filed by nonparty, the Government of the United States Virgin Islands (the "Government").
+
+## L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+The Motion to Intervene must be denied because it is procedurally defective and the Government has no sufficient basis to intervene in this case. The Government seeks to intervene for two reasons. First, it vaguely seeks to "ensure that the Epstein Estate's assets are not wrongfully dissipated," without articulating how it proposes to do so. GVI Mtn. at 2. Second, it asks this Court to enforce its unserved criminal CICO Subpoenas to Plaintiff and, more generally, to investigate Plaintiff in order to establish a predicate for future criminal charges
+
+I The Government Motion to Intervene is cited herein by page number as "GVI Mm."
+
+against her. GVI Mtn. at 2-3. These grounds are meritless and do not provide a sufficient basis to intervene in this case.
+
+First, the Government failed to comply with Rule 24(c)'s requirement that its motion be accompanied "by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(c) (emphasis added). This failure alone disposes of the Government's motion.
+
+Even on its merits, the Government's motion is fatally flawed. The Government's contingent claim to the "Epstein Estate's assets" is not a sufficient interest for intervention. The Government ignores law from this jurisdiction that an interest contingent upon a favorable judgment in an underlying suit is insufficient to sustain intervention of right under Rule 24. Even if it were, such interest would not practically be impaired here since the Government has filed Criminal Activity Liens covering the Estate's assets.2
+
+Next, the Government's extraordinary and unprecedented request that it be allowed to commandeer this civil case to function as an ann of its criminal investigation of Plaintiff and lay the predicate for future criminal charges against her is flatly contrary to law and cannot justify intervention.. Intervention is not appropriate where the party seeking to intervene has other means to protect its interests. The Government, of course, is no ordinary would-be intervenor in a civil action between private parties. Here, the Government has a number of investigatory tools
+
+{sup}`2` In making its argument that intervention is necessary to prevent the dissipation of Estate assets, the Government repeatedly disparages Plaintiff's claim for indemnification as "undocumented and otherwise suspect." GVI Mtn. at 10, 13. The Government is in no place to assess the merits of Plaintiff's claims, nor is such an inquiry appropriate under Rule 24. Moreover, we note that certain of the Government's own claims in its Motion to Intervene and CICO complaint against the Estate seem ripped from the tabloid headlines from dubious sources like The Sun and Page Six, rather than being based on verified facts. See, e.g., GVI Mm. at 5 (citing, inter alia, The Sun and Page Six to support the suggestion that Plaintiff "has engaged in repeated instances of avoiding service").
+
+at its disposal to obtain any information it deems necessary, including the power to issue CICO subpoenas (which it has done) and compel compliance (which it has not attempted to do). The Government should not be allowed to bypass this process by intruding into this civil action so that it can use this Court to help enforce its criminal subpoenas, which have nothing whatsoever to do with the simple contract dispute over indemnification at issue in this case. The Government should likewise not be allowed to act beyond its already considerable statutory authority. The appropriate scope and manner of the Government's criminal investigation of a private, nonresident of the Virgin Islands is not a matter for this Court; rather, it a question that should be addressed by the courts having proper jurisdiction over the criminal investigation.
+
+In sum, the Government's purported interests do not fit anywhere in this case. Instead, it should continue to use the broad statutory powers it already has to protect its alleged interests. The Court should therefore deny the Government's motion with prejudice.
+
+## II. ARGUMENT
+
+### A. The Motion is Procedurally Defective Because the Government Failed to File a Proposed Pleading in Intervention in Compliance With Rule 24(c)
+
+Rule 24(c) requires that a motion to intervene "must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." V.I..R.Civ.P. 24(c) (emphasis added).; This identical provision under the federal rules is intended to ensure that parties receive advance notice of the claims that an intervenor plans to set forth if intervention is permitted. SEC v. Investors Sec. Leasing Corp., 610 F.2d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1979).
+
+{sup}`3` The Reporter's Note to the rule restates the mandatory nature of this requirement. See Reporter's Note to V.I.R.Civ.P. 24 ("Plhe intervention application must attach a copy of the pleading which the proposed intervening party would present.")
+
+The Court may deny a motion to intervene that is not accompanied by a proposed pleading in intervention. See, e.g., id. at 178 ("Because the requirements of [R]ule 24(c) were not complied with, the owners were not proper parties in the district court."); JLS Equities LLC v. River Funding, LLC, 2020 WL 1503403, at \*1-2 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2020) ("Affinity's motion to intervene is [denied without prejudice] to refiling with a proposed pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought"); Aetna Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 427, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 2019); Montanez v. Beard, No. 04-2569, 2015 WL 2451770, at \*4 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 2015); Surety Admen, Inc. v. Samara, No. 04-5177, 2006 WL 891430, at \*3 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2006); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 160 F.R.D. 66, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Hecker v. Wierzba Insulation LLC, No. 12-CV-682-WMC, 2013 WL 12234527, at \*I (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2013) ("Since Rural Mutual failed to file a proposed pleading with its motion, the court will deny Rural Mutual's motion to intervene without prejudice to refiling."); Kubiak v. Meltzer, 2013 WL 1114203, at \*2 (N.D. 111. Mar. 15, 2013) ("Because Mr. Leventhal fails to attach a proposed pleading, his motion to intervene is denied."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tara Follese, Charles Case, 2010 WL 11646738, at \*2 (D. Minn. May 7, 2010).
+
+Here, the Government's failure to provide its proposed complaint in intervention requires the Court to deny its motion. As further explained below, this is no harmless error. The Government's Motion to Intervene itself does not adequately provide notice to Plaintiff of the precise nature of its claims. Without a proposed pleading, Plaintiff cannot discern whether the Government has a "sufficient interest in the litigation" that "may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition of the action" as required for intervention under Rule 24(a), and cannot discern whether the Government "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question or law or fact" as required for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)( I )(B). Specifically, it is not clear to Plaintiff how the Government's purported interests would be integrated into this litigation, how it proposes to "ensure that the Epstein Estate's assets are not wrongfully dissipated," how it proposes to advance its so-called "investigatory interests" in the context of this civil case, or what ultimate relief it purports to seek from this Court. Since the Government has not sufficiently provided notice to the existing parties of the basis and nature of its claims in this Court, its motion to intervene must be denied.4
+
+#### B. The Government Fails to Satisfy Rule 24's Requirements for Intenention of Right
+
+#### i. The Government cannot demonstrate a cognizable interest that would be impaired absent its intervention as required by Rule 24(a)(2)
+
+The Government did not file a proposed pleading in intervention under Rule 24(c) because it cannot — it has no protectable interest in this case. Rule 24(a) requires the "claim or defense" to relate to an interest "relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action" and that it "is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [the Government's] ability to protect its interest." V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). The Government here suggests that intervention "will allow [it] both to ensure its interest in preventing the dissipation of the Epstein Estate's assets and to enforce its subpoena and pursue potential and as appropriate independent claims against Maxwell." GVI Mm. at 18 (emphasis
+
+{sup}`4`Should this Court require the Government to comply with Rule 24(c) to file a proposed complaint in intervention, Plaintiff asks that she be afforded a further opportunity to address the Government's Motion to Intervene after reviewing the proposed pleading, and hereby reserves the right to do so. As stated herein, Plaintiff is not able to fully address the Government's arguments since the Government has not yet provided a proposed complaint stating its precise claims and prayer for relief.
+
+added). The Government thus concedes that any potential "claims" it may have at this point are purely speculative. In short, the Government effectively concedes it has no protectable interest within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2) by failing to proffer a proposed pleading as required by Rule 24(c).
+
+Nevertheless, in its brief, the Government vaguely identifies two distinct "interests" that form the basis of its Motion to Intervene:
+
+> First, the Government suggests that its "primary interest for intervention is to ensure that the Epstein Estate's assets are not wrongfully dissipated by Maxwell's suspect claims for indemnification and 'advancement' of legal expenses, and instead are preserved to satisfy the CICO judgment, which seeks forfeiture, divestiture, disgorgement, and payment of maximum civil penalties and damages by the Epstein Estate." GVI Mtn. at 2. Second the Government asks this Court to compel Plaintiff's compliance with certain criminal CICO subpoenas and otherwise aid in its criminal investigation of Plaintiff so that it can "pursue potential and as appropriate independent claims against [Plaintiff]." GVI Mtn. at 3; 18.
+
+Neither of these interests justifies intervention.
+
+#### a. The Government's contingent claim to the Estate's assets is not a sufficient interest for intervention
+
+First, the Government's contingent claim to the Epstein Estate's assets is not a sufficient interest for intervention.5 The Government lays claim to these assets in its recently filed civil
+
+Again, it is unclear how the Government proposes to vindicate this interest in the context of this litigation since it has not filed a proposed pleading in intervention.
+
+forfeiture action in the Virgin Islands against Defendants herein—the Estate and the Trustees under the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (CICO), 14 V.I.C. §§ 601 et seq. The parties to that action are not at issue as no answer has yet been filed by the defendants.6 The Government thus merely has a claim that is contingent upon its success in a separate action. "[C]ourts in this circuit that have been confronted with the issue have consistently held that intervention pursuant to Rule 24(aX2) is inappropriate where the proposed intervenor's interest is contingent upon prevailing on a tort claim in a separate action." Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Virgin Is. Port Auth, 224 F.R.D. 372, 375-376 (D.V.I. 2004) ("Proposed Intervenors cannot deny that any interest they have or may have in this matter is purely contingent upon a favorable judgment in their underlying suit . . . . The Court finds that such a contingent interest is insufficient to sustain intervention of right"); Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) ("In general, a mere economic interest in the outcome of the litigation is insufficient to support a motion to intervene.")
+
+Citing two cases, the Government claims that "numerous" courts have held that "a tort claimant has a sufficiently developed interest to intervene as of right in a coverage-related action involving the tort defendant." GVI Mm. at 10-11 (citing Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1991); v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3241452, at \*1 (D. Md. July 28, 2011)). However, neither of the cases that the Government cites hails from this jurisdiction. And, needless to say, neither case involves a government entity proposing to intervene in a civil
+
+{sup}`6` The Government's operative pleading in the civil forfeiture action is attached as Exhibit A to the Motion to Intervene. The Estate and Trustees moved to dismiss this pleading.
+
+action between private parties in order to investigate a potential target for CICO liability and to secure its position in an unrelated CICO action.7
+
+Even assuming that cases involving intervention by individual claimants in coveragerelated matters are sufficiently analogous to the novel circumstances here, the Government's argument still fails. The Government conspicuously ignores cases from this jurisdiction that are directly on point. In General Star Indemnity Co. v. Virgin Islands Port Authority, 224 F.R.D. 372 (D.V.I. 2004), the Virgin Islands District Court held that an interest that is contingent upon a favorable judgment in an underlying suit "is insufficient to sustain intervention of right" under the federal equivalent to Rule 24:
+
+> Proposed Intervenors' only interest in the matter at bar is to ensure that VIPA has sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment Proposed Intervenors may be able to obtain in the underlying suit against VIPA. Accordingly, the Court finds that Proposed Intervenors have asserted a purely economic interest.
+
+The Attorney General brings this action to seek all remedies available to the Government of the Virgin Islands in enforcing its laws and protecting the public interest and public safety. These claims are distinct from, and are not intended to supplant the claims of victims who were unconscionably harmed by Jeffrey Epstein and his associates.
+
+Moreover, the alleged victims of Jeffrey Epstein already have a perfectly adequate mechanism in place to protect their interests vis-a-vis the Estate. As the Court is aware, the Estate set up a Victim's Compensation Program to award compensation out of Estate funds to alleged Epstein victims who file an appropriate submission.
+
+{sup}`7` The Government suggests in its Motion to Intervene that its civil forfeiture action against the Estate is designed to "protect the rights of victims," casting itself as akin to a "tort claimant" and the Estate as an "insurer," the Government did not file its CICO complaint against the Estate on behalf of any victims. GVI Mtn. 10-11. The operative pleading in that action expressly states at Paragraph 39 that:
+
+Id., at 376. The General Star Court found that "courts in this circuit that have been confronted with the issue `have consistently held that intervention pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) is inappropriate where the proposed intervenor's interest is contingent upon prevailing on a tort claim in a separate action.'" Id. (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. SSM Group, Inc., 1995 WL 422780 at \*3 (E.D.Pa. July 13, 1995) and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 76 F.R.D. 656, 658-59 (W.D.Pa.1977)).
+
+The Government also conveniently ignores precedent from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reaching the same conclusion. For example, in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit concluded that a contingent interest in insurance proceeds is too remote and speculative to satisfy the interest requirement under the federal equivalent to Rule 24. The Treesdale Court noted that "the mere fact that a lawsuit may impede a third party's ability to recover in a separate suit does not ordinarily give the third party a right to intervene." Id., at 223. It ultimately found that
+
+> Appellants [i.e., the tort plaintiffs] have no contractual relationship with either Liberty Mutual [i.e., the insurer] or PMP [Le., the insured tort defendant], and the declaratory judgment action between Liberty Mutual and PMP will not have an immediate, adverse effect on them. Rather, the impact is collateral and (given the dispute about PMP's solvency) speculative. At most, the declaratory judgment action may impact their ability to collect any judgment obtained in their personal injury actions. However, that is not enough to support intervention of right under Mountain Top.
+
+Id., at 225 (citing Mountain Top, supra, 72 F.3d 361).
+
+In 2010, the Virgin Islands District Court again rejected a tort claimant's attempt to intervene in a coverage action between the insured and its insurer. See ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Axiom Constr. & Design Works, LLC, 2010 WL 11565292, at \*3 (D.V.I. Dec. 9, 2010). Applying Treesdale, the ACE Court denied the motion to intervene on the grounds that the proposed intervenor's interest was "a mere economic interest in the proceeds of Axiom's policy with ACE, and not a property interest or a legally protectable interest" Id.
+
+The holdings in General Star, Treesdale, and ACE are consistent with decisions in similar cases across the country finding generally that an intervenor must demonstrate more than "a mere provable claim" in order to be entitled to intervention of right, see Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 105 F.R.D. 106, 110 (D.D.C.1985), and specifically that a contingent interest in insurance proceeds is too remote and speculative to justify intervention in a coverage action under Rule 24(a). See In re HealthSouth Corp. Ins. litigation, 219 F.R.D. 688 (N.D.Ala. 2004); Ace American Ins. Co. v. Paradise Divers, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.Fla. 2003); Redland Ins. Co. v. Chillingsworth Venture, Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 206 (N.D.Ohio 1997).
+
+Second, the Government's purported interest in the Estate would not be affected or impaired as a practical matter by the disposition of this lawsuit. That is because the Government on January 30, 2020 filed certain Criminal Activity Liens on Estate assets pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610. These liens cover all real and personal property located in the Virgin Islands in the name or under the signatory authority of the Estate. See Criminal Activity Liens bearing document numbers 2020000423 and 2020000424, copies of which are collectively attached hereto as Exhibit "1." These Criminal Activity Liens provide that
+
+> Any trustee, executor, person or institution who moves, transfers or conveys title to personal or real property upon which a Criminal Activity Lien Notice has been filed in the iudicial subdivision in which the personal or real property is located, and who transfers or conveys such property while
+
+#### having actual notice of the Criminal Activity Lien Notice, shall be liable to the Attorney General in accordance with Title 14 V.I.C. § 610(1)(1)(2) or (3).
+
+(Emphasis in original.) The Government's position is that these Criminal Activity Liens are effective for up to twelve years, or until January 23, 2032, if properly renewed, that only the Attorney General can release these liens, that this Court may not vacate them, and that the liens cover all assets and property used in connection with the alleged unlawful activity.In the Government's view, that apparently includes all of the Estate's assets and property. See Government's Opposition to Motion to Vacate Criminal Activity Lien Notices, filed on June 11, 2020 in the Government's CICO action against the Estate, et al., a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2." The Motion to Intervene self-servingly seeks to downplay the scope of these liens, asserting vaguely in a one sentence footnote that the Court should ignore them for the purpose of deciding its Motion to Intervene due to "limitations on the scope of pretrial restraints" that the Government does not explain. GVI Mtn. at 12 n. 3. It is impossible to credit this assertion in light of the government's detailed defense of the breadth of these liens in its CICO action against the Estate.
+
+By their own terms, the Criminal Activity Liens subject the Executors to liability under 14 V.I.C. § 610 for any transfer or conveyance of Estate property. Again, the Government has already availed itself of sweeping, statutory powers designed to secure its interests in the Estate and accomplish everything that it purports to do by intervening in this case.
+
+In sum, the Government's purely contingent interest of a possible favorable judgment in another suit is not a significant interest authorizing intervention. Even assuming that it was. there
+
+is no chance it would be impaired as a practical matter. Accordingly, for this reason, the Government's Motion to Intervene should be denied.8
+
+#### b. The Government's interest in advancing its criminal investigation of Plaintiff through this civil proceeding is improper and not a sufficient interest for intervention
+
+The Government's so-called "investigatory interest against [Plaintiff]" is not an appropriate or sufficient interest to support intervention here. By the Government's own admission, it seeks to intervene here to supplement its broad investigatory powers under the Virgin Islands CICO statute, 14 V.I.C. § 600, et seq., and coopt this Court to help enforce its
+
+{sup}`8` By inserting itself in this action, the Government also seeks to circumvent issues of personal jurisdiction as to any claim it may seek to assert against Plaintiff—a non-resident of the Virgin Islands—relating to any recovery from the Estate. It is well-established that a litigant's consent to jurisdiction in one case does not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction in that forum ad infinitum. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 50 n.5 (2d Cir. 1991) ("A party's consent to jurisdiction in one case, however, extends to that case alone. It in no way opens that party up to other lawsuits in the same jurisdiction in which consent was given, where the party does not consent and no other jurisdictional basis is available."); Funai Elec. Co. v. Personalized Media Cornmc'ns, LLC, 2016 WL 370708, at \*2-3 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2016) (defendant that filed two earlier patent suits in Delaware against unrelated defendants did not consent to jurisdiction in Delaware); Fesniak v. Equifax Mortgage Servs. LLC, 2015 WL 2412119, at \*6 (D. N.J. May 21, 2015) ("Plaintiff cites no authority to support the theory that Credit Plus' participation in a prior lawsuit in this forum concerning different claims with different parties constitutes consent to settle all future disputes in New Jersey."); Otsuka Phann. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F.Supp.3d 456, 467 n.10 (D.N.J. 2015); Olympia Steel Bldg. Sys. Corp. v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 2007 WL 1816281, at \*3 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2007) (general jurisdiction would not arise where defendant participated in litigation on entirely different claims with entirely different parties) (citing Bowers v. NET! Techs., Inc., 690 F.Supp. 349, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Simplicity Inc. v. MTS Prods., Inc., 2006 WL 924993, at \*7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2006) ); Bertolini-Mier v. Upper Valley Neurology Neurosurgery, P.C., 2016 WL 7174646, at \*3 (D. Vt. Dec. 7, 2016) (defendant's filing of six lawsuits in Vermont courts did not amount to consent to personal jurisdiction in Vermont; prior lawsuits were not related to present case). Plaintiff reserves the right to move to dismiss any complaint in intervention by the Government for lack of personal jurisdiction.
+
+criminal subpoenas in order to establish a predicate for criminal charges against Plaintiff.9 This investigation is unrelated to any matter at issue in this civil proceeding. Not surprisingly, the Government cites no case supporting this basis for intervention, nor could it. Needless to say, the Government's extraordinary proposition is improper and not a sufficient interest for intervention.
+
+"Intervention generally is not appropriate where the applicant can protect its interests and/or recover on its claim through some other means." v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 526 (5th Cir. 1994). In , a third party moved to intervene to gain access to documents and testimony to use those materials in its own action against the same defendant. Id. at 525-26. The court denied the motion to intervene "as a matter of law," reasoning that the movant had "no rights or claims that [it] wanted the district court to adjudicate." Id. A movant-in-intervention that is in collateral litigation with the same defendant can protect any interest it has by filing discovery requests in its own case. Id. See also Head v. Jellico Housing Auth., 870 F.2d 1117, 1124-25 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of intervention where intervenor had substantially similar complaint pending elsewhere and therefore had "availed herself of other adequate means of asserting her rights").
+
+Here, the Government seeks to take the unprecedented step of intervening in this case for the purpose of aiding its criminal investigation of Plaintiff "in anticipation of a potential action against her." GVI Mtn. at 12. The Government, however, has a number of "other means" available to protect its interests, even more so than the private litigants in and Head. The Government, as prosecutor, has a host of investigatory tools at its disposal to obtain any
+
+{sup}`9` The Government states that it is "investigating Maxwell's participation in Epstein's criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct pursuant to its authority under CICO, 14 V.I.C. § 612, to investigate reasonably suspected criminal activity." GVI Mm. at 2.
