diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74e8c4f2cc02a2b8eb9d12320dc6630a6dfdac0e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.md @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +## COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES + +DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL + +Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Doe" or "Plaintiff') alleges as follows: + +#### INTRODUCTION + +I. This case arises out of years of sexual abuse and exploitation of a young girl by notorious pedophile and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). It all started in 1994 when 13-year-old Jane Doe met Epstein and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") at a summer camp in Michigan. Jane Doe was their first known victim and was subsequently abused by Epstein and Maxwell for years as a young girl, suffering unimaginable physical and psychological trauma and distress. Despite that, Jane Doe has persevered and survived to tell her story, to hold her perpetrators accountable and to seek justice for the atrocities committed against her. + +2. Throughout his life, Epstein systematically perpetrated acts of molestation. exploitation, assault and rape on hundreds of young girls. Epstein's system of abuse was facilitated in large part by his co-conspirator and accomplice, Maxwell, who helped supply him with a steady stream of young and vulnerable girls—many of whom were fatherless, like Jane Doe, and came from struggling families. + +2 3 3. This system, which took years to develop, all started with them exploiting and abusing Jane Doe who they used as a guinea pig to refine their criminal enterprise and widen their network of additional sexual abuse victims. + +#### 4 THE PARTIES + +5 6 7 4. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of the State of California. At all times relevant to this suit, Doe was a minor child living in Florida and New York and who was sexually abused while she was a minor by Defendants in New York. + +8 5. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in the State of New York. + +9 10 6. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +12 7. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +18 19 9. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands at the time of his death. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. The matter in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, and therefore jurisdiction in this Court is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). + +20 10. Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in New York. + +21 22 11. A substantial part of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, thus venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). + +#### 23 JURY DEMAND + +24 12. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all of her claims in this action. + +#### 25 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +#### 26 Epstein and Maxwell's Abuse of Doe + +27 28 13. In the summer of 1994, Jane Doe met Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell at Interlochen Arts Camp in Michigan when she was only 13-years-old. Doe was there as a student + +## JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +8. Plaintiff is domiciled in California. + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in the voice program. Doe was sitting alone on a bench between classes when Epstein and Maxwell approached her. Epstein bragged to her about being a patron of the arts and giving scholarships to talented young artists like Doe. Epstein and Maxwell probed her at length about her background, family situation and where she lived. As Doe got up to leave, Epstein requested her mother's phone number back in Florida. She was alarmed by his request, but also feared that she could not refuse the older man's request so she complied and provided him with the phone number. + +8 9 10 14. Several weeks later, once Doe had returned from Michigan to Florida, Epstein called Doe's home. Epstein first spoke with Doe's mother about how he mentors young kids and provides scholarships for the arts. He requested to speak to Doe and invited her and her mother to his mansion in Palm Beach. He sent a driver across town to pick them up. + +-a II -a O act 021 a 14 x 1 cn fa z + +12 5 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 15. Over the course of the next several months, Epstein and Maxwell attempted to groom and mentor 13-year-old Jan Doe. Epstein gave himself the name of Doe's "godfather" while Maxwell acted like an older sister to her. They took her to movies, went shopping with her and lounged around Epstein's estate with her. Epstein and Maxwell then started to make sexual references when they were with her. For instance, Maxwell told Doe that having sex with exboyfriends was easy because once you slept with them "they've been grandfathered in and you could go back and flick them whenever you wanted." Epstein also started to slowly display his pedophilic ways when shopping with Doe and Maxwell. Instead of Doe picking out clothes she wanted to wear, Epstein insisted that she pick out and wear little children's cotton underwear. Also, after nearly every visit with Epstein and Maxwell, Epstein sent Doe home with two or three one-hundred-dollar bills to give her mother since "she's having a hard time and struggling as a widow." + +24 25 26 27 28 16. While these visits made Doe extremely uncomfortable, Epstein and Maxwell made her feel she could not refuse them. During this time, Epstein started to pay for voice lessons for Doe and insisted that Doe could not advance her career in any way without him. When Doe expressed hesitation about spending time with Epstein and Maxwell or acquiescing to their desires, Epstein and Maxwell would threaten Doe, and scold her for being "ungrateful". + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +17. During one of Doe's encounters with Epstein, he took her to Mar-a-Lago where he introduced her to its owner, Donald J. Trump. Introducing 14-year-old Doe to Donald J. Trump, Epstein elbowed Trump playfully asking him, referring to Doe, "This is a good one, right?" Trump smiled and nodded in agreement. They both chuckled and Doe felt uncomfortable, but, at the time, was too young to understand why. + +18. Towards the end of 1994, Epstein invited Doe into his pool house, where he grabbed her, put her on his lap and started masturbating. Epstein told her that was what to expect from photographers who were soon going to be take modeling pictures of her. However, when Doe was ultimately photographed by these professional photographers, they did no such thing. + +19. Over the next few years, the sexual abuse escalated. On a regular basis, Epstein would digitally penetrate Doe, force Doe to perform sexual acts on him and apply vibrators on different parts of Doe's body. The abuse occurred at Epstein's home in Palm Beach, Florida, Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in New York City, and Epstein's ranch in New Mexico. When travelling to these places, Doe often flew with Epstein and Maxwell in Epstein's private jet. + +20. In 19%, when Doe was 16-years-old, Epstein moved Doe to New York City. At first, Epstein put Doe up in his apartment on 65th Street and 2nd Avenue. After a few months. Epstein co-signed the lease for Doe and Doe's mother for an apartment. Additionally, Epstein paid her tuition at a private high school in Manhattan as well. + +21. Once Epstein had secured Doe in New York and made her and her family completely dependent on him financially (including, for the roof over their heads), Epstein's abuse of Doe continued to escalate. + +22. In 1997, while at Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in the City of New York, Epstein asked 17-year-old Doe if she had a boyfriend. Doe replied that she did not. Epstein responded that when she did have a boyfriend she would want the sex to be "good' and that she should "get it over with already," meaning lose her virginity. Despite Doe's resistance, Epstein then pushed Doe down onto her stomach and raped her. From that point forward for several years in New York, Epstein raped Doe on multiple occasions. + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +23. During Doe's time in New York, Maxwell also regularly facilitated Epstein's abuse of Doe and was frequently present when it occurred. + +24. In 1999, Doe moved to Los Angeles to start a career. Upon moving to Los Angeles and being physically away from Epstein and Maxwell, Doe finally felt like she could escape Epstein's abuse and stopped returning his frequent calls where he would threaten and berate her for not appreciating him. + +25. Despite Doe's physical escape from Epstein and Maxwell, the years of abuse and exploitation perpetrated against her by them cause her immeasurable pain and suffering every day. + +## Epstein's Death and Will + +26. In July 2019, Epstein was indicted by the Unites States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. + +27. On August 10, 2019, Epstein was found dead in his jail cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, where he was being held pending trial. Upon information and belief, New, York City's medical examiner concluded Epstein died by suicide. + +28. On August 15, 2019, Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was filed in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +29. The Will indicated that it was executed by Epstein on August 8, 2019 at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The Will was accompanied by affidavits from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn attesting to their "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and Appointment of Local Counsel." Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn also filed a Petition for Probate and for Letters Testamentary in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +30. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs that "after the payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "givers] all of my property, real and personal, wherever situated...to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +31. On August 26, 2019, Defendant Darren K. Indyke filed a Certificate of Trust with the Superior Court for the Virgin Islands, confirming that he and Defendant Richard D. Kahn are the two Trustees of The 1953 Trust. + +32. On September 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands ordered that Epstein's will be admitted to probate and authorized Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn to administer the estate. + +#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION + +## (Sexual Assault) + +33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as if set forth fully herein. + +34. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein, with Maxwell's assistance, made violent sexual demands on Plaintiff while placing his hands on her body in a position of dominance and control and while touching Plaintiff in violent and invasive ways. + +35. These demands, often made when young Plaintiff was alone with Epstein or with only Epstein and Maxwell, were intended to frighten Plaintiff into submitting to his sexual demands and placed Plaintiff in apprehension of harm. + +36. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +37. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION + +## (Sexual Battery) + +38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as if set forth fully herein. + +39. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein raped Doe. + +1 2 40. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein digitally penetrated Doe with his fingers, tongue and foreign objects. + +3 4 41. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein made otherwise unwanted, unlawful, harmful, and offensive physical contact with Plaintiff's body. + +5 6 42. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +7 8 9 10 43. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 11 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +15 16 45. Epstein and Maxwell's campaign of sexual abuse against a teenaged Plaintiff was extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. + +18 19 46. Epstein and Maxwell's serial sexual assaults, committed during the course of a methodical plan of recruitment, enticement, and attack, inflicted severe pain and anguish upon Plaintiff. + +20 21 22 47. Epstein and Maxwell directed this conduct at Plaintiff and knew that it would cause severe and lasting emotional distress. Indeed, the conduct caused Plaintiff severe and lasting emotional distress and serious injuries to her mental health. + +23 24 25 26 48. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 27 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION + +## (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) + +44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as if set forth fully herein. + +I + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +II + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +28 + +49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as if set forth fully herein. + +50. Epstein and Maxwell coaxed Plaintiff, then a teenaged girl, into Epstein's home for a period of several years. They worked hard to groom her. Once under their supervision and influence, Epstein and Maxwell proceeded methodically to sexually abuse Plaintiff. + +51. Epstein and Maxwell's conduct was extreme and outrageous, breached a duty owed directly to Plaintiff, endangered her physical safety, and caused severe and lasting emotional distress and serious injuries to Plaintiff's mental health. + +52. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +## FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### (False Imprisonment) + +53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as if set forth fully herein. + +54. Defendants, in perpetrating the above-described non-consensual sexual assaults. did, by use of threat and/or physical force, willfully and intentionally confine, detain, imprison and/or restrain Plaintiff without lawful authority to do so, against her will, and without her consent. + +55. Plaintiff was aware of, and suffered the extreme effects of, the Defendants' unlawful confinement. + +56. As a consequence of Defendants' false imprisonment of Plaintiff, she sustained conscious pain and suffering, Plaintiffs health was impaired, Plaintiff suffered great mental distress, shock, fright and humiliation, and Plaintiffs reputation and character were injured. + +57. As a consequence of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred severe psychological trauma and damage, has suffered great humiliation, loss of esteem, mental anguish and suffering. + +2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 P.. It 15 II 17 n a= 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 214-g § C.P.L.R. N.Y. Act, Victims Child the under timely is action of cause This 58. was she when Plaintiff against perpetrated conduct of out arises it because 2019), (McKinney of Thirty Hundred One Article in defined as offense sexual a constitutes that 18 of age the under 130.55. § P.L. N.Y. 130.52; § P.L. N.Y. See 130"). ("Article Law Penal York New the RELIEF FOR PRAYER to: Court this for prays Doe Jane Plaintiff WHEREFORE, by EPSTEIN E. JEFFREY OF ESTATE Defendant that declaring judgment a Issue 59. legal as KAHN, D. RICHARD and INDYKE K. DARREN executors, its through and are MAXWELL GHISLAINE Defendant and Epstein, E. Jeffrey of Estate the of representatives case; this in alleged law of violations the for liable damages; punitive and consequential statutory, compensatory, actual, Award 60. law; by allowed rate highest the at interest -judgment post and -judgment pre Award 61. and proper. and just deem may Court this as relief further such Grant 62. submitted, Respectfully 2020 16, January Dated: pending) (admission Boyle Kevin pending) (admission Glassman Robert pending) (admission Werksman Nathan LLP BOYLE & SHEA PANISH 700 Suite Blvd., Monica Santa 11111 90025 CA Angeles, Los 477-1700 (310) Telephone: 477-1699 (310) Facsimile: boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com Morelli P. Benedict /s/ Morelli P. Benedict Sirotkin T. David Mahoney A. Sara PLLC FIRM LAW MORELLI + +A E 12 s aa 13 DW~4 g 14 8 03 98 < 16 E 8 X + +# C.e) - lf4 R. + +a. 11 {sup}`u`ee {sup}`12` olf s E 13 14 E 08 5 14 < 3 2 • x la{sup}`2` IS inm gF fa {sup}`16` + +777 Third Avenue, 31' Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (212) 751-9800 Facsimile: (212) 751-0046 bmorelli@morellilaw.com dsirotkin@morellilaw.com smahoney@morellilaw.com + +Attorneys for Plaintiff \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d88a706619a285b6e164938889606a8e605babfb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751880/EFTA02751880.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -16, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751880", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6d8b873f158a63468d9cc77d48b0df804468b527ff8f458b46e0a59de6cb36d8", + "output_sha256": "698348b2926711f1b1477df95a1644a651b048451ba206e5c62951b3251dcdbf", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4bda67eb40e5447802a3a06591d6cd2b32186806 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.md @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +PLAINTIFFS JANE DOE, + +The JS.44 civil cover shoot and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of coud. This form. approved by the Judicial Conference of the United Slates in September 1974. is requited for use of the Clerk of Coun for the purpose of 'nitrating the chnl docket sheet. + +ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME. ADDRESS. AND TELEPHONE NUMBER Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +DEFENDANTS DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN) Bennet Moskowitz (Attorney for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn ) 875 Third Avenue New York. NY 10022 + +CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE (DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) + +28 USC 1332; New York causes of action. + +Has this action, case, or proceeding, or one essentially the same been previously filed in SDNY at any time? No aYesO Judge Previously Assigned + +If yes, was this case Vol. 0 Invol. D Dismissed. No 0 Yes 0 II yes, give date & Case No. + +IS THIS AN INTERNATIONAL ANIMATION PAM + +(PLACE AN (x) IN ONE BOX ONLY) + +| TORTS | | PERSONAL INJURY | | PERSONAL INJURY | | FORFEITURE/PENALTY | | BANKRUPTCY | | OTHER STATUTES | | | +| ---------- | ----------------- | ----------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------- | -------------------------- | -------------------- | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------------- | +| CONTRACT | | PERSONAL INJURY | | PERSONAL INJURY | | FORFEITURE/PENALTY | | BANKRUPTCY | | OTHER STATUTES | | | +| [ ] 110 | INSURANCE | [ ] 310 | AIRPLANE | [ ] 367 | HEALTHCARE/ | [ ] 625 | DRUG RELATED | [ ] 422 | APPEAL | [ ] 375 | FALSE CLAIMS | | +| [ ] 120 | MARINE | [ ] 315 | AIRPLANE PRODUCT | PHARMACEUTICAL PERSONAL | INJURY/PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 625 | DRUG RELATED | [ ] 422 | APPEAL | [ ] 376 | QUI TAM | | +| [ ] 130 | [ ] 140 | [ ] 130 | [ ] 320 | LIABILITY | [ ] 365 | PERSONAL INJURY | SEIZURE OF PROPERTY | [ ] 423 | WITHDRAWAL | [ ] 400 | STATE | | +| [ ] 140 | NEGOTIABLE | [ ] 140 | [ ] 320 | ASSAULT, LIBEL & | PRODUCT LIABILITY | [ ] 690 | OTHER | [ ] 28 USC 158 | | REAPPORTIONMENT | | | +| [ ] 150 | RECOVERY OF | [ ] 150 | [ ] 330 | FEDERAL | [ ] 368 | ASBESTOS PERSONAL | INJURY PRODUCT | [ ] 490 | OTHER | [ ] 410 | ANTITRUST | | +| [ ] 150 | OVERPAYMENT & | [ ] 150 | [ ] 330 | EMPLOYERS' | LIABILITY | [ ] 680 | OTHER | [ ] 28 USC 157 | | [ ] 430 | BANKS & BANKING | | +| [ ] 151 | ENFORCEMENT | [ ] 151 | [ ] 340 | MARINE | [ ] 820 | COPYRIGHTS | [ ] 830 | PATENT | [ ] 450 | COMMERCE | [ ] 460 | DEPORTATION | +| [ ] 152 | OF JUDGMENT | [ ] 152 | [ ] 345 | MARINE PRODUCT | [ ] 370 | OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 835 | PATENT-ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION | [ ] 470 | RACKETER INFLU- | ENCED & CORRUPT | | +| [ ] 152 | MEDICARE ACT | [ ] 152 | [ ] 350 | MARINE PRODUCT | [ ] 370 | OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 840 | TRADEMARK | [ ] 480 | ORGANIZATION ACT | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 153 | OF JUDGMENT | [ ] 153 | [ ] 355 | MOTOR VEHICLE | [ ] 375 | TRUTH IN LENDING | [ ] 835 | PATENT-ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION | [ ] 490 | CABLE/SATELLITE TV | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 153 | STUDENT LOANS | [ ] 153 | [ ] 355 | MOTOR VEHICLE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 680 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 850 | CONSUMER CREDIT | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 153 | (EXCL VETERANS) | [ ] 153 | [ ] 365 | MOTOR VEHICLE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 680 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 490 | CABLE/SATELLITE TV | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 153 | RECOVERY OF | [ ] 153 | [ ] 368 | MOTOR VEHICLE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 680 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 850 | CONSUMER CREDIT | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 153 | OVERPAYMENT | [ ] 153 | [ ] 368 | MOTOR VEHICLE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 680 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 850 | CONSUMER CREDIT | (RICO) | | +| [ ] 150 | ENFORCEMENT | [ ] 150 | [ ] 368 | MALPRACTICE | [ ] 385 | PROPERTY DAMAGE | [ ] 710 | FAIR LABOR | [ ] 862 | COMMODITIES/ | | | +| [ ] 160 | STOCKHOLDERS | [ ] 160 | [ ] 368 | MED MALPRACTICE | [ ] 385 | PROPERTY DAMAGE | [ ] 710 | STANDARDS ACT | [ ] 863 | EXCHANGE | | | +| [ ] 160 | SUITS | [ ] 160 | [ ] 368 | SUITS | [ ] 385 | PROPERTY DAMAGE | [ ] 720 | LABOR/MGMT | [ ] 864 | SSID TITLE XVI | | | +| [ ] 190 | OTHER | [ ] 190 | [ ] 368 | SUITS | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 720 | RELATIONS | [ ] 865 | RSI (405(g)) | | | +| [ ] 190 | CONTRACT | [ ] 190 | [ ] 368 | CONTRACT | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 740 | RAILWAY LABOR ACT | [ ] 865 | RSI (405(g)) | | | +| [ ] 195 | CONTRACT | [ ] 195 | [ ] 368 | CONTRACT | [ ] 375 | OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 375 | FEDERAL TAX SUITS | [ ] 870 | TAXES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | | | +| [ ] 195 | PRODUCT | [ ] 195 | [ ] 368 | PRODUCT | [ ] 375 | OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 375 | FEDERAL TAX SUITS | [ ] 871 | IRS-THIRD PARTY | | | +| [ ] 196 | LIABILITY | [ ] 196 | [ ] 368 | LIABILITY | [ ] 375 | OTHER FRAUD | [ ] 375 | FEDERAL TAX SUITS | [ ] 870 | TAXES (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) | | | +| [ ] 196 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 196 | [ ] 368 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 390 | IMMIGRATION | [ ] 893 | ENVIRONMENTAL | | | +| [ ] 196 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 196 | [ ] 368 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 390 | IMMIGRATION | [ ] 895 | FREEDOM OF | | | +| [ ] 196 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 196 | [ ] 368 | FRANCHISE | [ ] 380 | OTHER PERSONAL | [ ] 390 | IMMIGRATION | [ ] 895 | INFORMATION ACT | | | +| [ ] 210 | LAND | [ ] 210 | [ ] 440 | OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS | [ ] 530 | HABEAS CORPUS | [ ] 790 | OTHER LABOR | [ ] 896 | ARBITRATION | | | +| [ ] 210 | CONDEMNATION | [ ] 210 | [ ] 440 | OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS | [ ] 530 | HABEAS CORPUS | [ ] 790 | LITIGATION | [ ] 899 | ADMINISTRATIVE | | | +| [ ] 220 | FORECLOSURE | [ ] 220 | [ ] 440 | ACCOMMODATIONS | [ ] 540 | MANDAMUS & OTHER | [ ] 791 | EMPL RET INC | [ ] 870 | PROCEDURE ACT/REVIEW OR | | | +| [ ] 230 | RENT LEASE & | [ ] 230 | [ ] 440 | AMERICANS WITH | [ ] 540 | MANDAMUS &am | | | | | | | + +No a Yes 0 + +NATURE OF SUIT + +REAL PROPERTY + +Check if demanded M complaint: + +CHECK IF THIS IS ACLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 + +DEMAND \$ OTHER JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER + +DO YOU CLAIM THIS CASE IS RELATED TO A CIVIL CASE NOW PENDING IN S.D.N.Y. AS DEFINED BY LOCAL RULE FOR DIVISION OF BUSINESS 137 IF SO, STATE: + + 1 Original Proceeding 2 Removed from State Court 3 Remanded from Appellate Court 4 Reinstated or Reopened 5 Transferred from (Specify District) 6 Multidistrict Litigation (Transferred) 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judge + + a. all parties represented + + b. At least one party is pro se. + + 8 Multidistrict Litigation (Direct File) + +(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY) BASIS OF JURISDICTION IF DIVERSITY, INDICATE + + 1 U.S. PLAINTIFF 2 U.S. DEFENDANT 3 FEDERAL QUESTION 4 DIVERSITY +(U.S. NOT A PARTY) + +## CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY) + +(Place an IX) in one box for Plaintiff and one box for Defendant) + +| | PTF | DEF | | PTF DEF | | PTF | DEF | +| -------------------------- | -------- | ------ | --------------------------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | +| CITIZEN OF THIS STATE | ft | (4 1 | CITIZEN OR SUBJECT OF A | ( )3 13 | INCORPORATED and PRINCIPAL PLACE | L 15 | ( )5 | +| | | | FOREIGN COUNTRY | | OF BUSINESS IN ANOTHER STATE | | | +| CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE | ir,4 2 | ( )2 | INCORPORATED or PRINCIPAL PLACE | ( )4 [ 4 | FOREIGN NATION | ( 16 | 16 | + +PLAINTIFF(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES) Jane Doe, Los Angeles , California do Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS(ES) AND COUNTY(IES) + +Darren K. Indyke, U.S. Virgin Islands Richard D. Kahn, U.S. Virgin Islands Ghislaine Maxwell, 116 East 65th Street, New York, NY 10065 + +DEFENDANT(S) ADDRESS UNKNOWN + +REPRESENTATION IS HEREBY MADE THAT. AT THIS TIME. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE. WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE. TO ASCERTAIN THE RESIDENCE ADDRESSES OF THE FOLLOWING DEFENDANTS: + +Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are sued as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. Per 28 U.S.C. §1332 , Defendants are deemed citzens of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) , Decedent Jeffrey Epstein's domicile. Defendants' residential addresses are unknown to Plaintiff. Their counsel is listed above. + +## COURTHOUSE ASSIGNMENT + +I hereby certify that this case should be assigned to the courthouse indicated below pursuant to Local Rule for Division of Business 18, 20 or 21. + +Check one: THIS ACTION SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO: O PLAINS g MANHATTAN + +DATE 1 /16/2020 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN THIS DISTRICT + +brI NO I I YES (DATE ADMITTED Mo. Yr. RECEIPT ri Attorney Bar Code SI + +Magistrate Judge is to be designated by the Clerk of the Court. + +Magistrate Judge is so Designated. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c042bc9ef39e6e90a9a28d9a9d2d5ea22c757fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751890/EFTA02751890.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4557, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751890", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 408, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "929b4c70f21c2a6d84bbd91ac2ea4e63be14c86349b7ef1332469c690030caf4", + "output_sha256": "91b4e707acd009afd46aba8de57829f5de83fe316802a4b8b3570633e214ddc8", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a79c3414a83dc25c142f161a9390d8431feb80f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +-against-DARREN/. 1NDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. + +Defendant. + +The motion of Robert Samuel Glassman, Esq. , for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +CV ( ) + +ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California, District of Columbia ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Robert Samuel Glassman + +Firm Name: Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/ 310.477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for + +Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro I lac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District / Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3fce7036976bed15cc258dada4139016520ac859 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751892/EFTA02751892.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751892", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1c33875d37295da14cfacc368baaa6dc44402465373d6c68750bd7771d041411", + "output_sha256": "1c33875d37295da14cfacc368baaa6dc44402465373d6c68750bd7771d041411", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bc7af3f81ffa7f0f1161fa8c144db5e298fdf49d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +►ANE **DOE,** + +Plaintiff, + +-against- Civ. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their MOTION FOR ADMISSION capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. + +### PRO HAC VICE + +Defendant. + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Robert Samuel Glassman, Esq. hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California, District of Columbia and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: January 16, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Robert Samuel Glassman + +Applicant Signature: ? -(96.----- + +Applicant's Name: Robert Samuel Glassman + +Firm Name: Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +City/State/Lip: Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone/Fax: 310-477-1700 / 310.477-1699 + +Email: glassman@psblaw.com + +![](_page_1_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## The State Bar of California + +OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION + +& CONSUMER RESOURCES + +180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105 888-800.3400 AttomeyRegulation@calbar.ca.gov + +# CERTIFICATE OF STANDING + +January 11, 2020 + +TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: + +This is to certify that according to the records of the State Bar, ROBERT SAMUEL GLASSMAN, #269816 was admitted to the practice of law in this state by the Supreme Court of California on June 1, 2010 and has been since that date, and is at date hereof, an ACTIVE licensee of the State Bar of California; and that no recommendation for discipline for professional or other misconduct has ever been made by the Board of Trustees or a Disciplinary Board to the Supreme Court of the State of California. + +THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA + +Dina DiLoreto Custodian of Records + +![](_page_2_Picture_1.jpeg) + +![](_page_2_Picture_2.jpeg) + +On behalf of JULIO A. CASTILLO, Clerk of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. the District of Columbia Bar does hereby certify that + +atete t9T-Letto + +was duly qualified and admitted on May 13.2011 as an attorney and counselor entitled to practice before this Court; and is. on the date indicated below, an Active member in good standing of this Bar. + +![](_page_2_Picture_6.jpeg) + +Issued By: District of Columbia Bar Membership \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..496bb8568b2bcc1321d8720970d8de532278009d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751893/EFTA02751893.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751893", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "82286f982072966e75c99c42a72c38cce3d6ffa6fda5a6ce1f902a7a5ce095bd", + "output_sha256": "82286f982072966e75c99c42a72c38cce3d6ffa6fda5a6ce1f902a7a5ce095bd", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a58a0a8bce50aa741fa7795182d69ff0f8785757 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +1:20-cv -00484 ( ) + +-against-DARREN'. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al Defendant. + +The motion of Kevin R. Boyle practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. , for admission to + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.C. ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R. Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa MonicaBlvd. Ste 700 + +ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/310-477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District / Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aef357a2a6ab74f4b25cb9a2b8205bc5dcc474ff --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751896/EFTA02751896.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751896", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c2279eab7b3b0fea794de31480a38251a27a46ca3dfea4eb0d368b2617a5ce4c", + "output_sha256": "c2279eab7b3b0fea794de31480a38251a27a46ca3dfea4eb0d368b2617a5ce4c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..31f290599899ab71c0a06e744129469f88368151 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.md @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al + +Defendant. + +1:20- Civ, 00484 + +#### MOTION FOR ADMISSION + +#### PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Kevin R. Boyle hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Jane Doe in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.0 and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: January 10, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Kevin R. Boyle + +Applicant Signature: + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 + +City/State/Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone/Fax: 310-477-1700/ 310-477-1699 + +Email: Boyle@psblaw.com + +![](_page_1_Picture_78.jpeg) + +![](_page_1_Picture_79.jpeg) + +On behalf of JULIO A. CASTILLO, Clerk of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, +the District of Columbia Bar does hereby certify that + +*Kevin R Boyle* + +was duly qualified and admitted on June 4, 1999 as an attorney and counselor entitled to +practice before this Court; and is, on the date indicated below, an Active member in good +standing of this Bar. + +![](_page_1_Picture_83.jpeg) + +![](_page_2_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## The State Bar of California + +OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION + +& CONSUMER RESOURCES + +180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105 888-800-3400 + +# CERTIFICATE OF STANDING + +TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: + +AttomeyRegulation@calba cca.gov + +January 11, 2020 + +This is to certify that according to the records of the State Bar, KEVIN RICHARD BOYLE, #192718 was admitted to the practice of law in this state by the Supreme Court of California on December 11, 1997 and has been since that date, and is at date hereof, an ACTIVE licensee of the State Bar of California; and that no recommendation for discipline for professional or other misconduct has ever been made by the Board of Trustees or a Disciplinary Board to the Supreme Court of the State of California. + +THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA + +Dina DiLoreto Custodian of Records \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fa0a07ef108cd8c160ec27d26a8cc6d0d40deeb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751897/EFTA02751897.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751897", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "93d11667355da648eeb516481395c5be7a36263b5513393aada3e88148036e0f", + "output_sha256": "d8ac56c6dd0046ea60b5b32dd1148797d0f44b5084f4feeb1d49fac4a3731f3d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a795290f3734f0e236dcf9c0de779d97d216b1c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +DOE, JANE + +## COURT DISTRICT STATES UNITED YORK NEW OF DISTRICT SOUTHERN + +1:20-cv-00484 No. Case + +## Plaintiff, + +v. + +D. RICHARD and INDYKE K. DARREN the of executors as capacities their in KAHN, 7 EPSTEIN, E. JEFFREY OF ESTATE individual, an MAXWELL, GHISLAINE 8 + +## Defendants. 911 + +17 • 2020 16, January Dated: II + +## MOTION PLAINTIFF'S OF NOTICE UNDER PROCEED TO LEAVE FOR PSEUDONYM + +allowing order an for Court this move record, of attorneys her through Doe, Jane Plaintiff in request this makes Plaintiff pseudonyms. using matter -captioned above the in proceed to her herewith files Plaintiff support, In injury. and retaliation harassment, from herself protect to order Pseudonym. by Proceed to Motion her of Support in Memorandum Plaintiffs the + +submitted, Respectfully + +pending) (admission Boyle Kevin pending) (admission Glassman Robert pending) (admission Werksman Nathan + +LLP BOYLE & SHEA PANISH 700 Suite Blvd., Monica Santa 11111 + +90025 CA Angeles, Los 477-1700 (310) Telephone: 477-1699 (310) Facsimile: + +boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com + +Morelli P. Benedict /s/ Morelli P. Benedict Sirotkin T. David Mahoney A. Sara + +PLLC FIRM LAW MORELLI II 28 + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 +Los Angeles, California 90025 +310.477.1700 phone • 310.477.1699 fax + +777 Third Avenue, 31{sup}`st` Floor +New York, NY 10017 +Telephone: (212) 751-9800 +Facsimile: (212) 751-0046 +bmorelli@morellilaw.com +dsirotkin@morellilaw.com +smahoney@morellilaw.com + +*Attorneys for Plaintiff* \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ab575dee9fd64ee10736e2f46e4f7143d1d88dce --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751900/EFTA02751900.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751900", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8290f29e1ec83e8cd215e5f012263c30886409a27b52e5a736cae7e4d145367a", + "output_sha256": "4e0ac48ad465e42b5bc0bbb35a467826eae90933990896afb41fba7f0a0f7e04", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f6f0ad260970c06434ee62dc8c41b8dbacec6e3e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +1 +2 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT** +3 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** + +4 JANE DOE, + +5 Plaintiff, + +6 v. + +7 DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. +8 KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the +9 ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, +10 GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +11 Defendants. + +12 Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +13 **[PROPOSED] ORDER ON** +14 **PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE** +15 **TO PROCEED UNDER** +16 **PSEUDONYM** + +17 +18 The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed by Pseudonym, the +19 Plaintiff's memorandum of law in support of her motion and any opposition thereto, the pleadings +20 and papers filed herein, and upon any such other matters as may be presented to the Court at the +21 time of the hearing on this motion, if any, hereby GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed by +22 Pseudonym as follows: + +23 Jane Doe is permitted to proceed by pseudonym in the above-captioned matter. +24 + +25 +26 DATED: \_\_\_\_\_ + +27 \_\_\_\_\_ +28 United States District Judge + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 +Los Angeles, California 90025 +310.477.1700 phone • 310.477.1699 fax \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac27f203dd92b13d424e4f5190c42833c3297cc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751902/EFTA02751902.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751902", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2aa69df06eb6f2c67fc3224135c96080deb8401ad2772659c09fa202dedd6e18", + "output_sha256": "2aa69df06eb6f2c67fc3224135c96080deb8401ad2772659c09fa202dedd6e18", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6070059852da095790db79c2260e96acff6841a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.md @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +a., 11 g O1 01,4 {sup}`13` 14 HE a 31 14 x2 2a 15 v) a g X \$k 16 + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +#### MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED BY PSEUDONYM + +Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff"), by her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of her motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym. + +#### I. INTRODUCTION + +Plaintiff Jane Doe suffered tremendous harm as a result of being sexually abused as a child by the late Jeffrey Epstein. Epstein and his associates, in particular, Ghislaine Maxwell, coerced Jane Doe into becoming their sexual puppet for years through power, money and exploitation. And like countless others, Plaintiff was victimized for so long by Epstein and Maxwell and at such an early age that she has done everything she could to remain anonymous and live a normal life now despite constant media requests for interviews and statements. + +The details underlying Plaintiff's sexual abuse are highly personal, intimate and humiliating to Plaintiff. Jane Doe has suffered drastically due to the Defendants' actions. Keeping her identity protected from public disclosure in this already high-profile matter is imperative. Indeed, public disclosure of her name in this litigation will expose some of the most intimate and humiliating moments of Plaintiff's life, furthering her ongoing psychological harm and injuring her family, including young children. + +Additionally, there is no public interest in revealing the identity of one of Epstein's many victims; to the contrary, allowing Plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym fosters the public interest in having victims come forward. Further, as other victims have already stated, revealing Plaintiffs + +1 identity could interfere with the Government's ongoing investigation of Epstein's associates. + +2 For the foregoing reasons and those that follow, Plaintiff Jane Doe respectfully + +3 requests that this Court permit her to proceed in this case under a pseudonym. + +#### 4 II. ARGUMENT + +5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly authorize, nor absolutely prohibit, + +6 the use of fictitious names by plaintiffs or other parties. In EW v. New York Stook Ctr., 213 + +7 F.R.D. 108 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit declared, "(a) plaintiff is entitled to proceed under a + +19 nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the ...party + +20 seeking proceed anonymously...; (3) whether identification presents other harms and the likely + +21 severity of those harms...(4) whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms + +22 of disclosure; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of private + +23 parties, (6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press his claims + +24 anonymously, ...; (7) whether the plaintiffs identity has thus far been kept confidential, ; (8) + +25 whether the public's interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his + +26 identity..." Id. at 190 (internal citations removed). + +27 New York state has made clear its intentions to protect the identities of survivors of sexual + +pseudonym where revealing the plaintiffs name subjects him or her to the risk of public + +disapproval, harassment, or bodily harm." + +In Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. 214 FR.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth + +Circuit held that "a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special + +circumstances when the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and + +the public's interest in knowing the party's identity." Id. at 1067. The Second Circuit has endorsed + +this balancing of interests when determining whether a plaintiff may act under a pseudonym. + +Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1,537 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit has + +gathered a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining the need for anonymity. + +This list of factors includes: + +"(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of a personal + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +II + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +28 + +have granted anonymity to protect against disclosure of a wide range of issues involving matters of the utmost intimacy, including sexual assault. Indeed, many states in this country, including New York, have enacted laws to protect the anonymity of sexual assault victims." Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 1% (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, N.Y. Educ. Law § 6448 states: + +Pursuant to subdivision (i) of rule three thousand sixteen of the civil practice law and rules, in any proceeding brought against an institution which seeks to vacate or modify a finding that a student was responsible for violating an institutions rules regarding a violation covered by this article, the name and identifying biographical information of any student shall be presumptively confidential and shall not be included in the pleadings and other papers from such proceeding absent a waiver or cause shown as determined by the court. Such witnesses shall be identified only as numbered witnesses. If such a name or identifying biographical information appears in a pleading or paper filed in such a proceeding, the court, absent such a waiver or cause shown, shall direct the clerk of the court to redact such name and identifying biographical information and so advise the parties. + +Additionally, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-b states: + +The identity of any victim of a sex offense, as defined in article one hundred thirty or section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of the penal law, or of an offense involving the alleged transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus, shall be confidential. No report, paper, picture, photograph, court file or other documents, in the custody or possession of any public officer or employee, which identifies such a victim shall be made available for public inspection. No such public officer or employee shall disclose any portion of any police report, court file, or other document, which tends to identify such a victim except as provided in subdivision two of this section. + +Further, "[u]pon approving New York's rape shield law, then Governor Mario stated, 'sexual assault victims have unfortunately had to endure a terrible invasion of their physical privacy. They have a right to expect that this violation will not be compounded by a further invasion of their privacy.'" Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citations omitted). + +# A. GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED USING A PSEUDONYM + +Here, all of the relevant factors strongly weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's motion to file this case using a pseudonym. Indeed, for similar reasons to those discussed below, numerous courts have permitted Epstein's victims to proceed under pseudonyms in prior cases. See Order, Doe v. Epstein, No. 08-cv-80119 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2009), ECF No. 253 (consolidating 11 Doe + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 cases against Epstein and every plaintiff to proceed anonymously in the style of the case); see also Hr'g Tr., United States v. Epstein, No. I9-cr-490 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019), ECF No. 53 (allowing eight of Epstein's victims to present testimony under protective pseudonyms after Epstein's death in connection with criminal case); Joint Rule 26(f) Report, Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein et al., No. 17 cv-616 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2017), ECF No. 28 at 4 (Rule 26 Report noting that "Idhie to the nature of the claim, the Plaintiff has proceeded anonymously through a pseudonym"); Order, Jane Doe No. 103 v. Epstein, No. 10-cv-80309 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2010), ECF No. 5 (granting motion to proceed anonymously). These courts have recognized that, throughout their litigation again Epstein, these women "will be required to disclose highly sensitive and intimate information," and disclosure of their real names "will cause . . . much additional embarrassment, humiliation, and psychological trauma," as well as "adverse professional and economic consequences." See Order, Doe v. Epstein, No. 08-cv-80893 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2008), ECF No. 15 at 2-3. + +13 + +14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Jane Doe filed her complaint using a pseudonym in order to protect her identity so as to mitigate damage done to her and her name as a result of the incidents alleged in her complaint. The details surrounding her sexual abuse are highly sensitive and of a personal nature. There was a fundamental privacy interest that was violated when Jane Doe was sexually assaulted and, as stated by New York's Governor =, exposure of Jane Doe's true identity would only compound that violation. Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citations omitted). + +21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Indeed, courts have recognized that "sexual assault victims are a paradigmatic example of those entitled to a grant of anonymity." Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Doe v. Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding allegations of sexual assault and ongoing sexual harassment were "highly sensitive and of an extremely personal nature"); Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 15-cv- 1069, 2016 WL 1448829, at \*3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016); Doe v. Greiner, 662 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that "the identity of a minor who was the victim of a sex assault" is among the "exceptional circumstances" justifying anonymity in court materials). For that reason alone, + +### 1. This Case Involves Details of a Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +I0 + +12 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +28 + +permitting Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously is warranted. + +Moreover, because of the significant public attention surrounding Epstein's arrest and untimely death, all of Plaintiffs potential harms would be more likely than not intensified should her identity become public. Plaintiff has a legitimate fear that her public identification could put her job, relationships and family at risk. And even though Epstein is deceased, a number of his associates, like Maxwell, are the subjects of potential criminal investigation and civil lawsuits. Many of these same individuals have already proven that they will intimidate and attempt to silence any of his identifiable victims. See Decision and Order Remanding Def., United States v. Epstein, No. 19- cr-490 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019), ECF No. 32 at 15, 15-18. This well-established history of retaliation justifies permitting Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. See, e.g., Doe v. Sclera Capital LLC, No. 18-cv-1769, 2019 WL 1437520, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) ("[C]ourts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed anonymously where disclosure of their identities created a risk of harm from third parties unaffiliated with the case."); L.N. v. Schwarzenegger, No. 06-cv-2042, 2007 WL 662463, at \*16 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2007); see also Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs may proceed anonymously "to protect themselves from retaliation by third parties"). + +#### 2. Defendants Will Not Suffer Prejudice + +Allowing Jane Doe to proceed by pseudonym will not prejudice the Defendants or interfere in any way with the policy underlying Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which apprises the parties of the identity of their opponent. Moreover, courts also balance the harm to the plaintiff with the potential prejudice to the defendant. See Sealed Plaintiff 537 F.3d at 189. The relevant considerations are the damage to the defendant's reputation caused by responding to anonymous allegations, difficulties in conducting discovery, and the fundamental fairness of proceeding in such a manner. E.W. v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). None of these factors weigh against allowing Plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym here. + +In light of Epstein's already well-known criminal and notorious actions, this case, more is one in which "any reputational harm to defendants has already been inflicted." Doe #1 v. Syracuse Univ., No. 18- cv-496, 2018 WL 7079489, at\*8 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2018). Further, Epstein's + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +28 + +estate and Maxwell will not be prevented from conducting discovery and reasonably defending this case. Plaintiffs counsel will provide Plaintiff's name to Defendants' counsel under conditions that will reasonably protect the safety of Plaintiff, her family, and potential witnesses. Where a defendant's counsel is made aware of plaintiff's identity, there is no "prejudice to [defendant's] ability to conduct discovery or try the matter if plaintiff were to proceed under a pseudonym." See E. W, 213 F.R.D. at 112; see also Kolko, 242 F.R.D. at 198 (finding that where defendants know plaintiffs identity, "defendants will not be hampered or inconvenienced merely by plaintiffs anonymity in court papers"). + +## 3. Public Polict\$upports Keeping Plaintiff's Name Protected + +Here, there is no public interest served by revealing the identity of Plaintiff Jane Doe who is one of Epstein's many victims. To the contrary, the public interest would be best served by permitting Plaintiff to seek justice under a protective pseudonym. As discussed above, New York State has a strong public policy interest in protecting the privacy interests of victims of sexual abuse, as demonstrated by Section 50-b of the Civil Rights Law, which protects sex-abuse survivors from undesired identification in a range of public administrative contexts, including certain court proceedings. See N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 50-b (McKinney 2019) (shielding sexabuse victims from identification in, among other things, any "police report, court file, or other document"). + +Moreover, in addition to the public's general interest in protecting the well-being of victims, "the public generally has a strong interest in protecting the identities of sexual assault victims so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting such crimes." See Kolko, 242 F.R.D. at 195-96. In consideration of that strong public policy, federal courts have permitted victims of sexual assault to proceed anonymously in similar cases. + +## 4. Plaintiff Jane Doe Has Preserved Her Confidentiality To Date + +Plaintiff has worked diligently to protect her identity. Indeed, despite numerous and ongoing attempts to interview her by the media and journalists, she has never spoken to the press or publicly identified herself in any way associated with her allegations. In the related criminal case, federal prosecutors have carefully protected her identity. These efforts weigh in favor of her + +1 2 1437520, WL 2019 Capital, Solera e.g., See, action. civil her in pseudonym by proceed to petition date" to preserved been has public the to anonymity Doe's that fact "the that (finding \*7 at + +3 + +pseudonymously). proceeding of favor in counsels + +#### CONCLUSION HI. 4 + +grant Court the that requests respectfully Plaintiff reasons, foregoing the For 5 + +pseudonym. a using complaint her file to her allow and motion Plaintiff's 6 + +submitted, Respectfully 7 + +8 + +9 + +2020 16, January Dated: + +Boyle Kevin 10 pending) (admission + +P.. 11 pending) (admission Glassman Robert pending) (admission Werksman Nathan + +12 s e t + +LLP BOYLE & SHEA PANISH 700 Suite Blvd., Monica Santa 11111 13 90025 CA Angeles, Los < o1 14 477-1700 (310) Telephone: 15 477-1699 (310) Facsimile: boyle@psblaw.com 16 glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com Morelli P. Benedict /s/ Benedict 18 Morelli P. 19 Sirotkin T. David Mahoney A. Sara + +:,,4 cf {sup}`O` igg + +t• 2 01 + +II g Can en + +X — + +17 n <= + +20 + +PLLC FIRM LAW MORELLI + +Floor 31" Avenue, Third 777 21 10017 NY York, New 22 751-9800 (212) Telephone: 23 751-0046 (212) Facsimile: bmorelli@morellilaw.com dsirotkin@morellilaw.com 24 smahoney@morellilaw.com + +25 + +26 + +Plaintiff for Attorneys + +27 + +28 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ab1ede6068c8d72243a058659a9ec4fe1245a39 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751903/EFTA02751903.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751903", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "149e08a0dbd697b28b04fac942cbbac5d41913b877e58f18a1db75d86e0c73f0", + "output_sha256": "589ba6ca7ada8bbdb560c0c203b028905bc1ffcbbbaaf9c2b28837f681c23644", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..52e43d45d32cd9ae3a0341d2e26d0bcef47df34c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +4 JANE DOE, + +5 Plaintiff, + +I + +a ,a a >- zi + +t' 2 + +02iii < g + +X 2 + +c<8 + +5. 7-1 In v. + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +DECLARATION OF ROBERT SAMUEL GLASSMAN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +12 II I, Robert Samuel Glassman, hereby declare as follows: + +- 1. I have never been convicted of a felony. 14 2. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by 15 any court. 16 3. There is no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. + - 4. I am a member in good standing of the bars of the State of California and Washington D.C. + +I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. + +Dated: January 21, 2020 + +Respectfully submitted, + +Robert S. Glassman PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98b6b4a73ecee3f49267b98dea425b06305ef759 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751910/EFTA02751910.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751910", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f7ee5c8f536eae0f1f1a6cfce29154ec5f00507721438346098a9f1959684e1a", + "output_sha256": "f7ee5c8f536eae0f1f1a6cfce29154ec5f00507721438346098a9f1959684e1a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b91590916c681e67878122c5c50650d6bb6f8d42 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## The State Bar of California + +OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION + +& CONSUMER RESOURCES + +{sup}`180`Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105 88B-800-3400 Attomeynegulation@calbar.ca.gov + +## CERTIFICATE OF STANDING + +January 11, 2020 + +TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: + +This is to certify that according to the records of the State Bar, ROBERT SAMUEL GLASSMAN, #269816 was admitted to the practice of law in this state by the Supreme Court of California on June 1, 2010 and has been since that date, and is at date hereof, an ACTIVE licensee of the State Bar of California; and that no recommendation for discipline for professional or other misconduct has ever been made by the Board of Trustees or {sup}`a`Disciplinary Board to the Supreme Court of the State of California. + +THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA + +Dina DiLoreto Custodian of Records \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..80ec596d357d348c84c73ab648f808b43dd1cb42 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751911/EFTA02751911.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751911", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fd02e042759decafbf0f864febbab4fa4632af0c102f9e36541b8a45f0e94271", + "output_sha256": "297a0ccb414fad96eb4d5101f902565caf08fdb323b2b10aaf182d076141fa2a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8919892ed15bc68a7a6aee806a2d08ff89963c93 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg) + +On behalf of JULIO A. CASTILLO, Clerk of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Bar does hereby certify that + +byeasmen + +was duly qualified and admitted on May 13.2011 as an attorney and counselor entitled to practice before this Court; and is. on the date indicated below, an Active member in good standing of this Bar. + +![](_page_0_Picture_6.jpeg) + +Issued By: District of Columbia Bar Membership \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..637a90c85be47033aad31b97905a9d4e55938717 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751912/EFTA02751912.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751912", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "26701e3a7e1d9a19f215e567e388de84fd80eab233b72a763cbf9c78163599b8", + "output_sha256": "26701e3a7e1d9a19f215e567e388de84fd80eab233b72a763cbf9c78163599b8", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b14e8359646963496763237357fbd315be17536 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +-against-DARREN/. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. + +Defendant. + +The motion of Robert Samuel Glassman, Esq. , for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +1:20 cv 00484 ( ) + +ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California, District of Columbia ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Robert Samuel Glassman + +Firm Name: Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/ 310.477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro I lac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court arc subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District / Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..30cd876a3e10329fe6e09085cca023f2dd0c0746 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751913/EFTA02751913.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751913", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "bedf4de13ae0ea78f96325e558a7638cafc0b817f3642af50358caabdad6de08", + "output_sha256": "bedf4de13ae0ea78f96325e558a7638cafc0b817f3642af50358caabdad6de08", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8004e54d27bae4cbb423dbd27b48c46f2dc95001 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +►ANE **DOE,** + +**Plaintiff,** + +**-against- 1:20 Civ. 00484 ( )** + +**DARREN g INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their** MOTION FOR ADMISSION capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. + +## PRO HAC VICE + +Defendant. + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Robert Samuel Glassman, Esq. hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California, District of Columbia and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: January 14 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Robert Samuel Glassman + +Applicant Signature: + +Applicant's Name: Robert Samuel Glassman + +Firm Name: Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +City/State/Lip: Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone/Fax: 310.477.1700 / 310.477-1699 + +Email: glassman@psblaw.com \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dd5bdb64bbd8ed3a407af4c4e27263aceab9fc8b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751914/EFTA02751914.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751914", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fd0d2722fcea08ba075f4de0caeff5bfc0f7b9bdc03f5829defe2e09456e383f", + "output_sha256": "fd0d2722fcea08ba075f4de0caeff5bfc0f7b9bdc03f5829defe2e09456e383f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f322529fe89fd73ad049ca387ac6639dfe4f679 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +1 +2 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT** +3 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** + +4 JANE DOE, + +5 Plaintiff, + +6 v. + +7 DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. +8 KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the +9 ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, +GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +10 Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +11 **DECLARATION OF KEVIN R. +12 BOYLE IN SUPPORT OF +13 APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION +14 PRO HAC VICE** + +12 I, Kevin R. Boyle, hereby declare as follows: + +1. 13 1. I have never been convicted of a felony. +2. 14 2. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission + 15 by any court. +3. 16 3. There is no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. +4. 17 4. I am a member in good standing of the bars of the State of California and Washington D.C. + +18 I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. + +19 +20 Respectfully submitted, + +21 +22 Dated: January 21, 2020 + +23 Kevin Boyle +24 PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP +25 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 +26 Los Angeles, CA 90025 +27 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 +28 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 +boyle@psblaw.com + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 +Los Angeles, California 90025 +310.477.1700 phone • 310.477.1699 fax \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2fd9b8a76c28656359106c84eb6ee9e8de382cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751915/EFTA02751915.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751915", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "89cff7fa13f18b70da581be09b5bda1be5c693c2478931da20af2b09eee88e0a", + "output_sha256": "1c0b2e1130420b634b1c8f580720dac0cd74c8093600c25e47b59abe67052b1f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09a74b86505f5ca0e85741805f840596e8ce2f34 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_68.jpeg) + +![](_page_0_Picture_69.jpeg) + +On behalf of JULIO A. CASTILLO, Clerk of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, +the District of Columbia Bar does hereby certify that + +*Kevin R Boyle* + +was duly qualified and admitted on June 4, 1999 as an attorney and counselor entitled to +practice before this Court; and is, on the date indicated below, an Active member in good +standing of this Bar. + +![](_page_0_Picture_73.jpeg) + +![](_page_1_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## The State Bar of California + +OFFICE OF ATTORNEY REGULATION + +& CONSUMER RESOURCES + +180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105 888-800-3400 AttorneyRegulationeacalbar.ca.gov + +## CERTIFICATE OF STANDING + +January 11, 2020 + +TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: + +This is to certify that according to the records of the State Bar, KEVIN RICHARD BOYLE, #192718 was admitted to the practice of law in this state by the Supreme Court of California on December 11, 1997 and has been since that date, and is at date hereof, an ACTIVE licensee of the State Bar of California; and that no recommendation for discipline for professional or other misconduct has ever been made by the Board of Trustees or a Disciplinary Board to the Supreme Court of the State of California. + +THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA + +Dina Diloreto Custodian of Records \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b15748740e7a9633e7ddd645b490e9d9698cfd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751916/EFTA02751916.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751916", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ada87af43024fd565e8ee3d1d82550f441e5ecf770223845b3d18fe6d2c1551f", + "output_sha256": "46c9b480af37fc2da1ebb15159d5543763adcddd141e4ec6b83a87ed37f8cd11", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..487f7e66b0aef89ee161b60608fb1f3ecb4ff793 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +1:20-cv -00484 ( JGK ) + +-against-DARREN.. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN. in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN. et.al Defendant. + +> The motion of Kevin R. Boyle for admission to + +ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.C. ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R. Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/310-477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for + +Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro I lac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District / Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d1f33c6f1038df7d1912c0742835d71689bf229 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751918/EFTA02751918.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751918", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "63984addfc224b0cff9101b82b2f85c210535875af3478c3ace8e3db8f71ec80", + "output_sha256": "63984addfc224b0cff9101b82b2f85c210535875af3478c3ace8e3db8f71ec80", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fd7de52175b3dfdccae07c87ff78b93d07f8dbb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al + +Defendant. + +1:20- Civ. 00484 ( IGK ) + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION + +## PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York Kevin R. Boyle hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Jane Doe in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.0 and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: January 10, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Kevin R. Boyle + +Applicant Signature: + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 + +City/State/Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone/Fax: 310-477-1700/ 310-477-1699 + +Email: Boyle@psblaw.com \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..858740b02e80059085ac0231694a2bcebc67be37 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751919/EFTA02751919.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751919", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f78bff8d95dfd905dd815a33f602bdc1b2565849cff6c4f0c5a57401ae28083b", + "output_sha256": "f78bff8d95dfd905dd815a33f602bdc1b2565849cff6c4f0c5a57401ae28083b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751920/EFTA02751920.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751920/EFTA02751920.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..be88dee947ad3975c7514efd5e927f780fba7712 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751920/EFTA02751920.md @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +26 + +27 + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, OHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +## COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES + +DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL + +Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Doe" or "Plaintiff") alleges as follows: + +## INTRODUCTION + +1. This case arises out of years of sexual abuse and exploitation of a young girl by notorious pedophile and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). It all started in 1994 when 13-year-old Jane Doe met Epstein and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") at a summer camp in Michigan. Jane Doe was their first known victim and was subsequently abused by Epstein and Maxwell for years as a young girl, suffering unimaginable physical and psychological trauma and distress. Despite that, Jane Doe has persevered and survived to tell her story, to hold her perpetrators accountable and to seek justice for the atrocities committed against her. + +2. Throughout his life, Epstein systematically perpetrated acts of molestation, exploitation, assault and rape on hundreds of young girls. Epstein's system of abuse was facilitated in large part by his co-conspirator and accomplice, Maxwell, who helped supply him with a steady stream of young and vulnerable girls—many of whom were fatherless, like Jane Doe, and came from struggling families. + +1 3. This system, which took years to develop, all started with them exploiting and +2 abusing Jane Doe who they used as a guinea pig to refine their criminal enterprise and widen their +3 network of additional sexual abuse victims. + +4 **THE PARTIES** + +5 4. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of the State of California. At all times relevant to this +6 suit, Doe was a minor child living in Florida and New York and who was sexually abused while +7 she was a minor by Defendants in New York. + +8 5. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in the State of New York. + +9 6. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the +10 Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +11 7. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the +12 Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +13 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE** + +14 8. Plaintiff is domiciled in California. + +15 9. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin +16 Islands at the time of his death. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, +17 Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. The matter +18 in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, and therefore jurisdiction in this Court is proper. 28 +19 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). + +20 10. Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in New York. + +21 11. A substantial part of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the +22 Southern District of New York, thus venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). + +23 **JURY DEMAND** + +24 12. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all of her claims in this action. + +25 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS** + +26 **Epstein and Maxwell's Abuse of Doe** + +27 13. In the summer of 1994, Jane Doe met Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell at +28 Interlochen Arts Camp in Michigan when she was only 13-years-old. Doe was there as a student + +I in the voice program. Doe was sitting alone on a bench between classes when Epstein and 2 Maxwell approached her. Epstein bragged to her about being a patron of the arts and giving 3 scholarships to talented young artists like Doe. Epstein and Maxwell probed her at length about 4 her background, family situation and where she lived. As Doe got up to leave, Epstein requested 5 her mother's phone number back in Florida. She was alarmed by his request, but also feared that 6 she could not refuse the older man's request so she complied and provided him with the phone 7 number. + +8 14. Several weeks later, once Doe had returned from Michigan to Florida, Epstein 9 called Doe's home. Epstein first spoke with Doe's mother about how he mentors young kids and 10 provides scholarships for the arts. He requested to speak to Doe and invited her and her mother to .-3a. 11 his mansion in Palm Beach. He sent a driver across town to pick them up. + +t4 0 t 12 15. Over the course of the next several months, Epstein and Maxwell attempted to O . 4 13 groom and mentor 13-year-old Jan Doe. Epstein gave himself the name of Doe's "godfather" 14 while Maxwell acted like an older sister to her. They took her to movies, went shopping with her i lit 15 and lounged around Epstein's estate with her. Epstein and Maxwell then started to make sexual references when they were with her. For instance, Maxwell told Doe that having sex with exboyfriends was easy because once you slept with them "they've been grandfathered in and you could go back and fuck them whenever you wanted." Epstein also started to slowly display his pedophilic ways when shopping with Doe and Maxwell. Instead of Doe picking out clothes she wanted to wear, Epstein insisted that she pick out and wear little children's cotton underwear. Also, after nearly every visit with Epstein and Maxwell, Epstein sent Doe home with two or three one-hundred-dollar bills to give her mother since "she's having a hard time and struggling as a widow." 18 19 20 21 22 23 + +16. While these visits made Doe extremely uncomfortable, Epstein and Maxwell made her feel she could not refuse them. During this time, Epstein started to pay for voice lessons for Doe and insisted that Doe could not advance her career in any way without him. When Doe expressed hesitation about spending time with Epstein and Maxwell or acquiescing to their desires, Epstein and Maxwell would threaten Doe, and scold her for being "ungrateful". 24 25 26 27 28 + +1 + +2 + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +14 + +I 11 15 20. In 1996, when Doe was 16-years-old, Epstein moved Doe to New York City. At g E 16 first, Epstein put Doe up in his apartment on 65th Street and 2nd Avenue. After a few months, n 17 Epstein co-signed the lease for Doe and Doe's mother for an apartment. Additionally, Epstein paid 18 her tuition at a private high school in Manhattan as well. + +17. During one of Doe's encounters with Epstein, he took her to Mar-a-Lago where he introduced her to its owner, Donald J. Trump. Introducing 14-year-old Doe to Donald J. Trump, Epstein elbowed Trump playfully asking him, referring to Doe, "This is a good one, right?" Trump smiled and nodded in agreement. They both chuckled and Doe felt uncomfortable, but, at the time, was too young to understand why. + +18. Towards the end of 1994, Epstein invited Doe into his pool house, where he grabbed her, put her on his lap and started masturbating. Epstein told her that was what to expect from photographers who were soon going to be take modeling pictures of her. However, when Doe was ultimately photographed by these professional photographers, they did no such thing. + +19. Over the next few years, the sexual abuse escalated. On a regular basis, Epstein would digitally penetrate Doe, force Doe to perform sexual acts on him and apply vibrators on different parts of Doe's body. The abuse occurred at Epstein's home in Palm Beach, Florida, Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in New York City, and Epstein's ranch in New Mexico. When travelling to these places, Doe often flew with Epstein and Maxwell in Epstein's private jet. + +19 21. Once Epstein had secured Doe in New York and made her and her family 20 completely dependent on him financially (including, for the roof over their heads), Epstein's abuse 21 of Doe continued to escalate. + +22 22. In 1997, while at Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in the City of New 23 York, Epstein asked 17-year-old Doe if she had a boyfriend. Doe replied that she did not. Epstein 24 responded that when she did have a boyfriend she would want the sex to be "good' and that she 25 should "get it over with already," meaning lose her virginity. Despite Doe's resistance, Epstein 26 then pushed Doe down onto her stomach and raped her. From that point forward for several years 27 in New York, Epstein raped Doe on multiple occasions. + +1 23. During Doe's time in New York, Maxwell also regularly facilitated Epstein's abuse 2 of Doe and was frequently present when it occurred. + +3 24. In 1999, Doe moved to Los Angeles to start a career. Upon moving to Los Angeles 4 and being physically away from Epstein and Maxwell, Doe finally felt like she could escape 5 Epstein's abuse and stopped returning his frequent calls where he would threaten and berate her for 6 not appreciating him. + +7 25. Despite Doe's physical escape from Epstein and Maxwell, the years of abuse and 8 exploitation perpetrated against her by them cause her immeasurable pain and suffering every day. + +# 9 Epstein's Death and Will + +10 26. In July 2019, Epstein was indicted by the Unites States Attorney's Office for the .-1 a. 11 Southern District of New York. + +tit 4' 12 27. On August 10, 2019, Epstein was found dead in his jail cell at the Metropolitan ir O -fr 13 Correctional Center, where he was being held pending trial. Upon information and belief, New ckl O • 14 York City's medical examiner concluded Epstein died by suicide. + +15 28. On August 15, 2019, Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was filed in the IMt .§ a 16 Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. .) + +Z := a ,., .4- 17 29. The Will indicated that it was executed by Epstein on August 8, 2019 at the 18 Metropolitan Correctional Center. The Will was accompanied by affidavits from Darren K. 19 Indyke and Richard D. Kahn attesting to their "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and 20 Appointment of Local Counsel." Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn also filed a Petition for Probate and for 21 Letters Testamentary in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +22 30. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all 23 expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my 24 estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs 25 that "after the payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "give[s] all of my 26 property, real and personal, wherever situated...to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +27 + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP +310.477.1700 phone • 310.477.1699 fax + +31. On August 26, 2019, Defendant Darren K. Indyke filed a Certificate of Trust with +the Superior Court for the Virgin Islands, confirming that he and Defendant Richard D. Kahn are +the two Trustees of The 1953 Trust. + +32. On September 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell of the +Superior Court of the Virgin Islands ordered that Epstein's will be admitted to probate and +authorized Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn to administer the estate. + +**FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION** + +**(Sexual Assault)** + +33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as +if set forth fully herein. + +34. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein, with Maxwell's assistance, +made violent sexual demands on Plaintiff while placing his hands on her body in a position of +dominance and control and while touching Plaintiff in violent and invasive ways. + +35. These demands, often made when young Plaintiff was alone with Epstein or with +only Epstein and Maxwell, were intended to frighten Plaintiff into submitting to his sexual +demands and placed Plaintiff in apprehension of harm. + +36. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to +injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +37. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g +(McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was +under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of +the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +**SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION** + +**(Sexual Battery)** + +38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as +if set forth fully herein. + +39. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein raped Doe. + +1 40. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein digitally penetrated Doe with 2 his fingers, tongue and foreign objects. + +3 41. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein made otherwise unwanted, 4 unlawful, harmful, and offensive physical contact with Plaintiffs body. + +5 42. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to 6 injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +7 43. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g 8 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was 9 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of 10 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 11 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### w • 12 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) + +Oa 0 v. 13 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as Witness my hand and the seal of the court on the 28th day of January 2020. + +JORGE E. NAVARRETE Clerk/Executive Officer of the Supreme Court + +By: + +M. Alfaro. Deputy C \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751951/EFTA02751951.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751951/EFTA02751951.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..afcd96cae8b21842ec33d4a7da89dc5267d8b8ca --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751951/EFTA02751951.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751951", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "eda28cc5840848f6ac89521af8173e3ba76ac12eac9e5c3b2ed182a737565733", + "output_sha256": "f1771e1504776a959a3eae2f2390d8d777ea7049e480357950b2c397b3fdba33", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c82f6c197fc2ed7c7620800cdab5f6dfe2371b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +1:20-cv -00484 ( JGK ) + +-against-DARREN.. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al Defendant. + +The motion of Kevin R. Boyle practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. , for admission to + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.C. ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R. Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 + +ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/310-477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintifkjane Doe in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District / Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ac19f5590ed2566dbd3405809396bd2ea774501 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751954/EFTA02751954.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751954", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "eb810f7400f07fb730200d59c2d697c374cf1ad7b5b37acd54fb2a56ff9122c5", + "output_sha256": "eb810f7400f07fb730200d59c2d697c374cf1ad7b5b37acd54fb2a56ff9122c5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..43ff7448c6de4c16e4ae682f10caab20ed9d5838 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al + +Defendant. + +1:20- Civ. 00484 ( IGK ) + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION + +PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Kevin R. Boyle hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Jane Doe in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.0 and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: January 10, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Kevin R. Boyle + +Applicant Signature: + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R Boyle + +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 + +City/State/Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 + +Telephone/Fax: 310-477-1700/ 310-477-1699 + +Email: Boyle@psblaw.com \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4fd9ece8e1142632ef63083c912e6bf4bf3dfc80 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751955/EFTA02751955.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751955", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "54849eb67e3f7713f6c4484c333cde1ee5ada425fdc9decce9726858089ac6a3", + "output_sha256": "54849eb67e3f7713f6c4484c333cde1ee5ada425fdc9decce9726858089ac6a3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1314cc370fd0c88f77ce2481a8ba53169721f37a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +1:20-cv-00484 ( JGK ) + +-against- +DARREN █ INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et.al + +**ORDER FOR ADMISSION +PRO HAC VICE** + +The motion of Kevin R. Boyle, for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of California and Washington D.C. ; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Kevin R. Boyle +Firm Name: PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 700 +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, California 90025 +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700/310-477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: 2/7/20 + +[Signature] +United States District / Magistrate Judge + +USDC SDNY +DOCUMENT +ELECTRONICALLY FILED +DOC# +DATE FILED: 2-10-20 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..925b4cfb420f7df4662344f3668d33a8f0b7a56f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751956/EFTA02751956.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751956", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ac58f07e26448ed1c726bad7fce426f116265ffd8090a2d7ca9ed533d7d3daba", + "output_sha256": "ac58f07e26448ed1c726bad7fce426f116265ffd8090a2d7ca9ed533d7d3daba", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c91ec802d72ff0f0e942b41a334e4cb47a91898 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +1:20 cv 00484 ( ) + +-against- +DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their +capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. +Defendant. + +**ORDER FOR ADMISSION +PRO HAC VICE** + +The motion of Robert Samuel Glassman, Esq., for admission to +practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that he/she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of +California, District of Columbia; and that his/her contact information is as follows + +(please print): + +Applicant's Name: Robert Samuel Glassman + +Firm Name: Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Address: 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +City / State / Zip: Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone / Fax: 310-477-1700 / 310-477-1699 + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for +Plaintiff, Jane Doe in the above entitled action; + +**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above +captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys +appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing +discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: 2/7/20 + +*[Handwritten Signature]* +United States District / Adjustate Judge + +USDC SDNY +DOCUMENT +ELECTRONICALLY FILED +DOC# +DATE FILED: 2.10.20 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9a11d9259f9fe0c3acf0782aac0f66b263a78bd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751957/EFTA02751957.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751957", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "dee267759773aa14822735d44ea2de77eba4bddd5e6c10eec33fa14e15b94b0b", + "output_sha256": "dee267759773aa14822735d44ea2de77eba4bddd5e6c10eec33fa14e15b94b0b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0573a10efe7c14bbe0f5c63d0c83e4b9cfbc29f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +- against - + +DARREN INDYKE, ET AL., + +Plaintiff, + +Defendants. + +USDC SONY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCit DATE FILED: \_4. men, + +20-cv-0484 (JGK) + +## ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +The above entitled action is referred to the designated Magistrate Judge for the following + +purpose(s): + +General Pretrial (includes scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, and settlement) + +Specific Non-Dispositive Motion/Dispute:\* + +> If referral is for discovery disputes when the District Judge is unavailable, the time period of the referral is: + +Settlement\* + +Inquest After Default/Damages Hearing + +SO ORDERED. + +DATED: New York, New York February 10, 2020 + +Consent under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) for all purposes (including trial) + +Consent under 28 U.S.C.§636(c) for limited purpose (e.g., dispositive motion, preliminary injunction) + +Purpose: + +Habeas Corpus + +Social Security + +Dispositive Motion (i.e., motion requiring a Report and Recommendation) + +Particular Motion: + +All such motions: + +C OIL '( )2, Z John G. Koeltl United States District Judge + +{sup}`•` Do not check if already referred for general pretrial. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7ef366b24973709f01d665a63ee88e95d5eade2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751958/EFTA02751958.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751958", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "67677d05b10b0b7e2198d3b5be7d57ed0822679b32875c5cfcf505036ad419cc", + "output_sha256": "07f37acfd54c52b44c6864530731aca31f11597c494e13f90d2856fda3c2d33a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..40dbfec013dc7db4f5e82976f68127631ea8089e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, X + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +X + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +I, Mary "Molly" S. DiRago, declare as follow: + +I. I am a member in good standing of the State Bar of Illinois and an associate with the law firm Troutman Sanders LLP, counsel for Defendants, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"). I submit this affidavit in support of my Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice before this Court. + +2. I have never been convicted of a felony. + +3. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred, or denied admission or readmission by any court. + +4. There are no disciplinary proceedings presently against me. + +I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. + +Dated: February 14, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +Is/ Mary "Molly" S. DiRago + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending) + +Troutman Sanders LLP + +One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 + +Chicago, 60606 + +(312) 759-1926 + +(312) 759-1939 (Fax) + +molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and + +Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of + +Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3daa86a29b08ec5b405762ede038d9b38ae8a91e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751959/EFTA02751959.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751959", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7ad8e1482a64f7e51fef86abe26a255d8e016e0e50901a8272a669e519be5c84", + "output_sha256": "7ad8e1482a64f7e51fef86abe26a255d8e016e0e50901a8272a669e519be5c84", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b9a5f0c2451df96c05003636f09e8cdca459f481 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## Certificate of Admission To the Bar of Illinois + +I, Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois, do hereby certify that + +Mary Sharon DiRago + +has been duly licensed and admitted to practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law within this State; has duly taken the required oath to support the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES and of the STATE OF ILLINOIS, and also the oath of office prescribed by law, that said name was entered upon the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors in my office on 11/04/2004 and is in good standing, so far as the records of this office disclose. + +> IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the seal of said Court, this 31st day of January, 2020. + +> > Croy acitee + +Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois + +## CERTIFICATE OF GOOD STANDING + +![](_page_1_Picture_2.jpeg) + +United States of America + +}ss. Mary S DiRago + +Northern District of Illinois + +G. Bruton , Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, + +DO HEREBY CERTIFY That Mary S DiRago was duly admitted to practice in said Court on (12/08/2004) and is in good standing as amember of the bar of said court. + +Dated at Chicago, Illinois on (01/29/2020 ) + +G. Bruton , Clerk, + +/0 + +By: Tina Lag Deputy Clerk \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4aeb0ba8cd6c12660afeb0adde63502e555850ef --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751961/EFTA02751961.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751961", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2e3216c7b6329fa39045bba32aa532dcf213ba82791cda8587185dcabb006651", + "output_sha256": "2e3216c7b6329fa39045bba32aa532dcf213ba82791cda8587185dcabb006651", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1502150dd6cff1c2671d968ad1eee78f1bd10a3b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, X + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +X + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows: + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-1939 (Fax) molly.dirago®troutman.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: + +United States District/Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..24b8df34ddbeff07fd56f9fee15534a2d35d5806 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751963/EFTA02751963.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751963", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "955e99c05cc5b54e5fff297dd332fe17ba5641ff0350ea320f77cca7c8f8d459", + "output_sha256": "955e99c05cc5b54e5fff297dd332fe17ba5641ff0350ea320f77cca7c8f8d459", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcda2a79c1ce1d62151174793940dd5c9494781c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, X + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +X + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Molly S. DiRago hereby moves this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-captioned action. + +I am in good standing of the bar(s) of the state of Illinois and there are no pending disciplinary proceedings against me in any state or federal court. I have never been convicted of a felony. I have never been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. I have attached the affidavit pursuant to Local Rule 1.3. + +Dated: February 14, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, + +/il Mary "Molly" S. DiRago + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago (Pro Hac Vice Pending) + +Troutman Sanders LLP + +One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 + +Chicago, 60606 + +(312) 759-1926 + +(312) 759-1939 (Fax) + +molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and + +Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of + +Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99de77acf20a9486fbc80ee4f2c101d0e67f695e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751965/EFTA02751965.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751965", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ec3aa047a48a32f81ebdfbd657a27f8cbb3a61ca6f70b2a06690ab8ef1962511", + "output_sha256": "ec3aa047a48a32f81ebdfbd657a27f8cbb3a61ca6f70b2a06690ab8ef1962511", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1acac0b085de76734965f8a7f349ccff751c723b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICIIARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual Defendants. X + +USDC SONY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC# X DATE FILED. a '19 1-\*O + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Mary "Molly" S. DiRago for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned action is granted. + +Applicant has declared that she is a member in good standing of the bar(s) of the state(s) of Illinois; and that her contact information is as follows: + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago Troutman Sanders LLP One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, 60606 (312) 759-1926 (312) 759-1939 (Fax) molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. + +All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Dated: 2/18/20 + diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e220027e7d5d3fd84c9eada120da8d358a7a8a18 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751967/EFTA02751967.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751967", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "add88fc921c1721741003c9be34ed2ba425f09a93e0803739684a046c6c55fb3", + "output_sha256": "e3baa64e3633cfea12398ac033afb92ff448834bc6f067cc906dd381b2d40aac", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95d08221a514848affb5f95f7b50890cd54e5e5e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +----- +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +-against- +DARREN █ INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in +their capacities as executors of the Estate of +Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell Defendant. + +----- +NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + + I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court, please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Mary "Molly" S. DiRago + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: \_\_\_\_\_ My State Bar Number is 6282757 + +I am, + +- An attorney +- A Government Agency attorney +- A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP +FIRM ADDRESS: One North Wacker Drive, Suite 2905 Chicago, IL 60606 +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312)759-1939 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP +FIRM ADDRESS: 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900, Chicago, IL 60606 +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312)759-1939 + +- I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. +- I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on \_\_\_\_\_ by Judge \_\_\_\_\_. + +Dated: 03/20/2020 + +/s/ Mary "Molly" S. DiRago +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c206b84ba361702a619a9b26d87184dcf9bb615c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751969/EFTA02751969.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -78, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751969", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a01a4229666e0d64088c5b3ab5ea95d45301eae1af43e0087c4eaac9eb9704c0", + "output_sha256": "956636b36a3b5e5c3ac749556873b9a55e541f7be870b2b41c9229afcb1cb4e7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e8596e7734df478c13f3aeb5a6b82c7ddb002cd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +March 23, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as coexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write to request a four day extension of the deadline for the Co-Executors to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint, from today to this Friday. We requested this extension because of difficulties arising from the COVID-19 outbreak and related lockdown of the tri-state area. Plaintiff consents to this request. The requested extension will not impact any other deadlines in this action. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is! Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e9f29a474ded3a7cf40a46e362ff7ac0afcfb39 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751970/EFTA02751970.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751970", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fc79e00a4fca0e06916a787b19a17c2444b0a6392ef251b4cd1ae54c1b4991ab", + "output_sha256": "fc79e00a4fca0e06916a787b19a17c2444b0a6392ef251b4cd1ae54c1b4991ab", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d15f363ef69a7eae9cbe3ccb9e1c538e659ba97b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +March 27, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. J Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as coexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Practices § 2(B) to request a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the time-barred claims and punitive damages claim in Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff") Complaint (Doc. 9). The bases for our anticipated motion are as follows. + +## A. Plaintiff's claims based on alleged torts that occurred outside of New York and those that occurred when she was an adult, regardless of location, are time-barred. + +Many of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that Jeffrey E. Epstein, now deceased, sexually abused her starting in 1994, when she was 14, and until sometime in 1999, when Plaintiff was an adult, in Florida, New York and New Mexico. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, 22, 24.) Plaintiff alleges she was 16 in 1996 (id. at ¶ 20); so she turned 18 in 1998. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment and seeks punitive damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-58, 60.) + +Plaintiff's claims based on alleged torts occurring outside New York expired long ago, including torts that occurred while she was a minor, as follows: (Florida) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of within 7 years after she reached age of majority (i.e., by sometime in 2005), within 4 years after she left the dependency of Mr. Epstein (i.e., sometime in 2003 at the latest),' or within 4 years from the time she discovered both the injury and the causal relationship + +Plaintiff alleges she "escaped" from Mr. Epstein in 1999, when she moved to California. (Comps.' 24.) Therefore, Plaintiff could not have depended on him after that time. + +between the injury and the abuse (i.e., by sometime in 2003 at the latest) {sup}`2` (See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7)); and, within 4 years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., by sometime in 2002) (See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)); (New Mexico) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of the "first instant" of Plaintiff's 24th birthday (i.e., sometime in 2004) or 3 years from the date that Plaintiff first disclosed her childhood sexual abuse to a licensed medical or mental health care provider in the context of receiving health care (plaintiff makes no allegations in this regard) (See N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30); and three years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., sometime in 2001) (See N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8). + +Plaintiff's claims that are based on torts that allegedly occurred after she became an adult, even if they took place in New York, are also time-barred. Under New York law, excluding alleged torts subject to the New York Child Victims Act ("CVA"),3 if any, Plaintiff's causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year of accrual (see CPLR § 215(3)); or, if Plaintiff's claims sound in personal injury, within three years (see CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, under New York law, Plaintiff's claims arising from her alleged sexual abuse occurring in New York when she was no longer a minor expired in 2002 at the latest. + +Although Plaintiff suggests all of her claims are timely pursuant to the CVA (see, e.g., Compl. 1137), she also alleges Mr. Epstein abused her in various locations and until 1999, when she was over 18 (id. at ¶¶ 19, 22, 24). The Court is not required to reconcile Plaintiff's contradictory allegations. See Whitley v. Bowden, No. 17-CV-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313, at '11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) ("'a court is neither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory allegations in the pleadings as true in deciding a motion to dismiss.'" (citation omitted)). + +Therefore, Plaintiff's claims based on torts occurring in New York after she reached majority, as well as her claims based on torts occurring in Florida and New Mexico — regardless of whether she was a minor at the time — must be dismissed. + +## B. Each of the jurisdictions where the torts allegedly occurred bars recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. + +Judges in this District regularly dismiss and strike punitive damages claims at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's badfaith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N. Y.C. Dept + +{sup}`2` Plaintiff's does not allege belated discovery of her injuries. To the contrary, she alleges she has experienced pain and suffering daily. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 25, 36, 42.) Plaintiff further claims she "was aware of" Mr. Epstein's alleged false imprisonment of her. (Id. at ¶ 54.) + +{sup}`3` The Child Victims Act created a one-year window period in which civil claims alleging damages "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age may be filed despite the statute of limitations having already run. CPLR § 214-g (emphasis added). + +of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at \*25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss statutorily unavailable punitive damages claims); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint lir, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages). See also In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) ("The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted."). "[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance ... as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccautgly denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint." See C. & A. 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.). + +Moreover, it is black-letter law that the place of a tort (here, Florida, New Mexico and New York) generally applies to the issue of punitive damages. When determining what state's law applies, courts look to the choice of law rules of the forum state. Simons v. Marriott Corp., 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at '15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, "[b]ecause punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.- Starr lndem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, No. 14-cv-0463- JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)). See also AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[I]t is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future.- ). + +Here, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must be dismissed as a matter of law because none of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts against her occurred permits punitive damages against the personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, 18-civ-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at \*6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) ("Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased."); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors."); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) ("For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury." (emphasis added)). That is also the law in most U.S. jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor."). + +March 27. 2020 + +Page 4 + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is! Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +![](_page_3_Picture_7.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4305afdf9ea8559d2ae7f1a22a987257403f9b1c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751971/EFTA02751971.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751971", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0121636fc1ab56d71c28ec96dd06ecdd4111af414cd781253a2bdde270f3c419", + "output_sha256": "1ee7485975551cb3b8aa9c03f3531407545c5f43bc44f5c78fa95f1e439b76d1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ec6bba4c7a141c7ebc4759db34292ddea37020f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.md @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +Troutman Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +troutrnan.com + +![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg) + +Bennot J. Moskowitz + +bennelmoskowitz@troutman.com + + +VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +ii-t-tran; o vk Aeuteler 5 0 .3/ c27420 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as coexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, Case No. 1:20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Practices § 2(B) to request a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing a motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the time-barred claims and punitive damages claim in Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff) Complaint (Doc. 9). The bases for our anticipated motion are as follows. + +## A. Plaintiff's claims based on alleged torts that occurred outside of New York and those that occurred when she was an adult, regardless of location, are time-barred. + +Many of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that Jeffrey E. Epstein, now deceased, sexually abused her starting in 1994, when she was 14, and until sometime in 1999, when Plaintiff was an adult, in Florida, New York and New Mexico. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, 22, 24.) Plaintiff alleges she was 16 in 1996 (id. at ¶ 20); so she turned 18 in 1998. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment and seeks punitive damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-58, 60.) + +Plaintiffs claims based on alleged torts occurring outside New York expired long ago, including torts that occurred while she was a minor, as follows: (Florida) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of within 7 years after she reached age of majority by sometime in 2005), within 4 years after she left the dependency of Mr. Epstein (i.e., sometime in 2003 at the latest),' or within 4 years from the time she discovered both the injury and the causal relationship + +Plaintiff alleges she "escaped' from Mr. Epstein in 1999, when she moved to California. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Therefore, Plaintiff could not have depended on him after that time. + +between the injury and the abuse (i.e., by sometime in 2003 at the latest) {sup}`2` (See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7)); and, within 4 years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., by sometime in 2002) (See Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)); (New Mexico) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of the "first instant" of Plaintiffs 24th birthday (i.e., sometime in 2004) or 3 years from the date that Plaintiff first disclosed her childhood sexual abuse to a licensed medical or mental health care provider in the context of receiving health care (plaintiff makes no allegations in this regard) (See N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30); and three years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., sometime in 2001) (See N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8). + +Plaintiffs claims that are based on torts that allegedly occurred after she became an adult, even if they took place in New York, are also time-barred. Under New York law, excluding alleged torts subject to the New York Child Victims Act ("CVA"),' if any, Plaintiffs causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year of accrual (see CPLR § 215(3)); or, if Plaintiffs claims sound in personal injury, within three years (see CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, under New York law, Plaintiff's claims arising from her alleged sexual abuse occurring in New York when she was no longer a minor expired in 2002 at the latest. + +Although Plaintiff suggests all of her claims are timely pursuant to the CVA (see, e.g., Compl. ¶ 37), she also alleges Mr. Epstein abused her in various locations and until 1999, when she was over 18 (id. at 111119, 22, 24). The Court is not required to reconcile Plaintiff's contradictory allegations. See Whitley v. Bowden, No. 17-CV-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) ("'a court is neither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory allegations in the pleadings as true in deciding a motion to dismiss.'" (citation omitted)). + +Therefore, Plaintiff's claims based on torts occurring in New York after she reached majority, as well as her claims based on torts occurring in Florida and New Mexico — regardless of whether she was a minor at the time — must be dismissed. + +## B. Each of the jurisdictions where the torts allegedly occurred bars recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. + +Judges in this District regularly dismiss and strike punitive damages claims at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's badfaith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept + +{sup}`2` Plaintiff's does not allege belated discovery of her injuries. To the contrary, she alleges she has experienced pain and suffering daily. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 25, 36, 42.) Plaintiff further claims she 'was aware or Mr. Epstein's alleged false imprisonment of her. (Id. at ¶ 54.) + +{sup}`3` The Child Victims Act created a one-year window period in which civil claims alleging damages "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age' may be filed despite the statute of limitations having already run. CPLR § 214-g (emphasis added). + +Hon. John G. Koeltl +Page 3 + +of *Educ.*, No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at \*25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss statutorily unavailable punitive damages claims); *Kunica v. St. Jean Fin.*, 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages). *See also In re Merrill* [REDACTED] *Auction Rate Sec. Litig.*, 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages); *Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp.*, No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) ("The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted."). "[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance ... as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint." *See C.* [REDACTED] & A. [REDACTED] 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.). + +Moreover, it is black-letter law that the place of a tort (here, Florida, New Mexico and New York) generally applies to the issue of punitive damages. When determining what state's law applies, courts look to the choice of law rules of the forum state. *Simons v. Marriott Corp.*, 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, "[b]ecause punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.'" *Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt.*, No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting *Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.*, 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); *Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp.*, No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)). *See also AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc.*, 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[I]t is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future.'"). + +Here, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must be dismissed as a matter of law because none of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts against her occurred permits punitive damages against the personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate. *See Poindexter v. Zacharzewski*, 18-civ-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at \*6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) ("Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased."); *Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.*, 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors."); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) ("For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, *but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury.*" (emphasis added)). That is also the law in most U.S. jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. *See Restat. (Second) Of Torts* § 908 cmt. a ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor."). + +Hon. John G. Kool0 + + +Page 4 + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s) Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +![](_page_3_Picture_5.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f49b40abc32116bc47ec6b95d23c5a2a4ab9088d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751975/EFTA02751975.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -64, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751975", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 3, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6e11cb734a2079d0b04e018c5ad65caff9b72f1d75e66cf76383f4d30cec743d", + "output_sha256": "4ca32fc680c0244768c64a66a67192f2241b805a2180b7184837e223d44eca6a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f830d6911d80978b54ca7ae5b4ea77056912bc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff, + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + +Case No. I :20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +## JOINT STIPULATION FOR ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED BY PSEUDONYM + +Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), jointly with Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff"), through counsel for the Co-Executors, respectfully submit this stipulation (the "Stipulation") together with the attached Proposed Order on Plaintiff's Motion For Leave to Proceed By Pseudonym (the "Proposed Order") and accompanying Non-Disclosure Agreement (the "NDA"). + +The parties respectfully request the Court enter the Proposed Order and NDA to resolve Plaintiff's Motion For Leave to Proceed By Pseudonym (ECF #5). + +Dated: March 30, 2020 Respectfully submitted, New York, New York + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP + +By:/s/Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 704-6000 bennet.moskowitz®troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +PANISH, SHEA & BOYLE LLP + +By:/s/ Robert S. Glassman [with permission] + +Robert S. Glassman 11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 (310) 477-1700 glassman@psblaw.cotn + +Attorneys for PlaintifiJane Doe + +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff, + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + +Case No. I :20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +# ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ANONYMITY + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any person subject to this Order, including the parties to this action and their respective counsel of record, shall adhere to the following terms: + +- I. Within three (3) days of entry of this Order, Counsel of Record for Plaintiff shall disclose Plaintiff's identity to Counsel of Record for the Co-Executors, in writing. +- 2. Counsel of Record for the Co-Executors may disclose Plaintiff's identity only to the Co-Executors and any attorneys, paralegals, and clerical or other assistants working with or for the Co-Executors on matters related to this action; and the recipients of such information shall not disclose it to any other persons. +- 3. If the Co-Executors wish to disclose Plaintiff's identity to any person not otherwise permitted to receive such information under this Order, the Co-Executors are limited to doing so in connection with defending this action, and must require such person to first execute a non-disclosure agreement, in a form agreed to by the parties, that prevents such person from disclosing Plaintiff's identity to any other persons. The Co-Executors must maintain a list of all such persons to whom Plaintiff's identity is disclosed and copies of the executed non-disclosure agreements, all of which are subject to in camera inspection. +- 4. All portions of pleadings, motions or other papers filed with the Court that disclose Plaintiff's identity shall be filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court and kept under seal until further order of the Court. The parties shall use their best efforts to minimize such sealing. Any party filing a motion or any other papers with the Court under seal shall also publicly file a redacted copy of the same, via the Court's Electronic Case Filing system, that redacts the Plaintiff's identity and text that would reveal Plaintiff's identity. + +- 5. The parties may seek to modify or amend this Order at any time upon motion to the Court or by stipulation. + +SO ORDERED. + +Date: + +New York, New York Hon. Debra C. Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York + +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + +Case No 1.20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +## NON-DISCLOSURE. AGREEMENT + +, acknowledge that I understand that the identity of the Plaintiff in this action is confidential. I agree that: (I) I will hold in confidence Plaintiffs identity; (2) I will use Plaintiff's identity only in connection with this litigation; and (3) I will take all due precautions to prevent the unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of Plaintiff's identity. + +By acknowledging these obligations under this Non-Disclosure Agreement, I understand that I am submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for the purpose of any issue or dispute arising hereunder, and that my willful violation of any term of the Non-Disclosure Agreement could subject me to punishment for contempt of court. + +Dated: + +[Signature] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f29df1ab0c9db3748ee95088825dd8ca12147aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751979/EFTA02751979.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -75, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751979", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ccecc8c930e2ecc3a1aaa19daead48596744378e9731a50be3dab6459458daa1", + "output_sha256": "aa9f20d7f8b4d9fbf2a299084625b76e431a82cc13e8d6bc75f802b5d250b140", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c7fe75a7e125115bbe25ddcac403a84234912621 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. I :20-cv-00484 (JGK) (DCF) + +## ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S ANONYMITY + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any person subject to this Order, including the parties to this action and their respective counsel of record, shall adhere to the following terms: + +- I. Within three (3) days of entry of this Order, Counsel of Record for Plaintiff shall disclose Plaintiff's identity to Counsel of Record for the Co-Executors, in writing. +- 2. Counsel of Record for the Co-Executors may disclose Plaintiff's identity only to the Co-Executors and any attorneys, paralegals. and clerical or other assistants working with or for the Co-Executors on matters related to this action; and the recipients of such information shall not disclose it to any other persons. +- 3. If the Co-Executors wish to disclose Plaintiff's identity to any person not otherwise permitted to receive such information under this Order, the Co-Executors are limited to doing so in connection with defending this action, and must require such person to first execute a non-disclosure agreement, in a form agreed to by the parties, that prevents such person from disclosing Plaintiff's identity to any other persons. The Co-Executors must maintain a list of all such persons to whom Plaintiff's identity is disclosed and copies of the executed non-disclosure agreements, all of which are subject to in camera inspection. +- 4. All portions of pleadings, motions or other papers filed with the Court that disclose Plaintiff's identity shall be filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court and kept under seal until further order of the Court. The parties shall use their best efforts to minimize such sealing. Any party filing a motion or any other papers with the Court under seal shall also publicly file a redacted copy of the same, via the Court's Electronic Case Filing system, that redacts the Plaintiff's identity and text that would reveal Plaintiff's identity. + +- 5. The parties may seek to modify or amend this Order at any time upon motion to the Court or by stipulation. + +SO ORDERED. + +Date: March 30, 2020 + +New York, New York Hon. Debra C. Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9baf54ee849ea9bce5025c4820d27984281c7139 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751984/EFTA02751984.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751984", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1066ea94537665b24787f6fe73b1db71d98a55ea8f15d5539fd498d3385ea957", + "output_sha256": "1066ea94537665b24787f6fe73b1db71d98a55ea8f15d5539fd498d3385ea957", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3f2cfa03dc1739e0dfb1b8c1162e9eb3557ac44 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +[PROPOSED] SCHEDULING ORDER + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +It is hereby ORDERED that: + +- I. The parties shall serve their initial disclosures no later than April 10, 2020. +- 2. The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than April 20, 2020. +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than May 14, 2020. +- 4. The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol regarding the production of documents and electronically stored information no later than June I, 2020. +- 5. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than July 21, 2020. +- 6. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiff's expert reports shall be served no later than July 21, 2020. + - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than August 21, 2020. + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than September 8, 2020. +- 7. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +- 8. The parties shall submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions no later than June 19, 2020. + +Dated: New York, New York + +2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA C. FREEMAN + +United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e29f0fa8b215b5d1e012166903fa31b19d3727b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751986/EFTA02751986.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751986", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9ea784d3c7536b5cf281eb6f99a806db14d24cb24f0a9e7a87f32ddbeac33c6d", + "output_sha256": "9ea784d3c7536b5cf281eb6f99a806db14d24cb24f0a9e7a87f32ddbeac33c6d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3ebdc8f714c6d5c569d558c615458b1adb82a22 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +## VIA ELECTRONIC COURT FILING + +Hon. Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 March 30, 2020 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the above-referenced action. We write to request that you enter the enclosed proposed scheduling order, to which Plaintiff Jane Doe has agreed. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +End.: Proposed Scheduling Order \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ce7e4adb40261ff63270446e85a8613e0491b4d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751988/EFTA02751988.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751988", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "75a563272e8d36ffca97d72e587a91680422851a8265896e6cc6499a2ef4f4c1", + "output_sha256": "75a563272e8d36ffca97d72e587a91680422851a8265896e6cc6499a2ef4f4c1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..125651ff860617f865b76c066916531151e341a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +April 1, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as coexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. On March 27, 2020, Judge Koeltl granted the Co-Executors leave to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 30). However, the Court did not set a briefing schedule. Accordingly, we write to request Your Honor's approval of the parties' agreed briefing schedule for Defendants' motion to dismiss, as follows: + +- The Co-Executors shall file their motion to dismiss on or before April 17, 2020; +- Plaintiff shall file her response to the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss on or before April 27, 2020; and +- The Co-Executors shall file their reply in support of their motion to dismiss on or before May 11, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70020e4cc0c77c92142bae3acb1caec85a5fdf52 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751989/EFTA02751989.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751989", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5a774c4132e3d89cda4df63fbe6332f8fa0e1cb468a35e3312bfade701dd0584", + "output_sha256": "5a774c4132e3d89cda4df63fbe6332f8fa0e1cb468a35e3312bfade701dd0584", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..32f2a958e6f304075549e60c3ba9d72b5cebdc92 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, CASE NO: 20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +tfittePSDt SCHEDULING ORDER + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +It is hereby ORDERED that: + +- I. The parties shall serve their initial disclosures no later than April 10, 2020. +- 2. The parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than April 20, 2020. +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than May 14, 2020. +- 4. The parties shall confer and stipulate as to a protocol regarding the production of documents and electronically stored information no later than June I, 2020. +- 5. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than July 21, 2020. +- 6. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiff's expert reports shall be served no later than July 21, 2020. + - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than August 21, 2020. + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than September 8, 2020. +- 7. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +- 8. The parties shall submit joint status reports to the Court, regarding discovery and the progress of settlement discussions no later than June 19, 2020. + +Dated: New York, New York + +April 1 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..303c2429e7732334fc424d5b7012d42d949c9ad1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751990/EFTA02751990.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751990", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0622105e7a64c01742fabaa5f4f8e409b1e766763d05940c63c0d53e760c18a0", + "output_sha256": "0622105e7a64c01742fabaa5f4f8e409b1e766763d05940c63c0d53e760c18a0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5dd2f8293b088af170932d069dbfaaed6a44ac1b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN g INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JOK-DCF + +## NOTICE OF CO-EXECUTORS' MOTION TO DISMISS + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying Memorandum of Law and all prior pleadings and proceedings in this action, Defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, will move this Court before the Hon. John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge, at the Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007, at a time to be scheduled by this Court, for an Order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12iIi(6), to dismiss with prejudice Counts I-IV in Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff") Complaint (ECF Doc. 9) to the extent they are time-barred, Count V in its entirety, and Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages against them. + +Dated: New York, New York April 17, 2020 + +By: /s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Attorneys for Co-Executors \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5e4d2ad1b6d8561acbaa05d2453f0b345974633b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751992/EFTA02751992.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751992", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a4816d754f14f772a181e016da2697483fb7097ad2dd4b76cbeb0d2ea8520591", + "output_sha256": "a4816d754f14f772a181e016da2697483fb7097ad2dd4b76cbeb0d2ea8520591", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..abf92c036b4345e31f36eb7db344a04a9410eb77 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.md @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN in their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## THE CO-EXECUTORS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Tel: 212-704-6000 Fax: 212-704-6288 + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +# TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| | Page | +| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | I | +| ARGUMENT | 2 | +| A. | Legal Standard: Legal conclusions, labels and formulaic recitations of the | +| elements of causes of action are insufficient to state a claim. | 2 | +| B. | Plaintiff's claims based on alleged torts that occurred outside of New York | +| time-barred | 2 | +| C. | Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment must be dismissed in its entirety | +| as untimely. | 4 | +| D. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors must be | | +| bars recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate | 6 | +| CONCLUSION | 8 | + +#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +| Cases AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., | Page(s) | +| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | +| 661 F. App'x 2 (2d Cir. 2016) Ashcroft v. lqbal, | 6 | +| 556 U.S. 662 (2009) Bell Att Corp. v. Twombly, | 2 | +| 550 U.S. 544 (2007) Carson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc., | 2 | +| 202 F. Supp. 3d 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., | 2 | +| 723 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., | 6 | +| No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003) In re M, | 6 | +| 93 Misc. 2d 545 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1978) | 5 | +| In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., | | +| 851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) In re Venie, | 8 | +| No. 2017-NMSC-018, 395 P.3d 516 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 2017) Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., | 4 | +| 117 N.M. 337 (N.M. 1994) Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., | 7 | +| (Sweet, J.) Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., | 7 | +| 1996) Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, | 8 | +| No. 18-civ-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) | 7 | + +#### Simons v. Marriott Corp., + +No. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993) 6 + +## SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., + +No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) 7 + +#### Starr lndem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., + +No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) 6 + +## The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, + +No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) 7 + +## Whitley v. Bowden, + +No. 17-cv-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) 2, 3 + +### Statutes + +| CPLR 214-g | 3, 5 | +| -------------------------------- | --------- | +| CPLR § 202 | 4 | +| CPLR § 214(5) | 4, 6 | +| CPLR § 215(3) | 4, 6 | +| EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) | 7 | +| Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3XO) | 3 | +| Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7) | 3 | +| Fla. Stat. § 95.11(9) | 3, 4 | +| N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8 | 4 | +| N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30 | 4 | +| N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2) | 4 | +| New York Child Victims' Act | 2 | +| New York Penal Law Art. 130 | 4, 5, 6 | +| New York Penal Law Article 135 | 5 | + +## Other Authorities + +| C. & k =, 5C Fed. Proc. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.) | 8 | +| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | +| N.Y.P.L. §§ 135.00 | 5 | +| Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) | 1 | +| Restatement (Second) of Torts | 7 | +| WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 16.4(c) (4th ed. 2019) | 3 | + +Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion, made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6), to dismiss Counts I-IV in Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff")Complaint (ECF Doc. 9) to the extent they are time-barred, Count V in its entirety, and Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages against them. + +### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT + +Several of Plaintiff's claims, which allege torts that ended over twenty years ago, are timebarred. Plaintiff alleges that Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Decedent"), now deceased, sexually abused her starting in 1994, when she was 14, until sometime in 1999, when Plaintiff was an adult, in Florida, New York and New Mexico. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, 22, 24.) Plaintiff alleges she was 16 in 1996 (id. at 1120); she therefore turned 18 in 1998. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment, and seeks punitive damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-58, 60.) + +While preserving all rights and legal positions, the Co-Executors do not seek to dismiss Plaintiff's first four claims (for battery, assault, and infliction of emotional distress) in their entirety. However, to the extent those claims are based on alleged torts that occurred in Florida or New Mexico, or after Plaintiff turned 18, regardless of where they occurred, they are time-barred and must be dismissed. + +Further, Plaintiff's fifth claim (false imprisonment) must be dismissed in its entirety for two reasons. First, the claim is time-barred regardless of how old Plaintiff was at the time or where it occurred. Second, even if it were not time-barred, Plaintiff failed to allege the facts necessary to assert a claim for false imprisonment. + +Finally, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors must be dismissed as a matter of law. None of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred permits recovery of punitive damages in actions against the personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate. + +#### ARGUMENT + +#### A. Legal Standard: Legal conclusions, labels and formulaic recitations of the elements of causes of action are insufficient to state a claim. + +"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the Court must normally accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor, those principles are "inapplicable to legal conclusions."M. at 678 (2009) (citing Bell Art Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & 556 (2007)). Thus, a pleading that offers only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). Moreover, "'[w]here [the] plaintiff's own pleadings are internally inconsistent, a court is neither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory allegations in the pleadings as true in deciding a motion to dismiss."' Whitley v. Bowden, No. 17-cv-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) (quoting Carson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). + +## B. Plaintiff's claims based on alleged torts that occurred outside of New York and those that occurred when she was an adult, regardless of location, are time-barred. + +In an apparent attempt to suggest her untimely claims have been revived by the New York Child Victims' Act ("CVA") Plaintiff alleges that each of her causes of action has been brought pursuant to it. (Compl. 7J 37, 43, 48, 52 and 58.) However, Plaintiff ignores that the CVA does not revive her claims (i) based on conduct that allegedly occurred after she turned 18 in 1998, or (ii) outside of New York, regardless of Plaintiffs age at the time.' + +The CVA creates a one-year window in which civil claims alleging damages "suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age" may be filed despite the statute of limitations having already run. CPLR § 214-g (emphasis added). The CVA's New York Penal Law predicate applies only to acts that occurred in New York. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 16.4(c) (4th S. 2019) ("a state has power to make conduct or the result of conduct a crime only if the conduct takes place or the result happens within its territorial limits."). + +Therefore, Plaintiff's claims based on torts occurring in New York after she became an adult, as well as her claims based on torts occurring in Florida and New Mexico—regardless of whether she was a minor at the time—expired as follows: + +- Florida: for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of within seven years after she reached age of majority (Le., by sometime in 2005), within four years after she left the dependency of Decedent (Le., sometime in 2003 at the latest),2 or within four years from the time she discovered both her injury and the causal relationship between that injury and the abuse (i.e., by sometime in 2003 at the latest)3 (See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7)); and, within four years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., by sometime in 2002) (See Ha. Stat. § 95.11 (3XO)).4 + +{sup}`I` Although Plaintiff suggests all of her claims are timely pursuant to the CVA (see, e.g., Compl. 1 37), she also alleges Decedent abused her in various locations until 1999, when she was over 18 (id. at 11 19, 22, 24). As noted above, the Court is not required to reconcile Plaintiff's contradictory allegations. See Whitley, 2018 WL 2170313, at \*II (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018). + +{sup}`2`Plaintiff alleges she "escaped" from Decedent in 1999, when she moved to California. (Compl. 1 24.) Plaintiff could not have depended on him after that time. + +{sup}`3` Plaintiff does not allege belated discovery of her injuries. To the contrary, she alleges she has experienced pain and suffering daily. (See. e.g., Compl. 9¶ 25, 36, 42.) Plaintiff further claims she "was aware of" Decedent's alleged false imprisonment of her. (Id. at 1 54.) + +{sup}`4`1n 2010, the Florida Legislature enacted Fla. Stat. § 95.11(9), which provides: "An action related to an act constituting a violation of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such action other than one which would have been time barred on or before + +- New Mexico: for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of the "first instant" of Plaintiff's 24th birthday (i.e., sometime in 2004) or three years from the date of the time that she knew or had reason to know of the childhood sexual abuse and that the childhood sexual abuse resulted in an injury to her, as established by competent medical or psychological testimony (Plaintiff makes no allegations in this regard) (see N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30);5 and three years after Plaintiff reached age of majority (i.e., sometime in 2001) (see N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8). +- New York: excluding alleged torts subject to the CVA, if any, Plaintiff's causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year of accrual (see CPLR § 215(3)); or, if Plaintiff's claims sound in personal injury, within three years (see CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, under New York law, Plaintiff's claims arising from her alleged sexual abuse occurring in New York when she was no longer a minor expired in 2002 at the latest.° + +## C. Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment must be dismissed in its entirety as untimely. + +Plaintiff's false imprisonment cause of action (Count V) must be dismissed because the CVA does not apply to it. As explained above, one of the two predicates for the CVA's application is a civil claim arising from conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in New York Penal Law Art. 130: + +July 1, 2010." (emphasis added). As explained above, Plaintiff's cause of action based on alleged abuse in Florida expired by 2005. Accordingly, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(9) is inapplicable to her claim. + +{sup}`3` As her cause of action expired before the current version of N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2) became effective on April 6, 2017, Plaintiff is not entitled to avail herself of it. See In re Venie, No. 2017-NMSC-018, 395 P.3d 516 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 2017) (distinguishing cases such as this, in which a cause of action expires before the enactment of a new limitations period, from cases in which a new limitations period extends the time to bring a cause of action before the prior limitations period had expired such that a defendant has no vested right in the statute of limitations defense based on the prior limitations period). Rather, Plaintiff is only entitled to invoke the prior version of N.M. Stat. §37-1-30(AX2), which provided that an action for damages based on personal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse must be commenced "three years from the date of the time that a person knew or had reason to know of the childhood sexual abuse and that the childhood sexual abuse resulted in an injury to the person, as established by competent medical or psychological testimony." See current version of N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2) ("An action for damages based on personal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced by a person before the latest of the following dates ... (2) three years from the date that a person first disclosed the person's childhood sexual abuse to a licensed medical or mental health care provider in the context of receiving health care from the provider."). In any event, Plaintiff fails to allege the condition precedent to either version of the statute. + +{sup}`6` That Plaintiff's causes of action accruing outside New York are untimely under New York law alone renders those claims time-barred. Plaintiff alleges she resides in California. (Comp!. 1 4.) New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, provides that, when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York, the complaint must be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued. (As explained above, the torts that Plaintiff alleges occurred outside New York fall outside the scope of the CVA.) + +Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary and the provisions of any other law pertaining to the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special proceeding, every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, incest as defined in section 255.27, 255.26 or 255.25 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, or the use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law, or a predecessor statute that prohibited such conduct at the time of the act, which conduct was committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, which is barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired, and/or the plaintiff previously failed to file a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim, is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section. + +CPLR 214-g (emphasis added). + +However, Article 130 of the New York Penal Law, titled "Sex Offenses," does not cover conduct that would give rise to a claim of false imprisonment, but rather various types of sexual abuse, misconduct, and assault. See N.Y.P.L. §§ 130.00, a seq. Conduct that could give rise to a claim of false imprisonment, specifically, "knowingly unlawful restraint without consent," is covered by Article 135 of the New York Penal Law, which address "unlawful imprisonment" among "Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses." N.Y.P.L. §§ 135.00, et seq. + +Here, albeit in a formulaic, threadbare fashion, Plaintiff alleges as the basis of her false imprisonment claims—as opposed to the conduct that forms the basis of her sexual assault and sexual battery claims—that Decedent and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell "imprison[ed]" her "without lawful authority"—i.e., "unlawful imprisonment." (Compl. ¶ 54.) While that alleged underlying conduct may in theory give rise to a N.Y.P.L. § 135 violation, it cannot give rise to a N.Y.P.L. § 130 violation. See In re M., 93 Misc. 2d 545, 549 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1978) ("Further argument advanced by respondent's attorney that the charge of unlawful imprisonment, second degree, under section 135.05 of the Penal Law does not exist independently of the charge + +of sexual abuse, second degree [Penal Law 135.05], is equally without merit ... Clearly, the elements of each of these crimes are totally different and each can stand independent of the other."). + +Therefore: (i) Plaintiffs false imprisonment claim is subject to the 1- or 3-year statutes of limitation set forth in CPLR §§ 215(3) and 214(5), respectively; and (ii) accordingly, and regardless of whether she was a minor at the time of the alleged false imprisonment, Count V expired by 2002 at the latest. + +#### D. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors must be dismissed because each jurisdiction where the torts allegedly occurred bars recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. + +As a matter of law, none of the jurisdictions where Plaintiff alleges she was abused permits her to recover punitive damages from the Co-Executors. It is black-letter law that the place of a tort (here, Florida, New Mexico or New York) generally applies to the issue of punitive damages. When determining which state's law applies, courts look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Simons v. Marriott Corp., No. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). + +Under New York law, "[b]ecause punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply."' Starr Indent. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)). See also AHW Inv. rship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Mt is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern + +their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future."'). + +Because none of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred permits punitive damages against the personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors. See Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, No. 18-civ-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at 416 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) ("Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased."); JaramilIo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) ("punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors."); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (aX1) ("For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury." (emphasis added)). That is also the law in most U.S. jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor."). + +Dismissing Plaintiff's punitive damages claim is procedurally proper. Judges in this District regularly dismiss and strike punitive damages claims at the pleadings stage where, as here, they are legally baseless, whether because they are barred by statute and black-letter law (as is the case here) or where a plaintiff fails to allege facts that would permit them. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at 4'17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SIB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at \*25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss statutorily unavailable punitive damages claims); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., No. 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at \*26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages). See also In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at IS (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) ("The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted."). See also C. & A. =, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.) ("[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance ... as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint."). + +# CONCLUSION + +For the reasons stated above, the Co-Executors respectfully request that the Court dismiss Counts I-IV of Plaintiff's Complaint to the extent they are time-barred, Count V in its entirety, and Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages, together with such other and further relief as is just and equitable. + +Dated: New York, New York April 17, 2020 + +By: /s/ Bennet .1 Moskowitz Bennet .1. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..970537abb6c0d0b310491841a99cc5ae1f7e150f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02751993/EFTA02751993.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -2249, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02751993", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 82, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "03c1c8ff78338c70f5a7ed3b2f451dede413c16461017540489f93daac163787", + "output_sha256": "0873f8a67ccc5520b306d26498e38f388aeb69dd79282981d6eae146484783ac", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..37bb741fcdc8433ad8857055d565b64686045a37 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +D: 212-7044000 + +bennetmoskowitz@troutman.com + +April 17, 2020 + +## VIA ELECTRONIC COURT FILING + +Hon. John G. Koelt1 + +Daniel Moynihan + +United States Courthouse + +500 Pearl St. + +New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Practices § 2G to request oral argument on the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 37). + +Respectfully submitted, + +slBennet.1 Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fdde9260fb9186bd2f99f3ba78ba001c87928811 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752007/EFTA02752007.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752007", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2d8f37658f51b173dbba98c58ffe6511148fc9438bf42deb13657cb28a03491a", + "output_sha256": "2d8f37658f51b173dbba98c58ffe6511148fc9438bf42deb13657cb28a03491a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4712874faeb34abe2c6e3cd58ba94b53dfafbf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.md @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +# PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +#### TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| | | Page | +| ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | +| I. | INTRODUCTION..... | 1 | +| II. | ARGUMENT ..... | 1 | +| | A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Is Procedurally Improper..... | 1 | +| | B. Defendants Misapply New York Law Which Indicates USVI Law Determines The Applicability Of Punitive Damages In This Case ..... | 2 | +| | 1. In Deciding This Question, The Court Must Apply New York's Interest Analysis ..... | 2 | +| | 2. USVI's Interest Is Considerably Stronger Than New York's Because of the Estate's Overwhelming Ties To The USVI..... | 3 | +| | 3. The Interest Analysis's Focus On "Justice, Fairness, And The Best Practical Result" Points Towards Applying USVI Law..... | 4 | +| | C. USVI Law Would Allow For Punitive Damages Against the Estate..... | 4 | +| | 1. The "Most Important" Banks Factor Supports Imposition Of Punitive Damages Against The Estate. .... | 5 | +| | 2. The Two Lesser Banks Factors Do Not Support Barring Punitive Damages Against The Estate..... | 7 | +| III. | ANY NEW ARGUMENTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS IN THEIR REPLY BRIEF SHOULD BE IGNORED ..... | 8 | +| IV. | CONCLUSION ..... | 9 | + +#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +| | Page | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | +| CASES | | +| Gov't of the V.I. v. [REDACTED]