+
+information it deems necessary for a potential prosecution, including those available under the Virgin Islands CICO statute. In fact, the Government even admits to using them, stating that it has already attempted service of CICO Subpoenas to Plaintiff for certain materials. GVI Mtn. at 4-5. Contrary to the Government's repeated suggestion, Plaintiff did not "evade service" of the CICO Subpoenas. Rather, these were served to persons who did not have authority to accept them. In any case, the Government does not explain why it has not made efforts to serve Plaintiff now that it presumably knows the jurisdiction where she is presently located.10
+
+Despite complaining that Plaintiff has not responded to the unserved CICO Subpoenas, the Government ignores the availability of statutory remedies to address this issue. Specifically, the CICO statute provides that "the Attorney General may petition the court of the judicial subdivision where the witness resides for an order requiring the witness to attend and to testify or to produce the documentary material." 14 V.I.C. § 6I2(k) (emphasis added). The Government thus has the power to initiate an original action to address issues of compliance with its CICO Subpoenas, and therefore need not resort to shoehorning this issue into this unrelated civil action.
+
+Notably, the Virgin Islands CICO statute requires that the Government bring an action to compel compliance with its process in the judicial subdivision where the witness resides. The Government would ask the Court here (in this unrelated civil action between private parties) to ignore this statute and the protections it affords a non-resident accused, like Plaintiff. The Government's deliberate attempt to exercise the powers given to it under the CICO statute, while
+
+{sup}`10` Instead, the Government spends three full pages explaining how it delivered the CICO Subpoenas to persons who did not have authority to accept them. See GVI Mtn. at 4-6. The Government's complaints that "locating and serving" Plaintiff "[e]ven before Epstein's 2019 arrest and death" was "impracticable" are irrelevant and do not justify the Government's request to use this civil case as a means to enforce its criminal subpoenas.
+
+seeking to avoid the statutory limitations on those powers, sets an ominous precedent and should not be lightly condoned.
+
+There is simply no support for the Government's remarkable request. In fact, courts typically only allow government intervention in civil cases for the opposite purpose — so the government can seek a stay of discovery in order to prevent discovery in the civil case from being used to circumvent the more limited scope of discovery in a parallel criminal matter. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Commit v. Fishoff, 2016 WL 1262508, at \*2 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2016) (citing cases). Even then, courts require that the issues in the criminal and civil cases "substantialnyi overlap" before entering a stay. Id. Here, on the other hand, the Government seeks an "end run" around the criminal process that already exists so it can use the civil process as one more tool against Plaintiff.
+
+In sum, the Government's unprecedented request to intervene in this case to advance its so-called "investigatory interest" must be denied because it is patently improper and because the Government has a number of other tools at its disposal to obtain any information it believes is necessary. This Court should require the Government to employ the tools available to it as investigator and prosecutor and deny its attempt to bypass judicial scrutiny in those cases to which it is already a party.
+
+#### The Government's claimed interest in the outcome of this case is adequately protected by Estate within the meaning of Rule 24(a)
+
+The Government is not entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a) for the additional reason that "existing parties adequately represent [the Government's] interest." V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a) does not require that Defendants here have "identical" interests to a would-be intervenor. The issue is whether they have "the same ultimate objective." Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976). For example, "if there is a party charged by law with representing [a would-be intervenor's] interest, then a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate why this representation is not adequate." Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 368-69 (emphasis added) (citing 7C =, & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1908, at 318-19).
+
+Here, as the Government concedes, the Trustees have "an interest in preserving Ithe Estate's] funds against [Plaintiff's] claim for indemnification." GVI Mm. at 15. In fact, the Trustees are "charged by law" to "faithfully and diligently perform the duties of [their] trust" at the risk of their removal. 15 V.I.C. § 240. Under Virgin Islands law, the Executors owe fiduciary duties to all who may have a beneficial interest in the estate. In re Estate of Cummings, 1985 WL 1177815, at \*5 (Ten. V.I. Nov. 26, 1985). Further, "[t]he Virgin Islands Probate Code prescribes stringent ethical standards of a person holding the trust office of executor or administrator." Estate of Christensen, 1998 WL 242722, at \*3 (Ten. V.I. Mar. 25, 1998). Finally, as noted above, the Government's Criminal Activity Liens subject the Executors to liability under 14 V.I.C. § 610 for any transfer or conveyance of Estate property. To the extent that the Government is concerned with the dissipation of the Estate's assets, the Trustees adequately represent the Government's interest here.
+
+The Government's suggestions that Plaintiff and Defendants "are not truly adversarial" are unsupported innuendos. The Government asserts that Plaintiff's "evident involvement in Epstein's alleged criminal conduct makes her a critical fact witness with whom the Estate is very likely to try to cooperate." Such a statement is not only improper—Plaintiff is innocent until
+
+proven guilty and has maintained her innocence from the beginning—but provides no coherent explanation for why Plaintiff and Defendants are somehow not "adversarial." As explained above, Defendants have every incentive to defend Plaintiff's claim vigorously. Indeed, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in this action. Defendants further apparently take no position as to the instant Motion to Intervene. Putting aside the Government's pure speculation, there is no actual support for the notion that the Executors would fail to "faithfully and diligently perform the duties of [their] trust" as required by Virgin Islands law.
+
+In sum, any interest the Government arguably has is coextensive with Defendants and is thus adequately represented by Defendants.
+
+### C. The Government Fails to Satisfy Rule 24's Requirements for Permissive Intervention
+
+#### i. The Government cannot articulate a "claim or defense" required for permissive intervention
+
+The Government also fails to satisfy the standards for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Rule 24(b)(1)(B) permits intervention, in a court's discretion, where the proposed intervenor has a "claim or defense" that shares "a common question of law or fact" with the main action. V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1)(B). Here, the Government's CICO complaint against the Estate and its Trustees and criminal CICO investigation of Plaintiff do not share common questions of law or fact with this indemnification action. Indeed, the matters could not be more distinct. The Government's stated intent for intervention is to "investigat[e] [Plaintiff's] [alleged] participation in the criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct of the Epstein Enterprise." at GVI Mtn.
+
+It Plaintiff categorically denies all allegations of personal conduct in the Motion to Intervene.
+
+at 4. This inquiry will involve a completely different set of witnesses, different operative facts, different procedural rules, and different (novel) legal issues, than the instant action, which does not involve "conduct of the Epstein Enterprise" and is governed by principles of contract law. There is no question of law or fact that these matters would share.12
+
+#### ii. The Government will cause undue delay and prejudice if it is allowed to intervene under Rule 24(b)
+
+Rule 24(b) is also clear that the Court "must" consider whether the proposed intervention "will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights." V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(6)(3).13 Unwittingly, the Government's Motion to Intervene demonstrates why its intervention would cause "undu[e] delay and prejudice" to Plaintiff, if not completely derail this case. Throughout its motion, the Government proposes to inject legal issues that diverge substantially from those involved in this indemnification action. These would include novel, complex issues of first impression concerning the Government's intent to conduct a criminal investigation of Plaintiff within the context of this civil action. These issues would assuredly and
+
+- (A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer, employee or governmental body, agency or board; or
+- (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under a statute or executive order.
+
+V.I.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2). The Government does not even mention this rule, nor can there be any argument that it applies here.
+
+{sup}`12` Notably, Rule 24 also expressly contemplates intervention by government entities. The rule allows the Government to officially intervene on behalf of the public interest in any case where a party's claim or defense is based on:
+
+{sup}`13` See also 7C Charles Alan =, Arthur R. , & Mary ■ **Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1911 (citing Chadima v. Nat'l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (D. Iowa 1994)).**
+
+unnecessarily clog this Court's docket. This indemnification action will take longer and cost more if the parties are required to litigate such unrelated, collateral issues. The Government's Motion to Intervene shows exactly why its participation would cause the very delay and prejudice that Rule 24(b) prohibits.
+
+"Additional parties always take additional time that may result in delay and that thus may support the denial of intervention." 7C Charles Alan In Arthur R. & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1913, at p. 481. That fact requires this Court to consider whether the Government's intervention would add value to the litigation. See 6 James Wm. Moore, Moores Federal Practice § 24.10[2][b] (1998). For the reasons discussed above, the Government's intervention would not. Because anything that the Government's wants to do can be adequately done in the other proceedings in which it is involved and by using the enormous statutory powers at its disposal that are not available to private civil litigants, its Motion to Intervene should be denied.
+
+## HI. CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons set forth above, the Government's motion is procedurally defective and its grounds for relief are meritless. The Government simply has not met its burden of showing that it has standing to assert any "claim or defense," much less one that is appropriate in the context of this proceeding. The Government's intervention would unduly delay this case and prejudice Plaintiff. Its Motion to Intervene therefore should be denied.
+
+Dated: September 8, 2020
+
+QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, & BOYER, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor Miami, FL 33156 T: (340) 693-0230 F: (340) 693-0300
+
+By: Is/ Kyle R. Waldner Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@qpwblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, which complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R.Civ.P. 6-1(e), was served via email and U.S. Mail this 8th day of September, 2020 to:
+
+ii•Croblin, Esq. KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate IME, Suite 101 St. , V.I. 00802 ckroblin@kellfer.com
+
+Ariel M. =, Esq. (AAG) VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of the Attorney General 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802 '.vi. ov
+
+> /s/ Kyle R. Waldner Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@ciowblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+#### VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+34.38 Eronprindsens Cade GERS Complex, 2 Floor Sc. v.i. 00802 (340) 774-5666 En: (340) 776-3494 Doc 4\* 2020000423 01/30/2020 10:40 Ni N Pages 3 Official Records of ST / ST 30114 ERICA DOVER M.P.A., REC0RIER OF ((HG Fees 10.00
+
+![](_page_20_Picture_1.jpeg)
+
+#213 Estate La Rein. RR I Roe 6151, KIngshill St. Croix, V.I. 00850 (310)773.0295 Fax: (340) 773-1425
+
+# CRIMINAL ACTIVITY LIEN NOTICE
+
+## Title 14 V.I.C. §610 CRIMINALLY INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
+
+TO: Ms. Erica Dover Director, Recorder of Deeds Office of the Lieutenant Governor 5049 Kongens Gade St. , VI 00802
+
+RE: Parcel Number 109803010100, consisting of 3.1 million square feet of land (Commonly known as "Little St. James")
+
+LET IT BE KNOWN THAT the Attorney General of the United States Virgin Islands hereby files a Criminal Activity Lien Notice pursuant to Chapter 30, Title 14 V.I.C. § 610, based on a civil proceeding, Case No. ST-2020-CV-14, having been instituted by the Government of the United States Virgin Islands under Chapter 30 of the Virgin Islands Code, namely, the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Otgankations Act (C/CO), is pending in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands naming the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC. as defendants.
+
+8 C4
+
+In conformity with Title 14 V.I.C. §610(e), from the time of the filing of this Criminal Activity Lien Notice, a Criminal Activity Lien in favor of the Government of the United States Virgin Islands is created on the following:
+
+- 1. Any and personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN;
+- 2. JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC. Any beneficial Interest of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY E.
+- 3. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC. in any personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands. Any and all bank accounts, certificates of deposits and any other accounts in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC.
+
+Pursuant to Title 14 V.I.C. § 610(a), the Director of the Record of Deeds, of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor shall, upon the presentation of a Criminal Activity Lien Notice, immediately record it in the official records.
+
+O n ra O O O
+
+Any trustee, executor, person or institution who moves, transfers or conveys title to personal or real property upon which a Criminal Activity Lien Notice has been filed in the judicial subdivision in which the personal or real property is located, and who transfers or conveys such property while having actual notice of the Criminal Activity Lien Notice, shall be liable to the Attorney General in accordance with Title 14 V.LC. 610(1)(1)(2) or (3).
+
+> DENISE N. ESQ. ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+DATED: January 02,, 2020 By:
+
+AR I, 1. RIITIL SQ. Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department oflustice 3438 Kronprindsens Gade GERS Building, 2nd Floor St. M, V.I. 00802 (340) 774-5666 Ext. 10101
+
+> 0 N (1 N S O .ts N
+
+#### VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTNI ENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+34.38 KronprIndsens Gade GERS Complex, 2" Floor St. M. V.I. 00802 (340) 774-5666 In: (340) 776-3494
+
+![](_page_23_Picture_1.jpeg)
+
+8213 Estate La Rene RR I Box 6151. Kingshill St. Croix, V.1.00850 (340) 773-0295 Fax: (340) 773-1425
+
+# CRIMINAL ACTIVITY LIEN NOTICE
+
+Title 14 V.I.C. §610 CRIMINALLY INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
+
+TO: Ms. Erica Dover Director, Recorder of Deeds Office of the Lieutenant Governor 5049 Kongens Gade St. VI 00802
+
+RE: Parcel Number 109801010100, consisting of 3.5 million square feet of land Parcel Number 109801010200, consisting of 450,000 square feet of land Parcel Number 109801010300, consisting of 1.2 million square feet of land (Collectively known as "Great St. James")
+
+LET IT BE KNOWN THAT the Attorney General of the United States Virgin Islands hereby files a Criminal Activity Lien Notice pursuant to Chapter 30, Title 14 V.I.C. 610, based on a civil proceeding, Case No. ST-2020-CV-I4, having been instituted by the Government of the United States Virgin Islands under Chapter 30 of the Virgin Islands Code, namely, the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ICICOA is pending in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands naming the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC. as defendants.
+
+In conformity with Title 14 V.I.C. §610(e), from the time of the filing of this Criminal Activity Lien Notice, a Criminal Activity Lien in favor of the Government of the United States Virgin Islands is created on the following:
+
+- 1. Any and personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC.
+- 2. Any beneficial Interest of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC. in any personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands.
+- 3. Any and all bank accounts, certificates of deposits and any other accounts in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC.; AND POPLAR, INC.
+
+Pursuant to Title 14 V.1.C. § 610(a). the Director of the Record of Deeds, of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor shall, upon the presentation of a Criminal Activity Lien Notice, immediately record it in the official records.
+
+Any trustee, executor, person or institution who moves, transfers or conveys title to personal or real property upon which a Criminal Activity Lien Notice has been filed in the judicial subdivision in which the personal or real property is located, and who transfers or conveys such property while having actual notice of the Criminal Activity Lien Notice, shall be liable to the Attorney General in accordance with Title 14 V.I.C. § 610(11( I )(2) or (3).
+
+> DENISE N. ESQ. ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+DATED: January 025/ , 2020 By:
+
+KIEL 111. M1TH, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice 3438 Kronprindsens Gade GERS Building, 20 Floor St. MI, V.I. 00802 (340) 774-5666 Ext. 10101
+
+> 0 a 8 a a A A
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
+
+GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS,
+
+PLAINTIFF,
+
+V.
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as the EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN and ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 1953 TRUST; RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as the EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 1953 TRUST; ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC; POPLAR, Inc.; SOUTHERN TRUST COMPANY, INC.; JOHN AND JANE DOES,
+
+DEFENDANTS.
+
+Case No.: ST-20-CV-14
+
+ACTION FOR DAMAGES
+
+JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
+
+#### GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY LIEN NOTICES
+
+The Government of the United States Virgin Islands ("Government") hereby responds in opposition to the motion filed March 17, 2020 by Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Epstein Estate") and Co-Administrators of the 1953 Trust, to vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Lien Notices. The Government states in opposition as follows.
+
+#### INTRODUCTION
+
+On January 15, 2020, the Government filed this action under the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("CICO"), 14 V.I.C. §§ 600 et seq. against the Epstein Estate and various Epstein-controlled entities. On February 5, 2020, the Government filed its Amended Complaint, adding, inter alia, Indyke and Kahn as Defendants in their capacities as Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate and Co-Administrators of the 1953 Trust.
+
+The Government alleges that decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein engaged in a criminal sexual trafficking enterprise in the Virgin Islands, wherein he used his vast wealth and property holdings and a deliberately opaque web of corporations and companies to transport young women and girls to his privately-owned islands where they were held captive and subject to severe and extensive sexual abuse. Epstein committed suicide in prison in August 2019 after he was indicted and incarcerated on federal charges of trafficking and sexually abusing girls as young as 14. Defendants Indyke and Kahn, in addition to being Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate, also are officers in several of the companies Epstein used in his criminal enterprise.
+
+Pursuant to its authority under 14 V.I.C. § 610, the Government filed Criminal Activity Lien Notices establishing liens in its favor on Epstein-owned property or beneficial interests therein located in the Virgin Islands and on the accounts of specified Epstein entities based in the Virgin Islands.
+
+In their motion to vacate the Criminal Activity Liens, lndyke and Kahn seek for the Epstein Estate to proceed wholly unfettered as though none of Epstein's credibly-alleged conduct ever occurred. They seek a blank check for the Epstein Estate by urging the Court to vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Liens in their entirety. As evidence of the free reign they seek for the Epstein Estate, the Government has approved and offered to permit future releases of Estate
+
+funds for administration and asset preservation upon a proper accounting of these items. See Ex. A (Government's Notice to Probate Court, filed Feb. 11, 2020), at 1-3. But Indyke and Kahn refused to provide this. Instead, they first filed an Emergency Motion with the Probate Court, asking that Court to vacate the Government's Liens even though it lacked jurisdiction because this Court's jurisdiction over the Government's Criminal Activity Liens under CICO is exclusive.
+
+Now, Indyke and Kahn ask this Court to vacate the Liens in their entirety, arguing that both they as Executors and the Epstein Estate itself are exempt from CICO's Criminal Activity Lien provisions based on various legal and factual contentions, none of which has merit. Their position, at bottom, is that any restraint on their use of Epstein Estate funds is impermissible. This position is inconsistent with the Government's express authority under CICO, the egregious conduct of the decedent and his associated entities, and the substantial claims asserted against the Estate by both the Government and individual victims.
+
+The Court thus should reject Indyke and Kahn's motion as both legally baseless and factually untenable.
+
+## STATEMENT OF FACTS
+
+## A. Jeffrey Epstein's Alleged Child Sex-Trafficking Enterprise
+
+The Government filed its operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against the Epstein Estate, Indyke, Kahn, and various Epstein-owned entities on February 5, 2020. The Government alleges that decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein was a resident of the Virgin Islands and maintained a residence since 1998 on Little St. James Island, which he owned. FAC, ¶ 5. In 2016, he purchased a second island—Great St. James. Id. By this time, he also was a registered sex offender because he was convicted in Florida of procuring a minor for prostitution. Id., ¶ 6.
+
+The Government alleges that Mr. Epstein for decades conducted an enterprise (the "Epstein Enterprise") whereby he used his web of businesses in the Virgin Islands to transport female victims, many of them children, to his privately-owned Little St. James Island, where they were sexually abused, injured, and held captive. Id., ¶¶ 40-41. Flight logs show that between 2001 and 2019, girls and young women were transported to the Virgin Islands and then helicoptered to Little St. James. Id.,1 46. Air traffic controller reports state that some victims appeared to be as young as 11 years old. Id., ¶ 51. Mr. Epstein and his associates lured these girls and young women to his island with promises of modeling and other career opportunities. Id., ¶ 49. Once they arrived, though, they were sexually abused, exploited, and held captive. Id.
+
+Mr. Epstein's privately-owned islands in the Virgin Islands were essential to the sextrafficking enterprise. Little St. James is a secluded, private island, nearly two miles off-shore from St. with no other residents. Id., ¶ 66. It is accessible only by private boat or helicopter, with no public or commercial transportation servicing the island. Id. When two victims, one age 15, attempted to escape from Little St. James, Mr. Epstein organized search parties that located them, returned them to his house, and then confiscated the I5-year old girl's passport to hinder her ability to escape again. Id., ¶¶ 57-58. Mr. Epstein's acquisition of the second island—Great St. James—in 2016 provided an additional layer of security, allowing him to better ensure that authorities could not observe the sex-trafficking activity on Little St. James and that the victims could not escape. Id., 1 67.
+
+Mr. Epstein's Virgin Islands-based corporations and companies also played central roles in the criminal sex-trafficking enterprise. Defendant Plan D, LLC knowingly and intentionally facilitated the trafficking scheme by flying underage girls and young women into the Virgin Islands to be delivered into sexual servitude. Id., ¶ 97. Defendants Great St. Jim, LLC and
+
+Nautilus, Inc.—for which Defendants Indyke and Kahn served, respectively, as Secretary and Treasurer—knowingly participated in the Epstein Enterprise and facilitated the trafficking and sexual servitude of underage girls and young women by providing the secluded properties at, from, or to which Epstein and his associates could transport, transfer, maintain, isolate, harbor, provide, entice, deceive, coerce, and sexually abuse them. Id., ¶¶ 23-29, 98.
+
+Defendant Southern Trust Company, Inc., of which Epstein was President/Director and Defendants Indyke and Kahn were respectively Secretary/Director and Treasurer/Director, fraudulently obtained tens of millions of dollars in tax exemptions from the Virgin Islands between 2012 and 2019. Id., ¶¶ 37, 112. Southern Trust Company held itself out as providing "cutting edge consulting services" in the area of "biomedical and financial informatics." Id.,111104-106. In fact, it had only one full-time employee working on information technology before 2019, while numerous other administrative or support employees performed personal services for Epstein, and the company itself existed solely or primarily to secure tax benefits that helped support his criminal activities and properties in the Virgin Islands. Id., ¶¶ 107-111, 113-114.
+
+## B. The Government's Criminal Activity Lien Notices
+
+Pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610, the Government filed and served Criminal Activity Lien Notices covering Mr. Epstein's Virgin Islands-based properties, beneficial interests therein, and accounts. Specifically, the Government's notices created liens on the following:
+
+- I. Any personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC; AND POPLAR, INC.
+- 2. Any beneficial interest of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY
+  - E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC; AND POPLAR, INC. in any personal or real property located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands;
+
+- 3. Any and all bank accounts, certificates of deposits and any other accounts in the name of, or under the signatory authority of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; THE 1953 TRUST; PLAN D, LLC; GREAT ST. JIM, LLC; NAUTILUS, INC.; HYPERION AIR, LLC; AND POPLAR, INC.
+
+Ex B (Criminal Activity Lien Notice, dated Jan. 23, 2020).
+
+#### C. The Attorney General's Attempts to Ensure Lawful Administration of the Epstein Estate
+
+On February 5, 2020, Shauna Betz, Legal Assistant at Kellerhals Kroblin PLLC (Attorneys for the Epstein Estate, Indyke, and Kahn) sent email correspondence to the Attorney General from attorney Kroblin, Esq., objecting to the Criminal Activity Lien hold ("Lien") the Government placed on accounts in the name of "The Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein," "Nautilus, Inc.," and "Great St. Jim, LLC" at the First Bank of Puerto Rico on January 31, 2020. See Ex. A (Government's Notice to Probate Court, filed Feb. 11, 2020) at 1. The next day, February 6, 2020, the Attorney General responded by email and offered to schedule a meeting for the following day, which Attorney Kroblin accepted. See id. at 2.
+
+On February 7, 2020, the Attorney General and Attorney Kroblin met in person. Attorney Kroblin expressed concern that the Lien would prevent the Epstein Estate from paying its expenses to maintain and preserve its assets. See id. The Attorney General recognized the importance of the Epstein Estate meeting its expenses for maintenance and preservation and so offered, pursuant to her express and exclusive and express authority under 14 V.I.C. § 610(r), to release sufficient funds to meet such expenses once the Epstein Estate identifies the expenses and the amounts of funds needed to satisfy them. See id.
+
+On Sunday February 9, 2020, the Attorney General followed up and memorialized the meeting by sending an email again conveying her willingness to accommodate an immediate
+
+release of funds sufficient to pay necessary expenses to manage, maintain, and preserve estate assets, and stating that the Attorney General's Office eagerly awaited the listing of expenses to facilitate the prompt release of funds for payment. See id. In that same email, the Attorney General also stated her intent to follow up about the proposed Epstein victims' compensation program fund that also was discussed briefly at the in-person meeting. See id.
+
+Rather than provide the requested itemization, however, Counsel for the Epstein Estate, Indyke, and Kahn (Attorney Kroblin) sent an email to the Attorney General on Monday February 10, 2020 stating that the Estate had that morning filed to seek an emergency Order from the Probate Court because FirstBank had conveyed that the hold would remain in place absent a court order. See id. at 3. The Attorney General has opposed the Epstein Estate's emergency motion, which is pending before the Probate Court.
+
+After the Epstein Estate filed its Probate Court emergency motion, the Attorney General continued to try to reach a common understanding with the Estate over what constitutes reasonable administration expenses. See Ex. C (March 17, 2020 email to Estate's counsel).
+
+On March 17, 2020, Defendants Indyke and Kahn filed their motion for this Court to vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+Despite Defendants' motions, the Attorney General has approved release of \$14.76 million from the Government's Criminal Activity Liens--\$10.4 million for Estate administration, maintenance expenses, and attorneys' fees, and has continued to seek a common understanding with the Estate on how to verify such expenses in the future, see Ex. D (May 18-27, 2020 emails between counsel) (5/20/20 email), plus an additional \$4.36 million for administration of a victims compensation fund. Defendants, however, continue to refuse to cooperate. They insist that the Government's Criminal Activity Liens cannot be enforced against them and that they should have
+
+unfettered control over funds used and obtained in connection with the Epstein Enterprise. See id. (5/21/20 email).
+
+### D. Unexplained Estate Transactions Involving Tens of Millions of Dollars
+
+On May 14, 2020, Counsel for the Government wrote Counsel for the Epstein Estate inquiring about irregularities in the Estate's accounting involving tens of millions of dollars. See Ex. E (May 14, 2020 letter by Government's Counsel). The first of these involves the Estate's payment of \$15.5 million to Epstein-owned Southern Country International, Ltd. ("SCI"), which the Estate represents to be repayment of a loan by SCI to Epstein for his legal expenses after his arrest in July 2019, but for which there is no record of any loan made by SCI. See id. at 1-2. This therefore is an unaccounted-for disbursement of \$15.5 million by the Epstein Estate.
+
+The second irregularity involves the Estate's transfer of \$24 million from Epstein-owned SCI to Epstein-owned Defendant Southern Trust Company. The Estate made this transfer from SCI to Southern Trust on December 18, 2019—the day before it made the above \$15.5 million payment to SCI—but did not disclose this payment until over four months later. See id. at 2-3. None of these transactions are consistent with SCI's banking license, which limits its activities, except in narrow circumstances, to non-resident individuals and entities, see 9 V.I.C. § 726(b), which excludes both Epstein and Southern Trust.
+
+Defendants have not explained these irregularities involving tens of millions of dollars of Epstein Estate funds. They also refuse to provide a basis for their requests for additional releases of funds covered by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens, insisting instead that they have complete control over these funds used and obtained in connection with the Epstein Enterprise.
+
+#### ARGUMENT
+
+In their Motion to Vacate, Defendants Indyke and Kahn raise a series of arguments that, if accepted, would effectively nullify the Attorney General's enforcement authority under CICO and other laws where a primary wrongdoer is deceased and his or her property and assets used in connection with the wrongful conduct go to probate. These arguments are contrary both to CICO's express provisions giving the Attorney General statutory authority to enforce Criminal Activity Liens and to the estate administration statutes that Defendants invoke. The Court therefore should reject each of Defendants' arguments as set forth below.
+
+#### A. The Court Should Not Vacate or Release the Government's Criminal Activity Liens Against Defendants While This CICO Action is Pending.
+
+Under CICO, where the Government has filed a civil or criminal action against a party and concurrently filed a Criminal Activity Lien Notice, only the Attorney General may release the liens thereunder while the action is pending. The relevant CICO sections provide first that "[u]pon the institution of any criminal or civil proceeding or action under this chapter, the Attorney General . . may file . . . a Criminal Activity Lien Notice" and that the "clerk of the trial court shall upon the presentation of a Criminal Activity Lien Notice, immediately record it in the official records." 14 V.I.C. § 610(a). The Government has done this here. See Ex. B (Criminal Activity Lien Notice, dated Jan. 23, 2020).
+
+The Government's "filing of a Criminal Activity Lien Notice creates from the time of its filing, a lien in favor of the Government of the Territory of the Virgin Islands" on the named person or entity's "personal or real property situated in the Territory of the Virgin Islands" and on "any beneficial interest in it located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands." 14 V.I.C. § 610(c)(1)- (2) (emphasis added); see also 14 V.1.C. § 610(f) ("The lien shall commence and attach as of the time of filing of the Criminal Activity Lien Notice . . ."). The Government's Criminal Activity
+
+Liens thus already are attached to all of the Epstein Estate's known property and interests located within the Virgin Islands connected to his criminal enterprise.
+
+Once the Government's Criminal Activity Liens were filed and attached, they "shall continue thereafter until expiration, termination or release as provided herein." 14 V.I.C. § 610(0. The Act provides with respect to expiration that "[t]he term of a Criminal Activity Lien Notice shall be for a period of 6 years from the date of filing" and subject to renewal for one additional 6-year period upon Notice filed by the Attorney General. 14 V.I.C. § 610(q). The Government's Liens on the Epstein Estate thus shall continue in effect until either January 23, 2026, or January 23, 2032, absent a termination or release as provided in the Act.
+
+Where, as here, the Government's underlying CICO action still is pending, only the Attorney General may release any property or interest from the Criminal Activity Liens. This is the express command of the statute, which provides in relevant part that:
+
+The Attorney General . . . filing the Criminal Activity Lien Notice may release, in whole or in part, any Criminal Activity Lien Notice or may release any personal or real property or beneficial interest in it from the Criminal Activity Lien Notice upon such terms and conditions as he may determine.
+
+14 V.I.C. § 610(r) (emphasis added). The Act thus is unambiguous that where a Criminal Activity Lien Notice has commenced and attached upon the Attorney General's filing of an action and Notice, the Attorney General has sole authority to vacate or release the Liens upon terms and conditions she deems appropriate. This means that the Court may not, with the one exception addressed below, vacate or release the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+The one instance where CICO permits the Court to release or extinguish a Criminal Activity Lien does not apply here. The Act provides that where "no criminal or civil proceeding or action under this chapter is then pending against the person named in a Criminal Activity Lien Notice, any person named in a Criminal Activity Lien Notice may institute an action .. . seeking a release or extinguishment of the notice," which a court may grant upon the appropriate factual findings. 14 V.I.C. § 610(t)(1)-(3). This exception does not apply here because the Government's CICO action against the Epstein Estate is pending. The Court therefore may not vacate or release the Government's Criminal Activity Liens as Defendants request.
+
+This statutory remedial scheme enables the Attorney General to ensure that property and assets used in or obtained from unlawful conduct are not shielded from law enforcement. It also protects defendants by allowing them to challenge the underlying allegations through, for example, a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment to ensure there is sufficient legal and factual basis for the Government's action. Where no action is pending, the § 610(t) review process likewise protects a lien defendant's due process rights. Where an action is pending, like here, the Criminal Activity Liens are to remain in place until the Government's claims are resolved.
+
+In sum, Defendants' request that the Court vacate or release the Government's Criminal Activity Liens is contrary to CICO's lien-enforcement statutory provisions. In light of the Legislature's purpose in enacting CICO to "curtail criminal activity and lessen its economic . . . power in the Territory of the Virgin Islands by . . providing to law enforcement . . . new civil sanctions and remedies," 14 V.I.C. § 601, the Court may not grant this relief while the Government's CICO action against the Epstein Estate is pending. The Defendant's motion to vacate therefore must be summarily denied.
+
+## B. The Government's Criminal Activity Liens are Valid.
+
+## 1. The Criminal Activity Liens Apply to the Estate's Property.
+
+Defendants Indyke and Kahn contend that CICO "excludes executors of estates from the reach of Criminal Activity Lien Notices." Motion to Vacate at 8 (citing 14 V.I.C. § 604(r)) (emphasis in original). This is incorrect. Although § 604(r) excludes executors from the Act's definition of "Trustee," this is immaterial to the Government's claims and Liens for two reasons.
+
+First, § 610(e)'s "trustee" provisions do not support vacature of the Government's Criminal Activity Liens on Epstein Estate assets. These provisions merely exempt the personal or real property of the trustees themselves from a Criminal Activity Lien where the trustees are not named in their personal capacity. See V .I.C. § 610(m). That has no relevance to this case because the Government's Liens are not on Defendant Indyke or Kahn's personal property, but on the Epstein Estate's property and assets.
+
+Second, and closely related, CICO also does not apply only to trustees. Rather, its Criminal Activity Lien Notice provisions apply broadly to any "person or other entity named in the [Lien] notice . . .." 14 V.1.C. § 610(e) (emphasis added). Thus, even if the Co-Executors are not deemed trustees under CICO, they do not have to be because the Act applies far more broadly to any other person or entity named—such as the Epstein Estate, each Epstein-controlled company, and each individual named in this lawsuit.
+
+Section 604(r)'s exclusion of executors from the Act's definition of a "trustee" thus is irrelevant to the validity and scope of the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+## 2. The Government Sued the Proper Parties in Interest
+
+Defendants Indyke and Kahn also argue that it was improper for the Government to name the Epstein Estate and the 1953 Trust as defendants in the CICO action because neither is a legal entity that can be sued. See Motion to Vacate at 8-9. This argument that the Epstein Estate and 1953 Trust are not "persons" that can be sued under CICO makes no reference to Virgin Islands law, under which both entities clearly can be sued for two separate and independent reasons.
+
+First, in Ottley v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.1.480 (2014), the Supreme Court addressed a lawsuit naming an estate as defendant. See id. at 486 ("Ottley named Bell's estate, Eboni, and Gerard (collectively, 'Appelles') as defendants in the action."). In deciding the appeal, the Supreme Court squarely held that it was permissible for the plaintiff to sue the estate. See id. at 500 ("Ottley correctly named Bell's estate as the defendant, and although not necessary, additionally listed the two heirs entitled to inherit her interest in the [disputed] property."). In Francis v. Ruan Living Trust, No. ST-15-cv-177, 2016 V.I. LEXIS 160, 2016 WL 5867452 (Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2016), this Court held the same with respect to a plaintiff's claims against a trust. See id. at \*13 ("Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support her claim of negligence . . . against Defendant Ruan Trust.") (emphasis added). These decisions thus demonstrate that both the Epstein Estate and the 1953 Trust are properly subject to suit.
+
+Second, the Court also should reject the argument that the Epstein Estate and 1953 Trust cannot be sued because this would undermine CICO's enforcement scheme by shielding Epstein's egregious conduct and the property and assets he used to carry it out from law-enforcement. The Government seeks to preserve the Estate's assets to satisfy claims for civil penalties, repayment of fraudulently obtained tax benefits, and restitution for victims. As discussed, supra, § A, the Legislature enacted CICO to "curtail criminal activity and lessen its economic and political power in the Territory of the Virgin Islands by establishing new penal prohibitions and providing to law enforcement and the victims of criminal activity new civil sanctions and remedies." 14 V.I.C. § 601. Exempting the Epstein Estate and 1953 Trust from the Act's Criminal Activity Lien remedy would thwart these purposes by allowing the wrongdoer's estate and beneficiaries to retain property and assets used for egregiously unlawful purposes.
+
+In sum, the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors' arguments on the alleged impropriety of the Government's CICO action against the Epstein Estate and the 1953 Trust are legally incorrect. The Court should reject these arguments as grounds for vacating the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+#### 3. Civil Forfeiture is an Available Remedy to the Government Under CICO, Though Not Necessary to Maintain its Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+Defendants Indyke and Kahn next argue that the Court must vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Liens because CICO does not permit civil forfeiture, and "[w]ithout a valid forfeiture claim, the Attorney General has no basis to freeze the Estate's assets pending the outcome of this action." Motion to Vacate at 10-12. Both parts of this argument are incorrect. CICO does provide for the Attorney General to obtain civil forfeiture, and the Criminal Activity Liens would be valid even if it did not. Each of these arguments is taken in turn.
+
+First, CICO provides for civil forfeiture. The Supreme Court squarely has recognized this. See In re Najawicz, 52 V.1.311, 333 (2009) ("CICO provides for both civil and criminal forfeitures . . . ."). Defendants ask this Court to ignore the Supreme Court's statement on this point as dictum that is incorrect. See Motion to Vacate at 10. The Supreme Court did not err on this point.
+
+Under 14 V.I.C. § 607, the Government's remedies in civil cases where it proves conduct violating the Act include a judgment "ordering any defendant to divest himself of any interest in any enterprise, or in any real property[.]" 14 V.I.C. § 607(a)(1). Defendants acknowledge this remedy,but try to dismiss it as irrelevant because "the Decedent no longer has an interest to be divested." Motion to Vacate at 11. This cavalier assertion does nothing to differentiate between divestiture and forfeiture as civil remedies available to the Government. Whether the Government seeks forfeiture, divestiture, or both (as here), Jeffrey Epstein still will be deceased. This argument thus is just another attempt to shield the Epstein Estate's assets from law enforcement altogether.
+
+Moreover, even if Defendants could meaningfully distinguish between divestiture and forfeiture under § 607 (which they cannot), the Government still could obtain forfeiture in this civil action. This is because § 607 also provides that "[n]one of the above provisions shall be held to limit the existing equitable powers of the trial court." 14 V.I.C. § 607(a)(6). The Court's retained equitable powers include the power to order forfeiture based upon proven misconduct. See generally Ottley, supra, 61 V.I. at 496 n.12 ("[A] court may properly find that an administrator forfeited the right to raise [15 V.I.C.] section 606 as a defense due to equitable considerations."); see also Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., 6 Cal. 5th 59, 237 (2018) ("The law takes these case-specific factors into account because forfeiture of compensation is, in the end, an equitable remedy."); Prozinski v. Northeast Real Estate Set-vs., LLC, 797 N.E.2d 415, 424 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) ("Forfeiture is an equitable remedy."); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex. 1999) ("[W]e look to the jurisprudential underpinnings of the equitable remedy of forfeiture.").
+
+It is true that equity sometimes disfavors forfeiture. See, e.g., v. Domain, 6 V.I. 599, 604 (1968) ("Equity relieves against a forfeiture where no real fault is committed . . . .") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This, however, is not a case where no fault was committed. Just the opposite, the appalling, numerous, and well-documented allegations by the Government and dozens of Epstein's victims confirm that equity commands that Epstein's Estate be denied the ability to deplete or transfer these assets to Epstein's beneficiaries. Forfeiture thus is and should be an available civil or equitable remedy.
+
+Second, Defendants' "no civil forfeiture" argument for vacating the Government's Criminal Activity Liens also fails because the Liens are expressly authorized by statute without regard to civil forfeiture. Under 14 V.I.C. § 610, the Attorney General may file a Criminal Activity
+
+Lien Notice "[u]pon the institution of any criminal or civil proceeding or action under this chapter[.]" 14 V.I.C. § 610(a). The Legislature thus did not condition the availability of Criminal Activity Liens on the assertion of forfeiture claims.
+
+Indeed, if Defendants were correct both that the Liens require a forfeiture claim and that forfeiture is unavailable in civil actions, then the Government could never file a Lien Notice in a civil action. The plain language of § 610 permitting Criminal Activity Liens in criminal and civil actions alike thus clearly refutes these arguments. And for good reason, as the Government's Liens will ensure the availability of Epstein Estate assets to satisfy its claims not only for forfeiture and divestiture, but also for maximum civil penalties, treble damages, disgorgement, restitution, and such other relief as the Court deems proper. See FAC, Prayer for Relief, y¶ D, E, F, J, K, N, P.
+
+For each of these reasons, the Court should reject Defendants Indyke and Kahn's "no civil forfeiture" arguments for vacature and should reaffirm the validity of the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+## 4. The Criminal Activity Liens are not Overbroad.
+
+The Government's Criminal Activity Liens are appropriately tailored to property used in the course of Mr. Epstein's alleged child sex-trafficking enterprise in the Virgin Islands. Under CICO, the Government may place a lien upon any personal or real property situated in the Virgin Islands where the notice is filed which then or thereafter was owned by the person named and upon any beneficial interest therein then or thereafter owned by the person named. 14 V.I.C. § 610(e)(1)-(2). In In re Najawicz, supra, the Supreme Court clarified that "on its face, CICO clearly allows for pre-trial restraint only of 'real or personal property used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through, conduct in violation of [CICO]."' 52 V.I. at 343 (quoting 14 V.I.C. § 606(c) forfeiture provision).