60 V.I. 597 (2016) ..... | 5 | +| FEDERAL CASES | | +| Babcock v [REDACTED]
12 NY2d 473 (1963) ..... | 4 | +| Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp.
55 V.I. 967 (2011) ..... | 4 | +| Booth v. Bowen
No. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067, at *5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008) ..... | 7 | +| Com-Tech Assocs. v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc.
753 F. Supp. 1078, (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ..... | 2 | +| Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree
837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005) ..... | 6 | +| Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc.
998 N.E.2d 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ..... | 6 | +| [REDACTED] v. Knack
170 A.D.3d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) ..... | 4 | +| Golden v. Wyeth, Inc.
No. 4-CV-2841, 2013 WL 4500879, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) ..... | 3, 5 | +| [REDACTED] v. Dowson Holding Co.
51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009) ..... | 7 | +| Hunter v Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC,
16 CIV. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) ..... | 1 | +| Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.
313 U.S. 487 (1941) ..... | 2 | +| Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson
No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805719, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) ..... | 2 | +| Nicholas v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc.
301 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D.V.I. 2002) ..... | 4 | +| Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp.
644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994) ..... | 2 | + +Rapay v. Chemov + +No. 16 Civ. 4910, 2017 WL 892372, at \*1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2017) 2 + +v. Philip Morris Inc. + +124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Babcock vM, 12 NY2d 473, 481 (N.Y. 1963) + +#### STATE CASES + +Alain Ellis Living Tr v. Harvey D. Ellis Trust (2016). + +308 Kan. at 1046 8 + +David B. v Millar + +2 AD3d 763, 764 (N.Y. 2003) 8 + +Hardison v. Fisher Surveying, Inc. + +201 Ariz. 1, 3-4 (2001) (en banc) 8 + +State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v LiMauro + +103 AD2d 514 (N.Y 1984) 8 + +### TREATISES + +Barry A. Lindahl, 2 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 20:24 (2d ed., June 2019 + +Update) 8 + +Zitter, 30 A.L.R.4th 707 8 + +#### I. INTRODUCTION + +Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff"), by her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss in part Plaintiffs complaint (ECF Nos. 36-37). First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims based on torts that occurred outside of New York and those that occurred when she was an adult are time-barred. Plaintiff does not dispute this point and did not allege such in her complaint'. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for false imprisonment must be dismissed in its entirety as untimely. Plaintiff does not oppose this argument and will hereby withdraw that cause of action against Defendants. And finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors must be dismissed. Not so. Defendants' argument regarding punitive damages is not only procedurally improper but it ignores the law of the governing jurisdiction which decides this question: that of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI"). + +#### II. ARGUMENT + +#### A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Is Procedurally Improper + +First, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is procedurally improper because punitive damages are not an independent cause of action. See, e.g., Hunter v Palisades Acquisition XVI, LW, 16 CIV. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) ("Because punitive damages are a form of damages, not an independent cause of action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the form of punitive damages is procedurally premature.") (internal quotations omitted). The proper vehicle for Defendants' attempt to strike Plaintiffs + +To be clear, however, Plaintiff did suffer tremendously both outside of New York and as an adult as a result of Decedent Jeffrey Epstein's repeated sexual abuse of her. For the purposes of this lawsuit, Plaintiff only brings claims against Defendants for the numerous rapes and assaults against her while she was a minor in the state of New York. + +prayer for punitive damages (a mode of relief) is a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). See, e.g., Rapay v. Chernov, No. 16 Civ. 4910, 2017 WL 892372, at \*1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2017); Corn- Tech Assocs. v. Comput. Assocs. Intl, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1078. 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying Rule 12(f) motion to strike punitive damages). + +Accordingly, Defendants' motion should be denied on this ground alone. Should the Court decide to entertain the motion on its merits, though, it should still be denied. + +### B. Defendants Misapply New York Law Which Indicates USVI Law Determines The Applicability Of Punitive Damages In This Case + +Defendants fail to address in the motion the likelihood that USV1 law applies to the question of whether Plaintiff may recover punitive damages in this case against Defendants. Based on the following points and authorities, it does. + +## 1. In Deciding This Question, The Court Must Apply New York's Interest Analysis + +A federal court must look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in resolving conflicts of law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 4% (1941); Intl Bus. Maths. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). The forum state in this matter is New York. Therefore, New York choice of law analyses govern this conflict. + +In the context of tort law, "New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions has the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation." Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994). "[U]nder New York law—for punitive damages in particular—a court must consider the object or purpose of the wrongdoing to be punished and give controlling weight to the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented." Nat'! Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805719, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). Further, because "punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant, ... the choice-of-law inquiry for punitive + +damages provisions is necessarily "defendant-focused."" Id. (citing Golden v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4-CV-2841, 2013 WL 4500879, at \*3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013)). Importantly, in conducting this analysis, New York courts seek to achieve "Wustice, fairness, and the best practical result..." v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Babcock v 12 NY2d 473, 481 (N.Y. 1963). + +## 2. USVI's Interest Is Considerably Stronger Than New York's Because (4' the Estate's Overwhelming Ties To The USVI + +Here, the USVI's interest in the availability of punitive damages supersedes New York's by a long shot. First, the Defendant is the Estate. The Estate was probated in the USVI, where it is governed by USVI laws. Compl. (ECF Doc. 9) fl 28, 29. Second, Defendants Indyke and Kahn, both named in their capacities as executors of the Estate, were authorized by USVI Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell to administer the Estate. Compl. 1 32. In fact, as legal representatives of the Estate, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the USVI. Compl. 1 9. Third, Epstein himself was a Virgin Islander and was domiciled there, not in New York. Compl. 1 9. + +Conversely, New York's interest in having its law applied is weak. As previously noted, the Estate is not domiciled in New York, nor is it in probate in New York. Further, Epstein was not a domiciliary of New York. In short, with regard to the punitive damages question, there is no "there" in New York. + +Because of the "defendant-focused" nature of punitive damages, the law of the USVI where the Estate was probated, where the Estate is actively overseen, and where Epstein was domiciled—should decide the question as to the applicability of punitive damages against the Estate. + +## 3. The Interest Analysis's Focus On "Justice, Fairness, And The Best Practical Result" Points Towards Applying USVI Law + +Moreover, justice and fairness require the Court to apply USVI law in deciding this question. First, as aforementioned, the USVI has strong interests considering it is the home of the Estate and was the home of Epstein. The USVI clearly is most "intimately concerned with the outcome of (the) particular litigation." Babcock vM, 12 NY2d 473, 481-82 (1963). Therefore, the applicability of punitive damages against the Estate should be decided by USV1 law. + +Second, the practical result of applying New York law, as opposed to USVI law, is that it will reward Epstein for committing suicide by shielding him from punishment for his heinous sexual abuse of his victims. Had Epstein not committed suicide, it is indisputable he would face punitive damages alongside Maxwell.2 Thus, justice and fairness require what is also the best practical result: the application of USVI law in deciding this question. + +### C. USVI Law Would Allow For Punitive Damages Against the Estate + +To determine USVI common law, USVI courts apply what is known as the Banks analysis. See Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). "[I]nstead of mechanistically following the Restatements, courts should consider three non-dispositive factors to determine Virgin Islands common law: (1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most + +{sup}`2` See, e.g., Nicholas v. Wyndham Intl, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (D.V.I. 2002) ("[P]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of defendant's evil motive or [her] reckless indifference to the rights of others."); v. Knack, 170 A.D.3d 667, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (punitive damages appropriate in sexual assault case because "the defendant's acts were particularly heinous"). + +importantly, which approach represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands." Gov't of the V.I. v. 60 V.I. 597, 600, 602 (2016) (emphasis added). An analysis of these three factors clearly indicates punitive damages are available under USVI law in this case. + +## 1. The "Most Important" Banks Factor Supports Imposition Of Punitive Damages Against The Estate. + +The "most important[]" of those factors—the "approach [that] represents the soundest rule tor the Virgin Islands"—clearly points towards allowing punitive damages against the Estate. In fact, the Government of the USVI filed a complaint against the Estate in which the USVI seeks punitive damages against the Estate. In its complaint, the USVI affirms the soundness of permitting the recovery of punitive damages against the Estate. First, the USVI states the purpose of punitive damages "is to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct that is reckless or intentional" and "to deter others from engaging in such conduct in the future." Additionally, the USVI states "punitive damages are especially important in the case of persons or companies that have money, assets, and power that mere fines, penalties, and economic damages are simply not sufficient." The Government of the USVI's seeking punitive damages should be dispositive in this Ihinks analysis. + +Of course, the USVI properly identifies the benefits to the Virgin Islands of permitting punitive damages against the Estate. An independent analysis too strongly favors this approach for the USVI. Punitive damages in the Virgin Islands are designed to both punish wrongdoers and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. See, e.g., Guardian Ins. Co. v. Gumbs, No. ST-I 5-CV-195, 2016 WL 9525609, at \*10 (V.I. Super. Aug. 22, 2016). The importance to the USVI of deterring the kind of conduct Epstein engaged in in the USVI is obvious. It is on the USVI where Epstein not only abused countless girls and young women, but also "abused [the] privileges of residency," specifically choosing the Virgin Islands as the location for his heinous crimes because of its seclusion and isolation, and thereby contributing to a public perception that the + +Virgin Islands is "a hiding place for human trafficking and sex crimes." + +Critically, Epstein committed suicide in prison with full knowledge that, to put it plainly, the jig was up. He faced not only the strong likelihood of life in prison, but also claims seeking punitive damages for his horrific acts. He committed suicide fully aware of that reality. The fact that Epstein would have been subject to punitive damages claims if he had not taken his own lite —and that he committed suicide knowing he was subject to such claims—further militates in favor of permitting punitive damages against his Estate. This specific circumstance is recognized and accounted for in other jurisdictions like, for example, in Indiana where the Indiana Supreme Court indicated its intention to decline applying its normal bar on punitive damages "where a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own death as an escape from punitive damages incident to some intentional tort" by committing suicide. See Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree. 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005)? In this circumstance, the USVI would clearly benefit from allowing for punitive damages against his Estate which would otherwise be available against Epstein (and the very same money now sitting in trust) had he not killed himself with full knowledge of the weight of the claims against him. + +While courts in the USVI have favorably cited to the Section 908 of the Restatement, the USVI Supreme Court in supra, 60 V.I. at 600 rejected "mechanistically following the Restatements" and instead instructed USVI courts to apply the Banks analysis instead. The Court should follow its heed. + +In conclusion, it is beyond dispute that the soundest rule for the USVI would be to allow + +{sup}`&#`x27; See also Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 238, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting a "possible exception" to the rule proscribing punitive damages against an estate "if the tortfeasor committed suicide to attempt to escape such damages"). + +punitive damages against the Estate: I) Epstein was a domiciliary of the USVI; 2) the Estate is probated in the USVI and actively administered through its courts; 3) the Government of the USVI is itself seeking punitive damages against the Estate; and 4) Epstein committed suicide knowing of the onslaught of claims against him. + +## 2. The Two Lesser Banks Factors Do Not Support Barring Punitive Damages Against The Estate. + +As for the other two elements of the Banks analysis, they do not provide any justification for denying punitive damages against the Estate. As for the first factor, Plaintiff is not aware of any USVI decision on the question of whether to permit punitive damages in this circumstance. + +While the federal court in the USVI declined to allow punitive damages in a case where the personal representatives of an estate seek punitive damages against a third party for the decedent's wrongful death, it goes without saying the circumstances there are entirely different from the one liere.4 They seek punitive damages in favor of an estate, whereas hem punitive damages are sought against an estate. Simply, the circumstance at issue here has not yet been addressed by a USVI court. + +As for the second, less-important factor of the Banks analysis, while it is true that barring punitive damages against an estate is the majority view, a significant minority has reached the opposite conclusion: ten (Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, + +{sup}`4` See, e.g., v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) (personal representative seeks punitive damage against operator of a hotel where decedent was shot and killed); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067, at \*5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008) (personal representative seeks punitive damages against scuba diving instruction company after decedent drowned during scuba course) + +Alabama, Montana, New Hampshire, and West Virginia)5 of the approximately 35 jurisdictions to address the question have decided punitive damages should be allowed against an estate, including for reasons the USVI as we write this seeks punitive damages against the Estate: adequate compensation for victims, punishment of wrongdoers, deterrence of other future wrongdoers, and social condemnation of uniquely abhorrent behavior. Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 201 Ariz. 1, 34 (2001) (en banc); see also generally Zitter, 30 A.L.R.4th 707; Barry A. Lindahl, 2 Modem Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 20:24 (2d ed., June 2019 Update). Importantly, most of the jurisdictions adopting the majority rule have—unlike the Virgin Islands—passed a statute codifying a prohibition on punitive damages against an estate. See Alain Ellis Living Tr., 308 Kan. at 1046 ("[A]t least 14 of the cases adopting the position that an injured party cannot recover punitive damages from the estate of a tortfeasor—the majority rule—reached that conclusion because their respective state legislatures had passed a statute stating that position."). Therefore, most of the jurisdictions that bar punitive damages against an Estate do so as an expression of legislative, not judicial, will. + +# III. ANY NEW ARGUMENTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS IN THEIR REPLY BRIEF SHOULD BE IGNORED + +Any new arguments raised by Defendants in the reply brief would be improper and should be ignored. "It is beyond cavil that raising a new substantive issue of law for the first time in a reply brief is improper ..." State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v LiMauro, 103 AD2d 514, 521-22 (N.Y 1984); see also David B. v Millar, 2 AD3d 763, 764 (N.Y. 2003) ("This argument is not properly before this Court since it is raised for the first time in [] reply brief'). + +{sup}`5` See Jay M. Zitter, Claim for punitive damages in ton action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged, 30 A.L.R.4th 707 (1984 ed., 2019 Suppl.). + +### IV. CONCLUSION + +For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. + +Respectfully submitted, + +I )atcd: April 27, 2020 By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP + +11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone: (310) 477-1700 + +Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 + +glassman@psblaw.com + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +#### CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE + +I, Robert S. Glassman, hereby certify that Plaintiffs Memorandum of Opposition to Defendant? Motion to Dismiss contains 2,583 words and complies with the formatting rules set forth in the Individual Practices of Judge John G. Koeld. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Dated: April 27, 2020 By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP + +11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + +Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Telephone: (310) 477-1700 + +Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 + +glassman@psblaw.com + +Attorneys for Plaintiff \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..038e24c5cdbcbc395c112481155816c84d89ca42 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752008/EFTA02752008.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -2144, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752008", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 73, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm-unicode-norm.html-named-entities\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "de7be94b5c2825fd4391e53108c2f66a7c3cdaa3bed12817700785098b2f288c", + "output_sha256": "85404f198be523fcc46163b4be5d8c88bb86c53b1d929e181c630d2a9b037acc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46718ffb71c661813ae92590d838e677ec67a4f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.md @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +### THE CO-EXECUTORS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP + +875 Third Avenue + +New York, New York 10022 + +Tel: 212-704-6000 + +Fax: 212-704-6288 + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +# TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| | Page | +| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | I | +| ARGUMENT | 2 | +| A. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims, which she admits are time | | +| barred. | 2 | +| B. | As Judge Engelmayer recently found, the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss | +| punitive damages is procedurally proper. | 2 | +| C. | As Judge Engelmayer recently held, New York law applies to the issue of | +| punitive damages where, as here, the torts occurred there. | 4 | +| D. As Judge Engelmayer recdently held, punitive damages are also | | +| unavailable under USVI law | 7 | +| CONCLUSION | 10 | + +### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +| Cases AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 661 F. App'x 2 (2d Cir. 2016) Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp., | Page(s) 6, 7 | +| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------- | +| 55 V.I. 967 (2011) Blisset v. Eisensmidt, | 8, 9, 10 | +| 940 F. Supp. 499 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) Booth v. Bowen, | 5 | +| Civ. No. 2006-217 (CVG), 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008) Brady v. Port Auth., | 8 | +| (NG)(CLP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16548, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., | 4 | +| 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Tea. Ct. 1989) 2008) v. Christian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005) Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., | 9 | +| 723 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) Gov't of Virgin Islands v. | 6 | +| 60 V.I. 597 (2014) Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009) Isaac v. Crichlow, | 8 | +| 63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) | 9 | + +Jane Doe 15 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et at, No. 19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DCF), ECF No. 39 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2020) " 3 4, 6, 7 + +Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005) 10 + +Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank SAL, 739 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 6 + +Mary Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et at, No. 19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DCF), ECF No. 38 (S.D.N.Y April 28, 2020) I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 + +Matthew v. Herman, 56 V.I. 674 (2012) 8 + +In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 3, 4 + +Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) 3 + +Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) 7 + +Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) 9 + +Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) 9 + +St. House, Inc. v. Barrows, 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979) 9 + +Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) 6 + +Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) 10 + +Rijos, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (T.1.V.I. 2011) 9 + +## Statutes + +E.P.T.L. § 11-3.2(a)(1) 4, 5 + +#### Other Authorities + +| Alec A. Beech, | Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be | +| ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| | Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev. | +| 553 (2016) | 8 | + +The Co-Executors submit this reply memorandum of law in further support of their motion to dismiss Counts I-IV of Plaintiff Jane Doe's Complaint to the extent they are time-barred, Count V in its entirety, and Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages (ECF No. 36). + +### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT + +In her opposition brief, Plaintiff concedes much of the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff agrees that Counts I-IV of her Complaint (ECF No. 9) are only timely to the extent they arise from alleged conduct that occurred in New York when Plaintiff was minor. (Plf.'s Opp. Br. ("Opp. Br."), ECF. No. 39, at p. 1.) To the extent her Complaint could be read to bring causes of action for conduct that occurred either (a) outside of New York or (b) after the Plaintiff became an adult, whether in New York or elsewhere, Plaintiff admits those claims are time-barred. (Id.) Plaintiff also acknowledges that Count V for false imprisonment must be dismissed as untimely; and she therefore withdraws it. (Id.) Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed by order of the Court. + +The only remaining issue is whether Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against a deceased alleged tortfeasor's estate—something which is precluded by New York statute—should be allowed to proceed. On April 28 and April 30, 2020, the Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer correctly ruled that the answer is "no," dismissing claims for punitive damages in two other actions against the Co-Executors in which plaintiffs raise claims similar to those asserted by Plaintiff in this action. See Melly Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et at, No. 19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DCF), + +Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Co-Executors' moving brief (ECF No. 37). + +Opinion & Order ECF No. 38 (S.D.N.Y April 28, 2020); Jane Doe 15 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et at, No. 19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DCF), ECF No. 39 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2020).2 + +In doing so, Judge Engelmayer rejected every single argument raised by Plaintiff in this action, finding that: (I) a motion to dismiss or strike punitive damages is procedurally proper, regardless of its title; (2) New York law applies to a claim for punitive damages under circumstances also present in this action, including that the alleged torts took place entirely in New York; (3) New York law bars claims for punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate; and (4) even if USVI law applied, which it does not, the result is the same. See generally id. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's punitive damages claims in this action on the same grounds as those applied by Judge Engelmayer. + +### ARGUMENT + +### A. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims, which she admits are time-barred. + +Plaintiff concedes that Counts 1-IV of her Complaint (ECF No. 9) are only timely to the extent they arise from conduct that occurred in New York State when she was minor. (Opp. at 1, ECF. No. 39.) Plaintiff also concedes that Count V (False Imprisonment) of her Complaint is completely time-barred; and she represents she is withdrawing it. (Id.) Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims to the extent they arise from conduct that occurred outside New York or when Plaintiff was an adult, as well as Plaintiff's false imprisonment cause of action in its entirety. + +### B. As Judge Engelmayer recently found, the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss punitive damages is procedurally proper. + +As Judge Engelmayer recently found in two other actions against the Co-Executors, in which the plaintiffs assert claims similar to those Plaintiff raises in this action, Plaintiff's argument + +{sup}`=` Copies of the Opinions & Orders entered in Mary Doe and Jane Doe 15 are attached as Exhibits A and B to the Declaration of Bennet J. Moskowitz submitted herewith. + +that the Co-Executors' motion is procedurally improper is misplaced and should be rejected. "The technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance inasmuch as prejudice to the nonmoving party can hardly result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated as a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint." See C. & A. =, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.). Regardless of whether the Co-Executors' motion would be more properly styled as a motion to strike, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs punitive damages claims at this time. See e.g., Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38 (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages against the Co-Executors); Jane Doe 15, No. 19 cv-10653, ECF No. 39 (same); see also In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendant's motion to strike sections of first amended complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Corarn Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at \*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) ("The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is granted."); Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7998 (HB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28999, at \*21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008) ("Because Defendant has failed to allege that Plaintiff's conduct was egregious and directed at the public generally, its claim for punitive damages cannot proceed."); see also Brady v. Port Auth., Nos. 87 CV 2702 (NG)(CLP), 93 CV 1679 (NG)(CLP), 95 CV 0442 (NG)(CLP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16548, at \*9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (granting Port Authority's motion to strike plaintiffs claims for punitive damages). + +As Judge Engelmayer found, "where punitive damages have been unavailable as a matter of law, courts have not hesitated to dismiss prayers for such damages at the threshold." Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 7; see also Jane Doe 15, No. 19-cv-10653, ECF No. 39. Judge Engelmayer also found that "ample authority permits striking prayers for punitive damages where such relief is unavailable as a matter of law." Id. at 8 (citing In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 544). + +Discarding the "conceptual debate" between motions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f), Judge Engelmayer further concluded that the Court could in any event dismiss claims for punitive damages sua sponte under Rule 12(0. Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2020). Judge Engelmayer further explained: + +Here, there is practical wisdom in treating defendant's motion as one to strike, if doing so is necessary to enable the Court to resolve at the jump the viability of Doe's prayer for punitive damages. With numerous personal injury actions pending against the Epstein estate as a result of the recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, there is value in clarifying—for the parties and settlors—the damages available in actions where the law permits a sure answer on this point. + +Id. + +The same "practical wisdom" applies here. Like the factually similar cases Mary Doe and Jane Doe IS, punitive damages are not available in this case as a matter of law pursuant to E.P.T.L. § 11-3.2(a)(1). As in those cases, clarifying the damages available to Plaintiff in this action would further serve to facilitate potential resolution of this and many other cases pending against the Estate. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages, however styled. + +### C. As Judge Engelmayer recently held, New York law applies to the issue of punitive damages where, as here, the torts occurred there. + +Plaintiff's next argument claims New York's choice-of-law analysis would find that USVI law applies to her demand for punitive damages. She is incorrect for the same well-founded reasoning that Judge Engelmayer applied when dismissing Mary Doe's claim for punitive damages against the Co-Executors. + +As a threshold matter, Plaintiff ignores Blisset v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 499, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). Blisset establishes Plaintiff may not have the Court simultaneously apply the first sentence of E.P.T.L. § 1 I-3.2(a)(1)—the portion of the statute permitting her to bring this action against the Estate—but disregard the very next sentence precluding punitive damages. See Blisset, 940 F. Supp. at 457 ("[I]t would be an anomalous situation indeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this section 1983 action against the estate of because of section I I -3.2(a)( I), while at the same time he was allowed to recover relief in the form of punitive damages, which clearly is beyond the scope of relief which that statute authorizes."). To quote Judge Engelmayer's findings, it would be "problematic for [Plaintiff] to cherrypick within that provision, invoking the part that authorizes a personal injury suit against an executor while disclaiming the balance, which delimits the recovery available in such a suit." Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 12 (citing Blisset, 940 F. Supp. at 457). + +Moreover, even if the reasoning in Blisset did not apply (it does), Plaintiff cites no authority justifying a departure from black-letter law holding the law of the place of the tort—here, New Yorks—governs punitive damages. The Second Circuit has expressly acknowledged the strong interest New York has with respect to unlawful behavior within its borders, holding that where, as here, alleged misconduct takes place in New York, New York law applies to the issue of damages: + +If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders. Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 72. In Licci a rel. Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 739 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam), we observed that, under New York law, when the jurisdictions of the conduct and injury are distinct, "it is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior 'interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that apilHits law will have on similar conduct in the future." Id. at 50-51 (quoting 65 N.Y.2d at 198) (alterations omitted). Here, the allegedly wrongful conduct ... took place in New York.... We therefore conclude that New York's rules ... apply. + +Plaintiff's Opposition brief concedes that her claims only apply to torts that allegedly occurred in Ncw York. (Opp. at n.I.). + +AHW btv. P'ship, MFS, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) ("Because punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply."') (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)). + +Plaintiff argues—just like the plaintiffs in Mary Doe and Jane Doe 15 unsuccessfully argued—that the USVI's interests in the availability of punitive damages supersedes New York merely because Mr. Epstein's will is being probated in the USVI and he beneficially owned real property there, and (Plaintiff claims based on pure speculation) because applying New York law would "reward" him by "shielding him from punishment." (Opp. Br. at 3-4.) However, per the well-established legal authority cited above and Plaintiff's own allegations (id. at 7), Plaintiff is wrong—New York has a far stronger connection to this action than the USVI. Here, as in Mary Doe, Plaintiff alleges the acts giving rise to her claims occurred entirely in New York. (Id. at n.1.) Further, just like the plaintiffs in Mary Doe (and Jane Doe 15, for that matter), Plaintiff chose to sue the Estate in New York, bringing claims that are only timely under New York law. See Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 12 ("New York's interest is also reinforced by the fact that Doe's suit is timely only by virtue of the state's recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, which temporarily revived time-barred suits."). Therefore, and consistent with Judge Engelmayer's Opinions & Orders and well-established New York law, New York unquestionably has the prevailing interest in this lawsuit. See AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS, Inc., 661 F. App'x at 5. + +By contrast, the USVI has no interest in applying its laws on punitive damages (which in any event are the same as New York, as further discussed below) to alleged torts that took place + +in New York. The sole connection of this matter to the USVI is that the Decedent's Estate is being probated there—over twenty years after the alleged tons occurred. This presents a connection much weaker than the one deemed "tenuous" in Adelson, on which Plaintiff heavily relies. See Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). Even under the framework of Adelson, New York, not the USVI, has the greater interest in applying its laws and policies concerning Plaintiff's improper claim for punitive damages. Moreover, and as Judge Engelmayer found, Adelson is inapposite where, as here, the lawsuit "does not build on a prior litigation in, or [is not] based on the law of, the USVI." See Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 14. + +### D. As Judge Engelmayer recently held, punitive damages are also unavailable under USVI law. + +In any event, and as Judge Engelmayer ruled, the choice of law debate here is "academic." Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, at 14. "That is because, while the USVI does not have a statute on point and USVI courts have not squarely resolved the issue, it is likely that USVI common law would not permit an award of punitive damages against an estate." Id. + +Plaintiff completely misapplies the Banks analysis, which USVI courts use to determine common law. See Banks v. Mt'l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). As set forth in Mary Doe, a proper Banks analysis demonstrates that USVI courts would not allow punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. See Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 14. + +A Banks analysis entails consideration of "three non-dispositive factors": (1) whether any USVI court has previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which rule represents the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.M., 60 V.I. 597, 600 (2014); see also Matthew v. Herman, 56 V.I. 674, 680 (2012); Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.1.967, 979 (2011). + +As for the first factor, "USVI courts have repeatedly cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 favorably." Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 14-15; see also v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, Civ. No. 2006- 217 (CVG), 2008 WL 220067, at \*5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)). "Twice, albeit in dicta, [USVI courts] have expressly quoted the language in comment (a) to § 908 that bars an award of punitive damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor." Id. In contrast, Plaintiff fails to set forth any authority in favor of its argument that USVI courts would take any other position. Accordingly, the first Banks factor favors the Co-Executors. + +With respect to the second Banks factor, Plaintiff admits this factor favors the Co-Executors, stating: "it is true that barring punitive damages against an estate is the majority view." (Opp. at 7). See also 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015) ("[A] majority of jurisdictions will not award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.") (citing Alec A. Beech, Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev. 553 (2016)); Timothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead Or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 393, 398 (2010) ("The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is one authority stating that punitive damages should not follow the death of a wrongdoer, and the majority of courts considering the issue have provided rulings consistent with this position."). + +Unable to argue otherwise, Plaintiff asks the Court to disregard this result merely because the USVI has not passed a statute to this effect. (Opp. at 8.) However, Judge Engelmayer was correct when he found that "this distinction ... does not appear germane to the Banks inquiry." See Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 14. + +The third Banks factor also favors the Co-Executors. USVI courts have already found that § 908 of the Restatement is "the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands with respect to the imposition of an award of punitive damages." Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing v. Christian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005); Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015); St House, Inc. v. Barrows, 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. MIT. Ct. 1979); Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Teti. Ct. 1989); v. Rijos, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011)); see also Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at \*5 n.13 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) ("Applying a Banks analysis, the Court finds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction."). + +Plaintiff's remaining arguments fail for all of the same reasons applied by Judge Engelmayer in Mary Doe. First, Plaintiff argues that, because the Attorney General of the USVI seeks punitive damages against the Estate in an unrelated, civil racketeering lawsuit, punitive damages are allowed under USVI law. "But the decision by a government lawyer to attempt to obtain such damages in a high-profile case involving allegations of extreme conduct . . . do not speak to the question that the third Banks factor assays: which rule of law best durably servers the USVI's interests." Mary Doe, No. 19-cv-10758, ECF No. 38, slip op. at 16. Even where an attorney general purports to interpret a law—and here the USVI Attorney General did no such thing—the Supreme Court has warned against accepting such interpretation as authoritative. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (2000) ("[O]ur precedent warns against accepting as 'authoritative' an Attorney General's interpretation of state law."). + +Finally, Plaintiff argues that the circumstances of Mr. Epstein's death—which are pure speculation in any event—should dictate the "soundest rule for the USVI." (Opp. at 5-7.) However, Plaintiff cites no law to support this position aside from a misleading quotation in dicta from Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005). Yet, in Crabtree, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to create a new rule permitting punitive damages where "a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own death as an escape from punitive damages," and instead joined the majority of jurisdictions in holding that "Indiana law does not permit recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor." Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005). + +In conclusion, every Banks factor favors the Co-Executors. The courts of the USVI would not allow Plaintiff to seek punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, and the Court should not permit Plaintiff to do so here. + +### CONCLUSION + +For the reasons stated above and in their moving brief (ECF No. 37), the Co-Executors respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. + +Dated: New York, New York May 11, 2020 + +By: /s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Attorney for the Co-Executors \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a547a1be718a0639287910449069cf73d8c47b7d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752022/EFTA02752022.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -1829, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752022", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 43, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9b37edec05f439344932ea3ba8f64ba1058211ed936062e9187459934a8de1ea", + "output_sha256": "6aec7ac9c5b9563d47c0421b0c8283a3a2e00d6820372a90cff99309e7b3dd7a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c24a653d1be32ca70d188f434bf4ea60525d05c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.md @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +# EXHIBIT A + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +MARY DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +-v- + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as Executors of the Estate ofiefrey E. Epstein, and I + +Defendants. + +19 Civ. 10758 (PAE) + +#### OPINION & ORDER + +PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge: + +In this diversity action, plaintiff Mary Doe' brings tort claims under New York law against, inter alia, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein ("Indyke and Kahn" or "the executor defendants"). The executor defendants now move to dismiss Doe's claim against them for punitive damages, on the grounds that, as a matter of New York law, such damages are categorically unavailable in a personal injury action against the personal representative of an estate.2 For the reasons that follow, the Court grants that motion. + +### I. Background + +### A. Doe's Complaint + +Doe's Complaint, filed on November 20, 2019, alleges a horrific course of sexual and psychological abuse at Epstein's hands during 2004 and 2005. Cmplt. ¶¶ 1-15 (summary account); id. 11 38-106 (detailed account). It alleges that Doe came to the United States with her + +Doe has been granted leave to proceed pseudonymously. Dkt. 21. + +{sup}`2` Doe also sues who is alleged to have served as Epstein's scheduler and assistant. See Dkt. 1 (Complaint, or "Cmplt.") ¶ 19. Doe's bid for punitive damages against is not implicated by this motion. + +parents as a young refugee from a war-tom country, and was working in pursuit of a promising career as a model when, in 2004, at age 16, she met Epstein through another model. Id. ¶ 2. + +Epstein made clear to Doe how important and powerful he was and promised to help her with her modeling career and college admissions. Id. ¶ 3. Doe, in turn, "believed she could trust him" and "that he could change her life." Id. ¶ 4. Epstein, however, "used his power over Mary to sexually abuse her, viciously and repeatedly." Id. ¶ 5. Aided by defendant Epstein's scheduler and assistant, Epstein "would summon Mary to his Manhattan townhouse, order her to give him massages, and then subject her to sexual acts, the severity of which increased over time." Id.; see also id.1119. The Complaint graphically chronicles Epstein's acts of sexual abuse in the townhouse, which included forcing Doe to perform oral sex on him and later raping her. Id. ¶¶ 7-9; 56-105. + +In late 2005, the Complaint alleges, Doe—as a result of an incident at the townhouse— "suddenly saw the truth: she was not even a human being to Epstein, she was an object," and Epstein was treating her as a prostitute, "one of many girls he treated as sexual objects." Id. ¶ 11. Doe had a breakdown, almost immediately thereafter left New York City, returned to her parents' home across the country, and never saw Epstein again. Id. ¶ 12. Epstein's abuse caused Doe to abandon her modeling career and left her humiliated, angry, and suicidal, with debilitating panic attacks and "dramatic psychological scars." Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Epstein's arrest in July 2019 gave Doe "briefl] hope that he might finally face consequences," but his death in August 2019 at a federal jail in Manhattan "left Mary with the desolate sense that he has evaded justice yet again." Id. ¶ 15. + +In this action, Doe brings claims, under New York law, of battery, id. ¶¶ 108-13, assault, id. ¶¶ 114-19, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 120-27, against Indyke + +and Kahn, solely in their capacities as executors of Epstein's estate, id. 1 18, and against M, for her "integral role in operating Epstein's operation of sex trafficking Mary and other girls," id. 1 19. As its basis for personal jurisdiction over the executors, it alleges that "Epstein was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time of his death," id. 122, "because the tortious acts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims took place in New York State," id. 1 23. The Complaint seeks, in addition to compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs, "punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial." Id. p. 19. + +## B. The Executors' Partial Motion to Dismiss + +On January 21, 2020, the executor defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 17, and a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 18 ("Def. Mem."). It sought dismissal of the prayer for punitive damages on the ground that such damages cannot, as a matter of New York law, be sought against the personal representatives of an estate. On March 3, 2020, Doe filed a memorandum of law in opposition, Dkt. 28 ("Doe Opp'n"), and a supporting declaration by Daniel Mullkoff, Esq., Dkt. 29 ("Mullkoff Decl."), which attached Epstein's will. On March 20, 2020, the executor defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 33 ("Def. Reply"). + +## II. Applicable Legal Standards Under Rule I .2(hX6) + +To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Att Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will only have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. When resolving a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2014). That tenet, however, "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pleadings that offer only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. + +#### 111. Discussion + +In moving to dismiss Doe's prayer for punitive damages against them, the executor defendants argue that New York law applies to this personal injury action and categorically prohibits an award of punitive damages against the personal representatives of an estate. Specifically, they note, § 11-3.2(a)(1) of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") provides: + +No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. + +EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). + +Applying this statute, courts have held punitive damages unavailable in personal injury actions against executors or administrators of estates. These include federal courts determining the damages available for constitutional-tort claims under New York law, see, e.g., Graham v. , 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (precluding, based on EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), punitive damages claims in § 1983 action against estate administrators, and noting that New York law is "very clear" on this point); Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (overturning, based on EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), jury's punitive damages award in § 1983 case against estate, and noting "strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent"), and state courts in personal injury actions governed by New York law, see, e.g., v. Nathan, 352 N.Y.S.2d 464, 464 + +(1st Dep't. 1974) (affirming dismissal of punitive damages claim because, under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), defendant's death precluded recovery of punitive damages from personal representatives of estate); cf. Flaum v. Birnbaum, 582 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (4th Dep't. 1992) (affirming denial of punitive damages in case against deceased executor; citing EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) and the "strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of the wrongful conduct of the decedent"). + +The law of a majority of states is in accord with EPTL § I I -3.2(a)(1), as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979) ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor[.]"); see also Doe Opp'n at 12 (acknowledging that "a majority of states do not permit punitive damages against estates"). This majority rule aligns with "[t]he general rule under federal common law," that "an action survives the death of a party insofar as it is remedial[,] and not penal[,] in nature." See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Exeter Holdings, Ltd. v. Haltman, No. 13 Civ. 5475 (JS) (AICT), 2017 WL 9485707, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3981299 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017). + +The justification commonly given for precluding punitive damage awards against estates is that punishment and deterrence—the recognized bases for imposing punitive damages on a tortfeasor—are not advanced by imposing punitive damages on his or her estate. As the New Mexico Supreme Court explained in adopting the majority rule: "[P]unishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors"; "[w]hen the tortfeasor cannot be punished for his culpable behavior, punitive damages no longer have the desired effect and, therefore, the victim loses the legal entitlement to recover those damages." Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351 (N.M. 1994) (canvassing laws of other states). + +Doe does not dispute that EPTL § 11-3.2(aX1) precludes punitive damages in a personal injury action under New York law. Instead, Doe makes three arguments: (1) that defendants' motion is premature, Doe Mem. at 4; (2) that defendants' motion is improperly styled as a motion to dismiss, id. at 3; and (3) that the law of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI"), not New York law, applies, and permits punitive damages against an estate, id. at 4-13. + +Doe's first argument is quickly dispatched. Doe cites cases where courts have declined to resolve motions to dismiss aimed at prayers for relief, finding such motions premature. See id. at 4 (citations omitted). But a review of these cases reflects that the motions in those cases were not based on categorical preclusions of punitive damages. In contrast, where punitive damages have been unavailable as a matter of law, courts have not hesitated to dismiss prayers for such damages at the threshold. See. e.g., Murtha v. N.Y. State Gaming Comm 'n, No. 17 Civ. 10040 (NSR), 2019 WL 4450687, at \*19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) (dismissing demand for punitive damages under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") because it "does not provide for punitive damages"); v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 6670 (AT), 2019 WL 4039958, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss demand for punitive damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") where neither statute permitted a plaintiff to recover punitive damages); Talarico v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 367 F. Supp. 3d 161, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing demand for punitive damages against Port Authority where "the Third Circuit and the overwhelming majority of district courts within this Circuit have held that punitive damages are not available against" that defendant (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Canete + +v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 17 Civ. 3961 (PAE), 2018 WL 4538897, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (dismissing demand for punitive damages where such relief was "precluded as a matter of law"); Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr. v. Gen. Reins. Corp., No. 16 Civ. 2063 (CM), 2016 WL 5793996, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016) ("In this case, the circumstances surrounding the denial of the insurance indemnification claim do not warrant the rare exception provided for punitive damages under a breach of contract claim. For this reason, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim."); SIB ex reL Berkhout v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653 (NRB), 2004 WL 1586500, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claim because such damages are unavailable in § 1983 actions against municipalities). Provided that New York law applies to this action, this case, too, involves a categorical preclusion of such damages, under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), that can be adjudicated at the threshold. + +Doe's second argument is that the defendant-executors' challenge is improperly brought as a motion to dismiss. Doe Mem. at 3 & n.3. There is divided case authority on this point. Courts, including in the cases cited above, have granted motions to dismiss prayers for such relief. But others have declined to entertain such motions, stating that, "[b]ecause punitive damages are a form of damages, not an independent cause of action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the form of punitive damages is 'procedurally premature.' Farina v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 3d 173, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, No. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)); see also, e.g., Wiederman v. Spark Energy, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 4564 (PGG), 2020 WL 1862319, at \*9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020); v. City of New York, No. 18 Civ. 1937 (VSB), 2020 WL 1644009, at \*17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020); Range v. 535 Broadway Grp. LLC, No. 17 Civ. 423 (WHP), + +2019 WL 4182966, at \*7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017); Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). + +The Court has no occasion to resolve this conceptual debate, because the executors' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) alternatively can be treated as a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). See C. & A. =, 5C Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed.) ("[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance inasmuch as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint."). And under Rule 12(f), on a motion or sua sponte, a court may strike from a pleading an "insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although motions to strike under Rule 12(f) arc generally "disfavored and granted only if there is a strong reason to do so," News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 2227 (PAC), 2013 WL 1746062, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976)), ample authority permits striking prayers for punitive damages where such relief is unavailable as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re Merrill Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motion to strike sections of complaint asserting punitive damages, because pleadings did not meet high bar for punitive damages in non-fraud case of breach of fiduciary duty), aff'd sub nom. La. Pac. Corp. v. Merrill & Co., 571 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2014); Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7998 (HB), 2008 WL 1710910, at \*5-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008) (granting motion to strike prayer for punitive damages for failure to allege level of high moral culpability + +necessary to sustain punitive damages award in case involving fraud and deceit); Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. v. Imaging Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting motion to strike punitive damages because complaint did not allege, inter alia, egregious conduct sufficient to sustain such an award); Brady v. Port. Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 93 Civ. 1679 (NG) (CLP), 1998 WL 724061, at \*2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (granting motion to strike punitive damages claims on grounds that Port Authority was immune from such damages); Nash v. Comm Healthcare Corp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 WL 363166, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (granting motion to strike prayer for punitive damages because complaint did not allege facts sufficient to support such damages in breach of contract case). + +Here, there is practical wisdom in treating defendant's motion as one to strike, if doing so is necessary to enable the Court to resolve at the jump the viability of Doe's prayer for punitive damages. With numerous personal injury actions pending against the Epstein estate as a result of the recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, there is value in clarifying—for the parties and settlors—the damages available in actions where the law permits a sure answer on this point. + +Doe's final argument is that USVI, not New York, law governs whether punitive damages are available. Because this Court sits in New York, it applies a New York choice of law analysis to that question. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Md. Cas. Co. v. Conti Cas. Co., 332 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state."). "Where, as here, the claims sound in tort, New York courts apply an `interest analysis' to determine choice-of-law issues." Golden v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2841 (JS), 2013 WL 4500879, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013). Under that analysis, punitive damages are considered to be conduct-regulating, + +and "the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply." See, e.g., Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 0463 (JMF), 2015 WL 2152816, \*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting Guidi v. Inter-Conti Hotels Corp., No. 95 Civ. 9006 (LAP), 2003 WL 1907901, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2003)); Bauta v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 3725 (RER), 2019 WL 8060183, at \*10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2019). Here, the tons alleged occurred entirely in New York. The personal injury claims which Doe's Complaint brings arise from sexual assaults and related conduct that, as alleged, occurred exclusively within New York City—in and around Epstein's Manhattan townhouse. + +Doe counters by noting that, while this rule applies as a general matter, it may be overcome if there is good reason not to apply it. Doe Mem. at 5 (citing Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d 416, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). In arguing that there is reason not to apply New York law to the punitive damages question here, Doe relies on the doctrine of depecage, under which courts may treat the choice of law analysis for one (or more) issues in a case—in this instance, the availability of punitive damages—as distinct from the rest of its analysis, here the applicability of New York law to Doe's tort claims for compensatory damages. Id.; see also 2002 R. Buchalter Alaska Tr. v. Phila. Fin. Life Assurance Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 182, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Ally Fin. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7010 (DLC), 2012 WL 6616061, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012). + +Doe argues that, although New York may have the greater interest in resolving issues relating to compensatory damages, the USVI, where the executors are domiciled and where Epstein's will is to be probated, has the greater interest as to punitive damages, which, unlike compensatory damages, are defendant-focused. Doe Mem. at 7—8. Doe does not argue that the executor-defendants themselves merit punishment or are in need of deterrence. Instead, Doe + +argues that Epstein's decision to alter his will shortly before his suicide to provide that it would be probated in the USVI was strategically motivated. She argues that his executors "should not be permitted to selectively avail themselves of certain benefits of USVI law but avoid those aspects of USVI law that they do not like." Id. at 7. + +The Court is unpersuaded. Whatever benefits Epstein envisioned for his estate by virtue of probating his will in the USVI, Doe does not articulate any relevant to this litigation. Other than conclusorily, Doe does not argue that the decision to probate Epstein's will in the USVI will have any adverse bearing on a personal injury action brought against the estate in New York that involves tortious conduct in New York. Doe does not argue, for example, that the probating of Epstein's will in the USVI stands to insulate his assets from recovery from such a plaintiff, or otherwise impede her or others victimized in New York from recovering on meritorious claims. Doe's point that the estate may prosper from being probated in the USVI is disconnected from her claims.3 + +More fundamentally, Doe does not articulate any concrete interest that the USVI has in either vindicating the rights of a victim sexually abused in a Manhattan townhouse in 2004 and 2005 or, specially relevant to punitive damages, in assuring that the perpetrator of that abuse is adequately punished and deterred. In contrast, the Second Circuit has noted the strong interest that New York has with respect to "conduct-regulating" rules, including regarding damages, with respect to unlawful behavior within its borders: + +"If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders." Cooney v. Osgood + +{sup}`3` If anything, the probating of the estate in the USVI may stand to benefit the estate's creditors, and thereby potentially Doe, to the extent that an estate probated in the USVI may avoid the high estate-tax rates imposed by New York State. + +Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 72 (1993). In Licci a rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL[,] ... we observed that, under New York law, when the jurisdictions of the conduct and injury are distinct, "it is the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct that generally has superior `interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future.' [739 F.3d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2013)] (quoting [v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 198 (1985)]) (alterations omitted). Here, the allegedly wrongful conduct .. . took place in New York .... We therefore conclude that New York's rules on fraud damages and negligent misrepresentation apply. + +AHW Inv. MFS v. Citigroup, Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016). New York's interest is also reinforced by the fact that Doe's suit is timely only by virtue of the state's recent enactment of the New York Child Victims Act, which temporarily revived time-barred suits. See Cmplt.1 107. + +That New York law governs the availability of punitive damages is further reinforced by Doe's having sued the executor defendants under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1). It is problematic for her to cherrypick within that provision, invoking the part that authorizes a personal injury suit against an executor while disclaiming the balance, which delimits the recovery available in such a suit.4 See BIissett, 940 F. Supp. at 457 ("[I]t would be an anomalous situation indeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this [§] 1983 action against the estate of because of [§] 11-3.2(aX1), while at the same time he was allowed to recover relief in the form of punitive damages, which clearly is beyond the scope of relief which that statute authorizes."). Such a result is also inconsistent with the doctrine of dopecage, where one forum's law is "applied to regulate certain issues arising from a given transaction or occurrence, while those of another system regulate the other issues." v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 2d 308, 328 + +{sup}`4` Doe's claims undisputedly all qualify as personal injury claims. See N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 37-a. (defining "personal injury" as including "an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another"). Doe does not argue otherwise. + +n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, Doe, in selectively drawing upon EPTL § 11-3.2(aX1), seeks to invoke depecage to apply two different sets of laws to a single issue. The doctrine does not invite such a result. + +Finally, Adelson, on which Doe relies in claiming that USVI law governs punitive damages, is inapposite. Adelson had brought an earlier action in this District for defamation. in breach of Nevada law, against the National Jewish Democratic Council and its chair (together, "NJDC"). Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 420-21. That action had been dismissed pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. NJDC then sued Adelson, seeking punitive damages under that same Nevada statute. Id. On Adelson's motion to dismiss the punitive damages prayer, Judge Oetken held that Nevada's interest was stronger than New York's as to punitive damages, because Adelson had brought the initial suit under Nevada law and because it had been dismissed under the Nevada SLAPP statute on which the NJDC now pursued punitive damages. He reasoned that "because the litigant has attempted to use Nevada's defamation law to chill First Amendment rights, Nevada has a corresponding interest in punishing the litigant for maliciously invoking Nevada law and in deterring future litigants from doing the same." Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (citing =, 65 N.Y.2d at 198). Noting that "[p]unitive damages are designed to punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff," Judge Oetken explained that "the choice-of-law inquiry for punitive damages provisions is necessarily defendant-focused" in this way. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Golden, 2013 WL 4500879, at •3). By contrast, Judge Oetken concluded that New York's interest in the dispute was "relatively attenuated" and effectively limited to the fact that the suit was filed in federal district court in Manhattan where, notably, the claims were brought under Nevada + +defamation law. "After all, New York lacks a particularized interest either in protecting defendants from liability under Nevada defamation law or in controlling the behavior of litigants who file in the federal courts. And where the locus jurisdiction has a merely fortuitous relationship with the case, that jurisdiction's interest in the case is minimal." *Id.* at 426-27 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Doe's case in this District, in contrast to *Adelson*, does not build on a prior litigation in, or based on the law of, the USVI. + +In any event, the choice of law debate here appears academic. That is because, while the USVI does not have a statute on point and USVI courts have not squarely resolved the issue, it is likely that USVI common law would not permit an award of punitive damages against an estate. In 2011, the USVI Supreme Court instructed courts to apply what it terms a "*Banks* analysis" to determine USVI common law. This entails consideration of "three non-dispositive factors": (1) whether any USVI court has previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which rule represents the soundest rule for the USVI. *See Gov't of Virgin Islands v. [REDACTED]*, 60 V.I. 597, 600 (2014); *Matthew v. Herman*, 56 V.I. 674, 680 (2012); *Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp.*, 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). The parties differ as to how these factors apply, but the executors' assessment is the more persuasive. + +As to the first *Banks* factor, USVI courts have repeatedly cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 favorably. Twice, albeit in dicta, they have expressly quoted the language in comment (a) to § 908 that bars an award of punitive damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor. *See [REDACTED] v. Dowson Holding Co.*, 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009) ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor, ordinarily, in an action under a death statute." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979)) + +(citing v. Atlas Motor Inn, Inc., 16 V.I. 367, 368-69 (D.V.I. 1979) (interpreting the Virgin Island's wrongful death statue, 5 V.I.C. § 76, to preclude punitive damages)); Booth v. Bowen, Civ. No. 2006-217 (CVG), 2008 WL 220067, at \*5 (D.V.1. Jan. 10, 2008) (same)5; see also Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (applying Banks analysis to hold that USVI courts would adopt Restatement (Second) of Tons § 908, and citing five USVI cases in accord); Powell v. Chi-Co 's Distrib. Inc., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 WL 1394183, at \*2 n.13 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) ("Applying a Banks analysis, the Court finds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction .... [C]onsidering the longstanding application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) in this jurisdiction and the apparent widespread application of this rule in a majority of jurisdictions, the Court finds that the Restatement (Second) of Tons § 908(2) represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands, and is in accord with local public policy."). Doe has not cited any contrary authority. + +As to the second Banks factor, the parties agree that, consistent with the Restatement, most U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate. See, e.g., Crabtree a rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 138 (hid. 2005) ("[t]he majority view denies punitive damages" from a deceased tortfeasor's estate); Jay Zitter, Annotation, Claim for punitive damages in ton action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707 (2020); 1 Punitive Damages: Law and Prac. 2d § 9:8 (2019 ed.) ("The prevailing view appears to be that punitive damages may not be recovered against the estate of a deceased wrongdoer."). Doe notes that some jurisdictions (like New York) have adopted this result by + +s The decisions in and Booth were dicta on this point, because the executor in each case was the plaintiff, not the defendant. + +statute while others have done so by court decision. Doe Mem. at 12. This distinction, however, does not appear germane to the Banks inquiry. + +As to the third Banks factor, the parties have not cited any evidence—beyond USVI courts having repeatedly cited Restatement § 908 with favor, including in the course of a Banks analysis—as to which rule would most soundly fit the USVI's interests. Beyond recognizing that USVI courts appear comfortable with the majority rule, the Court therefore cannot assign significant independent weight to this factor. Doe notes that the USVI's attorney general, in a separate lawsuit, is pursuing punitive damages against the Epstein estate based on alleged predations by Epstein in the USVI. See Mullkoff Decl. Ex. B ¶¶ 307-10. Doe further argues that because the only heir listed in Epstein's will—his brother Mark Epstein—allegedly knew or had constructive knowledge of Epstein's pattern of sexual abuse, it is just to deny him recovery from the estate by exposing the estate to punitive damages awards in cases such as hers. Doe Mem. at 11. But the decision by a government lawyer to attempt to obtain such damages in a high-profile case involving allegations of extreme conduct, or the alleged guilty knowledge of an heir in this case, do not speak to the question that the third Banks factor assays: which rule of law best durably serves the USVI's interests. The Court therefore has no basis to treats this Banks factor as countervailing, let alone outweighing, the first two. + +## CONCLUSION + +For the reasons above, the Court grants the defendant-executors' motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages against them. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at docket 17. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: April 28, 2020 New York, New York + +PDAte A. Paul A. Engelmaye United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d6418cadc687efd1a558e371faa6ba7fbdfce8a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752037/EFTA02752037.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752037", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d47cd9c4447cc6ce617533076ab9874caf8c3587b180d9132da3191b6043fc01", + "output_sha256": "b2983580a4963a410f04980b98a6b0fc5d7416771c989281afcdd9784a0175bf", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98a23d1b609a8587ff0d921fe7bd14f45e0b3687 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +## EXHIBIT B + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE 15, + +-v- + +Plaintiff, + +K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, + +Defendants. + +19 Civ. 10653 (PAE) + +## ORDER + +PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge: + +In this diversity action, plaintiff Jane Doe 15 ("Doe")' brings claims of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the estate of Jeffrey Epstein. These claims arise from Doe's allegations of sexual trafficking and abuse perpetrated against her by Epstein in 2004, when she was age 15. Doe alleges that Doe visited Epstein's Manhattan townhouse in New York City, where Epstein's secretary photographed her and groomed her for future sexual exploitation; on Epstein's behalf, the secretary later invited Doe to visit Epstein at his ranch in New Mexico, and arranged Doe's visit. See Dkt. 1 ("Cmplt.") ¶¶ 2-4,25-26,30-37. Epstein's sexual abuse of Doe occurred during the visit to the New Mexico ranch that ensued. M.1115-6,41-69. + +The defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss, directed solely at Doe's prayer for punitive damages. They argue that New Mexico law governs Doe's claims, and that under New Mexico law, punitive damages are unavailable in a personal injury action against the personal + +{sup}`I` Doe has been granted leave to proceed pseudonymously. Dkt. 22. + +representative of an estate. See Dkt. 18 (motion); Dkt. 19 (memorandum of law in support); Dkt. 34 (reply). Doe opposes that motion. Dkt. 29 (memorandum of law in opposition). + +The Court grants defendants' motion. The Court's analysis substantially tracks the analysis in a memorandum and opinion it issued earlier this week granting a motion seeking the same relief in another case in which a plaintiff has brought the same personal injury claims against the executors arising from sexual abuse Epstein allegedly perpetrated on her. See Mary Doe v. Indyke and Kahn, 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE) ("Mary Doe"); see id. Dkt. 38 ("Mary Doe Op.") (issued April 28, 2020). The Court here incorporates that decision by reference. + +In Mary Doe, Epstein's abuse was alleged to have occurred in his Manhattan townhouse. The Court noted that the New York statute that authorizes personal injury actions against the personal representative of the decedent precludes punitive damages in such actions, see Mary Doe Op. at 4 (citing New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") § 11-3.2(a)(1)), and required dismissal of Mary Doe's prayer for such damages, id. at 4-6. The Court rejected Mary Doe's counter-arguments: that defendants' motion was premature, id. at 6-7, and improperly styled as a motion to dismiss, id. at 7-9, and that the law of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI"), where Epstein's estate is being probated, applies, and permits punitive damages against an estate in such an action, id. at 9-16. As to the final argument, the Court noted that under New York choice-of-law rules, the substantive law of the location of the tortious conduct occurred generally applies as to punitive damages, and that there was no reason to depart from that rule here, id. at 9-14. In any event, the Court held, it is likely that, as a matter of common law, the USVI—like New York, the majority of states, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908—would not allow imposition of punitive damages on a tortfeasor's estate, id. at 14-16. + +The parties in this case are represented by the same counsel as in Mary Doe, and make substantially the same arguments for and against dismissal. The one variation is that, because Epstein's abuse is alleged to have occurred at the New Mexico ranch, defendants argue that New Mexico law applies. See Dkt. 19 at 2-6; Dkt. 34 at 5—8. But that, defendants argue, does not change the result, because New Mexico common law as announced by the state supreme court, like EPTL § I I-3.2(a)(1), bars punitive damages in a personal injury action against a tortfeasor's estate. See Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351-52 (N.M. 1994) (canvassing laws; noting that "punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of deceased tortfeasors"; and adopting majority rule that "[w]hen the tortfeasor cannot be punished for his culpable behavior, punitive damages no longer have the desired effect and, therefore, the victim loses the legal entitlement to recover those damages"); see also Barbara R. as next friend of S.R. v. No. 03 Civ. 1225 (MCA) (WDS), 2006 WL 8443923, at \*28 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2006) (citing Jaramillo and noting that "[t]he rationale behind this rule is that 'to punish the estate ignores the central purpose of punitive damages, which is to punish the tortfeasor and to deter him from repeating the wrongful act"). Doe, for her part, does not dispute that New Mexico law mirrors New York law. Instead, in opposing dismissal, she makes the same three arguments as in Mary Doe. + +The Court again finds punitive damages unavailable as a matter of law and plaintiffs' counter-arguments unavailing. As to the third argument, relating to choice of law, unlike in Mary Doe, there is indeed room for debate about which jurisdiction's law applies. But the debate is between New York (where the grooming process began) and New Mexico (where the sexual abuse occurred). And under either state's law, imposition of punitive damages on the + +Epstein estate is squarely prohibited. Doe does not have any stronger argument than did Mary Doe that USVI law applies in her case, or, if it did, that it would permit such damages. + +The Court, accordingly, grants defendants' motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. 18. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: April 30, 2020 New York, New York + +Paul A. Engelmaye United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d19c788f2eaddf7970a3a2f08d7a133b4665be61 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752055/EFTA02752055.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752055", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "bb7658f823561772b0ae09956a7729833b1cf819896dfc3c7f77a2fdf3ccf1a6", + "output_sha256": "b3af9ae2d809fdd7e462ed44002e284021d2f0955eb537eaa67dbdd085170c34", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..475b8c21c4a78fe1d4682b49730eb0308dbd7bb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +CASE NO. 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF CO-EXECUTORS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +BENNET J. MOSKOWITZ hereby declares as follows: + +- 1. I am a member of the bar of the State of New York. +- 2. I am a partner at Troutman Sanders LLP, counsel of record for Defendants Darren +- K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"). + - 3. I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances set forth herein. +- 4. I submit this declaration in support of the Co-Executors' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 40). +- 5. The sole purpose of this Declaration is to place before the Court copies of the Opinions & Orders entered in Mary Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et aL, No. 19 cv-10758 (PAE)(DCF) (S.D.N.Y April 28, 2020) (ECF No. 38); and Jane Doe 15 v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn et at, No. 19-cv-10653 (PAE)(DCF) (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2020) (ECF No. 39) which are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively. + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. + +Dated: New York, New York May 11.2020 + +/s/ Rennet J. Moskowitz, Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ead3c686284430fb11eb6fdb2163f7d7e2c66967 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752060/EFTA02752060.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752060", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0ef038c3e1263ed55ba58b0ef4690a2a5508a7b6c825a44964b313eb4d7a44b1", + "output_sha256": "0ef038c3e1263ed55ba58b0ef4690a2a5508a7b6c825a44964b313eb4d7a44b1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..14b9c03f3bd3de7fbffae1ccdef87d23fa9abaa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK -DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney hereby appears as counsel for defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein in the above-captioned action. I certify that I am admitted to practice in this Court. All notices given or required to be given in this case shall be served upon the undersigned. + +Dated: New York, New York. + +May 12, 2020 + +By: Is/ Charles L. Glover + +Charles L. Glover TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000 Charles.Glover@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +To: All Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ddf3c6b041ea2f1cc104e3dbeb0e49ba04fc8fcf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752062/EFTA02752062.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752062", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5750b5842866f31689f5057bbc2921615f8cbe1a1d70888e711ceb28c57c2446", + "output_sha256": "5750b5842866f31689f5057bbc2921615f8cbe1a1d70888e711ceb28c57c2446", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e85980ea4ab9d361810b38c682f67ff106947f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.md @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +# MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPROVE ALTERNATE SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(e)(1) + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90025 Tel: 310-477-1700 Fax: 310-477-1699 + +> Attorneys for Plaintiff Jane Doe + +#### TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| I. | INTRODUCTION | Pan 3 | +| ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------- | +| 2. | LEGAL ARGUMENT | 5 | +| | a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(I) permits service in this case | | +| | pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308 | 5 | +| | b. Rule 4(e)(1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that service upon a party may be effected by "following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made." Accordingly, Defendant Maxwell may be served pursuant to New York C.P.L.R. §308, which provides several methods by which service upon a natural person may be | | +| | effectuated under §§ 308(1), (2) & (4). | 5 | +| | c. Where service is "impracticable," CPLR §308(5) permits alternate service as long as it is "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an | | +| | opportunity to present their objections." | 5 | +| | d. Plaintiffs exhaustive and unsuccessfId attempts demonstrate service on | | +| | Maxwell is impracticable. | 6 | +| | e. Plaintiffs mailing the Complaint and summons to Maxwell's attorneys is | | +| | reasonably calculated to apprise Maxwell of the pendency of this action | 7 | +| 3. | CONCLUSION | 8 | + +#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +| FEDERAL CASES Dobkin v. Chapman | Pape | +| --------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | +| 236 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1968) v. lndyke, et at | 6 | +| 1:19-cv-I0475-LGS-DCF (S.D.N.Y.) v. Maxwell | 5, 7, 8 | +| 15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y.) Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at | 3. 5, 7 | +| 17 Civ. 00616-JGK (S.D.N.Y.) | 4 | +| =II v. Epstein | | +| o. I7-CV-616 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30. 2018) | passim | + +## STATE CASES + +### FEDERAL STATUTES + +Plaintiff Jane Doe, by and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of her motion to approve alternate service upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell. + +#### I. INTRODUCTION + +Plaintiff was sexually abused for years by Jeffrey Epstein. Maxwell helped him commit that abuse. Comp1.11 1-2. Maxwell was with Epstein the first time he met Plaintiff and played an active role in grooming her for abuse. Compl. 11 13, 15. Once the abuse began, Maxwell regularly facilitated it, pressuring Plaintiff to acquiesce to Epstein's desires and being frequently present when Epstein abused Plaintiff. Compl. el 16, 23. Since Epstein's death on August 10, 2019, Comp1.127, Maxwell has been in hiding. Numerous media outlets have reported on her unknown whereabouts, including The Sun, Vanity Fair, BBC, CNN, CNBC, and Page Six.' At the same time, her counsel is actively litigating in this Court to keep shielded from public view thousands of pages of court records that would expose her involvement and participation in Epstein's heinous crimes. v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y.). + +On January 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ghislaine Maxwell and the coexecutors of Epstein's estate, alleging years of child sexual abuse in New York at the hands of Maxwell and Epstein. Comp1.11 1-2. Plaintiff has attempted to locate and personally serve Maxwell to no avail. First Plaintiff's counsel has conducted extensive public records searches and located various addresses for Maxwell both in New York and in Florida. Service of process was + +See, e.g., https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/11/hunt-for-jeffrey-epstein-alleged-enablerghislaine-maxwell; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50927651; https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/08/uk/who-is-ghislaine-maxwell-jeffrey-epstein-intlgbdindex.html; https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/14/ghislaine-maxwell-location-unknown-jeffreyepstein-accusers-eye-her.html; hups://pagesix.com/2020/01/11/ghislaine-maxwell-flies-under-theradar-while-lawyering-up-for-epstein-lawsuid. + +attempted at five (5) such locations with no success. Declaration of Robert Glassman ("Glassman Decl."), 13, Ex 1. Second,Plaintiff's counsel also sent an email attaching a copy of the summons and Complaint to the several publicly known email address associated with Maxwell, including gmax@ellmax.com2. Glassman Decl., 14, Ex. 2. That email was not returned as undelivered, but counsel did not receive a response. Glassman Decl., 14. Third and lastly, on April 2, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to Maxwell's attorney Laura A. Menninger at Haddon M, attaching a copy of the summons and Complaint and asking her to accept service of Maxwell's behalf. Glassman Decl., q5, Ex 3. On April 13, 2020, Ms. Menninger replied she was not authorized to accept service on Maxwell's behalf. Glassman Decl., 96, Ex 4. + +Even before Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, locating and serving Maxwell was impracticable. In 2017, , a victim suing Maxwell in yet another matter related to Maxwell's participation in Epstein's sex trafficking scheme, attempted to serve Maxwell in a number of ways, including by providing Maxwell's attorneys at Haddon a copy of the summons and complaint, emailing a copy of the summons and complaint to gmax@ellmax.com and attempting to effectuate service at three locations associated with Maxwell in New York and New Jersey. Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at, 17 Civ. 00616-JGK (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 97 at 2-3. Despite those attempts, was unable to personally serve Maxwell and filed a motion asking the court to approve alternative service. Id. On January 30, 2018, this Court held that had demonstrated that serving Maxwell was impracticable under New York law and that providing copies of the summons and complaint to Haddon M, Maxwell's attorneys in + +{sup}`2` Additionally, emails including copies of the summons and the Complaint were sent to the following email addresses associated with Maxwell yet received no reply: + +hello@theterramarproject.org; gmaxwell@theterramarproject.org; + +maxwellg@theterramarproject.org• ghislaine@theterramarproject.org• + +gmax@theterramarproject.org; maxwell@theterramarproject.org; + +ghislaine.maxwell@theterramarnroiect.org. + +v. Maxwell, was reasonably calculated to provide Maxwell with notice of the lawsuit given that they were presumably in contact with Maxwell. v. Epstein, No. I7-CV-616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018); Glassman Decl., 18, Ex 5. + +In v. Indyke, et al., 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF (S.D.N.Y.), which is related to this case, the Plaintiff also faced the impracticability of serving Defendant Maxwell. In that case, Plaintiff attempted service to no avail by sending Maxwell's attorneys at Haddon with the complaint and summons in addition to emailing the complaint and summons to Maxwell's publicly available email address (gmax@ellmax.com). See v. Indyke, et al.,1:19-cv-10475-LGS (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 19 at 6. On February 12, 2020, the court found had adequately showed personal service of Maxwell to be impracticable and that those attempts taken by were "reasonably calculated to place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances." Id. at ECF No. 27; Glassman Decl., + +#### 2. LEGAL ARGUMENT + +- a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) permits service in this case pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308 +- b. Rule 4(e)(1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that service upon a party may be effected by "following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made." Accordingly, Defendant Maxwell may be served pursuant to New York C.P.L.R. §308, which provides several methods by which service upon a natural person may be effectuated under §§ 308(1), (2) & (4). +- c. Where service is "impracticable," CPLR §308(5) permits alternate service as long as it is "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." + +If service under CPLR §§308(1), (2) & (4) is impracticable, CPLR §308(5) permits service "in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs." The determination of whether service is impracticable "depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case." S.E.C. v. FIGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3866 (DLC), 1999 WL 1021087, at \*I (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999). + +Although the plaintiff must show impracticability of service, the burden is low—there is no requirement of "proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute." Id. + +Giving notice under a substitute system is permissible provided that it is "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See S.E.C. v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1093 (2d Cir. 1987). + +This Court in the v. Epstein case—a case in which, like this one, Maxwell is a defendant represented by Haddon ruled that Plaintiffs attempts at service—including 1) attempting service on various addresses associated with Maxwell, 2) emailing the complaint and summons to various email addresses associated with Maxwell, and 3) emailing the complaint and summons to Maxwell's counsel at Haddon were "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise [her] of the pendency of the action and afford [her] an opportunity to present [heir objections." 2018 WL 637421, at \*1. As a result, this Court deemed service of the summons and complaint to be complete as to defendant Maxwell. Id. + +This Court is not alone in approving alternate methods of service. New York courts consistently approve alternative methods of service where regular service has been deemed "impracticable." For example, in Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1968), the New York Court of Appeals held that, where a plaintiff could not accomplish the methods of service set forth in CPLR §308, a court is "given the discretion to fashion other means adapted to the particular facts of the case before it" pursuant to §308(5) (referred to in Dobkin as §308(4), the predecessor to §308(5)). Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that a Court's discretion to fashion such methods of service "must be broad" if the statute is to be "meaningful." Id. + +# d. Plaintiff's exhaustive and unsuccessfId attempts demonstrate service on Maxwell is impracticable. + +Plaintiff has demonstrated that personally serving Maxwell is impracticable by making numerous diligent attempts to effectuate service—to no avail. First Plaintiff attempted service on five (5) different addresses associated with Maxwell both in New York and Florida. Second, + +Plaintiff "has made numerous efforts to obtain information about [Maxwell's] current residence and general contact information to effectuate personal service but has been unable to locate Maxwell" including conducting extensive online searches. See , 2018 WL 637421, at \*1; see also Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7311 (LTS), 2003 WL21073951, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003) (authorizing alternative service under §308(5) when Plaintiff was unable to determine defendant's residence or place of business after "extensive Internet searches" and inquires with defendant's former clients); Ha 1999 WL 1021087, at \*1 (service by publication in USA Today authorized because defendant's whereabouts were unknown, efforts to locate his home or business address by searching computer databases failed, and there existed no record that he designated an agent for service). + +Third, in addition to trying to locate contact information for Maxwell, who is purposely evading service, Plaintiff has tried alternate avenues to serve Maxwell, including (1) sending the Complaint and summons to her current lawyers at Haddon M, who are actively litigating on Maxwell's behalf in two other cases and are most certainly in regular contact with her, and (2) emailing the Complaint and summons to Maxwell's publicly available email addresses. Maxwell's attorney declined to accept service on Maxwell's behalf, and Plaintiff received no response to the emails sent to Maxwell. As a result, personal service under these circumstances is impracticable. + +e. Plaintiffs emailing the Complaint and summons to Maxwell's attorneys is reasonably calculated to apprise Maxwell of the pendency of this action. + +With her service of the Complaint and summons on Maxwell's counsel, Plaintiff has also demonstrated that the steps she has already taken to serve Maxwell are "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise [the) interested pare) of the pendency of the action." See Tome, 833 F.2d at 1093. Haddon is actively litigating on Maxwell's behalf in multiple cases in the Southern District of New York. In the v. Maxwell case, Haddon appeared in court for Maxwell as recently as January 16, 2020 and participated in a joint filing on April 30, 2020. See v. Maxwell, 1:15-cv-7433-LAP (S.D.N.Y), ECF No. 1016 (ordering counsel to appear at January 16, 2020 conference) and ECF No. 1052 (a joint letter addressed to the court regarding unsealing decided motions). In the v. Indyke case, Haddon + +filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Maxwell on March 4, 2020. See cv-10475-LGS (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 32. Importantly, this Court in v. Indyke, 1:19 v. Epstein deemed service to be complete as to defendant Maxwell when Plaintiff emailed complaint and summons to Maxwell's attorneys at Haddon See 2018 WL 637421, at \*2. + +There is no doubt that Maxwell has had actual notice and knowledge of the claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint or that Haddon can easily—and likely already has—notified her of those claims. Maxwell must not be permitted to use selectively the justice system—litigating actively where it suits her and evading service where it does not. Maxwell must face the allegations against her. Therefore, the Court should deem the service methods attempted to be sufficient as the Court did in 2016 in v. Epstein. + +#### 3. CONCLUSION + +For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Approve Alternative Service Pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and find that the service efforts made by Plaintiff's counsel as described herein are sufficient to apprise Maxwell of this action. + +Dated: May 27, 2020 + +Respectfully submitted, + +Robert Glassman, Esq. + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com + +Attorneys for Plaintiff + +### COMPLIANCE OF CERTIFICATE + +of Support In Law of Memorandum Plaintiff's that certify hereby Glassman, S. Robert I, Procedure Civil of Rule Federal to Pursuant Service Alternate Approve to Motion Plaintiff's Individual the in forth set rules formatting the with complies and words 1,915 contains 4(e)(1) Koeltl. G. John Judge of Practices + +submitted, Respectfully + +2020 27, May Dated: + +Esq. Glassman, Robert + +LLP BOYLE & SHEA PANISH 700 Suite Blvd., Monica Santa 11111 90025 CA Angeles, Los 477-1700 (310) Telephone: 477-1699 (310) Facsimile: boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com + +Plaintiff for Attorneys \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b33c99d8b705e6f831afdf92a6f66acc1bd84657 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752063/EFTA02752063.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4741, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752063", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 47, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7c4bcd15b2c1a5d0cf3dec97615d5161e17816ca14cb887237870e7ad853ead4", + "output_sha256": "ac68cca05392149ae85ab96e780b83f0292976aafcfe9363e9ce0614b409209c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82abb179cbec8bb1817a542b84e9a104e543fea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.md @@ -0,0 +1,777 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff, + + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +#### DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. GLASSMAN + +ROBERT GLASSMAN, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declares under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: + +- 1. I am an attorney at the law firm Panish, Shea & Boyle LLP and am admitted before this Court. I represent Plaintiff Jane Doe in this matter. +- 2. I respectfully submit this Declaration in support of Plaintiffs Motion to Approve Alternate Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1). +- 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of declarations provided by process servers documenting five (5) unsuccessful attempts at service on Maxwell at addresses associated with her in both Florida and New York: 116 E. 65th Street, New York, NY 10065; 457 Madison Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10022; 1000 Venetian Way, APT 801, Miami Beach, FL 33139; 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, FL 33480; 20 E 66th ST, New York, NY 10065. My office conducted extensive Internet searches on Maxwell's whereabouts to find the addresses at which service was attempted. + - 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of an email that my office + +sent to gmax@ellmax.com on April 24, 2020 which attached a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. 9) and the summons as to Ghislaine Maxwell (ECF No. 17). We did not receive a response to that email, nor did we receive any indication that the email had not been delivered. We also sent the same email to several other email addresses associated with Maxwell (namely, hello@theterramarproject.org• gmaxwell@theterramarproject.org• maxwellg@theterramarproject.org• ghislaine@theterramarproject.org• gmax@theterramarproject.org• maxwell@theterramarproject.org• ghislaine.maxwell@theterramarproject.org) but received no response. + +5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the April 2, 2020 letter that my office sent to Maxwell 's attorney Laura A. Menninger of Haddon, and P.C. Enclosed in the letter is a copy of the Complaint in this matter (ECF No. 9) and the summons as to Ghislaine Maxwell (ECF No. 17). + +6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Maxwell's attorney Laura A. Menninger dated April 13, 2020 in which she indicated she is not authorized to accept service on behalf of Maxwell. + +7. Despite these enormous efforts, we have been unable to effectuate service on Maxwell. + +8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the order issued by this Court in v. Epstein, 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018), in which the Court found service upon Maxwell to be impracticable and approved Plaintiff serving the complaint and summons on Maxwell's attorneys as Haddon as an appropriate mode of alternative service. + +9. In the v. Indyke, a at, 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF (S.D.N.Y.), which is related to this case, the court granted alternate service in a text-only order issued on February 12, 2020 which appears as ECF No. 27 as follows: "ORDER granting a Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiffs motion is unopposed, and, based on her representations regarding her inability to locate a current address for Maxwell despite diligent efforts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that personal service + +would be impracticable. See [REDACTED] v. Epstein, No. 17cv616 (JCK), 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 + +(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in another action before the + +Court ([REDACTED] v. Maxwell, 15cv7433 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.), as well as to an email address publicly + +associated with Maxwell (see Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. 19), at 3), was reasonably calculated + +to place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances. + +No later than 2/14/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the + +same means (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the [REDACTED] case and to the email + +address publicly associated with Maxwell), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this + +action. Maxwell may then have until 3/6/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the + +Complaint. (HEREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman)(Text Only Order) + +(Freeman, Debra) (Entered: 02/12/2020), " + +Respectfully submitted, +Robert Glassman +[Signature] +R-GW + +Dated: May 27, 2020 +Los Angeles, California + +## EXHIBIT 1 + +| ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address) +**Robert S Glassman, Esq SBN: Bar No.269816** +**PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP** +**11111 Santa Monica Blvd Suite 700 GLORIA CELL# 213-444-8132 Los Angeles, CA 90025** +TELEPHONE NO.: **(310) 477-1700** FAX NO.: **(310) 477-1699** +E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): +ATTORNEY FOR (Name): | | FOR COURT USE ONLY | | | +| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -- | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | -- | +| **UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** +STREET ADDRESS: **40 FOLEY SQUARE ROOM 435** +CITY AND ZIP CODE: **NEW YORK, NY 10007** + +HEARING DATE: | | | REFERENCE NUMBER: +**DOE/INDYKE** | | +| Plaintiff(s): **JANE DOE** +Defendant(s): **DARREN K. INDYKE, et al.** | | | | | +| **DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE** | | | CASE NUMBER: +**1:20-cv-00484-JG** | | + +I received the within assignment for filing and/or service on April 24. 2020 and that after due and diligent effort I have not been able to serve said person.' attempted service on this serves on the following dates and times: + +Servee: GhIslalne Maxwell + +Documents: COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES;SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION; + +Address: 457 Madison Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10022 + +As enumerated below: + +4/24/2020 - 7:40 PM 457 Madison Avenue. 4th Floor Business New York, NY 10022 + +Bad address. This is a multi dwelling apartment complex under the name of Lone New York. Spoke with Jerry Illi nSecurity Supervisor for the building who informed me that the whole budding is empty at this lime due to the corona viru . e is currently residing here. No further information provided nor guard would confirm nor deny if subject resides here. + +IN\ + +I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United County: States of America that I am over the age o 18, t a party to this Registration No.: action and that the foregoing is I e ern This declaration was executed on 4 + +Nationwide LopiiC 1609 James M Blvd. Los Angeles, 15 + +Signature' + +MI ael . Levey + +DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE + +Ordart LA51503/DIIForreaundl + +| ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address) +**Robert S Glassman, Esq SBN: Bar No. 269816** +**PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP** +**11111 Santa Monica Blvd Suite 700 GLORIA CELL# 213-444-8132 Los Angeles, CA 90025** +TELEPHONE NO.: (310) 477-1700 FAX NO.: (310) 477-1699 +E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): +ATTORNEY FOR (Name): | | FOR COURT USE ONLY | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -- | ----------------------------------------- | +| **UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** +**STREET ADDRESS: 40 FOLEY SQUARE ROOM 435** +**CITY AND ZIP CODE: NEW YORK, NY 10007** + +**HEARING DATE:** | | | +| **Plaintiff(s): JANE DOE** +**Defendant(s): DARREN K. INDYKE, et al.** | | REFERENCE NUMBER +**DOE/INDYKE** | +| **DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE** | | CASE NUMBER: +**1:20-cv-00484-JG** | + +I received the within assignment for filing and/or service on April 24. 2020 and that after due and diligent effort I have not been able to serve said person.l attempted service on this servee on the following dates and limes: + +Servee: Ghlsialne Maxwell + +Documents: COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES:SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION; + +Address: 457 Madison Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10022 + +As enumerated below: + +4/24/2020 — 7:17 PM 116 E. 65th Street Home New York NY 10065 + +Bad address. This is a 4/5 story building. Doors locked. No one seen or heard inside the building. All shades are drawn shut, there is not a single light on in any of the floors nor on In any of the units. The whole builidiing is dark. There a 2019 construction permit posted on the door from the city of New York for work to be performed there. Could not establish contact with anyone at this address. + +4/24/2020 — 7:29 PM 20 E 66TH ST Home New York, NY 10065 + +Bad address. This is a multi dwelling apartment complex. No names listed on the directory. Spoke wilth buildiing superintendent by the name of Cesar Abreu. who slated that subject. Ghislaine Maxwell is not known to him. nor is she a tenant there according to his list of tenants. No further information provided. + +I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United County: States of America that I am over the age of 18 -•.j.a party to this Registration No.: action and that the foregoing is true an his Nationwide Le al LLC declaration was executed on 4/27/ + +1609 James M Blvd. Los Angeles, 15 + +Signature' + +DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE + +Mic S. Levey + +Order\*: 1.031503)D1IFormat.mdl + +#### AFFIDAVIT OF NON-SERVICE + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of New York + +Index Number: 1:20-CV-00484 Date Filed: 1/28/2020 + +Plaintiff: + +JANE DOE + +vs. + +Defendants: + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual + +For: + +Kevin Boyle. Esquire PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Received by U Got Served, LLC on the 24th day of April, 2020 at 12:17 pm to be served on GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 358 EL BRILLO WAY, PALM BEACH, FL 33480. + +I, Sandra Harris, being duly sworn, depose and say that on the 25th day of April, 2020 at 9:58 am, I: + +NON-SERVED the SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION AND COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL for the reason that I failed to find GHISLAINE MAXWELL or any information to allow further search. Read the comments below for further details. + +#### Additional Information pertaining to this Service: + +4/24/2020 3:11 pm Service was attempted at 358 EL BRILLO WAY, PALM BEACH, FL 33480; the property has a gate with a call box; no one answered. I was unable to gain access to the property. The windows of the property have shutters. + +4/25/2020 9:58 am Attempted service at 358 EL BRILLO WAY, PALM BEACH, FL 33480; The home caretaker came to the house while I was parked on front of the property. He stated that the Defendant does not live at this address. He has been living here for the last 3 years. I also spoke with the maintenance man at the house across the street; He stated that he has not seen the Defendant at the property. + +I certify that I am over the age of 18, have no interest in the above action, and I am a Certified Process Server, in good standing, in the Judicial Circuit in which the process was served. Pursuant to F.S. 95.525 "Under penalties of perjury", I declare that I have read the foregoing Return of Service and that the facts stated in it are true and correct" **Notary not required as per FS 92.525.** + +![](_page_7_Picture_127.jpeg) + +State of Florida County of Palm Beach + +Sworn and Subscribed before me on this 28 day of March, 2020. By + +Personally known \_\_\_\_\_ or Produce identification x +Type of identification \_\_\_\_\_ +produced Private Incons + +NOTARY PUBLIC +NAME Victor Garcia + +Sandra Harris + +Sandra Harris +#1682 + +U Got Served, LLC +1279 W. Palmetto Park Road +Unit 273938 +Boca Raton, FL 33427 +(561) 361-7111 + +Our Job Serial Number: AOA-2020000803 +Ref: Kevin Boyle, Esquire + +#### AFFIDAVIT OF NON-SERVICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of New York + +Index Number 1:20-CV-00484 + +Plaintiff: JANE DOE + +vs. + +Defendants: DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual + +Date Filed: 1/2812020 + +For: Kevin Boyle, Esquire PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA {sup}`90025` + +Received by U Got Served, LLC on the 24th day of April, 2020 at 12:17 pm to be served on GHISLAINE MAXWELL, {sup}`1000` VENETIAN WAY, APT 801, MIAMI BEACH, FL 33139. + +I, Natasha Caplan, being duly sworn, depose and say that on the 24th day of April, 2020 at 8:00 pm, I: + +NON-SERVED the SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION AND COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL for the reason that I failed to find GHISLAINE MAXWELL or any information to allow further search. Read the comments below for further details. + +Additional Information pertaining to this Service: 4/24)2020 8:00 pm Service was attempted at 1000 VENETIAN WAY, APT 801, MIAMI BEACH, FL 33139; I knocked on the door and no one answered. I heard music and noise inside the apartment. I spoke with the security guard; he did not know who was GHISLAINE MAXWELL. I showed him a picture of her and he stated that he has not seen her. I also spoke with the employees at the front desk who stated that they have not seen her. They also did not recognize her from the picture. She is not listed as a resident. The Keffler Family is listed a living at that unit. + +I certify that I am over the age of 18, have no interest in the above action, and I am a Certified Process Server, in good standing, in the Judicial Circuit in which the process was served. Pursuant to F.S. 95.525 "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing Return of Service and that the facts stated in it are true and correct' Notary not required as per FS 92.525. + +m emo! t County of Sworn and Subscribed before me on this 7i 7 day + +ofAQI t i {sup}`2020`By I + +Wishl rzp4n Personally known o Produce identificationX Type of identification produced + +![](_page_9_Picture_7.jpeg) + +My Commission Expirqs P W12073 + +Stephanie Nis NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA Cann\* 66299147 Expires 2/8/2023 + +atasha Caplan + +CPS #2327 + +U Got Served, LLC 1279 W. Palmetto Park Road Unit 273938 Boca Raton, FL 33427 (561) 361-7111 + +Our Job Serial Number: AOA-2020000802 Ref. Kevin Boyle, Esquire + +Civil Action No. + +PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l)) + +This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) GHISLAINE MAXWELL was received by me on (date) 4/24/2020 + +I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) ; or + +I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) ; or + +X I returned the summons unexecuted - I attempted service on 4/24/2020 at 8:00 p.m. at 1000 VENETIAN WAY, APT 801, MIAMI BEACH, FL 33139; I knocked on the door and no one answered. I heard music and noise inside the apartment. I spoke with the security guard; he did not know who was GHISLAINE MAXWELL. I showed him a picture of her and he stated that he has not seen her. I also spoke with the employees at the front desk who stated that they have not seen her. They also did not recognize her from the picture. She is not listed as a resident. The Keffler Family is listed a living at that unit. + +Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: 4/28/20 + +[Handwritten Server's signature] +Server's signature + +NATASHA CAPLAN, CPS #2327 + +Printed name and title + +U Got Served, LLC, 1279 W. Palmetto Park Rd., +#273938, Boca Raton, FL 33427 + +Server's address + +## EXHIBIT 2 + +From: Keilah Betts Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 8:49 AM To: igmax@ellmax.coM Cc: Robert Glassman; Nathan Werksman; Claudia Lomeli Subject: DOE, Jane v. The Estate of Jeffrey Epstein et al.: Attachments: SUMMONS.pdf; COMPLAINT.pdf + +Ms. Maxwell, + +Please be advised that this office represents a victim of Jeffrey Epstein, Jane Doe, who filed a lawsuit against you on January 22, 2020 in the Southern District of New York (Docket No. 20-cv-00484). I am attaching Jane Doe's summons and complaint to this email. We sent these documents to your attorney already and requested that she accept service on your behalf. Your attorney refused to accept service. Please confirm receipt of this email. + +Thank you, + +Keilah Betts Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 1 1 1 1 1 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tel: (310) 477.1700 Fax: (310) 477-1699 Email: betts@psblaw.com Web: www.psblaw.com + +#### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +## EXHIBIT 3 + +![](_page_14_Picture_1.jpeg) + +April 2, 2020 + +#### VIA U.S. MAIL. FACSIMILE & EMAIL + +Laura A. Menninger Haddon, and P.0 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 Fax: (303) 832-2628 Email: Imenninger@hrnflaw.com + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren Indyke, et at, 20-cv-00484 (16K) (DCF) + +Dear Ms. Menninger: + +Please be advised that we represent a woman identified as plaintiff Jane Doe in the above-referenced litigation filed in the Southern District of New York. It is our understanding that you represent Ghislaine Maxwell in a related action entitled v. Darren Indyke, et at (19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF) and appeared as counsel of record for Ms. Maxwell in that action on March 4, 2020. Ms. Maxwell has also been named a defendant in our case. + +Pursuant to the Court's order in v. Epstein, et at, 17-cv-616 (MK), ECF No. 107, and the Court's order in M, ECF No. 27, the delivery of this letter and its attachments (including plaintiffs complaint and summons) to you and your law firm, as counsel of record for defendant Maxwell, shall constitute service of the complaint and summons as to defendant Ghislaine Maxwell. + +Considering the well-documented impracticability of other methods of service on defendant Maxwell and the fact that you and your firm are actively representing Ms. Maxwell in other pending related litigation before the same court, this method of service is reasonably calculated to provide defendant Maxwell with notice of this lawsuit and an opportunity to respond. + +Accordingly, we are requesting that you agree to appear on behalf of Ms. Maxwell and respond to the complaint within twenty-one (21) days in lieu of us seeking another court order granting permission to effectuate service on Ms. Maxwell by alternative service pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1). If Ms. Maxwell chooses not to appear, we may pursue any and all available remedies, including the entry of a default judgment. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you wish to discuss any of the foregoing. + +Laura A. Menninger Haddon, and April 2, 2020 Page 2 P.C. + +Ends. + +Very truly yours, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +(.96.-- + +Robert S. Glassman + +SHEA& BOYLE + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiffs) + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, et al. + +Defendant(s) + +To: (Defendant's name and address) + +Ghislaine Maxwell + +116 East 65th Street, New York, NY 10065 Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00484 + +#### SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION + +A lawsuit has been filed against you. + +Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney, whose name and address are: Kevin R. Boyle + +Robert S. Glassman + +Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +11111 Santa Monica, Blvd., Suite 700 + + +If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court. + +Date: 01,28'2020 + +CLERK OF COURT + +/t,/x.17vel Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk + +![](_page_16_Picture_26.jpeg) + +Civil Action No. + +#### PROOF OF SERVICE + +(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1)) + +This summons for (name of individual and tide. if any) was received by me On (date) + +O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) on (date) ; or + +O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) , a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or + +O I served the summons on (name of individual) designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) on (date) or , who is + +O I returned the summons unexecuted because or + +O Other (specify): + +My fees are \$ for travel and \$ for services, for a total of \$ 0.00 + +I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. + +Date: Server's signature + +Printed name and tide + +Server's address + +Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + +Plaintiff, + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. I •70-cv-OD4R4 + +#### COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES + +DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL + +Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Doe" or "Plaintiff') alleges as follows: + +#### INTRODUCTION + +I. This case arises out of years of sexual abuse and exploitation of a young girl by notorious pedophile and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). It all started in 1994 when 13-year-old Jane Doe met Epstein and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") at a summer camp in Michigan. Jane Doe was their first known victim and was subsequently abused by Epstein and Maxwell for years as a young girl, suffering unimaginable physical and psychological trauma and distress. Despite that, Jane Doe has persevered and survived to tell her story, to hold her perpetrators accountable and to seek justice for the atrocities committed against her. + +2. Throughout his life, Epstein systematically perpetrated acts of molestation. exploitation, assault and rape on hundreds of young girls. Epstein's system of abuse was facilitated in large part by his co-conspirator and accomplice, Maxwell, who helped supply him with a steady stream of young and vulnerable girls—many of whom were fatherless, like Jane Doe, and came from struggling families. + +3. This system, which took years to develop, all started with them exploiting and 2 abusing Jane Doe who they used as a guinea pig to refine their criminal enterprise and widen their 3 network of additional sexual abuse victims. + +#### 4 THE PARTIES + +5 4. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of the State of California. At all times relevant to this 6 suit, Doe was a minor child living in Florida and New York and who was sexually abused while 7 she was a minor by Defendants in New York. + +8 5. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in the State of New York. + +9 6. Defendant Darren K. Indyke is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the 10 Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +7. Defendant Richard D. Kahn is sued in his capacity as an appointed executor of the 12 Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein. + +### o I t Li 13 JURISDICTION AND VENUE + +{sup}`a`. 14 8. Plaintiff is domiciled in California. + +x I2 a15 9. Jeffrey Epstein was a citizen of the United States domiciled in the U.S. Virgin § :q 16 Islands at the time of his death. As the legal representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, < 17 Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn are deemed citizens of the U.S. Virgin Islands. The matter 18 in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, and therefore jurisdiction in this Court is proper. 28 19 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). + +20 10. Ghislaine Maxwell is domiciled in New York. + +21 11. A substantial part of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the 22 Southern District of New York, thus venue in this district is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). + +#### 23 JURY DEMAND + +24 12. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all of her claims in this action. + +#### 25 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS + +#### 26 Epstein and Maxwell's Abuse of Doe + +27 13. In the summer of 1994, Jane Doe met Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell at 28 Interlochen Arts Camp in Michigan when she was only 13-years-old. Doe was there as a student + +f in the voice program. Doe was sitting alone on a bench between classes when Epstein and 2 Maxwell approached her. Epstein bragged to her about being a patron of the arts and giving 3 scholarships to talented young artists like Doe. Epstein and Maxwell probed her at length about 4 her background, family situation and where she lived. As Doe got up to leave, Epstein requested 5 her mother's phone number back in Florida. She was alarmed by his request, but also feared that 6 she could not refuse the older man's request so she complied and provided him with the phone 7 number. + +8 14. Several weeks later, once Doe had returned from Michigan to Florida, Epstein 9 called Doe's home. Epstein first spoke with Doe's mother about how he mentors young kids and 10 provides scholarships for the arts. He requested to speak to Doe and invited her and her mother to 11 his mansion in Palm Beach. He sent a driver across town to pick them up. + +12 15. Over the course of the next several months, Epstein and Maxwell attempted to 13 groom and mentor 13-year-old Jan Doe. Epstein gave himself the name of Doe's "godfather" 14 while Maxwell acted like an older sister to her. They took her to movies, went shopping with her 15 and lounged around Epstein's estate with her. Epstein and Maxwell then started to make sexual 16 references when they were with her. For instance, Maxwell told Doe that having sex with ex-17 boyfriends was easy because once you slept with them "they've been grandfathered in and you 18 could go back and flick them whenever you wanted." Epstein also started to slowly display his 19 pedophilic ways when shopping with Doe and Maxwell. Instead of Doe picking out clothes she 20 wanted to wear, Epstein insisted that she pick out and wear little children's cotton underwear. 21 Also, after nearly every visit with Epstein and Maxwell, Epstein sent Doe home with two or three 22 one-hundred-dollar bills to give her mother since "she's having a hard time and struggling as a 23 widow." + +24 16. While these visits made Doe extremely uncomfortable, Epstein and Maxwell made 25 her feel she could not refuse them. During this time, Epstein started to pay for voice lessons for 26 Doe and insisted that Doe could not advance her career in any way without him. When Doe 27 expressed hesitation about spending time with Epstein and Maxwell or acquiescing to their 28 desires, Epstein and Maxwell would threaten Doe, and scold her for being "ungrateful". + +1 17. During one of Doe's encounters with Epstein, he took her to Mar-a-Lago where he 2 introduced her to its owner, Donald J. Trump. Introducing 14-year-old Doe to Donald J. Trump, 3 Epstein elbowed Trump playfully asking him, referring to Doe, "This is a good one, right?" 4 Trump smiled and nodded in agreement. They both chuckled and Doe felt uncomfortable, but, at 5 the time, was too young to understand why. + +6 18. Towards the end of 1994, Epstein invited Doe into his pool house, where he 7 grabbed her, put her on his lap and started masturbating. Epstein told her that was what to expect 8 from photographers who were soon going to be take modeling pictures of her. However, when 9 Doe was ultimately photographed by these professional photographers, they did no such thing. + +10 19. Over the next few years, the sexual abuse escalated. On a regular basis, Epstein II would digitally penetrate Doe, force Doe to perform sexual acts on him and apply vibrators on 12 different parts of Doe's body. The abuse occurred at Epstein's home in Palm Beach, Florida, 13 Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in New York City, and Epstein's ranch in New Mexico. 14 When travelling to these places, Doe often flew with Epstein and Maxwell in Epstein's private jet. + +15 20. In 19%, when Doe was 16-years-old, Epstein moved Doe to New York City. At 16 first, Epstein put Doe up in his apartment on 65th Street and 2nd Avenue. After a few months. 17 Epstein co-signed the lease for Doe and Doe's mother for an apartment. Additionally, Epstein paid 18 her tuition at a private high school in Manhattan as well. + +19 21. Once Epstein had secured Doe in New York and made her and her family 20 completely dependent on him financially (including, for the roof over their heads), Epstein's abuse 21 of Doe continued to escalate. + +22 22. In 1997, while at Epstein's townhouse on 9 East 71st Street in the City of New 23 York, Epstein asked 17-year-old Doe if she had a boyfriend. Doe replied that she did not. Epstein 24 responded that when she did have a boyfriend she would want the sex to be "good" and that she 25 should "get it over with already," meaning lose her virginity. Despite Doe's resistance, Epstein 26 then pushed Doe down onto her stomach and raped her. From that point forward for several years 27 in New York, Epstein raped Doe on multiple occasions. + +23. During Doe's time in New York, Maxwell also regularly facilitated Epstein's abuse 2 of Doe and was frequently present when it occurred. + +3 24. In 1999, Doe moved to Los Angeles to start a career. Upon moving to Los Angeles 4 and being physically away from Epstein and Maxwell, Doe finally felt like she could escape 5 Epstein's abuse and stopped returning his frequent calls where he would threaten and berate her for 6 not appreciating him. + +7 25. Despite Doe's physical escape from Epstein and Maxwell, the years of abuse and 8 exploitation perpetrated against her by them cause her immeasurable pain and suffering every day. + +#### 9 Epstein's Death and Will + +10 26. In July 2019, Epstein was indicted by the Unites States Attorney's Office for the II Southern District of New York. + +12 27. On August 10, 2019, Epstein was found dead in his jail cell at the Metropolitan .4 O t d 13 Correctional Center, where he was being held pending trial. Upon information and belief, New 't 14 York City's medical examiner concluded Epstein died by suicide. + +• 2 15 28. On August 15, 2019, Epstein's last will and testament (the "Will") was filed in the Lt) § :q 16 Probate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +< 17 29. The Will indicated that it was executed by Epstein on August 8, 2019 at the 18 Metropolitan Correctional Center. The Will was accompanied by affidavits from Darren K. 19 Indyke and Richard D. Kahn attesting to their "Oath of Willingness to Serve as Executor and 20 Appointment of Local Counsel." Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn also filed a Petition for Probate and for 21 Letters Testamentary in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. + +22 30. The Will's first article directs Epstein's executors "to pay from my estate all 23 expenses of my last illness, my funeral and burial expenses, the administration expenses of my 24 estate and all of my debts duly proven and allowed against my estate." The Will further directs 25 that "after the payments and distributions provided in Article FIRST," Epstein "givers] all of my 26 property, real and personal, wherever situated...to the then acting Trustees of The 1953 Trust." + +27 + +I 31. On August 26, 2019, Defendant Darren K. Indyke filed a Certificate of Trust with 2 the Superior Court for the Virgin Islands, confirming that he and Defendant Richard D. Kahn are 3 the two Trustees of The 1953 Trust. + +4 32. On September 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carolyn P. Hermon-Percell of the 5 Superior Court of the Virgin Islands ordered that Epstein's will be admitted to probate and 6 authorized Mr. Indyke and Mr. Kahn to administer the estate. + +#### 7 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### 8 (Sexual Assault) + +9 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as 10 if set forth fully herein. + +11 34. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein, with Maxwell's assistance, • 5 12 made violent sexual demands on Plaintiff while placing his hands on her body in a position of o t e 13 dominance and control and while touching Plaintiff in violent and invasive ways. + +{sup}`14` HE oti S 14 35. These demands, often made when young Plaintiff was alone with Epstein or with g 1 15 only Epstein and Maxwell, were intended to frighten Plaintiff into submitting to his sexual g :q 16 demands and placed Plaintiff in apprehension of harm. + +< 17 36. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to 18 injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +> 19 37. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g 20 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was 21 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of 22 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 23 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### 24 (Sexual Battery) + +25 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as 26 if set forth fully herein. + +27 39. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein raped Doe. + +40. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein digitally penetrated Doe with 2 his fingers, tongue and foreign objects. + +3 41. On numerous occasions over several years, Epstein made otherwise unwanted, 4 unlawful, harmful, and offensive physical contact with Plaintiff's body. + +5 42. This conduct caused Plaintiff serious and persistent harm and contributed to 6 injuries that Plaintiff continues to suffer. + +7 43. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g 8 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was 9 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of 10 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 11 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### 12 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional I)istress) + +{sup}`1` 0 e 13 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as ft HE oti a 14 if set forth fully herein. + +2 To IS 45. Epstein and Maxwell's campaign of sexual abuse against a teenaged Plaintiff was Lt) g :q 16 extreme and outrageous conduct that shocks the conscience. + +< 17 46. Epstein and Maxwell's serial sexual assaults, committed during the course of a 18 methodical plan of recruitment, enticement, and attack, inflicted severe pain and anguish upon 19 Plaintiff. + +20 47. Epstein and Maxwell directed this conduct at Plaintiff and knew that it would cause 21 severe and lasting emotional distress. Indeed, the conduct caused Plaintiff severe and lasting 22 emotional distress and serious injuries to her mental health. + +23 48. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g 24 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was 25 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of 26 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + +#### 27 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION + +1 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as 2 if set forth fully herein. + +3 50. Epstein and Maxwell coaxed Plaintiff, then a teenaged girl, into Epstein's home for 4 a period of several years. They worked hard to groom her. Once under their supervision and 5 influence, Epstein and Maxwell proceeded methodically to sexually abuse Plaintiff. + +6 51. Epstein and Maxwell's conduct was extreme and outrageous, breached a duty owed 7 directly to Plaintiff, endangered her physical safety, and caused severe and lasting emotional 8 distress and serious injuries to Plaintiff's mental health. + +9 52. This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g 10 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was 11 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of 12 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"). See N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. • 3 6. + +#### O 13 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION + +#### a 14 (False Imprisonment) + +• 2 15 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and re-alleges them as y g :q 16 if set forth fully herein. + +< 17 54. Defendants, in perpetrating the above-described non-consensual sexual assaults. 18 did, by use of threat and/or physical force, willfully and intentionally confine, detain, imprison 19 and/or restrain Plaintiff without lawful authority to do so, against her will, and without her 20 consent. + +21 55. Plaintiff was aware of, and suffered the extreme effects of, the Defendants' 22 unlawful confinement. + +23 56. As a consequence of Defendants' false imprisonment of Plaintiff, she sustained 24 conscious pain and suffering, Plaintiffs health was impaired, Plaintiff suffered great mental 25 distress, shock, fright and humiliation, and Plaintiffs reputation and character were injured. + +26 57. As a consequence of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred severe 27 psychological trauma and damage, has suffered great humiliation, loss of esteem, mental anguish 28 and suffering. + +1 This cause of action is timely under the Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-8 + 2 (McKinney 2019), because it arises out of conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff when she was + 3 under the age of 18 that constitutes a sexual offense as defined in Article One Hundred Thirty of + 4 the New York Penal Law ("Article 130"), *See* N.Y. P.L. § 130.52; N.Y. P.L. § 130.55. + 5 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jame Doe prays for this Court to: + 6 and through its executors, DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as legal + 7 Issue a judgment declaring that Defendant ESTATE OF IEFFREY E. EPSTEIN by + 8 representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Defendant GHISLAINE MAXWELL are + 9 itable for the violations of law alleged in this case; + 10 60. Avant actual, compensatory, statutory, consequential and punitive damages; + 11 61. Avant pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law; + 12 62. Grant such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. + 13 and + 14 Dated: January 16, 2020 + 15 + 16 + 17 + 18 + 19 + 20 + 21 + 22 + 23 + 24 + 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + + 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + Telephone: (310) 477-1700 + Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 + boyle@psblaw.com + glassman@psblaw.com + werksman@psblaw.com + /s/ Benedict P. Morelli + David T. Sirokin + Sara A. Mahoney + +MORELL LAW FIRM PLLC + /s/ Benedict P. Morelli + David T. Sirokin + Sara A. Mahoney + + 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 + Telephone: (310) 477-1700 + Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 + boyle@psblaw.com + glassman@psblaw.com + werksman@psblaw.com + Nathan Werksman (admission pending) + Robert Glassman (admission pending) + Kevin Boyle (admission pending) + +Respectfully submitted, + Grant such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. + 6 2. *Re* + +WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jame Doe prays for this Court to: + 59. Issue a judgment declaring that Defendant ESTATE OF IEFFREY E. EPSTEIN by + 7 and through its executors, DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as legal + 8 representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Defendant GHISLAINE MAXWELL are + 9 itable for the violations of law alleged in this case; + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 17 + 18 + 19 + 20 + 21 + 22 + 23 + 24 + 25 + 26 + 27 + 28 + +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 +Los Angeles, California 90025 +310.477.1700 phone • 310.477.1699 fax + +777 Third Avenue, 31{sup}`st` Floor +New York, NY 10017 +Telephone: (212) 751-9800 +Facsimile: (212) 751-0046 +bmorelli@morellilaw.com +dsirotkin@morellilaw.com +smahoney@morellilaw.com + +*Attorneys for Plaintiff* + +## EXHIBIT 4 + +![](_page_29_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and e c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 DC 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerehmflaw.corn + +April 13, 2020 + +#### Via Email + +Robert S. Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Re: 20-CV-00484 (]GK-DCF), Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke, a at, + +Dear Mr. Glassman: + +I am not authorized to accept service of any complaint on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell. + +Your statement that your letter to me "shall constitute service of the complaint and summons as to defendant Ghislaine Maxwell" is an incorrect statement of the law. I am unaware of any authority for you to use decisions in other cases with other parties under other circumstances to support your own sua sponse service of a Complaint under Rule 4. If you have such authority, please share it with me. It also appears that you have undertaken no efforts to serve Ms. Maxwell consistent with the Rules. + +Your threat to seek "default judgment" when you have failed to follow the Rules or the applicable authority in New York is not well-founded in law. Please refrain in the future from making such threats. + +Sincerely, + +Laura A. Menninger + +## EXHIBIT 5 + +2018 WL 637421 + +Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. + +United States District Court, S.D. New York. + +Plaintiff, v. + +Jeffrey EPSTEIN, et al., Defendants. + +17-cv-616 (JGK) + +Signed 01/30/2018 + +#### Attorneys and Law Firms + +Justin Y.K. Michael Campion =, Steptoe & LLP, Alexander Seton Lorenzo, Alston & Bird, LLP, New York, NY, Laura A. Mcnningcr, Haddon, and P.C., Denver, CO, John E. Stephenson, Jr., Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants. + +#### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER + +John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge + +\*1 The plaintiff, - t , has moved the Court to approve alternative service on the defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and to find that service has been effected. The plaintiff asserts that, despite diligent measures, she has been unable to serve Maxwell personally. The plaintiff argues, however, that she has taken reasonable measures to provide Maxwell with notice of the pending lawsuit and requests that this service should be deemed sufficient. Non-party Haddon & P.C. ("Haddon M''), Maxwell's counsel in another litigation pending in this Court, has refused to accept service on behalf of Maxwell and has objected to becoming a general agent of process for Maxwell, but has taken no position on the plaintiff's application to deem service effected through the email efforts that the plaintiff has already made. Neither Maxwell nor any representative of Maxwell has otherwise opposed the current motion. + +Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(1) permits a plaintiff to serve a defendant by following the procedures set forth by state law in the state where the district court is located. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 308 sets forth available methods of service. Where service under §§ 308(1), (2), or (4)—which generally provide variants of personal service—is impracticable, § 308(5) provides that the + +Court may approve alternative service methods. See. e.g., Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc" No. 02-cv-73 I I (LTS) (AJP), 2003 WL 21073951, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003). Service under § 308(5) requires a showing of impracticability of the other methods of service, but does not require a showing of due diligence. lj + +The plaintiff has taken various steps in an effort to serve Maxwell personally—all to no avail. The plaintiff retained a private investigation firm to attempt to determine where Maxwell resides, and that firm attempted service at three physical addresses potentially associated with Maxwell. The plaintiff also emailed the summons and complaint to several email addresses that are publicly associated with Maxwell, only one of which has been returned as undelivered. The plaintiff has also provided a copy of the summons and complaint to Haddon who currently represents Maxwell in another litigation pending in this district. + +Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has demonstrated impracticability, because she has made numerous efforts to obtain information about the defendant's current residence and general contact information to effectuate personal service but has been unable to locate Maxwell. See, e.g. S.E.C. v. Nneke, No. 01-cv-5247 (KMW), 2003 WL 402377, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff has demonstrated that service on Maxwell is impracticable and thus grants the motion for alternative service. + +\*2 Further, the steps already taken by the plaintiff to serve Maxwell are "reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise [her] of the pendency of the action and afford [her] an opportunity to present [he]r objections," and the Court therefore deems service of the summons and complaint to be complete as to defendant Maxwell. See. e g. Bozza v. Love No. 15-CV-3271 (LGS), 2015 WL 4039849, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July I, 2015) (holding that service upon the defendant's counsel in an unrelated matter was sufficient); ftirnpersad, 2003 WL 21073951, at "I. + +Finally, Haddon objection to becoming a general agent of process for Maxwell is unfounded. The Court's ruling that service by email and personal delivery to Haddon has been reasonably calculated to provide Maxwell with notice of this lawsuit and an opportunity to respond does not turn Haddon into a general agent for Maxwell. Indeed, this order does not even require Haddon to accept service on behalf of Maxwell, but rather finds that + +service on Haddon is likely to provide notice of the lawsuit to Maxwell, given that Haddon is presumably in contact with Maxwell with regards to their representation of her in the other pending matter. See Bona, 2015 WL 4039849, at \*2. + +Accordingly, the motion for alternative service is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion pending at Docket Number 97. Defendant Maxwell's time to move or answer is twenty-one days from the date of this order. + +If Maxwell chooses not to appear, the plaintiff may pursue whatever remedies are available, including the entry of a default judgment. + +SO ORDERED. + +All Citations + +Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2018 WL 637421 + +#### Footnotes + +1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the case caption to name as the plaintiff. See Docket No. 96. + +End of Document \*2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e23472c90e1bffef2cda9683e9990bc687b5693f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752073/EFTA02752073.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -2261, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752073", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 31, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"swarm-unicode-norm.html-named-entities\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": false, + "input_sha256": "a1c1089e593ecc7b42547a94be29dfa229f3fe374af18ba978c764fd2ab07042", + "output_sha256": "836ee319829b630abd0309010fa1d9c6bdbfd085160fda0c976370655f09a8b7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..499233872c3d6eec1fb632950db25b5b2d6d0af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +## NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPROVE ALTERNATE SERVICE + +## PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(e)(1) + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying memorandum of law dated May 27, 2020, Plaintiff Jane Doe will move this Court for an order granting Plaintiffs Motion to Approve Alternative Service Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and finding that the service efforts made by Plaintiff's counsel are sufficient to notify Defendant Maxwell of the claims against her in this matter. + +submitted, Respectfully + +2020 27, May Dated: + +Esq. Glassman, Robert + +LLP BOYLE & SHEA PANISH 700 Suite Blvd., Monica Santa 11111 90025 CA Angeles, Los 477-1700 (310) Telephone: 477-1699 (310) Facsimile: boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com werksman@psblaw.com Plaintiff for Attorneys \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..206937a95dfc9d4a2c5061ac4b40de377ec1d40f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752106/EFTA02752106.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752106", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9b9bb211f6132c58bde6835c77bf5ba2622e43273ea119e75d06c78a427d9e05", + "output_sha256": "9b9bb211f6132c58bde6835c77bf5ba2622e43273ea119e75d06c78a427d9e05", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..90bef44a6c289384b87d1db52f2a37f0676caefe --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +# EXHIBIT + +# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT TH VIRGIN ISLANDS District of St. /St. John + +In the Matter of the Estate of JEFFREY E. Case Number: ST-2019-PB-00080 EPSTEIN, deceased. Action: Administration of Testamentary Estates + +# NOTICE of ENTRY of ORDER + +To: AMU= Kroblin, Esq. + +John H. Benham, Esq. Douglas B. Chanco, Esq. Richard P. Bourne-Vanneck, Esq. John K. Dema Esq. Denise N. {sup}`E` {sup}`l` Esq. Melody D. West all, Esq. Sean E lei Esq. Gaylin Voge , Esq. A. Jeffrey Weiss, Esq. + +Ariel M. Esq. + +Kevin F. D'amour, Esq. Kevin Boyle, Esq. Robert Glassman, Esq. + +Please take notice that on June 3, 2020 + +#### a(n) ORDER + +dated June 2, 2020 was entered by the Clerk in the above-titled matter. + +Dated: June 03, 2020 Tamara Charles + +By: + +Clerk of the Court + +44114 + +Edotcia =Frlodge Court C erk + +## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. MM AND ST. JOHN + +IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: + +JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, + +PROBATE NO. ST-19-PB-80 + +ACTION FOR TESTATE deceased. ADMINISTRATION + +### ORDER + +THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Co-Executors' Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Presentation of Program Protocol filed on June 1, 2020, wherein, in pertinent part, the Co-Executor notify that all interested parties have finalized and are in support of the protocol for the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (hereinafter "the Program")) The Court having received testimony concerning the Program at the hearing held on February 4, 2020, and having reviewed said Status Report, it is hereby + +ORDERED that the Expedited Motion for Establishment of a Voluntary Claims Resolution Program filed on November 14, 2019, is GRANTED; and it is further + +ORDERED that the Co-Executors are AUTHORIZED to commence the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on or about June 15, 2020. + +Dated: June , 2020 + +Magistrate ROLVN P. HER ON- ERCELL dge off e Superioil Court of the Virgin Islands + +## ATTEST: + +TAMARA CHARLES Clerk of the Court + +By: A EDOTCIA T MAS-HODGE Court Clerk Supervisor 6, / 3 g\_ca DATE oke,230 CERTIFIE T E COPY TAMARA CHARLES CLERK VrC 410t:Iii BY COURT CLERK + +{sup}`&#`x27;At the hearing held on February 4. 2020, while the Court did not allow the Attorney General of the U.S. Virgin Islands to intervene, the Court did request the Co-Executors and the Attorney General to resolve their differences concerning the proposed compensation program. which has garnered the support of all interested parties, including claimants' counsel. The Co-Executors now inform that IbIecause the need for the Program has grown increasingly urgent, and with the support of claimants' counsel and the USV1 Attorney General - and because the remaining impediments have been resolved and the interested parties have consented to the Protocol.' they and the Attorney General have reached an agreement in which the latter will promptly lift previously imposed liens to pay amounts owed for the Program and to begin funding the Program's active operations, including payment of compensation determinations to eligible claimants. Co-Executors' Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program and Presentation of Program Protocol, at 6. June 1. 2020. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c51395b26f4a9fa89e9177327413653ac3a3af15 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752108/EFTA02752108.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -12, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752108", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9c61d2c6810d0e4c73faac96f03866afbacfd592e7afb7af7d857dfd5595ec33", + "output_sha256": "7b736f3af514d6fc1d249192dd7a15aea7a142477e7fc9d762375e6be960f2b9", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c0b4a6f3ff060dd2279868881473c2f83b44fdd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +June 3, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Katlyn Doe, 1:19-cv-07771-PKC-DCF; Priscilla Doe, 1:19-cv-07772-ALC-DCF; Lisa Doe. 1:19-cv-07773 ER-DCF: VE. 1:19-cv-07625-AJN-DCF; ithzt Doe. 1:19-cv-08673-KPF-D . 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF; 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF: 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF: Jane Doe 1000, 1:19-cv-10577-LGS-D F- Jane Doe 15, 1:19-cv-10653-PAE-DCF; Mary Doe, 1:19-cv-10758-PAE-DCF; , 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF: Anastasia Doe, 1:19-cv-11869-AJN-DCF; Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the To-Executors"), in the above-referenced actions. We are pleased to inform the Court that, today, the Superior Court of the United States Virgin Islands entered an order granting the Co-Executors' Motion to establish the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. A copy of the Order is attached hereto. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0e240070c650901a8a0ffdf4fa5007dc2e77493d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752111/EFTA02752111.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752111", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "05b439d27b767b934029b2ce0fdcbef215420a212fc6876826065f04da0a9fdb", + "output_sha256": "05b439d27b767b934029b2ce0fdcbef215420a212fc6876826065f04da0a9fdb", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..26d4c1f91cc2f70799cb04876ea9cb0ea78c60ac --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +June 16, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Court's Text Order in the above-referenced case entered on June 15, 2020 regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, Plaintiff has served Ms. Maxwell with a copy of the Text Order by emailing it to Ms. Maxwell's counsel of record in the case, Laura Menninger, and is now hereby filing proof of such service on the Docket of this action. A copy of such proof of service is attached hereto. + +Very truly yours, + +Robert S. Glassman + +RSG + +**Sent:** Tuesday, June 16, 2020 7:05 AM +**To:** Imenninger@hmflaw.com +**Cc:** Robert Glassman; Nathan Werksman; Claudia Lomeli +**Subject:** Doe v. Indyke et al: Ghislaine Maxwell +**Attachments:** Activity in Case 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF Doe v. Indyke et al Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief + +**Importance:** High + +Dear Ms. Menninger – Please be advised that the Court has issued the attached minute order concerning service on your client Ghislaine Maxwell. Plaintiff was ordered to give notice to you of this order via e-mail. + +**Docket Text:** + +**ORDER granting [43] Motion To Approve Alternate Service on Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"). Plaintiff's motion is unopposed, and, based on Plaintiff's representations regarding her unsuccessful efforts to locate Maxwell's current residence, her fruitless attempts to serve Maxwell at multiple locations, her equally fruitless attempts to contact Maxwell via several email addresses publicly associated with Maxwell, and her rejected request to Maxwell's known litigation counsel to accept service on Maxwell's behalf, this Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that she has made diligent efforts to effect service, and that personal service would be impracticable. See [REDACTED] v. Epstein, No. 17cv616 (JGK), 2018 WL 637421, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018); see also [REDACTED] v. Indyke, No. 19cv10475 (LGS)(DF) (Text Order, dated Feb. 12, 2020). This Court further finds that Plaintiff's provision of a copy of the Summons and Complaint by email to Maxwell's current counsel of record in the [REDACTED] case (see Declaration of Robert S. Glassman, dated May 27, 2020 (Dkt. 43-2), Ex. 3) was reasonably calculated to place Maxwell on notice of this suit and to constitute sufficient service under the circumstances presented here. No later than 6/18/20, Plaintiff is directed to serve Maxwell with a copy of this Text Order by the same means (i.e., by email to Maxwell's counsel of record in the [REDACTED] case), and to file proof of such service on the Docket of this action. Maxwell may then have until 7/9/20 to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (HEREBY ORDERED by Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman)(Text Only Order) (Freeman, Debra)** + +Keilah Betts +Panish Shea & Boyle LLP +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 +Los Angeles, CA 90025 +Tel: (310) 477-1700 +Fax: (310) 477-1699 +Email: [betts@psblaw.com](mailto:betts@psblaw.com) +Web: [www.psblaw.com](http://www.psblaw.com) + +**CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:** + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1764ae93bbc866fd77125728555a321eef7ab8c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752112/EFTA02752112.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752112", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1d47797af7c47335b6c6f6fbb5d0c80c31dfc17c72808e0aa9c49fc6cad80791", + "output_sha256": "1d47797af7c47335b6c6f6fbb5d0c80c31dfc17c72808e0aa9c49fc6cad80791", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cbbf938ba862e2bf9ab3c3135c7c7aa3a06f52e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +June 19, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. Together with counsel for Plaintiff and pursuant to this Court's Order dated April 1, 2020 (ECF Doc. 35), we submit this joint status report regarding discovery and settlement discussions. + +## I. Discovery + +On April 20, 2020, the parties served their initial interrogatories and requests for production on each other. The parties served their responses and objections on June 3, 2020. The parties are working to set deposition dates, with Darren Indyke's deposition already scheduled for August 7, 2020. The parties are also corresponding to resolve any discovery disputes. + +## II. Settlement Discussions + +As the Co-Executors recently advised the Court in another action, the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("Program") has been established, with formal claims accepted for the Program Administrator's review starting on June 25, 2020. The Co-Executors encourage Plaintiff to consider participating in the Program. Plaintiff is currently considering whether or not she will be participating in the Program. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a26761e026230de4ad6cefb050662b9131a8a3b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752115/EFTA02752115.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752115", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "89a900898859f55c3b58c3ec2f13a664f85c256af8f9c0076b84c2c58897e203", + "output_sha256": "89a900898859f55c3b58c3ec2f13a664f85c256af8f9c0076b84c2c58897e203", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2dc4e3e11f1f72b9b84957bdcbaa9803c368176c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.md @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +LISA DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +- against - + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, ET AL. + +Defendants. + +# OPINION & ORDER + +19 Civ. 7773 (ER) + +Ramos. D.J.: + +Lisa Doe brings this action for alleged sex trafficking and abuse she suffered at the hands of Jeffrey Epstein (now-deceased) and three of his associated business entities, which are alleged to have facilitated and participated in Epstein's conduct. This action is one of several brought in this District by Epstein's alleged victims. + +The Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for battery, sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") against Epstein's estate, and for TVPA violations and negligence against Financial Trust Company, Inc. ("FTC"), NES, LLC ("NES") and HBRK Associates, Inc. ("HBRK," and together with FTC and NEC, the "Corporate Defendants"). Defendants move to dismiss two of the claims against Epstein's estate as being duplicative or time-barred, all of the claims against the Corporate Defendants for being improperly pled or time-barred, and the punitive damages claims against Epstein's estate on the grounds that punitive damages are not available against deceased defendants. + +For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. + +### I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND + +The following facts are taken from Doe's Amended Complaint (Doc. 41). + +Epstein is alleged to have been a man of enormous wealth who "had a compulsive sexual preference for young females," some as young as 14 years old, and who is alleged to have acted on that sexual preference for decades. (Doc. 41 at 19.) According to the Amended Complaint, and as relayed in the criminal indictment against Epstein, which is cited in the Amended Complaint and included as an exhibit thereto (the "Indictment"), Epstein enticed and recruited minor girls to visit his mansion in Manhattan to engage in sex acts with him, after which they were given hundreds of dollars in cash. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Indictment also alleges that Epstein caused others to entice and recruit minor girls to engage in sex acts with him. (Id.) In order to maintain a supply of victims, Epstein paid some of his victims to recruit other girls to be similarly abused by him. (Id. 1 27.) Victims were "initially recruited to provide 'massages' to Epstein, which would be performed nude or partially nude, would become increasingly sexual in nature, and would typically include one or more sex acts." (Id ¶ 30.) + +# A. The Alleged Conduct Against Doe + +Doe alleges that she was one of these victims, and has been considered as such by the Government. (Id. ¶ 32.) Doe alleges that she was 17 when she was first sexually assaulted by Epstein in 2002. (Id. ¶ 75.) An avid dancer aspiring to a professional career in the field, Doe was approached at a New York dance studio by an associate of Epstein's who wished to hire Doe to teach a dance-based exercise class to a wealthy individual, later revealed to be Epstein. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77.) Doe went to Epstein's Manhattan property, where she met Epstein. (Id. ¶¶ 78-80.) Epstein engaged Doe in conversation and told her that he was closely connected to major dance companies in New York City, was personal friends with influential figures in dance, and that he could use his resources to further Doe's dance career. (Id. ¶¶ 81-83.) After making these representations, Epstein required Doe "to engage in various sexually-charged stretching activities." (Id. ¶ 84.) After the + +initial session, Epstein asked Doe to return the following day for another session, and when she did, Epstein "was again only interested in sexually-charged stretching activities that involved [Doe] sitting on top of his body and pressing her body up against his in other manners." (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.) Sometime thereafter, the associate who had initially approached Doe at her dance studio, called her on the telephone and told her that Epstein would like her to return to give him a massage. (Id. ¶ 92.) The associate explained that Doe would be paid \$100 per hour to conduct the massage if she kept her clothing on, or \$300 per hour if she performed the massage with her clothing off. (Id. 1 93.) Doe went to the Epstein property and met him in a massage room. (Id. Ell¶ 95-96.) Epstein instructed Doe on how he wished her to massage him, which Doe listened to "very intently, knowing that she had to comply with his demands if she wanted him to use his connections to help her—and, conversely, not punish her if she failed to comply—with her dance career." (Id.1 96.) During this massage, Epstein forcibly inserted a sex toy into Doe's vagina, instructed her to squeeze his nipples, and began to masturbate. (Id. Ti 98-99.) Despite this sexual assault, Doe, "feeling she had no choice, especially in light of the promises and implied threats" made by Epstein, returned to the property on many occasions thereafter, where she was continually sexually abused, and after each such occasion was paid hundreds of dollars. (Id. ¶ 104.) This conduct continued for approximately eight years, until 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 108, 118.) + +# B. The Alleged Involvement of the Corporate Defendants + +Doe alleges that each of the Corporate Defendants performed actions or failed to perform actions that placed Doe in danger of being sexually abused by Epstein and assisted him in concealing his sexually abusive acts.' + +{sup}`&#`x27; FTC is a U.S. Virgin Islands corporation, conducting business in New York, among other places. (al 8.) NES is a domestic limited liability company, registered in and conducting business in, among other places. New York. (Id. 1 9.) And, HBRK is a domestic business corporation, also registered in and conducting business in multiple locations, including New York. (Id.1 10.) Employees of Corporate Defendants were paid through funds provided by Epstein. (Id. 11 137.) + +The allegations against HBRK and NES are nearly identical, but are alleged in separate sections with clear headings identifying the defendant to which they pertain. Doe alleges that HBRK and NES employees were hired by Epstein "strictly to perform functions to allow his sexual activity with young females," including Doe and other minors to continue. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 48.) HBRK and NES employees each kept large amounts of cash at Epstein's properties, including the one in Manhattan where Doe was allegedly sexually assaulted, in order for Epstein to have money to pay his victims, including Doe, for sexual activities. (Id. TO 41, 49.) These employees were also tasked with maintaining a list of names and phone numbers of young females, including Doe, to schedule them to go Epstein's properties to engage in sexual activities with him. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 43, 50, 51.) Employees were also expected to keep a schedule of appointment times for Doe and other young females so that a sexual encounter could occur at the exact place and time Epstein wanted. (Id. 1114445, 52-53.) HBRK and NES employees were also involved in recruiting additional victims and allegedly taught recruiters to inform Doe and other targeted young females that Epstein possessed great power and resources and that he would help them advance their education, careers, and lives if they provided Epstein with body massages. (Id. ¶ 68.) Doe also alleges that HBRK and NES employees helped conceal the sexual encounters between Epstein and Doe, and others, by: paying them; hiring lawyers for them; labeling them as masseuses in an attempt to describe the sexual encounters as innocuous; reminding them how powerful and wealthy Epstein was in order to prevent them from revealing the illegal nature of Epstein's sexual abuse; and maintaining damaging files on many of them that could be used against them if they were ever to turn on Epstein. (Id. 11146, 54.) + +The Amended Complaint's allegations against FTC are also clearly identified by a particular heading. (Id. ¶¶ 55-67.) FTC is alleged to have employed Epstein. (Id. ¶ 55.) According to the Amended Complaint, FTC "knowingly turned a blind eye to the dangerous sexual addictive propensities of its employee, Jeffrey Epstein, despite + +knowledge that he would cause harm to many young females including Plaintiff, in order to retain him as its most valuable employee." (Id. ¶ 57.) The Amended Complaint alleges that FTC's "corporate objective ... was to provide Jeffrey Epstein with sexual massages" and the sexual massages Epstein required from young females, including Doe, were conducted in the course and scope of Epstein's employment with FTC. (Id. ¶¶ 56, 59.) The Amended Complaint alleges that FTC employees other than Epstein were involved in coordinating sexually explicit massages by Doe and other young females, often minor children, for Epstein. (Id. ¶ 62; see also ¶ 64.) FTC taught recruiters to inform Doe and other targeted young females that Epstein possessed great power and resources and that he would help them advance their education, careers, and lives if they provided Epstein with body massages. (Id. ¶ 68.) Epstein, allegedly, frequently utilized corporate finances in furtherance of his sexually explicit behavior and conducted business telephone calls on behalf of FTC while receiving sexually explicit massages. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 63.) Doe also alleges that FTC helped conceal the sexual encounters between Epstein and Doe, as well as other young females, by: paying them; hiring lawyers for them; and labeling them as masseuses in an attempt to describe the encounters as innocuous. (Id. ¶ 67.) + +# IL LEGAL STANDARD + +"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." M. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). However, this "flexible 'plausibility standard"' is not a heightened pleading standard, /n re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d + +47, 50 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), and "a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. + +The question on a motion to dismiss "is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995)). "[T]he purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits" or "weigh[ing] the evidence that might be offered to support it." Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule I2(b)(6), the Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable...."). "For purposes of this rule, the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). + +# HI. DISCUSSION + +Defendants' motion argues that there are ten separate bases for dismissing certain of Doe's claims, or parts of those claims. Specifically, they argue that (a) the second cause of action, entitled "Sexual Assault," is duplicative of the first, titled "BatteryNiolation of Section 130 against the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein;" (b) Doe's fifth cause of action, titled "Battery" is time-barred; (c) each of Doe's TVPA claims is partially time-barred to the extent they relate to conduct before August 20, 2009; (d) the TWA claims against the Corporate Defendants fail to sufficiently allege the required intent + +requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 1591; (e) Doe's TVPA claims against the Corporate Defendants are conclusory and unsupported; (f) the negligence claims against the Corporate Defendants are time-barred; (g) the negligence claims against the Corporate Defendants should be dismissed because they fail to more than conclusorily plead damages; (h) the negligence claims against NES and HBRK rely on impermissible group pleading; (i) the Amended Complaint fails to allege a negligent supervision claim against FTC; and (j) the punitive damages claims against Epstein's estate are precluded by law because Epstein has died. The Court addresses each argument in turn. + +# A. Defendants' Argument that Count II is Duplicative of Count I + +Defendants seek to dismiss Doe's second cause of action, titled simply "Sexual Assault," as duplicative of her first, titled "Battery/Violation of Section 130 against the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein." (See Doc. 50 at 6-7; Doc. 1 at 38-40.) Defendants argue that both claims rest on the same legal and factual foundations. Specifically, Defendants point to statements made in the Amended Complaint in which Doe defends the timeliness of the second cause of action by invoking CPLR § 214-g. That section was enacted as part of the Child Victims Act ("CVA"), and created a one-year window to bring otherwise time-barred claims for conduct "which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law" in certain circumstances, and, therefore, Defendants argue, it is clear that both claims rest on the same legal theory, Penal Law § 130. + +In response, Doe argues that her reference in the second cause of action to § 130 was a "typographical error" and that she intended for the claim to be based on New York common law, as she argues the title of the claim suggests. She also appears to suggest that the first and second causes of action rest on separate factual allegations, one concerns claims before Doe turned 18 and the other after she turned 18. + +Neither party cites any law in favor of their respective positions. While a plaintiff may not plead the same claim twice, a plaintiff can plead alternative bases for relief. In + +re Skat Tax Refund Scheme Litig., 356 F. Supp. 3d 300, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). "A claim is alternative and not duplicative if a plaintiff may fail on one but still prevail on the other." Id. (citation omitted). + +Doe's invocation of CPLR § 214-g indeed suggests that the second cause of action is premised on a sexual offense as defined in § 130 of New York's penal law, as is the case with the first cause of action, and therefore that both claims rise and fall together. A reading of the Amended Complaint does not suggest that the two causes of action relate to different time periods. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the second cause of action without prejudice.2 + +# B. Defendants' Argument that Count V is Time-Barred + +Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint's fifth cause of action, "Battery Against Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahan as Joint Representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein." Defendants argue that under New York law, claims of battery perpetrated on an adult must be commenced within one year, and claims perpetrated against minors must be commenced with one year of the victim turning 18. Defendants argue that the battery claim therefore expired when Doe turned 18 in either 2002 or 2003, or sometime in 2011, one year after the date of the last alleged offense. + +Doe argues the claims are timely pursuant to both the CVA and §CPLR § 215(8Xa). + +In their reply brief, Defendants argue that as Doe has described the second cause of action in her opposition brief, it is time-barred. But, Defendants did not raise this argument in their opening papers and "[t)he law in the Second Circuit is clear that arguments or requests for relief raised for the first time in reply briefs need not be considered?' In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, 235 F. Supp. 3d 472, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing ABN Anoro Venelceringen BV v. Geologisfics Americas, Inc., 485 F.3d 85, 100 n.16 (2d Cir. 2007)). While, it is not immediately clear how Doe intends to escape the statute of limitations bar if she chooses to replcad the cause of action, she is entitled to have an opportunity to present her position on the issue. Defendants can raise this statute of limitations issue then. + +{sup}`2` Doe urges the Court to ignore the reference to § 130 "and construe the paragraph as referring to a New York common law sexual assault claim, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(0 (a "court may strike from a pleading any ... redundant .. . [or] immaterial. . . matter."). The Court does not find that justice requires ignoring parts of the Amended Complaint here because Doe has an opportunity to replead the second cause of action if she chooses. + +CPLR § 215(8)(a) allows civil plaintiffs, for a specified period of time, to bring actions against the same defendant and with respect to the same "event or occurrence" as was the subject of a criminal action, even if the statute of limitations on the civil claim has already run. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: + +Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action as defined in section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law in which to commence the civil action, notwithstanding that the time in which to commence such action has already expired or has less than a year remaining. + +Section 215(8Xa) "is satisfied so long as `(1) a criminal action has been commenced, (2) against the same defendants, and (3) concerning the same event or transaction from which the civil action arose." Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (1994)). + +Doe argues that the criminal action against Epstein triggers the application of § 215(8Xa). The Indictment accuses Epstein of engaging in sex trafficking and a sex trafficking conspiracy that led to the exploitation of dozens of minor girls, and Doe argues that she was one of these minor girls. She argues that the abuse she alleges here is the same as that charged in the Indictment, and that she was considered a victim of Epstein's by the Government. She further avers that as a victim, she delivered an impact statement before the Court presiding over Epstein's criminal case, and was identified as a victim by the Court. Thus according to Doe, this action is timely pursuant to § 215(8)(a) so long as it is was brought within one year of the termination of the criminal case against Epstein, which it clearly was. 3 + +In response, Defendants argue that Doe's reliance on § 215(8)(a) is misplaced because "to the extent Count V applies to conduct that occurred when Plaintiff was a + +{sup}`3` Doe claims, and Defendants do not dispute, that the criminal action against Epstein terminated on August 27, 2019 when the Court dismissed the case following Epstein's death. (Doc. 55 at 10.) This action was filed on August 20, 2019, before the criminal case was dismissed. + +minor, it is duplicative of Count I [and] [t]o the extent Plaintiff suggests that Count V is based on torts that occurred when she was an adult, CPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable" as the Indictment only concerned allegations that Epstein abused "minor girls" between 2002 and 2005. (Doc. 57 at 3.) + +Defendants do not elaborate on their claim that Count V is duplicative of Count I to the extent it relates to conduct that occurred when Doe was a minor, referring only to the argument "above" with respect to Count II. But Count II was duplicative of Count I because both were premised on a violation of Penal Code § 130. That is not obviously and necessarily so here: the Amended Complaint's description of Count V makes no mention of § 130, and Doe does not need to rely on the CVA, which references § 130, to avoid the statute of limitations here. Because it seems the legal foundations of the claims are different, they are not duplicative. Defendants' terse argument provides no reason to suggest otherwise. + +Defendants' argument that § 215(8Xa) is inapplicable to Epstein's alleged battery of Doe as an adult is more fleshed out. Defendants argue that for § 215(8)(a) to apply, the criminal action must relate to the "event or occurrence from which" the civil claim arises. Defendants argue that the Indictment concerned the alleged sex trafficking of minors between 2002 and 2005, and therefore does not relate to "torts allegedly committed against adults, whether Plaintiff or otherwise." (Doc. 57 at 3.) Defendants argue that New York courts apply § 215(8)(a) "narrowly," and cite to two decisions that found § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where the civil action related to events that happened on different dates than the criminal action, and a third where the Court found § 215(8)(a) inapplicable because the defendants in the civil action were not charged in the criminal action. (Id. (citing Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (1999); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at \*3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018); McElligott v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 7107 (LGS), 2017 WL 6210840, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017).) + +Defendants, however, read the Indictment and the § 215(8Xa) caselaw too narrowly. Unlike in Christodoulou and Gahm, the criminal case against Epstein did not relate to isolated events. One of the charges in the Indictment was for participation in a "Sex Trafficking Conspiracy." (Doc. 41-2.) Among other things, the Indictment alleges that Epstein "enticed, recruited, and caused to be enticed and recruited, minor girls to visit his mansion in Manhattan, New York ... to engage in sex acts with him, after which he would give the victims hundreds of dollars in case." (Id. ¶ 2.) The Indictment further alleges, however, that "once these minor victims were recruited, many were abused by Epstein on multiple subsequent occasions at" Epstein's New York residence. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendants do not dispute that Doe was one of the "minor girls" referenced in the Indictment, and the Court finds that the allegations in the Amended Complaint about battery Doe sustained as an adult are reasonably read as being referenced in the Indictment. + +Defendants, are correct, however that the conduct alleged in the Indictment spanned the period between 2002 and 2005, and therefore that the Indictment cannot for § 215(8Xa) purposes cover the allegations in the Amended Complaint between 2006 and 2010. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (1999). + +In finding that § 215(8Xa) applies here to the claims between 2002 and 2005, the Court is guided by the Second Circuit's analysis in Kashef Plaintiffs in that case, alleged victims of atrocities in Sudan at the hands of the government there, brought tort claims relating to those atrocities against a financial services corporation that had previously been convicted for federal and state felonies for evading U.S. sanctions on Sudan. 925 F.3d 53. The Second Circuit determined that § 215(8)(a) could apply because the "causes of action ar[o]se out of the same occurrence as the criminal prosecution" because plaintiffs theorized that defendant was "illegally funding Sudan's commission of atrocities by avoiding U.S. sanctions put in place to protect the Plaintiffs and the purported class." 925 F.3d at 62-63. + +The Court therefore has no trouble finding that the alleged battery against Doe as an adult arose out of the conduct that was the subject of Epstein's criminal case, indeed the conduct is arguably explicitly referenced in the Indictment. Because a criminal action was commenced against Epstein, whose estate is being sued here,4 "concerning the same event or transaction from which" this action arises, the Court finds that § 215(8)(a) applies and renders the battery claim alleged in Count V of the Amended Complaint timely to the extent it concerns conduct between 2002 and 2005 inclusive. See Kashef, 925 F.3d at 62. + +To the extent the fifth cause of action relates to conduct between 2006 and 2010, the claim is dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. Section 215(8)(a) cannot cover these claims. Nor would it seem could the CVA, as relying on the CVA would render the claim duplicative of the first cause of action for the same reasons as discussed above. + +# C. Defendants' Argument that Doe's TVPA Claims Are Partially Time-Barred + +Defendants argue that Doe's civil TVPA claims, brought in separate counts against each of the Defendants, are time-barred. Section 1595 of Title 18, which provides for civil TVPA suits, requires that such claims be brought "not later than the later of (1) 10 years after the cause of action arose; or (2) 10 years after the victim reaches 18 years of age, if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). Because, Defendants argue, Doe turned 18 in 2002 or 2003, and the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants misconduct ended in 2010, any alleged conduct that occurred before August 20, 2009—ten years before Doe initiated this action—must be dismissed as time-barred. + +Doe responds that the substantive violation she alleges through 18 U.S.C. § 1595 is a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and claims of conspiracy are not time-barred + +Defendants do not argue that because Doe sues Epstein's estate here, this action was not brought against the "same defendant" as the criminal case, as § 215(8)(a) requires. + +provided "at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement" occurred within the limitations period. (Doc. 55 at 18 (quoting United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d. Cir. 2001).) + +Defendants appear to concede the law, but dispute that the Amended Complaint alleges an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy after August 20, 2009. The Court disagrees. For example, the Amended Complaint plainly states that, at Epstein's direction, Doe was paid to engage in commercial sex acts until 2010. (Doc. 41 at 108; see also 9 111 (alleging that "from the time she met [Epstein] through and including 2010," Epstein would direct Doe to engage in sex acts with other females, in exchange for money, while he pleasured himself).) + +Defendants dismiss these allegations as "hopelessly vague" and further argue that the allegations "only reference actions attributed to Decedent and unidentified 'employees or associates of the sex trafficking enterprise,"' and not the Corporate Defendants. The Court disagrees that Doe is required to allege more details at this stage of the litigation. And, it is not the law that a plaintiff is required to allege an overt action by every defendant or co-conspirator—one is enough. See United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A]bsent withdrawal, a conspirator's 'participation in a conspiracy is presumed to continue until the last overt act by any of the conspirators."') (quoting United States v , 176 F.3d 52, 98 (2d Cir. 1999)). + +While the Court disagrees that the conspiracy claims are time-barred, Doe has not presented arguments as to why the non-conspiracy claims, such as attempt, referenced in Counts VI to IX are not time-barred and the Court dismisses those with prejudice. + +## D. Defendants' Argument that Doe Has Failed to Allege the TVPA's Intent Requirements + +Defendants additionally argue that Doe's TVPA claims against the Corporate Defendants must be dismissed because Doe has failed to allege the required intent requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Defendants argue that Doe was required to allege that each Corporate Defendant both "(I) knowingly recruit[ed] a person (or knowingly benefit[ed] from such a venture); and (2) [knew] that means of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion [would] be used by a person or the venture to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act." (Doc. 50 at 8 (citing Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17 Civ. 6404 (BMC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71582, at \*35 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2018).) Defendants argue that Doe's Amended Complaint fails to allege either element. + +As relevant here, § 1591 contains two intent requirements. Section 1591(a) states: + +(a) Whoever knowingly— + +- (1) ... recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or +- (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), + +Knowing, or ... in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). + +18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Therefore, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant violated either § 1591(a)(1) by knowingly recruiting, enticing, transporting providing, obtaining advertising, patronizing or soliciting a person or (2) by knowingly benefiting from participation in a venture that has engaged in any act described in § 1591(a)(1). And, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. Id. + +With regards to the first intent requirement, described in § 159I(a)( I) and (2), Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint "does not articulate how the Corporate Defendants purportedly benefited or participated in a TVPA violation." (Doc. 57 at 6.) While the Amended Complaint includes conclusory allegations that Defendants benefited from the TVPA violation (see, e.g. Doc. 41 ¶ 215), Doe's opposition brief indicates that she does not argue the "benefited" prong of § 1591(a)(2), but rather that Defendants knowingly participated in the TVPA violations under § 1591(a)(1) by recruiting, enticing, and otherwise soliciting Doe and other young female victims . (Doc. 55 at 15.) Indeed, the Amended Complaint includes numerous allegations detailing how the Corporate Defendants knowingly participating in the TVPA violations. (See, e.g. Doc. 41 ¶¶ 39 & 47 (HBRK and NES employees were compensated specifically to help Epstein obtain young females, including Doe and other minors, with whom Epstein could engage in sex acts), ¶¶ 43 & 51 (HBRK and NES employees maintained a schedule for appointment times for young females, including Doe, to be at Epstein's Manhattan property for the purpose of making sure a sexual encounter occurred at the exact time Epstein wanted), ¶¶ 56, 62 & 64 (FTC employees, other than Epstein, were coordinating sexually explicit massages by Doe and other young females, often minor children, for Epstein), ¶ 68 (FTC, HBRK, and NES taught recruiters to inform Doe and other targeted young female victims that Epstein possessed great power and resources and that he would help them advance their education, careers, and lives if they provided Epstein with massages).) The Court finds that these allegations sufficiently allege that the Corporate Defendants knowingly participated in the alleged TVPA violations. + +Neither party dedicates any meaningful argument to assist the Court in determining whether Doe has sufficiently alleged the second intent requirement under § 1591, that the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. Other than an incomplete description of this requirement (Defendants ignore the statutory language indicating that a plaintiff can satisfy this requirement by showing that defendants knew or should have known that the person engaged in the sex act "has not attained the age of 18 years"), Defendants simply state that "Plaintiff fails to allege either of [the] essential [intent] elements of a TVPA violation" (Doc. 50 at 8) and the Amended "Complaint is devoid of any specific allegations, and Plaintiff fails to point to allegations establishing [either of the intent] requirement." (Do. 57 at 6).5 + +The Court's independent analysis of the claims in the Amended Complaint suggests that Doe has adequately pled the second intent requirement. First, the Amended Complaint pleads facts from which it is reasonable to infer that the Corporate Defendants knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that the females they were recruiting to engage in sexual activities with Epstein had not yet reached the age of 18. (See, e.g., Doc. 41 ¶¶ 39 & 47 (HBRK and NES employees were compensated specifically to help Epstein obtain young females, including Doe and other minors, with whom Epstein could engage in sex acts), ¶¶ 45 & 53 (HBRK and NES employees communicated with young females, including Doe, in order to ensure that Doe and others were in Epstein's presence for sexual encounters to occur with him at the exact time he wanted), 111156, 62 & 64 (FTC employees, other than Epstein, were coordinating sexually explicit massages by Doe and other young females, often minor children, for Epstein), ¶ 68 (FTC, HBRK, and NES taught recruiters to inform Doe and other targeted young female victims that Epstein possessed great power and resources and that he would help them advance their education, careers, and lives if they provided Epstein with massages), ¶ 71 (HBRK, NES, and FTC, through their employees and independent contractors, recruited or procured dozens if not hundreds of young females, including minors, for the purpose of Epstein's sexual gratification.") ¶146, 54, 67 (noting that each Corporate Defendant made payments to young females).) By including specific allegations that the Corporate Defendants intentionally targeted young and minor females, and further by including + +s The Court shams in Doe's frustration that Defendants arguments arc "terse." These conclusory arguments complicate the Court's ability to evaluate Defendants' arguments as it is not always clear what precisely Defendants find insufficient about Doe's claims. + +allegations suggesting face-to-face interactions between employees of the Corporate Defendants and the young women that provided the Corporate Defendants an opportunity to see the victims, the Court finds that Doe has sufficiently pled that Defendants knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact the individual recruited to participate in the sex act had not yet reached the age of 18. See United States v 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that trier of fact could determine that defendant knew victim was underage because "the jury also had an opportunity to witness [victim's] appearance at trial in June 2010 when she was nineteen, and based on that appearance jurors could have inferred that [defendant] knew that [victim] was a minor both before and after the statutory amendment in December 2008.") + +Second, Doe sufficiently alleges that the Corporate Defendants were knowingly involved in coercing the sexual activity. For example, the Amended Complaint alleges that HBRK and NES reminded victims, including Doe how powerful and wealthy Jeffery Epstein was in order to prevent them from revealing the illegal nature of the sexual abuse they suffered at Epstein's hands. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 46, 54.) And, in addition, that FTC, HBRK, and NES taught recruiters to inform Doe and other targeted young female victims that Epstein possessed great power and resources and that he would help them advance their education, careers, and lives if they provided Epstein with the massages (id. ¶ 68). See Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("TVPA extends to enticement of victims by means of fraudulent promises of career advancement, for the purpose of engaging them in consensual or, as alleged here, nonconsensual sexual activity.") + +The Court therefore finds that Doe has sufficiently pled § 1591's intent requirements. + +#### E. Defendants' Argument that Doe's TVPA Claims Are Conclusory and Unsupported + +Defendants argue that Doe's TVPA claims against the Corporate Defendants ought to be dismissed in their entirety because they are conclusory and unsupported. + +In support of their position, Defendants point to 17 paragraphs describing the causes of action alleged in the Amended Complaint that are indeed conclusory when viewed in isolation. (See, e.g. Doc. 50 at 9 (citing ¶¶ 213, 222, 230 (each Corporate Defendant "by and through its management and personnel, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . .. knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained maintained, patronized, solicited by any means Plaintiff.")).) + +But the 17 paragraphs Defendants point to are only a small fraction of those in the 288-paragraph Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint includes a lengthy discussion of factual allegations, some of which are discussed above and many of which provide far more than mere-formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Defendants acknowledge four of these paragraphs but dismiss them as vague because "Plaintiff fails to articulate who did these things or when they occurred." (Doc. 50 at 10.) + +The Court disagrees that more is required at this juncture. The Amended Complaint lays out in several paragraphs what specific actions were taken by employees of each Corporate Defendant, and provides the time period in which the actions are alleged to have occurred. While, the Amended Complaint does not identify which specific employees took the action (though it does, as previously mentioned, explain who they were employed by), Defendants point to no authority suggesting that such specificity is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Second Circuit recognized that Twombly rejected "a heightened standard that requires a complaint to include specific evidence, factual allegations in addition to those required by Rule 8." Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). Instead the Federal Rules require "only a short and + +plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 + +Defendants also accuse Doe of engaging in group pleading, "impermissibly lumping] the Corporate Defendants' alleged conduct together." (Doc. 50 at 10.) While the Court suggested at a pre-motion conference that it agreed that Doe's first complaint engaged in group pleading (see Doc. 37 at 9:23-10:2), Doe amended her complaint to include numerous paragraph that separate the conduct of the various defendants and make clear what she alleges each specific Corporate Defendant did. (See, e.g. Doc. 41 111137- 67.) The Corporate Defendants are thus able to identify what each of them are alleged to have done. + +Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the TVPA claims against the Corporate Defendants on the grounds that they are conclusory. + +# F. Defendants' A rgu in eat that Doe's Negligence Claims Against the Corporate Defendants are Time-Barred + +Defendants argue that Doe's negligence claims against the Corporate Defendants are time-barred because New York law provides that negligence claims must be brought within three years, or, in the case of a minor, three years after the minor turns 18. (Doc. 50 at 12.) Doe responds that the statute of limitations was clearly extended by the CVA, which references "negligent acts or omissions."' + +{sup}`6` Later in their papers, Defendants take specific issue with certain allegations against FTC, which they believe to be conclusory. (Doc. 50 at II.) The Court agrees that some of the allegations, viewed in isolation, are conclusory. (See. e.g. Doc. 41 at 1 58 (FTC "operated to further Jeffrey Epstein's goal of to obtain, recruit, and procure young females for the purposes of providing him with sexually explicit massages.")) But, the Amended Complaint includes several other specific allegations against FTC, including, for example, that FTC employees coordinated sexually explicit massages for Epstein from underage young females, including Doe, and paid the young females. (See Doc. 41 II 56, 62, 64, 67.) + +{sup}`7` N.Y. CPLR 214-g, enacted as part of the CVA, provides in relevant part: + +Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary and the provisions of any other law pertaining to the filing of a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special proceeding, every + +Defendants do not respond to this argument in reply, and the Court deems them to have abandoned the argument. See Carlisle Ventures, Inc. v. Banco Espatiol de Credito, S.A., 176 F.3d 601, 609 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that, because the defendant "does not respond to [the plaintiff's] [contrary argument] in its Reply Brief," the court should "decline to consider" such a response); see also Stephens v. 1199 SEIU, AFL-CIO, 45 F. Supp. 3d 284, 292 n. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (same). + +#### G. Defendants' Argument that Doe's Negligence Claims Against the Corporate Defendants Fail to More than Conclusorily Plead Damages + +Defendants also urge the Court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Corporate Defendants on the grounds that Doe "merely recites the damages element of negligence." (Doc. 50 at 12.) Reading Defendants' papers, it seems that Defendants are complaining not that Doe has failed to state how she was damaged, but how the Corporate Defendants' negligence caused the damages. (See, e.g., id. at 13 ("Plaintiff fails to articulate how any of the Corporate Defendants' alleged breaches of alleged duties contributed to Decedent's alleged conduct.")) + +Doe responds that the complaint is "replete" with detailed allegations explaining how the Corporate Defendant contributed to Epstein's abuse and "damaged Doe through their direct participation in Epstein's sex trafficking organization." (See Doc. 55 (citing Doc. 41 at ¶¶ 37-74).) Many of these allegations are considered in the Court's discussion above, and, based on the papers before it, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint + +civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent ads or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age ..., which conduct was committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, which is barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired, and/or the plaintiff previously failed to file a notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim, is hereby revived, and action thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than one year and six months after the effective date of this section. + +{sup}`(`emphasis added). + +includes specific allegations about how the Corporate Defendants' conduct facilitated Epstein's abuse. + +Defendants' reply brief fails to respond to Doe's arguments, however, and the Court denies Defendants' motion with respect to this issue for the additional reason that Defendants' have abandoned the argument. See Carlisle Ventures, 176 F.3d at 609. Instead, Defendants' reply brief argues that Doe's negligence claims fail because the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the Corporate Defendants plausibly owed her a duty of care. (Doc. 57 at 7-9.) But, Defendants failed to raise this issue in their opening brief, Doe therefore has not had an opportunity to respond, and the Court declines to consider it. See v. First Am. Registry, 592 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining to hear argument that should have been made in opening brief because to countenance "such action would promote litigation by ambush and, in any case, deprive defendant of a fair opportunity to respond.") + +# H. Defendants' Argument that Doe's Negligence Claims Against HBRK and NES Impermissibly Rely on Group Pleading + +Defendants argue that Doe's negligence claims against HBRK and NES impermissibly rely on group pleading, a similar argument to that discussed above with respect to Doe's TVPA claims. + +Again, the Court disagrees with Defendants' characterization of the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint includes many specific allegations against both HBRK and NES, and notes with headings which actions are attributed to which individually. (See Doc. 41 ¶¶ 39-54.) While it is true that many of the allegations are repeated with respect to each Defendant, Defendants point to no authority suggesting that a plaintiff is not permitted to make the same allegations against different defendants, provided, as is the case here, the complaint pleads non-conclusory allegations such that each defendant is able to understand what they particularly are accused of doing. + +Defendants' citation to v. Bonanza.com, Inc. does not support their argument but rather underscores the difference between the allegations here and the undifferentiated allegations other courts have found insufficient. See No. 17 CIV. 8493 (LAP), 2019 WL 5199431, at \*10 n. 20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). There the Court found improper "several generalized allegations against all 'Defendants' collectively without separately and specifically identifying their individual alleged conduct" and where the "allegations d[id] not contain any specific facts to suggest that any individual" defendant ever engaged in the alleged wrongful conduct." Id. The Court reasoned that no individual defendant, therefore, "had fair notice of how it allegedly harmed Plaintiff because it was lumped together with other 'Defendants' without any distinction." Id. This is not the case here, the Amended Complaint clearly identifies, with headings and by specifically naming the relevant Defendant, what each of the Corporate Defendants are alleged to have done. + +### I. Defendants' Argument that Doe's Negligent Supervision Claim Against FTC Fails + +Defendants specifically challenge as conclusory the negligence claim against FTC, which they characterize as a negligent supervision claim because it is "predicated upon [FTC's] alleged employment of Epstein. (Doc. 50 at 14.) Doe does not dispute that her negligence claim against FTC is based on negligent supervision, "among other things." (Doc. 55 at 23.) + +To prevail on a negligent supervision claim, in addition to the traditional elements of negligence, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the tort-feasor and the defendant were in an employee-employer relationship; (2) that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury prior to the injury's occurrence; and (3) that the tort was committed on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels." Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 (2d + +Dep't 1997); D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987)). "But," as recently recognized by the Second Circuit, "[t]he employee also must not be acting within the scope of his or her employment; [for] in that situation the employer [would] only be liable ... vicariously under the theory of respondeat superior, [and] not for negligent supervision or retention." Rich v. Fox News Network, LLC, 939 F.3d 112, 129-130 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gray v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., 86 A.D.3d 771, 927 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (3d Dep't 2011)) (alterations in Rich). + +In defending her negligent supervision claim, Doe cites to her allegations that the "very 'corporate objective of [FTC] was to provide Jeffrey Epstein with sexual massages."' (Doc. 55 at 23 (citing Doc. 41 11159, 244) (alteration in Doc. 55).) And while she points to other allegations that support the assertion that FTC's "corporate purpose" was to provide Epstein with sexual massages and therefore that the "corporate purpose" allegation was not conclusory, these claims simply suggest that Epstein and other FTC employees' actions were undertaken in the scope of their employment with FTC and therefore do not support a negligent supervision theory, but one of respondeat superiors Plaintiffs are permitted to plead both theories, "leaving it up to the jury to decide the scope of employment question," but Doe's discussion of the claims confuses the two in a manner that suggests that the negligent supervision claim is not properly pled. + +Further, Defendants' opening brief specifically challenges as conclusory Doe's pleading with respect to showing that the torts were committed on FTC's property or using its chattels, and that FTC knew or should have known of Epstein's propensity for the conduct before Doe's injury. (Doc. 50 at 15.) Doe's opposition brief, seemingly + +{sup}`8` Defendants did not address the respondeat superior theory in their opening brief, and mention it in their reply brief in an approximately page-long summary of an opinion by Judge Sweet on the issue. (See Doc. 57 (citing Doe v. Abdulaziz Bin Fand Alsaud, 12 F. Supp. 3d 674 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).) To the extent Defendants arc attempting to challenge Doe's claim of respondeat superior liability, the Court declines to consider the argument because it was not raised in Defendants' opening brief. See Carlisle Ventures, 176 F.3d at 609. + +confusing the elements of respondeat superior and negligent supervision, does not meaningfully address these asserted deficiencies. The Court agrees that Doe's allegations with respect to the use of FTC's property or chattels are conclusory. Doe alleges that "Epstein was frequently utilizing corporate finances in furtherance of his sexually explicit behavior" (Doc. 41 ¶ 61), but does not explain how he did so. The Court disagrees that Doe's claims with regards to FTC's knowledge of Epstein's propensity are conclusory given the allegations regarding its role in coordinating sexually explicit massages and urging young females to participate in these massages. (See, e.g. id. ¶¶ 62, 64, 67, 68.) + +Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Doe's negligent supervision claim against FTC. + +# J. Defendants' Argu [tient that Doe's Punitive Damages Claims Fail + +Defendants seek dismissal of Doe's claims for punitive damages from Epstein's estate" Defendants challenge Doe's request for punitive damages as to both the claims under New York law and the federal TVPA. The Court addresses each in turn. + +#### 1. Punitive Damages Under New York Law + +New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts law provides: + +No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. + +N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-3.2(aX1) (emphasis added). + +Applying this statute, courts have found that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for personal injury tort actions against a decedent's estate. See, e.g., Doe v. Indyke, No. 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at \*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) + +{sup}`9` While they do not say so explicitly, Defendants do not dispute Doe's point that Defendants' arguments for dismissal do not apply to Doe's request for punitive damages from the Corporate Defendants. + +(collecting cases).10 Doe suggests three reasons why the Court should not apply what would seem to be a clear statutory bar on punitive damages here. + +First, Doe argues the Court should read this provision "as presupposing that the 'death' at issue was not self-inflicted by the tortfeasor, particularly where the tortfeasor appears to have committed suicide precisely to avoid punitive financial liability for his wrongdoing." (Doc. 55 at 26.) Doe speculates that she will be able to show through discovery that "Epstein committed suicide to escape large punitive damages awards which would erode his estate and consequently his plans for named beneficiaries to inherit his wealth."" (Id. at 27.) But, Doe provides no authority that would suggest that the Court can ignore the statute's clear text. See Guterman v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 927 F.3d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2019) (rejecting interpretation of New York statute that conflicted with the "clear and unambiguous text" of the statute and noting that New York courts find that as "a general matter, [the] unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative.") (quoting v. Cty. of Broome,95 N.Y.2d 455, 463-64 (2000).) Doe cites one decision by the Indiana Supreme Court, where in deciding that Indiana law prohibited a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, the court speculated that if it were ever confronted with a scenario where "a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own death as an escape from punitive damages incident to some intentional tort" it would "address that issue at that time." See Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005). Whatever the persuasive value of this dicta, Crabtree considered Indiana common law and not a statute that is reasonably read to foreclose the interpretation Doe seeks. + +ID This case is one of several currently pending in this District brought by one of Epstein's alleged victims and also raises the issue of the availability of punitive damages against Epstein's estate. + +al Doe argues that "Epstein initially attempted suicide in the Metropolitan Correction Center just one day after being served with a civil complaint seeking punitive damages." and thereafter executed a new will just two days before committing suicide. (Doc. 55 at 27-28.) + +Second, Doe argues that the Court should "permit discovery to move forward to allow Doe to establish the elements of equitable estoppel—specifically, that Epstein's estate is equitably estopped from raising the New York restriction on damages because of Epstein's own wrongful actions." (Doc. 55 at 29.) The "wrongful actions" Doe references are not those alleged in Amended Complaint, but Epstein's affirmative wrongdoing "in committing suicide," the wrongfulness of which Doe argues "has long been recognized." (Id. at 29-31) Doe analogizes to situations in which courts have found that the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be applied to preclude a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense, and argues that Epstein's conduct "now creates the grounds for his estate to try to raise a bar against punitive damages." (Id. at 29) While there may be multiple deficiencies in Doe's novel argument, even the cases Doe cites note that equitable estoppel is only applicable where a plaintiff reasonably relies on defendants "deception, fraud or misrepresentations," and Doe does not allege a "deception, fraud or misrepresentation" by Epstein with regards to his suicide and on which she reasonably relied. See N. Coast Outfitters, Ltd. v. Darling, 134 A.D.3d 998, 999 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (quoting Putter v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 N.Y.3d 548, 552-553 (2006)). + +Third, Doe argues that "Virgin Island courts would not permit Epstein to escape punitive damages liability through self-murder" and further that the Court should allow the case to proceed to discovery to allow the parties to investigate which forum has a greater interest in adjudicating Doe's claims in order to resolve the choice of law decision that "lurks in this case." (Doc. 55 at 32-36.) Doe, however, nowhere explains why Virgin Islands law might apply to this case, which alleges torts under New York law committed entirely within New York. Federal courts in New York apply New York's choice of law analysis. Under that analysis "[b]ecause punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply."' Starr Indem. Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 0463 (JMF), 2015 WL 2152816, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 723 F.Supp.2d + +521, 524 (E.D.N.Y.2010)); see also Doe v. Indyke, No. 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020). Accordingly, a choice of law analysis suggests that New York law applies here, and therefore that N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11- 3.2(a)(1) bars punitive damages here.12 + +#### I. Punitive Damages Under the TVPA + +The parties cite no cases that have considered the availability of punitive damages under the TVPA from a deceased defendant, and the Court is aware of none. As a general matter with regards to claims brought under federal law, "[u]nless a statute directly addresses the issue, courts are generally guided by principles of federal common law, which prescribe that claims characterized as `penal' abate upon a party's death, while claims characterized as `remedial' survive." U.S. ex rel. Colucci v. Beth Israel Med. Co:, 603 F. Supp. 2d 677, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Though both parties agree that punitive damages are available under the TVPA, the TVPA does not state whether claims for punitive damages survive a defendant's death. A remedial statute "do[es] not seek to punish but to compensate." Biatiu v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, No. 19 Civ. 822 (RA), 2019 WL 5448702, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2019) (citing S.E.0 v. Willy, 860 F. Supp. 2d 275, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). Even where a statute is characterized as remedial, however, courts have found punitive damages unavailable. See. e.g., Estwick v. U.S. Air Shuttle, 950 F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (The punitive damages are plainly penal.. ..); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 97 Civ. 6484 (LMM), 2000 WL 1024700, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000). + +This law suggests that punitive damages under the TVPA are not available after a defendant has died. Doe argues, however, that Epstein's estate should not be able to take advantage of an abatement argument, first, pursuant to equitable estoppel principles, an + +{sup}`12` Moreover, in another case brought by one of Epstein's alleged victims, Judge Engelmayer opined that Virgin Islands courts would also bar punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, suggesting that no conflict of law exists. See Doe v. Indyke, No. 19 CIV. 10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) + +argument the Court addressed and rejected above; and, second, because "[a]llowing a notorious sex trafficker such as Epstein to avoid punitive damages through the expedient of suicide—common law `self-murder'—would thwart Congress's purpose of protecting victims from sex trafficking operations directed by wealthy individuals, who upon capture could simply commit suicide to evade the MI financial consequences of their crimes" and would "be contrary to common law principles underlying punitive damages." (Doc. 55 at 39.) + +The Court is not convinced that Doe's stated reason justifies deviating from the rule that punitive damages are unavailable after a defendant dies. The Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of punitive damages it "to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54, (1983) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1977)) (modification in M); see also Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). After a defendant dies, the first two purposes of punitive damages, punishment and specific deterrence, cannot be achieved. See Kahlily v. Francis, No. 08 C 1515, 2008 WL 5244596, at \*6 ("Even if Kahlily could prove that Francis had engaged in outrageous conduct that caused a constitutional deprivation, the imposition of punitive damages cannot punish him or deter him from engaging in similar conduct in the future.") Further, the general deterrence purpose of punitive damages for TVPA violations is served by the availability of punitive damages against defendants who are alive. It is highly doubtful that a would-be TVPA violator would be less dissuaded to violate the statute by the prospect that punitive damages could be avoided if he committed suicide. Even Doe appears to concede that this possibility is unlikely. (See Doc. 55 at 28 ("It is apparent that a well-developed suicide-to-escape-punitive-damages issue has not been decided in a reported New York case, and perhaps under any case in American law. That should come as no surprise given the unusual set of circumstances that must align to present the issue.").) + +Accordingly, Doe's claims for punitive damages against Epstein's estate are dismissed with prejudice. + +# H. CONCLUSION + +For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Count II, Count V to the extent it alleges conduct between 2006 and 2010, Counts VI-IX to extent they allege a TVPA violation, other than conspiracy, before August 20, 2009, Count X to the extent it alleges a claim of negligent supervision, and Doe's claims for punitive damages against Epstein's estate. The remainder of Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.13 + +Doe is directed to file an amended complaint by June 30, 2020, if at all. If an amended complaint is filed, Defendants are directed to respond to that complaint by July 21, 2020. If no amended complaint is filed, by July 28, 2020 the parties are directed to file, on consent, a proposed discovery schedule and Defendants are directed to answer Doe's First Amended Complaint. + +The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at Docs. 49, 53, and 60. + +It is SO ORDERED. + +Dated: June 9, 2020 + +New York, New York D + +EDGAFtDO RAMOS, U.S.D.J. + +{sup}`13` Defendants' request for oral argument (Doc. 60) is denied as moot. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fc30221b20578d1574a85f37542641f45ed78937 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752117/EFTA02752117.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -40, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752117", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2f2dce8a6cb4797fd364088da30fc819f4c7da2a2bc31eb221f91eff2e3cf6c7", + "output_sha256": "8ab889d7f4c7cb7234b3148795365043207c07dea287cf01d0dddbcdc79aee32", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..72277e0f5619dce42f0e4cee897ef6515898e442 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.md @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, + +Defendants. + +19 Civ. 8673 (KPF) + +#### OPINION AND ORDER + +KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge': + +Plaintiff Jane Doe2 brings this action under New York law against Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn in their capacities as appointed executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (together, "Defendants"). Plaintiff asserts tort claims for sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which she seeks actual, compensatory, statutory, consequential, and punitive damages. Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, arguing that: (i) New York law applies to the punitive damages claim because the torts allegedly occurred in New York; (ii) New York law bars the recovery of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate; and (iii) even if the law of the United States Virgin Islands ("USVI") were to apply, it also would prohibit the recovery of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. For the + +Sarah n, a rising second-year student at Fordham Law School and an intern in my , provided substantial assistance in researching and drafting this Opinion. + +{sup}`2`Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed pseudonymously. (Dkt. #26). + +reasons explained below, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. + +## BACKGROUND 3 + +# A. Factual Background + +The Court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint for purposes of this motion. In broad summary, Plaintiff presents a disturbing and corrosive pattern of sexual abuse and emotional manipulation of herself and others over the course of three years by Jeffrey Epstein. (Compl. ¶¶ 15- 60). At all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was an economically disadvantaged minor child living in New York City. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 22). She was raised by her single mother for the majority of her life. (Id. at ¶ 21). Financial hardships afflicted Plaintiff and her family throughout her childhood, in part because of the extensive medical care required to treat Plaintiffs younger sister, who suffered from serious medical conditions. (Id. at ¶ 22). + +In or around 2002, when Plaintiff was approximately fourteen years old, she learned of Epstein through an older teenage girl from her neighborhood, who approached Plaintiff with an opportunity to meet a "wealthy man" and earn money. (Compl. ¶ 23). By that time, Plaintiff had been forced to move out of her home and take on certain jobs after school to help support her family. (Id. at ¶ 24). As a result, Plaintiff agreed to meet Epstein. (Id.). The older + +{sup}`3` The facts contained in this Opinion are drawn primarily from Plaintiff's Complaint ("Complaint" or "Compl." (Dkt. #1)), which is the operative pleading in this case. + +For ease of reference, the Court refers to Defendants' opening brief as "Def. Br." (Dkt. #47); Plaintiffs opposition brief as "Pl. Opp." (Dkt. #51); Defendants' reply brief as "Def. Reply" (Dkt. #55); and Plaintiff's Reply Letter as "Pl. Rep. Lt." (Dkt. #62). + +teenage girl brought Plaintiff to Epstein's Upper East Side mansion, where they waited in a room until Epstein arrived, wearing only a robe. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-27). Epstein asked Plaintiff her name and age, to which she responded truthfully. (Id.). With this knowledge, Epstein began to test Plaintiff's boundaries by engaging in escalating levels of sexual abuse on numerous occasions, paying her several hundred dollars after each encounter. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-43). + +The Complaint is harrowing in its detail of how Epstein's actions and demands intensified over the course of three years, to the point where he caused Plaintiff physical pain by forcing her to express pleasure as he violated her. (Compl. ¶¶ 34-44). The Complaint further alleges that Epstein was aided by his associates, who allowed, facilitated, and participated in his abuse of Plaintiff and other young women. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-53). As Plaintiff grew financially reliant on Epstein, she stopped attending school to spend her time "working" at his home, gratifying him sexually, or bringing other girls to do the same, just as she had been brought to him initially. (Id. at ¶ 41). Epstein's conduct, for which the adjective egregious seems an understatement, caused Plaintiff to develop post-traumatic stress disorder; she continues to suffer from lasting emotional repercussions that have affected her mental health, family life, and education. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-80). + +Plaintiff was one of several minor victims who suffered sexual abuse and exploitation at the hands of Epstein. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-44). In July 2019, Epstein was indicted in this District for his decades-long child abuse scheme after an investigation to which Plaintiff contributed by cooperating, confidentially, with + +authorities. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-62). On August 8, 2019, two days before his reported suicide, Epstein executed his last will and testament (the "Will"), which provided for his Estate to be probated in the USVI. (Id. at ¶¶ 63-65). Epstein appointed Defendants to administer his Estate. (Id. at ¶¶ 65, 67-68). Plaintiff seeks to obtain recovery from the Estate for the years of pain and suffering Epstein inflicted on her. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 63). + +# B. Procedural History + +Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on September 18, 2019. (Dkt. #1). The Complaint seeks relief for actual, compensatory, statutory, consequential, and punitive damages. (Compl. ¶ 88). On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter notifying the Court of several cases brought by other plaintiffs against the Epstein Estate alleging similar claims of sexual abuse. (Dkt. #16). All such cases, including the present one, were later consolidated for discovery purposes before Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman. (Dkt. #23). + +On December 2, 2019, Defendants filed a letter requesting a pre-motion conference concerning their anticipated motion to dismiss Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. (Dkt. #35). Plaintiff filed a letter in opposition on August 4, 2019. (Dkt. #36). The Court held a pre-motion conference on December 11, 2019. (Dkt. #40 (transcript)). Following the conference, the Court set a briefing schedule and denied a stay of discovery pending resolution of Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. #39). + +On January 15, 2020, Defendants filed their partial motion to dismiss, arguing that New York law applies to the issue of punitive damages because + +the alleged torts occurred in New York and, further, that as a matter of New York law, punitive damages cannot be recovered against personal representatives of an estate. (Dkt. #46, 47).4 Defendants further argue that even if USVI law were to apply, as Plaintiff claims, punitive damages would still be unavailable. (Id.). On February 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion. (Dkt. #51). The memorandum was supported by a declaration from Roberta A. Kaplan, Esq., that attached copies of Epstein's Will and the Complaint filed in Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, et al., ST-20-CV-14 (V.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020). (Dkt. #52). Defendants filed a reply brief on February 28, 2020. (Dkt. #55). + +On April 28, 2020, Defendants filed a letter notifying the Court of supplemental authority from a sister court in this District. (Dkt. #61). Plaintiff filed a reply letter on April 29, 2020. (Dkt. #62). On April 30, 2020, Defendants filed a letter with additional supplemental authority. (Dkt. #64). And on June 19, 2020, Defendants filed a letter with still further supplemental + +{sup}`4`Plaintiff contends that Defendants' motion is more properly denominated a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), inasmuch as the motion does not seek to dismiss any of Plaintiff's four causes of action, but rather seeks to excise Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages. (See Pl. Opp. 1 n.1). As a sister court in this District concluded in Mary Doe v. Indyke, — F. Supp. 3d —, No. 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020), this Court need not weigh in on this conceptual debate because Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(13)(6) can, alternatively, be treated as a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). See 5C Charles A. & Alan R. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1380 (3d ed.) ("(The technical name given to a motion challenging a pleading is of little importance inasmuch as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can result from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion to dismiss the complaint."). + +authority. (Dkt. #75). Accordingly, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. + +## DISCUSSION + +### A. Applicable Law + +When a court considers a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it must "draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff-Vs] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff will survive a motion to dismiss if she alleges "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) ("While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to nudge [a plaintiff's' claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). + +The Court is not, however, bound to accept "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions." Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[A]lthough a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, + +supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)).5 + +# B. Analysis + +The issue before the Court concerns whether the executors of Epstein's Estate may be held liable for punitive damages — recovery that would indisputably be available were Epstein still alive. (Pl. Opp. 2; Def. Reply 1). Defendants assert at the outset that New York estate law, rather than USVI law, applies to bar punitive damages against executors of an estate in a personal injury suit. (See Def. Br. 1-2). Plaintiff maintains that USVI law governs her punitive damages claim and allows it to stand, but that even if New York law applied, relevant choice-of-law rules enable her to bring this action under USVI law. (See Pl. Opp. 1-2, 17-18). By contrast, Defendants argue that, even under USVI law, punitive damages are unavailable. (See Def. Br. 4- 6). The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. + +A similar analysis would obtain were the motion construed as one to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. Under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts in this District have found that "(t)he standard that applies to a motion to strike is the `mirror image' of the standard on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Bd. of Managers of Trump Tower at City Ctr. Condo. v. Palazzolo, 346 F. Supp. 3d 432, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see generally Rosa v. TCC Commc'ns, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 1665 (WHP), 2016 WL 67729, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (granting motion to strike punitive damages claim). Courts have also observed that such motions are "generally disfavored." Oram v. SoulCycle LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 498, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). + +#### 1. The New York Statute Authorizing Personal Injury Actions Against a Decedent's Estate Precludes Punitive Damages Claims in Such Actions + +To begin, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs punitive damages claim on the ground that New York law bars such claims in personal injury suits against representatives of a decedent's estate. The statute in question, § 11- 3.2(a)(1) of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL"), provides: + +> No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. + +EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (emphasis added). + +As three recent cases in this District, presenting similar claims against the same Defendants, have recognized, this provision clearly prohibits the award of punitive damages in the situation at hand. See Mary Doe v. Indyke, — F. Supp. 3d —, No. 19 Civ. 10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (holding that EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) involves a categorical preclusion of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate); see also Lisa Doe v. Indyke, No. 19 Civ. 7773 (ER), 2020 WL 3073219, at \*14-15 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020) (same); Doe 15 v. Indyke, No. 19 Civ. 10653 (PAE), 2020 WL 2086194, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) ("New Mexico common law as announced by the state supreme court, like EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), bars punitive damages in a personal injury action against a tortfeasor's estate."). Both federal courts addressing constitutional-tort claims under New York law, and + +state courts in personal injury actions governed by New York law, have concluded similarly. See Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*2 (collecting New York federal and state cases). + +This position is also reflected in the majority of United States jurisdictions, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1979) ("Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor."). The common justification for the majority rule is that "punishment and deterrence — the recognized bases for imposing punitive damages on a tortfeasor — are not advanced by imposing punitive damages on his or her estate." Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*3; see also Blissett v. Eisertsmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (brackets and citation omitted) ("There is a strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent."). + +Thus, as a threshold matter under New York law, punitive damages are unavailable in a case against personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate. + +# 2. New York Law Governs Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim + +Plaintiff does not dispute that she would be barred from recovering punitive damages if her claim were strictly governed by EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1).6 + +{sup}`6`In Lisa Doe v. Indyke, No. 19 Civ. 7773 (ER), 2020 WL 3073219, at \*14 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020), the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that New York's "clear statutory bar on punitive damages" should not apply because Epstein's death was selfinflicted. + +Instead, Plaintiff makes two distinct arguments: (i) New York choice-of-law rules allow Plaintiff to seek punitive damages under USVI law, even if she pursues her personal injury claims under New York law; and (ii) Plaintiff has a statutory right to sue Epstein's estate under either USVI or New York law. (See Pl. Opp. 1-2, 17-18). + +With respect to Plaintiffs first argument, this Court, like many courts before it, recognizes New York choice-of-law rules, which apply an "interest analysis" to resolve conflicts of law in tort actions. See, e.g., Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*5; Golden v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2841 (JS), 2013 WL 4500879, at \*1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013). As construed by the Second Circuit, the "interest analysis" requires application of the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation. In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (brackets, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the jurisdiction with more "significant contacts" relating to the purpose of the law in conflict has the greater interest. See GlobalNet Financial.Com, Inc. v. Crystal & Co., 449 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197 (1985)). + +Torts are divided into two types: conduct-regulating rules, such as "rules of the road," and loss-allocation rules, "such as those limiting damages in wrongful death actions, vicarious liability rules, or immunities from suit." In re Thelen, 736 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted). "If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating + +behavior within its borders." Id. (quoting Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 72 (1993)) (emphasis added). + +The parties do not dispute that punitive damages rules are conductregulating. See, e.g., Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*5 (collecting cases reaching the same conclusion). Defendants argue that because Plaintiff's causes of action occurred entirely in New York, EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1) applies to bar punitive damages. (Def. Br. 3). Plaintiff counters that the conductregulating classification does not end the inquiry, because a court must still consider whether there is a "good reason not to apply" the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. (Pl. Opp. 9 (quoting Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2019))). + +In particular, Plaintiff identifies two circumstances that, she claims, give the Court "good reason" to apply USVI law to the issue of punitive damages. (See Pl. Opp. 8-11). First, Plaintiff contends that the fact that Defendants are USVI domiciliaries counsels in favor of applying USVI estate law. (See id. at 9- 10). And in this regard, Plaintiff relies on Adelson to argue the importance of deferring to a defendant's domicile in applying a particular jurisdiction's law. (See id. at 9, 11; P1. Rep. Lt. 1, 2 n.2 (citing Adelson, 417 F. Supp. at 426 (reasoning that defendant's domiciliary, Nevada, "points in favor" of applying Nevada punitive damages law))). But while Plaintiff's invocation of Adelson's "points in favor" language is well-argued, that language is ultimately only a partial recitation of the interest-analysis test described above. See Global Net, 449 F.3d at 384 (quotations and citations omitted) (explaining how under the + +interest-analysis test, significant contacts are, almost exclusively, the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort). In context, the weight afforded to domicile in Adelson was largely due to the irrelevance of the locus of the tort factor, as the suit's sole connection to New York was that it was filed there. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 426. Furthermore, Adelson's previous attempt to avail himself of the benefits of Nevada defamation law granted Nevada the greater interest in governing punitive damages as compared to New York. Id. + +To describe Adelson is thus to highlight its insignificance to the instant case. At all times material to the conduct alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff was domiciled in New York. All of the alleged torts took place in the home Epstein maintained in New York. (Cf. Compl. ¶ 13 ("All of the events giving rise to these causes of action occurred in the Southern District of New York, thus venue in this district is proper.")). Further, Plaintiff chose to sue in New York, where her causes of action are timely pursuant to the New York Child Victims Act, N.Y.P.L. § 130.52-55. (See id. at ¶¶ 73, 77, 82, 86). And Plaintiffs case, like Mary Doe and unlike Adelson with Nevada law, "does not build on a prior litigation in, or based on the law of, the USVI." Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*7. These facts, taken together, demonstrate that New York's interest in applying its punitive damages rules to this case outweighs the USVI's interest, which exists only because of Epstein's decision to probate his estate there. See Lisa Doe, 2020 WL 3073219, at \*15 (concluding that New York punitive damages law, rather than USVI punitive damages law, applied to plaintiffs case "alleg[ing] torts under New York law committed entirely within New York"). If + +anything, it is the USVI, and not New York, that has a "merely fortuitous relationship with the case," minimizing its interest in governing punitive damages. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (citation omitted). + +In addition to her domicile argument, Plaintiff asserts that the USVI has a greater interest than New York in preventing Epstein and his Estate from availing themselves of the benefits, but not the burdens, of USVI probate law. Despite her plausible policy concerns, Plaintiff provides little in the way of precedential support for her contention that "where a tortfeasor commits suicide to avoid imposition of punitive damages, considerations of fairness no longer counsel in favor of protecting his estate." (Pl. Opp. 12). Nor does she substantiate her claim that "Ipirohibiting punitive damages in this case would not protect innocent heirs; it would punish traumatized victims deserving of adequate compensation." (Id.). In Mary Doe, the plaintiff asserted a comparable argument, claiming that Epstein's decision to alter his Will shortly before his suicide was strategically motivated, and thus his executors should not be permitted to selectively avail themselves of certain benefits of USVI law but avoid aspects that they do not like. Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*5. But, as with the Mary Doe court, this Court is left unpersuaded. Id. at \*6 ("[Mary] Doe's point that the estate may prosper from being probated in the USVI is disconnected from her claims."). + +Meanwhile, New York's interest in governing Plaintiff's punitive damages claim remains clear, as the place of the allegedly wrongful conduct "generally has superior interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties + +who relied on the laws of that place to govern their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future." Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*6 (quoting AHW Inv. P'ship, MFS v. Citigroup, Inc., 661 F. App'x 2, 5 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). With numerous personal injury actions pending against the Epstein Estate under New York law for alleged conduct that largely occurred in New York, the state has abundant interest in "vindicating the rights of (these) victim[s]" and "assuring that the perpetrator of that abuse is adequately punished and deterred." Id. And as previously noted, New York's interest is reinforced by the fact that Plaintiffs suit is timely only by virtue of the New York Child Victims Act. (See Compl. q¶ 73, 77, 82, 86). Cf. 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A) (specifying two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the USVI). + +Separate and distinct from her choice-of-law argument, Plaintiff asserts a statutory right to sue Epstein's Estate under either USVI or New York law. First, Plaintiff claims a right to sue under USVI law because the Complaint does not specifically invoke EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1). The Court rejects this argument out of hand: Plaintiff's ability to sue Defendants originates from EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1), as her causes of action are all personal injury claims based on alleged conduct that occurred exclusively in New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13).7 Plaintiffs strategic decision to omit reference to the provision in her Complaint + +{sup}`7`See generally N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 37-a (defining "personal injury" as including "an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another"). + +does not change this fact, let alone preclude New York law from applying. See Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*6 ("It is problematic for [plaintiff] to cherrypick within [EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1)], invoking the part that authorizes a personal injury suit against an executor while disclaiming the balance, which delimits the recovery available in such a suit."). As the district court in Blissett recognized, "it would be an anomalous situation indeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this [§] 1983 action ... because of [§] 11-3.2(a)(1), while at the same time he was allowed to recover relief, in the form of punitive damages, which clearly is beyond the scope of relief which that statute authorizes." Blissett, 940 F. Supp. at 457. Plaintiff asserts that Blissett is inapplicable, as the claim there sought punitive damages for federal civil rights violations, which are governed by different choice-of-law principles than personal injury cases. (Pl. Opp. 18 n.9). However, the Blissett court concluded that this was a distinction without a difference: The plaintiff there argued that the statute was irrelevant because he sought redress for a constitutional violation, not a personal injury. Id. The court disagreed because "stripped to its core, in essence, [the plaintiff's] claim is one for personal injury." Id. It is only logical, therefore, to infer that the anomaly identified in Blissett would counsel against the grant of punitive damages that are disallowed under EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1). + +Second, Plaintiff asserts that she possesses a statutory right under USVI law because it, specifically 15 V.I.C. § 601, allows personal injury claims against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. Whether Virgin Islands law or New York law applies to her ability to sue the Estate, Plaintiff claims she is authorized to + +bring this action under the law of either jurisdiction. But this argument fails for several reasons, including that: (i) Plaintiff cites no legal authority permitting a New York litigant to file a personal injury suit under § 601 in New York in order to recover for torts occurring in New York; and (ii) Plaintiff does not explain how she can bring this lawsuit pursuant to § 601 and avail herself of USVI law governing punitive damages, while simultaneously maintaining that the action is timely pursuant to the New York Child Victims Act. + +Finally, echoing her choice-of-law argument, Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of depecage permits different jurisdictions' laws to govern the availability of punitive damages and the availability of a cause of action. (See Pl. Opp. 19).8 The Mary Doe court resolved the same question by holding that depecage does not invite the application of two different sets of laws to a single issue, and thus may not be invoked to cherrypick from EPTL § 11-3.2(a)(1). Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*6. Plaintiff argues that the availability of punitive damages and the availability of a cause of action are not a "single issue," and therefore that depecage may be invoked. (See Pl. Rep. Lt. 3). In particular, Plaintiff points out that the "New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the doctrine [of depecage] may sometimes require that a plaintiffs demand for punitive damages be analyzed under the law of a state other than the one under whose law the cause of action arises." Fed. Hous. + +{sup}`8`Under the doctrine of depecage, "the rules of one legal system are applied to regulate certain issues arising from a given transaction or occurrence, while those of another system regulate the other issues." Hunter v. , 734 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). + +Fin. Agency v. Ally Fin. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7010 (DLC), 2012 WL 6616061, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012). In such an analysis, "a court must consider the object or purpose of the wrongdoing, and give controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented." Id. (citation omitted). While this statement may be persuasive in a vacuum, the Ally Financial court still applied the punitive damages law of the states in which the alleged fraud took place, reasoning that the states where the "primary conduct allegedly took place ha[d] a stronger interest in deterring such [fraud]." Id. at \*5. By extension, and regardless of whether Plaintiffs alleged causes of action and prayer for punitive damages are considered a single issue, New York has the stronger interest in resolving Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Thus, depecage would be inapplicable here. + +### 3. USVI Law Is Likely in Accord with New York Law Under a Banks Analysis + +Even if the Court assumed, arguendo, that USVI law applied, the outcome would be the same. The USVI does not have a statute addressing the availability of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., Inc., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 WL 1394183, at \*2 n.11 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (pointing out the lack of standard for asserting punitive damages in the USVI). When considering a question not foreclosed by statute or precedent, USVI courts apply three "non-dispositive" factors: (i) whether any USVI courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (ii) the position taken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (iii) + +most importantly, which approach represents the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. 60 V.I. 597, 600 (2014) (citing Matthew v. Herman, 56 V.I. 674, 680 (2012)). The test, known as the "Banks analysis," determines the common-law disposition of the USVI on a given issue. See id. (citing Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011)). + +Plaintiff argues that the Banks analysis makes "clear that punitive damages are available in this case." (Pl. Opp. 13). Defendants champion the opposite conclusion. (Def. Br. 4-5). This Court is ultimately persuaded by the position taken by its sister court, viz., that the USVI would not allow the imposition of punitive damages on a tortfeasor's estate, thereby aligning itself with New York, the majority of states, and § 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*7-8 (citing supporting cases); accord Doe 15, 2020 WL 2086194, at \*1. + +As to the first factor, multiple courts in the USVI have recited the Restatement's rule precluding punitive damages. See, e.g., v. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, Civ. No. 2006-217 (CVG), 2008 WL 220067, at \*5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008). While these cases address punitive damages in wrongful death actions, they are still relevant, in spite of Plaintiff's objections, as support for the USVI's longstanding application of § 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts within the USVI. See Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (relying on this accepted application in finding the Restatement's provision to be the soundest rule for USVI courts with respect to the imposition of punitive + +damages and local public policy). Plaintiff has not cited any countervailing authority within the USVI. + +Plaintiff claims that Defendants exaggerate the degree to which the second Banks factor favors prohibiting punitive damages against an estate, but concedes that this is the majority rule. (Pl. Opp. 16). That "most of the jurisdictions adopting the majority rule" have passed a statute codifying a prohibition of punitive damages against a decedent's estate, and the USVI has not, does not suggest that the majority rule would not apply in the USVI. This is especially true considering that, before the adoption of the Banks analysis less than a decade ago, USVI courts strictly followed the Restatements. See Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 58-60 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (concluding, pursuant to a Banks analysis, that § 222A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the common law of the USVI, despite the fact that the Restatements "no longer constitute binding legal authority in this jurisdiction"); Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*7 (explaining how the distinction between adopting this result by statute or by court decision "does not appear germane to the Banks inquiry"). + +Plaintiff focuses on the third factor, asserting that the Mary Doe court reached its conclusion by "essentially eliminating the third Banks factor — i.e., which approach represents the soundest rule for the USVI - from its analysis, even though that factor is the 'most important' of the three." (Pl. Rep. Lt. 3 (citing Antilles Sch., Inc. v. Lembach, 64 V.I. 400, 428 (V.I. 2016))). The soundest rule, according to Plaintiff, is to permit punitive damages because: + +(i) the USVI Attorney General has articulated this very position on behalf of the Virgin Islands in her pending lawsuit against the Estate; and (ii) punitive damages in the USVI are designed both to punish wrongdoers and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. This Court does not give weight to the Attorney General's suit, as "the decision by a government lawyer to attempt to obtain such damages in a high-profile case involving allegations of extreme conduct ... do[es] not speak to the question that the third Banks factor assays." Mary Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at \*8. And while the Court does not deny the USVI's interest in punishing tortfeasors on its land, or even its interest in holding Epstein's Estate accountable for his tortious actions in the USVI, Plaintiff's alleged causes of action arose exclusively in New York. The Court is skeptical that that it would be the policy of the USVI to regulate conduct occurring in New York.9 Thus, consideration of the Banks factors leads the Court to conclude that USVI law, if applied, would likely be in accord with New York law and bar Plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages in this action. 'o + +{sup}`9`Notably, none of the available cases from the USVI relying on the Restatement questions the validity of its prohibition against punitive damages recovery from a decedent's estate. But courts have held that it is that "the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands, and is in accord with local public policy." Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., Inc., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 WI. 1394183, at \*2 n.11 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014). + +io Because the Court finds New York law applies to this issue, and USVI law would be in accord, it declines PlaintitTs request to certify the question to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. + +#### CONCLUSION + +To be clear, the conduct alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint is as shocking as it is reprehensible. That said, even for egregious fact patterns, the Court is not free to overlook the law, and the law here is clear. For the reasons detailed above, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at Docket No. 46. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: June 23, 2020 New York, New York a/halw PIA ia.a4\_ + +KATHERINE POLK FAILLA United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..215502df6f6cd8ea4e67844a58f06904b4f8cb9b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752146/EFTA02752146.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -28, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752146", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4e0cd942925731e29660d1eacfc191c9c7829883739156f58a8b433da3b88843", + "output_sha256": "88c092b7a8bb2231ae870bc5c678becb21ae43d41119b7af74320e021a570616", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c355350c2924eac2f525a77f9688bd17dbf98abd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz D: 212-704-6000 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +June 24, 2020 + +Via ECF + +Hon. J hn Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 1 0007-1 31 2 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as coexecutors of the Qsfate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, an individual, 1:20-cv-00484-JGI-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Defendants Darren,. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write to further supplement the Co-Executors' pending motion to dismiss (ECF Doc. 36) with the enclosed Opinion & Orders entered in two other personal injury actions against the Co-Executors. The first was entered earlier this month by The Hon. Edgardo Ramos in Lisa Doe v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Joint Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, et al. (19-cv-07773 (ER) (DCF)). The second was entered yesterday by The Hon. Katherine Polk Failla in Jane Doe v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as co-executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (19-cv-08673 (KPF) (DCF)). In both Opinion & Orders, the sister courts grant the Co-Executors' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim against them as a matter of law on grounds applicable to Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages in this action. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed6c63c77ec6c3534dedb33e0328b317c3629d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752167/EFTA02752167.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752167", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "bcce4bdb765b57fe4ce1b2b2f8f06ed4a57031dfe4a70a7fcb716c205fd8bf4d", + "output_sha256": "bcce4bdb765b57fe4ce1b2b2f8f06ed4a57031dfe4a70a7fcb716c205fd8bf4d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8b6181e26128f3e583d52303d435b8bbe34af800 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Jane Doe Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +Case No. 120-cv-00484-J9K-DCF + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court. please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +## Bennet J. Moskowitz + +## FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: 6M1024 My State Bar Number is 4693842 + +lam. + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: TroutmanSanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue New YorksklY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER:1212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER:422)704-6288 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER:42121704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 8, 2020 s/8en net J. Moskowitz + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..af78989f13127914debe8cda7e41044019766209 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752168/EFTA02752168.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752168", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "46213eb137f25e32b8a84774127bf7e626ad0e034b4b657a42ff8dca1127f725", + "output_sha256": "46213eb137f25e32b8a84774127bf7e626ad0e034b4b657a42ff8dca1127f725", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9a5057271a143b0b3ac101085a66388a7f8f30c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Jane Doe Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN. et al., Defendant. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-J6K-DCE + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court. please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Charles L. Glover + +My SDNY Bar Number is: CG0117 + +lam. + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My State Bar Number is 5329909 + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman SanderaLLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue. New York. NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (212) 704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-62\$1 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 875 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: 1212)704-6000 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (212) 704-6288 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 8, 2020 s/Charles L Glover + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ab344ca5cc6d203677749fb636d3149a9d85777d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752169/EFTA02752169.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752169", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "db7ab7588381c2d033fcf5a9193efae9ae5e8791a92857018a8ee42b4f04db96", + "output_sha256": "db7ab7588381c2d033fcf5a9193efae9ae5e8791a92857018a8ee42b4f04db96", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5c878bc3b3bc08183960648456ca5721333f735b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +Jane Doe Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN I. INDYKE and RICHARD + +D. KAHN, et al., Defendant. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS + +TO: ATTORNEY SERVICES CLERK AND ALL OTHER PARTIES + +I have cases pending I have no cases pending + +Pursuant to Local Rule 1.3 of this Court. please take notice of the following attorney information change (s) for: + +Mary "Molly" S. Dirago + +FILL IN ATTORNEY NAME + +My SDNY Bar Number is: My State Bar Number is + +lam. + +An attorney + +A Government Agency attorney + +A Pro Hac Vice attorney + +FIRM INFORMATION (Include full name of firm (OLD AND NEW), address, telephone number and fax number): + +OLD FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Sanders ISP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 227 W. Monroe Street. Suite 3900. Chicago, IL 60606 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: (SO 759-1920 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312)759-1939 + +NEW FIRM: FIRM NAME: Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +FIRM ADDRESS: 227 W. Munroe Street Suite 3900, Chicago, IL 60\_06 + +FIRM TELEPHONE NUMBER: f,312) 759.1920 + +FIRM FAX NUMBER: (312) 759-1939 + +I will continue to be counsel of record on the above-entitled case at my new firm/agency. + +I am no longer counsel of record on the above-entitled case. An order withdrawing my appearance was entered on by Judge + +Dated: July 8, 2020 s/Mary 'Molly" S. Dirago + +ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65613cd72b2b0502f95e06717777045fe7cca597 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752170/EFTA02752170.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752170", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f61df4add47ad5a3a0d8e9d1e054de38ec5a22b7938edd36895a01eef7cf6d6e", + "output_sha256": "f61df4add47ad5a3a0d8e9d1e054de38ec5a22b7938edd36895a01eef7cf6d6e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..041cd445086133b1e195083d3584f5d4cbd5ec2a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Laura A. Menninger, who is a member in good standing of the bar of this Court, hereby appears as counsel for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell in the above-captioned proceeding. + +Dated: Denver, Colorado July 9, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger (LM-1374) HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 10 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5b5ab1bb945406029761b9646b4111d8e36bc13 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752171/EFTA02752171.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752171", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d7d8cf1101bb7a78d1d0f4f167c8347e725d1f73c6fcf2717f8f43cfed34c148", + "output_sha256": "d7d8cf1101bb7a78d1d0f4f167c8347e725d1f73c6fcf2717f8f43cfed34c148", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1b9697a18cd794285e4f90a85bf05bbc0eec30bb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.md @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +---------------------------------------------x + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, by and through her attorneys Haddon, + +P.C., submits the following Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. + +# Introduction + +A. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York on June 29, 2020 caused a meritless indictment to be issued against + +. Maxwell has formed an opinion that responding to the allegations in this Complaint "could provide a link in the chain of evidence necessary to prosecute" Ms. Maxwell. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1951); In re Gorsoan Ltd., 435 F.Supp.3d 589, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). + +C. Under these circumstances, on the advice of counsel, Ms. Maxwell will answer the Complaint's allegations to the extent that she can without waiving the right against selfincrimination under the United States and New York constitutions and otherwise will invoke the right. + +D. Ms. Maxwell's denials of factual allegations shall be interpreted the same as pleading not guilty to the various counts in any criminal indictment. + +# Allegations + +- 1. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations contained in Paragraph I. +- 2. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph +- 2. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 2 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + - 3. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph +- 3. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 3 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + - 4. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph +- 4. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 4 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + - 5. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegation pertaining to her in Paragraph 5. +- 6. Ms. Maxwell is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 and therefore denies the same. +- 7. Ms. Maxwell is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same. +- 8. Ms. Maxwell is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same. +- 9. Ms. Maxwell is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 and therefore denies the same. + - 10. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegation pertaining to her in Paragraph 10. + +11. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions contained in Paragraph II. + +12. Paragraph 12 contains a legal assertion to which no response is required. + +13. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegation pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 13. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 13 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +14. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14. + +15. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegation pertaining to her contained in Paragraph + +15. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 15 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +16. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph + +16. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 16 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +17. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 and therefore denies the same. + +18. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 and therefore denies the same. + +19. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph + +19. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 19 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +20. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 and therefore denies the same. + +21. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 and therefore denies the same. + +22. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 and therefore denies the same. + +23. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations contained in Paragraph 23. + +24. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 24. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 24 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +25. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 24. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 25 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +26. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 and therefore denies the same. + +27. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 and therefore denies the same. + +28. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 and therefore denies the same. + +29. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 and therefore denies the same. + +30. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 and therefore denies the same. + +31. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 31 and therefore denies the same. + +32. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 and therefore denies the same. + +33. Paragraph 33 does not require a response. + +34. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 34. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 34 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +35. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 35. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 35 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +36. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 36. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 36 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +37. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 37. To the extent allegations and legal conclusions contained in Paragraph 37 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +38. Paragraph 38 does not require a response. + +39. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 and therefore denies the same. + +40. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 and therefore denies the same. + +41. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 and therefore denies the same. + +42. Ms. Maxwell is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 and therefore denies the same. + +43. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her contained in Paragraph 43. To the extent allegations and legal conclusions contained in Paragraph 43 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +44. Paragraph 44 does not require a response. + +45. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 45. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 45 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +46. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 46. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 46 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +47. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 47. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 47 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +48. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 48. To the extent allegations and legal conclusions contained in Paragraph 48 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +49. Paragraph 49 does not require a response. + +50. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 50. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 50 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +51. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 51. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 51 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +52. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 52. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 52 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +53. Paragraph 53 does not require a response. + +54. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 54. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 54 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +55. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 55. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 55 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +56. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 56. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 56 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +57. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations pertaining to her in Paragraph 57. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 57 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +58. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 58. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 58 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +59. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 59. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 59 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +60. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 60. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 60 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +61. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 61. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 61 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +62. Ms. Maxwell denies the factual allegations and legal conclusions pertaining to her in Paragraph 62. To the extent allegations contained in Paragraph 62 do not pertain to Ms. Maxwell, she is without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations and therefore denies the same. + +\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* + +63. To the extent not inconsistent with Ms. Maxwell's invocation of the rights against self-incrimination, Ms. Maxwell denies every averment not expressly admitted. + +64. Ms. Maxwell reserves the right to amend the foregoing answers in the event that the threat to her liberty is lifted. + +# AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES + +To the extent not inconsistent with Ms. Maxwell's invocation of the rights against selfincrimination, she asserts the following affirmative defenses. + +- I. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Ms. Maxwell. +- 2. The case is improperly venued in the Southern District of New York. +- 3. Insufficient process has been afforded to Ms. Maxwell. +- 4. Insufficient service of process has been afforded to Ms. Maxwell. +- 5. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. +- 6. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. +- 7. Plaintiff failed to take reasonable, necessary, appropriate and feasible steps to mitigate her alleged damages, and to the extent of such failure to mitigate, she should be barred from recovering some or all of the alleged damages she seeks. +- 8. Plaintiff's damages, if any, are the proximate result of intervening causes, preexisting medical and mental conditions of Plaintiff, and/or causes that occurred without the knowledge or participation of Ms. Maxwell and for which Ms. Maxwell is not responsible. +- 9. Plaintiffs damages, if any, were the result of her own conduct or the conduct of others and were not proximately caused by any action of Ms. Maxwell. + - 10. Plaintiff voluntarily or negligently assumed a known risk. + +- 11. Plaintiff consented to the alleged conduct. +- 12. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-g, N.Y.P.L. § 130.52 and N.Y.P.L. § 130.55 are unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Maxwell. +- 13. Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, laches, and unclean hands. + +## JURY DEMAND + +Ghislaine Maxwell demands that this matter be heard by a jury on all matters so triable. WHEREFORE, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell demands judgment as follows: + +- A. That Plaintiff take nothing by way of her Complaint; +- B. That the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice; +- C. That Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and against Plaintiff; +- D. That Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell be awarded her costs and fees in this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees and pre- and post judgment interest; and +- E. All other such relief as this Court deems just and proper. + +Dated: July 9, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Wine r (LM,1) , + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorney for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on July 9, 2020, I served the accompanying Answer on the following counsel of record: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c70ccdfec975d1fe09cf711b39f1572dc7f81c85 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752172/EFTA02752172.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752172", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ada0f5661b6536cfba0ec796dc94da0061ceec564c5cb7e6fa7908b1de80cc6a", + "output_sha256": "ada0f5661b6536cfba0ec796dc94da0061ceec564c5cb7e6fa7908b1de80cc6a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..abe8de553e6100ecf86a196e46348f58edf8d469 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOIR, i, + +July 15, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Request for Informal Discovery Conference + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We are writing on behalf of our client, plaintiff Jane Doe, in the above-referenced litigation. This case arises out of years of child rape, sexual abuse and exploitation of Jane Doe by Jeffrey Epstein and his accomplice Ghislaine Maxwell. Jane Doe was their first known victim and was subsequently abused by Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell for years as a young girl, suffering unimaginable physical and psychological trauma and distress. + +Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 37.2, Jane Doe hereby requests an informal conference with the Court for a pm-motion discovery conference. The need for this conference has, unfortunately, arisen as a result of defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein ("the Epstein Estate") engaging in obstructionist litigation tactics intended to stonewall and deprive Jane Doe of plainly relevant discovery. Indeed, even though Jane Doe served the Epstein Estate with written discovery requests and interrogatories nearly three months ago, she has not received a single substantive response nor a single page of evidence from the Epstein Estate to date. It is clear that absent court intervention, the Epstein Estate will not comply with its basic discovery obligations. For these reasons and those that follow, we request the Court's guidance and assistance prior to the filing of a formal motion. + +After a lengthy phone call on June 30 between counsel that lasted over an hour and a half discussing each other's initial discovery responses, we agreed that Jane Doe would provide supplemental responses to the Epstein Estate on July 7 and that the Epstein Estate would provide responsive documents to our requests on July 13. On July 7, she did just that and provided supplemental responses which included over 190 pages of documents that the Epstein Estate requested. The Epstein Estate, however, failed to provide a single page of evidence to us on the July 13 deadline despite assurances from its counsel that it would and that it had already + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +July 15, 2020 + +Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +identified documents within the possession, custody and control of the Estate containing Jane Doe's name and information. And as of the time of writing this letter, the Epstein Estate has not offered any explanation whatsoever as to why the documents were not produced or when we can even except to receive them, if at all. + +The information Jane Doe seeks from the Epstein Estate is clearly relevant and material to her case. For instance, the Estate was asked to identify and describe all interactions the coexecutors Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn (and Jeffrey Epstein himself) had with Jane Doe. Rather than provide a straightforward response, the Estate feigned confusion about the word "interactions" saying that it is vague and ambiguous and failed to provide any substantive response. The Epstein Estate also asserted the same boilerplate objections and response to nearly each of the 30 document requests sent to the Estate stating, in essence, that it would not provide documents unless we: (I) agreed to keep those documents confidential (without any showing whatsoever how or why the documents would be, in fact, confidential), (2) agreed on an undefined "ESI protocol" and (3) agreed to "mutually agreeable search parameters." The Epstein Estate then concluded each response by stating that it "will meet and confer with counsel for Plaintiff about the search as soon as practicable." The Epstein Estate cannot, and should not, get away with constructing baseless legal barriers, firewalls and conditions all designed to deprive Plaintiff from obtaining basic information. This is especially true given that, as discussed above, counsel for the Epstein Estate already represented to us that documents within the Estate's possession pertaining to Jane Doe have already been identified. + +On the other hand, the Epstein Estate seeks largely irrelevant and, quite frankly, outrageous information from Jane Doe. For instance, in one such request to Jane Doe, the Epstein Estate sought documents concerning any and all medical procedures and consultations she has ever had throughout her lifetime, including while she was a minor, even if such medical care had nothing at all to do with Jeffrey Epstein's abuse of her. + +The Epstein Estate also sought copies of each and every page of Jane Doe's passport, her birth certificate, documents pertaining to each and every address Jane Doe ever lived at throughout her lifetime, documents pertaining to all financial support or income Jane Doe ever received throughout her lifetime and documents pertaining to all phone numbers she has ever used throughout her lifetime. + +We also request to discuss deposition scheduling with the Court. Mainly, we previously scheduled the deposition of Dan-en Indyke for August 7 after clearing the date with his personal counsel and counsel for the Epstein Estate. Then, for whatever reason, counsel for the Epstein Estate on July 14 abruptly sent an email stating that his office was going to "mark" Mr. Indyke's deposition off calendar. Accordingly, not only is the Epstein Estate failing to provide any + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +July 15, 2020 Page 3 + +![](_page_2_Picture_4.jpeg) + +information to Jane Doe in this case but now, it would appear, it is also attempting to prevent her from obtaining testimony from critical witnesses. This behavior flies in the face of fairness, professionalism and much needed justice for Plaintiff. + +Finally, we would also like to discuss scheduling a deposition of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell as soon as practicable. Given her incarcerated status, we understand there are some addition hoops we will need to jump through and would of course work with her counsel and the appropriate authorities on coordinating an in-person or virtual deposition of Ms. Maxwell that takes place at a mutually agreeable time. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2eb6827d60a33d415597a8cd47c522408dbd605f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752183/EFTA02752183.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752183", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "effa7b16a439a036fff8d9945335e69af5182bd2ee135d5569ba62f9e09deb50", + "output_sha256": "effa7b16a439a036fff8d9945335e69af5182bd2ee135d5569ba62f9e09deb50", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09e2582afe6b9790460bf409896057c260f00a11 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK -DCF + +## NOTICE OF APPEARANCE + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney hereby appears as counsel for defendants Darren Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein in the above-captioned action. I certify that 1 am admitted to practice in this Court. All notices given or required to be given in this case shall be served upon the undersigned. + +Dated: New York, New York. July 16, 2020 + +By: /s/Mary W. Metcalfe + +Mary W. Metcalfe TROUTMAN PEPPER LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212.704.6000 MaryGmce.Metcalfe@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn as Co-Executors of the Estate of Affi-ey E. Epstein + +To: All Counsel of Record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba6305591f1e2de3c0e073326439a451c50cae65 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752186/EFTA02752186.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752186", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8d7f6491511374a92cadbcf1b4f21f635564640c40b6718d0b68b3ab5e350dec", + "output_sha256": "8d7f6491511374a92cadbcf1b4f21f635564640c40b6718d0b68b3ab5e350dec", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8293f022be74ca50bd6a38fd97401d7950b7218f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.md @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 5:24 PM To: Laura Menninger Cc: Nathan Werksman; Claudia Lomeli; Robert Glassman. daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com; Metcalfe, Mary Subject: Re: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF) Keilah Betts; Kevin Boyle + +Ms. Menninger: + +Thanks for confirming our understanding. As we previously advised Robert, the parties also need to get on the same page about a confidentiality agreement before we start productions; that was clear from our written discovery responses to him. We thought that would be discussed on Friday as well. We are still available to meet and confer as discussed, and will take up Robert's premature, erroneous letter with Judge Freeman unless he immediately withdraws it. + +Best, Bennet + +On Jul 15, 2020, at 5:17 PM, Laura Menninger wrote: + +# EXTERNAL SENDER + +That is correct. I understand that we were having a call tomorrow to discuss a number of scheduling issues, including scheduling depositions. I said that I needed to see the discovery and disclosures produced to date, prior to that call. I have yet to receive any discovery produced by either side. + +I now have other meetings scheduled at 10 am, 1 pm and 4:30 pm on Friday (all MST). Let me know if you all still want to have a discussion or not, given Mr. Glassman's very premature letter to the court. If so, please send me whatever dots have been produced to date. + +I believe that we need to compile a deposition schedule for all witnesses that the parties intend to depose at one time, so Mr. Glassman I assume you will be providing dates for your client's deposition. + +Laura A. Menninger I Partner + +Haddon, & P.C. 150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + 1 303 831 7364 (Office) Imenninger@hmflaw.com + + +Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 3:14 PM + +To: Laura Menninger + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli ; Robert Glassman ; daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com; Metcalfe, Mary ; Keilah Betts ; Kevin Boyle Subject: Re: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-.IGK-DCF) + +You may have seen that Robert just filed a letter to Judge Freeman claiming, among other things, that we unilaterally canceled Mr. Indyke's deposition to be obstructionist. Our understanding is that you requested we speak to, among other things, set new dates for that and all other discovery dates and deadlines which were set before you appeared in this action. Indeed, that is why we are supposed to speak on Friday. Is my understanding correct? + +Thank you, Bennet + + + + + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + + +On Jul 15, 2020, at 2:34 AM, Robert Glassman wrote: + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + +Friday works for us too. I am still waiting on a response from Ms. Menninger concerning the depositions I emailed her about on July 8. I would also like to add to the agenda for Friday scheduling the deposition of Ms. Maxwell. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. + + + + +Tel: (310) 477-1700 + +Fax: (310) 477-1699 + +Email: illassman@psblaw.com + + +#### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. [mailto:Bennet.Moskowitz@troutman.coml + +Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2020 1:56 PM + +To: Laura Menninger + +Subject: Re: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF) + +Friday works for us to speak. We sent our discovery materials yesterday. In the meantime, we Will mark Mr. Indyke's deposition off the calendar subject to whatever new schedule we all reach. + + + + + +bennet.moskowitEatroutman.com + + +On Jul 13, 2020, at 12:19 PM, Laura Menninger wrote: + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + +I am free Wednesday afternoon and all day Friday, presuming I have received the current discovery and disclosures by then. + +Laura A. Menninger I Partner + +Haddon. & a P.C. + +150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++1 303 831 7364 (Office) + +Imenninger@hmflaw.com + + +Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 10:18 AM + +To: Laura Menninger ; Robert Glassman + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli ; + +daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com• Metcalfe, Mary • Keilah Betts + +Subject: Re: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-.IGK-DCF) + +Today we will send you discovery served by or to the Co-Executors and responses thereto. When can we all speak? + +Thanks, + +Bennet + + + +bennet.moskowitz troutman.com + +'Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +On Jul 13, 2020, at 12:07 PM, Laura Menninger wrote: + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + +I did not yet receive the disclosures or discovery. When can I expect those? + +Thank you, Laura + +Laura A. Menninger Partner + +Haddon, & P.C. + +150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver, CO 80203 + ++I 303 831 7364 (Office) + +Itnenningerghtnflaw.com + +From: Robert Glassman + +Sent: Friday, July 10, 2020 10:03 AM + +To: Laura Menninger ; 'Moskowitz, Bennet J.' + +Cc: Nathan Werksman • Claudia Lomeli • + +'daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' • Metcalfe, Mary + +; Keilah Betts + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-0048.4-1GK-DCF) + +Bennet, yes, the depositions that were scheduled yesterday are, as previously advised, being continued, and the doc requests that went along with them are withdrawn for now. + +Laura, we will get you the disclosures and discovery both propounded and answered thus far. Free to discuss the scheduling order next week. + +Thanks. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. + + + + +Email: plassman@psblaw.com + + +#### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Laura Menninger Ernailto:Imenninger@hmflaw.comi + +Sent: Friday, July 10, 2020 8:53 AM + +To: 'Moskowitz, Bennet ; Robert Glassman + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli ; + +'daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' • Metcalfe, Mary + +.Keilah Betts + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-1GK-DCF) + +Counsel — + +Given my appearance in the case, please provide me with your R. 26 disclosures, any discovery requests that have been propounded in the matter, and any responses thereto. + +I will need to confer with you next week about my anticipated request for relief from the scheduling order to the extent it contemplated deadlines that passed or are soon approaching, all scheduled prior to my client's service in this case. + +Thank you, + +Laura + +Laura A. Menninger' Partner + +Haddon, P.C. + +150 E. 10th Avenue I Denver. CO 80203 + ++I 303 831 7364 (Office) + +Itnenningerghmflaw.com + + +Sent: Friday, July 10, 2020 7:31 AM + +To: Robert Glassman + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli • + +'daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' ; Metcalfe, Mary + +• Keilah Betts • Laura Menninger + + + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-16K-DCF) + +Robert, + +Again, please confirm you are withdrawing the document requests in the deposition notices. We do not want to have to burden Judge Freeman with this issue. + +I have added Laura Menninger to this email chain given her appearance in this action. + +Thank you, Bennet + + + + + +bennet.moskowitzOtroutman.com + + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2020 3:00 PM + +To: 'Robert Glassman' + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli . 'claniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' ; Metcalfe, Mary ; Keilah Betts + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-.IGK-DCF) + +We did not receive anything. Also, please confirm you are withdrawing the document requests in the deposition notices. + + + + + +bennet.moskowitzatroutman.com + +licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +From: Robert Glassman + +Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2020 2:57 PM + +To: Metcalfe, Mary .Keilah Betts . 'daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Nathan Werksman ; Claudia Lomeli + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-16K-DCF) + +### EXTERNAL SENDER + +Mary= supplemental responses were served on you and Bennet yesterday by email per our agreement. Looks like they were sent at 5:05 PST. Let us know if you need us to re-send them to you. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tel: (310) 477-1700 Fax: (310) 477-1699 Email: glassman@psblaw.com Web: www.psblaw.com + +#### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Metcalfe, Mary [mailto:MaryGrace.Metcalfe@troutman.coml + +Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 202011:31 AM + +To: Keilah Betts . 'daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' . Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Robert Glassman • Nathan Werksman • Claudia Lomeli + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-1GK-DCF) + +Robert, + +We have reviewed the subpoena below. It is accompanied a notice of deposition, similar to those issued alongside the subpoenas you sent us in April. As we noted then, such notices of deposition are improper. Please let us know if you will withdraw this one as you did its predecessors. + +Furthermore, you have included document requests without specifying a response date. Please clarify that point. + +Finally, you indicated last week that we could expect to receive supplemental discovery responses addressing the concerns we raised in our letter last month. We have yet to receive these responses. Please send them immediately. + +Thank you, + +Mary W. Metcalfe + +Associate + + +Direct: 212.704.6029 I Mobile: 425.984.4165 marygrace.metcaIfe@troutman.com + +Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 4:40 PM + +To: idaniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com' ; Moskowitz, Bennet J. + + + +Cc: Robert Glassman • Nathan Werksman • Claudia Lomeli + + + +Subject: Jane Doe (1:20-cv-00484-1GICDCF) + +Importance: High + +### EXTERNAL SENDER + +Counsel — Attached please find the Deposition Notice and Subpoena for Darren Indyke. + +Mr. Weiner — Per a previous conversation with Attorney Werksman, you are willing to accept service of the subpoena on behalf of your client, Mr. Darren Indyke. Please acknowledge receipt of this e-mail. Thank you + +Keilah Betts + + + + +Tel: (310) 477-1700 + +Fax: (310) 477-1699 + +Email: betts@psblaw.com + + +### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +This e-mail (and any attachments) from a law firm may contain legally privileged and confidential information solely for the intended recipient. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete it. Any unauthorized reading, distribution, copying, or other use of this e-mail (and attachments) is strictly prohibited. We have taken precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting computer viruses, but you should scan attachments for viruses and other malicious threats: we arc not liable for any loss or damage caused by viruses. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13526204fcdc2a205466edccaf5fa1715975a5be --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752187/EFTA02752187.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -981, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752187", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c913c09836a251f747b072926a034c0a8ec5a441b8806a4537c437ad40c6cdd8", + "output_sha256": "1de86f4a078254eff4c8c3dc73be0b362a90934fe54056fb9090813f43f3bb37", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7efedf15fc603a9e620dc3f491ac849ac7282978 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +Mary W. Metcalfe marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com + +July 16, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern rict of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1 :20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. We write in response to the letter counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe, Robert Glassman, filed yesterday afternoon (Doc. 54). Mr. Glassman's letter is, as counsel for Ms. Maxwell stated in an email yesterday, "very premature." It also misrepresents what occurred. + +As evidenced by the email chain submitted herewith as Exhibit A, last Friday, July 10, 2020, counsel for Co-Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, who had only appeared in this action a day earlier, asked the parties to meet and confer, among other things, to set new dates for Mr. Indyke's deposition and all other discovery dates and deadlines set before her appearance. + +Moreover, and as we promptly advised Mr. Glassman, shortly after we agreed to commence our rolling document production earlier this week, we realized that the Parties have yet to agree upon a confidentiality order, which must occur before we produce documents that refer to the Plaintiff, who filed this case anonymously, by her real name. That is for Plaintiff's benefit. The terms of the confidentiality order will also be discussed during the Parties' upcoming meet and confer call. + +As indicated in the attached email chain, rather than discuss the confidentiality order or advise us that he thought we were mistaken about counsel for Ms. Maxwell's request, Mr. Glassman instead chose to immediately burden the Court by filing his letter + +![](_page_1_Picture_12.jpeg) + +--- + +shortly before the parties are supposed to speak about discovery. In any event, counsel for Ms. Maxwell has since then expressly confirmed that we were correct in our understanding, stating: "That is correct. I understand that we were having a call tomorrow to discuss a number of scheduling issues, including scheduling depositions ... Let me know if you all still want to have a discussion or not, ***given Mr. Glassman's very premature letter to the court.***" (See Ex. A at p. 1. (emphasis added).) + +As for Mr. Glassman's contention that the Co-Executors are violating their discovery obligations, it bears mentioning that he filed his letter only after weeks of our attempts to have him remedy various discovery deficiencies in Plaintiff's discovery responses. We have sent Mr. Glassman letters detailing Plaintiff's discovery deficiencies. By contrast, Mr. Glassman has not met and conferred with us about many of the issues he raises in his letter to Your Honor. We do not intend to burden Your Honor with any of these discovery issues if they can be resolved among the parties. However, the meet-and-confer process is far from complete now that Ms. Maxwell has appeared in this action. + +Based on the foregoing, Counsel for the Co-Executors requests that the Parties be given the opportunity to finalize a confidentiality order and new discovery schedule that is agreeable to Ms. Maxwell's counsel, produce those documents that are not in dispute (something that can be done promptly after entry into the confidentiality order), and finish meeting and conferring so as to narrow the remaining issues in dispute as much as possible before seeking the Court's assistance. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Mary [REDACTED] W. Metcalfe +Mary [REDACTED] W. Metcalfe + +CC: All Counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2fb881a454b2b377b40d5b1ccebb0a173c3bbd07 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752195/EFTA02752195.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752195", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "544881c44783532402ada9e978abc00126e98561646339423bf2b903c1d0237b", + "output_sha256": "544881c44783532402ada9e978abc00126e98561646339423bf2b903c1d0237b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4bbe66e2428976db1339dc00c4a3beefc6e8a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +-against- + +DARREN K. INDYKE, et al., + +Defendants. + +20cv00484 (JGK) (DF) + +## SCHEDULING ORDER + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +The above-captioned case having been referred to me for general pretrial supervision, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: + +- 1. The Court will hold a telephonic initial pretrial conference in this case on August 5, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. The parties are directed to call Toll-Free Number: 877-411-9748 and use Access Code: 9612281. +- 2. The parties are directed to file, no later than July 29, 2020, a jointly proposed discovery plan, pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This submission should address all of the matters set out in Rule 26(0(3), and should specifically include proposed deadlines for: + - a. service of initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1); + - b. service of initial document requests and interrogatories; + - c. any motion for joinder of other parties or amendment of the pleadings; + - d. completion of fact discovery; and + - e. expert disclosures and the completion of expert discovery, if any. +- 3. It appears from the parties' recent correspondence to the Court (Dkts. 54, 56) that, even in advance of an initial pretrial conference, the parties have been engaging in discovery and + +may have discovery disputes. Counsel are directed to confer fully, in good faith, in advance of the scheduled conference, to try to resolve any such disputes. If, despite full good-faith conference, any issues remain, this Court will consider those issues at the August 5 conference. + +- 4. Counsel should also be prepared to address, at the conference, the potential for the settlement of this action. + +Dated: New York, New York July 21, 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Copies to: + +All counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8d6d8f40cd4277c2ceb493a45a145a15362d7587 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752197/EFTA02752197.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752197", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fdd2e696690a83bb799529f5436b2424adcedc1b483e1741103a41fe31e7ce2f", + "output_sha256": "fdd2e696690a83bb799529f5436b2424adcedc1b483e1741103a41fe31e7ce2f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92702a4b83d12c62362a03f6de0e695295b4bacf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +[PROPOSED] SCHEDULING ORDER + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +It is hereby ORDERED that: + +- 1. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell")shall serve her initial disclosures no later than August 10, 2020. +- 2. To the extent not already completed before Maxwell appeared in this action, the parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than August 21, 2020. +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than August 21, 2020. +- 4. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than November 6, 2020. +- 5. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiff's expert reports shall be served no later than November 6, 2020. + - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than December 6, 2020. + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than January 6, 2021. +- 6. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +Dated: New York, New York + +, 2020 SO ORDERED: + +DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ee3bdce2759b0854615b2247f0bee1f24260d858 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752199/EFTA02752199.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752199", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "50caf4557304b300495957678ad94fbb903792de58c81df2d2c153390fe8b2c0", + "output_sha256": "50caf4557304b300495957678ad94fbb903792de58c81df2d2c153390fe8b2c0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6092a414c3e462e12b0da749584c05077d7dfb74 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +bennelmoskowitz©Iroutman.com + +July 29, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, in the above-referenced action. Per Your Honor's Order dated July 21, 2020, we write on behalf of all parties to submit the enclosed proposed Scheduling Order. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +End.: Proposed Scheduling Order \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ceb48895842dbaf2963d4cf29e8cabb714a866c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752200/EFTA02752200.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752200", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "124c3a5c6ee0be800f4e04cab752aacafd0fa7985c6ea32c666435c58a27b935", + "output_sha256": "124c3a5c6ee0be800f4e04cab752aacafd0fa7985c6ea32c666435c58a27b935", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac7e42fb00d1fcc6a00ac83c9fd0323189a245bc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, Defendants. X + +20-ev-00484-.1(:K + +## Declaration of Jeffrey S. Pagliuca in Support of Motion to Appear Pro Hoe Tice + +I, Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, declare as follows: + +1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed in the State of Colorado. I am a member of the law firm Haddon, P.C., I respectfully submit this Declaration in support of my Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. + +2. I have not ever been convicted of a felony. + +3. I have not ever been censured, suspended, disbarred or denied admission or readmission by any court. + +4. There are no disciplinary proceedings presently against me. + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. + +Executed on July 31, 2020. + +s/ Jeffrey S. Pagliuca + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on Julyy 31, 2020, I filed this Declaration of Jeffrey S. Pagliuca in Support of Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record. + +s/ Nicole + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5be26efa7568db1353c4ed23db3cb0a5a4a8decc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752201/EFTA02752201.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752201", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "700bc80f3e2614b3d62c5f44dd2ab816c3edab98a947101b8748d175da24abae", + "output_sha256": "700bc80f3e2614b3d62c5f44dd2ab816c3edab98a947101b8748d175da24abae", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2568fe186f167df165ecfc4746a2e5530fb0d06e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_17.jpeg) + +STATE OF COLORADO, ss: + +*I, Cheryl Stevens Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, do hereby certify that* + +JEFFREY S PAGLIUCA + +*has been duly licensed and admitted to practice as an* + +*ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW* + +*within this State; and that his/her name appears upon the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors at Law in my office of date the 19th day of October A. D. 1982 and that at the date hereof the said JEFFREY S PAGLIUCA* + +*is in good standing at this Bar.* + +![](_page_0_Picture_25.jpeg) + +*IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said Supreme Court, at Denver, in said State, this +7th day of July A. D. 2020* + +*Cheryl Stevens* + +*Clerk* + +*By* + +*Deputy Clerk* \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02acfd02acb7ce6125638fadde7e187aec341956 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752203/EFTA02752203.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752203", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f7a581b4924423bce4abf0b13478101557381b3b11e7bec961e890a52c99314d", + "output_sha256": "f7a581b4924423bce4abf0b13478101557381b3b11e7bec961e890a52c99314d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9fbcf7656881e8c9c32c5c9f5ec8d6e8d769358c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, Defendants. X + +20-cv-00484-.IGK + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Jeffrey S. Pagliuca for admission to appear and practice pro hac vice in this action is GRANTED. + +Applicant has declared that he is a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Colorado; and that his contact information is as follows: + +> Jeffrey S. aF ca, Attyite,t12462 HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 101° Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 jpagliuca@hmflaw.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in the above entitled action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above-captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Date: + +United States District Judge John G. Koeltl \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ca14a52c0686b5ab968f70a654faf4b6e5f1a7b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752204/EFTA02752204.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752204", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ea95430b8898e884c0f518e038149ee2613dbd151ff5692facfcbe4d45ce4027", + "output_sha256": "ea95430b8898e884c0f518e038149ee2613dbd151ff5692facfcbe4d45ce4027", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0c832bcb6a73069fb275bd8bc872ef6467b5caf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +Pursuant to Rule 1.3 of the Local Rules of the United States Courts for the Southern District of New York, I Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, hereby move this Court for an Order for admission to practice Pro Hac Vice to appear as counsel for Defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in the abovecaptioned action. + +I submit in support of this Motion the attached Declaration of Jeffrey S. Pagliuca. + +Dated: July 31, 2020. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Jeffrey S. Pagliuca + +Jeffery S. Pa kica Colorado Reg. #12462 + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +jpagliuca@hmflaw.com + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on July 31, 2020, I filed this Motion for Admission Pro Hoc Vice with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF, which will send notice of the filing to all parties of record. + +/s/ Nicole + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a43357a3b5ac22846a210c7b7cb721037555ff96 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752206/EFTA02752206.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752206", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d9391f25791471de526f9dd2b96959aef49ca5532240f326dfcfac0d85ed512b", + "output_sha256": "d9391f25791471de526f9dd2b96959aef49ca5532240f326dfcfac0d85ed512b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d7552359c8bb6d5e2fea456093a934fe946bd16 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +Mary W. Metcalfe marygrace.metcalfe©troutman.com + +August 4, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-J6K-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write pursuant to Your Honor's Order dated July 21, 2020 to request that, during the August 5, 2020 scheduling conference, the court address Plaintiffs failure to satisfy Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). + +As a matter of context, Plaintiff served her Rule 26 initial disclosures on April 10, 2020, disclosing her alleged damages as follows: + +Plaintiff alleges damages for past and future pain and suffering, emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages against Defendants. Further, Plaintiff seeks (to the extent permitted by law) reimbursement of attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, court costs and other recoverable expenses of litigation. + +By letter dated April 20, 2020, we explained to Plaintiffs counsel that her damages disclosure was insufficient. Specifically, and as Your Honor pointed out to counsel for a plaintiff in another action against the Co-Executors, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) "requires a 'computation,' supported by documents," including an analysis providing the underlying calculations or formulas used in arriving at the damages claimed. Design Strategy, Inc. v. , 469 F.3d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Rule 26). See also Max Impact, LLC v. Sherwood Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 902649, at \*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) ("initial disclosures + +were wholly inadequate because they merely provided (the other party] with total dollar figures for each category of damages and were unaccompanied by any analysis whatsoever" and "failed to provide a calculation or formula through which the figures were derived"); Doe v. Indyke et al., 1:19-cv-08673-KPF-DCF, Transcript of Proceeding dated June 24, 2020, at 40:17-41:13 (wherein Your Honor noted that "[t]he computation of damages that was provided on its face does not comply with the rules" and while "there may be an expert coming down the pike who may have something to say about damages, and it may be that there'll be a need to supplement as evidence comes our, "that does not excuse a computation that, to the best of the plaintiffs ability, complies with the rules at the time the disclosure is made, which means you set out the amounts that are known to you in different categories"). + +On April 24, 2020, Plaintiff purported to supplement her Rule 26 disclosures, stating: + +Plaintiffs damages are in excess of \$25,000,000. That computation is based upon the damages caused by Decedent Jeffrey E. Epstein to Plaintiff as a result of repeated and malicious acts of sexual abuse, including rape, committed against Plaintiff. As a result of this repeated and horrific sexual abuse committed by Decedent Epstein on Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered significant past and future pain and suffering, emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life. + +We additionally explained to Plaintiffs counsel during a telephone call that Plaintiffs disclosures did not meet the requirements of Rule 26. + +In their First Set of Interrogatories, served on April 20, 2020, the Co-Executors requested that Plaintiff "[i]dentify and describe the computation of each category of damages for which you seek recovery in this litigation." In her response, served on June 3, 2020, Plaintiff simply copied-and-pasted her supplemental Rule 26 damages disclosure. + +By letter dated June 18, 2020 and during a telephonic meet-and-confer held on June 30, 2020, we once again urged Plaintiffs counsel to comply with Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). During the meet-and-confer, we again directed Plaintiff to the text of Rule 26 and case law applying it. Moreover, we explained that Your Honor had recently addressed this exact issue in another matter involving the Co-Executors. + +On July 7, Plaintiff again purported to supplement her response to the Co-Executors' interrogatory seeking a computation of Plaintiffs alleged damages, this time by adding the following: + +Objection. Pursuant to New York Pattern Jury Instructions ("PJI") 2:280, "no precise rule can be formulated to measure pain or to compensate for it in money damages." There is no requirement that evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain and suffering be introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these types of damages and no expert testimony need be introduced. Any such award should be fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial. There is also no yardstick by which to measure the dollar value of pain or injury. The jury will have to determine based on their common sense and experience that amount of money that will fairly and reasonably make Plaintiff whole or compensate her for the physical, psychological, or emotional pain and suffering that she sustained as a consequence of any intentional, negligent or reckless acts that violated her rights and safety. Indeed, it is improper for a lawyer to suggest to the jury that they may follow a particular mathematical guide or unit-of-time basis in fixing damages for pain and suffering. Halftown v. Triple D Leasing Corp., 89 A.D.2d 794 (4th Dept. 1982). + +New York's pattern jury instructions have no bearing on the proper scope of discovery under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). While the parties have not yet fully conferred on the majority of the issues that the Co-Executors raised in their June 18 letter, many of which we hope to resolve without the Court's intervention, the issue of Plaintiff's damages has been repeatedly discussed by counsel for several months, without resolution.' We therefore request that the Court address this matter at the August 5 conference. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Ma W. Metcalfe Mary W. Metcalfe + +CC: All Counsel (via ECF) + +{sup}`&#`x27;By contrast, the two issues Plaintiffs counsel prematurely raised in their letter to Your Honor dated July 15, 2020 do not warrant discussion during the coming court conference. First, Mr. Indyke's deposition has already been rescheduled, which is exactly what counsel for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell had requested before Plaintiffs counsel submitted their letter. Second, the parties are still discussing a confidentiality agreement to govern document productions. As the Co-Executors had already explained to Plaintiffs counsel before they submitted their letter to Your Honor, document productions should be made following and in accordance with such confidentiality agreement, just as in the numerous other actions against the Co-Executors pending before Your Honor. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..17db8557445288c3c9760be32f4a7309d3b087ad --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752208/EFTA02752208.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752208", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2b2920a4b15ae6236f1023628b2f2270bf9dfa381a8675b108ffa7891e6cc877", + "output_sha256": "376c03ae7efa3a672734a5c8fa62af7d5a35d1a734579b61b771f0f5b83cf945", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76fef4b953a8c2fe4caa1b1bf6713b3ec23c2dbe --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-.)GK + +## ORDER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE + +The motion of Jeffrey S. Pagliuca for admission to appear and practice pro hac vice in this action is GRANTED. + +Applicant has declared that he is a member in good standing of the bar of the State of Colorado; and that his contact information is as follows: + +> Jeffrey S. S1: ica t Attyite,t12462 HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 101h Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 jpagliuca@hmflaw.com + +Applicant having requested admission Pro Hac Vice to appear for all purposes as counsel for Defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in the above entitled action; + +**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Applicant is admitted to practice Pro Hac Vice in the above-captioned case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. All attorneys appearing before this Court are subject to the Local Rules of this Court, including the Rules governing discipline of attorneys. + +Date: 8/5/2020 + +United-States District Judge +John G. Koeltl- + +DEBRA FREEMAN +U.S. Magistrate Judge + +(This resolves Dkt. 59.) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a63c1609527872dc6c06dc175812fe0c29c1f709 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752211/EFTA02752211.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752211", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6f1e2e1b0b1859636664b674925dfc68ac1f49f310c61f031989fae5a48de3c6", + "output_sha256": "7a40b7dda075cb09335957802224181f9458cef36b84991131049df22a995af7", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e0e9621a702886a6b8b289dc3ee3268299830d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +v. + +Plaintiff, + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +[PROPOSED] SCHEDULING ORDER Plc + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +It is hereby ORDERED that: + +- 1. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell")shall serve her initial disclosures no later than August 10, 2020. +- 2. To the extent not already completed before Maxwell appeared in this action, the parties shall serve their initial document requests and interrogatories no later than August 21, 2020. +- 3. Any motions to amend the pleadings or to join any additional parties shall be filed no later than August 21, 2020. +- 4. All fact discovery shall be completed no later than November 6, 2020. +- 5. Expert discovery shall be conducted on the following schedule: + - a. Plaintiff's expert reports shall be served no later than November 6, 2020. + - b. Defendants' rebuttal reports shall be served no later than December 6, 2020. + - c. Expert discovery shall be completed no later than January 6, 2021. +- 6. The parties may stipulate to modify interim deadlines in this Scheduling Order, without seeking prior leave of Court. + +Dated: New York, New York August 5 , 2020 + +Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the within proposed schedule are adopted. The parties are directed to confer further regarding the deadlines contained in paragraphs 4 and 5, and to submit a joint letter regarding those deadlines by 8/12/2020. + +SO ORDERED: + +DEBRA C. FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..87efd9980dc3d0cb4cd4fc1ddb5e377ce58b6218 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752213/EFTA02752213.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752213", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "83a7652f4c2f29e536a1e19a090b5831def31b5af413a2ced328efb74cae9511", + "output_sha256": "83a7652f4c2f29e536a1e19a090b5831def31b5af413a2ced328efb74cae9511", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c1ff97181989cd61b59aa8c112146056d4df970 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E ,, + +August 12, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. Indyke, et at, I:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Status Update Following 8/5/20 Scheduling Conference + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We are writing on behalf of our client, plaintiff Jane Doe, in the above-referenced litigation and to update the Court on some discovery issues in our case following the August 5, 2020 scheduling conference. + +First, on August 5, 2020, this Court ordered defendant Ghislaine Maxwell to serve her initial disclosures no later than August 10, 2020. The Court's specific order was that: "/t is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") shall serve her initial disclosures no later than August 10, 2020." As of the time of submitting this letter, however, Ms. Maxwell has not served her initial disclosures on the parties. Moreover, Ms. Maxwell has not sought any relief from the Court to excuse her of complying with the order of the Court. Accordingly, as it stands, Ms. Maxwell has violated the Court's order. + +Second, it has now been over 4 months since Plaintiff served the Epstein Estate with document requests and she has still failed to receive a single substantive response nor a single page of evidence from the Epstein Estate to date. Indeed, even after providing counsel for the Epstein Estate with her proposed edits to their draft confidentiality order and non-disclosure agreement they have insisted all Epstein victims sign before producing any information to them, Plaintiff received no response and no documents have been released. + +And third, despite Plaintiff's multiple attempts at getting available deposition dates for defendant Richard Kahn, the co-executor of the Epstein Estate, his attorneys simply just refuse to provide them. Instead, they are insisting that Plaintiffs counsel first tell them what Mr. Kahn is to be questioned about and essentially prove why he—a defendant in this action—ought to be required to testify at deposition. + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +August 12, 2020 + +Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +It has become incredibly obvious that there is a concerted and coordinated effort by the Epstein Estate and its attorneys to not only deprive the victims of information in these cases that they are entitled to by law but also deny them of having their day in court. Indeed, the Epstein Estate repeatedly reminds Plaintiff how she is the only victim who continues to pursue her case against them while the other victims have all agreed to stay their cases in hopes of resolving them through the victim compensation fund. And despite the Epstein Estate's ongoing selfserving statements that they have not formally requested a stay as to any of the proceedings themselves, that is form over substance. To the contrary, they have done everything they can to make these cases as difficult as possible for the victims so the victims feel like they have no real choice but to submit to the fund and postpone the proceedings indefinitely. As a consequence, in this case, the Epstein Estate has resorted to belittling Plaintiff and threatening her lawyers with sanctions and accusations of impropriety simply because she is exercising her constitutional right to pursue a legal claim against those responsible for causing her unimaginable harm. In short, since Plaintiff has not agreed to stay her case and walk away, she is being punished by the Epstein Estate for doing what she has a basic right to do. That is simply unacceptable and Plaintiff is not walking away. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..26211eff3725bddf9ffa626e9f586650db77b05c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752214/EFTA02752214.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752214", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4b666e1810ffef08b7cf229ab63c56a3c2bf3b6e7cb26c85f7a93def603f76e0", + "output_sha256": "4b666e1810ffef08b7cf229ab63c56a3c2bf3b6e7cb26c85f7a93def603f76e0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..444b2e0eda97868b062fc86c980f4c86e73b04dc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.md @@ -0,0 +1,1033 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +In re: + +JANE DOE, + +- against - + +INDYKE, et al., + +Plaintiff, + +Defendants. + +## APPEARANCES: + +Docket #20cv484 : 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +New York, New York August 5, 2020 + +: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE + +#### PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEBRA C. FREEMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE + +For the Plaintiff: + +For the Defendant - Ghislaine Maxwell: + +For the Defendant - Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein: + +PARISH SHEA BY: ROBERT NATHAN 11111 Santa Los Angeles, & BOYLE, LLP GLASSMAN, ESQ. WERKSMAN, ESQ. Monica Blvd., Suite 700 California 90025 + +HADDON, & , PC BY: LAURA MENNINGER, ESQ. 150 East Tenth Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 + +TROUTMAN PEPPER SANDERS LLP BY: MARY METCALFE, ESQ. BENNET MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Transcription Service: Carole Ludwig, Transcription Services 155 East Fourth Street #3C New York, New York 10009 Phone: (212) 420-0771 Email: Transcription420@aol.com + +Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; Transcript produced by transcription service. + +### INDEX + +### EXAMINATIONS + +Re- Re-Witness Direct Cross Direct Cross Court + +None + +## EXHIBITS + +Exhibit Voir Number Description ID In Dire + +None + +2 THE COURT: So this is Doe versus Indyke, 3 20cv484, and this is Judge Freeman, can I have your 4 appearances for the record starting with plaintiff. + +5 MR. ROBERT GLASSMAN: Good morning, Your Honor, 6 this is Robert Glassman for the plaintiff. + +7 MR. NATHAN WERKSMAN: Good morning, Your Honor, 8 Nathan Werksman for plaintiff. + +9 THE COURT: I'm sorry, same firm? 10 MR. WERKSMAN: Yes. + +11 THE COURT: Okay, I'm not seeing your name on 12 the docket, how do you spell your last name? + +13 MR. WERKSMAN: W-E-R-K-S-M-A-N. 14 THE COURT: Okay, who do I have for defendant, + +15 defendants? 16 MS. LAURA MENNINGER: Your Honor, Laura 17 Menninger here on behalf of the defendant, Ghislaine 18 Maxwell. + +19 THE COURT: Okay. Do I have for the executor? 20 METCALFE: Your Honor, this is 21 Mary Metcalfe of Troutman Pepper on behalf of 22 the co-executors. I know that Mr. Moskowitz is 23 planning on joining us, he lost power and internet 24 during the storm last night and is driving to a place 25 where he can get internet and reception. So if it's + +2 all right with everyone if we could wait just a couple 3 of minutes for him to join. + +4 THE COURT: That's fine, I just got off a 5 conference call where out of four lawyers two had no 6 power, no internet, no landline service and they were 7 both out on the street using cell phones trying to 8 call in and saying we have no access to our files, we 9 have no access to anything. That's usually someone 10 dropping off, that beep, so let me make sure I still 11 have the people I've already identified. I have Mr. 12 Glassman? + +13 MR. GLASSMAN: Yes. + +14 THE COURT: Mr. Werksman? + +15 MR. WERKSMAN: Here. + +16 THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Metcalfe? + +17 MS. METCALFE: I'm here. + +18 THE COURT: Okay, and I had counsel for Ms. 19 Maxwell, Ms. Menninger? + +20 MS. MENNINGER: Yes, I'm here, Your Honor. + +21 THE COURT: Okay, I can't actually say who did 22 we lose. All right, who just joined? + +23 MR. BENNET MOSKOWITZ: Hi, this is Bennet 24 Moskowitz at Troutman Sanders, can Your Honor hear me? + +25 THE COURT: I can, I understand you've had a + +2 power outage problem? + +3 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, I actually was already on 4 the call listening to everyone (indiscernible), I 5 apologize, my reception is terrible but what was 6 described is correct, I have, we got hit pretty hard 7 by this storm and I've been driving along what seems 8 like the entire Eastern Seaboard to find a place with 9 consistent cell phone reception. + +10 THE COURT: Great, okay, we're having fun 11 trying to have these conferences today in the 12 aftermath of the storm. So I have others who are 13 apparently on the call based on the number of 14 participants that were identified when I joined. Is 15 there anyone else representing a party to the case? 16 No. Is there anyone on the call who is an attorney in 17 one of the other cases involving the Epstein estate? 18 Okay. Do I have my law clerk, + +19 THE CLERK: Yes, Judge, I'm here. + +20 THE COURT: Okay, anyone else from my 21 ? All right, so who else do I have on this 22 call, if you could just let me know who's on, I'd 23 appreciate that, do I have any members of the press? + +24 FEMALE VOICE: Yes, this is Emily + +25 (indiscernible) -- + +2 THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're cutting out. + +8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 else, I don't actually need all the specific identifications, members of the press, I'll just ask you to mute your phones. Is there anyone else who does not fit one of those categories as in a lawyer for the parties, a lawyer for or a representative of a party in another case, someone from my or a member of the press, or is that everybody? Okay, I'm not hearing anything so I'm assuming that's who we've got on this call. That's all fine. You know, if Mr. Moskowitz is an important person to have on the call and if we lose him or if his service is not adequate, we can adjourn the call in order to be able to have everybody to be able to participate. We really didn't need a pandemic followed by a hurricane to give us two separate problems, but the reason that I wanted to have the call, aside from the fact that I seem still to have the discovery dispute about the damages computation, I had gotten this proposed scheduling + +FEMALE VOICE: I apologize, Your Honor, I was + +simply identifying myself, this is Emily (indiscernible) I am a member of the media and I am on the call. + +THE COURT: Okay, all right, is there anyone + +2 order sent to me late July by Mr. Moskowitz, and it + +3 didn't indicate that it was jointly submitted. II + +4 actually, I guess it did, it said it was on behalf of + +5 all parties. But the proposed scheduling order + +6 included discovery from defendant Maxwell and I just + +7 wanted to have counsel for Ms. Maxwell to have a + +8 chance to address the extent to which she's currently + +9 comfortable participating in discovery in the case + +10 given that there has now been an indictment returned, + +11 and just to make sure we're all clear on that issue + +12 involving her active participation in the case. So + +13 those were the two issues, that and then the discovery + +14 issue involving the computation of damages that I had + +15 on my agenda. Does anybody have anything else on your + +16 agendas for me? + +17 MR. GLASSMAN: Your Honor, this is Robert + +18 Glassman, we still would like to discuss or I should + +19 say I would still like to discuss with Your Honor the + +20 fact that we haven't received any documents from the + +21 estate. And after I sent the Court a letter + +22 addressing some of the discovery issues I was + +23 forwarded by counsel for the co-executors a draft + +24 confidentiality agreement and nondisclosure agreement. + +25 I don't, you know, so I'd like to discuss that. I + +2 don't see how the documents that are responsive to our 3 discovery requests would be covered under that, that 4 agreement, and so I'm not inclined to sign it, but I'd 5 like to hear Your Honor's thoughts on it. Because, I 6 mean the most important thing for us at this juncture is 7 just to get documents, our discovery is now more than 8 three months outstanding and we still don't have any 9 evidence from the co-executors. So I'd like to kind of 10 get that moving if we can. + +11 THE COURT: All right, just to check because 12 perhaps I am losing my mental capacities here, I did, 13 I did indicate I was recording this, right? + +14 MR. GLASSMAN: Yes. + +15 MS. METCALFE: Yes, Your Honor. + +16 THE COURT: Okay, good, okay, I don't want to 17 go through this and have forgotten to do that. All 18 right, on that last issue about documents from the 19 estate, is that teed up for me, have you had a full 20 good faith conference, have you, and that and 21 regarding a protective order, have you gone back and 22 forth and is that something where you are stuck in 23 your discussions and you need me to pay attention to 24 it? I don't remember seeing something on that. + +25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, it's Bennet + +2 Moskowitz. First, let me just pause and say can you 3 hear me well enough at this moment? + +4 THE COURT: I can hear you well enough, not 5 well, but well enough. + +6 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Okay, this is the first time 7 I'm hearing that the other side won't sign the 8 document, in fact, I understood the opposite. So the 9 answer to your question is a firm no, we have not 10 discussed their refusal to sign what has been entered 11 in every other case against the executors. And, of 12 course, it kind of boggles our minds because this case 13 is brought by someone acting through an anonymous 14 name. To the extent we produced a single document that 15 says the name of this client or other people, that's 16 reason alone to have a confidentiality agreement. So, 17 yeah, there is still plenty to discuss and, no, the 18 meet and confer process has not, if it has started, it 19 certainly isn't complete. + +20 THE COURT: All right, let's take these issues 21 in turn. Let me start with the question that I had 22 about defendant Maxwell's participation in the case in 23 light of the changed circumstances on the criminal 24 investigation turning into a criminal prosecution. Can 25 I hear from the parties as to whether you have been + +2 discussing this, whether this jointly proposed 3 scheduling order is, in fact, being jointly proposed 4 and is acceptable? I just want to make sure before I 5 sign off on that. + +6 MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura 7 Menninger on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. We have had some 8 discussions, at some point counsel for the plaintiff 9 had indicated the desire to take her deposition in 10 this case and I pointed out that she is in custody at 11 the MDC and at this moment in time no one is allowed 12 inside of the MDC, myself and her other attorneys 13 included. And so I was unaware of any ability to take 14 a deposition right now. Certainly, obviously, things 15 may change over the course of the case and I think we 16 might need to come back to Your Honor if it's still an 17 issue. I believe that our position will be, although I 18 don't know that it's ripe for today, similar as it was 19 in a prior case, that is we would ask in the future, 20 Your Honor, that her responses to interrogatories and 21 her deposition be put off so that, you know, if there 22 is an ability to answer questions versus asserting her 23 Fifth Amendment right in the future in this case, then 24 we could address it at that time. But apart from the 25 interrogatories and the deposition I think this + +2 scheduling order sets forth our joint proposal. + +3 THE COURT: Well the joint proposal only has + +4 her serving initial disclosures, but it also has a + +5 deadline for the completion of all fact discovery, it + +6 has a deadline for serving all document requests and + +7 interrogatories, it doesn't say anything about staying + +8 any responses in any way. So there's no stay built + +9 into this for her and the other parties would be + +10 completely within their rights based on this schedule, + +11 if I approve it, to be assuming that she would be + +12 responding to discovery requests and responding to a + +13 deposition demand, if it's feasible, certainly + +14 interrogatory responses by the deadline set by the + +15 rules. And if that's not something that you're + +16 prepared to do, I think it should be discussed with + +17 the parties and brought to my attention before I sign + +18 off on this order. + +19 I will say for everyone's benefit that it is + +20 not uncommon for discovery against someone who is + +23. currently involved as a defendant in a criminal + +22 prosecution, for discovery to be stayed because of the + +23 implications of the Fifth Amendment invocation in a + +24 civil case. As I'm sure you know, she could take the + +25 Fifth in a civil case, and it's very common for + +2 criminal defendants to do that, lawyers often urge that + +3 they do, but then there can be an adverse inference from + +4 that in the civil case that can really prejudice her + +5 defense. So I was just surprised that I didn't have any new + +6 application, given that she was actually indicted, and given + +7 that last time around in another case, true, but + +8 nonetheless, I was being told, well, it's only an + +9 investigation, an investigation could go on forever and we + +10 don't know if she's actually going to be charged with + +11 anything and so on, and obviously we have a changed + +12 circumstance. + +13 So i don't want to argue the case for counsel, but + +14 I was just surprised that it wasn't coming up and wasn't + +15 being dealt with and that a prosed schedule was being put in + +16 front of me that did not address it and seemed to gloss over + +17 the issue. And I would be surprised if the issue doesn't + +18 come back come time to respond to interrogatories or come + +19 time for a deposition. Even apart from how easy or difficult + +20 it is to conduct a deposition while somebody is at the MDC. + +21 Let me hear on plaintiff's side since you're the one I + +22 assume will want the discovery. + +23 MR. GLASSMAN: Yeah, thank you, Your Honor, and + +24 again, this is Robert Glassman. We, counsel for Ms. + +25 Maxwell, for the co-executors, and for us, we've + +engaged in several emails, we've talked on the phone about discovery in this case, and, you know, it wasn't brought up once that, you know, there would be some kind of stay as to Ms. Maxwell's participation. Ms. Menninger is correct when she said I did request, you know, some dates for Ms. Maxwell's deposition, and she advised that it would be very difficult in light of the circumstances with Ms. Maxwell right now, and it really wasn't feasible to take her deposition at this point. And I, I mean I understand that. + +But this scheduling order that the co-executors filed was, you know, as Your Honor pointed out, jointly submitted after we discussed and deliberated over the dates. You know, everyone gave their input as to what they thought would be realistic as far as the dates are concerned. So I, you know, I would like, yeah, unless there is now an objection to it, I think everyone's, everyone has approved this and we're looking forward to it being entered by the Court. You know, so if there's, however, if there is an objection on Ms. Maxwell's side to discovery being directed or propounded on her, then I just, I think we'd have to -- + +THE COURT: All right, I'm not trying to make + +2 arguments on behalf of any party, that's the lawyer's 3 job and not mine, it's just that I had Ms. Maxwell as 4 a defendant previously where an argument was made that there 5 should be a hold on discovery because of the criminal 6 investigation. And there were discussions raised at that 7 time about the fact that it was merely an investigation with 8 no obvious end in sight. And so I'm just surprised and a 9 little confused, and if Ms. Maxwell's counsel on her behalf 10 is, you know, is jointly making the submission and is 11 comfortable with this, then it's all right with me and I'm 12 happy to sign off on it. I just didn't want to sign an order 13 and then have it all derailed because this issue, which I 14 assumed was coming up, you know, would come up after I sign 15 the order and throw the whole thing into some uncertainty. I 16 would rather find out if this is an issue that is or is not 17 being raised. If it's not been raised to date, find out why 18 it's not been raised to date. And, you know, I don't really 19 need your confidential thinking, I just want to make sure 20 that I'm not signing an order only to have you come back in 21 30 days and say, you know, we never anticipated that this 22 would mean that Ms. Maxwell would be answering 23 interrogatories and would be deposed, because that's not 24 what this order says. + +25 So let's, I mean maybe I send you back to talk it + +over and make sure that you're all in accord, and if you're not I'll decide the issue. Or I could just sign off on the order now and wait and see what happens, you know, but I would just be rather stunned if already having raised the issue elsewhere, the issue didn't get raised here. + +MS. MENNINGER: Your Honor, this is Laura Menninger again. I would be in support of sending the parties back to have discussions about it, it was not part of our discussions. There were discussions that we had that we were trying to come up with dates that were reasonable but could change, you know, depending on how things change in the future, and obviously things are moving quickly and there have been a number of developments that have taken place over the last 30 days, so it's a little difficult right now to anticipate all of the issues that may come up with these proceedings occurring simultaneously. + +So if Your Honor would like us to take account of those issues and have a further discussion about a schedule, we are happy to go back and confer with counsel for the other parties to reflect that in this initial scheduling order rather than asking to amend it when the discovery issues arise. + +THE COURT: Why don't I do this, why don't I + +2 approve this schedule as to the first three points + +3 which would be the initial disclosures deadline, the + +4 initial document request interrogatories deadline and + +5 the motions to amend the pleading or join any other + +6 parties. Which will take us to August 21, which is at + +7 least keeping you moving for right now. + +8 On the fact discovery deadline, I think what + +9 I'm going to do is just send you to go back and talk + +10 about that a little bit more and make sure that you're + +11 all on the same page. And then the expert discovery + +12 can certainly be geared to the close of fact discovery + +13 in the same sort of way as it is now. But, you know, + +14 I think that you should just make sure that you're of + +15 a mind if you're going to put something forward as a + +16 joint proposal, make sure it really is a joint + +17 proposal and it's not something that gets people + +18 exasperated because you want to re-discuss it, you + +19 know, 30 days from now. + +20 So go, and then if you agree, yeah, let's just + +21 say November 6, and if we end up making an + +22 application, we do, it's okay with me. And in terms of + +23 the stipulation to modify interim deadlines, if that + +24 meant the August 21 deadline that you wanted to agree + +25 to stipulate to modify that, you can still stipulate + +2 to modify that as is reasonable without coming back to 3 4 5 me, all right? I just want to avoid problems and I just see one on the horizon that I'd rather you talk about before it comes up as a problem, okay? + +6 7 8 9 10 11 12 By the way, this may be the only case of the cluster, I'm not sure if there's more than one, maybe the only one where we don't have a stay in place of the case generally because of the plaintiffs participating in the claims program that was set up. Is that right, let me ask on defendants' side, is this the only one? + +13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, Bennet Moskowitz for the co-executors, with the exception of one other case that was filed the last month, so it's really not of the same grouping if you are looking at it from this perspective, this is the only case that is not stayed. The other case that I was talking about, by the way, our answer deadline hasn't even come. And I think Your Honor is right to raise that, and this coupled with what we just heard from Ms. Menninger about the potential, whatever it is, at least partial staying of discovery against Ms. Maxwell, makes it especially appropriate from my perspective for the parties to discuss the case schedule in general. You + +2 know, I don't have to belabor the record, when, you 3 know, we've done many calls in other cases. I get this 4 is a different one, but the estate's position is still 5 unchanged, you know, we have not moved for a stay, but 6 there are many reasons that render it a very sensible 7 thing to do. And the fact that now this is the, 8 practically, virtually the only case that's moving 9 forward, necessitates that the parties and potentially 10 again with the Court discuss that issue. + +11 THE COURT: Well I will note that this 12 proposed scheduling order was submitted certainly on 13 behalf of the estate, so I'm assuming you have 14 discussed these issues before submitting that proposed 15 schedule. But just let me hear on plaintiff's side, is 16 plaintiff planning to participate at the moment in the 17 compensation fund program? + +18 MR. GLASSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor, this is 19 Robert Glassman. Yes, so we have not submitted a 20 claim to the fund yet; however, we do plan to at some 21 point participate in it, we just have not submitted 22 anything yet. And, you know, my understanding -- + +23 THE COURT: If you decide go ahead, I'm 24 sorry, go ahead and finish. + +25 MR. GLASSMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Yeah, + +2 so, you know, my understanding based on, obviously, 3 the terms and conditions of the program, and, you 4 know, through conversations with Mr. Moskowitz, you 5 know, participation in the fund in no way means that, 6 you know, the litigation needs to stop. And so we're 7 not, we're not interested in stopping the litigation 8 because we, quite frankly, just it is so unknown what 9 is going to happen through this program that I think 10 it would be very prejudicial to my client to just put 11 everything on hold while the program result is 12 pending. And then we just have to kind of, if it 13 doesn't turn out appropriately or reasonably, then we 14 just have to kind of start all over and pick up. + +15 And, you know, what we're interested in is -- + +16 THE COURT: Why would it be, look, I 17 understand that there is no requirement that you seek 18 a stay if you participate in the program, no 19 requirement that the Court stay the case if you decide 20 to participate in the program, but there have been a 21 lot of very able plaintiffs' counsel in these cases, 22 including very, you know, counsel who are very 23 strongly committed to protecting their clients' rights 24 and interests, who have, nonetheless, decided that a 25 stay would make sense, and have weighed the different + +2 issues and have apparently concluded that a stay would not be unduly prejudicial to their clients. And the evidence in these cases is all, already several years old, the chances at this point if a litigation is commenced and there's been litigation holds put out there, the chance at this point that there would be, you know, some serious erosion in the quality of the evidence seems unlikely. There isn't that much more to do in the case, given the deadlines that are being proposed, you're proposing November and it's already August. So it seems to me that if the case is not resolved through the program you can pick up and get it done relatively quickly. And I'm not saying you should agree to a stay, but I think you should consider it and, you know, really be able to explain why it's not in the interest of judgment and judicial economy and all of the rest to put the case on the same sort of track as the other cases, and all of which I've asked for a status report pretty soon to see how it's all going. I think I had August 14 as the date I put on all of the stay orders that I issued saying that I wanted to know and keep tabs on it, wanted to know how it was going by then. + +So I mean unless you have a particular witness + +2 3 who you think is, you know, who might be ill or something like that, or you might lose the testimony 4 of somebody important, or there is some, really some 5 concrete reason why you're concerned about the 6 prejudice that comes from delay, I want to throw it 7 out there, especially when we have this overlay of 8 issues regarding Ms. Maxwell and the pending 9 indictment. Does it make sense to plow forward if 10 you're going to participate in the program, and 11 obviously anybody who participates in the program is 12 not satisfied with the results and does not accept the 13 settlement, we would put everything back on the 14 calendar pretty quickly and the cases would get 15 wrapped up and ready to go. + +16 MR. GLASSMAN: Yes, Your Honor, my concern is 17 that it has taken so long to just do anything we want 18 to do in this case to date and, you know, if we just, 19 if we put everything on ice for three, four months, or 20 however long it will take for the administrator to 23. consider a package and render a decision, it's just 22 going to just delay it that much more. I mean we, you 23 know, we haven't been able to take a deposition so 24 far. Like I mentioned before, we don't have any 25 evidence or documents from the co-executors. Now we do + +2 have Mr. Indyke's deposition on calendar for August + +3 26, hopefully this time that date will stick, so I'm + +4 very pleased to see that we're going to start with + +5 depositions in the case. But, you know, I just think + +6 that like in most cases things really aren't going to + +7 pick up until we have a trial date and start working + +8 towards that date. So I just would like to keep + +9 moving forward at this point towards that, but I + +10 certainly will, I appreciate Your Honor's comments and + +11 I certainly will discuss them with my client. + +12 THE COURT: And there is also a motion to + +13 dismiss pending which the Court is going to have to + +14 spend time and energy to resolve, and a decision may + +15 be on the way any moment, it's possible. + +16 MR. GLASSMAN: With respect to the punitive + +17 damages? + +18 THE COURT: With respect to counts one through + +19 four, one through four to the extent they are time + +20 barred, count five in its entirety, and the demand for + +21 punitive damages, as I read the notice of motion, no? + +22 MR. GLASSMAN: Right, well, yeah. + +23 THE COURT: That's not just the punitive + +24 damages count. + +25 MR. GLASSMAN: No, yeah, I mean I think, + +2 obviously it's the co-executor's motion, but I believe 3 what it is, is, you know, counts one through four with 4 respect to any allegations after the plaintiffs turned 5 18. + +6 7 8 9 THE COURT: Right, I mean there have been similar motions in other cases and some judges have decided them, and others where cases were stayed have held off. + +10 MR. GLASSMAN: Yeah, and just so Your Honor 11 knows, I mean out opposition on that was basically we 12 kind of submit on it. I mean we agreed to the count 13 14 15 five and, I mean counts one through four for sexual assault, sexual battery, NIED and IIED, yeah, I mean anything that happened after she was 18 is not, we 16 can't recover, you know, for. So that -- + +17 THE COURT: That issue got taken out of the 18 case? + +19 MR. GLASSMAN: I mean that's what we argued in 20 our, you know, set forth in our opposition. + +21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: I see. All right, by the way, I also see on the docket a motion for an attorney to appear pro hoc vice which is still unresolved. I can resolve that, I don't think that attorney is on the phone, but I can grant that motion, I'll take care of + +2 that. + +3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 All right, so with respect to, with respect to your timing, go back and talk further, take not more than one week from today's date to write a new letter that's jointly submitted that tells me what the parties' positions are, and let's sort it out now instead of later so that I don't hear squawking down the pike. Okay, with respect to the computation of damages issue, I gather there is still discontent about the sufficiency of the computation, who wants to address that? + +13 14 15 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, Bennet Moskowitz here, my colleague, Mary Metcalfe will address that issue. + +16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. METCALFE: Thank you. We don't want to belabor this point which I believe Your Honor addressed in another case at the end of June involving the estate, but plaintiff has today failed to provide a calculation of damages or any supporting document that's required by Rule 26(A)(1)(a). In our letter we laid out the various responses we have received, none of which are sufficient, and despite raising this with plaintiff's counsel repeatedly over the last several months, the issue still hasn't been resolved. + +2 THE COURT: Do I have the actual response or 3 do I just have the letter that quotes from it? + +4 MS. METCALFE: I don't believe we submitted 5 the actual response, we did quote it in its entirety 6 throughout the letter though. + +7 THE COURT: So I read the blocked in quotes 8 together? + +9 MS. METCALFE: Yes, please, they consist of 10 the first response, or rather the first disclosure 11 that we received -- + +12 THE COURT: And the second blocked in quote in 13 your letter is the full extent of the second 14 disclosure? + +15 MS. METCALFE: The second blocked in quote is 16 what was supplemented during the amended disclosures, 17 the first chunk of the blocked in quote was still 18 present. + +19 THE COURT: Okay, and was there anything 20 further? I guess -- + +21 MS. METCALFE: Your Honor, I'm sorry, in our 22 interrogatories we requested a calculation of damages 23 and the content of the first two blocked in quotes 24 combined is the entirety of plaintiff's responses. 