+
+The Government's Criminal Activity Liens here do no more than this. With respect to the assets beyond Mr. Epstein's islands and aircraft referenced in Defendants Indyke and Kahn's motion, see Motion to Vacate at 14, the Lien Notices placed a hold on accounts held by the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein; Nautilus, Inc.; and Great St. Jim LLC. See Ex. F (Feb. 4, 2020 letter of FirstBank to Co-Executors). Mr. Epstein and both named entities are central to the alleged child sex-trafficking enterprise in the Virgin Islands. See FAC, ¶ 40 ("Epstein, through and in association with Defendants, trafficked, raped, sexually assaulted and held captive underage girls and young women at his properties in the Virgin Islands."); ¶ 27 ("Great St. Jim, LLC . . . owns at least three properties that make up Great St. James .. . ."); ¶ 28 ("Epstein is listed as manager and a member of Great St. Jim, LLC and the nature of its business is described as `holding assets."'); ¶ 98 ("Great St. Jim, LLC and Nautilus, Inc. knowingly participated in the Epstein Enterprise and facilitated the trafficking and sexual servitude of young women and underage girls by providing the secluded properties at, from, or to which Epstein and his associates were able to transport, transfer, receive, maintain, isolate, harbor, provide, entice, deceive, coerce, and sexually abuse underage girls and young women.").
+
+In light of these allegations specifically connecting each accountholder to the Epstein sextrafficking enterprise, Defendants' argument that "at best the Liens might attach to Little St. James Island and the three identified aircraft," Motion to Vacate at 14, is incorrect. Although Mr. Epstein's privately-owned islands clearly were central to the enterprise, so too were the activities and resources of the companies he controlled. The Criminal Activity Liens thus are appropriately tailored to the conduct of the Epstein Enterprise.
+
+The Court also should reject Defendants' undeveloped argument about the geographic scope of the Government's Criminal Activity Liens. See Motion to Vacate at 14-15 ("The
+
+Defendants request that the Court's Order specifically state that the Liens do not cover real or personal property or accounts located outside of the Virgin Islands."). Since Defendants do not specify which property or accounts they allege to be located outside of the Virgin Islands, the Court should decline this invitation to issue a blanket advisory opinion. Cf. In re Media Ventures Inc., 30 V.I. 43, 45 (Terr. Ct. 1994) (Hodge, V.) ("The Court therefore finds that no actual case or controversy exists which needs to be addressed, and that Petitioner is in effect asking this court for an advisory opinion. This request must therefore be denied."). The Government's Criminal Activity Liens are appropriately tailored to property and assets used in connection with the unlawful conduct alleged, and thus should not be vacated either in whole or in any part.
+
+#### C. The Government's Criminal Activity Liens Do Not Conflict with Legitimate Estate Administration.
+
+Finally, the Court also should reject Defendants Indyke's and Kahn's separate argument that the "expenses of Estate administration have priority" over the Government's Criminal Activity Liens. Motion to Vacate at 15. This question is not presented on the facts before the Court because the Government does not seek to prohibit the Epstein Estate from making truly administrative and preservation-related expenditures.
+
+Rather, the Attorney General repeatedly has sought an accounting from Defendants Indyke and Kahn to ensure that any Estate funds they release are used for these and only these legitimate purposes. See supra, Statement of Facts §§ C-D. The requested accounting would ensure that both the Estate's administrative and preservation purposes and the Government's law-enforcement interests are served. CI 15 V.I.C. § 161 (requiring Probate Court to administer justice in all matters relating to the affairs of decedents "in the manner prescribed by law.") (emphasis added). Defendants Indyke and Kahn, however, refuse to provide the Government or this Court with any accounting in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate. Their failure to do so either in their Motion to Vacate or elsewhere makes their argument for a determination of "priority" nothing more than another improper attempt to obtain an advisory opinion by this Court.
+
+Moreover, the "manner prescribed by law" for disposition of the Epstein Estate's property and assets subject to the Government's Criminal Activity Liens is set forth in CICO itself, specifically 14 V.I.C. § 610. This provision gives the Attorney General sole authority to set the terms and conditions for release of property subject to a Criminal Activity Lien while a CICO action is pending:
+
+The Attorney General or United States Attorney filing the Criminal Activity Lien Notice may release, in whole or in part, any Criminal Activity Lien Notice or may release any personal or real property or beneficial interest in it from the Criminal Activity Lien Notice upon such terms and conditions as he may determine.
+
+14 V.I.C. § 610(r) (emphasis added). Thus, any release of Epstein Estate property or assets covered by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens must be upon such terms and conditions as the Attorney General permits.
+
+The Attorney General is appropriately exercising her authority under CICO by requesting an accounting to ensure that released Epstein Estate funds are put to legitimate administration and preservation uses. She does not seek to prohibit the Epstein Estate from making necessary administrative and preservation expenditures. Just the opposite, she seeks to ensure that released Estate funds are used for these legitimate purposes and no other. Toward this end, the Attorney General has approved release of \$10.4 million for Epstein Estate administration and preservation expenses to date. See supra, Statement of Facts § C. This is both her exclusive right and her duty under CICO to ensure that the statute's law-enforcement objectives are served and not evaded.
+
+Since Defendants Indyke and Kahn as Co-Executors have refused to provide the Attorney General or this Court with any accounting of the Epstein Estate's legitimate administrative and preservation expenses, their request here for a blanket determination of priority improperly seeks
+
+an advisory opinion and/or is contrary to CICO's Criminal Activity Lien provisions. For either or both reasons, their motion to vacate should be denied.
+
+The Government credibly alleges that Jeffrey Epstein used his Virgin Islands properties and network of Virgin Islands-based companies to fund (through fraudulently-obtained tax benefits) and operate an unlawful sex-trafficking enterprise in which dozens of underage girls and young women were sexually abused and held captive. The Epstein Estate Co-Executors' motion to vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Liens is nothing less than an attempt to use Epstein's jailhouse suicide as a vehicle to sweep this sordid history under the rug and allow Epstein's beneficiaries to retain the instrumentalities of the enterprise at the expense of its victims. The Court should reject the motion and enforce the Government's Liens against the Epstein Estate.
+
+**CONCLUSION**
+
+For all of the reasons set forth, Defendants Indyke and Kahn's motion to vacate the Government's Criminal Activity Liens should be denied.
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+DENISE N. [REDACTED], ESQUIRE  
+ATTORNEY GENERAL  
+VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
+
+Dated: June 11, 2020
+
+
+(340) 774-5666 ext. 10155
+
+**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**
+
+IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the foregoing Opposition to Motion complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R. Civ. P. 6-1(e) and a true and correct copy of the Opposition was served via regular mail, postage prepaid, with a courtesy copy sent by email to counsel of record on June 11, 2020 to:
+
+[REDACTED] KROBLIN, ESQ.  
+ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ.,  
+WILLIAM BLUM, ESQ.  
+SHARI D'ANDRADE, ESQ.  
+KELLERHALS [REDACTED] KROBLIN PLLC  
+[REDACTED] Palms Professional Building  
+9053 Estate [REDACTED], Suite 101  
+St. [REDACTED], V.I. 00802-3602  
+Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com  
+aheymann@solblum.com  
+wblum@solblum.com  
+sdandrade@kellfer.com  
+mwhalen@kellfer.com
+
+ANDREW TOMBACK  
+[REDACTED] & CASE, LLP  
+1221 Avenue of the Americas  
+New York, New York 10020-1095  
+United States  
+Email: andrew.tomback@whitecase.com
+
+DANIEL WEINER  
+MARC A. WEINSTEIN  
+HUGHES HUBBARD & REID, LLP  
+One Battery Park Plaza  
+New York, NY 10004-1482  
+United States  
+Email: daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com  
+marc.weinstein@hugheshubbard.com
+
+
+St. [REDACTED] U.S. Virgin Islands 00802  
+Email: [REDACTED]  
+(340) 774-5666 ext. 10155
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LW, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+#### ORDER
+
+This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Intervene (the "Motion") filed by nonparty, the Government of the United States Virgin Islands (the "Government"). The Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
+
+ORDERED, that the Government's Motion is hereby DENIED; and it is further
+
+ORDERED, that a certified copy of this Order shall be distributed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated:
+
+ATTEST: Tamara Charles Clerk of the Court
+
+
+Dated:
+
+JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822253/EFTA02822253.md

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+# FILED
+
+September 08, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LW, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+# PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
+
+Plaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL ("Plaintiff'), by counsel, pursuant to V.I.R.Civ.P. 12, hereby opposes the Motion to Dismiss' (the "Motion to Dismiss") filed by Defendants DARREN K. INDYKE ("Indyke") and RICHARD D. KAHN ("Kahn") (collectively, the "Co-Executors"), in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), and on behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC ("NES").
+
+# L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+Defendants' Motion to dismiss must be denied because its primary basis is now moot and it secondary arguments have no sufficient basis.
+
+First, Co-Executors' argument that Plaintiffs claim against them is premature in violation of 15 V.I.0 § 606(a) is no longer viable. While the Co-Executors argue that they may
+
+The Motion to Dismiss is cited herein by page number as "MTD."
+
+not be sued until the expiration of twelve months from the granting of letters testamentary, that time has now passed. Under the Virgin Islands Supreme Court's ruling in Ottley v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.I. 480 (2014), this action may proceed against the Co-Executors.
+
+Next, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's claim for common law indemnification is premature on the grounds that a judgment has not yet been rendered against her likewise must fail. Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts supporting each element of a claim for common law indemnification recognized in this jurisdiction.
+
+Finally, NES, LLC's argument that Plaintiff's claim for indemnification fails to state a claim is meritless and depends entirely on irrelevant matters that fall outside the four corners of the Complaint. NES, LLC improperly invites this Court to award it summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's claim based on a company operating agreement adopted long after Plaintiff served as a company manager. Because this document does not directly pertain to the allegations of the Complaint, this Court should exclude it from its consideration of the Motion to Dismiss and consider only the allegations in the Complaint (viewing these allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff). Since NES, LLC does not otherwise argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted, its motion must be denied.
+
+# II. STANDARD
+
+A motion to dismiss under V.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) must be decided based upon V.I. R. Civ. P. 8's pleading standards. The Virgin Islands is a "Notice" pleading jurisdiction. Under Rule 8(a)(2), a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief-because this is a notice pleading jurisdiction ... . Rule 8's adoption
+
+"eliminates the [federal] plausibility standard and instead will permit a complaint so long as it adequately alleges facts that put an accused party on notice of claims brought against it." Milk-
+
+y. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 585 (V.I. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
+
+see also V.I. R. Civ. P. 8, Comment (this approach "declines to enter dismissals of cases based
+
+on failure to allege specific facts which, if established, plausibly entitle the pleader to relief."). In
+
+applying this standard, the Court must "'view the facts alleged in the pleadings and the
+
+inferences to be drawn from these facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."' Pedro v.
+
+Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 251, 264 (Super. Ct. 2019) (quoting v. AIG Ins. of
+
+P.R., 56 V.I. 558, 566 (V.I. 2012)). Rule 8 "will permit a complaint so long as it adequately
+
+alleges facts that put an accused party on notice of claims brought against it[,]"
+
+67 V.I. at 585, and "declines to enter dismissals of cases based on failure to allege specific facts
+
+which, if established, plausibly entitle the pleader to relief," V.I. R. Civ. P. 8, Comment.
+
+# III. ARGUMENT
+
+## A. The Estate May Be Sued In Its Own Capacity And Is Properly Named As A Defendant
+
+Defendants suggest in a footnote that it was improper for Plaintiff to name the Estate as
+
+defendant in this action because it "does not have a separate identity and may not be sued as a
+
+party." See MTD at 2 n. 1. Defendants do not cite any provision of Virgin Islands law in support
+
+of this argument. In fact, there is no provision of Virgin Islands law precluding an action against
+
+an estate, no Virgin Islands has held that it is improper to do so, and courts in this jurisdiction customarily allow it.2
+
+For example, in Ottley v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.I. 480 (2014), the Virgin Islands Supreme Court addressed a lawsuit naming an estate as defendant. See id. at 486 ("Ottley named Bell's estate, Eboni, and Gerard . . . as defendants in the action."). In deciding the appeal, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the plaintiff to sue the estate. See id. at 500 ("Ottley correctly named Bell's estate as the defendant, and although not necessary, additionally listed the two heirs entitled to inherit her interest in the property."). Consistent with this decision, Courts in the Virgin Islands have commonly recognized estates as legal entities that can sue and be sued. See, e.g., Laforce v. Estate of Laforce, 2019 WL 7987454, at \*2 (V.I. Super. Dec. 27, 2019); Garvey v. Estate of Moorhead, 2016 WL 9503603, at \*2 (V.I. Super. Aug. 1, 2016); Kalloo v. Estate of Small, 2015 WL 1514572, at \*1 (V.I. Mar. 27, 2015); Guardian Ins. Co. v. Estate of Knight-David, 2015 WL 5782098, at \*1 (V.I. Super. Sept. 30, 2015); Estate of Ludington v. Jaber, 2011 WL 1304470, at \*1 (V.I. Mar. 22, 2011). These decisions thus demonstrate that the Estate is properly subject to suit in this case.
+
+In sum, Defendants' argument that the Estate may not be sued as a party is unsupported by any law, is inconsistent with the law and practice of this jurisdiction, and must be rejected.
+
+{sup}`2` Defendants' sole citation in support of their argument is to an American Jurisprudence treatise—which in turn relies on a single Illinois state court opinion from 1981—that clearly does not reflect the law or practice of this jurisdiction.
+
+## B. Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Premature
+
+#### i. Plaintiff's claims against the Co-Executors are ripe and may proceed
+
+First, the Co-Executors argue that Plaintiff's claim against them is premature in violation of 15 V.I.0 § 606(a). See MTD at 4. This statute provides that
+
+> [a]n action may be commenced against an executor or administrator at any time after the expiration of twelve months from the granting of letters testamentary or of administration and until the final settlement of the estate and discharge of such executor or administrator from the trust, and not otherwise.
+
+Citing this provision, the Co-Executors argue that Plaintiff may not maintain an action against them "until September 6, 2020." See MTD at 4. Since this date has now passed, the Co-Executors argument under 15 V.I.0 § 606 is now moot.
+
+Further, the fact that Plaintiff commenced this action before the conclusion of the twelvemonth letters testamentary period does not require dismissal. Facing this exact scenario, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court in Ottley v. Estate of Bell held that the Superior Court erred in dismissing a complaint for failure to comply with 15 V.I.0 § 606 where the claim had ripened by the time the trial court dismissed it. 2014 WL 5471948, at \*6 ("Because Ottley could have immediately refiled the complaint, and the law does not generally require a useless act, the Superior Court erred in dismissing Ottley's complaint for the \$60,000 debt on the basis of noncompliance with section 606(b).") Thus, even assuming Plaintiff was not in compliance with Section 606(a) at the time she filed her Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against the Co-Executors are now ripe by the Co-Executors' own measure and may proceed.;
+
+{sup}`3` 15 V.I.C. § 606(b) further provides that "[a]n action against an executor or administrator shall not be commenced until the claim of the plaintiff has been duly presented to
+
+#### ii. Plaintiff's common-law claim for indemnification is ripe and may proceed
+
+Second, Defendants suggest in a footnote that Plaintiff's common-law claim for indemnification is premature on the grounds that "a party may not assert a common-law claim for indemnification in a separate action before a judgment has been rendered against her." See MTD at 6 n.5.
+
+Defendants cite one case for this proposition, Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 2017 WL 772808 (V.I. Super. Feb. 28, 2017). That case flatly contradicts Defendants' suggestion and plainly does not require dismissal of Plaintiff's claim here. In fact, Willie expressly allows a party to ` lead" a common law indemnification claim before a judgment has been rendered. Id., at \*30 ("The Court also agrees that before a party can prevail on, but not plead, a common law indemnification claim, there must have been a determination that the person who initially brought suit (in this case, Mr. Willie) was in fact injured.") (Emphasis added.) Indeed, courts in this jurisdiction commonly allow claims for indemnification to proceed despite the absence of any underlying judgment. Vandenhouten v. Olde Towne Tours, LLC, 2009 WL 1956360, at \*5 (D.V.I. July 8, 2009) ("there is no merit to Francis's contention that any indemnity claim against him must await a determination that Olde Towne is liable to the Vandenhoutens"); v. Sunrise Med. (US), LLC, 2013 WL 3775461, at \*6 (D.V.I. July 17, 2013).
+
+Under Willie, upon which Defendants rely,
+
+[t]o state a claim for common law indemnification, the indemnitee must allege that (1) it has been or may be sued (2) for damages, (3) proximately caused by the indemnitor's actions or inactions, and
+
+such executor or administrator and by him disallowed." Defendants do not—and could not claim that Plaintiff is in violation of this provision. Here, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Estate and the Estate did not honor it. Compl. 11 28-29.
+
+(4) but for the relationship between the indemnitee and the indemnitor, the indemnitee would not have been sued or found liable.
+
+Willie, 2017 WL 772808, at \*42 (emphasis added).4
+
+Here, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts supporting each of these elements. First, Plaintiff alleges that she "has incurred and will continue to incur significant legal fees, personal
+
+The Superior Court reached the opposite conclusion in In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litig. Series, 2006 WL 1084317 (V.I. Super. Mar. 6, 2006). In Manbodh, the Superior Court (through now-Justice, Hon. Maria Cabret) held that the rule for common law indemnification claims contained in the Restatement (Third) of Tort is the majority rule and the best rule for the USVI:
+
+In sum, while both the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) contain more modern approaches to common law contribution and indemnification, the Restatement (Third) represents the current majority substantive law. In the Restatement (Third), the drafters promote the interests of both flexibility and judicial economy by supplying security for settlors. ... For all of these reasons, and in an effort to establish the best total set of rules by bridging the gaps in substantive tort law, this Court acknowledges the current majority rule and adopts the provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, Topic 3 for the substantive requirements for common law contribution and indemnification.
+
+Id. at \*10. It is likely that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion, as that Court has acknowledged that a "strong preference exists for following the most recent Restatement over an older version." Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 2011 WL 6299025, at \*6 (V.I. Dec. 15, 2011).
+
+Plaintiff does not necessarily concede that Willie properly states the elements of a common law indemnification claim in this jurisdiction. The Willie opinion, more than anything, demonstrates that this is not a settled area of law because the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has not yet spoken to the issue. In Willie, the Superior Court recognizes that a "key difference" between the Restatement (Second) of Tort and the Restatement (Third) of Tort regarding "Apportionment of Liability" centers on whether a pre-judgment claim is ultimately viable, and that the Restatement (Third) allows such claims while the earlier restatement does not. Id. at 30 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22(a)). Nevertheless, the Superior Court in Willie ultimately held that it would require an underlying judgment before entering any judgment on the merits on a common law claim for indemnification.
+
+security costs, and other costs in connection with legal suits, proceedings, and investigations relating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims." Compl. 1 25. Second, Plaintiff alleges that she "incurred these legal fees and expenses as a direct result of Epstein's acts and/or omissions." Compl. 1 43. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he suits, proceedings, and/or investigations for which Maxwell seeks indemnification were instituted against Maxwell solely because she was an employee of Epstein and his affiliated businesses." Comp1.1 42.
+
+For all of the foregoing masons, Plaintiff's claim for common law indemnification is viable.
+
+## C. NES, LLC's Request That The Court Consider Matters Outside The Pleadings Should Be Rejected
+
+Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for indemnification against NES, LLC fails because "NES has no obligation to indemnify [Plaintiff] for or advance her fees and expenses" under the "Operating Agreement of NES, LLC dated January 1, 2014" (hereinafter, the "2014 Operating Agreement"). See MTD at 6. While Plaintiff did not expressly reference or premise her claims on the 2014 Operating Agreement, Defendants submit a copy of this Operating Agreement with its Opposition and invites the Court to consider it as part of the "pleadings." See MTD at 6. In other words, NES, LLC seeks judgment on the merits of this claim based entirely on matters outside the pleadings.
+
+In ruling on a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, courts 'assume all reasonable factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all fair inferences from such allegations.'" Arno v. Hess Corp., 2019 WL 5295588, at \*14 (citation omitted). "The basic purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint to state an actionable claim, not to test the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
+
+"[C]ourts [in the Virgin Islands] have the discretion to exclude extra-pleading materials attached to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief." Stanley v. Virgin Islands Bureau of Corr., 2020 WL 1639902, at •4 (V.I. Super. Apr. 1, 2020) (citing Howell v. U.S.V.I. Police Dep't, 67 V.I. 149, 158 n.4 (Super. Ct. 2016)). In Howell, the defendant submitted two documents with its pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Howell, 67 V.I. 149, 158 n.4. Finding that those documents "[did] not directly pertain to any allegation asserted in the complaint" and "[were] not relevant to deciding the present motion to dismiss," the Court did not convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment and decided the motion based on the allegations in the complaint. /d.