25 Then during our meet and confer we additionally raised + +2 3 the issue, it was one of the few issues we were able to discuss, and plaintiff then supplemented her 4 response to this interrogatory with the third blocked 5 in quote which contains the reference to the New York 6 (indiscernible) and jury instructions. + +7 MR. GLASSMAN: Your Honor, I was going to 8 suggest, I have it up here on my screen, I can just 9 read it to you if you want + +10 THE COURT: I think I have it, unless you 11 disagree that what's in the letter is accurate. + +12 MR. GLASSMAN: Well it was kind of a little 13 piecemeal, the second supplemental response was not 14 set forth kind of like in its entirety continuously in 15 the letter so I don't know if it's going to be clear 16 to Your Honor -- + +17 THE COURT: Well let me just ask this. + +18 MR. GLASSMAN: Sure. + +19 THE COURT: If you have different categories 20 of damages that the plaintiff is claiming, then each 23. separate category of damages needs to be separately 22 set out and computed to the best that you are able to 23 do so. There are obviously going to be some types of 24 damages that are not going to be readily susceptible 25 to a mathematical computation and everybody + +2 understands that, you know, pain and suffering is + +3 difficult or emotional distress is difficult. But + +4 there can be categories of damages that are + +5 susceptible of computation and there can be documents + +6 that support those computations, and when there is a + +7 category that is capable of being computed to the best + +8 of your ability at this time, it needs to be under the + +9 rule and the documents that support it need to be + +10 produced under the rule. + +11 So, you know, if you say something like, you + +12 know, loss of enjoyment of life, okay, we understand + +13 that, or punitive damages, we understand that it may + +14 be an uncertain computation. You can still put down + +15 the particular amount that as of now you claim to be + +16 seeking as best as you are able. Everybody understands + +17 that if there's an expert report later or something + +18 and there's a need to supplement responses, they can + +19 be supplemented. You know, the rule provides that if + +20 the information is made clear, then, you know, then + +21 that can suffice as supplementation. + +22 Let me just pull up for a moment the rule + +23 here. Under 26, hold on one moment, 26(E) + +24 supplementing disclosures and responses, you must + +25 supplement or correct in a timely manner if you learn + +2 that in some material respect the disclosure or 3 response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the 4 additional or corrective information has not otherwise 5 been made known to the other parties during the 6 discovery process or in writing, or as ordered by the 7 Court. So, you know, if you produce an expert report 8 that makes clear that you have some additional 9 information or corrective information that's made 10 clear during the discovery process, that may work, but 11 that doesn't excuse you from doing the initial 12 disclosures as best as you are able at the outset of 13 the case. + +14 And in addition, you've got some categories 15 here that are various expense categories that may well 16 be susceptible to computation, and you may not be able 17 to give, you know, the end amount that it's going to 18 cost at the end of the day, so reasonable attorney's 19 fees incurred in the case by the end of the day, but 20 if you have estimates of, you know, court costs, 21 quote, "other recoverable expenses," you should 22 provide as best of a computation as you can provide. 23 And if there are particular things that factor into 24 plaintiff's damages, I don't know, medical bills, lost 25 employment, if there are particular things, they + +2 should be itemized and you should provide the + +3 documents that support whatever you've got in the + +4 computation. If you really don't have anything, + +5 there's nothing concrete, there are no numbers you can + +6 add, then you have to say, at least in your good faith + +7 conference there are no specifics, there is nothing + +8 that we could add, we do not intend to rely on + +9 anything specific, we just intend to be, you know, + +10 coming up with general damages numbers that we think + +11 sound fair. If that's, I mean you can't invent + +12 documents, you can't invent computations if there is + +13 nothing to calculate or no formula that you can use, + +14 but if there is, you do it to the best of your ability + +15 at the outset of the case and then you supplement it + +16 later if something changes. + +17 Now what is it on defendants' side that you + +18 think is, needs to be specifically itemized and + +19 computed? Ms. Metcalfe? + +20 MS. METCALFE: Your Honor, I had the phone on + +23. mute for a moment. We've seen the categories that + +22 plaintiff's counsel has laid out in the first set of + +23 initial disclosures which have been sort of all + +24 grouped together, Your Honor noted the attorney's + +25 fees, the court costs, medical bills and expenses. In + +2 addition, the second supplement set of disclosures 3 breaks down the calculations, or rather the categories 4 of emotional damage to include past pain and 5 suffering, future pain and suffering, emotional 6 distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and then also 7 there's the amount of punitive damages at issue. In 8 particular, that's one we'd like to address because as 9 noted earlier on the call, the punitive damages are 10 the subject of a currently pending motion to dismiss, 11 and punitive damages such as those sought by 12 plaintiffs in this case have bene consistently 13 dismissed in other actions brought against the estate. + +14 So if we could please see a breakdown of each 15 of the categories of damages plaintiffs identified in 16 the various disclosures, supplements and answers to 17 the interrogatories, and then again, the basic 18 documents in support of those categories, for example, 19 while I know plaintiffs can't necessarily give us a 20 concrete number on how much the litigation will cost, 21 I think costs to date is a pretty good indicator and 22 then an estimate of how much more time and effort this 23 will take, that would go I think a long way towards 24 resolving this dispute. + +25 THE COURT: All right, well attorney's fees + +2 are a tough one because they continue to be incurred 3 as the case goes on and sometimes what's low at the 4 beginning ramps up and sometimes what's high at the 5 beginning goes down, and it's hard to extrapolate. And 6 you know how much you're spending on your end and it 7 probably gives you some clue as to how costly 8 litigation is. But I will say that if you have 9 separate categories of damages, even if the numbers 10 that you are using for those are numbers that you just 11 think are fair, you know, maybe based on other cases 12 you've looked at and you don't have a means to compute 13 them mathematically, you can still separate out the 14 categories. So you can separate out punitive damages 15 from actual damages. You can separate out past pain 16 and suffering from future. You can put different 17 numbers that then add up to your total and at least 18 give defendants the idea of, you know, what they're 19 dealing with in these different categories of damages 20 that you're asserting. Is there any reason on 21 plaintiff's side why you cannot do that? + +22 MR. GLASSMAN: Well, Your Honor, so to be 23 perfectly clear, we are not seeking any economic 24 damages in this case, period. And it's very clear in 25 our response that we're only seeking pain and + +2 suffering, emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of 3 life. And the cases that have been cited to 4 continuously by the co-executors in support of their, 5 you know, disagreement with this, are cases that 6 involve patent and copyright infringement claims, 7 that's the Max Impact v. Sherwood Group case, and also 8 the Design Strategy v. case which is a breach of 9 employment agreement and breach of fiduciary duties 10 case. In those two cases, the ones that they cite, 11 too, noneconomic damages are not being sought, period. 12 Economic damages are being sought, profits, future 13 sales, lost sales, and in some cases injunctive 14 relief. But neither, in no case that is cited to does 15 a Court ever say that pain and suffering has to be 16 computed in some mathematical way. In fact, the law is 17 that it's inappropriate and improper to do that. + +18 So in our response -- + +19 THE COURT: Is there any case law that either 20 side has identified that talks about breaking out past 21 pain and suffering and future? + +22 MR. GLASSMAN: You know, I looked, I looked 23 for that, Judge, and I have not seen it. but I will 24 say if, you know, if anyone is going to be satisfied 25 with us breaking out the past and future, I'm happy to + +2 do that. I mean the past damages would be from 1994 to 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2020, or whenever the trial would be in this case, right, that's how you calculate the past. So since I don't have a trial date, I don't really know exactly how, what defines the past, but I mean it would be from 1994 to the trial date, so 26, 27 years of past pain and suffering, past emotional distress and past enjoyment of life. And then the future is from the date of the trial until the end of plaintiff's life. And obviously there's life expectancy tables that, you know, I can look at and see what a normal life expectancy is for a 39, 40 year old woman. We have no evidence, you know, and I don't think the defense has any evidence that she is going to have any kind of shortened life expectancy, she's expected to life a full life expectancy. So I can put a number on the future, too, so 2020 or 2021 through the end of her life will be the future. + +20 21 22 23 24 25 So I'm happy to do that, but I mean we're not seeking damages for medical bills, we're not seeking damages for loss of earnings, so, you know, I think in my most recent supplemental response I can't be any clearer that we're only seeking noneconomic damages, we put a number in there what that amount is, and I + +2 mean we specifically say what it's based on. We say, 3 quote, "it's based upon the damages caused by Jeffrey 4 E. Epstein to plaintiff as a result of his repeated 5 and malicious acts of sexual abuse, including rape, 6 committed against plaintiff over the course of several 7 years while she was a minor as a result of this 8 repeated and horrific sexual abuse committed by 9 decedent Epstein on plaintiff. Plaintiff has suffered 10 significant and conscious past and future pain and 11 suffering, emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of 12 life for which he was aware she lost." And then -- + +13 THE COURT: Okay, let me interrupt you for a 14 second. All right, let me rule in this way. First, 15 separate actual damages and punitive damages. Okay, 16 but different numbers on those since you're seeking 17 them in different categories, okay? That will be 18 helpful to defendants understanding, if they win on 19 the punitive damages claim, what that does on the 20 value of the case and that might be helpful for 21 settlement purposes. + +22 MR. GLASSMAN: Okay. + +23 THE COURT: Second, I don't know and cannot 24 know if this is a situation where the plaintiff has, 25 based on her allegations, has suffered differently at + +2 differently points in her life. In other words, + +3 whether she went through a period of extreme turmoil + +4 and, you know, managed to get past it and live her + +5 life, or whether it has never abated, whether it has + +6 worsened, whether it has manifest in different ways in + +7 different levels of severity at different points in + +8 her life. So we're talking about a long period of + +9 time and it may be that the past and the future are + +10 not calculated the same way, it's not a certain amount + +11 per year from day one forever. + +12 So have a good faith conversation with + +13 I opposing counsel about the overall picture here, + +14 because if you're going to take the position that it's + +15 just really been a constant thing and to the extent + +16 that it's manifest differently over time, it's of no + +17 different value from the time when the events were + +18 occurring to the time immediately thereafter, to the + +19 time 10 years later or 20 years later or what may be + +20 30 or 40 years later, then let counsel understand + +21 that. And then I'm not going to require you to break + +22 it out by saying, fine, we'll just divide it by number + +23 of years of life expectancy and there you can have a + +24 calculation. + +25 If, on the other hand, it is a situation where + +2 things may be different past and future, then I'm + +3 going to ask you, you know, to discuss it so that + +4 defendants' counsel can have an understanding of what + +5 you're claiming and to see if it might make sense to + +6 at least break it out by past and future. It kind of + +7 depends upon what the claim is, I'll let you confer on + +8 your own part first instead of, you know, stating it + +9 now, and have a conversation with defendants' counsel. + +10 If you are not claiming anything like medical + +11 expenses or anything, fine, it's not an element and + +12 doesn't have to be broken out and so on. I'm not + +13 going to require a breakout now of legal expenses, it + +14 seems a little bit silly because they are ongoing and + +15 they're going to just keep changing over time. And I + +16 think that attorney's fees applications can be made at + +17 the end of the case and everybody understands that. + +18 Court costs, everybody understands, I don't think it + +19 has to be broken out and it's going to be a drop in + +20 the bucket anyway. And expert fees, you haven't even + +21 hired your experts yet, I assume where if you have + +22 they haven't even incurred the full cost yet, and + +23 they're going to have to disclose what they're paid + +24 anyhow in connection with their reports and so that + +25 will come out that way. + +2 I If there are no other actual damages other + +3 + +4 + +5 + +6 + +7 + +8 + +9 + +10 + +11 + +12 + +13 + +14 + +15 + +16 + +17 + +18 + +19 + +20 + +21 + +22 + +23 + +24 + +25 + +than the sort of general pain and suffering type + +damages, then we're going to leave it at that, and on + +defendants' side that's going to be the ruling, we're going + +to leave it at what I just said, all right? + +MR. GLASSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. + +MS. METCALFE: Thank you very much, Your + +Honor. + +THE COURT: Okay, now moving onto the question + +of documents from the estate and the protective order + +issue, talk further, bring it to a head, put it in + +writing to me if you still have an issue that you + +can't work out. I think defendants' point is well + +taken that plaintiff ought to want a protective order + +because plaintiff has confidentiality concerns + +regarding even her identify and I would imagine + +something like her medical records, and she's + +entitled, excuse me, to have some confidentiality on + +her very personal information. It can be used in the + +context of this case and, you know, should not + +otherwise be out there. There's no reason for, you + +know, for a minor's personal history of trauma to be + +not afforded some measure of confidentiality + +protection. But talk about it, if you really have an + +2 issue about a protective order and you think in some 3 way it is overbroad, talk about it, bring it to my 4 attention, I'll rule on it and we'll get an order in 5 place that makes sense and that can be supported by 6 the court with the understanding that documents are 7 presumptively public unless there is a reason to 8 protect them. And if you show me a good reason, I'll 9 protect them, and if you don't, I won't. + +10 In terms of the production of documents, I'm 11 assuming once the protective order issue is resolved, 12 documents will be produced forthwith and you'll be 13 able to work that out. I don't want undue delay but 14 also have some concerns about, as I said, the 15 discovery as to Maxwell. I have some concerns about 16 when this case can be tried anyway because we're set 17 back on trials because of Covid, and I think you 18 should not, on plaintiff's side, not be concerned it's 19 moving too slowly. If the protective order is in place 20 and you're still not getting documents, you'll put it 21 all in writing to me and I will rule and try to make 22 sure things move along appropriately. + +23 MR. GLASSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor, just two 24 quick points. So number one, you know, part of the 25 issue with the protective order is we were waiting for + +2 Ms. Maxwell's thoughts on whether or not she thought 3 it would be appropriate to have a protective order in 4 this case. Ms. Menninger has said she would think 5 about it and let us know, and we have not kind of 6 gotten her input on that issue yet so I think that's 7 part of the holdup. And number two, you know, 8 presumably the co-executors of the estate do not have 9 medical records of the plaintiffs in their possession, 10 custody and control. In fact, to the contrary, it's my 11 understanding, based on prior conversations, that they 12 do have some documents with my client's name on them. 13 They're not medical records, they are just simply 14 documents that were, you know, found through the 15 course of their, you know, their investigation and 16 discovery of their client. And I don't know why, I 17 mean I just, after reading the -- + +18 THE COURT: Well hang on a second, hang on a 19 second, is the issue, let me hear from defendant's 20 side, is the issue about the protective order the fact 21 that the documents have plaintiff's name on them or is 22 there some other issue? + +23 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, Bennet Moskowitz, 24 that's one issue, but if I take a step back I'm just, 25 again, scratching my head that something that has been + +2 a nonissue in over a dozen other cases against the 3 estate is an issue here. The broader issue is, 4 especially given Ms. Maxwell's role as a defendant 5 here, and if Your Honor has seen any of the coverage 6 of or otherwise knows anything about what's been going 7 on in other litigation involving Ms. Maxwell, we want 8 nothing to do with on the estate side any 9 confidentiality 10 seems innocuous 11 or someone else issues. Whether it's something that to us that Maxwell, or this plaintiff, will claim shouldn't have been out 12 there or should have been protected, there have been 13 many very public problems in that regard, not having 14 to do with us, but in the greater world of Epstein 15 related litigation. And it just stands to reason that 16 we would do what we did in every other case, know what 17 the rules are for designating things confidential and 18 if and when we identify any of those things to produce 19 we will treat them in accordance with that agreement 20 so that there is certainty and so that we are not then 21 spending money and time on something that could have 22 been avoided had we just simply entered into this, 23 again, this pretty standard agreement at this point. + +24 THE COURT: What on plaintiff's side are the 25 problems with the proposed agreement? + +2 MR. GLASSMAN: Well, so number one, there's + +3 been no showing by the estate that the documents they + +4 have contain confidential information, number one. + +5 THE COURT: Well hold on a second, for + +6 starters, you, yourself, said that they have + +7 identified documents that have your client's name. + +8 MR. GLASSMAN: Correct. + +9 THE COURT: You've asked to proceed in this + +10 case anonymously. Presumably you want some protection + +11 for documents that have your client's name. + +12 MR. GLASSMAN: Well but, Your Honor, so + +13 production of documents in discovery are not public + +14 documents, right, I mean + +15 THE COURT: No, production of documents in + +16 discovery are not public documents, but if you don't + +17 have a protective order, anyone with those documents + +18 is entitled to share them outside the litigation. + +19 Whereas if you have a protective order in place, it + +20 limits parties' ability to share those documents in + +21 other cases, for other purposes and with the public as + +22 a whole. So but your client, to be protected in terms + +23 of her identity, you would presumably want an order + +24 that would bind other parties from revealing documents + +25 with her name on them. Not that the estate is about + +2 to do that, but you would presumably want assurance + +3 that a Court would have said, no, don't do that, not + +4 for this moment in time, right, why would you not want + +5 that? + +6 MR. GLASSMAN: Well I'm operating on the + +7 assumption that neither the estate nor Ms. Maxwell, + +8 well the estate already has the documents, obviously, + +9 and they haven't, to my knowledge, just publicly + +10 disseminated them so far because that would be + +11 inappropriate and I don't expect them to do that. I + +12 wouldn't expect them to do that in the future. Just + +13 because they have my client's name on them, again, I + +14 think putting a confidentiality order in a case is + +15 something that is done when there is extremely + +16 sensitive confidential proprietary information that if + +17 it got out would harm a party. And here, just because + +18 this is a high profile case, doesn't mean that -- + +19 THE COURT: So you want to provide releases + +20 for your client's medical records and you want + +21 defendant to be able to get those medical records, and + +22 you don't care about having a confidentiality order in + +23 place, even if it's documents being produced by a + +24 third party or by you? + +25 MR. GLASSMAN: Well I've already produced, + +2 I've produced documents to the executors already, 3 about 200 pages of them -- + +4 THE COURT: And you don't want a protective 5 order for the documents that you produced, you are 6 trusting and don't care about any assurance of 7 protection for your client's personal information? + +8 MR. GLASSMAN: No, it's not about not 9 trusting, it's about the standards for a protective 10 order and a nondisclosure agreement are pretty high. 11 And I don't see any proprietary or commercially 12 sensitive information that has any bearing, 13 whatsoever, in this case. i mean I think that -- + +14 THE COURT: You don't think your client's, any 15 treatment she may have had for emotional distress or 16 pain and suffering, you don't think, or loss of 17 enjoyment of life, you don't think any of that 18 warrants confidentiality protection? I understand 19 you're saying that those are not documents currently 20 in defendants' hands, but you're providing documents 21 to them of that nature and you might assume that 22 they're not to show anyone. But you don't think that 23 that would constitute the kind of material that is 24 appropriately protected by the Court? + +25 MR. GLASSMAN: Your Honor, I really don't. So, + +2 I mean, unlike perhaps other, you know, like kind of 3 cases that the lawyers for the estate work on, I mean 4 all my cases involve medical issues and medical 5 records. And there are not protective orders put in 6 place just because a defendant gets a HIPAA release 7 for a medical record, or a plaintiff and then gets 8 those records and can share them with their experts 9 for litigation purposes. + +10 THE COURT: So let me ask the estate this, are 11 there any confidentiality issues that you can think of 12 that do not relate to plaintiff's information, 13 plaintiff's identity, plaintiff's personal 14 information, is there anything else that you think 15 ought to be given confidentiality protection? + +16 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor, Bennet 17 Moskowitz here. (indiscernible) all the other orders 18 that were entered in the others actions, including, 19 for example, without conceding that they're relevant 20 here but certainly they're things that plaintiff has 21 asked for in requests that we object to, financial 22 information that is not public, information about 23 other nonparties to the extent they come up in 24 documents. What about deposition testimony? You can't 25 just, plaintiff said they're kind of assuming that + +2 there's this group of documents and this group, let's 3 talk about them now, no, this is for planning for the 4 unknown, of all the fraud issues that will come up in 5 this case, and that have already come up in this case. 6 You have one defendant who's been indicted. I'm kind 7 of concerned here that I don't hear what the prejudice 8 is to plaintiff of something that would -- + +9 THE COURT: Okay, well look, look, hold on a 10 second, if there has been a protective order entered 11 in another case involving personal information 12 regarding other plaintiffs, we're not going to get 13 around that by having documents in this case produced 14 that mention these other plaintiffs who claim to be 15 victims of Mr. Epstein, and have not protected because 16 they've bene produced in this case. Similarly, if this 17 plaintiff were to testify about knowledge about 18 someone else she knew, even if not a plaintiff in 19 another case, but somebody else who was potentially a 20 victim, I think it is entirely appropriate to protect 21 the identities of victims and information about the 22 circumstances, personal information about the 23 circumstances of other victims, especially if they 24 were minors, so there's that. Even if this plaintiff 25 through counsel doesn't think that her own information + +2 needs to be protected, I'm not going to gloss over the 3 fact that there may be information that's produced or 4 that comes out in testimony regarding other claimed 5 victims. And to me, the quintessential information 6 that is appropriate to protect is highly sensitive 7 personal information such as information about sexual 8 abuse of a minor. That is highly personal and, you 9 know, unless there is further consideration by the 10 Court about why it should be released, in the first 11 instance that's appropriate to keep for use in the 12 case and not to share widely. + +13 Second, financial information, I don't know, 14 whose financial information are we talking about? What 15 kind of financial information are we talking about? 16 You know, that warrants some discussion. But you could 17 have a protective order that has a provision in it and 18 once documents are produced, if somebody wants to use 19 them for purposes other than the case or thinks that 20 the designation was really overbroad or improper, you 21 can come back to the Court and I can take a look at it 22 and I can determine whether it really is appropriate 23 or not for protection. You know, Mr. Epstein had a 24 certain amount of wealth, that's not contested, I'm 25 sure, information about his finances may not be the + +2 sort of thing that is appropriate for protection at 3 this point. But there may be other kinds of 4 information that's not public, I don't know what 5 you're talking about. But you should talk through 6 these things and I think it makes sense to have a 7 protective order in this case that covers at least 8 certain categories of information, and I don't see why 9 you shouldn't be able to discuss those categories and 10 come up with something sensible and have a provision 11 in there that says that you can return to the Court if 12 you think a designation was overbroad. + +13 I do not sign protective orders unless they 14 have some specificity. I will not sign an order that 15 says we can keep confidential anything we think is 16 confidential, that's not acceptable. The public has to 17 understand what the rationale is for having something 18 kept confidential, so it has to be spelled out what 19 the category is so that you can see on its face what 20 it is that the Court has decided to afford protection 21 to. So nothing vague. But I don't think that it's 22 appropriate to have no protections in a case that 23 involves one and potentially more through discovery 24 claimed minor victims of sexual abuse. I mean if 25 that's not highly personal, I don't know what is. + +2 I'm going to send you back to the well. Again, + +3 I'm going to send you back to talk. As far as Ms. + +4 Maxwell is concerned, counsel, be part of the + +5 conversation. Okay, I know there is some stuff going + +6 on about testimony that Ms. Maxwell has given + +7 elsewhere and whether it should be public or not, and + +8 I know that's currently in the courts and being + +9 discussed and, you know, there may be some precedent + +10 that's relevant, and we'll take it all into account. + +11 But you should be in discussions, in an initial + +12 discussion phase of what sort of protection order, if + +13 any, should be issued by the Court, okay. And on + +14 plaintiff's side, if this is what's slowing down + +15 production of documents, then let's get the issue + +16 about the protective order teed up quickly and I'll + +17 try to resolve it as quickly as I can so that the + +18 production can follow. + +19 MR. GLASSMAN: Okay, Your Honor, thank you, + +20 thank you, it's still not seen on the issue of + +21 documents how, you know, the estate is trying to act + +22 like they're protecting my client's privacy here, I + +23 mean -- + +24 THE COURT: That's not what I'm hearing. What + +25 I'm hearing is that the estate wants some certainty as + +2 to what it can and can't do to avoid issues later and 3 to avoid charges later that they improperly disclosed 4 something or didn't keep something confidential. + +5 MR. GLASSMAN: But we can't litigate in 6 secret, this is a public case in a public forum and I 7 just feel like every time we talk about this, I get 8 the statement that, well, every other case has decided 9 -- + +10 THE COURT: Okay, for defendants' benefit, I 11 don't care about every other case, I care about this case. 12 I do care that information relevant to other cases may 13 possibly come out through this witness or through the 14 documents that defendants have. If, for example, there's 15 a document that list three names, one might be your 16 client, you may not care if your client's name is 17 public, even though you wanted to proceed anonymously, 18 but the other two may care, and the other two may have 19 good reason for caring. And the defendant is right to 20 question whether there should be some protection so it 21 knows what the ground rules are. Right, let's put the 22 ground rules in place. And if your view is there 23 should be no ground rules and everything should be 24 fair game, then I'll allow defendant to make its own 25 application for a protective order, I'll hear your + +2 argument as to which provisions are or are not 3 appropriate and I'll decide what provisions should or 4 should not be in place. But I'm inclined to issue an 5 order that allows at least some protection for 6 identities and highly personal information regarding 7 alleged victims. + +8 MR. GLASSMAN: Okay, so we can go back, as you 9 said, to the well and probably narrowly tailor that 10 this -- + +11 THE COURT: You can narrowly tailor it, if you 12 have a dispute about certain categories of 13 information, Mr. Moskowitz mentioned financial, 14 nonpublic financial information, you can talk about 15 what that means, what would be covered by that 16 category, what kind of financial information of whom 17 are we talking about. If you cannot reach agreement 18 on that, you let me know what the issue is and I'll 19 decide it. Okay, Mr. Moskowitz, I am more concerned 20 about personal information of minor victims than I am 21 about financial information but I don't really know 22 what you're talking about. It's not a trade secrets 23 kind of case, it's not, you know, a case where 24 somebody has a customer list that somebody else might 25 steal, right, so be cautious about what it is, and I'm + +2 not going to entertain the argument of, well, 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 everybody else agreed so you should, too. This case is its own case, and bringing me back to what I was saying before, it seems to be the only one that is going full force which should lead to another conversation. Not trying to twist anybody's arms here, I just think you need to talk because I don't want to see money unnecessarily spent if you're going to decide a month from now that maybe the case should be stayed. Figure it out now, figure it out, figure 12 out whether it should be stayed in its entirety 13 because the plaintiff wants to participate in a 14 program, figure out whether it should be stayed in 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 part as to defendant Maxwell or not, and if in part, what part. You know, figure out now, try to figure out now the scope of an order so that, a protective order so that everybody has clear guidance on production of documents on both sides and knows what they can and can't do. And so that the public and the press knows what they can and can't get their hands on for the asking. And bear in mind that this discovery material, yes, it's exchanged between you, but it may 24 well be provided to the Court in connection with a 25 motion. And if so, and if the Court relies on it and + +2 3 it becomes a judicial document, some of those presumptions of confidentiality are going to disappear 4 anyway because the public is entitled to know what the 5 basis was for the Court's decision. So think about the 6 whole ball of wax when you're talking and, you know, 7 think about a protective order that maybe lays it out 8 a little bit more clearly than some other ones that 9 you've negotiated if you feel the need. + +10 All right, go back and talk some more. I'm 11 going to grant the motion for pro hoc vice counsel, 12 that's easy. I'm going to approve the scheduling 13 order that's been proposed as to the August dates and 14 then ask you within a week to send me a joint letter, 15 all counsel, as to whether you're in agreement as to 16 what should happen with regard to the close of fact 17 discovery and expert discovery or not. If you're not, 18 tell me where the disagreement lies, if I need to have 19 another conference I will. On the computation of 20 damages, to summarize, break out punitive and talk 23. with your client about the question of whether other 22 damages were consistent over time or not. If not, try 23 to break it out in a way that makes sense. If so, if 24 it's consistent over time, I'm not going to require 25 it. I'm not going to require breaking out attorney's + +2 fees and the like with separate amounts. And on 3 document production, if you end up slowed down even 4 after this protective order, then you come to me with 5 an informal motion to compel and I'll try to get on it 6 and try to get you moving, okay? + +7 MR. GLASSMAN: Thank you, Judge. + +8 THE COURT: Got all that? + +9 MR. GLASSMAN: Yes. + +10 THE COURT: All right, everybody, carry on. + +11 Be well. Hope you get your power back soon. + +12 MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. + +13 MR. GLASSMAN: Thank you. + +14 (Whereupon the matter is adjourned.) + +# 3 CERTIFICATE + +5 I, Carole Ludwig, certify that the foregoing 6 transcript of proceedings in the United States District 7 Court, Southern District of New York, Jane Doe versus 8 Indyke, et al., docket #20cv484, was prepared using PC-based 9 transcription software and is a true and accurate record of 10 the proceedings. + +15 Signature aue Ladoint + +16 Carole Ludwig + +17 Date: August 12, 2020 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5da67037a2ad00e0cca11adeb6a6fa6213745f6f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752216/EFTA02752216.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752216", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2763eed2a5d97712ed32e28649d59ff3784805f2676d49052b69e5ed26c22b62", + "output_sha256": "2763eed2a5d97712ed32e28649d59ff3784805f2676d49052b69e5ed26c22b62", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..048cac5e507a834a1f066e69f888bdaf4e51390c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE. + +INDYKE et al.. + +) ) v. ) Case No.: #20Cv484 + +USA / Plaintiff(s) ) + +) + +) ) ) ) ) + +Defendant(s) ) + +## NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT + +Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a TELEPHONE CONFERENCE held on 8/5/2020 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above-captioned matter. + +Redaction responsibilities apply to the attorneys of record or pro se parties, even if the person requesting the transcript is a judge or a member of the public or media. + +The parties have seven (7) calendar days from the date of filing of this NOTICE to file with the court any NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION of this transcript. A copy of said NOTICE must also be served on the court reporter. If no such NOTICE is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after ninety (90) calendar days. + +This process may only be used to redact the following personal data identifiers: Social-Security numbers; dates of birth; minors' names; and financial account numbers. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1. Parties wishing to request redaction of other information may proceed by motion. + +Carole Ludwig + +Court Reporter + +Date: 8/12/2020 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad49fd127434c1989462cded9ac19d5b44304ee2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752270/EFTA02752270.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752270", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8c36196f41fceb64c1162ca033f4fba693a4c5f62a5cde51a7f94b991ca75890", + "output_sha256": "8c36196f41fceb64c1162ca033f4fba693a4c5f62a5cde51a7f94b991ca75890", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19823d4ccb5bd2a00fe3b31f4a5b80a8b01486c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and e c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 rx 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com ImenningerehmfIcnv.com + +August 12, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: Order of August 5, 2020 (ECF 62) 20-cv-00484 (JGK-DCF), Doe v. Indyke, et at + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write in reference to Your Honor's Order of August 5, 2020 which directed, in part, that the "parties ... confer further regarding deadlines contained in paragraphs 4 and 5, and to submit a joint letter regarding those deadlines by" today. Respectfully, I seek one additional week to address deadlines in the Scheduling Order as well as other issues raised by Your Honor during the initial scheduling conference of August 5, 2020. + +First and foremost, I have not had the ability to meaningfully confer with my client regarding her decision whether to request a stay in this action and, if so, whether it might be a request for a partial stay only as to her or a request for the entire action to be stayed. As the Court is aware, Ms. Maxwell is currently in pretrial detention in the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC"). There is no ability to visit her in person there, nor to have any video conference with her. While she is being allowed phone calls with counsel, they must be scheduled three days in advance. When one lawyer for her team is allowed a call, others are permitted to be patched through, but the calls are of limited duration and encompass a number of issues relevant to her two active civil cases, one active civil appeal and one active criminal case. A brief review of the dockets in those other matters reveals the number of issues on which she has an absolute right to consult with counsel. Oftentimes the calls are cut short by the MDC staff. There is no ability to email her, for example, with draft protective orders. Between last Wednesday and today, undersigned counsel simply has not been able to confer with her sufficiently regarding this case to answer that question, which would affect our position on the scheduling order. Counsel does have a call scheduled for this Friday, August 14, 2020, and expects to + +Hon. Debra Freeman August 12, 2020 Page 2 be able to confer with her regarding this case. Ms. Maxwell therefore respectfully requests until next Wednesday, August 19, 2020, to either agree to extended dates for the Scheduling Order or to move for a stay. Second, to report to Your Honor, counsel for the parties engaged in a conferral call for over an hour on Monday, August 10. During that call, I conveyed to the other parties that I had been unable to sufficiently confer with my client and also that I believed our position would be at least a partial stay as to Ms. Maxwell's deposition and written discovery. When Plaintiff's counsel asked whether "initial disclosures" would be included in a written discovery stay, I said that it would, and still need to confer with my client before producing those, in the event we do not ask for a stay. He indicated he understood the challenges I am having communicating with my client and did not raise an objection to that proposed procedure on the call. I am thus taken aback by his letter to Your Honor earlier this afternoon accusing me of violating a Court order. Third, Mr. Glassman still has not made the damages disclosure ordered by Your Honor during the August 5, 2020, call. Additionally on the call, Mr. Glassman would not state whether he has served Rule 45 subpoenas on third parties for documents nor whether he has obtained documents from third parties all without notice to the partiesas required in advanceby Rule 45(a)(4). Instead, Mr. Glassman said he would not answer that question because he was unhappy that he did not have deposition dates from the Executors of the Estate. He then asked whether anyone was recording the telephone call. + +It is difficult to have a meaningful conferral process with such baseless accusations and refusals to answer simple questions. Counsel is open to any relief that Your Honor thinks appropriate, including having the conferral calls with the Court on the line. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Q . Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..be305a88642d4666708f815c4aeec6c9f0644599 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752271/EFTA02752271.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752271", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "20db73fdfbdcfc85b92cecf10eeca372d54f50a06187f2c6315d58ccdce48585", + "output_sha256": "20db73fdfbdcfc85b92cecf10eeca372d54f50a06187f2c6315d58ccdce48585", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..705544c1fd7ba816a83900b9b8a66841c419a7e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +Mary W. Metcalfe marygrace.metcalfe@troutrnan.com + +August 12, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southei l ict of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1 :20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write both in response to the letter that counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe filed this afternoon without any advance notice and pursuant to Your Honor's Order dated August 5, 2020 (the "Order"). Counsel for Plaintiffs letter is inaccurate and omits critical information. + +Prior to Plaintiffs counsel filing their letter, counsel for the Co-Executors understood and intended that counsel for Plaintiff, the Co-Executors, and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell would submit a joint letter pursuant to Your Honor's Order. In accordance with the directives Your Honor issued during the August 5 telephonic conference, on Monday, counsel for the parties met and conferred about a confidentiality agreement, discovery deadlines, and the possibility of a stay of this action in light of Plaintiffs intent to participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program and, separately, Ms. Maxwell's pending criminal action. + +Regarding the confidentiality order, the issue is straightforward: (1) Your Honor directed all parties to meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement on a proposed order; and (2) counsel for Ms. Maxwell expressly stated during the meet-and-confer that she needed more time to be able to speak to her client about the issue. Here is the relevant sequence: Several hours before the parties' meet-and-confer, Plaintiffs counsel for the first time circulated proposed edits to the draft confidentiality order which we had first circulated on July 15, 2020. During the meet-andconfer, we proposed that, in light of Your Honor's instruction during our conference call that Ms. Maxwell's counsel be involved in the discussion, it would make sense and be most efficient for the parties to discuss each other's positions after Ms. Maxwell's counsel was able to propose any revisions or otherwise weigh in on the matter. Regrettably, rather than simply wait for input from Ms. Maxwell, Plaintiffs counsel filed their letter today asserting that they "received no response" to their proposed edits. While we are prepared to discuss Plaintiffs edits — and in fact advised Plaintiff's counsel that we objected to Plaintiffs removal of provisions concerning the treatment of inadvertently disclosed privileged and confidential information — it makes no sense for only three of the four parties to this action to negotiate a confidentiality order that, once entered, will govern all parties.' + +Regarding Mr. Kahn's deposition, prior to the parties' meet-and-confer, counsel for Plaintiff stated that they wished to discuss scheduling the deposition of Mr. Kahn, in both his individual capacity and his capacity as a Co-Executor, the latter being the only capacity in which he is named as a Defendant in this lawsuit. Accordingly, counsel who represents Mr. Kahn in his individual capacity in connection with this matter, with whom Plaintiffs counsel's colleague had previously discussed Mr. Kahn's deposition, attended the meet-and-confer. During the call, Mr. Kahn's personal counsel asked a very simple question that counsel for Plaintiff's colleague had previously refused to answer: given Plaintiff's allegations in her Complaint that she cut ties with Mr. Epstein in 1999, and, that Mr. Kahn did not start working with Mr. Epstein until six years later, why is Plaintiffs counsel pursuing a deposition of Mr. Kahn in his personal capacity. Troublingly, Plaintiffs counsel refused to state a reason or subject matter for Mr. Kahn's deposition. Rather, they demanded a deposition date but admitted in words or substance that they need to consider whether there was a reason to depose Mr. Kahn and "maybe we do not even need to depose him [Mr. Kahn] in his individual capacity." Unless and until Plaintiffs counsel is willing to meet and confer in a meaningful manner about this issue, Mr. Kahn's personal counsel is left without any means to determine whether motion practice on this issue can be avoided.2 + +Most concerningly, when asked during the meet-and-confer whether Plaintiff had received documents in response to their third-party subpoenas seeking depositions and productions (which Plaintiffs counsel served without giving advance notice to Defendants, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4)), Plaintiffs counsel refused to answer.3 We urge Plaintiff to immediately disclose any and all non-party discovery materials she has received to date. + +The parties' discussion of a stay and the proposed scheduling order is also ongoing. During the call, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that Plaintiff would not seek a stay despite her intent to participate in the Victims' Compensation Program. Ms. Maxwell's counsel indicated that she + +During the telephonic conference, Your Honor confirmed that document production would follow the resolution of the confidentiality agreement and that remaining concerns about the receipt of documents could be addressed thereafter. It is unclear why Plaintiffs counsel is raising the issue now. + +{sup}`2` Plaintiff is entitled to depose the parties to this action. However, and despite the statement in Plaintiffs counsel's letter that Mr. Kahn "is a defendant," he is not a defendant in his individual capacity. + +{sup}`3` In addition to the other inaccuracies of the letter discussed herein, Plaintiffs counsel's claim that "the Epstein Estate has resorted to belittling Plaintiff and threatening her lawyers" is completely untrue. We have done no such thing, and the inclusion of this claim by Plaintiffs counsel further highlights their lack of good faith in these discussions. + +intended to seek a stay of discovery as to her client. Noting that such a stay would necessarily require amending the previously proposed scheduling order (i.e., if a stay is ordered, fact discovery cannot end until after the stay is lifted), we asked Plaintiffs counsel whether they thought it appropriate to pursue discovery in a piecemeal fashion. Plaintiffs counsel indicated that they would confer with their client and colleagues and let us know. They have not done so. + +We hope that, with a little additional time, counsel will be able to submit their positions with regard to the proposed discovery schedule in a joint letter, as Your Honor ordered. We therefore consent to Ms. Maxwell's request made earlier today (ECF No.66) seeking an additional week to address the deadlines as directed in the Order. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Ma W. Metcalfe Mary W. Metcalfe + +CC: All Counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6de45d821f09268d1b024ecb1556a3623e626a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752273/EFTA02752273.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752273", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7cc4ef4d9757ba64a20fd5f44cfcc62f122f28c6fda1bc02186a7bb90de9f87e", + "output_sha256": "65395df5c92c4d67479032935ea13044c13601a5291d1e9d3982b0462460a20a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..342e9500afe48ba09fc5e33012f751f7bd44ddde --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +20cv00484 (JGK) (DF) + +Plaintiff, + +## SCHEDULING ORDER + +-against- + +DARREN K. INDYKE, et al., + +Defendants. + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +This matter having been referred to this Court for general pretrial supervision; and this Court having held a case management conference on August 5, 2020 with counsel for all parties; and this Court having directed counsel to confer regarding certain discovery deadlines and to make a follow-up joint submission regarding those deadlines (see Dkt. 62); and this Court having no such joint submission, but having, instead, received three separate letters from counsel (Dkts. 63, 66, 67); and this Court having reviewed those submissions; it is hereby ORDERED as follows: + +I. In light of the fact that counsel for defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") has reportedly had difficulty arranging to communicate with Maxwell (who is currently in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center) regarding certain issues in this case, and in light of the potential ramifications of Maxwell's being required to respond to discovery demands in this case while a criminal prosecution is pending against her, the request by Maxwell's counsel for an extension of time to August 19, 2020, either to participate in a joint request regarding the setting of additional discovery deadlines or to move for a stay of any or all of these proceedings, is granted. If Maxwell moves for a stay of these proceedings, in whole or in part, then, within two business days of the motion's submission, the parties should jointly propose a schedule for + +opposition and reply submissions, and should also inform this Court of their views as to whether the motion should (or should not) affect any other deadlines set by this Order. + +2. This Court expects to enter a protective order in this case to protect, at a minimum, the personal information of individuals who are not parties to this action, but who claim to have been victims of sexual abuse by Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Epstein"). All counsel are directed to confer in good faith regarding the terms of a protective order, and to make a joint proposal to the Court no later than August 26, 2020, regarding the same. If the parties are unable to agree to proposed terms, then they should make separate proposals by that date, explaining any areas of disagreement. Document production shall be stayed pending this Court's entry of a protective order, but the parties should be prepared to produce documents in response to any outstanding document requests (or in accordance with the parties' initial disclosure requirements) within one week of the entry of such an order. + +3. Except with respect to any document production, which shall be governed by paragraph 2, above, Maxwell's obligation to make initial disclosures, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has not been excused. Although Maxwell apparently did not make those disclosures by the August 10, 2020 deadline previously set by this Court (see Dkt. 62), her time to do so shall be extended to August 26, 2020, so as to afford her counsel a fair opportunity to confer with her in advance of making those disclosures. + +4. If, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(IXA)(i), Maxwell or any party identifies as witnesses any women who claim to have been victims of Epstein, then the identities of those witnesses shall be maintained by all parties as confidential, pending the Court's entry of a protective order. The same principle shall apply to any claimed victims' identities and personal information that may be obtained in this action through any other means of discovery, such as by interrogatory + +responses, deposition testimony, or subpoena; all such information shall be maintained as confidential, pending the entry of a protective order. + +5. The parties are directed to set a date for Plaintiff's requested deposition of defendant Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as an executor of Epstein's estate. If Plaintiff also wishes to depose Kahn in his individual capacity, then Plaintiffs counsel should inform Defendants' counsel of this, and, if the parties cannot agree as to whether this would be permissible, then they should stipulate to a schedule to place the issue before this Court for resolution, in advance of the deposition. + +6. To the extent Plaintiff has not yet amended her Rule 26(a)(1) damages computation as directed at the August 5, 2020 conference, Plaintiff is directed to do so no later than August 26, 2020. + +7. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to ensure that Defendants are given advance notice of any subpoenas served by Plaintiff on any non-parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4), and are further directed to ensure that Defendants are notified of the receipt of any documents in response to such subpoenas. If Plaintiff has served any Rule 45 subpoenas and has not provided the required advance notice, or has failed to notify Defendants regarding the receipt of responsive documents, then Plaintiffs counsel is directed to furnish such notice forthwith. If, on the other hand, Plaintiff has not, to date, served any Rule 45 subpoenas in connection with this case, then Plaintiff's counsel should clarify this point to Defendants' counsel. + +Dated: New York, New York August 14, 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +"Ai DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +## Copies to: + +All counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..887a0043e593aa72cc43e6c89710050eafdc9d43 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752276/EFTA02752276.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752276", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a06209e2a4dd3daac9158699175eab20f8c8532412efa4681d75f5eccceb295c", + "output_sha256": "a06209e2a4dd3daac9158699175eab20f8c8532412efa4681d75f5eccceb295c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38cf42b6ed48f6fad3f918658bb31394d7ecb046 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 101h Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 DC 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerehmflaw.corn + + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: Letter Motion to Stay Proceedings 20-cv-484 (JGK-DCF), Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke, et al. + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write to Move to Stay proceedings in this matter until the conclusion of her pending criminal case. "Mlle power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). + +The interests of the courts, the public, the other parties and Ms. Maxwell all will best be served by a stay of this civil case. A stay will allow Ms. Maxwell to vigorously contest her criminal charges, and there is little chance that any evidence will be lost in the interim given the age of the accusations in this case. Plaintiff refuses to state whether she intends to pursue a civil remedy in the Epstein Claims Resolution Program, yet a stay also would permit her the opportunity to do so. She is inexplicably the only of the numerous Epstein plaintiffs in this Court to not agree to such a stay. While Plaintiff's counsel refuses to state whether his client is one of the three accusers in the currently-pending Maxwell Indictment, there exists substantial overlap in the facts and issues between this civil complaint and the Indictment. The burden on Ms. Maxwell to proceed forward in a civil case relating to quarter-century old events while detained at the MDC cannot be overstated in light of the conditions of her detention, to include no access to email, no access to her files, no access to her records from the relevant time period, no presence in depositions, and most importantly, insufficient access to her counsel. We respectfully request that this Court enter a stay. + + +Page 2 + +## Procedural Background + +On Maxwell wrote to this Court in connection with a separate pending civil suit, requesting a stay of discovery as to her, based on the U.S. Attorney's Office's public proclamation of an "ongoing" criminal investigation into alleged Jeffrey Epstein co-conspirators and on that plaintiff's stated intent to participate in the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program in the U.S. Virgin Islands. See v. Indyke, 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF, Doc. # 68 (May 13, 2020). Plaintiff opposed the request; her counsel David Boies claimed that Ms. Maxwell had not provided sufficient information about the ongoing criminal investigation and had refused to answer whether she herself is a target of such investigation. Id. at Doc. # 72 at 2. On May 22, after oral argument, this Court granted Ms. Maxwell's request in part, ordering that she not be required to answer interrogatories or give deposition testimony absent further order of the Court. Id., Doc. # 77. A short time later, on June 19, 2020, plaintiff reversed course and requested a stay of the proceedings, which was granted by this Court. Id. at Doc. # 84, 85. + +In this case, Jane Doe commenced her anonymous civil action on January 17, 2020. The Court approved alternative service on Ms. Maxwell on June 15. (Doc. # 45). On June 29, 2020, before she had the opportunity to answer, Ms. Maxwell was indicted by a grand jury. That criminal case is now pending before Judge Nathan, United States v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (MN). The July 8 Superseding Indictment is attached as Exhibit A ("Indictment"). Notably, the Indictment quotes directly from Ms. Maxwell's sealed civil deposition testimony in v. Maxwell, 15-cv-7433. + +On July 14, Ms. Maxwell was arraigned and pled not guilty. At the detention hearing, plaintiff spoke on the public record against Ms. Maxwell. Two other accusers provided their CVRA positions anonymously. Judge Nathan ordered Ms. Maxwell detained, and she currently is housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. A jury trial is scheduled to begin July 12, 2021. + +The U.S. Attorney's Office has refused to identify to Ms. Maxwell, even under seal or subject to the protective order, the accusers mentioned in the Indictment until it produces 3500 material shortly before trial. See 20 Cr. 330 (MN), Doc. # 40- 42. When asked on July 17, Plaintiff's counsel in this case refused to state whether his client is one of the three accusers described in the Indictment. + +Plaintiff's counsel has stated that his client is considering whether to participate in the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program but has not yet submitted such a claim. + +Hon. Debra Freeman August 19, 2020 Page 3 + +## Legal Standard + +"[Title power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA. Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Courts in this District balance the following six factors when considering whether to stay a civil matter: (1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; (3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; (4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the courts; and (6) the public interest. Id. at 99. + +## ARGUMENT + +Application of the six factors leads to the firm conclusion that this civil matter should be stayed. + +(1) Overlap of issues in the criminal and civil matters: A comparison of the Indictment and the Complaint reveals the common nature of the allegations and issues in both cases. Plaintiff Jane Doe contends she met Ms. Maxwell in the summer of 1994 and that she was "groomed" by Ms. Maxwell through movie and shopping excursions. Cplt 11 13-15. The Indictment likewise alleges that Ms. Maxwell spent time building friendships with minor victims by, for example, taking minor victims to the movies or shopping," including Minor Victim I whom she purportedly met in 1994. Ex. A at 1 4(a). Jane Doe alleges that Epstein paid for her educational opportunities and was facilitated by Ms. Maxwell. Cplt. 1 16. The Indictment makes the same claim. Ex. A at 1 4(d). The allegations contained in the Indictment at 17(a) are very similar in time frame and content to those in the Complaint.' + +Given the overlapping time frame, allegations and nature of the cases, the witnesses and evidence are highly likely to be overlapping, if not identical, in both this case and the criminal matter. + +I The press recently has speculated as much. See, e.g., Kate Briquelet, "Epstein Victim Claims He Showed Her Off to Trump When She Was 14," The Daily Beast (Aug. 18, 2020) (comparing Doe's allegations in the Complaint to the Indictment: "The accusations are similar to those in Maxwell's indictment. In 1994, the document says, Maxwell and Epstein 'attempted to befriend Minor Victim-I, taking her to the movies and on shopping trips' and asking the girl "about school, her classes, her family, and other aspects of her life.' They arranged for the victim to travel to New York and Florida, where she was abused by Epstein and Maxwell, prosecutors say.") (https://www.thedailybeast.com/epstein-victim-claims-heshowed-her-off-to-trump-at-mar-a-lago-when-she-was-14). + + +Page 4 + +(2) Status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted. "Whether the defendant has been indicted has been described as 'the most important factor' to be considered in the balance of factors..." Maldanado v. City of New York, Case No. 17-cv-6618 (MN), 2018 WL 2561026, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. June I, 2018) (citations omitted). "[O]nce an indictment has been issued, 'the likelihood that a defendant may make incriminating statements is greatest,' and 'the prejudice to the plaintiffs in the civil case is reduced since the criminal case will likely be quickly resolved due to Speedy Trial Act considerations."' Id. (quoting Trs. of the Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat? Pension Fund, 886 F. Supp. at 1139). "The weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that courts will stay a civil proceeding when the criminal investigation has ripened into an indictment." In re Par Phan!, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y.1990). + +Ms. Maxwell has been indicted, detained, arraigned and scheduled for trial. Should this case not be stayed, Ms. Maxwell will naturally be forced to decide whether to assert the Fifth Amendment protections afforded her by the U.S. Constitution or risk facing an adverse inference against her in this case. She also will have to make such a choice in response to written discovery requests. The burdens on an indicted defendant have led numerous courts in this Circuit and elsewhere to impose a stay on overlapping civil cases during the pendency of a criminal case. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Bemer, 18-CV -00699 (VLB), 2018 WL 5619716 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2018) (granting stay of federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act civil after defendant was charged in state court with patronizing a minor prostitute victim of trafficking); Stamile v. County of Nassau, No. CV 10-2632(SJF)(AKT), 2011 WL 1754125, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (granting stay of related civil proceedings following indictment of defendant accused of sexually touching inmates in jail). + +(3) Private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay. Plaintiff has brought this civil case a full 26 years after she claims the wrongdoing occurred. Having waited more than a quarter of century to pursue her claims, any evidence that has been lost to the passage of time is unlikely to have been in existence even at the inception of Plaintiff's case. In other words, there is hardly much harm in waiting an additional matter of months to litigate claims as stale as those presented here. Moreover, the Epstein Voluntary Claims Resolution Program, the basis for the stays for each of the other pending actions concerning Mr. Epstein and the one other concerning Ms. Maxwell, requires participation by, at least, March 2021. During the pendency of the requested stay, Plaintiff will have a full opportunity to participate in that program obviating the need for this case to proceed at all. + +(4) Private interests of and burden on the defendant. "A stay can protect a defendant from making a 'Hobson's choice' of choosing to be prejudiced in the civil litigation if the defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege, or from being + + +Page 5 + +prejudiced in the criminal proceeding if he or she waives that privilege in the civil litigation." Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 97. Furthermore: + +The Sixth Amendment provides that `Din all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Civil discovery is intrusive and time consuming. Engagirait civil discovery, including depositions and interrogatory compliance, Maxwell's] ability to zealously defend this civil case while at the same time preserving [her] right to defend against the criminal charges. To the extent [s]he is forced to make the "Hobson's choice" between protecting [her] financial interests by defending [herself] in this civil action and [her] penal interests by defending [herself] in the criminal charges, his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and speedy trial will be abridged if not denied. + +Nesbitt, 2018 WL 5619716 at \*6. Finally, the burden on Ms. Maxwell to proceed forward in a civil case while detained in the MDC without access to her files or potential witnesses, cannot be overstated. Defending against conduct that purportedly occurred decades ago requires an extraordinary degree of forensic sleuthing through one's records, memories, witnesses, and events. Her counsel cannot meet with her in person at all, and she cannot participate in any depositions. She currently has no access to email, so cannot review drafts, discovery or pleadings, without waiting for the mail, the opportunity to review and mark-up, and then mailing the pleadings back. The burden for actively litigating this civil case from custody, particularly given the restrictions imposed by the Covid-era, is extraordinary and cannot possibly result in fair proceedings in this case. + +(5) Interests of the court: "As many courts in similar circumstances have noted, `[t]he Criminal Case will resolve issues of fact common to the civil case and may reduce the number of issues to be decided in subsequent proceedings in this case."' SEC v. Abraaj Invest. Mgmt Ltd., 19-CV-3244 (MN), 2019 WL 6498282 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2019) (collecting cases); see also Shkreli, 2016 WL 1122029, at ■6 **("A stay of the civil action while the criminal case moves forward `would avoid a duplication of efforts and a waste of judicial time and resources.'");** SEC v. One or More Unknown Purchasers of Secs. of Global Indus., Case No. 11-cv-6500, 2012 WL 5505738, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) ("the Civil Case is likely to benefit to some extent from the Criminal Case no matter its outcome"). + +This is the only of the numerous Epstein related civil cases that has not been stayed pending the Claims Program outcomes. In conferral, Plaintiff has not advanced a cogent reason for wanting to press ahead alone, while coyly indicating his client is considering participation in that same program. Duplication of this Court's efforts at the same time that Judge Nathan is overseeing the criminal trial cannot be justified by Plaintiff. + +Hon. Debra Freeman August 19, 2020 Page 6 (6) Public interest.Finally, numerous courts have recognized a stay is "often necessary where liberal discovery rules will allow a litigant to undermine, or gain an unfair advantage in, a potential criminal prosecution which parallels the subject matter of the civil action." SEC v. Downe, Case No. 92-cv-4092, 1993 WL 22126 at \*12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1993). Most commonly, government-intervenors request such a stay to deny criminal defendants an unfair tactical advantage by circumventing the limited discovery provided by Fed.R.Cr.P. 16. However, there is no principled reason why the same logic should not apply to a civil plaintiff opposing a stay who might, for example, either alone or at the behest of the U.S. Attorney's Office seek to gain discovery from a civil defendant that would not be available to the government in the criminal case. Such discovery might include testimony of the criminal defendant or non-cooperative witnesses. Nor could a protective order cure this potential circumvention: the Indictment pending against Ms. Maxwell includes direct quotes from her civiltestimony that is both under seal and subject to a protective order in the case. In any event, a specific showing that plaintiff or the government "is likely to engage in misconduct is not necessary to conclude that the public's interest in witness security and integrity favors a stay." Abraaj Invest., 2019 WL 6498282 at \*3 (quotations omitted). It should be enough that discovery in this case, and any concomitant publicity, might allow witnesses in the criminal prosecution to conform their decades-old memories to that developed in the civil case, undermining the integrity of both proceedings. + +For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order staying the case until further order of the Court, and asks that the parties be directed to update the Court within 10 days of either (a) Plaintiff's successful participation in the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program or (b) the conclusion of Ms. Maxwell's criminal trial. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Laura A. Menninger 6 + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..781657ec3abfcef6e9e98bbcadccb819b1427ace --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752280/EFTA02752280.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -64, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752280", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "34716529442b3a07ee4813d21e15b9a7d2e62701ce72c2146cd3d4efc68c1d02", + "output_sha256": "8bc069aadc390d54f96cd7a46429edba9e3cf7fab8eb2f11944cde71bd67ef3d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ec91a74c165bb2a56b6978a817f18d92d4c70afb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz©troutman.com + + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write to obtain relief from Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff') refusal to reschedule the deposition of Darren K. Indyke, scheduled for August 26, 2020. Given recent case developments, holding the deposition next week defies the parties' obligations to promote judicial economy and avoid wasting party resources, as well as common sense. + +There are five reasons the deposition should not proceed next Wednesday. First if the deposition occurs next week then Plaintiff will undoubtedly seek to hold another deposition at a later date, following the parties' substantial completion of document discovery. Per this Court's Order dated August 14, document production has been stayed pending the entry of a protective order. The parties are required to make a joint proposal to Your Honor regarding the protective order by August 26, the day upon which the deposition is currently scheduled. Even if the parties are able to jointly propose, and the Court approve, a mutually agreed upon protective order in the next several days (which seems unlikely given that we are still waiting on feedback from counsel for the other parties), there would not be nearly enough time for the parties to complete their document productions, let alone to review each other's productions in preparation for the deposition. Regrettably, Plaintiffs counsel has repeatedly refused to confirm that she will not seek to further depose Mr. Indyke following the parties' document productions. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. +Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_14.jpeg) + + +The parties' document productions should be completed before the deposition proceeds. This will necessarily happen in short order: the Court's Order requires the parties to complete their document productions within one week of entry of the protective order. Doc. 68 at ¶ 2. + +Second, for the same reasons that this Court stayed document production pending entry of a protective order, it makes no sense to have any depositions proceed until the ground rules regarding confidentiality, including with respect to deposition testimony and exhibits, are set. + +Third, having the deposition next week would be unduly prejudicial to the Co-Executors as the result of Plaintiff's prior failures to provide proper notice of non-party discovery. Yesterday, counsel for Plaintiff confirmed for the first time that she has in fact received various documents from subpoenaed witnesses, stating in an email: + +Although responsive documents were not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas, we have recently obtained documentary evidence from these witnesses through their counsel. Indeed, we received what we expect to be the last of the evidence yesterday. In light of the Court's 8/14 Order regarding the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. + +However, the fact remains that we do not know the universe of so-called documentary evidence that Plaintiff received, when she received it, or from whom. The deposition of Mr. Indyke should not proceed while Plaintiff is improperly in sole possession of discovery. The Co-Executors have a fundamental right to review discovery materials that may form the basis for Plaintiff's deposition questions. + +Fourth, Plaintiff has failed to provide topics about which she will depose Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor of Mr. Epstein's Estate. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) ("In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination." (emphasis added)).{sup}`1` We raised this straightforward, uncontroversial issue multiple times, including by email on August 4, 6, 14, 17, and 19; Plaintiff's counsel never responded. During the parties' meet-and-confer telephone call on August 10, counsel for Plaintiff said he would confer with his + + +{sup}`1` The Committee Notes to the 2007 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) provide: "[O]ther entity" is added to the list of organizations that may be named as deponent. The purpose is to ensure that the deposition process can be used to reach information known or reasonably available to an organization *no matter what abstract fictive concept is used to describe the organization*. Nothing is gained by wrangling over the place to fit into current rule language such entities as limited liability companies, limited partnerships, business trusts, more exotic common-law creations, or forms developed in other countries." (emphasis added). Mr. Indyke is being deposed as the fiduciary of an estate, not solely in his individual capacity. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. +Page 3 + +![](_page_2_Picture_14.jpeg) + + +colleagues and then provide us with a response. Despite this representation and our follow-up inquiries, Plaintiff counsel has still not confirmed whether he will be providing a list of topics for Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor, much less actually provided one. If Plaintiff's counsel does not provide such a list, we will be forced to seek relief from this Court and the deposition should not proceed until that issue is resolved. Even if Plaintiff provides such a list today, we will not have sufficient time between now and next Wednesday to consider it, meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding any issues, and, if necessary, raise such issues with the Court. + +Fifth, yesterday evening Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell moved to stay this lawsuit in light of her ongoing criminal matter, which is currently scheduled for trial next summer. There is no reason that discovery should proceed in a piecemeal fashion, either while the motion for a stay is pending or during the stay itself. + +When we raised these issues with Plaintiff's counsel, we did not receive a substantive response to our concerns. Rather, Plaintiff's counsel stated they "would still like to proceed with [the deposition] on 8/26 since that date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now" and "would still like to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week even if [the Co-Executors] still haven't given [Plaintiff] documents before then". Despite our requests, no further explanation for Plaintiff's position has been provided. + +We have not received an answer to our repeated requests for a time to meet-and-confer today by phone about these and other pressing issues related to Plaintiff's discovery deficiencies, which are not as time-sensitive and thus we do not raise at this time. However, given the rapidly approaching deposition date and the issues listed above, we are left with no choice but to seek the intervention of the Court. We therefore respectfully request that the Court order Plaintiff to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition for a mutually agreeable date after resolution of Ms. Maxwell's motion to stay, Plaintiff's disclosure of deposition topics, entry of a protective order, and the parties' substantial completion of their document productions. + +Very truly yours, + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Laura Menninger, Esq. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..32407fbd3f27265f24f6d34773cc89b5fb747461 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752286/EFTA02752286.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -72, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752286", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d747b2917d5401845368eca68e35cd70e96adcfd085731a0b5f0b0fabe6fb9ab", + "output_sha256": "4ed272ad470d69d8f0ae66a3159f1c15f08d95ceed5a93c732661d374d772628", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6a9581690651b5f6c22685fc67977717bec7892a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.md @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +# PANISH SHEA& BOYL I E + +August 20, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JUK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We are writing on behalf of our client, plaintiff Jane Doe, in the above-referenced litigation. Earlier today, counsel for the Jeffrey Epstein Estate submitted a letter to the Court seeking to cancel the deposition of Darren Indyke scheduled for next week on Wednesday, August 26, 2020. This is a date that Mr. Indyke's own counsel selected last month that was agreed upon by the parties. Now, however, the Epstein Estate attorneys are raising a myriad of excuses to avoid producing Mr. Indyke for his properly noticed deposition. + +Since Mr. Indyke is being deposed in both his personal capacity and as a co-executor of the Epstein Estate, we expect him to offer extremely relevant testimony concerning the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs complaint. Indeed, we have reason to believe he has firsthand knowledge of Jeffrey Epstein's relationship with Plaintiff while she was a minor and even acted on Jeffrey Epstein's behalf to communicate with Plaintiff on several occasions. His testimony is vital to Plaintiffs case and the Epstein Estate should not be allowed to prevent his deposition from going forward. + +And despite counsel for the Epstein Estate representing to this Court that Plaintiff has not agreed to only take one deposition of Mr. Indyke, that is untrue. As stated in our emails to counsel for the Epstein Estate', we understand that Mr. Indyke is only being produced one time for his deposition. And even though the Epstein Estate has still failed to provide Plaintiff with a single document or piece of evidence in this case despite sending requests for them over 4 + +We have attached the full and complete email string concerning this issue for the Court's review and consideration. + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +August 20, 2020 Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +months ago, Plaintiff still intends on proceeding with the deposition next week with or without the documents. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +From: Robert Glassman Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 9:38 AM To: 'Moskowitz, Bennet J.' Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman; Laura Menninger; Weiner, Daniel H.; Kevin Boyle; Andrew Tomback Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Hi Bennet, as I stated on Tuesday, we would still like to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week even if you still haven't given us documents before then. I am sorry if you did not understand that the first time I said it. In that regard, please confirm you received the Zoom link we circulated earlier this week for his deposition. + +I'm not sure you correctly stated the chronology of events concerning your proposed confidentiality order and NDA. I provided you with my edits to it on August 10—ten days ago. Up until last night, we did not hear from you whether you had issues with or were satisfied with them. As Judge Freeman stated, the PO should protect the identity of other alleged Epstein/Maxwell minor victims. Other than that, I can't think of any other subject matter that ought to be legitimately protected that already isn't in this case. Regarding carving out Mr. Epstein from paragraph 4(a-b), it is my understanding that one does not have a right to privacy after death. If I'm wrong about that, I am happy to take a look at your authorities to the contrary. + +Regarding the documents I told you about earlier this week, as I said then, because of the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. But since you asked about them, please also answer for us the same questions you asked me last night about the documents you've been withholding from us. Specifically: + +How did you obtain them? Who did you obtain them from? What comprises the documents you have and when did you receive them? Why haven't you produced the materials you have to us upon your receipt of them? + +Regarding Mr. Kahn's deposition, we've been requesting dates for his deposition for several weeks now. To date, however, you have not provided any to us. With respect to Mr. Kahn testifying in his personal capacity, we would like to know to what extent he knew about Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell's criminal enterprise. We would like to know if Mr. Epstein had ever told him that he sexually abused and raped my client and other minor victims. I trust you would agree that even if Mr. Kahn started working for Mr. Epstein after Mr. Epstein stopped abusing my client that doesn't mean Mr. Kahn wouldn't or doesn't know anything about it. Right? + +Regarding the damages computation, we supplemented our response to your interrogatory which was what you wanted us to do in your letter to the Court and which was brought up with Judge Freeman at the conference. We separated out non-economic damages from punitive damages which is what Judge Freeman ordered and we specified what plaintiff's damages are to the Estate of Epstein and Maxwell. Judge Freeman said that if the past and future numbers are the same, we wouldn't need to separate them out. Here, the past and future numbers are the same. If, however, you want us to copy and paste the same response in a Rule 26 disclosure for you too, let me know and we would be happy to do that as well. + +Lastly, but perhaps most pressing, since Ms. Maxwell moved for a complete stay of this case in its entirety, then per the Court's Order, " within two business days of the motion's submission, the panics should jointly propose a schedule for opposition and reply submissions, and should also inform this Court of their views as to whether the motion should (or should not) affect any other deadlines set by this Order." Accordingly, we need to file a proposed briefing schedule by end of day tomorrow addressing the Maxwell request for stay. I propose that we have until Thursday, + +August 27 to file oppositions and replies bi.iday, Sept. 4. I also think the motion should not affect any other deadlines set by the Order. Bennet/Mary /Laura, please let me know your respective positions on this so we can file the joint proposed briefing schedule. Thanks. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tel: (310) 477-1700 Fax: (310) 477.1699 Email: glassman@psblaw.com Web: www.psblaw.com + +### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LIP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. [mailto:Bennet.Moskowitz@troutman.comj + +Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 7:03 PM + +To: Robert Glassman + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman ; Laura Menninger ; Weiner, Daniel H. ; Kevin Boyle ; Andrew Tomback + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Robert, + +As an initial matter, please clarify your position: if you are able to take Mr. Indyke's deposition next week, which would be over our objections (as explained below), are you committing to forgoing a further deposition of him following the parties' document productions? This is a yes or no question; and we need to know the answer today so we can advise the Court. + +With regard to the confidentiality agreement, we are not the hold up. Rather, we were waiting for input from you and Ms. Maxwell, who has now moved for a stay of the lawsuit. + +As you know, we circulated our draft confidentiality agreement on July 15 but only received your edits on August 10, a few hours before our meet-and-confer call. As counsel for Ms. Maxwell noted during the call, this short turnaround time had not allowed her to discuss your edits with her client. While we all acknowledged during our meet and confer that the confidentiality agreement should not be finalized without Ms. Maxwell's input, we did in fact raise several objections to your edits to which you still have not yet responded. In particular, we raised concerns that you had completely removed paragraphs 19-24, which provide standard claw-back provisions. We noted the importance of such a provision and asked you during the call for an + +explanation of your edits. We still have not received an answer. We are similarly concerned by your edits to paragraph 4, particularly your carving Mr. Epstein out of 4(a-b) and the deletion of 4(d-f) in their entirety. Please explain these changes as well. As noted during the call, you have proposed substantial and unusual edits, but once we understand the basis for your edits, we will be able to respond more fully. + +Your account of the "documentary evidence" you received from the witnesses you subpoenaed raises many questions. If, as you state, the "documentary evidence" was "not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas," how did you obtain it? Are these witnesses the only individuals from whom you have obtained "evidence"? What comprises this "documentary evidence" and from which of the witnesses was it received and when? What is the basis for your expectation that "the last of the evidence" was produced to you this week? Why didn't you produce the materials to us upon receipt? + +The fact remains that we do not know the universe of materials that has been produced to your client, when it was produced, or by whom. Nor have we had the opportunity to examine or review all of the "documentary evidence." As a result, you have unduly prejudiced our clients by depriving us of the opportunity to fully prepare them for their depositions. Combined with the lack of a finalized confidentiality agreement and your continued refusal to answer our questions regarding the topics to be covered by Mr. Indyke in his deposition as a Co-Executor, we are not in a position to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week. Nor does it make any sense for the deposition to proceed pending the resolution of Ms. Maxwell's motion to stay this lawsuit, which she filed earlier this evening. + +Please let us know today whether you will agree to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition. If not, please indicate whether you have any basis for refusing beyond the argument that the "date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now." + +With regard to the deposition of Richard Kahn, please provide us with your basis for seeking his deposition in his capacity as an individual. As noted, Mr. Kahn did not work with Mr. Epstein until, per your own Complaint, six years after the Plaintiff ceased her interaction with Mr. Epstein. We therefore need some guidance about what evidence Mr. Kahn could offer in his personal capacity. Per the Court's Order, if we "cannot agree as to whether this would be permissible," we will need to set a briefing schedule to address the scope of his deposition. Additionally, as we requested, please let us know when your client is available for her deposition. + +With regard to the damages disclosure and as raised in Mary [REDACTED] email on Friday, to which you still have yet to respond, the document you served on August 13 was styled as a supplemental response to the Co-Executors' Interrogatories, not a damages disclosure pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1). That document did not separate out the computation of damages as required by the Court during our conference on August 5. There is no breakdown of the damages according to the type of harm alleged, whether the harm in question is past or future, from which of the Defendants these damages are being sought, or the calculations used to arrive at any of these numbers. Nor are there any supporting documents, including medical records or actuarial tables, supporting your calculations. Please explain your failure to comply with the Court's instructions and remedy the deficiencies in accordance with the Court's recent Order. + +Similarly, as raised by Mary [REDACTED] on Friday and previously discussed in our deficiency letters and during our meet-and-confer call in June, we have yet to receive verifications from Plaintiff for any of her responses and supplemental responses to the Co-Executors' interrogatories. Please provide those immediately. + +We have repeatedly tried to resolve our concerns by emails, which you have either ignored or addressed only in part. We have also asked for your availability to meet and confer, without receiving any proposed times. In addition to providing us with your position today regarding Mr. Indyke's deposition, please let us know when you are available to meet-and-confer tomorrow morning on the outstanding issues identified in this email, Mary [REDACTED] communications from last week, and our two deficiency letters. + +Thank you, +Bennet + +Partner + +troutman pepper + +Direct: 212.704.6087 + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +\*Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +From: Robert Glassman + +Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 5:58 PM + +To: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman ; Laura + +Menninger ; Weiner, Daniel H. ; Kevin Boyle + + + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +### EXTERNAL SENDER + +Hi Bennet, + +Thanks for your email. I am in agreement with your recitation in paragraph 1 of your email concerning the Court's 8/14/20 Scheduling Order. + +Regarding Mr. Indyke's deposition which is scheduled for August 26, I understand that you will not be producing him multiple times for his deposition. I also realize that we may not receive documents from you before that time. Although I will note that nothing is stopping us from finalizing your draft PO before that time. The Court gave us until August 26 to resolve the issue but we can certainly finalize it before then. Right? In this regard, I would welcome your feedback on my proposed edits so we can get the ball rolling. But even if we cannot, for whatever reason, get the documents before his deposition, we would still like to proceed with it on 8/26 since that date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now. Let me know your thoughts on that. + +Per the Court's 8/14 Order, please also send me some dates for Mr. Kahn's deposition. Like Mr. Indyke, we would like to depose him in both his capacity as Co-Executor and in his personal capacity. So I suppose Mr. Tomback will have to be involved in the setting of that. + +Additionally, we served you with our amended damages computation on August 13 separating out the punitive damages and non-economic damages as ordered by the Court. Please let me know that you got it. Finally, per the Court's Order, please be advised that plaintiff previously served Rule 45 subpoenas for the depositions of Juan Alessi, David Rogers and Larry Visoski. Notice of such depositions were email served on you on June 30. Although responsive documents were not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas, we have recently obtained documentary evidence from these witnesses through their counsel. Indeed, we received what we expect to be the last of the evidence yesterday. In light of the Court's 8/14 Order regarding the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. + +If you would like to discuss any of this further, do not hesitate to call or email me. + +Robert + +Robert Glassman, Esq. + +Pettish Shea & Boyle LLP + +Tel: (310) 477-1700 + +Fax: (310) 477-1699 + +Email: glassman@psblaw.com + +Web: www.psblaw.com + +#### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LIP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. [mailto:Bennet.Moskowitz@troutman.com] + +Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 4:51 PM + +To: Robert Glassman + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman • Laura Menninger • Weiner, Daniel H. + +Subject: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-16K-DCF + +Hello Robert, + +Per the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order that hit the docket earlier today, document production in this action is now expressly stayed pending the Court's entry of a protective order (Doc. 68, § 2). Moreover, by August 26 (the previously noticed date for Mr. Indyke's deposition), the parties are required to make a joint proposal to the Court regarding a protective order (Id.). We trust that, absent complete agreement on such order, which regrettably seems unlikely based on prior meet-and-confers and your recent proposed edits, the Court will then need time to review the parties' respective submissions and rule on the matter. The parties will then have one week from the entry of such an order to make their document productions (id.)—something which we are prepared to do, as previously discussed. Separately, until this Wednesday, we will not know Ms. Maxwell's position on the discovery schedule or whether she plans to move for a partial or complete stay of this action (Id. at § 1). + +You have previously indicated that you would like to receive Defendants' respective document productions before you depose them. That is understandable. However, we are not willing to make either of the Co-Executors available for multiple depositions. Accordingly, we should reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition until Defendants' documents have been produced. We should discuss that date along with dates for your client's deposition and the deposition of Mr. Kahn, as Co-Executor. If you still intend to depose Mr. Kahn in his personal capacity, please inform him of that and your basis for doing so -- and then he must be part of the discussion regarding the timing and sequence of depositions. + +Please confirm at your earliest convenience whether you agree to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition. If you decline, we will have no choice but to immediately seek the Court's assistance to: (1) compel Plaintiff to provide deposition topics insofar as she seeks to depose Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor; and (2) preclude Plaintiff from pressing ahead with Mr. Indyke's deposition only to later seek another deposition of him following Defendants' completion of their document productions. If you decline, please provide us with the basis for your decision so as to expedite our raising the issue with the Court. + +Best, Bennet Bennet J. Moskowitz\* + +Partner + +Direct: 212.704.6087 + +bennet.moskowitz(&troutman.com + +troutman pepper + +875 Third Avenue + +New York, NY 10022 + +troutman.com + +\*Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +#### A HIGHER COMMITMENT TO CLIENT CARE + +Troutman Sanders and Pepper have combined to become Troutman Pepper (Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP). Troutman Pepper offers expanded capabilities and practice strengths while continuing to deliver powerful solutions to clients' legal and business issues with a higher commitment to client care. + +This e-mail (and any attachments) from a law firm may contain legally privileged and confidential information solely for the intended recipient. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete it. Any unauthorized reading, distribution, copying, or other use of this e-mail (and attachments) is strictly prohibited. We have taken precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting computer viruses, but you should scan attachments for viruses and other malicious threats; we are not liable for any loss or damage caused by viruses. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3866a621f68ed34e4eb29b49a7c894caa898a736 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752289/EFTA02752289.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752289", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "1784c76c7f037c2c32b5430091beab6786b814c1650e2ebb066c8c4fa6e8a328", + "output_sha256": "1784c76c7f037c2c32b5430091beab6786b814c1650e2ebb066c8c4fa6e8a328", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aff144334f823ee5d01f9cc199e84e24673cc33d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.md @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +From: Metcalfe, Mary Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 3:18 PM To: 'Robert Glassman'; Moskowitz, Bennet J. Cc: Nathan Werksman; Laura Menninger; Weiner, Daniel H.; Kevin Boyle; Andrew Tomback Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Robert, + +We will make Mr. Kahn available for a deposition in his capacity as co-executor only, on a mutually agreeable date in the second half of September or in October. Please keep in mind September is very difficult with the various holidays. Please let us know several possible dates on your side within the proposed window. This is without prejudice to our clients' rights and legal positions, including regarding the potential stay of discovery or the entire action. + +Thanks, + +Mary W. Metcalfe + +Associate + + +Direct: 212.704.6029 I Mobile: 425.984.4165 + +marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com + +From: Robert Glassman + +Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 12:38 PM + +To: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman; Laura Menninger; Weiner, Daniel H.; Kevin Boyle; Andrew Tomback + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +# EXTERNAL SENDER + +Hi Bennet, as I stated on Tuesday, we would still like to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week even if you still haven't given us documents before then. I am sorry if you did not understand that the first time I said it. In that regard, please confirm you received the Zoom link we circulated earlier this week for his deposition. + +I'm not sure you correctly stated the chronology of events concerning your proposed confidentiality order and NDA. I provided you with my edits to it on August 10—ten days ago. Up until last night, we did not hear from you whether you had issues with or were satisfied with them. As Judge Freeman stated, the PO should protect the identity of other alleged Epstein/Maxwell minor victims. Other than that, I can't think of any other subject matter that ought to be legitimately protected that already isn't in this case. Regarding carving out Mr. Epstein from paragraph 4(a-b), it is my understanding that one does not have a right to privacy after death. If I'm wrong about that, I am happy to take a look at your authorities to the contrary. + +Regarding the documents I told you about earlier this week, as I said then, because of the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. But since you asked about them, please also answer for us the same questions you asked me last night about the documents you've been withholding from us. Specifically: + +How did you obtain them? + +Who did you obtain them from? + +What comprises the documents you have and when did you receive them? + +Why haven't you produced the materials you have to us upon your receipt of them? + +Regarding Mr. Kahn's deposition, we've been requesting dates for his deposition for several weeks now. To date, however, you have not provided any to us. With respect to Mr. Kahn testifying in his personal capacity, we would like to know to what extent he knew about Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell's criminal enterprise. We would like to know if Mr. Epstein had ever told him that he sexually abused and raped my client and other minor victims. I trust you would agree that even if Mr. Kahn started working for Mr. Epstein after Mr. Epstein stopped abusing my client that doesn't mean Mr. Kahn wouldn't or doesn't know anything about it. Right? + +Regarding the damages computation, we supplemented our response to your interrogatory which was what you wanted us to do in your letter to the Court and which was brought up with Judge Freeman at the conference. We separated out non-economic damages from punitive damages which is what Judge Freeman ordered and we specified what plaintiff's damages are to the Estate of Epstein and Maxwell. Judge Freeman said that if the past and future numbers are the same, we wouldn't need to separate them out. Here, the past and future numbers are the same. If, however, you want us to copy and paste the same response in a Rule 26 disclosure for you too, let me know and we would be happy to do that as well. + +lastly, but perhaps most pressing, since Ms. Maxwell moved for a complete stay of this case in its entirety, then per the Court's Order, " within two business days of the motion's submission, the parties should jointly propose a schedule for opposition and reply submissions, and should also inform this Court of their views as to whether the motion should (or should not) affect any other deadlines set by this Order." Accordingly, we need to file a proposed briefing schedule by end of day tomorrow addressing the Maxwell request for stay. I propose that we have until Thursday, August 27 to file oppositions and replies Friday, Sept. 4. I also think the motion should not affect any other deadlines set by the Order. Bennet/Mary MLaura, please let me know your respective positions on this so we can file the joint proposed briefing schedule. Thanks. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. + +Panish Shea & Boyle LLP + +11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 + +Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +Tel: (310) 477-1700 + +Fax: (310) 477-1699 + +Email: glassman@psblaw.com + +Web: www.psblaw.com + +### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +**Sent:** Wednesday, August 19, 2020 7:03 PM + +**To:** Robert Glassman <[glassman@psblaw.com](mailto:glassman@psblaw.com)> + +**Cc:** Metcalfe, Mary [[MaryGrace.Metcalfe@troutman.com](mailto:MaryGrace.Metcalfe@troutman.com)]; Nathan Werksman <[werksman@psblaw.com](mailto:werksman@psblaw.com)>; Laura Menninger <[menninger@hmflaw.com](mailto:menninger@hmflaw.com)>; Weiner, Daniel H. <[daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com)>; Kevin Boyle <[Boyle@psblaw.com](mailto:Boyle@psblaw.com)>; Andrew Tomback <[ATomback@mclaughlinstern.com](mailto:ATomback@mclaughlinstern.com)> + +**Subject:** RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Robert, + +As an initial matter, please clarify your position: if you are able to take Mr. Indyke's deposition next week, which would be over our objections (as explained below), are you committing to forgoing a further deposition of him following the parties' document productions? This is a yes or no question; and we need to know the answer today so we can advise the Court. + +With regard to the confidentiality agreement, we are not the hold up. Rather, we were waiting for input from you and Ms. Maxwell, who has now moved for a stay of the lawsuit. + +As you know, we circulated our draft confidentiality agreement on July 15 but only received your edits on August 10, a few hours before our meet-and-confer call. As counsel for Ms. Maxwell noted during the call, this short turnaround time had not allowed her to discuss your edits with her client. While we all acknowledged during our meet and confer that the confidentiality agreement should not be finalized without Ms. Maxwell's input, we did in fact raise several objections to your edits to which you still have not yet responded. In particular, we raised concerns that you had completely removed paragraphs 19-24, which provide standard claw-back provisions. We noted the importance of such a provision and asked you during the call for an explanation of your edits. We still have not received an answer. We are similarly concerned by your edits to paragraph 4, particularly your carving Mr. Epstein out of 4(a-b) and the deletion of 4(d-f) in their entirety. Please explain these changes as well. As noted during the call, you have proposed substantial and unusual edits, but once we understand the basis for your edits, we will be able to respond more fully. + +Your account of the "documentary evidence" you received from the witnesses you subpoenaed raises many questions. If, as you state, the "documentary evidence" was "not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas," how did you obtain it? Are these witnesses the only individuals from whom you have obtained "evidence"? What comprises this "documentary evidence" and from which of the witnesses was it received and when? What is the basis for your expectation that "the last of the evidence" was produced to you this week? Why didn't you produce the materials to us upon receipt? + +The fact remains that we do not know the universe of materials that has been produced to your client, when it was produced, or by whom. Nor have we had the opportunity to examine or review all of the "documentary evidence." As a result, you have unduly prejudiced our clients by depriving us of the opportunity to fully prepare them for their depositions. Combined with the lack of a finalized confidentiality agreement and your continued refusal to answer our questions regarding the topics to be covered by Mr. Indyke in his deposition as a Co-Executor, we are not in a position to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week. Nor does it make any sense for the deposition to proceed pending the resolution of Ms. Maxwell's motion to stay this lawsuit, which she filed earlier this evening. + +Please let us know today whether you will agree to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition. If not, please indicate whether you have any basis for refusing beyond the argument that the "date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now." + +With regard to the deposition of Richard Kahn, please provide us with your basis for seeking his deposition in his capacity as an individual. As noted, Mr. Kahn did not work with Mr. Epstein until, per your own Complaint, six years after the Plaintiff ceased her interaction with Mr. Epstein. We therefore need some guidance about + +what evidence Mr. Kahn could offer in his personal capacity. Per the Court's Order, if we "cannot agree as to whether this would be permissible," we will need to set a briefing schedule to address the scope of his deposition. Additionally, as we requested, please let us know when your client is available for her deposition. + +With regard to the damages disclosure and as raised in Mary email on Friday, to which you still have yet to respond, the document you served on August 13 was styled as a supplemental response to the Co-Executors' Interrogatories, not a damages disclosure pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1). That document did not separate out the computation of damages as required by the Court during our conference on August 5. There is no breakdown of the damages according to the type of harm alleged, whether the harm in question is past or future, from which of the Defendants these damages are being sought, or the calculations used to arrive at any of these numbers. Nor are there any supporting documents, including medical records or actuarial tables, supporting your calculations. Please explain your failure to comply with the Court's instructions and remedy the deficiencies in accordance with the Court's recent Order. + +Similarly, as raised by Mary on Friday and previously discussed in our deficiency letters and during our meet-and-confer call in June, we have yet to receive verifications from Plaintiff for any of her responses and supplemental responses to the Co-Executors' interrogatories. Please provide those immediately. + +We have repeatedly tried to resolve our concerns by emails, which you have either ignored or addressed only in part. We have also asked for your availability to meet and confer, without receiving any proposed times. In addition to providing us with your position today regarding Mr. Indyke's deposition, please let us know when available to meet-and-confer tomorrow morning on the outstanding issues identified in this email, Mary communications from last week, and our two deficiency letters. + +Thank you, Bennet + +Bennet J. Moskowitz\* + +Partner + + +Direct: 212.704.6087 bennet.moskowitz troutman.com + +'Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +From: Robert Glassman + +Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 5:58 PM + +To: Moskowitz, Bennet J. + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman ; Laura + +Menninger • Weiner, Daniel H. • Kevin Boyle + + + +Subject: RE: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## EXTERNAL SENDER + +Hi Bennet, + +Thanks for your email. I am in agreement with your recitation in paragraph 1 of your email concerning the Court's 8/14/20 Scheduling Order. + +Regarding Mr. Indyke's deposition which is scheduled for August 26, I understand that you will not be producing him multiple times for his deposition. I also realize that we may not receive documents from you before that time. Although I will note that nothing is stopping us from finalizing your draft PO before that time. The Court gave us until August 26 to resolve the issue but we can certainly finalize it before then. Right? In this regard, I would welcome your feedback on my proposed edits so we can get the ball rolling. But even if we cannot, for whatever reason, get the documents before his deposition, we would still like to proceed with it on 8/26 since that date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now. Let me know your thoughts on that. + +Per the Court's 8/14 Order, please also send me some dates for Mr. Kahn's deposition. Like Mr. Indyke, we would like to depose him in both his capacity as Co-Executor and in his personal capacity. So I suppose Mr. Tomback will have to be involved in the setting of that. + +Additionally, we served you with our amended damages computation on August 13 separating out the punitive damages and non-economic damages as ordered by the Court. Please let me know that you got it. Finally, per the Court's Order, please be advised that plaintiff previously served Rule 45 subpoenas for the depositions of Juan Alessi, David Rogers and Larry Visoski. Notice of such depositions were email served on you on June 30. Although responsive documents were not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas, we have recently obtained documentary evidence from these witnesses through their counsel. Indeed, we received what we expect to be the last of the evidence yesterday. In light of the Court's 8/14 Order regarding the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. + +If you would like to discuss any of this further, do not hesitate to call or email me. + +Robert + +Robert Glassman, Esq. Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tel: (310) 477-1700 Fax: (310) 477-1699 Email: glassman@psblaw.com Web: www.psblaw.com + +### CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: + +This e-mail may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender by reply e-mail or telephone, and delete all copies of this message. + +If you are a potential client, the information you disclose to us by email will be kept in strict confidence and will be protected to the full extent of the law. Please be advised, however, that Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and its lawyers do not represent you until you have signed a retainer agreement with the firm. Until that time, you are responsible for any statutes of limitations or other deadlines for your case or potential case. + +From: Moskowitz, Bennet J. [mailto:Bennet.MoskowitzPtroutman.coml + +Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 4:51 PM + +To: Robert Glassmarassman@psblaw.com> + +Cc: Metcalfe, Mary ; Nathan Werksman • Laura Menninger , Weiner, Daniel H. cdaniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com> + +Subject: Jane Doe, 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Hello Robert, + +Per the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order that hit the docket earlier today, document production in this action is now expressly stayed pending the Court's entry of a protective order (Doc. 68, § 2). Moreover, by August 26 (the previously noticed date for Mr. Indyke's deposition), the parties are required to make a joint + +proposal to the Court regarding a protective order (Id.). We trust that, absent complete agreement on such order, which regrettably seems unlikely based on prior meet-and-confers and your recent proposed edits, the Court will then need time to review the parties' respective submissions and rule on the matter. The parties will then have one week from the entry of such an order to make their document productions (id.)—something which we are prepared to do, as previously discussed. Separately, until this Wednesday, we will not know Ms. Maxwell's position on the discovery schedule or whether she plans to move for a partial or complete stay of this action (Id. at § 1). + +You have previously indicated that you would like to receive Defendants' respective document productions before you depose them. That is understandable. However, we are not willing to make either of the Co-Executors available for multiple depositions. Accordingly, we should reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition until Defendants' documents have been produced. We should discuss that date along with dates for your client's deposition and the deposition of Mr. Kahn, as Co-Executor. If you still intend to depose Mr. Kahn in his personal capacity, please inform him of that and your basis for doing so -- and then he must be part of the discussion regarding the timing and sequence of depositions. + +Please confirm at your earliest convenience whether you agree to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition. If you decline, we will have no choice but to immediately seek the Court's assistance to: (1) compel Plaintiff to provide deposition topics insofar as she seeks to depose Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor; and (2) preclude Plaintiff from pressing ahead with Mr. Indyke's deposition only to later seek another deposition of him following Defendants' completion of their document productions. If you decline, please provide us with the basis for your decision so as to expedite our raising the issue with the Court. + +Best, Bennet + +Bennet J. Moskowitz\* + +Partner + +Direct: 212.704.6087 + +bennet.moskowitz(atroutman.com + + +875 Third Avenue + +New York, NY 10022 + +troutman.com + +\*Licensed to practice law in New York and Connecticut + +#### A HIGHER COMMITMENT TO CLIENT CARE + +Troutman Sanders and Pepper have combined to become Troutman Pepper (Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP). Troutman Pepper offers expanded capabilities and practice strengths while continuing to deliver powerful solutions to clients' legal and business issues with a higher commitment to client care. + +This e-mail (and any attachments) from a law Finn may contain legally privileged and confidential information solely for the intended recipient. If you received this message in error, please notify the sender and delete it. Any unauthorized reading, distribution, copying, or other use of this e-mail (and attachments) is strictly prohibited. We have taken precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting computer viruses, but you should scan attachments for viruses and other malicious threats: we are not liable for any loss or damage caused by viruses. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e52d6c72625365f8207f28465afbafda698f6c34 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752297/EFTA02752297.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -48, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752297", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "60841b0d0d2ed08c8af06a5c381b84c209e3c52f6f5fa0f9e2908a8c29ba94ac", + "output_sha256": "ee5eb80ef17bfb64406a026abf5117328b20c1a24117dc96373f6b0792632b19", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d06e9387274e660342edae30157519cd65f42047 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +Mary W. Metcalfe marygrace.metcalfe@troutrnan.com + +August 20, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern Di of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren'. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the to -Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write solely to correct the record with regard to a misstatement in the letter filed by counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff') this afternoon. Plaintiffs counsel, in a footnote, represented that they had "attached the full and complete email string concerning this issue for the Court's review and consideration." Doc. 71 n.1. However, Plaintiffs counsel omitted our reply sent today, before they filed their letter. The full chain is attached hereto. + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Ma W. Metcalfe Mary W. Metcalfe + +CC: All Counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f82d0fd107321eaf18971e969bbbe733fc8dd85c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752303/EFTA02752303.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752303", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ecb6ba5e39585ac84f4bab3d3b05fbc011f64bf9a79ad7efee5a8598adf2bd3c", + "output_sha256": "ecb6ba5e39585ac84f4bab3d3b05fbc011f64bf9a79ad7efee5a8598adf2bd3c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cb9dacc30ce6e183526654f8260f6964abcd10ce --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +August 21, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGE-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We are writing on behalf of our client, plaintiff Jane Doe, in the above-referenced litigation. On August 19, 2020, defendant Ghislaine Maxwell made a motion to stay proceedings in this action. Pursuant to the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order, the parties have conferred regarding a schedule for opposition and reply submissions and hereby propose that oppositions shall be filed on or before August 27, 2020 and replies shall be filed on or before September 4, 2020. Additionally, the parties agree that the motion to stay does not affect any other deadlines set by the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order, without prejudice to the parties' respective rights and legal positions. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..468a87045ef2bfccc0d17e728838d5f190edcb42 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752304/EFTA02752304.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752304", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "3edfd40656b3efce5536935d05328f820bed0f7b05557587835ede9c9ebf99d1", + "output_sha256": "3edfd40656b3efce5536935d05328f820bed0f7b05557587835ede9c9ebf99d1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ece86928b6953b3fd6d8318edaa8994402b886b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYLE I I I' + +August 21, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We are writing on behalf of our client, plaintiff Jane Doe, in the above-referenced litigation. On August 19, 2020, defendant Ghislaine Maxwell made a motion to stay proceedings in this action. Pursuant to the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order, the parties have conferred regarding a schedule for opposition and reply submissions and hereby propose that oppositions shall be filed on or before August 27, 2020 and replies shall be filed on or before September 4, 2020. Additionally, the parties agree that the motion to stay does not affect any other deadlines set by the Court's August 14, 2020 Scheduling Order, without prejudice to the parties' respective rights and legal positions. + +The proposed briefing schedule is adopted. + +Dated: 8/23/2020 SO ORDERED + +adm DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66ba9d3bb07f8f57d2ba09afce2a629aba8af572 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752305/EFTA02752305.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752305", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "3cbeec1fe781589eb6302c9a7745912d629498114b52a03f5579ccd4a397fc6d", + "output_sha256": "3cbeec1fe781589eb6302c9a7745912d629498114b52a03f5579ccd4a397fc6d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dbe4674c0937761980c9b5990a0427fcfe93b73e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +Troutman Pepper [REDACTED] Sanders LLP +875 Third Avenue +New York, New York 10022 + +troutman.com + +![](_page_0_Picture_21.jpeg) + +**Bennet J. Moskowitz** +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + + +**VIA ECF** + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman +United States District Court +Southern District of New York +Daniel [REDACTED] Moynihan Courthouse +500 Pearl Street +New York, NY 10007 + +Depositions in this action shall be stayed pending the Court's resolution of defendant Maxwell's motion for a stay of all proceedings. Counsel are directed to select an alternative deposition date for Mr. Indyke in September, should Ms. Maxwell's motion be denied, in whole or in part. + +Dated: 8/23/2020 +SO ORDERED + +**Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF** + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write to obtain relief from Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff") refusal to reschedule the deposition of Darren K. Indyke, scheduled for August 26, 2020. Given recent case developments, holding the deposition next week defies the parties' obligations to promote judicial economy and avoid wasting party resources, as well as common sense. + +There are five reasons the deposition should not proceed next Wednesday. First, if the deposition occurs next week then Plaintiff will undoubtedly seek to hold another deposition at a later date, following the parties' substantial completion of document discovery. Per this Court's Order dated August 14, document production has been stayed pending the entry of a protective order. The parties are required to make a joint proposal to Your Honor regarding the protective order by August 26, the day upon which the deposition is currently scheduled. Even if the parties are able to jointly propose, and the Court approve, a mutually agreed upon protective order in the next several days (which seems unlikely given that we are still waiting on feedback from counsel for the other parties), there would not be nearly enough time for the parties to complete their document productions, let alone to review each other's productions in preparation for the deposition. Regrettably, Plaintiff's counsel has repeatedly refused to confirm that she will not seek to further depose Mr. Indyke following the parties' document productions. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. +Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_14.jpeg) + +The parties' document productions should be completed before the deposition proceeds. This will necessarily happen in short order: the Court's Order requires the parties to complete their document productions within one week of entry of the protective order. Doc. 68 at ¶ 2. + +Second, for the same reasons that this Court stayed document production pending entry of a protective order, it makes no sense to have any depositions proceed until the ground rules regarding confidentiality, including with respect to deposition testimony and exhibits, are set. + +Third, having the deposition next week would be unduly prejudicial to the Co-Executors as the result of Plaintiff's prior failures to provide proper notice of non-party discovery. Yesterday, counsel for Plaintiff confirmed for the first time that she has in fact received various documents from subpoenaed witnesses, stating in an email: + +Although responsive documents were not produced by these witnesses pursuant to the subpoenas, we have recently obtained documentary evidence from these witnesses through their counsel. Indeed, we received what we expect to be the last of the evidence yesterday. In light of the Court's 8/14 Order regarding the current stay of document production in this case, we will produce such materials to you once we are permitted to do so by the Court. + +However, the fact remains that we do not know the universe of so-called documentary evidence that Plaintiff received, when she received it, or from whom. The deposition of Mr. Indyke should not proceed while Plaintiff is improperly in sole possession of discovery. The Co-Executors have a fundamental right to review discovery materials that may form the basis for Plaintiff's deposition questions. + +Fourth, Plaintiff has failed to provide topics about which she will depose Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor of Mr. Epstein's Estate. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) ("In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination." (emphasis added)).{sup}`1` We raised this straightforward, uncontroversial issue multiple times, including by email on August 4, 6, 14, 17, and 19; Plaintiff's counsel never responded. During the parties' meet-and-confer telephone call on August 10, counsel for Plaintiff said he would confer with his + +{sup}`1` The Committee Notes to the 2007 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) provide: "[O]ther entity" is added to the list of organizations that may be named as deponent. The purpose is to ensure that the deposition process can be used to reach information known or reasonably available to an organization *no matter what abstract fictive concept is used to describe the organization*. Nothing is gained by wrangling over the place to fit into current rule language such entities as limited liability companies, limited partnerships, business trusts, more exotic common-law creations, or forms developed in other countries." (emphasis added). Mr. Indyke is being deposed as the fiduciary of an estate, not solely in his individual capacity. + +Robert Glassman, Esq. +Page 3 + +![](_page_2_Picture_14.jpeg) + +--- + +colleagues and then provide us with a response. Despite this representation and our follow-up inquiries, Plaintiff counsel has still not confirmed whether he will be providing a list of topics for Mr. Indyke in his capacity as Co-Executor, much less actually provided one. If Plaintiff's counsel does not provide such a list, we will be forced to seek relief from this Court and the deposition should not proceed until that issue is resolved. Even if Plaintiff provides such a list today, we will not have sufficient time between now and next Wednesday to consider it, meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding any issues, and, if necessary, raise such issues with the Court. + +Fifth, yesterday evening Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell moved to stay this lawsuit in light of her ongoing criminal matter, which is currently scheduled for trial next summer. There is no reason that discovery should proceed in a piecemeal fashion, either while the motion for a stay is pending or during the stay itself. + +When we raised these issues with Plaintiff's counsel, we did not receive a substantive response to our concerns. Rather, Plaintiff's counsel stated they "would still like to proceed with [the deposition] on 8/26 since that date has already been cleared by the parties and has been on calendar for some time now" and "would still like to proceed with Mr. Indyke's deposition next week even if [the Co-Executors] still haven't given [Plaintiff] documents before then". Despite our requests, no further explanation for Plaintiff's position has been provided. + +We have not received an answer to our repeated requests for a time to meet-and-confer today by phone about these and other pressing issues related to Plaintiff's discovery deficiencies, which are not as time-sensitive and thus we do not raise at this time. However, given the rapidly approaching deposition date and the issues listed above, we are left with no choice but to seek the intervention of the Court. We therefore respectfully request that the Court order Plaintiff to reschedule Mr. Indyke's deposition for a mutually agreeable date after resolution of Ms. Maxwell's motion to stay, Plaintiff's disclosure of deposition topics, entry of a protective order, and the parties' substantial completion of their document productions. + +Very truly yours, + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: Laura Menninger, Esq. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b61f4b09145cfd6fb54abfac1613681a2a37681 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752306/EFTA02752306.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -65, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752306", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 3, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "07803fcc07a091ce0bf6a68217d0ed80c1a73c23ecd6bf31bf41082f30798823", + "output_sha256": "8a3d3d66f860178bd2d59fa03b915867678208e4567630fcb7d5af79bad84c33", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c4248947ebb1cbdf3cbbb8c354dffd33598ae334 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Index No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## STIPULATED CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER + +WHEREAS, Plaintiff Jane Doe, Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell (collectively, the "Parties" and each individually, a "Party") request that this Court issue a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to protect the confidentiality of nonpublic and sensitive information that they may need to disclose in connection with discovery in this action; + +WHEREAS, the Parties, through counsel, agree to the following terms; and + +WHEREAS, this Court finds that good cause exists for issuance of an appropriately tailored confidentiality order governing the pretrial phase of this action; + +IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Parties to this action, their respective agents, employees, and attorneys, any other person in active concert or participation with any of the foregoing, and all other persons with actual notice of this Order will adhere to the following terms, upon pain of contempt: + +1. "Producing Party" shall mean the parties to this action and any third parties producing Confidential Information. + +2. "Receiving Party" shall mean the party to this action and/or any non-party receiving Confidential Information. + +3. With respect to "Discovery Material" (i.e., documents, depositions and deposition exhibits, information or tangible things of any kind produced or disclosed in the course of discovery in this action) that a Producing Party has designated as "Confidential" pursuant to this Order, no Receiving Party may disclose such Confidential Discovery Material to anyone else except as expressly permitted hereunder. + +4. The Producing Party may designate as Confidential only the portion of such material that it reasonably and in good faith believes consists of information whose public release would violate common law and statutory privacy interests, including without limitation, information concerning: + +- (a) medical, mental health and/or other psychological conditions; +- (b) medical or psychological treatment; +- (c) other health care records; +- (d) use of controlled substances; +- (e) consensual or non-consensual sexual activity, sexual contact, or alleged sexual abuse; +- (f) education records; +- (g) email addresses, home addresses, Social Security numbers, personal telephone numbers, tax returns, and credit and banking information of any person, or similarly personally identifying information for parties and third-party witnesses; + +(h) names of alleged minor victims of sexual abuse; + +(i) any information subject to N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50 or 51; + +(j) previously non-disclosed financial information including personal financial information; + +(k) non-public information that the producing person in good faith considers to be, reflect, or reveal business, marketing, financial, or regulatory information or data, or information of commercial value, including, without limitation, trade secrets, contracts with third parties, or other information required by law or agreement to be kept confidential; and + +(1) any other category of information given confidential status by this Court or a Court of competent jurisdiction to include the tort of publication of private facts. + +5. With respect to the Confidential portion of any Discovery Material other than deposition transcripts and exhibits, the Producing Party or its counsel may designate such portion as "Confidential" by: (a) stamping or otherwise clearly marking as "Confidential" the protected portion in a manner that will not interfere with legibility or audibility; and (b) producing for future public use another copy of said Discovery Material with the confidential information redacted. + +6. A Producing Party or its counsel may designate deposition exhibits or portions of deposition transcripts as Confidential Discovery Material either by: (a) indicating on the record during the deposition that a question calls for Confidential information, in which case the reporter will bind the transcript of the designated testimony in a separate volume and mark it as "Confidential Information Governed by Protective Order," or (b) notifying the reporter and all counsel of record, in writing, within 30 days after a deposition has concluded, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript that are to be designated "Confidential," in which case all counsel receiving the transcript will be responsible for marking the copies of the designated transcript in their possession or under their control as directed by the Producing Party or that person's counsel. During the 30-day period following a deposition, all Parties will treat the entire deposition transcript as if it had been designated Confidential. + +7. If at any time before the termination of this action a Producing Party realizes that it should have designated as Confidential some portion(s) of Discovery Material that it previously produced without limitation, the Producing Party may so designate such material by notifying all Parties in writing. Thereafter, the Receiving Party will treat such designated portion(s) of the Discovery Material as Confidential. In addition, the Producing Party shall provide each Receiving Party with replacement versions of such Discovery Material that bears the "Confidential" designation within two business days of providing such notice. + +8. Nothing contained in this Order will be construed: (a) as a waiver by a Party or person of its right to object to any discovery request; (b) so as to prejudice a Party's ability to seek discovery in this or any other legal proceedings; nor to a Party's ability to object to such discovery; (c) as a waiver of any privilege or protection; or (c) as a ruling regarding the admissibility at trial of any document, testimony, or other evidence. + +9. Where a Producing Party has designated Discovery Material as Confidential, the Receiving Party may disclose such information only to the following persons: + +> (a)the Parties to this action; (b)counsel of record to the Parties, including any paralegal, clerical, or other assistant that such counsel employs and assigns to this matter; + +- (c)outside vendors or service providers (such as copy-service providers and document-management consultants) that counsel hire and assign to this matter, provided such person has first executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement in the form annexed as Exhibit A hereto; +- (d) any mediator or arbitrator that the Parties engage in this matter or that this Court appoints, provided such person has first executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement in the form annexed as Exhibit A hereto; +- (e) as to any document, its author, its addressee, and any other person indicated on the face of the document as having received a copy; +- (f) any witness who counsel for a Party in good faith believes may be called to testify at trial or deposition in this action, and such person's counsel, provided such person has first executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement in the form annexed as Exhibit A hereto; +- (g) any person a Party retains to serve as an expert witness or otherwise provide specialized advice to counsel in connection with this action, provided such person has first executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement in the form annexed as Exhibit A hereto; (It) stenographers engaged to transcribe depositions the Parties conduct in this action; and +- (i) this Court, including any appellate court, its support personnel, and court reporters. +- 10. Before disclosing any Confidential Discovery Material to any person referred to + +in subparagraphs 9(c), 9(d), 9(f), or 9(g) above, counsel must provide a copy of this Order to such person, who must sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement in the form annexed as Exhibit A hereto stating that he or she has read this Order and agrees to be bound by its terms. Said counsel must retain each signed Non-Disclosure Agreement, hold it in escrow, and produce it to opposing counsel either before such person is permitted to testify (at deposition or trial) or at the conclusion of the case including any and all appeals, whichever comes first. + +I I. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Paragraph 9 shall impose any limitation on the ability of a Producing Party to disclose its own Confidential Discovery Material; provided, however, that nothing in this Section precludes an argument or judicial determination that, by voluntarily disclosing its own Confidential Discovery Material outside this litigation, a Producing Party has waived confidentiality claims over such materials. A Producing Party shall not be required to obtain an executed Non-Disclosure Agreement from its own current or former employees with respect to disclosure of its own Confidential Discovery Material. + +12. This Order binds the Parties and certain others to treat as Confidential any Discovery Materials so classified. The Court has not, however, made any finding regarding the confidentiality of any Discovery Materials, and retains full discretion to determine whether to afford confidential treatment to any Discovery Material designated as Confidential hereunder. All persons are placed on notice that the Court is unlikely to seal or otherwise afford confidential treatment to any Discovery Material introduced into evidence at trial, even if such material has previously been sealed or designated as Confidential. + +13. In filing Confidential Discovery Material with this Court, or filing portions of any pleadings, motions, or other papers that disclose such Confidential Discovery Material ("Confidential Court Submission"), the Parties shall publicly file a redacted copy of the Confidential Court Submission via the Electronic Case Filing System. The Parties shall file an unredacted copy of the Confidential Court Submission under seal with the Clerk of this Court, and the Parties shall serve this Court and opposing counsel with unredacted courtesy copies of the Confidential Court Submission. Any Party that seeks to file Confidential Discovery Material under seal must file an application and supporting declaration justifying—on a particularized basis—the sealing of such documents. The parties should be aware that the Court will unseal documents if it is unable to make "specific, on the record findings ... demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006). Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, if the parties stipulate that specific portions of a document are both confidential and immaterial to this lawsuit, a party may publicly file a version of the document with those confidential and immaterial portions redacted, and that party need not submit an unredacted version to the Court or file a motion to seal. + +14. Any Party who objects to any designation of confidentiality may at any time before the trial of this action serve upon counsel for the Producing Party a written notice stating with particularity the grounds of the objection. If the Parties cannot reach agreement promptly, counsel for all affected Parties will address their dispute to the Court by motion. The Party seeking confidentiality shall bear the burden of establishing that the material at issue was properly designated as confidential. The Parties shall treat the disputed materials as Confidential pending the Court's resolution of such motion. + +15. Any Party who requests additional limits on disclosure (such as "attorneys' eyes only" in extraordinary circumstances), may at any time before the trial of this action serve upon counsel for the recipient Parties a written notice stating with particularity the grounds of the request. If the Parties cannot reach agreement promptly, counsel for all affected Parties will address their dispute to the Court. + +16. Absent an Order from a court of competent jurisdiction, Recipients of Confidential Discovery Material under this Order may use such material solely for the prosecution and defense of this action and any appeals thereto, and not for any other purpose or in any other litigation proceeding, including in any criminal action that involves any of the parties to this action, either as witnesses, defendants or otherwise. Nothing contained in this Order, however, will affect or restrict the rights of any Party with respect to its own documents or information produced in this action. Nor shall anything contained in this Order prejudice a Party's ability to seek discovery in this and any other legal proceedings, without prejudice to any other Party's right to object to such discovery. + +17. In the event that a party who has possession of Confidential Discovery Material pursuant to the terms of this Order receives a subpoena or other compulsory legal process which calls for the production of the Confidential materials, the person-in-possession shall respond that the materials are not disclosable absent an Order of the Court and shall promptly notify the Producing Party from whom they received the Confidential Discovery Material, and all other Parties, of the subpoena or other compulsory process. Such notice must be provided within 3 business days of the receipt of the subpoena or other compulsory process. Upon receiving such notice, the Producing Party or other Parties will bear the burden to oppose compliance with the subpoena, other compulsory process, or other legal notice if the Producing Party or other Parties deem it appropriate to do so. + +18. Each person who has access to Discovery Material designated as Confidential pursuant to this Order must take all reasonable precautions to prevent the unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of such material. + +19. If a Receiving Party receives documents or other materials that it has reason to believe are subject to a good faith claim of attorney-client privilege, work product protection, or other privilege or immunity from disclosure, the Receiving Party must refrain from examining the documents or other materials any more than is essential to ascertain whether the documents or other materials are reasonably subject to such a claim. The Receiving Party shall promptly notify the producing person in writing that the Receiving Party possesses documents or other material that appears to be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. + +20. If, in connection with this litigation, a producing person inadvertently discloses information that is subject to a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work product protection, or any other privilege or immunity from disclosure ("Inadvertently Disclosed Information"), such disclosure shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver or forfeiture of any claim of privilege, work product protection, or other privilege or immunity from discovery with respect to the Inadvertently Disclosed Information or its subject matter. In addition, a producing person may use its own document (e.g., as a deposition exhibit) containing material that is subject to a claim of privilege or immunity from disclosure for the purpose of establishing the basis of such claim without waiver of any applicable privilege or immunity from disclosure, unless the producing person affirmatively uses or relies upon the specific material contained in the document that is subject to the claim of privilege or immunity from disclosure for any purpose other than establishing the basis of such claim. + +21. If a producing person makes a claim of inadvertent disclosure, the Receiving Party shall, within five business days, return or destroy all copies of the Inadvertently Disclosed Information, and provide a certification of counsel that all such information has been returned or destroyed, unless the Receiving Party seeks to dispute that the information is privileged or otherwise protected as set forth below. Until the dispute is resolved or ruled upon, the Receiving Party shall undertake to keep such information restricted solely for use in connection with the dispute over the privilege or protection. + +22. Within five business days after the notification that such Inadvertently Disclosed Information has been returned or destroyed, the producing person shall produce a privilege log with respect to the Inadvertently Disclosed Information. + +23. The Receiving Party may move the Court for an Order compelling production of the Inadvertently Disclosed Information. Pursuant to the parties' obligations set forth herein, the motion shall not quote or paraphrase the substance of the document subject to the motion to compel beyond the description of the document contained in the privilege log entry for the document. The motion shall be filed under seal, and shall not assert as a ground for entering such an Order the fact or circumstances of the inadvertent production in this action. + +24. The Producing Party retains the burden of establishing the privileged or protected nature of any Inadvertently Disclosed Information. Nothing in this Order shall limit the right of any Producing Party or Receiving Party to request an in camera review of the Inadvertently Disclosed Information. + +25. Unless the parties otherwise agree or a court of competent jurisdiction otherwise orders, within 60 days of the final disposition of this action—including all appeals—all Receiving Parties must either return Confidential Discovery Material—including all copies thereof—to the + +Producing Party, or destroy such material—including all copies thereof. In either event, by the 60 day deadline, the Receiving Party must certify its return or destruction by submitting a written certification to the Producing Party that affirms that it has not retained any copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries, or other forms of reproducing or capturing any of the Confidential Discovery Material. Notwithstanding the foregoing: (i) Discovery Materials that have been received electronically and that cannot be returned or destroyed must be electronically deleted and deleted from "trash" files, and the Receiving Party must take reasonable measures to ensure that unauthorized persons do not have access to Confidential information residing on the Receiving Party's computer server and back-up media; and (ii) outside counsel for the parties are permitted to retain one archival copy of all pleadings, motion papers, court filings made under seal, transcripts, legal memoranda, correspondence, attorney work product, written discovery responses, deposition and trial exhibits, and expert reports, even if such materials contain Confidential Discovery Material, subject to a continuing obligation to protect information designated Confidential pursuant to this Order. + +26. This Order will survive the termination of the litigation and will continue to be binding upon each Receiving Party. + +27. This Court will retain jurisdiction over all persons subject to this Order to the extent necessary to enforce any obligations arising hereunder or to impose sanctions for any contempt thereof. + +SO STIPULATED AND AGREED. + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP + +P.C. + +/s/ /s/ + +Laura A. Menninger 150 E. 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 (303) 831-7364 Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Counsel for Defendant Ghislaine Doe Maxwell + +Dated: August 2020 + +2020 TROUTMAN PEPPER LLP + +/s/ + +Bennet J. Moskowitz 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 (212)704-6000 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Counsel for Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +Dated: August 2020 + +SO ORDERED. + +Robert Glassman 1 11 1 1 Santa Monica Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90025 (310) 477-1700 glassman@psblaw.com + +Counsel for Plaintiff Jane + +Dated: August + +Dated: + +New York, New York DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Exhibit A to Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE AND RICHARD D. KAHN. in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Index No. I :20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT + +, acknowledge that I have read and understand the Protective Order in this action governing the non-disclosure of those portions of Discovery Material that have been designated as Confidential. I agree that I will not disclose such Confidential Discovery Material to anyone other than for purposes of this litigation and that at the conclusion of the litigation I will return all discovery information to the party or attorney from whom I received it. By acknowledging these obligations under the Protective Order, I understand that I am submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for the purpose of any issue or dispute arising hereunder and that my willful violation of any term of the Protective Order could subject me to punishment for contempt of Court. + +Date: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..594de6784ea08adae54d5789871d5957d8f2de98 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752309/EFTA02752309.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752309", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "56add7d3477fde27239781aad33fc369bed7ba9713f8a47135e371da4894608e", + "output_sha256": "56add7d3477fde27239781aad33fc369bed7ba9713f8a47135e371da4894608e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..33ad1ec84ed7e3386ae202cd60e73e3056415706 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +August 26, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1 :20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. We write together with counsel for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell to request that the Court enter the attached draft Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order ("Proposed Order"). + +In accordance with Your Honor's Order dated August 14, counsel for the Co-Executors, Ms. Maxwell, and Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff"), respectively, conferred regarding the Proposed Order, exchanging multiple drafts and comments thereto. While counsel for the Parties have been able to agree on the majority of the Proposed Order's provisions, a few disagreements remain, as follows: + +Paragraph 4: Plaintiff's counsel indicates that they will only agree to designate "medical, mental health and/or other health care records", "Social Security numbers, personal telephone numbers, tax returns, and credit and banking information", and the "names of alleged minor victims of sexual abuse" as confidential under the Proposed Order. However, these limitations would remove many documents from the protection of the Proposed Order, including those containing sensitive and private information such as an individual's health or private habits, education, finances, home address, or history of abuse. Such documents are routinely form the subject of protective orders and should be protected here as well, particularly given the sensitive nature of the allegations in this case and the intense media scrutiny directed at both this matter and the ongoing criminal + +proceeding against Ms. Maxwell.{sup}`1` Counsel for Ms. Maxwell and the Co-Executors accordingly request that the Court include Paragraph 4 as currently written in the final Order. + +Paragraph 15: Counsel for Plaintiff has indicated that they wish to remove Paragraph 15, which provides: + +Any Party who requests additional limits on disclosure (such as "attorneys' eyes only" in extraordinary circumstances), may at any time before the trial of this action serve upon counsel for the recipient Parties a written notice stating with particularity the grounds of the request. If the Parties cannot reach agreement promptly, counsel for all affected Parties will address their dispute to the Court. + +Plaintiff's counsel mischaracterizes this section as providing "the unlimited ability to keep things confidential." However, this is a standard provision which allows for application of additional protections only as the need arises, subject to the agreement of the parties or the resolution of the Court. Both counsel for Ms. Maxwell and the Co-Executors request that the Court include it in the final Order. + +Paragraph 25: Plaintiff's counsel seeks to remove Subparagraph (ii) of Paragraph 25, which provides for outside counsel's retention of "one archival copy of all pleadings, motion papers, court filings made under seal, transcripts, legal memoranda, correspondence, attorney work product, written discovery responses, deposition and trial exhibits, and expert reports" following the conclusion of the case, "subject to a continuing obligation to protect information designated Confidential pursuant to this Order". As counsel for Ms. Maxwell noted during the parties' discussion of this provision, ethical rules require the retention of such records for a prescribed length of time. Accordingly, Counsel for Ms. Maxwell and the Co-Executors request that the Court include in the final Order express permission for them to maintain such records. + +NDA: Plaintiff's counsel seeks to relax the protection of documents produced to witnesses who sign the Non-Disclosure Agreement attached as Exhibit A to the Proposed Order. Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel seeks to allow witnesses to retain copies of + +--- + +{sup}`1` Plaintiff's counsel incorrectly maintains that, as Mr. Epstein is deceased, no protections should apply to his medical records, social security number and the like. However, and as we explained: (i) Mr. Epstein's estate is entitled to assert the same legal protections Mr. Epstein had before he died; (ii) the Social Security Act and the Internal Revenue Code restrict disclosure of information about deceased individuals; and (iii) HIPAA privacy rules protect individually identifiable health information about a decedent for 50 years following the date of death of the individual. While we have sound reasons to seek the ability to prevent Plaintiff's and her counsel's unfettered dissemination of such information, Plaintiff has no legitimate reason to have the unilateral ability to disclose such information as, when and where she sees fit. (While the Co-Executors in no way concede that such information is relevant to the parties' claims and defenses, it should not be preemptively excluded from coverage under the Proposed Order.) + +discovery materials provided to them in the context of the litigation, after the litigation has concluded. There is no legitimate reason a witness should retain such records, especially since these witnesses would, by signing Non-Disclosure Agreement, agree not to use documents they received for any purpose outside of the litigation. Counsel for Ms. Maxwell and the Co-Executors request that the Court include in the final Order the provision as currently written. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: All counsel of record \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..679a17110aa2a5c769c2e82977420893973d67f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752322/EFTA02752322.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752322", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d0d7893d94acfeba92d74b484e3eea2b3d4c8bd660bf722685ea411b891d20d6", + "output_sha256": "1c1f8bcfaf5c1a9265726f4dcc4d0148f97553f0d5d5e2a15c0534b465aa42a0", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9995c8aace12817f311cd4b4c74443de4714c7e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +August 27, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1 :20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors") in the above-referenced action. We write in response to the Letter Motion to Stay Proceedings ("Motion to Stay") filed by Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell. Doc. 69. As explained below, the Co-Executors consent to the entry of a stay and join in the request that it apply to the entire proceeding. + +The Co-Executors agree that a complete stay of this action is appropriate under the circumstances Ms. Maxwell sets forth in her Motion to Stay. Given (i) the readily apparent, significant overlap between the criminal case and the allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff") filed in this action, (ii) the fact that Ms. Maxwell has been indicted and her trial has been scheduled, (iii) the decades that have already elapsed since the allegations in the Complaint, (iv) the challenges Ms. Maxwell has identified with regard to her participation in this action, and (v) the near certainty that the resolution of Ms. Maxwell's criminal matter will address the core issues presented in this case, the interests of the parties, the Court, and the public all weigh in favor of the entry of a stay. S.E.C. v. Downe, No. 92-cv-4092-PKL, 1993 WL 22126, at \*14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1993). + +A partial stay would unduly prejudice the Co-Executors' ability to defend against Plaintiff's very serious claims in this action, in which she seeks recovery of tens of millions of dollars in damages from Mr. Epstein's Estate. Where, as here, one defendant is a "central figure" in a civil case, but subject to a stay of discovery because of an ongoing + + +criminal action, "[i]t would be unfair and prejudicial to the [remaining] defendants to require them to continue with discovery without first having an opportunity to depose [the indicted defendant] and receive any other information relating to [the indicted defendant] which might otherwise be available to them." *Downe*, 1993 WL 22126, at \*14 ("Even a cursory review of the complaint reveals that [the indicted defendant] is the central figure in this action and, thus, the taking of [the indicted defendant's] deposition will be critical for the other defendants in this civil action. It in the absence of a stay.") + +Here, Plaintiff's Complaint identifies Ms. Maxwell as a central figure in the alleged harm that is the subject of this dispute. In light of Mr. Epstein's death and the decades that have passed since the acts alleged in the Complaint, Ms. Maxwell's testimony will undoubtedly be crucial to the Estate's ability to develop the facts and defend against Plaintiff's claims. It would be fundamentally unfair to force the Co-Executors to continue defending this action without their having the opportunity to obtain and reference Ms. Maxwell's testimony, as well as any document production. + +A partial stay would also inflict unnecessary costs on all parties, all of which could be avoided if this action is stayed for now and resumed following the resolution of Ms. Maxwell's criminal action. Because Ms. Maxwell is central to both Plaintiff's claims and the Co-Executors' defenses, it is likely that additional discovery will be necessary once her testimony is taken and documents are received from her. This will almost certainly lead to duplicated expense and effort, particularly if it is necessary to re-depose witnesses whose testimony is taken while Ms. Maxwell is unavailable. *See Am. Express Bus. Fin. Corp. v. RW Prof'l Leasing Servs. Corp.*, 225 F. Supp. 2d 263, 265-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stayed as to all defendants "because [indicted defendants] are central figures in the instant action, a partial stay as to the individual defendants could lead to duplicative depositions because the plaintiff may need to re-depose certain individuals depending on the testimony given by [indicted defendants]."); *Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co.*, 152 F.R.D. 36, 41-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[indicted defendants] are the central figures in this case with the central issue .... Because of the importance of their testimony, a partial stay may lead to duplicative depositions."); *Downe*, 1993 WL 22126, at \*14 ("a partial stay would lead to duplicative depositions since, once the partial stay is lifted and [the indicted defendant] is deposed, the defendants would probably find it necessary to conduct a second deposition of individuals who were deposed prior to [the indicted defendant]'s deposition. Thus, a partial stay would likely result in additional expenses for the parties without expediting the discovery process."). Because this duplication could be avoided by staying the entire proceeding, a complete stay is appropriate in this matter. *See, e.g.*, *Downe*, 1993 WL 22126, at \*14 ("the Court, in the interest of fairness and avoidance of duplication of effort, will stay *all* discovery in this action" (emphasis in original)). + +A stay here is particularly appropriate because Plaintiff will still be able to pursue the resolution of her claims through the fully independent Epstein Victims' Compensation + + +Program (the "Compensation Program"). During our telephonic conference with Your Honor on August 5, 2020, Plaintiff's counsel represented that they "do plan to at some point participate in" the Compensation Program but that they "just have not submitted anything yet." Although staying one's civil case, if any, is not a Compensation Program requirement, excluding the lawsuits filed in the last 48 hours, Plaintiff stands alone in having failed to request that a stay be entered by this Court.{sup}`1` Plaintiff, by participating in the Compensation Program while the stay is in place, may resolve her claims and thus obviate the need to litigate further. + +None of these concerns are speculation. Just yesterday, Ms. Maxwell served the other parties to this action with initial disclosures that indicate, among other things: + +The United States Attorney's Office has provided F.R.Crim.P. 16 discovery to Ms. Maxwell pursuant to a Protective Order that prohibits disclosure of the information to any third parties and, under the terms of the Protective Order, use of the discovery by Ms. Maxwell is restricted to her defense in United States v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN). Ms. Maxwell, because of the Protective Order, cannot take any position regarding the content of the discovery and whether the discovery contains any witnesses or information relevant to any disputed facts alleged in the pleadings. Ms. Maxwell directs any interested party to government counsel of record in United States v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) for any further inquiry regarding this information. + +Requiring the Co-Executors to proceed in any fashion in this matter, without their having obtained and reviewed such critical information, is untenable. In addition, Ms. Maxwell's counsel's difficulties in communicating with their client have already required the rescheduling and extensions of deadlines. See Doc. 66. A partial stay would not resolve these issues, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood of further complications and delay. + +Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Co-Executors consent to the entry of a stay and join in the pending request that it apply to the entire proceeding. + + +{sup}`1` On August 13, 2020, the Hon. J. Paul Oetken entered a stipulated stay in an action against the Co-Executors which is currently assigned to Magistrate Lehrburger. [REDACTED] v. *Indyke, et al.* (1:20-cv-05069-JPO-RWL) at Doc. 17. It is our understanding that all actions against the Co-Executors are to be assigned to Your Honor. In this regard, it also bears mentioning that the two actions filed yesterday, which have been assigned to the Hon. John G. Koeltl and the Hon. Louis L. Stanton, have not yet been assigned to a Magistrate Judge. See *Doe 1001 v. Indyke et al* (1:20-cv-06904-JGK) and *Doe 1002 v. Indyke et al* (1:20-cv-06906-LLS). The *pro se* complaint filed today against Ms. Maxwell, which names Mr. Epstein instead of the Estate, has not been assigned at all. *Vernon v. Maxwell, et al.* (1:20-cv-06928-UA). + +The Honorable Debra Freeman August 27. 2020 Page 4 + +Very truly yours, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: All counsel of record + +![](_page_3_Picture_5.jpeg) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b31b5d3357a9fd33fc3ff64d3d92e5dedd95112 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752325/EFTA02752325.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -20, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752325", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "03203f15f4447ce8684532130a56896482d8a74782f4072b22f9b4ad66e5f2c2", + "output_sha256": "2db134a8c56a65d94633a2a302b5f21f475c7a5bb47e37399b3bd1a778a540cf", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b519482f2e4f3ed2716a81c421adb73f1f24363 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +# PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E ,, + + +#### VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. Indyke, el al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGE-DCF Plaintiff's Opposition Letter to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Letter Motion to Stay Proceedings + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On behalf of plaintiff Jane Doe in the above-referenced litigation, we hereby submit this opposition to defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Stay. + +## INTRODUCTION + +On August 19, 2020, defendant Maxwell wrote to this Court requesting that it stay this case until the conclusion of her pending criminal case in which she is accused of recruiting and enticing minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts. The trial in that case is not currently scheduled to commence until July of 2021. + +Defendant Maxwell's leading argument in support of her request is that she is unable to defend herself in this case while she is in jail and awaiting trial in the criminal case. Prior to filing her request to halt these proceedings, however, defendant Maxwell, through her counsel, filed her answer to Plaintiffs complaint over one month ago, participated in a case management conference with the Court on August 5 and has engaged in numerous email exchanges and phone calls with the other parties concerning setting depositions and case deadlines. Moreover, even after asking the Court to stay this case on August 19 because it would purportedly be a "burden" on her to defend this case under her current circumstances, defendant Maxwell propounded discovery on Plaintiff just two days later on August 21 seeking a wide variety of information and documents from her. Defendant Maxwell's thinly veiled argument that her criminal case is somehow preventing her from doing what she needs or wants to do in this case is undermined by the record of what has actually occurred. Rather, defendant Maxwell appears to want to gain an unfair advantage by acquiring as much information as she can about Plaintiff without having to divulge anything about herself or the bad conduct she is alleged to have committed. + + +Page 2 + +Defendant Maxwell's other main argument is that Plaintiff is somehow doing something foolish or inappropriate by not staying her case in order to "pursue a civil remedy in the Epstein Claims Resolution Program." She argues that Plaintiff is "inexplicably the only of the numerous Epstein plaintiffs in this Court to not agree to such a stay" and that "a stay also would permit [Plaintiff] the opportunity to [participate in the Epstein victim claims program]." Defendant Maxwell then falsely claims that "Plaintiff has not advanced a cogent reason for wanting to press ahead alone." Not so. Plaintiff is seeking to hold defendant Maxwell accountable for the heinous and sick sexual acts she committed against Plaintiff over the course of several years while Plaintiff was just a child. Pausing this lawsuit for approximately one year or more, as defendant Maxwell is requesting, would in no way help Plaintiff accomplish that objective despite defendant Maxwell's self-serving arguments to the contrary. Instead, it would simply delay long overdue justice for Plaintiff. + +Moreover, while defendant Maxwell would have this Court and the public believe that Plaintiff has to choose between pursuing her claims in this case or participating in the Epstein victim claims program, nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, the protocol for the claims program explicitly states that: "Individuals who have filed a lawsuit need not agree to a stay of litigation or make any other concession in any pending litigation to be eligible to participate in the Program." Despite this straightforward and sensible provision in the claims program protocol, defendant Maxwell has underhandedly attempted to persuade the Court that should a stay be entered it would "permit" Plaintiff to participate in the claims program. Plaintiff does not—and should not—have to choose between her civil lawsuit and participating in the claims program. And the last thing Plaintiff needs is for Ghislaine Maxwell to pretend that by putting a stop to this case she would somehow benefit by being "permitted" to participate in the claims program. Plaintiff does not need permission by defendant Maxwell or anyone else to exercise her legal rights. + +Defendant Maxwell's motion does not meet the high burden required by the law to justify an extraordinary remedy as a stay of proceedings in this case. For the reasons set forth above and those that follow, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant Maxwell's request to stay this case. If, however, the Court is inclined to grant a stay at all, Plaintiff submits that it should be as to the entire action and not just as to discovery directed to defendant Maxwell as counsel pointed out was the case in v. Indyke, 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF. Otherwise, defendant Maxwell would be given the unfair advantage of collecting evidence from others and taking part in the questioning of witnesses at depositions while at the same time silently hiding behind a court order blocking anyone from doing the same as to her. + + +Page 3 + +## LEGAL STANDARD + +![](_page_2_Picture_4.jpeg) + +A stay of a civil case to permit conclusion of a related criminal prosecution has been characterized as an "extraordinary remedy." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Asa result, a civil defendant urging a stay pending a parallel criminal prosecution bears the burden of establishing its need. Rex & Roberta Ling Living Tr. v. B Commc'ns Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 3d 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). "[A]bsent a showing of undue prejudice upon defendant or interference with his constitutional rights, there is no reason why plaintiff should be delayed in its efforts to diligently proceed to sustain its claim." Id. at 97. + +When determining whether a stay should be granted or denied, a court must undergo "a particularized inquiry into the circumstances of, and the competing interests in, the case." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 676 F.3d at 99. Courts in this District conduct the particularized inquiry guided by the following six factors which are balanced when considering a stay: 1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest. Id. at 99. + +Critically, the balancing of these factors "can do no more than act as a rough guide for the district court as it exercises its discretion." Id. These factors "do little more than serve as something of a check list of factors [the appellate court] ought to consider" when reviewing a lower courts determination. Ultimately, though, the court must rely on nothing more than its studied judgment "based on the particular facts before it and the extent to which such a stay would work a hardship, inequity, or injustice to a party, the public or the court." Id. + +# A STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS HARMS PLAINTIFF'S INTERESTS + +Defendant Maxwell argues that a stay in the litigation benefits Plaintiff. Not so. First, as discussed above, defendant Maxwell asserts that staying the litigation would "permit [Plaintiff] the opportunity" to participate in the Epstein victim claims program. Defendants Maxwell's implication is obvious: if Plaintiff continues to litigate, she cannot participate in the program. That is categorically false. Whether or not Plaintiff participates, the program explicitly states that a stay of any participant's civil proceedings is not required in order to participate. + +Defendant Maxwell also asserts that participation in the claims program will "obviat[e] the need for this case to proceed at all." Defendant Maxwell knows, however, that participation + + +Page 4 + +![](_page_3_Picture_4.jpeg) + +in the claims program is not binding and that victims of Epstein and Maxwell are free to reject any offer made in the program in favor of pursuing damages through litigation. + +Lastly, defendant Maxwell callously suggests that because Plaintiff's abuse occurred 26 years ago, there is "hardly much harm" in delaying Plaintiffs "stale" claims. The fact, however, that Epstein and Maxwell started to abuse Plaintiff when she was a 14-year-old girl-26 years ago—does not negate the ongoing damaging effects that abuse has had and continue to have on Plaintiff. + +Simply put, a stay would harm—not benefit—Plaintiffs interests. For too long Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell skirted the consequences of their vile acts. Now, Plaintiff brings this suit, as is her right by law, to hold the Epstein Estate and defendant Maxwell to answer. Plaintiff is best served by pressing forward with her claims—not waiting even longer for justice. Sadly, defendant Maxwell's seeking a stay is consistent with her decades-long routine of resisting accountability for sexually abusing minors. As a result, her request for a stay should be denied. + +## CONTINUED CIVIL LITIGATION WILL NOT BURDEN MAXWELL WHO HAS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CASE FROM JAIL + +Next, defendant Maxwell argues the burden on the Defendant militates in favor of a stay. Defendants Maxwell states that the burden of proceeding with this litigation "cannot be overstated." However, a particularized inquiry into defendant Maxwell's complaints about the difficulty of proceeding with the civil case while incarcerated reveal a stark contradiction. Indeed, defendant Maxwell has already been actively participating in this litigation from jail for months. Here is a relevant timeline: + +On July 2, 2020, Ghislaine Maxwell was arrested while hiding out in New Hampshire. On July 9, 2020, from jail, defendant Maxwell filed an answer in this case. Since then, defendant Maxwell through her counsel has actively participated in the litigation, including scheduling depositions, conferring several times with counsel for Plaintiff and the Epstein Estate, and appearing before this Court. + +On August 19, 2020, from jail, defendant Maxwell filed this motion to stay proceedings. Despite complaining of the monstrous burden imposed by litigating from jail, two days later, on August 21, 2020, Maxwell served discovery requests on Plaintiff, including sixteen interrogatories and twenty-four requests for production of documents. + + +Page 5 + +![](_page_4_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Clearly, defendant Maxwell wants to use her incarceration both as a shield and a sword: arguing that it is simply too much to litigate from jail, while at the same time, pressing ahead in her attempts to undermine Plaintiffs claims. Clearly, the burden on defendant Maxwell is not great. + +### THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO PROCEED + +In her motion, defendant Maxwell entirely fails to address why the public interest is served by a stay. That is because the public interest is not served by a stay; the public is best served by allowing Plaintiffs claims against defendant Maxwell—the only actively litigated claims against her currently—to proceed in full public view. + +Courts in the Second Circuit recognize that the public benefits from civil litigation not only when it advances the justifiable interests of the Plaintiff, but also when the litigation furnishes the public with information on the torts and crimes of a wrongdoer. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 676 F.3d at 103 (citing SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1372 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc) (denying a stay in order to avoid the continued dissemination of false or misleading information by companies to members of the investing public). In Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., the Second Circuit upheld the denial of a criminal and civil defendant's request for a stay of the civil litigation in part because, to the public's benefit, the litigation uncovered evidence that the defendant was running a counterfeiting operation. See id. + +For years defendant Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein were at the center of a criminal enterprise geared towards sexually abusing minor girls and getting away with it. Plaintiff's lawsuit is the only case currently being litigated against her—all others have either been stayed or dismissed. While Plaintiff has much to gain through this litigation, so too does the public. The continuation of this last remaining civil avenue can furnish the public with critical information as to defendant Maxwell's well known criminal enterprise, how it was operated and all those involved. A stay of the civil proceedings would provide what defendant Maxwell has sought for years—concealing her heinous acts from public view. + +#### MAXWELL'S EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST FOR A STAY SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED SIMPLY BECAUSE SHE HAS BEEN INDICTED AND CLAIMS THERE IS OVERLAP BETWEEN THE INDICTMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT + +Defendant Maxwell also argues that because of her indictment and an overlap between Plaintiffs complaint and the indictment, she is entitled to a stay. However, a defendant in both a + + +Page 6 + +![](_page_5_Picture_4.jpeg) + +civil and criminal matter, like defendant Maxwell here, has "no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting [her] Fifth Amendment privilege." Louis Vuitton Ma!leder S.A., 676 F.3d at 98 (quoting Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir.1995)). In fact, "[t]he existence of a civil defendant's Fifth Amendment right arising out of a related criminal proceeding thus does not strip the court in the civil action of its broad discretion" to move the case along. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 676 F.3d at 98-99. + +Defendant Maxwell has no absolute right to stay this case simply because she has been indicted. Instead, the Court must conduct its own particularized inquiry into the facts at hand when deciding whether to grant her request. As she has demonstrated throughout this litigation, during which time she has been both indicted and incarcerated, defendant Maxwell is not unduly burdened by continued litigation. + +For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant Maxwell's request to stay this case. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +cc: All counsel of record \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..db01b4c9d0499da624edf859113fe8d9a668b261 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752329/EFTA02752329.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -96, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752329", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "67f5eb6ffd2fa198243fbaa88b4f7b6ce4c1aa32616c8bf6eafddfea4889dc51", + "output_sha256": "e5843c73192f712e63cc4eb62b14d0c46ab9629076624566c33c591b1a73053e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6afb607c9d280a5a5d17b6b27b5a0fed0b820ec --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and EIM r.c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningeahmflaw.com + +September 4, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. Debra Freeman United States Magistrate Judge Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: Reply in Support of Letter Motion to Stay Proceedings 20-cv-484 (JGK-DCF), Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke, et al. + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, I write in further support of a Motion to Stay Proceedings in this matter until the conclusion of the criminal trial in United States v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) ("Criminal Case"). + +Plaintiff apparently concedes, by failing to respond, that (a) she is one of the three accusers mentioned in the Indictment in the Criminal Case, (b) substantial overlap, if not complete identity, therefore exists between the issues, witnesses and facts in the Criminal Case and her request for tens of millions of dollars from Ms. Maxwell in this case, (c) an indictment is legally "the most important factor" in a motion to stay parallel civil proceedings, (d) judicial economy will best be served by allowing the Criminal Case to proceed first, and (e) absent a stay, Ms. Maxwell will be forced to choose between her constitutional right to remain silent and her active and vigorous participation in defending against and refuting plaintiff's false claims in this case. + +Instead, Plaintiff argues that a stay would harm her (unspecified) interests and that litigating from inside the MDC under COVID-lockdown is "not [a] great" burden. Both arguments are borderline frivolous. + +No articulated harm to Plaintiff's interests: Despite proclaiming a stay will "harm plaintiff's interests," she fails to explain why. Ipse dixit aside, Plaintiff correctly explains that she can participate in the Epstein claims program while simultaneously pursuing this civil action and (apparently) advancing her interests through the Criminal Case. But she does not explain why the parties should be forced Hon. Debra Freeman September 4, 2020 Page 2 + +to expend Estate and Ms. Maxwell's resources litigating this civil case during the pendency of both the Epstein Claims Program and the criminal trial. If it is money she seeks, she can pursue it in the Claims Program during the stay or, barring successful participation, in a civil case to resume in August 2021, after Ms. Maxwell is at liberty to refute Plaintiff's claims. If it is "justice" she seeks, the Criminal Case will resolve those issues one way or the other. Plaintiff does not articulate a basis for her desire to pursue all three avenues simultaneously nor why such multiple paths are necessary to achieve her "interests." Perhaps not surprisingly, she also cites no legal authority to bolster her argument that she be permitted to do so. + +Burden of Covid-lockdown in-custody litigation substantial: Plaintiff also contends that Ms. Maxwell's expressed concerns regarding the burden of litigating from detention in the MDC under Covid-restrictions are somehow overblown. As support, Plaintiff points out that that counsel on behalf of Ms. Maxwell filed an answer denying all of Plaintiff's allegations and served discovery requests on Plaintiff. Respectfully, it appears Plaintiff's counsel has not thought through, or is ignorant of, the current situation in detention in New York and the demands on a party in a civil litigation: + +First, Ms. Maxwell cannot be deposed based on the current limitations put in place in the MDC by the Bureau of Prisons. + +Second, Ms. Maxwell cannot participate in any other party or witness deposition. + +Third, Ms. Maxwell cannot receive, review, edit or comment on pleadings, except via U.S. Mail in both directions. All such mail is taking over a week to get to her in one direction. + +Fourth, Ms. Maxwell cannot go through her records, her computers, her photos, her documents, or any other file from the time period 1994-1999 to prepare her defense to Plaintiff's claims. + +Fifth, even phone contact with Ms. Maxwell is limited, difficult and unpredictable. Legal calls are not always granted; many have been denied even as deadlines in the civil and criminal case are looming. On the best of days, these discretionary phone conferences must be scheduled at least three days in advance and are limited in duration, many times to 15 minutes. + +Undersigned counsel has represented incarcerated individuals in other civil and criminal litigation. While it is possible to do so under normal conditions, the COVID ban on in-person visits, inability to bring documents into and out of the facility, and the age of the claims in this case renders the burden far more than Plaintiff apparently appreciates. That counsel for Ms. Maxwell was able to orally + +Hon. Debra Freeman September 4, 2020 Page 3 confer with her to prepare a complete denial Answer, or to draft discovery requests to Plaintiff based on her claims and damages, speaks to none of these actual, real and substantial practical difficulties to be anticipated in any future litigation in this matter. By contrast, Plaintiff, who is not in custody and who launched her anonymous lawsuit nine months ago, inexplicably has been unable to produce during that time any documents corroborating her allegations. She filed a claim for \$75 million (at last count), yet has failed to verify either her complaint or her interrogatory responses, has disclosed not a single treatment provider or expert who can support her supposed trauma, has not produced any documents that corroborate her alleged abuse, and has not provided a single basis for her multi-million-dollars of purported damages. If it is so difficult for a party who is out of custody to fmd support for her claims or to swear to their veracity, the burden on a presumptively innocent pre-trial detainee to ferret out 26-year old documents to disprove those same claims should be obvious. + +Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Ms. Maxwell has not suggested there is an "absolute right to stay this case simply because she has been indicted." Resp. at 6. The Second Circuit has a litany of factors, articulated in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012), and applied numerous times since. Plaintiff has not identified any case applying the Louis Vuitton factors in which an indicted civil defendant has been denied a stay when the plaintiff is actively participating in the criminal prosecution and has an alternative forum for seeking a financial remedy. Plaintiff articulates no good basis for refusing such a stay here. + +It is obvious that Plaintiff seeks to improperly exploit Ms. Maxwell's custodial status for her tactical advantage. Plaintiff knows that her best chance to capitalize on these false allegations is to keep Ms. Maxwell, and the truth, from participating. With Mr. Epstein dead and Ms. Maxwell, literally, handcuffed, the Plaintiff attempts to seize this opportunity and advance her charges with little or no opposition. Justice, here, would not be served by permitting these dubious claims to go forward unchallenged. Ms. Maxwell simply requests a brief stay so that she may defend herself. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Q Laura A. Menninger ?c + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19df9e1bd533d15af15684c48566f700467d8949 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752335/EFTA02752335.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752335", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b1650420605601c3adbcfd3ed2c6e76f388c6c7ef703df59cdd532a41eb4273a", + "output_sha256": "b1650420605601c3adbcfd3ed2c6e76f388c6c7ef703df59cdd532a41eb4273a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0e05d83db2be26b267da643933bcb7b54fe45b8c --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +## U.S. Department of Justice + +United States Attorney Southern District of New York + +BY EMAIL' + +The Honorable Debra Freeman United States District Court Southern District of New York United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007 + +The Silvio J. Mello Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007 + +The Clerk of Court is directed to file this letter on the Docket September 4, 2020 of Case No. 20cv00484. + +Dated: 09/09/2020 + +SO ORDERED + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke, et at, 20 Civ. 484 (DCF) (JCK) + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +The Government respectfully submits this letter to request that the Court: (1) permit the Government to intervene in the above-referenced matter for the limited purpose of seeking a stay of the action, and (2) stay this matter in its entirety pending the resolution of the criminal prosecution against Ghislaine Maxwell in the matter of United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN). As discussed below, the Government submits that a complete stay of this civil action will serve the public interest of preserving the integrity of the criminal prosecution against Maxwell and will conserve private, public, and judicial resources; and that those interests will outweigh any delay or disruption caused to the resolution of this civil action. + +On June 29, 2020, a federal grand jury in this District returned a sealed indictment (the "Indictment") charging Ghislaine Maxwell with one count of conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and 2; one count of conspiracy to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and 2; and two counts of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The charges arise from a scheme to sexually abuse underage girls at Jeffrey Epstein's properties in New York, Florida, and New Mexico, between approximately 1994 and 1997. As the Indictment details, Maxwell played a key role in Epstein's abuse of minors by helping Epstein to identify, groom, and ultimately abuse underage girls. + +While the Government understands that letters from parties are required to be filed via ECF, the Government is not a party in this matter, and the ECF system does not permit non-parties to file letters. + +Over the past year, a number of plaintiffs have filed civil complaints in this District asserting claims arising from Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of minor girls. Of those lawsuits, the above-captioned matter is the lone case in this District that has not yet been either resolved or stayed at this point, as far as the Government is aware. In particular, this matter appears to be the only remaining active civil case in this District in which claims against Ghislaine Maxwell have been asserted. + +This Court has the inherent power to stay civil cases in the interests of justice pending the completion of criminal prosecution. See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936); Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986). Courts routinely t pplications to stay civil proceedings in order to protect a pending criminal case. See, New York City Police Dep't, 01 Civ. 6570 (RCC) (JCF), 2003 WL 21664882, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003); Okoli v. Cty. of Nassau, 15 Civ. 0701 (JS) (SIL), 2015 WL 8207496, at •2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2015). + +The complaint in this civil action alleges that Maxwell facilitated the sexual abuse of a minor by Jeffrey Epstein in the 1990s. Those allegations will, by definition, touch on matters relating to the pending Indictment. Indeed, based on a review of the civil complaint, the Government understands that it is likely that should discovery in civil action go forward, multiple witnesses or potential witnesses at the criminal trial would be subject to deposition. Accordingly, there is a significant risk that proceeding with this civil matter would adversely affect the ongoing criminal prosecution against Maxwell. Those concerns include, among others: (i) subjecting potential trial witnesses in the criminal matter to depositions by civil litigants in advance of their testimony on similar matters in the criminal trial; (ii) subjecting the defendant to a deposition on matters for which she presently stands criminally charged in advance of her criminal trial; and (iii) the potential waste of significant judicial, government, and defense resources that would result from having both the civil and criminal proceeding move forward simultaneously given the potential of the resolution of the criminal case to impact any resolution of the civil action. + +Courts generally apply a five-factor test in determining whether to stay a civil action pending the resolution of a related criminal matter, considering: (i) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed; (ii) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (iii) the interests of the courts; (iv) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (v) the public interest. SEC v. Beacon. Asset Mgmt. LLC, No. 02 Civ. 8855, 2003 WL 554618, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003); see also SEC v. Doody IV, 186 F. Supp. 2d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Here, the factors weigh in favor of granting a stay. + +Here, while the Government appreciates the plaintiff's interest in resolving the civil suit,2 any potential prejudice to the plaintiff is outweighed by both the public interest in the enforcement of criminal laws and the fact that resolution of the criminal process may result in a more efficient resolution of the civil suit. See generally In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 128 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("the public interest in the criminal case is entitled to precedence over the civil + +{sup}`2` As Maxwell also seeks a stay of this matter, it does not appear that granting the stay would cause any prejudice to Maxwell. + +litigant”); *United States v. Hugo Key & Son, Inc.*, 672 F. Supp. 656, 685 (D.R.I. 1987) (“While a civil litigant with a private dispute has an interest in the prompt disposition of his or her claims, the public has a greater interest in the enforcement of the criminal law.”). In particular, any concern regarding the potential delay of this civil suit is outweighed by the concern that Maxwell would seek to assert her Fifth Amendment rights rather than submit to a deposition in the civil action, and that depositions of other witnesses could potentially interfere with the criminal prosecution. *See United States v. Saad*, 229 F.R.D. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that invocations of the Fifth Amendment privilege can disrupt the orderly conduct of a civil case). Moreover, given the factual overlap between the civil and criminal cases, allowing the criminal matter to be resolved in the first instance may result in a narrowing of the factual and legal issues before this Court. *See Volmar Dist., Inc. v. New York Post Co.*, 152 F.R.D. 36, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Accordingly, the interests of judicial economy are better served by the stay the Government seeks. + +Additionally, consideration of the interests of third parties, including the public, weighs in favor of granting the stay. In particular, the Government is not aware of any third parties that would be harmed by a stay, and, to the contrary, the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law will be served by a stay. Multiple third-party witnesses possess information that is potentially relevant to both this lawsuit and the criminal prosecution.{sup}`3` Premature disclosure of the testimony of these witnesses could severely impair the criminal prosecution. First, such witnesses may be forced to testify about any efforts to assist the criminal investigation and prosecution, and may thereby expose facts about the investigation that would otherwise not be disclosed far in advance of a criminal trial and could potentially expose witnesses and/or their families to harassment. Moreover, permitting any discovery to proceed in this lawsuit would enable Maxwell to seek a preview of trial testimony in the criminal case, and would afford her with a broader array of discovery than she is entitled to in the criminal case. *See* [REDACTED], 2003 WL 21664882, at \*2 (“[T]he civil action, if not stayed, might undermine the criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, expand the rights of discovery beyond the limits of the state’s criminal procedure law, expose the basis of the defense to the prosecution, or otherwise prejudice the criminal case.”). Finally, the Government notes that Maxwell’s access to information about the criminal matter is under the jurisdiction of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, who has entered a protective order and has issued several rulings regarding the scope of discovery that Maxwell is + +--- + +{sup}`3` In an August 25, 2020 opinion, Judge Nathan held that Maxwell is not entitled to know who the Government’s trial witnesses are at this stage of the criminal case. *United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell*, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN), Dkt. 49. Consistent with that ruling, the Government is not including detailed information in this letter about who those trial witnesses might be and will not engage with Maxwell’s speculation as to who those witnesses may be. The Government respectfully submits that the Court need not make any findings on that score to resolve this motion, as a complaint concerning sexual abuse of minors by Epstein and Maxwell will inevitably implicate documents, witnesses, and other evidence that overlaps with the criminal matter, whether or not the plaintiff in this action—or the conduct she alleges—has any direct connection to the charges in the Indictment. If it would be useful to the Court, however, the Government is prepared to provide an *ex parte* submission under seal detailing the anticipated overlap of witnesses between the criminal case and this case. + +entitled to and the manner in which she may or may not use that information. Given that Maxwell is represented by the same counsel in both the criminal and civil matter, a stay is necessary to avoid blurring the carefully drawn boundaries between the criminal case and pending civil litigation. + +The Government recognizes that the plaintiff in this action has an interest in pursuing her claim against Maxwell. To that end, the Government has considered whether a partial stay—or some other remedy short of a complete stay of this action—would address the Government's concerns. However, after carefully considering the issues in this case and the pending criminal case, the Government respectfully submits that nothing short of a full stay of this matter would address the Government's concerns and preserve the public's substantial interest in avoiding interference with prosecution of the criminal case + +Finally, the Government notes that any stay would be no longer than necessary to accommodate the interests of the criminal process. At this time, the Government only seeks a stay until the conclusion of the criminal trial, which is scheduled to begin on July 12, 2021. + +Respectfully submitted, + +AUDREY STRAUSS Acting United States Attorney + +By: /s Maurene Comey Alison Moe Lam Pomerantz Assistant United States Attorneys Southern District of New York Tel: (212) 637-2324 + +Cc: All counsel of record (by email) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b012d2cf6d413b9cff8760b5a758bdaac80fc1c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752338/EFTA02752338.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -20, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752338", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d300126b85b05c16762555f4529e522b6827826e82273d00b70f994fbe338e44", + "output_sha256": "59dcdb4ea8be7707cf86c3625d210ce2abfd5304ee1d43225609d44a4c1c9061", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..977f0f8458d16cc69b7c7e55e8f8375a497ba2c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.md @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +PlaintilL + +-against- + +DARREN K. INDYKE, et al., + +Defendants. + +20cv00484 (JOK) (DF) + +MEMORANDUM AND ORDER + +## DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: + +This civil action, in which plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff') has sued defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein ("Epstein") (the "Co-Executors"), as well as defendant Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell"), individually (collectively, "Defendants"), for alleged sexual abuse and exploitation when Plaintiff was a minor, has been referred to this Court by the Honorable John G. Koeltl, U.S.D.J., for general pretrial supervision. Currently before this Court is a letter motion filed by defendant Maxwell, seeking a stay of these proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal proceedings against her. (Letter to the Court from Laura A. Menninger, Esq., dated Aug. 19, 2020 ("8/19/20 Menninger Ltr.") (Dkt. 69).) For the reasons discussed below, Maxwell's motion for a stay is granted, and these proceedings shall be stayed in their entirety, pending further order of the Court. + +# BACKGROUND + +Maxwell has been indicted by a grand jury in this District, and she is now being held in custody at the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") as she awaits her criminal trial, which is set to begin on July 12, 2021, before the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, U.S.D.J. (See id., at 2; see generally United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 20cr330 (MN) (S.D.N.Y.).) On August 19, + +2020, Maxwell filed the letter motion that is now before this Court, requesting a stay of this action until the conclusion of her pending criminal case. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr.) In her motion, Maxwell set out the factors relevant to a stay analysis, and argued that not only her own interest, but also the interests of the courts, the public, and the other parties would be best served by the requested stay. (See generally id.) + +On August 27, 2020, the Co-Executors submitted a letter consenting to the entry of a stay and joining in Maxwell's request that the stay apply to the entire proceeding. (See Letter to the Court from Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq., dated Aug. 27, 2020 ("8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr.") (Dkt. 77).) The Co-Executors principally argued that this Court should not consider a partial stay of this case (i.e., a stay that would apply solely as to Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell), as a partial stay would unduly prejudice the Co-Executors' ability to defend against Plaintiff's claims and would add unnecessary cost to the litigation. (See id., at 1-2.) The Co-Executors also pointed out that, if this matter were stayed, Plaintiff would still be able to pursue a resolution of her claims through the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Compensation Program") that has been independently instituted, and that has led numerous other plaintiffs in similar cases before the Court to seek voluntary stays of their lawsuits. (See id., at 2-3.) + +By letter dated August 27, 2020, Plaintiff vigorously opposed the requested stay, arguing that the relevant factors weigh against granting the requested relief. (See generally Letter to the Court from Robert Glassman, Esq., dated Aug. 27, 2020 ("8/27/20 Glassman Ltr.") (Dkt. 78).) In her opposition, Plaintiff contended, inter alia, that Maxwell's detention should pose no real impediment to her defense of this action, suggesting that Maxwell, who filed her motion for a stay only after she had first sought discovery from Plaintiff in this case, "appear[ed] to want to gain an unfair advantage by acquiring as much information as she [could] about Plaintiff without having to divulge anything about herself or the bad conduct she is alleged to have committed." (Id., at 1; see also id., at 4-5 (arguing that Maxwell had already demonstrated her ability to participate actively in this action from jail).) Plaintiff also noted that, under the terms of the Compensation Program, she is not required to agree to a stay of her lawsuit in order to participate in that program. (Id., at 2.) As for the prejudice that Plaintiff would purportedly suffer from a stay of these proceedings, Plaintiff asserted that, "[for too long[,] Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell skirted the consequences of their vile acts," and that she should not have to wait "even longer for justice." (Id., at 4.) + +Maxwell filed a reply on September 4, 2020 (see Letter to the Court from Laura A. Menninger, Esq., dated Sept. 4, 2020 ("9/4/20 Menninger Reply Ltr.") (Dkt. 79)), contending that Plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated how the requested stay would harm her interests, and taking issue with Plaintiff's assertions that Maxwell could reasonably litigate this case from the MDC (see it). + +On September 4, 2020, this Court additionally received a letter from Acting United States Attorney Audrey Strauss, on behalf of the Government, requesting leave to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose of — like Maxwell — seeking a stay of this case, in its entirety, pending the resolution of the Government's criminal prosecution against Maxwell. (See Letter to the Court from Audrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney, by Maurene Comey, Alison Moe, and Lara Pomerantz, Assistant United States Attorneys, dated Sept. 4, 2020 ("9/4/20 Gov't Ltr.") (Dkt. 80).) In its letter, the Government urged this Court to stay this action on the grounds that "a complete stay of this civil action [would] serve the public interest of preserving the integrity of the criminal prosecution against Maxwell and [would] conserve private, public, and judicial + +resources; and that those interests [would] outweigh any delay or disruption caused to the resolution of this civil action." (Id., at 1.) + +## DISCUSSION + +# I. THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION + +The Government is not a party to this civil action against Maxwell, and therefore does not have standing to move for a stay of this action. Thus, for the limited purpose of seeking a stay, the Government has sought leave to intervene in the action. (See 9/4/20 Gov't Ltr., at 1.) This Court finds it unnecessary, however, to deal with the Government's letter in an "intervention" framework, which would require an inquiry as to whether the Government meets the standards set out in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, given that a motion for a stay has already been made by Maxwell, this Court finds it appropriate, in connection with that motion and in the exercise of its discretion, to treat the Government's submission as that of an amicus curiae. See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 288 (2010) (M, CI, concurring in part) ("Courts often treat amicus participation as an alternative to intervention."); Washington State Inv. Bd. v. Odebrecht S.A., No. 17cv8118 (PGG), 2018 WL 6253877, at \*10 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2018) (considering company's submission contesting alternative service on chief executive officer as amicus filing); /n GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec. Litig., 287 F.R.D. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); see also Brenner it Scott, 298 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (not allowing organization that opposed same-sex marriage to intervene in Plaintiffs' actions challenging Florida's constitutional and statutory provisions banning same-sex marriage, but allowing the organization to be heard as amicus). On this basis, this Court has fully considered the views expressed by the Government in its letter. + +## II. MAXWELL'S MOTION FOR A STAY + +## A. Applicable Leeal Standards + +Although staying a civil action pending the completion of a criminal prosecution against a named defendant has been characterized as an "extraordinary remedy," Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012), "courts will not hesitate to grant a stay `when the interests of justice seem to require' it." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. LaGuardia, 435 F. Supp. 3d 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 02cv3288 (DLC), 2002 WL 31729501, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002)) (granting a stay where there was overlap of issues in the civil and criminal cases and explaining that overlap of issues is a particularly significant factor); see also Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (staying civil discovery pending completion of the criminal case against the defendant); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shkreli, No. 15-CV-7175 (KAM) (RML), 2016 WL 1122029, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (same). + +Ultimately, the decision as to whether to issue such a stay rests in the discretion of the district court, Louis Wilton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 99, and each case requires a particularized inquiry, see id., at 98. In determining whether a civil action should be stayed in the face of a parallel criminal proceeding, courts in this District have generally been guided by six factors: (1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has been indicted; (3) the private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the delay; (4) the private interests of and burden on the defendant; (5) the interests of the court(s); and (6) the public interest. See id.; see also, e.g., Trustees of + +Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund, 886 F. Supp. at 1139. The party seeking the stay "bears the burden of establishing its need," Louis Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 97 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and this burden may be met where, on balance, the relevant factors suggest that proceeding with the civil action will likely result in undue prejudice to the defendant, see id. (noting that "absent a showing of undue prejudice ... there is no reason why [a] plaintiff should be delayed in its efforts to diligently proceed to sustain its claim" (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)). + +# B. The Relevant Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting a Stay of This Action. + +In this instance, as discussed below, the relevant factors support Maxell's application for a stay. + +# 1. Overlap Between the Civil and Criminal Cases + +"The strongest case for granting a stay is where a party under criminal indictment is required to defend a civil proceeding involving the same matter." Volmar Distributors, 152 F.R.D. at 39 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord In re Worldcom, 2002 WL 31729501, at \*5. Denying a stay where there is significant factual overlap between the civil and criminal cases may "undermine a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . . expand the rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, expose the basis of the defense to the prosecution in advance of trial, or otherwise prejudice the case." Volmar Distributors, 152 F.R.D. at 39 (citations omitted); see also v. New York City Police Dep't, No. 0lcv6570 (RCC) (JCF), 2003 WL 21664882, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003). + +As a threshold matter, this Court finds that, in this instance, there is significant factual overlap between this civil case and the pending criminal case. For example, as Maxwell points out, both the Indictment in the criminal case and the Complaint in this action contain allegations that Maxwell "groomed" minor victims by taking them to the movies or shopping, that Epstein paid for victims' education, and that Maxwell facilitated Epstein's abusive conduct. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 3 (summarizing certain allegations made in both actions and noting that particular allegations in the Indictment "are very similar in time frame and content to those in the Complaint").) The Government, in its submission, has confirmed that the allegations pleaded in this case will necessarily "touch on matters relating to the pending Indictment" (9/4/20 Gov't Ltr., at 2), and has also noted that "given the factual overlap between the civil and criminal cases, allowing the criminal matter to be resolved in the first instance may result in a narrowing of the factual and legal issues before this Court" (id., at 3). Plaintiff, in her opposition, does not contest that there is substantial overlap between the cases, in terms of the people involved, the relevant evidence, or the facts sought to be established. (See generally 8/27/20 Glassman Ltr.) Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting a stay. + +# 2. Status of the Criminal Case + +The arguments favoring a stay are also stronger where the criminal case is not merely hypothetical or anticipated, but rather is actively proceeding. In fact, as Maxwell notes, "'[w]hether the defendant has been indicted has been described as "the most important factor" to be considered in the balance of factors."' (8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 4 (quoting Maldonado it City of New York, No. 17cv6618 (AJN), 2018 WL 2561026, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018)); see also In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that "[t]he weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that courts will stay a civil proceeding when the criminal investigation has ripened into an indictment" (collecting cases).) + +Here, Maxwell was indicted by a grand jury on June 29, 2020; she has been detained pending her criminal trial; and her trial date has been set. (8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 2.) Should discovery in the civil action proceed, Maxwell would be forced to decide whether to defend herself by making pretrial disclosures and giving deposition testimony (which could be used against her in the criminal case) or to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination (which would protect her in the criminal case, but which could well result in an adverse inference being drawn against her in the civil case). (See id., at 4; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 97-98 (discussing the burdens to the Fifth Amendment privilege that may be posed by parallel proceedings).) This legitimate concern, made more real and immediate by the active posture of criminal case, militates in favor of a stay. + +# 3. The Interests of the Plaintiff + +Plaintiff asserts that staying this proceeding would harm her interests because, as she is suffering "ongoing damaging effects" from the alleged abuse, and she should not have to wait any longer to hold Defendants accountable. (8/27/20 Glassman Ltr., at 4.) While, as a general matter, plaintiffs have a strong interest in the expeditious resolution of their civil claims, see Volmar Distributors, 152 F.R.D. at 40, Plaintiff here has not advanced any particularized reason why a delay would cause her prejudice, such as a likely loss of physical evidence or witness testimony during the period of a stay. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 1 (noting that "there is little chance that any evidence will be lost in the interim given the age of the accusations in this case); see also id., at 4.) + +Additionally, although this Court is not suggesting that Plaintiff has any obligation to agree to a stay so as to pursue her claims through the Compensation Program (and, in fact, recognizes that she does not), this Court does note that a stay would not entirely hinder Plaintiff in her ability to seek redress for the sexual assaults and other tortious conduct on which her claims are based, as, during the pendency of any stay, she would still be able to participate in that program. + +Overall, and despite Plaintiff's assertion that a stay would work to her disadvantage, this Court finds that any generalized prejudice that she would suffer as the result of a stay is not sufficient to counterbalance the other factors that the Court should consider, which all heavily favor a stay. + +## 4. The Interests of the Defendant + +The private interests of Maxwell, and the burden that she would face in proceeding with discovery in the civil action at this time are significant. As already noted, if civil discovery were to proceed, Maxwell would have to make the difficult decision of whether to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege — a decision that could adversely impact her position in one or the other of the cases she is defending. See Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 97. Also, due to heightened restrictions at the MDC during the COVID- 19 pandemic (restrictions of which this Court takes judicial notice), this Court understands that counsel has had difficulty, and will likely continue to have difficulty, meeting with Maxwell and arranging for her to review documents or otherwise to confer for the purpose of preparing a defense to this civil case. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 5; see also 9/4/20 Menninger Reply Ltr., at 2-3.) + +This Court finds that not only the existence of the criminal prosecution against Maxwell, but also the particularly (and unusually) restrictive circumstances of her current detention, would necessarily make it harder for Maxwell to participate fully in the discovery process in this action, and would cause her undue prejudice, weighing strongly in favor of a stay. + +### 5. The Interests of the Court + +As for the interest of the Court, it appears that staying discovery in the civil case could conserve judicial resources. Where a criminal case can potentially streamline the related civil case, this factor supports a stay. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Abraaj Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., No. 19cv3244 (MN), 2019 WL 6498282, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2019). As observed by the Government, the pending criminal case against Maxwell may resolve issues of fact common to the two actions, and may therefore reduce the number of issues to be decided in subsequent proceedings in this case. (See 9/4/20 Gov't Ltr., at 2.) + +Further, although it should not be the decisive factor, this Court also notes that it has some interest in coordinating discovery, where appropriate, among the many civil cases that have been brought in this District against the Epstein estate, and that none of those other cases are currently going forward. This Court additionally notes that tighter restrictions on discovery may be imposed in the context of a criminal prosecution than in a civil litigation, and that, if this civil case were to move forward, restrictions that have already been placed on Maxwell's access to information in her criminal case could have a limiting effect on this Court's ability to supervise discovery here. (See 9/4/20 Gov't Ltr., at 3-4 (noting that "Maxwell's access to information about the criminal matter is under the jurisdiction of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, who has entered a protective order and has issued several rulings regarding the scope of discovery that Maxwell is entitled to and the manner in which she may or may not use that information"); see also 8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr., at 3 (noting that Maxwell had indicated, in her initial disclosures, that, due to the terms of a protective order entered in the criminal case, she would be prohibited from disclosing certain information in the civil case).) + +Thus, at least to some extent, the Court's interest weighs in favor of a stay. + +### 6. The Public Interest + +Plaintiff argues that the public interest is best served by allowing her claims to proceed. (8/27/20 Glassman Ltr., at 5.) Specifically, she contends that the public benefits from civil litigation when that litigation furnishes the public with information on the torts and crimes of a wrongdoer. (Id.) Plaintiff further contends that, as her lawsuit is the only civil case currently being litigated against Maxwell (as any others have been stayed or dismissed), "the continuation of this last remaining civil avenue can furnish the public with critical information as to defendant Maxwell's well known criminal enterprise, how it was operated and all those involved." (Id.) It is a mischaracterization of this action, however, to call it the "last remaining civil avenue" for addressing Maxwell's alleged misconduct, as, to the extent other civil litigation against Maxwell has been stayed, it has not been terminated — just as this action, if stayed, would not be ended. Moreover, as the Government argues, the public interest is also served by protecting the integrity of criminal proceedings. (See generally 9/4/20 Gov't Ur.) Should civil discovery proceed, there is a risk that the criminal prosecution could be impaired by the premature disclosure of the testimony of various witnesses or could otherwise be prejudiced. (See id., at 3 (citing 2003 WL 21664882, at \*2).) On balance, this Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of granting a stay. + +Accordingly, taking all of the relevant factors into account, this Court finds that Maxwell has met her burden to show that a stay of this action is warranted. + +## C. The Case Should Be Stayed in Its Entirety. + +The Co-Executors, Government, and Plaintiff all agree that, should this Court grant Maxwell's request for a stay, the stay should apply to the case in its entirety. Indeed, the Co-Executors take pains to argue that a partial stay as to only Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell + +would unduly prejudice their ability to mount their own defense. (See 8/27/20 Moskowitz Ur., at 1-2.) Where one defendant is a central figure in an action, and where that individual's testimony is of key importance, a partial stay can lead to duplicative discovery efforts. Trustees of Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund, 886 F. Supp. at 1141. This Court is persuaded that, as Maxwell is a central figure in this civil case, a stay of discovery that applies only to her would prejudice the Co-Executors by requiring them to conduct discovery without having the opportunity to depose Maxwell or collect documents in her possession. (See 8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr., at 1-2.) Further, a partial stay could lead to duplicative depositions, as, once the partial stay is lifted, Maxwell would be entitled to question any witnesses (including Plaintiff) who may have already been deposed during the pendency of the partial stay, and, once evidence is obtained from Maxwell, other parties might also wish to re-depose witnesses. (See id. at 2.) + +## CONCLUSION + +For all of the foregoing reasons, Maxwell's motion for a stay of this action, in its entirety, pending the completion of the criminal prosecution against her (Dkt. 69) is granted. If, however, the underlying circumstances change over time in a way that could affect this Court's balancing of the relevant factors, then the parties may bring the changed circumstances to this Court's attention, and it will then consider whether the stay should continue or be lifted. Absent any further application to this Court to review the stay, the parties are directed to provide this Court + +with a joint status report in no more than 90 days, and every 90 days thereafter, during the pendency of the stay. + +Dated: New York, New York September 14, 2020 + +SO ORDERED + +XII orlon\_\_ + +DEBRA FREEMAN United States Magistrate Judge + +Copies to: + +All counsel (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49cedcd51f493a973c281d9c84d79994b7351830 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752342/EFTA02752342.