+
+Here, Defendants fail to demonstrate the relevance of its extraneous submission. Defendants ask this Court to accept, without a verified statements, that the 2014 Operating Agreement is the controlling document here. Indeed, the document raises more questions than it answers. According to the first page of the 2014 Operating Agreement, NES, LLC was formed in 1998. Presumably, there exist earlier operating agreements relating to the company. Plaintiff may enjoy rights under prior LLC operating agreements. See, e.g., Branin v. Roe Inv. Counsel, LLC, 2014 WL 2961084, at \*8 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (finding that an enforceable right to
+
+{sup}`5` The rules in fact require the Court to reject Defendants' unverified statements regarding the 2014 Operating Agreement and otherwise. See V.1.R.Civ.P. 6-1(d) (requiring that "thenavailable" affidavits and other documents supporting a party's position to be filed simultaneously with a motion that contains allegations of fact not appearing of record). For example, Defendants apparently ask the Court to conclude based on the representation of its counsel, without any independent support, that Plaintiff has engaged in "fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional misconduct." See MTD at 7.
+
+indemnification can vest in accordance with the terms of an operating agreement such that it may not thereafter be rescinded by a later amendment to the agreement).
+
+Further Plaintiff was a manager of the LLC during the mid-2000s, well before the effective date of the 2014 Operating Agreement. Compl. III 15; 46. The company thus had a different management structure, and surely a different operating agreement, at the time that Plaintiff was a company manager. Plaintiff is entitled to discover all circumstances surrounding the company and its indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies over time, including any in effect during her time as manager, before she is required to respond to Defendants' motion seeking judgment on the merits of the claim. Plaintiff is not able to do so now due to the Estate's refusal to voluntarily provide any documents relating to the company. See Compl. 151 ("By ... letter dated November 22, 2019 [to the Co-Executors], Maxwell requested copies of documents setting forth applicable indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies, including any operating agreements for NES, LLC, and never received a response.")
+
+Defendants themselves suggest that the Court should consider the 2014 Operating Agreement pursuant to the so-called "incorporation-by-reference" doctrine, claiming that Plaintiff "expressly incorporates by reference NES's corporate organizational documents in her Complaint." See MTD at 6 n.6. This doctrine is not applicable here.6 The "incorporation-byreference" doctrine allows a court to "review the actual document referenced in the complaint"
+
+{sup}`6` The "incorporation-by-reference" doctrine has not been expressly adopted by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, has not been widely embraced in the Virgin Islands, and Defendants ultimately fail to establish that this jurisdiction should recognize this common law rule. See Gov't of the V.I. v. =, 2014 WL 702639, at \*3 (V.I. Feb 24, 2014), referencing Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I.2011) ("[T]he Superior Court, when considering a question not foreclosed by prior precedent ... must perform a three-part analysis as set forth in Banks").
+
+to ensure that language has not been taken out of context. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Daniel, 2020 WL 1819622, at \*8 (V.I. Super. Apr. 8, 2020) (emphasis added). Unlike the Hess case, upon which Defendants rely, Plaintiff's Complaint does not expressly reference the 2014 Operating Agreement, which is, in any event, not relevant to the claims hem. Plaintiff did not incorporate by reference any particular version of the operating agreement because she was unable to do so. The operative operating agreements are not in her possession. Plaintiff asked the Estate for documents pertaining to NES, LLC before commencing this action but was refused. The "incorporation-by-reference" doctrine is therefore inapplicable here.?
+
+Finally, in the event that this Court elects to consider the extraneous documents submitted by Defendants with their Motion to Dismiss, thereby converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asks that she have a reasonable opportunity to conduct the discovery described herein. Rule 12(d) provides that:
+
+> If, on a motion under Rule 12(6)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
+
+{sup}`7` To the extent Defendants suggest that the 2014 Operating Agreement is not a "matter outside the pleading" for some other reason, any such suggestion too must fail. "[Ably written or oral evidence introduced challenging the pleadings that `does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings, will constitute a matter outside the pleading for the purpose of triggering a conversion, if not excluded?" Raymond v. Assefa, 2017 WL 5303467, at \*3 (V.I. Super. Nov. 8, 2017) (citing In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litigation Series, 47 V.I. 375, 382 (V.I. Super 2006. A court may only consider, without requiring the conversion of a motion the following: "(1) exhibits attached to the pleadings, (2) matters that the court can take judicial notice of [sic], and (3) items of unquestioned authenticity that are referred to in the challenged pleading and are integral to the pleader's claim for relief." Id. The 2014 Operating Agreement falls into none of these categories.
+
+V.I.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (emphasis added). The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the requirement that a non-moving party have notice and a fair opportunity to be heard with respect to any grounds for summary judgment raised sua sponte. United Corp. v. Hamed, 2016 WL 154893, at •5 (V.I. Jan. 12, 2016); Raymond v. Assefa, 2017 WL 5303467, at •3 (V.I. Super. Nov. 8, 2017) (listing Virgin Islands Supreme Court cases). Failure to give a nonmoving party adequate notice before conversion constitutes reversible error. Stanley, 2020 WL 1639902, at \*5.
+
+Here, NES, LLC may not be permitted to obtain a summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for indemnification before Plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to conduct essential discovery. NES, LLC has not moved to dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief. Instead, NES, LLC seeks judgment on the merits. The applicable rules of procedure contemplate that a party may conduct necessary discovery before a response to a Rule 56 motion must be made. See, e.g., V.I.R.Civ.P. 56(d) ("If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may ... defer considering the motion or deny it; ... allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or ... issue any other appropriate order.").8 Here, this necessary discovery is exclusively in the possession of NES, LLC and the other Defendants. The Court should therefore deny NES, LLC's Rule 56 motion so that the parties can conduct discovery on the issues presented therein.
+
+In sum, because the 2014 Operating Agreement does not "directly pertain to any allegation asserted in the [Clomplaint," the Court should exclude it from its consideration of the
+
+{sup}`8` Plaintiff reserves the right to file a motion pursuant to V.I.R.Civ.P. 56(d) in the event that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
+
+Motion to Dismiss and consider only the allegations in the Complaint. See Howell, supra, at 158 n.4 (emphasis added). In the event the Court elects to consider this agreement and converts the Motion to Dismiss to a Rule 56 motion, Plaintiff asks that consideration of such motion be deferred until she can conduct necessary discovery.
+
+# IV. CONCLUSION
+
+Defendants' arguments in support of dismissal lack legal support and must fail. Their Motion to Dismiss therefore should be denied.
+
+Dated: September 8, 2020
+
+QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, & BOYER, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor Miami, FL 33156 T: (340) 693-0230 F: (340) 693-0300
+
+By: /s/ Kyle R. Waldner Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@emblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, which complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R.Civ.P. 6-1(e), was served via email and U.S. Mail this 8th day of September, 2020 to:
+
+Kroblin, Esq. KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. , V.1.00802 ckroblin@kellfer.com
+
+Ariel M. =, Esq. (AAG) VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of the Attorney General 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
+
+Is/ Kyle R. Waldner
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Esq. kwaldner@cumblaw.com V.I. Bar No.: 1038
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+vs.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LW, a New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+#### ORDER
+
+This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion") filed by Defendants DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), and on behalf of the Estate, and NES, LLC ("NES"). The Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
+
+ORDERED, that the Motion is hereby DENIED; and it is further
+
+ORDERED, that a certified copy of this Order shall be distributed to counsel of record.
+
+Dated:
+
+ATTEST: Tamara Charles Clerk of the Court By: Dated:
+
+JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822268/EFTA02822268.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+## FILED
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF ME COURT
+
+## EXHIBIT
+
+![](_page_1_Picture_13.jpeg)
+
+Palms Professional Building, 9053 Estate Suite 101, St. Villard, VI. 00802  
+340.779.2564 Telephone | 1.888.316.9269 Fax | [www.kellfer.com](http://www.kellfer.com)
+
+September 15, 2020
+
+**By E-Filing**
+
+Honorable Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell  
+Superior Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands  
+Magistrate Division  
+Barbell Plaza South  
+St. U.S. Virgin Islands
+
+**Re: Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein**  
+Probate No. ST-19-PB-80
+
+Dear Magistrate Hermon-Percell:
+
+We write on behalf of the Estate in response to the Government's September 10, 2020 letter. The Government's letter, as well as the Government's August 18, 2020 letter, is yet further confirmation that the Attorney General is improperly usurping the roles of the Court and the Co-Executors in this probate proceeding. Although the Attorney General's liens are invalid, she is unfairly making use of the fact that there is no assigned judge in that case to rule on the Co-Executors' motions to vacate those liens and dismiss that action. Just as Your Honor directed the Attorney General in February 2020 to lift her liens to allow the Estate to operate, the Court should do so again here, where the Attorney General is crippling the administration of the Estate.
+
+The Attorney General's suggestion in her August 18 Letter{sup}`1` that the Co-Executors seek to conceal information about the administration of the Estate is not only unfounded, unfair, and misleading, it is squarely at odds with reality. By making those accusations, the Attorney General not only suggests that the Government is entitled to such information -- it is not -- but also pretends that the Government does not already have that information and that the Co-Executors are improperly seeking to withhold it. That is false: the Attorney General has issued two subpoenas, purportedly as a discovery tool in the Government's ongoing investigation, to FirstBank for records of the Estate's operating account. The first subpoena, served in February 2020, covered the period from 1998 through February 2020. The second subpoena, served in June 2020, called for all records of every transaction conducted from the Estate's operating account from February 1, 2020 through June 30, 2020. Putting aside whether those subpoenas, issued without notice to the Estate, comport with the legitimate exercise of the Government's authority under CICO, they provide the Government with the very information it complains to the Court it needs to release funds for administration of the Estate. The Estate has confirmed that FirstBank produced records for every transaction, of every size, conducted by the Estate from that account through June 30, 2020. For example, the Attorney General, having received and reviewed such records, required FirstBank to provide additional
+
+---
+
+{sup}`1` To the extent the Attorney General served her August 18 letter on counsel for the Estate, we are not aware of that service and were not aware of that letter until the Attorney General attached it to her September 10 filing. That is the only reason the Estate did not previously respond to the Attorney General's August 18 letter.
+
+Icrrnon-Pcrecll I P. Carolyn Honorable to Letter
+
+2020 15, September 2 Page
+
+described were which 2020 June through May period the during transactions 37 for information Attorney the which for transactions These Offset." "ACH as statements account the on generically two \$1,000, than less involving transactions 16 included information additional such required General 37 the of all for detail requested the provided FirstBank \$60. as little as for were which of transactions for information needs she that suggestion General's Attorney the Thus, transactions. by transaction every about information has General Attorney the since disingenuous, is \$5,000 above penny. the to down Estate the
+
+criminal Epstein's in participants "protect to trying is Estate the that argues also General Attorney The and of employees former and current certain indemnifying is Estate the because simply enterprise" Attorney The suit. General's Attorney the in defendants more or one of behalf on professionals discovery stay to motion -pending long a has Estate the that fact the Despite backwards. it has General that for plan discovery a adopted not has action that in Court the and suit, General's Attorney the in and individuals of swath a to subpoenas wide-ranging serve to continues General Attorney the matter, and employees former and current as well as action that in defendants certain including entities, accusations false) (and serious leveling for penchant General's Attorney the Given professionals. financial any that belief apparent her and Epstein, Mr. with associated individual any against many act, criminal a constitutes somehow entities various his or Epstein Mr. by conducted transaction counsel. afford cannot Many counsel. need they that determined have employees former and current which representation, legal for fees legal for indemnification requested understandably have many And agency enforcement law government a that troubling deeply is It afford. cannot otherwise they -less scope a of face the in representation legal for opportunity the individuals affording that contends concealment. of act an constitutes investigation enforcement law
+
+transactions financial "structured" Indyke -Executor Co that suggestion General's Attorney the Finally, only not is Court the to letter a in accusation baseless a such make To libelous. and false absolutely is an betrays it officer, enforcement law highest Territory's the of unbecoming and unprofessional them prevent to intended -Executors Co the intimidate to General Attorney the by effort ongoing to General Attorney the directed expressly Court the While duties. duciary fi their out carrying from the so, doing in duties duciary fi their exercise and Estate the administer to -Executors Co the permit instructions. Court's the ignoring on intent appears General Attorney
+
+to Court the ask urgently we 2020, 9, September and 14 August dated letters our in forth set As Attorney the for Order an issue to alternatively, or matter, this resolve to videoconference a schedule Estate's the in requested amount the in account FirstBank Estate's the on ens li the release to General harm. irreparable suffering of verge the on is Estate The General. Attorney the with correspondence
+
+submitted, Respectfully
+
+A/C
+
+Kroblin
+
+-Executors Co the for Counsel
+
+record of Counsel cc:

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822271/EFTA02822271.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# FILED
+
+September 22, 2020
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OHNE COURT
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL, )
+
+) ) ) )
+
+Plaintiff, ) Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+
+vs. )
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN ) K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF ) THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, ) RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as ) EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. ) EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited ) Liability Company, )
+
+Defendant. )
+
+#### GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE
+
+The Government of the United States Virgin Islands ("Government"), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Reply Brief in support of its motion for an order permitting the Government to intervene in this action as of right pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or else by leave pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Government states in further support of its motion as follows.
+
+#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
+
+The Government moves to intervene in this action by Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell seeking indemnification and advancement of legal expenses from Defendants the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and its Co-Executors—Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn—on two distinct but closely related grounds. First, the Government has an interest in preserving Epstein Estate funds to satisfy a judgment in its pending action against Defendants alleging that Epstein and others engaged in a criminal sex-trafficking enterprise in the Virgin Islands for which the Government seeks forfeiture, divestiture, disgorgement, and payment of civil penalties and damages under the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("CICO"), 14 V.I.C. §§ 601 et seq. Second, the Government has an investigatory interest in Maxwell's involvement with Epstein's criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct pursuant to its authority under CICO, 14 V.I.C. § 612, which Maxwell has thwarted by resisting and evading service of the Government's investigatory subpoena, even while she has invoked the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands Courts to obtain indemnification for the very same alleged conduct.
+
+Maxwell opposes the Government's motion to intervene on numerous grounds, none of which have merit. First, Maxwell contends she lacks sufficient notice of the Government's claims because it failed to attach a pleading as required by V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(c). This is incorrect. The Government attached as Exhibit A to its motion the Amended Complaint in its CICO action setting forth all of its claims against Defendants and the factual bases therefor. The CICO Complaint serves Rule 24's purpose of giving the parties notice of what the Government's claims and interests are. See, e.g., U.S. v. Metro St. Louis Sewer Dist, 589 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Appellees argue that MIEC's failure to submit a pleading is sufficient to deny its motion to intervene, but we conclude that the statement of interest satisfies Rule 24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to the court and the parties of MIEC's interests."); Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The Government and Microsoft make no claim they had inadequate notice of the intervenors' appeal, and we find no reason to bar intervention based solely upon this technical [lack of pleading] defect, if defect it be."). Maxwell and the Epstein Estate have ample notice of the Government's claims and interests.
+
+Second, Maxwell argues that the Government's pending CICO claims against Defendants do not provide a sufficient interest because they are contingent, not yet having been litigated to judgment. Maxwell relies almost entirely on federal court cases within the Third Circuit for this argument. These cases are not controlling. See Bruni v. Alger, 71 V.I. 71, 76 n.11 (Super. Ct. 2019) (decisions interpreting federal rules of procedure are persuasive, not binding, authority as to analogous Virgin Islands Rules provisions). Here, far more persuasive are decisions in at least six other federal Circuits rejecting the Third Circuit's analysis and holding that a pending claim may provide a sufficient interest for intervention in the defendant's coverage action. See, e.g., Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dept. of Tramsp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly gives a petitioner the requisite interest [in intervention as of right]."); Security Ins. Co. v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1380- 81 (7th Cir. 1995); Teague v. Baker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1991); TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Fin. Web.com, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 336, 338 (M.D. Ha. 2002); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Summit Ind's Co., 143 F.R.D. 129, 134 (N.D. Ohio 1992); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. 110 F.R.D. 549, 552 (D.R.1. 1986). The Government has a clear and sufficient interest in the outcome of this action.
+
+Third, Maxwell argues that intervention is unnecessary because the Government's interest in ensuring availability of the Epstein Estate's funds is secured by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens placed pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610. This is incorrect because the Government's Criminal Activity Liens under CICO are limited to Epstein's funds or property situated or owned in the Virgin Islands, see 14 V.I.C. § 610(e)(1)-(2), and because the Epstein Estate is fighting enforcement of the Government's Liens at every turn. See Exhibit M hereto (Letter of Counsel for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to Probate Court, Sept. 15, 2020) at 2 ("[W]e urgently ask the Court to ... issue an Order for the Attorney General to release the liens on the Estate's FirstBank account in the amount [\$7,200,000] requested in the Estate's correspondence with the Attorney General.").
+
+Finally, Maxwell argues that the Government's interest in the outcome of this case is adequately protected by the Epstein Estate's interest in protecting its own funds. This, too, is incorrect. Numerous of the above-cited federal courts reject the same argument that the parties to a coverage action can adequately represent the interests of a tort claimant. See, e.g., Security Ins., 69 F.3d at 1381; Teague, 931 F.3d at 262. Here, the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors clearly are inadequate to represent the Government's interest in preserving Estate funds because
+
+- Maxwell herself pleads that "Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate, also made assurances to Maxwell that Maxwell's legal fees and obligations would be reimbursed by Epstein and the Estate ...." Complaint, ¶ 21; and
+- Indyke and Kahn admit that "the Estate is indemnifying certain current and former employees of and professionals on behalf of one or more defendants in the Attorney General's suit." Ex. M (Letter of Counsel for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to Probate Court, Sept. 15, 2020) at 2.
+
+There thus is no question that the Co-Executors are not acting to preserve Estate funds. The Government's interest in preservation thus is not adequately represented by the Epstein Estate or its Co-Executors, the Defendants in the Government's CICO enforcement action.
+
+For all of these reasons and as set forth more fully below, the Court should grant the Government's motion to intervene.
+
+# ARGUMENT
+
+## A. The Motion Gives Ample Notice of the Government's Claims and Interests.
+
+Maxwell begins her opposition by arguing that the Government's motion to intervene is "procedurally defective" because it does not attach a pleading as required by Rule 24(c) and that, because of this alleged failure, the motion "does not adequately provide notice to Plaintiff of the
+
+precise nature of [the Government's] claims." Opposition at 3-4. This argument is factually and/or legally incorrect.
+
+Rule 24 provides that a motion to intervene "must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(c). The Government satisfied this requirement by attaching as Exhibit A to its motion its First Amended Complaint in its CICO action against Defendants the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors and others. The CICO Complaint is 54 pages, contains 114 paragraphs of factual allegations, and states 24 separate counts setting forth the legal grounds for each item of relief the Government seeks from Defendants. The Government also attached as Exhibit B its CICO Subpoena Duces Tecum, the service of which Maxwell previously resisted and evaded, which states clearly that the Government is seeking documents from her related to "the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates" in violation of Virgin Islands law. Maxwell does not even address the Government's submission of its CICO Complaint or Subpoena, let alone explain how or why they do not satisfy the Rule's requirement of a pleading to give notice of interest.
+
+Since Maxwell ignores the Government's attached CICO Complaint and Subpoena, she does not address whether or how Rule 24(c) contemplates something different. But even if it did, this would be purely a matter of form, not substance, because the CICO Complaint and subpoena clearly satisfy the pleading provision's purpose—to give the litigating parties notice of the intervening party's claims and interest. See generally In re LO.F., 62 V.I. 655, 665 (2015) ("It is a settled rule that in the construction of statutes an interpretation is never to be adopted that would defeat the purpose of the enactment.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
+
+This is the conclusion reached by numerous federal circuit courts of appeal in applying the identical pleading provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). See Peaje fm's. LLC v. -Padilla, 845 F.3d 505, 515 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Accordingly, denial of a motion to intervene based solely on the movant's failure to attach a pleading, absent prejudice to any party, constitutes an abuse of discretion."); Metro St. Louis, supra, 569 F.3d at 834 ("[T]he statement of interest satisfies Rule 24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to the court and the parties of MIEC's interests."); Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Furthermore, neither party has ever claimed that any prejudice would result from granting the motion to intervene despite the failure to attach a pleading; the parties are clearly on notice as to Hillandale Committee's position and arguments."); Mass. v. Microsoft, supra, 373 F.3d at 1236 n.19 ("The Government and Microsoft make no claim they had inadequate notice of the intervenors' appeal, and we find no reason to bar intervention based solely upon this technical defect, if defect it be.").