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752342", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "3473709fbcc255b5fcc77fa09348895ed249b04aee9c429d1c8773c02f471571", + "output_sha256": "3473709fbcc255b5fcc77fa09348895ed249b04aee9c429d1c8773c02f471571", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f643a9fc74aad5ab99bf8e02b9828f069a81706b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +--- + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +20 cv 484 (JGK) + +- against - + +ORDER + +DARREN █. INDYKE, ET AL. + +Defendants. + +--- + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +The motion to dismiss is withdrawn without prejudice to renewal at such time that the stay in the case is lifted. The Clerk is directed to close Docket Nos. 36 & 38. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York +October 27, 2020 + diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed72293b949923e23684286970b7fbad431a7618 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752355/EFTA02752355.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -5, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752355", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7458344e90cd0e8714d022db4727027fb97b44c988d86ba5a2cd7132a51954a4", + "output_sha256": "669d4cea9c84887cd207e78f10e25d293296a19cb3bce09d4419b35efe0fb809", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..75e85e405635bb160d13facaf66757754150c33e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennelmoskowitz©Iroutman.com + +December 14, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell No.1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +Pursuant to the Co.yrt's Order dated September 14, 2020 (Doc. 81), Plaintiff Jane Doe; Defendants Darren I. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein; and Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell, jointly submit this status report. Plaintiff submitted her claim to the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program on September 3, 2020 and has since been actively participating in the Program. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Robert Glassman Robert Glassman, Esq. Panish Shea Boyle LLP + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowiiiiii Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +/s/ Laura Menninger Laura MenrSer, Esci Haddon, and P.C. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0047fcc6d594a37f436bdfd6a4c9163884be55a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752356/EFTA02752356.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752356", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f309da1a9ec1aaf4e22de7826802bf5529754026eb99c15fb92c5695ad590b7d", + "output_sha256": "f309da1a9ec1aaf4e22de7826802bf5529754026eb99c15fb92c5695ad590b7d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..737b79cc3b787075ee2b2d90ed0a8b5de97a94dd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +December IS, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. Indyke, et it, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Case Status Update — Global Settlement Reached + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Plaintiff Jane Doe has decided to accept the offer of compensation made to her by the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("Program"). Pursuant to Individual Rule II.B., plaintiff is requesting a pre-motion conference on her request to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(aX2). Since any acceptance of an offer made by the Program requires that both defendants The Estate of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell be released in the settlement agreement, plaintiff will be seeking a stipulation from these defendants to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88752703ce152256d4ea1b5fbce87391ebc83560 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752357/EFTA02752357.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752357", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ff8b6821a7af5677e5d626f440b2c491283f59c8ee64892d381adb4f5330639c", + "output_sha256": "ff8b6821a7af5677e5d626f440b2c491283f59c8ee64892d381adb4f5330639c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cc7ee65c7859fefef6e7dd484f9a0caec9136448 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E ,, + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +December 15, 2020 + +If the parties submit a stipulation, no conference is needed. If not, the parties should appear for a conference on Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 3:30 p.m. + +SO ORDERED + +/s/ John G. Koeltl December 17, 2020 John G. Koeltl New York, NY U.S.D.J. + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et aL, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Case Status Update — Global Settlement Reached + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Plaintiff Jane Doe has decided to accept the offer of compensation made to her by the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("Program"). Pursuant to Individual Rule II.B., plaintiff is requesting a pre-motion conference on her request to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(aX2). Since any acceptance of an offer made by the Program requires that both defendants The Estate of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell be released in the settlement agreement, plaintiff will be seeking a stipulation from these defendants to a dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(AXii) with each party to bear its own fees and costs. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..07196f6f29c66347b7197af13596af854e54089d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752358/EFTA02752358.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752358", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c8cd3d821deb0d9c40649481ca0348c9fcfc5da005739c7317cb325f7fde4869", + "output_sha256": "c8cd3d821deb0d9c40649481ca0348c9fcfc5da005739c7317cb325f7fde4869", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..44db22f0aa3a3c23e90411653a1b1e58a64ee2c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E + +December 21, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. lndyke, et at, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Letter Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2), plaintiff Jane Doe in the above-referenced action hereby requests that the Court dismiss this case forthwith in accordance with the terms set forth in the concurrently submitted stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. Only defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is refusing to stipulate to the dismissal. + +## Brief Background + +Following the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff Jane Doe was consistently encouraged by the parties to stay this case so that she may participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("the Program"). Because, however, the Program rules clearly stated that "[i]ndividuals who have filed a lawsuit need not agree to a stay of litigation or make any other concession in any pending litigation to be eligible to participate in the Program," plaintiff did not agree to such a stay. Instead, defendant Ghislaine Maxwell brought a motion to stay these proceedings which was then joined by the Epstein Estate and the U.S. Government. Magistrate Judge Freeman granted the stay. + +Since that time, plaintiff submitted a claim to the Program. The Program administrator made a monetary offer to plaintiff which plaintiff accepted. The Epstein Estate and Ghislaine Maxwell mandated that Ms. Maxwell be included in the Program settlement release (presumably because when she committed her tortious and criminal conduct against the victims she was doing so as an agent and/or employee in the scope of her agency and/or employment with Mr. Epstein). Plaintiff signed the release and sent it back to the Program administrator. The Program rules state, in part, that payment cannot be disbursed to the plaintiff until a dismissal has been entered in this action. + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +December 21, 2020 Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Now, however, after Ms. Maxwell is the one who sought to stay this case and push Plaintiff into the Program, she is now also the one who is preventing Plaintiff from dismissing this action in a timely and expedient manner pursuant to the terms of the Program. + +Despite the straightforward nature of the dismissal, counsel for Ms. Maxwell has found one excuse after another not to stipulate to the enclosed dismissal executed by the other parties. And despite Plaintiff's counsel's multiple attempts to secure Ms. Maxwell's stipulation, it has become increasingly obvious that she will inexplicably not provide it. Indeed, just today, counsel for Ms. Maxwell stated, for the very first time, that "I will be able to get back to you after I have had a chance to meaningfully discuss with my client. I do not know when that will occur but I am reasonably confident we will be able to meet the Court's January 12 deadline." Not one time did counsel for Ms. Maxwell bring this up during the meet and confer process concerning the dismissal. Nor did she raise it to Judge Freeman at a recent status conference concerning the dismissal that she is also blocking in another Epstein case entitled v. Darren K Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF. + +## Conclusion + +There is no good faith basis in fact or law for defendant Ghislaine Maxwell to prevent this case from being dismissed following the settlement reached among the parties. The only conceivable reason is that she is being difficult for the sake of being difficult. Ms. Maxwell has already done unimaginable harm to Plaintiff when she was a child. She should not be permitted to perpetuate that harm by not allowing Plaintiff to bring much needed closure to this chapter in her life. Plaintiff is respectfully requesting that the Court exercise its discretion and dismiss her case in accordance with the terms set forth in the partially executed stipulation for dismissal so she can satisfy the terms set forth in the Program rules, the Court can clear this case from its docket and the parties can move on. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +End. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b083f5c6cc24373caf98a96b8b5c8cfe14112fb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752359/EFTA02752359.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752359", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f1a303ee6c26101f3a1b34dc1430412fce91b008309cafb008ee1de91e3e4257", + "output_sha256": "f1a303ee6c26101f3a1b34dc1430412fce91b008309cafb008ee1de91e3e4257", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b4922f6900fbe11b8e198ab5f8f8f7af132ec1d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E + +December 21, 2020 + +#### VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. lndyke, et at, 1:20-ev-000484-JGK-DCF Letter Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2), plaintiff Jane Doe in the above-referenced action hereby requests that the Court dismiss this case forthwith in accordance with the terms set forth in the concurrently submitted stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein. Only defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is refusing to stipulate to the dismissal. + +#### Brief Background + +Following the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff Jane Doe was consistently encouraged by the parties to stay this case so that she may participate in the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("the Program"). Because, however, the Program rules clearly stated that "[i]ndividuals who have filed a lawsuit need not agree to a stay of litigation or make any other concession in any pending litigation to be eligible to participate in the Program," plaintiff did not agree to such a stay. Instead, defendant Ghislaine Maxwell brought a motion to stay these proceedings which was then joined by the Epstein Estate and the U.S. Government. Magistrate Judge Freeman granted the stay. + +Since that time, plaintiff submitted a claim to the Program. The Program administrator made a monetary offer to plaintiff which plaintiff accepted. The Epstein Estate and Ghislaine Maxwell mandated that Ms. Maxwell be included in the Program settlement release (presumably because when she committed her tortious and criminal conduct against the victims she was doing so as an agent and/or employee in the scope of her agency and/or employment with Mr. Epstein). Plaintiff signed the release and sent it back to the Program administrator. The Program rules state, in part, that payment cannot be disbursed to the plaintiff until a dismissal has been entered in this action. + +Hon. John G. Koeld Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +December 21, 2020 Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Now, however, after Ms. Maxwell is the one who sought to stay this case and push Plaintiff into the Program, she is now also the one who is preventing Plaintiff from dismissing this action in a timely and expedient manner pursuant to the terms of the Program. + +Despite the straightforward nature of the dismissal, counsel for Ms. Maxwell has found one excuse after another not to stipulate to the enclosed dismissal executed by the other parties. And despite Plaintiff's counsel's multiple attempts to secure Ms. Maxwell's stipulation, it has become increasingly obvious that she will inexplicably not provide it. Indeed, just today, counsel for Ms. Maxwell stated, for the very first time, that "I will be able to get back to you after I have had a chance to meaningfully discuss with my client. I do not know when that will occur but I am reasonably confident we will be able to meet the Court's January 12 deadline." Not one time did counsel for Ms. Maxwell bring this up during the meet and confer process concerning the dismissal. Nor did she raise it to Judge Freeman at a recent status conference concerning the dismissal that she is also blocking in another Epstein case entitled v. Darren K Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell 19-10475-LGS-DCF. + +### Conclusion + +Them is no good faith basis in fact or law for defendant Ghislaine Maxwell to prevent this case from being dismissed following the settlement reached among the parties. The only conceivable reason is that she is being difficult for the sake of being difficult. Ms. Maxwell has already done unimaginable harm to Plaintiff when she was a child. She should not be permitted to perpetuate that harm by not allowing Plaintiff to bring much needed closure to this chapter in her life. Plaintiff is respectfully requesting that the Court exercise its discretion and dismiss her case in accordance with the terms set forth in the partially executed stipulation for dismissal so she can satisfy the terms set forth in the Program rules, the Court can clear this case from its docket and the parties can move on. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +End. + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484- JGK + +# JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF ENTIRE ACTION WITH PREJUDICE + +IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between all Parties to this action, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, that the action be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). + +IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit. + +IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as + +Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved. + +> Respectfully submitted, PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP + +Dated: December 21, 2020 By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman, Esq. Panish Shea & Boyle LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tel: (310) 477-1700 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff + +Dated: December 21, 2020 By: + +Bennet Moskowitz Pepper sEz . Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Tel: (212) 704-6087 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +Attorneys for Defendants Darren K Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein + +Dated: By: + +Lauran MerSer, Ego Haddon, , P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Tel: (303) 831-7364 LMenninger@HMFLaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..da99bc715f75047863e76bf56965a3732840b92a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752361/EFTA02752361.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752361", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "fb572f21b8254fd7653b5d92c0b6a9bb320d8af8bde2d4cf1bf7e923c0be6c06", + "output_sha256": "fb572f21b8254fd7653b5d92c0b6a9bb320d8af8bde2d4cf1bf7e923c0be6c06", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d611dd7ecec7adaa0f69c10d515d721a58654cae --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennelmoskowitz©Iroutman.com + +December 22, 2020 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable Debra C. Freeman Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No.1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Freeman: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced matter. We write in response to the December 21, 2020 letter from Plaintiffs counsel [Doc 87], to clarify the record. + +The Co-Executors have no objection to Plaintiffs request that the Court dismiss this action following her decision to accept the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program's (the "Program") independent Administrator's compensation determination. Accordingly, and as Plaintiff's counsel accurately notes, our clients have already executed the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal of Entire Action With Prejudice + +In his letter, however, Plaintiffs counsel inaccurately states: "The Epstein Estate and Ghislaine Maxwell mandated that Ms. Maxwell be included in the Program settlement release (presumably because when she committed her tortious and criminal conduct against the victims she was doing so as an agent and/or employee in the scope of her agency and/or employment with Mr. Epstein)." Neither Ms. Maxwell nor her counsel had any say whatsoever regarding the Program, including the scope of the Program release. Only the Estate, various plaintiffs' counsel and the U.S.V.I. Attorney General provided input on the Program. + +It is not surprising that, in the interest of finality and as expressly explained in the Program Protocol — a document drafted over several months with the assistance of claimants' counsel, and in which neither Ms. Maxwell nor her counsel had any involvement -- a claimant who elects to accept the offer of compensation from the + +Program must release her claims against the Estate and anyone who would potentially implead the Co-Executors. (Ms. Maxwell has already sued the Estate in the U.S.V.I. seeking indemnification of her legal expenses, including in this case. It is a matter of public record that the Estate has refused to indemnify Ms. Maxwell, and has moved to dismiss her claims for such relief.) All claimants remain free to pursue claims against others and are in no way prohibited from communicating their experiences (if they wish) to law enforcement, the press or the public. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..408abfa29db67d76c2b32b39b37e83436c64cfe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752366/EFTA02752366.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752366", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "b478dee31808f0fdbe773cdbd995429b76967f428fd5a92aa6f322ff0c783b84", + "output_sha256": "b478dee31808f0fdbe773cdbd995429b76967f428fd5a92aa6f322ff0c783b84", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e46194dbdb1dedddd0973cd3480ca3a4432c71c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and P.0 Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 FA 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningenthmflaw.com + +December 22, 2020 + +VIA ECF + +Hon. John Koehl United States District Court Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312 + +> Re: Response to Letter of Plaintiff dated December 21 20-cv-484 (JGK-DCF), Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke, et al. + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +On behalf of defendant Ghislaine Maxwell,/ write in response to plaintiff's "Letter Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2)" dated December 21, 2020, wherein counsel makes a number of factually and legally inaccurate statements. + +Plaintiff previously wrote the Court on December 15, 2020, asking for a premotion conference regarding her intent to file a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). This Court then issued an endorsement on December 17, 2020, advising that the parties need not have such a conference if they "submit a stipulation" of dismissal. In the absence of such a stipulation, the Court set a conference for January 12, 2021 at 3:30 p.m. See Doc. # 85. + +Without waiting for that conference and without negotiating with all parties a stipulation of dismissal, plaintiff now moves prior to the pre-motion conference to dismiss the case. She does not explain why she should be relieved of the rules requiring a pre-motion conference, nor her apparent disregard of the conference scheduled in January. Rather, she files her "Letter Motion to Dismiss" by levying baseless and false attacks on Ms. Maxwell and her counsel. As explained below, the parties have yet to complete conferring on the terms of a stipulated dismissal and therefore any ruling on the Letter Motion to Dismiss is premature. + +Plaintiff asserts that "Ms. Maxwell has found one excuse after another not to stipulate to the enclosed dismissal executed by the other parties." This is not true. Plaintiff's counsel first advised the defendants on December 11, 2020, that his client had accepted the offer from the Epstein program. Undersigned counsel inquired + +Hon. John Koeltl December 22, 2020 Page 2 + +repeatedly of plaintiff whether she would be willing to provide a copy of her signed and executed release of Ms. Maxwell in exchange for a stipulation to dismiss. Plaintiff never agreed to provide such a release. Plaintiff instead filed her "Letter Motion to Dismiss" without mentioning the disputed condition. It is plaintiff's refusal to answer whether she will provide a complete unredacted version of her signed release that has caused the delay in the parties' ability to reach agreement on the terms of a stipulated dismissal. Plaintiff's counsel offered an alternative — a redacted copy of the signed release — but undersigned counsel advised that she could not accept that counteroffer without conferring with her client. Ms. Maxwell is in custody and not able to communicate at will with her counsel. Instead of waiting for that discussion, plaintiff's counsel filed the Letter. He has not explained why he could not wait a day or two for counsel to confer with her client and to then continue the negotiations regarding a stipulated dismissal. Plaintiff, after all, waited (according to her false allegations) twenty-three years to bring this lawsuit but cannot wait 2-3 days for counsel to confer with her incarcerated client. + +If the Court is inclined to rule on the Letter Motion prior to any pre-motion conference or completion of the parties' conferral, Ms. Maxwell believes under Rule 41(a)(2) that the following "terms" are "proper" and should be included in the dismissal order: + +- a) Plaintiff provide a complete, unredacted version of her signed and executed release that purports to cover any and all claims against Ms. Maxwell so that she cannot bring a duplicative litigation in any forum; +- b) The language included in plaintiff's proposed dismissal concerning Ms. Maxwell's rights with respect to her ongoing litigation against the Estate for indemnification be included in the Court's Order. +- c) Plaintiff pay the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in litigating this action; + +First, Ms. Maxwell requests her counsel be provided a copy of plaintiff's signed and executed release. In the event plaintiff attempts to sue her again in any forum at some unknown time in the future, Ms. Maxwell needs a signed and executed release so that she has a legally enforceable document to seek dismissal of any such claim. Plaintiffs counsel's representations in correspondence that she is releasing Ms. Maxwell are insufficient. Ms. Maxwell has had no role in negotiating the terms of the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program. She is neither a signatory to any of its terms nor contractually bound by them. Whatever plaintiff was assured by the Program in terms of confidentiality apparently did not take into account the needs of third-party beneficiaries of her agreement to release "any employees of the Estate, Mr. Epstein, or any entities owned or controlled by the Estate." Counsel is unaware + +Hon. John Koeltl December 22, 2020 Page 3 + +of any legal support for refusing to provide a copy of a release to the released party; plaintiff's pre-motion letter cites none. + +Second, Ms. Maxwell also seeks to ensure that the dismissal is without prejudice to her ability to seek indemnification from Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, the executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Estate") for fees and costs incurred in defending against this action. Her request for indemnification is presently subject litigation in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands District of St. & St. John, Case Number ST-20-CV-155 (the "Indemnification Litigation"). In her proposed stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), plaintiff included the following language: "this action shall be dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs." The broad language contained in plaintiff's proposed stipulation could arguably act to waive Ms. Maxwell's ability to recover fees and costs incurred during litigation of this case in the Indemnification Litigation. Ms. Maxwell requests that the court include a term of dismissal that expressly preserves Ms. Maxwell's rights to seek fees and costs in the Indemnification Litigation against the Estate. + +Third, the grounds for an award of attorneys' fees and costs are numerous. First, plaintiff improperly brought this baseless civil suit against Ms. Maxwell, making claims that are decades old without a shred of documentary or corroborative support. Ms. Maxwell absolutely denies plaintiff's claims against her; they are false. + +Further, in addition to having to file an Answer, Ms. Maxwell was forced to litigate plaintiff's failure to provide appropriate Rule 26 disclosures to support her claims or to provide verified discovery responses. See Doc. #s 54, 60, 66. Although Ms. Maxwell, while incarcerated, managed to provide written discovery responses and initial disclosures, plaintiff, presumably not in custody, apparently was never able to quantify her damages nor to verify her interrogatory responses nor justify her failures to do so. Ms. Maxwell also was forced to litigate her request to stay the proceedings. Plaintiff refused to agree, even while she stated her intent to pursue the Epstein claims program. Only after the government intervened in this case to protect against Ms. Maxwell getting any discovery herein, did Judge Freeman grant a complete stay of the proceedings. + +Plaintiff falsely claims that Ms. Maxwell "push[ed] Plaintiff into the Program." This also is not true. The grounds for Ms. Maxwell's Motion to Stay depended largely on the fact that she is currently under indictment based on the same allegations as were made by plaintiff in this case. Under Second Circuit precedent, a stay of civil proceedings is appropriate during the pendency of a related indicted criminal case. See Doc. # 69; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). Nor did Ms. Maxwell dictate the terms of the Program or its required release: Ms. Maxwell and her counsel had no role whatsoever in crafting the Epstein program. + +Hon. John Koeltl December 22, 2020 Page 4 F.R.C.P. 41(aX2) provides "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." (emphasis supplied). Terms and conditions are generally imposed aw district court under Rule 41(a)(2) to protect the defendant from prejudice. 9 & =, Federal Practice and Procedure. § 2366 (3d ed.2008). "Courts have imposed a variety of terms and conditions, including the imposition of costs or attorneys' fees or requirements that the plaintiff produce documents or agree to allow discovery to be used in any subsequent action." In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust268 F.R.D. 539, 543-44 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis supplied) (citing 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2366). + +For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell requests first that the parties be provided an opportunity to finish conferral on the terms of a potential stipulated motion to dismiss. Barring that request, Ms. Maxwell asks that the Court enter an Order dismissing the case on the three terms outlined above. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1965c04f2f8d51542e3bdadd7e2ce244ee6c56f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752368/EFTA02752368.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752368", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9f2c6bfb05de54cc038054d81a99dfcf0984c3dd88da6823ea4fc6991f0ad260", + "output_sha256": "9f2c6bfb05de54cc038054d81a99dfcf0984c3dd88da6823ea4fc6991f0ad260", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..72fdac34786ec224457cd702208bce63ba29930f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, 20 cv 484 + +ORDER + +- against - + +DARREN I. INDYKE, ET AL., + +Defendants. + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +The parties should submit any motions in connection with dismissal of the case by January 15, 2021. Responsive papers are due January 29, 2021. Replies are due February 5, 2021. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York + +December 23, 2020 /s/ John G. Koeltl John G. Koeltl United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..487d53922025cf3b2d0f64149b35b8fbcf306fa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752372/EFTA02752372.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752372", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "08d859c2765c4f9b60fff5f68ba505437b6b5f402724c25098c0399d9f3c01b3", + "output_sha256": "08d859c2765c4f9b60fff5f68ba505437b6b5f402724c25098c0399d9f3c01b3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..913cc48856ac6cb12deb4e12b2fd717db581612d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.md @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE. + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual. + +Defendants. + +PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(2) + +#### TABLE OF CONTENTS + +| | | ngPa | +| ------ | ----------------------------------------------------- | ------ | +| I. | INTRODUCTION | | +| II. | BRIEF BACKGROUND | | +| III. | THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THIS CASE | 2 | +| IV. | ALTERNATIVE RELIEF | 3 | +| V. | DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION DOES NOT PREJUDICE MAXWELL | 3 | +| VI. | CONCLUSION | 4 | + +#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES + +Page + +# CASES + +Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985 3 + +v. Indyke et al., 19-cv- I0475-LGS-DCF 1, 4 + +## OTHER AUTHORITIES + +F.R.C.P. Rule 41(a)(2) 1, 2, 3 + +#### I. INTRODUCTION + +As the Court has been previously advised, this case settled following Plaintiff's acceptance of a settlement offer made by the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP"). Dismissal of this action with prejudice is a condition of the settlement set forth in the settlement release executed by Plaintiff. Despite Plaintiffs best and repeated efforts to reach a stipulated dismissal of this action both before and after the December 23, 2020 status conference this Court held regarding the case dismissal, those efforts have been met with resistance by Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and the parties have been unsuccessful in reaching a resolution. For the foregoing reasons and those that follow, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice, with each side to bear their own costs and fees, pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 41(a)(2) and according to the terms set forth in the previously submitted stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darien Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (ECF 87). + +# II. BRIEF BACKGROUND + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell and her counsel have attempted at every turn to delay this case from moving towards a resolution by trial, settlement or, now, through Plaintiff's participation in the EVCP. At first, counsel for Ms. Maxwell refused to accept service on her behalf of the complaint, despite already being litigation counsel for Ms. Maxwell in another pending SDNY case brought by another Epstein/Maxwell victim ( v. Indyke et al., 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF), forcing Plaintiff to seek an order approving alternative service. (ECF 45). Then, within a matter of weeks after making her first appearance in this case (ECF 52-53), Ms. Maxwell pleaded with Magistrate Judge Freeman to stay these proceedings on August 19, 2020 to avoid having to answer questions under oath about the abuse she and Jeffrey Epstein committed against Plaintiff as she remains jailed in New York and awaits her criminal trial in + +which she is accused of recruiting and enticing minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts. (ECF 69). Over Plaintiffs opposition, that motion was granted following briefs filed in support of Ms. Maxwell's request for a stay by the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Government. (ECF 81). + +And now, Ms. Maxwell has inexplicably refused to stipulate to a voluntary dismissal by Plaintiff of her lawsuit with prejudice following her acceptance of a settlement offer made by the EVCP. Ms. Maxwell claims, without any legal support, that she is first entitled to learn the amount of the settlement offer made to Plaintiff in connection to the confidential EVCP before she will consent to a dismissal. However, the EVCP did not involve Ms. Maxwell, she is not a party or signatory to the settlement release agreement and she is not contributing any money to the settlement. Despite this and without any obligation to do so, Plaintiff offered to make available to Ms. Maxwell and her counsel a redacted copy of the confidential settlement release agreement which Ms. Maxwell rejected. Plaintiff even proposed producing the release to Ms. Maxwell with the amount un-redacted if Plaintiffs name would remain redacted to protect her court ordered anonymity. Ms. Maxwell rejected that proposal too which calls into question her stated reason for refusing to stipulate to the dismissal. + +# III. THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THIS CASE + +F.R.C.P. Rule 41(a)(2) states that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." + +Plaintiff is requesting that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice, with each side to + +bear their own costs and fees, according to the terms set forth in the previously submitted stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (ECF 87). In light of Plaintiff's successful participation in the EVCP, dismissing the case with each party bearing its own fees and costs is proper. There are no counterclaims and Ms. Maxwell should not now be allowed to prevent Plaintiff from finalizing her successful participation in the Program, which Plaintiff was encouraged to participate in by Ms. Maxwell herself when she moved to stay these proceedings back in August of last year. + +# IV. ALTERNATIVE RELIEF + +Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter dismissal with prejudice as to defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein only, with each side to bear their own costs and fees, and allow Plaintiff to continue the prosecution of her case against Ms. Maxwell after the stay is lifted following the completion of Ms. Maxwell's criminal case. This relief is requested only if the EVCP agrees to its settlement obligations despite Ms. Maxwell's ongoing participation in the case. + +## V. DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION DOES NOT PREJUDICE MAXWELL + +Plaintiff expects Ms. Maxwell to oppose this straightforward motion with a laundry list of excuses and grievances. One such anticipated argument is that Ms. Maxwell would be + +It is anticipated that Ms. Maxwell will argue that she is entitled to costs and fees. However, Ms. Maxwell is unable to obtain costs and fees from Plaintiff if this case is dismissed with prejudice. Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("attorney's fees have almost never been awarded" when a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)." + +prejudiced should the case be dismissed according to the terms set forth in the previously submitted stipulation for dismissal. Ms. Maxwell, however, cannot seriously argue that she would somehow be prejudiced by the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit against her with prejudice following a settlement reached between the plaintiff and another party. + +Indeed, any such arguments raised by Ms. Maxwell in opposition to this motion must be met with suspicion in light of Ms. Maxwell's "lack of candor" to the Southern District of New York as recently noted by Judge Nathan in connection to Ms. Maxwell's second request for bail, which Judge Nathan, again, denied. (20-cr-330, ECF 106). Moreover, in the case of v. Indyke et al., 19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF, where Ms. Maxwell is also strangely objecting to the dismissal by the plaintiff following her acceptance of an offer in the EVCP, Judge Schofield recently questioned whether Ms. Maxwell's position is tenable in light of "the very substantial requests [she is] making." "US Judge Appears Unlikely to Require Disclosure of Epstein Accuser's Settlement With Estate," https://www.law.com/newyorklawjouma1/2021/01/14/usjudge-appears-unlikely-to-require-disclosure-of-epstein-accusers-settlement-withestate/?slreturn=20210014235043. + +# VL CONCLUSION + +Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court dismiss her case with prejudice and in accordance with the terms set forth in the partially executed stipulation for dismissal so she can satisfy the terms set forth in the EVCP rules, the Court can clear this case from its docket and the parties can move on. + +Dated: January IS. 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff + +#### CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE + +I, Robert S. Glassman, hereby certify that Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) contains 1,119 words and complies with the formatting rules set forth in the Individual Practices of Judge John G. Koeltl. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Dated: January 15, 2021 By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310)477-1699 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff + +**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** + +I hereby certify that on this 15 day of January, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(2)** with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Bennet Jerome Moskowitz +Charles [REDACTED] Glover +Mary [REDACTED] Metcalfe +Molly S DiRago +Troutman Pepper [REDACTED] Sanders LLP +875 Third Avenue +New York, NY 10022 +212-704-6000 +[bennet.moskowitz@troutmansanders.com](mailto:bennet.moskowitz@troutmansanders.com) +[Charles.Glover@troutman.com](mailto:Charles.Glover@troutman.com) +[marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com](mailto:marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com) +[molly.dirago@troutman.com](mailto:molly.dirago@troutman.com) + +Jeffrey S. Pagliuca +Laura A. Menninger +Haddon [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] +150 East 10th Avenue +Denver, CO 80203 +(303)-831-7364 +Fax: (303)-832-2628 +[jpagliuca@hmflaw.com](mailto:jpagliuca@hmflaw.com) +[lmenninger@hmflaw.com](mailto:lmenninger@hmflaw.com) + +Attorney for Defendant, **Ghislaine Maxwell** + +Attorney for Defendant, **Darren K. Indyke** and **Richard D Kahn** in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +/s/ Robert Glassman +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..36b443f04d33f1ec47f7015728c62f386936a1ac --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752373/EFTA02752373.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -227, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752373", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 19, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "7d7408c4d11b0015c120a9f7dd4ee96f3cf10ca0212db7bbd1895151a843c0f9", + "output_sha256": "795ef6190373d922f417681787223b88a164abaf80f3938dc7b332b7dc8faa23", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d625e6acade343ffc17cf0f6de64f6769613cb35 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE. + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-09484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual. + +Defendants. + +## NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 4I(a)(2) + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying Memorandum of Law and all prior pleadings and proceedings in this action, Plaintiff Jane Doe, will move this Court before the Hon. John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge, at the Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007, for an Order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2), to dismiss this case with prejudice, with each side to bear their own costs and fees and according to the terms set forth in the previously submitted stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (ECF 87). + +Respectfully submitted, + +Dated: January 15, 2021 By: /s/ Robert Glassman Robert Glassman PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I hereby certify that on this 15 day of January, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(2) with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Bennet . hh u .skowitz Jeffrey S. Pagliuca Charl Glover Laura A • ger Mary Metcalfe Haddon and Molly DiRago 150 East I • venue Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 212-704-6000 bennet.moskowitz@troutmansanders.com Charles.Glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com molly.dirago@troutman.com + +Attorney for Defendant, Darren K. Indyke and Richard D Kahn in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein + +Denver, CO 80203 (303)-831-7364 Fax: (303)-832-2628 jpagliuca@hmflaw.com Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorney for Defendant. Ghislaine Maxwell + +/s/ Robert Glassman Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..736d1a3c8cfbaa2227f758d6bdd960bb0c172ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752382/EFTA02752382.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752382", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "daa992ec21635ed0e9b55309aef60619b070909fc88e1b1e4906e84d337f5179", + "output_sha256": "daa992ec21635ed0e9b55309aef60619b070909fc88e1b1e4906e84d337f5179", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..087266e1c154814abd1f523eed51032e6b22de41 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +## CO-EXECUTORS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(21 + +Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"),submit this response to Plaintiff Jane Doe's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) (ECF No. 37). + +As the Co-Executors previously advised the Court, they have no objection to Plaintiff's request that the Court dismiss this action following her decision to accept the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program's (the "Program") independent Administrator's compensation determination. Accordingly, and as Plaintiff's counsel accurately notes, on December 21, 2020, the Co-Executors executed the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal of Entire Action With Prejudice (ECF No. 87). + +The Co-Executors submit this Response solely to address Plaintiff's request for "alternate relief'—namely, for the Court to "enter dismissal with prejudice as to [the Co-Executors]...and allow Plaintiff to continue the prosecution of her case against Ms. Maxwell." (Pl.'s Mem. of Law [ECF 91-1] at p. 3.) Such relief would be inappropriate. + +Under the Program Protocol — a document drafted over several months with substantial input from claimants' counsel, and in which neither Ms. Maxwell nor her counsel had any involvement — a claimant who elects to accept the offer of compensation must release her claims against the Estate and persons who could potentially implead the Co-Executors. (Ms. Maxwell has already sued the Estate in the U.S.V.I. seeking indemnification of her legal expenses, including in this case. It is a matter of public record that the Estate has refused to indemnify Ms. Maxwell; its motion to dismiss her claims for such relief is pending.) + +Program compensation determinations take this into consideration. Further, Claimants remain free to pursue claims against any others and are in no way prohibited from communicating their experiences (if they wish) to law enforcement, the press, or the public. + +Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for alternate relief fails to acknowledge that (1) the Program simply does not permit such relief and (2) relatedly, her Program compensation determination compensates her for damages recoverable from the Estate and not unilaterally alter the Program Protocol to obtain a Court order that would permit her to seek double recovery by receiving full compensation from the Program while continuing to maintain an action against Ms. Maxwell. + +## CONCLUSION + +For the reasons stated above, the Co-Executors respectfully request that, (i) should the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion, the form of Order dismissing this action be the one already executed by the Co-Executors and Plaintiff (ECF No. 87); and (ii) in any event, the Court deny Plaintiff's request for "alternate relief," together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. + +Dated: New York, New York January 29, 2021 + +By: /s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz TROUTMAN PEPPER SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + +Attorney for the Co-Executors \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4b9fe442cd7c2564fcba1be0312593aeac4b5853 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752384/EFTA02752384.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752384", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "a5bcf80b6e8d1aefb5ca93f4dbcaad977d585289bc81573f5330433c65106d83", + "output_sha256": "a5bcf80b6e8d1aefb5ca93f4dbcaad977d585289bc81573f5330433c65106d83", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c976f7e06121a67e048615a42fb6305f1dc7ba1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +## EXHIBIT A + +## EPSTEIN VICTIMS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM ("EVCP") + +## GENERAL RELEASE + +This General Release is made this day of 20 . + +WHEREAS, (the "Claimant"), submitted a claim for compensation to the Epstein Victims Compensation Program ("EVCP") asserting that she is a victim of sexual abuse by Jeffrey E. Epstein; and + +WHEREAS, the EVCP Program Administrator (the "Administrator") determined pursuant to the EVCP Protocol that Claimant is eligible to participate in the EVCP; and + +WHEREAS, after reviewing Claimant's submissions and after careful consideration of documentation and proof, and after due deliberation, the Administrator issued a compensation determination to Claimant ("Compensation Offer"); and + +WHEREAS, several jurisdictions within the United States have enacted claims revival statutes concerning the timeliness of claims of sexual abuse; and + +WHEREAS, Claimant is aware that, by accepting this Compensation Offer from the EVCP, Claimant waives and releases certain individuals and entities from any and all claims or causes of action arising from Mr. Epstein's conduct, whether pursuant to claims revival statutes or otherwise; and + +WHEREAS, after careful consideration of the proposed Compensation Offer, including consultation with her legal counsel regarding the Compensation Offer, Claimant informed the Administrator that Claimant has decided to accept the Compensation Offer. + +## NOW THEREFORE, + +Claimant, for and on behalf of herself and her heirs, devisees, legatees, distributees, executors, administrators, trustees, personal representatives, successors and assigns (collectively, "Releasor"), for and in consideration of Dollars (\$ ) (the Compensation Offer) to be received from the EVCP, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, hereby releases and forever discharges the Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the "Epstein Estate"), the Co-Trustees of The 1953 Trust, the Epstein Estate, any entities owned or controlled in whole or part by the Epstein Estate (the "Epstein Entities") and their respective current + +and former principals, officers, directors, stockholders, managers, members, partners, limited partners, trustees, beneficiaries, administrators, agents, employees, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns and affiliates, and any entities or individuals who are or have ever been engaged by (whether as independent contractors or otherwise), employed by, worked in any capacity for, or provided any services to Mr. Epstein, the Epstein Entities or the Epstein Estate (jointly and severally, the "Releasees"), from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, variances, trespasses, damages and judgments, whether sounding in equity, tort, common law, contract, statute, regulation or otherwise and whether now existing, hereafter existing or revived in the future whatsoever in law, admiralty, equity or otherwise, including without limitation any and all claims or causes of action that arise or may arise from or which otherwise concern acts of sexual abuse by Mr. Epstein (the "Cairns") which against the Releasees, Releasor ever had, now has or hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world through the date of this General Release. + +This General Release is a broad release of any and all Claims of Releasor against any and all Releasees, including without limitation any and all causes of action, lawsuits, claims, demands, damages and liability whatsoever, and also including without limitation to the extent of their respective liability for the same, any and all such claims against any and all Releasees for contribution as to any other person or persons who may be determined to have been joint tortfeasors arising out of or in any way related to any and all known and unknown personal injuries, and also including without limitation any derivative claims for loss of consortium, under any federal, state or local law, without limitation. This General Release is all-encompassing and is specifically made and given on the premise that any and all Claims by Releasor are hereby released and extinguished, whether said Claims arose in Florida, New Mexico, New York, the United States Virgin Islands, France or any other country, state, territory, possession or jurisdiction, or otherwise. + +This General Release extends to released Claims that Releasor does not know or suspect to exist in her favor, which, if known by Releasor, would have materially affected her decision to enter into this General Release, and Releasor understands and agrees that she is releasing any and all such unknown or unsuspected Claims in Release& favor. Releasor acknowledges that she is familiar with Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which provides as follows: + +A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS THAT THE CREDITOR OR RELEASING PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE AND THAT, IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER, WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR OR RELEASED PARTY. + +Releasor expressly waives and relinquishes any right or benefit that Releasor has or may have under Section 1542 of the California Civil Code and under any other statute or legal principle with similar effect. In connection with such waiver and relinquishment, Releasor acknowledges that she is aware that, after executing this General Release, Releasor or Releasor's attorneys or agents may discover released Claims or facts in addition to, or different from, those which they now know or believe to exist with respect to the subject matter of this General Release, but that it is Releasor's intent hereby to fully, finally and forever settle and release all of the Claims, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which now exist, may exist, or heretofore may have existed. In furtherance of this intent, this General Release shall be, and remain in effect as, a full and complete release of the Claims notwithstanding the discovery or existence of any such additional or different Cairns or facts. + +The Administrator of the EVCP has retained Garretson Resolution Group, Inc. d/b/a Epiq Mass Tort ("Epiq") to verify and resolve any lien or reimbursement claim that may be owed to Medicare Part A and/or Part B ("Medicare") and/or Medicaid with respect to compensation awarded to any participating claimant under the EVCP. If either entity asserts a lien or reimbursement claim, Epiq is hereby authorized to act on behalf of the EVCP to verify and resolve such lien or reimbursement claim. In the Claim Form, Releasor authorized the Administrator to use and/or disclose information as to Releasor for the resolution of Medicare and/or Medicaid liens. This includes providing to Epiq certain information as to Releasor, including: (1) first name, last name and middle initial, (2) Social Security number; (3) date of birth, (4) gender and (5) basic information regarding the nature of Releasor's Claims, and authorizing the Administrator and Epiq to use, exchange and report this information to Medicare and Medicaid, as may be necessary, for purposes of verifying and resolving Medicare and/or Medicaid liens and/or reimbursement claims and ensuring compliance with the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(b), and its accompanying regulations. In the event that Epiq resolves the asserted claim or lien, the Epstein Estate will pay the negotiated amount in addition to any Compensation Offer determined by the Administrator. + +Releasor represents and acknowledges that she is voluntarily and freely granting this General Release in exchange for payment of the Compensation Offer, and that she is legally competent to execute and deliver this General Release. Releasor further represents that she is represented by legal counsel and has received legal advice prior to entering into this General Release and that she has been advised by said attorney regarding the terms and conditions of this General Release, which she has completely read and fully understands, including that accepting the Compensation Offer and signing this General Release is a full and final compromise, adjustment and resolution of any and all Claims that Releasor may now have or ever will have against Releasees. + +Pursuant to the EVCP Protocol, the Administrator will maintain the confidentiality of all information and documentation relating to claimants who participate in the EVCP Program. This General Release does not require participating claimants to maintain such confidentiality and Releasor may — at Releasor's voluntary and sole option — disclose such information regarding the claims process and/or the Compensation Offer and any other information pertaining to her claim. + +This General Release specifically does not include as a Release or released party under this Agreement, and all parties expressly acknowledge, agree and understand that any and all claims that Releasor has or may have against are expressly preserved. + +Releasor represents and warrants that she has not assigned any Claims released pursuant to this General Release. + +Releasor will dismiss with prejudice any and all legal actions — whether lawsuits, probate claims or otherwise - that Releasor has filed against any of Releasees, with each party to bear her, his or its own costs and attorneys' fees and will submit proof of dismissal to the Administrator along with or prior to the signed acceptance of the Compensation Offer and this executed Release. + +This General Release contains the entire understanding of the Releasor and the Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate. Any modification of any of the provisions of this General Release shall be effective only if made in writing and executed by Releasor and the Co-Executors of the Epstein Estate with the same formality as this General Release. + +IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Claimant has executed this General Release on the date below her signature. + +(Signature: Claimant) + +(Date) + +STATE OF ) + +COUNTY OF ) + +ss: + +On 20\_, before me personally came , to me known, who, by me duly sworn, did depose and say that deponent is the Releasor who executed the foregoing General Release. + +Notary Public + +Reviewed and approved: + +Type (or print) Name of Claimant + +Attorney for Releasor: + +Type (or print) Name of Attorney: + +Signature: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..57e6624c4beeb303c545ac11301b969f3d073bf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752387/EFTA02752387.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752387", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ff44fd15c270dec2b6f2fa271c19246da6fc6003749db2659536a80513000d0e", + "output_sha256": "ff44fd15c270dec2b6f2fa271c19246da6fc6003749db2659536a80513000d0e", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a886826321b965ef50ffd63a5d5bbf3180c05062 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. DARKEN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, Defendants. X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +Proposed Order + +JOHN G. KOELTL, United States District Judge: + +This matter is before me on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Ms. Maxwell's Response thereto. + +It is hereby ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the above-captioned action will be dismissed with prejudice, upon the following conditions: + +Plaintiff shall provide an unredacted and signed copy of the General Release she executed with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP") within two (2) business days of her affirmative acceptance of the conditions set forth herein, or the expiration of the time period for withdrawing her Motion to Dismiss, as set forth below, together with a certification of its authenticity; + +Plaintiff and Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, shall each bear their own attorneys' fees and costs of suit. + +Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from plaintiff or from the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC, a New York Limited Liability Company, or release any such claims as between the Defendants. Nor does anything herein prejudice the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Richard D. Kahn, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, or NES, LLC's rights and legal positions with respect to Ms. Maxwell's seeking of fees or costs related to this matter, all of which rights and legal positions are hereby expressly preserved. + +It is further ORDERED that plaintiff shall have until [ 1 to accept an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on the above terms, or withdraw her MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(2) filed January 15, 2020. If Plaintiff takes no action by [ I, the conditions will be deemed accepted, and this Order and Judgment including the conditions shall be entered forthwith. + +Dated: New York, New York + +, 2021 + +SO ORDERED + +JOHN G. KOELTL United States District Judge Southern District of New York \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d41ed928666e64bd9df10f41caa6964f9c5eb283 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752393/EFTA02752393.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752393", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ef7f90297e307d7850f28653f95b4345adaa82dc63843b46061ec1ffaa9fd4d2", + "output_sha256": "ef7f90297e307d7850f28653f95b4345adaa82dc63843b46061ec1ffaa9fd4d2", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d4d4606422d87434ed470b8c187184e59900280 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.md @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +x JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, Defendants. X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(A)(2) + +> Laura A. Menninger Jeffrey S. Pa liuca HADDON, AND 150 East 1 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 303.831.7364 P.C. + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell hereby responds to plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). + +### INTRODUCTION + +This Court has the authority to -- and should -- impose two additional conditions on plaintiff's requested dismissal with prejudice. First, the Court should order plaintiff to disclose to Ms. Maxwell the signed release she executed with the Estate of Epstein that purports to release Ms. Maxwell as a former employee of an Epstein-related entity. Disclosure of the release will protect Ms. Maxwell's legal interests in (a) any future civil proceeding involving these parties, by serving as evidence of the actual name of the releasor, and (b) in her upcoming criminal trial, where she enjoys a constitutional, inviolate right to confront her accusers, including with evidence of their financial motive to fabricate stories against her. + +Second, the Court should strike from plaintiff's proposed order the request for each party to bear its own costs and fees. Although Ms. Maxwell is not seeking an order for her fees and costs in connection with the dismissal of this case from this Court, she reserves her right to do so in any future litigation against plaintiff and by way of her currently-filed indemnification lawsuit against the Estate in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Ms. Maxwell believes that plaintiff knew at the time she moved for service of her Complaint on Ms. Maxwell that she intended to participate in the Epstein Victim's Compensation Fund ("EVCF'), that Ms. Maxwell would be released as a result of her participation in that fund, and also that Ms. Maxwell would shortly be indicted in the Southern District of New York. Ms. Maxwell should not be prejudiced in her ability to pursue claims against plaintiff for abuse of process or malicious prosecution for bringing this lawsuit and to therein seek as damages recovery of her fees and costs in connection with her defense here. + +Both conditions are necessary "terms" that are "proper" within the meaning of Rule 41(aX2), and Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court order them as such. + +# Legal Standards + +Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Additional terms may be necessary to protect the interests of the defendant. See Mercer Tool Corp. v. Friedr. Dick GmbH, 175 F.R.D. 173, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The primary purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the interest of the defendant.") (citations omitted). The Second Circuit specifically authorizes the imposition of additional conditions to a plaintiff's request for a voluntary dismissal. See Cross Westchester Dev. Corp. v. Chiulli, 887 F.2d 431, 432 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The purpose of authorizing terms and conditions on a voluntary dismissal is to protect the defendant from prejudice."); see also Gravatt v. Columbia Univ., 845 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1988); 9 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2366 (4th ed.) ("The terms and conditions imposed by the district court upon granting a Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal motion generally are for the defendant's protection"). + +"The terms and conditions that may be imposed on a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal are not limited to paying money. The district court may grant a dismissal on condition that the plaintiff produce documents or agree to allow any discovery in the dismissed action to be used in any subsequent action or otherwise reduce the inconvenience to the defendant caused by the dismissed case." 9 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2366 (4th ed.); see also hi re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, 268 F.R.D. 539, 543-44 (ED. Pa. 2010) ("Courts have imposed a variety of terms and conditions, including the imposition of costs or attorneys' fees or requirements that + +the plaintiffproduce documents or agree to allow discovery to be used in any subsequent action.") (citing 9 , Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2366)). + +In its most recent decision on the "rarely litigated" Rule 41(aX2), the Second Circuit concluded that a district court can impose conditions on a proposed dismissal with prejudice so long as the plaintiff is permitted the opportunity to accept dismissal on those conditions or continue the litigation if it deems those conditions too onerous. Paysys Intl, Inc. v. Atos lT Servs. Ltd., 901 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2018). Specifically, the Circuit concluded that courts have the power to impose conditions on the dismissal (in that case, the imposition of attorneys' fees), and plaintiff then had "the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal" or "if he feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing his dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits." Id. (quotation omitted). + +Later cases are in accord, holding that courts can impose conditions to overcome prejudice to the defendant by the dismissal sought by the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the opportunity to accept the conditions and obtain the dismissal or reject the conditions and continue suit. In J. Burchett Photography, Inc. v. A.P. Moller Maersk A/S, No. 19 CIV. 1576 (KPF), 2020 WL 1285511, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020), one of the conditions requested is a condition requested here — removal or revision of language that the parties would bear their own attorneys' fees and costs. The Court noted the American Rule and expressed no opinion on whether the defendant might be able to obtain fees and costs in later litigation. However, given the possibility of recovery, as a condition of the requested Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal, the Court adopted the defendants' proposed language regarding fees as a condition of dismissal, affording the plaintiff the opportunity to accept or reject that conditions to obtain the dismissal order sought. Id.; accord Grgurev v. Licul, No. 1:15-CV-9805-GHW, 2020 WL 2415698, at \*4 + +(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (granting 41(a)(2) dismissal on condition that "Plaintiffs must stipulate that Defendants will be permitted to litigate their counterclaims in state court to cure prejudice to the Defendants"). + +Ms. Maxwell thus requests that the Court impose the above conditions on the Rule 41(aX2) order of dismissal requested by plaintiff. At that point, plaintiff can elect to accept those conditions and obtain the dismissal she seeks or proceed with the case on its merits. + +#### I. The Requested Conditions Are Necessary to Preserve Ms. Maxwell's Legal Interests + +#### A. Condition 1: Disclosure of an Unredacted Copy of Plaintiff's Release Necessary for Future Litigation Purposes + +## 1. Protects Ms. Maxwell against any future civil litigation from plaintiff. + +Plaintiff brought this suit anonymously — yet she resists disclosure of a signed, authentic copy of her release which, counsel can only presume, would bar plaintiff from bringing a future lawsuit in some other forum at some other time against Ms. Maxwell. Plaintiff's name is not on this lawsuit, so a dismissal with prejudice of this case would not evidence this particular Jane Doe's prohibition on re-litigation. See Dkt. 5 (Motion to Proceed by Pseudonym); Dkt. 87 (plaintiff's proposed terms of dismissal lacking any reference to her name). A simple search on the CM/ECF system reveals the dozens of Jane Doe lawsuits brought against Epstein and his Estate following the passage of New York's claim revival statute. + +A simple review of the release purportedly signed by plaintiff in connection with her decision to accept an offer from the EVCP reveals why Ms. Maxwell needs a signed, authentic copy. First, Ms. Maxwell's name is not specifically spelled out on the release itself. See Ex. A ("General Release from the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program"). Rather, the release purportedly extends to the Estate, Epstein Entities, and a number of different persons associated with the Estate or Epstein. Id. at 2-3. Based on the representations of counsel, Ms. Maxwell believes that she would be covered by any release signed by plaintiff. Notably, however, the release contains a provision that states, "This General Release specifically does not include as a Releasee or released party under this Agreement." Id. at 4. Did plaintiff include Ms. Maxwell's name in that blank before signing the release? Ms. Maxwell certainly does not know. The release also contains the amount of compensation offered to plaintiff in consideration for her release. Id. at 1. + +Should plaintiff (Jane Doe) opt to sue Ms. Maxwell in some other jurisdiction in some other court of law at some unspecified time in the future, Ms. Maxwell needs the signed, authentic, unredacted copy of this release as the proof she needs to plead claim and issue preclusion as a defense to any such lawsuit. A copy of the Complaint and dismissal in this case will not suffice; the suit was brought anonymously and there is no pleading containing plaintiff's true name on the docket or associated with plaintiff's motion to dismiss with prejudice. Without an authentic copy of the release, Ms. Maxwell would be unable to establish who had sued her previously and the extent of the associated dismissal. See, e.g., Ex. A at 1-2 (release extends to all claims "whether now existing, hereafter existing or revived in the future" and whether they arose "in Florida, New Mexico, New York, the United States Virgin Islands, France or any other country, state, territory, possession or jurisdiction or otherwise"). + +Plaintiff offers no justification for her refusal to provide a signed and executed copy to Ms. Maxwell, one of the purported releasees. Certainly, the EVCP does not prohibit her from sharing the information. The confidentiality of the program expressly does not prohibit any of the claimants from sharing information associated with their claim or compensation. See Epstein Victims' Compensation Program at 8-9 (May 29, 2020) ("Individual Claimants are not bound + +through the Program by any rules of confidentiality.").' Despite knowing this was a requested term, plaintiff completely failed to address the request in her Motion. There simply is no justification for keeping a copy of the release from one of the putative releasees and the person against whom plaintiff instituted this anonymous action. Ms. Maxwell needs a signed and executed release so that she has a legally enforceable document to seek dismissal of any future claim brought by plaintiff. + +### 2. Protects Ms. Maxwell's confrontation rights in her criminal trial + +Ms. Maxwell further needs a copy of the signed, authentic release to pursue her constitutional right to confront her accusers in her ongoing criminal case. Plaintiff has not denied that she is a likely witness in the upcoming criminal trial in United States v. Maxwell, 20 cr 330 (AJN).2 The allegations in this civil complaint track closely with those contained in the Indictment against Ms. Maxwell, thus there is a reasonable assumption that plaintiff may be a government witness. If so, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to cross examine her on the allegations in the Complaint, including her demands for millions of dollars at the same time she was pursuing a criminal case against Ms. Maxwell. The lack of the signed, unredacted release including the amount of compensation prejudices Ms. Maxwell's ability to confront plaintiff during her criminal trial on her bias and motive for fabrication. A criminal defendant "states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [s]he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical forth of bias on the part of the + +https://www.epsteinvcp.com/documents/4 + +{sup}`2` The U.S. Attorney's Office still refuses to identify to Ms. Maxwell the accusers mentioned in the Indictment. See Dkt. # 80 (Government motion to intervene and stay case) at 3 n.3 ("Judge Nathan held that Maxwell is not entitled to know who the Government's trial witnesses are at this stage of the criminal case [so] the Government is not including detailed information in this letter about who those trial witnesses might be and will not engage with Maxwell's speculation as to who those witnesses might be."). + +witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (quoting v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, (1974)). "[I]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.' Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (quoting 415 U.S. at 316-17). The amount of money plaintiff sought, and accepted, from the EVCP, qualifies as exculpatory Brady material. C. f Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (witness's "application for victim compensation payments and application for and receipt of emergency victim compensation payments may well have been `favorable' within the meaning of Brady," requiring government disclosure of exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants).3 + +Without knowledge of the complete terms of plaintiff's agreement with the Estate, including the settlement obtained, Ms. Maxwell and her counsel are precluded from fully crossexamining plaintiff. If the sum is large, the motive for fabrication of stories and the existence of bias are obvious. If the sum is small, yet was accepted, the credibility of any of plaintiff's allegations are cast into serious doubt. Regardless, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to the information of complete terms, including economic terms, of the agreement with the Epstein Estate under the EVCP to enable her to fully exercise her Constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause at her criminal trial in the cross examination of plaintiff should she appear as a witness. Including the production of an unredacted copy of the release executed by plaintiff as a condition of dismissal of this case will prevent the legal prejudice of impairing Ms. Maxwell's rights under + +{sup}`3` It is unknown if the Government, who intervened in this case, is in possession of a nonredacted copy of plaintiff's agreements and, if so, when it plans to produce them as Brady or Giglio material in the criminal matter if plaintiff is indeed a prosecution witness. + +the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against her and to the assistance of effective counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. 6; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). + +#### B. Condition 2: Inclusion of clause requiring each party to bear its own costs and fees prejudices Ms. Maxwell's right to prevailing party costs and to bring future suit for abuse of process or malicious prosecution + +Ms. Maxwell seeks the second condition — removal of the language "each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit" {sup}`4` - to preserve her rights to seek her costs as the prevailing party and to sue plaintiff for damages. + +First, Ms. Maxwell is the prevailing party as a result of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with prejudice and therefore is entitled to costs as a matter of law. Rule 54(d)(1) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936 (MK) BRER, 2018 WL 1583971, at \*14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior + +{sup}`4` Plaintiff failed to submit an actual Proposed Order, instead asking that the "Court dismiss her case with prejudice and in accordance with the terms set forth in the partially executed stipulation for dismissal." See Motion, Conclusion, at 7. Putting aside the procedural deficiency in the failure to provide a Proposed Order, this Court cannot enter an "order" that is stated in terms of a "Stipulation" to which the parties have not agreed, including terms such as "It is hereby Stipulated" and "It is Further Stipulated." Compare Rule 41(a)(1)(2) (permitting dismissal by a stipulation "signed by all parties who have appeared"). Ms. Maxwell is aware of no rule or precedent that would permit the Court to order her to "stipulate" to something to which she has not agreed. + +Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes 'an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.'" Carter, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted). + +In this response, Ms. Maxwell is not presently seeking attorneys' fees from plaintiff. Yet, plaintiff's proposed language would prejudice Ms. Maxwell from pursuing all future legal remedies against plaintiff for her false and baseless allegations here. Ms. Maxwell should not be precluded from pursuing damages (including her attorneys' fees incurred in defending this action) in a different civil action premised upon the torts of abuse of process or malicious prosecution. + +Ms. Maxwell is legally entitled to be deemed the prevailing party, with all rights that flow naturally therefrom, including an award of costs in this case as the prevailing party and the right to pursue claims any appropriate legal remedies should she later so choose. Inclusion of the language in the "stipulation" proposed by plaintiff legally prejudices Ms. Maxwell's ability to do so. + +### H. Plaintiff's Request for Alternative Relief Unsupported by Law + +Without any legal support, plaintiff seeks as "alternative relief" an order by this Court rewriting the terms of the EVCP, carving out the portion of the release that admittedly applies to Ms. Maxwell as a former employee of Epstein-related entities. Not only does plaintiff fail to cite any legal support for this request, but she also makes it contingent upon an agreement by the EVCP (not a party to this action) to its "settlement obligations." Motion at 3. + +Because there is no legal (or factual) support for plaintiff's request, Ms. Maxwell asks this Court to deny the "alternative" relief sought. + +#### CONCLUSION + +For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court impose as conditions of any Rule 41(a)(2) Order of Dismissal with Prejudice that: + +- 1. Plaintiff shall provide to Ms. Maxwell an unredacted and signed copy of the release she has executed with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program, including the amount of compensation she stands to receive in exchange for such release and including her legal name; and +- 2. Remove any language ordering each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees in connection with this action. + +A Proposed Order is provided herewith for the Court's convenience. + +Dated: January 29, 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger (LM-I374) + +Jeffrey S. Pa kca (pro hac vice + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +jpagliuca@lunflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +### Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on January 29, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant To FRCP 41(AX2) with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5a22a10a54adb0951e90962b15b83f714a2ab4b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752395/EFTA02752395.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -16, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752395", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "dcb9c2c1c4d9685744e1e227e0fb2c0024f33b4749c15fed11f3f101c7461e7d", + "output_sha256": "84f8fec8425eb31afdeb5c6e130ed32b5254f1e2230115ae1b43c30fb3394c99", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..736d71462704292d25156260d8260d40faa6097f --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## EXHIBIT 1 + +Epstein VCP + +## EPSTEIN VICTIMS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR VICTIMS-SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BY JEFFREY EPSTEIN + +February 4, 2021 + +## RE: Important Update Regarding the Epstein VCP + +Dear Robert, + +I am writing to inform you that, due to uncertainty about the liquidity of Estate assets to fund the Program, effective immediately, all compensation determination offers will be held until after the March 25, 2021 claims filing deadline or until such time that I have sufficient certainty that eligible claims can be timely and fully funded and paid. + +Although I sincerely regret having to take this action, I have concluded that it is necessary to protect the interests of eligible claimants who have not yet resolved their claims through the Program and to preserve Program integrity. Issuing any compensation offer that cannot be timely and fully funded and paid, consistent with the way the Program has operated to date, would compromise claimants' interests and the guiding principles of the Program. + +We will continue to accept claim filings through March 25, 2021, review claims, and hold meetings with claimants so that we can resume the issuance of compensation determination offers as soon as practicable. We will also continue to pay any compensation determination offers that were issued prior to this notice. + +The Program is funded with Estate assets. Under the Program Protocol, the Estate agreed to "pay all eligible claims based on the Administrator's determination" and represented that sufficient assets and liquidity existed to pay all claims. When the available funds fall below a designated threshold amount, the Estate is required to promptly replenish the funds in order to ensure continuity of operations and certainty of funding to pay claims. + +On February 3, 2021, the Estate informed me that it did not have sufficient liquidity to fully satisfy the most recent request for replenishment and that it could not predict when additional liquidity would be secured, prompting this action. The Estate has advised me that it is working to secure additional liquidity to continue to fund the Program and that it is committed to paying all eligible claims in accordance with the Protocol. + +With this development, I felt it was imperative to take immediate action and notify current and potential claimants and their representatives. Please know that I remain deeply committed to ensuring that the Program continues to operate with transparency and integrity, and that all eligible claimants receive the compensation and validation they deserve. + +I am continually inspired by the courage and resilience of the victims I have had the privilege of meeting, and truly regret having to implement these measures and the resulting delay and uncertainty this may cause. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. + +Sincerely, + +Jordalia H. Administrator \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1b0313303b7ec16b59fce01a9ae6b2c2da9a9af5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752407/EFTA02752407.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752407", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "ea4708b46b34cc36ddcc07efeb4284cdaca712d2b3e4cf2f26d61cac8d97a9e1", + "output_sha256": "ea4708b46b34cc36ddcc07efeb4284cdaca712d2b3e4cf2f26d61cac8d97a9e1", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd3db80dc7500eaa4f7b9faacdd517e3a103511b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYL I E + +February 4, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +> Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF Update Regarding Settlement and Plaintiff's Pending Motion to Dismiss + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +On October 16, 2020, the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (EVCP) made an offer of compensation to Plaintiff who accepted that offer on November 29, 2020. As the Court was previously made aware, a condition of payment of the settlement to Plaintiff was that she had to dismiss this pending action with prejudice. Plaintiff promptly attempted to do so by securing a stipulation for dismissal among the parties. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell refused to stipulate. On December 21, 2020, Plaintiff wrote this Court requesting that it dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) (ECF 87). In response to that letter, the Court scheduled a status conference for December 23, 2020. Following the status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss. Pursuant to that briefing schedule, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Dismiss on January 15, 2021 (ECF 91). Her reply brief is due tomorrow. + +Today, however, we received a letter from the EVCP Fund Administrator, Jordy entitled "Im rtant U ate Regarding the Epstein VCP." That letter is enclosed for the Court's reference. states, in pertinent part, "I am writing to inform you that, due to uncertainty about the liquidity of Estate assets to fund the Program, effective immediately, all compensation determination offers will be held until after the March 25, 2021 claims filing deadline or until such time that I have sufficient certainty that eligible claims can be timely and fully funded and paid." + +In light of this unanticipated development, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court continue her Motion to Dismiss and defer its ruling on it until after we know whether or not the settlement reached among the parties will be honored by the EVCP. + +Hon. John G. Kochi Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +February 4, 2021 Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +In addition, based on the questionable actions taken by Ms. Maxwell to delay the settlement by refusing to allow a case against her to be dismissed with prejudice, as well as the Estate's insistence that she must be dismissed even though the settlement was to be 100% from Estate assets, Plaintiff requests that the Court conduct a hearing with all interested parties (including the EVCP administrator) to determine if there have been any collusive efforts, plans or intentions by those involved to disenfranchise Plaintiff and the other sex abuse victims of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell in this litigation. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +End. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..facfb4343a93670731b645dbb92c227a97b2e002 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752409/EFTA02752409.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752409", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "491fe09f4c1824d9d37694665ba7dfb4f951b2193e82ba19682f7573fbb5e519", + "output_sha256": "491fe09f4c1824d9d37694665ba7dfb4f951b2193e82ba19682f7573fbb5e519", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8512b62e3a3809cef73ec55f645e49e23d7f159a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz bennelmoskowitz©Iroutman.com + +February 5, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. We write in response to the letter filed yesterday by Plaintiff (Doc. 94) in which she asks the Court to "continue her Motion to Dismiss and defer its ruling on it until after we know whether or not the settlement reached among the parties will be honored by the [Epstein Victims' Compensation Program ("EVCP")]."1 The Court should deny Plaintiffs request, which is based on her counsel's apparent misunderstanding of the letter annexed thereto from the EVCP's Administrator. + +Yesterday, the EVCP's Administrator announced a prospective, temporary suspension of new compensation determinations pending the Estate's resolution of liquidity issues. This temporary suspension in no way affects Plaintiff, who accepted her compensation determination before the suspension. Therefore, there was no need for Plaintiff's new request, let alone her counsel's erroneous suggestion of "collusive efforts" to "disenfranchise" her. + +There is only one reason Plaintiff has not yet received her payout from the EVCP: Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's refusal to stipulate to dismissal of this action absent + +Because there is no "settlement ... among the parties," we assume that Plaintiff is referring to her acceptance of the EVCP's independent Administrator's compensation determination. + +certain conditions. The Court directed the parties to complete briefing on that issue by today; there is no need to alter that schedule. + +Finally, Plaintiffs counsel again wrongly suggests there is something improper about the fact that the EVCP Protocol — a document drafted over several months with substantial input from claimants' counsel, and in which neither Ms. Maxwell nor her counsel had any involvement — provides that a claimant who elects to accept the EVCP offer of compensation must release her claims against the Estate and persons who could potentially implead the Estate or the Co-Executors. It thus bears reiterating that: (i) Plaintiffs Program determination compensates her for damages recoverable from the Estate and Ms. Maxwell; and (ii) it is both reasonable and unremarkable that the Protocol prevents Plaintiff from seeking double recovery. + +Respectfully submitted, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: All counsel of record \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9b3fc0c3ff023ff7934f6fcc3ef344532c6d3e5d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752411/EFTA02752411.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752411", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "54dc431aaf800fcbdb40fece847a92188c35877807a0590bd948315697c6ee8a", + "output_sha256": "54dc431aaf800fcbdb40fece847a92188c35877807a0590bd948315697c6ee8a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e9cdff2fc3d3ace60206eda5e72ad8f855b344ab --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +Case No. 1:20-cv-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual. + +Defendants. + +# PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FRCP 41(a)(2)I + +Plaintiff submitted a letter to this Court on February 4, 2021 (ECF 94) requesting that this Motion be continued and ruling on it deferred in light of new information concerning the Epstein VCP's uncertainty in making settlement offer payment to victims. However, upon review of the Epstein Estate's letter of today's date (ECF 95) and subsequent confirmation from the Epstein VCP's Fund Administrator, Plaintiff has been assured that her settlement will be funded promptly upon the Fund Administrator's receipt of the dismissal in this action. For these reasons, Plaintiff hereby withdraws her request that the Court continue this Motion and respectfully requests that the Court grant her Motion, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. + +Plaintiff Jane Doe submits this reply brief in further support of her motion to dismiss this action with prejudice, with each side to bear their own costs and fees, pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 41(a)(2) and according to the terms set forth in the stipulation for dismissal executed by both plaintiff Jane Doe and defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein (ECF 87). + +#### I. MAXWELL IS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell objects to the Court dismissing Plaintiffs case with prejudice pursuant to the proposed terms set forth in Plaintiffs Motion following the global settlement reached last year. Specifically, Ms. Maxwell argues it would be inequitable for the Court to dismiss the case against her without preserving her right to seek fees and costs against the Plaintiff and without an order that Plaintiff produce to her an un-redacted copy of the confidential settlement agreement. + +Further highlighting her documented "lack of candor" with the SDNY2, Ms. Maxwell contends that she is somehow the "prevailing party" here and therefore should not be precluded from pursuing fees and costs against Plaintiff at some later time. Ms. Maxwell, however, is not the prevailing party. Rather, dismissal of this action with prejudice is a condition of the settlement set forth in the settlement release executed by Plaintiff. Indeed, as plainly stated on page 4 in the general release agreement attached by Ms. Maxwell as Exhibit A to her Opposition: + +> "Releasor will dismiss with prejudice any and all legal actions - whether lawsuits, probate claims or otherwise — that Releasor has filed against any of Releasees, with each party to bear her, his or its own costs and attorneys' fees and will submit proof of dismissal to the Administrator along with or prior to the signed acceptance of the Compensation Offer and this executed Release." (ECF 93-1). + +Accordingly, not only does the settlement agreement direct Plaintiff to dismiss this action with prejudice, it also expressly states that each party in such legal action will "bear her, his or its own costs and attorneys' fees..." Ms. Maxwell cannot insulate herself from future liability by + +{sup}`2` 20-cr-330, ECF 106. + +agreeing to and benefiting from her inclusion in this settlement agreement as Jeffrey Epstein's joint tortfeasor/accompliceiformer employee but then turn around and claim she is also the "prevailing party." + +Further and notwithstanding the plain language of the settlement release, defendants Darren Indyke and Richard Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein, have stipulated that Ms. Maxwell shall not be precluded from seeking fees or costs related to this matter against the Epstein Estate and/or its related entities. (ECF 87). Ms. Maxwell's rambling tale about why she would suffer prejudice to have this action dismissed against her with prejudice is thus much ado about nothing. + +And finally, even if Ms. Maxwell was the prevailing party—which she is not—recovery of fees and costs against Plaintiff would be improper since dismissal is requested with prejudice.; See Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that the purpose of awarding fees and costs to prevailing party when cases are dismissed without prejudice "is generally to reimburse the defendant for the litigation costs incurred, in view of the risk (often the certainty) faced by the defendant that the same suit will be refiled and will impose duplicative expenses"). Conversely, when an action is dismissed with prejudice, such as what is being requested here, fees "have almost never been awarded" because "the defendant, unlike a defendant against whom a claim has been dismissed without prejudice, has been freed of the risk of relitigation of the issues just as if the case had been adjudicated in his favor after a trial, in which event (absent statutory authorization) the American Rule would preclude such an award"). Id. at 134. + +{sup}`3` Ms. Maxwell cites a single case in which a court included a condition to voluntary dismissal allowing the defendant to seek fees and costs, but that was a case in which the voluntary dismissal was without prejudice. J. Burchett Photography, Inc. v. A.P. Moller Maersk A/S, No. 19 CIV. 1576 (KPF), 2020 WL 1285511, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020). + +## II. THE EVCP PREVENTS VICTIMS FROM CARVING MAXWELL OUT OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT + +Ms. Maxwell attempts to lure the Court into believing that Plaintiff may have elected to carve Ms. Maxwell out of the settlement release to justify her need for an un-redacted copy of the confidential settlement agreement. (ECF 93 at 5). Ms. Maxwell knows, however, that the EVCP protocols prevent any victims, including Plaintiff, from carving out Ms. Maxwell from the settlement release. The Epstein Estate concedes this point in its response to this Motion (ECF 92 at 2). + +Under the settlement agreement, it is Plaintiffs sole option to disclose the confidential information and documentation relating to her participation in the EVCP Program. (ECF 93-1 at 4). Plaintiff chooses to maintain that confidentiality. Plaintiff was promised confidentiality when she chose to participate in the EVCP following the stay of this case requested by Ms. Maxwell. Plaintiff cannot be required to now waive that confidentiality in order to dismiss this case and receive payment. Such a condition would eviscerate the confidentiality promised to victims who chose to participate in the EVCP, and would deter continued participation in the Program. + +### III. CONCLUSION + +For the reasons stated above and in her moving brief (ECF 91), Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her motion to dismiss with prejudice, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. + +Respectfully submitted, + +Dated: February 5, 2021 By: /s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Telephone: (310) 477-1700 Facsimile: (310) 477-1699 glassman@psblaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4c0f0c0ad3837e32aaf8862ea462cda2ece2398 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752413/EFTA02752413.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752413", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "816c11a1584856a5c38ffdb54fd62c814e0b2576921a5bd02a39b9645ac229be", + "output_sha256": "ad8f2c0c04f36f8cb974d1e3d6093fd7bcb5acca80cf7b3c491f14d8bdb802d5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bb9f3e3f3378ec36734443025c865dd637a6196e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BO)R, i, + +#### VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +February 4, 2021 + +Application denied. The reply brief has already been filed. There is no need for a hearing at this time. SO ORDERED. + +/s/ John G. Koeltl February 5, 2021 John G. Koelti New York, NY U.S.D.J. + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-ev-000484-.ICK-DCF Update Regarding Settlement and Plaintiff's Pending Motion to Dismiss + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +On October 16, 2020, the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (EVCP) made an offer of compensation to Plaintiff who accepted that offer on November 29, 2020. As the Court was previously made aware, a condition of payment of the settlement to Plaintiff was that she had to dismiss this pending action with prejudice. Plaintiff promptly attempted to do so by securing a stipulation for dismissal among the parties. Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell refused to stipulate. On December 21, 2020, Plaintiff wrote this Court requesting that it dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) (ECF 87). In response to that letter, the Court scheduled a status conference for December 23, 2020. Following the status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss. Pursuant to that briefing schedule, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Dismiss on January 15, 2021 (ECF 91). Her reply brief is due tomorrow. + +Today, however, we received a letter from the EVCP Fund Administrator, Jordy entitled "Im ortant U ate Regarding the Epstein VCP." That letter is enclosed for the Court's reference. states, in pertinent part, "I am writing to inform you that, due to uncertainty about the liquidity of Estate assets to fund the Program, effective immediately, all compensation determination offers will be held until after the March 25, 2021 claims filing deadline or until such time that I have sufficient certainty that eligible claims can be timely and fully funded and paid." + +In light of this unanticipated development, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court continue her Motion to Dismiss and defer its ruling on it until after we know whether or not the settlement reached among the parties will be honored by the EVCP. + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +February 4, 2021 Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +In addition, based on the questionable actions taken by Ms. Maxwell to delay the settlement by refusing to allow a case against her to be dismissed with prejudice, as well as the Estate's insistence that she must be dismissed even though the settlement was to be 100% from Estate assets, Plaintiff requests that the Court conduct a hearing with all interested parties (including the EVCP administrator) to determine if there have been any collusive efforts, plans or intentions by those involved to disenfranchise Plaintiff and the other sex abuse victims of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell in this litigation. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +End. + +# EXHIBIT 1 + +Epstein VC 1' + +### EPSTEIN VICTIMS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR VICTIMS-SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BY JEFFREY EPSTEIN + +February 4, 2021 + +### RE: Important Update Regarding the Epstein VCP + +Dear Robert, + +I am writing to inform you that, due to uncertainty about the liquidity of Estate assets to fund the Program, effective immediately, all compensation determination offers will be held until after the March 25, 2021 claims filing deadline or until such time that I have sufficient certainty that eligible claims can be timely and fully funded and paid. + +Although I sincerely regret having to take this action, I have concluded that it is necessary to protect the interests of eligible claimants who have not yet resolved their claims through the Program and to preserve Program integrity. Issuing any compensation offer that cannot be timely and fully funded and paid, consistent with the way the Program has operated to date, would compromise claimants' interests and the guiding principles of the Program. + +We will continue to accept claim filings through March 25, 2021, review claims, and hold meetings with claimants so that we can resume the issuance of compensation determination offers as soon as practicable. We will also continue to pay any compensation determination offers that were issued prior to this notice. + +The Program is funded with Estate assets. Under the Program Protocol, the Estate agreed to "pay all eligible claims based on the Administrator's determination" and represented that sufficient assets and liquidity existed to pay all claims. When the available funds fall below a designated threshold amount, the Estate is required to promptly replenish the funds in order to ensure continuity of operations and certainty of funding to pay claims. + +On February 3, 2021, the Estate informed me that it did not have sufficient liquidity to fully satisfy the most recent request for replenishment and that it could not predict when additional liquidity would be secured, prompting this action. The Estate has advised me that it is working to secure additional liquidity to continue to fund the Program and that it is committed to paying all eligible claims in accordance with the Protocol. + +With this development, I felt it was imperative to take immediate action and notify current and potential claimants and their representatives. Please know that I remain deeply committed to ensuring that the Program continues to operate with transparency and integrity, and that all eligible claimants receive the compensation and validation they deserve. + +I am continually inspired by the courage and resilience of the victims I have had the privilege of meeting, and truly regret having to implement these measures and the resulting delay and uncertainty this may cause. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. + +Sincerely, + +9 tudana Priglause + +Jordana H. Administrator \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed57bfb47c6ba8619d7f76416c1368926b2b09b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752417/EFTA02752417.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752417", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "75b65dea1a056d3fba40e9b1a1895cebddf41fd8ddf0211748b67b1cdc361539", + "output_sha256": "75b65dea1a056d3fba40e9b1a1895cebddf41fd8ddf0211748b67b1cdc361539", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d87fba57a71eb1ba9a4ef040400ee6deff8c77b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.md @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +- against - + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, AND GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +20-cv-484 (JGK) + +### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +The plaintiff brought this action under a pseudonym as "Jane Doe" against Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as appointed executors of the estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the "Epstein Estate"), and Ghislaine Maxwell, seeking declaratory relief and damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The plaintiff now moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted, subject to certain conditions. + +### I + +The plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on January 17, 2020. For the purposes of this motion, the substance of the claims is relevant only insofar as to note that on June 29, 2020, Ms. Maxwell was indicted on criminal charges in this District. See ECF No. 1, 20-CR-330. On September 14, 2020, Magistrate Judge + +Freeman issued an order staying this case, pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution of Ms. Maxwell. See ECF No. 8. + +After the complaint was filed, the Epstein Estate set up the Epstein Victim's Compensation Program (the "Program") and the administrator started accepting claims on June 25, 2020. See ECF No. 47. On November 29, 2020, the plaintiff accepted an offer of compensation from the Program, which requires her to dismiss with prejudice her claims against the defendants in this action. See ECF No. 94. To satisfy the requirement, dismissal with prejudice by stipulation 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of the plaintiff sought pursuant to Rule Civil Procedure. See ECF No. 87. The stipulation provided that "each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit" but also that "nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the [Epstein Estate]." Id. at 3. While counsel for the Epstein Estate signed the stipulation, counsel for Ms. Maxwell declined to sign the stipulation. The plaintiff then filed this motion pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), seeking dismissal of the action with prejudice in accordance with the terms set forth in the partially-executed stipulation. + +# II + +Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1) [which describes voluntary dismissals made either before the defendant files a responsive pleading or with consent of all parties], an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2); see also Paysys Int'l, Inc. v. Atos IT Servs. Ltd., 901 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2018).' "Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals are at the district court's discretion and only will be reviewed for an abuse of that discretion." D'Alto v. Dahon Cal., Inc., 100 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1996). Once the district court articulates its terms for dismissal, "plaintiff . . . has the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal and, if (the plaintiff] feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing [the plaintiff's] dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits." Paysys, 901 F.3d at 109. + +# III + +Ms. Maxwell objects to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss with prejudice insofar as the motion incorporates the terms set forth in the stipulation and requests that any dismissal be subject to two conditions. First, Ms. Maxwell requests that the provision in the stipulation that "each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit" be stricken and that additional language be inserted to preserve her rights to seek her costs as the prevailing party in this action, and to sue plaintiff for damages in a subsequent action. Second, Ms. Maxwell requests that she be provided with the unredacted copy of the release that the + +{sup}`&#`x27; Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits all alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks in quoted text. + +plaintiff has signed under the Program. The release allegedly includes the plaintiff's name and the compensation for the release. + +#### A + +Ms. Maxwell's request regarding costs and fees has two components: (1) the provision that "each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit" should be stricken; and (2) the condition should include the language that "[n]othing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from plaintiff or from (the Epstein Estate.]" See Proposed Order at 2, ECF No. 93-2. + +The provision of the stipulation that "each party shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs of suit" is indeed inconsistent with the provision in the stipulation proposed by the plaintiff that "nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the [Epstein Estate]." Accordingly, the provision must be modified to state that "the plaintiff and their own attorney's fees and the Epstein Estate shall each bear costs of suit." + +In addition, Ms. Maxwell also requests that the condition specify that she may seek fees and costs from the plaintiff in addition to the Epstein Estate. Ms. Maxwell argues that she is the prevailing party in this litigation and, pursuant to Rule 54(d), she should be allowed to seek costs from the plaintiff. Moreover, Ms. Maxwell claims she should not be prejudiced from bringing a + +separate action against the plaintiff for damages—including attorney's fees incurred in this action—for the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d). See Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that where a plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case against one defendant with prejudice, that defendant was a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)). And under Rule 54(d), "costs—other than attorney's fees should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Therefore, a condition that precludes Ms. Maxwell from seeking costs from the plaintiff would prejudice her from exercising the rights she would normally have under Rule 54(d), and therefore, cannot be included. See Cross Westchester Dev. Corp. v. Chiulli, 887 F.2d 431, 432 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The purpose of authorizing terms and conditions on a voluntary dismissal is to protect the defendant from prejudice."). + +Furthermore, the stipulation in the amended form—that is, "the plaintiff and the Epstein Estate shall each bear their own attorney's fees and costs of suit"—should not affect Ms. Maxwell's ability to bring a future claim against the plaintiff for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Accordingly, the condition related to costs and fees, in its entirely, is as follows: "The plaintiff and the Epstein Estate shall each bear their own attorney's fees and costs of suit. Nothing herein shall be + +construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Epstein Estate and from the plaintiff." + +B + +With respect to the second request, Ms. Maxwell seeks to be provided with an unredacted copy of the release that would indicate who the plaintiff is and the amount of compensation that the plaintiff has received. On the one hand, the plaintiff has an understandable interest in maintaining her anonymity, and the Court entered an order to protect it. See ECF No. 32. On the other hand, it is important for Ms. Maxwell to know the name of the plaintiff so that if Ms. Maxwell is sued by the plaintiff, she can use the release as well as the dismissal with prejudice as a defense in that lawsuit. Further, if the plaintiff were to appear as a witness against Ms. Maxwell in Ms. Maxwell's criminal trial, it would be important for Ms. Maxwell to be able to use the release as possible impeachment material against the plaintiff. Each party's interest can be protected by requiring that the unredacted copy of the release be provided to Ms. Maxwell, but that it not be disclosed for any purpose without the prior approval of this Court. This will assure that the unredacted copy of the plaintiff's release is used only for a proper purpose. + +C + +Because the conditions added to the stipulation affect the rights of each of the parties, each of the parties should be given an opportunity to decide whether that party is prepared to proceed with the dismissal as provided in the partially-executed stipulation and with the changes provided by the Court. Each of the parties must indicate that party's acceptance of the conditions specified by the Court by March 19, 2021. If any party does not agree by that date, the motion to dismiss is denied and the case will be stayed. If all parties agree by that date, the case will be dismissed with prejudice subject to the stipulation with the changes proposed by the Court. + +## CONCLUSION + +The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss with prejudice is granted, subject to the following conditions: + +- (1) The plaintiff and the Epstein Estate shall each bear their own attorney's fees and costs of suit. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Epstein Estate and from the plaintiff; +- (2) The plaintiff shall provide an unredacted and signed copy of the General Release (the "Release") the plaintiff executed with the Program by March 23, 2021, together with a certification of its authenticity. The Release is subject to the Order on Plaintiff's Anonymity + +in this action and shall not be disclosed except pursuant to an Order of this Court. + +Each of the parties must indicate that party's acceptable of the terms of the stipulation and the additional conditions specified above by March 19, 2021. If any party fails to agree by that date, the motion to dismiss is denied and the case will be stayed. If all parties agree by that date, this case will be dismissed with prejudice, subject to the stipulation with the changes proposed by the Court. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York March 8, 2021 + +> /s/ John G. Koeltl John G. Koeltl United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cfb6f7377709cfd6cc7a80ccb0dbc7ea09ac9bd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752421/EFTA02752421.