+
+Since Maxwell cannot plausibly claim lack of notice of the Government's interests in preservation of the Epstein Estate's funds and in service of its CICO investigatory subpoena, her argument for denial of intervention based upon Rule 24(c) fails and should be rejected.
+
+## B. The Government Has a Clear and Sufficient Interest in the Outcome of this Action.
+
+Maxwell next argues that the Government's interest in preservation of Epstein Estate funds is insufficient for intervention because the interest is "contingent" until a judgment is entered in the Government's CICO action against the Estate. The Court should reject this argument because it relies upon an overly rigid and stringent conception of the "interest" that supports intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
+
+Maxwell cites as support for her argument decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, which was bound by Third Circuit precedent. See Opposition at 6-7 (citing Mountain Top Condo Assn v. Dave Stabbert Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 261, 366 (3d Cir. 1995); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. V.I. Port Auth., 224 F.R.D. 372, 375-76 (D.V.I. 2004)). These decisions, however, both applying Federal Rule 24, are not controlling on this Court's application of Virgin Islands Rule 24. See, e.g., Bnini v. Alger, supra, 71 V.I. at 76 n.11 (decisions applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive, not binding authority, as to analogous Virgin Islands Rules).
+
+Here, the Court should not find the Third Circuit's interpretation of Federal Rule 24 persuasive because it is contrary to decisions of courts in at least six other federal circuits—the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—which find that the holder of a pending claim may have a sufficient interest to intervene in a related coverage case. See Utahns for Better Transp., supra, 295 F.3d at 1115 ("The threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly gives a petition the requisite interest" to intervene); Security Ins. Co., supra, 69 F.3d at 1380-81 (affirming grant of intervention by tort claimant in coverage action); Teague, supra, 931 F.2d at 261 ("[O]ther [courts] have allowed intervention in a dispute between an insurer and its insured even when the intervenor's interest is contingent on the outcome of other litigation. We find the reasoning of this latter authority persuasive.") (citations omitted); TIG Specialty Ins. Co., supra, 208 F.R.D. at 338 (potential deprivation of source of recovery if intervenor prevails on its claim is a sufficient interest); St. Paul Fire & Marine, supra, 143 F.R.D. at 134 ("There is nothing in the wording or history of Rule 24 which indicates intent to exclude would be intervenors whose interest in the pending litigation is not yet vested.") (quoting New Hampshire Ins. Co., supra, 110 F.R.D. at 552); see also Romero v. Bd. of Cty. Comm 'n, 313 F.R.D. 133, 140 (D.N.M. 2016) ("[T]he Tenth Circuit and numerous other Courts of Appeal have permitted intervenors with a contingent interest to intervene.").
+
+In Teague, supra, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that class action plaintiffs seeking to intervene in a coverage action involving the class action defendant had a sufficient interest because they "stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the district court's judgment" in the coverage case. 931 F.2d at 261. That same conclusion applies here. If this Court rules that the Epstein Estate must indemnify Maxwell for claims related to her relationship with Epstein and to "advance" her attorneys' fees (while she is in prison awaiting trial on federal criminal charges), then the Government stands to lose funds for the satisfaction of a judgment in its CICO action against the Epstein Estate.
+
+Maxwell also argues that the Government's separate but related investigatory interest under CICO as to her involvement with Epstein's conduct is not sufficient to support intervention. See Opposition at 12-14. Maxwell focuses primarily on the Government's ability to enforce its CICO subpoena by other means, rather than on the investigatory interest itself. The Government's interest is established by statute, 14 V.I.C. § 612(a), and involves the same subject matter as this action—Maxwell's relationship to the Epstein Enterprise's conduct. Compare Maxwell Complaint, ¶ 1 ("This is an action for indemnification for and advancement of the attorneys' fees, security costs, costs to find safe accommodation, and all other expenses Maxwell has reasonably incurred and will incur by reason of her employment relationship with Jeffrey E. Epstein ('Epstein') and his affiliated businesses . . . ."); with Gov't Ex. B (CICO Subpoena) (seeking documents from Maxwell related to "the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates" in violation of Virgin Islands law). This related interest thus provides an additional basis supporting the Government's intervention.
+
+Based on the substantial weight and persuasive force of the foregoing authority applying the analogous federal rules provision, the Court should hold that the Government's pending CICO claims against the Epstein Estate provide it with a clear and sufficient interest to intervene to ensure preservation of Estate funds.
+
+#### C. The Government's Interest in Preserving Epstein Estate Funds for Payment of a Judgment May Be Impaired Absent Allowance of Intervention.
+
+Maxwell separately argues that the Government's interest in preservation of Epstein Estate funds will not be impaired by any judgment or resolution of this action because the Government has placed Criminal Activity Liens on certain Estate assets pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610. See Opposition at 10-11. The Court should reject this argument because it ignores the difference in scope between all Epstein Estate assets and those covered by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+CICO's Criminal Activity Lien provisions permit the Government to place liens upon a CICO defendant's property that is "situated in the Territory of the Virgin Islands" or its "beneficial interest" that is "located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands." 14 V.I.C. § 610(e)(1)-(2). Maxwell acknowledges this territorial limitation. See Opposition at 10 ("These liens cover all real and personal property located in the Virgin Islands in the name or under the signatory authority of the Estate.") (emphasis in original).
+
+The Government's claims for forfeiture, divestiture, maximum civil penalties per violation, treble and punitive damages, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains under CICO, see Ex. A-CICO Complaint at 53-54 (Prayer for Relief), are not so limited. See 14 V.I.C. § 607(c), (e) (provisions for awarding damages and civil penalties, without territorial limit).
+
+Since the Epstein Estate assets covered by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens are not co-extensive with the relief the Government may obtain through a judgment on its CICO claims, the Court should reject Maxwell's argument that the Liens alone are sufficient to secure the Government's interests without intervention.
+
+Although the foregoing suffices to reject Maxwell's argument, it also bears emphasis that Defendants the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors are resisting and seeking to evade the Government's Criminal Activity Liens at every turn. As just one example, even though the Attorney General and the Superior Court in the CICO action have sole and exclusive authority to release funds covered by the Liens, see 14 V.I.C. § 610(r) (Attorney General's authority), (t) (CICO Court's authority), the Co-Executors repeatedly have asked and currently are asking the Probate Court to order release of over \$7,000,000 covered by the Government's Criminal Activity Liens. See Ex. M hereto (Letter of Counsel for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to Probate Court, Sept. 15, 2020) at 2 ("[W]e urgently ask the Court to . . . issue an Order for the Attorney General to release the liens on the Estate's FirstBank account in the amount [\$7,200,000] requested in the Estate's correspondence with the Attorney General."). While these requests have no legal merit, their existence is at least relevant to Maxwell's assertion that the Government's interest are absolutely secured by the Criminal Activity Liens.
+
+Maxwell also argues that the Government's investigatory interest under CICO as to her involvement with Epstein's conduct will not be impaired absent intervention because the Government may protect this interest by other means—by enforcing its CICO subpoena in the state where she resides. See Opposition at 14 (citing 14 V.I.C. § 612(k)). In so arguing, Maxwell admits that she avoided service of the Government's CICO Subpoena by refusing to authorize her attorney in the Virgin Islands to accept service. See Opposition at 14 (Government's subpoenas "were served to persons who did not have authority to accept them."). She also does not deny that she resisted or evaded service in the, previously unknown, state where she resided prior to her
+
+arrest. See Gov't Motion at 4-6. She also does not consent to service or to a court's personal jurisdiction over her as a citizen of New York where she is imprisoned. She has, however, consented to this Court's jurisdiction over her claims related to her relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. This action in this Court thus is the one venue in which the Government's investigatory interest is certain not to be impaired.
+
+For all of these reasons, the Court should reject Maxwell's argument and should hold that the Government's interests in preservation of Epstein Estate funds and in advancement of its investigation of Maxwell may be impaired absent intervention.
+
+## D. The Epstein Estate Does Not Adequately Represent the Government's Interests.
+
+Maxwell also argues that the Government may not intervene because the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors, in her telling, share and thus adequately represent the Government's interest in preserving Estate funds. See Opposition at 15-17 ("To the extent that the Government is concerned with the dissipation of the Estate's assets, the Trustees adequately represent the Government's interest here."). They do not.
+
+Maxwell's own Complaint allegations undercut this argument. As one of the grounds for her alleged right to indemnification and advancement of legal costs, Maxwell alleges that separate and apart from Epstein's promises, Defendant "Indyke, in his capacity as an Executor of the Estate, also made assurances to Maxwell that Maxwell's legal fees and obligations would be reimbursed by Epstein and the Estate, and that Maxwell's legal fees and expenses would be paid going forward." Complaint, ¶ 21 (emphasis added). How this promise by Indyke squares with his "fiduciary duties to all who may have a beneficial interest in the estate," Opposition at 15, or to otherwise preserve Epstein Estate funds, Maxwell does not say.
+
+Nonetheless, her allegation that Indyke is offering up Epstein Estate funds for the legal defense of persons not specifically identified as Estate beneficiaries is borne out by Indyke and Kahn's recent admission to the Probate Court that this is exactly what they are doing. Their counsel's September 15, 2020 letter to the Probate Court acknowledges that "the Estate is indemnifying certain current and former employees of and professionals on behalf of one or more defendants in the Attorney General's suit." Ex. M hereto (Sept. 15, 2020 letter) at 2. Specifically, the Government has learned that the Estate is paying the legal fees for an immigration attorney it believes may have obtained visas for Epstein's trafficking victims. Paying the legal fees of individuals alleged to have participated in Epstein's trafficking enterprise demonstrates the Estate's interest in preventing the disclosure of information relevant to the Government's case in the Government's case, and belies Maxwell's assertion that the Government's and the Estate's interests in preservation of funds are perfectly aligned.
+
+At risk of stating the obvious, the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and its Co-Executors are not adequate representatives for the Government's interest in preserving the availability of Estate funds to satisfy a CICO action judgment based upon Epstein's sex-trafficking and other related criminal conduct. The Court therefore should grant the Government intervention as of right under Rule 24(a).
+
+### E. The Government Also Satisfies Rule 24(b)'s Requirements for Permissive Intervention.
+
+Maxwell's arguments for denying permissive intervention pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b) also have no merit and should be rejected if intervention as of right is denied (which it should not be).
+
+Maxwell first argues that permissive intervention should be denied because the Government's claims do not share "a common question of law or fact," V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B),
+
+with the claims in her indemnification action. See Opposition at 17. This is incorrect. The Government's CICO claims against Defendants, its investigated claims against Maxwell, and Maxwell's claims against Defendants all present the common question of: Who is liable to pay a judgment on the Government's CICO claims against Defendants (and/or Maxwell) for their involvement in or connection to the rape, abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Epstein and his associates?
+
+Numerous federal courts have addressed the question of whether a tort claim and an indemnification claim present a common question of law or fact, and concluded that they do. See Security Ins. Co., supra, 69 F.3d at 1381 (common question and independent jurisdiction requirements "are clearly met in this case"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l REO Mgmt, 205 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Thus, while the insurance contract may not be an issue in the underlying case in Superior Court, the factual similarities between the two cases are enough to establish a common question of fact. Specifically, both the present case and the underlying case arise from alleged carbon monoxide emissions from a furnace in the defendant's building that began on February 23, 1995. In addition, neither case can be decided without determining the source of the applicant's injuries. Accordingly, for purposes of [Federal] Rule 24(b), the court finds a common question of fact in the present lawsuit and the underlying lawsuit in Superior Court."). This Court should hold the same here.
+
+Maxwell's next and final argument is that the Government's intervention will cause undue delay and prejudice because the Government "proposes to inject legal issues that diverge substantially from those involved in this indemnification action." Opposition at 18. Not so.
+
+The only such issues Maxwell identifies are those "concerning the Government's intent to conduct a criminal investigation of Plaintiff within the context of this civil action." Id. This question, however, would be answered by the intervention itself. Once intervention is granted, the Government will seek to: (a) oppose unauthorized expenditures of Epstein Estate's funds, which Maxwell contends already is or should be the Estate's position, see Opposition at 16; and (b) enforce its investigatory subpoena against Maxwell, which raises a discrete question clearly answered under 14 V.I.C. § 612(a), as Maxwell also appears to recognize (but nonetheless wants to be answered in any other court where she has not yet consented to jurisdiction), see Opposition at 13-14.
+
+At bottom, the only thing the Government's intervention threatens is to provide facts answering the questions already raised by Maxwell's indemnification claim in this action. Maxwell seeks indemnification from the Epstein Estate based upon her purported "prior employment relationship" with Epstein and his businesses in connection with any claim "related to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims." Complaint, I 1 (emphasis added). The Epstein Estate's Co-Executors already are "indemnifying certain current and former employees of and professionals on behalf of Epstein's companies. Ex. M (Sept. 15, 2020 letter to Probate Court). Only the Government stands at the ready to determine:
+
+- what actual conduct by Epstein and Maxwell is at issue in connection with claims by Epstein's "alleged victims;"
+- whether the criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct that is alleged would fall within the scope of any purported employment relationship; and/or
+- whether, employment relationship or no, it is a legitimate expenditure of Epstein Estate funds to provide legal representation to persons connected to an alleged criminal sex-trafficking enterprise instead of preserving funds for the Estate's true beneficiaries and claimants.
+
+Thus, rather than unduly complicate this litigation, the Government's intervention would guide it towards a fact-based resolution of the issues Maxwell's indemnification claims actually present.
+
+For each of these reasons, the Court should grant permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) if intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) is denied (which it should not be).
+
+#### CONCLUSION
+
+For all of the reasons set forth herein and in the moving papers, the Court should grant the Government's motion to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) or else by permission under Rule 24(b).
+
+Respectfully submitted,
+
+DENISE N. ESQUIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL
+
+Dated: September 22. 2020 By: Ia o
+
+CAROL ESQ. Chief Deputy Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 3438 'Cron rindsens Gade St. U.S. Vi in Islands 00802 Email: (340) 774-5666 ext. 10101
+
+### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the foregoing Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R. Civ. P. 6-1(e) and a true and correct copy of the Motion was served via regular mail, postage prepaid, with a courtesy copy sent by email to counsel of record on September 22, 2020 to:
+
+KYLE R. WALDNER, ES QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4 Floor Miami, FL 33156 E-mail: kwaldner@qpwblaw.com & BOYER, P.A.
+
+DAVID CATTIE, ESQ. THE CATTIE LAW FIRM, P.C. 1710 Gade St. V.I., 00802 e-mail: david.cattie@cattie-law.com
+
+KROBLIN, ESQ. ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ., WILLIAM BLUM, ESQ. SHARI D'ANDRADE, ES . KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. , V.E. 00802-3602 Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com aheymann@solblum.com wblum@solblum.com sdandrade@kellfer.com mwhalen@kellfer.com
+
+ANDREW TOMBACK McLaughlin & Stem, LLP 260 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 United States Email: ATomback@mclaughlinstern.com DANIEL WEINER MARC A. WEINSTEIN! HUGHES HUBBARD & REID, LLP One Battery Park Plaza New York, NY 10004-1482 United States Email: daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com marc.weinstein@hugheshubbard.com
+
+> /S/ Carol CAROL ESQ. Chief Deputy Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 3438 !Cron rindsens Gade St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802 Email: (340) 774-5666 ext. 10101

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822288/EFTA02822288.md

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# FILED
+
+September 28. 2020
+
+#### TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OFTHE COURT
+
+UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+x
+
+UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INDICTMENT
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Defendant.
+
+x
+
+SEALED
+
+20 Cr.
+
+20 Cr. 330
+
+#### COUNT ONE
+
+(Conspiracy to Entice Minors to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts)
+
+The Grand Jury charges:
+
+#### OVERVIEW
+
+1. The charges set forth herein stem from the role of GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, in the sexual exploitation and abuse of multiple. minor girls by Jeffrey Epstein. In particular, from at least in or about 1994, up to and including at least in or about 1997, MAXWELL assisted, facilitated, and contributed to Jeffrey Epstein's abuse of minor girls by, among other things, helping Epstein to recruit, groom, and ultimately abuse victims known to MAXWELL and Epstein to be under the age of 18. The victims were as young as 14 years old when they were groomed and abused by MAXWELL and Epstein, both of whom knew that certain victims were in fact under the age of 18.
+
+2. As a part and in furtherance of their scheme to abuse minor victims, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, and Jeffrey Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to
+
+
+
+Epstein's residences in different states, which MAXWELL knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse. Moreover, in an effort to conceal her crimes, MAXWELL repeatedly lied when questioned about her conduct, including in relation to some of the minor victims described herein, when providing testimony under oath in 2016.
+
+# FACTUAL BACKGROUND
+
+3. During the time periods charged in this Indictment, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, had a personal and professional relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and was among his closest associates. In particular, between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, MAXWELL was in an intimate relationship with Epstein and also was paid by Epstein to manage his various properties. Over the course of their relationship, MAXWELL and Epstein were photographed together on multiple occasions, including in the below image:
+
+![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg)
+
+4. Beginning in at least 1994, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, enticed and groomed multiple minor girls to engage in sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, through a variety of means and methods, including but not limited to the following:
+
+a. MAXWELL first attempted to befriend some of Epstein's minor victims prior to their abuse, including by asking the victims about their lives, their schools, and their families. MAXWELL and Epstein would spend time building friendships with minor victims by, for example, taking minor victims to the movies or shopping. Some of these outings would involve MAXWELL and Epstein spending time together with a minor victim, while some would involve MAXWELL or Epstein spending time alone with a minor victim.
+
+b. Having developed a rapport with a victim, MAXWELL would try to normalize sexual abuse for a minor victim by, among other things, discussing sexual topics, undressing in front of the victim, being present when a minor victim was undressed, and/or being present for sex acts involving the minor victim and Epstein.
+
+c. MAXWELL'S presence during minor victims' interactions with Epstein, including interactions where the minor victim was undressed or that involved sex acts with Epstein, helped put the victims at ease because an adult woman was present. For example, in some instances, MAXWELL would
+
+massage Epstein in front of a minor victim. In other instances, MAXWELL encouraged minor victims to provide massages to Epstein, including sexualized massages during which a minor victim would be fully or partially nude. Many of those massages resulted in Epstein sexually abusing the minor victims.
+
+d. In addition, Epstein offered to help some minor victims by paying for travel and/or educational opportunities, and MAXWELL encouraged certain victims to accept Epstein's assistance. As a result, victims were made to feel indebted and believed that MAXWELL and Epstein were trying to help them.
+
+e. Through this process, MAXWELL and Epstein enticed victims to engage in sexual activity with Epstein. In some instances, MAXWELL was present for and participated in the sexual abuse of minor victims. Some such incidents occurred in the context of massages, which developed into sexual encounters.
+
+5. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated Jeffrey Epstein's access to minor victims knowing that he had a sexual preference for underage girls and that he intended to engage in sexual activity with those victims. Epstein's resulting abuse of minor victims included, among other things, touching a victim's breast, touching a victim's genitals, placing a sex toy such as a vibrator on a victim's genitals,
+
+directing a victim to touch Epstein while he masturbated, and directing a victim to touch Epstein's genitals.
+
+#### MAXWELL AND EPSTEIN'S VICTIMS
+
+6. Between approximately in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated Jeffrey Epstein's access to minor victims by, among other things, inducing and enticing, and aiding and abetting the inducement and enticement of, multiple minor victims. Victims were groomed and/or abused at multiple locations, including the following:
+
+a. A a multi-story private residence on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York owned by Epstein (the "New York Residence"), which is depicted in the following photograph:
+
+![](_page_4_Picture_5.jpeg)
+
+b. An estate in Palm Beach, Florida owned by Epstein (the "Palm Beach Residence"), which is depicted in the following photograph:
+
+![](_page_5_Picture_2.jpeg)
+
+c. A ranch in Santa Epstein (the "New Mexico Residence") following photograph: Fe, New Mexico owned by , which is depicted in the
+
+![](_page_5_Picture_4.jpeg)
+
+d. MAXWELL's personal residence in London, England.
+
+7. Among the victims induced or enticed by GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, were minor victims identified herein as Minor Victim-1, Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3. In particular, and during time periods relevant to this Indictment, MAXWELL engaged in the following acts, among others, with respect to minor victims:
+
+a. MAXWELL met Minor Victim-1 when Minor Victim-1 was approximately 14 years old. MAXWELL subsequently interacted with Minor Victim-1 on multiple occasions at Epstein's residences, knowing that Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18 at the time. During these interactions, which took place between approximately 1994 and 1997, MAXWELL groomed Minor Victim-1 to engage in sexual acts with Epstein through multiple means. First, MAXWELL and Epstein attempted to befriend Minor Victim-1, taking her to the movies and on shopping trips. MAXWELL also asked Minor Victim-1 about school, her classes, her family, and other aspects of her life. MAXWELL then sought to normalize inappropriate and abusive conduct by, among other things, undressing in front of Minor Victim-1 and being present when Minor Victim-1 undressed in front of Epstein. Within the first year after MAXWELL and Epstein met Minor Victim-1, Epstein began sexually abusing Minor Victim-1. MAXWELL was present for
+
+and involved in some of this abuse. In particular, MAXWELL involved Minor Victim-1 in group sexualized massages of Epstein. During those group sexualized massages, MAXWELL and/or Minor Victim-1 would engage in sex acts with Epstein. Epstein and MAXWELL both encouraged Minor Victim-1 to travel to Epstein's residences in both New York and Florida. As a result, Minor Victim-1 was sexually abused by Epstein in both New York and Florida. Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel across state lines for the purpose of sexual encounters with Epstein, and MAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with Minor Victim-1 after Minor-Victim-1 traveled to Epstein's properties, including in the context of a sexualized massage.
+
+b. MAXWELL interacted with Minor Victim-2 on at least one occasion in or about 1996 at Epstein's residence in New Mexico when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18. Minor Victim-2 had flown into New Mexico from out of state at Epstein's invitation for the purpose of being groomed for and/or subjected to acts of sexual abuse. MAXWELL knew that Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18 at the time. While in New Mexico, MAXWELL and Epstein took Minor Victim-2 to a movie and MAXWELL took Minor Victim-2 shopping. MAXWELL also discussed Minor Victim-2's school, classes, and family with Minor Victim-2. In New Mexico, MAXWELL began her efforts to groom Minor Victim-2 for abuse by Epstein by, among other things, providing
+
+an unsolicited massage to Minor Victim-2, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. MAXWELL also encouraged Minor Victim-2 to massage Epstein.
+
+c. MAXWELL groomed and befriended Minor Victim-3 in London, England between approximately 1994 and 1995, including during a period of time in which MAXWELL knew that Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18. Among other things, MAXWELL discussed Minor Victim-3's life and family with Minor Victim-3. MAXWELL introduced Minor Victim-3 to Epstein and arranged for multiple interactions between Minor Victim-3 and Epstein. During those interactions, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to massage Epstein, knowing that Epstein would engage in sex acts with Minor Victim-3 during those massages. Minor Victim-3 provided Epstein with the requested massages, and during those massages, Epstein sexually abused Minor Victim-3. MAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with Minor Victim-3 on multiple occasions, including at times when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, including in the context of a sexualized massage.
+
+# MAXWELL'S EFFORTS TO CONCEAL HER CONDUCT
+
+8. In or around 2016, in the context of a deposition as part of civil litigation, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, repeatedly provided false and perjurious statements, under oath, regarding, among other subjects, her role in facilitating the
+
+abuse of minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein, including some of the specific events and acts of abuse detailed above.
+
+#### STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS
+
+9. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, enticement, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422.
+
+10. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, would and did knowingly persuade, induce, entice, and coerce one and more individuals to travel in interstate and foreign commerce, to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422.
+
+# Overt Acts
+
+11. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
+
+a. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL participated in multiple group sexual encounters with Epstein and Minor Victim-1 in New York and Florida.
+
+b. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel from Florida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the New York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+c. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an unsolicited massage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless.
+
+d. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in London, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse Minor Victim-3 during those massages.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
+
+## COUNT TWO
+
+## (Enticement of a Minor to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts)
+
+
+12. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+13. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, knowingly did persuade, induce, entice, and coerce an individual to travel in interstate and foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, and attempted to do the same, and aided and abetted the same, to wit, MAXWELL persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced Minor Victim-1 to travel from Florida to New York, New York on multiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422 and 2.)
+
+## COUNT THREE (Conspiracy to Transport Minors with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity)
+
+
+14. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+15. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with each other to commit an offense against the United States, to
+
+wit, transportation of minors, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a).
+
+16. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others known and unknown, would and did, knowingly transport an individual who had not attained the age of 18 in interstate and foreign commerce, with intent that the individual engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a).
+
+# Overt Acts
+
+17. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
+
+a. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL participated in multiple group sexual encounters with EPSTEIN and Minor Victim-1 in New York and Florida.
+
+b. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel from Florida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the New York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+c. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an unsolicited massage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2 was topless.
+
+d. Between in or about 1994 and in or about 1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in London, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse Minor Victim-3 during those massages.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
+
+## COUNT FOUR (Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity)
+
+
+18. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+19. From at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, knowingly did transport an individual who had not attained the age of 18 in interstate and foreign commerce, with the intent that the individual engage in sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, and attempted to do so, and
+
+aided and abetted the same, to wit, MAXWELL arranged for Minor Victim-1 to be transported from Florida to New York, New York on multiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would engage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2423(a) and 2.)
+
+## COUNT FIVE (Perjury)
+
+
+20. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+21. On or about April 22, 2016, in the Southern District of New York, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having taken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in connection with a case then pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under docket number 15 Civ. 7344, knowingly made false material declarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined false testimony:
+
+- Q. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages? If you know.
+- A. I don't know what you're talking about.
+
+Q. List all the people under the age of 18 that you interacted with at any of Jeffrey's properties?
+
+A. I'm not aware of anybody that I interacted with, other than obviously [the plaintiff] who was 17 at this point.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.)
+
+## COUNT SIX (Perjury)
+
+
+22. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth within.
+
+23. On or about July 22, 2016, in the Southern District of New York, GRISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having taken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in connection with a case then pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under docket number 15 Civ. 7344, knowingly made false material declarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined false testimony:
+
+> Q: Were you aware of the presence of sex toys or devices used in sexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach house?
+
+A: No, not that I recall. . . .
+
+Q. Do you know whether Mr. Epstein possessed sex toys or devices used in sexual activities?
+
+A. No.
+
+. . .
+
+Q. Other than yourself and the blond and brunette that you have identified as having been involved in three-way sexual activities, with whom did Mr. Epstein have sexual activities?
+
+A. I wasn't aware that he was having sexual activities with anyone when I was with him other than myself.
+
+Q. I want to be sure that I'm clear. Is it your testimony that in the 1990s and 2000s, you were not aware that Mr. Epstein was having sexual activities with anyone other than yourself and the blond and brunette on those few occasions when they were involved with you?
+
+A. That is my testimony, that is correct.
+
+. . .
+
+Q. Is it your testimony that you've never given anybody a massage?
+
+A. I have not given anyone a massage.
+
+Q. You never gave Mr. Epstein a massage, is that your testimony?
+
+A. That is my testimony.
+
+Q. You never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage is your testimony?
+
+A. I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage.
+
+(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.)
+
+Form No. USA-33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58)
+
+## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
+
+#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+v.
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Defendant.
+
+### INDICTMENT
+
+(18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1623, 2422, 2423(a), and 2)
+
+> AUDREY STRAUSS Acting United States Attorney
+
+Foreperson

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822306/EFTA02822306.md

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# FILED
+
+September 28, 2020
+
+### TAMARA CHARLES IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS CLERK OF THE COURT DIVISION OF ST. & ST. JOHN
+
+CHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company
+
+Defendants.
+
+CIVIL NO. ST-20-CV-155
+
+# CO-EXECUTORS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
+
+DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and through their undersigned counsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), and on behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC ("NES"), an entity administered in probate by the Co-Executors as part of the Estate, respectfully submit this Reply Brief in further support of their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed in this action on May 1, 2020 (the "Motion to Dismiss").
+
+### I. MAXWELL'S CLAIM FOR COMMON LAW INDEMNIFICATION IS UNRIPE AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
+
+Maxwell initially filed her Complaint prematurely in violation of 15 V.I.C. § 606(a). (Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, 4-6.) After forcing the Co-Executors to file the Motion to Dismiss, Maxwell implicitly conceded her error and, on June 1, 2020, jointly moved with the Co-Executors for a stay of this action until the required one-year waiting period had passed. While the Court granted the stay on August 3, 2020, and Maxwell is no longer in violation of section 606(a), her claim for common law indemnification remains unripe for adjudication until judgments are rendered in the underlying actions against her pending in New York state and federal courts.
+
+Under the ripeness doctrine, courts in the Virgin Islands "will defer from ruling on a claim when ongoing or potential future litigation precludes an informed determination of the issues." v. =, 59 V.I. 611, 628 (V.I. 2013). For example, in =, the plaintiff, a convicted felon, pursued a legal malpractice action in Superior Court against his criminal defense attorney while his habeas corpus petitions were on appeal in federal and local courts and while the Ethics and Grievance Committee of the Virgin Islands Bar Association investigated the attorney's conduct. Id. at 615-20. After attorney moved to dismiss, the Superior Court considered claims on their merits, ultimately granting the motion. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision, holding that the Superior Court "committed a fundamental error" when it considered any aspect of claims on the merits rather than sua sponte dismissing the complaint for lack of ripeness. Id. at 621. Because criminal appeal and other related actions had not yet been decided (and he still had the ability to file additional habeas petitions), the Superior Court "severely disrupted comity amongst federal and local courts by creating inconsistent adjudications of essentially the same factual and legal issues." Id. at 630.
+
+Similarly, in Virgin Islands Government Hospitals and Health Facilities Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 50 V.I. 276 (V.I. 2008), the Supreme Court vacated an order granting an award of attorney's fees because "the presence of ongoing litigation precludes an informed determination of whether the moving party is in fact entitled to attorney's fees under the relevant law" and "the prevailing party [could not yet] be ascertained." Id. at 280-81. And in Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority v. Sound Solutions, LLC, the Superior Court dismissed a claim seeking costs and fees arising from an ongoing underlying case as unripe, holding that
+
+determination of the issue would "force this Court to assess and rule on whether Defendants' [underlying case] is meritorious before such a determination has been made in that case itself" and "there is a substantial possibility that the final disposition in [the underlying case] would moot this cause of action here, or at least substantially alter the appropriate remedy." No. ST-14-cv-558, 2015 WL 3429078, at \*4–5 (V.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 2015). As the *Sound Solutions* court found, "[i]t would be improper to allow this case to proceed when the relevant facts are so unstable." *Id.* at \*5.
+
+The same reasoning applies here, where the predicate criminal and civil actions accusing Maxwell of sexual abuse and other misconduct are pending in front of various state and federal courts.{sup}`1` As a matter of public policy, Maxwell cannot be indemnified for intentional wrongdoing, including criminal conduct.{sup}`2` As a result, any determination of Maxwell's common law
+
+---
+
+1. 1. The Co-Executors previously described the civil actions pending against Maxwell in the New York state and federal courts. (Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.3.) On June 29, 2020, Maxwell was criminally indicted in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, enticement of a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and two counts of perjury. (See Indictment, a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit D** (Exhibits A-C were attached to the original Motion to Dismiss).) Her criminal trial is scheduled to begin in New York federal court on July 12, 2021.
+2. 2. As this Court has held, "an agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the interests of the public . . . . The Court has a duty to refuse to enforce a contract that is contrary to public policy and tends to injure the public good." *Berne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands*, 46 V.I. 106, 115 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2004). Courts across the country—including in New York, where the underlying actions against Maxwell are pending—hold that indemnification for intentional wrongdoing is against public policy because it would promote illegality and allow a wrongdoer to cause intentional injury with impunity. *See, e.g., Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.*, 66 N.Y.2d 674, 676 (1985) (indemnification of party for "damages flowing from the intentional causation of injury" void as against public policy); *Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar*, 60 P.3d 746, 750 (Colo. App. 2002) ("Public policy prohibits 'indemnifying a party for damages resulting from intentional or willful wrongful acts.'") (quoting *Bohrer v. Church Mut. Ins. Co.*, 12 P.3d 854, 856 (Colo. App. 2000)); *In re RFC and RESCAP Liquidating Tr. Action*, 332 F.Supp. 3d 1101, 1134–35 (D. Minn. 2018) (indemnification void as against public policy "where the indemnitor shows that the indemnitee's underlying conduct was intentional, willful, or wanton"). *See also* Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22(e) ("Except for contractual indemnity, a vicariously liable person can obtain indemnity from the person whose negligence was imputed only
+
+indemnification claim in this proceeding risks inconsistent adjudication, wastes judicial resources, and threatens to disrupt comity between New York and Virgin Islands courts. In addition, if Maxwell's claim is allowed to proceed, discovery and fact-finding will have to be duplicated, and discovery in this case regarding the facts and circumstances of the underlying civil and criminal cases against Maxwell will have to be taken while those underlying cases are ongoing. Moreover, common law indemnity may not apply at all if any of numerous different events relating to the underlying proceedings occur, including if Maxwell is found (1) guilty of the crimes with which she is charged, or (2) civilly liable due to her own misconduct toward young girls, rather than her performance of legitimate, employment-related duties for Mr. Epstein or his affiliated businesses. In these circumstances, the doctrine of ripeness requires dismissal of Maxwell's common law indemnification claim.3
+
+The authorities Maxwell cites in her Opposition reinforce the Co-Executors' position. Those sources make clear that, because an indemnitee must discharge liability of the indemnitor in order to receive indemnification, an indemnitee may not plead a claim for common law indemnity unless it is (i) in the original suit, while that original suit is pending, or (ii) in a separate,
+
+if the vicariously liable person is not independently liable."); 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:19 (4th ed.) (indemnification agreements "tending to promote a breach of duty to the public" generally not upheld). Cf. Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.1.23, 34 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2017) (conducting an analysis under Banks v. International Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011), and finding that the Virgin Islands recognizes common law indemnification "when an innocent party is held vicariously liable for the actions of the true torffiasorl (emphasis in original).
+
+{sup}`3.` Courts in other jurisdictions also have found unripe claims for common law indemnification brought in a separate action prior to determination of the underlying proceedings. See, e.g., Medline Indus., Inc. v. Ram Med., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966-67 (N.D. III. 2012) (dismissing claim for common law indemnification under Illinois law as unripe when no underlying judgments had yet been rendered); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kingsway Am. Agency, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1195, 2013 WL 214634, at •10 (M.D. Penn. Jan. 18, 2013) (same, under Pennsylvania law); Gramercy Advisors, LLC v. BDO USA, LLP, No. FSTCV136020625S, 2015 WL 2191655, at \*3-4 (Conn. Sup Ct. Apr. 9, 2015) (same, under Connecticut law).
+
+"subsequent suit against the indemnitor." Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22, cmt. i (emphasis added) (listing cases); see also Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.I. 23, 30 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss counterclaims for common law indemnification where claims were brought in original tort suit); Manbodh v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. (In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Lit. Series), 47 V.I. 375 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2006) (in original tort action where various parties brought claims for common law indemnification against third-party defendants, converting motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment and holding that the Restatement (Third) of Torts set forth applicable law). None of these sources supports Maxwell's argument that she may pursue this independent action for common law indemnification while the underlying actions against her—both criminal and civil—remain pending in other jurisdictions.
+
+In particular, Maxwell's contention that Willie "expressly allows a party to 'plead' a common law indemnification claim before a judgment has been rendered," is critically misleading as applied to the present facts. (See Opposition at 6.) In performing a Banks analysis to determine the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands with respect to common law indemnification,' the Willie court canvassed Virgin Islands precedent since 1980, concluding that there are two types of common law indemnification cases. In the first type of indemnity case, a party may plead an indemnity claim before it is found liable if it does so "through a counterclaim or third-party complaint" in the underlying liability action. Id. This was the situation in Willie. In the second type of case, a party may bring a separate claim for indemnification "after a party has been found liable" in the underlying liability action. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in a separate action for indemnification—such as the present case—a purported indemnitee (here, Maxwell) may not
+
+{sup}`4.` Until the Supreme Court rules on this issue, it remains an open question whether a claim for common law indemnification is a viable cause of action in the Virgin Islands post-Banks.
+
+assert a claim for common law indemnification unless and until her liability has been determined in the underlying actions.{sup}`5`
+
+## II. MAXWELL'S CLAIM AGAINST NES FAILS.<sup>6</sup>
+
+### A. The Court Should Dismiss Maxwell's Claim Against NES as a Matter of Law.
+
+Maxwell alleges upon information and belief that NES's governing corporate documents entitle her to the advancement of expenses and indemnification that she now demands. (Compl.
+
+---
+
+5. All three of the other decisions cited by Plaintiff—*Vandenhouten v. Olde Towne Tours, LLC*, No. 20008-41, 2009 WL 1956360, at \*5 (D.V.I. July 8, 2009), [REDACTED] v. *Sunrise Med. (US), LLC*, No. 2012/29, 2013 WL 3775461, at \*6 (D.V.I. July 17, 2013) and *Manbodh*, 47 V.I. 392-95—are the first type of case, where an indemnity claim was asserted in an existing action as a counterclaim or third-party claim, and are therefore inapplicable here. Moreover, while Maxwell incorrectly asserts that *Manbodh* is directly contrary to the relevant holding in *Willie, Manbodh* says nothing about bringing a separate claim for indemnification while the underlying action remains pending, and that was not the situation faced by that court. Instead, *Manbodh* holds that the Restatement (Third) of Torts, rather than the First or Second Restatements, sets forth applicable law. *Id.* at 392-94. As discussed above, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that a claim for indemnification may be brought in the original underlying action or a subsequent suit:
+
+Except when a contract for indemnity provides otherwise . . . an indemnitee must extinguish the liability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The indemnitee may do so either by a settlement with the plaintiff that by its terms or by application of law discharges the indemnitor from liability or by satisfaction of judgment that by operation of law discharges the indemnitor from liability. . . . An indemnitee may, however, assert a *claim* for indemnity and obtain a contingent judgment *in an action where the indemnitee is sued by the plaintiff as permitted by procedural rules*, even though liability of the indemnitor has not yet been discharged.
+
+Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22(b) (emphasis added, in part); *see also* cmt. i (quoted above), notes to cmt. i ("[V]irtually all states permit the indemnitee to assert his claim in the original suit, by cross-complaint or impleader, or in a *subsequent* suit against the indemnitor.") (emphasis added).
+
+6. The Court also should dismiss Maxwell's claims against the Estate itself. While Maxwell continues to incorrectly assert that the Estate is a legal entity that can be sued (*see* Opposition at 3-4), it is a basic tenet of trusts and estates law that "[a]n estate is not a person or a legal entity and cannot sue or be sued; an estate can only act by and through a personal representative and therefore any action must be brought by or against the executor or representative of the estate." 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 847; *see also, e.g.*, 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 1141 (2016) ("Since estates are not natural or artificial persons, and they lack legal capacity to sue or be sued, an action against an estate must be brought against an administrator or executor as the representative of the estate."); [REDACTED] v. *Estate of Kilburn*, No. 3:13-cv-00627-LRH-WGC, 2014 WL 3613701, at \*3 (D. Nev. July 21, 2014) ("It has long been recognized that an estate is not a legal entity, but rather a collection of assets and liabilities. Consequently, an estate cannot sue or be sued, and it is thus proper to name the representative
+
+1 47.) However, when presented with the actual corporate document in question—the NES Operating Agreement—Maxwell ignores the effect of that document, which unambiguously allows NES to decline her claims for indemnification and advancement of fees and expenses. (See Motion to Dismiss 6—8)7 Instead, Maxwell contends that she should be allowed to conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of finding some other document that might undermine the unambiguous language of NES's Operating Agreement. That is not the law.
+
+As Maxwell acknowledges, courts deciding a motion to dismiss may consider "items of unquestioned authenticity that are referred to in the challenged pleading and are integral to the pleader's claim for relief." (Opposition at 11 n.7.) Put another way, this Court is free to consider "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleadings." Groff v. Cane Bay Partners VI, LLLP, No. SX-15-CV-127, 2017 WL 2709832, at •1-2 (V.1. Super. Ct. June 20, 2017). "The reasoning underlying this approach is particularly sound where the exhibit being considered is the very document forming the basis of a plaintiff's complaint." Id. at • 1.8
+
+of the estate, rather than the estate itself, as a party."). This principle is reflected in 15 V.1.C. § 606 ("Commencement of action against executor or administrator"). While Maxwell cites cases in which an estate has been named as a defendant, there is no indication that the status of the estate as a entity with the capacity to be sued was at issue in any of those proceedings. The Court should decline Maxwell's invitation to create law recognizing an estate as a separate legal entity here.