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752421", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "40d963c05b29ecb1d409bc09338f7402aeec202ddb89f48549e9e9ee89dfdfd2", + "output_sha256": "ef9d0d9e0d2c99ae0b1c1b73c3492e511d62f37fd80c8bc0d3183137a09fe45a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..71211b1dfe9db43208e19514611584687787f76d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOIR, ,, + +March II, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et aL, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Plaintiff Jane Doe hereby responds to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Opinion") dated March 8, 2021 (ECF 98). As the Court indicated in its Opinion, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell refused to sign the proposed stipulation to dismiss this action with prejudice following Plaintiffs acceptance of the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program's offer of compensation'. Plaintiff was then compelled to file her motion to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to FRCP Rule 41(aX2). + +The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case of Paysys Intl, Inc. v. Atos IT Servs. Ltd., 901 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2018), as cited to by this Court in its Opinion, states that once the district court articulates its terms for dismissal, "plaintzff ... has the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal and, if [the plaintiff] feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing [the plaintiff's] dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits." Paysys, 901 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added). Indeed, that was the recent choice Judge Schofield gave another Epstein/Maxwell sex abuse victim plaintiff in the case of v. Indyke et al., 19-cv10475-LGS-DCF, following a nearly identical motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff after Ms. Maxwell refused to stipulate to a dismissal in that case as well. In her Opinion and Order, Judge Schofield stated that: + +> "Plaintiff shall file a letter no later than February 12, 2021, stating whether she consents to the Court's entry of the Proposed Order modified by striking the language "with each party to bear its own + +{sup}`&#`x27; Defendant Maxwell is a willing and compulsory "Releasee" in the general release agreement executed by Plaintiff in connection to this action. + +Hon. John G. Koeld Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse + +March 11, 2021 + +Page 2 + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +attorneys' fees and costs," or wishes to withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal." (19-cv-10475, ECF 118). + +Neither Second Circuit authority nor Judge Schofield's recent Opinion and Order regarding the exact issue now before this Court empower defendants to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing her own case by not agreeing to additional conditions proposed by the Court in response to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Accordingly, by vesting Defendant Maxwell, who already once refused to agree to a dismissal with prejudice, with such control and influence over whether Plaintiff may dismiss her own case, the Court's Opinion may lead to inconsistent results and, if the case is not dismissed, will cause significant and undue prejudice to Plaintiff. + +Plaintiff agrees to and accepts the additional conditions regarding the dismissal specified by the Court in its March 8, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Accordingly, and pursuant to the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter the dismissal of her case forthwith regardless of whether defendants intend to agree or not to the Court's additional conditions. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eccde5b47d2e3e215fa7dc70074ed7fa8b3a43c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752429/EFTA02752429.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752429", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2e6426a0bc390ee5cb2c5121a0dc652a78f1c5dee364144cca227b8513a181c1", + "output_sha256": "fe328868e9986df5e5a1c01490839f165e66cd2fed2a2af6dcc918b4c658f90b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f1c92fe949732bc1e03d54d10bfe7baa2c249f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +bennelmoskowitz©troutman.com + +March 12, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl United States District Court Southern District of New York Daniel Moynihan Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Jane Doe v. Darren.. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell No. 1:20-cv-00484-J6K-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +We represent Defendants Darren.. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jefferey E. Epstein (the "Co-Executors"), in the above-referenced action. Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 8, 2021, we write to confirm that the stipulation and the additional conditions specified therein are acceptable to the Co-Executors. + +Very truly yours, + +/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +cc: All counsel of record (via ECF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..33f8e6f73347c9a09d889b102c03f9b229570483 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752431/EFTA02752431.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752431", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "3023266553f9c28ffd58eeebd8dc09caf84118b7b7c0d32379f460ea29af418a", + "output_sha256": "3023266553f9c28ffd58eeebd8dc09caf84118b7b7c0d32379f460ea29af418a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4453000d517fa50f6a54398895d5d83b9f387565 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +March 18, 2021 + +VIA ECF + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl United States District Court Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Haddon, and EIM r.c Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningerahmflaw.com + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et aL, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell is providing this letter to inform the Court of her acceptance of the conditions specified by the Court on March 8, 2021. + +It is unclear why the PlaintiffJane Doe believed it necessary to file its March 11, 2021 "response to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Opinion") dated March 8, 2021 (ECF 98)," or why she believed that Ms. Maxwell would not accept the imposition of the conditions that she herself had requested. + +In light of the above notification of Ms. Maxwell's acceptance of the conditions specified by the Court on March 8, 2021, and Jane Doe's notification of the acceptance of the conditions in her March 11th filing, the other issues raised in Jane Doe's March II, 2021 filing are moot. + +Ms. Maxwell joins Plaintiff's request that the Court enter the dismissal of Jane Doe's case on the conditions specified in the March 8, 2021 Order. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +a Laura A. Menninger ••• + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a094b818fe17a84e0fba2d35c3c94221047f093 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752432/EFTA02752432.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752432", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f1e93d2daf51e9793a3e0f58b1f7ca600a82e3d9b47f5492ca56e22f234ec133", + "output_sha256": "f1e93d2daf51e9793a3e0f58b1f7ca600a82e3d9b47f5492ca56e22f234ec133", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5da910deaefb43964fccbc81d287f80a7db43f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, 20-cv-484 (JGK) + +- against - ORDER + +DARREN K. INDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, AND GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +By Order issued on March 8, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, subject to the following conditions being accepted by each of the parties to this action: + +- (1) The plaintiff and the defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (collectively, the "Epstein Estate"), shall each bear their own attorney's fees and costs of suit. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude Ms. Maxwell from seeking fees or costs related to this matter from the Epstein Estate and from the plaintiff; +- (2) The plaintiff shall provide an unredacted and signed copy of the General Release (the "Release") the plaintiff executed with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (the "Program") by March 23, 2021, + +together with a certification of its authenticity. The Release is subject to the Order on Plaintiff's Anonymity in this action and shall not be disclosed except pursuant to an Order of this Court. + +By letters dated March 11, 12, and 18, 2021, each of the parties has indicated that party's acceptance of the terms of the stipulation and the additional conditions. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the case with prejudice and subject to the conditions enumerated herein. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment accordingly and to close this case. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York March 19, 2021 + +> /s/ John G. Koeltl John G. Koeltl United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3cbbf4fe97e0a7222e13cb34d7888bcaf29693ca --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752433/EFTA02752433.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752433", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "3839c6f8897975bb8f36daf719b6bafd7079e9e21dc84c5a8a264777c0e38237", + "output_sha256": "3839c6f8897975bb8f36daf719b6bafd7079e9e21dc84c5a8a264777c0e38237", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a08630ef7e3c2f5d4c42cd27a97635aa0ede4f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.md @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +#### United States District Court Southern District of New York + +Ruby J. Krajick Clerk of Court + +Dear Litigant + +Enclosed is a copy of the judgment entered in your case. If you disagree with a judgment or final order of the district court, you may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. To start this process, file a "Notice of Appeal" with this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit. + +You must file your notice of appeal in this Court within 30 days after the judgment or order that you wish to appeal is entered on the Court's docket, or, if the United States or its officer or agency is a party, within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order. If you are unable to file your notice of appeal within the required time, you may make a motion for extension of time, but you must do so within 60 days from the date of entry of the judgment, or within 90 days if the United States or its officer or agency is a party, and you must show excusable neglect or good cause for your inability to file the notice of appeal by the deadline. + +Please note that the notice of appeal is a one-page document containing your name, a description of the final order or judgment (or part thereof) being appealed, and the name of the court to which the appeal is taken (the Second Circuit) - it does not include your reasons or grounds for the appeal. Once your appeal is processed by the district court, your notice of appeal will be sent to the Court of Appeals and a Court of Appeals docket number will be assigned to your case. At that point, all further questions regarding your appeal must be directed to that court. + +The filing fee for a notice of appeal is \$505 payable in cash, by bank check, certified check, or money order, to "Clerk of Court, S.D.N.Y." No personal checks are accepted. If you are unable to pay the \$505 filing fee, complete the "Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis on Appeal" form and submit it with your notice of appeal to the Pro Se Intake Unit. If the district court denies your motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, or has certified under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, you may file a motion in the Court of Appeals for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, but you must do so within 30 days after service of the district court order that stated that you could not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. + +For additional issues regarding the time for filing a notice of appeal, see Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). There are many other steps to beginning and proceeding with your appeal, but they are governed by the rules of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. For more information, visit the Second Circuit Court of Appeals website at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/. + +THE DANIEL MOYNIHAN UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE SOO PEARL STREET New YORK, NY 10007-1312 + +THE CHARLES L. BRIEANT, JR. UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 300 QUARROPAS STREET PLAINS, NY 10601.4150 + +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +(list the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s)/petitioner(s).) CV + + +(list the full name(s) of the defendant(s)/respondent(s).) + +Notice is hereby given that the following parties: + +)( ) + +#### NOTICE OF APPEAL + +(list the names of all parties who are filing an appeal) + +in the above-named case appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit + +from the ❑ judgment ❑ order entered on: + +that: + +(date that judgment or order was entered on docket) + +(If the appeal is from an order, provide a brief description above of the decision in the order.) + +Dated Signature. + +Name (last, First, MI) + +Address City State Zip Code + +Telephone Number E-mail Address (if available) + +Each party filing the appeal must date and sign the Notice of Appeal and provide his or her mailing address and telephone number, EXCEPT that a signer of a pro se notice of appeal may sign for his or her spouse and minor children if they are parties to the case. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2). Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. + +**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT +SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK** + +(List the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s)/petitioner(s).) + +\_\_\_\_\_ CV\_\_\_\_\_ ( ) ( ) + + +**MOTION FOR EXTENSION +OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE +OF APPEAL** + +(List the full name(s) of the defendant(s)/respondent(s).) + +I move under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in this action. I would like to appeal the judgment entered in this action on \_\_\_\_\_ but did not file a notice of appeal within the required time period because: \_\_\_\_\_ date + + +(Explain here the excusable neglect or good cause that led to your failure to file a timely notice of appeal.) + +| _____ +Dated: | [REDACTED] +Signature | +| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| _____ +Name (Last, First, MI) | | +| _____ +Address | | +| _____ +Telephone Number | | +| _____ +E-mail Address (if available) | | + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +CV ( )( ) + +(list the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s)/petitioner(s).) + + +(List the full name(s) of the defendant(s)/respondent(s).) + +### MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL + +I move under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(1) for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. This motion is supported by the attached affidavit. + +Dated Signature + +Name (Last, First, MI) + +Address City State Zip Code + +Telephone Number E-mail Address (if available) + +### Application to Appeal In Forma Pauperis + +v. Appeal No. + +District Court or Agency No. + +| **Affidavit in Support of Motion** | **Instructions** | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that, because of my poverty, I cannot prepay the docket fees of my appeal or post a bond for them. I believe I am entitled to redress. I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury under United States laws that my answers on this form are true and correct. (28 U.S.C. § 1746; 18 U.S.C. § 1621.) + + | Complete all questions in this application and then sign it. Do not leave any blanks: if the answer to a question is "0," "none," or "not applicable (N/A)," write that response. If you need more space to answer a question or to explain your answer, attach a separate sheet of paper identified with your name, your case's docket number, and the question number. + +| | +| Signed: _____ | Date: _____ | + +My issues on appeal are: (required): + +- 1. For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received from each of the following sources during the past 12 months. Adjust any amount that was received weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. Use gross amounts, that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise. + +| Income source | Average monthly | | | +| ----------------- | ----------------- | ----- | -------- | +| | You Spouse | You | Spouse | +| Employment | \$ \$ | 5 | S | +| Self-employment | \$ S | S | S | +| | \$ \$ | 5 | 5 | + +| Interest and dividends | S | S | \$ | \$ | +| ------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | +| Gifts | \$ | \$ | S | S | +| Alimony | S | S | S | S | +| Child support | S | S | S | S | +| | \$ | S | \$ | S | +| | \$ | S | \$ | S | +| Unemployment payments | S | S | S | 5 | +| Public-assistance (such as welfare) | \$ | \$ | \$ | S | +| Other (specify): | \$ | S | S | 5 | +| Total monthly income: | \$ 0 | \$ 0 | \$ 0 | \$ 0 | + +- 2. List your employment history for the past two years, most recent employer first. (Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.) + +| Employer | Address | Dates of employment | Gross monthly pay | +| ---------- | --------- | --------------------- | ------------------- | + +- 3. List your spouse's employment history for the past two years, most recent employer first. (Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.) + +| Employer | Address | Dates of employment | Gross monthly pay | +| ---------- | --------- | --------------------- | ------------------- | + +4. How much cash do you and your spouse have? \$ + +Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other financial institution. + +| Financial Institution Type of Account Amount you have | Amount your | +| ------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | + +If you are a prisoner seeking to appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding, you must attach a statement certified by the appropriate institutional officer showing all receipts, expenditures, and balances during the last six months in your institutional accounts. If you have multiple accounts, perhaps because you have been in multiple institutions, attach one certified statement of each account. + +5. List the assets, and their values, which you own or your spouse owns. Do not list clothing and ordinary household furnishings. + +| Home | Other real estate | Motor vehicle #1 | +| ------------ | ------------------- | ------------------ | +| (Value) \$ | (Value) \$ | (Value) \$ | +| | | Make and year: | +| | | Model: | +| | | Registration #: | + +| Motor vehicle #2 | Other assets | Other assets | +| ------------------ | -------------- | -------------- | +| (Value) \$ | (Value) \$ | (Value) \$ | +| Make and year: | | | +| Model: | | | +| Registration #: | | | + +- 6. State every person, business, or organization owing you or your spouse money, and the amount owed. + +| Amount owed to you | Amount owed to your | +| -------------------- | --------------------- | +| 5 | \$ | + +- 7. State the persons who rely on you or your spouse for support. + +| Name [or, if a minor (i.e., underage), initials only] | Relationship | Age | +| ------------------------------------------------------- | -------------- | ----- | + +- 8. Estimate the average monthly expenses of you and your family. Show separately the amounts paid by your spouse. Adjust any payments that are made weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. + +| | You Your Spouse | +| -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | +| lot rented for | \$ \$ | +| Yes No | | +| Utilities (electricity, heating fuel, water, sewer, and telephone) | \$ \$ | +| Home maintenance (repairs and upkeep) | \$ \$ | +| Food | \$ \$ | +| Clothing | \$ \$ | +| Laundry and dry-cleaning | \$ \$ | +| Medical and dental expenses | \$ \$ | + +| Transportation (not including motor vehicle payments) | \$ | S | +| -------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | +| Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc. | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| | S | S | +| | S | S | +| Alimony, maintenance, and support paid to others | \$ | \$ | +| | \$ | \$ | +| Other (specify): | S | S | +| Total monthly expenses: | \$ 0 | \$ 0 | + +- 9. Do you expect any major changes to your monthly income or expenses or in your assets or liabilities during the next 12 months? + +Yes No If yes, describe on an attached sheet. + +- 10. Have you spent or will you b spendin —any money for expenses or attorney fees in connection with this lawsuit? Yes No + +If yes, how much? \$ + +- II. Provide any other information that will help explain why you cannot pay the docket fees for your appeal. + +- 12. Identify the city and state of your legal residence. + +City State + +Your daytime phone number: + +Your age: Your years of schooling: + +Last four digits of your social-security number: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa0a2bc12fd5021a006a90f07d021e359cd6a67b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752435/EFTA02752435.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -4725, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752435", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 206, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "2a88196d6f82ba4270249fc547b65aeacc52e9658c9c5cbda518f43fab4d6b65", + "output_sha256": "9759ef849e452ae5dc0de47506df72ce26eb5aea9d67e7b730a1ad0ff9cabe7a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88b389c1a4b85931c70a7bfe644b4a47cfb3d340 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JANE DOE, 301.2.3.)1 + +X + +Plaintiff, + +-against- 20 CIVIL 484 (JGK) + +## JUDGMENT + +DARREN K. 1NDYKE, RICHARD D. KAHN, AND GHISLAINE MAXWELL, + +Defendants. + +X + +It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That for the reasons stated in the Court's Order dated March 19, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(aX2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judgment is hereby entered; accordingly, this case is closed. + +Dated: New York, New York + +March 22, 2021 + +BY: + +RUBY J. KRAJICK + +Clerk of Court + +VI& sr Deputy Clerk \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..649453078c1c18970e4eb1c75718f7a6d7ea5dd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752445/EFTA02752445.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752445", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "9b2bd9bb1af9b3acdac8b092bd626e6b305b74bf5f20bc082f80472d4c8593a5", + "output_sha256": "9b2bd9bb1af9b3acdac8b092bd626e6b305b74bf5f20bc082f80472d4c8593a5", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28155e8726d1bc00207b9f774a7d2ec716a8c03b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S BILL OF COSTS + +I, Laura A. Menninger, aver as follows: + +- 1. I am counsel for defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in Doe v. hidyke, et at, No. 20-CV-00484-JGK (S.D.N.Y.). I am personally familiar with the costs incurred in connection with the litigation. + - 2. I am submitting this Affidavit in support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs. +- 3. The attached Bill of Costs and exhibits evidence the costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in defense of this action. +- 4. Each of the costs claimed are allowed by law, specifically Local Civil Rule 54.1. Each are correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. + +I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. + +Executed on Dated: April 21, 2021. + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0678a01ce6a5d5874829e0196a84a0a01ffbcff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752446/EFTA02752446.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752446", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c397ce20338a3f4f1defc83bdaabb6f5b559524865dcd5447b5347ff46aab588", + "output_sha256": "c397ce20338a3f4f1defc83bdaabb6f5b559524865dcd5447b5347ff46aab588", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ba81f4a3fa962fcd6307eb87abef9bd33f81e662 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.md @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +JANE DOE + +Case No.: 20-CV-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE et al. + +### BILL OF COSTS + +Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on 03/19/2021 against Plaintiff Date the Clerk is requested to tax the following as costs: + +Fees of the Clerk + +Fees for service of summons and subpoena + +Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Fees and disbursements for printing + +Fees for witnesses (.temize ; an page mo) 0.00 + +Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Docket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923 5.00 + +Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals + +Compensation of court-appointed experts + +Compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. 1828 + +Other costs (please itemize) 8.70 + +> TOTAL. 13.70 + +SPECIAL NOTE: Attach to your bill an itemization and documentation for requested costs in all categories. + +### Declaration + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this bill has been served on all parties in the following manner: + +Electronic service First class mail, postage prepaid + +Other: + +4 Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +Name of Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +For: Ghislaine Maxwell Date: 04/21/2021 Name of Claiming Party + +### Taxation of Costs + +### Witness Fees (computation. cf. 28 US.C. 1821 for statutor,• fees) + +| | ATTENDANCE Total | SUBSISTENCE | Total | MILEAGE Total | Total Cost Each Witness | +| ------ | ------------------ | ------------- | ------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------- | +| Days | Cost | | | | | +| | | Days | Cost | | | +| | | | | Miles Cost | \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 | +| | | | | TOTAI. | \$0.00 | + +#### NOTICE + +Section 1924,111k 28, US. Code (effective September I. 1948) provides: + +-Sec. 1924. Verification of bill of costs." + +"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the cast and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." + +See also Section 1920 of Title 28. which reads in part as follows: + +"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and. upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree." + +'1•he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions: + +RULE 54(dX1) + +Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. + +Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on I4 day's notice. On motion served within the next 7 days. the court may review the clerk's action. + +#### RULE 6 + +«I) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. + +When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under Rule5(b)(2)(C). (0). (E). or (F). 3 days an• i ! after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). + +RULE 58(e) + +Cost or Fee Awards: + +Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed. nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. But if a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(dR2). the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 5t1 + +### Detailed Transaction Report by Date + +All from 07/01/2020 to 09/30/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:2949 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back j New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_2_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| 07/07/2020 | 15:44:57 | 7 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.70 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ---------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------- | +| 07/07/2020 | 15:48:01 | 10 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | IMAGE9-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 9-0 | \$1.00 | + +![](_page_2_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 07/08/2020 | 14:16:40 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE51-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 51-0 | \$010 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | ------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | ------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:20:40 | 1 | WAWDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: [REDACTED] | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:50:43 | 8 I NYSDC | MAXWELL | I CKET | 1:20-CV | +| ------------ | ---------- | ----------- | --------- | -------- | ------------ | +| | | | | D0 | I DC | +| | | | | REPORT | 00484-1GK | + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 08/10/2020 | 16:55:23 | 9 | NYSDC | | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_4_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 08/13/2020 | 23:42:45 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: +INDYKE FIRST +NAME: DARREN | \$0.10 | + +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:06 | 10 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.00 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:15 | 4 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | IMAGE68-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 68-0 | \$0.40 | + +#### Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 10/01/2020 to 12/31/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:33:36 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back 1 New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | +| | | | | | | + +![](_page_6_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| 10/21/2020 | 16:32:28 | 12 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_6_Picture_14.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_7_Picture_5.jpeg) + +| 11/08/2020 | 14:37:47 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/08/2020 | 14:40:15 | 3 | NYSDC | | HISTORY/DOCUM | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.30 | + +![](_page_7_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/09/2020 | 19:02:30 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | + +![](_page_8_Picture_15.jpeg) + +![](_page_9_Picture_44.jpeg) + +12/22/2020 + +12:02:34 + +2 + +NYSDC + +MAXWELL - +[REDACTED] + +IMAGE88-0 + +1:20-CV- +00484-JGK- +DCF +DOCUMENT +88-0 + +\$0.20 + +![](_page_9_Picture_53.jpeg) + +[Back](#) + +[New Search](#) + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 01/01/2021 to 03/11/2021 + +Thu Mar 1112:36:07 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back J New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_10_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_11_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 02/05/2021 | 11:49:32 | 2 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE95-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 95-0 | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_11_Picture_8.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| Case 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF Document Review History 04/21/21 Page 13 of 13 | | | | | | | | + +![](_page_12_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 03/09/2021 | 09:28:48 | 13 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | Docket Report | 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.30 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_12_Picture_8.jpeg) + +PACER FAQ + +Back I New Search + +This site is maintained by the Administrative Off ice of the U S. Courts an behalf of the Federal Judiciary. + +Privacy & Security Contact Us + +PACER Service Center (800) 676-6856 pacer@psc.uscourts.gov \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eda505104e71d2670ed650520a8527cd286383a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752448/EFTA02752448.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -1178, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752448", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 154, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "148e9eb9d011cbb76b85d12ff858284290f7f298e4ad628d3940ba744a61d641", + "output_sha256": "f197394afe615998cb258cb40a90c08efa0827123b99eb19e1503bdc2f57f7b3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff6a42c0b402b7e288a826d4d2cce9c1a86c7468 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF TAXATION OF COSTS AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW + +Laura A. Menninger Jeffrey S. Pa liuca HADDON, AND 150 East le Avenue Denver, CO 80203 303.831.7364 P.C. + +On March 19, 2021, this Court dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice, based on her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As the prevailing party in this matter, Ms. Maxwell hereby requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), an order awarding her taxable costs against plaintiff Jane Doe. + +Rule 54(dX1) provides that "ruInless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936-MKB-RER, 2018 WL 1583971, at ■14 **(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018);** see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes 'an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata."' Caner, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted); accord Feb. 12, 2021, Opinion and Order, DE 118; accord Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. a/, Case No. 20-cv-484 (JGK), DE 98 at 5 (addressing identical Rule 41(a)(2) motion and holding "Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)"). + +An award of costs under Rule 54 is the "normal rule," and "the losing party has the burden to show that costs should not be imposed." Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Harris v. , No. 08-CV-1703 MKB, 2013 WL 632247, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013). Once "the prevailing party demonstrates the amount of its costs and that they fall within an allowable category of taxable costs, see Local Rule 54.1(a), that party enjoys a presumption that its costs will be awarded." Equal Employment Opportunity Commh v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 3d 199, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. McCarron, No. 99-cv-11078 (RCC), 2005 WL 735954, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005). + +Annexed hereto is Ms. Maxwell's Bill of Costs, including the Affidavit of Laura Menninger and exhibits, in the form required by Local Civil Rule 54.1 and including only those taxable costs prescribed by the rule.' As the prevailing party, Ms. Maxwell is presumptively entitled to an award of cost, and plaintiff is unable to meet her burden to demonstrate why costs should not be imposed. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay her costs in the amount detailed in the attached. + +WHEREFORE, Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell requests an award of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) as the prevailing party in this action. + +Ms. Maxwell seeks herein only her costs and expressly reserves her right to seek attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action in future litigation either against plaintiff (e.g., as claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), against the Estate of Epstein (under an indemnification theory), or both. See Opinion and Order of Feb. 10, 2021 at 5 (DE 118); accord Opinion and Order of Mar. 9, 2021, Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. al, 20-cv-484 (MK), at 5 (Dkt. 98) (striking language from proposed Rule 41(aX2) dismissal relating to each party paying their own fees and costs to preserve right to seek attorneys' fees from this litigation in potential future litigation for claims including the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). + +Dated: April 21, 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger (LM-1374) + +Jeffrey S. nalisa (pro ha + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10th Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +jpagliuca@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on April 21, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell 's Notice of Taxation of Costs and Supporting Memorandum of Law with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle + +Robert Glassman + +Panish, Shea & Boyle + +11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 + +Los Angeles, CA 90025 + +boyle@psblaw.com + +glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz + +Charles L. Glover + +Mary W. Metcalfe + +Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +875 Third Avenue + +New York, NY 10022 + +bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com + +charles.glover@troutman.com + +marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com + +Molly S. DiRago + +Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP + +227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 + +Chicago, IL 60606 + +molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7acfbcebed7ce4a5e01bb2a637b5966f7e2aa4d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752461/EFTA02752461.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752461", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "c123f42e619aba16c783021f66de72870e132697bcb67215ad31be93bdc08a6a", + "output_sha256": "c123f42e619aba16c783021f66de72870e132697bcb67215ad31be93bdc08a6a", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48060a01ef231eaf31e92acfa37b85d41a896f8e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.md @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +JANE DOE + +Case No.: 20-CV-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE et al. + +# BILL OF COSTS + +Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on 03/19/2021 against Plaintiff Date the Clerk is requested to tax the following as costs: + +Fees of the Clerk + +Fees for service of summons and subpoena + +Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Fees and disbursements for printing + +Fees for witnesses (.temize ; an page twat 0.00 + +Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Docket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923 5.00 + +Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals + +Compensation of court-appointed experts + +Compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. 1828 + +Other Costs (please itemize) 8.70 + +> TOTAL \$ 13.70 + +SPECIAL NOTE: Attach to your bill an itemization and documentation for requested costs in all categories. + +## Declaration + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this bill has been served on all parties in the following manner: + +Electronic service First class mail, postage prepaid + +Other: + +Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +Name of Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +For: Ghislaine Maxwell Date: 05/11/2021 Name of Claiming Party + +## Taxation of Costs + +### Witness Fees (computation, cf. 28 U.S.C. 1821 for slatutor,• fees) + +| | ATTENDANCE Total | SUBSISTENCE | Total | MILEAGE Total | Total Cost Each Witness | +| ------ | ------------------ | ------------- | ------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------- | +| Days | Cost | | | | | +| | | Days | Cost | | | +| | | | | Miles Cast | \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 | +| | | | | TOTAI. | \$0.00 | + +### NOTICE + +Section 1924,111k 28, US. Code (effective September I. 1948) provides: + +-See. 1924. Verification of bill of costs." + +"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the cast and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." + +See also Section 1920 of Title 28. which reads in part as follows: + +"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree." + +The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions: + +RULE 54(d)(1) + +Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. + +Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 day's notice. On motion served within the next 7 days. the court may review the clerk's action. + +### RULE 6 + +«1) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. + +When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under RuleS(1)(2)(C). (U). (E). Or (F). 3 days an. L! after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). + +RI LE 58(e) + +Cost or Fee Awards: + +Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed. nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. But if a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(dK2). the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59. + +### Detailed Transaction Report by Date + +All from 07/01/2020 to 09/30/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:29:49 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back j New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_2_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| 07/07/2020 | 15:44:57 | 7 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.70 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ---------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------- | +| 07/07/2020 | 15:48:01 | 10 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | IMAGE9-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 9-0 | \$1.00 | + +![](_page_2_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_3_Picture_19.jpeg) + +| 07/08/2020 | 14:16:40 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE51-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF +DOCUMENT 51-0 | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_3_Picture_21.jpeg) + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:20:40 | 1 | WAWDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: +[REDACTED] | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_3_Picture_23.jpeg) + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:50:43 | 8 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.80 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_3_Picture_25.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 08/10/2020 | 16:55:23 | 9 | NYSDC | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_4_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------- | -------- | +| | | | | | | | | | +| 08/13/2020 | 23:42:45 | | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: INDYKE FIRST +NAME: DARREN | \$0.10 | + +![](_page_5_Picture_19.jpeg) + +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:06 | | 10 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.00 | +| ------------ | ---------- | -- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:15 | | 4 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | IMAGE68-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF +DOCUMENT 68-0 | \$0.40 | + +![](_page_5_Picture_21.jpeg) + +#### Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 10/01/2020 to 12/31/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:33:36 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back New Search 1 + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_6_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| 10/21/2020 | 16:32:28 | 12 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_6_Picture_14.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_7_Picture_16.jpeg) + +| 11/08/2020 | 14:37:47 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/08/2020 | 14:40:15 | 3 | NYSDC | | HISTORY/DOCUM | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.30 | + +![](_page_7_Picture_18.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/09/2020 | 19:02:30 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | + +![](_page_8_Picture_6.jpeg) + +![](_page_9_Picture_13.jpeg) + +12/22/2020 12-02.34 2 NYSDC MAXWELL • IMAGE88-0 1:20-CV- \$0.20 00484.1GK-DCF DOCUMENT 88.0 + +![](_page_9_Picture_21.jpeg) + +N + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 01/01/2021 to 03/11/2021 + +Thu Mar 1112:36:07 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back I New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_10_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_11_Picture_18.jpeg) + +| 02/05/2021 | 11:49:32 | 2 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE95-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 95-0 | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_11_Picture_20.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_12_Picture_9.jpeg) + +| 03/09/2021 | 09:28:48 | 13 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | Docket Report | 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.30 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | -------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | -------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_12_Picture_11.jpeg) + +PACER FAQ + +Back I New Search + +lois site is maintained by the Administrative Off ice of the U S. Courts C41 behalf of the Federal Judiciary. + +Privacy & Security Contact Us + +PACER Service Center (800) 676-6856 pacer@psc.uscourts.gov \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e8b1ad951cdde1157fd19788774b37386e133b57 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752465/EFTA02752465.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -674, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752465", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 116, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "66b95d29ef3d55b687cd21a91f5a7456180e80263790a7db0c9cf815477154b8", + "output_sha256": "c483b8cc157895f3caf3ea3587fd2ef13106f482677f113da95e11638c01c23c", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca3be63491caceb54dbcb84be85c76dd7a844c37 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +x + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARKEN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGHT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs, the exhibits annexed thereto, the Affidavit of Laura A. Menninger dated May I I, 2021, and all other pleadings and proceedings herein, the Defendant will move this Court before the Orders and Judgment Clerk, at the United States Courthouse for the Southern District of New York, located at 500 Pearl Street, Room 250, New York, NY 10007 on May 26, 2021 at 11:30 am, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at a time and date to be determined as convenient for the Court, for an order pursuant to Rule 54 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., Local Civil Rule 54.1, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923, granting fees and costs sought by Ms. Maxwell and granting such other relief that this Court deems proper. + +Dated: May 11, 2021 New York, New York Respectfully submitted. + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mennin er (LIva + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on May 11, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff' on with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@ troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e99643b606d54401dad1a66bd11c656f0efcca87 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752478/EFTA02752478.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752478", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "aed32d2fd688c60bd38045625557dc922eb66659db9c5047cd91893a7a194e5d", + "output_sha256": "aed32d2fd688c60bd38045625557dc922eb66659db9c5047cd91893a7a194e5d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b54912d1f6cf32481ed7062a0045d36eb4bac8d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## CHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MEMORANDUM OF LAWIN SUPPORT OF HER APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGHT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +Laura A. Mennin er HADDON, AND 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 303.831.7364 P.C. + +On March 19, 2021, this Court dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice, based on her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As the prevailing party in this matter, Ms. Maxwell hereby requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), an order awarding her taxable costs against plaintiff Jane Doe. + +Rule 54(dX1) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936-MKB-RER, 2018 WL 1583971, at ■14 **(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes 'an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata."' Caner, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted); accord Feb. 12, 2021, Opinion and Order, DE 118; accord Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. al, Case No. 20-cv-484 (JGK), DE 98 at 5 (addressing identical Rule 41(a)(2) motion and holding "Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)").** + +An award of costs under Rule 54 is the "normal rule," and "the losing party has the burden to show that costs should not be imposed." Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Harris v. , No. 08-CV-1703 MKB, 2013 WL 632247, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013). Once "the prevailing party demonstrates the amount of its costs and that they fall within an allowable category of taxable costs, see Local Rule 54.1(a), that party enjoys a presumption that its costs will be awarded." Equal Employment Opportunity Cornmin v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 3d 199, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. McCarron, No. 99-cv-11078 (RCC), 2005 WL 735954, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005). + +Annexed hereto is Ms. Maxwell's Bill of Costs, including the Affidavit of Laura Menninger and exhibits, in the form required by Local Civil Rule 54.1 and including only those taxable costs prescribed by the rule.' As the prevailing party, Ms. Maxwell is presumptively entitled to an award of cost, and plaintiff is unable to meet her burden to demonstrate why costs should not be imposed. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay her costs in the amount detailed in the attached. + +WHEREFORE, Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell requests an award of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) as the prevailing party in this action. + +Ms. Maxwell seeks herein only her costs and expressly reserves her right to seek attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action in future litigation either against plaintiff (e.g., as claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), against the Estate of Epstein (under an indemnification theory), or both. See Opinion and Order of Feb. 10, 2021 at 5 (DE 118); accord Opinion and Order of Mar. 9, 2021, Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et al, 20-cv-484 (JOK), at 5 (Dkt. 98) (striking language from proposed Rule 41(aX2) dismissal relating to each party paying their own fees and costs to preserve right to seek attorneys' fees from this litigation in potential future litigation for claims including the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). + +Dated: May 11, 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mer.liner (LM-1374) HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 10 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on May 11, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Ghislaine Maxwell's Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cfd89c36a4aae486ea6a81787d6bdbcff2d61b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752481/EFTA02752481.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752481", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8f4d27b83076c2a4a532b646dacf0a15f254c9d68390fdb9069e474d9db0ba5d", + "output_sha256": "8f4d27b83076c2a4a532b646dacf0a15f254c9d68390fdb9069e474d9db0ba5d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..89522ed21f584a0e58021568e1ee9635ca7463f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +that: I, Laura A. Menninger, declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and under penalty of perjury + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +X + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +- 1. I am counsel for defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in Doe v. Indyke, etal., No. 20-CV-00484-JGK (S.D.N.Y.). I am personally familiar with the costs incurred in connection with the litigation. +- 2. I am submitting this Declaration in support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs and application for an award of costs against Jane Doe C'Plaintiff") in this action. +- 3. On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2). Dkt. 91. Ms. Maxwell responded on January 29 (Dkt. 93), and further litigation regarding the dismissal occurred over the succeeding months. + +4. On March 8, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order which determined, inter alia, that granted the dismissal with prejudice subject to certain conditions. Dkt. 98. Among the conditions were that Ms. Maxwell is permitted to seek her costs related to this action from Plaintiff. Id. at 7. The parties accepted the Court's conditions and on March 19, this Court issued an Order dismissing the case and ordering the conditions. Dkt. 102. + +5. This Court determined that Ms. Maxwell is the "prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d). Dkt. 98 at 5. Accordingly she is entitled "under Rule 54(d), (to] 'costs-other than attorney's fees." Id. (quoting Rule 54(d)). + +6. Because discovery was stayed in the case by Magistrate Judge Freeman, the costs were in fact de minimis. Nevertheless, Ms. Maxwell exercises her right to recovery of those costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). + +7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1923, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to Docket Fees for discontinuance of a civil action in the amount of \$5. + +8. Additionally, Ms. Maxwell incurred \$8.70 in search and printing costs from PACER associated with this case. + +9. The total costs sought by Ms. Maxwell therefore is \$13.70. + +10. The Bill of Costs attached to the Notice and its exhibits evidence the costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in defense of this action. + +11. Each of the costs claimed are allowed by law, specifically Local Civil Rule 54.1. Each are correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. + +I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. + +Executed on Dated: May II. 2021. + +5/Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fceb864b53b715cfec6a3df7be6bc356db05832a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752485/EFTA02752485.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752485", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "8cec5f4b19f83d43464fde5ed9315be04cdde43c5af3f2d580da4f9e652dc5fe", + "output_sha256": "8cec5f4b19f83d43464fde5ed9315be04cdde43c5af3f2d580da4f9e652dc5fe", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cb1aed535462128758663d52b694d18eef7a2318 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +- against - + +DARREN K. INDYKE, ET AL., + +Defendants. + +USDS SDNY DOCUMENT El EC'i "CONICALLY FILED I DOC #: DATE FILED: -- + +20-cv-484 (JGK) + +ORDER + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell may refile her bill of costs by June 2, 2021. + +On March 22, 2021, judgment was entered dismissing the case on the plaintiff's motion. ECF No. 103. On April 21, 2021, Ms. Maxwell filed a bill of costs that was rejected by the Clerk for failure to comply with technical filing requirements under the Court's Local Rules. ECF No. 104. Ms. Maxwell refiled a bill of costs on May 11, 2021, but this filing was untimely. ECF No. 105. + +Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party. . . . The clerk may tax costs on 14 days' notice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Local Civil Rule 54.1(a) provides, in part, that "[w]ithin thirty (30) days after the entry of final judgment, . . . unless this period is + +extended by the Court for good cause shown, any party seeking to recover costs shall file with the Clerk anotice of taxation of costs by Electronic Case Filing . . . indicating the date and time of taxation which shall comply with the notice period prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and annexing abill of costs. . . . Any party failing to file anotice of taxation of costs within the applicable thirty (30) day period will be deemed to have waived costs." + +"The decision to award costs to a prevailing party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) rests within the sound discretion of the district court. The directive in Local Rule 54.1 does not purport to interfere with that discretion." Caravalho v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-4174, 2018 WL 5312886, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (allowing bill of costs to be filed one day late); see also {sup}`V`-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp. SpA, No. 01-cv-610, 2003 WL 21403326, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) ("[Fjinal judgment was entered on March 18, 2003 and Salomon defendants moved for costs on January 16, 2003 under the assumption that the stipulation of discontinuance entered December 16, 2003 constituted afinal judgment. Although the bill of costs was filed prematurely, {sup}`I` find good cause shown, given the confusion over whether the stipulation constituted afinal judgment, and no prejudice to plaintiff to enlarge the time to submit abill of costs."). + +In this case, good cause is shown because the plaintiff originally timely filed the bill of costs, but the bill of costs was rejected by the Clerk's office for failure to comply with the Local Rules. There is no significant prejudice to the plaintiff to allow for abrief extension to refile the bill of costs in compliance with the Local Rules. Therefore, III refile the bill of costs by June 2, 2021. She should consult with the Clerk's Office to assure that the form is correct + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York May 26, 2021 + +John G. Koeltl + +United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f35ae8661cde3ba1e6aeed0eac64c554948a6cf --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752488/EFTA02752488.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -8, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752488", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 1, + "fix_ids": "[\"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "5377aa660c5b25f70617cea0e2af159a3715fd4e1b4b5f1b8db9e3564993fbaa", + "output_sha256": "5b556ee9db0060e286eebbc7ca198d96186331aed8342fe0247701b7ad30fa0d", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eaff979aca3d135205ba9a7ccb6135037e2becf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.md @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +JANE DOE + +Case No.: 20-CV-00484-JGK + +DARREN K. INDYKE et al. + +### BILL OF COSTS + +Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on 03/2212021 against Plaintiff Date + +the Clerk is requested to tax the following as costs: + +Fees of the Clerk + +Fees for service of summons and subpoena + +Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Fees and disbursements for printing + +Fees for witnesses (itemize an page two) 0.00 + +Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case + +Docket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923 5.00 + +Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals + +Compensation of court-appointed experts + +Compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. 1828 + +Other costs (phase itemize) 8.70 + +> TOTAL 13.70 + +SPECIAL NOTE: Attach to your bill an itemization and documentation for requested costs in all categories. + +### Declaration + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this bill has been served on all parties in the following manner: + +Electronic service First class mail, postage prepaid + +Other: + +si Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +Name of Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + +For: Ghislaine Maxwell Date: 05/27/2021 Name of Claiming Para + +## Taxation of Costs + +### Witness Fees (computation. cf. 28 US.C. 1821 for statutor,• fees) + +| | A'ITENDANCE Total | SUBSISTENCE | Total | MILEAGE Total | Total Cost Each Witness | +| ------ | ------------------- | ------------- | ------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------- | +| Days | Cost | | | | | +| | | Days | Cost | | | +| | | | | Miles Cost | \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 | +| | | | | TOTAI. | \$0.00 | + +### NOTICE + +Section 1924,111k 28, US. Code (effective September I, 1948) provides: + +-Sec. 1924. Verification of bill of costs." + +"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." + +See also Section 1920 of Title 28. which reads in part as follows: + +"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and. upon allowance. included in the judgment or decree." + +The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions: + +RULE 54(d)(1) + +Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. + +Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 day's notice. On motion served within the next 7 days. the court may review the clerk's action. + +### RULE 6 + +«I) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. + +When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under Rule5(b)(2)(C).(U).(E). or (F). 3 days are i ! after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). + +RILE 58(e) + +Cost or Fee Awards: + +Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed. nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. But if a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2). the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59 + +### Detailed Transaction Report by Date + +All from 07/01/2020 to 09/30/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:29:49 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back I New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_2_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| 07/07/2020 | 15:44:57 | 7 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.70 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ---------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------- | +| 07/07/2020 | 15:48:01 | 10 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | IMAGE9-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 9-0 | \$1.00 | + +![](_page_2_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +| 07/08/2020 | 14:16:40 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE51-O | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 51-O | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:20:40 | 1 | WAWDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: [REDACTED] | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:50:43 | 8 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.80 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_4_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| 08/10/2020 | 16:55:23 | 9 | NYSDC | | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_4_Picture_17.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ------- | +| 08/13/2020 | 23:42:45 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: +INDYKE FIRST +NAME: DARREN | \$010 | + +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:06 | 10 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.00 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:15 | 4 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | IMAGE68-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 68-0 | \$0.40 | + +#### Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 10/01/2020 to 12/31/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:33:36 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +IT Back 1 New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | +| | | | | | | + +![](_page_6_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| 10/21/2020 | 16:32:28 | 12 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_6_Picture_14.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_7_Picture_17.jpeg) + +| 11/08/2020 | 14:37:47 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/08/2020 | 14:40:15 | 3 | NYSDC | | HISTORY/DOCUM | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.30 | + +![](_page_7_Picture_19.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/09/2020 | 19:02:30 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | + +![](_page_8_Picture_6.jpeg) + +![](_page_9_Picture_12.jpeg) + +12/22/2020 1202.34 2 NYSDC MAXWELL • IMAGE88.0 120•CV• \$020 + +00484-MK-DCF DOCUMENT 88.0 + +![](_page_9_Picture_20.jpeg) + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 01/01/2021 to 03/11/2021 + +Thu Mar 1112:36:07 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +Back J New Search + +### Billing Transactions + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_10_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_11_Picture_18.jpeg) + +| 02/05/2021 | 11:49:32 | 2 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE95-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 95-0 | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_11_Picture_20.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Pages | Court | Client Code | Description | Search | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------- | ------------- | ------------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_12_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 03/09/2021 | 09:28:48 | 13 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | Docket Report | 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.30 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | -------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | -------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_12_Picture_8.jpeg) + +PACER FAQ + +Back 1 New Search + +Ibis site is maintained by the AdministrativeOffice of The U S. Coin% cc behalf of the Federal Judiciary. + +Privacy & Security Contact Us + +PACER Service Center (800) 676-6856 pacer@psc.uscourts.gov \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9a1d1e13fd2d0d8c1f652b31fd7041b49e4ba9cd --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752491/EFTA02752491.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -647, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752491", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 111, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "091b77473df3773ed7fd598e617b8fcff0afdd2ddf16ddd126f21d6ccd0a176e", + "output_sha256": "fcb5f8c6593fb5551161ca63024035116f3f3d6b544a6c74513932dbc5b0e85b", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..43794f2a5899dfb60327885460bb4c9437f66d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARKEN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGHT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs, the exhibits annexed thereto, the Affidavit of Laura A. Menninger dated May 27, 2021, and all other pleadings and proceedings herein, the Defendant will move this Court before the Orders and Judgment Clerk, at the United States Courthouse for the Southern District of New York, located at 500 Pearl Street, Room 250, New York, NY 10007 on June 11, 2021 at 11:30 am, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at a time and date to be determined as convenient for the Court, for an order pursuant to Rule 54 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., Local Civil Rule 54.1, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923, granting fees and costs sought by Ms. Maxwell and granting such other relief that this Court deems proper. + +Dated: May 27, 2021 New York, New York Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menlo (US . + +HADDON, AND P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on May 27, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff' on with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34954680ac409c2703d3e40829a1113f9d1f4ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752504/EFTA02752504.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752504", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "e588847e25fad53b8f050564b7c34eaa47570ca3c7e0e6c39c63f664168465ba", + "output_sha256": "e588847e25fad53b8f050564b7c34eaa47570ca3c7e0e6c39c63f664168465ba", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3cef8bb17b422eb00c45d0ab90c64389311cacd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +x + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +X + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +## GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MEMORANDUM OF LAWN SUPPORT OF HER APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGHT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +Laura A. Mennin er HADDON, AND 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 303.831.7364 P.C. + +On March 19, 2021, this Court dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice, based on her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As the prevailing party in this matter, Ms. Maxwell hereby requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), an order awarding her taxable costs against plaintiff Jane Doe. + +Rule 54(dX1) provides that luInless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Ctr. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. 16-CV-3936-MKB-RER, 2018 WL 1583971, at ■14 **(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes 'an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata."' Caner, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted); accord Feb. 12, 2021, Opinion and Order, DE 118; accord Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. al, Case No. 20-cv-484 (JGK), DE 98 at 5 (addressing identical Rule 41(a)(2) motion and holding "Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)").** + +An award of costs under Rule 54 is the "normal rule," and "the losing party has the burden to show that costs should not be imposed." Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Harris v. , No. 08-CV-1703 MKB, 2013 WL 632247, at \*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013). Once "the prevailing party demonstrates the amount of its costs and that they fall within an allowable category of taxable costs, see Local Rule 54.1(a), that party enjoys a presumption that its costs will be awarded." Equal Employment Opportunity Commit v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 3d 199, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. McCarron, No. 99-cv-11078 (RCC), 2005 WL 735954, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005). + +Annexed hereto is Ms. Maxwell's Bill of Costs, including the Affidavit of Laura Menninger and exhibits, in the form required by Local Civil Rule 54.1 and including only those taxable costs prescribed by the rule.' As the prevailing party, Ms. Maxwell is presumptively entitled to an award of cost, and plaintiff is unable to meet her burden to demonstrate why costs should not be imposed. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay her costs in the amount detailed in the attached. + +WHEREFORE, Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell requests an award of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) as the prevailing party in this action. + +Ms. Maxwell seeks herein only her costs and expressly reserves her right to seek attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action in future litigation either against plaintiff (e.g., as claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), against the Estate of Epstein (under an indemnification theory), or both. See Opinion and Order of Feb. 10, 2021 at 5 (DE 118); accord Opinion and Order of Mar. 9, 2021, Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. al, 20-cv-484 (JOK), at 5 (Dkt. 98) (striking language from proposed Rule 41(aX2) dismissal relating to each party paying their own fees and costs to preserve right to seek attorneys' fees from this litigation in potential future litigation for claims including the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). + +Dated: May 27. 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mer,enninger (US . HADDON, AND P.C. 150 East 10 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +## Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on May 27, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Ghislaine Maxwell's Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover@troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f52195b9afcd86d90ce95b61675928098d97d9a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752507/EFTA02752507.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752507", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "49dc0d120f2814900f2215c8ebc9f72ad0b534db33d9ab2013851cdf5f95f7c3", + "output_sha256": "49dc0d120f2814900f2215c8ebc9f72ad0b534db33d9ab2013851cdf5f95f7c3", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7acde27059329f0f831e1b5b865892a68b3d843d --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +X + +JANE DOE, + +Plaintiff, + +v. + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + +Defendants. + +that: I, Laura A. Menninger, declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and under penalty of perjury + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +X + +## AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +- 1. I am counsel for defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell in Doe v. Indyke, etal., No. 20-CV-00484-JGK (S.D.N.Y.). I am personally familiar with the costs incurred in connection with the litigation. +- 2. I am submitting this Declaration in support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs and application for an award of costs against Jane Doe ("Plaintiff") in this action. +- 3. On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2). Dkt. 91. Ms. Maxwell responded on January 29 (Dkt. 93), and further litigation regarding the dismissal occurred over the succeeding months. + +4. On March 8, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order which determined, inter alia, that granted the dismissal with prejudice subject to certain conditions. Dkt. 98. Among the conditions were that Ms. Maxwell is permitted to seek her costs related to this action from Plaintiff. Id. at 7. The parties accepted the Court's conditions and on March 19, this Court issued an Order dismissing the case and ordering the conditions. Dkt. 102. + +5. This Court determined that Ms. Maxwell is the "prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d). Dkt. 98 at 5. Accordingly she is entitled "under Rule 54(d), [to] 'costs-other than attorney's fees." Id. (quoting Rule 54(d)). + +6. Because discovery was stayed in the case by Magistrate Judge Freeman, the costs were in fact de minimis. Nevertheless, Ms. Maxwell exercises her right to recovery of those costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). + +7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1923, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to Docket Fees for discontinuance of a civil action in the amount of \$5. + +8. Additionally, Ms. Maxwell incurred \$8.70 in search and printing costs from PACER associated with this case. + +9. The total costs sought by Ms. Maxwell therefore is \$13.70. + +10. The Bill of Costs attached to the Notice and its exhibits evidence the costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in defense of this action. + +11. Each of the costs claimed are allowed by law, specifically Local Civil Rule 54.1. Each are correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. + +I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. + +Executed on Dated: May 27. 2021. + +s/Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Menninger \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..61394228f1228262972c1ec896b64c3eaccad2f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752511/EFTA02752511.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752511", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d38cd09c1b508eaee68649694cdd8049cd21185c4e500077ac72d8f937de37ca", + "output_sha256": "d38cd09c1b508eaee68649694cdd8049cd21185c4e500077ac72d8f937de37ca", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..60ec837132d23e629aa98c267ad7ed223b846cd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +June 10, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Inelyke, e at, 1:20-cv-000,18,1-JOK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Plaintiff Jane Doe is in receipt of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Taxation of Costs which is seeking \$13.70 from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 109). As this Court knows, after Ms. Maxwell moved the Court to stay this case, the parties reached a global settlement agreement in which one of the conditions was that Plaintiff had to dismiss this case with prejudice against the Releasees to that agreement which included Ms. Maxwell and the Epstein Estate (which, of course, is what typically happens after a case gets settled). In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff disputes that Ms. Maxwell could be considered the prevailing party and entitled to reimbursement of costs. Nonetheless, if the Court is inclined to grant Ms. Maxwell's request that Plaintiff send her \$13.70 that is what Plaintiff will do. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..492f2cf432ea0ef753260dda673cd196b153be5a --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752514/EFTA02752514.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752514", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "0a4990c2c76dc1e781da2c9bc6575a372618ba64a596235ddd4202df1ef42d85", + "output_sha256": "0a4990c2c76dc1e781da2c9bc6575a372618ba64a596235ddd4202df1ef42d85", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b75989da7126d8ed946371b2c32ed28f97e4996 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.md @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +for the + +Southern District of New York + +JANE DOE + + +DARREN K. INDYKE et al. + + +Case No.: 20-CV-00484-JGK + +## BILL OF COSTS + +Judgment having been entered in the above entitled action on 03/22/2021 against Plaintiff , +Date + +the Clerk is requested to tax the following as costs: + +| Fees of the Clerk ..... | \$ | +| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | +| Fees for service of summons and subpoena ..... | | +| Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case ..... | | +| Fees and disbursements for printing ..... | | +| Fees for witnesses (itemize on page two) ..... | 0.00 | +| Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case. .... | | +| Docket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923 ..... | 5.00 | +| Costs as shown on Mandate of Court of Appeals ..... | | +| Compensation of court-appointed experts ..... | | +| Compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. 1828 ..... | | +| Other costs (please itemize) ..... | 8.70 | +| Docket of Submission, OBTECTIVES PRINTED, EMPLOYEE BE DEFINED
BY PHONE PLAYERS' DISPAZES FROM MR. MANUSEE COULD PAY
COSTS SHOWN FOR PLAN. CON PRINT V. ETC., ETC. SIX OBTECTIONS
SPECIAL NOTE: Attach to your bill an itemization and documentation for requested costs in all categories. | TOTAL \$ 0 13.70 | + +### Declaration + +I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this bill has been served on all parties in the following manner: + + Electronic service                      First class mail, postage prepaid + Other: \_\_\_\_\_ + s/ Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + Name of Attorney: Laura A. Menninger + For: Ghislaine Maxwell Date: 05/27/2021 +Name of Claiming Party + +### Taxation of Costs + +Costs are taxed in the amount of \$ 0 and included in the judgment. + +RUBY J. KROJIEC By: [Signature] Deputy Clerk 6/11/2021 +Clerk of Court Date + +# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT + +#### NOTICE + +Section 1924, Title 28, U.S. Code (effective September I, 1948) provides: + +"Sec. 1924. Verification of bill of costs." + +"Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." + +See also Section 1920 of Title 28, which reads in part as follows: + +"A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree." + +The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions: + +RULE 54(d)(1) + +Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. + +Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. Rut costs against the United States, its officers. and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 day's notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the court may review the clerk's action. + +RULE 6 + +(d) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. + +When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under Rule5(b)(2KC), (D). (E), or (F). 3 days arc added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a). + +RULE 58(e) + +Cost or Fee Awards: + +Ordinarily, the entry ofjudgment may not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. Rut if a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2). the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Ruk of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59. + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GIIISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + + +20-cv-00484-JGK + +#### DEFENDANT GIIISLAINE MAXWELL'S NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGHT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs, the exhibits annexed thereto, the Affidavit of Laura A. Menninger dated May 27, 2021, and all other pleadings and proceedings herein, the Defendant will move this Court before the Orders and Judgment Clerk, at the United States Courthouse for the Southern District of New York, located at 500 Pearl Street, Room 250, New York, NY 10007 on June 11, 2021 at 11:30 am, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at a time and date to be determined as convenient for the Court, for an order pursuant to Rule 54 of the Fed. R. Civ. P., Local Civil Rule 54.1, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923, granting fees and costs sought by Ms. Maxwell and granting such other relief that this Court deems proper. + +Dated: May 27, 2021 New York, New York Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. Mer.ier (LM-1374) + +HADDON, ANDS P.C. + +150 East 10 Avenue + +Denver, CO 80203 + +Phone: 303.831.7364 + +Fax: 303.832.2628 + +Imcnninger®hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + +I certify that on May 27, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff on with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle®psblaw.com glassman®psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover®troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe@troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 mo I Iy.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole + +## BILLING HISTORY + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date + +All from 07/01/2020 to 09/30/2020 + +Thu Mar 111a29:49 CST 2021 ftlenribtger34444 + +| Billing Transaction | | | | | | | | +| --------------------- | ------ | ------- | ------- | ----- | ----------- | ------ | ------ | +| Date | Time | Pages | Start | End | Start/End | Send | Fail | + +![](_page_5_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| 07/07/2020 | 15:44:57 | 7 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.70 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ---------------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 07/07/2020 | 15:48:01 | 10 | NYSDC | MAXWELL - [REDACTED] | IMAGE9-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF +DOCUMENT 9-0 | \$1.00 | + +![](_page_5_Picture_15.jpeg) + +| Contents | File Name | Pages | Time | URL | Date of Use | Status | Credit | +| ---------- | ----------- | ------- | ------ | ----- | ------------- | -------- | -------- | + +| 07/08/2020 | 14:16:40 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE51-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 51-0 | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | 17:20:40 | 1 | WAWDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: [REDACTED] | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +| 07/09/2020 | I | 17:50:43 | | | | | | | +| ------------ | --- | ---------- | --- | ------- | ----------- | -------- | ------------ | ------- | +| | | | 8 | NYSOC | I MAXWELL | DOCKET | 1:20 CV. | \$aw) | +| | | | | | | RIPON! | 00484.1GK | | + +3/11/2021 PACER Billing Mislay + +| Core | Time | Pages | Cons | Alerts | Succession | Control | Cont | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------ | -------- | ------------ | --------- | ------ | + +![](_page_7_Picture_4.jpeg) + +| 08/10/2020 | 16:55:23 | 9 | NYSDC | | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.90 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_7_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 3/11/2021 | | | | | | | | | PACER: Billing History | | +| ----------- | ------ | ------- | ----- | ------ | --------- | ------------ | ---------- | ------------ | ------------------------ | -- | +| Date | Time | Pages | Len | Dist | Program | Start Date | End Date | Start Date | End Date | | +|
| | | | | | | | | | | + +![](_page_8_Picture_4.jpeg) + +| 08/13/2020 | 23:42:45 | 1 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | SEARCH | LAST NAME: INDYKE FIRST NAME: DARREN | \$0.10 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_8_Picture_6.jpeg) + +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:06 | 10 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.00 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- | +| 08/17/2020 | 10:52:15 | 4 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | IMAGE68-0 | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF DOCUMENT 68-0 | \$0.40 | + +![](_page_8_Picture_8.jpeg) + +## BILLING HISTORY + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court I rom 10/01/2020 to 12/31/2020 + +Thu Mar 1112:33:36 CST 2021 Mennbagar34444 + +| Billing Transaction | | | | | | | | | +| --------------------- | ------ | ------- | ----- | ------------ | ---------- | ----- | ------ | -- | +| Date | Time | Fages | Sum | Total Cost | Cost per | Sum | Cost | | +| | | | | | | | | | + +![](_page_9_Picture_12.jpeg) + +| 10/21/2020 | 16:32:28 | 12 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | DOCKET REPORT | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | ---- | ------- | --------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_9_Picture_14.jpeg) + +#### 3/11/2021 PACER Billing History + +| Date | Time | Figure | Scale | Length | Position | Status | Cust | +| ------ | ------ | -------- | ------- | -------- | ---------- | -------- | ------ | + +![](_page_10_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| 11/08/2020 | 14:37:47 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | -- | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/08/2020 | 14:40:15 | 3 | NYSDC | | HISTORY/DOCUM | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.30 | + +![](_page_10_Picture_9.jpeg) + +| Date | Time | Page | Page No. | Security Level | Security | Code | | +| ------------ | ---------- | ------ | ---------- | ---------------- | ------------ | ----------------------- | -------- | +| 11/09/2020 | 19:02:30 | 2 | NYSDC | | PARTY LIST | 1:20-CV-00484-JGK-DCF | \$0.20 | + +![](_page_11_Picture_4.jpeg) + +![](_page_12_Picture_5.jpeg) + +12/22/2020 12:02:34 2 NYSDC MAXWELL • IMAGE138-0 1:20•CV- 10.20 00484.1GN-DCF DOCUMENT 88.0 + +![](_page_12_Picture_13.jpeg) + +| | | +| --------------- | --------------- | +| | | + +### BILLING HISTORY + +Thu Mar 1112:36:07 CST 2021 Menninger34444 + +| Billing Transaction | | | | | | | | | +| --------------------- | ------ | ------- | ------ | ------------- | -------- | --------- | ------ | -- | +| Date | Time | Pages | Cost | Description | Amount | Summary | Cost | | +| | | | | | | | | | + +![](_page_13_Picture_12.jpeg) + +Detailed Transaction Report by Date New York Southern District Court from 01/01/2021 to 03/U/2021 + +3/11/2021 PACER: Billing History + +| Unit | Have | Pages | Mode | Section | Interval | Speak | Cost | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------ | --------- | ---------- | ------- | ------ | + +![](_page_14_Picture_7.jpeg) + +| 02/05/2021 | 11:49:32 | 2 | NYSDC | MAXWELL | IMAGE95-0 | 120-CV-00484-JGK-DCF +DOCUMENT 95-0 | \$0.20 | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | --------------------------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | --- | ------- | --------- | ----------- | --------------------------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_14_Picture_9.jpeg) + +| Drug | Time | Faced | Card | Control | Enclosure | Contact | Coat | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------ | --------- | ----------- | --------- | ------ | +| ------ | ------ | ------- | ------ | --------- | ----------- | --------- | ------ | + +![](_page_15_Picture_23.jpeg) + +| 03/09/2021 | 09:28:48 | | 13 | NYSDC | [REDACTED] | Docket Report | 1:20-cv-00484-JGK-DCF | \$1.30 | +| ------------ | ---------- | -- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | +| ------------ | ---------- | -- | ---- | ------- | ------------ | --------------- | ----------------------- | -------- | + +![](_page_15_Picture_25.jpeg) + + + +PACER FAQ + +Privacy & Security + +Contact Us + +This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. + +**PACER Service Center** + (800) 676-6856 + pacer@psc.uscourts.gov + +### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + + + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + + +20-ev-00484-JGK + +#### AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE MAXWELL'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +I, Laura A. Menninger, declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and under penalty of perjury that: + +- I. I am counsel for defendant. Ghislaine Maxwell in Doe v. Indyke, el al., No. 20-CV-00484-JGK (S.D.N.Y.). I am personally familiar with the costs incurred in connection with the litigation. +- 2. I am submitting this Declaration in support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Bill of Costs and application for an award of costs against Jane Doe ("Plaintiff") in this action. +- 3. On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(aX2). Dkt. 91. Ms. Maxwell responded on January 29 (Dkt. 93), and further litigation regarding the dismissal occurred over the succeeding months. + +4. On March 8, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order which determined, infer cilia, that granted the dismissal with prejudice subject to certain conditions. Dkt. 98. Among the conditions were that Ms. Maxwell is permitted to seek her costs related to this action from Plaintiff. Id. at 7. The parties accepted the Court's conditions and on March 19, this Court issued an Order dismissing the case and ordering the conditions. Dkt. 102. + +5. This Court determined that Ms. Maxwell is the "prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d). Dkt. 98 at 5. Accordingly she is entitled "under Rule 54(d), [to] 'costs-other than attorney's fees." Id. (quoting Rule 54(d)). + +6. Because discovery was stayed in the case by Magistrate Judge Freeman, the costs were in fact de minimis. Nevertheless, Ms. Maxwell exercises her right to recovery of those costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). + +7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1923, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to Docket Fees for discontinuance of a civil action in the amount of \$5. + +8. Additionally, Ms. Maxwell incurred \$8.70 in search and printing costs from PACER associated with this case. + +9. The total costs sought by Ms. Maxwell therefore is \$13.70. + +10. The Bill of Costs attached to the Notice and its exhibits evidence the costs incurred by Ms. Maxwell in defense of this action. + +I I. Each of the costs claimed are allowed by law, specifically Local Civil Rule 54.1. Each are correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. + +I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. + +Executed on Dated: May 27. 2021. + +.c/ Laura A. :Vienna:ger + +Laura A. Henninger + +#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + + + + + +DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacities as executors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, an individual, + + + +20-cv-00484-.1GK + +### GIIISLAINE MAXWELL'S MEMORANDUM OF LAWIN SUPPORT OF I I ER APPLICATION FOR COSTS SOUGIIT AGAINST PLAINTIFF + +Laura A. Menriii er HADDON, AND 150 East 10=e Denver, CO 80203 303.831.7364 , P.C. + +On March 19, 2021, this Court dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice, based on her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As the prevailing party in this matter, Ms. Maxwell hereby requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(I), an order awarding her taxable costs against plaintiffJane Doe. + +Rule 54(d)( ) provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)( I ). "Courts consistently have found defendants to be prevailing parties where the action against them was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice." Cir. for Discovery, Inc. v. D.P., No. I6-CV-3936-MKB-RER, 2018 WL 1583971, at \*14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018); see Beer v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("All circuit courts to have directly addressed this issue have concluded that a defendant [who has obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice] is a prevailing party, or alternatively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant."); see also Carter v. Inc. Vi!!. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." (citations omitted)). "A voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice [is considered to materially alter the relationship of the parties], because it constitutes an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.'" Carter, 759 F.3d at 165 (citation omitted); accord Feb. 12, 2021, Opinion and Order, DE 118; accord Jane Doe v. Darren K lndyke a. al, Case No. 20-cv-484 (JOK), DE 98 at 5 (addressing identical Rule 41(a)(2) motion and holding "Ms. Maxwell is correct that under Second Circuit law, she is the prevailing party for the purposes of Rule 54(d)"). + +An award of costs under Rule 54 is the "normal rule," and "the losing party has the burden to show that costs should not be imposed." Torcivia v. Suffolk Cty., 437 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Harris v. No. 08-CV-1703 MKB, 2013 WL 632247, at • I (E.D.N.Y. Fcb. 20, 2013). Once "the prevailing party demonstrates the amount of its costs and that they fall within an allowable category of taxable costs, see Local Rule 54.1(a), that party enjoys a presumption that its costs will be awarded." Equal Employment Opportunity Commit: v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 3d 199, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. McCarron. No. 99-cv-1 1078 (RCC), 2005 WL 735954, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005). + +Annexed hereto is Ms. Maxwell's Bill of Costs. including the Affidavit of Laura Menninger and cxhibits, in the form required by Local Civil Rule 54.1 and including only those taxable costs prescribed by the rule.' As the prevailing party, Ms. Maxwell is presumptively entitled to an award of cost, and plaintiff is unable to meet her burden to demonstrate why costs should not be imposed. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay her costs in the amount detailed in the attached. + +WHEREFORE, Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell requests an award of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) as the prevailing party in this action. + +Ms. Maxwell seeks herein only her costs and expressly reserves her right to seek attorneys' fees incurred in defense of this action in future litigation either against plaintiff (e.g., as claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), against the Estate of Epstein (under an indemnification theory), or both. See Opinion and Order of Feb. 10, 2021 at 5 (DE 118); accord Opinion and Order of Mar. 9, 2021, Jane Doe v. Darren K. Indyke et. a!, 20-cv-484 (JGK), at 5 (Dkt. 98) (striking language from proposed Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal relating to each party paying their own fees and costs to preserve right to seek attorneys' fees from this litigation in potential future litigation for claims including the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution). + +Dated: May 27, 2021 + +Respectfully submitted, + +s/ Laura A. Menninger + +Laura A. MenOier (LM-1374 HADDON, ANDS, P.C. 150 East 10 Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: 303.831.7364 Fax: 303.832.2628 Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell + +### Certificate of Service + +I hereby certify that on May 27, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing Ghislaine Maxwell's Memorandum of Law In Support of Her Application for Costs Sought Against Plaintiff with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following: + +Kevin Boyle Robert Glassman Panish, Shea & Boyle 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025 boyle@psblaw.com glassman@psblaw.com + +Bennet J. Moskowitz Charles L. Glover Mary W. Metcalfe Troutman Pepper 875 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 bennet.moskowitz@troutman.com charles.glover®troutman.com marygrace.metcalfe®troutman.com Sanders LLP + +Molly S. DiRago Troutman Pepper Sanders LLP 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900 Chicago, IL 60606 molly.dirago@troutman.com + +s/ Nicole + +# PANISH SHEA & BOYLE 1 1' + +June 10. 2021 + +#### VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000,I84-.IGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +PlaintiffJane Doe is in receipt of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Notice of Taxation of Costs which is seeking \$13.70 from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 109). As this Court knows, after Ms. Maxwell moved the Court to stay this case, the parties reached a global settlement agreement in which one of the conditions was that Plaintiff had to dismiss this case with prejudice against the Releasees to that agreement which included Ms. Maxwell and the Epstein Estate (which, of course, is what typically happens after a case gets settled). In light of the foregoing. Plaintiff disputes that Ms. Maxwell could be considered the prevailing party and entitled to reimbursement of costs. Nonetheless, if the Court is inclined to grant Ms. Maxwell's request that Plaintiff send her \$13.70 that is what Plaintiff will do. + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +Is/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8ee118489beb16c82bd4334fe63c70830111a680 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752515/EFTA02752515.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -3924, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752515", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 183, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.table-boundary-padding\", \"epstein_legal.flight-log-tables.normalize\", \"epstein_legal.redaction-normalization.block-characters\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\", \"swarm.running-headers\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "d1d52bfd77df0fc143b6f6d2a1b2f7fe02d66bfc4b06beaa219bb18c1b4e1ee2", + "output_sha256": "65f8e5bd11734e3129173eda5e7878cd2b1dacc4fac5204bffa6cb118cf1a295", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b416e74757f1049299058114884dc985f09669e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK + +JANE DOE + +Plaintiff, + +- against - + +DARREN I. INDYKE, ET AL. + +Defendants. + +USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC# DATE FILED: \_\_.frjt.•&i + +20 cv 484 (JGK) + +ORDER + +JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: + +Defendant, Ghislane Maxwell, seeks to have her costs in the amount of \$13.70 taxed against the plaintiff because the plaintiff dismissed this action with prejudice against Ms. + +Maxwell. The Clerk declined to tax costs because the plaintiff disputed whether Ms. Maxwell was a prevailing party. This Court previously found that Ms. Maxwell was a prevailing party. See + +ECF No. 98 at 5. By letter dated June 10, 2021, ECF. No. 113, counsel for the plaintiff indicated that if the Court is inclined to grant Ms. Maxwell's request, the plaintiff will send the plaintiff the \$13.70. Because Ms. Maxwell is the prevailing party, the plaintiff should pay the costs in the amount of \$13.70. + +SO ORDERED. + +Dated: New York, New York + +June 16, 2021 (7661,9a John G. Koeltl United States District Judge \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d28cd11d4d6e03fdc8bce9bb7e3a754e43f3c67 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752539/EFTA02752539.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752539", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "f335556dcf6a3cfb8211a9d5a902c6b3b1b1c0cc6964126ba953f278a4245404", + "output_sha256": "f335556dcf6a3cfb8211a9d5a902c6b3b1b1c0cc6964126ba953f278a4245404", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b10c76660fb46ffa0d17ecbe32264fffba1275b --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +Haddon, and c Laura A. Menninger + +150 Eost 10th Avenue Denver. Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 DC 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenninger@hmflaw.com + +November 22, 2021 + +VIA ECF + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl United States District Court Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et at, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +I write pursuant to this Court's order of dismissal, dated March 19, 2021, granting plaintiff's motion for dismissal with prejudice on the condition that she provide to Ms. Maxwell an authentic, unredacted, and signed copy of the General Release she executed with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (EVCP). Dkt. No. 102. This Court explained that production of the Release was subject to the Order on Plaintiffs' Anonymity and that Ms. Maxwell could not disclose the Release except pursuant to an order of this Court. + +Ms. Maxwell now seeks authorization from this Court to disclose the Release as part of her criminal defense. + +As this Court knows, Ms. Maxwell is facing a multi-count indictment in Case No. 20 cr-330-AJN, which is scheduled to go to trial beginning on November 29, 2021. + +As explained in the briefing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case, and as this Court recognized in granting that motion subject to the condition that plaintiff provide Ms. Maxwell with the Release, Ms. Maxwell's constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation require that she be able to use the Release in her defense of the criminal case. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. The Release is material to her defense, and it shows plaintiff's bias and motive in alleging that Ms. Maxwell was involved in alleged abuse. + +A criminal defendant "states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that (s)he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby + +Hon. John Koeltl November 22, 2021 Page 2 `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (quoting v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, (1974)). "[T]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected ,of cross-examination.' Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (quoting , 415 U.S. at 316-17). At the time this Court ordered plaintiff to disclose the Release, it was unclear whether the government had a copy of the Release as well, such that it would be produced to Ms. Maxwell as Brady material. See Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (witness's "application for victim compensation payments and application for and receipt of emergency victim compensation payments may well have been 'favorable' within the meaning of Brady," requiring government disclosure of exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants). It is now clear the government does not have a copy of the Release, and as the government is keen to remind Ms. Maxwell at every turn, it "is under no obligation to turn over that which it does not have." United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Although Ms. Maxwell has issued a Rule 17(c) subpoena to the EVCP for the Release (as well as other materials), Judge Nathan has not yet ruled on several motions to quash that subpoena, including one filed by plaintiff. + +In order to vindicate her constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation, Ms. Maxwell seeks leave from this Court to use the Release disclosed by plaintiff in the defense of the criminal case pending before Judge Nathan. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +C. Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fad8b70c25f84a7edb7879e47a5380917b980c28 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752540/EFTA02752540.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752540", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "4e9bd2ad350b1977bd2e8cc1282fbca3350be453881937a816fd5c2cbcc185bc", + "output_sha256": "4e9bd2ad350b1977bd2e8cc1282fbca3350be453881937a816fd5c2cbcc185bc", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d8a35bf61a55435ff033316a4c14cc6e24d50dc --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +Haddon, and Re Laura A. Menninger + +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +November 22, 2021 + +VIA ECF + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl United States District Court Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007-1312 + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 rx 303232.2628 www.hmtlaw.com Imenningerehm8aw.com + +A{sup}`t` {sup}`E` ,1443eveg Art f 14a 1, 2 5e2 eidaute, -,A6V6,66,2€ + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF S • 3 • Dear Judge Koeltl: 1/4 W?/ + +I write pursuant to this Court's order of dismissal, dated March 19, 2021, granting plaintiff's motion for dismissal with prejudice on the condition that she provide to Ms. Maxwell an authentic, unredacted, and signed copy of the General Release she executed with the Epstein Victims' Compensation Program (EVCP). Dkt. No. 102. This Court explained that production of the Release was subject to the Order on Plaintiffs' Anonymity and that Ms. Maxwell could not disclose the Release except pursuant to an order of this Court. + +Ms. Maxwell now seeks authorization from this Court to disclose the Release as part of her criminal defense. + +As this Court knows, Ms. Maxwell is facing a multi-count indictment in Case No. 20 cr-330-AJN, which is scheduled to go to trial beginning on November 29, 2021. + +As explained in the briefing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case, and as this Court recognized in granting that motion subject to the condition that plaintiff provide Ms. Maxwell with the Release, Ms. Maxwell's constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation require that she be able to use the Release in her defense of the criminal case. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. The Release is material to her defense, and it shows plaintiff's bias and motive in alleging that Ms. Maxwell was involved in alleged abuse. + +A criminal defendant "states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that (s)he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby + +Hon. John Koeltl +November 22, 2021 +Page 2 + +'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (quoting [REDACTED] v. *Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 318, (1974)). "[T]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." *Olden v. Kentucky*, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (quoting [REDACTED] v. *Alaska*, 415 U.S. at 316-17). + +At the time this Court ordered plaintiff to disclose the Release, it was unclear whether the government had a copy of the Release as well, such that it would be produced to Ms. Maxwell as *Brady* material. *See Moore v. Marr*, 254 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (witness's "application for victim compensation payments and application for and receipt of emergency victim compensation payments may well have been 'favorable' within the meaning of *Brady*," requiring government disclosure of exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants). It is now clear the government *does not* have a copy of the Release, and as the government is keen to remind Ms. Maxwell at every turn, it "is under no obligation to turn over that which it does not have." *United States v. Upton*, 856 F. Supp. 727, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Although Ms. Maxwell has issued a Rule 17(c) subpoena to the EVCP for the Release (as well as other materials), Judge Nathan has not yet ruled on several motions to quash that subpoena, including one filed by plaintiff. + +In order to vindicate her constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation, Ms. Maxwell seeks leave from this Court to use the Release disclosed by plaintiff in the defense of the criminal case pending before Judge Nathan. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dda751f9267f518c4c8e8f8333514b21dd8eb611 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752542/EFTA02752542.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": -13, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752542", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 2, + "fix_ids": "[\"builtin.empty-image\", \"swarm.html-myst-whitelist\"]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "01b9494c0756837bbe1c2ad172dc5d522a230818fe5f0ae66a17cf511f5b47b4", + "output_sha256": "f7842ed7c5977d87f969deb0e8ea365992c688e3f4483813b88d68861c34ae0f", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2ea16626e127507c30815e2df56d95f45e9602fa --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +November 24, 2021 + +## VIA ECF + +Hon. John G. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +Re: Doe v. lodyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +Plaintiff Jane Doe hereby responds to the letter submitted by Ms. Maxwell's defense counsel on November 22, 2021 seeking authorization from this Court to disclose an unredacted copy of the settlement release as part of Ms. Maxwell's criminal defense. As this Court previously stated in its Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 32), "the plaintiff has an understandable interest in maintaining her anonymity, and the Court entered an order to protect it." As a condition of the dismissal of this action, Plaintiff produced to Ms. Maxwell an authentic, unredacted and signed copy of the settlement release. Plaintiffs anonymity, however, would be severely compromised if an unredacted copy of the release were to be used by Ms. Maxwell "as part of her criminal defense." Indeed, nowhere in Ms. Maxwell's letter does she actually state how the unredacted release would be used in her criminal case or which witnesses or persons she would show it to. Accordingly, and contrary to this Court's previous ruling, there is no way of knowing that the unredacted copy of the release will be "used only for a proper purpose." (Id. at 6). Plaintiff is also unaware of what protections are in place, if any, in the criminal case that would maintain her anonymity in the event that an unredacted copy of the release was to be used in some way by Ms. Maxwell. + +Further, it is Plaintiff's understanding that Ms. Maxwell's Rule 17(c) subpoena issued to the EVCP for the settlement release has been granted by Judge Nathan. Accordingly, the matter currently before this Court is moot. + +In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Ms. Maxwell's request allowing her to disclose a copy of the unredacted release. + +![](_page_1_Picture_4.jpeg) + +Hon. John G. Koeltl BOYLE Daniel Moynihan t ip United States Courthouse + +November 24, 2021 Page 2 + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66a408c92c7a7a1f680dde57c229a71d8d2714be --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752544/EFTA02752544.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752544", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "cd5f2dcfefea915ba6a7f24cb132f8350eb98f9ddab05dfca8dd8d4419d93017", + "output_sha256": "cd5f2dcfefea915ba6a7f24cb132f8350eb98f9ddab05dfca8dd8d4419d93017", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f7e34072eb615ea384618a631dc9cea4558fa377 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## PANISH SHEA & BOYLEI + +VIA ECF + +Hon. John O. Koeltl Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 + +November 24, 2021 + +4 Cue-PG--E/CE Gvg't, 9f 0 1d ref./247f Oecea-4L4 .9-0,-.1 'ft °Pe", pin-ie/: (gig) 767 -Lt. 'Pt". 4ccerf corn: Itt0011. if FLO + +S' + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGE-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +tm-o6,40 + +c/(5 1e-e - + +O-9/,,JVc + +PlaintiffJane Doe hereby responds to the letter submitted by Ms. Maxwell's defense counsel on November 22, 2021 seeking authorization from this Court to disclose an unredacted copy of the settlement release as part of Ms. Maxwell's criminal defense. As this Court previously stated in its Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 32), "the plaintiff has an understandable interest in maintaining her anonymity, and the Court entered an order to protect it." Asa condition of the dismissal of this action, Plaintiff produced to Ms. Maxwell an authentic, unredacted and signed copy of the settlement release. Plaintiffs anonymity, however, would be severely compromised if an unredacted copy of the release were to be used by Ms. Maxwell "as part of her criminal defense." Indeed, nowhere in Ms. Maxwell's letter does she actually state how the unredacted release would be used in her criminal case or which witnesses or persons she would show it to. Accordingly, and contrary to this Court's previous ruling, there is no way of knowing that the unredacted copy of the release will be "used only for a proper purpose." (Id. at 6). Plaintiff is also unaware of what protections are in place, if any, in the criminal case that would maintain her anonymity in the event that an unredacted copy of the release was to be used in some way by Ms. Maxwell. + +Further, it is Plaintiff's understanding that Ms. Maxwell's Rule 17(c) subpoena issued to the EVCP for the settlement release has been granted by Judge Nathan. Accordingly, the matter currently before this Court is moot. + +In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Ms. Maxwell's request allowing her to disclose a copy of the unredacted release. + +Hon. John G. Koeltl + +Daniel Moynihan + +United States Courthouse + +November 24, 2021 + +Page 2 + +SHEA & + +BOYLE + +Respectfully submitted, + +PANISH SHEA & BOYLE + +/s/ Robert Glassman + +Robert Glassman + +LLP \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2485fe8b50f1a002d3995effb8e7b60ecd5b027e --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752546/EFTA02752546.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752546", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "e3c3ee96ef68128287c104b88805b7f9ec1821eca3fd2d877bf56726d13ecec6", + "output_sha256": "e3c3ee96ef68128287c104b88805b7f9ec1821eca3fd2d877bf56726d13ecec6", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19c7a04b9d09a94da17da516b0dc5de3a9ac9625 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) + +December 2, 2021 + +VIA ECF + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl United States District Court Daniel Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007-1312 + +Haddon, and P.0 Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 PH 303.831.7364 F X 303.832.2628 www.hmflaw.com Imenningeahmflaw.com + +Re: Doe v. Indyke, et al., 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +I write to withdraw Ms. Maxwell's November 22, 2021 letter request for permission to use the unredacted release in her defense in Case No. 20-cr-330-AJN. Due to developments in the criminal proceeding, that request is now moot. I therefore also request that this Court vacate the status conference presently set for 2:30 p.m. on December 6, 2021. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +••• Q . Laura A. Menninger + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.receipt.json b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.receipt.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3677268a346a54942bada11dec71cdd5c729d347 --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752548/EFTA02752548.receipt.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "byte_delta": 0, + "dataset": "marker2", + "doc_id": "EFTA02752548", + "engine": "marker-pdf-2.0.0+surya-0.22.1", + "event_count": 0, + "fix_ids": "[]", + "idempotent": true, + "input_sha256": "6591fcaedb32c4aa4e3b02f94334fe374f5863b445aa2956e88364e810e817da", + "output_sha256": "6591fcaedb32c4aa4e3b02f94334fe374f5863b445aa2956e88364e810e817da", + "page_markers": false, + "source_id": "marker2-court-doe-v-indyke-00484", + "text_format": "markdown" +} diff --git a/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752549/EFTA02752549.md b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752549/EFTA02752549.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d9d70297416c7341c27ca69cdbc09495831014cb --- /dev/null +++ b/marker2-fixhub/court-doe-v-indyke-00484/EFTA02752549/EFTA02752549.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +![](_page_0_Picture_130.jpeg) + +Haddon, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], p.c +Laura A. Menninger + +150 East 10th Avenue +Denver, Colorado 80203 +PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628 +www.hmflaw.com +lmenninger@hmflaw.com + +December 2, 2021 + +**VIA ECF** + +The Honorable John G. Koeltl +United States District Court +Daniel [REDACTED] Moynihan +United States Courthouse +500 Pearl Street +New York, NY 10007-1312 + +**Re: *Doe v. Indyke, et al.*, 1:20-cv-000484-JGK-DCF** + +Dear Judge Koeltl: + +I write to withdraw Ms. Maxwell's November 22, 2021 letter request for permission to use the unredacted release in her defense in Case No. 20-cr-330-AJN. Due to developments in the criminal proceeding, that request is now moot. I therefore also request that this Court vacate the status conference presently set for 2:30 p.m. on December 6, 2021. + +Respectfully Submitted, + +CC: Counsel of Record via ECF + +*The conference scheduled +for 12/6/21 is Cancelled. +SO ordered. +J. G. 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