+
+- 7. The NES Operating Agreement also forbids indemnification for "fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional misconduct." (NES Operating Agreement, attached as Exhibit C to the Motion to Dismiss, § VI.B.1.)
+- 8. As discussed in the Co-Executors' opening brief (Motion to Dismiss at 6-7 & n.7), the "incorporation by reference" doctrine "permits a court to review the actual document referenced in the complaint 'to ensure that the plaintiff has not misrepresented its contents and that any inference the plaintiff seeks to have drawn is a reasonable one' . . . [and] 'limits the ability of the plaintiff to take language out of context?" Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Daniel, No. SX-05-CV- 165, 2020 WL 1819622, at •8 (V.1. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2020) (quoting Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 797 (Del. Ch. 2016), overruled in part on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933, 939 (Del. 2019)). "Without the ability to consider the document at issue in its entirety, complaints that quoted
+
+Here, Maxwell does not contest the authenticity of the NES Operating Agreement attached to the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss.9 And the NES Operating Agreement is "integral" to Maxwell's claim that she is entitled to mandatory indemnification and the advancement of fees and a myriad of other costs due to the "corporate organizational documents for NES." (Compl. 1 47.) Under applicable New York law, I° "[t]he operating agreement is the primary governing instrument for" a New York LLC, and must contain "any provision not inconsistent with law or its articles of organization relating to (i) the business of the LLC, (ii) the conduct of its affairs and (iii) the rights, powers, preferences, limitations or responsibilities of its members, managers, employees or agents." N.Y. Limit. Liab. Co. Ch. 34, Refs & Annos § 5.1. In other words, Maxwell's claim for contractual indemnification is based on her allegations about the contents of NES's corporate organization documents and, under New York law, the NES Operating Agreement is NES's corporate organization document. See Groff, 2017 WL 2709832, at \*1-2 (in a case asserting claims for breach of an employment agreement and breach of the implied covenant
+
+only selected and misleading portions of such documents could not be dismissed under Rule I2(b)(6) even though they would be doomed to failure." Id. In addition, the Court may consider "a document attached to a motion to dismiss ... if the attached document is: "(1) central to the Plaintiff's claim; and (2) undisputed." Id. (quoting Ackah v. Hershey Foods Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (M.D. Pa. 2002)). That is the case here.
+
+- 9. While Maxwell argues that the Court cannot consider the NES Operating Agreement because "[t]he operative operating agreements are not in her possession," there is no legal or factual basis to believe that an earlier, different version of the NES Operating Agreement even existed. (Tellingly, the language of the NES Operating Agreement does not reference or purport to amend any prior operating agreements.) Maxwell cites no support for the proposition that she can allege, upon information and belief, what she believes a purported previous operating agreement may say and then defeat the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss based on the NES Operating Agreement by simply claiming that she does not have that supposed earlier document.
+- 10. NES is a New York limited liability company governed by New York law. (See Complaint p. 1 (identifying NES as a "New York Limited Liability Company"); Operating Agreement §§ I, VIII.E.)
+
+of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the original offer letter and form employment contract can be considered on motion to dismiss).
+
+To the extent that Maxwell now argues that her claim for indemnification from NES is based on an implied or unwritten corporate obligation that she might find evidence of, if only she were allowed to rummage through NES's files, this argument is barred by the New York Statute of Frauds. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(2) (requiring an agreement to be in writing if "by its terms is not to be performed within one year of the making thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime" or it "[i]s a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person")." Such an argument is also barred by the Virgin Islands Statute of Frauds. 28 V.I.C. § 244 (2019) (voiding any unwritten agreement that (1) "by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof" or (2) constitutes "[a] special promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of another person"); see, e.g., Guye v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of the Virgin Islands, Inc., No. SX-10-CV-119, 2011 WL 13116070, at \*3- 4 (V.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss claim for the alleged breach of an employment agreement pursuant to the Virgin Islands Statute of Frauds where plaintiff did not assert the existence of a valid, written agreement); Arawak Foods, Inc. v. Lawaetz, No. 764/1983, 1985 WL 1264047, at \*3 (Terr. V.I. Feb. 21, 1985) (letter stating that defendant personally
+
+{sup}`11.` New York limited liability companies without written operating agreements apply the default provisions set forth in New York statutes, which permit—but do not require—a company to choose to indemnify employees under certain circumstances. See, e.g., In re Eight of Swords, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 839, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (when no written operating agreement exists, the LLC is subject to the "numerous sections in the [Limited Liability Company Law] that set forth default provisions applicable to the limited liability company"); N.Y. Limit. Liab. Co. § 420.
+
+guaranteed that a corporation's debt would be paid found insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds). 12
+
+Materials outside of the NES Operating Agreement likewise are insufficient to undermine the unambiguous language of that Agreement. See, e.g., Borriello v. Loconte, No. 503180/2013, 2014 WL 702172, at \*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014) (finding that, where operating agreement provided for indemnification but was silent on the issue of advancement of fees, LLC members could not vote to advance legal fees); N.Y. Limit. Liab. Co. Ch. 34, Refs & Annos § 5.2.2 (material outside of written operating agreement insufficient to find obligation in face of written operating agreement). Finally, Maxwell's assertions that there are "presumably" or "surely" earlier operating agreements of NES and that she "may" have rights pursuant to those agreements (Opposition at 9-10) are mere speculation—not even rising to the level of factual allegations insufficient to support her complaint. See, e.g., Brathwaite v. HD.V.I. Holding Co., Inc., No. ST-I6-CV-764, 2017 WL 2295123 at \*2 (V.I. Super. Ct. May 24, 2017) (a complaint must "adequately allgen facts that put an accused on notice of claims brought against it") (emphasis added). 13
+
+{sup}`12.` To the extent that Maxwell's first cause of action is based on an alleged oral promise, it is likewise barred in its entirety by the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., MacKay v. Paesano, 185 A.D.3d 915, 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (where breach of contract action dismissed based on Statute of Frauds, promissory estoppel claim also correctly dismissed as an impermissible attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds).
+
+{sup}`13.` Maxwell does not respond to that portion of the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss Count Three of her Complaint to the extent it seeks contractual indemnification from "other entities" not named as defendants. (Motion to Dismiss at 8 n.8.) As the Complaint fails to allege the necessary elements of a claim for contractual indemnification against these additional entities, the Court should dismiss Count Three as against them.
+
+### B. In the Alternative, the Court Should Convert this Motion to a Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismiss Maxwell's Claim Against NES.
+
+To the extent that the Court concludes that it may not consider the NES Operating Agreement on this motion to dismiss, the Court should convert this proceeding to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(d) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Stanley v. Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections, No. ST-16-MC-075, 2020 WL 1639902, at \*5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2020) (holding that the notice requirement of Rule 12(d) was satisfied where moving party attached material outside of pleadings, opposing party noted that it was outside of pleadings and that, in consideration thereof, the Cout would convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, and opponent received additional time to respond in order to provide contrary factual materials). "[W]hen considering a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge can consider material outside the pleadings, including affidavits, responses to discovery, and other evidence to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact." Racz v. Cheetham, ST-17-CV-461, 2019 WL 7985359, at \*2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2019) (granting summary judgment).
+
+Summary judgment is appropriate where, as here, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." V.I. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). Once the party moving for summary judgment has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact, "the responding party must introduce some evidence showing a genuine issue for trial. To carry this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on its allegations alone, but must present actual evidence, amounting to more than a scintilla, in support of its position." v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority, 67 V.I. 727, 742 (V.I. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While the nonmovant may show "by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition," V.I. R. Civ. Proc. 56(d),
+
+it cannot require additional discovery without showing that "the facts sought exist." Family Home and Finance Center, Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Morig. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment despite nonmovant's argument that discovery was needed to oppose); see also, e.g., Carney v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming grant of summary judgment where nonmovant merely speculated about evidence that could be adduced in discovery).
+
+As discussed above and in the Motion to Dismiss, the language of the NES Operating Agreement unambiguously demonstrates that NES has no obligation to indemnify Maxwell or advance her fees and expenses. (See Motion to Dismiss at 6-9 & Ex. C.) Even if Maxwell could adduce evidence of an implied agreement or oral promise for indemnification, such an agreement or promise could not give rise to an enforceable indemnification obligation. (Supra § ILA.) And while Maxwell speculates (again, without basis in law or fact) that there are "presumably" earlier operating agreements of NES and that she "may" have rights pursuant to those hypothetical agreements (Opposition at 9-10), such speculation—which does not even rise to the level of a factual allegation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss—is insufficient to meet Maxwell's burden here. Because no genuine dispute of material fact exists and Maxwell offers nothing more than her mere hope that discovery could possibly reveal something that might support her claim, the Court should dismiss Maxwell's claim against NES.
+
+# III. CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons set forth herein and in the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss, the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.14
+
+{sup}`14.` In recent briefing on its motion to intervene in this action, the Government of the Virgin Islands asserts that, where Maxwell's claims for indemnification are concerned, "the Epstein Estate and its Co-
+
+Respectfully,
+
+Dated: September 28, 2020 /s/ Kroblin KROBLIN, ESQ. ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ. WILLIAM L. BLUM, ESQ. SHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ MARJORIE WHALEN, ESQ. V.I. Bar Nos. 966 266 136, 1221 & R2019 KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. M, V.I. 00802 Telephone: (340) 779-2564 Facsimile: (888) 316-9269 Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com aheymann@solblum.com wblum@solblum.com sdandrade@kellfer.com mwhalen@kellfer.com
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28'h day of September 2020, I caused a true and exact copy of the foregoing Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, which complies with the page or word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), to be served via VIJEFS upon:
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, Quintairos, Prieto, & Boyer, P.A. 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4'h Floor Miami, FL 33156 lovaldner®qpwblaw.com /s/ Kroblin
+
+Executors clearly arc inadequate to represent the Government's interest in preserving Estate Funds . . . ," bizarrely accepting as gospel truth Maxwell's allegation that one of the Co-Executors orally agreed to indemnify her. (Gov't of the U.S. Virgin Islands' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene, dated September 22, 2020, at 4 (emphasis in original).) That is nonsense: as the Court is well aware, the Co-Executors refused to indemnify Maxwell. Maxwell brought this action seeking to obtain indemnification; by this Motion, the Co-Executors seek to dismiss Maxwell's claims for indemnification in their entirety.

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822319/EFTA02822319.md

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+**FILED**  
+February 11, 2021  
+ST-2020-CV-00155  
+TAMARA CHARLES  
+CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS**  
+District of St. [REDACTED] /St. John
+
+**GHISLAINE MAXWELL,**  
+**Plaintiff**
+
+v.
+
+Case Number: ST-2020-CV-00155  
+Action: Debt
+
+**ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN et al,**  
+**Defendant.**
+
+**NOTICE of ENTRY**  
+**of**  
+**AN ORDER**
+
+To: Kyle R. Waldner, Esq.
+
+Hon.Judge Harold W.L. Willocks
+
+
+
+Please take notice that on February 11, 2021
+
+a(n) \_\_\_\_\_
+
+**ORDER**
+
+dated FEBRUARY 11, 2021 was/were entered  
+by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
+
+Dated: February 11, 2021
+
+Tamara Charles  
+Clerk of the Court
+
+By:
+
+**Donna Donovan**  
+Court Clerk Supervisor

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822320/EFTA02822320.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+## FILED
+
+February 11, 2021 5T-2020-CV-QOM TAMARA CHARLES CI.ERK OF THE COURT
+
+## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. fl AND ST. JOHN
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, A New York Limited Liability Company,
+
+Defendants.
+
+CASE NO. ST-20-CV-155
+
+## ORDER
+
+THE COURT, sua sponte, and the premises having been considered, it is hereby
+
+ORDERED that, pursuant to V.I.R. Civ. P. 92(e)(1), this matter is forwarded to the
+
+Complex Division to consider and determine whether this case should be treated as complex.
+
+ORDERED that copies of this order shall be distributed to the Presiding Judge and counsel
+
+of record.
+
+DATED: February 11, 2021
+
+ATTEST: TAMARA CHARLES Cler oft Court
+
+BY:
+
+D I NA DONO AN Curt Clerk Supervisor Ju M. Tejo rior Court e Virgin Islands

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822321/EFTA02822321.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+FILED
+
+March 11. 2021
+
+ST-20,10-Cv-0011,1,
+
+TAMARA CHARLES
+
+CI1RK OF THE COURT
+
+## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT VIRGIN ISLANDS District of St. St. John
+
+GHISIAINE MAXWELL, Plaintiff,
+
+V.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E EPSTEIN, et al., Defendants.
+
+To:
+
+Case Number: ST-2020-CV-00155 Action: Debt
+
+## NOTICE of ENTRY of ORDER
+
+K le R. Waldner, Esq.
+
+A. Kroblin, Esq.
+
+Ariel M. , Esq., AAG
+
+Please take notice that on March 17, 2021
+
+a(n) ORDER
+
+dated March 17, 2021 was/were entered by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.
+
+Dated: March 17, 2021
+
+By:
+
+Tamara Charles Clerk of the Court
+
+Cheryl Court Clerk DI

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822322/EFTA02822322.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+March 17, 2021
+
+ST-2020-CV-00155
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF St / St JOHN
+
+Case No. ST-2020-CV-00155
+
+PLAINTIFF, Action for Indemnification
+
+v.
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; DARREN K. INDYKE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; RICHARD D. KAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN; AND NES, LLC, A NEW YORK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
+
+DEFENDANTS.
+
+## ORDER
+
+THIS MATTER was referred, sua spume, by Order dated and entered February II, 2021, to determine whether the case should be treated as complex. The Court issues this Order to set a briefing schedule for the parties to follow in addressing that question. Additionally, upon reviewing the case, the Court notes that the Government of the Virgin Islands ("Government") moved to intervene. Assuming, for purposes of this determination only, that the motion would be granted, the Court will allow the Government to be heard as to whether complex treatment is appropriate. The Court takes judicial notice that a similar order was entered on March 12, 2021, in Case No. ST-2020-CV-00014, Goventment of the Virgin Islands r. Dart-en K. hidyke, e at, setting a briefing schedule for the parties to follow as to whether that case should be designated as complex. Considering that the Co-Executors are parties in both cases, and in the related probate matter, and further that the Co-Executors filed the motion in Case No. ST-2020- CV-00014 to designate it as complex, the Court will direct them to respond first, whether in support or in opposition to complex treatment, followed by Plaintiff Ghislane Maxwell and the Government. Further
+
+**ORDER**
+
+
+
+response by the Co-Executors will only be permitted on motion showing cause but should be accompanied by the proposed surresponse, if any.
+
+Accordingly, it is hereby
+
+**ORDERED** that the Co-Executors **MAY SERVE** and **FILE** a response in writing **within ten (10) days** from the date of entry of this Order addressing whether this case should be designated as complex and/or assigned to the same judge as Case No. ST-2020-CV-00014 to avoid delay and inconsistent rulings. Plaintiff Ghislane Maxwell and the Government of the Virgin Islands **MAY SERVE** and **FILE** a reply to the Co-Executors' response **within fifteen (15) days** from the date the Co-Executors file their response, if any, or if none, then **within fifteen (15) days** from when the response was due. It is further
+
+**ORDERED** that failure to file a response or reply will be construed as no objection to designating this case as complex or assigning it to the same judge as the other related cases. No extensions of time will be granted given the length of time that has already passed since the February 11, 2021 Order was entered without response from the current or prospective parties. Lastly, the Court will make its decision based on the papers without oral argument.
+
+A copy of this Order shall be served on Kyle R. Waldner, Esq., [REDACTED] Kroblin, Esq., and Assistant Attorney General Ariel M. [REDACTED], Esq.
+
+**DONE and so ORDERED this 17{sup}`th` day of March, 2021.**
+
+**HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS  
+Presiding Judge of the Superior Court**
+
+**ATTEST:**  
+TAMARA CHARLES  
+Clerk of the Court
+

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822324/EFTA02822324.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Hatch 29, 2021
+
+ST-2020-CV-00155
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DISTRICT OF ST. & ST. JOHN
+
+\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+CIVIL NO. ST-2020-CV-00155
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+v.
+
+) ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN) K. INDYICE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF ) THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, ) RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as ) EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY ) E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York ) Limited Rabin() Company, ) ) Delcodams. ) )
+
+## BRIEF PURSUANT TO COURT'S MARCH 17, 2021 ORDER
+
+COME NOW the Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate"), DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, and hereby submit this brief pursuant to the Court's March 17, 2021 Order.
+
+#### DISCUSSION
+
+The Court's March 17, 2021 Order requests that the Estate address whether this case should be: (i) designated as complex, and (ii) assigned to the same judge as Case No. ST-2020- CV-00014 to avoid delay or inconsistent rulings.
+
+The Court should not designate this matter complex. A "complex" case "requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel." V.I. R. Civ. P. 92(a). This is not such a case. Rather, it is a simple, one (1) issue dispute—whether Maxwell is entitled to indemnification of legal fees. Moreover, the Rule 92(c) factors do not weigh in favor of complex designation: the action
+
+does not involve a large number of parties, claims, or claimants; the case does not require special expertise or case processing by the Complex Litigation Division judge or staff; and the case does not implicate the various potential efficiencies of coordinated proceedings.
+
+Nor would coordination of this matter with Case No. ST-2020-CV-00014 (the "CICO action") significantly advance judicial efficiency. As noted above, this matter is a simple one, based on a nine (9) page complaint asserting three (3) indemnification claims and seeking as its sole remedy indemnification of legal fees and costs. The pending motion to dismiss in this matter raises two (2) arguments. By contrast, the Government's proposed Second Amended Complaint in the CICO action is seventy-six (76) pages long, asserts twenty-six (26) CICO claims, alleges a multi-decade long criminal enterprise, and seeks a laundry list of remedies, including forfeiture, divestiture, the dissolution of entities, injunctions, revocation of licenses, receivership, monetary penalties, and punitive damages. The Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint raises at least ten (10) separate legal issues, none of which overlap with the issues raised in the motion to dismiss in this matter. Given the distinct nature of the claims and legal issues presented in the two matters, there is little risk of inconsistent rulings should the cases remain assigned to different judges. Nor are there issues of delay in either matter that would be alleviated by coordination of both matters before a single judge.
+
+# CONCLUSION
+
+For the reasons set forth above, the Court should not designate this matter complex nor assign the case to the same judge assigned to the CICO action.
+
+Respectfully,
+
+Dated: March 29, 2021 /s/ Kroblin KROBLIN, ESQ. SHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ. MARJORIE WHALEN, ESQ. V.I. Bar Nos. .966 1 1221 & R2019 KELLERHALS KROBLIN PLLC Palms Professional Building 9053 Estate M, Suite 101 St. V.I. 00802 Telephone: (340) 779-2564 Facsimile: (888) 316-9269 Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com sdandrade@kellfer.com mwhalen®kellfer.com
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of March 2021, I caused a true and exact copy of the foregoing Brief in Response to Court's March 17, 2021 Order, which complies with the page or word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), to be served via VIJEFS upon:
+
+Kyle R. Waldner, • Quintairos, Prieto, & Boyer, P.A. 9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4'b Floor Miami, FL 33156 kwaldner®qpwblaw.com
+
+Mel M. =, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade St. U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
+
+// Kroblin

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marker2-fixhub/court-maxwell-v-estate/EFTA02822327/EFTA02822327.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+## FILED
+
+April 02, 2021
+
+51-2020-CV-00155
+
+TAMARA CHARLES CLERK OF THE COURT
+
+## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. AND ST. JOHN
+
+GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
+
+Plaintiff,
+
+Case No. ST-20-CV-155
+
+v.
+
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN K. )
+
+INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE )
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD )
+
+D. KAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF THE )
+
+ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, )
+
+LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company )
+
+
+Defendants. )
+
+
+## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
+
+COMES NOW, C. Rhea, Esq., of C. Rhea, P.C., and enters his appearance as counsel for Defendant Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and requests that copies of all further pleadings and filings be delivered to him at the address appearing below.
+
+Dated: April 2, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,
+
+A MI sabgu
+
+C. Rhea, Esq.
+
+VI Bar No. 220
+
+C. Rhea, PC
+
+1533 Appling Dr.
+
+Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
+
+340-2444058
+
+grhea@rpwb.com
+
+## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
+
+I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 2, 2021, I filed the foregoing, which complies with the page and/or word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), with the Clerk of the Court using the Court's electronic filing system and selected the "eService" method to automatically serve the following individuals:
+
+K le Waldner, Esq.
+
+Kroblin, Esq.
+
+Shari N. D'Andrade, Esq.
+
+Carol Esq.
+
+Is! C. Rhea

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